The Music and Multiple Identities of Kurdish Alevis from Turkey in Germany

Ozan Aksoy

Graduate Center, City University of New York

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THE MUSIC AND MULTIPLE IDENTITIES OF KURDISH ALEVIS FROM TURKEY IN GERMANY

by

OZAN EMRAH AKSOY

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Music in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York

2014
This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Music in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Jonathan H. Shannon

____________________________________

Date       Chair of the Examining Committee

Norman Carey

____________________________________

Date        Acting Executive Officer

Stephen Blum

____________________________________

Jane Sugarman

____________________________________

Martin Stokes

____________________________________

Supervisory Committee

THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK
Abstract

THE MUSIC AND MULTIPLE IDENTITIES OF KURDISH ALEVIS FROM TURKEY IN GERMANY

by

Ozan Emrah Aksoy

Adviser: Professor Stephen Blum

This dissertation investigates the experiences of Kurdish Alevis, currently living in Germany, who trace their background to locations within the boundaries of the Republic of Turkey. I argue that music has been a particularly important mode through which Kurdish Alevis in Germany have articulated collective histories and have fashioned narratives of belonging and multiple and sometimes contradictory identities. The subjects of my research are immigrants and refugees who are ethnically Kurdish and whose religion is Alevi, an Anatolian religion whose relations to both Sunni and Shi'a Islam are historically controversial. They speak Turkish along with Kurdish, in most cases are Turkish and German citizens living in and around Cologne, Germany, and have family members in Istanbul, Turkey.

Kurdish Alevis struggled against being labeled with certain identities, such as Turkish and Muslim within the larger immigrant pool from Turkey. At the same time, many of them have striven for their collective identities, namely Kurdish and Alevi, primarily in the last two decades. Music has been an integral part of their efforts. I argue that, in the last two decades, a new transnational field has emerged for Kurdish Alevi immigrants and refugees in Germany and by extension in Turkey, opening spaces for realignment around various and fluctuating loyalties with respect to ethnic, political, and social modes of belonging. This work is an investigation of the music of this ethno-religious double minority group in their second and third homelands.
Acknowledgements

I would like to dedicate this work to the Kurdish Alevi communities in Turkey and Germany. I am grateful to have been invited into their lives. This work would not have been possible without their generosity and trust.

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Glossary
(from Turkish unless otherwise stated)

Ağa: Feudal leader and landowner

Ağıt: Lament

Alawite (Nusayri): Arab Alevi mostly living in Turkey and Syria

Alebesk: A new musical genre which emerged as part of a second homeland aesthetic based on arabesk lyrical structure with Alevi musical sensibilities

Almaneci: Turkish guestworker, a reference sometimes used in a derogatory fashion by the people in Turkey

Altyapı: Infrastructure or skeleton of a musical piece

Arabesk: A Turkish hybrid and urban musical genre incorporating an Arab aesthetic, established in the 1970s

Aşık: Bard singing oral poetry

Ayak (‘Foot’): Musical term used to refer to the modal system governing Turkish folk music

Bağlama (Saz or Kr. Tembur): A fretted longneck lute, the most common instrument in Anatolia, used to accompany ritual and secular Alevi poems as well as most religious rituals.

Barış Süreci (‘Peace Process’): Negotiation process aiming at reaching a peace deal between the Turkish state and the PKK (Kurdistan Worker’s Party) since 2010

Bektaşi: Follower of Bektaşi Sufi order

Bölücü: Separatist, a reference used to refer to Kurdish nationalists

Camı: Mosque

Cem (Ayn-i Cem): Communal Alevi ritual

Cemaat: Religious community

Cemevi: Cem house, building in which cem is celebrated, ext. Alevi community center
Çepki: A form of Kurdish folk dance popularized in Germany in the 2000s

Çepni: A heterodox religious group living in north Anatolia

Çiftetelli (Göbek Dansı): Generic term for regional and urban dances in which dancers shake their bellies with open arms

Dede: Member of an Alevi holy lineage, leader of the ritual

Dede sazı: A short bağlama with three strings and fewer frets compared to the modern bağlama

Değişmek: To change

Demokrat: An umbrella term used to describe all liberals, social democrats, and some socialists from Turkey

Dengbêj: Kurdish bard, musician, and storyteller

Deyiş: Para-liturgical Alevi tunes

DiskoFolk: Hybrid genre established in Germany among musicians from Turkey in the late 1970s and early 1980s

Diyanet: Religious institution regulating Sunni religious life in Turkey

DJ-Müzik: Eclectic juxtapositions of Turkish and Kurdish folk music with other popular genres in Germany

Dönüşmek: To evolve

Ehlibeyt: The family or the people of the prophet Mohammad and his son-in-law Ali

Ezan: Muslim call to prayer

Êzîdî: A Kurdish religious group

Fantezi müzik: An iteration of the Arabesk genre, which is sometimes used interchangeably by lay people to refer to the “more modern” and “more hybridized” examples of Arabesk

Fremde: Gr. Foreigner

Govend: Kr. Generic term for line dances
**Gastarbeiter**: Gr. Guestworker, Guestworkers Program

**Gurbet**: the condition of living or working outside of hometown or homeland

**Hacı Bektaş-ı Veli**: Founder of the Bektaşi order also revered by Alevis

**Halay**: Generic term for line dances in Turkish

**Hasret**: Longing

**Heimat**: Gr. Homeland

**Hemşehri** (organization): Hometown

**Hemşerilik**: Common origin

**İstekler**: Audience requests at türkü bars

**Kerbela**: A holy city in Iraq for Alevi and Shia Muslims.

**Kitle**: Masses, people, or the crowd

**Kirve**: Godfather, the man who holds in his lap the boy being circumcised, resulting in an alliance between the two families

**Kısa Sap**: Shorter necked bağlama with nineteen or less frets

**Kızılbaş**: "Red headed," a term historically used to refer to heterodox groups that are now called Alevi

**Kom**: Kr. Music group

**Kurmançî**: The most common Kurdish language

**Kürt Sorunu**: The “Kurdish Question,” an ongoing conflict in Turkey that became a reference to the lack of rights of Kurds living in Turkey

**Leitkultur**: Gr. The leading culture, a reference of the mainstream German culture

**Lorik**: Kr. Lament

**Makam**: Modes in classical Turkish music

**Mescit**: Prayer houses
**Mezhep:** Originally designates the four schools of Sunni jurisprudence; in Turkey the term has taken on the meaning of a denominational group and is often used to refer to the distinction between Alevis and Sunnis

**Muhabbet:** Intimate Alevi gatherings at homes accompanied by bağlama and featuring collective singing

**Namaz:** Muslim prayer

**Nefes:** Hymn

**Newroz:** Kr. New Year, the first day of spring

**Ocak:** Alevi holy lineage

**Oniki İmamlar:** Twelve Imams of Shia Islam also revered in Alevism

**Ozan:** Tr. Bard or wandering minstrel

**Pir:** Tr. Kr. Religious leader or guide

**Parallelgesellschaften:** Gr. Parallel societies, a term used to designate communities resisting integration into the German mainstream culture

**Potpori:** Medley used differently for different kinds of juxtaposition of songs

**Rehber:** Religious guide

**Renk:** Color, timbre, musical color

**R’nBesk:** A recent Germany-based genre combining Arabesk musical taste sung over German lyrics

**Şark Odası:** Eastern room, a section of a living room dedicated to exhibiting artifacts and furniture from the first homeland

**Semah (Tr.), Semê (Kr.):** Ritual dance, an important element of cem and other mystic ceremonies of Alevis

**Tahtacı:** Heterodox group in West Anatolia
**Takiyye**: Dissimulation

**Talip**: Laypeople, Alevi laypeople who do not belong to any holy lineage

**Tekke**: Dervish lodge

**Türkiyeli**: People from Turkey, which includes Turks, Kurds, and others with ties to Turkey

**Türkü**: Generic term used for folk songs in Turkey

**Ummah**: Muslim community of believers

**Uzun Sap**: Longer-necked bağlama with twenty-two or more frets

**Vatan**: Tr. Kr. Soil, land, and homeland

**Yabancı**: Foreigner, as a reference to Germans or non-Türkiyeli people in Germany

**Zakir**: Tr. Kr. Bağlama player and singer during the cem gatherings

**Zorunluluk**: Obligation, necessity, exigency

**Zülfikar**: Tr. Kr. the sword of Ali, son-in-law of Prophet Mohammad and the first imam of the Twelve-Imam Shia
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<th>Acronym</th>
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<tr>
<td>AABF</td>
<td>Almanya Alevi Birlikleri Federasyonu (Federation of Alevi Unions of Germany)</td>
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<tr>
<td>AABK</td>
<td>Avrupa Alevi Birlikleri Konfederasyonu (Confederation of Alevi Unions of Europe)</td>
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<tr>
<td>AAKM</td>
<td>Anadolu Alevileri Kültür Merkezi (Culture Centre of Anatolian Alevis)</td>
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<tr>
<td>AKP</td>
<td>Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATİF</td>
<td>Almanya Türkiyeli İşçiler Federasyonu (Federation of Workers from Turkey in Germany)</td>
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<td>BBC</td>
<td>British Broadcasting Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>BDP</td>
<td>Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi (Party of Peace and Democracy)</td>
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<td>BÜFK</td>
<td>Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Folklor Klübü (Boğaziçi University Folklore Club)</td>
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<td>CEM Vakfı</td>
<td>Cumhuriyetçi Eğitim ve Kültür Merkezi Vakfı (Centre for Republican Education and Culture Foundation)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CHP</td>
<td>Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People's Party)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DHKP-C</td>
<td>Devrimci Halk Kurtuluş Partisi-Cephesi (Revolutionary People's Liberation Party-Front)</td>
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<td>DİB</td>
<td>Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı (Directorate of Religious Affairs)</td>
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<td>DİDF</td>
<td>Devrimci İşçi Dernekleri Federasyonu (Federation of Revolutionary Workers Union)</td>
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<td>DİSK</td>
<td>Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu (Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions of Turkey)</td>
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<td>DİTİB</td>
<td>Diyanet İşleri Türk İslam Birliği (DİTİB, Religious Affairs of the Unity of Turkish Islam)</td>
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<td>DTK</td>
<td>Demokratik Toplum Kongresi (Democratic Society Congress)</td>
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<td>DTP</td>
<td>Demokratik Toplum Partisi (Democratic Society Party)</td>
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ECHR  European Court of Human Rights
EU  European Union
FEK  Federasyona Elewiyan Kurdistani (Federation of Kurdistan Alevi)
HBV  Hacı Bektaş-ı Veli
HBVAKV  Hacı Bektaş-ı Veli Anadolu Anadolu Kültür Vakfı (Hacı Bektaş-ı Veli Anatolian Culture Foundation)
HBVKTD  Hacı Bektaş-ı Veli Kültür ve Tanıtma Derneği (Hacı Bektaş-ı Veli Culture and Information Association)
HTA  Hometown Association
IGMG  İslamische Gemainshafen Milli Görüş (Islamic Community of Milli Görüş)
IFB  İslamische Federation Berlin (Islamic Federation of Berlin)
IHD  İnsan Hakları Derneği (Human Rights Association)
KHBVCE  Köln ve Çevresi Hacı Bektaş-ı Veli Alevi Cem Evi (Hacı Bektaş-ı Veli Alevi Center of Cologne and Environs)
KOMKAR  Konfederasyona Komelên Kurdistan li Ewrupa (Confederation of Associations from Kurdistan in Europe)
KTP  Kardeş Türküler Projesi (Ballads of Solidarity Project)
MEP  Member of European Parliament
MG  Milli Görüş (National Ideal)
MP  Member of Parliament
NÇM  Navenda Çanda Mezopotamya (Mesopotamia Cultural Center)
PDS  Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus (Party of Democratic Socialism)
PKK  Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan (Kurdistan Workers' Party)
PSK  Partiya Sosyalista Kurdistan (Kurdistan Socialist Party)
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<td>Pir Sultan Abdal Kulliir Dernegi (Pir Sultan Abdal Culture Association)</td>
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<td><strong>SPD</strong></td>
<td>Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party of Germany)</td>
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<td><strong>THM</strong></td>
<td>Türk Halk Müziği (Turkish Folk Music)</td>
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<td><strong>TİKKO</strong></td>
<td>Türkiye İşçi Köylü Kurtuluş Ordusu (Liberation Army of Turkish Workers and Peasants)</td>
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<td><strong>TKP</strong></td>
<td>Türkiye Komünist Partisi (Communist Party of Turkey)</td>
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<td><strong>TRT</strong></td>
<td>Türkiye Radyo ve Televizyon kurumu (Turkish Radio and Television Corporation)</td>
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<td>Wuppertal Alevi Kültür Merkezi (Alevi Cultural Center of Wuppertal)</td>
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Chapter 1. The Music and Multiple Identities of Kurdish Alevis from Turkey in Germany

1.1. Introduction

This dissertation investigates the experiences of Kurdish Alevis currently living in Germany who trace their background to locations within the boundaries of the Turkish state. Music has been an important mode through which Kurdish Alevis in Turkey and in Germany have articulated collective histories and have fashioned narratives of belonging. The subjects of my research are immigrants and refugees who are ethnically Kurdish (Kurmançî-speaking), religiously Alevi, and who speak Turkish and in most cases are Turkish citizens living in and around Cologne, Germany, and having family members in Istanbul, Turkey.¹

What makes this group a unique anthropological and ethnomusicological subject is that their places of origin are the villages within a geographical triangle defined by the eastern Turkish cities of Maraş, Malatya, and Adıyaman. Among all ethno-religious groups in Turkey, only the Kurdish Alevi communities have followers of both Kurdish and Alevi political movements. The Alevi awakening movement of the 1990s and the Kurdish uprisings of the 1980s and 1990s have posed among the most serious challenges to the hegemonic cultural, legal, and economic policies of the Turkish state. Kurdish Alevis have become involved with both of these challenging and contradictory movements. In their first homeland, where their social and cultural identifications were denied by state authorities, this double minority group, mobilized transnationally, has proved itself to be in opposition to the Sunni Muslim Turkish majority at all levels.

¹ All interviews were conducted in Turkish except where otherwise indicated.
One of the values of this ethnographic study of a small ethno-religious group’s identity formation process through musical practices is that members of this group have conflicting and contradictory ideas, practices, and identities regarding themselves and their fellow Kurdish Alevis. Some “Kurdish Alevis” may even refuse to call themselves Kurdish or Alevi or both due to many reasons, including internationalist and humanist stances of some members of the community. Some Kurdish speaking Alevis may have problems with any kind of nationalist labels, including “Kurdish.” Some Kurdish speaking Alevis who have already embraced Turkish identity as their main identity marker may refuse all other labels. Some Kurdish speaking Alevis may not believe in any religion. Therefore, it is significant for this project to state from the outset that the idea of one “Kurdish Alevi identity” is problematic, given the cosmopolitan and fragmented nature of many Kurdish Alevi communities in Cologne who have constant exchange with other people via transnational networks through their multiple homelands. In claims-making processes of Kurds or Alevis, those who are both Alevi and Kurd, both in Germany and Turkey, might invoke a multiplicity of self-identifications.

As many other ethnographers have pointed out in different contexts for migrant ethnic groups from the Middle East (Şahin 2005, Vertovec 2010, Özyürek 2009, and Çağlar 1998, 2007), I have observed that one of the most significant factors that leads to the creation of collective identities has been the place of origin, and for this group these villages provide a strong basis for their collective identity. Other corollary identification criteria, not only for Kurdish Alevis but also for many other ethno-religious communities in the world, are “tribal” connections or the historical references given to those “tribal” connections that were transformed into claims of place of origin.

Kurdish Alevi social life cannot be defined without reference to music, especially the *saz*.
or bağlama (also known as tembur in Kurdish), a long-necked lute that holds special symbolic significance for the Kurdish Alevi people. Each generation of Kurdish Alevi men teaches this instrument to their sons, as my father did to me when I was a child. For Alevi families, especially for Kurdish Alevis, family socialization with music is a central element of community cohesion. Unlike a Sunni Muslim child raised in a different household and with a different soundscape, many Alevi children like myself grew up with the sound of saz and the Kurdish and Alevi repertoires that surround us. My involvement with Alevism, therefore, is deeply musical, as was my family's.

When I was conducting research in Cologne, İbrahim, a man who had grown up in the Turkish city of Adana, told me that his family had had to hide their Alevi religious practice in order to prevent possible clashes in their relatively conservative and predominantly Sunni-populated neighborhood. İbrahim, a musician and an instructor of bağlama at a local Alevi organization located in the Keupstrasse district in Cologne, told me that he believed that his family managed to be seen as “regular” at their first encounters with their neighbors in Adana thanks to the lack of a distinct accent in their Turkish. Yet that was not the family’s only precaution. İbrahim was also sent to a local Qur’an school in Turkey for five years by his parents, and he recalled that when he was a child his family made a practice of keeping lights on in their house at night during Ramadan in order to make it seem as if they were fasting like Sunni Muslims. In our conversations, İbrahim expressed a belief that this takiyye or dissimulation2 with respect to the Sunni majority was forced upon him by his family solely to protect their well-

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2 Historically many Alevis “in order to avoid persecution took refuge in inaccessible regions, adopting dissimulation (takiyye) as their favored means of defence.” (Massicard 2013: 15)
being, but nonetheless he regretted that this had happened to him. Describing his families’ *takiyye* process, Ibrahim—who was now forty-two years old—noted that certain patterns of speech and pronunciation, for instance, were to be closely guarded so as to avoid possible implications about their city of origin and any other qualities that could possibly distinguish them as “Alevi people.”

Ibrahim’s experience is not uncommon, but between the ways he articulated his experience of dissimulation and the fact that more recently he had become a vocal advocate on behalf of other Kurdish Alevi causes, his story was formative of his upbringing and his future aspirations with regard to his Alevi and Kurdish activism. As a proud Alevi trying to learn and teach his religion to the next generation, Ibrahim is an active participant in political action organizations working to advance Alevi causes. As a proud Kurd, he also is active in Kurdish recognition movements, an example of what philosopher Charles Taylor has called the “politics of recognition” (Taylor and Gutmann 1992). Considering that his situation in Germany was quite different from the one he grew up in, Ibrahim’s experiences led me to think about the current instances of public display by Kurdish Alevis. Over the past thirty years of substantial demographic and social transformation in Germany and Turkey, certain changes have taken place in how Kurdish Alevis express multiple modes of belonging under the rubric of the politics of recognition in two countries and in a transnational space. This dissertation examines the contribution of musical practices disseminated through different media to the politics of recognition among Kurdish Alevis in Germany.

In order to understand this twentieth-century transformation, I delved into history, exploring Kurdish Alevis’ geographic migrations and changing relationship with an avowedly secular Turkish state. I wanted to find out different ways people live Alevism, or the lack
thereof, in its historical context and in multiple locations. Owing largely to masses of people who migrated from Turkey to Germany in the twentieth century, I found a substantial body of scholarship concerning, in turn, Kurds and Alevi who had made the same trip, yet in spite of this emphasis I discovered that the Kurdish Alevi subgroup had not received individual attention. In fact, the population of this subgroup—estimated at over 100,000 individuals in Germany—has not yet been the sole subject of any ethnographic research. I set out to close this gap by investigating the experiences of Kurdish Alevi currently living in Germany who trace their background to locations within the boundaries of the Turkish state through an ethnomusicological lens.

The matter of expressing Kurdish Alevi belonging involves a process of mediation that cannot be isolated within one set of national borders. While Kurdish Alevi in Germany enjoy greater religious freedom than their relatives have done in Turkey, they nevertheless face unique struggles of their own as they are relegated to what I refer to as a “dual minority status” (Kurdish and Alevi). More specifically, in Germany, Kurdish Alevi are vulnerable to the same kinds of discrimination that they experience in Turkey in their encounters with the Turkish Sunni immigrants who constitute the overwhelming majority of the immigrant population in Germany. The Turkish state and its legal apparatus, which subsumes differences among its citizens beneath the blanket categories of “Muslim” or “Turk,” deny Kurdish Alevi’s distinct Alevi religious and Kurdish ethnic modes of belonging. This silencing of concerns and problems specific to Kurdish Alevi living in Turkey is also a feature of the condition of Kurdish Alevi in Germany, except that in Germany Kurdish Alevi are subjected to discrimination at two simultaneous levels: among their Sunni Turkish immigrant peers at workplaces or cultural or social centers as Kurdish Alevi, and among German citizens as Turkish immigrants because, as one of my informants put
it, they “destroy the German Leitkultur (leading culture).” It is crucial to clarify that Kurdish Alevi communities in Turkey and in Germany are not simply minorities but that their minority status in these contexts translates into powerful negatives in the realm of experience.³ Kurdish Alevi communities in Germany find themselves part of two minority populations, by virtue of both their Turkish background and their difference from “other Turks.” I realized that to account for this my investigation into the shifting terms of belonging would necessitate my engaging both the population of Kurdish Alevi communities living in Germany and the population living in Turkey.

For this dissertation, then, I engage the full extent of the German-Türkiye’li transnational space (see below). Drawing primarily on research conducted among Kurdish Alevi communities in Cologne and Istanbul, this study investigates the transnational space opened up by modern media such as internet social networking technologies in order to analyze changes in a set of ethnic and religious identity expressions and struggles expressed through music that is unique to Kurdish Alevi communities with roots in contemporary Turkey.

Probably as much as anything else, however, this dissertation is about my own search and struggle for finding and defining my family’s identity (ies). Raised as Kurdish-speaking in Turkey, with a self-conscious Alevi upbringing, and with a left-leaning political stance embracing secularism as one of the most significant political issues throughout my life, I share with my informants in Germany and in Turkey many aspects of their own life experiences.

My hometown, Antakya, is one of the most culturally diverse cities in Turkey. Predominantly populated by people of Arab descent, it is characterized in particular by the

³ I believe it is important for this study to distinguish between being a minority and suffering negative consequences based on that minority status. In many cases in the world, minorities have
coexistence of many religious groups. In Antakya, things were not as difficult for me as they were for Ibrahim and other Kurdish Alevi immigrants, surviving as members of a small minority among Sunni majority groups (Beşikçi 1997, Zürcher 2004). As many of our friends and neighbors were Nusayris or Alawites— who all shared the same fate with other Alevis in the sense that they were subjected to the Islamic assimilation, or Sunnification, policies of the “secular” Turkish state—my family members did not have to fear government reprisal when they acknowledged our Alevi identity in Antakya. Still, when my late grandmother was bidding me farewell as I left home for the first time to attend college in Istanbul, she cautioned me to never tell anyone that I am Alevi and/or Kurd. I was not sure what to expect when she repeatedly warned me about keeping our family’s background a secret, but sure enough once in Istanbul I heard that “Alevis do mum söndü,” “candle extinguishing” (implying orgies and incest), and phrases like “en iyi Kürt ölü Kürt’tür,” “the best Kurds in the world are those who are dead.” Thus, it is significant for the writing of this dissertation that I have struggled to find possible explanations for my own identification since early childhood. After moving to Istanbul, I had to hide, sometimes lie about, and sometimes ignore everything I learned from my parents, grandparents, and other family members regarding our past, our religion, our ethnicity, and all the social identities that I and we had embraced and had to struggle with. I have had to navigate the place of religion, ethnic and national belonging, assimilation, integration, tolerance, multiculturalism, solidarity, citizenship, political mobilization, and artistic expression in my own daily life. Put simply, the issues this dissertation problematizes are the ones I have struggled to address in my life.

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exercised power over the majority, as in virtually any instance of colonialism, for example.
Finally, my research shows that music has been a particularly important medium through which Kurdish Alevis in Turkey and Germany have shared narratives of collective histories and reproduced a common vocabulary of belonging. While conducting research in Germany I was surprised by the prominence of what I call “alebesk,” a musical genre that I associated with Kurdish Alevis along with others in Turkey. Furthermore, I was surprised when one elderly Kurdish Alevi whom I interviewed referred to sound—and musical sound in particular—both as the metaphor and as the means through which members of the community realized their belonging. “Imagine a lonely orphan in the dark,” he said to me. “He hears many noises and then suddenly he hears something familiar, something safe, reminding him of his family. That is how we [Kurdish Alevis] found each other, via the bağlama and the songs we sing and listen to together.” For this man, and for many Kurdish Alevis, even in spite of the pain and dispersal that figure so prominently in that collective history, rearticulating connections through music provided them with a source of strength.

1.2. Situation of the Research Subject: Kurdish Alevis

Who are the Kurdish Alevis? Since no official census figures account for Kurdish or Alevi people in either Turkey or Germany, it is difficult to pinpoint the size of this population. According to widely accepted estimates, there are around fifteen million Kurds living in Turkey and 300,000 in Germany, of whom the majority are Sunni Muslims while approximately one third are Alevi. On the other hand, varying estimates place the total population of Alevis in Turkey at around twenty-five million, of whom a quarter (slightly over six million) are Kurdish while the remaining nineteen million are of Turkish, Arab, or Albanian (who are Bektaşı) origin. I use the term Alevi, like almost all that call themselves such, to include the people categorized
under the larger Alevi-Bektaşi tent that has been used to label all heterodox groups in Anatolia in the 20th century. In the current public discourse in Turkey and elsewhere, Alevis and Bektaşis use the labels Alevi and Alevi-Bektaşi interchangeably to refer to all of those heterodox groups. Figure 1.1 summarizes some ethno-religious groups in Turkey, categorized according to the native language of the members in relation to the two largest linguistic groups, namely the Turkish- and Kurdish- speaking. The Turkish-speaking Alevi groups include the Tahtacı, Çepni 4, and Abdal, whereas the Kurdish-speaking Alevis include both Kurmancî and Zazakî speakers, some of whom identify themselves as Kızılbaş.

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4 For one of the most detailed accounts of the Çepni to this date see Gökbalp 1980.
Bearing this in mind, we may begin by noting that Alevism (Alevilik, Elewi, and Kızılbaş) is an Anatolian religion whose relations to both Sunni and Shi'a Islam are historically controversial. Markus Dressler defines Alevis as "a number of heterogeneous socio-religious communities in Turkey and the Balkans, historically referred to as Kızılbaş, who in the twentieth century began to share in a common trans-regional Alevi identity called Alevism" (2008: 93). According to Zeidan (1999), Turkish Alevis, mainly from Central and Eastern Anatolia, constitute the majority of Alevis in Turkey. A quarter of Alevis are ethnic Kurds speaking

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5 For a detailed map of ethnic groups in Turkey see Andrews and Benninghaus (1989).
Kurmancî or Zazakî (Dimîli). Kurmancî is the most commonly spoken Kurdish language among some thirty million Kurds in the world, the majority of whom live within the borders of Turkey. Most Kurmancî speakers are Sunni Muslim while a small minority (approximately 20%) is Alevi. Zazakî is the language, sometimes categorized as one of the dialects of Kurdish by Kurdish nationalists, spoken by the residents of cities in Turkish Kurdistan including Tunceli, Elazığ, and Diyarbakır. More than half of Zazakî speakers are Alevi though not all of these identify as Kurds (Kaya 2011). Thomas Solomon (2011), in discussing the diversity of the immigrant population from Turkey in Germany, eloquently summarizes the “dizzying array of multiple identities” among the larger “Turkish community” as:

Even the category “Kurd” is not transparent, as it also includes significant overlapping sub-groups based on linguistic or sectarian identities, including Kurmancî speakers and Zazakî speakers (Kurmancî and Zazakî are not mutually intelligible languages); speakers of both of these languages may be Sunni Muslim or Alevi, and the latter of these may privilege their Alevi identity over their “Kurdishness,” feeling they have more in common with Turkish-speaking Alevis than with Kurmancî or Zazakî-speaking Sunnis.

Throughout the decades following the establishment of the Turkish republic in 1923, the environment of hostility in Turkey led many Alevis to reify as Alevi religious/cultural symbols and memories of the pogroms of Maraş (1978), Çorum (1980), Sivas (1993), and Gazi (1995)

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6 Although Kurdistan has been known for centuries as the geographical location populated mostly by Kurds (along with Turkmens and Arabs among others), it is still a politically charged...
among others, in which hundreds of Alevis were massacred by mobs or state troopers. During my research, I heard about those events in almost all of my conversations, a testament to how the stories have come to form a significant part of Alevi cultural memory. The Alevi reverence of martyrdom, part of the Alevi cultural memory that can also be observed in other Shi'a groups, exemplifies the use of historical narrative to create a common past as part of a community. The notion of martyrdom continues to dominate Alevi and Kurdish personal and collective narratives, resembling those of Jews, Shias, Palestinians, and Sikhs, among many other ethno-religious groups. Alevis have been reminding their children and grandchildren about their ancestors who suffered for centuries under Sunni rule, from Sultan Selim II of the Ottoman Empire up through the Sivas massacre in 1993 and the Gazi events in Istanbul 1995. In his recent work Bir Siyeset Tarzı Olarak Alevi Katliamları (Alevi Massacres as Political Strategy, 2011), Mehmet Bayrak summarizes the Alevi massacres committed, directed, or allowed to be committed by the Sunni citizens of the Republic of Turkey and the Ottoman Empire. Although it is impossible to find actual state documents that will reveal that those were part of an official state policy, the long sequence of massacres reinforces the inherent distrust that Alevis feel against any form of the Sunni state apparatus. Those massacres suggest that either by ordering or allowing a certain group of people to harm Alevis, the state managed to exert power over its “dangerous” citizens. This sequence also reinforces the Alevi narrative around martyrdom and the problems that stem from a Sunni-controlled state.

Thus, a historical narrative filled with the atrocities committed against Alevis has been used to remind Alevis, especially Kurdish Alevis, to never trust the Turkish Sunni state, as

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label and term in Turkey.
almost all of the atrocities committed against Alevis targeted Kurdish Alevis in Maraş, Gazi, Malatya, and Sivas. As Kurds, Kurdish Alevis have been subjected to constant assimilation and forced migration policies by the Turkish state coupled with a constant denial of their ethnic and linguistic rights. Massacres and other forms of atrocities committed against Kurds and Alevis were used to create local heroes in Kurdish Alevi narratives, which have been transmitted from generation to generation. Kurmancî Alevis from Maraş and Malatya, for instance, have many heroic songs and laments written for Mehmet Ali, who was sentenced to death in 1915 after he allegedly helped Armenian fighters. In practice, the dominant Sunni Muslim jurisprudence in Turkey does not accept Alevism as a legitimate religious denomination, within Islam or separate from it (Dressler 2013, Tambar 2010).

During my fieldwork, Kurdish Alevis mentioned the Sivas Massacre more than any other event that they have talked about both publicly and privately. One of the main reasons has been that it was one of the most tragic events that happened to public figures, including musicians and novelists. The victims, most whom were famous Alevi musicians such as Hasret Gültekin, Nesimi Çimen, and Muhlis Akarsu, along with dancers, poets, scholars and intellectuals, were in Sivas to attend a cultural/religious festival on July 3, 1993. The attendees were trapped inside a hotel called Madımak and mobs of Sunni residents and lay people burned the hotel down. The massacre has made its way through the most indispensable moments of Alevi social memory (see Özyürek 2001 for social memory in Turkey). Alevi identification became more visible especially after the Sivas Massacre. It became a political and organizational milestone for Alevis to organize and remember the massacre on all occasions. Today, the commemorations of anniversary of the massacre are among the most significant events that the Alevis I interviewed attend regularly in order to protest. Especially after this event, one could see a change in the tone
of Alevi activism, which led to a change in hometown organization titles to include Alevi, Bektaşi or other titles associated with Alevi religiosity. Almost identical with what the 1984 Sikh massacre in Punjab, located in the imagined Sikh homeland of “Khalistan,” did to organize Sikhs around a unified objective (Axel 2001); the Sivas Massacre was instrumental in unifying a political message for Alevis. The reaction was much stronger among Alevis in Germany than among those living in Turkey, which in a sense helped galvanize all Alevi organizations to mobilize, creating a transnational social field that strategically located Alevis, especially Kurdish Alevis, in opposition to the Turkish state.

A reliable December 2012 poll commissioned by the main opposition party (CHP, the secularist Republican People's Party) among Alevis in Turkey clearly describes the state of living for Alevis in Turkey (Akkiraz 2012). The poll reveals that even in the year 2012, the majority of Alevis in Turkey claim they have no freedom of religion or freedom to worship. Commissioned by the CHP Istanbul deputy Sabahat Akkiraz (a famous Alevi singer-turned politician), the poll indicates that the plurality of Alevi communities in Turkey cite the lack of legal status for cemevis (Alevi religious centers for prayer and communal gathering) as the most important problem for their community's religious practice (*Hürriyet Daily News*, December 17th, 2012). In the same poll, 67 percent of self-identified Alevis say they must hide their Alevi identity. One of the most pertinent questions for this study arose when Alevis were asked about their religious identity. Informants identified themselves as the following:

- 60 percent Alevi
- **18 percent Kurdish Alevi**
- 10 percent Turkmen Alevi
- 9 percent Muslim
- 3 percent Atheist
One revealing aspect of this study is that about one in five Alevis identify their religion as “Kurdish Alevi,” with the implication that “Alevi” does not express their identification enough so that they express the need for being identified with their ethnic belonging along with their religion. Categories of “Kurdish Alevi” and “Alevi”, among others, may well be selected by Kurmancı and Zazakî speakers. There is little doubt that some Kurdish Alevis reply to the same questions with other options such as “Alevi” or “atheist”; however, this point is significant as it highlights a clear public articulation by Kurdish Alevis of their differences from other Alevis.

When asked their views of the most important problem facing Alevis, 42 percent responded with the absence of legal status or protection for cemevis, while 27 percent cited compulsory religion courses (teaching solely the foundations of Sunni Islam) and 16 percent cited assimilation to Islam. The issue of the lack of legal status for cemevis has recently become more visible. On July 7, 2012, the CHP's Tunceli deputy, Hüseyin Aygün, appealed to the Speaker of the House for a cemevi to be established in the Turkish Parliament. Speaker Cemil Çiçek refused the deputy’s request by referring to the Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı (DİB, Department of Religious Affairs governed by the Prime Minister), which says that the sole house of worship for Islam is the mosque and that "Alevism is not a separate religion." In another recent incident, Turkey's Supreme Court of Appeals ruled on July 25, 2012 that only mosques and masjids (prayer rooms) could legally be considered defined places of worship for citizens of Turkey, overruling a request to register a cemevi in Ankara as a house of worship. These two incidents emphasize once again the extreme difficulty for Alevis to obtain official recognition and constitutional protection of their religious rights in Turkey today.
1.3. Migration History of Kurdish Alevis in Turkey and Germany

There are approximately four million people in Germany with roots in Turkey, but of those, the vast majority initially migrated from their villages to Istanbul or other Turkish metropoles, where they settled briefly before finally moving beyond the national boundaries. This migration process began as part of a larger movement of Kurds along with Turks in the early twentieth century (Ammann 2001). In many cases, migration meant moving to make a living in different locations where one could find jobs and economic security, but it is inaccurate to assume that migration is voluntary, and this is especially true in the case of Kurdish Alevis. In the early years of the Turkish Republic, repressive state policies also prompted dramatic shifts in the geographical distribution of the population and forced many Kurdish Alevis to leave their homes and resettle in predominantly Sunni Muslim cities. The Turkish nation-state physically deported people and in some cases they were otherwise coerced. Nevertheless, despite moving west and south throughout the 1940s and 1950s, many retained contact with their relatives and searched out fellow Kurdish Alevis to create new bonds of community in their homeland. In the 1960s and 1970s, a second migration movement was underway to search for social, economic, and political security. Kurdish Alevis began moving from small towns where they had resettled in western and southern Turkey, heading toward urban centers in the north.

By the time of my research in the early twenty-first century, my informants, Kurdish Alevi migrants in Istanbul and Cologne, predominantly traced their origins to the towns of Maraş, Malatya, and Adıyaman. Those living in the European part of Istanbul concentrate in the Bağcılar, Bahçelievler, and Yenibosna neighborhoods, and those living on the Asian side of the city live in districts such as Kadıköy, Maltepe, and Ümraniye. In most cases, Kurdish Alevis in Istanbul live in neighborhoods also populated by Sunni Turks as well as other (non-Alevi) Kurds.
The three figures below (Figure 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4) show the locations of the three homelands that I talk about throughout this dissertation. The first location is in the middle of the three cities that constitute a triangle in southeastern Turkey, where most of the Kurdish Alevis used to live. Now almost all Kurdish Alevis live either in their second or third homelands.

Figure 1.2. First Homeland of Kurdish Alevis

The second homeland they settled in is the city of Istanbul, in which they established networks based on kinship and prior relationships.
Figure 1.3. From the First Homeland to the Second
Figure 1.4. From Second Homeland to the Third

The force of discrimination and the occasional outright violence exerted by the Turkish state against its Kurdish Alevi citizens have resulted in a continuing and significant exodus, and the majority of these refugees have fled to Germany. The first wave of Kurdish Alevis to settle in Germany (along with other guest workers from Turkey) began arriving in the early 1960s as part of the immigrant labor agreement signed between German and Turkish governments. As migrant laborers, they were expected to revitalize Germany's manufacturing industry and rebuild its post-WWII war-torn cities, and then afterward simply to leave. Germany and Turkey signed an agreement for temporary foreign workers, also known as *Gastarbeiter* (guestworkers), on 31 October 1961. In the first year of the agreement, 7000 workers were settled in Germany to work
in mainly low-skilled jobs. Many workers from Turkey (including Kurdish Alevis among others) who came to Germany as guestworkers did not leave as they earned much better social security and economic advantages in their new homeland. To the contrary, many stayed legally or illegally. Even though the agreement between Germany and Turkey ended in 1973, the German government could not stop the migration of workers from Turkey. In the years after the immigration agreement ended, some Kurdish Alevis left Turkey and entered Germany illegally. The late 1970s and early 1980s were a tumultuous time in Turkey and with their security jeopardized by political clashes, a second major wave of Kurdish Alevis--especially those politically active members of Marxist and Leninist parties in Turkey--migrated to Germany as well. The second wave arrived in the late 1970s due to the political tensions that preceded the military coup d'état of 1980 in Turkey. While the first group was admitted as temporary guestworkers, the second group comprised refugees or asylum seekers.

Kurdish Alevis have settled in cities such as Hamburg, Berlin, Stuttgart, and Cologne, where they have relied on established family networks. As Martin Sökefeld documents in his important work on Alevis, the first Alevi organization was established in Hamburg and more followed suit (Sökefeld 2008). The Kurdish Alevis I studied have set up enclaves in the Cologne area such as those in Bergish Gladbach, downtown Cologne, Wuppertal, and Essen. There are Kurdish Alevi communities in different districts in Cologne and in other parts of the country as well. The scope of this study was limited to the Kurdish Alevis living in or near Cologne in order to narrow the sample to get a cohesive picture of their music. Studies of the communities living near other large cities such as Berlin would provide different opportunities, perhaps resulting in different findings. Berlin's special situation with its historical division (East-West), reunification, and subsequent anti-immigrant sentiment in the post-unification period, along with the
establishment of large enclaves of Kurds and Turks, would make this kind of study too difficult to conduct. By all accounts, with its manageable size, Cologne provided a microcosm for investigating all of my research questions. The presence of all Alevi and Kurdish organizations in Cologne provided a full picture more accurate than in any other location in Germany. Another reason I studied the Kurdish Alevis in the vicinity of Cologne is that Cologne is regarded by many as the most multicultural city in Germany, an opinion shared by many of my informants.

For this whole community in Cologne, the older generation of guestworkers were mostly male, and then they gradually brought their families or intermarried with Germans establishing families in Germany. Among the older generation, there are a lot more men. Almost all immigrant households I have been to for this study shared similar demographic features with their fellow Kurdish Alevis in Istanbul. Most members of the Kurdish Alevi immigrant groups are employed at full-time jobs. Musicians and other artists I met generally have college or higher degrees as opposed to the median education level of high school diploma among all Alevi groups.

Municipalities and other local governmental organizations help immigrants to learn German and find jobs in various sectors. Cultural centers, including Alevi cultural centers, are providing job placement workshops, vocational training, and other supportive activities for community members. Since the stigma about the immigrants among Germans has been that those immigrants have been draining federal welfare funds instead of working at jobs to support their families, most Alevi and Kurdish organizations have been working to improve the employment conditions of their community members. Kurdish Alevis I met own or run diners, cafes, restaurants, bars, and mobile phone shops, while some have high-paying jobs at private companies or governmental institutions. Some Kurdish Alevi women also own or manage
businesses, like Meryem, who helped for this study tremendously and is managing a türkü bar and a restaurant.

Compared to immigrants, the majority of whom are German citizens, Kurdish Alevi refugees are the most vulnerable and the most dependent to the governmental support among all foreigner groups in Germany. That is why the federal government and local institutions have initiated job placement programs to reduce their level of dependency on government funds. For the refugees, due to the placement conditions and logistical and political reasons, there has been more gender segregation in their relationships with people from Turkey. For example, my cousin Evrim, a refugee settled in Wuppertal by the German local immigration authorities, has almost no close male friends among the Kurdish Alevis she has contacts with.

1.4. Situation of the Agents in the Field

In pursuit of identifying the newly established Türkiye’li (people from Turkey) transnational social field and its principal actors, this dissertation tracks changes in the major agents within Kurdish Alevi life in the 20th century. Formerly those agents were Ağa (tribal leader and/or landowner), Dede (religious leader of Alevis), and State, modifying the formulation of Martin van Bruinessen whose classic study of Kurdistan is entitled Ağa, Sheikh, and State (1978). Who are the new agents in the modern contexts of the three homelands? What kinds of agencies have emerged in this new era? In what ways are musicians benefiting from this

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7 Levitt and Glick Schiller (2004) remind us that “social fields are multi-dimensional and encompass structured interactions of differing forms, depth, and breadth that are differentiated in social theory by terms like “organization,” “institution,” “networks,” and “social movement.”
environment and from the transnational space? The new agents that affect the socio-political and cultural lives of Kurdish Alevis emerged in the last hundred years or so and include the nation state, agents of the neoliberal system, and the religio-political parties which include hometown associations (HTAs) as well as all forms of religious, political, and cultural organizations with political agendas.

Below is a table (Table 1) based on my research and on theoretical writings regarding societal shifts among Kurdish Alevis. I narrowed down the list of possible agents to identify major old and new agents by drawing on social theory in conjunction with critical theory. The field, as I understand Bourdieu's term (1984), is a meaningful heuristic in social sciences in understanding the constructed modalities in human interactions regarding the control of power through the use of different kinds of capital: social, political, and cultural. Sometimes agents are significant, but the most important issue is the question of what makes a field a field. I answer these questions by seeking to understand which agencies exert power with respect to those types of capital within this community. The old agents could, and in some instances would, exert influence in the new system. I start with the initial agents of ağa’s, Sufi lodges, ocaks and dedes, and the nation-states as the institutions that exercise authority over members of Kurdish Alevi communities in their first homelands. The historical significance of dedes in Alevi social life stems from not only their religious authority and guidance but also their legal and social functions in the communities they engage with. Four major new agents are involved in the livelihoods of Kurdish Alevis in the multiple locales they now inhabit. These new agents have affected each other in multiple ways and to varying degrees. The religio-political party agents, cultural entrepreneurs (i.e. musicians and artists), nation-states, and neoliberal system agents such as multinational corporations and suprational institutions such as IMF, World Bank,
and European Commission along with EU-affiliated interest groups shape the new transnational social field of Kurdish Alevi life.

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<th>Old Agents</th>
<th>New Agents</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>(First Homeland)</strong></td>
<td><strong>(Second and Third Homelands)</strong></td>
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<td>Ottoman Empire then Republic of Turkey</td>
<td>Republic of Turkey and Germany</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ağaş (The landowners or the tribal leaders)</td>
<td>Religio-Political Parties</td>
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<td>Sufi Lodges</td>
<td>Neoliberal System Agents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ocaks and Dedes (Religious leaders)</td>
<td>Cultural Entrepreneurs</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1.5. A Typology of Agents in Kurdish Alevi Life

Among Kurdish Alevis, I have observed that parties and organizations that coalesce around Alevi causes, including the hometown associations, are actively involved in accruing political capital that they could use to further their political and economic interests while claiming that they act on a religious basis. Although the Alevi organizations' political capital might not have been as strong as that of other groups, such as that of Sunnis constituting overwhelming majorities in both Turkey and among immigrants from Turkey in Germany, many Alevi organizations and parties attempt to use Alevi voting power in elections in Turkey and Germany in order to further their political interests. Thus, I argue that in the Alevi context, the religious is identical with the cultural as well as with the political. In the current situation, there are no clear-cut differences between the political and religious spheres, especially when it comes to the domains where Kurdish Alevis have been active in the politics of recognition. That is why
I intentionally hyphenate the religious and political parties to call them religio-political parties. I could not precisely track the differences between political alignment and loyalty building organizations among Alevis around "religious" organizations and among Kurds around "political" parties. The Kurdish political claim and Alevi religious claim are both made in a political sphere where both religious and political parties have to compete in the same ways, with the same tools, and in my study’s case, by mobilizing the same group of people.

The political nature of religiosity in the Alevi case is a significant example of what Talal Asad has suggested with respect to the distinction between the secular, as a Eurocentric understanding of religion, and the religious that is defined as its opposite (Asad 1993, 2003). Building on Asad's assertion, I argue that the ambiguity in defining Alevism stems from Muslims’ and non-Muslims’ adoption of Protestant or Western European approaches to defining non-Christian religions and beliefs from the perspectives of the old actors in power, most significantly nation-states. In the case of Alevism, the Turkish state apparatus adapted this notion to the extent that it created the boundaries of Alevism by defining religion (a Turkish version of Sunni Islam) and its own secularism.

Most Kurdish Alevis treat “religious” organizations such as Almanya Alevi Birlikleri Federasyonu (AABF, Federation of Alevi Unions of Germany), Hacı Bektaş-ı Veli Kültür ve Tanıtma Derneği (HBVKTD, Hacı Bektaş-ı Veli Culture and Information Association), and Federasyona Elewiyan Kurdistani (FEK, Federation of Kurdistan Alevis), and political organizations such as PKK (Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan, Kurdistan Workers’ Party), PSK (Kurdistan Socialist Party), and TİKKO (Türkiye İşçi Köylü Kurtuluş Ordusu, Liberation Army of Turkish Workers and Peasants) in the same way. In most cases, my informants would be members of only one of those organizations.
The main argument of this dissertation is that a new field has emerged in the transnational space for Kurdish Alevi cultural entrepreneurs, whose influence has gradually increased in the last two decades. Kaya identifies the transnational space as “a wider spectrum of social, cultural, political, and economic transactions among transnational subjects, families, institutions, corporations, networks, images, figures, languages, discourses, arts, rituals, cuisines, and symbols” (Kaya 2007: 485). He calls the space created by immigrants and refugees from Turkey in Germany a German-Turkish transnational space, which also constitutes the space that the subjects of this dissertation have engaged in creating a new transnational social field. I extend Kaya’s formulation of German-Turkish transnational space to include all people from Turkey by referring to it as the German-

Türkiye’li transnational space. Thus, whenever I use transnational space, I refer to this German-

Türkiye’li transnational space in which transnational all German, Turkish, Kurdish, and Alevi identities and subjects are mediated.

In the newly emerging transnational field, the most mobile actors moving back and forth among the cities in Germany and Turkey have been those I call cultural entrepreneurs. Two of the most significant informants of my study, namely Shêxo and Ali Baran, epitomize the figure of the artist-activist, the socially committed and politically engaged cultural entrepreneur. Both Ali Baran's and Shêxo's songs make social statements about the problems Kurdish Alevi society faces. Both men were also involved in political and social organizations. Through their music, they exemplify a form of activism that can be presented through art and media and is illustrated in their albums. The category of cultural entrepreneurs also includes musicians, organizers, producers, and other artists who are involved in the struggle for power over the cultural capital of Alevis and Kurds. Each entrepreneur acts according to his or her own political agenda. In the new transnational field, cultural entrepreneurs move back and forth between three homelands in
order to maintain the shared cultural and social memories of the members. These actors also benefit significantly from the popular culture industry by appropriating the cultural capital of Alevis and Kurds, in some cases to the extent of exploitation, by selling albums, giving concerts, and organizing events benefiting from the consumption of these cultural products. For instance, many musicians make money out of producing, releasing, and performing live the religious music of Alevis.

Furthermore, the names of many Alevi organizations in Turkey include the title “culture,” which in many cases has worked as a shield as they are not allowed to establish religious organizations, especially when those would be seen as a threat to the dominant “secular” Turkish nation-state (Tambar 2010). Even as recently as July 2012, the Turkish Parliament would not pass any legislation that would designate legitimate Alevi religious spaces, namely cemevi, in Turkey. Accordingly, the current spaces that Alevis use for worship are not legally registered as religious spaces; rather they were opened as "cultural" centers. Another reason for having named many Alevi institutions as cultural institutions has been that many leftist and agnostic Alevi youth, who rebelled against all local tribal, feudal, and religious authorities in the 1970s as part of the dominant Marxist discourse labeling religion as "opium," perceived Alevism as solely a secular lifestyle, not as part of a “dogmatic” practice. Therefore, the political, religious, and cultural domains that shape Kurdish Alevi lives are intermingled. One of the best ways to understand the complexity of shifts in the social, cultural, religious, and political fields of Kurdish Alevis is to analyze the music they make and enjoy in settings that favor isolated cultural acts that could reveal significant traits of shared cultural memories.
1.5. Situation of the Study within Anthropology and Ethnomusicology

To investigate the music of an ethno-religious double minority from Turkey living outside its homeland in Germany, I have drawn on thematics from both anthropology and ethnomusicology. This dissertation integrates migration and diaspora studies with music, social movements and networks, and the politics of recognition. Studies of Alevi and Kurdish diaspora formations as well as ethnomusicological works that deal with the music in and from diasporas ground the project within Turkish, Kurdish, diaspora, and minority music studies. Martin Stokes' insightful works on Turkish music and *arabesk* (1992), ethnicity and music (1994), and Alevis (1996) are used to understand how notions of ethnic belonging have developed and have been expressed among Kurdish Alevis over the last three decades. Important cultural-anthropological and ethnomusicological works dealing specifically with Alevis provide the Alevi pillar of the project (Neyzi 2002, Markoff 1986, 2002, Dinçer 2004, Öztürkmen 2005, Kaya 1998 and 2000). I also draw from works dealing with Kurds and multiple identities among Kurdish Alevis (van Bruinessen 1992, 1997, Gezik 2012), Kurdish Alevi history and music (Bayrak 1997, 2004, 2006), and music of an imagined homeland, Turkey (and to some extent Kurdistan), in Germany (Greve 2003).

I approach Kurdish Alevi immigrants and refugees as a transnational community (Solomon 2005, Sökefeld 2006) struggling *with* and *for* the formation of multiple identities among its members. The transnational quality of this group lies not only in the character of Alevi religious identity, but also in the Kurdish identity that has been influential among the members of the community living in their second and third homelands, especially with the reinforcement of Kurdish nationalist movements like the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party, which is the most powerful Kurdish nationalist organization active since 1979; see Chapter 3 for more). In Chapter
2. I problematize the application of the diaspora concept that is used indiscriminately by scholars on the Kurds and Alevi. I interrogate the use of diaspora as a conceptual tool for analyzing the identities and loyalties of the Kurdish Alevi population in Germany, drawing on recent scholarship on the subject of diaspora (Brubaker 2005, Dufoix 2008).

1.5.1. A Note on Identity

In this dissertation, I regard identity as a socially constructed and collectively claimed concept with boundaries that are constantly contested and redefined by political and social actors. Drawing on Stuart Hall's assertions regarding identities' location in social space, this dissertation builds on the understanding of defined and continuously contested social constructs resulting in collective claims-making for groups whose members may or may not come from the same ethno-religious backgrounds (Hall 1992, 1996). Hall writes that identities

... are about questions of using the resources of history, language, and culture in the process of being: not 'who we are' or 'where we came from,' so much as what we might become, how we have been represented and how that bears on how we might represent ourselves. Identities are therefore constituted within, not outside representation. They relate to the invention of tradition as much as to tradition itself, which they oblige us to read not as an endless reiteration but as 'the changing same': not the so called return to roots but coming-to-terms-with our "routes." (Hall 1996: 3-4)

In this sense, individuals of the same ethnic or religious affiliations might have simultaneously diverging and converging political agendas that enable them to coalesce around specific socially
constructed forms or modes of belonging, i.e. identities. The unsolidified nature of these modes of belonging is evidenced by the fact that they can be manipulated, redefined, and reproduced by multiple social and political agents. The initial tribal or kinship boundaries grow into different social and political loyalties surfacing at different points in time, with different manifestations among people with the same ethno-religious backgrounds.

Identity is a key element in theorizations of meaning and representation. Modes of representation and cultural poetics become primary for my research in tracing narratives that have been articulated among Kurdish Alevis in the last three decades. In analyzing and comparing the production of cultural texts (mainly the albums and performances) and the personal narratives of the artists and authors of those cultural texts, I tackle the various underlying currents of multiple identity construction. Kurdish Alevis’ personal and collective identifications could inform us about the possible audiences who consume the music that this study is researching and the possible candidates to be recruited by the religio-political parties. Documenting the life histories of my subjects, in conjunction with the production of their cultural texts, was a major part of my research objective. My approach is to explain cultural texts within their historical context in order to understand the cultural memory of Kurdish Alevis.

In some instances, a specific identity marker that is claimed by the members of a specific group might refer to a mode or form of belonging that was totally lost or has been reinvented, like many other invented modes of belonging and imagined communities (Anderson 1991 and Hobsbawm 1990). Furthermore, imagined communities are not only imagined by members who share the same imagination, but by those who might imagine a community in contrary ways. For example, with respect to an imagined Turkish identity, there are those who imagine an invented Turkish community as pluralistic rather than monolithic, embracing ethnic and religious
differences. Others imagine “Turkish identity” representing a more homogenous or even monolithic community. Building on differences in understandings of imagined communities, there follows the problematic attribution of a static or unchanging quality to the communities, both by their members and by outsiders who label them. This assumption ignores the fact that socially constructed imagined communities, and by extension, identities claimed and contested around those imaginings, evolve through time and space along with the boundaries and linkages of the people who claim, challenge, and negotiate around them. Finally, members of those groups can bend the putatively ascribed categories that define the boundaries of those contested identities. In that sense, categories that people use to distinguish themselves from others become more blurry and fluid than they were once thought to be by members and non-members alike. Scholars studying those groups have too often re-essentialized certain categories, as many recent works suggest (Brubaker 2013). In the end, the self-inflicted ambiguities among Kurdish Alevis have been exacerbated by multiple assertions regarding the categories to which the members of this group supposedly belong.

Throughout this dissertation, I deal with the entanglement of the categories of politics, culture, and religion among Kurdish Alevis in multiple homelands and in transnational space. One of the key issues I had to contend with was to reframe the discussion of culture, politics, and religion to better approach Kurdish Alevi discourses of belonging through music, which has become an embodiment of all three at once.

1.6. Situation of the Researcher and Methodology

My interest in the music of Alevis and then in the ethnomusicology of Asia Minor led me to become a founding member of a band called Kardeş Türküler [Ballads of Solidarity], a
popular and progressive experimental folk music group performing in multiple languages in Turkey in the late 1990s and the 2000s. This ensemble, established at Boğaziçi University in İstanbul, performed the music of Anatolia, the Balkans, and the Caucasus, with a specific interest in Kurdish and Alevi music. The group's repertoire was research-based, relying heavily on multi-ethnic musical archives and field trips in Turkey where traditional folk tunes were recorded in the village context. From 1995 to 2002 we gave concerts in many cities across Europe and Turkey. During that time, the band released four solo albums and a joint production with Şivan Perwer, perhaps the most famous Kurdish musician alive today. By being involved with the production and dissemination of Kurdish, Turkish, and Alevi music as a member of Kardeş Türküler, I witnessed and participated in the emergence of a new transnational field maintained by Kurdish-Turkish-Alevi cultural entrepreneurs.

Historically, artists and musicians in their second and third homelands have been able to bend the first homeland aesthetic norms, not only by cultural but also by political modes of conduct, in order to achieve their political agendas. In some cases, artists have managed to create their own aesthetic, sending it back to the first homeland, in the form of social remittances (Levitt 2001) or cultural remittances (Flores 2009). Kurdish Alevis maintain ties with their origins. For example, many who reside in Istanbul tend to return to their villages in the summer. More significantly, in the past several decades, many have started investing millions of euros to improve the living conditions in villages. I argue that music functions like remittances: it is a means of communication, mobilization and, ultimately, transformation of the Kurdish Alevi communities in both Germany and Turkey. To that end, in later chapters of this study, I compare and contrast Kurdish Alevis' religious and traditional music and lives in Germany to those in Istanbul and their ancestral villages.
This dissertation is based on multi-sited ethnography (Marcus 1998) and participant observation in the three homelands that I conceptualized above. To understand the cultural formations and cohorts within the Kurdish Alevi communities in Cologne and Istanbul, I participated in cultural events sponsored by different social and political organizations that provide an arena for Kurdish and Alevi sociability and socio-political outreach and organizing. In addition, my research included participant observation at weddings among the members of the communities; at intimate muhabbet gatherings where the members of the communities sang together; and at türkü bars (Rebecca Bryant (2005) calls them saz bars) located in Cologne, all of which constitute significant spaces of Kurdish and Alevi socio-musical practices. Aside from in-depth interviews with the people attending those events, I had the chance to perform in several venues with various musicians, which enabled me to see the cultural codes, performance settings, power relationships between audience and musicians, and cultural intimacy that could be missed from the other side of the stage. I played the saz and sang some tunes from the repertoire I know. I was not immune to istekler (audience song requests) either, so I did my best to perform what I could after I received a couple of those requests.

As a Turkish-born Kurdish Alevi musician, my ethnic and religious background allowed for liberal access to, and a greater understanding of, the exclusive events of Kurdish Alevis. The first phase of the tripartite research was conducted in Istanbul, where I observed the state of current music-making of Kurdish Alevis in their second homeland. Through interviews with Kurdish and Alevi musicians, producers, and consumers, the fieldwork traced current trends in the cultural and musical life of Kurdish Alevis. In Istanbul, I visited particular cemevis in

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8 Generic term used to refer to all Turkish folk songs and sometimes applied to Kurmanci songs.
different districts of the city (such as Yenibosna and Karaca Ahmet Cemevi) and attended *cem* ceremonies to broaden my view of Alevi religious musical practices in metropolitan areas. Through extensive interviews with dedes in charge of those ceremonies, I am now able to trace current trends in the cultural and musical life of Alevis. The second phase was dedicated to research in the first homelands of the Kurdish Alevis. There, I observed the Alevi dedes who live or regularly visit Kurdish Alevis of Maraş and Malatya and conduct their *semah* (dances in circle during the *cem* ceremonies) rituals. In the days I stayed in Maraş and Malatya, I also attended weddings and other social gatherings in order to learn more about the local performance settings.

In the third phase of the fieldwork, I spent time in the houses, weddings, *türkü bars*, *cemevis*, and other cultural centers that are run by Kurdish Alevis who live in the Cologne vicinity. I chose to work in Cologne for several reasons as mentioned in I.3 above. Personal connections enabled me to adapt easily and begin work from the first day of my arrival in the city, as my cousins have been living there for more than ten years. One of the most important respondents in my study, Shêxo, a self-identified Kurdish Alevi musician, is also a resident of Cologne, and I spent a significant amount of time with him. Germany is the country with the largest Turkish immigrant population in Europe, hosting about 70 percent of all Turkish immigrants, and Cologne hosts the second largest immigrant population in the country. Almost half of those immigrants are from Turkey, with a sizeable Kurdish segment (Sirkeci 2006). At the same time, Cologne has been an important center for Kurdish and especially Alevi social and political organizations in Germany. The headquarters of many associations such as KOMKAR (Immigrant Organization of the Kurdistan Socialist Party), FEK (Federation of Kurdish Alevi Associations), and AABF (Federation of Alevi Unions of Germany) are located in Cologne. The founders of those cultural, political, and religious centers have also chosen Cologne as their base.
In order to understand the transnational field that I have described, I also did research on Internet forums and forms of digital sharing platforms including social media sites like Facebook and YouTube. I researched Internet forums, popular websites, and Facebook notifications in order to learn how musical learning processes occur. The learners of the tunes usually ask for sheet music notation or sometimes the guitar chords of popular songs they want to play with their saz or guitar. I gathered almost a hundred songs that are popular among Kurdish Alevis according to the download rates on the Internet forums. These songs are requested and performed frequently at türkü bars and are listed on the Facebook profiles of my informants. Most of these songs belongs to the türkü repertoire and are sung in Turkish. With a couple of exceptions, the musical aesthetic of Kurdish Alevis resembles the aesthetic of their fellow Turkish Alevi immigrants and refugees. The Kurdish songs also play significant roles, as most have political implications. Some türkü songs are also in the domain that I call “alebesk,” indeterminate because they constitute a grey area between arabesk and the Alevi türkü repertoire (for detailed analysis see Chapters 4 and 5).

Finally I prepared an online survey via google.com (Online Survey App) that Kurdish Alevi informants from the Cologne vicinity participated in (see Chapter 6). I aimed at understanding the listening habits of Kurdish Alevis living in their third homeland, which greatly resemble the habits of those living in the second homelands in Turkey. Participants were required to type some answers, while for other questions they could just check boxes. They were asked to specify the names of musicians and songs that trigger an emotional impact on listeners. The purpose was to learn the extent to which listeners associated their emotional states with certain musicians and their songs. The first question on the survey asked them to define what musician or singer makes them feel the most sadness. With those questions, I aimed at understanding the
cultural memory of Kurdish Alevis. I conceptualize cultural memory as an entity that mediates the tensions between collective and individual ways of imagining the past in individuals' contemporary experience.

I realize that emotional connection with music has culture-specific ramifications. In certain cultures, the emotional connection to a collective identity could be associated with perceived happy tunes, whereas among Kurdish Alevis I observed that sadness is strongly associated with the reproduction and remembrance of a collective memory. Signs of emotions associated with exile, homeland, pride, and nostalgia, among others, are all present in the answers to the survey questions. I believe that the cultural memory of a community connects both individual and collective imagination with the identities articulated in public both individually and collectively. Cultural memory pertains to the individual and collective stories about the past told in public and private.

1.7. Studying the Music of Kurdish Alevis

One of the many valuable insights I acquired from the ethnomusicological literature has been that the authors show how music does so much more than merely "express" some kind of pre-existing identity or experience, rather playing a formative role in the construction of identities and experiences (Sugarman 1989, Small 1998, Turino 2000 and 2008). Indeed, I observed complex negotiations over production and creative transformation among performers and listeners, who are themselves understood to be multiple and complex. Identity emerges from performers' and audiences' multiple interpretive efforts, whether the object of interpretation is musical meaning, the political and social context of performance, social media representation, or the ontological presuppositions that allow music to do different kinds of work in different times.
and places. For me, this reinforces the methodological strength of using music to inquire into broader social, political, and cultural questions, a major aim of ethnomusicology since the mid-1990s. In this dissertation, I explore how notions of cultural belonging underpin the complex identity politics of a double minority in their second and third homelands, not only in the outpouring of grief, but also in the process of transformation.

Alevism intricately incorporates music into its religious rituals. The central Alevi ritual is the *cem*, a communal gathering involving music, singing, and dance. The close relationship between music and religiosity also manifests itself in social and political life. The central role of music in the multiple identity formations within Kurdish Alevi communities makes the study of musical activities and religious and secularized rituals a promising subject for ethnographic research on this group. The Kurdish identity of Kurdish Alevis has been influenced by the ethnonationalistic Kurdish movement led by organizations like the PKK, which engaged with the politics of recognition. In that process, the organizations promoted albums in Kurdish language with lyrics invoking nationalistic aspirations. My project explores the aesthetic and political sensibilities of Kurdish Alevi music through an analysis of the production, presentation, and dissemination of their secular and sacred music in relation to social and political formations. Investigating the reception of music associated with multiple identity conceptualizations helps one understand how the members of this community construct and imagine different kinds of cultural belonging as a dual minority group (as Kurdish and Alevis in relation to a predominantly Turkish and Sunni majority in Turkey) both in Turkey and as part of the immigrant population in Germany. As Thomas Turino eloquently points out, music is social life; it is not just a way or tool to get at or to reflect on social life (Turino 2008).

The spectrum of music that Kurdish Alevis produce and consume ranges from highly
produced and carefully arranged recordings to simple recordings by a solo vocalist accompanied by the bağlama or saz. It is not uncommon for Kurdish Alevi musicians to issue recordings that are not only in different styles but are also intended to convey a different sense of identity in each recording, emphasizing leftist aspirations on one recording and pan-Kurdish or pan-Alevi features on another. Through not only the music but also the venues where it is performed, both secular and sacred spaces, Kurdish Alevi in Turkey and Germany engage in identity negotiations (Kastoryano 2002). They have a number of options in choosing their ethnic, religious, national, and other identifications. The terrain is muddied by second homeland and first homeland political realities and ideologies, as well as by global trends and national alignments.

1.8. Outline of the Dissertation and Summary of Findings

I lay out the framework of the pages and chapters to follow in five strands of assertions regarding the music of Kurdish Alevis in Istanbul and Cologne. First, I argue that this group cannot be categorized under the rubric of any single diaspora, such as Kurdish, Turkish, or Alevi (Chapter 2). There are significant enough differences between the Sunni Kurds and Alevi Kurds that, except in limited instances, it would be inaccurate to include all Kurds in a “Kurdish diaspora.” Similarly, there are significant differences between Alevi Kurds and other Turkish Alevis that would prevent me from including all of those Alevis in the same “Alevi diaspora” category. Instead, Kurdish Alevis navigate in a transnational space between both homelands that they can easily share and communicate within, organize around, and politically use to claim loyalties, distinctions, and boundaries. I deal with theoretical issues regarding the Kurdish Alevi groups, transnational networks, and diaspora studies in Chapter 2.
My second assertion is that the Kurdish Alevi musicians’ struggle during the conflict between the Turkish state and the alleged Kurdish “separatists” shaped their understanding of ethnic belonging and politicized them in favor of Kurdish identity, especially in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Chapter 3). This process is manifested in the songs that they have written, performed, and disseminated from the late 1990s through today. I analyze the reconciliation between Turkish and Kurdish sides, since it has been one of the main themes that my informants mentioned in interviews in multiple cities. It is also significant to talk about the “Kurdish Question” (Kürt Sorunu) of Turkey in this context, since it has shaped the political loyalties of Kurdish Alevi musicians and the cultural production of their music. The question, though, of whether a particular music is credited with the capacity to overcome politically significant lines of difference and contribute to the development of a new politics is complicated by consideration of the many fields in which power can operate within a complex performance context. The aesthetic force of a piece to do certain kinds of political work has a lot to do with how high-prestige and influential segments of the audience value and interpret the work. Our understanding of music’s political efficacy depends on careful examination of who among audiences has the power to create meanings that last. This presses us to inquire into how questions of class, gender, ethnicity, and other categories inflect the performance context of the genres scholars scrutinize.

The third assertion I make is that a recent shift in the claims-making processes of mobilized Kurdish Alevis is evidenced in new attempts to reconvert Kurdish Alevis into specific denominations within Alevism (Chapter 4). After the Alevi revival in the late 1980s and early
1990s, which, building on the anthropology of Alevism, I called the Alevis’ coming out,⁹ the recent decades witness a new phase in Alevi religious alignment in which new Alevi missionaries are trying to recruit or convert primarily agnostic Alevi youth into specific religio-political parties. In that process, one of the dominant movements among the Kurdish Alevis I have studied has been the emergence of strategic essentialism, taking the term Kızılbaş (“Red-headed,” a formerly derogatory term referring to Alevis) as an alternative to the generic title of Alevi. The reemployment of the Kızılbaş label is a result of the religio-political parties’ attempts to distinguish Kurdish Alevis politically, culturally, and religiously from the big Alevi-Bektaşi tent, which has been used to label all heterodox groups in Anatolia since the early 20th century. One of the musical manifestations of this process is the resurrection of the instrument called dede sazı (Figure 1.5) among Kurdish Alevi musicians in both Germany and Turkey, including Cemil Koçgūn, Mikail Aslan, Ahmet Aslan, and Ulaş Özdemir, among others.

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⁹ As Aykan Erdemir, an anthropologist of Alevism, remarks, the rapid social change that Alevi religious groups have experienced in Turkey since the 1990s has drawn increasing scholarly, journalistic, and lay attention to the topic. This phenomenon of Alevi transformation has been labeled in different ways: ‘process of rediscovery’, ‘revitalization’, ‘enlightenment’, ‘innovation’, ‘coming out’, ‘revival’, ‘remaking’, ‘re-politicization’, or even ‘the explosion of Alevism’ (Alevilik patlaması) (Erdemir 2004).
The *dede sazi* had become popular especially among young Kurdish Alevi musicians as part of the project of finding roots to the old and divine Alevi religious rituals in which the *dede sazi* used to be indispensable, whereas the recently used saz is a relatively young and modified instrument. I believe that these are symptoms of the search for an “authentic” belief system on the part of those musicians.

My fourth major observation is the emergence of a new genre among the Kurdish Alevis in both homelands, which I call *alebesk* (Chapter 5). Based on the analysis of performance settings of the Kurdish Alevi musicians, especially in türkü bars, I argue that there is a sizeable culture industry exploiting and marketing this music to their audiences in both homelands. The türkü as a focal genre produces a unity among different ethno-religious communities from Turkey that encompasses and transcends regional, religious, and many times political differences. My depiction of music at türkü bars in Germany relies on the premise that music is understood as ontologically capable of aesthetically and emotionally blurring otherwise significant political divisions. I have also observed that some musicians or music groups, irrespective of their publicly stated political loyalties, have been regarded as organically tied to
certain political movements or parties that are active in Turkey and/or in Germany. Listeners’ affinity to certain musicians, in some cases, might go beyond aesthetic listenership; in the cases of politically active respondents, it signifies a political loyalty with the parties that those particular musicians are regarded as affiliated with. Türkü bars have become transcending entertainment venues, perhaps the only viable spaces occupied by almost every immigrant group from Turkey, including leftists, conservatives, Alevis, Sunnis, Kurds, and Turks alike. All of these sociopolitical identities or boundary markers are welcomed in those bars as long as they do not interfere with the economic interests of the owners. I found it helpful to identify the redundancy of a classificatory distinction between “sacred” music and “secular or ethnic” music among Kurdish Alevis (Chapter 5). Finally, I lay out the musical landscape of different generations of immigrants in Germany to get a better understanding of their integration within the German secular public (Chapter 6). The questions regarding the spiritual edification of Alevism and political mobilization of Kurdish ethnic identity in Germany cannot be untangled without looking at the historical journey from a small village in Turkey to the suburbs of Cologne.
Chapter 2. Kurdish Alevi in Multiple Homelands and Transnational Space

2.1. Introduction

This chapter sets the stage for an analysis of the musical practices of my subjects, a group of ethnic Kurds speaking Kurmancî-Kurdish, self-identified Alevi, all of them initially citizens of the Republic of Turkey, who are now immigrants and refugees living in Cologne. Each of these individuals identifies his or her place of origin among a group of villages in a small triangle of territory between the present-day Turkish cities of Maraş, Malatya, and Adıyaman. By exploring their musical practices, I demonstrate how members of this population are positioned in a transnational space. My discussion arrives at an appropriate concept for constructing a sensitive and productive investigation of the changes in social and political formations within Kurdish Alevi community in the subsequent chapters.

To that end, I first review recent uses of the diaspora paradigm, presently a popular approach in social science scholarship, for understanding the unique condition of immigrants and bodies in transnational spaces. After discussing key works of this literature in a broad sense, I review current trends in how ethnomusicologists have engaged the concept of diaspora. I then examine whether the diaspora concept adequately attends to the characteristics of the Kurdish Alevi diaspora from which I drew my research. I ask the question: which aspects of Kurdish Alevi subjectivity fall outside the analytical scope of an approach that treats their condition as diasporic? Finally, after reviewing some of the limitations of the diaspora concept for the analysis of contemporary Kurdish Alevi life in Germany and Istanbul, I close the chapter by

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10 In most cases, those I interviewed are both Turkish and German citizens, and most interviews were conducted in Turkish.
proposing a new approach to describing this and similar populations. I also introduce the concept of "second homelander" as a concept in exploring the conditions shared by the Kurdish Alevis I met during my research in Germany, in relation to the aesthetic that emerged among Kurdish Alevis outside their first homeland. Building on the discussion of agents and the new transnational field that emerged among the Kurdish Alevis, I describe shifts in the cultural and social loyalties of the members of this population in two homelands. For the sake of simplifying my claims, I call all Kurdish Alevis living in their second and/or third homelands “second homelanders” (I define this term further below).

In order to support my use of “second homelander,” I rely primarily on ethnography I conducted among members of this community in Cologne and Istanbul. Most of my informants were directly or indirectly associated with cultural or religious organizations. I also included musicians and artists who have taken an active role in maintaining the transnational field that has transformed the Kurdish Alevi cultural world in the last three decades. To that end, I include findings from my interview notes as well as the images and messages shared among members of Facebook groups of which I eventually became a member. To have a more accurate snapshot of their cultural memory, I also conducted an online survey among Kurdish Alevis living in Germany, and to better explain the social transformations occurring in new homelands. I indicate how I encountered the concept of second homeland during my fieldwork. Finally, I close by identifying significant themes that this concept evokes about how individuals of this population imagine themselves as members of various social formations. Instead of placing Kurdish Alevis in Germany within the Turkish or Kurdish diasporas, I tend to emphasize their socio-spatial difference in terms of a sequence of homelands. When they refer to their fellow Kurdish Alevis, those I interviewed used terms such as bizden (from us), Kürt Aleviler, Kızılbaş toplumu
(Kızılbaş society), Kızılbaş Kürd, Elbistan’lı or Maraş’lı (from Elbistan or Maraş, emphasizing the hometown), bizim halk (our people). When they refer to those in Europe, they use terms such as gurbetçi and göçmen (immigrant) as a reference to their immigrant status. When they refer to the Germans with no ties with Turkey they frequently use terms such as yabancı (foreigner). Participants in this study have used Turkish terms such as memleket and vatan as well as the Kurdish term welat when they have referred to their first homeland.

Kurdish Alevi have established a new aesthetic in their second and third homelands among the Kurdish Alevi diasporic community. I call this new aesthetic a second homelander aesthetic, embodied in the türkü bar, alebesk genre, and other cultural forms. I agree that this group is dispersed and diasporic in nature, but in its specificity it differs from other diasporas, such as those of Jewish, African, or Armenian peoples. The second part of my argument concerns other diasporas associated with this group, such as those of Kurdish, Alevi, or Turkish peoples. My main argument contends that “Kurdish,” “Alevi,” or “Turkish” diasporas cannot be isolated, given the various loyalties among members like Kurdish Alevis, who have two if not more political or religious modes of belonging.

I build on the diaspora scholarship, developing a more nuanced understanding of this new aesthetic, shaped and informed in the new homelands throughout the new transnational field I argue has come into existence. Thus, ethnomusicological methods of learning about this group’s music and rituals can help illuminate, for example, the new aesthetic formation of alebesk, which I also call second homelander aesthetic. First, I review the term diaspora and its use in anthropology and ethnomusicology.
2.2. The Diaspora Concept

Diaspora as a conceptual term has been debated among scholars since the late 1980s in a number of different disciplines including sociology, anthropology, and cultural studies. It is important to note at the outset that scholars of diaspora studies were not in agreement on a single definition of the term as a description of a human condition. A few social scientists have applied the idea as a substitute for "immigrant communities," but as diaspora studies have flourished the proliferation of scholarship has resulted not in a consensus, but in a variety of uses for the concept. This is particularly the case when "diasporic" is used as an adjective to index the particularities of life for members of immigrant communities. Thus, even while there may be agreement regarding whether a population constitutes part of a diaspora, there is likely to remain significant disagreement over what makes an experience or a practice diasporic. This result may indicate that using the term is to further confound an already complex issue. I argue that such ambiguity should not be interpreted as a problem but instead another manifestation of diversity and healthy debate within the social sciences. Why dismiss a concept simply because there is disagreement over its use or definition? Such differences mark the practice of discussion, if not always the practice of refinement. These differences should be taken to indicate a widely shared sense of a concept's analytical value and certainly not as a reason to avoid its use.

What constitutes a diaspora? Although the complexity encompassed within diasporic populations has been a challenge, some scholars, including Robin Cohen (1997), Gabriel Sheffer (2003), Khatchig Tölölyan (1991, 2007), and William Safran (1991), have attempted to define the boundaries of the diaspora concept. Where are the borders of those assumptions? Safran identifies the global population of Jewish people as the “ideal” type of diaspora and presents ten criteria from which scholars may determine what groups do or do not constitute an ideal
diaspora. Notably, in this theoretical formulation, the diaspora is not only a matter of movement but also of religious and ethnic affiliation, passed across generations (Safran 1991). Departing from Safran's definition, James Clifford (1997) emphasizes the agency of individuals and the role of diasporic consciousness, drawing attention to the formation and reformation of diasporas through a constant renegotiation of their borders by persons choosing how they will associate themselves with others. For Clifford, diasporas are not static bodies, but rather a mode of consciousness marked by ethnic or religious boundaries. Similarly, Martin Sökefeld (2006), who has studied Alevi communities in Germany, has suggested an understanding of diaspora as the creation of an "imagined transnational community." Building on the diaspora studies scholarship, Sökefeld rightly argues that speaking of an “Alevi diaspora negates the idea of [national] homogeneity… and Alevi diasporic associations endorse multiple identifications” (2008: 252). It is important for this dissertation to point out that the varying conditions for the formation of the new transnational space have resulted in multifaceted manifestations of those imagined transnational communities among Kurdish Alevis in two homelands (Chapter 1 and Chapter 4). I approach the concept of transnational space through the lenses of recent studies on immigrants with strong ties with multiple locales (Levitt and Glick-Schiller 2004, Kaya 2007, and Yurdakul 2009).

For the new transnational social field to be created, cultural entrepreneurs, in collaboration with the members of religio-political parties, needed to imagine, and in some cases reimagine and essentialize, transnational communities such as Alevi, Kızılbaş, KurdAlawi, or Kurdish Alevi (Chapter 4). It is worthwhile to quote Sökefeld about the conditions among Alevi immigrants in Germany before the emergence of the new transnational field:

Alevi immigrants maintain transnational relationships with their relatives in Turkey, with
their hometowns, villages, and regions even before the formation of an imagined transnational Alevi community. The formation of Alevi diaspora was not simply a natural consequence of such ties. Accordingly, transnational relationships may be a necessary condition for the formation of diasporic consciousness, but they are not sufficient.
(Sökefeld 2008: 260)

Anthropologist Steven Vertovec (2010), building on Paul Gilroy’s work, calls diaspora a level of consciousness and a mode of cultural creation. Vertovec's theory attends to the discursive nature of diaspora formation. This theoretical understanding stems from the claim-making processes of certain ethno-religious group formations. Vertovec also applies the findings and suggestions made by Arjun Appadurai, who in his Modernity at Large (1996) claims that the world system cannot be explained by the center-periphery dichotomy, as there are other spatiotemporal openings, negotiations, and opportunities. He offers the concept of -scapes with such prefixes as ethno-, media-, finance-, for identities and cultures that are negotiated in more complex and multidimensional ways than Marxists and neo-Marxists have suggested.
Concerning the diaspora's discursive formation, Appadurai also mentions the significance of the imagination and nostalgia (Appadurai 1996).

In the field of diaspora studies, some scholars theorize ways and forms of the maintenance of diasporic boundaries, such as Dufoix’s Diasporas (2006). Dufoix has contributed to the analysis of group formations in diaspora communities: how they maintain transnational networks, for example, distinguishing two Greek applications of the dendritic (local groups whose members maintain connections with the help of the Greek government) and galactic models (through the central Orthodox Church).

Cultural studies scholar Ien Ang's chapter entitled “Heritage and Diaspora: Unsettling the
National” (2011) suggests the challenges that diaspora communities face in their involvement with their nation of origin in the determination of cultural and heritage identities. Ang defines diasporas as "... dispersed, fluid, hybrid transnational formations with shifting, and constitutively ambivalent (dis) identifications to many places around the world, shaped by the contradictory experience of 'dwelling-in-displacement'” (Ang 2011: 86). Social scientists have emphasized the implications of the transnational movements of peoples largely in terms of how they challenge nationalist unity narratives (Cohen 1997, Anthias 1998). These narratives are especially inapplicable in countries such as Turkey, which hosts significant populations with multiple memories and identities, "many of whom simply may not want to inherit and/or represent or be represented by, a single essence, a single essentialized identity" (Ang 2011: 92). The challenge may be less that of holding onto the memory of the distant homeland than of re-establishing cultural identities in diverse new locations, those where the old homeland may well be a mere genealogical influence or a location the subject has never seen.

As Ang reminds us, “the diasporic experience is not just about the nostalgic remembering of the past, or about the place left behind, but also about life in the present and the process of reinvention towards a new future. This process of reinvention under conditions of displacement and in new sites of settlement may also require a rupture with the past, rather than its virtual continuation through preservation of a particular cultural heritage” (Ang 2011: 92). In this sense, cultural identity may act as a constraining factor for migrants, because a focus on preserving that identity tends to deemphasize and devalue the importance of change, transformation, and hybridity. Being locked into the identity of “immigrant” forever reminds the diasporic subject
that s/he comes from “elsewhere” and does not really belong “here.”\textsuperscript{11} At the same time, being cast as one who got “away” from “home” may only strengthen a sense of cultural dependency and inferiority vis-à-vis the putative “homeland,” where diasporic subjects will always tend to be positioned as having “lost” their “authentic” cultural identity (Ang 2011).

Diasporas are conceived not only by scholars who study them and members of immigrant groups, but also by the publics of the countries "hosting" a diaspora. Sandya Shukla provides a more nuanced version of this argument by pointing out that diasporas, as the logical “others” of the nation, exist where nations and national borders are defined (Shukla 2002 and 2003). Following the route provided by Partha Chatterjee, Shukla also emphasizes the multiplicity of diaspora identities, locations, and temporalities. Nations’ “others” define the borders of a nationhood, as they do for diasporas, argues Shukla.

Probably the most influential of all sociologists dealing with diaspora issues is Brubaker. In “Diaspora' Diaspora” (2005) and \textit{Ethnicity without Groups} (2004), Brubaker focuses on the terms, narratives, and categories used by the group itself to maintain cohesion. He argues that those group formations and the tools they apply should not be equated to ethnicity or diaspora. He draws a distinction between ethnicities and the organizations or groups that claim to represent those ethnicities through a process that he calls “micropolitics.” One of the most useful offerings to come from diaspora studies is a new approach to understanding multi-centered formations of nevertheless cohesive groups. Brubaker's commitment to beginning with the terminology already in use among members of a group—starting from the inside, rather than outside—is instructive.

\textsuperscript{11} See Chapter 6 for more details.
and, as I will demonstrate later in this chapter, something I believe to be of utmost importance and value in analyzing the Kurdish Alevis in Germany.

2.3. Ethnomusicology's Response to Diaspora Studies

The role of music as a cultural expression of immigrant groups or diasporas has attracted more attention among scholars in the 1990s (Wong 2004), and the field of ethnomusicology has been absorbing some of the ideas emerging from the discipline of diaspora studies. More recent ethnomusicological works have dealt with the functions of circulation of music among immigrants and members of diasporic communities in forming and maintaining national, ethnic, and religious identities and social networks (Stokes 2004). In the last decade, we can see a significant attempt to incorporate debates in diaspora studies into the larger body of ethnomusicological work.

The 2000s witnessed a gradual increase in the level of engagement of ethnomusicologists with diaspora scholarship. Some have built on the debates and added new theoretical foundations to the discussion. In general, it seems relevant to point out Martin Stokes’ assessment that "a more recent ethnomusicology has situated itself on the border zones, in 'global cities', along the pilgrimage routes and amongst the diasporic communities, in spaces and places that challenge the logic of bounded culture and positively demand attention to multivalent and multi-directional kinds of musical circulation" (Stokes 2008: 4). We will probably witness a stronger engagement between ethnomusicology and diaspora studies in coming years if ethnomusicologists and other scholars continue to study the music of diasporic communities.

Music is increasingly recognized by anthropologists and sociologists as one of the primary media for facilitating interaction among people across different locations. Discussions
on music in the diaspora provide insight to understand the third spaces (Bhabha 1994), contact zones (Clifford 1997), and -scapes (Appadurai 1996) that diasporic communities inhabit. Ethnomusicologists have responded to the debates surrounding diasporic communities and their music by identifying specific diasporic formations and their music. A few edited volumes have resulted: on the African diaspora, edited by Ingrid Monson (2000); on diasporas and their music, edited by Thomas Turino and Lea (2004), and by Hemetek and Reyes (2007); and on Turkish music in diaspora by Hemetek and Sağlam (2008). All of these volumes have mirrored theoretical discussions of diaspora studies in considering immigrant groups' musical practices and their ties with homelands. After laying out the main theoretical debates on the term diaspora and its use, Thomas Turino distinguishes between different kinds of social group formations like immigrant communities, diasporas, and cosmopolitans. He claims that immigrant communities live between two specific places, whereas diasporas connect multiple sites. Turino maintains that an individual within a dispersed community decides whether to join up with or partake in a diaspora, which is not always the case for many immigrants with multiple ethno-religious and political loyalties (Turino 2004).

The discipline of ethnomusicology has followed similar methodological and theoretical frameworks as those occurring within diaspora studies. Following the diaspora studies path through the Jewish experience as the ultimate example of diasporic formations, among earlier installments of the ethnomusicology of diasporas were those written on the Jewish diaspora and their musical practices. Kay Shelemay's *Let Jasmine Rain Down*, for instance, is a study of para-liturgical Jewish songs performed by the Syrian Jewish diasporas in multiple centers such as New York City, Israel, and Mexico City. Shelemay applies this de-centered diaspora formulation to the Syrian Jewish practice of remembering the diaspora by performing these songs (Hebrew
pizmonim), with local Arabic melodies brought with them "to the diaspora" as part of this consciousness in different locales.

Ethnomusicologists' use of the diaspora concept has contributed a variety of insights including musical transformations among diaspora groups. Ethnomusicologists have provided strong cases for the use of ethnographic research on the perception of music and ritual, in order to understand the cultural formations and cohorts among ethno-religious minorities in the diaspora.

The late 1990s and 2000s can be perceived as the period in which immigrant and diasporic communities became a focal point in the ethnomusicological scholarship. Ethnomusicologists began to work in urban settings with immigrant and diasporic communities in order to answer overarching questions that social scientists have been trying to understand about those communities. One of the ethnomusicologists working on the immigrant groups relevant to this study, Kurds and Turks, is Thomas Solomon. In his 2006 paper, "Whose Hybridity? Whose Diaspora? Agency and Identity in Transnational Musics," Solomon argues that "hybridity and diaspora should come in for re-evaluation, especially for ways they have been uncritically applied in rhetoric that celebrates the possibilities for constructing transnational identities beyond the constricting paradigm of the mono-ethnic nation-state" (Solomon 2006: 2). Solomon advocates for a more nuanced approach with respect to the identifications of minorities and their music in the migration context.

Drawing on fieldwork conducted in Trinidad, Guyana, and Surinam, Peter Manuel has analyzed the music of the Indo-Caribbean diaspora. Manuel points out that, for Indo-Caribbeans, the physical homeland has become less important to the members of diaspora than the idea of Indian-ness. Manuel also notes how members of the diaspora rely on depictions of Indian-ness
from movies and secondary representations of movies (i.e. movie posters and advertisements), rather than from relatives in the first homeland. He examines the diverse and often contradictory roles played by images of India in the music culture of the Indian diasporic community and its members. Manuel’s assessments are significant; he observes, with respect to the Indo-Caribbean diaspora, that "local concepts of 'India,' while remaining important, have become tenuous, idiosyncratic, and imaginative" (1997: 19). His assessment that for many members of the Indo-Caribbean diaspora, "India has become more a state of mind than a locale..." remains a powerful insight (1997: 31). In this study, confirming Manuel’s assertions on Indo-Caribbean diaspora communities’ musics, I found that the music produced by diasporic populations such as Kurdish Alevi in Germany takes new forms that are closer to those imagined than the actual living form in their first homeland, and sonic representation in the second homeland gradually becomes the normative form given the lack of performances in homeland and in diaspora.

Other works in ethnomusicology apply various sociological and anthropological definitions of the boundaries of diasporas as units of social science research. In his work on diasporic Jeliya, David Racanelli (2010) explores the ways in which Mande griots' (bards or wandering minstrels) experiences in the most recent African diaspora in New York have affected their musical practices. Racanelli argues that constant collaboration and the Western music milieu with which these griots have had to engage have altered their aesthetic and artistic norms through exerting change in the parameters of their repertoire and performance practice in New York.

Other useful insights for this study come from scholars of Asian diaspora music like Deborah Wong and Su Zheng. In her writings on the Asian diasporas and their musics, Wong (2004) argues that ethnomusicologists should study the music in diaspora as transplants’ music.
Music changes as it moves to new places. She also tackles questions of agency of the individual performer and of genre, as certain genres demand specific qualities that may or may not conform to the musical aesthetic of the homeland (Wong 2004). Zheng (2011) argues that Chinese Americans’ struggles in identifying themselves in the new America can be best explained with the conceptualization of "claiming diaspora" as opposed to the previously popular notion of "claiming America" (Zheng 2010: 10). In Asian American immigration history, the exclusionary period around World War II and the following decades has evolved to embrace subjectivities of Asian Americans in America (Zheng 2010). As I observed among Alevis in Germany, the notions of claiming Kurdish and Alevi identities have become more prevalent compared to the frequently used “Turkish,” “proletariat,” and “immigrant” identities.

In this context, ethnomusicology has incorporated theoretical frameworks provided by diaspora studies in locating immigrant groups within different migration and integration experiences. Ethnomusicologists have also engaged with musical practices of immigrant groups such as those pertaining to persons migrating from Turkey to Germany. One such study, edited by Max Peter Baumann, is *Musik der Türken in Deutschland* (1985), which consists of descriptive and ethnographic work done by German musicologists on Turkish musicians living in Berlin. It also features interviews with musicians like Şah Turna, a blind Alevi singer and saz player. The articles include interesting studies, for example, on children’s songs, a dance troupe, a music group, and the protest and political music performed by Turkish immigrants living in Germany.

Martin Greve’s 2003 book, *Die Musik der imaginären Türkei: Musik und Musikeben im Kontext der Migration aus der Türkei in Deutschland*, a more detailed work featuring some discussion of diaspora studies, analyzes the music of the Turks in Germany in order to
understand the imagined Turkey or imagined identities perpetuated by Turkish immigrant music-making. Opening with historical accounts of Turkish workers in Germany, Greve points out the cultural dilemmas of first-generation Turkish immigrants who had imagined returning to their homeland one day. The second section of the book deals with cultural survival, using the "improvisation" metaphor to explain the strategies applied by Turkish musicians. Greve's intensive ethnography also addresses issues related to Turkish music-making with connections to regional, religious, ethnic, and political identities.

Recent ethnographic research on Armenian music (Adriaans 2012) and Syriac church congregational music in the Netherlands (Bakker 2013) helped extend the analytical and geographical scope of this dissertation. Scholars like Ayhan Kaya (2000), Levent Soysal (1999, 2004), Thomas Solomon (2006, 2011a, 2011b), Orhan Kahyaoğlu (2003), Sinan Gündoğar (2005a, 2005b), and Ayşe Çağlar (1998) have written descriptive and analytical studies on popular genres among the larger Turkish immigrant communities in Germany and elsewhere in Europe. I discuss these ethnographic diaspora studies in more detail in Chapter 6, along with others whose focus on minorities and diasporic groups informs my discussion on the Kurdish Alevis. In order to introduce the conceptual framework building on uses of the term diaspora, the following section examines the music of this community to provide musical context for the analysis to follow.

2.4. A Musical Tale of Kurdish Alevis in the 20th Century

This section lays out a brief history of the Kurdish Alevi double minority in Turkey with the intent of analyzing the multiple identities that Kurdish Alevis have claimed in multiple homelands. I provide a musical history of this group, describing foundational or iconic music
examples from various eras. I use ethnomusicological methodologies in order to analyze messages conveyed and negotiated through public representations. Taking the approach of Martin Stokes (2010) in his work on music in Turkey, I rely on a particular set of representations—in this chapter cornerstone or iconic songs and their representations through radio, TV, and Internet broadcasts—explored as texts. These musical examples, as specific musical "objects," mediate multiple and sometimes contradicting identities through sonic, social, discursive, and visual modes. When needed, I add my personal reading as a member of this community and a former member of a popular music group whose music has found a loyal following among Kurdish Alevis interviewed for this project. I summarize the cultural memory of Kurdish Alevi communities in Turkey and in Germany through excerpts from oral histories and ethnographic data gathered during my fieldwork. Furthermore, I incorporate my informants' narratives into historical information and findings, adding interview data on musicians such as Shêxo, Ali Baran, Hakan Akay, Mehmet Akbaş, and Ömer Avcı.

One of the writings on Kurdish Alevis in Turkey is a pseudo-memoir of the late journalist Evrim Alataş, Her Dağın Gölgesi Deniz’e Düşer (The Shadows of All Mountains Reach the Sea). I met Alataş years ago when she was working as an editor for the pro-Kurdish newspaper Gündem. We had mutual friends, just as we shared questions about the multiple identities both of us struggled with as Kurds, Alevis, and leftists among others, as we came from the same ethno-religious background. As Alataş eloquently elaborates in her semi-fictional autobiography, starting from the early years of the Turkish Republic in the 1930s, a homogenous citizenship model was devised to conform to the social needs of the Sunni Muslim majority. Kurdish Alevis were forced to fit into a citizenship “uniform” designed for every citizen. The uniform citizenship clothes, tailored for the new nation, unraveled for many Kurdish Alevis who refused
to fit into a uniform "Turkish" Sunni citizen prototype (Alataş 2009: 11).

In the early years of the Republic of Turkey, some Kurdish Alevis responded to the impact of Kemalism (the official Turkish state ideology) by hanging Kemal Atatürk's portrait next to Ali’s in their living rooms.\(^\text{12}\) Kemalism, along with its other modernist goals, at least in rhetoric, provided a secular framework that would benefit especially the Alevi minority in the new nation-state but that also denied Alevi religious and Kurdish ethnic rights. The Kemalist discourse of “secularism,” one of the six arrows of Kemalism,\(^\text{13}\) helped Alevi embrace the ideals of the new republic by trying to participate in Western modernity. As the Kemalist modernity project took off, especially during the Cold War period, it was common to encounter Marxist and other leftist movements being embraced by secular youth of all denominations, but especially Kurdish Alevi (Ertan 2008).

In this period, the leftist movements swayed Alevi in Turkey towards denying their religion in favor of socialism or communism. Alevi embraced the secularism arrow more than had other Muslim groups. Gradually Alevi dedes (religious leaders) became more involved with Marxism along with their constituents. This involvement resulted in numerous Alevi dedes abandoning their duties as they began to view the religion "the opiate of the masses," a claim that Marxists of Turkey adapted from Marx. In the 1970s, religious tensions between Alevi and Sunni groups were transformed into political disputes and in some instances outright fights between the

\(^{12}\) Ali, the Prophet Mohammad’s son-in-law, is also the first imam of the twelve-imam Shias.

\(^{13}\) Also known as the six arrows represented in the flag of the CHP (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, Republican People's Party): republicanism, nationalism, secularism, statism, populism, and revolutionism.
Left (comprised mostly of Alevis) and Right (predominately supported by Sunnis), as political legacies and loyalties were historically realigned according to previously religious distinctions.

An important figure in the folk and protest music scene in 1960s and 70s Turkey was the great Aşık (bard singing folk poetry) Mahsuni. Mahsuni composed more than 5000 songs on his bağlama before his death in Cologne in 2002. He was a popular figure, especially among Kurdish Alevis of the older generation, and my parents still admire his work. As a member of the leftist anti-imperialist movement, Mahsuni objected to American influence in the conservative and right-wing government policies of Turkey; in 1976 he wrote the song “Amerika Katil Katil” (America the murderer), which became very popular among the Kurdish Alevis at the height of this period:

Defol git benim yurdumdan  Get the hell out of my country
Amerika katil katil       America the murderer
Yıllardır bizi bitirdin    You consumed us for years
Amerika katil katil       America the murderer

Kurdish Alevis moved from the first homeland to the second while listening to Aşık Mahsuni’s songs in any media they could. The sound of the saz or bağlama, and the lamentations on old places and times, followed them as reminders of the historical oppression Kurdish Alevis had faced wherever they settled. Thus, for many Kurdish Alevis, laments about their painful past were conveyed through the combined effect of the saz and vocals (see Chapters 4 and 5).

In the 1960s and 70s, communal gatherings in villages became focal points for listening to radio broadcasts in order to hear news and music from stations including Turkish Radio.
Television, Radio Yerevan, and Radio Baghdad, along with the BBC. Radio and TV both symbolically and practically replaced the dede, storytellers, and musicians, as the power of the religious authority among Alevis diminished. Among Kurdish Alevis, decades of Turkish state teaching and enforcement of the requirement for youth to speak Turkish, coupled with internal migration, hindered the transmission of Kurdish language to the younger generation. The elderly spoke in Kurdish solely for communications they hoped to hide from Turkish guests. In most cases, Kurdish was spoken in a whisper in the presence of foreigners. It survived among younger generations in part because some words did not have Turkish equivalents that they were aware of, so the young had to learn or remember Kurdish words like golik (calf), babiko (a dish), and dotmam (uncle’s daughter). Such words occupied the young people’s memories, sometimes unconsciously and in many cases involuntarily (Alataş 2009).

In the same period, Kurdish Alevis began moving from small towns in western and southern Turkey where they had settled, heading toward urban centers in the north. Nowadays, almost all Kurdish Alevis live in either their second or third homeland. Numerous Kurdish Alevis have settled in districts of Istanbul, where they have established networks based on kinship and prior relationships. These immigrants have settled in Istanbul and other metropoles in Turkey through a gradual acceptance of such locations as their second homeland. In the cosmopolitan settings of such cities, and through encounters with other Turkish inhabitants, "the music they listen to, the books they read, the way they talk, and the food they eat all are different from the first homeland counterparts," said Kadir Abi, an elderly restaurant owner in Cologne. "While their parents and grandparents used to hold hidden cem (religious gatherings) in the memleket (homeland), those ceremonies have almost vanished in the second since the new generation started to believe in different ideals, such as the revolution," observed Şevki Abi, who
is in charge of religious affairs at the Wuppertal Alevi Culture Center. As much as they have stopped believing in or practicing the Alevi religion (signaling a rise in atheism), for many Kurdish Alevis, Alevi identity has become a badge of honor to defend against others who would disseminate lies of incest and orgies to denigrate Alevis.

In the years preceding and following the third military coup d'état of September 12, 1980 in Turkey, possession of audiocassette tapes by Şivan Perwer, who sang proletariat marches in Kurdish, or Aşık Mahsuni, Aşık Nurşani and Aşık İhsani, who sang türkü (the generic term for folk tunes) along with other calls for solidarity, were deemed grounds for the arrest for Kurdish Alevi who had bootlegged the albums. The 1980 military coup demonstrated definitively how the Turkish state exerted its power over dissenters by arresting almost every adult who had anything to do with politics, and by torturing and killing thousands of innocent people (Zürcher 2004, Ayata 2011). The coup marked the limits of the freedoms granted by the state, which reclaimed hegemonic power over its citizens.

Gradually Kurdish Alevi went even further, to Europe, to pursue a safer and better life. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the first wave of Kurdish Alevi to settle in Germany (along with other guest workers from Turkey) began arriving in the early 1960s. As migrant laborers, they worked in harsh conditions with low pay. The environment of insecurity in Turkey caused a second major wave of politically active Kurdish Alevi arriving Germany as refugees and asylum seekers.

Recording voices and music on cassette tapes and mailing them to family members in Germany maintained ties, and made possible the retention of the sonic environment of the first homeland. These cassettes gradually replaced long letters, which posed problems, especially for the illiterate elderly. One of the iconic songs of this period, a proletarian march, was the Turkish
version of the “Austrian Workers’ March,” otherwise known as "Hayat Denilen Kavgaya Girdik" ("We Joined the Fight Called Life"). Fervent Kurdish Alevi activists in Germany sang this song on every possible occasion as part of the remembrance of shared revolutionary values. "Singing certain marches together must have sealed certain initiation ceremonies within a leftist group," said one of my elderly informants. Certain marches were associated with specific political groups. Later, Group Yorum, Ahmet Kaya (see Chapter 3), and Ferhat Tunç became popular among the Kurdish Alevi youth (see further discussion below). In the last three decades, these musicians along with other agents have presided over the establishment of a new transnational field.

2.5. The New Transnational Field and Kurdish Alevis in Transnational Space

Kurdish Alevi cultural entrepreneurs in Germany and Istanbul have established a transnational social field in which they can relate to members from those communities living in multiple locations. This multiplicity results from simultaneous politicization processes of Alevi and Kurdish movements that have allowed old and new actors to engage with political and social capital along with symbolic capital through cultural and religious activism around multiple identities (Bourdieu 1984). The transnational space has allowed new actors to employ different means to serve their main political goals: cultural, musical, and those of other art forms, along with public campaigns to mobilize activists. Therefore, cultural entrepreneurs and other religio-political actors have been navigating in this transnational space while reformulating religious and secular political demands.

Cultural entrepreneurs and religio-political parties use the transnational space to further their own political interests. The transnational space is organized through previously established
kinship networks, which have helped maintain long-distance artistic exchanges that were established in the late 1970s. Historically, artists and musicians in a second and third homeland have been able to bend first-homeland aesthetic norms, not only by cultural but also by political modes of conduct. In some cases, artists have managed to create their own aesthetic, sending this back to the first homeland in the form of social or cultural remittances (Levitt 2001). In the Kurdish Alevi case, increased speed and diversity of media have helped to improve relationships among community members in two homelands.

This new transnational field has emerged predominantly via mobilized cultural entrepreneurs in Germany and other countries in Europe. In the early years of immigration (1960s and 1970s), most musicians were located in the first homeland but had performed in the second homeland. In the 1990s and 2000s, the situation has begun to work for both locations thanks to the transnational space and the networks musicians have established, even more in favor of musicians located in the second homeland than those in the first. Musicians active in new homelands have started visiting the first homeland more frequently than did previous generations. Cultural entrepreneurs keep ties between the two homelands alive; while they enjoy new iterations of the field, they focus on survival and growth. Artists and musicians maintain bonds with the help of new media and the condensing of time and space in today's connected world.

Older and slower forms of transnational ties with first-homeland relatives and friends have always existed among immigrants, first through letters, then through audio- and video-cassettes as mentioned. Nowadays, these immigrants communicate more quickly, for longer periods of time, and more frequently than ever. New media tools have made it easier to share and diversify content and have increased the symbolic capital of new actors mobilized in both
homelands and within the new transnational field. This more democratic environment (Sheyhulislami 2011) has provided space and opportunity for new cultural entrepreneurs to mobilize towards new religio-political alignments. The new environment has also provided opportunities for a politically and religiously diversified alignment and transformed the field with new actors, including the cultural entrepreneurs and new agents who now have tools to accumulate and spend political, cultural, and social capital.

While these agents reproduce the bonds between two homelands, they also enable or encourage immigrants to stay in a liminal zone between the two homelands. In all locations where Kurdish Alevis have settled, the transmission of institutionalized religion, music, and culture from one generation to the next has been hindered. Compared to other institutionalized groups, such as Sunni religious brotherhoods or Christian congregations, Kurdish Alevis have lacked institutional anchors they could rely on, as they have constituted a minority wherever they went.

Cultural entrepreneurs building on, or sometimes exploiting, Kurdish and Alevi sensibilities have utilized the transnational space in order to accommodate their own needs while responding to, and to a certain extent shaping, audience demands. For the cultural entrepreneurs to maintain this new transnational field they have needed continuous support of their followers, who attend their events and concerts, purchase their albums, and request their songs, calling for political mobilization by joining those organizations. The new music addresses themes relevant to immigrant issues. Several musicians I interviewed, including Mehmet Akbaş, Ali Baran, Shêxo, Hakan Akay, and Mikail Aslan, give concerts in Turkey in the summer and in Germany in the winter, to benefit from opportunities in both countries while maintaining the field that shapes the aesthetic in both homelands. In the summer, these musicians give concerts in places
where immigrants might spend a few weeks, either their hometowns or near vacation spots on the west coast of Turkey.

I observed that the majority of songs listened to by Kurdish Alevis, or requested from musicians, belong to the türkü repertoire and are in Turkish. Some tunes popular in the 2000s can be classified in a grey area I call alebesk, a hybrid genre area between the arabesk and Alevi türkü repertoires. Ayhan Kaya (2000) calls arabesk a “syncretic form of music” promulgated as an “epiphenomenon of urbanization” in Turkey in the 1970s. The main characteristics of arabesk lyrics include fatalism, sadness, and pessimism (Özbek 1991, Stokes 1992). Alebesk lyrics combine arabesk notions or themes of love, loneliness, and pain along with a türkü musical setting (i.e. the prominence of bağlama) and other compositional elements selected from Turkish and Kurdish folk repertoire. In the last section of this chapter and in Chapter 5, I analyze in detail the alebesk genre, which has historic ties with other aesthetic and musical norms of the Kurdish Alevis. Like numerous songs written by Kıvırcık Ali (an Alevi musician who passed away in 2012 leaving behind a long list of songs that are still popular at türkü bars) and others, the lyrics include commentary on social inequalities and issues related to immigration, and longing for places and people left behind.

The Kurdish Alevis I met were active members of local and transnational organizations, as epitomized in their creation and maintenance of hemşehrilik (being from the same place of origin such as village, town, or city) through Home Town Associations (HTAs). As Elise Massicard observed among the HTAs with ties with the city of Sivas in Turkey, "despite their apolitical image, some hemşehri organizations—more openly on the province or sub-province scale, but in some cases even on a village scale—have been political channels" (Massicard 2005). Her observations corroborate my findings regarding the Kurdish Alevi HTAs, as these
organizations can be categorized among the religio-political parties of the immigrant groups in Germany and Turkey (see Chapter 1). Through HTAs, my research subjects went about seeking other Kurdish Alevis in and around Cologne. I observed that HTAs were one of the places where music became a popular means for individuals to connect to one another and to Kurdish Alevis elsewhere, especially those remaining in Turkish Kurdistan.

Together with such scholars as Sökefeld and Kaya, I contend that for groups having multiple identifications, politicized use of the diaspora concept must be broadened. The presence of groups like Kurdish Alevis or Turkish Alevis challenges the holistic perspectives that label all Kurds in Europe as members of the “Kurdish diaspora,” Turks as the “Turkish diaspora,” or Alevis as the “Alevi diaspora.” The PKK, one of the key actors in the political mobilization in transnational space, for instance, would like to call all Kurds in Europe members of the Kurdish diaspora, a claim that will serve its own political agenda in order to unify all Kurds around the party’s message. Like Sökefeld’s analysis of Alevis (2008), my research suggests that “diasporas” as categories of social scientific inquiry regarding immigrant Kurds, Alevis, and Kurdish Alevis should be understood as imagined transnational communities in order to be applied to those groups. Contrary to what the PKK would like to claim, the multiple religious affiliations of the Kurds to Sunni Islam, Alevism, and other religions weaken the possibility of a cohesive Kurdish diaspora. This is not to claim that all immigrant groups must exhibit a cohesive set of attributes; however, as I demonstrate in the following chapters, if Kurds in Germany are to be regarded as part of a “Kurdish diaspora” those in Istanbul must also be considered part of the same Kurdish diaspora.

In fact, I found that most members of the Kurdish Alevi community in and around Cologne do not claim membership in a Kurdish or any other diaspora. Moreover, certain
members of the community expressed a pointed rejection of the term; as Serdar, one of my refugee informants, told me, "we as people in exile with two, three identities have a specific, urgent need to protect ourselves." I felt an evident hesitation to use the term “diaspora” among the Kurdish people in Germany. Shêxo, a prominent musician, expressed strong reservations about the use of "Kurdish diaspora" with respect to the Kurdish Alevis, as he rightly observed; "we don't have one single goal or identity that ties all of us to each other." As I learned, there were two main reasons for this, both of which correspond to Mishra's (2006) critique of the way applications of the diaspora concept have tended to create inaccurate generalizations of populations.

First is a popularized (mis)use of the term by the Turkish state, which treats Armenian populations as a *diyaspora* as a means of erasing the past and denying official recognition of the Armenian genocide of 1915-1923. In the official Turkish narrative, Armenians in Europe and the US are referred to as the Armenian diaspora. While it may be true that members of these populations consider themselves as such, the point is that the Turkish state has refused to recognize as a diaspora those Armenians living in Turkey. Recognizing this population’s separation from places of origin would draw attention to the circumstances of its displacement and the current state of dispersal. In this framework Armenians in Turkey officially "become" Turks, and Armenians outside of Turkey are the “Armenian diaspora”—in neither case are these populations officially recognized as the grandchildren of Anatolian immigrants who survived genocide. Thus, because use of the term "diaspora" denies the displaced status of Armenians in Turkey, at least ten Kurdish Alevis in Germany I interviewed told me they saw the term as holding a certain stigma.

Second, the fact that Kurdish Alevis in Germany do not describe themselves with the
term "diaspora" stems in part from the way outsiders and some social scientists (mis)apply the term. In Germany, Kurdish Alevis are often referred to as belonging to the Turkish diaspora, because they and their parents migrated from within the Turkish national borders. Because the state has called Turkey their place of origin, when in fact some Kurdish Alevis trace their origin to Kurdistan, some Kurdish Alevis I interviewed for this dissertation indicated that the term "diaspora" connotes false claims and that, as a result, rather than apply the term only with a correction—Kurdish diaspora rather than Turkish diaspora—they had opted to avoid using the term altogether. In particular, the resistance derives from the problem of representation among members; political parties and organizations that claim to represent a large unique body, such as the PKK, present themselves as the most ardent advocates of the Kurdish diaspora. In that vein, Kurdish Alevis who do not support the PKK's politics worry about misrepresentation of all Kurds in new homelands.

In the remaining sections, I discuss the term some Kurdish Alevis chose in describing themselves relative to their membership in this transnational community, and I explore the theoretical distinction it points to between the concept of diaspora as figured in recent literature, and the sense of self articulated by the Kurdish Alevis with whom I spoke.

2.6. Second Homelanders

A self-claimed, well-integrated Kurdish Alevi immigrant told me that he is living in his "second homeland" (zweite Heimat) in Germany, although if one views homelands in sequential order of the dispersal of the population, Germany would be their third, not second homeland. Kurdish Alevi villages and hometowns in the southeast of present-day Turkey would constitute the first, metropolitan cities in Turkey, mainly Istanbul, the second, and German cities such
Cologne the third homeland.

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<th>FIRST or OLD HOMELAND</th>
<th>NEW HOMELAND</th>
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<td>Second Homeland</td>
<td>Third Homeland</td>
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<td>Villages in (&quot;Kurdistan&quot;)</td>
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<td>Cologne (G)</td>
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"SECOND HOMELANDERS"

Figure 2. 1. Typology of Homelands for Kurdish Alevi

I have observed no significant differences in daily practices of enculturation in the two communities (Kurdish Alevi in Cologne and Istanbul), especially regarding ethnic or religious mobilization around specific identities, in this case, Kurdish, Alevi, or Kızılbaş. I categorize Kurdish Alevi residing in villages or nearby hometowns as those in their first or old homeland, and those residing in metropolitan cities in Turkey, mainly Istanbul, where Kurdish Alevi constitute a double minority, and in German cities, such as Cologne, as in their new (second or third) homeland. However, my research shows that this linear sequence may not be applicable to all of my informants.

Criticizing the scholarly assumption that one homeland and one or more host countries define a diasporic community, Stuart Hall (1994) suggests the presence of a cultural identity that provides room for collective unities, given the discontinuity, hybridity, and differences among
members of immigrant communities. By maintaining the possibility of multiple homes rather than a single home, Hall questions the strict dichotomy between homeland and host-land identification. As if developing Hall’s definition, my informants have claimed multiple homelands, but, more importantly, they do not consider these in sequence, attached to a linear process of dispersal across time. Rather, as I conclude, they view Germany as their second, not third homeland, and Istanbul also as a second homeland: in other words, these people would consider any place outside of Kurdistan as a second homeland. Calling Germany their second homeland implies as firm a root as would anywhere else, including most significantly, Istanbul. Thus calling any place outside Kurdistan their second homeland indicates the intensity of their commitment to a single place rallied around as first homeland.

The most difficult challenge for Kurdish Alevis in Germany is that they oscillate between two or three languages, religions, belief systems, lifestyles, and cultures. Emekçi, from Turkish Kurdistan, a well-known Kurdish Alevi musician now exiled in Germany, describes this state of mind:

There is also the problem of space. Are we from here or not, which space and location do we belong to? We simultaneously belong to Germany and we do not. When we visit our homeland we feel that we don't belong there either. Some feel that way and some do not. I think I feel that there is a community of people who are looking for their identities every single moment in their lives. For a couple of seconds they find something they can closely relate to themselves. They find some objects, symbols, emotions, songs, spices, and poems that they feel comfortable with. Then within a couple of seconds that comfort disappears, the moment she opens her eyes she realizes that she is not where she feels really at home, she is in fact on a street where there are traffic rules that must be obeyed.
At that moment she loses the taste of that momentary spice she gets and that comfort feeling disappears. (Emekçi, Cologne 2010)

I conceptualized the term "second homelander" in order to indicate one possible way individuals of this population relate to other Kurdish Alevis in time and space. Thus, I use the term “second homelanders” to denote the population of Kurdish Alevis living in both Germany and Istanbul or anywhere outside the historic first homeland. My interviewees expressed a sense of displacement—a detachment from what the diaspora literature would simply call their "homeland"—but did not refer to Germany as a host country. Their strong sense of loss of place harkens back to the forced dispersal of Kurdish Alevis from the triangle between the cities of Maraş, Malatya, and Adıyaman.

The sense of loss among Kurdish Alevis has been exacerbated and carried forward as the Turkish state has resisted accepting Kurds and Alevis among the founding partners of the Turkish nation, but it also powerfully reflects a shared sense among Kurdish Alevis in Germany that political structures do not at present exist that would allow for a reestablishment of sovereignty and a return of displaced Kurdish Alevis. I have had several conversations about the lack of a real homeland among Kurdish Alevis in their second or third homelands. Because Sunni Turkish majority does not include them among the founders of the Republic of Turkey, Kurdish Alevis have internalized this exclusion and view it as a barrier to their integration into Turkish society. In various locations, they have had to stay in neighborhoods in which they constitute a minority, unlike Sunni Kurds who could relate to the Sunni Turks through religious camaraderie in their mosques or other locations. The main cause of this constant emotional exclusion is the double minority status they hold in the first homeland, which travels with
immigrants to the second homeland. Shêxo remarked, "if you don't have a real home in your homeland, and your homeland [Kurdistan] is still in question, it is not easy for Kurds to feel they belong to one place.” Müslüm Alagöz, a 54-year old restaurant owner in Bonn, formulated the situation of himself and his fellow Kurdish Alevis as “in-between many homes" (Kr. nave malan mayin) He went on:

I live at my workplace in Germany, at home as Turkish and Kurdish. If someone is able to put all of these qualities from both homelands together in their lives they don't even need a homeland, you don't need to be limited within one space and homeland. I don't want to get from one perspective. The people coming from Turkey, regardless of their ethnic or religious affiliations such as Kurdish, Turkish, Alevi, or Sunni, have a constant emphasis and search for a clearer identity every moment. The lifestyle of the people here becomes different because of this constant search for identification. (Field notes, June 15, 2010)

This well-integrated Kurdish Alevi demonstrates that the term “second homeland” is actually a corrective to this sense of transcending the locales. Such a state of mind among interviewed immigrants and refugees can be described as what Homi Bhabha calls “unhomeliness” (1994), which was a common sentiment among the Kurdish Alevis I interviewed in Germany and Istanbul. Many second homelanders reflect a commitment to the idea shared among Kurdish Alevis in Germany that Germany is indeed a homeland—that they may be displaced but they are
not homeless. Second homelanders try to convert the place where they live to look, smell, and sound like the first homeland. This is most evident in the şark odası (eastern room), a decorated corner of a house with kilims, garments, and other artifacts resembling those in the first homeland of Kurdistan. Such garments and artifacts in Shêxo's living room are almost identical to those my grandmother made and gave to her daughters upon marriage. They represent village living rooms, giving household members and guests in Germany the comfort of a familiar Kurdish living room. Quite a few of my informants in both Turkey and Germany devote at least a section of their living room, if not the entire room, to exhibiting items from the şark (see below).

Figure 2.2. A Picture representing the şark odası from Saz Time Türküevi in Cologne

14 The şark odası is an old practice of exhibiting personal items, such as oriental rugs and pottery, in one's living room. It reflects the sensibilities of the şark feel in the modern world. Kurds and Armenians in Istanbul, and in other large cities in Turkey, tend to have a site at home set up to remind them of their origins.
We might ask why Kurdish Alevis are embracing Germany as their second homeland. "German society has opened its arms and accepted the Kurds and Alevis," Ali Baran said in one of our conversations. This new homeland has given them linguistic and educational rights, which alleviated the integration process by building confidence and loyalty, thus making it easier to be part of their second homeland. In new homelands (both in Istanbul and Germany), I observed that people are more involved with the search for identity. The concept of second homelanders reminded Shêxo of the recent citizenship debate in Germany with respect to the status of immigrants (see Chapter 6). He remembered that in some instances, the affirmation of Germany as Erste Heimat (first homeland) by the immigrants was used by the German authorities as a litmus test to confirm them as loyal German citizens. In our conversation, Shêxo went on,

… people like me who left their (first) homeland and lived for a long while in another cultural structure seem to have lost the battle. My search for a homeland is over. I look at my beliefs and myself if I need to find some homeland. Kurdish culture and Alevi religion guide my life and philosophy. It is the person’s values that would and should guide someone when s/he has lost the way, not a specific piece of land.

On that note, I turn to the musical implications of the concept of second homelanders.

2.7. The Results of the Survey: Conclusions

The locales where I investigated the music-making practices of Kurdish Alevis included homes, cemevis (house of worship), bars, festivals, and inside the cars of my informants, as well
as media such as the Internet, radio, TV, and Facebook. In these places they listened to live music, drank alcohol, danced, or listened to their cassette players, iPods, computers, or TVs. The music and musicians that circulate in these venues give insights into the transformation of this community and the consumption of music in such spaces.

I observed among Kurdish Alevis a nostalgia for the first homeland enacted through songs about village life, references to hometowns, and singing in the local dialects in intimate settings in the ways of local singing. Hometown pictures and videos about elderly villagers have increasingly been shared through Facebook posts. This trend is also visible in the repertoire of the new generation of musicians like Mikail Aslan, Ahmet Aslan, Cemil Koçgiri, and Garip Dost.

Listening habits of the Kurdish Alevis living in Germany closely resemble those of individuals living in Turkey (Chapter 4). The online survey I prepared indicated that Kurdish Alevis in Germany dedicate an average of 1.25 hours a day and 7.75 hours a week to listening to music (see Appendix for the questions in Turkish and Kurdish with English translations). More than 85% of participants listen to music via the Internet, which includes YouTube, Facebook, Internet radio, and downloaded mp3s. Although the online survey automatically selected younger people over the less technology savvy elderly, the community members have been using Internet more frequently than their relatives and friends in Turkey. Almost all of the people I engaged with for the study have been using Facebook on a daily basis and they all have email addresses.

I asked participants to type in names of specific musicians they follow and songs that have an emotional impact on them. With these questions, I aimed to understand the cultural memory of Kurdish Alevi second homelanders. I view cultural memory as an entity that links
collective and individual ways of imagining the past to the individuals' contemporary experience; it connects both individual and collective imagination with the identities articulated in public. Cultural memory pertains to the individual and collective stories about the past told in public and private. Thus, the cultural memory of Kurdish Alevis could be mapped in their answers to questions about sadness or happiness resulting from listening to specific songs.

Question 1 on the survey asked them to name the musician or singer who makes the questionnaire participant feel saddest (en çok üzünlendiren). Although there were different answers to those questions, the names Ahmet Kaya (a Kurdish musician who performed music in Turkish until his exile from Turkey in 1999), Kıvırcık Ali (an Alevi musician whose songs are still popular at türkü bars as mentioned above), and Şivan Perwer (probably the most well-known Kurdish musician alive, exiled in 1976 from Turkey and living in Germany) were mentioned significantly more. The second question asked what musician or singer made the participant feel happiest (en çok mutlu eden). The answers to this question, to my surprise, constituted a more diverse spectrum of musicians and groups, as no answer was given more than once. The musicians or groups mentioned included Şivan Perwer, Farid Fariad, Kamkaran, Emin Erbani, Kardeş Türküler, and Sezen Aksu. The happiness articulated by those Kurdish Alevi participants was generated by an inclusive set of musicians associated with a larger geographical region, namely Anatolia. Happiness had more to do with inclusion in the larger Anatolian landscape than did sadness, which was confined to the Kurdish and Alevi psyche exemplified in the laments of Kaya and Perwer as well as the alebesk of Kıvırcık Ali. Some members of this community, especially youth, indicated that they are not just listening to Turkish or Kurdish music, as was evident from the American and European musicians they mentioned on their Facebook profiles as well as the questionnaire answers they gave. Some of my respondents have become members
of fan clubs of musicians and groups such as Metallica, Madonna, and 50 Cents according to their social media profiles (see Appendix A).

When asked which specific pieces (şarkı, türkü, and parça) make them feel happiest, most respondents named fast-tempo Kurdish folk tunes. Most of these line-dances (govend) are indispensable parts of celebrations, weddings, and public gatherings. When asked which tunes make them feel saddest, the participants gave a long set of songs. The detailed answers on songs associated with sadness could speak about the cultural memory that comes most to the fore in the sad moments in their journey (for a case study see Solomon 2012). The answers included gurbet türküleri, alebesk, and laments (lorik and ağıt) about the history of Kurds, such as the Halabja massacre. The term gurbet has been used among many ethnic groups in formerly Ottoman regions (Buchanan 2007) to refer to different experiences such as being exiled, leaving and/or working in a foreign city or country, or more broadly living outside the home. Although male self-pity and other emotional reactions have been prized in the larger Mediterranean region, I observed among the Kurds that the lamentation and other forms of articulation of sadness have constituted a large portion of poetry, folk music, and epics told by the dengbêj (bard). The Kurdish Alevis who responded to the survey provided longer lists of sad songs as opposed to happy ones (see Appendix B). The history of displacement and atrocities they or their parents have faced along with already existing repertoire of gurbet and laments after the deceased have exacerbated the large lexicon of sadness. Among adjectives frequently used for sad songs or states have been acıklı (touching), yamk (burned), içini yakan (burning inside), hüzünlü (sad), duygusal (emotional), kırılgan (fragile), dertli (heartbroken), xemgin (sad), gamlı (sorry), ağlamaklı (tearful), süzgün (drawn out), and melül (blue).

When asked to describe their national or ethnic identity, almost all participants claimed
Kurdish identity. However, they used different ways to say Kurdish; some used the Turkish pronunciation of Kürt while others used Kurd, and a few used Alevi Kurd as their ethnic identification. Scholars of Alevism have reported the confusion and varying answers given by Alevis when they were asked to define Alevism (Massicard 2013, Erdemir 2004, Erol 2011 and 2012). The results of the survey confirm the same kind of multiplicity in identification among members of this group. Some do not even consider themselves Alevis. On the other hand, when asked about their ethnic or national identification it becomes obvious that they identify themselves as Kurds.

Question 3 was about religious identification, in which participants could write in any option, just as they could for the ethnicity question. The set of answers was more complicated than that to the ethnicity question. Half said that they were Alevi; a quarter specifically mentioned that they were Kızıldağ-Alevi, and the other quarter included answers such as Humanist, Atheist, and Tolerant. These findings corroborate what other studies on Alevis have suggested with respect to Alevi religious self-identification (van Bruinessen 1997, Sökefeld 2008, Gezik 2012).

When asked how they described their political identity, forty percent used different versions of Demokrat (or democrat, an umbrella term used to describe all liberals, social democrats, and some socialists), forty percent claimed they were socialist, and the rest split between answers such as "Marxist-Leninist," "leftist," "pacifist," and "unaligned." Seventy percent claimed to have visited their village at least once in the previous year (2010). This question was designed to see how much participants kept ties to the first homeland, and the percentage of positive answers was higher than expected. It confirmed the recent increase in back-and-forth mobility between homelands. Question 4 asked "Have you ever attended any
religious observance or visited any sacred place in 2010?” Almost a third of the respondents gave
an affirmative answer. Their responses mostly mentioned funeral services they attended and cem
ceremonies held once a year. When asked whether they attended any political strike or
demonstration in 2010, fifty percent gave an affirmative response. The events attended included
demonstrations against racism, the actions of the Turkish state, and some Kurdish and Alevi
rallies around various political purposes. These results corroborate my findings on Facebook and
other social media, where I have observed a similar multiplicity in self-identification with
various ethnic, religious, and political loyalties.

Kurdish Alevis in Germany demand media content relating to their first homeland,
captured and mediated through music and other forms. As an example, the popularity of a song
or a TV show in the first homeland could make it easier for dissidents in the second homeland to
be assimilated into the evolving first homeland. The decrease in political tension and the
depoliticization process for many refugees and immigrants in Germany, has led to the Kurdish
Alevi people (at least those I met) becoming more versed in Turkish culture than they could have
been had they stayed in the first homeland. Therefore, Kurdish Alevis in Germany are becoming
receptive to the cultural shifts in the first homeland at least as much as, if not more than their
relatives living in another second homeland in non-Kurdistan Turkey have been. These cultural
productions in the second homeland, mediated not only on the Internet but also in entertainment
venues, resemble those of first homeland practices.

An essential example of the second homelander aesthetic is found in alebesk, which has
been embraced by several second homelander Kurdish Alevis. The similar landscape of türkü
bars in Istanbul and Germany leads me to include them as part of the same second homelander
aesthetic (See Chapter 5 for musical examples of alebesk).
To conclude, I have introduced the concept of the second homelander to understand my research subjects, describing how it builds on mainstream academic discussion of similar populations as diaspora, discussing briefly why some research subjects have opted against the term to describe themselves. Displaced from their place of origin, they root themselves in a series of new homelands (Cologne and Istanbul, for instance), but meanwhile ally themselves with other Kurdish Alevi and work to shore up and perpetuate the ties that bind all Kurdish Alevi together regardless of the geographical space separating them.
Ch. 3: Kurdish Identity, the ‘Kurdish Question,’ and Kurdish Alevi Musicians

3.1. Introduction

In this chapter, I focus on the most common theme that emerged in almost all of my conversations, what the Turkish state has labeled Kürt Sorunu (the Kurdish Question), and the problem of reconciliation between Kurds and Turks. In order to better understand the Kurdish identities embraced and claimed by the Kurdish Alevis I studied, I deal with the history of the Kurdish Question in Turkey, as most Kurdish Alevis I have interviewed have embraced their Kurdish identity in the context of the conflict between Turkey and its self-identified Kurdish citizens. This chapter looks at the reconciliation between Turks and Kurds as part of the discursive analysis of the work of Kurdish, Turkish, and Alevi musicians. I observe that the ongoing conflict helped accelerate the participation of some Kurdish Alevi musicians in the new transnational field as cultural entrepreneurs. This process is manifested in the songs that they wrote, performed, and disseminated from late 1990s through today. During the past 30 years, the Kurdish conflict became a national issue in Turkey, which created major difficulties for the articulation of Kurdish identity demands. Whenever Kurds have been mentioned in the public sphere by the Turkish media, the government officials, and many others, it has been in the context of the conflict, and intimately connected to political violence, separatism, or terrorism.

Michel Foucault’s understanding of discourses embedded and naturalized in the public space forms the primary lens for understanding the function and implications of this discourse of

15 It is significant to note in other historical writings on minorities, that the oppressor has often termed the formation of a situation a "question," with a pejorative connotation. Kurds, as this chapter shows, have a distinct identity and culture that is not at all in “question.” Nonetheless, the term seems to be embraced by everyone involved with the conflict.
“separatism.” Foucault conceptualizes discourse as constitutive of social relations and identities, and he emphasizes the interdependency of discursive practices. He argues that the chosen discourse delivers the vocabulary, expressions, and style of communication that impart a point of view (Foucault 1972). In discourse on the Kurdish Question in Turkey, the official Turkish nationalist discourse has historically been framed around notions of “war” and “terrorism,” resulting in denial of the cultural, linguistic, and political demands of Kurds in Turkey. In this context, a counter-discourse against war and violence has emerged among a small group of artists and musicians in Germany and Turkey who from the early 1990s onwards have been calling for peace and reconciliation. Musicians who have promoted peace and reconciliation, even in the very limited form of performing songs in languages other than Turkish, have created a new layer of argument over the prevailing line, which suggests a militant resistance against the Turkish Republic regarding the Kurdish Question. The discourse of these peace-seeking musicians who have had to struggle against the policies of militant Kurdish organizations as well as the Turkish state cannot be separated from the significance of performance aspects (i.e., performance settings, dress, and presentation among others) of their argument and discursive strategies. Such groups have applied these strategies in order to open up a space invoking solidarity among the different ethno-religious peoples of Turkey. In effect, musical performance has provided an arena for musicians to rehearse and enact solidarity.

Within a historical account that traces the emergence of Kurdish and other non-Turkish music produced and disseminated in Turkey and Germany, the late 1990s show increased production and collaboration among musicians from diverse ethnic backgrounds. Such close collaborations have invariably contributed to reconciliation by lessening the effects of deepening polarization between the Kurdish and Turkish communities, which became more and more
visible during the 1990s as a result of the escalation of the conflict. In particular, the efforts of the band **Kardeş Türküler** [Ballads of Solidarity] – established by students in Istanbul’s Boğaziçi University in 1993 (and of which I was a member) on the principle of living together in solidarity and taking a firm stand against polarization and conflict – stand at the center of the solidarity and reconciliation activities of musicians in Turkey. Those efforts, I argue, have contributed to the emergence throughout the 2000s of polycultural alternatives to the discourse of war and exclusion, promoting instead the development of a peaceful resolution to the Kurdish Question in Turkey. Although the efforts of many peace-seeking musicians and artists, i.e. cultural entrepreneurs, have helped to open an alternative and peaceful discursive environment and have contributed to a greater public understanding of Turkey’s ethno-cultural diversity, much remains to be done to reach a solution to the Kurdish Question.

In my research I observed that Kurdish Alevi musicians, myself included, would like to play a role in politics, similar to the roles of organic intellectuals as defined by Gramsci (Gramsci, Hoare, and Nowell-Smith 1972). In their endeavors, they enact the organic intellectual mission that Gramsci was suggesting in his model. This self-appointment by the musicians and other cultural entrepreneurs secures musicians’ and other artists’ place in the new transnational field I described earlier (Chapter 1). Depending on the issue that the musicians have advocated, they have claimed to fulfill a mission as either representatives or mouthpieces of the cause at hand. In some cases there were musicians who were directly involved with politics entered into politics from the left-leaning or pro-Kurdish parties in Turkey as well as from Social Democratic parties in Germany. One of the candidates for the July 2011 elections for MP in Dersim, Tunceli was Ferhat Tunç, a musician from the region who was nominated by the pro-Kurdish BDP party. Since the BDP was not allowed to participate in elections, the party declared that it was
supporting “independent candidates” in districts that they could win. Tunç ran as an independent candidate supported by BDP and lost. Arguably one of the key cultural entrepreneurs in Kurdish Alevi life, he used to live in Germany and had some ties with the organization called Partizan, which reportedly “sent him back” to the first homeland to help in organizing. He publicly denies any ties with the organization but had performed at almost all of its events in the last three decades. His populist message and overt lyrics raised his profile among Kurds and Alevis. He is also part of the “musician imports” to Turkey who spent a period of time outside the first homeland.

The first section of this chapter provides the historical context of music-making in Turkey, exploring the environment within which Kurdish and Turkish musicians worked and created music from the 1980s until the late 20th century. I briefly reflect upon the tragic experience of Ahmet Kaya in order to highlight the difficulties and outright repression faced by Kurdish musicians. I then explore the reconciliation efforts in Turkey and look at the case study of Kardeş Türküler. Music has been an important medium to articulate political and social demands; and music produced by Turkish and Kurdish musicians in Turkey has reflected, and in certain cases helped to accelerate, the process of change in the perception and recognition of the rights of Kurds. As this chapter elaborates in detail, the music that has been popular among the Kurdish Alevis I studied reveals a yearning for a more peaceful era by reinforcing the claims for peace, unity, and reconciliation. In this context, some Kurdish and Turkish musicians have attempted to go beyond the discourse of violence, war, and denial dominant in Turkey in the past three decades in order to shape public opinion and perceptions of Kurds and Kurdish identity.
3.2. Kurdish Question and Kurdish Musicians in Turkey: A Historical Overview

The history of Turkey’s Kurdish Question can be understood by analyzing the history of the Turkish authorities’ policy of assimilation and denial of Kurdish music and dance, and thus the existence of a Kurdish ethnicity or nation. The denial of the existence of a Kurdish nation or ethnicity within the current borders of Turkey is evident in the official denial of the existence of a separate Kurdish music, which, well into the 1990s, has often been officially designated as ‘Turkish music.’ The forced appropriation and colonization of the Kurdish cultural heritage has taken the form of translating folk songs from Kurdish and other languages into Turkish without acknowledging their ethno-linguistic origins. This has been a significant assault on Kurdish music. The suppression of textual expression in Kurdish has given more reason to Kurdish youth to organize around cultural centers and political activities established and promoted through the performance of Kurdish music. Kurdish music has played an important role in mobilizing Kurds around their ethnic identity, and they have used both traditional and modern Kurdish music as a counter-hegemonic tool as well as raw material in Kurdish identity formation. Throughout the past three decades, Kurdish music has become an inseparable part of the Kurdish national movement, where music is utilized as a powerful vehicle to state positions either in support of or in opposition to issues that often provoke political demonstrations and public gatherings (Kızıldemir 1995). This close relationship with music also manifests itself in the social and political struggles of the Kurds in Turkey, where protest songs have been integral to group cohesion and mobilization as well as a vital platform for formulating political critiques and demands.

The concept of identity is a complex and evolving one. Turkish and Kurdish labels and identities can carry different meanings determined by various processes in different contexts. For
example, the term ‘Turkish-ness’ (*Türklük*) refers to both ethnic and national identities. Denial of the non-Turkish elements within the multiethnic fabric of Turkey since 1923 has contributed to the interchangeable use of ‘Turkish-ness’ to refer to both Turkish ethnicity and Turkish nationality—exclusive of Kurdish and other ethnicities. Only non-Muslim religious communities have been legally recognized as “minorities” in Turkey. No legal or judicial standing applies to Kurdish, Alevi, or any other Muslim ethnic or religious groups since the Lausanne treaty in 1922, by which Western allies recognized the establishment of the new Republic of Turkey instead of the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, I refer to Kurdish musicians in Turkey as those who self-identify as Kurds and who are also citizens of Turkey or another country. Kurdish musicians can also be defined as musicians who sing or perform music in Kurmançî or Zazakî (Dimîlî).

In order to situate Kurdish musicians within a historical context, I begin by discussing the musical climate and context of music-making in Turkey since the early 20th century. Following the First World War, the majority of Kurdish-inhabited lands (called Kurdistan) were divided between the states of Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria. In these countries, musicians who performed in Kurdish faced harsh punishments by states in addition to the denial, homogenization, and assimilation policies that forbade cultural production of the Kurds (Beşikçi 1969, 1997; van Bruinessen 2000). In many instances, such harsh policies presented Kurdish and Alevi musicians, artists, and scholars with choices that resulted in either persecution by the government or forced exile. Among the harshest policies for Kurdish culture and music were those of the Turkish Republic, which established a legal framework to silence political and cultural activities perceived as *iç mihrak* ‘internal threats’ soon after its founding in 1923. As Murat Yüksel’s (2008), Deniz Gökbalp’s (2007), and Bilgin Ayata's (2011) dissertations demonstrate, in the early years of the Turkish Republic repressive state policies prompted dramatic shifts in the
geographical distribution of the population and forced many Kurdish Alevis to leave their homes and resettle in predominantly Sunni Muslim cities.\textsuperscript{16} Laws implemented by the Turkish government in the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s were intended to minimize the density of the Kurdish and Alevi population by scattering them into different parts of the country (Gökalp 2007, Yüksel 2008, and Ayata 2011). The \textit{Takrir-Sukun Kanunu} (The Law of the Maintaining Order) of 1925 and the \textit{Iskan Kanunu} (Settlement Law) of 1927 played an instrumental role in sparking this dispersion movement in order to homogenize the Turkish nation by diluting Kurdish population in the eastern cities. The 1927 Law of Settlement authorized the Ministry of Internal Affairs to relocate and (re) settle nomadic tribes (in many cases Kurdish tribes), thus provoking migrating Kurdish Alevis to strike out in a multitude of different directions. The Settlement Law consequently led to the breaking apart of Kurdish Alevi enclaves. In most cases, the state physically deported people, but in some cases, they were otherwise subjected to constant surveillance and in some cases intimidation. Nevertheless, despite moving west and south throughout the 1940s and 1950s, many retained contact with their relatives and searched out fellow Kurdish Alevis to create new bonds of community in their new homelands. Turkey continues to fail to officially acknowledge the existence of its Kurdish or Alevi population; hence, that population has faced systematic state violence and forced migration as well as

\textsuperscript{16} In Forced Migration and the Politics of Internal Displacement in the Making of Modern Turkey: The Case of Dersim, 1937-1947, Yüksel focuses on the laws forcing the Kurds and other ethnic groups in Turkey to settle throughout the west and north of Turkey. In her dissertation titled The Politics of Displacement: A Transnational Analysis of Kurdish Forced Migration in Turkey and Europe, Ayata asserts that the displacement of Kurds was state policy. Deniz Gökalp's dissertation, Beyond Ethnopolitical Contention: the State, Citizenship and Violence in the 'New' Kurdish Question in Turkey, is another significant study of the migration of Kurds within Turkey (Gökalp 2007).
intensive assimilation into the Turkish language and culture. However, in private and in informal gatherings, the Kurdish people have continued to practice Kurdish culture and music even as they were banned publicly.

In informal gatherings, the folk music tradition of the *dengbêj* continued to play an important role in transmitting old Kurdish folk melodies and stories to new generations of Kurds. It was almost impossible to hear recordings of such repertoires in Turkey in the public sphere until the 1970s, when homemade bootleg cassettes of local singers began to emerge and were secretly distributed among Kurds to be listened to at home. Before the circulation of such underground copies, the only opportunity for Kurds to hear Kurdish music was provided by Yerevan and Baghdad broadcasts of Kurdish music. Key developments in Kurdish folk music in Turkey, ironically, occurred in other countries. Illegally copied and disseminated cassettes of Kurdish singers living in exile, such as Şivan Perwer, Nizamettin Arıç and Ciwan Haco, were the first Kurdish albums to circulate among Kurds in Turkey.

In the late 1980s, Kurdish national movements (primarily the work of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and the Kurdistan Socialist Party (PSK), and other party activists) grew.

A recent discursive analysis of ideological texts produced by the Kurdish movement, primarily by the PKK, suggests that there have been three separate periods in the history of Kurdish activism (Güneş 2012). Until the early 1970s, Güneş argues, the Kurds in Turkey emphasized the joint struggle of Kurdish and Turkish progressives against internal and external oppressors, namely feudalism and imperialism. From the late-1970s onward, and especially since the rise of the PKK, the dominant Kurdish discourse was one of national liberation: Kurdistan was a colony of Turkey. A shift in the Kurdish political activist discourse occurred in the late 1990s and became especially apparent after the imprisonment of the PKK’s leader, Abdullah
Öcalan, in 1999. From that time, the PKK renounced the idea of an independent Kurdish state and redefined its objectives as democracy and equal rights for all Kurds and Turks (Güneş 2012).

Kurdish political activism took the form of a resistance movement and military activity against the Turkish state beginning in the mid-1980s. The state used the conflict as a pretext for violence against the members of political organizations and the musicians associated with them. In many instances, Kurdish musicians and artists were the most vocal and visible representatives of the movement, their public visibility making them targets of suppression. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Kurdish musicians made unambiguous references to the sufferings of the Kurds in their recordings and public performances both in Kurdistan and in the diaspora. Even in these decades the Turkish state responded by censoring cultural organizations such as the Navenda Çanda Mezopotamya (NÇM, Mesopotamia Cultural Centers) in Istanbul and Izmir. Throughout the 1990s, this organization was under constant police surveillance; on numerous occasions its members were subjected to police brutality, its archives were destroyed, and the use of its concert hall was banned for years. The state’s violent reaction to the political demands of the Kurds made it difficult to distinguish between political activists demanding separation from Turkey and peaceful activities demanding cultural, linguistic, and educational rights. Thus, many Kurdish musicians demonstrated their solidarity with organizations such as the NÇM; consequently, most have faced prosecution and imprisonment. These musicians became activists in protests.

In the 1990s, the cultural policies of the Turkish Republic had certain openings, either due to the pressure from external actors criticizing Turkey’s poor human rights record, or
internal openings that were thought to help win the hearts of some Kurds to support the state against ‘separatists.’ However, in most cases, the state’s legal system was for a long period of time not tolerant of music in the Kurdish language. An example demonstrating a governmental response toward Kurdish music is the case of Rahmi Saltuk, a Kurdish musician who established his career by singing in Turkish, as many of his fellow Kurdish musicians did. Prior to 1989, his work had centered on türkü, traditional Turkish folk songs. Saltuk’s Hoy Nare, released in 1989, became the first Kurdish album that initially received approval from the Turkish Ministry of Culture. It featured songs sung in Kurdish, and was possibly overlooked on its initial perusal as the Ministry censored the album only a few weeks later. The public prosecutor stated that the reason for the ban was that the use of the Kurdish language violated an article in the penal code against the use of non-Turkish local languages in cultural productions (Aksoy 2006).

The law against releasing local non-Turkish albums was eventually altered in 1992, although it still did not allow the dissemination of Kurdish albums in Turkey. Even after several legal amendments, harsh resistance by the authorities to the dissemination of Kurdish music remains. Most recently, this resistance was evident in the 2008 arrest of the public bus-driver Mustafa Tüzün for playing a Kurdish song in his bus. A court in Diyarbakır sentenced Tüzün to ten months’ imprisonment (Antenna Turkey 2008).

Performing Kurdish music in concert has not been easy for Kurdish musicians. Local law enforcement and police authorities have banned many concerts for the content of the music, and such policies continued into the late 1990s and early 2000s. As I have personally witnessed along with many other Kurdish and Turkish musicians, Kurdish musicians were arrested and the police

17 Also known commonly with its Turkish acronyms, MKM (Mezopotamya Kültür Merkezi).
regularly destroyed their archives throughout the 1990s. The Turkish Ministry of Culture could ban a song and thus an album if the lyrics contained words that even alluded to Kurdish identity, Kurdistan or the Kurdish national movement. Musicians and producers have had to submit translations of their lyrics to the Ministry of Culture in order to obtain permission before the release of an album. Therefore, Kurdish musicians have developed strategies to circumvent the censorship barriers by replacing a ‘dangerous’ word such as ‘Kurdistan’ with a rhyming alternative, such as ‘Gülistan’, meaning the garden of roses.

3.2.1. An Event: Ahmet Kaya’s Departure

Another dramatic event that highlights the marginalization of dissident musical voices in Turkey was the forced departure of Ahmet Kaya from Turkey in 1999. Kaya, whose mother was Turkish and father Kurdish, was born in Malatya. Although he never became fluent in Kurdish and wrote his lyrics almost exclusively in Turkish, he expressed flawlessly the experience of the Kurds, in Turkey and elsewhere, for nearly three decades. Kaya’s appeal originates from the populist and protest quality of his lyrics and his unique delivery style. His voice stood out among the few musicians and intellectuals who were protesting the undemocratic policies of the Turkish state, particularly after the military coup d’état of 1980, which destroyed all such protest movements. Although Kaya usually performed in Turkish, his audiences consisted mainly of disenfranchised Kurds and Turks who occupied the outskirts of metropolitan cities.

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For an analysis of the events that led to Kaya’s departure, see Aksoy 2010.
Kaya had to leave Turkey after a physical attack, upon receiving the 1999 Best Turkish Singer of the Year Award in Istanbul. During his acceptance speech at the award ceremony, Kaya told the audience: ‘I composed a Kurdish song, I am looking for a brave producer and a brave TV channel to broadcast it, and I know there are some among you.’ Upon hearing this statement, prominent Turkish musicians and celebrities in the audience began throwing objects at Kaya, including forks and knives from the dinner table. A few friends and sympathetic waiters protected him, but soon after this event, Kaya, facing constant harassment and death threats, was forced out of the country and fled to Western Europe. Approximately two months before his death in 2000, from a heart attack while in Paris, I met Kaya just before a concert at a pro-Kurdish event in Germany. He invited us, the members of Kardeş Türküler, into his dressing room to reminisce. He looked sad and lonely, yet said he did not regret voicing his criticisms about the state of the Kurds and Kurdish music in Turkey.

In an interview appearing in Milliyet (Çini 2009), Serdar Ortaç, a Turkish pop singer and songwriter who was among the instigators of the attack against Kaya, apologized for his actions during the 1999 awards ceremony. Ortaç admitted that he had been wrong and stated that he had only recently realized his mistake. In a similar change of heart, the Turkish Radio Television Broadcasting Company (TRT) recently announced that it plans to retract its policy of banning blacklisted singers, including Kaya, following the new government’s democratization policy called demokratik açılım (democratic opening). For more than twenty-five years, hundreds of blacklisted singers had been banned from all national radio and TV stations controlled by the state.

Skeptics have continued to question the viability of reconciliation efforts given the problems and decades of hostility exemplified by the violence that led to Kaya’s exile. The
incident of his forced exile left an even deeper scar, not only because Kaya was a highly popular figure, but also because his message was more conciliatory than those of other Kurdish musicians. The attack on Kaya made manifest the power of Turkish nationalism’s exclusionary practices and the accompanying mainstream campaign against Kurds. In response to this experience, Kaya developed a new more pro-Kurdish stance in exile, which reflected the lives of many exiled Kurdish musicians and artists in Europe and elsewhere.

3.3. Musical Expression and Reconciliation in Turkey

Ethnomusicology has been described as the study of music in its social contexts. The main inquiry of many ethnomusicological studies has been to examine music’s social and cultural uses, meanings, and functions in both local and global contexts. Music does not at all times have to communicate something readily understood, but in most instances, it does. Musical practices and discourses express specific stances, ideas, messages, and emotions. Music can either help or thwart people in listening to what others say and feel. It can alleviate pain and suffering; it can heal. Musical practices and discourses can also convey hatred, exclusion, and violence. Musicians might also help to initiate peace in a discourse outside of the boundaries of official claims. Musical expression includes lyrical discourses as well as sonic, aesthetic, and symbolic messages that musicians bring together. In order to highlight the strong bond between music and socio-cultural identities, the analysis presented in this chapter relies on feminist scholar Susan Friedman’s assertions in her Mappings (1998), which describes the process of identities becoming narratives of formation as they go through space and time. Friedman argues that ‘the narrative texts—whether verbal or visual, oral or written, fictional or referential, imaginary or historical—constitute primary documents of cultural expressivity’ (1998: 8). I
approach musical expressions and performances as cultural texts that represent the memories and narratives of people in Turkey and Kurdistan. This formulation also entails treating the works of Kurdish and Turkish musicians who contribute to the reconciliation process as narratives of the formation of a peace-seeking cluster of artistic expressivity. These musicians, who articulate peace and reconciliation in the forms of peace-seeking narratives, call for a change in the public understanding of the Kurdish Question.

Listening to the music produced to reach audiences who would like to see a more peaceful environment might help all concerned to recognize the feelings and experiences they share. Music can provide a sonic and kinetic space to help enhance bonds between people of varying backgrounds, identities, memories, and traumas. Music can also enhance cultural understanding between peoples who have systematically been indoctrinated to misunderstand each other, and can create a sense of a common cultural tradition and historical bonds shared by Turks and Kurds in Turkey for centuries.

Music and dance can foster engagement between peoples at concerts or political rallies. Dance has become an indispensable part of the protest tradition. Among many festivals and events I have attended, as performer on stage or as audience participant, the most exciting and anticipated part centers around the dance. At various kinds of political rallies for organizations associated with Turkish, Kurdish, and Alevi groups I have found it difficult to resist joining in, feeling the collective teeming and waving bodies of Kurdish and Turkish youth all together. In dance, engagement between individual bodies and with the collective kinesthetic whole is expressed in the line-dance (govend in Kurdish, halay in Turkish). At protests, Kurdish and Turkish activists and onlookers join in govend while shouting certain slogans in unison. They dance hand-in-hand in the same rhythm with complex foot movements, which are reminders of a
shared expressive history. More than just a traditional line-dance, the *govend* becomes a tool to discipline the bodies and create a unified collective. In political rallies, the *govend* represents the appropriation of a traditional dance into the demonstration, supporting the political cause of the organizations involved, a phenomenon that resembles the common practice of *dabkeh* (a line dance among Arabs in the Levant) by Palestinian refugees in Jordan (MacDonald 2010). In both the Kurdish and Palestinian gatherings, group dancing works alongside other discursive forms of struggle (speeches, for example) to reinforce and reproduce collectivity among people to coalesce around common political causes. In these two contexts, collective dance with responsive singing, like other genres in the world, can be interpreted as creating a new habitus as a bodily inscribed practice that breaks away from verbal discourse, as a bodily inscribed communal action, and eventually as a group cohesion-building process. This practice also improves the bonds among Turkish and Kurdish audiences from different backgrounds who come to the concerts and events organized by peace-seeking musicians and artists. It provides space where bodies move together and hold each other, as even another form of reenacting peace, harmony, and synchronization.

The language in which a song is performed, regardless of its content, often becomes a more prominent marker than non-textual musical features differentiating it from other songs in other languages.19 In the 1990s, performing a song in a language other than Turkish constituted a political act. Performing in a language banned for decades deployed a counter-discourse to the official “separatist” discourse promulgated by Turkish nationalist power centers that continued to

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19 This has been the case for many other minority languages, such as Catalan songs in Spain; see Liew 1993.
consider public use of the Kurdish language and music sung in Kurdish as separatist or terrorist acts.

The relationship between music and sound and social movements, and social networks in various communities, has received ample attention in recent ethnomusicological and anthropological studies (Sugarman 1999, Hirschkind 2006, Bohlman 2004, Turino 2008, and Nooshin 2009). Many scholars have argued that music has a unique and indispensable role in articulating the demands of community members. Recent ethnomusicological studies have come to focus more on the power, politics, and musical expression among immigrants and minorities. Drawing on ethnomusicological studies of the relationships between music/musicians and political and social movements, I believe that music has been a crucial part of both the sociocultural and the political milieux. Other ethnomusicological studies have dealt with the functions of circulating music among immigrants in the formation and maintenance of a variety of national, ethnic, and religious identities and social networks (Hyder 2004; Meintjes 2003, Shannon 2006).

Recent studies on the reconciliation efforts of musicians within the disciplines of cultural anthropology and ethnomusicology have explored the ways music functions in and contributes to cultural reconciliation processes and formations of cohorts among immigrants, in both majority and minority communities (Laurence and Urbain 2011, O’Connell and Castelo-Branco 2010). Both collections are welcome additions to the process of understanding music and conflict, and the transformation as well as fomenting of conflict through music-making. The authors demonstrate the significance of music in both reinforcing disputes and in conflict-resolution efforts in situations ranging from the Catholic-Protestant dispute in Northern Ireland to the enactments of conflicts between African American and Euro-American musicians in the U.S.
Others have examined the role of music in peace-building and the reconciliation efforts in conflicts in South Africa, the Americas, and the Arab-Israeli conflict (Urbain 2008). On the subject of the Arab-Israeli conflict and musical reconciliation, Brinner (2009), for example, argues that the efforts of musicians on both sides of the conflict contributed significantly to the emergence and sustenance of a common cultural ground. In that regard, reconciliation attempts through music in the Turkish and Kurdish dispute show commonalities with similar attempts elsewhere, as in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict that Brinner discusses. In the case of Turkish and Kurdish communities, music and musicians have reenacted peace both on stage and on their albums in order to counter the othering of the Kurds in Turkey that occurs in both the political and cultural spheres (Said 1978, Mackey 1993). Drawing on the studies mentioned above, peace might be rehearsed and staged via representing others as the perceived ‘us’ (i.e. Turks, Kurds, and others) in order to create a platform engaging all distinct socio-cultural entities constituting the multi-ethnic fabric of Turkey.

While the close focus on the role of music in reconciliation has been a welcome addition to the growing literature on the topic, not everyone is convinced that music has made a positive impact in reconciliation processes. The main critique of the reconciliation efforts through music and art comes from the proponents of the culture talk criticism initiated by Mahmood Mamdani (2002). Opponents of the possibility of reconciliation through actions other than political or armed struggle claim that confining the actual social and political reconciliation issues to the cultural domain may lead to the devaluation of enormous political and historical problems. These skeptics of cultural or musical reconciliation also claim that focusing solely on cultural production as the only or main vehicle to address complex and difficult political issues could simply bypass the actual problem, which might also function as another form of manipulation.
Although those concerns are both legitimate and significant, as my chapter demonstrates, cultural and musical reconciliation efforts have contributed significantly to the visibility of the music, language, and culture of the Kurds and various other minorities in Turkey who have been ignored, silenced, and oppressed for decades.

Given the severe and at times dangerous ethnic polarization in Turkey concerning the Kurdish issue (Blum and Hassanpour 1995; Bayrak 2002; Aksoy 2006), some intellectuals and musicians on both sides have attempted to raise the demands and voice calls for peace and reconciliation. Here it is important to underline the extremely hostile and demonizing discourse deployed by the Turkish state and mainstream media in representing the Kurdish rebels, which has also strongly informed the actual military policies implemented against them. During the 1990s, any support of the cause of Kurdish culture (or in fact anything associated with Kurdish identity) could result in severe consequences including imprisonment.  

Nevertheless, during the 2000s there have been important improvements in Turkey’s folk music scene in linguistic and ethnic terms, and in cultural expressions of Kurdish, Alevi, Armenian, and Laz musicians, especially after the ceasefire between the PKK and the Turkish Army between 1999 and 2005 (Bates 2008). Productions and collaborations among musicians of different ethnicities have led to the encouraging emergence of non-Turkish music produced and disseminated in the late 1990s and the early 2000s. In 2009, the ruling Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP, Justice and Development Party) started the project ‘democratic opening’ to begin a

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20 At the time, even worse forms of official harassment and suppression were applied to other dissident Kurdish and Turkish musicians who dared to question the status quo on the Kurdish Question. It is worth mentioning here that Aynur Doğan, a worldwide renowned Kurdish singer
dialogue around Turkey’s internal problems, starting with a conversation around Kurdish identity and civil and cultural rights. In 2010, the prime minister of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, met with some sixty musicians and composers to discuss the country’s democratic initiative. Here, Erdoğan gathered Turkey’s top performers and celebrities to talk about the government’s plans to end the civil war between Turks and Kurds by extending more cultural rights to Kurds. Turkey’s most popular singers such as Sezen Aksu, Ajda Pekkan, İbrahim Tatlıses, Emel Sayın, Ferhat Göçer, and Mahsun Kırmızıgül were among the participants. This relatively small development encouraged some peace-seekers and highlighted the significance of reconciliation efforts.

Music indeed has a role in creating space for dialogue with and about, and an understanding of, the other. There are many instances, exemplified by the participation of prominent figures of Turkish popular music in cultural political events and in festivals held in predominantly Kurdish cities and organized by different cultural and political Kurdish organizations. One important and symbolic example from recent years is the work of Sezen Aksu, an important figure in Turkish popular music who is undoubtedly the most popular singer and songwriter of Turkish popular music and wrote many hits in the last three decades. In 2009, in order to show solidarity with the Kurdish Alevi from Dersim at their national regional festival, she performed a couple of Kurdish songs with Mikail Aslan, a Kurdish Alevi musician living in Germany. In a musical evening, Aksu sang in Kurdish with Aslan, which was interpreted as a great symbolic gesture and public display of solidarity with the Kurds and their

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and songwriter, was harassed at multiple events in public, even as recently as July 16, 2011 at the Istanbul Jazz Festival (www.radikal.com.tr, July 16, 2011).
language. The popularity of Aksu has helped vernacularize the multicultural fabric and legitimize the existence of the other, meaning cultures and languages that have been ignored, denied, and excluded for so long. As organic intellectuals in the Gramscian sense, those musicians use choice of language as part of their political strategy. Such symbolic cultural and musical activities have also helped to de-stigmatize and de-politicize Kurdish language, identity, and culture away from associations with separatism, terrorism and violence held by the general Turkish public.

![Image](image.png)

**Figure 3.1. Sezen Aksu in 2009 Munzur Festival in Dersim (Tunceli)**

Other events where Turkish musicians have shown—at significant risk to their careers—solidarity with Kurds and their Kurdish musician colleagues have been the Kurdish New Year celebrations of Newroz (New Year) in Diyarbakır and other Kurdish cities, as well as various political events and rallies featuring Turkish and Kurdish musicians standing side by side. Emphasizing historical and cultural proximity by performing music from all sections of the society has alleviated tensions and transgressed imposed boundaries, and so-called
‘insurmountable’ cultural differences.

Emphasizing historical and cultural proximity through such multi-genre performances might question perceived boundaries formed by those who have been led to believe that differences between ethnicities stem from insurmountable cultural factors. By emphasizing both proximity and difference between the Kurdish minority and the Turkish majority, the Kurdish people might be more fairly represented to a larger and more liberal Turkish audience. While the nationalists on both sides have articulated differences, peace-seeking musicians such as Sezen Aksu emphasize the commonalities while not denying differences. Not only do these cultural leaders work more diplomatically than the fear mongers, but they also envision a better and more peaceful possible future, at least through their songs. Thus, they may enact peace on stage and in their recordings. Ultimately, such attempts of enacting peace in their most idealized or poetic forms help initiate a lived peace first articulated in formal and vernacular discourses.

It is important to recognize the vital contribution Turkish musicians have made to such reconciliation efforts. The members of my former group Kardeş Türküler contributed to the Derguş (Cradle) album of Koma Amed, one of the most popular Kurdish bands of the 1990s. My former group was also involved in the musical direction and arrangements of the famous Kurdish singer Şivan Perwer’s Roj u Hiv (Sun and Moon) album, demonstrating its solidarity with one of the best-known Kurdish singers who has been forced to live in exile for the past three decades. Various Turkish studio musicians have not hesitated to contribute to the Kurdish kom (music groups) and their albums produced in Turkey. The newly established kom (music groups) of the 1990s could not have produced their recordings without the help of such Turkish musicians, producers, and arrangers (Aksoy 2006, Sarıtaş 2010). This cooperation (which also represents to some extent a form of reconciliation) began in the Turkish music industry through collaboration on various
aspects of recording and studio production processes, sales, organization, performance, and personal training. Thus, a collaborative network of Kurdish and Turkish musicians has played a catalyzing role in fostering links and better understanding between the communities in times of war and devastation. Kardeş Türküler, along with many other Turkish and Kurdish musicians, has confirmed the possibility of music and musicians contributing positively to the healing process that anticipates political reconciliation in attempting to resolve the ‘Kurdish Question’ in Turkey.

3.4. Kurdish Music and Musicians in Germany

Political tensions between the Turkish state and its Kurdish citizens have resulted in a significant exodus of Kurdish musicians to Europe. As a result, modern developments in nationalistic Kurdish music take place in countries like Germany and through the new media. It is significant that the key developments in Kurdish music have occurred more in Europe than in Kurdistan in the last decade. The history of Kurdish music closely parallels the history of Kurdish politics. Political tensions have not only spurred the development of Kurdish music but have also allowed for its widespread dissemination. The 1990s and early 2000s have seen the distribution of a large number of Kurdish albums produced by Kurdish musicians living in exile. Production companies like Mir and Hunerkom – established by Kurds living in Europe – are largely responsible for the dissemination of Kurdish music throughout the world.

21 Such as Turkish pop singers Sezen Aksu and Sertab Erener; and Kurdish musicians like Mikail Aslan, Mehmet Atlı, Aynur Doğan, and Metin Kahraman among many others.
Another recent development in Kurdish folk music has been the shift towards placing an increasing importance on the individual artist. Only recently have Kurdish musicians developed celebrity status, as seen by the recent trend of Kurdish youth establishing fan clubs for their stars. Two important examples are Şivan Perwer and Diyar, both of whom have been very successful in appealing to the Kurdish youth in the metropolitan areas of Turkey. I had a chance to work with Şivan Perwer in 2000 on his *Roj u Hîv* album when I was a member of Kardeş Türküler. Later, in 2004, I composed, arranged, and performed pieces for both Shêxo and Ali Baran, Germany-based Kurdish Alevi musicians. I have maintained contact with these musicians since our collaborations.

3.4.1. *An Oral History with Ali Baran in Düsseldorf, Summer 2010*

In order to provide a representative sample of extended oral histories with Kurdish Alevi musicians who left their first homeland for Germany and who produced albums extensively within the realm of “Kurdish” music, I include here certain parts of my interview with Ali Baran, a well-known Kurdish Alevi musician. I worked with Baran in 2005 as an arranger and studio performer for his album *Teberik*. I believe that Ali Baran’s albums are significant historical texts. As one of the initiators of the new Kurdish Alevi transnational field and an active cultural entrepreneur, his music documents the political and social state of Kurdish Alevis, who also constitute his main audience. Baran has performed for nearly every religio-political organization active in Germany and Turkey. This broad connection has given him a unique perspective about members of religio-political parties, as they often request songs from him. As an immigrant musician living in Germany, he has witnessed all of the phases that Kurdish Alevis in two homelands have undergone. I lay out Ali Baran’s life and his experiences in order to illustrate
how multiple identities held by Kurdish Alevis have been shaped by historical events.

Born in 1956 in Hozat (a predominantly Kurdish Alevi town in Turkish Kurdistan), Baran sings Kurdish songs at public events and began playing bağlama (or saz) on stage when he was 12 years old. Like many Kurdish Alevis of that era, he grew interested in leftist youth movements in those years, and was eventually suspended by the school authorities due to his political activities. In 1973, he decided to visit his father in Germany, returning to Turkey in 1975 after his father died in a car accident. He began to give concerts in other Turkish cities, including Iskenderun, Istanbul, and several predominantly Kurdish cities. He was arrested a few times simply for singing in Kurdish. In 1977, in Diyarbakir he was arrested after a concert in which he sang songs in Kurdish and was imprisoned for nearly a year.

In 1979, Baran had to leave the country for Germany, where he attended the University of Karlsruhe, studying engineering, a similar career path for almost all Kurdish Alevi musicians in their new homelands. In 1982, after the military coup in Turkey, he was denied his Turkish citizenship along with prominent union leaders and musicians such as Melike Demirağ and Şanar Yurdatapan, whose citizenship was abrogated by the junta regime. He was forced to seek asylum in Germany.

Baran’s first album, Lo Wara (“Come On”), was released in Cologne in 1982 by the leftist organization Devrimci İşçi Dernekleri Federasyonu (DIDF), the Federation of Revolutionary Workers Union. Some Kurdish Alevis brought bootlegged copies of this album to their relatives residing in the first homeland. The most striking characteristic of this album was Baran’s use of traditional Kurdish vocal style in several songs and its most popular songs were “ Lê Dayîkê,” “Xezal,” and “Tev Lê.” Ali Baran told me he had been a member of Halkın Kurtuluşu (Freedom of People), a leftist organization popular among Kurdish Alevis in the 1970s.
and 80s. Baran invoked the political affiliations of artists of the era by mentioning those of one of his idols, Yılmaz Güney, an important figure that influenced all musicians and artists in exile. Güney, the most famous of all Kurdish exiles and a noted actor and director who left Turkey in 1982, was close to anti-Soviet leftist movements in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Baran participated in solidarity nights after which people requested cassettes of his music. At the time, he had none and thus decided to record. The DIDF Workers Federation sponsored Baran’s recording project with Nedim Hazar, who featured piano and accordion frequently in his arrangements.

Baran was a university student at the time he released *Lo Wara*. Subsequently, he felt that the leadership of DIDF disliked his recording songs in Kurdish. "They were not open to my singing in Kurdish, and one night after an event a member of the party approached me and said, ‘Don’t you know any Turkish songs? Sing one so that we could enjoy too.’"

I felt they were not accepting me anymore, which led me to get closer to other organizations. Then I met Hasan Kuş, a member of KOMKAR (Immigrant Organization of the Kurdistan Socialist Party) at the time, who invited me to perform at their solidarity night. KOMKAR was Ulusalçı (nationalist, or Kurdish nationalist). Then I asked my people from Halkın Kurtuluşu for their permission to perform for KOMKAR. Ranking members within the organization would not let me perform after saying to me, “What kind of business can you have with those social fascists?”

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This exchange caused Baran to decide to leave the Halkin Kurtuluşu during the period right after Yılmaz Güney passed away. Becoming an independent artist meant that Baran could produce his second album himself and organize his own events. Baran’s second album, *Deriye Hepisxane* ("Door of the Jail"), was produced independently and released in 1984. The lyrical content of this album was mostly about political advocacy, and specifically the jail strikes and protests against the junta regime in Turkey. Due to distribution problems and ongoing political turmoil, this album failed to reach much of his audience in either of the two homelands.

But I couldn’t be as successful as I was with their [DIDF’s] institutional help. My second album cost me about 5000 DM [Deutsche Mark] at the time, in a studio in Cologne with Orhan Timur, in 1983. The album was simple with few instruments. Some criticized me for making an *arabesk* album, which was almost like a sin among my fellow leftists.

Then I did the *Êy Dêrsimê* ("Hey Dersim") album. I went to the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) people to get their distribution companies to release the album. I then went to Hunerkom in 1984, which was the production section responsible for dissemination of albums that were supported by the PKK. I talked to people at Hunerkom to get some money to pay the bills as an advance before the release of the album.

Hunerkom managers told me, “we are at war and we don’t have money.” Then I went back to KOMKAR, which then agreed to pay me an advance and they released my album. They were nice as they cared so much about art and education of Kurds. They showed their respect for my music. They represent the intellectual section of the Kurdish political activists. I picked happy and fast songs for the album repertoire. Then we learned that it became a success and I was invited to countless concerts and solidarity
nights. I became more popular among Kurds.

Ali Baran’s third album, and his most popular, Êy Dêrsimê was released in 1987, and prominent Turkish and Kurdish musicians living in Turkey have covered a few songs from this album since. By releasing Êy Dêrsimê, Baran was the first in the recording industry in Germany or Turkey to sing in Kurmancî, Zazakî, and Turkish. The most popular songs were “Êy Dêrsimê,” “Yekê Bigrim,” “Betlis,” “Ax Baba,” and “Bukê.” Orhan Temur wrote the arrangements that, importantly, featured individual styles on the various songs. The Zazakî song titled “Lori Lora Mîna” became a hit and has been performed by various musicians, including the late Armenian musician, Arame Tigran. Ali Baran told me that he was inspired by the Alevi religious songs when he composed the beyit titled “Ax Baba.”

Ali Baran, in this album preceding the Sivas massacre and the Alevi revival, expressed the idea that Kurdish ethnic and national identity, with the ideal of Kurdish independence, was the most significant mode of belonging for all Kurds, asking Kurds to join the ranks of the Kurdish movement in one way or another. The album and especially the title song are significant examples of Kurdish nationalist and to some extent militant calls made by Kurdish musicians. In “Êy Dêrsimê,” Baran calls for all Kurds to unite through deferring all internal disputes, political differences, and historical problems.
In the lyrics of “Êy Dêrsimê,” Baran has a clear agenda of reporting the issues that Kurds, mainly those Alevi Kurds of the Dersim region, have faced. He calls Kurds to use all tools
available against their enemies, whom he does not name. In the end, he calls for Kurds to join the
fight and salutes those Kurds who could sacrifice their lives for Kurdistan, a clear nationalistic
reference making it illegal for the song and album to be circulated in Turkey until the 2000s.
Although Baran had not continually emphasized Kurdish identity, and was less militant than
some of his peers, the lyrics of “Êy Dêrsimê” are unblemished examples of a pan-Kurdish
political and musical stance.

Baran’s singing style on “Êy Dêrsimê” exhibits the vocal characteristics of Kurdish folk
and traditional music, which is known for the extensive use of higher register crescendo male
vocals (Christensen and Blum 2001). In this song, Baran’s vocal starts with a high-pitched
crescendo resembling the timbre of the Kurdish dengbêj. When he starts singing from the higher
register, he uses Kurdish male vocal ornamentation as well as other folk music vocal
embellishment techniques such as vibrato. The vocal section starts from the seventh degree and
reaches the higher octave in calling to ask how the people of Dersim are doing. The melodic
structure exhibits parallel features with many folk songs from Turkey and Kurdistan where many
melodies follow a common formulaic melodic progression resembling a ladder of tones. It
follows a pattern of climbing down the steps of a ladder from a high pitch to the karar sesi, the
tonic or the strongest pitch in the pitch hierarchy.

The scale used in “Êy Dêrsimê” is the most common one used in the Kurdish Alevi tunes
that share considerable melodic and rhythmic features with Turkish Alevi and Kurdish music.
Although the song uses the scale of Hüseynî makami, it does not necessarily follow the rules of
the Turkish makamlar (melodic modes), like many other folk and arabesk tunes (see Stokes
On “Êy Dêrsimê,” written and composed by Ali Baran, the rhythmic structure consists of a cycle of five beats split into groups of two and three beats marked as strong (Düm) or weak (Tek) beats. This rhythmic mode, usûl in Turkish, is also known as Türk aksağı.

\[
\begin{array}{ccccc}
1 & 2 & + & 3 & 4 & 5 \\
\text{Düm} & \text{Tek} & + & \text{Düm} & \text{Tek} & \text{Tek}
\end{array}
\]

The percussion instruments most likely consisted of a darbuka (goblet-shaped drum) and a bendir (frame drum) marking the beats. Similar to many other folk music arrangements made in Turkey and Germany in the 1980s and 1990s, the overall structure of the arrangement exhibits a heterophonic character with a couple of significant exceptions in which the bağlama, the cura (the smallest bağlama), strings, and bass play parallel thirds and fifths in specific melodic sections, mainly in the descending sections of the interlude. The arrangement of “Êy Dêrsimê” shares common features with those of albums by Şivan Perwer and Arif Sağ (the most famous Turkish Alevi musician alive) in terms of functional harmonic use of thirds and fifths and especially utilization of the bass. The use of a string section (with drones and glissandos in
specific melodic phrases) resembles Şivan Perwer’s famous tune “Yare,” while the calls and responses between bağlama and vocals, the harmonic use of the cura, and the bağlama timbre resemble Arif Sağ’s “Sözde Ben Bir Insan Olmaya Geldim,” which utilizes thirds, fourths, and the fifths in the melodic or contra-melodic parts. The bağlama and cura used on the recording of “Êy Dêrsimê” were tuned in the baglama düzeni (bağlama tuning system). Ali Baran has always used the baglama düzeni, which has been associated with Alevi musical, rhythmic, and melodic milieu. Through “Êy Dêrsimê,” Ali Baran tapped into rhythmic, melodic, and instrumental qualities of continually submerging traditions of Kurdish, Alevi, and Turkish folk music while maintaining his Kurdish nationalistic view through the lyrics.

In 1989, emotionally stressed due to the massacre of Kurds in Iraq instigated by Saddam Hussein, Baran released his fourth and most pan-Kurdish album, Helepçe u Zindan (“Halabja and the Dungeon”). The song selection of this album resembles that of Êy Dêrsimê.

The Halabja massacre left a big emotional scar for Kurds including myself. I released an album called Helepçe u Zindan. Sufferings of my fellow Kurds under Saddam moved me so much. I included my Zazakî songs as well.

Baran released his fifth album, Çene Çene, in 1991. Along with bağlama, the arrangements featured such instruments as violin and kanun (plucked zither). The title song, “Çene Çene,” is in Zazakî and makam Kurd. Baran worked with Hasret Gültekin (who was killed in the Sivas

24 The YouTube link can be reached at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lyyDBqGz-9k
25 The YouTube link can be reached at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K__qZo0ykT8
massacre along with 33 other musicians and artists in 1993) and Oğuz Abadan on this album. His strong Kurdish voice can be heard over rich instrumental arrangements, especially in the popular song titled “Dîlem Loy Loy.” Baran’s compositions for the lyrics of nationalistic Kurdish songs such as “Azadixwazım” (“I Want Independence”) written by Cigerxwin, and “Tu Kûrmancî Nizâni” (“Can’t You Speak Kurdish?”) by Cizrewi are among the highlights of the album.

In 1993, after fifteen years in exile, Baran returned to Turkey with a German passport, along with other prominent labor leaders who had lost their citizenship. There he worked with Arif Sağ for his sixth album, Deste Ma, released that year. This album is striking in its dominant bağlama sound. The first song on the album, “Dem ê Dem ê,” resembles the Kurdish Alevi deyiş (para-liturgical tunes). The song became popular when my former band, Kardeş Türküler, covered it in 1997. In protest of the Sivas massacre, Baran released no other recordings until 2000, when his seventh album, Evina Me, came out.

I met Hasret Gültekin, one of the musicians who died in the burning of the hotel in Sivas, at a KOMKAR night. We had a great muhabbet (intimate gathering at homes featuring playing the bağlama and singing together) until 4am. I had many friends killed in that massacre [meaning Sivas]. That is why I decided not to visit Turkey for three years; I didn’t want to visit the country that allowed my fellow Alevis to be burned alive. Sivas was another turning point in my life and in many other Alevi lives as well.

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26 See Chapter 4 for more on the bağlama tuning systems.
Baran visited Turkey and Turkish Kurdistan more frequently after *Evîna Me* and eventually participated in Kurdish Alevi cultural events. On the album, which features minimalistic arrangements, he worked with arranger and drummer Ömer Avci.27 Baran’s efforts to compile the recordings of Kurdish folk musicians on *Evîna Me* marked a significant contribution to the preservation of the tradition. The popular song “Em Dixwazin” expresses the yearning for a new world, and “Sino” is significant in its reliance on the Kurdish *dengbêj* (bard) tradition, and also its large vocal range that displays the expressive quality of his voice.

A key development in the history of Kurdish Alevis was the emergence of the Kurdish nationalist movement, embodied in the PKK of the 1980s. The PKK has played a significant role in creating the discursive tools for Kurdish youth to unify against their common enemy, the Turkish state (Güneş 2011). At least in earlier times, the PKK managed to strike a tone of secular discourse, which allowed Kurdish youth from different religious backgrounds to transcend religion in favor of a nationalistic ideology that could unite all Kurds. This transcendence has not spread to some elderly Kurds, who have kept their religious differences, which could jeopardize a Kurdish national unity project. Even though some elderly Kurds argue that they are “enlightened,” they still carry on old feuds stemming from sectarian differences and problems between Kurdish groups (see Chapter 4). Thus, a wide gap between factions appears in terms of generational approaches to the Kurdish nationalist movement.

The next event that shocked me was the arrest of Öcalan in 1999, the leader of the PKK, and the terrible treatment he received by the Turkish authorities. I felt humiliated by

27 I interviewed with Ömer Avci for this study as well (see Chapter 6).
those actions they made on Öcalan. I felt my Kurdish identity humiliated by Öcalan’s humiliation by the Turkish law enforcement. After Öcalan came to the court and apologized to the Turkish families who had lost family members as soldiers that was another blow to us, as I came to believe that we were right in terms of our fight against the Turkish army. I lost any hope that I had for the Kurdish movement. I was criticizing the Kurdish organizations’ officials who did not even try to speak in Kurdish as the next generation began losing the language and the national identity. They said let’s create Kurdistan and then we will deal with the language. When you lose your language you lose your past and your difference.

Baran’s 2005 album, Teberik (on which I worked with him as an arranger and performer in the studio) features his original compositions. The songs concern historical events and feature traditional themes. Teberik also features such successful musicians as Hakan Akay and Mikail Aslan in Germany, myself and Soner Akalın in Turkey. “Medîna Min” and “Teberik” became the most popular songs on the album. Baran's latest album, Çel Avaz, was released in 2010, with arrangements by Hakan Akay and Ali Baran himself.

Baran has engaged with both Kurdish and Alevi repertoires since his early childhood years. Baran’s quest to represent traditional forms has resulted in a diverse set of compositional approaches. Along with original lyrics, he has composed music for poems written by famous Kurdish poets such as Cigerxwin, Feqiye Teyra, and Mela Ciziri. Prominent Turkish and Kurdish musicians have covered many of his compositions. Our conversation ended with talk of the
passing of Aşık Mahsuni, probably the most prolific Alevi aşık or ozan (bard)\textsuperscript{28} of modern times. Baran told me that although he used to criticize Aşık Mahsuni, now that he has passed away no other Turkish and Alevi folk music composer can fill the void. Baran described elderly musicians like himself as “like apples fallen to the ground, waiting to go bad.” When I asked him how he would describe the sources of his music, he said:

I had many melodies in my head from my early childhood. Like “Medina Min,” which I had on my last album, the melody I remember my grandmother used to sing; I added some parts and modernized it with a traditional touch. “Demme Demme” is another melody I remember from a Kurdish Alevi cem ceremony I attended when I was five years old. It was sung and performed by Seyit Murtaza, who was a rehber (guide) and also mirtik (entertainer), in a big house in our village. I also recorded my mother’s version of the dance of that semah a couple of decades ago. Our holy book is this three-stringed lute [bağlama], which goes back all the way to Zarathustra. Its melody allows human spirits to rest. The dance makes the body connect with the soul.

When we talked about the Turkish Republic’s policies to prevent Kurdish Alevis getting involved with the Kurdish nationalist movement, Baran remarked,

\textsuperscript{28} Both terms refer to itinerant musicians playing the saz or bağlama and telling stories. Since Ozan is also my first name, I should note that these also denote Alevi religious/ethnic belonging.
The Turkish Republic used Alevi Kurds. Especially to prevent Kurdish Alevis from joining the Kurdish nationalist movement, Turkey did everything it could to widen the divide among Kurds by highlighting the religious/sectarian differences between Alevi and Sunni Kurds. Some Alevi dedes were told to convince their Kurdish Alevi congregants not to get involved with Kurdish separatists, who according to some dedes were predominantly Sunni and would harm Alevis after they succeeded in accomplishing their goals.

On his 2006 album, Baran recorded a song called “Aşkın Divanesi” in Turkish, which has become his most popular song on YouTube, with more than 160,000 views as of September 2013. It is a simple love song in which the protagonist searches at length for his beloved. A commenter on YouTube wrote that he “loved the song, even though it was in Turkish, Baran managed to sing it like it is Kurdish.” The premise of this observation stems from the differing modes of singing in the two languages. Baran embraces a Kurdish vocal and articulation style in his expression of the song, as opposed to the Turkish, which listeners would expect from a Turkish love song (see Berger 2008). I informed Baran of the listener’s comment at our interview and he agreed that people love him for different reasons, and that he could not hide his Kurdish stance even when he sings in Turkish.

One of my latest popular songs, “Aşkın Divanesi,” is in Turkish. It is popular among young Kurds. After one of my concerts a couple of my fans came and congratulated me. One of them told me that I was singing it like it is Kurdish anyway. People love your music for different reasons, some appreciate your laments, some appreciate your fast and entertaining songs, and some like your voice.
Some of our fellow Kurds wanted to be assimilated into Turkish. We tried to escape from ourselves. We tried so hard to become like Turks. I have an audience from Kurdish, Alevi, and Turkish backgrounds. One interesting observation I had over the years has been that while the Kurdish audience requests me to perform fast Kurdish songs, Kurdish Alevis specifically want me to sing laments and sad songs as if they had not cried enough in their lives. Sunni Muslim Kurds want happy songs from me to dance.

Ali Baran’s life story and music have influenced Kurdish Alevi musicians who have claimed both Kurdish and Alevi identities. His primary audience has been of Kurdish Alevis, though he had many followers among other Kurds and Alevis in Germany and Turkey. Baran emphasized to me that a key issue preventing some Kurds from embracing him was his Alevi origins, whereas some Alevis renounced him because he sings mostly in Kurdish. Some Kurds from predominantly Sunni Muslim regions avoid listening to Baran’s music, especially those from the regions of Hakkari, Van, and Mardin. I have observed in recent years that young people have embraced the old tunes associated with both Kurdish and Alevi identities in Baran’s music.

3.5. Conclusion: Return to the Reconciliation Process

The 31st of October 2011 marked the 50th anniversary of this official mass migration from Turkey to Germany. In order to mark the anniversary local and federal authorities, along with Turkish organizations in Germany, organized events celebrating the occasion with concerts, panels, and public programs (Çelik 2011). Nowadays, more than four million people whose first homeland has been Turkey have settled in their second or third homeland, Germany. Many times
In my research, I heard the same phrase that was supposedly used by the German officials: "We asked for workers, but they sent human beings." In a different way this sentence crystallizes the resentment regarding the early years of German authorities' treatment of migrant workers, who suffered during their adaptation period into German life (Greve 2003).

Among those who attended the 50th anniversary were the members of Kardeş Türküler. Kardeş Türküler and the Augsburg Philharmonic Orchestra gave a concert in Augsburg, “Germany’s city of peace.” First, the Augsburg Philharmonic Orchestra took the stage performing the overture from Mozart's "Abduction from the Seraglio," and four sections from Rimsky-Korsakov's “Scheherazade.” The organizers and the music director of the orchestra had selected the most famous examples of Western composers’ imagination of the Orient in an attempt to perform pieces that could be played together. It is significant to point to the cultural imagination of some Germans regarding the east and its music as part of the event, which was titled Songs of Migration (Çelik 2011). Since the concert was organized to improve the ties between the places of origin of immigrants and their new locations as immigrants, the organizers must have tried to find the most eastern-sounding pieces that could be performed by both the orchestra and Kardeş Türküler. Although the organizers wanted to demonstrate the cultural and historical ties between Germany and the east, the classical music section was limited to the examples depicting an exotic orient from the past.

Then, Kardeş Türküler took the stage, performing Turkish, Arabic, Laz, Romany, and Kurdish songs. Finally, Kardeş Türküler and the Augsburg Philharmonic Orchestra together performed Borodin's “In the Steppes of Central Asia,” and then “Dargın Mahkum” (a Turkish tune composed by late Alevi Aşık Mahsuni), “Kerwane” (Kurdish), “Bingol” (Armenian), and “Güldaniyem” (Romani) from the Kardeş Türküler repertoire (Çelik 2011).
The experience of Kardeş Türküler going to German and exploring the music scene in Augsburg was a common one that I encountered in my fieldwork. Kardeş Türküler was formed as a collective by members of the multi ethnic fabric of Turkey. For this reason, the Kardeş Türküler project (KTP) was invited to every single event organized by Germans as well as other Kurdish and Alevi organizations as a prototype of collective living. KTP began performing in 1993 with folk tunes from Turkish, Kurdish, Armenian, Laz, Georgian, Circassian, Roma, Macedonian, and Alevi musical repertoires. All CDs of the KTP deliberately included songs representing these ethnic and religious groups in order to highlight the diversity in Turkey, but also to preserve and to educate their listeners about historical commonalities these traditions have maintained.

The members of the group itself are musicians from various ethnic and religious groups, including Turks, Kurds, Laz, Sunnis, and Alevis. The group has arranged its repertoire in accordance with the polycultural philosophy of the ensemble, based on research conducted by members who were active in the Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Folklor Klübü (BUFK, Boğaziçi University Folklore Club), performing at a variety of artistic events, festivals and celebrations (Akkaya 2008). In 1997, Kalan Music released Kardeş Türküler, an album with various examples from the musical traditions of the Anatolian/Mesopotamian landscape, featuring Kurdish, Turkish, Armenian, Laz and Georgian folk songs. The presence of songs sung in multiple languages on this album forms a groundbreaking contribution to the movement for peaceful coexistence. Drawing on research via conducting regular field trips through villages and obtaining personal recordings of local musicians with the intent of creative experimentation, the group, for instance, merged a Kurdish-Alevi tune with a Turkish-Alevi tune to highlight their shared history and common features.
Reconciliations following a long history of complex political strife are not easy to accomplish. I have argued here that peace-making efforts should include cultural/musical approaches, and that using music to address political concerns does not devalue or oversimplify the complexity of the underlying conflict. Compared to the early years of denial of Kurdish people and their music, this chapter argues that Kurdish music and culture have become more visible as a direct result of the efforts of Kurdish and Turkish musicians in two homelands. Many musicians and millions of fans have been deeply shaken by the tragic end of the famous singer Ahmet Kaya and have questioned the actions against him as an activist musician. Turks and Kurds in Germany and Turkey have heard and appreciated for the first time in their lives the public articulation of the linguistic and musical plurality of musicians such as Sezen Aksu and bands such as Kardeş Türküler. Ultimately, one might argue, as cultural entrepreneurs, musicians carry the burden of conflicts and wars, and they should especially enjoy the rewards of peace and reconciliation. On the other hand, no one should expect that musicians can solve the decades-old problems alone.

Those working for reconciliation have affirmed, despite the ongoing war, the need for such alternative ways in beginning and nurturing a conversation among the country’s various ethnic groups. Such a space fostering musical exchange among all ethnic groups from Turkey has helped negate the differences and lessen misunderstandings and prejudices. Reconciliation continues to be a very difficult process in Turkey, as evidenced by the ongoing stalemate in the Kurdish Question. Within this context, music has helped initiate a healing process and, over extremist voices that benefit from the status quo, has created a very small but significant space where one side might hear what the other has to say. Music was probably one of the few domains that was open to dialogue and reconciliation, at first for Kurdish and Turkish musicians, and later
for their audiences. The fragile and sonic field that opened for efforts at peace and reconciliation could not lead to a solution of the problem by itself, given the enormity of the challenges and historical political problems.
Chapter 4: “Alevi music” and Identity among Kurdish Alevis in Turkey, Germany, and Transnational Space

4.1. Introduction

My primary focus in this study is how musicians from the Kurdish Alevi immigrant community have engaged with defining and refining the shifting modes of belonging that members of the community have articulated over the last three decades. Musicians from the Kurdish Alevi community in Turkey and Germany have accomplished that process mainly through releasing albums with songs related to identity politics, teaching at cultural centers, performing at public events, and articulating their stances in political activities they have attended along with other Kurdish Alevis. This chapter investigates the transformation of the relationships between Alevi religious formations and the music produced for and consumed by community members in both homelands and through the transnational space. In particular, I examine the musical manifestations since the Alevi revival in the 2000s, as the number of public performances has visibly increased. In this chapter, I also reflect on “Alevi music” in relation to the Alevism of both Turkish and Kurdish Alevis, to the extent that it becomes "political" as opposed to "religious," or more significantly "cultural" (see below and Chapter 6 for more).

In order to understand the multiple social and political formations within the Kurdish Alevi community, I analyze the production, presentation, and reception of music, and specifically its role in religious rituals. Group listening, collective singing, and line dancing, among other activities, are components of Alevi rituals as well as collective representations of Alevi identity, which has been mediated and negotiated through musical representation. This ethnographic approach to the rituals of the Kurdish Alevis provides some insight on the extent to which “Alevi music” has mobilized or instilled a sense of community.
In analyzing Alevi music and identity, I utilize findings of prominent Alevi ethnomusicologists Seyit Yöre (2011), Bedriye Poyraz (2007), and especially Ayhan Erol, whose research among Alevi communities in Izmir (2009, 2010, and 2011) and Toronto (2009, 2012) provided significant information to build on for this study. In his research on the Alevi community in Toronto and its music, Erol reaches similar conclusions to those I have reached in my study of Kurdish Alevis in Cologne. Though he does not primarily deal with Kurdish identity in his work, Erol’s research subjects comprised mostly Kurdish Alevis from the city of Maraş, like some of my informants.

With the goal of understanding the social memory of Kurdish Alevis, I explore Alevi musicians’ compositions, stances, and public messages in the context of protests against the difficult events Alevis have faced in the last four decades. Those recent events, combined with previous atrocities committed by the Sunni Ottoman Empire and then the Republic of Turkey, resulted in a victimhood discourse around which Alevi identity has coalesced. Scholars like Shankland (2003) and Kosnick (2004, 2007), among others, have documented this victimhood discourse. Even a quick review of the web pages of Alevi organizations in Germany and Turkey confirms the utilization of Alevi victimhood and martyrdom as a discursive tool through images such as those of Alevi musicians killed in the Sivas massacre (see below).

In this chapter, I also argue that musicians along with other cultural entrepreneurs have strategically essentialized the label and identity of Kızılbaş (“red-head”), a derogatory term even today, by appropriating it from the literature historically used to describe Alevis and reinserting it into the daily lives of Kurdish Alevis who have begun to identify themselves more often as Kızılbaş than just Alevi. In the 2000s, Kurdish Alevis in two homelands have begun to embrace the new strategic essentialism imbued in e ‘Kızılbaş’ to claim their new transnational field and
the space it has opened. This reappropriation, aimed at politically distinguishing themselves from other Alevi groups, has flourished especially after influential institutions, such as Kalan Müzik, released albums with titles nodding toward the Kızılbaş, several musicians like Metin and Kemal Kahraman released songs with titles such as "Ez Kızılbaşım" (I am Kızılbaş), and journals were published with the Kızılbaş title.

4.2. Alevi Identity, “Alevi Music,” and the **Bağlama**

While Alevi beliefs are closer to Shi’a Islam than they are to Sunni Islam, Alevis do not subscribe to the mainstream doctrines of either. Their worship takes place in assembly houses rather than mosques. Alevism does not have an authoritative tradition of religious scholarship; its main religious practice lies in shared local traditions and esoteric interpretations of Muslim as well as non-Muslim local beliefs and practices. Music, sacred or not, plays a vital role in Alevi identity formation and has deep kinesthetic and symbolic meaning for Alevis. One important question that remains to be addressed in this section is, whether there is an authentic and unique Alevi music. The answer is probably limited to some religious ceremonial music. As Ayhan Erol argues, there has never before been a holistic definition of Alevi music (Erol 2009). In this section, I attempt to contribute to that discussion.

Major aspects of “Alevi music” share many features with other types of folk music of Anatolia. I was told many times by my informants that “Alevi music” is not solely religious. It has embraced the daily issues Alevis have dealt with as well as their emotions, desires, and aspirations. As Turan Koluaçık, an Alevi dede (religious leader and guide) from the Wuppertal Alevi Cultural Center, told me, what he calls Alevi music "improves his morale, deepens his philosophical understanding, and unifies all Alevis around one common purpose." It still
survives given all of the interruptions in the history of Alevism. Alevi music and musicians have made a large contribution to what is now called Turkish folk music, also known as the türkü repertoire (see Chapter 2).

Bedriye Poyraz, in her Direnişle Piyasa Arasında: Alevilik ve Alevi Müziği (Between Resistance and Market: Alevism and Alevi Music), argues that the survival of music in Alevi culture is the main reason Alevism has survived for generations (2007: 119). Erol argues that defining Alevi music was never an issue until the first quarter of the 20th century, when the Turkish state's cultural policy makers through the Turkish Radio TV Corporation (TRT) decided to lump together all of the local music that Alevis had been performing as part of “Turkish folk music,” devoid of its religious or other values and implications for Alevis (Erol 2009:113). He also observes that among its practitioners and audience, part of “Turkish folk music,” devoid of its religious or 119). Erol argues that defining Alevi music was never an issue until the first quarter of the 20th century in the history of Türk Halk Müziği (THM) (Turkish folk music) after the establishment of the Turkish Republic. For this dissertation, then, I distinguish between the liturgical repertoire of Alevi music and the music Alevi people enjoy in their Alevi-only secular gatherings. Instead of putting Alevi music in quotes, I will specify the implications of the categorizations of the repertoires Alevis have consumed in both secular and sacred settings.

Scholars of Alevism and Alevi music have argued that the three pillars of Alevi music and identity have been the bağlama, the cem ceremony, and the dede and other guides, with names including murşid, pir, or rehber (Markoff 1986, Clarke 1999, Yaman 2006, Erdemir 2004, Erol 2009, Poyraz 2007). In many respects the most powerful tool for the endurance of Alevi religious or cultural teachings has been the music that was transmitted orally over generations. The music has played a central role in maintaining Alevi religious continuity by
providing a sonic channel for other aspects of culture, history, and practice as well as religious knowledge and rituals. The bağlama is involved with the practices in two major Alevi-only occasions. The first is the religious gathering called cem, an exclusive Alevi gathering. The other is the muhabbet, an informal gathering at an Alevi house. Both cem and muhabbet feature liturgical and what I call para-liturgical tunes that are performed to commemorate significant religious figures, events, and dates.

The central ritual of Alevi religious life is ayn-i cem or cem, which features music and dance called semah to the accompaniment of bağlama. Within the cem ceremonies there could be tunes for semah (or semê in Kurmançî-Kurdish), which in many cases implies the distinct musical piece that would accompany specific dances that participants do in a circle. The music preceding, then initiating and accompanying the semah is performed in the cem in which participants, both men and women, dance in circles. Some Alevis believe that the semah dancers symbolize the main planets around the Sun (with men and women turning in circles like revolving planets) and the liberation of one’s self to unite with the divine light. Usually, this ritual is held once a year under the leadership and the guidance of a dede (who usually also plays bağlama) in a private house or a cemevi (communal building), attended by women on an almost equal footing with men. Performance settings of semah usually include one bağlama, which is the only instrument allowed in the semah, serving both melodic and rhythmic functions, played by the dede or by another player called the zakir. The congregants sometimes dance and sing vocables such as Hü, Allah, and Ali while occasionally beating their knees. In Alevism, men and women are regarded as equals, and pray side by side. Unlike most Muslim practices in the world where Arabic prayers and Qur’anic chanting dominates, Alevi rituals are usually conducted in Turkish, and some in Kurdish.
For Alevis, the *bağlama*, Alevi and Bektaşı poetry, and the *semah* constitute the pillars of religious practice as well as the articulation of Alevism in public. In my fieldwork, I observed that all three also constitute representations (real or imaginary) of Alevi cultural identity. Alevis refer to both the liturgical repertoire and the dance accompanying it when they use the term *semah*. *Semah* as dance can be summarized very briefly as spiritual and ritual acts and dances during Alevi *cem* ceremonies, as part of the Alevi rituals, performed with *bağlama* and vocals by both men and women. Semah works as a means to reach *Hak* (God) and to mediate between the spiritual and the real worlds. Alevis dance in circles during their semah ritual as many other groups in West Asia have been doing during their rituals. *Semah dönmek* (whirling in semah) is an indispensable part of the Alevi religious ritual. My informants gave varying explanations of what it has meant for them to join the ritual, which included “flying to the sky,” “imitating the universe’s movement,” “wings like cranes,” “connecting the spiritual world with the real world,” and “showing solidarity with other congregants.” When it comes to the liturgical repertoire, there are more than 100 distinct *semah* with different names known by almost all Alevi groups. The most commonly known *semah* include Kırklar Semahı, Turnalar Semahı, Gönüller Semahı, Kırat Semahı, Hubyar Semahı, Ali Yar Semahı, Urfa-Kıras Semahı (see Appendix for staff notations).

Figure 4.1: Men and women during a *semah* (www.pirsultan.net)
The bağlama, considered a sacred instrument by the Alevi people, is a long-necked lute that is prevalent in almost all regions of Turkey. The beginnings of the Alevi religious ceremonies are marked by the musicians kissing their instruments and touching them to their heads before they start to play liturgical and para-liturgical tunes, which make up the larger part of the ritual. The liturgical tunes can be categorized as: Duaz-i Imam, Miraçlama, Tevhid, and Mersiye. Those are obligatory sections of the cem ceremonies in which the participants must follow the lead of the dede. Para-liturgical tunes, resembling the forms and functions of the piyyutim in Jewish religious practice, can be performed in different forms and lengths. The most significant para-liturgical song structure is called deyiş. Erol argues that the deyiş are the most significant cultural forms of expression and the main means of transmission of Alevi culture and history (Erol 2009: 103). Multiple names are used for deyiş from different regions, such as beyit, nefes, ayet, and kelam, each of which has different implications for different Alevi communities in Turkey. Those deyiş are usually sung in Turkish and in some cases Kurdish. The poetic forms of the liturgical and para-liturgical poems could include varying poetic, lyrical, and syllabic forms (for more see Yöre 2011).

It is important to point out that even the religious repertoire or the tunes performed during the cem ceremonies are not fixed among all Alevi groups. One community of Alevis from southwest Anatolia may not recognize the tunes from a community in another region of Turkey. An important function of deyiş has been that they have worked as pedagogical and community-building tools that unify singing along, listening, repeating or responding to the soloists, and reproduction of the traditional Alevi musical codes, almost like the framework of an Alevi habitus. There are hundreds of deyiş written and sung by aşık and ozan, along with some specific deyiş that are sung during the religious ceremonies in cem such as Oniki Imam deyişi, çerağlama
deyiş, niyazlaşma deyişi, and semah deyişi. Attendees of the cem ceremonies occasionally respond to the dede or ozan or zakir by singing along or singing in chorus. Seyit Yöre, in his work on the musical codes of Alevi-Bektaşı culture (2011), points to the fact that they consist of simple musical motifs repeated with some slight modifications by different ozans depending on the context, sometimes with different texts. Some ozans occasionally change the instrumental and vocal sections in order to increase the participation of audience members.

4.2.1. The Instrument and Tuning Systems

The word bağlama most likely comes from the Turkish verb “bağlamak,” to tie, as a reference to the frets that are tied on the neck (Picken 1975, Reinhard and Pinto 1990). In the most common current practice in Turkey, the octave is divided into 17 tones, allowing for a chromatic scale plus five microtonal intervals. There are three courses of strings, two of which are often doubled and one of which is often tripled, for a total of seven strings. The addition of the seventh string probably happened in the last 50 years (Stokes 1992). The resonator of the body can be either carved out (oyma bağlama) of a single piece of wood, preferably from mulberry, chestnut, or hornbeam, or carvel-built from curved planks (yaprak bağlama). The yaprk bağlama is usually more expensive and fragile than the oyma bağlama. The strings are commonly plucked with a wooden, or in recent decades nylon, plectrum called mizrap. The instrument is played either with a mizrap or with bare hands, a technique also known as şelpe (Parlak 2001). The latter form is the favored method of playing by an Alevi ozan or aşık. The bağlamas are roughly 70-90cm in length. The body of the instrument is usually 3/8 the length of the instrument. The three-stringed bağlama is the holy book of Alevis; as one of my informants said, “our bağlama is our Qur'an.” Though some Alevis associate the three strings with the Allah-
Muhammed-Ali trinity, the Kurdish Alevi that I talked to do not necessarily accept that formulation.

Figure 4.2.a (left): A long-necked (uzun sap) **bağlama**

Figure 4.2.b (right): Short fingerboard (**kısa sap**)

Although the **uzun sap** (long-necked or long-fingerboard) **bağlama** has been the most common type in Turkey, among Alevi the **kısa sap** (short-fingerboard) **bağlama** is preferred as it is more suitable to be played during the Alevi gatherings. Fingerboard length is correlated with the number of frets that each one has on it: the short-fingerboard **bağlamas** or **curas** usually have nineteen or fewer frets while the **divan** and other large **bağlamas** have at least twenty-two frets providing an additional half an octave. Both types have seven strings in three courses. The
largest size *bağlama* is the one known as *divan*, which has the largest body and fingerboard. It has seven strings in three courses. Another is the *tambura*, resembling a modern version of the *dombra*, a two-stringed Kazakh and Kirghiz instrument, or the *tambur* among the Ahl-e Haqq people in Iran. Its body is the same size as that of a *bağlama* with a short fingerboard, but it is played like the long fingerboard *bağlama*. Like the *divan*, it has three groups of seven strings.

The short fingerboard *bağlama* is the one regarded as sacred by the Alevi. The smallest *bağlama*, the *cura*, has a small body and short fingerboard. It is played like the long and short fingerboard *bağlamas*, but has only six strings in three courses. The fret sizes are proportional to the scale length of each type of instrument.

*Bağlamas* are tuned differently in every part of Turkey. Structures of the folk song to be played and the strokes of the plectrum also affect the tuning systems. Two major tuning systems (I assume the middle strings are tuned to G) from top to bottom course are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>String Number:</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bağlama düzeni</strong></td>
<td>Aa, GG, Ddd</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kara düzen</strong></td>
<td>Cc, GG, Ddd</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

![Diagram of bağlama and kara düzen tunings](image)

Figure 4.3. *Bağlama düzeni* and *kara düzen* tunings
The kısa sap bağlamas are almost always tuned in the bağlama or aşk düzeni based on the scale ratios above. For instance, in order to get the best performance and sound quality, the bağlama I recently bought from Erdal Erzincan Sazevi in Istanbul should ideally be tuned as:

**String Number:**

| 3 | 2 | 1 |

*Bağlama düzeni*  
Bb, Aa, Eee

Below (Figure 4.3) is the diagram used in the Wuppertal Alevi Cultural Center by the bağlama instructor Ercan Şahin in his bağlama kursu (bağlama class) that also shows the string numbers. It marks main frets for each one of the three courses of strings (Tr. tel) of the bağlama tuned in the bağlama düzeni, which is the system almost exclusively taught at Alevi cultural institutions.

![Diagram of bağlama tuning](image)

**Figure 4.4.** Corresponding pitches in Turkish for major frets for each string (Tr. tel) on the bağlama düzeni

*Kara düzen* is, or used to be according to the bağlama instructors I talked to, the most popular tuning system in Turkey (Picken 1975: 276). The bağlama düzeni has become more popular in the last half of the 20th century, thanks to the increasing popularity of the albums released by musicians like Arif Sağ, Musa Erol, and Yavuz Top, who mostly used bağlama
The bağlama düzeni, along with a revival of folk music based on the Alevi repertoire in Turkey (Erol 2009). The bağlama düzeni, compared to the kara düzen, provides a simpler framework for playing songs and accompanying vocalists with parallel fourths and fifths. The bağlama düzeni is also a system engaging all three strings as opposed to kara düzen, which relies more on performing the highest-pitched string. The bağlama düzeni utilizes fifths and fourths and on a small part of the neck, a performer can play the whole scale of an octave without changing the left-hand position. Most performers learn both tuning systems and the playing techniques each requires.

The choice of tuning system provides significant musical, cultural, and historical cues as to what kinds of messages bağlama players express. Alevi youth are accustomed to the music shaped by the gradual increase in the use of bağlama düzeni as the number of short-necked bağlamas used in Alevi-based music and folk music increased in the 1980s and 1990s. The increase in the number of kısa sap bağlamas in circulation, and thus in the popularity of the bağlama düzeni tuning, has happened as Alevi music expanded into the mainstream of Turkish folk music in the 1990s. Alevis, and thus Alevi music’s “coming out” to the public, seem to have opened a field for the shorter-necked bağlama and subsequent changes in the sonic coding through bağlama düzeni.

I should also point that becoming a professional bağlama player in Turkey entails that a player must be able to play in (or master) as many düzens as possible. Each düzen has its stance, its own performance practice, and its emotional and technical differences coming out of the same staff notation. As famous bağlama virtuoso Erdal Erzincan once told me, “you cannot be a bağlama virtuoso without mastering some of the iconic songs on the düzens they were composed for and supposedly played on.” Among some iconic songs performed in their respective düzens is the most famous Ali Ekber Çiçek composition “Haydar Haydar” on kara düzen. I observed
that especially in the 2000s there has been a gradual dominance of bağlama düzen over kara düzen in Alevi musical practices and other forms that became easily accessible and available by the bağlama kursu instructors utilizing the pedagogical tools available on the Internet such as www.turkuler.com and www.bağlama-kursu.de, which provide lyrics, sheet music, and guitar tablatures as well as instruction videos.

Before moving on to the relationship between folk music and Alevi music in Turkey, I want to point out another advantage of the bağlama düzeni over the kara düzen. While working on recent developments in the dissemination of folk music and especially music of Alevis, I came across an important development for the way bağlama will be taught and played, in the form of a smart phone application (app) or a computer program. An interesting iPhone application recently released enables average people to play bağlama on their smartphones. This development may be another indication of the mainstreaming of Alevi and folk music in the Turkish public sphere.

Figure 4.5. Saz Cepte Application for the iPhone, released in February 2013
4.2.2. Turkish Folk Music and Alevi Music

In his analysis of folk music and Alevi cultural identity in Turkey, Erol argues that thanks to significant contributions of Alevi musicians such as Belkıs Akkale, Musa Eroğlu, Arif Sağ, Yavuz Top, and Ali Ekber Çiçek during the 1980s, in the 1990s there was a Turkish folk music revival, Türk Halk Müziği (THM) Uyanışı, among both Alevis and non-Alevis. In this revival, precursors of which were albums of Belkıs Akkale and the Muhabbet cassette series, bağlama as the main instrument and bağlama düzeni as the main tuning system played a central role. After this revival, Building on Erol’s findings, I aimed at identifying the transformation that the music is undergoing within the newly emerged transnational field as Alevi religious practice and Alevi religion are going through a transformation process. After a detailed discussion of what folk music in Turkey means today for different actors and audiences, Erol (2009) argues that there has been a constant transformation in the definition of the folk, and thus in folk music, which he classifies in three phases:

1. From 1920s until 1950s: An invented "folk" and "its music" by the Turkish state. This phase, according to Erol, was marked by the archiving of local melodies by TRT officers, to institutionalize the “authenticity" of the styles and performances. Most importantly, the diverse melodies were categorized and treated in the same way, as they all represented the one and only folk, the Turkish nation.

2. 1960s and 1970s: The Turkish popular music industry and its discovery of folk music. In this phase, the most important vehicle for folk music to be used and utilized were the Anatolian pop and Anatolian rock musicians who wished to improve their credentials in
the political sphere by using folk music instruments and melodies in their compositions and performances.

3. From 1990s until today: **THM Uyanışı (THM revival)**. Erol argues that this period witnessed the creation of the first generation of musicians whose core goal as musicians was to create folk music, unlike the previous generations. This new breed of musicians “was equipped to create in the THM milieu” (Erol 2009:77). Two factors that Erol mentions are the end of the state monopoly in the media and other communication tools, and the Alevi cultural revival of the 1990s.

Alevi music is not independent from Anatolian folk music. Quite the contrary, one might find almost identical melodies in a religious tune from Maraş or Malatya and a “secular” folk tune from Erzurum or Erzincan. In the 1970s and 80s, as Alevis increasingly demanded to hear their music in public through the available channels, they faced institutional censorship by the officials at the TRT and self-censorship by the producers, musicians and performers. Some Alevi songs were banned and some were modified. According to Arif Sağ some were stripped of their Alevi character through modification of lyrics containing words directly or indirectly associated with Alevi religiosity, such as **Ali, Şah, Ehlibeyt, Oniki İmam, and Kerbela**. According to an interview Sağ gave to Poyraz, “an invisible hand would replace ‘Ali’ with ‘Dost’ [Friend] on all TRT radio shows” (Poyraz 2007: 134). Reportedly the folk song “**Dersim Dört Dağ İçinde**” (“Dersim in Four Mountains”) was banned because it had the word Dersim in it, which was associated with the city that was renamed as Tunceli by the Turkish government in 1937 following a massacre. Compared to the 1970s and 1980s, ‘Ali’ and other words are perfectly
acceptable in today’s music industry in Turkey.

Another significant issue in the history of the relationship between Alevi identity and Alevi music has been the fact that Alevis first “came out” in the public sphere through their music and dance (Dinçer 2004, Poyraz 2007: 77). For Alevis, the process of becoming accepted members of Turkish society was preceded by the popularization of “Alevi music,” or tunes that are associated with Alevi people and culture. In this process of “coming out,” Alevi music played a significant role in informing the predominantly Sunni citizens of Turkey and elsewhere about the existence of a separate Alevi music, culture, and ultimately, religion.

In this popularization and becoming public, many recording labels benefited from the mass distribution of Alevi music. The recording labels, or plak şirket in Turkish, that produced and distributed “Alevi music” included Özdemir Plak, ATM Müzik, Yarın Müzik, Güvercin Müzik, Arda Müzik, Kalan Müzik, Ema, İber, Arif Sağ Müzik, Diyar, Şah, and Akkiraz (personal communication with Hasan Saltık). Although there are no accurate and reliable numbers about the sales of cassettes or CDs in Turkey, it is safe to assume that Alevi recordings have accounted for between 10 and 20 percent of the sales of local music of these companies since the 1980s. Poyraz argues, “It would be correct but incomplete to argue that as part of Alevi cultural expression, Alevi music has turned into a commodity if it were to be analyzed from a political economy perspective” (2007: 120). The best known musicians who recorded and performed Alevi music in the last four decades include Arif Sağ, Belkıs Akkale, Can Etili, Aşık Mahsuni Şerif, Ali Ekber Çiçek, Sabahat Akkiraz, Musa Eroğlu, Yavuz Top, Emre Saltık and, among the younger generations, Erdal Erzincan, Tolga Sağ, Erol Parlak, and Cengiz Özkan, among others. Alongside these musicians there are self-identified Kurdish and Zaza Alevi musicians who released albums in their own languages, such as Mikail Aslan and Metin
Kahraman (see Chapter 3 for more on the relationships between Kurdish identity and Kurdish music). During the late 1980s a growing Alevi struggle started to gain momentum, and in the early 1990s the Alevi movement flourished; Alevis would eventually pursue additional struggles such as the Kurdish Alevis’ political activism in the Kurdish nationalist movement (van Bruinessen 1997, Sökefeld 2008, Erdemir 2005, Massicard 2013).

4.2.3. An Example from the 1990s “Türküler Yanmaz” (“Türküs cannot be burned”)

The recent tensions between Alevis and Sunnis continue the mistrust between members of the two communities. The article below (Figure 4.1), describes an incident that occurred in September 2009, in Hekimhan, Malatya. A Sunni supervisor reportedly cut the hand of an Alevi woman because, he said, the food prepared by Alevis was not halal or appropriate for Muslims. After arguing with her, he cut her hand with a knife.

Figure 4.6. Habertürk, 27 September 2009.

Ongoing sectarian problems and historical mistrust, coupled with such incidents, have caused
Alevis to resist revealing their identity in a Sunni majority society. The environment of hostility in Turkey has, in a sense, led Alevis to concretize the memories of the massacres of Sivas, Maraş, Çorum, and Gazi as part of the Alevi identity formation (Chapter 1). The idea of martyrdom continues to dominate Alevi and Kurdish personal and collective narratives, reproduced as part of the Alevi imaginary of suffering for centuries under Sunni rule, from the Ottoman Sultan Selim II through the Sivas massacre in 1992 and the Gazi events in Istanbul 1995, in which Alevis were killed by state troopers along with Sunni rioters (van Bruinessen 1997, Dressler 2002, Bayrak 2011). After the Sivas events, Alevi musicians composed multiple songs to commemorate and to reflect on the burning of the musicians. Below is the most popular among those performed by my informants; it was requested multiple times at the türkü bars I visited.

“Türküler Yanmaz” (“Türkü cannot be burned”) by Edip Akbayram

Güneşin ak yüzüne bir duman çöktü
A smoke cloud fell down on the shining sun.

Bir türkü çığlıkla ateşe düştü
A türkü fell into the fire screaming

Kuytu bir köşede bir çiçek küstü
A small flower stopped smiling,

Döktü yaprağını boynunu büktü
Left its leaves and let its neck loose

Şu Sivas’ın elinde sazım çalınmaz
They don’t allow my bağlama to be played in Sivas

Güllerim yandı yüreğim dayanmaz
My roses were burned, my heart hurt

Kararmış yüreğin hiç ışığı olmaz
There is no light for dark souls.

Bilmez misin ki türküler yanmaz
Don't you know you cannot burn the songs?
“Türküler Yanmaz” is an important response of musicians to the massacre. It conveys the symbolic significance of the bağlama and the türkü, the folk song. The bağlama embodies Alevi history as part of the Alevi identity and it encapsulates the Alevi sonic memory. Thus, the bağlama is a crucial element of religious practice and of the image Alevis have promulgated.

The bağlama that was not allowed to be played in “Türküler Yanmaz” is a symbolic reference to the denial of the existence of Alevis. The song urges Alevis to never forget that the mobs in Sivas wanted to kill the songs and burn the bağlamas.

4.2.4. An Example from the 2000s: Strategic Essentialism of Kızılbaş (Red-head)

As I have surveyed the music and the digital footprints of Kurdish Alevis, I have observed an increasing trend of strategic essentialization of a Kızılbaş identity among the members of this community. I probed the reemergence of the Kızılbaş term in this context to see its significance for those who employ and embrace Kızılbaş identity as an alternative to Alevism and in some instances to Kurdish Alevi identity. Mélikoff and Erseven (1997), Dressler (2008, 2013) and Karakaya-Stump (2008), point out that initially, around the end of the in the 15th

29 16th Century ozan from Sivas revered by Alevis.
century, the term Kızılbaş referred to the mostly Turkmen adherents of the Safavi Sufi order. According to van Bruinessen (1997) and Dressler (2013), in today’s Turkey the Alevi, both Kurdish and Turkish speakers, are descendants of those Kızılbaş groups, which “had rebelled against Ottoman rule in the early 16th century and were ever since regarded by the Ottomans as politically unreliable” (Dressler 2013: 12).

Although Gayatri Spivak has since distanced herself from her concept of “strategic essentialism,” it has proven to be useful when speaking of minority groups’ embrace of derogatory terms used by powerful majorities to label them as a political and strategic tool. Spivak (1993) suggests that on occasion subaltern groups temporarily "essentialize" themselves, or emphasize a particular form of group identity, to achieve recognition and distinction. For the Kurdish Alevi I studied, this process started in the 2000s with the term Kızılbaş: not only overturning the negative connotations and rumors about the term (implying that Kızılbaş people are heretical, people doing orgies and incest, or rebellious people) but also creating a space where members could identify themselves with a distinct marker. One of the reasons for this attempt, one could speculate, is that the term Alevi covered too many diverse and distant groups, such as Bektaşis, Tahtacis, and Nusayris among others. For some Kurdish Alevi, the declaration of difference by emphasizing Kızılbaş identity seemed to be the easiest form of strategically essentializing their distinction. Almost equal to an ethnic slur, the term Kızılbaş has now begun to have a different meaning among the Kurdish Alevi, like the “N-word” in the USA.

In many cases, this reclaimed and to some extent reconstructed Kızılbaş identity serves as no more than a historical label for some "myth," unknown and mysterious on its own. Thus, musicians recreate an identity that does not correspond to a specific reality. In this process of distinguishing themselves from other Alevi (Turk and Arab) and Kurds (Sunni, Êzîdî, and
Shaf‘i), they increasingly resort to a constructed Kızılbaş identity.

The new transnational field has provided a space and means for cultural entrepreneurs and especially musicians to get involved with identity politics. One of the most significant cultural forms Kurdish Alevis and musicians relate to Kızılbaş identity and its history is "Kızılbaş music." Since the term had almost vanished from everyday use, replaced by “Alevi” in most cases, there is no way to relate musical characteristics to a particularly Kızılbaş music. Thus, Kurdish Alevi musicians I talked to, including Shêxo, Ali Baran, Mikail Aslan, and Hakan Akay, return to the descendants of common ancestors, those living in Iran. By embracing the music of the Ahl-e Haqq of Iran, and relating to religious or secular music of other heterodox groups in West Asia, those Kurdish Alevi musicians are trying to resuscitate a mode of belonging, even as they have no real living example they might relate to in their first homeland. Instead, they reproduce something they cannot know firsthand; they rely heavily on interpreting the images and sounds of a Kızılbaş past. Among the most popular examples I came across is a recent series of CDs with the titles "Kızılbaş" and "Kızılbaş-II," released by Kalan Müzik, in which Alevi musicians interpreting Alevi sacred tunes and deyiş (see below). In the same vein, Shêxo, one of many influential musicians, issued an album in which he related to his "true" ancestors, who were Kızılbaş, by interpreting modes he vaguely remembered from conversations in his youth (see Chapter 6 for an oral history with Shêxo). Further, musicians of the younger generation, like Ahmet Aslan and Mikail Aslan, are trying to relate to the "old," the "true or authentic" form of Kızılbaş music, part of the same search they direct towards the Kızılbaş past. In that sense, it is an important development that Kurdish Alevi musicians are trying to create a separate Kızılbaş identity by strategically essentializing the term and embracing its implications.

Kalan Müzik's Kızılbaş albums (2009 and 2012) give us a sense of how cultural
entrepreneurs (the producers and musicians involved with the project) are perceived and imagined. These two compilation albums were published in Istanbul; most of the tracks are taken from previously released albums and put alongside tracks recorded for the first time.

Figure 4.7. *Kızılbaş* and *Kızılbaş II* by Kalan Müzik (Istanbul), two album-covers.

The owner of Kalan music, Hasan Saltık, told me in an interview, "*Kızılbaş* has been in use as a swear-word and is perceived as such by a great many people." By embracing it and using it in this new context, Mr. Saltık wants to reverse previous pejorative meanings of the term. He wants to unveil some of the least known Alevi deyiş and nefes (hymns and other tunes associated with Alevi repertoire), which were indispensable in their religious gatherings and intimate muhabbet to serve a broader audience. Saltık also reminds us that centuries of suppression and other harsh treatment of Alevis have not erased those tunes from the collective memory. "The deyiş and nefes on this album are among the most significant aspects of Alevi cultural heritage," Saltık observes.

Cemil Koçgün, a Kurdish Alevi musician in Germany, also released an album titled *Heya*
on Kalan Müzik (2008). He made a point of highlighting his goal by subtitling the album, “Songs from Qızılbaş,” the cover of which has a dede sazı, which was used by elderly dedes (for more discussion, see Chapters 3 and 5). The album is comprised of tracks in Turkish, Kurmancî, and Zazaki, recorded in Cologne and Istanbul. By releasing albums with pictures of dede sazı on the covers, Kurdish Alevi musicians want their audience to associate their music with a religious symbol from the past.

Published in Germany and disseminated via the Internet, one of the visible examples of this movement is the monthly magazine Kızılbaş (see Fig. 4.4).
The subtitle of the magazine (Kızılbaş Alevilerin Sorunlarını Tartıştığı Demokratik Kürsü) suggests (in Turkish) that it provides a democratic platform for discussing the problems of Kızılbaş Alevis. The sample here includes reports on Xızır, a significant figure in Alevi spirituality; a current debate on the Dersim region and its significance in Kurdish Alevi life; and the situation of the Western Anatolian Kurdish Alevi in the context of assimilation attempts of the Turkish government in both religion (Alevi to Sunni) and language (Kurdish to Turkish). Kızılbaş has sections in three languages, Turkish, Kurmancî, and Zazakî, regarding political discussions or current political events. The magazine is published in Germany.

4.3. Organizations, Alevi Identity, and Alevi Music

During my fieldwork and constant correspondence with my informants, I aimed at understanding the influence of organizations on Alevi communities in Germany and Turkey through the music Alevis have experienced in religious and secular occasions. I tried to formulate the religiosity of Alevis and the political power of the religious organizations. As I
tried to demonstrate in Chapter 1, many organizations active in Germany among Kurdish Alevi operate as religio-political parties whose leaders have created and maintained a new transnational field.

Almost all Alevi organizations in Germany and Turkey have titles with the word “culture” attached. One reason for this label stems from the first homeland, where establishing organizations with religious titles has been almost impossible for many as doing so was against the Turkish constitution. Thus they coalesced around hometown associations, with organizations as “cultural centers” seen both as a reference to an understanding of Alevism as a culturally distinct mode of belonging, and as a cover for the proxy religious education emerging from those centers (Çelik 2003). I would argue that another reason for the use of “culture” has developed through the adaptation of culture as a collective leitmotif of such organizations, as most left-leaning Alevi youth have been comfortable with the label “cultural,” as opposed to religious titles. Alevi cultural organizations actually coalesce around different belief structures, political leanings, regional differences, and even former tribal ties that direct them to organize individual "cultural" centers. Outsiders have framed Alevism as either heresy or a cultural deviation from the orthodoxy of both Shia and Sunni Islam. For Alevis themselves, the framing of Alevism under the rubric of “culture” seems like part of the same political questioning. The fact that there are dozens of Alevi "cultural" organizations in Germany reflects the diversity among members who are involved in the Alevi religious and political spheres.

Political distinctions among Kurdish Alevis, and possibly other ethno-religious groups worldwide, have sometimes overshadowed religious and ritualistic commonalities among members of the community. The secularization and almost de-religionization experienced by Alevis in Turkey has hindered participation in rituals that was expected of all able or pious
Alevis in the past. I have observed in Germany and Turkey that some religious events and services have come to be observed only by limited and clustered members of the community. Today Alevi religion is more like what the head of the Almanya Alevi Birlikleri Federasyonu (AABF) (Federation of Alevi Unions of Germany), Turgut Öker, said in a 2007 Toronto speech: “Alevism is not a religious sect. Alevism, which recognizes man as its founding principle and supreme value, is a culture, a doctrine, a way of life, a philosophy, and even a social reality” (quoted in Erol 2012:843).

As the Alevi dede institution has almost been eradicated in the late 20th century, many Alevi institutions in Germany have called for the help of experts and scholars who worked with Alevis in the 1960s and 70s to reinstitute religious authority by training potential dedes to be sent around Europe to revive Alevi religious teachings including music, prayer, and semah (see Dinçer 2004, Erdemir 2005, Erol 2010, Dressler 2013). The discontinuity in religious authority and teachings has caused Alevi religious practice to diminish among the younger generations since the 1970s (Dressler 2006). The transmission of this tradition has been hindered by the secularization and politicization of Alevism as a collective identity around which to mobilize. The demise of the Alevi dedes’ hierarchical religious authority within Alevi society has been exacerbated by new agents, laid out in Chapter 1, who have used Alevi networks in order to further their political agendas. Diminishing Alevi religious authority has made it hard for Alevis to coalesce around credible representatives and institutions.

Another issue around using the term “culture” to cover up religious affiliation or association is the competition among Alevi organizations in gaining member support as well as funds from the German government. That fierce competition, also for money from Turkish and other Alevis, is so rampant that claiming to represent Alevis becomes a chaotic space for
competition among ideologies and cult personalities. One of the figures I met in Cologne was Cafer Cebe, the AABF project coordinator on integration processes. He rightly pointed out that Hacı Bektaş-ı Veli and other organizations and foundations were designed in part to receive the political and strategic benefits of recognizing Alevis as a voting block with political mobility in Germany. During my fieldwork, I met many ranking members (including the leader) of the AABF that come from a radical leftist party background (gelenek, “tradition” as my informants called it) such as Devrimci Yol (Revolutionary Path), one of the most popular radical leftist movements in Turkish history.

Legal and political differences in Turkey and Germany led the way for the “Alevist movement” to flourish initially in Germany and then gradually in Turkey (Massicard 2013). The tacit denial of Alevis’ existence in the public space in Turkey was challenged in the new homeland, as the public display of Alevism is not only encouraged but also more and more institutionalized, thanks to funds and political support of German local and federal governments (see Chapter 6). For the Kurdish Alevis scattered in Germany, being in a second or third homeland, without the threat from the Sunni majority, has made it much easier to reveal their identities, differentiating themselves from Sunni and Shi’ah Muslims. Alevis have begun publicly declaring a difference between Alevis and Sunnis. Şehriban Şahin (2008) argues that the politics of difference for Alevis who claim they should be treated differently from Sunni Muslim immigrants has opened social and political opportunity structures for Alevis. Unlike other institutionalized religions and denominations, the European Christian secular domain provides a space where Alevis in particular, as opposed to Sunnis or Muslims in general, might feel more comfortable in public appearances. Most of my informants claimed that religious freedom in Germany is greater than in Turkey, in terms of state or public approaches to Alevism.
Drawing on the findings of Østergaard-Nielsen (2002) and Kosnick (2007), I argue that first-homeland politics are in play in Germany for Alevi and other political and religious organizations. The politics of recognition for Alevis in relation to the Sunni-Muslim and mostly Turkish organizations in Germany has followed a similar course to that of the struggle in their first homeland. In Turkey, Alevis developed certain secular anxieties against the Sunni Islam imposed by the state apparatus. The first-homeland politics of claiming secularism pays a dividend in the second homeland in that this status labels Alevis as the good, or even better, Muslims of Germany, preferred over other Muslim immigrants (Chapter 6).

Once a burden (and a reason to be cautious) in their first homeland, Alevi identity has become a convenient exclusionary marker used against other Muslims (mostly Turkish) in Germany by highlighting difference. Cultural and religious differences from other Turks and Muslims have become reified in this identification. Differences from practicing Muslim Turks became publicly articulated in discourses invoking secularism. By highlighting such differences, the Alevis have played into the anti-Muslim rhetoric already rampant in Europe. The reification occurs especially when Alevis introduce themselves to other Germans emphasizing their differences from other Muslims; in fact, one of my young informants said he denied he was Muslim at all to his German peers, as some Alevis in their first and especially in their second homeland have done. By emphasizing the non-Islamic features and practices of their religion, and by not practicing religion in public, Alevis affirm anti-Muslim sentiments among Germans, claiming to know more about Muslims than Germans do. They reaffirm the legitimacy of "Islamophobia" in Germany by providing a tangible and visible example of the problems
Muslims have caused in their old and new homelands. A June 2013 conference titled “Salafism in Germany,” 30 co-organized by the AABF, the Municipality of Cologne, and Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (Federal Office of Migration and Refugees), praised Alevis’ stance against extremism and fundamentalism in Germany while seeing some Sunni Muslims as a potential threat to harmony among its citizens. It is also important to point out that Germans have found Alevis convenient figures to use in their exclusionary discourses, a point I discuss more on Chapter 6.

An important event, a cornerstone of Alevi music and Alevi identity, was the concert titled Bin Yılın Türküsü (The tune of the millennium), which was organized by the AABF on 13 May 2000 in Cologne Arena and repeated two years later in Istanbul. The concert, or “festival” as the organization committee preferred to call it, was comprised of bağlamas playing Alevi repertoire, and a massive semah show. Zafer Gündoğdu, a prominent Alevi musician, conducted this concert. There were more than 2000 musicians and dancers on the stage, which put them in the Guinness Book of World Records. As Poyraz argues, this concert “was organized to fulfill the need Alevis have been feeling to demarcate the existence of Alevi identity” (Poyraz 2007: 143).

4.3.1. Wuppertal Alevi Kültür Merkezi (Wuppertal Alevi Cultural Center)

An important organization for promoting Alevi music and identity in Germany is the Wuppertal Alevi Kültür Merkezi (WAKM), which was established in 1992. WAKM is affiliated with the AABF in organizing important events, demonstrations, and concerts, such as those put
together for the Sivas massacre anniversaries with other organizations affiliated with the AABF. According to the directors of the WAKM, there are 7,000 Alevi people registered in Wuppertal, of a total population of 100,000. The organization has 550 member households, as they register household membership instead of individuals (statistics from Wuppertal Stadt). The organizational structure of the center is divided into three subdivisions: the belief commission, women’s division, and youth division, each sending representatives to the executive committee. The director explained to me that the three main objectives of the foundation are to serve needs of the Alevi community in Wuppertal for "belief, culture, and music." Again, it seems to be imperative for any Alevi organization to include culture and music in one way or another in the title or branches of the organization.

In the hallway of the WAKM when I visited, two large-screen TVs were turned on, one showing Euro Star and the other Habertürk; both satellite TV channels broadcast in Turkish, one the Turkish Star TV's European edition, and the latter a Turkish news channel. The men gathered were playing card games just as they might at any teahouse in Turkey. The designated dede of the center, Turan Koluaçık, sat in on the game when he was not guiding his congregation. I recognized him later, when he introduced himself as the belief commissioner of the WAKM. He received a “dede certificate” from the Alevi Akademisi (Alevi Academy) established by the AABF in 1997 (for more on the Alevi Academy see Dressler 2006 and Sökefeld 2008). The dede was also in charge of all religious affairs at the WAKM. He gave his business card to me, showing “Alevi Dedesi” as his profession.
In the early years of immigration to Germany, as Turan Dede told me, in the whole Cologne vicinity there were only four or five people who could play the bağlama, nor were there knowledgeable people who could direct religious services. One of the managers, Şevki Abi, from Başak (a predominantly Kurdish Alevi village in Malatya), also told me that in recent years picnics and occasions like solidarity nights (Chapter 3) had helped expose youth to Alevi music.

The WAKM organizes group music classes on the guitar and the bağlama, as well as "folklore" (folk dance in Turkish) designed primarily to teach Alevi semah and some other local line-dances from Anatolia. Some parents who send their children to the bağlama classes told me that they demanded that they learn Kurdish songs alongside the general repertoire of “bağlama music” or “Alevi music,” which comprises predominantly tunes in Turkish, from both Alevi and türkü repertoires. I recorded sessions of the instructor teaching eight girls how to play basic türkü repertoire and how to read notation. Once a week, Ercan Şahin, a relatively famous bağlama player and a good friend of mine, was invited to teach the "essence" of the Alevi feeling. In the classes I observed at WAKM, Ercan taught fast and lively tunes associated with Alevis or Alevi repertoire. According to Mr. Koluaçık, the class opens "the door of Alevi music to the young
generation, thus Alevism." The bağlama kursları (schools), also known as dershane (Stokes 1992), have been important gateways for Alevis to teach the young generation to appreciate Alevi music and the values of Alevism. The students, when I asked, expressed their dismay about some Turkish tunes that are associated with the Sunni-Turkish repertoire. There was a strict, small group of eight to ten students, to whom only Ercan would teach advance techniques of bağlama within the Alevi repertoire. The organizers were somewhat dissatisfied with the current instructor, Mehmet Hoca, who had been teaching for the last five years, and the number of his students was dwindling slowly. Among the continuous attendees, 70 percent were girls, showing a growing trend in all Alevi organizations I visited.

The WAKM also offers German language classes and tutoring sessions to aid the youth in integration into German society. Managers from all three divisions organize music and poetry-reading events, and evening sing-alongs featuring leftist poems and protest literature in Turkish as well as tunes to "rekindle the spirit of old times," as Mr. Koluaçık told me. The "Marxist literature" used in those reading sessions, as my 18-year-old informant put it, still has a strong impact on how the older generation indoctrinates the new with leftist values similar to those practiced in Turkey. This classic "Marxist literature" contains works of Turan Feyizoğlu, Che Guevara's Life, and Karl Marx’s Das Kapital, among others. On a personal note: as a child who grew up in a household with these books, it was striking for me to revisit the same literature, as the heroes and theorists of the left have remained the same.

The WAKM also organizes monthly brunches and events to commemorate Mothers' Day, Women's Day, May Day, and other important dates celebrated or commemorated by Kurdish and Alevi political organizations. Under the auspices of the belief section, the WAKM organizes cem ceremonies twice a year. The center helps people to observe the fasts of Muharrem and Aşure as
well as assisting for funerals. Along with *cem* ceremonies, the center organizes *lokma* (sacred food distribution) services and 40-day services for Alevi families to mark the 40th day after the death of a member or relative. WAKM organizes large cultural nights every six months attracting hundreds, along with public events commemorating days with significant social meaning for Alevis, such as the Sivas massacre or other religious dates. The managers of WAKM have also been instrumental in establishing the Cologne-based international satellite channel Yol-TV. They occasionally send guests to appear on Yol-TV if needed.

**4.3.2. Pazarcık Cultural Center in Cologne**

One of the organizations I visited in order to get a better understanding of religious musical practice in *cem* ceremonies in Cologne, was the Pazarcık Cultural Center. Many Kurdish Alevis from the Pazarcık district in Maraş live in the Bergisch Gladbach district near Cologne. The Cultural Center invited the Kurdish Alevi families in the vicinity to their annual *cem* ceremony directed by a *dede* whom the organizers brought from Turkey, a common practice for many local Alevi organizations. Most of the families who attended were Kurdish Alevis, and one could hear both Kurdish and Turkish spoken. There was no way to recognize the *dede* at the beginning, though I learned that he was one of the men who arrived in a fancy Mercedes Benz. The *cem* ceremony was held in an arena-type building, where a large gap existed between the *dede* and the attendees. Some of the elderly attendees asked for chairs in order to avoid sitting on the ground. The *dede* refused to give permission for chairs to the elderly and said, "the *cem* service cannot be observed on chairs." The *cem* lasted seven hours, during which the *dede* blended the religious repertoire with some Arabic and Turkish prayers, which left many attendees dissatisfied, and he left out traditional Turkish and Kurdish prayers and hymns.
Cem ceremonies in Germany have begun to be held more frequently since the 1990s in large cities like Cologne, which has resulted in more opportunities to expose younger participants coming from non-practicing households to Alevi teachings. In contrast to the religious experiences of older generations of Kurdish Alevis, this development provides more opportunities for the "professional" dedes to find employment and increase their earnings from the state and NGOs. Reinstatement of these rituals de-secularizes some non-practicing Alevis by providing more venues in order to reconvert them to Alevism or even Islam.

4.3.3. Köln ve Çevresi Hacı Bektaş-ı Veli Alevi Cem Evi

Another organization I visited was Köln ve Çevresi Hacı Bektaş-ı Veli Alevi Cem Evi (KHBVCE) [Hacı Bektaş-ı Veli Alevi Center of Cologne and Environs], which has become, according to many Kurdish Alevis, the bedrock of the Turkish nationalist movement among Alevis. This organization, I was repeatedly told, has become the central organization in promulgating a mythic history, arguing that Alevism is the first and only Turkish religion. Scholars have debunked this claim, but it is still used as a historical argument against Kurdish and Arab Alevis. The KHBVCE is located in the Keupstrasse district of Cologne, which is very close to downtown with a dense immigrant population from Turkey. Inside the KHBVCE, the first striking view was pictures of Atatürk alongside Hacı Bektaş-ı Veli (The founder of the Bektaşi Order and a figure revered by all Alevis) and Hz. Ali (son-in-law of the prophet Mohammad) hanging on the walls of the hall. But the most venerated picture was unmistakably that of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (the founder of the modern Republic of Turkey) next to Ali and HBV. When I met Kemal Gültekin, the secretary of KHBVCE, he seemed to be defensive and guarded in response to my questions on Kurdish or other Alevi groups, thereby revealing that his
foundation's stance was close to the official Turkish ideology of denying Kurdish language rights. Like many other Alevi organizations I visited, KHBVCE does not organize cem ceremonies during the summer, as it is hard to persuade people to join them during the summers except for occasional gatherings on Thursdays.

Testimonies from my fieldwork in Cologne demonstrate that members of the Kurdish Alevi communities never attend KHBVCE, the closest cemevi in their district, which has organized regular cems and other religious ceremonies. The KHBVCE is associated with the Turkish-based organization called CEM Vakfı, which has tense relations with pro-Kurdish members. Mr. Gültekin told me that there are some Kürt kökenli Alevi (“Alevis with Kurdish background”) in this organization who do not claim a Kurdish identity and refuse to attend events of their fellow Kurdish Alevis if there is a slight implication of Kurdish "separatist" politics involved with that event or organization. These instances of avoidance confirm the claim that politics supersedes religious rituals in many situations. In this way, the religion and its rituals become clustered according to the political loyalties of the members of each organization.

4.4. Music and Alevi Identity in Transnational Space and Social Media

The spaces examined in this study of music-making included bars, homes, cemevi, festivals, Internet, radio, TV, Facebook, and the cars of my informants. In these spaces Kurdish Alevis listen to live music, dance with it, drink alcohol, or listen to their cassette players, iPods, computers, or TVs (Chapter 5). I investigated Internet forums, popular websites, and Facebook posts and notifications in order to understand musical learning processes. I found that those who wish to learn tunes on the bağlama or guitar usually ask for sheet-music notation or akor (chords to accompany popular songs). I gathered almost a hundred songs popular among this group, in
that they are in demand on Internet forums, requested and performed regularly at türkü bars, and listed on Facebook profiles of my respondents. The majority of these songs belong to the türkü repertoire and are sung in Turkish. With few exceptions, the musical aesthetic of this group resembles that of their fellow Turkish Alevi immigrants and refugees in Germany. The presence of Kurdish songs, constituting twenty percent of all songs, plays a significant role in the social and political lives of this group, as most song texts have political implications.

I was impressed in my fieldwork in 2010 and 2011 by the increasing role of Skype and other digital communication media in the dissemination of Alevi religious practices. Now everyone can observe the once-exclusive religious gatherings in a small town of their first homeland, either on satellite TV, the Internet, Skype, or other software. Most of these are broadcast from Turkey, and occasionally from Germany, to the rest of the world. The exclusive cem ceremony was originally meant to be attended solely by pious believers from the community, members who were supposed to follow certain rules and do good deeds in order to get the dede’s permission to attend. Broadcasting those intimate gatherings on satellite TV or on Internet sites such as YouTube, changes the whole dynamic of intimacy and exclusivity of religious practice.
The transnational space with all new tools has resulted in a modern and open practice of using new media to reconnect disenfranchised Alevis and using new-media platforms to articulate political demands for recognition of the religion. The main goal of broadcasting such religious gatherings, some of my informants claimed, was to address people of Alevi-Atheist practices, and to remind and reconvert them to being practitioners of the religion. Having these practices widely available makes the religious practice more visible. For non-Alevi Turks who might want to view Alevi ritual, the demystification serves to legitimize the specific forms of Alevism that the organization wants to promulgate. Many Kurdish Alevis I interviewed articulated their concerns on the danger of the religion's dilution by opening up spiritual and exclusive space to the rest of the world. Being open to foreigners changes the setting of the cem ceremonies, as well as affecting the actions and reactions of people who attend these broadcast events.

This is another form of missionary politics of specific Alevi organizations. Thus those organizations broadcasting weekly or annual cem gatherings have certain political and economic
agendas. The events broadcast are theatrical, rehearsed, and highly stylized. New-media opportunities and modernized versions of spiritual messaging have provided tools used to re-convert Alevis without religious affiliation towards particular organizations with nationalistic, pluralistic, or more neo-spiritualistic political agendas. Among those political and social agendas, the Kurdish and Turkish nationalistic agendas compete in the same realm of finding historical roots. One side claims Alevism was originally a Turkish religion, and the other claims it is indeed a Kurdish religion; some argue that it has been an Anatolian religion. This competition might be resolved more by political struggles of the parties than by historical facts.

As observed by Ayhan Erol and other scholars, many activists, scholars, and religious leaders care about the Alevi religious repertoire and prevent it from being performed in secular or even "profane" venues such as türkü bars. Some members of Alevi organizations who visit these türkü bars ask musicians not to play pieces from the Alevi religious repertoire. Some organizers from the AABF also asked Yol-TV and other TV stations located in Cologne not to broadcast music videos of religious tunes on TV, along with other music video clips. One can observe the link between wedding salons and türkü bars, as both venues host the same kinds of entertainment activities (see Chapter 5). Now, especially after the concerted efforts of the Alevi dedes and organizations, it is not possible to hear Tevhid and Duaz-i Imam (sacred tunes for the Alevis) at türkü bars. Ironically, there is no regulation over displays of religion in a public space. Video clips of sacred religious tunes are played less on Yol-TV (though still possible), but on other TV stations such as Cem TV (which Turan Koluaçık from Wuppertal Alevi Cultural Center calls “Şeriatçı TV” in reference to the TV’s close ties with Sunni Islam) it is possible to encounter such religious video clips. Some of these media outlets have increased their viewer ratings with no resentment from Alevi viewers for the abuse of Alevi sentiments. Some of the
I interviewed were proud they had warned the religious committee at the AABF not to include sacred music in the repertoire.

The dissemination of religious music in the public sphere without the control of religious authority is a significant point. The religious sermons, music, and dance that were purportedly exclusive to a small group of devoted Alevis have become available via satellite TV and the Internet. Non-Alevis can also reach, view, and even comment on these programs and events, previously the sacred properties of the Alevis in exclusive settings. Prior to the mass media, if Alevi members of the village behaved wrongly, one punishment was to exclude them from the cem ceremony. Now, however, the once-exclusive gatherings of Alevis are open to everyone, even those who might have otherwise been punished and excluded from participation. Through the exploration of the distinctions my informants made with respect to Alevi religious music and secular türkü repertoire, I came to understand the difficulty of identifying the fact that there have been blurry lines between "sacred" and "secular or ethnic" music among Kurdish Alevis (see Conclusion for more discussion). This understanding has implications for how we analyze the way the music works to constitute different kinds of audiences, and thus, different kinds of communities.

4.4.1. A Kurdish Alevi Facebook Group: Platforma Kurdên Alawî

One of the recent changes in the social formations through the transnational space is the emergence of online communities. A recently formed online community on the most popular social media site (Facebook) is worth analyzing. One of the dozens of Facebook groups significant to my discussion is Platforma Kurdên Alawî (the Platform of Kurdish Alevis), which serves Kurdish nationalists who also seek to claim an exclusive Kurdish Alevi identity, through a
constructed title KurdAlawi.

Figure 4.14. Female guerillas (presumably members of PKK) during a *semah*, from the Facebook group of Platforma Kurdên Alawî.

The platform's mission statement reads in both Turkish and Kurmancî-Kurdish, "We are neither Turkish nor Muslim; we are KurdAlawi. We are here to understand and own the history of the Kurdish Alevis." Some of my informants from Cologne and Istanbul are among those who "like" the Facebook page, an act that I interpreted as an endorsement. Essentially this group is formed around claiming both Kurdish national and Alevi religious identities defined against Kemalism and Islamism. This was made clear by a picture shared widely in which the road to Kurdistan is split from the roads that connect to Islamism and Kemalism (see Figure 4.14). The pictures and information shared among the members serve the purposes of the Alevi branch of Kurdish nationalists with secular and anti-Turkish overtones. Among the 2900 members of this group (as of June 2013), there are also some younger members, a sign that Kurdish nationalist Alevis are reaching out to recruit disenfranchised youth through opposition to the undemocratic policies of their utmost enemy: the Turkish state. In its conversion attempts as well its continuing practice of denying religious spaces for Alevis in public, this enemy “not only denies Kurds
autonomy and language rights but also religious freedom for Alevis” (www.facebook.com/pages/Platforma-Kurđên-Alawî). The musical examples that the members of this group shared include Kurmancî-Kurdish and Zazakî Alevi tunes from musicians like Aynur, Mikail Aslan, Metin and Kemal Kahraman, and Ahmet Aslan.

![Figure 4.15. A sign summarizing the main ideological stance of the Group](www.facebook.com/pages/Platforma-Kurđên-Alawî)

The Platforma Kurđên Alawî Facebook group does not define Alevism with theological presumptions, concepts, tools, and ritual traditions; rather it relies on recycling pro-Kurdish and anti-Kemalist ideological and political arguments. In February 2013, Platforma Kurđên Alawî, along with Demokratik Toplum Kongresi (DTK) [Democratic Society Congress, a pro-Kurdish organization] and a couple of other Kurdish Alevi organizations, held the first international "Kurdistan Alevi Conference” in Diyarbakir (Turkey), a city populated overwhelmingly by Sunni Kurds and “the capital of independent Kurdistan,” as some Kurds would like to see it. This conference is probably the first of its kind to combine “Kurdistan” and “Alevi” in its title.
4.5. Summary and Conclusion

In this chapter, I laid out the transformation history of Alevism as the most prominent mode of belonging among Kurdish Alevis in Turkey, Germany, and transnational space. I examined the current state of the relationship between Alevi music and Alevi identity in Turkey and in Germany. In my research, I observed the recent realignment of religious authority within Alevi religious organizations as Alevi religious authority was claimed by various new organizations. The Wuppertal Alevi Culture Center (WAKM), among others, exemplifies how Kurdish Alevis teach religious and secular tunes in "cultural centers" that serve the religious, cultural, and political lives of Alevis in the second homeland. I have related the changing social structures of the Kurdish Alevis in terms of how they have utilized the opportunities acquired through the transnational space created by cultural entrepreneurs along with other religio-political agents in recent years. My examination of the changing religious meaning of the sacred Alevi ritual called *cem* demonstrates how it was transformed in the transnational space, reaching different audiences via the Internet and mass media. The presence of the *bağlama* and depictions of it in all forms of media constitute a significant aspect of Alevi sonic and visual memory.

I explained the significance of the *bağlama*, which is considered a sacred instrument for the Alevis. For the Alevi case we need to look deeper into the question of representation of a religion and/or an ethnic or cultural identity by examining groups coalesced around specific religio-political parties (Chapter 1). Thus, the fact that some groups claim they can speak in the name of all Alevis should not lead to the conclusion that all Alevis follow the same religious principles. I argued that the history of Alevism, real or imaginary, and the atrocities Alevis faced informed Alevi musicians’ cultural, poetic, and artistic expressions. The *bağlama* player or *zakir*’s kissing the *bağlama* and applying it to his head before he starts playing hymns marks the
Alevi religious rituals called *cem*, and the *bağlama* plays a key part in both folk music and the sacred music of Alevi rituals. In the competition between two *bağlama* tuning systems I reaffirmed that the *bağlama düzeni* has dominated the *kara düzen* in the last thirty years and that Alevi musical practices have long existed alongside the folk music of Anatolia. The shared past between those two makes the boundaries between the religious and secular music among Alevi blurrier than ever, a subject I talk about more in Chapter 5.

I have argued that a significant example of the recently shifted claims-making process for Kurdish Alevis is the strategic essentialism attached to the term Kızılbaş, and its implications for their identity. Kurdish Alevis who would like to highlight their differences from other Alevis in an exclusionary way have embraced the Kızılbaş label to declare their Kurdish identity while not limiting themselves to Alevi identity (which includes Turkish or Arab Alevis). In Chapter 5, I investigate one of the key venues for Alevi music and especially for the music of Kurdish Alevi youth: the türkü bars of Cologne.
Chapter 5: Türkü Bars in Germany

5.1. Introduction

Türkü is a generic term used for all folktunes with Turkish. Thanks to a substantial cultural industry in Turkey and Germany, türkü experienced a revival especially during the 1990s and the 2000s. The use and sale of türkü albums and the process of marketing ethnic and religious tunes to the masses have been significant developments in the history of popular and folk music in Turkey. In the last two decades, new producers, with particular political and economic agendas, began to sell and propagate folktunes to the masses in new and old packaging, responding to the demands of consumers. This revival and the development of one of türkü’s newer iterations, a genre I call alebesk, deserve more scrutiny, especially given the marketing of ethnic or religious tunes to communities, or henceforth, consumers. This era of marketing folktunes—or türküs—and other forms of alebesk, demonstrates a pluralistic patronage of music production and dissemination. New cultural entrepreneurs have attempted to occupy the domain formerly controlled by previous nation-state agents, such as Turkish Radio Television (TRT).

Türkü is became symbols of resistance and in Turkey were among the most-performed tunes of leftist movements in the last quarter of the 20th century. In the 1990s, the türkü became a popular commodity as the country entered a less regulated cultural and political era. Neoliberal economic policies and the opening of the Turkish markets to foreign goods accelerated the production and dissemination of all kinds of cultural products, along with some formerly

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31 Some publications apply the term to Kurmancî folk songs as well.
32 I introduce the term and discuss alebesk in Chapter 1 and 2.
marginalized tunes. The highest-selling musical product of marketing campaigns aimed at Alevis and Sunnis alike was the türkü, as it was part of the music already consumed by Alevis. In the early 2000s, türkü contests appeared on newly established private TV and radio stations. Since playing the türkü repertoire has become a popular activity within both Alevi and Sunni circles, attending türkü bars has become one of the most popular entertainment activities. This chapter describes the musical scene in venues called türkü bars in Kurdish Alevi communities in Germany. I compare the sonic and material qualities of this leisure activity with those of türkü in the Kurdish Alevis’ first homeland.

5.2. Türkü Bars as Businesses

In Türkü bars, two or three musicians perform covers of folk, protest, and popular songs. These venues have been established in cities such as Istanbul and Cologne, with large Alevi immigrant populations. The closest American equivalent of türkü bars would be country music bars where cover bands primarily perform requests from the audience. In türkü bars, musicians are required to perform requests (istikler); in most cases, türkü bar groups might be categorized as cover bands. People choose the türkü bars to see live performances, to mingle with others, and to participate in the action and the music. Onstage, it is quite common to hear Turkish jokes flying around. Musicians drink alcohol for free if they want, and almost all drink before they go onstage. For my research, I focus on Cologne and its vicinity, and draw on interviews with musicians, owners, and the audience/customers in the türkü bars Dudu Café, Ley Lim Türküevi, and Prestige Türkü Bar.

Many businesses owned by Kurdish and Alevi immigrants and refugees in Cologne—restaurants, bars, and coffee shops—appear to have cordial and seamless relationships with
German and non-German customers alike. In business locales catering to customers from all walks of life, background music runs the gamut from Latin and pop to jazz and other genres. In some restaurants TVs broadcast Turkish satellite channels, as many consider such access a part of the touristic ambience of such enclaves as “Little Istanbul” in Cologne. In restaurants and especially bars and coffee shops, background music is almost the same as that in German establishments. When it comes to türkü bars, however, one can hardly overlook the exclusive nature of music selected to cater to Turkish and Kurdish immigrant communities.

Replacing former downtown bars and nightclubs, venues filled with well-dressed mixed-gendered customers, with entrance fees as high as ten euros and beers at five euros, türkü bars are not cheap venues for an evening’s entertainment. Almost all türkü bars I attended have clientele consisting of men and women (represented almost equally depending on the location) who are between twenty and fifty years old. A handful of owners and managers of türkü bars I talked to stated that the clientele of their bars used to consist of a mainly male audience compared to its current almost equally represented demographic. Other factors that influence the make-up of the audience include economic and political constraints that could prevent certain groups or individual from joining this expensive enterprise. The location of türkü bars can also make a difference in terms of gender breakdown of attendees. Among the audience members I talked to for this study, most had at least high school or higher degrees. Among the attendees near the University of Essen, almost half of the attendees were college students. Birthday parties are common at the bars. Whereas the majority in Istanbul stay open almost every night, most türkü bars in Germany are open only on Friday and Saturday nights. Business hours conform to the German working-class schedule; just like the general population, those attending türkü bars abide by rules of engagement and conventions of leisure at these entertainment venues. One of
the most relevant spatial components of the türkü bars is the dominance of cigarette and hookah smoke. Some türkü bars allow their customers to smoke and provide hookahs for rent, establishing other sources of revenue.

Türkü bars, though they are a recent phenomenon, have become part of the aesthetic of not only the Kurdish Alevi but also the others including those who attend them. Although türkü bars are not designed solely for Kurdish Alevis, many owners and managers I met come from Kurdish Alevi backgrounds, and most of them have clientele from different groups in Turkey. Türkü bars are part of the same larger group of the transnational exchanges that occur between Turkey, Kurdistan, and Germany. Türkü bars not only reenact the nostalgia of an imagined space and time for customers, but also provide a space designed to be thoroughly practical for capitalistic exchange. Most türkü bars have minimum covers billed individually, known in Turkey as Alman Hesabi (Dutch Treat, lit. German). Each person pays his or her share, unlike their counterparts in Turkey where the establishment bills each table separately, and people either share the total amount, or in many cases, only the men at the table pay. This difference of custom marks a critical point regarding the changes in the economic regimes that immigrants have lived through. For immigrants navigating across nations with transnational ties, it marks the transition to a European liberal and cosmopolitan mode as opposed to a formerly more patriarchal one.

The political economy of the transnational movement of music, the modes of performance, and the transition of listener from audience member to customer in türkü bars happen in the context of this adaptation to modern modes of transaction. To this end, each person paying individually (after drinking mostly German beers) at the end of a long night of entertainment and commiseration accomplishes simultaneously the adoption of German modes
of consumption and the reenactment of an imagined place inside the türkü walls.

Türkü bars have transcended standard entertainment venues and become perhaps the only viable spaces that welcome most immigrant groups from Turkey, including leftists, conservatives, Alevis, Sunnis, Kurds, and Turks alike. All sociopolitical identity labels are welcomed in the bars. Inside those I have visited in the Cologne vicinity, I have seen traditional garments and artifacts on the walls, all exhibiting the aesthetic of şark odası (eastern room, see Chapter 2). When asked why they hang these garments on the walls, the owners generally said that they help the customers feel “comfortable and closer to home, and even to their village.” These garments and artifacts, the owners and many customers believe, represent the living room of a village house, and give attendees the comfort of a familiar living room while in Germany; it is not inconceivable for patrons to feel contented in their second homeland in a village living-room setting at 3am, drinking alcohol and surrounded by dancing. In other words, the eclecticism in this setting represents a form of appropriation that combines German modes of entertainment and leisure with Kurdish Alevi music, garments, and language.

5.3. Aesthetic of Şark Odası (Orient Room)

The şark odası is an old practice of exhibiting personal items, such as oriental rugs and pottery, in one’s living room. It reflects the sensibilities of the şark feel in the modern world. Kurds and Armenians in Istanbul, and in other large cities in Turkey, tend to have a site at home set up to remind them of their origins. Many of my informants both in Turkey and Germany have at least a section of their living room, if not the entire living room, dedicated to exhibiting items from the şark. In Object of Legacy: Material Objects of Displaced People (2008), Zeynep Turan analyzes the value certain artifacts, such as pottery and silverware, hold for Armenian transplants
and others of the diaspora in their recreation of space. Similarly, the owners and managers of türkü bars have recreated areas designated for playing music that purportedly comes from an old place where garments and artifacts on the walls originate. The irony is that, in many living rooms of those villages, people have barely worn those garments nor do they listen to the music of modern türkü bar musicians. Instead, a mediated link exists between the cultures and these items symbolically carry the idea of that link, with nostalgia for the old times when “everything was fine” in the village and people might enjoy the companionship of their own kind. As currently implemented in living rooms and spaces such as türkü bars, the şark odası has become a nostalgic symbol of values not often seen, if at all, in the places with which they are associated.

The şark odası decoration in türkü bars creates a space for the audience to feel comforted and at home. It also reenacts an imaginary place and time as the audience engages with modern music, which can also represent older, innocent, imagined times. By invoking a şark odası taste in türkü bars, or other restaurants and businesses, owners and designers of these venues attempt to make their spaces appear Kurdish, Anatolian, Turkish, or oriental. Svetlana Boym (2001) has written extensively and brilliantly about immigrant interiors of homes in terms of the “nostalgia” they feel and share with other community members in diasporic settings. The şark odası concept, like other aspects of what Boym (2001) calls the “diasporic intimacy” in which the immigrants or members of the diaspora communities live, has been utilized as a marker of cultural identity that does not factually relate to the places those artifacts putatively represent. The Comaroffs (2009: 2) claim that “cultural identity, in the here-and-now, represents itself ever more as two things at once: the object of choice and self-construction, typically through the act of consumption, and the manifest product of biology, genetics, and human essence.” This self-exoticizing of traditional settings caters more to the members of these
immigrant populations than to outsiders. Therefore, the marketing and remaking of space to look “authentic” or local perhaps works in the immigrant setting, regardless of the profiles of the consumers. As Boym (2001) and Özyürek (2001) remind us, much of the memory-work of migrants occurs not in the public sphere (from which they are often marginalized or excluded) but in the private sphere, for example through the display of valued photographs and objects of the homeland in the home, or in the intimate settings.

The şark odası also helps musicians in their endeavor to make (or at least to feel they can make) music that is more authentic, traditional, Turkish, Kurdish or Anatolian. It provides an imaginary spatial connection in circumstances that otherwise might become totally disconnected from the actual music in its village context, even as musicians on the stage do not necessarily perform traditional music. In order to retain the music’s traditional characteristics, they may choose not use synthesizers and electric or “effect” guitars. I would argue that this şark odası aesthetic provides a “traditional” mask for the modern performing practices of the musicians, one that appeals to the audience, who may be comfortable in a şark odası while listening to alebesk and dancing as if at a wedding. Though not a complete imitation, which would fail to convince in most cases, the cover of a preexisting song exemplifies the practice of modernization for immigrant communities, one that relies on the bricolage of spatial and sonic eclecticism (Hebdige 2002).

5.4. Audience and Repertoire at Türkü Bars

Almost none of the musicians are full-time musicians; in fact many have other fulltime jobs. Shêxo is a mechanical engineer, Ali Baran owns a restaurant, and other musicians work at full-time jobs, which are usually not related to music. The performance process at the türkü bars
is related to the other places and occasions where musicians perform as well. Türkü bar musicians perform at weddings as well as political rallies and fundraisers in Germany, which they call programs. Türkü bar musicians in some occasions also perform at those venues if the political party that organizes the event hires them. Thus, the political/cultural events and rallies are where politics influence the musical aesthetic most. Then come the türkü bars where political stances are contested through the audience requests, and finally the least politicized venues are weddings that are designed to entertain the attendees. Wedding repertoires consist of local dance and entertainment songs from regions that the bride and bridegroom come from. I attended a couple of weddings, which are highly localized and exclusive entertainment events for a specific group of attendees. The weddings are by definition designed as entertainment activities closed to those sad and melancholic alebesk songs. Although line dances and göbek dansı exist in other places, türkü bars are unique in the sense that the collective melancholy happens only in the türkü bars. The customers sing along with musicians. Some cry while engaging with the imagery of the homeland reproduced in those venues. Common aspects between all three venues are the line dances. The bodies moving together exhibit similar qualities in all three locations. The most significant feature distinguishing türkü bars from weddings and political events is the presence of alebesk.

Unlike political events and weddings, türkü bars are open to everyone. Some nights, members of the audience make requests (istekler) of arabesk, Turkish songs of pop stars like Ajda Pekkan and Tarkan, or Turkish nationalist songs, most of which the musicians on stage ideologically oppose. In some türkü bars, an “extreme” request (or one from a politically extreme member) might come from the audience. “We try to play it down so that there would not be any problem for the venue, and we try our best in those cases,” said Suat, one of the musicians I
interviewed. Though some request political or symbolically powerful songs by musicians such as Ahmet Kaya, generally the subjects of requested songs are love and loneliness.

People who go to türkü bars, like many of my subjects, seek sonic and visual environments resembling both the intimate muhabbet gatherings at home and the traditional weddings where people dance together. This urge calls to mind the rituals used to make a group part of a community. Continuous collective activities at these türkü bars—the secularized ritual and ritualized secular musical practice of collective singing and dancing—compensate for a lack of “traditional” weddings and entertainment in Germany. The musicians, for instance, rely on reenacting the actual wedding settings, where people join in line dances. It became evident in my research that audience members were able to sing along to those happy or sad songs, remembering the lyrics sometimes far better than the vocalists onstage, an important quality of türkü bars that bears further study.

Türkü bar-goers in Istanbul, which for most of the Kurdish Alevis is the second homeland, also miss the first homeland. I did research in türkü bars in both countries and the music they requested was similar, proving the relevance and dominance of the transnational field maintained by those cultural actors. In that sense the western European mode of entertainment meet with the nostalgia for the old and first homeland in both homelands. As Ayhan Erol observed at türkü bars in Izmir, the repertoire performed in those bars includes tunes full of Alevi-Bektaşi musical codes if not direct references to Alevism.

5.4.1. Istekler

Different codes and messages are transmitted through audience requests, istekler (request written on papers or napkins), which are as part of the negotiation between the audience and the
musicians on stage all the while as all of those present reconstruct the cultural memory together. The attendees and those who paid to be able to request particular songs from musicians, in most cases anonymously, can tell how cultural memory is mediated at those venues. Those requests helped me understand the power dynamics in that kind of environment, in which the artistic, aesthetic, political, and cultural priorities intertwined. When a member of the audience wanted to make a political statement, he or she could send an istek to the musicians so that they would play a song associated with a particular political stance. Alternatively, if one of the audience members wanted to signal his or her local pride, he or she could do so by requesting a song associated with a specific place of origin in the first homeland. These requests are one of the best cultural texts in understanding the intimate modes of exchange happening in second homeland entertainment venues.

Istekler are narrative texts that give an unfiltered perspective of what those making the requests would like to share with their peers. They also affect the repertoire selections and performance settings by pressuring the musicians on stage through constant negotiation. The customers send istekler, through which the negotiations occur between not only musicians and their audience, but also between audiences from different identities and political stances. Some of the istekler I collected have phrases like “Yeter artık Türkçe şarkılar, Kürtçe yok mu?” (Enough of Turkish songs, can you play a Kurdish song), “Halaya geldik, çok yavaş şarkılar çalıyorsunuz” (We came to dance, enough with those slow songs), “Kurdish halay,” “Any song from Malatya,” and “Maraş türküsü.” Through these requests members of the audience try to shape the direction of the night as much as they can. In fact, there is a lot of appeasement that has to go on to make the evening work because there are in fact political and social factions, frictions, and contestations. Alongside the negotiations taking place between the leaders of the
community organizations and musicians and bar owners are real-time negotiations at türkü bars with musicians and other members in the audience through istekler that shape the actual musical process.

Figure 5.1. Two examples of istekler from the LeyLim Türkü Bar

As is documented in many social science studies, in many instances including my own survey, there is an inherent discrepancy between what participants say in public and what they would declare in their intimate or personal spheres. I observed that, as part of understanding the cultural memory of those who attend the türkü bars, the istekler provide insight into what the audience actually demands from their musicians. Türkü bar musicians try to cover the most popular and frequently requested songs even before the audience requests them. Even then, in most cases, members of the audience would not stop requesting repeatedly the same songs. In the list I compiled, the song “Şaçlarını Taramışsun” was requested seven times in one night, sometimes with different titles taken from different sections of the lyrics. The following (Figure 5.2) is one of the most popular versions, from a bağlama kursu (bağlama school) located in Cologne. I analyze one version of this song in following section.
An analysis of the songs requested by the audience yields a number of songs of 60-70 per night. More than 80 percent of the songs are in Turkish. Not all songs are necessarily performed that night. The nights I attended as participant observer, the musicians played almost 90 percent of the requests, a sign that the audience for the most part was getting what they wanted from the
musicians. A melodic analysis of the songs requested suggests a melancholic picture in terms of emotional qualities of the tunes requested. Almost all are sung within a couple of melodic scales or modes, and the majority are in line with folk music scales of Turkish music. Sometimes the musicians have to follow certain melodic patterns in order to stay within the same scales, so that they can easily connect songs in a medley. A connection to the next song without interruption is especially pertinent for the line dance sequences, where musicians have to connect songs to each other so that there will be at least 20 minute-long dance intervals that would keep the audience dancing. Most dance tunes have happy themes and lyrics sometimes calling for action or involvement in a struggle for peace.

Prolonged social events and hours spent in türkü bars have become locations of collective melancholy for Kurdish Alevi immigrants. These events and performances have helped to maintain the group’s ritual and spiritual unity. In this context, “spirituality” refers to a more modern form of a non-practicing but collectively accepted solidarity within the Alevi community. The rather cheerless ritual in a smoke-filled room—with collective singing of emotionally charged tunes in common remembrance—might seem an unhappy event to outsiders. As an insider of the culture to a certain extent, I view türkü bar events as symptomatic of a cultural and generational melancholy and nostalgia similar to that which overtake the participants in original Alevi spiritual rituals (Chapter 4). Technically these events lack the amusement of an entertainment, and might perhaps even be defined as the opposite of entertainment.

Musicians usually follow a certain path when they perform at türkü bars, as they respond to the audience requests as part of the negotiated practice to make that night possibly go along with minimal problems. Most nights, audience members start sending their requests from the
beginning of the night. On certain occasions through the night, türkü bar musicians announce that they are open to requests from the audience members. With the melancholic repertoires full of nostalgia, türkü bars work almost like laboratories for longing, nostalgia, and melancholy.

5.5. Alevi Music, Türkü, and Alebesk

Both religious and secular repertoires of Alevi musicality, as elderly Alevis perceived them previously, are incorporated into the folk-music practice of the second and third homelands, along with the officially sanctioned Turkish türkü repertoire. I argue that the religious music associated with sociopolitical Alevi identity has continued in the form of this secularized music. Performing music with the saz and singing a few Alevi hymns with other folk tunes has become the sole practice, musical or other, that all Alevis share. One possible explanation for this transformation from sacred to secular is that aspects of the religious ritual were long ago infused into the folk music. Another explanation is that folk music has always been a ritualistic pillar of religion in Kurdish Alevi practice. A distinction between the secular and sacred may thus not be applicable to the music Alevis listen to and associate with their identity. The Alevi repertoire appears to have an inherent sacred status for Alevis regardless of their individual piety. Thus, the music plays a more significant role in presumed Alevi modes of living than any other religious symbol or practice associated with Alevism. The Alevi repertoire has become part of singing in public for financial or other benefits, and has survived in gatherings in which alcohol is consumed as well. For some Alevis, especially the elderly, cem ceremonies continue to hold social significance, while for others this religious gathering has no meaning. The music that elder generations are accustomed to hearing in cem ceremonies has now been recycled in secular contexts. Alevi religious repertoire has become part of the Turkish musical vernacular, and
listeners have ceased to associate the music with Alevis: thus, the music has become decontextualized from its Alevi ethos.

The categorical distinction between “sacred” and “secular or ethnic” music among Kurdish Alevis has become particularly problematic. Inspired by Martin Stokes’ work on *arabesk* in Turkey, I have coined the term “*alebesk*” to designate a musical genre in which the old Alevi musical ideas and taste, sacred or secular, are infused with the lyrical imagery and content of *arabesk* (Stokes 1989, 1992). This new secularized and popular genre was propagated among Alevi circles in the last two decades—first among immigrants in Germany and then in Turkey. The lyrical domain of this Alevi-*arabesk* hybrid genre draws on worldly expressions of belonging, loneliness, and other painful experiences common among immigrants, which are also articulated in *arabesk* songs. The viability of this genre stems from the strong support of those in Germany; most of its performers have gradually transported it back to Turkey. Such circumstances of exchanges are likely true for many genres and forms in the musical world of immigrants, and remain an imperative for the growing popularity of hybrid genres like *alebesk* among Kurdish and Alevis living in their second or third homelands. *Alebesk* and other folk tunes have begun to be perceived as the sole representatives of a culture belonging to a different time and place, even as the lyrics have no spiritual or ritualistic content. Sonic references to the religious repertoire, severed from its religious meanings, might be key factors for the many Alevis who embrace *alebesk*. The relatives of the Kurdish Alevi families I met in Cologne also love this music; they share many YouTube links, pointing to these songs on their Facebook pages with relatives dispersed throughout the world.

When audience members request a folk song they usually call it a *türkü* or if it is a pop song they call it a *şarkı*, whereas when they request an *alebesk* song, they usually ask for a *parça*
(piece), an unspecified reference to all genres. In some instances, I saw alebesk songs requested as türküs, which led me to believe that this genre is occupying a space in the folk music domain. After conceptualizing the name of the genre as alebesk, I asked the opinions of my sources including Shêxo, Ali Baran, and Ulaş Özdemir, who all agreed that alebesk is an informative title for the music that has become popular among Türkiye’li people.

Alebesk tunes have become among the most preferred songs in türkü bars and other kinds of gatherings. The sonic proximity of this repertoire to the türkü repertoire became more evident to me when I was asked for the first time to perform with a group in a türkü bar in Germany; my hesitation disappeared the moment the vocalist began singing. The musical framework and all aspects of the performance were identical with folk music that might have been performed, and often is, along with alebesk. This genre managed to appeal by capturing the experience of the people living in their second or third homeland. There are no significant sonic boundaries between religious repertoire, folk, and alebesk, especially for those living in their second or third homelands. Another quality of alebesk is the vocalists’ timbre, imitating the arabesk vocalists of the 1980s.

The appeal of alebesk among Kurdish Alevis does not necessarily minimize the significance of this genre among other Turks or Alevis as they are part of the same transnational space and the same social field in which the cultural entrepreneurs and political agents are active. This new second homelander aesthetic exemplified by alebesk features such qualities as: a) bağlama düzeni is dominating over the kara düzen, b) elktrosaz is not as common as it used to be, replaced by the bağlamas with pickups, c) dede sazi and a search for other forms of saz timisi (timbre) become more common practice, d) the classical guitar has become an even more dominant instrument than it used to be. Alebesk features elements of folk music or türkü,
arabesk, and popular music. Guitar chords and tablatures have become indispensable elements of compositions, recordings, and performance practices.

Most recognizable examples of alebesk genre belong to Kıvırcık Ali. The following song named “Isırgan Otu” (Stinging Nettle) is probably the most popular song about nostalgia for the village life, a direct critique of urban life in both Istanbul and Germany, thus the gurbet (the condition of living or working outside of hometown or homeland). Kıvırcık Ali was born in a small Alevi town in central Anatolia, and then migrated to Istanbul where he worked at low-paying jobs while learning how to play the saz from a music dershane in Istanbul. In fact, Kıvırcık Ali’s 2001 arrangement of “Isırgan Otu” musically inspired many of the arrangements of folk, pop, and protest albums released in Turkey. The same arrangement templates can be heard in many other alebesk albums. The lyrics, though not exclusive to alebesk, are about the problems of modernity, migration, being exiled, and urbanization.

The folk musical elements make these kinds of song hard to classify as arabesk, which is already an established genre with an Arab-inspired sound. Following are the lyrics of “Isırgan Otu,” which is available on the online music store iTunes under the category of pop music. This category can be interpreted as another sign of the popularity of the song as well as the unease of those who categorized this song under the folk music or other categories.
“İsırgan Otu,” lyrics and composition by Kıvırcık Ali (2001)

Yaylalara veda ettik, ve de dağlara
Yatağı yorganı alp, düştük yollara
Gülü çemeni değiştik, kör betonlara
Köyü düşündükçe anam, içim yanıyor
Yanıyor da ciger aney, yürek kanıyor

Burda dost bildiğin anam, İsırğan otu
Elini tuttu mu bil ki, elin yanıyor
Şeref ekmek bulamazken, şerefsiz budu
Götürdükçe ciger aney, içim yanıyor
Yanıyor da güzel anam, yürek kanıyor

We bid our farewell to the valleys and mountains.
We took our beds and sheets and hit the road.
We exchanged roses and grass for damn concrete.
My heart aches as I think about our village.
Oh mother, my heart is burning, it is bleeding.

Another famous example by Kıvırcık Ali called “Üçüncü Gurbet,” [The Third Gurbet]:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HLJQt6ejnTE
Here, those you thought your friends are stinging nettle.

As you touch them your hands burn.

While the honored remains hungry,

The dishonored eats chicken breast.

Oh mother, my heart is burning, it is bleeding.

The syllabic meter present in the lyrics affirms folk music or türkü, and to some extent Alevi background, lyrical and metric frameworks. This syllabic meter is a common one used in both Alevi poetry and 19th and 20th century Turkish folk and urban poetry. Each verse consists of a group of eight and a group of five syllables with a durak (breath or pause) in between. The name and the themes suggest a pastoral nostalgia shaping the social memory of the immigrants. The gaze is from the perspective of a visitor to a new place reporting to those who stayed in the old home or village. The metaphors are rural and full of nostalgia for the village and the values it entails. In his vocal delivery, Kivircik Ali uses local or “broken” Turkish versions of some phrases that I indicated in boldface. Grammatically incorrect Turkish or Kurdish lyrics and inappropriate application of syllables have been among the unmistakable features of this new aesthetic.
Figure 5.3. Staff notation of “İsırkan Otu,” lowered one and a half step to A. The B-flat2 is between B and B-flat.

The main melodic phrase is performed by the instruments including the mey (double-reed aerophone). The bağlama provides the downbeats with the şelpе (playing bağlama with bare hands) strokes as a sign of incorporation of the search for the new saz tınısı (see below). The bağlama opens the way to the vocals, which are throughout the piece accompanied by piano, classical guitar, and multiple bağlamas. The bağlama’s main function in this arrangement is to
provide the answers of the melodic phrases the vocalist sings as a call-and-response between the vocalist and the accompanying instrument. While Kıvırcık Ali is singing we hear accompanying piano, guitar, synthesizers, and bağlamas. The dede sazi and şelpe sound is invoked by the strokes of the downbeat in the interlude where most instruments join the unison performance. The chords of each stroke follow the following pattern:

![Figure 5.4. Bağlama “chords” marking the down beats.](image)

The downbeats of each melodic sentence are marked by the şelpe strokes providing a rhythmic framework marking the beginnings of measures. The rhythmic structure and the values of each cycle have been part of the same emotional qualities that those songs invoke: nostalgia for a time and place that do not exist anymore, an imaginary location. In the vocal repetitions and refrain, Kıvırcık Ali sings in octaves. He resorts to improving the emotional message and thickness of the vocal section, an ambiguous reference to the strained high register male vocals. This practice, I would argue, is an aesthetic remnant of essential compositional elements of arabesk songs (Stokes 1992). “İşırgan Otu” is one of the quintessential examples of the alebesk genre with its aesthetic features that exemplify frequently used melodic, harmonic, and arrangement qualities and techniques. Singing in the higher octave is part of breaking the monotony of the aesthetic understanding of the musical progression. When he sings the refrain, we hear the higher octaves accompanying the main vocal line while other instruments join the vocals in a unison fashion.
Featuring similar compositional and performance qualities with “İşirgan Otu,” Kıvırcık Ali’s “Yanımda Sen Olmayınca,” [“When You Are Not With Me”] is probably the most visible example of alebesk. As of January 21, 2013, more than 7.6 million people have viewed the link on YouTube. It features all aspects of the folk music with lyrics about modern problems stemming from migration. Ali’s vocal style resembles that of the late Ahmet Kaya (Chapter 3).

Historically, artists and musicians in their second or third homelands have been able to bend first-homeland aesthetic norms through their cultural and political acts. In some cases, artists have managed to create their own aesthetics, sending these back to the first homeland like cultural remittances (Flores 2009). For musicians, channels of such transactions include releasing albums in the first homeland, broadcasting music videos on satellite TV channels, sharing songs and videos on YouTube and other digital media, and performing in the first homeland. For musicians with Turkish or Kurdish roots living in their second homeland, some of these cultural remittances are articulated in once taboo or unexpected ways: writing lyrics that contain grammatical errors; inappropriate use of vocables, words, or sentences; and eclectic submerging of ideas within musical sentences.

The broken Turkish resulting from interaction with German and other languages in Germany is not the same broken Turkish spoken in regions where Kurds, Aleviis, or other minorities used to live. "Broken Turkish" may be another way to resist assimilation in both countries by not assimilating to the "proper" Istanbul dialect of Turkish. Some of alebesk

34 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TfHbykwLEJI
musicians and singers, who would like to "authenticate" their music, compose and sing songs with broken Turkish.

As Martin Stokes has observed, "Halk [folk music] and arabesk must be seen above all as different ways of talking about music, rather than different ways of performing or experiencing music" (Stokes 1992: 50). I would extend his observation to include the context of alebesk and halk/türkü. The form of this genre is identical with the türkü. The main issue, one could argue, has been what Harris Berger (2009) calls the stance of alebesk tunes that distinguishes them from others. The alebesk musical framework, taken from folk music melodies, follows a similar pattern in terms of its melodic trajectory. Usually there are two and sometimes three distinct sections, but in most cases (80%) the songs analyzed have two principle melodic sections with distinguishable themes. In some cases, major themes are either the same as the refrain or slightly modified versions of it.

One might speculate that the emergence and popular appeal of this aesthetic arises from a political reaction against first-homeland practices, such as an educational system that enforces Turkish-only regulations in public spaces. In opposition to this policy, musicians have perhaps expressed their outrage in any form they wished, disregarding the grammatically correct forms of singing in Turkish. One might think that the decades of national teaching of “Our Beautiful Turkish,” 35 emphasizing “correct” pronunciation of modern Turkish in all official radio or TV (TRT regulated) broadcasts, informed this new aesthetic. A more convincing explanation is that the new aesthetic results from changes in the daily language of practitioners, who have been

35 An official policy of forcing students of other mother tongues to speak “perfect Turkish” in order to assimilate them (Zeydanlıoğlu 2007, 2008).
using German along with their mother tongues. In the second homeland, assimilation has shaped their expressive aesthetic into a more German mode of articulation. Unorthodox use of language and music seems to be a common trait among the recordings of musicians who live in their second or third homelands. Good examples of this practice in the realm of Alevi music are found in the songs of the late Kıvırcık Ali, who in his lyrics expressed his dislike of “perfect Turkish.” One of the most prominent protagonists of the *alebesk* genre, Ali passed away at an early age while touring in Turkey.

Another popular example of the alebesk genre, for which I provided the notation above, is *Saçlarınızı Taramışın* (“You Combed Your Hair”) composed by Ozan Vural. The most popular version of it, also available on the iTunes online music store, is the one by Turgay Başyıyla, whose YouTube page of the song had more than two million views as of January 21, 2014. The inclusion of his song in the mainstream folk music scene in Turkey is a sign that this aesthetic has found its way through the musical world of the folk musicians in Turkey and Germany.

“*Saçlarınızı Taramışın*” (‘You Combed Your Hair’) (With guitar tablatures)

\[
\begin{align*}
Em & \quad Am \\
Saçlarınızı taramışın, & \quad \text{You combed your hair} \\
G & \quad D \\
San renge boyamışın, & \quad \text{Dyed it yellow} \\
Am & \quad G \\
Haberin varmiydi benden, & \quad \text{Have you ever noticed me?}
\end{align*}
\]
The arrangement begins with classical guitar and şelpe bağlama arpeggios, *bendir* (frame drum), and bass over a *duduk* (double-reed aerophone) solo improvised in a pre-composed manner. This kind of introduction with a reed instrument has become part of the folk music recordings made in both Istanbul and Cologne. The guitar tablatures are significant tools for the learning and performance processes of the music that is being produced in the German-Türkiye’li transnational space. The increasing appeal of the guitar in Turkey and Germany undoubtedly was influenced by its global appeal. The arpeggios provided both by the guitar and the bağlama are constant elements of this genre. Other melodic instruments follow similar patterns in a heterophonic manner. The *dede sazi* sound is more audible in the interlude, which is a repetition of the vocal melody. The syllabic meter of the lyrics follows those in Turkish folk tunes with a division of 4+4, which is one of the most common versions of the 8-syllable meter, also called
səkdizli hece ölçüsü. Examples similar to this one go back to older times in Turkish folk poetry. This form shows a strong affinity with the lyrical qualities of türkü with quatrain structures.

The artistic domain that musicians living in their second homeland have created and occupied has been fluid in terms of the cultural, social, and financial resources they have relied on. Support mechanisms in the second homeland have been unreliable in that the “formal” ways of making music, or even of being a musician, have been financially and culturally challenging, if not alienating, to these musicians. Experience of this fluid space and unreliable support has come with early exposure to the multiplicity of cultures and practices in the second homeland. These de facto musicians, therefore, have seized opportunities to bend first-homeland rules, boundaries, and borders of performing, creating, and reproducing. Those musicians might not have had the same status in Turkey. In the second homeland, with its political and economic agendas, they have felt comfortable and intrigued enough to make music in unorthodox ways that would be impossible, or at least unusually daring, in the first homeland. This does not mean that the music created in the second homeland has been completely unique or different from that of the first homeland, as musicians have not re-invented the wheel; however, it is significant that the second homeland has provided an adaptable space they might navigate more freely, which in many respects appears more complex than the first homeland’s cultural space. In many instances musicians have performed the same repertoire in their two worlds. It is telling that audiences have been prepared to understand what such musicians have provided and enjoy it as much as they have.

Most musicians I met for this study with roots in Turkey and/or Turkish Kurdistan have partaken into the creation of a political aesthetic, which at times resulted from a distaste for, and in some cases resistance to, the official or authorized modes of making and performing music,
thus for a policing of culture. This practice of resistance to orthodox music-making in an entirely
different environment from that of their country of origin could be viewed as a reaffirmation of
the failure of republican control over the aesthetic choices of its citizens. The government has
failed to convince the entire population of Turkey as it has sought to impose particular ways and
forms of playing, spelling, writing, articulation, and pronunciation.

The transnational networks and flow of people, and with them cultural forms, between
homelands has contributed to the appeal of the new aesthetic in the new homeland, and
eventually in the old. The acceptance of second homeland musicians’ aesthetic has gradually
created a space for appreciation in the first. This space has been negotiated and mediated
between the two homelands. The aesthetic cannot be excluded from the political in either
homeland, for political actors have functioned as harbingers or enablers in the process of this
transnational transaction. Such political influence may be seen in musical aspects and audience
attitudes, as discussed below.

Among the concepts that could be used in describing cultural production and
consumption in the second homeland are bricolage, syncretism, hybridity, and assimilation. In
examining Alevi music, one of the best concepts to describe the internal medley of musical form
and repertoire performed in türkü bars is that of the potpourri. Türkiye’li musicians have
acquired terminologies used by the TRT, which has been the dominant institution in musical
performance and education. Musical terms such as potpori have come from the terminology TRT
musicians and educators of the conservatories have used for decades. Türkü bar musicians
extend and modify the term potpori to include Kurdish songs with similar tempos and rhythms as
opposed to the TRT’s standardized repertoire of potporis.

Musicians and the attendees of türkü bars use the term potpori in reference to a musical
medley that is usually associated with juxtaposed dance tunes with similar rhythms and tempos. I believe that the concept of potpourri can capture the cultural approaches of the musicians and attendees alike in the second homeland. Thus, I extend the potpourri concept to all genres and tunes performed with minimal distinction made among them by the musicians, an egalitarian take on all of the songs from the first homeland. Performance of Kurdish, Turkish, and Alevi religious and other songs associated with various regions of Turkey where immigrants originate might be best described as a form of potpourri. Musicians creating potpourris would not claim to be doing something unique; instead, they aim to present as many examples as possible of songs from first homeland, in order to embrace each group or entity. When the türkü bar musicians perform a potpourri they combine songs with similar rhythmic features from different regions. Usually those medleys are more specific and short, playing four or five consecutive halay songs from different regions of the first homeland.

The metaphor of potpourri helps clarify the eclectic juxtaposition of “local” cultures from the first homeland with those of the second. The potpourri concept captures the transformation process and modes of cultural expression for many communities around the world. The juxtaposition of distinct and hyper-local cultural practices associated with the first homeland is an essential cultural move. Many songs are juxtaposed and performed non-stop, not only in the türkü bars and muhabbet gatherings, but also at weddings. The aesthetic of potpourri best manifests itself in türkü bars. Potpourris are not limited to one language; a Turkish song can be followed by a Kurdish song and vice versa. It is important to note that the earliest (and probably the only) venue where both Kurdish and Turkish tunes might be enjoyed by Turks and Kurds together has been in türkü bars. The relatively recent but significantly inclusionary spaces, in the form of türkü bars, have been crucial as they create a venue for gathering folks from all lifestyles.
and all parts of the first homeland.

5.6. Politics at Türkü Bars

Most türkü bars have background music played from jukeboxes filled with alebesk, the general türkü repertoire, and Turkish pop music. The most popular songs are those performed by musicians such as late Kazım Koyuncu, a Laz musician who released Laz folk music albums along with Turkish, and compilation albums such as Yedi Karanfil (Seven Cloves) and Türküler Sevdamız (Türküς Are Our Love), among others. The music of türkü bars illustrates ideological choices of owners and producers, based on profiles of the customers they serve. A band enjoyed by a particular person may constitute an identity marker she desires to associate with. Some politically active musicians or bands are either associated, or perceived to be associated, with certain political movements or parties active in Turkey and/or in Germany. Engagement with a musician or band entails strong political choices for the people I interviewed. An affinity to music groups like Kızılbayrak (Red Flag), Kutupyıldızı (Polaris), koms (Kurdish music groups), or individual Alevi musicians, in many cases goes beyond aesthetic listenership to signify a political identification with the parties with which those particular musicians or groups are associated. Even the musicians and groups who were able to transcend those barriers, like Şivan Perwer or Mahsuni Şerif, could not escape criticism from other political parties for their engagements with political issues.

Those who prefer listening to music in the Turkish and Kurdish languages come to türkü bars in order to enjoy, participate, and dance. I encountered almost no native German person at concerts that Kurdish Alevis organized or at türkü bars generally. Türkü bars are not exclusively for customers who drink alcohol, though almost all attendees do. In rare cases,
there have been pious Sunni or Alevi türkü lovers who drink non-alcoholic beverages, such as the energy drink Red Bull. Such pious customers have tended to hide their non-alcoholic beverages; I discovered their secret from interviews with owners. Meryem, the owner of a bar in Essen, said that some Muslims want to be viewed as socially integrated with their peers who drink alcohol. Such customers constitute less than five percent of türkü bar customers. In Germany, modern modes of socializing that include drinking alcohol have become normalized in immigrant life. Many perceive drinking alcohol as a daily social activity.

Most of those who attend prefer to listen to folk and other popular alebesk tunes, mostly in Turkish but also in Kurdish. A small Kurdish, Sunni Muslim group associates themselves with the ideological framework of multiculturalism and, at the same time, practices piety by not drinking alcohol when patronizing türkü bars. Thus, they manage to socialize with other Kurds and Turks with whom they share political and cultural interests and background. Türkü bars also represent a prominent place where they might, like others, listen to Turkish and Kurdish tunes and dance as they do at “authentic” weddings.

Active transnational political organizations have had a strong impact on the lives of immigrants from Turkey; however, in my excursions to türkü bars, I saw that Kurdish Alevis have gradually become more immune to the political directives of the organizations than they used to be. A possible explanation might be that, as many leftist organizations have demonized the bars, these venues have subsequently been spared the attention of the most active members of Marxist and Leninist organizations, as well as those who criticized owners for serving alcohol and providing “corrupt” spaces serving as “venues for prostitution.” Kurdish nationalists have also condemned alcoholic beverages, advocating instead a more sterilized Kurdish platform and space, far from "corrupt" Western forms of living. For example, I was told that a popular
Kurdish Alevi singer, who was supposed to perform, was so drunk he could not speak or hold his saz properly. I also heard things like, "these … were the main places for prostitution; they were selling Kurdish girls here.” My impression is that this image is changing and türkü bars are becoming more accepted as sites of social entertainment. Some bars held political affiliations that used to matter much more. Munzur Türkü Bar had a more Kurdish stance and nationalist Kurds preferred spending their weekend nights there, listening to a more Kurdish-intensive repertoire, that still included tunes in Turkish and other languages.

5.6.1. Melancholy and Intimacy in Second Homeland Türkü Bars: The Şark Odası Effect

People who spend hours at these places, mingling with their peers, friends, and family members, share recognizable traits that define their collective belonging to the immigrant community with origins in Turkey. Political and social transformation in the lives of my interviewees has become more visible through my theoretical inquiry into the collective intimacy these bars witness. The türkü bar, as I have seen it, is a unique place where gender tensions interconnect with both first and second homeland social and collective intimacies. For those who search for such intimacy, the location of türkü bars serves as a strong emotional reflection of second-homeland sociocultural changes in their current iteration. Customers in türkü bars, mostly between ages twenty and forty, know each other well. The place hosts their encounters with friends, peers, and relatives. Türkü bars also play a significant role as locations for dating and mating practices of young Turkish and/or Kurdish Alevis. Among my respondents, many highlighted the fact that they can find dates at the bar—or after, or at least spot potential dates while singing and dancing together. The türkü bar as a place to find possible mates recalls the village wedding, which, in its traditional form, served not only as the venue to entertain families
of the bride and groom, but was also where youths might find their future mates.

A few türkü bars had bouncers waiting outside, confirming that they had had security issues in the past. People get drunk and, just as at village weddings, a few drunken men begin to harass women while they dance, which happened a few times while I was there. The türkü bar, thus, is a stage for exhibiting masculinity, and gender roles are in play. Especially after 2:00am on crowded dance floors, there was almost constant fighting. It has become virtually impossible to avoid embarrassment of the insiders and a macho display in the bars, in which what Michael Herzfeld has termed “cultural intimacy” is at play. Herzfeld (1997) defines cultural intimacy as the aspects of a culture viewed as embarrassing vis-à-vis outsiders. These embarrassing actions and simultaneous attempts to conceal them constitute the pillar of cultural intimacy of Turkish-Kurdish-Anatolian immigrants, in both old and new homelands. From my observation, the friction and display of gendered tensions have been more prominent in the second homeland than in the first. The social auto-control mechanisms at play in the first homeland have virtually disappeared in the second, probably due to the dispersed structure of immigrant lives, which prevents them from building a critical mass that would activate first-homeland social controls. Such controls manifest as warnings by elder members or by collective suppression of the problematic behavior of drunken males of the community. The lack of such societal warnings and prevention mechanisms is also crucial in understanding “honor killings” in new homelands such as Germany or Sweden (Wikan 2008). These aspects of cultural intimacy deserve more scrutiny in future studies.

Türkü bars also witness social tensions and divisions among the audience members due to the political or social or cultural or economic factors. Those divisions can precipitate discussions and fights among the members of the audiences. In order for all to get along in that
space, some kind of balance needs to be achieved to allow for different ethnic, political, and religious identities to be represented, contested, and negotiated. Some members with Kurdish and Alevi backgrounds claim their identities, differences from, and similarities with the larger Türkiye’li population through articulation of the existence of Kurdish and Alevi music in order to be accepted by all Türkiye’lis in attendance. Other salient social, economic, and education divisions are being overlooked thanks to the music’s dominance and nostalgia mediated in “living rooms” of those people.

I also want to make the point that the main motive behind establishing türkü bars has been a commercial one. There has been an incentive for the owners and the musicians of those clubs to negotiate with the political and religious party members as they want to increase the number of people who attend their establishments. For example: once Alevi religious songs were part of a negotiation between the owners and musicians of türkü bars with the religious leaders. There are strict divisions between communities from Turkey, namely Kurds and Turks, especially in different locations.

5.7. Case Study: LeyLim Türkü Bar and the Performers of MyHosch

Meryem, the owner of the LeyLim Türkü Evi in Essen, invited me to meet musicians who play regularly at her bar. On the entrance of the türkü bar were pictures of patrons taken with owners, musicians, friends, and families. The weekly and monthly programs were posted outside, handwritten in Turkish. The bar is located close to the University of Essen campus, next to two erotic shops and a popular gay bar, but this location seems not to have bothered the ever-increasing number of customers. The hidden or underground nature of the place has not discouraged customers, either; instead, it has probably helped to conceal it from outsiders and
intruders who might alter the innocence and intimacy of the place and the music performed there.

The bar has standard bar tables. When I checked out the audio equipment, a mixer and a couple of amps, I found they were made primarily of cheap or secondhand devices. Interior lighting is quite dim in almost all türkü bars I visited, both in Germany and Turkey. The bars operate in venues previously run as bars or discothèques. Meryem had started another business, but apparently it had failed. The drinks listed are not cheap by German standards. The background music was consistent with typical türkü bars in Germany. The schedule of music at the bar was:

- Fridays: Grup MyHosch (Suat and Ferhat)
- Saturdays: Grup Leylo (some Saturdays Grup MyHosch takes the stage).

Once in a while, members of the local law enforcement came to check the noise level following complaints from local residents. This was not a common experience; the complaining neighbors called the police only on rare occasions. Since the bar owner had a noise and liquor license, she managed to deal with the disgruntled neighbors. The last time I talked to Meryem, in September 2011, she told me they had moved to a new space in Düsseldorf and are apparently quite happy with their new neighbors and customers.

Suat, the guitarist and vocalist of MyHosch, asked the other musician to reduce the volume, offered me a cigarette, and joked about the bar being a workplace, not a hangout, for him. Then Ferhat, the bağlama player and vocalist, joined us and the interview began. They both smoked cigarettes nonstop even though both would sing for hours into the night. Ferhat and Suat are both Alevi and Suat comes from a Kurdish Alevi family. I got the impression that they felt a little intimidated by my background and role as interviewer, as if I were going to judge their talent.
I tried to reassure them that what they do was my research topic, not how well they did, and that I respected their efforts and experiences. When I asked what was behind the name of the group, Ferhat told the story. One night they were drinking, like this, and were looking for a name. They decided on the Turkish *mayhoş* (sour, cool, strained), twisting it by replacing the Turkish *may* with the English *My*, and the Turkish *hoş* with *Hosch*, which has no meaning in German but the sound of *sch* is equivalent to the *ş* sound.

Suat is originally from Siverek, Urfa, but was raised in Mersin as an internal immigrant in Turkey, a typical experience for many Kurdish and Turkish musicians. He told me that he migrated to Germany from Turkey ten years ago. Ferhat has been in Germany for about twelve years. All band members and almost everybody speak in Turkish and all the dialogues and background discussions are in Turkish. He plays the bağlama while Suat plays the classical guitar. For a couple of days they had a drummer accompanying them. Suat said that the third musician, the rhythm player, would join them later. Both Suat and Ferhat complained about the business owners, who, for the most part, were not willing to pay more for "extra" musicians. The musicians are paid about 100 euros each per night, and owners of türkü bars are unwilling to pay an additional 100 euros. Suat said they were pushing the owners to allocate money for at least one other musician. Sometimes MyHosch includes a bass player. Sometimes for large gigs, he said, they had even a fourth musician, which made him smile.

Like many other türkü bar musicians, Suat complained that business and financial constraints overwhelmed the necessities of musical aesthetics. On many occasions, musicians were not paid enough to include more *renk* (color) instruments, drums, and in some cases even extra vocalists. He compared the conditions in Germany with the venues in Turkey, where four or five musicians might play onstage; here in Germany, he said, it was extremely hard to
convince owners to pay for an additional musician. It was better for musicians in Turkey, he claimed. Nevertheless they managed to convince Meryem to include a third musician on the payroll, at least at most gigs. In another bar where I conducted fieldwork, the Prestige Türkü Bar in Wuppertal, only two musicians were hired; one on the saz and the other on the organ, playing the *altyapı* (basis or frame) rhythm, and sometimes melodic instruments based on samples and synthesizers. *Altyapı* is a significant musical concept in Turkish music and pedagogy; in many cases, it comprises the rhythmic frame and melodic infrastructure, or both. Sometimes it provides the drones, or even the major part of the musical arrangement, on top of which one or more melodic instruments might be played. When MyHosch had the opportunity to include an organ player, they had him play similarly: *altyapı*, organ, and percussion, as well as sometimes color instruments. In the first phase of MyHosch, they had saz and guitar, both providing rhythm as well; therefore, they had no need for a rhythm player. Gradually they included new members. Their tenure at Ley Lim had lasted more than two years, since the inaugural day of the bar.

5.7.1. “*Değişmedik ama dönüşüyoruz*” (“We have not changed; we evolved”).

It is pertinent to compare and contrast the repertoire of the türkü bars in Istanbul with that in Cologne. The most significant differences lie in the non-musical aspects of the settings. More than the repertoire, the days and times of the music played in türkü bars are different. In Istanbul, which has clusters of türkü bars, one might go out every night of the week and choose from many options. In Cologne, however, customers can hear live music on only a few nights and at fewer bars. When immigrants in Germany manage to go out on weekends, they demand full-scale entertainment with music and dance for long hours, well into morning.
Suat insightfully remarked that, "I was criticizing other musicians playing popular tunes to appease the crowds, but then I realized that here people work at an exceptionally hard pace and our audiences deserve what they demand, not what we want." Thus, common practice for türkü bar musicians in Germany changed to accommodate the needs of audiences—their customers. Türkü bar musicians like Suat feel they should consider their customers’ requests when selecting repertoire. Therefore, the audience shapes almost the entire repertoire of the gigs with requests. At times, some members of the audience complain about song selection. I heard many musicians express their discomfort at not performing the music they prefer to play. Even so, it was difficult, they told me, to judge harshly people who could come out for entertainment only one night a week. Suat observed that insisting on performing repertoire musicians preferred hurt business, and that ultimately no one would hire musicians who would not satisfy audience requests. The bar owners want to sell alcohol and make money. Thus, shaping the repertoire of the türkü bar amounts to a business decision as much as an aesthetic one. The end product becomes a mere juxtaposition of songs that might satisfy customers from various backgrounds and expectations of their türkü bar night. Essentially, then, the choice of repertoire results in a potpourri.

In responding to audience requests, the members of MyHosch formerly had stricter rules, Suat said. He summarized his feelings and the stance of so many musician and non-musician immigrants alike when he remarked that “we have not changed, we evolved” (değişmedik ama dönüşüyoruz). Change in this case is distinct from the stable state of mind associated with evolution, which entails adaptation to the new conditions of the second homeland. Değişmek (to change) entails a more concrete rupture from a political stance, and it has historically had negative connotations, such as “to convert” or to lose one’s former character. Dönüşmek (to
evolve), on the other hand, concerns evolution, a more acceptable state of being from a leftist point of view. Dönüşmek also entails a more adaptive nature, such as that of musicians and immigrants, in which many constraints might complicate their lives unless they adapt to conditions by evolving. Thus, Suat, like other musicians, describes a mindset that has transformed certain qualities of their existence and beliefs while holding “core” values intact. In thus framing his condition, Suat tells others that he struggles to stick to his principles and core beliefs. By adapting to the conditions in Germany and in venues where his group performs, he claims that his musical aesthetic has evolved in order to incorporate, for example, the requests of customers.

LeyLim Türküevi, unlike the majority of türkü bars in Germany, is run by a woman. Meryem is a popular business owner—many musicians would prefer to be hired by her—as she takes good care of her employees. Her manner was easygoing and extremely helpful for my research. The group MyHosch was playing on Saturdays in Dortmund and Bochum, and once a month on Saturday, at Ley Lim. “This place is a free place and more comfortable for demokrat people,” as Suat put it, “Good people come here and we try to satisfy them.” Suat, like many other musicians I interviewed in both Germany and Turkey, uses leftist discourse, emblematic of the fact that musicians have adopted the language of the political groups they favor. The term demokrat is a generic word in the leftist vernacular used to describe mostly the leftist, liberal, socialist, and other democratic people in Turkey. Their use of leftist jargon, such as kitle (the masses, the people, or the crowd), was evident on many occasions, and, I believe, signifies that musicians see their audience through a leftist lens as, generally, musicians hail from leftist communities of Turkey. I observed in musicians and non-musicians alike the adoption of the leftist line, primarily in formulations and articulations of ordinary conversation. Musicians
constantly use the term *kitle* when they refer to their audience, just as the “enlightened activists” or “organic intellectuals” describe the masses that must be guided as *kitle*. Thus, this highly politicized group can hardly escape current terminology.

I eventually concluded that the configuration of repertoire and length of performance in türkü bars was very formulaic. Usually the program started around 10:30pm, depending on attendance. At the bars I attended, the formula below was more or less followed, with slight modifications. In Prestige and Ley Lim türkü bars, musicians started with türkü and *alebesk* songs, and then played fast-paced songs for line dances, followed by çifte telli or göbek dansı “belly dance”36 tunes to which people dance in traditional dance forms from Central and South Anatolia. The line-dance tunes were generally from the folk music repertoire of the TRT and some Kurdish folk tunes, whereas the *alebesk* comprised compositions with closer resemblance to türkü, albeit with lyrics similar to those of *arabesk*. The following diagram shows the timing and repertoire of the sessions, similar to those at weddings, with the exception of the emphasis on the *alebesk* repertoire at the beginning of each cycle.

A. 20 min (6-7 songs) – türkü and *alebesk*, Slow, Turkish, Bağlama, Drum Synthesizer.
   B. 30 min (5-6 songs) - halay-govend, Fast, Turkish and Kurdish, Instrumental and Vocal
   C. 15 min (4-5 songs) – göbek, “belly-dance” Tunes from Central and South Anatolia

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36 Çifte telli or göbek dansı can be used as a generic term for regional and some cases urban dances for couples or mix gender groups from Western, Central, and South Anatolia. In those dances, the dancers raise their both hands and snap their fingers while dancing through figures
After the initial performance program, different versions and combinations of this sequence
ensue, such as B-A-B-A-(C), and different permutations of these, until 6:00 in the morning. After
this basic starting pattern, musicians might pick various options regarding the order or length of
the sections. Depending on the enthusiasm of the audience and how much people dance onstage,
or sing along with the vocalists, the length and the order might vary. In certain cases, the
musicians refrain from taking a break in order that customers dancing onstage will keep doing
so. Some music groups use no predetermined sets whatsoever. When hired for türkü bars and
especially for weddings they usually perform tunes the family members who hired them prefer.
Other musicians have pre-composed sets they follow for each gig. A learning curve for
musicians concerns what tunes are requested by the attendees or owners. By responding to
audience requests as much as possible, and adding repertoire they themselves prefer, musicians
learn to both appeal to and negotiate with their audience so that both parties might be satisfied.

Responding to my question “what would you ideally like to play at türkü bars?” one
musician told me that he loved the folk music, what people actually listen to in their authentic
settings, which he thought could be done only in villages, not in those bars. One of the most
common notions articulated by musicians I interviewed was their attraction to the great folktunes
from each city of Anadolu (Anatolia), with its rich culture and music. Ferhat from MyHosch told
me his ideal would be a thoroughly “authentic” performance, but he was also pleased with
synthesizing the modern with the authentic as long as the source was “not destroyed.” If the kök
(root) was preserved, it was good enough for him.

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imitating birds like a partridge. Figuratively and contextually, those dances differ from what is
known and marketed as belly dance from the Arab world.
Most of the musicians I interviewed had not collaborated with German or other world-music musicians in Germany. Some had been invited to perform in local festivals for a broader, predominantly German audience. On certain occasions, such as the world music festival in Kemnade, where each year performers gather and enjoy music from around the world in a small town near Bochum, some of the musicians I spoke with performed as representatives of either Turkey or Kurdistan. Thus, it is safe to argue that these musicians have limited opportunities to reach German audiences. Given this limitation, they cannot make a living from performances alone. They also cannot rely solely on their music to make a living in Germany. Thus, the majority of musicians also have other jobs, most of which are fulltime. “I handle cases for a beverage company,” Suat said. Ferhat was working as a freelance wholesaler who finds cheap products for resale in Cologne and environs.

Many türkü bar musicians have had some formal musical training. Suat had taken a few private lessons at Gazi University in Ankara. He mentioned that he is now forty years old and wishes he could have attended more lessons, but it was not his “kısmet,” his fate or destiny. Ferhat had taken individual saz classes from an instructor from Turhal in Tokat for only one month. From there, he said, he practiced at home and improved his technique on his own. Ultimately, it is significant that these musicians try to fulfill their own artistic needs onstage, while also catering to their audiences’ wishes.

The text of the majority of songs covered and performed by the türkü bar musicians has been in Turkish, followed by Kurmanci, then Zazaki. The Alevi deyiş, almost exclusively in Turkish, are also among the indispensable tunes in the request repertoire. Group MyHosch generally refrain from playing and singing Alevi semah because they believe these to be sacred tunes, therefore not appropriate for the bar scene. Most of these musicians have either
direct or indirect ties with political parties in Turkey.

In general, there seems to be a natural selection process transpiring in repertoire in terms of shifts in audience demographics, as the music and repertoire gradually starts to eliminate certain groups of people with so-called *extreme* requests. Suat said that “we show our respect but we have our own lines we draw in the sand,” by which he meant they categorically refuse to play Turkish nationalist songs and *arabesk* tunes known to be sung by Turkish nationalists.

Suat also told me that he began playing music quite late. “I think we are the *hannals* (busboys or porters) of this music,” later adding, “those musicians are doing the groundwork for musicians who make a lot of money.” The busboy metaphor is poignant, as türkü bar musicians basically learn and play songs other popular musicians wrote or made popular. Most türkü bar musicians will not play even a single composition of their own. Thus, they comprise cover bands of the türkü repertoire. They keep such songs alive by repeatedly performing them upon request.

Later in my interview, Gökhan, the drummer of MyHosch, joined us. He plays a synthesizer drum machine. He had come from a “program,” where he played drum set. A “program” is an event such as the *Kızıldere’yi Anma* (Commemoration of the Kızıldere Massacre) and most of these musicians play on such “solidarity” nights. MyHosch, like many other türkü bar groups, did not need a sound check. The rhythm set was a brand new Roland drum kit, apparently a very compact instrument. In some concerts, Gökhan plays the Turkish *davul* (double-sided large membranophone). He also owns an acoustic drum set.

The songs were performed in keys such as D, E, B, and A, according to the range and timbre of the solo vocalists. Usually the groups decide to stick to one key when they perform, especially when they play in medley format. Suat and Ferhat’s pieces were primarily in D. When Ferhat sang, they transposed the saz with a capo to E, or sometimes G. Most türkü bar musicians
play the *bağlama düzeni*, the most common tuning system that is also associated with Alevi performance practice (Chapter 4). Musicians usually avoid the use of staff notation or notes of any sort; some vocalists carry booklets to recall lyrics. In some cases, poorly prepared musicians forget the lyrics and fumble on stage, but if the rhyming is correct, Suat said, no one seems to mind. Some musicians try to memorize the lyrics rather than reading from the booklets.

5.8. Sonic Diversity and Estrangement from the *Saz Tınışı* (Timbre)

Apparent on many albums of the last decade that türkü bar musicians have been listening is a pronounced search for the “soul” of the *bağlama* via distinct interpretations of its sound. Muting the instrument, adding or dropping various strings, or employing different sound effects, achieves a total shift in the arsenal of *bağlama* timbres of these albums. Is this a search for the authentic version of the *bağlama* sound, or a reaction against the sonic and emotional symbolism attached to its timbre? The sound of *bağlama* has long been associated with the traditional and local, or to put in another way the first homeland, aesthetic, which some of my informants called the “authentic” timbre. This sonic and emotional symbolism has been promoted by prominent Alevi musicians such as Arif Sağ and Musa Eroğlu in the last four or five decades (see Chapter 4). It is an important question that also relates to developments in amplification that provide multiple options for highlighting frequencies, tones, and timbres extracted from the *bağlama*.

On recent albums of many composers and arrangers, such as Barış Güney, Ulaş Özdemir, and Erol Mutlu, it is striking to hear multiple explorations of the sound of the *saz*. Until this recent shift, the most common saz timbre was associated with either one seven-stringed *bağlama* or a couple of them performed in unison. This “clear *bağlama* sound” has become more popular since the 1980s thanks to musicians like Arif Sağ. A “clear” 7-stringed *bağlama* with both *bam*
(thick) and *ince* (thin) strings sounding together has a powerful and thick timbre compared to those with six or three strings without the *bam* (Fig 5.5). Recent versions of the *dede sazi* and other *kısa sap* bağlamas, which are used more frequently for the *şelpe* technique as well, sound thinner than the bağlamas with seven strings. Below are three different courses (“old” vs. “new” versions) of strings from top to bottom for right-handed performers:

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[ ][ ][ ]
[ ][ ][ ]
[ ][ ][ ]
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Figure 5.5. Old (left) and new (middle and right) arrangements of strings used on the bağlama resulting in different timbers, *saz tınısı*.

In the search for newer timbres, players usually tend to use fingers instead of plectrums resulting in more arpeggios and softer timbres as opposed to the “traditional bağlama timbre.” One reason for this search might be that previously timbres were associated with particular political, social, or organizational identifications of performers or consumers. I argue that specific connotations of particular *saz* tunings on individual tracks map specific cultural codes. Thus, the coding of cultural, social, and political stances occurs, at least for some artists, in the timbres they choose to highlight or to hide. The use of *saz* in specific ways and in particular roles tells us much about the cultural cohort the musicians are catering to and are in turn fed by. Thus, the *dede sazi* timbre in this new iteration points to the fact that there is a shift in the aesthetic that musicians project in this new era more geared towards the search for a new sound, distinct from those “ancient” or “authentic” sounds, as sound engineer Ömer Avcı called them. In just this
particular instrument, so vital for some, are the contrasting forms and articulations of sounds. The function, timbre, arrangement styles, interaction with other instruments and vocals, frequencies, framing, and individual use of tapping, hands, and plectrum, among other variables, are all identifiers of the cultural cohort the individual musician seeks to please.

For other instruments used in Turkish and Kurdish music such issues become even more complex. In the past, the use of an instrument as the lead or melodic lead held particular cultural connotations that remain obscure to the public sphere. For instance, among some Alevis, the *ud* and *ney* used to, and to some extent still do, represent Sunni music, or at least the Ottoman or Arabic music their secular ideology reputedly rejects. It is still uncommon to hear individual instruments such as the *ney*, *ud*, or violin in arrangements of some Alevi musicians. Some Alevi musicians, and especially older ones, conveyed to me that this is because such arrangements are: 1) “not familiar to our audience,” 2) “not part of our music,” 3) “are Classical Ottoman instruments and have no place in Alevi music,” and 4) “I have not even thought that we can use them,” among other reasons.

A wholly separate kind of dissatisfaction and search for new sounds is also apparent, either in bending the timbre of the *bağlama*, adding functions in the arrangement, or adding instruments to imitate the sounds of the *bağlama* or other instruments. Therefore, *bağlama* has become an instrument that Alevis and non-Alevis alike experiment with in order to acquire new functions and timbres that fulfill specific needs of musicians in their arrangements and performances.

The introduction of the *elektrosaz* on the music scene in Turkey, and its prominent use among musicians, signifies much about the extent to which modern modes of entertainment and musical adaptation of new technology occurred in Turkey in the 1970s (Stokes 1992). I observed
stark differences between current uses of the *elektrosaz* in multiple settings and those of the early 1970s. Once the instrument of the pubs, nightclubs, and weddings, the *elektrosaz* has not been heard in türkü bars, as musicians had assumed it would be. As a loud and electromagnetically amplified instrument, the *elektrosaz* might easily have been played in türkü bars with its powerful sound. Instead, it is mainly heard at weddings. In türkü bars, where almost exclusively türkǘs are performed, most musicians I talked to reiterated their concerns about the necessity of conveying the türkǘ timbre, which they argued cannot be conveyed or expressed via the timbre of the *elektrosaz*. One might infer an aesthetic decision made by musicians and audiences in not including *elektrosaz* in türkǘ performances, at least not in the repertoire of Alevi-oriented tunes. Thus, the amplified saz with DI-box, clearly amplified by *eşik altı* (a built-in magnetic amplification), and otherwise difficult to hear, has remained the main melodic instrument of türkǘ bars. The timbre of *elektrosaz* is not welcome in most of the türkǘ bars and avoided by musicians playing there.

As seen in Appendix A, some *alebesk* songs are learned with guitar chords accompanying the main melody. These notations, in most cases downloaded from the Internet, provide the main pedagogical tool for learning to play the music at home, then in the bars. This pedagogical route is no different from folksong pedagogy. Folksongs, *alebesk*, and other popular songs are learned through this pedagogical approach. Using guitar chords is a newer phenomenon of learning and teaching folktunes and *alebesk* songs. This practice relates to the guitar pedagogy used among guitar students with a primary interest in popular and protest songs in Turkey. It began in the 1980s when music groups and individual musicians employed the guitar as an alternative to other melodic instruments, including the *saz* and the *ud*, for the main melodic and rhythmic accompanying instrument. A remarkable shift in instrumentation, the
prevalent use of the guitar exemplifies the modernization of music pedagogy, embodied in the rise of guitar accompaniment in the 1990s and 2000s, and disseminated with the help of new media tools. Starting from the inclusion of guitar in the music of individual songsters such as Selda Bağcan, it is not uncommon now to see guitars used by protest musicians.

In recent years, a new movement in the music scene catering to Kurdish Alevi communities suggests a revival of the use of the guitar. This resurrection is noteworthy in that its transformation of instrumentation coincides with an increased emphasis on neo-spiritual identifications of the musicians. In Chapter 6, I provide examples of the new imaginings of Alevism among young musicians who yearn for new forms of spirituality encountered in their second homeland.

This revival of the guitar in musical and aesthetic configurations does not come without changes. Its recent widespread inclusion in music of Kurdish and Alevi communities calls for more investigation. In particular, the latest albums of Metin and Kemal Kahraman, Ahmet Aslan, Mikail Aslan, and Hüseyin Koçgiri demonstrate a strong reliance on the guitar, not only as accompanying instrument within their arrangements, but also as a melodic instrument replacing the bağlama, whose timbre is no longer fashionable. Even in new albums, the styles of the older singers are sometimes imitated.

Maraş-born Alevi rock musician Kıraç is one of these recent musicians who adopted the guitar as a substitute for the bağlama in the 2000s. Kıraç, whose songs are played frequently in the türkü bars, has used the classical and electric guitar as both a rhythmic and a melodic instrument as he played both functions through imitating melodic movements of the bağlama. In
his Garbiyeli album, Kıraç has featured almost exclusive türkû repertoire on the guitar, which is
the mere instrument playing all of the melodic and rhythmic parts of those türkûs.

Musicians are also becoming more involved in creating older sounds with new instruments,
as seen in reproductions of nearly extinct instruments, such as the dede sazı, a trend my friend
Ulaş Özdemir has lately advocated. The dede sazı has yet to be utilized in türkû bars as it
represents a quasi-religious past and “a symbol of tradition that should not be used to make
money” at those bars, according to Suat. This does not mean that those bağlamas will not show
up in near future at those bars.

5.9. Conclusion

Türkü bars in Germany have several functions, from providing leisure and performance
spaces, to serving as virtual laboratories of longing and nostalgia where attendees exchange and
negotiate political, religious, and social attitudes and stances through their requests and acts. The
music and acts in the bars have become performative: not only expressing emotional states, but
creating states and tensions through reenactment of living rooms in the old homeland. The music
and the selection and construction of repertoire of second homeland musicians might usefully be
conceptualized as a potpourri of local forms previously performed by individual groups in
various settings such as weddings, solidarity nights, and, most prominently, türkû bars. A
distinguishable second homeland aesthetic is prevalent among musicians who do not subscribe to
the curated form of Turkish music and language, and who feel comfortable performing at venues
where they perform for bar attendees, as opposed to their audience, who have become

37 See Appendix for the pictures and Discography for albums.
consumers. Türkü bars are venues where the patrons have become consumers of the musical, spatial, and social practices based on an imagination of the first homeland.

In Chapter 6, I discuss further the neo-spiritual movements among the Kurdish Alevi musicians in their second homeland. The association of spirituality with folk tunes, in most cases türkü, forms another phenomenon that might constructively be dealt with in the framework of manipulating the aesthetic of Alevi musicality. Such a discussion might demonstrate that both the elder and younger generations of musicians and audiences embrace the spiritual undertaking of the Alevi sonic world for different ends.
Chapter 6: Music in the Integration of Kurdish Alevis in Secular Germany

6.1. Introduction

In Chapters 2 and 4, I looked at the Kurdish Alevi transnational space and its role in boundary maintenance through music. In this chapter, I discuss Kurdish Alevi lives within Germany in the context of integration into German society. I start with the locales of encounters between Germans and Turkish immigrants (most of whom are Sunni) and the music they consume. I argue that both Kurdish and Alevi identities and the music Kurdish Alevis have associated with each one have helped Kurdish Alevi community members in their journey of "becoming German."

I lay out the German context for the Kurdish Alevis in order to understand shifts in the music they have consumed in the last four decades. The music that Kurdish Alevis have enjoyed has been diversified by the addition of new repertoires and genres, initially from their fellow Turkish immigrants and then from their fellow Turkish Alevi immigrants. Those alterations are the result of a couple of important societal shifts within the immigrant communities in Germany as well as in the German government’s policies of managing the integration of immigrants. In that process, current discussions on Parallelgesellschaften (“parallel societies”) have shaped the debate on immigrants, mostly Muslim immigrants, and their problems of integration into German society. Paradoxically, Kurdish Alevis become more German by becoming Alevi and then by becoming Kurdish, in opposition to the Turkish and Muslim categories they have been assigned to by German scholars and politicians. As a result of hybridization and adaptation into German culture, which one might call integration, there has been a constant emergence of hybrid musical genres among the immigrants from Turkey, from alebesk (Chapter 5) to R ’nBesk (see below). For Kurdish youth, Kurdish rap has just recently been gaining momentum, a little bit later than
Turkish rap\textsuperscript{38} became popular among the youth. I have also observed that, like their German counterparts, Kurdish Alevi youth have been enjoying dance and \textit{DJ-Müzik} in dance halls since mid-2000s. Through the lens of musical changes, one can see that, by attending \textit{türkü} bars and dance halls, third generation Kurdish Alevi immigrants are more integrated into German life than their predecessors.

One of the main objectives of this chapter is to understand what their experiences in Germany have meant for Kurdish Alevis, who have gone through a formative process with respect to cultural citizenship in two areas. Members of this community have struggled against being identified as Turks, immigrants, and Muslims. At the same time, many of them have striven for certain modes of belonging and identities, including leftist, Alevi, and Kurdish. Music has been an integral part of this process. The formation history of the identities of Kurdish Alevis, an ethnic and religious "dual" minority, suggests that scholars should take a more nuanced approach towards understanding the multiple affiliations of members of minority immigrant communities. I aim to contribute to the debates around the cultural citizenship of immigrants and refugees from Turkey with a focus on particular aspects of the Kurdish-Alevi minority in Germany. To this end, I attend particularly to the literature on Alevi (Şahin 2001, Sökefeld 2008, Göner 2005, Özyürek 2009) and Kurds as diasporas and minority communities in Europe (Östergaard-Nielsen 2002, Wahlbeck 1999, Alinia 2004, Wikan 2008). Hence, this research aims to find a common ground between these formerly two separate strands of study.

\textsuperscript{38} Ayşe Çağlar has observed that the rap music that Turkish immigrants enjoy has become more commoditized and used to commercialize the “cultural differences” between immigrants and the Germans. The middle and older generations of Alevis listen to the radio, and song lyrics are
I distinguish two periods in the history of the Kurdish Alevi community in Germany. In the 1960s, the first generation of immigrants from Turkey went to Germany as guestworkers. They established networks based on family connections, places of origin, and kinship (Greve 2003). The second wave arrived in the late 1970s due to the political tensions that preceded the military coup d'état of 1980 in Turkey. Their networks were different from those of the first group; they were primarily identified with the leftist movements. The Germany they encountered was experiencing economic pressures and systematic disinvestment. While the first group was admitted as temporary guestworkers, the second group comprised refugees or asylum seekers.

Each form of entry into Germany had significant consequences for the group's way of relating to Germany. The music that both of these groups enjoyed at times was in alignment with the larger immigrant community from Turkey, and at other times was distinguished from it, as I discuss in Chapter 2. I argue that two major factors have affected the integration processes of Kurdish Alevis, or other immigrants from Turkey for that matter, in Germany: first, old homeland political alignments: and second, social and political opportunity structures in new homeland in Germany. Sökefeld (2003) argues that the Alevis in Germany were demanding equality while in Turkey, and then they began demanding the acceptance of their difference from the Sunni majority in Germany.

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limited to tunes with gurbet and other traditional themes. The new generation listens to rock, rap, pop, and arabesk (Çağlar 1998).
6.2. Kurdish Alevi Minority in Germany as Western Muslims

In this study, I approach the Kurdish-Alevi minority in Germany as one of the Muslim minority communities in Europe, as they have been labeled and treated as such by their neighbors and by the German government. The recent literature on the Muslim minority in Europe focuses mainly on cultural citizenship (Nuhoglu-Soysal 2000 and 1994, Bunzl 2005). Following scholars like Abdelkader Sinno (2012), I approach the Kurdish Alevi community in Germany as a Western Muslim community, even though many Kurdish Alevis might reject both Western and Muslim categories. Approaching Turkish or Kurdish immigrants in the West as Western Muslims helps us better understand their images and representations by the German public. Non-religious members of Muslim minorities are defined as “Muslims” by the media, by Muslim organizations, by religious leaders, and in the speeches of many politicians. Non-Muslim European politicians talk of “Muslims” in their countries nowadays more than of “Pakistanis” or “Turks.” (Sinno 2012: 166).

Although I occasionally generalize the policies of all branches of German government (including federal, state, and local institutions), there needs to be a certain level of differentiation. Many immigrants perceive those institutions as one body. I am aware that no one in practical terms deals with “the German government”; instead, they deal with some federal organizations or those of the municipalities or states. Kurdish Alevis who deal with governmental agencies, in one form or another, do not think all of those governmental institutions constitute the same “German government.” Multiple levels of engagement with the “German government” exist. As opposed to the strictly centralized Turkish nation state, the policies of which have been determined and implemented by the central government, Germany has multiple layers of governing bodies. There are significant differences in practice and rhetoric.
between local governmental agencies and the federal government, the head of which, Chancellor Angela Merkel, infamously claimed on October 16, 2010 that the multiculturalist experiment was a failure in the history of Germany.\footnote{http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11559451, accessed on Dec 11, 2011.}

More tolerant municipalities like that of Cologne or local boards like that of Keupstrasse in Cologne implement inclusive policies towards Muslims and Alevis. One important reason for this difference is that in cities like Cologne, where there are sizable immigrant communities, there is more engagement with the local government at all levels, which then improves the symbolic capital of the immigrants, most of whom are also German citizens (Haug, Müssig, and Stichs 2009). In cities where there is a significant immigrant population from Turkey, Alevis have a sizable constituency relative to the Sunnis; for example, as of January 2010, Cologne’s population with Turkish origin was 6.3 percent of as opposed to a 4 percent national average. Because of their numbers, immigrants from Turkey living in Cologne have more leverage than their fellows residing in other cities.

A recent study of Muslim minorities titled Muslim Life in Germany, conducted by the German Office of Immigration (2008-2009) and presented at the annual meeting of the German Conference on Islam, found that the group of Alevis from Turkey has a special position among Muslims, and that Alevi beliefs differ significantly from those of Orthodox Islam (Haug, Müssig, and Stichs 2009).\footnote{http://www.deutsche-islam-konferenz.de/, accessed on May 13, 2012.} Although some Muslims deny that Alevis are Muslim—a claim that is also shared by some Alevis—many consider themselves Muslims. If they are accepted as Alevi Muslims, then this group constitutes 13 percent of all Muslims in Germany, the second largest
religious group among immigrants after the Sunni Muslims. The total population of Alevis in Germany is estimated at between 480,000 and 552,000, almost all from Turkey. About three-quarters of the Alevis have personally experienced migration. Slightly more than half have German naturalized citizenship or they obtained it at birth.\textsuperscript{41} Sökefeld documents that the number of Alevis who have obtained German citizenship is disproportionately higher than the number of Sunni Turks who were granted citizenship in 2000. That number was 55.6 percent for Alevis compared with 37 percent for Sunni Muslims with ties to Turkey (Sökefeld 2003: 135-150).

Among the reasons for some immigrants not to become German citizens has been that they had to recuse their first homeland citizenship. There is no dual citizenship agreement between Germany and Turkey, which prevents many Turkish citizens who want to keep their Turkish citizenship from becoming German citizens. As Deutsche Welle recently reported, the German federal government will begin granting dual citizenship for a small group of German-born descendants of immigrant parents as a result of the coalition agreement between the Christian Democrats (CDU), their Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social Union (CSU), and

\textsuperscript{41} Since the new Nationality Act was signed into law on 1 January 2000, German citizenship has been acquired by birth not only by those born to German parents (principle of parentage, “jus sanguinis”) but also by those born in Germany to foreign parents (principle of territoriality, “jus soli”). Since this reform in the law, in accordance with the principle of territoriality such persons acquire German citizenship by act of law in addition to the foreign citizenship of their parents when one of their parents has lived in Germany for at least 8 years and possesses permanent residency (Nationality Act, Section 4 (3), sentence 1).
the Social Democrats (SPD). According to this recent agreement, the German-born citizens could become citizens of both Germany and Turkey provided that they were under the age of twenty-three, which was the age limit to accept the German citizenship and recuse their Turkish citizenship. Compared to the U.S immigration system allowing dual citizenship, lack of dual citizenship for immigrants from Turkey in Germany might have exacerbated the worries of immigrants in their new home country.

The average age of Alevis living in Germany is 33.2 years, which is higher than that of the Turks and other Muslims in Germany. More Alevis arrive in Germany on family reunification visas or as marriage partners than by other forms of entry. Nearly one in three was recruited as a guestworker. A significant number of Alevis in the same survey said that they came to Germany because of the risk of persecution in Turkey. The educational level is relatively low. Their employment rate is similar to that of all Muslims in Germany, though the Alevi male employment rate is higher than that of females; however, gender difference in employment rates, surveys indicate, is lower among Alevis than for all Muslim immigrants in Germany. The 2008-2009 study also suggests that, compared to all Muslim immigrants in Germany, Alevis are less religious. One in five Alevis reported being an unbeliever or agnostic. Not surprisingly, few Alevis observe religious services and rituals or prayers. Moreover, they rarely follow dietary laws or fast during Ramadan, and Alevi women usually do not wear headscarves. In summary, Alevi religiosity is less visible compared to that of other Muslims and, as a consequence, they are more readily accepted by German society and other faiths.

The Alevi communities' relatively “secular” lifestyle (exemplified by their lack of public display of religiosity as opposed to Sunni Muslims’ visible presence) was welcomed by German society, starting from the early years of migration and increasingly in the 1990s (Özyürek 2009). Alevis embraced a secular practice of life and demanded personal, social, and organizational rights more than their Sunni counterparts did in the 1980s and 1990s. For Alevis, struggles to educate the public about their religion as contrasted with Sunni Islam, to demand religious rights and religious education in public schools, and to form cemevis have become important enactments of secularism within the public domain in Germany.

In line with the findings of scholars like Kaya and Kentel (2005) among others, I observed that Alevis believe, and act accordingly, that compared to other Euro-Turks they have fewer integration problems. I also concur with the assessments of the scholars who have observed that freedom of religious expression in Germany has led the Alevi religion to be practiced, as many have attended religious ceremonies in Germany for the first time in their lives (Özyürek 2009). Another fact Kaya and Kentel pointed out was that the Alevis in Germany converted some churches into a cemevi as their religious space, which was given as the ultimate example of integration by one of Kaya's informants (Kaya and Kentel 2005: 145). One of my informants argued in the same vein that "Alevis are open to change compared to Sunni immigrants. Alevis can be viewed as natural-born Europeans compared to other Muslims."

While comparing two homelands for these immigrants and refugees, one of my informants told me, "in Germany we have many more opportunities that my people are not using." As an example, he said, "one person should not eat only Turkish food for his entire life, as we have so many other options here." The participation of this immigrant group in German cultural life is limited, though broader than that of Sunni Muslim Turkish immigrants, as most of
them do not go to cinemas, theaters, or music events and do not participate in local politics, even though they follow politics closely. The inherent cultural differences with Germans are not as significant as the lack of immigrant participation in the state apparatus, which demands certain responsibilities alongside the rights and privileges it provides. When asked who constitutes a foreigner or alien to a German, one of my informants said, "the person who doesn't pay their income tax is the foreigner." If you do not share the burden of the state with the rest of society, you are the alien; "you are the Fremde (foreigner)," according another respondent. Thus, one could argue that the whole idea of “parallel societies” would be irrelevant once those immigrants paid their income taxes and obeyed German modes and codes of living. This avoidance of German modes of living with certain responsibilities underlines the differences between the immigrant groups and ‘native Germans.’

6.3. A Musical History of Immigration from Turkey to Germany

Very little collaboration has taken place between German and Kurdish and/or Alevi musicians; thus the integration process cannot be scrutinized solely on the basis of concrete collaborations of musicians with a different cultural and historical upbringing. A limited number of collaborations have occurred, particularly in regard to political solidarity. Albums, rallies, and concerts have featured German musicians alongside Alevi and Kurdish ones. The participation of Turkish immigrants in the labor movement and other oppositional movements made them easy targets for coercive policies of the federal and local governments, as they were organized around labor unions such as the Federation of Workers from Turkey in Germany (ATIF, established in 1976). Compared to other Turkish organizations established later like the hometown associations and religious groups, German labor organizations are the longest running and most powerful
organizations with a popular immigrant membership (Çelik 2011). I observed from my interviews with many Kurdish Alevi among the first two generations of immigrants that the earlier integration process had started on the level of the proletarian consciousness that developed in the factories where immigrants worked with their fellow Germans as low-paid workers. The increased level of solidarity regarding integration is evident in the establishment history of the first workers' and solidarity organizations in the 1970s, which promoted an internationalist ideal from the beginning. Practical integration, it can be argued, began with these international organizations.

The integration process that began with proletarian solidarity was later in the 1980s and 90s transposed into the "social," "religious" or "cultural" milieu, especially among blue-collar workers from Turkey and elsewhere. During the early years of migration, immigrant workers had to work in hard conditions with lower salaries than their German counterparts, which could be considered the first phase of discrimination against immigrants. One of the most active organizations in the 2011 celebration was the ATIF, which organized events on different dates in different cities such as Duisburg, Hamburg, and Stuttgart (Chapter 3). The International Cultural Center (a sub-section of the ATIF dedicated to immigrants from Turkey) has members from among Turkish, Kurdish, Armenian, and Assyrian immigrants and refugees from Turkey.

For the Türkiye’li (people from Turkey) population, sharing public spaces with others has created a common esthetic in the new homeland. The following is a list of locations that Kurdish Alevi share with Germans and other immigrants; the music that was present in those venues is underlined:


A. Locations where Kurdish Alevi Interact with Germans:

**Airports** *(Relatives waiting for their guests to arrive or to bid farewell, especially in the terminals of Turkish Airlines, Onur Air, and Atlas Jet)*

**Public Offices** *(Schools, Municipalities, Federal Offices)*

**Türkiye’li-Owned Workplaces** *(Cellphone Stores, Imbiss (Diner), Cafes, Kiosks, and Restaurants)* *(Popular music from Turkey)*

B. Locations With Minimal Interaction with Germans:

**Cultural and Political Centers** *(Turkish and Kurdish protest music)*

**Dance Halls** *(DJ-Müzik, Turkish, Kurdish, and Western Popular Music)*

**Weddings** *(Turkish and Kurdish regional and dance tunes)*

**Türkü Bars** *(Alebesk, Alevi, Türkü, Kurdish, and popular Turkish)*

**Homes** *(Music in the form of muhabbet in Turkish and Kurdish)*

**Cemevi** *(Alevi in Turkish and Kurdish)*

Figure 6.1. List of primary locations in Germany and the music that can be heard

Among my informants, some perceive that strong walls that seem insurmountable were built over the last 40 years between their first homeland and their second- or third-homeland lives. As one of my informants in Bochum put it, "they [second homelanders] want both worlds; but for some there are barriers between those worlds that were built over decades." Among those
barriers, which could be interpreted as a local affirmation of the parallel societies narrative of some German scholars, are limited engagements with Germans. However, Alevis are more likely to have intermarriages than their Sunni counterparts from Turkey. The rate of intermarriages between Alevis and Germans has been higher than that of Sunni Muslims and Germans. In fact, a 2009 study shows that adult Alevis with immigrant background are married to Alevis with the rate of 56.1% as opposed to that of Sunnis with 81.4% Sunni spouses (Haug, Müssig, and Stichs 2009: 275). Shêxo, one of the most important sources of this study, was married to a German woman with whom he has a twenty-two years old daughter.

Kurdish Alevis and other immigrants from Turkey have similar kinds of lack of interaction with Germans, as they do not want to open their houses, cemevis, and other places that "Germans would never appreciate." One of my informants, Hatice, wanted to pursue a career in acting at a theater company in Cologne. When she got involved with the companies near the vicinity of Cologne, she applied to and was accepted by a couple of them. After several attempts, she decided that acting in the German language was not satisfying her. She claimed that she did not "feel" the words she was uttering. Feeling in another language and showing your feeling in another language is not easy, she said to me. It was impossible to express her feelings in German, even though she is fluent in German and has been a naturalized German citizen for 15 years. The emotional boundaries are real even for the diasporic experience; certain things cannot be expressed in diaspora in another language. Hatice feels a barrier of emotional exclusion, and she wants to act in Turkish, not German, but the Turkish theater companies around the Bochum area are not open and active; thus she is seriously considering returning to Turkey to take acting lessons in Istanbul. There will be other problems waiting for her in Istanbul regarding integration to the Turkish landscape and acting world.
The conversation started with her question, "Can a Turk or Kurd sing a German folksong as well as Germans do, with the same level of emotion?" She went on, "Can you translate a türkü into German and keep the same level of emotion?" The question seemed flawed at first, as there is no concept of türkü in German culture. The türkü is an Anatolian concept that has ties with Central and West Asia. The question is an important one nonetheless; it marks the limits of integration. There are certain boundaries that even the most integrated people will not be able to overcome. One of the many reasons for this is the endurance of certain emotional qualities that are inherited from the older generations via collective performances and other modes of transmission. The modes of learning and integration have limitations: the political and social baggage that comes with the immigrants to their second homeland. This liminal group has yet to leave behind their baggage of expressing emotions the only way they know how and appreciate singing in their own language, whether Turkish or Kurdish, but definitely not German.

I have been exposed many times to the discourse of dislocation that is sometimes given as a major excuse for failures in the adaptation or integration process. Their journey from the village all the way to the suburbs of Cologne, by way of Istanbul, was a difficult trip, which exacerbated the disorientation that the immigrants experienced. Aside from the unwillingness of German society to accept the differences among all citizens and residents, there are some immigrants who do not want to integrate, which makes it harder to reconcile the differences. The unwillingness of some immigrants to participate in German society is a result of the strength of the social, political, and cultural organizations' interests and ties to Turkey. Compared to older interviewees, my younger informants have greater access to and interest in new German imagery, with successful role models among immigrants from Turkey such as Fatih Akin (winner of a Golden Bear for Best Director at Berlin Film Festival, the most prestigious movie
award) or Mesut Özil (one of the best soccer players in Germany). Maybe the unwillingness or stillness can also be interpreted as part of a claim-making process.

My research on the music albums consumed by Kurdish Alevis since the 1980s identified four major cultural cohorts with respect to musical repertoires. I call the first cohort the traditionalists. Their music is characterized by "longing and belonging" (Greve 2003) for a time and place where Kurdish Alevis shared the same musical repertoire as many of their fellow first-generation guestworkers from Turkey. In the traditionalist cohort, diaspora musicians have continued to play the music they were accustomed to in Turkey. Contemporaneous with the first, the second cohort reflects the leftist movements in Turkey. Many Kurdish Alevis were members of these groups in Turkey and retain ties to them. The lyrics and musical forms and sources of their songs were appropriated from their Turkish leftist counterparts. The third cohort evolved in the mid-1980s, when the Kurdish nationalist movement was influential among Kurdish Alevis. The fourth cohort reflects the era of Alevi revival since the late 1980s, which was embraced by all Alevis (Sökefeld 2008). Kurdish Alevi individuals do not necessarily belong to only one cohort; as they engage with others their stances and degrees of membership in each cohort may change along the way. In the last five decades of migration from Turkey to Germany, the major change in the music immigrants have consumed and produced happened in the transition from the gurbet-based themes of the 1960s and 1970s to more complex, urban, challenging, and hybrid genres, as immigrants from Turkey including Kurdish Alevis have gradually felt more comfortable with the fact of living in Germany and more confident about their place there.

The earliest immigrants from Turkey arrived as temporary workers. As Greve (2003) points out, they had enormous language problems in their communications with Germans, and work conditions were unbearable for so many that they found refuge in sad folk tunes.
“Adventure, at first, for so many immigrants turned into a disappointment.” Greve points out (2003). As he argues, the initial songs of migration (mostly in türkü form) were almost exclusively about hasret, longing, a strong emotional state that is about yearning for family and friends in the first homeland. Those songs were about the people who yearn to return to their homeland and who miss their soil and family. The first examples of these türküs were those of Yüksel Özkasap, who is originally from the city of Malatya. An iconic example from this period is the song “Nasıl Oldu Yolum Düştü Kölün’e?” (“What Went Wrong That I Ended up in Cologne?”) that made her famous as the “Nightingale of Cologne.” Her numerous songs about migration, hasret, yearning, longing, and pain in Germany are emblematic of this period’s emotional world.

“Nasıl Oldu Yolum Düştü Kölün’e?” [“What Went Wrong That I Ended up in Cologne?”]  

Ne mektubun gelir ne de selamın, Neither your letters nor your greetings arrived,  
Hasret kaldım bizim evin güline. I am longing for the rose of our home.  
Gözleri görmüyor anamın, My mother lost her eyesight,  
Nasıl oldu yolum düştü Kölün’e What went wrong that I ended up in Cologne?  

Bir Alman kızına gönlümü verdim, I fell in love with a German girl,  
Bir sarışın mavi gözülü geline. A blond bride with blue eyes.  

43 http://www.trt.net.tr/televizyon/detay.aspx?pid=31737
Ayhan Kaya, who has written extensively on the migration and music of Euro-Turks in Germany, points to historically significant examples of hybrid forms early on during the immigration period. An iconic example of this kind of hybrid form, combining both the fantezi müzik style and traditional folk narrative style, is the music of Derdiyoklar, whose album titled Disko Folk became the name of a genre (see Appendix for three YouTube links of Derdiyoklar’s music). Fantezi müzik is an iteration of the arabesk genre, which is sometimes used interchangeably by lay people to refer to the “more modern” and “more hybridized” version of arabesk. After that period, as Kaya points out, protest music before and after the military coup d’état in the 1980s became popular among the highly politicized segments of the immigrant population.

It might be relevant here to quote from the liner notes of the re-issued 1979 LP called Disko Folk: “Anadolu pop doesn't get weirder than this! Back in 1979, two Turkish guys armed with electro-saz, guitar, drums and synthesizers were hitting the Turkish market in Germany where they lived, playing their sets of traditional-flavored electro-folk in weddings and circumcision feasts for Turkish emigrants in Germany. That's their crazy story, and that's their crazy sound.”
The 1990s in Germany witnessed a diversification in the music created for and consumed by the immigrants. Along with traditional forms, during this period hip-hop became an important vehicle for second- and third-generation immigrants to express their frustration with the “German society” that looked down on them, discriminated against them, and excluded them from the mainstream. Hip-hop provided a space for the youth to express problems stemming from the class differences that they were exposed to along with the racialized separation from German life (Kaya 2000). The youth had problems not only with German society but also with the traditional societal norms of their family members. Their songs foregrounded their working-class struggle with the other problems they had with their family and traditional lifestyles (Nuhoğlu-Soysal 2000). Youth of the second and third generations engaged with hip-hop and rap through graffiti in subaltern spaces.

The emergence of satellite TV in the 1990s changed the means of communication between those who live in two lands. Greve argues that the most significant change in the lives and transnational networks has been the emergence of satellite TV and then cable TV among immigrants. The TRT-international broadcast, the first from Turkey, provided an opportunity for immigrants to watch live news and other programs. This development is responsible for most of the transnational relations and changes in the two homelands by improving the “Imagined Turkey” in the minds of immigrants (Greve 2002).

In the documentary *Uzaktaki Şarkılar* (Distant Songs), directed by Pelin Asal and produced by the TRT in 2013, a Turkish-born German musician, Sema Mutlu, says that when she first started performing music, her German producers and friends always emphasized her
Turkish origin instead of her music, which made her feel as if she was trying to stay in-between two chairs in a balanced way.⁴⁵ The two chairs represent two identities or backgrounds that she tries to maintain. Ultimately, she says, “instead of staying between two chairs she says she sits on two treasures.” In an interview I conducted with her when she was in New York in 2010, famous Berlin-based DJ İpek İpekçioğlu told me that the new generation of immigrant musicians are trying to make music to gain acceptance among their German peers as well as their fellow immigrants. She went on, “he makes music that could change according to the needs of the environment where he has been. He would like to appeal to the world audience by singing in English or German or Turkish or sometimes all three languages in the same songs.” For the new generation it is significant that they speak perfect German, and “even dream in German,” as one of my informants reminded me. Raised as German and keeping the Turkish spirit in them all the while, they still feel the music of their families’ sonic codes, melodies, and musical framework.

In the 2000s, as immigrants from Turkey increasingly embraced Germany as their homeland, there has been a decline in the presence of rap and hip-hop within the immigrant community. Kaya argues that this period has been about the emergence of hybrid styles in the forms of fantezi müzik. One of the most recent hybrid genres, with German lyrics, melodies inspired by folk and popular music from Turkey as well as Rhythm and Blues, and arrangements informed by the arabesk genre, has been “R’nBesk,” a name coined by producers and marketers in Germany.

Muhabbet is the most popular singer of R’nBesk. For the first time with R’nBesk, Germans could listen to and understand the music of their fellow immigrants from Turkey, with melodies from *arabesk* and lyrics intelligible to them, with meanings attached to the emotional state of immigrant youth.

“Du hast geschworen,” (‘You Gave Your Word’) Muhabbet’s 2007 album *R’nBesk In Deinen Strassen (In Your Streets)*

I begged you a thousand times,
This is not a good route to take.
Here, many people know your parents
When they see us we will run away
Schau nach links Schau nach rechts
Schau nicht zurück Blick mit mir nach vorn.
glaub mir süße was ich weiß
wir bleiben in ihren Augen nur ein Dorn.
Sie begegnen uns nur mit Zorn
denn sie haben noch was
wir haben auf Liebe geschworen.

... 

Though I have no information about the size of its German audience, it is one of the first steps from the immigrant community from Turkey toward German-language music. Though it is not the first hybrid genre, it is significant that the German audience can understand the meaning of those “sad songs” for the first time.

6.3.1. Kurdish Alevi Youth and DJ-Müzik

My aim in this section is to explain social practices regarding Kurdish Alevi integration into German society through music, laying out the details of integration, and giving some recent examples of adaptation to the German modes of entertainment by the younger generation among the Kurdish Alevi communities, especially in the form of DJ-Müzik (see below). Kurdish Alevis, like other immigrants from Turkey, rarely go to German popular music events, let alone concerts of classical music. As my informant Metin Kalaç, a producer and sound engineer for Hunerkom

46 The URL for his most popular song on YouTube “Du hast geschworen” (“You Gave Your Word”) can be reached at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XNhMILTtG4Q
Music Production based in Cologne, told me, musicians are no exception to this fact. Musicians and some of my other informants never criticized, nor saw any problem with, their ignorance regarding classical and popular music events in Cologne.

One visible sign of the music that Kurdish Alevi youth enjoy is what multiple informants of mine called “DJ-Müzik,” which can be described as dance hall playlists combining popular dance songs from the West with some local or traditional songs in Kurdish or Turkish, along with instrumental dance tracks (see Appendix for YouTube links of DJ-Müzik). If one looks at the music of the DJ culture at the venues I visited, one cannot distinguish those youth from their Turkish counterparts or other immigrant friends. The youth spend their days with Germans in limited spaces and places. Moreover, the youth are engaged more with German life than with their own immigrant communities when it comes to participating in cultural activities. In most instances, they have friends among immigrant and lower-class German young people. My informants told me that lower-class Germans like to hang out at DJ parties and discotheques. Those entertainment forms are common in this part of the world, shared especially by the lower class. Stating the fact that Germans go regularly to classical music concerts, operas, and ballets, one of my young informants put it, “but in our society it is totally DJ-Müzik, çepki (recently popularized Kurdish line dance form), halay (generic name for the Turkish line dances), and türkü bars.”
Compared to its Turkish equivalent’s recent decline in popularity, Kurdish rap has recently become more popular among the Kurdish Alevi youth that I interviewed. Concurrent with this development is that these youth participate more in German popular culture as they become increasingly consume German as well as Turkish and Kurdish traditional and non-traditional music. One of my young informants told me that his parents listen to “old music” or “traditional music” at home. “My parents respected our traditional music so much,” he went on, “because they find camaraderie with those songs that they share with their fellow first generation immigrants. They cry to the same song” (personal communication with Roni Azad Altay, 18, born in Cologne, Summer 2010).

In an interview he gave to Kurdish journalist Mehmet Aslanoğlu, Kurdish rapper Serhado argues that hip-hop is the music of struggle. Born in 1984 in Sweden, Serhado is a second-generation immigrant whose parents settled in Sweden in early 1970s. He creates music with politically motivated lyrics calling on Kurds to unite. As I argued earlier, Kurdish hip-hop lagged
in popularity among youth in the second and third homelands. One reason is that Kurdish hip-hop lacked the institutional push and support Turkish hip-hop had, which led to a delay until pro-Kurdish production companies realized its potential and growing popularity among Kurdish youth. Those pro-Kurdish production companies were losing their audience to their Turkish or other counterparts (Solomon 2012).

It is vital to point to the difficulties that Kurdish Alevi immigrants from Turkey have gone through in Germany regarding the transmission of values, norms, and identities from one generation to the next. Limited and inefficient transmission stems from the fact that the first generation comes from an uneducated and rural background; the only thing they could bring to the table was their life experience, which was limited to the village life they brought as blue-collar workers. As my most important informant, Shêxo, puts it,

The previous generation did not provide a solid ground. The previous generation’s reasons for being here were clear and crisp, and limited. Their presence has been not problematic as they were supposed to be leaving by then. For a very short period of time and just to make a little bit of money, and then their return ticket was deferred and deferred. Thus there was a cultural genocide (kültür katliami) in the process of this delay and uncertainty. (personal communication)

The new generation has grown up without "cultural anchors" they can rely on in their quest to find their identities or affiliations, as opposed to the first generation of immigrants who cling to their past in the search for their own identities. Having spent their formative years in the first homeland, their search for "self" became less urgent for the first generation in Germany.
especially when compared to the second and third generations. Since they arrived as temporary guest workers anyway, they had less appetite to adapt to German culture compared to the second generation. The third generation, born in Germany, is "struggling, vacillating, and stumbling," according to one of my respondents, a man in his early twenties who included himself in the same category. The new generation's affinity with *DJ-Müzik, çepki* and *halay* dance parties, and *türkü* bars is no coincidence. It is a result of the search for the "self," which, in many cases, takes place in those safe venues where the inescapable search for belonging becomes less painful among friends or relatives, where they feel more comfortable by not losing contact with the sonic references mediated in “those ‘Germanized’ but comfortable places” (personal communication with nineteen-year old Kemal Alim from Bochum). In those collective spaces, they could share the burden of the search for belonging and form new associations with their fellow second-generation friends with the same historical ties. They dance together with the people they want to feel close to.

The language of the songs that the new generation has on their iPods is usually English, not Turkish or Kurdish. The young generation is unfamiliar with classical Turkish music, which is another significant point that could be explored further. The new generation is not happy with the genres that their parents rejected such as Turkish classical music, but they also cannot exhibit a close affinity with the genres their parents liked such as *türkü*. The tunes that the parents excluded, or at least dismissed, are not on the playlists of the young generation.

Finally, I observed that the identity question for the Kurdish Alevi young generation becomes more germane because in their daily lives they interact more with Germans who demand specific identities from their peers and friends. The young immigrant generation feels more inclined to show some cultural signifiers and symbols, such as wearing T-shirts of Che
Guevara, an idol among the resistance movements, or wearing the necklace of Zülfikar, the sword of Ali. I have not seen older Alevis wearing any object like the necklace of Zülfikar, though in the corner of the şark odası in their living rooms they might keep objects reminding them of the homeland.

Figure 6.4. Kurdish Alevi Youth wearing Che T-shirts (left) & Zülfikar necklace (right) in Cologne in 2011.

The Kurdish Alevi youth want to show their differences from other Muslims or Turks in public by communicating with those symbols.

One of the most significant observations I made with respect to the young generation of Kurdish Alevis is that they communicate with older generations through those symbols. Almost no direct communication occurs between the two generations about how to transmit cultural and social values. As they have been engaged with German modes of living, the regular means for communication such as music, stories, and poetry have gradually weakened. Through those
objects and symbols, the young generation attempts to communicate with the elderly generation with the only means they have. They pick the most obvious choices that could fit well with their household identity, such as Zülfikar and the depictions of other politically or historically significant figures.

6.4. Integration Debates and Western Muslims in Germany

The challenges Kurdish Alevi youth face in their integration into German society need to be understood in the context of public debates surrounding how they were located in the public sphere. Current public debates on Muslim immigrant communities in Germany have been shaped around the discourse of *Parallelgesellschaften* (parallel societies), meaning communities living next to mainstream German society and its so-called mainstream culture or *Leitkultur* (Tibi 2002; Ceylan 2006). The concept of *Leitkultur* emphasizes the values that all Germans must share, like those core values that immigrants must know and embrace to pass the German citizenship test. However, the term is problematic in its assumption that there are clear “mainstream German values and culture” that are not subject to change. Bassam Tibi, who coined the term *Leitkultur* in 2002, assumes that German society, and other European societies for that matter, is secular while Muslim minorities evolve around that secular core as parallel societies (Tibi 2002). In his view, the one mainstream culture and many parallel cultures coexist, providing contexts for resisting assimilation to the mainstream culture. This discourse spread from academia and political circles to the general population, members of which then used it to stigmatize other communities. The discourse of parallel societies seems to be internalized even by some of my respondents. Shêxo spoke of parallel societies multiple times in our conversations, referring to the Sunni Muslims living in Germany who live parallel lives isolated from their German
neighbors.

The parallel societies narrative against certain Muslim groups implicates some Kurdish and Turkish immigrants who have yet to be integrated into “German society.” As one of the supposedly relatively well integrated and accepted communities, Alevi in general, and Kurdish Alevi in particular (Kaya and Kentel 2005), have experienced rigorous secularization processes rendering them more sensitive and open to modern and/or cosmopolitan values and aesthetics (Stokes 1994, van Bruinessen 1992, 1997; Gezik 2012; Shankland 2003, Gürdal Aksoy 2006).

However, the discourse of parallel societies within "German society" is problematic in major ways. I observed that many members of the Kurdish Alevi community strongly believe and demonstrate that they are integrated into German public life, more than other immigrants from Turkey; by becoming Alevi, they become German (Chapter 4). Yet in certain other ways they remain “parallel.” For example, they usually do not listen to the same music as their German neighbors and friends. The discourse of parallel societies therefore complicates the actual integration process by failing to offer any clear-cut recommendations for how to approach different immigrant communities about the possibilities of integration. All immigrants I have conversed with reminded me that they have strong roots in their second homeland that would prevent them from "packing up and leaving." Within the politics of recognition, they are searching for members of communities who can mobilize with them to convince German society and its institutions to accept them as they are.

First-generation Muslim immigrants with problems concerning their participation in modern German society and those with less education in Germany find their religious otherness exacerbated by socioeconomic marginality because of a vicious circle of decreasing levels of opportunity. José Casanova (2006) argues that Muslim immigrants in Europe have entered a
second homeland of low religiosity and limited religious diversity. In this uniquely secularist context, the decline of religion, as Casanova argues, is seen as normal, progressive, and modern, while serious religiosity per se and Muslim religiosity in particular are widely viewed as reactionary, fundamentalist, and anti-modern (Casanova 2006, see also Brubaker 2013).

European populations that had previously been identified and labeled using national, demographic, legal, or racial categories have been increasingly identified and labeled in religious terms. In part, as in the UK, this reflects a movement of self-identification, a deliberate assertion and embracing of Muslim identity as an alternative to other frameworks of identification. But it mainly reflects a top-down discursive shift in the categorization of others, regardless of how the categorized populations identify themselves.47

The dynamics of urban marginality and inequality do not turn primarily on religion, but on other forms of social closure and marginalization. Grouping immigrant populations under a religious rubric is, as Brubaker (2013) argues, potentially distracting and misleading. In that sense, the tensions surrounding the Muslim immigrants' integration process may actually be overlooked and be reduced to "cultural differences" by politicians like Thilo Sarrazin, who has criticized Turkish and other Muslim immigrants in Germany for not being willing to integrate

47 Casanova (2006) argues that globalization influences the formation and transformation of the boundaries between religious communities, members of which self-identify as distinct from other groups. Anthropologist John Bowen (2012) argues that in an era of the globalization, religious identifications "create and imply the existence and legitimacy of a global public space," which cannot be reduced to a dimension of migration or of transnational religious movements. He goes on to examine the ways that Islam is reinterpreted in the diaspora. Mandaville (2001) presents a detailed picture of changing Muslim subjectivities in the diaspora (2001). Recent studies on contemporary migrant experiences focus on the ways Muslim identities and subjectivities are constructed in relation to different places and communities (Göle and Schäfer 2008, Gökarkin 2009).
into German society (Sarrazin 2010). Another example of this cultural difference dilemma resurfaced when a Cologne court deemed circumcision as unconstitutional on 26 June 2012. As for Jews and Muslims, circumcision has been a significant social and cultural practice for the Alevi, who traditionally celebrate circumcisions with large festivities. I believe that those politicians and commentators miss the underlying political, social, and economic accommodation problems that migrants face, leading them to label the actual social differences as merely cultural; this is clearly explained by Mahmood Mamdani in his critique of “culture talk” (2002), in which all historically contentious issues are explained by cultural differences, overlooking the underlying political, social, and economic factors.

Immigrants and politicians alike have approached integration into German society by re-essentializing the Muslim parallel societies narrative, which has meant adding a second sentence in Kurdish Alevi’s daily encounters with Germans. Right after telling where they are from, e.g. Turkey, they go on by consciously pointing out their differences from Sunni Turks, adding their Kurdish and/or Alevi identities and backgrounds. As Nancy Foner and Richard Alba (2008) argue, religion is treated as a barrier rather than a bridge when it comes to models of integration, particularly in Europe. Justin Gest, in Apart: Alienated and Engaged Muslims in the West, argues that young Muslim immigrants may be more accurately thought of as hybrids that connect multiple sociopolitical attributes across different identity forms that may not necessarily conform to each other (Gest 2010:100).

The German government has increasingly had to deal with the representatives of the religious communities. Bowen (2012) observes that religious representations have become more visible markers of separation for the members of any religious community than they were a couple of decades ago. This rise in the religious representation and public visibility of religion
has resulted in religious organizations overpowering or dominating previous political alignments. Therefore, in my current research in Germany I observed a competition between the religious organizations and the political parties from Turkey and Germany, trying to convince the new generation to join their struggle. As post-9-11 era security policies have dominated policies toward citizenship and individual citizens, German policies have created new problems for the nation’s Sunni Muslim immigrant population. Immigrants, as many Germans have seen them, will remain as immigrants, not fully accepted as Germans. Gest argues that, as more engaged members of the society, the second and third generation young Western Muslims are not only treated as somewhat apart from other immigrant communities, there is also a tendency to “trap” in the immigrant frame people who have actually been outside of it for one or more generations (Gest 2012: 191). This framework has been mentioned a couple of times in my research as some Türkiye’lis have raised concerns about the future of their place in their new homeland.

6.4.1. Integration of Immigrants from Turkey in Germany

Interviews I conducted, especially with elderly informants, suggest that problems of integration for the immigrant communities usually stem from the actions and discourses of all societies involved. Sixty-five -year old Hasan Kartal told me "it was a collective fault, going beyond the responsibilities of the German government, it was the fault of the immigrants who never pay taxes, and it was the society's fault leaving room for neo-Nazis to survive among many others." I attended several multicultural or integration-oriented events, which were putatively designed for Germans who were present to remind everyone that Turks and Kurds are indeed still immigrants (see Chapter 3). As Shêxo told me once, “in its immigration discourse, some of the workers of German local and federal governments are still not willing to let those immigrants
forget their status as immigrants even though they might have been born in Germany and have German citizenship and a passport.” Even for second- and third-generation professionals, it is always significant for the German federal governmental officials, especially in public discourse, those people are and probably will remain immigrants, even though they have invested in their new homeland much more than they have done in their first. Even the most peaceful and multiculturalist events are held under the shadow of being reminded that those immigrants and refugees are not fully German even though they claim a German identity more than any other they could claim.

I heard many different migration stories, from being political refugees to being hired as cooks for high-end restaurants. Each one is unique. Each one is powerful. I once met a "story-maker" for the political asylum seekers, who would write fictional stories for each person to use in requesting asylum. In most cases, I heard, his stories were successful. In many interviews I had, I realized I heard the word zorunluluk (obligation, necessity, and exigency) as the main reason for their migration from the first homeland to the second or for staying in the second or third homeland. "The difficulties (zorluklar) in your own country force you to move to another one," said Hakan Akay, a Kurdish Alevi musician and sound engineer who worked and lived in Cologne for a decade. After the Agreement of 31 October 1961 between Germany and Turkey, many workers from Turkey who came to Germany as guestworkers could not leave as they earned much better social security and economic advantages in their second homeland. They had friends and neighbors, and they "gave" and "received" brides from other emigrant communities in Germany, which would prevent them from being reintegrated into the first homeland had they decided to return immediately.

In the 1980s and 90s the German federal government applied a policy of scattering
refugees as much as possible in different sections of the same city or even in some cases to neighboring cities, in order to prevent the ghettoization of the immigrant population. The main motivation of German governmental policies with regard to the settlement issues of immigrants was to discourage political mobilization and representation of the immigrants, who might end up clogging the streets and workplaces of the cities. This policy, however, did not prevent refugees along with immigrants from establishing their own communities in cities like Cologne and most visibly in Berlin. The policy with regard to the settlement of political refugees has been a little bit different from that toward the other "economic" immigrants, as the government had more leverage in where to locate those refugees. In many cases, the existence of enclaves exacerbated the lack of integration and assimilation with other groups in Germany. It is still possible to work and live in Cologne without speaking a single German (or English) word.

The city of Cologne is presented as a great example of multiculturalism by the German authorities and by my informants in Germany, one of which at least some Germans are proud. I heard a German woman in Cologne saying, "I don't like the sound of church bells but I really love the Muslim call to prayer that I can hear in the city." Some Germans are quite progressive when it comes to integration, even though the discourse of parallel societies has been prominent not only among Germans but also among the immigrants I interviewed. The parallel society that Alevis criticize is that of the conservative Sunni Muslims who refuse to integrate into German society, but for many Germans all Muslim and other immigrant societies are included in this discourse.

6.4.2. Problems among Immigrants from Turkey in Germany

This section locates Kurdish Alevis and their musical lives in the German context to the
extent that it involves the integration process of Alevis into the German society while they deal with other Turkish immigrants. Among Kurdish Alevis, sounds like the music coming out of the TVs and radios as well as daily conversations surrounding immigrants from Turkey have some affinity with the Turkish soundscape, specifically that of different sections in Istanbul. Immigrants and refugees in Germany buy unlimited phone plans that they use in excess. Although unsubstantiated, one urban legend suggests that a couple of cell phone companies went bankrupt due to the overload from those unlimited plans. Housewives, specifically, spend enormous amounts of time on the phone and some do not participate in German daily life. Like many other immigrants around the world, some immigrants prefer being isolated from real life in Germany, instead spending time on the phone or Internet with their relatives and friends in Turkey or other parts of Europe.

Most musicians I conducted interviews with identify themselves as Kurdish, Türkiye’li, Kızılbaş, or Alevi. Many of the Kurds and Alevis subverted Turkish nationalism by referring to "people from Turkey" (Türkiye’liler) instead of "Turkish people" (Türkler), implicitly de-centering Turkish citizenship and creating a political space for others to be recognized and represented. Of course, the Türkiye’li population has never been homogenous.

Among the members of the Türkiye’li communities, it has been very common to encounter diverse discourses regarding the labeling of immigrants. “Türkiye’li” is used instead of “Turkish” in order to include people from all ethnic groups in Turkey, as well as being an identity marker used in Germany by the people who have ties with Turkey and Turkish Kurdistan. In the same vein, another term has also been used: Anatolian. It is revealing to read how Cem Özdemir, former co-chair of the Green Party and a member of the German Parliament, locates himself in Anatolia in his book *Ich bin Inlander: Ein anatolischer Schwabe im Bundestag*.
(I am from here: An Anatolian Swabian in the Bundestag) (Özdemir and Engels 1997). It is another form of discursive inclusion for the communities to geographically relate to Anatolia instead of emphasizing ethnicity or nationality. By employing Anatolian, not Turkish, in his lineage, Özdemir implies the inclusion of Turks, Kurds, Greeks, Armenians, and many other groups from Anatolia.

I have not seen any Kurdish Alevi person in daily practice exhibiting or implying any religious act or utterance publicly, such as praying five times a day like other Muslims. This has been true for the Alevi immigrants in big and cosmopolitan cities in Turkey as well, where one can hardly see in the public sphere any utterance of religious words or practices, since these are done in private, in exclusive places where it is safe to exhibit religiosity, such as villages. There is no public display of any religious action that would distinguish Kurdish Alevis, and many Turkish Alevis, from the "secular" Germans. Daily life seems to be totally devoid of religious practice, unlike that of observant Turkish Alevis or Sunni Muslims. Religiosity is limited to demarcation of differences and signifiers in discourse, created when distinction from the rest of the Kurds or other immigrants from Turkey is necessary. The historical mistrust of the Turkish state against the Kurdish, Alevi, and especially Kurdish Alevi citizens of Turkey seems to resemble the former fear that Jews would never become true Christians and citizens of Germany (Kastoryano 2002, Mandel 2008, Yurdakul 2009). Alevi in Germany have been in a favored position among all immigrants from Turkey to become “true” German citizens because they were not fundamentalists. The anxieties of the Alevi citizens of Germany about the Muslim challenges to the German secular public life have roots in the secularism of Turkish history.

Immigrant and first-homeland political activities cannot be separated when we consider Alevi social and political mobility. According to its own publications, the aim of the largest
Alevi organization in the world, AABF, is to work for the recognition of Alevism inside and outside of Turkey (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003). As Østergaard-Nielsen argues, Alevi in Germany urge the Turkish state to officially recognize Alevism and stay loyal to the secular ideals of the modern republic of Turkey. Many Alevi organizations have pursued extensive campaigns to portray Alevis as “good” and secular Muslims who are easy to integrate because of their lack of adherence to Sunni traditions. Irrespective of their piety, the contrast between Alevis and Sunnis in both homelands has given Alevis the upper hand in the religious integration competition, as some scholars equate this with cosmopolitanism (Özyürek 2011, Stokes 2008). Alevis, in opposition to Sunnis, have claimed to be more secular than other immigrants from Turkey were. Thus, being in opposition to the Sunni Muslims who practice their religion and who resist integrating into the German society has made Alevis "good" citizens or at a minimum good immigrants to Germany. The lack of religious display and practice is an important factor in the daily lives of the people I contacted.

In Germany, I observed the notion of non-veiling as a counter-narrative for Alevi women in their other-ing of (Sunni or other) veiled Muslim women. The same question of secular anxiety that they acquire in their homeland shows itself in their reaction to veiling in Germany. One of my informants, frustrated by the hypocrisies of the local Alevis who live highly conservative life-styles, said, "not veiling could easily be perceived as a sign of being modern and enlightened (aydin)." Some Alevi women who are more conservative than Muslim women have not hesitated to highlight the fact that they are different, as if by not wearing headscarves they suddenly can become more modern and enlightened. Still, even though the level of acceptance by their family members has been better than among their Sunni counterparts, Alevi women continue experiencing difficulties in dating and eventually marrying German men. By
virtue of not looking like conservative Muslim women, the relatively moderate Alevi image gives the impression that Alevi women more closely follow the German lifestyle.

As Casanova (2006), Bowen (2012) and other scholars working on Muslim communities in Europe have pointed out, there are clashes occurring in the public spaces in Europe regarding the differences in the display and daily practices of Muslims with the other citizens of those countries. In many instances the display of religion or other deviations from mainstream appearance, attire, and sounds have become increasingly perceived as threats to the secular lifestyles of Europeans. I am not the only person who observed that the secular domain with no public religious display in Germany resists the practiced and publicly displayed religious identities of Muslim immigrants. The secular public square in Germany thus helps Alevi to show their differences from the practicing Muslim immigrants.

While continuously advocating for multiculturalism in Germany, many of the Kurdish Alevi immigrants I interviewed opposed the construction of a large mosque in Cologne in 2010. Some oppose the center not because they are afraid of a backlash against Muslims but because the mosque represents more than a place for worship for them. For most Alevi who emigrated from Turkey, mosques embody decades of semi-official Turkish pro-Sunni Islamic policies, in which mosques were built in Alevi-populated villages without the consent or demand of the local Alevi communities. Mosques have become the spatial and sonic symbols that resurface and/or resurrect the secular anxieties of Alevi along with Islamophobic Germans. This is the underlying reason for the opposition of the Alevi immigrants, whose secular anxieties in Germany exhibit strong parallels with their homeland anxieties.

Considering that the cosmopolitans in Germany and elsewhere embrace secularism and feel threatened by the non-secular (Mandel 2007), a deeper examination into the theoretical
formulation in Germany as to the relationship between Alevis and Sunnis would be helpful. I came to the conclusion that detaching the secular from the cosmopolitan can open a new horizon for a theoretical inquiry on secularism, because “the cosmopolitan” in this case does not adequately describe the roots of the friction between the Sunnis and Alevis, given their treacherous history. It is also pertinent to mention that the Alevi understanding of the secular is not fully cosmopolitan, as the cosmopolitans in Turkey have historically represented the elite of Turkish society, which by no means has been exclusively Alevi. To put in another way, Alevi anxiety over the public display of Sunni religious practices and symbols has stemmed more from political causes than cultural ones, something that, according to one correspondent in Cologne, has been “also true of the reaction of German cosmopolitans when it comes to the discourses of ‘tolerance’ and ‘multiculturalism.’”

The source of secular anxiety among Germans and Alevis is not the same. German secular anxiety has historically emerged in forms of anti-immigrant (and in some cases neo-Nazi) movements against all Muslim and non-Caucasian immigrants. There are significant symbolic and semiotic differences between what the mosque and muezzin represent for Germans and for Alevis. The voice of the muezzin calling Muslims to prayer heard in Cologne could result in different emotions depending on the religious affiliation of the listener. For some Alevis, ezan (Muslim call to prayer) is a sonic reference to the historically problematic relationship with the pro-Sunni Turkish state apparatus. On the other hand, it makes some conservative Germans anxious because they see the mosque as a real or symbolic threat against the German way of living.
6.4.3. Becoming German by Becoming Alevi

As most scholars of religion in the US and Europe have argued, unlike their counterparts in Europe, from the early years immigrants in the USA have been able to become American without changing their religion. It is significant to point to the fact that religion has served as a framework in which other forms or modes of belonging could be reconstructed and redefined. Brubaker (2013) argues that the distinctive legitimacy of religion in the American context continues to provide a resource for immigrants to seek a place at the multicultural table. As Kurien (2007) argues in her work, A Place at the Table: Multiculturalism and the Development of an American Hinduism, by becoming Hindu many Indian American immigrants have become American. In certain cases embracing a religious identity helped immigrants to feel at home in their new homeland. In certain ways, the Hindu case in the US resembles the Alevi case in Germany. Religious "tolerance" in European and North American countries has allowed religious communities such as Hindus or Alevis to organize around a religious mode of belonging. By publicly becoming Alevis in Germany and by organizing around their religious identity, Alevi immigrants become non-Sunni, and thus can start to become "naturalized" and ordinary citizens of Germany. As I suggest in Chapters 4 and 6, being Alevi has given Alevis the opportunity of being excluded from the larger Muslim or Turkish labels. On the other hand, Alevis are used as buffers against the demands of Sunnis as well.

Alevi identity in Germany has become the third party in the negotiations between the German government and active Muslim organizations. Alevi religious education is one area where the binary modes of religious belonging for Muslims in Germany are at play. The German government has encouraged the recognition of Alevi institutions and the opening of schools for Alevi religious studies, a position that is unheard of and even illegal in the first homeland. This
process helped the binary (Alevi-Sunni) to be concretized. The political actors called for this binary to be more visible, which actually resulted in Sunni dissatisfaction with the German government (Aitchison, Hopkins, and Kwan 2007).

When Sunni political organizations such as Milli Görüş (IGMG, Islamic Community of Milli Görüş [National Ideal]) and Diyanet İşleri Türk İslam Birliği (DITIB, Religious Affairs of the Unity of Turkish Islam), the two largest Turkish Sunni Muslim organizations in Germany, demanded certain improvements in the religious lives of their members, such as contributions to building mosques or assistance in religious practices, the representatives from Hamburg and Cologne municipalities agreed to negotiate with them if they agreed to include Alevi organizations’ demands. While giving certain rights or privileges to Sunni Muslim Turkish groups’ religious practices, German authorities used Alevi organizations’ demands to counter the excessive demands of Sunnis, which made Alevis the third party in the negotiations. Alevi demands for religious rights in Germany are taken into account as part of the larger dialogue between two major actors, the German government and the Sunni organizations, gradually making this two-part structure into a three-part relationship: the German governmental authorities (states and municipalities), Sunni organizations (IGMG, DITIB), and Alevi organizations (AABF, CEM Vakfi, FEK). Besim Can Zırh’s recent work (2012) on this issue is illuminating in its scrutiny of the funeral service problems between Alevi-Sunni organizations and the German government's changing policies to accommodate Alevi demands.

Right after the official recognition of Alevis as “one of the religious groups” within the city of Berlin in 2002, Alevis in Berlin were granted the rights of religious education there (Sökefeld 2008). In four other states including North Rhine-Westphalia, to which the city of Cologne belongs, Alevi religious education has been in place in public schools since the school
year 2006-07. On the other hand, in Turkey, Alevis are not only not getting Alevi religious education, but to the contrary, they have been forced to take Sunni Islam classes starting from ninth grade.

The 2012 laws passed by the local parliaments in Hamburg and Cologne suggest that the government has agreed to recognize the religious holidays of Muslims (www.alevi.com). The caveat for this decision was, as reported by German newspapers, that the German government agreed to acknowledge not only the Sunni Muslim holidays, but also Alevi religious days. The municipality of Cologne has sponsored concerts and cultural events of the Alevi organizations including many of those associated with AABF. Municipalities also sponsor the spaces for the religious and political gatherings. As a member of Kardeş Türküler, I have performed at concerts partially or fully sponsored by the cultural or integration sections of the municipalities of Cologne, Hamburg, and Stuttgart in 2000 and 2001.

6.5. Conclusion

As one of the Western Muslim communities, the Alevi immigrant community became more integrated into German society by declaring themselves and becoming Alevi. Not only do those Alevis want to be included in German multiculturalism (also referred generically to as multikulti, a German shortcut for the multiculturalism that happened to be the name of a cultural center in Wuppertal dealing with solidarity among Turkish and German workers), but they also become Alevi in opposition to a more conservative Sunni Islam. Furthermore, the more they become Alevi by declaring their differences from the Sunni Muslims, the more German they become. The discrepancies in the policies towards the integration of Alevis and Sunnis into German society have increased Alevi mobilization that stemmed from the inherent issues from
the first homelands.

Many scholars argue that in Europe among Muslim immigrants, the shift from a diaspora mentality to engaged citizenship has been much slower than in the United States and Canada, in part because several European countries continue to encourage ties between Muslim citizens and residents with their countries of origin (Glick-Schiller and Şimşek-Çaglar 2007, Bowen 2012, Brubaker 2013). I argue, along with other scholars who have worked with Turkish immigrants in Germany, that first homeland political issues have been as significant as those in the new homelands, especially for the Alevis who have been active transnationally. There is also another shift that has happened among the Kurdish Alevi immigrants from Turkey: namely, that from temporary immigrant workers to legitimate cultural citizens of the modern world with multiple ethnic and religious identities. Kurdish Alevis have actively tried to distinguish themselves from the stigmatized Turkish Sunni immigrants, which in turn, helped them integrate into German society faster. I argue that those identities opened some space for Kurdish Alevis in their integration process as points of departure from the Turkish/Muslim labels. My informants on almost all occasions made a point of emphasizing their differences from Sunni Muslims or Turks.

During the five decades of migration from Turkey to Germany, there have been major changes in the music Kurdish Alevi immigrants and refugees have consumed and produced. The most significant one has been music’s transition from *gurbet*-themed folk music tunes to more complex, urban, challenging, and hybrid genres such as *alebesk*, R’nBesk, and DJ-Müzik, as second and third generation immigrants have gradually felt more comfortable with the fact of living in Germany and more confident about their place in the larger German society. In their quest for living like their German peers, Kurdish Alevi youth have engaged with German modes
of entertainment, modified to fit their aesthetic needs. As a result, they have been consuming music in discotheques and türkü bars.
Chapter 7: Epilogue

As I was concluding this work, four significant developments in Turkey and Germany occurred highlighting the historical and social significance of Kurdish Alevis in Turkey and Germany for the people of both nations. The events I lay out also highlighted, as I see them, the relevance of the quest of the members of this group for multiple identities within the context of accelerating political and social transformation in Turkey. The events, as I try to connect them to each other within the Turkish context, embody the main research question of this work, namely, the multiple and sometimes contradictory identities that Kurdish Alevis have been struggling for and with. Recent events also clarified my main arguments, mostly in Turkey and but also in Germany.

The first has been the set of recent public announcements by both sides of the conflict between the PKK and Turkey, also known as the *barış süreci* (peace process). Kurdish Alevis I have contacted have expressed their worries about the exclusionary Islamic rhetoric embraced by both sides, clouding the possibility of an inclusive peace process for all Kurds and Turks. The second is the set of public protests begun in Istanbul in June 2013, also known as the Gezi Protests (*Gezi Olaylari*), in which all of the casualties were from Alevi families, including a Kurdish Alevi. Through social media and other means, I observed that almost all the Kurdish Alevis I know got actively involved with the Gezi Protests. The third development was the release of a report regarding the ongoing trials in Germany involving the National Socialist Underground (NSU), in which the German authorities were criticized for their negligence and in some instances total misconduct in their investigations of a neo-Nazi group indiscriminately killing immigrants from Turkey, including one Kurdish Alevi refugee. The last one came in September, when six labeling companies that release Alevi albums along with other repertoire
decided to protest the suggestion made to radio and TV stations by the leader of the CEM Vakfı (Cumhuriyetçi Eğitim ve Kültür Merkezi Vakfı, Centre for Republican Education and Culture Foundation) that Alevi could pray at 

\textit{cemevis} within a \textit{cami} (mosque) along with Sunni Muslims. Six labeling companies, led by Hasan Saltık, owner of Kalan Müzik, have publicly denounced this project as attempt to deny the differences between Sunni and Alevi religiosities, and to convert Alevis into a Turkish version of Sunni Islam. I believe that these four events have made the struggles of Kızılbaş Kurds or Kurdish Alevis more visible and relevant in terms of the social shifts in the public sphere of Turkey and Germany.

In order to connect all of these events to Kurdish Alevi life in Turkey, Germany, and transnational space, I now address historical divisions among the members of the groups constituting the population of Turkey. Scholars like Fikret Başkaya (1991), İsmail Beşikçi (1997), and Eric Zürcher (2004) have suggested, in different ways, that the Kemalist policy makers of the Republic of Turkey have operated around ethnic, religious, and ideological divisions that defined the Turkish nation around majorities: Turkish over Kurdish, Sunni over Alevi, and Right over Left. The governing principles of Kemalism were implemented to create a nation around all three majorities. In order to create a Turkish Sunni Islam, the Republic of Turkey through its ideological state apparatus along with repressive state apparatus (Althusser 1984) utilized tactics of converting, suppressing, assimilating, and crushing (when necessary) those who dissented from the projected nation-state. Alevis and liberals or leftists have always acted as de facto secularists in opposition to others. Kurdish Alevis or Alevi Kurds have usually been in the minority of the aligned ideological, religious, and ethnic configurations of the Republic of Turkey as well as among the immigrant populations from Turkey in Germany.

As the recent challenge to the secular character of the republican project by the rise of
Islamism has indicated, probably the republican project’s most successful suppression was its policy of crushing the leftist movements in the country in the 1970s and 1980s. The absence of a powerful left/liberal opposition that would protect the secular nature of the republic popularly is a result of those tactics of oppression. The Alevi-Sunni Muslim division is still as active as ever; the recent Gezi Protests re-introduced that split to the public sphere. The Kurdish-Turkish axis has also seen transitions in the 1990s and 2000s. If Fikret Başkaya (1991) is correct, the Kemalist paradigm is bankrupt and the assimilationist and oppressive policies implemented in Turkey against its own citizens (such as assimilating Kurds into a Turkish identity and converting Alevi to Sunni Islam) are doomed to fail. I would argue that the recent success of the Kurdish uprising led by the PKK is evidence of the fact that the paradigm failed to assimilate all Kurds into Turkishness. Thus, at least in the Turkish-Kurdish axis, Kurdish ethno-national identity does not look like it will fade soon. Ultimately, according to Başkaya, the Kemalist paradigm will eventually have to change and embrace all communities in order to resolve the resistance on the part of those minorities to joining the secular Turkish national project.

7.1. Barış Süreci and Kurdish Alevi

Earlier in this work, I talked about the long history of the “Kurdish Question” in Turkey and the extent to which it has shaped the lives of Kurdish Alevi. It is one of the most important political issues affecting Kurdish Alevi cultural entrepreneurs as well. The ethnic or national Kurdish identity of Alevi Kurds was worked on, emphasized as necessary, and in the last decades or so taken for granted by other Kurds, especially certain political organizations like the PKK. Reflecting the emotions expressed by most Kurdish Alevi I talked to, Shêxo told me on a Skype interview on September 10, 2013 that:
we [Kurdish Alevis] are among the least respected members of both the Kurdish family and the Alevi family, both of which are already not respected by the larger Turkish society. The least respected members of a very large family, Kurdish Alevis have been treated as an adopted or unwanted last child.

The recently accelerated peace process (barış süreci) initiated a cease-fire between the PKK guerillas and the Turkish army earlier in 2013. In order to increase the public profile of the reconciliation process, some political parties and religious organizations, including the ruling AKP in Turkey, have begun invoking the common religious bond between Kurds and Turks, most of whom are Sunni Muslim. On March 21 2013, the jailed leader of the PKK, Abdullah Öcalan, released a statement including the sentence, “Peace will come to Turkey under the flag of Islam,” invoking an ümmet (Ar. ummah, Muslim community of believers) connection among Muslims who belong to the larger community of believers. As he uttered those words in his support for the peace process, he overlooked other religious groups within the larger Kurdish population, which caused significant resentment among Alevi, Christian, and Êzîdî Kurds. Kurdish Alevi villages have witnessed as much pressure, if not more, as Kurdish Sunni Muslim villagers have. Many Kurdish Alevis I talked to, including Ali Baran and Shêxo, expressed their frustrations with the tone of Öcalan’s statement ignoring the Kurdish Alevis and other Kurds from different religious backgrounds. The statement highlighted a shift in terms of a diminishing secular common denominator among all Kurds. Thus, the PKK and its leader seemed to ignore the religious sensibilities of Kurdish Alevis in order to reach a peace deal with an Islamic-motivated AKP government. I observed that Öcalan’s pragmatically motivated decision made it
harder for Kızıldaş Kurds or Kurdish Alevi to follow the peace process as closely as other Kurds have done. Since its inception as a Marxist/Leninist organization, the PKK movement has managed to be an inclusive organization for Kurds coming from all faiths and backgrounds. There were many nonbelievers in the higher ranks. In addition, Kurdish Alevi had contributed to the secular nature of the movement. Gradually it has turned into a Kurdish-Sunni majority as the locomotive carrying its full weight.

The attempt to reach a solution to the “Kurdish Question” by connecting Sunni Muslim majorities of Kurds and Turks, which would have been unimaginable until the mid-2000s, might work if the alignment of the Turkish republic were defined in religious terms. Instead, as one of the six core principles of Kemalism, laiklik (secularism) obligates, at least in theory, an inclusive secular nation embracing all religious groups living in Turkey. By invoking the religious connection between those two majorities, some religio-political parties have elevated the fears of the ethno-religious minorities in Turkey, including Alevi, through an exclusionary discourse. I argue that this puts Kurdish Alevi in a significant position, indispensable for the success of both Turkish and Kurdish secular and nationalistic projects. As politically weak as they have been, many times nationalists on both sides have tried to assimilate them as Turkish or Kurdish. Within the secular formalization of the Turkish republic, this ethno-religious double minority can play a significant role in mediating between the two majority groups. This has significant implications for internal social peace and harmony in Turkey under the shadow of the “Kurdish Question.” If peace and security in the country were defined through a secular framework, as a secular republic would require, this group’s presence could advance a solution to the “Kurdish Question” through a secular framework based on liberal ideals and policies. This double minority seems able to effect the most visible and influential connection between two large sections of the
society in the secular space assumed by the nation-state. The future of the secular republic will most likely depend on reliable communication channels that Kurdish Alevis could provide, both figuratively and internally, with both of the two large Sunni Muslim groups in the country. Geographically, the first homeland of Kurdish Alevis constitutes as well the buffer zone between predominantly Turkish and Kurdish populated cities.

Sunni Muslim Turkish

Turkish Alevi

Kurdish Alevi

Kurdish Sunni Muslim

Clues to this possible mediation lie in the music that has been shared in transnational space and in Turkey among the four groups that I identified above. The musical and aesthetic space that Kurdish Alevis have occupied is literally between two separate worlds that Turks and Kurds have embraced. The music Kurdish Alevis have been listening to encompasses both the Kurdish and Turkish musical worlds as well as its own traditional music developed in liminal space. The music that Kurdish Alevis have been creating and consuming has reflected sensibilities of all parties involved. Kurdish Alevi musicians have composed many songs in Turkish. Not only musicians but also the lay people who listen can easily embrace Turkish lyrics. Before a concert he gave in New Jersey in 2012, at which I performed on the bağlama, Delil Dilanar, a famous Kurdish musician living in Europe, told me that he did not know how extensive the liturgical and para-liturgical durik and türkü repertoires were among the Kurdish Alevis of Maraş, Malatya, and Adıyaman. This region has produced many songs that are mostly
dance tunes, so he thought that the only musical tradition from this region consisted of those line-dance tunes. He said that his perspective had changed as he had listened to the songs of Shêxo, Ali Baran, and Ozan Garip Dost.

Kurdish Alevi musicians historically provided resources for the Alevi repertoire that Arif Sağ and other musicians utilized and later popularized. Of great importance to any discussion of cultural hybridity, integration, and assimilation is the strong presence of Turkish words and phrases in the Kurdish oral literature of Kurdish Alevis living close to Turkish communities in Maraş, Malatya, and Adıyaman. The inclusion of Turkish words and phrases in the Kurmancî-Kurdish of this region can be interpreted as a strategy of survival for this unique culture instead of a sign of the death of the “true” Kurd. Bilingual Kurdish and Turkish songs have been overlooked not only by Turkish cultural policy makers but also by Kurdish purists since this group exhibited signs of “assimilation” more than other Kurdish communities did. Viewing this co-existence and bilingualism as an interchange rather than an imposition may help us to understand more easily the Kurdish Alevis’ hybrid nature. Here is an example of a Kurmancî-Kurdish semah (religious tune) I recorded in 2007 with Turkish lyrics underlined:

“Axababa Semahı,” as sung by Hüseyin Alim on June 5th, 2007 in Elbistan, Maraş

Tu Tembûr î ez perde me  You are the lute, I am the fret
Tu Axa yî ez kole me  You are the ruler, I am your subject
Li ber derîyê we sêvî me  I am the orphan in front of the home
Ne kenîme ne şa bûme  With no laughter and no happiness
Gelir geçer dünya gami  The pain in this world is temporary
Ox ox ox ox Axbabaye....  Hey hey it is Axaba. 
The *duriks*[^48] (short quatrains in Kurdish) and other famous songs originated in the geographical triangle defined by the eastern Turkish cities of Maraş of this community have become the trademark of famous Kurdish musicians like Şivan Perwer. Without falling into the trap of melting pot rhetoric, I argue that the liminal state of the musical and other cultural creations among the members of this group has proven to be one of the most significant cultural spaces that members from all four groups could relate to in varying degrees. Turks have embraced many Turkish and bilingual songs from this repertoire. Alevi and *türkü* tunes that made their way towards the Turkish folk music milieu created liminal spaces that helped many to navigate in between multiple homes and homelands.

7.2. Gezi Protests and Alevi Identity

The Gezi Protests (*Gezi Olayları*), named after the park in Taksim Square, Istanbul, started on May 31, 2013 and were sparked after a peaceful protest against planned destruction of the park and its replacement by a shopping mall. They have had significant implications for the

[^48]: The *duriks* are short quatrains in Kurdish, often focusing on love and passion.
Kurdish Alevis in Turkey and Germany. Those who lost their lives in the Gezi Protests, which prompted spontaneous protests all around the world, are all from Alevi families: Abdullah Cömert, Ahmet Atakan, Ali İsmail Korkmaz, Ethem Sarısülük, and Mehmet Ayvalıtaş. This detail might have been missed in many political analyses, but many Alevis who participated in the protests did not miss it. The Gezi Protests could be a sign that the Turkish republican secular model is fracturing as the protesters (composed of Alevis and the secular elite) and their targets (the conservative Islamic-leaning AKP government) represent two sides of the larger religio-political axis of division within the population in Turkey, i.e. Alevis and Sunnis. Protesters, mainly secular constituencies from Kurdish and Turkish Alevi, Sunni Turkish, Armenian, and Jewish communities, faced the non-secular majority and the state apparatus.

Most members of the Kurdish Sunni Muslim majority were hesitant to join the protests with their friends from the Turkish left and the secular groups in Turkey. The political actors on the Kurdish side did not want to jeopardize the ongoing peace process between the PKK and the AKP government by engaging with the opposition. The only Kurdish group that was visible among the protesters were Kurdish Alevis, whose Kurdish and Alevi identities were in contradiction with each other in the context of the peace process and the Gezi Protests. Kurdish Alevis have struggled with sticking to secular ideals while trying to maintain their separate Kurdish loyalty. After the protests in tens of cities in Turkey, as observed by many journalists, scholars, and activists, the AKP government began to crackdown on the protesters more harshly in towns and districts where more Alevis resided than in Sunni-populated cities (Saymadı 2013).

48 For more examples see the Appendix.
7.3. Discrimination in the New Homeland

Like other Western Muslims, Alevis in Germany have been subjected to discrimination along with other Turkish immigrants, since anti-immigrant or Islamophobic Germans see no visible difference distinguishing them from other Muslims or Turks. Although many Alevis agree with those xenophobes, especially in their opposition to the construction of mosques in large cities like Cologne, they have not been spared anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim rhetoric and actions. Hate crimes like the murders between 2000 and 2007 have affected Kurdish Alevis as much as they did other groups from Turkey.

A recently released official investigation reports the incompetence of German institutions with respect to neo-Nazi organizations. It reveals that the German police and security services suffered "from deeply rooted prejudices and a lack of cultural diversity, which allowed a neo-Nazi cell to carry out violent attacks against immigrants for more than a decade without being detected," according to a parliamentary committee report issued on August 22, 2013 (Eddy 2013). As the New York Times reported, “the inquiry concluded that prejudice often led the police to draw quick and erroneous conclusions about certain murders, based on the ethnicity of the victims, and it demanded changes in the 36 law enforcement agencies, including training and recruiting more ethnic minorities.” 49 Nine known NSU-related murders were committed in Germany between 2000 and 2007. At least one of the victims of neo-Nazi violence was a Kurdish Alevi, Mehmet Kubasik, who was granted asylum in Dortmund and had lived in Germany for a decade and a half. A Deutsche Welle (DW) article summarizes the sentiment

shared by many Kurdish Alevis I interviewed: “as a Turkish-Kurdish Alevi and thereby part of a religious minority, he had no longer felt safe living in southeastern Anatolia at the end of the 1980s. He applied for asylum in Dortmund, and it was granted. Mehmet and his family became German citizens in 2003.” His daughter, in the same DW interview, said "her father always defended his new country, which he deemed was ‘democratic’” (Grunau 2013).

Earlier in the dissertation, I argued that Alevis have become more German by becoming Alevi in the public order that they navigated in. Just as they were discriminated against like their fellow Sunni Muslim Turks, in the German social context, Kurdish Alevis from Turkey can play the roles of secular arbiters between other Sunni Muslims (Turks and Kurds) from Turkey and the German state apparatus. The Alevi secular stance could serve as a model for the institutional integration process that German secularity, or in a more general sense European secularity demands, between different state and local authorities and Turkish and Kurdish religio-political parties.

7.4. Cami-Cemevi Project

As a recent study by the oppositional CHP suggested (Hürriyet Daily News, December 17th, 2012), the main demand of Alevis in Turkey has been to have their own religious places where they can worship, gather, and observe religious services and duties like funerals and other events. Historical refusal, continued under the AKP government, to grant cemevis religious status accelerated the disenfranchisement of Alevis from the republican project. The shift in the policies of the AKP government towards a more religious (and less secular) agenda interferes with the ideals of the republican secular project. A recent attempt at converting Alevis into a unique Turkish Sunni Islam is the construction of a religious center that would include both
mosque and cemevi, the Cami Cemevi Kültür Merkezi Projesi (CCKMP, Mosque Cemevi Cultural Center), to be built in Ankara. It will have two sections, a cemevi and a mosque, so that Alevis and Sunnis will be together and pray together. The leader of the CEM Vakfı, Izzettin Doğan, who comes from a highly respected dede lineage, called this new CCKMP project the best project for social harmony in Turkey in the last 900 years. According to an article that appeared in Zaman, Doğan claimed that this project would be the most peaceful project that this land has ever seen. 

At first, the project seemed like a good attempt to seek peace among Sunnis and Alevis. However, from its inception the CEM Vakfı’s mission was to establish a Turkish version of Alevi Islam. Thus, Kurdish Alevi friends and relatives have seen this project as a gimmick, not a sincere attempt at bridging the gap between Sunnis and Alevis. To the contrary, many have interpreted this as the latest version of attempts to convert Alevis to Sunni Islam, or at least to a different version of Turkish Alevi Islam. Some Alevi musicians and producers protested the CEM Vakfı and organizations related with the CEM group.

The owners of seven major Alevi music labels in Istanbul also called this project a gimmick, resembling problematic assimilationist attempts by the Sunni Muslim majority and the AKP government. As the memorandum above indicates, they pulled all of their recordings and music videos from the radio and TV channels associated with the CEM Vakfı. One of the participants in this study summarized her anger on her Facebook page: "Now what? Are you going to convert all Kurds and Turks to Islam?"

7.5. Conclusion

In this study, I have analyzed the music produced for and consumed by the Kurdish Alevis in Cologne and Istanbul who trace their first homeland to the cities of Maraş, Malatya,
and Adıyaman in Kurdistan or Eastern Turkey. I have aimed to shed light on how a group of people within a predominantly Sunni Muslim majority relies on music to navigate and negotiate religious constraints and secular contempt in Turkey, and with a secular German context in which they were granted religious and cultural rights. In the discussion of culture, politics, and religion in the lives of this immigrant community, I have approached Kurdish Alevi discourses of belonging through music as an embodiment of all three at once. Kurdish Alevi have engaged with the politics of recognition through multiple identities that at times contradict each other. The contradictions grew as they moved from one homeland to the next. The meanings and contradictions exist not only in terms of political realignments but also in issues of representation of identities.

Until the establishment of the transnational space among immigrants in Turkey and Germany, the Turkish ideological state apparatus controlled almost all forms of cultural production in the public sphere (Kaya 2007). By censoring undesired content and punishing artists and musicians who opposed the state’s demands, the nation-state had managed to shape the cultural scape and the sonic world of its citizens. That dominance lost its power as other political actors got more involved with alternative artistic, musical, and political productions. Politically active musicians and artists have created alternative and protest voices, challenging the hegemony of the Republic of Turkey. The hegemonic power of the political center gradually diminished in the 1990s and 2000s as the new agents became more influential among their audiences. Alongside state actors emerged religious, cultural, and hometown organizations that have been maintaining and benefiting from the new transnational social field. The last iteration of this shift came as the immigrants and refugees in Germany and internal immigrants within Turkey established a new transnational social field. The other important development in the last
two decades has been the formation of a new aesthetic in the transnational space and in the new homelands among Kurdish Alevi. Almost all Kurdish Alevi musicians I talked to for this study have taken part in the new and constantly evolving aesthetic as cultural entrepreneurs. In conclusion, although some Kurdish Alevi musicians have occasionally resorted to militant and politically salient music, they inherently may have felt themselves to play the role of arbitrators or mediators between Kurds and Turks and Alevi and Sunnis, for which they wrote more songs about peace and reconciliation than have their Sunni Muslim musician friends.
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<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Likes, Memberships, and Posts</th>
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<td>Kurd</td>
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Appendix B. Online Questionnaire (in Turkish) and the Translation of the Questions

1. Sizi en çok hüzünlendiren müzisyen ya da şarkıcı kimdir?
What musician or singer makes you feel saddest?

2. Sizi en çok mutlu eden müzisyen ya da şarkıcı kimdir?
What musician or singer makes you feel happiest?

3. Gün içinde ortalama ne kadar süre müzik dinlersiniz?
How much do you listen to music on average on a day?

4. Sizi en çok mutlu eden parçalar nelerdir?
Can you state the songs that make you feel happiest when you listen to?

5. Sizi en çok hüzünlendiren parçalar nelerdir?
Can you state the tunes that make you feel saddest when you listen to?

6. Bir hafta içerisinde ortalama ne kadar süre müzik dinlersiniz?
How much do you listen to music on the average in a week?

7. Milliyetinizi ya da etnik kimliğinizi nasıl tanımlarsınız?
How would you describe your national or ethnic identity?

8. Dini kimliğinizi nasıl tanımlarsınız?
How would you describe your religious identity?

9. Siyasi kimliğinizi nasıl tanımlarsınız?
How would you describe your political identity?

10. 2010 yılı içerisinde hiç köyünüzü ziyaret ettiniz mi?
Have you visited your village in 2010?

11. 2010 yılı içerisinde herhangi bir dini törende ya da dini mekanda bulunduysanız belirtebirmisiniz?
Have you ever attended any religious observation or visited any sacred place in 2010? If so please state.

12. 2010 yılı içerisinde herhangi bir politik eyleme katıldınız mı? Belirtebilmisiniz?

Have you attended any political strike or demonstration in 2010? If so please state.

13. Müzik dinlemek için en çok kullandığınız medya nedir?

What media do you use most in order to listen to the music?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
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<th>Participant #2</th>
<th>Participant #3</th>
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<td>sivan perwer</td>
<td>sivan perver</td>
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<td>Hayır</td>
<td>Evet (YES)</td>
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<td>hayır</td>
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<td>10-15 saat</td>
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<td>Sivan</td>
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<td>Kani</td>
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<td>Humanist</td>
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<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Internet, iphone</td>
<td>Internet, Radyo, CD</td>
<td>Internet, CD</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Appendix C. Selected guitar chords/notations downloaded by musicians and music students.

1. “Kafama Sıkar Giderim” by Ahmet Kaya

Em
Artık seninle duramam,
   F
Bu akşam çıkar giderim.
Am     F
Hesabım kalsın mahşere,
Dm     Em
Elimi yıkar giderim.

Em
Sen zahmet etme yerinden,
   F
Gürültü yapmam derinden,
Am     F
Parmaklarının üzerinden,
Dm     Em
Su gibi akar giderim.

Em
Artık sürersin bir sefa,
   F
Ne cismim kaldı ne cefa,
Am     F
Şikayet etmem bu defa,
Dm     Em
Dişimi sıkar giderim.

Em
Bozar mı sandın açılar,
   F
Belaya atlar giderim,
Am     F
Kurşun gibi mavzer gibi,
Dm     Em
Dağ gibi patlar giderim.

Em
Kaybetsem bile herşeyi,
   F
Bu aşkı yırtar giderim,
Am     F
Sinsice olmaz gidişim,
Dm     Em
Kapıyı çarpar giderim.

Em
Sana yazdığım şarkıyı,
   F
Sazımdan söker giderim,
Am     F
Ben ağlayamam bilirsin,
Dm     Em
Yüzümü döker giderim.

Em
Köpeklerimden kuşumandan,
   F
Yavrumdan cayar giderim,
Am     F
Senden aldığım ne varsı,
Dm     Em
Yerine koyar giderim.

Em
Ezdirmem sana kendimi,
   F
Gövdemi yakar giderim,
Am     F
Beeddua etmem üzülme,
Dm     Em
Kafama sıkar giderim.

AĞLAMA BEBEĞİM

Söz: AHMET KAYA
MÜZIK: AHMET KAYA

Am Dm Em Gm

Ağ le na be bek ağ la na son de Umat son de ya rim sen de

Dm Am Em Am

Yağmur gi bi gözle rin den a kan yağı ni ye SAZ

Dm Am Em Am

Bu sus kan hat bu dur gun hat kar gun lik ni ye

Am Dm Em Am

Çok u zakt a o ży le bir ye var O yer ler de mat la luk lar

F Dm Am 2

Bu li ya ne ye ha zir bir ha yat var bir ha yat var
4. “Kadınlar” by Ahmet Kaya

KADINLAR

Söz: H. Hüseyin Koçak
Müzik: Ahmet Kaya

[Music notation]

Üç e sek si ak pu gu lu tu r k a be kug li
Ka dün la yu yor dağ la ra doğ ru
Ley lâk ma ru
gül lu ru su dağ la ra doğ ru
Oz lêhn te le
a ci la bir an do lu
Si vaş li ma
ur fa li mi bie mey ney
Kadınlar
5. “Metrisin Önünde” by Ahmet Kaya

METRİSİN ÖNÜNDE

Söz: AHMET KAYA
MEZHE: AHMET KAYA

m.277

Am

S AZ

C Dm Am Dm

Met ri sin ö nun de dur dum

Dm

Has ret tim yer le ce vor dam SAZ

C Am

Ben dağ lar da u çan kuş tu nu u çau kuş tu m

C Gm Am

Ka na tla nun du n vu nil dur dum

Am

Yıl lar ve r ki yor gu nun ben Ma pas lar da

Gök yil žı ne ve r gu nun ben

dur gu nun ben dur gu nun ben
6. “Olmasa Mektubun” by Yeni Türkü
7. “Senden Oldu” by Ali Kızıltuğ

Diyar diyar göğmez idim
Senden oldu senden oldu
Ben bu kadar içmez idim
Senden oldu senden oldu
Hayır siz yar senden oldu

-2-
Hava yana baktım yazılık
Etme zalim bana yazılık
Sendikleri şu beyazlık
Senden oldu senden oldu
Hayır siz yar senden oldu

-3-
Bundan sonra halim sormam
Kırmızı etsen inanmam
Benim gurbet kuğu olmam
Senden oldu senden oldu
Hayır siz yar senden oldu

-4-
Akar gözümum durmadı
Yar gelip halim sormadı
Kızıltuğ aşık olmadı
Senden oldu senden oldu
Hayır siz yar senden oldu

Appendix D. Most frequently performed songs representing Alevi repertoire that were featured at the Tune of the Millennium concert.

1. “Ötme Bülbül Ötme”
2. “Güldür Gül”

**BİN YILIN TÖRKÜSO**

**ESER NO:**

**GÜLDÜR GÜL**

---

Bu gün ben pi ri mi gör düm
Bu gün ben pi ri mi gör düm
Pi rin ce ma li göl
dür göl Pi rin ce ma li göl dür göl
E gi gi ne yü züm sür dön E gi gi ne yü züm
sür dön Pi rin e te gi göl dür göl
Pi rin e te gi göl dür göl

---

**1.**
Buğün Ben Pirimi Görдум
Pirin Celâli Güldür Göl
Eşiğine Yüzüm Sürdüm
Pirin Eteği Güldür Göl

**2.**
Gülden Terazi Yeperler
Gülü Göl ile Tartalar
Göl Afırlar Göl Setler
Çarşı Pazarı Güldür Göl

**3.**
Gel ha Gel ha can HATAYLı
Hakkın Nefesi Güldür Göl
Şu Olen Garip Bülbülün
Derdi Figani Güldür Göl
3. “Kısaş Semahi”

**BİN YILIN TÜRKÜSÜ**

**Kısaş SEMAHI**

**URFA SEMAHI**

**BAŞIM AÇIK YALIN AYAK YÜRÜTTÜN**

(Saz...)

Başım a çık ya lim... Ayak yü rüt tım... Sen mêr he mêr ey le...

(Saz...)

Leb bi ba lim yar... Yü re gi mi ce víz... gi bi gi rüt tım...

(Saz...)

Se nın Aş kın Buk tû... Kad elı... Da lim yar...

(Saz...)

Çek tir me ce fe lär... yan dür... ma na re...

(Saz...)

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4. “Bugün Bize Pir Geldi”

BİN YILIN TÜRKÜSÜ

ESER NO:

BUGÜN BIZE PİR GELDİ

Bu gün bizə Pir gel di
A li bi zim Şa hi miz
Pa di şa hem ya rı dan

O kur ak dan ka ra dan

Mın raq te ki ku hem met
Ben pi rim den

Ay ni mam
Bin yıl geç se a ra dan

Ey val lah Şa hem
Ey val lah

A di gü zel dir gü zel Şah

1-
Bugün bize Pir geldi
Güllerı taze geldi
Önüş sira Kamberi
Aliyel Mürtseza geldi

2-
Ali bizim Şahımız
Kâbe kibleğahımız
Mihractaki Muhammet
O bizim Padişahımız

3-
Padişah’ım yaradan
Okur ekdan karadan
Ben Pirimden ayrılmam
Kirk yıl geçse aradan

4-
Arayi uzattılar
Yarama tuz bastılar
Fazlidan bir kul geldi
Bedestanda sattılar

5-
Sattılar bedestanda
Ses verir gülistanda
Muhammedin hatemi
Ber güzardır aslanda

6-
Kul Hımmet Östadımız
Burda yoktur yadımız
Şah-i Merdan aşkına
Hak versin murađımız
5. “Uzun İnce Bir Yoldayım” by Aşık Veysel

BİN YILIN TÜRKÜSÜ

ESER NO:

UZUN İNCE BİR YOLDAYIM

(Saz.....)

Uzun ince bir yol da yım
Dün ya ya gel diğim an da
Şe şer Vey sel iş bu ha le

(Saz.....)

Gidiyorum gün düz ge ce
Yö düm ey ni za men da
Kaş ağ-la-yı ka hi gül-le

(Saz.....)

Bilmiyorum ne hal de yım
Gi di yo rum gün düz ge ce
I ki ka pi li bir han da
Ye tiş mek i çın men zi la

Gün düz ge ce gün düz ge ce
Gün düz ge ce Hey

-1-

Uzun ince bir yoldayım
Gidiyorum Gündüz Gece
Bilmiyorum ne haldayım
Gidiyorum Gündüz Gece

-2-

Dön yaya geldiğim anda
Yörüdüm aynı zamanda
İki kapı bir anda
Gidiyorum Gündüz Gece

-3-

Saşar Vey sel iş bu hale
Kah ağlay Kahi göle
Yetişmek için menzile
Gidiyorum Gündüz Gece
6. “Ne Ağlarsın Benim Zülfü Siyahım” by Aşık Daimi

BİN YILIN TÜRKÖSÜ

ESER NO: NE AĞLARŞIN BENİM ZÜLFÜ SIYAHIM

Ne ağ lar sin Ben im Zül fü Sı ya hm Bu da Ge lir
Bu da Ge çer Ağ la ma Gök le re E

Bir Göllü Çevreşi Dikendir Hardır
Bülbül Göllü Elinden Ahile Zardır
Nede Olsa Kışın Sonu Bahardır
Bu da Gelir Bu da Geçer Ağlama

Daimi yem Her Can Emez Bu Sirta
Geççek Aşık olan erer O Nura
Yusuf Sabir ile Vardı misira
Bu da Gelir Bu da Geçer Ağlama
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