

City University of New York (CUNY)

CUNY Academic Works

Dissertations and Theses

City College of New York

2012

The Effects of Social Media on Democratization

Melissa Spinner
CUNY City College

[How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!](#)

More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/cc_etds_theses/110

Discover additional works at: <https://academicworks.cuny.edu>

This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY).
Contact: AcademicWorks@cuny.edu

The Effects of Social Media on Democratization

Melissa Spinner

Date: August 2011

Master's Thesis

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of
International Affairs at the City College of New York

Advisor: Bruce Cronin

Table of Contents

Introduction.....	1
Chapter 1: Defining and Understanding Democratization.....	16
Chapter 2: Defining and Understanding New Technologies	30
Chapter 3: Infrastructure and Contextual Conditions that Lead to Democratization.....	49
Chapter 4: Evidence of the Link Between Social Media and Democratization	68
Chapter 5: The Philippines: How Text Messaging Ousted a President	85
Chapter 6: Egypt: The Beginning of Democratization	92
Chapter 7: Disputing the Dissenters	99
Conclusion	121
Bibliography	130

Table of Figures

Figure 1: Influence of voters in 2004 Spanish election	66
Figure 2: Linear graph of ties between democracy and interconnectivity.....	69
Figure 3: Correlation between Democracy and Internet Users.....	70
Figure 4: Democracy versus Technology Diffusion Index.....	71
Figure 5: Qualitative Analysis Structures	76

Abstract

Within the past decade people around the world have become progressively more aware and interested in the new uses of digital technologies in movements for political change. The technologies have given more people and groups access to information and the tools needed to increase productivity and communication than in the past. As a result of these new digital technologies, the number of people contributing to their civil societies has radically increased.

My thesis questions: What is the value of digital activism in the process of democratization around the world? How did those that succeed successfully use these new technologies as opposed to the several others that have failed? Are the successful practices replicable in other scenarios with a similar context? In studying, analyzing, and evaluating digital activism, I attempt to determine how citizens can use digital technologies more efficiently in order to exercise their political power in a more effective manner.

Introduction

On January 17th, 2001 thousands of Filipinos gathered on Epifanio de los Santos Avenue, a major crossroad in Manila, after having forwarded the text message “Go 2 EDSA. Wear blk” and “Full mblsn tday EDSA” to over seven million people. Within a few days there were over a million people protesting the impeachment trial of President Joseph Estrada for not using incriminating evidence during his trial.¹ Thanks to the public’s ability to coordinate such a fast and massive response, Estrada was impeached three days later. The impeachment of Estrada was the first, but not final, time a form of digital media was used to force out a national leader.

In the past few years several societies have used different forms of digital media in order to revolt against their governments. As with all new technologies, it is important to study the effects digital media has had on both communities and regimes in order to attempt to predict its effects on other nation-states. Digital media can be defined as a form of electronic communication in which users create communities to share information, ideas, and other content via web-based and/or mobile technologies.² My thesis will question whether digital media tools create, aid, enhance, or hinder democratization. I will observe the text message coordinated protest in the Philippines in 2001 as well as the Facebook Egyptian revolution in 2011 to support my findings. This paper concludes that while digital media may not have been the cause of these revolutions it has certainly aided and expanded the reach of the revolutions.

¹ Clay Shirky, "The Political Power of Digital media," *Foreign Affairs*, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67038/clay-shirky/the-political-power-of-social-media>.

² "Dictionary and Thesaurus," *Merriam-Webster Online*, <http://www.merriam-webster.com>.

This is a very important and time sensitive topic in the field of international relations. While democratization has been occurring for hundreds of years and has equally been a topic worthwhile of research, it is just recently that technology, and more importantly digital media, has been a factor in democratization. Politicians, news anchors, and even bloggers have been concentrating on this topic increasingly as more countries rise up against their governments.

Democratization is defined as the change to a government in which the supreme power is vested in the people and exercised by them directly or indirectly through a system of representation usually involving periodically held free elections.³ To begin I will examine democratization theories laid out by political scientists and philosophers. Samuel Huntington in *Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* discusses several causes of democratization including wealth, education, capitalism, social equality, culture and foreign intervention. He also mentions three processes of democratization. Transformation is a top-down change coming from within the government. Transplacement is when the regime and government negotiate reform. Replacement is when the regime breaks down or collapses.⁴ I will be primarily concerned with the third process of democratization: replacement.

Huntington believes there have been three modern waves of democratization: first during the 19th century, second after World War II, and third in the mid 1970's.⁵ I would like to further his studies by arguing that the fourth wave of democratization began in the

³ Dictionary and Thesaurus: Oxford English Dictionary

⁴ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).

⁵ *ibid.*

new millennium with the rise of digital media and technology. While digital media has not caused non-democratic nations to begin the democratization process, I believe that it has offered a new means of communication for individuals to fight for their right.

Robert Dahl, a distinguished political scientist, has argued that in order for a government to continue, all citizens must be able to “formulate their preferences” as well as have their preferences be weighed equally regardless of the source.⁶ This is especially relevant in situations in which citizens rise up against their governments using digital media sources.

The Internet is not the first technology associated with freedom. Previous inventions such as the printing press, telegraph, radio, telephone and computer all have the ability to free individuals, as well as to assist their oppressors.⁷ However, unlike the television, radio, and printing press, the Internet is both interactive and personalized to allow users to share experiences online.⁸ Barry Wellman argues that social networks are “profoundly transforming the nature of communities, sociality, and interpersonal relations”.⁹ These networks enable the communication between different cultures by sharing their values of communication despite and different values they may have.

⁶ Robert A. Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971).

⁷ Henry Jenkins, David Thorburn, and Brad Seawell, *Democracy and New Media*, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2004), p. 26.

⁸ Michael Richter, "Facebook's Response to DoC," *Facebook*, Palo Alto, January 28, 2011.

⁹ Jeffrey Juris, "The New Digital Media and Activist Networking within Anti-Corporate Globalization Movements," *American Academy of Political and Social Science* 597 (2005), p. 189-208.

Although cultures may have opposing cultural values, these networks enable them to share their values of communication and thus interact more easily.¹⁰

Digital technologies and applications are changing the way individuals, governments, and non-governmental organizations are interacting today. They have given more people and groups access to information and the tools needed to increase productivity and communication than in the past. As a result of these new digital technologies, the number of people contributing to their civil society has radically increased.

In my thesis I will describe and define major social media technologies. Facebook, a major social networking website, launched in 2004 for college students, and has more than 600 million users as of January 2011.¹¹ Facebook exists and thrives because of people's desire to share information with others. Twitter is a more recent social networking website created in 2006 which operates as a microblog for users to send and read messages. These messages, called Tweets, are text-based messages up to 140 characters that are used to connect people all over the globe. Freedom of expression is essential for Twitter¹². As Twitter blogged, "Some Tweets may facilitate positive change in a repressed country, some make us laugh, some make us think, some downright anger a vast majority of users".¹³

¹⁰ Manuel Castells, *Communication Power*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 38.

¹¹ Nicholas Carlson, "Goldman: Facebook has 600 million users," *MSNBC*, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/40929239/ns/technology_and_science-tech_and_gadgets.

¹² "Twitter Blog: The Tweets Must Flow," *Twitter Blog*, <http://blog.twitter.com/2011/01/tweets-must-flow.html>.

¹³ *ibid.*

There are several other social media websites including the U.S.-made Wikipedia and YouTube, the Chinese instant messaging service QQ, WikiLeaks whose servers are located in Sweden, the Spanish social network Tuenti, the Korean social network Naver, and Speak2Tweet, which is a voicemail transcription service for Twitter created by Google and Twitter during the Egyptian revolutions. Mobile applications, networks, and devices have also been included in digital media.

Digital technologies have several features that assist and enhance the democratization process. In recent years digital media has become inherent in many western societies and a crucial form of communication. These communities offer users empowerment and nourish the ideals of a citizen-based form of democracy. Their speed combined with their low costs allows activists to organize around concrete goals.¹⁴ These tech savvy activists generally think of themselves as belonging to a global movement. Their local activities become directly linked via photographs, articles, and sound clips to problems around the world. These mediums also allow for a constant flow of information in societies where the media is generally censored to permit only pro-government messages. They also give a voice to those that have been silenced. It allows people to share and gain information that is sometimes not available or is censored to give them a false idea of what is happening in their country. Instead of a top down approach, as is with most efforts, digital media allows for a more flexible coordination among people

¹⁴ Jeffrey Juris, "The New Digital Media and Activist Networking within Anti-Corporate Globalization Movements."

with minimal structure. This creates the ability to send information without managerial control or formal organizations.¹⁵

Manuel Castells, a leading sociologist of information society and communications research, argues that three features make networks most efficient. First, their flexibility allows reconfiguration based on a changing environment while retaining original goals. Second, scalability is the ability to expand or minimize without disruption. Third, survivability is the networks ability to withstand attacks.¹⁶ Digital media emits these three features.

Because of these characteristics users have the ability to form masses of 100,000 people in cities such as Ismailia with a population of 750,000 million.¹⁷ Without these technologies groups might not be able to organize mobs of people large enough to have an effect on their government. While larger groups do not always equal success, they do make a larger impact. Also there is the possibility that if the crowds were not as large, the government could re-group to fight back, stabilize the revolters, and repress their society.

Besides the technological advantages to using digital media in the fight for democratization there is also the empathetic experience that assists. An empathetic experience is when we share the emotions of people around us. This could mean the proximity of either a geographical community or a virtual community. Psychology studies show that when we are participating in digital media our brains are releasing

¹⁵ Clay Shirky, "The Political Power of Social Media." and Jeffrey Juris, "The New Digital Media and Activist Networking within Anti-Corporate Globalization Movements."

¹⁶ Manuel Castells, *Communication Power*, p. 32.

¹⁷ "Egypt," *The Central Intelligence Agency*, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/eg.html>.

Oxytocin.¹⁸ Oxytocin is the hormone related to caring and bonding within relationships. These same studies also show that digital experiences can inspire the kind of bonding experience through trust and empathy.¹⁹ It is this bonding that will engage users to share and connect with each other and to assist in political struggles.

There have been many instances in which digital media has aided in the process of democratization. In Spain, in 2004, demonstrations were organized via a text message that led to the end of Prime Minister José María Aznar's time in office, after he had wrongly blamed the Madrid transit bombings on Basque separatists.²⁰ In Moldova, in 2009, the Communist Party lost power after protests were coordinated via text messages, Facebook messages, and Tweets.²¹ In Tunisia, in 2010 and 2011, the youth of the country used Facebook and Twitter to share grievances, gain up-to-the-minute information, and fuel a movement that led to the removal of Zine EI Abidine Ben Ali.²²

So what qualities must a state possess to lead to a digital media revolution? While each society creates their individual path, our network society is global and thus there is interdependence in the process of "cultural transformation".²³ There are six

¹⁹ Deanna Zandt, "Civic Engagement in the Era of New Media," Speech, *2011 New York Life Symposium* from Colin Powell Center for Policy Studies, New York, March 16, 2011.

¹⁹ Deanna Zandt, "Civic Engagement in the Era of New Media."

²⁰ Clay Shirky, "The Political Power of Social Media."

²¹ *ibid.*

²² Alexis Madrigal, "The Inside Story of How Facebook Responded to Tunisian Hacks," *The Atlantic*, www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2011/01/the-inside-story-of-how-facebookresponded-to-tunisian-hacks/70044.

and Hilary Rodham Clinton, "Internet Rights and Wrongs: Choices and Challenges in a Networked World," Speech, George Washington University from U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC, February 15, 2011.

and Michael Richter, "Facebook's Response to DoC," *Facebook*, Palo Alto, CA, January 28, 2011.

²³ Manuel Castells, *Communication Power*, p. 116.

requirements of democratic technologies: access, information, discussion, deliberation, choice and action.²⁴ I will go further into each of these requirements in my upcoming chapters. These six requirements depend on the movers and the medium of a state.²⁵

The movers are the people behind the protests as well as the regimes responding to the protests. Protesters have the biggest effect when the public already constrains the actions of the government.²⁶ Literacy, unemployment, and nationalism also affect the likelihood of whether protesters will be able to use digital media to change their regime. These three criteria affect people's ability to afford a computer, have access to the Internet, and read what is being said online. Youth in the Arab world currently face high unemployment and a high cost of living. But they are also relatively well educated which leads to high literacy, confidence, and motivation to strive for change. Youth in China, on the other hand, are at a declining rate since the 1980's and have a great nationalism thus they are less likely to democratize. There are high rates of youth in Zimbabwe that are relatively uneducated compared to those in the Arab world. Also unemployment in Zimbabwe is similar for all age ranges.²⁷ A regime's ability to succeed in stopping protesters also depends on several qualities. Their ability to respond is very important, as is their knowledge of sophisticated technology. China is very adept at technology with filters, blocking content, long-term cyber warfare and pushing their own nationalistic

²⁴ Henry Jenkins, *Democracy and New Media*, p. 27.

²⁵ Sarah Logan, "Replicating Facebook revolutions: why Ahmadinejad should worry but Mugabe and Hu Jintao can wait it out," *openDemocracy*, <http://www.opendemocracy.net/sarah-logan/replicating-facebook-revolutions-why-ahmadinejad-should-worry-but-mugabe-and-hu-jintao-c>.

²⁶ Clay Shirky, "The Political Power of Social Media."

²⁷ Sarah Logan, "Replicating Facebook revolutions: why Ahmadinejad should worry but Mugabe and Hu Jintao can wait it out."

message. The Zimbabwean government has begun monitoring certain key words concerning Egypt and Libya on digital media websites, though, which does cause concern.²⁸

Along with the movers, the medium is also very important. Internet penetration has grown significantly in the Arab world. Decades of state control over the media, however, means repression of free speech is deeply felt. Zimbabwe, on the other hand, is quite unsophisticated in terms of technology but their citizens' Internet usage is also quite low. Despite this, the Internet usage is increasing, mobile phone use is growing exponentially, and the press is still relatively free.²⁹

After the Iranian crackdown on the Internet in 2009, Freedom House, an independent organization that supports and monitors freedom around the world, published a report called *Freedom on the Net*. In this report, they state that the negative trends towards Internet freedom is the expanding of censorship, the privatization of censorship, a lack of transparency and accountability, legal threats, and technical attacks. The positive trends are poverty not being a barrier to new media freedom, growing civic activism, and Internet freedom being greater than press freedom.³⁰ I plan on exploring Internet freedom further as it is vital to any digital media revolutions.

Just as there are many people that argue digital media can help people work towards democratization, there are many that argue digital media has hindered democratization. One argument against technology assisting democratization is that the

²⁸ *ibid.*

²⁹ *ibid.*

³⁰ Karin Deutsch Karlekar, and Sarah Cook, "Freedom on the Net: A Global Assessment of Internet and Digital Media," *Freedom House Special Report 1*, 2009, <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=383&report=79&group=19>

tools are ineffective. Malcolm Gladwell in *New Yorker* concentrates on ‘slacktivism’ where casual participants want change through activities such as joining a Facebook group.³¹ As Morozov states, “You can’t simply join a revolution any time you want, contribute a comma to a random revolutionary decree, rephrase the guillotine manual and then slack off for months. Revolutions prize centralization and require fully-committed leaders, strict discipline, absolute dedication and strong relationships based on trust”.³² While this is true, there are indeed committed actors that use digital media effectively. The effective use of digital media in revolutions has been shown in instances such as Egypt where people use these technologies to organize and promote protests.

In order to determine the effects digital media has on democratization I use both quantitative research, to compare democratic and non-democratic countries to countries that allow or engage in digital media, and qualitative research, to review both current and past events and analyze what caused the beginnings of the revolutions. I will also examine other scholars’ quantitative and qualitative analyses.

I have reviewed relevant information from the following categories to argue my position: The historical process of democratization, how the invention of digital media has affected the rate of democratization, the censorship of digital media, the demographics of nations, and the history of digital media. My research includes several books on the democratization of countries and the connections between communication and democratization. I also gathered academic journals and news articles that are being published while Egypt is transforming. I have explored the literature from both a

³¹ Clay Shirky, “The Political Power of Social Media.”

³² Evgeny Morozov, *The Net Delusion: The Dark Side of Internet Freedom*, (New York: Public Affairs, 2011).

technical and analytical point of view made possible due to my background in information technology.

I also used case studies to support my findings. I will start by observing the occurrences of the EDSA revolution in the Philippines. There have been several attempts at changing the regime in the Philippines since 1970 including the movement that forced former President Ferdinand Marcos out of office in 1986. Unlike in 1986, wired and wireless technologies made the 2001 revolution larger in scope and reach.

President Estrada was run out of office by angry citizens that were mobilized via text messages on mobile devices. It was this wireless technology that became the “effective messengers of information.”³³ The technology allowed people to mobilize quickly and efficiently, creating a snowball effect towards a common goal. While the Filipinos were successful without the use of digital media in 1986, governments now have a much wider range of tools at their disposal in order to maintain their position and thus citizens need to broaden their reach as well in order to be successful.

The second case study I explored is that of the recent revolutions in Egypt. While this situation is ongoing I feel that we can learn by observing the overall timeline of events leading up to and during the revolution. The Egyptian revolution of 2011 began on January 25th with the first demonstrations. Egyptian citizens, inspired by the successful revolution in Tunisia, went to the streets of Cairo’s Tahrir Square to protest the 30-year-old regime that had created poverty, unemployment, and corruption.³⁴

³³ *ibid.*

³⁴ AP, “Mubarak Faces Egypt Protests On 'Day Of Rage',” *Breaking News and Opinion on The Huffington Post*, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/01/25/mubarak-faces-egypt-prote_n_813572.html#s229529.

After 18 days of protests, President Hosni Mubarak stepped down on February 11th, 2011. The young people of Egypt overturned a regime that lasted three decades in order to start a new order in the Arab world. President Obama commended the Egyptians on their victory stating, “Egyptians have made it clear that nothing less than genuine democracy will carry the day.”³⁵ The digital media website Facebook was quickly credited with the success of the uprising. Google Marketing Manager Wael Ghonim played a key role in organizing the January revolutions on Facebook. Before being imprisoned in Cairo he reached out to Egyptian youths via Facebook to gather masses on the streets.

In an interview with CNN, Ghonim argued that Facebook and the Internet were responsible for the uprisings. He said, “I want to meet Mark Zuckerberg one day and thank him [...] I'm talking on behalf of Egypt. [...] This revolution started online. This revolution started on Facebook. This revolution started [...] in June 2010 when hundreds of thousands of Egyptians started collaborating content. We would post a video on Facebook that would be shared by 60,000 people on their walls within a few hours. I've always said that if you want to liberate a society just give them the Internet. [...]”³⁶

As with the ousting of President Estrada in 2001, the revolutions in Egypt were not thought of because of digital media tools. They were brought together by poor conditions in their countries. Filipinos were fighting injustice of the courts in order to get

³⁵ David Kirpatrick, “Egypt Erupts in Jubilation as Mubarak Steps Down,” *New York Times*, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/12/world/middleeast/12egypt.html?scp=1&sq=Egypt%20Erupts%20in%20Jubilation%20as%20Mubarak%20Steps%20Down&st=cse>.

³⁶ Catharine Smith, “Egypt's Facebook Revolution: Wael Ghonim Thanks The Social Network,” *Breaking News and Opinion on The Huffington Post*, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/11/egypt-facebook-revolution-wael-ghonim_n_822078.html?view=screen.

a President impeached. Egyptians, on the other hand, were protesting the entire government and order in their nation. However, in both instances, the people of their individual nations used a new technology to join together in order to show the reigning regimes their desires and to bring about a new order in the countries. As one protester in Cairo summed it up, “We use Facebook to schedule the protests, Twitter to coordinate, and YouTube to tell the world”.³⁷

My thesis contains seven chapters. The first chapter delves into the history of democratization around the world. The second chapter discusses and defines different forms of digital media. It also reviews the history of communication methods including digital media. The third chapter contains research on how digital media can assist democratization and discusses the flexibility, low cost, scalability, survivability, accessibility and speed of digital media. The fourth chapter looks at other scholars’ quantitative and qualitative analyses. It will review the positive and negative aspects of both forms of studies. The fifth and sixth chapters look at the use of text messages in ousting President Estrada in the Philippines in 2001 and the use of Facebook in the Egyptian revolutions in 2011. The seventh chapter reviews the antithesis of my hypothesis by looking at how digital media can hinder the democratization of some nations. I also explore governments that censor digital media or use digital media to promote their own messages. Finally, the conclusion reviews the previous chapters’ arguments and will examine how we can measure success.

³⁷ Philip N. Howard, “The Arab Uprising’s Cascading Effects | Smart Journalism. Real Solutions. Miller-McCune,” *Miller-McCune*, <http://www.miller-mccune.com/politics/the-cascading-effects-of-the-arab-spring-28575>.

Technological freedom is a very important initiative of the twenty-first century. It is extremely important that we not only study but also protect digital media, as it is more than just a way for college students to procrastinate between classes. Digital media, as a key ingredient and catalyst of the fourth wave of democratization, has a huge impact on our society as well as to globalization as a whole. As Marc MacKinnon wrote during the Thai protests, “Twitter didn’t create the hatred, it amplified it.”³⁸ When we examine the necessary elements a non-democratic nation needs in order to be a likely candidate for a digital media revolution we can better predict the future.

Within the past decade people around the world have become progressively more aware and interested in the new uses of digital technologies in movements for political change. Digital activism is the use of digital technologies such as mobile phones, computers, and Internet-enabled devices to campaign for political or social change. We study these practices in order to better understand and possibly replicate the effective tactics in similar situations.

The goal of my thesis is to examine the link between information and communication technologies and democratization in order to answer some difficult questions: What the value of information and communication technologies is in the process of democratization around the world? Where has digital activism successfully transformed or liberalized a government in a democratic direction? How did those that have succeeded use these new technologies as opposed to the several others that have failed? Are the successful practices replicable in other scenarios with similar contexts? In

³⁸ Mark MacKinnon, “Twitter’s role in Bangkok conflict unprecedented - The Globe and Mail,” *The Globe and Mail*, <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/twitters-role-in-bangkok-conflict-unprecedented/article1578064>.

studying, analyzing, and evaluating digital activism I hope to determine how citizens can use digital technologies more efficiently in order to exercise their political power more effectively.

Defining and Understanding Democratization

Democratization is the process of a regime becoming more democratic. Democracy is a type of government where people are holding the power, either themselves or by electing representatives. There is currently, and might not ever be, a universally accepted definition of democracy. Despite this, most scholars and politicians agree that equality and freedom are two of the most important characteristics of a democratic regime. Many also agree that democracy includes free and equal social, economic, and political conditions. Democratization does not always conclude in consolidation though. It could encounter frequent reversals as in Argentina. Democratization is influenced by many factors. The most recurrent mentioned aspects are economic development, education, resources, and civil society.

The word democracy actually comes from the Greek term *dēmokratía* which means rule of the people. This term was introduced during the middle of the 5th-4th century BC in order to explain political systems in city-states such as Athens. While the term democracy was coined in Ancient Greece, democratic practices were prevalent in early societies such as Mesopotamia, Phoenicia and India.³⁹

Unfortunately, as James Hyland argued in *Democracy Theory*, while most people claim to be in favor of democracy, people cannot agree on what democracy means.⁴⁰ Rather than try to give democracy a definition, Robert Dahl examines what conditions “favor or impede” democratization in his book *Polyarchy: Participation and*

³⁹ B. Isakhan, and S. Stockwell (co-eds). *The Secret History of Democracy*, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), p. 19–59.

⁴⁰ James L. Hyland, *Democratic theory: the philosophical foundations*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995), p. 36.

*Opposition.*⁴¹

Dahl lists the necessities for Democracy within a large group of people. He believes there needs to be a liberty to form and join organizations, freedom of expression, a right to vote, eligibility for public office, right of political leaders to compete for support, alternative sources of information, free and fair elections, and institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other expressions of preference.⁴² Dahl argues that a country absolutely needs to have a tolerant government in order to be a democracy. Even if the nation had universal suffrage, if they had a repressive government, there would not be opportunities for opposition within the country.⁴³ Dahl does an excellent job of pointing out what qualities a democratic regime must have as well as what conditions

Larry Jay Diamond and Leonardo Morlino also discuss what conditions are necessary for both newly democratized and long standing democratic nations in their book *Assessing the Quality of Democracy*. However, before we can rate a democracy, Diamond and Morlino believe we first need to know what a democracy is. They claim democracy has four requirements: 1) universal, adult suffrage; 2) recurring, free, competitive, and fair elections; 3) more than one serious political party; and 4) alternative sources of information.⁴⁴

⁴¹Robert Alan Dahl, *Polyarchy: participation and opposition*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), p. 1.

⁴² *ibid*, p. 3.

⁴³ *ibid*, p. 5.

⁴⁴ Larry Jay Diamond and Leonardo Morlino, *Assessing the Quality of Democracy*, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), p. 21.

Diamond and Morlino continue to argue that a true democracy will have a quality of results, content and procedures. Through this they mean that the citizens will be satisfied with their expectations of their government, the government will allow citizens political equality and the freedom to judge the performance of the government through elections in order to hold government officials and institutions accountable.⁴⁵

Democratic freedom consists of political, civil and social rights. Diamond and Morlino believe governments are not democratic unless they permit all adult citizens the right to participate. More so, good democracies make sure citizens are able to use these rights in voting, organizing and protesting for their interests.⁴⁶ Democracies also need competition between different political parties. The country should have regular, free, and fair elections for the different parties to compete.⁴⁷ The elected political leaders must be held accountable vertically to their voters in their decisions as well as horizontally to other officials and state institutions.⁴⁸

While governments possess several of Diamond and Morlino's dimensions of democratic qualities they still may not please most citizens. Diamond and Morlino contend this because citizens don't always know what will happen after their desired policy is enacted. Since information reaches citizens faster than ever before media sensationalism has taken over to the point where negative aspects are highlighted most often in mass media. Finally, citizens may not be completely happy because a democracy

⁴⁵ *ibid*, p. 22.

⁴⁶ *ibid*, p. 23.

⁴⁷ *ibid*, p. 24.

⁴⁸ *ibid*, p. 25.

is fundamentally multifaceted.⁴⁹ Diamond and Morlino conclude that democracies need reforms in order to consolidate and work against public discontent and disappointment.⁵⁰

Samuel Huntington, the author of *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, argued “a wave of democratization is a group of transitions from nondemocratic to democratic regimes that occur within a specified period of time and that significantly outnumber transitions in the opposite direction during that period of time.” He deemed that a wave could even involve liberalization or partial democratization in nations that were not able to fully consolidate.⁵¹

According to Huntington, three waves of modern democratization emerged. However, a wave of democratization does not mean all nations involved were fully consolidated. The first two waves were followed by reverse waves where some of the nations involved transitioned back to a nondemocratic regime.⁵²

The first wave of democratization occurred from 1828 through 1926 in American and French revolutions. According to Jonathan Sunshine, there are two minimal democratic criteria for when nineteenth century regimes would begin to democratize. First, fifty percent of male adults would have to be eligible to vote. Second, a responsible leader is elected and supported by the majority of people. Huntington argues that by using Sunshine’s standards of measurement it can be inferred that the United States began the first wave of democratization in 1828.⁵³

⁴⁹ *ibid*, p. 30.

⁵⁰ *ibid*, p. 20.

⁵¹ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), p. 15.

⁵² *ibid*.

⁵³ *ibid*, p. 16.

A reverse wave followed from 1922 through 1942. Following the reverse wave, a second wave of democratization began in 1943 and ended in 1962. This wave began during World War II with allied occupations promoting democracy in West Germany, Austria, Italy, Korea, and Japan. Many nations democratized during the second wave. Turkey, Greece, Brazil and Costa Rica began the democratization process in the late 1940s and early 1950s while Uruguay returned to democracy during the war. Huntington reveals that Argentina, Colombia, Peru and Venezuela all had elections in 1945 and 1946. The democratic practices in these countries did not last though and they were all replaced by dictatorships by the early 1950s. Argentina and Peru did move back towards unstable limited democracies later in the decade. In the same decade, the other two Latin countries, Colombia and Venezuela, ended their military dictatorships through negotiations and introduced lasting democratic regimes.⁵⁴

The second reverse wave occurred from 1958 through 1975. Huntington asserted that the third wave of democratization began in 1974 and went through the 1990s. The third wave commenced with the end of the Portuguese dictatorship in 1974 and affected about thirty authoritarian regimes in Europe, Asia, and Latin America. Many other countries faced liberalization, legitimacy, and democratic strength as well. Portugal created a parliamentary and ratified a new constitution for elections with popular approval.⁵⁵

Later in the decade the military leaders in Ecuador withdrew from politics. The country formed a new constitution and held elections, which produced a civilian government. A similar experience happened in Peru, which led to a constituent assembly,

⁵⁴ *ibid*, p. 18.

⁵⁵ *ibid*, p. 21.

then the election of a civilian president in 1980. Unlike Peru and Ecuador, the military withdrawal in Bolivia created four years of coups until the election of a civilian president in 1982. Two years later Uruguay elected a civilian president after negotiations between the military and political leaders. During the mid 1980s Guatemala also elected a constituent assembly and civilian president.⁵⁶

Asia was also affected by the third wave of democratization. In the late 1970s India returned to democracy. In the early 1980s Turkey produced a civilian government after their military departed. Benigno Aquino was assassinated the same year, which led to the end of the Marcos dictatorship in the Philippines and the return of democracy. Taiwan also became dedicated to democracy in the 1980s.⁵⁷

Huntington's main point regarding these waves was that democratization at these points in time was a global movement. Despite the reverse waves, in which Huntington believed was "a two-step-forward, one-step-backward pattern," democratization did progress either with full out democratic consolidation or simply liberalization.⁵⁸

Unlike the previous authors, Jack Goldstone concentrates on social revolutions in the process of democratization rather than defining democracy. Goldstone is an American political scientist, sociologist, and the author of *Revolutions: Theoretical, Comparative, and Historical Studies*. In this book, Goldstone questions why some governments have been taken down by their own citizens while others have not.

Many people believe it is as simple as "misery breeds revolt." Goldstone explains this means when people believe their oppression is too much to handle the masses will

⁵⁶ *ibid.*

⁵⁷ *ibid.*

⁵⁸ *ibid.*, p. 25.

revolt against their oppressor. Goldstone offers a second explanation: when the state faces many struggles at the same time such as bankruptcy, conflicts between those in power, war, and/or famine revolutions may begin. A third explanation is that radical ideas change people's everyday lives. When people see these extreme ideals they may feel it would allow them to lead a better life and thus are more likely to revolt in order to obtain these principles.⁵⁹

Yet the concept of democracy was even discussed amongst Greeks and Romans. So why did this idea of democratization only become the cause of revolutions over two thousand years later? Goldstone mentions the comparative study of revolutions began after the Russian Revolution of 1917 through 1921. Since then there have been three generations of studies: the natural histories from 1920 through the 1930s, the general theories of the 1960s through early 70s, and the structural theories from the 1970s through 80s. The fourth generation, as Goldstone attests, began with the collapse of the Soviet Union.⁶⁰

In order to study revolutions, Goldstone looks at the English Revolution of 1640, the American Revolution of 1776, the French Revolution of 1789, and the Russian Revolution of 1917. By looking at these historical revolutions Goldstone develops ten major events to describe the revolutionary process.⁶¹

First, before the revolution many times the intellectuals stop supporting those in power and demand change. Prior to the French Revolution Voltaire and Beaumarchais

⁵⁹Jack A. Goldstone, *Revolutions: theoretical, comparative, and historical studies*, (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1986), p. 1.

⁶⁰ *ibid.*

⁶¹ *ibid*, p. 3.

wrote plays for the aristocrats and Russian nobles demanded local parliaments before the Russian Revolution.⁶²

Second, before the old regime falls the state typically tries to make reforms in order to stop criticism from being spread. Their belief is that they can accommodate the opposition groups without giving them any real power. These types of reforms typically lead to further opposition against the regime. This occurred in France with the reform of Louis XVI, the Stolypin reform in Russia, and the Boxer reforms in China.

Third, the regime's inability to deal with a political, economic or military crisis starts the fall of the regime.⁶³

Fourth, after the revolution has brought down the old regime internal troubles start to erupt and cause additional problems. The euphoria of success wears off after time when the opposition tries to start forming a new regime.⁶⁴

Fifth, moderate reformers are typically the first to gain control of the state. This can be seen in Iran when Bazargan, a moderate critic, took power after the Shah was forced out twenty years ago.⁶⁵

Sixth, more radical reformers will begin to mobilize against the moderate reforms. In France the moderate Girondin assembly faced the radical Jacobin clubs and in America, the radical Sons of Liberty pushed the moderate critics of King George III into revolutionary war.⁶⁶

⁶² *ibid.*

⁶³ *ibid.*

⁶⁴ *ibid.*

⁶⁵ *ibid.*

⁶⁶ *ibid.*

Seventh, the important changes generally occur after the radicals have taken over the moderates. Goldstone argued that the changes do not occur when the old regime falls because the moderates taking over typically do not get rid of the problems that caused the old regime to fail in the first place. As a result they find themselves with the same economic, political, and military issues.⁶⁷

Eighth, the radicals typically use a coercive ruling style and force an imposition of order upon the society to cease the disorder. An example of this is the guillotine days during the French Revolution as well as Stalin's gulag and Mao's cultural revolutions.⁶⁸

Ninth, Goldstone believes the struggle between the moderates, radicals, and those in favor of the old regime permit the military leaders to become leaders. Goldstone's example for this includes Washington, Cromwell, Napoleon, Mao, and Ataturk.⁶⁹

The tenth and final revolutionary phase is when progress starts being made and a new status quo is formed. The moderates will finally have defeated the radicals. This happened with the fall of Robespierre in France, Khrushchev's repudiation of Stalin in Russia, and the fall of Mao's allies, the gang of four in China.⁷⁰

Goldstone does an excellent job of reviewing previous revolutions in order to find commonalities. However, even Goldstone's ten revolutionary phases failed to answer why revolutions arise in the first place. He also failed to take into account that nations have distinctive features and respond differently to events. What happens during one, or even four revolutions, does not necessarily mean it will happen for future revolutions

⁶⁷ *ibid.*

⁶⁸ *ibid.*

⁶⁹ *ibid.*

⁷⁰ *ibid.*

especially given the globalization we face today.

Goldstone continues to mention the general theory approach to revolution. Within the general theories Goldstone discusses Davies psychological approach that “misery breeds revolt” and Gurr’s refined approach of identifying the different kinds of misery that leads to political chaos. Davies and Gurr argue that people will accept great oppression if they expect it to occur in life. It is when these people begin to anticipate a better life that they will become frustrated and resent their oppressors. Thus they argue that it is change in society that will give people the desire for a better life without their government providing the means to attaining their wishes. This begins to destabilize the regime.⁷¹

Smelser and Johnson developed another general theory. They argued that academics should focus more on social institutions than on the dissatisfaction felt by the society. They claim that governments will stay stable as long as the society’s economic, political, and the available upward movement of youth grows at the same pace.⁷²

Samuel Huntington, who I have already discussed, combined Davies, Gurr, Smelser, and Johnson’s approaches. Huntington believed that it was the modernization of societies that lead to an imbalance of the regime. As the educational and economic subsystems grow, so do people’s desire to have a role in their political system. This becomes a problem when the political institution does not grow as fast as the other subsystems in order to accommodate people’s desire for change. This in turn creates frustrated expectations, which lead to thoughts and sometimes actions of revolutions.⁷³

⁷¹ *ibid*, p. 5.

⁷² *ibid*.

⁷³ *ibid*.

Goldstone points to Tilly's argument that dissatisfaction alone doesn't result in revolutions as long as the dissatisfied stay unorganized and without means of organizing. Tilly holds that conflict and disgruntlement is normal in politics but that violence will occur when the oppressed have the necessary resources to take action. Thus, according to Tilly, while modernization will bring higher expectations and thus discontent, it will not necessarily lead to a revolution until the oppressed have the means to mobilize the masses and the resources to challenge the regime.⁷⁴

Each of these general theories had issues with explaining why the revolutions occurred in the first place. When academics realized that societies will not experience the same process of modernization or democratization was too easy, they began to step away from the general theories towards structural theories of revolution.⁷⁵

Those who argue in favor of structural theories believe that regimes will differ in their structure and thus are susceptible to diverse forms of revolutions. Structural theorists maintain that revolutions initiate with a combination of a weak regime, foreign conflicts, issues with the elites of the society, and mass uprisings. Unlike general theorists, structural theorists reason that states are organizations made up of resources in their society and that some will not hold up as well as others in crises. States become open to a revolution or coup when the elites of a nation are in opposition with the state. However, it is only when there is widespread opposition throughout the nation that a full revolution may occur.⁷⁶

While general and structural theorists provide a good amount of information

⁷⁴ *ibid.*

⁷⁵ *ibid.*, p. 6.

⁷⁶ *ibid.*, p. 7.

about revolutions they fail to explain why revolutions occur in some countries and not others. Goldstone believes the first step towards explaining why revolutions occur is scrutinizing the revolutionary process.⁷⁷ This process will uncover why a revolution has specific characteristics.

There are many ways for a state to respond to the beginning stages of a revolution. They could react with change or additional oppression. The way the state responds as well as the societies opinion of the state's reaction greatly determines whether or not the societies growing revolution is suppressed. As Goldstone mentions, a major paradox of a revolution is that even with a state's attempts to avoid a revolution through reform or repression it typically makes things worse. When the state offers change more demands arise. When the state further represses its citizens they become more enraged and are more likely to act out.⁷⁸ Typically the end of an old regime does not end a revolution. It is merely the beginning of the effort to shape the revolutions outcome. It could take years for the revolutionary leaders to build a new and lasting institution.⁷⁹

When there is an imbalance between the demands of a society and the government along with the government's ability to respond, the state's stability declines. When the state's stability declines the risk of revolutions is increased.⁸⁰

Furthermore, Huntington argues that democratic regimes are more impervious against revolutions than authoritarian ones. He quotes Che Guevara, a major figure of the

⁷⁷ *ibid*, p. 12.

⁷⁸ *ibid*, p. 14.

⁷⁹ *ibid*, p. 15.

⁸⁰ *ibid*, p. 18.

Cuban Revolution, as saying, revolutions can't succeed against a government which "has come into power through some form of popular vote, fraudulent or not, and maintains at least an appearance of constitutional legality." However, from the early nineteenth century down to 1990 democracies did not, with only trivial or formal exceptions, fight other democracies." Therefore Huntington concludes as long as democracy continues to spread, eventually we will live in peace.⁸¹

A report Freedom House put out in 2005 concerning the nonviolent civic resistance in democratization contributes to Huntington's position. In this study they found that nonviolent civic resistance was a strong factor in 67 countries that had collapsed dictatorships since 1972. They stated that in these processes, "changes were catalyzed not through foreign invasion, and only rarely through armed revolt or voluntary elite-driven reforms, but overwhelmingly by democratic civil society organizations utilizing nonviolent action and other forms of civil resistance, such as strikes, boycotts, civil disobedience, and mass protests."⁸²

The way foreign powers react to revolutions is also very important. The foreign nation has the option to either support, oppose, or ignore the revolution. Goldstone stresses that when a world is more supportive it increases the chance of open revolutions. He argues that this explains how when the U.S. in 1979 and the U.S.S.R. in 1989 were not enforcing the status quo a wave of revolutions dependant on foreign support occurred throughout Nicaragua, Iran, the Philippines, Afghanistan and Eastern Europe causing

⁸¹ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, p. 29.

⁸² *Study: Nonviolent Civic Resistance Key Factor in Building Durable Democracies*, May 24, 2005, <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=70&release=275>.

these nations to depend on their own feeble resources.⁸³

Thus, according to Goldstone, three aspects shape a revolution. First it is shaped by the state, elites, and popular grievances. Second it is shaped by ideologies, coalitions, and conflicts that arise during the revolution. Finally, it is shaped by the disagreements between different leaders.⁸⁴

All of these authors have contributed towards defining democracy and what causes a nation to democratize. However, the majority of them assume that the democratization process for one nation will be quite similar to the democratization process of another despite the historical or geographic location of the nation. This is not the case. Hyland does succeed in explaining that there is not a single meaning of democracy nor is there a single path to democratization.⁸⁵ Because of this we need to think of the process towards democratization and the countries involved as more or less democratic. This is important to remember in my following chapters as democratization is not an ending result, but rather a process all democratic regimes must participate in.

⁸³ Jack Goldstone, *Revolutions: theoretical, comparative, and historical studies*, p. 18.

⁸⁴ *ibid*, p. 16.

⁸⁵ James Hyland, *Democratic theory: the philosophical foundations*, p. 45.

Defining and Understanding New Technologies

Social media is not the first technology associated with freedom. Previous inventions such as the printing press, telegraph, radio, telephone and computer all led towards the invention of social technologies. The radio began as a messaging service before it was used as a broadcast system. The telephone was created for business use only and people were even told not to chat ‘frivolously.’⁸⁶ The Internet also was originally used as a business and research tool rather than for public usage. All of these inventions have the ability to free individuals, as well as to assist their oppressors.⁸⁷

But social media did not start with social networking sites such as Facebook. Social media existed well before the Internet was even created. In the 1950s people began phone ‘phreaking’ by exploring telephone networks. These people, ‘phone phreaks,’ studied and explored the equipment and systems of the public telephone network in order to satisfy their desire for information. They built homemade devices that would produce the necessary tones to allow them to make free calls as well as gain access to the back end of the telephone network. Phone phreaking became especially popular in 1971 when Ron Rosenbaum wrote an article for *Esquire Magazine* called “Secrets of the Little Blue Box.”⁸⁸

Even the first blogs and podcasts can be said to have taken place over voice mail systems rather than on the Internet. Phone phreaks would hack into corporate voice mail systems called codelines and leave messages that other people could comment on. The

⁸⁶Janet Abbate, “Government, Business, and the Making of the Internet,” *The Business History Review* 75, no. 1, 2001, p. 147-176.

⁸⁷ Henry Jenkins, *Democracy and New Media*, p. 26.

⁸⁸ Ron Rosenbaum, “Secrets of the Little Blue Box,” *Esquire Magazine*, October 1971.

phreak would then respond to these comments in his or her next update. They would continue this until they were caught and would then move on to the next mailbox. This continued through the 1990's until products such as mobile phones and Skype were readily available.⁸⁹

Social media did take a giant step forward with the invention of the Internet. While static merely a decade ago, the Internet is now both interactive and personalized to allow users to share experiences online.⁹⁰ Barry Wellman argues that social networks are “profoundly transforming the nature of communities, sociality, and interpersonal relations”.⁹¹ Although cultures may have opposing cultural values, these networks enable them to share their values of communication and thus interact more easily.⁹²

The Internet, as the FNC passed in a resolution on October 24, 1995, refers to the “global information system that (i) is logically linked together by a globally unique address space based on the Internet Protocol (IP) or its subsequent extensions/follow-ons; (ii) is able to support communications using the Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) suite or its subsequent extensions/follow-ons, and/or other IP-compatible protocols; and (iii) provides, uses or makes accessible, either publicly or

⁸⁹ Cameron Chapman, “The History and Evolution of Social Media,” *Web Design Blog*, <http://www.webdesignerdepot.com/2009/10/the-history-and-evolution-of-social-media>.

⁹⁰ Michael Richter, “Facebook's Response to DoC,” *Facebook*, Palo Alto, CA, January 28, 2011.

⁹¹ Jeffrey Juris, “The New Digital Media and Activist Networking within Anti-Corporate Globalization Movements,” *American Academy of Political and Social Science* 597, 2005, 189-208, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25046069>.

⁹² Manuel Castells, *Communication Power*, (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 38.

privately, high level services layered on the communications and related infrastructure described herein.”⁹³

The first concept of the Internet can be found in the memos, “Galactic Network”, written by J.C.R. Licklider in August 1962 at MIT.⁹⁴ His idea concerned a set of computers that would be connected globally where anyone could access data.

Before Licklider’s vision could become a reality there were several steps that needed to be overcome. One key step was when Leonard Kleinrock published a paper on packet switching theory at MIT in July 1961.⁹⁵ Packet switching would allow for a faster response time as well as a better utilization of bandwidth. It would divide the messages into packets with the routing decisions made based on each individual packet. With this paper the early research and development of the Internet had begun.

A second key step towards computer networking was to find a way for computers to be able to talk. Lawrence Roberts and Thomas Merrill were able to overcome this challenge when they connected the TX-2 computer in Massachusetts at MIT to the Q-32 computer in Santa Monica, California in 1965 using a low speed dial-up circuit switched telephone line and acoustic couplers. While the telephone line worked fine for data, it was not sufficient bandwidth and it was expensive.⁹⁶ This incompetent connection confirmed Kleinrock’s belief of the need for packet switching.⁹⁷ Work on packet

⁹³ Barry Leiner, Vinton Cerf, David Clark, Robert Kahn, Leonard Kleinrock, Daniel Lynch, Jon Postel, Lawrence Roberts, and Stephen Wolff, “A Brief History of the Internet,” *Internet Society (ISOC)*, <http://www.isoc.org/internet/history/brief.shtml>.

⁹⁴ *ibid.*

⁹⁵ *ibid.*

⁹⁶ “Computer History Museum - Exhibits - Internet History.”

⁹⁷ Barry Leiner, et al. “A Brief History of the Internet.”

switching networks was occurring simultaneously at the National Physical Laboratory and MIT.⁹⁸ Packet switching was used to break up data into small pieces and then send these pieces individually over a network. This would increase efficiency.⁹⁹ Merely a year later Roberts left MIT to plan for ARPANET, the predecessor of the Internet.

Governmental agencies such as the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the Bureau of Standards, and the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) in the Development of Defense funded the majority of work done in the beginning towards the creation of the Internet.¹⁰⁰ Work on ARPANET began in 1969 by ARPA to enable computers to share resources among researches across the country.

Kleinrock's Network Measurement Center at UCLA was chosen to be the first connection on ARPANET. In September 1969 the Bolt Beranek and Newman (BBN) group at UCLA installed the first Interface Message Processor (IMP) as the first host computer connection. The team working on the first site, the Network Working Group, worked on developing a protocol.¹⁰¹ The second connection was located at the Stanford Research Institute. The final two connections were created in the end of 1969 at UC Santa Barbara and the University of Utah.¹⁰² These four connections were the initial creation of ARPANET. Within the next few years other computers were quickly added to ARPANET.

⁹⁸ "Computer History Museum - Exhibits - Internet History," *Computer History Museum*, http://www.computerhistory.org/internet_history.

⁹⁹ Janet Abbate, "Government, Business, and the Making of the Internet."

¹⁰⁰ *ibid.*

¹⁰¹ "Computer History Museum - Exhibits - Internet History."

¹⁰² Barry Leiner, et al. "A Brief History of the Internet."

On October 29, 1969 the first host-to-host connection was made.¹⁰³ As Kleinrock said in an interview, “We set up a telephone connection between us and the guys at SRI. We typed the L and we asked on the phone, ‘Do you see the L?’ ‘Yes, we see the L,’ came the response. We typed the O, and we asked ‘Do you see the O.’ ‘Yes, we see the O.’ Then we typed the G, and the system crashed...”¹⁰⁴

Ray Tomlison at BBN created the first electronic mail application in March 1972 in order to send and read software over ARPANET. He developed the user@host convention. What was interesting was that Tomlison chose the @ sign arbitrarily even though the character was used by several other systems various commands. These “header wars” were not settled until the 1980’s when the @ sign became the global standard.¹⁰⁵ Roberts furthers the creation of this application by adding the ability to file, forward, selectively read, and respond to messages.¹⁰⁶

Since ARPANET was connecting several incompatible computers for various purposes, a set of standard protocols was needed. An open-architecture network was essential for unifying different network interfaces, providers, and locations. Robert Kahn created the idea of an open-architecture network in 1972. Since the Host-to-Host protocol, the Network Control Protocol, could not address other networks, Kahn, along with Vint Cerf from Stanford, began to develop a new version of the protocol, the Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) to work with an open-

¹⁰³ "Computer History Museum - Exhibits - Internet History."

¹⁰⁴ Laurence Shafe, *Building intranet applications: a manager's guide to intranet computing*, (Boston: Intelligent Environments, 1996).

¹⁰⁵ "Computer History Museum - Exhibits - Internet History,"

¹⁰⁶ Barry Leiner, et al. "A Brief History of the Internet."

architecture network.¹⁰⁷ The Specification of Internet Transmission Control Program, the document that described the functions of the TCP/IP, contained the first use of the term Internet. This term was used as shorthand for the adjective internetworking.¹⁰⁸ At the same time Xerox PARC was working on a wire-based system for Local Area Networks (LANs), which would become known as Ethernet.¹⁰⁹

Several changes were needed with the growth of the Internet. With the increase of computers and connections it was important to assign names to hosts so that people would not need to remember a numeric address. When independently managed networks grew it was no longer possible to have a single list of hosts. Because of this Paul Mockapetris and Jon Postel of USC/ISI and Craig Partridge of BBN created the Domain Name System (DNS) and the user@host.domain address system in 1983.¹¹⁰ Another necessary change was creating a hierarchical model of routers with an Interior and Exterior Gateway Protocol tying different regions together.¹¹¹

Tom Truscott and Jim Ellis, Duke University students, created Usenet, an Internet discussion system. This system allowed the distribution of online forums for those using a UNIX operating system. Users could submit messages to the Usenet group and have it be available to all other users of the group in order to have a discussion.¹¹² These Usenet systems were a precursor to social media that allowed people to post articles to different

¹⁰⁷ *ibid.*

¹⁰⁸ Vinton Cerf, Yogen Dalal, and Carl Sunshine, "Specification of Internet Transmission Control Program," *Network Working Group*, December 1974, p. 70.

¹⁰⁹ "Computer History Museum - Exhibits - Internet History,"

¹¹⁰ *ibid.*

¹¹¹ Barry Leiner, et al. "A Brief History of the Internet."

¹¹² Janet Abbate, "Government, Business, and the Making of the Internet."

newsgroups. These Usenet systems contained many of the same features that Google and Yahoo! Groups use today. They are also responsible for the creation of newsreaders and RSS feeds.¹¹³

In the late 70's Bulletin Board Systems (BBS) started appearing online. Originally opened to the public by Ward Christensen, these systems were typically hosted on a personal computer and only one user could access them at a time through the host computer's telephone modem. These sites are credited as being the first form of website that allowed people to interact. People would have social discussions, play online games, or contribute to the files available for download. It is also important to note that the majority of content found on BBSs were illegal such as viruses, directions for hacking, The Anarchist's Cookbook, and other adult material.¹¹⁴

The early 80's brought about commercial online systems. CompuServe, America Online, and Prodigy were developed in order to allow personal computers to access data. They were not originally created to offer Internet access. Users would have to dial up using a modem and software to the provider's computer center in order to shop online, email other users, and enter chat rooms.¹¹⁵

When ARPANET was created it was a single network. In the decade from 1973 through 1983 it became a system with multiple networks. Many branches of the United States government got involved in the research and development of the Internet, the successor of ARPANET including the National Aeronautics and Space Agency (NASA), the National Science Foundation (NSF), and the Department of Energy (DOE). In fact

¹¹³ Cameron Chapman

¹¹⁴ *ibid.*

¹¹⁵ Janet Abbate, "Government, Business, and the Making of the Internet."

there were several different networks being created. MFNET was created by the U.S. Department of Energy for researchers of Magnetic Fusion Energy, High Energy Physicists created HEPNet, SPAN was created for NASA physicists, and CSNET was created for academics of the computer science community. These networks were created with a specific community in mind, academics. By 1985, ARPANET was able to connect several communities of researchers.¹¹⁶ Thus began the merging of networks and the creation of the Internet.

In 1985 the U.S. National Science Foundation Net declared their desire to serve all of the higher education community rather than just a specific concentration. The NSF suggested that its networks look to commercial customers in order to expand their facilities and lower subscription costs.

By 1985 there were 2,000 hosts on the Internet with the networks growing to nearly 30,000 by 1987. Two years later, Tim Barners-Lee brought up the issue of the rotating people and organizations assigned to projects. He proposed a hypertext system to work on different operating systems and run across the Internet.¹¹⁷ The term Internet began to be used as the name of the network while NSFNET was linked with ARPANET in the late 1980s. Thanks to NSFNET, ARPANET was formally shut down in 1990 after becoming obsolete. It had 300,000 hosts by the end of its long run.¹¹⁸ A year after ARPANET was shut down, NSF created a plan to have the Internet taken over by a

¹¹⁶ Barry Leiner, et al. "A Brief History of the Internet."

¹¹⁷ "Computer History Museum - Exhibits - Internet History,"

¹¹⁸ *ibid.*

commercial service provider. It wasn't until 1995, though, that U.S. government ownership of the Internet finally ended.¹¹⁹

In 1988 Internet Relay Chat (IRC) was created. It was the first instant messaging client and was used to share files, links, and communicate with others. It was UNIX-based and because of this the general population did not have access.¹²⁰

An important change to the Internet took place when Tim Berners-Lee created World Wide Web in 1990 at CERN. CERN is a European physics lab near Geneva, Switzerland. It is said that Berners-Lee was disappointed with the lack of graphics on the Internet given its text-only format. He also wanted to be able to link sites from around the world. It became publicly available on August 6th, 1991. Berners-Lee kept the World Wide Web as freeware, and by 1992 servers were set up at other physics research centers in the United States to support it. A year later Marc Andreessen at NCSA developed a web browser called Mosaic to add color to Web pages. In 1994 Andreessen began work on a new commercial browser, Netscape, while Microsoft worked on Internet Explorer.

David Bohnett and John Rezner founded one of the first social networking sites, Geocities, in 1994. The idea behind Geocities was that each user would create their own website that would be categorized by one of six neighborhoods. The neighborhoods included Colosseum, Hollywood, RodeoDrive, SunsetStrip, WallStreet, and West Hollywood. In January 1999 Yahoo! purchased Geocities for \$3.57 billion in stock.¹²¹

¹¹⁹ Janet Abbate, "Government, Business, and the Making of the Internet."

¹²⁰ Cameron Chapman, "The History and Evolution of Social Media."

¹²¹ "Yahoo! buys GeoCities - Jan. 28, 1999," *CNN Money*, http://money.cnn.com/1999/01/28/technology/yahoo_a.

In 1997 AOL Instant Messenger (AIM) was made available to the general public, making instant messaging incredibly popular. It had been available to AOL employees since 1995 and to AOL subscribers since early 1996. AIM was the first real time instant messenger service. The early uses of AIM included peer-to-peer instant messaging, chat rooms, and file sharing. Later versions brought games to be played between users, away messages, cell phone integration, and Facebook support.¹²²

Later that year Andrew Weinreich launched SixDegrees.com as a social networking site. Six Degrees was the first modern social networking website. This site allowed users to create profiles, list their friends that were users on the site as well as friends offline, and send messages to each other.¹²³ A profile is a person's unique page where they can enter information such as their age, location, interests, contact information, and possibly a photo of themselves. Also the term friends may not be an interpersonal relationship formed offline; it could be a random person the user has never and will never meet in person. SixDegrees.com shares the same social-circles network model as many of the popular social networking sites we use today. At the height of its popularity, it had close to a million members.¹²⁴ This site was purchased in 2000 for 125

¹²² Jim Hu, "What will AOL do with ICQ? - CNET News," *CNET Technology News*, <http://news.cnet.com/2100-1033-212056.html>.

¹²³ Christopher Nickson, "The History of Social Networking," *Digital Trends*, <http://www.digitaltrends.com/features/the-history-of-social-networking>.

¹²⁴ Cameron Chapman, "The History and Evolution of Social Media."

million, and closed in 2001.¹²⁵ The founder of SixDegrees believed that the site was simply ahead of its time, and perhaps he was correct.¹²⁶

The next social media site to take off was Friendster in 2002. It had a user base of over 90 million registered users at its peak with the majority coming from Asia. The goal of Friendster was to create a safe place for people to meet new people including their friends-of-friends in order to expand their social circles.¹²⁷ Unfortunately the servers used by Friendster were not able to sustain Friendster's growth and thus the site went down quite often. While Friendster's popularity was increasing in the Philippines, Singapore, and Indonesia, many of the users in the U.S. became frustrated with the site's technical difficulties and began using their email to connect with friends rather than Friendster.¹²⁸

In 2003 the popular LinkedIn was founded as a professional social network. Users could upload their resume or post a profile and then interact with other users. LinkedIn operates on the idea that you should actually know the people you are interacting with on the site. Over time groups, forums, and job boards were created.¹²⁹ While most social networks up until this point focused on communicating with friends on the Internet or meeting new people to date, this site focused on expanding one's professional network in the same way people would pass out business cards or introduce acquaintances for specific business ventures.

¹²⁵ Christopher Nickson, "The History of Social Networking."

¹²⁶ D.M. Boyd, & N. B. Ellison, "Social network Sites: Definition, History, and Scholarship," *Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication*, 13(1), article 11, 2007, <http://jcmc.indiana.edu/vol13/issue1/boyd.ellison.html>

¹²⁷ Cameron Chapman, "The History and Evolution of Social Media."

¹²⁸ D.M. Boyd, & N. B. Ellison, "Social network Sites: Definition, History, and Scholarship."

¹²⁹ Cameron Chapman, "The History and Evolution of Social Media."

MySpace launched in 2003 and was the most popular social network site in the world by 2006. It first began growing its user base by utilizing the estrangement felt by many of Friendster's users. MySpace was able to distinguish itself by allowing people to customize their profiles by allowing users to edit and add html code. People can also add music or videos to their profiles and post public comments on their friends' profile. Users can also send private messages or group messages.¹³⁰ MySpace also grew its popularity by allowing bands to create their own pages in order for fans and bands to interact. Bands could inform their fans of upcoming shows and users could access their bands' pages in order to listen to new music. News Corporation purchased MySpace in July 2005 for \$580 million before any of the many safety issues, including sexual interactions between adults and minors began to estrange users from the site.¹³¹ While many users have fled MySpace, the site is still in operation and considered one of the top social networking sites. In fact, as of July 2011, Justin Timberlake, former member of the boy band 'N Sync and current actor, teamed up with Specific Media to purchase the social networking site for \$35 million, 94% less than News Corp had paid for it in 2005, to attempt to resuscitate it.¹³²

Launched in 2004 for college students, Facebook had more than 600 million users as of January 2011.¹³³ It was originally created to connect students at Harvard College but quickly grew to other colleges as well before admitting high schools, businesses, and

¹³⁰ *ibid.*

¹³¹ D.M. Boyd, & N. B. Ellison, "Social network Sites: Definition, History, and Scholarship."

¹³² Ramy Inocencio, "MySpace and Friendster: Back from the dead?," *Business 360 - CNN.com Blogs*, <http://business.blogs.cnn.com/2011/07/03/myspace-and-friendster-back-from-the-dead>.

¹³³ Nicholas Carlson, "Goldman: Facebook has 600 million users," *MSNBC*, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/40929239/ns/technology_and_science-tech_and_gadgets.

then opening to the general public. Facebook exists and thrives because people desire to share information with others. Facebook grew to be the leading social networking site in 2008 when it started having more unique visitors per month than MySpace. The main difference between Facebook and MySpace is that Facebook does not allow for the same customization as MySpace.

Twitter is a more recent social networking website created in 2006 operating with the intent of being a microblog for users to send and read messages. These messages, called Tweets, are text-based messages up to 140 characters. Twitter has many celebrity followers including Ashton Kutcher, Oprah, Martha Stewart, MC Hammer, and Demi Moore.¹³⁴ The goal of Twitter is to connect people all over the globe. In order to do this freedom of expression is essential. As Twitter blogged, “Some Tweets may facilitate positive change in a repressed country, some make us laugh, some make us think, some downright anger a vast majority of users”.¹³⁵

Several media sharing social networking sites have also popped up in recent years. In 2003 Photobucket launched as the first major site to allow users to share their photographs online either to their friends and family or to the public. Flickr, owned by Yahoo!, is also a photo sharing site. As of June 2009, Flickr claims to have more than 3.6 million images stored on their site. YouTube launched in 2005 as the first major video hosting site. On YouTube people can upload videos up to 10 minutes in length. They can then share their videos on the site or embed them on other websites.¹³⁶

¹³⁴ *ibid.*

¹³⁵ "Twitter Blog: The Tweets Must Flow," *Twitter Blog*, <http://blog.twitter.com/2011/01/tweets-must-flow.html>.

¹³⁶ Cameron Chapman, "The History and Evolution of Social Media."

Similar to media sharing sites, there is also a selection of sites that are dedicated to sharing news. One social news site, Delicious (Del.icio.us) allows people to bookmark sites and articles they find interesting and then share them with other people. Digg users, on the other hand, share links to anything online. Other users then vote on posted content to determine its popularity by either voting for it (“dig”) or voting against it (“bury”). This site was created in 2004 before even YouTube launched.¹³⁷

There are several other social media websites including the U.S.-made Wikipedia, the Chinese instant messaging service QQ, WikiLeaks whose servers are located in Sweden, the Spanish social network Tuenti, the Korean social network Naver, and Speak2Tweet, which is a voicemail transcription service for Twitter created by Google and Twitter during the Egyptian revolutions. Google’s Orkut was unsuccessful in the U.S. but is insanely popular in Brazil. Mobile applications, networks, and devices have also been included in social media.

Mobile phones have also had a huge effect on social media and the democratization process through social media. In the beginning mobile phones had to stay within a specific area. There was no such thing as a continuity of service. It was not until 1970 when Amos Joel, Jr., a Bell Labs engineer, invented a system to allow these mobile phones to move between cell areas without interrupting conversations.¹³⁸ At the same time two-way mobile radios were being developed to be used in taxicabs, police vehicles, and ambulances. These mobile radios were not connected to the telephone network though. In Sweden, in 1960, the first mobile phone system, the Mobile

¹³⁷ *ibid.*

¹³⁸ U.S. Patent 3663762: *Cellular Mobile Communication System* — Amos Edward Joel (Bell Labs), filed December 21, 1970, issued May 16, 1972.

Telephone System A, was created to make and receive calls using a rotary dial in one's car.¹³⁹

The first portable mobile phone was created by Martin Cooper, a Motorola researcher, in April 1973, despite the long race between Motorola and Bell Labs. This first generation (1G) of mobile phones had the ability to transfer calls from one site to another as a person moved between cells. The first commercial cellular network was launched in Japan in 1979 by NTT and covered Tokyo's 20 million citizens with 23 base stations.¹⁴⁰

The second generation (2G) mobile phone system was developed in the 1990's using the first GSM network, Radiolinja, in Finland. This phone system used digital rather than analog transmission.¹⁴¹

The first mobile phone that was able to connect to the Internet, the Nokia 9000 Communicator, was created in 1996 in Finland. This mobile phone was introduced at \$1900 to appear like a regular mobile phone with a small keyboard similar to a handheld computer. It had a 24MHz Intel 80386EX embedded processor and used the Geos operating system. It allowed users to connect their phone to a computer in order to download or upload data, and included an alarm clock, a browser, and a section for facsimile and electronic mail.¹⁴²

¹³⁹ "Facts about the Mobile. A Journey through Time," *Mobilen 50*.
www.mobilen50ar.se/eng/FaktabladENGFinal.pdf.

¹⁴⁰ "Swedish National Museum of Science and Technology" (http://www.tekniskamuseet.se/mobilen/engelska/1980_90.shtml). Tekniskamuseet.se.

¹⁴¹ *ibid.*

¹⁴² Louise Williams, "NOKIA 9000 COMMUNICATOR SETS THE STANDARD FOR INTELLIGENT CELLULAR TELEPHONES," *Computer Business Review*,
http://www.cbronline.com/news/nokia_9000_communicator_sets_the_standard_for_intelligent_cellular_telephones.

The third generation (3G) technology changed from using circuit switching for data transmission to using packet switching for data transmission. Once again, NTT DoCoMo launched the first trial network with third generation technology in Tokyo, Japan in May 2001. While mobile phones had the ability to access the Internet for several years by this point, it was not until 3G technology that smartphones with Internet access capability regularly appeared thanks to their ability to connect over Wi-Fi rather than to a computer via a USB plug.¹⁴³

The iPhone, an internet-enabled smartphone created by Apple, was introduced 11 years after the Internet was first brought to mobile phones with the Nokia 9000. The iPhone has a global following and has been credited with the rise in popularity of real-time updates for sites such as Facebook, Twitter, and Foursquare. Real time updates are especially important in crises and revolutions when it is necessary to spread information to large masses in little time.

Fourth generation (4G) technologies started being developed once it was clear that 3G networks would not be able to handle bandwidth-intensive applications. 4G networks eliminated the use of circuit switching and began using an IP network. WiMAX standard, created by Sprint in the U.S., and the LTE standard, created by Scandinavian company TeliaSonera, were the first two companies that offered 4G technologies commercially.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴³ "Privateline.com: 3G and Cellular radio Information," *Daily Notes*, <http://www.privateline.com/3G/3G.htm>.

¹⁴⁴Fahd Ahmad Saeed, "Capacity Limit Problem in 3G Networks," Purdue School of Engineering. www.ece.iupui.edu/~dskim/Courses/ECE695MWN/2006-saeed-Capacity_Limit_Problem_in_3G_Networks.ppt.

For the purpose of my thesis, social media will include crowdsourcing, social networking, online communities, blogging, micro-blogging, mobile technologies such as short message services, flashmobs, sousveillance and Internet censorship circumvention.

Crowdsourcing can be defined as outsourcing different tasks such as gathering information to the public via the Internet and/or mobile technology in order to obtain collaborative content to which anyone can contribute. Supporters of a digital activism campaign may all contribute a variety of content and/or skills to their campaign in order to make it more dynamic despite limited finances and/or time.

Social networks are interconnected users that can engage with friends and other users to share and discuss interests, events, activities, ideas, and/or media. An online community is a form of social network sustained by membership rituals such as engaging in chat-rooms or forums. When a piece of content is spread quickly online to friends, acquaintances, social networks, and finally the world it is considered to have 'gone viral.' It is similar to how viruses are transmitted from person to person offline. Having gone viral increases a piece of content's visibility and thus the awareness of it.

A blog is an online webpage or website where an individual, group of people, or an organization creates regular entries consisting of commentary with description of events, graphics, videos, or other forms of media that visitors can then comment on. A blog can be written by an individual, group of individuals or an organization in a conversational manner. Blog posts may contain links, audio, video, images, etc. Most blogs are written from the blogger's viewpoint and may allow readers to post comments and interact with the blogger/s. A micro-blog, on the other hand, is a form of online diary

that limits users to short messages viewable by subscribers. The most popular microblogging service today is Twitter.

A flashmob is a large group of people who gather abruptly and unexpectedly in a public space to engage in a collective action before separating at the same speed. Within digital activism, flash mobs can be coordinated through social media, text messages, or email.

The term *sousveillance* describes the observation and recording of an activity of a participant. Steven Mann, a professor at the University of Toronto, created the term to describe when an event or activity is recorded from the viewpoint of an observer. With the increase in smart mobile devices, there are more opportunities for citizens to monitor their government, law enforcement, and corporations. It is now harder for those in power to conceal their activities since anyone with a mobile phone can monitor and report their findings to the world.

Mobile technology is a communication technology enabled by mobile phones to make voice calls, use the short or multimedia messaging service (SMS or MMS), and recently access the Internet. Short message service (SMS), also known as texting or text messaging, allows for short messages to be sent from one mobile device to another. Many mobile devices also use SIM cards. A SIM card is a piece of plastic found in mobile phones that contains the subscriber identity module (SIM) that is a unique identifier. It may hold the user's phone number, email account, and text messages so that a user can switch between different mobile devices.

Internet censorship circumvention is possible through various technologies that allow users to evade barriers that block access to specific online content. These tools can

be used alone or in concurrence with each other. They are used to share alternative opinions, spread news-worthy and time-sensitive information, allow for collaborating, access specific groups in a society that may be barred by traditional media, and mobilize individuals with similar interests.¹⁴⁵

Social media today has attracted users around the world so significantly that many have incorporated these technologies into their daily routines. Whereas people once sat down with a morning paper they may now read the New York Times on the iPhone before ‘checking-in’ at the office on Foursquare and then making plans with friends via Facebook. While these tools are certainly entertaining, and at times a drain on actual productivity, they are also increasingly being used to help democratization efforts around the world. I will further explore the use of social networks including mobile devices and social media websites, in the upcoming chapters. What we can already say for certain; however, is that social networks are important and are embedded in many societies. Some social networks even have more users than the populations of small countries.

¹⁴⁵ Dana Bekri, Brynne Dunn, Isik Oguzertem, Yan Su, and Shivani Upreti, “Harnessing Social Media Tools to Fight Corruption,” London School of Economics and Political Science May (2011), <http://irevolution.files.wordpress.com/2011/05/harnessing-social-media-tools-to-fight-corruption-1.pdf>.

Infrastructure and Contextual Conditions that Lead to Democratization

As Daniel Drezner, the author of *Weighing the Scales: The Internet's Effect on State-Society Relations* notes, “parsing out how ICTs affect the tug-of-war between states and civil society activists is exceedingly difficult.”¹⁴⁶ Democratization can't be researched sufficiently without looking at the role of digital information and communication technologies. Thus, academics, journalists, and politicians all note that there are several advantages to social media that assist and enhance the democratization process. Proponents of this argument believe digital activism has the potential to empower citizens to affect their political regimes. Scholars such as Yochai Benkler, Mark Pesce, Clay Shirky, and Graeme Kirkpatrick advance this optimistic stance.¹⁴⁷

Luther Gerlach and Virginia Hine, researchers from the University of Minnesota, wrote the book *People, Power and Change* in 1970. This book discusses the decentralized structure of social movements. According to Gerlach and Hine, social movements include three characteristics: The first characteristic is that they are segmented. Social movements include several smaller nodes that contribute to the movement. Social movements can also be polycentric. This refers to the characteristic of social movements where there can be multiple leaders to influence the movement. Finally, the social movements can be integrated. There can be multiple groups connected through activists' relationships or through a common set of beliefs.¹⁴⁸ Networked

¹⁴⁶ Daniel W. Drezner, “Weighing the Scales: The Internet's Effect on State-Society Relations,” *Brown Journal of World Affairs* 16, no. 2, 2010, p. 31-44.

¹⁴⁷ Mary Joyce, *Digital Activism Decoded: The New Mechanics of Change*, (New York: International Debate Education Association, 2010), p. 11.

¹⁴⁸ Luther P. Gerlach, and Virginia H. Hine, *People, Power and Change*, (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1970).

societies are able to take advantage of these features as well in order to expand their reach.

It is important to note that there is not just one formula for democratization. Rather there are many different combinations of factors that create the same outcome. There are many digital technology infrastructure conditions of digital media that assist individuals in their campaigns for social change. The most important technology condition to assist those desiring change might be access.¹⁴⁹ While access does not necessarily mean citizens will use the technology, without it they do not even have the chance. Access to ICTs among a diverse and spread out population brings the nation together over a common cause.

Examples of the different digital technology infrastructure conditions include the speed and low cost of their tools. The swiftness combined with the reasonably priced rates allows activists to organize around concrete goals.¹⁵⁰ Many of the social media websites used, such as Facebook and Twitter, are free. Other tools may have fees associated with them while still offering free versions with limited features. These sites are all accessible any time of the day and are able to send messages, photos, videos, etc. at the drop of a hat. Sending a message to someone across the world can be done in an instant. Users of Twitter are even able to receive Twitter feeds via their mobile devices. These devices also allow for live tweeting so the updates are instantaneous. People can post the latest news concerning protests as well as their impressions from the street. Setting up one's website is also relatively inexpensive as compared to the costs

¹⁴⁹ Henry Jenkins, *Democracy and New Media*, p. 27.

¹⁵⁰ Jeffrey Juris, "The New Digital Media and Activist Networking within Anti-Corporate Globalization Movements."

associated with renting physical space to hold off-line meetings.

Mobile devices are also relatively inexpensive compared to their wired counterparts. Short Message Service (SMS) or text messages are very economical. Although SMS messaging was first introduced as a free promotional gimmick in 1995, it has remained relatively inexpensive.¹⁵¹ Text messaging is usually one-tenth of the price of wired telephone service making this a significant economic difference for people living in countries where people live on less than a dollar a day. These messages can be used in a myriad of ways, including recruiting supporters, sharing information, and assisting in the mobilization of people. Many activists have also used SMS in order to gain funds or sign petitions by sending a short code and their name to a specific number.

In her article, *Activism Transforms Digital: The Social Movement Perspective*, Anastasia Kavada discusses five key practices for activists wishing to distribute information quickly and inexpensively. First they can set up a website for their campaign. They could also create a website for a specific event. Activists use alternative media platforms such as Indymedia. They can use blogging, micro-blogging, video and photo-sharing platforms such as Twitter, Blogger, YouTube, and Flickr. Finally, they can make information, photos, and/or videos go viral through email or networking sites such as MySpace and Facebook. It is the low cost of each of these options that allow the social movements to bypass mainstream media.¹⁵²

¹⁵¹ Howard Rheingold, *Smart Mobs: The Next Social Revolution*, (Cambridge, MA: Perseus Pub., 2003), p. 58.

¹⁵² Anastasia Kavada, "Activism Transforms Digital: The Social Movement Perspective," In *Digital Activism Decoded: The New Mechanics of Change*, (New York: International Debate Education Association, 2010, 101-117), p. 106.

Another feature of digital media that assists the democratization process is the ability for communities to form in patterns other than within towns or even national borders. These tools allow for fast and cheap communication that is not restrained by typical national borders. Since the Internet is borderless, it helps activists organize and coordinate protests in different nations. It also helps activists plan physical meetings.

Social media has become inherent in many western societies and a crucial form of communication. These communities offer users empowerment and nourish the ideals of citizenship. These tech savvy activists generally think of themselves as belonging to a global movement. Their local activities become directly linked to problems around the world.

The change of hierarchy in regard to power is another benefit of digital media tools. Benkler, Pesce, and Shirky argue digital networks allow people to communicate outside of the typical power structure.¹⁵³ Instead of a top down hierarchy, as is with most efforts, social media allows for a more flexible coordination among people with minimal structure. Digital networks consist of a more peer-to-peer chain of command. This creates the ability to send information without managerial control or formal organizations.^{154 155} Digital technologies and networks also have the capability of changing power relationships offline.

These mediums also allow for a constant flow of information in societies where the media is generally censored to permit only pro-government messages and gives a

¹⁵³ Mary Joyce, *Digital Activism Decoded: The New Mechanics of Change*.

¹⁵⁴ Clay Shirky, "The Political Power of Social Media."

¹⁵⁵ Jeffrey Juris, "The New Digital Media and Activist Networking within Anti-Corporate Globalization Movements."

voice to those that have been silenced. It allows people to share and gain information that is sometimes not available or is censored to give them a false idea of what is happening in their country.

Along with giving people a voice in a censored society, digital media has the capability for activists to access and discover information. Activists have increased access to the news, reports, and other publications. They also have more opportunities to view suppressed information through sites such as Wikileaks. The Internet also gives activists access to different tools and platforms, such as Google Alerts, Digg, Del.icio.us, to monitor and share information.

When the Internet was originally created it was intended to be a place that exemplifies freedom of expression and communication for people around the world. This concept was best expressed by John Perry Barlowin, an Internet theorist, in 1996 in the Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace.

“Governments of the Industrial World... I declare the global social space we are building to be naturally independent of the tyrannies you seek to impose on us. You have no moral right to rule us nor do you possess any methods of enforcement we have true reason to fear. Governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed. You have neither solicited nor received ours. We did not invite you. . . . Cyberspace does not lie within your borders. . . . We are creating a world where anyone anywhere may express his or her beliefs, no matter how singular, without fear of being coerced into silence or conformity.”¹⁵⁶

The idea of ‘Sousveillance’ is another tactic used by activists. Steven Mann, a professor at the University of Toronto, created the term to describe when an event or activity is recorded from the viewpoint of an observer. With the increase in smart mobile devices, there are more opportunities for citizens to monitor their government, law

¹⁵⁶ John Perry Barlow, *Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace*, (San Francisco, CA: Electronic Frontier Foundation, 1996).

enforcement, and corporations. It is now harder for those in power to conceal their activities since anyone with a mobile phone can monitor and report their findings to the world.

One example of this occurred on New Year's Day in Oakland, California. Several mobile phone users were able to capture a video of a police officer shooting Oscar Grant who was unarmed and restrained by other officers. These videos were uploaded to YouTube where they spread virally. After viewing these videos, several people began organizing rallies. While Grant did in fact die of his injuries, these videos helped in the prosecution of the officers.¹⁵⁷

Another tactic for digital activism is election monitoring and observation. Mobile phones have been used to combat fraudulent elections and voting fraud. MobileActive.org, a global network of people using mobile phones to make a social and political impact, was created in part by Katrin Verclas. Verclas believes mobile phones can be used for informal citizen-based election monitoring and data generation as well as more methodical organization where trained activists can monitor elections. These two methods have been used in countries such as Lebanon, Mexico, Ghana, Kenya, Sierra Leone, and India. As Kofi Annan, a former United Nations Secretary General mentioned to CNN on August 25, 2008, "With communication and cell phones, this is where it is difficult to cheat in elections now. You are announced at the district level and cell phones go wild so by the time you go to the capital, if you have changed the figures, they will

¹⁵⁷ Brannon Cullum, "Devices: The Power of Mobile Phones," In *Digital Activism Decoded: The New Mechanics of Change*, (New York: International Debate Education Association, 2010. 50-70), p. 59.

know and you will be caught out.”¹⁵⁸ Annan praised the use of these mobile phones in maintaining free and fair elections.

The capturing and sharing of videos and photographs is also now possible on mobile phones. Several mobile phones even allow users to upload videos directly from their phones to YouTube. These videos can then be shared with friends, other activists, or even international media outlets in order to reach millions of people. Iranian citizens used this technology during the June 2009 protests in Tehran following the presidential elections. Iranians suspected the election was fraudulent and demanded a recount. Many people outside of Iran learned about these protests from the violent images and videos captured on mobile phones and broadcasts worldwide. Since Al Jazeera and BBC World maintained that the Iranian government was censoring their broadcasts, the use of mobile phones was one of the few ways to transmit information.¹⁵⁹

Many mobile devices today have location-aware applications and networks. Due to the GPS sensors, mobile phones are able to pinpoint a physical location. These applications have had great success with crisis reporting, election monitoring, and citizen journalism. Specifically, in Kenya in 2008 and in Gaza in 2009, citizens were able to report the location of incidents during these turmoil situations using their phones’ GPS and SMS.¹⁶⁰ Some applications that use location-aware technology are FourSquare, Brightkite, Loopt, and Google Latitude.

In addition to the different technologies available to activists there are also specific tactics used for activism. One such tactic is “smart mobbing.” Howard

¹⁵⁸ *ibid*, p. 58.

¹⁵⁹ *ibid*, p. 54.

¹⁶⁰ *ibid*, p. 56.

Rheingold, the author of *Smart Mobs*, created this term. According to Rheingold, a smart mob is a group of people to coordinate their actions through the use of mobile devices such as phones, PDAs (Personal Digital Assistant) and SMS.¹⁶¹ While these smart mobs typically were without any centralized control, there were often activist groups directing their configuration. Thus, despite the lack of a formal leader, protesters have the ability to function as a group by relying on SMS for information on when and where to go as well as what to do.

Despite the lack of organizers, individual activists can use new digital applications and tools to coordinate protests in new ways that were not possible in the past. Digital media tools also have the capability for coordinating and decision-making. They offer people ways to easily become members by subscribing to an email list or joining a Facebook group. It allows activists a place for discussion to organize actions or determine the next step. It aids the scheduling of meetings and events through calendar-matching services. Activists can vote via the Internet or even exchange to-do lists.

Citizens of Kiev protested for over two weeks concerning the results of the presidential election during the 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine. These protesters believed the election to be fraudulent. Pora, a pro-democracy group, used text messages to coordinate demonstrations, send information to participants, and to increase the effectiveness of the protest. They used these text messages to schedule shifts to move people between ten cities to prolong the demonstrations. These protests resulted in a new election, which elected the opposition candidate Viktor Yushchenko.¹⁶²

Coordination was especially beneficial when American student James Karl Buck

¹⁶¹ Howard Rheingold, *Smart Mobs: The Next Social Revolution*.

¹⁶² Brannon Cullum, "Devices: The Power of Mobile Phones," p. 50.

and his translator were arrested during protests in Egypt in April 2008. Buck was able to send a text message to update his Twitter feed with a single word: “Arrested.” Buck’s Twitter followers worked together and were able to obtain his release within hours.¹⁶³

Manuel Castells, a leading sociologist of information society and communications research, argues three features that make networks the most efficient.¹⁶⁴ Social media emit these three features: First, their flexibility allows reconfiguration based on a changing environment while retaining original goals.¹⁶⁵ The Internet epitomizes the concept of a flexible and decentralized method of communication. It is because of this released form of organization that makes the Internet beneficial to social movements. People can start their movement using one tool and easily switch to a different tool if there is fear of their government learning their location and enforcing repercussions.

Castells’ second feature, scalability, is the ability to expand or minimize without disruption.¹⁶⁶ An example of scalability is the ability of mobile devices for bulk text messaging. This is a relatively new creation. Mobile phone users are not able to send bulk text messages. This makes it much easier to send information to a group of people instantly. This is also possible using many new social media sites such as YouTube. With larger audiences there is the possibility of messages to go viral. When this happens, authorities have a harder time stopping the spread of these messages.

¹⁶³ *ibid*, p. 56.

¹⁶⁴ Manuel Castells, *Communication Power*, (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 23.

¹⁶⁵ *ibid*.

¹⁶⁶ *ibid*.

Castells' third feature of digital media tools that assist democratization is their survivability. Survivability is the network's ability to withstand attacks.¹⁶⁷ Survivability is extremely important given authoritarian regimes' ability to halt protesters by censoring news stories, shutting down access to specific sites, or shutting off Internet access as a whole.

Mobile phones are also beneficial for activism because they can maintain communication with participants and outsiders even if/when mainstream media is cut off. In 2007 the Burmese government banned the majority of foreign media outlets and forbid reporting against its policies. Many civilians continued protests using their mobile phones to share news, upload photos and videos, and contact the press.¹⁶⁸ Similarly, in 2007 and 2008, Pakistani citizens used their mobile phones to contact radio stations when their country was under emergency rule. The government had censored and shut down independent media outlets but the radio stations were able to rebroadcast citizens' messages.¹⁶⁹

Kavada discusses how digital technology assists social movements through new tools. Kavada explains while the Internet greatly facilitates the mobilization of people in movements, the movements can also fail as fast as they begin. These movements typically last when people continually work together towards a common goal even if that goal changes. Kavada believes it is the stability and continuity that make online movements last.¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁷ *ibid.*

¹⁶⁸ Brannon Cullum, "Devices: The Power of Mobile Phones," p. 51.

¹⁶⁹ *ibid.*

¹⁷⁰ Anastasia Kavada, "Activism Transforms Digital: The Social Movement Perspective," p. 113.

Within these characteristics Kavada argues open narratives, regular offline meetings, well-defined objectives, and a permanent online space helps create a lasting online movement.¹⁷¹ It is important for online movements to have an open narrative in terms of their goals. This helps the movement maintain a continual stream of new members. It also helps them change their short-term goals as needed to make the most of new information.

Having regular offline meetings are also extremely important. With the increasing number of websites devoted to social movements it makes it nearly impossible for activists to actively participate in every one of them. Because of this the movement may become dispersed and have less of an effect. With offline meetings and demonstrations, activists are brought together at the same place and time.¹⁷² This helps the movement feel a greater sense of belonging.

Having well-defined projects is especially important to movements. By focusing on a specific objective, activists are forced to develop a good relationship and put any differences behind them for the benefit of the movement.¹⁷³ The relationship developed through the movement will also remain once the project is finished creating a tighter network that would be more likely to remain over time.

The last characteristic important to making online movements last, a permanent online space, reinforces the stability and continuity of the movement. Activists located in different countries need to be able to easily find new information. A permanent space helps keep the movement grounded for both existing and new participants. They will also

¹⁷¹ *ibid*, p. 114.

¹⁷² *ibid*, p. 115.

¹⁷³ *ibid*, p. 116.

be a place of recording and archiving past actions, decisions, and discussions.¹⁷⁴

There are also many contextual conditions that can lead to democratization with the assistance of ICTs. One such factor is the availability of information and education within the country. Without the relevant education and information of how to use these new ICTs, citizens cannot effectively use them to mobilize. Education also leads to the knowledge of other political possibilities to strive for. Within this factor there is also the possibility of the new technologies stimulating political and social discussions amongst citizens and possibly between citizens and leaders.

Another factor is the average incomes within the country. The equitable distribution of wealth across the population is also very important. These disparities in wealth are frequently abused by authoritarian regimes. This scenario can be exaggerated by elections. These disparities are a huge motivation for social unrest. While poverty is a huge factor in peoples' motivation to rise up against their government, a perception, whether real or not, of economic disparities is a main factor in the likelihood of civil unrest. When those at the lower end of the economic ladder feel the space between them and the elite growing to insurmountable measures they are more motivated. Because of this, countries where the majority of people are financially stable are more likely to experience stable social climates with a lower possibility of violence and/or radical democratization movements.¹⁷⁵

The average level of income within the nation is another factor that can lead to social unrest. Countries with well-educated citizens typically have a better understanding

¹⁷⁴ *ibid*, p. 117.

¹⁷⁵ Philip N. Howard, *The Digital Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Information Technology and Political Islam*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 185.

of the cause of their poverty along with the repercussions of their financial status. Because of this they have a greater understanding of the political, social and financial alternatives and are more likely to work harder to attain their ideal status.¹⁷⁶

The importance of fuel exports for the nation's economy is also an important cause of social rebellion. The majority of oil-rich states are quite wealthy yet they also suffer from having nearly half of their citizens living on less than two dollars per day. Seven of the ten wealthiest heads of state in the world come from underprivileged Arab countries.¹⁷⁷

The combination of the infrastructure and contextual conditions has the possibility of creating a space where individuals feel they have both the resources and reasons for rising up against their regime.¹⁷⁸ When successful, these individuals create a new system for communication between politicians, journalists, civic groups, elites, and average citizens. This new political outcome can then lead to institutional consequences where democratization may lead to either democratic transition or possibly even democratic entrenchment.

Howard discusses the sufficient and necessary causes of both democratic transition and democratic entrenchment. He also discusses the percentage of cases covered by the specific solution and the consistency of the cases noting the necessary and sufficient causes of one with the highest degree of coverage and another with the highest degree of consistency.¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁶ *ibid.*

¹⁷⁷ *ibid.*

¹⁷⁸ *ibid.*, p. 192.

¹⁷⁹ *ibid.*

Howard begins with the causes leading to democratic transition. Having an active online society in a country with a small population is one sufficient cause of democratic transition. This cause covers 65 percent of Howard's case studies and was consistent across 82 percent of cases. Having an active online society in a country with a well-educated population is a sufficient cause that covers 63 percent of cases with a 74 percent consistency. Having a small population is a necessary cause found in 76 percent of his cases leading to democratic transition with an 85 percent consistency rating. Having an active online society in a small and well-educated country is a necessary cause covered by 68 percent of cases with consistency across 91 percent of covered cases leading to democratic transitions.¹⁸⁰

The two most outstanding sufficient causes of democratic transition include an active online society. This factor along with having a small or well-educated population appears to represent close to two-thirds of Howard's cases. Having a small population is the main solitary cause with the best-case coverage. Yet having all three causes account for 68 percent of the cases with a 91 percent consistency rating.¹⁸¹ However, having a large civil society alone is not sufficient without education. The Internet and mobile phone base of a society is what leads to multiple formulas for democratization.

Howard then discusses the sufficient and necessary causes that lead to democratic entrenchment. Having a well-developed ICT infrastructure with an economy that is not dependent on fuel exports is a sufficient cause in 56 percent of cases leading to democratic entrenchment with an 86 percent consistency rating. Having a well-educated population along with an economy not dependent on fuel exports is covered by 51

¹⁸⁰ *ibid.*

¹⁸¹ *ibid.*, p. 194.

percent of Howard's case studies leading to democratic entrenchment with an 86 percent consistency rating. Having an economy not dominated by fuel exports is a necessary cause in 77 percent of cases leading to democratic entrenchment with 73 percent consistency. Having a well-developed ICT infrastructure, an economy not dependent on fuel-exports and a well-educated population is a necessary condition in 77 percent of cases leading to democratic entrenchment and is consistent 96 percent of the time.¹⁸²

As for democratic entrenchment, Howard's study found that a well-developed ICT infrastructure along with not being dependent on fuel exports is a sufficient cause. Having a well-educated population and not being dependent on fuel exports is the second best set of sufficient causes of democratic entrenchment. As Howard notes, having an economy that is not dependent on fuel exports is a main ingredient in both cases of democratic entrenchment.¹⁸³

There have been many instances where the features of these tools have aided in the process of democratization. In Moldova, in 2009, the Communist Party lost power after protests were coordinated via a text message, Facebook messages, and Tweets.¹⁸⁴ In Egypt, in 2011, it took a mere 18 days for citizens to take down a 30-year police state government with the help of Facebook.¹⁸⁵ As one protester in Cairo summed it up, "We use Facebook to schedule the protests, Twitter to coordinate, and YouTube to tell the

¹⁸² *ibid*, p. 192.

¹⁸³ *ibid*, p. 194.

¹⁸⁴ *ibid*.

¹⁸⁵ John Lloyd, "Mightiest for the mightiest: "The Net Delusion", " openDemocracy, <http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/john-lloyd/mightiest-for-mightiest-%E2%80%9C-net-delusion%E2%80%9D>.

world.”¹⁸⁶ In Tunisia, in 2010-2011, the youth of the country used Facebook and Twitter to share grievances, gain up-to-the-minute information, and fuel a movement that led to a revolution and the removal of Zine EI Abidine Ben Ali.¹⁸⁷

Another example of citizens using mobile phones in order to create political change occurred during the 2004 general election in Spain. Merely days before the Spanish national parliamentary election three trains were bombed in Madrid. These bombings resulted in the deaths of 192 people and the injuring of hundreds others. Immediately after the bombings the governing Popular Party (PP) stated that the Basque terrorist group ETA was responsible for the bombing. They announced this before there was any evidence concerning the violent act. By the end of the day Al Qaeda had claimed responsibility for the bombing despite the Spanish government’s continual assertion that the ETA was to blame. Many believe the government took this stance because it would benefit the Popular Party in the upcoming election against the Social Party. Spanish citizens were outraged by the government’s response and their attempt to cover up legitimate evidence that connected Al Qaeda to the bombings.¹⁸⁸

Many of these outraged citizens called for protests to express their anger towards the government. The mobile penetration rate of Spain in 2004 was at 94 percent. This shows that most Spaniards had the ability to send and receive text messages on their

¹⁸⁶ Philip N. Howard, “The Arab Uprising’s Cascading Effects,” Miller-McCune, <http://www.miller-mccune.com/politics/the-cascading-effects-of-the-arab-spring-28575>.

¹⁸⁷ Alexis Madrigal, “The Inside Story of How Facebook Responded to Tunisian Hacks,” *The Atlantic*. www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2011/01/the-inside-story-of-how-facebookresponded-to-tunisian-hacks/70044.
and Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Internet Rights and Wrongs: Choices and Challenges in a Networked World,” Speech, George Washington University from U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC, February 15, 2011.
and Michael Richter, “Facebook’s Response to DoC.”

¹⁸⁸ Brannon Cullum, “Devices: The Power of Mobile Phones,” p. 50.p. 62.

mobile phones. The first SMS message was sent on March 13, the day before the election, and stated, “The government lied. Pass it on.” Some other messages that were sent stated, “18:00 PP head office Genova St. no parties silence for the truth,” “Information poisoning at 18:00 PP Genova pass it on,” “We want to know before we vote,” and “The truth now, stop the manipulation, your war, our dead. Pass it on!”¹⁸⁹

Despite Spain’s ban on any political protests occurring within a day of any election, ten thousand citizens ignored the ban and gathered in front of the PP headquarters in Madrid by 11:00 pm. There was a 20 percent increase in text messages on March 13th and a 40 percent increase on March 14th, the day of the election. These text messages urged Spaniards to vote for the Socialist Party and join in the protests. These digital activism tactics proved successful when the Socialist Party defeated the PP with a turnout of 77 percent of the population, which was an increase of 8 percent from the previous year.¹⁹⁰


In his book, *Guerra, Terrorismo y elecciones: incidencia electoral de los atentados islamistas en Madrid*, Narciso Michavilla argued the greater the voters were influenced by the bombings the more they hesitated before voting. Thus the longer they waited the more likely they were to vote for the Socialists as illustrated in Figure 1. Michavilla concluded that “the association between the final election and the influence of the attacks is statistically significant.”¹⁹¹

¹⁸⁹ *ibid*, p. 63.

¹⁹⁰ Brannon Cullum, “Devices: The Power of Mobile Phones,” p. 50.p. 63.

¹⁹¹ N. Michavilla, *Guerra, Terrorismo y elecciones: incidencia electoral de los atentados islamistas en Madrid*, (Real Instituto Elcano, DT N13/2005), p. 29.

Figure 1



Final vote for PP, PSOE, or others, among late-deciding voters in the Spanish parliamentary elections of March 14, 2004, according to the influence of the events of March 11 on voters' decisions
 Source: N. Michavilla, p. 29.

Because of all of these characteristics of digital media tools users have the ability to form masses of 100,000 people in cities such as Ismailia with a population of 750,000 million.¹⁹² Without these sites groups might not be able to organize mobs of people large enough to have an affect on their government. While larger groups do not always equal success, they do make a larger impact, as illustrated by smart mobs.

Graeme Kirkpatrick argues in his book *Technology and Social Power*, that people construct their own value and meaning of technology based upon how they use it. Thus by using a site such as YouTube to send political content we transform the web into a political platform.¹⁹³ Digital media tools have the ability to turn dissatisfaction into collective action. The tools aid the organization, spread of information, mobilization, coordination, and organization of social movements. The future of digital activism is very optimistic. With mobile phones becoming more affordable and more developing nations

¹⁹² "Egypt," The Central Intelligence Agency, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/eg.html>.

¹⁹³ Graeme Kirkpatrick, *Technology and Social Power*, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan), 2008.

switching to 3G mobile networks, along with more communities adopting Internet access through Internet cafes and hot-spots, activists have the ability to access new applications and tools in order to employ the many beneficial features in digital media technologies. These technologies along with specific contextual conditions create an atmosphere more prone to democratization and possibly even democratic entrenchment.

Evidence of the Link Between Social Media and Democratization

The purpose of this chapter is to review the different quantitative and qualitative evidence on the ties between digital media and democratization. There are several different approaches to studying these ties and I will review them in order to demonstrate the current evidence available to support my thesis. The goal of reviewing the following studies is for better understanding of how liberation technologies can change the balance of power between authoritarian regimes and the opposition movements that protest them. The first section of this chapter will offer studies involved in a quantitative analysis. The second section provides a review of qualitative studies, in particular, concerning R. Kelly Garrett's article *Protest in an information society: A review of literature on social movements and new ICTs*.

Quantitative Analyses


Christopher Kedzie is one of the first researchers to conduct quantitative approach concerning the relationship between the Internet and democracy. He uses data from 144 countries along with linear regression to analyze “the strength of traditional predictors of democracy including economic development and education, human development and health, ethnicity and culture, as well as indicators that represent pre-Internet ICTs, and studies them against the strength of Internet prevalence.”¹⁹⁴ Kedzie concludes that the Internet is a better predictor of democracy than other traditional predictors. This study was based on information from 1993.¹⁹⁵ At this time there were still very few Internet users, even less in developing countries, and many social media sites and location-aware

¹⁹⁴Christopher R. Kedzie, “The Third Waves”, In *Borders and Cyberspace: Information Policy and the Global Information Infrastructure*, Brian Kahin and Charles Nesson, eds. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997), p. 106-28.

¹⁹⁵ *ibid.*

technology was not yet prevalent in society.

Figure 2




source: Christopher R. Kedzie

Best and Wade also conducted a study concerning the effects Internet has on democracy around the world. They used data from 180 countries from 1992 through 2002 and statistical methods to examine the relationships between different predictors related to democracy and Internet prevalence based on region. While their results from 1992 through 2000 was limited due to ignoring the impact of mobile phones and being pre-social media sites their data from 2001-2002 did show a “substantial relationship between Internet usage and democracy” even when “accounting for region and socioeconomic development.”¹⁹⁶ The study’s finding “supports the existence of a positive relationship between democratic growth and Internet penetration.”¹⁹⁷

¹⁹⁶M.L. Best and K.W. Wade, “The Internet and Democracy: Global Catalyst or Democratic Dud?” *Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society* 30, no.3 (June 2009).

¹⁹⁷ *ibid.*

Figure 3
Correlation (and Linear Fit) Between Democracy
Variable and Internet Users per 1,000 People




source: Philip N. Howard

Philip Howard completed research on how information infrastructures support democratization in Muslim countries. He created a weighted index of technology diffusion and democracy for 74 countries from 1994 through 2008. “The index of technology diffusion was computed ... for mobile phones, Internet users, Internet hosts, personal computers, national Internet bandwidth, and broadband Internet users, and then averaged and transformed into set-theoretic values.”¹⁹⁸ The technology variables were weighted against the GDP of the country in order to keep wealth constant before calculating the diffusion index. His results show the level of technology diffusion in a country with its economic output compared to the other 73 countries. He then used fuzzy-set statistical models to put the countries into three groups based on their individual levels of information technology and democratization. Finally he used correlation statistics to conclude that six percent of the variation in democratization in Muslim countries can be

¹⁹⁸ *ibid.*

explained by technology diffusion.¹⁹⁹

Figure 4



Degrees of Membership in the Set of Countries where
Technology Diffusion caused Democratization
source: Philip N. Howard

Howard’s results “demonstrate that an active online civil society and good state information infrastructure in small countries with well educated populations has resulted in democratic transitions. The two most prominent and parsimonious sufficient causes of democratic transition share one ingredient—having a comparatively active online civil society. Having such an active online civil society, along with having a comparatively small population or a comparatively well-educated population, proves to represent almost two-thirds of the cases studied.”²⁰⁰ The results also show that “it is the relatively large internet and mobile phone user base—a wired civil society—that consistently serves as a

¹⁹⁹ *ibid.*

²⁰⁰ *ibid.*

causal condition across multiple democratization recipes.”²⁰¹ He concludes “among the countries with large Muslim communities, those with a rapidly expanding information infrastructure experienced either democratic transitions or entrenchment. This conclusion makes an explicit link through which technology diffusion can contribute to democratization.”²⁰²

Howard continues, “For countries such as Bosnia, Georgia, and Indonesia, good ICT infrastructure supported strong democratic movements. For Azerbaijan and the Central African Republic, the lack of technology diffusion has allowed for deepening authoritarianism. For countries such as Benin, Eritrea, and Gambia, technology diffusion has not been particularly rapid, and democratization movements in these countries have had little success.”²⁰³ Yet even with his analysis, Howard argues that statistical analysis is not enough to determine how information technology infrastructure supports democratization. Instead he promotes for a study to be done using qualitative, comparative, and quantitative research. As Howard states, “perhaps the best reason to proceed in a qualitative and comparative way is that the categories of ‘democracy’ and ‘technology diffusion’ are themselves aggregates and proxies for other measurable phenomena.”

Manuel Castells, along with Mireia Fernandez-Ardevol, Jack Linchuan Qiu, and Araba Sey, conducted a study concerning the use of mobile devices in social movements. They begin their study by mentioning the typical argument that technology is more often adopted by those with higher socio-economic statuses. They agree that this assumption

²⁰¹ *ibid.*

²⁰² *ibid.*

²⁰³ *ibid.*

can be made by looking at the Asian Pacific and the United States, however, as Castells, et al. discovered; when one looks at Europe they will notice that income is not an important predictor of cell phone adoption. The average cell phone penetration rate in Europe was at 70 percent as of 2004 and even up to 90 percent in some countries. Because of this the authors of *The Mobile Communication Society* believe that the higher the technology penetration rate, the less income differences matter.²⁰⁴

This, however, is not relevant in countries where the technological penetration rate is significantly lower than that of European countries. In these countries socio-economic status still remains a significant factor in whether or not a person will own or operate a mobile phone. For example, in South Korea 84.3 percent of people with a monthly income above KRW 3.5 million had adopted the mobile phone technology whereas only 69.9 percent of those who earn less than KRW 2 million per month had adopted it.²⁰⁵

While socio-economic status does indeed make a huge difference in the adoption of mobile phones in countries that have lower penetration rates, there are still other methods for the lower income classes to obtain this technology. One of the more popular options is using a prepaid service. Between 70 and 90 percent of mobile subscribers in the Philippines use prepaid phone cards instead of having fixed-term contracts with a mobile phone provider.²⁰⁶ These prepaid phone cards are an excellent choice for those without credit history, a stable source of income, or a permanent address.

²⁰⁴ Manuel Castells, Mireia Fernandez-Ardevol, Jack Linchuan Qiu, and Araba Sey, *The Mobile Communication Society*, (Los Angeles: University of Southern California, 2004), p. 55.

²⁰⁵ *ibid*, p. 56.

²⁰⁶ *ibid*, p. 58.

People's income also affects the rate of adoption of mobile phones and mobile Internet. In 2004 the majority of mobile phone users in China had a medium income and education with 45 percent having a monthly income of 800-3,000 Yuan and 10.6 percent having a high-income bracket of more than 3,000 Yuan. Thus over 55 percent of monthly subscribers had a medium to high monthly income. This shows that those with a higher income tend to adopt new technology earlier than their counterparts.²⁰⁷

The United Nation's International Telecommunications Union estimated there were 4.1 billion people worldwide in 2009 that subscribed to mobile phone with two-thirds of those people located in developing countries.²⁰⁸ Also the 2009 report on digital activism reported by DigiActive noted that those with a mobile phone with more features were more likely to use their phones for activism.²⁰⁹

There are several limitations to most quantitative analysis studies concerning the use of the Internet and/or digital media. The data available for these studies typically end before the mobile phone was as prevalent as it is not and before most major social media websites were even created. The quantitative study performed by Howard is the only one that uses data through 2008. The studies also typically focus on either the Internet or the use of mobile phones but rarely touch on both. It is important to study both since they work together especially when using social media on ones' internet-enabled mobile device. Also the research typically groups data on either democratic or authoritarian states but forget that the democratization of authoritarian states may not always lead

²⁰⁷ *ibid*, p. 59.

²⁰⁸ Mary Joyce, *Digital Activism Decoded: The New Mechanics of Change*, (New York: International Debate Education Association, 2010), p. 47.

²⁰⁹ *ibid*, p. 48.

quickly to consolidation but may pause at liberalization. This is not to say liberalization is not a significant mark of progress.

Qualitative Analyses


The second part of this chapter reviews qualitative analyses done by researchers in the field. I will review R. Kelly Garrett's study along with James Hyland, Philip Howard, Clay Shirky, and several others. These scholars use case studies in order to provide conclusions concerning the ties between digital media and democratization.

In *Protest in an information society: A Review of Literature on Social Movements and New ICTs*, R. Kelly Garrett "explains the emergence, development and outcomes of social movements by addressing three interrelated factors: mobilizing structures, opportunity structures and framing processes."²¹⁰ Garrett starts with three mechanisms concerning the use of information and communication technology to assist with democratization: mobilizing structures, opportunity structures, and framing processes. According to Garrett, mobilizing structures aid the organization and collective action. They may include social structures and/or tactical Opportunity Structures are the conditions that support a social movement. Finally, framing processes are "strategic attempts to craft, disseminate, and contest the language and narratives used to describe a movement."²¹¹

²¹⁰ R. K. Garrett, "Protest in an information society: A review of literature on social movements and new ICTs," *Information, Communication, and Society*, Vol. 9, No. 2. 2006.

²¹¹ *ibid.*

Figure 5



According to Garrett, “Organizing a review of the relationship between social movements and new ICTs along these lines facilitates conversations across the field around common issues of concern, highlighting connections between scholars and research agendas that might otherwise be difficult to discern. The breadth of the framework, integrating several major strands of social movement scholarship, makes it particularly appropriate to the task. A recent volume addressing the relationship between social movements and new ICTs effectively employs a similar strategy for integrating the studies it includes.”²¹²

Howard then breaks these three factors down into subgroups. Mobilizing structures are broken down into categories such as participation levels, contentious activity, recruitment and organizational issues. These subgroups are then broken down even further. Participation levels are broken down to reduction of participation costs, promotion of collective identity, and creation of community. These categories are not

²¹² *ibid.*

mutually exclusive nor are they necessarily interdependent.

Under mobilizing structures, Garrett discusses the influence of ICT on participation in social movements. He believes it is linked to the reduction of participation costs, the promotion of the collective identity, and the creation of a community. Participation is very important for civic engagement. “The effect of Internet use on engagement is positive.”²¹³

Information and communication technologies certainly have the potential to “reduce the costs of conventional forms of participation, and to create new low-cost forms of participation, ultimately contributing to an upsurge in participation.”²¹⁴ Garrett argues that by lowering these costs the ICT’s can help with group formation, recruitment, retention, and efficiency in order to increase political participation.

Similarly, Howard argues that, “countries where Internet access has become less costly have seen greater use and a greater number of civic groups taking to the Internet. Some groups are long-standing contributors to civic discourse; many are new and exist because the Internet has facilitated the interaction and organization of likeminded citizens.”²¹⁵ As an example, Howard explains how new ICTs in Iran “gave social movement leaders the capacity not only to reach out to sympathetic audiences overseas but also to reach two important domestic constituencies: rural, conservative voters who

²¹³ S. Boulianne, “Does internet use affect engagement? A meta-analysis of research,” *Political Communication*, 26, 2009, p. 193-664.

²¹⁴ R. K. Garrett, “Protest in an information society: A review of literature on social movements and new ICTs.”

²¹⁵ Philip N. Howard, *The Digital Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Information Technology and Political Islam*.

had few connections to the urban chaos; and the clerical establishment.”²¹⁶

James Hyland purports that in a smaller and more local society in which people are face-to-face information travels effortlessly. However, many societies do not exist of simply a small town where people see each other every day and can inform one another of town events. In large countries where people in cities and far reached rural areas never even meet there needs to be a method to distribute the information to the masses. Thus Hyland argues, “the freedom of the press’, not to mention its quality and who controls it, is and must be one of the fundamental elements of a mass democracy.”²¹⁷

In addition, Shirky claims, “as the communications landscape gets denser, more complex, and more participatory, the networked population is gaining greater access to information, more opportunities to engage in public speech, and an enhanced ability to undertake collective action.”²¹⁸

Finally, Garrett concludes that international social movements cannot communicate as efficiently without today’s ICTs since “costs and delays associated with prior communication technologies made coordinating transnational advocacy too cumbersome to be effective.”²¹⁹

Next under participation, ICTs promote the collective identity. They may further the view “among individuals that they are members of a larger community by virtue of

²¹⁶ *ibid.*

²¹⁷ James L. Hyland, *Democratic theory: the philosophical foundations*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995), p. 43.

²¹⁸ Clay Shirky, *Here comes everybody: the power of organizing without organizations*, (New York: Penguin Books), 2009.

²¹⁹ R. K. Garrett, “Protest in an information society: A review of literature on social movements and new ICTs.”

the grievances they share.”²²⁰ ICTs may also promote the collective identity across borders. This allows activists to more easily mobilize.

Also under participation, ICTs can assist with the creation of a sense of community “through automated mailing lists that distribute announcements, online discussion forums such as chat rooms, message boards, text/instant messaging, and links to the web ring of affinity groups with like-minded objectives.”²²¹ As Howard describes, “Opposition campaign managers in Iran consistently say that such Internet applications allow them to get messages out as never before and thereby organize bigger and bigger campaign rallies. Without access to broadcast media, savvy opposition campaigners turned social media applications like Facebook from minor pop culture fads into a major tool of political communication.”²²²

Besides the technological advantages to using social media in the fight for democratization there is also the empathetic experience that assists. This could mean the proximity of either a geographical community or a virtual community. An empathetic experience is when we share the emotion of what is occurring to the people around us. This greatly helps in forming a sense of community. Studies show that when we are participating in social media our brains are releasing Oxytocin. Oxytocin is the hormone related to caring and bonding within relationships. These same studies also show that digital experiences can inspire the kind of bonding experience through trust and

²²⁰ *ibid.*

²²¹ *ibid.*

²²² Philip N. Howard, *The Digital Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Information Technology and Political Islam.*

empathy.²²³ It is this bonding that will engage users to share and connect with each other and to assist in political struggles.

The next factor that influences mobilization structures by linking ICTs with social movements is contentious activity. One aspect of ICTs is their “ability to accelerate and geographically extend the diffusion of social movement information and of protest.”²²⁴ ICTs allow information to travel at a faster pace and to far reach places. They also allow activists to use new forms of contentious activity.

One type of contentious activity that is made possible by ICTs is the alteration of existing tactics to influence the media and create transparency. These new technologies employ concepts such as sousveillance and deterrence. In 2009, President Obama argued that “the more freely information flows, the stronger the society becomes, because then citizens of countries around the world can hold their own government accountable.”²²⁵ As Garrett mentions, “Elites are more likely to behave in a manner consistent with citizen concerns if they work in an environment where they must assume their actions are being observed and that news of any inappropriate actions—even those traditionally outside the media spotlight—will quickly reach the public.”²²⁶

The final factor to contribute to mobilizing structures is organizational issues. ICTs “facilitate the adoption of decentralized, non-hierarchical organizational forms, and

²²³Deanna Zandt, “Civic Engagement in the Era of New Media,” Speech, 2011 New York Life Symposium from Colin Powell Center for Policy Studies, New York, March 16, 2011.

²²⁴R. K. Garrett, “Protest in an information society: A review of literature on social movements and new ICTs.”

²²⁵ Evgeny Morozov, *The Net Delusion: The Dark Side of Internet Freedom*, (New York: Public Affairs, 2011).

²²⁶ R. K. Garrett, “Protest in an information society: A review of literature on social movements and new ICTs.”

make movement-entrepreneur-led activism more likely.”²²⁷ Bruce Etling, Robert Faris and John Palfrey, in *Political Change in the Digital Age: The Fragility and Promise of Online Organizing*, discuss how smart mobs are an increasingly effective method of digital activism given their ability to take governments by surprise. “In a few cases, the ability of a mob to quickly overwhelm unprepared governments has been successful.”²²⁸ Because of these items there will likely be a rise in ICT facilitated protests.

Bringing down President Estrada via a text message was a great example of the early eruption of smart mobs but it was not the only one. Thousands of bicyclists gather monthly for “Critical Mass” demonstrations since 1992 riding through San Francisco after having been alerted by mobile phones and mass email chains. Demonstrators protested the meeting of the World Trade Organization on November 30, 1999 using “swarming” tactics, mobile phones, and websites to win the “Battle of Seattle.” The following Spring, a group of violent demonstrators were videoed using a webcast to chronicle these protests. In September of that year thousands of British citizens used mobile phones, SMS, email and CB radios to coordinate groups to block fuel delivery at specific gas stations to protest the sudden rise in gas prices.²²⁹

The second factor to connect ICT’s and democratization through social movements are opportunity structures. Opportunity structures include both political and economic contexts. Within the political context there is the accessibility to the political system, which reduces resistance, the alignment among elites, and the state’s allies.

²²⁷ *ibid.*

²²⁸ Bruce Etling, Robert Faris and John Palfrey, “Political Change in the Digital Age: The Fragility and Promise of Online Organizing”, *SAIS Review*, Summer-Fall 2010, p. 37.

²²⁹ Howard Rheingold, *Smart Mobs: The Next Social Revolution*, (Cambridge, MA: Perseus Pub., 2003), p. 158.

Within the economic context there is the idea that ICTs “foster transnational activity, including contention, and this ultimately influences national-level political opportunity structures.”²³⁰ In this context we find the dictator’s dilemma. The idea behind the dictator’s dilemma is that “globalization and globalized markets—largely facilitated and accelerated by the Internet—force governments to keep their countries’ communication borders open.”²³¹

The third factor in Garrett’s framework is the framing processes. The framing processes include “strategic attempts to craft, disseminate and contest the language and narratives used to describe a movement.”²³² As Howard mentions, “it used to be that these cultural elites were able to define public opinion. Now there are mechanisms for at least allowing some contrasts and divergence of opinion. The Internet and mobile phones, in some modest respects, have freed public opinion from being narrowly constituted as the opinion of a small elite.”²³³

ICTs allow people to bypass state media. New technologies have reduced the necessary resources to get around state ventures. Because of this “information available online is less likely than other mass media formats to conform to the prevailing national-level ideological and hegemonic structures, because the *potential* for nearly anyone to participate and contribute in an online environment is much greater than it has been with

²³⁰ R. K. Garrett, “Protest in an information society: A review of literature on social movements and new ICTs.”

²³¹ M.L. Best and K.W. Wade.

²³² R. K. Garrett, “Protest in an information society: A review of literature on social movements and new ICTs.”

²³³ Philip N. Howard, *The Digital Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Information Technology and Political Islam*, p. 103.

other, more traditional media.”²³⁴ ICTs can also be a useful tool for covering news and producing exposure.

In particular, wireless communications are increasingly able to bypass mass media as a new source of information. There have been many instances of people using mobile communications in order to express their discontent or frustration with the powers that be. These same frustrated people have also used mobile communications in order to form protests and sometimes even flash mobs in order to have a substantial impact.

It allows information to flow through networks more quickly in order for more people to act. However it can also be used to spread inaccurate information. Based on the use of wireless communication technology in the ousting of President Estrada, this tool is extremely beneficial to those who wish to influence and/or change politics. While cell phones do not replace wired communication methods they do add to and expand the networks available to activists.

Qualitative research also has several weaknesses. The materials are typically very anecdotal and rely more on theoretical data than empirical. The majority of these studies also concentrate on a single case study, which does not prove much worth in determining the likelihood of replication in other scenarios. Thus there is the need for a research study using both quantitative and qualitative research across several case studies.

Combining Quantitative and Qualitative Research

The Meta-Activism Project (MAP) is currently working on the Global Digital Activism Dataset (GDADS) with Clay Shirky, Ethan Zuckerman, and Patrick Meier serving as advisors. MAP launched in 2010 in order to provide data on digital activism

²³⁴Jacob Groshek, “A Time–Series, Multinational Analysis of Democratic Forecasts and Internet Diffusion,” *International Journal of Communication* 4, 2010, p. 142-174.

activities between 1982 and 2010 to be used for quantitative analysis. They have a three-step process in place. First is the collection of case studies. They are using case studies from popular press, citizen journalism, and academic journals. Second, they plan to create a codebook with variable definitions to analyze data across different cases. Currently the codebook has 72 variables for each case including time, geography, actors, digital technology used, and strategies. The third step is to request volunteers to help code the case studies. GDADS is an enormous undertaking and will greatly advance the data available on the link between digital technology and democratization. GDADS will not, however, be available until late 2011.²³⁵ By the time this dataset is completed there will most likely be new technologies invented to assist social movements with their campaigns for democratization, the study will take a huge leap in the research available to conclude these positive ties.

²³⁵ The Open Society Institute's Health Media Initiative, "The Global Digital Activism Data Set," The Meta-Activism Project, <http://www.meta-activism.org>.

The Philippines: How Text Messaging Ousted a President

Case studies are also very important to support my findings. I will start by observing the occurrences of the Power People II in the Philippines. There have been several attempts at changing the regime in the Philippines since 1970 including the movement that forced former President Ferdinand Marcos out of office in 1986. Unlike in 1986, wired and wireless technologies made the 2001 revolution larger in scope and reach. This four-day revolution occurred from January 17th through the 20th in 2001. It is named the EDSA Revolution after the street Epifanio de los Santos Avenue, which is where the crowds originally gathered, or Power People II after the Power People Movement in 1986.

The background to Power People II is very important. Joseph Estrada served in the public sector first as mayor for 16 years, then as senator, followed by vice-president and finally as the 13th President of the Philippines on June 30th, 1998. Estrada won the presidential election with the strong support of 10.7 million votes.²³⁶

From the beginning of his presidency and on, accusations of Estrada's involvement in corruption were spreading around the country. Some of these accusations include accepting bribes, mishandling public funds, and using illegal funds to buy houses for his mistresses. A friend of President Joseph Estrada accused Estrada and his family and friends of receiving over 80 million from *jueteng*, an illegal numbers game, on October 4th 2000. This was the most serious charge to date. On October 5th Senate Minority Leader Teofisto Guingona Jr. accused Estrada of taking P70 million on exercise

²³⁶ Manuel Castells, Mireia Fernandez-Ardevol, Jack Linchuan Qiu, and Araba Sey, *The Mobile Communication Society*, (Los Angeles: University of Southern California, 2004), p. 198.

tax on cigarettes as well receiving P220 million from Governor Singson from 1998 to 2000.

Vice President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo resigned from the Cabinet on October 12th before becoming the leader of People Power II.²³⁷ Opposition groups filed an impeachment complaint with House Representatives on October 18th, 2000 before flocking to the streets of Manila. Within one month over a dozen senior officials, including the Senate President and House Speaker, withdrew their support. Investigations began and many house members, including Manila Cardinal Archbishop Jaime Sin, the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines, former Presidents Corazon Aquino and Fidel Ramos to impeach President Estrada. Speaker of the House of Representatives, Manuel Villar, read the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate on November 13, 2000. The Articles of Impeachment was signed by 115 representatives.²³⁸ On November 20th the impeachment trial was formally opened and began on December 7th with Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. presiding.²³⁹

Five bombs exploded in Mainila killing 22 and injuring over a hundred citizens at public spaces such as the airport, a train, bus, gas station and park, on December 30th, 2000. This act of violence disrupted the entire country. The Muslim rebel group, Jemaah Islamiyah, was accused following a police investigation; however, many believed the violent act was related to Estrada's impeachment trial.²⁴⁰

²³⁷ *ibid*, p. 198.

²³⁸ Estrada vs Desierto: 146710-15 : March 2, 2001 : J. Puno : En Banc (http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/146710_15.htm)

²³⁹ *ibid*.

²⁴⁰ Manuel Castells, et al, *The Mobile Communication Society*, p. 198.

The trial hit a crucial point on January 16, 2001 when the question arose of whether to open an envelope that contained important evidence that would allegedly incriminate and sustain the corrupt acts of Estrada. Francisco Tatad, the Senate Majority Floor Leader, requested a vote to open the envelope.²⁴¹ Senators voted 11-10 to keep an envelope, believed to contain records of Estrada's transactions, sealed on January 16th, 2001. This infuriated Manila residents. Within hours of the critical meeting for the trial text messages were sent with instructions to meet at the Shrine at Epifanio de los Santos Avenue, also known as EDSA, to protest the apparent injustice.²⁴²

These crowds were brought together through their disapproval of the impeachment court. However, had it not been for their text messages and use of another information technologies, the crowds might not have grown to the extent they were able. One text message sent out after the voting results were made public stated, "Baboy ang mga 11 na mga senador! S#%^t, acquitted na si Estrada! Pipol Power na! Pls. pass..." which translates to "The 11 senators are pigs! S#@t, Estrada is acquitted! Let's do People Power! Pls. pass..."²⁴³

People Power II lasted four days. On the second day of demonstrations a group of senator-judges that served on the impeachment trial resigned suspending the case indefinitely. Two days later the Defense Secretary and Finance Secretary resigned joining Gloria Arroyo and the other former officials leading the demonstrations. At this point

²⁴¹ Belinda Olivares-Cunanan, "Philippine Daily Inquirer - Google News Archive Search," Google News, <http://news.google.com/newspapers?id=PX42AAAAIIBAJ&sjid=hCUMAAAAIIBAJ&pg=2261,35034653&dq=estrada+trial+envelope&hl=en>.

²⁴² Manuel Castells, et al, *The Mobile Communication Society*, p. 199.

²⁴³ Jennifer Bagalawis, "How IT helped to topple a president" *ITworld*, http://www.itworld.com/CW_1-31-01_it.

Estrada's cabinet lost several leaders, including having the military side with the opposition. Estrada appeared on television at 2:00pm to insist that he would not resign. He reappeared on the television at 6:15pm announcing a presidential election to take place on May 14th without his name in the running.²⁴⁴ Finally, on January 20, 2001, the Armed Forces Chief of Staff and Vice Chief of Staff led Estrada out of the Malacanang Palace. That evening the Supreme Court officially declared the presidency vacant in order to have Gloria Arroyo sworn in.²⁴⁵

President Estrada was run out of office by angry citizens that were mobilized via text messages on mobile devices. It was wireless technology that became the "effective messengers of information."²⁴⁶ The technology allowed people to mobilize quickly and efficiently creating a snowball effect towards a common goal. While the Filipinos were successful without the use of social media in 1986, governments now have a much wider range of tools at their disposal in order to maintain their position and thus citizens need to broaden their reach as well in order to be successful.

The two major SMS operators in the Philippines, Smart Communications Inc and Globe Telecom, transmitted a total of over 115 million text messages each day during Power People II as opposed to the typical daily average of 24.7 million text messages.²⁴⁷

²⁴⁸ Many people complained there was no signal at EDSA on the days of the revolution

²⁴⁴ Estrada vs Desierto

²⁴⁵ Manuel Castells, et al, *The Mobile Communication Society*, p. 199.

²⁴⁶ Jennifer Bagalawis, "How IT helped to topple a president."

²⁴⁷ Michael Bociurkiw, "Revolution by Cell Phone" *Forbes*, <http://www.forbes.com/asap/2001/0910/028.html>.

²⁴⁸ Manuel Castells, et al, p. 200.

but these were not simply dead spots. There was no signal because the large masses of people concentrated in one location were too much for the cell sites to handle.²⁴⁹

The Philippines, similar to other developing nations with liberal trade policies, has the most up to date technologies while remaining hindered by their failing infrastructures. While their roads, railroads, postal services, and power continually worsen, they are able to bypass these obstacles with a mobile phone.

Vincent Rafael, author of *The cell phone and the crowd: Messianic politics in the contemporary Philippines*, goes over the three reasons mobile phones have become a thing of obsession in Manila, Philippines. The first reason was because of the “perennial difficulty and expense of acquiring land line phone in the Philippines, and the service provided by the Philippine Long Distance Company (PLDT).”²⁵⁰

The second reason was because of the low costs. Since most people bought prepaid phone cards to go with their low cost phones (typically \$50 in an open market) the mobile phone would be more affordable than either a wired phone or a computer.²⁵¹

The third reason for the mobile phone craze was because mobile phones “allow users to reach beyond traffic-clogged streets and serve as an alternative to slow, unreliable, and expensive postal service.”²⁵²

Other methods of technology were used to mobilize the masses as well. The e-petition site E-Lagada.com gathered 91,000 e-signatures. An SMS (text message) poll-

²⁴⁹ Jennifer Bagalawis, “How IT helped to topple a president.”

²⁵⁰ V. Rafael, “The cell phone and the crowd: Messianic politics in the contemporary Philippines,” *Popular Culture*, 15(3): 399-425, 2003, p. 402.

²⁵¹ Manuel Castells, et al, *The Mobile Communication Society*, p. 126.

²⁵² V. Rafael, “The cell phone and the crowd: Messianic politics in the contemporary Philippines,” p. 402-403.

taking technology, wpulse.com received 5,157 votes in favor of the impeachment of Estrada and 475 opposed. The typical methods of communication, radio and television broadcasts were also used in this revolution.²⁵³

Estrada was succeeded by his vice-president, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in front of the crowds. Estrada released a letter stating he had “strong and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as president” but that he would give up office to help the nation.²⁵⁴ The world’s reactions to these events were very mixed. One text message sent after the fall of President Estrada summed it up perfectly, “CONGRATULATIONS! THANK U 4 UR SUPPORT N DS HISTORICL EVENT. ERAP WIL GO DOWN N PHIL. HSTORY S BEIN D 1ST PRESIDNT OUSTD BY TXT.”²⁵⁵

Foreign nations, including the United States recognized Macapagal-Arroyo as a legitimate president. However, other commentators have described the revolution as “a defeat for due process,’ as ‘mob rule,’ as ‘a de facto coup”²⁵⁶ But as President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo said in her inaugural speech, “advances in information and communication technology create both peril and opportunity.”²⁵⁷

One question that has surfaced since the Power People II is, why did Estrada not attempt to prevent the mobilization of people by shutting off mobile communication

²⁵³ Jennifer Bagalawis, “How IT helped to topple a president.”

²⁵⁴ *ibid*

²⁵⁵ *ibid*.

²⁵⁶ Seth Mydans, “‘People Power II’ Doesn’t Give Filipinos the Same Glow” *The New York Times*, <http://www.nytimes.com/2001/02/05/world/people-power-ii-doesn-t-give-filipinos-the-same-glow.html>, February 5, 2001.

²⁵⁷ Jennifer Bagalawis, “How IT helped to topple a president.”

networks? Rafael argues the power of the cell phone was due to the need “to overcome the crowded conditions and congested surroundings brought about by state’s inability to order everyday life.”²⁵⁸ As Castells et al. continue, it was the existence of a weak state prior to the protests that made the mobile phone plays a key role in this situation. Had there been a stronger state, Castells argues, there would have been a different result.²⁵⁹

Most media channels saw the overthrow of Estrada as positive progress in the country’s democratization. The mobile phone played a huge role during People Power II with its ability to disseminate messages, methods of instant communication, mobilize political demonstrations, and coordinate logistics. While Marcos was able to rule for nearly two decades after allegations of corruption and human rights violations had been made, it was only two and a half years into Estrada’s presidency to oust him from his position. For these above reasons, Helen Andrade- Jimenez claimed that, “People Power II showed the power of the Internet and mobile communications technology – not to mention broadcast media – not only to shape public opinion but also to mobilize civil society when push came to a shove.”²⁶⁰ Given the significantly decreased levels of violence and military involvement from Power People in 1986, the larger and faster use of information and communication technologies in the 2001 ousting of President Estrada did in fact assist the nation in taking a major leap in the process of democratization.²⁶¹

²⁵⁸ V. Rafael, “The cell phone and the crowd: Messianic politics in the contemporary Philippines,” p. 402-403.

²⁵⁹ Manuel Castells, et al, *The Mobile Communication Society*, p. 204.

²⁶⁰ *ibid*, p. 200.

²⁶¹ *ibid*.

Egypt: The Beginning of Democratization

For the second case study, I will explore the recent revolutions in Egypt. While this situation continues, I feel that we can learn by observing the overall timeline of events leading up to and during the revolution. After all, as Huntington explained in *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, waves of democratization are often followed with reverse waves.²⁶² This is not to say that the liberalization which had occurred during the initial wave was not immense progress. Despite Egypt's continual struggle towards consolidation, their revolution and work towards becoming a fully consolidated democracy is worth reviewing.

The democratization of Egypt through digital medium began years before the 2011 Egyptian revolution. In fact, the 2011 Egyptian revolution was not even the first time Facebook had been used for civic organizing in Egypt. A strike to fight for better wages at a state-owned textile factory in Mahalla, Egypt was planned via Facebook in April 2008. What started as a local strike soon became the "April 6 Youth Movement" consisting of over 70,000 young and educated Egyptians.²⁶³ This movement fought for the release of journalists from jail, conducted online discussions about government corruption, and organized protests against President Hosni Mubarak's diplomatic relations with Israel during the air strikes against Gaza in December 2008. At this point in time there were an estimated 12 million Egyptians regularly online along with a projected 160,000 Egyptian bloggers. These numbers increased and within a year there were

²⁶² Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, p. 15

²⁶³ Philip N. Howard, *The Digital Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Information Technology and Political Islam*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 135.

800,000 Egyptian Facebook members making Facebook the third most popular website in the country.²⁶⁴

The Egyptian revolution of 2011 began on January 25th. Egyptian citizens, inspired by the successful Tunisian revolution that forced President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali from the office and country, fled to the streets of Cairo's Tahrir Square to protest the 30-year-old regime that had introduced poverty, unemployment, and corruption. They were also protesting police brutality, state emergency laws, a lack of free elections, corruption, and food price inflation. Several Egyptians had been deprived of their basic needs including education and health care. Almost 40 million people in Egypt were living under or near the United Nations' poverty line of \$2 a day.²⁶⁵

The demonstrations on the 25th were the largest Egypt had seen in years. These protests began with a small group of activists handing out flyers on the street. The crowds grew at an alarming rate once social media tools became involved in spreading the word. Soon 90,000 people announced that they would attend the demonstrations via Facebook and Twitter. The protests began in a peaceful manner but soon the protesters began to attack trucks and throw rocks while being beaten by officers with batons and tear gas. Many marched to the headquarters of President Hosni Mubarak's National Democratic Party.²⁶⁶ By late in the afternoon on the 25th the government blocked access to Twitter in order to attempt to halt the increasing civil unrest.

²⁶⁴ *ibid*, p. 135.

²⁶⁵ AP, "Mubarak Faces Egypt Protests On 'Day Of Rage'," *Breaking News and Opinion on The Huffington Post*, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/01/25/mubarak-faces-egypt-prote_n_813572.html#s229529.

²⁶⁶ AP, "Mubarak Faces Egypt Protests On 'Day Of Rage',"

The protests continued and by the 27th the Egyptian government had shut down Internet access just hours before the largest planned protest.²⁶⁷ Ben Wedeman, a CNN reporter, confirmed via Twitter, “No internet, no SMS, what is next? Mobile phones and land lines? So much for stability. #Jan25 #Egypt.”²⁶⁸ Mubarak’s regime cut Internet access in order to try to prevent dissent from being spread virally. Mubarak understood that the Internet had assisted the revolutions and assumed cutting access to the Internet would be enough to stop the revolution from gaining momentum.

On January 28th President Mubarak announced his plans to form a new government. In his speech he proclaimed, “I have requested the government to step down today. And I will designate a new government as of tomorrow to shoulder new duties.”²⁶⁹ He acknowledged the citizens’ frustration but gave no indication of stepping down despite the many requests for him to do so. The protests continued and began to gather momentum as he set a curfew for Cairo, Alexandria and Suez and deployed the army.²⁷⁰

The Interior Minister and longest serving cabinet member were both replaced. He kept Defense Minister, Hussein Tantawi, as well as Foreign Minister, Ahmed Aboul Gheit. Mubarak named his Intelligence Chief, Omar Suleiman, as Vice President, and the

²⁶⁷ Craig Kanalley, “Egypt’s Internet Shut Down, According To Reports,” *Breaking News and Opinion on The Huffington Post*, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/01/27/egypt-internet-goes-down-_n_815156.html.

²⁶⁸ Ben Wedeman, “@bencnn,” *Twitter*. twitter.com/#!/bencnn/status/30759361454276608.

²⁶⁹ The Associated Press, “New Egypt Government To Be Appointed, But President Mubarak Refuses To Step Down,” *Breaking News and Opinion on The Huffington Post*, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/01/28/new-egypt-government-to-b_1_n_815682.html.

²⁷⁰ BBC, “Egypt protests: Key moments in unrest,” *BBC*, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12425375>.

former Air Force General, Ahmed Shafiq, as Prime Minister.²⁷¹ Protests continued with 74 people reported dead within two days.²⁷²

Light could finally be seen on January 31st as the army announced their recognition of the "legitimate rights of the people" and their decision not to use force against the protesters.²⁷³

On February first, huge protests took place in Cairo and other large cities after leaders called for a "march of a million." It was estimated that hundreds of thousands of people were in attendance.²⁷⁴ Following the march, in a televised address, President Mubarak announced that while he did not plan on running for re-election in the upcoming September election, he also did not have any plans of stepping down.²⁷⁵

After five days without Internet access, the Internet was up and running again in Egypt on February 2nd, 2011.²⁷⁶ After the army advised protesters to return home, a "Day of Departure" was called for by Egyptians on February 4th. One Al Jazeera analyst explained, "the idea is to send a message, and have the largest amount of people participate."²⁷⁷ Over 10,000 people showed their support in the streets of Cairo.²⁷⁸ The

²⁷¹ Maggie Michael, and Hamza Hendawi, "Egypt's New Government Announced On State TV," *Breaking News and Opinion on The Huffington Post*, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/01/31/egypt-new-government_n_816160.html.

²⁷² BBC, "Egypt protests: Key moments in unrest,"

²⁷³ *ibid.*

²⁷⁴ *ibid.*

²⁷⁵ The Associated Press, "Mubarak Tells Egypt He Will Not Seek Re-Election," *Huffington Post*, www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/01/mubarak-tells-egypt-he-wi_n_817132.html.

²⁷⁶ Shaimaa Fayed, "Egypt Internet Returns," *Breaking News and Opinion on The Huffington Post*, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/02/egypt-internet-returns_n_817319.html.

²⁷⁷ The Associated Press, "Day Of Departure, Feb. 4, 2011: Crowd To Call For Mubarak To Resign," *Breaking News and Opinion on The Huffington Post*, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/03/day-of-departure-feb-4_n_818398.html.

masses of people that showed up on the “Day of Departure” helped force Egypt’s ruling party to resign from office. Several top leaders stepped down including Gamal Mubarak, the president’s son, Secretary-General Safwat el-Sharif, as well as the six-member Steering Committee of the General Secretariat.²⁷⁹ However despite these leaders’ resignations, President Mubarak still would not step down. Labor strikes spread throughout Egypt for the next few days. Protests also continued, as did Mubarak’s vows to maintain his position as president.

After 18 days of protests, President Hosni Mubarak stepped down on February 11th, 2011. Vice President Oar Suleiman announced Mubarak’s departure would take place immediately. The young people of Egypt overturned a regime that lasted three decades in order to start a new order in the Arab world. President Obama commended Egyptians on their victory stating, “Egyptians have made it clear that nothing less than genuine democracy will carry the day.”²⁸⁰

The social media website Facebook was quickly credited with the success of the uprising. Google Marketing Manager Wael Ghonim played a key role in organizing the January 25th revolutions on Facebook. Before being imprisoned in Cairo, he reached out to Egyptian youths via Facebook to gather masses in the streets. In an interview with CNN, Ghonim argued that Facebook and the Internet were responsible for the uprisings. He said, “I want to meet Mark Zuckerberg one day and thank him [...] I’m talking on

²⁷⁸ *ibid.*

²⁷⁹ The Associated Press, “Egypt Ruling Party Leadership Resigns; Obama Backs Gradual Transition,” *Breaking News and Opinion on The Huffington Post*, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/05/egypt-ruling-party-leader_n_819084.html.

²⁸⁰ David Kirpatrick, “Egypt Erupts in Jubilation as Mubarak Steps Down,” *New York Times*, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/12/world/middleeast/12egypt.html?scp=1&sq=Egypt%20Erupts%20in%20Jubilation%20as%20Mubarak%20Steps%20Down&st=cse>.

behalf of Egypt. [...] This revolution started online. This revolution started on Facebook. This revolution started [...] in June 2010 when hundreds of thousands of Egyptians started collaborating content. We would post a video on Facebook that would be shared by 60,000 people on their walls within a few hours. I've always said that if you want to liberate a society just give them the Internet. [...]"²⁸¹

Another major contributor to the revolution was Asmaa Mahfouz, founder of the 'April 6 Youth Movement.' A week before the initial protest Mahfouz posted a video advocating for the Egyptian people to meet her at the Tahrir Square to demand democracy, fight for human rights, and voice their condemnation of Mubarak's regime. Mahfouz posted another video chronicling the hard work Egyptians had made to support her efforts on the day before the first protest. In this video she publicized her intention to return to Tahrir Square on January 25th. She proclaimed, "Whoever says it is not worth it because there will only be a handful of people, I want to tell him, 'You are the reason behind this, and you are a traitor, just like the president or any security cop who beats us in the streets.'"²⁸² While both of these videos first appeared on Facebook, they were soon transferred to YouTube where they went viral within days. The handful of people Mahfouz had expected to take part in the protest grew much larger than she originally expected, in part due to her contribution to the revolution.

²⁸¹ Catharine Smith, "Egypt's Facebook Revolution: Wael Ghonim Thanks The Social Network," *Breaking News and Opinion on The Huffington Post*, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/11/egypt-facebook-revolution-wael-ghonim_n_822078.html?view=screen.

²⁸² *Asmaa Mahfouz & the YouTube Video that Helped Spark the Egyptian Uprising*, Film. Directed by Asmaa Mahfouz, Cairo: Democracy Now!, 2011.

While many Egyptians are still frustrated with the lack of reforms that have taken place since the revolutions, ten out of the fourteen demands protesters initially made have been met and the remaining four have been announced. President Mubarak resigned and will not be running in the upcoming presidential election, the State Security Investigation Service was disassembled, the recently imposed curfew ended, the SSI-controlled university-police were removed, Anas el Fiqqi was removed from office, the protesters demands were publically announced, the NDP was dismantled, and President Mubarak and his two sons were ordered to stand on trial. Also, it has been announced shop owners would be reimbursed for losses occurring during curfew, the State of Emergency would be cancelled, and all revolution prisoners would be released.²⁸³

As with the ousting of President Estrada in 2001, the revolutions in Egypt ten years later were not the product of social media tools. They were brought together by poor conditions in their countries. Filipinos were fighting injustice of the courts in trying to get a President impeached. Egyptians, on the other hand, were protesting the entire government and order in their nation. However, in both instances, the citizens used a new technology to mobilize citizens of their country in order to voice their opinions to the reigning government and to bring about a new order in the country.

²⁸³ Amira Al Hussaini, "Egypt: A List of Demands from Tahrir Square," *Global Voices*, <http://globalvoicesonline.org/2011/02/10/egypt-a-list-of-demands-from-tahrir-square>.

Disputing the Dissenters

Just as there are many people that argue social media can help oppressed inhabitants work towards democratization there are many that argue social media has hindered the process of democratizing authoritarian regimes. Those that believe social media hinders rather than assists oppressed citizens argue that cyber-utopianists are delusional in believing they are assisting revolutions by joining a Facebook group, that these tools help authoritarian regimes more than the tools help their oppressed, or that the amount of entertainment found online outweighs any possibility of political actions. For the following chapter I will delve into seven arguments against social media assisting democratization and rebut every one of their arguments in order to disprove this antithesis.

Mary Joyce, the author of *Digital Activism Decoded: The New Mechanics of Change*, notes there are three different perceptions of the value of digital activism: optimists, pessimists and persistents.²⁸⁴ In this chapter I will concentrate on the pessimistic and persistent arguments. Pessimists believe these technologies are used for censorship purposes, illegal activities, or to create chaos. They believe the technology can and will be used for destructive purposes. Their views on technology center around fears of authoritarian regimes' control over said technology. They look primarily to the aspects of digital technology that lead to new methods of control, surveillance, and their ability to empower hackers and terrorists.²⁸⁵

²⁸⁴ Mary Joyce, *Digital Activism Decoded: The New Mechanics of Change*, (New York: International Debate Education Association, 2010), p. 11.

²⁸⁵ *ibid.*

Pessimistic Arguments

One pessimistic argument against social media assisting democratization is that the tools produce as much harm as good since repressive governments use the tools to suppress dissenters.²⁸⁶ Morozov believes social media simply “empowers the strong and disempowers the weak.”²⁸⁷ One of his main arguments is that people today are guilty of being cyber utopians in that they believe that technology empowers the oppressed to mobilize themselves through different forms of social technologies including text messages, Facebook, Twitter and any other new technology that is created.²⁸⁸ According to Morozov, we use faulty assumptions as cyber-utopians and then proceed with defective methods known as Internet-centrism: alternatively known as the Net Delusion.²⁸⁹ Morozov claims we need to be using a more realist position.

Morozov prefers us to consider that authoritarian regimes have shown more complexity and are not about to be outsmarted by tweets.²⁹⁰ As Castells states, “The Internet is indeed a technology of freedom, but it can make the powerful free to oppress the uninformed” and “lead to the exclusion of the devalued by the conquerors of value.”²⁹¹

Governments are aware of the Internet’s potential for mobilizing individuals in opposition of the state. The knowledge of this possible effect of the Internet has led

²⁸⁶ Clay Shirky, “The Political Power of Social Media.”

²⁸⁷ Evgeny Morozov, *The Net Delusion*, p. xvii.

²⁸⁸ *ibid*, p. xiv.

²⁸⁹ *ibid*, p. xvii.

²⁹⁰ *ibid*, p. 29.

²⁹¹ *ibid*, p. 255.

authoritative figures to pursue controls to manage the information going in and out of their borders. States have the same access-if not more-social media as protesters. On top of that the governments also have the power to react when faced with an approaching revolution. Social media allows for governments to be aware of and police gatherings before they even begin. Secretary Hillary Rodham Clinton explains that these technologies are being used to exploit human progress and rights. “While they are being used to organize movements for freedom they are also allowing al-Qaida to create violence.”²⁹² She mentions that freedom is not simply about one’s right to assemble without retribution. These new technologies, while they help people, they also create new censorship opportunities for authoritarian regimes.

In the past, communication systems such as the radio and television allowed governments to reach out to their citizens with their own nationalistic message. Now information can travel so fast through several borders that governments have a difficult time monitoring what goes in and out of their territory. In the digital age distances do not matter in terms of security. Geographical distance is irrelevant when a person could hack a computer in one country and affect a computer on the other side of the world. This worries governments as they begin to lose their power over common citizens.

The Internet has the possibility of becoming a place of civil disobedience. Andrew Chadwick, a professor of political science at Royal Holloway, University of London, provides several tactics used to create civil disobedience in his book *The Routledge Handbook of Internet Politics*. Some of the tactics he discusses include

²⁹² Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Remarks on Internet Freedom,” Speech, Remarks on Internet Freedom from U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C., January 21, 2010.

distributed-denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, virtual sit-ins where people flood a website simultaneously, and email bombing where people bombard an inbox with emails.

Andrew Chadwick's book has a chapter titled *The Geopolitics of Internet Control*, which is devoted to censorship sovereignty and cyberspace. He explains how the Internet was originally intended to be borderless.²⁹³ Today countries and companies are teaming up to filter the information flowing through nations borders. For example, the Internet in Canada is very different than the Internet in Iran. It is no longer a single Internet that connects people around the world.

Governments use several different methods in order to censor their citizens. There are three generations of censorship, which are not mutually exclusive. Countries that are more authoritarian typically apply more complete control in cyberspace using all three generations of control. Democratic countries, on the other hand, stick with second and third generation controls.

The first-generation controls include Internet filtering and policing of cybercafés. Internet filtering occurs in two different methods. The first is considered address blocking. A router denies access to a particular IP address or domain name. Address blocking can be done by either inclusion or exclusion filtering. Inclusion filtering is when users are only allowed access to sites that are already approved. It could also be done by exclusion filtering which is when users can access any site except those that are restricted. The second type of filtering is called content analysis. In this method access is blocked according to its content such as specific keywords or graphics. Another way

²⁹³ Andrew Chadwick, and Philip N. Howard, *Routledge Handbook of Internet Politics*, (Hoboken: Taylor & Francis, 2008).

countries use content filtering is by targeting the local language. As Chadwick's book points out, if you are in China and search the phrase "Chinese Labor Party" in Chinese it is blocked 93 percent of the time. When you search the same phrase in English it is only blocked 20 percent.²⁹⁴

An immense dilemma is the lack of accountability and transparency in the censorship by nations filtering practices. There is a large debate occurring over whether a state's right to cultural sovereignty or individuals' right to free information is more important. Although, many nations won't even let this debate take place. These nations won't admit their methods for filtering nor the nature of their filtering. Some nations, such as China, block sites and make it appear to be a time-out error on the users end. Other nations, such as Saudi Arabia, provide the user with an explanation as to why the site had not been blocked.

The second-generation controls include creating a legal environment for information control, managing information removal requests, creating technical shutdowns and computer network attacks. These techniques create the laws and technical capabilities to deny access to information as needed. These second-generation controls have both an overt and a covert track. The overt track legalizes content controls by listing the conditions under which they can be denied. The covert track, alternatively, creates procedures and the technology to allow content controls to be put in place "just in time" when the information is at its highest value.²⁹⁵ An example of this is immediately before

²⁹⁴ *ibid.*

²⁹⁵ Ronald Deibert, John G. Palfrey, and Jonathan Zittrain, *Access controlled: the shaping of power, rights, and rule in cyberspace*, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2010).

or during a public demonstration. These controls can even be made to look like technical errors, especially in the case of last minute removal requests.

Third-generation controls focus less on denying access and more on competing with possible threats by using a counter information campaign that either overpowers or damages the reputation of adversaries. Third-generation controls include warrantless surveillance, national cyberzones, state-sponsored information campaigns and direct action.²⁹⁶

The New York Times featured the article *Googling the Censors* on September 28th, 2010. This article detailed two tools Google created to monitor governmental censorship. Google released a tool in May 2010 to allow individuals to monitor governmental requests to remove content. Then in September 2010 Google released a new tool that exposes less evident governmental attempts to censor content. This tool was capable of showing how the traffic on YouTube in Iran literally halted after the presidential election in 2009. It also shows how the traffic in Libya stopped in January after videos of demonstrations and partying of Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi relatives aired. This new tool does not show how the traffic was brought to a standstill, just that it was indeed stopped.²⁹⁷

Internet surveillance is not the only type of censorship involved in social networking technologies. The surveillance of wireless phone providers is also happening. The article *T-Mobile Claims Right to Censor Text Messages* by David Kravets was featured in *Wired News*. Kravets discusses the recent court case concerning wireless

²⁹⁶ *ibid.*

²⁹⁷ New York Times, "Googling the Censors," *The New York Times*, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/28/opinion/28tue4.html>.

customers and their rights. T-Mobile argued to the New York Federal Court that they should be able to choose which text messages they deliver. They state that they are different from wired telephone providers and thus are under different obligations. This is the first federal case concerning wireless providers censoring text messages.²⁹⁸

However, while both Morozov and Castells have argued the Internet enables authoritarians to continue oppressing the weak, the Internet is not specifically 'bad.' The Internet, instead, is a neutral tool and only becomes what users make of it. Larry Diamond, of the Hoover Institution, confirms, "Technology is merely a tool, open to both noble and nefarious purposes. Just as radio and TV could be vehicles of information pluralism and national debate, so they could also be commandeered by totalitarian regimes for fanatical mobilization and total state control."²⁹⁹

A second pessimistic argument is known as the dictator's dilemma. This argument believes that an authoritarian regime has a decision to make. They can censor the Internet, 'protect' their citizens, and thus suffer economically since censorship conflicts with globalization. Or they can open their nation up to globalization as well as the economic benefits that accompany globalization. As U.S Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton said in her 2010 Internet freedom speech, "Countries that censor news and information must recognize that from an economic standpoint, there is no distinction

²⁹⁸ David Kravets, "T-Mobile Claims Right to Censor Text Messages," *Wired*, <http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/09/text-message-censorship>.

²⁹⁹ Evgeny Morozov, *The Net Delusion*, p. 296.

between censoring political speech and commercial speech. If businesses in your nations are denied access to either type of information, it will inevitably impact on growth.”³⁰⁰

The 1985 U.S. Secretary of State, George Schultz, similarly stated, “Totalitarian societies face a dilemma: either they try to stifle these technologies and thereby fall further behind in the new industrial revolution, or else they permit these technologies and see their totalitarian control inevitably eroded.”³⁰¹

Morozov furthers Clinton and Schultz’s argument by explaining, “Dictators cannot globalize unless they open up their networks to hordes of international consultants and investment bankers scouring their lands in search of the next acquisition target.”³⁰² But as Morzov continues, there is not a direct correlation between a nation’s economy and Internet freedom. Most authoritarian states have adopted the Internet, with North Korea as an exception. Even China has more Internet users than U.S. citizens. As we are all aware, China has gone to great lengths to censor its citizens from the rest of the world. Morozov notes that the dictator’s dilemma assumes that authoritarian regimes had to choose between using the Internet and completely censoring it. The dilemma does not take into consideration that there are technologies, such as keyword filtering, that allow regimes to block specific political activity and allow for Internet activity that supports and assists economic growth.³⁰³

³⁰⁰ Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Remarks on Internet Freedom,” Speech, Remarks on Internet Freedom from U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C., January 21, 2010.

³⁰¹ Evgeny Morozov, *The Net Delusion*, p. 94.

³⁰² *ibid*, p. 93.

³⁰³ *ibid*, p. 96.

It is important to note that this argument makes several assumptions. The argument first assumes that dictators will decide not to censor their Internet in order to grow their economies. The argument also assumes that if the regime does use specific censorship techniques in order to censor specific political discussions and allow for economic activity then people will not be able to rise up because they won't have the means. Finally, the argument assumes that if they do decide to try specific censorship techniques that citizens will not be able to get around them.

A third pessimistic argument concerns the use of mobile phones for digital activism. Mobile phones have several benefits for mobilizing people as well as keeping them updated during a revolution. Phones are cheaper than computers and do not require as much training. Revolutions in Ukraine, the Philippines, and Indonesia have all used mobile technology in order to protest against their governments. Evgeny Morozov discusses several problems with using mobile phones in revolutions. One problem is that an authoritarian regime can shut down either an entire mobile network or even just the mobile network for a particular region of the country whenever they deem it necessary.³⁰⁴ One instance of a country shutting down a mobile network was in 2007 when the Cambodian government declared a "tranquility period." This included all Cambodian mobile network operators turning off text messaging for two days. Cambodian authorities explained this period of time as necessary to keep voters from being "flooded" with messages regarding the election.³⁰⁵

³⁰⁴ *ibid*, p. 173.

³⁰⁵ *ibid*.

Another instance of this occurred in 2009 in Moldova when the government turned off mobile networks in the capital Chisnau. They did this to hamper any communication during their local Twitter revolution in order to prevent any uprisings.³⁰⁶

An additional instance of mobile networks being shut off also occurred during the 2006 Color Revolutions in Belarus. The authorities turned off mobile coverage where the protesters were gathering in order to stop their ability to connect with other protesters as well as the outside world. In this situation the government argued that they did not shut off coverage but rather there were too many people using the service that the networks weren't able to accommodate the amount of people trying to make calls and send texts at the same time.³⁰⁷

Another problem with the use of mobile phones in revolutions, according to Morozov, is that keyword filtering does not extend to text messages. If the authorities censor text messages they will either simply not be delivered and/or the authors may be punished for their text messages. The censoring of text messages happened in 2009 in Azerbaijan when the police punished forty-three people for voting for an Armenian in a Eurovision contest while Armenia and Azerbaijan were at war over the Nagorno-Karabach territory. These people were accused of going against national security.³⁰⁸

Yet another issue concerned Western companies providing authoritarian governments with censorship technology. Morozov mentions that IBM made a deal with China Mobile in 2010 to provide technology to track (human) social networks as well as

³⁰⁶ *ibid.*

³⁰⁷ *ibid.*

³⁰⁸ *ibid.*

tracking messaging habits such as who sends text messages and to how many. IBM argued that this technology was intended to be used in order to help Chinese mobile companies eliminate spam, not to censor political communications.³⁰⁹

Morozov's final problem with mobile phones being used for activism is that they allow people or regimes to track their location. As an example, a U.K.-based company, ThorpeGlen, brags that they can track "a specific target through ALL his electronic communications...We can detect change of SIM and change of handset after identifying one suspect...We can even detect that profile again even if the phone AND SIM are changed."³¹⁰ Because of this, authoritarian regimes can potentially speculate as to where people could mobilize next.

However despite these issues there are also solutions. Activists and protesters are not blind to these problems. They are aware of the problems and thus look to loopholes to work around them. They may buy an unbranded phone without a unique identifier in order to make their location untraceable. Another solution is to purchase a disposable prepaid SIM card, which enables activists to change their phone numbers as often as they wish. However more developed countries, such as Russia and Belarus, require storeowners to write down the customer's passport number when they buy a prepaid card.³¹¹

There are several examples of how these social media tools do not aid in revolutions that are cited by journalists, academics and politicians. Social media in Iran in

³⁰⁹ *ibid.*

³¹⁰ *ibid.*

³¹¹ *ibid.*

2009 was very one-sided with the majority of Tweets supporting Mir Hossein Moussavi.³¹² The Iranian regime did not simply dismiss social media. This regime understood the benefits of the technology and decided to use text messages to warn Iranians to stay off the street and away from protests. One message the Intelligence Ministry sent read, “Dear citizen, according to received information, you have been influenced by the destabilizing propaganda which the media affiliated with foreign countries have been disseminating. In case of any illegal action and contact with the foreign media, you will be charged as a criminal consistent with the Islamic Punishment Act and dealt with by the Judiciary.”³¹³

It only took a few months for the Iranian government to form a cybercrime team made up of twelve people in order to find false information, including insults, on Iranian websites. Once people were found to be spreading either lies or insults they were arrested.³¹⁴ The Revolutionary Guard tracked the Green Movement via their online profiles to shut down the Internet and mobile networks, raid homes, make mass arrests, and stop Internet-driven protests.³¹⁵

What is still uncertain, is how many people were tweeting from within Iran about the protest and whether Twitter was actually used to organize the protest rather than just describing what was happening. Sysomos, a social media analysis company, reported

³¹² Mark MacKinnon, “Twitter’s role in Bangkok conflict unprecedented - The Globe and Mail,” *The Globe and Mail*, <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/twitters-role-in-bangkok-conflict-unprecedented/article1578064/> (accessed May 19, 2011).

³¹³ Evgeny Morozov, *The Net Delusion*, p. 11.

³¹⁴ *ibid*, p.10.

³¹⁵ Clay Shirky, “The Political Power of Social Media.” and Lee Siegel, “The Net Delusion’ and the Egypt Crisis.” and Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Remarks on Internet Freedom.”

there were only 19,235 registered Twitter accounts or 0.027 percent of the population in Iran on the eve of the “Twitter Revolution.”³¹⁶ Morozov concludes that whether or not Twitter was being used within Iran to mobilize people, it did prevent the movement from acting strategically with one mission and one voice.³¹⁷ This is a common problem with social media. A benefit of it is that they give the oppressed a voice. The problem is that those gaining a voice need to remain united in order to accomplish their goal.

The Thai government managed to disperse and kill dozens of protesters during the uprising of the Red Shirt in Thailand in 2010 after social media savvy protesters occupied downtown Bangkok.³¹⁸ In Thailand only one out of five people are online and even fewer have Twitter accounts. Yet the tweets being written were the same thoughts being mentioned verbally throughout the country. Protesters were not the only ones using social media during these protests though. Both sides were using social media, including Twitter and Facebook, to spread their propaganda messages. Social media was able to keep both sides of the uprisings informed and to warn people about what areas of the city had turned violent.

As Mark MacKinnon, a reporter in Bangkok mentioned, “A year ago, we might have e-mailed our editors to see what the news wires were reporting, or checked a television set for an update. But in Thailand's fast-moving and violent political crisis, there was no time to wait for those “old media” to tell us what was going on.”³¹⁹

³¹⁶ Evgeny Morozov, *The Net Delusion*, p. 15.

³¹⁷ *ibid*, p. 197

³¹⁸ Clay Shirky, “The Political Power of Social Media.”

³¹⁹ Mark MacKinnon, “Twitter’s role in Bangkok conflict unprecedented.”

One Thai Internet activist, Poomjit Sirawongprasert, told Mark, “Twitter is the only place where we can say things freely.”³²⁰ In December 2010 political protest Facebook pages were hacked by Ammar (the authorities that censor the country’s Internet) in order to steal the passwords of the entire country. In the U.S. an IP address would be looked at in order to find out who hacked an account but in Tunisia the IP addresses are reassigned. The country was using a malicious piece of code to record users login information when they visited sites.

Facebook took a technical approach rather than a political one. Facebook’s chief security officer Joe Sullivan said, "At its core, from our standpoint, it's a security issue around passwords and making sure that we protect the integrity of passwords and accounts. It was very much a black and white security issue and less of a political issue." In order to fix the problem Facebook first rerouted all Tunisian Facebook requests to an https server to encrypt the information sent and received. Second, Facebook then required anyone that logged out and tried to log back in while the malicious code was running to identify your friends in photos.³²¹

Persistent Arguments

While pessimists believe the digital media will be used for inherently bad purposes, persistents do not believe digital technologies will have a significant impact on the world at all. They believe digital technologies won’t change the nature of activism nor will it change the current political power distribution. One persistent, Marshall Ganz

³²⁰ *ibid.*

³²¹ Alexis Madrigal, “The Inside Story of How Facebook Responded to Tunisian Hacks,” *The Atlantic*, www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2011/01/the-inside-story-of-how-facebookresponded-to-tunisian-hacks/70044.

(the creator of President Obama’s successful grassroots campaign in 2008) argues that the digital tools we use are also available offline even if they are slower and more costly.³²²

One persistent argument against technology assisting democratization is that social networking tools are ineffective. Malcolm Gladwell in *The New Yorker* concentrates on what he refers to as “slacktivism” where casual participants want to create change through activities such as joining a Facebook group.³²³ As Evgeny Morozov, the author of *The Net Delusion: The Dark Side of Internet Freedom*, states, “...you can’t simply join a revolution any time you want, contribute a comma to a random revolutionary decree, rephrase the guillotine manual, and then slack off for months. Revolutions prize centralization and require fully committed leaders, strict discipline, absolute dedication, and strong relationships based on trust.”³²⁴ Morozov continues “Tweets, of course, don’t topple governments; people do.”³²⁵ After all, if “an authoritarian regime can crumble under the pressure of a Facebook group, whether its members are protesting online or in the streets, it’s not much of an authoritarian regime.”³²⁶ Morozov argues that the results of digital activism are not typically seen as long-term goals. Rather, according to him, they are abrupt protests that are the result of a Facebook group conversation that will be forgotten about as quickly as it began.

Evgeny Morozov is not the only person who has spoken up concerning the ideals of the Internet. Jon Stewart of *The Daily Show* has also mocked the idea that the Internet

³²² Mary Joyce, *Digital Activism Decoded: The New Mechanics of Change*, p. 12.

³²³ Clay Shirky, “The Political Power of Social Media.”

³²⁴ Evgeny Morozov, *The Net Delusion*, p. 195.

³²⁵ *ibid*, p. 19.

³²⁶ *ibid*, p. 198.

can accomplish something even superpower militaries cannot solve in Iraq and Afghanistan. Stewart jokes, “Why did we have to send an army when we could have liberated them the same way we buy shoes?”³²⁷

Morozov, Stewart, and others, believe the West just wants to be responsible for the democratic revolutions. Morozov cites Iran’s Twitter Revolution as revealing the “intense Western longing for a world where information technology is the liberator rather than the oppressor, a world where technology could be harvested to spread democracy around the globe rather than entrench existing autocracies.”³²⁸ Even former hippies, Morozov argues, assert that the Internet is doing what then 1960s couldn’t by increasing democratic involvement and creating newer and stronger communities.³²⁹ According to him, we are just a society that is desperate to believe that we had something to do with the revolutions occurring miles away from us.

While it is true that revolutions cannot just simply happen whenever one feels like joining a Facebook group, there are indeed committed individuals and organizations that use social media effectively. Those fighting in revolutions and dying for what they believe in goes against the idea that people believe all protesters are fighting by simply ‘Like’-ing a Facebook page. Furthermore, citizens of the West are admittedly joyful concerning the democratization of other nations. However being interested about a cause or event and believing you contributed to its success are two separate entities.

³²⁷ *ibid*, p. 19.

³²⁸ *ibid*, p. 5.

³²⁹ *ibid*, p. xiii.

A second persistent argument concerns the digital divide that is occurring both within countries and internationally. While social media allow for more people to have access to information and collaboration all over the world there is also the digital divide which separate users and non-users based on access and skill. Optimists believe the Internet allows knowledge to transfer to isolated countries and their citizens. These people believe the Internet is an opportunity for developing nations to take a leap forward in order to find a place in the global economy. Pessimists, on the other hand, believe that only the most economically privileged nations and citizens will benefit and progress from the Internet, and thus causing the under-developed nations and citizens to fall even further behind in the increasing digital divide. While Hillary Rodham Clinton argues the digital divide between the haves and have-nots has not happened³³⁰, one only needs to look at India to witness a society where the new centers for IT are creating several new jobs and pushing money into their economy while millions are still deprived of basic needs.

Yet despite this so-called digital divide, people around the world are finding methods of overcoming their socio-economic status in order to communicate with family, neighbors, and even strangers in other countries. Through the use of pre-paid mobile phones those in a lower economic bracket can afford the luxury of owning a mobile device without being tied down to an expensive contract. Also the creation of Internet cafes has allowed individuals and communities without the funds to purchase computer equipment to surf the Internet.

³³⁰ Hillary Rodham Clinton, "Remarks on Internet Freedom."

A third persistent argument against social networking tools assisting democratization is the idea that entertainment found on the Internet overpowers any possibility of political actions. Those in favor of this argument believe the majority of Internet users primarily are interested in entertainment and consumerism rather than helping people rise up against their oppressors. Morozov continues this argument by saying that as a society we lack principles and thus the Internet cannot stimulate our political awareness enough to fight authoritarianism. He argues that everyone is too busy shopping online and watching their plasma TVs in order to actually make a difference.³³¹ This argument assumes that we are a society where all people care about is shoes and sitcoms.

Morozov even goes as far to say that it is naïve to assume that political principles will come from this “hodgepodge of consumerism, entertainment, and sex.” He believes the Internet actually makes it harder for people to care about politics since the alternative is much more entertaining. After all, according to Morozov, any entertainment, even YouTube, outweighs our drive for political knowledge.³³² This argument, while not only palpably wrong given the 2008 election of U.S. President Obama after a fierce online campaign, is also offensive.

Some authoritarian countries are even beginning to believe that the entertainment side of the Internet can work in their favor. If people are too busy searching for the latest tabloid gossip they will not have the time or the desire to rise up against their government. Thus governments can use online entertainment as a distraction.

³³¹ Evgeny Morozov, *The Net Delusion*, p. 68.

³³² *ibid*, p. 70.

Unfortunately, this view is not an absolute. The idea of “control by entertainment” will not work in societies where people are already tired of being oppressed. Entertainment will not make these people forget about their oppression nor will it change their minds.

Good Samaritans in the West led an experiment in 2007 where volunteers loaned their computer bandwidth to people in countries with censored Internet through a tool called Psiphon. They hoped that these strangers would begin to educate themselves enough to rise up against their oppressive regimes as soon as they witnessed an uncensored version of the Internet. *Forbes Magazine*, however, proved that this experiment had failed given that users searched for “nude pictures of Gwen Stefani and photos of panty-less Britney Spears.”³³³ This experiment had several faults though. Simply giving an uncensored version of the Internet to a stranger in an oppressed country does not immediately make them want to free themselves. The Internet, as I have stated, is just a tool, which does not necessarily lead to freedom. A person, or community, needs to want to liberate him or herself in order for the Internet to provide any benefit. A revolution does not occur by the idea of the Internet. Revolutions occurs when people are angry enough about their living conditions that they use what they have available to assist them in their fight for freedom.

Many journalists, politicians, and academics have also been debating whether or not social media technologies have any real link to the revolutions that have been occurring in the Middle East. This is the firth argument against social media assisting democratization. While they all admit that revolutions did occur and that people were engaged in social media, they do not believe there was any connection between the two.

³³³ *ibid*, p. 71.

Morozov says just this, “The West, however, wasn’t hallucinating. Tweets did get sent, and crowds did gather in the streets. This does not necessarily mean, however, that there was a casual link between the two.”³³⁴ He continues arguing that mobilizing the people is typically the last step in a protest and thus the social media tools do not actually democratize nations, they simply report about them.³³⁵

Within this disconnected argument, he does manage to admit that social media tools do make it easier to mobilize people. “Cell phones cameras, Facebook, Twitter...seem...to be making everything happen much faster,” claims Morozov.³³⁶ But as he continues, “It is easy to mistake quantity for quality.”³³⁷ Even if we do believe they help assist with mobilizing people to overthrow their oppressors, it does not mean it will lead to the consolidation of democracy. However, as I have mentioned in a previous chapter, a wave of democratization does not necessarily lead to consolidation. As Huntington argues, the first two waves of democratization were followed by a reversal wave.³³⁸ So while consolidation does not always occur, the liberalization is a worthwhile step to be made.

Overcoming Pessimistic and Persistent Arguments

Yet despite the many arguments against social media helping further democratization, there are still several ways dissidents can overcome these arguments in order to conceal their activity. While Morozov has mentioned that technologies such as

³³⁴ *ibid*, p. 16.

³³⁵ *ibid*, p. 196.

³³⁶ *ibid*, p. 197.

³³⁷ *ibid*, p. 187.

³³⁸ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, p. 15.

the Internet and mobile phones help authoritarian regimes, no one can argue they don't also help the oppressed. There are several ways for dissidents to conceal their activities.

The first way is to encrypt sensitive data. It has become significantly cheaper in order for the oppressed to have extra protection against their oppressors. People can now use voice over IP (VOIP) technologies such as Skype in order to speak to others without the fear of their conversations being bugged. The failure of governments to listen in on Skype conversation troubles many governments. The U.S. National Security Agency offered a cash prize for anyone who could break Skype's encryption in 2009. According to Morozov, as of 2010, no winners had been announced.³³⁹

A second way dissidents can conceal their activities is due to the immeasurable amount of data being constantly produced and updated online. Because of the constant production of new websites and new technology, it is impossible for many authorities to analyze all of it. Because of the large amounts of data, it takes oppressors a few months to find the activists' hideout. By this time the activists may have found a new place to hide. As Morozov said, "The authorities are much better informed about the parameters of the haystack, the needle is still quite hard to find."³⁴⁰

A third way for dissidents to conceal their online actions is through technologies such as Tor. Tor is a tool that protects users' anonymity and privacy while surfing the Internet. It was originally funded by the U.S. Navy but eventually became an independent project. People are able to protect their privacy by connecting to a random proxy node on their network and then using the node's connection to connect to their intended website.

³³⁹ Evgeny Morozov, *The Net Delusion*, p. 168.

³⁴⁰ *ibid.*

These types of tools also can be used to evade government censorship. During the 2009 protests, the Iranian government blocked access to many proxies after learning by Westerners on Twitter of individuals avoiding their keyword censorship techniques.³⁴¹ Technologies such as Tor are an excellent way for dissidents to conceal their activities, so long as people are not publicizing such actions for the oppressors to see. Morozov concludes, “As long as the government doesn’t know these helpers by name, the helpers don’t know each other, and you frequent enough other networks not to attract attention to the helpers, you can get away with browsing whatever you want.”³⁴²

Despite all the many arguments against why social media cannot or does not affect the revolutions towards democratization, this new technology is proving that it is a tool that, if used properly, does assist in the overthrowing of authoritarian regimes. According to Morozov, “Facebook is to group formation what Red bull is to productivity.”³⁴³ Through creative means such as purchasing pre-paid mobile phones, using software to conceal their activities, and by proving arguments wrong by standing up for political participation rather than succumbing to the latest video of a cat playing the piano on YouTube, people around the world are disproving these arguments and asserting that they do not hold validity in the international affairs arena.

³⁴¹ *ibid*, p. 169.

³⁴² *ibid*.

³⁴³ *ibid*, p. 180

Conclusion

The availability of suitable digital networking tools is a necessary, but not sufficient, cause of democratization and regime change. There needs to be the combination of infrastructure conditions and contextual circumstances to allow for either a democratic transition or democratic entrenchment to occur. These tools allow individuals a greater extent of power than they have held in the past. This allows them to have a greater say in their nation and government. In authoritarian countries this could mean the beginning of a democratic transition.

Social movements do not just use new information and communication technologies to learn about democratization strategies of other nations. ICTs are also utilized to sustain a movement, to improve the justice system, to give strength to opposition political parties, to have fair elections, and to create a new sense of transparency within the regime. Thus, as Howard argues, “It is safe to assert that there is a close casual connection between information infrastructure and contemporary democratization.”³⁴⁴

Once the political or social movement has begun, individuals must determine the type of metrics to employ in order measure their success. In *Measuring the Success of Digital Campaigns*, Dave Karpf discusses two different types of metrics that can be used in digital activism: tactical and strategic.³⁴⁵ While tactical metrics count specific numbers

³⁴⁴Philip N. Howard, *The Digital Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Information Technology and Political Islam*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 197.

³⁴⁵Dave Karpf,, “Measuring the Success of Digital Campaigns,” In *Digital Activism Decoded: The New Mechanics of Change*, (New York: International Debate Education Association, 2010), 150-161, p. 151.

such as visits to a website, blog posts, Facebook friends, they only provide how many individuals have taken a form of action towards your campaign.

Alternatively, strategic metrics measure actual success. Strategic metrics require the activists to establish what their goals are as well as how they plan on determining their success or failure. Since various campaigns have different desired results they also have distinctive meanings of the terms “influence,” “power,” and “success.” As a result strategic metrics are more difficult to determine. Individuals need to question how they will know when they have achieved their goal.³⁴⁶

As an example, David Faris, a professor at the University of Pennsylvania, has researched the use of digital media in Egypt. His findings show that while Egypt has a low Internet-adoption rate, Egyptians are greatly influenced by political bloggers.³⁴⁷ He believes the key is to create relationships with the independent media as well as four other types of activities that enhance the media: breaking stories that typically go unnoticed; documenting with a distinctive text, photos, or videos; sending stories to an international audience; and “red-lining” where bloggers speak about topics that are illegal for the Egyptian media. Unfortunately, as Faris mentions, these activities are hard to recognize using tactical metrics typically used in the United States such as traffic rankings, hyperlink analysis, and link click-throughs. Therefore instead Faris uses interviews and case analysis to determine the importance of the Internet in Egypt. Through his research Faris determined that Egyptian bloggers have reported on key news stories such as the persecution of Sudanese refugees, sexual harassment in the streets of

³⁴⁶ *ibid*, p. 164.

³⁴⁷ *ibid*, p. 161.

Cairo, and police brutality stories.³⁴⁸ These news stories would have been disregarded had it not been for the bloggers reports. Faris concludes that small groups of Egyptian digital activists continually mobilize and coordinate activities to change government actions.

Tactical metrics are also very contextual. They attempt to make the success of a specific campaign, using a specific tool, with a particular audience. Many people attempt to reproduce these strategies yet it is also impossible since the context of campaigns is continually changing even within the same country. As an example, the online mobilization in Egypt was successful for the April 6 strike in 2008. Yet in 2009, using the same tactics, mobilizing other Egyptians failed.³⁴⁹

And yet, despite the inadequacy of tactical metrics, digital activism still heavily relies on it since we do not yet have a set of analytical tools to use in different contexts. Hence, for the time being, many activists believe we must use our knowledge of tactics that work offline and attempt to apply them to digital activism.

We need to work to increase our strategic knowledge of digital activism rather than depend on the assumption that it is simply an extension of offline activism. The lack of our strategic knowledge can be extremely limiting, for without this knowledge it is impossible to understand all potential actions and reactions. With a better comprehension of digital activism, activists can create effective campaigns with a higher success rate of accomplishing their goals.

³⁴⁸ *ibid.*

³⁴⁹ Mary Joyce, *Digital Activism Decoded: The New Mechanics of Change*, (New York: International Debate Education Association, 2010), p. 210.

In my first chapter I discussed the definition and history of democratization and explained that there is not currently, and might not ever be a universally accepted definition of democracy. Despite this, most scholars and politicians agree that political, social and economic equality and freedom are some of the most important characteristics of a democratic regime. Furthermore, I explained Huntington's waves including his reversal waves to justify how democratization does not always lead to consolidation or entrenchment. It could encounter frequent reversals as in Argentina. Yet despite the reverse waves, in which Huntington believed was "a two-step-forward, one-step-backward pattern," democratization did progress either with full out democratic consolidation or simply liberalization.³⁵⁰ We need to think of the process towards democratization and the countries involved as more or less democratic since it is important to that democratization is not an ending result, but rather a process all democratic regimes must participate in.

My second chapter reviewed the history of information and communication technologies beginning with the invention of ARPANET (and later the Internet), leading to mobile devices, and concluding with social media websites. These technologies are now embedded in our societies to the point where they can be used for anything from checking the morning news, to creating news by overthrowing an authoritarian regime. Mark Zuckerberg did not invent Facebook in order to help citizens rise up against authoritarian regimes. Nor did Jack Dorsey construct Twitter with this idea in mind. Nevertheless these tools are indeed used for that purpose.

³⁵⁰ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, p. 25.

As I discussed in chapter three, it is important to first identify the economic, social, political, and infrastructural factors of the environment before we can explain why digital revolutions occur in some countries versus others. I reviewed the different combinations of infrastructural and contextual conditions that have a possibility of leading to social unrest and possibly democratic transitioning or entrenchment. Finally I analyzed Philip Howard's research results, which found that the two most outstanding sufficient causes of democratic transition both include an active online society. Whereas having a small population is the main solitary cause with the best-case coverage. As for democratic entrenchment, Howard's study found that a well-developed ICT infrastructure along with not being dependent on fuel exports is a sufficient cause.³⁵¹ After we have examined the environment in which digital activists operate we can then discuss the different possible methods of digital activism.

Chapter four reviews the different quantitative and qualitative evidence on the ties between digital media and democratization. The first section of this chapter offered research involving quantitative analysis by Kedzie, Best and Wade, Howard, and Castells. The second section provided a review of qualitative studies, in particular, concerning R. Kelly Garrett's article *Protest in an information society: A review of literature on social movements and new ICTs*. Yet a primarily qualitative or quantitative study is severely limited. Quantitative studies typically lack enough data to make a full analysis given the recent events in the Middle East and the recent creation of several technologies. Qualitative studies lack empirical data and typically rely too heavily on

³⁵¹Philip N. Howard, *The Digital Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Information Technology and Political Islam*, p. 194.

anecdotal evidence. Through the combination of qualitative and quantitative data the Global Digital Activism Dataset will greatly advance the data available on the link between digital technology and democratization by the end of 2011.

I continue my thesis by exploring case studies in chapters five and six in order to identify the successful tactics so that those methods can be replicated in other scenarios with similar contexts. While most scholars agree that case studies are not sufficient to rely upon, they are still important for our understanding of digital activism since it is still a relatively new practice and thus there is little information and even less data that has been analyzed concerning the topic.

The first case study I reviewed concerns the Power People II in the Philippines in 2001. Unlike the original Power People movement in 1986, wired and wireless technologies made the 2001 revolution larger in scope and reach. This four-day revolution resulted in the ousting of President Estrada from office. The mobile phone played a huge role during People Power II with its ability to disseminate messages, methods of instant communication, mobilize political demonstrations, and coordinate logistics. Given the significantly decreased levels of violence and military involvement from Power People in 1986, the larger and faster use of information and communication technologies in the 2001 ousting of President Estrada did in fact assist the nation in making great progress in the process of democratization.³⁵²

For the second case study, I explored the recent revolutions in Egypt in chapter six. While this situation continues, I feel it was important to observe the overall timeline of events leading up to and during the revolution. After all, as Huntington explained in

³⁵² Manuel Castells, et al, *The Mobile Communication Society*, p. 200.

The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, waves of democratization are often followed with reverse waves.³⁵³ This is not to say that the liberalization which had occurred during the initial wave was not immense progress. Despite Egypt's continual struggle towards consolidation, their revolution and work towards becoming a fully consolidated democracy is worth reviewing.

As with the ousting of President Estrada in 2001, the revolutions in Egypt ten years later were not the product of social media tools. They were brought together by poor conditions in their countries. Egyptians protested the thirty-year regime responsible for their living conditions. The citizens used a new technology to mobilize citizens of their country in order to voice their opinions to the reigning government and to bring about a new order in the country.

Unfortunately, just as there are many people that argue social media can help oppressed inhabitants work towards democratization there are many others that dispute social media has hindered the process of democratizing authoritarian regimes. Those that believe social media impedes rather than assists oppressed citizens argue that cyber-utopianists are delusional in deeming they are assisting revolutions by joining a Facebook group. Their belief that these tools help authoritarian regimes more than their oppressed, or that the amount of entertainment found online outweighs any possibility of political actions is ignores the concept that the Internet is simply a neutral tool to be used as one sees fit.

In this chapter I reviewed the pessimistic and persistent arguments against the ties between ICTs and democratization. Pessimists believe ICTs are used for censorship

³⁵³Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, p. 15.

purposes, illegal activities, or to create chaos. They claim that technology can and will be used for destructive purposes. Persistents, on the other hand, emphasize that technology does not enhance or hinder democratization based on its neutral status.

Yet despite the many arguments I set forth in chapter seven against ICTs helping further democratization, there are still several ways dissidents can overcome these arguments in order to conceal their activity. Activists can encrypt sensitive data or use voice over IP (VOIP) technologies such as Skype in order to speak to others without the fear of their conversations being bugged. Also because of the constant production of new websites and new technology, it is typically impossible for authorities to analyze all of it. A third way for dissidents to conceal their online actions is through technologies such as Tor, that protects users' anonymity and privacy while surfing the Internet or evade government censorship.

Despite the many arguments against why social media cannot or does not affect the revolutions towards democratization, these new ICTs are continually proving that it is a tool that, if used properly, does assist in the overthrowing of authoritarian regimes. Through creative means such as purchasing pre-paid mobile phones, using software to conceal their activities, and by proving arguments wrong by standing up for political participation people around the world are disproving these arguments and asserting that they do not hold validity in the international affairs arena. To paraphrase the Chinese activist Xiao Oiang, since the fate of digital activism is still uncertain idealists must take action.³⁵⁴

Of course, this is not to say there is only one path to democratization nor is it to

³⁵⁴ Mary Joyce, *Digital Activism Decoded: The New Mechanics of Change*, p. 14.

say that ICT's alone cause political change. It is purely to say that information and communication technologies provide the capacity to create political or social change. It is, however, safe to say that an effective social movement today includes the use of ICTs and that democratization is not possible without some use of these technologies. As Howard accurately states, "Protests and activist movements have led to successful democratic insurgencies, insurgencies that depended on ICTs for the timing and logistics of protest. Sometimes democratic transitions are the outcome, and sometimes the outcome is slight improvement in the behavior of authoritarian states."

With these new digital technologies, individuals now have the potential to be better educated, communicate easier, and cooperate more efficiently than ever before. We also have the capability to create global change. Yochai Benkler, a Harvard Professor, argued in his book, *The Wealth of Networks*, that more people will be engaged if there is a low time commitment and lost cost.³⁵⁵ Digital activism has the capability of doing just that. With improving our strategic knowledge of the field we can enhance this new medium in order to see new political and power structures forming in nations around the world.

³⁵⁵Yochai Benkler, *The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom*, (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2007).

Bibliography

- Abbate, Janet (2001), "Government, Business, and the Making of the Internet," *The Business History Review* 75, no. 1: 147-176. www.jstor.org.
- Al Hussaini, Amira (2011), "Egypt: A List of Demands from Tahrir Square," *Global Voices*. <http://globalvoicesonline.org/2011/02/10/egypt-a-list-of-demands-from-tahrir-square>.
- Asmaa Mahfouz & the YouTube Video that Helped Spark the Egyptian Uprising* (2011), Film. Directed by Asmaa Mahfouz. Cairo: Democracy Now!.
- Bagalawis, Jennifer, "How IT helped to topple a president | ITworld," *IT news*, technology analysis and how-to resources | ITworld. http://www.itworld.com/CW_1-31-01_it.
- Barlow, John Perry (1996), *Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace*, San Francisco, CA: Electronic Frontier Foundation.
- BBC (2011), "Egypt protests: Key moments in unrest," *BBC*. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12425375>.
- Bekri, Dana , Brynne Dunn, Isik Oguzertem, Yan Su, and Shivani Upreti (2011), "Harnessing Social Media Tools to Fight Corruption," London School of Economics and Political Science May. <http://irevolution.files.wordpress.com/2011/05/harnessing-social-media-tools-to-fight-corruption-1.pdf>.
- Benkler, Yochai (2007), *The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom*, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.
- Best, M.L. and K.W. Wade (2009), "The Internet and Democracy: Global Catalyst or Democratic Dud?" *Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society* 30, no.3.
- Bociurkiw, Michael, "Revolution by Cell Phone," *Forbes*. <http://www.forbes.com/asap/2001/0910/028.html>.
- Boulianne (2009), Does internet use affect engagement? A meta-analysis of research. *Political Communication*, 26.
- Boyd, D.M., & Ellison, N. B. (2007), Social network Sites: Definition, History, and Scholarship. *Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication*, 13(1), article 11. <http://jcmc.indiana.edu/vol13/issue1/boyd.ellison.html>
- Bruce Etling, Robert Faris and John Palfrey (2010), Political Change in the Digital Age: The Fragility and Promise of Online Organizing, *SAIS Review*, Summer-Fall

2010.

- Carlson, Nicholas, "Goldman: Facebook has 600 million users," *MSNBC*.
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/40929239/ns/technology_and_science-tech_and_gadgets.
- Castells, Manuel, Mireia Fernandez-Ardevol, Jack Linchuan Qiu, and Araba Sey (2004), *The Mobile Communication Society*. Los Angeles: University of Southern California.
- Castells, Manuel (2009), *Communication Power*. Oxford: Oxford University Press,.
- Cerf, Vinton, Yogen Dalal, and Carl Sunshine (1974), "Specification of Internet Transmission Control Program," *Network Working Group* December, p. 70.
- Chadwick, Andrew, and Philip N. Howard (2008), *Routledge Handbook of Internet Politics*. Hoboken: Taylor & Francis.
- Chapman, Cameron (2009), "The History and Evolution of Social Media | Webdesigner Depot," *Web Design Blog*. <http://www.webdesignerdepot.com/2009/10/the-history-and-evolution-of-social-media>.
- "Computer History Museum - Exhibits - Internet History," Computer History Museum.
http://www.computerhistory.org/internet_history.
- Cullum, Brannon (2010), "Devices: The Power of Mobile Phones," In *Digital Activism Decoded: The New Mechanics of Change*. New York: International Debate Education Association.
- Dahl, Robert A. (1971), *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Deibert, Ronald, John G. Palfrey, and Jonathan Zittrain (2010), *Access controlled: the shaping of power, rights, and rule in cyberspace*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
- Deutsch Karlekar, Karin, and Sarah Cook (2009), "Freedom on the Net: A Global Assessment of Internet and Digital Media," *Freedom House Special Report 1*, <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=383&report=79&group=19>.
- Diamond, Larry Jay, and Leonardo Morlino (2005), *Assessing the quality of democracy*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Dictionary and Thesaurus*. Merriam-Webster Online. <http://www.merriam-webster.com>.
- Drezner, Daniel W. (2010), "Weighing the Scales: The Internet's Effect on State-Society Relations," *Brown Journal of World Affairs* 16, no. 2, p. 31-44.

"Egypt," The Central Intelligence Agency. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/eg.html>.

Estrada vs Desierto (2001), 146710-15: March 2, 2001 : J. Puno : En Banc
(http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/146710_15.htm)

"Facts about the Mobile. A Journey through Time," *Mobilen 50*.
www.mobilen50ar.se/eng/FaktabladENGFfinal.pdf.

Fayed, Shaimaa (2011), "Egypt Internet Returns," *Breaking News and Opinion on The Huffington Post*, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/02/egypt-internet-returns_n_817319.html.

Gerlach, Luther P., and Virginia H. Hine (1970), *People, Power and Change*.
Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.

Giglio, Mike (2011), "How Wael Ghonim Sparked Egypt's Uprising - Newsweek,"
Newsweek. <http://www.newsweek.com/2011/02/13/the-facebook-freedom-fighter.html>.

Goldstone, Jack A. (1986), *Revolutions: theoretical, comparative, and historical studies*.
San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.

Groshek, Jacob (2010), "A Time-Series, Multinational Analysis of Democratic Forecasts
and Internet Diffusion," *International Journal of Communication* 4, p. 142-174.

Howard, Philip N., "The Arab Uprising's Cascading Effects | Smart Journalism. Real
Solutions. Miller-McCune," Miller-McCune. <http://www.miller-mccune.com/politics/the-cascading-effects-of-the-arab-spring-28575>.

Howard, Philip N. (2010), *The Digital Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy:
Information Technology and Political Islam*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hu, Jim, "What will AOL do with ICQ?," *CNET News*. <http://news.cnet.com/2100-1033-212056.html>.

Huntington, Samuel P. (1991), *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth
Century*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.

Hyland, James L. (1995), *Democratic theory: the philosophical foundations*. Manchester:
Manchester University Press.

Isakhan, B. and Stockwell, S (2011), *The Secret History of Democracy*. London: Palgrave
Macmillan.

- Jenkins, Henry, David Thorburn, and Brad Seawell (2004), *Democracy and New Media*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
- Joyce, Mary (2010), *Digital Activism Decoded: The New Mechanics of Change*. New York: International Debate Education Association.
- Juris, Jeffrey (2005), "The New Digital Media and Activist Networking within Anti-Corporate Globalization Movements," *American Academy of Political and Social Science* 597, p. 189-208. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25046069>.
- Kanalley, Craig (2011), "Egypt's Internet Shut Down, According To Reports," *Breaking News and Opinion on The Huffington Post*. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/01/27/egypt-internet-goes-down-_n_815156.html.
- Karpf, Dave (2010), "Measuring the Success of Digital Campaigns," In *Digital Activism Decoded: The New Mechanics of Change*. New York: International Debate Education Association, p. 150-161.
- Kavada, Anastasia (2010), "Activism Transforms Digital: The Social Movement Perspective," In *Digital Activism Decoded: The New Mechanics of Change*. New York: International Debate Education Association, p. 101-117.
- Kedzie, Christopher R. (1997), The third waves. In *Borders and Cyberspace: Information Policy and the Global Information Infrastructure*, Brian Kahin and Charles Nesson, eds. Cambridge: MIT Press, p. 106-28
- Kirkpatrick, Graeme (2008), *Technology and Social Power*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Kirkpatrick, David (2011), "Egypt Erupts in Jubilation as Mubarak Steps Down," *New York Times*. <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/12/world/middleeast/12egypt.html?scp=1&sq=Egypt%20Erupts%20in%20Jubilation%20as%20Mubarak%20Steps%20Down&t=cse>.
- Kravets, David (2010), "T-Mobile Claims Right to Censor Text Messages," *Wired*. <http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/09/text-message-censorship>.
- Leiner, Barry, Vinton Cerf, David Clark, Robert Kahn, Leonard Kleinrock, Daniel Lynch, Jon Postel, Lawrence Roberts, and Stephen Wolff, "A Brief History of the Internet," Internet Society (ISOC), <http://www.isoc.org/internet/history/brief.shtml>.

- Lloyd, John, "Mightiest for the mightiest: "The Net Delusion" openDemocracy.
<http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/john-lloyd/mightiest-for-mightiest-%E2%80%9C-net-delusion%E2%80%9D>.
- Logan, Sarah, "Replicating Facebook revolutions: why Ahmadinejad should worry but Mugabe and Hu Jintao can wait it out," openDemocracy.
<http://www.opendemocracy.net/sarah-logan/replicating-facebook-revolutions-why-ahmadinejad-should-worry-but-mugabe-and-hu-jintao-c>.
- MacKinnon, Mark, "Twitter's role in Bangkok conflict unprecedented - The Globe and Mail," *The Globe and Mail*.
<http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/twitters-role-in-bangkok-conflict-unprecedented/article1578064>.
- Madrigal, Alexis (2011), "The Inside Story of How Facebook Responded to Tunisian Hacks," *The Atlantic*. www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2011/01/the-inside-story-of-how-facebookresponded-to-tunisian-hacks/70044.
- McGuire, Mary (2011), "Freedom House: Freedom in the World 2011: The Authoritarian Challenge to Democracy," Freedom House,
<http://freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=70&release=1310>.
- Michael, Maggie , and Hamza Hendawi (2011), "Egypt's New Government Announced On State TV," *Breaking News and Opinion on The Huffington Post*,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/01/31/egypt-new-government_n_816160.html.
- Michavilla, N. *Guerra, Terrorismo y elecciones: incidencia electoral de los atentados islamistas en Madrid*, Real Instituto Elcano, DT N13/2005.
- Morozov, Evgeny (2011), *The Net Delusion: The Dark Side of Internet Freedom*. New York: Public Affairs.
- Mydans, Seth (2001), "'People Power II' Doesn't Give Filipinos the Same Glow". *The New York Times*. February 5, 2001.
- New York Times (2010), "Googling the Censors," *The New York Time*.
<http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/28/opinion/28tue4.html>.
- Nickson, Christopher, "The History of Social Networking," *Digital Trends*.
<http://www.digitaltrends.com/features/the-history-of-social-networking>.
- Olivares-Cunanan, Belinda, "Philippine Daily Inquirer," Google News.
<http://news.google.com/newspapers?id=PX42AAAIBAJ&sjid=hCUMAAAIBAJ&pg=2261,35034653&dq=estrada+trial+envelope&hl=en> .

- Preston, Jennifer (2011), "Facebook Officials Keep Quiet on Its Role in Revolts," *The New York Times*.
<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/15/business/media/15facebook.html>.
- "Privateline.com: 3G and Cellular radio Information," Daily Notes.
<http://www.privateline.com/3G/3G.htm>.
- R. K. Garrett (2006), "Protest in an information society: A review of literature on social movements and new ICTs," *Information, Communication, and Society*, Vol. 9, No. 2. 2006.Tekniskamuseet.se.
- Rafael, V. (2003), "The cell phone and the crowd: Messianic politics in the contemporary Philippines". *Popular Culture*, 15(3) p. 399-425.
- Rheingold, Howard (2003), *Smart Mobs: The Next Social Revolution*. Cambridge, MA: Perseus Pub.
- Rich, Frank (2011), "Wallflowers at the Revolution," *The New York Times*.
<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/06/opinion/06rich.html>.
- Richter, Michael (2011), "Facebook's Response to DoC," *Facebook*, Palo Alto.
- Rodham Clinton, Hillary (2011), "Internet Rights and Wrongs: Choices and Challenges in a Networked World," Speech, George Washington University from U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC, February 15, 2011.
- Rodham Clinton, Hillary (2010), "Remarks on Internet Freedom," Speech, Remarks on Internet Freedom from U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C., January 21, 2010.
- Rosenbaum, Ron (1971), "Secrets of the Little Blue Box," *Esquire Magazine*, October 1971.
- Saeed, Fahd Ahmad, "Capacity Limit Problem in 3G Networks," Purdue School of Engineering. www.ece.iupui.edu/~dskim/Courses/ECE695MWN/2006-saeed-Capacity_Limit_Problem_in_3G_Networks.ppt.
- Shirky, Clay, "The Political Power of Social Media," *Foreign Affairs*.
<http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67038/clay-shirky/the-political-power-of-social-media>.
- Shirky, Clay (2009), *Here comes everybody: the power of organizing without organizations*. New York: Penguin Books.
- Siegel, Lee (2011), "'The Net Delusion' and the Egypt Crisis," *New York Times*.
<http://artsbeat.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/02/04/the-net-delusion-and-the-egypt->

crisis/?scp=1&sq=The%20Net%20Delusion%E2%80%99%20and%20the%20Egypt%20Crisis&st=cse.

Smith, Catharine (2011), "Egypt's Facebook Revolution: Wael Ghonim Thanks The Social Network," *Breaking News and Opinion on The Huffington Post*. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/11/egypt-facebook-revolution-wael-ghonim_n_822078.html?view=screen.

"Swedish National Museum of Science and Technology" (http://www.tekniskamuseet.se/mobilen/engelska/1980_90.shtml),

The Associated Press (2011), "Day Of Departure, Feb. 4, 2011: Crowd To Call For Mubarak To Resign," *Breaking News and Opinion on The Huffington Post*. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/03/day-of-departure-feb-4_n_818398.html.

The Associated Press (2011), "Egypt Ruling Party Leadership Resigns; Obama Backs Gradual Transition," *Breaking News and Opinion on The Huffington Post*. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/05/egypt-ruling-party-leader_n_819084.html.

The Associated Press (2011), "Mubarak Faces Egypt Protests On 'Day Of Rage'," *Breaking News and Opinion on The Huffington Post*. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/01/25/mubarak-faces-egypt-prote_n_813572.html#s229529.

The Associated Press (2011), "Mubarak Tells Egypt He Will Not Seek Re-Election," *Huffington Post*. www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/01/mubarak-tells-egypt-he-wi_n_817132.html.

The Associated Press (2011), "New Egypt Government To Be Appointed, But President Mubarak Refuses To Step Down," *Breaking News and Opinion on The Huffington Post*. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/01/28/new-egypt-government-to-b_1_n_815682.html.

The Open Society Institute's Health Media Initiative, "The Global Digital Activism Data Set," The Meta-Activism Project. <http://www.meta-activism.org>.

"Twitter Blog: The Tweets Must Flow," Twitter Blog. <http://blog.twitter.com/2011/01/tweets-must-flow.html>.

U.S. Patent 3663762: *Cellular Mobile Communication System* — Amos Edward Joel (Bell Labs), filed December 21, 1970, issued May 16, 1972

Wedeman, Ben, "@bencnn," *Twitter*. twitter.com/#!/bencnn/status/30759361454276608.

Williams, Louise, "NOKIA 9000 COMMUNICATOR SETS THE STANDARD FOR INTELLIGENT CELLULAR TELEPHONES," *Computer Business Review*.
http://www.cbronline.com/news/nokia_9000_communicator_sets_the_standard_for_intelligent_cellular_telephones.

"Yahoo! buys GeoCities - Jan. 28, 1999," *CNN Money*.
http://money.cnn.com/1999/01/28/technology/yahoo_a.

Zandt, Deanna (2011), "Civic Engagement in the Era of New Media," Speech, 2011 New York Life Symposium from Colin Powell Center for Policy Studies, New York, March 16, 2011.