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A CROSS-BOUNDARY PEOPLE: THE COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES, SOCIAL NETWORKS, AND TRAVEL WRITINGS OF JAPANESE AND TAIWANESE SEKIMIN IN THE SHANTOU TREATY PORT (1895–1937)

by

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A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in History in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York

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ABSTRACT

A CROSS-BOUNDARY PEOPLE: THE COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES, SOCIAL NETWORKS, AND TRAVEL WRITINGS OF JAPANESE AND TAIWANESE SEKIMIN IN THE SHANTOU TREATY PORT (1895−1937)

by

LIN-YI TSENG

Adviser: Professor Helena Rosenblatt

This dissertation explores Japanese imperial history in East Asia and focuses on a group of “cross-boundary people”—Taiwanese sekimin (Taiwanese who registered as Japanese subjects) and Japanese—who went to the treaty port of Shantou in southern China during the period between 1895 and 1937. The starting time point (i.e., 1895) corresponds to the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, by which Japan acquired Taiwan as a colony and informal privileges in Chinese treaty ports. The ending time point (i.e., 1937) corresponds to the decline that Shantou’s Japanese community experienced owing to the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War on July 7, 1937. By examining the official documents of the Taiwan General Government, commercial reports of Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and major newspapers and travel writings published in colonial Taiwan, I explore the connections among the Japanese homeland
Concerning commercial activities, I argue that Shantou was an important market for both Japanese and Taiwanese goods, and that the commercial network comprising the Japanese metropole, colonial Taiwan, and the Shantou treaty port was significant for Japanese imperial formation in East Asia. Moreover, by analyzing the Japan-China co-invested Dadong Ice-making Company in Shantou, I explore the complicated competitive and cooperative relationships among three notably different ethnic groups there: Taiwanese sekimin, local Chinese, and Japanese in Shantou. By examining the Japan-founded educational institution known as —the Tōē School in Shantou, I clarify two important points: (1) the Taiwan General Government established a network of human resources for the Japanese homeland, colonial Taiwan, and the Shantou treaty port; and (2) this particular school’s Japanese and Taiwanese teachers produced writings published in major Taiwanese periodicals, signifying a network of “words” between an element of Japan’s formal empire (Taiwan) and an element of Japan’s informal empire (Shantou).
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During the years I spent taking courses in New York, I benefited from a fellowship courtesy of Taiwan’s Ministry of Education, which provided financial support for my living expenses in New York. During the years I spent writing my dissertation in Taipei, I received financial assistance from many foundations and want to take this opportunity to thank each one individually: the Sumitomo Foundation in Japan, the Interchange Association of Japan, the Taipak Kianseng Rotary Club, the Institute of Taiwan History at Academia Sinica, the Christian Center at Shantou University, the China Times Cultural Foundation based in North America, and the Chiang Ching-Kuo Foundation for International Scholarly Exchange. Without all this financial assistance, I could not have completed my dissertation.

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the difficulties before me. My parents’ endless love and devotion have been my main source of motivation in completing the dissertation. I want to thank my husband, Pio, who accompanied me during my studies in New York and helped me right up to the final step in my pursuit of a PhD. Our daughter, Josephine, has taught me patience and courage as a mother, and her smile is the most precious gift from God.
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Chapter 1: Introduction: Empire, Migration and Local Society

1.1 Prelude

In 2008, a movie called Cape No. 7 directed by the young Taiwanese director Te-Sheng Wei became a blockbuster in Taiwan. Even without a strong promotional campaign, Cape No. 7 became the second highest grossing film in Taiwan’s cinematic history, only behind 1997’s Titanic directed by James Cameron. At the start of Cape No. 7, a Japanese teacher in 1940s southern Taiwan falls in love with a Taiwanese girl whose Japanese name is Tomoko. After the surrender of Japan in 1945, the Japanese teacher is forced to return to his Japanese homeland. While aboard the repatriating Japanese boat Takasagomaru on his trip back, he composes seven letters expressing his love for Tomoko. He encloses the letter in an envelope addressed to “Cape No. 7,” the girl’s home address in southern Taiwan. As the years go by, the Japanese teacher and Tomoko, the former residing in Japan and the latter in Taiwan, enter into their respective marriages. The passage of a half-century brings with it change: the Japanese teacher has passed away, and his daughter finds the love letters and send them to Taiwan. However, the address “Cape No. 7” was an address used only during the Japanese colonial period in Taiwan, and the mailman has no idea where he should deliver the article of mail. After
a complicated process involving appearances by many other figures, Tomoko, now an old grandmother, receives the love letters. The film end with a scene in which the elderly Tomoko tenderly touches letters and recalls her time with the Japanese teacher over a half-century earlier.

After the film’s blockbuster success in Taiwan, many scholars and critics explored why the film had been so popular there. A widely applauded theory was that the film had aroused complex Taiwanese emotions toward Japan, which had colonized the island for fifty years prior to the succeeding governance of Chiang Kai-shek’s Guomintang. In some ways, the movie reflected the complicated and entangled histories of Taiwan, Japan, and China in the twentieth century. The Japanese teacher in Cape No. 7 is undoubtedly a cross-boundary person who has crossed not only the geographical boundary between his Japanese homeland and colonial Taiwan, but also—by falling in love with Tomoko—the ethnic boundary separating the colonizing Japanese from the colonized Taiwanese. The Japanese empire’s expansion in East Asia between the late nineteenth century and the end of the Second World War created a situation where many migrating Japanese, Taiwanese, and Koreans, and others became cross-boundary people, like the Japanese teacher in Cape No. 7. My dissertation focuses on a specific population of these cross-boundary people, that is, Taiwanese and Japanese who migrated to a treaty port named
Shantou in southern China during the early to mid-twentieth century. From the experiences and stories of these migrants, I explore the connections among the Japanese homeland, colonial Taiwan, and southern China during the Japanese colonial period in Taiwan.

1.2 Migration: The Cross-boundary People

Japanese Migration

Concerning the issue of Asian migration, Adam McKeown analyzes the complicated relationship between Asian migration and the establishment of modern sovereignty, challenging the conventional Euro-central concept of globalization.¹ His research has inspired me to think about the complicated relationships of migration under the Japanese empire. In the field of Japanese imperial studies, some scholars have applied the approach of “migration” to studies on the Japanese empire, that is, by examining “Japanese” (including Koreans and Taiwanese) people’s interactions with local places, researchers can strengthen studies on the Japanese empire. Most previous studies in this field explored migration of people from the Japanese homeland to a diverse set of acquisitions: Japan’s formal colonies of Taiwan and Korea, Japan’s puppet state of

Manchukuo, Japan’s informal imperial conquests in China (namely Chinese treaty ports), and areas in Southeast Asia.

Concerning Japanese immigrants in northeast Asia, Erik Esselstrom explores the activities of Japanese police officers whom Japan’s Foreign Ministry assigned to Manchuria and Korea, and he argues that these officers’ migration played an active role in facilitating Japanese imperial expansion in northeast Asia.² Joshua Fogel examines the Japanese communities in Harbin between 1898 and 1930, and notes three important points: (1) most Japanese immigrants in the area were from Kyushu, searching for better opportunities; (2) by the 1910s, the Japanese communities of Harbin had produced local social, educational, economic, and religious institutions functioning to support the Japanese people there; and (3) Japanese communities, while establishing many self-supporting institutions, underwent a certain level of ethnic integration and assimilation. Many Japanese learned Russian, wore Western-style clothing, and frequently interacted with both indigenous and foreign communities. Japanese communities’ integration into Harbin’s local communities was much deeper than the corresponding integration

of the Jewish communities.³ Barbara Brooks discussed the migration of millions of Japanese
“proletarian colonizers” (including farmers, workers, and prostitutes) to Korea and Manchurian
during the Japanese imperial period. Concerning their social and economic status, these
proletarian colonizers were not significantly different from local residents. Moreover, the
Japanese government encouraged Japanese women residing in colonies to marry local men
(chiefly Koreans and Russians), and praised Japanese prostitutes as vanguards of the Japanese
empire. Brooks argued that gender functioned as an instrument in the Japanese empire’s
penetration of and expansion throughout various colonial acquisitions.⁴

Mark Peattie’s research compares Japanese immigrants with British immigrants in Shanghai,
Hankou, Tianjin, Amoy (Xiamen), and Fuzhou, and identifies four important points: (1) most
Japanese immigrants came from Kyushu and western Japan; (2) the formation of Japanese
immigrants in China was similar to the corresponding formation in the main colonies of Taiwan
and Korea, with the formations covering all social classes, from high-ranking officials to the
bourgeoisie (like small shopkeepers) to the lower classes (like common laborers and prostitutes),

and for the most part, Japanese immigrants had a modest lifestyle, in contrast to the luxurious
lifestyles of, for example, the British taipan; (3) Japanese communities were self-sufficient and
isolated; and (4) Japanese immigrants made a greater effort than did their British counterparts to
accommodate the Chinese community and Japanese had fewer problems in matters of
accommodation. In addition, Peattie points out that the Japanese government was the only
“treaty port”-based foreign power that officially supported China-related research institutions.5

Research conducted by ChristianHenriot examines the Japanese communities in Shanghai
between 1875 and 1945. He argues that commercial opportunities were the primary force that
attracted Japanese to Shanghai both before and after 1937 (the outbreak of the Second
Sino-Japanese War). The Japanese residents here were made up of many small shopkeepers and
employees. They concentrated in certain quarters, resulting in a kind of urban isolation and were
the most regulated and organized of Shanghai’s foreign communities. Because of their isolation,
Japanese were rarely in touch with local Chinese and had a strong sense of Japanese identity.6

5 Mark Peattie, “Japanese Treaty Port Settlements in China, 1895–1937,” in Peter Duus, Ramon Myers, and Mark
166–209.
ChristianHenriot, eds., New Frontiers: Imperialism’s New Communities in East Asia, 1842–1953. New York:
Concerning Japanese immigrants in southeast Asia, Mark Peattie explores the Japanese immigrants in Micronesia. His research tells of many Japanese businessmen who operated in Micronesia and who included the pioneer and patriot Koben Mori 森小弁 and the “sugar king” Haruji Matsue 松江春次. Readers also learn about both the Micronesia policies adopted by different Japanese political regimes and everyday Micronesian life as experienced by Japanese immigrants, including Okinawan and Korean immigrants.7 Hiromitsu Iwamoto examines Japanese who stayed in New Guinea between the 1890s and 1949, including the businessman Isokichi Komine 小瀧礫吉, who later became a famous planter in both German and Australian New Guinea. However, Japanese in New Guinea faced severe challenges after Australia formally regarded Japan as an enemy in 1942.8

Taiwanese Sekimin Migration

Taiwan had been under Japanese colonization for fifty years, from the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895 to the end of the Second World War in 1945. Many scholars conducted

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studies exploring the history of Taiwan under Japanese colonial period.\(^9\) Leo Ching’s research analyzes Taiwanese literature during the Japanese colonial period and argues that the formation of Taiwanese identity was part of a triangular relationship involving Japanese colonialism and Chinese nationalism. The neo-nationalism or proto-nationalism of Taiwanese was shaped under Japanese colonial rule.\(^10\) Faye Yuan Kleeman examines the concept of “the south” from the perspective of literature and the portrait of the South Pacific and Taiwanese aborigines in both political novels and popular media, emphasizing how these texts reflect the symbolic meaning and impact of “the south” in the Japanese colonial context.\(^11\) Research edited by David Der-wei Wang and Ping-hui Liao examines colonial Taiwan’s literature and, in particular, discusses how the Japanese colonial government developed a mechanism of governance by means of connections between power and knowledge.\(^12\)

**Concerning the kōminka (Japanization) movement in Taiwan, Wan-Yao Chou** suggests that wartime pressures demanded the mobilization of all colonial sources and manpower.

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The kōminka movement served as a means of mobilization. The Japanese authorities wanted to turn Koreans and Taiwanese into loyal imperial subjects by, for example, building Japanese shrines, instituting oaths to the Japanese state, and assigning Japanese names to non-Japanese.\(^\text{13}\)

Sociologist Ming-Chang Lo 駱明正 demonstrates the mutual relationships between the professional identity and the ethnic identity of Taiwanese doctors under the Japanese colonial empire, and she argues that Taiwanese doctors’ attitudes toward the colonizers grew more positive as the doctors increasingly perceived themselves less and less as national physicians (a perception common in the 1920s) and more and more as medical modernists (a perception common during the kōminka period, 1937-1945).\(^\text{14}\)

Concerning the issue of migration, in addition to examining people from the Japanese homeland, some scholars have focused on the migration of Taiwanese sekimin. The term ‘Taiwanese sekimin’ 臺灣藉民 is a Japanese one indicating “Taiwanese who registered as Japanese citizens.” The term commonly appeared in official Japanese documents during the Japanese colonial period (1895–1945), when many Taiwanese sekimin sojourned specifically to


southern China. There, they undertook a variety of occupations: for example, some were businessmen in search of new opportunities; others were teachers assigned by the Taiwan General Government to teach at Japanese-funded schools in China. Moreover, some Taiwanese sekimin travelled for personal reasons, like sight-seeing or reunions of family and friends. In this sense, research on Taiwanese sekimin’s migrations in China has enriched studies on the broader topic of the Japanese empire.

Concerning previous studies on Taiwanese sekimin, Japanese scholar Takashi Nakamura has put out perhaps the most important research in this area, beginning with several papers in the 1980s. Some of his research addresses the Taiwan General Government’s management of certain southern Chinese sites, encompassing the Japanese management of hospitals, schools, the press, and the like. Moreover, he focuses on the activities of Taiwanese sekimin in Fuzhou and Xiamen, but the research seldom addresses sekimin in Guangdong Province’s Shantou area. Masami Kondō analyzes schools, hospitals, and the press,

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15 Takashi Nakamura, Taiwan sekimin wo meguru sho mon dai 「臺灣籍民」をめぐる諸問題 (On issues related to Taiwanese sekimin), Tōnan ajia kenkyū 東南アジア研究, vol. 18: 3 (December 1980), pp. 66–89; “Fukushū no Taiwan sekimin” 福州の臺灣籍民 (Taiwanese sekimin in Fuzhou), Nanpō bunka 南方文化, vol. 10 (October 1983), pp. 160–172; “Kamon no Taiwan sekimin to san dai sei” 廈門の臺灣籍民と三大姓 (Taiwanese sekimin in Xiamen and the three big family names), Nanpō bunka 南方文化, vol. 12 (November 1985), pp. 115–137; “Kamon oyoibi fukushū hakuai kai inin no sei ritsu: Taiwan sōtokufu no bunka kōsaku” 廈門及び福州博愛会医院の成立—臺灣總督府的文化工作 (The establishment of Xiamen and Fuzhou hakuai hospitals: The cultural work of the Taiwan General Government), Nanpō bunka 南方文化, vol. 15, (November 1988), pp. 1–57; “Swatō hakuai kai iin...
the so-called three cultural facilities of the Taiwan General Government during the Taishō period (1912–1926) and argues that the expenses of the Taiwan General Government’s ventures in southern China and southeastern Asia occupied a significant proportion of the Taiwan General Government’s overall expenses.¹⁶

Among Taiwanese scholars, Hua-huang Liang 梁華璜 stands out as one of the earliest scholars to pay attention to the sekimin issue. He demonstrates the Japanese colonial government’s discriminatory treatment of Taiwanese by examining the government’s passport policy for Taiwanese traveling to China. For example, when Taiwanese sekimin would board a ship leaving Taiwan for China, they had to hand over their passports to law-enforcement officers who would collect all the passports and submit them to the Japanese consulate in China. The consulate would keep the passports belonging to the Taiwanese sekimin until their return to Taiwan. However, Japanese immigrants who were passengers aboard a ship bound from the Japanese homeland to China did not have to hand over their passports to Japanese authorities.¹⁷

¹⁷ Torajirō Inoue 井上庚二郎, “Xiamen de Taiwan jimin went” 廈門的臺灣籍民問題 (The issue of Taiwanese
In this sense, Japan’s passport-control policies for Taiwanese subjects differed substantively from those for Japanese subjects. Hsueh-chi Hsu 許雪姬 explores the activities of Taiwanese sekimin in Manchukuo, which—she argues—was a haven for Taiwanese pursuing new opportunities. She focuses on a group of Taiwanese students who, after attending medical schools in Manchukuo, practiced their respective professions there. Some of these medical specialists even served as the last emperor Puyi’s private doctors and went into exile with the emperor. Shu-minh Chung 鍾淑敏 approaches the issue of Taiwanese sekimin from the perspective of commercial history. She argues that sekimin excelled in the ice-making business and the cold-refreshment business in Xiamen, and that these entrepreneurs actively participated in the establishment of public utilities, like water and electricity.

Some scholars have addressed the social history of Taiwanese sekimin, arguing that “hei

20 Shu-minh Chung, “Ri zhi shi qi Taiwan ren zai Xiamen de huo dong ji qi xiang guan wen ti” 日治時期臺灣人在廈門的活動及其相關問題 (The activities and related issues of Taiwanese in Xiamen during the Japanese colonial period) in Zou xiang jin dai 走向近代. Taipei: Dong hua shu ju, 2004, pp. 399–452.
bang ji min” 黑幫藉民 (the sekimin gangs), whose members engaged in drug trafficking, prostitution, and other illegal activities were an offshoot of Japan’s southern strategy. The Taiwan General Government turned a blind eye to sekimin’s illegal actives because Japanese officials regarded the activities of sekimin gangs as a way to enlarge Japanese influence in China.21 Some Japanese scholars have focused on Taiwanese sekimin’s ethnic and national backgrounds and have attempted to identify relationships between sekimin and imperial Japan.22

Most American scholarship has not touched on the issue of Taiwanese sekimin, but recently some American scholars have opened up the possibility of further exploration in this area. Barbara Brooks argued that colonial citizenship, which spanned multiple imperial fields, serves as a way for historians to explore the issue of identity in the Japanese empire. Meanwhile, imperial Japan’s policies concerning ethnicity and nationality demonstrate the different positions

of colonized peoples (e.g., Taiwanese and Koreans) within the empire.²³

Research by Man-hong Lin 林滿紅 is a combination of overseas Chinese history and commerce studies. She takes the sekimin Chunyang Guo 郭春秧 in Indonesia as an example and argues that overseas Chinese merchants adopted multiple nationalities, including the Japanese nationality, to reduce commercial risks and to seek out economic benefits. Actually, by means of deliberate falsification, many Chinese in Fujian Province acquired sekimin status in order to enjoy extraterritorial privileges.²⁴ Kenichi Gotô 後藤乾一, who is famous for conducting research about the relationship between imperial Japan and Indonesia, relates the life history of Taiwanese sekimin in southeastern Asia. He uses the sekimin Dai Ke 柯呆 to depict sekimin who diligently reclaimed wasteland in Java but whom local Javanese governments not only regarded as citizen of an enemy country after the outbreak of the Great East Asian War but indeed subjected to property confiscations and internment in concentration camps.²⁵


Moreover, Lori Watt and Tessa Morris-Suzuki explore the issue of migration in postwar Japan. Watt’s scholarship addresses Japan’s policy of hikiage 引揚 (repatriation) and deportation in the postwar period under the instruction of the Allied Powers. The former policy concerned the repatriation of Japanese from all of Japan’s former colonies to the Japanese homeland whereas the latter concerned the dispersal of Japan-based ex-colonial peoples (e.g., Taiwanese and Koreans) from the Japanese homeland back to their region of origin. Watt argues that both repatriation and deportation significantly shaped the reconfiguration of postwar Japan.26 Morris-Suzuki explores the story of mikkōsha 密航者 (stowaways), most of whom were Koreans who entered Japan between 1946 and the 1970s for economic reasons. She attempts to fill in the “blank space” (1945–1980) in Japanese immigration history and argues that the numbers of illegal immigrants, in reality, were much higher than the Japanese official statistics showed. In some cases, would-be immigrants who were not lucky enough to get a residence permit were confined in detention camps and suffered dehumanizing treatment.27

In conclusion, the abovementioned scholars have explored Japanese imperial history and post-war Japanese history in reference to migration and migrants. The scholars’ findings help clarify the Japanese empire’s diverse makeup and have inspired me to analyze the relationship among the Japanese homeland, colonial Taiwan, and the Shantou treaty port, with a specific focus on both the Japanese and Taiwanese immigrants.

1.3 The Significance of Local Chinese Society

A local society is a group of interacting people sharing an urban or rural environment. Recent studies on the matter have stressed the agency of local societies and the interactions between local societies (small) and the state (large).

According to Max Weber’s research, China never developed “urban community” or “urban autonomy.” Cities in imperial China were static, merely centers of bureaucracy. By contrast, Western European cities represented freedom, equality, rationality, and capitalism. In the 1970s, William Skinner first challenged Weber’s argument and provided macro-region theory.

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core-periphery theory, and central-place theory in studying Chinese cities.²⁹ Later, many scholars of Chinese history applied Skinner’s theories to various strands of research. For example, William Rowe’s research about Hankow suggests that early modern China developed a national market, at the center of which was Hankow, possessing modernity, urban autonomy, and urban community akin to the character of nineteenth-century Paris.³⁰ Adopting Skinner’s theories, Mary Rankin in her research on nineteenth-century-Zhejiang argues that the gap between core and periphery in Skinner’s theory is more significant than the traditional urban-rural dichotomy in Weber’s theory, and that the growth of the “public sphere”³¹ enabled Zhejiang elites to play a more active role in social and political life.³²

Richard Lufrano examines the late imperial Chinese world from the perspective of merchants and commerce. He challenges Western scholarship’s traditional conclusion that Confucian thought has been a major obstacle to Chinese economic development. From his examination of merchant manuals (e.g., travel guides, practical instructions, and moral instructions) published in

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the late Ming to the mid-Qing period, he argues that merchants absorbed many Confucian values (e.g., self-discipline and frugality) and emphasized self-cultivation, reciprocity, and rationalism.  

Examining local society in 1920s Beijing, David Strand’s study argues that a public sphere there occupied a space between the state and society. Citizens (including laborers) discussed political issues in temples, tea houses, bathhouses, theaters, brothels, and many other public places. Richard Belsky’s research concerns the influence that both *hui guan* 會館 (native-place lodges) and sojourners in Beijing had on the city’s urban ecology in the early twentieth century. On the one hand, the sojourners made use of *hui guan* to communicate with other countrymen in Beijing and to influence the imperial bureaucracy; on the other hand, the state used *hui guan* to balance different local powers and to maintain the security and operations of the imperial bureaucracy.  

Ruth Rogaski’s research on Tianjin explores how *wei sheng* 衛生 (hygiene) became representative of Chinese modernity in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Tianjin experienced the presence of foreign powers on its soils after the 1850s, and during the

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1930s and 40s, it was controlled by Japanese. Her study essentially opens a window through which we can understand the complexity of a Chinese treaty port’s local society.\(^\text{36}\)

Concerning local society in Chinese cities, many scholars have focused on Shanghai because of its status as the “key to modern China”\(^\text{37}\); in other words, knowledge of Shanghai can shed considerable light on not only China but also China’s encounters with modernity, which were rooted in urban settings. Diverse scholars have conducted research on Republican Shanghai from different angles: (1) Christian Henriot’s and Frederic Wakeman’s work concerning the relationship between Shanghai and state-influenced social control;\(^\text{38}\) (2) Bryna Goodman’s and others’ examinations of the immigrants in Shanghai and their identities;\(^\text{39}\) (3) research by Hanchao Lu 盧漢超 examining Shanghai residents’ everyday life;\(^\text{40}\) (4) Shanghai’s urban life and cultural industry, especially the printing culture, as seen from the perspectives of Leo Ou-fan Lee 李歐梵 and Christopher Reed;\(^\text{41}\) (5) Emily Honig’s and Elizabeth Perry’s discussions


about workers in Shanghai;\(^4^2\) (6) Christian Henriot’s and Gail Hershatters’ findings concerning prostitution in Shanghai;\(^4^3\) (7) Frederic Wakeman’s treatment of terrorism and crime in Shanghai;\(^4^4\) and (8) Shanghai’s economic sentiments, researched by Wen-hsin Yeh 葉文心.\(^4^5\)

If we turn our eyes to the study of local society in southern China during this period, we can see that *Hua nan xue pai* 華南學派 (the Hua nan school of thought) contributed greatly to this field. The school consists of scholars from the Chinese University of Hong Kong, Sun Yat-sen University in Guangzhou, and Xiamen University. Having inherited anthropologist Maurice Freedman’s theoretical concept of lineage in southern China, the scholars emphasize an approach steeped in historical anthropology, paying particular attention to religion, village-level lineage in southern China, and interactions between the state system and local society.

David W. Faure examines the relationship between state and society, and he argues that under the Ming dynasty, with the institutionalization of lineage (i.e., ritual and group ownership

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of property), southern China melded into imperial China. Helen Siu 蕭鳳霞 and Zhiwei Liu 劉志偉 argue that cultural identity in the Pearl River Delta of southern China has never been fixed and has continually adapted itself to diverse interactions between local society and state. They explore the ethnic identity of both the Danjia 蟠家, a minority in Chinese society, and the Han, and argue that ethnic identity has fluctuated, often in relation to language and lineage. Research conducted by Chun-sheng Chen 陳春聲 centers on the Guangdong area, emphasizing religious belief and lineage in local Chaozhou society. Mei-bao Cheng 程美寶 explores the formation of the so-called Guangdong culture and the transformation of the Guangdong language in different places. Zhen-man Zheng 鄭鎮滿 has collected a great amount of information pertaining to genealogies in Fuzhou villages, and explores how institutionalized lineage has functioned in local society. Scholarship by a research partner of

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50 Zhen-man Zheng, MingqīngFjianjiazurezhibushuíbiantian “家族機構與社會變遷 (Family institutions and social change in Fujian during the Ming Qing period). Beijing: zhong guo ren min da xue chu ban she, 2009.
Zhen-man Zheng, Michael Szonyi integrates new sources (e.g., stone inscriptions) and genealogies from Fuzhou villages, and argues that the lineage (and the compiling of genealogies) was actually a strategic practice characterized by flexibility and negotiation.\textsuperscript{51} Chi Cheung Choi addresses the Chaoshan area’s commercial activities and pays particular attention to influence exerted by Chaoshan businessmen over kinship in order to explore business in southern China, East Asia, and Southeast Asia.\textsuperscript{52} In addition to the abovementioned scholars, the local governments of Chaozhou and Shantou developed offices responsible for recording local history and collecting related materials, thereby helping to reconstruct the Chaoshan area’s past from local perspectives.

Some scholars have explored local history from the angle of Christianity. Research overseen by Joseph Tse-Hei Lee concerns the role of Christianity in the Chaoshan area. His work examines the missionary efforts of both American Baptists and English Presbyterians in Chaozhou villages during the period between 1860 and 1900, with an emphasis on missionaries’ creation of Christian villages in local Chinese society and the power relationships


between Christian and non-Christian villagers.\textsuperscript{53}

Michael Szonyi’ study of Quemoy 金門 draws out the significance of local society during the Cold War of the 1950s. Quemoy is a small island currently belonging to Taiwan and located in the Taiwan Straits. The location of Quemoy made the island suitable as a buffer between Chiang Kai-shek’s Guomintang in Taiwan and Mao Tse-tung’s Chinese Communist Party in China. Szonyi explores how the Cold War transformed the local society and the lives of the residents on this small island.\textsuperscript{54}

The abovementioned research about local Chinese society (cities and villages) inspired me to examine Japanese communities in the Shantou treaty port.

Although people are used to regarding Shantou (Swatow) and Chaozhou as a single region and frequently refer to it as the “Chaoshan” area, the two places differ from each other in many significant ways. One of the most significant of these lies in Chaozhou’s status as a historical city, where lineage was well institutionalized by the nineteenth century; by contrast, Shantou was traditionally a fishing village and its rapid modernization was in large part a response to the


Second Opium War. In 1860, Shantou was formally opened as a treaty port. In this sense, most residents in Shantou were immigrants from other places, and the specific manifestations of institutionalized lineage (e.g., ancestral shrines) were much weaker than those in Chaozhou.

Geographically, Shantou has consisted of three parts: Shantou Town was an old urban area hosting prosperous commercial activities; Qilu 魁竃 was east of Shantou Town and, after the designation of Shantou as a treaty port, became the site of Western consulates, foreign companies, wharfs, warehouses, churches, schools, and hospitals; Queshi 磐石 (or Kakuseki 角石 in Japanese)—an island opposite Qilu was basically an English settlement.

After Shantou opened as a treaty port, Western powers entered it one by one, and among the newcomers were British, American, German, Russian, Dutch, and Belgians. Japan entered Shantou after the First Sino-Japanese War in 1895, thirty years later than the Western powers. The Western and Japanese powers established consulates, companies, schools, hospitals, and churches in Shantou, and thus, the city became one of China’s international metropolises. It is interesting to note that, regarding government levies on traded goods, both the Chinese government’s customs agency (chang guan, 常關) and foreign governments’ customs agency

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55 According to the Sino-British Tianjin Treaty of 1858, Chaozhou would be a treaty port. However, residents of Chaozhou severely resisted this agreement. Thus, the Western powers gave up on Chaozhou and chose Shantou as a treaty port instead. In 1860, Shantou formally acquired this status.
(yang guan, 洋關) co-existed in Shantou. The Qing government established Shantou’s Chinese customs agency (Chaozhou shin guan, 潮州新關) in 1853; in 1860, the Sino-British Tianjin Treaty opened up the possibility of foreign customs agency (Chao hai guan, 潮海關) in the port city. Ma yu dao 媽嶼島, a small island near Shantou was the site of these agencies’ customs buildings. In the mid-1860s, the customs agencies relocated their operations to Shantou city itself. The co-existence of both Chinese and foreign customs in Shantou was brought to an end by the Boxer Protocol of 1901, which demanded that the Qing government renounce the right of Chinese customs to operate on Chinese soil. From that time forward until 1949, foreign powers exercised exclusive control of customs in Shantou.

During the period between the early 1900s and the 1930s, Shantou accommodated many foreigners and experienced commercial prosperity. The freight-handling capacity of Shantou ranked third in China, behind only Shanghai and Guangzhou, and served as a nexus for east Guangdong Province, southwest Fujian Province, and southeast Jiangxi Province. Moreover, Shantou was the hometown of many workers laboring in Southeast Asia, and served as a window of exchange with markets farther south in China via the South Seas. However, Shantou was not a place of political stability and had been a battlefield in the various Chinese civil wars waged by
competing warlords. Meanwhile, Shantou exhibited some of the most pronounced anti-foreign currents in Republican China (mainly anti-British and anti-Japanese). Different political powers, including the Guomindang, Soviet advisors, and Chinese communists were keen to mobilize anti-British and anti-Japanese protests. In this sense, when exploring the Japanese empire’s management of companies, schools, and hospitals, and the activities of both Japanese and Taiwanese sekimin in Shantou, one should rigorously account for Shantou’s local society, including its economy, politics, and international dimensions.
Fig. 1-1 Shantou Customs in the 1920s.

[Illustration] The building on the right is Bell Tower, which was constructed in 1919 and finished in 1921. (Source: Photo by Lin-Yi Tseng at Chao shan li shi wen hua yan jiu zhong xin 潮汕歷史文化研究中心 Research Center of Chaozhou and Shantou History and Culture.)

Fig. 1-2 Shantou Customs Museum.

[Illustration] Shantou Customs (the Bell Tower) is a historical spot, which was preserved by the Shantou Government in 1994. Later, the building was renovated and opened to public as the Shantou Customs Museum in 2008. (Source: Photo by Lin-Yi Tseng, 2013.)
1.4 The Approaches and Arguments in My Dissertation

My dissertation explores the Japanese imperial formation in East Asia by analyzing the commercial trade, educational activities, and social networks of both Japanese and Taiwanese sekimin communities in the Shantou treaty port during the period between 1895 and 1937.56

Concerning the theoretical framework of my dissertation, I have drawn considerable inspiration from several important scholars. First, I was inspired by Peter Duus who conceptualized China as Japan’s “informal empire.” He argues that before the Manchurian Incident in 1931, Japanese imperialism in China was informal and that this informality was connected with the unequal treaty system. After the Manchurian Incident, with Japan’s strengthened military forces, Japanese control over China evolved into a formal system. Duus suggests that Japan was interested in China in terms of trade rather than territory and that, thus, Japan’s informal empire in China enabled Japan to acquire economic benefits while saving on the costs of formal colonization. Japan’s informal colonies in China accounted for more of Japan’s trade than did all of Japan’s other colonies combined.57 I think that this concept

56 The starting time point (i.e., 1895) corresponds to the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, by which Japan acquired informal privileges in Chinese treaty ports. The ending time point (i.e., 1937) corresponds to the decline that Shantou’s Japanese community experienced owing to the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War on July 7, 1937. Given the tense Sino-Japanese relationships that accompanied these open military hostilities, many Japanese who had resided in Shantou fled to Hong Kong, to Taiwan, and even back to the Japanese homeland.
57 Peter Duus, “Introduction: Japan’s Informal Empire in China, 1895–1937: An Overview,” in Peter Duus, Ramer
rigorously illustrates Japanese management in Shantou because the importance of Shantou for

the Japanese empire lay chiefly in commercial interests.

Second, I was inspired by Ann Laura Stoler whose concept of “imperial formations”

promotes historical research that pays significant attention to imperial actors—to “people on the

fringes of empires as well as at their centers, to designated subjects as well as colonial

administrators, to those with companion and countervailing motivations to empire, and to those

who reside at the categorical edges of the imperial.”58 I think that the concept of imperial

formations provides a persuasive theoretical framework for discussing the mobility and the

networks of Taiwanese sekimin under imperialism because Taiwanese sekimin were people on

the fringes of not only the empire but the colonized populations, as well.

Concerning my application of research approaches to the topic of imperial Japan's extension

in East Asia, I was influenced by Joshua Fogel, Mark Peattie, Christian Henriot, Takashi

Nakamura, Hsueh-chi Hsu, Shu-min Zhong, and many others who explored “Japanese”

(including Taiwanese) immigrants in China. On the one hand, I treat the Japanese and Taiwanese

sekimin immigrants in Shantou as a window through which to perceive Japanese imperial

58 Ann Laura Stoler, Carole McGranahan, and Peter C. Perdue eds., Imperial Formations. Santa Fe: School for

formation in East Asia; and on the other hand, I pay attention to the significance of local Chinese society, and consider the political, economic, and social dimensions of Shantou.

The majority of materials in this dissertation are Japanese sources, including commercial reports issued by Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, newspapers published in colonial Taiwan (such as Taiwan nichi nichi shinpō), official reports of the Japanese consul in Shantou, official reports of Japanese teachers who taught in the Japanese-funded Tōē School in Shantou, and Taiwan General Government officers’ travelogues. I have used these records to represent the imperial gaze informing many Japanese peoples’ perceptions of Shantou and to represent Taiwanese people’s self-positioning in this curious contact zone of Shantou, where Japanese, Taiwanese, and local Chinese interacted. I have not used Shantou municipal archives or Anglo-American foreign-office reports on Japan in this dissertation because my key concerns have been (1) the management of Shantou by the Japanese empire—not by native or Western forces and (2) the perceptions of cross-boundary Japanese and Taiwanese in Shantou. However, I must admit that my heavy reliance on Japanese primary sources may have created some methodological problems because the Japanese government, whether in Tokyo or in Taipei, not only produced these records but often censored them as well. Anyone considering this research
should keep these unavoidable complexities and possible gaps in mind.

Based on the abovementioned theoretical frameworks and approaches, my dissertation consists of four chapters, as will be discussed in the following section.

Chapter Two: The Commercial Activities and Networks of Japanese Merchants and Taiwanese Sekimin Merchants in Shantou

In this chapter, I explore the commercial relations among the Japanese homeland, colonial Taiwan, and the treaty port of Shantou by examining Japanese commercial reports, such as *Tsūshō kōhō* 通商公報. The records show that Shantou was an important market for both Japanese and Taiwanese goods, including coal, seafood, molasses, and alcohol. Shantou’s Taiwanese sekimin merchants and Shantou-based Japanese companies (e.g., the Mitsui Company, Taiwan Bank, and the Osaka Shipping Company) contributed significantly to the commercial network comprising the three abovementioned places.

In studying this commercial network in East Asia, I drew inspiration from the “network mode” and “inter-port mode” concepts developed by Japanese scholar Takashi Hamashita 濱下武志, who provided a new approach to exploring Asian history. His focus is not on a specific national history (which traditional Oriental studies have favored) but on the important...
waterway connections among different ports and regions. For example, he argues that to analyze
the connections among ports yields more details than would a traditional examination of the
historical relationships among nations.\(^{59}\) In my case, examination of Japanese matches sold in
Shantou clarify the relationships among the Japanese city of Kobe, the Taiwanese city of
Keelung, British Hong Kong, and Shantou in southern China.

**Chapter Three: Competition and Cooperation: The Case of the Dadong Ice-making**

**Company and Relations among Japan, China, and Taiwan**

In this chapter, I explore the cooperation and competition, conflict and compromise among
Shantou’s Taiwanese sekimin merchants, local Chinese merchants, and the Japanese imperial
consulate in Shantou by examining the Sino-Japan co-invested Dadong Company in Shantou.

The Dadong Ice-making Company was initiated by Shin Huang, a Tainan-based Taiwanese
member of the gentry and entrepreneur who collected funds from both his relatives in Tainan and
Taiwanese sojourners in Shantou to establish the company. In response to Japan’s Sino-Japanese
friendship, Shin Huang invited some Chinese to invest in the company, not just Taiwanese.

Among these Chinese investors, the chief councilor of Shantou City, Zi-bin Zheng, was the most important. Over its history, the Dadong Ice-making Company faced at least two major crises: the first one was brought on by the obstructionist actions of the Japanese consul in Shantou, and the second one took place in the severely anti-Japanese atmosphere of Shantou, where the Chinese businessman Zi-bing Zheng attempted to expel Taiwanese shareholders from the Dadong Ice-making Company. In the first crisis, Taiwanese shareholders cooperated with Chinese merchants to resist the Japanese consul’s oppression; and in the second crisis, Taiwanese shareholders cooperated with the Japanese authority in Shantou to expel the Chinese shareholder Zheng from the company. I will use the case of the Dadong Company to explain the history of these complexities in a Chinese treaty port, where ethnicity, nationality, identity, and commercial interests were prominent factors.

Chapter Four: The Educational Network Encompassing the Japanese Homeland, Colonial Taiwan, and the Shantou Treaty Port—The Tōē School in Shantou

In this chapter, I have focused on a Japanese-funded Tōē School in Shantou. I have explored two aspects of the Tōē School in Shantou: (1) the “network of human resources,” regarding which I will discuss some Japanese and Taiwanese teachers whom the Taiwan General
Government assigned to the Tōē School in Shantou; and (2) the “network of words,” regarding which I will analyze teachers’ travel writings and reports published in colonial Taiwanese periodicals, including *Taiwan kyōiku* (Taiwan Education). By analyzing their words, I will explore these teachers’ perceptions of the educational affairs in Shantou, and specifically the perceptions of European- and American-funded schools in the city. In sum, from both the network of human resources and the network of words in this particular setting, we will see how an educational network established itself among those from the Japanese homeland, colonial Taiwan, and the Chinese treaty port of Shantou.

Chapter Five: The Image of Shantou in Japanese Writings (1910s–1930s)

In this chapter, I examine Japanese texts describing Shantou during the period from the 1910s to the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War in July 1937. I find substantial evidence that Japanese travelers and residents’ most striking impression of Shantou was of the city’s strident anti-Japanese climate, which would take such forms as restrictions on Japanese citizens’ movements and boycotts on Japanese goods. My paper in some degree responds to Karl Gerth’s research about the relationship between Chinese nationalism and the culture of consumption prevalent during the National Products Movement from 1900 to 1937. He argues that by
promoting the purchase of *national* products as opposed to *foreign* products, the movement offered people of all classes an opportunity to resist imperialism and express nationalist sentiments. Boycotts of foreign goods took place mainly during the period extending from 1905 to the 1930s, and most of the boycotts during the movement targeted Japanese products.

Boycotts contributed to the growth and proliferation of movement organizations. My study here indicates that most Japanese travelers were very alarmed by Shantou’s anti-Japanese movements.

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Chapter 2: The Commercial Activities and Networks of Japanese Merchants and Taiwanese Sekimin Merchants in Shantou

Fig. 2-1 The Chinese Treaty Ports.
2.1 The Japanese Empire’s Interests in Shantou: Trade

In the 1870s, Meiji Japan’s overarchi ng national goal was *fukoku kyōhei* 富國強兵 (wealthy nation and strong army). By the 1890s, a new slogan had risen in popularity: *shōkō rikkoku* 商工立國 (build the nation through commerce and industry). Both of the slogans revealed that a developing economy was Meiji Japan’s priority. Some scholars have contended that economic interest best explains the expansion of the Japanese empire. According to Akira Iriye, the Japanese empire initially placed as much weight on economic matters (through trade and immigration to ensure Japan’s elevated status in the world) as on military and territorial matters (direct control over overseas resources). However, after the economic crisis in 1929, impediments to economic development compelled Japan to seek a military-territorial solution to domestic problems, and this strategic shift led to Japan’s occupation of Manchuria.\(^6\) The economic crisis in 1929 caused a decline in exports of Japanese silk and cotton cloth,

contributing to Japan’s inability to afford imports of coal, iron, and other natural resources.

These circumstances provided Japanese militarists an excuse to occupy Manchuria, which was rich in such natural resources. Like Japan, Germany took a path to war that was deeply rooted in economic concerns: both the indemnity that Germany had to pay after the First World War and French occupation of German industrial centers prevented Germany from experiencing a robust post-war economic recovery. The economic crisis in 1929 justified for many Germans their country’s subsequent implementation of large-scale military expansion, which dramatically reduced domestic unemployment there and which made possible Germany’s military conquests of neighboring countries as a way to resolve domestic economic problems.

Peter Duus proposed that before the Manchurian Incident in 1931, Japanese imperialism in China had been informal and that this informality had reflected the unequal treaty system. After the Manchurian Incident, with Japan’s strengthened military forces, Japanese control over China evolved into a formal system. Duus suggested that Japan’s interest in China had emphasized trade over territory and that, thus, Japan’s informal empire in China had enabled Japan to acquire
economic benefits while avoiding the various costs of formal colonization. In other words, these scholars suggested that Japanese imperialism, which initially manifested itself in the First Sino-Japanese War in 1894, was economic imperialism. Japan needed China’s resources and markets, and the Treaty of Shimonoseki made Japan’s penetration of China possible.

In the early twentieth century, Shantou was an important commercial port-city of China. In 1904, the value of Shantou’s trade reached 70 million yen (about 53 million Haikwan tael), which was twice the-value in Xiamen. In 1925, Shantou’s volume of trade reached 83 million Haikwan tael, the seventh-highest ranking amount of all the port cities in China. Among the port cities in southern China, Shantou trailed behind only Guangdong and boasted trade values much higher than Xiamen’s and Fuzhou’s. The great wealth of trade stemmed from the importation of foreign goods. The characteristics of trade in Shantou were such that the monetary value of the city’s imports was much greater than (sometimes double) the monetary value of the city’s

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63 Concerning the development of Shantou port, please see Xiu-rong Chang 張秀蓉. “Mao yi xian dao yi gang xing shi: shi lun shantou gang shi de xing qi” 貿易先導，以港興市：試論汕頭港市的興起 (From harbor to trading center: the rise of Shantou Port), in Wu Song-di 吳松弟, Lian Xiao-ming 連曉鳴, and Hong Zhen-ning 洪振寧 eds., Zou ru li shi de shen chu: zhong guo dong nan di yu wen hua guo ji xue shu yan tao hui lun wen ji 走入歷史的深處：中國東南地域文化國際學術研討會論文集. Shanghai: ren min chu ban she 人民出版社, 2011, pp. 161–177.

64 “Sвато Ryoji bunkan no shin setsu” 汕頭領事分館の設施 (The new established Shantou-branch consulate office), Taiwan kyōkai kaihō 臺灣協會會報 (Bulletin of Taiwan Association), vol. 72, p. 34, 1904.
exports. The economic balance of Shantou was sustained by the significant remittances from Shantou’s overseas workers. Shantou was a chief source of overseas workers from China, and approximately 100,000 Shantou coolies went abroad yearly. For example, in 1926, approximately 160,000 Shantou coolies went abroad, and the main destinations were Siam, Singapore and Vietnam.\(^{65}\)

Another characteristic of trade in Shantou was that this city was the import and export hub for the region’s large hinterland, including the cities of Chaozhou, Chenghai, Chaoyang. And the larger the hinterland, the larger the markets. Compared with the relatively modest regional expanses in southern China’s treaty ports of Amoy and Fuzhou, Shantou’s vast expanse of territory and people gave this treaty port a competitive edge for amassing wealth. The great volume of imported foreign goods served not only Shantou’s local needs, but also consumers demand in many other Chinese cities and even in Southeastern Asia. Many foreign goods were imported through Shantou and then transported to cities inside Guangdong Province. From the perspective of Japan, Shantou symbolized an entrance for Japanese imports, which could then saturate Chinese markets while making inroads in Southeast Asia, where many Shanou coolies

worked and resided. In this sense, Shantou was on the periphery of Japan’s informal empire in China and, yet, possessed great economic importance to the empire.

Records indicate that by December 1898, a Japanese merchant was residing in Shantou. Later, in the early 1910s, other Japanese merchants migrated to Shantou. For example, Sadami Hikosaka 隈阪貞美 opened a photo shop in April 1902. Urai 浦井 and Kawafuru 川古 first co-invested in the glass-making shop known as the Urakawa Company in October 1903. Manjirō Hiruta 蛭田萬次郎 opened the grocery store Kazukiyo 和清 Company in January 1904. Evidence shows that Manjirō Hiruta opened the Taisei 大成 Company, dealing in tobacco in 1902. Tamesaburō Yanagita 柳田為三郎 opened the grocery and medicine store Tōkashō 東華昌 Company in 1906. Concerning Taiwanese sekimin merchants in Shantou, Guang-qin Tzeng 曾廣欽 was probably one of the earliest. He opened the Ekian 益安 Company, which

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66 Gaimushō tsūshōkyoku 外務省通商局, Tsūshō isan 通商彙纂 (Bulletin of commerce), no. 125, p. 74 (February 28, 1898).

67 Gaimushō tsūshōkyoku 外務省通商局, Tsūshō isan 通商彙纂 (Bulletin of commerce), no. 53, p. 355 (September 8, 1906); Takashi Nakamura 中村孝治, Nihon no nanpō kanyō to Taiwan 日本の南方関与と臺灣 (Japan’s concern about the south and Taiwan). Nara: Tenrikyō dōyūsha 天理教道友社, 1988., p. 118.

68 Taiwan sōtokufu kanbō chsaka 臺灣總督府官房調査課, Swatō teikoku ryōji kannai jijō 汕頭帝國領事館內事情 (The circumstances inside the Shantou imperial consulate). Taihoku: Taiwan sōtokufu kanbō chsaka, 1922., p. 110; Xue-ying Xie 謝雪英, Shantou zhinan 汕頭指南 (A guidebook to Shantou). Shantou: Shantou shishi tongzun she 汕頭時事通訊社, 1933., p. 168.

69 Gaimushō tsūshōkyoku 外務省通商局, Tsūshō isan 通商彙纂 (Bulletin of commerce), no. 20, p. 416 (April 3, 1907); Gaimushō tsūshōkyoku 外務省通商局, Tsūshō kōhō 通商公報 (Public report of commerce), no. 20, p. 988 (June 9, 1913); no. 113, p. 542 (May 11, 1914).
sold grocery items and provided private banking services as early as 1899. Later, a steady stream of sekimin came to Shantou for business and most of them dealt in the grocery business and private banking. By the end of 1903, Shantou was home to 18 Taiwanese sekimin and 12 Japanese. Most of them were merchants and their families.

A rapid increase in both Japanese and Taiwanese residents in Shantou took place after 1904, when the Japanese Sango Company (三五公司) started overseeing the construction of the Chaoshan Railroad, and when the Taiwan General Government started assigning Japanese and Taiwanese technicians to Shantou. In order to serve the needs of these individuals and their families, Japanese restaurants, laundries, and accommodations started to open in Shantou, and thus, a primary Japanese community emerged there. Furthermore, it was in 1904 that Japan used the construction of the Chaoshan Railroad as a pretext to establish a branch office of the Xiamen

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70 Takashi Nakamura 中村孝治, Nihon no namū kanyo to Taiwan 日本の南方関与と臺灣 (Japan’s concern about the south and Taiwan), Nara: Tenrikyō dōyūsha, 1988, p. 119; Akira Matsuura 松浦章, “Shinmatsu no Swatō to nihon tōji ka Taiwan to no kōun kankei” 清末の汕頭と日本統治下臺灣との航運関係 (The maritime relationship between late-Qing Shantou and colonial Japanese Taiwan), Nantō shigaku 南島史學, no. 60. Tokyo: Nantō shigakukai 南島史學會, 2002, p. 4.


72 The Sango Company handled a great deal of varied business. For example, the company transported Jianying-zhou’s camphor from Shantou to Fujian and Jiangxi Provinces. Gaimushō tsūshōkyoku 外務省通商局, Tsūshō isan 通商彙纂 (Bulletin of commerce), no. 57, p. 396 (April 3, 1907).

73 Chaoshan Railroad was between Chaozhou and Shantou. In 1903, Yu-nan Zhang 張煜南, a successful Chinese businessman in Indonesia, received permission to construct the railroad. He invited Rong-guang Xie 謝榮光, Li-qing Wu 吳理卿, and Li-sheng Lin 林麗生 to put up capital to found the railroad company. The total capital was 2,000,000 silver dollars. In 1904, the Chaoshan Railroad Company invited the Japanese Sango Company (三五公司) to proceed with construction. The establishment of Chaoshan Railroad created great convenience in the area’s transportation and significantly boosted the prosperity of Shantou.

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Japanese consulate in Shantou. Three years later, in 1907, Japan established the independent
Shantou Consulate. The Chaoshan Railroad offered its first transport services in November 1906.
The total length of the railroad was 39 km, comprising 8 stops: Anbu 蔦埠, Huamei 華美, Caitang 彩塘, Quechao 鶴巢, Fuyang 浮洋, Fengxi 楓溪, and Chaozhou 潮州. In 1908, the line extended to Yixi 意溪, and the total length of the railroad reached 42 km. The time it would take to get from the first departure point to the last stop was 80 minutes. Early in the railroad’s operations, all the stationmasters, trainmasters, and technicians were Japanese and Taiwanese.\(^\text{74}\)

Later, Chinese took over the positions. In sum, we could say that the construction and operation of the Chaoshan Railroad provided Japan an opportunity to expand its influence in Shantou, where a Japanese community formed in the late 1900s.

\(^{74}\) Toshio Mimaki 三巻俊夫, “Chōswan tetsudō” 潮汕鐵道 (The Chaoshan Railroad), *Taiwan Tetsudō 臺灣鐵道* (Taiwan Railroad), no. 55, pp. 38–52 (January 1, 1917); “Chōswan tetsudō no enchō to hontō kannkei” 潮汕鐵道の延長と本島関係 (The relationship between the extension of the Chaoshan Railroad and Taiwan), *Taiwan zhi chaye 臺灣之茶葉* (Taiwanese tea), vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 60–61 (January 1, 1918).
Fig. 2-2 Shantou Station, 1906.
(Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/a6/SwatowStation-1906.jpg)

Fig. 2-3 Opening Day for the Chaoshan Railway, November 1906.
(Sources: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/58/Swatow-Rly-Opening1.jpg)
With the formation of this community in Shantou, the commercial relationship between Japan and Shantou grew closer. In the mid-1910s, Japanese trade occupied 70% of Shantou’s foreign trade, and Japanese goods were the most important foreign goods in Shantou’s market. In the trading circuit between the Japanese homeland and Shantou, Hong Kong was an important intermediary. Many Chinese merchants who resided in Kobe and Yokohama exported Japanese goods to Shantou through Hong Kong. Aware of this trading circuit, Masasuke Kishi, the manager of the Taiwan Bank’s branch office in Shantou, suggested that a strictly statistical analysis of the volume of Japan–Shantou trade or of Taiwan–Shantou trade might lead one to underestimate the real volume of trade between Japan or its colonies and Shantou chiefly because most Japanese goods entered Shantou through Hong Kong, thus distorting the origins and the destinations of the traded goods. Kishi suggested that according to the reports of the Japanese merchants who had traveled throughout Shantou and observed Shantou’s grocery markets, 70% to 80% of their grocery-related goods had been from Japan. All of these statistics suggest that under both Shantou’s anti-Japanese atmosphere and the British competition, the trade between Japan and Shantou was significant and Shantou was a powerful market consuming
Japanese products. The majority of Japanese goods came to Shantou mainly through Hong Kong, but some of the Japanese goods went through Taiwan. For example, in 1917, insufficient tonnage and growing transportation charges promoted an influx of Japanese goods to Shantou through Taiwan, instead of through Hong Kong or Shanghai. The increase in Japanese goods through Taiwan prompted sekimin merchants to open stores in Shantou. In 1917, there were eleven Taiwanese sekimin stores in Shantou, and three more stores were preparing to open.

What were the main Japanese goods imported to Shantou? Of great importance were Taiwanese molasses and alcohol. Shantou imported alcohol from three places, Taiwan, Java, and Germany. In Taiwan, the two major exporters of molasses and alcohol to Shantou were Taiwan Seitō Kaisha (the Taiwan Sugar-Making Company) and Kagi Seishū Kaishua (the Jia-yi Wine-Making Company). Shantou merchants mixed Taiwanese alcohol with water to make Shantou wine, and exported it to Southeastern Asia for consumption by overseas Chinese. Shantou merchants mixed sorghum liquor from Tianjin with Taiwanese alcohol for purchase by Shantou consumers. The stores selling Taiwanese molasses and alcohol in Shantou were the

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75 Masaaki Kishi 貴志政亮, “Swatō no kinyū jijō to kakyō mondai” 汕頭の金融事情と華僑問題 (The financial affairs of Shantou and issues of overseas Chinese), Taiwan jihō 臺灣時報, (July 8, 1939), pp. 202–211.
76 Taiwan gingō shiten hōkoku 臺灣銀行支店報告 (Report of the Taiwan Bank Branch Office), “Taigan ippan shōkyō” 臺灣一般商況 (The general commercial situation of China), Taiwan shōkō geppo 臺灣商工月報, no. 96, p. 21 (April 25, 1917).
77 Taiwanese molasses is a by-product of the refining of sugarcane. It is a viscous and dark-brown colored fluid.
Japanese-run Mitsui Company, the Taiwanese-run Sanrin Company, and four Chinese-run companies: the Guan Te-fa 光德發 Company, the Zhou Yuan-cheng 周元成 Company, the Shun-tai 順泰 Company and the Guang-ri 公利 Company. The owner of the Sanrin Company, Taiwanese sekimin Bing-rin Luo 羅炳麟, understood the complicated customs of Chinese merchants in trading and thus earned trust both from Chinese and Japanese sides.78

Japanese coal was an important good for Shantou. The yearly demand for coal in Shantou was around 100 thousand tons, including 70 thousand tons of coal dust and 30 thousand tons of coal chunks. The major sources of coal came from Kaiping 開平 in Guangdong Province, Wakamatsu 若松 in Kyushu Japan, Keelung 基隆 in Taiwan, and Hong Gai 鴻基 in Vietnam.

In the mid-1910s, Shantou imported 20 thousand tons of coal from Wakamatsu. The main stores selling Wakamatsu coal in Shantou were the Japanese-run Mitsui Company and the English-run Bradley & Co. 徳記 (Tey-kee). In the late 1910s, the extraction of coal in Keelung was a prosperous endeavour, and Shantou imported Keelung coal in place of Wakamatsu coal. In the mid-1920s, the coal used for lamps, waterways, railroads, and factories in Shantou were mainly from Keelung. The main stores selling Keelung coal in Shantou were the Taiwanese-run Sanrin

78 “Shina shū” 支那酒 (Chinese liquors), Taiwan shōkō geppō 臺灣商工月報, no. 82, pp. 18–21 (February 25, 1916); Sōtarō Tanaka 田中莊太郎, “Swatō ni okeru shusei jōkyō” 汕頭における酒精情綋 (The status of alcoholic beverages in Shantou), Taiwan shōkō geppō 臺灣商工月報, no. 88, pp. 28–30 (August 25, 1916).
Company, the Japanese-run Mitsui Company, the Suzuki Company, and the English-run Bradley & Co.\textsuperscript{79}

Seafood in Shantou was comprised, for the most part, of Japanese products. In the mid-1910s, Japan exported a great volume of seafood (200 million haikwan tael) to Shantou both for local needs and for export to inner China and Siam. Five-sixth of the total volume of Japanese seafood arriving in Shantou went through Hong Kong and Shanghai, and one-sixth went through Keelung.

One reason for this imbalance was that remittance through Shanghai and Hong Kong was advantageous to trade. Second, merchants in Hong Kong and Shanghai traded with Hokkaidō, which was a direct—and therefore relatively inexpensive—exporter of seafood. In this sense, the price of seafood in Shantou directly reflected prices in Hong Kong and Shanghai, rather than prices from Japanese sources. The main seafood items in demand were fish, dried shrimp, abalones, shark’s fins, shellfish, sea cucumbers, agars, mushrooms, and kelp. The main stores selling Japanese seafood in Shantou were the Japanese-run Mitsui Company, the Taiwanese-run

\textsuperscript{79} Sōtarō Tanaka 田中莊太郎, “Swatō sekitan juyō jōkyō” 汕頭石炭需要情況 (The demand of coal in Shantou), \textit{Taiwan Kōgyō kaihō} 臺灣礦業會報, no. 35, pp. 20–23 (November 20, 1916); Kinosuke Fukutome 福留喜之助, “Taiwan no sekitan kōgyō ni tsu i te” 臺灣的石炭礦業に就いて (Concerning Taiwan’s coal mining industry), part 2, \textit{Taiwan Kōgyō kaihō} 臺灣礦業會報, no. 71, pp. 1–34 (November 30, 1919). Kawamata 川俣, “Swatō sekitan jukyō jōkyō” 汕頭石炭需給情況 (The demand of coal in Shantou), \textit{Taiwan Kōgyō kaihō} 臺灣礦業會報, no. 127, pp. 49–51 (January 30, 1926).
Sanrin Company, and the Taiwanese-run Mangen Company. 80

In the latter half of the 1930s, Shantou was still an important market for Japanese seafood. Miyagami Kameshichi 宮上亀七, a Japanese official at the Taiwan General Government’s Bureau of Colonization and Industry regarded Shantou as the best location for developing southern China’s seafood industry because Shantou had larger hinterlands than did Xiamen and Fuzhou, hence symbolizing a larger consumer market. 81

Japanese cotton cloth and cotton products were important products in China at that time. Shantou was the largest market for cotton cloth among all the treaty ports in southern China. And although Shantou imported most of its cotton cloth from India as well as from Japan, Indian cotton cloth and cotton products (like handkerchiefs, towels, and socks) constituted 20% of the imported cotton products in Shantou whereas Japanese products constituted 80% of the market. Japanese cotton cloth started arriving in bulk in Shantou mainly after 1896, the second year of Japanese colonization in Taiwan, and most of these products went through Hong Kong, with a much smaller volume of products going through Keelung. That is, the Chinese merchants in

80 Sōtarō Tanaka 田中莊太郎, “Swatō ni okeru kaisan jōkyō” 汕頭に於ける海産情況 (Seafood in Shantou), Taiwan suisan zasshi 臺灣水產雜誌, no. 12, pp. 89–90 (December 15, 1916); “Swatō kaisan jōkyō” 汕頭海産狀況 (The seafood situation in Shantou), Taiwan suisan zasshi 臺灣水產雜誌, no. 22, pp. 1–10 (October 15, 1917).
81 Kameshichi Miyakami 宮上亀七, “Nan shina no omoido (2)” 南支那の憶ひ出 2 (Memoirs from southern China, part 2), Taiwan suisan zasshi 臺灣水產雜誌, no. 273, pp. 5–9 (October 10, 1937).
Shantou did not trade directly with Kobe and Osaka, but indirectly via the chief intermediary of Hong Kong. Japanese cotton cloth served not only Shantou’s local residents, but also the Hakka people residing in Jiaying Prefecture (嘉應州), where these cotton materials were transformed into products for export to other Chinese ports and to Southeast Asia. The main stores selling Japanese cotton cloth in Shantou were the Taiwanese-run Rikyō 利強 Company and four Japanese stores: the Mitsui Company, the Kōsaka 幸阪 Company, the Junatendō/ Yamaguchi 順天堂/山口 Company, and the Maeda 前田 Company.\(^2\)

Concerning the match market in Shantou, the imported matches in Shantou were all Japanese products that arrived in the city through Hong Kong and Keelung. Compared with the cost of other goods there, the market price of matches seldom changed, being influenced by the market price back in the Japanese homeland. The main stores in Shantou selling Japanese matches were the Japanese-run Mitsui Company, the Taiwanese-run Sanrin Company, and the Taiwanese-run Mangen Company. Japanese medicine came to Shantou mainly through Hong Kong and constituted 50–60% of Shantou’s imported medicine. The main stores selling Japanese medicine

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were concentrated on Yu-shan Street (育善街), where one could find the Taiwanese-sekimin
Yamato 大和 Pharmacy and three Japanese stores: the Kōsaka Company, the Kōkandō 廣貫堂
Company, and the Junatendō/Yamaguchi Company. Another Japanese store dealing in
medicinal products was the Nichiryū 日龍 Company located on Yong-ping Road (永平路).  

In addition to the abovementioned goods, Japanese sugar made up 40% of Shantou’s foreign
sugar market, and most Japanese sugar came to Shantou through Hong Kong and Keelung.
Japanese glass made up 50% of this market in Shantou, and in particular, 80% of the port’s
window glass came from Japan. Both Japanese glass and glass-containing products came to
Shantou through Hong Kong. The English-run Bradley Company and the Japanese-run Kōkandō
Company dealt in Japanese glass in Shantou. Imports of paper in Shantou were mainly from
Japan and Germany. After the First World War, Japanese paper made up the whole of Shantou’s
foreign-paper market, which—like so many of the city’s other markets—depended on the
intermediary locations of Hong Kong and Keelung. Goods like umbrellas and stationery in
Shantou were all Japanese imports. Japanese porcelain made up 60–70% of the market in

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yunyū sūryō oyobi yunyū keiro” 汕頭的重要日本商品輸入數量及輸入経路 (The quantities and routes of
important imported Japanese products in Shantou), Taiwan shōkō geppō 臺灣商工月報, no. 103, pp. 4–5
(November 25, 1917); Gaimushō tsūshōkyoku 外務省通商局, Ni kan kaigai shōhō 日刊 海外商報 (Overseas
commercial reports), no. 550, p. 110 (July 21, 1926).
Shantou. Japanese clothes and clothing accessories (e.g., hats, gloves, buttons) made up 50–60% of Shantou’s clothing market. Enamel products and toys in Shantou tended to be German imports, but Japanese goods substituted for German goods after the start of the First World War. Japanese clocks made up 60–70% of this market in Shantou owning to their competitive pricing: the products effectively underpriced American and British clocks that might otherwise have dominated the market. Japanese cosmetics made up 50–60% of this market in Shantou. All these Japanese imports, yet again, made their way to Shantou through Hong Kong and Keelung.

The abovementioned records strongly indicate that Shantou was an important market to Japan and that the Japanese goods entering Shantou came mainly by way of Hong Kong and Keelung. The records also provide evidence that Japanese products served not only Shantou’s local needs but also—by way of this city—those of other Chinese cities and of populations throughout Southeast Asia.

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2.2 Japanese Merchants in Shantou

The first large-scale Japanese company to open its doors in Shantou was the Mitsui Company. In 1876, the Mitsui Company began doing business in the Japanese homeland and, twenty years later, in 1896, established branch offices in Taiwan. As a company supported by the Taiwan General Government, the Mitsui Company had become one of the largest enterprises in Taiwan, monopolizing the island’s trade in camphor, tea, coal, and opium. Serving as a component of the Taiwan General Government’s south-expansion policy, the Mitsui Company established branch offices in treaty ports in southern China, including the Amoy branch office in 1901. In March 1906, the Mitsui Company’s Shantou branch office opened and set out to achieve its primary objective: to sell Japanese goods to China. Mitsui’s Shantou branch office dealt with the imports of molasses and alcohol from Taiwan, coal from Keelung, cotton cloth and matches from Osaka and Kobe, seafood from Hokaidō, and ginseng from Korea. Among these items, cotton cloth and matches were the most important, reaching an approximate value of 700 thousand silver dollars annually and constituting half of the volume of Mitsui’s trade by late 1910s. It was not uncommon for shoppers in Shantou marketplaces to see items bearing the Japanese brand-names of Gekkin 月琴 and Jūrō 濟老. In addition to Japanese goods, Mitsui’s
Shantou branch office imported some non-Japanese goods to Shantou, selling them to the local Chinese retail market or transporting them to other cities. For example, Mitsui’s Shantou branch office imported cotton cloth from Shanghai and India, flour from Shanghai, tin from Singapore and Hong Kong, soybean from Dalian, rice from Saigon, and sugar from Java. Moreover, beginning in 1918, the Taiwan General Government requested that Mitsui’s Shantou branch office spend 200 thousand 俯 yearly to buy leaf tobacco in Jiangxi Province and then transport it to Taiwan.  

It is worth noting that although Shantou’s volume of exports and imports was substantial, and Mitsui’s Shantou branch carried out transactions involving many goods, the company still faced difficulties in the region. First, the currency risk in Shantou was high because the values of popular currencies there were in a near-constant flux. In order to lower the risks associated with this problem, in 1912, Mitsui contracted with Taiwan Bank to ensure that the former’s business would take place at a fixed currency value. Nevertheless, several secondary, though important, factors led to the idea that the branch office in Shantou was, on balance, counterproductive: the

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alleged duplicity of Shantou’s Chinese merchants, the severity of Shantou’s anti-Japan atmosphere, and noted corruption linked to the branch officers themselves. These factors prompted, in 1926, the directors of Mitsui’s branch offices to consider whether they should dissolve the Shantou branch office or at least send an officer to the Shantou branch, where he could supervise its operations while, himself, submitting to supervision from Mitsui’s Amoy branch office.\(^{86}\)

In addition to the Mitsui Company, Taiwan Bank was an important Japanese company with an official presence in Shantou. The Japanese government established Taiwan Bank in 1899, and it served as Taiwan’s most influential financial institution during the Japanese colonial period. Responding to Japan’s intended objective of expanding commercial relations with China and Southeast Asia, Taiwan Bank in 1900 started to establish branch offices in such southern Chinese cities as Amoy (1900), Hong Kong (1903), Fuzhou (1905), Shantou (1907), and Guangdong (1910). The establishment of the Shantou branch office took place in 1900, when the Amoy branch office opened; in fact, the first president of Taiwan Bank, Jūichi Soeda 添田壽一, and the bank’s director Hiromi Kawasaki 川崎寛美 visited Amoy and paid visits to Fuzhou and

Shantou. After inspecting the new sites, Soeda and Kawasaki perceived the necessity of
establishing a branch office in Fuzhou and another one in Shantou. The functions of Taiwan
Bank’s Shantou branch office were (1) to provide loans to both Japanese and Taiwanese
merchants, (2) to promote Sino-Japanese economic cooperation, and (3) to assist Shantou’s
development of public construction. For example, Taiwan bank provided a loan to the Mitsui
Company and several loans to Shantou’s Chinese merchants for the construction of Shantou’s
electrical infrastructure and sewer system. Moreover, Taiwan Bank’s Shantou branch office
issued currencies. For example, the bank issued silver certificates (銀票) in 1909, and issued
Shantou certificates (汕票) in 1913.87

Taiwan Bank was significant for Shantou City, as well. Taiwan Bank’s Shantou branch
office was the city’s only branch office of a foreign bank to deal with “general affairs” in
addition to overseas remittances. Some foreign banks had “agencies” rather than “branch offices”
in Shantou, and these agencies dealt specifically with overseas remittance. For example, the
Chinese Yuanxing 元興 Company was an agency belonging to Dutch Bank and Guang Yi-yu
光益裕 Private Bank was an agency belonging to Singapore’s Sze Hai Tong Banking &

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87 Kisaku Nagura 名倉喜作, Taiwan ginkō yonjū nen shi 臺灣銀行四十年誌 (A commemoration of Taiwan
Insurance Co. One example will suffice to illustrate the importance of Taiwan Bank’s Shantou branch office. When the Chinese Revolution occurred in 1911, the Revolutionary Army attacked two Chinese banks Daqing Bank (大清銀行) and Jiaotong Bank (交通銀行), which dealt with Shantou Customs’ tariff duties and, in the process, plundered 9,700 haikwan tael. Later, the Revolutionary Army proclaimed that the tariff duties of Shantou would help cover the expenses of maintaining Shantou’s security. The director of Shantou Customs discussed the matter with representatives from seven foreign countries that had acquired certain guarantees regarding tariff duties, and specially, the discussions took place with Japanese, British, and American consuls among others. In the end, the Shantou Customs director decided to entrust the tariff duties to Taiwan Bank’s Shantou branch office. In order to preserve the guarantees regarding tariff duties, Taiwan Bank’s Shantou branch office established a new treasury and remitted tariff duties by telegraph to Shanghai every month until 1916, when Taiwan Bank ceded these business responsibilities to China Bank (中國銀行). The example illustrates foreign countries’ trust in Taiwan Bank and Taiwan Bank’s important role in Shantou.89

88 Kamesaburō Anjū 安重亀三郎, Swatō shōfu 汕頭商埠 (Shantou Treaty Port). Taihoku: Nanyō kyōkai Taiwan shibu 南洋協会臺灣支部, 1922, pp. 52–53.
89 Kisaku Nagura 名倉喜作, Taiwan ginkō yonjū nen shi 臺灣銀行四十年誌 (A commemoration of Taiwan Bank’s fortieth anniversary), pp. 20–21, 221–222, 226–227, 238–239. Tokyo: Taiwan ginkō, 1939; Taiwan ginkō chosa ka 臺灣銀行調査課, Nanshi nanyō ni okeru hōjin no jōkyō 南支南洋ニ於ケル邦人ノ狀況 (The Japanese
From 1907 to August 1937, when Taiwan Bank was forced to close owing to the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War in July 1937, the bank remained in operation in Shantou for thirty years. The reopening of Taiwan Bank took place during the Japanese occupation of Shantou in June 1939. Most directors of Taiwan Bank’s Shantou branch office had been born and educated in the Japanese homeland, and had then worked at Taiwan Bank for several years before being assigned to branch offices in China. For example, Mimaki Toshio 三卷俊夫, the director of the Shantou branch office between 1915 and 1916, was born in Yamaguchi Prefecture, Japan. In 1904, he graduated from Kyoto Imperial University and went to work at Taiwan Bank in Taiwan. Before his assignment to Shantou, he served as the director of the Taizhong branch office in central Taiwan in 1914.90

Other directors of Taiwan Bank’s Shantou branch office went through an experience similar to Mimaki’s. The directors of Taiwan Bank’s Shantou branch office usually were leaders of the Japanese Association in Shantou. For example, Chikara Uchimi 内海力 served as director of Taiwan Bank’s Shantou branch office and as the president of the Japanese Association in

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90 Hakusui Hashimoto 橋本白水, Taiwan tōji to so kōrōsha 臺灣統治及其功勞者 (The governance of Taiwan and its contributors). Taihoku: Nankoku shupan kyōkai 南國出版協會, 1930, p. 54.
Shantou in the early 1920s.\textsuperscript{91} Mineji Takefuji 竹藤峰治 was the director of Taiwan Bank’s Shantou branch office and simultaneously headed the Japanese Association in Shantou in the 1920s.\textsuperscript{92}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{shantou_bank_office.png}
\caption{Taiwan Bank’s Shantou Branch Office.}
\end{figure}

[Illustration] Since the early twentieth century, the pictured building has served as the Taiwan Bank’s Shantou branch office. Many Japanese and Taiwanese sekimin conducted business in the area neighboring the branch office. The building has been preserved and currently is the site of the Shantou Open Port Cultural Exhibition. (Source: Shantou Open Port Cultural Exhibition.)

\textsuperscript{91} Giichi Tsubakimomo 植本義一, \textit{Tawian taikan 臺灣大觀} (Overview of Taiwan). Taipei: Cheng wen chu ban she 成文出版社, 1985, p. 76.

Shantou was home to many Japanese civil merchants, as well as to companies with a degree of official status. For example, Yu-shan street in Shantou City was home to the Japanese companies Kōsaka 幸阪, Juntendō 順天堂, and Kōkandō 廣貫堂. The Kōsaka Company was established in March 1916 by Michisuke Kōsaka 幸阪道介, a native of Yamaguchi Prefecture. The company supplied Shantou’s residents with medicine and products like toys, socks, and coal; moreover, the company was the Japanese Navy’s designated supplier of articles for daily use. While managing this company, Michisuke Kōsaka managed the Kōsaka Hotel, which was located in Yu-shan Street. In 1921, Michisuke Kōsaka served as a member of appraisal meetings for the Japanese Association in Shantou. During the Shanghai Incident in 1932, when many Japanese stores were forced to close because of the severely anti-Japanese atmosphere in Shantou, Kōsaka nevertheless continued to do business in China.

In August 1906, an Osaka merchant Kikumatsu Yamaguchi 山口菊松 established Juntendō in Shantou, which would become one of the most prosperous pharmacies and general stores in Shantou. In July 1918, Yamaguchi invested in the Shantou Hotel which was located on Hai-an Street. In 1920, Yamaguchi extended his business to Korea and opened a branch office of Juntendō in Keijō (today’s Seoul). After the Shanghai Incident in 1932, Yamaguchi terminated...
his business in Shantou. In 1911, Kōkandō, whose head office was in Amoy, opened a branch store in Shantou. The company dealt in general and pharmaceutical products. The director of the Shantou branch office was initially Kisaku Takakuwa and later Gisaburō Takabayashi. The company sold glass, toys, socks, fountain pens, and insurance plans to Shantou residents. 93

Several Japanese merchants opened stores on Zhenbang Street (鎮邦街), Wanan Street (萬安街), and Yongping Road (永平路). In 1915, Osaka merchant Taizō Yamamoto opened the Nikka Company, dealing in general and medicinal products. In 1918, the Suzuki Company, run by Kuninosuke Hiruta 細田國之助, opened up for business in Shantou,

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importing Japanese cotton cloth, Javanese sugar, Shanghai flour (wheat from Wuxi, or 無錫),
and Singaporean tin to Shantou. In 1924, the Suzuki Company made a contract with Taiwan
Renwa Kaisha 臺灣煉瓦會社 (the Taiwan Brick Company) to import 30 thousand tons of brick
to Shantou. In 1918, Seigorō Kuramoto 藏本清五郎 opened a general store pharmacy—known
as the Nichi Ryu 日龍 Company—in Shantou. In 1920, Teikichi Maeda 前田禎吉 opened the
Maeda Company in the same city, spending an initial capital outlay of 80 thousand yuan to do so.
The company was co-run by three Maeda brothers and was the strongest general store-pharmacy
in Shantou. The items for sale there included socks, umbrellas, cotton products, pottery, electric
appliances, and aluminum products. The Maeda Company established branch offices in other
Chinese cities: Shanghai, Hankou, Nanjing, and Wuhu. In Osaka, Maeda established a soap
factory.94

94 Taiwan ginkō chosa ka 臺灣銀行調查課, Nanshi nanyō ni okeru hōjin no jōkyō 南支南洋二於Kel邦人ノ状
況 (The Japanese situation in southern China and the South Seas). Taihoku: Taiwan ginkō chosa ka, 1919, pp. 235,
239; Taiwan sōtokufu kanbō chsaka 臺灣總督府官房調查課, Swatō teikoku ryōji kanmai jijō 汕頭帝國領事館內
事情 (The circumstances inside the Shantou imperial consulate). Taihoku: Taiwan sōtokufu kanbō chsaka, 1922, pp.
27, 110, 196, 219; Kamesaburō Anjū 安重亀三郎, Swatō shōfu 汕頭商埠 (Shantou Treaty Port). Taihoku: Nanyō
kyōkai Taiwan shibu 南洋協會臺灣支部, 1922, pp. 104–105; Taiwan nichī nichī shinpō 臺灣日日新聞, no. 8764,
daily news (October 7, 1924); Gorō Uchida 內田五郎, Skin Swatō 新汕頭 (New Shantou). Taihoku: Nanyō
kyōkai Taiwan shibu 南洋協會臺灣支部, 1927, pp. 11–12; Xue-ying Xie 謝雪影, Shantou zhinan 汕頭指南 (A
guidebook to Shantou). Shantou: Shantou shishi tongzun she, 1933, p. 367; Nanyō kyōkai Taiwan shibu 南洋協會
臺灣支部, Nan shina no shōgyō 南支那の商業 (Commerce in southern China). Taihoku: Nanyō kyōkai Taiwan
shibu, 1938, p. 66; Hideo Kobayashi 小林英夫, Nihonjin no kaigai katsudō ni kansuru rekishi teki chōsa 日本人の
海外活動に関する歴史的調査 (Historical surveys of the overseas activities of Japanese). Tokyo: Yumani shobō
ゆまに書房, 2000, p. 452.
The abovementioned Shantou-based Japanese companies and merchants replied significantly on shipping companies to transport goods. The most important Japanese shipping company in Shantou was the Osaka Shosen Kaisha 大阪商船會社 (the Osaka Shipping Company). Before the Osaka Shipping Company assigned special correspondents to Shantou in January 1920, Bradley & Co. served as the Osaka Shipping Company’s contact there, assisting the arrangements of passengers and commodities. In March 1926, the burgeoning prosperity stemming from Sino-Japanese trade and the rapid increase in travelers back and forth led the Osaka Shipping Company to establish a branch office on Shantou’s Haikwan Road.95

The Osaka Shipping Company opened a route to Shantou in response to the Taiwan General Government’s policy of meirei kōro 命令航路 (command of the sea routes). The command-of-the-sea-routes policy rested on the Taiwan General Government’s subsidization of the Osaka Shipping Company in exchange for the right to designate sea routes, the number of vessels on the high seas, their tonnage, and even the velocity. In order to expand Japanese influences in southern China, the Taiwan General Government requested that the Osaka Shipping Company open a route connecting colonial Taiwan to treaty ports in southern China.

95 Taiwan ginkō chosa ka 臺灣銀行調查課, Nanshi nanyō ni okeru hōjin no jōkyō 南支南洋ニ於ケル邦人ノ状況 (The Japanese situation in southern China and the South Seas). Taihoku: Taiwan ginkō chosa ka, 1919, pp. 235–236.
On April 2, 1899, the Osaka Shipping Company opened the Tansui–Hong Kong line (involving the two ships the Sumida Maru and the Maitsuru Maru), which featured weekly stops in Amoy and Shantou. In 1900, the company established the Anping–Hong Kong line and the Hong Kong–Fuzhou line, both featuring a layover in Shantou. In 1907, the Anping–Hong Kong line changed to the Takao–Hong Kong line, and in 1911, again changed to the Takao-Guangzhou line (Takao being today’s Kaohsiung). In April 1915, the Tanshui–Hong Kong line changed to the Keelung–Hong Kong line (involving the two ships the Kaijō Maru and the Taijin Maru). The Osaka Shipping Company faced severe competition in managing the sailing lines between Taiwan and southern China, with the stiffest competition coming from the British Douglas Company, which had managed similar routes many years earlier than the Osaka Shipping Company. In order to overcome the competition, the Osaka Shipping Company adopted several strategies, such as decreasing its transportation fees and shipping at frequent, regular intervals. These strategies were successful, and in 1904, the British Douglas Company withdrew from the shipping lanes between Taiwan and southern China.\(^{96}\)

In addition to the Taiwan General Government’s command of various sea routes, some Japanese goods came to Shantou by way of the Kobe–Hong Kong line and the Osaka–Hong Kong line. Some Japanese goods made their way to Shantou aboard vessels operated by other Japanese shipping companies, like Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha 日本郵船會社 (the Japan Mail Boat Company) and Yamashita Kisen Kaisha 山下汽船會社 (the Yamashita Steamship Company). For example, Yamashita Kisen Kaisha managed the Keelung–Haiphong line (using the ship the Daika Maru), which completed its circuit once every two weeks with stops in Amoy, Shantou, Hong Kong, and several ports in Vietnam.\(^97\) But in general, the Osaka Shipping Company was the most important Japanese shipping company that transported Japanese and Taiwanese goods to Shantou.

The Osaka Shipping Company, like the Taiwan Bank, was a so-called kokusaku kaisha 國策會社 (National-Policy Company). In other words, the companies were supported by and, indeed, demanded by the Taiwan General Government. In Shantou’s Japanese communities, directors of the Osaka Shipping Company’s Shantou branch office often served as directors of the Japanese Association in Shantou. For example, both Shunzō Kodama 児玉春三 and Kiichi

Mori 森喜一 were directors of the Osaka Shipping Company’s Shantou branch office and directors of the Japanese Resident Association in Shantou in the 1920s.98

Fig. 2-5 The Map of Shantou City Painted by Japanese in the 1920s.
2.3 Taiwanese Sekimin Merchants in Shantou

The previous paragraphs introduced the management practices typical of Japanese companies and merchants in Shantou. In this section, I want to explore the question of when the Taiwanese sekimin merchants entered Shantou and how they maintained and expanded their businesses.

A useful primary source regarding Taiwanese sekimin merchants in Shantou is *Tsūshō Isan* 通商彙纂, a published volume containing collected economic reports issued by overseas Japanese consulates to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Japan. One report notes that, in September 1899, a Taiwanese sekimin named Guang-qin Tzeng 曾廣欽 opened the Ekian Company (益安洋行) in Shantou. The company sold grocery items and provided private banking
services. Tzeng was probably the first Taiwanese sekimin to settle in this area.  

By 1904, when Japan established a primary imperial consulate in Shantou, the Chaoshan area was home to only 14 Taiwanese sekimin, including 4 members of the Chaoshan Railroad staff and 10 businessmen. In 1905, the area was home to 57 Taiwanese sekimin, including 33 businessmen and their family members. In 1907, the year in which a formal Japanese Imperial Consulate was established in Shantou, the population of Taiwanese sekimin was 113, including 94 shop owners and clerks living in the area and dealing in such markets as clothing, private banking, groceries, rice, sugar, and straw bags. In 1916, the population of Taiwanese sekimin was 151. In 1917, the population of Taiwanese sekimin jumped to 217, including 148 males and 69 females. By the end of 1918, the population of sekimin was 269. In the latter half of the 1920s, Japanese “nationals” constituted the largest foreigner group in Shantou. For example, in 1927, Shantou was home to about one thousand foreigners, among whom were 568 Japanese

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99 Gaimushō tsūshōkyoku 外務省通商局, Tsūshō isan 通商彙纂 (Bulletin of commerce), no. 53, p. 2 (September 8, 1906).
100 Ibid., no. 71, p. 55 (December 13, 1904).
101 Ibid., no. 63, p. 61 (November 3, 1905).
102 Ibid., no. 60, p. 68 (October 23, 1907).
104 Gaimushō tsūshōkyoku 外務省通商局, Tsūshō kōhō 通商公報 (Public report of commerce), no. 454, p. 1062 (September 25, 1917).
105 Hiroshi Katase 片瀬弘, “Swatō gaikyō” 汕頭概況 (The general status of Shantou), Taiwan kyōiku 臺灣教育, p. 47 (February 1, 1919).
“nationals,” including 377 Taiwanese, 173 Japanese inlanders, and 18 Koreans. The Japanese “nationals” constituted almost 60% of the foreign population in this area and Taiwanese sekimin constituted the largest group.106

The Japanese inlanders in Shantou were hōkyū seikatsu sha 僚給生活者 (salaried workers), working in Japanese governmental institutions, like the branch office of the Taiwan Bank, the Japan-funded Hakuai Hospital, the Tōē School, and the Japanese elementary school in Shantou; in contrast, most Taiwanese sekimin in this area were merchants and shop clerks.107 Why did the majority of Taiwanese sekimin conduct business in Shantou? The reason is likely complex: First, sekimin, as Japanese nationals, enjoyed most-favored-nation privileges, which included exemption from paying taxes to the Qing government. Second, Shantou featured many markets of both Japanese and Taiwanese goods (e.g., Japanese coal, Keelung coal, Japanese matches, Japanese silk, Japanese seafood, Taiwanese sugar, and Taiwanese alcohol). Third, the local language of Shantou was Chaozhouness, which was very similar to the Minnan language, the most popular language in Taiwan. The reason for this similarity can be traced back to

historical migration patterns: the ancestors of a majority of Taiwanese had migrated from southern Fujian Province (Minnan) to Taiwan in the seventeenth century. Therefore, Taiwanese sekimin enjoyed the convenience of a familiar language and familiar social networks when conducting business in Shantou.

By 1922, according to a report issued by Shantou’s Japanese consul Shōroku Uchida 打田庄六, the five most powerful sekimin merchants in Shantou were Bing-zhang Luo 羅炳章, who owned the Sanrin Company, Chuan-zhi Lin 林傳之, who owned the Rikyō Textiles Company, Guang-shu Chen 陳廣述, who owned the Kōgen Company, Zhen-xian Wang 王振咸, who owned the Kanki Company, and Zhen-guo Lin 林振國, who owned the Fuji Company.108

Bing-zhang Luo’s family was registered in Taipei, but he had in fact been born in Zhejiang Province in 1878, when Taiwan was under Qing governance. When Japan governed Taiwan, Luo served as an interpreter for the Japanese Navy and helped Japan conduct surveys along the Taiwan coast. In February 1898, Luo started to work in Taipei City’s post office. A contemporary news report in Taiwan nichi nichi shinpō entitled “dojin ni mezurashiki koin”

Đa # ˀö (a rare native employee) suggested that Luo was a rare “native” (Taiwanese) employee of the post office and was good at translating Japanese. The report further suggested that Luo was cautious, and had acquainted himself with finer aspects of money remittance and financial deposits. He was a model employee who, unaffected by the less-than-ideal circumstances of his residential neighborhood (on Mengjia’s Xiashin Street), concentrated on his work.¹⁰⁹

In 1904, after six years working in the post office, Luo went to Shantou as a staff member for the Chaoshan Railroad Company. Apparently, he was not a technician and probably served as an interpreter. Later, Luo started to conduct business, importing liquor, seafood, matches, and groceries into Shantou. In November 1916, Luo established the Sanlin Company on Wai-ma Road, where the most prosperous establishments had set up shop. The name ‘Sanlin’ literally meaning “three lins,” probably was an homage to his three sons, whose names were Bing-lin 炳麟, Zhen-lin 振麟, and Zhao-lin 兆麟. The Sanlin Company imported Keelung coal, Taiwanese liquors and molasses, seafood, matches, and flour to Shantou.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁹ *Taiwan nichi nichi shinpō* 臺灣日日新報, no. 148, daily news 5 (October 29, 1898); *Taiwan sōtokufu shokuin roku* 臺灣總督府職員錄 (The staff listing of the Taiwan General Government), p. 78 (1902); p. 90 (1903); p. 83 (1904).
About the importation of alcohol, the sixth article of *Guang dong quan sheng jiu shui zhang* (the alcohol tax for the whole of Guangdong Province) prohibited the scale of blended liquors (i.e., of alcohol blended with water) throughout Guangdong Province. Transgressors would be fined between ten and one hundred yuan. This article triggered many disputes between Japanese merchants, Taiwanese merchants, and Chinese officials because of the prohibition’s ambiguous terminology. However, “Taiwanese sekimin Bing-zhang Luo understood local affairs in various regions of China, and thus he could mitigate various obstacles presented by complicated Chinese business customs, and the result was the ongoing importation of Taiwanese alcohol into Shantou.”

In addition to the importation of Japanese and Taiwanese goods, Bing-zhang Luo was an agent for Teikoku Seimei Hoken Kaisha (Imperial Life Insurance Company), which is today’s Asahi Seimei Hoken Sōgō Kaisha (Asahi Life Insurance Company). The company was established in Tokyo in 1888, and with Japan’s expansion in East Asia, the Imperial Life Insurance Company expanded its business to Japan.”

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111 *Taiwan nichi nichi shinpō* 臺灣日日新報, no. 5639, daily news 1 (March 9, 1916); Gaimushō tsūshōkyoku 外務省通商局, *Tsūshō kōho* 通信公報, no. 268, p. 595 (November 22, 1915).

colonial and semi-colonial holding, including Taiwan (colony) and the Chinese treaty ports (semi-colonies). For example, when Imperial Life Insurance expanded their business in colonial Taiwan in 1918, the main subjects of insurance were Japanese officials and their family members.

Concerning the insurance business in Shantou, Japan assigned technicians and staff to the Chinese city beginning in 1904 to facilitate the construction of the Chaoshan Railroad. Later, with the formation of a primary Japanese community in Shantou, more and more Japanese officials and merchants relocated there, despite facing many risks including dangerous work and local diseases, such as cholera. In addition to Japanese residents, some Taiwanese residents in Shantou expressed demand for insurance, as well. In this sense, the demand for insurance was significant, and Bing-zhang Luo—as an agent for Imperial Life Insurance—responded to this demand.

In general, several factors explain Bing-zhang Luo’s business success. First, he spoke both Japanese and Mandarin, and this bilingual ability facilitated his business. Second, he was trusted by both the Japanese and Chinese communities for his credit worthiness. Third, he was well versed in the Chinese customs surrounding trade. Because of Luo’s success in business,
moreover, he had been the vice-director of the Japanese Association in Shantou. In the Personal Matters section of the November 7, 1924 issue of the *Taiwan nichi nichi shinpō*, a report stated that Bing-zhang Luo had arrived in Taipei from Shantou on November 5, 1924. *Taiwan nichi nichi shinpō* was the official newspaper of the Taiwan General Government and was the most important newspaper in colonial Taiwan. The report of Baing-zhang Luo’s voyage to Taipei indicates that he was an important figure whose activities were newsworthy.

Chuan-zhi Lin was the second most powerful Taiwanese sekimin merchant according to Japanese consul Uchida’s report. The household register for Chuan-zhi Lin listed a residence in Taipei, but he had been born in Shantou. After Japan’s governance of Taiwan commenced in 1895, Lin registered as a Japanese citizen, but not before starting up a business that would eventually import towels, socks, and cotton products into Shantou. In September 1913, Lin co-invested with a Chaoyang merchant Feng-wu Fan in establishing the Likyō Textiles Company, which was located on Sheng-ping Street (昇平街) in Shantou. The company specializing in making socks and rested on capital value at 50 thousand yuan, with most of the investments coming from Chuan-zhi Lin. In 1914, with its factory complex finally

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113 Ibid.
114 *Taiwan nichi nichi shinpō* 臺灣日日新報, no. 8795, daily news 2 (November 7, 1924).
constructed, Likyō Textiles Company started to operate.

The Likyō Textiles Company imported Japanese materials and, processing them with 29 American-made machines, put out 160 dozen products daily. The socks exported to Singapore served the needs of Chinese workers there. The Likyō Textiles Company was the largest manufacturer in Shantou in 1914. At that time, there were two soy-bean factories, two canning factories, one roof-tile factory, and two ramune (soft drink) factories in Shantou. All these factories were much smaller than the factory used by the Likyō Textiles Company.  

In 1918, Likyō Textiles Company expanded its facilities, no longer limiting itself to the production of socks. The company manufactured cotton cloth, towels, handkerchiefs and other cotton-made products. In the rush seasons, the company would hire as many as 180 employees, and even in the slack seasons, the company hired approximately 130 employees. It was regarded as the most prosperous Japanese (and Taiwanese) business in Shantou.

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115 “Swatō ni okeru hōjin seisōgyō no shinsetsu ni kansuru ken” 汕頭に於ける邦人製造業の新設に関する件 (Regarding the establishment of new Japanese manufactures in Shantou), Gaimushō kiroku 外務省記録, B11090049800; “Swatō ni kansuru chōsa jikō hōkoku no ken (2)” 汕頭に関する調査事項報告の件 2 (A survey report on Shantou, part 2), Gaimushō kiroku 外務省記録, B03050703300 (1921); Gaimushō tsūshōkyoku 外務省通商局 Tsūshō kōhō 通商公報 (Public report on commerce), no. 269, p. 659 (November 25, 1915).

116 Taiwan ginkō chosa ka 臺灣銀行調査課, Nanshi nanyō ni okeru hōjin no jōkyō 南支南洋に於ける邦人ノ狀況 (The Japanese situation in southern China and the South Seas). Taihoku: Taiwan ginkō chosa ka, 1919, pp. 236–238; Taiwan sōtokufu kanbō chsaka 臺灣總督府官房調査課, Swatō teikoku ryōjikan kannai jijō 汕頭帝國領事館内事情 (The circumstances inside the Shantou imperial consulate). Taihoku: Taiwan sōtokufu kanbō chsaka, 1922, p. 201.
Chuan-zhi Lin spoke both Japanese and Nankinese and was regarded as a trustworthy man in both the Japanese and Chinese communities in Shantou. He was appointed to a position on an appraisal board of the Japanese Association in Shantou, and was active in the Japanese communities in Shantou.\textsuperscript{117}

Guang-shu Chen was the third most powerful sekimin merchant in Shantou. The household registration of Guang-shu Chen listed him as residing in Taipei (the Da dao cheng area). He was born in Chaozhou in 1856. In 1876, when he was twenty years old, he went to Shantou, Amoy, and other places in southern China with his father while conducting business in the tea trade. When Japan began governing Taiwan in 1895, Chen registered as a Japanese citizen and kept conducting the tea business in Chaozhou, Shantou, and Taiwan. The Chen family grew very rich, as it ranked in profits from tea shops in Taipei, Siam, Shantou, and many other places. In Taipei, Guang-shu opened a baozhong tea shop (包種茶) named Mei sheng shu ji 美盛述記, conducting business with Siam.\textsuperscript{118}

\textsuperscript{117} “Swatō ni kansuru chōsa jikō hōkoku no ken (2)” 汕頭に関する調査事項報告の件 2 (A survey report on Shantou, part 2), Gaimushō kiroku 外務省記録, B03050703300 (1921).

\textsuperscript{118} Gaimushō tsūshōkyoku 外務省通局, Tsūshō kōhō 通局公報 (Public report of commerce), no. 527 (June 17, 1918), p. 1041; no. 528 (June 24, 1918); Kamesaburō Anjū 安重亀三郎, Swoō Shōfu 汕頭商埠 (Shantou Treaty Port). Taihoku: Nanyō kyōkai Taiwan shibu 南洋協會臺灣支部, 1922, p. 12.
During the Qing period, the machines used for weighing of baozhong tea were hand-crafted according to subjective standards, not universal ones. In 1907, the Taiwan General Government undertook the task of designing and producing universal weighing machines in conjunction with universal standard for packaging tea. However, some tea stores in Taipei (mainly in Da do cheng) disobeyed the Taiwan General Government’s policy. Guang-shu Chen was one the most powerful tea-shop owners who resisted the Taiwan General Government’s calls for the unification of standards. The *Taiwan nichi nichi shinpō* published a news report that, criticizing Guang-shu Chen, galvanized other tea merchants’ decision to violate governmental orders and measure tea with non-standard counterweights and scales.\(^{119}\) Being very active in the circle of tea business in Taipei, Guang-shu Chen in 1908 and 1910 was elected to the position of executive secretary of the Taipei Tea Merchants Guild, and in 1915, he became a member of an appraisal board for the Guild.\(^{120}\)

\(^{119}\) *Taiwan nichi nichi shinpō*  蔣日日新報, no. 2796, daily news 2 (August 30, 1907).
\(^{120}\) *Kanbun Taiwan nichi nichi shinpō* 漢文臺灣日日新報 (Chinese version), no. 3085 (August 12, 1908); no. 3707 (September 2, 1910); Akira Matsuura 松浦章, “Shinmatsu no Swatō to nihon tōji ka Taiwan to no kōun kankei” 清末の汕頭と日本統治下台湾との航運關係 (the maritime relationship between Shantou under late-Qing governance and Taiwan under Japanese governance), *Nantō shigaku* 南島史學, no. 60. Tokyo: Nantō shigakukai 南島史學會, 2002, p. 12.
In 1918, Chen opened the Kōgen Tea Store on Sheng-ping Street in Shantou. The venture became the most important Japanese (and Taiwanese) tea company in the city. In March of every year, which was a peak period in the purchase of tea, Guang-shu Chen assigned between thirty and forty Shantou-based employees to Taiwan, where they would appraise and purchase tea. Chen’s fluency in Japanese and mandarin earned him the trust of both the Japanese and Chinese communities in Shantou.121

Zhen-xian Wang made the list of important Taiwanese merchants in Shantou at the time. He was born in Tainan and received a bachelor’s degree from the Japanese university. In 1919, he opened Kanki Company (乾記洋行) on Yong-he Street in Shantou, dealing in the excavation and sale of mineral substance. His wife graduated from the feminine school in Kobe, and was known for her graceful and diplomatic social skills. Zhen-xian Wang received an appointment to the appraisal board of the Japanese Association in Shantou.122

Zhen-guo Lin was the last important Taiwanese merchant mentioned in Japanese Consul Unida’s report. The household register of Zhen-guo Lin listed him as residing in Taipei. It is not clear where he was born. In January 1920, Lin opened the Fuji Company on Sheng-ping Street in

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121 Swatō ni kansuru chōsa jikō hōkoku no ken (2)” 汕頭に関する調査事項報告の件 2 (A survey report on Shantou, part 2), Gaimushō kiroku 外務省記録, B03050703300 (1921).
122 Ibid.
Shantou, where the business imported and sold seafood and groceries. He understood the Japanese language and served as a member of an appraisal board at the Japanese Association in Shantou.¹²³

Sekimin merchants outside those mentioned in Japanese Consul Uchida’s report, excelled at conducting business in Shantou since the 1910s. The Chen Family stood out in this regard, owing largely to their oversight of the Mangen Company (萬源洋行), which was the brainchild of Tainan merchant Guan-ying Chen 陳冠英, (1880–1926) in Shantou. Guan-ying Chen was a comprador of sugar and rice who established the Chen Wanyuan 陳萬源 Company in 1906 in Tainan, dealing in those same two products. Later, he established the Douliu Sugar Company (斗六製糖) and was a supervisor of the Tainan Sugar Company (臺南製糖). Chen also participated in the Tainan Prefecture Conference (臺南州協議會) from 1921 to 1925.¹²⁴ In December 1916, the Mangen Company opened on Sheng-ping Street in Shantou, and sold

¹²³ Gaimushō tsūshōkyoku 外務省通商局, Tsūshō kōhō 通商公報 (Public report on commerce), no. 527 (June 17, 1918), p. 1041; no. 528 (June 24, 1918); “Swatō ni kansuru chōsa jikō hōkoku no ken (2)” 汕頭に関する調査事項報告の件 2 (A survey report on Shantou, part 2), Gaimushō kiroku 外務省記録, B03050703300 (1921); Kamesaburō Anjū 安重亀三郎, Sōtō shōfu 汕頭商埠 (Shantou Treaty Port). Taihoku: Nanyō kyōkai Taiwan shibu 南洋協会臺灣支部, 1922, p. 106.

¹²⁴ Tainan shinpō sha 臺南新報社, Nanbu Taiwan shinshi roku 南部臺灣紳士録 (The roster of Taiwanese gentlemen in southern Taiwan). Tainan: Tainan shinpō sha, 1907, p. 53; Taiwan taikan sha 臺灣大覲社, Saikin no nanbu Taiwan 最近の南部臺灣 (Contemporary southern Taiwan). Tainan: Taiwan taikan sha, 1923, p.12; Fuhō 府報 (Bulletin of the Taiwan General Government), no. 3834, p. 51 (June 25, 1926).
imported alcohol, molasses, seafood, pineapples, matches, and flour from Japan and Taiwan.\textsuperscript{125}

The Mangen Company’s capital was valued at 50 thousand \textit{yuan} during the primary stage of operations, and in 1919, three years after the opening of the company, the value of the capital had reached 70 thousand \textit{yuan}. In the same year, the Mangen Company made a contract with the Osaka Suzuki Ekiji Company (鈴木騒次商店), exporting tungsten to Japan. It was said that the annual volume of tungsten trade was valued at 500 thousand \textit{yuan}. Early in the company’s history, Zun-ding Chen 陳遵鼎 was responsible for operations. In the early 1920s, Fan-shu Chen 陳蕃薯 became the director of the Mangen Company, and later, Guan-ying Chen’s nephew Qi-hui Chen 陳祺輝 became the director.\textsuperscript{126}

Qi-hui Chen was very active in Shantou’s Taiwanese communities. He served as the secretary in charge of the Taiwanese Association in Shantou in the late 1910s. In the early 1930s,

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{125} Nanyō kyōkai Taiwan shibu 南洋協会臺灣支部, \textit{Nan shina no shōgyō} 南支那の商業 (Commerce in southern China). Taihoku: Nanyō kyōkai Taiwan shibu 南洋協会臺灣支部, 1938, p. 66; Kamesaburō Anjū 安重亀三郎, \textit{Swatō shōfu} 汕頭商埠 (Shantou Treaty Port). Taihoku: Nanyō kyōkai Taiwan shibu 南洋協会臺灣支部, 1922, p. 106; Taiwan ginkō chosa ka 臺灣銀行調査課, \textit{Nanshi nanyō ni okeru hōjin no jōkyō} 南支南洋ニ於ケル邦人ノ状況 (The Japanese situation in southern China and the South Seas). Taihoku Taiwán ginkō chosa ka, 1919, p. 240; Xue-yīng Xie 謝雪影, \textit{Shantou zhinan} 汕頭指南 (A guidebook to Shantou). Shantou: Shantou shishi tongzun she, 1933, p. 168; Gaimushō tsūshōkyoku 外務省通商局, \textit{Tsūshō kōhō} 通商公報, no. 451(September 3, 1917); no. 476 (December 10, 1917); no. 484 (January 17, 1918); no. 494 (February 21, 1918); no. 877 (October 6, 1921).
\textsuperscript{126} Taiwan ginkō chosa ka 臺灣銀行調査課, \textit{Nanshi nanyō ni okeru hōjin no jōkyō} 南支南洋ニ於ケル邦人ノ状況 (The Japanese situation in southern China and the South Seas). Taihoku Taiwán ginkō chosa ka, 1919, p. 240; Kamesaburō Anjū 安重亀三郎, \textit{Swatō shōfu} 汕頭商埠 (Shantou Treaty Port). Taihoku: Nanyō kyōkai Taiwan shibu 南洋協会臺灣支部, 1922, p. 106; Gorō Uchida 内田五郎, \textit{Shin Swatō} 新汕頭 (New Shantou). Taihoku: Nanyō kyōkai Taiwan shibu 南洋協会臺灣支部, 1927, p. 12; \textit{Tainan shinpō} 臺南新報, (May 7, 1930); (May 14, 1930); Nanyō kyōkai Taiwan shibu 南洋協会臺灣支部, \textit{Nan shina no shōgyō} 南支那の商業 (Commerce in southern China). Taihoku: Nanyō kyōkai Taiwan shibu 南洋協会臺灣支部, 1938, p. 66.
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when the Tainan gentry and entrepreneur Shin Huang established the Dadong Ice-making Company (大東製冰公司) in Shantou, Qi-hui Chen ranked as one of the most important shareholders in the venture. Later, owing to the dispute between the Japanese consul in Shantou Kumakichi Befu and the Dadong Ice-making Company, Befu issued orders of deportation to Qi-hui Chen and other important Taiwanese shareholders in the company (see Chapter three for a more detailed discussion of the dispute). Nevertheless, the dispute was settled and Qi-hui Chen was able to remain in Shantou with his family until the end of the Second World War. Qi-hui Chen, his wife Shu-qing Lin, and their daughter Hui-juan Chen returned to Taiwan in 1946 as “non-guilty Taiwanese residents in Shantou.”

Xin-dong Xiao’s 蕭信棟 was an important Taiwanese investor in Shantou. Born in 1887, he hailed from a rich family of Hakka ethnicity in southern Taiwan’s Pingdong area (Jiadong). In 1906, he graduated from the Taiwan General Government’s Japanese Language School (國語學校). Later, he attended the Tokyo Engineering School (today’s Japan Engineering School) specializing in machinery. After studying in Japan, Xiao returned to Taiwan and became active

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127 Among the investors in the Dadong Ice-making Company were members of Tainan’s gentry, the merchant Shin Huang, and other Taiwanese residents in Shantou. The value of the company’s capital reached 90 thousand yuan, and the company itself was the largest producer of ice in Shantou.
128 Taiwan sheng xing zheng zhang guan gong shu dang an 藍省行政長官公署檔案 (The government office files of the chief executive of Taiwan Province), 00306520001157 (February 11, 1946).
129 Fuhō 府報, no. 1942, p. 13 (April 6, 1906); no. 1980, p. 6 (June 2, 1906).
in business circles. Xin-dong invested in several companies, including in light-rail and
ice-making companies. In 1912, Xin-dong—along with another local gentry A-bing Dai—proposed a plan to the Taiwan General Government for constructing the light-rail Neipu Ahou Line in the Pingdong area for transporting rice from Neipu and Chaozhou (in Taiwan), two rice-production cites, and after being accepted, designated, constructed, the new contributed significantly to local prosperity.¹³¹

In addition to the light rails, Xin-dong invested in at least four ice-making companies, including the Kagi Ice-making Company (嘉義製冰會社), for which he served as a manager director in 1913; the Shinkō Ice-making Company (新高製冰株式會社), for which he served as supervisor in 1915 and 1916; and the Takao (today’s Kaohsiung) Ice-selling Company (高雄賣冰會社), for which he served as director in 1921.¹³² When I visited Xiao’s house in Pingdong, I found a financial statement for the Nittō Ice-making Company (日東製冰會社) dating from

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¹³⁰ A-bing Dai 戴阿丙 (1876-1942) was a member of the Hakka gentry and a merchant in Taiwan. In 1898, when bandits attacked Japanese Chaozhou office in southern Taiwan, A-bing immediately informed the Japanese military police and helped the Japanese authorities pacify the area. In 1909, he received the shinshō 紳章 award, given to Taiwanese gentry by the Taiwan General Government during the Japanese colonial period in Taiwan.¹³¹ Taiwan nichī nichī shinpō 臺灣日日新報, no. 4226, daily news 2 (March 5, 1912); no. 4227, daily news 4 (March 6, 1912).
¹³² Taiwan nichī nichī shinpō 臺灣日日新報, no. 4526, daily news 6 (January 9, 1913); no. 5565, daily news 2 (December 23, 1915); no. 5874, daily news 2 (November 8, 1916); no. 7659, daily news 6 (September 28, 1921); Chun-chen Zhao 趙春晨, Chao shan bai nian lu hen 潮汕百年履痕 (The traces of one hundred years in Chaozhou and Shantou). Guangzhou: Huacheng chuban she 花城出版社, 2001, p. 118.
1919, and Xin-dong was listed as a shareholder in possession of 97 shares.\textsuperscript{133}

Xin-dong’s investment ambitions expanded to Shantou. In 1915, he invested in the construction of Shanzhang Light Rail (汕樟輕便鐵道), which connected Shantou, Denghai (灯海), and Zhanglin (樟林) to one another covering a total length of 18.5 kilometers. In January 1923, the line between Shantou and Denghai started to operate. It featured trolley-style cars, a style popular in southern Taiwan during the Japanese colonial period. The Shanzhang Light Rail, as well as the Chaoshan Railroad, played an important role in promoting the commerce and transportation in the Chaoshan area.\textsuperscript{134}

In 1916, Xin-dong invested 800 thousand yuan in establishing the Shantou-based Eiwa Company (永和洋行), which dealt in exports of tungsten. Since the outbreak of the First World War, tungsten had become an important strategic material. In 1918, Xin-dong bought a tungsten-rich strip of land in Longfeng 隆豐, located in Guangdong Province. Xin-dong exported tungsten to Japan and to the United States. In May 1918, Xin-dong transported tungsten from Shantou to Keelung and Hong Kong by means of the Osaka Shipping Company. For example, 37 packages of tungsten were shipped to Keelung on May 1, 23 packages of tungsten


\textsuperscript{134} Osaka asahi shinpū 大阪朝日新聞 (June 22, 1939).
were shipped to Keelung on May 6, 2 packages of tungsten were shipped to Hong Kong on May
15, and 90 packages of tungsten were shipped to Keelung on May 20. These preliminary
numbers suggest that Xin-dong transported most of the tungsten to Keelung and only a small part
to Hong Kong. He entered into a contract with the Kobe Kyūgen Company (神戸久原商店) to
export a volume of tungsten equivalent to 100 thousand yuan monthly. In this sense, the tungsten
was probably transported from Shantou to the United States through Keelung and Japan.\footnote{Gaimushō tsūshōkyoku 外務省通商局, Tsūshō kōhō 通商公報 (Public report on commerce), no. 531, pp. 6–7 (July 1, 1918); Taiwan ginkō chosa ka 台灣銀行調査課, Nanshi nanyō ni okeru hōjin no jōkyō 南支南洋二於ケル邦人ノ状況 (The Japanese situation in southern China and the South Seas). Taihoku: Taiwan ginkō chosa ka, 1919, p. 240.}

However, the business did not make Xin-dong rich because when the tungsten finally arrived in
the United States, the First World War had already ended (on November 11, 1918).\footnote{Interview with Mr. Kun-yuan Xiao 蕭錫沅, a relative of Xin-dong Xiao 蕭信棣.}

I had the opportunity to go through Xin-dong’s private letters in his house in Pingdong, and I
took note of a letter that, sent from Kitōta Amano 天野喜藤太, identified engine production as a
possible lucrative field for Xin-dong’s investments. According to the letter, Amano went to
Shantou in March 1924; and on October 3, 1924, he returned to Kaohsiung, and promptly visited
the Ogiwara Shipyard (荻原造船所) established in March 1901 in Kaohsiung. The letter goes on
to state that Amano heard from the Japanese workers in the shipyard that China had recently

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ordered two new ships (40 and 25 horsepower respectively), and that Amano later heard about
Xin-dong’s involvement in the engineering of ships from various Taiwanese sources at the
Ogiwara Shipyard; thus, Amano wanted to meet Xing-dong as soon as possible. This letter
indicates that Xin-dong might have invested in the Ogiwara Shipyard’s manufacture of modern
ocean-going vessels outfitted with powerful engines.

Xin-dong resided on Shantou’s Yu-shan Street for many years until the end of Second World
War. He had no offspring and adopted his brother’s son Dao-ying Xiao 蕭道應. Dao-ying
and his son Kai-ping Xiao 蕭開平 were both famous forensic medical experts in Taiwan.

Wei-zhen Rao 鰲維珍 was an important Taiwanese sekimin merchant in Shantou beginning
in the 1920s. Wei-zhen Rao was originally from the Xinzhu (Toufen) area in northern Taiwan. In
the mid-1920s, Wei-zhen Rao opened the Shinshū Company (神州洋行) on Shantou’s
Zhen-bang Street. The company’s capital had a value exceeding 10 thousand yuan, derived
chiefly from such products as medicine, liquor, tobacco, and canned food. After the outbreak of
the Shanghai Incident on January 28, 1932, many Japanese stores were forced to close because

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137 Taiwan sheng xing zheng zhang guan gong shu dang an 蘭省行政長官公署檔案 (The government office
files of the chief executive of Taiwan Province), 003065200001157 (February 11, 1946).
of the severe Sino-Japanese tensions, but the Shinshū Company continued to operate as usual.¹³⁸

Wei-zhen Rao also operated the Shinshū Hotel, a Chinese-style hotel in Shantou located on the third floor of the Guangdong Bank on Yong-ping Road, a prosperous area of Shantou. The hotel, whose facilities were top of the line, was one of the best Chinese-style hotels in Shantou.

Wei-zhen Rao operated another hotel, the Kaan Hotel (華安旅館), which was, in fact, not far from the Shinshū Hotel. However, the Kaan Hotel was less ritzy than the Shinshū Hotel.¹³⁹

Rao’s family members resided on Shantou’s Yu-shan Street, and the children received their education in Shantou. For example, Wei-run Rao 饒維潤, born in 1913, attended the Zheng-shi Elementary School (正始小學) and then the First Junior School in Shantou. Wei-shin Rao 饒維信, born in 1915, was a student at Ling-dong Commercial School.¹⁴⁰ The Rao family stayed in Shantou until the end of the Second World War. Wei-yun Rao 饒維運, his wife Duan Lin 林綿, and their daughter Mei-hui Rao 饒美惠 returned to Taiwan as “non-guilty Taiwanese...

¹³⁸ Taiwan sōtokufu kanbō chsaka 臺灣總督府官房調査課, Swatō teikoku ryōji kannai jijō 汐頭帝國領事館内事情 (The circumstances inside the Shantou imperial consulate). Taihoku: Taiwan sōtokufu kanbō chsaka, 1922, p. 27; Xue-ying Xie 謝雪影, Shantou zhinan 汐頭指南 (A guidebook to Shantou). Shantou: Shantou shishi tongzun she, 1933, pp. 168, 269, 296, 370; Nanyō kyōkai Taiwan shibu 南洋協會臺灣支部, Nan shina no shōgyō 南支那の商業 (Commerce in southern China). Taihoku: Nanyō kyōkai Taiwan shibu 南洋協會臺灣支部, 1938, p. 66.

¹³⁹ Taiwan sōtokufu kanbō gaijika 臺灣總督府官房外事課, Nashi nanyō ryōkō no shiori 南支洋旅行の案 (A travel guide for southern China and the South Seas). Taihoku: Taiwan sōtokufu kanbō gaijika, 1919, p. 61; Gorō Uchida 内田五郎, Shin Swatō 新汕頭 (New Shantou). Taihoku: Nanyō kyōkai Taiwan shibu 南洋協會臺灣支部, 1927, p. 42.

¹⁴⁰ Gaimushō kiroku 外務省記録, B04011305400 (1930).
residents of Shantou.” Wei-zhen Rao’s name appeared on Shantou shi tai qiao shen qing liu shan ju zhu xing ming ce 汕頭市台僑申請留汕居住姓名冊 (the roster of Taiwanese residents who applied to stay in Shantou City).  

Hailing from Taiwan, the members of the Yu family who owned the Yūtai Company (裕泰洋行) in Shantou also had a Hakka ethnic background. The Yu family’s main residence in Taiwan was in the Taoyuan (Zhong-li) area in northern part of the island. In 1916, A-cen Yu 余阿岑 graduated from the Industrial Training Institution in Taiwan, which was affiliated with Taiwan General Government.  

And thereafter, he became active in his hometown’s business circles. In February 1918, the Taiwan Minerals Company (臺灣礦業株式會社) held its founding meeting at Zhong-li Christian Church, and in attendance were many Japanese officials, such as the director of the Industrial Training Institution and the director of Taoyuan’s General Affairs Section. A-cen Yu was appointed a member of the standing committee of the Taiwan Minerals Company. Meanwhile, the Japanese government grant A-cen permission to excavate coal in Taoyuan’s xincheng 新城 area. In 1925, A-cen took the lead role in founding the Zhong-li

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141 Taiwan sheng xing zheng zhang guan gong shu dang an 臺灣省行政長官公署檔案 (The government office files of the chief executive of Taiwan Province), 003065200001157 (February 11, 1946).
142 Fuhō 府報, no. 1060, p. 37 (July 13, 1916).
143 Taiwan nichi nichi shinpō 臺灣日日新報, daily news 2 (February 25, 1918) (number unknown); daily news 5 (February 26, 1918) (number unknown).
Joint Electricity Company.  

In 1927, the Yu family opened the Yūtai Company in Shantou, and Yuan-mei Yu 余圓妹, a woman, was the registered owner. The Yūtai Company facilitated the import of machines, chemical materials, medicines, and groceries from Japan and Taiwan to Shantou. The capital of the company was valued at over 10 thousand yuan in the 1930s. Later, in the 1930s, A-cen ascended to the top position in the company.  

Born in 1907, A-cen Yu’s wife, Mei-xiang Lin 林美祥, was a native of Chaozhou. She graduated from Shanghai Dong-nan Medical School (上海東南醫學院) and then traveled to Japan for further studies. She came back to China as a reconstructive surgeon. Their son Zheng-xiong Yu 余正雄 was born in 1931 and eventfully served as the chairman of the Taiwan Galleria Company (多禮股份有限公司). A-cen, Mei-xiang, and Zheng-xiong resided in Shantou until the end of the Second World War.

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144 Taiwan nichichi shinpo 臺灣日日新報, no. 8989, daily news 5 (May 20, 1925).
147 Taiwan sheng xing zheng zhang guan gong shu dang an 臺灣省行政長官公署檔案 (The government office files of the chief executive of Taiwan Province), 00306520001159 (March 28, 1936); 00306520001157 (February 11, 1946).
Many sekimin merchants, in addition to the aforementioned, conducted business in Shantou during the Japanese colonial period in Taiwan. For example, several sekimin merchants participated in business related to sea transport. Kun Lin 林坤 operated the Daishin Ironworks (大新鐵工廠), specializing in ship repairs. Han Yang 楊漢 operated the Kengen Keisei Company (謙源桂誠洋行) in Shantou and the Tōgen Company (東源商行) in Taiwan, each contributing to marine transportation. Wen-teng Tsai 蔡文騰 operated the Jisei Company (自成洋行), dealing in sea-transportation and deep-sea fishing. He-qing Zhang 張河清 ran the Kenmo Company (建茂洋行), dealing in imports of seafood and grocerics. Headed by Jin-hai Xiao 蕭金海, the Mika Company (三華洋行) imported seafood and dyes. Textiles and tobacco were important products throughout the region. Concerning the manufacture of textiles, Taiwanese sekimin Ji-pu Liu 劉既溥 oversaw operations at the Liu Mei-tai Company (劉美泰號), which specialized in lace. Dealing in the manufacture of ramie fabrics, the Tokumi Company (德美洋行) was overseen by Xue-liu Tsai 蔡雪六。148

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As for the tobacco industry, Huang-xuan Xu 徐煌暄 operated the Kokushin Company (國信洋行) on Haikwan Road, which dealt not only in tobacco leaves but also in dyes, industrial medicine, and electric materials. Shen-lai Hong 洪神來 operated the Taihan Company (臺阪洋行), selling processed tobacco. Located on Yong tai Street, the Fukuki Company (福記洋行)—under You-fu Zheng 鄭有福—sold processed tobacco, as did the Yōsōhō Company (葉雙豐), which also dealt in alcohol, silks, satins, and general goods, owing in large measure to the diversifying efforts of the company’s head Zi-de Ye 葉自得.

Concerning the business of alcohol, Zhi-fang Lin 林芝舫 was a sekimin who headed the Kyūki Company (秋記洋行), selling alcohol and general goods. Ming-qin He 何鳴琴 ran the Kengen Company (謙源洋行), which specialized in three rather disparate products: molasses, alcohol, and pottery. The Giri Company (義利洋行) was under Zhu Pan 潘助, and also specialized in alcohol and molasses. Guang-de Zhou 周光德 took charge of the Heian Company (平安公司), which sold alcohol and coal. Overseeing two ventures, Ming Liu 劉明 was known for directing both the Meihatsu Company (明發洋行) and the Renhatsu Company (聯發洋行) in the brick business. Qi Zhou 周其 operated the Gensei Company (元成洋行) on Yong-he Street, where he oversaw the business’ role in importing soy beans and
matches.  

2.4 Brief Conclusion

In studying this commercial network in East Asia, I drew inspiration from the “network mode” and “inter-port mode” concepts developed by Japanese scholar Takashi Hamashita 濱下武志, who provided a new approach to exploring Asian history. His focus is not on a specific national history (which traditional Oriental studies have favored) but on the important waterway connections among different ports and regions. For example, he argues that to analyze the connections among ports yields more details than would a traditional examination of the historical relationships among nations. In my case, an examination of Japanese goods sold in Shantou can clarify the relationships among the Japanese city of Kobe, the Taiwanese city of Keelung, British Hong Kong, and Shantou in southern China.

Beginning in the early twentieth century, Japan established closer commercial relations with Shantou. Shantou was an important market for both Japanese and Taiwanese goods, including coal, seafood, molasses, and alcohol. The Japanese and Taiwanese goods served not only

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149 Ibid.
Shantou’s local needs but also those of other Chinese cities and of various regions in Southeast Asia. In Shantou, three Japanese companies with a certain degree of government sponsorship were the Mitsui Company, Taiwan Bank, and the Osaka Shipping Company. Japanese companies that profited without as much governmental assistance included Kōkandō, the Kōzaka Company, and the Nikka Company. Moreover, Taiwanese merchants played a crucial role in Shantou’s business circles. The sekimin merchants established tea shop, textile company, mining company, pharmacies and groceries. Most Japanese and Taiwanese companies concentrated in Shantou City’s Qilu area (礫礦), a coastal and prosperous commercial area. Specific sites for these businesses were Wai-ma Road, Zhen-bang Street, Yu-shan Street, and several other noteworthy thoroughfares. Here, Western, Japanese, Taiwanese, and Chinese merchants would gather and interact. In this chapter, I have argued that a cross-boundary commercial network emerged among the Japanese homeland, colonial Taiwan, and Shantou in southern China and that the network was a consequence chiefly of interactions between Japanese officials and Taiwanese merchants whose commercial activities were of great significance.
Chapter 3: The Case of the Dadong Ice-making Company and Relations among Japan, China, and Taiwan

3.1 Prelude

In this chapter, I explore the cooperation and competition, the conflict and compromise among Shantou’s Taiwanese sekimin merchants, local Chinese merchants, and the Japanese imperial consulate in Shantou, a major city connected to other cities in the Chaoshan area by both railways and waterways. Specifically, I explore the Sino-Japanese co-investment Dadong Ice-making Company in Shantou (汕頭大東製冰公司).

This chapter enters into a dialogue with research conducted by Timothy Brook and Fu Poshek, who tried to revise the conventional nationalist discourse emphasizing the resistance and hardships of the Chinese people during the Sino-Japanese War. Brook concentrates on the initial period of the occupation (mainly 1937–8), and on five different locations, all within the Yangtze delta, and investigates wartime collaboration between Chinese local elites and Japanese army agents. In sum, Brook suggests that the line between resistance

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151 The Chaoshan area (潮汕地區) corresponds to eastern Guangdong Province in China and includes Chaozhou (潮州), Shantou (汕頭), and Jieyang (揭陽). The region is the origin of Teochew (潮汕話) and many local people from this region immigrated to southeastern Asia, including Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore.
and collaboration is not, in fact, an easy one to draw.\textsuperscript{152} Poshek Fu’s research explores how Chinese intellectuals in Shanghai reacted to the Japanese occupation during the period between 1937 and 1945, and records their choices of retreating from, resisting, or cooperating with Japan, all while facing the dilemma between remaining loyal to China and confronting hard, unpleasant realities.\textsuperscript{153} Both Brook’s and Fu’s studies indicate that the interactions between Japanese and Chinese—and on some important occasions, Taiwanese—during the wartime period were much more complicated than traditional perceptions have suggested.

Moreover, Karen Laura Thornber examines the literary output of writers in Japan’s colonies, semi-colonies in China, and Manchukuo, illustrating how these writers translated, adapted, and reinterpreted Japanese literature. Her study indicates that the boundaries, cooperation, and resistance characterizing relationships between colonizers and colonized under the Japanese empire were blurred.\textsuperscript{154} In this chapter, I will use the case of the Dadong Ice-making Company to explain the interactions among Japanese, Taiwanese, and local Chinese in Shantou between late the late 1920s and the mid-1930s, to illustrate the complexities in a Chinese treaty port,

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where ethnicity, nationality, identity, and commercial interests were prominent factors.

3.2 *Nanshin* 南進  *policy and nisshi shinzen* 日支親善

The Dadong Ice-making Company was one of the most important Taiwanese-invested industries in Shantou. The main founder, Shin Huang 黃欣, was a famous entrepreneur and politician from Tainan. In response to the Taiwan General Government’s *nanshin* policy (southward expansion), around 1926, Huang collected money both from his countrymen in Tainan and from Taiwanese sekimin in Shantou to establish the company. In 1928, the company’s founding conference was formally held in Tainan. Dadong was not only a reaction to Japan’s *nanshin* policy, but also a product of Japan’s policy of *nisshi shinzen* (Japan–China friendship), promoting Japanese and Chinese co-investment in companies and other institutions, like schools and hospitals. In addition to Japanese (in this case, Taiwanese) shareholders, 10–20% of the Dadong Ice-making Company’s funds stemmed from Chinese investors. In 1930, the company started to operate in Shantou.155

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155 *Taiwan nichi nichi shinpō* 臺灣日日新報, no. 11882, evening news 4 (May 6, 1933).
Shin Huang, the main founder of the Dadong Ice-making Company, was a prominent figure in Taiwanese history during the Japanese colonial period. He graduated from the Japanese Language School, an elite school affiliated with the Taiwan General Government. He worked at Tainan Hospital after graduation, and then, like many Taiwanese elites, Huang went to Japan in pursuit of higher education. In 1914, he came back to Taiwan with a bachelor’s degree of law from Meiji University. Later, he played an active role in Taiwan’s business circles. He occupied numerous high-ranking positions, including executive director of the Taiwan Seishi 臺灣製紙 (Taiwan paper-making company) in 1917, inspector of the Tainan Jidōsha 臺南自動車 (Tainan Automobile Company) in 1919, director of Kagi Bank 嘉義銀行 in 1919, inspector of the Taiwan Seien 臺灣製塩 (Taiwan salt-making company) in 1919, and director of the Taiwan Keitetsu 臺灣軻鐵 (Taiwan Light Rail Transit Company) in 1927.

Moreover, Huang earned permission from the Monopoly Bureau of the Taiwan General Government to sell tobacco and opium in Taiwan. Huang played an active role not only in business circles but in the political arena, as well. He participated in the Tainan Prefecture Conference (臺南州協議會) in 1920, and was a member of the Council of the Taiwan General Government.

156 Shin Huang (1885–1947) has other names, like Mao-sheng Huang 黃茂笙 and the Japanese name Nanmei Kunie 國江南鳴.
Government (總督府評議會) in 1921; and in the same year, he was granted shinshō 紳章, an honorary title bestowed by the Taiwan General Government on Taiwanese local elites. In short, Shin Huang was one of the most powerful men in southern Taiwan during the Japanese colonial period.\(^{157}\)

In contrast to Shin Huang’s outgoing personality, his younger brother Xi-quan Huang 黃谿荃 (1891–1960) was an introvert and moderate in his goals. Xi-quan had no interest in serving public office and preferred spending most of his time in composing poems. Actually the Huang brothers were key figures in Nansha 南社, a major circle of poets in Tainan.\(^{158}\) In spite of these significant personalities differences between the two Huang brothers, they were very close to each other and when Shin Huang decided to establish the Dagong Ice-making Company, Xi-quan supported his brother completely.


As mentioned, the Dadong Ice-making Company was a product of Japan’s *nanshin* policy.

In the early Taishō period (1912–1926), the Taiwan General Government encouraged Taiwanese to explore *nanshi* (southern China) and *nanyō* (southeastern Asia) to strengthen the Japanese influence in these areas. As an influential figure in Tainan, in December 1924, Shin Huang received an appointment from the Taiwan General Government to undertake his own explorations in *nashi* and *nanyō*. He travelled in Indochina, Dutch Indonesia, British Hong Kong, British Singapore, Siam (modern-day Thailand), Guangdong Province, and Yunnan Province. He probably visited Shantou in this trip. *Taiwan nichi nichī shinpō*, a major official newspaper in

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159 Ibid., pp. 91–92.
colonial Taiwan, indicated that Shin Huang had been active in Shantou since 1925. By 1928, the Huang brothers, having already collected funds from multiple shareholders, decided to establish an ice-making company named “Dadong.”

Among the various fields of business they could have entered, why did the Huang brothers choose the ice-making business? A news report in *Taiwan nichi nichi shinpō* offered an explanation.

“When Taiwanese are competitive to promote developing overseas, as the pioneer of Taiwanese, (they) plan to do business in southern China. Shantou is located in east Guangdong province. The population is large. The residents are rich. Moreover, the weather is warm. Thus, the ice-making business could be managed.”

In the late 1920s, the population of Shantou numbered approximately 120,000. The nearby cities included Chaozhou, with a population of approximately 150,000; Chaoyang 潮陽, with a population of approximately 120,000; Jieyang 揭陽, with a population of 100,000; Anbu 蕪浦, with a population of approximately 50,000; and Chenghai 澄海/ Dahao 達豪, with a population

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160 *Taiwan nichi nichi shinpō* 臺灣日日新報, no. 14107, daily news 7 (June 25, 1939).
161 *Taiwan nichi nichi shinpō* 臺灣日日新報, no. 10227, evening news 4 (October 10, 1928).
162 *Taiwan nichi nichi shinpō* 臺灣日日新報, no. 11882, evening news 4 (May 6, 1933).
of approximately 30,000. All these cities were connected to Shantou by both railways and
waterways, helping extend the great political and economic circles that took Shantou as their
center to some 500,000 people. The significant size of this population and the warm weather
in the region explain the demand for ice, especially during the summer season. In addition,
before the Dadong Ice-making Company entered the picture, Shantou had only one ice-making
company, Wutunji 五屯機, operated by a Taiwanese named Tian Wang 王田. These factors
are likely reasons for Shin Huang’s decision to establish an ice-making a promising business in
Shantou.

The list of Dadong Ice-making Company’s shareholders covered most of the powerful
Taiwanese sojourners in Shantou, and many of them were originally from Tainan, Shin Huang’s
hometown. In addition to Shin Huang, four important Taiwanese who took the position of
executive directors merit our attention here:

Executive director 1: Mu-yi Huang 黃木邑 (1901–?) was a teacher at a junior high school
in Tainan. In 1927, Mu-yi resigned from his teaching job and moved to Shantou after receiving
an invitation from Shin Huang to be the manager of the Dadong Ice-making Company. In the

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163 Gorō Uchida 内田五郎, Shin Swatō 新汕頭 (New Shantou). Taihoku: Nanyō kyōkai Taiwan shibu 南洋協會
台湾支部, 1927, p. 3.
164 Tainan shinpō 臺南新報, no. 10171, evening news 4 (May 15, 1930).
early 1930s, conflicts between the Japanese consulate in Shantou and the Dadong Ice-making Company prompted the consul Befu to order Mu-yi back to Taiwan (the conflict is explained in the next section). However, Mu-yi later returned to Shantou, and in addition to investing his personal wealth in the Dadong Ice-making Company, he served as the general manager of the Baixing Company (百興洋行), a large company that dealt with Sino-Japan trade, was headquartered in Shanghai, and had branch offices in Xiamen (Amoy), Shantou, Guangzhou, Hong Kong, and Nanjing.165

Executive director 2: Chi-hui Chen 陳祺輝 was the nephew of Guan-ying Chen 陳冠英, a prestigious merchant in Tainan.166 On the basis of his family’s abundant financial support, Chi-hui went to Shantou in the 1910s and eventually started the Wanyuan Company (萬源洋行), a large company established in 1916 with funds exceeding ten thousand yuan. The Wanyuan Company participated in the trade of seafood, pineapples, matches, flour, alcohol, and syrup among Japan, colonial Taiwan, and Shantou. In 1919, the Wanyuan Company entered into

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165 Taiwan shinminpōsha 臺灣新民報社, *Taiwan jinshi kan 臺灣人士鑑 (Directory of the Taiwanese people)*. Taihoku: Taiwan shinminpōsha, 1934, p. 159.
166 Guan-ying Chen 陳冠英 (1880–1926) was a comprador of sugar and rice. He established the Chen Wanyuan 公司 in 1906 in Tainan, dealing in sugar and rice. Later, he established the Douliu Sugar Company (斗六製糖) and was a supervisor of the Tainan Sugar Company (臺南製糖). Chen also participated in the Tainan Prefecture Conference (臺南州議會) from 1921 to 1925.
167 *Tainan shinpō 臺南新報*, no. 10163 (May 7, 1930), evening news 4; no. 10170 (May 14, 1930), evening news 4; *Taiwan taikan sha 臺灣大觀社*, *Saikin no nanbu Taiwan 最近の南部台灣 (Contemporary southern Taiwan)*. Tainan: Taiwan taikan sha, 1923, p. 12.
a contract with the Suzuki Ekiji Company (鈴木鶴次商店) in Osaka, exporting tungsten from Shantou to Japan. Chi-hen was active in Shantou’s Taiwanese circles and was the secretary of the short-lived Taiwanese Association of Shantou, an organization that operated between 1918 and 1919.\footnote{Nanyō kyōkai Taiwan shibu 南洋協会臺灣支部, Nanshina no shōgyō 南支那の商業 (The commerce of southern China). Taihoku: Nanyō kyōkai Taiwan shibu, 1938, p. 66; Kamesaburō Anjū 安重亀三郎, Swatou shōfu 汕頭商務 (Shantou treaty port). Taihoku: Nanyō kyōkai Taiwan shibu, 1922, p. 106; Taiwan ginkō chosa ka 臺灣銀行調查課, Nanshi nanyō ni okeru hōjin no jōkyō 南支南洋における邦人の状況 (The Japanese situation in southern China and the South Seas). Taihoku: Taiwan ginkō chosa ka, 1919, p. 240; Xue-ying Xie 謝雪影, Shantou zhinan 汕頭指南 (Shantou guidebook). Shantou: Shantou shi shishi tongzun she 汕頭時事通訊社, 1933, p. 168; Gaimushō tsūshōkyoku 外務省通商局, Tsūshō kōhō 通商公報 (Bulletin of commerce), no. 451 (September 4, 1917); no. 476 (December 10, 1917); no. 484 (January 17, 1918); no. 494 (February 21, 1918); no. 877 (October 6, 1921).}

Executive director 3: Chang-sheng Chen 陳長生 graduated from the Japanese Language School (國語學校) of the Taiwan General Government and then taught in Tainan. In 1921, Chang-sheng and his wife Yin-zhi Zheng Chen 陳鄭引治 were assigned by the Taiwan General Government to teach at Tōē School in Shantou, a Japanese-funded educational institution accommodating both the children of Taiwanese residents and the children of local Chinese. The Chens worked at Shantou Tōē School from 1921 to 1927. They then resigned from their teaching jobs and started to pursue business opportunities,\footnote{Qi-lu Chen 陳奇祿, Chenghuai guandao: Chen qi-lu xiannsheng fangtanganlu 澄懷觀道: 陳奇祿先生訪談錄 (An oral history of Chi-lu Chen), interviewed by Yi-zen Chen 陳怡真. Xindian: Guo shi guan, 2004, pp. 4–6.} including investments in the Dadong Ice-making Company. It is worth mentioning that Chang-sheng was the father of famous
Taiwanese anthropologist Chi-lu Chen 陳奇祿, an academician at Academia Sinica.

Executive director 4: Yong-lu Jian 简永禄 was different from the abovementioned executive directors who were originally from Tainan, as Jian was originally from Taizhong Prefecture. After graduating from the Medical School of the Taiwan General Government, he worked at Taipei Hospital. In the 1920s, he operated Yamato Hospital (大和医院) in Shantou and was a respectable doctor in Taiwanese circles. 171

In addition to these four executive directors, the list of shareholders of the Dadong Ice-making Company included some Taiwanese doctors in Shantou. For example, Ji-yu Jian 简積玉, originally from Taizhong Prefecture, was a graduate of the Taipei Medical Professional School. Later, he went to Shantou and worked at Yamato Hospital (大和医院). 172 He was

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170 Medical School of General Government of Taiwan was established in 1898, which was the first formal professional medical school in Taiwan. The school changed the name to Medical Professional School of General Government of Taiwan in 1919, and again, in 1922, it changed to Taipei Medical Professional School of General Government of Taiwan. In 1936, the school was incorporated into the Medicine Division of Taipei Imperial University.

171 Taiwan nich nich shinpō 臺灣日日新報, no. 4049, daily news 7 (August 31, 1911); Taiwan Sōtokufu shokuinroku 岡總督府職員録 (The staff listing of the Taiwan General Government), p. 124 (1911); Kamesaburō Anjū 安重亀三郎, Swatou shōfu 汕頭商埠 (Shantou treaty port). Taihoku: Nanyō kyōkai Taiwan shibu, 1922, p. 105; Gaimushō tsūshōkyoku 外務省通商局, Nī kan kaigai shōhō 日刊 海外商報 (Overseas commercial reports), no. 550 (July 21, 1926); no. 1099 (February 22, 1928); Taiwan sōtokufu kanbō chsaka 岡總督府官房調査課, Teikoku ryōjikannai jijō 日本帝國領事館内事情 (The circumstances inside the Shantou imperial consulate). Taihoku: Taiwan sōtokufu kanbō chsaka, 1922, p. 27; Xue-ying Xie 謝雪影, Shantou zhinan 汕頭指南 (Shantou guidebook). Shantou: Shantou shishi tongzun she, 1933, p. 168, 302, 367; Gorō Uchida 内田 五郎, Shin Swatou 新汕頭 (New Shantou). Taihoku: Nanyō kyōkai Taiwan shibu, 1927, p. 12.

172 Xue-ying Xie 謝雪影, Shantou zhinan 汕頭指南 (Shantou guidebook). Shantou: Shantou shishi tongzun she, 1933, p. 56; Gorō Uchida 内田 五郎, Shin Swatou 新汕頭 (New Shantou). Taihoku: Nanyō kyōkai Taiwan shibu, 1927, p. 35; Taiwan sōtokufu keimukyoku ēseika 岡總督府警務局衛生課, Nanshi nanyō ni okeru iryō shisetsu 南支南洋における醫療設施 (The medical facilities in southern China and the South Seas), Vol. 1. Taihoku:
probably from the same family as Yong-lu Jian. Ji-yu Jian stayed in Shantou until the end of
World War Two, at which time the ROC Government decided not to prosecute him for
complicity with the Japanese enemy.173 Zhen-qian Wang 王振謙, a Taiwanese doctor in
Shantou, was another shareholder of the Dadong Ice-making Company. Originally from
Kaohsiung, Wang graduated from the Medical School of the Taiwan General Government and
later operated a private Zhen-qian Clinic in Shantou.174

Because Dadong was a product of nisshin shinzen 日支親善 (Japan–China friendship),
Shin Huang invited some Chinese to invest in the company, not just Taiwanese. Among these
Chinese investors, the chief councilor of Shantou City Zi-bin Zheng 鄭子彬(1887–1944) was
the most important one. He was born in Chaoyang City in Guangdong Province, and in 1905, the
18–year–old Zheng went to Siam as a coolie, as many of his hometown were doing. Several
years later, he operated two pawnshops and a liquor store in Bangkok, and became a rich
Chinese merchant.175 Because of Zheng’s wealth and power, Shin Huang invited him to invest

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173 Taiwan sōtokufu keimukyoku ēseika, pp. 128–129 (publishing date unknown).
174 Taiwan sōtokufu keimukyoku ēseika, pp. 128–129 (publishing date unknown); Taiwan Sōtokufu shokuinroku 臺灣總督府職員錄 (The staff listing of the Taiwan General Government), p. 130 (1933); p. 134 (1934).
175 Ying-qiu Zhang 張映秋, “Aiguo qiaoling Zheng zi-bin jiqi zhesi Zheng wu-lou xiansheng” 愛國僑領鄭子彬及
in the Dadong Ice-making Company. In total, the Chinese stockholders’ investments reached 10–20% of the Dadong Ice-making Company’s total capital.\(^{176}\)

To harmonize with Japan’s policy of southward expansion and Japan–China friendship, Shin Huang raised funds from both Taiwanese residents of Shantou and local Chinese merchants to establish the Dadong Ice-making Company. The total capital outlay for this venture was 90,000 yuan. The factory was located in Qilu, an area home to many foreign companies and institutions. The expected amount of production daily was twenty tons ice.\(^{177}\)
3.3 The Order of Deportation Incident (命令退去事件)

Because the Dadong Ice-making Company was a product of Japan’s policy of southward expansion and of Japan–China friendship, the Japanese consulate should have protected and promoted the business venture in Shantou. However, actual events were starkly inconsistent with the aforementioned agenda. In the initial stage of the Dadong Ice-making Company’s operation, a conflict arose between the Japanese consul in Shantou whose name was Kumakichi Befu 別府熊吉 and the shareholders of the Dadong Ice-making Company; indeed, the conflict was so severe that the company almost failed to open its doors for business.

Fig. 3-2 The Japanese Consulate in Shantou in the 1920s. (Source: Uchida Gorō, Shin Swatō, Taihoku: Taiwan sōtoku-hu kōnai nanyō kyōkai Taiwan shibu, 1927. National Taiwan Library.)
Fig. 3-3 The Building That Served as Shantou’s Japanese Consulate from 1904 to 1945.

[Illustration] The building that served as the Japanese consulate from 1904 to 1945 in Shantou has been preserved and currently is part of the Shantou Entry-Exit Inspection and Quarantine Bureau (汕頭出入境檢驗檢疫局) (Source: Photo by Lin-Yi Tseng, 2010.)

In 1929, after Shin Huang had collected enough funding to establish the ice-making company, he went to the Japanese consulate in Shantou, requesting a business permit. Consul Befu told Shin Huang that the consulate had issued a business permit several years earlier to Riichirō Taenaka 妙中利一郎, a Japanese resident in Hong Kong whose intention had also been to open an ice-making company in Shantou. Moreover, a Taiwanese man by the name of Tian Wang 王田 had already been operating the Wutunji 五屯機 Ice-making Company in Shantou. Consul Befu told Shin Huang that “Japanese” should not compete with each other. Thus, Befu
suggested that Shin Huang purchase the previously issued business permit from Taenaka at the price of 6,000 yuan. After negotiations, a deal was struck for the price of 600 yuan.\textsuperscript{178}

In 1930, the construction of the Dadong Company’s ice-making facilities reached completion, and operations were ready to begin. Suddenly, consul Befu requested that Shin Huang name Taenaka the manager of the Dadong Ice-making Company. Shin Huang refused this proposal furiously. From the perspective of Shin Huang and other shareholders in the Dadong Ice-making Company, the completed payout of 600 yuan to Taenaka in exchange for his business permit was a done deal. Moreover, Taenaka has proven to be a rather inept manager, so Dadong has no reason to appoint Taenaka to any kind of managerial position in the Dadong Ice-making Company. It seems that the head of the Taiwan Bank’s branch office in Shantou attempted to mediate the dispute, specifically suggesting that the Dadong Ice-making Company hire Taenaka for three years at a salary of 50 yuan per month. Not surprisingly, Shin Huang rejected the suggestion. Consul Befu was indignant at the Dadong Ice-making Company’s actions. When the company started operations, Befu made straight for the factory and demanded that it shut down immediately. Facing Befu’s arbitrary action, the shareholders of the Dadong

\textsuperscript{178} Tainan shinpō 臺南新聞, no. 10171, evening news 4 (May 15, 1930).
Ice-making Company decided to go to the Shantou City Government, registering Dadong as a Chinese company. As a company registered with the ROC Government, Befu had no authority to stop operations, and the ice-making business maintained its work schedule.179

Surprisingly, on May 3, 1930, Shin Huang who was in Tainan at the time received a telegram from Shantou. The telegram reported that four Taiwanese executive directors of the Dadong Ice-making Company, Qi-huei Chen 陳棋輝, Yong-lu Jian 簡永祿, Chang-sheng Chen 陳長生, and Mu-yi Huang 黃木邑 had earlier been handed an “order of deportation” (退去命令) from the Japanese consulate in Shantou. Consul Befu argued that these four individuals were interfering with the peace of the Japanese community in Shantou and that they, should be ordered back to Taiwan. Regarding their details, the deportations affecting these four men varied from one to the other. Doctor Yong-lu Jian, the owner of Yamato Hospital (大和醫院), and Qi-huei Chen, the owner of the Wanyuan Company (萬源洋行), were ordered to leave Shantou within two months, and were prohibited from returning to Shantou for one year. Chang-sheng Chen and Mu-yi Huang, the two previously mentioned teachers from Tainan, were ordered to leave Shantou within two weeks and were prohibited from returning to Shantou for two years.

179 *Tainan shinpô* 臺南新報, no. 10163, evening news 2 (May 7, 1930).
These deportations were obviously acts of revenge on the part of Consul Befu. No evidence has surfaced suggesting that these four individuals had been “disturbing the local peace.” Doctor Yong-lu Jian had resided in Shantou over many years, and was a respected leader in the area’s Taiwanese community. Qi-huei Chen, the owner of the Wanyuan Company, was a successful businessman who had facilitated trade among Shantou, Taiwan, and the Japanese homeland. Furthermore, Mu-Yi Huang and Chang-sheng Chen had been pivotal in getting the Dadong Ice-making Company’s operations underway. Befu had made an unjust series of accusations, acting on a personal grudge while exerting power in an official capacity.\(^{180}\)

On May 14, 1930, both Chang-sheng Chen and Mu-yi Huang arrived at Taiwan’s Keelung Port within two weeks of having been expelled from Shantou. The incident attracted public attention in Taiwan, and on the following day (May 15), \textit{Tainan shinpō} published an interview with Chen and Huang. In the first part of the interview, they made the following statement:

> A few days ago, the Japanese Consulate suddenly demanded that we show up there for a meeting. [Consul Befu] harshly scolded us and denounced our decision to start operations without authorization, since the negotiations with Taenaka had not yet

\(^{180}\) \textit{Tainan shinpō} 華南新報, no. 10171, evening news 4 (May 15, 1930).
been settled. [Consul Befu] wanted us to choose between accepting deportation back to Taiwan and closing the factory down. We convened an emergency meeting of the Chinese shareholders, and sent out an emergency telegram to shareholders in Taiwan. The Chinese shareholders Zi-bin Zheng and Qi-yun Xie were very angry with the attitude of the Japanese consul. Having no choice, however, we received permission [by telegram] from the shareholders in Taiwan to change the register owner from a Taiwanese individual to a Chinese individual. 181

This interview shows that the registered owner of the Dadong Ice-making Company had not been Chinese. After all, the Chinese shareholders had accounted for only 10-20% of the total investment, so it would generally be unreasonable to register a Chinese individual as the owner of the company. However, oppressive actions targeting the Taiwanese shareholders had left them no choice but to register—under the name of a Chinese individual—the Dadong Ice-making Company with the Shantou City Government.

181 Ibid.
In the latter part of the interview, Chen and Huang offered further insights into the affair:

The Japanese consul demanded that the two of us as well as Yong-lu Jian, Qi-hui Chen, and Fan-shu Chen—five in total—come to the consulate. [Befu] handed Jian and the two Chens their deportation orders. They objected, arguing that they three were members of the local gentry and that it was extremely unreasonable to demand their deportation on received only a *yushi taikyo* (suspendable order). However, we two received formal, legally binding orders of deportation. We objected, but had no resources: we had to return to Taiwan by Kōdōmaru [a Japanese steamship].

The interview confirms that, on this occasion, but five people visited the Japanese consulate, including Fan-shu Chen who—like Qi-hui Chen—was a representative of Wanyuan Company. Befu had issued orders of deportation to five people and they all had objected. In response to the objections, Befu partly conceded by issuing two different kinds of orders. On the one hand, Doctor Jian and the two Chens of the Wanyuan Company received comparatively light

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182 Ibid.

orders of deportation that could be suspended at a future date. On the other hand, Chang-sheng Chen and Mu-yi Huang received formal orders of deportation. The two kinds of orders reflected the different degree of involvement of these five people in Shantou. Jian and the two Chens of the Wanyuan Company were much more involved in Shantou than were Chang-sheng and Mu-yi. Mu-yi Huang had come to Shantou only in 1927, after Shin Huang had invited him to work at the Dadong Ice-making Company.

Facing Befu’s oppressive vindictiveness, Shin Huang decided to fight back. We should not forget that Shin Huang was a powerful entrepreneur and politician in Taiwan. He exercised political relationships and personal networks asking for assistance. First, he asked Chief of Police Ishii 石井 and Director-general Gotō Fumio 後藤文夫 (1884-1980), both in the Taiwan General Government, to negotiate with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan for a cancellation of the orders of deportation. Second, he visited Chief Officer Ishii of the Taiwan General Government’s Hygiene Section and Chief Officer Yamauchi 山内 of the Taiwan General Government’s Safety Section for their support of a petition. Third, he employed a lawyer to submit an administrative petition to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Fourth, because Chang-sheng Chen and Mu-yi Huang were Tainan residents, Shin Huang submitted a
petition to the Mayor Nagayama 永山 of Tainan Prefecture, asking for a cancellation of the orders of deportation. Shin Huang decided that if the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan would not solve this problem to his satisfaction, he would politicize the issue. He suggested that it was even worth exhausting the Dadong Ice-making Company’s funds to pursue justice in this matter.\textsuperscript{184}

Three months passed and the problem had yet to be settled. On August 30, 1930, a news report in \textit{Taiwan shinminpō} stated that the Taiwan General Government was sorry for Consul Befu’s brusk actions, and that it had tried to negotiate with Befu in pursuit of a cancellation of the deportation orders. However, Consul Befu had ignored the Taiwan General Government’s request and the negotiations had gone nowhere.\textsuperscript{185}

The news report identified a political ambivalence between the Taiwan General Government and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Consul Befu answered to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, and only the higher authority of \textit{gaimushō} (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan) could result in a cancellation of his orders. If \textit{gaimushō} kept silent on the matter, the Taiwan General Government would be powerless even to modify the orders.

\textsuperscript{184} \textit{Taiwan shinminpō} 臺灣新民報, no. 312 (May 10, 1930).
\textsuperscript{185} \textit{Taiwan shinminpō} 臺灣新民報, no. 328 (August 30, 1930).
The orders of deportation greatly annoyed Chang-sheng Chen. He had resided in Shantou with his wife since 1921, after the Taiwan General Government had assigned the couples to teaching positions at Tōē School. Later, he had resigned from his teaching job to become a businessman. In addition to his investments in the Dadong Ice-making Company, Chang-sheng Chen’s business ventures included the construction of the Dapu Bridge (大埔大橋) in Chenghai County (澄海縣), an area near Shantou. The price of the construction of Dapu Bridge reached 120,000 yuan. By May 1930, 90% of the bridge’s construction was complete. However, because of Befu’s order of deportation, Chen was forced to leave Shantou, bringing the construction to a standstill. On July 6, a flood occurred in Chenghai County, and the existing bridge construction suffered serious damage. The Bureau of Construction of Guangdong Province assigned commissioners to investigate the damage to the bridge and asked Chen to come back and supervise the continuation of the construction. It was assumed that if Chen could not come back to Chenghai as soon as possible, the oversight of the construction would probably transfer to other parties. Chen was deeply concerned about this turn of events because he had already invested a great amount of money in the construction and could not easily sustain a complete loss.
In response to this situation, Chang-sheng Chen went to the Tainan Prefecture Government, asking for a temporary travel permit to Shantou. The Tainan Prefecture Government sympathized with Chen’s position and was willing to issue a temporary travel permit. However, the Taiwan General Government took a different stance, contending that issuance of the travel permit depended on Consul Befu’s approval. Not surprisingly, Befu did not reply to the Taiwan General Government’s request for his approval, and thus, the temporary travel permit was not issued. Adding to his woes were letters that Chang-sheng Chen received from his family in Shantou, informing him that some relatives were ill. The bad news convinced Chen that he had to smuggle himself back into Shantou. In mid-September of 1930, Chen secretly took a steamship to Moji in Kyushu, Japan and then proceeded to Shanghai, finally arriving in Shantou. Afraid of being deported by Consul Befu, Chen stayed in Chaozhou, an inland city near Shantou. However, not long thereafter, Befu received information of Chen’s arrival and set about to deport him once again. Chen could no longer tolerate these oppressive tactics from the Japanese consulate anymore, and he made a firm decision: he would abandon his Japanese nationality. In January 1931, Chen submitted an application to the Minister of Domestic Affairs of the ROC government to register as a Chinese citizen. In April, Chen formally acquired
national citizenship with the ROC and, meanwhile, renounced his Japanese nationality. From then on, Chang-sheng Chen operated the Dadong Ice-making Company as a “Chinese” shareholder, free from the constraints of the Japanese consulate.186

Chang-sheng Chen’s change of nationality, from Japanese to Chinese attracted public attention in Taiwan. On June 27, 1931, a news report in Taiwan shiminpō declared, “The Shantou Dadong Ice-making Company’s executive director Chen renounced his Japanese nationality to carry on in the position. The renunciation stemmed from the Japanese consulate’s oppressive actions toward Chen, who was left with no other choice. Where happened to the southern development to be undertaken by the Taiwan authority?” The last part of the news report stated the problem in the form of a question:

How did the Taiwan authority, which constantly advocates development in southern China and the South Seas, perceive this problem? The authority has spent immense sums of money every year on the pretense of subsidizing development in southern China and the South Seas. However, the fact of the matter is that people’s suspicions are targeting just how sincere the authority really is. Therefore, from now on, we hope that the Taiwan authority acts with the utmost sincerity and generosity, advising the Japanese consulates in China never again to make a similar mistake.187

186 Taiwan shiminpō 臺灣新民報, no. 328 (August 30, 1930); no. 370 (June 27, 1931).
187 Taiwan shiminpō 臺灣新民報, no. 370 (June 27, 1931).
It would seem that there was considerable public criticism of Taiwan General Government’s weak position in dealing with the problem between Consul Befu and the Dadong Ice-making Company. The passive attitudes of the Taiwan General Government prompted Chang-sheng Chen to denounce his Japanese nationality and become a “Chinese” citizen. A popular feeling, as expressed in the above quote, was that the Taiwan authority truly wanted to develop southern China, no similar case should ever arise again.
[Illustration] The news report criticized the order of deportation issued by Shantou’s Japanese consulate forcing Taiwanese in Shantou return to Taiwan. (Source: Tainan shinpō, evening wews, May 7, 1930 and daily news, May 8, 1930.)
Fig. 3-5 News Report on Taiwan Shinminpō.

[Illustration] A news report stating that Cheng-sheng Chen’s renunciation of his Japanese nationality stemmed from the Shantou Japanese consulate’s oppressive actions toward Chen. (Source: Taiwan shinminpō, June 27, 1931.)
3.4 The Conflict between Taiwanese and Chinese Shareholders

A product of Japan–China friendship, the Dadong Ice-making Company benefited from the co-investment of both Taiwanese and Chinese shareholders, with the former accounting for 80–90% of the funds and the latter accounting for 10–20% of the funds. In the initial stage of operations, interference by the Japanese Consul Befu prompted the registered owner of the company to change his national status from Japanese to Chinese. Thereafter, the Dadong Company did good business, divvying up profits among the Chinese and Taiwanese shareholders.

However, with the outbreak of the Shanghai Incident on January 28, 1932, anti-Japanese sentiment gripped all of China, and Shantou was no exception. Under this circumstance, the position of Taiwanese who were Japanese subjects became nearly untenable, and more specifically, conflicts between the Dadong Ice-making Company’s Taiwanese and Chinese shareholders became more frequent and more intense. The Chinese shareholder Zi-bin Zheng decided to drive out Taiwanese shareholders and to monopolize the company by taking advantage of the severe anti-Japanese atmosphere in Shantou. Early on in this struggle for control, Taiwanese shareholders endured the maneuverings of Zheng out of the fear that their status as Japanese subjects might put them at risk of even worse outcomes. However, Zheng’s
actions became so severe that the Taiwanese found it impossible to continue enduring the ruthless plotting. In early April of 1933, under Taiwanese shareholders’ request, Shin Huang came to Shantou to supervise the business of the Dadong Ice-making Company and especially to investigat Zi-bin Zheng’s action. He exposed the conspiracy of Zi-bin Zheng and other Chinese individuals who, associated with the company, sought to monopolize their control over it. It was a difficult problem to deal with because Zi-bin was the registered owner of Dadong and the anti-Japanese atmosphere was very intense in Shantou then. Aware of these diverse factors, Shin Huang only fired the Chinese staff who had colluded with Zi-bin. As for Zi-bin, Shin Huang decided to increase his share of the profits, thus not only satisfying his personal quest for wealth but also removing key reasons for his initial plotting, or so it would seem.\footnote{\textit{Taiwan nichi nichi shinpō}, no. 11882, evening news 4 (May 6, 1933.)}

In truth, Shin Huang’s pacification policy did not work as intended. Zi-bin Zheng again colluded with the fired Chinese staff to gain control over the Dadong Ice-making Company. Shin Huang grew aware of this second round of plotting and requested that Chief Chen, who headed the Investigation–&–Detention Team at the Shantou City Government’s Bureau of Public Safety, negotiate with Zheng; however, this effort came to nothing. Meanwhile, Zi-bin published an
announcement in Shanbao 汕報 and Qiaoshengbao 僑聲報, two major local newspapers in Shantou, proclaiming himself the general manager of the company and declaring that the property of the Dadong Ice-making Company should belong to him (and by extension, to the Chinese) rather than to the Taiwanese, who were willing subjects of Japanese imperialism. He attempted to channel public anti-Japanese emotion by manipulating local Chinese newspapers.189

Facing Zheng’s second wave of maneuvering, Taiwanese shareholders decided to fight back to protect the company. Right around the corner was the summer season, which was the Dadong Ice-making Company’s most profitable period; moreover, the company’s property was valued at approximately 160,000 yuan, of which only 4,000 yuan came from Chinese investors. Taiwanese shareholders, hoping to retain their majority control over these current and future assets, took two steps. First, they published an announcement in local newspapers, clarifying that most of the Dadong Ice-making Company’s shares belonged to Taiwanese shareholders. Second, they registered the Dadong Ice-making Company with the Japanese Consulate in Shantou. Thus, as a Japanese company, the Dadong Ice-making Company could receive protection from Japan. In addition to these two actions, Shin Huang returned to Tainan to hold emergency meetings (on

189 Ibid.
May 2 and 6), discussing with Taiwan–based shareholders how they could best settle this matter.\textsuperscript{190}

During Shin Huang’s return to Taiwan, Taiwanese shareholders in Shantou negotiated with Zı-bin Zheng and his “Chinese” partner Chang-sheng Chen, the former Taiwanese executive director of the Dadong Ice-making Company who had renounced his Japanese nationality in 1931 in order to avoid Consul Befu’s obstructions. Zheng and Chen proposed multiple conditions, including the dismissal of the board of directors and the appointment of Zı-bin Zheng as general manager and Chang-sheng Chen as general supervisor. They further proposed that they should sell their own shares to Taiwanese shareholders at the price of 190 yuan per share (original price: 100 yuan), and meanwhile, Zheng and Chen should be able to buy shares from other shareholders at price of 80 yuan (original price: 100 yuan). All these conditions were unreasonable to and rejected by the Taiwanese shareholders.\textsuperscript{191}

Zi-ben Zheng and Chang-sheng Chen took further action. They forced the Shantou Ice-making Company (汕頭製冰廠) to terminate its “co-sell contract” (共同販賣契約) with the Dadong Ice-making Company. Being the only two ice-making companies in Shantou, they had

\textsuperscript{190} Taiwan nichi nichi shinpō, no. 11882, evening news 4 (May 6, 1933).
\textsuperscript{191} Taiwan nichi nichi shinpō, no. 11885, daily news 12 (May 9, 1933).
perceived the competition between them as disadvantageous to each company. Thus, under negotiations, the two companies had entered into a co-sell contract to share the profits equally. When the dispute between the Taiwanese and Chinese shareholders arose, Zi-bin Zheng, being the registered owner of the Dadong Ice-making Company, withdrew 2,000 yuan from the Co-sell Office without other shareholders’ consent. He further requested that the Co-sell Office regard him as the only legal representative of the Dadong Ice-making Company. Once aware of these events, Shin Huang and other Taiwanese shareholders went to the Co-sell Office to stop the withdrawal of money undertaken by Zi-bin Zheng. The Co-sell Office was annoyed with all of these back-and-forth-maneuvers and decided not to hand out money to each side until a solid resolution to the dispute was reached.

Later, Zheng and Chang-sheng Chen forced the Co-sell Office to accept a plan: on May 1, 1933, the side able to deliver ice would be the only legal representative of the Dadong Ice-making Company and would, thus, have the right to acquire 10,000 yuan from the Co-sell Office. Zheng and Chen provided this condition because they controlled the company’s Chinese drivers and workers and was confident that they could win over Shin Huang. Under this situation, Taiwanese shareholders held an emergency meeting in Yamato Hospital. Then, with the
assistance of the President Takahayashi 高林 of the Association of Japanese Residents in Shantou, Consul Tonegi 戸根木 of the Japanese consulate in Shantou, and Chief Iwada 岩田 of the Japanese Police Force in Shantou, Taiwanese shareholders visited the Shantou City Government’s Bureau of Public Safety, asking for Chinese officials’ assistance. On May 1 (the day the competition for supremacy at the company was to have been decided) and on May 2, both Japanese consulate officials and armed Chinese police officers closed and garrisoned the Dadong Ice-making Company. On May 3, the company factory re-opened as usual.¹⁹²

Zheng and Chen, despite the setbacks, did not give up their goal of monopolizing the Dadong Ice-making Company. This time, they manipulated specific anti-Japan associations (抗日會) to disrupt the company’s operations, and even employed lawyers to harass the company’s Taiwanese shareholders. Moreover, Zheng and Chen pushed the Shantou City Government’s Bureau of Sanitation to check the sanitation at the company’s facilities. It seems that the investigators found no evidence of wrongdoing, but on May 20, 1933, local newspapers published several unfavorable articles with such titles as “The Dadong Ice-making Company’s Ice Has Bacteria— Sales Banned by the City Government,” and “The Bureau of Public Safety

¹⁹² Ibid.
Bans Sales of Dadong Ice, and Will Crack Down on Buyers.” The news reports prompted many customers to stop purchasing ice from the Dadong Ice-making Company, and the slowdown forced operations to terminate for several days. Zi-bin Zheng’s disruptive tactics convinced Taiwanese shareholders to dismiss Zheng from his position, and the registered owner of the Dadong Ice-making Company was changed to Bao-zhi Luo 駱葆芝, the head of the Chinese Association in Tainan. The Shantou City Government approved the new personnel change on June 7, 1933. At this point, Zheng was formally expelled from the Dadong Ice-making Company.

Why did Bao-zhi Luo choose to be the new registered owner of the Dadong Ice-making Company? Luo was Chinese, born in Guangdong Province in 1880. Later, he moved to Tainan and operated a company called Shunji 順記, conducting medical business between Taiwan and China. In March 1926, he established the Chinese Association in Tainan and was elected to the position of chairman. Tainan was an important city in colonial Taiwan, and by 1926, the members of the Chinese Association in Tainan reached eighty, as many member as could be

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193 *Taiwan nichi nichi shinpō* 聖日日新報, no. 11917, evening news 4 (June 10, 1933).
194 *Taiwan shinbunsha* 臺灣新聞社, *Taiwan jitsugyō meikan* 臺灣實業名鑑 (Directory of Taiwanese businesses). Taichū: Taiwan shinbunsha, 1934, p. 222.
found in the Chinese Association in Taipei.\textsuperscript{195} As the leader of Tainan’s sojourning Chinese, Luo was active in the city. Luo’s close relationships with Taiwanese made Shin Huang and other Taiwanese shareholders regard him as an adequate choice for the position of registered owner of the Dadong Ice-making Company. According to one news report on the personnel change, “Luo has been a shareholder in the Dadong Ice-making Company. He has lived in Taiwan for a long time and has earned the trust of every shareholder. The obstacles recently afflicting company operations have been overcome, and prospects are good for strong business growth in the future.”\textsuperscript{196}

The problem with Zi-bin Zheng was settled. How about the problem with Chang-sheng Chen? A news report suggested that the dispute between Chen and Dadong had finally been settled by February 1937. According to this report, Shin Huang and other Taiwanese shareholders had held a meeting in Tainan, discussing the lawsuit between Chang-sheng Chen and the Dadong Ice-making Company. Chen had long been strongly opposed to the company, accusing it of wrongdoing several times. Finally, with the assistance and conciliatory dispositions of both Bing-shen Hu 胡丙申 and Bao-zong Chen 陈保宗, Dadong bought back

\textsuperscript{195} Taiwan nichi nichī shinpō 臺灣日日新報, no. 9279, evening news 4 (March 6, 1926); no. 9289, daily news 5 (March 16, 1926).

\textsuperscript{196} Taiwan nichi nichī shinpō 臺灣日日新報, no. 11917, evening news 4 (June 10, 1933).
all the company’s shares from Chen and the longstanding dispute was settled. Like Chang-sheng Chen, both Bing-shen Hu and Bao-zong Chen were graduates of the Taiwan General Government’s Japanese Language School (国語学校). Bao-zong Chen and Chang-sheng Chen had been in the same class, and Bing-shen Hu had been in a class several years up. Probably the friendship among these three men facilitated Shin Huang’s request that Bing-shen and Bao-zong help mediate the dispute between the Dadong Ice-making Company and Chang-sheng Chen.

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197 Taiwan nichi nichi shinpō 日日新報, no. 13249, evening news 4 (February 12, 1937).
198 Taiwan shinminpōsha 臺灣新民報社, Taiwan jinji kan 臺灣人士鑑 (Directory of Taiwanese People), Taihoku: Taiwan shinminpōsha, 1934, p. 135; Taiwan Sōtokufu shokuinroku 臺灣總督府職員錄 (The staff listing of the Taiwan General Government), p. 255 (1913); pp. 309, 311 (1918).
Fig. 3-6 News Report on the Chinese Version of the *Taiwan Nichi Nichi Shinpō*.

[Illustration] This news report states that the Taiwanese shareholders of the Dadong Ice-making Company were risking significant losses stemming from Shantou’s severe anti-Japanese atmosphere. (Source: *Taiwan nichi nichi shinpō*, Chinese version, May 6, 1933.)
3.5 Brief Conclusion

Over its history, the Dadong Ice-making Company faced at least two big crises: the first big crisis was brought on by the obstructionist actions of Consul Befu, and the second one took place in the severely anti-Japanese atmosphere of Shantou, where the Chinese businessman Zi-bin Zheng attempted to expel Taiwanese shareholders from the Dadong Ice-making Company. The company passed through these crises safely and business grew prosperous. In 1936, the company expanded to Chaozhou, a nearby city where they bought Chaozhou’s Huiqun Ice-making Company (惠群冰廠) and renamed it the Chaoan Ice-making Company (潮安冰廠).¹⁹⁹

With the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War in July 1937, the Dadong Ice-making Company was forced to close. Its facilities were severely damaged during the fighting, and on June 21, 1939, Japanese forces formal occupied Shantou; thereafter, the Japanese authority in Shantou made efforts to reestablish the Dadong Ice-making Company. On July 5, 1939, the headquarters of the East Guangdong Expeditionary Army (粵東派遣軍) granted the Dadong Ice-making Company a permit for establishing factory facilities in the area. On July 16, 1939, Shin Huang and shareholders in Taiwan held a meeting in Tainan. Shin Huang reported on the

¹⁹⁹ *Taiwan nichi nichi shinpō* 臺灣日日新報, no. 13072, daily news 8 (August, 17, 1936); no. 13095, evening news 4 (September 9, 1936).
situation in Shantou, to which he had paid a recent visit after the Japanese occupation, and he suggested a plan for revival, including collecting funds for immediate purchase of machines to deal with the summer season’s high demand.\textsuperscript{200} With Shin Huang’s efforts and the assistance of the Japanese authority in Shantou, the Dadong Ice-making Company reopened and operated smoothly during the Japanese occupation of the city.

The story of the Dadong Ice-making Company brings to light several interesting issues. First, although Taiwanese were Japanese subjects, it was not necessarily the case that Japanese authorities overseas would protect these Taiwanese. On some occasions, the Japanese authority was the origin of conflicts and obstacles besetting Taiwanese interests in China. Consul Befu exemplifies this pattern. As the preeminent representative of Japanese authority in Shantou, he chose to not to protect Dadong’s interests and, indeed, exerted his power to expel Taiwanese shareholders from China. Acting on a personal vendetta, he even tried to terminate the Dadong Ice-making Company’s operations.

A second interesting issue brought to light here is the fact that the Dadong Ice-making Company exposed the discord between the Taiwan General Government and the Japanese

\textsuperscript{200} \textit{Taiwan nichi nichi shinpō} 臺灣日日新報, no. 14131, daily news 5 (July 19, 1939).
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. When Shin Huang and later, Chang-sheng Chen asked officials of the Taiwan General Government for help, the officials sympathized with the Taiwanese’ situation and attempted to negotiate with the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not react to the request from the Taiwan General Government for a cancellation of the deportation orders targeting Chang-sheng Chen and Mu-yi Huang. It seems that the two institutions lacked a mechanism of coordination.

Third, the case of the Dadong Ice-making Company emphasizes the important role that nationality played in conducting business in Chinese treaty ports, in this case, the treaty port of Shantou. In the initial stage of the company’s operations, Consul Befu’s oppressive actions resulted in the Dadong Ice-making Company’s decision to register as a Chinese company by taking Zi-bin Zheng as its registered owner. Later, in 1933, Zi-bin Zheng’s own strategic maneuvering led the company to register with the Japanese consulate in Shantou as a Japanese company, which afforded the company a degree of Japanese protection. In other words, both Japanese and Chinese nationals protected the Dadong Ice-making Company’s interests at different times. By way of example, Chang-sheng Chen renounced his Japanese nationality and registered as Chinese to avoid the stream of obstacles erected by Consul Befu. In Chang-sheng
Chen’s case, his Chinese nationality protected his interests in Shantou. Both the Dadong Ice-making Company and Chang-sheng Chen exemplify the importance of nationality to Taiwanese interests in Shantou.

Fourth, the dispute between Taiwanese and Chinese shareholders in 1933 manifested the ambivalence of Taiwanese who lived in China. Taiwanese who lived in Shantou had similar languages, ethnic backgrounds, and customs, and cooperated with local Chinese in business and in local civic matters. However, the situation of Taiwanese was strongly influenced by the local atmosphere, that is, by anti-Japanese sentiment. Compared with Xiamen (Amoy) and Fuzhou, the other two treaty ports in southern China, Shantou had been famous for its anti-foreign atmosphere, especially when it came to Japan. When anti-Japan movements were active in Shantou, Taiwanese found themselves personally in very real danger as their business would often experience significant losses. Therefore, how Taiwanese sojourners in Shantou protected themselves and their interests in an atmosphere of pronounced anti-Japanese sentiment is an issue of great importance here.
Fig. 3-7 Taiwan You Xiang 台湾右巷 (Taiwan Right Lane)

(Source: http://stu.dahuawang.com/?p=11611)

Fig. 3-8 Taiwan Zuo Xiang 台灣左巷 (Taiwan Left Lane).

[Illustration] Shantou city still uses the names “Taiwan Left Lane” and “Taiwan Right Lane” in the old city area. The two lanes were located at the intersection of Wai ma lu 外馬路 (Wai Road) and Guo-ping lu 國平路 (Guo-ping Road). The names of these two lanes suggest that this area was a central site where Taiwanese sekimin lived and conducted business in Shantou during the Japanese colonial period in Taiwan. (Source: Photo by Lin-Yi Tseng, 2013.)
Chapter 4: The Educational Network Encompassing the Japanese Homeland, Colonial Taiwan, and the Shantou Treaty Port—The Tōē School in Shantou

4.1 Prelude

Focusing on the Tōē School in Shantou, this chapter explores the transnational network characterizing the relationships among the Japanese homeland, colonial Taiwan, and the treaty port of Shantou. The word ‘tōē’ 東瀛 literally means “the sea in the East,” and has long been an alternative name for Japan. In this sense, the Tōē School means “the school of Japan.” In 1914, the Japanese Association in Shantou submitted a petition to the Taiwan General Government, requesting that it establish Japanese educational institutions in Shantou. In the next year, in 1915, with the assistance of the Taiwan General Government, the Japanese Association in Shantou established two schools: the Japanese Elementary School and the Tōē gakkō (the Tōē School) in Shantou. The former accommodated children of Japanese residents in Shantou with a clear purpose of providing Japanese-style education to the Japanese children while the latter accommodated both children of Taiwanese residents in Shantou and local Chinese children. Through this offering of Japanese-style education to Taiwanese and Chinese children, Japan aimed both to cultivate Taiwanese colonial subjects’ loyalty to the Japanese empire by granting
them its academic privileges and to enlarge Japan’s influence in Shantou by immersing Chinese students in all things Japanese, including the Japanese language. In other words, the establishment of the Tōē School was closely related to both colonial consciousness and Japan’s ambitions for expansion in China.

In this chapter, I will explore two aspects of the Tōē School in Shantou: (1) the “network of human resources,” regarding which I will discuss some Japanese and Taiwanese teachers whom the Taiwan General Government assigned to the Tōē School in Shantou; and (2) the “network of words,” regarding which I will analyze teachers’ travel writings and reports published in colonial Taiwanese periodicals, including *Taiwan kyōiku* 臺灣教育 (Taiwan Education). By analyzing their words, I will explore these teachers’ perceptions of the educational affairs in Shantou, and specifically the perceptions of European- and American-funded schools in the city. In sum, from both the network of human resources and the network of words in this particular setting, we will see how an educational network established itself among the Japanese homeland, colonial Taiwan, and the Chinese treaty port of Shantou.
4.2 The Establishment of the Tōē School in Shantou and Its Contributors

The establishment of Shantou’s Tōē School was closely related to Japan’s southward policy (南進, nanshin). Japan developed the southward policy in the early Taishō period (1912-1926), which thus historically was called “Taishō nanshin ki” 大正南進期 (the Taishō southward period). Taiwan was Japan’s most important outpost of the southward movement, and Japan’s Taiwan General Government established companies like the Sango Company (三五公司) and the Taiwan Takushoku Company (臺灣拓殖), whose function was to pursue development in southern China and the South Seas. Japan aimed to enlarge its influences in the south by means of economic expansion. In addition to economic penetration, Japan’s southward policy sought to establish cultural facilities in the south. And in association with the increasing number of both Japanese and Taiwanese residents in southern China during the Taishō period, the Taiwan General Government established schools in Chinese treaty ports. Among these schools were schools serving the needs of young Japanese residents and schools for Taiwanese sekimin residents. By establishing these schools, the Taiwan General Government aimed to strengthen the relationship between Taiwan and southern China.
Before the establishment of Shantou’s Tōē School, two other schools in southern China had been accommodating Taiwanese sekimin: Amoy’s Tōa shoin 東亞書院 (the Tōa Academy)\textsuperscript{201} and Fuzhou’s Tōē gakudō 東瀛學堂 (the Tōē School).\textsuperscript{202} Two members of the Taiwan General Government were crucial in pushing for the establishment of Shantou’s Tōē School: Hankichi Kumamoto 隈本繁吉, who was the chief of School Affairs Ministry (学務部長), and Yoshikichi Uchida 内田嘉吉 (1866–1933), who was the chief of Civil Administration (民政長官) and later became the ninth Taiwan General Governor.

Kumamoto was born in Fukuoka, Japan. After graduating from Tokyo Imperial University, he worked at Japan’s Department of Education (文部省, monbushō). In 1908, Kumamoto went to work for the Korean General Government, and during his stay in Korea, he devoted himself to popularizing the Japanese language on the peninsula. In March 1911, he was assigned to a position in the Taiwan General Government, where he was responsible for educational affairs. During his term in office, Kumamoto earned the trust of the Civil Administration chief, Yoshikichi Uchida 内田嘉吉, who was enthusiastic about the southern expedition. Uchida was

\textsuperscript{201} Tōa shoin 東亞書院 was established in 1899. Later, in 1910, it changed its name to Kyōē shoin 旭瀛書院 and was run by Amoy’s Taiwanese Association.
\textsuperscript{202} Fuzhou’s Tōēi gakudō 東瀛學堂 was established in 1908. Later, in 1915, it changed its name to Tōēi gakkō and was run by Fuzhou’s Taiwanese Association.
born in Tokyo, Japan. After graduating from Tokyo Imperial University, he served as the chief of Civil Administration in Taiwan from August 1910 to October 1915. Uchida then became a crucial assistant to Taiwan’s sixth General Governor, Sadayoshi Andō (安東貞美, 1853–1932), who governed Taiwan between May 1915 and June 1918 and who worked to implement the southward policy. Uchida was deeply concerned about southern China’s Japanese-funded educational institutions, and under his assignment, Kumamoto paid an inspection visit to southern China, including Fuzhou, Amoy, Shantou, and Hong Kong during the period between December 11, 1912 and January 8, 1913. While staying in Shantou, Kumamoto visited Chinese-funded schools as Zhong deng shang ye xui xiao (the secondary commercial school) and British-funded Presbyterian boys’ school as Anglo Chinese College (英華學院). He met members of Shantou’s Japanese consulate and of Shantou’s Japanese Residents Association, and discussed the possibility of establishing schools to accommodate the children of Shantou’s Japanese and Taiwanese sekimin residents.

With the support of Kumamoto, Etsuji Yanagi 柳悦耳, who headed the Japanese Association of Shantou, persuaded Shantou’s Taiwanese residents to donate money for

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203 Pei-feng Chen 陳培豐, Encyclopedia of Taiwan (http://taiwanpedia.culture.tw/web/content?ID=5751)
204 Takashi Nakamura 中村孝志, Nihon no nanpō kanyo to Taiwan 日本の南方関与と臺灣 (Japan’s concern about the south and Taiwan). Nara: Tenrikyō dōyūsha, 1988, pp. 120–121.
establishing a Taiwanese-oriented school in the city and successfully collected 700 USD.

Shantou’s Japanese Residents Association donated 100 USD, and thus 800 USD were in hand.

Having solved the school-funding problem, Yanagi and others dealt with related issues, including naming the school ‘Tōē,’ renting a local house for the schooling to take place in, and hiring a Chinese teacher.\textsuperscript{205}

In February 1914, Shantou’s Japanese Residents Association submitted a petition to Taiwan General Governor Yoshikichi Uchida 内田嘉吉 through Shantou’s Japanese consul deputy Nobu Kasai 河西信, asking for the Taiwan General Government to assign a teacher to the new established Shantou’s Tōē School. The petition first declared that there was no local Taiwanese-oriented school serving the school-age children of Taiwanese residents in Shantou; thus, Taiwanese parents either would send their children to Chinese schools or, if money was readily available, would hire Chinese tutors for home schooling. Both of these choices centered on Chinese-style education, which the petitioners considered inadequate for cultivating the character of prospective imperial subjects.\textsuperscript{206} In other words, the reason for Japan’s establishment of a Taiwanese-oriented school in Shantou was closely related to Japan’s colonial

\textsuperscript{205} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{206} Ibid; \textit{Taiwan Sōtokufu kōbun ruisan} 臺灣總督府公文類纂 (The collection of official documents of Taiwan General Government), vol. 61, no. 16 (February 6, 1915).
perspectives regarding the cultivation of Taiwanese subjects’ loyalty to the Japanese empire. The abovementioned analysis may reflect Patricia Tsurumi’s study, which examines the Taiwan General Government’s educational policies and the teaching materials of public schools in Taiwan, and which argues that Japan’s main purpose for installing a system of education in Taiwan was not to develop academic studies but to transform Taiwanese into docile followers of Japanese governance.207

Further, the petition declared that with the assistance of Kumamoto, who was the chief of the Taiwan General Government’s School Affairs Ministry, and Yangi, who was the chief of Shantou’s Japanese Association, the Tōē School had finally opened its door to students in early February of 1915, and thus the school had an immediate need for the Taiwan General Government to assign Japanese or Taiwanese teachers to the school. In response to the petition, several days later, the Taiwan General Government decided to assign Shizuo Muraoka 村岡賤夫 and his wife, Sen, to the new Tōē School located in the city’s Qilu 磯頭 area.208 It was at this point that the educational network comprising Japan, Taiwan, and Shantou formally got underway.

208 Ibid.
Shantou’s Tōē school accommodated two kinds of students: Taiwanese students and local Chinese students. For the former subjects, Japan aimed to provide them with a Japanese-style education to cultivate loyal subjects of the Japanese empire; for the latter subjects, the Taiwan General Government presumed that the Chinese students who attended Shantou’s Tōē School and who learned Japanese would become pro-Japan in their outlook. In other words, the function of Shantou’s Tōē School addressed not only the imperial responsibilities of Taiwanese residents there but also nishi shinzen 日支親善 (Japan-China friendship). Japan regarded its schools and hospitals in China as “cultural institutions” that could strengthen this Sino-Japanese friendship, chiefly by winning over the minds and hearts of Chinese people. Imperial Japan’s project of enlarging Japanese influence in China through the establishment of Japan-approved education for Chinese was influenced by similar projects undertaken by Western powers.

After Shantou opened as a treaty port, the British and the Americans established Shantou-based Christian schools accommodating Chinese students. Japan entered Shantou much later than these Western powers and, in many ways, imitated them. The nominal founders and managers of Tōē School and the Japanese Elementary School in Shantou were members of Shantou’s Japanese Residents Association, but it was the Taiwan General Government that
provided most of the assistance and direction, including assigning teachers to these schools and financing them.209

The first principal of the school, Shizuo Muraoka 村岡貞夫 (1872–1919), was born in Gunma Prefecture in Japan. He graduated from the Taiwan General Government’s Japanese Language School (国語学校) in 1898 and, later that year, joined the staff at Kokugo denshūjō 国語伝習所 (Japanese Short Course)210 in Yilan, Taiwan. In October 1898, he received a teaching license for public schools,211 permitting him to teach at public schools accommodating Taiwanese students. From 1905 to 1914, he taught at several public schools, including Touwei 头尾 and Luodong 羅東 in the Yilan area of Taiwan. Because of Muraoka’s prestige as a teacher, in 1915, the Taiwan General Government assigned him to be the first principal of Shantou’s Tōē School. His wife, Sen, was assigned to teach at the Japanese Elementary School in the same city—she had previously been teaching at public schools in the Yilan area.212

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209 For example, Tōē School’s annual operating expenses totaled 4,500 fu 弘. Of this amount, approximately 600 fu were covered by the Japanese Residents Association, 400 fu was from tuition-based revenue, and the Taiwan General Government covered 3,500 fu. Kinosuke Ishii 石井喜之助, “Swatō no ichinen (3),” 汕頭的一年 3 (One year in Shantou, part three), Taiwan kyōiku, no. 292, p. 53 (October 1, 1926).
210 In 1896, the Taiwan General Government established fourteen Kokugo denshūjō (Japanese Short Course) for propagating the Japanese language around Taiwan.
211 During the Japanese colonial period, Taiwanese children went to kōgakkō (public schools) while Japanese children in Taiwan went to shōgakkō (primary schools).
212 Taiwan sōtokufu shokuin roku 臺灣總督府職員錄 (The staff listing of the Taiwan General Government), p. 182 (1907); p. 21 (1908); p. 218 (May 1909); p. 226 (1910); p. 234 (1911); p. 298 (1912); p. 187 (1913); p. 195 (1914).
The Muraoka couple, as the first Japanese teachers to Shantou, contributed greatly to the establishment of Shantou’s Japanese educational institutions. And specifically, as the first principal of Tōē School, Muraoka worked tirelessly in his position. At first, he and other staff would hold classes at local people’s houses in the Qilu area, where the attending students numbered only about twenty. In 1917, Muraoka opened new classes on Shantou’s Fu-an Street (福安街), resulting in growing enrollment of students. In the same year, the Taiwan General Government granted the school significant funds for the purchase of land and for the construction of a new building, and Muraoka was the main supervisor of this project. During the construction phase, there were several setbacks from natural and human disasters, including a tremendous earthquake in February 1918, a storm in June 1918, and the Constitutional Protection War (1917–1922). After the earthquake, Muraoka sent an update report entitled “Shantou Earthquake Report” to the Taiwan General Government, reporting the damage to the school. This report was published in *Taiwan kyōiku*, the most important periodical about education in colonial Taiwan. In 1918, during the Constitutional Protection War, *Taiwan kyōiku* published

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213 The Constitutional Protection War was a series of military conflicts between Sun Yat-sen’s forces and the Beiyang Government between 1917 and 1922.

214 Shizuo Muraoka 村岡賢夫, “Swatō shinshai hōkoku” 汕頭震災報告 (A report on a disastrous earthquake in Shantou), *Taiwan kyōiku*, no. 189, p. 72 (March 1, 1918).
Muraoka’s article “Swatō tsūshin” (News from Shantou), mentioning that with the geographical shift in fighting to Amoy, the markets in Shantou were stabilizing and the attendance of students was getting back to usual.²¹⁵ In June 1919, Muraoka died from cholera. The Japanese government named him a recipient of the Order of the Sacred Treasure for his contributions in education.²¹⁶

After Muraoka’s death, the Taiwan General Government named Kamesaburō Anjū 安重亀三郎 (1882-1924) the second principal of Tōē School. Anjū was born in Ibaraki Prefecture, Japan. He graduated from Waseda University and came to Taiwan, teaching at several public schools in central Taiwan, including Lugang 鹿港, Erlin 二林, Beidou 北斗, and Shetou 社頭. Because of his prestige in teaching, in 1915, he was assigned to a teaching position at the Kyokuei Shoin in Amoy, a Japanese-funded school for accommodating children of Taiwanese sekimin and local Chinese. At that time, the school had plans for the construction of a new building. Anjū helped the principal Yōhachirō Okamoto 岡本要八郎 purchase the necessary land and oversee all the construction work. When the new building—Dairei—was

²¹⁵ Shizuo Muraoka 村岡誠夫, “Swatō tsūshin,” 汕頭通信 (Newsletter from Shantou), Taiwan kyōiku, no. 197, p. 54 (November 1, 1918).
²¹⁶ Takashi Nakamura 中村孝志, Nihon no nanpō kanyo to Taiwan 日本の南方関与と臺灣 (Japan’s concern about the south and Taiwan). Nara: Tenrikyō dōyūsha, 1988, pp. 122, 136.
completed in 1917, Anjū’s reputation soared. In addition to this construction project, Anjū compiled two books: *Kyokuei shoin yōran* (Handbook of Kyokuei School) and *Kamon jijō* (The circumstances of Amoy). The former presented the school’s basic features, and the latter provided a contextualized introduction to Amoy. These two books helped disseminate important information about Japan’s expanding reach both to people in colonial Taiwan and to people in the Japanese homeland.\(^{217}\)

Anjū brought his talents into full play at Shantou’s Tōei School. During his term of service, he contended with an anti-foreigner movement (the May–Fourth Movement) and the Constitutional Protection War. Even when circumstances were baleful, he tried to expand the school’s program, successfully attracting more Chinese students to the institution of learning. In 1920, he established *yagaku bu* 夜学部 (night school), and *tokusetsu ka* 特設科 (special courses), which was a Japanese-language course for Chinese students wanting to study in Taiwan or in the Japanese homeland. In 1922, Anjū established *hoshū ka* 補習科 (supplementary courses), and in 1924, he changed “supplementary courses” to *jimuka* 実務科 (practical business courses), providing education for those who were going to engage in practical business

\(^{217}\) Yōhachirōe Okamoto 岡本要八郎, “Anjū Swatō Tōei gakkō kōchō ikeri” (In memory of the principal of Tōei School, Anjū), *Taiwan kyōiku*, no. 270, pp. 48–51 (December 1, 1924).
affairs. All these offerings were practical, aiming to propagate the Japanese language in Shantou and to provide Chinese students a practical means for studying in Taiwan or in the Japanese homeland.

In addition to making the courses in Shantou more substantive, Anjū conducted an intensive survey of Shantou and communicated the information to people in colonial Taiwan. For example, in February 1920, *Taiwan kyōiku* published a report from Anjū, —“Swatō annai” 汕頭案内 (An introduction to Shantou), which presented a useful outline of the city, including the city’s historical background, the characteristics of the port, the foreign settlements there, and the city’s commerce, transportation, and diverse facilities, such as hospitals, schools, temples, churches, hotels, and tea houses.218

Moreover, Anjū compiled two books about Shantou: *Swatō shōfu* 汕頭商埠 (The treaty port of Shantou) and *Nichiswago shōkei* 日汕語捷徑 (Transnational shortcuts between the Japanese language and the Shantou dialect). The former book provided comprehensive information about Shantou’s many features, including local customs, markets, and perhaps most important for the current study, the Japanese community there; the latter book helped Japanese

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learn the Shantou dialect quickly. These books not only influenced Japanese readers, but also
greatly influenced the local Chinese community. In 1933, eleven years after Swotō shōfu was
published, the Chinese journalist Xue-ying Xie 謝雪影 published a guidebook of the city,—

*Shantou zhinan* 汕頭指南 (An introduction to Shantou). Xie greatly contributed to a
Chinese-language guidebook about Shantou, noting that until then, there had been no accurate
and detailed publication on Shantou’s sites and institutions. One of the prefaces of this book was
by Jia-lan Zhang 張家蘭 (1888–1958), a Shantou-based educator, who suggested that Shantou
had changed significantly since the early 1900s and which, in fact, had become a prosperous city.
The Chinese government had experienced serious problems in preserving historically and
culturally relevant documents, and when Zhang served in the Bureau of Education, he could find
almost no documents about educational affairs. A similar situation beset other bureaus, like the
Bureau of Hygiene and the Bureau of Construction. The city mayor Yu-ruo Wang 王雨若 tried
to compile a new gazetteer of the city; however, he failed owing to a lack of both sufficient funds
and relevant documents. In the final part of the preface, Zhang wrote,

One day I accidentally saw a Shantou guidebook in Japanese on my friend’s desk. It
had been compiled by the principal of Shantou’s Tōē School (I forget the title of the
book). I read the catalogue and the figures, and soon I realized that the work rested
on an extensive survey. It was a pity that foreigners had come to know our city much better than we had!²¹⁹

嘗在友人案頭獲觀東瀛學校某校長編著之日文小冊（書名已忘），觀其目錄及插圖，知其曾經調查之功者而歎外人之知我每詳於我。

The abovementioned book was Anjū’s Swotō shōfu. Zhang’s preface, itself, reveals two important facts. First, the lack of relevant documents obstructed the efforts of Chinese researchers to compile a comprehensive city guide, whereas Anjū proved to be a marvelous researcher insofar as he overcame this obstacle and gathered significant relevant information, ultimately compiling a formidable city guidebook. Second, Swotō shōfu encouraged local Chinese to compile a guidebook about the city. The perception that Japanese knew Shantou better than Chinese themselves probably made local Chinese, like Zhang and Xie, feel disempowered.

Anjū was very active in the local Japanese community. In addition to helping manage Tōč School, he served as the vice president of the Japanese Residents Association and participated in the association’s Committee on School Affairs. During the last part of his life, he contributed to the establishment of Shantou’s largest Japanese hospital, the Hakuaikai Hospital (汕頭博愛會醫

established in 1924, and served on the hospital’s governing council. Furthermore, it seems that Anjū had a good relationship with local Chinese leaders in Shantou. For example, the leader of the Guangdong Army, General Jiong-ming Chen 陳炯明 (1878–1933) asked Anjū to exercise his influence so that seven Chinese literati could safely arrive in Japan for their own studies. In November 1924, Anjū died at the young age of 43. In December, Taiwan kyōiku published an article by Yōhachirō Okamoto, Anjū’s previous superior at the Tōē School in Amoy, to mourn Anjū’s death.\(^{220}\)

After Anjū’s death, the Taiwan General Government named Kinosuke Ishii 石井喜之助 the third principal of Tōē School. Ishii was born in Nara Prefecture, Japan. He graduated from the Japanese Language School (国语学校) under the Taiwan General Government in 1908 and, later that year, received a public-school teaching license.\(^{221}\) From 1909 to 2019, he taught at several public schools in southern Taiwan (Bingdong). In 1920, he became the supervisor of the General Affairs Section for the local government in Hualian, a port area in southeast Taiwan. Five years later, in 1925, the Taiwan General Government assigned Ishii to Shantou, where he

\(^{220}\) Yōhachirō Okamoto 岡本要八郎, “Ä Anjū Swatō Tōei gakkō kōchō ikeri” 善安重汕頭東瀛學校長逝けり (In memory of the principal of Tōē School, Anjū), Taiwan Kyōiku, no. 270, pp. 48–51 (December 1, 1924); Kinosuke Ishii 石井喜之助, “Swatō no ichinen (3)” 汕頭の一年 3 (One year in Shantou, part three), Taiwan kyoiku, no. 292, pp. 51–52 (October 1, 1926); Takashi Nakamura 中村孝志, Nihon no nanpō kanyo to Taiwan 日本の南方関与と臺灣 (Japan’s concern about the south and Taiwan). Nara: Tenrikyō dōyūsha, 1988, p. 138.

\(^{221}\) Fuhō 府報, no. 2400, p. 79 (March 28, 1908); no. 2407, p. 21 (April 8, 1908).
spent four years at Tōē School. At the end of his stay there, the Taiwan General Government assigned Ishii to Tōē School in Fuzhou, a city in Fujian Province, where he stayed from 1929 until 1936. Because of his long residence in southern China, Ishii was familiar with local patterns of life and local current events. On the basis of his familiarity with the region, he published several articles such as “Swatō wo kataru” (A discourse on Shantou) and “Fuken shō no kyōiku wo ronji” (The debate surrounding education in Fujian Province).

The fourth principal was Kishio Kitahara 北原癸巳男. Kitahara was born in Saga, Japan. Before his assignment to Shantou, he taught at Keelung’s Japanese Elementary School for one year. In 1922, Kitahara was assigned to Shantou’s Japanese Elementary School. His wife, Kitahara Fuji had a similar experience with Kisho. Fuji taught at schools in the Keelung area and later, in 1922, went to teach at Shantou’s Japanese Elementary School. When the third principal of Shantou’s Tōē School, Kinosuke Ishii, transferred from Shantou to Fuzhou in 1929, Kitahara was assigned to the concurrent post of principal of the Tōē School in Shantou. Kitahara essentially spent eighteen years in Shantou, where he was the principal of Shantou’s two Japanese educational institutions from 1930 to 1937, when he was transferred to Fuzhou.222 The

222 *Taiwan sōtokufu shokuin roku* (The staff listing of the Taiwan General Government), p. 241 (1921); pp. 36–37 (1922); p. 36 (1923); p. 37 (1924); p. 39 (1925); p. 42 (1926); p. 42 (1927); p. 44 (1928); p.
Kitaharas, succeeding the Muraokas, contributed greatly to Shantou’s Japanese educational affair.

The abovementioned principals—Muraoka, Anjū, Ishii, and Kitahara—were important contributors to the operation of the Tōē School in Shantou during the period between its establishment in 1915 and the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937.

4.3 The Profile of Taiwanese Teachers at the Tōē School in Shantou

The network of human resources between colonial Taiwan and Shantou was exemplified by important figures above and beyond these four prestigious Japanese principals. Unlike the situation of Shantou’s Japanese Elementary School, which employed no Taiwanese teachers, many Taiwanese teachers taught at Shantou’s Tōē School. During the period between 1915 and 1945, the Taiwan General Government assigned multiple Taiwanese teachers to Tōē School in Shantou. Some of these Taiwanese teachers were couples. The first couple was Zhao-xing Zhong 鍾兆興 and his wife Feng-jiao Lin Zhong 鍾林鳳嬌. Zhao-xing Zhong came from a rich family in southern Taiwan’s Bingdong area. As a child, he expressed enthusiasm for learning. When

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46 (1929); p. 95 (1930); p. 101 (1931); p. 100 (1932); p. 104 (1933); p. 107 (1934); p. 112 (1935); p. 120 (1936); p. 447 (1937).
growing up, he taught at a public school in his hometown, and enjoyed a good reputation as an educator. His wife, Feng-jiao taught in the Bingdong area, as well. In 1918, the Taiwan General Government assigned the Zhong couple to Shantou’s Tōē School. The couple stayed on at Tōē School only for one year before being reassigned to Taiwan for the fulfillment of teaching duties at the public schools in the Bingdong area. 223

The second couple was Feng-zhang Xu 徐鳳樟 and his wife Bao-zhu Ye Xu 徐葉寶珠. Feng-zhang Xu was from Taipei. In 1916, he received a teaching license for public schools, and then taught at a public girls school in Dadaocheng 大稻埕 in the Taipei area. In 1919, the Taiwan General Government assigned Xu to Tōē School in Shantou. Xu’s wife, Bao-zhu was assigned to the same school in 1920. They worked there until 1921, when a reassignment led them back to Taiwan, teaching at public schools in Taipei. 224

The third couple was Chang-sheng Chen 陳長生 and his wife Yin-zhi Zheng Chen 陳鄭氏引治. The famous Taiwanese anthropologist Chi-lu Chen’s 陳奇祿 parents—Chang-sheng Chen and Yin-zhi Zheng Chen—received assignments to teach at Tōē School in

223 Jin-fa Lin 林進發, Taiwan kanshin nenkan 臺灣官紳年鑑 (The almanac of officials and gentry in Taiwan). Taihoku: Minshū kōronsha 民衆公論社, 1933, pp. 391, 877; Taiwan sōtokufu shokuin roku 臺灣總督府職員錄 (The staff listing for the General Government of Taiwan), p. 279 (1914); p. 282 (1915); p. 296 (1917); p. 309 (1917); p. 347 (1918); pp. 360, 372 (1919).
Shantou. Chang-sheng Chen was born in Tainan. He graduated from Kokugo Gakkō in 1918. Later, he taught at Jalixing Public School in his hometown. Yin-zhi Zheng Chen was from Tainan, as well. She graduated from Kokugo gakkō daisan fuzoku gakkō (the Affiliated Third School of the National Language School). It was the most prestigious educational institution that Taiwanese girls could attend during the Japanese colonial period. After graduation, she taught at Xuejia Public School in Tainan.

In 1921, the Taiwan General Government assigned the Chens to educational positions in Shantou. The Chens worked at Shantou Tōē School from 1921 to 1927. Chi-lu Chen’s memoir states that his parents later resigned their teaching jobs and started their own business. They still lived in Shantou until the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937, when the situation for Taiwanese in Shantou was worsening, thus compelling the Chen family to flee to Hong Kong.

Here, an interesting question arises: why had the Chens discarded their teaching jobs and launched their own business in Shantou? The records show that, in general, the Japanese in Shantou were “people living on salary” (俸給生活者, hōkyū seikatsu sha), working in Japanese

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225 The school was established in Taipei’s Shilin area in 1898 with two courses: a regular course and a craft course. The school accommodated outstanding Taiwanese girls. In 1915, the school moved to Taipei’s Mengchia area and later, in 1922, it changed its name to Taipei Third Girls High School. During the Japanese colonial period in Taiwan, this school was the most prestigious educational institution for Taiwanese girls.

governmental institutions like the consulate and schools, while most Taiwanese sekimin were merchants and shop clerks.\textsuperscript{227} I think that the Chens’ change of jobs might have been attributable to such factors as the commercial network of Taiwanese in Shantou and the competition between Japanese and Taiwanese teachers.

The fourth couple was Jia-chang Zheng 鄭嘉昌 and his wife Jin Pan Zheng 鄭潘氏謹. Jia-chang Zheng graduated from Kokugo gakkō 国語学校 in 1923 and taught at several public schools in the Yilan area. Toward the end of 1927, the Taiwan General Government issued an order assigning Zheng to Tōē School in Shantou. His wife, Jin Pan, was from a rich mining family in Pingchi 平溪. In 1926, she graduated from the Taipei Third Girls High School, the prestigious educational institution for Taiwanese girls. In the following year, when she taught at the public school in Taipei, she met Jia-chang Zheng. After marrying Zheng, Jin Pan went to teach at Shantou Tōē School. The Zheng couple stayed in Shantou for five years, and in 1933, he returned to Taiwan, where he taught at a public school.\textsuperscript{228}

\textsuperscript{228} Fuhō 府報, no. 3206, p. 44 (April 11, 1924); no. 254, p. 84 (November 30, 1927); Gaimushō kiroku 外務省記録 (Records of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan), I-1-5-0-088 (June 14, 1930); Taiwan sōtokufu shokuin roku 臺灣總督府職員錄 (The staff listing for the General Government of Taiwan), p. 274 (1924); p. 262 (1925); p. 267 (1926); p. 279 (1927); p. 45 (1928); p. 46 (1929); p. 96 (1930); p. 101 (1931); p. 100 (1932); p. 370 (1933).
In addition to the abovementioned Taiwanese couples, some Taiwanese whose hometown was Taipei taught at Tōē School in Shantou. These individuals include Shang-zhou He 何煒舟, Shui-sheng Yang 楊水生, and Shui-chun Ji 紀水傳. Shang-zhou graduated from Kokugo gakkō in 1918, and went on to teach at Shantou Tōē School for fourteen years (1925–1939).\(^{229}\)

Shui-sheng Yang graduated from Kukugo gakkō in 1923, and after teaching at Banquio Public School in Taipei for several years, he was assigned to Shantou at the end of 1927. He taught at Tōē School in Shantou for another four years and then transferred to Kyokuei shoin 旭瀛書院, an important Japanese-funded school in Amoy. He left Amoy and returned to Taiwan before the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War, and taught at Banquio public school again. In 1940, Yang resigned from the teaching position and became a businessman. Later, he was elected to the directorship position at the Banquio Industrial Union.\(^{230}\)

Shui-chun Ji graduated from Kokugo Gakkō in 1926 and, before taking up a teaching in Shantou, taught at Dalongtong 大龍峒, Beitou 北投, and Laosong 老松 public schools in the

\(^{229}\) *Taiwan sōtokufu shokuin roku* 臺灣總督府職員錄 (The staff listing for the General Government of Taiwan), p. 37 (1921); p. 36 (1922); p. 46 (1929); p. 100 (1932); p. 104 (1933); p. 107 (1934); p. 112 (1935); p. 420 (1937); p. 447 (1938).

\(^{230}\) *Taiwan shinminpōsha* 臺灣新民報社, *Taiwan jinshi kan* 臺灣人士鑑 (A list of famous Taiwanese). Taihoku: Taiwan shinminpōsha, 1934, p. 148; *Taiwan sōtokufu shokuin roku* 臺灣總督府職員錄 (The staff listing for the General Government of Taiwan), p. 264 (1922); p. 271 (1923); p. 277 (1924); p. 265 (1925); p. 276 (1926); p. 289 (1927); p. 45 (1928); p. 46 (1929); p. 96 (1930); p. 101 (1931); p. 100 (1932); p. 104 (1933); p. 108 (1934); p. 112 (1935); p. 421 (1936).
Taipei area. He was interested in teaching music, and published several articles about ways of combining music and play for students. He stayed in Shantou from 1933 to 1936, and then returned to Taipei, where he continued to work as a teacher. It is interesting to note that all three teachers—He, Yang, and Ji—were from Taipei, taught at Tōē School in Shantou, and were assigned by the Taiwan General Government’s Bureau of Education to interpreter positions for the Japanese military during the Second Sino-Japanese War. Yang served as an interpreter for the Japanese troops from 1938 to 1939, and he published an article entitled “With Brave Soldiers” describing his experiences during the war. During their tours of duty, both He and Ji were photographed on warships, and the caption under the photos read “Active in the Navy, Shang-zhou He from Shantou Tōē School” and “Teacher at Miyamae Public School, Shui-chun Ji.”

231 Shui-chuan Ji 紀水傳, “Gakushū kyōiku to yūgi to shōka no mondai” 学習教育と遊戯と歌唱の問題 (Issues of learning education, playing, and singing), Daiichi kyōiku 第一教育, vol. 11, no. 8, pp. 97–109 (September 3, 1932); “Shōka ka shidō yōshi” 唱歌科指導要旨 (The guiding light of the singing subject), Daiichi kyōiku 第一教育, vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 63–75. (February 26, 1933); Taiwan Sōtokufu shokuin roku 臺灣總督府職員録 (The staff listing for the General Government of Taiwan), p. 263 (1926); p. 275 (1927); p. 295 (1928); p. 317 (1929); p. 337 (1930); p. 348 (1931); p. 342 (1932); p. 104 (1933); p. 108 (1934); p. 112 (1935); p. 405 (1936).
233 Shui-sheng Yang 楊水生, “Isamashii heitai san to issho ni” 勇ましい兵隊さんと一しょに (With Brave Soldiers), Kokukō 国光, no. 92, pp. 10–12 (January 15, 1940).
234 Kiyoshi Takeuchi 竹内清, Jiken to Taiwan jin 事變と臺灣人 (The Second Sino-Japanese War and Taiwanese). Taihoku: Taiwan shinminpōsha 臺灣新民報社, 1940.

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Shantou Tōē School was the workplace for several Xinzhou-based Taiwanese teachers, including Qi-rui Jian 简啟瑞, A-sheng Guan 官阿勝, Zhang-mei Rao 饒氏長妹, Shu-zhun Zheng 鄭述准 and Jing-hua Liu 劉鏡華. Of these teachers, Rao was the only female. Also of note is Jian, who was unique regarding the longevity of his thirteen-year stay at Shantou’s Tōē School (1917–1930). Indeed, Liu’s stay at Shantou Tōē School covered the whole period of the Second Sino-Japanese War and permitted him to observe the turbulent situation in Shantou during the wartime period.

In addition to Japanese and Taiwanese teachers, Shantou’s Tōē School employed a Chinese teacher, Fen-sheng Lin 林奮生 who worked at the school from 1917 to 1930. He was the only Chinese teacher at any Japanese educational institution in Shantou.

The majority of the abovementioned Japanese and Taiwanese teachers graduated from the Taiwan General Government’s Japanese Language School, and, after graduation, taught at schools in Taiwan before being assigned to teaching positions at the Japanese Elementary School and Tōē School, which constituted the educational beachhead of the Japanese empire in southern

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235 Taiwan Sōtokufu shokuin roku 留滿州總督府職員績 (The staff listing for the General Government of Taiwan), p. 308 (1912); p. 193 (1913); p. 202 (1914); p. 204 (1915); p. 211 (1916); p. 331 (1917); p. 347 (1918); p. 385 (1919); pp. 400, 249 (1920); p. 37 (1921); p. 36 (1922); p. 36 (1923); p. 38 (1924); p. 39 (1925); p. 42 (1926); p. 42 (1927); p. 46 (1929).
236 Taiwan Sōtokufu shokuin roku 留滿州總督府職員績 (The staff listing for the General Government of Taiwan), p. 429 (1935); p. 120 (1936); p. 420 (1937); p. 447 (1938); p. 482 (1939); p. 396 (1940); p. 426 (1941); p. 447 (1942); p. 50 (1944).

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China. The Japanese government thoroughly navigated this flow of humans, and in particular, the Taiwan General Government determined the precise contours of these teachers’ stays in Japan’s informal empire in China.

4.4 Network of Words: Teachers’ Writings about Shantou

Colonial Taiwan and Shantou were connected to each other by more than just human-resource networks: networks of words brought the two regions closer together. For example, Japanese and Taiwanese teachers who had been assigned to Shantou and the staff working at the Taiwan General Government’s Bureau of Education would submit their documents—in the form of travel writings and reports to periodicals in Taiwan. Through these “words,” readers in Taiwan, most of whom worked in the field of education, would attain information and knowledge not only about Tōē School but also about Shantou at large. This information was comprehensive, covering political and economic matters, both the Chinese-run schools and the Western-run schools in Shantou, local customs, and the social atmosphere there. Using these “words,” researchers today can explore the teachers’ perceptions of the city.
In this section, I will analyze articles published in one of the most important educational periodicals in colonial Taiwan—*Taiwan kyōiku*—to explore teachers’ perceptions of Shantou. The magazine was the publication of Taiwan kyōikukai (the Taiwan Education Association), and was in operation for a long period, from 1900 to 1943. It was a first-hand source for educators seeking to explore the educational history of Taiwan during the Japanese colonial period. In addition to this magazine, I examined the topic by analyzing some supplementary periodicals: one was *Taichūshū kyōiku* 臺中州教育, a publication of Taichū kyōikukai 臺中教育會 (the Taizhong Education Association); and another was *Reisei 麗正*, a publication oriented toward the alumni hailing from the Taipei First High School, which had been established in 1898 and which presently is known as Taipei Municipal Jianguo High School, the best boys school in Taiwan. The writings in the abovementioned periodicals expressed at least two kinds of perceptions that Japanese and Taiwanese educators had of Shantou: (1) the perception that Shantou was a dangerous place, exemplified by Chinese civil wars and anti-Japanese activities (see chapter five for a more detailed discussion of this perception); and (2)

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237 Taiwan kyōikukai 臺灣教育會 (the Taiwan Education Association) was an institution promoting assimilation of Taiwanese through Japanese-language education. The original title of the magazine was Kokugo kenkyūkai kaihō 国語研究會會報. In July 1901, the magazine changed the title to Taiwan kyōikukai and later in 1912, it changed again to Taiwan kyōiku.
the perception that comparisons of Chinese schools and Western schools should yield important
information helpful to the Japanese and Taiwanese educators. In the following, I will focus my
discussion on the second perception.

Both Japanese and Taiwanese teachers in Shantou paid much attention to Shantou’s local
educational affairs. In their reports to the Taiwan General Government, in addition to reporting
on the situation of Shantou’s Japanese Elementary School and Tōē School, many writings
reported on Shantou’s Western-funded schools, especially the American- and British-funded
schools. In general, the writings expressed a strong sense of competition with Western powers
regarding the establishment of schools in Shantou. Both Japanese and Taiwanese teachers
reminded the Japanese authority to monitor the Western strategy of establishing schools in
China—a strategy intended to expand Western influence there.

It is understandable that these Japanese and Taiwanese teachers had a distinct sense of
competition with Western powers. In contrast to Western powers’ mid-nineteenth century
entrance into Shantou, Japan entered Shantou only after emerging victorious from the First
Sino-Japanese War in 1895. Among the pre-WWI foreign powers in Shantou, Germany
exercised the greatest influence over the port city; and in Shantou’s immediate post-WWI
circumstances, Britain was the most influential power there. During these years, Japanese reports about Shantou came from such sources as the city’s Japanese Consuls and from the Taiwan General Government’s visiting officials, and one common characteristic of these reports was the Japanese authors’ consciousness of competing Western powers. In general, the Japanese reports described Western powers’ presence in Shantou and how Japan should learn from its Western competitors in terms of conducting commercial business and establishing “cultural institutions” (namely schools and hospitals). Regarding commercial business, the Japanese reports recorded the number of foreign companies in Shantou, the value of trade (between Shantou and individual foreign powers), and the number and tonnage of foreign steamships. Regarding “cultural institutions,” Japanese reports recorded the number and size of foreigner-run schools and hospitals in Shantou. The authors of these Japanese reports expressed their belief that the Western powers were essentially buying Chinese people’s hearts and minds by bestowing on Chinese communities a host of impressive schools and hospitals. The authors further noted that this strategy seemed to be working quite well. For example, Kiwata Ishii 井出季和太, a tariff officer in the Taiwan General Government submitted a report in the early 1920s containing the following passage:
Why did Japanese merchants lack commercial power [in Shantou]? The essential reason lay in Japan’s national character. Generally speaking, Japanese neither had faith in Chinese nor cooperated with or shared gains and losses with Chinese. [Japanese] did not have plans to expand and manage sustainable development [in China], and thus, a severe anti-Japanese atmosphere easily took hold [in Shantou]. Moreover, Japan lacked both experience in managing local institutions and the spirit of taking up permanent residence in a place for such managerial activities. In contrast, the British and Americans possessed the equipment for developing maritime trade, and invested in social and cultural facilities, like schools and hospitals, to buy Chinese people’s allegiance and to cultivate [their] strength.238

日本商人は何故に商勢力がないかと云は、根本的には日本人の国民性に存在す。蓋し日本人は支那人を信用し協同的に利害を共にし、永続的に事業の拡張を計らぬ為に常に排日の気分を熾ならしめつつあり。又当地に対して多年事業上の設備経験に乏しく。又将来と雖も永久的経営及住居の精神を缺如す。反之英米人等は航海貿易上の設備を有すると同時に、学校病院其の他社会文化的設備にも相当投資をして、支那人の甘心を買って、実力を扶植しつつあり。

Ishii’s report directly pointed out the problem of Japanese management in Shantou and why Japanese influence was inferior to that of British and American powers.

These same reports, when addressing British investment in Chinese cultural matters, focused on two aspects, religious education and higher education. The British established many high schools in China, and the graduates were accommodated in Hong Kong University, where they submitted to strict educational discipline. Moreover, the very best graduates would have a

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238 Kiwata Ide 井出季和太, “Swatō no bōeki” 汕頭の貿易 (Trade in Shantou), *Taiwan Jihō* 臺灣時報 (December 1922), p. 79.
chance to pursue higher education in Great Britain. In the 1920s, Chinese students in Shantou had access to about ten British-run schools, such as the Bethel Christian Church Elementary School (伯特利禮拜堂小學), Anglo Chinese College (英華學院), and Shude Feminine School (淑德女學校). Most of the British-run schools were located on Wai-ma Road and in the neighboring area. American investment in China’s cultural business was similar to British investment insofar as the Americans developed a diverse portfolio covering education, medical treatment, and religion. In the 1920s, about eight American-run schools in Shantou accommodated Chinese students, and included the True Light Elementary School (真光小學), Baptist Academy (磐石中學), and Baptist Girls’ Academy (磐石女中). Most of these schools were located in the Queshi 磐石 area, an island located opposite the Shantou port. Regardless of whether these foreign schools were run by British or American, most were Christian and had been established by Western missionaries.239

Facing so many British-run and American-run Christian schools, the Japanese teachers in Shantou had ambiguous responses. On the one hand, Japanese teachers admired Western powers’

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239 Gorō Uchida 内田五郎, Shin Swatō 新汕頭 (New Shantou). Taihoku: Nanyō kyōkai Taiwa shibu 南洋協会臺灣支部, 1927, p. 35; Taiwan sōtokufu bunkyō kyoku 臺灣總督府文教局 (Education Section of Taiwan General Government), Nanshi nanyō no kyōiku shisetsu 南支南洋の教育施設 (The educational facilities in southern China and the South Seas). Taikoku: Taiwan sōtokufu bunkyō kyoku, 1935, pp. 64–65.
well-founded plans and generous financial support to these schools, and on the other hand, Japanese teachers grew convinced that Japan should compete with these Western powers.

Since the British-funded and American-funded schools had been established in Shantou much earlier than the Japanese-funded schools, local Chinese people tended to experience a greater sense of awe and wonderment at Europe and America than at Japan. In order to demonstrate the educational achievements of the Japanese empire to local Chinese residents in Shantou, the Tōē School held a three-day exhibition of educational works (教育品展覧会, kyōiku hin tenrankai) in January 1919. The exhibition collected students’ works from multiple schools, including the Tōē School in Shantou, the Tōē School in Fuzhou, Kyokuei shoin in Amoy, and many schools in Taiwan. To popularize the exhibition, the Taiwan General Government had documentary films shown during the exhibition period. The documentaries presented the streets of Taipei City, the beautiful campuses, and the well-behaved school children in Taiwan. Owing to the limited number of available seats, Shantou’s Tōē School issued only seven hundred tickets for showings of the documentaries, but so many people expressed interest in the films that the school eventually tripled the number of tickets. The Chinese audience was most impressed with the films depicting Taiwanese students’ handicrafts and the
Maruyama Zoo. One Japanese teacher—Hiroshi Katase 片瀬弘—recorded the event.

Katase was born in Kumamoto Japan. Before acquiring his teaching position in Shantou, he taught at public schools in Taizhong, Taiwan (1915–1917). In 1918, Katase was assigned to a teaching position at Tōē School, where he stayed for seven years until 1924. At the end of his report recording the educational exhibition in January 1919, he wrote, “The exhibition and the films enabled the Chinese audiences to experience the greatness of Japan; otherwise, they would have continued to assume that only Britain and the United States were great.”240 (此度の展覧会及び活動写真は、香港の美と英米人の偉大より外思はざる当地支那人に、吾国の偉と大との一端を感ぜしめ得たる事を此の上もなく愉快に存居候).

In the same report, Hiroshi Katase stated that visible on the streets of Shantou were Western-operated schools’ advertisements aimed at recruiting Chinese students. In his report to the Taiwan General Government, he wrote,

Local schools run by European, Americans, and Chinese used the month of December in the Lunar Calendar to mark the end of a semester. Many schools held graduation ceremonies during this month, and around the same time, the streets everywhere were flooded with leaflets declaring “such-and-such a school is now

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240 Hiroshi Katase 片瀬弘, “Swatō tsūshin” 汕頭通信 (Newsletter from Shantou), Taiwan Kyōiku 臺灣教育, no. 202, pp. 52 (March 1, 1919).
accepting applications from prospective students.” This is the season for recruiting new children. I heard that the American-run school Zhen-guang Elementary School had delivered three thousand leaflets!”

At the end of the above passage, Katase seems to have been expressing—whether implicitly or explicitly—a sense of competition with the Americans.

The second principal at the Tōē School, Anjū, suggested that the most attractive aspect of education in Shantou was the marvelous collection of British and American schools there.

Through carefully constructed programs and English-language lessons, the schools attracted Chinese students. Moreover, the schools, which tended to include Western religious curricula, served as forums where students could discuss current events, organize boycotts, and win over local people’s hearts through the presentation of popular dramas and films. Anjū wrote,

Recently, I heard that American Baptist churches are planning to establish an architecturally magnificent stone-made girls school in Kakuseki. Moreover, they are planning to invest 50–60 thousand fū in establishing more junior high schools in

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241 Hiroshi Katase 片津弘, “Swatō tsūshin” 汕頭通信 (Newsletter from Shantou), Taiwan Kyōiku 臺灣教育, no. 202, pp. 52–53 (March 1, 1919).
Shantou. I heard that they already bought a vast swath of land along the Han River
[for the construction of the schools].

The description expresses Anjū’s strong sense of wonder at—and perhaps an equally strong
sense of competition with—the Western powers.

Regarding this competition with Western-funded schools, the Japanese teacher of the Tōē
School in Shantou, Matsugorō Okabe 岡部松五郎, offered some telling comments. Okabe was
born in Kumamoto, Japan. He taught at public schools in Tainan beginning in 1913. Between
October 1924 and March 1925, the Taiwan General Government assigned him to a position at
the Tōē School in Shantou. During his stay in Shantou, he visited other cities in Guangdong
Province, and even Hong Kong. The section of Okabe’s report addressing the recruitment of
Chinese students asserted that the Shantou’s Tōē School faced two problems in competing with
Shantou’s American- and British-funded schools: problem one was the practicability of the

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242 Many Japanese and Taiwanese teachers called the area Kakuseki 角石 instead of the given name of Queshi 角石. This shift in terms took place probably because the word Que 角 would have been extremely difficult for Japanese and Taiwanese to write as well as to pronounce. Anjū Kamesaburō 安重亀三郎, Sōtō Shōfu 汐頭商埠 (Shantou Treaty Port). Taihoku: Nanyō kyōkai Taiwan shibu 南洋協會臺灣支部, 1922, pp. 37–38.
Japanese language; and problem two was continuity of education. The number of students at the Tōē School was declining. Every year about one hundred students would enter the school, but when these one hundred students would move up one grade, many of them would drop out. What accounted for this phenomenon? Okabe contended that in addition to the anti-Japanese atmosphere in Shantou, the practicability of the Japanese language was an important reason for students’ decision to transfer from the Tōē School to non-Japanese schools in the area. For Chinese students studying either in the Japanese homeland or in colonial Taiwan and hoping to maintain contact with Japanese society following the completion of their education, learning Japanese was practical. But for Chinese students who wanted to work locally in China, English typically proved to be more useful than Japanese. Most students who dropped out of the Tōē School transferred to Western schools. If the Japanese language was not indispensable to Chinese students, why did Chinese parents send their children to Shantou’s Tōē School to learn Japanese? Okabe attributed this behavior to two factors, one being psychological and the other economic. As for the psychological factor, the Chinese parents believed that sending their children to attend a Japanese-funded school would make them more competitive in the future and, meanwhile, granted the parents an opportunity to express their tastes in education. As for the
economic factor, the Tōē School’s tuition was more affordable than the Chinese-run and Westerner-run schools’ tuitions in Shantou.\textsuperscript{243}

In addition to the issue of the practicability of the Japanese language, a significant problem besetting Shantou’s Tōē School as it competed with Western-funded schools for Chinese students was “continuity of education.” Okabe asserted that to influence development in China, Europeans and American had established extensive educational institutions in various parts of the country. He noted that the mission schools were built in grand architectural styles and boasted dormitories and sports grounds. He went on to note that Western powers had thus skillfully combined mission work with education and attracted the attention of many Chinese children and their families: these academic strongholds in the centers of big cities and branch schools in neighboring suburbs even included kindergartens. Okabe’s assertions seem to be consistent with the facts. Indeed, Chinese students who finished their junior-high courses at the schools could earn eligibility to enroll in a senior high school or a college in Western countries. Thus, it was popular for Chinese students to study abroad in the West. Moreover, missionaries at Western-oriented schools based in China would help Chinese students search for work

opportunities upon graduation. At the end of his report, Okabe wrote, “It is a great pity that, despite Shantou’s proximity to our country [Japan], our educational system in China was so inferior to that of the Western powers.”

As an educator concerned about Japan’s educational management in Shantou, Okabe commented that it was a pity to see Japan investing large amounts of money and human resources in students who would eventually drop out of Shantou’s Tōē School at the half-way mark. In order to fulfill the mission of these Japanese-funded schools (which was essentially to earn the admiration of Chinese students and to expand Japanese influence in China), Okabe argued that there was an urgent need to establish an overall program of Shantou-based vocational schools capable of accommodating not only Chinese but also Japanese and other foreign students there—schools similar to Taiwan’s vocational school directly under the jurisdiction of the Taiwan General Government.

\[244\] Ibid., p. 40.
The abovementioned writings expressed Japanese teachers’ ambiguous emotions toward many Christian schools established by Western powers in Shantou. As noted previously regarding a similar context, on the one hand, Japanese teachers admired Western powers’ generous financing of educational institutions; and on the other hand, Japanese teachers expressed their strong sense of competition between Japan and the Western powers.

In general, Shantou’s Japanese and Taiwanese teachers observed that Western powers, especially the Americans and British, had been skillfully expanding their influence in Shantou by establishing grand mission schools and by providing comprehensive long-term curricula to Chinese students.

Concerning Shantou’s Chinese-funded schools, Japanese and Taiwanese teachers pointed to myriad problems, including unstable finances and low teacher salaries. Kinosuke Ishii, serving as the third principal of Shantou’s Tōē School, suggested that the development of the Chinese educational program in Shantou faced many disturbances, including the region’s unstable political situation and local government’s disproportionate funding of military affairs among total expenditure. Compared with the Chinese schools in Shantou, the city’s foreigner-operated schools had stable finances and sufficient facilities, which attracted students and which, thus,
made these schools’ enrollment much greater than the corresponding numbers for Chinese
schools. The faculty in foreigner-operated schools enjoyed a relatively stable life, too. In these
senses, the faculty and staff in Shantou’s Chinese schools would have been envious of the city’s
foreigner-operated schools. 246

Moreover, some Japanese teachers—like the third principal of the Tōē School in Shantou,
Kinosuke Ishii—criticized Chinese political parties’ excessive influence on education in China.
Ishii noted, for example, that after the Guangdong Army took control of Shantou, the nature of
schools’ commencements changed for political reasons. Previously, the five color flag (the flag
of the Beiyang Government) had been on display during commencements, but now, the flag on
display was that of the Republic of China. In addition, students were now to bow to the iconic
image of Sun Yat-sen during commencements, and then were to read his testament out loud, sing
songs of the Chinese Civil Revolution, and shout slogans in praise of the Guangdong Nationalist
Government. Ishii’s observation indicates the instability of Chinese schools in Shantou at that
time. Changes in local leaders and in the dominant ideology triggered changes in school events

246 Kinosuke Ishii 石井喜之助, “Swatō no ichinen (4)” 汕頭の一年 4 (One year in Shantou, part four), Taiwan Kyōiku 臺灣教育, no. 293, pp. 73–77 (October 30, 1926).
like commencements. These changes reflected the overall turbulence gripping Shantou.\footnote{Ibid., p. 75 (October 30, 1926).}

At Shantou’s Tōē School, the Taiwanese teacher Jia-chang Zheng 鄭嘉昌 pointed out that although Shantou had made great progress recently in the realm of material life, spiritual life in the city was poor and its cultural industry was underdeveloped. According to Zheng’s report, the Chinese schools there were suffering from two problems: First, the number of schools was not small, but the quality of these establishments’ curriculum and instruction was disappointing. Some of these establishments actually were small-scale tutoring centers even though they bore the title of “school.” Second, most of the schools were private: only five of the thirty-seven elementary schools and two of the twenty junior high schools were public. Also, most of the schools had been established by private entities, including (1) native place associations, (2) benevolent groups, (3) labor unions, (4) teachers overseeing for-profit private schools, (5) and Christian churches. Zheng added that in Shantou’s Chinese schools, full-time jobs for teachers were rare. The Chinese society did not consider women capable of being top teachers. Regarding salary, the earnings of a male teacher in the Chinese countryside could cover just one single person’s living expenses. Compared with teachers’ salaries in Taiwan, those earned by Chinese
teachers in Shantou were paltry. The size of a profession’s typical salary can powerfully influence people’s perception of the profession: in colonial Taiwan, teachers were held in high esteem, but in Shantou, teachers’ worth was associated with their poor remuneration.248

Moreover, Japanese teacher Matsugorō Okabe pointed out that although Chinese schools throughout the country were managed by the new Chinese government’s educational system, established in 1912, Chinese schools remained primitive. The underdevelopment of education in China was closely related to China’s tumultuous political conditions. Most schools lacked money and could not sustain themselves satisfactorily. Lacking sufficient financial support from the government, schools had to impose high tuitions (15 to 20 yuan annually), which accounted for the better part of schools’ incomes. However, even high tuitions could not erase the difficulties in maintaining the schools, and thus the principals sought to pad these incomes with funds raised from individual Chinese, including those living overseas, particularly those in Southeast Asia.249

According to Chi-lu Chen’s memoirs, he traveled to Shantou with his parents, who had been assigned by the Taiwan General Government to teaching positions at Tōē School. For one year,

Chen studied at Tōē School, which accommodated the children of Taiwanese sekimin. Later, his parents decided to transfer him to a local public school because they frowned upon the idea of teaching their own son. In this situation, Chen spent six years at First Elementary School in Shantou. Chen recollected, “As for my six years in a Chinese elementary school, I don’t have any special memory. The only thing I remember is the school’s old and shabby condition.”

The abovementioned writings strongly suggest that many Japanese teachers, Taiwanese teachers, and even Taiwanese students like Chi-lu Chen observed dreadful conditions in Chinese schools.

4.5 A 2013 Interview with 83-year-old Ms. Mei-hua Zheng

Mei-hua Zheng is the daughter of Jia-chang Zheng and Jin Pan Zheng, both of whom were teachers at Shantou’s Tōē School during the period between the late 1920s and the early 1930s. Mei-hua was born in Shantou in July 1930, and her two brothers were born in Shantou, as well. The Zheng family lived in the Tōē School’s teachers dormitory.

In September 1931, the Manchurian Incident occurred (Mei-hua was 14 months old), and in

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January of the following year, the Shanghai Incident occurred. The two incidents reflected the deeply troubled Sino-Japanese relations at the time, and the Zheng family, like many Taiwanese and Japanese families in China, repatriated to Taiwan as a consequence. Both Jia-chang Zheng and Jin Pan continued their teaching professions at schools in Taiwan.

However, the relationship between the Zheng family and Shantou did not end with this repatriation. In July 1941, the Zheng family again moved to Shantou because Taiwan General Government had assigned Jia-chang Zheng to an interpreter position in Shantou, which had been under Japanese occupation since June 1939. Mei-hua enrolled in Shantou’s Tōē School as a fifth-grade student. This time, she stayed in Shantou for one and a half years until her graduation from the Tōē School in February 1943. Because Jia-chang Zheng was no longer a member of Tōē School’s faculty at this time, the Zheng family were unable to reside in the teachers dormitory, and they thus opted for a four-floor rented townhouse located in the city’s Tongyi houlu (同益後路) neighborhood. The owner of the townhouse was a successful Shantou-based businessman in Southeast Asia. The townhouse itself was well designed, and even in the more than a half century that has passed since Mei-hua left the house, she still vividly remembers its layout. During the interview, she recalled a small court-yard with landscape gardening just inside
the entrance. The original arrangement of the house was such that the first floor was for the host, the second floor was for the legal wife, the third floor was for the concubine, and the fourth floor was the balcony. In the backyard was a beautiful old well. Because the structure’s owner and his family had left for Southeast Asia, Mei-hua and her family could live comfortably in this perfectly acceptable residence.

Regarding school life in Shantou, Mei-hua’s recollections reveal that there were thirty some students in her class. All were Taiwanese, though some had been born to Shantou-based mothers. Each grade had only one class, and Mei-hua’s teacher was Kazuhiko Era 恵羅一彦, who was responsible for the fifth and sixth grades. Mr. Era was very young and just married. His wife, remembered as a great beauty, gave birth to a baby boy for him. Not only was Mei-hua a student at Shantou’s Tōē School but so too were both of her younger brothers. One brother was in Mr. Shirō Inokuchi’s 井口資郎 class, and the other brother was in Mr. Kido Morikazu’s 木戸守一 class. Mei-hua was most impressed with her teacher Fujie Tajima 田島富士恵, who was responsible for home economics. Ms. Tajima was friendly and earnest as she instructed students on the finer points of such activities as sewing. She also taught at Shantou’s Japanese Elementary School, and on some occasions, Ms. Tajima—if she were too busy to make the trip to the Tōē
School—would ask Mei-hua and her classmates to go to the Japanese Elementary School for class there. Mei-hua recorded that the relationships between students and teachers were close. After class, they often went to teachers’ homes (i.e., the dormitories) to play and found the premises very clean and well designed.

Sometimes, the Tōē School would hold field trips in Shantou city. Students would tour the city in Japanese military vehicles with one soldier as the driver and one soldier as a guard. After the field trips, school teachers would ask Mei-hua and her classmates to record their thoughts on the events of the day, and she even submitted one of her papers to a Shantou-based newspaper company.

Among the Taiwanese teachers at Tōē School, Shui-sheng Yang 楊水生 was the Zheng family’s best friend. Jia-chang visited Shui-sheng’s home almost every night for a chat and he told Mei-hua and his other children that Yang was a respected senior. Moreover, the Chens—Chang-sheng Chen 陳長生 and Yin-zhi Zheng Chen 陳鄭氏引治—were familiar with Jia-chang’s family. Because Yin-zhi and Jia-chang had the same surname, Zheng, Jia-chang regarded Yin-zhi as his sister and the two families were close. Yin-zhi would bring his son Qi-lu Chen, who became a famous international anthropologist, to Mei-hua’s home and Mei-hua’s
mother, Jin Pan was responsible for his preschool teaching. Furthermore, Zhang-mei Rao
visited Zheng’s family often because Rao and Jin Pan had graduated from the same
girls school in Taiwan.

On weekends, Mei-hua’s family would go to Shantou’s largest park, Zhong-shan Park,
where she saw many local people wearing Chinese-style robes while playing soccer. Mei-hua’s
parents would bring her and her siblings to restaurants near the port to enjoy Chaozhou cuisine
(潮州菜). 251 Her favorite dish was crispy crab, a delicacy for which crabs were coated in batter
and deep-fried. Zheng’s family hired a local Chinese female as a helpmate, who happened to be
good at making Shantou-style soy-sauce pickles. First, she would stir-fry raw olives and Chinese
pickled vegetables in peanut oil. Then she would place the cooked ingredients in a pot and store
them there for one year, until the olives had turned a purplish color. Shantou people were used to
eating these Shantou-style pickles with porridge for their breakfast.

The local markets would sell various kinds of fruits, soft Japanese sweets, and kasutera, a
Nagasaki-style honey cake. Mei-hua’s mother sometimes brought her to a pastry shop named Tai
yang guan 太陽觀, where shoppers could purchase refined candies. Moreover, professional

251 Chaozhou cuisine originated from the Chaoshan (Chaozhou and Shantou) region in the east of Guangdong
Province, and thus it was one kind of Guangdong cuisine. However, Chaozhou cuisine bears more similarities to
Fujian cuisine, owing to Chaoshan’s and Fujian’s geographic proximity and language similarities. Chaozhou cuisine
is renowned for its seafood, soups, and sparse use of oil.
dressmaking activities in Shantou were very progressive. Mei-hua’s parents would occasionally take her to a local dressmaker for new tailored clothes. Sometimes, Mei-hua’s mother would bring her to the Nan Sheng Department Store (南生百貨公司), a seven-floor magnificently laid out building constructed in 1932 and featuring Shantou’s earliest usable elevator. There, the mother and daughter would shop for daily-use articles.

When Shantou was under Japanese occupation, the city’s Japanese and Taiwanese residents received “military tickets,” a kind of money that buyers and sellers could use for daily-use articles. One military ticket equaled one hundred yuan. Mei-hua and her classmates at Tōē School would tear military tickets in half and declare each half equal to fifty yuan. With this currency, they were actually able to rent comic books; in fact, half a ticket could rent about ten comic books. According to Mei-hua, her friends and she would sit in the shade of trees and read comic books, which tended to be quite different from comic books today: back then, each page of a comic book would present only one square, in contrast to post-war comic books, with each page presenting multiple squares.

Mei-hua sometimes went to Kakuseki 角石, an island across from Shantou Port, to her classmate’s home for playtime. Kakuseki was a British settlement and had many Western-style
houses and gardens. The classmate’s father had already passed away and her mother, who hailed from Shantou, worked at an American Baptist Church in Kakuseki as a cleaner. As recollected by Mei-hua, the church was very clean and the sounds of piano playing could be heard from somewhere inside.

In February 1942, Mr. Era brought Mei-hua and other students back to Taiwan by the Japanese steamship Hongkong Maru 香港丸. Their purpose was to participate in the entrance examinations for junior high school in Taiwan, held in March. After arriving in Taipei, Mr. Era and the students stayed at the Hikōya Hotel near the Imperial Taipei University Affiliated Hospital. In the morning, Era gave students lessons for preparing for the entrance examinations, and in the afternoon, students undertook further preparations. In early March, students were dismissed from their preparatory studies and went back to their hometowns to take the entrance examinations. Mr. Era returned to Shantou at that time, as well.

Later, Mei-hua entered a junior high school, the same school that her mother Jin Pan had attended. When Mei-hua started her new life as a junior high school student in Taiwan, Jia-chang Zheng still lived in Shantou, but he was working no longer as an interpreter for the Japanese Army, but as a businessman helping to oversee the operations of the Yoshimura Company 吉村...
洋行), a rice-and-grains business centered in Shantou’s suburbs. Before the end of the Second World War, Jia-Chang decided to return to Taiwan, but chose to make the trip by a private fishing boat rather than by a Japanese steamship, which would have been a likely target for Allied forces. Of course, it was an extremely dangerous voyage one way or the other. Before his departure for Taiwan, Jia-chang attended Shantou’s Mazu Temple, where he prayed for safety. Luck turned out to be on his side, as he arrived safely in Taiwan.

In conclusion, Mei-hua’s recollections of this period in her life provide us with precious records of Taiwanese students who attended Shantou’s Tōē School between 1941 and 1943. For Mei-hua, it was a precious time, which she spent with her parents, siblings, classmates, and teachers in Shantou, a beautiful port city with many Westerners, Japanese, and Taiwanese residents.
4.6 Brief Conclusion

Regarding Japanese imperialism, Peter Duus reminds us that we should consider both the formal empire and the informal empire of Japan to understand Japan’s influence on wider East Asia. The scope of Japan’s informal empire sometimes may not have been as clear as Japan’s formal empire. This chapter reflects an attempt to explore, from a transnational framework, some of the connections between one of Japan’s formal territories (here, colonial Taiwan) and one of Japan’s informal territories (here, the treaty port of Shantou). I have focused on a group of “Japanese” teachers (including Taiwanese) whom the Taiwan General Government assigned to teaching positions at Tōē School in Shantou. I have analyzed their stories and writings in order to explore Japanese imperial formations in colonial Taiwan and in Shantou. It is clear that the Taiwan General Government was the main organization responsible for the connection between colonial Taiwan and Shantou, at least in the field of education. In addition to assigning teachers and financing schools, the Taiwan General Government published teachers’ reports and travel writings in periodicals, such as *Taiwan kyōiku*. By means of these periodicals, people in the field of education in colonial Taiwan attained information about Shantou. To varying degrees, readers in Taiwan shared Japanese teachers’ perceptions of Shantou, including perceptions of Chinese
schools’ status in Shantou, of Western-based schools in Shantou, and of Japanese teachers’ self-examination stemming from Japan’s management of education in Shantou. My examination of Japanese teachers’ writings specifically reveals these teachers’ strong sense of competition with Western-funded schools in Shantou. In sum, these travelers under the blanket of Japanese imperialism—the teachers at Tōē School in Shantou—reflect the significant transnational connection among imperial Japan, colonial Taiwan, and the treaty port of Shantou.
Table 4-1 Japanese Teachers at Shantou’s Tōē School (1915–1944)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Native place</th>
<th>Period of designation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shizuo Muraoka</td>
<td>Gunma</td>
<td>1915–1919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kamesaburō Anjū</td>
<td>Ibaraki</td>
<td>1920–1924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kinosuke Ishii</td>
<td>Nara</td>
<td>1925–1928</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hiroshi Katase</td>
<td>Kumamoto</td>
<td>1918–1924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masaru Wada</td>
<td>Kagawa</td>
<td>1925–1934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kishio Kitahara</td>
<td>Saga</td>
<td>1930–1936</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shirō Inokuchi</td>
<td>Hiroshima</td>
<td>1928–1929; 1940–1944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noboru Kawasaki</td>
<td>Fukushima</td>
<td>1930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masaichi Kubo</td>
<td>Nagasaki</td>
<td>1931–1935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morikazu Kido</td>
<td>Hiroshima</td>
<td>1936–1944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fujie Tajima</td>
<td>Hiroshima</td>
<td>1940–1941; 1943–1944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tsuruji Gondō</td>
<td>Fukuoka</td>
<td>1941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tokuji Nakashima</td>
<td>Nagasaki</td>
<td>1941–1944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazuhiko Era</td>
<td>Yamaguchi</td>
<td>1941–1944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toshie Nakashima</td>
<td>Nagano</td>
<td>1942–1944</td>
</tr>
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Table 4-2 Taiwanese Teachers at Shantou’s Tōē School (1915–1944)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Native place</th>
<th>Period of designation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Qi-rui Jian 簡啟瑞</td>
<td>Xinzhu 新竹</td>
<td>1917–1930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhao-xing Zhong 鍾兆興</td>
<td>Bingdong 屏東</td>
<td>1918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feng-jiao Lin Zhong 鍾林氏鳳嬌</td>
<td>Bingdong 屏東</td>
<td>1918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-sheng Guan 官阿勝</td>
<td>Xinzhu 新竹</td>
<td>1919–1924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feng-zhang Xu 徐風樟</td>
<td>Taipei 臺北</td>
<td>1919–1920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bao-zhu Ye Xu 徐葉氏寶珠</td>
<td>Taipei 臺北</td>
<td>1919–1920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chang-sheng Chen 陳長生</td>
<td>Tainan 臺南</td>
<td>1921–1927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yin-zhi Zheng Chen 陳鄭氏引治</td>
<td>Tainan 臺南</td>
<td>1921–1926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shu-zhun Zheng 鄭述准</td>
<td>Xinzhu 新竹</td>
<td>1921–1927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shang-zhou He 何鳴舟</td>
<td>Taipei 臺北</td>
<td>1925–1939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhang-mei Rao 饒長妹</td>
<td>Xinzhu 新竹</td>
<td>1928–1931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jia-chang Zheng 鄭嘉昌</td>
<td>Taipei 臺北</td>
<td>1928–1932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jin Pan Zheng 鄭藩氏謹</td>
<td>Taipei 臺北</td>
<td>1930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shui-sheng Yang 楊水生</td>
<td>Taipei 臺北</td>
<td>1928–1931</td>
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<tr>
<td>Shui-chuan Ji 紀水傳</td>
<td>Taipei 臺北</td>
<td>1933–1935</td>
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<tr>
<td>Shu-zhi Yu 余樹枝</td>
<td>Taipei 臺北</td>
<td>1935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jing-hua Liu 劉鏡華</td>
<td>Xinzhu 新竹</td>
<td>1937–1944</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Fig. 4-1 Teachers at Shantou’s Tōē School. (Source: Mei-hua Zheng.)

[Illustration] In the front line on the far left was Inokuchi Shirō and on the far right was the Chinese teacher Fen-sheng Lin, who taught the Chinese language. In the back line on the far left was Jia-chang Zheng, third from the left was Qi-rui Jian, on the far right was Shang-zhou He, and third from the right was Zhang-mei Rao.

Fig. 4-2 Teachers and Guests at Shantou’s Tōē School. (Source: Mei-Hua Zheng.)
Fig. 4-3 Teachers at Shantou’s Tōē School. (Source: Mei-hua Zheng.)

[Illustration] On the far left was Jia-chang Zheng, second from the left was Inokuchi Shirō, third from the left was Shang-zhou He, in the middle was Zheng-mei Rao, and on the far right was Qi-rui Jian.

Fig. 4-4 Teachers and Students at Shantou’s Tōē School. (Source: Mei-Hua Zheng.)
Fig. 4-5 Jia-Chang Zheng in Shantou. (Source: Mei-Hua Zheng.)

Fig. 4-6. Jin Pan Zheng in Shantou. (Source: Mei-Hua Zheng.)
Fig. 4-7 Wedding photo of Jia-chang Zheng and Jin Pan Zheng in Shantou.  
(Source: Mei-hua Zheng.)

Fig. 4-8 The Yoshimura Company in Shantou. (Source: Mei-hua Zheng.)
Fig. 4-9 Nan Sheng Department Store. (Source: Photo by Lin-Yi Tseng, 2013.)

Fig. 4-10 Mazu Temple in Shantou. (Source: Photo by Lin-Yi Tseng, 2013.)
Chapter 5: The Image of Shantou in Japanese Writings from the 1910s to the Outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937

Anti-Japanese boycotts occurred frequently in many Chinese ports. However, Shantou was the site of the most pronounced ones.

支那諸港の多くは時々排日貨運動あれば、
汕頭に於けるものは殊に顕著なるものとす。

Kiwata Ide 井出季和, 1922

5.1 Anti-Foreign Sentiment: The Character of Shantou’s Native Residents

Since the 1910s, the Japanese government had been carrying out the “nanshin” (Southward Advance) policy, and thus, the Taishō period (1912–1926) was called “the period of the Taishō Southward Advance.” During this period, the Taiwan General Government sent a great number of Japanese (and some Taiwanese) to southern China, where they collected information and explored business opportunities. Meanwhile, large Japanese enterprises like Mitsui and the Osaka Shipping Company—in cooperation with the government’s Southward Advance policy—established branch offices in southern China and assigned staff to local branch offices. Moreover, the Taiwan General Government assigned a group of Japanese and Taiwanese teachers to
Japanese-financed schools in southern China. As one of the treaty ports in southern China, Shantou was the destination of many Japanese travelers and all these officials, businessmen, and teachers produced reams of reports and travelogues about Shantou.

As citizens who enjoyed most-favored nation treatment in China, Japanese were, if not colonizers, at least “semi-colonizers” benefiting from diverse privileges in Chinese treaty ports. This chapter raises the question of how Japanese travel writings depicted Shantou, which was an important part of Japan’s informal empire in China. Did these writings present unique features of Shantou that differentiated the site from other southern Chinese treaty ports, such as Xiamen (Amoy)? In responding to these questions, my approach has been to analyze writings, including travelogues, official reports, and news reports authored by Japanese who had travelled and resided in Shantou, and in this way, I have reconstructed these communities’ perceptions of Shantou. Concerning my approach to these topics, I have been inspired by Emma Teng, who used travel writings, pictures, and maps to discuss the evolution of sovereignty and territorial concepts that existed between the non-Western Qing empire and peripheral Taiwan.252 By analyzing the writings of Japanese about Shantou, I will explore Japanese perceptions of Shantou.

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This chapter illuminates—in Pratt’s words—how the Japanese used imperial gaze to see Shantou, an important contact zone for Chinese, Japanese, Taiwanese sekimin, and other foreigners. This chapter shows that Japanese writings reflected the experiences of Japanese in Shantou, and the most powerful of these many experiences were of Shantou’s strident anti-Japanese atmosphere and political instability.

Kiwata Ide 井出季和太, a revenue officer in the Taiwan General Government, was one of many Japanese travelers who visited Shantou during the Japanese colonial period in Taiwan, and his writings reflected many Japanese perceptions of Shantou—the young treaty port in southern China. Ide was born in Nagano Prefecture, Japan, in 1880. In 1909, he received a degree from the Department of Politics at Imperial Tokyo University. In 1915, when he was 35 years old, he served in the Taiwan General Government’s Bureau of Financial Affairs. In the following years, he headed customs offices in Danshui, Keelung, Kaohsiung, and Taipei. In March 1921, Ide was assigned by the Taiwan General Government to a one-month-long sojourn in southern China. He went to Xiamen (Amoy), Shantou, Guangzhou, and Hong Kong. In December 1922, the

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widely read newspaper *Taiwan jihō* in colonial Taiwan published one of Ide Kiwata’s articles entitled “Trade in Shantou,” an investigative report based on his visits in 1921. A paragraph of this article suggested, “Anti-Japanese boycotts occurred frequently in many Chinese ports.

However, Shantou was the site of the most pronounced ones.”

Many Japanese travelogues and reports noted intense anti-Japanese sentiment and activities in Shantou. Tokusaburō Ida 飯田德三郎, a former head of the Shantou branch office of the Osaka Shipping Company (Ōsaka Shosen Kaisha) suggested that, before the Japanese occupation of Shantou in June 1939, two main reasons explain the feeble connection between Shantou and Japan. First, Shantou exhibited the most pronounced anti-Japanese sentiment of any city in China. Every two or three years, the city would be the site of a significant anti-Japanese movement. Second, Shantou had been under British control since the latter half of the nineteenth century, which rendered Shantou an extension of Hong Kong. These two reasons underlie the difficulties experienced by Japanese seeking to expand in Shantou.

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255 Kiwata Ide 井出孝和太, “Swatō no bōeki” 汕頭の貿易 (Trade in Shantou), *Taiwan jihō* 臺灣時報, p. 77 (December 1922).
As the head of the branch office of the Osaka Shipping Company in Shantou, Ida’s comments are pertinent. We might pose the question: What made Shantou the site of the most pronounced anti-Japanese sentiment of any city in China? Some Japanese travelers suggested that the native residents of Shantou possessed a pronounced anti-foreigner streak. For example, Kiwata Ide 井出季和太 pointed out,

Shantou’s native residents are ungrateful, suspicious, and stubborn. They have had xenophobic tendencies since ancient times, and they are utilitarian and ruthless. On the other hand, they are easy to unite on the basis of local community and have exhibited the virtues of diligence and thriftiness. I heard from those who had lived there that the diligence of local farmers far surpasses that of Japanese farmers.\(^{257}\)

This passage expresses Ida’s perception of the character of Shantou’s native residents.

Kinosuke Ishii 石井喜之助, the third president of the Tōē School in Shantou, a Japanese-financed school in the city catering chiefly to Taiwanese and local Chinese children, expressed opinions similar to those of Kiwata Ide concerning the character of Shantou’s native

\(^{257}\) Kiwata Ide 井出季和太, “Swatō no bōeki” 汕頭の貿易 (Trade in Shantou), *Taiwan jihō* 臺灣時報, p. 86 (December 1922).
residents. Ishii was born in Nara Prefecture, Japan in 1880. In 1908, he graduated from the
Taiwan General Government’s affiliated Kokugo Gakkō (Japanese Language School). From
1909 to 1920, he taught several public schools in southern Taiwan. In 1925, when the principal
of the Tōē School in Shantou died, the Taiwan General Government took note of Ishii’s prior
experience running schools and, on this basis, selected him to be the third principal of the Tōē
School, prompting his four-year stay in Shantou.258 As a sojourning Japanese in Shantou, Ishii
observed the local people close up, he commented that Shantou’s native residents were naturally
“brave, aggressive, and good at exploring overseas. Many residents had relocated to Siam and
Singapore at a young age.” (勇敢で進取の気候に富んでいる。そして海外発展性強く、子供
の頃から暹羅や新嘉坡に行く位の事は何とも思っているない). Shantou indeed was the
hometown of millions of Chinese workers in Southeast Asia, especially in Siam. Ishii further
commented that these people’s aptitude at relocating in far-flung areas while preserving a
cultural heritage was probably “due to their possession of strong self-awareness, and violent
infiltrations by foreigners have sunk deep into their frame of mind, resulting in deeply set

258 Taiwan Sōtokufu shokuin roku (The staff listing for the Taiwan General Government), pp.
313, 130 (1909); p. 353 (1910); p. 371 (1911); p. 431 (1912); p. 270 (1913); p. 281 (1914); p. 285 (1915); pp.
297-298 (1916); pp. 310-312 (1917); p. 326 (1918); p. 361 (1919); pp. 374, 245 (1920); p. 402 (1921); p. 426 (1922);
p. 444 (1923); p. 455 (1924); p. 39 (1925); p. 42 (1926); p. 42 (1927); p. 45 (1928); p. 46 (1929); p. 95 (1930).
anti-foreign sentiment.” Ishii’s comments specifically on the xenophobic tendencies of Shantou’s native residents can prove useful in the context of the current study’s discussions.

The abovementioned writings imply that many Japanese perceptions of Shantou were of an uninviting place, since the city’s native residents were allegedly anti-foreign. According to a principal of the Japanese Elementary School in Shantou, Japanese citizens sojourning or residing in Shantou faced four principal difficulties: bad sanitation, an intense anti-Japanese atmosphere, an unstable political situation, and a lack of educational institutions for Japanese children. After examining a good number of Japanese writings, I can state with a considerable degree of certainty that most Japanese sojourners who traveled to Shantou observed an intense anti-Japanese atmosphere and political instability there.

Shantou was not the only Chinese city noted for its anti-Japanese atmosphere in the first half of the twentieth century. Since Japan’s victory over China in the First Sino-Japanese War in 1895, the incursion of Japanese imperialism infuriated Chinese people, who organized strikes

259 Kinosuke Ishii 石井喜之助, “Swatō wo kataru” 汕頭を語る (Talking about Shantou), Taiwan jihō 臺灣時報, p. 228 (July 1939).
and boycotts of Japanese goods in protest. Many other Chinese cities registered anti-Japanese movements. Anyone familiar with early Republican history would agree that its tale includes numerous Chinese civil wars among warlords in the first half of the twentieth century. For example, in the Constitutional Protection Movement (1917-1922), war broken out between Qirui Duan's Beiyang Government and Sun Yat-sen, and Shantou became a battlefield fought over by various warlords. The subsequent changes in Shantou’s ruling government made the local residents and Japanese sojourners uneasy. In the following, I will examine Japanese writings in different time periods from about the 1910s through the 1930s to explore in greater detail Japanese perceptions of Shantou.
5.2 Japanese Writings on Shantou’s Reaction to the May Fourth Movement

Japanese writings about Shantou in the 1910s show that the two greatest threats besetting most Japanese living in Shantou were political instability and intense anti-Japanese sentiment.

Hiroshi Katase 片瀬弘, a teacher at a Japanese-financed Tōē School in Shantou, observed the situation at that time. Born in Japan’s Kumamoto Prefecture, Katase had taught from 1915 to 1917 at a public school in Taizhong, which is located in central Taiwan. In 1918, the Taiwan General Government had assigned Katase to a teaching position at the Tōē School in Shantou, where he stayed until 1924.261 During his stay in Shantou, he submitted reports about the local situation to the Taiwan General Government’s Bureau of Education, and some of his reports were published in *Taiwan kyōiku* 臺灣教育 (Taiwan Education), a publication overseen by Taiwan Kyōikukai (the Taiwan Education Association). In October 1919, a report entitled “Newsletter from Shantou” by Katase was published in *Taiwan kyōiku*. The article suggested that at the start of the second semester in August, only thirty some students attended classes owing to widespread anti-Japanese sentiment and to a lingering cholera epidemic. The anti-Japan demonstrations made Japanese goods unsalable, and Japanese businessmen were at a loss as to

261 *Taiwan Sōikufu shokuin roku* 臺灣總督府職員錄 (The staff listing for the Taiwan General Government), p. 226 (1915); p. 236 (1916); p. 245 (1917); p. 347 (1918); p. 385 (1919); p. 400 (1920); p. 249 (1921); p. 37 (1922); p. 36 (1923); p. 37 (1924); p.174 (1925).
how they should respond. Katase wrote, “The anti-Japanese [activities] at this time taught the egoistic Japanese businessmen a lesson.”262 (この度の排日は我利主義の邦人商人にとって是充分教訓になりたるしく）.

These activities were Shantou’s response to the May Fourth Movement. The May Fourth Movement was an anti-imperialist uprising that initially took the form of student demonstrations in Beijing on May 4, 1919, protesting the Chinese government’s weak response to the Treaty of Versailles, especially the transfer of advantage in Shandong from Germany to Japan. The May Fourth Movement provoked many responses nationwide, including in the treaty port of Shantou. On May 6, 1919, the local Shantou newspaper Gongyan ribao 公言日報 issued an extra edition on May Fourth (五四號外), and many Shantou students publicly voiced their support of the student movement in Beijing. On May 14, students established the Ling Dong Student Union (嶺東學生聯合會) at Huaying School (華英學校) and, through the union, called for a demonstration and for the cessation of economic relations with Japan. On September 13, masses of Chinese in Shantou publicly burned Japanese goods for the first time.263

262 Hiroshi Katase 片瀬弘, “Swatō tsūshin” 汕頭通信 (Newsletter from Shantou), Taiwan kyōiku 臺灣教育, no. 209, p. 54 (October 1, 1919).
Katase stated that Shantou’s participatory response to the May Fourth Movement sharply reduced the number of students (including Chinese as well as Japanese and Taiwanese) attending classes in the city’s Japanese schools and obstructed the sale of Japanese goods there. Regarding specifically the issue of school attendance, parents dared not let their children attend Japanese-financed schools for fear that they would make easy targets. And regarding the boycott, the issue was clear cut: Japanese goods were simply unmarketable in the heated atmosphere, and Japanese businessmen subsequently and unavoidably suffered severe economic losses.

In another article, Katase depicted Shantou’s response to the Fuzhou Incident (福州事件), an event related to the May Fourth Movement. On November 16, 1919, some Chinese students in Fuzhou got into an altercation with Japanese and Taiwanese residents in Fuzhou while the students were boycotting Japanese goods as part of the May Fourth Movement. The conflict left one student dead and five injured. Katase wrote,

Because of the Fuzhou Incident in November, students in Shantou carried out a week-long strike. During the week, students held daily conventions and carried out demonstrations. The telegraph poles were covered with posters describing the
Fuzhou Incident in exaggerated detail. The posters specifically stated, “In front of the youth assembly hall, heavily armed Japanese killed Chinese and fired their weapons into the crowds.”

Katase further stated that the stores in Shantou had started labeling their wares “Japanese goods” or “native goods,” thus helping consumers to distinguish between tarnished imports and preferable domestic articles of commerce. Because of the prohibition on imports of Japanese goods, the price of commodities generally rose, and people from all walks of life suffered accordingly.

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264 Hiroshi Katase 片瀬弘, “Swatō tsūshin” 汕頭通信 (Newsletter from Shantou), Taïwan kyōiku 臺灣教育, no. 213, p. 50 (February 1, 1920).
265 Ibid.
Fig. 5-1 Hiroshi Katase's “Newsletter from Shantou.”

[Illustration] The words in the red frame suggest that the anti-Japanese demonstrations made Japanese goods unsalable, and that Japanese businessmen suffered subsequent financial losses. (Source: Taiwan kyōiku, October 1, 1919.)
The city’s Chinese residents as well as local Japanese and Taiwanese businessmen suffered from the aforementioned inflation because many Japanese goods were in fact considered daily-life necessities in Shantou. Among Shantou’s many imported goods were coal, matches, silk, and seafood (like dried abalone and salted trout) from Japan and alcohol from Taiwan. Shantou merchants mixed Taiwanese alcohol with local waters to make Shantou wine, and exported it to Southeast Asia for consumption by overseas Chinese. Shantou merchants mixed sorghum liquor from Tianjin with Taiwanese alcohol for Shantou residents’ consumption. In this sense, the boycott of Japanese goods forced Shantou residents to seek substitutes, thus driving up the prices of commodities in general.

The boycott was not a unique phenomenon in Shantou. In other treaty ports in southern China, like Xiamen and Fuzhou, boycotts took root. However, the boycott in Shantou was different from those in Fuzhou and Xiamen. A report by Chinzō Kondō 近藤鎮藏, the head of the branch office of the Mitsui Corporation in Fuzhou and Xiamen, commented on differences among the three locations’ respective dispositions and boycotts.

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266 Masasuke Kishi 貴志政亮, “Swatō no kinyū jijō to kakyō mondai” 汕頭的金融事情と華僑問題(Shantou’s financial affairs and issues of overseas Chinese), Taiwan jihō 臺灣時報, p. 204 (July 8, 1939).
First, Kondō suggested that native people’s dispositions in Fuzhou were similar to those in Kyoto, that is, the two communities were typically gentle and agreeable. He further noted that the native residents in Fuzhou were not good at conducting overseas explorations and that almost none of Fuzhou’s native residents went overseas to earn money. He asserted, in contrast, that native residents in Xiamen and Shantou were very aggressive and particularly apt at exploring overseas sites. Java and Manila were destinations preferred by most Xiamen workers, and Siam was the chief destination of Shantou migrants.267

Kondō then analyzed differences among the three locations’ respective anti-Japanese activities. In Xiamen, the boycott was not successful and he predicted that the market would soon right itself because, first, many Taiwanese sekimin who were powerful businessmen lived in the city; second, Xiamen was not a city known for possessing excellent and comprehensive administrative functions, and indeed only a few high-ranking Chinese officials lived there; and third, the percentage of Xiamen’s population accounting for students, the main force supporting the boycott, was not high, thus restricting the boycott’s influence. About Fuzhou, Kondō suggested that the boycott manifested a straightforward conflict between students and

267 Chinzō Kondō 近藤鎮蔵, “Fukushū, Kamon oyobi Swatō no kinkyō” 福州、廈門及汕頭的近況 (The recent situations in Fuzhou, Xiamen, and Shantou), *Taiwan jihō* 臺灣時報, pp. 73–83 (June 1921).
businessmen. The students wanted to boycott Japanese goods, whereas businessmen wanted to trade. The businessmen ended up on the losing side in this conflict, in no small part because they feared being attacked by students. Kondō regarded the native residents in Fuzhou as neither aggressive nor creative, preferring to characterize them as followers. Thus, Kondō promoted the idea that Japanese merchants should strategically entice local Chinese businessmen in Fuzhou to trade in Japanese goods. He predicted that once some Chinese merchants started to trade in Japanese goods, other Chinese merchants might follow, as would be their tendency. He also predicted that the boycott in Fuzhou would gradually lessen in intensity. In general, businessmen in Xiamen and Fuzhou put a halt to their trade in Japanese goods for fear of being attacked by students, not out of patriotism.268

Different from the situation in the abovementioned two cities, the boycott in Shantou was noticeably severe. In general, businessmen in Shantou tended to exclude foreign businessmen and, thus, were more likely to manage business matters by themselves than to import foreign goods through foreign agencies. Thus, the foreign presence in Shantou was less influential than in Xiamen and Fuzhou. During the May Fourth Movement, businessmen in Shantou

268 Ibid.
“automatically” quit trading in Japanese goods and found substitutes from Chinese suppliers farther inland. However, during the boycott in Shantou, the city continued to import coal from Japan because local businessmen encountered difficulties finding substitute suppliers outside Japan. In addition, there was some speculation that a number of grocery items were Japanese imports that, through a change in labels, were masquerading as non-Japanese goods. In sum, the anti-Japanese movement in Shantou was consolidated and, according to Kondō’s prediction, the city had only a slim opportunity to restore its market in the near future.\(^{269}\)

The abovementioned facts suggest that Shantou was quite different from the treaty ports of Xiamen and Fuzhou regarding the personalities of native residents, the power of student unions, and the tendencies of merchants. Thus, the boycott in Shantou was much severer than in the other two locations, despite Shantou’s continued import of Japanese coal.

We might be surprised to learn that, at least according to Kondō’s writings, the student unions in Shantou played an important role in Chinese boycotts of Japanese goods. Concerning this point, Kiwata Ide 井出季和太 recorded a detailed description of student unions’ prominent role in Shantou’s boycott. Ide suggested that student unions were the main force in the

\(^{269}\) Ibid.
anti-Japanese movement in many cities, and such was decidedly the case in Shantou. Students used groups of music performers to promote an anti-Japanese atmosphere, kept a watchful eye on Japanese goods passing through customs, and checked every dock in the port city. Students who found suspicious goods, whether at docks or on store shelves, would sometimes hand them over to Chinese authorities or simply burn the confiscated goods and fine the offending businessmen arbitrarily. Over time, the student unions grew more and more radical, with the students themselves sometimes acting, in essence, like thugs.270

Ide cited some cases exemplifying the students’ wild and violent actions. In late 1920, students got into a dispute with a Chinese owner of a pharmacy who had been retailing Japanese dyes, and the event evolved into an intense court case. During the judicial process, the pharmacy owner fled to Hong Kong and students burst into his Chinese lawyer’s home, forced the lawyer out, and paraded him through the streets as a traitor. Another case took place in the spring of 1921: a Chinese businessman who had British citizenship was importing Hong Kong silk, which students confiscated on the grounds that the silk might be a Japanese import. The event wound up in the courts, where it was left pending for a long time. Finally, the Chinese government

270 Kiwata Ide 井出季和太, “Swatō no bōeki” 汕頭の貿易 (Trade in Shantou), Taiwan jihō 臺灣時報, p. 77 (December 1922).
demanded that the businessman pay a fine of 3,500 fu 弗 to the student unions. It was said that the student unions had asked for 35,000 fu. At about the same time, a Chinese merchant named Wen-kou Yang 楊文口 imported Java sugar from Chun-yang Guo 郭春秧 (1859–1935), a famous Chinese Indonesian entrepreneur who possessed Japanese citizenship. The student unions regarded the sugar as Japanese goods and fined the businessman 1,500 fu.\(^{271}\)

It is worth noting that the Java sugar from Chun-yang Guo was regarded by the student unions as Japanese goods because Guo possessed Japanese citizenship (i.e., he was a Taiwanese sekimin). Born in Fujian Province, Guo had travelled to Dutch Indonesia to operate a sugar company, eventually becoming a millionaire in the process. His company, the Hedong Company (河東公司), established factories and branch offices in Java, Surabaja, Hong Kong, and Shanghai. Later, he registered as Japanese, and operated a tea business in Taiwan successfully. He even received awards from the Dutch and Japanese Governments.\(^{272}\) For example, in 1928, the Japanese government granted Guo membership in the Order of the Sacred Treasure, Gold Rays with Rosette (勲四等瑞寶章), and praised him for having “devoted all his efforts, publicly or privately, to Japan on behalf of Sino-Japanese trade and diplomacy, and in response to

\(^{271}\) Ibid., pp. 77–78.

\(^{272}\) *Fujian mingguo ribao* 福建民國日報, p. 7 (February 13, 1935).
Southeast Asia’s boycott of Japanese goods. In short, he has been a superlative overseas entrepreneur representing Taiwan.”

Because of the boycott of [Japanese] goods, Chinese merchants suffered greatly, as did local prosperity, which was inextricably linked to domestic and international trade. Why did local officers permit the boycott to persist? The reasons centered on the frequent political turmoil, which was threatening the officers’ own positions. In essence, the officers and politicians alike were secretly acting in their own best interest when dealing with students.

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273 Aizō Shibayama 柴山愛藏, Gotaiten showa no shin nihon 御大典紀念昭和之新日本 (The great ceremony, Showa’s new Japan). Taikoku: Shunkan Tokyo jiji sinpōsha shikyoku 旬刊東京時事新報社支局, Yomiuri shinbun Taiwan shikyoku, 1929, p. 84.
274 Kiwata Ide 井出季和太, “Swatō no bōeki” 汕頭的貿易 (Trade in Shantou), Taiwan jihō 臺灣時報, p. 78 (December 1922).
Ide’s writings expressed Shantou’s political instability. Those who possessed power today might be unseated tomorrow.

We might be curious to know why the student union participated so actively in such political movements as the boycott of Japanese goods. The organization of the General Conference of the Student Unions of Lingdong Union (嶺東學生聯合會) was composed of all regional student unions in Shantou and its hinterlands, as well as those in the Hakka region, and it was largely dominated by the English-educated Christian students from the Anglo-Chinese School. Concerning mission students’ political psychology, Susan Rigdon suggested that the majority of Christian educators in China saw themselves as on a mission of “nation salvation” and exhibited a keen desire to train civil leaders in order to save China from chaos. By 1930, under the control of the Guomindang, Christian schools could no longer control their curricula, and the Guomindang integrated Christian schools into the National Salvation program. Under this circumstance, students from mission schools in China were encouraged to participate in political movements that declared national salvation their main objective.275

Moreover, the abovementioned Japanese records suggest that student unions in Shantou were more active than those in Fuzhou and Amoy. This situation is perhaps attributable to Shantou’s political fluidity, the activism of Hakka politicians, and the relative inaction of British and Japanese consuls. The changes in Shantou’s local regimes were very complex, especially in the 1910s and 1920s. Local warlords and municipal governments came and went. Further, many Hakka revolutionaries were in control of Shantou after the 1910s and were often in conflict with the Shantou Chinese Chamber of Commerce. In addition, local warlords in Shantou often turned to British and Japanese consuls for help: Jiong-ming Chen 陳炯明 exemplifies this trend, insofar as he cooperated with the Japanese consul there in the early 1920s. In sum, the rivalries between Hakka revolutionaries and Shantou merchants, between local warlords and Shantou merchants, and among various consuls made it difficult for any of them to form a united front against the Soviet-supported Guomindang and other communist-organized anti-foreign activists in the mid-1920s.

How unstable was Shantou’s political situation? Matsugorō Okabe 岡部松五郎, a Japanese teacher who taught at Tōē School in Shantou from October 1924 to March 1925 provided his observations on the matter. According to Okabe, the Guangdong Army under Chong-zhi Hsu
許崇智 (1886-1965) fired on parts of Shantou in March 1925 and the Japanese Consulate in Shantou issued an emergency notice, warning Japanese residents to practice extreme caution. The emergency situation manifested itself in the form of fluctuating commodity prices. As Shantou appeared to be on the verge of becoming a battlefield, many residents fled to Hong Kong and Shanghai. Later, the Guangdong Army occupied Shantou and began plundering the city. Okabe wrote, “The Chinese proverb ‘The army is the thief, and the thief is the army’ (軍は賊也・賊は軍也) described the situation.”

Okabe’s recorded observations describe the Guangdong Army’s lack of military discipline and, specifically, the situation at Tōē School: many Chinese refugees had crowded into the school because the school had received permission from the Japanese Consulate in Shantou to provide asylum to refugees in an emergency. The entrances to the school were closed and locked, as passing Chinese soldiers glared at the building from the street. The Hinomaru, or the Japanese flag, remained perched atop the school’s roof, serving as a warning to the Chinese soldiers that the building was off limits. When the turmoil passed, the Chinese refugees quickly withdrew from the place of sanctuary, which they had praised only moments earlier. Okabe’s writings state

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276 Matsugorō Oakbe 岡部松五郎, “Nanshi wo kaku (1) Sono goro no Shōgaiseki shi” 南支を描く(1)：その頃の蔣介石 (Describing southern China, part one: Chiang Kai-Shek at that time), *Taihūshū kyōiku* 臺中州教育, vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 34–35 (February 23, 1937).
that none of the refugees expressed their gratitude to him or to the other Japanese who had attended to the building during the crisis; that is, Okabe apparently observed ingratitude on the part of Chinese citizens.²⁷⁷

Further, Okabe’s recollections describe the hardships experienced by the teachers who stayed at Tōē School during the crisis. According to his writings, Japanese residents in Shantou faced severe material conditions at the outset of the war. Sometimes the Guangdong Army would fire their guns indiscriminately on Shantou, and the school itself suffered damages in this way. It was impossible to venture out on the streets to buy anything. Sometimes the situation outside the school was so dangerous that the teachers had to remain sequestered in the school for a whole week. Although experienced teachers might not have been surprised at such periodic dangers in Shantou, newcomers like Okabe were astonished. Okabe recorded his overall assessment of the visit: “The crisis went on and on. It is not an overstatement that I went without a single peaceful day during my stay in Shantou.”²⁷⁸

²⁷⁷ Ibid.
²⁷⁸ Ibid.
In sum, the writings and reports of Katase, Okabe, Kondō, and Ide constitute evidence that Shantou’s response to the May Fourth Movement was strong, and that Japanese residents in Shantou were disturbed by both the strong anti-Japanese sentiment and the political instability there.
5.3 Japanese Writings about Shantou’s Reaction to the May Thirtieth Incident

Tokusaburō Ida 飯田德三郎, the head of the Osaka Shipping Company’s branch office in Shantou, offered this revealing commentary:

The stubborn degree of anti-Japanese sentiment in Shantou was unequaled elsewhere in China. Once [the Chinese government] essentially authorized anti-Japanese activities, the end result was a movement of violence, which proceeded for between half a year and an entire year. It [anti-Japanese sentiment] would boil over every two or three years, which grew wearying for [Japanese]. Any kind of Japanese business that has just taken off immediately gets cut to the ground by the [anti-Japanese] movement. How could Japanese put up with such situation?279

In the mid-1920s, an important anti-Japanese boycott occurred in China, the “May Thirtieth Incident” (五月三日). On May 30, 1925, a British Municipal Police officer in Shanghai gave the order to open fire on Chinese protesters who had gathered in Shanghai’s International Settlement

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279 Tokusaburō Ida 飯田德三郎, “Swatō yawa” 汕頭夜話 (Nighttime discussion in Shantou), Taiwan jihō 臺灣時報, p. 238 (July 1939).
to protest the actions of Japanese-owned Shanghai-based cotton factories, which had illegally laid off and beat up Chinese workers. The shootings sparked nation-wide anti-foreign demonstrations. The anti-foreign atmosphere, especially the anti-Japanese and anti-British movements, reached their peak during the period from July to October in 1925. Maids, rickshaw pullers, and boatmen called a strike, and food supplies to foreign residents stopped. Most Japanese residents in Shantou, including about 170 Japanese and 380 Taiwanese, went back to Japan or Taiwan, except for some staff at the consulate and at schools.\(^{280}\)

Katayose Gunji 片寄軍兒, who was born in Miyazaki Prefecture, Japan in 1897, and started to work at the Archives Section at the Taiwan General Government in 1921,\(^{281}\) commented that “the Chinese are people who like turmoil. Without turmoil, it seems that [the Chinese people] wouldn’t be able to distinguish day from night. It is a nation that manages to maintain year-round turmoil.” Katayose named the turmoil “Shina sō” 支那騒, Chinese-style turmoil. He suggested that many Chinese people tended to linger around the turmoil but failed to grasp the meaning and purpose of the demonstrations. Katase regarded it as a “kūsō” 空騒, turmoil in vain. For example, Chinese people repeatedly distributed anti-Japan leaflets and

\(^{280}\) “Swatō jōhō” 汕頭情報 (Information about Shantou), *Taiwan jihō* 臺灣時報, p. 13. (April 1927)

\(^{281}\) *Taiwan Sōtokufu shokuin roku* 臺灣總督府職員錄 (The staff listing for the Taiwan General Government), p. 30 (1921); p. 30 (1922); p.31 (1923); p. 33 (1924); p. 31 (1925).
waved flags appealing for the abolishment of imperial Japan’s Twenty-One Demands on National Humiliation Day (May Fourth) every year, and yet many of these activists lacked even a rudimentary understanding of these events. In fact, a surprising number of activists regarded the turmoil as a festival (御祭騒) and regarded National Humiliation Day as a sanctioned opportunity to plunder Japanese goods.282

Katayose further depicted the turmoil of Shantou’s response to the May Thirtieth Incident. According to his observations, a 10,000-person demonstration took place on June 8, 1925, and consisted of students, Guomindang supporters, members of sailors unions, and average citizens. The General Conference of the Student Unions of Lingdong Union (嶺東學生聯合會) issued several appeals in the demonstration, including the following six: (1) a call for ending both the collection of excrement and the provision of food for Japanese and British residents in Shantou; (2) a call for a boycott of Japanese and British goods; (3) a call for Shantou’s ports to refuse harbor to Japanese and British ships; (4) a call for a general boycott of foreign paper money; (5) a call for a boycott of hotels and theaters run by foreigners; and (6) a call for citizen-organized

282 Gunji Katayose 片寄軍兒, “Saikin no chūka minkoku wo miru” 最近の中華民國を観る(Observations of recent events in the Republic of China), Taiwan keisatsu kyōkai zasshi 臺灣警察協會雜誌, p. 68 (August 1, 1925).
donations and citizen-organized militias.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 73–74.}

The National Diplomacy Supporters’ Association (國民外交後援會) in Shantou made a host of announcements, including the following five demands: (1) a call for the breaking off of economic relations with Japan and Britain; (2) a call for a citywide strike on June 15; (3) a call for every household’s display of a white flag with the words “Support Fellow Shanghai Martyrs! Overthrow British and Japanese Imperialism!” and for fines to be levied on any household not hanging the flag; (4) a call for strikes among workers like excrement collectors and cooks, whose labor typically catered to foreigners; and (5) a call for labor unions to help the abovementioned workers during the strike.\footnote{Ibid.}

Katase’s writings vividly describe the anti-Japanese atmosphere in Shantou in the aftermath of the May Thirtieth Incident.

In September 1925, four months after the May Thirtieth Incident, Mitsumasa Kobayashi 小林光政 (1892–1962), a high-ranking police officer, visited southern China’s treaty ports, including Xiamen, Shantou, and Guangzhou. Kobayashi’s report published in Taiwan keisatsu kyōkai zasshi 臺灣警察協會雑誌 (Taiwan Police Association Magazine) in February 1926,
paints a detailed picture of the anti-Japanese atmosphere in Shantou. Kobayashi was born in
Tochigi Prefecture, Japan in 1892. When he was still a student at Tokyo Imperial University, he
passed the advanced civil-office examination and worked at the Police Agency immediately after
graduation. In 1919, he served as secretary at the Korea General Government, and two years later,
he transferred back to the Police Agency. Kobayashi enjoyed a sterling reputation in the field of
law enforcement, and was regarded as “a new favorite son in police circles. Clear-headed, with
excellent ability, he has none of the taint so often attributed to police.”

In the travelogue, a passage by Kobayashi depicts Shantou port as strikingly different from
the scene at Xiamen. When first setting eyes on Shantou port, he saw no sampans, which were
used for disembarking both passengers and luggage. The wild port looked very lonesome, as
only a few steamships were anchored there, including the Japanese warship Yūbari 夕張, one
Chinese steamship, and two other foreign steamships. The lonesome scene was certainly the
result of anti-foreign activities. The travelogue then states that a coup against Sun Yat-sen had
taken place in Shantou just several days earlier and that Shantou now was occupied by an army

285 “Kobayashi Mitsumasa shi ryaku reki” 小林光政氏略歴 (A brief summary of Kobayashi Mitsumasa’s career),
Taiwan nichi nichī shinpō 臺灣日日新報, no. 8965, evening news 1 (April 26, 1925).
under Zho-lin Hong 洪兆麟 (1872–1925) who served Jiong-ming Chen 陳炯明 to fight Sun Yat-sen. It seems that the boycott in Shantou became much more moderate under Hong’s (and Chen’s) governance and it is said that the sampan operators gradually returned to work. Later, Kobayashi boarded a small yacht belonging to the Osaka Shipping Company and because the passengers were still not allowed to enter Shantou through normal customs posts, Kobayashi and other passengers disembarked from the Asian Oil Company’s private passageway. After landing, Kobayashi planned to visit the Japanese consulate, but his entourage and he had no luck securing rickshaws, as the runners refused to pick up Japanese passengers. In the end, the Japanese group had to walk to the Japanese consulate in the oppressive heat and humidity.

After meeting with the vice consul, Kobayashi visited the Tōē School, a Japanese-financed school near the consulate. Because of the anti-Japanese movement, the number of students at the school had dropped dramatically to between 140 and 150. After noting this effect of the turmoil, he visited the Japanese-financed Hakuai Hospital, which was still under construction. When the entourage walked out to the street listlessly (probably because of the heat), a young Chinese man approached them and asked them something. The administrator of the hospital who had walked

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286 Mitsumasa Kobayashi 小林光政, “Nanshi no hatsutabi” 南支の初旅 3 (Forays into southern China, part 3), *Taiwan keisatsu kyōkai zashi* 臺灣警察協會雑誌, p. 79. (February 1, 1926) 287 Ibid.
out with Kobayashi answered with several sentences in Chinese. Kobayashi could not understand
Chinese and, after the Chinese man’s departure, asked what had just transpired. The
administrator told Kobayashi that the young man had suspected them of being Japanese—a
suspicion that the administrator had denied. Kobayashi wrote, “I wonder what he would have
done had we admitted to being Japanese.”

Later, Kobayashi tried to buy cigarettes on the street, but the vendor refused to sell them to
him. Finally, Kobayashi went back to the Asian Oil Company complex and waited to reboard the
ship. Most of the passengers appeared to be officials of the former government who were going
into exile. Among them were two Chinese women. A Japanese-consulate staffer told Kobayashi
that these two women were family members of the head of the former government’s Negotiation
Bureau (交涉署). They had all escaped to another consulate the previous night and were now
seeking passage to Hong Kong, which might offer them protection. Regarding some

heavy-looking bags placed on the deck, Kobayashi heard that they contained silver brought by
these passengers, who intended to be as financially prepared as possible when going into exile.

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288 Ibid., p. 80.
289 The Negotiation Bureau was an institution affiliated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Nationalist
Government of the ROC or with local governments in charge of foreign affairs, affairs concerning nationals living
abroad, customs, and entry and exit controls. In the late 1940s, Negotiation Bureaus in many places were dissolved
and they totally disappeared by 1949.
Kobayashi wrote, “It is ironic that these people [Chinese officials of the former government and their families] put the boycott of Japanese goods and of British goods aside thoroughly, boarding a Japanese steamship to British Hong Kong, where exile awaited.”

Aboard the steamship, Kobayashi asked for some bread and beer, but the server said that the ship carried neither beer nor Japanese sake. Kobayashi wrote, “This has resulted from the boycott, which even affects the ship!”

Finally, Kobayashi could eat only bread and waited for dinner. He commented, “My impressions of Shantou are getting worse and worse!”

Kobayashi’s writings provide us a vivid picture of the anti-Japanese (and anti-British) atmosphere in Shantou in the latter half of 1925. Indeed, throughout the latter half of the 1920s, anti-Japanese sentiments simmered. For example, On January 4, 1926, two crew members of the Japanese steamship Kenkon hired four sampans in Shantou, and a conflict arose stemming from the payment for services. The conflict eventually resulted in physical confrontation and two

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290 Ibid., pp. 80–81.
291 Ibid., p. 81.

The action provoked Chinese anger, and on January 6, angry Chinese sampan workers initiated a strike targeting all Japanese steamships in Shantou. On the same day, Wen-Dong Ma, the chief negotiator for Shantou’s Negotiation Bureau sent a letter to Shantou’s Japanese consul, Gorō Uchida, requesting the following actions: (1) detention of suspected criminals, (2) prompt trials of suspects charged with crimes in Shantou, (3) an apology from the Japanese government to the Nationalist Government and Shantou citizens, (4) compensation, (5) and assurances that similar incidents would not happen again.

On January 7, the labor union of sampan workers formally accused Japanese crew members of violence and two hundred sampan workers petitioned the Negotiation Bureau in Shantou for justice, forcing the Japanese consul Uchida to accept the five requests. Later, on January 16, the workers in Shantou called a demonstration to protest both Japan’s dispatching of troops to Manchuria and the injuries sustained by the sampan workers in Shantou.\(^{292}\) In the following year, on July 7, 1927, a large-scale boycott of Japanese goods took place in Shantou and many

Japanese goods were confiscated.\textsuperscript{293}

In fact, anti-Japanese sentiment continued into the late 1920s. The experiences of Tairiku Munetō\footnote{Tairiku Munetō 宗藤大陸, “Nanshi ryokō no shokan” 南支旅行の所感 (The thinking of traveling southern China), \textit{Taiwan kyōiku} 臺灣教育, no. 320, p. 95 (March 1, 1929).} attest to the lingering resentment. Munetō was born in Okayama Prefecture, Japan in 1893. He worked for the police department in Japan’s Hyogo Prefecture for several years. In 1924, he traveled to Taiwan, where he initially worked for the police force under the Taiwan General Government and, later (in 1927), transferred to the Department of Education. In January 1929, Munetō started off on a journey with other colleges, including the head of the Department of Education, Hidehiko Ishiguro\footnote{Ibid., p. 149.}, to southern China, where they would inspect the regions’ educational institutions. They visited Xiamen, Fuzhou, and Shantou. In Munetō’s report, he wrote,

> When deciding to go to China, the first thing that came to my mind was the anti-Japanese situation. Upon arriving in China, I didn’t feel the severity of it [anti-Japanese situation]. However, Japanese officials and residents there [in Shantou] told me that the boycott was indeed significant… I did see slogans and graffiti of ‘Down with imperialism!’ and ‘Down with the Japanese bastards!’ everywhere.\textsuperscript{294}
Munetō’s worries reflected concerns of most Japanese travelers en route to China at that time.

In May 1929, *Taiwan zhi chaye* 臺灣之茶葉 (Taiwan’s tea), a periodical in colonial Taiwan, published a report entitled “The Current Status of Shantou’s Importation of Japanese Goods” noted,

[Shantou’s] boycott of Japanese goods, though still active, was showing signs of dissipating. [Japanese and Taiwanese] merchants had waited for the storm to pass. From the start of the anti-Japanese movement, Shantou had been regarded as the most intensive site of the boycott. In fact, Shantou’s boycott was not restricted to Shantou. The boycotts in Vietnam and Siam, which were closely connected with Shantou’s economy, were intensive, as well. According to telegrams from Shantou yesterday and today, some wealthy merchants in Shantou recently started importing Japanese goods, and the overall importation of Japanese goods into the city has become noticeably smoother and less impeded than it was. Businessmen predicted that these improvements have grown visible not only in Shantou, but in Vietnam and Siam, as well.²⁹⁵

In sum, the writings and reports of Katayose, Kobayashi, and Munetō constitute evidence that Shantou’s response to the May Thirtieth Movement was strong, and that Japanese travellers and residents in Shantou were annoyed by the strong anti-Japanese sentiment there.
Fig. 5-2 Tokusaburō Ida’s “Nighttime Discussion in Shantou.”

[Illustration] The words in the red frame suggest that significant anti-Japanese sentiment in Shantou was unequaled elsewhere in China. (Source: Taiwan jihō, July, 1939.)
5.4 Japanese Writings about Shantou in the Turbulent 1930s

In the early 1930s, Sino-Japanese relations reached a breaking point with the outbreak of

the Manchu Incident in 1931 and the Shanghai Incident in 1932.\footnote{The Manchurian Incident, which occurred on September 18, 1931, was an armed conflict between the Japanese Kwantung Army and the Chinese Tungbei Army led by Xueliang Zhang 張學良. The military conflict raised calls for war in Japan. The Shanghai Incident, which occurred in Shanghai on January 28, 1932, was an armed conflict that broke out between the Japanese Marine Corps and the Chinese 19th Route Army.}

How did Japanese travelers in Shantou perceive the port city in the early 1930s? Shunsuke Morida 森田俊介, who headed the Taiwan General Government’s Section of Hygiene depicted

Shantou as he saw it in the early 1930s. Born in Fukuoka, Japan in 1900, Morida had graduated from Tokyo Imperial University and then, in 1924, had traveled to Taiwan, working at the

Bureau of Domestic Affairs and, later, at the Bureau of Police Affairs.\footnote{Taiwan Sōtokufu shokuin roku 臺灣總督府職員錄 (The staff listing for the Taiwan General Government), p. 34 (1924); p. 35 (1925); p. 38 (1926); p. 242 (1927); p. 262 (1928); p. 67 (1929); p. 120 (1930); p. 124 (1931); pp. 123-124 (1932).} In March 1932, when Morida was working at the Section of Hygiene, Bureau of Police Affairs, he visited branches of

Hakuai Hospital in Fuzhou, Xiamen, Shantou, and Guangdong. In his travel report, he stated that

the Japanese-financed Hakuai Hospitals were the targets of angry crowds of Chinese. In some

instances, windows at the branches had been shattered by stone-throwing crowds. When Morida

arrived in Shantou, he was surprised by the messages written in enormous letters on wall skirting
the coastline: “Expelling imperialism!” “Japanese Dogs.”

Morida wrote,

It is said that Shantou is a unique community of 120 thousand people with a toxic anti-Japanese atmosphere. While I was aboard the vessel Kōdōmaru as it entered Shantou’s port, no single sampan appeared to unload our cargo; in fact, only a launch carrying customs and quarantine officials came to us. The scene was lonesome and unsettling.

I boarded the Japanese Consulate’s launch and set off for land with the welcome of Mr. Nagashima, the head of the Hakuai Hospital at that time. [We] avoided landing at customs, instead making our way to a dock behind the Japanese Consulate. There, [we] visited the consulate deputy, Mr. Tonegi.

Morida’s recollections of reaching Shantou’s ports was similar to those of Kobayashi Mitumasa, who had traveled to Shantou in September 1925. Both Morida and Kobayashi

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298 Shunsuke Morida 森田俊介, “Nanshi sōyūki” 南支遊記 (Travelogue of southern China), Shinchikushū jiho 新竹州時報, no. 20, pp. 85–86 (January 4, 1939).
299 Ibid., p. 86.
perceived Shantou’s ports as desolate (e.g., the absence of sampans). Both Morida and Kobayashi avoided landing at a normal customs post, preferring the private trestle belonging to the Japanese consulate.

After depicting the experience of landing Shantou, Morida then depicted the scene inside Shantou city, where many Chinese soldiers were stationed. He wrote,

I went to the Hakuai Hospital located in Waimalu 外馬路. Soldiers were stationed on the roofs of tall buildings, apparently keeping a watchful eye on the foreign warships anchored in the port. The soldiers on the streets were armed, and most were slim youths, wearing uniforms like those of Taiwanese able-bodied men.\(^\text{300}\) [The Chinese soldiers] carried guns and umbrellas on their backs, which make the soldiers look peculiar. I heard that Chinese soldiers’ equipment later improved, so that one would no longer see soldiers carrying umbrellas on their backs.\(^\text{301}\)

外馬路にある博愛医院に行ったが、街の大きな建物の屋上には番兵が立っていた。港内の各国の軍艦の動静を監視しているのだろう。町の通りにも兵士が、武装して警備している。その兵士は概して痩せた青年であり、台湾の壮丁団のような服を着て、銃を持ち、背中には傘などを背負っているのが異様に感せられた。その後支那の兵備を改善されたそうだから、今では傘を背負った兵など見られないことであろう。

\(^{300}\) After 1898, the third year of Japanese governance in Taiwan, the Taiwan General Government established the Hokō System 保甲制度, an auxiliary institution of the police. According to this system, every ten households constituted one kō 保 (甲), and every ten kō constituted one ho 保 (保). Every kō had a kōchō 甲長 (a head of the kō), and every ho had a hoshō 保正 (a head of the ho). A sōteidan 壯丁団 (a group of able-bodied men) formed a subgroup of the Hokō System and comprised able-bodied men between 17 and 50 years old. The purpose of sōteidan was to guard against banditry and natural disasters. Chao-ju Chen 陳昭如, *Taiwan da baike quan shu* 臺灣大百科全書 (Encyclopedia of Taiwan), http://taiwanpedia.culture.tw/web/content?ID=3718.

\(^{301}\) Shunsuke Morida 森田俊介, “Nanshi sōyūki” 南支遊記 (Travelogue of southern China), *Shinchikushū jiho* 新竹州時報, no. 20, p. 86 (January 4, 1939).
Morida depicted another episode. When he tried to buy a cigarette, the vendor—perceiving Morida was Japanese—refused to make the sale. Later, Morida and his entourage entered a Chinese restaurant for lunch, where the waitstaff grew openly sullen after noting that the customers were Japanese. However, one waiter at the restaurant was Taiwanese and treated the Japanese group kindly while serving them food. It is interesting to note that, regarding attitudes toward Japanese, there were a significant difference between Taiwanese and local Chinese in Shantou: the former were hospitable whereas the latter expressed antipathy, indicating different points of views about the presence of Japanese in Shantou.

At the end of his stay in the city, Morida wrote, “When I left Shantou, it was engulfed in an anti-Japanese atmosphere. I felt it difficult to anticipate any kind of lasting peace among people.”

The Sino-Japanese relations in Shantou deteriorated in May 1932 because of the occurrence of “Shantou Incident.” Huai-zhen Zhang 張懷真 (1871–1941), the president and the chief editor of Shan bao 汕報, a major local Chinese newspaper in Shantou, published an editorial

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302 Ibid.
303 Ibid., p. 88.
praising Bong-gil Yoon 尹奉吉 (1908–1932), the Korean independence activist best known for orchestrating the bombing of a Japanese gathering in Shanghai on April 29, 1932. Zhang argued that Yoon’s activities were proof of the Korean people’s enduring nationalist spirit and that the Chinese people should follow Yoon’s example. By way of a memorandum, the Japanese consul in Shantou informed the Shantou City Government that Zhang’s activity was an insult to the Japanese emperor and asked the Shantou City Government to close Shan bao and arrest Huai-zhen Zhang immediately because he had insulted the Japanese emperor. The Shantou City Government refused the Japanese consul’s request.

Several days later, twenty Japanese warships arrived in Shantou. Seven of the warships entered the Shantou port with uncovered cannons, clearly issuing the threat that military action was pending. Meanwhile, the Japanese consul issued an ultimatum, demanding that the Shantou City Government implement the following actions within forty-eight hours: (1) close Shan bao, (2) arrest Huai-Zhen Zhang and send him to a designated Japanese warship to await punishment, (3) compensate Japan for the expense of the warships’ unscheduled stop in Shantou, (4) ensure the safety of Japanese citizens in Shantou, and (5) prohibit any further public displays of
anti-Japanese sentiment in the city.\textsuperscript{304}

Facing such threats, the Shantou mayor Zi-xin Huang 黃子信 went into hiding. Rui-gui
Zhang 張瑞貴 (1891−1977) was the director of the Chinese army garrisoned in Shantou at that
time. He openly supported Shan bao and Huai-Zhen Zhang. Facing Japan’s ultimatum, Rui-gui
Zhang took the following actions: (1) he declared that Shantou City was under martial law; (2)
he evacuated Shantou’s citizens to the suburbs, such as Chaoan, Chaoyang, and Jieyang,
especially turning Shantou City into a ghost town; (3) he ordered that Chinese army units
surround Japanese citizens’ residences in Shantou, supervising their actions and prohibiting them
from stepping outside; (4) he ordered that fortifications made from sandbags and other materials
be built at strategic points along the coast; and (5) he ordered the port be closed. Rui-gui Zhang,
on the one hand, diplomatically refused Japan’s ultimatum and, on the other hand, strongly
implied that if the Japanese warships dared to open fire, the Chinese military might impose harm
on—Shanotu’s Japanese citizens. Finally, Japan conceded and the two sides declared that the
entire sequence of events had stemmed from a misunderstanding. The so-called Shantou Incident

\textsuperscript{304} Shantou shi di fang zhi bian zuan wei yuan hui gong shi 汕頭市地方誌編纂委員會辦公室 (Office of the
resolved itself peacefully.  

Kameyuki Katayama 片山龟雄, a staffer in the Taiwan General Government, described the situation in Shantou around 1935. Born in Japan’s Kumamoto Prefecture, Katayama had worked at a radio station in Keelung. In 1935, he visited Shantou and described the port as captivationally quiet. The tension in the air, however, was electric. Probably because the Sino-Japanese tensions at that time were explosive, Katayama and his fellow passengers did not disembark from their steamship until receiving some kind of confirmation that their safety could be ensured. Shortly, they received a telegram from a local agent at the Osaka Shipping Company in Shantou, stating that Japanese would be safe from harm in Shantou but that the boycott of Japanese goods was growing in intensity.

After setting foot in Shantou, Katayama wrote,

“There were armed soldiers stationed at strategic point on the street and it looked like the city was under martial law. In any case, almost no Japanese were visiting the area. Certainly, I didn’t see any sumptuously clad ladies like those in Xiamen. The scene before me was that of a dead port.”

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305 Ibid.
306 *Taiwan Sōtokufu shokuin roku* (The staff listing for the Taiwan General Government), p. 167 (1928); p. 178 (1929); p. 224 (1930); p. 231 (1931); p. 228 (1932); p. 239 (1933); p. 249 (1934); p. 258 (1935); p. 274 (1936); p. 289 (1937).
307 Kemeo Katayama 片山龟雄, “Kaikyō wo iku (2)” 海峡を行く 2 (Voyage across the straits), *Taiwan teishin kyōkai zasshi* 臺灣通信協會雜誌, no. 189, p. 94 (December 17, 1937).
308 Ibid.
In this passage, it is interesting to note that Katayama’s comparison of Shantou and Xiamen points to Xiamen’s far superior circumstances. Indeed, most port cities would garner a more favorable assessment than, as Katayama put it, a “dead port.” (死の港)

In early 1936, a significant Sino-Japanese conflict occurred in Shantou. On January 21, 1936, Susumu Kakuda 角田進, who was a member of the Japanese consulate’s security detail in Shantou was found dead in the street. The Japanese consul in Shantou, Harada, reported to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Japan that Kakuda had died from gunshot wounds and that Chinese anti-Japanese activists had perpetrated the murder; furthermore, Harada requested compensation from the Shantou mayor Yuan-he Li 李源和 for the brutal act. However, the Chinese version of Kakuda’s death was starkly different from the Japanese version. According to Chinese sources, Kakuda had been sick for a long time and had died from natural causes. On January 22, the Japanese warship Yūbari 夕張 entered Shantou port, outfitted to open fire if the order came. Noting that only six staffers were in Shantou’s Japanese consulate at that time, the
chief of staff of the Taiwanese Army (臺灣軍參謀長), Rippei Ogisu 萩洲立兵 (1884–1949), took the following actions: (1) Ogisu asked Yamada, the consul general of Xiamen (Amoy), to send officials to Shantou, where they would assist Japanese citizens residing in the area; (2) he ordered the Japanese steamships Gotake 吳竹 and Sanae 早苗 to make haste for Shantou, where they would be ready to open fire; and (3) he asked the special investigator of the Guangdong Government, Zhong-hui Zhang 張鍾輝, to investigate the alleged crime and to arrest the criminals responsible.

On January 23, Ogisu had talks with Jitang Chen, the director of the Guangdong Government, in an effort to settle the dispute. Whether the truth of Kakuda’s death resembled the Japanese or Chinese version mattered little in terms of the incident’s effects on Shantou’s residents: both the Japanese and Chinese there grew distinctly uneasy. Under the city’s strong anti-Japanese atmosphere, Japanese citizens in Shantou worried about their safety; likewise, Chinese residents were scared that the Japanese warship would open fire on them.³⁰⁹ Three months and half after Kakuda’s death, on May 1, 1936, Japanese Consul Harada sent an ultimatum to the Shantou Government, requesting compensation. In response, the Guangdong

³⁰⁹ *Taiwan nichi nichi shinpō* 臺灣日日新報, no. 12866, daily news 2 (January 23, 1936); no. 12870, daily news 7 (January 27, 1936); no. 12872, evening news 4 (January 29, 1936); no. 12873 daily news 12 (January 30, 1936).
government accepted a compromise: they agreed to compensate Kakuda’s family in the sum of five thousand Chinese yuan in the name of the Cunxin Charitable Society (存心善堂), the largest benevolent society in Shantou.\(^{310}\)

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Concerning Shantou’s Sino-Japanese relations in 1936, the article “Notes on Shantou” written by Seijiuemon Ōkubo 大久保清次右衛門, a teacher at the Japanese Elementary School in Shantou (汕頭日本人小學校), provides us some revealing information. Ōkubo was born in Ibaraki Prefecture in Japan. In 1933, he worked at a public school in Taitung (in eastern Taiwan), and later, in 1936, he was assigned to the Japanese Elementary School in Shantou. He stayed there until 1940, when he returned to Taipei to fill a teaching position at an elementary school.³¹¹

Ōkubo’s report declares that the slogan “Down with imperialism!” (打倒帝國主義) was on display, in written form, on many streets throughout Shantou. In Zhongshan Park (which was named in memory of Sun Yat-sen), people had etched onto various surfaces not only the slogan “Down with imperialism!” but also the slogan “Praise the three principles of the people!” (禮讚三民主義) On the front doors of Japanese residents’ homes were scrawled “Down with imperialism!” and “Japanese dog!” among other epithetic exclamations. Ōkubo commented, “Anti-Japanese thought permeated Chinese people’s thought.”³¹²

³¹¹ Taiwan Sōtokufu shokuin roku 臺灣總督府職員錄 (The staff listing for the Taiwan General Government), p. 577 (1933); p. 600 (1934); p. 623 (1935); p. 120 (1936); p. 420 (1937); p. 447 (1938); p. 396 (1940).
³¹² Seijiuemon Ōkubo 大久保清次右衛門, “Swatō mangen” 汕頭漫言 (Notes on Shantou), Taiwan kyōiku 臺灣教育, no. 412, p. 76 (November 1, 1936).
Ōkubo’s notes further declare it a pity that many native residents in Guangdong Province went to Japan for their studies, while anti-Japanese thought in Guangdong was practically feverish. On the one hand, ethnic Chinese from Guangdong were absorbing Japanese culture, and on the other hand, they were enthusiastically resisting Japan. From these complex, if not inconsistent phenomena, one can appreciate Ōkubo’s comment that “China was a mysterious country and the Chinese were mysterious men!” (支那人はやはり謎の国であり、支那人は謎の入であるやうです) Ōkubo criticized Chinese people’s anti-Japanese attitudes but posed a question about the matter: “Should Japanese not conduct a self-examination about their general attitudes toward China and Chinese?”

Ōkubo’s writings indicate that Japanese residents of Shantou faced hardship stemming from the city’s anti-Japanese atmosphere. Kobayashi, an officer serving aboard the Fukkenmaru steamship suggested that, because anti-Japanese sentiment and activity were thriving in Shantou, Taiwanese sekimin would regularly pretend to be Chinese in everyday life. Only when they faced oppression by the Chinese government or some other similarly insurmountable danger

313 Ibid.
would the Taiwanese hoist the hinomaru flag (the Flag of Japan) in an opposite strategy of self-protection.314

In March, 1937, some four months before the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War, a group of Japanese and Taiwanese students published their travelogues in Reisei 麗正, a publication of Taipei First Junior High School. Some of the students expressed their keen awareness of Shantou’s tense atmosphere. For example, Saburō Watanabe 渡部三郎 noted that the entrances of many large stores in downtown Shantou were embanked with barbed wire nettings and fences. The explanation for these security measures was that if something untoward were to occur, the stores could immediately shut down to avoid looting. The blue-uniformed Chinese soldiers of the Guangdong Faction (關東派) kept a watchful, resentful eye on them. Finally, they arrived in front of the Japanese Elementary School and observed the sun-mark flag (i.e., the flag of Japan) waving in the breeze atop the school.

Then, Watanabe wrote,

“When I witnessed the sun-mark flag waving vigorously, I felt a surge of strength. When I thought of the stance being taken by this group of young fellow countrymen,

314 “Daigokai nanshi shisatsu hōkoku zadankai” 第五回南支視察報告座談會 (The fifth forum of inspection and report after a visit to southern China), Senbai tsūshin 専売通信, vol. 15, no. 11, p. 55. (November 20, 1936)
who had been persistently bearing on their backs Chinese people’s revilement but had still behaved in a manly way, my face grew hot spontaneously.”

異郷で見る日の丸の旗は実に神神しく、力強く感ずるものである。此の様な異郷で常に支那民衆の無謀な罵声を背後に受けながらも、雄々しく奮闘している我が小同胞の気なげな姿を想ひ起す時、臉は自然と熱くなる。

5.5 Brief Conclusion

In this chapter, I examine Japanese texts describing Shantou during the period from the 1910s to the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War in July 1937. I find substantial evidence that Japanese travelers and residents’ most striking impression of Shantou was of the city’s strident anti-Japanese climate, which would take such forms as restrictions on Japanese citizens’ movements and boycotts on Japanese goods. My paper in some degree responds to Karl Gerth’s research about the relationship between Chinese nationalism and the culture of consumption prevalent during the National Products Movement from 1900 to 1937. He argues that by promoting the purchase of national products as opposed to foreign products, the movement offered people of all classes an opportunity to resist imperialism and express nationalist sentiments. Boycotts of foreign goods took place mainly during the period extending from 1905

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315 Saburō Watanabe 渡部三郎, “Hong Kong Swatō” 香港-汕頭 (Hong Kong–Shantou), Reisei 麗正, no. 44, p. 177 (March 3, 1937).
to the 1930s, and most of the boycotts during the movement targeted Japanese products. Boycotts contributed to the growth and proliferation of movement organizations.\textsuperscript{316}

When we examine Japanese texts describing Shantou during the period from the 1910s to the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War in July 1937, we find substantial evidence that Japanese travelers and residents’ most striking impression of Shantou was of the city’s strident anti-Japanese climate, which would take such forms as restrictions on Japanese citizens’ movements and boycotts on Japanese goods. In the late 1910s and the early 1920s, many Japanese writings focused on Shantou’s reaction to the May Fourth Movement (1919).

For example, Hiroshi Katase, a teacher at Shantou’s Tōē School, and Chinzō Kondō, chief of the Mitusi Bussan’s Amoy and Fuzhou Branch Office, depicted the severity of Shantou’s response. Thereafter, between the mid- and late 1920s, officials of the Taiwan General Government, including Gunji Katayose, Mitsumasa Kobayashi, Tairiku Munetō, separately testified to Shantou’s pronounced opposition to both Japanese goods and Japanese activities in the city. Subsequently, the Manchuria Incident and the Shanghai Incident, which occurred respectively in September 1931 and January 1932, further deteriorated the Sino-Japanese

relations in Shantou. Shunsuke Morida and Kameo Katayama, who worked in the Taiwan General Government, vividly described the worsening relations on the basis of their travels in the area.

These and other writings expressed the intense anxiety felt by Japanese people staying in Shantou, a city that went through turbulent political change during this period. Shantou was essentially a battlefield where chaotic military conflicts among various warlords played themselves out in the first half of the twentieth century. Indeed, Shantou underwent much more political turbulence than its counterpart Amoy, another Chinese treaty port in southern China. Matsugorō Okabe, a teacher briefly at Shantou’s Tōē School, expressed his fear and anxiety about living in such a turbulent city under different warlords.

In sum, these Japanese writings constitute compelling evidence that neither native Japanese nor Taiwanese possessing Japanese citizenship could easily subsist in Shantou. These individuals—whether they were businessman contending with the Chinese boycott movement, teachers struggling to prevent the dissolution of Japanese-funded schools, or officials of the Taiwan General Government inspecting the city in the midst of myriad hostilities—would find it necessary either to presevere or flee in the face of mounting hostilities.
CONCLUSION

My dissertation has focused on a group of Japanese and Taiwanese people who lived in the Chinese treaty port —Shantou —during the period between 1895 and 1937. The starting time point (i.e., 1895) corresponds to the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, by which Japan acquired informal privileges in Chinese treaty ports. The ending time point (i.e., 1937) corresponds to the decline that Shantou’s Japanese community experienced owing to the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War on July 7, 1937. Given the tense Sino-Japanese relationships that accompanied these open military hostilities, many Japanese who had resided in Shantou fled to Hong Kong, to Taiwan, and even back to the Japanese homeland. These Shantou-based Japanese and Taiwanese people, including merchants, teachers, officials of the Taiwan General Government, and officials of Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, were cross-boundary people: they traversed geographical, national, and ethnic frontiers, migrating from either the Japanese homeland or colonial Taiwan to their new homeland—Shantou. By examining the activities of these cross-boundary people, I have explored the networks connecting the Japanese homeland, colonial Taiwan, and Shantou treaty port to one another; and
in this way, I have contributed to a new understanding of Japanese imperial expansion in East Asia.

For the conceptual framework of this dissertation, I drew inspiration from a group of scholars. First of all, I was inspired by Peter Duus, Ramon Myers, and Mark Peattie, who remind us that we should consider both the formal empire (the colonies) and the informal empire (the Chinese treaty ports) of Japan to understand Japan’s influence on wider East Asia and the importance of the connection between Japan’s formal and informal empires in East Asia. These scholars have suggested that Japan was interested in China in terms of trade rather than territory and that, thus, Japan’s informal empire in China enabled Japan to acquire economic benefits while tamping down on the costs of formal colonization.\footnote{Peter Duus, Ramon Myers, and Mark Peattie eds., The Japanese Informal Empire in China, 1895–1937. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989.} Second, I was inspired by Ann Stoler, Carole McGranahan, and Peter Perdue, who argued that we should turn our attention to imperial actors—to “people on the fringes of empires as well as at their centers, to designated subjects as well as colonial administrators, to those with companion and countervailing motivations to empire and to those who reside at the categorical edges of the imperial.”\footnote{Ann Laura Stoler, Carole McGranahan, and Peter C. Perdue eds., Imperial Formations. Santa Fe: School for Advanced Research Press; Oxford: James Currey, 2007, pp. 3–42.} In other words, we should turn our attention to peripheral people and the colonized.
Inspired by the abovementioned scholars and their studies, my dissertation focuses on, first, the connection between Japan’s informal empire in China (in this case, the Shantou treaty port) and Japan’s formal empire (in this case, Taiwan) in terms of commercial activities, educational activities, and the perceptions of Shantou articulated in Japanese travel writings published in Taiwan; second, the dissertation illustrates the ambiguous, complex interactions of Japanese, Taiwanese, and local Chinese in Shantou by exploring the Japan–China co-investment Dadong Ice-making Company. In order to clarify the two abovementioned issues, I have examined a great many Japanese sources, including official records of the Taiwan General Government, commercial and diplomatic reports of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Japan, major newspapers and periodicals in colonial Taiwan, and travel writings. In previous research concerning Japanese imperial expansion in East Asia, we seldom see studies exploring imperial Japanese influence on Shantou, and thus, my dissertation delineates imperial Japanese history from a new perspective.
1. The Commercial and Educational Network among the Japanese Homeland, Colonial Taiwan, and Shantou Treaty Port

Concerning the network of commerce in these circumstances, the early twentieth century saw Japan establish closer commercial relations with Shantou. Shantou was an important market for both Japanese and Taiwanese goods, including coal, seafood, molasses, and alcohol. The Japanese and Taiwanese goods served not only Shantou’s local needs but also those of other Chinese cities and of various regions in Southeast Asia. In Shantou, three major Japanese companies (the Mitsui Company, Taiwan Bank, and the Osaka Shipping Company) received a certain degree of governmental sponsorship; however, beyond them was a group of medium-sized companies that, without much public-sector assistance, successfully established their trade in Shantou. Moreover, Taiwanese merchants who established tea shops, textile companies, mining companies, pharmacies, and groceries played a crucial role in Shantou’s business circles. In examining these Japanese and Taiwanese companies and merchants, I have argued that a cross-boundary commercial network emerged among the Japanese homeland, colonial Taiwan, and Shantou treaty port.
Concerning educational networks and activities, I have focused on the Tōē School in Shantou (汕頭東瀛學校) and a group of Japanese and Taiwanese teachers whom the Taiwan General Government assigned to teaching positions in Shantou. It is clear that the Taiwan General Government was the main organization responsible for the connection between colonial Taiwan and Shantou in the field of education. In addition to assigning teachers and financing schools, the Taiwan General Government published teachers’ reports and travel writings in periodicals, such as *Taiwan kyōiku* 臺灣教育. By means of these periodicals, people in the field of education in colonial Taiwan attained information about Shantou. To varying degrees, readers in Taiwan shared Japanese teachers’ perceptions of Shantou, including perceptions of Chinese schools’ status in Shantou, of Western-based schools in Shantou, and of Japanese teachers’ self-examination stemming from Japan’s management of education in Shantou. These cross-boundary travelers at Shantou’s Tōē School reflect the significant transnational connections among the Japanese homeland, colonial Taiwan, and the treaty port of Shantou.

Concerning travel writings, I have examined relevant Japanese texts describing Shantou during the period from the 1910s to the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War in July 1937, and it is obvious from these texts that Japanese travelers and residents’ most striking impression
of Shantou was of the city’s strident anti-Japanese climate, which would take such forms as restrictions on Japanese citizens’ movements and boycotts on Japanese goods. These Japanese writings constitute compelling evidence that neither native Japanese nor Taiwanese possessing Japanese citizenship could easily subsist in Shantou. These individuals—whether they were businessman contending with the Chinese boycott movement, teachers struggling to prevent the dissolution of Japan-funded schools, or officials of the Taiwan General Government inspecting the city in the midst of myriad hostilities—preserved or fled in the face of mounting hostilities.


The social position and the legal status of Taiwanese sekimin in the Japanese empire’s hierarchy constitute an interesting issue that reaps great insights upon close examination. Barbara Brooks argued that colonial citizenship, which spanned multiple imperial fields, serves as a way for historians to explore the issue of identity in the Japanese empire. Meanwhile, imperial Japan’s policies concerning ethnicity and nationality demonstrate the different positions of
colonized peoples (e.g., Taiwanese and Koreans) within the empire. Some Japanese and Taiwanese scholars have demonstrated that Japan’s passport-control policies for Taiwanese subjects differed substantively from those for Japanese subjects. Moreover, Taiwanese sekimin who stayed in China didn’t enjoy exactly the same rights as Japanese who stayed in China. In this sense, although Taiwanese were Japanese subjects during the Japanese colonial period in Taiwan, Taiwanese were ultimately “sekimin” unable to benefit from the same set of rights as “Japanese” who hailed from the Japanese homeland. My dissertation explores the cooperation and competition, the conflict and compromise among Shantou’s Taiwanese sekimin merchants, local Chinese merchants, and the Japanese imperial consulate in Shantou by examining the Sino-Japanese co-investment Dadong Ice-making Company in Shantou, as previously mentioned.

The story of the Dadong Ice-making Company brings to light several interesting issues. First, although Taiwanese were Japanese subjects, it was not necessarily the case that Japanese

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authorities overseas would protect these Taiwanese. On some occasions, the Japanese authority was the origin of conflicts and obstacles besetting Taiwanese interests in China. An example of these marginalizing tendencies can be found in the actions undertaken by Shantou’s Japanese Consul Kumakichi Befu 別府熊吉, who chose to protect the interests of a “real Japanese” individual, Riichirō Taenaka 妙中利一郎, by expelling Taiwanese shareholders from China.

Second, the case of the Dadong Ice-making Company emphasizes the important role that nationality (国籍) played in business activities in the treaty port of Shantou. In the initial stage of the company’s operations, Consul Befu’s oppressive actions resulted in the Dadong Ice-making Company’s decision to register as a Chinese company by identifying Zi-bin Zheng 鄭子彬 as its registered owner. Later, in 1933, Zheng’s own strategic maneuvering led the company to register with the Japanese consulate in Shantou as a Japanese company, which afforded the company a degree of Japanese protection. In other words, both Japanese and Chinese nationals protected the Dadong Ice-making Company’s interests at different times. By way of example, the Taiwanese sekimin Chang-sheng Chen 陳長生 renounced his Japanese nationality and registered as Chinese to avoid the stream of obstacles erected by Consul Befu. This action by Chen was welcomed by the Republican Government of China, which regarded the
transformation as a kind of expansion of power. In Chen’s case, his Chinese nationality protected his interests in Shantou. Both the Dadong Ice-making Company and Chang-sheng Chen exemplify the importance of nationality to Taiwanese interests in Shantou.

Third, the dispute between Taiwanese and Chinese shareholders in 1933 manifested the ambivalence of Taiwanese who lived in China. Taiwanese who lived in Shantou had similar languages, ethnic backgrounds, and customs, and cooperated with each other in business and in local civic matters. However, the situation of Taiwanese was strongly influenced by the local atmosphere, that is, by anti-Japanese sentiment. As I have explored in Chapter Five, many Japanese travelers, like Kiwata Ide 井出季和太, a revenue officer in the Taiwan General Government, have suggested that Shantou was the site of the most pronounced anti-Japanese atmosphere in China. In this sense, we can speculate that when anti-Japanese movements were active in Shantou, Taiwanese found themselves personally in very real danger and found that their businesses would often experience significant financial losses. Therefore, how Taiwanese sojourners in Shantou protected themselves and their interests in an atmosphere of pronounced anti-Japanese sentiment is an issue of great importance here.
In conclusion, I have conducted a trans-national and cross-area study, combining theories and materials from across the board, and in this effort, I have provided a platform for dialogue among researchers in the fields of imperial Japanese history, colonial Taiwanese history, and local Chinese studies of Shantou.
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