

2012

An Endless Array of Options; How the Internet is revolutionizing the ways we meet and mate

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Effective Utilization of Foreign Aid in Counterinsurgency Operations

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Masters Thesis

January 10, 2012

Master's Thesis

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of
International Affairs at the City College of New York

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Abstract

The repercussions of September 11, 2001 have been felt worldwide and have drastically changed the paradigm in which countries operate today. They have justified two wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and incursion into sovereign territories in pursuit of terrorists and insurgents. As insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan have continued to thrive, Coalition countries have been forced to adjust their approach to defeating non-conventional forces that they are largely not trained to fight. This has resulted in tactics that utilize what scholars have called “Smart Power,” a mixture of both hard and soft power. Foreign aid and its distribution in COIN operations has sparked a major debate amongst scholars, soldiers and aid industry workers as to who should distribute foreign aid and what relationship the military and aid workers should have. I hypothesize that the traditional relationship between aid workers and the military in the distribution of foreign aid in COIN operations is inadequate and dysfunctional. I will argue that while both parties are important vehicles in the distribution of aid, because of the lack of coordination between them, COIN has been much less effective. Therefore, this thesis aims to study the ways in which aid is distributed by aid workers and the military, in order to uncover evidence to support my thesis and draw conclusions as to what are the best practices in aid distribution, when dealing with insurgencies and winning hearts and minds. Traditionally, military and aid workers have tried to operate separately from one another, in order to maintain impartiality. However, COIN has called for aid workers to work with troops to implement development projects and in some cases troops have been responsible themselves for implementing projects. This has resulted in protests from the development community, arguing that soldiers are unqualified to distribute aid and separation of the military and aid workers is essential to security. Using Iraq and Afghanistan as case studies, this thesis looks at how foreign aid has been utilized in COIN. In the conclusion, based on my research, I make recommendations for ways in which countries can improve distribution of foreign aid in the COIN context.

Chapter 1 Introduction

Modern visions of war conjure images of Allied troops landing on the beaches of Normandy or fighting in the jungles of Vietnam. However, just as important in winning wars are soft power tactics, in conjunction with hard power, to gain a desired outcome. As the West, and in particular the United States, has become dominant in conventional warfare, its enemies have been forced to resort to irregular guerilla warfare in an attempt to exploit weaknesses in mobility and public support for ongoing engagement. Today in the Afghan and Iraq wars, soft power in the form of foreign aid has emerged as a vital component of efforts to defeat insurgents and win the hearts and minds of the local population.

However, arguments rage today over how this power should be wielded in Counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. In the “US Government Counterinsurgency Guide,” published in 2009 by the Department of State, insurgency is defined as “...the organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify or challenge political control of a region.”¹ As the US has struggled with its efforts to install legitimate governments in Afghanistan and Iraq, insurgencies have been one of the biggest bottlenecks to security and to the struggle by national and local governments to gaining legitimacy in the eyes of the native populations. One of the principal debates that has arisen is over how development aid should be used in COIN efforts and by what methods it should be distributed. The United States has spent billions of dollars a year in development and aid to stabilize Afghanistan and Iraq, in the face of insurgents using irregular warfare. The debate over development aid and COIN has become especially pertinent, as the United States is having to make very serious budgetary choices as the country deals with a national debt that has grown to an

¹ US State Department, “U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide,” US State Department, January 2009, accessed via www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/pmppt.

estimated \$14 trillion and a global financial crisis with no end in sight.² This is coupled with a global examination of development partner engagement in developing countries and the effectiveness of aid dollars. Because of the massive monetary costs, the potential loss of life during COIN campaigns, and the repercussions these actions have in an increasingly interconnected and globalized world, the use of development aid in COIN in Iraq and Afghanistan deserves more attention. I hypothesize that the traditional relationship between aid workers and the military in the distribution of foreign aid in COIN operations is inadequate and dysfunctional. I will argue that while both parties are important vehicles in the distribution of aid, because of the lack of coordination between them, COIN has been much less effective. Therefore, this thesis aims to study the ways in which aid is distributed by aid workers and the military, in order to uncover evidence to support my thesis and draw conclusions as to what are the best practices in aid distribution, when dealing with insurgencies and winning hearts and minds.

In what the Bush administration called the “third pillar” of the US national Security Strategy and one of the elements of what the Obama administration has referred to as “smart power,” aid has become central to US foreign policy in the post 9/11 world. In his 2010 National Security Strategy, Obama stated that the United States would pursue “...a development budget that more deliberately reflects our policies and our strategy, not sector earmarks; and ensure that our policy instruments are aligned in support of development objectives.”³ The strategic nature of this development assistance is demonstrated in the COIN doctrine and begs the question of how aid can best be distributed in order to defeat the insurgencies. In order for the

² United States Treasury, <http://www.usdebtclock.org/>, US Treasury, Accessed April 19, 2011.

³ Barack Obama, “National Security Strategy,” The White House, Washington D.C., May 2010, accessed at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/homeland-security/>, p. 15.

distribution of aid to be effective, the mechanisms and policies employed must be justified and backed up with results.

Additionally, aid distribution in Afghanistan and Iraq is important to the United States' support of democracies around the world. As the Obama administration continues to confront insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan it has reiterated its commitments. "... America will persist in promoting peace among different peoples and believes that democracy and individual empowerment and need not come at the expense of cherished identities."⁴ However, some fear the ability of the United States to wield smart power as it has in the past is waning. The continuing financial crisis has strained budgets and considering the foreign aid budget is only one percent, any budgetary cuts could have major effects. In a nod to the importance of spending every dollar of aid effectively, Chairwoman Kay Granger of the House appropriations subcommittee overseeing foreign affairs, argued spending must be prioritized to reflect national security interests and furthermore, must stand up to the scrutiny of the public.⁵

The end of the cold war has changed the dynamics of relations between states and given rise to a new group of non-traditional actors that threaten security within states and entire regions throughout the world. The Cold War was led by two distinct national powers, the Soviet Union and United States, which created a relatively stable bi-polar world. The current insurgents are characterized as more fluid with many factions and de-centralized authority, and in the case of Al Qaeda, united by ideology. This has made identifying the enemy and negotiating with them more difficult.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. ii.

⁵ Steven Lee Myers, "Foreign Aid Set to Take a Hit in U.S. Budget Crisis," *New York Times*, October 3, 2011, accessed at <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/04/us/politics/foreign-aid-set-to-take-hit-in-united-states-budget-crisis.html?pagewanted=all>.

In the particular cases of Iraq and Afghanistan, because the enemy is so difficult to identify, the use of foreign aid has become all the more important in convincing the populations, among which the insurgents operate, that the governments offer a better alternative. This is done by channeling aid through five main categories: bilateral development aid, civilian security aid, military aid, humanitarian aid, multilateral development aid and political/strategic aid.⁶ Additionally, but perhaps most importantly, the creation of the Iraq and Afghanistan Reconstruction Fund has skewed the statistics on foreign aid because of the sheer size of the packages each fiscal year. Of the \$104 billion provided since 2002, \$57 billion has been channeled through the Department of Defense (DoD) budget.⁷ It is the large amount of development aid under the DoD's control and the infringement upon traditional humanitarian space that has sparked debates in the nongovernmental organizations (NGO) and aid worker community.

During the Cold War foreign aid was a tool that the United States used to gain influence and stem the spread of Communism. Aid demonstrated the good will of the United States, as well as the prosperity that it enjoyed as a result of its ideology, but it also served as an incentive to others to adopt the ideology of the United States. However, with the end of the Cold War many donor nations and leaders fell into what in retrospect could be seen as a false sense of security. To some, the fall of Communism seemed to highlight the supremacy of liberal democratic societies and those that had formed in former republics of the Soviet Union were a testament to the peoples' desire for them. This resulted in significant cut backs in aid funding in the 1990s. Francis Fukuyama went so far as to question whether the end of communism signaled "The End of History?" or the triumph of the final form of government to be

⁶ Cur Tarnoff and Marian Leonardo Lawson. "Foreign Aid: An Introductory Overview of US Programs and Policies," *Congressional Research Service*, February 10, 2011, pp. 4-7.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

adopted by man. Liberal economic policies were seen to be the solution for many of the economic and social problems that plagued parts of the globe.

While the end of the Cold War brought a wave of nations embracing democratic reform, the reality is that liberal democracies were, in fact, not embraced by all, and even developing democracies are still mired in extreme poverty. This calls into question whether liberal democracies are even desirable by large segments of the global population. In the Middle East, the Balkans and parts of Asia, autocratic regimes still hold power over populations lacking basic freedoms and economic opportunities. While the *Arab Spring* brought about popular uprisings calling for democracy and has succeeded in several nations, there is still debate over whether the final product of these movements will result in true democracies or more authoritarian regimes with religious fundamentalist leanings.

In the case of Afghanistan, the country has suffered decades of war, been ruled by a totalitarian regime and suffered from extreme poverty. The ruling Taliban was notorious for their human rights violations and enforcement of Sharia law and still today, as an insurgency, it has been successful in forming a shadow government in parts of the country. According to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) World Factbook Afghanistan has the world's second highest infant mortality rate at 151.5 deaths/1000. The life expectancy in Afghanistan is 44.65 years, giving the country an overall ranking of 221 out of 223 nations. Only 28.5 percent of the population is literate, with the average citizen attending school for 8 years. Additionally, a 2008 estimate put Afghanistan's unemployment rate at 35 percent.⁸ This has caused not only the structural decimation of Afghanistan, but also damaged the fabric of Afghan culture and civil society, in turn creating a society constantly at war with itself.

⁸ CIA World Factbook. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/iz.html> 2009

The 24-year rule of Saddam Hussein left Iraq with a deeply divided society. Stoking ethnic tensions, Saddam put power into the hands of the Sunni minority and disenfranchised the Shiites, while massacring Kurd Separatists. The 1980's and 90's brought war with Iran and later war with a coalition led by the United States, causing damage to the Country's infrastructure and national defense. United Nations resolution 661 placed stringent economic sanctions on Iraq and in turn pushed the country to the verge of bankruptcy and major humanitarian crisis. While Iraq does not suffer from poverty to the same degree as Afghanistan, years of crippling economic sanctions, autocratic rule, the US invasion, insurgencies and sectarian violence have made for a situation in which the country experiences 15 percent unemployment.⁹ Furthermore, continued violence and insecurity from suicide bombings have made recovery and achieving security within the country a slow and arduous process. The invasion of 2003 represented for insurgents and terrorist groups an opportunity to challenge the United States. While officially the duty of maintaining security within the country has been handed over to Iraqi security forces, the United States until recently maintained a significant military presence within the country, creating resentment.

The importance of stabilizing Iraq and Afghanistan cannot be understated. At stake are Iraqi and Afghan lives, stability of the region, American strategic interests and American image and prestige around the world. The perceived failures in Afghanistan have caused the American public to question the feasibility of a mission that was overwhelmingly supported at its inception. The struggling mission in Iraq has also damaged American prestige abroad, as the mission failed to garner support at the outset and was not supported by many allies and regional powers. These factors

⁹ *Ibid.*

make studying how aid is distributed of utmost importance. American power comes not only from its military strength, but also from its ability to persuade and demonstrate its good will and development aid stands to play a major role in this. By helping to bring security to the region, the United States stands to gain not only allies, but also credibility throughout the world.

The events of 9/11 served as a sobering reminder of the gulf that still exists between many members of Muslim nations and the west. This gulf is not only economic, but also in clashing understandings of issues such as rights and governance in an increasingly globalized world. It not only exists in peoples nation of origin, but as emigration due to economic circumstances increases, immigrant communities that do not integrate often times retain their native understandings of rights and governance, causing strains in relations with communities of adopted nations. What is not in doubt is that these attacks changed the dynamic of relations between the United States, its allies and enemies.

“The War on Terror,” is a somewhat ambiguous term that has justified action in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan and other regions throughout the globe. To resolve these new conflicts, it is important not only to use hard power, but also soft power in the form of aid. Using hard power the United States and its allies have had success in killing insurgents. However, in a guerilla war in which insurgents operate amongst the communities, civilian casualties and destruction of property is inevitable. Without the use of soft power the United States and its allies will simply be seen as destructive. Although not the entire population will be won over, a majority must view the war as bringing about something more than death and destruction. This thesis therefore explores the usefulness of development aid and how it is best distributed when in conjunction with a counterinsurgency strategy. It begins with a

review that will look at the pertinent literature relating to aid effectiveness, COIN and smart power. It will then look at different methods of aid distribution in Iraq and Afghanistan, to identify the most effective ways to distribute aid.

Chapter 2: Research Design, Analytical Framework

This thesis hypothesizes that when fighting insurgencies the use of a foreign aid strategy that is coordinated by both donors and the military will more likely produce results than a strategy of non-coordinated aid. However, military partners and development partners are often at odds. Therefore, I propose the best way to ensure aid effectiveness is to find ways for the military and other development partners to coordinate their efforts.

My hypothesis is based on the following observations. First, insurgencies have complex roots. As opposed to national armies that are under the command of a government in power, insurgents grow from the population and communities that do not support the government. This can be a result of anywhere from a lack of legitimacy, inability to provide services or lack of social justice.¹⁰ This makes winning the support of the population that the insurgents operate amongst as essential to any solution.

Second, aid serves as one of the many tools that governments use to project power and comes in many forms that serve different purposes. Today, development aid is key to the counterinsurgency (COIN) mission taking place in Iraq and Afghanistan. Foreign aid can be divided into five primary types of aid: bilateral development aid, economic assistance supporting US political and security goals, humanitarian aid, multilateral economic contributions, and military aid.¹¹ Analysis of budget appropriations over time shows that major events like the Cold War, anti-narcotics campaigns, and 9/11 have had major effects on the amount of money the United States sends abroad. With the end of the Cold War in the 1990s foreign aid

¹⁰ Ben Connable, "The End of an Insurgency: What President Obama Can Learn From Peru, Angola and Colombia," *Foreign Affairs*, September 20, 2010, accessed at <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66749/ben-connable/the-end-of-an-insurgency>

¹¹ Curt Tarnoff, Marian Leonardo Lawson, p. 8.

declined to an all time low, because much of the aid had been spent on anti-communist initiatives. This decline in aid reflected a major change in US policy and the lack of “big idea” policy objectives after years of predominantly channeling aid towards one overall initiative.¹² However, since 9/11 aid budgets have increased to levels not seen since the Cold War. Aid allocations in 2010 totaled \$39.4 billion dollars, the highest levels of foreign aid since 1985.¹³ Therefore, although aid decreased after the Cold War, the post 9/11 environment has made development aid all the more important in helping the US to promote democracy, development and good governance. The distribution of aid now aims to achieve five main objectives: Peace and Security; Investing in People; Governing Justly and Democratically; Economic Growth and Humanitarian Assistance.¹⁴ This is relatively clear-cut in non-conflict situations. However, in Iraq and Afghanistan, vigorous debates are taking place as to how aid should be distributed and what the relationship should be between aid organizations, governments and the military.

Since the attacks of 9/11, bilateral and multilateral development and humanitarian assistance have increased significantly and now make up more than 50 percent of all foreign aid. Bilateral aid alone accounted for 34 percent of the budget and more at certain times in the past decade. Largely administered by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), it is used to promote economic progress and social stability in developing countries, health and education initiatives, as well as well-known programs like the Peace Corps and the new Millennium Challenge Corporation programs. Aid is also used to provide assistance

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 2.

¹³ Curt Tarnoff, “Foreign Aid: An Introduction to US Programs and Policy”, *Congressional Research Service*, February 10, 2011, Summary.

¹⁴ Curt Tarnoff, “Foreign Aid: An Introduction to US Programs and Policy”, *Congressional Research Service*, February 10, 2009, p. 4.

during natural disasters.¹⁵ Development assistance allows the United States to exercise soft power and create new markets for US goods in the future. In the case of counterinsurgency, this type of aid can win the hearts and minds of the nationals of the country, while providing concrete economic and social benefits.

This increase in development aid is juxtaposed against the decline in the last decade of spending on military aid. Toward the end of the Cold War military spending increased 42 percent in 1984, because of the Reagan administrations efforts to counter the Soviet threat.¹⁶ However, with its conclusion and the rise of new issues such as drug trafficking and terrorism, scholars began to study what the root of these problems were and many identified poverty and bad governance as the main culprits. States in which drug trafficking was rampant and terrorists were found, tended to be also wracked by poverty and corrupt governance.¹⁷ The events of 9/11 further highlighted what many believed to be the correlation between poverty, terrorism, and state insecurity. With this in mind, many policy makers advocated an emphasis on the concepts of human security, good governance, and development as key to dealing with security issues.¹⁸ Consequently, development budgets increased while foreign military aid decreased significantly. In comparison to Cold War budgets, which allocated 42 percent towards military aid, the 2011 budget calls for an allocation of 10 percent.¹⁹ To offset the loss of military aid in the annual foreign aid package, the Department of Defense (DoD) has increased its share of development spending. The overall increase in the amount of money dedicated to development demonstrates the adoption of human security as central in US foreign policy.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p.11.

¹⁷ “The World Development Report 2011: Conflict Security and Development” The World Bank, 2011, accessed at <http://wdr2011.worldbank.org/> p. 53.

¹⁸ Curt Tarnoff, Marian Leonardo Lawson, “CRS Report for Congress: Foreign Aid: An Introduction to US Programs and Policy”, Congressional Research Service, February 10, 2011 p. 12.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

It is the role of the DoD in providing aid, that has become a much-debated issue. From fiscal year 1998 to 2005 the DoD's percentage of Official Development Aid (ODA) increased from 3.5 percent to 22 percent, while USAID's ODA decreased from 65 percent to less than 40 Percent.²⁰ These funds are used to pay for development projects in support of the governments COIN mission.

What is at the root of the debate about aid and COIN is how and by whom it is distributed, and whether it is effective in achieving its goals of defeating the insurgents and winning over the native population. Therefore in order to support my hypothesis, I will proceed as follows: I will examine the COIN operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and compare military aid programs to those by the aid community outside of military programs. The latter will include aid distributed by independent NGOs, government programs and multilateral organizations. Such a comparison will allow me to gauge whether COIN initiated development projects or projects independent of the COIN mission have been more successful and make a case for my suggestions regarding coordination. I will judge effectiveness by acceptance of development of projects by the communities, overall success of projects and the prevalence of insurgents in communities targeted by development projects.

In order to support my hypothesis I will study the distribution of aid by the US military in Iraq and Afghanistan in order to judge what are the strengths and weaknesses of their practices. I will juxtapose the militaries practices against those of organizations that operate independently of the military. These will include aid distributed by independent NGOs, government programs and multilateral organizations. By gathering data from an array of organizations independent from the

²⁰ Kaysie Brown and Stewart Patrick, *The Pentagon and Global Development: Making Sense of the DoD's Expanding Role*, Center for Global Development, Working Paper no. 131, November 2007, p. 4.

military I will be able to make more informed judgments about organizations that operate in different contexts.

2.1.

Theoretical Literature on Counterinsurgencies and Development

Smart Power

In the study of military tactics the use of “hard power” or force has been researched as one of the primary means for winning wars. With the United States engaged in the “War on Terror” and wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, there has, however, been a revival of academic research on soft power as well as hard.

In 2004 Suzanne Nossel authored a piece in *Foreign Policy* magazine calling for what she felt was a need to respond to the growing militarism in American foreign policy. In this article she formulates the concept of a cohesive policy based on the exercise of both hard and soft power to more adequately achieve policy objectives. This she refers to as “smart power.”²¹

Nossel sees smart power as a response to the distinct change in international relations. “The unparalleled strength of the United States, the absence of great-power conflict, the fears aroused by September 11th, and growing public skepticism of the Bush administration's militarism have created a political opening for a cogent, visionary alternative to the president's foreign policy.”²² Nossel goes on to argue for the adoption of a liberal internationalism that uses an equally weighted combination of trade, foreign aid, diplomacy and the spread of American values.²³ It is this combination of tools that the Obama administration has adopted as part of their COIN efforts.

²¹ Suzanne Nossel, “Smart Power,” *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 83, no. 2 (Mar.-Apr. 2004), p. 138.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 131.

²³ *Ibid.*, pp.131-132.

In large part this is driven by liberal ideals adopted by much of the west. These ideals are rooted in what Emanuel Kant called the “Perpetual Peace” and is today called the Democratic or Liberal Peace Theory. This is based on the idea that democratic states do not fight each other because of shared rights that include freedom from arbitrary authority, referred to as a “negative freedom,” “positive freedoms,” which are “those rights necessary to protect and promote the capacity and opportunity for freedom” and democratic participation, which guarantees the previous rights are not infringed upon.²⁴ After the Cold War ended scholars like Francis Fukuyama hypothesized that a wave of liberalism would bring about peace based on these shared principles of democratic ideals, individual rights, rule of law and free trade.²⁵ This has been challenged in the wake of the struggles in Iraq and Afghanistan and scholarly work that argues factors like population, regional affiliations and size of economies, play major roles in the likelihood of states going to war.²⁶ The aftermath of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the Arab spring will serve as a further test of this theory as more democracies emerge in the Arab region.

Central to the US and its allies spreading these liberal values will be the use of smart power, incorporating development aid and diplomacy as central to official US military policy and Counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy. Economic aid has even been referred to as a “weapons system” by the US military, in a handbook that gives soldiers and commanders proper guidelines on how to properly spend money and which types of projects.²⁷ Joseph Nye argued that traditionally, the strength of a great

²⁴ Michael Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs,” *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, Vol. 12, No. 3, (Summer, 1983), pp. 206-207.

²⁵ Scott Burchill, et al. *Theories of International Relations*, 4th ed., Palgrave Macmillan: New York, 2009, p. 61.

²⁶ Htun Ming Kim and David L. Rousseau, “The Classical Liberals Were Half Right (or Half Wrong): New Tests of the ‘Liberal Peace’, 1960-88*,” *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 42, No. 5, 2005, p. 540.

²⁷ US Army Combined Arms Center, “Handbook 09-27: Commanders’ Guide to Money as a Weapons System handbook,” April 2009 accessed via http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/call/call_09-27.htm

power was made manifest in its ability to wage successful wars.²⁸ This ability was attributed to a large power's control of land, natural resources, military technology and human resources, among other things. This held true for much of history.

However, many scholars have debated whether interdependence in global politics, the world economy, cultures, and societies, have made waging traditional wars a more costly and difficult effort than before. Transnational groups invest large amounts of money in countries around the world developing industries, building infrastructure, extracting resources, and growing economies. Because of this investment and the impetus on governments to protect them, countries have become more interconnected in order to foster these relationships, trade and build economies. It is argued that after World War II increased trade between Germany and France created an interconnected relationship that fostered peace. Oneal and Russett argued that the increasing economic interdependence "...reinforces structural constraints and liberal norms by creating transnational ties that encourage accommodation rather than conflict."²⁹ Furthermore, "...trade is a mutually beneficial interaction, giving each party stake in the economic well-being of the other- and in avoiding militarized disputes."³⁰ For example, while not all democratic and liberal, countries in the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) claim to have more than 80% of all petroleum reserves, or more than 1 trillion barrels of oil.³¹ While other organizations set these estimates as low as 727 billion barrels, the interdependence of the sellers of this oil and the consumers is real.³² Additionally, transnational

²⁸ Joseph Nye. "Soft Power," *Foreign Policy*, No. 80, (Autumn 1990), p. 154.

²⁹ John R. Oneal and Bruce M. Russett, "The Classical Liberals Were Right: Democracy, Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950-1985," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 41, No. 2 (Jun., 1997), p. 269.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 270.

³¹ OPEC, "OPEC Share of World Crude Oil Reserves 2010," OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin 2010/2011 edition, accessed at http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/data_graphs/330.htm

³² Energy Information Administration, "World Proved Reserves of Oil and Natural Gas, Most Recent Estimates," accessed at <http://www.eia.gov/emeu/international/reserves.html>.

companies extract these resources and are dependent on good relations between countries in order to turn a profit. These factors in turn have forced states to utilize “soft power” in order to keep good relations, but have not eradicated the option of war between states.

Redefining Security to include Human Security

The end of the Cold War brought about a shift in relations between states throughout the globe, but it also sparked debates as to how development and security would be viewed in the future. During the Cold War the US and its allies had programs that were focused on Human Security, seen in initiatives like the Alliance for Progress, which called for a “...a vast cooperative effort, unparalleled in magnitude and nobility of purpose, to satisfy the basic needs of the American people for homes, work and land, health and schools.”³³ While these types of programs highlighted human security, some critics felt there was still too large a focus on the territorial security of the states. Politically speaking, military threats to a nation are simple for the average citizen to see as a clear threat to their security. Richard Ullman argued that this way of thinking is misguided because it neglects security threats from within a nations border and other non-military threats.³⁴ Many saw the post-Cold War as an opportunity to rethink security and development.

The authors of the 1994 United nations Human Development Report (HDR) wished to focus more global attention poverty and accountability by creating a new paradigm that shifted focus from state and nuclear security, which had preoccupied states during the Cold War, to human security. Critics felt that the focus on sovereignty of states had neglected the security of citizens; especially in developing

³³ John F. Kennedy, “Address by President John F. Kennedy at a White House Reception for Latin American Diplomats and Members of Congress,” March 13, 1961, accessed at <http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1961kennedy-afp1.html>.

³⁴ Richard H. Ullman, “Redefining Security” *International Security*, Vol. 8, No. 1 (Summer, 1983), p. 133

countries. Instead wealth and advancements had been concentrated in the hands of the elite leaving large portions of the population disenfranchised. Often development aid had been misused to enrich leaders. The United States and the west had continuously supported corrupt regimes in the name of stopping the spread of communism, but this in turn bred corruption and violence. In 1993 42 countries were involved in 52 major conflicts, while 37 were experiencing political violence. 65 of the 79 countries were in the developing world.³⁵ Furthermore, old ethnic tensions, which were largely suppressed during the cold war, manifested themselves in the form of civil wars. Former dictators fell by the wayside and power struggles ensued. This highlighted the inadequacy of the development agenda.

The definition of human security is subjective and highlights the complexity of the issue. The new agenda argues that human security has two aspects that can be identified, the first being, "...safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression=" and second, "...protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life-whether in homes, in jobs or in communities."³⁶ Achieving human security is largely based around the concept of achieving sustainable and people-centered development, as opposed to development strategies that "will respond to emergency relief. Or to fitful policy interventions"³⁷ The overview of the Human Development Report states:

Sustainable human development is development that not only generates economic growth but also distributes its benefits equitably; that regenerates the environment rather than destroying it; that empowers people rather than marginalizing them. It is development that gives priority to the poor, enlarging their choices and opportunities and providing for their participation in decisions that affect their lives. It is development that is pro-people, pro-nature,

³⁵ United Nations, *United Nations Human Development Report 1994*, New York: Oxford University Press p. 47.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. iii.

pro-jobs and pro-women.³⁸

Defining Human security represents a challenge for scholars and the development community. Some proponents see a vague definition of human security as being useful in that it allows for use by a broad array of groups to chip away at the traditional security paradigm.³⁹ They argue that issues like health, environment, migration and access to natural resources threaten security and therefore should be included because they are as much drivers of insecurity as are military threats.⁴⁰ Other Scholars others have argued that too vague a definition risks the term not having any meaning at all. Roland Paris argues that Human Security is like “Sustainable Development” in that everyone supports it, but it is very hard to define.⁴¹ This has lead some to attempt to define human security and more importantly find ways in which the concept can be incorporated into actual policy.

In their book *The Ultimate Weapon is No Weapon*, Shannon D. Beebe and Mary Kaldor define human security as personal security or security from violence and the prevention of violence by mitigating the conditions that lead to violence.⁴² This definition, the authors argue, necessitates coordination in war situations between the development community and the military in providing humanitarian space for development to take place.

Beebe and Kaldor are careful to make the distinction between COIN strategy and human security. "Counterinsurgency is not actually human security, however the term is defined. In counterinsurgency, human security, or population security, is a

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. iii.

³⁹ Roland Paris, “Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?,” *International Security*, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Autumn, 2001), P. 88.

⁴⁰ Richard H. Ullman, pp. 134-135

⁴¹ Roland Paris, p. 88.

⁴² Shannon D. Beebe and Mary Kaldor, *The Ultimate Weapon is No Weapon*, New York: Public Affairs, p. 7.

tactic, not a strategy.”⁴³ In contrast, human security seeks to prevent situations from escalating into violence.⁴⁴ It is in the areas that violence is absent development is able to take place. By developing institutions that promote good governance and law and order, based on human rights rather than the laws of war, a civil society is able to take root.⁴⁵

Beebe and Kaldor argue for the integration of military and civilian personnel in achieving development goals. Traditionally rules of humanitarianism are based on the concept of aid workers operating in humanitarian space respected by two sides in a conflict. Today, they argue, these spaces are not as respected and the only places that provide security are military bases. The human security paradigm would create spaces that would allow for both security and development to take place.⁴⁶ This concept of integration has sparked an outcry from throughout the development community as many have argued the opposite, that aid has been securitized or militarized. In a joint report by more than 20 aid organizations working in Afghanistan, they claim that the work of soldiers and civilians and NGOs protected by armed guards has compromised the relationship of aid agencies providing assistance and development, and the military providing security.⁴⁷ With or without actual coordination between aid organizations and the military, a common understanding of roles is necessary to deliver effective aid. Continued lack of agreement creates inefficiencies and can result in a lack of dialogue between parties that work in the same space.

Development Commitments and Aid Effectiveness

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 73.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 89.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 93.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 121.

⁴⁷ Ashley Jackson, “Nowhere to Turn: The failure to Protect Civilians in Afghanistan,” Joint Briefing Paper for the NATO heads of Government Summit, Lisbon, November 19, 2010, accessed at www.oxfam.org/.../bn-nowhere-to-turn-afghanistan-191110-en.pdf, P. 17.

The end of the Cold War brought new challenges to the international community as priorities shifted and new challenges were confronted on multiple levels. The Cold War had provided security in some measure, as nations and their leaders were propped up primarily by either the United States or the Soviet Union, depending on the political ideology to which a nation subscribed. With the fall of the Soviet Union, many nations were left to fend for themselves and intrastate power struggles became more common as decades-old internal problems between religious and ethnic groups and challenges to governance came to a head.⁴⁸ Additionally, the distribution of aid saw a significant change, as donors called for a new paradigm of engagement in developing countries. Along with shifting priorities there was a call for more effective distribution of development aid, which in turn caused a change in the way aid is distributed.

166 countries and International Organizations adopted the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, on March 2, 2005, in reaction to a call for countries to change the strategies and criteria for aid distribution. The Millennium Development Goals, ten development goals to be achieved by 2015, were a pre-cursor and reaction to the grinding poverty that affects a huge portion of the world's population. The Paris Declaration has since acted as a set of guidelines by which countries have agreed to abide, in order to engage in countries most effectively. "We, Ministers of developed and developing countries... resolve to take far reaching and monitorable actions to reform the ways we deliver and manage aid as we look ahead to the UN five- year

⁴⁸ Peter Wallensteen and Margareta Wallenberg, "After the Cold War: Emerging Patterns of Armed Conflict 1989-1994*," *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 32, No. 3, 1995, p. 345.

review of the Millennium Declaration and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) later this year.”⁴⁹

Central to the Paris Declaration are five commitments based on past experiences and applied in context. The commitments are to ownership, alignment, harmonization, managing for results and mutual accountability.⁵⁰ While the Paris Declaration is non-binding, it has put pressure on donors to make aid effective and has forced them to allow developing countries to decide how development will proceed in their countries. Commitments to the aid effectiveness paradigm were further solidified at the Accra Agenda for Action on September 2-4, 2008 in Accra Ghana. At this meeting, development partners and developing countries reviewed the progress made in achieving the goals set in The Paris Declaration and called for further country ownership of development, the building of more effective and inclusive partnerships and delivering and accounting for development results.⁵¹

The result of adopting these principles has been mixed as some development partners have had more success than others in following the commitments. In 2011, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) sponsored a report that evaluated the success of development partners implementing the Paris Declaration from 2005-2010 in 78 countries that received a combined \$70 billion and results were mixed. Out of all the 13 targets to be met in 2010, only one, “Strengthen capacity by co-ordinated support”, was met.⁵² While significant progress was made

⁴⁹ OECD, “Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action,” 2005-2008, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, accessed at www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/41/34428351.pdf, p. 1.

⁵⁰ *Ibid*, pp. 3-8.

⁵¹ *Ibid*, pp. 16- 21.

⁵² OECD, “Aid Effectiveness 2005-10: Progress in Implementing the Paris Declaration,” OECD Publishing, 2011, accessed at http://www.oecd.org/document/1/0,3746,en_2649_3236398_48725569_1_1_1_1,00.html pp. 18-19.

in attempting to achieve the others, development partners continue to struggle in meeting their commitments.

The struggle for countries to follow the Paris Declaration commitments is in large part owed to the struggles and debates of how to engage in fragile states. The 2011 World Development Report highlights the fact that 1.5 billion people today live in countries that experience chronic violence both political and criminal in nature, including violence resulting from organized crime, trafficking and terrorism.⁵³ Furthermore, the problem of repeated cycles of violence plague the majority of conflict affected countries, with 90% having already having experienced a civil war in the last 30 years. The mechanisms of the modern international system were based largely around fighting national armies. Much of the violence coming from irregular forces is financed through illicit crimes.⁵⁴

These statistics do not only have an effect upon the people of these nations, but also have major repercussions for nations bordering fragile states and those around the world. The existence of instability and violence because of factors such as crime and poor governance in a country results in mass migration internally and across borders, sowing chaos in entire regions. The end of 2009 saw globally a total of 42 million people displaced from their homes due to violence. This included 15 million people forced to flee across borders and 27 million internally displaced people.⁵⁵ This in turn places stresses on the neighboring countries both politically and economically. Furthermore, illicit crimes to finance operations, increases the drug trade around the world, which in turn fuels violence.⁵⁶ The complexity of engaging in fragile states has been recognized; however the major debate that remains is how to

⁵³ The World Bank, "The World Development Report 2011: Conflict Security and Development" The World Bank, 2011, accessed at <http://wdr2011.worldbank.org/> p. 1.

⁵⁴ *Ibid*, pp. 2-5.

⁵⁵ *Ibid*, p. 61.

⁵⁶ *Ibid*, p. 222.

engage properly. These debates inevitably bring up the role of development aid and that of the military, and questions of how and who should be implementing aid projects.

In 2007 OECD countries committed to Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations, which recognize the need for additional guidance when operating in fragile states. These include:

1. Take context as the starting point
2. Do no harm
3. Focus on state building as the central objective
4. Prioritize prevention
5. Recognize the links between political, security and development objectives
6. Promote non-discrimination as a basis for inclusive and stable societies
7. Align with local priorities in different ways and different context
8. Agree on practical coordination mechanisms between international actors
9. Act fast... but stay engaged long enough to give success a chance
10. Avoid pockets of exclusion⁵⁷

While OECD countries have adopted these rules in principle, implementation of the rules has been less than consistent. Many of the countries that have committed to these principles face pressures relating to strategic national interests and security objectives that they feel are not adequately addressed.

The result of these pressures is seen in the actions of some countries in fragile states. These countries argue that violence in communities causes insecurity and therefore aid should be targeted differently, specifically, in order to bring security and in the case of the COIN mission, to win hearts and minds. The US military published a COIN manual in 2006 that calls for the military to build or assist in the building of roads, schools and hospitals, specifically in conflict zones affected by insurgents, in order to provide security and secure the hearts and minds of the local populace.⁵⁸

Many have seen this as a militarization of aid that focuses on principles other than

⁵⁷ “Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations,” OECD, April 2007, accessed at www.oecd.org/dataoecd/61/45/38368714.pdf

⁵⁸ *Counterinsurgency*, FM 3-24 MCWP 3-33.5 Headquarters of the US Army, December 15, 2006, pp. 5-20 – 5-21.

those agreed upon in 2007 at the OECD conference on Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations. They claim that this engagement violates commitments like staying engaged and avoiding pockets of exclusion. In contrast, COIN proponents argue that the security situation dictates the type of engagement at the time. “COIN requires Soldiers and Marines to be ready to fight and to build- depending on the security situation and a variety of other factors.”⁵⁹ Because of the fluid nature of COIN operations and the focus on winning hearts and minds, the ability to follow the prescribed OECD principles is made more difficult.

COIN efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq that have focused on QUICK Impact projects in areas that are insecure, while avoiding areas that are more poor, but stable. For example, Helmand province receives an estimated \$285 per capita. In contrast, the more secure province of Takhar receives \$43 per capita.⁶⁰ A paper sponsored by multiple aid organizations, including Oxfam, Afghanaid, Care and Norwegian Refugee Council, Ashley Jackson makes the argument that there is too much focus by nations on winning hearts and minds as opposed to solving the problems that are at the root of poverty and conflict. “Development projects implemented with military money or through military-dominated structures aim to achieve fast results but are often poorly executed, inappropriate and do not have sufficient community involvement to make them sustainable.”⁶¹ However, the military is at odds with this viewpoint, as demonstrated with their QUICK Impact projects designed to make short-term, quick gains.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 1-19.

⁶⁰ Ashley Jackson. “Quick Impact, Quick Collapse: The Dangers of Militarized Aid in Afghanistan,” paraphrased from a speech given by Kai Eide to the UN Security Council on January 3, 2010, accessed on November 10, 2010, at <http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/quick-impact-quick-collapse-jan-2010.pdf> pp. 3-4.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 1-3.

The embracing of development aid as a carrot for winning hearts and minds was furthered with the publishing of the “Commander’s Guide to Money as a Weapons System,” making clear the governments’ intentions of using development aid to win the war. “Coalition money is defeating COIN targets without creating collateral damage, by motivating antigovernment forces to cease lethal and nonlethal operations, by creating and providing jobs along with other forms of financial assistance to the indigenous population, and by restoring or creating vital infrastructure.”⁶² This document lays out the different funds available to troops for and the necessary protocol for engagement, which focus on loose rules to be followed and that are largely under the discretion of commanders.⁶³ Many aid organizations argue that as the COIN manual has called for increasing collaboration between the military and civilian organizations, this increasing involvement of the military has additionally put aid workers at risk. “The integration of civilian and military efforts is crucial to successful COIN operations.”⁶⁴ “Particularly after security has been achieved, dollars and ballots will have more important effects than bombs and bullets. This is a time when “money is ammunition.””⁶⁵ This has brought with it worries of the safety of aid workers, as in some cases, aid workers associated with coalition forces have become the targets of insurgent attacks.⁶⁶ These examples expose the rift between the development community and government’s commitment to aid effectiveness. This debate is made more complex as the military has become more involved in the distribution of aid and has its own COIN objectives to meet.

⁶² US Army, “Commanders Guide to Money as a Weapons System: Tactics Techniques and Procedures,” No. 09-27, April 2009, p. i, accessed at usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/docs/09-27/09-27.pdf.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 3-6.

⁶⁴ *Counterinsurgency*, p. 2-1.

⁶⁵ *Counterinsurgency*, p. 1-21.

⁶⁶ Rod Nordland, “Killings of Afghan Relief Workers Stirs Debate”, *New York Times*, December 13, 2010, Accessed December 13, 2010, at <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/14/world/asia/14afghan.html?partner=rss&emc=rss>

COIN

COIN strategy as reflected in the US army manual of 2006 as well as a US government guide of 2009, developed in response to irregular warfare in Iraq and Afghan wars, calls for a coordinated relationship between political, economic, information and security functions.⁶⁷ At the center of this rethinking is the idea that soft power and foreign aid will win the battle for hearts and minds and turn the tide of the war in the United States' favor. Soft power tactics include diplomacy, propaganda, and foreign aid to demonstrate social and political values, in order to persuade indigenous populations to accept the legitimacy of the national government.

David Kilcullen, a former Australian soldier was picked by General David Petraeus to help author the *US Government Counterinsurgency Guide*. In his book, Kilcullen argued that there should not be a separation of the military and development community in COIN because of the fact that development during COIN is not a typical war. Rather, the aid community is a key player in gaining the trust and support of the local population.⁶⁸ Furthermore he argues that aid is the key to successful COIN because in the end the people are choosing between the government and or the insurgents and seeking "survival by certainty."⁶⁹ In the end, it is human security that is at the root of what most people strive for in their daily lives.

The history of development aid is one checkered with failures and successes that have spurred the international community to evaluate best practices in order to deliver aid in the most effective manner. The COIN missions undertaken in Afghanistan and Iraq and the recent financial crisis add another dimension to this debate and warrant further analysis. By taking into account the human security

⁶⁷ Bureau of Political Military Affairs, Department of State, "US Government Counterinsurgency Guide." (January 2009) Department of State, accessed October 15, 2010 at www.state.gov/documents/organization/119629.pdf.

⁶⁸ David Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerilla*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 66

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 67.

paradigm, COIN policies and how aid is distributed, I will be better able to understand whether coordinated aid distributed at the behest of the military in Iraq and Afghanistan is more effective than traditional aid distribution.

Chapter 3 Pros and Cons of Some Coordinated Aid Projects

The use of foreign aid as a tool was seen in the unsuccessful efforts by the US in the Vietnam War to win over the Vietnamese population. From 1961 to 1968 the United States invested \$2.9 billion dollars in foreign aid in South Vietnam, in attempts to win over the indigenous population.⁷⁰ In 1967 the US AID budget for Vietnam totaled more than \$550 million. Taken from its total budget that was more than \$2 Billion, this represented a concerted effort by the US Government to garner indigenous support within Vietnam. The projects spearheaded by the US during this time were similar in nature to those being implemented in Iraq and Afghanistan, including schools, hospitals and highways.⁷¹ However, because of the failure of the United States in Vietnam, development aid used for winning hearts and minds in war should be wielded with caution.

In 2006, the US Army released, for the first time in 20 years, a completely revised counterinsurgency manual that called for an expanded role in efforts to win over civilian populations affected by insurgents. General David Petraeus spearheaded this in reaction to the US Army's experiences in the Iraq War. What is most important to take note of in the new COIN manual is that the military has been called on to take on a non-traditional role that will require adaptation on a level that is radically different from the conventional training given to soldiers. The foreword to the manual is the first piece of evidence of the changing role of soldiers. "They must be prepared to help reestablish institutions and local security forces and assist in rebuilding infrastructure and basic services."⁷² Traditionally, soldiers have been

⁷⁰ Stephen Biddle, "Seeing Baghdad, Thinking Saigon", in *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 85, No. 2 (Mar.-Apr., 2006), p.3.

⁷¹ Marc Leepson. "The Heart and Mind of USAID's Vietnam Mission", *American Foreign Service Association*, accessed via <http://www.afsa.org/fsj/apr00/leepson.cfm>.

⁷² US Army, *Counterinsurgency*, FM 3-24 MCWP 3-33.5 Headquarters of the US Army, December 15, 2006, p. x.

deployed in battlefields to fight an enemy. In the introduction to the manual it is explicitly stated that the objective is "...to secure the safety and support of the local populace..." as necessary to success.⁷³ The manual goes on to repeatedly emphasize the role of the soldier in nation building. These objectives are important in that they allow the US to seem less like an occupying force, and more as a provider of security.

An interagency counterinsurgency guide, similar to that of the US Army's, was released by the US government, in concert with several government agencies in 2009. It calls for a more multifaceted operation that utilizes soft power noting, "A successful COIN operation meets the contested population's needs to the extent needed to win popular support, while protecting the population from the insurgents."⁷⁴ This represents not only a new strategy in COIN, but also redefines traditional humanitarian and development aid as a more explicit tool of the US military. With government agencies including the military becoming involved in administering foreign aid, traditional agencies, like USAID and NGOs also stand to lose access to the limited foreign aid that is available. Additionally, traditional standards for how foreign aid is distributed have changed and have sparked debate within the development community as to what are best practices.

For the Afghanistan and Iraq War, the U.S has implemented a plan that utilizes soft power within a COIN strategy as a tactic to defeat insurgencies. In a speech to NATO forces before he was fired, General Stanley McChrystal, reiterated the importance of soft power to a successful COIN strategy. "It's not the number of people you kill, it's the number of people you convince. It's the number of people

⁷³ *Ibid.*, Foreword.

⁷⁴ US State Department, *US Government Counterinsurgency Guide*, Department of State, January 13, 2009, PDF accessed October 27, 2010 at www.state.gov/documents/organization/119629.pdf, pp. 2-1.

that don't get killed. It's the number of houses (that) are not destroyed."⁷⁵ The adoption of soft power by the military presents major challenges to the capabilities of an institution that trains and deploys soldiers to engage enemies in combat. It begs the question of whether soldiers are qualified and have the skills to properly carry out such a mission. In turn, questions about the role of the military and whether they should be engaged in implementing soft power policies, such as foreign aid, are called into question.

PRTs

The continuing resilience of and violence perpetuated by insurgencies in both Afghanistan and Iraq have forced the US government and military to make drastic changes not only in their military strategy, but also in their relationship with the aid community. Traditional relationships have been questioned and governments are struggling to effectively utilize and implement what amounts to billions of dollars worth of foreign aid through new and untested strategies and programs. This is in the hopes of building political legitimacy, gaining security and winning the hearts and minds of the population. These changes have sparked debates as to not only what best practices are, but also how distribution methods affect the perceptions of donors by populations living in the conflict zone.

Effectively getting civilians and military units to work together in post conflict zones has always been one of the main challenges because of the need to adhere to humanitarian principles. The presence of the insurgencies has magnified this problem as aid workers have struggled to provide humanitarian and development aid in conflict zones, while trying not to appear biased towards coalition forces, which threatens the security of civilians.

⁷⁵ Shachtman, Noah. "Can US Troops Run McChrystal's 'Soft Power' Playbook?" *Wired* (23 December, 2009). Accessed October 11, 2010 at <http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2009/12/can-us-troops-run-mcchrystals-soft-power-playbook/#ixzz138TsMok3>

Driving much of the debate about the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq has been the attempts by the US military to provide aid in insecure areas. While in certain areas the military may be the only party able to implement aid programs, the general feeling among aid workers and many government officials is that professionals with expertise are the preferred party to implement projects. In many zones in which the military has been working there has been vocal criticism of what is perceived as the use of aid as a political tool for winning hearts and minds, and a lack of communication with communities.

The increase in the Department of Defense's (DoD) involvement in the Iraqi and Afghan humanitarian and development missions is evident in the creation of several programs that have combined military and civilian capabilities. A prime example of this has been the formation of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT), which combines "...civilian and military personnel in order to meet stability objectives in a defined region."⁷⁶ The PRTs were a reaction to increasing violence in Afghanistan and Iraq and the inability to provide humanitarian and development aid to civilians living in insecure areas. Most NGOs were not able to operate outside of safe zones protected by coalition forces and the US government recognized the need to address the lack of aid distribution. The provision of aid also falls in line with the military's COIN goal of winning the hearts and minds of civilians.⁷⁷ In a news conference, former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice described the role of the PRT as crucial to what is known as the "clear, hold and build" strategy. "Our military operations must be fully supported and integrated with our civilian and diplomatic efforts across the entire US government to help Iraqis clear, hold and build throughout

⁷⁶ Nina M. Serafino, p. 83

⁷⁷ US Department of Defense, "Fact Sheets- Provincial Reconstruction Teams," September 27, 2004, accessed on April 1, 2011, via <http://www.defense.gov/home/articles/2004-10/a100107b.html>

all of Iraq.”⁷⁸ To many aid workers and policy makers this represented a dangerous encroachment on humanitarian space and the traditional separation from the military.

Initially formed in Afghanistan in 2004 and later adopted in Iraq, PRTs were created with the intention of extending the influence of the national governments, and to encourage NGOs and international actors to focus on development and reconstruction in rural areas. Their goals included contributing to the reconstruction process and coordinating with the UN Missions, NGOs and international organizations.⁷⁹ In order to undertake the PRT’s mission, the US government had the massive task of creating a system that recruited qualified civilians to operate in conflict zones alongside soldiers under extreme conditions. While soldiers are trained for fighting, their skill sets are not specific to providing humanitarian aid or implementing long-term development projects. In turn, an aid worker does not have the same skills as soldiers. The PRT model calls for both parties to carry out tasks that have historically been exclusive from one another. This gives an idea of the daunting task that lay before the government.

The actual structure of the PRT, while differing in some respects, follows a general pattern in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The departments of the government with representation in the PRTs are the Department of State (DOS), USAID, the DOD and the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). The military objective is to provide security for the entire PRT in regions that have been identified by the government as key to stabilization. Meanwhile, the role of civilian aid workers from USAID is to carry out reconstruction projects, while the DOS oversees the political and reporting aspects of the projects. What is especially unique is that all parties

⁷⁸ Donna Miles. “More Provincial Reconstruction Teams to Stand Up in Iraq,” *American Forces Press Service*, accessed March 24, 2011 at <http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=2656>

⁷⁹ “Fact Sheets- Provincial Reconstruction Teams,” September 27, 2004, accessed April 1, 2011 at <http://www.defense.gov/home/articles/2004-10/a100107b.html>

involved, civilian and military, are required to give their approval in order for projects to move forward.⁸⁰ This structure demonstrates how interconnected the actors within the PRTs are and how it has changed the relationship between civilians and soldiers. Furthermore, their actions are explicitly political in their efforts to defeat insurgencies. While the PRT Playbook claims that the PRT is not a development agency, one could claim that is merely semantics. “A PRT stabilizes an area through its integrated civilian-military focus. It combines the diplomatic, military, and developmental components of the various agencies involved in the stabilization and reconstruction effort.”⁸¹ Among other things, the goal of the PRT is clearly to provide development after hostilities.

Central to the success of the PRT mission has been its funding and the ability to distribute resources in a timely fashion. What has become one of the most useful sources for funding is the Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP). CERP was created in 2003 by the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, in order to create stability in the field in a timely fashion. According to Mark Martins, “This Program will enable commanders to respond to urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements within their areas of responsibility, by carrying out programs that will immediately assist the Iraqi people and support the reconstruction of Iraq.”⁸² While originally funded by the Iraqi government with seized funds from the Ba’athist party, the fund was soon emptied after the war because of the poor Iraqi oil infrastructure and inability to generate income. This resulted in the US government supplementing the fund.⁸³ The CERP, which has become one of the

⁸⁰ “PRT Playbook: Tactics, Techniques and Procedures,” *Center for Army Lessons Learned*, No. 07-34, September 2007, p. 56.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

⁸² Mark S. Martins. “The Commander’s Emergency Response Program,” *Joint Forces Quarterly*, issue 37, p. 47.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 47.

major resources for the PRTs to fund infrastructure projects, is administered by the DOD and has played a major role in funding reconstruction in both Afghanistan and Iraq.

While indispensable in helping provide funds for the PRTs in a timely fashion, it has at the same time given the military broad powers in making crucial decisions with little oversight. In the “Commander’s Guide to Money as a Weapons System,” commanders are encouraged to, “As much as possible, use the existing processes at the province level (for example, provincial reconstruction development committee reviews) to obtain local provincial government participation in planning...”⁸⁴ This has allowed for the participation of the Iraqi and Afghan government, but at the same time leaves it in the hands of the commanders to decide when it is “possible” to utilize government institutions. In a report by the US Government Accountability Office on Iraq PRTs, members reported that the correct government officials were interviewed before beginning projects.⁸⁵ However, reviews of projects found projects that were unfinished or had not been maintained after the PRT left.⁸⁶ This highlights the dangers in projects that are implemented too quickly, and do not have the proper institutions to support them after the PRT has left. That has resulted in questions of effectiveness and accountability with respect to projects implemented under the program.

Iraq PRTs

The insurgency in Iraq arises largely from ethnic tensions, with Sunni insurgents fearful of a Shi’ite and Kurd government seeking revenge for years of oppression under Saddam Hussein’s Ba’athist party. While security has largely

⁸⁴ US Center for Army Lessons Learned, “Commanders Guide to Money as a Weapons System: Tactics, Techniques and Procedures,” (Handbook 09-27) April 2009, p. 23.


⁸⁵ United States Government Accountability Office, “Military Operations: Actions Needed to Better Guide Project Selection for Commander’s Emergency Response Program and Improve Oversight in Iraq,” GAO-08-736R Military Operations, Washington DC, June 23, 2008, p. 4.

⁸⁶ *Ibid*, p. 5.

improved in Iraq in 2011, the insurgency is still operating and is being countered on all fronts. With violence spiraling out of control in 2004 and 2005, the United States formed PRTs in Iraq based on those being used in Afghanistan. At this point in time there was legitimate fear of a civil war breaking out. Furthermore, the killing of aid workers in Iraq (including the director of CARE’s Iraq office) and Afghanistan had made working in the countries too unsafe for many NGOs.⁸⁷ It was the formation of PRTs that aimed to fill this role of providing much needed aid for civilians living in areas affected by insurgents. The reaction to PRTs in Iraq has been mixed, with some groups trumpeting their success and others highly critical.

As of 2010, \$154.12 billion had been spent for relief and reconstruction efforts in Iraq. Of this amount, \$56.81 billion had been donated by the United States alone. In 2004 alone, the US spent almost \$20 billion in an effort that was significantly larger than the similar efforts in Afghanistan.⁸⁸ As security has improved, the Iraqi government has begun to take more responsibility for funding their reconstruction with money from oil revenues and the US donations have decreased significantly.

Table 3.1: US and Iraqi Support for Reconstruction, 2003-2010 \$ Billions (% of combined annual funding)



Source: “Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction,” Quarterly Report to the US Congress, October 30, 2010, p. 24

⁸⁷ US Agency for International Development, “Iraq PRTs,” *US Agency for International Development*, Fall 2007, accessed April 10, 2011 at http://www.usaid.gov/iraq/pdf/iraqprrts_1007.pdf, pp. 2.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 24.

However, the sheer amount of money spent in that short period of time justifies a closer look at the effectiveness of aid distributed during that time period.

Originally civilians from the DOS and USAID ran the PRTs in Iraq and operated at the provincial level. However, with the “New Way Forward” introduced by the Bush administration in 2007, utilizing a strategy of 5 core principles to create stability and self reliance and the troop surge in 2007, there was the creation of what was known as the embedded PRTs (ePRT), which embedded with Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) to go into the neighborhoods at the local level in order to provide aid.⁸⁹ The embedding of the PRTs with the military created a new structure that was largely ad hoc because of time constraints and the continued insecurity on the ground. Dealing with soldiers and civilians working closely together on a mission with differing objectives, many teams were forced to confront issues ranging from personalities to priorities, which in some cases created tensions and certain levels of inefficiency. Moreover, at times, because of a lack of training, many of the ePRTs were not able to hire adequately qualified civilian staff. This resulted in the position of aid workers being filled by military personnel with little experience.⁹⁰ As the US continues their efforts to integrate civilian and military capabilities, the fact that the PRTs are untested beforehand presents the question of whether they are able to use aid money in an efficient way. While it is likely that this capacity will improve overtime, in the meantime filling skilled positions with unqualified military personnel is bound to result in wasted money, poor delivery of aid and an inability to meet mission objectives.

⁸⁹ House Armed Services Committee, “Agency Stovepipes vs Strategic Agility: Lessons We Need To Learn from Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan,” US House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Sub Committee on Oversight and Investigations, April 2008, p. 15

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

Because of an improving security situation in 2008, PRTs had a stronger civilian presence than in the past but still struggled in areas of relative insecurity. Operating in specific areas where the insurgency was the most powerful, the PRTs did not have as much flexibility to implement projects and instead served more as advisers to the military. This involved them recommending ways in which projects could be quickly implemented to win hearts and minds and gain an advantage. However, these recommendations were beholden to whether commanders felt the region was secure enough to carry out projects in the manner in which advisors recommended and could be ignored at anytime.⁹¹ This highlights the short-term as opposed to long-term gains that are at the core of COIN and more importantly the subordinate relationship the civilian aid PRT members have vis-à-vis the military. Because the military has so much influence in a PRT, if there is not a good relationship between the civilian and military branch, the military has the ability to disregard advice.

The relationship between the actors in PRTs is of utmost importance because much of the funding culled from the CERP and the aid workers security is dependent on the cooperation of the military team. The CERP fund has allowed commanders to have access to grants of up to \$500,000 without having to go through the usual bureaucratic steps.⁹² The point of the fund has been to give commanders the ability to act on projects that require immediate funds. This is a very valuable program, but at the same time it has created problems within the PRT because commanders, who are not experts in development, can decide which projects they deem necessary. While security is of the utmost importance, the ability of aid to be effective is largely dependent on identifying the needs of the population. If the right projects are not put

⁹¹ Rusty Barber, Sam Parker. "Evaluating Iraq's Provincial Reconstruction Teams While Drawdown Looms," United States Institute of Peace, December 2008, p. 9.

⁹² Nina M. Serafino, p. 88

into place the potential for waste increases. Additionally, because the security of the civilian team is the responsibility of the military, they dictate much of the civilian team's movement. A study by the House Armed Services committee found that PRT members surveyed felt they lacked adequate security some or all of the time they were deployed. Furthermore, without a military escort they are not able to meet with people in the communities in which they work. One PRT civilian member described the importance of being on good terms with the military stating, "If Brigade did not like you it would have been difficult."⁹³ This highlights what aid workers sacrifice when they are embedded with the military. When working independently, their safety to a large extent, is of their own concern. By embedding with troops in highly insecure areas, their safety becomes the responsibility of the military and consequently limits their ability to move freely.

The funding of the PRTs in Iraq also has had a major effect on the US foreign aid budget and has caused a major shift in funds distributed by the government. Funding for PRTs is made available through programs like the Quick Response Fund (QRF) and the Provincial Reconstruction Development Council fund. The QRF was created in Iraq in 2007 by the DOS in response to the DODs creation of the CERP. The program allows for the distribution of grants from \$25,000 to \$500,000 through a streamlined process for obtaining funds. PRT leaders approve purchases of under \$25,000, resulting in faster approvals of large amounts of money for COIN objectives.⁹⁴ While this allowed for more flexibility, it also resulted in cases of fraud and less of a chance for a bidding process that was most beneficial to the government.

⁹³ "Agency Stovepipes vs Strategic Agility: Lessons We Need To Learn from Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan," US House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Sub Committee on Oversight and Investigations, April 2008, pp. 71-72.

⁹⁴ "Opportunities to Improve Management of the Quick Response Fund," Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction report-09-011, January 29, 2009, p. 2.

Part of this is a result of the fact that independent contractors have been hired by the PRTs because of the lack of security.

Civilian PRTs travel with armed security contingents, which in turn attracts a great deal of attention. Consequently, often-times unqualified proxies were hired to do the work of PRT members.⁹⁵ This is an example of the problems that occur because of the relationship between the civilian and military arm of the PRT. By being seen as complying with the military or a political agenda, the civilian actors become targets themselves. “We can distinguish who is NGO and who is PRT and we also know that there are civilians in the PRT. They seem to be dangerous and have hidden agendas. They make us suspicious.”⁹⁶ The suspicion by the general population is evidence that the hearts and minds campaign may need to make major adjustments in order to achieve its goals.

As opposed to NGOs that work as professionals in development and tend to work in communities for long periods of time and develop close relationships, contracting firms are present for only as long as the contract and then tend to leave. This in turn has led to some contractors producing shoddy work and cases of corruption that leave the community feeling taken advantage of or distrustful of the government and coalition forces. In one example, the PRTs hired the contracting firm Development Alternative Inc. (DAI) to disburse grants and purchases. According to a report, DAI’s charges to USAID appeared to be relatively high, with charges of \$.45 of every \$1 going to the company. Additionally, the subcontractor was awarded on average an 8 percent of grant totals for distributing funds. In the end this resulted in

⁹⁵ Sippi Azarbaijani-Moghaddam, et al. “Afghan Hearts, Afghan Minds: Exploring Afghan Perceptions of Civil-Military Relations,” *British Irish Agencies Afghanistan Group*, 2008, accessed April 9 at www.baag.org, p. 47

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 37.

an average cost of \$.61 per \$1 of grant money distributed.⁹⁷ The high cost of contractors can partly be attributed to the insecure nature of working in conflict zones. While costs are high, at times, the PRTs are faced with few options of contractors qualified to implement projects. Testifying in Congress, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction acknowledged the problem when asked whether fraud and waste were present in reconstruction in Iraq:

Regarding waste, yes; regarding fraud, no. The overuse of cost-plus contracts, high contractor overhead expenses, excessive contractor award fees, and unacceptable program and project delays all contributed to a significant waste of taxpayer dollars.⁹⁸

The hope is that if the US government's attempt to build the capacity of their coordinated civilian and military capabilities is successful, this will become less of an issue in the future.

In 2009, Iraq PRTs submitted reports measuring progress in five different categories; Governance, Political Development, Economic Development, Rule of Law and Reconciliation. Looking at the time period from late 2007 to August 2008, the PRTs reported a significant positive change in all categories.⁹⁹ In large part, this has been attributed to the troop surge of late 2007 and puts the PRTs in a positive light. However, the fact that the analysis was carried out by the PRTs themselves suggests a conflict of interest. For a more objective analysis, the PRTs need to have outside firms conducting evaluations to gauge the effectiveness of projects.

While the Iraq PRTs have encountered many challenges in their fight to provide security against insurgents, they have also had successes in COIN. The Community Stabilization Program (CSP) was initiated to help Iraqi leaders bring

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

⁹⁸ Curt Tarnoff. "Iraq: Reconstruction Assistance," Congressional Research Service, August 7, 2009, p. 20.

⁹⁹ Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, "Provincial Reconstruction Teams' Performance Measurement Process Has Improved," *SIGIR-09-13*, January 28, 2009, pp. 20-22.

stability to communities throughout the country. One of the major problems contributing to the problem of the insurgency was that of unemployment among males. Because of the lack of jobs, the insurgency was able to attract Iraqi males to their cause with promises of wages. Working through the PRTs the CSP helped to sponsor programs to provide job skills and employment opportunities in insecure areas. This included more than 54,000 jobs for formerly unemployed Iraqis.¹⁰⁰ Furthermore, funds provided by the CSP were used to help complete infrastructure projects and provide grants for small businesses.¹⁰¹ In this case, the PRT was able to successfully facilitate the implementation of programs that brought stability to insecure regions. But more importantly, the work of the PRT helped in achieving the COIN goals of gaining legitimacy for the Iraqi government.

The PRT's work with provincial governments helping them create effective budgets has been especially successful. In helping the government to provide services, they are achieving the essential COIN goal of the government, strengthening capacity, and gaining legitimacy. The role of the PRT is to provide training in the skills that many Iraqi officials lack, such as budgeting and project management.¹⁰² By providing workshops and facilitating meetings, the PRT is able to interact with the populace and encourage community development of governance and ownership of projects. Success stories like these clearly demonstrate their ability to create programs that are successful; however a lack of independent analysis of their work has limited our understanding of how successful they actually are in implementing cost effective programs.

¹⁰⁰ "Iraq PRTs," *US Agency for International Development*, Fall 2007, accessed on April 10, 2011, via http://www.usaid.gov/iraq/pdf/iraqprts_1007.pdf, p. 16.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p. 16

¹⁰² Rusty Barber, Sam Parker, pp. 3-4.

Today in Iraq, the US military has taken a largely behind the scenes supportive role to the Iraqi security forces as security has slowly improved. As the US continues to withdraw troops from the country, there has been a movement away from COIN and more into stabilization efforts. Consequently, the ePRTs are being phased out and civilians are once again working as advisers within the government. As the US continues to spend large amounts of aid money in the country to defeat insurgents, while the deficit increases at home, the evaluation of aid effectiveness has become all the more crucial. In light of the evidence, it is clear that there are serious questions as to whether PRTs are as effective as people had hoped and at the least, suggests that there needs to be changes in the way they are run and the zones of operation.

Afghanistan PRTs

While the invasion of Afghanistan in 2003 brought the full brunt of the US military on the country, planning by the US government failed to take into account the resilience of the Taliban insurgency. Problems were further compounded with the invasion of Iraq and the subsequent diversion of resources away from Afghanistan. Today, the US military and coalition forces are approaching the ten year anniversary since the invasion of Afghanistan and the Taliban still is considered a serious threat to the security of the country. Operating in Afghanistan and in the autonomous tribal region of Pakistan, the Taliban has employed guerilla style tactics to destabilize regions of the country. Meanwhile, there is evidence that they simultaneously operate a shadow government that collects taxes, appoints officials, operates courts and threatens to gain the support of people who favor the rough justice of the Taliban, as

opposed to the corruption of the Hamid Karzai government.¹⁰³ The inability of the GoIRA to provide security and good governance, has only further served to embolden the Taliban and discredit a seemingly inept government.

As the war has dragged on there has been a concerted effort by donors and recipients to distribute aid in the most effective manner possible. The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness is especially relevant in that it calls for coordination between donors and recipients that in some cases has proven elusive in the war in Afghanistan. Drafted in 2005, the declaration laid out partnership commitments that included ownership, alignment, harmonization, managing for results and mutual accountability.¹⁰⁴ While donors have attempted to follow these guidelines, the ability to adhere, has in large part, been dictated by the security situation in the provinces or the goals of donor nations. In the case of the Afghan PRTs, they have taken on a bigger mission that not only aligns civil society, but also gives the military an expanding role in development initiatives designed to win hearts and minds. As was the case in Iraq, critics argue that PRTs use of aid to achieve security objectives violates core humanitarian principles, resulting in failed development projects.

PRTs were originally formed in Afghanistan in response to the continuing security issues facing the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force. The original idea of the PRTs, formulated in 2002, was to provide a civil-military force that combined military, diplomatic and economic functions in order to bring security and stability to unstable regions.¹⁰⁵ Today, the composition of the PRTs is largely dictated by the security situation in the region in which they are operating.

¹⁰³ Griff White, "Taliban Establishes Elaborate Shadow Government in Afghanistan," Washington Post, 8 December 2009, accessed at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/12/07/AR2009120704127.html>.

¹⁰⁴ OECD, "Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action," 2005-2008, accessed at www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/41/34428351.pdf.

¹⁰⁵ Oskari Eronen. "PRT Models in Afghanistan: Approaches to Civil-Military Integration," *CMC Finland Civilian Crisis Management Studies*, Volume 1, Number 5, 2008, p. 4

Depending on the situation and the country running the PRT, some have more integrated civilian-military functions, while others are careful to have limited coordination.

American PRTs work largely independently from other countries along the insecure Pakistan border. Relatively speaking, they are small with a predominantly military presence and three or four civilian advisors from the Department of State and USAID. In 2009, PRTs in Afghanistan had 1021 military staff and 35 civilian staff in the entire country.¹⁰⁶ Similar to PRTs in Iraq, Afghan PRTs have military commanders that retain final authority, while PRT Civil Command group acts as advisors.¹⁰⁷

The funding of Afghan PRTs is also very similar to that of the Iraq PRTs; however the amount of money dedicated to Afghanistan is vastly different. With the invasion of Iraq, much of the US foreign aid budget was diverted away from Afghanistan. Even with the invasion in 2001, Afghanistan continued to receive less foreign aid than Palestine, India and China in 2002, and less aid than Iraq, Vietnam and Tanzania in 2003. However, this changed in 2008 when Afghanistan became the largest recipient of aid in the entire US budget.¹⁰⁸ Of the foreign aid budget for Afghanistan, GIRA estimates that \$2 billion was used by Afghan PRTs to support reconstruction, security sector reform and better governance. The GIRA Development Assistance Database has tracked \$939.2 million in foreign aid that has been channeled through foreign militaries. However, the Afghan Ministry of Finance estimates that an estimated \$14.9 billion in untracked foreign aid was channeled

¹⁰⁶ Curt Tarnoff. "Afghanistan: US Foreign Assistance," *Congressional Research Service*, July 14, 2009, p. 3.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 14-15.

¹⁰⁸ Lydia Poole, p. 5.

through foreign militaries between 2002 and 2009.¹⁰⁹ This is another example of the significant amount of power that the military has in dictating the foreign aid agenda and the types of development projects that are pursued.

Clearly, there is an integration between the military and civilian functions, but the more important question is how effective are they. While each country has created its own PRT models, adopting the best practices of each has been difficult because of the restrictions that national politics place on what they are able to do. The American PRT is focused on Quick Impact Projects in very insecure regions, while other countries' PRTs are more focused on long term development projects. In some PRTs there has been a strong military presence, while in others, their ability to work with the military is limited. Much of this is related to the security situation in the places where they are located, but the influence of home country politics is prevalent as well and influences their ability to function.¹¹⁰ While the PRTs are attempting to coordinate their civil-military capacity to distribute foreign aid, they are lacking in their ability to coordinate between PRTs of different countries. This in turn has created inconsistencies in their success rate.

The actual work that the PRTs have carried out has been widely criticized by the NGO community. NGOs have been adamant from the beginning in their opposition to the coordination of civil and military distribution of aid and much of the work of the PRTs seemed to support their fears. Prior to 2005, the PRTs lacked the expertise of qualified USAID representatives and consequently their projects were poorly planned and at times overlapped with the work of NGOs operating in the region. Often times, in the hopes of winning hearts and minds, they would build schools in regions with no trained teachers or build hospitals where there were no

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

¹¹⁰ Robert M. Perito, "The US Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: Lessons Learned," *United States Institute of Peace*, Special Report 152, October 2005, p. 3.

doctors.¹¹¹ This in turn created resentment from Afghans and aid workers who felt that in the governments push to win hearts and minds by distributing aid, they were sabotaging quality work done by NGOs.

The public's perception of the PRTs plays a major role in gauging their effectiveness overall. Central to COIN is the mission to inject large amounts of aid in order to win the hearts and minds of the population. However, the way that PRTs have utilized aid to accomplish this has been called into question. To the detriment of some of the PRTs and to many civilians, they are seen as secretive and lacking the transparency that is present in the work of independent NGOs or those associated with GoIRA programs. This has created suspicion and a negative perception of the PRTs. Additionally, because of the overall focus on creating security and meeting political goals, the PRTs, as opposed to NGOs, are seen as not listening to the needs and concerns of the population.¹¹²

In areas like the Balkh province in the north of Afghanistan, PRTs were seen as having some success in bringing security, but residents were skeptical as to the ability of development aid to bring about long-term change. Instead, residents argued that the real drivers of insecurity were governance, ethnicity and ideology, which could not be addressed with development projects.¹¹³ This suggests that there needs to be a re-evaluation of where funds are used and more robust oversight into the effectiveness of these project in achieving COIN objectives. The US has invested large amounts of development money in the hopes that development will bring security, when evidence suggests that there may not actually be a strong enough correlation to warrant this level of investment.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 10.


¹¹² *Ibid.*, p. 7.

¹¹³ Paul Fishstein, pp. 4-5

Regional disparities in funding have also been a major driving force in creating resentment within Afghanistan. Because of the focus on security and development, large amounts of aid have been channeled through PRTs in the southern provinces. (See Map 3.2) On average, Uruzgan and Kandahar received PRT funding of an average of \$150 per person, while Helmand, Paktika and Zabul received an average of \$75 per person. This is in contrast with central and northern provinces that have been relatively more secure, like Faryab, Daikundi, and Takhar, which received on average of less than \$30 per person.¹¹⁴ To many Afghans, the concentration of aid in the violent southern regions seems to reward insecure provinces, while punishing peaceful provinces in what is referred to as the “peace penalty.” This was summed up by a group of elders:

We see the situation in Khost, where there is lots of aid, and wonder if we should try to attract that with tak o took [a bit of noise]. No attention is being paid to the peaceful places. Sholgara was the first place to quit opium cultivation, but we haven’t received anything. We asked for a tractor from the Agriculture Department, but we didn’t get anything.¹¹⁵

Map 3.2 Afghanistan Provinces




Source: Afghan Provinces Map, accessed April 19, 2011 at <http://mapprojectionpic.co.cc/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/wpid->

¹¹⁴ Matt Waldman, p. 12.

¹¹⁵ Paul Fishstein, p. 29

This highlights the ill effects that aid based on military and political objectives can have on the efforts made by the government to gain legitimacy. The attempts to bring security to insecure regions through short-term development seem to have the effect of actually fueling resentment. Furthermore, disproportionate amounts of aid funneled to insecure provinces creates the bigger problem of the possibility of persistent poverty in those provinces that are secure, creating opportunities for insurgents to take advantage of disenfranchised citizens.¹¹⁶ The frustration of the Afghans with the PRTs concentration of aid in the south points to the complicated nature of distributing aid in coordination with the military. (Table 3.3) As aid is channeled to specific regions of the country to achieve

Table 3.3: Completed, Ongoing, Planned, and Funded PRT Spending Per Capita, Per Province



Source: Matt Waldman. "Falling Short: Aid Effectiveness in Afghanistan," ACBAR Advocacy Series, March 2008, p. 12.

¹¹⁶ Matt Waldman. "Falling Short: Aid Effectiveness in Afghanistan," ACBAR Advocacy Series, March 2008, p. 12.

military and political goals, the campaign to achieve hearts and minds has been undermined. The PRTs face a difficult task in walking the fine line between achieving military and political goals, while meeting the needs of the entire Afghan population.

Major impediments to the success of the PRTs have also been observed in the way in which the PRTs are run, resulting in insufficient and poor quality projects. The short-term deployment of many PRT aid workers has resulted in problems in implementing successful projects. The length of deployment for PRT aid workers tends to be one-year contracts, after which they are replaced by new workers. This is in comparison with NGO employees, who tend to have either been present in provinces prior to the war or are devoted to longer-term projects. The short length of PRT worker's deployment results in a lack of workers with a broad knowledge of the dynamics of the region in which they are working and forces lessons to be re-learned. Therefore, there has been a focus on small as opposed to large-scale and long-term projects, which require more knowledge and organization.¹¹⁷ This means that many of the major underlying reasons for persistent poverty and insecurity cannot be properly addressed. Furthermore, the military is faced with the reality that, at times, their goals do not align with those of the GoIRA or the aid community, forcing them to make choices that are contrary to the principles laid out in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness.¹¹⁸ This has caused tension between the aid community, Afghan Civilians, GoIRA, and the military.

¹¹⁷ Matt Waldman, p. 13.

¹¹⁸ Oskari Eronen, p. 27

Chapter 4 Pros and Cons of Some Independent (Uncoordinated) Aid Projects in Afghanistan and Iraq

In both post-invasion Afghanistan and Iraq, there is a recognizable need for both continuing efforts to ensure military security and for reconstruction. In both countries, massive amounts of aid are being distributed in order to win the hearts and minds of the population and gain stability, and legitimacy for the central government. A small percentage of aid can be classified as “uncoordinated” aid, distributed through three channels: bilateral aid from governments, aid distributed through multilateral organizations and aid distributed through private NGOs.

Table 4.1: *Top 5 recipients of ODA From Donors Reporting to the OECD DAC, 2001-2009, Constant 2008 Prices, US\$ Billion*

2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
India 2.5	Pakistan 2.8	Iraq 2.8	Iraq 5.1	Iraq 8.8	Iraq 5.9	Iraq 4.5	Afghanistan 4.9	Afghanistan 6.2
Pakistan 2.5	Palestinian /OPT 2.5	Viet Nam 2.2	Afghanistan 2.7	Afghanistan 3.2	Afghanistan 3.3	Afghanistan 4.1	Ethiopia 3.3	Ethiopia 3.9
Serbia 2.3	India 2.4	Tanzania 2.2	Viet Nam 2.1	Indonesia 2.3	Pakistan 2.4	Viet Nam 2.7	Iraq 3.3	Viet Nam 3.7
China 2.2	China 2.0	Afghanistan 2.1	Ethiopia 2.0	Viet Nam 2.2	Sudan 2.3	Ethiopia 2.7	Palestinian /OPT 2.6	Palestinian /OPT 3.1
Viet Nam 2.1	Afghanistan 2.0	Ethiopia 2.0	Tanzania 2.0	Ethiopia 2.2	Viet Nam 2.1	Pakistan 2.3	Viet Nam 2.5	Tanzania 3.0

Source: Lydia Poole. “Afghanistan: Tracking Major Resource Flows 2002-2010,” *Development Initiatives*, January 2011, accessed March 24, 2011 at <http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/report/afghanistan-tracking-major-resource-flows-2002-2010>, p. 6.

Today in Afghanistan, foreign aid has become a major component of the stabilization efforts. According to a recent report by *Development Initiatives*, from 2002-2009, a total of \$26.7 billion dollars was spent on aid initiatives in Afghanistan, making it one of the top recipients of foreign aid in the world. In 2000, Afghanistan was ranked 69th in terms of the amount of Official Development Aid (ODA) it received in comparison with other countries. By 2008, seven years after the invasion,

Afghanistan was the largest recipient of ODA in the world (Table 3.1).¹¹⁹ While this is a significant increase in aid, it is significantly less than the actual amount pledged, amounting to a total of \$62 billion by donor nations. This means that donors have actually only met 43.1 percent of their overall pledges.¹²⁰ What is more telling is the amount of aid that is outside of the control of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GoIRA). It is estimated that 77 percent of aid to Afghanistan is administered through foreign militaries and outside the control of the government. This contravenes the principles laid out in the Paris Declaration that call for ownership and harmonization of aid.¹²¹ Of the 23 percent of total aid channeled through the GoIRA, roughly half is dedicated to priorities of the Afghan National Development Strategy.¹²² This points to a trend of Afghans having less control over their future and leads to a question of whether this is detrimental to strategy. Can objectives be met with less input from Afghans? Is aid being used to meet the goals of international donors or those of Afghans?

National Solidarity Program (NSP)

For my first case study of independent aid, I will focus on the National Solidarity Program (NSP) in Afghanistan. Created in 2003 with the World Bank Group and the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD), the goal of the NSP is to focus on rural areas and "...develop the ability of Afghan communities to identify, plan, manage and monitor their own development

¹¹⁹ Lydia Poole. "Afghanistan: Tracking Major Resource Flows 2002-2010," *Development Initiatives, January 2011*, accessed at <http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/report/afghanistan-tracking-major-resource-flows-2002-2010>, p. 6.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 2-4.

¹²¹ "Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action," 2005-2008, pp. 3-6, accessed at www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/41/34428351.pdf.

¹²² Lydia Poole, pp. 9.

projects.”¹²³ In a World Bank Emergency Project Paper on a Proposed Grant to Afghanistan, the Bank identifies the goal of the NSP as:

“... to strengthen community level governance in Afghanistan and to improve the access of rural communities to social and productive infrastructure and services by channeling resources to democratically-elected Community Development Councils (CDCs) and building the capacity of CDCs to facilitate community level investments.”¹²⁴

These objectives align with those of the US Armies’ “Counterinsurgency” field manual goal, which identifies political power as the central issue when fighting insurgencies and therefore argues for building the government’s capacity, and the people’s confidence in the government to provide services and stability.¹²⁵ The NSP does this by building the local rural community’s capacity to elect representatives, identify community needs and involve a larger cross section of the community in rebuilding. Currently, 60 percent of the Afghan population is involved some way in the agriculture sector. Consequently, central government programs that focus on rural communities are of major importance in gaining the trust of the population. The NSP’s community-driven approach to development gives the Afghans viable skills and institutions to sustain themselves, which debunks the insurgents’ argument that the government cannot provide for the people. It also stands in opposition to the US governments’ COIN guides goal for a more coordinated approach with the military.

How the NSP is structured is important to its goal of strengthening the government and empowering the people. Often times, aid programs leave beneficiaries feeling disenfranchised because of their lack of input in choosing projects in their communities. This in turn results in projects that do not meet

¹²³ NSP, “The Largest Project in the History of Afghanistan,” accessed March 30, 2011 at <http://www.nspafghanistan.org/>.

¹²⁴ The World Bank, “Emergency Project Paper on a Proposed Grant in the Amount of SDR 27.2 Million (US\$40 Million Equivalent) to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan for a Third Emergency National Solidarity Project,” *The World Bank Group*, Report No: 54540-AF, June 10, 2010, pp. 3.

¹²⁵ US Army, *Counterinsurgency*, FM 3-24 MCWP 3-33.5 Headquarters of the US Army, December 15, 2006, pp. 1-1.

community needs. The NSP differs, in that while the development aid to support the program is provided by the World Bank and other bi-lateral donors, the decisions of how the aid is spent is largely identified by the community. This requires the integration of all members in order to be successful. The idea of the community taking ownership of its own development, which will allow for sustainable growth in the future, is in line with the aid communities' recent focus on human security.

The NSP is structured so that the Afghanistan Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) is responsible for distributing aid in the form of small block grants to rural villages. The villages are eligible for the grants after they have elected what is known as the Community Development Councils (CDC). The role of the CDC is to identify the needs of the community with the consultation of an NGO.¹²⁶ CDCs are elected by the local community and have been considered largely successful and accepted within the community because of a rule that requires they include both men and women. Where as traditional *shura* ruling councils were all men, today women members make up 35 percent of the council members.¹²⁷ This integration has not only resulted in the empowerment of women, but also more effective governance because involving women in the decision making process allows for identifying more of the community's needs as a whole.

The result of the CDCs has been local Afghan ownership of their future and a vested interest from the beginning to the end of the project. The way that the NSP is funded has also played a major role in its success. While the World Bank and other donors provide funds, the size of the individual grants given to communities is limited. This means that not only are grants manageable on a smaller scale to meet

¹²⁶ John A. Nagl, Andrew M. Exum and Ahmed A. Humayan. "A Pathway to Success in Afghanistan: The National Solidarity Program," *Center for a New American Security*, Policy Brief, March 2009, pp. 2.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 2.

specific village needs, they also reach larger parts of the rural region. Distributed in what are known as block grants of \$200 dollars per family, with a \$60,000 limit per village and an additional 10 percent of the cost contributed through cash and labor, these are distributed after the Community Development Program (CDP) has identified, through community input, what is needed.¹²⁸ Additionally, the program empowers communities to “...collectively contribute to increased human security.”¹²⁹ CDCs are unique in that NGOs merely act as Facilitating Partners (FP). The hope is that by empowering Afghan communities to foster their own development, they are more likely to achieve human security and become less reliant on foreign aid in the future.

The administration of the program is what is key to achieving many of its stated goals. As opposed to many aid programs administered in coordination with the US military, the NSP operates through the mechanisms of the Afghan government and input of the local community. As of 2010, the NSP had received \$1.1 billion in funding from the World Bank and bilateral donors.¹³⁰ The program is funded through the multilateral World Bank Groups’ International Development Association, which is comprised of 148 donor countries who contribute aid distributed through the bank to promote development projects around the world. Through the International Development Association, the World Bank has contributed \$358 million in IDA grants stages since its first inception in 2003 after the US invasion.¹³¹

The overall goal of COIN operations is to win the hearts and minds of the population by providing security, while at the same time building long-term

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 2.

¹²⁹ NSP, “The Largest Project in the History of Afghanistan,” accessed March 30, 2011 at <http://www.nspafghanistan.org/>.

¹³⁰ “Emergency Project Paper on a Proposed Grant in the Amount of SDR 27.2 Million (US\$40 Million Equivalent) to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan for a Third Emergency National Solidarity Project,” *The World Bank Group*, Report No: 54540-AF, June 10, 2010, pp. 3.

¹³¹ John A. Nagl, Andrew M. Exum and Ahmed A. Humayan, pp. 3.

legitimacy for the government. The Coalition forces have attempted to do this through initiatives like Quick Impact Projects (QIP), a program established in 2003, which utilize funds from a pool, which commanders can then easily access in order to fund small, highly visible projects like repairing roads and schools, which in turn are aimed at achieving stability and legitimacy for the Afghan Government.¹³² For instance in 2007, PRTs working in conjunction with USAID representatives, focused on kinetic regions in the south of Afghanistan, building roads and implementing cash for work programs to win over the hearts and minds of the local population.¹³³ These projects are largely focused on regions that lack stability. It is the structure and the implementation of the NSP and its focus on human security that is the backbone of the program, that delineates it from QIP. As opposed to QIP, that aim to win hearts and minds through highly visible projects, NSP projects are based on community input.

The importance of the whole community's input cannot be understated. Development projects do not have an impact unless they meet the real needs of an entire community. Recently a study was undertaken, with the support of the World Bank, the Food and Agricultural Organizations of the United Nations and the MRRD to study the impact of the NSP on Afghan rural communities. This study involved conducting a baseline survey to compare future findings with. For the study, both men and women were interviewed as to what they viewed as the top development priority for their village. Both female and male respondents cited access to clean

¹³² USAID, "PRT Quick Impact Projects," accessed at http://afghanistan.usaid.gov/en/USAID/Activity/91/PRT_Quick_Impact_Projects

¹³³ "Civil-Military Cooperation in Counterinsurgency Operations" accessed at www.microlinks.org/.../COIN_Ops_September_2007_20_mins.pdf.

water as the number one priority, followed by schools and hospitals.¹³⁴ Furthermore, the baseline survey found that the role of women in the villages was distorted under the current dominance of the *shura* council. “92 percent responded that the council or village leaders had done nothing for women within the past year and 91 percent responded that there was no formal role by which women could participate in the village council.”¹³⁵ Furthermore, the survey showed that women felt that they should have a role in the council in some form. Seventy percent of women felt females should have membership in the council and 86 percent felt there should be a separate council for women. While only 43 percent of men supported women membership in the council, 85 percent supported a separate female council.¹³⁶ The baseline survey is important in that it shows that by forming CDCs, which require female membership, they are addressing issues of the community at the most basic level of decision making. As the NSP is implemented by the Afghan government, it aims to build trust in the central government’s ability to govern. The baseline survey discredits the Taliban’s argument that the people do not want more rights to be provided for women or more services. However, cultural norms have played a role in the effectiveness of the NSP and present challenges to the central governments.

Beginning in 2008 and culminating in 2010, the Feinstein Center at Tufts University, led by Professor Andrew Wilder, conducted a study on the relationship between aid and security in Northern Afghanistan, which included an analysis of the NSP. Perceptions of the NSP were positive in many respects. Respondents favored the way that funds were distributed because of the fair and democratic nature of the community electing a council and the council deciding what projects to initiate.

¹³⁴ National Solidarity Programme, “Randomized Impact Evaluation of Afghanistan’s National Solidarity Program, Baseline Survey Report,” National Solidarity Programme- Randomized Impact Evaluation, December 13, 2008, accessed January 21, 2011 at <http://www.nsp-ie.org/#>, p. x.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. vii.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. vii.

Furthermore, the NSP is seen as more transparent and less corrupt.¹³⁷ This was in contrast to Cash for Work (CFW) programs, which were often times implemented by commanders, with little oversight or accountability, resulting in nepotism and resentment.¹³⁸

Furthermore, the general perception of the NSP in the province compared to Provincial Reconstruction Teams, which were teams composed of combined civilian and military personnel tasked with carrying out the COIN objectives and more specifically development projects to win hearts and minds, was generally positive. Not only did respondents appreciate the transparency of the NSP, but they also liked the skills that they gained through working in coordination with the CDCs and connections made to the government. The success of the NSP was tangible in the responses analysts obtained from Afghans living in villages where the NSP had not been implemented. Many respondents had heard of the successes of the NSP and hoped for the program to be brought to their villages.¹³⁹ Faryab is a province of Northern Afghanistan with a primarily Uzbek and Tajik population, along with smaller percentages of Pashtuns, Turkmen and Hazra.¹⁴⁰ While the Farayab province is less violent than many other provinces, the positive reaction of Afghans to the NSP speaks to the possibilities of development without linkages to the military.

There is also evidence of a relationship between the NSP and the relative security that their development projects have produced. The ultimate goal of insurgents is to win over the general population and gain legitimacy. Because of the

¹³⁷ Paul Fishstein. "Winning Hearts and Minds? Examining the Relationship between Aid and Security in Afghanistan's Balkh Province," Tufts University Feinstein International Center, November 2010, p. 39-41.

¹³⁸ Geert Gompelman. "Winning Hearts and Minds? Examining the Relationship Between Aid and Security in Afghanistan's Faryab Province," Tufts University Feinstein International Center, 2010, p. 39.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 39.

¹⁴⁰ Norway, "About Faryab" accessed via http://www.norway.org.af/News_and_events/prt/faryab/

fact that that the NSP is based on community-driven development and villagers have a stake in the projects, the Taliban has been more reluctant to attack these projects out of fear of alienating the population. Gregory Wagner, in an article for the *Washington Monthly*, cites a Human Rights Watch survey of Afghan school burnings that suggests that schools built by the NSP are less likely to be attacked because of the communities' stake. Dennis De Tray explains that, "If you're the Taliban, you feel some comfort in attacking things built by foreigners... But you don't want to create animosity among citizens you're trying to recruit to your side."¹⁴¹ This relationship between security and how aid is distributed is important when taking into account the disproportionate amount of development aid that is distributed in coordination with the military. In the context of fighting insurgents, it cannot be forgotten that how development aid is administered is as important as the outcome of that development aid. COIN campaigns are about perceptions just as much as they are about engaging the enemy or providing for the people. In the case of Afghanistan, if and when the people begin to take ownership of their future and also see the government as facilitating that prosperity, the Taliban is likely to lose legitimacy.

The sheer size of the NSP demonstrates the commitment the Afghan government has made to community-driven development across the whole of Afghanistan. Since its inception in 2003, 22,500 CDCs have been established across all 34 Afghan provinces.¹⁴² Evaluations of the NSP program have shown mixed results in terms of its effectiveness. A major hurdle that the central government of Afghanistan has had to deal with is the traditional cultural norms that challenge

¹⁴¹ Gregory Warner. "The Schools the Taliban won't Torch," *Washington Monthly*, (December 2007), accessed February 13, 2011 at <http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2007/0712.warner.html>.

¹⁴² "Randomized Impact Evaluation of Phase II of Afghanistan's National Solidarity Program (NSP): Estimated Impact of Interim Program Impact from First Follow-Up Survey," National Solidarity Programme- Randomized Impact Evaluation, July 8, 2010, accessed February 3, 2011 at <http://www.nsp-ie.org/reportsimpacts.html>, pp. iv.

central government authority. While villages throughout the country have embraced CDCs, their ability to displace traditional *shura* councils has not been as effective. In many villages, people have embraced the democratic concept and elected leaders that include women. However, the CDCs have only managed to exist alongside the *shuras*, failing to gain more effective authority. It is predominantly the men of the villages who are more reluctant to cede authority to the central government; trusting more in elders and the clergy.¹⁴³ Much of the aid that has been channeled through the NSP to the villages has been effective in creating positive perceptions of government. However, villages have still been reluctant to cede authority.

While the NSP has been successful in forming CDCs and gaining rights for women in the councils, the effectiveness of development projects has been questioned. NSP development projects have addressed village needs for clean water and electricity, but they have failed to show improvement in economic activity or access to infrastructure.¹⁴⁴ The lack of improvement in economic welfare is very worrisome to the NSP project. Because of the nature of insurgencies, the more immediate the results, the more the chances are that the insurgents will not be able to gain legitimacy. While there are many different factors that create economic growth, stability and good governance, time is not on the side of those conducting COIN. It is not only the results relative to the Afghan people that are worrisome. As the war drags on, the will of the American public has begun to wane and questions of the feasibility of success have risen, leading to calls for withdrawal. Consequently, time is of the essence.

The Tufts University study also hi-lighted many of the challenges that the NSP faces in Afghanistan. For some Afghans, the NSP program presents

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. v.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 73.

opportunities for some at the expense of others. Like the Afghan Central government, the CDC has not been immune to major bouts of corruption. Many Afghans see the NSP as bringing corruption to a local level because of the amount of money that has been made available to corrupt and powerful figures.¹⁴⁵ In some cases, commanders or village elders have co-opted the CDC for their own purposes, causing resentment throughout the community. In Sholgara District of Karab Province, located in Northern Afghanistan, a CDC chief was ousted after having submitted fake bills, stealing furniture meant for the meeting house and funneling benefits to his own family.¹⁴⁶ At times CDCs were even controlled from the outside by influential members of the community, creating resentment amongst community members. FPs have not been spared accusations of misusing block grants, which has made maintaining legitimacy and working partnerships more difficult.¹⁴⁷ Fortunately, the democratic process of the CDCs has mitigated many of these problems.

The success of NSP has to be viewed in relation to other projects operating in Afghanistan and the context of the Afghan situation. The program is operating in a conflict environment in which the country's civil service system and infrastructure have largely been destroyed. Because the judicial system and security are weak, it is reasonable to expect that some forms of corruption will exist. However, the reactions of the community have been largely positive when compared to other programs operating in the region. Afghans have largely embraced the democratic principles of the CDCs and the concept of having a stake in choosing and implementing development projects. Furthermore, the defense of these projects by the Afghans and the reluctance on the part of the Taliban to commit acts of sabotage relating to NSP projects speaks volumes to the importance of community driven projects. The general

¹⁴⁵ Geert Gompelman, p. 40

¹⁴⁶ Paul Fishstein, p. 39.

¹⁴⁷ Geert Gompelman, p.

positive feedback about the program from the government, villagers and international donors, reported by the Tufts University Feinstein International Center, signals a chance to duplicate aspects in other provinces. As the COIN mission advances, it is important to study programs like the NSP in order to gain knowledge of best practices.

Norwegian PRT Model

Much of the debate regarding the use of coordinated foreign aid is in response to major programs that were initiated by the US military in response to deteriorating security situations. In both Iraq and Afghanistan the US military created what are known as *Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)*, which are designed to incorporate both military and civilian capabilities into one unit that can provide both security and development in insecure zones, in an effort to win hearts and minds. This has garnered much attention in the international development community because the method of combining civil and military capabilities has called into question whether it meets ethical standards and if it is effective.

The case of the Norwegian PRT operating in Faryab province of Afghanistan represents an interesting case study that demonstrates the use of methods that are not common to the PRTs and could offer some insight into best practices. As Faryab is primarily Uzbek and Tajik population, along with smaller percentages of Turkmen and Hazra¹⁴⁸ and as the Taliban are predominantly Pashtun, their presence in the province has not been as strong, resulting in a relatively more stable security situation than that of other provinces. The question is whether this relatively secure situation can be related to the Norwegian PRT methods and if they are winning over the Afghan population away from the Taliban Insurgency.

¹⁴⁸ Norway, "About Faryab" accessed via http://www.norway.org.af/News_and_events/prt/faryab/

Based on studies of British and Irish PRTs, Afghans found that often times PRTs were not as responsive to their needs because of the complicated relationship that they had relating to their structure, security and mission. Many respondents found that while the PRTs attempted to communicate with the villagers, the tendency to repeat the same mistakes gave people the impression that PRT members were going through the motions, rather than genuinely responding to needs.¹⁴⁹ By focusing on winning the hearts and minds of the population, rather than presenting long-term solutions, the PRTs were further disenfranchising the population. For some, the ability of the PRTs to implement projects was lacking all together. “Development projects are beyond their [PRT] capacity and do not help them in winning hearts and minds either. They have only succeeded in creating publicity for themselves. Now many people know who they are and how much resources they have.”¹⁵⁰ In Afghanistan, because of the insurgents’ tactics of trying to discredit the government and occupying forces, publicity is often the last thing that groups want.

What sets the Norwegian PRT apart from others is its insistence on drawing a line between the mission of the military and that of development. While the military branch in the US PRTs is active in development projects, this is not the case in the Norwegian model. In a joint statement, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Defense and Ministry of Justice and Police stated that, “The main aim of the Norwegian engagement in Afghanistan is to support the Afghan authorities in their responsibility to ensure stability, security and development.”¹⁵¹ While these

¹⁴⁹ Sippi Azarbaijani-Moghaddam, et al. “Afghan Hearts, Afghan Minds: Exploring Afghan Perceptions of Civil-Military Relations,” *British Irish Agencies Afghanistan Group*, 2008, accessed April 9 at www.baag.org, p. 47.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 43.

¹⁵¹ “A Strategy for Comprehensive Norwegian Civilian and Military Efforts in Faryab Province, Afghanistan,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Justice and the Police, May 2009, accessed April 3, 2011 at http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/Whats-new/news/2009/faryab_strategy.html?id=566387, p. 3.

goals are intertwined in many respects, the way that they are implemented is an important distinction.

In theory, the Norwegian government utilizes what is called the integrated or whole of government approach to carrying out their mission. The integrated approach is based on the premise that security, governance and development cannot be achieved without coordination between all sectors.¹⁵² However, when examined more closely the Norwegian approach for meeting their goals has not fully applied this theory and has differed significantly from the common US PRT operating in Afghanistan. While embracing the idea of the integrated approach, the Norwegians interpret this as meaning that, “The respective roles of the Norwegian civilian and military actors shall be clearly distinguished, and the coordination between all actors shall be strengthened and their efforts made coherent. The civilian component shall therefore be drawn out of the PRT and linked more closely to the local authorities and to the UN (UNAMA) as soon as the security situation permits.”¹⁵³ This implies instead that the civilian sector is to work more in coordination with the Afghan government rather than the military. However, there is still debate today within Norwegian society as to the proper relationship between the military and civilian coordination when distributing aid.

Many leaders within the military establishment have embraced the idea of the military as a distributor of aid or collaborator with the aid community. After a campaign in the village of Ghormach, Badghis Province, the military advocated for an influx of development aid, which would help to secure and win the hearts and minds of the population. However, the Norwegian NGO community was less enthusiastic about the idea of inserting themselves into a situation where the safety of workers

¹⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 3.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

would be an issue.¹⁵⁴ At the crux of the argument is whether the Norwegian integrated approach will bring about visible benefits. As opposed to the US COIN strategy, which calls for winning hearts and minds through quick win projects the Norwegian strategy envisions long term and sustainable projects as more effective in creating legitimacy for the government and helping the population.

Norwegian NGOs have argued that attempting to achieve short-term security goals instead of pursuing a long-term strategy of development puts Afghans at risk because of the implications of benefiting from the military action. If communities are seen as benefiting from the work of military development projects, they may be seen as colluding with foreign occupiers. Therefore, they argue, NGOs that maintain their impartiality are most qualified to provide aid.¹⁵⁵ Without maintaining these standards the NGOs stand to be viewed as another part of the military and as having ulterior motives. The Norwegian government has continued to support NGOs, which continue to operate separately from the military.

The PRT has two pillars: one military and one civilian. The two components are separated in terms of mandate and employees, however close cooperation and multidisciplinary is a key to success including respect for each other's competences. The task of the military part of the PRT is, as part of the ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) operation, to promote a good security environment in the Faryab province and to facilitate development and reconstruction. The civilian component consists of police liaison officers, prison officers and civilian advisors, including a development and political advisor.¹⁵⁶

This has allowed the Norwegian aid community to operate and be viewed as more impartial providers of aid. Recent studies by the Norwegian Government, The Norwegian Institute of International Affairs and The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, while not conclusive, have indicated that the Norwegian Model

¹⁵⁴ Arne Strand, "Drawing the Lines: "The Norwegian debate on Civilian- Military Relations in Afghanistan," Noref Policy Brief, No. 8, June 2010, pp. 5-6.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

¹⁵⁶ "Norwegian Led PRT in Faryab," accessed April 6, 2011 at http://www.norway.org.af/News_and_events/prt/faryab1/

deserves closer analysis because of its strengths in providing aid and Afghan perceptions of the PRT.

The ability of the Norwegians to adequately provide quality aid projects to Faryab province has been helped by their willingness to coordinate with the Afghan institutions. As opposed to PRTs run by other countries, the Norwegian PRT has rejected the use of Quick Impact Projects (QIP) and projects run through Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC). These QIP and CIMIC projects are designed to win hearts and minds, with funds provided by the military as opposed to the Ministry of foreign affairs.¹⁵⁷ The explicit military and political goals of these programs have caused critics to question their impact, effectiveness and the security effects on the communities receiving the aid. Furthermore these types of projects blur the traditional rules of aid distribution based on providing aid to mitigate the impacts of war. In contrast, the Norwegian PRT has embraced a different strategy based on Afghan priorities and needs as opposed to the political and security needs of the military.

PRT Meymaneh (Capital of Faryab province) is based on a model which entails that the PRT does not implement development projects of its own. Instead, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Oslo and the Norwegian Embassy in Kabul channel funds to programmes in Faryab, which are implemented through the World Bank, United Nations and NGOs. These programmes are chosen according to Afghan national priorities and the recommendations of the PRT.¹⁵⁸

Not only does this meet the needs of the Afghan population, but it also allows the PRT to keep a lower profile while at the same time fulfilling its mission to provide assistance and support to the Afghan government.

The tactic of utilizing the Afghan government to distribute aid has worked for the Norwegians in many respects. To begin with, many NGOs and contractors have garnered bad reputations in Afghanistan. The amount of money pumped into

¹⁵⁷ Geert Compelman, p. 22.

¹⁵⁸ "Norwegian Led PRT in Faryab," accessed April 6, 2011 at http://www.norway.org.af/News_and_events/prt/faryab1/

Afghanistan since the invasion has made the country a hotbed for NGOs and contractors helping to implement programs and projects of all sizes. Unfortunately, because of the sheer size of the aid packages and the pressure to spend money quickly, these programs have often been beset by problems. Furthermore, the quality of some organizations operating in Afghanistan has been criticized. Perceptions of contractors, NGOs and PRTs have been mixed as many have been viewed as greedy and corrupt. Given that the goal of COIN is to win the hearts and minds of the population, some view the reputations of actors as a detriment to the overall mission. A recent study sponsored by the European Network of NGOs in Afghanistan (ENNA) and the British and Irish Agencies Afghanistan Group (BAAG) found that a lack of communication between actors and the population was a major factor in causing negative perceptions of development projects.

The Norwegian PRT has attempted to address some of the concerns expressed above by clearly delineating civilian and military functions. The results have been positive when juxtaposed against reactions to other PRTs. In the Feinstein Center study of Faryab province the general reaction towards the PRT was relatively positive. While the population is aware of the presence of the Norwegian PRT, and the fact that they are a major donor for the region, the perception of the team is generally positive.¹⁵⁹ Many PRTs in other provinces are seen as a liability that can possibly bring more violence to the region. In the case of the Norwegian PRT, it appears in some instances that rather than seeing them as the reason for insecurity, some respondents equate them with providing aid. One villager responded, “We are happy with the Norwegian PRT, although they cannot guarantee security in the whole

¹⁵⁹ Geert Gompelman, p. 36

province because they don't know the area. But they do provide a lot of aid."¹⁶⁰ The analysis and positive reviews of the Norwegian PRTs seems somewhat to support the arguments against aid distribution through the military. Receivers of aid are aware of the intentions of aid distribution and channeling it through the military apparatus seems to give it a negative perception. By utilizing GoIRA institutions, the Afghan people are empowered and the Norwegian PRTs are able to make a difference without being viewed as an entity working to achieve military objectives

Aga Khan Development Network

As opposed to aid distributed through the military, many NGOs in Afghanistan have been operating in Afghanistan and distributing aid for an extended period of time and in turn have developed relationships with the communities in which they work.

The Aga Khan Development Network is a prime example of an organization that has long-term ties within communities and has in turn utilized these ties to promote meaningful and sustainable development. Furthermore, the cultural ties that the organization shares with the communities they work in have further created trust that makes legitimacy possible. For all people, an understanding of their needs comes not merely from an influx of money. Rather, an understanding of cultural context and customs when implementing development projects is as important and a much more effective way of conveying sincerity and winning the hearts and minds of a population.

The Aga Khan Development Network, founded and chaired by Aga Khan, who is the leader and 49th hereditary Imam of the Shia Ismaili Muslims and has

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 39.

worked in this capacity for over 50 years.¹⁶¹ While the network is a non-denominational organization, it does follow the ethical principles of Islam, “...particularly consultation, solidarity with those less fortunate, self reliance and human dignity...”¹⁶² In many ways this is important to its success in that the ISAF is seen as occupiers or having ulterior motives for being in the country and not being Muslim. In the words of a tribal leader, “It would be a bit difficult for the PRT or the military to achieve winning hearts and minds because people still look at them suspiciously as foreigners. It would be good if Islamic countries replaced them and started talking to the Taliban.”¹⁶³ This demonstrates the negative feelings towards ISAF that still persist today and calls into question the notion that by simply providing aid, the population will support you. In reality, the population is aware of some parts of the ISAF mission, while at the same time misinformed by the Taliban propaganda about others. By utilizing as many GoIRA institutions, Muslim NGOs or independent NGOs, the insurgency has a more difficult time convincing civilians that the ISAF is benefiting from occupation or programs do not have their best interests at heart.

The Aga Khan Development Network also has built a relationship with communities it has worked in over time. The group began work in Afghanistan in 1995, distributing Humanitarian aid in the northeast of the country and has developed trust within communities from this relationship built through the years.¹⁶⁴ Today they are involved in social, cultural and economic development throughout the country and currently act as a facilitating partner in the GoIRA NSP program and also in promoting small business enterprise in the Afghan community.

¹⁶¹ Aga Khan Development Network “Press Centre Frequent Questions” accessed April 12 at <http://www.akdn.org/faq.asp>.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*

¹⁶³ Sippi Azarbaijani-Moghaddam, et al., p. 26.

¹⁶⁴ Aga Khan Development Network, www.akdn.org/publications/akdn_afghanistan.pdf

As an FP for the NSP the Aga Khan is an ideal partner because of its previous experience with communities in Afghanistan and affiliation with Islam.

It is in its role as an FP that the organization is able to use its knowledge of the community in order to more adequately facilitate development projects. In testimony before the Wartime Contracting Commission, Anne C. Richard of the International Rescue Committee testified to the importance of the relationship and genuine partnership between communities and facilitating partners. In the Afghan NSP program the FPs are NGOs as opposed to outside contractors.

NGOs have in-depth knowledge of the communities we serve. We often arrive in these countries before we are awarded grants and stay when that grant is over. Because of our long-term approach, our staff has extensive knowledge of the communities in which we work. This knowledge is built over years of earning trust, ensuring community involvement in decision making, and promoting a greater sense of ownership.¹⁶⁵

In contrast, private contractors carry out many of the projects developed through aid distributed by the US military, without ties to the community. While the NGO FPs are paid a fee for their work, because as NGOs they often times promote social causes they have the ability to donate their own funds to causes they feel are worthy. In the case of the Aga Khan Development Network, during a project to bring electricity to the Uland and Khushpak villages, the price of the project cost more than the grant that the villager had received. However, the Aga Khan Development Network was able to supplement the rest of the project with additional funds of \$13,000.¹⁶⁶ With outside contractors as facilitating partners for these projects, the extra money necessary to

¹⁶⁵ Anne C. Richard. "Genuine Partnership: Building Strong Foundations for Afghanistan's Future," Testimony before the Wartime Contracting Commission, April 11, 2011, accessed via http://www.wartimecontracting.gov/docs/hearing2011-04-11_testimony-Richard.pdf, p. 4.

¹⁶⁶ Ben Arnoldy. "Afghanistan War: Successful Foreign Assistance lets Afghans Pick their Project," *Christian Science Monitor*, July 28, 2010, accessed April 13 at <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2010/0728/Afghanistan-war-Successful-foreign-assistance-lets-Afghans-pick-their-project>.

continue the project would not have been available. Furthermore, outside contractors have little vested interest in the community besides getting paid for the project.

Oxfam in Iraq

As the debate continues as to what kind of aid should be distributed and how, Oxfam has argued since the beginning of the war that the focus on development projects to win hearts and minds of the population in COIN is the wrong tactic. As Iraqis have struggled with humanitarian crises the differences between the amount of humanitarian and development assistance given has been significant. Table 3.1 shows the decrease in humanitarian assistance from more than \$862 million in 2003 all the way to \$95 million in 2006. This is in comparison \$1.2 billion in development aid in 2003, which then increased to \$18 billion in 2006.¹⁶⁷ As the security situation has stabilized relatively, the amount of humanitarian aid has decreased, but the gulf between humanitarian and development aid still exists as humanitarian crises persist. In 2009 Iraq received \$497 million dollars in humanitarian aid compared to \$2.9 billion in development aid.¹⁶⁸

Table 4.2 Emergency Humanitarian Assistance and ODA to Iraq from DAC donors 2003-2006 (\$millions)

	2003	2004	2005	2006
Emergency Humanitarian assistance from DAC donors	862.48	875.09	453.43	95
Assistance for Development Only	1,232.50	3,518.73	20,948.64	18,010.10

Source: Mary Kirkbride, Michael Bailey, Manal Omar, p. 24.

Additionally, the formation of the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) by the US congress is intended to provide funds to commanders in need of

¹⁶⁷ Mary Kirkbride, Michael Bailey, Manal Omar. “Rising to the Humanitarian Challenge in Iraq,” *Oxfam International*, Briefing Paper 105, July 2007, p. 24.

¹⁶⁸ Global Humanitarian Assistance, “Iraq: Global Humanitarian Assistance” accessed April 28, 2011 at <http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/countryprofile/iraq>.

urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction needs. Congress has consequently provided funds of \$854 million in 2005 and \$500 million in 2006 and 2007.¹⁶⁹ While this shows the commitment of the US military to provide humanitarian aid, it is also bound to draw criticism from aid workers as to what are the intentions of the military implementing development projects in regions that are still dealing with humanitarian crises, in what some would argue is a case of putting the cart before the horse. Defense secretary Robert Gates hoped for the US government to permanently increase the military's overall capabilities in "long-term reconstruction, development and governance."¹⁷⁰ What does this mean for the future of humanitarian principles? Is the government and military, in distributing aid, focusing too much on meeting political goals as opposed to meeting the basic needs of those experiencing humanitarian crises? While political calculations are always a factor in aid distribution, many organizations see the military further expanding their role, especially under the pretense of COIN, as further threatening aid workers and their ability to deliver effective aid.¹⁷¹

Oxfam has argued that under international law, the Iraqi people have a right to assistance and protection based on traditional humanitarian principles of aid distribution, but in the Coalition forces' efforts to win hearts and minds, immediate humanitarian needs are being neglected in favor of development projects and political goals. Two years after the start of the Iraq war the World Food Program in Iraq released a study that showed the malnutrition rate in Iraq to be 26% of the

¹⁶⁹ Nina M. Serafino. "The Department of Defense Role in Foreign Assistance: Background, Major Issues, and Options for Congress," *Congressional Research Service*, December 9, 2008, p. 7.

¹⁷⁰ Nina Serafino, p. 5.

¹⁷¹ Matt Waldman. "Falling Short: Aid Effectiveness in Afghanistan," ACBAR Advocacy Series, March 2008, p. 13.

population.¹⁷² This is evidence of a major humanitarian crisis, yet, as illustrated in table 3.2, humanitarian aid continued to decrease from 2003 to 2006 in favor of development assistance. Furthermore, there needs to be more of a focus on providing humanitarian aid without discrimination because civilians suffer "...from a denial of fundamental human rights in the form of chronic poverty, malnutrition, illness, lack of access to basic services, and destruction of homes, vital facilities, and infrastructure, as well as injury and death."¹⁷³ This disturbing situation of extreme violence has resulted from, in large part, a myriad of problems related to insurgents, sectarian violence and general power struggles.

After the beginning of the war in Iraq the security situation was so unstable that many organizations were not able to reach communities in need and deliver assistance in non-combat zones. Furthermore, they feared that the US government would use the opportunity to distribute humanitarian aid as a chance to portray themselves as liberators, violating the rules of impartiality and neutrality.¹⁷⁴ In a briefing paper Oxfam International argues that civilian actors are the most qualified to administer humanitarian aid whenever possible. Citing the 2001 Draft Oslo Guidelines, the authors say that it "...establishes that military and civilian-defense capabilities are a means of last resort in responding to the needs of civilians in an emergency."¹⁷⁵ Furthermore, the paper argues that there needs to be less of a focus on Quick Impact Projects and more of a focus on cost effective aid administered by UN aid agencies and other organizations.¹⁷⁶ Without the proper skill sets and qualified

¹⁷² United Nations World Food Program, Iraq Country Office, "Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis in Iraq," February 13, 2008 accessed at <http://reliefweb.int/node/257120>, p. 17.

¹⁷³ Mary Kirkbride, Michael Bailey, Manal Omar, p. 8.

¹⁷⁴ Peter Ford. "Humanitarian aid to Iraq Proves One of the Wars Biggest Obstacles," *Christian Science Monitor*, March 28, 2003, via <http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0328/p09s01-woiq.html>.

¹⁷⁵ Cara Thanassi. "Iraq: Humanitarian- Military Relations," *Oxfam International*, Briefing Paper 41, March 2003, p. 6

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 6-7.

administrators, aid is bound to be spent inefficiently and cause resentment and confusion about who is an aid worker, and consequently cause more suffering within the population.

The continued insecurity within Iraq has resulted in the exodus of international NGOs from the country because of an inability to guarantee the safety of employees. This has been compounded by many NGO's adherence to traditional humanitarian principles and refusal to accept funds from countries involved in the war out of fear of being perceived as impartial.¹⁷⁷ Therefore, they argue that the military must maintain its neutrality and role as provider of security.

In spite of all of the factors that have limited, on many levels, NGOs' ability to function within the country, it has not fully diminished their ability to still provide some assistance that adheres to humanitarian principles and is less influenced by COIN objectives. Currently, while not operating in Iraq because of security concerns, Oxfam International operates from offices in Jordan by partnering with Iraqi organizations still functioning within the country. So bad was the security situation beginning in 2003 that the organization has been forced to hide their affiliation with Iraqi NGOs out of fear for the Iraqis' safety.¹⁷⁸ In July 2007 Oxfam argued for a return to traditional humanitarian principles, highlighting some of the NGOs they anonymously worked with and the work that they had achieved. These included organizations that provided healthcare to more than 100,000 Iraqis, the pre-positioning of medical supplies in potential conflict zones and food and water to internally displaced people throughout the country, even with limited funds.¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁷ Mary Kirkbride, Michael Bailey, Manal Omar, p. 27

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid*, p. 23.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid*, p. 5.

Oxfam has also been able to provide assistance in Iraq by serving on the NGO coordinating committee for Iraq.¹⁸⁰

Limits placed on Oxfam are evident when viewing their work in comparison to their activities in other regions. Oxfam and other organizations have been excluded from participation in Iraq for reasons including their commitments to certain standards of operation and security concerns. As COIN continues, NGOs have been forced to adapt to the environment and in many cases this has meant taking a lesser public role. Recent studies identified what was described as a toxic environment for aid workers.¹⁸¹ What was left of a visible aid and humanitarian mission in 2007 was one largely connected to the military and carried with it a lot of baggage regarding politics and neutrality. This highlights the need for better communication or coordination in some fashion between NGOs and the military. Coalition military forces continue to provide humanitarian aid, yet insecurity persists in many regions of the country. Differences in the amount of funding for development projects versus humanitarian related projects, combined with the continuing human security threats to the Iraqi population are significant and deserve more attention.

As the military continues to develop their capacity to provide development and humanitarian aid, the recognition of the importance of civilian actors must be kept at the center of the debate. Former Secretary of State Robert Gates highlighted this when he pointed out that aid distributed by the military “is no replacement for civilian involvement and expertise.”¹⁸² However, this will require dialogue between both sides and a common understanding of the roles of each party.

¹⁸⁰ Oxfam, “Oxfam’s Work in Iraq in Depth,” accessed April 16, 2011 at <http://www.oxfam.org.uk/resources/countries/iraq.html>

¹⁸¹ Greg Hansen. “Iraq More Challenges Ahead for a Fractured Humanitarian Enterprise,” *Feinstein International Center*, Briefing Paper, December 2008, p. 3.

¹⁸² Nina M. Serafino. p. 4

Chapter 5 Conclusion

The attacks of September 11, 2001 changed the paradigm that the world operated in and the repercussions from this event still resonate today. Stemming from those attacks, the US has justified engagement in two wars, costing billions of dollars and countless soldier and civilian lives on both sides. According to a 2011 report, since the 9/11 attacks, the United States has spent \$806 billion in Iraq, \$444 billion in Afghanistan, \$29 billion in enhanced base security and \$5 billion in unallocated funds, for a total of \$1.283 trillion.¹⁸³ The global financial crisis of 2008 has further compounded the mounting debt that the US has accrued to the point of threatening its financial future and those countries dependent on trade with the US. Ironically, as America battles terrorism, insurgencies and financial meltdowns, in a speech on Aljazeera TV, Osama Bin Laden stated that one of the tactics of al Qaida was “continuing this policy in bleeding America to the point of bankruptcy.”¹⁸⁴ With the US debt at \$14 trillion in 2011 and the country forced to make serious decisions about its economic future, all forms of spending should be scrutinized for effectiveness and foreign aid will be held to the same standard.

I hypothesized that the traditional relationship between aid workers and the military in the distribution of foreign aid in COIN operations is inadequate and dysfunctional. Furthermore, I argued that while both parties are important vehicles in the distribution of aid, because of the lack of coordination between them, COIN has been much less effective. Therefore, my thesis studied the ways in which aid is distributed by aid workers and the military, in order to uncover evidence to support

¹⁸³ Amy Belasco. “The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11,” *Congressional Research Service*, March 29, 2011, p. 1.

¹⁸⁴ Osama Bin Laden. “Speech to the American People,” *Conflict After the Cold War*, 3rd edition, ed. Richard K. Betts, New York: Pearson, Longman, 2008, p. 543.

my thesis and draw conclusions as to what are the best practices in aid distribution, when dealing with insurgencies and winning hearts and minds.

However, my research has revealed evidence that does not fully support my hypothesis. Debate around the use of foreign aid in COIN has centered on whether it violates humanitarian principles of impartiality and neutrality. In the past NGO coordination with the government or military has largely been discouraged and been considered a conflict of interest in their ability to deliver aid effectively. However, this conflict of interest seems to be more of a grey area than it initially appears and organizations seem to have drawn different distinctions as to what this actually means. Many NGOs that strive to maintain impartiality are funded and entirely independent of any government programs. However, others still receive funds from government organizations like USAID and are said to be impartial. The fact is that offices like USAID are part of the government; they fund militaries, and are to some degree political because of their affiliation. The attempt to distinguish between governments and the militaries they fund seems to represent a problem for NGOs considering the obvious relationship between them. Again, those organizations that work to promote programs like the NSP are involved in initiatives that are inherently political in their goals of creating a stronger civil society that is affiliated with the GoIRA. Furthermore, many NGOs are working to promote institutions and ideals that go against the very core ideals of the insurgent groups. This then begs the question of whether their claims of impartiality and neutrality are legitimate. This is important as the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq continue into their tenth year and the struggle to defeat the insurgents appears in many respects to be making little headway.

This is not to say that there are not degrees of impartiality that can be identified when distributing aid. It is clear that embedding civilians within PRTs is not an ideal model because of the impression that it gives to civilians of the military being a chief provider of aid. Additionally, the problem of the blurring of identities of aid workers and soldiers makes it more difficult for civilians to make the distinction between their roles. In Afghanistan and Iraq this has created considerable problems as PRT associated projects have become targets for insurgents, based on military and political associations.

Unfortunately, in certain areas in which COIN is being carried out, insecurity is extremely high and the military is the only possible provider of aid available. In these situations alone the PRTs stand to serve a useful function in providing basic humanitarian aid, with the help of aid workers, for suffering civilians. As was shown in the earlier research, the military's capacity to deliver development aid has not reached a level in which effective projects can be achieved through the PRTs in highly insecure regions. Instead, the focus on quick impact projects to win hearts and minds has created resentment among the population because of the poor work of contractors with no permanent stake in the region and a lack of quality control related to projects.

Part of the reason that PRTs have experienced failure is related to the problems that are encountered when trying to achieve development objectives in insecure areas. Because of their focus on security, soldiers are not able to fully utilize the skills of civilian aid workers and are forced to pick and choose the advice that works in the given security situation. This makes for incomplete and inefficient programs and implementation. By focusing on gaining security and providing humanitarian aid the military will be more able to competently coordinate with the aid community in tasks

that it has trained for and performed well in the past. Furthermore, the military and aid workers projects will be less of a target because they are focusing on less high profile projects. Quick impact projects can be of short-term benefit, but if implemented poorly, they stand to impede the COIN objective of winning hearts and minds.

In areas that are more secure, civil/military separation stands to serve the population best and achieve COIN objectives. The Norwegian model demonstrates how the separation of functions best delineates the relationship between civilians, aid workers and military. Furthermore, civilian aid workers are the most qualified to implement projects by helping to promoting community driven development that allows civilians to choose projects that meet their needs. It is most important for aid workers to encourage ownership of projects in the community by channeling them through government institutions. Ownership encourages citizens to defend projects from insurgent attacks in the future and helps the government gain legitimacy as catalysts of change.

In response to the failure of development aid in the past, recipient countries have advocated for reforms in aid disbursement in post-conflict and fragile states that can be applied to both Iraq and Afghanistan. In December 2010, on the sidelines of the OECD International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding in Dili, Timor-Leste, conflict affected and fragile states met to share lessons learned in an attempt to decide the future of development in their countries. Out of this meeting the g7+ (Afghanistan is a member) was formed, the Dili Declaration was drafted, and the g7+ statement was agreed upon, which called members to “reduce poverty, deter conflicts

and provide better conditions for our people.”¹⁸⁵ Subsequent work of the g7+ has resulted in what is known as the “New Deal”, which was adopted by the international community at the Fourth High Level on Aid Effectiveness in Busan South Korea in November 2011.

Currently, as can be seen by the different methods of engagement by different country’s PRTs, there is a lack of coordination on the part of the international community in their efforts to defeat the insurgencies using foreign aid. The New Deal builds on experiences of fragile states to guide donor engagement in fragile states. Central to the New Deal is a focus on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs), that call for, among other things, legitimate politics that “foster inclusive political settlements and conflict resolution” and security.¹⁸⁶ Additionally, the new deal calls for countries to “FOCUS on new ways of engaging, to support inclusive country-led and country-owned transitions out of fragility...” and “TRUST by providing aid and managing resources more effectively and aligning these resources for results.”¹⁸⁷ The New Deal principles, most importantly country led development, will undercut the insurgents claims of international interference and will allow the aid community to have more separation from the military. While security in certain regions is still a major issue, the New Deal’s focus on peacebuilding and statebuilding allow for fragile states like Iraq and Afghanistan to have the necessary institutions to counter the insurgencies arguments against ineffective government and gain legitimacy.

As the US winds down its operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, defeat of insurgents is perhaps the most important objective to an overall successful mission. Not only will failure damage American prestige, but it could also stand to embolden

¹⁸⁵ g7+, “g7+ Statement,” Dili, Timor-Leste, April 10, 2010 accessed at <http://www.g7plus.org/news-articles/category/g7-statement>, p. 1.

¹⁸⁶ International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, “The New Deal,” Busan, South Korea, November 30, 2011, accessed at <http://www.g7plus.org/new-deal-document/>.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 2-3.

insurgencies and terrorist networks throughout the region. As can be seen in Iraq after the recent troop withdrawals, weak state institutions and renewed sectarian violence are threatening the future of the entire country.¹⁸⁸ The Norwegian PRTs separating military and aid workers and support of local governance has reaped benefits for the entire community, which appears to be sustainable and equitable. By maintaining humanitarian space for aid workers, continuing the traditional separation between civilians and the military, except in only the most insecure situations, and adopting the principles of the New Deal, the COIN operation stands to achieve its primary goals.

¹⁸⁸ Sam Dagher, "Iraq Crisis Grows With New Threat," Wall Street Journal Online, December 27, 2011, accessed at <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204296804577122264202398078.html>.

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