Date of Award
Summer 8-10-2017
Document Type
Thesis
Degree Name
Master of Arts (MA)
Department
Economics
First Advisor
Ingmar Nyman
Second Advisor
Devra L. Golbe
Academic Program Adviser
Randall K. Filer
Abstract
Is the executive’s compensation structure influenced by the credit rating assigned to his company? I analyze a panel of U.S. public firms using the random-effects and fixed-effects estimations. Compared to firms with lower credit risk, I find that firms facing higher probability of default provide more incentives for their CEOs.
Recommended Citation
Mudekereza, Olivier Mugisho, "Credit Risk and Corporate Governance" (2017). CUNY Academic Works.
https://academicworks.cuny.edu/hc_sas_etds/214
Included in
Corporate Finance Commons, Finance Commons, Labor Economics Commons, Other Economics Commons