UN Quick Impact Projects: A Stepping stone for United Nations Missions Effectiveness through the Creation of a Confidence Building System

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United Nations Quick Impact Projects: a stepping-stone for United Nations missions’ effectiveness through the creation of a confidence-building system

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**Abstract:**

This thesis is focusing on the United Nations Quick Impact Projects, which were officially established as part of the UN peacekeeping missions program through the Brahimi report in 2004. Their primary purpose is to develop and strengthen the relationship between the mission and the host population. Precisely, this analysis is centering on the influence that improved relationships have on the effectiveness of a UN mission. In order to do so, the structure of this research is based on a comparative method, using interviews from the field and at the UN headquarters in New York City. The purpose of such method is to gather substantive data to enable the establishment of a first layer of evaluation. The study-cases are the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in DR Congo (MONUSCO), the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). Other participants to the interviews are from the United Nations civil affairs Office and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). Both the United Nations and the IR literature have lacked the analysis to evaluate the correlation between the improvement of population trust and the increase of the mission’s effectiveness. Therefore, this analysis demonstrates the reasons of the absence of such framework and proposes recommendations to develop a first layer of structural assessment.
INTRODUCTION

“If we don’t act now and decisively, I will not exclude the possibility of a genocide occurring.”¹ These are the words of Amada Dieng, United Nations Special Adviser on the prevention of genocide, to describe the appalling scenario that occurred in Central African Republic. Echoing this statement, France, the UN Security Council president during January 2014 explained: “given the seriousness of the situation in the Central African Republic, which may implode, the international community should lend its immediate support to the African force.”²

One may think that this is the first time that the Central African Republic has encountered such a fate, however, since its independence in 1960, 13 mandates were developed from 1997 to 2013 to protect, secure and assist this country in its peace process. Although mandates have been designed, and joint work with the African Union (AU) and the UN have been established to protect this country from chaos, it seems that peace never lasted long.

Peacekeeping operations have fundamentally been established by the United Nations to assist in the peace process between conflicting parties and assure the protection of civilians. However, since the terrible outcome of different UN missions in the ‘90s, the peacekeeping operation mandates were enlarged to include broader actions. As Diehl and Druckman say in their book Evaluating Peace Operations, “peace

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¹ Reuters, Friday November 1st 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/01/us-centralafrica-un-idUSBRE9A00Y120131101
operations refer to the range of peace missions (traditional peacekeeping, robust peacekeeping, peace-building, peace observation).”

This analysis will focus on peace-building missions in countries that have undergone intrastate conflict. The main goal of this type of mission is to assist countries in rebuilding the institutional framework of their State to prevent them from falling back into war. As one can imagine, peace-building missions are long-standing, sinuous and complicated. The missions are asked to assist the State in restoring its authority through the reinforcement of its public institutions. Similarly to the traditional peacekeeping operations, peace-building missions cannot be set up without the full consent of the parties involved. Marrack Goulding, in his article *The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping* explains that the consent of the country can be a strength thanks to the legitimacy it implies for the country mission, however it could easily turn into a weakness if the government uses it as a reason not to follow the mission’s recommendations or as a threat for the mission to lose its authorized existence.4

In 2000, Secretary-General Kofi Annan requested the establishment of a Panel in order to address the challenges of the new era and to adequately promote peace by improving the United Nations peace operation system. Lahkdar Brahimi, chairman of this committee on UN Peace Operations replied to Kofi Annan that this endeavor has been accomplished “to offer frank, specific and realistic recommendations for ways in which

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to enhance [the peace operation system] capacity.”

It also informs that the peace operations were firstly military and now involves a growing civilian capacity. The peacebuilding process is therefore aimed to “reassemble the foundations of peace and to provide the tools for building a safe, strong and sustainable state.”

In this attempt to renovate the peacekeeping operation structure, Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) were first introduced in the Brahimi Report, which “recommended that a small percentage of a mission’s first-year budget should be made available to the representative or special representative of the Secretary-General leading the mission to fund QIPs in its area of operations, with the advice of the United Nations Country Team’s Resident Coordinator.”

They “are small-scale, rapidly-implementable projects, of benefit to the population.”

Diehl and Druckman explain that previous research on evaluation of peace operations “focus generally on the conditions for success rather than on the mechanisms responsible for the outcome.” This analysis will therefore concentrate on the QIPs mechanisms and evaluate their impact on peace operation effectiveness.

QIPs are supposed to develop a climate of trust between different actors involved in the peace process: the host government, which has been tremendously weakened during times of conflict, the missions, which needs to legitimate its presence, the population, who have long been disillusioned and NGOs involved in the QIPs implementation. They are also aiming at “attracting future voluntary support” and “might

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5 Letter from Lahkdar Brahimi to Secretary-General Kofi Annan on August 17, 2000
8 Ibid., 3
9 Diehl, Druckman, op. cit., 7
attract the attention of development and reconstruction donors.”\textsuperscript{11} Not only do the QIPs attempt to develop strong relationships between different actors during the implementation of the mandate requirements, they are also a springboard for future voluntary donations. As the Henri L. Stimson Center report also details, the Quick Impact Projects are applied to a variety of activities: education, sanitation, or the reconstruction of public infrastructure such as prison or courts.\textsuperscript{12} They could also be aimed at developing structures to promote human rights, such as agricultural projects for prisoners reinsertion or the construction of different rooms separating detainees given their age or gender.

While QIPs were officially created in 2004, no project evaluation of their impact on effectiveness has been undertaken. More importantly, most of the interviewees who participated in the discussion on QIPs explained that they had no idea how to assess the population needs or the QIPs impact on the mission mandates. The goal of this thesis will therefore be to call for the establishment of an assessment of the QIPs on the mission’s effectiveness. The analysis starting point is to consider that by developing strong relationships between different actors and stakeholders, QIPs assist the missions in developing a stable environment for the mandate’s achievement. From this argument, several questions are raised. What are the types of relationships discussed? How often should the mission be in contact with the population to properly understand its needs? Is there really an improvement in the population’s opinion with regards to the mission once the QIPs are closed?

\textsuperscript{12} Ibid., 57.
All these questions need to be answered if the United Nations wishes to properly establish a framework of evaluation of their Quick Impact Project’s impact. This analysis will therefore attempt to construct a frame of inquiry in order to facilitate such assessment material.

Although being a modest part of the UN missions’ budget, we can argue that QIPs impact, if correctly implemented, can strengthen the chances of success of UN operations by increasing the legitimacy of the United Nations mission and thus opening the dialogue between the host government and the UN personnel. It could even develop other links of partnerships which would further improved the mission’s effectiveness. Besides, through the implementation of short-term projects such as QIPs, “the threat of withdrawal”, mentioned in Goulding’s work, could be minimized by the increase in the mission’s short-term achievements. It could also develop trust by the population towards the peacekeepers and facilitate their work, and lastly, on the long-term, they could create opportunities for further financial support.

Consequently, this research study asks: how can we accurately measure Quick Impact Project’s impact on the UN missions’ effectiveness?

The main hypothesis of this research is to prove that by strengthening good relations between the actors working for the stabilization of peace and promoting future economic support, QIPs genuinely improve the effectiveness of a peace operation. However as it has been previously stated, no proper set of measurement have been defined to prove such purpose. This project’s goals is understand the reasons of such absence and establish a set of recommendations to facilitate the establishment of a framework of evaluation.
In order to carry out this analysis, I will use practical sources such as reports from the United Nations, reports from NGOs and I will perform interviews with United Nations staff, both at the Headquarters and in the missions. With regards to the latter, an analysis of the Quick Impact Projects influence on the mission effectiveness raises different questions that could become the basis for interviews, as well as for the corpus of my research\(^\text{13}\).

Apart from the interviews and the literature from the United Nations, I will also use sources that have been published on the evaluation of peace operations in order to substantiate my analysis based on a qualitative methodology. My research will not be a single-case project, I will use three different missions in order to enable generalization toward the implementation of this policy and its impact on peace operations success. Out of these three, two are located in Africa (Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire) and one is located outside the African continent, Haiti, which allows plurality in the type of cases and so better legitimacy for this research. The literature will allow me to find a standard framework to define the concept of success and failure of peace operations and to accurately relate it to the effectiveness of QIPs in these missions.

With regards to the time period of the assessment, the QIPs are being implemented during the first year of the mission in theory, however, as the research goes on, it might be possible to observe an influence on a longer term. Besides, if QIPs are known to be fast implemented, almost immediate, it also generate financial support and develop a strong climate of trust, which can be assumed as impacts that go beyond the simple year of operation.

\(^\text{13}\) See full set of questions in the appendix of this research
Finally, the study will follow a typical framework of analysis; a literature review follows the introduction. Chapter 3 is the definition of terms used in the analysis, in order to provide better visibility and understanding for the following chapters. Chapter IV will consist in the presentation of the different study-cases, lastly the subsequent chapter is aggregating the data collected in chapter 4 in order the reasons that makes the establishment of the framework so problematic for the United Nations.
Chapter II: The literature Review

Refocusing the research: From Peacekeeping to Peace-building

Saira Mohamed sets her study on a structural level. Rather than wondering if a peacekeeping mission achieved its mandate or failed in its attempt, she wonders whether or not the peace-building process should stay under the authority of the Security Council. She believes that the Trusteeship Council should be reformed to handle this new kind of peace-making. Indeed, as she explains, the peace operations diverged from traditional military peacekeeping to now focus primarily on state-collapsing situations. The interesting part of her research for this analysis lies in her attempt to separate peacekeeping from peace-building, as she explained, “following the Cold War, the UN embarked upon a new type of peace operation. The mandate of these missions extended beyond matters of war and security and required UN peacekeepers to undertake a range of civilian functions [...]”  

Mohamed details a recent evolution of peacekeeping where it is no longer kept into the field of security and military, but it has evolved into a civilian capacity where peace-making extends into state-building, even state-reinforcing. Although, her research emphasizes the legitimacy of the Security Council, it reveals a more precise topic than peacekeeping, the notion of peace-building, critical for our research. Indeed, the narrowed topic of peace-building is extremely relevant to the Quick Impact Projects analysis. These were established in the Brahimi report in order to address the shortcomings of the traditional peacekeeping missions. More accurately, although

unofficial, the UN personnel have already taken such actions in the past\textsuperscript{15}, however, the development of the Brahimi Report made official this type of procedure, enabling the establishment of policies attached to the concept of building peace. Indeed, by focusing on peacekeeping effectiveness, this analysis attempts to explore and assess the different processes in which third-party missions assist the state in redefining its authority after it has collapsed or has been consequently weakened. Furthermore, as defined during the High Level Panel Report in 2004, “the core task of peace building is to build effective public institutions that, through negotiations with civil society, can establish a consensual framework for governing within the Rule of Law”.

Also, Hartzell, Hoddie and Rotchild talk about “stabilizing the peace” through the reinforcement of the sustainability of the State\textsuperscript{16}. If the State has lost its internal sovereignty there is a high percentage of chance that peace will not last. A strong and democratic state, to be differentiated with an authoritarian regime, is necessary to gain the trust of the population and therefore achieve a stabilization of peace. Although this article seems to only focus on the military and security aspect of a peace operation\textsuperscript{17}, two facts are important for this study: the necessary democratization of the State in post civil war conflict and the need for the government to gain the trust of the population in order to become strong and sustainable. Indeed, these two variables reveal that Quick Impact Projects by improving the well being of the population can benefit the mission and the host government in gaining a climate of trust and therefore improve the overall

\textsuperscript{15} Documentary Sierra Leone: Rebuilding a Torn Society
\textsuperscript{16} Hartzell C., Hoddie M., Rotchild D., Stabilizing the Peace after Civil War: An investigation of some Key Variables, in International Organization, Vol. 55, No. 1 (winter 2001) pp 183-208
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid, pp192-193
effectiveness of the UN country team in assisting the State to stabilize the peace on the long run.

Again concerning peace building, Samuels’s work\textsuperscript{18} enlightens the scholarly field by developing an empirical strategy based on the observations of shortcomings and achievements that has been done in former peace operation such as Timor Leste or Haiti. She focuses on three pillars: “political transformation, reform of the governance framework, and the associated building constitutions through capacity transfer.”\textsuperscript{19} Diehl and Druckman refers to former scholarly works to differentiate the “new peacekeeping” concept taken from Ratner, or also characterized as “second-generation missions” by Mackinlay and Chopra from the traditional peacekeeping which they characterizes by their “core peacekeeping goals”\textsuperscript{20}: “violence abatement”, “conflict containment” and “conflict settlement”. What is important to bear in mind is that traditional peacekeeping has not been replaced by the new form of peace operations, it has rather evolved into a more complex structure and encompasses much more than the three goals previously mentioned and therefore necessitates a new form of evaluation of effectiveness.

Lastly, the article \textit{There are peace-building tasks for everybody} from Chaldwick Alger is interesting because it attempts to discuss the “culture of peace” promoted by the United Nations and the development of a multi-actor networks in peace-building processes. In the case of Quick Impact Projects, the policy and the finance are led by the United Nations, however it involves a plurality of actors which are described in Alger’s

\textsuperscript{19}ibid, p. 729
article: Non-governmental organizations, International organization, businesses, the population and of course the host government. This article underlines the modernity of policies such as QIPs which attempts to involve a plurality of actors in order to reach a high level of effectiveness.

The need for a systematic analysis

The effectiveness of UN peacekeeping missions is not a recent subject of analysis. Since the end of the cold war, many academic researchers attempted to define the effectiveness of such endeavors along with the UN itself which has produced many reports to assess its achievements and shortcomings.

Mullenbach attempts to redirect the topic because “peacekeeping missions have not been adequately examined.” He details the scope of these inadequate examinations by describing the errors in their level of analysis. Many studies focused on the success or failure of certain peacekeeping missions without achieving a proper level of generalization. The limitation of these analysis reveals a larger issue when one examines peacekeeping mission’s effectiveness; each conflict is different and therefore each mission should be different. Therefore, focusing on the missions as the principle subject of research could lead to a consequent error in the analysis. Attempting to explain the failure or success of one mission will not necessarily be a tool for understanding those to come. This is precisely the mis en garde enunciated by Mullenbach that this research should follow. On the same topic, Paul F. Diehl and Daniel Druckman attempt to define a general framework of analysis in order to facilitate accurate assessment of the

effectiveness of the United Nations peace operations while enabling a high level of
generalization. In order to do so, they established a “Decision-making Template
Approach”\textsuperscript{22} with five different steps. They explained that given the need to consider the
goals of the peace operations in order to achieve an adequate analysis, the identification
of primary goals\textsuperscript{23} becomes the basis of any research. In the case of this study, defining
the goals of Quick Impact Projects in a general scheme and then in a mission-specific
method becomes the foundation to properly assess their impact on the overall
effectiveness of their mission, and more broadly on their general influence regarding
peace operations.

On a practical basis, the United Nations provides annual report on the
achievement of particular missions. These documents assist the Security Council, which
is the principal body making the decision to launch, extend or close a UN peacekeeping
mission, in deciding whether or not a mandate should be extended, transformed or simply
closed. For this research purpose, it will provide data, and practical information in order
to enable the general evaluation.

In 2000, the Security Council, decided to produce a report, \textit{No exit without strategy}, in order to define the factors in which such actions are made. With regards to
this report, the President of the Security Council asked the Secretary-General of that time,
Kofi Annan, to produce a report on the factors that determine the success or failure of
peacekeeping missions. Annan explains the importance of uniqueness of each missions
and insists on “[…] both the restoration of mutual confidence and the rehabilitation that

\textsuperscript{22} Diehl Paul, Druckman Daniel, \textit{Evaluating Peace Operations} (Boulder: Lynne Rienner
Publishers Inc., 2010) p. 26
\textsuperscript{23} ibid, p. 25
help make an agreed border and a negotiated peace work.”

Lastly, he refers to the importance of coordination with other international actors or UN agencies. Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) seem to match these expectations. QIPs policy and directive stipulate that their purpose is to “[…] establish and build confidence in the mission, its mandate, and the peace process, thereby improving the environment for effective mandate implementation.”

Analyzing both academic and UN reports will enable this research to balance between theoretical expectations of generalization and the practical necessity of using case-by-case insight. This study will not necessarily focus on each mission but rather observed the policies that United Nations have attempted to synchronize as a general process of peacekeeping. In this case the Quick Impact Projects become a study in the broader picture of the UN peacekeeping missions. The goal is to understand if the UN Headquarters, where the policies are elaborated, properly assesses the requirements for long-standing peace when there are such a high variety of subjects.

How my research adds to the field

Few or no research studies have been constructed to establish a framework of evaluation for Quick Impact Projects. The bureaucratic system in which the United Nations staff members have to work often makes it difficult for them to define concrete steps, and understandings, to form proper criteria for assessment. The analysis undertaken by this thesis research of different UN missions and their QIPs teams’ work underlines the constraints the UN faces in establishing such a framework of evaluation. My research discloses the work of the UN staff and the UN system used to propose, choose and

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25 United Nations, DPKO/DFS policy directive (revised), 2013
implement QIPs. Most importantly, this project attempts to understand the reality of QIPs and their goals when applied to the field. In the conclusion I offer recommendations on the practice of QIPs, field evaluation by local residents, and the necessity to enlarge the network of partnerships.
Chapter III: Methodology Employed for the evaluation of Quick Impact Projects on Peacekeeping Operations:

This thesis is paved with a few challenges. This chapter uses different methodological processes in order to avoid bias and therefore maximize the accuracy of this research.

Challenge 1: Finding a good balance between generalization and particularity

This analysis is focusing on Quick Impact Projects (QIPs), a policy elaborated by the United Nations in order to maximize the effectiveness of its peacekeeping missions. The policy directive stipulates that the QIPs should be funded and operated in the “area of operation of the mission.”26 The semantic used in this directive is fundamental for the correctness of this research. If the policy discusses the “area of operation”, it is logical to assume that each mission have different areas of operation. Therefore, the first challenge to this analysis is to enable generalization in the study of an issue that seems to be functioning on a case-by-case basis. In order to do so, I am using previous academic work that has attempted to raise a level of generalization in the evaluation of peacekeeping missions. The core of this thesis is based on the evaluation framework defined by Diehl and Druckman in their book Evaluating Peace Operations. I will attempt to determine a general framework of “area of operations” in the rule of law missions and observe if whether or not the QIPs have been able to achieve their goals and consequently provided help in maximizing the country mission’s effectiveness. The academic sources will thus assist this research in reaching a level of generalization while respecting the singularity of each case.

The United Nations documents such as bi-annual or annual reports, policy directives, and lesson-learned will help in determining the theoretical expectations of QIPs and the reality of practice. Put together the scholarly works and the UN documents will provide this research with a balance between generalization and singularity.

Challenge 2: Gathering information from people in the field

In order to be as impartial as possible to conduct this study, I decided to gather information and personal opinions from interviews. The interview participants were selected both at the Headquarters (Civilian Affair department) and on the ground (Country teams in Haiti, Liberia, Democratic Republic of Congo and in the recently deployed mission in Mali). The goal of such interviews is to distinguish the theory taken from the UN documents and the scholarly work and the reality of the field. Two types of interviews were directed: face-to-face and via email. It was difficult for a Master thesis to travel and meet the UN personnel on the ground, this is the reason why part of the interviews had to be done through Internet rather than in person.

The main issue when it came to gather the information from people on the ground is that the questions were often fastly answered and

Unfortunately one of the shortcomings of this thesis is to have been unable to gather information from the population in the country, the Non-governmental organizations working in the field and from the government hosting the mission. A more advanced study, on a longer time frame would enable me to travel and meet with the people on the field in order to maximize visibility and impartiality. The QIPs imply a plurality of actors and I acknowledge the limitations of this collection of information. Lastly, the other issue raised by the missing interviews from other stakeholders does not
represent the fact that “these actors often have different goals or different priorities or assign different priorities to shared goals” as Diehl and Druckman emphasize in their book.

**Challenge 3: Maximizing neutrality, avoiding bias**

Jeremy Farral explains that the problem of drawing upon data from United Nations reports is that these documents often lack neutrality. Not that the United Nations is purposely biased but it is important to bear in mind that in order to keep the financial support from the member states, agencies and offices of the UN often have to emphasize their achievements rather than their shortcomings. As I was interning for one of the component of the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions, I realized that the member states' expectations were often higher than the possibility of actions from the UN personnel. Therefore, in order to avoid subvention cuts, these services had to present a positive front and focus on their successes. Once again, this is not done on purpose but rather it is a systemic problem inside the United Nations structure that should be assessed while doing research on a UN endeavor. In order to do so, I decided to gather information from the scholarly field and from the UN, the former would bring some neutrality to the latter. I also decided to get information from Non-governmental Organization reports, hoping that it would highlights information that would not necessarily appear in the international organization documents.

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I want to insist on the fact that for six months I observed the work done at the Secretariat and I was amazed by the passion and the hard-working mentality of the staff. Their anxiety regarding financial support is a down side of this system and should not be interpreted as a lack of competence, quite the contrary. Again, in order to adequately assess UN works on the ground and at the Headquarters, one should be aware of that financial pressure that hangs on every service of this institution. Moreover, one should acknowledge the disparity between the high expectations and the lack of capacities (financial, staff…) attached to a mission. For instance, in the case of rule of law area of operation, the United Nations member states often expect rapid changes when the reality is often long and sinuous. The QIPs have been introduced to address these problems and provide fast improvement to a long-process mission. Studying the capacity for QIPs to achieve such goals is also a way for this research to determine whether the United Nations have been able to address this long-standing issue.
Chapter IV: Defining Terms

The purpose of this chapter is to provide the reader with a definition of effectiveness but also to give a clear explanation on the whys and wherefores of United Nations Quick Impact Project. Effectiveness of peacekeeping missions is a complicated matter since it implies a range of area of operations and stakeholders. If peace agreements are respected and disarmament has been agreed upon, the rule of law area might be running behind in their objectives. Therefore, in order to properly determine the concept of effectiveness, it is essential to first define the assessed activities.

This research centers its observations on the rule of law area of operations. More precisely, it focuses on the re-establishment or creation of Justice and Correctional institutions in post-conflict situations in Liberia, Democratic Republic of Congo and Haiti. The impact of the Quick Impact Projects with regards to these two components of the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions will be the dependent variables, while the effectiveness of the peace operation being impacted by these projects will define the independent variable of this study.

The Quick Impact Projects

On March 7 2000, Secretary-General Kofi Annan required a high-level panel on the future of Peacekeeping Operations whose aim has been to adequately assess the shortcomings of the UN missions. The formal introduction of the Quick Impact Project was included in the report of this reformation process. Different criteria could describe the Quick Impact Project, and since its first introduction as a UN policy it has encountered some evolution in order to match the reality of the field.
In 2007, a Quick Impact Project policy directive has been devised to define the nature, scope, value and duration of the projects. In the policy, QIPs are “small-scale, rapidly-implementable projects, of benefit to the population.”\textsuperscript{29} They are used by the peacekeepers in order to create a climate of trust and confidence about the mission, its mandate and the overall peace process. Therefore, they are supposed to “improve the environment for effective mandate implementation”\textsuperscript{30}

The Quick Impact Projects have three general criteria of impact: First, it is supposed to promote acceptance of the mandated tasks. Secondly, it should be building confidence in the peace process and building support through the demonstration of early achievements. Thirdly, it might generate support for the mission.\textsuperscript{31} In theory, if QIPs are properly implemented, these steps should be appearing in the establishment of quickly implemented initiatives, and the mission should be able to develop longer-term projects without risking losing the confidence of the host population and therefore avoiding to notice the development of a negative climate. As sum up below, the QIPs should encompass the characteristics as presented in the 2013 revised policy\textsuperscript{32}:

\begin{itemize}
  \item 10.1 small-scale and low-cost;
  \item 10.2 designed to be of benefit to the population;
  \item 10.3 planned and implemented within a short-time frame;
  \item 10.4 of a non-recurrent nature, and do not place an unforeseen financial burden on the recipient or create material requirements that cannot be met within the country;
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{29} United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, QUICK IMPACT PROJECTS Policy Directive, 12 February 2007, p 2.
\textsuperscript{30} ibid
\textsuperscript{31} ibid, p2-3
\textsuperscript{32} United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Department of Field Support, QUICK IMPACT PROJECTS Revised Policy, January 2013.
10.5 usually visible to the population;
10.6 done in consultation with representatives of national or local authorities, and, where appropriate, with the participation of local communities;
10.7 done in consultation with relevant UN actors, and not duplicative of the programmes of UNCT or other actors;
10.8 selected in an impartial and transparent manner;
10.9 sensitive to considerations of gender, ethnicity, age and vulnerability;
10.10 selected and implemented in accordance with the principles of ‘Do No Harm’;
10.11 sensitive to any potential risks to the population, including risk of conflict or risk of damage to the environment.

The analysis and evaluation of the three study-cases will enable this research to observe the good implementation of these characteristics and thus conclude if when properly implemented Quick Impact Projects can have a positive impact on the overall mission effectiveness.

The Quick Impact Projects are initially implemented during the mission’s first year, however, in some cases such as with regards to the mission in Sierra Leone, the General Assembly recommended that the QIPs budget should be extended to the second year of the mission. In the 2011 QIPs Lessons learned study, it is recommended that the duration of implementation should be extended to the second year of the mission in order to avoid delays. Also, for each project a timeframe of three months is mentioned in the policy but not in a compulsory manner. The lessons learned document therefore recommended the extension to a six-month timeframe for each project to be implemented. As the document stipulates, “increase implementation timeframe in the Policy Directive to a recommended maximum of six months, to allow a more realistic
period for project implementation, whilst retaining the defining characteristic of QIPS as projects that are ‘rapidly implementable.’

With regards to the financial characteristics, QIPs must represent a very small amount of the entire mission’s budget. As an illustration, in the 2013-2014 peacekeeping mission budget, QIPs represented 0.87% of the MINUSTAH whole budget and 0.21% of the UNMIL budget.33

The Quick Impact Projects are broadly defined to have a positive impact on the wellbeing of the population. In the case of the rule of law area of operations, QIPs are funded to develop capacity-building. Indeed in the lessons learned study, QIPs should be differentiated from humanitarian action to avoid “be[ing] viewed as an unwelcome and ill-considered incursion into humanitarian space by military or by mission actors.”34 Therefore, to avoid any confusion with other UN structure work, QIPs are implemented on three major pillars with regards to Rule of Law sector: Human Rights and Livelihoods, Security, and institutional capacity and infrastructure. One can imagine that these three sectors of action are profoundly intertwined, and a deeper analysis of QIPs in each study-case will be provided in the following chapter.

Defining Effectiveness

Evaluating the effectiveness of a mission has always been tedious. Scholars have often concentrated their work towards the notion of “success” or “failure” and the factors influencing such outcomes. Mullenbach has an interesting point of view since he

33 United Nations General Assembly, Approved resources for peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July 2013 to 30 June 2014, distributed on 18 July 2013.
starts his discussion by stipulating: “In fact, the success or failure of a third-party peacekeeping mission may at least partly be influenced by the initial decision to establish or not establish the mission.” Indeed, the first angle to define effectiveness is to understand why the mission came to existence. If one acknowledges the goal of the mission, it becomes easier to assess its achievements.

Secondly, Diehl and Druckman explain, “it is rare that any peace operation is uniformly a success or a failure. For an assessment to be accurate, it is essential to observe and evaluate the different dimensions of the mission and base the analysis on the achievements of their respective goals. For example, UN mandates might set up a list of objectives; however, the different stakeholders on the ground might have different priorities or expectations from the mission.

In this case, the observation of Quick Impact Projects will attempt to analyze if the work of the UN staff has been facilitated through the improvement of their relations with the population, the government and the NGOs. That is to say, the purpose of this research is to determine if the amelioration of relations on one hand and the prospect of future financial support on the other hand consequently benefited the UN staff in doing a better work and achieving what the mandate has stipulated with regards to rule of law issues. Again, the basis for this analysis is to understand if the Quick Impact Projects have a positive impact on the UN mission’s work, which in the long term would enable them to stabilize and strengthen the rule of law institutions in the host countries.

35Mullenbach Mark J., Deciding to Keep Peace: An analysis of International Influences on the Establishment of Third-Party Peacekeeping Missions, in International Studies

MONUSCO Background:

MONUSCO was not the first UN operation engaged in Congo. Two preceded the latest one, starting in July 1960 with the ONUC, after the outbreak of a civil war following the independence of the former colony.

The purpose of this first international intervention was to assist the newly created Congolese government in strengthening its public authority through the reinforcement of rule of law institutions. Its primary function was then extended to “maintaining the territorial integrity and political independence of the Congo, preventing the occurrence of civil war and securing the removal of all foreign military, paramilitary and advisory personnel not under the United Nations Command, and all mercenaries”\(^\text{36}\). In his book entitled *The theory and practice of peacekeeping*, Indar Jit Rikhye underlies the collapse of the entire state structure that required the involvement of UN technical assistance and its direct military action to assist this sovereign power in restoring law and order throughout its territory. He further explained that the Democratic Republic of Congo, which was administered by the Belgians during the colonial era, did not have an educated leadership that could have been able to stabilize the public infrastructure in their newly independent country. “But the Belgians had not created any indigenous leadership, as the British had done in their colonies; nor had they established a cadre of *évolués* (highly

educated Africans), as the French had done. Within a few days of Independence the whole administrative infrastructure had disappeared amid chaos and bloodshed."

Although rapidly established in the country, the ONUC was confronted to several political issues that tremendously hampered the mission’s capacity to work. Hammarskjöld was challenged by the September constitutional crisis that occurred when Patrice Lumumba, the Prime Minister, annoyed by the UN’s refusal to deal with the Katanga insurrection by force, decided to undertake such mission’s by himself. The intervention was highly contested by the President Kasavubu, who used the principle of Loi Fondamentale to destitute the Prime Minister from his function and replaced him by the Senate President, Jospeh Ileo. The political crisis reached another cataclysmic level when Colonel Mobutu, the army Chief of Staff, lead a coup which evicted Kasavubu, Lumumba and Ileo’s from the political scene.

As Rikhye concludes, ONUC was a new form of peacekeeping, working in the middle of a civil war. After the dismantlement of its territory into 4 political spheres only ONUC has been able to reunify this sovereign power into one single political unit. Peacekeeping was therefore not only based on keeping peace through military separation of forces, although ONUC was also mandated to do so, it worked into political chaos in order to stabilize peace, which was threatened by political and ideological warfare.

The second and third UN operations in Congo go hand in hand. The United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo was established in 30 November 1999 through the resolution 1279 following the implementation of the Lusaka ceasefire agreement. This operation was strictly based on security and

humanitarian issues and did not include any mandated task with regards to State building. Its main purposes were to observe the correct implementation of the ceasefire, monitor the disengagement of violence while providing assistance to the displaced persons, refugees and children and support the protection of human rights and the right of children\textsuperscript{38}. After reaching a new phase of peace building, MONUC became the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) through the Resolution 1925 on May, 28 2010, in order to assist the state intensively in developing a stable and strong public authority throughout the country and to emphasize the importance of rule of law institutions yet recognizing the importance of security with regards to civilians and the necessary cessation of all armed conflicts especially in the Kivus and Orientale Province. This new mandate enlarged consequently the work of the UN personnel to civilian affairs in assisting the state to develop a stable and peaceful environment. Martin Kobler, the Special Representative to the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council in August 2014 during the Great Britain’s presidency. He firstly discussed the different issues that MONUSCO and the DRC government had to deal with since their last report: the M23 crisis, followed by the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) crises which caused 66,000 Congolese to flee their homes and finally the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) attacks in Eastern DRC. He then explained that as of today, through the joint work with the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC) the M23 rebel groups has been dismantle, the FDLR strongly weakened and the ADF and FDLR had voluntarily agreed

to a disarmament process. 4000 rebels from various groups have surrendered, 500,000 Internally Displaced Persons have returned to their homes and thanks to the Nairobi declaration the process of rehabilitation is underway. However, as Martin Kobler expressed it, the situation is still fragile and the Mutarule massacre where 33 people died with the inaction of a MONUSCO contingent a few kilometers created a consequent gap in the confidence that the mission has been trying to build with the Congolese population. SRSG Martin Kobler personally took responsibility for the inaction; the commander has been relieved from his leading responsibility and an internal investigation is in process in order to raise accountability for nonintervention. Lastly, Martin Kobler recommended for a “paradigm shift” in the MONUSCO work through three core actions: “reaction to prevention”, “static to mobile”, “and protection by presence to protection by action”39. Martin Kobler also discussed the necessary increase in military engagement, being the priority in Eastern Congo in order to put a final stop to the FDLR’s action. More stability is thus perceived as the development of multiple opportunities for the well-being of the Congolese population, such as market’s development, farm works, education… This prospect of an effective society can only be envisaged if rebel groups are forced to disarm. The Security Sector Reform is still considerably slow but joint works with the government are underway. Finally, with regards to the role in assisting the government with Human Rights and democratic practices establishment, MONUSCO has been monitoring the opposition’s ability to freely express their opinions. The mission also works cooperatively with the government to ensure that all political decisions are constitutionally correct and therefore prevent undemocratic practices to occur. The

general idea in the political stabilization facilitated by MONUSCO is based on the reconciliation of political differences through the development of an inclusive and comprehensive dialogue, which would establish free, fair elections and therefore enhance further stability in the whole territory.

As a conclusion, we can understand that MONUSCO is different from the two precedent mission as it requires the UN personnel to undertake processes in order to stabilize the country not only on a security matter but also as a process of democratization, and social reintegration of the former armed forces. Therefore, it is interesting to evaluate the role played by QIPs in such endeavor. The following part of this chapter will list and gives detailed information on the different QIPs action that have been established and their impact on the overall mandated tasks of MONUSCO.

**MONUSCO Quick Impact Project Initiatives:**

In March 2015, the Secretary General’s report on MONUSCO came out. As a consequence, the new resolution 2211 published by the Security Council dedicated a chapter on “*Gender issues, child protection, and interaction with civilian population.*” This part encourages MONUSCO to further strengthen their interaction with civilians in order “*to raise awareness and understanding about its mandate and activities.*” The Security Council therefore recognizes the ultimate importance of bonding with the population in order to facilitate the work for MONUSCO. The resolution also focuses on the importance of creating strong public relations; In other words, it states that trust is a highly effective way to obtain reliable information on human rights violation or abuses.

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and to identify potential threats. The role of QIPs is therefore significant for this new mandated year, as its main purpose is to assist the mission in developing strong relations with the populations through the achievement of small, fast-paced projects.

The resolution also demands MONUSCO to operate serious structural reforms in order to make the mission more adequate to respond to its new challenges. In this changing dynamic, it became highly difficult to obtain data from the QIPs team, as their working group has been experiencing important changes since the end of 2014. Although they kindly accepted to participate, the responsibility of answering the questionnaire was being passed around to different UN personnel and a long time passed before the questionnaire came back. V was the staff member who kindly participated to be interviewed, however she specified that her recent arrival at MONUSCO QIPs unit would make it difficult for her to answer core questions on MONUSCO’s experience on QIPs implementation. V. has worked since 2005 in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. She spent five years in Haiti as a civil affairs officer and was moved to MONUSCO. She both worked at the mission’s headquarters and the regional offices (Kindu and Bukavu). Since September 2014, she has been re-assigned to MONUSCO HQ in Goma as a QIPs program manager in the QIPs Unit, under the authority of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General (DSRSG) for rule of law.

In order to present MONUSCO’s QIPs initiatives, this chapter will be subdivided into four parts: the first part will focus on the objectives of QIPs in the recently reformed MONUSCO’s perspective. Second, the categories and actors will be presented, which will be followed by the implementation cycle based on MONUSCO’s Standard Operating

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41 Ibid
42 The name of that staff member will not be disclosed.
Procedure (SOPs) and the last part of this analysis will center on the critical aspect of MONUSCO’s use and purpose of QIPs initiative.

**MONUSCO QIPs Major Objectives**

In the first part of her responses, V. focused on the objectives defined by the QIPs unit for the year 2014/2015. The first part concerns the planning and implementation plan of the approved QIPs for the financial year of 2014/2015, which has allocated $7,000,000. Within the allocation of this year budget, 75% of the $7,000,000 has to be focusing on a new concept of “Islands of Stabilities” and to support the restoration of state authorities. The concept of Island of Stabilities will be further detailed in the last part of this chapter. As in many other UN missions, their purpose is not only to maintain peace, but first and foremost, to strengthen the public authority in order to assure long-lasting stability. Therefore, developing strong and effective public institutions becomes a UN priority, which by extent, falls into the QIPs mandate. In the case of MONUSCO rule of law, it means working closely with public officers in order to assist them in refurbishing public institutions, building strong relations with representatives of the public force (police, justice…) and assure that the population feels confident in their political and security representatives.

The second part of the major objectives relates to the revision and monitoring of the effectiveness of implementation of QIPs Standard of Procedures. In order to efficiently proceed in the achievements of projects, QIPs unit has to follow a strict procedure that is summed up in their Standard Operating Procedure, based on the policy

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43 Interview with V., March 2015, p2.
44 Ibid, p3
and guidelines published by the UN headquarters. The new MONUSCO SOPs, according to V., has been implemented with delay due to the redeployment of staff and the general structural reforms that MONUSCO undertook in the end of 2014. The SOPs are the main tool used by the QIPs team to select, implement and monitor projects.

The third part concerns the closure of the projects for the financial year 2013/2014. During the past years the Board of Auditors and the OIOS/audits have produced reports of the achievements and their recommendations for QIPs. One of the goals for this coming financial year is to implement the different directions given by these two monitoring entities. Lastly although staying in the same dynamic, the QIPs team is also expected to produce report for this financial year.

These different goals are set up in order to organize QIPs unit’s work for one year. They might evolve given the reality of the field but this is what is expected of them for the 2014/2015 financial year.

The other general tasks are about “managing QIPs.” In this regards, V. explains that the “QIP unit at MONUSCO is responsible to support 9 Head of Regional Offices and the QIPs focal points to identify and implement QIPs in the sectors.”

**Stakeholders and categories of QIPs**

Curiously, when V. answered the question on the stakeholders, she only mentioned the UN services and agencies. She made no comment on the population, the government and NGOs contrary to the other mission who gave more importance to the non-UN organs. The fact that she works at the HQ and not at the regional office might explain her brief answer. Indeed, her unit might be more involved at the upper level of

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45 Ibid, p3
the QIPs structure, that is to say, they are in touch with UN services and agencies to assure that the QIPs initiated are not overlapping with other UN initiatives, but they do not necessarily interact with the other stakeholders that are usually working at the other side of the QIPs structure. This unit is also directly in contact with the different focal points at the regional offices, who are dealing with the QIPs implementation. Indeed, she explained in one of her answers that: “QIPs unit is only very seldom in contact with the population as the QIPs identification and implementation is managed in the sectors and QIPs team hardly have the capacity to visit the beneficiary. First time I will go in the field since September is to follow up implementation next week.”

The way in which V. answered the question on stakeholders also reflects that she might have interpreted stakeholders as UN’s partners more than concrete actors coming from different sectors (public, private, governmental, non-governmental, civil society…). In her answer, she says: “once the QIPs unit receives QIPs proposal from the sectors, the QIPs unit check with UN agencies for duplication and also for advice.” She doesn’t say much about who are the actors who have submitted proposals, certainly because it is not a priority for her team to know where it comes from, this being the responsibility of the “sector” or region. Her team’s priority is to make sure that the proposals are realistically feasible according to the QIPs criteria or do not duplicate an already existing project. She also mentions the importance of checking with “the area of responsibilities.” These scopes of responsibility will enable them to get in touch with the agencies in charge of a domain in which a QIPs proposal falls. Thanks to these divisions of task, they are able to

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46 Ibid, p6. She sent back her answer late March, so her first visit in the regions, since September, happened in the start of April.
47 Ibid, p3
48 Interview with V on MONUSCO QIPs, March 2015, p3.
ask for advice from experienced actors that first will inform them if their projects is not already undertaken. Secondly, if there is no overlapping, they will be able to participate and bring knowledge to the construction of the project, therefore facilitating the process of implementation.

The different agencies listed by V. are International Organization for Migration, UNICEF, UNHCR, UNDP and the Stabilization Unit (SSU). In her listing of QIPs categories she does not say much about Migration and Refugee assistance, however, in her listing of partners she both mentions the OIF and UNHCR that shows that assistance to displaced population is an important focus in MONUSCO QIPs.

She also states the importance of collaboration and support in the QIPs. Here again, the circulation of information between the different agencies not only avoids loss of time and overlapping but it enables the different actors to support each other’s work in order to become as effective as possible.

The implementation cycle

The first part of the Standard Operating Procedure states that “these SOP are in line with the DPKO/DFS Policy on Quick Impact Projects approved on 21 January 2013 and mandatory for all staff engaged in the identification, selection, approval, implementation, monitoring, closure and evaluation of QIPs.” Therefore the SOP is the principal tool with which the QIPs unit and the focal points in charge of implementation and monitoring will have to follow in order to adequately undertake the projects. This

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49 This part will mostly be based on the analysis of the Standard Operating Procedures document provided by the MONUSCO QIPs unit.  
50 United Nation Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Standard Operating Procedures for the Management of Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) (revises draft), 2015, p2
document starts with a reminder taken from the policy on the nature and scope of the QIPs which states the value and duration, the purpose etc… Then, it focuses on the “selection and design of the QIP proposals,” in which it explains that the senior officer of each component (police, civilian or military) will assign a “project officer” who will become the focal point regarding any issue on project design, implementation and monitoring of progress. This part never refers to the criteria for the project officer to be selected. This falls into the quality of judgment and experience of the senior officer to select the best-fitted staff for the position. For instance, V. has been contacted by the Chief of civil affairs in GOMA who offered her to become Manager of the QIPs unit, which is consisted of 4 national staff (2 National-provided officers, two assistants) and herself (international staff). Once the responsible staff and focal point are selected, they are expected to present a proposal summary to the Head of Office who will check with the Mission priorities and the provincial work plan. The UN staff in the country team is “encouraged” by the UN HQ through the SOP to “seek out implementing partners to advance Mission mandate priorities.” The list of implementing partners include: UN agencies, other international organizations, national and international NGOs, local organizations, local authorities and government and state institutions. The document also specify that commercial contractors cannot be considered as a potential implementing partner.

The following section focuses on the legality of the implementing partners that needs to be registered and recommended by the local authorities or the local chiefs.

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51 Ibid, p3
52 Ibid, p4
53 Ibid, p4
Consequently, the mission is expected to create a list of reliable and potential implementing partners.

The next step is on the creation of the Quality Assurance Management Team (QAM), which entity will review and advise on QIPs. The Head of Office is in charge to establish such team and will designate a focal point whose task will be to organize QAM team meetings. According to the SOP, the QAM team shall include: senior components representatives, the Field Administrative Officer and Field Financial Officer, representatives from the Stabilization Support Unit, Gender or HIV/AIDS Unit. In the same chapter, the QAM team responsibilities are listed going from making sure that the proposals fits the QIPs criteria as enounced in the policy, assuring the usefulness of the project to the population it targets, establish logistical estimation for the construction of the projects, provides a detailed budget, to manage the land ownership of the QIPs site to assure access to the project officer, and making sure that the time frame is feasible as stated in the QIPs policy.

The following part centers on the establishment of the Project Review Committee (PRC) in which the DSRSG will chair. The DSRSG designates the Chief of Office as the chairperson of the PRC. The PRC will be composed of the following members: DSRSG, Director of Mission Support, Force Commander, Chief of Staff, Police Commissioner, Chairs of Stabilization and Protection Tasks Force and Gender or HIV/ Aids Section representative. The Chief of Office is expected to supervise the QIPs unit and the latter will serve as the secretariat of the PRC. The responsibility of the PRC range from selecting and approving project based on the budget available for QIPs, endorsing the allotments and guidance provided to the field offices, reviewing the project proposals and
reviewing the annual QIPs evaluation. In summary, it is in charge of doing what does not fall under the QAM team responsibilities. Sub-paragraphs state that the PRC’s decisions are made by majority vote and every deliberation should be recorded and prepared by the QIPs unit within 5 days of each PRC meeting.

The next section focuses on the creation of “Memorandum of Understanding” (MOU) for each approved project. Once the PRC has the approved projects, the QIPs unit will have to initiate the next steps of the implementation process regarding commitment of funds, signature of MOU if necessary and prepare the first installment. If a non-UN body undertakes the implementation, the QIPs unit will have to produce a MOU in cooperation with the project officer in the field, which will be signed between the mission and the implementing partner.

The financial process includes the commitment of funds and the disbursement of installments. The QIPs program officer is in charge of obtaining the Budget Section Clearance, the DMS certification and the Finance Section/Accounts Unit approval in order to get the commitment number. Once the latter is received, the QIPs program officer will submit the first installment request to the Finance unit in order for the field finance officer to receive the first payment. Because there is no bond or bank guarantee, the SOP advises MONUSCO staff to limit the first payment to a maximum ranging from $15,000 to $25,000 for projects that would exceed $35,000 of total budget. For the same financial security reasons, the second and third installment should be based on project advancement. The last part of this section states that “exceptional cases,” identified by the DMS office based on the Head of Office’s recommendations, could lead to the

54 Ibid, p7

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disbursement of a bigger first installment. The finance officer is responsible for ensuring that the financial aspects of QIPs are correctly monitored and that a financial report is submitted through the Head of Office.

Next to the financial disbursement part, the implementation and monitoring section explains that the project officer will ensure the completion of the projects however the agreed time-frame is defined by the PRC. The monitoring visit needs to be reported, and such report has to be sent to the QIPs unit. The designation of an appropriate project officer is the responsibility of the Head of Office and the responsible section. This part also mentions the necessity for the Public Information Division and the Public Information officers to adequately publicize the QIPs in order to maximize visibility and therefore the confidence-impact of each project on the targeted population.

Lastly, the report encourages the mission to organize monthly meeting in order to discuss the implementation progress, and if any discuss challenges and possible ways to address them. These briefing should be reported to the QIPs unit so the latter can produce a report on monitoring and evaluation and further improved the guidance for implementing QIPs based on field experience.

The final part of the SOP report states the importance of an appropriate closure and evaluation of QIPs. Therefore, it is expected of the project officer to organize a site visit and to fill in the “Project Closure and Evaluation Form” which s/he will then submit to the QIPs unit program officer. The implementing partner should also produce a report that should be submitted a week after the final site visit. Following the administrative reporting, the project officer, in collaboration with the Head of Office, should organize a
“hand-over ceremony” with the presence of relevant local authorities and the MONUSCO PI component.

At the beginning of each new fiscal year, the QIPs unit program manager, with the office of the DSRSG should produce an evaluation report on the previous year. The annual evaluation is supposed to include: “a statistical overview of mission mandate priorities advanced through QIPs funds, an overview of Management QIPs program, the impact of QIPs program, best practices, lessons-learned, recommendations and observations.” This report brings closure to the previous year however, it could also become a very effective tool to improve the effectiveness in the management of QIPs by providing visibility on challenges and achievements and to leave space for field officers to make observations about their work and therefore facilitate communication between the headquarters and the field.

Use and Purpose of QIPs

The policy and the guidelines insist that the QIPs’ primary focus must be on building confidence. The MONUSCO SOP sums it up in three goals: “promoting acceptance of the Mission’s mandated tasks, contributing to building confidence in the peace building process and contributing to improving the environment for effective mandate implementation.” When selecting QIPs, the proposals should include at least one of the three goals to become relevant and potentially accepted. The QIPs at MONUSCO are therefore used to ensure the effectiveness of the overall mission, to facilitate the work of the UN staff by developing a stable and confidence-focus system on which they could build long-term projects. Indeed, as the most recent Security Council

55 Ibid, p8
56 Ibid, p3
resolution encourages MONUSCO, confidence building should become a priority if MONUSCO wants to observe changes in the populations’ opinion of their work and thus facilitate the stabilization process, which is one of the larger goal of the Mission.

V. explained in her answers that the main purposes of this fiscal year at MONUSCO was in the “restoration of state authorities and Islands of Stability.” Indeed, according to her 75% of the funds goes to support in creation of islands of stability. Islands of stability are based on the new directives given by the Security Council on the importance of stabilization. In the resolution 2098 of March 2013, the Security Council created the “Force Intervention Brigade,” a first offensive strategy led by MONUSCO to force peace into areas of the Democratic Republic of Congo. Its primary goal, in cooperation with the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC), is “neutralizing and disarming small groups” as stated in the paragraph 12b of the resolution. The QIPs are now taking the same directions towards these islands of stability where, once the areas are being cleared of armed groups, stabilization activities should be put in place. However, an activist at Oxfam was warning last year of these islands of stability which, by focusing on only one purpose, the neutralization of armed groups, tend to put other critical issues on the side. She further criticizes the non-sustainable characteristic of these “short-lived military victories.” According to Cooper,

57 Interview with V on MONUSCO QIPs, March 2015, p3.
60 Ibid.
the greatest threat emerging from these islands of stabilities is the creation of confusion between humanitarian aid and the MONUSCO political agenda.

This critique underscores the importance for QIPs to focus on these islands in order to bring confidence in the military offensive led by MONUSCO. As stated in the SOP, QIPs become a tool for the mission to “promote acceptance, contribute to building confidence and improve the environment for effective mandate implementation.”

Moreover, V. mentions in her answers the importance of implementing QIPs based on a sustainable structure: “many QIPs have a component of sustainability and request establishing so called “monitoring committees.” However, she does not clearly explain how this scope of sustainability is really established. Indeed, she further says, “but in general no major follow up is done after QIPs.” She therefore accepts that there is no proper connection between the moment the QIP is being implemented and its longevity on the long term. It is important to bear in mind that it is not because a project is implemented short-term that it should have short-term longevity, however MONUSCO QIPs in their SOP strictly explains that the future of the project will not be MONUSCO’s responsibility but the implementing partners’. This issue of sustainability might create tension if the projects, holding promises of confidence and trust, happen to be abandoned by the mission.

The MONUSCO QIPs, as observed in other missions, are confronted with the problem of connecting short-term implementation and long-term longevity of projects. Indeed, after the final evaluation that occurs following the closure ceremony, it seems that the bond between the mission and the project is neutralized and the mission could no

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61 Interview with V on MONUSCO QIPs, March 2015, p5.
62 Ibid, p5
longer be held responsible for its future. It is therefore important for the mission to bring visibility to its role, and what the population should expect from it. If there is confusion in what is expected of the mission, there will be more room for tension and the climate of trust built during the implementation process will be ruined. This is an issue that should be properly assessed in order to determine whether or not the confidence environment is correlated to the short-term nature of the project implementation.

Another important aspect of the implementation of QIPs is the bureaucratic environment in which UN personnel have to work. Although V. is a UN staff member working for the QIPs unit, she only has been to the QIPs site once or twice. She is caught in an administrative structure which prevents her and her colleagues from implementing the public relations goals which are the purpose of these projects. There does not seem to be any feedback from the local people on the confidence building impact of the projects.
Chapter VI: UNMIL – United Missions Mission in Liberia

UNMIL Background:

Liberia entered in a cycle of violence when in 1980 Samuel Doe organized a coup d’état with a group of 17 young army officers killing the president, William Richard Tolbert, Jr., along with 24 members of his security staff and of his government. Although extremely violent, Samuel Doe’s coup gained consequent popularity among the Liberians when he expressed his will to defend the long-oppressed population. However, his political control soon involved oppressions to americo-liberians and to indigenous people that would not be part of his ethnicity (Krahn). After several years in power the Doe’s government was starting to crumble when an army rebellion called the National Patriotic Front of Liberia led by Charles Taylor attacked from Côte d’Ivoire. In six months this rebel group recruited ten thousand armed men and was therefore able to capture a consequent part of the Liberian territory including important locations such as Buchanan, the second largest city in the country. This military progress forced the Economic Community of West Africa to offer a peace deal. In 1990, Doe’s government unwillingly accepted an ECOWAS proposal that included a ceasefire, the deployment of a peacekeeping force called ECOMOG and the formation of a new government of national unity.

Soon after and although under the supervision of ECOMOG, Doe was murdered by Prince Yormie Johnson’s armed men after they were invited to discuss a peace

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64 Ibid, p316.
arrangement. Prince Yormie Johnson was a collaborator of the NPFL, however contrary to Doe’s contingent, which was forced by ECOMOG to disarm, the INPFL kept their arsenal and was able to capture, torture and then killed the president and his group.

As it is clearly explained by Farrall in his article *Recurring dilemmas in a recurring conflict: Evaluating UN mission in Liberia (2003-2006)*, the following 13 years were illustrated by moments of peace and return to conflict.\(^65\) Charles Taylor became a leader and was able to gain military control over a vast majority of the Liberian territory. In July 1997, he finally legitimized his power thanks to political elections promoted by the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL). Meanwhile, the country fell into a new cycle of conflicts opposing the Taylor’s government to two armed groups, the Liberians United for Reconciliations (LURD) and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL). Over the next six years, Taylor’s power was confined to the city of Monrovia.

In 2003, Taylor left office after the rebel groups gained most of the Liberian territory and put Monrovia under siege. President Bush offered to support the deployment of a Peace Operation under the condition that Taylor would leave his office. However, ECOWAS got in-between and made a deal with Taylor in which their armed force would be immediately deployed and Taylor would be exiled to Nigeria. Then, after three months ECOMIL would be replaced by a UN peace operation. In August 2003, the three major parties to the conflict, the Liberian government, LURD and MODEL met in Ghana to sign the “Comprehensive Peace Agreement that included a transitional period of two and a half year, which would enable the establishment of a shared transitional government.

\(^{65}\) Ibid, p316.
The United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) was established under chapter VII of the United Nations Charter to monitor the Peace process, and was also mandated to facilitate the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, repatriation of the armed forces as well as help this transitional government in the reform of the security sector.\textsuperscript{66}

Since then UNMIL mandate has comprehended: “enabling the transition of full security responsibility to the Liberia National Police by strengthening its capabilities, promoting human rights, supporting national process of reconciliation, constitutional reform, and decentralization, enhancing support for security sector and rule of law reform, supporting the participation of women in conflict prevention, conflict resolution and peacebuilding, enhancing cooperation with ONUCI for the stabilization of border area and coordinating and collaborating with the Peacebuilding Commission on its engagement in Liberia, ensuring regular interaction with the civilian population to raise awareness and understanding about its mandate and activities.”\textsuperscript{67}

Since June 2014 the development process of Liberia has been put on hold, as the attempt to control the spread of the Ebola Virus Disease epidemic has become the priority. Indeed, in the UNMIL progress report to the Security Council under the United States Presidency, Karin Langdren, Special Representative of the Secretary-General, expressed her concerns by qualifying the crisis as “the greatest threat since the war”\textsuperscript{68} and therefore explained that the majority of her report would focus on the matter. Furthermore, according to the Liberian Ministry of Health, there is over 2070 reported

\textsuperscript{66} Ibid, p317.
cases and more than 1200 deaths as of August 2014. The SRSG of Liberia also attempted to enlighten the Security Council members on the different ways in which the crisis has spread. Firstly, she mentioned the exponential growth of this crisis, and explained that cultural rituals of death, given the epidemic, became extremely dangerous and only the full commitment of both religious and traditional leaders would enable UNMIL and the Liberian government to replace these traditions by safer ones, thus avoiding a consequential increase in the reported cases. She continued her report by mentioning the lack of confidence coming from an important part of the population, which rejects the importance of Ebola or to an extreme point even rejects its whole existence. Then she devoted an important part of her review on the infrastructural problems that emerged due to the epidemic crisis and forced the public system to undertake extreme measures such as the closings of schools and markets and most importantly the closing of borders apart from a few exceptions. In a public allocution, she listed other issues that were developed due to the crisis: the increase of prices, the expected cut by more than half of the economic growth, the deceleration of trades, the fact that many farmers had to stop tending their field, even though agriculture is a pillar of the Liberian economic and social system and lastly children are currently prevented from going to school, among other important issues. Moreover, she reported the decision of the National Elections Commission to postpone the mid-term senatorial elections, initially taking place on October 14th, 2014. She then reinforces the importance of giving clarity to the Liberians in this time of uncertainty.

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69 UNMIL Public Information video, Allocution by Ms. Karin Langdren, UNMIL Special Representative of the Secretary-General, October 1st, 2014: http://unmil.unmissions.org/
The other part of this chapter will focus on the different Quick Impact Projects that has been implemented in the past and those recently chosen to support the Liberian government in dealing with this epidemic crisis.

**UNMIL Quick Impact Project Initiatives:**

Liberia has been profoundly affected by the Ebola Virus Disease (EVD). Although the epidemic seems to be receding, The World Bank published in January 2015 a final report on the matter in order to raise awareness of the impact of the Ebola outbreak on the social and economic life of the Liberians. The result are worrying as it confirmed that "even with improvements in the health situation, the economy continues to shed jobs faster than they are replaced."\(^{70}\) It is even more perturbing as the Ebola stigma could become a threat to the stability that Liberia has been able to achieve so far. Indeed, negative socio-economic impacts such as an increase in the unemployment rate, or the spiking prices of basic necessities such as rice or local produce, due to the impact that the epidemic had on agricultural work, can lead to food insecurity and to potential conflict. As the chart in the World Bank report illustrates\(^{71}\), the increasing prices of rice can be explained due to the closing of public places such as markets or the difficult accessibility of fresh produce and rice to urban areas, among other issues. However, the report seems to give more concern to the lack of consumer resources as a threat to food security, as many work places had to shut down. A large part of the Liberian population lost a consequential part of their general income, obviously impacted their capacity to sustain themselves. Indeed, as the World Bank report noticed, " many in wage labor are

\(^{70}\) The World Bank, Report on the impacts of the Socio-Economic impacts of Ebola in Liberia: Results from a High Frequency Cell Phone Survey Round 3, January 12, 2015. p 1
\(^{71}\) Ibid, p11
not working because their business or government office is closed, and very few have been able to return or find alternative employment.”

The tough socio-economic impacts can have tremendous repercussions on the stability of a country especially if the latter is still very fragile. In the case of Liberia, QIPs are very important for different reasons: First of all, attempting to fill the basic needs in communities that erupted with the crisis, secondly, to assure that the population stays confident about the mandate and the mission, especially during the crisis and lastly, to support the national government in handling the situation.

Similarly to the other case-studies, this chapter attempts to analyze the work of the UNMIL QIPs team on Rule of Law issues and witness the achievements and shortcomings of the mission in responding to the mandate stated in Resolution 2066 of the Security Council.

The mandate and QIPs

The resolution 2066 states that the rule of law, which is part of the peace-building process, is one of the "key areas" to which the Mission should give priority. The QIPs thus become a very important tool for the Mission to assist the government in "the reform and restructuring of the Justice Sector.” The Security Council also asks the Liberian government to coordinate and collaborate with UNMIL in order to reinforce its public institutions. Therefore QIPs are used in order to create a genuine bond between partners, facilitate the relationships and build cooperation. In order to accurately gather information on QIPs in Liberia, a questionnaire was sent to the QIPs Team in UNMIL.

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72 World Bank Report, Ibid. p. 10
73 Security Council, Resolution 2066, September, 12 2012, p1
74 Resolution 2066, Ibid, p2
The participants have background in the corrections field. They are civilian staffs from many different countries\textsuperscript{75}, with a professional experience in their national prison of at least 15 years. As the interviewees explained in the case of Rule of Law, they would assist the government in "supply of EVD items in order to avoid the spread of Ebola in the facilities."\textsuperscript{76} The interviewees have to assist corrections facilities through QIPs initiatives, because prison officers can transmit the disease inside and outside the infrastructure, therefore aggravating the case of Ebola. Moreover, these confined establishments with often no proper health system, have higher chances to witness a rapid spread of the disease without having durable solutions. The contamination of detainees would require the corrections facilities to find ways to transport the sick to hospitals and assure their well-being while guaranteeing security. QIPs thus become not a solution but a mean for prevention.

The Security Council is clear when stating that the State of Liberia is responsible for the reform of its public institutions, especially in the rule of law area. However, it also mentions the duty of UNMIL to properly assist the government in reaching complete autonomy. QIPs was recently used as a preventive tool for the spread of Ebola, however it has always been considered as a general tool to assist the government in reconnecting with its population through the development or reinforcement of public institutions, particularly regarding the Justice and Corrections system. The interviewees explained in their responses that QIPs, which were initially planned to only be used for two or three years, has been used on a longer period because it became a solution to "the limited

\textsuperscript{75} Exchange in an email with the Chief of the Corrections team in UNMIL. She explained that staff members comes from: Kenya, Zimbabwe, Sweden, Ghana, Nigeria
\textsuperscript{76} Interview with a QIPs manager in UNMIL, November 2014, p2.
resources of the national partners.” QIPs therefore become a budget option to achieve part of the mandate, reforming the justice and corrections system for instance, and therefore strengthening the whole Rule of Law system in Liberia. The UNMIL mandate changed from being purely peace-keeping to becoming a peace-building mission, attempting to restructure norms and institutions that are vital for the long-term stability of a country like Liberia, which has suffered decades of civil war and human rights violations. The UNMIL mandate, as previously mentioned is thus focusing on the Security Sector Reform, rule of law and human rights. As any institutional reform, the process of change is tremendously long and sinuous. QIPs are therefore used to provide fast-paced improvements that could assist the government in bringing rapid changes to the population. Indeed, QIPs policy describes their use as to assist in developing a good relationship between the Mission and the national partners, however, it is also accurate to notice that it may also consequently improve relations between the government and its population, therefore strengthening stability. UNMIL is here to provide assistance and guidance, however the government is often the main stakeholder in the endeavor when it comes to reforming the rule of law. The interviewees described the mandate as follows:

- Providing strategic and technical advice on corrections issues
- Provide support, expertise and guidance on penal reforms
- Support the infrastructural development and expansion of the Bureau's facilities
- Develop the Bureau's human resource through mentoring

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77 UNMIL interview, Ibid, p1
• Train the Corrections staff in modern prison management and human rights
• (more recently) Support the national partners to prevent the spread of Ebola in the facilities

The mandate illustrates the importance of training and supporting the government staff on their renovation of public institutions, including the importance of establishing practices that respects human rights norms as promoted by the international community.

The actors involved

One of the interesting aspect in analyzing different UN Missions and the implementation of their QIPs is to notice the plurality of actors involved. Of course, the national government and the population of the host country as partners for QIPs provide an indirect tool for the nation as much as they are tools for the Mission. In the case of Liberia, along with the regular partners such as UNDP, UNICEF, UN Women, UNHCR or international organizations such as WHO or ICRC and local NGOs, there are also partnerships that are singular to Liberia. As it is stated in the Resolution 2066, the Mission was asked to work closely with the Peace-building Commission which became a QIPs partner to help develop strong and sustainable infrastructures. Other partners include, the Food and Agricultural organization and others such as German Agro, Prison Fellowship, Carter Centre, the Justice for Peace Commission and the American Bar Association which provide assistance for the reform of the Justice and Corrections systems. Others include the organization of Health, Agriculture, and Development for Sustainability (HANDS), and lastly the Defense for Children.
The work within such a plurality of actors could become very sensitive, raising conflicts and problems of overlapping practices. However, the UNMIL interviewee seems to be confident in the creation of good relations between all partners. As an example, he gives the construction of two facilities in Fishtown and Cestos which was done jointly with the Joint Sexual Gender Based Violence (SGBV) group and was a success. He further explains that in order to avoid overlapping work, "close coordination"\textsuperscript{78} is a priority when implementing QIPs, which on the down side could lead to major delays for all the parties to agree on a project.

The other interesting point when it comes to analyzing partners is the issue of eligibility. The interviewees stated that this is a concerning point regarding QIPs because neither the Guidelines nor the Policy are strictly specific regarding the selection of implementing partners. It is informally agreed that any type of actors could participate in these projects. However, it could also become an issue of time, if the UNMIL QIPs team has to research and monitor each potential partner to make certain that any affiliation to political, religious, social parties would not turn into the instrumentalization of a project and therefore favor a community to the detriment of another. In order to do so, the interviewees further explained, the UNMIL team has to analyze "the political (or religious) profile of a given implementing partner, the capacity and reliability of the implementing partner and their relationship to the identified project site host community."\textsuperscript{79}

Another problem raised concerning the plurality of partners is the difference in the expectations of the outcome. Indeed, because each partner has a different mandate,

\textsuperscript{78} UNMIL interview, Ibid, p 3
\textsuperscript{79} Ibid, p3
they might expect a different result in order to consider the project effective. The singularity of the mandate leads to a singularity of achievements and therefore might create disappointment or confusion. It was also mentioned that the government expressed concerns regarding the short-term nature of the projects. The public authority may misinterpret these projects and consider them as potential long-term initiatives to respond to a long-term goal, when they are, as defined by the interviewee, "seed money projects."

Categories of QIPs

QIPs categories are usually similar among the different missions. Three kinds of categories in UNMIL can be defined: 1/ the promotion of acceptance of the mandated tasks and support of credibility of the work achieved by the mission; 2/ contribution to building confidence in the peace process and strengthening support in this process through “demonstrating early dividends of stability to the population”80; 3/ contribution to improving the environment for the mandate implementation including “through addressing immediate needs of the population.”81 These general categories are then supported by practical categories which in the case of Corrections QIPs are as follows: prison infrastructural improvements, training of corrections staff, support of prisoners’ rehabilitation programmes, spiritual and social welfare services, and in the recent months the supply of EVD items to prevent the spread of Ebola in the prison facilities. These categories of QIPs are supporting the long-term work of the mission by assisting the government in getting institutions that will not only protect civilians but also the basic rights of its population while improving the security of the communities. By improving the well-being of the incarcerated population and developing infrastructure and a

80 UNMIL Interview, Ibid, p2
81 Ibid, p2
Corrections system that would respect the International Minimum Standard Rules,\textsuperscript{82} security would be improved on two levels: the renovation of prisons obviously assures the physical security of detainees and prison staff, but it could also have a positive impact on detainees’ behavior. For instance, the rehabilitation program is tremendously important to train the detainees professionally and to a larger extent avoid a recurrence of criminality.

The Corrections QIPs represents 12\% of the total QIPs and has been focusing mostly on renovation and construction work and on training of staff (60 projects in total) all done in coordination with the Bureau of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

The implementation cycle

The QIPs are all undertaken in consultation with representatives of national and local authorities, and where appropriate, with the participation of local communities. The Head of Field Office is a major pillar of the implementation cycle in Liberia as it is the one which interprets the mandate in correlation with defining geographic and thematic priority in the selection of QIPs. Indeed, the Field Office is significant in the QIPs choice because their constant presence on the field make them more aware of the needs of the communities and therefore more relevant in carefully choosing QIPs theme to fit both the local needs and the mandate requirements. The other pillar is obviously the constant cooperation with external actors. Then, it is the role of the Head of Mission to establish a Project Review Committee. Once projects are accepted, the responsibility of monitoring the implementation is given to the appropriate component representative, and work with the finance department is set up. With regards to finance, the Director of Mission Support

\textsuperscript{82} These rules are an international normative document whose goals is to encourage the respect of human rights in Prisons.

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is in charge of setting out the conditions for financial management and ensuring that the allocation of funds is in accordance with the UN financial rules and regulations. For instance, these rules ask for the QIPs team to use wire transfer as a way of payment and prohibit the use of cash. The latter being very unsafe because it quickly becomes untraceable and prevent the whole monitoring process from being truly effective. Interviewees from different missions raised the problem of having implementing partners disappearing with the money before wiring transfer were introduced. Although, other comments were made on the difficult process that a wire transfer requires in a country witnessing a state of institutionalization and reconstruction.

**Use and purpose**

There is a two-level confidence building system in the implementation of QIPs. First, it helps the UNMIL Mission to develop legitimacy in its support of the government and thus creates good relationships between the public authority and the civilian staff. On the other hand, it also helps the work of the peacekeepers to be considered by the population not as an occupation force but rather as a positive assisting dynamism. Therefore, instead of having some antagonist energy between the mission and the national actors, a strong link of cooperation is developed facilitating the work of the Mission while consequently improving the well-being of the population. Another fact worth noting is the subliminal creation of a mutual trust between the host government and its population. Indeed, with the constant participation of public offices in the QIPs, the population may develop a better understanding of their expectations as citizens toward their State. It is of major importance for stability to be sustainable that the population starts acknowledging their role and rights in their society. The involvement of civil
society in these projects further enhances the importance of representation and civil action in a democratic space. Indeed, QIPs can also work on a political basis, as being a tool to respond to the population needs, and most importantly, become a tool for the community to express these needs. The use and purpose of QIPs is important in a state of volatile stability as it develops relations between actors that were not accustomed to participate in such social dynamics. It is obvious that the primary goal of QIPs is to build confidence between the Mission and external actors, however, it also informally becomes an educative tool for the community and the government to participate in the stabilization process. Peace-building is such a sinuous endeavor that QIPs provides quick results and strengthen the credibility of all actors within the peace process. This is only when actors can observe results that the legitimacy of the Mission can be reinforced. Consequently, this is only when the work of the Mission is accepted that it becomes truly effective. Achieving mandated tasks is one part of the whole peace projects, as if there is no recognition of such advancements, the population and its government will never be able to stabilize peace when the Mission will leave the country.

It is particularly relevant to state that the use of QIPs in post-conflict context, is subject to perpetual uncertainty. The theory in which QIPs are required to build confidence and facilitate the work of the mission is stated both in the Guidelines and in the policy. But this theory does not take into consideration all the difficulties listed by the UNMIL team such as “the high volatility of political stability, the occurrence of corruption, the unreliability of public infrastructure, the difficulty to deal with weather conditions, price fluctuations and public strife.”83 The latter are part of a common disease

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83 UNMIL Interview, Ibid, p5
that many post-conflict countries experience. The unstable political realm, the political bigotry often give possibilities of fraud and political misconduct. These troubles can lead to drastic outcome such as the collapse of all the achievements and the fall back into conflict. All these problems need to be assessed and avoided by the UNMIL QIPs team in order to circumvent any issue and loss of legitimacy.

The interviewees also listed several recurrent complications that are often delaying the operational practice of QIPs in Liberia and lessen consequently the positive impact that QIPs may have on the overall effectiveness of the mission. There are constant logistics problems, such as a complicated or even impossible access to project sites, the lack of business acumen among the local contractors or the fluctuation of prices…”

Although important difficulties may delay the implementation cycle of QIPs, UNMIL has delegated the work of conducting an assessment review to the Joint Mission Analysis Centre in 2014 and the result were positive and shown that the QIPs have been “highly successful in restoring authority and capacity-building within local communities.” However, the interviewees stated that UNMIL needed to refocus QIPs’ priorities toward livelihood generation programmes and socio-economic access to basic services in order to generate decentralization and the strengthening of local ownership of QIPs to assure the longevity of improving conditions created by the projects.

84 Ibid, p6
85 Ibid, p6-7
MINUSTAH Background

In 1990 the provisional government of Haiti sought the assistance of the United Nations, which became the first mission to Haiti to strengthen the free and fair proceedings of the national election. The resolution of March 1990 established the United Nations Observer Group for the Verification of the Elections in Haiti (ONUVEH). This mission was jointly supervised by the Member States and the Organization of American States to achieve the peaceful occurrence of the national elections in Haiti and more broadly assist in the support of the economic and social development efforts of the country. Such an endeavor necessitated the gathering of the first fifty-observer group that assisted in the implementation of democratic elections; more observers arrived during the time of registration and elections in order to assure a peaceful and fair proceeding. Lastly, two or three advisers were requested to bring assistance to the coordinating committee for the security of the elections.

ONUVEH reported that the election occurred without major incidents and therefore the Haitian population had, for the first time, participated in a democratic election where Jean-Bertrand Aristide was elected president. In 1991, a military coup led by Lieutenant-General Raoul Cédras evicted the newly elected government and the political and social situation dramatically worsened. On October 2nd, Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar stated that the international community was hoping to see the return to power of the rightful government in accordance to the Haitian constitution. The OAS ministers of foreign affairs also demanded the return of President Aristide and thus echoed the statement of Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar although in a tougher voice.
Indeed, they asked for a complete isolation of Haiti until the legitimate government was reinstated. Soon after their demand, they sent a delegation to Haiti but the Army soon expelled it from the territory. A few days later, the two Haitian Chambers were forced by the military to appoint a new president, a prime minister. The OAS reacted to the illegal appointment of the new heads of administration by adopted a new resolution to condemn the creation of any illegitimate government that could result from this undemocratic coup. Two days after the statement made by the foreign ministers of the OAS, the United Nations matched their declaration and asked all member states to assist the OAS in achieving their mandates.

In February 1993, the Secretary-General decided to dispatch a preliminary team in order to prepare the arrival of the UN component of the Mission to Haiti. The UN and the OAS jointly managed the mission and therefore a Head of Mission appointed by both parties directed the mission’s operations. By the end of May, the operation team comprised of more than a hundred personnel. In June, following the submission of a human rights report that listed multiple violations, along with the statement from the Permanent representative of Haiti in New York that explained that the constitutional order was not yet restored and thus requested the international community to put a mandatory embargo on oil and arms. The Security Council answered the request on June 16th and the members adopted a resolution\textsuperscript{86} that obligated States to prevent the sale or supply of any kind of defensive or offensive weapons from their territory or their nationals. The Security Council members also forbid the sale of oil\textsuperscript{87} and lastly, they

\textsuperscript{86} Security Council, Resolution 841 on the situation in Haiti, June 16\textsuperscript{th} 1993
\textsuperscript{87} In the exception of humanitarian use. See Resolution 841 above mentioned.
decided to freeze all funds in the name of the government of Haiti, hoping to encourage Army General Raoul Cédras, to join negotiations with President Aristide.

In the end of June, Army General Raoul Cédras accepted the Special Envoy’s invitation to meet with Jean-Bertrand Aristide. They met on July 3rd in New York and were able to reach an agreement in which the mission’s presence was maintained in order to modernize the Armed Force and to assist in establishing a new Police force. Following the meeting, the Security Council suspended the sanctions and on July 16, 1993, the parties agreed to a six-month truce. Although an agreement had been signed, the political situation soon deteriorated. In September 1993, reports stated that human rights violations and deep mistrust between political parties occurred on a daily basis. This political turmoil hurried the creation and deployment of UNMIH, the first UN peacekeeping operation to Haiti. Despite the deployment of UNMIH, the political circumstances only worsened. The military broke the agreement by not reinstated President Aristide and prevented also the UNMIH team from deploying. Therefore, in December 1993 the UNMIH mandate was extended in order to improve the lack of progress concerning the agreements signed in New York City. The Security Council had long terminated the suspension of sanctions however the provisional president, in July 1994, announced that MICIVIH was no longer desirable. On July 31st, 1994 and after months of diplomatic failures, the Security Council passed resolution 940 under chapter VII and authorized a multinational forces to use "all necessary means" to ease the military departure on one hand and the return of the legitimate president and his government on the other hand. In September 1994, the multinational force was deployed
and achieved a peaceful implementation of the terms of resolution 940. In March 1995, UNMIH took over the peace operations in Haiti.

UNMIH was replaced by the United Nations Mission Support in Haiti (UNSMIH) and Haiti witnessed their first hand-over of power between two democratically elected presidents. Thus, it announced the need for a new type of assistance, which was established through resolution 1063, on June 28, 1996. It had, among other mandated tasks, to assist the government of Haiti in creating, maintaining and strengthening a stable environment through the reinforcement and professionalization of the Haitian National Police (HNP)\textsuperscript{88}. The government of Haiti had been extremely determined to develop and strengthen their rule of law institutions in accordance to human rights norms. Although the progress was consequential the HNP was still lacking the experience and confidence to control on subversive groups endangering the peace and democratic process in Haiti, therefore the mandate was extended until May 1997. In July, the recently appointed Secretary-General Kofi Annan expressed that despite the progress made the challenges were still important. It necessitates the establishment of a new mission capable of managing the progress that has been made while effectively handling the transitional challenges.

On April 30, 2004, the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) was established through resolution 1542. Although the mandate was quite similar to the previous missions, the difference was in the size of the civilian force dispatched in the country. Indeed, UNMIH was only composed of 160 international

civilian staff.\textsuperscript{89} UNSMIH 119 civilian personnel\textsuperscript{90}, and MINUSTAH had 550 civilian officers.\textsuperscript{91} This large number of civilian affair staff was required in order to further strengthen the National Police, restore and maintain the rule of law institutions, support the constitutional and political process, the human rights monitoring and last but not least assist the Haitian government in their Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration program\textsuperscript{92}. Not only peace and security had to be secured and stabilized, but the reinforcement of public authority was to be prioritized through the processes of peace-building and capacity building.

The earthquake in 2010 tremendously weakened Haiti. With 220,000 people dead and more than 1.5 million left homeless, the natural catastrophe had a profound impact on the political and social climate throughout the country. The United Nations therefore authorized the temporary increase in personnel to counter the calamitous situation.

In November 2010, another wave of political turmoil occurred after accusations of fraud were made following the release of the primary results regarding the presidential elections, which consequently led to another outbreak of violence. The Security Council then made a statement calling for peaceful and democratic elections. In February 2011, the final results of the first round of presidential and legislative elections were released.

\textsuperscript{89} UNMIH facts and figures: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unmihfacts.html
\textsuperscript{90} UNSMIH facts and figures: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unsmihfacts.html
\textsuperscript{91} MINUSTAH figures: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minustah/background.shtml
\textsuperscript{92} United Nations Security Council, S/RES/1542, April 30 2004, p3
two months later the results showed that Michel Martelly was democratically elected president of Haiti.

In both 2011 and 2012 through resolutions 2012 and 2070 respectively, UN personnel were decreased in MINUSTAH after the release of the Secretary-General’s report in which he stated that a decrease in the police and military force would not be a threat to the security in Haiti. In the latter resolution, the Security Council acknowledged "that the overall security situation while fragile has improved since the adoption of its resolutions 1908, 1927 and 1944, and remained relatively stable since the adoption of its resolution 2012 (2011).”

The situation in Haiti is in a process where the strengthening of public institutions has been understood as a fundamental step in the construction of a stabilized social and political system. Indeed, as in the two previous study-cases (UNMIL and MONUSCO), it can be seen that peacekeeping is strongly intertwined in the concept of rule of law and capacity-building. The next step in our analysis is to understand how Quick Impact Projects work in such dynamics, and whether or not it helps the United Nations Missions in assisting the state to reinforce its public authority while respecting the fundamental rights and well-being of its population.

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94 Resolution 2070 (2012) adopted by the Security Council at its 6845th meeting, 12 October 2012. p1
MINUSTAH Quick Impact Projects initiatives

This part of the MINUSTAH chapter examines how QIPs are being used and implemented. In order to be able to develop a framework of evaluation that would enable an adequate assessment for the impact of QIPs on the effectiveness of a mission, it is important to first understand if there is a generality in their use among missions. Therefore, interviews were conducted with each person in charge of QIPs. In the case of MINUSTAH, the mission mandated through resolution 1542 on April 30th 2004, an interview was conducted via email, and has been analyzed in parallel to the report they produced in 2011. The focal point who accepted to participate in the interview is a lawyer and journalist and has worked for MINUSTAH since June 2006. His responsibilities are directed towards the strengthening of the rule of law in Haiti, more precisely in the Justice department. Surely, deeper research would enable a greater spectrum of interviewees and further the accuracy of the research, however for the time being, as previously mentioned, this analysis will focus on the peace-building and rule of law initiatives of the mission, without ignoring the profound impact it could have on the security level.

This part will be divided into sub-parts in order to understand the implementation cycle, the role of the different stakeholders, the use and nature of QIPs and of course, the shortcomings and achievements that have been observed since the first QIPs were created.
The mandate and QIPs

The Quick Impact projects in MINUSTAH officially started in 2004, a year after the Brahimi report recommended a better focus on the consolidation of a climate of trust between the population and the mission. As the interviewee stated, "the objective of MINUSTAH was firstly to reestablish peace and public stability in Haiti in order to facilitate a political transition through the hosting of fair and free elections. Through the mandate, the other important goal aimed at toward the reinforcement of the National Police Force, in order to assure the security of the population after the Mission's departure." But, in 2007, resolution 1702 extended the mandate to include the strengthening of rule of law in the Justice area. The mission was therefore asked to:

assist with the restructuring and maintenance of the rule of law, public safety and public order, will provide assistance and advice to the Haitian authorities, in consultation with relevant actors, in monitoring, restructuring, reforming and strengthening of the justice sector, including through technical assistance to review all relevant legislation, the provision of experts to serve as professional resources, the rapid identification and implementation of mechanisms to address prison overcrowding and prolonged pre-trial detention and the coordination and planning of these activities, and invites the Government of Haiti to take full advantage of that assistance.\textsuperscript{96}

\textsuperscript{95} Interview with a UN personnel at the UN Headquarters, August 13th 2014, p3
In 2007 it specifically required the mission "to maintain a proactive communications and public outreach strategy to improve public understanding of the mandate and the role of MINUSTAH in Haiti."\(^{97}\)

The mandate related to justice included a very detailed plan on how to assist the Haitian judicial system. Indeed, the mission had to reinforce the technical capacities of the judiciary, transfer know-how to the relevant actors in preparation of the mission's departure, and implement QIPs in order to maximize the climate of trust in association with the justice sector and the Superior Council of the Judicial Power. This part included the implementation of construction projects as stated in resolution 1927, in order to reconstruct some of the courts and tribunals that had been destroyed during the 2010 earthquake. The mandate required the mission to support the justice commission to decrease the number of prolonged detentions, to organize research, and to publish the results. It also required the mission to assist the Ministry of Justice and Public Security in reintroducing the forensic institute, to assist the government in establishing the Superior Council of the Judiciary Power and to give judicial advice to other sectors of MINUSTAH. The role of QIPs is therefore to assist in these processes in order, on one hand, to strengthen the good relations between the actors of the host country and the mission, and on the other hand to reinforce the mission's legitimacy to assist the government. \(^{98}\)

\(^{98}\) Ibid, Interview in french, p2
The actors involved in the Justice MINUSTAH QIPs program

Quick Impact Projects include a large number of actors from different sectors. As the interviewee explained, the mission mostly deals with services of the government, and donors that he listed as follows:

- Ministry of Justice and Public Security
- Superior Council of the Judiciary
- Forensic Institute
- Ministry of Public Health and Population
- Appeal Court of Port-au-Prince
- Court of Cassation
- United Nations Development Programme
- Donors such as International Organization of Francophonie, USAID...

The interview participant did not mention the role of grassroots NGOs. However, the mission’s 2012 Report reveals that NGOs and grassroots associations often propose projects that would help the community. Each stakeholder has a different role to play, either to propose, create or implement the projects in order to effectively complete the QIPs cycle, which will be further explained in the analysis. It appears that most stakeholders for the justice program of QIPs are from the public service. It might not be the case in all kind of QIPs, however, in the case of Justice, the mandate of MINUSTAH requires the development of a strong and fair judicial system and its development throughout the country. Its primary purpose is to reinforce on a longer term the rule of law institutions and the capacity of public infrastructures. The partnership between

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99 MINUSTAH: Evaluation of MINUSTAH Quick Impact Projects, July 2012. p45
MINUSTAH and the government with regards to QIPs seems therefore part of a larger project than simply improving the confidence between the Mission and the host population.

The different categories of QIPs

Between 2004-2005, the year of the introduction of QIPs in Haiti, and 2011, the date of their most recent report, more than a thousand projects have been implemented by the MINUSTAH Quick Impact Project team and their partners. There are four categories that describe the different type of projects. Based on the chart below.

![Figure 1: QIPs by categories, 2004-2011](image)

This chart shows the different categories and the quantity of projects that have been done each year. As we can see the number of projects, depending on the type, varies according to the year. In 2010-2011, given the assistance needed to reconstruct infrastructure after the hurricane, projects in the category infrastructure and public

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100 MINUSTAH Evaluation, Ibid. p.12-13
101 Ibid, p14
services tremendously increased to answer the demand. Indeed, in order to build
certainty between the mission and the host country MINUSTAH has had to answer the
primary needs depending on the situation. QIPs have to be extremely practical and
achieve important visibility in order to maximize the climate of trust. Because of its
short-term nature, they had to answer primary needs coming from either the population or
the local authorities in order to avoid turning the project outcomes into something
elusive. Over the years, this would impact on the mission’s ability to work effectively.
Therefore, as the chart shows, infrastructure remains the dominant category even though
there are variations for the "training/ capacity building” and the "livelihood/employment
generation” which have both consequently increased over the years. The "social services"
projects stopped being a full category by 2009 and merged with the "infrastructure/public
services” category.\footnote{Ibid, p14}

The category "Infrastructure/public services” encompasses different subcategories
of work such as construction and renovation, usually of public ownership, such as courts
and tribunals, city halls, police stations and schools but also road repairs, shore protection
and electrification projects. The social services used to include water distribution
projects, sewage and canal cleaning but as previously mentioned it is now part of the
former category. Another important category is the training and building capacity
projects, whose primary purpose is to prepare and reinforce the state personnel capacity
on issues such as human rights, gender or simply to assure the effectiveness of the public
institutions. The report explains the work of the mission "as a response to the need to
build capacity within the public service system following the 2006 local and general
elections and to enhance the decentralization process.” The last part of this statement is interesting for this research. It reveals that not only do QIPs build a climate of trust, but in the case of MINUSTAH they also assists the state in building its own public infrastructure and therefore its own public legitimacy. This is in addition to making sure that they not only respect but strongly implement the international standards of democracy and human rights. The different stakeholders have therefore the duty to determine practically what is meant in the QIPs policy as a "contribution to promoting acceptance of the mandated tasks," "building confidence in the peace process" or "generating support for the mission."

The implementation cycle

According to the guidelines, QIPs projects "should" follow a very strict cycle from creation to evaluation. Generally, it starts with the Identification and Review. This usually begins when an entity either public, private or directly within the mission proposes a project. According to the MINUSTAH QIPs representative "for all QIPs, you always need a demand from the national partner, which could be from a ministry, local authorities, a local judiciary authority or a grassroots NGO. This proposal is formulated directly in the region where the project may be implemented and the entity submitting it has the duty to inform the ministry in charge of the issue for which the QIP is being created. For instance, in the case of justice QIPs, the entity would have the responsibility to inform the Ministry of Justice and Public Safety in order to make sure that the project

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103 Ibid. p14
104 United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, *Quick Impact Projects (QIPs): Policy*, January 21 201 p2
would be sustainable.\textsuperscript{105} Once a project is initiated, it is sent to the MINUSTAH section that is in charge of leading it.\textsuperscript{106} This section will then work with the Department of Civil Affairs in order to deal with the QIP budget. Each department is entitled to their own part of the annual budget.\textsuperscript{107}

The next step in the cycle is the intervention of the Project Review Committee composed of representatives of every MINUSTAH section\textsuperscript{108}. This committee is the decisional branch of the process and is in charge of deciding whether or not a project proposal is feasible and can be approved.

Based on the guidelines, each head of mission should establish a QIPs Management Team (QMT), however, in his interview, the MINUSTAH representative did not mention the QMT as a leading team for the creation or implementation of the project. The project, once accepted by the Review Committee is validated by the head of the Civil Affairs Team.

Then, the Central office of Civil Affairs in Port-au-Prince sends the project proposal to the Finance Team, which finally reach the Division of Mission Support for the final part of the agreement process. The budget service sends the project to the Finance Team in order to release the funds, which is often 80\% of the total amount. However, the funds are usually divided in two or three parts depending on the situation. As the guidelines advises, the missions should consider a 40/40/20 disbursement when

\textsuperscript{105} Interview in French with a MINUSTAH QIP Representative, August 2014, p7. See Annexes
\textsuperscript{106} As an example, if the project is building a court, the Justice section of the Mission would be responsible for it.
\textsuperscript{107} Ibid, Interview, August 2014, p7
\textsuperscript{108} It is composed of UNPOL, UN Military. UH Human Rights, Justice team, Corrections Team, Gender Team and Civil Affairs
they deal with new implementing partners. Indeed, as another interviewee from the Civil Affairs Office at the UN headquarters in New York explained, it has happened that implementing partners would disappear with the money, obviously putting the whole mission and QIPs team in a complicated situation.\footnote{109 Interview with a UN personnel at the UN Headquarters, August 13th 2014}

Once the first payment is made, the implementing partner starts the project. The way in which the project progresses is monitored depending on the requirements of the Mission. Nothing is clearly detailed at this level in the guidelines. For example, in the case of MINUSTAH, the mission asks the implementing partner and the entity who submits the idea to provide a financial statement with documents to substantiate the report. The goal is to explain with specific details the progress of the project and prove that the latter is either finished or soon to be finished. Once this report is submitted, the budget section analyzes it and if it considers that enough work has been achieved, asks the financial section to transfer the 20% remaining in the budget. The interviewee also explained that throughout the entire process of implementation, both justice and civil affairs officers from the regional office organize visits to monitor the progress of the project.

The last part of the cycle, according to the guidelines, is the closure, evaluation of the project and the writing of the final report. Indeed, the missions are asked to develop annual reports on QIPs in order to assess their work throughout the year and inform the headquarters in NYC on any shortcomings and difficulties they had to overcome. In the case of MINUSTAH, an annual report has been developed in 2012 and gathers all their work since QIPs started in 2004-2005. The report summarizes the implementation
process and attempts to evaluate the impact that MINUSTAH QIPs had achieved. It is, apparently, the only substantive report that has been submitted by a mission since the implementation of the QIPs policy in the UN peacekeeping field.

**The use and purpose of QIPs**

The first QIPs Policy that was published by the UN headquarters defined the scope and purpose of QIPs as follows: promoting acceptance of the mandated tasks, building confidence in the peace process and generating support for the mission.\(^{110}\) These directives are quite general as it does not precisely inform the Mission on how QIPs would generate support and confidence. It simply advises the UN personnel in the field that their projects should follow these purposes but leaving them with the possibility of taking initiatives according to the situation they are currently dealing with. Obviously, the headquarters understood that figuring which type of projects would generate support is a task that only the people in the field can achieve, for it is a case-by-case process, not even nationally, but also regionally. Consequently, depending on the location of the QIPs, its nature will be different in order to respond to a specific need. As the interviewee explained in the case of MINUSTAH: "the goals and purposes of QIPs depends on the nature of the project."\(^{111}\) For instance, the construction or rehabilitation projects proposed by the government (through the request of a ministry) is usually aimed at improving the work conditions. As it was stated for the justice QIPs, "to provide a more appropriate framework to facilitate the effectiveness of the judiciary, to strengthen the *prestige* of the

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\(^{110}\) United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Department of Field Support, Quick Impact Projects: Policy, 12 February 2007. p 3

\(^{111}\) Interview in French with a MINUSTAH QIPs Representative, August 2014, p6. See Annexes
Judiciary, and to smooth the fair and equitable distribution of Justice in a reasonable timeframe.\textsuperscript{112}

When it comes to QIPs training, their goal was to "build capacity within the public service system following the 2006 local and general elections and to enhance the decentralization process."\textsuperscript{113} Therefore, the purpose of QIPs is no longer about building confidence but also building capacity and to professionalize the public service personnel. The interviewee explain that they also aim at improve "the quality of judicial decisions and the judges' competence." More broadly, he explains that the goal is to reinforce the institutional capacity and strengthen the authority of public authorities. Lastly, he mentions, “the purpose of some QIPs is to improve the living conditions of the population.”\textsuperscript{114} Indeed, the policy requires that the projects be "rapidly-implementable and of benefit to the population."\textsuperscript{115} The QIPs projects proposals come from ministries, local authorities or directly from the community, therefore, depending on which entity initiates it, the purpose might change to respond a need from the demanding stakeholder. It is also noted that the timeframe will differ, for instance, the use of QIPs for the public authority, such as the Ministry of Justice and Public Security, seems to be based on a longer-term goal (strengthening the rule of law), although using small projects. When it comes directly from a need of the community the project is on a short-term basis, such as installing solar panels or building a community plaza.

The interviewee at the UNHQ reinforces that statement by saying that the QIPs primary purpose is to build confidence in the Mission and the peace process “[...]] because

\textsuperscript{112} Ibid. p 6
\textsuperscript{113} MINUSTAH: Evaluation of MINUSTAH Quick Impact Projects, July 2012. p14
\textsuperscript{114} Interview in French, Ibid, p6.
\textsuperscript{115} Ibid, Policy, 12 February 2007.
we want those actors to be engaged and supportive of the peace process, so QIPs are one of the tools to develop this kind of relationship.” As an example, the MINUSTAH mission in partnership with the Ministry of Justice and Public Security set up a large construction process of facilities for tribunals. Thanks to the QIPs project of construction, the Ministry became owner of more than 70% of the tribunal facilities compared to only 10% in the past.

QIPs are also used to develop strong relationships between the Mission and the government, local authorities, civil society representatives and the population. Not only does each project respond to a specific need, it also would be impossible for the different partners to answer these needs without funds from the Mission. As an example the MINUSTAH officer explained that the tribunal of Saint Michel de l'Attalaye is the result of a partnership between MINUSTAH, the Ministry of Justice and Public Security, local authorities and civil society, and the Haitian President described it as a “very beautiful structure”. However, in some cases, when the UN Mission has not enough funds, development agencies such as UNDP can participate in the project. These projects are really directed toward the increase of the well-being of the population.

QIPs in Haiti are also aimed at facilitating dialogue and understanding between the mission, civil society and the Haitian State. The human rights, justice, electoral divisions and the component to decrease community violence inside MINUSTAH focused their QIPs on this process of improving the dialogue and the relations between society groups, either public or private. These projects enable MINUSTAH to develop strong relations with most components of the Haitian society and therefore strengthen its

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116 Interview with a Civil Affairs Officer at the UN Secretariat, August 13th, 2014, p3
legitimacy in working for the development of rule of law and peace. As the interviewee stated, "the execution of QIPs allow a direct contact with the local authorities and with several civil society grassroots associations and with the population. It appears as the Mission satisfies a communal claim, therefore facilitating dialogue and comprehension between stakeholders."\(^{117}\)

The QIPs have helped the security organs (Haitian National Police) to strengthen their authority in a democratic manner, reinforcing de facto the country peace stabilization process. The corrections team of MINUSTAH also developed many projects in order to humanize the corrections facilities. The improvement of the living conditions for inmates can strengthen security by diminishing the risk of escape and enhance the chances of rehabilitation. QIPs also assisted the corrections facilities in training on gender and human rights in corrections facilities. Indeed, stabilizing a country is also ensuring the development of a strong normative system in the public spheres in order to avoid riots and violence. Security has also been enhanced through the establishment of QIPs in difficult neighborhoods where the dialogue with the public authority has long been inexistent. As stated by the interview, the objective was also to show that the mission is not only focusing on military work but it is also willing to reach security through development projects.\(^{118}\)

QIPs influence the visibility of the mission’s work, which does not only involve military peacekeeping. Indeed, "even if people can easily forget the catastrophic security situation of the past, they are witnessing the material achievements that have improved the living conditions in their community such as construction or school refurbishing,\(^{117}\) Interview in French, Ibid, p.4\(^{118}\) op. cit., p5
construction of police stations, corrections facilities, drinkable water access in remote and poor neighborhood of the Haitian territory that has often been forgotten by the public authorities in the past."\textsuperscript{119}

Thanks to these projects, the reputation of the mission has tremendously improved. Projects are a reflection of the community's demand and operated with transparency with the participation of civil society in order to establish, as it is expected, a climate of harmony and trust between the population and the mission.\textsuperscript{120} Furthermore, after the Cholera crisis, an anti-MINUSTAH resentment started to grow. The Parliament even considered agreeing to the full departure of MINUSTAH. However, the QIPs have been able to reintroduce the population to the work of the Mission, its positive influence and in some ways were able to prevent its departure. With good communication and some projects focusing on the improvement of the living conditions of the population, MINUSTAH has legitimize its role within the stabilization of Haiti.

QIPs seemed to be a useful tool for the MINUSTAH Mission in order to develop partnerships and open dialogues with society stakeholders. It also seems to assist in strengthening the rule of law and education in faraway areas. It helps the Mission to work with the Haitian State to reinforce its democratic authority and stabilize the country.

A few shortcomings were mentioned during the interviews: Firstly a problem may emerge if too much attention is given to assist the government in strengthening its capacity. On the long-term, the population may benefit from it but not necessarily in the short timeframe that is given to implement QIPs. Therefore the original purpose of QIPs to build confidence between the mission and the population, in a rapid manner, may be

\textsuperscript{119} op. cit., p5
\textsuperscript{120} op. cit., p5
jeopardized. Secondly, certain projects might overlap with the work of development agencies and creates tensions in the work environment. In order to avoid such overlaps, dialogue should be developed between all work partners but at the risk of extending the process of implementation. Lastly, the implementation cycle is designed with "too many steps." As it was previously explained, the implementation cycle requires phases of approbations, reports writing, a sinuous bureaucratic process, vacations and lateness of the implementing partners. All of these delay the finish date of a project to a point where it can take up to a year and a half when the policy sets the deadline to 6 months. Moreover, because most of components implementing QIPs do not have a direct budget, there is a long period of waiting to get the approval of the Project Review Committee, the Regional Civil Affairs team or the Division Mission Support.

The last part comprehends experiences from the MINUSTAH team manager which reveal the complications that might erupt during the process of implementing QIPs. With experiences taken from other missions, this analysis will be able to draw conclusions on the impact that QIPs might have on a mission's work.

\[ \text{\textsuperscript{121} op. cit. p11} \]
Chapter VIII. General discussion

Unfortunately, as mentioned before, it was quite difficult to reach people for interviews due to the distance and because UN staff members are extremely busy. I was grateful, however, for their participation in adding first-hand information on these QIPs projects.

Besides the difficulty in gathering data, this section of the thesis establishes a framework for evaluation in order to assess the impact of QIPs on the mission’s effectiveness. More precisely, I will attempt to develop an assessment plan to understand whether QIPs really contribute to confidence-building and therefore assist in the achievement of the mission’s purpose. Indeed, effectiveness will be described as the capacity to achieve the mandated tasks.

According to the civil affairs officer at the UN headquarters, “QIPs are a tool, essential in accompanying the mission’s life span and most of its existence.”122 Its primary purpose is to build confidence and “to maintain a proactive communications and public outreach strategy to improve public understanding of the mandate and the role of MINUSTAH in Haiti”123 as it is required in the resolution 1743 regarding MINUSTAH.

This section first examines the necessary refocusing that all missions should undertake, followed by the development of observations to assist the missions in developing a survey that they would use in order to assess the population’s trust development since the introduction of QIPs.

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122 Interview with a Civil affairs officer, p4
Extending the actors and their role

In none of the answers did the interviewees clearly detail the role of the actors. Many were listed, from government agencies, grassroots NGOs to UN entities, although the bond created by their work on the projects were never explicitly explained. In MINUSTAH for instance the main actors seem to be the UN, and the national and local authorities, although not much were said on NGOs nor did the participant explain who the implementing partners were. What is striking is also the absence of clarity regarding the relations between the national and local authorities to the population. It is obvious that the QIPs are supposed to create a climate of trust between the mission and the population, but not much is said about the creation of a bond between the mission and other partners however this would be essential to assess if one’s was willing to estimate the impact of QIPs on the Mission’s effectiveness. Trying to simply evaluate the impact of QIPs on the increase of the population’s trust seems to reduce the influence of QIPs to only one angle of the prism. I do believe that the survey should be detailed in as much categories as they are relevant partners. It would enable the evaluation to gather the opinions of all the actors involved.

Another important remark is regarding the lack of comments on the creation of a bond between the local authorities and the population. Indeed, if QIPs are supposed to increase the well-being of the population and assist the mission in its tasks, then supporting the creation of a strong bond between the population and the public authorities seems to be essential. Stabilization and capacity building can only be properly implemented if the population starts to trust its political representatives. The mission should therefore work on this level and QIPs could be an important bridge to connect
these two actors. The population would develop its trust; the government would nurture it. Thinking the process at a micro-level such as with QIPs could be an appropriate start to further enhance the state building capacity. Indeed, it could also help the mission in connecting the short-term projects to the long-term mandated tasks. Again, in order to undertake such process, a survey should be developed to acknowledge the relational problems that the population might have regarding its political representatives. Many post conflict country experience corruption, political violence, and a significant problem of trust. Hence QIPs should be redefining its purpose to include the development of a climate of trust between all the actors involved in order to notice a tangible change in the confidence-building process.

The pivotal part in QIPs is the population. Yet, one of the problems that came out during the interviews is the difficulty to understand what the people need. In order for the QIPs to have a proper impact this question should be made a priority in order for the QIPs to be effective and consequently enhance the creation of trust whether between the community and the mission or as previously mentioned, between the population and its political representatives. The QIPs need to be centered on the idea of “need of the population”. Because the timescale of the project only starts when the first payment has been made to the implementing partner, a time of research and opinion survey should be exercised in order to grasp what is the definition of these needs. Indeed, the civil affairs officer mentioned this question during his interview and said: “how do you identify the need of the population?”\textsuperscript{124} This is an extremely relevant question to understand the impact of QIPs on the mission’s effectiveness. If the population trust is the center of the

\textsuperscript{124} Ibid, p8
QIPs purpose, and to some extent, the center of the mission’s itself as it is trying to stabilize a country and build long-lasting peace, the impact cannot be assessed if the need of the main target is not defined. Thus, the main problem is for the missions to have been able to assess efficiency but never effectiveness. The leadership of the mission will define the priorities to which QIPs will have to keep pace with. However, in all the interviews, nobody mentioned the need of the population or its participation in defining these priorities that the QIPs will need to be based on.

The survey

The confidence-building system that creates bridges between actors via QIPs misses the step to define the population needs. Currently, the need of the population might be a priority in the establishment of QIPs but is not yet considered as a centerpiece in the QIPs system. It means that the missions lack the capacity to assess QIPs impact on their effectiveness due to a shortcoming of understanding of what could really be beneficial to the population. By working with all the actors of the society, public and private, along with a participation of the different UN agencies, the missions could achieve synergy to reach not only efficiency, but an effective application of QIPs, which on a longer term could positively impact the mission.

Below is a chart representing how the cycle of trust should be defined:
The priorities of the missions are often defined on rational basis. For instance, the definition in MONUSCO of islands of stabilities was made in order to focus the work in the violence abatement, as it was defined by Diehl’s and Druckman. However, if the general goals are important, they are not sufficient to establish trust. Trust is based on a more emotional connection between the trusted and the trustee. If confidence-building should be developed, a survey of the community members should be made, in accordance with local authorities and chiefs, to learn how they define the priorities.

The survey should therefore be done, before and after the implementation of QIPs and should attempt to gather the opinions of the surveyed people. After gathering the
information enabling the establishment of proposals, the political representatives and chiefs would assist the missions in selecting the more significant one. This step would create partnerships and trust between the mission and the population but also create a link between the represented and their authorities. After a selection of proposed projects, the mission would start the implementation cycle. At the closure of projects, a new survey should be made to realize the evolution of trust.

Volunteers should do the survey, in order not to lose any part of the QIPs budget. Local universities, politically engaged people or even foreigners might be willing to assist the mission in creating a stable bond between all the stakeholders. By doing so, the volunteers would help the mission in defining what the population wants, and by precisely answering these needs with the assistance of other actors, they would create a long-lasting bond, as it is expected; the link of trust would circulate and develop a positive and stable environment in which the missions could advance long-term projects.
CONCLUSION

As it was stated in the beginning of this analysis, QIPs are expected to assist the mission in achieving its mandate by developing strong relations with the population. However, the bureaucratic system in which the UN personnel is held gives difficulty to adequately assess its impact. The QIPs efficiency is defined in the all the documents that the missions use to establish QIPs. However, the United Nations struggles to assess its effectiveness, that is to say the impact that it has in building a confidence system between all the stakeholders. The civil officers who was interviewed at the UN headquarters in New York perfectly summed up this dilemma between efficiency and effectiveness:

“I think the main problem of QIPs is we have not developed a capacity or an ability to assess their impacts. So I mean the reports I shared with you basically was trying to look at the efficiency of QIPs. Because I think member states have been coming back and forth on why QIPs was often implemented beyond the given timeline, they’re really focusing on process and so that’s why we attempt to look at who is responsible, what is the average value of project, ... But actually nobody is really asking, how do we measure whether their contributing to the confidence”125

He states an important dynamic that is recurrent in UN works, what is expected by the mission from the state members and what the mission should be doing in order to achieve a high level of effectiveness. Another interviewee from MINUSMA who previously worked at MINUSTAH approached the same issue when he discussed the

125 Ibid, p8
evaluation made by the auditors, which are usually representing the state members even though they are working as a board of auditors for the United Nations. He thus explains:

“Because this is also true, and this is an interesting part, when we receive the auditors from the UN, which are auditors from member countries, they work as board of auditors for the UN but they are from the member countries, typically their understanding is the typical of the financial output, so they don’t have, most of the case, experience from the field and 90% of the case they just stay at the capital so they don’t have any idea of how things are in the field and they tend to just apply the regulations as it is from NYC so this also is a bit discouraging because if the control that comes from NY are really rigid, I don’t think any chief of administration is ready to get criticized from on the outdoors or works and be ready to apply more flexible processes.”126

Both agree that the difficulty to adequately assess the impact of QIPs is because too much importance is given to their efficiency, to the “process” that the former one consider “rigid”.

For the missions to be able to satisfactorily assess the impact of QIPs on the confidence building, which would have a consequent impact on the effectiveness of the mission, flexibility should be introduced in their implementation process, to encompass the evaluation of the needs of the population. Including local or foreign volunteers to establish survey, including researchers and students from the academic world in order to delegate this evaluation process would assure the proper assessment of the population.

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126 Interview with a UN staff at MINUSMA, February 2015, p7-8
needs. Discussion with the community should also assist the mission in creating confidence while giving them the ability to adequately reply to the population’s requests. However, as the person at MONUSCO explained, she was only going to the field a few times a year.

Moreover, the missions should also not forget in their assessment the confidence created between them and other partners and between these partners and the community. Impact can only be properly assessed if all angles of the confidence-building system are being analyzed. Also, improvement regarding effectiveness can only be achieved if the missions acknowledge all the particularities of this system.

The main priority is to encompass the community as the main stakeholder. Efficiency is worthy, however, the missions will never be effective if confidence is not at the foundation of its work.

I regret that this analysis did not obtain more data to further define what could be undertaken by the missions, however it raised the importance of putting the community back at the center of the QIPs process, and raised the necessity for QIPs to not only build confidence between the missions and the populations, but simply to create a circle of common understanding and trust which would then become a real stepping stone for the missions to achieve its mandate and develop a strong, stable, “healthy” society.
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