Questioning Our Moral, Ethical, Aesthetic Convictions and Social Conventions

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Preface

I choose that subject, questioning of our moral, ethical, aesthetic convictions, conventional wisdoms, in order to remind the readers of my work that there are many of us, who are not culturally, morally, aesthetically represented as members of society. Many of us, as emphasized by some authors cited in the work, which we are about to read, are irrationally excluded from the literature, cultural reality, entities of our own society, and are in constant struggle to have our own voice counted, reflected, represented in such entities.

As rational and emotional beings, we naturally respond to the world external to our senses, which consists in both natural and cultural elements. Despite that natural intellectual capacity to reason, question, understand, comprehend the world around us, our concerns, voice, and responses are often unrepresented in the
very moral, ethical, aesthetic, legal principles that govern our own lives, as experienced by some characters discussed in this work. Concerned with that issue, I would like to bring to the attention of the readers that we need to constantly question our moral, ethical, aesthetic convictions, conventional wisdoms with the views, concerns, voice of every member of our society in mind, and seek to rationally and empirically justify, and reformulate them accordingly, in order to generate a moral means, consensus, common denominator that reflects every member of a society.
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**Introduction:** Our moral, ethical, aesthetic convictions, and the question of whether we should unquestionably hold them as ultimate truths or constantly seek to rationally and empirically justify them.

The idea or the notion of ethical, moral, aesthetic convictions, knowledge, social conventions, reality, and the issue of whether we should unquestionably hold, abide by, and impose them on one another as immutable, unchanging ultimate truths, or should we constantly seek to, in a deductive and inductive approach, rationally and empirically justify them, has been and continues to be the focus of intense, ethical, moral, aesthetic conflicts and discussions, among many philosophical and artistic thinkers.
CHAPTER I

MAKING SENSE OF THE REIGNING MORAL, ETHICAL, AESTHETIC ASSUMPTIONS OF THE TIME.

Our notions of truth, reality, knowledge, arguing John Locke and David Hume, are photocopies of reality itself, an argument echoed by Immanuel Kant, who, however, claims that those notions can be proved by reason.

In an attempt to make sense of their world, the reigning assumptions of their time, John Locke, for example, a seventeenth-century English philosopher, and Immanuel Kant, an eighteenth-century German philosopher, offer several theories on the concepts or the terms ‘reality,’ ‘truth,’ and ‘knowledge,’ according to Hunt, Honer, and Okholm, authors of the book entitled Invitation to Philosophy (ISSUES AND OPTIONS).
Locke, in his theory called “representative theory of perception,” as indicated in *Invitation to Philosophy*, conceives ‘Knowledge,’ what we call ‘truth,’ as merely the “picture” of reality, accessible through the sense organs, as opposed to reality itself (quoted in *Invitation to Philosophy 58*). And Immanuel Kant makes a similar argument, claiming “external things exist but that human beings do not perceive those things as they really are,” (Hunt, Honer, Okholm 61).

In addition, Robert C. Solomon and Clancy W. Martin, in the book entitled *Morality and the Good Life*, indicate that Kant, in response to the Seventeenth-century Scottish philosopher, David Hume’s skepticism as to whether human beings would ever be able to demonstrate that our “ideas” are equal to ‘reality,’ and Hume’s Claim that “reason is, and ought to be, the slave of the passions,” advances that Morality is founded on reason, as opposed to
passions, and our moral principles can be proved by reason

(quoted in Morality and the Good Life, Solomon and Martin 260).
CHAPTER II

RATIONAL AND EMPIRICAL JUSTIFICATION OF OUR MORAL, ETHICAL, AESTHETIC CONVICTIONS AND THE RESULTING CONFLICT.

Joining the controversy, with an emphasis on the rational and empirical justification of our moral, ethical, aesthetic convictions, social conventions, and the emerging tensions, disagreement among characters, are Charles Dickens, Daniel Defoe, and John Milton.

In the book entitled Great Expectations, for example, Charles Dickens presents the character, pip, at the very beginning of the novel, away from home, at a churchyard, looking for evidences of his parents’ origin, despite his sister, Mrs. Gargery’s disapproval of his behavior (Dickens 1&9). Pip is portrayed as disobeying the
moral rules set by his sister, who, according to Pip, has the
to his household education,
any information he may have received regarding his parents' background, which his sister does not allow him to question at home, to rational and empirical investigations. He describes some of his conclusions about his parents' family root as his “fancies,” being, as he claims, “unreasonably derived from their Tombstones,” and others about his mother particularly, as “childish” (Dickens 1& 14).

Addressing that situation, in which some social groups tend to unquestionably hold their ethical, moral convictions, abide by and impose them on one another, and taking issue at that very topic, or question of whether that should be the case, as experienced and indicated by Charles Dickens, through the
character Pip, in his relationship with Mrs. Joe Gargery, Daniel Defoe, for one, portrays Robinson Crusoe as resisting his Father's moral convictions of how Crusoe should live his life. Crusoe, for instance, is determined to travel to seas, but his father wants him to become a lawyer, which, according to Crusoe, the father “designed” for him, as being in conformity with the “common Road”, the “middle Station” of Mankind (Defoe 4-6). The moral conflict resulting from those different views leads the father to call for a meeting in his room, which Crusoe sees as very meaningful: “My Father, a wise and grave Man, gave me serious and excellent Counsel against what he foresaw was my Design,”(Defoe 4).

Such moral, ethical, aesthetic skepticism, inquietude, and dualism are also central in Paradise Lost and Regain’d, by John Milton. Milton begins his poem with the phrase “Of Mans First
Disobedience...,” and deductively tells us a well-known story, one that has become part of our conscience, cultural, moral make-up, in the manner of a reporter, without much individual, personal intrusion. In the first stanza of Paradise Lost, for instance, he systematically and deductively reports the events by beginning with “Disobedience,” followed by the “Fruit of that Forbidden Tree,” “mortal tast,” and the consequences, in a deductive, decreasing, a priori order, as opposed to inductive reasoning, suggesting that the power, the notion of God is from above, from general to particulars. Such movement from general to specific ideas, cause and effect, where the poet acts as a simple reporter, is indicated in the first stanza:

Of Mans First Disobedience, and the Fruit
Of that Forbidden Tree, whose mortal tast
Brought Death into the World, and all our woe
With loss of Eden, till one greater Man
Restore us, and regain the blissful Seat,
Sing Heav'ny Muse, that on the secret top
Of Oreb, or Sinai, didst inspire
That Shepherd, who first taught the chosen Seed,
In the Beginning how the Heav'ns and Earth
Rose out of Chaos: Or if Sion Hill
Delight Thee more, and Siloa's Brook that flow'd
Fast by the Oracle of God; I thence
Invoke thy aid to my adventurous Song,
That with no middle flight intends to soar
Above th' Aonian Mount, while it pursues
Things unattempted yet in Prose or Rhime (1.1-13).

In that stanza, Milton first reports the events as they take place, in
a deductive approach, descending power, while, in the last lines,
describing his mission as one that “pursues things unattempted
yet in Prose or Rhime.”
TITLE: QUESTIONING OUR MORAL, ETHICAL, AESTHETIC
CONVICTIONS, AND SOCIAL CONVENTIONS

Due to the nature of these arguments, dealing with moral, ethical, aesthetic issues, involving parents and their children, younger and older siblings, members of society and their relationships to one another, and to God, they tend to be very sensitive, challenging our readers, as to what stand to take or how to approach the question, as suggested by the emerging or resulting topic itself: Should we unquestionably hold our moral, ethical, aesthetic convictions, conventional wisdoms, abide by, and impose them on one another, as immutable, unchanging ultimate truths, or should we constantly question and seek to, in a deductive and inductive reasoning approach, rationally and empirically justify, reconstruct them, accordingly, and thus generating a progressive, moral, ethical, aesthetic, cultural renaissance, rebirth, and change?
While acknowledging the merit of such reactions and the possibility that some of our readers may argue in favor of the first part of the question, which is to unquestionably hold, abide by and impose them on one another as ultimate truths, we must, however, as rational and emotional beings, and members of society seeking justice, equal rights, intellectual growth, and social change, progress, constantly question our moral, ethical, aesthetic convictions, and seek to, in a deductive and inductive approach, rationally and empirically justify, and reconstruct them, accordingly, thus perpetuating a moral, ethical, aesthetic, and cultural renaissance, rebirth, and change that reflects the sense of right or wrong of every member of a given society.
CHAPTER III

RATIONAL AND EMOTIONAL BEINGS AND THE QUESTIONING OF OUR MORAL CONVICTIONS

As rational and emotional human beings, co-existing and interacting with other members of society, we must and need to constantly question our moral, ethical, and aesthetic convictions, and seek to rationally and empirically justify, reconstruct them, and thus generating and perpetuating a progressive, moral, ethical, aesthetic, cultural renaissance, rebirth, and change.

At the present state-of-the-art, as opposed to society’s preliminary attempts to introduce and argue the notion of human
species being rational, and later, both rational and emotional, one can certainly state that such notion has been accepted and become part of our intellectual, conventional wisdoms, or the state-of-the-art world. Examples of the elements qualifying human beings as such, and thus the argument as convincing enough to be tolerated among the theories of our cultural, intellectual properties, are our psychological behaviors toward nature, the natural, as well as our cultural, moral, ethical, aesthetic entities, and, indeed, the very definition of the term rational.

According to Webster’s New World College Dictionary, Fourth Edition, the term Rational means: Adj.* [ME. (Middle English), racional < Latin Rationalis <ratio: see reason]]

1. Of or derived from reasoning, ability to reason logically as by
drawing conclusions from inferences. And the term emotion, on the other hand, means [[Fr. (French) Prob. (Probably) after motion) < Emouvoir, to agitate, to stir up <VL (Vulgar Latin) exmovere < e- out + movere, to move]]

1a) strong feeling; excitement.

b) a state of consciousness having to do with the arousal of feelings, distinguished from other mental states, as cognition, volition, and awareness of physical sensations.

2. Any specific feeling; any various complex reactions with both mental and physical manifestations, as love, hate, fear, anger, etc. Syn(synonym) feeling.
Adj.* Adjective

The intellectual activity implied or reflected in the preceding definition of both the terms rational and emotional, such as deduction from inference, is evident in the existence of our cultural, moral, ethical, and aesthetic entities, which constitute the tangible proof of that rational and emotional interaction with the external world or environment. The fact that we have a culture or those cultural entities, which originally come naturally between human species and nature, natural entities, as well as other cultural entities, without any social groups imposing them or their creations on one another, indicates the natural
existence of such moral philosophy between humans and anything external to the senses.

The characters, Pip, in *Great Expectations*, by Charles Dickens, and Robinson Crusoe, in *Robinson Crusoe*, by Daniel Defoe, and the son of God, Jesus, in *Paradise Lost* and *Regain’d*, by John Milton, for example, rationally, empirically, and culturally interact with both natural and cultural entities, drawing conclusions, justifying, reconstructing, and multiplying those cultural, moral, ethical, and aesthetic units, despite the attempts of other opposing characters to unquestionably hold and impose them. In Dickens’s *Great Expectations*, for instance, as indicated in our discussions of the novel, Pip, as young as he is, characterizing the age of reason, the Enlightenment, is found at the beginning, first part of the novel, at the tombstones of his parents, away from home, in the empirical world, trying to justify the information
regarding his family background. He defines some of his conclusions as being “unreasonably derived from their Tombstones,” “childish,” based on his “Fancies” (Dickens 1& 14).

Pip, in the following version of the novel, continues to describe his rational and emotional, empirical interaction with his surrounding, moral, ethical, and aesthetic, cultural elements, providing a sense of how natural this intellectual activity is:

My father’s family name being Pirrip and my Christian name Philip, my infant tongue could make of both names nothing longer or more explicit than Pip. So, I called myself Pip and came to be called Pip. I give
Pirrip as my father’s family name, on the authority of his Tombstones
and my sister, Mrs. Joe Gargery, who married the blacksmith (Dickens 1).

In the preceding statements, Pip calls our attention on the intelligibility of theoretical, conceptual language, moral convictions, when taken into context. The names, Pirrip and Philip dialectically become the morpheme, Pip. In those statements, Pip also emphasizes the renaissance, rebirth, and change that take place in our moral, ethical, and aesthetic principles, when we seek to rationally and empirically justify them. The word tongue, for instance, which is the organ of the sense of taste, emphasizing the emotional and empirical aspect of the novel, is, according to Webster’s New World College Dictionary, fourth Edition, N (noun) [[ME. (Middle English) Tunge <OE (old English) akin to Ger. (German) Zunge<IE (Indo-European) base *dnghû-Tongue> L.]}
(Latin) lingua, which also means hybrid language (Webster New World College Dictionary, Fourth Edition, Michael Agnes 835 & 1507).

The terms hybrid, Tongue, indicate the constant moral, ethical, aesthetic, cultural rebirth, change, and our intellectual, rational interaction with the external world, which produces such change, through, based on the definition of rational, deducing and drawing conclusions from inferences, an activity which, due to Pip's young age, as suggested by the phrase "infant Tongue," is natural in human beings.

This rational, emotional, empirical engagement between human beings and the natural, cultural environment, as enhanced in the novel, is also evident in other terms, phrases, used by the character, Pip. The term authority, for example, in the phrase, "on
the authority of," of which the fourth definition means: 4a) the citations of a writing, decision, etc. in support of an opinion, also stresses the idea of rationality, and characterizes Pip as a rational character. In addition, the term authority is also found in the word axiom, which means: {{Fr. (French) axiome<L.axioma<authority, authoritative sentence<axioum, to think worthy<axios, worthy<base of agein, to weigh}} 1) a statement universally accepted as true; maxim. 2) An established principle or law of a science, art, etc. (WEBSTER’S New World COLLEGE DICTIONARY, FOURTH EDITION 100).

The definition of authority, which includes the citation of a writing, decision, in support of an opinion, as well as part of the etymological background of the term axiom, which is, as indicated above, agein, meaning to weigh, emphasizes the idea of a base, foundation, an axiom, natural, cultural, moral, aesthetic element, with which, we rationally, and emotionally interact to produce our
morality, ethics, culture, which begins with that basic opinion. That opinion is the result of our natural, rational, emotional responses to the world around, and it is the basic unit of our morality, ethics, aesthetics, which we unconditionally, deliberately interact with. Those cultural entities, principles, referred to as ethics, which is defined as 1) the study of the standards of conduct and moral judgment 2) moral philosophy 3) the system or code of morals of a particular person, religion, group, profession, and morality, which means principles of right and wrong conduct; ethics; and finally aesthetics, which means the study or theory of beauty and the psychological response to it, the doctrine that aesthetic principles underlie all human values, constitute the cultural product of our natural and emotional relationships with the external world. That term, authority, which is linked to the word axiom, from agein meaning to weigh, balance, measure, is also related to the term essay which means:
[ofr. (old French) essayer < VL (Vulgar Latin) exagiare < LL (Late Latin) exagium, a weight, weighing < ex – out of + agere, to do] 1) to test or quality of; try out (Webster’s New World College Dictionary Fourth Edition 486). So Dickens’s use of the word authority, which, in its etymology, is related to the term ‘axiom,’ and ‘essay,’ meaning to weigh, to describe the young, unconventional character, of course, not yet conventional, Pip’s interactions with his environment, the churchyard, the tombstones, again, supports our discussion of human beings’ rational and emotional nature, and thus our natural, rational, emotional responses to the world external to the senses.
Questioning of Our Moral Entities and the Resulting Conflicts

Based on the rational and emotional nature of human beings, and in fact, our rational and emotional nature, as emphasized and established through the natural, unconventional behavior of the young Pip, as indicated through his “infant tongue,” “childish conclusion,” and other characters such as Robinson Crusoe, one should be able to question our moral abstracts, dogmas, or values. However, the characters find themselves in the middle of intense moral, ethical, and aesthetic conflicts when it comes to question such entities, as we have, so far, experienced through the discussions. Pip, who, for instance, makes a promise to bring a ‘file’ and ‘wittles’ to Magwitch, the convict, who threatens to kill him, shows interest in his sister’s husband, Joe Gargery’s conversation, and asks questions about convicts. However, Mrs. Gargery, who does not allow Pip to question anything she says, becomes angry. An example of such
reaction is indicated in the response from Mrs. Gargery, which Pip sees as impolite:

“There was a convict off last night” said Joe, aloud, “after sunset- gun. And they fired warning of him. And now, it appears they’re firing warning of another.”

“Who’s firing?” said I. “Drat that boy,” interposed my sister, frowning at me over her work, “what a questioner he is. Ask no questions, and you’ll be told no lies.”

“It was not very polite to herself, I thought, to imply that I should be told lies by her, even if I did ask questions...” (Dickens 5 and 14).
In that statement above, Mrs. Joe Gargery calls Pip a “questioner,” and warns him not to ask questions if he does not want to be told lies as opposed to the truth. And Pip expresses his disapproval of Mrs. Joe Gargery’s statement that if he asks questions, he should be told lies, instead of truth, by referring to such statement as being not “polite.”

This moral conflict, which Charles Dickens experiences through the character, Pip, used in the first-person point of view, in his social interactions with other characters such as Mrs. Joe Gargery, who unquestionably holds and imposes her moral, ethical views on Pip, is also central in Robinson Crusoe’s relationship with his father. As we have previously discussed in our arguments, Daniel Defoe, through the character, Robinson Crusoe, used in the first-person point of view, finds himself in moral contradictions with his father, who insists that Crusoe
should abandon his inclination to travel to seas, to become a lawyer, which the father, as he claims, “design’d” for him (Defoe 4 & 5). Daniel Defoe, as indicated through Robinson Crusoe, emphasizes the absolute, timeless aspect of his father’s moral, ethical, aesthetic values, their cultural foundations, and how the father wants him to unquestionably obey, as opposed to question and seek to rationally and empirically justify them. For example, he uses the term “design” several times, on one occasion, with capital, to indicate the power of that term, and, indeed, the eternal, absolute, deontological or binding character of his father’s view of those moral convictions. The term “design,” for example, means{{ME. (Middle English), designen <L. (Latin), designare, to mark out, define<de-out, from+signare, to mark <signum, a mark, sign}}(1) to make preliminary sketches of; sketch a pattern or outline for; plan, a definition, which matches the third and fourth definitions of the word teleology, which means: 3a) a belief as
that of vitalism (a vital force) that natural phenomena are
determined not only by mechanical causes but by an overall
design or purpose in nature, and fourth definition 4), ethics. The
evaluation of conduct, as in utilitarianism, in relation to the end or
ends it serves, (Webster's New World College Dictionary, Fourth
Edition 391 and 1471).

The term ‘design’ is also compounded, according to
Merriam- Webster’s Collegiate Encyclopedia, with the term
argument, to become: an argument from design or Teleological
argument held by Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, in favor of the
existence of a creator, God, (Merriam – Webster’s Collegiate
Encyclopedia 86). According to the preceding definition, the term
“Design,” used by Crusoe, in describing his father’s advice,
logically indicates the Teleological, Godly, intrinsic meaning,
which he attributes to it, and his emphasis on Crusoe’s obedience,
as opposed to his questioning of the father’s advice: “My father, a
wise and grave Man gave me serious and excellent Counsel
against what he foresaw was my Design” (written with uppercase
letter D) (Defoe4). The father advises him (Crusoe) against what
he foresees as his misfortune, which, according to the father, is a
divinely or humanly intrinsic, unquestionable advice that he
needs to follow, otherwise, he will suffer.

That moral issue, which involves family members, as
previously indicated in the case of the characters, Pip and his
sister, Mrs. Gargery, Crusoe and his father, can be sensitively and
authoritatively motivated, defined as having an intrinsic value
that cannot be explained by reason itself. Nevertheless, we need
to take into account that we are rational and emotional beings,
and would naturally respond to anything external to the senses,
whether it is a natural, cultural, moral, ethical, and aesthetic
entity. We, in fact, do not start with our cultural world, artifacts; we start with nature, natural entities, such as human species, ourselves, the plants, the animals that serve as elements of contemplation to the mind, our sense organs. And through that contemplation, rational, and emotional interaction, and phenomenon of those natural entities, noumena, sense data are produced, which the mind rationally organizes into logical constructs, which make up our cultural world, second nature. That process, which begins with nature, will not stop; it will naturally continue as an inherent function of our human nature, rational, and emotional nature. Despite the emotional and sensitive aspects of our moral convictions, we need to question and seek to rationally, empirically justify, and reconstruct them, accordingly, and thus generating a moral, ethical, aesthetic, cultural renaissance, rebirth and change; unquestionably holding them, however, they will become absolute, timeless, uncaused,
like strangers to the current reality, that do not reflect the present.

That state, atmosphere of constant, moral, ethical, aesthetic, and, in sum, cultural dynamism pursued by Charles Dickens through the character Pip, and Daniel Defoe through Robinson Crusoe, despite being opposed by Mrs. Gargery’s “ask no questions and you will be told no lies,” and Crusoe’s father’s “Common Road,” “Middle State,” approaches, can only be equitably achieved through rational and empirical justification, by questioning our moral tenets and taking them to the empirical world of experience for reconciliation, and possible reconstruction. That process, more specifically, can be executed through a free, deliberate interaction with our conventional wisdoms, that tend to become timeless, absolute, uncaused, with the passage of time, and through a philosophical, and empirical analysis of those moral, ethical, aesthetic entities, by questioning
and weighing them against current reality. Such an endeavor in moral philosophy will create a social, cultural context, a representational, objective form of art, morality that reflects society as a whole, young as well as old generations, parents and their children, husbands and wives, in their emotional and rational state of nature, as opposed to a nonrepresentational, nonobjective, conceptual art that represents the past experiences, and rejects the present reality, including those living in it.

The closer we are to one another, more requiring, important it becomes to question and seek to rationally and empirically justify and reconstruct our moral convictions. The emotional level, as indicated in many instances in life, in its struggle with rationality, tends to be more intense, getting more ground, and less cooperative, as we live closer to one another in society, particularly in family settings where there is a sense of belonging, authority, ownership, loss, or one’s interest being at stake. In a
populated, concentrated place, or city like New York, for example, crime tends to occur more often than it does in other less crowded states, because the sense of vulnerability, of loss, self-protection, becomes so strong that the level of emotions overrides the rational capacity and reduces the rational levels of our judgment, which explains why we tend to have more security agents in New York City than we do in other cities that are less populated. Other social gatherings of close individual interactions that require high security due to the degree of emotions, and more importantly strong rational and empirical approach to balance and reconstruct our moral convictions, accordingly, are, for example, presidential voting places, educational institutions, public schools, and football stadiums. Living or being at such locations of high tensions, where emotions tend to impair our moral judgments, one needs to carefully question the moral judgments, convictions, and seek to rationally and empirically justify, reconstruct them, regardless of
whether they are born or deduced out of the present context, or
totally different circumstances.

Charles Dickens, through the character Pip, and Daniel
Defoe, through Robinson Crusoe, emphasize the dissolving,
absorbent capacity of such atmosphere and the importance of
questioning and weighing our moral, ethical, aesthetic principles,
in context, and their relative behavior. The names, Pip and Philip,
become Pip in context, and Kreutznaer becomes Crusoe (Defoe 1)
and (Dickens 1). And Dickens, as well as Defoe, despite the
opposition from other characters, stress that sense of becoming,
of renaissance, and change, by having Pip and Crusoe describe
where they come from, what they start with, and where they
morally stand. In the opening lines of the novels, Dickens, using
Pip in the first-person point of view, emphasizes that notion of
questioning our moral convictions and seeking to rationally and
empirically justify and reconstruct them. He uses his father’s
family name and his Christian name, to indicate how our moral convictions change from one social layer to another, as hypothetical scenarios, changing from a general, deductive reasoning, to a practical, inductive reasoning status, in a more interdependent, co-existing, common world:

My father's family name being Pirrip and my Christian name Philip, my infant tongue could make of both names nothing longer or more explicit than Pip. So I called myself Pip, and came to be called Pip (Dickens 3).

As opposed to unquestionably hold those moral, ethical, and aesthetic concepts, abide by and impose them on one another or one person, character, from one social context to another, as some characters, like Mrs. Gargery, attempt to do, Dickens, through the character Pip, rationally and empirically applies them, in context, to new situations, including his infant tongue, and responses from other characters of his time, where they undergo the empirical,
pragmatic, dialectic, sociolinguistic test, and become Pip. And a somewhat similar approach is adopted by Daniel Defoe, who supports and helps maintain, as well, our argument, which consists in constantly questioning our moral determinations and trying to rationally and empirically prove their status, and reconstruct, change them, accordingly. Defoe, through the character, Crusoe, equally used in the first-person point of view, takes Crusoe's previous last name, Kreutznaer, from a specific context, and shows how it is morphologically and phonetically reconstructed into a new name, undergoing a moral, ethical, aesthetic rebirth, renaissance and change:

I was born in the year 1632, in the City of York, of a good Family, tho’ not of that country, my Father being a Foreigner of Bremen... married my Mother, whose Relations were named Robinson, a very good Family in that country, and from whom I was called Robinson Kreutznaer, but by the
usual Corruption of Words in England, we are now called, nay we call our selves, and write our Name Crusoe, and so my Companions always call’d me (Defoe 4).

In that statement, Defoe, represented by Crusoe, used in the first-person point of view, again emphasizes the renaissance, rebirth, reconstruction, transcendentalism, and change of our moral, ethical, aesthetic notions, through a demonstration of how those names, moral convictions, relatively change as they move from a general social context, as principles, norms, to a pragmatic, more interdependent, co-existing, interacting world. That specific social context, which includes Crusoe, his companions, naturally, rationally and emotionally responds to those cultural entities, and translates them into their own local dialect, which reflects their own emotions and experiences.
Experiencing that dualism, dialectical struggle of the opposites, those moral, ethical, aesthetic principles that find themselves being rationally, empirically and emotionally weighed in the world of experiences, passions, emotions, where the chance of survival is minimal, one may argue that the issue of characters not being able to question their moral convictions, is not materialized or well founded in the novels. However, such a reaction would be a misinterpretation of the novels, for the dynamics, the chemical reactions, dialectical movement, generated by the presence of those moral, ethical, aesthetic principles, entities: Pirrip and Philip, which produce Pip, and Robinson Kreutznaer, which results in Crusoe, do not constitute a uniform, overall, commonly shared reality among the characters in the novels; they are, on the contrary, the points of view of Charles Dickens, expressed through the character Pip, and those of Daniel Defoe, carried through Robinson Crusoe on how, we, as
rational, emotional beings, naturally respond to the external world, more specifically the natural and cultural entities, external to our sense organs, and reform, change them accordingly, through rational and empirical justification, in context.

This view of transcendental idealism, rebirth, renaissance, change of our moral, ethical, aesthetic principles, as they move through different social contexts, along with Pip and Crusoe, who are portrayed as dynamic, progressive characters of change, is, in fact, opposed to by other powerful characters, such as Mrs. Joe Gargery and Crusoe’s father. Mrs. Joe Gargery, as we have experienced, and discussed in *Great Expectations*, raises Pip by “hand,” does not allow him to ask any question, calling him “Drat,” “questioner,” when he attempts to do so (Dickens 14). And Crusoe’s father, as indicated in *Robinson Crusoe*, as well, despite his meeting with Crusoe, regarding Crusoe’s determination to travel to sea, instead of staying home to become a lawyer, which,
according to Crusoe, the father “design’d” him for, does not, anywhere, in the course of his advice to Crusoe, allow him to speak, question what he calls the “common Road,” “upper Stations of Low Life,” which he advises him to follow (Defoe 5).

Those social boundaries, which the father refers to as “common Road,” “upper Station of Low Life,” which, in his view, are the “middle State” of life, are, according to the father, the best moral and social ladders, which Crusoe should follow. And Crusoe’s refusal to abide by those boundaries, as is the case with Pip, who dares questioning Mrs. Gargery’s views, results in the moral conflict among the characters, as to whether those moral boundaries, “common Roads,” “middle State,” of life, “Upper Stations of Low Life,” and Mrs. Gargery’s moral convictions should be unquestionably held, abided by, and imposed on other characters, as immutable, ultimate truths, or should they be rationally and empirically justified and reconstructed, reborn,
changed, as Crusoe and Pip emphasize they should, through their
demonstration of Pirrip and Philip that change to Pip, and
Kreutznaer to Crusoe. Both characters indicate a dualism, a
struggle of the opposites, and, in fact, the rational and empirical,
dialectical justification of the concepts, names, Pirrip and Philip,
and Robinson Kreutznaer that are reconstructed into Pip and
Crusoe, experiencing a moral, ethical, aesthetic renaissance,
rebirth, and change, when taken from one social context to
another, and thus supporting our arguments on questioning our
moral convictions and seeking to rationally and empirically justify
and reconstruct them.

That theme, questioning our moral, ethical, aesthetic
convictions, conventional wisdoms, emphasized by Charles
Dickens and Daniel Defoe, through the characters, Pip and Crusoe,
is counter-argued by David Hume, who, in the book entitled A
Treatise of Human Nature, treats reason as the “slave of the
passions” (Hume 415). Such an argument advanced by David Hume is, however, contradictory to what nature, our source of knowledge, moral, ethical, cultural entities, second nature, teaches us. Let us, for example, start with the commonly accepted axiom that we began our civilization with the world of nature, without a culture, a second nature, and ask ourselves where we are now? What has happened? The obvious answer is that we live in a systematically arranged second nature, which we have created through our natural faculty, which is culturally and linguistically defined by the terms, intellect, dialect, understand, construct, which respectively mean:

Intellect [[ME (Middle English) <L. (Latin) intellectus, a perceiving, understanding <pp. (past participle) of intellegere, to perceive, understand < from inter-between, among + legere, to gather, pick, choose; see logic]] 1) the
ability to reason or understand the relationships,

differences, etc.; power of thought; mind.

Dialect [[L. (Latin) dialectus < Gr. (Greek) dialektos, discourse,
discussion, dialect < dialegesthai, to discourse, talk < dia, between,
(see dia-) + legein, to choose, talk, see: logic]] 1) the sum total of
local characteristics of speech. 2) (Rare) the sum total of
individual’s characteristics of speech; idiolect. 3) popularly, any
form of speech considered as deviating from a real or imaginary
standard speech. 4) Linguis. a) a form or variety of a spoken
language, including the standard form, peculiar to a region,
community, social group, occupational group, etc..

Those terms, which include ‘reason,’ as mentioned in the
first definition of the word intellect, define human interactions
with nature, which results in our world of ideas, second nature,
are all together rejected by David Hume in his statement, in which, he disqualifies ‘reason’ as being incapable of regulating passions, and the whole notion of moral philosophy, of questioning our moral convictions and seeking to rationally and empirically justify and reconstruct them. He indicates this position against the capacity of reason to dialectically work with experience, passions, emotions, to generate knowledge, moral, ethical, aesthetic entities, in his claim of reason being the “slave of the passions,” an argument which he boldly expresses: “reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them” (Hume 415). The definitions of those terms, intellect, dialect, and reason, which imply choosing, selecting between, which are active, transitive verbs, words of actions, are logically chosen, without any abuse of language, to define that interaction between human beings and nature, the external world. And the active role of
reason in that process is justifiable in the form, stable structure of our world of ideas, cultural world of second nature, which reason alone keeps in equilibrium. The claim that reason has no other role but to obey and serve the passions is not established on rational ground. The strong participation of reason is clear, evident, explainable through the restructuring, reshaping of our cultural elements, second nature, as proved by Charles Dickens and Defoe, through the names, Pirrip and Philip that change to Pip, and Robinson Kreutznaer to Crusoe, in a closer, denser, new social context, justifying our discussion of a dialectical struggle of the opposites, passions, emotions, reason, in context, and the rational, empirical justification of our moral convictions, reconstruction and change.

Hume’s denial of the important function of reason, the intellect, in shaping our cultural world of ideas, structuring, and giving it form, puts him in contradiction with Immanuel Kant, who
argues that morality is based on reason, as opposed to passions, and our moral principles can be proved by reason (Morality and the Good Life, Robert C. Solomon and Clancy W. Martin 260). Both authors agree that the senses data, the ideas, concepts, generated through our exposition to the external world of nature, culture, are not equal to reality, as indicated in the previous statements. Kant, as we have previously argued, for example, claims that “external things exist but that human beings do not perceive those things as they really are,” (Invitation to Philosophy, Hunt, Honer, Okholm 61). And David Hume echoes that argument through his skepticism as to whether we can prove that our “ideas” are equal to reality (quoted in Morality and the Good Life, Solomon and Martin 260).

The skepticism, expressed by Hume, as to whether we can prove that our ideas are equal to reality, equates Kant’s argument that we do not perceive the external world as it is, in the sense
that those ideas are not real, or do not constitute reality. The controversies are, however, around the foundation of morality and whether we can prove our moral convictions by reason, or questioning, and whether we should even question them. To answer that question, one needs to consider the state-of-the-art, commonly accepted notions, axioms that we are exposed to the world around us, both natural and cultural, including our moral, ethical, aesthetic entities, and what happens between us and those elements, which results in our arranged, organized world of ideas, second nature. There must be a regulator, organizer; it does not accidentally or miraculously happen. We, rational beings, do examine that interaction between us and our surroundings, using our common terms, understanding, perception, intellect, which, according to their definition, logically define that phenomenon. Denying that intellectual activity, David Hume needs to explain whether reason is a wrong choice of term, used to describe that
phenomenon, or there is a misconception by the perceiver of that intellectual activity, which generates our organized, cultural world.

The definitions of those related terms, reason, understanding, dialect, intellect, comprehend, which are the creators, regulators of our cultural world of second nature, as indicated in our discussions, logically imply, reflect both the syllabic, artistic, stable unity of that world, and the relationships between us and the external elements that produce it. We live in an artistically organized world of ideas, ideological, logical constructs, entities, which, by their own structures, constitute the end-products of that mental, intellectual activity, involved in the definition of such terms as reason, which, for example, mean [[ME.(Middle English) Reisun]< OFr. (Old French) <L ( Latin ratio, a reckoning, a fixed relation in the degree, proportion]] 1) an explanation, justification of an act, idea, etc. And intellect [[ME (
Middle English) < L (Latin) intellectus, a perceiving, understanding < pp. of intellegere, to perceive, understand < inter-
between, among + legere, to gather, pick, choose] 1) The ability to reason, or understand, perceive the relationship, differences, etc.
This intellectual endeavor, which involves, as the definitions indicate, a determination to explain, justify, show relationship, proportion, gather, pick, choose, logically leads to such arrangement, solid, stable form of our cultural world of ideas and artifacts. And the term reason, along with the activity which it summarizes, which is inferring, drawing conclusion, deducing, organizing, logically points to our cultural unity, entities. Claiming that reason is incapable of producing such result, Hume, therefore, needs to prove that the definition does not accomplish that cultural reality, which we live in, and that the beholder does not perceive that type of activity between human beings and the external world.
As opposed to David Hume and the characters such as Mrs. Gargery, Pip’s sister, in *Great Expectations*, and Crusoe’s father, as well as Crusoe’s sailing companions, in *Robinson Crusoe*, who, as we have by far debated, are against questioning our moral, ethical, and aesthetic convictions, a position that also involves a denial of our moral renaissance, rebirth, and change, which can only take place through questioning, Immanuel Kant, John Locke, John Milton, Charles Dickens, and Daniel Defoe argue in favor of questioning such convictions and using reason as our guide in doing so. Hume’s argument, denying the function of reason as an organizer of our cultural reality, calling it the “slave of the passions,” echoes the character, Mrs. Gargery, who, as discussed in our analysis of *Great Expectations*, by Charles Dickens, opposes to the character, Pip’s questioning of her moral convictions, and refers to him as a “questioner,” (Dickens 14). He also shares the views of Crusoe’s father, who imposes on Crusoe what he calls the
“common Road,” which, he claims, is advised by the “wise Man,” and wants Crusoe to unquestionably abide by (Defoe 5). Hume, in the same manner, that is, being against the use of reason to question our moral convictions, the natural, as well as moral, cultural, ethical entities, shares the opinions of Crusoe’s sailing companions, who attribute the terrible storm on the sea, to Crusoe’s disobedience of his father’s advice, claiming that they, themselves, have the “calling,” vocation, duty to be what they call “Seafaringman,” but not Crusoe (Defoe 12). Such a reference to the term “calling,” which suggests a voice, sound, with no tangible, rational basis, allowing no room for reason, questioning, like many other similar statements made by morally opposing characters in the novels, such as Mrs. Gargery’s sarcastic treatment of Pip, as a “questioner,” and Crusoe’s father’s insistence on the “common Road,” “middle State,” or the “upper Station of Low Life,” as the unquestionable moral models,
challenges the philosophy of Dickens or Pip, and Milton, which, despite the opposition, conservative views of some characters, remains a practical philosophy of becoming.

As indicated, for example, through the title of Great Expectations, the pursuit of gentlemanship by Pip, standing for Dickens in the first-person point of view, questioning his family background, and more particularly his moral growth, including his education sponsored by the convict, Magwitch, the dynamism of the novel, despite opposition from Pip’s sister, Mrs. Gargery, Dickens uses or emphasizes the process philosophy or philosophy of becoming. The pursuit of such moral renaissance, rebirth, growth, and change, of course, puts him in contradiction with characters such as Mrs. Gargery, who wants him to unquestionably abide by her moral rules or convictions. This conflict is, likewise, experienced by Daniel Defoe and John Milton, who, despite the opposition from characters such as Satan in
Paradise Lost and Regain’d, and Crusoe’s father in Robinson Crusoe, manage to go beyond the present status quo. Defoe, for instance, through the character Crusoe, in the first-person point of view, as well as Milton, raise and support the issue of prophecy and repentance, victory over conscience. An example of how Defoe emphasizes such notions is indicated in his statements regarding his father’s disappointment for not being able to change Defoe’s mind, concerning his determination to travel to seas. Defoe, through Crusoe, describes his father as emotional, with tears running down his eyes, in the last part of his discourse, which Defoe sees as “prophetick,” (Defoe 6). He, also, in the same statements, underlines the possibility of his father’s ignorance of that aspect of his speech, being prophetic:

I observed in this last Part of his Discourse, which was truly ‘Prophetick’ tho’ I suppose my father did not know it to be so himself; I say, I observe the Tears run down his face very
plentifully, and especially when he spoke of my Brother who was kill’d; and that when he spoke of my having Leisure to repent, and none to assist me, he was so mov’d, that he broke off the Discourse, and told me his Heart was so full he could say no more to me (Defoe 6).

In that part of the discourse, the father, according to Defoe, through Crusoe, used in the first-person point of view, is “prophetick,” without even perhaps knowing that. Defoe also uses the term ‘repent’ in this representation of his father’s advice, which, if taken along with the term “prophetick,” in the literal sense, tends to lead us to conclude and argue that the father is a character, who predicts the future and is, according to the word ‘repent,’ a progressive character of change, moral renaissance.
However, taken into the context of the novel, which includes the father’s emphasis on Crusoe’s abiding by the morality of what he refers to as the wise Man, his insistence on “upper Station of Low Life,” as the moral, “common Road,” which Crusoe needs to unquestionably follow, those terms convey a different character of the father. Based on that context and the dynamic, progressive direction of the novel, initiated and maintained by Crusoe’s or Defoe’s philosophy of becoming, in opposition to the father’s conservative views, it is logical to conclude that Defoe rather uses the term “Prophetick,” to indicate that his father’s prophecy, moral predictions happen to be true, as evidenced by his experience of the terrible storm on the sea, and thus enhance his theme regarding questioning our moral convictions, by taking them to experience, as he does, by disobeying his father. He also suggests through the phrase, “tho’ I suppose my father did not know it to be so himself....” that we can always prophesize, there
is a possibility we can be right when testing our predictions through rational, empirical justifications. His reference to the phrases “Drowned all my repentance,” (Defoe 8), and “got as complete a Victory over Conscience,” (Defoe 9), as well as his claim that we are “asham’d to repent,” and that should not be the case (Defoe 13), supports Defoe’s notion of a check- and-balance approach, predictions, prophecy, and repentance through experience, which contradicts the father’s conservative views, but contributes to our discussions, emphasizing the questioning of our moral, ethical, aesthetic principles, and seeking to rationally and empirically justify and reconstruct them, which implies repentance.

This idea of repentance through rationality is similarly sustained by John Milton in Paradise Lost and Regain’d, despite the opposition, contradiction implied in Satan’s malicious practices. Milton, for instance, sees his poem as an “adventurous
song” that, according to the poet, “intends to soar,” with no “middle flight,” pursuing things that have not been attempted in prose or rhyme (1.13-16). Taken or interpreted vaguely, ambiguously, the language used in that stanza of the poem tends to suggest an irrational, liberal undertaking pursued by Milton. The lines, “adventurous song that with no middle Flight intends to soar above th’ Aonian Mount,” as indicated in the poem, though they imply the notion of repentance, or despite the implication of the notion of repentance, as well, in the sense of moving beyond conscience, status quo, the idea of having, as Daniel Defoe himself phrases it, “ got as complete a Victory over Conscience,” also convey the sense of repentance without any moral direction, (Defoe 9) and Milton ( 1. 13-16). That sense of those phrases, and the stanza, as a whole, can be verified through the definitions of, for example, the words, song [[ME (Middle English) < OE (Old English) Sang: IE (Indo-European base) see: sing]], Sing [[ME.
(Middle English) singen < OE (Old English) singan, akin to (related to) Ger. (German) singen< IE base (Indo-Euroean base) Singwh > Gr. (Greek) Omphe, a voice]], and the term, soar [[ME. (Middle English, soren < OFr. (Old French)Essorer, to expose (wings) to the air, hence soar as a falcon < VL. (Vulgar Latin) exaurare < latin ex-out + aura, air]] 1) to rise or fly high into the air (Webster’s New World College Dictionary 1367).

The definitions of those terms, therefore, which suggest a movement, consisting in crossing over the moral boundaries, flying above the present conventional wisdoms, “th’ Aonian Mount,” in Milton’s words, echo Daniel Defoe’s “Compleate a Victory over Conscience,” repentance, and appear to convey the notion of a moral, ethical, aesthetic freedom, pursued by Milton and Defoe without a rational direction. Nevertheless, taking that sense into the context of the poem, as a whole, and finding
Milton’s argument in which he emphasizes the justification of, as he claims, the “wayes of God to men,” which implies the use of reason, rationality, once again allows us to recreate that sense of both passions and reason, working together to achieve that moral, ethical, aesthetic renaissance, rebirth, and change, which we have argued, is possible through a constant questioning of our moral, ethical, aesthetic convictions, and seeking to rationally and empirically justify, and reconstruct them. Milton enhances that questioning of our moral determination in that engagement between reason and passions, emotions, as implied in the preceding phrases, “my adventurous song that with no middle flight intends to soar above the Aonian Mount,” invoking the spirit to join him in his poem so that, as he claims, “I may assert Eternal Providence/ And justifie the wayes of God to men,” (1.25 - 26). so the emotional, deliberate, unmeasured, unrestrained movement suggested in such terms such as ‘Flight,’ adventurous, soar, and
more particularly ‘Aonian Mount,’ which, according to the footnote, at the bottom of page (354), is one of the Helicon Mountains, home of the muses (spirit), and the highest peak, along with the term ‘asserts,’ ‘justifie,’ supports the rational and empirical theme of the poem, and thus Milton’s emphasis on questioning our moral convictions and seeking to empirically justify them, a theme equally supported by Defoe.

One could argue that Satan, in Paradise Lost and Regain'd, supports the notion of moral renaissance, rebirth, and change, by means of rational and empirical ground, since he pioneers that revolution in heavens, challenging God. However, Satan does not react to the conditions in heavens, according to Paradise Lost and Regain’d. He uses physical forces, war of physical destructions, which, logically, has nothing to do with a response to the moral conditions, and would not bring any moral, ethical renaissance, order and change, but Chaos, as indicated in the stanza, which
begins with, “in the Beginning how the Heav’ns and Earth/ Rose out of Chaos...” (1. 9-10). He disguises himself in serpent as a symbol, a trompe l’oeil (eye seducer) to seduce Eve and Adam, and create an irrational basis for their subsequent behavior, which is disobedience (1. 31-33). Satan would need a rational approach that consists in questioning and seeking to rationally and empirically justify and reconstruct those conditions, of course, not the rules of God, since they constitute the intrinsic elements of faith that are immutable, but the way Satan extrinsically applies them. The son of God, as emphasized in the conversation with his mother, Virgin Mary, regarding his father, is a rational character, who becomes human through a father and a mother, without malice, disguise, enhancing our argument on questioning our moral convictions, and thus generating a moral renaissance, rebirth, and change.
John Reichert, the author of the book entitled, *Nature and Scripture*, in his argument, for example, presents Satan, as a rational character, who, according to the author, does not ‘arraign’ either God, the father, or the son, but only Satan himself, and proceeds by claiming that Satan’s lines constitute “neither parody nor travesty”. This argument, nevertheless, does not reflect or characterize Satan as he is portrayed in *Paradise Lost* and *Regain’d*, by John Milton. Satan is engaged in a physical war, not moral, in terms of challenging the ideology, moral conditions in Heavens, but a physical war of material, epic proportion, which Milton, in book one of *Paradise Lost*, first stanza, describes as chaotic: “In the Beginning how the Heav’ns and Earth/ Rose out of Chaos…” (1.9-10). In the preceding lines, Milton indicates that the earth and heavens are the result of a disorderly condition, which he continues to emphasize in his invocation of the spirit to enlighten him in his writing of the poem:
And chiefly Thou O Spirit, that dost prefer
Before all Temples Th’ upright heart and pure,
Instruct me, for Thou know’st; Thou from the first
Wast present, and with mighty wings outspread
Dove-like sats brooding on the vast Abyss
And mad’st it pregnant: What in me is dark
Illumin, what is low raise and support;
That to the highth of this great Argument
I may assert Ethernal Providence,
And justifie the wayes of God to men
(1.17-26).
Milton, in these lines, calls upon the spirit to illumine him, claiming that the spirit was present during the chaos in heaven and earth, sitting on the Abyss, emptiness, and regenerating it, by getting it “pregnant.” He asks the spirit to “raise” “what is low” in him and support it so that he can, as he phrases it, “in the hight of this great argument,” strongly, firmly, claim God and prove, justify his ways to men. Milton reminds us of the chaos caused by Satan’s irrational action, rebellion, malicious behavior, as indicated in his seduction of Eve through the serpent, used as his disguise, and how he (Milton) wants to morally reconstruct and change his present world through a justification of the way of God. He also emphasizes the method of that justification, which consists in a great argument, in which darkness must be illumined, “what is low,” is to be raised and supported, suggesting his reliance on reason and experience, and thus The Enlightenment movement, an approach that enhances our
argument supporting the constant questioning of our moral, ethical, aesthetic convictions, and seeking to rationally and empirically justify and reconstruct them. The characterization of Satan, which is the opposite of Milton’s rational and empirical method, is logically applicable under the terms parody and travesty, which are the synonyms of caricature, meaning the destruction of reality by applying inappropriate, irrelevant attributes, properties, to a subject, hence linking Satan to the travesty, parody, chaos witnessed in heaven and earth. John Reichert uses a few lines to make a generalization about Satan’s lines in the poem as a whole, by claiming that “Satan’s lines are neither travesty nor parody.” For example, he refers to that stanza, in which Satan, troubled by his imminent defeat, loss of the battle against God, loss of heaven, begins to recognize God’s power and his own weakness, to explain, justify the general statement about Satan’s lines:
Sometimes towards Eden which now in his view

Lay pleasant, his grieved look he fixes sad,

Sometimes towards heaven and the full-blazing sun,

Which now sat high in his meridian tower:

Then much resolving, thus in sighs began.

O thou that with surpassing glory crowned,

Look’st from thy sole dominion like the God . . .

(4.24-26, quoted in Milton’s wisdom, nature and scripture in Paradise Lost, Reichert 77).

Satan, as Reichert argues, does not arraign or accuse either the son or the Father, but that does not make Satan a rational character, whose judgments are sound, who is not engaged in either travesty or parody, as the author claims. Satan, as indicated
in *Paradise Lost*, is characterized as a trompe l’oeil (seducer), who is disguised, masked, lives in the serpent’s body, to seduce Eve:

> Say first what cause mov’d our Grand Parents in that Happy State... who first seduc’d them to that foul revolt?

> Th’ infernal Serpent; he it was... Stird up with Envy and Revenge, deceiv’d the Mother of Mankind. ...(1.29-36).

Milton, in his search for truth, to, like does the son of God, defeat Satan, reconstruct *Paradise Lost* into *Paradise Regain’d*, through questioning and seeking to rationally and empirically justify the “wayes of God to men,” interacts with the spirit, questions him as to what causes the loss of paradise. That moral, ethical, aesthetic renaissance, rebirth and change, as exemplified in regaining *Paradise Lost*, according to Milton, through illumination of what in him is “dark,” elevation and “support” of what is “low,” or in other
words, through an argument supported by reason, rational
ground, premises, constitutes a moral weapon against Satan’s
hypocritical, seductive approach, travesty, parody, and a reason
for us readers to constantly question our moral convictions and
seek to rationally and empirically justify and reconstruct, change
them in order to provide justice to one another in society. (1.17-26).

Satan’s approach, which consists in deceiving other
characters through lying, plotting, misrepresentations, is,
according to the poems, Paradise Lost and Paradise Regain’d, the
opposite of Christ’s, the son’s, and milton’s philosophy of moral,
ethical, and aesthetic revival through questioning of the moral
convictions and seeking to, as Milton claims in Paradise Lost,
justify the “wayes of God to men”(1.26). The actions of Satan and
Paradise Lost work as cause and effect in the poems. The cause is
Satan’s rebellion, plotting, false appearance, seduction, hypocritical approach, and the effect, consequence is the moral, ethical, aesthetic decadence, death, loss of paradise or *Paradise Lost*, which Milton, using a philosophy similar to that of the son, revives, changes from *Paradise Lost*, moral death, to *Paradise Regain’d*, through argument, questioning, justification, and reconstruction of the moral, ethical convictions. Milton emphasizes his interest, engagement in a moral rebirth, renaissance, particularly in his use of the terms “brooding,” “pregnant,” to describe how the spirit, whom he invokes to guide him through *Paradise Lost*, changes the “Chaos,” “Abyss,” to a productive world of moral regeneration by “brooding” and making it “pregnant”(1.21-23). He uses similar terms, language of moral, ethical, aesthetic death in the first stanza of *Paradise Lost*, to remind his readers of the painful, deadly consequences of Satan’s actions, and reconstructive language to indicate the
rescuing mission of the son of God, a journey, which he embarks on, in *Paradise Lost*, and successfully completes in *Paradise Regain’d*:

Of Mans First Disobedience, and the Fruit
Of that Forbidden Tree, whose mortal tast
Brought Death into the World, and all our woe
With loss of Eden, till one greater Man
Restore us and regain the blissful Seat... (1.1-5).

In that stanza, Milton, using the method of cause and effect, presents the “Disobedience” of Satan, and the use of the “Forbidden Tree,” as the cause, and “Death,” as the consequence, which the son of God restores us from, and regains *Paradise Lost*. He, on one hand, uses death to represent the effect of Satan's
disobedience, and restore, to describe the son’s action. So
Reichert’s argument that Satan does not arraign either the son or
the Father, and uses neither parody nor travesty, in his lines
(Satan), is inconsistent with the events in the poems. The stanza,
which he uses to support his argument, instead, deals with Satan’s
despair, remorseful moment where he blames himself, and tries to
glorify God so that he could avoid hell.

The stanza, used by Reichert to support his argument, is full
of rhetoric, adopted by Satan to avoid the painful consequences of
his action. That portion of the poem deals with Satan’s sadness,
grievances, evoked by heaven, the sun and Eden, as he
contemplates them, and recalls the happy state, which he once
enjoys. In his present state of despair, he is portrayed as
addressing God, and describing Him as being crowned with
surpassing glory, heaven’s matchless king, while attributing his
failure (Satan's failure) to what he calls his “worse pride,” and “worse ambition,” (Reichert 77). That version of Paradise Lost, which presents Satan in his defeat, trying everything to win the approval of God, cannot be used to support the argument that Satan does not “arraign,” accuse God, or the son, and that he uses neither “parody” nor “travesty.” The missions of the son of God, as well as Milton's missions in the poem, are clearly centered around questioning the moral conditions, which is, as indicated in Paradise Lost, the moral, ethical decadence, chaos, resulting from Satan's irrational approach of seduction, disguise, travesty, parody, and seeking to rationally and empirically justify and reconstruct them.

That theme, moral reconstruction, rebirth, renaissance, and change through constant questioning, rational and empirical justification of the present moral status quo, which, as we have
argued, is equally supported by Charles Dickens, in *Great Expectations*, and Daniel Defoe, in *Robinson's Crusoe*, is also identified by other critics of the novels. Harold Bloom, the author of the book entitled *Defoe's Robinson Crusoe*, for instance, identifies the notion of “individualism,” in *Robinson Crusoe*, which he defines not as being egoistic where everything is self-centered, but in the sense of having a social system, social contract that unites every individual's sense of right or wrong. The novel, according to Bloom, is concerned with taking everyone’s ‘life,’ value, regardless of their social status, into consideration, making it part of the working elements or ingredients of that social contract, or in Bloom’s word, the “literature” of that society to which the person belongs. He further indicates that such condition, required by the novel, would be characterized by the “rise of a society,” defined by “vast complex of interdependent
factors denoted by the terms ‘individualism.’” In this interpretation of Robinson Crusoe, Bloom means a society that would undergo a moral, ethical, aesthetic rebirth, change, in which the conventional wisdoms, tenets, social contracts would represent, or reflect every member, a condition that echoes our argument supporting the constant questioning of our moral conclusions and trying to rationally and empirically justify and reconstruct them (Bloom 11). Questioning our moral, ethical, aesthetic convictions and seeking to rationally and empirically justify them, and thus generating a constant moral, ethical, aesthetic renaissance, rebirth, which we have maintained through our argument, should be the philosophical activity of every society, as emphasized by Daniel Defoe in Robinson Crusoe, Charles Dickens, in Great Expectation, and John Milton, in Paradise Lost and Regain’d. Such a philosophical approach can produce constant changes in our beliefs, moral, ethical, aesthetic
concepts, and renewed social contracts, in which we can see one another’s views, senses of right or wrong, and changes in mankind as a whole.

That individualism, which Bloom underlines in Robinson Crusoe, as a movement of each individual’s senses of right in a particular society to that society’s general sense of right or wrong, known as social contract, where everyone’s voice is counted, through rational and empirical justification of our moral concepts, which produces changes, moral rebirth, renaissance and growth, or as Bloom phrases it “the rise of a society characterized by a complex of interdependent factors,” is also pointed out by Jerome Meckier in his critique of Dickens’s Great Expectations. In his book entitled Dicken’s Great Expectations, Meckier views Dicken’s novel, Great Expectations, as a realistic work that challenges other unrealistic works, emphasizing the idea that we should not expect a life of “unqualified ascent” (Meckier 2). An example of stories,
which, according to Meckier, Dickens sees as unrealistic, is
Cinderella’s fairy tale of unexpected rise. The diligent Pip, who
finds himself in contradiction with Mrs. Gargery, for his constant
questioning of her moral convictions, his determination, as we
have argued, to investigate his family background through
questioning, and seeking to rationally and empirically justify the
information, to the point of being called a “drat” and “questioner”
by Mrs. Gargery, is, based on Meckier’s interpretation of the novel,
a realistic character, whose growth, whether moral, ethical,
aesthetical, has a rational and empirical basis. Meckier interprets
Pip as a character purposely used by Dickens to remind us, his
readers, not to expect what Meckier calls a life of “unqualified
ascent” (Meckier 2). Cinderella’s fairy tale and thus the sudden
rise in her life is, based on the author’s critique of Great
Expectations, an “unqualified ascent” that, unlike Pip’s moral,
ethical, aesthetic growth, renaissance, which is based on constant
questioning, rational and empirical justification, cannot be explained through rational ground, an argument that again enhances our own discussions supporting the constant questioning of our moral, ethical, aesthetic entities, and seeking to rationally and empirically justify, and reconstruct them.

Such a position, constant questioning of our moral, ethical, aesthetic resolutions, and trying to rationally and empirically, pragmatically justify and restructure them, which we have maintained throughout our discussions, despite being, as it has been demonstrated, supported by Daniel Defoe through Robinson Crusoe, Charles Dickens through Pip, and John Milton, still remains an issue for David Hume, who disagrees on that moral philosophy, particularly with Immanuel Kant and John Locke, who also support it. Daniel Defoe, as emphasized in our previous arguments, represented by Crusoe, used in the first-person point of view, refuses to unquestionably abide by his father’s advice, not
to travel to sea, though he acknowledge that it turns out to be, as he claims, a “prophetick discourse” (Defoe 15). He questions his father’s notion that he should abide by the “common Road,” meaning the moral code followed by a category of people in his society. Crusoe demonstrates how our moral, ethical, aesthetic resolutions can change from one social context to another, by indicating how his last name changes from “Kreutznaer,” in a specific social context to Crusoe in another different context, stressing the importance of a dialectic approach, questions and answers, dialogue, moral rebirth, renaissance and change. Dickens emphasizes a similar point by changing Pirrip, in one social setting, to Pip, in another. This pattern, dialectical reality, which can only happen through dialogue, questioning of our moral convictions, is also experienced in Paradise Lost, by John Milton, who resolves to question, and justify the “wayes of God to men” (1.26) and (Dickens 3).
This emphasis on questioning, a dialectical approach, and moral, ethical, aesthetic rebirth, change, enhanced by the preceding authors, as well as Immanuel Kant and John Locke, is, however, rejected by David Hume. Kant, according to Honer, Hunt, and Okholm, authors of the book, Invitation to Philosophy, emphasizes the existence of a world, external to our senses, but insists that we do not exactly perceive that world as it is, echoing John Locke, who, as indicated by the same authors (Honer, Hunt, and Okholm), refers to our sense organs as “cameras that take ‘pictures’ of objects” (Honer 58 & 61). Those arguments are similar to one another, and to David Hume’s doubt, as to whether we can prove that our “ideas” are equal to reality, in the sense that we do not automatically (by the senses) know the things existing outside those senses (quoted in Morality and The Good Life, Solomon and Martin 260). They are also similar to Dickens’s, Defoe’s, and Milton’s emphases on questioning our moral, ethical,
and aesthetic convictions, and seeking to rationally and empirically justify them, in terms of both, our inability to automatically know the world around us and that inability being the reason to support that philosophical activity, questioning our ideas, since we do not immediately know them.

What causes the controversy between Hume and the other authors, who agree among them on the issue of questioning our moral convictions is, as we have argued, the question of whether our moral principles are based on reason and passions, and whether we should question them, using reason. Hume, in response to that question, makes a bold, general statement: “Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them” (A Treatise of Human Nature, Hume 415). The tone of that argument tends to make one wonder if Hume ever considers his reactions as an opinion, point of view on an issue, matter, which he, like any
other debater, attempts to resolve. To fully understand the inaccuracy of that claim, we need to ask ourselves what makes ‘reason’ the slave of the ‘passions’? Hume offers an explanation for the superiority of passion to reason, by claiming that passion, as opposed to reason, has an “original existence,” reaffirming his other statements, including stressing the “impossibility of deriving an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’,” (quoted in Morality and the Good Life, Robert C. Solomon, Clancy W. Martin 12).

Arguing that passion is natural, original, Hume reiterates his notions of an “ought” for “an is,” indicating in other words, that world of experience is real, an argument rejected by Kant, who claims “The objects with which we have to do in experience are by no means things in themselves but merely phenomena” (Critique of Practical Reason, Kant 71). We can logically understand the argument of Kant in terms of subjectivity of the things exposed to our senses, which consistently explains both his
previous argument that “external things exist but that human beings do not perceive those things as they really are” and thus the necessity to pursue our search for truth, reality, by questioning our perceptions (Invitation to Philosophy, Honer, Hunt, and Okholm 61). As for Hume’s claims, emphasizing the “impossibility of deriving an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’,” there is no consistency, no logic in it. Hume himself contradicts his own notion of conceiving the object of experience as an “is,” by expressing his doubt as to whether we can prove that our own “ideas” correspond to reality (quoted in Morality and The Good Life, Solomon 260). This contradiction, therefore, cancels Hume’s notion of the existence of an ‘is,’ including the originality of passions, thus causing him to have no basis for his argument against questioning our moral principles and using reason to do so. Those self-contradicting statements that leave Hume with no argument on this issue, also take him back to the point where he
agrees with the fore-mentioned authors, that we do not automatically know the world external to our senses, and place before them, including Hume himself, the moral obligation to, at least, inquire into that world, using reason.

What Hume has, all along, failed to realize, however, is the capacity of ‘reason’ to help question our unavoidable moral abstracts, complex ideas, which we, as rational beings, naturally formulate, and, as experiences teach us, use as instruments of absolute, timeless, uncaused, immutable, and unchanged values, to monopolize our cultural make-up, and thus taking control of one another’s life. For example, in the novels, Great Expectations and Robinson Crusoe, Charles Dickens and Daniel Defoe share that experience with us, readers, through the characters, Pip, and Crusoe, used in the first-person point of view. Part of that complete control and disregard for the right of human beings in
social context is the phase in the novel where Dickens, embodied in Pip, shows how he cannot even ask a question regarding his sister, Mrs. Gargery’s moral views, convictions, without being reprimanded or called a “questioner.” And, in addition, shared with us, readers, is the experience of Daniel Defoe with his father through the character Crusoe similarly used in the first-person point of view. Crusoe’s father, despite the meetings, conferences, which he holds with Crusoe, in order to convince him not to travel to sea, does not really allow Crusoe to express his opinions. We could avoid that moral obligation, if we lived in isolation to one another in nature. As rational and emotional beings, who, according to the definition of rational, meaning, [[ME. (Middle English) racional, from Latin, rationalis, from ratio, reason]] and emotional, emotion, have naturally responded to nature and created our cultural world, we could only free ourselves from that obligation by staying away from social contexts, living in nature.
This way, our rational, emotional responses to nature, environment, would not affect other members of society. However, since our capacity to reason, draw conclusions, inferences, and see fixed relationships, ratios between things, elements of the external world of nature takes us away from nature itself, into the organized society where our moral resolutions tend to morally impact other members, we must and need to constantly question and seek to rationally and empirically, pragmatically justify, and reconstruct them, with the moral convictions of other members in mind so that they can reflect the views of every member of society, and thereby providing a sense of justice for all.

Immanuel Kant, as well as, Charles Dickens, through Pip, Daniel Defoe, through Crusoe, and Milton emphasize that philosophy of becoming, change, renaissance, rebirth of our moral, ethical, aesthetic convictions when taken to social,
pragmatic contexts, and questioned, an approach that, as it has been indicated in our argument, generates the controversy between those authors and Hume, including the characters, Mrs. Gargery and Crusoe’s father. Kant, for example, in his book, *Critique of Practical Reason*, elaborates on the objectivity, or in other word, survival of our moral principles when arriving in social Milieu, if we formulate them with regard to every rational being, and their subjectivity when they are based solely on our will, ignoring the will of others. Kant, for instance, defines practical principles as propositions that involve or contain what he refers to as a “general determination of the will having under it several practical rules,” (Kant 31). Those rules, according to Kant, are considered “subjective, or Maxims,” that is existing in one individual’s mind, valid only for that subject or being, as general, as opposed to practical rules that reflect every rational being or member of society. They are, nevertheless, “objective or practical
laws,” argues the author, if the subject considers the condition as valid for every member. Kant, in this argument, emphasizes that constant questioning of our moral convictions by insisting that we consider every rational being in our moral, ethical, aesthetic convictions, so that such convictions can be objective, and survive as practical laws, when dialectically exposed to the views of every rational being. He also anticipates the moral, ethical, aesthetic renaissance, rebirth, and change that they tend to undergo when they are subjective, that is, valid for only one individual’s will, idiolect, and then dialectically challenged, questioned by other rational beings. When we base our moral determinations solely on our own will, ignoring the will of other rational beings, according to Kant, they are considered subjective, Maxims, existing only in our own mind, and then change to, as Daniel Defoe, through Crusoe, phrases it, “repentance” and “as compleat a Victory over Conscience,” (Defoe
Defoe justifies the notion of subjectivity, change, moral renaissance, repentance, objectivity, through, as we have previously discussed, ‘Kreutznaer’ that is dialectically changed to ‘Crusoe,’ the testing of his idea to travel against his father’s advice, which happens to be, with experience, objective, and referred to, by Crusoe, as “prophetic,” meaning real, effective. (Defoe 4 & 15).

Defoe, through Crusoe, echoes Kant’s argument on the subjectivity, and objectivity of our moral resolutions, the possibility of their survival, or rebirth, change, from an individual, idiolect, to a dialectical, social contract status that reflects everyone’s sense of right or wrong, in various circumstances in the novel. Examples of the circumstances indicating that similarity between the authors, and thus their support of our position emphasizing the constant questioning of our moral, ethical, aesthetic convictions, and seeking to rationally, and empirically, pragmatically justify and reconstruct them, can be, for instance,
verified in the versions dealing with Defoe’s stress on making hypotheses and testing them with the possibilities of change, rebirth, and survival. For example, Crusoe’s statements “I drowned all my Repentance, all my Reflections upon my past Conduct...,” “Got as compleat a Victory over Conscience,” change, which, according to Crusoe, takes place in relation to the changing of the storm on the sea, indicate that notion of subjectivity emphasized by Kant, which defines the world as existing in our own mind, and being differently perceived by each of us, and subject to change, as we expose our views to other views, or different situations, and question them (Defoe 8 &9).

And the objectivity of our views, resolutions, which, according to Kant, depends on whether we take every rational being into account, or how well they do when rationally, empirically, dialectically exposed to other views, in social context, is also enhanced by Crusoe, in his statement regarding the
pragmatic, contextual, empirical, and rational survival of his father’s advice when taken to the sea:

At this surprising Change of my Circumstances from a Merchant to a miserable Slave, I was perfectly overwhelmed; and now I look’d back upon my Father’s prophetick Discourse to me, that I should be miserable, and have none to relieve me, which I thought was now so effectually brought to pass, that it could not be worse; that now the Hand of Heaven had over-taken me, and I was undone without Redemption (Defoe 15).

Crusoe, in that statement, indicates how his condition change from being a “Merchant” to a “miserable slave,” a situation that greatly affects, and causes him to look back at his father’s sincere, honest advice, warning him of such outcome, which is exactly as the father predicts it to be. While reminding his readers of the potential objectivity, truth, survival of our moral, ethical,
aesthetic predictions, and the importance of making them, Crusoe, however, Cautions us on how minimal, unscientific, irrational that survival or objectivity can be, by attributing it to heaven, God, as suggested in the phrase “that now the Hand of Heaven had over taken me,”(Defoe 15). In that version of the novel, Defoe, through Crusoe, encourages his readers to make moral judgments, convictions, as does his father, but recommends that as he, himself, does, we take them to the practical, contextual, pragmatic world, question and seek to rationally and empirically justify and reconstruct them, with the possibilities of their survival of that test being very low, compared to the likelihood of their being changed, reborn, reconstructed, as implied in his phrases “I drowned all my Repentance,” “like a true repenting prodigal,” and “as compleat a Victory over Conscience” (Defoe 8& 9). Crusoe takes his father’s advice to experience, question them, and they pass the rational, empirical, contextual test, which, according to
Crusoe, they could have failed, through repentance or “Victory over Conscience.” He encourages us to question one another’s moral conclusions, make judgments, be skeptical and willing to repent, an approach for which, according to Crusoe, we can be “esteemed wise men” (Defoe 13).

That emphasis on making moral, ethical, aesthetic resolutions, questioning and seeking to rationally and empirically justify and reformulate them, with the possibility of their survival of the empirical, rational test, being proved by reason, or going through, as Defoe claims, repentance, change, rebirth, being disproved by reason, as indicated by Kant and Defoe, is counter-argued by Hume, who considers that approach, an “abstruse philosophy” that, as he claims, “vanishes when the philosopher leaves the shade and comes to open day” (Inquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals,
Hume 7). Hume, in that argument, for example, refers to that moral philosophy, the questioning of our moral conclusions and seeking to, in a deductive and inductive manner, rationally and empirically justify and reconstruct them, as an abstract philosophy that unquestionably disappears when arriving in the empirical, common world of “passions,” “affections,” “the feeling of our heart,” which he phrases as the “open day” (Hume 7).

Hume's stresses on the rapid, quick disappearance of that philosophy, by claiming that it “vanishes” in the world of our “passions,” “affection,” “feeling of our heart,” which, according to Hume, also “dissipate all its conclusions,” (the conclusions of that philosophy), echo Kant’s and Defoe’s arguments on the subjectivity, and repentance of our moral conclusions, in terms of their possible disappearance in social context, as well as the influential role of that context, empirical world, in what they
become. They, however, disagree on the chance of survival of those moral conclusions. Hume, for instance, rejects the formulation of those moral, ethical, aesthetic principles through questioning, reasoning, as we have indicated through our arguments, by defining reason as the “slave of the passions,” (A Treatise of Human Nature, Hume 415), and arguing the “impossibility of deriving an ‘ought’ from an ‘is,’” (quoted in Morality and the Good Life, Solomon and Martin 12). He also emphasizes the unquestionable vanishing, dissipation of those moral principles in context, as well as the moral philosophy that generates them, (Inquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, Hume 7).

While Kant’s, Defoe’s, Dickens’s, and Milton’s arguments, emphasizing the subjectivity, objectivity, moral repentance, “Victory over Conscience,” survival of our moral conclusions through questioning, contradicting Hume’s, as well as Mrs.
Gargery’s, the character in Dickens’s Great Expectations, and Crusoe’s father’s approaches of no question, no moral philosophy, they do, however, support our argument on constant questioning of such conclusions. The questioning of our moral, ethical, aesthetic convictions and seeking to rationally, empirically justify and reconstruct them allows us to, in a dialectical battle of the opposing views, take everyone’s views into account and reach a decision, social contract, society’s general sense of right or wrong that reflects everyone’s own sense of right or wrong. Nevertheless, unquestionably holding, abiding by and imposing our moral convictions on one another as ultimate truths, as Crusoe’s father, through his emphasis on Crusoe’s abiding by what he calls the cultural, moral “common Road,” the “middle Station,” of Mankind, the “upper Station of Low Life,” on the contrary, would perpetuate, eternalize them as absolute, timeless, uncaused, cultural units that do not reflect present reality, or the
concern of the present or future generations, the views, or senses of right or wrong of every member of a society, as we have witnessed in the novels (Defoe 5-6).

*The Characters’ Resolutions to Question the Social Conventions Result in the Family Issue and the Emerging Conflict*

Pip’s and Crusoe’s determinations, therefore, to question and seek to rationally and empirically justify and reconstruct those conceptual, moral models such as the notions of “common Road,” the “middle State,” or “upper station of Low Life,” held and worshipped by Crusoe’s father, and Mrs. Gargery’s conception of Pip being a “questioner,” including Pip’s investigations of his parents’ background, then result in the moral, ethical, aesthetic conflicts among the characters (Defoe 5) and (Dickens 14). Both novels, for example, begin with the skeptical characters, Robinson
Crusoe’s and Pip’s unanswered questions: who were my family roots? Pip, on one hand, does not know his family root and is engaged in solving that problem, that question mark? Robinson Crusoe, on the other hand, has a second brother whom he does not know anything about, but acknowledges that lack of information, which suggests that he, like Pip, may be engaged in answering that particular question, or moving from a state of moral darkness to enlightenment. Examples of moral questions and curiosity that make up both characters’ state of consciousness and set the controversial, moral tone of the novels are indicated in their opening statements at the beginning of the novels:

I give Pirrip as my father’s family name, on the authority of his tombstone and my sister Mrs. Joe Gargery, who married a blacksmith. As I never saw my father or my mother, and never saw any likeness of either of them (for their days were long before the days of photographs), my first fancies regarding what they
were like, were unreasonably derived from the tombstones. The shape of the letters on my father’s, gave me an odd idea that he was a square, stout, dark man, with curly black hair (Dickens 3).

That statement, which shows Pip at the beginning of the novel, away from home, at the tombstones of his parents, whom he claims that he never sees, looking for evidence of the family roots, as well as his own roots, justifies our discussions of the character’s attempt to answer moral questions through rational and empirical grounds, and initiates the moral controversy between Pip and Mrs. Gargery (Dickens 3). We, readers, become aware of that instability when Pip takes us back home, along with him from the tombstones located on the churchyard. When returning home, for example, Pip learns from Joe that Mrs. Joe Gargery, who, as we have discussed, raises Pip by “hand,” calls
him “questioner,” warning him not to ask any question in order not to be told lies, looks for him about a “dozen times” (Dickens 8). And “what’s worse,” adds Joe, “she’s got Tickler with her,” which, according to Pip, is a “wax-ended piece,” used by Mrs. Joe to whip him (Dickens 9-14).

These circumstances, which are the consequences of Pip’s moral, ethical, and aesthetic curiosity, directed toward questioning and trying to make sense of the current cultural realities, and avoiding a world of purely conceptual, nonrepresentational moral entities, also constitute the experience of Robinson Crusoe. Crusoe, for example, like the character Pip, who does not know his parents, begins the novel with the idea of not knowing what happens to his brother, who goes to war as a soldier of an army. This lack of knowledge regarding Crusoe’s brother, which provides us with a sense of Crusoe’s mental state,
which, based on the moral instability between Crusoe and his father, is full with uncertainty, unanswered questions, is indicated in the following statement:

I had two elder Brothers, one of which was Lieutenant Collonel to an English Regiment of Foot in Flanders formerly commanded by the famous Coll. Lockhart, and was killed at the Battle near Dunkirt against the Spaniards: what became of my second Brother I never knew any more than my Father or my Mother did know what was become of me.

That curiosity, wonder, question mark, which is natural, inherent in every rational and emotional being, including the characters, Pip and Crusoe, as indicated in our discussions of their constant questioning of the other characters’ moral convictions, such as Mrs. Gargery and Crusoe’s father, and emphasized as well
by John Milton, who seeks to justify the “wayes of God to men,” needs to and must be exercised by every member of society. Once engaged in that moral philosophy, constant questioning, and seeking to rationally and empirically justify and reconstruct our moral convictions, like Crusoe, who has been able to weigh his father’s moral advice through experiences and repentances, and thus discover the truth, Pip who has become a gentleman, and finally John Milton’s inquiry that changes *Paradise Lost* to *Paradise Regain’d*, we can generate a moral renaissance, rebirth, and change that reflects every member of our society, and have a better world.
CHAPTER IV

CONSTANT QUESTIONING OF OUR MORAL, ETHICAL, AESTHETIC CONVICTIONS WITH THE VIEWS OF OTHER MEMBERS OF SOCIETY IN MIND, SEEKING TO RATIONALLY AND EMPIRICALLY JUSTIFY, RECONSTRUCT THEM, AND THUS GENERATING A DIALECT, MORAL CONSENSUS, REPRESENTATIVE, AND A SENSE OF JUSTICE, INTELLECTUAL GROWTH, PROGRESS, SOCIAL CHANGE.

Constant questioning of our moral, ethical, aesthetic convictions, with other members of society in mind, seeking to rationally and empirically justify and reconstruct them can generate a moral renaissance, rebirth, change, a representative that reflects every member of a society, and a sense of justice, intellectual growth, progress, social change.
We can reduce our moral, ethical, aesthetic convictions to a means, consensus that represents the sense of right or wrong of every member of a society, through constantly questioning them, with one another’s senses in mind, and seeking to rationally, empirically justify, and reconstruct them. As rational beings, who respond to nature, natural surroundings, and create a culture, we do react to one another’s views, senses of right or wrong, in social co-existence, and therefore cannot ignore such reactions, responses, by unquestionably holding our moral convictions, abiding by, and imposing them on other members of society. We need to constantly question them and seek to, in a deductive and inductive approach, rationally and empirically justify, and reconstruct them accordingly, thus generating a moral renaissance, rebirth and change, a moral means, representative that summarizes the sense of right or wrong of every member. Responding to nature, natural as well as moral, cultural entities,
we are challenged by other rational beings, members of society, who respond differently to such entities, and react to our views by either agreeing or disagreeing to them. Instead of unquestionably holding, abiding by and imposing them on other members, we need to brainstorm our moral convictions through deductions, and weigh such inferences against their empirical bases, which can be either nature or culture, and as well as the views of every member of society, in order to deduce a moral consensus that reflects the senses of right or wrong of everyone. During our exposition to nature, for example, impressions, sense data are produced through phenomena, and we name, organize such data under conceptual language or lexical definition, and form our concepts, complex ideas, or cultural entities. We balance, weigh those concepts against nature and adopt them as cultural wholes, which we continue to respond to. However, since we have different reactions to nature, as well as our cultural elements, and
according to John Locke’s notion of knowledge being a “picture” of reality and Immanuel Kant’s argument that “we do not perceive the things as they really are,” we, therefore, need to question our different views, to arrive at a moral common denominator that represents every member of society.

That social contract, along with the philosophical activity that generates it, constitutes a necessity, need, as well as, a moral obligation in any social context respectively. Reason takes us away from nature to culture, and then subculture, made of our responses to nature, to which we continue to respond; it is, therefore, a necessity to find a representative, social contract that features the views, concerns, voice of every rational being or member of a given society. Any moral, ethical, and aesthetic conviction that is to be adopted as moral guidance in an established society should be questioned and weighed against
both its empirical basis and the responses, views, which it generates, provokes from other members. In the course of that process, any conviction that is proved to be unreflective of its empirical foundation, as well as, the views of other members of society, or irrelevant to one or the other, must be redefined or reconstructed, as emphasized by Daniel Defoe through Robinson Crusoe in his “Victory over Conscience” or the notion of repentance, and the taking of his father’s social “common Road” advice to the sea, testing it against the storm, where its justification leads him to the moral repentance. However we should never redefine, reconstruct a moral conviction because it simply cannot be born out of the current status quo, especially if it is there for a change. Any moral hypothesis that reflects changes must experience problems, landing, because it is a stranger, carrying its own provision of change. Do not negatively judge and quickly redefine or destroy it because of its difficulty landing. As
an ambassador of change it is normal to find the ground impractical. Again, to avoid making such mistake, we need to question our moral convictions and seek to rationally and empirically justify and reconstruct them, using rational, sound judgments. For example, the president’s healthcare plan, referred to as Obama's Care, should never be negatively judged because of the unfriendly condition of the status quo. It carries its own components of change; therefore, it is normal and logical that it be unwelcomed, either morally or technologically in the present condition. People need to look beyond the superficial, technological issue encountered by that plan to discover its value.

Such a moral approach will guarantee a sense of justice, equal rights, intellectual growth, progress, social change. A moral approach, which is defined by and consists in such components, as the constant questioning of our moral convictions and seeking to
rationally and empirically justify them with the views of every member of a given society in mind, instead of imposing them on other members, will generate a sense of justice, equal rights, intellectual growth and change. For example, when responding to an external entity, whether natural or cultural, if we measure our responses or weigh them against their empirical sources, that is, that external entity in question, and the views of other rational beings, resulting from their responses to that natural or cultural entity, and to our own views, through questioning, we can then reduce our responses to a moral means that reflects every rational being.

Generating that sense among members of any given society, through questioning of our moral convictions with the views of other members in mind, and arriving at a moral means, consensus that represents the sense of right or wrong of every
member, we can then have a stable, better society, and a better world.

As it has been indicated throughout our discussions, some characters such as Mrs. Gargery, in Great Expectations, by Charles Dickens, Crusoe’s father in Robinson Crusoe, by Daniel Defoe, Satan in Paradise Lost and Paradise Regain’d, by John Milton, want and attempt to unquestionably hold their moral convictions, abide by and impose them on other characters. The characters, Pip and Crusoe, as witnessed in the novels, for example, are engaged in constant moral struggles to have their voice, views, senses of right or wrong represented, reflected in the literature, the moral convictions, assumptions of their times, to be able to question and seek to rationally and empirically justify them,
despite the oppositions from other characters, such as Mrs. Gargery and Crusoe’s father. Adam and Eves as we have experienced in the novels, as well, are lied to, seduced by the disguised Satan, who wants to hide the truth from them and reduce their ability to question their actions. However, as we have discussed and maintained all along, being rational and emotional, co-existing and interacting with other members of society, seeking justice, intellectual progress, change, we must and need to constantly question our moral, ethical, and aesthetic convictions with the views of other members of society in mind, and seek to, in a deductive and inductive approach, rationally and empirically justify, reconstruct them, thus generating and perpetrating a moral renaissance, rebirth, change, and a moral means, consensus, common denominator that reflects, represents the senses of right or wrong of every member of society. Arriving at that moral
means, we can certainly have a better society and a better world where we are all culturally, morally represented.


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