Fall 12-21-2016

The Effect of Economic Integration and Political Centralization on Linguistic Diversity - And the New Function and Status of the English Language in Europe

Demba K. Baldeh
CUNY Hunter College

How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
Follow this and additional works at: http://academicworks.cuny.edu/hc_sas_etds

Part of the Anthropological Linguistics and Sociolinguistics Commons, Economics Commons, International Relations Commons, and the Social and Cultural Anthropology Commons

Recommended Citation
Baldeh, Demba K., "The Effect of Economic Integration and Political Centralization on Linguistic Diversity - And the New Function and Status of the English Language in Europe" (2016). CUNY Academic Works.
http://academicworks.cuny.edu/hc_sas_etds/109

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Hunter College at CUNY Academic Works. It has been accepted for inclusion in School of Arts & Sciences Theses by an authorized administrator of CUNY Academic Works. For more information, please contact AcademicWorks@cuny.edu.
The Effect of Economic Integration and Political Centralization on Linguistic Diversity - And the New Function and Status of the English Language in Europe

By

Demba K. Baldeh

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts Anthropology, Hunter College, The City University of New York

2016

Thesis Sponsor

December 21, 2016

Date

Christina Zarcadoolas

Signature

December 21, 2016

Date

Thomas H. McGovern

Signature of the Second Reader
ABSTRACT

This paper examines the effect of economic integration (EI)\textsuperscript{1} and political unity on linguistic diversity and the new function and status of the English language in Europe. Using a broad range of analytic approaches for examining the evolving linguistic situation and for assessing how strong the demand for a common language in Europe is, this paper shows that the current sociolinguistic transformation and the growing use of English as the language of choice are both strong effects and key indicators of the dynamic integration process. As I shall show in the following sections, linguistic analyses based on continent-wide patterns of second language acquisition and language use in different formal and informal contexts across Europe from 1950s to the present indicate the evolution of a dynamic, complex, and interesting linguistic pecking order in which English is increasingly assuming the role of the ‘integrating’ and functional language.

Keywords: European Economic and Political Integration, Linguistic Diversity, English.

\textsuperscript{1} Economic Integration (EI) here refers to the continuous removal of tariff and nontariff restrictions among nations through economic policies and political agreements meant to bring about economies of scale, increased productivity, and lower prices; whereas European Integration is the whole process of not just economic integration but also the political, legal, cultural, social and sociolinguistic integrations of the participating countries either wholly (e.g. for Germany) or partially (e.g. as was for UK) in Europe.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract ........................................................................................................................................... 1

Preface and acknowledgements ........................................................................................................ 3

Summary .......................................................................................................................................... 6

Introduction ....................................................................................................................................... 7

**PART One** ................................................................................................................................... 11

1. European integration and the nature of behavior of sociocultural systems: a functionalist approach ................................................................................................................................... 11

2. An overview of the evolution and structure of European integration: its determinants and indicators ............................................................................................................................................... 27

**PART TWO**: ................................................................................................................................... 49

3. Effect of economic integration and political centralization on linguistic diversity in Europe ........................................................................................................................................ 49

4. Effect of economic integration and political centralization on the functions and status of the English language in Europe ........................................................................................................ 75

Conclusion ....................................................................................................................................... 97

A Postscript ..................................................................................................................................... 117

Notes ............................................................................................................................................... 124

Bibliography .................................................................................................................................... 126

Tables and figures ............................................................................................................................... *2

---

2 All tables, figures, and subsections appear on their relevant sections fully numbered
Preface and Acknowledgements

My interest on the topic of languages evolved naturally during many spirited classroom discussions with Professors both in the Department of Anthropology as well as in the Political Science Department here at Hunter and at Baruch College all of which helped nurtured my academic interest leading me to be convinced that learning and education is indeed a highly selective process and contestable enterprise. As I came to see it, the process involves deliberate choices on what material gets to be included, discussed, emphasized, and what gets ignored, played down or marked for exclusion – all for good reasons. During those class discussions and before narrowing down to this present topic on European integration and its sociolinguistic situation, I was interested in investigating one of three broad topic areas:

- Egypt or Mesopotamia: which was the first to rise and why?
- The Rise of the State and the Evolution of Monotheism (using Egypt as the case study), and
- History and the Behavior of Power (showing how in history, culturally similar or different, leading nations applied their power).

My hypotheses were: One/ it was Egypt which rose first before Mesopotamia (which I found out ran contrary to that of the views held by Professors like Greg. Johnson who was also Chair of the Department of Anthropology), Two/ the evolution of Monotheism mirrored the development of the State - at least for Egypt, and Three/ that the behavior of politico-cultural power could be usefully compared to that of gravity, to be studied as such, and could be even regarded as independent of its possessors much as one would
talk of a person or nation as being possessed by power (the familiar phrases that ‘what goes up comes down’ or ‘history repeats itself’ are pertinent metaphors).

It was incredibly satisfying thinking of the academic potentials and merits of these topics; and I still believe they are great topics awaiting serious attention. However, for their further consideration, I was unable to enlist the kind of interest and or support I felt I needed either because I had failed to cultivate the student-faculty socializations at the time necessary for their enthusiastic participation or because the topics were just considered, again, too sensitive to delve into as my discussions with Professors like J. Brown on race matters, and Greg. Johnson on Mid-Eastern origins led me to believe.

My fourth topic option was on the evolution of the European languages after having a lively discussion once with my former linguistics Prof. E. Bendix (now emeritus) on the subject of the origin of languages. Here too, judging from the discussions, I concluded that this research topic was also equally problematic as it was about the tracing of Indo-European languages that inevitably leads one on a sure path to their African roots according to a Graduate Seminar I took with Prof. Delgado on Paleoanthropology which asserts that Africa is humanity’s cradle (I remember writing: “The Problem of Modern Human Origins and Why it Matters” as one of my term papers discussing human origins).

Finally, upon a reconsideration of that general topic on languages from a different angle, this present thesis and its multidisciplinary approach took shape - inspired by insights drawn from principles such as the 'uniformitarian principle' in geology that the natural forces or processes observable today are similar to those which shaped the past. In other words, studying this topic in a contemporary setting - the process and dynamics of
modern European integration - provided me a new testing ground to apply the same
general principles, theories or insights I would have had to apply had I taken on the other
more historically situated topics. It also allowed me to use a methodological approach
that is both diachronic and synchronic as it is theoretical and empirical.

The thesis essentially sets out to investigate ‘culture changes’ in a macro and
transformational context by shedding light on the interactive causal dynamics between
the economic and political forces and the emerging sociolinguistic situation with the aim
of applying that understanding to show further the type of interventionist policies that can
be feasible, practical, or desirable in a multilingual European Union.

I am therefore truly indebted to all those privileged and stimulating discussions of the
Undergraduate or Graduate Seminars I participated. I am thankful to all the Professors of
the departments of Anthropology and Political Science (and Sociology) who, in one way
or another, have contributed in my academic life. I am also grateful to all the Professors
and Graduate Advisors for their understanding and patience. I am particularly thankful to
Prof. McGovern and Prof. Zarcadoolars of the Department of Anthropology for support
and feedback on earlier drafts of this thesis. All opinions, facts, or errors expressed in this
paper, written in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts
(Anthropology), Hunter College, The City University of New York, are mine alone.
SUMMARY

The impact of economic and political integration on linguistic diversity has stimulated an upsurge of recent research interest on the link between the two phenomena. This paper examines the cumulative effect of integration on linguistic diversity and the new functions and status of the English language within the European Union (EU), one of the most significant multi-issue developments still unfolding in Europe.

The paper employs a wide range of analytic approaches showing the links between the economic, political, and sociolinguistic spheres and uses survey data analyses to assess the evolving linguistic situation in Europe and to what extent English is becoming the primary language of transnational communication for many EU citizens.

By and large, the sociolinguistic evidence presented in this paper indicate that the harmonizing and homogenizing dynamics of the economic, political and social integration have a significant impact on sociolinguistic diversity as languages compete and complement one another and as English becomes the most commonly spoken foreign language at the expense of others. In the future, English will be the most used language for intra-EU-wide communications in which it performs the different roles and functions of a mother tongue for some, a regional language for many, and a lingua franca for most. Consequently, when modeling the Continent’s evolving sociolinguistic trajectory, the most predictable in time will be the evolution of a linguistic pecking order, an increasing language convergence whereby languages become more similar to each other, and the emergence of a new continent-wide English variety with the distinctive characteristics of the broader macro-cultural context and overall sociolinguistic situation of Europe.
Introduction

Introduction to the content, scope and significance, and approaches and methodology.

Recently, there has been a resurgence of interest to understand better the forces that activate and shape economic integration, transform political structures and build new institutions with the aim of gaining insights and developing a useful explanation of the process. There is a considerable amount of attention being devoted particularly to the understanding of the profound development taking place in Europe in which established patterns of economic, political, and social structures are being constantly altered and reordered. Various analytic frameworks from different disciplinary perspectives have been developed over the past decades by economists, political scientists, sociologists, anthropologists, and others interested in European integration to assess the dynamics of this process: its course, the consequences it generates, and how to respond to some of its adverse effects. Diverse studies commissioned by the European Commission, contributions cataloged in the ARENA working papers, as well as ones by individual scholars, among others, represent this growing interest on the subject. This paper is therefore an attempt to study “culture” changes in its macro form which is, in the words of the anthropologist Edward Tylor (1832-1917), “…that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society” including language.

---

4 http://www.sv.uio.no/arena/english/research/publications/arena-working-papers/
5 https://www.britannica.com/biography/Edward-Burnett-Tylor
This paper reviews some of the theoretical conceptions and empirical findings often employed in the literature to examine aspects of the causal characteristics and functional mechanisms of the economic and political integration process (the independent variable) and its overall impact on the sociolinguistic situation (the dependent variable) in Europe. This is because, at a fundamental level, economic and political integration necessarily lead to cultural unity of sorts that generates an inviting environment for linguistic unity. This macro-causal, deterministic approach, follows the tradition of thought which asserts that there are crucial, difficult to measure factors that help regulate or guide man’s behavior in spite of his participation seemingly as a ‘free-agent.’ Darwin’s theory that biological factors do act as the basis for what man can be or do and what he cannot, Freud’s insight that subconscious activities of the human mind are responsible for much of man’s basic choices, decisions, and actions, Marx's understanding that economic forces are what serve as the superstructures affecting man’s political calculations, behavior and conditions, as well as Sapir-Whorf’s argument that meanings imposed by language significantly influence man’s thought, perceptions, and actions are some of the factors.

In this paper, however, I shall examine European integration from the 1950s to the present to illustrate the interactive nature of the economic, political, and sociolinguistic spheres. This deserves examination because, the development not only better tests aspects of some prevailing theories in the social sciences, it also has the significance of being the first important test on new structures and institutions such as the EU set to transform and/or depart from the traditional nation-state system – thereby setting a precedent for
other regional or global integrations that is different from the very self-limiting characteristics of the nation-state. But I want to consider this question in a much broader and richer context by drawing on the anthropological, economic, as well as the political science approaches and insights on integration in order to avoid viewing it in too narrow and shallow a focus. From a theoretical standpoint, what is happening in Europe - the internal reorganization of society in which economic and political differences between nation-states are minimized through deeper and wider harmonization and collective external adaptation - is not surprising since it is broadly in accord with prevailing evolutionary theories on the nature of sociocultural systems according to which macro-scale structures are the emergent properties of micro-scale processes (White, 1949, 1959, 1975; Johnson, 1982). Thus, the paper begins with a brief examination of the characteristics and behavior of sociocultural systems in general in order to more meaningfully situate European integration as an evolving functional system in which the interactive nature of its people, member states, and the emergent EU institutions are analogous to those of the parts, structures, and the whole of a fully functioning organizational system. As Lewis and Steinmo have noted (2007), “evolutionary theories begin with an understanding of change as being a simultaneously endogenous and exogenous process. Instead of seeing the process as one of fundamental stability (what political scientists and economists would call ‘equilibrium’) evolutionary theorists understand the world as a ‘complex adaptive system.’” (the authors’ emphasis).

I have organized the paper into an introduction, two main parts: Part One and Part Two, and the conclusion. Part One constitutes the foundation and addresses two
fundamental issues: theoretical orientation, framework, or methodology with a review of the literature on the general characteristics and behavior of sociocultural systems in section I and an overview of the evolution and structure of European integration in Section II. While Part Two constituting the socio-economic dimensions of language addresses two other main issues: evolution of linguistic diversity in Europe in Section III and the emerging status of English as the integrative and functional language for Europe in Section IV. And the conclusion, taking into consideration major current events such as the eurozone crisis, the refugee crisis, and Brexit, in Section V.

The analyses begin in Section II on the key links between the economic and the political spheres. It brings theory closer to data and further strengthens the reliability of the findings and conclusions in the sections that follow. The cumulative effect of the economic and political integration on the linguistic diversity using sociolinguistic data analyses derived mainly from the European Commission’s language survey services, the ‘Eurobarometer,’ the ‘Eurostat’6 and others is presented in section III. Following Crystal (2003), Graddol (1997), and to some extent Phillipson (2003) and others, section IV examines the effect of the integration process on the functions and status of the English language. We apply the derived implications from Kachru’s concentric model on the functional uses of English to assess to what extent English is becoming the most widely used European language in Europe. Section 5 concludes the paper.

---

6They are periodic public opinion surveys and data analyses in the countries of the EU, established by the European Commission, aimed at monitoring the development of public opinion among the EU population.
PART ONE: Section I

European integration and the nature of behavior of sociocultural systems: a functionalist approach

1.1 Evolution and culture change

Some observers insist that European integration, when placed in its overall context, represents “one of the very few current situations in which the decomposition of old nations can be systematically analyzed within the framework of the evolution of a larger polity - a polity destined, perhaps, to develop into a nation of its own” (Haas, 2004:xxxi (1958)). That is, the evolution into a larger continent-wide political-economic and sociolinguistic single system with its own characteristics. However, in order to analyze the process showing how changes in one area are related to changes in other fields, we must start with systems in general which are similarly composed of interrelated, interacting, and interdependent kinds of parts or structures with complementary functions. In principle, systems are self-regulating entities possessing the following characteristics: among other things, (I) inner cohesion (II) greater coordination, and (III) functional harmony, between parts to ensure efficient functioning and dynamic stability of the overall system. A system has its parts, structures, institutions or spheres interrelated into patterned arrangements which determine, to a varying degree, the relative functions of individuals as well as that of the system itself. Moreover, complex systems have embedded subsystems in which the causal links between parts and whole or center and periphery are not only complex and indirect which render the interactive processes of mutual influence and feedback uneven, but the links may also be difficult to
identify, analyze or interpret. Generally, according to White (1959), systems can evolve only in their systemic forms adapting continually to their environment within self-sustained dynamic equilibria in which changes in one or more parts or levels impact the rest of the system. Furthermore, such systems also can evolve through the differentiation of functions and structures and can expand or collapse through dynamic processes which accelerate or inhibit system growth as reported by Johnson (1982). These essential and shared characteristics of systems taken together, interestingly, are also being exhibited by the evolving European Union system.

For instance, “If a system, biological or cultural, possesses energy resources beyond the necessity of merely maintaining the status quo, it will evolve, i.e., take steps to produce a more highly organized, more powerful system,” as White (1975:31) pointed out. That is, it shall evolve by means of “vertical cleavages” and “horizontal cleavages,” at least for sociocultural systems, corresponding to their depth and breadth according to Steward (1972:66). In other words, successful systems such as ‘free market democracies,’ like biological species, expand while unsuccessful ones like Communism contract or die out following the principle that the most efficient or best adaptable have the best chance for further development or survival. It is also observed that sociocultural evolution, the term for how societies and cultures change over time consisting of selection from interacting ‘traditions,’ institutions, or systems in a given context, is a dynamic process akin to “natural selection” – the key mechanism in biological evolution. In other words, whereas biological evolution takes place through the ‘gene’ selection, cultural evolution

---

7 The unit of heredity that determines the basic characteristics of offsprings and is transferred from parent to offspring.
takes place with the help of the ‘meme’ - the mechanism by which behavior, style or idea is spread in culture from person to person.

The process seemingly operates ‘blindly’ according to random selection and hence ensures that evolutionary processes generally remain ‘neutral’ of rational design or purposeful action - implying that evolutionary change may not be a ‘goal’ or ‘progress’ driven process after all - at least in the Darwinian sense. Stated differently in the words of Deutsch (1988):

Not all of the behavior of political leaders, interest groups, governments, and states is purposive. At all levels - among individuals, groups, and nations - the communication channels and messages directing them toward their goals are not the only ones that impinge on their behavior. Indeed, several goals and several streams of messages from both without and within, may be competing for the limited available communication channels and for the time and attention of decision makers. Some of these competing inputs may be relatively random; and all of them may increase the confusion within the decision-making system and the overload on its channels facilities, and personnel. This can result in making some part of its output relatively random, and hence cause the whole input-output cycle to be much less predictable in the distribution of its results. (p. 92)

Furthermore, since evolutionary change is, moreover, a complex process and proceeds imperceptibly slowly, a useful distinction is often made between ‘micro-level evolution’ which refers to the development of variation within the same kind and ‘macro-level evolution’ that refers to the development of one type of a different kind. Anthropologists generally consider such distinct forms of human society: bands, clans, chiefdoms, kingdoms, nations, and nation-states as instances of macro-level evolution which they point out developed both of size and complexity by means of “integration” - the progressive linking of existing structures and institutions into larger, interrelated and coherent organizations. The evolutionary process, in some cases, however, may be
regression or disintegration ("fission") to an earlier type, a negative form of integration (entropy). Contemporary analysts of political integration usually cite the dissolution of the Soviet Union as an instance of macro-level disintegration in which its nations, the subsystems, and the center could not evolve further or hold together in the face of pressing internal and external challenges that faced the system. Such dynamics of integration-disintegration, and hence a system’s evolutionary path, are aptly summarized by Olsen (2005):

Most of the time, integration into a larger organized system competes with the desire for autonomy among the system's components. It is difficult to find and maintain a proper balance between system integration and sub-unit autonomy. System coordination and coherence tends to foster efforts to protect the identity and distinctive character of the components. Likewise, differentiation of subsystems and integration of each component, are likely to generate demands for system coordination and control, coherence and consistency. Processes of political integration, therefore, can trigger disintegration and processes of disintegration can trigger reintegration and coordination. Hence, all systems are facing the questions of how much and what forms of unity the components can tolerate and how much and what forms of diversity the systems can tolerate. (p. 4)

Thus, in the evolution of the EU, for the most part, this tendency explains why the nation-states of Europe while moving in the collective direction of integration in some respects are for preserving some aspects of their national autonomy at the same time. Yet, according to Johnson (1982: 396), “System disruption or simultaneous hierarchy development may not be the only alternatives available to deal with scalar-communications stress. If a problem is being generated by the presence of too many units in the system, it might be possible to make the operational size of these units… larger, and thus the number of units in the system smaller.” And some observers

---

8 Napoleon Chagnon, in his study of the Yanomamo ‘tribes’ of South America mapped out such fissioning of villages.
of EI have viewed the nation-states in Europe as constituting too many units in need of further development, thus why “The Europe that gave birth to the idea of the nation-state appears to be well on the way to rejecting it in practice” in order to evolve (Lindberg, 1963:3).

1.2 European integration and the evolutionary-functionalist approach

The ‘emergence,’ or more correctly the evolution, of European integration has brought together sovereign nation-states into ‘ever closer union’ through a dynamic process of economic, political and social integration considered one of the most extraordinary phenomena in contemporary international politics or organizational studies, not the least because seemingly it is proceeding against the explanatory and predictive powers of the finest theories in social science literature. In some respects, the EU seems more like a traditional international organization; in other ways, it is closer to a Continent-wide confederal arrangement; and yet in many more aspects, it resembles and increasingly functions as a typical nation-state with other characteristics of an evolving supra-state that is poised to relieve its members of higher tasks. Accordingly, there are different ontological and epistemological approaches or orientations reflecting this – and various conceptual frameworks consistent with the underlying perception of the EU as unique, n-1 or a sui generis, have appeared with little agreement about its exact nature or its future end stage (Rosamond, 2000).

1.2.1 The statist, or ‘realist,’ approach vs. the evolutionary, or ‘neo-functionalist,’ approach

---

9 n-1 or sui generis is sometimes used to describe the EU as a new and different type of organization that has no true precedents - for which some things are simply unique to itself and past experiences may not fully apply to it.
Consequently, theorists and empirical researchers often differ in their view of European integration: whether it should be treated as a process, a condition, or an outcome - leading to different theories, model analyses, and levels of analyses, etc. in the attempt to explain EI satisfactorily. In particular, two basic approaches have been employed by political scientists and economists in their analyses: (a) the statist, or ‘realist,’ approach which emphasizes the centrality of states (the parts), why they cooperate, and how this shapes the integration process and (b) the evolutionary, or ‘neo-functionalist,’ approach which privileges the role played by the EU’s own emergent, centralized institutions (the whole) and its increasing impact on the behavior of its Member States in which “The states themselves are changed as a result of their participation in European integration” (Sandholtz, 1996: 426). The latter regards integration as a top-down process while the former a bottom-up process - an important distinction when analyzing causality. The weakness of the statist, strictly intergovernmental approach, however, stems in part from the growing preeminence of the EU over its Member States on a range of vital issues.

These broad scholarly strategies seek to examine the causal characteristics and mechanisms of the process of change in terms of two sets of factors frequently discussed in the relevant literature: namely, the “endogenous” factors that are determined by the integration system and the “exogenous” factors that are causally independent from the system’s internal variables such as the roles of NATO and globalization and their effects on European integration. Analysts who seek to explain EI within the ‘statist’ context are more likely to focus on the role played by the interacting endogenous factors and their
interconnectedness while those who seek to view the process from an evolutionary, global, context are more apt to recognize the role of external factors such as the transformative effects of modern transport-communications technologies as triggers and their subsequent impact on European integration. This suggests that the two approaches are not mutually exclusive but complementary and that EI could be better explained in terms of both sets of factors which are invariably interrelated whether they function as the antecedent, conditioning, intervening, dependent or independent variables and whether it is at the micro- or macro-levels. However, ‘exogenous shocks’ or factors such as Europe’s deep desire for independence from US influence, its fear of a potential future subordination to a more powerful China, and other advantages to be gained through collective action, all seem to explain better the macro-level strategies of European integration.

1.2.2 ‘Unilinear evolution’ vs. ‘multilinear evolution’

Anthropologists, not surprisingly, also have two broad, similar approaches on how sociocultural systems, to which we include the EU, evolve, function, and are maintained: “unilinear evolution” and “multilinear evolution”. These approaches mainly deal with variability, change and continuity corresponding to the neofunctionalist and statist (intergovernmental) approaches respectively. The unilinear model pioneered by previous anthropologists such as Lewis H. Morgan (1818-1881) and Edward Tylor (1832-1917) posits that a sociocultural system evolves, in the sense that is presently applied to European integration, following the path of increase of size, greater complexity and the development of organizational hierarchy. It stresses the overall linear direction of human
history and emphasizes the essential and decisive role of technology in the development process - for “It is the technological sector of a cultural system that harnesses and puts to use the energy necessary to the cultural system” (White, 1975:18). However, in the early 20th century, a systematic critique and consequently a rejection of the uni-linearly deterministic approach was accompanied by the acceptance of the rather multi-linearly static evolutionary approach whose emphasis is based on cultural relativism. Cultural anthropologists, led by Franz Boas, operating under the principle of ‘data first, theories later’ criticized the unilinear evolutionary theorists for their simple-to-complex notion of evolution, for their failure to account satisfactorily the significant role of non-technological culture variables, and for their deep interest ‘in making generalizations’ at the expense of relevant specificities (Steward, 1955). Moreover, they objected to the claims that cultural changes are both progressive and directional, or that societies can be ranked on a single, linear scale of evolutionary complexity or worth; i.e., such as ‘primitive’ or ‘underdeveloped’ social forms vs. ‘civilized’ or ‘advanced’ societies. From the perspective of the multilinear model or cultural particularism, cultures are to be compared only relatively in accordance with their respective historical specificities. Consequently, according to this model, there is much more to cultural evolution and cultural variability than simply the one assigned to the role of technology in determining change. They argue, for example, different outcomes and variability could also be generated from identical background conditions simply when ideological\textsuperscript{10} motives intervene. The 19th-century Manifest Destiny - a belief or doctrine that US

\textsuperscript{10} Ideological motives derived from a collection of beliefs that are held by society or by an individual.
expansion throughout the Americas was inevitable and justified is an apt example. Thus, with a focus on cultural particularities between cultures and the role of the more fluid factor of human agency, this synchronically sensitive model sought to replace the deterministic trending of unilinear evolution in which the role of human agency in directing development takes the place of technological determinism.

1.3 The resurgence of the technology-led model of change: economic determinism in social evolution

By the 1940s, however, a second generation of anthropologists lead by Leslie White (1949, 1959, and 1975) sought to revive the earlier unilinear and diachronic model by increasingly relying also on empirical evidence with emphasis on the interrelationships between the state of technological systems and the other subsystems of culture. From the perspective of this model, a sociocultural system can, in fact, be distinguished from others by its unique technological base reflected in the patterns of its economic subsistence, political organization, and social institutions. According to this refined model, the economic sphere within which the technologic component is integral subordinates all other subsystems within the system in terms of dynamic causal relations and that development in technology inevitably lead to further evolution of sociopolitical organization of a culture. That is, changes brought about by the operation of new technologies must be accompanied by changes in the other aspects of society since an organic whole must develop at relative structural-functional equilibrium. Moreover, the model disputed the assertion that cultural variations merely reflect differences in environmental, human, or ideological factors, arguing that there is a strong deterministic
relationship between all the components or spheres of a sociocultural system.

As White (1975) argues, different cultures are characterized not only by different levels and forms of development and sophistication, they can be explained better by reference to the determining technological variables rather than specifics of the conditioning geographical environments or human factors. White’s (1949) analysis of the evolution of culture, “from Anthropoid society to Human society” with emphasis on the role of the economic sphere, strongly emphasized that the technological contribution to the development process of sociocultural systems has been quite significant and this, he argues, undermines the claims of historical particularism. For him, the discovery and/or invention of distinct technologies were noticeably accompanied not only by greater harnessing of energy but also by higher forms of social organization and complexity: from the band level of hunters and gatherers, the nation-state system of modern society, to the emergence of further unions of the nation-states. This conclusion, prima facie, admittedly maintains a linear sequence of evolution along which all cultural systems, though obviously at uneven rates and different periods, presumably progressed - just as rejected by the multilinear model.

In White’s view, a sociocultural system evolves in the direction of greater complexity in proportion to the level of technology at hand, according to rules inherent to culture itself. His evolutionary theory of culture focuses on the relationships between technology (the primary means), the harnessing of energy, ‘the active agent,’ and the overall development of culture (White, 1975:376). In empirical terms, he states that the degree of cultural development, and thus differences between cultures, can be explained
using a $E \times T \times V = P$ formula, in which $E$, $T$, and $P$ have (positive) values where $E$ is the energy factor or variable, $T$ the technology/tool factor, $V$ for the environment, and $P$ the total product or degree of cultural development. With that, White (1959: 49) formalized a culture growth model to estimate the relative contribution of each variable that enables comparison between different cultures. Thus, cultures will vary as the determining variable, $T$, varies and it is this which he claimed directly determines cultural variability both diachronically and synchronically rather than the environmental $V$ factor which he regards to be a constant variable.

His model, thus views the role of technology, whether in Ancient Egypt or the European Union, as the prime mover in the change process; it views a wide range of phenomena such as sociopolitical setups and the functions of languages in society as being shaped by the operating imperatives of changes brought by technology and places purposeful human action and the intervening social arrangements as secondary. It is in short a 'technology-led' model which regards decisive changes in new technologies as the essential instruments of change at every level of society. And, it is from this perspective that the role of advanced modern technologies such as air, sea, and land transport and communication systems like telephone, radio, TV, internet, etc. get causal priority in the transformation of Europe. For it is these technologies which have made European integration entirely feasible through the fundamental changes brought on the functioning of nation-states and the interactions of their languages.

But more significantly, White (1975) also asserts that technologies and some of their applications may develop independently from purposeful concerns, setting out on
lives of their own acting to regulate sociopolitical activity and its meaning. This view is consistent with the core hypotheses of evolutionary theory and the law of unintended consequences. It not only suggests that sociopolitical behavior has strong technologically determined sociopolitical correlates, but it also poses new questions about the extent to which ‘purposeful actors’ play a role in determining the forces of change. As he argues, “It is not a changing sentiment that turns the wheels of social evolution. Rather, it is the alteration of social and political groupings by the operation of technological forces that determines the direction and scope of the sentiment” (White, 1959: 26). In other words, it is the advancement of the technological “forces that made small political units obsolete and their amalgamation inevitable;” not the mere visions of statesmen (White, 1959: 26). However, others have suggested that the technology component and the economic sector are relevant though they may not perform the determining role in development processes quite independent of the other factors.

1.4 An alternative model of change: ‘organizational structure and scalar stress.’

An alternative approach to sociopolitical and organizational change has argued that in complex organizations or sociocultural systems, other factors such as different modes of organizing a system, policies, human values which may be less dependent on the role of technology may influence, if not determine, the direction, processes, and structures within which change takes place. In particular, Johnson’s (1982) ‘organization structure and scalar stress’ model, which considered both ‘small-group’ as well as ‘large-scale’ dynamics, focuses on demographic growth, organizational and structural changes, etc. as underlying factors which affect sociopolitical evolution and under what
conditions, system’s growth or evolution might falter. It regards the development of communication technologies such as writing as responsive mechanisms designed to meet the needs of administrative and control functions. It is a ‘technology demand-pull' model in sharp contrast to the ‘technology-led’ model: in the former, technology facilitates cultural progress, in the latter it determines progress. In this ‘technology demand-pull' sense, technologies act like biological mutants: they ‘emerged’ (are invented) only to meet the demand of a selective pressure or ‘scalar stress’ rather than being created to bring about desired changes.

Johnson (1988) applied the concept of “scalar stress” largely as an empirical-analytic technique to show the interrelations between population size, organizational complexity, political structure, scalar stress, the development of new technology, and the evolution of social systems. He defined organizational performance which is at the root of change in his model as load/capacity; and like White (1959), he formalized ‘scalar stress’ as (n-squared - n)/2 where n = the number of units in the organization system (such as the number of nation-states within the EU (28)). As he shows, technological innovations, though can help the development process in reducing scalar-related stresses on existing structures and processes - by increasing the number of information channels between center and periphery, or making the operational size of units larger by means of integration and, thus, the number of units in the system smaller, could increase performance in an evolutionary way (Johnson, 1982:396). That is, an organization or system could evolve ‘sequential hierarchies’ in which case it has simply ‘reorganized’ itself without significant changes in technology. For example, instead of
organizing a, b, c, d together in one group in abcd, they could be reorganized into various forms such as: ac, ad, dc, cb, etc. which would essentially not only change form but also meaning and performance, among other things. The ‘multi-speed’ form of differentiated integration adopted by the EU on the basis of similar organizational models allows common objectives to be pursued first by a group of member states both willing and able to proceed in a chosen area such as in the single currency, and Schengen area with the implication others will follow later when ready and able.

His analysis based on very diverse datasets obtained from different social science literature on various group dynamics shows that simply by restructuring the size of operational units within an organization, the ability to process and monitor information in decision-making contexts would be increased. This means by simply restructuring its organization with just the right ideas it would be possible to bring significant, to be sure endogenous, changes within a system. Thus, as Steward (1972: 21) puts it, “There are certain problems in which man’s rational and emotional potentials are not a zero factor in the equation.” And as some anthropologists, Shore and Wright (1997 have further observed, governing policies can be viewed as "political technologies" that are useful instruments for ordering society or organizations.

1.5 Multi-causation and economic primacy

Admittedly, these arguments suggest a lack of general consensus on the relative weight of causal factors on the evolution of sociocultural systems leading some analysts to argue for a “multicausal view” of reciprocal causation between variables, suggesting that the issue of causality in developed systems is just too complex to be captured by a single theoretical model or to be determined by one main factor. In fact, the issue on the
relative roles of technology vs. organizational style and ideas, the economic vs. the political, and nature vs. nurture, in determining change of any system has been a subject of ongoing scholarly debate with no single acceptable answer at present and remains one of the most difficult to resolve within social science.

These arguments and the lack of a clear-cut consensus regarding causation notwithstanding, the models and overall approach in this paper on social evolution with particular pertinence to European integration follow the “economic relevance” view of Moravesik (1998) according to which:

Economic interests remained primary. Pressures from economic interest groups generally imposed tighter constraints on policy than did security concerns and the ideological visions of politicians and public opinion. When one factor had to give way, it tended to be geopolitics. Economic interests, moreover, determine the circumstances under which geopolitical ideology could influence policy. Only where economic interests are weak, diffuse, or indeterminate could national politicians indulge the temptation to consider geopolitical goals. (p. 6-7)

This approach enables us to accept White’s deterministic model and use its derived implications to assess the economic and political determinants of European integration and its impact on the more conservative and reactive sociolinguistic area.

In spite of these insights and the progress made in understanding the evolution and functioning of sociocultural systems outlined above, the link between economic and political integration and its overall effect on linguistic situations remains a relatively unexplored area of research. In this paper, following these insights, approaches, and using sociolinguistic data analyses, I shall explore how and to what extent increased economic and political integration within a highly open and pluralistic society impacts linguistic diversity and how this is creating an unusual linguistic situation in Europe.
Section II, therefore, presents an overview of the evolution and structure of European Integration step by step showing the dynamic causal links between the economic and political spheres. It also examines how the economic-political integration extends to the sociocultural area through the spillover process mechanism. In this context, section I serves as the necessary theoretical foundations connecting sections II on economic and political integration to III and IV on sociolinguistic data that illustrates causal links.
PART ONE: Section II

An overview of the evolution and structure of European integration: its determinants and indicators

German aggression was a particularly vicious outgrowth of a bad general system, and only a radical and general change of the system of itself will provide continuous security for all. (David Mitrany, 1966)

By pooling basic production and by creating a new high authority whose decisions will be binding on France, Germany and the other countries who may subsequently join, this proposal will create the first concrete foundation for a European federation which is so indispensable for the preservation of peace. (Robert Schuman, 1950)

According to Marx and Lenin, as well as to J. A. Hobson and Charles A. Beard, we ought to expect economic class or group interests to be decisive, but the evidence suggests a far more complex picture. (Deutsch, 1988)

Our concern will be with the political consequences of economic integration (Lindberg, 1963)

2.1 Economic and political integration as basis for corresponding sociocultural and sociolinguistic integration

This section outlines an overview of the link between the economic and the political spheres as the basis for the cultural and social integration and deals primarily with the nature of their relationships according to the referenced theories and or models in the previous section. That is, the evolutionary theory or systemic framework, the economic primacy thesis, the neofunctionalist theory, and the spillover thesis as they relate to the evolution, development and functioning of the EU system and process by applying
Burchill’s six criteria against which theories are generally evaluated on:

- a theory’s understanding of an issue or process,
- a theory’s explanatory power of the theory,
- the theory’s success at predicting events,
- the theory’s intellectual consistency and coherence,
- the scope of the theory, and
- the theory’s capacity for critical self-reflection and intellectual engagement with contending theories. (Burchill, 1996: 24, emphasis in original)

Since at a fundamental level, economic and political integration necessarily leads to ‘cultural integration’ of sorts that generates an inviting environment for sociolinguistic unity, I intend to show here how the macro co-variables - the economic and the political arenas - correlate, influence, and affect each other in a dynamic way. Having shown this in this section II, Sections III and IV complete the paper by showing that this 'economic-political' integration has also ‘spilled over’ into the sociolinguistic area (or cultural sphere) with various effects and reactions. Section III, therefore, looks at these cumulative effects on linguistic diversity in Europe which is simply another way of saying the next section examines the extent to which linguistic integration, or the linguistic situation, responds or reacts as the cultural correlate alongside developments within the economic and political areas as described in this section.

2.2 Motivations and formalization

Up to 1951, motivation in a European Integration (EI) process\(^{11}\) project was for whatever the ‘founders’ said it is.\(^{12}\)

---

\(^{11}\)Two essential concepts are integration and process.  
\(^{12}\)“Standing up to USA and Japan” is a far above-average reason for "hope" among the French (44 % : second rank there). It was France alone among EC member states which pressed for counter-sanctions rather than continued negotiations when the United States threatened trade war against the Community over the GATT oilseeds dispute in November 1992.” (Source: EUROBAROMETER 38, 1992)
• peace, security, prosperity, freedom,

• ‘an ever closer union,’

• restoring European influence in the world,

• and more specifically the anchoring of Germany into binding post-war European institutions, etc.

The decision by Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands to sign the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) Treaty on April 18, 1951, brought about the initial formalization of what has become the dynamic EI process. The Treaty entered into force on July 27, 1952. This development has had its necessary corollary, and there is evidence economies of scale derived from the ECSC have had beneficial effects for the rest of the integrated six-nation economies. Although the observed growth rates varied widely among each of the common market products, the overall performance by the whole sector was significant. From 1952 to 1956, with a limited but well-defined agenda, yearly economic growth among the member countries increased noticeably in all the ECSC products; the production of coal, iron ore, crude steel, and scrap increased by 4, 22, 31, and 12-18 per cents respectively, according to Haas (2004: 67). The sharp increase in the volume of trade within the ECSC countries in the commodities under review during the period from 1952 to 1955 reflect this success: trade in coal grew to 140, iron ore to 137, steel products to 251, and scrap to 457 (1952 = 100). As noted by Haas (2004: 63), “The volume of trade in ECSC products rose by 93 per cent between 1952 and 1955, while the increase in trade in all other sectors liberalized under the OEEC

\[\text{\footnotesize 13 Originally published by Stanford University Press in 1958.}\]
code, but not under the common market, amounted to only 59 per cent in the same period’, suggesting further growth could be generated by the addition of cognate sectors through expansion of the common market. Statistically, these are meaningful results as they are consistent with the logic or intended effect of market integration and spillover effects. The implication of this sector-to-sector, sector-to-economy, and economy-to-economy growth relationships in the context of one of the key questions being addressed in this paper is that there appears to be a significant link between the ECSC sector performance, economic growth of its member states, and the overall evolution of the integration process as caused by “the growth of capital interpenetration inside the Common Market” according to Mandel (1967:31). In other words, as predicted by the ‘neofunctionalist theory.’

2.3 The neofunctionalist theory and economic primacy

It is a theory of regional integration developed in the mid-1950s as an approach to the integration of individual sectors mainly within the economic sphere at first with expectations of achieving spillover effects to other areas that further the process by which countries additionally remove barriers to free trade and other forms of interactions employing formal treaties.

Haas (1958), Deutsch (1963), and to some extent Lindberg (1963) pioneered the study of European integration which focused on the performance and integrative mechanism of the ECSC. Their work at the beginning of the 1950s used the ECSC as a case study in analyzing the processes and mechanisms of economic integration occurring across state boundaries which, in their view, would lead to the uniting of Europe. In Haas (1958), he
argued, based on his observations, the growth of the integration process was driven by a positive spillover mechanism between related sectors arising as a consequence of modest economic integration in initial sectors. According to him, “Converging economic goals embedded in the bureaucratic, pluralistic, and industrial life of modern Europe provided the crucial impetus. The economic technician, the planner, the innovating industrialist, and trade unionist advanced the movement not the politician, the scholar, the poet, the writer.” (Haas, 1968: xix, emphasis added). Haas (1958) used a deterministic trending approach in his analysis which implies once the initial political decision is made on economic integration, such as the one exercised by the leadership of Jean Monnet, Robert Schuman and others on the creation of the ECSC, continued automatic economic leakages and linkages between ‘cognate’ sectors would ensure the rest of the process. Under this assumption, he contended this development process would be path-dependent as integration in one sector creates pressure as well as the condition for further integration in related sectors as a result of new demands and presumably the need to maintain overall structural equilibrium within the overall system. He also maintained that the process was inherently expansive and that it would lead to ‘the eventual loss of the individual identity of the ECSC through its absorption into what became the new European Community.’ The ECSC has since lost its identity into what became the EU which is still expanding and evolving, composed of such bodies and institutions as the European Commission, Parliament, Council, and the Court of Justice. Their studies involved applying statistical as well as qualitative analyses on a variety of integration variables seeking to demonstrate a positive correlation between sector performance, economic growth, and the further
development of the overall process. While they all agreed on the logic of integration, Haas view of the process was that economic considerations were the driven force whereas for Lindberg (1963), it was more of a political process that involve public feedback, actor-socialization, and side-payments. That is, in order to get the process function and move forward, one must get the support of as many individual decision-makers and groups as have vested interests in the outcomes. Meaning, the process was, for the most part, due to processes of political feedback or responses to political problems. As Deutsch (1988) who treated the EC as an example of regional integration puts it,

Feedback signals, we have said, may be used to bring about an increase or a decrease in the intensity and/or frequency of the original behavior that gave rise to them. If the feedback always increases the intensity and/or the frequency of the original behavior, then it is called positive or amplifying feedback; and it will drive the original behavior of the system higher and higher until some element in the system or in its environment breaks down, or until some essential resource or supply is exhausted. (p. 90)

In fact, according to him (1988), the “Feedback works in cycles: from action to echo (that is, to the return of messages about the results of that action), and then from echo to reaction (that is - as the next step - either to a repetition of the original action or to an action at least somewhat different from the original)” (p. 90).

Haas methodology and the validity of some of their assumptions have been disputed on several grounds, however. In particular, Hoffmann (1966) criticized the general problem arising from modeling the sector-by-sector integration deterministically which he argues was rather driven by individual state interest considerations. Moreover, Pollack (1997) and Moravcsik (1998) noted the importance of this bias not only in the original
model’s lack of emphasis on the primary role played by the states in initiating the direction and pace of the integration process but also the influence exerted by other domestic actors on the process. Furthermore, as Moravcsik argues, contrary to Haas expectations, European integration appeared to strengthen the nation-states, not weaken them, and any power delegated at the supranational level results from deliberate decisions by national governments in a principal-agent context where the States act as the principals. His “... contention is that major integration decisions- and multilateral negotiations over international cooperation more generally - are better explained with more narrowly focused yet more broadly generalizable ‘mid-range’ theories of economic interest, bargaining, and institutional choice drawn from the general literature on international cooperation” (Moravcsik, 1998:19). More significantly, Holland (1980) pointed out their studies failure to place the neofunctionalist analysis14 within the narrow context of Western European particular experience and questioned their generalization and predictive validity. He argues EI may be unique, a sui generis, to the Western European economic, political, and cultural experience and hence incapable of fully describing the processes of regional integrations in general. Furthermore, he points out under the process the assumption of economic growth through spillover as ‘linear, smooth and homogeneous, rather than staggered, uneven, highly diverse and differentiated’ on a range of areas may be an unrealistic depiction of the actual process and consequently, the Haas deterministic model could not be valid.

2.4 ‘Spillover’ and the other ‘spill-’ concepts

---

14 A perspective that past integration drives the whole integration process.
Schmitter (1971), Sandholtz and Stone Sweet (1998), Haas (2004), and others subsequently tried to address some of the criticisms and shortcomings inherent in the original approach by taking into account not only the crucial role played by States as insisted by the Intergovernmental analysts but also the impact of other intermediaries and non-state domestic actors. In its most general formulation, according to Lindberg (1963:10), “‘spill-over’ refers to a situation in which a given action, related to a specific goal, creates a situation in which the original goal can be assured only by taking further actions, which in turn create a further condition and a need for more action, and so forth.”

The theoretical underpinnings of the original neo-functionalist model as outlined by Haas himself “assumed that integration would proceed quasi-automatically as demands for additional central services intensified because the central institutions proved unable to satisfy the demands of their new clients. Thus, activities associated with sectors integrated initially would ‘spill over’ into neighboring sectors not yet integrated, but now becoming the focus of demands for more integration” (2004: xv). His model conceived of the spillover process as being limited mainly to the economic sectors but postulated an eventual Europe-level macro-polity outcome, nevertheless. It envisioned the continuing rise of new central institutions whose function would be to harmonize, homogenize, standardize and coordinate macro-policy differences among the member states, a process which would also simultaneously and gradually weaken the European nation-state system.

This concept of micro-spillover which is within cognate sectors and macro-spillover is between the economic and political spheres, while remaining the key aspect of the
model of integration as formerly devised by Haas and the neofunctionalist school, has since been refined to incorporate additional strategies of integration to account for the uneven processes of ‘spill-back’, ‘spill-around’, ‘encapsulation’ (‘the inclusion of one thing within another thing so that the included thing is not apparent’) (Schmitter, 1971:242), and the growth of further unintended developments to better reflect the complexity and multi-process and multi-level dynamics which have significantly transformed European economic integration into a political union, the EU (Sandholtz, and Sweet Stone, 1998). Rosamond (2000) sums up the basic neo-functionalist reasoning, logic, or argument like this:

Two or more countries agree to work for integration in a given economic sector (sector a). To accomplish this task more effectively, they agree to appoint a supranational bureaucracy - a ‘high authority’ to use the parlance of the time - to oversee operations. While the integration of sector a achieves some of the supposed benefits, the full advantage of integration will not be achieved unless cognate economic sectors are also drawn into the integrative web. In any case, the integration of a creates functional linkage pressures for related sectors b and c to become part of the game. There are two other more or less automatic processes in the neofunctionalist model. First, economic integration automatically generates an increased level of transactions between actors within the integrating region. Second, as we have seen, because of the essential group characteristic of politics, there is a tendency for new interest organizations to form at the regional level. This is particularly true of producer groups… whose interests shift (and indeed arise) as new levels of integration are accomplished. Meanwhile, the high authority becomes a key sponsor of further integration. Thus, it develops strategies (corresponding to its own emerging interests) to accomplish the twin goals of deeper economic integration in an expanding range of economic sectors and the increased institutionalization of authority at the regional level. To some extent, the high authority achieves this by acting as a constant advocate of the advantages of integration and by pointing to the relationships that exist between sectors a, b and c. (p. 58)

This review of the spillover mechanism is consistent with the generalizations offered by Haas and others and shows that while it depends on prior intergovernmental bargains,
once a decision is made, it functions on a logic of its own.

It is the key theoretical innovation forming the basis of the revised neo-functionalist model which admittedly demonstrates spillovers are apt to follow quite variable paths within a diverse, multi-path, multi-level, complex system. Thus, through the spillover dynamics of integration, “In Europe, what began as piecemeal problem-solving for the member states - underpinned by the peace motive - has ended up in a supranational order subjecting the constituent parts to collectively binding decisions”15 (Eriksen, 2010:10). It shows that the systemic crisis the process experienced in the mid-1960s - as well as the current Europe-wide refugee crisis - was and is, rather than disproving the deterministic theory of spillover, merely the result of the punctuated counter-actions of the logic of integration in some areas with that of the logic of diversity as indicated by divergent national preferences on almost everything else.

2.5 An interactive timeline of macro-spillover process in the form of ‘this then that, that then this…’

In spite of the complex, uneven, and slow pace of the integration process, the overall developments following the initial, positive performance of the ECSC suggest Haas’ model could not be rejected. On the contrary, a short survey of the growth of additional treaties (or credible commitments) and mechanisms to further the process shows that the basic spillover thesis remained by and large valid and consistent with much of what Haas had predicted. Two additional Treaties: the European Economic Community (EEC) or ‘Common Market’, and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) establishing

---

15 David Mitrany (1888-1975) saw that part of the root of international conflict was due the division of the world, and Europe in particular, into competing and rival political units.
further economic integration were signed on March 25, 1957. They entered into force on January 1, 1958. In sharp contrast to the limited agenda of the ECSC, the EEC had additional regulatory powers together with the authority to define the future order of things, marking the first step toward the emergence of a self-regulating and self-directing European polity - one which, instead of being dictated by individual national interests would direct their collective interests. This necessitated the establishment of new Europe-level institutions and brought about a dynamic process of decision-making innovations which have increasingly led and transformed the EI regime into ‘an ever closer union.’ On January 14, 1962, bolstered by past successes, prospect for further economic growth, and additional memberships, which is now at 28 strong member states providing greater economies of scale, the scope of integration was expanded to include other key sectors under the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and Single Customs Union (SCU) which was completed on July 1, 1968, 18 months ahead of schedule. In 1986 the Single European Act (SEA), a major reform of the Rome Treaty (1958), providing an extra basis for the establishment of the ‘Single Market’ is signed. Completed in 1993, it amended the rules governing the functioning of the European institutions and expanded the Central powers adding new momentum to the integration process.

2.6 Treaty on the European Union, and introduction of the Euro

Furthermore, the ‘Maastricht’ Treaty on the European Union signed in 1991 created the single European currency, the euro, and the European Union. It opened the way for increased political integration and European citizenship and represented a new stage in
European integration. Also, the Treaty of Amsterdam signed in 1997 extended the scope of co-decision making between the EU and its member states which reformed the pillars on foreign policy, justice, and home affairs further thereby closing the gap between economic integration and political cooperation. The treaty also introduced a High Representative who, together with the Presidents of the European Commission and the Council, provides a unified EU foreign policy, face, and voice, to the rest of the world. And the Lisbon Treaty, drafted as a replacement for the Constitutional Treaty and signed in 2007, aimed at increasing the coherency and consistency of the EU's external actions while streamlining the system’s decision-making structures. It clarified which powers belong to the member states, which ones belong to the EU and those that are shared between the two - through the principle of subsidiarity.

Collectively, these series of treaties showing the gradual growth of the integration process demonstrates more significantly the formal macro-spillover from the economic sphere to the political one as envisaged by Haas and defined by Lindberg (1963):

> Political integration is (1) the process whereby nations forgo the desire and ability to conduct foreign and key domestic policies independently of each other, seeking instead to make joint decisions or to delegate the decision-making process to new central organs; and (2) the process whereby political actors in several distinct settings are persuaded to shift their expectations and political activities to a new center. (p. 6)

In fact, Lindberg's definition was simply a restatement of Haas formulations (2004) according to which “the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations, and political activities towards a new center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states” (p.16).
2.7 The Schengen Agreement as spillover into labor, sociocultural, and language issues

Furthermore, the Schengen Agreement signed in 1985, the parallel form of social integration comparable to the economic and political integrations initially created independently of the European Union but now incorporated into it, aimed for much of the gradual abolition of border controls between member states. As a result, the agreement has increased people's, socioeconomic and cultural interactions between Europeans. And while for the most part the series of treaties before 1985 were notably designed to address and smooth the progress of the economic and/or political integration, the Schengen Agreement, in particular, marked the first formalization of the macro-spillover into the sociocultural domain, a spillover whose effect we will look at closely in the next sections as it relates to issues of European citizen interactions, linguistic diversity, communication and mutual intelligibility, and the need for a common language for Europe. It demonstrates relationships between the integration processes at the economic and political levels and the sociocultural sphere (cultural links, common norms, movement and communications), though sometimes lagging and complex, are interrelated and feed on each other, nonetheless; implying that the decision to omit or side step main issues related to the sphere of culture from the earlier treaties was merely a strategic choice rather than one of substance. In the words of Jean Monnet (1978), ‘To succeed, always choose the path of least resistance.’\(^{16}\) Or as Haas (2004) noted,

\[\text{Taking literally the text of the Treaty which calls on the High Authority to ‘orient and facilitate’ the initiative of the governments in creating a free labour market, the High Authority in 1953 worked out a series of proposals. They asserted the}\]

---

\(^{16}\) page 18, The Choice for Europe, Moravcsik (1998)
right of qualified workers to seek [Haas emphasis to contrast it with to ‘accept’ an offer] employment free from immigration and passport restrictions, other than those concerned with health and public order, recommended the issuing of an ECSC labour card to all qualified personnel which would entitle them to migrate… (p. 498)

As such, the macro-spillover from the economic-political spheres to the sociocultural field shows that deepening economic and political integration beyond a certain level between nations or regions is incompatible with the legal restriction of the free movement of persons living within the integrated area. In fact, labor mobility is one of the key conditions for successful, long term, integration according to Deutsch et al. (1957). It also suggests integration, at least of the sort pursued by Europe, the union of peoples rather than just the union of States, would be attained not only by the formal but also by the informal forms of interactions which involve social interactions, information, and cultural exchanges, and so on. The official form of integration alone isn’t necessarily a sufficient indicator of integration: as noted by De Witte (1990:208), “A comparative analysis of the three bilateral relationships established between Britain, France, and Germany clearly shows that the formal links between France and Germany are qualitatively superior to those established by either of those two with Britain; for informal links, however, the picture is exactly the opposite.” As Romero also tells us (1992:190), “Integration in Western Europe is extended primarily by informal factors. The formal level of integration - although not a prerequisite for most of these phenomena - can, however, activate a more complex interplay among various flows, which will ultimately alter their nature and extend their range.”

This classic formal-informal spillover, according to which the unintended consequences of increasing political cooperation and cultural exchanges gradually grow from closer economic integration and interdependence, validated by the observed process on EI, strongly confirms the underlying link between the overall integration process and the pattern of increased cultural flows. And thus the developments of the EU system are not only consistent with the core idea of the neofunctionalist model; they moreover exhibit the general, systemic growth patterns by which systems increase in both size and complexity as noted in Section I (White, 1959; Johnson, 1982). In fact, as envisaged by the theory, an institutional spillover can also be seen to have occurred through not only the deepening of integration between the original six members but also the enlargement that now includes 28 members. Meaning, as Keohane and Hoffman (1990) put it, “A new form of spillover, not from one economic sector to another but from one institutional dimension to another, took place.” Thus, thanks to the developments that have taken place since 1951, the process now offers a rich and full characterization not only of when and how it has evolved - but also how it will quite predictably continue to grow in the future.

2.8 ‘The expansive logic of sector integration’ and growth of the integrative mechanisms

The growth of the original feature of European integration, the ECSC, and how it has evolved into its present form, the European Union, offers a clear case study on the various mechanisms of the integration process in particular and the dynamic evolutionary processes of sociocultural systems in general. A complete process of Europeanization is
taking place, and various integrative mechanisms and strategies have evolved or been adopted to address the complexities and multidimensional aspects of the process showing that it is also changing in a systemic form and through differential allocation of functions among its parts: the states, regions, central institutions, businesses, etc., according to varied means or formulations the key of which is the principle of subsidiarity based on efficiency, competency, and economy.

2.9.1 ‘The principle of subsidiarity’ as separation of functions/powers within the EU

The principle of subsidiarity, also related to the idea of the separation of powers or checks-and-balances principle in the US, is intended to ensure decisions are taken as closely as possible at the best possible level: at the citizen, local, national, regional or European level. Specifically, it is the principle whereby the central institutions of the Union, except in the areas which fall within their exclusive competence, do not take action unless it is more effective than action taken at local, national or regional levels. It is directly bound up with the related principles of necessity and proportionality, which require that any action by the Union or Central Institutions should not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the treaties.

2.9.2 The ‘multi-speed,’ the ‘enhanced cooperation’ form of differentiated integration

The ‘multi-speed’ type of differentiated integration adopted by the EU allows common objectives to be pursued first by a group of member states both willing and able to proceed in a chosen area with the implication others will follow later when ready and able. It represented a different mechanism from the unanimity procedure which addressed
the questions of how far and how fast the process can go. Multi-speed based on the core idea of common but differentiated capacity within the system. In other words, it recognizes that certain areas, states, or regions within the system do not progress or function at the same pace in all given areas as is formalized in the ‘enhanced cooperation’ framework, thus, recognizing the fact that the European Union consists of uneven regions or subsystems which have achieved different levels of formal or informal integration.

2.9.3 The ‘variable-geometry’ form of differentiated integration

The ‘variable-geometry,’ which allows states ‘opt-outs’ from existing and new common European rules, represents another method of differentiated integration showing that there are sometimes irreconcilable functional or structural variances among the member states. The Schengen project and regime is an example of this variable geometry. Another related non-uniform form of integration is the Europe ‘a la carte’ procedure or construct which permits member states to select policies/areas of action as if from a set and then fully proceed in those items with the assumption there would be a minimum number of common objectives pursued. The Cohesion policy, implemented through a ‘structural’ Fund, for regional development initiatives, illustrates the need to smooth over national or regional differences and reduce the effects of asymmetry in the system.

These differentiated, uneven processes of integration show that, in practice, different mechanisms or formulations are required to bring together within a single institutional framework what was formerly separate, mostly disconnected and various national entities in Europe. In principle, the spillovers between sectors and/or spheres, however, show there is a given directional pattern of flow of exchange which illustrate causal
connections within the dynamic system. The observation here on the primacy of the economic sphere as the essential generator of integration activities in the process as well as the fact that the parts of the system do not all change at uniform speed or in a single direction, follows the general thesis of economic determinacy theorized in section I.

That is, the basic outline described here in terms of the primary trend and timeline of the integration process is also consistent with the Sweet and Sandholtz (2003) observations and formulation on “Why does movement on any of the dimensions [spheres] occur in the first place?” and “Why do some policy domains move farther and faster toward the supranational pole than others?” (p.227). This is a detailed assessment of that by the two authors (2003):

Our starting point is society, in particular, non-state actors who engage in transactions and communications across national borders, within Europe. These are the people who need European standards, rules, and dispute resolution mechanisms - who need supranational governance. In the beginning, the causal mechanism is quite simple: increasing levels of cross-border transactions and communications by societal actors will increase the perceived need for European level rules coordination, and regulation. In fact, the absence of European rules will come to be seen as an obstacle to the generation of wealth and the achievement of other collective gains. Separate national legal regimes constitute the crucial source of transaction costs for those who wish to engage in exchanges across borders: customs and other border controls, different technical standards, divergent health and environmental regulations, distinct systems of commercial law, divers national currencies, and so on. Further, the cost of transacting across borders are higher than those involved in contracting within a single member-state, to the extent that there exists no secure common legal framework at the supranational level, comparable in its efficacy to that of national legal systems. As transnational exchanges rise, so does the societal demand for supranational rules and organizational capacity to regulate. Transactors can exert pro-integration pressure on their own governments, but when these are reticent, transactors can access supranational arenas dominated by the Commission and the European Court of Justice.

Government actors clearly have their own interests, which may include maximizing their autonomy and control over resources. They may resist the shift toward supranational policymaking. But as they do so, they inhibit the generation of wealth within their territory by those actors that depend on European
transactions. Such resistance is therefore sustainable only at a cost in prosperity. They can also attempt to slow integration or push it in directions favorable to their perceived interests, but they do not drive the process or fully control it. In a fundamental sense, governments are reactive, constantly adjusting to the integration that is going on all around them. (p. 228)

That is, the EU, functionally, like all dynamic systems, has the natural tendency to regulate itself, and changes in one area or sphere are primarily therapeutic in nature to make the system not just efficient but also more symmetrical, balanced, and therefore towards stability or a state of dynamic equilibrium as economists prefer to call it.

From the above analytic description of the behavior of European integration, the developments described within its evolutionary process, namely, that economic integration leads political coordination (unity), which in turn result in sociocultural integration, are highly consistent with the functionalist logic of change envisioned and set up by Jean Monnet (1888-1979) and others as reviewed in Section I and the neofunctionalist model presented and analyzed by Haas and others discussed in this section II according to which the structure of interrelated sectors or spheres of society changes when one or more of its subsystems change by means of spillover causal mechanisms. Thus, in ‘Europe needs more economic integration’ Josep Borrell Fontelles, former President of the European Parliament (2004-2007), identifies what he called a structural flaw in the EU according to which “while there is a common currency, the euro, there is no international governing body that determines fiscal strategies for the member -states, leading to inconsistencies in policy.”18 In other words, the logic of monetary Union requires a corresponding fiscal union to avoid inconsistencies in policy

18 http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2014/10/15/EU-president-talks-fiscal-policy/
which Sweet and Sandholtz referred to as ‘costs.’ As Balassa (1961) noted, “total economic integration presupposes the unification of monetary, fiscal, social, and countercyclical policies and requires the setting-up of a supra-national authority whose decisions are binding for the member states.” So while fiscal union is needed by the logic of monetary union, the spillover thesis says that, if the integration process continues, sooner rather than later, there would be a fiscal union for the EU. This means for an entire integration process to fully proceed on all interacting key subsystem areas, it must proceed along the lines suggested by anthropological theories based on the overall nature of sociocultural systems, processes and culture changes.

It is therefore not surprising to see also a parallel form of ‘legal integration’ otherwise regarded as ‘institutional spillover’ - the process of evolving sets of legal arrangements within the system which bind sovereign States on rights and obligations that keeps the system strengthen itself as well as setting in motion the whole process of enlargement. The set of laws, and the growth of legal elements, otherwise the translations into operational terms of policies, constitute therefore a good indicator or measure of the state of the integration process. This proves, or rather shows, that overall European integration is a multi-speed, multi-sphere and multi-faceted process that includes other areas. As De Witte (1990) put it,

The growing involvement of the European Community in culture and in education would seem to provide an excellent illustration, and partial vindication, of functionalist theories of integration. ‘Spillover’ into the cultural sphere takes place, roughly speaking, as follows. Market integration for economic activities implicitly but directly affects culture in its material form, but thereby also indirectly in its symbolic significance. National cultural policies are limited by those rules on market integration much more effectively than by any other explicit form of cultural cooperation. This limitation of national powers may, in turn, lead to the perception that some forms of regulation, to be effective, must be
transferred to the European level, in order to counterbalance the undesirable effects of market integration. All this constitutes a dynamic process which does not, at any given time, present a perfect equilibrium between the ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ dimensions of integration, but instead is marked by major integration deficits which keep the process in motion. (p. 198) (emphasis added)

Conclusion

Following this overview of the ‘evolution and structure of European Integration’ which confirms that economic integration beyond a certain level does indeed lead to political integration or unity, we therefore expect to see strong, clear, and measurable effects that have been generated by the economic and political integration process on the linguistic situation since it's being argued in this and in the previous sections that changes occurring in any one or more subsystems or spheres of a system impact the other spheres through the now well-familiar spillover process. And since the main aim of this paper is to look at the impact on the sociolinguistic situation, no further analysis is pursued concerning the chain of events, detailed examination of causal links, or exact nature and direction of causality between the economic and political spheres. Nor do we undertake a further separate analysis of the economic and political areas in part because economic integration and political coordination (unity), as we have shown, interact and reinforce each other on various levels and in interesting ways well beyond the intended scope of this paper.

Since the more formal treaties aim to eradicate or minimize economic obstacles and political differences within the EU for the development of 'an ever closer Union' whereas the official language position of the EU is for that member states to promote their national identity and language(s), according to the motto, 'United in Diversity', we detect a notable contradiction within the system of some apparent mutually opposing or
cancelling forces or strategies: the logic of unity within the economic and political spheres which brings Europeans together on one hand, and the logic of diversity within the sociocultural and linguistic spheres acting as negative integration, on the other. Thus, we introduce four main potential paths\textsuperscript{19} of Europeanization through one of which the overall process with its effects will continue to express itself in Europe:

a) cultural diversity and linguistic diversity,

b) cultural unity and linguistic diversity,

c) cultural diversity and linguistic unity, and

d) cultural unity and linguistic unity.

The next section shows developments toward sociolinguistic integration including that of an evolving hierarchy of languages and the emergence of a common language. As White (1975:61) reminded us about languages and their nature, “Languages are not merely inert forms; they are dynamic systems. They grow and change... They compete with one another; some become archaic or extinct” - all of which is to say, man’s socio-economic, political, and cultural life are all interconnected, interdependent, dynamic, and that changes in one aspect necessarily lead to corresponding alterations in the others.

---

\textsuperscript{19}Potentially, it is my own conception
PART TWO: Sections III

Effect of economic integration and political centralization on linguistic diversity in Europe

The study of language history shows that if two social groups come to be separated only by a mountain range or a wide river, they will soon begin to develop different habits of speech (Crystal, 2003)

Genetically related languages form language families and they show systematic and recurrent formal correspondences, i.e. similarities and differences which are too regular and frequent to be mere chance or the result of borrowing. (Herbert Schendl, 2001)

Some languages (Italian & Spanish, Czech and Polish) are so close that speakers of one can understand the other to some degree. How to use this asset for a diverse European society? (Intercomprehension: A linguistic phenomenon the EU Commission)

Languages are not merely inert forms; they are dynamic systems. They grow and change. Grimm’s Law expresses certain tendencies in Indo-European languages. Languages differentiate, become diversified into sublanguages and dialects. They compete with one another; some become archaic or extinct. They are an essential part of everything that people do as human beings… Languages may inspire people to fight - even to the death - to decide which language shall be the official language of a province or city... (White, 1975)

3.1 Europe, language diversity, and why history of languages is important for language learning and policymaking in the EU

In section I, I introduced the anthropological approaches and other theoretical foundations upon which to situate, observe, and analyze both the micro- and macro-levels
of sociocultural and politico-economic systems and their characteristics or tendencies. This contextualization was necessary because properly considered, European integration and the EU is one such evolving system. Section II has examined the dynamically interactive link between the economic and political spheres of this process or system and has reviewed its evolution and structure from the 1950s to the present as is generally discussed in the literature.

In this section, we look at the diversity and unity of languages in Europe showing the altering nature of sociolinguistic situations and how that affects the present state. It shows how preferential national policies helped created hierarchies of languages in every country and how national languages such as English, French, German, and Russian have emerged as more dominant regional languages mainly as a result of their countries sizes. Shown in this Section and the next one is also how the present integration is creating a similar linguistic situation and hierarchy of languages with English emerging as the most favored one, at least for now - suggesting an interesting dynamic situation of competition and complementarity among languages has emerged. According to a recent European Commission Press Release (2012)\(^{20}\), “Almost nine out of ten EU citizens believe that the ability to speak foreign languages is very useful, and 98% say that mastering languages will be good for the future of their children, according to a new Eurobarometer opinion poll on EU citizens' attitudes towards multilingualism and foreign language learning.”

While the focus of most European integration studies has been about understanding the relationship between the economic and political spheres as observed in the previous

---

section, less attention has been paid to the impact of the process on the more reactive sociolinguistic domain. Increased global interconnection, heightened interdependence and deepening European integration all occasioned by advanced technology developments in transport and communication systems, which allow greater movements and interactions of people, goods, services, and capital, mean that Europe’s languages are also increasingly coming into closer contact in a variety of ways to complement and to compete with one another in what is a highly pluralistic and open European society. The European Commission reflecting the heterogeneous political and social facts within its institutions and member-states commits itself to the principle of "unity in diversity" and has set up research studies particularly devoted to the understanding of the overall effects of the integration process on the diversity of national cultures, especially as related to linguistic differences and language use. It is part of a concerted effort in formulating strategies aimed at synchronizing concrete economic and political everyday realities with corresponding changes within the sociolinguistic sphere. This section discusses the evolution of Europe’s linguistic diversity and the emergence of present-day ‘national languages’ as a result of barriers built around constructed political borders that came with the creation of nation-states; it shows the effect of economic integration and political centralization on linguistic diversity in Europe.

3.2 Evolution of linguistic diversity in Europe: its geographical, historical, and political factors

21 Increased global interconnection, heightened interdependence all occasioned by advanced technology developments in transport and communication systems which allow greater movement and interaction of people, goods, services, and capital constitutes the paper’s antecedent condition - the phenomenon whose presence activated or magnified the operation of the causal variable(s)
22 The Eurobarometer and the Eurostat
Linguistically, Europe is both ‘diverse’ and ‘homogenous’ mainly from the fact that most of its languages are intimately linked not just by such geography and political factors but also by a common ancestor: Indo-European, the hypothetical ancient language which shared common ancestry with the Indo-Iranian family of languages (Edwards, 2013). And there are three main factors that have shaped Europe’s diverse linguistic kinships and histories, namely: the geographical, historical and political. Geographically, the major language boundaries and distributions are the Greco-Slavic languages of southeastern Europe, the Latin languages of southern Europe, the Celtic languages of southwestern Europe and the Germanic languages of northwestern Europe.

Historically, population migrations within and between the regions have been one of the main factors that produced language situations: population dispersals have led to language divergence or the emergence of different languages while contacts between communities have brought about language convergence or similarities. That is, the contacts almost always allow exchanges between languages in the form of linguistic features such as lexical, syntactic, phonological, and morphological which leave historic marks on all the languages concerned. There is evidence that population movements have contributed to the distribution and redistribution of languages and linguistic features across Europe that gave rise to the present differences and similarities. What was once single speech communities or languages have been transformed into various varieties or distinct languages by population migrations.23 They have brought speakers of different languages into contact with one another in which some languages emerged as

---

23 Such as when the Roman provinces split into distinct own languages: French, Spanish, Portuguese
mixed or dominant languages such English in the UK and Ireland and French in France and Belgium, and they have also caused other languages to thrive or to disappear through processes well known to linguists (Crystal, 2000). The Roman Empire’s extension into what was its Provinces of France, Spain, Portugal, and the British Isles, for example, led to the spread of the Roman language, Latin, to what are today the other Latin languages of French, Spanish, and Portuguese with English as the exception because of a later spread of the Anglo-Saxon languages into England.

Politically, the relatively recent evolution of the nation-states in Europe also has played a significant role that produced its own modern linguistic situations and dynamics in which politically favored languages were chosen and promoted, while others demoted. And in some cases, few languages even found a home in more than one state as a result of the demarcations of state territoriality and sovereignty (Nelde, 1997) - a situation the present integration process is slowly reversing as it weakens or does away with national borders. Languages that were promoted and protected by States such as French, English, Spanish, for example, became today’s dominant national languages. Those that were demoted or undefended remained minority or marginal languages such as Breton in France or Cornish in England, for instance, while the ones that were split between or spread across different States emerged as overlapping regional languages. German, which is widely spoken in Central Europe and is co-official language in Germany, Switzerland, Austria, etc., is a good example of a regional language split between nation states. Thus, in some cases, people found themselves speaking a minority language in one area even

---

24 The Breton and Celtic languages are thriving languages
though they belonged to a linguistic majority in another adjacent region or state. As Anderson (2012) tells us, “Centuries of French governments have striven to make that country linguistically uniform” with French as the favored language at the expense of many others: Basque, Breton, the Germanic language spoken in Alsace, Gascon, Picard, Provencal and several more that are “as different from ‘French’ in at least some cases as, for instance, Spanish is from Portuguese” (p. 13).

Due to its diversity in unity, linguists therefore generally classify European languages into more or less four linguistic kinships that share clear cognate features and structural similarities across broad linguistic areas such as vocabulary, morphology, structure, syntax, grammar, etc. That is, the four groups are ‘West Romance, South Slavic, North Slavic, West Germanic, Scandinavian’ (Romaine, 1994). Though intra-group languages such as French and Spanish should, in principle, have more commonalities with one another than languages between groups such as Swedish and Italian, some languages exhibit features that are common to more than one group. This is explained by factors such as language ‘contacts’ and ‘spread’ over an area. For instance, English which developed in the British Isles due to such contact, is mainly a West Germanic language in its structure, grammar, and basic vocabulary though it has nearly twice as many words derived from Latin, French and Greek roots. Therefore it hardly fit neatly into these categories, whereas an isolate language like Basque does not have known close genealogical kinship to any existing modern European language. This is how Schendl (2001) explains linguistic evidence due to contact of languages:

In the history of practically every language, we come across syntactic

25 The Basque are an indigenous people inhabiting the Basque Country in southwestern France and parts of northern Spain.
constructions that were once foreign to that language but which were (or are) common constructions in other languages with which the language in question was in contact. In studying such syntactic innovations linguists may, and often have, come to the conclusion that a change was brought about by ‘syntactic borrowing’. Cases in point in the history of English are the use of the absolute participle … in imitation of the Latin ablativus absolutus …; the employment of subjectless relatives in Middle English (ascribed to French …); the development of peri-phrastic do (due to Celtic …), etc. (p. 102-103)

As Crystal (2003) explains, that is why English speakers often have the luxury of choice from multiple parallel lexicons; one can say 'kingly' from the Anglo-Saxon language; 'royal' from French; or say 'regal' from Latin. That is to say, English is essentially a mixture of Germanic, French, Latin - and Celtic - making it the lucky recipient of all kinds of loanwords and linguistic features (p.23). In other words, according to Schendl (2001), the ability to say or express an idea in English with different words similar in meaning as well as “the use of the absolute participle … in imitation of the Latin ablativus absolutus …; the employment of subjectless relatives in Middle English (ascribed to French …); the development of peri-phrastic do (due to Celtic …), etc.” all is due to this history of language contact (p. 102-103).

The following table is an example showing why English speakers often have this luxury of choice from multiple parallel lexicons.

**Table 1: English words identical in meaning of Germanic/Dutch and Latin/French origin**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>English</th>
<th>German/Dutch</th>
<th>Latin/French</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>god/deity</td>
<td>god</td>
<td>deity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>holy/sacred</td>
<td>holy</td>
<td>sacred</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>harbor/port</td>
<td>harbor</td>
<td>port</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hate/detest</td>
<td>hate</td>
<td>detest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>first/primary</td>
<td>first</td>
<td>primary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>foretell/predict</td>
<td>foretell</td>
<td>predict</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
help/assist                  help                       assist
lawful/legal                lawful                   legal
answer/respond             answer                   respond
meet/encounter             meet                     encounter
height/altitude            height                   altitude
hardship/difficulty      hardship               difficulty (dis-facultas)
Other (O.E)/different  other                     different
seem/appear                seem                     appear
old/ancient                old                       ancient
teach/educate              teach                    educate
tell/narrate               tell                     narrate
work/labor                 work                    labor
wild/savage                wild                     savage
wage/salary                wage                    salary
whole/entire               whole                   entire
tongue/language          tongue                  language

Source: Various

Nearly the ‘whole/entire’ English ‘tongue/language’ vocabulary can be traced to these donor languages. To further appreciate how English has evolved, the table below demonstrates how its words have been modified, for instance, from the Germanic forms.

Table 2: English words of Germanic origin

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>English</th>
<th>German (or Dutch)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>god</td>
<td>gott</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>holy</td>
<td>heilig</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>good</td>
<td>gut</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>green</td>
<td>grun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>world</td>
<td>welt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>water</td>
<td>wasser</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>over</td>
<td>uber</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>help</td>
<td>helfen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>answer</td>
<td>andswaru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>see</td>
<td>sehen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>self</td>
<td>selbe/zelf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other*(O.E)</td>
<td>ander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>speak</td>
<td>sprechen /spreken</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
motherspeak\textsuperscript{26} muttersprache
friend freund\textsuperscript{27}
love lufu/liebe
which Welche
for fur
singing singen
lip lippe

Source: Various\textsuperscript{28}

The same can be demonstrated of Latin or French origins of the English vocabulary; in fact, most European languages are related this way. And for English, this special heritage constitutes some of its strongest appeals as well as one of the best arguments one can make for its promotion as a shared language for Europe. That is, a language that derived its heritage from not just the Germanic languages but Latin as well as other ‘non-European’ languages globally (Crystall, 2003).

English, however, also became a major loaner/donor of vocabulary to other languages such as modern Japanese. The following list shows how English words have been borrowed, adopted, and then adapted through a process of ‘nativization’ to become part of the Japanese language in Japan. It is a fascinating instance of role reversal in history where English itself is now the donor language on such a global scale as to precipitate the evolution of distinct varieties such as Nigerian English, Indian English, etc in what is simply being termed ‘World Englishes’\textsuperscript{29} (Kachru, 1992) or ‘Euro-English’\textsuperscript{30} (the kind of

\textsuperscript{26} mother tongue - a person's first language at home
\textsuperscript{27} mein freund = my friend, literally
\textsuperscript{28} More German verbs and their English equivalents can be found in Strutz (1964).
\textsuperscript{29} varieties of English that have been developed under influenced by the United Kingdom or the United States
\textsuperscript{30} I define ‘Euro-English’ as the emergence of a new continent-wide English variety with the distinctive characteristics of the broader macro-cultural context and overall sociolinguistic situation of Europe.
compromised English Europeans of diverse backgrounds and nationalities speak when they interact). It demonstrates the reach and creativity of English and its global status - another strong argument for it as most suitable lingua franca in Europe. The following table presents an example of modern Japanese words of English origin.

**Table 3: English words that become Japanese words**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>English</th>
<th>Japanese</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>old</td>
<td>orudo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>light</td>
<td>raito</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>desk</td>
<td>denki</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>boobs</td>
<td>bubusu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>flares</td>
<td>furea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>milk</td>
<td>miruku</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>girl</td>
<td>garu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>standing</td>
<td>sutando</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>left</td>
<td>refuto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>taxi</td>
<td>takushi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>ingurisshu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lose</td>
<td>ruzu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>salaried man</td>
<td>sarariman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>conveyer belt</td>
<td>beruto konbea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>school</td>
<td>sukuru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>solar</td>
<td>sora</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>television</td>
<td>terebi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MacDonald’s</td>
<td>makudonarudo</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Stanlaw (1992:178-208)

This English-Japanese illustrates how English today is being appropriated not just in Europe where it shares history with others, but globally as well.

These examples are interesting and significant on several levels: 1/ similarity of vocabularies with identical meanings between languages supported by history show
evidence of kinship. 2/ when languages borrow words from one another, the borrowing languages make sure that the loanwords conform, among other things, to their own phonological rules (Stanlaw, 1992), and 3/ distance is no barrier for contact and mixture between languages. This is true in all languages regardless of the period, environment or nature of their relationships. The English word ‘love’ was a transformation of the original German form ‘lufu,’ which is also being transformed into Japanese as ‘rabu.’ One can only imagine what form it would have if the Germans were to borrow the ‘new’ Japanese word ‘rabu’ and transform it into German since the word is of German origin…

In fact, we know what happens when a word is borrowed, modified and is lent back to the original loaner: Vendryes (1925) explains:

> Sometimes a word which has gone abroad and been lost to us may come back hundreds of years after. For example, *flirt* and *budget* are today borrowings from English; but we know that they were originally French words which crossed the channel at an early date. And yet it would be inaccurate to take seriously a metaphor which compares words to travelers passing and repassing frontiers. It is no longer an old French word *fleurette* that comes back to France, but an English word *flirt* that is introduced into our modern language. Nor is it the old French word *bogete* (little bag) that French people have taken back under the form ‘budget’; it is a different word, a foreign word, signifying something quite other. (p. 194)

This brief demonstration of the relatedness of languages is at the heart of evolutionary or historical linguistics.

3.3 Linguistic diversity and mutual intelligibility in Europe

Nichols (1992) has made a useful distinction between "genetic diversity" and “structural diversity" of languages that enables us to determine degrees of their differences and similarities. The latter refers to the amount of disparity exhibited by a population of languages as a result of adaptation through contact with other languages.
The relative frequencies of structural features such as the order of Subject, Verb, and Object (SVO) or "word order and head/dependent type" shown as low or high in a language or group of languages – is the measure of the degree of structural diversity between languages. The former, "genetic diversity," is the number of discrete lineages such Germanic, Greek, Latin, and Slavic and the extent to which individual lineages have also branched out further such as Germanic into West Germanic, North Germanic, etc. It deals with relationships between languages which reflect their evolutionary histories and kinships. By using ‘genetic density,’ the ratio of genetic lineages to square miles within a geographic area, Nichols (1992:232-237) finds a low level of genetic diversity in Europe. That is, a majority of Europe’s languages belong to the above-noted four groups and hence low in genetic diversity while a proportionately fewer of them exhibit marked structural differences indicative of historic and frequent contacts and spreads. Low genetic diversity with a low level of structural diversity shows a high similarity between languages, language convergence, and unity of culture; it has implications on such issues as mutual intelligibility, difficulty or ease of mutual language learning. Romaine (2000) has provided an example of just how deeply similar Scandinavian languages or speech forms are to each other in spite of established political boundaries and superficial appearances:

A Danish school principal told the story of how she gave a lecture to an audience in Stockholm from a manuscript which had been translated into Swedish. She said, ‘They understood me very well. Then I fumbled for an expression, and the audience cried out, “just talk Danish, you are so easy to understand”. I switched to Danish, to the great surprise of the Swedes, who understood nothing! They had thought I was talking Danish all along. (p. 13)
That is, like Urdu in Pakistan and Hindi in India, Swedish and Danish are counted as distinct languages though they are similar than, say, Cantonese and Mandarin are to each other - two languages commonly viewed as dialects of the same language, ‘Chinese.’ As Anderson (2012) notes,

The putative unity of Chinese’ (as a construct encompassing the Sinitic languages) thus rests on facts such as the largely shared writing system, the existence of a standardized form of Mandarin (Putonghua) which is widely used as a sort of koine, and especially the political unity of the modern Chinese state: the individual Sinitic languages do not have separate flags, armies, and navies. (p. 63)

This illustration is both interesting and revealing. It is interesting because it demonstrates how profoundly similar some European ‘languages’ are to each other, and revealing because it shows how constructed political boundaries have helped promote behavioral attitudes on perceived language differences between people who live in different nation-states even when their languages are pretty similar or mutually intelligible to one another. As James and Lesley Milroy (1997:63) put it, other than those involving geographical factors, “Separateness of languages is therefore largely the result of social and political processes, and among these processes, language standardization is particularly important.” Standardization being, among other things, the preference and elevation of one language or variety above others and the insistence that people conform to that standard form of communication for intelligibility, comprehensibility, and interpretability.

Thus, while geographical isolation and the construction of political borders are key factors that helped create the environment for the evolution of linguistic diversity and the preservation of linguistic differences in Europe, language contacts have also brought
about the evolution of linguistic hierarchies such as is the case with English, Hindi and the other languages in modern India (Kachru, 1985, 1990, 1992) and now English and the other EU languages.

3.4 European integration and the evolving linguistic unity in Europe: its economic, political, and social factors

Despite some major challenges such as the eurozone crisis and Brexit facing European integration that is explained elsewhere as well as the fact that the evolving language situation is still fluid, some results and a clear trend have already begun to attract attention, posing a number of questions and interpretations for policy positions on issues of language diversity, multilingualism, and need for a common language. As the evidence in this section and section iv indicate, the linguistic situation is increasingly adapting to what has always been an uncertain economic and political landscape as languages perform different roles and functions within the EU institutions and in European society. As the sections will show, a few languages have already emerged as the leading "integrative media" in different geographical areas and social contexts within the European Union where they now coexist with other national languages. In the remainder of the section, we examine these emerging linguistic changes as languages both complement and compete within what is becoming a single ranked linguistic space in Europe.

We observed in section II a robust and systematic correlation between the growth of economic integration and the further development of political unity and cultural flows; the deeper the economic integration, the greater the political coordination or unity. Prima
facie, this suggests that the link is causal in nature showing that as the process of economic integration proceeds, more intermediary political structures and institutions correspondingly have emerged to regulate and harmonize the growing economic links.

We now look at the sociolinguistic data to determine the trend or to what extent the dynamics of integration impact linguistic diversity. The method involves three steps:

- estimating the languages most known to EU citizens other than mother tongues (I),
- ranking the languages on a scale deemed useful to learn (II), and
- comparing changes in the demand for second and foreign languages over a period (III).

And these changes thus are the measures of ‘the effect of economic integration and political centralization on linguistic diversity in Europe’ in a transformational context.

(I) Estimating the languages most known to EU citizens other than mother tongues

Since nearly all Member States have single or major national languages within their borders, there is a good correlation between the population size of a State, the size of its national language or mother tongue, and therefore languages known other than the mother tongue. Below is a recent data on the population sizes of each EU State:

Table 4: The nations of Europe, big and small (506 million total Europeans)

* Countries with More than 10 Million Native Speakers:

1. Germany, 81,
2. Turkey, 76 *
3. France, 66

---


32 Figures are rounded to the nearest million

33 Turkey is included, considered a European state and in the process of joining the EU
4. The United Kingdom, 64\textsuperscript{34}
5. Italy, 60
6. Spain, 47
7. Poland, 39
8. Romania, 20
9. Netherlands, 17
10. Belgium, 11
11. Greece, 11
12. The Czech Republic, 11
13. Portugal, 10

* Countries with More than one Million but less than 10 Million Native Speakers
14. Hungary, 9, 9
15. Sweden, 9, 6
16. Austria, 8
17. Switzerland, 8
18. Bulgaria, 7
19. Serbia, 7
20. Denmark, 6
21. Finland, 5
22. Slovakia, 5
23. Norway, 5
24. Ireland, 5
25. Croatia, 4
26. Lithuania, 3
27. Former Yug. Rep. of Macedonia, 2
28. Slovenia, 2
29. Latvia, 2
30. Estonia, 1

* Countries with less\textsuperscript{35} than million native speakers:
31. Cyprus 900
32. Montenegro 600
33. Luxembourg 500
34. Malta 400
35. Iceland 300
36. Liechtenstein 37

Per a Special Eurobarometer 243 / Wave 64.3 (2006) report on the language skills of European citizens and their attitudes towards other European languages, German not surprisingly is the most widely spoken mother tongue in Europe (18%) followed by

\textsuperscript{34} See discussion on Postscript
\textsuperscript{35} Figures rounded to the nearest thousandth
English and Italian with shares of 13% each. 12% of Europeans speak French as a mother tongue, and so on. Since this basic statistical measure represents or is an accurate indication of the overall population size of the countries concerned, we expect this country-to-sociolinguistic data correlation to remain a constant feature in Europe for the foreseeable future relatively. That is, the same proportions shall be more or less speaking these languages as native tongues. Statistically, therefore, this national population-to-language correlation favors the large countries such as Germany with 18% of Europeans claiming it as native tongue because of its population size (81 million speakers). That is, more than half of the EU citizens (18+13+13+12 = 56%) speak one of these four languages as mother tongues while only 44% speak the other remaining languages as their mother tongues.

This is consistent with the conclusion that, other than the institutional support languages receive that extends their reach, a country’s population size or national demography remains one of the primary sources of language vitality (McConnell, 1997: 354) which is another way of saying that in Europe, “Apart from English, the rank order of languages more or less follows the rank order of inhabitants.”

One of the features of this correlation is that since the populous countries are also some of the most prosperous and advanced economies in the Union, people in these countries can be less inclined or compelled to learn the languages of those in the less developed, less prosperous, and less populated countries who are more likely to have greater incentives for learning the languages of the populous/prosperous countries. This

---

36 Eurobarometer Report Number 55, 2001:82
is, since the freedom to work, travel, and study in another Member State - causal factors for the new linguistic situation - is one of the compelling arguments for integration by many EU citizens who are from less developed and prosperous economies. This also suggests that, in the future, as many more Europeans move into the more affluent countries and learn how to speak their languages, more people will therefore speak the dominant languages of these countries - at least as second or foreign languages, perhaps with the exception of Spanish, which is showing an increased demand from people living in the four leading countries for reasons associated with its significance and standing in Latin America\textsuperscript{37}, for example. Moreover, since those in the more developed and prosperous countries have little need to learn and acquire new language skills of the languages of the lesser economies, then they will also be more likely to know fewer languages such as the Germans and the French or may even remain monolingual speakers especially for native English speakers whose language is being learned more and more by other Europeans. This, however, has already been seen both an asset as well as a liability for the mostly monolingual British with their mostly English-only language skills. According to a British Council study conclusion, “It is a widely held – if not undisputed – view that the UK is lacking in the necessary language skills for the future, partly because of the status of English as the language of international communications.”\textsuperscript{38} This observation is consistent with the remarks made earlier that the big and more prosperous

\textsuperscript{37} This is a case of an exogenous cause having an effect within the EU: how Spanish does in the US and Latin America affects its relative position among other EU languages in EU. In the next chapter, we will see how English does globally equally affects its relative positions against the other EU languages in Europe

\textsuperscript{38} http://www.britishcouncil.org/sites/britishcouncil.uk2/files/languages-for-the-future.pdf
countries tend to have less incentive for acquiring knowledge of languages from the small and less prosperous ones.

Thus, in 2001\textsuperscript{39}, in addition to their mother tongue, the languages most well-known by Europeans are predictably as follows: English (41%), French (19%), German (10%), Spanish (7%), and Italian (3%).

The remaining languages had scores of less than three percent each. This means that 80\% of EU citizens (41+19+10+7+3=80\%) now know at least one of these five languages. More significantly, it means one needs only English (41\%) and French (19\%) to be understood by at least 60\% of all Europeans. And other than these five languages, the rest of the other EU languages are spoken, for all practical purposes, only by those who claim them as their mother tongues, which is another way of stating that they are not that much spoken by others either as second or foreign languages outside of their home countries.

In fact, according to a Eurobarometer 2001 survey (Report Number 55) on knowledge of languages in the EU: “Forty-seven percent of EU citizens speak a language other than their mother tongue well enough to take part in a conversation. However, there are large variations between the Member States, with people in Luxembourg most likely to speak a ‘foreign’ language (97\%) and people in the UK (27\%) least likely to do so.” Again, this outcome is highly consistent with what has already been noted here that people in smaller states are more likely to learn other European languages while those of big states with influential languages are less likely to do the same. In fact, the contrast can’t be more

\textsuperscript{39} Eurobarometer 2001 survey (Report Number 55)?
revealing since not only is the UK home of native English speakers, but Luxembourg is also one of the smallest states and the home to not just its own national language, Luxembourgish, but the two other important European languages: French and German. Needless to say, the ability or inability to speak more than one language is neither good nor bad in itself; however, it can be either a liability or an asset, for those able to speak more languages can be more likely to take advantage of more opportunities in multilingual societies such as Europe.

Thus, in estimating the languages most known to Europeans other than mother tongue, the five languages - English, French, German, Spanish, and Italian are the most known respectively. This argues that while the absolute strength of these languages isn’t dependent on the integration process, their evolving relative worth within the European Union is. Below we investigate what this relative rank within the EU reflects.

(II) Ranking the languages on a scale of deemed useful to know

Following the European Commission’s survey and analysis service, we can assess and interpret any sociolinguistic changes based on languages Europeans deem most useful to know.

In 2006 when asked which two languages, apart from your mother tongue, do you think children should learn as citizens of the EU? The results were predictable:

77% of the EU citizens consider that children should learn English as their first foreign language while the rest of the respondents were divided among the remaining other major languages: French, German, Spanish, Russian, Italian and Swedish in that order. English is number one in all countries polled, except the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Luxembourg. French follows next with a 33% share and German receives support from 28% of the respondents.40

That is, English (77%), French (33%), German (28%), Spanish (19%), Russian (3%), Italian (2%), and Swedish (0%). Below is the full table showing the relative rank of the seven major languages people deem the most useful to speak, apart from their mother tongue in each country.

**Table 5: Language preferences for children within the EU**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>English</th>
<th>French</th>
<th>German</th>
<th>Spanish</th>
<th>Russian</th>
<th>Italian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovak</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>99%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Source:41

This data confirms that, for most Europeans of all countries and regions, English is the clear choice for the language deem most useful to know, followed by either French or German depending on the particular countries or region. It means that a new linguistic situation, at present a tri-lingual one, has or is evolving in Europe in which most Europeans who speak languages other than English, French, and German as their mother tongues are now acquiring them as their regional language or English as the all-regions lingua franca. This is the immediate future of Europe and its likely distant future as well unless some major unseen linguistic situations emerge that disrupt42 the present trend. It is the new linguistic situation for Europe replacing the old one that rose when the nation states were created.

(III) Comparing changes in the demand for second and foreign languages over a period

Using data from the European Commission’s Eurobarometer and Eurostat, this subsection highlights the extent to which a clear trend has or is emerging, statistically. Below we reproduced the EU’s official language membership list in chronological order, first.

Table 6: Official EU languages since...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dutch, French,</td>
<td>1958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German, Italian</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Danish, English</td>
<td>1973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek</td>
<td>1981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portuguese, Spanish</td>
<td>1986</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


42 It would be interesting to see the future of English in the EU institutions if and when the UK leaves the EU and it looses it official status; see postscript for more on that.
Finnish, Swedish 1995
Czech, Estonian, Hungarian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Maltese, Polish, Slovak, Slovenian
Bulgarian, Irish, Romanian 2007
 Croatian 2013

Source

That is, the original official EU languages in 1958 were Dutch, French, German, and Italian; English and the rest of the other languages did not join the official list until 1973.

The surveys by the EU Commission have shown the extent to which European feelings and attitudes toward the EU institutions and their languages have changed over time as the integration process unfolds. Since European economic and political integration is the causal variable generating changes within the sociolinguistic sphere, the results have followed an expected pattern: as the integration process goes, so has that been reflected in the linguistic situation. For example:

In 1987, within what was the EC12, the national languages spoken at home were: Danish, Dutch, English, French, German, Greek, Italian, Portuguese, Spanish. Then one out of three citizens of the European Community spoke at least one foreign language ‘well enough to follow a conversation’. Of those interviewed, 51% had at least some training in English, 42% in French, 33% in German; while to speak ‘well enough to follow a conversation,’ 36% spoke English, 27% French, and 25% German.

Fast forward, in 2001, in addition to their mother tongue, the language most known by Europeans is English (41%), followed by French (19%), German (10%), Spanish (7%), and Italian (3%). In 2001, the languages widely considered as the most useful to know apart from the mother tongue were: English 69%, French 37%, German 23%, and Spanish at 19%. Only 5% of the EU population believed other languages would be most useful to know.

In 2006, 83% of EU25 respondents said knowing other languages is advantageous while 50% of Europeans agree with the view that everyone in the EU should be able to speak two languages in addition to their mother tongue.’

In 2012, when asked to name the two languages, apart from their mother tongue, that they believed to be most instrumental for their personal development and for children to learn for their future, most Europeans think English is the most useful language at 67%, German at 17%, French 16%, Spanish 14%, and Italian at 5%. Chinese at 6% and Russia’s 4% were also mentioned as among other non-EU languages good to know for personal development. No other language is specified as being of significant use by more than 1% of respondents.

According to a 2015 Press Release by Eurostat (164/2015), “In 2013, 17.7 million primary school pupils (or 81.7% of all the pupils at this level) in the European

48 Mandarin Chinese is perceived to gain status with the rise of China while Russian was the lingua franca within the Soviet Union and most parts of Eastern Europe
49 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/7008563/3-24092015-AP-EN.pdf/bf8be07c-ff9d-406b-88f9-f98f5199fe5a
were studying at least one foreign language, including 1 million (4.6%) studying two foreign languages or more. At primary level, English was by far the most popular language, studied by 16.7 million pupils.” As per the same Eurostat, “The second most commonly studied foreign language at both primary and lower secondary level and upper secondary level was French (19 per cent of pupils in primary and lower secondary level and 23 per cent in upper secondary), followed by German (nine per cent, and 21 per cent, respectively) and Spanish (six per cent and 18 per cent, respectively).” The evidence has shown that, over time, more and more Europeans are learning another language, and that English has emerged as their clear first foreign or second language of choice. And these reordering of the languages by merit of usefulness by and large shows a clear development toward a well-defined language hierarchy consistent with the theoretical postulations discussed in section I and the predicted outcome outlined in section II.

3.5 Brief comment and conclusion

In this section, I examined the linguistic situation in Europe from past to present in a transformational context showing how the Nation States system and national language policies helped create a hierarchy of languages in every country and how national languages such as English, French, German, and Russian emerged as more dominant regional languages in Europe mainly as a result of their countries sizes. This is because empirical researchers using the same or similar data typically measure such changes without assessing their link to the causal variables that generate the changes over time. In analyzing the economic and political integration as the dynamically causal variable (process) in Section II and the ongoing changes in the linguistic situation as the effect or
reactive variable in this Section III, we have therefore shown the cause-to-effect link between the two phenomena. That is, within this framework, changes in the linguistic sphere are explained by the integration process that determines the basic course of the EU.

The next section looks further at the changes in the linguistic situation by examining the evolving functions and status of English in Europe mainly in a tri-lingual setting.
PART TWO: Sections IV

Effect of economic integration and political centralization on the functions and status of the English language in Europe

In 1958, the then European Economic Community passed a Regulation naming Dutch, French, German and Italian as its official languages, these being the languages of the first six countries to join the organization. (EU Commission)

When dominant languages feel they are being dominated, something much bigger than a simplistic conception of power relations must be involved. Crystal (1997)

In several Asian and African countries, English now has national and international functions that are both distinct and complementary. Kachru (1990)

In Section II, I examined the evolution and structure of European integration showing the interactions of its principal spheres and how the functional spillover mechanism, in particular, maintained the process and brought about integration from one sector, sphere, or economy to another. I also examined how the formal and informal processes of the process function and how different roles and functions are allocated between the EU, Member States, and other agents through the subsidiary mechanism. Section III examined the cumulative impact of the processes on linguistic diversity more generally which has posed some interesting questions and policy challenges for policymakers on the European integration. The section also explained how the current EI process, which seeks the removal of political borders which act as linguistic barriers, for instance, has generated a reverse sociolinguistic situation as a consequence where languages are coming into contact in what is increasingly becoming a shared sociolinguistic space for language
complementarity and competition. Thus, as demonstrated in the previous sections a significant measure of sociolinguistic disturbance and linguistic transformation, triggered mainly by the processes of integration, is taking place in Europe. That is, the evolution of a new linguistic situation with the formation of a pecking order of language hierarchy led by the emergence of a new Continent-wide English variety with the distinctive characteristics of the overall sociolinguistic situation and broader European macro-cultural context\textsuperscript{50}. As recent surveys indicate, “The five most widely spoken foreign languages remain English (38%), French (12%), German (11%), Spanish (7%) and Russian (5%).”\textsuperscript{51}

Evidently, there are various sub-sociolinguistic situations evolving in Europe that are also of interest in their own right: situations within individual speakers, country, region, and within the institutions of the European Union. However, here I mainly look at the reason or reasons that are propelling English as the top EU working and integrative language. And as English keeps on increasing its share of being the most use language within the EU institutions as well as the most commonly spoken second and foreign language by most Europeans at the expense of the others, most notably French and German, several studies have sought to explain the forces or factors behind its rise and current position as now the de facto European lingua franca. Many observers of English including Kachru (1992) have noted that this is not the first time the language is involved in “historically and linguistically interesting and complex” situations where it competes

\textsuperscript{50} A European English variety comparable to the British, American, or Australian English varieties because of its distinctiveness from them

and complements other languages (p. 53). In fact, for Crystal (1997), “There is the closest of links between language dominance and economic, technological, and cultural power, too, and this relationship will become increasingly clear as the history of English is told” (p. 7). This section looks at the brief history, the role played by economic, political and other factors in the development, spread, and dominance of the English language globally as well as its present function and status within the European Union.

4.1. A brief historical overview of the development of the English language

Linguists generally (and conveniently) classify English as belonging to the Germanic branch of the Indo-European language family - a family now considered the largest and most widely spread and diffused group estimated to have about three billion or 46% speakers worldwide⁵² (Ethnologue, 2014). As I have noted in section III, in many ways English is mainly a West Germanic⁵³ language that is also historically and strongly related to the Latin and Greek languages.

The Roman Empire, at its height of power in the second century C.E, extended to Britain in the far fringes of Western Europe. The language of the Empire, Latin, became the language of government, power, and prestige throughout its provinces including Britain. As the Roman Empire began to disintegrate by the fifth century A.D and Latin split into its four well-known modern languages (Italian, French, Spanish, and

---

⁵² Nations of Indo-European speakers: ‘Afghanistan, Albania, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Fiji, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, India, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Isle of Man, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Maldives, Myanmar, Nepal, Netherlands, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Vatican State, Venezuela’

⁵³ See Section III for detail explanation of the German origin of basic English words.
Portuguese), large groups of Germanic and Scandinavian speaking peoples began to descend on Britain, bringing with them the Anglo-Saxon languages and culture (the order of events can also be reversed according to which it was the coming of the Anglo-Saxon peoples into the Roman Provinces which caused or accelerated Roman disintegration\(^5^4\)). In any case, as they become the dominant economic and political power in Britain their languages, West Saxon in particular, also mixed with and came to dominate the ‘native’ Celtic (or the autochthonous) languages and Latin which gave the ancient English its first mix of lexicon and grammatical structures which at times frustrate researchers interested in its etymological and often irregular features\(^5^5\).

Furthermore, the Norman Conquest of what is now "England" in 1066 C.E. moreover further changed the evolution and structure of the language; for about three centuries ‘Old French’, a language similar to Latin, became the new language of the law, administration, and the courts in Britain. During this period, Old English mixed with this language too and evolved into Middle English which left French, and through it even more Latin words, with significant influence especially on the lexical inventory of the language as demonstrated in the previous section. The evolution and development into

\(^5^4\) "Meanwhile Roman power on the Continent came under irresistible pressure from barbarian invaders. The Goths crossed the Danube and in 378 annihilated a Roman army and killed the Emperor Valens. In 406 an enormous horde of Germans swarmed across the Rhine and descended on France. They could not be driven out but were with difficulty ejected into Spain and North Africa. The city of Rome itself was sacked by the Goths in 410. The Empire in the West fell to pieces. The British were left to fend for themselves." (Richard Cavendish, p6)

\(^5^5\) For instance, “The England of the Megalithic period felt the impact of a strong Negroid Egyptian-Phoenician influence. In fact, the first Phoenician and Sidonian navigations of the Bronze Age are contemporaneous with the XVIIIth Egyptian Dynasty…; the Phoenicians, subjects and brokers of the Egyptians, fetched tin from the Sorlinguan Islands, meaning from England… It was in this period that a pre-Christian African vocabulary came into what was to become the English language: ancient Saxon.” Diop (1991:19)
Modern English have since been shaped by a wide range of other comparable events or influences: European Renaissance and the resurgent interest in the Greco-Roman traditions, development of modern science and technology using Greco-Latin roots in English, British global colonial expansion, the founding of the United States, and so on. In each case, the English language underwent substantial change and enrichment with more lexicon from such linguistically diverse places as Africa, North America, and Asia as evidenced by a wide variety of modern loan words in the language. Its expanded vocabulary as well as the high number of words it has for expressing related ideas, which all have contributed in making it a rich and attractive language of choice, is due to these historic contact and language exchanges. Together, these profound developments account for the fact that at present over 75 percent of all English words and the vocabulary of the modern sciences and technology have Latin or Greek roots, according to Crystal (2003).

A great deal more could be said about the chronological development of the English language including a further detail history to account for the various layers of lexical and grammatical elements that entered it at different periods in its history - as we have demonstrated in section III. However, the fact that it is also possible to show a strong link between the economic and political factors (the interactive co-independent variables) and the spread and development of the language (the dependent variable) has led some analysts to argue that there is a positive link between the two phenomena (for instance,

---

56 The English word ‘coffee’, for instance, is from the Fulani word ‘kade’ for ‘bitter beans’ via the Asian form ‘kave’ or ‘kafe’ - a linguistic fact which can be inferred from the fact that coffee is a Sudanic/Ethiopian native bean; ‘banana’ is also a West African word probably from the Mande language; the words ‘guru’ for a teacher and ‘totem’ for kin group (a concept of great value for anthropologists) are from the East Indian and Native American languages respectively; just as the word ‘ginseng’ for the name of a plant, is of Asian origin.
see Kachru (1990), Phillipson (1992), Crystal (2003), Graddol (1997, 2006)).

4.2 The economic and political factors and the global spread of English

Many comparisons have been made between the conditions and processes that gave rise to past lingua francas such as old Egyptian (Fulani), Chinese (Mandarin), Arabic, Latin, and French and the present situations of Spanish in Latin America, Swahili in East Africa, and that of English both globally and in Europe. In each case, analysts have argued that languages prestige, its functions, status, and spread are causally linked to the technological, economic and cultural power of its speakers, In their view it was inevitable, with England and later the United States leading world industrial capitalism and the information age in the last two centuries, that English would correspondingly become the dominant global language. Moreover, with the establishment of British- and US-led global institutions such as the United Nations, World Bank, IMF, and many others, it was also argued that the global standing and role of English would be maintained and further enhanced.

But how exactly are the two phenomena - economic and political power and the rise of the language correlated?

4.3 The ‘grassroots theory’ and the ‘exploitative theory.’

There are two basic approaches usually employed in the literature to explain the relationship between economic and political factors and language dominance: "the grassroots theory" and "the exploitative theory" (Mair 2002). The latter refers to a situation in which a dominant language in contact with lesser prestigious languages exerts strong constraining pressure on their range and function such that the contact tragically
results in what linguists are increasingly referring to as either ‘language murder’ or ‘language suicide.’ In varying degrees, the dominant language spreads over, assimilates, or replaces the lesser prestigious ones in a manner that gradually leads to either ‘linguistic obsolescence’ or the ‘loss of domains.’ Dominant languages such as Spanish in Latin America that spread in this way at the expense of others are known as ‘killer languages.’ The latter, the grassroots theory, refers to a rather limited and more voluntary use of a dominant language typically among speakers of mutually different languages as a common, available, and neutral language such as in Singapore where Malay, Tamil, Mandarin and English coexist with English functioning as the common language. Given this, the exploitative model arguably does not quite fit neatly describe the current spread of English within Europe. That is, the 'grassroots' theory which emphasizes a utilitarian function for the rise of the language, therefore, must be included. I explained this by the link between the enhanced global position of English outside of the EU by both the exploitative and the grassroots models and its current status within Europe by the grassroots model. That is, English does well in Europe as it rises globally.

Kachru\textsuperscript{57} has made a useful contribution in this connection by incorporating extra-linguistic, sociopolitical and demographic variables to explain the influence and role of English in native and non-native countries or settings. His model consists of three concentric circles: inner, outer, and expanding in which each circle consists of a set of countries where the language performs different functions and has different statuses: as a mother tongue, an official language, and a foreign or international language, respectively.

\textsuperscript{57} Cited by Crystal In English as a Global Language (2003: 60-61).
That is, the inner circle represents countries where English functions as a mother tongue such as the UK or the US. In the outer circle, for historical reasons, it plays a significant part in the country's’ administrative and educational institutions and functions as an official language such as Nigeria and India. In the expanding circle, however, it is widely and mostly used as a lingua franca or ‘connecting’ foreign language – that is, in those countries where the language has played no administrative or historical role such as China and Russia. The relationship between the circles is described as 'norm-providing' (inner), norm-developing' (outer) and 'norm-dependent' (expanding). This relationship, however, is soon to be reversed, at least, according to Graddol (2000:5): “The main areas of development in the use and form of English will undoubtedly come from non-native speakers.” That is, the innovation will originate from the outer and expanding circles or countries to the inner one.

4.4 The different functions and roles of English in different countries

The figure illustrates the role of English in each circle according to Kachru:
In this subsection, I shall, therefore, apply this model to show the functions of the language within each circle and why it is increasingly becoming the primary integrative language as well as the first choice for most Europeans.

Kachru (1992:58) identifies four key functions the English language performs in different local, national, and global contexts which according to him have made it highly competitive and the natural choice in a growing number of countries including Europe:

1. *instrumentality* – English as a medium of learning in educational systems;
2. *regulative* – English in administrative and legal systems;
3. *imaginative* – English in various literary genres, and
4. *interpersonal* – English as a link language between speakers of different languages or dialects in socio-linguistically pluralistic societies and as a language of elitism and modernization.

That is, English performs various combinations of these functions in different countries for different persons depending on the local situation: as mother tongue, a national language, an official language, and a foreign or international language.

Since many EU national languages are also highly developed languages and perform many of these functions in their respective countries, therefore it is mainly the ‘interpersonal’ (and international) functions use among a growing majority of EU citizens as well as the rest of the world that account for the continuing rise in the demand for English in Europe. In fact, Ammon (2015) has blamed the low standing in the global market of languages on poor German language policies.

More recent studies have indicated that English is also gradually playing an important
role as a medium of learning in the educational systems in much of the European Union\textsuperscript{58} in spite of these function having been traditionally performed by national languages. This increasing role for English is consistent with the emerging linguistic situation and EU language policies that encourage EU citizens and require EU students to learn and to become proficient in at least one or two EU languages other than their mother tongues\textsuperscript{59} one of which is almost always English. Thus, the spread of English in Europe can be considered as the result of many factors that enable it to meet and advance the communicative needs of an integrating Europe than can similarly be accomplished by other languages given their functional reaches in Europe and globally.

In some countries or even regions, German can perform many of these functions quite well, while in other nations, it is French that performs them well. The Russian language, for historical reasons already noted, is also used for some functions in some regions, especially in the former Soviet Republics and Eastern Europe. None of these languages, however, increasingly performs all functions at all levels - at the intrapersonal, local, national, regional, European, and international as effectively as English does for Europeans. For instance, if a Danish wants to speak or do business with someone in Greece, a German doing business with a Gambian, a Polish talking to a Singaporean business representative, a Swedish vacationing in Italy, a random EU officials interacting at a Cafe at the European Parliament, in any of these interlocutions, the chances are that English would the language use in the majority of cases.

And since languages that cannot or do not perform these functions satisfactorily would

\textsuperscript{58} Various European Commission Studies and Surveys have shown that English is becoming more and more the medium of learning

\textsuperscript{59} defined as the language first learned and still spoken by an individual
be relatively disadvantaged and thus less in demand, therefore, this is the key to understanding why English is becoming so successful within Europe. In fact, such a linguistic situation where speakers of different languages are motivated or compelled to adopt English as their common and convenient language is not a new phenomenon.

The linguistic and cultural pluralism in Africa and South Asia contributed to the spread of English, and helped foster its retention even after the colonial period ended. The nationalist awakening needed a pan-national medium for a resurgence; the medium chosen was, ironically, the “alien” language. And there were reasons, both cultural and linguistic, for that choice (Kachru, 1990:7-8).

Crystal (2003) has summed up the global context that gave rise to the position of the English language today this way: “The present-day world status of English is primarily the result of two factors: the expansion of British colonial power, which peaked towards the end of the nineteenth century, and the emergence of the United States as the leading economic power of the twentieth century” (p. 59). Graddol (1997) and Crystal (2003) have also identified the following major areas where English is already universally recognized as the global language as the direct result of the two factors Crystal (2003) discussed:

- the language of world trade, and banking
- the working language of international conferences and organizations
- the language of international law
- the language of international travel safety: aviation and maritime
- the language of global brands advertisements
- the language of international tourism
• the language of physics, chemistry, biology, medicine, technology transfer, academic (scientific) publications\(^{60}\)
• the language of the media/press, public broadcasting, the internet, and cultural audio-visual products such as popular music, film, and TV
• the language of higher or university education, literature, and
• increasingly, the ‘relay language’ in translation and interpretation within the EU institutions

These are some of the universally recognized key functional areas that give the English language the decided advantage over its competitors. And it is also the interplay of these functions, together with ‘the prestige factor’ on English as the language of progress as well as the ‘neutral language factor,’ which makes the language the inevitable choice as lingua franca for Europe. Harold Schiffman (1997) explains how the perception of English as the preferred ‘neutral language’ between the speakers of different countries in Europe has already helped raised its status as their lingua franca. "The use of the H-variety German in Alemannic Switzerland conversely may be seen as a power-trip designed to put the Swiss speaker at a disadvantage. The fact that the Hochdeutsch speaker may have no alternative L to use may be irrelevant; it certainly explains the desire to switch to ‘neutral’ English or French” (p. 214). That is, by opting for English, it places everyone on an equal footing, except for native English speakers whose advantage can be reduced only by the evolution of a real European English variety.

4.5 The principle of natural selection as it applies to language competition and

---

\(^{60}\) ‘Publish in English or perish’ means to be able to reach as many peer readers, within the academic field, one has to publish in English...
complementarity and the rise of English dominance

Given that French, along with English, is the co-official and working language of most international bodies, the fact that it is the only other truly global language besides English, given that German is also the language of the most populous and economically dynamic European nation, and given that at present both French and German are threatened by the growing demand and use for English throughout Europe itself - suggest that the principle of Natural Selection, popularly known as ‘survival of the fittest’, may also apply in situations of linguistic diversity within a common space. That is, under natural selection, adaptive or “advantageous” feature tend to produce more successful ones than their peers do, perhaps accounting for the luck of languages in situations of linguistic diversity and political integration. Since a particularly interesting effect of the European integration is its impact on linguistic diversity by ‘compelling’ or exposing languages into greater contact not just to complement but also to compete one another within the EU institutions and in Europe, the principle of natural selection, therefore, seems the most natural, effective, and ‘invisible force’ or explanation that sorts out the languages by placing each in its ‘right place’ or in a hierarchy of useful worth. As Graddol (1997:36) explains, for instance, “The English language flows into other languages, which adopt English words and phrases. English also ‘colonises’ the space of other languages by taking over certain communicative domains.”

4.6 Survey of language usage in the EU

Below is a sample Eurostat report on the complementary and competing demand for some languages within the EU educational institutions from 2005-2011 to demonstrate
the dynamics that are playing out within the emerging new linguistic situation that creates a ‘pecking order.’

**On primary education**

Within primary education a clear majority of pupils (choose to) study English. Indeed, learning English is mandatory in several countries within secondary education institutions, and so a number of EU Member States have close to 100% of pupils learning this language already in primary education... The highest shares of primary education pupils studying English in 2011 were recorded in Malta, Spain, Austria, Italy, Greece, Croatia and Poland, with more than nine out of every ten children studying English; this was also the case in Liechtenstein, Norway and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The relative importance of English as a foreign language may be further magnified because pupils tend to receive more instruction in their first foreign language than they do for any subsequent languages they (choose to) study.

Many of the central and eastern European Member States that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 were characterised by the fact that learning Russian was compulsory in the past. This situation has changed rapidly and these days most pupils have more choice concerning the language(s) they wish to study. In most of these countries there has been a marked increase in the proportion of pupils learning English, often above 50% of all students, and in Bulgaria and Lithuania over 70% in 2011, with the peak over 90% in Poland (as already noted above).

Luxembourg is also of particular interest, insofar as there are three official languages, with most pupils receiving instruction in Luxembourgish, German and French at primary level; English is only introduced at secondary school. A similar situation is observed in Belgium, with the focus in primary schools on learning French or Dutch (depending on the community and/or region), rather than English.

Apart from Luxembourg, the only other EU Member State where more than one quarter of primary school children learnt French as a foreign language was in the United Kingdom, where this share exceeded two thirds (69.6%). German is the main foreign language taught to all primary school children in Luxembourg, while more than one fifth of primary children were taught German in 2011 in Greece, Croatia and Hungary.

**On secondary education**

Turning to language learning in upper secondary school... some 93.8% of all EU-28 students at ISCED\(^6\) level 3 were studying English as a foreign language in

---

\(^6\) ISCED: International standard classification of education is an instrument for compiling internationally comparable education statistics. The ISCED 97 version covers two classification variables: levels and fields of education as well as general/vocational/prevocational orientation and
2011, compared with slightly less than one quarter (23.0%) studying French and slightly more than one fifth (21.1%) studying German. Between 2006 and 2011, the proportion of students at ISCED level 3 in the EU-27 studying English increased slightly (up 0.7 percentage points), while the proportions studying French and German fell 7.7 and 13.8 percentage points respectively.

Luxembourg and the Czech Republic stood out as the countries with the highest proportion (100%) of secondary education students (at ISCED level 3) learning two or more languages in 2011, while there were also shares above 90% recorded in Finland, Slovenia, Slovakia, Romania, Estonia (2008 data), Sweden and France; note this indicator includes all foreign languages, not just German, English and French.

Source: Eurostat 2015: ‘Foreign language learning statistics’

And since the average foreign language learned by each student is about two, and since the first foreign language of choice is English, and since no other EU language constantly follows second place to English in every country, therefore, this means that the other major languages: namely, French, German, Italian, Spanish, and Russian are second foreign language choices only in their respective regions of influence. Meaning, they are simply regional languages and are not as spread as English has become. As noted by Kachru (1992) for languages under similar situations,

The spread of one language in relation to others is a phenomenon which presumably goes far back in human history as the existence of a multiplicity of languages. Certainly, it is documented as far back as written records go; e.g., in the second millennium B.C., Akkadian replaced Sumerian but the speech community retained the latter in certain learned uses. Also, it is a familiar phenomenon for one language to serve as a lingua franca or language of special functions (religious, commercial) over a large area of many languages: Sanskrit, Greek, Latin, Arabic, and French are examples at various periods and in different parts of the world. But there has never before been a single language which spread for such purposes over most of the world, as English has done in this century. (p. xv)
And since the language that is the dominant choice for today’s young generation becomes the language of the future, and given the present trend, therefore, it is predictable that English would be the language of the future for Europe.

4.7 The growing use of English and the relative decline of others in Europe

I now examine the rise of English and its relationship with the national languages in Europe. Obviously, since both French and German are two highly developed, well protected and prestigious national, regional and international languages on their own rights, and since from a purely linguistic perspective no language is inherently superior to another and are identical on all levels of abstraction (a Chomskyan conception), ‘something much bigger than a simplistic conception of power relations must be involved’, to repeat after Crystal (1997). The replacement of the Russian language in Eastern Europe for English, the relative and steady decline in the use of two major European languages, French and German, within the very Pan-European institutions they co-founded62 has raised understandably some interesting questions and concerns.

The table below illustrates the rise of English and the relative decline of French and German in written use within the European Union institutions over a 14-year period.

Table 6: ‘Languages of primary texts produced by the European Commission (in %)’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>French</th>
<th>English</th>
<th>German</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>44.7</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

62 “In 1958, legislation specified German, French, Italian and Dutch as the official and working languages of the European Union’s (EU) predecessor, the European Communities”.
In this table, the increasing use of the English language over time is closely correlated with the declining use of both French and German, the two main international languages at a competition with English. That is, the evidence shows some systematic correlation between the progress of economic integration and political centralization and the emergence of a linguistic hierarchy. It indicates that economic and political integration involving countries with different languages can have significant linguistic consequences. In other words, despite EI being initially a Franco-German project, and despite the fact that the first official language policy of the then European Community (EC) identified French, German, Italian, and Dutch only as the working and official languages of the EC (EU), English is now the dominant integrative language. The fact that English has been diminishing their functions in the EU institutions and European society in general imply that some of the consequences of integration are fundamental and unintended. In fact, this has been happening in spite of deliberate efforts aimed at slowing down the pace and changing the trend - perhaps, teaching us one or two things on the behavior of culture change discussed in Section I.

In an article written by Amelia Gentleman (2004), ‘French-language fightback as English colonizes EU,’ she reported that despite efforts to reduce the impact of the increased use of English, France is achieving the opposite results:

The creation of the school in Avignon reflects mounting anxiety in Paris that the EU - originally a primarily French body, with its main headquarters in Francophone countries, formed along the lines of French administrative structures, with French as its core language - is drifting further from its roots with every expansion. Between 1997 and 2002, the use of French in European council
documents, for example, dropped 24% while there was a 32% rise in English. A survey of officials from the new member states this year showed that almost 70% had English as their second language.

A trend that is expected to rise as more young people learn English than they do in other languages in schools as already noted which is also consistent with a Eurobarometer Special Surveys conducted in 2001 which found, among other things, that:

The foreign language to be spoken by most young Europeans is, without surprise, English. One young person out of two (whose mother tongue is not English) declares having a sufficient knowledge of the language to take part in a conversation. This is more or less the same percentage as in 1997 (54 %) but noticeable more than in 1990 (42 %) and in 1987 (34 %). In other words, English is steadily becoming the young Europeans lingua franca.

And as if to make matters more challenging for the French and German languages, the Survey also notes that “As in 1997, Spanish is the foreign language young people (29%) would prefer to learn.” That is, it is Spanish which is surprisingly becoming the second, second language preferred by young Europeans besides English. Therefore, it is safe to state or even predict that English is being selected for and shall be the lingua franca within the European Union. In part, this is because, as Kachru (1990:98) noted, “the planning for the spread of English is steadily passing into the hands of its non-native users” and is therefore nearly unstoppable or irreversible unless some extraordinary opposing event like a total disintegration of the EU took place. Girod (2011) puts the effect already felt by some languages as the result of a correlation:

![image](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_151_summ_en.pdf)

French has definitely lost it. 64

All this demonstrates that the power or influence of a language involves more than a complex interplay of hegemonic factors derived from the economic, political, and cultural power matrix of its speakers. It shows sociolinguistic factors such as the range of functions a language has, all have made English the best suited for a common language in Europe. This also demonstrates that the coercive or language imposition thesis often applied to explain the spread of English outside of Europe cannot fully account for the language’s relative success in Europe where it actually faces other successful, European, international, and former imperial languages such as French, German, Spanish, Italian, and Russian and on their home countries.

Therefore, while rejecting the linguistic imperialism theory of Phillipson (1992) directly for the success of English in Europe, I argue that it's phenomenal spread there is due, in large measure, to two major factors: 1/ its global success that compels most Europeans to communicate with non-Europeans in English, and 2/ its use or appropriation as the ‘neutral’, common denominator language - the most common reason for a lingua franca, as noted earlier. In other words, we accept Crystal’s argument that English now plays the most crucial and needed role in international communication.

4.8 The future linguistic situation in Europe and the future of English

The paper sought to demonstrate that there is a link between the process of economic and political integration and changes on the linguistic situation in Europe as shown by the evolution of a new linguistic hierarchy and by the growing use of English the common

---

64 The French government has also been fighting back: in 1994, through its Toubon Law, the government mandated the use of the French language in official government publications.
language in Europe. The sociolinguistic evidence presented made a strong case that the harmonizing and homogenizing dynamics of the economic, political, and social integration in Europe have a significant impact on linguistic diversity. The evidence has shown that the new linguistic situation and the spread of English in Europe are the consequence of the dynamic, expansive EI process.

Consequently, when modeling the continent’s evolving sociolinguistic trajectory, the most predictable in time according to the analyses presented in this paper will be the gradual evolution of a linguistic pecking order, accompanied by an increasing language convergence whereby languages become more similar to each other, and the emergence of a new continent-wide English variety with the distinctive characteristics of the broader macro-cultural context and overall sociolinguistic situation of Europe. That is, according to a model of transition from speaker innovation to linguistic change (James and Lesley Milroy, 1997:51). In the future, English will be, therefore, the most used language for intra-EU-wide communications in which it performs the different roles and functions as a mother tongue to some, a second language for many, and a lingua franca for most. Below is a joke that has aptly captured a model summary of how the new European English variety most likely would evolve:

The European Commission has just announced an agreement whereby English will be the official language of the EU rather than German which was the other possibility. As part of the negotiations, Her Majesty's Government conceded that English spelling had some room for improvement and has accepted a five year phase-in plan that would be known as "Euro-English". In the first year, "s" will replace the soft "c". Certainly, this will make the civil servants jump with joy. The hard "c" will be dropped in favour of the "k". This should clear up confusion and keyboards can have 1 less letter.
There will be growing publik enthusiasm in the sekond year, when the troublesome "ph" will be replaced with "f". This will make words like "fotograf" 20% shorter.

In the 3rd year, publik akseptanse of the new spelling kan be ekspekted to reach the stage where more komplikated changes are possible. Governments will enkorage the removal of double letters, which have always ben a deterent to akurate speling. Also, al wil agre that the horrible mes of the silent "e"s in the language is disgraseful, and they should go away.

By the fourth year, peopl wil be reseptiv to steps such as replasing "th" with "z" and "w" with "v". During ze fifz year, ze unesesary "o" kan be dropd from words kontaining "ou" and similar changes vud of kors be aplid to ozer kombinations of leters.

After zis fifz yer, ve vil hav a reli sensibl riten styl. Zer vil be no mor trubl or difikultis and evrivun vil find it ezi to understand ech ozer. Ze drem vil finali kum tru! And zen world!65

This is in fact not a joke anymore but an evolved reality that the European Union form of English is differing from other recognized varieties of English, including its use of “words that do not exist or are relatively unknown to native English speakers outside the EU institutions66.” For instance, in EU English, the word “‘action’ is used countably as a synonym for ‘scheme,’ ‘project’ or ‘measure,’ the latter are preferable.”67 And the purported German influence in the emerging English variety in Europe can be explained by the fact that Germany remains the most important European country both regarding the size of its population of native speakers as well as the size and influence of its economic output.

65 http://www.ahajokes.com/eng011.html
This section IV and section III have therefore shown that there is indeed a causal link between the process of European integration and the ongoing overall changes within the sociolinguistic situation in Europe. The next section concludes the paper with some summary discussion on current events such the eurozone crisis, Brexit, the Greek crisis, and suggestions on a therefore minimalist model of political strategy on language policy.

V. Conclusion:

Speakers give up their language gradually and knowingly (and even to a degree voluntarily) as its functions are taken over by a more powerful rival. This typically occurs after an extended period of bilingualism, during which there is a reduction of the social functions and in consequence the grammatical and lexical complexity, of the dying language. Herbert Schendl (2001)

If the sociology of language is preoccupied with language presence/usage in terms of social functions and roles, as well as the environmental forces of change that influence these roles, then it
may be argued that some sort of program of control or planning should be applied to influence the course of events. Grant D. McConnell (1997)

The EU’s founding treaty states that EU citizens have the right to communicate with the EU institutions in the official language of their choice, and to receive a reply in the same language. ~ European Commission

5.1 Summary of the present study

The aim of the thesis has been: to examine the effect of economic integration and political unity on linguistic diversity and the new function and status of the English language in Europe. The paper has offered an overview of the state of European integration and has concluded that there is a dynamic, causal link between the process of economic and political integration and the evolving linguistic situation in Europe as shown by these significant developments:

- growing complementarity in language choice and use,
- increasing competition in language choice and use,
- the gradual evolution of a linguistic hierarchy, and
- the emergence of English as a common language

From the start I realized, in making a descriptive and analytic assessment on such a topic within a vast field in such a short thesis, it was necessary to be more selective in what I wished to describe, analyze, and explain. However, in order to avoid viewing European integration in too narrow and shallow a fashion, I chose to consider the question in a rather broader, richer, and macro context by drawing on anthropological insights as well as from the economic and political science approaches on the structure and behavior of
political and socio-cultural systems.

I have therefore incorporated different methods and ideas in the presentation than is commonly attempted in a similar paper which has allowed me to situate, analyze, and interpret the current, evolving linguistic situation in Europe in a transformational context showing that it is both triggered by and entirely consistent with the overall economic and political integration process. Section I introduced some of the literature’s pertinent insights and approaches on the study of the behavior of dynamic systems more generally while Section II reviewed the evolution and structure of the EU process and system in particular from the 1950s to the present as typically discussed in more recent studies showing the interactive links between the economic and political spheres that determine the system's underlying behavior. And, Sections III and IV analyzed the reactive sociolinguistic field especially concerning the emerging linguistic hierarchy as well as the growing role being played by English as the leading integrative and shared language in Europe respectively. The evidence shows that, on the whole, the economic and political variable forces of change that influence the process have a significant impact as languages complement and compete with one another in various formal and informal contexts within an evolving pecking order in accordance with the principles of equilibrium, economy, and subsidiarity. The paper found the development of this linguistic hierarchy and with it the movement toward a de facto lingua franca to be a fundamental effect or aspect of the overall process as it provides the necessary sociolinguistic adjustment.

As the evidence in the three-sphere - the economic-political-sociolinguistics -
macro-analytic framework has shown, the parallel and dependent process of change within the sociolinguistic sphere, also governed by the dynamics of harmony, economy, and subsidiarity is a necessary consequence of the economic and political integration process. The evidence does not indicate the causality runs in the reverse: changes within the linguistic situation is the effect. A common language can facilitate but does not necessarily lead to economic integration or political union; the Arabic language in the Middle East, or Spanish in South America, for example, have not fostered closer integration among member states sharing them in common. On the other hand, economic and political integration, beyond a certain level, leads to cultural integration as well that increases the demand for and the emergence of a common language; Recently, the Russian language within the ex-Soviet Union, and now English in the European Union, for instance. The analysis has confirmed that economic and political integration within linguistically diverse and highly open societies causally leads to linguistic integration as well and thus the process of integration can indeed predict the future linguistic situation: the more closely integrated Europe become, the more well-defined would be the emergent hierarchy of languages in terms of which languages are utilized for what functions. That is, developments in the sociolinguistic area are systematically related and consistent with the economic and political integration process and thus can serve as a leading indicator for the overall process. A total disintegration of the integration like the Soviet Union, for instance, or a partial slowing of the process such as signaled by ‘Brexit’ (the abbreviation for Britain's (UK) exit from the EU can also affect the direction of the
process of a sociolinguistic situation or regime. As a recent survey (2013)\(^{68}\) about the effect of economic crisis on culture within the EU indicates, “A comparison with the 2007 survey shows that, across the EU, there has been a decline in participation in the majority of activities asked about, which may reflect an overall reduction in the amount of money or time EU citizens spend on cultural activities since the economic crisis began.”

5.2 Globalization, the dynamics of integration, and crisis

In sections I and II, globalization and its far-reaching effects\(^ {69} \) were viewed as a distant exogenous variable on the movement toward regionalism generally and toward European integration in particular. It was also noted in Section II that, as a result of the vast opportunities and constraints presented by globalization, few European countries had either the desire or the capacity to go it alone in what sometimes seems a hostile global environment where great cultural and political powers like Russia, China, the US and some powerful multinational entities are major players. Hence, among other things, the need and call for European integration. As examined in Section II, the ‘periodic’ crises within the EU whether it be political, economic, or institutional have almost always being addressed by commitments for further integration whose rationale or argument, I have explained, is that solving current problems or challenges also require addressing structurally related areas that are yet to be integrated into the overall process.\(^ {70} \)


\(^{69}\) ‘What does globalization have to do with the erosion of welfare states? Sorting out the issues’ ARENA Working Paper 17/1996, Andrew Martin.

\(^{70}\) ‘Hollande, Merkel press for clear agenda for post-Brexit EU’; http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-09/16/c_135689948_2.htm
discussed the ‘spillover thesis’ as the mechanism of problem-solving that brings about further integration. It argues that in effect, European integration has been a slow process of progress often mired with periodic crises and that until it reached to a certain level of comprehensive political, economic, industrial, monetary, financial, fiscal, legal, labor, cultural, etc. integration, major disruptive crises were still bound to occur - again and again just as the current eurozone crisis affecting Greece, Italy, Portugal, Ireland, etc. and the ones before that. In fact, the ‘spillover thesis’ predicts such crises since the dynamics between areas not yet integrated (and there are still many) and the ones that are integrated, are some of the primary sources for such crisis or tension. That is because it is through such tensions or crises that policy makers are compelled to act and that it is by addressing the current crises such as the debt crisis that (formerly) unintegrated areas such as fiscal policy become integrated.

5.3 Roots of Brexit and the Greek debt crisis - and the call for more reform

European integration of the kind envisioned by its architects requires compromise between national sovereignty of Member States and more EU. And except for European countries that are not part of the EU, the UK has been the most reluctant to engage in the trade-offs considered necessary between sovereignty for a cohesive, stronger EU. This explains why even before its formal decision to leave the EU on June 23, 2016, the UK was not in the Eurozone monetary union, not a member of the Schengen passport-free movement agreement, and was not in favor of building a joint European defense, among others. In other words, the UK has always been a one-foot-in, one-foot-out Member State
in the EU; its only notable achievement for any EU-wide project has been the promotion of the English language in Europe - which is now the most widely spoken second language in the EU. Its decision for leaving the EU is hence mainly for political reasons - which is, to remain unbound from EU rules and regulations for which there are incentives but also costs. For instance, Theresa May, the British Prime Minister, “said she wanted to ‘operate’ within the EU's single market, yet end free movement of people and the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice”, whereas President Hollande, the French President, has said that “There must be a threat, there must be a risk, there must be a price. Otherwise, we will be in a negotiation that cannot end well.”

Brexit’s most likely effect on the EU is a further and deeper integration for the rest of the EU in areas not yet integrated such as a collective defense, a single foreign minister, the extension of the Schengen borders outward, common fiscal policy, etc. As noted in the postscript, Brexit would have little to no adverse effect on the role and status of the English language in Europe whose propagation is already now in the hands of its

72 “Jean-Claude Juncker, the European Commission president, suggests UK will not have access to single market after Brexit”: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/09/13/eu-facing-an-existential-threat-in-the-wake-of-brexit-jean-claud/
non-native speakers.

As for the Greek crisis, like the Portuguese and Italian ones, however, it is a different kind of crisis from that of the UK which is mostly a political act that is beyond the mere concerns of human migration and social costs. The Greek crisis is mainly an economic, debt crisis which is the result, among some domestic factors, of structural imbalances within the EU-wide integration structure which advantaged economically stronger members at the expense of the relatively weaker ones. Greece became Europe’s most acute debt crisis center for reasons also related to the contagious linkages of the global economic implosion in 2008. In their recent studies, Daianu, D’Adda, Basevi, and Kumar (2014), described the root of the crisis as “a flawed design and inadequate policy arrangements, which have invited rising imbalances among EU member states.”75 That is, the eurozone crisis is merely an acute form of ‘structural, trading imbalances’ of capital and labor markets that are also the result of the uneven dynamics within the EU-global political economy.

In short, beyond the normal weaknesses of some of the southern economies, thus what became Greek pains and Spain’s losses turned out as gains for the German economy76, for instance. Eriksen put it this way: “The EU’s member states, and in particular the Eurozone members, have moved themselves into a community of fate through lock-ins and normative commitments. Mending the Eurozone crisis has become a matter of justice, as some are profiting and some losing on the European Monetary Union.

76 Germany government gained from Greek crisis - IWH study: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-33845836
However, there is disagreement as to what medicine is the right cure.\textsuperscript{77} And the interactions between the Greek financial institutions, the European Central Bank, and the IMF to resolve the crisis have only managed to postpone a resolution since the interventions merely act as an effort of shifting potential losses from private international creditors to ones of public European governments. Thus, the austerity measures for the Greek economy were no more than efforts aimed at squeezing national resources and funds as much as is practically possible for private and public debt servicing as is typically done in third world countries. The “joint European Union-IMF €110 billion financing package to help the country ride out its debt crisis, revive growth, and modernize the economy”\textsuperscript{78} as noted by the IMF has been understood as effectively meaning a joint EU-IMF financial support to help pay off private international creditors.

And as noted in Section II, the history of European integration indicates that further integration that incorporates the financial, the fiscal, and other not yet integrated areas is the next logical and likely step; neither a return to national currencies nor restrictive measures to protect domestic markets can be the practical solution. As Kathleen R. McNamara, Associate Professor of Government & International Affairs, Georgetown University (2010), puts it, “The history of the EU shows that crisis often—but not always—leads to increased integration.”\textsuperscript{79} That is, according to the way the EU has been constructed thus far, it will be more integration - not less integration - since the alternate

\textsuperscript{77} “The Normative Implications of the Eurozone Crisis’.  

\textsuperscript{78} IMF Approves €30 Bln Loan for Greece on Fast Track:  

\textsuperscript{79} http://www.cfr.org/world/eurocrisis-uncertain-future-european-integration/p22933
solutions would be far more costly and therefore less likely options. This is because not only are the national economies interdependent but also the unintegrated areas are all dynamically related with the ones already integrated and the ‘spillover thesis’ strongly suggests the integration of these yet unintegrated areas in the future. This is how the European Commission head, Jean-Claude Juncker, said it recently on Sept. 14, 2016: “The European Union still does not have enough union. There are splits out there and often fragmentation where we need further union, that is leaving space for galloping populism.”

5.4 International political and economic crisis and the refugee problem in Europe

The very causes of the refugee crisis globally and in Europe particularly has its roots in the geopolitical dynamics of political conflicts and economic downturns and hence is beyond the aim of this paper to directly address exhaustively. Thus, only a cursory overview of the effect of the refugee crisis on the dynamics of the integration process and its impact on the sociolinguistic situation in Europe is discussed. Hence, a few things can be said on the refugee influx in Europe, its causes, and some of the ways to address it.

First, the refugee’s problem is not just a European crisis; it is a global one. Second, the European refugee crisis is mainly the result of Sub-Saharan Africa, North African, and Middle Eastern refugees influx driven by conflicts in which the major European powers such as the UK, France, Germany, and Italy are participatory actors. Third, the refugees are thus all both economic as well as political refugees. Fourth, Europe itself, refugees or

---

no refugees, is in a deep political and economic crisis of its own as noted and the refugees simply exacerbate the problem. The European Commission\textsuperscript{81}, citing the UNHCR as its source, puts the global refugee crisis in perspective.

The world is facing an unprecedented displacement crisis. Today, more than 65 million people are forcibly displaced as a result of violent conflicts and natural disasters. In 2015, over 1 million people – refugees, displaced persons, and other migrants – have made their way to the EU, either escaping conflict in their country and in search of better economic prospects. While the numbers have shown a decreasing trend in 2016, by June around 156 000 people have reached Europe.

And with this, it can only be added that, in the short term, each EU country will experience a different refugees impact either because of proximity to the migration source such as Italy and Greece are or owing to the attraction of a national economy such as Germany is. However, in the long-term, the most likely step to address this crisis or future such crises would be a collective response that shifts either partial or the whole control of national borders from Member States to an EU-wide external borders control mechanism that would be a further integration.

As for the refugees’ impact on the sociolinguistic situation, no major effects or changes to the already outlined trajectory is expected since most of the refugees have English as their international language of communication. That is, if anything, the refugees will more likely help elevate the already growing status of the English language in Europe as explained in sections III and IV. For instance, even though immigrant refugee children upon arrival in Germany receive German language training, one cannot fail to notice that the foreign language skills they display is not German as shown by the

\textsuperscript{81} http://ec.europa.eu/echo/refugee-crisis\_en
English vocabulary of a young Syrian refugee, Muhammad: “‘Melon, bananas, and cherries!’” (Sumi Somaskanda, 2015)\textsuperscript{82}

Since the aim of the thesis has been to examine the effect of economic integration and political unity on linguistic diversity and the new function and status of the English language in Europe, I will now conclude with a summary discussion and suggestion of a therefore minimalist model of political strategy on language policy.

5.5 Summary discussion on relations between the EU’s integration strategies, linguistic diversity, and the language policy challenges

In order to show causal relations to better help suggest a more practical approach to language policy options, the organization of the paper and its sections have been intentionally structured around:

- the nature of the behavior of socio-cultural systems,
- the structure and development of European integration,
- the history and evolution of the contemporary linguistic situations of Europe,
- and the reactions to the effects on language choices and use,

with the aim of gaining valuable insights on the process in order to meaningfully help address some of the concerns on the present linguistic situation particularly concerning the developing issues and policy considerations on a practical language regime for the EU. In my view, it would be a mistake to design and set in motion a language policy for Europe that is in opposition to the core efforts being made on a more comprehensive

\textsuperscript{82} http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/09/15/refugees-german-schools-integration-language-assimilation-politics/
economic, political, and social integration - since language and other cultural differences, when promoted to a certain level, can and do become obstacles to economic efficiency, political unity as well as other negative social conditions.

The idea that countries should proceed to protect and promote their respective languages and cultural identities while simultaneously seeking an ‘ever closer’ economic, political, and social union can be regarded as a fundamental contradiction since promotions of differences and diversities within an integrating, open, and common space to some degree can and do undermine cohesive unity that is being sought through a people's Union. And since this tension between the commitment to diversity on one hand and the need and call for integration on the other and the necessity to reconcile the two has been a source of active policy considerations and frustrations within the EU project, this paper addresses, therefore, two basic and broad strategies that can be considered, each with its own costs and merits: a managed multilingual regime vs. a self-generated language hierarchy.

5.5. A managed multilingual regime vs a self-generated language hierarchy.

First, the EU can either choose to intervene through a combination of strategies and policies based on some protections and incentives on behalf of languages viewed or recognized as in need of special assistance. “For instance, the Saami languages of northern Finland, Sweden, Norway and the Kola Peninsula (Russia) have only a few hundred speakers in some communities and are in danger of dying out.”83 Second, or it can choose to let languages compete and complement one another, in accordance with the

Darwinian model, based on the principle of demand and supply in which free market forces determine the use and luck of each language.

The first strategy, the choice to intervene through a combination of language policies based on special guarantees so that all EU citizens can communicate and receive official information through their languages, has the merit of maintaining the essential link between the citizens and their EU institutions. Furthermore, the use of all languages in official communications while costly and may be administratively inefficient makes the EU not only apparently transparent but a more inclusive and legitimate institution in the eyes of the citizens. The downside of this first strategy is that policymakers would have to bear its associated costs as well as forego the merits of the second strategy.

The second approach, letting free market forces determine the fortune of each language, entails possible and practical consequences that could be considered as both politically ‘unacceptable’ and socially ‘undesirable’ including the decreasing use of some languages with the resultant losses of certain domains of language use for others, among others. For other languages, exclusion from official use not only would affect those who use them but it also may threaten the languages’ very long term status, vitality, and even survival since their speakers would be increasingly drawn to adopt the languages chosen for official communication. Moreover, excluding languages from official communication not only contradicts the EU language policy and law\(^84\) as it is, it could also prevent some speakers from communicating in the languages of their choice with the effect that they would be either unable or unwilling to fully participate in the political process as active

\(^{84}\) ‘The Treaty of Rome and Regulation 1/1958 stipulates that all EU languages are to be treated on an equal basis with respect to publication of official EU documents and that EU citizens have the right to communicate with EU institutions in an EU language of their choice.’
citizens. Furthermore, limiting the official or working languages to just a few or one would be not only a violation of the EU language laws, but it would also serve to adversely restrict access to information resources for those whose languages have been excluded as well as alienate those who personally and culturally identify with them.

However, its upside, letting the market decide, means official communication would be streamlined, financially less costly, more efficient, and less complicated. That is, given that the EU institutions and corporate businesses spend much time and resources on communication through the multiplicity of languages as required by law\(^8\), the free market strategy would provide not only greater efficiency but also financial savings on all language-related matters. Moreover, it would minimize the technical complications that often result from constant translation, interpretation, and storage of published materials. And it is also through the efficient market mechanism - that is, the Darwinian model - that an ‘optimal number’ of working languages in the EU, whether it is just one, two, or three, etc. can be possible, produced, and maintained.

These conflicting considerations for “a managed multilingual regime” versus “a self-generated language hierarchy” situations have been highlighted simply in order to acknowledge the difficulty and complexity on some of the key sociopolitical issues at hand and how to formulate a sociolinguistically neutral, efficient policy strategy with minimal costs.

These are, therefore, the two practical options available to the EU language policy

---

\(^8\)‘Article 217. The rules governing the languages of the institutions of the Community shall, without prejudice to the provisions contained in the rules of procedure of the Court of Justice, be determined by the Council, acting unanimously.’
planners. And as noted, there are both the benefits of plurality requiring the maintenance of diversity and benefits around integration requiring the promotion of unity and homogeneity. The two, diversity and unity, while not mutually exclusive forces and are of benefit together within limits, when pressed beyond a certain degree in opposite directions, however, could pose an inherent risk of fundamentally undermining each other and their system. As Clyne (1997) has noted, the optimal option in multilingual societies is a delicate balance that takes into account the social, political, economic, and sociolinguistic needs:

Language policies… and or community attitudes may enforce, support, accept, tolerate, or reject multilingualism or give special status to one or more than one language. Where language policies have been formulated to promote multilingualism, the motivation may be: Social - in the interest of equity for all groups; Cultural - to facilitate cultural maintenance; Political - to ensure the participation of all groups and / or gain their electoral support; Economic - to be able to harness language assets to the advantage of the country’s balance of payments.” Singapore, for instance, has three major ethnic groups - Chinese, Indians, and Malays but it has four official languages Mandarin, Tamil, Malay respectively and English which serves as the language of interethnic and international communication. (p. 303)

5.6 Integration, linguistic diversity and suggestion for a therefore minimalist model of political strategy on language policy

As noted above, it is argued for good reasons that introducing any limited set of languages or a single language regime in the EU challenges the rights to information access and language use for many people and it poses the problem of which languages or language to choose for some: whether it should be English which is already the language most widely understood and used in the EU, German which has the most native speakers in the EU, French which was the most widely used for EU-level internal communications
purposes though now in sharp decline, or some other. Thus, admittedly, choosing any set of languages or language has the potential to stir protest because of the fact that language issues remain inherently sensitive and divisive; and some people would be strongly against the promotion of any language unless it is one’s own that is chosen. And since there are 24\textsuperscript{86} EU official languages at present the choice could get even more complicated and less practical than the case with Singapore where only four languages are involved, for instance.

However, since the vast majority of EU official documents already get prepared first in English before translation into others, it seems reasonable that Europe should promote national language policies that align with such practical, evolving communications needs of the EU institutions if it is to remain integrated and united similar to the existing ‘controlled full multilingualism’ which requires that a European Parliament document that is drafted in any language need not necessarily be translated directly into all other languages automatically but only to the most widely used relay languages first: English, French or German. This practical approach increases efficiency, streamlines work, reduces workload while allowing an adaptive language policy serving all EU citizens to emerge efficiently, naturally, and minimally.

And the all-inclusive language policy while a popular and should remain a key objective, the current official multilingual regime of language equality before the law need be only in principle through a transitory phase during which the evolving language

\textsuperscript{86}Bulgarian, Croatian, Czech, Danish, Dutch, Estonian, English, Finnish, French, German, Greek, Hungarian, Italian, Irish, Latvian, Lithuanian, Maltese, Polish, Portuguese, Romanian, Slovak, Slovenian, Spanish and Swedish.'
hierarchy whose nature and merits is discussed above is allowed to ‘naturally’ adapt itself. As Crystal (2003) noted, such a policy of language hierarchy is, in fact, essential for multilingual existence and maintenance.

Arguments about the need for national or cultural identity are often seen as being opposed to those about the need for mutual intelligibility. But this is misleading. It is perfectly possible to develop a situation in which intelligibility and identity happily co-exist. The situation is the familiar one of bilingualism - but a bilingualism where one of the languages within a speaker is the global language, providing access to the world community, and the other is a well-resourced regional language, providing access to a local community. The two functions can be seen as complementary, responding to different needs. And it is because the functions are so different that a world of linguistic diversity can in principle continue to exist in a world united by a common language. (p. 22)

5.7 The any-three-language set option model for any European

This paper, therefore, suggests a three-language hierarchy optimal combinations for every EU speaker analogous to Kachru’s concentric circles on the uses of English as a global language. I have adapted his idea to formulate a linguistic situation of any three-language set option for any European as shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2. Any three-language model for any European

That is, for each person, the inner circle (A) represents ‘national languages’ (nl) one of which is spoken as mother tongue, the outer circle (B) for the ‘regional languages’ (rl) one of which is spoken as national language, and the expanding circle (C) for the ‘EU’s common language(s)’ (cl) spoken as the language(s) understood by most people. In this way, knowing at least one language in each circle enables anyone to understand and be understood by everyone in Europe. Thus, one need to speak only one or at the most three languages for successful communication with others in Europe. A Belgian who speaks
Dutch as mother tongue, French or German as regional language and English as the common European language (CEL) would, for example, be able to communicate with other Europeans who also speak any three European languages within their concentric circles such as someone in Spain who speaks Catalan as mother tongue, Spanish as the regional language and English as the common language - where their common language is English. As shown in Sections III and IV, English is already the de facto common language as illustrated by Fenyo (2003) in figure 3 following Berns (1995) who adapted Kachru’s model of world Englishes for Europe.

Figure 3. The concentric circles of European Englishes

In brief, I suggest two strategies on language policies for a *minimalist model of political strategy on language policy*: 1/ Transitional Policies and 2/ Adaptive Policies. The transitory policies are temporary measures and may permit or even require a limited intervention of sorts for some languages for some time while the later are long-term, process-adaptive policies to allow the linguistic situation to continuously adjust itself to the overall condition of the integration process as it unfolds. Since language issues or conflicts are mostly indications of ‘other’ broader and deeper economic, political, historical, or cultural issues or grievances in society, this paper also recommends robust
policy measures that address the perception or reality of these other non-language, negative considerations such as discrimination, prejudice, and alienation of people.

5.8 Conclusion

Finally, in carrying out this research on the evolution of the European Union, I have tested some key theories of social science. Through the three-sphere macro-analytic framework I have developed here, I have found the relationships between the economic, political, and sociolinguistic areas to be dynamic and causal with correlated development and different speeds in the same direction. Though the paper did not deal in depth with the many detailed aspects of language behavior, the recommendations put forward for policy strategies are, however, based on the nature of the co-relationships between the political, economic, and sociolinguistic variables that are highly consistent with the general systems behavior and systemic change, technology-led change, economic primacy, spillover mechanism, and the Darwinian model - which I have set forth in Section I and referenced throughout the paper.

And while this thesis isn’t claiming to have uncovered new insights during the theories validating process, I have nevertheless gained a better understanding of the relevant links between the economic, political, and sociolinguistic aspects as conceptualized in the three-spheres model analyses framework allowing me to accept the conclusions arrived at with good confidence. I therefore encourage further studies of similar approach to improve and formalize the concept of a therefore minimalist model of political strategy on language policy developed here for Europe in order to formulate more effective, efficient, and better strategies on linguistic diversity in political unity.
A POSTSCRIPT

‘In 1958, the then European Economic Community passed a Regulation naming Dutch, French, German and Italian as its official languages, these being the languages of the first six countries to join the organization. (EU Commission)’

‘The regulation listing official languages of the EU would have to be changed unanimously by remaining countries if they want to keep English as an official language’

‘The Commission has already started using French and German more often in its external communications, as a symbolic move after Britain voted to leave the EU’

The future of English in the EU after Brexit?

It was observed in sections III and IV, particularly since the EU expanded into Scandinavia and Eastern Europe, that English has been slowly and steadily increasing its influence while edging out both French and German to become the most dominant language of the EU even to the dismay and protest of others, notably, the French. So, will English remain the EU’s de facto official language now that the UK is leaving the EU? In other words, could ‘Brexit’ actually threaten the dominant status of the English language especially within the EU institutions? The answer is No, Not Really, and Except - depending on how things unfold.

First, since English is already the most commonly understood foreign language in the EU, the one learned by most young Europeans as a second language, and the most widely

---

87 Considering the fact that the EU institutions were located in predominantly Franco-German speaking cities of Brussels, Luxembourg, and Strasbourg.
spoken language in the world, it is most likely to retain its current status and influence in the EU regardless of happened next. So, considered from this overall reality, the answer is no, Brexit would not threaten the dominant status of the language in the EU.

Second, if at least one country identifying English as its official language chooses to remain in the EU, this would help maintain unaffected the language’s current official status and political legitimacy. So, viewed from this possibility, the answer is not really, Brexit would not threaten the official position of the language in the EU.

And third, now that the UK will activate Article 50 of dissociation, English will likely not be one of the block’s official languages since it was Britain alone in the EU which had identified it as an EU official language (Ireland having declared Gaelic as its EU official language). It could lose its official status as soon as Britain leaves the EU - especially if there is no EU-wide desire and political will to keep the language and its de facto current state. In fact, there is the possibility that the French and the Germans whose languages were the most affected by the rise of English dominance would instead seek a more assertive approach in promoting their languages - either or both as a gradual replacement to English. But since any change to the EU’s language policy to drop English from the current regime would itself require a unanimous vote from all Council of Ministers whose most common language is English, the EU could simply decide to leave it as a working language with or without official status but take measures that limits its influence in the organization in accordance with the Franco-German wishes. So, considered from an EU without the UK, the answer is English is likely to remain functional except if the Council wants an EU without English. English is, in fact, the
language of the European Central Bank even though the UK remained out of the Schengen visa-free travel area or the eurozone - and is likely to play the same role in the Eu even without UK membership.

**P1**

**The real problems of replacing English in the EU**

Since the UK’s vote leave the EU, the debate over the future place of the English language in Europe has intensified with some suggesting that the EU would have no English as an official language in its future.

However, there are two major problems to encounter in any effort aimed at diminishing, edging out, or replacing English with either French or German in the EU. First, as David Crystal and others have noted, the English language remains the most useful global language of our time because of its unmatched international roles and functions. It is the only language which enjoys a privileged position in the multilingual society of the 21st century, appearing in the language mix in every part of the world including the EU, according to Graddol (1997:63). To try to eject it out of the EU language mix would, therefore, require complicated steps and political decisions.

Secondly, as Kachru (1990:98) and others have also pointed out, the planning for the spread of the language has already passed into the hands of its non-native users even in the EU, and therefore, any efforts to try to reverse, hamper, or remove it out of the language mix in the EU would require extraordinary difficulties at this stage. As we have noted in Sections III and IV, the education systems of most EU Member States are, in

---

88 P = postscript sub-header
fact, so highly geared toward teaching English as the first foreign language that even
Brexit is less likely to change the position of the language in the EU.

P2. The future of English and why the EU may have no other options

David Graddol, commissioned by the British Council in 1997, published ‘The Future
of English?’ to forecast future use and learning of the English language worldwide and
the potential benefits for UK native speakers. Using the language’s legacy of history,
current status, and global trends, he concluded that “no single language will occupy the
monopolistic position in the 21st century which English has - almost - achieved by the
end of the 20th century” (p. 59). Below is an index score he used showing the ranking of
‘global influence’ of the 12 major languages according to an Engco model analysis that
incorporates, among other variables, the economic and cultural power of a language’s
native speakers.

1. English 10089
2. German 42
3. French 33
4. Japanese 32
5. Spanish 31
6. Chinese 22
7. Arabic 8
8. Portuguese 5
9. Malay 4
10. Russian 3
11. Hindi/Urdu 0.4
12. Bengali 0.09

Table 7

89 ‘An index score of 100 represents the position of English in 1995.’
According to him, “Chinese, Hindi/Urdu, Spanish, and Arabic may join English” at the top as most influential global languages while “French and the other OECD languages (German, Japanese) are likely to decline in status” (1997: 59). In other words, “English will remain pre-eminent for some time, but it will eventually become one language amongst many” (1997:61). This finding is useful in that it helps us see why the EU is likely to proceed with English in post-Brexit Europe because the language is so deeply ingrained in the EU at this stage for any change to be feasible or desirable. In fact, English already accounts for more than 80% of all new internally drafted legislative proposals, according to some estimates. This is because, English’s two main EU challenger languages, French and German, both face imminent retreat or decline in their share of global influence in the future.

Also, though at present all EU citizens enjoy the right to freely live and work in other EU countries without legal requirements to speak any country’s languages in order to do so, and though UK citizens not only would have to apply for visas to travel within the EU area but also may be required to meet any language policy requirements for living and working in an EU country such as Germany or France, however, the fact that English would continue being the lingua franca for most EU citizens means that the EU may have no better option but to keep it in the EU language mix even after Brexit.

Obviously, with Brexit not just the sociolinguistic aspect but the whole integration is being tested - but again, exactly, it is going to proceed as the theories predict it will - MORE EU and not less. An EU country, under the treaties, accepts all the ‘Four

---

90 More than that, the English translation is and will remain the most go-to document for the majority of officials wanting access to other documents not in their own languages regardless of their nationality
Freedoms’: the freedom of movement of goods, services, capital, and people. No country is exempted to pick and choose out of the four which ones it wants to opt out on and which ones it wants to keep. Apparently, the UK wants to keep the first 3 freedoms of movement of goods, services, and capital but not people. It wants the benefits that come with the 3 freedoms but not the responsibility or cost that accompany the 4th freedom - the movement of people. That is going to be the complication in the negotiations on Article 50 that might bring it back into EU AGAIN. It would not be surprising if the UK, failing to get a "special" exit ideal package, re-applies to remain in the EU sooner than we can see - giving English keep the political cover it needs.

**Conclusion**

**Some basic facts about languages and the English language in Europe:**

- The EU has 24 official and working languages of which French, German, and English are the recognized working languages in its institutions’ executive arm - not a surprising as they are also the languages of the block’s three largest economies.
- The EU has fewer official languages than the Member States because some members share common languages.
- English is one of the 24 EU official languages because of UK which identified it as its official language which 13% of EU citizens speak as their native language. It is spoken by ninety-eight percent of UK residents as a first language.
- English is one of or the official languages of Great Britain, the Republic of Ireland, Northern Ireland, Scotland, Wales, Malta, Gibraltar, Jersey, Guernsey, and the Isle of Man.
- French and German are each spoken by 14% while Spanish and Russian at 6% each, and Italian at 3% of the European population.
- Scandinavian countries have the highest working knowledge of English.
- Keeping English post-Brexit could make communications in the EU fairer since most of those speaking it would be using a foreign language.

---

91 Ironically, it is the UK’s educational policy towards promoting its language that goes to explain why it is the English-speaking countries of the UK and Ireland that are also the migrant destination for Europeans able to function better in English than in other EU languages.
• English could or will remain a working language in the EU though it may not remain an official language.
• English is the world global lingua franca, the most commonly spoken foreign language in 19 out of 25 EU countries - with nearly half of EU citizens who claim to have sufficient conversational skills in it.

These facts constitute the factors generating some of the sociolinguistic dynamics within the EU.
Notes

The Notes is a short list of some basic ‘terms’ or ‘concepts’ used in this paper.

The evolutionary approach: the diachronic progression of societies from simple to complex

Theories: ‘a coherent group of tested general propositions, commonly regarded as correct, that can be used as principles of explanation and prediction for a class of phenomena.’

Variables: they are events or things that can vary or change in value or characteristics in ways that can be measured. A variable can independent, dependent, or precedent. The measure of how much two or more variables change together is their ‘covariance’.

Politics - ‘the making of decisions by public means’ - Karl Deutsch

A political system: ‘a coordinated set of principles, laws, ideas, and procedures relating to a particular form [or arrangement] of government.’

European integration: the process of the political, economic, sociocultural, and the legal integration of states and peoples in Europe. Unless specified such as economic integration or political integration that are restricted to integration within their spheres, the term ‘integration’ refers to total process of European integration.

Dynamism: ‘the quality of being characterized by vigorous activity and progress’

Spillover effects: ‘they are the political, economic, and other events that occur in one context because of something else in a seemingly unrelated context had occurred. They are secondary effects that follow from a primary effect though may be removed in time or place from the primary events themselves.’

Neofunctionalists: theorists who ‘maintained that the unintended consequences of integration, once launched, would be self-reinforcing.’ ~ Andrew Moravcsik

Spheres / domains: as applied here, the two words are more or less interchangeable to the mean, distinct areas of analysis, activity, or control. In the sociolinguistic sphere or domain, the area also encompasses sub-domains as language acquisition, pragmatism, multilingualism, contact linguistics, etc.
**Micro vs. macro analysis:** micro analysts analyze the individual, the smallest units of interaction within a system while macro analysts focus on the system itself or the ‘big picture.’

**Levels of analysis:** are levels of abstraction or generalization that isolate a particular level for analysis from its complex whole. In Europe, it may be individual, the Member states, or the EU itself. In this paper, the EU is the level of analysis.

**Linguistic diversity:** the existence of more than one language in a country, region.

**Mutual intelligibility:** the degree of mutual understanding that people may have based on how close their languages are or perceived to be related or similar to one another such as Norwegian and Danish or Spanish and Italian.

**Multilingualism:** ‘can refer to either the language use or the competence of an individual or to the language situation in an entire nation or society.’ ~ Michael Clyne
Bibliography


Carmichael, Marney (2016). Will English remain as the de facto EU official language?

Chagnon, Napoleon (1981). ‘Terminological kinship, genealogical relatedness and village fissioning among the Yanomamo Indians.’ In Alexander and Tinkle (ch.28).


