The Integration Trajectory of Muslim Immigrants in France and the United Kingdom

Sydney Winnick

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The Integration Trajectory of Muslim Immigrants in France and the United Kingdom

By: Sydney Winnick

Submitted to the Committee on Undergraduate Honors at Baruch College of the City University of New York on **May 7, 2015** in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Bachelor of Science in Public Affairs with Honors.

**Els de Graauw**
**Joselyn Muhleisen**
Faculty Sponsors

**Iris Geva-May**
Reader

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1 Although this thesis was originally entitled “The Integration Trajectory of Muslim Immigrants in France and the United Kingdom”, the data and following conclusions were not sufficient explanation for Muslim immigrants. More generally, this thesis concentrated on the Algerian immigrant population in France and the Pakistani immigrant population in the United Kingdom.
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Looking back to one year ago, when I first began to consider writing a thesis, I could not imagine the day I would be able to complete it. This process was quite possibly the biggest challenge I have ever taken on, and it has helped me to grow tremendously both personally and academically. This thesis would have absolutely not been possible had it not been for the wonderful academics I had the chance to work with these past two semesters.

First and foremost, I would like to thank my amazing mentors, Joselyn Muhleisen and Els de Graauw. I have been so incredibly fortunate to be able to work so closely with a European Union expert, Joselyn, and an immigration expert, Els. Very few undergraduate students get the chance to work with two incredible and accomplished scholars on an interdisciplinary project, and I am so lucky to be one of them.

My thesis would not have been possible without their guidance, mentorship, and support. From the very beginning of my project, Joselyn and Els helped me to put all of my ideas in motion and aided me in structuring my research. I am fairly certain that both of them edited my initial thesis prospectus upwards of seven times. They even took me under their wing the summer before my thesis class commenced to begin the initial plans for my project. If it was not for both of them sending me articles discussing how to conduct research and explaining what comparative research was, I would have been completely lost. Additionally, I was able to complete some of my research at the European Union Studies Center at the CUNY Graduate School with the help of Joselyn.
My two fabulous mentors also painstakingly edited all of my drafts and provided copious amounts of feedback. This meant so much to me, because both of my mentors are busy women. As they were mentoring me, Joselyn was completing her doctorate dissertation, and Els was conducting research across the country. Yet no matter how time consuming it may have been for them to provide me feedback, sometimes even pointing out repeat issues, I would receive ample encouragement to “keep plugging!” Joselyn and Els consistently pushed me past all of my preconceived limits and taught me to always reach for a higher level of perfection. I learned so much this past year, the greatest being that I can achieve even the greatest expectations. I cannot thank them enough for all they taught me this past year. I grew tremendously as a student and a person because of their inspiration and encouragement.

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Last, but certainly not least, I want to give a special thanks to my Writing Center consultant Brook Wilensky-Lanford. I attribute the proper writing throughout this paper to her and her patience. She was able to take all of the thesis edits that I came with and help me to create a plan of action to perfect everything. She was always there to help me make sense of my work, and helped me to not only develop a stronger writing process, but also to implement critique in a positive way. She often dealt with my questions and anxieties twice a week, and I am forever grateful for her seemingly endless patience.
There were many other individuals that helped me to make my research interest a reality. I want to recognize Professor Iris Geva-May who dedicated her time to be a reader for my thesis and Dr. Patrizia Nobbe who supported me in the EU Studies Center. The help I received through Baruch College and CUNY allowed me to end my senior year with skills that will enable me to pursue all of my future endeavors.

I truly extend my deepest gratitude to everyone that believed in me, encouraged me, and pushed me to complete this project and pursue my own research interests.
Abstract

This thesis studied the societal integration of Muslim immigrants in Western Europe by asking the question: How do the citizenship regimes of France and the United Kingdom affect the integration trajectory of Muslim immigrants? To do so, it compared France and the United Kingdom, and utilized the cases of Algerian immigrants in France and Pakistani immigrants in the United Kingdom to represent its Muslim immigrant populations. The cases were chosen based upon their similar colonial histories, statuses in Western European society, and adherence to Islam. This comparison provided insight into the integration process of each country, uncovered the nuances of integration specific to each regime, and discovered if citizenship regimes correlate with certain groups, such as Muslims, having different integration outcomes than other immigrants in the same country.

Muslim integration was studied by measuring three socioeconomic indicators—employment, occupational attainment, and average hourly wage—and three political indicators—citizenship acquisition, voting participation, and ethnic representation in government. Each indicator was analyzed for the Algerian immigrants in France and the Pakistani immigrants in the United Kingdom. Additionally, each Muslim immigrant group was measured against the native-born population of each country, because this thesis defined “perfect” integration as having statistics similar to the native-born. It also compared each Muslim immigrant group against overall immigrant population in each country. This comparison was to see if the Muslim immigrant groups had integration that differed from overall immigrant population, which may have indicated that a citizenship regime correlated with differential integration outcomes.
This thesis discovered that with both socioeconomic and political indicators considered, France seemed to have superior integration for Algerian immigrants because in the soundest data comparisons, its indicators showed an overall greater level of societal integration.
Chapter 1: Introduction

Since the mid-20th century, globalization has visibly changed the face of Western Europe. Compared to earlier waves of immigration following World War II, such as from Eastern Europe, “present-day migrants tend to be more clearly distinct from the native population in terms of their skin color, cultural markers, or religion,” (Koopmans, 2005; p.4). Cold War economic migration to Europe was characterized by the arrival of large numbers of immigrants from less economically advanced countries. This included French colonials who came to France seeking better economic opportunities before independence and West Indians recruited by British companies for low-wage jobs in the United Kingdom (Pettigew, 1998; p.79). Post-war migration policies of several European countries specifically sought to recruit this group of migrants under visas that categorized them as guest workers. However, in the early 1970s, a recession hit Western Europe. The openness to guest workers had been premised on the idea that the workers would leave after their temporary jobs ended, but this was not the case. Although few to no new guest workers came after the recession, those who were already in Europe started to bring over their relatives, in the process making especially large European cities like London and Paris more ethno-racially diverse. The growing visibility of the guest worker population produced the first signs of host society opposition to migration. As xenophobic sentiment spread, anti-immigrant political actors stared to organize (Messina, 2007; p.2-5). As Amikam Nachmani asserted, the growing unease with immigration in Europe was likely because many of the new migrants were Muslim (2009; p.9). Other scholars have also cited particular difficulties pertaining to Muslim immigration specifically (Hargreaves, 2007; Koopmans, 2005; Laurence et

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2 Although this thesis is concerned with immigration, the introduction and literature review may use the terms “migration” or migrants. These terms are used when broadly referring to immigration, migration and migration patterns, and not specifically to the legal and documented immigration data being analyzed in this thesis.
In the 1970s and onward, the migration trend shifted from guest workers to refugees and asylum seekers of Third World countries seeking refuge in rich northern countries such as those in Western Europe (Miles and Thränhardt, 1995; p.16). As a result of their modernization and colonial ties, Western countries, especially the United Kingdom and France, became viable options for refuge. This meant that there were a large number of foreign-born individuals of non-European descent in France and the United Kingdom. In 1982 specifically, there were over 3.6 million foreign-born individuals in France and over 2.4 million foreign-born individuals in the United Kingdom (Caseli et al., 2005; p.279). Many people in these countries were not happy about the growing number of foreigners, and for this reason, the countries that received the most immigration had the most negative sentiment towards new immigrants (Messina, 2007; p.2).

Immigrants of the 21st century, like those from several decades ago, are still coming to Europe for economic opportunities and family connections. Each year, over 1.5 million immigrants enter the European Union. In 2009, immigrants made up 11.3% of the population of the United Kingdom and 11.6% of the population of France. In recent years, this equated to 450,000 legal immigrants entering the United Kingdom and 200,000 entering France (Schain, 2012; p.2). Of these, 38% of immigrants to the United Kingdom and 25% of immigrants to France come from outside the EU (2012; p.2). The large percentages of people in Western European countries who do not appear to be of European descent poses an issue for France, the United Kingdom, and other countries in the European Union. While discrimination is often practiced through employment status and citizenship, negative sentiment towards minority

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3 Miles and Thränhardt use the term North-South migration to describe the phenomenon of those living in poorer countries in the global south (i.e. Third World countries) moving to richer, more developed nations for better opportunities (1995; p.16).
4 The data in Demography was presented for Great Britain and Ireland separately. The data I’ve provided was produced by combining the total foreign populations for each country to create data for the United Kingdom.
groups and immigrants is also emphasized with new social and political movements. These include the anti-immigration and anti-minority platforms of political parties such as The United Kingdom Independence Party (Ukip) and the National Front Party of France (FN). With the economic recession and EU membership issues, right-wing groups gain voters. Unfortunately, these political groups are often also discriminatory.

To explain and define the integration experience of new immigrants in a country, this thesis used the phrase ‘citizenship regime’. In this thesis, a citizenship regime was defined as how a nation confers citizenship to an immigrant based upon its own norms, values, interests and desires. This theory suggested that something like wanting to protect a country’s national identity informs certain laws or practices that apply to new immigrants. Therefore, this thesis also used ‘citizenship regime’ to explain the integration practices of the two countries studied: France and the United Kingdom.

Beginning with the case of France, literature suggested that the French government practices the absorption of people into its ethnocultural framework (Bloemraad & Schönwälder, 2013; Brubaker, 1992; Schain, 2012). Historically, France has not been very receptive to outsiders and its culture dictates for all new immigrants to quickly assimilate into the French culture. For this reason, scholars say that France has an assimilationist approach to immigrant inclusion in society, or in other words, an assimilationist citizenship regime (Brubaker, 1992; Heckmann et al., 2003; Schain, 2012). However, a possible downside with the desire to make every person living in France “French” is that some immigrants may not want to be forced to assimilate. This was exemplified by the fall 2005 riots in France’s ethnically imbalanced suburbs, which contain large enclaves of immigrant groups, and recent political controversies such as the law against covering the face, which disproportionately affects Muslim women
(Thomas, 2011; p.4). As some of the recent events help to illustrate, it is possible that the assimilationist integration process is not preferable for all immigrants.

The United Kingdom, on the other hand, has a different approach to integration. Muslim immigrants to the United Kingdom, primarily Pakistani and Bangladeshi, are poorer than their other South Asian counterparts as a result of the weak British economy when they arrived in the United Kingdom in the 1970s. However, while this does influence Muslims’ ability to mobilize in British society, it is not a sufficient explanation for the gaps in their societal integration. Some choose to live separately, not only out of economic ability but also out of communal comfort. They are not forced to assimilate as in France, thus some do not become part of mainstream British society. For this reason, one could say that the United Kingdom has a multiculturalist citizenship regime.

Considering the importance of citizenship regimes in defining the culture of the country and the way immigrants are treated, it is easy to see how the controversy surrounding certain immigrant groups begins. This thesis was interested in how citizenship regimes affect integration of Muslim immigrants because as stated earlier, oftentimes Muslim immigrants are socially, ethnically, and culturally distinctive from many native-born Western Europeans. Perhaps this is the reason for the growing Islamophobia in Western Europe and elsewhere in the world (Thomas, 2011; p.6). Looking back to the cases this thesis was concerned with, France and the United Kingdom, the question of the integration of Muslim immigrants is equally valid. The 2014 European Parliamentary elections, for example, resulted in increased representation of anti-immigration parties such as United Kingdom Independence Party (Ukip) and the French National Party (FN). This election resulted in a 27.5% vote for Ukip, or a 10 member increase in European Parliament, and a 25% vote for FN, or an increase of 21 members from the last
election in 2009 (Cross, 2014; Mudde, 2014). As the elections indicated, is clear that support for anti-immigrant rhetoric is strong in the European political realm.

To be able to study the integration of Muslim immigrants in France and the United Kingdom, in this thesis, I compared the integration trajectories of Algerian immigrants in France to that of Pakistani immigrants in the United Kingdom. France and the United Kingdom are Western European countries with colonial histories and large Muslim populations. With these similarities in mind, I was interested in how the independent variable of ‘citizenship regime’ affects immigrant integration. I utilized data for three socioeconomic indicators (employment, hourly wage, and occupation) and three political indicators (citizenship acquisition, voting rates, and ethnic representation) for each group, each country’s immigrant population, and each country’s native-born population. This thesis sought to determine which citizenship regime promoted greater socioeconomic and political integration for Muslim immigrants by asking the question: how do the citizenship regimes of France and the United Kingdom affect the integration trajectory of Muslim immigrants?
Chapter 2: Literature Review

Introduction to International Migration

The movement of persons from one place to another because of labor, wars, famine, and national catastrophes is central to human history. Any of these reasons could constitute what is considered an immigrant’s motivation, or the reason that a person migrates from one area to the next. There is also an important difference between an international migrant and an immigrant. An immigrant is someone who has been given a visa to legally reside in a country, and usually to also work (Bean et al., 2003; p.10). An international migrant, on the other hand, is anyone who moves internationally, which includes both legal and illegal status in a country (2003; 4).

Increased globalization over the past few decades has increased both immigration and migration to many different areas throughout the world, because globalization brings an increased awareness of opportunities abroad. The following chart is a snapshot of the worldwide migration trends of the past 30 years:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>International Migrants Per Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970s</td>
<td>84,620,000&lt;sup&gt;5&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990s</td>
<td>154,200,000&lt;sup&gt;6&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>231,500,000&lt;sup&gt;7&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As the data indicates, in 2013, there were 231.5 million international migrants. To put this into perspective, that amount alone would make the population the equivalent to the 5th most populated country in the world (Migration Policy Institute, 2013). This number has grown dramatically over the past few decades because of increased globalization, or the “growing

<sup>5</sup> (International Migrant Stock, 2002; p.6).
<sup>6</sup> (International Migrant Stock, 2002; p.6).
<sup>7</sup> (Migration Policy Institute, 2013)
integration of economies and societies around the world” (Ervin et al., 2008;p.3). This increased integration has also increased communication, tourism, market interaction and trade across nations (Bean et al., 2003; p.5). Considering that globalization leads to the integration of different cultures worldwide, one can imagine what this causes for just a single country. With globalization, countries now contain more people of different backgrounds than ever before.

Globalization also helps to explain the large flows of labor migration that often bring a new immigrant group to a host society. Increased migration and immigration accompanies international knowledge of another country’s demand for labor when the economy is strong. During an economic upswing, migrants meet the labor demand (Tiersky, 2014; p.155). Immigrants take jobs that nationals do not want, thereby filling a “niche,” or an area complementary to the society to which they are moving (Bean et al., 2003; p.209). As this thesis discovered, this economic relationship is one of the reasons for the presence of Algerian immigrants in France and Pakistani immigrants in the United Kingdom.

One nation’s growing economy is just one of the many reasons that might drive a person to leave his or her home country and move to a new place. The factors that motivate an individual to move from one place to another, in other words “pull” him or her to a new pace, are known as pull factors. Some of these factors include economic opportunities, especially those that outweigh the difficulties involved with moving from one place to another. Other pull factors include “increased social and educational opportunities, relaxation of immigrant laws and policies, post-colonial access, and the presence of international connections,” (Elliot et al., 2009; p.7). These personal and social connections are especially important in the integration process, as they can help give support to new immigrants as they settle in to their new environments (Ortega et al., 2012; p.66).
Introduction to Integration

An individual moving from one country to another also faces the challenge of adapting to a new society. At the same time, the receiving country must decide how it will incorporate, in other words integrate, these immigrants. For this thesis, integration was defined as “the process by which immigrants become able to participate in a receiving country socioeconomically and politically” (Joppke and Seidle, 2012; p. 9). The process of becoming a fully participatory member of society concerns many different areas of the social sciences (Schunck, 2014; p.1). It is a contentious issue because by integrating an immigrant into a country, he or she is given many tools to succeed in society. As this thesis will attempt to show, an immigrant’s ability to integrate into, and be granted citizenship to a country may be correlated with the country’s own citizenship regime. As it is defined here, an integration process is dependent upon the receiving country.

A relatable example of the integration process is the one that occurs in the United States. Two scholars, Richard Alba and Victor Nee, illustrated the American citizenship regime by detailing the integration process that came before the concept of the American ‘melting pot’. Previous to the 1960s, the United States practiced the assimilation of immigrant groups, meaning that an immigrant was expected to adapt to the majority culture. Therefore, to be accepted into American society, an immigrant had to ‘unlearn’ his or her cultural traits, which were evaluated by the host society as “inferior”, in order to “successfully learn the new way of life for full acceptance,” (2009; p.1). Coupled with having cultural traits that were distinctive from American cultural traits, some immigrants also exhibited a unique physicality. Similar to the experience of many new immigrants trying to blend into Western Europe, being visibly different made the process of being accepted as an American even more challenging (2009; p.4).
To better explain the process of an immigrant integrating into American society, Emory Bogardus, a sociologist, created a race relation theory. His theory in particular helps to explain the changing dynamics of the American immigrant experience from before the 1960s to present-day. It is broken down into seven steps (Bogardus, 1930; p.614-616)8:

1) **The receiving society becomes interested in, and feels compassion for, the new immigrants.**

2) **Immigrants are brought into the economy by performing labor that the receiving country will not.**

3) **The receiving society views the immigrants as rivals.**

4) **Fearing the immigrant group’s lack of assimilation incurred by living in certain enclave neighborhoods, society continues to segregate the immigrant group into certain areas. This practice makes it difficult for the immigrant group to mobilize economically. Additionally, politicians may also use this newfound xenophobia against the group for political leverage.**

5) **Society realizes its own negativity towards the immigrant group.**

6) **Society feels sympathy again for the immigrant group and tries to end the discrimination it caused against it.**

7) **The second generation of immigrants has one of two experiences. It either feels that it fully belongs to the country it were born into, and estranged from its parent’s heritage, or completed isolated in society.**

Although this thesis was concerned with Muslim immigration in Western Europe, parts of this theory are especially relevant to the Western European experience, particularly steps 2-7. As previously detailed, the pull factor for immigration and migration into France and the United Kingdom was often labor, and this history compliments step two of Bogardus’s cycle. Steps

---

8 Bogardus uses his race relation theory to explain both races and minority groups. Here, the phrases “immigrant” and “immigrant group” are replacing words such as minority and race in the step summary as to best relate his work to the focus of this thesis.
three and four of Bogardus’s cycle concern the growth of ethnic enclaves of immigrant groups, which relates to the increase in European Parliamentary seats awarded to anti-immigration parties. Finally, steps five and six of Bogardus’s theory were studied by this thesis through the lens of each country’s citizenship regime. A country’s resources available to immigrants, the sign of a government’s willingness to assist them, indicated how inclusive a citizenship regime is. When socioeconomic and political indicators were tested for this thesis, it was clear how the governments of France and the United Kingdom provided support to immigrant groups such as Muslims, and if certain immigrant groups were therefore able to integrate further than others.

**Key Indicators of Immigrant Integration**

Understanding the process of integration, as well as the many potential outcomes, it is also important to understand the way in which scholars measure immigrant integration outcomes. One method is to study socioeconomic integration, which is widely researched by scholars and describes an immigrant’s employment, occupation, and salary (Biezeveld et al., 2003, p.19). There is also political integration, which describes the participation of an immigrant group in host country activities such as voting, petitioning/campaigning, political institutions, ethnic or demographic representation, and policies (de Graauw, 2013; p.1875). It also includes social processes, non-profit, or governmental resources that help to mobilize immigrants (Bloemraad, 2007).

Both socioeconomic and political integration indicators apply to the challenges of integrating new immigrants into Western European society. In Europe, the debate surrounding the large influx of immigrants began after the end of colonialism, and the question of how to integrate these specific groups is nothing new. Again, in addition to labor needs, immigration also increased because of different immigration laws and quotas, which often resulted in large
waves of family reunification immigration. For example, the United Kingdom had open immigration for all 55 of its Commonwealth countries, its 15 dependent territories, and Ireland through 1962 (Schain, 2006; p. 145). Eventually however, the British government realized that it had thousands of new immigrants that it was now responsible for. Comprehending the situation that it faced, the British government enacted its Commonwealth Immigration Act in 1962, and Commonwealth immigrants were restricted to 7,000 annually, except for family reunification (Heckman et al., 82). The allowance of family reunification actually caused immigration to increase, which proved that even with restrictions put in place, the immigration flow was hardly stemmed. To illustrate this phenomenon, the following table shows the amount of international migrants present in in France and the United Kingdom in both 1970 and 2000.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1970</th>
<th>2000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>5,200,000</td>
<td>6,300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>2,900,000</td>
<td>4,000,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: International Migrant Totals


Not indicated in the International Migration Total chart are the exact countries that the immigrants came from. One of the reasons why the immigration debate has intensified within the past half century is because of the amount of Muslim immigrants that have been coming to Western Europe (Thomas, 2012; p.3). After World War II, there was an increase in labor recruitment from Muslim countries. The differences between Muslim immigrants and the native-born Europeans aside, immigrants from Muslim countries provided cheap, unskilled labor for Western European countries between 1950 and 1970 (Messina, 2007; p.2).
Today, Muslim immigration to Western Europe continues. As the chart below displays, European countries have large Muslim populations:

**Table 3: Muslim Populations in EU Countries**

![Muslims in EU Countries](chart.png)


According to Pew, Muslims represent the largest percent of the population in Bulgaria (13.7%), France (7.5%), Germany (5.8%), Greece (5.3%) and the United Kingdom (4.8%) compared with the other European countries. As the map indicates, with the exception of Bulgaria and Romania, the Muslim populations tend to account for larger percentages of the population in Western European countries than they do in Eastern, Southern, or Nordic countries.

It is important to remember that one of the reasons that these populations are significant is because “in Europe, national identity and national pride typically relate positively with anti-immigration views” (Pettigrew et al., 2011). For this reason, being culturally and physically distinctive from the native-born presented many issues for the immigrant groups, as well as
political leaders and policy makers (Bean et al., 2013; p.5). This is perhaps the reason why the significant Muslim immigration has increased discourse surrounding the changing national identities of European countries (Koopmans, 2005; p.4).

Understanding how central nationality can be to a country, some may wonder what it takes for an immigrant to be fully integrated, again defined in this thesis as having similar socioeconomic and political opportunities to a native-born citizen. To this end, it is also important to understand what it takes for an immigrant to become a legal citizen. As explained earlier, a nation’s citizenship regime is representative of many different aspects of the country. Therefore, a citizenship regime will indicate how a country recognizes the individuality of each immigrant and allows, or not, the immigrant to keep his or her background, or adopt the national identity.

To clarify, there are three main types of citizenship regimes. The first is ethnic or exclusive, best exemplified by Germany (Koopmans, 2005; p.8). Here, someone can only become a citizen by hereditary relation. This type of citizenship is known as *jus sanguinis*, or citizenship by blood (Koslowski, 2010; p.27). The next type of citizenship regime is assimilationist, also known as Republican, which is best shown by countries such as France and Israel (Koopmans, 2005; p8; Rebhun et al., 2004; p.68). Here, it is fairly simple to obtain citizenship, however to do so, an immigrant must adopt the national identity. Oftentimes for the second generation, this citizenship is procured by *jus solis* (born on the soil) acquisition, meaning that if someone is born in the country, he or she is automatically a citizen (Schain, 2012; p.12). The final type of citizenship regime is multiculturalist, where once again it is fairly simple to obtain citizenship. However, unlike an assimilationist regime, in multiculturalist societies, minority ethnic groups are recognized and do not have to adopt the national identity. Examples
of societies like these are Sweden, the United States and the United Kingdom. In these countries as well, citizenship is *jus solis* where it is granted to anyone born in the country (Koopmans, 2005; p.8). The table below synthesizes nuances specific to citizenship regimes:

**Table 4: Societal Level Structures**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Citizenship Regime</th>
<th>Micro-</th>
<th>Meso-</th>
<th>Macro-</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Multiculturalist</td>
<td>Daily interactions with those who are easily defined by their ethnocultural background. (i.e. knowing that one has Pakistani friends)</td>
<td>Wide prevalence of cultural community organizations aimed at increasing aid and awareness</td>
<td>Minorities are able to retain cultural differences and ethnic identities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assimilationist</td>
<td>Daily interactions with those who are all of the same culture, and the person’s ethnic heritage is not a question</td>
<td>Ethnic backgrounds are kept primarily inside the home; outside, everyone adheres to the overarching culture</td>
<td>Everyone in society follows the national identity as to be marginalized based on cultural differences</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Citizenship acquisition, integration, and citizenship regimes as they relate to immigrant integration and societal acceptance have a large body of research in literature (Feldblum, 1999; Brubaker, 1992; Breton, 2003; Bloemraad, 2006; Jenson, 2007; Joppke, C., & Seidle, L., 2012; Koopmans, 2005; Maxwell, 2006). To show how a government supports or prevents integration through daily interactions, resources, and institutional beliefs, it is important to look at the *micro-level*, *meso-level*, and *macro-level* structures that exist in a society. Micro-level factors are individual interactions between people. They lend themselves to meso-level interactions, such as community groups, and networks. The final category, macro-level factors, is the societal institutions. In this case, the macro level would be the actual citizenship regime (Brym et al., 2006; p.147). This is because, as this thesis argued, the citizenship regime helps to determine what resources and organizations exist in society for the Muslim immigrants (*meso*), and how the
Muslim immigrants are viewed in society (micro). Some people view immigration as a threat to previously established nation building. This is why the perception of immigration informs a country’s integration process. In the cases of the two countries studied, France and the United Kingdom, it is clear how micro-, meso-, and macro-level structures help to define each country’s citizenship regime and how they, in turn, integrate Muslim immigrants.

In assimilationist France, the citizenship regime instills sameness and unity (Williams, 2013; p. 3). The French practice secularism as their way of ensuring societal equality. This macro-level practice is meant to create a “transcendence of diversity” and an answer to the marginalization someone’s background can create (Heckmann et al., 2003; p. 133). Meso-level factors of this citizenship regime are a “color-blind policy”, or the practice of not including race and ethnicity as a part of census surveys or identification (2003; p. 18). Meso-level factors are also apparent in French schools, where there is a centralized education system in place. It is also shown in society, where the integration model allows for equal treatment of new immigrants in all areas except for the legal rights that come with citizenship (2003; p.96, 17). However, problems have arisen, especially in the micro-level of the assimilationist citizenship regime. In one famous event in 1989, known as Affair de Foulard, or Headscarf Affair, a head teacher from the West Indies did not allow three Muslim girls to come to her secondary school wearing headscarves. The event sparked a controversy about the place of laïcité, or secularism, in French schools (Heckmann et al, 2003; p.33). This event brings to light the difficulties of being a new immigrant. The question then becomes, for a new immigrant to become “French”, must he or she separate completely from his or her ethnic heritage and former country? If so, does it positively impact his or her societal integration?
On the other hand, in multiculturalist Untied Kingdom, immigrants experience nuances of cultural inclusion, perhaps even sensitivity. The recognition of different cultures informs the meso- and micro-structures of British society (Heckmann et al., 2003; p. 11). Consider education: one of the most obvious meso-level nuances of the United Kingdom. It is decentralized, allowing there to be special schools for different ethnic and religious groups, as well as separate classes for those with a low command of English (Heckmann et al., 2003; p. 88-89). Of interest to this thesis, Muslim lobby groups have also worked to have Halal food and mother-tongue classes in schools, something that is simpler to instill in a decentralized education system (Heckmann et al., 2003; p. 88-89; Maxwell, 2006; p. 745). However, the micro level helps to convey the issues that pertain to the independent identities of British citizens. In this level, something such as the fact that ethnic neighborhoods exist brings up the debate of how someone could ever become “British” (Maxwell, 2006; p. 745). This is the origin of the question of whether in a multiculturalist society, is an individual confined by his or her ethnic boundaries, or can he or she be both British and something else? More than anything, there are those that want to know if multiculturalism can backfire and lead to feelings of isolation for an individual (Maxwell, 2006; p. 740). For all of its benefits, multiculturalism is not a perfect structure, nor is it a practice that ensures true societal equality.

While it is impossible to say what makes a regime “better” or “worse”, there are ways to compare and contrast them to see how citizenship regimes make opportunities are available to immigrants. In the next section, I discuss how I have designed my study to complete a comparison of France and the United Kingdom.
Chapter 3: Methodology

Background

Since World War II, France and the United Kingdom have experienced high immigration rates from Muslim-majority countries (Thomas, 2012; p.3). According to The Future of the Global Muslim Population, there is a projected increase of 2,698,000 Muslims in the United Kingdom and 2,156,000 Muslims in France by 2030, making them the countries with the largest Muslim populations in all of Western Europe (Pew Research, 2011). These immigrants are different culturally, religiously and ethnically than the native populations. To understand how these new immigrants are integrated into these two countries, it is key to understand the citizenship regimes of France and the United Kingdom. This is because citizenship regimes encompass state access, societal participation, nationality, and national membership (Jensen, 2007; p.55-56).

Again, the citizenship regimes of these two countries differ in a few key ways. The United Kingdom has a multiculturalist citizenship regime, which means that all groups are seen as equal, but distinguishable by ethnic and cultural terms (Schain, 2008; p.155). In France, on the other hand, racial categories are absent, and the topic of “race” is considered taboo (Koopmans, 2005; p.21). France has republican and revolutionary definitions of nationhood and citizenship, valuing universality and secularism (Brubaker, 1992; p.1). To have one overarching culture, the French government utilizes an assimilationist citizenship regime (Hamilton et al., 2004). Clearly, each citizenship regime is distinct; a multiculturalist regime openly recognizes, values, and celebrates ethnic, racial, and cultural differences, and an assimilationist regime does not want to
separate individuals from the national identity. These contrasting citizenship regimes lead this thesis to further inquire if the integration outcomes of immigrants is directly correlated to a country’s citizenship regime.

The integration practices by France and the United Kingdom by no mean lead to universal integration. Some even believe that if the status quo is maintained, Western Europe could become a breeding ground for poverty, exclusion, and possibly even extremism (Algan et al., 2010; p. F4-5). The validity of such arguments, especially pertaining to the integration of Muslim immigrants, merited a closer examination. For these reasons, my thesis has explored the central research question: how do the citizenship regimes of France and the United Kingdom affect the integration trajectory of new Muslim immigrants?

**Country Cases**

For this study, I used a “most similar” case design. The purpose of the study was to better understand how the citizenship regimes of France and the United Kingdom affect the integration trajectory of Muslim immigrants. This method undertakes that all variables are similar except for the one variable of interest (Gerring et al., 2008; p.12). To achieve a high degree of comparison reliability, everything must be similar in all respects except for the variable being studied (Przeworski et al., 1970; p.34). This is a common approach used in immigration studies, as demonstrated by scholars such as Irene Bloemraad (2008), Rahsaan Maxwell (2008), and Martin Schain (2006).

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9 The French government does not collect or publish information on religion. According to the Brookings Institution, “the last census that indicated respondents’ religion was taken in 1872, and a 1978 law restricts official recordkeeping regarding racial and ethnic data” (Being Muslim in France, 17). Throughout this thesis, I will be using information from organizations such as Pew Research, and from researchers with special access to French census data to provide statistical evidence that the government does not.
To study how the citizenship regime affects how Muslim immigrants integrate into France and the United Kingdom, I used the Algerian immigrants in France to represent its Muslim immigrant population and the Pakistani immigrants in the United Kingdom to represent its Muslim immigrant population. As fore stated, my study required that both chosen groups and countries are similar in fundamental ways. France and the United Kingdom are countries that share vast colonial histories, and the groups I studied are both from former colonies. Furthermore, I found that Algerian immigrants in France and Pakistani immigrants in the United Kingdom have similar migration patterns, motivation, and treatment by their receiving countries.

I chose Algerian immigrants and Pakistani immigrants as the immigrant groups because they compose the largest Muslim populations of France and of the United Kingdom respectively. In 2009, there were 177,000 Pakistani immigrants in the United Kingdom out of a total foreign population of 4,524,000, or 4% (OECD, 2009). Similarly, Algerian immigrants are the largest Muslim immigrant group in France; their population in 2009 was 466,405 out of a total foreign population of 3,821,456, equaling 12% (OECD, 2009). In addition to being the largest Muslim immigrant groups for each country, there are further similarities between the groups’ backgrounds and their relationships to their receiving countries.

First, as mentioned earlier, Algerian immigrants and Pakistani immigrants come from former colonies. Algeria was a French colony from 1830 until the Algerian War between 1954-1962 (Silverstein, 2004; p.3). Pakistan was part of the Indian subcontinent, and ruled by the British government from 1857 until 1947. However, Pakistan did not become the Independent Islamic Republic until 1956 (Greer et al., 2004; p.604; Gilliat-Ray, 2010; p. 45; Rengel, 2004; Rengel, 2004; Gilliat-Ray, 2010; p. 45; Rengel, 2004; Gilliat-Ray, 2010; p. 45; Rengel, 2004).

11 Technically, the United Kingdom had ruled India since 1763 during which time India was controlled by the British East India Company (Greer et al., 2004; p.604). However, the British government only formally took control when the Parliament of the United Kingdom voted to dissolve the British East India Company in 1958 and transfer control of the Indian Government to the British Crown.
Pakistan and Algeria relied on the United Kingdom and France respectively for economic opportunities.

The United Kingdom and France also relied heavily on their colonies for labor, especially following the First and Second World Wars. Males of French and British colonies were recruited to make up for gaps in the labor force, which caused large waves of labor migration (Chatterji et al., 2013; p.296; Silverstein, 2004; p.4). After Pakistani independence in the 1950s and 1960s, male Pakistani immigrants migrated to the United Kingdom for work. They cooperated with the difficult and cramped living conditions, and new surroundings, to able to send money back home (Chatterji et al., 2013; p.296). As laborers, they tolerated the difficult situation because they thought it was only a temporary one (Akhtar, 2013). Algerian immigrants had a very similar fate. After World War I in the late 1930s, Algerian immigrants came to France and were given the “most difficult and lowest paying jobs” (Aissaoui, 2008). They also lived in separate housing, marginalized from the rest of French society (Aissaoui, 2008).

As colonial rule came to an end, the situation for both groups proved to be more permanent than expected. In Pakistan, post World War II labor migration of the 1950s and 1960s led to family reunification in the 1970s (Chatterji et al., 2013; p.296; Akhtar, 2013; p.175). The migration flow can also be attributed to the partition of India and Pakistan, as well as the international decision to build the Mangla Dam in Azad Kashmir, Pakistan in 1950, which displaced 100,000 Pakistani immigrants between 1960 and 1967 (Akhtar, 2013). Once again, the Commonwealth Immigrant Act in 1962 increased immigration from former British colonies, which triggered Britain to enact quotas to slow down the large immigrant flows. This increased the trend of family reunification, as the only people who could immigrate were those who had relatives already living in the United Kingdom (Gilliat-Ray, 2010; p.47).
Algerian immigrants had similar migration patterns to France, as did Pakistani immigrants to the United Kingdom. From World War II until Algerian independence in 1963, Algerian immigration also increased because Algerian immigrants were considered French subjects and this status allowed them to enter and stay in France (Silverman, 1992; p. 41-42). Additionally, the turmoil following Algerian independence in 1963 also forced families to flee to France to rejoin other members already working there. As immigration quotas were enacted to stem the influx of Algerian laborers in the 1960s and 1970s, there were simultaneously family reunification migration flows, which continued through the 1990s (House, 2006; Silverstein, 2004; p.4). The reason that migration patterns are so important to understanding why these groups are similar is because they help to contextualize the experience of each group since the beginning of significant migration over 50 years ago.

Besides immigrant motivation and colonial histories, the Pakistani immigrants in the United Kingdom and the Algerian immigrants in France are comparable because of their current status. The British Pakistani population is extremely diverse, and is affected by Britain’s ‘North-South Divide.’ This means that in the South and East, Pakistani immigrants are socially mobile and have professional jobs, but in the North and West, Pakistani immigrants have less English skills, and therefore work in factories (Chatterji et al., 2013; p.297). Additionally, Pakistani immigrants have some of the lowest levels of education skills and English among immigrant groups upon their arrival in the United Kingdom (Chatterji et al., 2013; p.297). Algerian immigrants do not have significantly greater mobility. According to a 2008 study, out of 300,000 Algerian immigrants arriving after the age of 18, only 60,000 have good/very good French writing and speaking skills (INSEE, 2012; p.161). Much like the Pakistani immigrants, Algerian immigrants are oftentimes confined to poorer neighborhoods (Loch, 2009). Without having
adequate human capital, mobilizing in either society and gaining a higher social status is difficult. Even today, there are many Algerian immigrants who live in the modernized version of the original worker apartments: separate, low-income housing known as banlieues (House, 2006). As shown by their histories, Algerian immigrants in France and Pakistani immigrants in the United Kingdom are comparable because of their similar status in society.

**Measurement**

To recall: this thesis aimed to study how the citizenship regimes of France and the United Kingdom affect the integration trajectories of Muslim immigrants. For this thesis, if an immigrant had socioeconomic and political indicators similar to the native born, I presumed that he or she has achieved “perfect” integration.

To explain the impact of the citizenship regime on integration outcomes, it is key to understand how I refined the definition of citizenship regime. My definition of citizenship regime stems from international relations and sociological terminology. Citizenship is representative of the public and private recognition of diversity and the ways in which the government helps immigrants through policies and programs (Bloemraad, 2006; p.139). To this end, a regime is defined by the norms, decision-making process, and procedures made by a government (Krasner, 1983; p.2). Together, a citizenship regime encompasses how a government grants citizenship to immigrants within the framework of its own norms and values. Therefore, the reason this thesis compared how two ‘citizenship regimes’ affect integration of similar immigrant groups is to see if the integration of a specific group is impacted by the desires, values, and mentality of the governing nation.

In this thesis, integration was defined as the process by which immigrants participate in society economically, socially, and civically/politically (Joppke and Seidle, 2012; p.9). This
thesis therefore focused on this process by studying the socioeconomic integration and political integration of Algerian immigrants in France and Pakistani immigrants in the United Kingdom. These two categories of integration, socioeconomic and political, are best able to capture immigrant incorporation into society because the indicators used are easily measureable (de Graauw, 2013; p. 1875). The literature suggested that integration outcomes could be traced to the different citizenship regime models of each country (Bloemraad, 2006; Brubaker, 2009; Joppke and Seidle, 2012; Koopmans, 2005; Williams, 2013). In this thesis, citizenship regime was explored further to see if it caused varied group integration outcomes in different countries based upon each country’s particular citizenship regime.

**Socioeconomic Indicators**

Socioeconomic, or labor market participation, is considered the “most widely recognized indicator for successful integration” (Biezeveld et al., 2006; p.19). To operationalize the socioeconomic status of both Algerian immigrants and Pakistani immigrants, I used employment statistics, occupation statistics, and average hourly wage statistics for first generation Algerian immigrants in France and Pakistani immigrants in the United Kingdom with a base year of 2011. I measured the statistics of each group against the native-born population and the overall immigrant population.

The reason for the comparison of my Muslim immigrant groups to the native born was to see the integration of my Muslim immigrant groups because this thesis defined “perfect” integration as statistics similar to the native-born in each country. Additionally, I compared my

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12 Here and elsewhere in this thesis, I used 2011 as my base year for country comparison as it was the last census released in Europe. However, especially in the case of France, where certain information can only be located through scholars and research institutions that have been granted special permission to European University Institute’s European Social Survey (EUI ESS). If 2011 data was not available; I used the most recent date possible, and use comparable years for each country.
groups to the overall immigrant population to see if the citizenship regimes of each country caused differential integration outcomes. If this was the case, then the integration outcome for my Muslim immigrant groups could be because of their religious background, because of their human capital in comparison to other immigrants, or because the regime causes some groups within the country to be integrated more than others.

First, I expected each group to have lower employment rates and be less gainfully employed than the native-born population in each country. I also expected there to be a slight difference between my two groups and the overall immigrant populations. I believed that as demonstrated by each group’s migration history following the end of colonialism, Algerian immigrants and Pakistani immigrants might have been granted special treatment by each of the citizenship regimes because of past colonial status. I thought that this was independent of potential differences in human capital for my immigrant groups. Comparing France and the United Kingdom, I expected there to be greater employment in higher-skilled positions for Pakistani immigrants in the United Kingdom than there will be for Algerian immigrants in France. This hypothesis was based on my belief that multiculturalist citizenship regimes produced greater integration for Muslim immigrants than assimilationist regimes.

I hypothesized that although the average hourly wage would still be lower than the native-born and overall immigrant populations, Pakistani immigrants in the United Kingdom would receive greater compensation for their work in the United Kingdom than Algerian immigrants will in France. I hypothesized higher levels of socioeconomic integration for Pakistani immigrants in the indicators mentioned because I believed that there were more opportunities available to immigrants in a multiculturalist citizenship regime. My belief was based upon the concept that a multiculturalist regime embraces the backgrounds of all of its
inhabitants (Williams, 2013; p.2-3). I assumed this to mean that one group in society is not inferior to another. However, in France, a country with great pride in its national culture, as well as an assimilationist citizenship regime, there have been backlashes against immigrants of different backgrounds by the right wing, which resulted in exclusionist attitudes towards them (Brubaker, 1992; p.113). I thought that this would cause differential treatment for non-native populations.

Employment

For the employment measures, the base year was 2011, and the minimum age of an employee was fifteen in France and sixteen in the United Kingdom. To study employment rates in France, I used data from the *Population de 15 ans ou plus par sexe, type d'activité et nationalité* (Population of Age 15 and Older by Sex, Type of Activity, and Nationality) from the French National Institute for Statistics and Economic Research (INSEE). To study employment rates in the United Kingdom, I employed information from *2011 Census Analysis: Social and Economic Characteristics by Length of Residence of Migrant Populations in England and Wales* by the Office for National Statistics (ONS)\(^{13}\). Employment was calculated using the economic formula:

\[
\text{Employment rate} = \frac{\text{employed}}{\text{employed} + \text{unemployed}}
\]

For each of my immigrant group populations, I compared their employment rates to the native-born population and the overall immigrant population for the same year. Similar employment to the native born signified integration. I then compared my groups to the overall immigrant population, and if there was a significant difference between my groups and other immigrants in each country, I determined this to mean that a country’s citizenship regime

\(^{13}\) The ONS lists other nationalities separately from the native-born, and categorizes by age and sex.
correlated differential integration outcomes. Afterwards, I was able to compare the gaps in employment by country to see which regime had higher rates of employment of the two Muslim immigrant groups. If the gap was significant, I could attribute it to the country’s citizenship regime. If the gap is smaller, another factor, such as economy or human capital, could have been at work.

*Occupation*

It was also imperative to study the kind of occupations available to immigrants in the country. To do so, I used *Population par catégorie socioprofessionnelle et nationalité* (Population by Socio-professional Category and Nationality) from INSEE to study the professions of the Algerian immigrants in France. For the Pakistani immigrants, I used the *2011 Census Analysis: Social and Economic Characteristics by Length of Residence of Migrant Populations in England and Wales* by the ONS. For this comparison, my base year was 2011 and for both cases, I compared the data of each of my groups to the native-born population and overall immigrant population. Doing so allowed me to compare any gaps between my groups and the overall immigrant population and native-born populations of each country, and then compare the statistics of France and the United Kingdom to see which regime has greater employment opportunity for Muslim immigrants.

If there was more representation of my groups in lower-level occupations compared to the native-born, it could have meant that in the regime, immigrants did not have as many opportunities as a full citizen or had significantly less human capital. If there was a significant

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14 In this database, “Algerian immigrant” was listed as a separate nationality from ‘French by Birth’ and ‘French by Acquisition’, indicating that they are still considered immigrants and not yet French citizens (Brubaker, 1992; 112, 139-140).
difference between either of my groups and the overall immigrant population, it could mean that the regime had different integration outcomes, or that the there was a difference in human capital between my groups and the overall immigrant population. This was not to say that Muslim immigrants specifically have lower human capital, it was just a potential explanation for a differential finding. Finally, I compared the occupations of the Algerian immigrants in France to the Pakistani immigrants in the United Kingdom. Large disparity between the two countries could mean that one regime offered immigrants the same or similar occupational opportunities to the native-born, showing greater integration. A smaller difference could mean that a factor other than citizenship regime, such as potential differences in human capital led to higher occupational attainment in the country’s job market.

The occupational data was presented in differing ways by each country, so certain calculations were taken to render the data comparable. The ONS presented occupational data in two categories: higher-skilled and lower-skilled, and length of residence: more than 30 years, 11-30 years, 5-10 years, and recent arrivals (i.e., foreign-born individuals who have resided in the United Kingdom less than 5 years). The ONS also provided a calculated total for all born outside the United Kingdom and all native-born.

INSEE presented the occupational data differently. It did not separate the data by length of residence, and also separated it into more categories than just higher and lower skilled. It presented the categories: farmers, artisans/merchants/entrepreneurs, higher managerial and professional, intermediate professional, company employees, blue-collar workers, retired, others without professional work, and a total of all categories. As the data was presented in French, I translated the categories.
To make the data for both countries more comparable, the data for the United Kingdom was averaged so there was one rate for higher and one rate for lower-skilled with all lengths of residence included. The data from INSEE, however, took a few more steps to be able to be compared. First, this thesis compiled the categories of famers, artisans/merchants/entrepreneurs, and blue-collar workers into the category of lower skilled, and higher managerial and professional, intermediate professional, and company employees into the category of higher skilled. To get a percentage, the categories of ‘retired’ and ‘others without professional work’ were extracted from the total to get a total workforce number. Then, each compiled group was divided from the total workforce for each nationality provided to get a percentage. I repeated this step for the categories of French by Birth, Algerian immigrants, and all other nationalities (which includes Algerian immigrants).

Employment Compensation

Compensation was the third indicator that I used to capture the socioeconomic integration of the immigrant groups. While simply considering job placement and employment rates can also be representative of immigrant language skills and educational attainment, adding income data helps to show differential treatment for the same profession (Biezeveld et al., 2006; p.19).

My hourly wage data for both countries came from The Economic Journal’s 2010 article entitled: The Economic Situation of First and Second-Generation Immigrants in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. The most recent hourly wage data I was able to find for first generation Algerian immigrants for France is 2007; while a more recent year would have been ideal, this was consistent with the United Kingdom and still helped to capture any wage disparities that may exist. Another imperfection with this source was that the French Labor Force
survey provided to certain scholars and institutions by France puts Algerian immigrants, Tunisians, and Moroccans into the category of “Maghreb” region immigrants (Algan et al., 2008; p. F9). The best publicly available salary information for France was organized in this way and did not simply give the same information for Algerian immigrants themselves. Although imperfect, Algerian immigrants are the majority of the Maghreb category by composing 52% of the population of Maghrebian immigrants, so the data was still able to provide critical detail (OECD, 2009). In order to extend a vital point of comparison, I used hourly wage information for first generation Maghrebians as a rough proxy for Algerian immigrants.

With this data, I compared hourly wage data for first generation Pakistani immigrants and first generation Maghrebians to hourly wage data for each country’s native-born population and overall immigrant population. Again, the reason for comparison to the native-born was to see how integrated the Muslim immigrant groups were, and the comparison to the overall immigrant population was to see any in-country differential integration outcomes that could be correlated to the citizenship regime.

First, I compared the gap between the hourly wages of the native-born and my immigrant groups between countries to see which regime provided compensation for members of the immigrant groups that is most similar to the native-born. Furthermore, I also compared the hourly wage of each of my immigrant groups to the overall immigrant population of each country to see if the assimilationist regime or multiculturalist regime compensated immigrant groups differently, which might indicate differential treatment. These findings also did not include the exact occupation of any group member either, but it helped to illustrate any overall socioeconomic disparities for a group within a citizenship regime.
Political Indicators

Another dimension of integration measured by scholars is the political integration of immigrants. This involves the legal citizenship, voting participation, and ethnic representation of an immigrant group (de Graauw, 2013; p.1875). I studied each of these indicators to understand how politically integrated Muslim immigrants are in France and the United Kingdom. These are common political indicators of immigrant integration as show by scholars such as Irene Bloemraad & Karen Schönwälder (2013), Els de Graauw (2013), Terri Givens and Rahsaan Maxwell (2012), and Shamit Saggar (2000).

I expected that the United Kingdom’s multiculturalist regime will have greater citizenship acquisition rates, voting rates, and ethnic representation for both the overall immigrant population and the Pakistani immigrants versus the overall immigrant population and Algerian immigrants in the assimilationist regime of France. According to Rahsaan Maxwell, there is often mobilization by Muslim politicians who “inspire high turnout rates among Muslims.” Maxwell also found that unlike the belief that mobilization by other Muslims is “a negative influence on national identity, voting participation is positively significant for British identification among Muslims” (Maxwell, 2006; p.745-746). Based upon this study, I thought that a multicultural citizenship regime would be more accommodating to the political needs of Muslim immigrants, which therefore contributes to greater political integration.

Citizenship acquisition

This project compared the citizenship regimes’ citizenship acquisition rates. Citizenship acquisition is the process by which an immigrant acquires citizenship (de Graauw, 2013; p.1876). The reason I used citizenship acquisition is because it shows how many of each of my
groups obtained citizenship, which in conjunction with political participation, such as voting, helps to depict political integration (Bloemraad, 2006; p.5). Citizenship acquisition is a very important indicator of integration because citizenship indicates not only the willingness of a country to extend rights to an immigrant, but also a sense of belonging and identity of the immigrant (COMPAS, 2007).

As noted earlier in this project, the two types of citizenship regimes grant citizenship under different circumstances and by different processes. In France, citizenship is obtained by marrying a national, being born on the soil to at least one parent who has French citizenship, or applying for citizenship after five years of living consistently in France before the application (“Acquiring French Nationality”). In addition, the individual who wants citizenship acquisition has to prove that he or she can speak French, is culturally assimilated, and has knowledge about the ‘rights and duties’ of French citizenship (Hajjat, 2003; p.3).

In the United Kingdom, there are many different types of nationality, for example: an overseas territory citizen, an overseas citizen, a British subject, a British national, and a British protected person. These different categories are products of the United Kingdom’s past colonial history, and tend to apply after 1983. Though people with these nationalities may hold a British passport, they are not automatically British citizens, do not have an automatic right to live or work in the United Kingdom, are subject to immigration controls, and are not considered British nationals by the European Union. Furthermore, to apply for citizenship acquisition, a person has to be over 18, should have no criminal record, meet the knowledge of English and UK History, and should have lived in the country five years prior to the application (Gov.uk). This is why I chose to work with Commonwealth citizens, as they have a close relationship with the United Kingdom but are still distinguished from native-born British citizens.
For this indicator, I used the citizenship acquisition level, which measures how many members of an overall immigrant population acquired citizenship by a certain date (Bloemraad, 2006; p.26). This was operationalized by comparing the citizenship acquisition statistics of each of my groups to the overall citizenship acquisition in each country. I consulted the *Acquisition of Nationality by Country by Former Nationality* by the OECD for Algerian immigrants in France and Pakistani immigrants in the United Kingdom for 2009*15 and the OECD’s database entitled *Stock of Foreign Born Population by Nationality* for 2009. I then divided the number of Algerian immigrants and Pakistani immigrants who had acquired citizenship by the total overall immigrant population of each group. Then, I compared the percentage of naturalized immigrants for each country in 2009. If there was a large difference between either the Pakistani immigrants or the Algerian immigrants and the immigrant population overall in a country, I was able to conclude that the regimes impact distinct immigrant groups differently. Differential outcomes within a country’s citizenship regime or between my two immigrant groups also showed me which regime’s resources, laws, or policies result in greater citizenship acquisition (Bloemraad, 2007).

**Voting Rates**

The second indicator I studied was the participation of Algerian immigrants and Pakistani immigrants in French and United Kingdom elections respectively. Though government policies to encourage voter mobilization cannot fully account for voting participation, voting rates partially reflect efforts made by the French and British governments to ensure political

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15 In this case, 2011 would have been better, but 2009 is the last year listed by the OECD for *Stock of Overall immigrant Population by Nationality* for Algerian immigrants in France. For this indicator, now 2009 will be our base year.
mobilization (Bloemraad and Schönwälder, 2013; p.565). Voting rates therefore helped me to gauge which regime achieved higher political participation of the two immigrant groups.

I compared the 2012 voting participation rates of Algerian immigrants in France to the 2010 rates of Pakistani immigrants in the United Kingdom for democratic parliamentary elections. The voting statistics of each of my groups were compared to the native-born population of each country. To complete this comparison, I consulted *Conditions de vie-Société - L'inscription et la participation électorales en 2012 - Qui est inscrit et qui vote* (Conditions of Societal Life- The Inscription and Voting Participation in 2012- Who is Inscribed and Who Votes) by INSEE. For Pakistani immigrants in the United Kingdom, the *February 2012 Ethnic Minority British Election Study – Key Findings* by the Runnymede Trust\(^{16}\) was considered as well. Gaps between Algerian immigrant and Pakistani immigrant voting rates indicated a few things. It could signal the identification my immigrant groups have with the national identity, the ethnic representation of those running in the election, or other barriers to voting (Laurence and Maxwell, 2012). A lower voting participation rate could correlate with a country’s citizenship regime because the regime helps to determine how open the government of a country is to immigrants. If the citizenship regime required more from an immigrant to vote, it may be the case that the country is less willing to integrate citizens.

For INSEE, the percentages of voting participation were provided. However, for the Runnymede Trust, voting participation for each category of the minority group measured was calculated by dividing the number of who voted out of the total population. Additionally, the Runnymede trust publishes data on ethnic minorities and not strictly immigrants. This did prove to be problematic for a comparison because it required the category of “white” to be treated as

\(^{16}\) This is the United Kingdom’s race equality think-tank administered by the London School of Economics.
native-born, which is not the most logically sound. However, to get an idea of voting attitudes, solely to see differences in voting participation for Algerian immigrants and Pakistani immigrants, the category of ‘white’ was compared to the native-born of INSEE, and ‘Pakistani’ was compared to those born in Algeria.

It was also essential to my research to understand the voting laws of each country that may affect voting participation. In France, voting laws are strict. A person can only vote if he or she has French citizenship and is 18 years or older (Assemblé nationale, 2012). In the United Kingdom, a person can vote if he or she is registered to vote, 18 years or older on polling day, a UK citizen, Commonwealth citizen, or citizen of the Irish Republic, and not legally excluded (Gov.uk). Considering that Commonwealth citizens, such as Pakistani immigrants, are able to vote in the United Kingdom, I expected to see a greater voting participation rate in the United Kingdom for the native-born population and the Pakistanis than the corresponding groups in France.

Stricter voting laws enable a citizenship regime to be more selective about who in the country gets to participate in voting. Therefore, this determinate was central to understanding the ramifications of a citizenship regime, as deciding whom gets to vote is a clear indicator of a country’s own desires and values. With this indicator, although admittedly imperfect, it still enabled an analysis of the voting attitudes of those who were born abroad and also of a Muslim background. Furthermore, it indicated the ramifications of voting laws on the voting participation of those born abroad.

**Ethnic Representation**

Ethnic representation signifies a country’s openness to an ethnic group, which shows integration as it indicates a public desire to allow an ethnic group to represent the country. This is a
fundamental indicator because especially in the European context, scholars have demonstrated that groups with better ethnic representation benefit from stronger group structures (Bloemraad and Schönwälder, 2013; p.569).

To measure ethnic representation, a researcher must “evaluate whether the share of elected officials is proportionate to their share of the population” (de Graauw, 2013; p.1880). For this thesis, ethnic representation was measured by comparing the number of Algerians and Pakistanis in the French and British legislative bodies in comparison to the representation of natives in elected positions. This included immigrants as well as direct descendants of each ethnic group. To measure ethnic representation, I counted the number of Algerian senate members in the French National Assembly and the number of Pakistanis elected as Parliament Members (MPs) as part of the current composition of the National Assembly and House of Commons respectively.

Out of all of the indicators used for this research, ethnic representation required the most steps and resources to complete. The first step was to view the elected governmental officials listed on each parliament’s page and compile the names of the elected officials into a database. I then researched the backgrounds of each member elected of the French National Assembly by using a combination of the information provided by the parliamentary page and further triangulating any disparities by consulting the member’s candidacy website. Unfortunately, there was no existing list of any second generation or ethnic minority members of the National Assembly published by a credible source, which meant that French nationals born in Algeria when it was still a department before its independence in 1963 were counted as Algerians. It was slightly simpler to find ethnic representation in the House of Commons, because the House provides a list of ethnic members: Ethnic Minorities in Politics, Government, and Public Life.
This list was consulted when researching the backgrounds to see the representation of Pakistani immigrants. However, the information about the background of each member was often difficult to locate, and unlike the National Assembly, country of birth is not provided by the parliamentary website, or sometimes at all. This difficulty prompted the usage of alternative sources to locate the birth country of ethnic House members.

To measure how well the elected parliament reflected society, I looked at population numbers for each group, each overall immigrant population, and each native-born population from the election year. For France, I used the populations provided by INSEE’s *Population de 15 ans ou plus par sexe, type d'activité et nationalité* (Population of Age 15 and Older by Sex, Type of Activity, and Nationality) for the year 2011, the most recent census to the election year. For the United Kingdom, I used the ONS data for the total British population of 2010, and the OECD Migration Database’s *Stock of Foreign Population by Nationality* for 2010 for the native-born, overall immigrant, and Pakistani immigrant populations.

Finally, I compared the populations provided to the percentages I found of each of the category: the native-born, the overall other foreign born, and the Muslim groups. Admittedly, it was much easier to see if a parliament member was 1st or 2nd generation in the United Kingdom than it was in France, especially because the list of ethnic members was given. For France, I generally went by the birthplace provided by the Parliament’s website, but if the information does not seem conclusive, I did further background research. Again, in this thesis, ethnic representation was measured by looking at government officials who were born abroad, or are direct descendants of immigrants. I could not measure strictly for Muslim background, as it was hard to prove that an official is of a specific religion.
Once native-born, foreign-born, and Muslim group members of parliament were recorded in the database, I calculated their representation in parliament. Afterwards, I compared parliamentary statistics to demographic representation, to see if a group was over, under, or equally represented in parliament.

Data Sources

In addition to the information I gathered through scholars, I carefully chose my data sources. The main data for the French case was from the National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) that collected data through a census of French households. To collect information about nationality, the function I required for my research, INSEE administers a questionnaire called an “individual bulletin,” which features 25 questions regarding the age, nationality, place of birth, qualifications, place of residence the year before, and occupation to all members of a household. The survey is given every five years to areas with 10,000 people or more. This data is widely utilized by many immigration scholars, including but not limited to Rahsaan Maxwell (2008), Martin Schain (2008), and Maxim Silverman (2002).

For the case of the United Kingdom, I relied on the Office for National Statistics (ONS). According to the United Kingdom’s governmental website, the ONS is the its largest independent producer of official statistics as well as the recognized statistical institute (Gov.uk). It is also responsible for collecting the national census in England and Wales every ten years. To be able to survey the whole population, the ONS sends a census to each household, and allocates extra help to ensure that harder to reach populations are surveyed. In addition, the ONS works with communal establishments (i.e. community organizations that are geared towards certain populations) to make sure that no group is left out of the census. In total, 25 million household questionnaires are sent out, and those that are not returned are tracked down to be completed.
ONS data is used by European immigration scholars such as Ruud Koopmans (2005), Martin Schain (2012), and Rahsaan Maxwell (2006).

The final database I used for my indicators was the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The OECD is an independent research organization whose goal is to create a forum for different governments to come together to find solutions to economic issues and recommend policies. The OECD consists of 34 member countries and 250 committees. The Secretariat of the OECD collects and analyzes data from the member countries, then governments and members come together to peer review, make decisions and recommend change. OECD data is available to researchers through an extensive online database and is popularly used in scholarship, including by scholars such as Terri Givens and Rhonda Case (2014), Robert Miles and Dietrich Thränhardt (1995), and Martin Schain (2012).

I also used independent research organizations to make up for any gaps in data. To best understand Pakistani immigrant voting participation, I used the Runnymede Trust. It is the United Kingdom’s “most prominent race equality think tank” and performs research pertaining to ethnic minorities (The Runnymede Trust). Furthermore, to understand employment compensation, I also relied on independent research organizations. The paper I used for my hourly wage data was originally published in the *Economic Journal*. This is one of the original journals of modern economics, and similar to the Runnymede Trust, has contributions by scholars from top research institutions.

Finally, in addition to the databases and articles consulted, I used the parliamentary websites of France and the United Kingdom. To triangulate any disparities in the information the governments provided me, I used the personal websites and news articles published about the members.
Chapter 4: Socioeconomic Indicators

As explained earlier in this thesis, socioeconomic indicators are important to understand immigrant integration, because they demonstrate how immigrants participate in the economy. To this end, an immigrant’s place in the national economy is very telling of his or her integration. Many immigrants move from their homelands to a new country for economic reasons. If having a better life is a goal, are the immigrants actually achieving it? This section presents the analyzed employment, occupation, and job compensation data to determine how the citizenship regimes of France and the United Kingdom affect economic mobilization.

Each indicator compared Algerian immigrants in France and Pakistani immigrants in the United Kingdom against each country’s native-born population and overall immigrant population. Once again, the native born comparison indicated the level of integration of the group, and the comparison against the overall immigrant population was to see if there may be differential integration outcomes for different immigrant groups. These indicators showed how the assimilationist citizenship regime of France and the multiculturalist citizenship regime of the United Kingdom impact the socioeconomic integration of the two selected Muslim immigrant groups. If each Muslim immigrant group is treated no differently in the citizenship regime than other immigrants, even if the statistics do not align with that of the native born, the statistics should be similar to the overall immigrant population. Conversely, if the Algerian immigrants and the Pakistani immigrants had socioeconomic statistics that diverged from overall immigrant population, this shows differential integration outcomes and suggested that the citizenship regimes may treat Muslim immigrants differently. It could also mean that the Muslim immigrant groups studied have lower human capital than the other immigrant groups.
Employment

The first indicator measured was employment, or market participation, of each immigrant group. Each database, INSEE for France and the ONS for the United Kingdom respectively, gathered information for all inhabitants in the workforce, aged 15 and older in France, and aged 16 and older in the United Kingdom.

The following employment information is presented in both percentages and indices. The purpose of the index was to compare the overall immigrant population and the Muslim immigrant group to the native-born population’s statistics. By doing so, it was easy to see discrepancies in each citizenship regime. For the index, I used Excel to set the statistics for the native-born as the comparative set, or “100%”, and compared all other statistics accordingly. When considering the index, anything higher than 100% shows greater integration than the native-born, and anything below 100 shows less integration.

Table 5: Employment Statistics in France

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>France</th>
<th>Percent Employed</th>
<th>Index (according to native-born employment rate)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Native-Born French</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Overall Immigrant Population</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algerian Immigrants</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

INSEE (2011): *Population de 15 ans ou plus par sexe, type d'activité et nationalité* (Population of Age 15 and Older by Sex, Type of Activity, and Nationality)

Table 6: Employment Statistics in the United Kingdom

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>United Kingdom</th>
<th>Percent Employed</th>
<th>Index (according to native-born employment rate)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Native-Born British</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Overall Immigrant Population</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistani Immigrants</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ONS (2011): *Census Analysis: Social and Economic Characteristics by Length of Residence of Migrant Populations in England and Wales*
These results indicated a few things. In France, there was a significant difference, 11% and 13 index points, between immigrant employment and the native-born employment, which indicated that the citizenship regime might treat immigrants differently in employment than the native-born. There was an even greater difference, however, between Algerian immigrant employment and both native-born and overall immigrant employment. There was a 23% difference in employment between Algerian immigrants and the native-born, and a 12% difference and an index of 13 points between Algerian immigrants and other immigrants in the country. This showed that the citizenship regime might also correlate with differential outcomes in France, potentially indicating differential treatment for Muslim immigrants.

The employment situation in the United Kingdom, however, was slightly different. Here, the employment rates between the native-born and the immigrant populations were very close, 1%, and showed an index of 1 point, which indicated that there is nearly equal employment of immigrants and of native-born in this citizenship regime. There was a larger gap, 3% and 3 index points, between Pakistani immigrant employment and the overall immigrant employment rate. Finally, the gap between the Pakistani immigrants and the native-born was 4%, a greater difference than between the overall immigrant population and the native-born. This signified that there might be differential treatment for certain immigrant groups in the British citizenship regime, and possibly differential treatment for Muslim immigrants, but the difference between groups was marginal.

Comparing the employment experience in France and the United Kingdom, especially among the Algerian immigrants and Pakistani immigrants, there was a notable difference. First, there was a higher employment rate for the overall immigrant population in the United Kingdom than in France. This data suggested that in the French assimilationist citizenship regime,
immigrants may not be treated as equal in employment. Finally, and most significant to the study, was the difference in treatment of Algerian immigrants in France and Pakistani immigrants in the United Kingdom. In this case, I saw greater employment of Pakistani immigrants in the United Kingdom, and closer rates of employment to both the immigrant population overall and the native-born population. Algerian immigrants in France had a comparatively lower employment rate. The data suggested that in employment/market participation, the multiculturalist citizenship regime of the United Kingdom might correlate with greater economic integration for Muslim immigrants and immigrants overall than the assimilationist regime of France.

**Occupation**

The next indicator considered was occupation. This was an important factor for understanding socioeconomic integration because it helped to show the kinds of jobs attained by immigrants in the citizenship regime. Occupational attainment helped to answer the question of whether immigrants have access to similar occupational opportunities to a native-born citizen, or if they are only receiving lower-skilled occupations, potentially even below their capacity. To calculate the rates for “higher skilled” and “lower skilled” occupations, data was once again collected from INSEE for France and the ONS for the United Kingdom. Once a statistic was extracted, an index was created in relation to native-born population for each country to see how the native-born, overall immigrant population, and cases compared. The index was again created in Excel, where the higher skilled and lower skilled occupations for the native-born were set as “100” and the statistics of the overall immigrant population and the Muslim group populations were compared accordingly.
The results of this data indicated a few situations occurring. In France, there was a 14% or 20-index points difference in higher-skilled employment between native-born French and the overall immigrant population. This indicated that the citizenship regime might not allow the same employment opportunities for immigrants as it does for the native-born citizens. However, Algerian immigrants had 4% or 28 index points less higher skilled occupational attainment than the total overall immigrant population. This might indicate that the assimilationist citizenship regime correlated with less higher occupational attainment for Algerian immigrants.

For lower skilled employment, the data indicated that the native-born French population had the lowest amount of lower-skilled occupational attainment at 30%. Immigrants had a higher
rate at 44%, and Algerian immigrants have the greatest amount at 48%. The data indicated that different groups might be treated differently in society. However, the data was not clear in whether this was because Muslim immigrants in France were allowed less occupational opportunities compared to other immigrants in society or because they had less human capital than other immigrants.

In the United Kingdom, there was less higher-skilled occupational attainment overall. This aside, the higher skilled occupational attainment between the native-born population and the total immigrant population showed a 2% or a 4 index-point difference. The Pakistani immigrants had 15% less higher-skilled occupational attainment than the native-born, or 17 index points. Additionally, there was a 13% or a 23-point difference between the occupational attainment of Pakistani immigrants and the overall immigrant population. This indicated that the multiculturalist citizenship regime might correlate with differential occupational outcomes for each immigrant group, and possibly treats Muslim immigrants differently.

In lower-skilled occupational attainment, the native-born population in the United Kingdom had the lowest amount at 47%, and the overall immigrant population had a similar amount of 49% and had 4-index points greater lower-skilled occupation attainment than the native-born population. Finally, the Pakistani immigrants had the greatest amount of lower-skilled employment at 62%, which was 30 index points greater than the native-born population. The data might indicate that different groups in multiculturalist United Kingdom have different occupational opportunities, and that Muslim immigrants potentially have greater lower-skilled employment than other groups. There are other possible explanations for the data, but those explanations go beyond the scope covered by this thesis.
Comparing Algerian immigrants in France and Pakistani immigrants in the United Kingdom, Algerian immigrants might have greater higher-skilled occupational attainment compared to the native-born and total immigrant population than the Pakistani immigrants have in the United Kingdom. There was a 14% difference in the amount of Algerian immigrants employed in higher skilled labor versus Pakistani immigrants.

It was not yet clear why France appears to have greater employment of immigrants and Algerian immigrants in higher-skilled positions than the United Kingdom. What could be seen in this data set was that, without intervening variables considered, France’s assimilationist citizenship regime might correlate with greater employment of Algerian immigrants in higher-skilled occupations than the United Kingdom for Pakistani immigrants. This data also conflicted with the overall employment rates in France, which seemed to indicate much lower employment of Algerian immigrants in France than Pakistani immigrants in the United Kingdom. The issue might come down to the jobs available. Greater lower-skilled occupational acquisition by Pakistani immigrants in the United Kingdom may signify that those jobs are the most available to them. Conversely, perhaps the case in France is that the only jobs available are higher skilled, and those may only go to Algerian immigrants with the proper integration and human capital.

**Job Compensation**

The final socioeconomic indicator studied was job compensation. This indicator helps to show integration in the workplace. An immigrant may obtain the same occupation as another immigrant or a native-born citizen but not be compensated equally for that occupation. Compensation indicators can therefore demonstrate if there are differences in integration of immigrants in the workplace.
This indicator used hourly wage data from the *Economic Journal*, published in the year 2010, with data compiled from 2007. As described in my methodology, although this was a slightly dated dataset, it still helped to display any compensation disparity between Pakistani immigrants and Algerian immigrants with both the native-born populations and the overall immigrant populations. The data was presented by country, by ethnic group, by generation and by sex. Again, there was no data available for Algerian immigrants, only Maghrebian immigrants, thus this category was used to represent the Algerian immigrant group. Data was for first generation Pakistani immigrants in the United Kingdom and Maghrrebian immigrants in France, and the hourly wages of men and women were averaged for a single hourly wage for each category. Overall immigrant average wages and native-born wages for each country were listed separately, and did not require any calculation other than averaging male and female wages.

### Table 9: Hourly Wage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Native-born Average Hourly Wage</th>
<th>Total Immigrant Average Hourly Wage</th>
<th>Total Muslim Immigrant Group Hourly Wage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>$10.40</td>
<td>$9.49</td>
<td>$9.37 (Maghrebians)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>$9.80</td>
<td>$10.46</td>
<td>$8.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In France, there was almost a $1 difference between the average hourly wage of the native-born and the overall first generation immigrant population. Potentially, the types of occupations held by immigrants could explain this occurrence. This possibility was indicated in the previous data
set, which showed that immigrants on the whole have less higher-skilled occupational attainment. Comparing first generation Algerian immigrants and the overall first generation immigrant population though, I saw just a small difference, $0.12, between the average hourly wages. The difference in hourly wage showed that the citizenship regime might correlate with differential compensation for immigrant groups in addition to a possible difference in the type of occupations held. Furthermore, the higher-skilled occupation data set indicated that Algerian immigrants and the overall immigrant population might have similar higher skilled occupational attainment, so there could be a slight difference in how the assimilationist citizenship regime compensates its immigrant workers. This could also possibly be explained by the usage here of Maghrebian immigrants and not strictly Algerian immigrants.

In the United Kingdom the average hourly wage for first generation immigrants was actually higher by $0.66 than the native-born. According to the findings of a study by Christian Dustmann and Francesca Fabbri, this is because “while individuals from most white immigrant communities have, on average, higher wages than British-born whites with the same characteristics, immigrants from all ethnic minority communities have lower wages” (2005; p. 460). So, a potential reason for the higher immigrant wages could be the amount of ethnically white immigrants that were counted as part of the data.

The difference between the Pakistani immigrant population and the overall immigrant population showed just a difference of $2.45 in average hourly wage. Between the Pakistani immigrants and the native-born, there was still a wage difference of $1.79. The data indicated that the multiculturalist citizenship regime of the United Kingdom may not compensate all immigrants equally to the native-born, and might also correlate with differential wages for immigrant groups. This showed that the multiculturalist citizenship regime of the United
Kingdom may have differential integration outcomes for immigrant group’s compensation, and may pay Muslim immigrants differently.

Comparing the Pakistani immigrants in the United Kingdom and Maghrebian immigrants in France, the data could indicate that not only were Maghrebian immigrants paid more per hour than Pakistani immigrants, but also were paid much more similarly to the overall immigrant population, and not much less than the native-born. In the United Kingdom, however, there seemed to be a clearer hourly wage disparity between Pakistani immigrants and the immigrant population overall, but The United Kingdom also seemed to have greater compensation for the overall immigrant population than in France.

Socioeconomic Overview

The socioeconomic integration outcomes studied for Algerian immigrants in France and Pakistani immigrants in the United Kingdom produced different results than originally expected. The only area in which Pakistani immigrants were further integrated in comparison to the native-born was in employment. In both job compensation and higher-skilled employment, Algerian immigrants showed significantly greater integration than the Pakistani immigrants in comparison to the native-born French. Also notable was the contradiction between employment rates the other socioeconomic indicators. This might signify that although far fewer Algerian immigrants are in the workplace than Pakistani immigrants, they are much more gainfully employed. As the conclusion disses, there were a variety of factors that explain these outcomes. The next section of this thesis analyzes political indicators.
Chapter 5: Political Indicators

As stated earlier in the methodology discussion, the political indicators measured in this thesis were citizenship acquisition, voting rates, and ethnic representation. The reason for these indicators is because they help to show immigrant participation in politics. One would assume that an integrated member of society eventually gains citizenship, engages in voting, and has their views represented in parliament. However, if these areas are not present, it is clear that an immigrant lacks integration, and therefore representation in the political realm. With these indicators, it was clear if Algerian immigrants and Pakistani immigrants have different political integration outcomes in each citizenship regime compared to the native-born population and the overall immigrant population. Again, based on the research by Rahsaan Maxwell, I hypothesized that the multiculturalist citizenship regime of the United Kingdom may correlate with greater political integration for Pakistani immigrants than there will be of Algerian immigrants in France.

Citizenship Acquisition

As this thesis tried to prove that a nation’s citizenship regime may cause differential integration outcomes for Muslim immigrants in France and the United Kingdom, one of the most important indicators to analyze was citizenship acquisition. In the following data set, information from the OECD was used to see the citizenship acquisition rates for the year 2009. Remember that to calculate citizenship acquisition, the total amount of citizen acquisition for a group was divided by its total population in the country. Although it would have been preferable to have citizenship acquisition data that included all citizenship acquisition up to a certain point, this was the most
relevant data available to me as an undergraduate without governmental permission. I also used 2009 as a benchmark because it was the most recent data available for the citizenship acquisition of Algerian immigrants in France with corresponding data for Pakistani immigrants in the United Kingdom.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 10: Citizen Acquisition (2009)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>France (Algerian Immigrants)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of total population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom (Pakistani Immigrants)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of Total citizenship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>acquisition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Immigrant population</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,821,456</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4,348,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total citizenship acquisition of Immigrants</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>135,842</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>203,789</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total population of Muslim immigrant group</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>466,405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>177,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Citizenship Acquisition of Muslim immigrant group</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20,659</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20,945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As the table indicates, citizenship acquisition rates for each Muslim immigrant group were compared to the overall immigrant population to see if there were differential outcomes. In France, the citizenship acquisition rate of 4% was the same for Algerian immigrants and the overall immigrant population. However, in the United Kingdom, the rates did not seem equal. Pakistani immigrants had a 7% greater rate of citizenship acquisition than the overall immigrant population.

Comparing Algerian immigrants in France and Pakistani immigrants in the United Kingdom, there was an 8% difference between Pakistani immigrant citizenship acquisition and the overall immigrant population, but no difference between Algerian immigrants and the overall immigrant population. There was even a slight difference between the overall immigrant
populations of each country, with the United Kingdom having a 1% greater rate of citizenship acquisition than the French immigrant population.

Although the difference was marginal at best, perhaps the requirements of becoming a citizen in each citizenship regime were the reason for this finding. Although both regimes require fluency in the language, residency for at least five years before applying, and knowledge, France also requires an individual to be “culturally assimilated” before being granted citizenship. This extra provision is perhaps not only indicative of France’s citizenship regime, but also may be the reason that there is greater citizenship acquisition in the United Kingdom. Furthermore, Pakistanis are Commonwealth citizens, so it may be the case that having full British citizenship in addition to this designation is more beneficial to their success in the United Kingdom.

**Voting**

The next indicator I measured was voting participation in national parliamentary elections. The reason for the inclusion of this indicator was to see if immigrants were driven to vote. Here, voting participation rates for Algerian immigrants in France and Pakistani immigrants in the United Kingdom were measured against the native-born populations of each country. Political integration was taking place when immigrants have voting participation similar to the native-born. In this indicator as well, the native-born populations of each country were used as a control to see possible differential integration outcomes in voting.

Again, it should also be noted that the voting participation rate for all minority groups was recorded in the United Kingdom, but only voting participation for naturalized citizens\(^\text{17}\) was available for France by INSEE. It would be preferable if both data sets were recorded the same way. However, recall that in France, the only people that can vote are French citizens, but in the

\(^{17}\) Translated from INSEE into English, the exact term given was “French born abroad”.  
58
United Kingdom, many more groups have the opportunity. Therefore, in France, all voters born in France were classified as the native-born, and all French born abroad in Algeria were compared as the Algerian immigrant population. A further downside to this comparison was that what the United Kingdom classified as “white” went into the category of native born, and the Pakistani immigrants were compared accordingly. To account for the imperfections of the data available, the following data set only measured the Algerian immigrants and the Pakistani immigrants against the native-born.

In the table below, data is presented in percentages and index points. As in the other sections, data was indexed in Excel, where the native born statistics became “100” and the Muslim immigrant groups were compared accordingly. Again, a Muslim group having similar statistics to the native-born indicated integration. The index includes calculations for the native-born and group populations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 11: Voting Participation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France-Algerian immigrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native-born</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim Group Population</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


For France, the data table shows that 78% of Algeria-born French vote, compared to 94% of native-born French. As the index helps to convey, Algeria-born French had a 16-point lower voting participation than the native-born population. Also shown in the chart, in the United Kingdom, 67% of Pakistanis vote compared 75% of the native-born or “white” population. As
the index indicated, Pakistani immigrants had a 12-point difference between their voting rates and the voting rates of the native-born.

Comparing Algeria-born French and Pakistanis in the United Kingdom, the index indicated that Pakistanis might be more integrated through voting rates than Algerian-born French. This was shown through the 12-point difference between Pakistani immigrants and native-British versus 16-points between Algeria-born French and native-born French. It might be the case that in voting, the multiculturalist citizenship regime of the United Kingdom correlated with greater political integration for Pakistani immigrants than France does for Algerian immigrants.

With the electoral laws considered, the data for voter turnout was expected. It stands to reason that the reason for lower voting participation in France was because, although there are limited voting laws, a person has to be a citizen before voting. In the United Kingdom, Commonwealth citizens such as Pakistanis can vote. Considering the requirements for citizenship explained earlier, the process to become an eligible voter is more daunting in the assimilationist citizenship regime of France, possibly affecting voter participation.

Recall that one of the citizenship requirements in France is cultural assimilation. Perhaps this is the reason only naturalized citizens can vote. Furthermore, being assimilated in this way may affect the voting participation and attitudes. However, neither of these provisions applies to the multiculturalist citizenship regime of the United Kingdom. Therefore, with regime-specific laws in mind, it makes logical sense that there was greater voting participation by minority and immigrant groups in the United Kingdom.
Ethnic Representation

The last political indicator I examined was ethnic representation in government, or the representation of an ethnic minority group in parliament in comparison to its population in the country. Once again, the point of this indicator is to show the willingness of native-born citizens to elect someone of an ethnic, minority, or religious background, showing acceptance of that group in society. It also can indicate the desire of an immigrant group to take part in the voting process, leading to the election of someone who understands the group’s specific needs (de Graauw, 2013; p.1880).

For this indicator, parliamentary data was examined for the 577\textsuperscript{18} members of the National Assembly for France and the 650 members of the House of Commons for the United Kingdom\textsuperscript{19}. To extract data, information about the Parliamentary members elected to the French National Assembly in 2012 was compiled into a database. From there, I gathered information about the member’s birthplace, age, political party, and position in the parliament. Usually, the data about birthplace was available directly on the parliamentary page, but if the information seems inconclusive, I triangulated further.

For the British House of Commons, my job was made simpler, as there was a list of the Ethnic Members of the House. What the United Kingdom did, in comparison to France, was list any ethnic minority member, not just limited to immigrants. However, the House did not provide information about each member’s background, and additional research had to be performed to find each member’s ethnic background. Data was entered into a table with the same categories as France, but to render the data comparable, “white” was counted as “native-born”, “ethnic

\textsuperscript{18} The data provide by the French National Assembly only provides information for 567 members, even though there should be 577

\textsuperscript{19} The House of Commons provided a list of the 27 ethnic members of parliament, and this was consulted when researching for this thesis
“minority” was counted as total overall immigrant population, and “Pakistani” was put into the same category as “Algerian immigrant”.

In the following tables, the categories of “Algerian immigrant” and “Pakistani” include both immigrants and native-born British citizens of minority descent. Even though this meant that some members elected are second-generation, it still indicated societal integration.

**Table 12: Ethnic Representation in French National Assembly**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number in National Assembly</th>
<th>Percent in NA</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>percent of population</th>
<th>difference in representation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>510</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>57,968,088</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algerians</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>466,405</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrant groups</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>5,493,000</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Table 13: Ethnic Representation in British House of Commons**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number in House</th>
<th>Percent in HC</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Percent of Population</th>
<th>Difference in Representation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>British</td>
<td>623</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>58,246,000</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistani</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>137,000</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>0.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Ethnic Groups</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4,524,000</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
<td>3.20%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The first country displayed is France. As the data indicated, 92 percent of the population of France was native-born, and 90% of the Parliament was native-born French. Therefore, the difference was marginal. The same proportionality went for ethnic groups in general; they made up 10% of the population and 11% of parliament. Similarly, in the French population, approximately 1% of the population was Algerian immigrant-born, and the percentage of Algerian-born parliamentarians was 3%. As explained in the methodology section, political
integration is defined by representation in government that reflects population. So, for this indicator, in France, political integration was occurring.

In contrast to France, which showed slight overrepresentation of Algerians and ethnic groups, the United Kingdom had lower representation of ethnic groups but slight overrepresentation of Pakistanis. British-born individuals made up 96% of the house but only 93% of the population. To this end, ethnic groups made up 7.2% of the population, but only received 4% of the seats in the House of Commons. Finally, Pakistani immigrants made up 0.2% of the population, but 1% of the House. According to this thesis’s definition of integration, an integrated group would have representation similar to its representation in the population. In the United Kingdom, I found that although Pakistani immigrants were showing integration, the overall ethnic population of the United Kingdom was underrepresented in the House of Commons.

Comparing France and the United Kingdom, there was more integration of Algerians and ethnic groups in France than there were of Pakistanis and ethnic groups in the United Kingdom. This was opposite of what I thought would happen, as I originally assumed that there would be greater ethnic representation present in the United Kingdom for both Pakistanis and the overall ethnic population.

I also noticed a difference in my ease in finding the birthplace information for parliamentary members in the United Kingdom. It was actually much more difficult than it was for the French National Assembly, where birthplace information was available right on the parliamentary page. This is potentially a downside to the United Kingdom’s multiculturalist citizenship regime. Perhaps by consistently defining people by their backgrounds, people in the United Kingdom were made to feel different, and therefore it might be difficult to seem relatable
to others in the population. Potentially, it was more of a detriment to be defined by someone’s race, ethnicity, or religion than it was to just be “British”. For this reason, it might be simpler in an assimilationist country, such as France, to become a member of parliament. Although as explained earlier, one needs to be integrated to be a French citizen, maybe this allows an immigrant to transcend his or her background and simply be recognized as “French” in society.

**Political Results**

Unlike the socioeconomic indicators, the political indicators here were generally stronger in the United Kingdom in most areas, but with a few exceptions. The political indicator data was truly conflicting; one would think that having high voting participation would mean better ethnic representation in the House of Commons, for example, but this was not the case. Perhaps the participation was attributed to voting laws that only require registration for many immigrant groups in the country.

Most interesting to this thesis, the United Kingdom stopped short in equal parliamentary representation. One explanation of this could be that the multiculturalist regime in the United Kingdom differentiated candidates by ethnicity, which might cause marginalization. As I found when trying to research the ethnic background of British candidates, and having a lot of difficulty, I considered the potentially marginalizing outcome of constantly defining individuals by something such as his or her birthplace.

In France, perhaps its assimilationist regime was what caused it to be the country with greater ethnic representation. This could be because French citizens had proven assimilation to the country before even becoming citizens, and therefore parliamentary candidates were able to relate to a wider part of the population beyond their backgrounds. In the following conclusion,
these many conflicting results were analyzed to process the varying integration outcomes of both citizenship regimes.
Chapter 6: Conclusions

This project began with a hypothesis generated from the literature: that the multiculturalist citizenship regime of the United Kingdom that recognizes ethnic and racial differences in society would facilitate socioeconomic and political integration more than the assimilationist citizenship regime of France. The assimilationist citizenship regime of France, the same one which passed the ‘Law Against Covering the Face’ a few years ago, seemed counterintuitive to societal inclusivity as it does not recognize any identity other than ‘French’ in mainstream society. This prompted my interest in studying the Muslim integration process in both countries, eventually leading to a study of citizenship regime as a causal variable in integration.

Unfortunately for this thesis, one of the gravest issues with my research was the availability of governmental data, and my ability, as a student without special permission, to obtain it. This led me to use somewhat outdated data at times, and compensate with research provided by institutions. A further complication that became apparent later on was that the data is presented very differently for both countries. As mentioned throughout this thesis, and also arguably expected, ethnic data was available for the United Kingdom and not for France. Conversely, it was easier to locate information about immigrants in France than it was in the United Kingdom. I did everything that I could to make my data comparable, but sometimes this meant that my comparisons fell short.

Another challenge that I experienced was that although I chose commonly measured integration indicators, some applied better one country better than others. This was most apparent in my voting indicator, which was challenged by the law allowing Pakistani immigrants to vote, while only citizens are allowed to vote in France. Overall, even with the difficulties and
provisions in mind, I was still able to find notable correlations through my data, and for this reason, I firmly believe that the comparisons are still worthwhile.

To recap my study, France’s assimilationist regime is based upon Republican and Jocobinist ideas of sameness and unity. There is one overarching identity, French, and French citizens are very proud of their nationality. Furthermore, the French practice *laïcité*, or secularism, which keeps religion out of the public sphere. The practice of universality is also apparent in education, as France has a centralized system. Finally, to become a citizen, in addition to being able to speak French and having lived in the country for at least five years before applying, a person has to prove cultural assimilation. Although everyone who lives in France has similar legal rights, being a citizen is the only way one can vote.

In contrast, the United Kingdom’s multiculturalist regime recognizes, embraces, and allows different ethnicities and religions in society. Part of this is, because of its colonial history, even today, its former colonies and Commonwealth countries throughout the world hold British passports. The British government tries to accommodate the many different people who live in the United Kingdom. School systems are decentralized, allowing different neighborhoods to have their specific needs met in education. All British “citizens”, meaning those in former colonies and Commonwealths, can vote in the election, and being granted citizenship does not require proof of cultural assimilation, only a clear record, residency, and English.

Though embracing diversity and enabling cultural understanding may seem the key to an integrated society, in fact, it may not be the case. The data gathered in this research demonstrated that the assimilationist citizenship regime of France correlated with greater socioeconomic and political integration for Muslim immigrants; while in the United Kingdom, this correlation was not as strong.
As far as the indicators, socioeconomic and political, the data presented showed that France had greater integration in occupational attainment, average hourly wage, and ethnic representation in parliament for Algerian immigrants. The United Kingdom had greater integration in employment, voting participation, and citizenship acquisition for Pakistani immigrants. Although it seemed like an even split, three indicators each, France arguably had greater integration in the most sound comparisons. As I have explained in the chapters, not all indicators have equal weight. For example, voting participation is a matter of law. In the United Kingdom, Commonwealth citizens such as Pakistanis, who may not be full British citizens, have the right to vote. In France, the only people who can vote are full citizens. This means that this indicator did not provide information that clearly proved integration. Ethnic representation, on the other hand, is indicative of societal integration because anyone voting is making his or her own choice. Therefore, it is a fairer comparison between both Muslim groups in both countries.

To begin with Chapter Two’s socioeconomic indicators, employment seemed to show that the United Kingdom had greater integration. As displayed, France only had a 65% employment rate of Algerian immigrants; incredibly low in comparison to all other groups in the country. However, occupational attainment showed a different side to the data. Although Pakistani immigrants had greater employment, only 38% were employed in higher-skilled occupations. This means that the majority is trapped in low-skilled jobs. Conversely, although Algerian immigrants had low employment in comparison, 24% less to be exact, they had 14% greater higher-skilled employment than Pakistani immigrants. As noted earlier, there are far fewer low-skilled jobs in France, and potentially this means that the only jobs available are higher skilled, available to Algerian immigrants who may have superior human capital or are further integrated. Also discussed in the data analysis was the possibility that Algerian
immigrants were able to acquire higher-skilled jobs because France’s assimilationist citizenship forces the cultural assimilation that gives them access to those professions compared to Pakistani immigrants in United Kingdom’s multiculturalist one. Finally, the greater occupational attainment caused Algerian immigrants to have greater average hourly wage than Pakistani immigrants. To conclude socioeconomic indicators, the data suggested that the assimilationist regime of France, although producing differential integration outcomes, had much greater integration overall for Muslim immigrants.

For political integration, the laws of each citizenship regime greatly affected the data. Recall that the United Kingdom has a more lenient voting process and less stringent citizenship requirements than France. This in mind, it made sense that the United Kingdom showed greater political integration in these areas for both Pakistani immigrants and immigrants overall. In ethnic representation, however, a different side to the citizenship regime was shown.

As discussed in Chapter Three, one would think that based upon the simpler citizenship requirements and Commonwealth relationship, there would be more Pakistani immigrants voting in the national elections, leading to greater representation in the British House of Commons. This, in fact, was not the case. As detailed in the methodology section and Chapter three, while the data of Ethnic Minorities of the House was available for the United Kingdom, making research much easier, its existence is significant. This thesis offers a possible explanation: perhaps recognition of ethnic minorities in a multiculturalist citizenship regime is not always positive for integration. Again, when researching the backgrounds of the ethnic minority members of the House of Commons, the search became increasingly difficult. Unlike France, which clearly displayed the birth country of each member of the National Assembly on the parliamentary page, the United Kingdom did not provide such a service. In fact, even when
looking up general information about each elected member, it was fairly difficult to find information. It did not seem like the members wanted to openly display anything that would separate him or her greatly from the other candidates. Perhaps in British politics, aligning oneself with a singular group is detrimental to success, and shows that one does not identify with the rest of the British population. What this may mean for voters in the United Kingdom is that ethnicity could be a deciding factor in voting attitudes.

The findings with the ethnic representation of the British House of Commons are what I believe truly help to characterize the role of citizenship regime as a causal factor in integration. By insisting upon a central education system and specific needs to become a citizen, it may be the case that France ensured that all people whom acquire citizenship and integrate into the society share a common identity, knowledge, and experiences. Conversely, the original assumption about the United Kingdom was that, based upon its decentralized education system and the ability to keep ones cultural heritage intact, the citizenship regime would allow greater integration because one wouldn’t have to “adopt” a new nationality to be successful. While this still may be the case, staying completely immersed in one’s background might make it difficult to ever gain the important skills for successful integration into a new society. It seems that in the United Kingdom, although the multiculturalism itself may seem like a great thing, it may also be what gets in the way of successful integration.

The findings also demonstrate that although there may be negative outcomes to requiring all citizens to adhere to a singular identity in public, especially difficult for those of strong religious convictions, it is important to create standards to ensure proper integration. I now argue that France has greater integration of Muslim immigrants than the United Kingdom because it showed greater integration with the most-sound comparisons, suggesting there was
potentially greater overall integration for Algerian immigrants than there were for Pakistani immigrants in the United Kingdom. The requirements of the French citizenship regime make it very clear what one needs to prosper in society, and the regime leaves it up to the individual to decide whether or not to adhere. In the United Kingdom, the idea is that it is important to maintain one’s identity, but as exemplified through the indicators, doing so could sometimes separate individuals from the mainstream more than incorporate them.

While these findings do require further research, they emphasized that because the 21st century is a time of increased globalization and the immigration that follows, changes to a country’s integration processes need to be made. This thesis concentrated on Muslim immigrants because current events have unfortunately caused this religious group to oftentimes be associated with a negative connotation. As explained throughout this thesis, as Muslim immigrants continue to compose a large part of the global immigrant stock, it is important to understand the factors that lead to integration or marginalization. For desired societal integration, the study seemed to also indicate that there should be explicit standards in place to proper integration. However, my hope is also that an immigrant’s ability to be integrated by certain citizenship regimes is not negatively impacted by an immigrant’s religion or ethnicity.

Considering the many issues that this thesis found to be associated with the first generation immigrant experience, my hope is that the second generation has better socioeconomic and political integration. I think that to truly understand the ramifications of each country’s citizenship regime, there should be further research conducted on the second-generation’s experience with comparison to the first-generation. I firmly believe that integration is a multi-generational process, and perhaps while one type of citizenship regime seems to
provide greater integration at the outset, in future generations it may not prove to be as beneficial.
References


