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# Themes in Global Terrorism from 2010 to 2016

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Themes in Global Terrorism from 2010 to 2016

A Thesis Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements  
for the Master of Arts in Criminal Justice  
John Jay College of Criminal Justice  
City University of New York

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## DEDICATION

This paper is dedicated to Dr. Charles B. Strozier who has guided me throughout my BA/MA combined degree program in Criminal Justice at John Jay College of Criminal Justice. Through your guidance, I was able to complete coursework which I thought I would never be able to. Without your wisdom and knowledge on the course material, this paper would have never been completed as it was intended to be. Thank you for being a mentor to me and someone I look up to.

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## ABSTRACT

Over the past decade, there has been an increase in the amount of global terrorism incidents. There has also been an increase in the amount of organizations that commit these acts of terror. Specifically, the attacks seem to have increased drastically since 2010 because the year signifies the beginning of the downfall of Osama bin Laden, leader of al-Qaeda at the time. The current study explores and analyzes the pattern of non-U.S. global terrorism between 2010 and 2016. Between the timeframe, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) began to gain tremendous ground and territory globally and would later go on to be described as the new form of al-Qaeda by many scholars in the field of terrorism. Eventually, the terror organization would start to decline, but the understanding of global terrorism during that timeframe is essential to this study because of the amount of horror and fear witnessed throughout the world during those years. The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) by START is used due to its information of all the terrorism incidents that occurred between 2010 and 2016. The variables of interest are the sheer number of attacks between the years specified, the lethality of the attacks, the geographic region such as where they occurred, and which organization carried out the attack in that specific nation. Through a univariate analysis and descriptive statistics, the data presents the pattern of global terrorism from 2010 to 2016 and explains whether there are key trends that existed during that time period.

Keywords: global terrorism, Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, ISIS, al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, Islamic-extremism, right-wing terrorism, left-wing terrorism, global terrorism database

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**Introduction:**

Terrorism has drastically changed since “Le Terreur” during the French Revolution. Whereas terror then was carried out by the state, now terrorism exists in many forms of non-state actors. These include left-wing, right-wing, extremist, Islamist, and lone-actor terrorism. Internationally, individuals are recruited by organizations to carry out lone-actor attacks. The organizations recruiting individuals into lone-actor attacks are mainly Islamist-extremist organizations that are based globally. These Islamist-extremist groups seek to cause havoc and destroy governments. Many of the terrorist organizations have many local branches that operate under a larger umbrella. Major groups such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) have regional groups in Libya and Yemen that were created after its inception. The root of terror today is caused by global terrorism. The understanding of global terrorism is essential to study because of its importance in the world.

This study will examine the pattern of non-U.S. global terrorist violence from 2010 to 2016. The reason this timeframe is chosen is because it begins with the death of Osama bin Laden, continues through the creation of ISIS, and ends with the decline of ISIS. Major wars such as Afghanistan and Iraq between state-actors and terrorist actors in the Middle East began to wind down during this period, but the rise of ISIS and the Syrian civil war may have increased the amount of terrorism during the period. Though there have been reports and studies conducted in regards to the patterns of terrorism internationally, they do not, however, include some key historical moments that helped shape and advance terrorism for many years to come (Miller, 2018; Jenson, 2018; Smarick, 2018; and LaFree, 2018). Some discuss only ISIS attacks, while others discuss attacks on a yearly basis. A study such as this, as far as one can tell from open sources, has not been implemented for global terror. The goal of this study is to describe and

analyze terror attacks, specifically within the timeframe chosen, to be able to uncover the nature of global terrorism.

Even though Islamist terrorism is prominent globally, some cross-sectional terrorist groups will be used that are non-Muslim to see whether a particular form of terrorism has increased due to an increase from Islamist-extremist terrorism. Additionally, there will be a discussion of the forms of terror that existed from 2010 to 2016, ranging from Middle Eastern terrorism to affiliates of al-Qaeda and ISIS to forms of left-wing terrorism. This accounts for every possible organization that might be presented after a data analysis is conducted.

Mixed methodology will be used and will also include univariate analysis to answer the overall research question:

What is the pattern of non-U.S. global terrorism between 2010 and 2016?

The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) by the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) is an excellent source that lists and describes terrorism incidents throughout the world and will allow a comprehensive analysis of the research question. The variables of interest in this study will be the sheer number of attacks between the years specified, the lethality of the attacks, the geographic region where they occurred, and which organization carried out the attack in that specific nation.

Terrorism is a major issue that is continuing to be faced by governments and citizens. It is being combatted everyday by the military. The topic needs to be continuously studied because it can drastically change on any given day whether in form, in type, or in the creation of a new organization. Most people are asking more about one organization or a region such as al-Qaeda in Libya or ISIS in Yemen. This study aims to gather a snapshot based on the information

gathered from the database of interest in hopes of discovering whether these historical moments considered led to the increase and/or decrease of global terrorism.

### **Literature Review:**

#### *Rise of ISIS and other Middle Eastern Terrorism*

There is much that we can understand in the rise of ISIS by understanding the conflict between the Shia and the Sunni- the two rival branches of Islam. The conflict between both branches has been ongoing for 1,400 years and started with the death of the prophet Mohammed in the year 632 when he failed to announce a successor (Hall, 2016). The Sunni's believed that the Prophet's trusted friend Abu Bakr should be his successor while the Shia believed that the role belonged to Mohammed's cousin Ali. The divide between the Sunni and Shia led to each of the branches creating their own unique cultures and doctrines, although Shia and Sunnis share the same core orientations, such as the belief that Islam is the complete system of truth and religion (Moaddel & Karabenick, 2018, p. 2). However, Sunni's are largely focused on the power of God in the physical world whereas the Shia seek the rewards of the afterlife (Hall, 2016).

Although both branches were once a cohesive form of Islam, the current divide between the Sunni and Shia shapes the ideologies of terrorist organizations. Shia terrorist organizations feature large campaigns against a state and include organizational objectives (Lynch, 2008). Sunni extremists rely on the support from communities in facilitating their terrorist activities. Additionally, Sunni terrorist groups are more prone to kill those abducted while Shia extremists abduct civilians to barter them. The history between both branches have drastically altered Islamic terrorism to feature different forms of Islamic-extremism and it is important to note that

a vast majority of the Muslim population in the world are Sunni (Hall, 2016) which explains why a majority of Islamic-extremist organizations bear Sunni ideologies.

Given the rich history of Islam, the earliest form of Islamic terrorism that paved the way for the rise of ISIS was al-Qaeda which was formed in 1988 by Osama bin Laden (al Qaeda, n.d). Bin Laden had just finished fighting the Soviet Army from 1979 to 1988 in Afghanistan and wanted to take the concept of *jihad* (holy war) elsewhere to liberate other occupied Muslim lands. Many of his followers had been trained, military equipped, and funded by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) when they backed Afghanistan against the Soviets (al Qaeda, n.d). Al-Qaeda's main ideology was the opposition of western influences and regarded them as "unIslamic" (MI5, n.d). It claimed that democracy is a rival religion and that the only acceptable form of government is an Islamic Caliphate, although the organization did not define what the Caliphate that they advocated for represented.

After the creation of al-Qaeda, bin Laden met Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in 1999 who had set up his own terrorist organization of Jama'at al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad (JTWJ) in Jordan in 1999 (Zelin, 2014, p. 1). Before the groups formed a marriage of convenience in 2004, the U.S. invaded Iraq due to the apparent belief that the country's dictator, Saddam Hussein, was in the process of building weapons of mass destruction (History.com Editors, 2009). bin Laden wanted to own the Iraqi jihad and remain relevant in the United States and in 2004, al-Zarqawi pledged *baya* (religious oath of allegiance) to bin Laden which would set up al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and the insurgency that would follow suit (Zelin, 2014, p. 3).

Once AQI planted its roots in Iraq, al-Zarqawi would widen the gap between the Sunnis and Shia that had already existed (Holahan, 2015). Al-Zarqawi's goal was to ignite an anti-U.S. insurgency and create a civil war in Iraq. During his reign as AQI's leader, his organization

targeted symbols of western corruption such as liquor stores and pornographic theaters which exemplified al-Qaeda's views against western influences (Sprusansky, 2016). Although al-Zarqawi was proving himself as a ruthless leader who enhanced his credentials while carrying out acts of terror in Iraq, bin Laden viewed him as too extreme and refused to award him a prominent role within the al-Qaeda organization (Sprusansky, 2016). Al-Zarqawi was killed in 2006 by a U.S. drone strike (Youssef, 2006).

After the death of al-Zarqawi, AQI re-branded and became the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) through the leadership of al-Zarqawi's successor Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Al-Baghdadi envisioned a huge swarm of territory which stretched across three continents. The organization was supported by many of Iraq's minority Sunni population. He eventually capitalized on the U.S troop withdrawal in 2011 from Iraq (Holahan, 2015) which would later allow Baghdadi to exploit the benefits of the Arab Spring; most notably the Syrian Civil War.

The role of the Syrian Civil war is a key factor in shaping ISI which would eventually become ISIS. The war began in 2011 and was inspired by the Arab Spring which began in Tunisia a few months prior and shook several Arab regimes (Rabinovich, 2018, p. 45). The core of the war was centered on the corrupt and dictatorial regime of President Bashar al-Asad. Under President al-Asad's regime, Syria's relationship with Iran was transformed into an alliance of dependency due to the threat of the rebels and ISI in Syria. President al-Asad stepped aside and let ISI combat the rebels themselves. Al-Baghdadi and his followers proved themselves quickly as their fighters were effective in combatting the rebels and they gained recruits and land within Syria and Iraq as a result (Holahan, 2015).

The ISI were successful due to the acquiring of large amounts of weapons that had originally been supplied by the U.S to the Iraqi military during the war (Welch, 2014). President

al-Asad's plan of having the ISI fight the rebels backfired when they began attacking the government forces of Syria. ISI eventually obliterated the Syrian-Iraqi border (Rabinovich, 2018, p. 47). In 2013, al-Baghdadi announced that he was extending ISI into Syria and renamed the organization the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) (Zelin, 2014, p. 4). In 2014, the group captured Fallujah (Holahan, 2015). The event led to the disaffiliation with the declaration of al-Baghdadi as the caliphate and ISIS in a few mere years accomplished more tangible results than al-Qaeda managed in two decades (Holbrook, 2015, p. 93-94).

The organizations that are most prominent in the Middle East are al-Qaeda and ISIS. The majority of attacks are shared between the two, but their ideologies are different (Braniff, 2015). Al-Qaeda's phased approach to reestablishing the caliphate begins with awakening the masses, continues with the management of barbarism, and ends with the reestablishment (Braniff, 2015). ISIS on the other hand seeks to destabilize tyrants and get stronger in order to reestablish the caliphate. Al-Zawahiri, the new leader of al-Qaeda and successor of bin Laden after his death in 2011, has argued that the principle difference between both organizations is their approaches to *jihad* and that al-Qaeda is focused on the U.S. and its allies rather than "peripheral battles" (Holbrook, 2015, p. 95). The main difference between the two, however, is how al-Qaeda has never established a caliphate and controlled territory as ISIS has done through the turmoil of Syria. Despite the differences between both organizations in the Middle East, ISIS is waging war against a near enemy such as the authoritarian regimes of the Middle East (Hassan, 2016, p. 768).

Despite al-Qaeda and ISIS being the most prominent in the Middle East, there are other umbrella organizations and groups present within the region. Some, but not all, of al-Qaeda's umbrella organizations and affiliates operate within the Middle East. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian

Peninsula (AQAP), formed in 2009, operated first out of Saudi Arabia and then Yemen (Mendelsohn, 2016, p. 140). The organization seeks to attack U.S. and western interests in Yemen and destabilize the Yemeni government (Rollins, 2011, p. 319-20). The former leader of AQAP, Nasir al-Wuhayshi, had close ties to the original leadership that existed within al-Qaeda (Humud, Arieff, Ploch Blanchard, Blanchard, Sharp, & Katzman, 2014, p. 41). Additionally, ISIS has gained a foothold in Yemen and in 2014 established The Islamic State in Yemen (Kis-Benedek, 2017, p. 6). The group has not been established as AQAP, but the Islamic State of Yemen has committed a few bombings and is composed of a few defectors from AQAP and other militants in the area.

Besides the AQAP and the Islamic State in Yemen, the Middle East is home to the organization of Jabhat al-Nusra which was established in Syria in 2011 (Humud et. al, 2014, p. 42). The organization trained in al-Qaeda training camps and developed significant military capabilities (Anzalone, 2016). Al-Nusra proved themselves as valuable assets in the war against the Syrian government and was at the center of political debates by external actors. Al-Baghdadi ignored al-Zawahiri's claims of establishing al-Nusra as their official Syrian affiliate, and tried to recruit the organization into ISIS (Anzalone, 2016). Despite al-Baghdadi's attempts of incorporating the group as one of ISIS' affiliates, al-Nusra proclaimed allegiance to al-Qaeda and this was due to not being consulted when al-Baghdadi announced the expansion of then ISI into Syria (Simonelli, 2014, p. 2).

Aside from al-Qaeda, ISIS, and their umbrella organizations, there are other groups residing in the Middle East such as the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and Hamas. It is important to note that the MB helped establish some of the prominent terror organizations that the world sees today such as al-Qaeda and ISIS (Farahat, 2017). In 2009, five MB leaders were charged with

providing material support to Hamas which is their Palestinian branch (Farahat, 2017). Hamas' sole purpose is to carry out attacks to cripple Israel and establish a state of Palestine with Jerusalem being its capital. The organization operates out of the Gaza strip and since the Israeli pullout of soldiers within the region in 2005, the group has constantly carried out attacks against the state of Israel (The airbrushing, 2014). The organization has no interest in peace with Israel and has largely abandoned civil governance.

Likewise, the al-Aqsa Martyr Brigades also exist in the Palestinian region and have committed attacks together with Hamas (Gadalla, 2014). There is as well evidence that Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis originated in Gaza and later conducted attacks in Egypt before pledging allegiance to ISIS and becoming their main organization in the Sinai Peninsula (Ansar Bayt, 2014). Since the transfer of the -Aqsa Martyr Brigades into Egypt, ISIS has formed a new organization, Sheikh Omar Hadid Brigade in 2015, to continue their operations in the Gaza strip (Sheikh Omar Hadid Brigade, n.d).

Going beyond Hamas and the MB, Hezbollah have also been active in Lebanon. The organization rose to power from the Parliament elections in 2000 and the first role of the group has been to commit terror attacks in the surrounding Arab countries (Al-Jayallah, 2018). While in general Hezbollah operates within the border of Lebanon and Israel, there has been a case where they fought in the Syrian Civil war as President al-Asad's forces were disintegrating (Rabinovich, 2018, p. 45). The organization attacked a few villages that were controlled by the Free Syrian Army (FSA) who stated that they do not recognize political law in Syria and started combatting al-Asad's forces (Hassan, 2013). Apart from fighting Hezbollah, the FSA have also been fighting Jaish al-Islam, who undermined the FSA, and have had many groups merge into what is now known as the Army of Islam (Hassan, 2013).

The rise of ISIS has been attributed to many factors such as the US invasion and occupation of Iraq, the torture and discrimination against Iraqi Sunnis by the government, and the Shia-dominated government of Syria (Hassan, 2016, p. 768). ISIS and the caliphate were established through the toxic combination of the Syrian Civil war, corruption of the government, and a divide between the existing communities (Holahan, 2015). The rise of ISIS, therefore, is not related to religion and territorial conquests but rather due to the failure of the reconciliation between the Shia and Sunnis that exists for centuries and the politics in Iraq and Syria.

### *Global Affiliates of al-Qaeda and ISIS*

Even though al-Qaeda and ISIS are the two most significant Islamic-extremist organizations that exist, there are many branches of both organizations theologies that exist through the world. In Africa, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) was established in 1999 (Salafist Group, n.d). The group eventually integrated itself with al-Qaeda which was announced by then deputy al-Zawahiri in 2006 (Humud et. al, 2014, p. 36) and became Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in 2008 (Gomez, 2010, p. 11). AQIM operate in Algeria, Mali, and Niger. Al Murabitoun, which formed in 2013 and swore allegiance to al-Qaeda in 2015, is a splinter cell of AQIM and operates in in the same regions. The faction of Ansar al Sharia in Tunisia has not sworn allegiance to al-Qaeda, but the group is ideologically allied to AQIM (Humud et. al, 2014, p. 49).

Al-Qaeda's most successful affiliate operates in Africa as well. Al-Shabaab, which formed in 2004, has worked closely with al-Qaeda in the past (Rollins, 2011, p. 327). The organization has evolved out of the militant wing of Somalia's court and has been religiously driven in uniting the inhabited areas of Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Somalia under an Islamic caliphate (Humud et. al, 2014, p. 38). The group racked up immense victories and controlled

many areas in the region. (Hansen, 2013, p. 146). Al-Shabaab pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda in 2012 (BBC, 2017), but has since flirted with the idea of associating itself with ISIS (Kis-Benedek, 2017, p. 6).

Since the establishment of the caliphate, ISIS has been gaining ground in Africa by creating organizations and recruiting those who have been present within the region. ISIS has used the term *wilayah* (state/province) as their branding for their provinces (Blanchard & Humud, 2017, p. 20). The Islamic State in Egypt, formally known as Ansar Bayt al Maqdis and has already been discussed, pledged allegiance to al-Baghdadi in 2014 (Byman, 2017). ISIS established the Islamic State in Libya which includes Ansar al Sharia (Libya) formed in 2011 (Wehrey & Alrababa'h, 2015). Ansar al Sharia wants to establish a state which adopts sharia law rather than man-made laws (Humud et. al, 2014, p. 48). The group does not face strong government opposition (Byman, 2017).

A well-established organization that existed prior to ISIS involvement in Africa is Boko Haram which translates into “western education is forbidden” (Blanchard & Humud, 2017, p. 22). The group formed in 2002 (CNN Library, 2018) and is one of the deadliest besides al-Qaeda and ISIS (Humud et. al, 2014, p. 44). Leaders of the organization have called upon civilians and militants to rise against authority in order to establish a caliphate in Nigeria. The West African province (The Islamic State in Nigeria) was established in 2011 (Lovelace, 2016) and Boko Haram swore allegiance to al-Baghdadi in 2015 (Lynch, 2015, p. 91). Aside from West Africa, ISIS has made camp in Algeria which was established in 2013, but has not been as successful as the campaigns carried out in West Africa (Islamic State Algeria, n.d).

Unlike Africa, al-Qaeda’s influence and affiliates in Asia seems stagnant. An organization that has aligned itself with al-Qaeda in recent years has been Tehrik-e Taliban

Pakistan (TTP) established in 2007 (Currently listed entities, 2018). It is unknown whether the organization has pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda. Harakat-ul Jihad Islami, formed in 1980 and based in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh (Sharma & Behera, 2014, p. 195), has also been closely aligned with al-Qaeda (Rollins, 2011, p. 316), but it is unknown if the group have pledged their allegiance to the organization. The last form of influence in Asia that al-Qaeda has created is al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent established in 2014 (AQIS, n.d). The creation of the organization was a response to the ISIS challenge faced in South Asia (Lynch, 2015, p. 96).

ISIS has gained in the region of Asia since its establishment and has even attracted former al-Qaeda affiliated factions. Wilayat Qawqas was established in 2014 (Vatchagaev, 2015) when al-Qaeda's Islamic Emirates of the Caucasus pledged allegiance to al-Baghdadi (Gunaratna, 2016, p. 135). The four minor jihadist groups based in Dagestan, Russia and the Caucasus declared themselves as supporters of al-Baghdadi (Lynch, 2015, p. 91). Not far from the Caucasus Province exists the Khorasan Province in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The organization was previously known as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) which was formed in 1998 (Rashid, 2002), but has since declared its support for ISIS in 2014 (Lynch, 2015, p. 91).

There has as well been a drastic surge of ISIS in the Philippines with multiple groups pledging *baya* to al-Baghdadi. The Philippines Province of ISIS was formed in 2014 when the organization of Abu Sayyaf pledged loyalty to ISIS (Ressa, 2014) The Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Movement (BIFF) has been one of the most active in the Philippines and was formed in 2008 (BIFF, n.d). The group pledged loyalty to al-Baghdadi and have been committing acts of terror in the name of ISIS in the Philippines ever since (The Economist, 2015). The Maute Group

in the Philippines formed in 2012 and pledged in 2015 (Maute Group, n.d). Ansar Al-Khilafa formed in 2014 and pledged in the same year (AKP, n.d).

Perhaps the largest organization that exists in the region of the Philippines and Indonesia is Jemaah Islamiya (JI) which was established in 1993 (JI, n.d). The group previously saw themselves as Indonesia's al-Qaeda (Rollins, 2011, p. 329). The members and supporters of JI share similar ideologies and objectives as al-Qaeda and ISIS (Singh, 2017, p. 7). Although JI had been closely aligned to al-Qaeda, the group pledged allegiance to al-Baghdadi in 2014 (JI, n.d). The organizations of Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT), formed in 2010 (Roggio, 2016), and Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (Wilkinson, 2018), formed in 2015, have as well pledged loyalty to al-Baghdadi.

Despite Africa and Asia being overpopulated with organizations, Europe has not had the same experience. Instead, Europe has experienced a surge of lone-actor attacks and al-Qaeda/ISIS inspired attacks. One of the only known organizations that operate in Europe is the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group which was established in 1990 and is an affiliate of al-Qaeda (GICM, n.d). The group has been mainly focused on document forgery, gunrunning and drug trafficking, but many former members of the group operate on an independent basis (Jesus, 2009). Some of the notorious bombings that have been linked to the group have been the 2004 Madrid train bombings and the 2007 Casablanca bombings. There are numerous splinter cells across Europe that exist (Guidère, 2012, p. 230). Still, Europe has not been inundated with organizations as seen with Africa and Asia. There are as well no organizations affiliated with al-Qaeda and ISIS in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC).

The number of affiliated organizations is enormous, but there must be some reason as to why organizations choose to affiliate themselves with al-Qaeda and ISIS. According to Singh

(2012), the motivations that influence organizations to affiliate and pledge loyalty to al-Qaeda is due to failure, finance, a safe haven, training, common defense, branding, and personal networks. For instance, the Taliban's alliance with al-Qaeda is strengthened through the trade of finances and training territories provided by the groups (Bacon, 2018). Although the Taliban has not pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda, cooperation between the organizations still exists to the current day. Likewise, those who join ISIS' cause are motivated by their success, technology, ideologies, training, and finances (Jabbour, n.d). Basically, an organization goes through a cost and benefit analysis of what both ISIS and al-Qaeda has to offer and judging by the amount of organizations that have been affiliated with both organizations, the number has tremendously increased between 2010 and 2016.

### *Forms of Left-Wing Terrorism*

Regardless of right-wing and Islamic dominance of terrorism, left-wing terrorism still exists, although it is not once what it was during the 1960s and 1970s. In Asia, India experiences a vast majority of left-wing terrorism. The conflict originates from the Naxalite movements where an armed guerilla movement was launched from Naxalbari against the Indian state (Bhambhri, 2015, p. 15). Local terrorist/insurgent groups which include left-wing extremists have resorted back to terror attacks after failing to attract support from external factors (Subramaniam, 2012, p. 400–402). The current threat stems from the Communist Party of India (Tan, 2018, p. 161) and left-wing groups are active in both states that are of low and high socioeconomic status (Chowdhury, 2016, p. 89). The insurgency of left-wing terrorism in India was brought upon by the lopsided development in the tribal parts within the country which led to left-wing extremists targeting innocent civilians in pursuit of their stated objectives (Subramaniam, 2012, p. 399).

Additionally, Europe has experienced a great amount of left-wing terrorism with some incidents coming from anarchist organizations. In Greece, a left-wing guerilla group claimed responsibility for conducting a gun attack on an Israeli embassy in Athens (Kitsantonis, 2015). Other organizations, such as anarchist groups and protesters, were responsible for damaging 60 stores in Greece as well (Associated Press, 2017). The protest was sparked when an Athens court refused to suspend a sentencing of an individual who had ties to anarchist group. Dozens of youths participating in the protest were carrying hammers and metal bars while the police used tear gas to disperse the crowd (Greece, 2017).

One of the most prominent form of left-wing terrorism that still exists is the Irish Republican Army (IRA) now known as the Provisional IRA. The Provisional IRA have repeatedly committed acts of violence and issued warnings to the police advising them to cease operations in certain areas of Ireland (The patriot, 2013). When warnings were ignored, the groups set two mortars in an area where police were investigating. The Provisional IRA has experienced splinter cells that broke off which were operating under a new unified structure (The patriot, 2013) and the original organizations has been quiescent since 1998. Despite the left-wing terror that is experienced in Europe, Ireland has continued to be the focus of attention due to it being home to one of the last forms of left-wing terror still in existence from the 20<sup>th</sup> century although the violence that has continued has been low-level and carried out by dissident groups that oppose peace.

The Middle East and Africa have had minimal interaction with extremist left-wing organizations. However, there has been an increase in political left-wing movements due to poverty and inequality continuing to be an issue in the area (Beresford, 2012, p. 880). It is as well important to note that left-wing organizations in the Middle East and Africa have rejected

Islamic groups and Islamist-led government. In Tunisia, the National Salvation Front (NSF), united for protests after the assassination of Mohamed Brahmi (Chronology Tunisia, 2014, p. 148). Likewise, in Syria, the Democratic Union Party (PYD) expelled jihadi groups and has had clashes between Kurdish groups and Islamist militant groups (Chronology Syria, 2014, p. 144). The rejection of Islamic organizations by left-wing groups falls in line with the longstanding issue of right-wing vs. left-wing.

Unlike other regions, LAC has continued to struggle with a left-wing insurgency. In Colombia, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC) was active, but has since been defeated and inactive since 2017. The material that made the group successful was that it thrived on the rivalries between other organizations in the area (Phillips, 2015, p. 65). Like the groups in Colombia, Peru has had their own experience with terror groups such as the Shining Path which, since its inception, have been accredited to many deaths in Peru (Shadle, 2013, p. 285). Although the region has had instances of terrorism through organizations such as the Shining Path and FARC, there has not been much media coverage of terrorism in LAC (Connell, 2004, p. vii). The same can be said for left-wing terrorism throughout the world as it is highly unreported on.

### **Research Design:**

The unit of analysis is terrorism incidents (n = 54,762). The data was acquired from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) operated by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) in Maryland. The GTD began in 2001 when researchers at the University of Maryland obtained a database that was originally collected by the Pinkerton Global Intelligence Services (PGIS) (START, 2018). The data collected from 1998 through 2007 was collected retrospectively, while the data on more recent events has been

collected in real-time due to the benefits of media archives. The data is available to the public and START allows individuals to download the entire dataset off of their website.

Terrorist attacks, by the GTD, are defined as “the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation” (START, 2018). The attack is considered into the database if it meets three attributes which are the incident must be intentional, entail some level of violence or threat of violence, and the perpetrators must be sub-national actors. Acts of state terrorism are not included. The number of incidents in the database are attributed to manual data collection strategies employed by the GTD team to increase the efficiency, accuracy, and completeness of the collection of attacks. The process starts with over one million media articles which are on any topic that are published daily worldwide. They are then analyzed by the GTD staff to a small subset of articles that describe terror attacks which are added to the database (START, 2018).

The GTD also codes the attacks by criteria that individuals can choose to include or exclude. The criterions were established and applied to the incidents to assure the adherence of the broad definition of terrorism that exists in order to filter out cases that seem inappropriate to specific analytical interests that researchers have (START, 2018). Two of the three criteria must be present for the incident to be added to the database. The three criteria are:

Criterion I: The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal.

Criterion II: There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the immediate victims.

Criterion III: The action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities, i.e. the act must be outside the parameters permitted by international humanitarian law (particularly the admonition against deliberately targeting civilians or non-combatants).

For the purpose of this study, all three criteria will be included. Criterion I is essential to the analysis because this study wants the terrorism incident to be aimed at attaining political,

religious, and/or economic goals due to the objectives of ISIS and al-Qaeda. Criterion II is included due to both fear and recruitment purposes. Terrorist organizations want to reach an audience beyond the initial victims to spread psychological factors and change the minds of individuals to join the fight. Lastly, criterion III is included because it is important to be sure that the incidents are acts of terrorism and not acts of violence committed in warfare. Humanitarian law forbids attacks on civilians for its own sake in warfare. Terrorism makes such attacks its main purpose.

The analysis as well allows including ambiguous cases due to uncertainty whether or not an incident meets all of the criteria for inclusion as a GTD terrorist incident. Including ambiguous cases broadens the number of incidents that occur from 2010 to 2016. Lastly, unsuccessful attacks are not included in the unit of analysis. When discussing terror organizations, this design looks at attacks that were successfully committed by the groups and not those that were thwarted. By including unsuccessful attacks in this study, this will not explain how powerful and effective an organization was.

Based on the timeframe, the incidents analyzed are from January 1<sup>st</sup>, 2010 to December 31<sup>st</sup>, 2016. The GTD codes countries into regions and the regions of interest to this study that will be included in the analysis are: Australasia & Oceania, Central America & Caribbean, Central Asia, East Asia, Eastern Europe, Middle East & North Africa, South America, South Asia, Southeast Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Western Europe. The database as well assigns each incident a unique event ID which includes the year, month, day, and incident number of that specific day. For example: 201612310001.

Once the analysis is run, that data is categorized by the sheer number of attacks between the years specified, the lethality of the attacks such as the fatalities and wounded, the geographic

region such as where they occurred, and the organization that carried out the attack in that specific region. Each incident has a brief summary noting the “when, where, who, what, how, and why” (START, 2018). The GTD uses a standardized list of group names that have been established by the staff at START. Also, due to the number of independent sources that lists casualties, the most recent source is usually reflected by the GTD unless that source is of questionable validity.

A univariate analysis is used to explore each variable in the data set created. After the analysis is conducted, descriptive statistics is used to describe and summarize the data. Due to the time constrictions of the current study, the organizations that committed the attacks are limited to the top 20 most successful groups. The most successful organizations are measured by the number of successful terror attacks the groups have carried out.

## **Results:**

### *Number of Attacks*

Table 1 presents the number of terror attacks between 2010 and 2016. Overall, between the years studied, the total number of successful incidents was 54,762 and unsuccessful was 8,765. Whereas successful terror attacks in 2010 numbered 4,215, that number doubled by 2013. After the death of Osama bin Laden, the number of successful attacks increased from 4,274 in 2011 to 6,108 in 2012, which was a 42.88% increase. The peak number of terror attacks occurred in 2014 which still remains an all-time high. Since 2014, terror attacks have been decreasing according to the findings. In 2016, the number of successful terror attacks was 9,100 which is a 24% decrease since 2014.

Unsuccessful terror attacks have seen a gradual increase between the years studied. In 2010, it was reported that of the 4,639 attacks that occurred, 424 were unsuccessful. That number

doubled from 2011 to 2012 which is seen by a 91.42% increase. This might be due to the number of attacks committed in 2012 increasing from the previous year. Of the 11,192 attacks that occurred in 2016, 2,092 were unsuccessful. Unsuccessful terror attacks between the period have seen a 343.4% increase.

A majority of the successful terror attacks were conducted in the Middle East & North Africa region which saw 38.91% of attacks between 2010 and 2016 according to table 2.1. The number of attacks peaked at 5,019 in 2014. The data also presented that the runner-up behind the Middle East & North Africa for the amount of attacks between the timeframe was South Asia which saw 34.7% of attacks. Lastly, 12.74% of attacks were conducted in Sub-Saharan Africa. All regions saw decreases in attacks after 2014 excluding Western Europe. Western Europe experienced a 70.8% increase in attacks from 2014 to 2015.

Table 2.2 illustrates the number of unsuccessful attacks by region between 2010 and 2016. South Asia experienced the majority of unsuccessful terror attacks between the timeframe which was 41.24%. The Middle East & North Africa witnessed 34.6% of the total number of unsuccessful attacks. As with the trend of the total number of unsuccessful attacks increasing, the same is seen by region as most regions experienced an increase in unsuccessful attacks. Some regions such as South Asia and Western Europe did not, but this can be due to the amount of overall attacks conducted in the respective years.

### *Lethality of Attacks*

The lethality of civilians in terror attacks between 2010 and 2016 have shown an extreme increase. Table 3.1 depicts the total fatalities and wounded of civilians from successful attacks between the timeframe. In 2011, the number of civilian fatalities were 6,790 and wounded were 13,282. After the death of Osama bin Laden, in 2012 the fatalities were 9,676, a 42.5% increase and the number of wounded were 21,404, a 61.15% increase. In 2014, the amount of fatalities

reached a record high which was 27,507. The record high for wounded was in 2015 which totaled 35,564. The total number between the timeframe of fatalities was 107,741 and wounded was 183,601.

Besides civilians who are killed or wounded by attacks, there have been many perpetrators who have been killed or wounded committing a successful attack. In 2010, a total of 74 perpetrators were wounded and 411 were killed illustrated in table 4.1. Those numbers have severely increased over the years. In 2014, there were 5,995 perpetrator fatalities which was a 156.97% increase from the previous year. In 2016, there were 1,178 perpetrators wounded, a 9.95% decrease from 2015 and 4,537 perpetrator fatalities, a 21.95% decrease from the previous year. The total number of perpetrator fatalities of successful attacks between 2010 and 2016 was 20,964 and wounded was 4,338.

There have also been civilians who were wounded or killed in unsuccessful attacks. According to the GTD, unsuccessful terror attacks are defined as attacks in which the objective of the attack is not completed. An example would be an attack that targeted a high ranking official by an explosive in which others are killed such as civilians or law enforcement officials but not the individual initially targeted. According to table 3.2, there have been a total of 3,688 civilians wounded and 1,068 killed between 2010 and 2016 by unsuccessful attacks. In 2013, there were 764 civilians wounded which was a 209.31% increase from 2012. In 2015, 241 civilians were killed.

Compared to the lethality of civilians in unsuccessful attacks, perpetrators have had the most fatalities in unsuccessful attacks. In 2010, there were only 13 perpetrators wounded and 31 fatalities as reported in table 4.2. In 2015, there was a 1,345.83% increase of perpetrators wounded from the previous year and a 494.24% increase in killed from 2014. In 2016, 437 were

wounded and 2,228 were killed. Between 2010 and 2016, the number of perpetrators wounded and killed has only continued to increase and the amount killed between the time period was 4,313 and wounded was 888.

The highest number of civilian casualties from successful terror attacks came in the Middle East & North Africa region in 2014 as depicted in table 5.1. The number of civilian fatalities was 12,553 and overall, between 2010 and 2016, the Middle East & North Africa had 46.53% of fatalities of successful attacks occur in the region. South Asia had 24.67% of fatalities occur in the region with a total of 26,579 and Sub-Saharan Africa had 23.84% with a total of 25,686. Of the 107,741 fatalities from successful attacks, 102,398 occurred in the three regions. A trend that was also discovered in the data is while fatalities in Eastern Europe decreased, attacks in Western Europe increased towards 2016.

The data presented in table 5.2 on civilians wounded in successful terror attacks by region illustrates the same trend as fatalities. The top three regions where the most wounded occurred was in the Middle East & North Africa, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa. In the Middle East & North Africa, a total of 55.63% of the wounded between the timeframe occurred in the region. Unlike fatalities, the highest number of wounded did not occur in 2014 for the Middle East & North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa. In 2013, 9,401 civilians were wounded in South Asia. In 2015, 20,620 civilians were wounded in the Middle East & North Africa and 5,466 civilians were wounded in Sub-Saharan Africa. Of the 183,601 civilians wounded, 170,700 were wounded in the three regions. Lastly, as the number of wounded in Eastern Europe decreased, the number of wounded in Western Europe increased.

Civilian fatalities of unsuccessful terror attacks mimic the same direction as successful terror attacks by region, but not the same high numbers of casualties. The highest number of

fatalities from unsuccessful attacks came in the Middle East & North Africa, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa as shown in table 6.1. Of the 1,068 casualties, 986 occurred in the regions which is 92.32% of the overall total. In 2015, 64 civilians were killed in the Middle East & North Africa, 78 were killed in South Asia, and 81 were killed in Sub-Saharan Africa which were the highest number of civilian casualties from unsuccessful attacks between 2010 and 2016.

Once again, as seen from fatalities of unsuccessful attacks, the Middle East & North Africa and South Asia saw the highest number of civilians wounded in unsuccessful terror attacks. As shown in table 6.2, in 2013, 331 civilians were wounded in the Middle East & North Africa while 338 were wounded in South Asia in 2015. Both regions accounted for 80.66% of civilians wounded between the time period. Sub-Saharan Africa was accountable for 10.71% of civilians wounded.

There have been many perpetrators who have committed terror attacks and have been killed in the process. Depicted in table 7.1 is the amount of perpetrator fatalities of successful terror attacks by region. In 2014, 2,191 perpetrators died committing a successful attack in Sub-Saharan Africa. In 2015, 2,315 died in South Asia. And in 2015, 1,828 died in the Middle East & North Africa. Combined together, of the 20,964 perpetrator fatalities, 20,196 occurred in the three regions which accounted for 96.34% of the total. The most perpetrator fatalities overall between 2010 and 2016 occurred in South Asia which was 8,746, 41.72% of the total.

South Asia has also seen the greatest number of perpetrators wounded in successful terror attacks which was 3,413 as seen in table 7.2. In 2015, 1,063 perpetrators were wounded in South Asia. Of the total 4,338 wounded, 78.68% perpetrators were wounded in South Asia. The Middle East & North Africa saw the second highest number of wounded perpetrators although in much

lesser amounts from South Asia. In 2015, 165 perpetrators were wounded with the total between 2010 and 2016 amounting to 556, 12.82% of the total.

The number of perpetrator fatalities of unsuccessful terror attacks heavily outweighs those of civilians. In table 8.1, 57.29% of perpetrator fatalities occurred in the Middle East & North Africa with the highest number occurring in 2016 at 1,502. The total number of perpetrator fatalities in the region was 2,471. In South Asia, the highest number of perpetrator fatalities was in 2016 which saw 647 killed. The total number of perpetrator fatalities in South Asia between the time period was 1,298, 30.10% of the total. Sub-Saharan Africa drew the third highest amount of perpetrator casualties at 10.48% of the total with the highest amount occurring in 2015 at 289 fatalities.

South Asia had the highest number of perpetrators wounded in unsuccessful terror attacks shown in table 8.2 which was 670, 75.45% of the total between 2010 and 2016. The highest number of wounded occurred in 2016 in which 332 perpetrators were wounded from unsuccessful terror attacks. The Middle East & North Africa saw a total of 179 perpetrators wounded and the highest number wounded came in 2016 at 94. This was 20.16% of the total. Every other region had relatively low numbers of perpetrators wounded.

### *Terror Organizations*

Of the 54,762 successful terror attacks between 2010 and 2016, 17,113 were committed by the top 20 most successful organizations shown in table 9. The organization that committed the most attacks within the timeframe was the Taliban which was 4,155 successful attacks. The highest number of successful attacks was 977 and occurred in 2015. The Taliban committed 7.59% of the total amount of successful terror attacks. Nearing the Taliban's numbers was ISIS with 3,649 successful attacks. ISIS attacks included attacks committed by AQI and ISI. The highest number of attacks committed was 1,048 in 2014 with a decrease followed in 2015 to 835

attacks and an increase in 2016 to 955 successful attacks. ISIS committed 6.66% of the total successful attacks between 2010 and 2016.

Although most of the successful attacks were committed by Sunni Islamism organizations, there were a number of successful organizations that were left-wing. The Communist Party of India committed 1,119 of the successful terror attacks. In LAC, FARC and the National Liberation Army of Columbia (ELN) combined for 645 successful attacks. Overall, of the 20 successful terror organizations, 13,652 attacks were committed by Islamist organizations leaning to the right while 3,461 attacks were committed by left-wing/far-left organizations.

Unlike the Taliban having the greatest number of attacks between 2010 and 2016, ISIS had the most civilian fatalities between the time period. The highest number of civilian fatalities occurred in 2016 and was 6,267 according to table 10.1. The total number of civilian fatalities in ISIS attacks was 20,322 which was 18.86% of the entire total between 2010 and 2016. Boko Haram had the second highest number of civilian fatalities which was 12,502, 11.6% of the total. The organization's highest number of civilian fatalities was 4,863 in 2014. The Taliban's highest number of fatalities was 2,161 in 2015 and the total between the time period was 9,692, which accounted for 8.9% of the entire total. Overall, Islamist organizations civilian fatalities accrued to 53,723 and left-wing organizations civilian fatalities accrued to 3,060 between 2010 and 2016. Altogether, all 20 terror organizations accounted for 52.58% of civilian fatalities.

The number of civilians wounded by terror organizations showed similar results as those killed by terror attacks. According to table 10.2, ISIS attacks had the most civilians wounded with a total of 29,061 with the highest number occurring in 2016 at 7,599. The group's civilians wounded accrued to 15.83% of the entire total. The Taliban's civilians wounded was half of ISIS

being 14,522, 7.91% of the total. The highest number of civilians wounded was 3,354 in 2015. Behind the Taliban was Boko Haram which had 7,777 civilians wounded between the timeframe with the highest being 3,336 in 2015. Overall, the number of civilians wounded by Islamist organizations accrued to 67,571 and the number of civilians wounded by left-wing organizations accrued to 5,055 between 2010 and 2016. Altogether, all 20 terror organizations accounted for 39.56% of civilians wounded.

### **Discussion:**

Since 2010, the amount of terror attacks has significantly increased. After the death of Osama bin Laden, terror attacks around the world have had an increase. As seen in the data, 2014 had the record high of terror attacks and it comes as no surprise that this occurred when ISIS became an organization and split from al-Qaeda. Successful terror attacks have decreased towards 2016, but the amount of unsuccessful terror attacks through the years have increased suggesting that the policies that are in effect around the world make it more difficult for actors to commit successful terror attacks.

A majority of the successful terror attacks occurred in the Middle East & North Africa. This was suggested earlier as the regions are known to be home to some of the deadliest terror organizations. South Asia had the second highest of successful terror attacks occur in the region. This could be due to the proximity the area is from the Middle East & North Africa and because South Asia incorporates countries such as Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan to name a few. Other regions had relatively low numbers of successful attacks.

Unlike the Middle East & North Africa having the most successful attacks, South Asia had the majority of unsuccessful attacks occur in the region between 2010 and 2016. Each region experienced increases in unsuccessful attacks throughout the years studied which, once again,

suggests that there must be some counterterrorism policies or sanctions in effect in each region that makes committing terror attacks much more difficult than in the past. South Asia and Western Europe did not have the same experiences, but this is most likely due to the fact that towards 2016, the amount of terror attacks that are actually being committed have shrunk.

The lethality of civilians reveals that the death of Osama bin Laden had a severe effect on the fatalities and wounded tolls. After his death, fatalities increased by 42.5% in 2010 which raises the issue as to whether more terror organizations were able to rise due to his death. In 2014, the amount of fatalities reached a record high, but is once again due to the rise of ISIS. In 2015, however, the record high for wounded occurred which suggests that some terror organizations may have been more effective in wounding individuals in their attacks compared to the number of attacks in 2015.

In unsuccessful terror attacks, there have been many civilians who have been casualties in a failed attempt to commit a terror attack. The data explains that individuals who are responsible for the attempts care nothing about those who get in the crosshairs and will do anything to see the attacks through. But this shows that it is not the case because the attacks were unsuccessful and this is probably due to outside measures such as law enforcement, the military, or the inexperience of the attacker to commit a successful terror attack.

Besides civilian casualties, perpetrators themselves have died in the process of committing an attack. In successful terror attacks, perpetrators have not had the same level of deaths and wounded as civilians did but the statistics are still high. During the rise of ISIS in 2014, there was a record high of perpetrators who were killed during a successful attack. The data suggests that perpetrators do not care whether they live or die when committing an attack and they subjectify themselves as suicide attackers. This can also be due to the level of training

that each individual obtains from their respective terror organizations. Terror organizations expand onto their followers that dying for a cause while committing an attack is a blessing and fulfilling.

In unsuccessful attacks, however, most individuals who die or end up wounded are perpetrators. This could be due to a number of reasons, but some of the main ones would either be the state of mind of the individual or the lack of experience. If an individual is going through a psychotic and emotional breakdown that leads him to commit an attack, then the attack might not go as planned. Likewise, if the individual fails to grasp the knowledge provided by the organizations, then that attack will also not go according to plan. The number only continues to increase which shows that there once again are obstacles in place that stop perpetrators from committing the attacks.

The region which had the greatest number of civilian fatalities and wounded from both successful and unsuccessful terror attacks was the Middle East & North Africa. Trailing closely behind were the regions of South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. All three regions closely accounted for most of the overall fatalities and wounded from terror attacks. This is no surprise because of the amount of attacks that occur in the regions. A trend that was discovered is while fatalities in Eastern Europe decreased, fatalities in Western Europe increased towards 2016. This is due to the number of attacks in the regions. In Eastern Europe towards 2016, terror attacks have significantly decreased while in Western Europe they have increased. This raises an issue as to whether Eastern Europe has made it more difficult for individuals to commit attacks or individuals are being sent to and radicalized more in Western Europe to commit attacks.

In the Middle East & North Africa, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa, the amount of perpetrator fatalities in successful attacks accounted for 96.34% of the total with South Asia

having the highest percentage of the three regions. South Asia as well had the most amount of perpetrator fatalities from unsuccessful attacks. Once again, this should come as no surprise because of the number of attacks witnessed and the many terrorist organizations which planted their seeds in the regions. The more amount of attacks, the more there is a chance that the perpetrator(s) will die in the commission of an attack. Some notable examples are the 2015 Paris attack in which ISIS gunman organized mass shootings and suicide bombings, the 2014 Kano bombing in which Boko Haram members organized bombings on a mosque, and the 2016 Berlin truck attack in which an ISIS member ran a truck through civilians in a heavily populated street. These perpetrators knew going into the attack that there was a high chance that some or all would be killed.

The data revealed that the Middle East & North Africa had the highest number of perpetrator fatalities from unsuccessful attacks. It can be understood that South Asia had the highest number of perpetrators wounded from unsuccessful attacks, but this can be explained by individuals who are not directly trained by terror organizations, but rather radicalized. In the Middle East & North Africa, many of the attackers are somehow directly or indirectly trained. This can come in the form of an individual hearing about training received from an organization by a friend or directly being recruited into the organization. The fact that many perpetrator fatalities from unsuccessful attacks occur in the region suggests that either the organizations are not supplying sufficient enough of training or the region is once again making it more difficult to commit an attack. Since the Middle East & North Africa experience the most amount of attacks, it is safe to assume that governments in the region have made massive changes to policy throughout the years and this is seen from the amount of perpetrator fatalities in unsuccessful attacks in 2016.

The data displayed in the top 20 successful terror organizations reveals a high amount of information. Firstly, of the overall attacks, 31.3% were conducted by the organizations. Individuals might think that ISIS committed the most attacks throughout the years, but the data shows that the Taliban committed the most throughout the timeframe. The Taliban's amount of attacks decreased towards 2016 compared to ISIS. When ISIS rose in 2014, they committed 1,048 attacks. In 2015, the amount decreased to 835 successful attacks. And in 2016, they orchestrated 955 successful attacks. As heard by many news outlets and governments, these statistics don't refer to a decline of ISIS although much of the land that they currently control has been lost due to military interference.

ISIS has also held a strong lead above other organizations in the most civilian fatalities and wounded. In 2016, ISIS had their highest number of civilians killed. Overall, they were responsible for 18.86% of civilian deaths between 2010 and 2016. In comparison, Boko Haram and the Taliban did not have as high the amount of civilian fatalities, but combined, they still were responsible for 20.5% of civilian fatalities. ISIS almost nears the combined groups in death tolls and judging from the statistics in 2016, they do not seem to be slowing down. ISIS also had the greatest number of civilians wounded in which they accrued 15.83% of the entire total between 2010 and 2016. Once again, they saw the highest amount in 2016. As seen from the data, ISIS has not been declining going into 2016 and seem to be rapidly growing in number of attacks and casualties from those attacks.

The data as well identified that a number of left-wing terror organizations still exist throughout the world. Of the 20 successful terror organizations, seven were left-wing armed political movements which seek to establish a communistic or Marxist government. The other 13 organizations were Sunni Islamic which seek to establish systems based on their ideologies.

There were no Shia organizations and this can be due to the vast majority of the Muslim population being Sunni and not many Shia terror organizations exist.

Sunni organizations had the greatest number of successful attacks, the greatest number of civilian fatalities, and the greatest number of civilians wounded compared to left-wing organizations. This can be due to a few reasons such as radicalization and “the following”. Left-wing organizations do not radicalize and brainwash individuals like Islamist organizations do. Left-wing organizations have a main agenda through armed conflict such as war with opposing governments and do not have time to radicalize other individuals to come to their respective countries and join the fight. Islamist organizations have the entire world at their alter hence “the following” and commit attacks throughout the world unlike left-wing organizations. The groups can brainwash individuals at will to join their cause and commit attacks wherever the perpetrators want. The span of radicalization is a primary focus of Islamist right-wing terror groups and this explains the high number of attacks and civilian casualties.

### **Limitations:**

There were a few issues encountered when divulging into the data. Firstly, some of the attacks were coded into the wrong dates. For instance, an attack that was committed in 2014 had an event id that started with the year 2015. This error was encountered nine times and was fixed by placing the attacks into their respective years by the dates they were committed and not the event id. The second issue that occurred when looking at the attacks was that some attacks had no date for the day and was 0 such as an attack committed on March 0, 2013. This was the case for 79 incidents and was rectified by putting the attacks into the respective years they were committed. Third, many attacks had no reports of civilian and/or perpetrator fatalities and wounded. This presents a flaw in this study because there might be more individuals who are

killed and wounded by certain organizations which increases their dangerousness. Likewise, there might be more perpetrators who are killed or wounded committing an attack which expresses weaknesses in an organization's training of the individual(s).

There were two errors encountered when observing all the organizations themselves and categorizing the top 20 successful organizations. First, many attacks had the organizations tab as unknown. This can mean two things such as an organization may have claimed an attack, but the GTD did not report it or there were no organizations that claimed the attack. This occurred in 29,050 instances. Once again, this poses a flaw on the research because there might be attacks that were committed by the top 20 successful organizations which increases the threat and the dangerousness that they pose to the world. The second error encountered was that when looking at the top 20 successful organizations, many attacks were not committed by groups, but by individuals who were extremists and were categorized by the GTD under a group. For instance, some attacks that fell into the top 20 categories were committed by organizations such as Maoists, Houthi extremists, Fulani extremists, Muslim extremists, Palestinian extremists, and separatists. These are not organizations. Although organizations consist of individuals who are dubbed extremists, they respectively commit attack for one or a few purposes. The extremists who committed the attacks as mentioned above were not doing so out of an organizations' purposes, but their own and so they were excluded from the top 20 successful organizations.

### **Conclusion:**

This study was conducted around the themes of the death of Osama bin Laden followed by the rise of ISIS to the decline of ISIS. The data revealed key elements to the timeframe studied. There were a few left-wing organizations that still exist today, but they did not measure up in dangerousness of Islamist right-wing organizations. Left-wing terrorism is slowly dying

and Islamic terrorism seems to be the new norm of terror. For example, after the death of Osama bin Laden in 2011, there were increases in attacks and civilian fatalities and wounded by Islamist organizations in 2012 and the statistics continued to grow in the coming years. It is still unclear whether other organizations feared to rise while Osama bin Laden was alive due to the repercussions there might be, but this can be implied from the data. The rise of ISIS was certainly a rise and not a decline up to 2016 because as the data presented, ISIS is in no shape or form declining and only rising. There may be a decrease in attacks and their lands may be liberated, but the number of civilian fatalities and wounded remain high. It is important to note that although ISIS has seen increases in attacks and lethality across the board, between 2010 and 2016, the main al-Qaeda network and not an affiliate committed only one attack which was a kidnapping of an American woman in 2011 in South Asia and shows how the organization has been stagnant since the death of Osama bin Laden.

The rise of ISIS has now raised more concerns on the radicalization of individuals. The fact that the attacks still remain high for the organization implies that there are individuals all over the world who are radicalized to join the cause. Radicalization has always been an issue in terrorism due to propaganda and rising technology. Propaganda and exposure through technology poses an increased threat to individuals because agencies of countries might be able to stop a few organization's propaganda videos, but not all. This then leads to policies revolving around individuals after they have been radicalized. Policies such as rehabilitation, offering employment benefits for those who return, and reintegration into society (EIP, n.d). This may have an effect, but much radicalization stems from psychological issues which cannot be fixed overnight.

Although radicalization has its effects on terrorism, countries have still continued to create policies in which address these issues. Recently, the United Nations raised issues revolving around international cooperation, the evolving threat of foreign terrorist fighters, the misuse of new technology by terrorists, and the supporting of member states (Megally, 2018). International cooperation should be the focal point of any discussion when terrorism is involved. Each country has its own policies on combatting terrorism such as what should be done with a returning fighter seeking to reintegrate into society. Whereas some governments revoke citizenship, others emphasize rehabilitation and reintegration strategies. Sharing policies might offer governments different strategies to prevent and combat terrorism.

A major contributor to combatting terrorism within the United Nations has been the United States. This might be different by the end of 2019 according to President Donald Trump who has announced that the United States will begin withdrawing from Syria in 2019. This is due to the “historic victories” seen by the United States in Syria described by President Trump. (Specia, 2019). Since the announcement, equipment has been withdrawn from Syria, but there have been attacks on American soldiers by ISIS continuing. If the United States continues to completely withdraw from the area, ISIS will fully rise again and judging from the patterns seen up to 2016, the organization was never declining and only remained more prominent throughout the Middle East, Africa, and Asia.

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**TABLES****TABLE 1**

<b>NUMBER OF TERROR ATTACKS BETWEEN 2010 TO 2016</b>						
<b>Year</b>	<b>Successful</b>	<b>% Change from Previous Year</b>	<b>Unsuccessful</b>	<b>% Change from Previous Year</b>	<b>Total Attacks</b>	<b>% Change from Previous Year</b>
<b>2010</b>	4215	n/a	424	n/a	4639	n/a
<b>2011</b>	4275	1.42%	443	4.48%	4718	1.70%
<b>2012</b>	6108	42.88%	848	91.42%	6956	47.44%
<b>2013</b>	8664	41.85%	1412	66.51%	10076	42.80%
<b>2014</b>	11983	38.31%	1642	16.29%	13625	35.22%
<b>2015</b>	10417	-13.07%	1904	15.96%	12321	-9.27%
<b>2016</b>	9100	-12.64%	2092	9.87%	11192	-9.16%
<b>Total</b>	54762	n/a	8765	n/a	63527	n/a

TABLE 2.1

<b>NUMBER OF SUCCESSFUL TERROR ATTACKS, BY REGION</b>									
Region	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	Total	% of Total
Australasia & Oceania	1	0	0	1	9	12	10	33	0.06%
Central America & Caribbean	1	1	1	11	3	0	3	20	0.04%
Central Asia	8	5	8	3	6	6	12	48	0.09%
East Asia	1	4	3	12	31	23	8	82	0.15%
Eastern Europe	220	166	116	109	449	321	84	1465	2.68%
Middle East & North Africa	1269	1390	1850	3445	5019	4294	4042	21309	38.91%
South America	110	90	110	133	211	121	118	893	1.63%
South Asia	1787	1821	2648	3316	3732	3281	2417	19002	34.70%
Southeast Asia	439	312	389	766	694	639	715	3954	7.22%
Sub-Saharan Africa	290	433	857	721	1692	1486	1495	6974	12.74%
Western Europe	89	53	126	147	137	234	196	982	1.79%
<b>Total Attacks</b>	<b>4215</b>	<b>4275</b>	<b>6108</b>	<b>8664</b>	<b>11983</b>	<b>10417</b>	<b>9100</b>	<b>54762</b>	<b>100%</b>

TABLE 2.2

<b>NUMBER OF UNSUCCESSFUL TERROR ATTACKS, BY REGION</b>									
Region	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	Total	% of Total
Australasia & Oceania	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0.01%
Central America & Caribbean	0	0	0	3	2	1	0	6	0.07%
Central Asia	1	2	4	4	2	4	3	20	0.23%
East Asia	0	0	1	2	5	4	0	12	0.14%
Eastern Europe	38	28	34	32	40	30	32	234	2.67%
Middle East & North Africa	129	145	142	357	642	689	929	3033	34.60%
South America	36	16	7	15	35	22	18	149	1.70%
South Asia	129	148	464	696	637	796	745	3615	41.24%
Southeast Asia	28	30	50	133	101	138	150	630	7.19%
Sub-Saharan Africa	20	37	82	61	107	130	152	589	6.72%
Western Europe	43	37	64	109	71	89	63	476	5.43%
<b>Total Attacks</b>	<b>424</b>	<b>443</b>	<b>848</b>	<b>1412</b>	<b>1642</b>	<b>1904</b>	<b>2092</b>	<b>8765</b>	<b>100%</b>

**TABLE 3.1****LETHALITY OF CIVILIANS OF SUCCESSFUL TERROR ATTACKS BETWEEN 2010 TO 2016**

Year	Total Wounded <sup>1</sup>	% Change from Previous Year	Total Fatalities <sup>1</sup>	% Change from Previous Year
2010	14930	n/a	6658	n/a
2011	13282	-11.04%	6790	1.98%
2012	21404	61.15%	9676	42.50%
2013	32537	52.01%	15833	63.63%
2014	33802	3.89%	27507	73.73%
2015	35564	5.21%	22292	-18.96%
2016	32082	-9.79%	18985	-14.84%
<b>Total</b>	<b>183601</b>	<b>n/a</b>	<b>107741</b>	<b>n/a</b>

<sup>1</sup> Does not include perpetrators who were wounded or killed during respective terror attacks

**TABLE 3.2****LETHALITY OF CIVILIANS OF UNSUCCESSFUL TERROR ATTACKS BETWEEN 2010 TO 2016**

Year	Total Wounded <sup>1</sup>	% Change from Previous Year	Total Fatalities <sup>1</sup>	% Change from Previous Year
2010	486	n/a	126	n/a
2011	510	4.94%	133	5.56%
2012	247	-51.57%	80	-39.85%
2013	764	209.31%	173	116.25%
2014	534	-30.10%	146	-15.61%
2015	618	15.73%	241	65.07%
2016	529	-14.40%	169	-29.88%
<b>Total</b>	<b>3688</b>	<b>n/a</b>	<b>1068</b>	<b>n/a</b>

<sup>1</sup> Does not include perpetrators who were wounded or killed during respective terror attacks

**TABLE 4.1****LETHALITY OF PERPETRATORS OF SUCCESSFUL TERROR ATTACKS BETWEEN 2010 TO 2016**

Year	Total Wounded <sup>1</sup>	% Change from Previous Year	Total Fatalities <sup>1</sup>	% Change from Previous Year
2010	74	n/a	411	n/a
2011	125	68.92%	468	13.87%
2012	247	97.60%	1407	200.64%
2013	307	24.29%	2333	65.81%
2014	1106	260.26%	5995	156.97%
2015	1301	17.63%	5813	-3.04%
2016	1178	-9.45%	4537	-21.95%
<b>Total</b>	<b>4338</b>	<b>n/a</b>	<b>20964</b>	<b>n/a</b>

<sup>1</sup> Does not include civilians who were wounded or killed during respective terror attacks

**TABLE 4.2****LETHALITY OF PERPETRATORS OF UNSUCCESSFUL TERROR ATTACKS BETWEEN 2010 TO 2016**

Year	Total Wounded <sup>1</sup>	% Change from Previous Year	Total Fatalities <sup>1</sup>	% Change from Previous Year
2010	13	n/a	31	n/a
2011	11	-15.39%	63	103.23%
2012	29	163.64%	157	149.21%
2013	27	-6.90%	147	-6.37%
2014	24	-11.11%	243	65.31%
2015	347	1345.83%	1444	494.24%
2016	437	25.94%	2228	54.29%
<b>Total</b>	<b>888</b>	<b>n/a</b>	<b>4313</b>	<b>n/a</b>

<sup>1</sup> Does not include civilians who were wounded or killed during respective terror attacks

TABLE 5.1

<b>CIVILIAN FATALITIES OF SUCCESSFUL TERROR ATTACKS, BY REGION<sup>1</sup></b>									
Region	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	Total	% of Total
Australasia & Oceania	0	0	0	0	2	1	0	3	0.003%
Central America & Caribbean	0	2	2	9	5	0	3	21	0.02%
Central Asia	6	8	5	2	1	11	10	43	0.04%
East Asia	7	13	18	38	162	85	29	352	0.33%
Eastern Europe	209	145	122	107	682	257	31	1553	1.44%
Middle East & North Africa	2393	2210	3362	8053	12553	10786	10776	50133	46.53%
South America	58	40	112	71	100	67	44	492	0.46%
South Asia	3008	2953	3881	4622	4581	4056	3478	26579	24.67%
Southeast Asia	304	268	313	440	349	331	388	2393	2.22%
Sub-Saharan Africa	669	1071	1850	2485	9068	6539	4004	25686	23.84%
Western Europe	4	80	11	6	4	159	222	486	0.45%
<b>Total Fatalities</b>	<b>6658</b>	<b>6790</b>	<b>9676</b>	<b>15833</b>	<b>27507</b>	<b>22292</b>	<b>18985</b>	<b>107741</b>	<b>100%</b>

<sup>1</sup> Does not include perpetrators who were killed during respective terror attacks

TABLE 5.2

<b>CIVILIANS WOUNDED OF SUCCESSFUL TERROR ATTACKS, BY REGION<sup>1</sup></b>									
Region	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	Total	% of Total
Australasia & Oceania	0	0	0	0	7	0	1	8	0.004%
Central America & Caribbean	0	0	1	2	63	0	0	66	0.04%
Central Asia	42	1	8	1	2	9	19	82	0.05%
East Asia	14	32	28	66	471	81	41	733	0.40%
Eastern Europe	624	569	302	268	630	599	73	3065	1.67%
Middle East & North Africa	7472	5396	9527	19641	19243	20620	20235	102134	55.63%
South America	146	84	403	216	290	87	156	1382	0.75%
South Asia	4996	4901	7987	9401	7378	7356	6238	48257	26.30%
Southeast Asia	612	696	1179	858	967	827	773	5912	3.22%
Sub-Saharan Africa	984	1510	1958	2001	4723	5466	3667	20309	11.06%
Western Europe	40	93	11	83	28	519	879	1653	0.90%
<b>Total Wounded</b>	<b>14930</b>	<b>13282</b>	<b>21404</b>	<b>32537</b>	<b>33802</b>	<b>35564</b>	<b>32082</b>	<b>183601</b>	<b>100%</b>

<sup>1</sup> Does not include perpetrators who were wounded during respective terror attacks

TABLE 6.1

<b>CIVILIAN FATALITIES OF UNSUCCESSFUL TERROR ATTACKS, BY REGION<sup>1</sup></b>									
Region	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	Total	% of Total
Australasia & Oceania	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.00%
Central America & Caribbean	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.00%
Central Asia	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0.09%
East Asia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.00%
Eastern Europe	0	12	1	1	0	0	0	14	1.31%
Middle East & North Africa	55	45	22	55	47	64	43	331	30.99%
South America	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	5	0.47%
South Asia	55	50	30	65	50	78	57	385	36.05%
Southeast Asia	3	11	0	11	8	13	16	62	5.81%
Sub-Saharan Africa	13	15	26	41	41	81	53	270	25.28%
Western Europe	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.00%
<b>Total Fatalities</b>	<b>126</b>	<b>133</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>173</b>	<b>146</b>	<b>241</b>	<b>169</b>	<b>1068</b>	<b>100%</b>

<sup>1</sup> Does not include perpetrators who were killed during respective terror attacks

TABLE 6.2

<b>CIVILIANS WOUNDED OF UNSUCCESSFUL TERROR ATTACKS, BY REGION<sup>1</sup></b>									
Region	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	Total	% of Total
Australasia & Oceania	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.00%
Central America & Caribbean	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	2	0.05%
Central Asia	1	0	3	1	1	0	5	11	0.30%
East Asia	0	0	10	0	0	1	0	11	0.30%
Eastern Europe	8	7	6	4	6	2	1	34	0.92%
Middle East & North Africa	244	322	67	331	252	138	139	1493	40.48%
South America	2	4	4	0	1	1	0	12	0.33%
South Asia	178	143	115	317	189	338	202	1482	40.18%
Southeast Asia	16	23	8	38	24	53	78	240	6.51%
Sub-Saharan Africa	36	11	32	72	60	80	104	395	10.71%
Western Europe	1	0	2	0	0	5	0	8	0.22%
<b>Total Wounded</b>	<b>486</b>	<b>510</b>	<b>247</b>	<b>764</b>	<b>534</b>	<b>618</b>	<b>529</b>	<b>3688</b>	<b>100%</b>

<sup>1</sup> Does not include perpetrators who were wounded during respective terror attacks

TABLE 7.1

<b>PERPETRATOR FATALITIES OF SUCCESSFUL TERROR ATTACKS, BY REGION<sup>1</sup></b>									
Region	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	Total	% of Total
Australasia & Oceania	0	0	0	0	2	1	0	3	0.01%
Central America & Caribbean	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	6	0.03%
Central Asia	2	2	0	0	1	2	9	16	0.08%
East Asia	0	6	9	22	160	34	3	234	1.12%
Eastern Europe	25	16	30	23	65	142	24	325	1.55%
Middle East & North Africa	140	95	249	564	1475	1801	1828	6152	29.35%
South America	0	0	5	6	5	0	3	19	0.09%
South Asia	208	275	848	1220	2047	2315	1833	8746	41.72%
Southeast Asia	8	9	6	9	48	34	24	138	0.66%
Sub-Saharan Africa	27	65	260	489	2191	1472	794	5298	25.27%
Western Europe	1	0	0	0	1	12	13	27	0.13%
<b>Total Fatalities</b>	<b>411</b>	<b>468</b>	<b>1407</b>	<b>2333</b>	<b>5995</b>	<b>5813</b>	<b>4537</b>	<b>20964</b>	<b>100%</b>

<sup>1</sup> Does not include civilians who were killed during respective terror attacks

TABLE 7.2

<b>PERPETRATORS WOUNDED OF SUCCESSFUL TERROR ATTACKS, BY REGION<sup>1</sup></b>									
Region	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	Total	% of Total
Australasia & Oceania	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.00%
Central America & Caribbean	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.00%
Central Asia	0	0	0	0	2	3	1	6	0.14%
East Asia	0	0	0	5	2	2	3	12	0.28%
Eastern Europe	2	15	2	3	4	5	0	31	0.72%
Middle East & North Africa	15	24	24	35	154	165	139	556	12.82%
South America	1	1	6	0	0	0	4	12	0.28%
South Asia	46	74	170	234	809	1063	1017	3413	78.68%
Southeast Asia	6	1	2	9	2	32	2	54	1.25%
Sub-Saharan Africa	3	10	41	21	133	31	10	249	5.74%
Western Europe	1	0	2	0	0	0	2	5	0.12%
<b>Total Wounded</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>125</b>	<b>247</b>	<b>307</b>	<b>1106</b>	<b>1301</b>	<b>1178</b>	<b>4338</b>	<b>100%</b>

<sup>1</sup> Does not include civilians who were wounded during respective terror attacks

TABLE 8.1

<b>PERPETRATOR FATALITIES OF UNSUCCESSFUL TERROR ATTACKS, BY REGION<sup>1</sup></b>									
Region	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	Total	% of Total
Australasia & Oceania	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.00%
Central America & Caribbean	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.00%
Central Asia	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0.02%
East Asia	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	4	0.09%
Eastern Europe	0	0	6	8	0	5	15	34	0.79%
Middle East & North Africa	6	13	10	49	122	769	1502	2471	57.29%
South America	0	3	0	0	1	3	2	9	0.21%
South Asia	19	32	107	57	67	369	647	1298	30.10%
Southeast Asia	0	2	8	0	13	5	15	43	1.00%
Sub-Saharan Africa	6	13	26	33	40	289	45	452	10.48%
Western Europe	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0.02%
<b>Total Fatalities</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>63</b>	<b>157</b>	<b>147</b>	<b>243</b>	<b>1444</b>	<b>2228</b>	<b>4313</b>	<b>100%</b>

<sup>1</sup> Does not include civilians who were killed during respective terror attacks

TABLE 8.2

<b>PERPETRATORS WOUNDED OF UNSUCCESSFUL TERROR ATTACKS, BY REGION<sup>1</sup></b>									
Region	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	Total	% of Total
Australasia & Oceania	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.00%
Central America & Caribbean	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0.11%
Central Asia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.00%
East Asia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.00%
Eastern Europe	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0.11%
Middle East & North Africa	1	3	3	8	6	64	94	179	20.16%
South America	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.11%
South Asia	11	6	12	14	15	280	332	670	75.45%
Southeast Asia	0	1	0	1	1	1	4	8	0.90%
Sub-Saharan Africa	1	0	14	3	1	2	7	28	3.15%
Western Europe	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.00%
<b>Total Wounded</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>347</b>	<b>437</b>	<b>888</b>	<b>100%</b>

<sup>1</sup> Does not include civilians who were wounded during respective terror attacks

TABLE 9

<b>ATTACKS OF TOP PERPATRATOR ORGANIZATIONS BETWEEN 2010 AND 2016<sup>1</sup></b>									
<b>Perpetrator Organization</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>% of Total</b>
Taliban	286	187	548	623	842	977	692	4155	7.59%
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) <sup>2</sup>	79	35	274	423	1048	835	955	3649	6.66%
Boko Haram	13	114	360	208	439	462	177	1773	3.24%
Al-Shabaab	63	149	130	187	462	206	306	1503	2.75%
Communist Party of India - Maoist (CPI-Maoist)	481	332	44	42	66	70	84	1119	2.04%
Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)	150	103	123	125	110	76	58	745	1.36%
New People's Army (NPA)	50	45	38	112	126	157	106	634	1.16%
Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)	13	34	79	15	48	222	197	608	1.11%
Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)	37	42	103	73	147	61	38	501	0.92%
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)	84	69	70	73	109	58	5	468	0.86%
Tripoli Province of the Islamic State	0	0	0	0	4	112	143	259	0.47%
Donetsk People's Republic	0	0	0	0	151	82	6	239	0.44%
Baloch Republican Army (BRA)	0	22	16	19	86	63	10	216	0.39%
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)	17	14	18	24	40	56	43	212	0.39%
Sinai Province of the Islamic State	0	0	0	0	12	107	87	206	0.38%
Al-Nusrah Front	0	0	23	30	53	52	44	202	0.37%
Janjaweed	0	0	0	0	96	65	29	190	0.35%
National Liberation Army of Colombia (ELN)	6	6	7	15	50	31	62	177	0.32%
Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)	1	0	3	6	30	45	44	129	0.24%
Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Movement (BIFM)	0	0	11	30	37	37	13	128	0.23%

<sup>1</sup> Successful terror attacks only

<sup>2</sup> ISIS includes AQI and ISI attacks

TABLE 10.1

<b>FATALITIES<sup>1</sup> OF TOP PERPATRATOR ORGANIZATIONS BETWEEN 2010 AND 2016<sup>2</sup></b>									
<b>Perpetrator Organization</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>% of Total</b>
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) <sup>3</sup>	610	312	823	1649	6052	4609	6267	20322	18.86%
Boko Haram	69	315	1050	1252	4863	4084	869	12502	11.60%
Taliban	527	588	1478	1479	1862	2161	1597	9692	8.90%
Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)	704	550	487	526	474	187	248	3176	2.95%
Al-Shabaab	167	261	233	420	838	582	612	3113	2.89%
Al-Nusrah Front	0	0	212	511	430	371	86	1610	1.49%
Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)	147	195	244	144	359	145	60	1294	1.20%
Communist Party of India - Maoist (CPI-Maoist)	606	243	27	83	63	48	51	1121	1.04%
Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)	16	0	3	40	298	163	213	733	0.68%
Donetsk People's Republic	0	0	0	0	453	176	0	629	0.58%
Sinai Province of the Islamic State	0	0	0	0	11	392	118	521	0.48%
Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)	12	18	55	1	9	135	233	463	0.43%
New People's Army (NPA)	25	34	33	79	49	75	52	347	0.32%
Tripoli Province of the Islamic State	0	0	0	0	7	116	189	312	0.29%
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)	53	38	98	43	53	18	1	304	0.28%
Janjaweed	0	0	0	0	201	31	17	249	0.23%
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)	29	13	16	11	27	18	9	123	0.11%
Baloch Republican Army (BRA)	0	19	24	15	29	7	14	108	0.10%
National Liberation Army of Colombia (ELN)	2	1	1	3	33	27	21	88	0.08%
Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Movement (BIFM)	0	0	3	22	27	19	5	76	0.07%

<sup>1</sup> Successful terror attacks only

<sup>2</sup> Does not include perpetrators who were killed during respective terror attacks

<sup>3</sup> ISIS includes AQI and ISI fatalities

TABLE 10.2

<b>WOUNDED<sup>1</sup> OF TOP PERPATRATOR ORGANIZATIONS BETWEEN 2010 AND 2016<sup>2</sup></b>									
<b>Perpetrator Organization</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>% of Total</b>
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) <sup>3</sup>	1513	817	2499	4515	5766	6352	7599	29061	15.83%
Taliban	820	743	2528	2182	2597	3354	2298	14522	7.91%
Boko Haram	126	451	677	350	1720	3336	1117	7777	4.24%
Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)	1276	1037	1011	1271	736	264	666	6261	3.41%
Al-Shabaab	193	561	586	717	812	521	898	4288	2.34%
Al-Nusrah Front	0	0	961	218	436	244	334	2193	1.19%
Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)	5	68	207	6	19	334	1148	1787	0.97%
Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)	94	113	230	308	465	141	80	1431	0.78%
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)	136	62	326	168	210	38	6	946	0.52%
Communist Party of India - Maoist (CPI-Maoist)	383	180	42	88	34	37	43	807	0.44%
Sinai Province of the Islamic State	0	0	0	0	11	438	121	570	0.31%
Donetsk People's Republic	0	0	0	0	266	299	0	565	0.31%
New People's Army (NPA)	29	20	54	95	56	110	42	406	0.22%
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)	65	33	98	11	32	138	12	389	0.21%
Baloch Republican Army (BRA)	0	28	131	34	147	27	8	375	0.20%
Tripoli Province of the Islamic State	0	0	0	0	2	92	245	339	0.19%
Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Movement (BIFM)	0	0	5	84	149	15	74	327	0.18%
Janjaweed	0	0	0	0	141	51	49	241	0.13%
Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)	0	0	0	19	72	51	30	172	0.09%
National Liberation Army of Colombia (ELN)	3	1	23	11	44	42	45	169	0.09%

<sup>1</sup> Successful terror attacks only

<sup>2</sup> Does not include perpetrators who were wounded during respective terror attacks

<sup>3</sup> ISIS includes AQI and ISI wounded