1-1-1993

A defense of Immanuel Kant's notion of practical reason

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DEFENSE OF IMMANUEL KANT'S NOTION OF
PRACTICAL REASON

by

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DECEMBER 6, 1993

Submitted to the Committee of Honors of Baruch College of the City University of New York in partial fulfillment for the Undergraduate Degree with Honors in Liberal Arts in Philosophy

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I would like to express my sincere appreciation to my advisor, Dr. Schwarzenbach, for her assistance in this project. I am especially grateful for the content of her instruction and the work ethic she has instilled in me; each of which I am confident will have a significant influence in much of my life.

Julian.

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of my thesis is to gain a better understanding of Immanuel Kant's notion of practical reason. Kant's notion of practical reason is embedded in a moral theory in which he claims to have discovered the supreme principle of morality. The significance of this principle is that it serves universally as a moral standard that will apply equally to everybody. It is this same universal element that has been subjected to strong critiques which have proven difficult to overcome.
Alternatives to Kant's theory are problematic, however. Utilitarian philosophers, like David Hume, claim that moral standards should comply with the principle of utility. According to Hume, that set of rules of action which bring about the general happiness or welfare is best. This theory contains at least two difficulties. The first is that people's ideas of happiness or the general welfare differ. It is, thus, difficult to determine a general standard of happiness or welfare toward which behavioral maxims should strive. The second difficulty is that morality becomes goal or consequence oriented. It thus becomes conceivable that the sacrifice of a minority's happiness would be acceptable in this theory for the good of the whole or the happiness of the majority. For example, a system of slavery might accord with utilitarianism if it can be shown that the happiness of non-slaves vastly outweighs the unhappiness of the slaves. Any such analysis will also bring up the problem of definition as well.

My initial attraction to Kantian theory arose from my dissatisfaction with utilitarian-based ethics. The first difficulty I had with utilitarianism is that it equates the "right" with that which maximizes "the good." For example, the argument that capitalism might be the "supreme" principle governing society is ultimately based on the utilitarian position. The reasoning behind such an argument is that capitalist methods would create the greatest efficiency in all aspects of public life. Thus, theoretically, problems such as discrimination against minorities would not occur for such a practice would in the end be "inefficient." In other words, the "good" of efficiency should (theoretically) determine what is "right." I found such arguments to be completely unsatisfactory; what if practicing discrimination actually turns out to be efficient? Defining the "right" as prior to the good, however, proved to be a very difficult task. I was attracted to Kant because he claims to have found this elusive explanation in his expression of the moral law--what he calls the "categorical imperative."

Hegel, in his critique of Kant, questions Kant's categorical imperative as the test or criterion for moral standards. Hegel seems to believe that the categorical imperative is "impotent" as a test in that any behavior (even obviously immoral behavior) can pass Kant's requirements. Furthermore, Hegel argues that the categorical imperative fails to produce a universal list of moral duties. Hegel attributes these weaknesses to the "formalism" of Kant's principle. In the following, we shall decide whether Hegel's criticisms of Kant's moral principle are valid.

The difficulty with ethical theories is that they exist within the context of a complete philosophical doctrine. Since they attempt to supply us with a type of knowledge (moral knowledge), they rely on the epistemological convictions of the theory's author. For example, Hume holds the empirical view that all knowledge arises from sense experience. Another school of philosophers, the rationalists, believes that true knowledge is found by way of reason or the mind alone. These theories differ and each needs justification. The strength of a moral theory, therefore, depends not only on its moral claims but on those of the epistemological theory on which it rests. Kant constructed his own theory of knowledge for he was not satisfied with those that existed in his time--this he called "the critical philosophy." In the first chapter of this thesis, I will evaluate the relevant aspects of Kant's background, epistemological theory. With these ideas
understood, I can then discuss in the second section what Kant expressly says on the nature of practical reason and afterwards, respond to the famous Hegelian criticism of Kant's ethics. Practical reason, according to Kant, is what directs our choice of action whereas theoretical reason determines our knowledge of objects. In the final section I will focus on what Kant calls the justification of his doctrine. I shall argue that, although not without problems, Kant's ethical theory seems to be the best one around.

CHAPTER 1

THEORETICAL REASON

Critical or pure philosophy, according to Kant, is the study of the *a priori* principles that govern our knowledge. The category of *a priori* knowledge, particularly of *a priori* synthetic knowledge, is controversial, however, and in need of justification. Kant conducts his defense in his *Critique of Pure Reason*. The aim of this critique is not only to justify synthetic *a priori* knowledge but to make an extensive inquiry into all valid types and conditions of rational knowledge. Kant is interested in the relationship between reason and experience. Empiricists claim, for instance, that all knowledge is derived from experience. Based on this view, David Hume, for example, constructs an extremely skeptical view of what humans can know. Hume maintains that knowledge can only consist of sense impressions and their copies which he calls "ideas." Hume then argues that the connections between sense impressions reveal no necessary order (1). For instance, our belief that the sun will rise tomorrow cannot be considered certain; just because the sun rose yesterday and today, it is not necessarily the case that it will rise tomorrow. Hume concludes that what humans take to be necessary is really only the "constant conjunction" of the two events. Habit joins the two together in thought. Thus, although much of our ordinary knowledge involves the idea of necessary connection, Hume insists that such knowledge is "without foundation." By contrast, Kant thinks that much of our ordinary knowledge is beyond doubt and an established fact. The tremendous success of modern science, particularly physics, also argues against Hume's position. Kant must, therefore, construct an alternative epistemological theory.

Kant's first statement in the introduction to his first *Critique* "that all our knowledge begins with experience there can be no doubt..." (2), represents a different epistemology than the empiricist's claim that all knowledge "arises" out of experience. Kant means that knowledge begins with experience in a temporal sense. Kant believes it possible nonetheless that our empirical knowledge could consist of a "compound of that which we receive through impressions and that which our faculty of cognition supplies from itself"(3); that it possesses a non-experiential element. Kant believes further that our reason can isolate in thought the latter contribution by removing everything empirical from it. This kind of pure knowledge Kant terms *a priori*(logically prior to sense experience) while empirical knowledge or knowledge acquired through sense experience is considered *posteriori*. 
According to Kant, if *a priori* knowledge is supplied by the cognitive faculty, it follows that it does not come from and is thus independent of sense experience. Kant is not interested in understanding propositions that are *a priori* in a relative sense. For example, it may be claimed that when the correct key is used, one knows *a priori* that the door will unlock. This proposition is relatively *a priori* for it applies only to this particular experience. It is, therefore, strictly speaking, incorrect to say that "one knows *a priori* that the correct key will unlock the door" for the following reason. Such knowledge of unlocking the door must have been derived from previous experiences and this knowledge is independent only of this particular experience; hence, we are still talking about empirical knowledge. By contrast, true priori knowledge must be independent of all experience. Kant gives the example that "every change has a cause" as being a valid priori proposition (4). He believes not only that this judgment cannot arise out of empirical experience, since we cannot experience every change, but that the principle seems to be applicable to all experience; it is, in fact, an axiom of modern scientific method.

Since the *a priori* propositions which Kant has in mind (such as "every change has a cause") are not contingent on any experience, it follows that they are universal. In other words, if the *a priori* propositions are not relative, they must be universal. Furthermore, for Kant, universality in this sense is strict universality (5) which in turn seems synonymous with necessity. Kant claims that if a proposition is true universally, it is true in all instances, meaning it is necessarily true. Conversely, if a proposition is necessarily true, it is true universally. Therefore, in Kant's view, *a priori* propositions are both necessary and universal. Perhaps this description by two synonymous terms is meant to illuminate two different aspects involved. Whereas universality may denote truth in every instance, necessity may denote the impossibility of exception. Kant also claims, however, that any necessary and universal propositions must be *a priori* (6), though this has yet to be qualified for it does not immediately follow from the preceding analysis.

Before Kant, Hume had already argued that the certainty of necessary and universal relationships can not be empirically proven. For Hume, there are necessary and universal relations between our ideas (like "all circles are round") but these are ultimately analytic definitions and do not necessarily tell us anything about real objects of the world. For example the proposition: "All unicorns have horns" is true but tells us nothing about the world. When it comes to knowledge of experience, however, Hume's claim is that no amount of experience of a repetitively occurring event can be the basis for the deduction of a universal claim. Based on the empirical theory of knowledge, Hume concludes that universal claims like "every event must have a cause" can achieve no certainty. Since we are not able to experience every event, we can not deduce that each has a cause. Hume claims that we make these judgments by means of induction which is ultimately an unjustifiable method.

It is important to note that Kant agrees with Hume regarding the impossibility of empirically deducing universal claims (7). However, Kant does think that it may still be possible to justify universal claims about experience for he does not begin with the empirical view that all knowledge is based on experience. Since universal judgments
cannot be derived empirically or a posteriori, if they exist, they must exist a priori. Therefore, any actual universal and necessary propositions must be a priori. Before addressing the actual existence of a priori knowledge, I must explain the important distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments in Kant. Basically following Hume, Kant argues that judgments can be "analytic" or "synthetic." In analytic judgments, the predicate is already contained in the concept of the subject. An example is "apples are fruit." This judgement is analytic because being a fruit is contained in the concept of an apple; it is part of its definition. In a synthetic judgment, by contrast, the predicate makes an addition to the concept of the subject. An example of this type of judgment is "Those apples are red." This judgment is synthetic because being red is not contained in the concept of an apple (some apples are yellow, etc.). Analytic and synthetic judgments, as well as a priori-a posteriori judgments, are mutually exclusive. If a judgment is not analytic, then it must be synthetic. Either the predicate adds to the subject or it does not. No third alternative is possible. Similarly, if a judgment is not a posteriori, then it must be a priori. Either the knowledge is derived independently of experience or it is not.

Some logical relationships exist between both of the preceding distinctions. In an analytic judgment, there is no need to go beyond the preconceived notion of the subject to attain the predicate. It can, therefore, be formed independently of experience and can accurately be described as a priori. Since analytic judgments can only be a priori, a posteriori judgments must be synthetic. However, it does not logically follow that all synthetic judgments are a posteriori nor that all a priori judgments are analytic. Kant believes that there is a category of synthetic a priori judgments. In fact, it is his theory's most significant (if controversial) epistemological contribution. An example of a synthetic a priori judgment is "every event has a cause." Such a claim is to be distinguished from the judgment that "every effect has a cause." This latter judgment is analytic because having a cause is contained in the concept of an effect. However, having a cause is not contained in the concept of an event. An event is merely something that happens. Thus, the former judgment is "synthetic." Kant claims that it is also known a priori for it is impossible to experience every event. Nonetheless, "that every event has a cause" is a basic principle of modern science which Kant takes as fact.

If one holds the empirical view, that all knowledge arises out of experience, such a category is impossible. For all synthetic judgments contain new knowledge (something added to the subject) and thus, on the empirical view, they can only be known posteriori. Analytic and a priori propositions must also be equivalent on the empirical view. If it is the case that knowledge must be derived from experience then any a priori proposition must be analytic, where there is no addition to the subject. For empiricists, the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments is, therefore, equivalent to the a priori-a posteriori distinction.

Kant, however, claims that synthetic a priori propositions do actually exist and they can be found in the sciences of mathematics and physics. In fact, they seem to form the very basis of such sciences. For Kant, what is at stake here is the very possibility of certainty in knowledge itself. Such depends on the existence of a priori principles. Clearly we
verify truth claims by submitting them to objectively valid principles. True objectivity, for Kant, implies the absence of empirical conditions (8).

According to Kant, all mathematical judgments are synthetic a priori (9). He uses the example of "7 + 5 = 12." Such a judgment is considered a priori because of its necessity. Kant claims that it is synthetic, because it is not analytic. That is, for Kant, to be analytic means that the predicate must either be already contained in or follow logically from the subject. In analytic judgments, the connection between the subject and predicate is thought "through identity" (10). He claims that the proposition "7 + 5 = 12" appears analytic as it accords with the principle of contradiction (11). However, if we look only to the concept of the union of seven and five, Kant claims that the concept of twelve is not arrived at "through identity" or by a purely logical analysis. He claims, instead, that to find the actual sum, we need "to call in the assistance of intuition" (12). What this "assistance of sensuous intuition" entails exactly is unclear to me, however, his description of how we discover the actual sum reveals why he believes mathematical judgments to be synthetic. To find the sum of seven and five, Kant claims we must separate one of the numbers into units and then add them, one by one, to the other. Thus, Kant believes that mathematical problems are solved through a process more complex than logical analysis.

Kant also claims that geometrical judgments are synthetic a priori. He uses the example that "the shortest distance between two points is a straight line" (13). This judgment is synthetic because the conception of a straight line does not already include the notion of the "shortest distance." Nonetheless, this judgment is a necessary proposition in geometry, axiomatic and, therefore, a priori.

Kant claims physics, too, possesses synthetic a priori principles. He claims the proposition: "In all changes in the material world, the quantity of matter remains unchanged" (14), is synthetic for the unchanging quantity of matter is not contained in the conception of a material change. Nonetheless, physics accepts this principle absolutely (or at least did in Kant's day). For Kant, the necessity of the preceding proposition is "clear" (15) while Hume concludes that all universal claims, including those in physics, are unjustifiable. Again, Kant believes that the tremendous successes and unceasing progress in physics and mathematics establish them as fact. In the end, Kant's view is that philosophical theories must conform in the face of these facts, for science will not cease to exist in the face of philosophical theories.

Thus, even if mathematical propositions turn out not to be synthetic a priori, those found in physics are enough to ground the existence of such propositions. Conversely, if mathematics does, in fact, consist of synthetic a priori judgments, Kant's doctrine would seem to be above reproach.

Because Kant is convinced that a priori knowledge is actual, he next seeks to explain how it is possible. He regards the empiricist's view that all knowledge arises out of experience as totally inadequate to explain our a priori knowledge. He also uncovers an assumption on which the empiricist's view is based. "Hitherto it has been assumed that all
our knowledge must conform to objects" (16). If no knowledge can originate from within ourselves, then our mind must passively conform to objects given through our senses. The passivity of the mind, however, can not be empirically proven and is thus, ultimately, an assumption. Since on this assumption we must deny the universality and necessity of scientific and (possibly) mathematical knowledge, Kant suggests an alternative hypothesis; that our minds actively make objects conform to our knowledge. On this hypothesis our a priori knowledge can be explained.

Kant claims his reasoning is analogous to the "Copernican Revolution" in science (17). Copernicus observed that the immediate phenomena of the sun's movement could be explained not only on a geocentric hypothesis but by a heliocentric one as well. In fact, the heliocentric hypothesis became the superior one because it could explain and unify more astronomical phenomena than could the geocentric hypothesis. Similarly, Kant claims that empirical (a posteriori) knowledge can be explained by either Hume's or his own hypothesis. Synthetic a priori knowledge, however, as well as the certainty and progress of the natural sciences, could only be explained on his view knowledge can be explained. Thus, Kant's hypothesis is superior.

In assuming that objects conform to the activity of the mind, Kant does not mean that the mind changes the empirical world. The term "object" in the preceding statement refers to objects of our knowledge: not to objects as they exist independently. According to Kant, the objects that we sense are subjected to a priori conditions in order to become objects of our knowledge. Kant discovers twelve such conditions which he calls the pure concepts of the understanding, or the categories (18).

Though, Kant's hypotheses is meant to account for our various types of ordinary knowledge, it does place at least one new restriction on our knowing; our knowledge becomes limited to objects of our knowledge. At this point, Kant distinguishes between phenomena and noumena. We are unable, he claims, to have knowledge of objects as they exist independently of us as knowing subjects. Our knowledge consists of what is, in part, always supplied by our own minds. To have knowledge of an empirical or "outside" object (phenomenon) necessarily implies a relationship between object and knowing subject. What is controversial is whether our knowledge of objects (phenomena) differs from apprehending sensual objects as they would exist independently of us, or as Kant says, as "things in themselves" (noumena). Kant's hypothesis does seem to necessitate an alteration of our conception of the objects we sense for they must conform with certain a priori principles grasped by our rational minds.

A review of Kant's reasoning reveals many correlations with the method of modern science. Kant begins, for instance, with the immediate phenomena of our knowledge and constructs a comprehensive theory that succeeds in explaining it. By contrast, other philosophical schools, namely empiricists and rationalists, seem to begin with a commitment to first principles and they construct theories from them. These theories often end in contradiction or skepticism for they do not seek an adequate correlation with the phenomenal realm. Hume, for example, begins his theory with the principle that all knowledge arises out of experience. On this assumption, Hume is forced to conclude that
we can have no certain empirical knowledge nor knowledge of empirical universal relationships. This seems counter intuitive given physics and geometry. Kant shows that if Hume's conclusions are accepted, experience as we know it would not be possible. Though Kant's theory may contain problems, his attempt is to construct an epistemological theory that correlates closely with our phenomenal knowledge.

CHAPTER 2

PRACTICAL REASON

As creatures with reason, we not only think but act. It is then possible that our reasoning faculty can influence our actions as well as our thoughts. Kant attempts to find the limits and conditions of reason's practical influence just as he did with reason's theoretical influence. In both cases Kant uses the same "critical" method. In his first Critique, this involves examining our ordinary knowledge and finding the necessary conditions for possessing such knowledge. Kant discovers that some of our knowledge is "synthetic a priori" which in turn cannot be explained under any existing epistemological theories. As discussed in Chapter One, Kant then formulates his own hypothesis which maintains that sensuous objects are subjected to a priori conditions given by pure reason in order to become objects of knowledge. He claims his view should be accepted because it best explains ordinary knowledge such as physics and mathematics.

A critical inquiry of practical reason, by contrast, will differ from that of theoretical knowledge insofar as there are apparently no established and accepted practical principles to examine as there are theoretical ones (i.e. the principles of mathematics and physics). Thus Kant first examines our ordinary moral experience (an experience unique to rational beings) and seeks the basis of such experience. Kant claims he is not attempting to construct new moral duties or principles but only clarifying existing ones (19) upon which we already, if confusedly, act.

I shall begin my account of Kant's notion of practical reason by contrasting his view, once again, with Hume's. I discussed in Chapter One that Hume viewed reason as "passive." Hume holds this position regarding reason's practical function as well. In general, reason is defined by Hume as "the discovery of truth or falsehood" (20). There are two methods which reason uses to make such judgments of truth; it can find truth in the "relations of ideas" or by "matters of fact" (21). Hume calls the former method a judgment of demonstration and the latter a judgment of probability (22). In the former method Hume is referring to mathematical and logical deductions. Through this type of reasoning, we are able to attain certainty. However, this certainty regards only our ideas which are distinct from the actual world. Ideas, for Hume, are merely "copies" of our "impressions" which in turn are only sensory images (23). A necessarily true relation of any idea may give certain knowledge of our ideas of reality, but not of factual reality itself. An example is the proposition: "2 + 2 = 4." The truth of this proposition is necessary and universal. However, since a number is only an idea and not an
independently existing object in the empirical world, such a proposition reveals no necessary relationship between objects in the world. It merely shows a relation of an idea of an object to another idea.

Hume says that "all reasonings concerning matters of fact seem to be founded on the relation of cause and effect" (24) for such is the discovery of relations between real existences as opposed to their copies (ideas). However, it is impossible to confirm causal relations empirically. Hume claims that you cannot find the causal relationship by examining objects which appear to be causally related because "the effect is totally different from the cause and consequently can never be discovered in it" (25).

Furthermore, an experience of a "constant conjunction" between two objects is, strictly speaking, just that. No necessary relation can be deduced from a constant conjunction. Hume uses the example of the sun rising everyday. Here is an apparent necessary relationship, but Hume shows that it would not be contrary to reason if the sun did not rise one day. "Were it (the sun not rising one day) demonstratively false, it would imply a contradiction, and could never be distinctly conceived by the mind" (26). Hence, this type of matter of fact reasoning gives us factual knowledge of the world but it is only probable rather than certain and demonstrative.

If reason is to motivate the will, then for Hume, it must be by one of the two preceding ways. Since demonstration involves ideas and volitions involve reality, Hume says that "the two must be totally removed from each other" (27). He claims, for example, that mathematical reasoning may be useful in mechanical operations, yet we only employ such operations to attain a desired end. Thus demonstrative reasoning alone can not motivate the will without being moved by a prior desire. It can only influence the means to satisfy the desire.

In a similar manner, Hume finds that reasoning about matters of fact can not alone motivate the will. For example, if we believe that an object will bring us pleasure, we may seek to attain it. However, it is our propensity for pleasure that causes us to take action. Our knowledge of the probable relationship of the object merely directs it. Since neither of these types of reasoning can alone produce action, then for Hume, only feeling or passion can produce action. Thus Hume concludes that "reason is and ought only be the slave of the passions and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them" (28).

A passion, according to Hume, is an "original existence," which contains no "representational quality" (29). By "original existence," Hume seems to mean that a passion can "originate" action or change existence; a passion is a movement or an expression of the self. By contrast, a thought or idea is a "representation;" ideas represent a state of affairs in the world. Hume says that passions, because they have no representational aspect (unlike thoughts), can not be true or false; they neither correspond or fail to correspond to anything in the world. Passions merely express subjective feelings of the self. As such, they are "complete in themselves." Hume finds two instances where a passion can be called "unreasonable," however. In both instances, though, the passion is
accompanied by some judgment. The first instance is when a passion is "founded on the supposition of the existence of objects, which really do not exist" (30). For example, I may wish to fly in a spaceship from Star Trek. This "however insofar as it is not possible to wish is "unreasonable," however insofar as it is not possible to fulfill because there is no such actual spaceship. A passion can also be called unreasonable when the means chosen to satisfy it are insufficient. For example, I may wish to write a book by tomorrow, yet I am entirely incapable of accomplishing such a feat.

Hume concludes that, unless a passion is accompanied by such a false judgment, it can not be called unreasonable. He thus claims that, "It is not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger"(31). Since there is no logical contradiction nor any foundation on some phantom object, reason is incapable of criticizing such a preference. Hume does not claim that a person proclaiming such a preference would not be immoral, only that it is not our reason which tells us this. Nonetheless, morality's influence on human actions is an empirical fact (32).

Regarding the origin of morality, Hume thus concludes that since morality indeed influences our actions and reason alone can not, then moral distinctions are not derived from reason. He argues that a moral feeling or sentiment is the only alternative (33). If a certain feeling is what distinguishes what is morally right or wrong or, as Hume says, virtue and vice, then we must become aware of such distinctions by the impressions which they give us. Hume maintains that the impression from virtue is generally agreeable and that from vice is uneasy. Thus an explanation of why an action, character, or sentiment causes us pleasure or pain is an explanation of the virtue or vice (34).

Hume claims that virtues can be either "natural" or "artificial." This distinguishes those impressions that arise naturally like a natural desire to care for one's child from those that arise "by means of an artifice or contrivance" (35). Justice is, for Hume, an example of an artificial virtue (36). A sense of justice causes people to regulate their behavior according to conventional rules. These rules are "artificial" insofar as they prohibit actions which may normally bring about immediate pleasure in order to increase the welfare of the general public. For example, taking someone's food may bring about some immediate satisfaction. However, Hume argues that one should decide to refrain from such behavior providing that others also refrain. For following the convention of private ownership upholds the institution of property which in turn has been shown generally to increase the public welfare and security. Hume finds that the value of any convention can be measured in its usefulness to society as a whole. Our knowledge that rules of justice increase the public welfare becomes a part of our general character in turn by affecting our moral sentiment.

At this point, I have given a brief overview of Hume's conception of the practical function of reason. Reason can influence action only if there exists a prior passion or desire in the agent. Reason can, thus, only contribute the means to the satisfaction of a passion. A moral sentiment found in all people is a possible cause to action and it seeks the ends which virtue tends to promote. These ends are simply those that are useful (37). Thus, reason, when directed by the moral sentiment, seeks the general welfare or utility.
Our moral sentiment discerns what is useful by judging either general approbation or the contribution to the public welfare.

Most people would not Object to the practical function which Hume found reason to possess. It is, in fact, a significant part of Kant's theory and it is incorporated into his notion of the hypothetical imperative. According to Kant, when one is possessed by a desire, reason may present the means for satisfying the desire through an imperative of the best means. Such may be called the practical use of empirical reason. It is empirical because such an imperative is ultimately grounded on sensuous desires; it is practical because it can actually influence the means undertaken to satisfy the desire.

It is not readily acceptable, however, that reason's practical influence is limited to that of finding means to "originally existing" ends. Such a view comes dangerously close to the idea that people may not be responsible for their actions. For, since our reason can not determine our ends, we might often be possessed by natural desires which we would apparently have no choice but to follow.

Kant claims his own view will, in the end, provide a better account of ordinary morality than that of Hume. Ordinary moral deliberation seems, in contrast to Hume, to be concerned often with motives rather than simply with actions and their consequences. Kant attempts to illustrate the importance of motives in ordinary moral deliberation with his example of a grocer who does not overcharge his inexperienced customer (38). For Hume, as long as such an action is, as a general rule, good for the public welfare, it is morally good. Kant agrees that the grocer's action accords with duty, but nonetheless asserts that the moral value of such behavior depends on the grocer's motive. If the grocer is motivated to deal honestly simply because it is "good for business," then even the ordinary person would not consider the person "virtuous;" for the ordinary person knows that such a person may cheat if it proves "good for business." If this is so, then Hume's theory seems to lack an essential part of our moral experience. Once again, Kant starts with the opposite hypothesis from Hume that reason is not passive, but active, and it can directly determine actions. Since, as Hume contends, it is impossible to empirically confirm the causality of our volitions, it would seem equally impossible to deny (empirically) an alternative causal relation.

In order to find how reason can determine action Kant looks to people's maxims. He claims that the actions of rational beings can be determined by their maxims. A maxim is a subjective principle which determines the rational will (39). It is subjective because it is valid for, meaning it determines the will only of, a particular person (as opposed to all people). It is a principle because it can be applied in similar circumstances. For instance, say I decide to cheat on an exam because I felt I would otherwise fail. The maxim of this choice can be formulated as follows: "I will cheat on an exam if it is necessary to pass." If another such situation were to arise again, and I act in a principled manner, I would likewise apply this same principle. What distinguishes us as creatures with reason from other natural objects, according to Kant, is that we can act according to our ideas of laws (or principles) as opposed just to conforming to law (40).
The claim that people act on maxims is not inconsistent with the position of Hume. As long as the underlying motive is not determined by reason, Hume would accept that we may form principles on which to act. For example, Hume may admit my preceding example ("I will cheat on exams.") as a principle of volition. He will qualify the end, however, as having its origin in oursensuous desires or passions. Hume may say that the desire to pass exams is based on the belief of completing certain educational requirements which in turn is a requirement for a pleasurable life. However, the final cause of the end of any act is, for Hume, the propensity for pleasure or the aversion to pain. The final cause is thus given by sensuous inclination which must be the ground of any maxim.

In general, unless an action is a mere physical reflex, it must in some sense be "voluntary." Voluntary actions must have a purpose, for why else would a person decide to act? This purpose or object must be empirical for our actions take place in the empirical world. Thus all maxims must contain an empirical object as well. Hume maintains that the desire for this empirical object can be the only possible motive for our actions. Kant, by contrast, here argues that maxims actually contain two elements, either of which may serve as a sufficient motive; an empirical content or the a priori form of law (41). In Kant's view, the form of a maxim or its a priori is equivalent to the form of a law. Kant claims that this form can only be supplied, a priori, from pure reason because the concept of universal law cannot be found in sensuous experience. So if the will is determined by a maxim's a priori element, as opposed to its empirical content, then it would be pure practical reason that is determining the will.

Kant formulates this a priori principle of determination in the form of an imperative as follows: "I ought never to act except in such a way that I can also will that my maxim should become a universal law" (42). He calls this formulation the categorical imperative because it applies unconditionally to all rational and reasonable beings as opposed to hypothetical imperatives which determine the rational will only when particular sensuous desires are the primary motive.

As creatures with reason, we can be described as "reasonable" as well as "rational." In fact, the German term, "Vernunft" is defined as both reasonable and rational (43v). John Rawls, in a recent work (44), claims that this distinction, has its origin in Kant's distinction between the categorical and hypothetical imperative. The former (the categorical imperative) represents pure practical reason, whereas the latter (the hypothetical imperative) represents empirical practical reason. Rawls associates the "reasonable" with the willingness to propose and honor fair terms of cooperation, while the "rational" he associates with powers of judgment and the choosing of instrumental means to ends. Hume's theory grasps only the latter. In claiming that reason can only supply means to originally existing ends, Hume implies that reason only entails the "rational" thought process. Hume does claim that we also seek to promote the public welfare. However, this pursuit is driven either by moral sentiment or a roundabout method of satisfying our own desires. Thus this apparent interest in the good of others has its origin, according to Hume, in our sensuous faculty rather than in our reason. By showing how reason can supply the motive for acting in a universal manner, by contrast,
Kant is illustrating our capacity to be "reasonable." Fair terms of cooperation are such that all reasonable people could accept them. As will be made clear, this seems to correspond directly with what the categorical imperative commands.

If one were to subject a prospective action to the categorical imperative then the principle of determination would be conformity to universal law. Such a principle is not empirically conditioned for the form of universal law is not based on sensuous experience. One may deny that a person whose actions seems to be in accordance with this principle is actually moved to act from reason, however such a denial, again, cannot be empirically confirmed. It is Kant's claim that in order for reason to originate action the motive must be supplied from pure reason. This motive (which Kant claims is embodied in the categorical imperative) is reverence for the law. Such a motive is unique to reasonable beings. Whereas everything else in nature seems to act in accordance with laws, only reasonable beings can act from their idea of, or reverence for, law. All other motives, according to Kant, are derived from sensuous experience.

Kant claims that the categorical imperative is the imperative of morality (45) for it determines the will independently of the sensuous motives of which ordinary moral deliberation is suspect. In the form of a principle it is the moral law because this principle, like a law, is unconditioned. If we look again to his example of the grocer who deals honestly because it is, overall, good for his business, it is evident that the behavior is not determined by the categorical imperative. If, however, the grocer acted in such a way because he thought it was how all grocers should act, then this would be equivalent to being determined from the categorical imperative and thus, according to Kant, have moral value. The grocer would be doing the right thing for its own sake. Furthermore, once convinced that the dutiful behavior is done without any ulterior motive but for duty's sake, the ordinary person would consider the grocer's act to be moral. Thus, Kant's account of what is involved in our moral deliberation seems to be more accurate than that of Hume for the latter's view does not include this seemingly essential aspect; that the motive be duty and the right act be done for the right reason's or for duty's sake. For this reason alone, Kant's view should be favored over Hume's, for Kant's theory gives a fuller account. However, before Kant's can be fully accepted, there are further ramifications which must still be analyzed.

One consequence of Kant's view, which has already been mentioned, is that reason may of itself originate action. Since an empirical denial of this claim is impossible, it can not be the ground for rejecting Kant's theory. Another essential point is that the categorical imperative serves as "the supreme principle of morality." It is supreme because it is a universal principle from which all particular moral duties can presumably be derived. The formulation of the categorical imperative given thus far, however, requires merely that one be able sincerely to will that one's maxims be fit to be universal laws. Such an elementary guideline for moral behavior, however, can easily be used to justify obviously immoral behavior as Hegel recognizes in his famous critique of Kant.

The essence of Hegel's criticism of Kant is captured in the following quote from Hegel's Philosophy of Right:
..if the definition of duty is taken to be the absence of contradiction...then no transition is possible to the specification of particular duties nor, if some such particular content for acting comes under consideration, is there any criterion in that principle for deciding whether it is or is not a duty. On the contrary, by this means any wrong or immoral line of conduct may be justified. (46)

Hegel interprets the categorical imperative as merely commanding action whose general form is not involved in contradiction when viewed as a universal law; this interpretation indeed seems to correspond with some of Kant's examples. For instance, after giving his first formulation, Kant poses the question "Does a lying promise accord with duty" (47)? He answers, of course, that it does not for to will this maxim as a universal law entails a contradiction in that the institution of promising could not then exist. A universal principle of false promising is inconceivable because if all people made false promises then no one would believe them and thus no one would allow false promises to be made to them. Thus a sustained universal practice of false promising could not exist.

If maxims had merely to pass the preceding test then Hegel would be correct in saying both that Kant's notion of duty can justify any behavior and that "no immanent doctrine of duties is possible". For example, say that a Nazi who is sincere in his beliefs feels that all Jews should be killed. For him there would be no contradiction in willing such a conviction as universal law. Furthermore, the test of contradiction is insufficient to prohibit the willing of different universal laws by different people. Thus Kant's doctrine would yield an inconsistent set of duties.

According to Kant, however, duty requires more than the universal form of action. These further requirements are brought out in further formulations of the categorical imperative which Kant claims are "merely so many formulations of precisely the same law." (48). For example, Kant contends that the categorical imperative also contains an end which functions as the single limiting condition of moral action. This is clearly explained in his Formula of the End in Itself:

Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end (49).

To treat humans as "ends in themselves" requires that each person one deals with be allowed (in principle, at least) to choose their own ends at the same time. This formulation makes explicit what was required implicitly in Kant's previous formulation emphasizing universal form; what is willed to be a universal law by a particular person should also be capable of being willed to be universal law by any person with whom he comes in contact. In this way, my own particular inclination cannot serve as the motive for moral behavior. Kant illustrates how this second formulation may test for duty with the same example mentioned above: (50) "Does a lying promise accord with duty?" Kant claims that misleading someone (by lying to them) for a particular desire is obviously using that other as a means rather than as an end in themself; for this person (the lied-to) is never given a chance voluntarily to choose to assist in my end. I thus simply use (fool) his reason in the service of my own inclination. When Kant says not to treat humanity
"simply as a means," he is not saying that people should never serve as means, only that they must choose also to do so themselves. For example, in a sense a student uses teachers as a means to receiving an education, however, they are not used simply as a means for, at the same time, presumably it is the will of the teachers to supply this education.

Thus Hegel's claim that Kant's notion of duty can justify any immoral line of conduct is simply false. The sincere Nazi cannot justify killing Jews through the categorical imperative because he is not treating Jews as "ends in themselves." The Nazi's action could never be agreed to by the Jews themselves. Hence, the Nazi's maxim could never attain to universality. Hegel mistakenly takes the first formulation of the categorical imperative to be the only formulation; he does not see that the various formulations of the categorical imperative are really one law. Hegel thus does not grasp the true meaning of Kant's doctrine.

In regard to Hegel's other criticism that Kant's notion of duty produces "no immanent list of duties;" this is simply not one of Kant's objectives. Hegel seems to have misunderstood Kant's aim. Kant is not seeking a list of duties (51). A general list of particular duties, moreover, seems to be conceptually impossible insofar as people's conventions differ. For example, in some places (like New York City) people may feel that an unauthorized entrance onto their property is a severe violation whereas in other places (some rural areas perhaps) people may be welcome in almost anybody's home. Conventions differ. Furthermore, by way of the second formulation, Kant does give us, at least, the general duty that people be allowed to choose their own ends only if compatible with the ends of others. This general duty, however, will have to be interpreted according to local customs. At the very least, Kant's general duty does seem to have found acceptance as a political principle; each person is to be given the maximum amount of liberty limited only by a like liberty for others (52). Such a principle seems to be essential for modern Western governments to be considered just.

Kant, in fact, never makes the claim that he will supply a list of particular duties, indeed he thinks that people already know their moral duties (53). He claims that the sole objective of The Groundwork is to seek out and establish the supreme principle of morality (54). Kant establishes the categorical imperative as such "regressively" by an examination first of our moral experience. If we allow that we make responsible moral distinctions then we must accept that they are based on some principle. Hume claims that they are based on the principle of utility. However, this principle does not seem to concur with ordinary moral experience as we have seen, whereas Kant's principle does. Thus, if nothing else, Kant seems to have found one condition of our ordinarily confused idea of morality. We must, after all, account for the fact that the demand for universal human rights is causing a tremendous stir in the modern world. Kant does attempt to show a necessary connection between the categorical imperative and the human will. He claims that the categorical imperative is a synthetic a priori proposition (55) which he intends to justify theoretically. This justification will be analyzed in my final chapter.
CHAPTER 3

THE JUSTIFICATION OF PURE PRACTICAL REASON

As a synthetic a priori proposition, the categorical imperative [at least according to Kant) is in need of justification. This need arises from the necessary connection that is proposed to exist between two distinct concepts. Kant claims that the categorical imperative is a priori for it necessarily connects an action to a will without presupposing an empirical condition. At the same time the categorical imperative is "synthetic" because the act commanded is not contained in the concept of the human will. Though the human will is "imperfect" (as limited and sensuous), Kant nonetheless argues that the categorical imperative commands this will necessarily. The justification must explain why the categorical imperative should determine the will rather than hypothetical imperatives.

As we saw in Chapter 1, the justification of synthetic a priori theoretical propositions (i.e. every event has a cause), for Kant, entails the explanation of how they are possible rather than whether they are possible. As a practical principle, however, the categorical imperative has a different function than such theoretical principles. Thus the justification of practical reason may have different requirements. The notion of practical reason, itself, is difficult to understand for it does not necessarily involve objects of which we can have certain knowledge. Practical reason involves the deliberation of rational and reasonable action. Such deliberation need not have its basis in certain knowledge.

The lack of a successful, uncontroversial moral science excludes the type of justification used with theoretical, synthetic a priori propositions (such at those in mathematics and physics). Kant does, however, attempt to justify the categorical imperative in at least two other ways. In the last chapter of The Groundwork, Kant claims that a third term which includes both concepts of the human will and the categorical imperative is necessary to justify the necessary connection (56). In his Critique of Practical Reason, however, he claims that the fact that morality does indeed influence human actions, makes the moral law a "fact of reason" (57). The existence of the moral law is then taken as a fact of ordinary morality much like the principles of physics and mathematics is for the natural sciences.

In order to understand each of Kant's justifications, we must first become familiar with his third formulation of the categorical imperative. Kant calls it the Formula of Autonomy:

So act that your will can regard itself as at the same time making universal law by means of its maxims (58).

The Formula of Autonomy looks very similar to Kant's first formulation. It differs in that it stresses that each rational will not only acts on maxims but constructs them. The categorical imperative is a device to show how the will can be determined by reason rather than sensuous inclination. This third formula merely highlights this constructive
aspect. In acting according to the moral law, rational beings display their autonomy for they act according to a law which they give to themselves.

Kant claims that the Idea of freedom directs us to the third term which connects the human will and the obligation of moral law. Freedom is an example of what Kant calls an "Idea of Reason" (59). Such Ideas are produced by our reason while seeking the unconditioned. For example, according to Kant, if we assume that natural necessity is the only type of causality, we will then be faced with a contradiction or with what Kant calls an "antinomy." If we attempt to comprehend the totality of causes, we need to posit a primary cause. Otherwise, there could be no totality (the causal chain would never cease for there would be no origin). Kant thus claims we inevitably form a transcendental Idea of freedom whose existence we must allow as possible. Theoretical certainty of such freedom, however, is impossible since a necessary condition of our knowledge is the assumption of causality (as natural necessity).

Since we can have no certain knowledge by means of Ideas, we cannot construct a positive definition of this possible freedom. We can, however, describe freedom in a negative sense; freedom cannot be the same as natural necessity. At the very least, freedom is a property enabling something to occur without its being determined by natural or outside influences.

A will, according to Kant, is the power to act in accordance with the idea of law (60). Kant points out that a will which is free, is not the same as a chaotic will; a free will would have to be determined by principle or law. At the same time, these principles or laws cannot come from outside sources, or else the will would not be free in the above established negative sense. Thus, Kant concludes, that the will is free which obeys laws given to itself by itself. When the will is determined by the categorical imperative, it fulfills both of the above requirements for this law reason gives to itself. If the human will could be shown to be free, then the connection with the categorical imperative would be justified, for Kant claims that "a free will and a will under moral laws are one and the same" (61).

Kant's dilemma, however, is that since we can have no certain and positive knowledge of freedom, we cannot claim from a theoretical standpoint that the human will is free. Kant then argues that it would be sufficient if we could, instead, show that we necessarily presuppose our wills to be free when we act (62). That we do in fact make this presupposition seems correct when we examine, at least, our theoretical judgments. We generally consider our capacity to reason capable of determining objectively valid judgments. If we were not free, then our judgments would be the mere product of a causal chain of previous mental impulses considered as mere mechanisms. In order for us to consider our judgments to be valid, however, we must consider ourselves able both to recognize or construct valid principles. Thus, in order to believe in the validity of our theoretical reason, we must assume we are free. In the same way, presumably, we consider ourselves largely responsible for our actions. Responsibility, too, implies freedom for it suggests that we are capable of acting in a way other than the way we actually do.
So we apparently do presuppose ourselves to be free both in thinking and in our ordinary action and the categorical imperative would thus seem to be justified. Kant claims, however, that there is a suspicion that the justification argues in a vicious circle (63). Since Kant simply equates freedom with being subject to the moral law, the two concepts (freedom and the principle of autonomy) are reciprocal rather than distinct. Thus, the justification seems to fail for there is no distinct third term which contains both concepts.

According to Rawls (64), this attempt fails because the presupposition of freedom can only be seen as necessary in reason's theoretical function: as necessary to form valid judgments. Practically, however, we may act either autonomously (by submitting ourselves to the categorical imperative) or heteronomously (by only following hypothetical imperatives). The latter, however, is not the same as acting morally. Thus the presupposition of freedom works in the case of theoretical reason alone. In general, Rawls claims that the attempt to justify the categorical imperative through theoretical reason (or an Idea of theoretical reason) is equivalent to an attempt to derive the reasonable from the rational (65). Rawls is against such an approach for it implies that the reasonable needs a basis for which the rational does not. Instead, Rawls views both the rational and the reasonable, though distinct, as equally fundamental.

In Kant's later work, the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant seems to realize that his justification in The Groundwork does not work for he claims: "..to presuppose freedom as a positive concept would require an intellectual intuition which cannot here be assumed" (66). Yet he still considers the moral law "firmly established of itself" (67). Kant calls the mere "consciousness of the (moral) law a fact of reason" (68). It is a fact of reason rather than an empirical fact for nowhere in our experience can we be certain that it determines the will. Rather than justify the categorical imperative from the presupposition of freedom, the moral law as a principle of autonomy instead accounts for why we suppose we are free.

If Kant's account is correct, then the very fact that we make moral distinctions entails that we do consider the moral law (as expressed by Kant) as valid. There are at least three strong reason's why Kant's view is the best explanation of our moral experience. As I have already argued in Chapter 2, the categorical imperative captures the importance of motives in ordinary moral deliberation (which neither utilitarianism nor the principle of utility do). So too, it functions simultaneously as a principle of autonomy. It thus clarifies how we presuppose freedom in our actions when at the same time we view everything else as obeying the laws of natures.

Finally, the categorical imperative lends each human being an absolute value in themselves which Kant calls "dignity." The moral law considers each person as an end in themself and thus, as a principle which should condition the will of all people, it bestows dignity on all persons. This is the ideal of pure practical reason, which our moral practice attempts to realize. It is mainly as a principle of autonomy, however, that the moral law can bestow dignity. Our capacity to construct and follow our own principles allows us to be unconditioned in the sense that we need not be determined by outside laws. A heteronomous account of morality (Hume's, for instance), by contrast, regards people as
ultimately conditioned. Hume's doctrine is a heteronomous account in that he views people as determined in the end by their sensuous feelings and yet feelings are determined by principles which the feelings themselves do not determine.

It is important to note that the three preceding points are not intended to persuade people that accepting the moral law is in their best interest. According to Kant, each of the three points are part of the "fact of reason." It is a fact that motives are essential in ordinary moral experience. It is a fact that we often presuppose our actions to be~freely determined by ourselves and it is a fact that we ordinarily attribute (or should attribute) dignity to each human being. We need to account for these important aspects of our moral experience. Kant's notion of practical reason simply succeeds in this task better then others.

ENDNOTES

1 Hume, David. An Inquiry Into Human Understanding, edited by Charles W. Hendel. 1955. P. 89. "In all instances of the operation of..the mind..nothing..can suggest any idea..of necessary connection." Further references to this edition will be abbreviated as I.

2 Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason, translated by F. Max Muller, 1966. IA: 1, B: 1]. Further references to this edition will be abbreviated as CPR.

3 CPR. [A: 2,B: 1].

4 CPR. [A: 2, B: 3].

5 CPR [A: 2, B: 4]. "..experience never imparts to its judgments true or strict (universality), but only assumed or relative universality (by means of induction)..".

6 CPR. [A: 2, B: 4]. "If a judgment is though with strict universality..it is not derived from experience but.. a priori..".

7 See note 5.

8 CPR [A: 3, B: 5]. "For whence should experience take its certainty, if all the rules which it follows were always again and again empirical, and therefore contingent..".

9 CPR [A: 10, B: 14].

10 CPR. IA: 7, B: 10].

11 ibid.

12 CPR [B: 11].
13 CPR [A: 10, B: 17].

14 CPR [A: 11, B: 17].

15 Ibid.

16 CPR. [B: xvi].

17 CPR [B: xxii]. "...my own view of metaphysics, which has so many analogies with the Copernican hypothesis, as an hypothesis only..".

18 CPR [B: 102].

19 Kant, Immanuel. **Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals.** Translated by H. J. Paton. New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1964. P. 22 (=404). "Might it not then be more advisable in moral questions to abide by the judgment of ordinary reason and...to bring in philosophy only in order to set forth the system of morals..and to present its rules..". Further references to this edition will be abbreviated as G.

20 Hume, David. **A Treatise of Human Nature. Vol. I & II.** Aldine Press, 1911. 3,1,1. p 167. Further references to this edition will be abbreviated as T. The number of the volume, book, and chapter will precede the number of the page.

21 Ibid.

22 T. 2,3,3. p 125. 'The understanding exerts itself after two different ways as it judges from demonstration or probability; as it regards the abstract relations of our ideas, or those relationships of objects which experience only gives us information.

23 T. 1,1,1. P. 11.

24 I. 4,1. P. 40.

25 I. 4, 1. P. 43.

26 Hume, David. **An Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals.** Edited by V.C. Chappel in **The Philosophy of David Hume**. Random House, 1963. Chapter 4, p. 325-6. Further references to this edition will be abbreviated as M.

27 T. 2,3,3. P. 126.

28 T. 2,3,3. P 127.

29 Ibid.

30 T. 2,3,3. P.128.
31 ibid.

32 T. 3,1,1. p. 167. 'And this is confirmed by common experience, which informs us that men are often governed by their duties.'

33 T. 3,1,2. P. 178. 'since vice and virtue are not discoverable merely by reason, it must be by means of some impression or sentiment.'

34 T. 3,1,2. p.179. 'In giving a reason, therefore, for the pleasure or uneasiness, we sufficiently explain the vice or virtue.'


36 ibid.

37 M. Appendix 1. p. 464. 'reason instructs us in the several tendencies of action, and humanity makes a distinction in favor of those which are useful.'

38 G. p. 9 (=397).

39 G. p. 15n (=400), 51n (=421).

40 G. p. 36 (=412).

41 G. p. 14 (=400).

42 G. p. 17 (=402).


45 G. p.44.


47 G. pp. 18-19 (402-3).

48 G. p. 79 (=436).

49 G. p. 66-7 (=429).

50 G. p. 67-8 (=429-30).
51 see note 19.

52 This serves as one of the two basic principles in Rawls' political doctrine, "Justice as Fairness." It is also a principle found in all the liberal political thinkers.

53 G. p. xi, (=391).

54 G. p. xiii, (=392).

55 G. p. 50 (=420), 87(=440), 95(=444).

56 G. p. 99.

57 Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Practical Reason. Translated by Thomas Kingshill Abbot. London: Longmans, Green and Co. 1909. P. 164. "..the moral law is given as a fact of pure reason of which we are a priori conscious." Further references to this edition will be abbreviated as CPrR. Page numbers will be given from the German Rosenkranz, edition.

58 G. p. 76 (=434).

59 G. p. 114 (=456). "Freedom is only an Idea of Reason whose objective reality is in itself questionable..".

60 G. p. 36. (=412).

61 G. p. 98 (=447).

62 G. p. 100n (=448). "..the same laws as would bind a being who was really free are equally valid for a being who cannot act except under the Idea of his own freedom."

63 G. p. 104 (=450).


65 ibid.

66 CPrR. p. 143.

67 CPrR. p. 163.

68 CPrR. p. 143.
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