Date of Award

Summer 8-10-2017

Document Type

Thesis

Degree Name

Master of Arts (MA)

Departments/Programs

Economics

First Advisor

Ingmar Nyman

Second Advisor

Devra L. Golbe

Academic Program Adviser

Randall K. Filer

Abstract

Is the executive’s compensation structure influenced by the credit rating assigned to his company? I analyze a panel of U.S. public firms using the random-effects and fixed-effects estimations. Compared to firms with lower credit risk, I find that firms facing higher probability of default provide more incentives for their CEOs.

 
 

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