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Children's Gender and Investments from Nonresident Fathers

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Abstract: Evidence suggests that fathers have stronger ties to sons than daughters, which may result in differential investments in their children. This paper investigated whether girls' gender restricts their access to fathers' contributions if they do not live together. The data used were the 1994-2008 March/April Match Current Population Survey Child Support Supplements, a large, nationally representative sample which identifies child support eligible mothers of all marital statuses and collects information on nonresident fathers' financial and social investments in their children. Results for court-mediated outcomes such as the existence and amounts of child support orders showed that courts do not allocate child support differentially by child gender. Small but suggestive effects of child gender were found on fathers' post-dissolution investments, but these effects disadvantaged boys rather than girls.

Keywords: gender, child support, union dissolution, child well-being, father involvement

Of the 73.6 million children in the United States in 2015, 26.8% lived with a single parent (U.S. Census Bureau 2015a); and it is estimated that half of all American children will spend time in single parent families at some point prior to age 16 (Heuveline et al. 2003). Given that the vast majority of these children live with their mothers and that single mother families are much more likely to be poor than married couple families and single father families (U.S. Census Bureau 2015a), the allocation and receipt of child support for children of nonresident fathers is an important topic for policy makers, researchers, and practitioners. In 2015 only about 32% of mothers whose children's fathers were nonresident received any child support payment (Grall 2018, Table 2). Researchers are also concerned with the continued participation of nonresident fathers in their children's lives, because it is largely accepted that, after the dissolution of the parents' union (whether marriage, cohabitation, or non-coresidential), a high-quality relationship with the father is most often beneficial to children (e.g., Carlson and McLanahan 2004; Garasky and Stewart 2007; Neymotin 2014).

Many studies of child support outcomes have focused on how the characteristics of the parents or the child support enforcement environment have affected the likelihood of child support payment and receipt.¹ More recent work has made inquiry into how the characteristics of the children themselves may affect the child support they receive. One important attribute of children that affects how they are treated both by their parents and by society is gender. Research has produced findings that child gender influences families in a surprising number of dimensions, including paternal labor supply, fertility, time spent with children, marital satisfaction, and the formation and dissolution of parental unions.² Taken together, the findings have indicated that boys are advantaged in gender-influenced outcomes.

Seminal work by Beller and Graham (1993) investigated determinants of child support receipt

¹ Some examples are Aizer and McLanahan 2006; Allen et al. 2011; Beller and Graham 1993; Case et al. 2003; Freeman and Waldfogel 2001; Hanson et al. 1996; Smock and Manning 1997; Sorensen and Hill 2004. "Child support enforcement environment" refers broadly to the laws in place in a given city, state, or region, the resources allocated to enforce them (Rich et al. 2007), judicial and individual attitudes toward the provision of child support, and other factors such as the availability of off-the-books employment, which impedes wage withholding as a mechanism for child support collection (Kurz 1995; Rich et al. 2007).

² Lundberg (2005) and Raley and Bianchi (2006) provide reviews.

using the first four rounds (1979, 1982, 1984, and 1986) of the March/April Match Current Population Survey (CPS) Child Support Supplement (CSS) from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (CPS-CSS), a survey with information not commonly available in other child support-related datasets, such as whether child support has been awarded and levels of awards (Case et al. 2003). The CPS-CSS also collected information for mothers of all marital statuses – divorced, remarried, separated, and never-married - also rarely available in one dataset.³ The current study utilized eight rounds of the survey (1994 – 2008). For purposes of comparability, it described how child support outcomes and the characteristics of child-support eligible women have changed relative to the profile found by Beller and Graham (1993).⁴ In addition, this investigation extended the research into the relationship of child characteristics to child support outcomes, focusing on child gender, specifically, whether the oldest child is a boy.

I examined the effects of child gender on outcomes influenced by the legal system: existence and amount of child support awards and the incidence of joint physical and joint legal custody arrangements; and on measures of father involvement: contact, receipt of informal and financial support, and amounts received. Results for court-influenced outcomes suggested that courts do not allocate child support differentially by child gender. Small but suggestive effects of child gender on post-dissolution investments by fathers were found, but these effects disadvantaged boys rather than girls.

Theoretical Framework and Related Literature

Theoretical Framework for Investments in Children from Nonresidential Fathers

Gary Becker (1960) characterized the economic framework governing childbearing and childrearing as investments of time, effort, and money that parents make in their children, with the return being the utility (or “psychic income”) that children impart to parents. The determinants of these parental investments have been an important area of study because childhood circumstances influence both

³ Married women with child-support eligible children in the CPS-CSS data are referred to as remarried mothers in this paper for parsimony, although we cannot observe whether the previous parental union was marriage, cohabitation, or not coresidential.

⁴ The CSS asks questions in April of the survey year about events of the previous year. This paper consistently refers to the data by the year the survey was fielded, but it should be remembered that the responses reported refer to the previous year.

children's current well-being and their economic outcomes in adult life (e.g., Case et al. 2005; Garces et al. 2002).

It has been well-documented that the disruption of the parental union, whether marriage, cohabitation, or non-coresidential, changes these parental investments (e.g., Beller and Graham 1993; McLanahan and Sandefur 1994). A number of economic factors have contributed. Dissolving a union incurs transaction costs for relocating family members and developing new routines and networks (Weiss and Willis 1985). Divorcing and separating couples lose *economies of scale* (Nelson 1988), the *increased production resulting from specialization* (Becker 1973), and the consumption of *household public goods* (Weiss 1997); the same is true, to varying degrees, for cohabitators and couples whose union was not coresidential. Unsurprisingly, per person net wealth has been lower for divorced, separated, cohabitating, never married, or widowed individuals relative to the married (Wilmoth and Koso 2002; Zagorsky 2005).

However, the low amounts of child support paid on both the intensive and extensive margins cannot be attributed solely to the post-dissolution decline in total family resources. The decline in living standards has been disproportionately greater for mothers and children relative to fathers (e.g., Daniels et al. 2006; Kreider and Fields 2002). Failure to pay has been correlated with fathers' unemployment and low income (e.g., Ha et al. 2008),⁵ but there were plenty of financially able fathers who did not pay their obligation (Garfinkel and Oellerich 1989; Hill 1992).

Economic theories of determinants of child support payments (Beller and Graham 1993; Weiss and Willis 1985, 1993) have attributed the disparity between amount owed and amount paid to the father's inability to monitor and control how his contributions are spent;⁶ mothers may or may not have been dedicating all of the money to child-specific goods. This principal-agent problem has led to suboptimal investments in children (Weiss and Willis 1993).

Another economic factor has been that when the father exits the household, the value of the child

⁵ Note, the mothers of these fathers' children have been even more disadvantaged than the fathers, because they must both parent and work, and because women have been paid less than men (Cancian et al. 2011).

⁶ Abundant qualitative evidence has supported this notion, e.g., Edin et al. (2009).

as a consumption good (Becker 1960) has likely declined; the marginal utility of expenditure on the child was reduced if the father was not present. This notion is consistent with evidence showing that for nonresident fathers who form new families, living with new biological children has been associated with reduced child support payments to their noncustodial children (Manning and Smock 2000). Additionally, diminished contact post-dissolution may have reduced the father's altruism toward the child (Becker and Murphy 1988).

Related Literature

Economists' study of investments from nonresidential fathers has overlapped broadly with the inquiry from other disciplines into nonresidential father involvement. Measures of investment and involvement have ranged from the material – monetary and in-kind child support – to the nonmaterial – father-child contact, and the quality of the father-child relationship, including a warm and authoritative parenting style (cf. Hofferth et al. 2010). It has been widely, although not universally, accepted that greater father involvement improves outcomes for most children, with the quality of the relationship with the father considered to be more salient than simple measures of contact (Amato et al. 2009; Hawkins et al. 2007; Hofferth and Pinzon 2011).⁷ A large body of literature has examined determinants of receiving child support awards, the amounts awarded, whether mandated child support funds were received by mothers, and the amounts received (e.g., citations in footnote 1). Understanding the provision of child support is important in its own right because it influences child well-being; it has also been found to be correlated with contact and relationship quality (e.g. Seltzer 2000, Stewart 2003).

Beller and Graham (1985; 1993, p. 70; and Graham and Beller 2002) categorized the empirical determinants of child support awards and receipt into: (a) the costs and benefits to mothers of obtaining support, (b) the father's ability and desire to provide support, and (c) the legal environment prevailing at the time of union disruption (Beller and Graham 1986). More recently, the literature has turned attention to the question of reverse causality, examining how the characteristics of the children themselves may

⁷ Contact can be beneficial in a father-child relationship, but detrimental if there are negative interactions with the child or conflict between the parents (e.g., Hofferth et al. 2010).

affect the child support they receive (“child effects”), in addition to the effects on child well-being resulting from father’s provision of support (“father effects”) (e.g., Hawkins et al. 2007, Nepomnyaschy et al. 2014).⁸

A few early articles investigated the effect of child gender on outcomes which occur subsequent to the dissolution of the parental union, such as custody and living arrangements, receipt of child support payments and in-kind support, and contact with nonresidential fathers (e.g., Meyer and Garasky 1993; Mott 1994; Paasch and Teachman 1991; Seltzer 1991a). Interest has continued to this day (e.g., Meyer et al. 2017; Mitchell et al. 2009) but many questions have remained unresolved, in part because of differences in data, empirical specifications, inconsistent availability of control variables, and measures of investment.

Numerous studies have found effects of child gender on children’s living arrangements. Fathers were more likely to be present in the homes of elementary school aged children if the child was male (Mott 1994), and women with sons were more likely than women with daughters to be married at any point in time (Teachman and Schollaert 1989). Although effects were not large, the presence of sons decreased the probability of divorce (e.g., Dahl and Moretti 2008; Morgan et al. 1988; Spanier and Glick 1981); and increased the likelihood that fathers would have custody of a child following divorce (Dahl and Moretti 2008). Regarding unmarried couples, evidence indicated that a nonmarital birth was more likely followed by marriage, and marriage occurred more quickly, if the child was a son (Dahl and Moretti 2008; Lundberg and Rose 2003). Boys were significantly more likely than girls to live in a two-married-parent home rather than a single mother home (Mammen 2008). Some of these authors and a large number of other studies have suggested that sons create a stronger sense of attachment and obligation in fathers that keeps them in unions, perhaps as a result of deeper bonding and communication between parents and same-sex children (e.g., Marsiglio 1991).

⁸ The father effects and child effects terminology originated in the psychology literature (e.g., Bell and Chapman 1986, Russell and Russell 1992). An early study of child effects in the child support literature was Aughinbaugh (2001), who found that higher scores on children’s achievement tests increased the likelihood of receiving child support and the amount received.

To the extent that they live disproportionately with single mothers, girls have fared worse on average than boys, due to the high poverty rates of these families (U.S. Census Bureau 2015a). Have girls also been disadvantaged in contributions and involvement from nonresidential fathers? A number of studies have found small effects of gender in a surprising direction: Boys rather than girls were disadvantaged in the realm of post-dissolution father involvement (Mammen 2008; Paasch and Teachman 1991; Seltzer 1991a). Paasch and Teachman (1991) proposed that negative results for boys could stem from negative selection. Because boys are thought to need their fathers' presence as a male role model, among fathers of boys, only the more "low-investing" fathers are willing to end their union with the mother. On the other hand, among fathers of girls, some high-investing fathers will exit their parental union along with the low-investors, because the high-investing fathers believe it is not necessary to reside full-time with their daughters to continue being a good father. Thus the pool of nonresidential fathers of daughters is on average of higher quality than the negatively selected pool of nonresidential fathers of sons; this is one proposed explanation for why fathers of girls are more likely to pay child support and pay higher amounts on average.

Current Study

The current study contributes to the literature by further investigating the connection between the determinants of child support outcomes, and the effects of child gender on child well-being. This analysis investigated child gender effects on child support outcomes using the CPS-CSS, a large, nationally representative dataset, 1994 to 2008, which has information on the existence and amounts of child support awards, and which includes mothers of all marital statuses. Two important questions, detailed below, were examined.

First, does gender of the child influence the outcomes that are mediated by the courts: award rates and amounts of awards, and custody arrangements? The existence of a child support award and the amount of the award have been significant determinants of child support receipt and therefore of children's financial status (e.g., Beller and Graham 1993; Grall 2018). While a priori it is not expected that child gender will affect court mediated outcomes, it is important to confirm this baseline in any study

of child gender effects on child support.

Second, does gender of the child affect investments controlled more directly by nonresident fathers: contact, and the amounts and type, formal or informal, of support that are actually contributed? Based on the notion of negative selection into the nonresident fathers group and the empirical findings discussed earlier, the hypothesis is that oldest child is boy will be negatively correlated with the measures of direct father investment. The findings are important because the research consensus has been that most children benefit from maintaining contact with a nonresidential father, especially if the quality of the relationship is high (e.g., Carlson and McLanahan 2004; Garasky and Stewart 2007; Neymotin 2014); and that formal and informal child support confer both material and nonmaterial benefits to children (Garasky et al. 2010; Hofferth et al. 2010; Knox 1996; Nepomnyaschy 2007).

Data, Measures and Methods

Analysis Sample

The CPS-CSS has provided detailed demographic and family structure information on all household members, as well as information on which children had a parent living outside of the household, and who therefore may have been eligible for child support (CPS 2010). The CPS is a nationally representative sample of the noninstitutionalized population which is the primary source of labor force statistics in the U.S. The basic questionnaire has been fielded monthly with supplementary topical question modules. The March supplement, also known as the Annual Demographic file, collects additional demographic and economic information. The April supplement, first released in 1979 and fielded biannually since 1982, has asked about child support eligibility of household members with resident children aged less than 21 whose other parent lives elsewhere.⁹ Households responding to the March and April supplements were then matched to create the CPS-CSS files. The details and strengths of the data are further described in the Appendix.

⁹ Initially the April supplement was directed only towards mothers; fathers were added in the 1992 survey (Scoon-Rogers and Lester 1995).

The CPS-CSS was significantly expanded and re-organized prior to the 1994 survey, so that precise comparisons were not possible between the 1994 forward data and the earlier years (Grall 2018). Therefore the 1994 – 2008 surveys were utilized, and pooled for a larger sample size, comprised of 12,941 child-support eligible mothers aged 18-40, with children under the age of 12. Because very few mothers have a gap of greater than five years between their first and second children (e.g., Dahl and Moretti 2008), the children's age restriction was imposed in order to rule out most women whose older children lived away from the household and so were not recorded in the data. This was important for accurately measuring the right-hand side variable of interest, the gender of the oldest child.

Measures

Dependent variables.

There were two types of dependent variables: (a) binary variables which take value one if the mother reported this characteristic, and zero if not; and (b) continuous monetary variables, denominated in real 2019 U.S. dollars.

Court-mediated outcomes.

- Had child support award from the court – binary.
- Amount of child support mother was owed last year, for the subsample of women who had a child support order (CSO) with payment due – continuous. In this paper the terms amount owed and amount due have been used interchangeably.
- Had joint physical custody with the father – binary.
- Had joint legal custody with the father – binary.

Direct father investments.

- The father had any contact with the child in the last year – binary.
- The father provided any informal or in-kind support last year – binary: The survey question asked whether the father gave the child(ren) any birthday, holiday, or other gifts, provided clothes or food, or paid for child care, summer camp, or any medical expenses.
- Received any child support last year, for the subsample of women who had a child support order

with payment due – binary.

- Amount of child support mother received last year, for the subsample of women who had a child support order with payment due– continuous.

Independent variables.

This study has improved upon some of the previous studies of child gender effects on post-dissolution investments by using an indicator for whether the oldest child is a boy as the measure of child gender composition in the family. Gender composition has been endogenous: It has affected parents' coresidence with their children, and it has also affected fertility (e.g., Angrist and Evans 1998; Dahl and Moretti 2008). However, the gender of a couple's first child has been widely considered in the literature to be exogenous, if not conditioned on parental partnership status (e.g., Dahl and Moretti 2008, Lundberg 2005).¹⁰

For the remarried mothers, gender was calculated for her child-support eligible children, thus excluding children with her current husband. Mother attributes included to control for socioeconomic status were age, education, race, the number of adult men and women in her household, and indicators for metropolitan statistical area (MSA) status. Child characteristics included were whether the father lived in the same state, the number of children and the ages of the youngest and oldest children. State-year fixed effects controlled for unmeasured influences on child support variables specific to the state and year that the mother was asked about, such as economic conditions and the child support enforcement environment.

Results

Characteristics of the Sample of Child-Support Eligible Women

Trends in Child Support Measures

Figures 1 and 2 show trends over time in child support outcomes: had child support award, received any child support if had child support order with payment due, amount owed if had CSO with

¹⁰ Because the sample in the current study includes children from mothers of all marital statuses, the results were not biased by selection into marital status by child gender.

payment due, and amount received if had CSO with payment due.¹¹ Figure 1 series A shows for the CPS-CSS sample of child-support eligible women with children aged less than 21, the percent who were awarded child support by the courts, from the first year of the survey in 1979 through 2008. Although the data were not strictly comparable over time, especially prior to 1994, the figures show no dramatic or lasting changes in award rates during this period; the 1979 value is 59.1 and for 2008 it is 56.9. Pertinent to the current investigation, series B shows the award rate for the sample used in this paper, eligible women with children aged less than 12, from 1994 to 2008. Although these award rates were 8 to 13 percentage points lower than those of the entire CPS-CSS sample, the trend was quite similar. Series C and D show for the subset of eligible women who had a CSO with payment due, the proportion who received any payment, for the CPS-CSS sample and the current sample respectively. The series C receipt rates increased from 71.7 % in 1979 to 77.0% in 2008. The receipt rate for the current sample (series D) in 1994 was lower than that of the CPS-CSS sample, but series D was quite close to series C in years 1996 – 2008.

Figure 2 shows trends in dollar amounts (real \$2019) due and received for women with child support orders with payment due. For the CPS-CSS sample the dollar amounts showed greater volatility than the award rates from Figure 1, but the pattern was similar – ups and downs over time but no lasting shifts, and a lower value in 2008 than in 1979. The amount due declined slightly from \$6,637 to \$6,604 (series A), and amount received from \$4,274 to \$4,129 (series C). The current sample showed similar patterns in series B and D, although amounts due and received were lower, perhaps because the younger children in the current sample had lower expenses or had smaller household sizes than the entire CPS-CSS sample.

Sample Summary Statistics

Table 1 presents sample averages, pooled and then separately by the marital status subsamples.

¹¹ Beller and Graham (1993) presented time series for survey years 1979 – 1986. As would be expected, the Beller Graham numbers, although not included in the figures, conformed almost exactly to the corresponding dates in the CPS-CSS series in Figures 1 and 2.

The sample comprised 22% divorced mothers, 16% remarried, 12% separated, and 50% never married. For child support, socioeconomic status, and demographic measures, magnitudes frequently descended monotonically from divorced mothers, to remarried, separated, and then never-married mothers. This held true for had child support award, amount owed if had CSO with payment due, amount received if had CSO with payment due, had joint physical or joint legal custody, age, and percent of each marital subsample which had some college or college plus. All mothers were more likely to have joint legal custody than joint physical custody.¹² The statistics confirmed the research consensus that never-married mothers are younger, less educated, more likely to be Black, and fare worse in child support outcomes than do their ever-married counterparts. Separated mothers resembled never married mothers in a lower likelihood of having a child support award; they resembled divorced mothers in the likelihoods of their children having contact with or receiving informal support from the father in the last year.

Changes Over Time

To illustrate how the characteristics of the analysis sample in Table 1 have changed over time, Table 2 shows the magnitudes of the differences in the means for the 2008 sample less the means for the 1994 sample, and which differences were statistically significant.¹³ As would be expected given the continuing increase in nonmarital births over the sample period (U.S. Census Bureau 2015b), row 1 shows that divorced women were a smaller, and never-married, a larger, proportion of the 2008 sample. Child support outcomes were addressed in rows 2 through 5. As we saw in Figure 1, the award rate (row 2) declined by a statistically significant 5 percentage points, driven by a decline in awards to divorced mothers. The child support receipt rate for women with some payment due (row 3) increased statistically significantly by 8 percentage points, driven by an increase for never-married mothers.

¹² Surprisingly little is known about the prevalence of joint physical and joint legal custody at the national level (Bartfeld 2011); the CSS is unusual in collecting nationally representative information. Earlier national figures showed that about 5% of divorced families had joint physical custody and 20% had joint legal custody (Nord and Zill 1996, Table 1). In the CSS sample in the current study the incidence of both types of custody were higher for divorced mothers, reflecting the increase over time in joint custody arrangements after divorce (Bartfeld 2011, Cancian et al. 2014).

¹³ Tables 5 and 6 in the appendix show averages for the 1994 and 2008 samples respectively. Results for the separated mothers will not be discussed because the sample size is insufficient to estimate credible time trends.

Amounts owed for women with some payment due (row 4) decreased for all mothers and for the subsamples except never-married mothers, although these differences were not significant. There was little change in the average of amounts received for those due some (row 5), but these amounts increased significantly for never-married mothers.

For custody, divorced and never married women showed significant increases in joint physical custody over the time period, driving a significant increase in joint physical custody for the sample as a whole.¹⁴ Never married women showed a significant increase in joint legal custody.¹⁵ There were no significant differences over time for the proportion of mothers with contact with the child or informal support from the father in the past year. The differences for education categories, some significant and some not, showed a similar pattern across marital status subsamples: a decline in the proportion in the lower education categories and an increase in the proportion in the higher education categories, as would be expected. There were some changes in proportions Black and Other Race, which may have been related to changes in the questions about race on the survey over this period of time (Grall 2009).¹⁶

Multivariate Analysis

Empirical Strategy

Multivariate analyses addressed the question of child's gender on post-dissolution outcomes. To allow the effect of child gender to vary by the marital status of the mother, the dichotomous gender variable, oldest is boy, was interacted with indicators for each marital status; m denoted the categories divorced, remarried (where the mother was married to someone other than the child's father), separated, or never married. The main effects of marital status (without interactions) were also entered, with

¹⁴ Cancian et al. (2014) studied the increase in joint physical custody arrangements in Wisconsin through 2008 and concluded that it was largely driven by changes in social norms.

¹⁵ Chen (2015) studied the increasing incidence of joint legal custody for nonmarital children in Wisconsin in the period 1988 – 2009. She concluded that increasing preference for this custody arrangement, encouraged by a policy change that made it presumptive, brought about this result, rather than a change in the demographic composition of never-married parents.

¹⁶ The remaining significant differences were an increase in the average number of children for separated women, a decrease in the presence of never-married women (and the all-women sample) in central-city MSAs, and an increase in the household size of divorced women (and the all-women sample). These characteristics were controlled for in the multivariate analysis.

divorced (and oldest is girl) the omitted category. The empirical specification was

$$C_i = \alpha_0 + \sum_m \beta_m \cdot 1(\text{oldest is boy})_i \cdot 1(\text{Marital} = m) + \sum_{m=1} \lambda_{m-1} \cdot 1(\text{Marital} = m) + x_i' \theta + \sum_{s=1} \eta_{s-1} \cdot 1(\text{state} \cdot \text{year} = s) + \varepsilon_i$$

where i denoted the unit of observation, the mother, and C_i , the dependent variables listed above. α_0 represents the constant term; β_m , the coefficients on the interaction terms of oldest is boy with marital status, $m = 1, 2, 3, 4$ (that is, divorced, remarried, separated and never-married); λ_{m-1} , the coefficients for the main effects of marital status; x_i' , the vector of control variables for mother and child characteristics with θ the corresponding vector of coefficients; η_{s-1} , the coefficients on the state-year fixed effects; and ε_i the error term.

The dichotomous dependent variables were coded as one if the event (“success”) occurs (e.g., child support is awarded), and zero if it does not. These specifications were estimated with logit regression, a binary response model which predicts the probability that an event occurs, as a function of the explanatory variables. The logistic function is nonlinear, so the magnitude of the marginal effect of regressor x_i varies as x_i takes on different values. The logit estimation results were presented as average marginal effects, that is, the marginal effects were calculated using the observed values of the regressors for each observation, then averaged.¹⁷ The interpretation of the average marginal effect is the change in

¹⁷ The variables of interest $\mathbf{x}$ reported in the regressions in the current study were all binary, so the AME for each regressor x_i was calculated as follows: for the first observation in the data, x_i is set to one, all other regressors are at the observed values for this observation, and $P(y = 1|x_i = 1)$ was calculated. Then x_i was set to zero, all other regressors remained at the observed values for this observation, and $P(y = 1|x_i = 0)$ was calculated. The difference $P(y = 1|x_i = 1) - P(y = 1|x_i = 0)$ was the marginal effect for the first observation. This calculation was performed for each observation, and the resulting n marginal effects were averaged to obtain the AME. If $x_i = 1$ represented female and $x_i = 0$, male, the AME gave the estimated difference in $P(y = 1)$ between women and men, controlling for all other variables. In this paper the average marginal effects are referred to as simply the marginal effects. There are a number of ways to evaluate marginal effects for nonlinear binary response models, for which the following terminology has evolved: calculating average marginal effects at observed values of the regressors (AME), marginal effects at the means of the regressors (MEM), or marginal effects at representative values of the regressors (ME). Noted advantages of AMEs were that they use all of the data and the use of observed values of the regressors yields more “realistic” estimates (Bartus 2005; Cameron and Trivedi 2010, p. 343; Williams 2012).

the probability of the event occurring, $P(y = 1)$, given the change in x_i . Ordinary least squares analysis was applied to the specification for amount child support owed, for women with a CSO and payment due. Tobit analysis was used for the specification for amount child support received last year, women with a CSO and payment due, in order to account for the observations recorded as receiving zero.

Multivariate Results

Table 3 examines child support and custody outcomes of the legal system; Table 4 turns to outcomes more in the charge of fathers: contact and informal support, and receipt and amounts of child support payments. Table 3 shows no statistically significant effects of having an oldest boy on the court-mediated outcomes, but there were statistical differences between mothers of different marital statuses. Column 1 reports results for the effect of child gender and marital status on the indicator for whether the mother had a child support award in place last year. The marginal effects for the interaction terms (marital status*oldest is boy) in the logit regressions are calculated as the amount by which the probability of having a child support award differs for mothers whose oldest was a boy, relative to women with the same marital status whose oldest was a girl. For instance, a divorced mother whose oldest was a boy was 2.9 percentage points less likely to have a child support award than a divorced mother with an eldest girl. However, this effect was not statistically significant, therefore likely due to chance and not representative of a true effect in the population.

The marginal effects of the marital status main effects are calculated as the amount by which the probability of having a child support award differs for mothers of that marital status whose oldest was a girl, relative to divorced mothers whose oldest was a girl. Remarried mothers with oldest girls were 8 percentage points less likely, never-married mothers 19.6 percentage points less likely, and separated mothers at 22.2 percentage points the least likely, to have a child support award, statistically significant at the 1% level. The differences between the remarried coefficient, and the separated and never-married coefficients, were statistically significant.¹⁸

¹⁸ These and subsequent statements of statistical differences between coefficients for the remarried, separated, and never-married mothers groups were based on unreported computations, and significant at the 5% or 1% levels.

There were no statistically significant differences by child gender in Column 2 where the dependent variable was the amount of child support owed, for the subsample of women who had a child support order with payment due. Among the marital status categories, separated and never-married mothers' amounts due were lower than divorced mothers' at the 10% and 0.1% significance levels respectively; the never-married mothers' coefficient was also statistically significantly lower than the remarried mothers coefficient. In Columns 3 and 4, having an oldest boy made no significant difference for the custody arrangements, but marital status did, with divorced mothers most likely to have had one of these joint arrangements and never-married mothers statistically significantly least likely.

Table 4 presents results for nonresident fathers' potential investments in their children. Column 1 shows that father-child contact in the past year was 2.1 percentage points less likely for never-married mother with oldest boy than for never married mothers with oldest girl, significant at the 10% level. Although the significance level is marginal, this result suggests that boys are disadvantaged and is consistent with the notion that nonresident fathers of oldest boys are a negatively selected group. In Column 2 the father-contact specification was re-estimated on a larger sample including women with older children – up to age 17. For this group both the remarried and never-married mothers of oldest boys have lower father-child contact relative to their counterparts with oldest girls, both significant at the 10% levels.¹⁹

For receipt of informal support (Column 3) there were no significant effects of having an oldest boy, but statistical differences existed between mothers of different marital statuses. Separated mothers were the most likely to receive informal support, significantly so relative to remarried and never-married mothers; never-married mothers were least likely, significantly so relative to all other mothers.

For the subsample of women with child support orders with payment due, divorced mothers whose eldest is boy had a 4.3% lower likelihood of receiving child support than did divorced mothers of eldest girls, although this estimate was significant only at the 10% level (Column 4). The marginal effect

¹⁹ Thanks to the referee who suggested investigating father contact for the older children.

on amount child support received was also negative for the divorced mothers with eldest boy relative to those with eldest girl (Column 5), with magnitude \$412.15, but not statistically significant at conventional levels ($p = 0.156$)

To sum up, the court system did not allocate child support awards differently for oldest boys. Child gender did not make a difference for whether mothers shared joint physical custody or joint legal custody with fathers. There were some small but suggestive effects of having an oldest boy on father's post-dissolution investments in children. Father-child contact was lower for never-married mothers, and for remarried mothers with children younger than 18, relative to their counterparts with an oldest girl. For women with a child support order with payment due, divorced mothers of oldest boys were less likely to have received any child support relative to divorced mothers of oldest girls.

Discussion

Summary and Comparison with Previous Results

A notable result here is that, as hypothesized, child gender does not affect the existence or amount of a child support award, across all marital statuses of the mothers. This may not be surprising at first glance, but there is evidence that child support awards often deviate from states' presumptive formulas. The finding with a large national sample that child gender is not a factor in these legal outcomes is an important one. It also suggests that any gender effects we find for the remaining outcomes are influenced only by parental behavior and not by child support obligations which differ by child gender.

For the second hypothesis, that having an oldest boy would be negatively correlated with the more direct father investments, suggestive supporting evidence is found for never-married and remarried mothers in terms of father-child contact, and for divorced mothers' child support receipt rates. These results are consistent with earlier research finding slight disadvantages for boys with nonresidential fathers. Seltzer (1991a) found in a sample of divorced, separated, and never-married mothers that sons are less likely to receive any child support or any paternal visits than are girls. For divorced fathers of at least one son relative to divorced fathers of all girls, Paasch and Teachman (1991) found they are less likely to

pay for dental care and carry medical insurance, while Mammen (2008) found they are less likely to pay any child support.²⁰ The results are also consistent with the notion that divorced fathers of boys are a negatively selected group relative to divorced fathers of girls (Paasch and Teachman 1991).

A more recent study of adolescents, with more detailed measures of father contact, found girls and boys equally involved with fathers on most measures, including payment of any child support, although boys experienced more overnights stays, sports, and movies (Mitchell et al. 2009). Father involvement was found to benefit both boys and girls on measures of well-being, with only slight differences. Notably, though, within subgroups there was some evidence of disadvantage to boys: (a) Boys born outside of marriage were statistically significantly less likely to receive any child support from nonresident fathers than are girls²¹; (b) in the Black subsample, daughters were statistically significantly more likely to receive child support from, and to have recently talked to, their nonresident fathers, although the authors did not emphasize these results.

Limitations of the Current Study

A limitation of this study, common to many investigations of post-dissolution parenting, is the lack of information on the nonresident fathers. The CSS relied on mothers' reports of fathers' contributions, which may differ from fathers' reports (Braver et al. 1991; Seltzer and Brandreth 1994). Regarding fathers' demographic profiles, many of the demographic characteristics of the mothers' households were controlled for, which typically correlate with the fathers' (Tach et al. 2010) and provide a rough proxy. However, the CSS had no measures of fathers' parenting styles, their relationships with their children prior to dissolution, whether they are involved with a new partner, or other factors that have been shown to be significant for fathers' post-dissolution involvement (Amato and Gilbreth 1999). The study would benefit greatly from more details on the types, levels, and tenor of nonresident fathers' interactions with their children, because it is generally agreed that the quality and closeness of the father-

²⁰ Mammen (2008) also found that never-married mothers with at least one son received smaller amounts of child support than did never-married mothers of all daughters.

²¹ An arguably related finding was that being born outside of marriage significantly increased sons' but not daughters' externalizing problems.

child relationship is crucial to the time spent with fathers increasing children's well-being (Arditti and Keith 1993; Majumder 2016).

Contributions of the Current Study

The CPS-CSS allows examination of the full range of marital statuses of child-support eligible mothers and a greater array of outcomes, for a larger, more representative sample than has been available for most other studies of child gender. The findings add to our knowledge of child gender effects on fathers' post-dissolution investments in children as follows. First, the results here are the first using nationally representative data to show for women of all marital statuses that the likelihood of obtaining a child support award and the mandated amounts of awards are not affected by child gender. Second, I disaggregate women by all marital statuses and find child gender effects for never-married, remarried, and divorced women; other studies which group women differently (such as separated and divorced women together, or marital and nonmarital births) may mask these effects.

Finally and most importantly, these results confirm that although we should not automatically assume that gender matters in every situation (Mitchell et al. 2009), neither should we dismiss the possibility of gender effects in a given situation without careful investigation. The small but significant disadvantages to boys post-dissolution are found in different samples, different time periods, and different specifications. The effects of child gender deserve continued attention given the important role gender plays in people's life chances.

Directions for Future Research

These results highlight the value of continued research on the nuances of family structure to inform assessment of how the different types of families they live in affect girls and boys. More information on how outcomes differ across family types and by children's characteristics is needed, especially for emerging family configurations, such as the increasing prevalence of single father families and multiple partner fertility.

Two recent studies of father involvement which control for the existence of subsequent partners and children of both of the child's parents, find no gender effects on fathers' post-dissolution involvement with the child (Garasky et al. 2010; Tach et al. 2010). Another study finds, however, that fathers with any coresidential sons visit nonresidential children less often than fathers with only coresidential daughters (Guzzo 2009). More inquiry is needed to determine whether the evolution of new family forms is reducing the effects of gender or simply making them more difficult to detect.

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Table 1
Sample Averages
Child-Support Eligible Mothers with Children under 12

	1	2	3	4	5
	All Mothers	Divorced Mothers	Remarried Mothers	Separated Mothers	Never Married Mothers
Proportion of sample	1	0.22	0.16	0.12	0.50
Had child support award	0.50	0.68	0.62	0.42	0.39
Rcvd any CS, if had CSO with \$ due	0.73	0.77	0.79	0.73	0.67
Amount owed, if had CSO with \$ due	5,487	6,559	5,869	5,567	4,367
Amount rcvd, if had CSO with \$ due	3,204	4,141	3,831	3,129	2,094
Joint physical custody	0.09	0.16	0.13	0.08	0.05
Joint legal custody	0.15	0.28	0.22	0.14	0.07
Any contact with father last year	0.70	0.77	0.70	0.76	0.66
Any informal support last year	0.56	0.64	0.57	0.65	0.50
Oldest child is boy	0.49	0.49	0.50	0.49	0.49
Age	28.22	31.31	29.80	29.51	26.01
Father lives in state	0.78	0.77	0.73	0.81	0.80
Less than high school	0.19	0.10	0.16	0.21	0.24
High school only	0.38	0.36	0.37	0.37	0.40
Some college	0.33	0.39	0.36	0.32	0.30
College or more	0.09	0.15	0.12	0.10	0.05
White	0.65	0.82	0.83	0.72	0.50
Black	0.30	0.13	0.12	0.24	0.45
Other race	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04
Number of children	1.54	1.59	1.33	1.82	1.51
Has 1 child	0.61	0.56	0.74	0.43	0.64
Has 2 children	0.27	0.33	0.21	0.38	0.25
Has 3 children	0.09	0.09	0.05	0.14	0.09
Has 4 or more children	0.03	0.03	0.01	0.05	0.03
Central city-MSA	0.32	0.23	0.21	0.30	0.40
Household size	3.75	3.33	4.42	3.57	3.76
Observations (unweighted)	12,941	3,039	2,197	1,533	6,172
Observations: had CSO with \$ due	5,832	1,919	1,310	522	2,081
Observations: rcvd any CS last year	5,687	1,711	1,207	626	2,143

Notes: 1994 - 2008 March-April Match Current Population Survey Child Support weighted with April supplement sample weights. Counts of children are for the mother's resident children aged 11 or younger with a nonresident father. Receipt and amounts are for the previous calendar year; amounts are in real 2019 U.S. dollars. For remarried mothers the child-support eligible children are from a previous relationship.

Table 2
Differences in Means: 2008 Sample Values Less 1994 Sample Values
Child-support Eligible Mothers with Children under 12

	1	2	3	4	5
	All Mothers	Divorced Mothers	Remarried Mothers	Separated Mothers	Never Married Mothers
1 Proportion of sample		-0.06***	0.00	-0.02	0.08***
2 Had child support award	-0.05**	-0.09**	-0.06	0.07*	-0.01
3 Rcvd any CS, if had CSO with \$ due	0.08**	0.04	0.056	0.16†	0.16**
4 Amount owed, if had CSO with \$ due	-339	-102	-584	-460	74
5 Amount rcvd, if had CSO with \$ due	8	-318	87	120	781**
6 Joint physical custody	0.03**	0.08**	0.00	0.04	0.04***
7 Joint legal custody	0.01	0.04	0.03	0.003	0.03**
8 Any contact with father last year	-0.02	-0.02	-0.06	-0.00	0.01
9 Any informal support last year	-0.00	-0.01	-0.03	-0.03	0.04
10 Oldest child is boy	0.03	0.01	-0.02	0.18***	0.01
11 Age	0.090	0.405	0.19	0.80	0.51**
12 Father lives in state	0.03**	0.07**	0.05	0.03	0.02
13 Less than high school	-0.05**	-0.03	-0.01	-0.10**	-0.08**
14 High school only	-0.04**	-0.08**	-0.10**	-0.04	-0.01
15 Some college	0.05**	0.01	0.07	0.07	0.06**
16 College or more	0.05***	0.09**	0.05	0.07**	0.03**
17 White	-0.01	-0.05	0.01	0.03	0.04
18 Black	-0.02	0.00	-0.07**	-0.04	-0.07**
19 Other race	0.03***	0.05**	0.06**	0.01	0.02**
20 Number of children	-0.01	-0.02	0.02	0.20**	-0.05
21 Has 1 child	0.01	0.03	-0.01	-0.07	0.01
22 Has 2 children	-0.01	-0.03	0.00	-0.01	0.01
23 Has 3 children	0.00	-0.01	0.01	0.04	0.00
24 Has 4 or more children	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.04	-0.02*
25 Central city-MSA	-0.04**	0.03	0.02	-0.07	-0.11***
26 Household size	0.13**	0.21**	0.190	0.25	-0.02

Notes: 1994 and 2008 March-April Match Current Population Survey Child Support weighted with April supplement sample weights. Counts of children are for the mother's resident children aged 11 and under with a nonresident father. Receipt and amounts are for the previous calendar year; amounts are in real 2019 dollars. For remarried mothers the child-support eligible children are from a previous relationship. P-value notation indicates a statistically significant difference between the 2008 mean and the 1994 mean.

† p < 0.10 * p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 *** p < 0.001

Table 3
Effect of Oldest is Boy on Child Support Awards and Custody Outcomes
Child-Support Eligible Mothers with Children under 12

	1	2	3	4
	Logit AMEs	OLS	Logit AMEs	Logit AMEs
	Had child support award	Amount child support owed last year; had CSO with \$ due	Joint Legal Custody	Joint Physical Custody
Divorced * Oldest is boy	-0.029 (0.020)	-56.95 (259.49)	-0.005 (0.015)	0.016 (0.012)
Remarried * Oldest is boy	0.004 (0.023)	-14.02 (242.22)	0.024 (0.016)	0.008 (0.012)
Separated * Oldest is boy	-0.019 (0.028)	54.47 (411.39)	-0.028 (0.018)	-0.016 (0.015)
Never-married * Oldest is boy	-0.004 (0.014)	24.35 (182.86)	-0.009 (0.009)	-0.003 (0.008)
Divorced (omitted category)				
Remarried	-0.080*** (0.023)	-215.20 (256.36)	-0.062*** (0.016)	-0.029** (0.012)
Separated	-0.222*** (0.024)	-590.98† (348.51)	-0.079*** (0.017)	-0.026* (0.014)
Never-married	-0.196*** (0.018)	-957.77*** (235.17)	-0.120*** (0.013)	-0.045*** (0.011)
Observations	12,941	5,832	12,941	12,941
R ² / Pseudo R ²	0.110	0.199	0.179	0.145

Notes: standard errors are presented in parentheses. The unit of observation is the mother. State-year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Other regressors are ages of the mother and of her oldest and youngest child, number of adult women and number of adult men in the household; indicators for whether father lives in the same state; number of children (2, 3, 4 or more); White, Black; central-city-MSA, balance of MSA and non-MSA; high school only, some college, college or more, and an intercept. The omitted category for number of children is one; for race Other; for MSA status "unidentifiable"; for educational status, less than high school. Amounts owed are for the previous calendar year, reported in real 2019 terms using the Consumer Price Index.

† p < 0.10 * p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 *** p < 0.001.

Table 4
Effect of Oldest is Boy on Father Contact and Support
Child-support Eligible Mothers with Children under 12 or under 18

	1	2	3	4	5
	Logit AMEs	Logit AMEs	Logit AMEs	Logit AMEs	Tobit
	Any contact with father last year		Any informal support last year	Received any child support; had CSO with \$ due	Amount received last year; had CSO with \$ due
	kids < 12	kids < 18	kids < 12	kids < 12	kids < 12
Divorced * Oldest is boy	0.002 (0.017)	-0.008 (0.013)	0.015 (0.019)	-0.043† (0.023)	-412.15 (291.05)
Remarried * Oldest is boy	-0.015 (0.021)	-0.025† (0.015)	-0.015 (0.023)	0.033 (0.027)	245.11 (298.75)
Separated * Oldest is boy	0.002 (0.023)	0.009 (0.019)	-0.002 (0.026)	0.024 (0.040)	235.54 (474.94)
Never-married * Oldest is boy	-0.021† (0.012)	-0.019† (0.011)	-0.017 (0.014)	-0.003 (0.021)	-153.72 (227.78)
Divorced (omitted category)					
Remarried	-0.033 (0.020)	-0.027† (0.015)	-0.019 (0.022)	-0.010 (0.027)	-132.43 (321.83)
Separated	-0.007 (0.020)	-0.020 (0.016)	0.030 (0.023)	-0.040 (0.032)	-829.92* (383.77)
Never-married	-0.070*** (0.016)	-0.080*** (0.013)	-0.073*** (0.018)	-0.048** (0.023)	-1,091.48*** (269.93)
Observations	12,941	19,904	12,941	5,832	5,832
R ² / Pseudo R ²	0.128	0.114	0.057	0.132	0.014

Notes: standard errors are presented in parentheses. The unit of observation is the mother. State-year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Other regressors are ages of the mother and of her oldest and youngest child, number of adult women and number of adult men in the household; indicators for whether father lives in the same state; number of children (2, 3, 4 or more); White, Black; central-city-MSA, balance of MSA and non-MSA; high school only, some college, college or more, and an intercept. The omitted category for number of children is one; for race Other; for MSA status "unidentifiable"; for educational status, less than high school. Amounts owed are for the previous calendar year, reported in real 2019 terms using the Consumer Price Index.

† p < 0.10 * p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 *** p < 0.001

Figure 1

Notes: The CPS-CSS Sample figures represent all mothers with child-support eligible children aged less than 21. The figures are taken from the Census Bureau published tabulations of the CPS-CSS data as follows:

1979-1990: Lester 1991, Table B, rows 2 and 7

1992: Scoon-Rogers and Lester 1995, author calculations from Table B, Column 3, rows 1-4

1994-2008: Grall 2018, Table 2, rows 14 and 19

The Current Sample figures are author's calculations from the analysis sample of 12,941 child-support eligible women with children aged less than 12.

Figure 2

Notes: The CPS-CSS Sample figures represent all mothers with child-support eligible children aged less than 21.

The figures are taken from the Census Bureau published tabulations of the CPS-CSS data as follows:

1979-1990: Lester 1991, Table F, rows 2 and 3

1992: Scoon-Rogers and Lester 1995, author calculations from Table D Column 2, rows 2 and 3

1994-2008: Grall 2018, Table 2, rows 16 and 17

The Current Sample figures are author's calculations from the analysis sample of 12,941 women with child-support eligible women with children aged less than 12.

All figures have been converted to real 2019 U.S. dollars.

Appendix

Data Appendix

The CSS data had a number of strengths.

1. The CSS contained measures of outcomes of the legal system such as the existence and amounts of child support orders that mothers have been awarded by the court, and whether the father had joint physical custody or joint legal custody of the child(ren), for women of all marital statuses.

2. The CSS identified children living with a mother and a stepfather who were child-support eligible - that is, which children in married-parent homes were born in previous unions. Married women were sometimes omitted from studies of post-dissolution outcomes when this information was not available. For parsimony these women are referred to as remarried mothers in this paper, although the previous parental union could have been marriage, cohabitation, or not coresidential. This was an important group to study because in well-being measures, children living with stepfathers do no better than children of single mothers (e.g., McLanahan and Sandefur 1994, p. 90). Evidence has also suggested that remarriage reduced amounts of child support from nonresident fathers (Hill 1992).

3. It is likely that child support amounts were measured more accurately in the CSS than in some other surveys, because the CSS questions were asked directly of all household members 15 and over who had children living with them (CPS 2010). In contrast, in the March CPS, for example, one household member was asked about all other members (Campanelli et al. 2005, p. 425).

Appendix Tables

Table 5
Sample Averages for 1994 sample
Child-support Eligible Mothers with Children under 12

	1	2	3	4	5
	All Mothers	Divorced Mothers	Remarried Mothers	Separated Mothers	Never Married Mothers
Proportion of sample	1	0.25	0.15	0.14	0.46
Had child support award	0.48	0.70	0.63	0.35	0.35
Rcvd any CS, if had CSO with \$ due	0.69	0.75	0.77	0.64	0.57
Amount owed, if had CSO with \$ due	5,185	5,668	6,137	5,248	3,974
Amount rcvd, if had CSO with \$ due	2,865	3,741	3,813	2,624	1,270
Joint physical custody	0.06	0.11	0.11	0.07	0.02
Joint legal custody	0.14	0.26	0.19	0.14	0.05
Any contact with father last year	0.69	0.78	0.68	0.77	0.62
Any informal support last year	0.55	0.64	0.55	0.69	0.47
Oldest child is boy	0.48	0.49	0.50	0.43	0.49
Age	28.17	31.01	29.69	29.05	25.87
Father lives in state	0.77	0.76	0.70	0.80	0.78
Less than high school	0.23	0.12	0.15	0.28	0.30
High school only	0.39	0.38	0.42	0.39	0.38
Some college	0.32	0.38	0.35	0.28	0.28
College or more	0.07	0.11	0.09	0.05	0.05
White	0.65	0.86	0.83	0.70	0.47
Black	0.31	0.11	0.14	0.27	0.48
Other race	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.05
Number of children	1.56	1.58	1.35	1.72	1.56
Has 1 child	0.59	0.55	0.70	0.45	0.63
Has 2 children	0.29	0.33	0.25	0.41	0.24
Has 3 children	0.09	0.10	0.05	0.10	0.09
Has 4 or more children	0.03	0.02	0.00	0.03	0.04
Central city-MSA	0.35	0.26	0.20	0.34	0.45
Household size	3.69	3.22	4.25	3.50	3.82
Observations (unweighted)	2,099	572	313	289	925
Observations: had CSO with \$ due	917	373	193	82	269
Observations: rcvd any CS last year	899	336	176	110	277

Notes: 1994 March-April Match Current Population Survey Child Support weighted with April supplement sample weights. Counts of children are for the mother's resident children aged 11 or younger with a nonresident father. Receipt and amounts are for the previous calendar year; amounts are in real 2019 U.S. dollars. For remarried mothers the child-support eligible children are from a previous relationship.

Table 6
Sample Averages for 2008 sample
Child-support Eligible Mothers with Children under 12

	1	2	3	4	5
	All Mothers	Divorced Mothers	Remarried Mothers	Separated Mothers	Never Married Mothers
Proportion of sample	1	0.19	0.15	0.12	0.55
Had child support award	0.43	0.62	0.56	0.42	0.34
Rcvd any CS, if had CSO with \$ due	0.77	0.79	0.83	0.80	0.72
Amount owed, if had CSO with \$ due	4,846	5,566	5,553	4,788	4,048
Amount rcvd, if had CSO with \$ due	2,873	3,423	3,901	2,745	2,051
Joint physical custody	0.10	0.20	0.11	0.11	0.06
Joint legal custody	0.15	0.30	0.21	0.15	0.08
Any contact with father last year	0.67	0.76	0.62	0.76	0.63
Any informal support last year	0.55	0.63	0.52	0.66	0.50
Oldest child is boy	0.51	0.50	0.48	0.61	0.50
Age	28.26	31.42	29.88	29.85	26.38
Father lives in state	0.80	0.83	0.75	0.84	0.80
Less than high school	0.18	0.09	0.13	0.18	0.22
High school only	0.35	0.31	0.32	0.35	0.37
Some college	0.36	0.40	0.41	0.35	0.34
College or more	0.12	0.20	0.14	0.12	0.08
White	0.64	0.81	0.84	0.73	0.51
Black	0.29	0.12	0.07	0.23	0.42
Other race	0.07	0.08	0.09	0.05	0.07
Number of children	1.55	1.56	1.38	1.92	1.51
Has 1 child	0.60	0.58	0.69	0.38	0.63
Has 2 children	0.28	0.30	0.25	0.40	0.25
Has 3 children	0.09	0.09	0.06	0.14	0.09
Has 4 or more children	0.03	0.02	0.00	0.07	0.02
Central city-MSA	0.31	0.28	0.22	0.27	0.35
Household size	3.82	3.42	4.44	3.74	3.80
Observations (unweighted)	1,370	279	212	158	721
Observations: had CSO with \$ due	555	166	110	58	221
Observations: rcvd any CS last year	566	158	109	65	234

Notes: 2008 March-April Match Current Population Survey Child Support weighted with April supplement sample weights. Counts of children are for the mother's resident children aged 11 or younger with a nonresident father. Receipt and amounts are for the previous calendar year; amounts are in real 2019 U.S. dollars. For remarried mothers the child-support eligible children are from a previous relationship.