Extra-Sovereign Institutions; The Ties That Bind

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Extra-Sovereign Institutions: The Ties That Bind

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Abstract

Governance, globalization, and regionalism are all statements regarding the nature of integration in the current international relations system, but they do not readily explain what brings nation-states together in the first place. At first glance, regional institutions seem to be established on a basis of proximity, suggesting a spatial model of regional integration. However, a deeper investigation of the motivations and factors that lead to the creation of these institutions show this is not the case.

In considering regional integration movements, this study establishes three core principles. First, that the creation of a successful extra-sovereign institution is dependent on specific issues and motivations, creating a functional model of regional integration, as opposed to a spatial model. Second, with purpose to clarify much of the debate surrounding the definition of regional movements, this study establishes that this functional model is made up of two incremental steps. The first step is an initial period of mutual economic interactions and integration, which leads to the second step of political integration and stability brought on by the pressure of an external political or economic threat. Finally, it identifies the European Union as an extra-sovereign institution which, during the formation of the institution, followed this functional model, but as it continued to expand strayed from the model in favor of a spatial-centric model. This shift in the model of regional integration has directly resulted in the economic woes and internal political stress the European Union currently faces, in the wake of the 2008 recession. In order to come to these conclusions, a case study was done between the Swiss Confederation, the Iroquois League, and the European Union.
Extra-Sovereign Institutions: The Ties That Bind

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Chapter 1: Introduction

In his Socratic dialogue entitled *The Republic*, Plato states, “If the study of all these sciences which we have enumerated, should ever bring us to their mutual association and relationship, and teach us the nature of the ties which bind them together, I believe that the diligent treatment of them will forward the objects which we have in view, and that the labor, which otherwise would be fruitless, will be well bestowed.”\(^1\) While Plato's stated purpose concerned the definition of justice and the order and character of the just city and the just man, the way in which he achieved this purpose was through understanding the underlying parts of a specific phenomena and looking for the factors that brought this phenomena together: “the ties that bind.”

This paper will not discuss justice or the character of the just city or just man however, but the methods in which I make my connections are the same. What I am interested in are the ties that bind nation-states together. Governance, globalization, and regionalism are all statements regarding the nature of integration in the current international relations system, but they do not readily explain what brings nation-states together in the first place. If you were to look at various alliances and institutions on the world stage, you would find many that were organized at a regional level. Institutions

like the European Union, the African Union, or the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. So, did these nations simply organize based on their geographic proximity?

This certainly seems to be the case when investigating these kinds of institutions in the past. Take for example, the Iroquois League or the Swiss Confederation. While both institutions represent a dramatic shift in political organization for their time periods, each institution is based in their relatively small physical-regional proximity. Considering the technology available to these societies at the time, organizations regionally based make sense. With the absence of fast and effective means of transportation over long distances, the ability for alliance formation between societies would have been limited to their general region.

This does not explain, however, the relationship between modern nation-states and the alliances or institutions that they form. After all, modern technological advances, like the internet and cell phones, jets and high speed railroads, have shifted our understanding of space and time, “undermin[ing] the importance of local and even national boundaries in many arenas of human endeavor.”² That is what globalization is all about. So, if mere physical proximity is not the answer to institutional formation, there must be a different conclusion.

In fact, writing off historical examples of political institutions as exclusively geographical alliances is only looking at their stories at face value. The five Native American tribes of the Iroquois League had other neighbors. Why were some of these tribes not invited into the League instead of pushed off their land, if this were an alliance of mere convenience? For the Swiss Confederation, why would three cantons distinguish themselves from other territories in the Hapsburg Empire based solely off of geographic location? Investigating further into these two cases will reveal specific reasons these groups chose to band together, and while a strengthening of power was certainly an outcome of their union, it was not the reason for it. Following this line of thought will lead to issues, factors, and motivations that led these specific members to not only form an alliance, but extra-sovereign institutions. From this narrative, I can discover similar motivations for modern extra-sovereign institutions, namely the European Union, and bring light to some of the issues it experienced, and continues to experience, in the face of the expansion of members and influence.

Therefore, this study establishes three core principles. First, that the creation of a successful extra-sovereign institution is dependent on specific issues and motivations, creating a functional model of regional integration, as opposed to a spatial model. Second, this study establishes that this functional model is made up of two incremental steps. The first step is an initial period of mutual economic interactions and integration, which leads to the second step of political integration and stability brought on by the pressure of an external political or economic threat. Finally, while the formation of the
European Union featured the use of the functional model, continued expansion of the institution saw a decrease in use of the functional model in favor of a spatial-centric one. This shift in the model of regional integration has directly resulted in the economic woes and internal political stress the European Union currently faces, in the wake of the 2008 recession.

Definitions

Previously, I identified the Swiss Confederation, the Iroquois League, and the European Union as “extra-sovereign institutions.” Incidentally, these three cases are the focus of my thesis, but before delving into the thesis proper, it should be noted what an extra-sovereign institution is, and what makes these three organizations one of them. A definition can be reached by breaking the term into its constituent parts. First, the prefix “extra-” is used to delineate something is outside or beyond the boundaries of whatever word it is applied to. Therefore, something that is “extra-sovereign” would be something outside or beyond the typical boundaries of sovereignty. As suggested, the term “sovereign” is related to the term sovereignty, which means, “in political theory, the ultimate overseer, or authority, in the decision-making process of the state and in the maintenance of order.” The current system of the international community, as identified by international relations, is that of the “sovereign state,” a unit that dates back to the Peace of Westphalia, and refers to a state with a defined territory on which it exercises

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internal and external sovereignty, a permanent population, a government, independence from other states and powers, and the capacity to enter into relations with other sovereign states. It identifies a state as not being dependent or subject to any other power. An “institution” is a “complex of positions, roles, norms and values lodged in particular types of social structures and organising relatively stable patterns of human activity...”

After putting these terms together, an extra-sovereign institution can be defined as an organization of societal groups that agree to go outside the boundaries of their sovereignty in favor of participation in said organization.

It should be noted that the three cases for this study can all fall under the definition of “confederation.” A confederation, as described by the Oxford English Dictionary, is “a permanent union of sovereign states for common action in relation to other states.” Confederations stand out from the modern nation state, and federations in general, because they often feature constitutions, but do not feature the formation of a new state on top of the existing ones. Taking this definition into consideration, I feel that my definition for “extra-sovereign institution” is sufficient to include confederation, but not be limited by it: essentially, a confederation is an extra-sovereign institution, but an extra-sovereign institution is not exclusively a confederation. For example, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations is an extra-sovereign institution because it is an economic and security alliance between several Southeast Asian nation-states that

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member states use as a forum for various issues.\(^8\) While the members have agreed to a legally binding charter, there does not exist a formal supranational government or constitution like in the case of the European Union. The use of confederations as primary cases can be contributed to the nature of the integration; essentially the greatest degree to which nation-states can agree to. I intend to prove my theory by applying my findings to institutions with the most integration. In other words, if my theory does not hold up under these circumstances, it won't hold up under any.

The next chapters will establish my theoretical background and historical context in relation to these definitions and my overall thesis. The next chapter, on theory, will deal with the theories that have both influenced my findings and those that play directly into my conclusions. Of specific importance will be the Neofunctionalist framework. The following chapter, on historical context, will serve as a guide, based on the experiences of both the Swiss Confederacy and the Iroquois League. This guide will answer the first part of this investigation, proving that despite region, extra-sovereign institutions are formed based on issue specific criteria. The final chapter will take these findings and compare them to the European Union, a modern day confederation and extra-sovereign institution. Using the previously established criteria, the case will be made that as the European Union continued to expand in an increasingly spatial-centric manner, it created stress on its economic infrastructure, which in turn led to political stress, the two major internal problems facing the European Union today.

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Chapter 2: Theoretical Background

Governance, Globalization, and Regionalism

Three theories have been at the forefront of the development of this thesis. Early concepts were rooted in governance and globalization, and focused on the development of global supranational institutions. This proved to be too unwieldy however, due to the largely unproven status of that type of institution, and a lack of critical evidence. From there, the concept evolved into questions of globalization, its indicators, and interest in where the current international system stands in regards to globalization. From here, further focus was applied, and instead of focusing on globalization, it was decided to look at a regional level instead. At its core, this study has always been about the building blocks of international institutions, the things that tie different nation-states or societies together, and what that means for the institutions as they continue to evolve. So, even as this study has evolved, the theories of governance, globalization, and regionalism have remained the building blocks for it, and have impacted this study accordingly.

Global governance has been defined as “the management of global processes in the absence of global government.” The international system of global governance dates back to the post World War II period and the creation of the United Nations. Since this period, the establishment of various organizations and institutions has marked an

emergence of both globalization and regionalism. According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy the term globalization is identified as “fundamental changes in the spatial and temporal contours of social existence, according to which the significance of space or territory undergoes shifts in the face of a no less dramatic acceleration in the temporal structure of crucial forms of human activity.”\textsuperscript{10} In other words, since humans typically measure space and distance through time, globalization has significantly altered the human experience of both space and time. In \textit{Global Transformations}, authors Held, McGrew, Goldblatt, and Perraton state their concept of globalization as:

\begin{quote}
The spatial reach and density of global and transnational interconnectedness weave complex webs and networks of relations between communities, states, international institutions, non-governmental organizations and multinational corporations which make up the global order. These overlapping and interacting networks define an evolving structure which both imposes constraints on and empowers communities, states and social forces. In this respect, globalization is akin to a process of 'structuration' (Giddens) in so far as it is a product of both the individual actions of, and the cumulative interactions between, countless agencies and institutions across the globe.\textsuperscript{11}
\end{quote}

This definition of globalization is interesting, because while many scholars point to globalization and regionalism as independent phenomena, this definition points to comparisons. Regionalism refers to the expression of a common sense of identity and purpose, combined with the creation and implementation of institutions that express a particular identity and shape collective action within a geographical region. The “global

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\textsuperscript{10} Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. “Globalization.”
\end{flushleft}
order” mentioned above is similar to the identity created in regionalism, and the structure imposed by globalization play a similar role to the institutions regionalism makes. In both cases, globalization and regionalism are seen as step by step processes.

Following these theories has led to the spatial versus functional question that has become central to this study. Keep in mind that the definition of regionalism does incorporate both spatial and functional terms. A simpler definition comes from Joseph Nye, who defines regionalism as, “the formation of interstate associations or groupings on the basis of regions,” and subsequently defines a region as, “a limited number of states linked by a geographical relationship and by a degree of mutual interdependence.”

Other academics have raised the point that there is not consensus on the definition of regionalism. For example, Mansfield and Solingen, in their article “Regionalism,” state, “Despite widespread interest in regionalism, we lack consensus on its definition. In part, this is because observers do not agree on what constitutes a region. Regions are frequently defined as groups of countries located in the same geographic space; but where one region ends and the next begins is sometimes unclear. Furthermore, most researchers agree that a region implies more than just physical proximity, although the additional criteria that should be used have proven controversial.” Notice how Nye's definition of region states that states are linked by a “degree” of mutual interdependence.

This speaks directly to Mansfield and Solingen's point, and this overall controversy speaks to the purpose of this study. I believe that investigating historical regional movements and comparing them to the modern regionalism movement will help to clarify the additional criteria Mansfield and Solingen speak of. Specifically, a successful extra-sovereign institution will form around initial economic desires and long term desires for economic or political security from an external threat.

It is important to note that the concept of regionalism isn't generally used prior to 1945, so most international relations theorists would not consider the Swiss Confederacy or the Iroquois League as regional movements. The reason for this is that many advocates of the concept attribute it to the rise of modern institutions. In spite of this consideration, I do believe that the Swiss Confederacy and the Iroquois League represent regional movements in their own right. If we consider that regionalism occurs because, “the logical response for smaller countries who desire greater international leverage in such a system is to form coalitions with similar sized states to increase their clout in international forums,” then historical examples can also be considered despite their classification not being specifically a “country.”14 As I stated previously, these two examples came together in order to guarantee political and economic security, much like European nations did when they kicked off the modern period of regionalism. This connection is essential to show that despite regionalism being an inherently geographical concept, it is not the spatial element that is key in the equation. Functional issues are the

key ingredient to successful integration, and if these issues are not negotiated between each member, problems can occur.

**Neofunctionalism**

The theoretical approach for this study branches out of the school of neofunctionalism. Neofunctionalism is a variance on the school of functionalism, where a focus is placed on purposes or tasks to explain the growth of organizations. While functionalism has a broader scope, neofunctionalism focuses on regional integration, and acts as both a theory to explain regional integration, and a strategy to promote it. John McCormick, in his book *The European Union*, explains neofunctionalism through a process where, “states integrate in limited functional or economic areas. Thereafter, partially integrated states experience increasing momentum for further rounds of integration in related areas.” This process is referred to as “spillover” and presents itself in two varieties, functional and political. This establishes the process of regional integration as incremental. Functionalism and neofunctionalism differ in that, “functionalism presupposes a rational basis for political choice. Welfare gains or losses — Mitrany’s 'common index of need' —determine whether a particular policy will, or will not, be selected. Neofunctionalists counter that functional pressures are necessary, but not sufficient, to change the scope, level, or character of regional integration.”

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Phillipe Schmitter recognizes three intervening processes at work in neofunctionalism, that stand in stark contrast to functionalism. They are functional spillover, externalization, and politicization. The process that this study stands to gain the most from is politicization. Schmitter goes on to argue that, “alone, functional interdependence based on high rates of mutual transactions is impotent. It must be perceived, interpreted, and translated into expressions of interest, strategies of influence, and viable decision making styles.” This becomes important when looking at the success rate of extra-sovereign institutions, because it speaks to the importance of dialogue and negotiations between potential members as the group continues to grow. Applying this to the European Union will be a major argument for the stalling of the institutions expansion and subsequent effectiveness. Essentially, political spill-over could not be cemented since the issues that newer members needed to focus on were too dissimilar to the original Western European members. This study argues that the Eastern European members of the European Union did not share an external security threat with the Western members; economic, political, or otherwise. So, where economic spillover was more readily achieved – both sub-regions desired economic benefits, like free trade agreements, between each region – political spillover was being attempted by pre-existing organizational structures that did not necessarily take into account the inclusion of the new members. As Hooghe and Marks explain, “functionality (…) is the engine, but politicization is the drive shaft—a decisive intervening variable—determining whether, when, and how functional pressures lead to regional integration.”

18 Hooghe and Marks, “‘The Neofunctionalists Were (Almost) Right: Politicization and European Integration.”
19 ibid.
20 ibid.
Theoretical Implications

These theories form the background and basis for my work. While some details were given regarding how such theories will be used, they will see further depth in the next two chapters. It is my hope that considering elements of governance and globalization will keep me aware to various concerns while delving deeper into regional theory. The inclusion of regional integration theory, through the framework of neofunctionalism, will help to realize what factors and motivations bring societies together for mutual benefit in extra-sovereign institutions. It will also bring light to what factors might contribute to preventing full integration or stunting the growth of such institutions.

It is my belief that consideration should be applied to multiple disciplines, and that various elements can be put together to create a clearer picture of extra-sovereign institutions. For example, at least in this instance, globalization and regionalism are not counteractive forces, but elements of the international community that convey similar purposes for increasing integration between the world's nation-states.

As was stated at the beginning of this chapter, just as these theories represent the building blocks of institution building, they also represent the evolution of this study. This consideration has helped to identify elements key to this thesis that would have gone overlooked had it been limited to a specific framework.
Chapter 3: Historical Context

In order to develop a set of motivations and circumstances that bind nation-states together in extra-sovereign institutions, this chapter will investigate two historical regional movements; the Swiss Confederation and the Iroquois League. Comparing and contrasting these two movements will establish the theory that extra-sovereign institutions form according to an incremental, issue based, process. First, societies come together to benefit from economic arrangements that typically result in free trade between them. Second, these societies solidify political bonds based on a political or economic threat from an external actor. The result of this chapter will be a narrative guide, outlining this theory, which can then be used to compare to the European Union.

The Swiss Confederation and the Iroquois League were chosen for this study for a few reasons. Both represent developments for their respective societies that were unusual for their time. In the case of the Swiss Confederacy, the original members and their neighbors were a part of an empire, while other areas were organized as kingdoms. Democratic forms of government were rare and regional organizations were even rarer. In the case of the Iroquois League, they too experimented with democratic government forms and their regional organization was entirely unique. Some even credit the Iroquois with influencing early American democracy, though this connection is highly disputed. In addition to the unusual nature of these institutions during their respective time periods, the Iroquois League offers a non-European experience. This will help to establish that
whatever comparisons are found between the historical examples and the European Union are not solely European experiences and are rather tied into the formation of extra-sovereign institutions as a whole.

In order to provide a clear narrative, four factors are being taken into consideration. First, each examples' structure will be profiled, lending insight into the mandate of each institution. This profile will include basic information, including time period, governmental structure, representation, and the means in which decisions are made. The next consideration are the political, economic, and social influences and outcomes for each institution, rounding out the remaining three factors. After providing details for each case, comparative points of interest will be explained, outlining the economic benefits of integration that led to the initial formation of the institution, and the economic or political external threat that led to solidification.

The Swiss Confederation

Historians make two major distinctions in the history of Switzerland's organization; the Old Swiss Confederacy and the Swiss Confederation. The marker for this distinction is a series of civil wars that occurred in the 1600s and 1700s, the conquering of lands by Napoleon and the French in 1798, and the creation of the most recent constitution, adopted in 1848. In truth, many of the structures established in the early development of the Old Swiss Confederacy are still a part of the Swiss
Confederation today. The major difference, is that, as Switzerland, the Swiss Confederation is recognized as a modern federal state. That being said, the basic responsibilities of the government have remain largely unchanged.

The Swiss Confederation is divided into twenty six cantons that are subsequently divided into three thousand communes. Foreign policy, national defense, federal railways, and currency are the sole domain of the federal government. All other issues, including religious and educational decisions and domestic trade, are the responsibility of the individual cantons and communes.

The federal government is split into two houses; the National Council and the Council of States. The National Council uses proportional representation, while the Council of States has two representatives per canton and one per half canton. Swiss politics are controlled by four political parties. None of the four parties have a majority in either the National Council or the Council of States, and each is represented in the national executive's cabinet. The political parties are encouraged to achieve consensus on legislation and are balanced by a popular referendum period on each law. Officially, new legislation must be approved by both houses and pass the public referendum. In addition to this, amendments to the constitution may be proposed by the government or the people. In regards to the national executive, a different president is elected by members of the central government every year.²¹

Economic and Political Influences and Outcomes

Prior to the establishment of the Old Confederacy, three Swiss cantons formed a traditional alliance. The cantons were comprised of four different ethnicities; German, French, Italian, and Romansh. This alliance, comprised of the Schwyz, Uri, and Unterwalden cantons, was mainly economically based, looking to secure free trade rights between each member of the alliance. Since all three cantons did trade along the mountain routes in modern day Switzerland, mutual agreements between each member had greater benefits that attempting competition.

Despite being a part of the Hapsburg Empire, the three cantons enjoyed considerable freedoms. The reason for this being, “in the controversy between Frederick II and the Pope, the three Forest Cantons united in a league to support the Emperor, and were rewarded by him with charter exempting them from feudal dependence...”22 These freedoms continued through the rule of Count Rudolf of Hapsburg, the successor to Frederick II, due to the former being a native of Switzerland.

Upon the death of Rudolf in 1291, however, his son Albert took the throne and, being born in Austria, felt no connection to the Swiss cantons. Albert intended to force full subjugation upon Schwyz, Uri, and Unterwalden, and began to put pressure on them. Anticipating this pressure, the three cantons created the League of 1291, continuing their

economic agreements, but adding security benefits into a loose confederation. While the League of 1291 had no constitution, it did have a formally recognized bill of rights, intended to preserve laws, customs, and personal liberties. The formation of the League was not in itself a declaration of independence, but mounting pressure between the League and its Hapsburg rulers led to war, eventually resulting with the Hapsburg's relinquishing authority over the land in 1318. “The accession of Lucerne in 1332, Zurich in 1351, Glarus in 1352, and Berne in 1353, enabled the League to resist the Austrian aggressions of later years,” and marked further political integration and the creation of the Old Confederacy.  

The above details make for specific outcomes in terms of the viability and effectiveness of the Swiss Confederation. Politically speaking, Schwyz, Uri, and Unterwalden, and subsequent members to the Old Confederacy, faced a political security threat by the Hapsburg Empire. While each of the cantons were initially a part of the empire, making this an independence movement, the Hapsburg Empire as a whole was not a part of their regional institution. In fact, it was the actions of the Hapsburg Empire, that pushed the cantons away from economic alliance and into a more formal agreement. The continued aggression from Austria after the institution gained independence led to further integration and political solidification. This lends credence to the belief that extra-sovereign institutions strengthen their bonds due to an external political or economic threat. This also had a profound effect on the Swiss Confederations outlook on military endeavor. Defending the confederacy from Hapsburg and Austrian aggression

23 Pike, John, “Swiss Confederation – Formation.”

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led to Switzerland having a strong military tradition, one that is supported through social and structural norms. Additionally, since the Swiss Confederation is home to four ethnicities, remaining neutral in foreign affairs and conflicts became an important institutional priority, in order to ensure that people continued to identify themselves as a part of the confederacy, and not with their home ethnicities in surrounding locales. This too, is supported by social and structural norms.

Economically speaking, a case can be made for the Swiss Confederation's continued economic viability being an effect of its political structure. The confederation allows for individual cantons and communes to make domestic economic decisions, but frees up the federal government to focus on international trade and finances. Even though Switzerland was impacted by the economic recession beginning in 2008, the confederacy is still one of the richest countries in the world by per capita gross domestic product standards, with a nominal per capita GDP of $69,838. In 2010, the Swiss Confederation had the highest wealth per adult of any country in the world, with $372,692 per person. The World Economic Forum also named Switzerland as the most competitive nation in the world in 2010.

Social Influences and Outcomes

When dealing with the Swiss Confederation, social and political influences go hand in hand. The major social influence turns out to be the four distinct ethnic groups that live within the confederation. In order to prevent ethnic or religious conflicts within the confederation, and prevent involvement in external conflicts, focus had to be put on different factors to encourage unity. These presented themselves in the form of political freedoms, military strength, foreign neutrality, and direct democracy. The result is a very fluid society, where individual citizens have a large part in governmental decisions and an expectancy to be involved. The freedoms afforded to every citizen bridge the ethnic divide and allowed them to unite against the Austrian armies that threatened the early confederation, effectively spurring further integration. This, in turn, marked an effective extra-sovereign institution, with laws and guidelines set in place to guarantee benefits, even with the introduction of new members.

Since the structure of the Swiss Confederation allows for the individual cantons and communes to self govern, ethnic and religious groups are allowed remarkable freedom of movement within the institution. Conflict between groups has resulted in the division of cantons into half cantons, or the creation of new cantons altogether. In other cases, border communes have elected to withdraw from a canton to join neighboring ones. This ability has all but eliminated violent conflict within the institution, since different groups of people can organize their communes and cantons however they
This freedom extends to an individual basis as well. Direct democracy was a founding principle of the institution and is a source of pride for its citizenry. Individuals are involved in the decision-making process for everything from local decisions to national laws. At a local level, citizens are afforded a unique view into how each canton does business. “...Because each canton is different, they are also able to see for themselves which policies work best. For example, one canton might have high taxes and expensive welfare programs, while another might opt for low taxes and private charity. Each Swiss citizen can then decide which policy suits him best and 'vote with his feet' by moving to the canton which he finds the most attractive. The result is that good policies tend to drive out bad.”

At a federal level, laws are subject to not only approval by both houses of the legislative branch, but also to a popular referendum. The law making process includes a six month period where any individual or group can start a petition for a public vote. If that person or group can get fifty thousand signatures for their petition, the referendum takes place and, if the law is voted down, it is rejected. Even constitutional amendments can be recommended by both the federal government and the citizenry, allowing for a truly unique political experience.

27 Kendall Frances.
28 ibid
In regards to the military, service is “universal and compulsory.” The federal government provides, finances, and controls the military, but units are made up of citizens from the same canton. The Swiss policy of neutrality is well known, and in the modern era, their military has only been mobilized three times. All three times were in response to external events that threatened the integrity and neutrality of the confederation.

The Swiss Confederation as an example provides us with two core insights into this study. First, it follows the model of forming initial bonds through economic cooperation, and then expands those bonds through political integration in the face of an external threat. Second, the Swiss Confederation continued to follow this model as newer members were accepted into the institution, facing external political security threats from Austria and the remaining Hapsburg Empire. This, combined with the structure of their institution, based on the initial factors that led to integration, have resulted in a long lasting, successful, extra-sovereign institution.

The Iroquois League

The Iroquois League of Nations was formed between 1450 and 1600, but was fully established prior to European contact. The original extra-sovereign institution consisted of five Native American tribes; the Mohawk, the Oneida, the Onondaga, the Cayuga, and the Seneca. A sixth nation, the Tuscarora, joined in 1722. While historians

29 Kendall, Frances.
refer to the institution as the Iroquois League of Nations, the members referred to themselves as the Haudenosaunee. This translates to “People of the Longhouse,” and “implies that the Nations of the confederacy should live together as families in the same long house. Symbolically, the Seneca were the guardians of the western door of the "tribal long house," and the Mohawk were the guardians of the eastern door.”

From the beginning of the confederation a constitution had been created. The constitution was passed down from generation to generation orally, and was not written down until 1915. Known as Gayanashagawa, or “Great Law of Peace,” the constitution called for the establishment of a council that was made up of fifty chiefs, called sachem. The Oneida and Mohawk had nine seats each, the Onondagas had fourteen, the Cayuga had ten, and the Seneca had eight. The representation was not based on population, but rather each clan within the Five Nations had a representative. Sachem were chosen by the senior most woman of the clan, and followed a matrilineal structure. Decisions in the council were determined exclusively by consensus, essentially giving each sachem veto power. A president was chosen by the sachem and held the authority to assemble and moderate the Council. The hunters of the confederacy, who also made up the military, and the elder women of each clan made up two political groups who held a considerable amount of power, in addition to the sachem. The hunters could call for council meetings and veto laws. The elder women also held a veto, but also had the right to sit in on all council meetings, speak to the delegation, and often wrote speeches for the sachem of

Each canton or nation was a distinct republic, entirely independent of the others in what may be termed the domestic concerns of the state; but each was bound to others of the league by ties of honor and of general interest. The council held three kinds of ceremonies which were distinguished as the Civil, the Mourning, and the Religious. The Civil ceremony was responsible for declaring war and making peace, sending and receiving ambassadors, entering treaties with foreign tribes and powers, regulating the affairs of subjugated tribes, and other welfare issues. The Mourning ceremony was responsible for paying respects to sachem who passed away and subsequently deciding on who would take their place. The final ceremony was responsible for religious festivals and acted as a regular means of bringing all members of the tribes together to celebrate.

The confederacy of the Haudenosaunee was an institution unique among Native Americans, and its constitution is the oldest example of one on the American continent. “Originally occupying only northern New York, the League would expand by alliance and conquest to control an area from southern Canada to Kentucky north to south, and Eastern Pennsylvania to Ohio east to west.” The Iroquois League quickly became one of the strongest and most influential powers in North America, and “for more than a

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century, though never mustering more than five thousand fighting men, they were able to hold the balance of power on this continent between France and England,” recognized for both their military and diplomatic prowess. The confederation lasted in its original form until the American Revolution, where the Five Nations took different sides, and was disbanded by the American government in the Second Treaty of Fort Stanwix in 1784. Despite this treaty, the confederacy still exists today, although more in a cultural sense than in a governmental one.

Economic, Political, and Social Influences and Outcomes

In his 1881 book, Hiawatha and the Iroquois Confederation: A Study in Anthropology, Horatio Hale recounts the history of the formation of the Iroquois League. His account provides one of the earliest written works on the subject, and was discovered through a series of interviews he completed with “the most experienced councillors, and especially the ‘wampum-keepers,’ the official annalists of their people.” Through this history of the Iroquois League, specific political and economic factors can be reached that show that the formation of the confederacy followed the theory that extra-sovereign institutions are created through initial economic benefits and strengthened by an external political or economic threat.

36 Hale, Horatio, Hiawatha and the Iroquois Confederation: A Study in Anthropology.
Politically speaking, the formation of the Confederation can be explained by two factors. First, the Five Nations were in the midst of a lengthy war with the Mohegans, a tribe of Algonquin. The Mohawks and Oneida were closest to the land of the Mohegans at the time, and thus were most effected by the violence. The Five Nations were not aligned for this war, however, and a second front existed within them. The Onondaga Nation was ruled by a chief by the name of Atotarho, “a man of great force of character and of formidable qualities—haughty, ambitious, crafty and bold—a determined and successful warrior, and at home, so far as the constitution of an Indian tribe would allow, a stern and remorseless tyrant.”  

Atotarho was known for violently silencing those who opposed him, and was supported by hunters within the nation whose loyalty was solely to him. Despite mistreating his people, his military strength and cunning intimidated his neighbors, solidifying his place within the nation.

The war with the Mohegans, coupled with the battles between the Five Nations at the hands of Atotarho, led an Onondaga man of great standing within his nation to seek a way to end this violence and insecurity. The man, Hiawatha, was a victim of Atotarho's actions, losing much of his family to the tyrant, but he himself was spared. Hiawatha, a man known for his wisdom and benevolence, “had long beheld with grief the evils which afflicted not only his own nation, but all the other tribes about them, through the continual wars in which they were engaged, and the misgovernment and miseries at home which these wars produced.”

It was then that he came up with the idea for a

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38 ibid.
permanent confederation, and established many of the policies that would become the institutions constitution. Hiawatha's original idea was for the confederation to infinitely expand, taking all peoples under its wing to ensure peace. His primary objective, however, was to bring an end to the war between the Five Nations, and prevent further war with their neighbors.

Unable to garner support for his plan in his own nation, due to the intimidation of Atotarho and his followers, Hiawatha took his plan to the people of the Mohawk nation. There he found a supporter, a man of Onondaga birth, but adopted by the Mohawk, named Dekanawidah. Dekanawidah, though not the head chief of the Mohawk, had great influence among his people, and after seeing the benefits to the plan Hiawatha proposed, took the idea to his nation's elders, and secured their involvement. Next, the Mohawk sent two diplomats to discuss the plan with the Oneida, who, after a year, signed off on the proposal and joined the proposed confederacy.

For the institution, still in its infancy, it was important to convince the Onondaga of the benefits of the confederacy and gain them as members. As the strongest nation among the five, the Onondaga represented a partner that would prove beneficial for neutralizing external threats, and necessary to end internal ones. After securing the support of the Mohawk and the Oneida, Hiawatha, joined by Dekanawidah and a representative from the Oneida, Odatshehte, made their way back to Onondaga, to implore Atotarho to reconsider. Their pleas fell on deaf ears again, however, and the
three made their way to the Cayuga. “The Cayugas, who had suffered from the prowess and cruelty of the Onondaga chief, needed little persuasion. They readily consented to come into the league, and their chief, Akahenyonk, “the wary spy,” joined the Mohawk and Oneida representatives in a new embassy to the Onondagas.”

This time, the leader of the Onondaga, Atotarho, agreed to the plan. Two factors played into his approval. First, the tyrant, who had already proved not just his military might, but also his intelligence, recognized that his closest neighbors were forming an alliance. Were he to ignore this alliance any further, it could prove disastrous to his rule. Secondly, the four ambassadors, Hiawatha, Dekanawidah, Odatshehte, and Akahenyonk, offered Atotarho and the Onondaga special privileges within the confederation, as a good will gesture, and to move towards peace. They offered Onondaga up as the capital of the confederacy, since it was central to all five nations, and they offered the nation the position of “Keepers of the Central Fire.” This established the Onondaga as the place where all meetings of the Council would take place, and the Onondaga people as the official historians and record keepers for the confederacy. In addition to these privileges, they offered the position of first chief executive of the institution to Atotarho. This offering highly appealed to him, since it kept him as a central figure of strength within the Five Nations. However, any further attempts at tyranny would be kept in check by the Council and its rules of unanimity. In other words, “...no single individual could dominate the proceedings. It was the structure of the proceeding itself that produced


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decisions.” After the Onondaga accepted the plan, Atotarho recommended they go west and recruit the Seneca into the confederation. Upon their approval, the Five Nations gathered, each of their leaders led by Hiawatha, and held the first Council, and with it, created the Great Law of Peace.

The union of the Five Nations secured peace between them, and also strengthened the Iroquois against external threat. The Iroquois League expanded their land and influence through warfare and alliance, but it was a goal of Hiawatha and the original Council to bring in more members through peaceful means. This is best represented by the addition of the Tuscarora in 1722, but is also exemplified by adopting members of nations who were defeated in battle, and forming an alliance with the Algonquin that lasted two hundred years. Horatio Hale muses on the impact of such an institution, stating:

His conceptions were beyond his time, and beyond ours; but their effect, within a limited sphere, was very great. For more than three centuries the bond which he devised held together the Iroquois nations in perfect amity. It proved, moreover, as he intended, elastic. The territory of the Iroquois, constantly extending as their united strength made itself felt, became the “Great Asylum” of the Indian tribes. Of the conquered Eries and Hurons, many hundreds were received and adopted among their conquerors. The Tuscaroras, expelled by the English from North Carolina, took refuge with the Iroquois, and became the sixth nation of the League. From still further south, the Tuteloes and Saponies, of Dakota stock, after many wars with the Iroquois, fled to them from their other enemies, and found a cordial welcome (...) Many fragments of tribes of Algonquin lineage — Delawares, Nanticokes, Mohicans, Mississagas — sought the same hospitable protection, which never failed them. Their descendants still reside on the Canadian Reservation, which

may well be styled an aboriginal “refuge of nations”—affording a striking evidence in our own day of the persistent force of a great idea, when embodied in practical shape by the energy of a master mind.41

Hale's praise is noteworthy, but what stands out in regards to this study is what this analysis tells us of the ongoing process of the Iroquois League. Much like the Swiss Confederation, the Iroquois League's structure and functional focus lead to continued success, even when expanding. As Europeans began to gain a greater hold over the political and economic dealings in North America, more Native Americans shared this threat with the League. Nations not a part of the confederacy had everything to gain by joining, and their admission served to strengthen the protection and influence of the League as a whole. Although it ultimately wasn't enough to spare them from European encroachment, it did establish the Five Nations as players within these various conflicts, and a lasting legacy in North America.

The people of the Five Nations were also unique in their economic practices, when compared to other Native American nations. Even prior to the formation of the confederacy, the Iroquois combined an agricultural system with the hunter-gatherer system that was more common to their neighbors. The political structure of their institution cemented this way of life, and brought it to other nations as they expanded. This way of life came as a surprise to European settlers as they encountered the Iroquois, since other nations were more nomadic in their way of life.

41 Hale, Horatio, Hiawatha and the Iroquois Confederation: A Study in Anthropology.
The economic beliefs of the Five Nations were communal in nature, meaning all land and resources were shared within the group. This style continued into the League after it was formed. This means that as discussions were taking place to form the extra-sovereign institution, economic benefits were not explicitly mentioned. This does not, however, mean that the formation of the League did not follow the model of initial economic integration followed by political integration. Rather, it shows that, since the individual nations already saw economics as communal in nature, forming an extra-sovereign institution inherently granted economic benefits, and the equivalent of free trade within the institution. Trading as a concept between the members of the confederacy was unnecessary, since resources already belonged to everyone, as a cultural norm. Essentially, economic integration did not have to be negotiated, because to the ambassadors of each nation it was par for the course. In fact, it can be argued that economic integration was, in reality, the major force that created peace between the Five Nations, for if the leaders of each nation did not anticipate or desire this, mere security alliances would have been formed, instead of an intricate institution, complete with federal government and a constitution.

The Iroquois League did trade with other Native American nations and Europeans, often trading excess maize, beans and squash. As European influence increased, and the Iroquois League expanded, the latter took over fur trade routes, trading it in return for manufactured goods, firearms, and steel. The Iroquois participated in trade through the process of gift-giving. The process entailed one nation trading a good
or providing a service for another nation, with the anticipation that that nation would do
the same. No formal agreements were made and no currency was used. This process
was extremely effective among Native Americans, but was eventually taken advantage of
by Europeans, who would, for example, trade firearms, but not provide gun powder.
“External trade offered one of the few opportunities for individual enterprise in Iroquois
society. A person who discovered a new trading route had the exclusive right to trade
along the same route in the future; however, clans would still collectivize trading routes
to gain a monopoly on a certain type of trade.”

The influence of the Iroquois League's economic practices had an immense
impact on their social life, and the effectiveness of the institution as a whole. A typical
criticism of a communal economic structure is that it does not provide incentive to work,
since the individual gets the same regardless of effort. In order to counteract this
concern, the Five Nations had to cultivate a communal work ethic. This work ethic is
what kept the institution united and productive, and was instilled at a very young age.
“The idealized Iroquois man was a good warrior and productive hunter while the perfect
woman excelled in agriculture and housekeeping. By emphasizing an individual's
usefulness to society, the Iroquois created a mindset that encouraged their members to
contribute...”

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42 New World Encyclopedia, “Iroquois.”
43 ibid.
Comparisons and Conclusions

The purpose of this chapter was to establish the theory that extra-sovereign institutions are formed in a two step process that involves initial economic integration and long term political integration spurred on by an external security threat. This chapter further establishes that this process is not only integral to the formation and solidification of an extra-sovereign institution, but to the continued success of the institution as well.

Initial economic integration began in the Swiss Confederation as they negotiated free trade across important mountain routes, while for the Iroquois League, the Five Nations sought the joining of each members communal economic strategy. Each extra-sovereign institution not only experienced an economic benefit through this initial integration, but also cemented political security between its members.

When considering the question of external political and economic security, the Swiss Confederation faced aggression from Austria and the Hapsburg Empire, before and after their independence, threatening their desire for direct democracy, while the Iroquois League faced aggression from neighboring Native American nations, like the Algonquins, and subsequent pressure from European settlers as time went on. At each phase of enlargement, both institutions accepted members that were encountering a similar external political or economic threat, leading to integration that further benefitted the institution, and complemented the structure established by each institution's
Not only did new members complement the structure of the institution, but the structure itself provided flexible measures for successful enlargement, which acknowledged the functional processes that united the institution originally. Interestingly, the structure of each institution was supported by the development of cultural norms that helped to form unity among the members, and were extended to new members as expansion occurred. In the case of the Swiss Confederation, the cultural norms established were political freedom, military strength, foreign neutrality, and direct democracy, while the Iroquois established the norms of representative democracy, and virtue through a communal work ethic.

These three factors make up the functional model of regional integration, the central argument of this study. In order to show that this model is not merely a historical case, it will be tested against the modern extra-sovereign institution of the European Union, and its development. The next chapter will focus on how the founders of the European regionalism movement used the functional model to spur integration between the nation-states of Europe, but as integration continued, and the member base expanded, the institution lost sight of this model, and began to follow a spatial one. In turn, the abandonment of the functional model weakened the European Union, and led to the economic issues the institution is dealing with today.
Chapter 4: The European Regionalism Movement

Through the profiling of two historical regional movements, this study was capable of establishing a fundamental set of factors and motivations that led to the creation of extra-sovereign institutions. This set turned out to be a functional model, centered around initial economic integration and subsequent political integration, based on an external political or economic threat. With the functional model established, it can now be applied to a more modern example, the European Union.

But investigating the ties that bind the European Union together is not as simple as looking at the history of the organization from its naming in 1993 onward. In order to gain a clear picture of the development of the European Union, we must consider the entirety of the integration process, and focus on the European regional movement as a whole. Due to this consideration, the structure of this chapter will be different from the previous chapter.

Whereas the Swiss and Iroquois cases were separated into sections that covered their structure and their political, economic, and social issues, the case study on the European Union will be broken up by its phases of enlargement, starting with the original six members of the European Coal and Steel Community. In order, this study will consider the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the first expansion that happened after the formation of the European Communities (EC), the Mediterranean
expansion that developed during the European Communities period, and the third wave of expansion that occurred after the establishment of the European Union (EU). Each section will include the factors considered in the previous chapter, investigating the structure during that period of integration, and the political, economic, and social influences and outcomes.

Following this structure allows for the application of the functional integration model at every step of the integration process. By providing a way to determine the factors and motivations that pushed forward European integration, this study can determine how well, if at all, the process followed the functional model. Once this is established, the impacts on the regional movement can be discussed, specifically investigating the impact on the effectiveness of the European Union.

Ultimately, this chapter will show that the process of European integration began through the use of the functional model. The bonds that brought the original six members of the European Coal and Steel Community together formed through initial economic integration, and were cemented through political integration in response to an external political and economic threat. They even adopted a cultural norm to support the integration, much like the historical examples. However, as integration continued, and the membership of the European institutions expanded, the functional model became increasingly unimportant and unused, with the process relying on an increasingly spatial model, headlined by the cultural norm, instead of supported by it.
Furthermore, this chapter will propose that the current economic woes faced by the European Union, in the wake of the world economic crisis of 2008, are the direct result of the spatial-centric model. Because new members were being accepted into the integration process based on their geographic location, or their inherent “Europeanness,” instead of specific issues, nation-states were accepted into the process that were not up to the same economic standards of those who were already members. While individual members may have benefitted from these nations being accepted, through free trade agreements, the institution as a whole was weighed down. This culminates in the current situation, where the European Union is economically weakened, forced to bail out member-states severely impacted by the economic crisis, and politically weakened, due to internal stress, caused by the more stable member-states, who are forced to pay.

The Founding Members: the European Coal and Steel Community

The end of World War II brought with it many things, and for Western European nation-states, the cost was the most apparent. The continent had experienced massive loss of life and financial cost. With a past full of continuous violence between the nations of Europe, many leaders knew a drastic change needed to be made. As Western-European leaders joined the United Nations and tried to link themselves closer to the rest of the world, they also wanted to link themselves closer to each other. As Robert Schuman, one of the founder's of the European regional movement, stated, “It is no

longer a question of vain words but of a bold act, a constructive act.”  

On May 9, 1950, in what came to be known as the Schuman Declaration, Schuman, the French Foreign Minister, continued saying:

The gathering of the nations of Europe demands the elimination of the age-old antagonism of France and Germany. The first concern of any action undertaken must involve these two countries. With this objective in mind, the French government proposes to direct its action on one limited but decisive point: The French government proposes to place Franco-German production of coal and steel under one common High Authority in an organisation open to the participation of other countries of Europe.  

From this speech, in 1951, the European Coal and Steel Community was formed. The six founding members were France, West Germany, Italy, and the Benelux countries of Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. The integration of the coal and steel industries of each of these nations exemplifies the initial economic integration found in the functional model. Much like the Iroquois League, this economic integration brought economic benefits, but was also a means of ensuring peace between each of the members, for if fighting were to occur, it would inherently hurt each economy equally. 

The second step of the functional model can be found by the external political and economic threat represented by the United States and the Soviet Union. After World War II, the power structure of the European players was supplanted by a bi-polar structure, featuring these two new super powers. The pooling of resources by France, Germany, and the rest of the original six members, was a way of protecting themselves from these

46 ibid.
powers, and, hopefully, bringing about a faster recovery from the devastations of the war.

While the European Coal and Steel Community was only an economic venture, the founders of the institution never intended for it to be the only step. On the contrary, it was to be “the first step in the federation of Europe,” and while early attempts were made at making stronger economic and political institutions, none were successful until 1957, when the six members signed the Treaties of Rome.47 These treaties brought about the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM).

The European Coal and Steel Community had a large impact on the European regional movement, aside from representing the start of the process. Much of the structure established in the ECSC still stands today as a part of the European Union. For example, the High Authority of the ECSC is now the European Commission, while the Common Assembly has been transformed into the European Parliament. The High Authority represented the executive branch of the ECSC and had nine members. The nine members were appointed by the member-states, with representation being made up of two representatives each for the three largest member-states, and one each for the remaining three. The president was then elected by these nine members. The Common Assembly was made up of seventy-eight representatives that could be chosen by each home government's parliament or directly elected by the people. The assembly was a check on the High Authority and provided a supervisory role. The European Coal and

47 Price, David H., “Schuman Declaration and the Birth of Europe.”
Steel Community also had three other institutions within its structure, the Council of Ministers, the Court of Justice, and the Consultative Committee. The Council of Ministers was a voice for the member-states governments, the Court of Justice ensured that the laws and treaty of the Community was being upheld, and the Consultative Committee was a forum for businesses, workers, and consumers, that provided a real world voice on possible legislation. This institution was reformed as the Economic and Social Committee in the European Union.

The European Coal and Steel Community laid the ground work for further European integration and established specific issues as the means to achieve it. It is no coincidence that the founders of the European regional movement chose coal and steel as the means to spur integration. These two industries represented the means in which weapons of war were made, ensuring no weapons could be made for one member over the other. The linking of these two economic sectors brought economic benefits to the original six, but also cemented peace within their region, a development that was extremely important for France and Germany. The institution was also a response to the rise of the United States and the Soviet Union as world powers, especially their creation of nuclear weapons. Being literally in the middle of this conflict marked a concern for the Western European powers, and would continue to inspire the integration movement as means of economic and political security became increasingly important. In fact, it is these reasons, among others, that would bring on the first wave of expansion for the European regional movement.
The European Communities and the First Expansion Wave

The period between 1957 and 1972 saw no enlargement to the European Coal and Steel Community, the European Economic Community, and the European Atomic Energy Community. Instead, this period saw a structural shift, as the three communities were organized to work more in accordance with each other, and the names of the institutions were changed to reflect a broader approach than the single division focus of the ECSC. The shift was marked by the Merger Treaty in 1967, that joined all three communities together with a single set of institutions, under the name of the European Communities.

At the same time, other European nation-states were developing their own economic alliance. Instead of forming a set of institutions however, these nations focused on free trade agreements, and in 1960 formed the European Free Trade Association. The members were Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. In 1962, Denmark, Norway, Ireland and the United Kingdom asked to join the European Communities. Their initial accession was vetoed by France, but ten years later, in 1972, the expansion was approved. The United Kingdom joined without referendum of their people. Denmark and Ireland held successful referendum, but Norway's referendum failed with only forty-six percent approval.
A number of economic and political factors were at work in this first wave of expansion, and although four nations were considered, the proceedings really focused on the United Kingdom. For the United Kingdom, economic reasons were the most prevalent. First, the United Kingdom's own economy had started to slow, with much of its trade centered around its formal colonies. At the time, the most beneficial trade took place between industrialized nations, but the United Kingdom failed to garner free trade agreements with the European Communities.\footnote{Bache, Ian and George, Stephen, \textit{Politics in the European Union}. Oxford University Press, US. 2006. pg. 540-542} Joining the Communities would secure this advantage. For Ireland and Denmark, the accession of the United Kingdom practically forced their hands into application, so linked were their economies to that nation. But the benefit extended to the European Communities as well, with members only standing to gain from the inclusion of the United Kingdom. As with the original six members, initial integration of this expansion centered on the benefits of free trade agreements. But for Benelux nations, Italy, and West Germany, the United Kingdom also represented a counterweight to France, who many nations feared could rise to dominate in influence the European sphere. This was the core reason France vetoed United Kingdom accession initially, but they also feared United States influence through the them. Despite this, however, the United States and the Soviet Union represented an economic security threat to both France and the United Kingdom. For example, both nations had experienced the compromise of certain economic strategies by the super powers during the Suez Crisis, when the United States and the Soviet Union pressured France and England to withdraw from Egypt before they could secure the Suez Canal and
influence the fall of Gamel Abdel Nasser, the Egyptian President, from power. Political and economic integration of the European community stood the best chance of abdicating this external threat.

This first expansion marks the turning point for European regional integration. While the formation of the European Communities and the first wave of expansion followed the steps established by the functional model, subsequent enlargement drifted away from this model. At first, each expansion seems to involve some functional method, but they may not represent both steps of the model. For example, the Mediterranean expansion will have a political security threat at the center of its establishment, but the nation-states accepted did not have strong economies prior to accession and thus do not represent an initial economic benefit for the institution as a whole. While Greece, Spain, and Portugal would experience sustained economic growth after their accession, their economies were in recovery as democracy was restored.

Mediterranean Expansion

The Mediterranean expansion took place in the 1980s, with Greece joining the Communities in 1981 and Spain and Portugal following in 1986. This expansion showed a change in purpose for the European Communities, for while each member prior to this expansion represented an economic benefit to the institution, the same could not be said for these three nation-states. All three had recently restored democracy within their
nations, following years of dictatorship. While each had reestablished democracy by 1974, the years leading up to their accession into the European Communities was marked by economic recovery. While they were steadily improving, they did not represent the immediate economic benefit that previous members had offered.

Instead, this wave of membership focused in on a shared political security threat. Since Greece, Spain, and Portugal had just reestablished democracies within their nations, each nation's leaders were looking for ways to stabilize the new government. Entrance into the European Communities represented a favorable way of achieving this goal. For the members of the European Communities, the stabilization of these new democracies also meant the stabilization of their borders. The dictatorships that persisted in Greece, Spain, and Portugal, were external political threats, so supporting their new democracies would prove to be beneficial to the institution.

While the institution did not face any immediate consequences of this expansion, and Greece, Spain, and Portugal did experience sustained economic growth through the beginning of their membership, this expansion nonetheless marked a shift in the mode of integration. What is concerning, however, is that while political integration was supported by an external political threat, and thus functional in nature, the process of this expansion is inherently less functional than the previous expansion, and the model established by the Swiss Confederation and the Iroquois League. Additionally, the threat itself is external to the European Communities, but internal to the proposed members,
expressing a potential shift into more spatial concerns.

As the European Communities continue to evolve, a set of criteria will be devised to ensure future members meet certain standards. While this seems to acknowledge the importance of functional issues in expansion to ensure a successful institution, future enlargement will show little evidence that these standards are being considered in practice.

The European Union and the Third Wave of Expansion

The time period covered by this section is longer than previous sections, and actually covers three occurrences of expansion. The section covers the enlargement process that started in 1995 and ended in 2007. While traditional study on the European Union recognizes these as two separate waves of expansion, for the purposes of this study they will be considered together. This has been decided because they all come after the establishment of the European Union and the Copenhagen Criteria, both put in motion by the Maastricht Treaty in 1993. The Copenhagen Criteria spells out specific standards a nation-state must meet to be considered for the European Union. With this institutional structure in place, it can be compared to the functional model established by this study, and clearly see the levels to which the functional model were applied. What is of main importance for this study, is that since the development of the Copenhagen Criteria, and the acknowledgement that functional issues are of main importance to the
formation of a successful institution, the enlargement process became less functional over time, actually ignoring the standards of the Criteria.

The main factor that led to the shift from a functional model to a spatial model is actually the factor that led to a strengthening of structure in the Swiss Confederation and the Iroquois League; the development of a cultural norm. The creation of the European Union began the effort to make “Europeanness” its cultural norm. While a certain element of this has been evident from the beginning, with Robert Schuman calling for a “federated Europe,” up until this point it had not been a part of the decision-making process. This section will cover certain elements that represent this push for “Europeanness,” and show how the development of this norm actually led the institution to accept nation-states as members at times that were actually detrimental to the institution as a whole.

The years leading up to the creation of the European Union saw major changes, both for the European Union, and the world as a whole. 1986 saw the signing of the Single European Act, the first major revision of the structure of the institution since its inception in 1957. Its purpose was to set in motion the development of a Single Market, encouraging free trade between all members, and providing them with a venue to harmonize laws to achieve this. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 saw the reunification of Germany, effectively adding East Germany into the European Communities. Finally, 1990 saw the end of the Cold War, ending a major external political and economic threat
to the European Communities. The effects of these events were mostly beneficial for the institution. The development of the Single Market not only benefitted the current members of the European Communities, but also pressured members of the European Free Trade Association who weren't a part of the European Communities to ask for membership. German reunification represented a double-edged sword for Germany. On a positive note, the East German economy resembled the Western version, with similar industry, export models, and a well trained work force.49 Conversely, the economy of East Germany was mired in Soviet institutions, and the transfer from those models left it weak, especially when compared to its western counterpart. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union was probably the greatest benefit however; it opened up the way for the European Communities to have the greatest influence in their area.

1993 saw the creation of the European Union under the Maastricht Treaty. An additional part to the Maastricht Treaty was the establishment of the Copenhagen Criteria, a set of standards for future expansion. These were made after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the agreement that Eastern European nation-states should be open to membership. The standards established by the Copenhagen Criteria “require that candidate countries have: stable institutions to guarantee democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities (known as the political criterion); a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competitive

pressure and market forces within the EU's internal market (known as the economic
criterion) and; the ability to take on all the obligations of membership, i.e. the entire
body of EU law and policy known as the acquis communautaire, and adherence to the
aims of political, economic and monetary union (known as the acquis criterion).”

It should be noted that while the process of accession involves negotiations and
monitoring of these criteria, the Copenhagen Criteria itself does not describe this process.
It was not until 1997, four years after the criteria's creation, and two years after the first
expansions that fell under it, that the European Union clarified that the political criterion
must be achieved before membership can be considered, but the economic and acquis
criterion can be achieved during the process of accession. Additionally, while the
Copenhagen Criteria does not specifically outline this requirement, the European Union
does require members to be a part of Europe. This was tested by Morocco in 1987, when
it tried to join the European Communities alongside Turkey. While Turkey has been in
accession talks ever since, Morocco was denied outright because it was not considered
European. It was eventually granted “advanced status relations”, however, in 2008.

The expansions that have occurred since the creation of the Copenhagen Criteria
have shown that the application of these standards are limited at best. 1995 saw the
accession of Austria, Finland, and Sweden. The reason for their accession had a
functional element to it. In 1993, the European Union had made an agreement with the

Last accessed May 8, 2011.
European Free Trade Association to form a European Economic Area, a policy that allowed EFTA member-states to participate in the EU Single Market without full EU membership. This policy was initially made to avoid further enlargement, but in practice it limited how involved EFTA members could be. Austria, Finland, and Sweden pursued full membership status so they could gain greater benefits from the European Single Market, and, faced with the relative failure of the European Economic Area, the European Union reconsidered. Functionally speaking, the inclusion of Austria, Finland, and Sweden fulfilled the first step of the functional model. These three nation-states had strong economies that would create immediate mutual benefits for them and the European Union. On the other hand, however, the political integration of these three nation-states was not supported by any external political or economic threat. The Soviet Union was no longer a concern, and the European Union was making strides in becoming the main voice of the continent, offsetting any United States influence. So the functional purposes of expansion only went so far, but in cultivating a European common identity, the accession of Austria, Finland, and Sweden made perfect sense, especially when faced with the potential for poorer Eastern European nations seeking membership later. After all, contributions from nations with stronger economies would certainly help balance the budget.

2004 and 2007 saw the final set of expansions to the European Union, with the accession of twelve countries. The Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia were accepted in 2004, while Romania
and Bulgaria were accepted in 2007. This round of expansion marked the greatest departure from the functional model yet. In fact, this period of enlargement doesn't follow functional issues at all.

As of 1990, the nation-states of Eastern Europe were free from Communist control. Much like Greece, Portugal, and Spain before them, each nation was looking for a way to secure their newly democratic governments. Additionally, Eastern European nations were looking for a way to protect themselves from future Russian influence. Considering their young democracies, and faced with weak economies due to Soviet rule, these nations looked to the European Union as a way to help solve these problems. When looking at the two steps of the functional model, however, the European Union did not stand to gain in any way by this potential expansion. In regards to the first step, the Eastern European nation-states did not offer an immediate, mutual, economic benefit, especially with the European Union already coping with the added stress of Eastern Germany. While the extension of markets through free trade with these nations represented benefit to some, the stress on the economic infrastructure of the European Union as a whole would far outweigh any benefit. In regards to the second step of the functional model, while a very real external political threat existed for the Eastern European states, the threat of renewed influence from Russia, the same threat did not exist for the European Union. Russia's economy and political influence were weakened greatly by the collapse of the Soviet Union, so the European Union would not have had the same concern.
Even when considering the Copenhagen Criteria, the Eastern European nation-states did not comply. Let us clarify that the accession process for these states started between the years of 1994 to 1996. The treaty that retooled the criteria did not come into place until 1997, so it does not apply to these nations. Therefore, in order for accession processes to begin, Eastern European nation-states had to meet all three criterions. Even when considering the 1997 clarification, conditions could not possibly have been met. The political criterion alone calls for the achievement of stability of institutions to guarantee democracy, rule of law, human rights, and the respect for and protection of minorities. Assuming that ten nations had solidified stable democratic institutions in four years time is unreasonable. The European Union even acknowledged this, creating the Phare Program, a strategy that would help to conform Eastern European institutions and economic practices to their Western neighbors.\textsuperscript{52} This plan essentially contradicts the Copenhagen Criteria, and this was not the only incident.

The inclusion of Cyprus marks another example of how the European Union ignored the criteria. Again, the political criterion call for stable governmental institutions and the guarantee of democracy and human rights before accession talks can even begin. Yet Cyprus was in the midst of a decades spanning civil dispute that had recently resulted in half of the island attempting to claim sovereignty from the other, a move not recognized by the international community. While Cyprus' economy was far better than the Eastern European nations who also achieved membership during this time, it shared

no political or economic external threat with the European Union. In fact, the European Union had solved any such problems as plans moved forward for Turkey's recognition by the institution. Despite all this, instead of holding off on Cyprus accession, the European Union pushed forward, but prevented the northern part of the island from gaining any of the benefits.

This wave of expansion, however, has brought the European Union the farthest south and east it has ever been, creating a land mass that is larger than all but six countries. While expansion to further countries is expected to slow for some time, the “enlargement to candidate and potential candidate countries from the western Balkans is still seen just as a matter of time.”53 The process has clearly moved away from functional issues and towards a spatial focus, and while “EU enlargement has served as an anchor of stability and democracy and as a driver of personal freedom and economic dynamism in Europe,” the true success of this enlargement is questionable.54

54 ibid.
Chapter 5: Conclusions and Implications

This study has established that a functional model of integration is essential for creating an extra-sovereign institution. Moreover, it has developed this functional model, acknowledging that initial economic integration and benefit and subsequent political integration brought on by an external political or economic threat are the key steps in this process. This study has also discussed what makes a successfully created extra-sovereign institution continue to be successful, and has sought to link failure in this arena to the abandonment of the functional model as the institution continues to grow.

The case studies of the Swiss Confederation and Iroquois League adequately established the functional model. These institutions were successful in formation and beyond because they continually followed the functional model of integration. In the case of the Swiss Confederation, the initial economic integration surrounded securing free trade along mountain routes, while the Iroquois sought economic unity as a means to provide internal security. Their institutions achieved political stability by seeking to prevent external aggression and influence, the Austrian armies of the Hapsburg Empire in the case of the Swiss Confederation, and other Native American nations in the case of the Iroquois. As their institutions continued to grow and saw expansion, these same issues highlighted the integration movement. Circumstances may have changed, like in the case of the Iroquois League facing a political and economic threat from European settlers, but the process remained the same, reaffirming the functional model.
In the case of the European Union, however, this is not what develops. The initial integration process is marked by the same functional model as the Swiss and the Iroquois, but as the institution grows and expansion occurs, it follows an increasingly less functional model, and an increasingly spatial model. The paths in which these three case studies deviate is the formation of a cultural norm. While the cultural norm established by the Swiss Confederacy and the Iroquois League served to strengthen their union, the cultural norm for the European Union did not. This presents two possible conclusions.

First, since the cultural norm had an effect on two cases but not the third, it is possible that the development of a cultural norm is not necessary to the formation of an extra-sovereign institution. Second, and what is more likely, is that the development of a cultural norm plays a part in the formation of extra-sovereign institutions, but it is not the presence of a cultural norm that is important, but rather the kind of cultural norm. In the case of the Swiss Confederation and the Iroquois League, both cultural norms represent something that is mechanical in function, and something that is transformational. By this I mean that first, the cultural norm was something that could be used or developed, like direct democracy in the Swiss Confederation, or the communal work ethic in the Iroquois League, and second, that it is something that new members to the institution can become. In essence, it is not just a cultural unifier, but something that can be used every day. The Swiss Confederation were able to overcome ethnic differences within their institution, not because they could say they were Swiss, but rather because they saw the tangible
benefits their institution brought them on a daily basis. The same can be said for the Iroquois League. Their union was not focused on the fact that they were Iroquois, but rather on their strength as a community, their ability to overcome inherent differences to secure peace from external actors, and then eventually attract others to their cause. The expansion of these two institutions is testament to the success of their cultural norm.

The cultural norm of “Europeanness” however, does not hold the same clout. In terms of function, you cannot use “Europeanness,” and in terms of transformation, one is either European or one is not. While in all three cases, societies that wished to join each institution were doubtlessly attracted by the immediate economic gains and the subsequent political stability, but with the cases of the Swiss Confederation and the Iroquois League, their cultural norms were intrinsically linked with these benefits. Those who wished to join these institutions knew from the beginning that joining them would mean military strength, in the case of the Swiss, or communal sharing of land and resources, in the case of the Iroquois. With the European Union, the opposite is true. Those nation-states who wish to join the Union do so because they are already European and desire the economic and political benefits that other Europeans have.

This can become a problem for the institution if you start to follow a spatial model for integration instead of a functional one. As was shown in the previous chapter, the European Union began to accept members, essentially on the basis that they were European. This led to the ignoring of policies put in place that specifically ensured a
functional model. By not matching the needs of the institution with the needs of incoming members, the European Union unnecessarily placed stress on their economic infrastructure, the likes of which are coming to fruition today. Current debate in the European Union surrounds the economic bail outs for Greece, Ireland, and most recently Portugal. The week of May 2, 2011 saw the announcement of the Portugal bail out by the European Union and the International Monetary Fund. The bail out, “requires it [Portugal] to pay interest of over 5 percent on its 78 billion euro ($113 billion) loan and enact drastic austerity measures that will likely push the country into recession until 2013.”

Paul Ames, in his article for the Global Post, continues stating, “But even such dire measures will not silence the growing ranks of doubters in the European Union’s richer northern nations. Having seen the EU use their taxpayers’ money for similar bailouts to Greece and Ireland over the past year, they have had enough of shipping funds to what they regard as profligate peripheral partners.”

Portugal and Greece were two of the first nation-states to join the European Union as the functional model began to lose prominence. Even though their economies experienced growth upon entering the Union, they are experiencing major downturns in the current recession. And while some of blame must be placed on the governments of the nation-states themselves, what does the disparity between countries hit hard, like Greece and Portugal, and countries who have stayed strong, like Germany, say about the structure of the European Union?

56 Ibid.
This is not to say that the nation-states who joined the European Union in the last twenty years do not belong in the institution or never should have been included. On the contrary, it is the purpose of this study to show that their inclusion when it happened was not in the best interest of the institution at that time. Had the European Union stayed true to the Copenhagen Criteria, and held off on admitting ten new members with relatively weak economies, the Single Market might have been better prepared to deal with the 2008 recession. Had the European Communities held off on membership for Spain, Portugal, and Greece and encouraged the development of their democracy and economy prior to membership, Portugal and Greece might never have developed the circumstances that brought them to their current situation.

Regardless of these implications, the current situation in the European Union, where a German Parliament leader states, “If you want to help Greece and Portugal, then you have to say 'get out of the euro-zone,'” is a direct result of the Union moving away from a functional model of integration. The leaders of the European Union seem to be acknowledging this, however. Along with the slowing of further expansions, certain elements seem to be in the forefront of the institutions consciousness. In a 2009 article, EU affairs analyst Piotr Kaczynski, from the Brussels-based Centre for European Policy Studies, stated, “The centre of gravity has moved and we are looking for it ...This means that we have an inflation of summits – micro-summits, different groups meeting in different forms and different formulas, there are lots of government to government meetings. We have really multiplied levels of governance.”

When referring to the

Eastern European nations who joined the EU in 2004 and 2007, Kaczynski goes on to say, ""If these countries had more clout, Europe would adopt [the] Lisbon Treaty and grant membership to Croatia and Serbia in a matter of months, consider membership for Ukraine and Moldova, pursue more robust economic liberalisation, and take a 'Nato-first' approach toward European defence and security. Despite the economic crisis, these countries would keep state protectionism at bay and fully liberalise labor markets.""58 Regardless of the policies mentioned, this new "center of gravity," when found, could mark the return to an issue based, functional model, and the continued success of the extra-sovereign institution. Ironically, if this were to happen, it would be at the hands of the new member-states; the ones accepted during a period of spatial-centric integration.

Bibliography


