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Citizenship Status and Patterns of Inequality in the United States and Canada

Sofya Aptekar

Objective: This study investigates inequalities in the distribution of citizenship status among immigrants in Canada and the US between 1970 and 2001. It is motivated by a desire to probe deeper into the gap in citizenship rates between the two countries.

Methods: Logistic regression analysis of Census data is used to predict the odds of citizenship among the foreign-born, controlling for a range of factors.

Results: There has been a growing inequality in the distribution of citizenship in the US, but not in Canada. Low rates of citizenship hide the appearance of a large disparity in citizenship between those with the lowest levels of education and everyone else. These results cannot be entirely ascribed to the presence of undocumented immigrants.

Conclusion: Persistent and large inequalities in citizenship leave the already disadvantaged unskilled immigrants without access to rights, representation, security, and job and educational opportunities.

In Canada and the US, citizenship brings a range of rights and benefits, such as the ability to vote and run for public office, access to some desirable jobs and educational benefits, travel passports, and safeguards from deportation. High rates of citizenship among the foreign-born, such as those found in Canada, signal success in immigrant incorporation. Low citizenship uptake in the United States, on the other hand, raises questions about hurdles in the naturalization process and boundaries erected around national membership. Moreover, inequality in the distribution of the rights and benefits of citizenship along axes of stratification such as socioeconomic status can compound social inequality and limit the political representation and collective mobility of immigrant groups (Portes and Curtis, 1987). I demonstrate the growth of citizenship inequality in the United States since the 1970s, with the least educated falling precipitously behind. I show that a contemporaneous increase in naturalization in Canada was a tide that lifted all boats: differences in citizenship by educational level are minor.

This article relies on analyses of Canadian and American census data from 1970 to 2001. Comparisons with Canada in the study of American immigration are relatively rare, despite the many parallels in immigration trends and policies, which allow for similar case analysis (Lipset, 1989; Zolberg, 1996). In the case of naturalization, this cross-country comparison is particularly compelling due to the large and growing gap in citizenship rates. Until the 1980s, rates of citizenship among the foreign-born in Canada and the US were similar, at around 60%. But while the proportion of immigrants who are citizens in Canada has steadily increased to 75% in 2001, it has declined to 40% in the US in the same time period (Bloemraad, 2006b, see Figure 1). I look at the relationships between a range of demographic and contextual factors and citizenship status, evaluating various theoretical understandings of naturalization and exploring the implications for larger processes of stratification. I begin with an overview of immigration and

naturalization policies in the two countries and a description of the economic, contextual, and assimilation models of citizenship acquisition. I then present the analytic results and attempt to account for the trends over time and differences between Canada and the US.

[Figure 1 about here]

Immigration and Naturalization in Canada and the US

There are many similarities in the immigration history and policies of Canada and the US. They are settler nations, populated by European migrants who pushed out the native population. Citizenship for immigrants in both countries is based on the *jus soli*, or birthright citizenship principle, and access to citizenship has been very similar since the post-World War II period (Weil, 2001). The residency requirements in Canada are three years (five years prior to 1977), and five years in the US. In both countries, there are lengthy waiting periods, with backlogs varying by location, as well as examinations of language proficiency, civics, and history, and a litany of forms and fees.

Canada and the US also share similar immigration policy trajectories. Ethnicity-based restrictive policies implemented in the 1920s were lifted in both countries in the 1960s in favor of more equitable policies, which eventually led to an influx of immigrants from developing countries. Canada has long had a higher proportion of immigrants among its population: by 2001, 18% of the total population was foreign born compared to 13% in the US (Malone *et al*, 2003; Statistics Canada, 2003). The mix of national origins is also different: China and India supply 36% of all immigrants to Canada, while immigrants from Mexico are 30% of the foreign-born in the US (Malone, *et al* 2003; Statistics Canada, 2005b). Finally, Canada admits many more skill-based immigrants through its point system than the US, where most immigrants come

through family reunification provisions. Nonetheless, on average, immigrants in the two countries have similar levels of education (Bloemraad, 2006a). Although only Canada officially recognizes dual citizenship, there is a *de facto* dual citizenship regime in the US because laws governing renunciation of other allegiances are rarely enforced (Kivisto and Faist, 2007). Moreover, dual citizenship laws in Canada and the US often clash with the laws of sending countries, which may rescind citizenship from those gaining citizenship of another country or make it impossible to give up original citizenship. Regardless, there is also evidence that many immigrants do not claim dual citizenship, even when they technically have it (Bloemraad, 2004).

Despite the many similarities between naturalization processes and benefits of naturalization in Canada and the US, the proportion of immigrants with citizenship in the US has fallen far below that in Canada. The *rate* of acquiring citizenship has also decreased in the US while increasing in Canada, and immigrants from every origin have lower proportion naturalized in the US, even when disaggregated by cohort (Bloemraad, 2006a). Irene Bloemraad (2002, 2006a, 2006b) makes a strong case for the role of institutional factors as the explanation for the citizenship gap between Canada and the US: the Canadian government programs actively encourage and support citizenship acquisition, treating it as a right, whereas the US has a far less interventionist approach that leaves citizenship up to the individual. Bloemraad's conclusions rest on cross-sectional analyses of 1990/1 census data for Portuguese and Vietnamese immigrant groups, as well as extensive qualitative research. I build on her work – and that of others (e.g. Bueker, 2005; Liang, 1994; Pantoja and Gershon, 2006; Yang, 1994) – by examining naturalization patterns in the entire immigrant populations in Canada and the US over thirty years, and by focusing on the potential of citizenship to exacerbate existing inequalities. As such, this paper is of interest to scholars of inequality more generally.

Citizenship and Inequality

Several theoretical perspectives are useful in explaining the mechanisms through which citizenship comes to be unequally distributed and overlap with other social categories. **Rational choice** economic maximization models presume autonomous actors who weigh the costs and benefits of acquiring citizenship. Citizenship is attractive as a way of maximizing earnings through access to jobs and federal contracts, academic scholarships, and travel passports. The higher one's education and income, the more one can expect to benefit from acquiring citizenship. The positive relationship between socioeconomic status and citizenship among immigrants has been amply documented in Canada and the US (e.g. Balistreri and Van Hook, 2004; Bloemraad, 2002; Bueker, 2005; DeVoretz and Pivenko, 2005; Jones-Correa, 2001; Liang, 1994; Mata, 1999; Pantoja and Gershon, 2006; Van Hook, Brown and Bean, 2006; Yang, 1994). Aside from potentially higher earnings and better employment opportunities, naturalization gives immigrants priority in sponsoring family migration to the US (but not to Canada). Given financial requirements of sponsorship, immigrants with higher socioeconomic status may be more interested in this benefit of citizenship. At the same time, immigrants with lower socioeconomic status may be more likely to have relatives who want to move to the US (Bloemraad, 2006a). Since 1996, federal welfare benefits in the US have been contingent upon citizenship. Thus, immigrants with low levels of education may try to maximize their income through naturalization, reducing class differences in the distribution of citizenship status (Borjas, 2002). In that case, the socioeconomic gradient of citizenship may, in fact, be steeper in Canada because welfare benefits there are not contingent on citizenship. However, previous studies have shown little evidence that welfare eligibility is related to naturalization in the US. Rather, the

passage of the Welfare Reform Act – and contemporaneous measures that made deportation of permanent residents much easier – served as a signal to all immigrants about the precariousness of permanent resident status and the potential for further curtailment of rights (Balistreri and Van Hook, 2004; Van Hook, Brown, and Bean, 2006).

The costs of naturalization range from the time and money invested in the application process to potentially relinquishing the benefits of previous citizenships. Application fees and citizenship tests are more costly for immigrants with lower levels of education. At the same time, highly skilled immigrants are more likely to own property or have business interests in other countries – benefits that they may lose when acquiring American or Canadian citizenship. On the other hand, acquiring citizenship may aid the cosmopolitan lifestyle of the highly skilled immigrants. The growing number of sending countries allowing dual citizenship in the 1990s may be reflected in increasing naturalization rates among the highly-skilled between the 1990/1 and 2000/1 Census waves (Sejersen, 2008).

Another way of looking at naturalization is by considering **contexts of exit and reception**. Immigrants from geographically distant countries, or countries with repressive regimes, may be more likely to become citizens due to the difficulty in reversing their migration (Bueker, 2005; Portes and Rumbaut, 1996). In contrast, immigrants who come to the US from Mexico and Canada have lower citizenship rates than other groups partly due to the relative ease with which they can reverse their immigrant status (Bloemraad, 2006a). The reversibility thesis is undermined, however, by research indicating that citizenship acquisition can actually be a means to increased transnational activity by easing travel to and contacts with the home country (Gilbertson and Singer, 2003).

Contexts of reception are different in Canada and the US. Although Canada has fewer affirmative action-type measures than the US, government assistance to ethnic groups – including assistance in naturalizing – is likely to increase naturalization among those with low socioeconomic status compared to the US, which lacks such policies (Bloemraad, 2006a). Immigrants also confront contexts of reception conditioned by prevailing frameworks of dealing with difference. For instance, Hispanic immigrants face a hostile context of reception in the US, which may make it less likely that they seek citizenship or are able to overcome the hurdles in acquiring it (Portes and Rumbaut, 1996). Empirical research shows that Canada and the US are comparable in their attitudes toward racial minorities, although social and economic distance between groups is lower in Canada (Reitz and Breton, 1994). In addition, there are sub-national differences in the context of reception. For instance, there is local level variation in anti-immigrant sentiment and political mobilization of immigrant groups. In Canada, the province of Quebec has its own point system for selecting independent immigrants, although the federal government continues to regulate family migrants and refugees (Grenier, 2003; Labelle and Salee, 2001). With more emphasis on assimilationist policies than the rest of Canada, we might expect residence in Quebec to be negatively associated with having citizenship status. The difference in the institutional contexts of Quebec and the rest of Canada are likely to be much greater than the differences between American states.

Citizenship acquisition can also be viewed as a by-product of the **assimilation process**. With successful adaptation comes commitment to the host country and a change in the identity of the individual, which are then formalized through naturalization (Gordon, 1964). The assimilation model is quite complementary to the economic model of naturalization since it also predicts that immigrants with higher levels of education and income will be more likely to

naturalize – because they are better integrated into society. Moreover, simply the length of time spent in the host country will play a decisive role in whether an immigrant has naturalized, serving as a proxy for increased adaptation to and understanding of the host society.

Data and Methods

This paper uses four waves of census data for each country: 1971, 1981, 1991, and 2001 for Canada and 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000 for the US (Ruggles *et al*, 2004; Statistics Canada, 1971; 1982; 1994; 2005a). I use the 1% Public Use Microdata Samples (PUMS) of the US Census for all waves, 1% PUMS Files from the 1971 Canadian Census, 2% from the 1981 Canadian Census, and 3% from the 1991 and 2000 Canadian Census. The sample in this study includes foreign-born aged 25 and over at the time of the census. I merge the waves of each dataset to create two combined datasets. Since naturalization decisions are likely to differ for immigrants who arrive as children or those who acquire college education in the host country, analysis is limited to foreign-born individuals who immigrated at age 18 and over. Neither dataset includes information about the timing of naturalization, making it impossible to establish causal relationships between determinants and citizenship status. To reduce the possibility of reverse causality, I restrict analysis to respondents who immigrated between 5 and 15 years before the census. The American census includes foreign-born individuals who are not eligible to be naturalized because they are not permanent residents but are either resident foreigners or undocumented migrants. The 1971 and 1981 waves of the Canadian data are similar to the American census in this limitation.

The dichotomous dependent variable indicates whether the foreign-born respondent was a naturalized citizen at the time of the census. The primary determinant of interest is level of

education, and I also control for income, age at the time of the census, time since migration, sex, and marital status. Income is measured as the natural log of the total personal income in the year prior to the census year, adjusted and converted to the value of the US dollar in 1999 using Purchasing Power Parities and Consumer Price Index (Heston, Summers, and Aten, 2006; US Department of Labor, 2009). For US models, I include dummy variables for states and major metropolitan areas. For Canada, I control for residence in Quebec. Logistic regression is used to test the association between level of education and the odds of citizenship, including interaction effects between year of the census and education.

Results

Table 1 presents proportion naturalized in each educational category by census year. Overall, the distribution of citizenship varies far more by level of education in the US than in Canada. The gap in citizenship between levels of education has increased in the US while remaining small in Canada. For instance, 42% of immigrants with less than high school education and 45% of those with college education were citizens in the US in 1970. By 2000, this gap of 3% has increased to 20%, with only 18% of the least educated holding citizenship status.

Table 2 presents results of logistic regressions predicting citizenship status of immigrants in Canada and the US. The associations with the level of education, as well as the interaction of education with the year of the census, reach statistical significance in many cases, particularly in the US. In addition, income is positively related to citizenship status, with each additional percent of total yearly income associated with 2.7% higher odds of citizenship in Canada and 1.4 % higher odds of citizenship in the US.¹ Other controls are statistically significant as well,

including age (positive in Canada), time since migration (positive in both), being male (positive in Canada, negative in the US), and being married (positive in the US). Living in Quebec is associated with a 35% increase in the odds of citizenship holding other factors constant. In the US, most state and municipality coefficients do not reach statistical significance (not shown, available upon request).

In order to interpret the relationship between level of education and citizenship status over time, it is best to refer to Table 3, which shows predicted probabilities. The predicted probability of being a citizen in the United States was around 45% for all educational groups in 1970. Controlling for other factors, immigrants grew progressively less likely to be citizens over time across educational categories. However, those with less than high school education fell farther behind everyone else. By 2000, the predicted probability of having citizenship for that group was only 18%, compared to 32% among high school graduates, and 40 and 39% for those with some college and college educations. Canadian data reveals an almost flat educational profile of citizenship in 1971, at around 43%, controlling for other factors. By 2001, predicted probabilities of citizenship are much higher but are still within a narrow range of 76 to 83%. The increase in probability of citizenship in Canada did not come at the cost of higher inequality by education level.²

[Tables 1, 2, 3 about here]

Figure 2 shows the odds of having citizenship status by country or region of origin.³ Compared to immigrants from Germany, immigrants to Canada from the US have significantly lower odds of being citizens. The highest relative odds of having citizenship in Canada are found among immigrants from USSR and Africa, followed by those from Poland and Asia. Immigrants from United Kingdom and Italy are not statistically different than immigrants from

Germany. The US Census allows for a more detailed disaggregation by country or region of origin. In the US, only Canadian and Northern European immigrants have lower odds of naturalization than Mexicans, the largest immigrant group. The Japanese and Central Americans are not significantly different than immigrants from Mexico. The highest odds of naturalization are to be found among the Vietnamese, immigrants from the USSR, the Philippines, and the Middle East. The group with the next highest odds includes immigrants from Eastern Europe, China, and Korea. Only somewhat different from Mexican immigrants in the US are immigrants from Oceania, Western Europe, South America, Central Europe, and Cuba.

[Figure 2 about here]

As mentioned, a shortcoming of the US Census data is the inability to identify and exclude undocumented immigrants (who are not eligible for citizenship) from analysis. Thus, it is possible that the increasingly negative association between less than high school education and odds of being an American citizen observed here is due to the presence of this disproportionately unskilled population. It is estimated that over half of undocumented migrants in the US come from Mexico (Passel, 2005). Therefore, I excluded immigrants born in Mexico, as well as those born in Central America (altogether eliminating approximately 85% of the undocumented) to explore the possibility that my results are affected by the presence of those ineligible for citizenship (see Tables 2 and 3). One notable difference is that the predicted probability of being a citizen is higher for every level of education once Mexican and Central American origin immigrants are excluded. In addition, the drop in predicted probability among the least educated from 20 to 18% between 1990 and 2000 is actually an increase from 23 to 31% once the most likely to be undocumented are excluded. This indicates that the undocumented could very well have been depressing the odds of citizenship for the unskilled in this time period. Yet the

dramatic declines in proportion naturalized – as well as the predicted probabilities of citizenship controlling for other factors – occurred between 1970 and 1990, and not when the undocumented population mushroomed in the 1990s (Passel, 2005). Therefore, the inclusion of the undocumented in the US Census cannot be the entire explanation for the dramatically declining odds of citizenship among American immigrants with the lowest levels of education between 1970 and 1990.

Discussion

Rates of naturalization grew in Canada and declined in the US in the decades leading up to the millennium. The contribution of this paper is the analysis of inequalities hidden in these trends. In the US, citizenship status and the benefits it conveys came to be more unequally distributed, with unskilled immigrants faring worse than their skilled contemporaries, and worse than the unskilled in previous decades. In Canada, on the other hand, the significance of education for citizenship acquisition remained low. Some of the growth in citizenship inequality in the US is due to the growing undocumented population, which is disproportionately unskilled and ineligible for citizenship. Nevertheless, the growing inequalities and declines in naturalization rates became apparent long before the massive growth in undocumented migration to the US. Traditional economic maximization and assimilation theories would point to an explanation that hinges on the costs and benefits of acquiring citizenship. What happened in the 1970s and 1980s to raise the costs of naturalization and lower its benefits for immigrants, particularly unskilled immigrants? In fact, benefits of citizenship for immigrants remained the same until 1996: voting, improved ability to sponsor family migration, eased travel, and access to some jobs. The costs, on the other hand, may have increased as the vast immigration

bureaucracy confronted a dramatic upswing of immigrants without amending naturalization procedures to improve on the typical “Long Gray Welcome” (North 1987). It is this alienating and labyrinthine process, with backlogs lengthening in response to the growing numbers of immigrants, which may have been responsible for the lower uptake of citizenship, particularly among the unskilled, for whom these hurdles were higher. This, of course, is part of the American context of reception, described and contrasted to the Canadian alternative by Bloemraad (2002, 2006a, 2006b). After the reforms of 1996, the benefits of US naturalization increased dramatically, not only because of access to welfare benefits, but as an opportunity to escape the sudden precariousness of the permanent resident status. Combined with changes in many sending countries’ citizenship laws, this led to what appears to be a reversal of a twenty year downward trend, although not a reversal of the growing inequality in citizenship. Meanwhile, the low significance of education for naturalization in Canada is consistent with the expansion and consolidation of multiculturalism policies in the 1970s and the lowering of barriers to citizenship in the Citizenship Act of 1977 (Kaplan, 1991). Given Canada’s proactive approach to naturalization of immigrants – outreach and funding of various programs – it is not surprising that immigrants with the lowest levels of education are not as disadvantaged as they are in the US.

Another factor of importance in this analysis appears to be the context of exit. In both countries, the more “reversible” the migration is, the less likely are migrants to become citizens: migrants from repressive political regimes and/or migrants from far away have the highest odds of acquiring citizenship, while those from neighboring countries and countries with democratic regimes have the lowest odds, controlling for other factors. In the US, these patterns of naturalization intersect with patterns of racial stratification. Immigrants from Mexico and

Central and Southern America have some of the lowest odds of citizenship. They are closely followed by black immigrants from the West Indies and Africa. The low odds of having citizenship for Hispanic and black immigrants exacerbates the disadvantages experienced by Hispanic and black populations in the US in general. The Asian label obscures variability: immigrants from some parts of Asia have much lower odds of naturalization than others, controlling for other factors. Race does not have the same significance in Canada as it does in the US (Reitz and Breton 1994). There are relatively few Hispanic immigrants in Canada but other ‘visible minorities’, including black and Asian immigrants, have relatively high odds of citizenship. In fact, the lowest odds are to be found among white groups. Refugees in the US receive additional government assistance in acquiring citizenship, so the association between country of origin and odds of citizenship could reflect that factor as well. Cuba is an exception: one would expect high odds of citizenship because of the refugee status of the immigrants and the difficulty in returning, but being from Cuba is associated with relatively low odds of citizenship.

Place of residence once in the host country matters as well. Since Quebec stresses assimilation to the Francophone culture (Grenier, 2003; Labelle and Salee, 2001), we might expect residence there to negatively impact the odds of naturalization compared to the rest of Canada, where multiculturalism policies facilitate feelings of trust and loyalty to the government. However, living in Quebec is associated with significantly *higher* odds of citizenship than living in other Canadian provinces, even when origin countries are held constant. In fact, previous studies have found that immigrants in Quebec are more likely than immigrants to other provinces to speak neither English nor French, and to subsequently transition to using English (Beaujot, 2003). In addition, although Quebec has some freedom in deciding which immigrants to admit,

naturalization is still managed from Ottawa and is clearly about joining Canada. Perhaps, immigrants in Quebec have higher odds of citizenship because they are resisting Quebec's efforts at assimilation – or reacting to the difficulty of integrating into the Quebecois identity group – by becoming Canadian, not Quebecois. Further research is needed to investigate this counterintuitive finding. In the US, there were a few statistically significant effects of living in different states (available upon request), although it is difficult to discern any coherent patterns.

This analysis is focused on citizenship status among recent adult immigrants, not the entire immigrant populations of Canada and the US. Other types of immigrants, such as longtime residents and immigrants who arrived as children, are likely to have higher incidence of naturalization. For the population examined, however, there is not simply a growing national gap in naturalization rates between Canada and the US, but a hidden growing inequality in how citizenship is distributed in the US.

Conclusion

Trends in citizenship acquisition by immigrants flag failures and successes of immigrant incorporation in multicultural democracies. But gross trends can hide additional patterns of inequality that map onto existing systems of stratification. The differences in citizenship status by level of education among Canadian immigrants are small, dwarfed by the sheer size of the increase in naturalization rates for everyone in the last thirty years. Even the least educated immigrants in Canada are naturalizing at almost twice the rate of the most educated immigrants in the US. The situation in the US, on the other hand, is a cause for concern. Persistent and large inequalities in citizenship leave the already disadvantaged unskilled immigrants without the

access to rights, representation, security, and job and educational opportunities that citizenship brings.

The US Citizenship and Immigration Service (the government agency responsible for immigrant naturalization) has been working on directly promoting citizenship acquisition, which may increase the rates of citizenship among the most disadvantaged. Despite some post-9/11 delays in application processing, the number of newly naturalized immigrants is high in the 2000s (USDHS, 2009). The same period, however, saw the development of a new and far more rigorous naturalization test. Aside from raising the citizenship hurdle for the unskilled, this test is indicative of the ongoing anxiety about the ‘cheapening’ of citizenship in the US (Preston, 2007). In addition, by 2008, naturalization fees increased from a few hundred dollars to \$675 (compared to only \$200 in Canada). Thus, it seems unlikely that current American naturalization policies can adequately reverse the dismal rates of naturalization and the inequality hidden within these rates.

High naturalization rates alone are not a guarantee of successful immigrant integration. There are many forms of exclusion that continue to affect immigrants regardless of citizenship status. Nevertheless, citizenship at least holds the potential of inclusion. With that in mind, Canada is more successful at immigrant incorporation. The US could probably raise naturalization rates, especially among the disadvantaged segments of immigrant population, by replicating some of the Canadian programs that promote citizenship and assist in the naturalization process through English and civic classes. Concern over the consequences of extremely low rates of naturalization and the compounded disadvantage of the least educated should outweigh anxiety over maintaining high boundaries around citizenship.

1. Inclusion of an instrumental variable measuring expected gain in income from acquiring citizenship did not significantly alter the results of these models. The variable itself was statistically significant but had the value of 1.000 (odds ratio).
2. I also ran separate models for each educational group. These results are in line with those reported for the entire immigrant population, with two exceptions. In Canada, living in Quebec is only positively associated with citizenship for those with less than college education. In the United States, time since migration has a significant and positive coefficient only for those with college education.
3. No measure of dual citizenship was included in the analysis. Controls for country or region of origin were used instead. Many of the sending countries that adopted dual citizenship provisions did so at the very end of the period under consideration, and this should not change the trends observed between 1970 and 1991.

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Table 1. Percent Naturalized by Level of Education and Year of Census

	Less than		H.S.		Some		College and		Total	
	h.s.				college		above			
	US	CA	US	CA	US	CA	US	CA	US	CA
All	23.8	60.6	34.3	63.2	39.8	71.6	40.7	74.7	32.4	67.0
1970/1	41.6	42.6	45.3	41.8	45.5	42.6	44.7	42.0	43.4	42.3
1980/1	27.2	52.3	37.6	60.4	38.8	60.2	44.7	66.4	34.5	58.5
1990/1	20.3	70.9	32.3	71.2	38.9	74.9	40.8	76.9	30.9	73.5
2000/1	18.2	76.5	31.6	77.8	39.8	78.4	38.6	82.5	30.0	78.9

Source: Canadian Census 1971, 1981, 1991, 2001 and US Census 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000.

Note: The sample is limited to immigrants who are aged at least 25 and arrived in Canada or the US between 5 and 15 years prior to the census at age 18 or higher.

Table 2. Selected Odds Ratios from Logistic Regressions Predicting Citizenship Status of Immigrants in Canada and the US.

	Canada	United States	United States without Mexico & Central America
Age	1.005***	0.999	0.998***
Years since migration	1.173**	1.217***	1.237***
Male	1.066**	0.929***	0.928***
Married	0.955	1.189***	1.193***
Highest level of education (ref: high school)			
Less than high school	0.951	0.793***	0.772***
Some college	0.974	0.986	0.977
College	0.908	0.824**	0.812**

Logged income	1.027***	1.014***	1.015***
Census year (ref: 1970/1)			
1980/1	2.237***	0.599***	0.577***
1990/1	2.360***	0.447***	0.421***
2000/1	3.219*	0.446***	0.463***
Quebec	1.349***		
Interaction effects: edu*year			
Less than hs * 1980/1	0.653***	0.855**	0.864*
Less than hs * 1990/1	0.924	0.811***	0.656***
Less than hs * 2000/1	0.923	0.729***	0.840**
Some college * 1980/1	1.027	1.057	1.073
Some college * 1990/1	1.384**	1.260**	1.343***
Some college * 2000/1	1.163	1.288***	1.276**
College * 1980/1	1.458**	1.302***	1.320***
College * 1990/1	1.705***	1.427***	1.490***
College * 2000/1	1.673***	1.268***	1.194*
N	57,521	138,554	98,372

Source: Canadian Census 1971, 1981, 1991, 2001 and US Census 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000.

Note: The sample is limited to immigrants who are aged at least 25 and arrived in Canada or the US between 5 and 15 years prior to the census at age 18 or higher. The models also include controls for country/region of origin and states and selected metropolitan areas in the US.

** $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$*

Table 3. Predicted Probabilities of Citizenship Status by Level of Education and Year

Census Year	US - All				Canada-All				US - Without Mexicans and Central Americans			
	Less		Some		Less		Some		Less		Some	
	than hs	HS	college	College	than hs	HS	college	College	than hs	HS	college	College
1970/1	0.42	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.43	0.40	0.43	0.43	0.45	0.46	0.45	0.45
1980/1	0.27	0.38	0.39	0.45	0.52	0.60	0.60	0.67	0.32	0.39	0.40	0.45
1990/1	0.20	0.32	0.39	0.41	0.71	0.72	0.72	0.77	0.23	0.35	0.42	0.42
2000/1	0.18	0.32	0.40	0.39	0.76	0.78	0.78	0.83	0.31	0.38	0.44	0.40

**Figure 1. Percentage of Citizens Among All Foreign-Born Residents in the
United States and Canada 1970-2006.**

Source: Canadian Census 1971, 1981, 1991, 2001, 2006, US Census 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, American Communities Survey 2006.

Figure 2. Odds Ratios for Country/Region of Origin in Multiple Regressions
Predicting Citizenship Status in Canada and the US.

Source: Canadian Census 1971, 1981, 1991, 2001, US Census 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000

White bar indicates statistically non-significant at the $p < 0.05$ level. Black bar is the omitted category.