

Fall 2015


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Recommended Citation

Jacob, Frank, "Gurkha Soldiers as an Intercultural Moment on the European Battlefields of the Great War" (2015). *CUNY Academic Works*.

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Gurkha Soldiers as an Intercultural Moment on the European Battlefields of the Great War

Frank JACOB

The centennial of the First World War in 2014 created a high impact for research of the events between 1914 and 1918.ⁱ However, the perspective remained a mainly European one, as it can be seen by having a look in the Cambridge History of the First World Warⁱⁱ, which covers mainly the European aspects of the Great War. Despite this partially still existing Euro-centrism with regard to the events of the “seminal catastrophe of the twentieth century,”ⁱⁱⁱ research on colonial spheres and the use of colonial troops^{iv} in the international campaigns are especially important to show the transnational impact of the events during the war years.

The British Empire and its multiethnic colonial sphere had created many different colonial elite troops, whose members were recruited in Africa^v, the Punjab^{vi}, and especially Nepal^{vii}. The last named country provided countless generations of young men to fight and die for the sake of the British Empire, and military historians as well as those who served as officers in the British army know that the so-called Gurkhas have been an elite troop inside the British Indian Army for more than one and a half centuries.

Since the Anglo-Nepalese War (1814-1816),^{viii} the soldiers of Great Britain have been aware of the military potential of these Nepalese warriors.^{ix} When Britain sent 22,000 men to Nepal, they had to face an enemy that was not just willing but effectively able to resist the ambitions of the Empire. After three attempts and the use of the assembled strength of its military system, the British campaign was finally successful in 1816. The peace treaty signed with the Nepalese ruler on 4 March of the same year finally ended the conflict but also provided the right to the victorious British Empire to recruit soldiers from the small Asian country, neighbored by India and China. The war and the fierce fighting of the Nepalese Gurkhas “left each side with an increased respect for the other”^x, and the British officers were more than happy for the opportunity to fill their ranks with the

strong and talented warriors, who seemed to be more than equal to be used against the Afghan tribes. The Gurkhas proved their talent in countless campaigns on the different parts of the Indian-Afghan border^{xi}, where the regiments had to secure British hegemony for more than a century.

In the following decades, the Gurkhas became a fundamental part of the British Indian Army serving in the North-West as well as the North-East Frontier of the British Indian Empire, where they remained in loyal support of its aims and its majesty even during the Indian Mutiny^{xii} in 1857. The Gurkhas seemed to be the most loyal soldiers because there were almost no desertions and even when the rebellious forces pleaded for assistance, they remained loyal to their British officers. During the last two centuries, whole generations of Gurkhas have served as part of the regiments of the British Indian Army. Even if their main reason for joining the British army might have been a financial one, the stories of heroism and martiality, “stories of their prowess in battle, particularly with their short curved knives, called kukris, with the cutting edge on the inside and the notched phallus on the blade”^{xiii}, would become a major part of their legend. Almost every British officer who had served with a Gurkha regiment would state that those soldiers were the bravest troops of the whole Empire. As a consequence, many officers were willing to serve at least some years as part of a Gurkha regiment in the British Indian Army – the higher pay in this part of the world might have been a driving force as well. However, not many achieved this aim especially since those officers who wanted to serve in a Gurkha regiment would have to learn the Nepalese language of Khas Kura. To be fully accepted by the soldiers meant to be understood by them:

The surprise and delight of the Gurkha officers and men at hearing their own dialect spoken by an officer of (...) high rank, and the way their faces lighted up, would be ample reward for the trouble taken ver “Khas Kura”.^{xiv}

Gurkhas, originally meaning 'cow protectors', was a term that just described the people of Mongolian origin who lived in the Nepalese hills and were part of the warrior class of the small

Asian country. This term thus became synonymous for bravery and heroism. Stories of the brave Gurkhas can consequently be found with regard to all major wars of the 20th century^{xv}, and even their enemies acknowledged this and described them as “transparently honest men, very brave sticklers for regulations – the very model of sturdy, honest and simple soldiers”^{xvi}. It is true that “their military skills and bravery are rightly admired”^{xvii}, and almost every soldier or officer who met a Gurkha himself was charmed by their simple but friendly habits. Many British officers were attracted by the service of these short Nepalese soldiers and their constant contact with their former comrades in arms.^{xviii} It were these Asian soldiers who were described as tremendously brave when they were fighting and dying for the honor of the British Empire, especially on so many battlefields during the Great War 1914-1918.^{xix}

The following article will trace the role of the First World War in the creation of the heroic and transnational image of the Gurkha soldiers, who were recognized not only by their British officers but also by their enemies, who recognized that these Asian soldiers were especially skillful when killing Germans or Turks with their kukris on the Western or Middle Eastern front.^{xx} In the first section, I will provide a short survey of the battlefields of the Great War where the Gurkha soldiers were sent. This should also affirm that the decision to bring them into the game could be wise, but also absurd, depending on the characters of the battlefield itself. In the second section, I will point out the effect of the global influence of the small but brave soldiers to show that the Great War was responsible for the long lasting myth of the military skills and the heroic bravery of the Gurkha soldiers.

The Great War

When the First World War broke out in 1914, the British Indian Army immediately began to mobilize, and in contrast to the Second World War, there were no antagonist Gandhi^{xxi} and no peace

movement that might have slowed down the Indian support for the war cause because such a movement would have caused problems with regard to an Indian participation in the war scenario. In August 1914, the Indian Army, therefore, started its own mobilization to send troops to support the British. Nepal also remained a loyal ally of the British rulers, not only sending money and weapons in support of the British Indian Army but also recruiting more than 200,000 Gurkhas to the British regiments, leaving the hills of Nepal without its male population. The Great War, in general, mobilized the whole human potential of the colonial empires, bringing not only soldiers but also workers^{xxii} from all around the globe to the European battlefields, where the non-Europeans were supposed to fight and die for the causes of their colonial rulers. The Gurkha soldiers were assembled into ten infantry regiments of the British Indian Army and sent to different battlefields of the Great War, where 10% of these men were going to die what was later called to be an honorable death. The Asian soldiers “certainly were not consciously fighting to preserve Western civilization or to make the world safe for democracy”^{xxiii} but were rather longing for honor and glory or pay and pension or were just waging the fight because they were told to do so by their officers. It is definitely hard to generalize the motives of the Nepalese men who fought for the sake of the British Empire. While some of them might at first instance have been just interested in the good payment, others could have served the cause of the war just as a consequence of tradition. In many Gurkha families, more than one generation had served in the British service before, so the young men in 1914 could also have seen a possibility to proceed with the family tradition. Despite their personal willingness to fight, they might have been surprised when they were confronted with the new and modernized way of warfare in the trenches of the Western front.^{xxiv}

In contrast to the mobilized warfare in the colonial spheres where the Gurkhas had been brave and reliable soldiers, the battlefields in France just offered trench warfare, where the amount of artillery seemed to be more important than the right fighting spirit.^{xxv} Due to the lack of movement during the campaigns, the Gurkhas were not able to become an effective weapon against

the enemies.

On 29 October 1914, the first Gurkhas reached Europe. When the 28th Regiment was ordered into battle, the danger of losing almost a whole generation of Gurkha men was as high as within other regiments. The so-called “lost generation”^{xxvi} of the First World War, was as Nepalese as it had been Australian, British, Canadian or European. Facing the modern face of warfare, no level of bravery could have been sufficient to overcome a heavy artillery just by will and spirit. Consequently, the very successful soldiers of the British Indian Army had no chance to gain a victory in France, and after 13 months, the Indian Corps was transferred to the North-West Frontier again. The harsh climate, the size of the trenches and the logistic problems regarding sufficient Indian food supplies made the Nepalese soldiers unsuitable for the war planning of a European campaign. Regardless of these facts and despite the outcome that the Gurkhas were not able to provide a British victory, the soldiers from Nepal were well received as a positive aspect of Britain's Asian Empire because neither the civil population nor the British officers could complain about them.

It had simply been a mistake to send the Gurkha regiments to France, where the climatic and geographic environment as well as the trench warfare was just unsuitable for the fighting style of the Gurkha soldiers. Geography, climate and the way of warfare had their specific impact on the usability of traditional colonial troops who were used to the fighting style on the Indian-Afghan border region and not to a trench war. As a consequence of this miscalculation of the British military, many young Gurkhas lost their lives during the 13 months at the Western front of the First World War. They were sent to support the French and British contingents, yet the Gurkhas were never able to succeed there. They arrived poorly equipped and had to face hunger, cold, mud, dampness and trenches that were too deep for the short soldiers from Nepal.^{xxvii} Despite the bad conditions in their new fighting environment, the Gurkhas kept up their morale and tried to give their best. Many of the soldiers as well as their officers died, shot like flies by the better equipped

German troops who were using machine guns to drown their enemies in a sea of blood. When the Gurkhas participated in the British offensive at Neuve Chapelle in March 1915, they had to face the same fate as the European soldiers before them. They were dying in great numbers, and over just a few minutes, whole regiments were erased from the course of history.

Due to the rather unsuitable environment, it, therefore, is no wonder that the Gurkhas would receive more fame on other battlefields of the global war because other scenes of the global war provided better stages for the “art of Gurkha warfare“.

Therefore, another place would become more glorious for these Nepalese men. All ten Gurkha regiments sent at least one battalion to Mesopotamia, an important sphere of the Great War^{xxviii}, even though the European powers regarded this battlefield as a minor sideline of the war theater. With special regard to the large amount of Muslims living in the British Empire, the success or failure of the British forces in this region was decisive for a large part of the colonial territories of Great Britain especially since Turkey had proclaimed the beginning of a holy war in late 1914. General Sir John Nixon (1857-1921) was requested to secure lower Mesopotamia against the Turks, but driven by his thirst for fame, he developed an obsession for the seizure of Baghdad^{xxix}, which would cost a lot of soldiers their lives. He sent 11,000 men against the Turks at Kut-el-Amara,^{xx} and when the troops were able to defeat the Turks, they were ordered to proceed against Baghdad. However, the British forces were not able to continue the victories of the beginning of the campaign and had to return to Kut on 3 December. After several days of hard fighting, they had to retreat from there as well. The retreat from there was a shock for the British Empire that took two months for the British army to recover from. Then the 2nd Gurkhas^{xxxi} crossed the Tigris, built a strong bridgehead and reopened the march on Baghdad again. Later, they were involved in the re-occupation of Kut-al-Amara and when the British took Baghdad in March 1917. The war in Mesopotamia seemed to be rather successful, compared to the Western Front in Europe, a fact that was also a consequence of the fighting tactics, which were rather based on movement and mobility, in the Middle East. In

September 1918, General Allenby and the 27th Gurkha Regiment defeated the Turks at Megiddo^{xxxii}, securing British success at this stage of the Great War. The high temperatures, thirst and sand were not as problematic as the rainy trenches of France, and the Gurkhas provided a vital part of the British success in Mesopotamia. The battles in partly mountainous environments, the drier climate and the moving battles were better suited for the small Nepalese soldiers, who were trained and used to this kind of battle by their experiences on the Indian-Afghan border in the years before. However, another battle would make them famous forever. The decisive battle of Gallipoli^{xx} should become a synonymous term not only for military failure but also for Gurkha bravery. The events at Gallipoli not only impacted the creation and strengthening of an Australian nationalism but also established the since ever told myth of the brave Gurkha, fighting for the British Empire. By meeting other colonial troops, e.g. from Australia, and showing greater interest in each other, as visible in the photograph in Figure 1 of an Australian soldier with his Nepalese comrades posing with their kukris, the image of the Gurkha as an emblematic figure for bravery and chivalry was spread even further.

However, the campaign on the Gallipoli Peninsula would finally create a myth that lasted ever since with regard to the kukri using Gurkha soldiers. The Battle of Gallipoli was “one of the most moving and tragic campaigns in all history, tragic not only in the severe loss of life but because from the British point of view, priceless opportunities were thrown away after the first landings on 25 April 1915”^{xxxiv}. Despite the image of military failure, General Ian Hamilton (1853-1947) decided well when he asked Lord Kitchener for some Gurkha troops for his campaign because he was sure that “each little 'Gurk' might be worth his full weight in gold at Gallipoli” (Farwell, 96). He received the 15th, 16th and 210th Gurkha Regiments, which then became part of the 78,000 men who were going to land on the Mediterranean peninsula. (Figure 2) They would encounter 60,000 Turks, led by the German general Otto Liman van Sanders (1855-1929)^{xx} as well as Mustafa Kemal (1881-1938), who were able to cause severe casualties on the Allied side,

especially with regard to the ANZAC troops. The Gurkha troops did not arrive until the fifth day of the campaign, and they were successful in the beginning when the so-called Gurkha bluff became a victorious assault on a high Turkish stronghold. In a campaign due to which victories were rather rare, the attempt of the Nepalese soldiers and their success were able to be used to create a new legend of chivalry in the bloody sand of the beaches of Gallipoli.

The Gurkhas also participated in the third battle at Krithia, but even these Nepalese soldiers were not able to seize the Achi Baba Hill, where the Turks caused another 7,000 casualties. The planners of the British military staff had underestimated the strength of the Turkish enemy and the hardship that would be presented by the geographical environment at Gallipoli. While the British troops were landing on the wide beaches, the Turkish troops used machine gun fire to kill the landing soldiers, who had to debark from the transporting ships before seeking concealment. Those who were able to survive the landing had to mount the cliffs of the peninsula to face the Turks, but until they got there, most of them were killed or wounded already.

Consequently, in the first five weeks of the campaign (25 April 1915 - 9 January 1916), the 210th Gurkha Regiment lost 70% of their officers and 40% of all soldiers. These numbers were no exceptions because other regiments lost a lot of their men as well. In August, the short Nepalese soldiers were also participating in an assault against Hill Q, but they were not able to seize the hill for long. The British navy mistakenly opened fire on them, forcing Major C. J. L. Allanson and his troops to retreat again and the Turks to re-occupy the hill. After many brave soldiers from New Zealand, Australia and Nepal had died in the campaign and many more had become victims of cold weather, for which they had not been prepared appropriately, at the end of 1915 (Fig.4), the British military leaders commanded a retreat.

Even though the Gurkhas were not successful in gaining a complete victory on the peninsula, during this important military campaign, "Gallipoli" became an expression of Gurkha bravery and honor. All in all, the First World War, with its high losses of human lives intermingled

with the fearless attempts of the small Nepalese soldiers, created a myth: the myth of the elite force of the Gurkha soldiers. This force would never stop an assault no matter how dangerous the situation would be. A lot of British officers who had served with these Nepalese soldiers wrote their memoirs^{xxxvi} or other stories of Gurkha bravery in the aftermath of the Great War, thereby promoting the image of the regiments filled by the recruitment of young men from Nepal.

Effects

There are just a small number of soldiers who are really prepared for the cruel image a modern and real war is going to present to them. The cruelties of the First World War were especially frightening and traumatizing. Men like Ernst Jünger (1895-1998) were able to at least give an impression of this modern warfare:

What was that about? War had shown its claws, and stripped off its mask of cosiness. It was all so strange, so impersonal. We had barely begun to think about the enemy that mysterious, treacherous being somewhere. This event, so far beyond anything we had experienced, made such a powerful impression on us that it was difficult to understand what had happened. It was like a ghostly manifestation in broad daylight.^{xxxvii}

The noise, confusion, blood, horror and a too real fear are sometimes more than a human being could ever expect to meet in the trenches or on the battlefield, not only in the “hell of Verdun“. Furthermore, the physical and psychological attrition as a consequence of cumulative filth and fatigue could be too harsh for young men dreaming of a better future. Experiencing death in all its possible and cruel ways traumatized a whole generation. It made them ill. However, the Gurkhas had shown that they were reliable soldiers who were always eager to do their duty even if the chances to survive were minimal. They attacked no matter how high or low their chances for victory would be. Ironically, they made the “perfect soldiers“.

With the end of the First World War, due to which they had received their international baptism of fire, no wise man would again question the challenge of a Gurkha regiment without sufficient preparation. The harmless image of the short soldiers did not exist anymore. The men who had even joked about death and the modern expression of Western civilization (e.g. planes) were described and praised in countless memoirs, regimental histories, diaries and autobiographies.^{xxxviii} The Gurkhas were described as a visible expression of masculine heroes in the battles of the Great War. These men were the resemblance of bravery, but only a courageous British officer was able to lead the men to victory.^{xxxix} Consequently, it was the might of the white British officers to channel the brute force of the most valued soldiers of the Empire in battle. The image of the brave Gurkha was thereby not able to overcome racist and chauvinist assumptions or prejudices although it was able to show that the colored part of the British Army was of tremendous importance. In contrast to other colonial subordinates, the Gurkhas were seen as a fighting race who received the respect of their British masters who recognized themselves in the bravery of the Gurkha soldiers.

However, the experience of the Gurkhas did even more for many other people. It was able to show that there were Asian people who were as strong, as brave, and as loyal as Western soldiers. Due to this, the participation of the Nepalese soldiers during the European war helped to overcome the stereotypes of uncivilized and weak Asians, who must have been protected themselves. On the other hand, this image was used by the British officers in their memoirs to defend the mission of British imperialism as well because it was the impact of Western rule that made the high potential of the Nepalese soldiers available.

Despite this Western interpretation, the bloody victories changed the reception of Asia in many ways and that of Nepal and its brave soldiers in particular. It seems to be ironic, but by sharing the deadly experiences of the Great War, the soldiers in British regiments related to each other on the same level: as bleeding and dying soldiers ready to be killed in the name of honor and

glory for the British Empire.

ⁱ Countless volumes were published and conferences are taking place all around the globe. Due to this I would like to name just a few titles of the flood of new publications that were published in the last two years: Christopher Clark, *The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914* (New York: Harper, 2013); Frank Furedi, *First World War: Still No End in Sight* (New York: Bloomsbury, 2014); Jörg Leonhard, *Die Büchse der Pandora: Geschichte des Ersten Weltkriegs* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2014); Herfried Münkler, *Der Große Krieg: Die Welt 1914 bis 1918* (Berlin: Rowohlt, 2013); David Reynolds, *The Long Shadow: The Legacies of the Great War in the Twentieth Century* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2014); Alexander Watson, *Ring of Steel: Germany and Austria-Hungary in World War I* (New York: Basic Books, 2014); Geoffrey Wawrow, *A Mad Catastrophe: The Outbreak of World War I and the Collapse of the Habsburg Empire* (New York: Basic Books, 2014).

ⁱⁱ *The Cambridge History of the First World War*, ed. Jay Winter, 3 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

ⁱⁱⁱ George F. Kennan, *The Decline of Bismarck's European Order: Franco-Russian Relations, 1875-1890* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979), 3.

^{iv} For a general survey on colonial troops see: *Guardians of Empire*, eds. David Killingray and David Omissi (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999). The volume provides a global perspective, while also dealing with cultural and gender aspects.

^v The King's African Rifles would be one example for British colonial troops that were recruited in Africa. For their history see: Hubert Moyse-Bartlett, *The King's African Rifles: A Study in the Military History of East and Central Africa, 1890-1945* (Aldershot: Gale/Polden, 1956); Malcom Page, *A History of the King's African Rifles and East African Forces* (London: Cooper, 1997); Timothy H. Parsons, *African Rank-and-File: Social Implications of Colonial Military Service in the King's African Rifles 1902-1964* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1999).

^{vi} David Omissi, *The Sepoy and the Raj: The Indian Army, 1860-1940* (London: Macmillan, 1994).

^{vii} For surveys of the history of the Gurkha forces see: Purushottan Banskota, *The Gurkha Connection: A History of the Gurkha Recruitment in the British Indian Army* (Jaipur: Nirala Publications, 1994); Mike Chappell, *The Gurkhas* (Oxford: Osprey, 1993); Mary des Chenes, "Relics of Empire: A Cultural History of the Gurkhas, 1815-1987," (Ph.D. Dissertation, Stanford University, 1991); Byron Farwell, *The Gurkhas* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1985); Tony Gould, *Imperial Warriors: Britain and the Gurkhas* (London: Granta Books, 2002); John Parker, *The Gurkhas* (London: Headline Books, 1999).

^{viii} An anonymous account gives a survey of this conflict from a British perspective: "An account of the war in Nipal; Contained in a Letter from an Officer on the Staff of the Bengal Army," *Asiatic Journal and Monthly Miscellany* 1 (1816): 425-429. See also: Bernardo A. Michael, *Statemaking and Territory in South Asia: Lessons from the Anglo-Gorkha War (1814-1816)* (London: Anthem Press, 2012). Britain was afraid of a growing Nepalese military power that might be attracted to attack Tibet and create a Chinese or Russian intervention in a sphere of British interest, Kaisher Bahadur, "Modern Nepal," *East and West* 5:1 (1954), 22. That Nepal was an active military of the region is visible through the events of the Sino-Nepalese War in 1792, John W. Killingrew, "Some Aspects of the Sino-Nepalese War of 1792," *Journal of Asian History* 13:1 (1979): 42-63.

^{ix} Due to one of the earliest accounts on Nepal, Colonel Kirkpatrick, *An Account of the Kingdom of Nepal* (London: W. Bulmer Co, 1811), the country was not unknown for the British military planners.

^x Farwell, 32.

^{xi} The Gurkha regiments of the British Indian Army were regularly sent into conflicts with the Afghan tribes.

^{xii} For a short survey of the events of the Indian Mutiny see: Gregory Fermont-Barnes, *The Indian Mutiny 1857-58* (Oxford: Osprey, 2007).

^{xiii} Farwell, 11.

^{xiv} Major-General Nigel Woodyatt, *Under Ten Viceroys: The Reminiscences of a Gurkha* (London: Jenkins, 1922), 73.

^{xv} Gurkhas not only fought in World War I, but also in World War II, the Falkland War and many other conflicts, e.g. as part of the NATO forces in Afghanistan, see: Vron Ware, "Critical Whiteness Studies Needs to Think About Warfare," *Sociologist Forskning* 46:3 (2009), 60. Today, the Gurkha soldiers are often seen as mercenaries, fighting for foreign countries. "'Mercenaries' and Others," *Economic and Political Weekly* 34:30 (1999), 2045.

^{xvi} Farwell, 13.

^{xvii} *Ibid.*, 14.

^{xviii} The written accounts of these British officers consequently created a specific stereotype, which very often resembled an imagination instead of realities. See: Heather Streets, *Martial Races: The Military Race and Masculinity in British Imperial Culture, 1857-1914* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), 190-224 or with regard to the Gurkhas Lionel Caplan, *Warrior Gentlemen: 'Gurkhas' in the Western Imagination* (Providence: Berghahn Books, 1995). The relationships between the soldiers and the officers could be very close, as could be seen in the case of Charles Granville Bruce, B. E. M. Gurdon, "Obituary: Brigadier-General the Hon. Charles Granville Bruce, M. V. O., C. B.," *The Geographical Journal* 96:4 (1940): 301-303, especially 301. The intercultural exchange between officers and soldiers was also made possible by the fact that the British officers had to learn the Nepalese language, if they were willing to communicate directly with their soldiers, Jeremy MacClancy, "Obituary: Rodney Needham: 1923-2006: Distinguished Structuralist Anthropologist," *Anthropology Today* 23:2 (2007):22-23, especially 22. Needham for example supported four Gurkha families by paying money through the Gurkha Welfare Association.

^{xix} Especially Gallipoli should prove the worth of the Nepalese regiments of the British Indian Army, even if their effort was not able to change the outcome of the campaign.

^{xx} The weapon of the Gurkhas became also emblematic for their martial fighting skills.

^{xxi} Gandhi had hoped to improve the status of the Indian population due to their support for the British military needs.

^{xxii} Frank Jacob, "So beteiligte sich China am Ersten Weltkrieg," *Focus Online*, 5 October 2014, accessed January 10, 2015, http://www.focus.de/wissen/experten/jacob/experte-zum-ersten-weltkrieg-auch-china-war-am-ersten-weltkrieg-beteiligt_id_4167817.html.

^{xxiii} Farwell, 87.

xxiv On trench warfare in Eastern and Western Europe see: Tony Ashworth, *Trench Warfare*

1914-1918: The Live and Let Live System (London: Macmillan, 1980); *Jenseits des Schützengrabens: Der Erste Weltkrieg im Osten: Erfahrung – Wahrnehmung – Kontext*, eds. Bernhard Bachinger and Wolfram Dornik (Innsbruck: Studienverlag, 2013).

xxv Sanders Marble, *British Artillery on the Western Front in the First World War: 'The Infantry Cannot Do with a Gun Less'* (Burlington: Ashgate, 2014).

xxvi Examples for Australia could be found in Ross MacMullin, *Farewell, dear People: Biographies of Australia's Lost Generation* (Brunswick, Vic. Scribe, 2012).

xxvii Their average height was five feet three inches.

xxviii For a survey of the campaign see A. J. Barker, *The First Iraq War, 1914-1918: Britain's Mesopotamian Campaign* (New York: Enigma Books, 2009).

xxix Ibid., 299-316 describes the operations to take Baghdad.

xxx Ibid. 215-232.

xxxi Also known as The Sirmoor Rifles.

xxxii The fights at such historical places were used by the British propaganda as well, see: Eitan Bar-Yosef, "The Last Crusade? British Propaganda and the Palestine Campaign, 1917-18," *Journal of Contemporary History* 36:1 (2001): 87-109.

xxxiii The author is actually working on a survey of the Gallipoli campaign, which will be published by Schönigh in 2016.

xxxiv Eric David Smith, *Britain's Brigade of Gurkhas* (London: Cooper, 1973), 72.

xxxv Otto Liman von Sanders was one of the German officers, who were sent to the Ottoman Empire during the Great War. Carmen Klatt, "Deutsche Militärmissionen im Osmanischen Reich. Colmar von der Goltz, Otto Liman von Sanders, Erich von Falkenhayn," in *Aspekte einer Waffenbrüderschaft im I. Weltkrieg. Das Deutsche Reich und das Osmanische Reich*, ed. Carmen Klatt (Berlin: epubli, 2014).

xxxvi F. M. Warren Crooke, Letters, Australian War Memorial, Private Record, PR84/114.

xxxvii Ernst Jünger, *Storm of Steel* (New York/London: Penguin Books, 2004), 7.

xxxviii i.e. History of the 8th Gurkha Rifles (1824-1949), Huxford. Ralph Turner for example called his Gurkha soldiers often the “bravest of the brave”, John Burton-Page, “Sir Ralph Turner,” *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland* 2 (1984), 257-258.

xxxix David Omissi, “Warrior Gentlemen: ‘Gurkhas’ in the Western Imagination by Lionel Caplan,” *The International History Review* 18:4 (1996): 909. This also expresses some kind of imagined “cultural hegemony of ‘whiteness’”, Ware, 57.