China's Search For "Peaceful Internationalism" Vis-À-Vis A Liberal World Order: Interests, National Identity And Foreign Policy

Bo Ma

Graduate Center, City University of New York

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Yan Sun

8/6/2014
Date
Chair of Examining Committee

Alyson Cole

8/6/2014
Date
Executive Officer

Yan Sun

Thomas Weiss

Peter Liberman
Supervisory Committee

THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK
ABSTRACT

CHINA’S SEARCH FOR “PEACEFUL INTERNATIONALISM” VIS-À-VIS A LIBERAL WORLD ORDER: INTERESTS, NATIONAL IDENTITY AND FOREIGN POLICY

by

Bo Ma

Adviser: Professor Yan Sun

In this dissertation, I employ the concept of national identity to explain China’s foreign policy behavior during the history of the People’s Republic of China. Specifically, I propose the concept of “peaceful internationalism” to characterize the behavioral orientation of China in the post-Mao era. Peaceful internationalism as both an idea and a policy, aims at a cross-national framework for cooperation and co-existence through non-conflictual, non-hegemonic and non-unilateral mechanisms of dispute resolution. This study argues that China pursues peaceful internationalism in a liberal international order, which is consistent with its contemporary national identity, which I term the “phoenix rising” identity. This identity has three roots: the Confucian identity, the victimhood identity and the identity of revolutionary internationalism. As an analytical category, the “phoenix rising” identity captures China’s contemporary national identity, highlighting the rebirth and renewal of China’s past identities in addition to China’s experience of integrating into the world community during the post-Mao era. It shares the values of non-intervention, non-hegemony and equality among powers and serves as a framework for understanding China’s foreign policy behavior in contemporary times.

In the dissertation, according to the ideas and policies embedded in China’s peaceful internationalism, China’s resurgence will undermine certain special rights and privileges the U.S. enjoys. But essentially, peaceful internationalism and American-led liberal internationalism
share many fundamental principles, such as the market economy, inter-state cooperation and international institutions. In order to maintain world peace and stability, the system must guarantee the survival and coexistence of states, strong or weak, in a system of sovereign states. My work provides little evidence that a rising China exploits its own unequal power over subordinate states through alliance systems or imperial systems, or that it will move to balance against the United States in the twentieth-first century.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I have always wanted to write a doctoral dissertation that I truly wanted, and I am sure in spite of its immaturity and flaws, this is the one. This is a work on how China behaved, behaves and will behave in international politics, and I believe it; I certainly hope that I am right because it is not just about China, but also the world order.

I cannot recall when I start this project, and certainly it is not the end either. Despite my own dedications: perhaps more than 1001 days and nights’ research, reading, writing, and revising, I want to express my upmost thanks to Professor Yan Sun, my advisor, for all the helps she gave to me. I cannot imagine reading and correcting someone else’s 250-pages work for five times, but she did. It will not be exaggerated that this work will not look like this without the helps from Prof. Sun. I owe her a lot.

In addition, I want to express my gratitude to Prof. Thomas Weiss and Prof. Peter Liberman, two of my committee members, for their insights to improve the work and advice to me not just writing the dissertation, but also on how to become a scholar in these years. I truly appreciate it. Furthermore, I like to express my thanks to Prof. James Hsiung and Prof. Irving Leonard Markovitz. Prof. Hsiung has been my mentor since I first came to the United States in 2007, and he will always be my most respected mentor; I learn so much from him. Prof. Markovitz read my whole dissertation draft and gave me not just great suggestions, most important, he gave me confidence on successful defending it.

In the end, it will not be possible for me to finish this work without the support from my parents. Their loves to me during these years cannot be measured by words, the only thing I can think of is to love them back when I return to China.
Perhaps this is my last student paper, but certainly it is my first “book.” I hope it is not the last one, and I will always be able to write articles and books that I truly want and believe.
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Introduction

Does the resurgence of China as a major power challenge the liberal international order built and led by an American hegemon since the end of World War II? Given the size of China’s economy, the build-up of its military power and its regime type, international relations (IR) scholars are unlikely to answer in the negative. As China reemerges into a world order unknown to it during its millennia of eminence, how can we account for its foreign policy behavior? And what will this behavior portend at a time when, in the words of John Ikenberry (2011), “American liberal internationalism is in crisis?”

Conventional IR scholarship on China’s foreign policy is divided into two camps, both of which focus primarily on the material interests of a rising China. On one hand, the pessimistic camp suggests that a resurgent China will force the world order in an illiberal direction (Jacques 2009; Weber and Jentleson 2010). On the other hand, the optimistic camp perceives the rise of China, not as a rejection of the current world order, but as an admission of a new player among the key stakeholders thus preserving rather than eclipsing liberal internationalism (Ikenberry 2011).

This study tries not only focus on material interests, but also focuses on Chinese national identity in order to understand and predict Chinese foreign policy behavior. Specifically, I propose the concept of “peaceful internationalism” to characterize the behavioral orientation of China in the post-Mao era. This orientation, I argue, has three roots: the traditional Confucian system practiced by China during its millennial reign as Asia’s leading power (Fairbank 1968, 1979; Kang 2007, 2010), the victimhood identity shaped by the “century of humiliation” from the 1840s to the 1940s (Wang 2012; He 2009), and the revolutionary internationalism of the Mao
era from the late 1940s until the mid 1970s (Richardson 2010). Together, they form the main sources of a contemporary Chinese national identity, which I term the “phoenix rising” identity. Ultimately, my study intends to contribute to studies of identity in international relations and aims at enriching the literature that uses national identity for studying Chinese foreign policy.

The Argument

This History informs China’s national identity, how it sees itself vis-à-vis the world and, thus also, how it engages with the world. This study argues that China pursues peaceful internationalism in a liberal international order, which is consistent with its contemporary national identity. I define peaceful internationalism as both an idea and a policy, aimed at a cross-national framework for cooperation and co-existence through non-conflictual, non-hegemonic and non-unilateral mechanisms of dispute resolution. In explaining China’s “peaceful internationalist” foreign policy behavior, I employ the composite concept of the “phoenix rising” identity. As an analytical category, the “phoenix rising” identity captures China’s contemporary national identity, highlighting the rebirth and renewal of China’s past identities in addition to China’s experience of integrating into the world community during the post-Mao era.

The components of the contemporary Chinese national identity are well rooted in China’s ancient and modern history. First, as the patron state in the tribute system, East Asia’s system of international relations for millennia, China’s institutional memory of being a “benign empire” is a foundational aspect embedded in its culture and identity. Second, having suffered during the age of imperialism, China’s lingering sense of victimhood feeds a lack of trust for Western powers and its identification with other victims of imperialism in the developing world. Third, as a regime born out of a national liberation movement against foreign domination, the anti-imperial history of the Chinese regime disposes it against support for hegemonic power or wars
of conquest. In short, these national experiences influence China’s contemporary identity as a resurgent power.

This dissertation aims to (re)interpret Chinese foreign policy behavior during its resurgence, and to employ a national identity theory capable of incorporating Chinese foreign policy behavior into a contemporary IR theory framework. Most IR theories look at China as just another state, without regard to the effects of its long civilization, and their bearing on the present. Given its former preeminence, however, China cannot simply be seen as an emergent power, but rather as a power in its resurgence following nearly two hundred years of decline. In the annals of the modern Westphalian system, there is little precedent of a once dominant state regaining prominence after a long eclipse. But for more than a millennium preceding 1820, China was the world’s largest economy, and hence one of the strongest powers. Unlike the rise of Brazil or India today, China’s resurgence is not like the arrival of a “new kid on the block” totally unknown to us (Hsiung 2012). Therefore, to understand the rise of China, one must also look to China’s past patterns of foreign policy behavior in conjunction with contemporary IR theory. During China’s earlier prominence, it did not leave a record of abuse of power toward foreign states. I argue that China’s foreign policy behavior will have imprints from patterns of foreign policy developed during its millennium-long rein in the region as well as the lessons learned from its eclipse.

I argue that since the beginning of the post-Mao era in the late 1970s, China’s pursuit of peaceful internationalism has shared the prevailing ideas and practices of the current liberal international world order, but differed in terms of values and practices at the domestic level. At the international level, these ideas and practices include open markets and free trade, international institutions and international cooperation, collective problem solving and the rule of
law. However, China’s peaceful internationalism differs from the liberal order in its objection to the imposition of one country’s norms and practices, such as the universality of democracy and human rights, on other states, especially if enforced by coercion or the use of force. As an operational principle, peaceful internationalism favors the resolution of inter-state conflicts based on the so-called “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence,” namely respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity, mutual respect, justice, and consensus building among countries. In sum, peaceful internationalism has vowed to strengthen the current world order in terms of its openness and stability, while limiting the special rights and privileges enjoyed by any one power.

The logic supporting China’s peaceful internationalism is its “phoenix rising” national identity. I argue that this identity rooted in China’s own historical experiences both before and after the establishment of the PRC in 1949. In this dissertation, I identify three crucial periods that have shaped the “phoenix rising” identity. The first is China’s so-called “glorious past” from the 700s to the 1800s, when it was the leading state in Asia as well as in the world. During this time, China nurtured a worldview that a benign hegemon with no territorial ambitions was a necessary source of stability in the interstate system and would not threaten neighboring states. Consequently, hierarchy rather than anarchy dominated regional international relations among East Asian states for a thousand years (Kang 2010). Rather than pursuing territorial expansion, China’s material wealth combined with military weakness made it a periodic victim of invasion and conquest by much smaller neighbors. In fact, China’s territories were historically augmented by neighboring conquerors, which ruled in the name of the Chinese dynasty, a process of territorial and cultural expansion known as “osmosis” (i.e. expansion by being conquered) (Fairbanks 1976:80-105).

Second, a psychological state of mind, what scholars have called a “victimhood identity,”
provides another key source of China’s national identity (Wang 2012; He 2009). As China reemerges from the ashes of defeat, a century of decline lasting from the mid-1800s to the mid-1900s, it is highly sensitive the suffering it endured at the hands of imperialist powers. On security matters, the so-called “century of humiliation” serves as a double-edged sword. China may bandwagon with the superpowers on military issues that are not directly related to it in order to avoid direct confrontation. However, on issues that China deems to be its “core” national interests, such as territorial sovereignty, its posture is firm and unyielding. Beijing advocates peaceful settlement of conflicts, but on both material and psychological matters, it may stand up to former “imperialist” powers in serious conflicts of interest. Furthermore, as a former victim of imperialist powers, its empathy toward other developing countries serves as an important source of foreign policy making (for example, non-intervention in the domestic affairs of sovereign states, UN votes, and long standing aid to Africa). Empathy for—not just interest concurrence with—the “underdog” is reflected in its foreign policy principles toward developing countries (for example, identification with developing states in the UN and the WTO or refusal to join the G-8).

Third, the identity of revolutionary internationalism forged during the Mao era has had an influence on the post-Mao Chinese leadership in dealing with foreign relations. This identity has two dimensions. One is rooted in the process by which the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) came to power, i.e. by winning a revolutionary war. As a war of “national liberation” against foreign as well as domestic oppressors, the experience established the CCP’s empathy with anti-colonial and domestic revolutionary movements elsewhere.¹

¹ In fact, Internationalism has its own roots in China as well, the expression of “the Universe belongs to all” was dear to Dr. Sun Yat-sen and still endorsed by both the KMT and the CCP
The second dimension involves the revolutionary regime’s foreign policy. Stephen Walt observes that revolutionary regimes are not inherently expansionist (1996). The Chinese case tends to bear out his findings: during the Mao era, Chinese foreign policy on security issues was mainly defensive. Many scholars have pointed out the ideological differences between the foreign policies of the Soviet Union and Maoist China (Chang 1990; Hsiung 2012). Despite vocal support and moderate aid to a number of states China did not export revolutions as the Soviet Union did. While the Soviet Union tried to balance against the United States through military intervention in small states, China associated itself with the “Third World” and gave moral and sometimes material support to national liberation movements in colonial and semi-colonial countries under the banner of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism. In Africa and Latin America, post-revolutionary China built infrastructure and sent medical personnel, a practice that has continued to this day. Officially, China’s foreign policy has followed the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” with other developing countries and has continued to associate itself with the “Third World” countries to this day.

**The Phoenix Rising Identity and Patterns of Chinese Foreign Policy**

Together, these three historical sources have contributed to China’s contemporary national identity building, which I term the “phoenix rising” identity. It shares the values of non-intervention, non-hegemony and equality among powers and serves as a framework for understanding China’s foreign policy behavior in contemporary times. In subsequent sections, I will discuss five prevailing patterns in China’s foreign policy behavior associated with its national identity. The first three patterns are manifested in all of the PRC’s foreign policies; the

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*today. In addition, Confucian classics read, “When the Great Way prevails, the Universe will belong to all.”*
fourth and fifth are expressed exclusively in post-Mao foreign policies. These patterns include:

I. Hypersensitivity over sovereignty issues. Due to a deep sense of historical victimhood, shaped by imperial invasions and encroachments, Chinese foreign policies are hypersensitive over territorial integrity, sovereign equality and perceived national humiliation.

II. Assertiveness about national autonomy and independence. Due to the sense of victimhood as well as revolutionary internationalism, Chinese foreign policies are assertive about national autonomy and independence, and consciously identify with the third world countries or fellow victims of colonialism and imperialism.

III. Defensive Posture. Due to China’s Confucian identity, particularly its pacifist foreign policy tradition, Chinese foreign policies tend to be defensive and consider the use of force as the last resort or as means of political maneuvering.

IV. Conflict Avoidance and Non-alignment. Due to its long preeminence in a stable Asian system but modern oppression by imperialist powers, Chinese foreign policy prefers to avoid conflicts by bandwagoning with rather than balancing the leading power in the system; and to pursue a “non-alignment” foreign policy in order to maintain national autonomy and avoid becoming a hegemon.

V. Pluralism within the liberal world order. As a beneficiary of the liberal world order since the late 1970s, China’s contemporary identity and foreign policy are supportive of the stability of this order but, within the frame of this order, seek some amendments according to its own interests and identity (such as opposition to unilateralism and the universality of human rights, and support for multilateralism and mechanisms for peaceful resolution of conflicts).

These five patterns interact with one other. Pattern I and pattern II, regarding sovereignty and national autonomy, reflect China’s deep sense of historical victimhood and its past struggles
against imperial invasions and encroachments. Thus, they are closely associated with China’s victimhood identity and its experience during the revolutionary era. The “century of humiliation,” China’s loss of sovereignty and independence that resulted from Western aggression, is essential to understand the foreign policy stances taken by China.

By “hypersensitivity” and “assertiveness,” I refer to the PRC’s tendency, on issues related to sovereignty, autonomy, and even perceived humiliations, to over-interpret and over-react to the foreign policies of other states, particularly those of perceived imperialistic states. The Chinese government’s sensitivity about issues of sovereignty reflect the traumas of its past, particularly when Western powers annexed Chinese territory, usurped the Chinese government’s sovereign rights, and meddled in China’s domestic politics. As a result, China is inclined to stand up firmly against such powers over perceived interventions or humiliations. Furthermore, when facing issues related to sovereignty, China has at times behaved aggressively and uncompromisingly even towards fellow developing countries. Such hypersensitivity over sovereignty and assertiveness on issues of autonomy, both in the Mao and post-Mao eras, have at times contradicted Chinese strategic and material interests. Thus, regardless of the economic or political cost to China, on issues of sovereignty over Taiwan and many disputed territories, there have been limited signs of moderation in Beijing’s stance since the PRC was founded in 1949. Throughout the diplomatic history of the PRC, Beijing has been adamant about securing its jurisdictional claims over Taiwan, and shows limited flexibility on territorial disputes with neighboring states.

Nonetheless, following the rise of China since the late 1980s, characterized by Deng Xiaoping’s policy of “reform and opening,” the strategic value of Taiwan and the persistence of historically conditioned sovereignty-centered values have undergone some changes. China has
exhibited more flexibility with regard to disputed territories with neighboring states. Sovereignty, for China, is still an essential issue, but it may not be the only issue of concern in China’s foreign policy realm. Nonetheless, “the century of humiliation” still triggers China’s anti-Western nationalism today, and such sentiment becomes part of collective psyche in Chinese society. From foreign policy perspective, the Chinese government, in addition to the Chinese people, tends to act aggrievedly toward Western states on perceived subjugation and discrimination against the nation in order to restore its lost dignity. This is why not only the issues of sovereignty and autonomy, but also issues on perceived humiliations, strike a nerve in Chinese government and society. In sum, straightforward national security concerns, which preclude any serious consideration of China’s past victimhood and hypersensitivity to internal/external challenges that appear to jeopardize Chinese rule over its perceived territories, are insufficient to analyze contemporary China’s strategic calculations.

Pattern III and IV reflect Chinese perceptions toward balancing and alliances, and the use of force. They are influenced together by Confucian identity, victimhood identity and past revolutionary internationalism. Pattern V, the promotion of pluralism, is shaped by the contemporary Chinese national identity, itself a result of the interaction between China and the liberal world order beginning in the post-Mao era. It reflects China’s understanding of polarity and hegemony in international relations studies.

While the importance of state sovereignty has diminished as a result of economic globalization and the norms of human right protections, sovereignty and national autonomy still play a special role in Chinese foreign policy and are essential to the Chinese definition of a just

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2 David Shambaugh, a China expert at the George Washington university, called such nationalism “a part of China's psyche has a very low threshold for foreign criticism, zero tolerance for “losing face” and little self-awareness of how nationalistic eruptions appear abroad (2008).
world order. Historically speaking, the Chinese empire never engaged in sustained contact with another country on the basis of sovereign equality. Similar to the United States in contemporary international politics, China once played a special role in Asia’s international system. The idea of the “Mandate of Heaven” placed China in a central position in the world in a geographical and a cultural sense. The tribute system, which defined China’s diplomatic and economic relations with neighboring countries, represented a friendly but distanced relationship between China and the rest of the world.

However, from the 1840s to the 1940s, China lost a tremendous number of territories and was treated as inferior. In other words, China’s sovereignty and equal status within the international system had been deprived during the “century of humiliation.” These experiences resulted in China’s later identity, which emphasizes an aggressive protection of sovereignty from encroachments by other countries. The ability and the determination to defend its sovereignty function to bolster the domestic legitimacy of the ruling CCP and as well as the state’s international legitimacy as a “non-intervening” power. In the post-Mao era, following its resurgence, China will face a trade-off between the erosion of such a narrow idea of protecting sovereignty and the provision of more public goods to the world. That is to say, the growing interests in China in portraying itself as a responsible member of the international community has pushed the Chinese to make more compromises on issues regarding sovereignty-intervention nexus.

China’s conflict avoidance and “non-alignment” policy (Pattern IV) is predicated upon revolutionary internationalism and traditional Confucian pacifism, and is perceived as a strength by Chinese government officials in conducting foreign relations with other countries. China’s past experiences explain why it is difficult for the country to make international allies. Before the
1840s, China had little experience forming alliances as it had no territorial or economic ambitions toward other countries and Chinese rule was largely based on its cultural superiority. On the other hand, during the “century of humiliation,” China’s attempts to form alliances with Western powers did not prevent it from being bullied by them. In the early years of the PRC, China had a formal alliance with the Soviet Union, which ended badly in the early 1960s as China felt that it was constantly being bullied by the Soviets. In fact, the PRC’s foreign policy of “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” is rife with anti-alliance sentiments and connotations. In reality, China’s practice of a non-alliance foreign policy dates back to its early participation in the Non-Aligned Movement in the 1960s.

In addition, while alliance relations can be beneficial to a state’s security, this same state may not gain respect or be treated fairly by the other member in the alliance. For instance, the alliance between the United States and Pakistan did not prevent the United States from violating the territorial sovereignty of Pakistan during the War on Terror. Also, alliances are exclusive and special relations between only the allied parties. However, China has consistently claimed that it is one of the “Third World” countries, and that it will treat all countries equally “no matter big or small.” Such a foreign policy stance is observed by China’s refusal to form a “G-2” with the United States after the 2008 Global Financial crisis, and China’s “strategic partnership,” rather than military alliances, with both Russia and India today. Comparatively speaking, China’s negative attitude toward alliance formation has not been unusual. President George Washington, in his 1796 *Farewell Address* pointed out the negative aspects of forming alliances with European powers. Washington believed that no alliance could be an adequate substitute to

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3 For example, Central Intelligence Agency launched drone strike campaign in the country’s tribal belt, which has resulted in at least 265 attacks since January 2008. See Walsh, Declan, "Pakistani Parliament Demands End to U.S. Drone Strikes," the *New York Times*, March 20, 2012.
the efficacy and permanency of the Union. Such alliances should be avoided, while temporary alliances should be encouraged for “extraordinary emergencies.”

China’s attitude toward the use of force (Pattern III) combines its ancient wisdom with contemporary adaptations of international law and norms. The Art of War, a treatise on war strategy written by Sun Tzu during China’s Spring and Autumn period (770-476 B.C.), summarizes Chinese military culture and strategy and is still regarded highly by the contemporary Chinese government. The essential idea in The Art of War is that war is not purely military, but also encompasses psychological and political elements. These ideas were echoed by European military theorist Carl von Clausewitz when he claimed, “War is a continuation of politics by other means.” However, in contrast to the Western tradition of war, which tends to focus on victories in battle, Sun Tzu believed that winning war without actual using force was the supreme object of war. Sun Tzu writes, “Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting” (1971). Furthermore, victory was not simply the triumph of the armed forces, but rather the achievement of one’s ultimate political goals. For Sun Tzu, “The art of war is of vital importance to the State. It is a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to ruin. Hence it is a subject of inquiry, which can on no account be neglected” (1971). Whether the state is strong or weak, when dealing with issues regarding the use of force, the leadership should be particularly cautious. Writing on the role of leadership in war, Sun Tzu argued, “Thus it may be known that the leader of armies is the arbiter of the people’s fate, the man on whom it depends whether the nation shall be in peace or in peril” (1971). Thus, according to China’s ancient wisdom, force is considered a means of last resort or political maneuvering.
However, China’s perception of the use of force changed during its descent of the 1840s. The economic and military backwardness of China resulted in losses to western powers. After suffering at the hands of Western powers, Mao Zedong famously claimed, “Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.” Since then, building a strong military force has been one of the top priorities of the country. After direct military engagement with the United States in the Korean War in the 1950s, Peng Dehuai, the supreme commander of the Chinese army remarked, “The War demonstrates that the age that a Western power can conquer an Eastern country by just force using several cannons has ended forever” (1953). The Korean War became one of two large-scale wars the PRC fought to maintain a power balance on its borders since its establishment in 1949. The other one was the 1979 war with Vietnam after the latter’s invasion of Cambodia. The use of force by the PRC during the Mao era almost exclusively involved territorial disputes with neighboring countries rooted in imperial encroachments during the century of humiliation.

In addition, the use of force has become a political instrument for deterrence rather than a means to gain material advantages for the Chinese regime. MIT political scientist Taylor Fravel finds that in the twenty-three territorial disputes that China has been involved in since 1949, it used force in only six, offering concessions or compromising in the remaining seventeen (2008). These compromises have caused China to abandon potential irredentist claims to more than 3.4 million square kilometers of land that had been part of the Qing Empire; in total the PRC has contested roughly 7 percent of former Qing territory (2008:2). Thus, Fravel concludes that China has rarely exploited its military superiority as leverage in negotiations or to seize outright territory that it claims (2008:2). The PRC has consistently asserted the defensive nature of its

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military buildup. For instance, when it built its nuclear arsenal in 1960s, the state announced a “no-first use” pledge. In the post-Mao era, China has never used force toward other countries except for Vietnam in 1979, and has opposed the use of force by any state outside of the UN Charter framework. These patterns of non-aggression with regard to territory disputes are illustrated in my analysis of the 1962 Sino-Indian border war and the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese border war. In both cases, despite military victories, China did not seize any disputed territory, but rather used war to send political messages of deterrence.

Furthermore, in the post-Mao era, the PRC holds the idea that despite the different justifications for military intervention, by its nature, it involves a violation of a basic principle of respect for sovereignty, and of a central legal, as well as ethical component of the UN Charter—the right to self-determination (Finnemore 2002:6). China can agree to non-military intervention on a case-by-case basis, but oppose any form of military intervention outside the framework of UN authorization. The latest example is China’s veto of UN Security Council Resolution 10536, which would potentially authorize the Western powers to intervene in Syria’s civil war under the framework of “Responsibility to Protect (R2P).”

The future of China’s use of force may exist in the framework of UN or regional organizations-sponsored peacekeeping, peace-building and peacemaking operations. While China’s national identity may tolerate the use of force against former colonial powers, such as Japan, it is less likely to use force to resolve disputes with countries it does not have bitter

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5 Tod Lindberg, a research fellow at Hoover Institution, points out that the West’s use of R2P to topple Qaddafi after the UN Security Council authorized it to “take all necessary measures” to protect civilians, made China realize that the R2P had been abused by the West (2013). Thus, China will block further resolutions that can potentially authorize the West to use force unilaterally, which violate China’s foreign policy pattern of treating the use of force as the last resort, despite that these actions are under the UN banner.
historical ties. In either scenario, it will likely be Chinese national identity, rather than purely material interests that will matter most, and it is likely that the victimhood identity will serve as a guide for China’s use of force in the future. In sum, the use of force as a means of last resort and political maneuvering in its foreign policy are principles inherited from the experiences of different periods in Chinese history.

Unilateralism and hegemonism, however, are two phenomena in the international system that China has consistently opposed, thus a promotion of pluralism in play (Pattern VI). For China, unilateralism reflects the privilege and superiority of one state over other states and the imposition of one’s will on others regardless of their consent. Such behavior is a threat to a consensus and rule-based regional and world order, as well as to stability and peace in specific regions and the world. Similarly, according to arrays of Chinese government documents, hegemonism means that the ideas and practice of power politics serve the interests of powerful states while harming the interests of other countries. This phenomenon has been opposed by the PRC since its establishment in 1949. Moreover, opposition to hegemonism is rooted in the ancient Confucian tradition, as Chinese emperors were taught to practice Wang Dao (the kingly way or benign power), rather than Ba Dao (the way of the bully or hegemonism). Antipathy toward hegemonism was reinforced by China’s experience during the “century of humiliation.” Subsequently, China considered the Western powers of the nineteenth century both imperialist and colonist in nature, and since the establishment of the PRC, four generations of Chinese leaders, from Mao Zedong to Hu Jintao, have opposed unilateralism and global hegemony, foresworn unilateral policies and the desire for China to become a future hegemon. In short, anti-unilateralism and anti-hegemonism are rooted in both the policies and beliefs of the Chinese government.
Although the above patterns are interconnected, in actual practice they may contradict one another. Identifying these patterns helps to synthesize Chinese foreign policy as influenced by both its national identity and material interests. In the following section, I discuss the ontology and epistemology of identity in social science, particularly in international relations research, and its relevance for the case of China.

**National Identity and International Relations**

Identity has appeared frequently as an explanatory variable in social science research over the past two decades. A national identity can be defined as “a group of people who aspire to or have a historical homeland, share a common myth and historical memories, have legal rights or duties for all members, and have markers to distinguish themselves from others” (Telhami, Shibley and Barnett 2002).\(^6\) Borrowed from sociology, political scientists have adopted the concepts and methods of identity politics in their research, particularly after the end of the Cold War.\(^7\) Samuel Huntington provided a new paradigm for research in world politics by looking at major world civilizations, and their relations with Western civilization in the post-Cold War era (1996, 2004). It shifts the debate of international politics from structural differences to cultural and identity-based differences. Amartya Sen writes about different identities as a cause of violence but also a possibility of the convergence of plural identities into a peaceful communitarian identity (2006). Other authors have argued that identities can affect conceptions of legitimacy, shared interests and policy choices, as well as preferences for political leaders and

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\(^6\) Similar definitions can be found in Dittmer and Kim 1993; Smith1991; Wendt 1999; Prizel 1998; McSweeney 1999; Glenn, Spirtas and Frankel 1998.

\(^7\) For example, sociologist Benedict Anderson explored the origins of formation of nationalism in his seminal work *Imagined Communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism*. For a detailed review of definitions of identity, see James Fearon “What is identity (as we now use the word)?” at www.stanford.edu/~jfearon/papers/iden1v2.pdf (Accessed on August 27, 2012)
parties (Abdelal et al 2009:26). These seminal works demonstrate that identity, like institutions, can be used as an explanatory variable in social science research.

In the field of international relations, the rise of constructivism after the end of the Cold War emphasized ideational rather than material factors in understanding relations among states. In contrast to rationalist theories of power politics, which have dominated the field since World War II, constructivism highlights the significance of identities and preferences in analyses of state behavior and the relations between states (Wendt 1999; Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Ruggie 1998). Even for rationalists, according to Andrew Moravcsik, a social identity is a set of preferences shared by individuals that shapes a set of interests representing these rational actors’ preferences (1997). For instance, there is a growing trend to go back to Wilsonian idealism and its emphasis on the role of a community of liberal democratic states and a rule-centered world order based on international laws and institutions to understand American foreign policy (Hoffmann 2000; Ikenberry and Slaughter 2006). As indicated above, national identity is becoming as important as national interests in understanding inter-state relations.

To understand state behavior in international politics, constructivism places an emphasis on the social structure of states, which constitute both identities and interests. 8 Early constructivist scholarship focused on “national character” and “identification theory” to explain nation building and foreign policy. National character is explained as a particular set of cultural norms and political norms, through socialization, are passed down from generation to generation within a particular ethnos. And identification theory is a psychological theory, which holds out the possibility of providing a psychological key to this problematic of integration and

8 For the early development of theoretical statements on the social structure of states, see McSweeney 1999; Wendt 1999; Katzenstein 1996; Hall 1999; Reus-Smit 1999; Goldstein and Keohane 1993; Lapid and Kratochwil 1996; Bloom 1990.
mobilization (Bloom 1990:Ch 1-2). After the end of the Cold War, scholars like Peter Katzenstein began to use culture as a variable to explain different strategies of national security across states (1996). The cultural perspective focuses on uniqueness within cases, rather than similarity among states. In answering John Ruggie’s question, “What Makes the World Hang Together?” Albert, Jacobson and Lapid suggest an analytical triad formed by the concepts of identity, border and orders (IBO) to serve as an alternative instrument for understanding international relations (2001). Christian Reus-Smit argues that modern Western institutions originated from Western states’ social identity, defined by the moral purpose of the state and norms of procedural justice in history (1999). Alexander Wendt argues that state identities and interests are to an important degree constructed by social structures, which are inter-subjective, rather than material, and hence, interests are dependent on identities (1994:385). For instance, he gives the example of German national identity in 1939, which was chauvinist and exclusivist, while today it coexists with a broader European identity (387).

This social identity of states shapes and constrains the institutional imagination, as well as defines the parameters of legitimate international political action. Bruce Cronin argues that elites can build security relations around “transnational communities” based on common identity, and different types of transnational identity determine the type of cohesive security arrangement (1999). For instance, NATO is organized around different combinations of shared values, despite its different geographical locations. Rodney Bruce Hall has carried out empirical studies to back up constructivist approaches on collective identity (1999). By analyzing key historical episodes in Western history, Hall argues that the patterns of international politics are shaped by different collective identities ranging from the dynastic-sovereign system to the territorial-sovereign

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9 Including the Seven Years’ War, the French Revolution, the rise of German nationalism, the character of imperialism and World War I.

Besides ontological claims, IR scholars have also developed constructivist theories to explain regional and national politics, deviating from realist perceptions of international relations. Scholars of European studies argue that the formation of transnational alliances, such as the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), are products of global or transnational norms rather than shared threats (Risse-Kappen 2010). Through political construction projects undertaken by various national or supranational elites, along with varying scales of social mediation and exchange, a common European identity is taking shape and helping to transform a war prone continent into an increasingly peaceful, prosperous and confident polity (Checkel and Katzenstein 2009). In all, the evolution of European identities is the result of open-ended processes that gives space to various actors pursuing their specific interests (Checkel and Katzenstein 3). Nevertheless, scholars recognize that instead of a single identity, European identities are pluralistic, the products of both social processes and political projects (213).

While identity studies were pioneered by European cases, they have also flourished elsewhere in the world. Peter Katzenstein identifies various civilizational identities, and argues that those civilizational identities are often shaped by and reflected in institutionalized memories, for instance, the “century of humiliation” for China, the American civil war for the U.S., and the Holocaust for Europe (2010). Srdjan Vucetic explores the formation and the influence of the “Anglosphere,” a racialized identity shared by several English-speaking countries (Australia, America, Britain, Canada and New Zealand), and how they came to be a racialized community,
exempting themselves from the rules that have shaped war, peace, alliances, coalitions, conflict and cooperation in world politics (2011). Katzenstein has made similar arguments to the effect that the European standard of civilization is grounded in race, ethnic affiliation and religion, and the belief in the superiority of European civilization is often supported by doctrines of scientific racism (2010:1). Hence, civilization ought to be thought of as pluralistic rather than singular. Nonetheless, the nature and dynamics of national identity cannot be grasped without understanding the history of a nation.

The transformation of collective identity can help shape a nation’s political and economic development. Michael Barnett has shown how identities, along with political stability and economic growth, brought vital political legitimacy to leaders in both Israel and Egypt, even while they conflicted with their international aims. Instead of “regime survival” as the ultimate goal of states, “Arabism” focuses on “intense debates” or “dialogues,” defining some Arab countries’ national interests and causing shifts in their foreign policies (1998). Specifically, the public discourse in Jordan has transformed its foreign policy; its foreign policy now depends on domestic consensus achieved through public discourse (Lynch 1999). For Joseph Massad, the judiciary also played an important role in creating a post-colonial national identity in Jordan. According to Massad, Jordanian law (both the judicial organs and the military) is not simply a repressive manifestation of the political; it also plays a central productive and regulatory role in the creation of a post-colonial national identity (2001).

As indicate above, the study of identities is not confined to the EU, but neither is it confined to the national level. Earle and Wirth look at the interaction of North America’s identities among Canada, America and Mexico throughout history, and explore the possibility of a “New World amplitude of vision” that sets North Americans apart from Europe because of
geography and history (1995). African specialists have explored the role of identity in understanding African disorder. In culturally diverse societies, such as Rwanda, Burundi and Sudan, ethnic, racial and religious identities play central roles in confrontations and civil wars (Mamdani 2001; Horowitz 2001; Deng 1995). Scholars writing about German identity after World War II argue that the German nation, both the Federal Republic and the German Democratic Republic, searched for a new identity that would liberate them from the “Guilty Nazi” image of World War II and the “vassals” image during the Cold War (Lowenthal 1985).

On East European politics, Ilya Prizel argues that the interaction between national identity and foreign policy is particularly important in newly emerging or re-emerging states. In post-Cold War Russia, Ukraine and Poland, a lack of abiding institutions made them heavily reliant on their collective memories as the bases for their national identities (1998). In this sense, the formation of national identities is mobilized by a shift in collective memory (Prizel 1998:2-3). On Asian politics, Amitav Acharya uses identity to explain the “lack of multilateral cooperation in Asia.” The absence of an international organization like NATO, he argues, is due to different ideas that Western and Asian states have about intervention and collective security (2009). Thus, he argues, Asian regionalism, in contrast to the Western variant, is characterized by non-intervention.

These works demonstrate that identity not only affects the behaviors of states, but also challenges realist propositions that material interests are the only factors that concern states. For constructivists, national identity itself is a variable that needs to be clarified and explored, and different national identities may produce distinct political outcomes. Whereas a neo-realist

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10 The primary purpose in international relations scholarship is to find out the causal relationship between identity and foreign policy, rather than explore identity formation for different nations. Comparative politics has done more works on state formation and identity building. However, IR scholars do clarify the sources of a particular national identity.
such as John Mearsheimer would argue, “state behavior is largely shaped by the material structure of the international system” (1995:91), constructivists agree that states define their identities and interests in a variety of ways, including the density or salience of interactions with other states (Wendt 1994:389). Even for some realist scholars, the concept of interest varies. For instance, after examining Hans Morgenthau’s works, Michael Williams argues that power and interest are actually remarkably flexible and indeterminate concepts (2004:638). Despite an international system measured by power politics and material capabilities, states’ international behavior is also influenced by their respective national identities based on their own historical legacies. In other words, the interests of states are not fixed, but subject to different interpretations.

Criticisms and Response

The scholarship on identity has demonstrated that bringing identity into our understanding of foreign policy can be a fruitful alternative to existing theoretical frameworks of inter-state relations. However, without a discussion of rival hypotheses, using identity as a causal variable can be considered the null hypothesis. Realist scholars do not deny that culture and identity can help people understand how states behave, but they are suspicious that culture and identity provide better explanations than a realist approach (Desch 1998). Michael Desch argues that cultural variables are tricky to define and operationalize; they lack applicability to a number of cases; and hence cannot create a culturalist school *per se* (150). In short, treating culture as a causal variable does not provide much additional explanatory power in the real world.

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11 Noticeably, the realist proposition is that national interest, particularly survival, matters the most when states make foreign policy decisions, ideology can only receive a secondary impact for states in conducting ones foreign policy.
However, culture and identity may not be the same concepts for constructivist scholars. Culture, as Desch criticized, is hard to define. Identity, which is more clearly defined, involves both power and ideas. National identity, which focuses on behaviors at the national level, has more explanatory powers with regard to the foreign policies of states. In addition, scholars using identity as a variable recognize that sources of national identity are unique for each nation, and are subject to constant interactions. Few would claim the generalizability of states’ behaviors by using national identities of individual states.

A realist approach cannot fully explain the dynamics of world politics. First, realist and neorealist approaches fail to recognize that identities are sources of interests (Telhami and Barnett 17; Wendt 1999: Ch. 3). As scholarly works across different regions have demonstrated, identity is an important source of the state’s national interest. Ultimately, however, any particular approach is less important than whether the outcome of research advances our knowledge and understanding of the world. As Yale Ferguson and Richard Mansbach argue, “When science fails to measure up to reality, it is time to modify science” (quoted in Lapid and Kratochwil 12).

Second, as Victoria Hui points out, mainstream theories of international politics, and in particular neorealism, are flawed by structural determinism and unilinear thinking (2004:176). In contrast, constructivists do not usually predict a specific causal relation between national identity and state behavior. Instead, they characterize possible or probable behavior based on certain identities and, more importantly, they offer an explanation of the rationale for such behaviors that goes beyond a systemic understanding of international relations (Ruggie 1998; Wendt 1998). In the words of Goldstein and Keohane, this means that identity serves as a road map, and contributes to outcomes in the absence of a unique equilibrium (1993:11-12).

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12 Definitions such as “collectively held ideas, beliefs, and norms.”
13 For a discussion on different relations among IR theories, see Walt 1998.
In spite of the benefits of using identity as variable in social research, it does pose some problems. One crucial issue is how to measure continuity and change in identity. Are identities fixed into histories, or can they be created and developed by political leaders or institutions? Obviously, identity comes from the histories, cultural and social practices of a society, and sometimes, competing identities exist within the same period.\(^\text{14}\) Also, scholars argue that since ethnic identities exist because of history, they cannot be easily influenced by politicians or political institutions (Laitin 1986; Young 1976). However, identities are by no means locked in place. History itself is dynamic, and so is identity. Furthermore, national identity is subject to constant redefinition; even well established identities can change at a remarkable rate (Prizel 8). As Peter Katzenstein writes, “Norms are not static; they are contested and contingent” (1996:3).

With regard to national identity, leaders and interstate interactions can also instigate change, especially during a crisis (Legro 2000; Gourevitch 1986). Ultimately, politics amounts to politicians responding to events by competing to frame various issues (Saideman 189). An identity can cause a policy to have more or less support at home. On the other hand, understanding other countries’ identities can help politicians predict what the response from other countries will be and, hence increase the chances of favorable outcomes when making foreign policy (Legro 2000; Gourevitch 1986). Visionary leaders, such as Wilson, Lenin, Roosevelt and Mao, shaped their countries’ foreign policy in systematic and dramatic ways. From this perspective, national identity itself is a part of political invention.

The question remains, however, how does a state maintain and inherit newly formed identities? Institutionalists focus on the role of building institutions to enforce new identities.

\(^{14}\) One of the scenarios is in China’s Spring and Autumn period, which was considered to be an age that “hundreds of different thoughts” were competing for the domination of the political sphere.
Leaders are constrained by formal and informal institutions because institutions are the products of past political battles, compromises and debates (Dittmer, Fukui and Lee 2000). A change of identity will therefore bear certain costs (Saideman 193). For constructivists, the relations between agent and structure are socially constructed, and mutually influential. Identity can shape actors’ interests and perceptions, and then actors create compatible institutions. Subsequently, institutions influence successive politicians’ perception of legitimacy and interests (Wendt 1987, 1994). In sum, there is a dialectical relation between national identity and foreign policy insofar as they constantly influence and interact with each other.

The Role of Identity in IR Studies

What is the role of identity in foreign policy according to the various approaches to international relations? Existing approaches, namely realism, institutionalism, liberalism and constructivism, offer four different answers, some of which are interrelated. I summarize each of these approaches in Table 1.15

Table 1: Identity and Foreign Policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IR Approach</th>
<th>Role of Identity</th>
<th>Type of Interests</th>
<th>Mechanism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Neo-Realism</td>
<td>No Relation</td>
<td>Material</td>
<td>Balancing and Conquest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutionalism</td>
<td>Constraining</td>
<td>Material</td>
<td>Cooperation and Interdependence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberalism</td>
<td>Influencing</td>
<td>Material/Ideational</td>
<td>Promote Universal Values. E.g., Democracy and Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constructivism</td>
<td>Constructing</td>
<td>Material/Ideational</td>
<td>Social interaction</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

15 This table is inspired by the work of Stephen Saideman’s “Conclusion: thinking theoretically about identity and foreign policy.” In Telhami, Shibley, and Michael N. Barnett. 2002. Identity and foreign policy in the Middle East. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
For Neo-realism, survival is the ultimate goal of states, and seeking to maximize military security is a state’s logical choice. Balancing and bandwagoning are the two forms of state behavior in an anarchical world. For Kenneth Waltz, all social systems are characterized by three dimensions: (1) the ordering principle, (2) states are treated as units of the international system, and (3) the distribution of capabilities (1979). For John Mearsheimer it is the “Tragedy of Great Power” that each power needs to face their external threat in order to survive (2001). In addition to military security, economic interests are often said to determine states’ behavior, and in some cases, states adopt an offensive foreign policy to protect their economic interests (Liberman 1996; Gibbs 1991). In either case, for realism, the identity of the state makes little or no impact on foreign policy.\(^\text{16}\)

Institutionalists agree that the organizing principle of international relations is anarchy, but they argue international organizations’ norms and ideas facilitate cooperation and interdependence among states, and thus constrain states’ behavior (Keohane and Nye 1989; Goldstein and Keohane 1993).\(^\text{17}\) Once ideas have influenced organizational design, they are reflected in the performance of those institutions, serving interests as well (Goldstein and Keohane 1993:20). Identity may play two roles in constraining states’ behaviors. First, by altering expectations, cooperation within regimes can force a reevaluation of identity and interest. Second, shared identity may influence the perception of threat and the salience of relative gains (Rousseau 36-38). The success of the European community after World War II can

\(^\text{16}\) However, for classical realism, shared identities ranged from moderately important for Morgenthau to potentially extremely important for Walt and his “balance of threat” approach. See Walt 1987.
\(^\text{17}\) They define ideas as “beliefs held by individuals, help to explain political outcomes, particularly those related to foreign policy.” Idea for neo-liberalism is different than identity, which focuses on “collective memories.”
be seen as a successful story of creating a common institution and identity to constrain states’ behavior (Keohane, Nye and Hoffmann 1993).

For liberalism, identity plays a central role in understanding states’ foreign policy behavior. The premise of this approach is that democratic regimes, which share similar identities and values, will rarely go to war with each other, and cooperation rather than conflict is the norm (Doyle 2011). For liberalism, it is the prevalence of both democratic values and democratic institutions that influence the foreign policy of democratic states, as championed by the United States after World War II. For John Ikenberry, the United States built hierarchical state relations but also mutually agreed-upon rules and institutions, and rising powers, like China, will eventually share the same identity (2011).

Slightly different from liberalism, constructivism argues that the interests of states are not fixed, and it is a process of social interaction among different states. Identities make up important parts of states’ interests (Mercer 1995). Although constructivist scholars do not usually offer a standard “road map” of how states behave in international politics, neither do they think all states are supposed to behavior unanimously. Constructivist scholars do identify a relation between national identity and a states’ foreign policy, and the former can serve as a guideline for future international relations.

Constructivists are interested in the construction of identities and interests from a sociological perspective, which takes domestic politics seriously. From the perspective of constructivism, identity influences foreign policy in at least five ways: identity serves as a prop; identity shapes legitimacy; identity influences preferences; identity raises the costs of alternative
policy; and identity shapes outcomes.\textsuperscript{18} From a rational domestic politics perspective, by involving identity in foreign policy making, leaders minimize opposition and mobilize support from different interest groups, thus helping to define the interests of states. Identity helps create the preferences of states, and reinforces them through interactions with other states. Furthermore, by continuing to follow similar foreign policies as established by their predecessors, successive leadership reduces uncertainty and transaction costs in both domestic and foreign policy. On the other hand, an “identity violation” may affect a leader’s legitimacy or, more seriously, it can create an identity crisis for the public. Hence, leadership will bear certain costs by dramatically changing foreign policy (Saideman 177-183). In summary, although constructivism cannot provide a general theory on relations between identity and foreign policy, even from a rational perspective, identity matters in influencing states’ foreign relations.

\textbf{Research Methods}

The literature review so far has shown that identities have been widely used both as independent variables and dependent variables in political science research.\textsuperscript{19} In this dissertation, I will use national identity as an independent variable to explain a specific state’s foreign policy.


\textsuperscript{19} For international relations scholars, identity is treated as a collective concept focused on social and political identities. The assumption of identity as an independent variable rests on a notion that certain identities can be understood with improved and more accurate measurement techniques and strategies (Abdelal \textit{et al} 3-4). Identity often exists as a dependent variable and indicates that nations holding certain identity can translate into a particular type of action and behavior. Identity construction is occurring at multiple intersections of elite projects and social processes (Checkel and Katzenstein 226-227). While realism asserts that culture and identity do not challenge existing theoretical frameworks of international relations studies, I argue that using national identity as an independent variable works better to detect changes and continuities in a state’s international behavior across time.
behavior. As Alexander Wendt argues, social constructivists treat states as “actors” or “persons,” that is, we can explore the rationality, identities, interests and beliefs of states as we do with human beings, and states are described in terms of collective cognition (2004:289-304).

My identity variable will serve as a “road map” to my analysis of how a country behaves, rather than a deterministic mechanism. In this dissertation, I am not suggesting that national identity causes China’s specific foreign policy behavior. Rather I argue that without taking into consideration national identity, current IR theories are often incomplete in explaining China’s foreign policy.

This dissertation is a largely qualitative research project. I will employ the case study method in general, content analysis and process tracing in particular. The nature of my research, dealing with a single country, China, is to explore the relations between its national identities and foreign policies in a particular historical and cultural milieu. Hence, a qualitative research design serves the purpose of the inquiry. Chapter 3 will analyze the general trend of the PRC’s foreign

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20 For Wendt, states are characterized by a massive division of labor internally, the structure of which enables their members to operate as a single cognitive system (2004:304).
21 Political scientists have developed multiple methods to measure identities. In Abdelal et al’s *Measuring Identity: a Guide for Social Scientists*, five measurement strategies are laid out: experiments, discourse and content analyses, and open and closed ended surveys. Among these five, content analysis and discourse analysis have been widely used by political scientists.
22 In international relations, case studies have been conducted in the areas of international security and international political economy (Venneson 2008). Alexander George describes the case study method that “the single case study and the method of ‘controlled comparison’ of a few cases has become a respectable, legitimate research strategy that can contribute to theory development” (1979:49). The nature of my research, dealing with a single country--China, is to explore the relations between its national identities and foreign policies in the particular historical and cultural milieu. Hence, a qualitative research design serves the purpose of the inquiry. Regarding the benefits of using the case study method, Schramm writes, “The essence of a case study, the central tendency among all types of case study, is that it tries to illuminate a decision or set of decisions: why they were taken, how they were implemented, and with what result” (1971). Similarly, John Gerring defines a case study as “an intensive study of a single unit with an aim to generalize across a larger set of units” (2004:341). Charles Ragin argues that case study is a research strategy based on the in-depth empirical investigation of one, or a small
policy in the past six decades. Relying on the Central Government Annual Reports, I will use
content analysis and discourse analysis to code and decipher Chinese identities and,
subsequently, foreign policy behaviors! Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7 will analyze China’s bilateral
relations with the superpowers (the U.S. and the Soviet Union), secondary powers (Japan and
India) and minor powers (North Korea and Vietnam). I will use both discourse analysis and
process tracing methods to try to build relations between national identity and foreign policy.

While using the case study method, tradeoffs are inevitable. That is, breadth versus depth,
case comparability versus representativeness, causal effect versus causal mechanisms, invariant
versus probabilistic explanation and exploratory versus confirmatory analysis (John Gerring
2004). In my study, instead of choosing a single unit to analyze the role of national identity
played in Chinese foreign policy, I choose China’s relations with a few key countries to illustrate
and test my argument. These “crucial cases,” in the words of Eckstein (1975, 1992), are
representative enough to build and test the national identity theory I propose. As Gerring argues,
an estimate of probabilistic arguments in a case study is as important as a causal effect, and a
cause increases the likelihood of an outcome and/or the magnitude of an outcome (2004:348-
349). Moreover, the case study method is more useful when insight into causal mechanisms is
more important than insight into causal effects, and when the strategy of research is exploratory,
I will select “crucial cases” and use process tracing as a means to test the theory. These cases include the PRC’s foreign policies with the superpowers—United States and the Soviet Union, the secondary powers—Japan and India, and the minor powers—Vietnam, North Korea and Israel across time. By using process tracing, a research procedure designed to identify processes linking a set of initial conditions to a particular outcome, I intend to assess the Chinese national identity theory by identifying the causal chain that links Chinese national identities and foreign policy behavior, and to uncover the possible causes and observed outcomes. By using memoirs of leaders, archival documents, interview transcripts and secondary literature, I examine whether the causal process of Chinese national identity theory is at play. As Robert Jervis argues, process tracing allows the researcher to link manifestos to what actually happens, to examine the reasons that actors give for their actions and behavior, and to investigate the relationship between beliefs and behavior (2006). Thus, process tracing is a way to assess actors’ perceptions and intentions in political science research.

23 Guy Peters argues that as no amount of case-study research can confirm a theory definitively, by selecting and testing “crucial cases,” the researcher can have greater confidence about that theory (1998:150).
24 As Pascal Venesson describes process tracing can be fruitfully used in both positivist and interpretivist research designs, allowing researchers to combine a positivist and an interpretive outlook in case study research (2008). In addition, Clayton Roberts describes process tracing as “the minute tracing of the explanatory narrative to the point where the events to be explained are microscopic and the covering laws correspondingly more certain (1996:66). Similarly, George and Bennett describe process tracing “a procedure for identifying steps in a causal process leading to the outcome of a given dependent variable of a particular case in a particular historical context” (2005:176).
25 Pascal Venesson distinguishes process tracing from “telling stories” by arguing that first process tracing focuses on certain aspects of the phenomenon, and secondly, it is structured in the sense that the investigator is developing an analytical explanation based on a theoretical framework identified in the research design, and last the goal of process tracing is to provide a narrative explanation of causal pathways that lead to a specific outcome (2008).
26 Amenta also holds similar thoughts that uncovering the reasons that actors give for their actions are a key aspect of the empirical investigation (1991:179-180).
As none of the methodology in social science is perfect, the existence and credibility of the empirical sources I use in the dissertation research are crucial to reduce bias.\(^\text{27}\) To avoid the confirmation bias, i.e. the tendency to collect information that confirms one’s own theory, I will consider alternative explanations from secondary literature, particularly realist explanations of the PRC’s bilateral relations with other states. To avoid the problem of over-determination, I make no claim that the national identity theory literature or my own research suggest that identity is the sole explanation for China’s foreign policy behavior.\(^\text{28}\) Finally, to avoid neglecting negative evidence, I will ask what events should occur and what evidence should be observable if this argument or explanation is correct.\(^\text{29}\)

In the end, one needs to recognize the limits of the methods we know in order to build and test new theories. As Mills wrote, “ultimately, however, they (methods) cannot substitute for a passionate curiosity about a great problem, the sort of curiosity that compels the mind to travel anywhere and by any means, to re-make itself if necessary, in order to find out” (1959:105).

The sources I use fall under two broad categories. First, I use archival sources, such as the memoirs, speeches and statements of both Chinese and foreign leaders across. Methodologically speaking, understanding the perspectives of leaders in the transformation of their countries’

\(^{27}\) The biases inherent in the case study method are the confirmation bias, the over-determination problem and negative evidence.

\(^{28}\) As Davis argues, focusing on other theories and hypotheses can help, as well as on counterfactuals, which can be a powerful tool to challenge our preexisting theories (2005:168-175). However, in general, as Njolstad suggests, by clarifying potential conflict of interpretations about the evidence, clarifying whether competing explanations address different aspects of a case, and comparing various cases and identifying the scope conditions for explanations of a case, the bias can be dealt with (1990).

\(^{29}\) As national identity theory is not only supposed to explain country’s past behaviors, but also should be able to explain and predict the current and future foreign policy behaviors, which serves as test of the utility of the theory. In this dissertation, I specifically predict that China’s phoenix rising identity will lead to China’s peaceful internationalism in terms of foreign policy behavior in the future.
foreign policy and formation of national identity is both legitimate and reliable. The “agent-structure” debate has long existed in international relations studies. Liberal scholars, like John Ikenberry, have long argued for the critical role of individual presidents like Woodrow Wilson in the formation of American liberal foreign policy (2009, 2011). Even classical realist scholars like Hans Morgenthau recognized the role of individual leadership in making foreign policy (1946). In Joseph Nye’s recent book *Presidential Leadership and the Creation of the American Era*, he focuses on the role that individual leadership played in American primacy (2013). He writes, “Sometimes leaders not only take a fork in the historical road but help to create it” (2013:5). For him, transformational leaders seek major change, and their objectives can be measured in terms of the degree and scope of change they seek. Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman all responded to the rise of American power resources and tried to create, expand and consolidate a new world order (10-16).

Elite perspectives on foreign policy making are even more important in the case of China, an authoritarian country. Feng Huiyun argues that leaders’ beliefs are crucial in deciding foreign policy as crises in foreign policy do not transpose directly into decisions, and decision makers draw upon analogies and past experiences of their own to make foreign policy judgments (2009:318). In the case of China, during Mao Zedong’s rule, he took upon himself almost exclusively the prerogative of defining China’s official national identity. Implementation inevitably involved the entire official PRC apparatus as they attempted to turn the collective image of China into viable political action, both domestically and internationally. For the
Chinese leadership, a foreign policy line is a unified, theoretically articulated, comprehensive design for dealing with the global system (Van Ness 200-201).30

There are both pros and cons in focusing on the perspectives of leadership and political elites in an authoritarian country. Shih, Shan and Liu argue that elite studies continue to be important and necessary for understanding authoritarian regimes like China as power is concentrated in the hands of one or a few leaders, whose preferences, beliefs, and actions can have a profound influence on political and economic outcomes (2010:51-52). On the other hand, foreign policy decision-making in any country tends to be concentrated at the top of the hierarchy, and political researchers lack direct access to the processes of decision making outside of published documents. Thus, regarding the credibility of leaders and high officials’ speeches, statements and memoirs, two questions arise: are they rhetoric and are they lies?

In order to perceive the rhetoric that political leaders made, I cross-examine Chinese sources with sources from foreign leaders. As foreign policy negotiations often involve multiple parties, a cross-examination will enable me to detect what is rhetoric and what is reality during foreign policy making.31 On the possibility of leaders telling lies in international politics, John Mearsheimer in Why Leaders Lie, reaches an unconventional conclusion. “Lying is...acceptable conduct in international politics,” he says, “Because there are sometimes good strategic reasons for leaders to lie to other countries and even to their own people. Nevertheless, there is actually

\[30\] In all, constructivists emphasize how agents shape structures, which then influence agents in the sense that identity shapes an actor’s interests and perception, so that the agent creates an institution embodying the identity, and the institution influences subsequent politicians, shaping their imagination about the route map of policies (Saideman 193).

\[31\] In addition, Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7 examine China’s bilateral relations with other states, which can also provide checks for China’s foreign policy behavior.
not much lying between states” (2011:6). As a prominent realist scholar, Mearsheimer does not consider morality as an obstacle for leaders to tell lies to other states. In fact, he writes, “leaders do not always lie about foreign policy, but they occasionally say things or purposely imply things that they know are not true” (8). The conclusion is certainly counterintuitive, but it serves as a way to provide theoretical legitimacy for my discourse analysis of the speeches, statements and memoirs of Chinese leaders and what they reveal about the Chinese national identity and related foreign policies.

The second category of sources I will use in this research is secondary literature from both Western and Chinese area specialists in the field of international relations and China studies. The benefits of using secondary literature, Gerring argues, are that both literature review and meta-analyses are systematic attempts to integrate the results of individual studies into a single dataset in order to conduct the case study (345). In the dissertation, I use MLA (Modern Language Association) style in bibliography for academic books and articles cited. For other sources, such as articles from newspapers, magazines and the internet, I use in-text citations for the purpose of clarity.

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32 However, Mearsheimer does find that leaders do not lie very often to other countries, but instead seem more inclined to lie to their own people.

33 On the definition of lying, Mearsheimer wrote, “Lying is when a person makes a statement that he knows or suspects to be false in the hope that others will think it is true” (2011:16).

34 Mearsheimer summarizes two different reasons for leaders to tell international lies: first is the strategic lies that leaders tell for the purpose of helping their country survive in the rough and tumble of inter-state relations; second, leaders can tell selfish lies to protect their personal interests or those of their friends (2011:11). For the concerns of scholars of international relations, it is the strategic lies that draw more attentions. However, few inter-state cases of lying have been discovered and documented in IR scholarship, which is contradictory to conventional beliefs (26). Also, through a cost-benefit analysis, telling inter-state lies causes one country more harms than benefits. Hence, statesmen rarely tell international lies as they will be hard to get away from lying. In reality, lying is only effective when the potential victim thinks the liar is probably telling the truth (30). Furthermore, it is particularly difficult for a state to lie or try to hide a lie to other states for a long period of time, with very few cases of bluffing in international negotiations and diplomatic lying having been disclosed to the public.
Organization of the Dissertation

This dissertation attempts to understand China’s international behavior through both a liberal and a constructivist view. I share with liberalism and constructivism the notion that identity can influence as well as construct a state’s interests. However, scholars tend to agree that constructivism is not a theory of international politics, but a framework for developing models of social interaction. Therefore, constructivist theories must rely on substantive empirical research to provide alternative/complementary understandings of the real world. To that end, my research explores the relations between Chinese identity and its international behavior by asking: first, what is/are Chinese national identity(s) in terms of its international behavior; second, how does Chinese national identity affect China’s foreign policy? Chapter 1 of the dissertation deals with the first question; the remaining chapters deal with the second question.

Following this introductory chapter, Chapter 1 identifies the sources and patterns of contemporary Chinese identities, namely, Confucian, victimhood and revolutionary experience. Chapter 2 will demonstrate the impact of China’s national identity on its foreign policy by looking at trends in the formal principles and positions of Chinese foreign policy since the PRC’s establishment in 1949. I employ content analysis to analyze the Chinese Central Government Annual Reports (1954-2012), as well as discourse analysis to measure the general trends of Chinese foreign policy since 1949. Chapter 3 and 4 employ Chinese identity theory to explain its bilateral relations with the two superpowers, the USA and the former USSR. Chapter 5 and 6 discusses China’s relations with secondary and small states, using Japan, India, North Korea and Vietnam as cases. Chapter 7 will conclude by summarizing the key patterns of Chinese foreign policy behavior as informed by its national identity, and offering my insights on peaceful internationalism vis-à-vis liberal internationalism in understanding China’s future policy.
behavior. Ultimately, in this dissertation, I employ the concept of national identity to explain China’s foreign policy behavior during the history of the People’s Republic of China.
Chapter 1: Chinese National Identity in International Relations: Sources and Patterns

American exceptionalism is missionary. It holds that the United States has an obligation to spread its values to every part of the world. China’s exceptionalism is cultural.

---Henry Kissinger on China, xvi

In this chapter, I identify three crucial periods that have influenced China’s contemporary national identity with regard to its foreign policy. Specifically, this chapter will discuss the evolution and adoption of the Confucian identity from ancient times, the victimhood identity inherited from the “century of humiliation,” and the identity of revolutionary internationalism from the Mao era. These periods will illustrate the historical trajectory of the development of the contemporary Chinese identity.

Confucian Identity

From its emergence as a unified state in 221 B.C. until the middle of the nineteenth century, China stood at the center of the East Asian international system. China produced a greater share of total world GDP than any Western state in eighteen of the last twenty centuries (Kissinger 2011:11-12). As late as 1820, it produced over 30 percent of world GDP—an amount exceeding the GDP of Europe and the United States combined (Maddison 2006:261-266).

Despite these economic advantages, however, China acquired no overseas colonies and showed no interest in countries beyond its own territories.35 Rather than territorial expansion,

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35 In the period of Ming Dynasty between 1405 and 1433, China acquired the most advanced technology, and launched several times’ naval explorations led by Admiral Zheng He. His fleets reached as far as India, the Horn of Africa, and the Strait of Hormuz. However, these voyages brought back only “tribute” back, China claimed no colonies or resources from all those naval explorations.
China’s material wealth combined with military weakness making it a periodic victim of invasions and conquests by much smaller neighbors. In fact, historically, it has been neighboring conquerors ruling in the name of the Chinese dynasty who augmented China’s territories. Henry Kissinger refers to it as a process of “expansion by osmosis” (2011). At the same time, “the Chinese Emperor was conceived of (and recognized by most neighboring states) as the pinnacle of a universal political hierarchy, with all other states’ rulers theoretically serving as vassals” (Kissinger 2011:2-3). The China-centered tributary system kept interstate relations stable in East and Southeast Asia for millennia.

Why did ancient China behave as a benign hegemon and a source of longstanding stability for the surrounding international system? Scholars in the West and China usually attribute this to “Confucian pacifism” (Weber 1951; Fairbank 1974; Solomon 1998; Di Cosmo 2009; Kang 2010; Bell 2008; Feng 2009). Confucianism has long played a dominant role in Chinese political history. Since the Han Dynasty (206 B.C.—220 A.D.), Confucian thought was adopted as the official state doctrine. Gradually, Confucianism evolved into something akin to China’s Bible and Constitution combined (Kissinger 2011:14), and Confucius came to be regarded as more than a king—a living god among men (Feng 1948:47-48).

The moral basis of Confucian principles derives from an optimistic conception of human nature and human relations. According to Confucianism, human nature is inherently good (in contrast to the realist conception of human nature as self-interested) because humans, as such, are capable of benevolence (Ren), namely love for one’s kinship. Thus, a father is naturally capable of loving his children, and his children of loving their father, etc. By extension, one is capable of loving members of the larger society. The basis for loving humans outside of one’s
family is to use a measurement: to love others’ children or parents as one would love one’s own. Again, by extension, a ruler is supposed to love his subjects as he would do his own children.

In the original words of the *Analects*, a collection of Confucius’ wisdom written by his disciples, “A man of Ren is one who, desiring to sustain himself, sustains others, and desiring to develop himself, develops others. To be able from one’s own self to draw a parallel for the treatment of others; that may be called the way to practice Ren.” According to Feng Youlan, a Columbia University-trained philosopher in the pre-Communist period, the idea of Ren is to “love others” as benevolence entails. Just as in a family, a father would act according to the way a father should act, i.e. by loving his son, so by extending this benevolence to the society, the man who loves others is able to perform his duties in society (1948:42-43). In other words, “Do to others as you would have them do to you” (43). Hence the Chinese term for the “state” or “government” is a compound word, “country-family” (guojia), while government officials are traditionally known as “parental officials” (fumu guan). Confucianism also holds that humans are perfectible by nature and, hence, they can cultivate moral values through learning.

Two basic principles of Confucian political philosophy follow from this. One is the principle of government by the sage or a morally endowed man capable of benevolent love and justice. The sage or cultivated wise man is supposed to be a combination of commander in chief, supreme pontiff, and top educator (Pines 2012:45). The sage king is supposed to provide leadership from above, dispensing wise counsel and presiding over an orderly realm by exemplifying of virtue. Good governance, in this thinking, comes from centralized but prudent leadership from above, not from coalescing aspirations from below (Pines 2012:65). Confucianism thus infers a preference for “rule of man” to “rule of law.” It believes that no
matter how well a system is designed and how well rules and laws are established, without the proper men to conduct them, they will not lead to good governance.

Second, Confucianism advocates the fundamental idea of righteousness (Yi). That is, it is righteous or incumbent upon one to exercise Ren or benevolence. This obligation entails the principle of reciprocity. It means that a father should act fatherly so that his son can follow in a manner most appropriate to his self-identification as a son. According to Tu Wei-Ming, a philosopher at Harvard University, the son’s filial piety is conceived as a response to the father’s kindness, and the father must set an example for the son as a loving and respectable person before he can reasonably expect his son to love and respect him (1985:124). The eminent scholar of Chinese history, John Fairbank, thus explains, the Chinese man defines his “self” by his relations to others through the “web of reciprocal obligations” (1979:71). Confucius believed that unless one is righteous and benevolent, one cannot make others righteous and benevolent. In his words, “the ruler must himself possess good qualities before he requires them of the people. He must not have bad qualities in himself before he may require that they shall not be found in the people.” In Confucianism, to lead by example is the way a ruler should govern. He must constantly try to look at things from the standpoint of the people rather than from his own.

The role of familial roots in the conception of human and societal relations is a key difference between Chinese and Western political traditions. The former is closely linked to its familial root, while the latter tends to ignore it (Solomon 1998:28-29). Confucianism sees the family as the natural habitat of humans, and among it, the father-son relationship as a defining characteristic of the human condition (Tu 1985:123). Tu Wei-Ming argues that unlike Christian symbolism, which tends to undermine the significance of familial relationships in the formation of society, Confucian salvation takes the basic dyadic relationships of the family as the
foundation of Chinese society (1985:123). Rule by benevolence and rule by the sage (or one who practices benevolence), in turn, lead a society to prosperity and harmony. These are the ultimate goals for Confucian rulers. In the Analects, the idea of filial piety and brotherliness are the foundations of humanity, and by extending the good intention of caring for strangers as dearly as caring for one’s own kin, social harmony is achieved. In the Confucian tradition, social harmony and peace have been fundamental and enduring political values (Bodde 1953:19-80).

Confucianism and Ancient Interstate Relations

At the interstate level, the idea of Ren (benevolence) and rule by the sage (or one who practices Ren) is the origin of Confucian pacifism and universalism. The idea of leading from above was the ideational foundation of the tribute system, with China at the top of the interstate hierarchy that lasted centuries in East Asia.

Established during the Han Dynasty (206 BC – 220 AD), the tribute system included, at various times, Korea, Vietnam, Japan, the Ryukyu Islands, Siam, Burma and Malacca. Under this system, the weaker states would acknowledge China’s preeminence by periodically honoring the Chinese emperor with gifts and ritualized ceremonies paying respect. In return, they were bestowed gifts of greater value, the right to trade in China, and for nearby small states, military protection in the event of foreign invasion. China led the tribute system not only because of its economic and cultural prowess, but also as a moral example and an international duty to the other states. That is, in a hierarchical international order, the leading state should act like a benevolent and righteous state.

For a detailed discussion of Confucian political philosophy, see Wu 1928.
In dealing with the non-Chinese, Confucian culture emphasized pacifist views. The use of force was usually considered a reactive and defensive means or else a mechanism for diplomatic maneuvering. War was destructive to the people and wasteful of a state’s resources. It was by good faith that a small state served a great one, and benevolence was demonstrated by a great state’s protection of a small one (Fairbank 1968:24-26). This Confucian pacifism in ancient China has been widely observed by scholars and practitioners of international politics. Max Weber notes “the pacifist character of Confucianism” (1951:140) and John Fairbank writes that Chinese culture has a “pacifist bias,” considering the use of force the “last resort” (1974:7-9). He refers to “a cult of state humanism” based on a faith in the power of virtuous conduct to capture the hearts of men, who will be led to the path of order under wise and benevolent authority (1979:63). Fairbank also writes that in traditional Chinese states, indoctrination in the orthodox principles of social conduct was the primary way to preserve peace and prosperity within the state, whereas the use of physical violence to maintain order was seen as a last resort (1979:70).

The Sinologist Richard Solomon writes about Confucian avoidance of social conflict and suppression of hostility and aggression in inter-state relations because conflict tended to go beyond the bounds of dispute over specific issues into a “confusion or chaos” for the system (1998:514). The noted historian Nicola Di Cosmo writes, “the Confucian and Mencian philosophical traditions valued the brush far more than the sword. In foreign policy the same tenets allegedly privileged peace over war, persuasion over coercion, while arms and violence were solutions of last resort” (2009:2).

Emphasis on hierarchy was another character of the Confucian world order. Scholars acknowledge the formal inequality (or hierarchy) of the Confucian order but also its informal benevolence (Bell 2008). Political scientist David Kang (2007, 2010) argues that the ancient
Chinese tribute system is “formally unequal, but informally equal” and “created much less inter-state war than the Westphalian system.” By his count, only six inter-state wars occurred in East Asia between the middle of the 15th century and the middle of the 19th century, but during the same period, almost fifty major wars in Europe broke out (2007:36-41). Further, he argues that during those four hundred years, Europe’s five hundred independent units shrunk to about twenty, while the number of countries in East Asia stayed about the same during the same period (41).

The lack of war in Asia was precisely due to the Confucian order and its longstanding “tribute system,” which recognized China’s status as hierarchical and the leading power in that system. As Kang puts it, the tribute system “provided a normative social order that also contained credible commitments by China not to exploit secondary states that accepted its authority” (2010:2). Compared with the Westphalia system, “a formal equality between states and balance-of-power politics,” the East Asian tribute system emphasized “formal inequality between states and a clear hierarchy in the system,” and yet “was marked by centuries of stability among the core participants” (Kang 2010:2). As the dominant state in the tribute system, China achieved the status through its cultural achievements and social recognition, rather than by its military and economic capability (Kang 2010:8). Rana Mitter argues that in the Confucian world view, those who were privileged to be at the top of the hierarchy were not permitted to abuse that superior position with impunity, but were required to exercise reasonable, in effect just, control over the ruled (2003:210). This view applied at all levels of society, including the relationships of the Chinese court with its suzerain and tributary territories.

Chinese political scientists concur on the hierarchical but pacifist structure of the Confucian world order. Qin Yaqing, a leading IR scholar in China trained in the West, writes
that the nature of the Confucian world order is “unequal but benign” (2007). Feng Huiyun, also trained in the West, writes that under Confucian influence, China had a defensively strategic culture, and in its thousands of years history, just two large-scale military expansionist movements. China avoided war at all costs because the use of force, particularly as an aggressive means to gain material advantage, was anathema to its value system (2009:314).

In contemporary terminology, China was, in short, exercising its “soft power” overseas while it was the strongest power in the system. Or as Fairbank puts it, “Chinese influence abroad was based on commerce and culture rather than on military power” (1979:65). From a cultural perspective, the nature of Confucian identity and the international system based on it were distinct from the Westphalia system, enabling China to act as a benign hegemon throughout history.

**Confucianism and Contemporary Interstate Relations**

The Confucian pacifist order and the tribute system associated with it, however, collapsed when Britain invaded China in the middle of the nineteenth century. It was replaced by the British imposed “Treaty System,” where a long series of unequal treaty clauses contributed to China’s deeply felt “century of humiliation.” The much hated clauses ranged from losses of tariff and customs controls, cession of ports and territories, the ending of opium controls, extraterritorial rights for foreign subjects, and heavy indemnities for wars that China lost fighting imperial encroachments into its own land.

The Chinese Communist Party has staked its legitimacy as a nationalist movement against foreign imperialism symbolized by the “unequal treaties” and has continued to buttress its legitimacy as the party that ended foreign imperialism. As China becomes a normal state once
again, after embracing and virtually abandoning the imported Marxism as official doctrine, it is re-embracing its traditional cultural heritage. Daniel Bell, a Princeton trained political theorist working at Tsinghua university, reports that a resurgence of Confucian ideas and values can easily be found, and these continue to influence Chinese society in both visible and invisible ways (2008).

Indeed, Confucian pacifism has increasingly been reflected in the policy goals and strategies of the post-Mao regimes. Under the paramount leader Deng Xiaoping, from the late 1970s to the mid-1990s, “China’s strategy is and always will be defensive” (Wang 2011:21). Under Jiang Zemin, head of the CCP and president of the Chinese state from 1989 to 1999, one of the goals of the party was to achieve “the great revival of the Chinese nation.” Under his successor Hu Jintao, “a harmonious society” at home and “a harmonious world” abroad were promoted, both echoing the Confucian tenets of harmony under the heaven (Bell 2008:9). With specific reference to China’s foreign policy, Hu notes, “China since ancient times has had a fine tradition of sincerity, benevolence, kindness and trust towards its neighbors” (Wang 2011:2).

Chinese foreign policies have also exhibited Confucian pacifism in the post-Mao period. Taylor Fravel, a Chinese foreign policy expert at MIT, argues that China has rarely exploited its military superiority to secure its disputed territories. By his count, out of China’s twenty-three territorial disputes with neighboring countries (all of which resulted from imperial encroachments in modern times), China offered significant concessions in seventeen, or over 70% of the disputed cases. On the other hand, China has only gained back between 25% to 30% of the disputed territories (2008). Since China’s use of force against Vietnam in 1979, in response to the latter’s invasion of Cambodia, China has not engaged in any military conflict with other
countries. One scholar notes after studying Chinese strategic behaviors in the past, “if history is any guide, it will shed light on China’s future behavior” (Wang 2011:3).

Despite its wide recognition, the thesis of Confucian pacifism is not without challenge. The most prominent is the “cultural realism” perspective proposed by Alastair Johnson, a Harvard political scientist. If from the perspective of Confucian pacifism, China’s historical use of force is defensive, reluctant and reactive, Johnson attributes a cultural realism to China’s traditional strategic culture. “China has historically exhibited a relatively consistent hard realpolitik or parabellum strategic culture that has persisted across different structural contexts into the Maoist period” (1996:217). He thus interprets traditional China’s use of force as eager, proactive, offensive and, often times, expansionist. A defensive grand strategy is adopted only when China is in a weak position, Johnson argues (1995). For him, China’s leaders have internalized the parabellum strategic culture, leading to an offensive grand strategy that China has pursued in times of superior strength.

In rebuttal, scholars familiar with ancient Chinese texts point out that Johnson’s argument was based on a highly selective reading of ancient texts, and only military ones at that. Wang Yuan-kang writes, “by selectively drawing on realpolitik-conforming elements from the military classics and disregarding the Confucian-affirming evidence as well as a vast body of Confucian writings, the theory of cultural realism underestimated the impact of Confucianism on Chinese strategic culture” (2010:27). Feng Huiyun questions Johnson’s selection of cases from the Ming Dynasty, whose rulers fought and replaced the Mongol invaders that established the preceding Yuan Dynasty in the 13th century. It is thus highly misleading to choose this particular period to conclude that Chinese strategic culture was offensive. As Feng points out, “Johnston prescribed one identity for the Chinese as a historically and culturally produced realpolitik
state...This deterministic feature in Johnston’s cultural realism leads to a misperception that China is a rising revisionist state that is aggressive in nature” (2007:30).

More importantly, Johnson’s claim about a Chinese cultural realism is not supported by empirical history. Examining China’s external relations rather than internal strife shows that China was highly pacifist. David Kang, in *East Asia before the West*, writes, “From 1368 to 1841—from the founding of the Ming dynasty to the Opium wars between Britain and China—there were only two wars between China, Korea, Vietnam, and Japan” (2010:2). Rana Mitter argues that the traditional tribute system was a way for the Chinese court to retain nominal control over remote areas while the suzerain rulers were, in fact, autonomous, betraying a tacit understanding that Chinese authority could not stretch beyond the empire’s military capabilities (2003:209). Furthermore, in regard to China’s strategic culture in the post-Cold War period, Johnson himself no longer subscribes to his views of Chinese leaders or a cultural interpretation of the Chinese security stance (2003).

**Victimhood Identity**

If millennia of the Confucian civilization have brought pride and glory to the Chinese nation, the “century of humiliation” since the 1840s represents shame and injury. Hence, avoiding a repetition of such humiliation has become one of the crucial goals in conducting foreign relations for the Chinese government ever since. From its traumatic decline during the mid-1800s to the mid-1900s, a psychological state of mind, what scholars have called a “victimhood identity,” has evolved and provided another key source of China’s national identity. It has made China highly sensitive about its past sufferings and contemporary slights from Western countries.
Scholars of postcolonial studies generally agree that a society is in close contact with the history of a prior regime, as collective memory is fresh and institutional political legacies are vibrant (Cruz 2000). However, since each society has its own collective memories and historical legacies, there can be no generalizations about how postcolonial nations are supposed to behave. Some scholars argue that symbols of defeat for nations often assume a foundational role in the construction of national identity. Although symbols of defeat may not explain formations of nationalism for all nations, one study finds that they serve as the very signifier of modern national identity building in such states as Israel, Serbia, Greece and Ghana (Mock 2012).

Among theories of post-colonial ideology, dependency theory has emerged as a powerful tool that blames underdevelopment and backwardness on historical creations by modern imperialism. Likewise, Chinese scholars have argued that the Chinese state has used historical memories as raw material for constructing China’s contemporary national identity, a key to understanding Chinese foreign policy behavior and nationalism (Zhao 2004; Wang 2012).

The colonial past of many developing countries has had significant effects on post-colonial interstate relations. In the modern period, China has always found engagement with the (West-dominated) international system a frustrating experience. The theme of “victimhood” helps both to lend legitimacy to the Chinese regime and inform its policies. Studies on Chinese victimhood identity and nationalism suggest that these are among the most important sources of motivation for Chinese international behavior. Jerome Cohen, a scholar of Chinese law at Harvard University, argues that the succession of humiliations that began with the Opium War (1839-1842) created nationalism out of Confucian culturalism (1967:110). The sentiment caused by a loss of territoriality and sovereignty have instilled in a proud and once powerful people the determination to end their country’s status as a semi-colony and to achieve its recognition as a
sovereign equal (110). Callahan argues that “shame politics” should be considered a methodological approach in understanding China’s domestic and foreign policies. According to him, national humiliation continually informs Chinese foreign policy in both elite and popular discussions. Thus, it is imperative that the West understand China’s particular suffering during the “century of humiliation,” as well as why that suffering has led the Chinese to conclude that they need a strong state to save the nation from imperialists (2003, 2004).

The historical details of the “century of humiliation” are widely taught in Chinese classrooms and well known to the Chinese public. It began with the first Opium War (1842) that Britain started in Canton after a Chinese commander destroyed 1189 tons of opium smuggled into China by British merchants. After losing the Opium War to the militarily superior British, a notorious “unequal treaty” was imposed on China, referring to the one-sided nature of concessions made under gunboat diplomacy. It initiated the age of imperial wars and unequal treaties made at China’s expense. The unequal treaty clauses included:

- The abolition of tariff autonomy for China, thus opening the door to manufactured goods from the newly industrializing countries of Europe;
- Heavy indemnities imposed on China for losing each war, eventually leading to British takeover of custom revenues and British bank financing to pay off the reparations;
- Extraterritorial rights, or exemption of Western subjects from local law;
- Opening of ports in coastal cities, with loss of local control over trade, trade products and routes; easing of opium trade;
- Most favored nation (MFN) status;
- Cession of territories or territorial concessions;
- Cession of suzerain rights over tributary states and territories.

The unequal treaties resulted in eventual British control over a majority of China’s key manufacturing industries, trade, finance, transportation sectors and resource exploration (Moulder 1977:106-107).

Table 2 shows a list of “unequal treaties” that China was forced to sign between the 1840s and the 1940s. Among them, the two Opium Wars between China and Great Britain established a pattern whereby China paid heavy indemnities to foreign governments as punishment for resistance (Moulder 1977:105). The unequal treaties brought grievances to generations of Chinese as victims of Western “gunboat diplomacy” and became symbols of national humiliation. At the same time, they have helped to strengthen the sentiment of “never allowing another national humiliation” among the Chinese public and elites.

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<tr>
<th><strong>Treaty</strong></th>
<th><strong>Year</strong></th>
<th><strong>Imperial Power</strong></th>
<th><strong>Chinese Concessions</strong></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Treaty of Nanjing</td>
<td>1842</td>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>Abolition of tariff autonomy; cession of Hong Kong; indemnity of 21 million tael of silver; opening of five ports; easing of opium trade</td>
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<td>Treaty of the Bogue</td>
<td>1843</td>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>British residence in the newly opened ports and extraterritorial rights</td>
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<td>Treaty of Wanghia</td>
<td>1844</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Most-favored Nation (MFN) status, namely, rights to receive the same treaty benefits as earlier Western powers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Treaty of Whampoa</td>
<td>1844</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Same privileges to France as in the Treaty of Nanking (Nanjing) and subsequent treaties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treaty of Canton</td>
<td>1847</td>
<td>Sweden, Norway</td>
<td>MFN status</td>
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<td>Treaty of Kulja</td>
<td>1851</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Opening of three Chinese cities to Russian trade with MFN status</td>
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<tr>
<td>Treaty of Aigun</td>
<td>1858</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Cession of 300,000 to 400,000 square miles of territory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treaty of Tientsin</td>
<td>1858</td>
<td>France, Britain, Russia, USA</td>
<td>Further loss of tariff autonomy; opening of ten new ports; legalization of opium trade; cession of more territory to Britain; indemnity of 16 million tael of silver</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convention of Peking</td>
<td>1860</td>
<td>Britain, France and Russia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treaty of Tientsin (1885)</td>
<td>1885</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Opening of four additional ports to Western trade and residence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treaty of Saint Petersburg</td>
<td>1881</td>
<td>Russian Empire</td>
<td>9 million rubles in return for Ili.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treaty of Tientsin (1885)</td>
<td>1885</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Loss of suzerainty over Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treaty of Shimonoseki</td>
<td>1895</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Colonization of Taiwan by Japan; loss of suzerainty over the Ryukyus; cession of the Liaotung peninsula; MFN status for Japan in Korea (a Chinese suzerain) and in China; indemnity of 200 million tael.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Li-Lobanov Treaty</td>
<td>1896</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Increased Russian presence in Northeast China; use of Chinese ports in war; construction of Eastern Railway linking to Russia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convention for the Extension of Hong Kong Territory</td>
<td>1898</td>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>Cession of Hong Kong for 99 years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guangzhouwan</td>
<td>1899</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Cession of Guangzhouwan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leased Territory</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Country/Region</td>
<td>Details</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boxer Protocol</td>
<td>1901</td>
<td>Britain, USA, Japan, Russia, France, Germany, Italy, Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Spain, the Netherlands</td>
<td>Indemnity of 450 million taels of silver over a course of 39 years; rights to base troops in Beijing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simla Accord</td>
<td>1914</td>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>Division of Tibet into “Outer” and “Inner” Tibet; imposition of boundary Between Tibet and China proper and between Tibet and British India (the McMahon Line).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twenty-One Demands</td>
<td>1915</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Formalization of acquisitions in Shandong Province; limitation of coastal or island concessions to Japan only.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanggu Truce</td>
<td>1933</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Creation of demilitarized zone from Beijing to Tianjin, with the Great Wall under Japanese control.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 2 A List of Unequal Treaties Between China and Foreign Nations Since 1840**
The “century of humiliation” is so deeply ingrained in the collective psychology of Chinese society that it has shaped the so-called “victimhood identity.” Renwick and Cao are the first to argue that such an identity would continue to inform Chinese foreign policy into the twenty-first century (1999). Gries (2004) and Suzuki (2007) argue that modern China’s national identity has been characterized by an acute sense of “victimhood” arising from its turbulent interactions with international society and that it frames the ways that China interacts with the West today. Suzuki suggests that Japan also plays an important role as an “other” that enhances China’s self-image as a “victim.” Moreover, the U.S.-Japan military alliance compels China to act defensively and is perceived by the Chinese government as a new attempt by the West to contain China (2009). Kaufman suggests that Chinese elites are suspicious that Western powers will ever be able to treat China as equals. In other words, the “victimhood identity” erects a psychological barrier between “them” and “us” (2010).

Other studies have noted a revival of anti-imperialist nationalism in contemporary Chinese society. Chen argues that Chinese foreign policy has always tried to set itself apart from power politics, whereby the powerful bullies the weak and interferes in the domestic affairs of other states (2005). Hughes (2006) and Gries (2004:49-50) observe that the resurgence of Chinese nationalism since the mid-1990s has been a “bottom up” phenomenon, with popular opinion constraining the options open to Chinese decision makers. They suggest that this new Chinese nationalism cannot be understood in isolation from the nation’s past trauma. China’s leaders and scholars go to great lengths to present the “rise of China” as “peaceful” (Zheng 2005; Wang 2005; Qin 2007; Feng 2007; Jia 2005), but the reason they have to do so is that China was denied equal status with the Western powers for a long time, and is still often treated as such in
the Western media today. As long as historical animosities and memories linger, Yinan He argues, reconciliation remains difficult (2009).

For generations of Chinese, the history of the “century of humiliation” cannot be simply “forgotten” and has been embedded into the Chinese collective memory. The “victimhood identity” that comes out of it creates two possible guidelines for Chinese foreign policy. First, in a serious conflict of interest, China may stand up squarely to former “imperialist” powers in order not to repeat the humiliating history. Second, in dealing with post-colonial countries that have similar historical sufferings, China may act “empathically,” being less likely to oppose them in time of their international isolation or crisis.

Scholars have noticed such trends in Chinese politics. In discussing “the revival of the Chinese nation” by the Chinese leadership since the early 1990s, Huntington notes that one of their missions is to bring to an end of the “century of humiliation and subordination to the West and Japan” (Huntington 1996:229). Zheng Wang, a professor of international relations at Seton Hall University, argues that the CCP has used history education as an instrument for the consolidation of national identity in order to gain legitimacy in the post-Cold War era. The collective historical consciousness in turn becomes a powerful force in the way the Chinese conceptualize, manage and resolve external conflict in their foreign policy (2012). Moreover, Wang argues, historical memory affects the way Chinese leaders and people interpret and understand the world (2012:225).

In addition, scholars have demonstrated that historical humiliation may not heal through time or the rising status of states because politically constructed narratives and interactions with
former conquerors may reshape contemporary national identities. In part, this is a matter of degrees of grievance. Rana Mitter, a political scientist at Oxford University, points out that the Chinese suffered a grave injustice between 1868 and 1945, during which the country fought ten major wars, at great material and human costs to China (2013). It may, then, be difficult for countries like the United States to appreciate how the traumas of national setback have shaped China’s worldview (Chan 1999:201). For instance, the legacy of the Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945), which led to more than thirty-five million Chinese deaths, remains a source of the troubled relationship between China and Japan, as Japan continually fails to show contrition for its war crimes (Mitter 2013). The phrase Wuwang Guo Chi, or “never forget national humiliation,” has frequently appeared in Chinese school textbooks, public events and political assemblies. Topics related to the Opium Wars (1840s and 1860s) and the War of Resistance against Japan (1937-1945) have been repeatedly made into movies and TV series since the PRC was founded in 1949. They have become an important part of Chinese public culture and psyche.

The similar discourse of the Chinese leadership in different historical periods provides further evidence of a consistent victimhood identity and its influence on Chinese foreign policies. After overthrowing the traditional dynastic system in 1911, successive Chinese regimes have used China’s traumatic national experiences to call for solidarity and support from the people. No Chinese leader, regardless of historical setting or generation, has suggested that China ought to be at the center of the world or that its own culture is superior to other civilizations. But they

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38 There is no denying that there may be contradictions on what actually happened in history and the constructed narrative by the state. Nevertheless, as mentioned before, collective memories are often time a political project and constructed by elites.  
39 He also points out that the U.S. and the British Empire each suffered losses of 400,000 during WWII, China suffered losses of 14 million.  
40 Chinese government constructed more than ten thousand memorial sites nationwide for the purpose of patriotic education stared in 1991.
have all asserted that China ought to stand equally with other great powers (Zhao 2000:115). Dr. Sun Yat-sen (1866 – 1925) was educated in America and Japan, and led the revolution to overthrow China’s last dynasty and to establish the Republic of China. Considered the founding father of modern China, he is embraced by both the Kuomintang (the Nationalist Party, which fled to Taiwan in 1949) and the CCP. In his last words, “The Will of Dr. Sun Yat-Sen,” he deplored the continuing vestige of China’s unequal treatment by the imperial powers:

“I have served the cause of the People’s Revolution for forty years, during which time my objective has consistently been to secure liberty and equality for our country. From the experience of these forty years, I have come to realize that, in order to reach this objective, it is necessary to awaken the masses of our people, and to join hands with those countries which are prepared to treat us as equals in our fight for the common cause of humanity…I have proposed the convening of a national people’s conference and the abolition of unequal treaties. You should especially work toward the realization of these aims within the shortest period of time.”

Sun Yat-sen’s unfinished goal, “fighting for China’s equal rights,” was carried on by his successor, General Chiang Kai-chek in the late 1920s. In the early years of his rule, Chiang’s Kuomintang (KMT) government demanded a repeal of Western powers’ extraterritorial and tariff rights in China, an effort known as “revolutionary diplomacy” (Jordan 1991). As China plunged into the Anti-Japanese War in the 1930s and 40s, and subsequently the civil war between the CCP and the KMT in the late 1940s, Chiang continued to declare that the upholding of China’s territorial integrity was the vital point of his foreign policy (Rosinger 1944:18-20). Although a close friend of the United States and a Christian, Chiang emphatically deplored the
“unequal treaties” imposed by Western imperialists and their devastating consequences for China. In his best-known writing, *China’s Destiny*, Chiang wrote:

“During the last hundred years, China’s position in the world has been greatly weakened and the morale of the Chinese people has steadily declined, thus giving rise to an abnormal situation never before witnessed in our history of five thousand years. China has had the pain of seeing parts of her territory necessary for her national existence seized by alien races, and has been bound and oppressed by the unequal treaties—all of which has seriously diminished the chances of her survival as a nation and state. After surveying China’s long history the conclusion is inescapable that although the nation has in the past undergone many vicissitudes, yet they bear no comparison to what China has suffered during the last hundred years. During this period all kinds of dangers and weaknesses brought about an unprecedented crisis that threatened to destroy the foundation of our existence, and to prevent any possibility of national revival.” (Ch.1)

The next leader of China, the CCP’s Mao Zedong, declared famously on the Tiananmen podium, “the Chinese people have stood up!” on Oct. 1, 1949. Specifically, they had “stood up” against “oppression and exploitation by foreign imperialism and domestic reactionary governments.” The establishment of the PRC, he announced proudly, would protect its people from “being a nation subject to insults and humiliation” and would “foster its own civilization and well-being while at the same time promote world peace and freedom.” Few Chinese knowledgeable about China’s modern history would fail to appreciate the profound historical meaning of Mao’s pronouncements. Not least, the CCP has built its (initially massive) popularity and continuing legitimacy on its historical role as the party that ended the legacies of the colonial era once and for all.

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41 For Chiang Kai-shek, he divided China’s “century of humiliation” into three periods: the first period was from the First Opium War (1840-1842) to the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895); the second period started from the Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895) to the joint expedition of the Eight Powers (1901); the third period started from Boxer Rebellions (1901) to the end of World War II (1945).

In the post-Mao era, the paramount Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping was no less assertive on issues relating to the “century of humiliation.” When Sino-British negotiations began in the 1980s over the return of Hong Kong, Deng told British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher:

“On the question of sovereignty, there is no room for maneuver for China. Frankly speaking, the question of sovereignty is not a question that can be negotiated with…If China failed to recover Hong Kong in 1997, when the People’s Republic will have been established for 48 years, no Chinese leaders or government would be able to justify themselves for that failure before the Chinese people or before the people of the world. It would mean that the present Chinese government was just like the government of the late Qing Dynasty and that the present Chinese leaders were just like Li Hongzhang!” (Deng 1994)

Jiang Zemin, the Chinese leader who succeeded Deng Xiaoping, launched the “patriotism education campaign” in the early 1990s. He frequently quoted Lu Xun’s (a famous patriotic writer during the period of the “century of humiliation”) phrase, “We Chinese have backbones,” to accentuate his point, “We shall never yield to unreasonable pressure exerted on us by foreigners” (Gilley 1998:16). As the head of the CCP, Jiang stated in his Report at the 15th CCP National Congress in 1997:

“Earth-shaking changes have taken place in China over the past century. In 1900, the eight-power allied forces occupied Beijing and subjected the Chinese nation to great humiliation and subjugation. In 2000, China will enjoy a fairly comfortable life on the basis of socialism and will make big strides towards the goal of being more prosperous and strong.”

Four years later, on the 80th Anniversary of the founding of the CCP, Jiang’s speech again touched on the sentiment of victimhood when glorifying the party’s achievements:

“We have thoroughly put an end to the loose-sand state of the old China and realized a high degree of unification of the country and unparalleled unity of all ethnic groups. We have abrogated the unequal treaties imposed upon China by Western powers and all the privileges of

43 In Selected Documents of The 15th CCP National Congress, Beijing, New Star Publishers. 3.
imperialism in the country. We have thoroughly ended the history of humiliating diplomacy in modern China and effectively safeguarded our sovereignty, security and national dignity."\textsuperscript{44}

Wen Jiabao, Chinese Prime Minister from 2003-2013, frequently used his personal memories to illustrate this sentiment of victimhood suffered by the nation. He used his family stories during the anti-Japanese war to express how this sentiment had shaped his own identity. In his speech at Harvard University in 2003, he reminisced, “I spent my childhood mostly in the smoke and fire of war…our home was burned down, the primary school that my grandpa built himself went up in flames” (Wen 2003). When Premier Wen talked to Secretary of State Colin Powell during the dinner Powell held for him, he said, “I was born during China’s Anti-Japanese War. I can never forget the scene when I huddled against my mother frozen in front of the bayonets of Japanese soldiers…If my American friends would ask me about my political beliefs, I can tell you clearly and definitely, I myself and my people will use our own hands to build my country well” (Wang 2012:139).\textsuperscript{45}

According to social scientists, “anger’ can have both symbolic and instrumental dimensions. When a country has been treated with injustice, it can act in a way to restore a desired state of affairs, reassert power or retaliate against the offending parties (Shaver, Schwartz, Kirson and O’Connor 1987). It may also try to correct imbalanced or disjointed power relationships (Barbalet 1998:136). Peter Gries writes, “The Chinese are neither innately pacifist nor hardwired for conflict. Instead, history and culture shape how individual Chinese will construe the events of world politics. The social psychology of intergroup relations can then help explain whether they will choose cooperation or conflict in a given situation” (2005).

\textsuperscript{44} Jiang, “Speech at the Meeting Celebrating the 80th Anniversary.”
The changing status of China following its independence in 1949 and its recent resurgence create new meanings for its victimhood identity in contemporary times. One is empathy for those countries that had a similar historical past but have now stood up to Western states on various issues. Another is to promote greater equality in the international order. As Yan Xuetong, one of China’s leading IR scholars, puts it, the rise of China entails a restoration of fairness in international relations rather than China gaining an advantage over others (2001). Yet another contemporary meaning is national vindication. As Zheng Wang puts it, the legitimacy of the CCP lies in putting an end to the history of national humiliation and rejuvenating the nation (2012:130).

In other words, China no longer seeks revenge against countries that once inflicted deep wounds on it. However, its victimhood identity is a useful factor in understanding its foreign policy behavior of standing firm on issues deemed to be “core interests,” namely, those relating to Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Identity of Revolutionary Internationalism

The Mao era, from 1949 to the late 1970s left two foreign policy tenets for post-Mao China. One is the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence,” while the other is the theory of the “Three Worlds”. They form the core values of what I term China’s revolutionary internationalist identity, the third element in the post-Mao Chinese national identity. Shaped during the first three decades of the PRC’s diplomatic history, they still influence Chinese foreign policy in the post-Cold War era.

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46 In many former colonial states across regions, historical grievances are partly the sources of anti-Western nationalism.
China’s revolutionary internationalism has dual components, that is, a nationalistic and an international dimension (Tang 1986). When China first emerged from the “century of humiliation,” the CCP won the revolution at home to liberate the Chinese people from “imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism.”47 However, for a new socialist state that officially endorsed Marxist-Leninist ideology, the international communist revolution had yet to be accomplished. As Marx and Engels declared in The Communist Manifesto, “the working man has no country.” And Mao Zedong acknowledged the mandate, “By establishing a new republic, we just finished the first step of the Long March.” That is, the CCP was supposed to help other countries to achieve their communist revolution.48

It is not altogether clear whether the CCP felt a purely ideological call or a common cause with fellow victims of imperialism in developing countries. In November 1949, Liu Shaoqi, Mao’s deputy, declared that the people of various colonial and semi-colonial countries should follow “the path taken by the Chinese people in defeating imperialism and its lackeys” (Tsou and Halperin 1965:82). As Tsou and Halperin point out, China’s revolution to overthrow the KMT was also a struggle against the so-called lackeys of Western imperialism, particularly American imperialism (1965:81). The new Chinese regime, on the eve of its establishment, faced tensions to balance between socialist internationalism and its national interests.

47 Both the Communist Party of China and the Nationalist Party endorsed Dr. Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary nationalism aiming at anti-imperialism and anti-feudalism. And both parties till today considered Dr. Sun as the “founding father” of a Modern China.
48 James Hsiung argues, “The discovery of Communism, as a variant of the "revolutionary nationalism" mode of China's response to the West, crowned the long progression of successive responses aimed at “saving” China, a search that dated from the mid-nineteenth century. It also means that the Chinese Communists were more likely to “bend,” or adapt, Marxist ideology to fit the reality of their revolution in China” (2012:97).
The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence

In the arena of foreign policy, therefore, tension existed between the Marxist orthodoxy of “spreading revolutions overseas” and an independent foreign policy that served the best interests of the new nation. Marx did not have a specific “theory” of international relations and the Russian revolution in 1917 occurred outside the Marxist prediction that socialist revolution would happen in advanced capitalist countries.\(^49\) Both the Russian and the Chinese revolutions made theoretical innovations to orthodox Marxism based on their national contexts.\(^50\) The “Sinification of Marxism” had its own historical inevitabilities. As Germaine Hoston observes, “The systematic historical analysis of the past in Marxian terms grew out of conflict among Marxists within and outside the Chinese Communist party concerning the proper strategy and tactics of the Chinese revolution” (1994:273).\(^51\)

On the other hand, internationalism had its appeal on both ideological and historical grounds. Since the CCP and the Chinese revolution were inspired by a wave of international communist revolutions, the CCP felt a historical responsibility to stand firmly for revolutions elsewhere. The nature of internationalism, in part, explains China’s initial decision to join the international socialist camp led by the Soviet Union, even though it did not fit with Mao’s own ideas about the importance of the United Front (Garver 1993:118-119). The United Front meant uniting all social and progressive forces against oppressive and imperial forces. Particularly Mao

\(^{49}\) Though Marx believed that imperialist countries’ competition over the territories of the world was bound to lead to world war, and the classical expectation was that socialist revolution would erupt inside the imperialist power.

\(^{50}\) Mao used to declare, “There is no such thing as abstract Marxism, but only concrete Marxism…Marxism applied to the concrete struggle in the concrete conditions prevailing in China, and not Marxism abstractly used” (Tang 1986:114).

\(^{51}\) For an analysis of the relations between Marxism and Chinese Revolution, see Hoston 1994:Ch 7.
Zedong, the chairman of the CCP and one of the founding fathers of “Chinese internationalism,” considered the CCP one of the leading parties in the socialist revolutions. Mao specifically called his party to oppose “narrow” nationalism and patriotism:

“We must unite with the proletariat of all countries to oppose the capitalist countries, with the proletariat of Japan, Britain, the United States, Germany, Italy and all other capitalist countries, before it is possible to overthrow imperialism, to liberate our nation and people, and to liberate the other nations and peoples of the world. This is our internationalism, the internationalism with which we oppose both narrow nationalism and narrow patriotism.” (Vol. 2:337)

Nevertheless, joining the international socialist camps did not prevent China from developing an independent foreign policy. In the Chinese case, since all top CCP leaders were educated in the pre-revolutionary era, the CCP regime inherited both the Confucian heritage and the legacy of the “century of humiliation” (Solomon 1998:xiii). As Sophie Richardson observes, “The first two decades of Chinese foreign policy are often characterized as revolutionary. Yet this label is somewhat misleading in its implication of an aggressive, worldwide campaign to promote Marxism; such activities were carried out almost exclusively during the Cultural Revolution” (2010:26). In fact, as early as 1945, at the CCP’s Seventh Party Congress, Mao’s conception of China’s future was “an independent, free, people-oriented (minzhu), unified, prosperous and strong (fuqiang) new country” (Hsiung 2012:101).

The same report stated China’s willingness to accept foreign technology and assistance, an opposition to any “closed-door policy” and a strong endorsement of “peaceful coexistence” in China’s approach to foreign relations (Hsiung 2012:114; Richardson 2010:5). According to Richard Solomon of the University of Michigan, Mao Zedong’s intention was to “embody a complex mixture of efforts to change part of China’s traditional political culture and to draw upon other elements of the tradition in order to sustain political influence” (1998:xiii). Thus, the
CCP’s revolution was a change within tradition, rather than a change of traditional Chinese culture. Nonetheless, the CCP leaders’ initial visions of the new international system were vague except for absence of imperialism and presence of national equality (Garver 1993:117; Friedman 1979; Tsou and Halperin 1965).

Hence, the birth of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence in the mid-1950s, a symbol of China’s own independent foreign policy, not only reflected the domestic needs of Chinese foreign policy, but also indicated a global trend following the end of colonialism after WWII. These Five Principles are:

1) Mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty,
2) Nonaggression,
3) Noninterference in others’ internal affairs,
4) Equality and mutual benefit, and
5) Peaceful coexistence.

The first, “Mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty” is the most important one, as the “century of humiliation” taught the newly established PRC that all countries, regardless of their size, wealth and power, should be treated as sovereign equals. Only when sovereignty was protected could individual countries choose freely their paths of development.

The second principle, nonaggression, does not mean to preclude China’s option and right to use force, but is designed to oppose offensive wars, such as imperial wars aiming at the seizure of foreign territories or natural resources.

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52 In fact, it was Stalin himself who raised the possibility of “peaceful coexistence” first in a speech at the nineteenth congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in October 1952. His successors, both Malenkov and Khrushchev embraced such ideas (Garver 1993:119).
The third principle, *Noninterference* in others’ internal affairs, prescribes that individual countries and international organizations should not interfere in the domestic affairs of another country. It is in accordance with Article 2 (7) of the UN Charter, which states, “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter.”

The fourth principle, *equality and mutual benefit*, has roots in the historical memories and suffering from the “unequal treaties” and economic exploitation by the West. It is meant to prevent the assumption of unfair benefits and privileges while dealing with less powerful countries. It signifies that the Five Principles are not just principles for peace, but also principles for development.

Finally, the principle of *Peaceful Coexistence* demonstrates China’s willingness to have relations with divergent regimes. State size, regime type, levels of economic development or strategic importance should not be the reason for determining whether to establish, maintain or alter diplomatic relations. “Seeking common grounds while reserving differences (*qiu tong cunyi*)” describes relations among different countries dating back to the Confucian period.

In the early days of the PRC, Chinese leaders believed that the existing international system was profoundly unjust, being based on the wishes of several hegemonic powers (Garver 1993:116-117). As Jerome Cohen observes, because of American intervention in the Chinese civil war in the late 1940s as well as over Taiwan’s return to China, the PRC perceived itself as unsuccessful in preventing new humiliations (1967:111). Amid the wave of decolonization in Asia and Africa during the 1950s, the imperative to safeguard independence and sovereignty,
resist foreign interference, cultivate equal interstate relations and secure international peace and
development, all contributed to China’s embrace of the Five Principles. Scholars argue that the
impulses leading to the emergence of the Five Principles were not especially different from those
that led to Western realism and American foreign policy at that time: leaders perceived historical
challenges and determined the best way of avoiding the horrors of major international conflicts
(Richardson 2010:8-9).

China’s victimhood mentality also played a role in its enthusiastic embrace of the Five
Principles. Dittmer and Kim argue that those principles allowed China to avoid becoming either
“victim or victimizer” (1993:245). In other words, victimhood mentality motivated realism on
the part of the post-revolution Chinese leadership. From a realist perspective, the PRC emerged
out of great atrocities from the 1840s until 1949 and, thus, the priority of the first generation of
post-revolution leaders was to secure the survival of the state and the restoration of sovereignty.
As Sophie Richardson observes, “In order to focus on the core project of domestic development,
the CCP needed to ameliorate the threats to its security, but it had no military or diplomatic
capacity comparable to that of the United States, the USSR, or European states and had few
international allies” (2010:6). The Five Principles offered a new set of rules in world politics for
such a self-perceived weak country.

By the mid-1950s, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence became the basic norms
for China’s relations with other developing countries. The Sino-Indian joint declaration, made in
1954, stated, “these principles not only are applicable to relations between nations, but also to the
general international relationship.” The Sino-Burmese joint declaration, made in the same year,
expressed the hope that “these principles will be observed by all nations.” In 1955, the Five Principles were introduced to the first “Asian-African Conference” in Bandung. A total of 29 newly independent nations signed on to them. In 1956, when anti-Soviet sentiments erupted in Eastern Europe, China empathized with the weaker countries, believing that Stalin’s “errors” should be rectified and relations among all socialist countries and communist fraternal parties should be founded on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (Garver 1993:121-122). Since then, the Five Principles have been reiterated in documents relating to China’s establishment of diplomatic relations with all countries. In 2004, 50 years after the birth of the Five Principles, then Prime Minister Wen Jiabao reaffirmed, “Holding high the great banner of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, and making new contributions to the noble cause of world peace and development” (Wen 2004).

The Five Principles reflected the international climate that faced the PRC upon its founding. Their creation reflected the PRC’s determination to have an independent foreign policy after the country was established in 1949. They have also demonstrated longevity in the PRC’s diplomatic history, since China characterizes its foreign policy toward all countries as following the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.

In recent years, Western scholars have started to pay more attentions to the role that the Five Principles actually play in Chinese foreign policy. Sophie Richardson argues that those

54 “Carrying Forward the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence in the Promotion of Peace and Development,” Speech by Wen Jiabao Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China At Rally Commemorating the 50th Anniversary of The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, see http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/topics/seminaronfiveprinciples/t140777.htm
55 For a thorough analysis of the application of the Five Principles to PRC policies, see Richardson 2010.
principles are not “empty rhetoric or a diluted version of Maoism” but instead “were, and are a guide to action that explains why China forges and maintains relationships with all manner of states…they clearly indicate that certain kinds of action against or scrutiny of China itself are unacceptable” (2010:4). In a *World Policy Journal* article in 2009, a mix of Western and eastern scholars argue that the Five Principles will serve as the framework for Eastphalia as Asia rises collectively in the global system (Kim, Fidler and Ganguly 2009).

If the Five Principles represent the guidelines of Chinese foreign policy and its desired world order, the “Three World” theory is more of a realist approach to the world order and how China is supposed to act based on its status in that order. Credited to Mao Zedong in the early 1970s, it was announced to the world by then Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping in his speech at the United Nations in April 1974. This theory was path breaking because it categorized three blocs of countries by their material (especially military) power and global designs, rather than by ideological affiliations as the Cold War paradigm entailed at the time. The insight from this new paradigm for China was that China belonged and would always belong to the developing third world or, in other words, different and independent from the other two worlds. But Mao also saw the developed second world as potential allies against the first world, where both superpowers were hegemons. Until the end of the Cold War, this view of world order served as the standard lens through which Chinese foreign policy makers viewed and interpreted international politics.

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56 Mao first introduced the concept of “Three World” during a talk with Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda in Feb.22, 1974.
57 Deng’s speech was made at the Sixth Special Session of the UN General Assembly. He was the Chairman of the Chinese delegation.
The Three Worlds Theory

The “Three Worlds” theory was based on China’s status as a socialist developing country. Historically, like China, many other developing countries suffered from oppression and exploitation at the hands of imperialist powers. After independence, it became natural for China to identify with other developing countries in their anti-imperialist, anti-colonial, and anti-hegemonic struggles. Economically, like China, developing the economy was a vital objective for newly independent countries to maintain stability and progress. As Samuel Kim puts it, “China is a socialist country belonging to the Third World. Support for and solidarity with the Third World is indeed a basic principle in Chinese foreign policy, and such identification will continue undiminished even if China becomes a rich and powerful state” (148). China’s foreign policy identity towards the Third World countries, according to Peter Van Ness, can be called an “official national identity,” as it was articulated by Chinese leaders as a part of their official responsibilities, a collectively determined official position on China’s role in the world (1993: 196).

Central to the “Three World” concept is the united front strategy against both superpowers. In other words, China was not to lean toward one side despite being a socialist country. The united front was supposed to be a strong, stable and united coalition of social classes during the stage of national revolution. The same was to be of the peace movements within the imperialist, colonial and neo-colonial countries (Garver 1993:137). The essence of Mao’s “Three World” theory was to unite the third world states, to win over the “middle” second world and to isolate the two “reactionary” superpowers (Yee 1983). In the 1960s, China faced both superpowers as potential enemies—a capitalist imperialist United States and a socialist imperialist Soviet Union. Identifying as a member of the Third World, China assigned itself a
leadership role in the forefront of “defense” against superpower expansion (Yee 1983:241). Chalmers Johnson suggested that Mao hoped to pressure the U.S. to cease its support of the KMT in Taiwan, its blocking of China’s entry into the UN, and its economic embargo on China. On the other hand, China might emerge as the leader of a revitalized world revolutionary movement (1973).

The “Three World” theory came at a time of great uncertainty in international politics during the heyday of the Cold War, and served China’s needs to confront both the Soviet Union and the United States. It was a major shift from China’s initial “leaning to one side” foreign policy to a pragmatic approach to international politics: the criteria and standard of making Chinese foreign policy was not based on the political ideology of a country, but the expansionist and military capacities of a state. According to John W. Garver, the “Three World” theory differed from the old interpretation of the world revolutionary process by taking countries, rather than social classes or national liberation movements, as the main agents of change in the international system (1993:167). That is, China in the 1970s positioned itself as one of the third world countries—rather than ideologically, as one in the socialist camp—based on its own economic and military status in the world.

However, recognizing China’s inferior material capabilities did not mean that China would stay neutral in the Cold War or sacrifice other countries’ interests to serve its own. The “Three World” theory also accompanied China’s foreign policy to oppose “global hegemony and imperialism with all the force and defend the interests of the third world countries.”

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58 During the Meeting between Deng Xiaoping and Jimmy Carter in 1979, Deng spoke to Carter, “During the line of anti-hegemonism, frankly speaking, the United States should be included, and the United States should be a major force on containing the expansion of Soviet hegemonism.”
less, the anti-Soviet orientation in the “Three Worlds” theory brought China into conflict with many leftist revolutionary regimes, such as North Vietnam.\(^{59}\) On the other hand, it endeared China to the capitalist countries in the second world. By the end of the 1970s, China had established diplomatic relations with almost all major Western countries.

With the end of the Cold War, the world order changed and left the United States as the only superpower. At the same time, economic globalization also changed China’s relations with both the United States and the “Second World” countries. Thus, China quietly abandoned the “Three World” theory while still calling itself a developing country. Of course, China’s position had always been to oppose the imperialism and hegemonism in American and Soviet policies, rather than those two countries \textit{per se}. In rhetoric, at least, China has repeated its own pledge that it would not seek to become a hegemon or conduct hegemonic and imperialistic foreign policy toward other nations (Deng 1974 1985:43).\(^{60}\) Hence it has continued to reiterate that the developing countries are the main forces in the international system against hegemonism.

Indeed, China’s perspectives on the developing world have remained fairly consistent under both Mao and successive leaders. These include 1) to gain political support against hegemonism and threats to national sovereignty; 2) to present an alternative model of political and economic development; 3) to acquire resources for China’s own economic development; 4) bilaterally and through multilateral groups, to acquire leverage against Western-dominated groups and 5) to speak with one voice as a developing country leader (Ditmmer and Yu 2010:24-25). This is a list of a mix of ideational and material goals. Indeed, despite China’s increasingly

\(^{59}\) To Hanoi, Beijing’s new orientation, such as making friends with the United States, was considered as a betrayal of the Vietnamese and world revolutions as U.S. forces were still ravaging North Vietnam during President Nixon’s historical visit to China in 1971.

\(^{60}\) Speech by, chairman of the delegation of the People’s Republic of China, Teng Hsiao-ping, at the special session of the U.N. General Assembly: April 10, 1974.
material interests in its relations with the West, it still appears to identify as a “Third World”
country. Thus, China declined to join the “G-8” (a “rich country club”) or a proposed “G-2” with
the United States. Not least, a key rationale for these refusals is that “China is always a Third
World country.”

Revolutionary internationalism, consisting of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence
and the “Three World” theory, is a combination of idealism and realism, and the first trial of the
PRC’s independent foreign policy since its establishment. China’s revolutionary heritage and
Marxist-Leninist ideology continue to have an impact on its foreign relations, although they may
no longer play a major role (Garver 1993:175). “Revolution” means overturning the old
international order founded on superpower hegemony, and creating a new “international” order
based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. It became a prototype of contemporary
Chinese foreign policy and served a pivotal role in the identity formation of the Chinese nation.
Since then, developing good relations with developing countries and associating with developing
countries have been the focus points of foreign policy, also parts of the contemporary Chinese
national identity.

Conclusion

In all, Confucian identity, victimhood identity and revolutionary internationalism have
historical roots and have had a formative impact on the contemporary Chinese national identity.
They were formed over the course of the rise and fall of the Chinese nation in different historical
periods, hence my characterization of the contemporary Chinese identity as a “phoenix rising”
identity. Of the five broad patterns in China’s foreign policy identified in the introductory
chapter, we can trace “hypersensitivity over sovereignty issues” and “assertiveness about
national autonomy and independence” (patterns I and II) to the victimhood identity; we can
attribute “defensive posture and conflict avoidance” (pattern III) to Confucian heritage; and we can link “non-alignment” and “pluralism” (patterns IV and V) to both the victimhood identity and the legacy of revolutionary internationalism.
Chapter 2 Chinese Foreign Policy in Six Decades: Changing Principles and Positions

In the next four chapters I elaborate the role of national identity in Chinese foreign policy. This chapter attempts to identify this role by looking at the basic trends in Chinese foreign policy since the PRC’s establishment in 1949. It proceeds by an analysis of the central government’s annual reports and the broad contours of Chinese foreign policy under four generations of CCP leadership. These four time periods include the Mao era (1949-1978), the Deng era (1978-1989), the Jiang Zemin era (1989-2002) and the Hu Jintao era (2003-2012). The last three periods will be referred to, collectively, as the post-Mao era.

I argue that changes in Chinese positions and policies in key areas of international relations do not simply reflect power dynamics, threat levels or the distribution of interests at the international level over time. Rather than purely balance of power considerations, the endogenous role of ideas in transforming Chinese foreign policy positions cannot be ignored (Legro 2000:255). Although both structure and agency play a role in states’ changing views of international affairs (Wendt 1987, 1999; Johnston 1999; Risse 2000; Finnemore 1996; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Price 1998), I show that changing ideational structures under different generations of Chinese leadership have had a greater impact than the changing international environment on Chinese foreign policy.

I employ two methods to detect and measure changing ideational structures. First, I conduct a content analysis of the Central Government Annual Reports (hereafter CGARs), the
equivalent of the State of Union Address in the United States, from 1954 to 2012. Specifically, I extract foreign policy positions and look for general patterns in Chinese foreign policy from the CGARs over the past six decades. By doing so, I systematically document broad trends and changes in the principles and positions of Chinese foreign policy during each period. Second, I conduct a discourse analysis of four generations of Chinese leaders’ statements, speeches and memoirs to determine whether actual foreign policies conformed to the broad principles and positions held in the CGARs.

Both content analysis and discourse analysis are important methods for conducting social inquiry, particularly in case studies. Content analysis is a quantitative method designed to summarize of the key words of messages (Neuendorf 2004:33). Components of the message—terms or categories of terms—constitute the units of analysis, and their frequencies are summarized quantitatively. Content analysis seeks to count the statements of being and purpose associated with a group identity and the other groups against which it may be defined, as well as to analyze the semantic qualities of such statements of being and purpose. Political scientists have used content analyses of speeches, letters, party manifestos, textbook, government bills, and court rulings to study beliefs of political elites (Stockmann 2010:109). These constitute primary

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61 In general, political texts are the concrete by-product of strategic political activity and have a widely recognized potential to reveal important information about the policy positions of their authors (Laver, Benoit Garry 2006:311).

62 One of the functions of the content analysis is to count both key words and categories of terms in the text in order to disclose the meaning behinds words. Another is to categorize a text into multiple meanings, a method based on the idea that the individual text is meaningful on its own and that a summary of the messages within it is the desirable outcome (Neuendorf 2004:6-7).

63 The critical step is the creation of a coding scheme that is written out in great detail in order to ensure reliability among coders of the text (Abdelal et al 5).

64 For example, Sylvan and Toronto use content analysis to create measures of media coverage on the issue of Israeli-Palestinian relations (2004); Legro used content analysis to demonstrate the development of American internationalism through analyzing the States of Union speeches (2000).
sources about the major decisions and policies made by political leaders. The goal is to open the “black box” and observe how certain policies or ideas have been formulated and how they affect a state’s relations with others.\textsuperscript{65} Political scientists have used content analysis of speeches, letters, party manifestos, textbook, government bills, and court rulings to study beliefs of political elites (Stockmann 2010:109). I choose the traditional coding method, since an analysis of fifty CGARs is manageable without computerized coding.

In the second section of this Chapter, I supplement content analysis with discourse analysis. Discourse analysis is a qualitative and interpretive means to uncover meaning from the language that actors use to describe and understand social phenomena (Herrera and Braumoeller 2004; Hardy, Harley, and Phillips 2004; Crawford 2004; Hopf 2004; Laffey and Weldes 2004; Neuendorf 2004; Fierke 2004). It relies on the interpretive skills of the scholar to mediate between the reader and the text or practice under study.\textsuperscript{66} Scholars employing discourse analysis rely on close readings of primary source texts, such as books, newspapers and news magazine articles, speeches, and other historical documents to place texts and practices in their inter-subjective contexts.\textsuperscript{67} For my discourse analysis, I use speeches, memoirs and statements by Chinese leadership to further illustrate the role of national identity in the PRC’s foreign policy over the past six decades.

\textsuperscript{65} According to Laver, Benoit and Garry, using content analysis, observed patterns in texts can be used to generate a matrix of similarities and dissimilarities between the texts under investigation (2006).

\textsuperscript{66} According to Abdelal, Scholars have relied on structured and semi structured interviews and their own informed interpretations of a variety of texts, including policy statements, newspaper articles, and classic texts of prominent public intellectuals, speeches of political leaders, and the minutes of government meetings (2009).

\textsuperscript{67} Rather than statistics, social knowledge and a familiarity with interrelated texts are required for an analyst to recover meanings from discourse, and to demonstrate that a particular reconstruction of the inter-subjective context of some social phenomenon, such as national identity, is useful for understanding an empirical outcome (Abdelal et al 2009:7-8).
The CGAR and Its Credibility

Analyzing discourse and symbols is a common way to assess collective ideas in the research of international relations. Most relevant to this study, Legro (2000) has examined the origins of American internationalism by analyzing the State of the Union addresses of the U.S. government. He argues that many pressing contemporary issues of world politics hinge on the likelihood of change in national ideas about international security, with State of the Union addresses reflecting such changes (2000:253). The CGAR is a comparable official document, delivered annually by the Chinese Prime Minister since 1954. The annual CGAR elaborates the broad principles and contours for government policies and contains sections on foreign policy. Because there is no competing political party in the PRC, the CGAR rather accurately reflect the collective identity of each successive CCP leadership. Overall, the uniform format of the annual report makes it meaningful to compare Chinese foreign policies under different political leadership.

How credible are the foreign policy pronouncements in the annual reports, from an international relations perspective? As with any government pronouncements, it is necessary to scrutinize distinctions between rhetoric and actual foreign policies. This can be done in two ways. One is to understand the nature of the CGARs, and the other is to see how pronouncements correlate with actual foreign policy, which I analyze in the second half of this chapter.

To understand the nature of the CGARs, I first look at their drafting processes to see how the content is created. In the Chinese political system, these annual reports provide the sole

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68 For reasons of domestic political turmoil, the reports were not issued for some years. The missing years serve to provide a rough measure of the content and timing of change.
official documents summarizing the works of the central government over the past year and giving future direction to different administrative strata of the government. Nominally, the drafting of CGARs is performed under the direct leadership of the Prime Minister and is one of the central tasks of the State Council’s General Office. The drafting process formally lasts two to three months—from the end of the calendar year to March, when the Chinese National Congress gathers. Participants include members of the State Council’s General Office as well as experts from different branches of the State Council, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the foreign policy section of the report.

The drafting consists of three stages. In the initial stage, members of the drafting committee will do research and consult with relevant government branches and ministries to form a first version of the draft. Such a draft is similar to the concept of an omnibus bill in the United States. In the second stage, debates and consultations are held with a broad spectrum of state and party agencies as well as groups outside of officialdom. The omnibus report will be sent to the highest operational organ of the State Council for debate and discussion. A revised draft will then be sent to the Standing Committee of the CCP, the highest decision making body in the Chinese political system, for further discussion and debate. After Standing Committee gives its input and approval, the draft report will go to different ministries of the central government, provincial governments, and the People’s Liberation Army for feedback. During this stage, the draft report will also go to various influential individuals and groups, such as business leaders and associations, prominent scholars and think tanks for suggestions. At the end
of the consulting process, the drafting committee will produce a final draft of the report before it is delivered to the *Politburo* of the CCP for approval.\(^{69}\)

In the third stage, the report is formally approved and disseminated. The prime minister delivers the report at the annual convention of the National People’s Congress (NPC), China’s national legislature, and NPC members make suggestions. After a further revision of the report by the drafting committee, it is sent to the NPC for formal approval and thereafter, for dissemination to the general public. In recent years, an English version of the report is also available.

The drafting of the report is, thus, a collective and deliberative effort. The process is serious and not at the caprice of a single leader or political agency. Although there is no input from the public or political opposition, the drafting process serves the state’s purpose of explicating its work to the public. On the one hand, the report lays out the accomplishments and agendas of Chinese government to a domestic and foreign audience. On the other hand, it provides broad policy guidelines for various agencies and levels of the Chinese governments in the coming year. As such, the report serves as an important channel to understand and analyze policies of the Chinese government. In each CGAR, the foreign policy section contains general principles and summaries of Chinese foreign policy in different regions of the world, not specific strategy-driven policy reports.

\(^{69}\) For Instance, one news report indicates that during the drafting of the 2011 Report, the drafting committee received 659 suggestions from various sources, and eventually 216 of them were adopted into the final draft; see http://epaper.bjnews.com.cn/html/2011-03/18/content_211981.htm. Another report indicates that during the draft of the 2012 report, 143 suggestions were accepted by the drafting committee; see, http://news.china.com.cn/2013lianghui/2013-03/14/content_28243800.htm.
Broad Trends from the CGARs: 1954-2012

Figure 1 below presents the results of a content analysis of the CGARs from 1954-2012. My assessment, in half-point scale, is based on the type of language and ideas related to foreign policy contained in the reports. I use the following six-point numerical continuum to measure the degree of “peaceful internationalism:”

Point 5: Reports contain language stating that Chinese foreign policy should promote development, stability and peace in the world through participating in multilateral cooperation and institutions and playing a large role in building a peaceful, prosperous and just world order.

Point 4: Chinese foreign policy should promote peace, development and cooperation through participating in multilateral cooperation and institutions in order to defend China’s sovereignty and national interests.

Point 3: Chinese foreign policy should maintain peace with other countries through multilateral cooperation, while opposing hegemony and unilateralism imposed by others.

Point 2: Chinese foreign police should avoid wars and conflicts with superpowers on the basis of the principle of peaceful coexistence, and it should support other developing countries in their struggle against colonialism and imperialism.

Point 1: Chinese foreign police should support developing countries, and to the extent possible China should live and let live through peaceful coexistence, while preparing for clashes with Western powers.

Point 0: China should seek alliances against major Western powers and help bring revolution in other developing countries.

In the above schematic, there are not necessarily differences in China’s goal of world peace but there are crucial differences in the way China perceives how that goal is to be achieved and for what purpose:

A score of 5 marks a most positive attitude about international cooperation and institutions as instruments promoting peace and, moreover, for the good of the world (“building a peaceful, prosperous and just world”).

A score of 4 shows endorsement of the same instruments for peace promotion, but for China’s own good (“defending Chinese sovereignty and interests”).
A score of 3, a mid-level grade, shows endorsement of multilateral cooperation but guardedness against superpower politics (“opposing hegemonism and unilateralism”).

A score of 2 and below reflects a polarized view of the world, i.e. a Chinese perception that hegemonic and imperial powers are the key threats to world peace while developing countries are partners in peace. But a score of 2 or 1 still indicates approval for peaceful co-existence with the perceived threatening powers.

A score of zero marks dissociation with major Western powers and support for social revolution in developing countries. The latter by implication would bring about anti-Western (i.e. anti-imperial and anti-capitalist) regimes in developing countries and thus change power dynamics world politics.

Figure 1 Chinese Foreign Policy Episteme, 1954-2012

The line shown in Figure 1 reflects my assessment and coding of the reports. The solid line indicates the level of “peaceful internationalism” detected in the annual report for that year. Over the span of 59 years since 1954, data is available for 36 years. For the years without data,

I assign a value representing a mean of the preceding and following years. The lowest value recorded is 0.5, in 1954, representing the fact that China considered the maintenance of regime stability to be the primary goal of its foreign policy. The scores rose significantly in the late 1970s, and have sustained high levels during the 1990s, corresponding with the leadership transition from Mao to Deng in the late 1970s. The highest value scored is 4.5, from 2008 (China’s Olympics year) to 2012 (the latest year analyzed), representing a high degree of peaceful internationalism.

These changing scores may be accounted for by changes in both the international environment and domestic identities. The Cold War environment abroad and Mao’s revolutionary policies at home combined to produce low scores from the early 1950s to the late 1970s. For the dramatic ideational changes in post-Mao leadership in the late 1970s, studies suggest that the logic of epistemic change proceeded in two steps (Abdelal et al 2009). One stage involved the collapse of the reigning consensus and the second required consolidation of a new consensus. The death of Chairman Mao in 1976 put an end to the Cultural Revolution—an end of radical domestic politics in China, although less so in terms of foreign policy. Deng Xiaoping’s regaining of power in the late 1970s ushered in a new national priority—economic development and opening up. In order to ensure its priority of developing the economy while maintaining close ties with a vast majority of countries in the world, the post-Mao leadership ridded itself of the Maoist orthodoxy that focused on class struggle and social revolution. This new national identity has developed further in the direction of peaceful internationalism with the three successive generations of post-Mao leadership.

Though realist logic would predict increasing balancing behaviors against the remaining superpower, externally, the end of the Cold War did not produce many changes in Chinese
foreign policy. After the 1990s, two events account for the slight drop in scoring between 2000 and 2004. One was the Sino-US air collision in the South China Sea in 2001 and the other was the victory of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), a pro-independence party, in Taiwan’s presidential election the same year. Both events briefly increased tensions in the region, and were reflected in the foreign policy stipulations of the CGARs from 2000 to 2004. However, a peaceful resolution of those two crises returned the language of the CGARs to positive assessments since then. The second small change occurred after the 2008 global financial crisis, this time a rise in perceived peaceful internationalism. With China well integrated into the global economy, the annual reports from 2009-2012 call for more cooperation among nations affected by the crisis. In a far more constructive tone than its earlier revolutionary internationalism, the recent CGARs advocate reforms toward an international system represented by more developing countries, or a “fairer and more just” world order, rather than one dominated by the West.

![Figure 2 Positive and Negative Words in the CGARs](image-url)
Figure 2 presents a rather detailed analysis of each year’s CGAR. It shows the percentage of words reflecting positive or negative views of international politics in the foreign policy section of the CGARs in a given year. Line II (blue line) represents negative and pessimistic attitudes toward international relations and China’s foreign relations with other countries, while Line I (red line) indicates positive and optimistic attitudes. The words I extract from the CGARs that are considered positive and negative are, respectively:

Positive: peace; cooperation; stability;

Negative: war; invasion; threat; offense; imperialism/colonialism; hegemony/unilateralism; revolution.

Because the reports are written in Chinese and there are different wordings to express similar meanings in English. I adjust them using my own understanding and translate them to similar words in English. In addition, after analyzing each report during the past six decades, I translate the Chinese words according to their substantive meanings. Phrases that are double negatives have been counted as positive words and vice versa. For instance, the phrase “to oppose hegemons” is counted as positive, since they convey criticism of power politics and superpower domination. Words such as “without peace” are counted as negative.

The findings in Figure 2 show a clear demarcation of Mao and post-Mao periods in terms of China’s view of international relations. The frequencies of “positive” views on foreign relations decreased between the 1950s and the end of the 1970s, then surged until the late 1980s. The percentage of positive words toward the world order has risen steadily from the late

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71 The different lengths of the annual reports on foreign policy rather than substantive changes caused the sudden change of percentage in 1987 and 1988. In the 1987 report, there were 755 words on foreign policy, with positive words appearing 38 times. In the 1988 report, there were a total of 4839 words on foreign relations, with positive words appearing 38 times as well.
1980s to the present. The year 1979, the same period that Deng regained power after the death of Mao, was a turning point for China’s attitude towards international relations and the world order. In that year, positive words outnumbered negative words in the annual report. The end of the Cold War, on the other hand made little impact on the wordings for peace and security. Entering the 2000s, the China-US air collision in 2001 and the 2008 Global Financial Crisis affected the frequency of words on peace and cooperation in those years, with a decrease of positive words in the annual reports of those years. As an overall trend, the decrease of negative words has been constant in the post-Mao era and, particularly after 2006, pessimistic words disappear from the annual reports completely (see Figure 3).

Figure 3 the Share and Numbers of Positive/Negative Words

In the next section, I will give a brief overview of the PRC’s actual foreign policy behaviors over the past 60 years, to see whether these have been compatible with the regime’s identity change in the same period.
PRC Foreign Policy in 60 years: a Brief Review

Using the CGARs as a blueprint of Chinese foreign policy in the past six decades, I trace the evolution of Chinese foreign policy in terms of five pairs of relations deemed essential in the reports. In addition, since the annual reports are written in a standardized format, i.e. arranged by topics, the topical sections can be summarized and compared across time.

Table 3 summarizes the annual reports (1954-2012) based on the following dimensions of Chinese foreign policy for the past six decades: international involvement, relations with superpowers, international cooperation, role of the military, approach to recovery of Taiwan (as an important indicator of the use of force) and the international environment (order). To measure changes in foreign policy and the evolution of national identity, I follow the Chinese political periodization: the Mao era (1954-1979) and the post-Mao era (1980-present). The post-Mao era is further divided into the eras of Deng (1980-1990), Jiang (1991-2003) and Hu (2003-2012). I argue that in each period, Chinese foreign policy is consistent with the five broad foreign policy patterns identified in Chapter 1.
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>International Involvement</td>
<td>Opposition to imperialism and colonialism; support for third world; limited participation in international organizations</td>
<td>Opposition to hegemony as foundation of foreign policy; support for third world against superpowers</td>
<td>Support for peaceful negotiation in solving conflicts; opposition to use of force and external intervention</td>
<td>Building peaceful world order with other countries; confronting challenges together</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationship with Superpowers</td>
<td>Counter-balancing U.S. by allying with USSR in 1950s; breakup with USST in 1960s; rapprochement with U.S. since 1970s</td>
<td>Improving relations with both superpowers, but opposition to their hegemonic policies</td>
<td>Maintaining stable relations with U.S.; opposition to unilateralism &amp; hegemony</td>
<td>Strengthening strategic dialogue; improving trust and cooperation; opposing unilateralism &amp; hegemony</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Cooperation</td>
<td>Allying with socialist states; peaceful co-existence with others that endorse the tenet</td>
<td>More cooperation with third world; developing relations with all others.</td>
<td>Global cooperation to promote economic growth and development</td>
<td>Active participation in global governance; striving for fairer &amp; more just rules</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of the Military</td>
<td>Strengthening defensive capabilities; preparing for invasion by imperialist countries</td>
<td>Serving the country’s economic development; modernization of the military</td>
<td>Improving overall capabilities &amp; defending national sovereignty</td>
<td>Modernization of the military; improving defensive capabilities in case of regional conflicts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approach to Taiwan’s recovery</td>
<td>To recover from KMT and U.S. occupation; opposition to foreign intervention</td>
<td>Economic engagement and direct communication; opposition to independence</td>
<td>Ending hostilities through negotiations; reserving right to oppose independence by all necessary means</td>
<td>Peaceful engagement; opposition to independent movements; unification still goal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>View of International environment</td>
<td>Threats of new world war; possible to be delayed through power balancing</td>
<td>Competition between the two superpowers as key source of instability</td>
<td>New multilateralism in the making; world still unstable.</td>
<td>Peace and development as dominant trends; regional conflicts persisting</td>
</tr>
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Table 3 Transformation of Chinese Foreign Policy Perception in 60 Year
The Mao era (1949-1979): Revolutionary Internationalism

Foreign policy during the first three decades of CCP rule exhibits continuity and change from prior Chinese governments’ understanding of world order and national identity. Influenced by domestic turmoil and foreign intrusions over the previous one hundred years, the new regime went beyond its traditional geographical reach and became a revisionist power in the international community. As Richardson notes, China’s leaders looked out at massive historical challenges and changes and tried to determine the best way of avoiding the horrors of imperial collapse and major international conflicts (2010:8-9).

First, the newly established PRC regime appeared to be hypersensitive to issues of sovereignty due to China’s aggrieved sense of victimhood in modern times. In the early 1950s, a perception (or misperception) that the U.S. was planning an invasion of the Chinese mainland during the Korean War resulted in the two countries’ military clash. After the Korean War, the Taiwan issue, in which the PRC considered the U.S. an obstacle to China’s reunification, was a defining source for Sino-U.S. confrontation over the next three decades. Despite their initial alliance relations in the 1950s, only after the Soviet Union ended military hostilities towards China over border disputes did Sino-Soviet relations improve. In addition, China and India, despite being fellow victims of imperialism and colonialism, engaged in a border war in 1962. All of these developments reflected China’s hypersensitivity over its own sovereignty, leading to China’s use of force in conflicts during the Mao era.

Second, the PRC’s foreign policy was assertive about its national autonomy and independence, and expressed such sympathy and support to fellow third world countries. The CCP’s legitimacy is derived in large part from its successful struggle against imperialism and the
ending of unequal treaties with the West and the Japanese. The historical experiences informed a conscious identity about national autonomy and independence. As the PRC’s first chairman, Mao Zedong, put it, “for one hundred and five years before 1949, almost all large and small imperialist states in the world have invaded us. Except for the Anti-Japanese War, all foreign invasions ended up with China’s loss and unequal treaties imposed by the West … China must strive to overcome its economic and technological backwardness to catch up with the West. Otherwise, we will repeat those humiliating histories” (CGAR 1978).

In foreign policy, the young PRC supported fellow victims of imperialism, regardless of their ideological affiliations. While China engaged in both “hot” and “cold” wars with the U.S. in the 1950s, its relations with developing countries improved in the same period regardless of ideological differences or conflicts of interest. The 1954 report offered these guidelines for China’s relations with other Asian countries: “In Asia, countries need peace and cooperation, rather than wars and hostilities. Countries in Asia should negotiate with each other, and promote cooperation in order to maintain collective peace and security in Asia.” Even referring to Japan, the 1954 report stated, “The Chinese people deeply sympathized with the Japanese people now under the U.S. occupation…we hope Japan can remove foreign control and become an independent, democratic and peaceful country, rather than pursuing militarism.” China’s feeling towards its neighboring states during the 1960s was sympathetic, yet with an interesting mix of former (tributary) patron and modern victimhood mentalities.

Besides associating with fellow victims of the imperialism and colonialism, the PRC gradually became a force supporting national independence movements throughout the world. The 1959 annual report expressed explicit support for independent movements in Asia, Latin America and Africa, stating, “We Chinese always sympathize the struggles against imperialism,
colonialism and invasion by any country, because not long ago, China was suffering from imperialist and colonist invasions, even today, our Taiwan, was still under occupation by the imperialist power.” Mao linked common victimhood to Chinese support for Vietnam during the Vietnam War: “the fraternal people of southern Vietnam and the entire fraternal Vietnamese people can rest assured that your struggle is our struggle” (Mitter 230). Mao also showed a desire to demonstrate solidarity when he stated, “we belong to the same family. The North Vietnam, the South Vietnam, Indochina and Korea, we belong to the same family and support one another” (Mitter 220).

Both the foreign policy of preserving sovereignty and assertiveness about national autonomy have been formalized into the PRC’s first independent foreign policy principle, namely, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. Despite territorial disputes and the Tibet issue, the Five Principles were formally put to use in China’s efforts to normalize relations with India in 1954. Later, through the Asian-African conference in Bandung in 1955, the Five Principles were the primary instruments by which China reduced suspicion and hostility from non-alignment countries in South Asia and Africa.

Third, in the late 1960s, Mao’s revolutionary ideology led China to take a radical anti-hegemonism stance, briefly turning the Five Principles upside down during the Cultural Revolution. Through the 1960s, according to Henry Kissinger, Mao made three points in terms of China’s status in the international system, all heavily influenced by revolutionary internationalism. First, China endorsed a “self-reliance” foreign policy aimed against “American imperialism and the Soviet Union’s revisionist” simultaneously. China was prepared to stand alone, against the United States in the Korean War and in military conflicts with the Soviet Union over border issues. Second, Mao reaffirmed the principles of permanent revolution.
advanced in these confrontations, and called for other countries to go against the two superpowers. Finally, facing the two superpowers as potential enemies, Mao was preparing to appease relations with the United States, but this did not imply an end of ideological struggle between socialism and capitalism (2011:311).

In the heydays of the Cultural Revolution in the late 1960s, not only did China become confrontational with the superpowers, but also many countries believed that China intended to export the communist revolution to the developing world. During the 1960s, the PRC’s statements of anti-imperialism and liberation for colonized peoples were sometimes matched by its foreign policy. They became an extension of China’s assertiveness about national autonomy and independence to other states. Mao personally made statements supporting revolutionary causes overseas. In 1960, he “expressed full sympathy and support for the heroic struggle of the African people against imperialism and colonialism…and the patriotic and just struggles of the South Korean people and the Turkish people against U.S. imperialism and its running dogs” (Mitter 2003:218). According to Rana Mitter, having liberated China itself from the “century of humiliation,” it made sense for the Chinese to feel sympathy for other peoples in the same position (218). Under the anti-imperialism umbrella, China actively supported the Vietnamese communist movement, Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, and the PKI, the Indonesian Communist Party (Van Ness 1970:101-110).

Nevertheless, China’s revolutionary agenda was largely confined to rhetoric of liberation rather than actual attempts to upset the established bipolar world order. As Rana Mitter observed, besides opposing the dominant order monopolized by the U.S. and the Soviets, China was prepared to compromise as well as to confront (2003:220). Furthermore, China’s own insistence on national autonomy constrained it from exporting revolution through real policies. Thus,
Mao’s assistance to African countries consisted only of railway construction, stadiums and medical personnel. Only in Vietnam did Mao provide material help to the North Vietnamese side during its war with the U.S.

Fourth, the revolutionary face of the Chinese foreign policy halted in the early 1970s, and was gradually replaced by a foreign policy of conflict avoidance and non-alignment. In the early 1970s, Mao adopted the “Three World” theory, which recognized the hierarchal structure of international system, in which the United States and the Soviet Union were two superpowers. It also indicated China’s self-identification as a member of the third world. China’s readmission to the United Nations, with the help of the developing nations in 1971, influenced changes in China’s negative perceptions of international organizations and, more importantly, changes in China’s perception towards its own position in the international system. For example, in Deng Xiaoping’s 1974 speech to the UN General Assembly as the representative of the PRC, he pointed out the similarities between the Five Principles and the UN Charter, emphasizing the same focus on peace, security, equality, and development (Richardson 2010:17). The readmission to the UN also gave China a platform for advocating its own vision of the world order. Mao Zedong summarized by saying,

“Clearly, it (The readmission to the UN) set forth China’s foreign policy from an overall strategic point of view. Uphold justice, boost the morale of the world’s peoples and deflate; the arrogance of the superpowers. China is against the imperialist policies of war and aggression and the superpowers’ hegemonic behavior, against any power’s acts of aggression, interference, control, subversion and bullying. China supports the just struggle of all oppressed peoples and nations. China advocates the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and equality among, all

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72 Deng argued in his UN speech, “Since the two superpowers are contending for world hegemony, the contradiction between them is irreconcilable; one either overpowers the other, or is overpowered. Their compromise and collision can only be partial, temporary and relative, while their contention is all-embracing, permanent and absolute, they may reach certain agreements, but their agreements are only a facade and a deception…the really powerful are the Third World and the people of all countries uniting together and daring to fight and daring to win” (Kissinger 2011:303-304).
nations, big and small. China belongs to the Third World, and will never be a superpower. The United Nations belongs to all its member states. The United States must be criticized for its obdurate blocking of the restoration of the lawful seat of the PRC in the UN over the years—China demands the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Taiwan” (Huang 2008:252-253)

Since the 1970s, when China’s aspirations of a world revolution faded, the confrontations and struggles between it and the two superpowers began to shift from ideological differences to specific foreign policy disagreements.

Toward the end of Mao’s rule, China’s foreign policy began to abandon the ideological struggle between socialist and capitalist states, and revolutionary sentiments toward a bipolar world order as well. China moved toward a more realistic, issue-driven and problem-solving foreign policy by recognizing its own power status in the system, influenced by the emergence of a new national identity. As a result, from 1970 to the end of 1976 the number of countries with diplomatic relations with China increased sharply from 49 to 105 (Huang 2008:285-286). On the other hand, the idea and policy of the Five Principles and the “Three World” theory also began to be rooted in China’s perceptions of international affairs and the international system and, ultimately, they became the bedrocks of Chinese contemporary foreign policy.

*The Deng Era (1980-1990): Pragmatic Internationalism*

The end of the Cultural Revolution following by the death of Mao Zedong started another chapter of the PRC’s history, characterized by Deng Xiaoping’s new policies of “Reform and Opening Up.” Chinese foreign policy after Mao switched rapidly from supporting revolutionary
ideas abroad to a pragmatic one that supported the status quo while advocating pluralism within the existing world order.\textsuperscript{73}

The first change was the imperative of a new international environment for new domestic priorities. Facing a daunting economy after the Cultural Revolution, Deng promoted the “Four Modernizations,” or the modernization of agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technology at home. Hence, foreign policy was to serve this grand strategy, and the idea of Mao’s continuous revolution had to come to an end. Deng’s priority was to promote China’s economic development, and he called for \textit{tao guang yang hui} (keep a low profile) and \textit{you suo zuo wei} (take selective actions) in conducting China’s foreign policy. As Jeffery Bader puts it, China’s overwhelming national priority was internal economic development, and to achieve this objective it had to enjoy a peaceful international environment (2012:80). Thus the 1983 report stated, “China’s modernization requires a peaceful international environment, and that is the common demand from both the Chinese people and people all over the world.” The 1988 report stated again, “All of our foreign policies will serve the goals of peace and economic development.” Pragmatic foreign policy indeed followed. During the 1980s, China joined the IMF and the World Bank, among other international organizations, and foreign loans began to flow into the country.

\textsuperscript{73} In the azrena of foreign policy, Mao’s positive legacy still played a significant role. As indicated in the 1981 Report, “We must continually follow the foreign policy principles made by Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, which are anti-hegemonism, maintaining world peace and support other countries’ just fights against imperialism.” In principles, the beginning of the Deng era inherited those largely from the Mao era. Thus, Hypersensitivity on sovereignty and assertiveness about national autonomy was bedrocks of Chinese foreign policy in the post-Mao era. On the other hand, defensive posture, conflict avoidance and advocating pluralism were increasingly appeared in the post-Mao foreign policy behaviors, and gradually became new Chinese national identity during the Post-Mao era.
A second change was to eliminate revolutionary language completely in its foreign policy and to phrase it in accordance with the norms and principles of the international organizations that China had joined. In the words of Rana Mitter, “domestic necessity forced the revolutionary state to follow international norms” (2003:223). As Deng Xiaoping explained, “It is absolutely essential that we remove the appearance of being a war like power, and show that we really want to take on this role” (Mitter 2003:223). This change was reflected in the annual reports of the early post-Mao era. The 1981 report, in summarizing China’s foreign policy goals, stated, “China wants peace, not war; China opposes hot wars, as well as the Cold-War.” The 1988 report affirmed, “All states need to follow the norms of international community and respect for each other’s sovereignty.” Thus, under Deng Xiaoping, Chinese foreign policy moved from a peripheral member to a full member of the international community; and from “leaning on one side,” going against both superpowers, and supporting third world revolutions to normal relations with the superpowers, the developed countries and the developing countries.

Yet another change from Mao’s revolutionary internationalism was to avoid conflicts with the two superpowers while promoting pluralism in the international system. The Five Principles, which placed less emphasis on ideology, became useful guidelines in the 1980s for China to pursue full normalization with the United States and Japan while continuing to condemn the USSR’s hegemonism. Deng Xiaoping spoke against revolutionary antagonism this way, “This turmoil (the Cultural Revolution) has been a lesson to us. We are more keenly aware that the first priority should always be given to national sovereignty and security” (1989). In May 1984, Deng summed up China’s foreign policy in two sentences: “first, to safeguard world peace we oppose hegemony. Second, China will always belong to the Third World” (Scott 2007:77). Specifically, Deng emphasized that China needed to “cope with affairs calmly and bide our time,
be good at maintaining a low profile, and never assume leadership” (Wang 1994:29). All these signified a shift to a foreign policy of conflict avoidance and pluralism in a new age.

At the same time, on issues of sovereignty, Chinese foreign policy remained unyielding. Thus in dealing with the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, Deng adopted Mao’s “Three World” approach, whereby China stood apart from superpower competition, and adhered to an independent foreign policy while trying to avoid conflicts and alignment with either one. Despite the post-Mao regime’s eagerness to establish diplomatic and economic relations with the United States, it did not yield on the most important precondition, the status of Taiwan. Only when President Jimmy Carter accepted China’s three conditions on the issue, namely to withdraw U.S. troops from Taiwan, abolish the U.S.-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty and end all official relations with Taiwan, did the two countries finally establish diplomatic relations in 1979. From that point until the 1990s, the largest obstacle for improving Sino-U.S. relations remained the U.S.’ arms sales to Taiwan, which China considered an infringement on its national autonomy.

Early post-Mao foreign policy also remained unyielding on opposition to superpower hegemonism, a corollary of its insistence on pluralism. Vietnam’s 1978 invasion of Cambodia

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74 Hu Yaobang, a Deng protégé and then Party Secretary, outlined the prevailing Chinese foreign policy concept to the Communist Party’s Twelfth National Congress in September 1982. Its key provision was a reprise of Mao’s key tenets, such as “China has stood up,” “China will never attach itself to any big power or group of powers, and never yield to pressure from any big power” (Hu 1982:29).

75 The U.S arm sales to Taiwan were in fact an unsolved issue when two countries established diplomatic relations in 1979. In the third Communiqué between China and the US, the key operative paragraph concerned arms sale to Taiwan, it read: “The United States Government states that it does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan, that its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China, and that it intends to reduce gradually its sales of arms to Taiwan, leading over a period of time to a final resolution. In so stating, the United States acknowledges China's consistent position regarding the thorough settlement of this issue.”
backed by the Soviet Union as well as the Soviet Union’s 1979 invasion of Afghanistan confirmed to China that a hegemonic Soviet Union endangered regional peace in a more imminent way than the United States. To halt Vietnamese and Soviet expansion in Indochina, China launched a border war against Vietnam. Thus, ironically, anti-hegemonism entailed putting aside the principle of conflict avoidance. As Deng Xiaoping later explained, “Our proposals for safeguarding world peace are by no means empty talk, but instead are based on our own needs . . . Opposing hegemonism and safeguarding world peace are our established policies and are the foundation of our foreign policy” (Deng 1984).  

When Gorbachev sought to improve relations with China, China set up three pre-conditions: to evacuate from Cambodia, to withdraw Soviet troops stationed in Siberia and Mongolia along China’s northern border, and to withdraw from Afghanistan (Qian 2006:47-53; Sutter 2000). All of these aimed at ending the Soviets’ hegemonic dominance in the region.

The policy of conflict avoidance and the promotion of pluralism were also reflected in China’s changing attitudes toward international organizations. For the first time, the PRC praised the United Nations’ endeavors in maintaining world peace. In 1985 the Chinese foreign Minister Wu Xueqian stated, “In the past 40 years the United Nations has followed a torturous path and made some erroneous decisions. But on the whole, we should affirm its effective efforts to maintain peace, prevent and ease conflicts, accelerate decolonization, and promote international cooperation” (Shichor 1991:263). In 1986, for the first time, multilateral diplomatic policy appeared in the PRC’s foreign policy language. The annual report of 1986 stated that China had joined international organizations in a broad way to conduct active multilateral diplomacy in order to enhance cooperation with other countries.

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During the 1980s, China was also solidifying its position in the Third World by being a neutral power, in the sense of a conflict avoiding and non-aligned promoter of pluralism. China considered imperialism, hegemonism, and colonialism to be the main forces jeopardizing peace among nations. The brief Sino-Vietnamese border war in the late 1970s and the early 1980s, the sole international military conflict China engaged in the post-Mao era, was characterized by the PRC as a struggle against Vietnam’s attempt at “regional hegemonism.” During the same period, China made concrete foreign policy changes to appease relations with Southeast Asian states that did not share ideological affinity with China. During Deng Xiaoping’s 1978 visit to Singapore, Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew suggested to Deng that China stop urging the overthrow of local governments in Southeast Asia through its broadcasts to the regions and end funding to arms for insurgents. Deng promised to deal with it, and the broadcasts stopped a year later (2013:32).

The end of China’s support for “Third World” revolutionary causes can also be observed in Chinese foreign policy during the 1980s. The 1983 report called for changes in the “unequal economic relation” between developed countries and the third world countries, stating that China would follow the principles of “mutual benefits” in dealing with relations with other third world countries. The 1984 report stated, “We will never get involved in conflicts within the Third World countries bloc, and we oppose intervention by other countries.” The 1989 report stated, “While China actively cooperates with the global south, we support dialogues between the global south and north, and advocate a new world economic order based on mutual benefits.”

Throughout the 1980s, revolutionary language in support of third world countries gradually vanished from the reports, replaced by calls for a new “world economic order” and “mutual benefits” with other developing countries.
These patterns of conflict avoidance, non-alignment and pluralism were sustained during the Deng era despite severe international and domestic woes. One such circumstance occurred in 1989, when the Cold War was ending abroad and the Tiananmen protest movement occurred at home. The socialist camp was collapsing in Europe, while almost all Western countries put sanctions on Beijing after its Tiananmen crackdown. Nevertheless, the 1990 annual report still assessed the international order in a positive way: “We think that a peaceful world can be maintained, it is possible to have a long period of peaceful time.” There was almost no change in tone compared to the previous years. In response to Western sanctions, the report stated, “We do not interfere with the internal affairs of other countries, and will not allow any country to intervene us either; trying to overthrow the regime by antagonism cannot succeed.” On the post-Cold War international order, the 1990 report stated, “…no matter how complicated the circumstance is and will be, we believe that a new world order should be based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, which are the interests of all countries.” Obviously, China’s vision of the “new” world order after the end of the Cold War was a long way from reality, a unipolar world represented by the United States. On the other hand, both China’s behavior and its assessment toward the end of the Cold War suggest that China was unlikely to go back to a revisionist power.


The “third generation” leadership of the CCP, under Deng’s handpicked successor Jiang Zemin, inherited Deng’s foreign policy ideas as well. For them the end of the Cold War symbolized the end of a bipolar world order and the emergence of a multipolar world order. As a result, China strengthened its resolve to promote pluralism within the liberal world order. Instead of changing directions after the Cold War ended, the post-Tiananmen era became one
consolidating Deng’s foreign policy platform, particularly in terms of conflict avoidance, non-alignment and the promotion of pluralism.\footnote{As stated in the 1992 report, “The old world order has been ended...[the new world order] is moving toward a multipolarity.” Also, Jiang Zemin personally called, “The world is moving towards multipolarity, a hallmark of the present day international situation” (Scott 2007:86).}

One reason for remaining in this direction was China’s assessment during the early 1990s that the world was moving toward multipolarity, and peace and economic development represented the overall global trend. Though such a world order had not yet been achieved, China at least believed in the promise of such a process. As expressed in the 1993 annual report, “Actively developing friendly relations with neighboring countries, having a peaceful environment, is the goal of our foreign policy.” In addition, the Chinese government would like to portray itself as a force for “maintaining peace and stability,” or in \textit{de facto} compliance with the world order dominated by the United States. For instance, the 1996 report stated, “China’s development is a contribution to world peace, it will never be a threat to any country.” It aimed at avoiding becoming a new “enemy” to the West.

For specific ways to promote pluralism, Jiang’s government of the 1990s identified “hegemonism” and “power politics” as the two largest challenges in world politics, while positioning itself as the force for “maintaining world peace and stability.” Different from the Mao and Deng’s eras, phrases that described Western countries as “imperialist” totally vanished in the annual reports of the 1990s. In addition to calling for opposition to any form of hegemonism—global or regional, the Chinese government repeatedly stated that it would never seek the position of a hegemon either. Through the annual reports in the 1990s, the Chinese government began to emphasize the role of international organizations in maintaining a peaceful and stable world order. The 1992 report stated, “China would like to cooperate closely with
regional and international organizations in dealing with international affairs; China supports the roles of UN Security Council and UN Secretary-General in dealing with international affairs.” Again the 1993 report stated, “China, as one of the permanent members of the UN Security Council, will always respect and follow the UN Charter…” These statements were new in Chinese foreign policy, and they partly reflected China’s wish to have a multipolar world order, in a way to constrain the supremacy of the U.S as well. Furthermore, China’s approach to the international human rights regime, a sensitive issue in the past, has changed significantly since the post-Mao era, and moved toward a more cooperative stance.⁷⁸

On the other hand, the commitment to conflict avoidance, particular with the United States, did not undermine or alleviate China’s hypersensitivity on sovereignty issues. China’s relationship with the United States—the only superpower, became the most important bilateral relation that China needed to manage. During the 1990s and the early 2000s, the Taiwan question, an issue China deemed crucial to its territorial integrality and sovereignty, dominated the ups and downs of Sino-U.S. relations. Overall, China’s policy was to “keep a low profile” in dealing with the United States in the 1990s, which limited the confrontation with the U.S. to a minimum. The U.S.-Chinese military standoff in 1996 over the Taiwanese president Lee Teng-hui’s visit to the United States and his speeches advocating “Taiwan independence” did result in resentment toward the United States. The continuation of U.S. weapons sales to Taiwan made China continually suspicious of U.S. intentions to interfere in China’s national autonomy, notwithstanding the U.S.’ rhetoric of providing only “defensive weapons” to Taiwan. Almost

⁷⁸ For instance, China signed the International Covenant on Social, Economic, and Cultural Rights (ICSECR) in 1997 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in 1998.
two decades after the Sino-US reconciliation, Taiwan, an issue of a sovereign claim, was still the biggest concern for China in dealing with the United States.

Hypersensitivity to issues of sovereignty was highlighted again during the 1999 war in Kosovo. This conflict made China worried about its own ethnic conflict and territorial sovereignty in Xinjiang and Tibet, in spite of its greater integration into the world community. According to Rana Mitter, the Chinese leadership saw justice in the international community as being primarily a collective issue for a country rather than for individuals within those countries (2003:222). Hence, the Kosovo war indicated new challenges for the Chinese government, withdrawing from participation in the new global order, in which humanitarian intervention was becoming a new norm, was not an alternative. The Chinese government faced the dilemma of maintaining its stand on sovereignty issues, on one hand, while honoring the changing global norms on human rights, on the other. This hypersensitivity to sovereignty and the perceived humiliation associated with it, furthermore, resulted in two Sino-U.S. diplomatic crises in the late 1990s and early 2000s, which will be analyzed in the next chapter.79

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79 In May 1999, when the U.S.-led NATO force bombed the Chinese embassy building in Belgrade, most Chinese thought that this was intentional and provocative, and the leadership would not accept the explanation from the U.S. government after the incident. Another similar incident happened between China and the United States in 2001 in the South China Sea, a U.S. EP-3 surveillance airplane had a collision with a Chinese fighting jet, which resulted in the death of the Chinese pilot. The U.S. crews were detained by the Chinese military after they made an emergency landing on China’s Hainan Island. The Chinese side blamed the U.S. for violating its territorial sovereignty and caused the death of Chinese pilot, and demanded a formal apology as the condition to solve the crisis. The U.S. crews only returned after the Chinese believed that the U.S. had formally apologized to its wrongdoing. Although in both cases China apparently suffered from causalities, those episodes did not prevent US-China relations towards a trend of more cooperation and engagement through the 1990s largely due to the Chinese government curbed its domestic angers and constrained its aftermath foreign policy response to avoid further damages to Sino-US relations. Moreover, China started to rethink the role of sovereignty in its overall foreign policy making, and moved towards a more flexible gesture in dealing with it.
China’s relations with neighboring countries improved dramatically during the 1990s through a zhoubian diplomacy (“good neighbor”), an extension of its foreign policy patterns of non-alignment and promotion of pluralism. After years’ of confrontation, China normalized relations with Russia and Vietnam, two neighboring countries that were accused by China of seeking global and regional hegemony in the past. Sino-Indian relations suffered a brief setback during India’s nuclear test in 1997, but recovered quickly over the next several years because India’s testing was not an essential issue according to the Chinese national identity. China could not in principle condemn India’s national autonomy in conducting the nuclear test. The buildup of diplomatic relations with South Korea and Israel did not come at a big cost for China’s relations with North Korea and the Arab countries, as there had been no alliance relations involved. As for many Southeast Asian countries, China’s relationships were primarily characterized by increasing trade and business investment rather than any type of alliance. As economic interdependence between China and the rest of the world strengthened dramatically during the 1990s, China’s attitude towards participation in international organizations became increasingly positive. China joined the WTO in 2001 after a decade of negotiations and hosted the Olympic Games in 2008 as well as the World Expo in Shanghai in 2010.

On the other hand, during the 1990s, China’s rapid rise created new tensions for its identities of victimhood and third world status. China’s economic relations with other countries underwent steep changes because of the rapid development of its economy and its shortage of natural resources. China’s relations with developing countries began to move from Third World fellowship to more pragmatic “mutually beneficial” relations. Since 1993, China became a net oil importer; and the amount of oil from overseas increased from 6% to over 50% in merely 16
years. Meanwhile, following China’s ascendance, the perception of a “China threat” gained ground in the West and compelled the Chinese leadership to deal with such a perception.


The fourth generation of CCP leadership, under Hu Jintao, began to deal with the issue of China’s appropriate status in light of its rising economy. In 2004, two years after Hu assumed the office, peaceful internationalism strengthened. The foreign policy patterns of conflict avoidance, non-alignment and the promotion of pluralism came to be grouped into the concept of “peaceful development” advocated by his government.

This concept of “peaceful development” began to appear frequently in Chinese foreign policy reports and was repeated by the top Chinese leadership domestically and abroad. Beginning with the Central Foreign Affairs Work Conference in August 2006, the Chinese leadership proposed a strategic guideline for China’s foreign relations: *daguoshiguanjian, zhoubianshishouyao, fazhanzhongguojiashijichu* (big powers are the key, periphery countries are the priority, and developing countries are the foundation). These guiding ideas on foreign policy can also be observed from the annual reports. The 2004 report stated, “We will promote multilateralism, advocate the democratization of international relations and the plurality of developmental models.” Specifically, it stated that in dealing with developed countries, China should “solve disputes and promote stable developments through equal dialogues and negotiations;” in dealing with developing countries, China should “deepen friendships and

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81 “Xin Shiqi Zhongguo Waijiaode Fangxiang,” (New Directions of Chinese Foreign Policy), http://www.outlookweekly.cn/htm/content_4954.htm
cooperation, increase solidarities;” and in dealing with neighboring states, China should “develop friendly companionships with them.”

From the Chinese side, the leadership believed that the first twenty years of the twenty-first century represented a distinct “strategic opportunity period” for China. Hu Jintao voiced this thought at a November 2003 meeting of the Communist Party Central Committee’s Political Bureau, where he suggested that a unique convergence of domestic and international trends put China in a position to advance its development and status in the world. Any opportunity entailed danger, and vice versa, according to Hu Jintao; like other rising powers before it, if China were to lose the opportunity presented, “it might become a straggler” (Lida 2009). Similarly, the 2005 report explained “peaceful development” in the following language: “This strategy is to develop China by utilizing the opportunity of world peace, and using the advantage of development to maintain and promote world peace.”

The platform of “peaceful development” was also an official response to Western countries’ suspicions that China would conduct a provocative, power balancing and unilateral foreign policy following its ascendency. This perception of “China threat,” following China’s rapid economic and military development, would trigger the West, particularly the United States, to worry that China’s growing power might endanger the existing world order. Hence, potential conflicts might erupt between China and the United States (Mearsheimer 2010). Facing growing Western sentiment of the “China Threat,” Beijing tried to articulate the idea of China’s “peaceful rise.” Almost at the same time, President Hu Jintao delivered a speech at the United Nations

82 This concept was published in a 2005 foreign Affairs article by the influential Chinese policy figure Zheng Bijian served as a quasi-official policy statement. Zheng offered the assurance that China had adopted a "strategy . . . to transcend the traditional ways for great powers to emerge."
General Assembly, entitled “Building Towards a Harmonious World of Lasting Peace and Common Prosperity.”

At least in earnest rhetoric, he reaffirmed the importance of the United Nations system as a framework for international security. Hu insisted, “China would pursue its goals peacefully and within the framework of the UN system and China’s development, instead of hurting or threatening anyone, can only serve peace, stability, and common prosperity in the world” (Hu 2005). The 2007 annual report defined a harmonious world as “Equality in interstate relations, mutual benefits and cooperation in economic relations, and meeting traditional and non-traditional security challenges through cooperation, with the eventual goal of achieving perpetual peace and prosperity.” These manifestos found expression in China’s post-Mao foreign policy patterns of conflict avoidance, non-alignment and promoting pluralism.

Even hypersensitiveness on sovereignty and national autonomy, which were fundamental to the Chinese identity, increasingly accommodated the new strategy of peaceful development. Taiwan was no longer the ultimate defining issue for Sino-U.S. relations as the two countries became more “mutually dependent.” When George W. Bush left office in 2008, many high officials in his cabinet characterized the Sino-US relationship as having reached its best period historically (Paulson 2008). China was described as a “shareholder” rather than a “strategic competitor.” After the Global Financial Crisis, President Obama offered Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao a vision of “G-2” (the United States and China) to solve global affairs

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84 This idea appeared first in a 2005 speech at the National Committee on United States—China Relations, Robert Zoellick, then Deputy Secretary of State, amounted to an invitation to China to become a privileged member, and shaper, of the international system.
together. Important issues between the U.S. and China were dramatically shifted to economic issues, such as China’s trade surplus and the RMB exchange rate. In the security area, China cooperated with the U.S. on the North Korean and Iranian nuclear crises, and stayed largely neutral on the U.S.’ “war on terror.” For many scholars and policy makers, the United States has quite successfully engaged China as it rose to enter a liberal world order (Overholt 2008; Steinfeld 2010; Bader 2012).

But China’s illiberal domestic regime remained a barrier to fully convincing the world of its identity and strategy of peaceful rise. The 2008 Global Financial Crisis weakened China’s confidence in the Western economic development model, and thus strengthened China’s confidence in its own model and its wish to have more influence in the making of a global order. The relative decline of the West, meanwhile, also increased the suspicions of western politicians and policy makers about China’s strategic intentions. Martin Jacques’s 2009 book, When China Rules the World: the End of the Western World and the Birth of a New Global Order, alerted many in the West who were used to the superiority of the Western liberal world order. Many Western scholars and policy-makers speculated that China’s declaration of a peaceful path might be a conciliation under circumstances when it was still not powerful enough to challenge the United States (Mearsheimer 2006, 2009; Buzan 2010; Jacques 2012). In response, Chinese politicians and scholars tried to rebuke such arguments. State Councilor Dai Bingguo, the highest-ranking official overseeing China’s foreign policy, wrote,

“Persisting with taking the path of peaceful development is not the product of a subjective imagination or of some kind of calculation. Rather, it is the result of our profound recognition that both the world today and China today have undergone tremendous changes as well as that China’s relations with the world today have also undergone great changes; hence it is necessary to make the best of the situation and adapt to the changes” (Dai 2010).

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Dai went on to trace the root of the peaceful rise strategy embedding in China’s early post-Mao reorientation under Deng Xiaoping. That was, China should remain humble and cautious; it should refrain from taking the lead, from waving the flag, from seeking expansion, and from claiming hegemony. Dai reiterated Deng’s own pledge, “If one day China should seek to claim hegemony in the world, then the people of the world should expose, oppose, and fight against it. On this point, the international community can supervise us” (Dai 2010). Zheng Bijian, the author of the “peaceful rise” concept, told a Western reporter that China had at last overcome the legacy of the Opium War and China’s century of struggles with foreign intrusion, and that it was now engaged in a historic process of national renewal. As it emerged as a major power, China would rely on the attraction of its model of development, and its relations with other countries would be “open, non-exclusive and harmonious,” aiming to “mutually open up the route to world development” (Kissinger 2011:502).

In all, “peaceful development” and “a harmonious world,” two concepts that were the themes of Hu Jintao’s rein from 2002-2012, encapsulated the essential continuities in China’s post-Mao foreign policy: upholding sovereignty and national autonomy, maintaining a defensive posture and conflict avoidance, and promoting a pluralistic world order. As Henry Kissinger summarized:

“The peaceful rise and harmonious world theories evoked the principles of the classical era that had secured China’s greatness: gradualist; harmonizing with trends and eschewing open conflict; organized as much around moral claims to a harmonious world order as actual physical or territorial domination. They also described a route to great power status plausibly attractive to a generation of leadership that had come of age during the social collapse of the Cultural Revolution, that knew its legitimacy now depended in part on delivering China’s people a measure of wealth and comfort and a respite from the previous century’s upheavals and privations” (2011:500)
Conclusion

This chapter has reviewed the general trends of the PRC’s foreign policy, by identifying the basic foreign policy themes in six decades of government annual reports and the broad patterns in six decades of foreign policy behaviors. In the Mao era, the identity patterns of hypersensitivity over sovereignty and assertiveness about national autonomy dominated Chinese foreign policy, at times expressed in radical and provocative gestures toward superpowers and neighboring states. In the post Mao era, those patterns have remained but have been de-ideologized and moderated, while the identity patterns of a defensive posture, conflict avoidance, non-alignment and the promotion of pluralism have emerged and been strengthened over time. Together, the above patterns form what I term China’s contemporary “peaceful internationalism.”
Part Two China’s Relations with Superpowers: the United States and the Soviet Union

Part II and Part III will use some key turning points and crises in China’s bilateral foreign relations with selected countries to illustrate how patterns of China’s national identity have influenced its foreign policy across time. The cases I choose will be the two superpowers and China’s neighboring countries. I will make the argument that during the Mao era, it was mainly identity patterns associated with victimhood identity and revolutionary internationalism that guided China’s bilateral foreign policy. In the post-Mao era, “peaceful internationalism,” with a mix of Confucian heritage, victimhood identity and revolutionary internationalism, has emerged and gradually gained prominence in China’s foreign policy.

Part II will examine the role of China’s national identities in influencing relationships with the two superpowers. Needless to say, China’s relations with the United States and the Soviet Union are too complicated to be fully examined in two chapters, but my focus will be on the role of national identity in Chinese foreign policy decision-making. Specifically, I choose several important events in Sino-U.S. and Sino-Soviet relations for my case illustrations, because they represent critical junctures in the PRC’s relations with them.
Chapter 3: The Mao era: Simultaneous Opposition to Both Superpowers

Over the past six decades, in power relations among China, the United States and the Soviet Union, China has been constantly located in a weaker position. According to realism, this position should leave China with very limited strategic choices, namely to either ally with one or balance against it. Although in the early 1950s China did briefly align with the Soviet Union to balance against the United States, this alliance relation lasted only a little over a decade. For most of the Cold War era, China confronted both the superpowers. Why did Mao’s China lock itself into simultaneous confrontation with both superpowers for three decades while being in a much weaker power position?

Political scientists have long noticed this phenomenon but provided few answers. Andrew Nathan and Robert Ross point out that China was the only major country during the Cold War standing at the intersection of the two camps, and a target of influence and enmity for both (1997:13). Similarly, Michael Yahuda notes, the PRC was the only power that by its independent actions has been able to exercise a major influence on the strategic central balance between the two superpowers, and became the only state to have been threatened at different times with nuclear attack by both the United States and the Soviet Union (1978:14). Tsou and Halperin argue that China has proceeded to engage the two superpowers simultaneously in a contest from her position of military and economic weakness, due to its recent revolutionary experience (1965:80, 99). But what was it about this experience that drove Mao’s China to seemingly audacious foreign policy behaviors?
Realist interpretations offer inadequate explanations for the changing Sino-U.S. and Sino-Soviet relations over the past six decades. Realism, while initially correct in explaining China’s behavior toward the superpowers in the early years of the Cold War, fails to explain the breakup of the Sino-Soviet relationship subsequently. In addition, realism provides few answers for understanding China’s antagonism toward both superpowers during the bulk of the Cold War era.

In this chapter, I demonstrate that patterns of Chinese national identity can provide a good framework to understand Chinese foreign policy with the United States and the Soviet Union. The period I focus on is the Mao era, from 1949 to the mid-1970s. This also coincided with the heyday of the Cold War era. During that period, the U.S.’ global reach as a superpower – not least its reach in China’s own vicinities – led to Chinese hypersensitivities over infringements upon its sovereignty and national autonomy. By the same token, the Soviet Union’s global reach as a superpower led to similar qualms on China’s part, despite their common membership in the socialist camp. Thus, during much of the Mao era, China stood up firmly against both the U.S. and the Soviet Union, even at the cost of the use of force. This chapter uses several key events to illustrate my argument. For Sino-U.S relations, I use China’s involvement in the Korean War in the early 1950s and the negotiations over the normalization of Sino-U.S. diplomatic relations in the 1970s. For the Sino-Soviet case, I use the Sino-Soviet split in the late 1950s and the Sino-Soviet war over Zhenbao Island in the late 1960s.

**China’s Decision to Enter the Korean War**

For China, entering the Korean War was not planned in advance, or as a part of a global socialist revolution. Neither was it done for the purpose of helping the Soviet Union to balance against the United States in Asia. Rather, its goal was to prevent the U.S. from invading
mainland China after the U.S. deployed its fleets in the Taiwan Strait. China’s decision to enter the Korean War, at a time when it had barely emerged from its own civil war, had less to do with Sino-DPRK relations, but was considered vital to maintaining its own sovereignty and security (Shen 2000; Stueck 2002; Chen 1994; Christensen 1996). In other words, it was mainly part of the new government’s efforts at regime consolidation.

First, from the perspective of both the Chinese national identity and realistic concerns, it was a war perceived by the Chinese as a potential infringement on Chinese sovereignty and autonomy. Recent accounts by both Chinese and American analysts have confirmed Chinese concerns about the impact of the Korean War on its own territorial integrity. Based on Chinese sources available in the post-Mao era, Chinese scholars show that Mao’s objective was to send troops to North Korea to prevent the collapse of North Korea, while saving China from attacks by Taiwan and the United States through the Taiwan Strait (Zhang 1995:101-7, 123-25,132-33; Chen 2001:91-96). During a meeting of the Chinese Politburo, Mao told its members, “If the American imperialists are victorious, they will become dizzy with success, and then be in a position to threaten us. We have to help Korea; we have to assist them” (Kissinger 2011:143). Zhou Enlai, Mao’s deputy and longtime Chinese Prime Minister, summed up the Chinese objective by saying, “We do not treat the Korean problem merely as one of concerning a fraternal country … it should be regarded as an important international issue,” namely one involving the neighboring country, China (149-150).

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86 That was different from what scholars believed Stalin’s main goal in Korea was to create a buffer zone so that he could invade Japan in future conflicts and to divert American military attention away from Europe (Goncharov, Lewis and Xue 1993).
87 That was also the reason the slogan for entering the Korean War was precisely “Resist America, Aid Korea.”
China weighed whether to enter the Korean War only after the U.S. occupied Taiwan and signaled that it would enlarge the war to the Chinese mainland. The United States had responded to Kim Il-sung’s attack on South Korea not only by dispatching U.S. troops to the Korean Peninsula, but also by ordering the U.S. Pacific Fleet to “neutralize” the Taiwan Strait to prevent military attacks in either direction across it (Kissinger 2011:129-130). This became a turning point for China to reevaluate the situation it faced in the Korean Peninsula. It eventually decided that the Seventh Fleet’s deployment constituted an “invasion” of China. Furthermore, once the United States marched to the Yalu River, which was the borderline between China and North Korea, it posed a direct threat to China’s Northeast regions, which housed China’s only heavy industrial bases at that time.

The U.S. at the time did not perceive the Chinese sensitivities nurtured out of China’s modern history of imperial invasions and national humiliation. The United States dismissed warnings about a possible Chinese intervention in the Korean War. For instance, Allen Whiting argues that the problem of mutual misperception was at play in Sino-U.S. relations over intent and capability during the Korean War with both sides seemingly unable to understand the frame of reference within which the other was operating (1960). Western scholars tend to use the concept of “strategic misperception” to describe the Sino-U.S. war in Korea (Christensen 1996; Stueck 2002). According to Kissinger, the United States did not anticipate that the PLA, barely finished with the civil war and largely equipped with captured weapons from the Kuomintang (KMT), would take on a modern army backed up by nuclear weapons; but Mao decided to get involved in the Korean War to prevent attacks by the United States (2011:133). Thomas Christensen, a Princeton political scientist and an Assistant Secretary of the State during the Clinton administration, argues that president Truman’s placement of the Seventh Fleet in the
Taiwan Strait signaled to Mao that Americans might duplicate that along the Yalu River. Thus, it was miscommunication and misperception that dragged the two countries into a war (1996, 2011). Indeed, after Russian and Chinese documents on the Korean War were released from previously sealed archives, little or no evidence has suggested that China encouraged North Korea to start the war or saw the war as an opportunity to spread revolution.

Like his ready entry into the Korean War, Mao’s ready withdrawal from it also demonstrated a well-defined and limited objective, namely to prevent the takeover of North Korea by the U.S. and South Korea and to curb U.S. threats on or across the Chinese border. Because Mao’s goal was mainly to safeguard China’s own sovereignty and stability, there was no desire to station Chinese troops in North Korea. The Chinese armies stopped further engagement in the war after they reached the 38th parallel, the dividing line between South and North Korea where the war originally started. By early 1953, the total number of Chinese troops in Korea had reached 1.35 million, a number unprecedented in Chinese history. As David Scott points out, “In itself this represented a dramatic projection of China’s power and presence outside her boundaries in a way not seen for over one and a half centuries since her old Middle Kingdom days” (2007:26). In July 1953, both sides reached agreements to stop fighting, and in 1958, the Chinese army withdrew completely from North Korea. Despite tremendous costs to China, the Korean War did achieve China’s strategic goal, which was to prevent the United States from enlarging the war to the Chinese mainland, thus helping to consolidate Mao’s newly established regime.

One side effect of the Korean War was that it strengthened China’s determination about anti-imperialism, an important part of its revolutionary internationalism. At a moment of great weakness, China fought the most powerful country in the world to a standstill. In China’s view
the Korean War demonstrated that a weak military power could stand up to the strongest in the world, and that its words and policies must be taken seriously by the Western powers. As Kissinger puts it, Mao framed the war as a struggle to “defeat American arrogance” that restored China’s pride and confidence from the “one hundred year’s humiliation” (Kissinger 2011:143-147). Peter Gries, an expert on Chinese nationalism, argues that to many Chinese, the Korean War marks the end of the “Century of Humiliation” and the birth of “New China” (2004:56).

Not incidentally, after the end of the Korean War in 1954, Beijing and Moscow reached agreements for the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Port Arthur, which had been taken by Czarist Russia. Some scholars argue that China’s sacrifices on the battlefield in Korea enabled it not only to stand up taller with the U.S., but also with the Soviet Union (Scott 2007:36). However, China did not exploit its sacrifices to take advantage of North Korea. The PRC signed the Sino-North Korean Mutual Aid and Cooperation Friendship Treaty in 1961. Article 2 of the treaty stated that the two nations were resolved to adopt all necessary measures to oppose any country or coalition of countries that might attack either nation. Because of this treaty, which was renewable every twenty years, IR scholars have since considered North Korea an ally of the PRC. However, in contrast to the United States’ stationing of military forces in South Korea after the Korean War, Chinese military forces never again set foot on Korean soil.

An alternative explanation for China’s entry into the Korean War is to consider the war part of a global socialist revolution, which China would support ideologically. However, empirical evidence suggests otherwise. Both Stalin and Mao opposed Kim Il-sung’s idea of recovering South Korea and restoring a fully sovereign united Korea. Stalin did reverse this position in April 1950 and gave the green light to Kim’s request, on the assumption that the United States would not intervene (Kissinger 2011:124). But he did not promise to give Kim any
help. Stalin was said to have told Kim, “If you should get kicked in the teeth, I shall not lift a finger. You have to ask Mao for all the help” (Goncharov, Lewis and Xue 1993:144-145).

During Kim’s meeting with Mao in Beijing in mid-May, 1950, Mao told Kim, “not to launch a military attack until the moment is favorable” and that China could not help North Korea until China’s own revolution was complete (Shen 2000:65). That is, Mao had wanted to liberate Taiwan before Kim Il-sung launched an invasion of South Korea. Kim replied that the North Koreans’ own forces would be enough for the invasion, and China’s military involvement was unnecessary (Cheng 1994:112). Later on, North Korea went along with the attack on South Korea unilaterally.

In short, although China ultimately entered the Korean War, it was not a war that Mao meant to fight from the beginning. It was the first time that the PRC faced a superpower directly in the military battlefield. But it was not to be the last.

**Negotiations over Sino-U.S. Diplomatic Relations: Why Did Taiwan Matter?**

Since the establishment of the PRC in 1949, U.S. involvement in Taiwan has been the key issue preventing China from establishing diplomatic relations with the United States. In Beijing’s conception, Taiwan was a renegade province separated from the mainland during a “century of humiliation.” The U.S. alliance with Taiwan was therefore an extension of that subjugated experience. Hence, the reunification of Taiwan and China became a sacred goal of the Chinese leadership for each post-1949 generations, and an uncompromising goal at that. The Taiwan issue could trigger China’s hypersensitivity on sovereignty because Taiwan remained a breakaway territory after the establishment of the PRC. It could spark China’s assertiveness over national autonomy and independence because the U.S. maintained both official and military relations with the Taiwanese government, even stationing its troops in the breakaway province.
An analysis of the negotiations that led up to the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the U.S. provide direct evidence for China’s non-comprising stance on sovereignty and national autonomy in spite of a disadvantageous power position and eagerness to end such disadvantages. The negotiations lasted 8 long years, and its processes revealed much about China’s “un-realist” concerns. My analysis below will be based on primary sources, including recent memoirs by Chinese and American diplomats directly involved with the Sino-U.S. rapprochement, such as China’s former minister of foreign affairs Huang Hua and former national security advisors Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski.

First, when the PRC was founded in 1949, the Taiwan question was the biggest obstacle for the establishment of a Sino-U.S. relationship. China’s relations with the United States, unlike its relations with other former imperialist powers, were not problematic until the Chinese Civil War (1945-1949). On the eve of its establishment in 1949, the PRC indicated to the U.S. that it was willing to establish diplomatic relations with it on the condition that the U.S. abandoned all policies detrimental to China’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. This mainly referred to Taiwan, to which the defeated KMT government had just fled. Huang Hua, representative of the CCP, conveyed Mao’s message to Ambassador Stuart that the United States must “withdraw all its armed forces from China, sever its relations with the KMT government and abandon all policies detrimental to China’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity” (Huang 2008:116-117). In response, the U.S. side offered loans to help China’s industrialization, but refused to break up with the KMT government, citing international law (Huang 2008:120-121). Seeing no hope that the U.S. would sever its relations with the KMT government, China decided to adopt the “leaning on one side” foreign policy, i.e. to embrace the Soviet camp.
Second, in the early 1970s China set as a precondition of Sino-U.S. rapprochement that the U.S. change its stance on the Taiwan issue. Despite President Nixon’s enthusiasm for rapprochement, China insisted that the Taiwan issue was the largest obstacle for the two countries to normalize relations, and would not compromise on that issue. During National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger’s secret trip to Beijing in 1971, Prime Minister Zhou Enlai told him that “the U.S. military forces must be withdrawn from Taiwan within a limited time, and the U.S.-Taiwan treaty was null and void” (Huang 2008:220-221). Kissinger told Zhou that the United States government did not support “two Chinas - one China, one Taiwan, or Taiwan independence,” and would withdraw two-thirds of the U.S. military forces from Taiwan during the present term of Nixon’s government, and the remainder after an improvement of Sino-U.S. relations (Huang 2008:227-228). Only after reaching this consensus did the two countries announce Nixon’s historical visit to China. In fact the rapprochement was so important to China that Premier Zhou flew to Hanoi and Pyongyang to inform the Vietnamese and Korean leaders of Kissinger’s secret visit, and the Japanese government, a close ally of the United States, was informed only one hour before the announcement.

During Nixon’s visit, the Chinese leadership made it clear to Nixon that despite China’s eagerness to make a breakthrough in the Sino-U.S. relationship, by no means would China sacrifice its foreign policy principles, particularly on the issue of Taiwan. Zhou Enlai told Kissinger that in terms of a reconstruction of geopolitics, “The first question is that of equality, or in other words, the principle of reciprocity between China and the United States” (Kissinger 1971). During the meeting between Premier Zhou Enlai and President Nixon, Zhou mentioned that the withdrawal of American armed forces from Taiwan and from the Taiwan Strait was a condition for restoring Sino-U.S. relations (Kissinger 2011:233). For the Americans, the
precondition was that China committed itself to a peaceful resolution of the issue with Taiwan (248). Nixon made five points on the U.S. policy on Taiwan: the U.S. (1) would acknowledge the Chinese position that there is one China and that Taiwan is a part of it; (2) it would not support a Taiwan independence movement; (3) as it left Taiwan, it would ensure that Japan does not come in to replace it; (4) it would support any peaceful solution to the Taiwan situation, and not support Taiwan in any military action against the People’s Republic of China; and (5) it would seek normalization and try to achieve it.

On the Taiwan issue, Nixon’s intention was to withdraw American troops from Taiwan in his second term while making no formal commitment to that effect (Kissinger 2011:271). But his visit allowed him to learn that Taiwan was a fundamental matter for China, and that there could be no compromise on a sovereignty issue. Mao Zedong, China’s ultimate leader, had made it clear to the U.S. government that establishing Sino-U.S. diplomatic relations would only be possible once the U.S. was ready to sever relations with Taiwan. According to Kissinger, Mao told him in their meeting in 1973, “The question of the U.S. relations with us should be separate from that of our relations with Taiwan.” For Mao, as long as the United States severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan, Sino-U.S. diplomatic relations would be possible, and while he did not believe that a peaceful unification would be possible between China and Taiwan, he felt that the issue should be considered an internal Chinese matter (Kissinger 2011:279-280).

Third, throughout the negotiations over the Sino-U.S. diplomatic relationship, Taiwan lingered as the defining issue during the ups and downs of the negotiations. In the aftermath of Nixon’s historical visit to China, the Taiwan issue remained the central issue for the two

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88 As the achievement of Nixon’s historical visit to China, which he called “the week that changed the world,” a communiqué between China and the United States, named the Shanghai communiqué, had been produced after intensive negotiations between two countries.
countries to negotiate over the next decade. Nixon stepped down as U.S. president after the Watergate scandal, but Sino-U.S. relations did not suffer setbacks or improvement under the new administration. When Jimmy Carter became the U.S. president in 1977, normalizing Sino-U.S. relations was one of his foreign policy priorities. According to Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter’s National Security Advisor, normalizing Sino-U.S. relations was a key strategic goal of the Carter Administration and “a central stabilizing element of our global policy and a keystone for peace” (1983:196-202; Huang 2008:346-347). For China’s part, it remained steadfast on the Taiwan issue. Even before Carter became the U.S. president, China experts in the U.S. had already warned that no country had succeeded in both normalizing relations with the PRC and maintaining an embassy in Taipei. Jeremy Cohen, a China-expert at Harvard, wrote in Foreign Affairs in 1976, “The PRC is not prepared to make an exception of the only major holdout—the United States—even if Taiwan is” (1976).

It thus came as little surprise for China experts that renewed negotiations under the Carter administration did not go well initially, due to the different views on Taiwan among Carter’s foreign policy teams. Not all of Carter’s high profile foreign policy teams would agree to give in to China’s demands on the Taiwan issue. While National Security Advisor Brzezinski saw enhanced Sino-U.S. relations as a potential counterweight in the struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance believed that improving the U.S.-Soviet relationship would enhance prospects for arms control. He would only push to normalize Sino-U.S. relations by preserving an official U.S. liaison in Taiwan. Carter first sent Vance to Beijing in August 1977 to talk with Chinese leaders. During his meeting with Deng, Deng opposed Vance’s idea and told him, “The arrangement of U.S. government officials remaining in Taiwan unofficially actually means an embassy without a national flag and a name plaque.”
After this encounter, in an interview in September with an Associated Press delegation, which included Kay Graham of the Washington Post and Arthur Sulzberger of the New York Times, Deng said that efforts to normalize relations had suffered a setback during Vance’s visit (Brzezinski 1983:196-202).

The Chinese government firmly insisted that the U.S. complete three tasks in order to establish diplomatic relations with China, and all were related to Taiwan: abrogate its military treaty, withdraw its military forces and cut off its diplomatic relations with Taiwan (Huang 2008:345-346). After fully weighing China’s position on the Taiwan issue, the U.S. government was ready to meet China’s preconditions in order to break the deadlock. In the final stage of the negotiations, the Chinese side stated that any progress would have to be a reaffirmation of Nixon’s five points on the Taiwan issue made during previous negotiations. Brzezinski, who was responsible for the negotiations after Vance, got confirmation from President Carter on these five points. Meanwhile, Carter told him, “We should not ass-kiss them the way Nixon and Kissinger did, and also be careful not to antagonize domestic constituencies” (Brzezinski 1983:196-202). However, facing an unyielding China on the Taiwan question, it became unavoidable for the U.S. to compromise. Brzezinski told the Chinese side that the United States would accept the three basic Chinese conditions regarding normalization, namely to terminate relations with Taiwan, withdraw all U.S. troops and abrogate the U.S.-Taiwan Security Treat; but the U.S. would continue military sales to Taiwan (207-208).

Eventually, the two sides made compromise on the “use of force” on Taiwan. The U.S. made a statement calling for a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue, while China could also issue a statement expressing the position that the timing and means for Taiwan reunification was exclusively a Chinese internal affair (Tao 2011:109). Although the Chinese side would want the
United States to discontinue weapon sales to Taiwan immediately and would not endorse the United States’ position on this matter, China had achieved most of what it demanded, and did not want to jeopardize the entire deal by insisting on this detail. Hence, the Chinese government did not call off the deal but maintained its opposition on U.S. arms sales to Taiwan in principle. Finally, the United States and China agreed to establish official diplomatic relations in 1979, ending 30 years of hostility. Strategically, this was a convergence of interests for both sides, but tactically it would have been impossible without accommodating China on the Taiwan issue. It was also a result of compromise from both countries: the U.S. could not make China promise not to use force in solving the Taiwan issue in the future, while China could not stop the U.S. from continuing the sale of weapons to Taiwan. After accepting requests from the Chinese government, the United States responded with its own “three preconditions” regarding the Taiwan issue. First, the Chinese would not contradict the unilateral statements at the time of normalization concerning the peaceful future of Taiwan. Second, the U.S. would retain a full range of economic, cultural, and other relations with Taiwan on an unofficial basis. Third, the U.S. could continue to sell arms to Taiwan (Brzezinski 225; Carter 1982:197). The Chinese government agreed to the second one, but found the first one hard to accept. Deng Xiaoping told the U.S. counterpart, “We cannot take the obligation to achieve national reunification by peaceful and no other means. We cannot bind ourselves up. If we do so, we will find it harder to realize the aim of peaceful settlement in the Taiwan issue” (Tao 2011:109). As expected, arms sales were to become the next major obstacle in improving Sino-U.S. relations and a major cause of conflict between the two states since then. The Taiwan question has persisted and influenced the wax and wane in the bilateral relations between China and the United States to this day.
China’s material and strategic interests for establishing relations with the United States were to counter the Soviet Union. Why did it allow the seemingly small issue of Taiwan to hold up negotiations for almost a decade? The reason was China’s deeper belief that it was just as important to prevent a powerful U.S. from interfering in the internal affairs of a relatively weak China. Realist scholars argue that China only negotiated with the United States once its own position improved because the United States wanted to play the “China card” with the Soviet Union (Ross 1995). Indeed in the early 1970s, China faced potential wars along its frontiers, and in terms of material interests, China would seem to be the desperate party among the three.

As for the United States, it was also plausible that it would want to play the China card. After all, Nixon inherited a war in Vietnam and was eager to end it. According to Kissinger, Mao treated the rapprochement as a strategic imperative to break the circumstance of facing two hostile superpowers, while Nixon saw it as an opportunity to redefine the American approach to foreign policy and international leadership after the Vietnam War (2011:241). Kissinger believed that “they (Chinese) are deeply worried about the Soviet threat to their national integrity, and see in us a balancing force against the USSR” (1971). Furthermore, Nixon and Kissinger did consider China to be the most vulnerable party in the strategic triangle among the United States, the Soviet Union and the PRC. Zhou Enlai confirmed China’s concern about its vulnerabilities, telling Nixon that China’s problem was that “You all would attack China—the Soviet Union comes from the north, Japan and the U.S. from the east, and India into China’s Tibet.”

Kissinger also believed that the Soviets might attack China’s nuclear facilities, attesting to China’s very vulnerable position and need for rapprochement with the U.S. (216-217).

89 “Memorandum of Conversation,” Tuesday, February 22, 1972, see http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/publications/DOC_readers/kissinger/nixzhou/ (accessed 18 September 2013).
Moreover, there did exist doubts on the part of the U.S. as to whether the Sino-U.S. rapprochement would serve the national interests of the U.S., that is, if the China card was worth playing. For instance, a limited Sino-Soviet war may involve Soviet strikes to destroy Chinese nuclear facilities, which could be a solution to the Chinese nuclear problem.\textsuperscript{90} Thus, a potential Sino-Soviet clash may not be a disaster for the United States during the Cold War, and the Sino-U.S. rapprochement would bring more benefits to China than the U.S., since China was the least powerful state among the three.

However, if the only rationale for the Sino-U.S. rapprochement was the common threat from the Soviet Union, this would raise two issues. First, what led China to break up with the Soviet Union in the first place? IR scholars have failed to predict or explain this. Second, what explains China’s non-compromising stand on the Taiwan issue at the risk of direct military conflict with the United States in the early stage of the Cold War? The answer to both questions, I argue, was China’s concern for sovereignty and national autonomy.

This concern predetermined China’s strategic interests and behaviors in the negotiations over the Sino-U.S. rapprochement. During the near decade of negotiations, as this section has demonstrated, the biggest obstacle was the U.S. policy toward Taiwan, an island that was not strategically crucial to China’s survival and stability, yet psychologically so. Historical documents suggest that it did not matter who was at the helm—Mao, the revolutionary leader, or Deng, the pragmatic reformer—the Chinese leadership behaved unyieldingly on the issue of Taiwan. Hence the realist assumption, which did not consider the role of Taiwan in Chinese

national identity, is insufficient for understanding the difficult process of the Sino-U.S. rapprochement in the 1970s.

The Sino-Soviet Split in the 1960s-70s

Although China and the Soviet Union entered into a formal alliance in 1950, bilateral relations were built on a series of elements that ran counter to the Chinese national identity. These eventually triggered the split between the two countries a few years later. China’s alignment with the Soviets in the early 1950s were originally motivated by economic and strategic concerns, along with aspirations of becoming a strong and well-off socialist state. But after a series of Soviet behaviors activated China’s hypersensitivity over sovereignty and assertiveness on national autonomy, the Chinese side considered the Soviet a hegemon and a socialist imperialist. Hence, the split was inevitable in the end. This section will first highlight the reasons for the Sino-Soviet alliance in the early 1950s and its attendant tensions. Then it will discuss their split since the late 1950s.

Economic and strategic reasons, above all, accounted for China’s alignment with the Soviet Union in the early 1950s. From a Western IR perspective, the relations between Stalin’s Soviet Union and Mao’s China, from 1949 to 1953, were relatively normal. Economically and strategically, when the PRC emerged from the civil war in October 1949, its survival and stability were at risk as a revolutionary regime. The Soviet Union was the first country to recognize the PRC upon its founding. The two countries signed the *Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance* in February 1950. Based on the treaty, the Soviet Union provided China with low interest credits of US$300 million in 1950 and of 500 million in Rubles in 1954 to complete 156 projects, thus making vital contributions to the early industrialization of China (Huang 2008:494).
But the relations were also built on a compromise of China’s sovereignty because of the special rights for the Soviet Union in China. By aligning with the Soviet Union, China also joined an international division of labor in the socialist camp, with the Soviet Union overseeing leadership of the world communist movement. The Soviets delegated China to lead the anti-colonial movements in Asia and promised to be China’s vanguard (Westad 1998:304). As Liu Shaoqi, Mao’s deputy, remarked to the Soviet politburo in July 1949, “The Soviet Communist Party is the main headquarter of the international Communist movement…the interests of China should be subordinated to international interests” (Westad 1998:313). Thus, through the Sino-Soviet treaty, China agreed to a hierarchical relationship. The PRC foreign policy eventually became “leaning to one side” in the 1950s, meaning standing with the international socialism camp led by the Soviet Union.

For the first generation leaders of the PRC, the Soviet Union was the “older brother.” It not only inspired China’s communist revolution, but also provided material aid and diplomatic support to the new regime. At the same time, this vanguard role also benefited the Soviet Union during the early days of the Cold War. Soviet aid to China, including the sharing of secrets necessary for the development of atomic and nuclear weapons, was considered to be aid to the Soviet Union itself (Westad 1998:306). Khrushchev wrote in his memoirs that the Soviets considered such aid to China a way to strengthen the socialist camp by securing the eastern borders (Khrushchev 1997:306). Although this arrangement entailed Chinese subordination to its big Soviet brother, it gave hope to China that it was making progress on the road to socialism (Westad 1998:305).

Thus, in early Sino-Soviet relations, there was an uncomfortable trade-off between Chinese equality and Chinese development. Although the Sino-Soviet treaty of 1950 indicated
that the Soviet Union should relinquish its rights to co-manage the Manchurian railway system and the naval port of Lushun and Dalian as soon as possible, it was not until 1955 that the Soviet Union fulfilled its promises. Moreover, China was never able to restore sovereign control of Outer Mongolia, which had been made independent from China due to Soviet pressure.

From the Soviet side, its alliance with China was not meant to be equal from the beginning. The Chinese were seen as less developed intellectually and technically in modern history. Even before the CCP took power in China, Stalin demanded that Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist government grant the Soviets privileges in both Manchuria and Xinjiang comparable to those achieved by the Czarist regime. He also pressured Chiang to grant Outer Mongolia independence as a condition for Soviet entry into the war against Japan in 1945. In August 1945, the Soviet Union and the KMT’s Republic of China signed the *Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance* to confirm these privileges that China had ceded to the Soviets. Through this treaty, Moscow was able to achieve control of the Chinese Eastern Railroad, Lushun and Dalian. All this restored the *de facto* Russian influence in Manchuria before the October Revolution of 1917 (Shen 2000:55).

In the beginning, the PRC tolerated these historical burdens in order to maintain the Sino-Soviet alignment. Following the CCP’s victory in the civil war and the establishment of the new regime, Stalin was reluctant to relinquish rights acquired through the KMT government just because a communist party came to power in China. Under such circumstances, Mao’s first meeting with Stalin in Moscow in 1949 did not go well. According to Nikita Khrushchev’s memoir, during Mao’s visit in Moscow, Stalin would sometimes not meet him for days and ordered no one else to accompany him. Only when Mao complained would Stalin meet him for another dinner (Khrushchev and Talbott 1974:240). Eventually, it took Mao two months in
Moscow to convince Stalin to put China under Moscow’s security umbrella, at the cost of China’s major economic concessions in both Manchuria and Xinjiang.

International pressure, particularly from the United States, also played a role in Stalin’s decision to form an alignment with China in 1950. U.S. Secretary of State Acheson asserted that the integrity of China was an American national interest regardless of China’s domestic ideology. “We must take the position we have always taken—that anyone who violates the integrity of China is the enemy of China and is acting contrary to our own interest,” said Acheson (Kissinger 2011:120). Acheson’s speech excluded Taiwan and South Korea from America’s defense perimeter in the western Pacific, and suggested that the Soviet Union was pursuing an imperialist policy toward China, especially in Xinjiang and Manchuria (Shen 2000:53). Immediately after this gesture by the U.S., Stalin reassured Mao, who was still in Moscow for alliance negotiations, and told him to not be deceived by the United States (Kissinger 2011:120-121). Mistrusting the intentions of the United States himself, Mao made the decision to “lean on one side”—toward the socialism camp.

The U.S. attitude on Taiwan, namely recognizing it as the only legitimate government of China and refusing to recognize the PRC, also contributed to Mao’s decision to finally embrace the Soviet Union. Mao thus explained his decision: “There are still people who have doubts about this policy. They think China should take a middle course and be a bridge between the Soviet Union and the United States. . . . If China stands between the Soviet Union and the United States, she appears to be in a favorable position, and to be independent, but actually she cannot be independent. The United States is not reliable, she would give you a little something, but not much. How could imperialism give you a full meal? It won’t” (Stuart 1989:153).
There are multiple reasons for the split between the PRC and the Soviet Union in the mid-1950s, but all are plausibly related to the Chinese victimhood identity. As discussed earlier, China’s alignment with the Soviet Union was a trade-off between regime stability and striving for equal status among nations. With regime consolidation and the birth of China’s own foreign policy principles, Mao began to stand up against the Soviet Union’s excessive demands, which had unsettled China’s sensitivity over sovereignty and national autonomy. From the perspective of Chinese national identity, the Sino-Soviet alliance relations were problematic from the very beginning, and being a satellite state of the Soviet Union could only be transient. With the Chinese regime consolidated after the Korean War, the feeling of not being treated equally and constantly bullied by the “socialist imperialist,” could no longer be tolerated. It did not help that the Soviet Union under Khrushchev regarded the communist world as being a single block under Moscow’s leadership.

Despite a formal alignment with the Soviet Union, China could not subordinate the defense of its national interests and territorial sovereignty to an international coalition. Mao refused to join the Warsaw Pact of communist countries, which was created by the Soviet Union in 1955 to deter NATO. Instead, in 1956, China participated in the first Asian-African Conference in Bandung and offered its own foreign policy doctrine: the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.” These began to symbolize the departure from China’s “leaning on one side” foreign policy in the early 1950s, and the development of an independent foreign policy. Realists such as Henry Kissinger argue that Mao had sought to organize the Non-Aligned into a safety net against both the United States and the Soviet Union in Asia (2011: 162-163). But it could be seen as the return to the national autonomy that was so important to the first generation of Chinese Communist leadership who fought a violent revolution to achieve it.
In addition, through interaction between Mao and Khrushchev, China’s increasing concerns about sovereignty and autonomy became a critical issue. They led two leaders to clash over issues that realist IR scholars would consider trivial. For instance, in 1958, Khrushchev proposed to Mao that the Soviet Union be allowed to build a radio station in China to communicate with Soviet submarines and that the Soviet Navy be given the rights to use Chinese ports. In return, the Soviet Union would help China to build submarines. This did not look like a bad deal for a young regime in desperate need of technological support. However, despite the two countries’ formal alliance and the Soviets’ supply of military technology to the Chinese side, Mao furiously refused Khrushchev’s proposals by informing the Soviet ambassador in Beijing. This caused Khrushchev to travel to Beijing to amend the relationship with Mao. To alleviate Mao’s anger, Khrushchev offered China special access to Soviet submarines based in the Arctic Ocean, as an exchange for Soviet use of China’s ports in the Pacific. Mao once again refused, and replied to Khrushchev, “We won’t agree to that either and every country should keep its armed forces on its own territory and on no one else’s” (Khrushchev and Talbott 1974:260).

Clearly alluding to China’s past sufferings, Mao further claimed, “We’ve had the British and other foreigners on our territory for years now, and we’re not ever going to let anyone use our land for their own purposes again” (Kissinger 2011:168). Mao explicitly traced the Soviets’ “red imperialism” to the Stalin era, telling Khrushchev, “It is not a matter of red or white imperialists. There was a man by the name of Stalin, who took Port Arthur and turned Xinjiang and Manchuria into semi-colonies, and he also created four joint companies. These were all his good deeds” (Kissinger 2011:170). The incidents might seem trivial, but what lay behind them was China’s strong assertion of sovereign equality with and national autonomy from the Soviet Union.
Furthermore, Mao’s sensitivity did not only apply to issues of national security and territorial integrity, but also to any issue that infringed on China’s quest for equal status with the Soviets. During his visit to China, Khrushchev also made a request that China supply workers for logging projects in Siberia. Mao replied directly, “You know, Comrade Khrushchev, for years it’s been a widely held view that because China is an underdeveloped and over populated country, with widespread unemployment, it represents a good source of cheap labor. But you know, we Chinese find this attitude very offensive. Coming from you, it’s rather embarrassing. If we were to accept your proposal, others might think that the Soviet Union has the same image of China that the capitalist West has” (Khrushchev and Talbott 1974:249).

For many Soviet observers, these personal clashes between Mao and Khrushchev represented two different cultures, and the Soviet leadership could not understand China’s Sinocentric culture (Zagoria 1962; Westad 1998; Radchenko 2009; Luthi 2008). Based on China’s strategic interests, its action was also irrational—turning down and offending the leader of a superpower and its principal ally. But from the perspective of China’s national identity, Mao’s clashes with Khrushchev on various issues were rationally rooted in China’s preoccupation with national autonomy and territorial integrity after struggling for national independence and equality for a century. China made no exception for that principle, even with its closest ally.

Finally, Mao and Khrushchev clashed on the Soviet policy of intervention in other socialist states. This can also be attributed to China’s identity stance on sovereignty, national autonomy, and anti-hegemonism. China opposed Khrushchev’s treatment of Tito’s Yugoslavia as a deviant state, and opposed his decision to use force in Hungary and Poland in 1956. During Khrushchev’s visit to China in 1959, Mao accused him of “right opportunism” (Taubman 2003:394; Zhang 2001:229). Before the Sino-Soviet military conflict in 1969, Beijing had
condemned the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in a manner more vehement than many Western protests of the invasion at the time. China called Brezhnev the new czar, even the new Hitler (Chang 1990:286-287).

Along with conflicts between two countries’ top leadership, Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated on all fronts in the 1960s. After initially taking a neutral stand on the border clashes between China and India in 1962, Khrushchev joined the United States to denounce China as the aggressor. Khrushchev later publicly declared Mao to be an “ultra-leftist, ultra-dogmatist, indeed a left revisionist” (Westad 1998:25; Taubman 2003:470). The Soviet Union and China also fought for the support of other developing countries. In 1961, Khrushchev approved an unprecedented level of military aid to a number of revolutionary groups in Latin America and Africa, citing competition with China over the leadership of revolutionary movements in those regions. The two countries’ economic relations underwent steep changes in the early 1960s. In 1960 the Soviet government withdrew its experts working on all 156 projects in China. By 1962, economic activity between the two countries had been reduced to just 5 percent of its 1959 level (Hopf 2009:311).

In the end, the Sino-Soviet split in the midst of the Cold War did not fit with the conventional predictions of foreign policy makers and IR scholars. China was a much weaker power compared to the Soviet Union, but by the early 1960s, less than a decade after the Korean War with the United States, China was facing two hostile superpowers with the potential of military conflicts with both of them. If realists were right that the alliance formed between China and the Soviet Union in early 1950s was aimed at balancing against the United States, the split between China and the USSR suggested otherwise. Furthermore, during the heyday of the Cold
War in the 1960s and 1970s, Sino-Soviet relations even deteriorated to the level of military conflicts despite the fact that China also faced a formidable U.S. military power.

**The Sino-Soviet military clashes on Zhenbao Island**

The Sino-Soviet split eventually resulted in military conflicts along the disputed border between the two countries in 1969. Since the open split between China and the Soviet Union, there had been a number of armed conflicts along the Soviet border with China’s northeastern provinces and the Xinjiang province. Among them, the clash over Zhenbao Island (Damansky Island), in March 1969, marked the nadir of Sino-Soviet relations. The conflict stemmed from disputes between the two countries on the Heilongjiang (Amur) River, which China considered territory lost through the “unequal treaties” during the Qing Dynasty. From January 23, 1967 to March 2, 1969, the Chinese complained that Soviet troops had intruded sixteen times onto Zhenbao Island (Robinson 1972:1182). In response, the Chinese side organized the ambush on Zhenbao Island on March 2, firing the first shot. Another armed incident took place on Zhenbao Island on March 14-15, during which Soviet authorities reported several scores of dead and injured soldiers, while the Chinese side mentioned an undetermined but high number of causalities (Robinson 1972).

The reasons for China to initiate the attack were complex. China’s use of force on Zhenbao Island, from a foreign policy point, was to oppose the Soviet violation of the border status quo. Nevertheless, the border problem did not appear to be a crucial issue before the two countries’ split, and once that happened, it helped to worsen Sino-Soviet relations in a dramatic way. On the surface, the conflict was about territorial disputes between two countries, but the Chinese side initiated the attack despite gaining no actual benefit through the conflict. Neither side achieved its strategic goal, and to gain more through the negotiation of border disputes later,
the issue was left until the late 1990s to be solved. Beside the possibility that China was too weak to gain back any disputed territory, a deeper motivation for China, I argue, was the sentiment of historical victimhood and humiliation caused by the loss of territories in the past, and intensified by the further deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations.

Using the paradigm of Chinese hypersensitiveness over sovereignty and anti-hegemonism, it is easier to understand the reasons by which the Chinese side instigated the conflict, even though it was not a good strategic move. First, the PRC had long declared that the border treaties signed between Tsarist Russia and China’s Qing Dynasty were among the “unequal” treaties of the imperial age and hence subject to revision. China claimed that according to international law and practice, the border of two countries along a river should be marked by the central line of the river’s mainstream. The Soviet Union maintained the claim of the Czars that the border was on the Chinese side of the river. In fact, by the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Russians had seized a total 1.4 million square kilometers, and another 1.5 million by 1900. The Russians codified these gains through a series of “unequal treaties,” as current Chinese histories call them. Khrushchev had refused China’s request for repudiation of the treaty in the 1950s (Robinson 1972).

After the armed conflicts on Zhenbao Island, Beijing’s stand that it would not negotiate any border agreement with the Soviets unless Moscow acknowledged that the nineteenth century border agreements were “unequal treaties” akin to those forced on China by the imperialists.91 During that period, the tension between China and the Soviet Union was high. By the summer of 1969, the Soviet troops along the Chinese border grew to over a million and signs of an

91 This statement was according to a CIA report. See “The Sino-Soviet Border Conflict, 1969: U.S. Reactions and Diplomatic Maneuvers,” National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 49. See http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB49/
imminent war between China and the Soviet Union were apparent. The Chinese government worried about the possibility of a Soviet “preemptive attack,” and Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai even claimed that if Moscow struck, Beijing was ready to “respond in a war that would know no boundaries.”

Few realist foreign policy observers in the West could have predicted that in less than a decade, the two countries’ relations could deteriorate to such enmity. Realism would predict global balancing in a bipolar world from 1949 to 1989, or the sustenance of the Sino-Soviet alliance to face a common threat—the United States. However, the decisions of the Chinese leaders to go against both the superpowers cannot be explained rationally according to realist understanding of world politics.

Through the lens of Chinese identity we may understand the reasons why China behaved in such an unorthodox way or put itself into such a position. For social constructivists, the Sino-Soviet split was not caused by any change in the material balance of power, but by China and the Soviet Union’s identities and how these differences impacted their perception of each other (Hopf 2009). From a realist perspective, China looked like the irrational party, being the weaker power and engaging in military conflicts while gaining no concrete advantage. But this symbolized the willingness of the Chinese government to use force to defend its territorial integrity against any power. Since the border war in 1969, for almost two decades, rather than seeking reconciliation, both Mao and Deng waited patiently for a change of foreign policy on the Soviet part.

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Conclusion

This chapter has analyzed four major episodes in the Sino-U.S. and Sino-Soviet relationships during the Mao era: China’s entry into the Korean War; the Sino-U.S negotiations over rapprochement; the Sino-Soviet split; and the Sino-Soviet conflict over Zhenbao Island. While realism may explain the larger strategic environments and choices faced by China, national identity theory provided explanations for China’s specific foreign policy behaviors toward the superpowers. In terms of realistic considerations, due to China’s weakness, it was left with very limited strategic choices other than to ally with one or balance against it. But identity patterns—hypersensitivity on sovereignty issues and assertiveness over national autonomy influenced by a historical sense of victimhood and the party’s revolutionary internationalism—also helped to shape Chinese foreign policy behavior toward both superpowers during most of the Cold War era.

China’s decision to enter the Korean War in 1950 had less to do with balancing against the U.S., and more to do with China’s own regime consolidation. The main goal was to prevent the U.S. from invading mainland China after the U.S. deployed its fleets in the Taiwan Strait. On the one hand, a perceived long-term threat from the U.S. would be posed to China if North Korea fell. On the other hand, the U.S. dismissed warnings about a possible Chinese intervention in the Korean War. Thus, the war was largely due to a “strategic misperception” between China and the U.S.

When Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated after the late 1950s, there were both potential material and strategic interests for China to establish relations with the U.S. However, during the 1970s, the status of Taiwan emerged as the defining issue highlighting eight years of negotiations between China and the U.S. Facing a potential invasion from the Soviet Union,
reconciliation with the United States would have greatly improved China’s security status and served as a strong deterrent to Soviet aggression. Nonetheless, China’s unyielding stance on sovereignty and national autonomy prevented it from compromising on the Taiwan issue in spite of a potentially disadvantageous power position and an eagerness to end the encroachment by both the U.S. and Soviet Union.

While realism was initially right to predict the Sino-Soviet alignment of the 1950s, it came as a surprise that such an alignment broke up a decade and a border war broke out between the two countries in 1969. Although Sino-Soviet alignment was motivated by economic and strategic concerns, it was also built on a compromise of China’s sovereignty and national autonomy, which seriously triggered China’s deep sense of victimhood. Such historical victimhood and humiliation caused by the loss of territories in the past ultimately resulted in China standing up against the Soviet Union. Thus, the Sino-Soviet split was not caused by any change in the material balance of power among the U.S., the Soviet Union and China, but by changes of Chinese perceptions of the USSR from a country it admired to a socialist imperialist.
Chapter 4 the post-Mao Era: Pragmatic and Peaceful Internationalism

This chapter turns to the post-Mao era to illustrate the utility of the Chinese national identity for understanding China’s foreign policy behavior. My cases continue to be China’s relations with the two superpowers. During this period, from the late 1970s to the present, Chinese foreign policy has remained unchanged in terms of its hypersensitivity over sovereignty and assertiveness about national autonomy. However, in line with an emerging peaceful internationalism, Chinese foreign policy has also gradually been characterized by defensiveness and conflict avoidance with the superpowers. Thus, while crises in Sino-U.S. and Sino-Russian relations continued to be predominated by issues of sovereignty and perceived victimhood, the PRC has largely refrained from provocative or aggressive behavior that could damage relations with the superpowers.

Since the end of the Cold War, China has been able to improve relations with both the U.S. and Russia even while the relationship between the latter two states has deteriorated. Some realist scholars hold that it would be more advantageous for China to strike a strategic partnership with the U.S. in order to cope with the potentially dangerous constraints of American hegemony (Goldstein 2003; Lampton 2001), however this has yet to happen. Instead, Chinese foreign policy has neither tried to align with the U.S. nor to balance against it. Such ambiguities have been reflected in U.S. foreign policy. For example, a report submitted to U.S. Congress by President Bush in 2002 claims, “We welcome the emergence of a strong, peaceful and prosperous China’s,” yet also warns, “…in pursuing advanced military capabilities China can threaten its neighbors in the Asia-Pacific region” (Bush 2002:27). But at the end of Bush’s term, the Sino-U.S. relationship was more favorable than it had been in the history of the countries’
bilateral relations (Paulson 2008). At the same time, China has not made alliances with Russia or other states to balance against the U.S.

China’s neutral or ambiguous behavior in the post-Cold war era, I argue, is best understood through the lens of China’s identity patterns associated with peaceful internationalism. I use key crisis points in China’s bilateral relations with the two superpowers to illustrate this contention. Specifically, I look at the Third Taiwan crisis in 1996, the U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999 and the air collision incident in 2001, and the Sino-Soviet reconciliation in the 1980s. China’s consistent promotion of pluralism and non-alignment with the U.S. or Russia since the end of the Cold War, I argue, harkens back to the anti-hegemonism of the Mao era, an identity pattern rooted in revolutionary internationalism. I illustrate this argument using two cases: China’s refusal to join the G-2 and the formation of the Sino-Russian “partnership” without alignment against the U.S.

**The 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis**

The Taiwan Strait crisis in 1996 was by far the most serious crisis between China and the U.S. after the normalization of their diplomatic relationship in 1979. However, it was not the first time China and the U.S. had a military standoff in the Taiwan Strait. The first and second Taiwan Strait crises occurred after the Korean War, in 1954 and 1958 respectively, when U.S. presidents dispatched the Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Strait to halt China from an invasion of Taiwan. In March 1955, both U.S. Secretary of State Allen Dulles and President Dwight D. Eisenhower warned that the United States might use nuclear weapons against China, the first time the United States made a nuclear threat in an ongoing crisis (Kissinger 2011:156). The 1996 crisis was the third of its kind and yet another reflection of China’s non-comprising stand on sovereignty issues.
Although Sino-U.S. relations have improved significantly since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. policy toward Taiwan has remained a sensitive issue for China. The Chinese and the U.S. governments concluded a joint communiqué on August 17, 1982 dealing with U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. But the U.S.’ continued arms sales to Taiwan, based on the *Taiwan Relations Act* passed by the Congress in 1979, became the primary source of friction between China and the U.S. under every U.S. presidency. This friction reflected China’s belief that the U.S. had been acting in bad faith on the Taiwan issue (Bader 2012:18-19).

The 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis started when the United States granted an entry visa to Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui to attend a reunion and speak at his *alma mater*, Cornell University in 1995. The Chinese government considered it a violation of the United States’ earlier promise not to grant a visa to him. Particularly, before Lee Teng-hui’s visa application, U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher had promised the Chinese side that the United States would not allow Lee Teng-hui to visit as this did not accord with the unofficial relations between the United States and Taiwan (Qian 2005:243-251; Kissinger 2011:473-474). Although later, President Clinton, under the pressure of the U.S. Congress, granted Lee Teng-hui a visa, the condition was that the visit needed to be private and nonpolitical. Thus, when Lee used his commencement speech at Cornell University to repeatedly refer to Taiwan as the “Republic of China on Taiwan,” China overreacted by claiming that Lee’s visit signaled a fundamental shift in the U.S.’ “one China” policy (Christopher 2001:242-246). This overreaction, I argue, was consistent with the PRC’s hypersensitivity over sovereignty issues. But its eventual restraint also showed a trend different from the Mao era, that is, an emerging peaceful internationalism.

First of all, the U.S. abrogation of its earlier promise was perceived by the Chinese government as indirect support for the “Taiwan independence” movement and, thus, also
indirectly undermined China’s sovereignty claim over Taiwan. This perception is evidenced by a series of hyper reactions by China over Lee’s visit. China withdrew its ambassador from the U.S. and suspended consultations between Chinese and American experts on the Missile Technology Control Regime and nuclear cooperation. In July 1995 China carried out two large-scale missile tests in the Taiwan Strait, though using dummy warheads to avoid further provocation of Lee Teng-hui. The Chinese army announced a further round of exercises in March 1996, just prior to the Taiwanese presidential election. This effort at intimidation was serious enough to provoke the Clinton administration to dispatch two aircraft carrier battle groups to the region, amounting to the biggest display of American military might in Asia since the Vietnam War (Ross 2000). The U.S. government did not fully comprehend the consequence of granting a visa to Lee Teng-hui or China’s antagonism on this issue before the crisis erupted. But from the Chinese perspective, its reaction should have been expected, as it would allow no deviation from its “one China” policy in Sino-U.S. relations.93

Second, Chinese President Jiang Zemin spoke of the crisis as a “deliberate provocation” by the U.S., a judgment based not on an understanding of the American political process but on China’s hypersensitivity on sovereignty issues. Jiang specifically declared, “The great People’s Republic of China will never be bullied, the great Chinese nation will never be humiliated, and the great Chinese people will never be conquered” (Kuhn 2004:2). According to Kissinger, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen told him in April 1995, before the Sino-U.S. military confrontation, “We hope to see Sino-U.S. relations restored to normal and improved. But the U.S. government should be clear about the point: we have no maneuver-room on the Taiwan question. We will never give up our principled position on Taiwan” (2011:473-474). For

93 For a detail account for the 1995-1996 Sino-U.S. confrontation in Taiwan Strait, see Ross 2000.
U.S. officials, China’s behavior was seen as both overreaction and over-interpretation of U.S. intentions. But from the perspective of Chinese national identity, it was the righteous way to defend Chinese sovereignty.

Third, in spite of a non-compromising stance during this crisis, the Chinese government did not try to further escalate it into an actual military conflict with the U.S. It was a behavior that was to become a trend in China’s post-Cold War foreign policy, namely, conflict avoidance. According to Robert Ross, a seasoned analyst of Sino-U.S. relations, because Taiwan was not a core interest for the U.S., its dispatch of two aircraft carrier battle groups to the region signaled that the U.S. was ready to defend the strategic reputation of U.S. resolve rather than defending Taiwan; and once the Chinese government received that message, it backed down. In actuality, neither side was willing to use force. For the Chinese government, it was exercising its coercion policy while the U.S. responded with its deterrence policy (Ross 2000: 88-90; 112-114). A potential Sino-U.S. direct military conflict was thus avoided thanks to the last-minute restraint on both sides.

Furthermore, Chinese sensitivity over sovereignty was soothed once the U.S. gave reassurance on the matter. President Clinton later publicly declared the United States’ “three nos” policy on Taiwan. That is: no support for Taiwan’s independence; no support for “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan;” and no support for Taiwan’s entry into any international organization joined by sovereign states. This was the first time a president of the United States had made the three promises publicly and thereafter, Sino-U.S. relations were restored to normalcy (Qian 2006; Clinton 2000:108).

For realists, it may be intriguing that a trivial issue, the issuing of an entry visa to the Taiwanese President Lee, almost triggered a military conflict between China and the U.S. In the
age of China’s engagement with the Western world, China would have had far more to lose than
to gain from a military conflict. But by the logic of Chinese national identity, the confrontation
was unavoidable because it was an issue of territorial integrity and sovereignty. The reason, once
again, was China’s perception of the U.S.’ wavering policy over the Taiwan issue that caused
Chinese antagonism.

The Politics of Apology: Two Incidents, One Demand

In 1999 and 2001, two military accidents triggered foreign policy crises between China
and the United States. One was the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Serbia by the U.S.-led
NATO forces during the Kosovo War. The second was the air collision between a Chinese
fighter jet and a U.S. Navy EP-3 in the South China Sea. In both cases, the Chinese government
restrained domestic anger to avoid further escalation of the crisis, while firmly demanding formal
apologies from the White House. Both cases demonstrated once again that China was
hypersensitive over perceived humiliation, but in another sign of peaceful internationalism,
China was also careful to avoid further conflict with the U.S.

The Two Incidents

The 1999 bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade created a major diplomatic crisis
between China and the U.S. It occurred at a delicate time for Sino-U.S. relations. For the few
years prior to the incident, China had been negotiating contentiously with the U.S. over its
membership in the WTO. Their bilateral relations were just recovering from the 1996 Taiwan
Strait military standoff. Before the 1999 Kosovo War, China, along with Russia, opposed
NATO’s military intervention without a UN Security Council mandate, although China did not
veto UN Resolutions 1203 on Kosovo.
On May 8, 1999, five precision-guided heavy bombs were dropped into the Chinese embassy in Belgrade by a B-2 Spirit aircraft taken off from U.S. soil. After the bombing, the U.S. claimed that the B-2 pilots had thought the building was a Serbian weapon acquisition agency. The strike caused three deaths and twenty injured personnel in the Chinese embassy.

China’s reaction to the incident once again demonstrated its hypersensitivity over perceived national humiliation and violation of its sovereignty. Beijing accused the United States of a deliberate attack because its embassy building was hit several times. The state-owned Xinhua News Agency condemned the U.S.’ violation of Chinese sovereignty, the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and norms of international relations (Tang 2011:215). The Chinese media made a connection between the embassy bombing and the “century of humiliation,” with the main official paper, The People’s Daily, noting “that is not China in 1899.” As Peter Gries notes in his study of contemporary Chinese nationalism, Chinese reactions to the 1999 Belgrade bombing were shaped in part by memories of China’s semi-colonial past (Gries 2004:19).

It was this sense of victimhood and righteousness that led to formal demands for an apology. On May 9, one day after the bombing, Hu Jintao, then Vice President of the PRC, gave a television speech on the bombing to strongly protest the U.S.-led NATO forces, demanding that the United States assume full responsibility (Tang 2011:215). On May 10, Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan issued demands to the U.S.-led NATO forces requiring a formal apology along with other requests. They included:

1. A public and official apology to the Chinese government, the Chinese people, and relatives of the Chinese victims;
A complete and thorough investigation of the NATO precision-guided bomb attack on the Chinese embassy in Yugoslavia;

3. Prompt publication of the detailed results of the investigation;

4. Severe punishment for those responsible for the attack.

Meanwhile, China postponed high-level exchanges between the two countries, delayed Sino-U.S. talks on nonproliferation, arms control, and international security, and suspended dialogue on human rights (Tang 2011:218-219). At the same time, the bombing triggered the largest anti-American protest in China since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries in 1979. Chinese protests besieged the U.S. embassy in Beijing for days, trapping the ambassador James Sasser behind broken windows.

A similar crisis, the Sino-U.S. air collision, occurred months after George W. Bush became the U.S. president. On April 1, 2001, an American EP-3 military surveillance plane, while conducting a “routine” surveillance mission in the southeast of China’s Hainan Island, collided with and destroyed a Chinese military aircraft. The latter was sent by the Chinese Navy to follow and monitor the U.S. plane. The Chinese pilot was later declared dead while the EP-3 made an emergency landing on China’s Hainan Island. The twenty-four member U.S. crew was immediately detained and held at a military barracks on the island. China’s reaction over the incident was similar to the 1999 embassy bombing, loaded with frustration over perceived humiliation and anger at violated sovereignty.

The U.S. crew was not released for eleven days and the incident was one of the major crises during Bush’s eight-year presidency. The U.S. position was that that its plane was over international water and it was important to defend the freedom of navigation. The U.S. government also blamed the Chinese pilot for ramming the U.S. plane in the first place. The
Chinese side, on the other hand, demanded that the U.S. accept full responsibility for the incident. Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan told the press, “It was the U.S. plane that hit the Chinese aircraft, rather than the other way around…the entire responsibility for the collision lies with the United States and they should give a satisfactory explanation to the Chinese people” (2011:327-330). With neither side being willing to back down, the U.S. crew was held by the Chinese government while the two governments began negotiations about the incident. The U.S. side demanded an immediate release of the crew. The Chinese side, not surprisingly, demanded a formal apology from the U.S. government first and foremost.

Why Apologies?

Why did these two minor incidents become the most serious foreign policy crises between China and the United States since the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis? And why did China demand formal apologies from the United States, symbolic gestures in both cases, as the conditions of peaceful resolutions to the crises?

From Chinese national identity perspective, there were three reasons. First, both cases involved the loss of Chinese lives and perceptions of sovereignty infringements by the U.S., the latter a familiar theme in China’s victimhood discourse. Hence, China felt compelled to stand up firmly against the U.S. in two seemingly “trivial incidents.” Second, China’s demand for apologies symbolized its claim to moral justice in the incidents and its gesture to be willing to “forgive” the misdeeds of the U.S. This mentality is closely associated with Confucian ideas of righteousness and benevolence. Lastly, reflecting the post-Mao era tendency of conflict avoidance, the Chinese government restrained the widespread domestic anger among its
population at home and sought a peaceful resolution of the crises. These three factors combine to explain China’s behavior in these two crises.

First, China’s victimhood identity made it impossible for China to treat these two incidents as merely “accidents,” as the U.S. claimed. Rather, it inevitably entailed serious diplomatic crises for the two countries. In both cases, the Chinese government was so incensed that it initially refused to talk to the U.S. about the matters. But differences in U.S. attitudes also affected how China’s victimhood mentality was soothed or provoked further. In the first incident, the 1999 embassy bombing, U.S. Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, made an urgent call to the Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan on the day of the bombing, although she was told that he was not available to pick up the phone (Albright and Woodward 2003:417-418). President Clinton also sounded conciliatory after the incident, telling reporters that the bombing was an unintended tragedy, and expressed regret and offered his condolences to the Chinese leaders and people for the loss of lives and property. On May 9, President Clinton expressed wishes to talk to President Jiang at the earliest convenience, again as Jiang refused to pick up the phone after the bombing. For the Chinese, the refusals were symbols of protest because the nation’s feelings “were hurt.” In the words of Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan, “We taught the United States that today’s China and its people couldn’t be bullied. They are ready to fight for the defense of national sovereignty and dignity at all costs, and are resolutely opposed to hegemonic acts” (2011:233-236). Peter Gries’s argument was on target: the Chinese protestors’ response to the Belgrade bombing was not simply a calculated way to pursue China’s national interests, but the cherished identifications of individual Chinese with their nation (2004:108).
Indeed, once the “defense of national sovereignty and dignity” was fulfilled at the moral level, in the form of the U.S. side accepting responsibility, the Chinese side was willing to settle for token compensations. On May 16 the United States sent a special envoy to China, representing President Clinton. He briefed the Chinese side on the outcome of the investigation into the embassy bombing. The United States agreed to pay compensation of $4.5 million to the families of those killed and to individuals injured in the bombing. It was a meager figure for three diseased and over twenty injured Chinese embassy staff, but the Chinese government nevertheless accepted it. On January 17, 2001, the U.S. government compensated the Chinese government for property losses resulting from the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, at $28 million (Tang 2011:233-236).

Nevertheless, between sovereignty sensitivity and conflict avoidance, the Chinese side still compromised in the end. This is because the U.S., despite accepting responsibility for the incident, still claimed the incident was an “accidental bombing.” The Chinese government has not accepted this. Thus, Beijing accepted the U.S. taking responsibility by way of material compensations and avoided further conflict. But on account of its victimhood identity, it needed to retain a symbolic rejection of the U.S. explanation.

The second crisis, the EP-3 incident in 2001, involved less of a loss of Chinese lives but because of the Chinese perception of U.S. arrogance, the crisis escalated more than it did in the first incident. Like the 1999 Embassy bombing, the incident was perceived as a national humiliation and a violation of Chinese sovereignty. And similar to the 1999 Embassy bombing, the United States was not able to establish communication with Chinese leadership after the incident. Secretary of State Colin Powell could not get the Chinese Foreign Minister to return his phone call. But unlike President Clinton, the U.S. officials were far less conciliatory and came to
be perceived by the Chinese side as “arrogant” and morally unjust. President Bush initially took a hard stance toward China by demanding “prompt and safe return of the crew and the return of the aircraft without further damaging or tampering” (Shepperd 2013:121). One day later, he reiterated his previous points and claimed that the U.S. had “allowed the Chinese government time to do the right thing” (Bush 2003:364). Dennis Blair, the head of the United States Pacific Command, even criticized the Chinese Air Force for failing to intercept the U.S. aircraft in a professional way and playing “bumper cars in the air” (Rice 2011:48). Condoleezza Rice reveals in her memoir, “The Chinese wanted us to apologize for his death, something that we were unwilling to do—particularly once we learned that his hot-dogging had been a prime cause of the accident” (2011:45-49). In addition, the U.S. Navy dispatched three destroyers to cruise the vicinity of Hainan Island in the name of “monitoring the development of the situation” (Tang 2011:335-337).

The Chinese government felt the response from the U.S. was highly arrogant, akin to bullying. It did not help that President Bush had been vocally hostile toward China during his presidential campaign. Instead of inheriting Clinton’s goals of building a potential “strategic partnership” with China, he called China a “strategic competitor.” As Peter Gries puts it, “By refusing to apologize, America appeared extremely arrogant” to the Chinese. Furthermore, regardless of who was at fault in the plane collision, a Chinese citizen was dead, and a sincere American apology was therefore needed to restore the Sino-U.S. relationship (2004:111).

Once again, reflecting the ideational discourse of victimhood and the Confucian discourse of righteousness, Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan made four demands to the U.S. Ambassador Prueher:
1. The United States should bear full responsibility for the incident and issue an apology;
2. The U.S. attitude and actions subsequent to the collision were wrong, and greatly unsatisfactory to China; (Chine considered the U.S. EP-3 illegally entered China’s airspace, and landed at a Chinese airfield. These actions had infringed upon China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and posed a threat to China’s state security)
3. There would be no release of the aircrew until the United States apologized;
4. The United States must stop reconnaissance activities in China’s coastal areas (2011:335-337).

Western scholars of Chinese nationalism, such as Peter Gries, argue that both incidents fit into an emerging Chinese “victimization narrative” in which the Chinese chronicle a long history of injury at the hand of Western aggressors so that apologies from the United States are necessary to restore their self-respect (2004:139). Indeed, for the Chinese side, the incidents both represented insults to Chinese sovereignty and national dignity, particularly when the U.S government had an arrogant attitude in its initial handling of the incidents. Research on state apology has drawn attention from both IR and Sociology scholars in foreign relations between states. Jennifer Lind, an IR scholar at Dartmouth College, argues that unapologetic remembrance elevates threat perception and inhibits reconciliation, and apologetic remembrance reduces threat perception and promotes reconciliation (2008:9). Hence, remembrance can be a critical factor that shapes how states perceive each other’s identities. Specifically, in American culture, an apology requires admitting past misdeeds and expressing remorse for them (16).

On the other hand, an apology from a state demonstrates its regret over past misdeeds and avoiding similar behavior in the future and, hence, offers a better indication of its threat perception and intentions. Sociologist Nicholas Tavuchis argues that an apology entails at least
the “acknowledgment of the legitimacy of the violated rule, admission of fault and responsibility for its violation, and the expression of genuine regret and remorse for the harm done” (1991:3). Thus, for states, whether to issue an apology or to demand an apology, is always more of a political and psychological issue than just a symbolic one. In addition, apology speaks to something larger than that: it pays homage to a moral order rendered problematic by the very act that calls it forth (1991:14). That is to say that the party that receives apologies despite its loss, can claim moral justice. In terms of power relations, Peter Gries writes that vengeance and apologies not only help reestablish power relations; they also restore self-esteem (2004:89).

Indeed, both incidents were only resolved peacefully once the U.S. issued apologies, showing once again that China would not compromise on an issue sensitive to its victimhood identity. In the 1999 bombing case, facing strong hostile reactions from the Chinese side, the U.S. government reevaluated the situation and conceded. President Clinton wrote a letter to Chinese president Jiang Zemin to express an “apology for the tragic event at the Chinese embassy in Belgrade and sincere condolences to the victims” (Tang 2011:229). But in the 2011 air collision case, since the U.S. initially refused and later was reluctant to apologize to the Chinese side, almost the entire Sino-U.S. negotiation was about the wordings of such a letter of apology.

In the 2001 case, the Chinese government sustained the deadlock and made clear that it would not release the U.S. crew until receiving a formal apology that satisfied China’s claim. President Jiang Zemin, during his trip to Chile while the incident happened, drew the line that the United States bore full responsibility for the incident and must give an apology to the Chinese people (Tang 2011:337). The Chinese side insisted that the letter of apology must specifically fulfill three requirements:
1. There must be an appropriately worded apology for the collisions, the loss of the Chinese pilot and for the U.S. plane entering China’s airspace and landing at a Chinese airport without China’s authorization;

2. The United States must admit that its plane had entered China’s airspace without China’s authorization;

3. The United States should express gratitude for China’s proper arrangement for the U.S. air crew (Tang 2011:343).

Between April 5 and 10, 2011, the two sides conducted eleven rounds of negotiations. Only after six drafts did China become finally satisfied with the apology letter. The final text read that:

Both President Bush and Secretary of State Powell have expressed their sincere regret over your missing pilot and aircraft. Please convey to the Chinese people and to the family of pilot Wang Wei that we are very sorry for their loss…we are very sorry the entering of China’s airspace and the landing did not have verbal clearance, but very pleased the crew landed safely. We appreciate China's efforts to see to the well-being of our crew.  

In the letter, the words “very sorry” were used twice, in reference to the loss of Chinese pilot and the entry into China’s airspace respectively. This fulfilled China’s first two requirements, and the word “appreciate” expressed the gratitude China demanded. After the Chinese got the sixth draft from the United States, they even consulted with senior English experts on expressions of apology and referenced Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary and

Webster’s Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language, to confirm that that “sorry” can be used to mean apologize. After the confirmation, the Chinese government accepted the final version presented by the United States (Tang 2011:346). Thereupon, on April 12, the crew members were released on “humanitarian considerations.”

Finally, even the repatriation of the U.S. plane was handled by the Chinese side through the narrative of victimhood and national autonomy. During the negotiations between the two governments over the returning of the EP-3 airplane to the United States, the U.S. Defense Department initially wanted to send a technical assessment group to undertake repairs so that the plane could fly back from Hainan Island. But their demand was firmly rejected by the Chinese side, citing that, “the Chinese people would never agree to let the plane be repaired and to leave China as if nothing had happened” (Tang 2011:350-354). Eventually the EP-3 was disassembled and then transported by a commercial Antonov-124 cargo plane chartered from a Russian airline. After the matter was resolved, the Chinese sent the U.S. a bill for $1 million, to which the U.S. offered only $34,000 (Bush 2010:426).

In short, the apologies from the U.S. government were extremely important for China. To sum up this significance with the words of Tang Jiaxuan, the Chinese Foreign Minister, in his memoir about the 2001 EP-3 incident, “It (the apology) was not simply a matter of semantics or rhetoric, but a political issue for history” (2011:347). At the same time, accepting the apology was also an indication, in the Confucian tradition, that China was able to “forgive” the misdeeds of the U.S. and ready for a peaceful resolution of the conflict. In both cases, after the Chinese government perceived that the U.S. had “apologized,” Sino-US relations resumed to normalcy rapidly. Indeed, when George W. Bush was ready to leave office in 2008, his Treasury Secretary, Henry Paulson wrote a piece on Sino-US relations for the journal Foreign Affairs, saying that
Sino-U.S. relations had been at their best since the two countries’ establishment of diplomatic relations (2008).

**Sino-Soviet Reconciliation in the 1980s**

The reconciliation of Sino-Soviet relations began in the early post-Mao era in the early 1980s. In terms of material interests, this would serve Chinese interests in many ways. In the 1970s, the Soviet Union had deployed a million troops to Outer Mongolia and along the extensive borders with China, posing direct threats to China. Improving relations with the Soviet Union, when China’s new priority was economic development, would help reduce its national security challenges. Deng Xiaoping also wanted to have a balanced relationship with both the United States and the Soviet Union. While the Soviet Union’s hegemonic actions would still be criticized, its internal affairs would no longer be chastised by the Chinese government in public (Tang 2011:500). Finally, in a new era of reform and opening, thawing relations with the Soviet Union would symbolize a transition from a revolutionary regime to a pragmatic regime.

However, Deng Xiaoping would only adjust China’s foreign policy toward the Soviet Union without sacrificing China’s national security and ideational tenets. According to the memoirs of two former Chinese Foreign Ministers, Deng personally approved three points for the negotiation of normalizing Sino-Soviet relations, all of which related to the Soviet Union’s hegemonic behavior in China’s border regions. The three points were: withdrawal of Soviet troops stationed along the Sino-Soviet borders and in Outer Mongolia; withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan; and urging Vietnam to withdraw from Cambodia (Tang 2011; Qian 2005). Essentially Deng asked the Soviet Union to remove the troops that had established Soviet hegemony from Northeast Asia, West Asia and to Southeast Asia. In the analytical prism of Chinese national identity, Deng’s three conditions were consistent with China’s anti-hegemonic
principles and policies associated with revolutionary internationalism. China viewed both Vietnam and the Soviet Union as seeking to become regional and global hegemons.

Because of the three preconditions set by Deng, it took almost a decade to complete the Sino-Soviet normalization process. It began in 1982 under Soviet leader Brezhnev, who was relatively conciliatory. He expressed full support for China's position on a key sovereignty issue, Taiwan. He was conciliatory on another sovereignty issue, proposing to resume border talks between the two countries. But he would only reach an agreement with China without any preconditions (Tang 2011:497). The next three Soviet leaders—Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenkov—avoided issues that concerned China. They would dwell on the trivial and try to bring about normalization of bilateral relations through developing economic, trade cooperation and increasing visits between the two countries (Qian 2005:13-20). According to Qian Qichen, special envoy to the Sino-Soviet political consultations and later China’s foreign minister, the Soviet stand could be summarized in three points: first, they criticized China for setting “preconditions” for the talks; second, they held that normalization of Sino-Soviet relations must not “harm the interests of a third country,” referring to Vietnam; third, they asserted that the Soviet Union “never threatens China” (Qian 2005:1-12).

When Gorbachev became the next Soviet leader and shifted to “new thinking about diplomacy,” Deng still insisted on the three conditions, with priority given to Vietnam’s withdrawal from Cambodia. Deng suggested a meeting at the highest level between China and the Soviet Union and asked Romanian president Ceausescu to convey this in an oral message to Mikhail Gorbachev (Qian 2005:13-20). Facing an intransigent China, Gorbachev finally moved to meet Deng’s preconditions. In July 1986, he announced in Vladivostok that the Soviet Union would pull six regiments of its army from Afghanistan, was negotiating with Mongolia on troop
withdrawals, and acknowledged that Cambodia was an issue between China and Vietnam. In response, Deng talked about Sino-Soviet relations when American reporter Mike Wallace interviewed him on September 2, 1986. Deng emphasized that the key to improving Sino-Soviet relations depended on the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia (Qian 2005:13-20). After reaching some mutual understanding, China and the Soviet Union’s delegates worked through twelve rounds of political negotiations on these three issues, particularly the Cambodia issue. In December 1988, Chinese foreign minister Qian Qichen visited the Soviet Union, the first time such a visit had been conducted since 1957. According to Qian’s memoir, the central issue was still Cambodia, and China wanted the Vietnamese troops to completely withdraw before the end of June 1989 (2005:21-28). Finally, in February 6 1989, both sides announced the joint Communiqué on Cambodia and the date of Gorbachev’s visit to China, the first of its kind in more than two decades.

Thus, one by one the Soviets fulfilled Deng’s three conditions, and only then did the two countries normalize their bilateral relations in 1989. Deng’s meeting with Gorbachev on May 16, 1989 symbolized the normalization of Sino-Soviet relations after three decades of confrontation. Realists can plausibly argue that all three conditions set by Deng were aimed at eliminating the Soviet Union’s geopolitical encirclement of China. But from the national identity perspective, it was significant that during Deng’s meeting with Gorbachev, Deng told the latter that the principal problem in the two countries’ previous relations was that the Soviets had not treated China as an equal. The joint communiqué published after the summit meeting formally proclaimed a non-aligned and non-confrontational relationship between China and the Soviet Union (Qian 2005:28-31). Also significant from the national identity perspective, the outcome of the reconciliation was not aimed at setting Sino-Soviet alliance relations back to the 1950s, but
motivated by cooperation and co-existence through non-conflictual and non-hegemonic mechanisms of dispute resolution.

**G-2: China and the United States**

Since China’s ascent to prominence in the global economy in the 2000s, and particularly after the global financial crisis of 2008, China’s has sustained and strengthened its ideational commitment to non-alignment and pluralism. It has chosen to neither join with nor balance against the U.S. in the global system. Rather, China has promoted a cross-national framework for cooperation and co-existence through non-conflictual, non-hegemonic and non-unilateral mechanisms of dispute resolution. This section will use China’s response to the U.S. G-2 proposal in 2009 to illustrate this identity pattern.

When Barack Obama became U.S. president in 2009, the new administration wanted bring Sino-U.S. relations to a higher level, particularly after the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. According to Jeffrey Bader, President Obama’s senior director for Asian affairs on the National Security Council, Obama’s China policy was “resolutely pragmatic and non-ideological…and giving Asia higher overall priority” (2012:5-6). On the rise of China, the Obama Administration’s approach was to have China become “a stabilizing and constructive force rather than a threat to peace and equilibrium” (7). According to Bader, Obama’s China strategy would rest on three pillars: (1) a welcoming approach to China’s emergence, influence, and legitimate expanded role; (2) a resolve to see that its rise is consistent with international norms and law; (3) an endeavor to shape the Asia-Pacific environment to ensure that China’s rise is stabilizing rather than disruptive (2012:7).
In this context, some U.S. scholars and former policy makers began to support a call to form a Group of Two (G-2) between the United States and China to tackle global challenges. Henry Kissinger called for Sino-U.S. relations to be “taken to a new level,” while Zbigniew Brzezinski advocated the idea of developing a G-2. Neil Ferguson coined the term “Chimerica” to call for further cooperation between the two countries (2007:228). Although Taiwan was still a crucial issue in Sino-US relations, the tension was downplayed particularly from the U.S. side. In 2011, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton wrote an article titled “American’s Pacific Century” in the journal Foreign Policy, to describe America’s foreign policy in Asia. The words “Taiwan” did not appear even once (2011). It was mainly the U.S. government that downplayed the role of Taiwan in conducting its China policy. Both countries agreed that Sino-U.S. relations had become the most important and complicated bilateral relations in the world. At the end of President Bush’s eight-year presidency, Washington already called China a “stakeholder.”

Nevertheless, the Chinese side was not passionate about the G-2 framework. At the Sino-European Union summit in Prague, in May 2009, Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao rejected the concept of a G-2 binding China and the United States, saying, “It is totally ungrounded and wrong to talk about the dominance of two countries in international affairs.” During President Obama’s November 2009 trip to China, Wen Jiabao told Obama in person that China disagreed with the “G-2” idea, citing three reasons. First, China is still a developing country. As Wen put it, “China must always remain sober-minded about this.” Second, China pursues an independent foreign policy of peace and will not align with any country or blocks of countries. Third, global issues should be decided by all the nations of the world, rather than one or two countries.

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95 Zbigniew Brzezinski, “The Group of Two that could change the world,” January 13, 2009, the Financial Times.
However, he did believe that “Sino-U.S. cooperation can play a unique role in advancing the establishment of the new international political and economic order, as well as promoting world peace, stability, and prosperity.”

From the perspective of Chinese national identity, the Chinese leadership’s response was hardly a surprise. First, joining the G-2 would entail that China be a “co-hegemon” with the U.S., which was against China’s long-held foreign policy of anti-hegemonism associated with revolutionary internationalism. In fact, looking back at the three communiqués signed between China and the United States, which have long been held by China as the bedrock of Sino-U.S. relations since the rapprochement, the sentiments of “anti-hegemony” have been consistent in the documents. Undoubtedly, such wording was inserted at the insistence of the Chinese side. As early as the 1970s, the first joint communiqué between China and the U.S. took up the issue of hegemony, stating, “The Chinese side stated…All nations, big or small, should be equal…China will never be a superpower and it opposes hegemony and power politics of any kind.” The second joint communiqué, signed in 1979 when China and the U.S. formally established diplomatic relations, stated, “Neither side should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region or in any other region of the world and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony.” The last communiqué signed in 1982, specifically aiming at U.S. weapons sales to Taiwan, stated, “the two governments reaffirm the principles agreed on by the two sides in the Shanghai Communiqué and the Joint Communiqué on the

Establishment of Diplomatic Relations.” Clearly, at each major phase in the development of Sino-U.S. relations, the Chinese side has constantly brought up the term “anti-hegemony” along with the Taiwan issue.

Second, the post-Mao ideational pattern of promoting pluralism, specifically non-unilateral and consensus-based decision making in global politics, would prevent China from allying with the United States. This is because a G-2 structure would potentially result in China imposing its will on other countries against their wishes. The Chinese objection to such world leadership has been consistent in the past. In addition to the G-2 proposal, China has refused to join the G-7—the group of the seven most industrialized countries. Instead, China has criticized the G7 as a “rich countries’ club” that alienates the rest of the world, which again, shows China’s preference for “non-alignment” and pluralism. All this speaks to a contemporary Chinese national identity that emphasizes national autonomy and avoidance of “co-management” or domination in global affairs.

Lastly, in the post-Mao era, the ideas of anti-hegemonism and non-alignment have gradually been transferred to an identity pattern of promoting pluralism in world affairs. In the G-2 case, alliance with the United States at the top would bring both gains and challenges to China. However, the Chinese leadership chose to stick with its commitment to pluralism and anti-hegemonism, and to maintain its own national autonomy, rather than embracing what the United States endorsed and promised based on a liberal world order. There would have been obvious benefits to “co-manage” world affairs with the U.S. after the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, but the Chinese side was neither interested nor tempted. Rather, China repeatedly

100 “Joint Communiqué of the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China.” August 17, 1982.
reiterated the themes of “never become a hegemon” and “always be a third world country,” that have been embedded into the contemporary Chinese national identity since the early days of the PRC.

An alternative explanation, according to Yan Xuetong, a leading realist IR scholar in China, is that the Chinese government has adhered to the principle of not challenging America’s global leadership during the financial crisis (2010:266). In Yan’s analysis, the Chinese government has followed Deng Xiaoping’s policy of “keeping a low profile” in global politics, set forth by Deng in 1990 (2010). At the same time, Yan argues that neither China nor the U.S. were ready to share world leadership within one another (2010:278). He calls the contemporary Sino-U.S. relations a “superficial friendship” (2010). Similarly, David Shambaugh, a leading scholar on Sino-U.S. security policy, calls today’s China a “the partial power” that lacks the material capacity to challenge U.S. supremacy (2013). Needless to say, it remains to be seen if China will actually challenge U.S. leadership once it has the material capacity. My argument, based on the national identity framework, suggests otherwise.

**Sino-Russian Partnership in the Post-Cold War era**

Sino-Russia relations after the disintegration of the Soviet Union provide another illustration of China’s peaceful internationalism in the post-Mao era. One of the notable developments in Sino-Russian relations after the disintegration of the Soviet Union was the formation of a Sino-Russian strategic partnership. It symbolizes a new type of bilateral relationship for China after the end of the Cold War.

From the Chinese perspective, a “strategic partnership” connotes mutual respect and mutual interests in conducting foreign relations with another state. It also signals, for some scholars, the partner’s political willingness to recognize China’s legitimate rise, to manage areas
of disagreement in order to steadily improve the overall bilateral relationship, and possibly to enhance coordination in promoting their common preferences in the international arena (Deng 2008:129). China implemented such an idea of partnership with Russia in 1996, and formed similar strategic partnerships with the European Union in 2003 and with India in 2005.

The new strategic partnership between China and Russia was different from a traditional balance of power dynamic, I argue. For the Chinese part at least, it was based on China’s ideational beliefs in the post-Mao era and in a changing and dynamic world. First, China had no intention to upgrade its warming relations with Russia to the status of an alliance as in the 1950s. In the latest example, when Russia was increasingly isolated by the Western powers after annexing Crimea in March 2014, Russian President Putin talked about Sino-Russian relations by praising China’s neutral stance but still conceded, “Russia and China are natural neighbors and therefore natural partners, but a system of military blocs has outlived itself.” 101 The Chinese side immediately clarified by stating, “The essence of the China-Russia relationship is non-aligned and non-conflictual, no moves against any third country.” 102

Second, despite increasing hostilities between Putin’s Russia and the U.S. government since the 2000s, they have not affected Sino-U.S. relations. The latter have in fact reached their peak since the two countries re-established diplomatic relations in 1979. China has been able to maintain warm relationships with both the United States and Russia, a feat that would have been unimaginable during the Mao era when China was alone, standing up against the two superpowers simultaneously. Liberal scholars would have predicted that a democratic and

transformed Russia would isolate the nominally communist China in the foreign policy arena. However, China’s relations with Russia did not suffer setbacks after the Cold War. At the same time, in contrast to what realists would have predicted, China has not taken advantage of Russia’s deteriorating relations with the U.S. to ally with Russia in order to balance against the United States. In just a few years since normalization of their relations, from 1992-1996, the Sino-Russian relationship dramatically improved, from “friendship” to a “constructive partnership” and eventually to a “strategic partnership” (Deng 2008:130-131). Officially, China claims that the China-Russia partnership is a model for peaceful coexistence and neighborly friendship between major countries.

Third, China has managed relations with Russia with a focus on economic cooperation and stability in the region, rather than military alignment. Nor has China tried to take advantage of Russia’s decline. Under the initiative of both countries, a new international organization was formed, first named the Shanghai Five Leadership Conference and later changed to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Although the two governments have envisioned different roles for the organization, with China more interested in anti-terrorism and Russia more interested in security functions, the SCO has evolved into an international organization that plays an important role in maintaining peace and stability in central Asia.103

From a realist perspective, China’s stable relationship with Russia after the end of the Cold War was largely due to Russia’s changing perception of its status in the international system. Russia was a descending power and China an ascendant power, as Russia was left with less than half of its GDP compared to the Soviet Union. It was Russian president Yeltsin who proposed to Chinese president Jiang Zemin the idea of forming a partnership in 1994 and 1996

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103 For a detailed discussion on SCO, see Marketos 2009; Bailes 2007.
(Qian 2005:240). Russia during the 1990s was a country that had been weakened, humiliated, and disenchanted with the West, and it was longing to restore its great power status (Deng 2008:141). The expansion of NATO into East Europe and the 1999 NATO war against Serbia unnerved the Russians as well as hurt its core interests. Despite Putin’s support of the U.S.’s “war on terror” after 9/11, U.S. support for the “color revolutions” in Georgia and Ukraine left Russia feeling threatened. Based on these sentiments, the Sino-Russian partnership seemed to be natural. As a country often chastised by the West, with its emergence characterized as a potential threat, it would seem that China found a willing partner in Russia.

However, from the national identity perspective, China came to embrace a partnership with Russia only after progress had been made on border disputes. The two countries had been negotiating border agreements since the early 1990s, and agreements resolving border issues had been reached in 1991, 1992 and 1997. Russia relinquished parts of the disputed territories under its control, in addition to agreeing on evenly splitting the more important Black Bear Island. In 2004, China and Russia solved their last border disputes through a bilateral treaty prior to the final agreement. In fact, for Russia, the final deal assuaged its fear of future Chinese irredentist claims (Deng 2008:135). For the Chinese side, both the PRC government and the mainstream media no longer talk about “lost territories” as they did during the 1970s. These are indications that China has left behind its victimhood mentality involving Russia.

In short, China has not exploited Russia’s weakness to reattribute payback for what it suffered in its relationship with the Soviet Union. For China, Russia no longer poses a threat to its national security as the Soviet Union did, nor does it provoke China by reminding the Chinese of their past victimhood under both the Czars and the Soviets. On the other hand, China has showed no interest in aligning with Russia to balance the U.S. On the contrary, China has
maintained positive relations with both Russia and the U.S while the Russian-U.S. relationship has suffered significant setbacks as realism would predict. In all, both Sino-U.S. relations and the Sino-Russia partnership remain within the scope of China’s peaceful internationalism.

Conclusion

In the post-Mao era, China has been able to improve relations with both superpowers. This chapter has illustrated how a mix of material interests and identity patterns have affected Sino-U.S. relations through four major cases: the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis; the 1999 Belgrade embassy bombing; the 2001 air collusion; and the G-2 proposal. In addition, I have illustrated how a mix of those material interests and ideational patterns affected Sino-Soviet relations using two major cases, the Sino-Soviet reconciliation during the 1980s, and the Sino-Russian strategic partnership since the 1990s. This chapter has argued that in the post-Mao era, besides rational strategic considerations, ideational patterns associated with a Confucian identity, a victimhood identity and an identity of revolutionary internationalism have persisted in Chinese foreign policy. Together, these identity patterns have merged into a new type of national identity—the phoenix rising identity. In sum, both rationalist approaches and ideational approaches provide complementary rather than competing answers to understand China’s relations with the U.S. and the Soviet Union in the post-Mao era.

In the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, the Chinese perception of a deliberate provocation from the U.S. to challenge its “one China policy” resulted in a serious stand-off between the two countries. From a rationalist perspective, deterrence and signaling theories provide ways to understand Chinese foreign policy in this context. In this case, mutual deterrence involved U.S. deterrence of China’s use of force for unification and Chinese deterrence of U.S. support for Taiwanese independence. During the crisis, missile launches by the Chinese government sent
signals to the U.S. that it would pay a price for revoking its “one China policy.” The aircraft
carrier deployment by the Clinton administration coupled with the U.S. commitment to defend
Taiwan sent signals to the Chinese government that a war with Taiwan would mean a war with
the U.S. Beijing indicated that it was willing to bear the high cost of a Sino-U.S. war. The crisis
only abated after the U.S showed its resolve and China got reconfirmation that the U.S. would
maintain its “one China policy.” It is clear that Taiwanese President Lee’s visit to the United
States fell far short of a declaration of independence. However, one cannot understand China’s
overreaction toward the U.S., which sparked the most serious militarized crisis between two
countries, without understanding its hypersensitivity over issues of sovereignty due to its past
victimhood.

Similarly, to account for the willingness of Chinese and American leaders to confront
each other over the Sino-American apology diplomacy in 1999 and in 2001, rationalist
approaches highlight the instrumental dimension of China’s foreign policy. In both the 1999
Belgrade bombing case and the 2001 EP-3 collision case, a rationalist analysis of Chinese
foreign policy would be that China was attempting to restore its power position in East Asia by
demanding repeated apologies from the U.S. Furthermore, such a policy might restore China’s
status in the eyes of the Chinese people and tame nationalist outrage However, “apology” is
mostly a symbolic gesture that does not indicate much material interests for rationalist. In
retrospect, if it had been Serbia that bombed the Chinese embassy or an airplane collision with
the Philippines, China would not have behaved in the ways that it did with the U.S. government.
Thus, both cases also demonstrated that China was hypersensitive over the perceived humiliation
associated with the “century of humiliation.” From the national identity perspective, it was this
Both realist concerns and Chinese national identity contribute to an understanding of the Sino-Soviet reconciliation and the later Sino-Russian strategic partnership. Rationalists can help explain the strategic cause of Sino-Soviet reconciliation, but they falls in short on the timetable set for this reconciliation, which may be accounted by the Chinese national identity. In the early 1980s, facing escalated Cold War competition with the U.S. in Europe, the Soviet Union was practically operating on two fronts against both China and the U.S. Despite China’s economic and military backwardness, the Soviets still deployed sizable numbers of troops on the Sino-Soviet border. Thus, it would be of mutual interest to both the Chinese and the Soviets to improve relations. But the fact that the Sino-Soviet ten-year reconciliation talks demonstrated that success would not have been possible without fulfilling China’s demands, which were a mix of China’s national security concerns and ideational tenets—China’s anti-hegemonic principles and policies associated with revolutionary internationalism.

From the perspective of realism, a post-Cold War Russia would need to accommodate the rise of China and ensure Sino-Russian border stability in order to face the more serious challenge from NATO. In the post-Cold War era, Russia was faced with a trade-off between securing against NATO’s eastward expansion, which threatened Russia’s western front, and its vulnerability to Chinese economic and military power in the Far East. Russia chose to cooperate with China and, by doing so, Russia was able to export arms to China to finance its defense industry and export energy to acquire sources of state income. From the perspective of Chinese national identity, China needs to manage peaceful relations with both Russia and the U.S., focusing on economic cooperation and stability in the region, rather than balancing or making
alliances. This has contributed to China’s positive relations with both the U.S. and Russia since the end of the Cold War.
Part III: China’s Relations with Its Neighbors

In Part III, I use cases from China’s vicinities, i.e. China’s relations with Japan, India, North Korea and Vietnam—to illustrate how China’s identity patterns play out in its foreign policy. In contrast to its relations with superpowers, where China was in the weaker position and subject to subjugation, it possesses dominant force or other advantages in its relations with secondary and small states. I will demonstrate whether China’s foreign policy is influenced by national identity or the pursuit of material interests. In both the Mao era and the post-Mao era, China’s national identity influenced bilateral relations with secondary and small states, and its contemporary foreign policy is also a result of its phoenix rising identity in seeking peaceful internationalism.
Chapter 5 The Mao era: Revolutionary Internationalism

Using key turning points and crises, this chapter examines whether China followed patterns of Chinese national identity in bilateral relations and crises involving neighboring states during the Mao era. Among these states, China had border disputes involving India, Japan and Vietnam. Why did China choose hardline policies toward India and Vietnam during the 1960s and late 1970s, but a more concessionary posture toward Japan during the same period?

The patterns, I will show, are clear. During the Mao era, to solve territorial disputes, China would sometimes use force or assist revolutions in neighboring states that went beyond its own material interests. By providing support during the Vietnam War and a brief border war with India, China did not gain material advantages, but rather demonstrated its foreign policy beliefs associated with both its victimhood identity and identity of revolutionary internationalism. Largely because of these two national identities, China maintained close ties with Vietnam, while engaging India in military conflict. On the other hand, China was inclined to build a diplomatic relationship with Japan to reiterate its stance of anti-hegemony in the region while launching an attack on Vietnam after perceiving it as a regional hegemon. I choose to include the case of China’s 1979 border war with Vietnam in the Mao era, not only because it was the last time China used force against a country until today, but also because the cause of the war has strong connections with China’s pre-war Vietnam foreign policy. Thus, I consider this as a border case between the Mao era and the post-Mao era.

China and India: From Mutual Sympathy to Enmity

Sino-Indian relations in the 1950s symbolized both Chinese foreign policy toward its neighbors and toward a fellow third world country. In the early 1950s, shortly after India’s
independence and China’s revolution, the assertiveness of both countries about national autonomy and independence reflected their respective historical sufferings and brought Mao and Nehru together to form a companionship despite different ideologies and political systems. The two countries enjoyed a peaceful and stable relationship until the early 1960s, followed by a border war in which India was defeated. Similar sentiments of “never repeat historical humiliation” were in large part responsible for unyielding territorial disputes that brought end to the companionship. Since then, during the 1960s and 1970s, China has been dedicated to resolving the border disputes with India using peaceful negotiations, and has called on the Indian side to give up the precondition for settlement that claims the disputed territories were “occupied” by the Chinese. Why did the Sino-Indian relations evolve the way it did during the Mao era, i.e. from mutual sympathy to enmity? National identity, again, played a crucial role.

First, the foundation of Sino-Indian relations was based in large part on a shared experience of historical suffering from imperialism and colonialism. China and India had maintained a tradition of friendly cultural relations for centuries. For instance, Chinese Buddhism was brought by Xuan Zhuang from India to China in the seventh century; Admiral Zheng He’s visit in 1405 opened the Maritime Silk Road with India. From the early nineteenth century to the middle of the twentieth century, the two countries - two of the oldest civilizations in human history - shared similar humiliating experiences under imperialism and colonialism. India was part of the British Empire for more than two hundred years and won its independence only in 1947. China, on the other hand, was a semi-colony, a victim of both European and Japanese imperialism, and became an independent state in 1949. These shared experiences created mutual sympathy between the two countries associated with victimhood identity. As the famous Indian poet Rabindranath Tagore wrote in 1942, “the fraternal unity between China and
India is the foundation stone of Asia...In Asia, we must be united...through the sincere spirit of mutual sympathy” (Huang 2008:397).

Similarly, post-colonial nationalism, rooted in the culture, history and identity of each country, gave an alternative to realist theories of balancing power. The colonial past of both countries was significant in determining the nature of post-colonial state relations. The colonial legacy, or victimhood under the colonial and imperial powers, made both countries less likely to seek the position of a new imperial power or to balance against each other in the absence of vital conflicts. As David Malone, a former Canadian ambassador to India, argues, both ideational realm and the legacy of anti-colonial nationalism profoundly shaped India’s post independence foreign policy. After India won its independence in 1947 from the British Empire and China was victorious over Japanese imperialism, the mutual sympathy and support of the Chinese and Indians during WWII laid a solid foundation for friendly relations after China’s independence in 1949(2011).

Moreover, the leadership of China and India had close engagements because of this mutual sympathy even before their countries’ independence. Nehru and Mao, as the founding fathers of the two countries, believed that both China and India shared these experiences vis-a-vis western colonial powers, and the priority of the two countries should be self-reliance and independence—economically and politically—from the West. In 1939, Mao Zedong spoke of India’s struggle against British imperialism and emphasized the need to use revolutionary violence to fight for the independence of Indian people (Huang 2008:399-400). In 1942, Mao criticized Britain for using violence against India’s non-violent independence movements and called on Britain to give independence and freedom to India (Huang 2008:401). India was the second country, after the Soviet Union, to recognize the PRC and in April 1950, India became
the first non-socialist state to establish diplomatic relations with China. Although Nehru was anti-communist by principle, he believed that the founding of the PRC was a victory of nationalism and a demonstration of Asia’s emerging emancipation rather than a triumph of communism (Holslag 2010:49-50). He repeatedly asserted that both countries had a shared destiny and close friendship (Holslag 2010:50). The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, which later became the PRC’s official foreign policy principle, were first used in Sino-Indian negotiations and were written into the preface of the *Sino-Indian Agreement on Tibetan Trade and Intercourse* signed in 1954. In October 1954, Indian Prime Minister Nehru paid a visit to China, and was warmly welcomed by more than 500,000 people along the route from the airport to the guesthouse (Huang 2008:403). During Nehru’s meeting with Mao, Mao said to him:

“China was bullied by Western imperialist countries for more than 100 years. And your country was bullied even longer—for more than 300 years. Therefore we Orientals have the desire for unity and for defending ourselves. Despite the differences in our ideologies and our social systems we have a major common point, i.e., we have both had to cope with imperialists” (Huang 2008:403).

Nehru responded by saying:

“Both China and India are large countries, facing similar problems and have resolutely embarked on the road of progress. The deeper the understanding between our two countries becomes the better will be the guarantee not only for the welfare of Asia, but also for the welfare of the whole world. The tense situation in the world today requires our joint efforts for peace.” (403)

The two countries also shared similar approaches and supported each other during the Bandung Conference in 1956. Right after Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai finished his speech proposing that Asian and African countries seek common ground while reserving differences, Nehru went on to the platform and said, “The speech made by the Chinese premier today should be taken most seriously. The remarks made by the Chinese premier are authoritative” (Huang 2008:404-405).

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104 The agreement was also called Sino-Indian Trade Agreement over Tibetan Border.
As the discussion above indicates, Sino-Indian relations in their early years were largely influenced by their colonial past and by their common victimhood under Western imperialism. Western scholars largely consent to such an argument. As both Mansingh (1994) and Holslag (2010) observe, during the interactions between Mao and Nehru in the early days of the Sino-Indian relationship, Mao’s theory of “intermediate zones” and his “united front” strategy, Nehru’s nonalignment policy, anti-colonialism and emphasis on Asian solidarity, led both countries to have favorable attitudes toward each other in the 1950s. Because of the similar history and culture of the two nations, the role of such victimhood identity was crucial in terms of shaping the public opinions and foreign policies toward each other. As constructivist scholars argue, states act differently toward enemies than they do toward friends because enemies are threatening and friends are not (Wendt 1992).

Second, identity patterns of hypersensitivity over sovereignty associated with victimhood identity determined that neither country would yield on disputed territories deemed too crucial for compromise after winning independence. Holslag observes that both countries considered national unity vital via the promise of internal stability and the capacity to fend off new attempts of external intrusion (2010:48). Garver argues that India overestimated the initial friendship with China, to the point that Nehru felt he could ignore the territorial trade-offs that might have resolved border problems (2001). The 1962 Sino-Indian border war, which India appeared to lose but from which China did not benefit, cast a long shadow over the two countries’ history. The war was caused in large part by both sides’ strong interests in maintaining sovereignty and territorial integrity. The war also resulted from legacies of foreign conquest by the West over the past century.
Historically, there had been no clear borderline between India and Tibet, the actual line of control served as a *de facto* borderline between the two countries. The border between India and Tibet was drawn by the British and formalized with the Simla Accord in 1914. The Chinese governor to Tibet participated in the Simla convention but did not consent to the outcome, the McMahon Line. Sir Henry McMahon was the foreign secretary of the British-run Government of India and the chief negotiator of the convention at Simla. The new borderline incorporated what were historically territories of Tibet into the British Indian Empire. After the establishment of the PRC, China viewed the McMahon Line as a symbol of British plans to loosen China’s control over Tibet and considered the Simla Accord part of the imperial “unequal treaties.” In the west, China disputed India over control of the Aksai Chin plain, historically known as “south Tibet.” In the east, two sides disputed along the McMahon Line, which divided India and Tibet.

However, taking into consideration China’s relations with Indian relations as a whole, Prime Minister Zhou Enlai under the instruction of Mao Zedong, offered a deal to India after the 1959 Tibetan rebellion. China would trade claims in the Eastern part of the line, that is, it would recognize the McMahon Line as a basis for negotiations, in return for recognition of Chinese claims to Aksai Chin, which India held in the west. Nehru rejected the Chinese proposal, due to domestic pressure from its democratically elected parliament to never give up any territory (Martin 2010:89). Since 1961, India adopted the “Forward Policy,” to move its outposts forward and gradually crossed the actual borderlines of China. Initially, Chinese troops would at times withdraw several kilometers to avoid a crisis, giving India the perception that China would not resist a forward movement (Garver 2006:106). Eventually, in October 1962, Chinese forces took offensive military actions toward India, which came to be known as the 1962 Sino-Indian border war. After a massive assault that reached the vicinity of the traditional imperial demarcation line,
on November 21 of 1962, China announced a unilateral cease-fire and its army returned to the staring point well behind the borderline China was claiming. The border issue has remained unsettled today.

The fundamental source of conflict between the two countries was that both had national identities of “never repeating the humiliations,” developed out of their respective history of victimhood. Thus neither side would or could compromise on issues of sovereignty or territorial integrity. The two countries had earlier signed a treaty on Tibet, with India recognizing China’s suzerainty over Tibet. But given the historical ties and complex relations between India and Tibet, in the late 1950s the political voices against India’s recognition of China’s suzerainty and in favor of Tibetan independence certainly gained ground in Indian politics (Kripalani 1959:46-60). There were members of the Indian parliament who called China an “aggressor,” and claimed Tibet to be “a free nation” (46-60). Particularly after the Tibetan aristocratic rebellion in March 1959 and the subsequent flight of the Dalai Lama to India, tensions between two countries increased. Chinese suspicion of Indian involvement in the Tibetan unrest also contributed to a hardening of the PRC’s position on border issues (Hoffmann 2006). Thus, Sino-Indian border disputes along the Tibetan border began to surface following the increased tensions between the two countries in the late 1950s, ultimately leading to a border war in 1962.

Third, China’s decision to use force toward India on border issues can be seen as more of political maneuvering than an attempt to gain material interests or strategic benefits. It was India that first launched the “Forward Policy,” which ordered Indian troops to patrol as far as possible, frequently crossing into the Chinese side. Kissinger argues that after repeatedly exercising forbearance, China was forced to adopt a policy of “counter attack in self-defense” (Kissinger 2011:404-405). Other scholars argue that the war was “a product of mistakes, misconceptions,
and misjudgments on both the Indian and Chinese sides” (Hoffman 2004:45). Others argue that China can be blamed for resorting to arms, while India should be blamed for refusing to recognize that the Chinese possessed genuine and legitimate territorial counterclaims and for refusing to search for a solution well beyond the aggressive “Forward Policy” (Whiting 1975; Burles and Shulsky 2000).

From the perspective of Chinese national identity, China’s decision to push Indian troops back was consistent with its non-compromising stand over issues of national sovereignty and territorial integrity. After winning independence from imperialist and colonialist control, neither side was willing to sacrifice territory in exchange for peace and security along the border. As Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai had earlier conceded in discussing the Sino-Indian border dispute, “In settling the boundary question between the two countries, the national sentiments of the two peoples towards the Himalayas and Karakoram should be taken into consideration.” This was an allusion to territories historically and culturally that were part of the Tibetan Kingdom but incorporated into India under the British empire.

On the other hand, China avoided becoming a conqueror and quickly withdrew from India without seizing any territories. The surprising action may be explained by a variety of factors - the lack of international support for China’s action, the PRC’s isolation as a new socialist regime, China’s concerns about international reputation, the Soviet Union’s shift of support to India and finally, the difficulty of logistic supply over the Himalayan plateau (Garver 2001). However, it is equally plausible to add one ideational motive. That is, China did not want to act like an expansionist, imperial power. After all, China was already isolated, its reputation was already damaged, and its relations with the Soviet Union were already becoming tense. As

for the difficulty of logistic supply, the same problem did not deter China from taking over Tibet, which was considered as a constitutive part of its Qing dynasty.

If China followed a realist understanding of international relations, it could have conquered the disputed territory, rather than winning the war and then making a total retreat. Moreover, it was not the first time China would make a total retreat from a foreign war it did not lose: China did not stay behind in North Korea after the Korean War or in Vietnam, as we will see, after the Sino-Vietnam war in 1979.

**China and Japan: Anti-hegemonism Trumping Victimhood Identity**

During the Mao era, Japan for the Chinese was not only a former imperialist power, but also a victim of World War II itself and the U.S. occupation in the post-war era. This could at least partly be attributed to Maoist China’s view of the world from the point of revolutionary internationalism and anti-hegemonism. After the two countries established diplomatic relations, China considered Japan a potential partner in anti-hegemonism. This assessment was based on Mao’s analysis of the “three worlds” whereby a second-world country like Japan was to be won over in a united front against the first world. My emphasis here, on the identity reasons for China’s benign perception of Japan during the Mao era, is based on several factors

First, Chinese leadership perceived Japan as a victim of the war, and China expressed sympathy toward it while downplaying the role of Japan as a former invader. Historically, Sino-Japanese relations were not always sour. Japan had been a close neighbor of China, receiving considerable cultural influence from China for over 2,000 years. The Confucian metaphors, teacher-student and older brother-younger brother, were apt descriptions of Sino-Japanese relations (Gries 2004:39). On the other hand, Japan was an aggressive power in modern history
that brought catastrophic warfare and suffering to China as well as many Asian countries from the first Sino-Japanese War (1894-95) to World War II (1938-45). Between the wars, Japan invaded China with a “three all policy” – burn all, plunder all and kill all; seized territories; and caused over 30 million deaths and an inestimable loss of properties. Since the end of WWII, however Japan had been a peaceful country. The American imposed constitution restrained Japan’s military development and actions. Japan’s military expenditures remained below one percent of GDP during the post-WWII period as constitutionally dictated. Japan had no involvement in an international conflict.

Because Japan was considered a country under U.S. occupation, the PRC’s attitude toward Japan was positive and even sympathetic towards its people. For China at that time, Japan was not only under foreign occupation but also the only country to have suffered a nuclear strike in human history. The latter factor made it easier for Chinese leaders to overcome the bitter feeling over the two countries’ traumatic past. Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai told Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka during his first visit to China, both the people of both countries were traumatized during the war, and the few militarists must be strictly separated from the vast majority of the Japanese people (He 2007:5). The 1954 Chinese Central Government Annual Report stated, “The Chinese people deeply sympathize with the hardship the Japanese people are suffering under the U.S. occupation…we hope Japan can get rid of foreign control and its own militarism, and become an independent, democratic and peaceful nation. Building diplomatic and economic relation between China and Japan is the wish of both people and would benefit the Far East and the entire Asia.”

Both the 1954 and the 1959’s CGAR reiterated this attitude toward Sino-Japanese relations.
China’s empathy towards Japan was not just sentimental but backed by action. In 1960, during the meeting between Mao Zedong and a Japanese literary delegation, Mao told them that both Chinese and Japanese people were the victims of aggressive wars, and that was the reason the Chinese government had in principle given up the right to war reparations (Huang 2008:309). Upon normalization of their relations in the 1970s, China indeed waived all claims against Japan on war reparations under the condition that Japan ceased all official relations with Taiwan.

However, empathy did not mean that China would give in on the fundamental issues, i.e. sovereignty and territorial integrity. Because Japan colonized Taiwan for decades before and during the WWII, the major obstacle for developing normal Sino-Japanese relations rested on the Taiwan question. Before normalizing relations with China, Japan recognized the KMT as the legitimate government of China. In 1971, Chinese Prime Minster Zhou Enlai set up three principles for China and Japan to normalize diplomatic relations: 1) to recognize the government of the People’s Republic of China as the sole legitimate government of China, 2) that Taiwan was an inalienable part of Chinese territory and 3) that the Japan-Taiwan Treaty must be abolished (Huang 2008:310-311).

Second, upon the establishment of diplomatic relations with Japan, the Chinese government felt that a peace treaty with Japan could secure the two countries’ future peaceful relations as well as acting against hegemonism in world politics. However, China’s insistence on the inclusion of anti-hegemonism in the treaty became a key bottleneck. This insistence may be explained by China’s own security concerns involving both superpowers, but may also be understood as motivated by Maoist China’s revolutionary internationalism, since it was this ideational factor that contributed to China’s estrangement from the two superpowers in the first place.
The Chinese government always intended to sign a peace treaty with Japan. The Chinese leadership, in dealing with Sino-Japanese relationship, had designed the policy of “establishing diplomatic relations first, and signing a treaty later” in the 1950s (Jin 2008:3). After China and Japan established diplomatic relations in 1972, China felt it was necessary to sign a treaty with Japan to secure peace between the two countries because of their bitter historical memories. However, the treaty between China and Japan would undergo tough negotiations over the next six years because of the article on “anti-hegemony” (Jin 2008:3-4). For Japan, a Sino-Japanese treaty should not refer to a third country—either the U.S. or the Soviet Union. Thus, the negotiations over the term “anti-hegemony” lasted for a few years, and Japan agreed to conclude the treaty only when China agreed to add an article that read, “the present Treaty shall not affect the position of either contracting party regarding its relations with third countries” (Jin 5).

After signing the treaty, during the meeting between Deng Xiaoping and Japanese Prime Minister Fukuda, Deng told him that China and Japan had more than 2,000 years of friendly exchanges, that the two countries should look forward without forgetting the past despite different social systems, and that the opposition to hegemony was in the common interests of China and Japan (Huang 2008:334-335).

The Chinese insistence on “anti-hegemonism” served as both a security and identity driven reason to reach the Sino-Japanese peace treaty. However, the treaty was not based on the public support of the Chinese people. At that time, anti-hegemony, an important part of revolutionary internationalism, trumped the feeling of victimhood widely shared among the Chinese people especially in regard to Japanese atrocities during WWII. When Soviet hegemony ceased to exist after the end of the Cold War and Sino-U.S. relations improved significantly in
the post-Cold War era, victimhood sentiments have dominated China’s attitudes toward Japan and the two countries have been at odds on a series of dispute.

An alternative explanation for the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty negotiations was the realist concern that the two countries faced a common threat from the Soviet Union. For China in the 1970s, despite improved relations with the United States, the expansion of the Soviet Union remained a direct threat. In addition, China worried about Japan’s rapid military build-up. During Henry Kissinger’s first trip to China in July 1971, he had to assure Beijing that Japanese rearmament was in response to the Soviet threat and was not intended to threaten China (He 2011:1180). Thus, a treaty with Japan could keep at bay the Soviet military threat as Japan was threatened by heavy Soviet military deployment in the Far East as well as by their territorial disputes. Hence, a peace treaty seemed to be mutually beneficial to China and Japan, insofar as it deterred Soviet power. However, Japan would not offend the Soviet Union, and it would prefer to stay under the security umbrella of the United States. Some scholars argue that the fact that China gave up its demand for war reparations was due to China’s eagerness to bring Japan into an anti-Soviet club (Wan 2006; Howe 1996; Taylor 1985).

However, there is reason to question this explanation. First, Japan was under the U.S. security umbrella, and would not find much interest in forming a peace treaty with China to protect its security. Second, the peace treaty itself had no article about a military alliance, but represented more of an expression of solidarity from both nations. Moreover, the fact that the peace treaty itself took six years to negotiate demonstrated that neither side worried about immediate threats from the Soviet Union. Huang Hua, the Chinese foreign minister, called this treaty “the first real and equal peace treaty between two countries in modern history,” (Jin 2008:5), because to develop good-neighborly and friendly relations, both sides pledged to not
seek hegemony but would oppose the efforts of any other country or group to establish hegemony (Huang 2008: 329-330). In short, the Chinese government’s insistence on the anti-hegemony clause had at least as much to do with security concerns as with its revolutionary identity. Nor surprisingly, in the post-Mao era, when revolutionary internationalism waned, China’s perception toward Japan changed because victimhood identity came to prevail.

**China and Vietnam: From Brotherhood to Enmity**

There were both identity-based and strategic reasons for China to support the Vietnamese guerrilla war from the 1950s onward. From a realist perspective, Vietnam’s anti-colonial war in the 1950s did not affect China’s security. Nor was China yet part of the Sino-Soviet rivalry over third world countries. From the perspective of Chinese national identity, support for Vietnam was based on a mix of moral obligations of the tribute system under Confucianism and international duty under Mao’s revolutionary internationalism. China’s support symbolized both Mao’s ambition to transform China into a country that would stand up for universal equality and justice, and China’s assertiveness about extended national autonomy and independence. These again reflected revolutionary internationalism.

During the Mao era, from 1950 to 1978, China sympathized with Vietnam’s struggle against Western colonists and imperialist powers, and supported Vietnam’s early independence war and later its war with the United States. Such sentiments reflected China’s own struggle against foreign conquerors in China’s national independence movement. In this period, the two countries were bound by ancient linkages under the influence of the Chinese tribute system, similar sufferings under foreign invaders and struggles to restore sovereignty, and a socialist revolutionary brotherhood. These factors all worked together to motivate China to devote material and moral support to North Vietnam during the Mao era.
First, given the long hierarchical relations between China and Vietnam under the Chinese tribute system, the PRC felt responsible to assist Vietnam in fighting for autonomy and independence. Since the second century B.C., Vietnam was either under Chinese direct rule or a part of the tribute system. For the Vietnamese, there were two contradictory feelings toward China. On one hand, they embraced Chinese cultural influences; on the other hand, they were cautious of Chinese political and military domination (Zhai 2000). Between 2 B.C. and A.D. 1000, Vietnam was under the direct rule of Chinese emperors, simultaneously assimilating Chinese culture while being intensely nationalistic (Guan 1998). According to Kissinger, resistance to China helped produce a passionate pride in Vietnamese independence and a formidable military tradition (2011:342-343). Hence, after the CCP established the new regime in China, it felt sympathetic to the struggle of the Vietnamese people to achieve their own independence. As Prime Minister Zhou Enlai explained to Henry Kissinger during his secret trip to Beijing in 1971, Chinese policy in Indochina was based on a historical debt incurred by ancient dynasties (Kissinger 2011:344-345). More directly, Zhou told Kissinger, “The debt we owe them was incurred by our ancestors. We have since liberation no responsibility because we overthrew the old system. Yet we still feel a deep and full sympathy for them” (Kissinger 2011:250). Relatedly, Chen Jian argues that although Beijing never pursued political and economic control in Vietnam, and its huge military and material aid was seldom accompanied by formal conditions, China did want Vietnamese recognition of China’s morally superior position, which was a reflection of China’s traditional relations with its Asian neighbors (1995).

Second, the Vietnam War, as perceived by the Chinese, was not only a war for national autonomy and liberation, but also a war against U.S. imperialism and thus, supporting the war was consistent with China’s anti-hegemonism associated with revolutionary internationalism.
For instance, in 1963, during Mao’s deputy, Liu Shaoqi’s visit to Vietnam, he told Ho Chi Minh that if the war expanded as the result of their efforts to liberate the South, they “can definitely count on China as the strategic rear” (Jian 1995:359-60). China’s increasing support to Vietnam also suggested Beijing’s role in promoting national liberation movements in Asia. The Chinese leadership believed that China’s experience had established a model for the struggles of other oppressed people (Jian 1994). Hence, assistance to Vietnam was also considered an international duty for the PRC. As Mao pointed out, “In the era of imperialism, without international assistance, a nation’s revolution cannot prevail in any country. Even achieving success, regime consolidation will be impossible” (Zhang 2010:35). For Mao, China had a special role in the reshaping of a future revolutionary order in the world, which served the integrity of its self-image as a supporter of national liberation movements against imperialism and colonialism (Scott 2007:33). However, although top Chinese leaders publicly supported North Vietnam in fighting the U.S., Beijing and Hanoi reached a fundamental understanding that the Vietnamese would fight the war with their own forces, and that Chinese land forces would not be used in operations in Vietnam (Jian 1995:370-371).

The result was that China provided key material support without direct participation in the war. During the first two Vietnam War periods, China sent over 100,000 noncombat military personnel to support North Vietnamese infrastructure and logistics along with weapons and food, and provided Hanoi with $20 billion in assistance, more than any other country (Zhang 2010:855). Similarly, during the 1956-63 period, China’s military aid to Vietnam totaled 320 million yuan. China’s arms shipments to Vietnam included 270,000 guns, over 10,000 piece of artillery, 200 million bullets of various types, 2.02 million artillery shells, over 1,000 trucks, 15 planes, 28 naval vessels, and 1.18 million sets of military uniforms (Jian 1995:359). Many
scholars have pointed out that Beijing’s support played a role in deterring American expansion of the war to spread farther into the North and, without the support, the outcome of the war might have been different (Jian 1995; Garver 1981; Whiting 1975).

Finally, such a foreign policy guided by national identity also coincided with China’s strategic concerns, and can be considered an alternative explanation for China’s support for Vietnam during its war with the United States. China’s support for Vietnam effectively prevented its own strategic encirclement. Besides the Vietnam War, the United States also stationed troops in the Korean Peninsula and in Taiwan, posing direct threats to the PRC. In sum, from historical traditions to revolutionary ideology, and from a national security perspective, China had reasons to be a strong political and military supporter of Vietnam during the first two Vietnam wars in the 1960s and 1970s. As Mao himself emphasized repeatedly, China was facing an international environment full of crises, in which the reactionary force was preparing to wage a war against China. It was crucial for China to prepare politically and militarily for those challenges (Jian 1995:361-62). Thus, assistance to Vietnam could also be considered helpful for China. But given the fact that the PRC had been supportive to Vietnam’s independence movement and its wars against both France and the U.S in the next two decades, the assessment that only China’s strategic concerns mattered in this case was thus incomplete.

Beijing and Hanoi were “brotherly comrades” during the latter’s anti-colonial wars, in the words of Ho Chi Minh, but they became bitter adversaries a few years after the Vietnam War in the late 1970s. In fact they fought a bloody war after Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia. From a realist perspective, American withdrawal of troops from Vietnam had removed concerns about American encirclement. But continued Soviet support for Vietnam, along with Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia, increased fear of Soviet sphere of influence at China’s southern
gateway and Soviet encirclement. Not incidentally, Deng initiated the war on Vietnam only after he first visited the U.S. in 1979 and reached an understanding about Southeast Asia with President Carter.

From the perspective of China’s national identity, there were two reasons for China to use force against Vietnam in 1979. One was anti-hegemony. Following Vietnam’s 1979 invasion of Cambodia, China considered Vietnam a proxy of Soviet global hegemony, and used force to oppose its ambition to become a regional hegemon in Southeast Asia. The use of force against hegemonism was consistent with Mao’s revolutionary internationalism and had lasted into the early years of the post-Mao era. For China, its early support for but later opposition to Vietnam did not contradict its national identity, as Vietnam was first considered a victim of Western colonialism and imperialism, but later a victimizer toward weak neighboring countries by virtue of its hegemonic policies. Second, the use of force was a means of political maneuvering associated with Confucian pacifism. In this case, it served the function of “teaching Vietnam a lesson” in Deng’s words, and breaking up the Soviet-Vietnamese alliance. Thus, the Sino-Vietnamese border war in 1979 became the only military conflict involving the PRC in the post-Mao era. China’s enmity toward Vietnam, however, lasted until 1992, the year when Vietnam withdrew its troops from Cambodia. The ideational reasons for the Sino-Vietnam war of 1979 were at least as strong as the realist ones, I argue.

First, China’s brief border war with Vietnam in 1979 aimed at curbing Vietnam’s ambition of becoming a dominant power in Indochina, thus an effort against regional hegemony and a motive associated with revolutionary internationalism. The trigger for the Sino-Vietnamese border war was that China considered Vietnam a proxy of the Soviet Union conducting its expansionary policy in Southeast Asia. Deng Xiaoping told the visiting Khmer Rouge leader
Khieu Samphan, “When one superpower [the United States] was compelled to withdraw its forces from Indochina, the other superpower [the Soviet Union] seized the opportunity . . . to extend its evil tentacles to Southeast Asia . . . in an attempt to carry out expansion there” (Ross 1988:74). The “Cambodia factor” became the focal point of the Sino-Vietnamese conflict in the late 1970s and during the early 1980s, symbolizing China’s struggle against regional hegemony and of its effort to promote peace and pluralism in the region. China’s border war with Vietnam had multiple purposes. Saving Cambodia from Vietnamese occupations was one among them, if not the most important one.

From the late 1970s till the early 1990s, Cambodia, a tiny country in Southeast Asia, had a considerable impact on China’s diplomatic relations, particularly with Vietnam. Following the Vietnam War, North Vietnam signed a mutual defense pact with the Soviet Union, hoping it would be protected when it embarked on the annexation of Cambodia and Laos (Lee 2013). China objected strongly to Vietnam’s invasion and replacement of the Khmer Rouge, which had taken over Cambodia in 1978. It launched a war against Vietnam to “teach it a lesson,” in Deng’s words, and then to prevent Vietnam from creating an Indochinese Federation in Southeast Asia. If Vietnam were to succeed in its ambition to create an Indochinese Federation, it would be a bloc of 100 million in population and bring serious pressure to countries in this region, such as Thailand that sheltered many Cambodian refugees. At the time Vietnam had already achieved a dominant position in Laos by stationing troops there. Vietnam maintained around 150,000 troops in Cambodia after its invasion in 1978. Thus Deng Xiaoping justified China’s use of force toward Vietnam by saying, “Both China and Cambodia face the task of combating imperialism and hegemonies…We firmly believe that our two peoples will unite even more closely and march together toward new victories in the common struggle” (Kissinger 2011:347).
Different from the wars the PRC had engaged in previously, which were launched suddenly and ended as soon as possible, Deng Xiaoping tried to “publicize” the war with Vietnam in order to gain support from an array of states. Before China’s attack on Vietnam to punish its aggression toward Cambodia, Deng Xiaoping visited Burma, Nepal, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Japan twice, and the United States, to gain support, which further isolated Vietnam. In addition, Deng told leaders of those countries in advance to expect a response from China if Vietnam embarked on such an invasion. Deng told Lee Kuan Yew, the leader of Singapore, that China did not want a Soviet “Cuba” in Southeast Asia (Lee 2013). During Deng’s meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira, Deng said, “To uphold the long-term prospects of international peace and stability . . . [the Chinese people] will firmly fulfill our internationalist duties, and will not hesitate to bear the necessary sacrifices” (Kissinger 2011:367). During Deng’s 1979 trip to the United States, China even notified the United States that it was going to attack Vietnam in order to prevent Vietnam from moving forward to other countries besides Cambodia. During Deng’s meeting with President Carter, Deng told Carter about the potential attacks in Vietnam that China was not afraid of Soviet attacks, but it needed Washington’s “moral support” (Kissinger 2011:364). According to Brzezinski, Carter told Deng, “It would be difficult for the U.S. to encourage violence. We can give you intelligence briefings. We know of no recent movements of Soviet troops toward your borders” (Brzezinski 1983:410).

Despite the U.S. refusal to endorse China’s preemptive attack, Deng still insisted that China must teach Vietnam a lesson. However, the action would be very limited Deng Xiaoping declared that China had an obligation to act to prevent the situation from developing further (Kissinger 2011:364).
Eventually, the Chinese side went to war with Vietnam to demonstrate China’s determination to fight against both global and regional hegemons. The Chinese government officially stated that the war was a self-defense measure in response to Vietnam’s military provocations against China, which was in accordance with the provisions of the UN Charter. However, the border war with Vietnam in 1979 was costly from a military perspective. On February 17, 1979, China mobilized 200,000 to 400,000 soldiers to launch attacks on northern Vietnam from both Guangxi and Yunnan provinces. The war lasted twenty-nine days. The conventional wisdom among historians was that the war was costly to China as China failed to save Cambodia from the Vietnamese occupation and caused huge casualties on the Chinese side (Segal 1985:211-227; Chen 1987). However, Vietnam was forced to maintain a heavy military presence along the border, which indirectly reduced the risk to other Southeast Asian countries. In addition, the Soviet Union appeared to be the loser in the conflict as it failed to keep its promise of supporting Vietnam and the war was a blow to its ambitions in achieving global hegemony using Vietnam as a proxy. As Kissinger states, “The third Vietnam War may thus be counted as another example in which Chinese statesmen succeeded in achieving long-term, big-picture strategic objectives without the benefit of a military establishment comparable to that of their adversaries” (2011:375).

Second, China launched the war as a means to deter Vietnam from further provoking China and to break up the Soviet-Vietnamese alliance. Thus, the use of force served the function of political maneuvering, closely associated with the identity patterns of Confucian pacifism. Vietnam’s provocative posture toward China after the Vietnam War accounted for the further deterioration of Sino-Vietnamese relations. After the Vietnam War, China began to cut its loans and aid programs toward Vietnam, with which Vietnam was displeased. Two reasons were given...
for the Chinese termination of loans and aid: first, China needed to focus more on domestic
development, second, large amounts of earlier aid had not been utilized (Amer 1994:357-358).

Since then, Vietnam had a range of policies aimed at retribution to China. Vietnam began
to force the repatriation of ethnic Chinese from North Vietnam and encroached to Chinese
territory along the border. Ethnic Chinese became the bulk of the so-called boat people from
Vietnam. China was soon identified as Vietnam’s “principal enemy” at a meeting of the
Vietnamese Politburo in June 1978 (Kissinger 2011:347). In the same year, Vietnam and the
Soviet Union signed a bilateral treaty that included a military clause, and Vietnam’s invasion of
Cambodia followed just one month after the signing of the treaty, which deeply offended
Chinese leaders. In June 1978, Vietnam was admitted to the Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance (CMEA), a Soviet-led economic group, and a few months later, Vietnam and the
Soviet Union signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, which China perceived as a direct
threat.

Vietnam’s seemingly ungrateful attitude toward China in spite of generous Chinese aid
and support during its war agitated Chinese leaders. At one point, Deng Xiaoping called Vietnam
a wangbadan (which can be translated as “son of a bitch”) in front of a foreign leader (Lee
2000:595). During Deng Xiaoping’s visit to Thailand in November 1978, he warned that the
Soviet-Vietnamese treaty threatened not only China, but also the security and peace of Asia.107
Eventually, the policy of “teaching Vietnam a lesson” had gained support among Chinese elites.
According to Chen Jian, for the Vietnamese, the unification made it possible to confront China’s
influence. On the other hand, for the Chinese, it was necessary to “punish” their former comrades
in order to defend their heavily wounded sense of superiority throughout history (1995).

From the standpoint of the Chinese national identity, the war was intended to be limited, aimed at deterrence rather than offense. Following the pattern in which PRC behaved during military conflicts with neighboring states, China gained no material benefits or territories from the war. Rather, it was a means to achieve foreign policy goals. Similar to the Sino-Indian war in 1962, after the PLA captured the capitals of the three Vietnamese provinces along the border, Beijing announced that Chinese forces would withdraw from Vietnam, leaving the disputed territories for future negotiations. According to Henry Kissinger, based on his discussion with Deng Xiaoping one month after the war, Deng told him that China could have marched to Hanoi as the PLA occupied all the defensive areas of fortification and there wasn’t a defense line left all the way to Hanoi (2011:369-370). This was not a sign of actual changes in Chinese foreign policy, but a way to demonstrate that the war was defensive in nature and limited, and in compliance with the international standard of using force only under self-defense. The war pushed Vietnam to negotiate with China on border issues, which were solved following bilateral negotiations in the 1990s.

Although China chose to merely “teach a lesson” to Vietnam by instigating the war, China paid a price by losing world public opinion. By attacking Vietnam, China ran the risk of being called an aggressor. To quote Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter’s National Security Advisor, “China is now seen as a peaceful country that is against aggression, and its favorable moral position that Beijing would forfeit by attacking Vietnam and run the risk of being accused of aggression” (1983:410).

Conclusion

This chapter has argued that, in the Mao era, a mix of identities—both shared victimhood and revolutionary internationalism toward China’s neighbors—interacted to influence the ups
and downs of China’s relations with India, Japan and Vietnam. Through the case studies in this chapter, it has been shown that Chinese foreign policy toward these states often went beyond its own material interests, influenced by ideational and historical factors, such as colonial legacies, a Confucian tribute system and China’s own revolutionary experience.

According to China’s identity patterns, India has been seen as a fellow victim of colonial powers, and the two countries were able to generate sentiments of mutual sympathy. Later on, because of each country’s sentiment of “never repeat historical humiliations,” China and India were responsible for an unyielding rigidity on territorial disputes that brought end to the companionship. From a rationalist perspective, during the Sino-Indian border war in 1962, Chinese leaders may have seen the use of force in the Himalayas, not as a measure to expand Chinese territory, but primarily as a way to send a political message for military deterrence. This message was aimed, not just at India but also at the United States and the Soviet Union—meant to deter U.S. involvement in Taiwan as well as the potential for Soviet support for Tibetan independence. As for Sino-Indian relations after the 1962 border war, without conquering any territory the dispute caused Indian leaders to take Chinese power more seriously, thus helping to maintain peace in the border areas ever since, though at great costs to both China and India.

By considering Japan a country suffering from both WWII and occupations by the United States in post-WWII era, and thus also a victim of the war, China was able to downplay the role of Japan as a former invader and occupier. In addition, China waived all claims against Japan on war reparations. From the national identity perspective, concluding a peace treaty with Japan, particularly with an article on anti-hegemonism, served the need of putting aside a bitter history between China and Japan. Also, as indicated in this chapter, a rationalist and strategic motive for concluding a Sino-Japanese peace treaty is persuasive. Normalizing relations with Japan could
deter the Soviets as both countries shared a common adversary in the Soviet Union. In addition, China worried about Japan’s rapid military build-up. Thus, a treaty with Japan could be mutually beneficial: it could deter Soviet power while minimizing perceived mutual security threats, given the bitter history between these two countries.

Similarly, China’s support for Vietnam during the Vietnam War had both strategic and identity-based motivations. From the perspective of Chinese national identity, support for Vietnam was based on a mix of moral obligations of the Confucian tribute system, a socialist revolutionary brotherhood and a reflection of China’s own struggle against foreign invaders to restore sovereignty and autonomy. They worked together to motivate China to devote material and moral support to North Vietnam during the Mao era. In addition, Mao’s assessment of international security trends apparently affected his decisions to increase the amount of material aid transferred to the Vietnamese government. China’s support for Vietnam effectively prevented its own strategic encirclement. Although China did not directly use force during the Vietnam War, China’s intervention, such as direct military aids and diplomatic support certainly raised the costs and dangers of American involvement in the war. But after the end of the Vietnam War and U.S. withdrawal, facing an increasingly aggressive Vietnam, China began to view Vietnam as a regional competitive power challenging China and infringing on regional stability. Thus, its foreign policy changed and relations deteriorated into military conflicts.
Chapter 6 The post-Mao era: A Return to Harmony?

Entering the post-Mao era, identity changes, ideas and policies promoting non-conflictual, non-hegemonic and non-unilateral mechanisms of dispute resolution—what I term peaceful internationalism—begin to influence China’s foreign policy behavior toward secondary and small states. During this period, Chinese foreign policy appears more defensive, aimed at avoiding conflict with all neighboring states while avoiding alignment as well. In addition, China tries to promote pluralism in the region. This contradicts some IR scholars’ arguments that Asia is “ripe for rivalry” because the bipolar structure of the Cold War is giving way to an unstable multipolarity in the region, and a lack of regional institutions, common values, and collective identity combine with the rise of China, further complicating the Asian security order (Friedberg 1993; Betts 1993). For instance, Aaron Friedberg predicts that East Asian countries will undertake intense arms races, and that smaller states will choose sides among regional powers, allying with some to balance against others (2011).

However, China is increasingly being viewed as a benign, status quo power, leading other smaller Asian countries away from forming a coalition to contain it (Johnston 2003). As Lowell Dittmer observes, China is implementing a “new security concept,” which is different from the U.S. bilateral “hub-and-spokes system,” to create a multilateral framework based on mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, and coordination and directed largely against nontraditional security threats (2010:3).

In this chapter, I use the Sino-Vietnamese negotiations on the Cambodian issue in the 1980s and the Six Party Talks on the North Korean nuclear crisis in the 2000s to illustrate China’s promotion of pluralism in regional crises, which used direct and multilateral negotiations
to achieve its goals. Furthermore, when facing provocation, China tends to restrain its reactions in order not to further agitate the issues while seeking peaceful negotiations as the case of India’s nuclear launch crisis, and Sino-Japanese disputes on the Yasukuni Shrine visits and Diaoyu Islands dispute have demonstrated. In the end, the Sino-Indian “strategic partnership” case symbolizes China’s new type of bilateral relationship under peaceful internationalism.

**Small Powers, Big Troubles**

In international relations, small size does not automatically translate into vulnerability in the international arena (Hey 2003:2). Keohane argues “a small power is a state whose leaders consider that it can, acting alone or in a small group, make a significant impact on the system” (1969:296). However, minor powers are by no means more peaceful than larger powers. As Maurice East concludes, small states are in fact more likely than large states to engage in risky behavior (1975). He argues that as small states have fewer diplomatic and information-gathering resources, they are more likely to become involved in international affairs when the stakes are already high and high-risk action has become necessary (1975:159-178). Similarly, Peter Katzenstein argues that small European states, many with weak military capabilities, outperformed their larger neighbors in policy flexibility and creativity (1985). However, because of their relatively weak power base within the international system, small states will act in passive and reactive modes, rather than as proactive agents of international change (Sutton 1987:20). China’s relations with two small states, Vietnam and North Korea, provide evidence for such interactions.

Broadly speaking, according to realist assumptions, North Korea and Vietnam, which are minor powers compared to China, ought to make alliances with China, and China in return, needs to provide a security umbrella to them and use them to balance against the Soviet Union
and the United States. During the Mao era, China’s assistant to North Korea and to Vietnam seemed to support realist assumptions. However, realist assumptions fail to account for China’s 1979 war with Vietnam, immediately after the Mao era, and China’s increasing impatience toward North Korea’s nuclear weapon build-up.

**China’s Multilateral Diplomacy on the Cambodian Issue**

Entering the 1980s, China’s aggressive foreign policy in solving the Cambodian issue and Sino-Vietnamese border disputes has been gradually replaced by a non-conflictual and non-unilateral foreign policy, symbolizing the transition to peaceful internationalism from revolutionary internationalism. After the 1979 border war, the Sino-Vietnamese border dispute negotiations came side-by-side with the development of the Cambodian issue. For Vietnam, it wanted to discuss problems solely related to border issues, while China also wanted to include the presence of Vietnamese troops in Cambodia and Laos in the negotiations (Amer 1994:363-364). When the tension of Cambodia eased in the early 1990s, China presented a more flexible posture toward the Sino-Vietnamese border disputes.

In December 1990, Chinese president Jiang Zemin met Nguyen Van Linh, general secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam. The two sides signed the *Interim Agreement on Settling Border Issues between the People’s Republic of China and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam*, which aimed at “ending the past and creating the future” (Tang 2011:283-287). Since then, both sides have agreed to maintain the status quo and resolve the border disputes by peaceful negotiations. In 1993, China and Vietnam held the first official round of talks on border issues in Beijing, and later that year, China and Vietnam signed the *Agreement on the Basic Principles for Solving the Problems of Land Boundary and Delimitation of the Beibu Gulf*. 

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The two sides agreed to settle the border issues, both maritime and land, based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (Tang 2011:289-293). Eventually, in December 1999, China and Vietnam signed the Treaty of the Land Boundary between the People's Republic of China and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Since then, Sino-Vietnamese land border disputes have been solved, leaving the territorial questions around the Beibu Gulf, Nansha (Spratly) Islands, and Xisha (Paracel) Islands pending.

In contrast to the bilateral border negotiations between China and Vietnam, the peaceful solution of the Cambodia issue was China’s first attempt at building multilateral diplomacy to mediate inter-state conflicts regardless of political ideologies. After the Chinese forces withdrew from Vietnam after the five-week war, a decade long negotiation started between China and Vietnam on Cambodia’s status. China considered the 1991 Cambodian Peace Agreement not only the end of a thirteen-year war that resulted in regaining independence and sovereignty for Cambodia, and restored peace and stability to Southeast Asia, but also a success for China in mediating the issue through international cooperation and multilateral negotiations.

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108 The two sides agreed that the alignment of the borderline between China and Vietnam should be based on the 1885 Sino-French Demarcation Treaties, relevant supplementary documents and maps, and the boundary markers. The principle was to avoid major shocks to the inhabitants of border areas, respecting their long-established residence.

109 In terms of Beibu Gulf, China and Vietnam signed an agreement on the Delimitation of the Territorial Seas of the Beibu Gulf, the Exclusive Economic Zones, and the Continental Shelf to “continue talks on the maritime issues, so as to achieve a basic and permanent solution.” Regarding the disputes along Spratly Islands, there had been no disputes before 1970s. Chinese side deemed that the development of modern laws of the sea made coastal countries extended their sovereign rights beyond their territorial seas. Since 1975, Vietnam initiated territorial claims over the Spratly Island and Paracel Islands. At this moment, Chinese government considered that “China has indisputable sovereignty over the Nansha Islands, and the issue of sovereignty is nonnegotiable” (Tang 2011:283-287).
Through the negotiations with both the Soviet Union and Vietnam on the Cambodia issue, China built a broad coalition in international society, symbolizing China’s first major endeavor of multilateral diplomacy in an international dispute since the PRC was established. Following Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia in 1978 and the establishment of a proxy regime there, the People’s Republic of Cambodia and China, along with ASEAN’s members, the United States, and Western European nations, formed a diplomatic coalition in denouncing and opposing Vietnam and its Soviet backer. Also, after the thirty-fourth General Assembly of the United Nations in 1979, each Assembly passed a resolution demanding that Vietnam withdraw its troops unconditionally from Cambodia. Like China, the western world had refused to accept Vietnam’s continued occupation of Cambodia (Gordon 1986). China worked with the United States with the goal of isolating Vietnam internationally and blocking the international recognition of the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK), which was supported by Vietnam (Amer 1995:377). The ASEAN in its 1979 Foreign Minister meeting in Bali also identified Vietnam as the invader of Cambodia and called upon Hanoi to withdraw its forces from both the Thai border and all of Cambodia through a joint communiqué (Simon 1979:1185).

In addition to diplomacy, in order to add pressure on Vietnam, China kept a strong military presence along the common border with Vietnam, which forced Vietnam to permanently station large numbers of troops in the border region. Nevertheless, China did not attempt to launch any large-scale attack, as it had in 1979, during the 1980s.

China also named Soviet support to the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia as one of the “three obstacles” to improved Sino-Soviet relations. During the Vietnam-Cambodia conflicts, China held several rounds of meetings to negotiate peace in Beijing. In 1988, after the Gorbachev government sent out messages that all foreign troops should be withdrawn from
Cambodia following its own withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Chinese government announced its own proposal for a peaceful settlement of the Cambodia issue. According to Qian Qichen, the Chinese foreign minister, China’s proposal included suggestions such as a coalition government headed by Prince Norodom Sihanouk after the withdrawal of the Vietnamese troops; a free general election in Cambodia and effective international supervision (Qian 2006:33-41). Back then, the west generally supported giving direct economic and military aid to elements loyal to Prince Norodom Sihanouk and former Cambodian Prime Minister Son Sann, rather than the Khmer Rouge. Thus, the Chinese proposal was accepted by all parties except for the Khmer Rouge, which refused to take part in the general election.

China also promised U.S. Secretary of State Baker that it would stop military aid to the Khmer Rouge government after Vietnam had totally withdrawn its troops, and would not support a solution that allowed the Khmer Rouge to return to power (Qian 2006:47-53). Eventually, Vietnam agreed to accept the UN supervision and inspection of the withdrawal of troops, and the UN sent 22,000 peacekeeping troops to Cambodia in 1991. China and Vietnam normalized their relations in 1992—one year after the Cambodian peace agreement was signed in Paris. Later on in 1994, the Khmer Rouge was declared an illegal organization as it refused to participate in the general election.

China’s involvement in the Cambodia issue, from a realist perspective, did not offer much in terms of a material interest. The Sino-Vietnamese conflicts were mainly caused by Vietnam’s hegemonic behavior toward its Southeast Asian neighbors, particularly Cambodia. After Vietnam’s retreat from Cambodia, which symbolized the end of its hegemonic behavior, Sino-Vietnamese relations began to improve. Strategically speaking, China would intervene in order to restore its political interests there, or at least continue support for the Khmer Rouge,
which did not occur. Post-war Cambodia became a democracy, which left China no special privileges in the domestic politics of Cambodia. Nonetheless, these actions were consistent with the development of China’s peaceful internationalism in the 1990s.

**The “Six Party Talk” and the Korean Nuclear Crisis**

In the Korean Nuclear Crisis case, China’s identity patterns of conflict avoidance originating in Confucianism explain its willingness and efforts to help rein in the North Koreans in compliance with U.S. wishes of peace and stability in the Korean Peninsula. In addition, the policy of non-intervention prevented China from intervening further in the domestic affairs of North Korea. Thus, China would be reluctant to require North Korea to drop the nuclear program by threat or to provide a nuclear umbrella to North Korea as the U.S. have done in South Korea. In this case, China cooperated with the United States and related countries to ensure the success of the policy of non-proliferation in the Korean peninsula in order to maintain peace and stability in the region.

First, China’s role in curbing North Korea’s nuclear ambitions since the early 2000s demonstrated China’s willingness and efforts to help rein in North Korea not only in compliance with the U.S.’ wishes but also coinciding with its identity patterns of conflict avoidance and peace maintenance, both consistent with peaceful internationalism. In the early days of the Korean nuclear crisis, China’s policy was to avoid conflicts with both the U.S. and North Korea. Despite the close PRC-DPRK relations during the Korean War and later during the Cold War, Chinese attitudes and policies toward North Korea in the post-Mao era, according to Qian Qichen, former Vice Premier and Foreign Minister of China, was that according to the priority of economic development, a favorable outside environment was crucial for China and, hence, “The
further easing of the tension on the Korean peninsula, the promotion of peaceful negotiations between the two Koreas were placed on our agenda” (2006:105-115).

When the Korean nuclear crisis first broke out in the early 1990s, when North Korea demonstrated its ambitions to develop nuclear weapons, the United States, along with South Korea and Japan, had tried to appease North Korea by offering energy aid and providing it with two light-water nuclear reactors. The Chinese attitude then was to advocate a direct negotiation between the U.S. and North Korea in solving the nuclear issue. In 1994, the Agreed Framework had been reached between the United States and North Korea. China was not involved in those negotiations. Even in 1999, Chinese Prime Minister Zhu Rongji told the media on questions of the North Korean nuclear issue, “We had no idea that North Korea was developing its nuclear weapon, in addition, it was an independent nation, and how can we intervene its internal affairs?” (Jiang 2007:31)

In the 2000s, initially requested by the U.S., facing an escalation of the crisis, China began to play a role in the North Korean nuclear issue. When George W. Bush came to power in 2001, particularly after 9/11, he took a more hostile attitude toward the North Korean nuclear issue compared to the previous administration. Bush considered the Clinton administration to have made too many concessions to Kim Jong-il in return for a pledge to abandon its nuclear weapon program, and that the program had not worked (Bush 2010:90). In his 2002 State of the Union address, he named Iraq, Iran, and North Korea the “axis of evil” as they intended to “threaten the peace of the world” (233). In addition, from U.S. intelligence reports, the Bush Administration believed that North Korea was operating a secret highly enriched uranium program, which can be used to build nuclear bombs. Since North Korea claimed that they already owned nuclear weapons, instead of negotiating with North Korea on a bilateral basis as
before, Bush decided to rally China to join the negotiations with North Korea. During President Bush’s meeting with Chinese President Jiang Zemin in October 2002, Bush told Jiang that North Korea was a threat not only to the United States but also to China, and urged China to join the United States in confronting North Korea diplomatically. Jiang told Bush, “Exercising influence over North Korea is very complicated” (Bush 2010:424). Again, in February 2003, Bush told Jiang that if North Korea’s nuclear weapon program continued, the United States could consider a military strike against North Korea (424). Also, Secretary of State Colin Powell, during his visit to China in the same month, told Vice-president Hu Jintao that the U.S. wished China to broker a multilateral meeting to deal with the North Korean nuclear crisis (Jiang 2007:31). In response to President Bush’s calling, both President Jiang Zeming and then Vice-president Hu Jintao told him that China would not support North Korea in developing nuclear weapons (31).

Facing a potential conflict in the Korean Peninsula and urged by the U.S., China brokered the “Six-Party Talks” in late 2003: in addition to China, North Korea and the United States, Japan, South Korea and Russia were also included, and the talks were considered a multilateral mechanism of conflict resolution. Since then, the Chinese government has claimed that its policies in the Korean Peninsula are maintaining peace and stability, denuclearization and using peaceful diplomacy to solve disputes (Cai 2006). In 2005, North Korea finally agreed to abandon all nuclear weapons and return to their commitments under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

Second, when North Korea became the troublemaker for the peace and security of the region, a violation of China’s peaceful internationalism, China’s foreign policy toward North Korea became increasingly hardened while maintaining a non-confictual, non-hegemonic and non-unilateral dispute resolution framework. North Korea broke its promise in 2006 by carrying out its first full-fledged nuclear test. In fact, the North Korean side informed China only three
hours before the nuclear test, and China told the U.S. government immediately after receiving this message. China’s condemnation of North Korea’s nuclear weapon test was harsh.

Officially, Chinese President Hu Jintao announced, “the Chinese government strongly opposes this…we engaged in conversations to appeal to the North Koreans for restraint. However, our neighbor turned a deaf ear to our advice” (Bush 2010:425). In addition, with China’s support, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1718 imposing the toughest sanctions on North Korea since the end of the Korean War. Eventually, in February 2007, North Korea agreed to shut down its main nuclear reactor and allow the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to verify its actions. In exchange, the United States removed North Korea from a list of state sponsors of terror. Although later on North Korea reneged on its commitment toward cessation of its nuclear program, the Six-Party Talks initiated by China still demonstrated China’s willingness and efforts to rein in North Korea to prevent it from destabilizing regional peace and security.

Another indicator of China’s attitude toward the North Korean nuclear weapons program is China’s voting record on United Nations Security Council Resolutions on this issue. From the 1990s to the present, eight Security Council Resolutions on North Korean Nuclear Issues have been passed. China voted yes seven times, abstaining once. From 2006 to 2013, China voted yes seven straight times condemning the North Korean nuclear programs. The latest was Resolution 2087 in 2013. China and the United States drafted the resolution together to put further sanctions on North Korea when it conducted another nuclear weapon test in January

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110 This information was based on a workshop on U.S.-China Relations at the U.S. Air Force Academy from February 4-6, 2013, while Retired Lt. Gen. Daniel P. Leaf, who was the Deputy Commander at U.S. Pacific Command, spoke to the participants of the workshop.

111 It was Resolution 825 (1993) on North Korea’s withdrew from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which China abstained.
2013, and called upon North Korea to “abandon all nuclear weapons and nuclear programs completely, verifiably and irreversibly.”\textsuperscript{112} It also included restrictions that block financial transactions and impound cash that would amount to unprecedented harm to North Korea. Chinese Envoy to the UN, Li Baodong, commented on the Resolution by saying, “China is a country of principle…we are formally committed to safeguarding peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.”\textsuperscript{113} In addition, a series of sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council were also backed and enforced by the Chinese government. The latest example was that China supported a ban on exporting “dual-use technologies,” which can be used for either civilian or military purposes, to North Korea.\textsuperscript{114}

On many occasions, the United States has expressed appreciation for China’s positive diplomatic efforts in resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis. Christopher R. Hill, the former American diplomat who participated in the Six-Party Talks during the Bush’s administration, said that China’s co-sponsorship of the resolution “suggests that after many years, the screws are beginning to turn.”\textsuperscript{115} Secretary of State Colin Powell said in an interview with the CNN on October 2003, “the President is committed to a diplomatic solution, and he said to the President of China, please keep playing the essential role you had been playing in leading us along, serving as a convener of the six-party talks and participant in those six-party talks.”\textsuperscript{116} Moreover,

\textsuperscript{115} Ibid.
President Bush himself commended China on the “leadership roles” played during the nuclear crisis in November 2005 during his trip to China (Wang 2011:116).

Finally, the breakup between China and North Korea over North Korea’s nuclear program has long been indicated in the contemporary Chinese national identity based on peaceful gestures toward solving international conflicts. North Korea’s hostility towards South Korea, which endangered the peace and security of the Korean Peninsula, its unilateral behavior of developing nuclear weapons and breaking consensus reached by multilateral negotiations, and its “military first” strategy and failed promises to improve its people’s livelihood, all contradict China’s national interests and identity. Hence, China’s behavior toward North Korea, particularly since the 2000s, reflects its own national identity and interests rather than the conventional wisdom of realist balancing and alliancing.

Realist scholars and analysts suggest that China should try to use North Korea to balance the U.S. and consider North Korea to be within its sphere of influence in East Asia. For instance, Robert Rose writes, “Since 1989 China has dominated North Korea’s strategic environment, and North Korea has been a secure Chinese buffer state” (2010:526). However, the evidence does not support such claims. North Korea’s ambitions of developing nuclear weapons contradict both China’s policy of nuclear disarmament and the idea of maintaining peace and stability in the region in the post-Mao era. From a realist perspective, China should have used North Korea to balance against the United States to serve its own interests, but reality shows that China has cooperated with the United States to maintain peace and stability in the Korean Peninsula through a multilateral mechanism and a non-conflictual approach consistent with peaceful internationalism.
China and Japan: History and Sovereignty

Entering the twentieth-first century, while Sino-Japanese economic relations were more closely than in previous decades, their diplomatic relations suffered setbacks because of territorial disputes and an array of “symbolic issues,” primarily the Japanese government’s attitudes toward its reflections on crimes during wars with China historically. Memories of the suffering and humiliation by the Japanese during the wars resulted in China’s strong reaction opposing such behavior. As a result, a seemingly symbolic issue seriously disrupted Sino-Japanese relations. Not only China, who suffered directly from Japanese conquest, but the world also criticized Japan for failing to handle its past violence. As IR scholar Jennifer Lind writes, “Tokyo’s apologies have been perceived as too little, too late. Even worse, its politicians repeatedly shock survivors and the global community by denying past atrocities; its history textbooks whitewash its wartime crimes” (2008:2).

In this section, I present how China’s victimhood identity transformed the Yasukuni shrine visit in 2005, a symbolic issue, and territorial disputes over Diaoyu Islands, a few uninhabited rocks in the East China Sea, into full diplomatic crises between the two countries. Nonetheless, despite the increasing rise of Chinese nationalism against Japan, the Chinese government would constrain nationalism to prevent jeopardizing China’s peaceful internationalism.

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117 Since 1978, China and Japan maintained close economic ties, in which China benefited from it during the past three decades. However, after the 1980s, the Chinese government’s dissatisfactions to Japan’s inadequate reflections on its WWII history were mainly because of victimhood identity.

118 For instance, the New York Times on February 19, 2014 reported that American analysts and officials have faulted Mr. Abe for failing to sufficiently distance himself and his administration from the nationalistic statements.
Sino-Japanese clash on the Shrine visit

During the years 2003-2005, Sino-Japanese relations suffered serious setbacks due to Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s repeated visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, which China considered a deep offense to its national feelings. Large-scale national protests against the Japanese government erupted in major cities in China in 2005.\(^{119}\) Although the nationalist protests against Japan in Chinese cities had been put down, Sino-Japanese relations were never able to recover from these episodes.\(^{120}\)

First, for China, Japanese leaders’ visits to the Yasukuni Shrine were not an internal Japanese issue as the Japanese side claimed, but a mistaken and provocative attitude toward the crimes it committed during WWII that deeply triggered China’s victimhood identity. From the Japanese perspective, Prime Minister Koizumi claimed that his visits to the Yasukuni Shrine were to commemorate the ordinary officers who had died in WWII, not the Class-A war criminals, hence, a Japanese domestic issue. Almost every time, prior to the Prime Minister’s visit, the Japanese side, usually from high level officials, would inform China of such visits and reiterate wishes to maintain friendly relations with China, and each time, China opposed such visits. By 2004, Koizumi had visited the Shrine four times, and by April 2004, there had been street demonstrations against Japan in several Chinese cities, with violence erupting in some instances. Koizumi paid another two visits to the Shrine in October 2005 and August 2006.

\(^{119}\) However, all Japanese prime ministers during the period 1972-1981 worshiped at the Yasukuni Shrine (He 2011:1179). Ordinary Chinese people had no way to learn about the Japanese leaders’ visit to the Yasuhuni Shrine or right-wing activists (He 2007:49). But since both China faced a bigger threat—the Soviet Union at that time, the Chinese side in dealing with Japan then did not bring up the Shrine visits.

\(^{120}\) There were suspicions from Western and Japanese media that Beijing used public sentiment as diplomatic tactic, however, numerous works argued that the Chinese government was not a unitary actor and might not be impervious to public opinions in this issue. See He 2010, Hughes and Geriers 2006 for detailed discussions.
respectively, which resulted in a total suspension of contacts between the leaders of China and Japan. During his last visit to the shrine as prime minister, he said, “No matter what day I choose to go, China and the Republic of Korea will protest, so why not go on the day of the anniversary?” (Tang 2011:43).

For the Chinese government, Japanese leaders’ repeated visits to the Yasukuni Shrine were a serious political problem rooted in the two countries’ bitter war history. The Yasukuni Shrine was used as a holy place to commemorate soldiers who died for the emperor during various wars, 80 percent of whom died during World War II, including thirteen Class-A war criminals, and more than one thousand Class-B and Class-C war criminals. In addition, its war museum offered a revisionist view of the war as a Japanese-led struggle against Western colonialism during World War II. As Chinese former Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan described, “Since the Yasukuni Shrine enshrines Class-A war criminals whose hands were stained with the blood of Chinese and other Asian peoples, the visits of Japanese leaders to the shrine are not an internal Japanese affair, nor is it an issue of religion or tradition. It is a significant matter of principle whether the Japanese government holds a correct attitude towards Japan's history of military invasion” (Tang 2011:3-4).

Incidents like the visits to the Yasukuni Shrine—a symbolic issue in bilateral relations, can infringe upon the two countries’ relations, although it may not be in the interests of either country. Despite having a heavy stake in commercial interests, the Chinese government realized that issues like Yasukuni Shrine involved Chinese political principles that should never be compromised. Western scholars share such sentiments as well. For instance, Jennifer Lind at Dartmouth College observes, “Japan’s unapologetic remembrance…continues to poison relations with South Korea, China, and Australia more than sixty years after the war” (2008:3).
Second, in spite of rising nationalism against Japan in China, the Chinese government’s post-Mao identity pattern of conflict avoidance, can also be observed in this case. During the crisis, the domestic protests against the Japanese government, some of them violent, further threatened to damage Sino-Japanese relations. After violence erupted in the protests, Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs Nobutaka Machimura said that the Japanese side had received no explanation from China, and demanded China’s apology for the violent attacks on Japanese diplomatic missions, companies, and citizens in some Chinese cities (Tang 2011:30-31). On one hand, the Chinese government curbed the angry sentiments toward Japan. For instance, after a violent Shanghai protests against the Japanese, Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing told 3,500 propaganda officials, “the masses . . . must believe in the party and the government’s ability to properly handle all issues linked to Sino-Japanese relations” (Reilly 2012:14). And nationwide, a campaign of “recasting Japan” took place, which resulted in considerable expansion of favorable coverage of Japan in both official and commercial media (He 2011:1188). Thus, over the next few years of the Shrine visits crisis, the Chinese government successfully reined in anti-Japan activism, and improved public opinion toward Japan (Reilly 2012:2-3).

On the other hand, the Chinese government tried to amend the two countries’ deteriorating relations. After Koizumi stepped down from the premiership in September 2006, his successor Shinzō Abe promised not to visit the Yasukuni Shrine.\footnote{However, in 2013, Primer Minister Abe’s visit to the Shrine once again instigated angers and protests from China and South Korea, even the United States officials criticized Abe’s Shrine visit.} In response to that, the Chinese government decided not to insist that the Japanese leadership promise publicly that they would not visit the Yasukuni Shrine (Zhang 2008:13). Chinese President Hu Jintao put forward five points to cool the tensions between the two countries, meanwhile containing the nationalist...
sentiment against Japan launched by Chinese people. President Hu’s five points included: first, strict adherence to the principles of the three political documents, namely, the China-Japan Joint Statement, the China-Japan Treaty of Peace and Friendship, and the China-Japan Joint Declaration, and continued deeds to develop friendly, cooperative relations oriented to the twenty-first century; second, adherence to the principle of taking history as a mirror to guide future development; third, proper handling of the Taiwan issue; fourth, appropriately addressing bilateral differences through dialogue and consultation on an equal footing, actively exploring ways to settle differences, and avoiding new disturbance to, and impact on, Sino-Japanese friendship; fifth, further strengthening of bilateral exchanges and cooperation (Tang 2011:36-37).

In March 2007, Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao commented on Sino-Japanese relations, saying that the two countries should “take history as a mirror and look forward” (Tang 2011:45). A month later, Wen spoke at the Japanese Diet, stating, “By stressing the importance of drawing lessons from history, we do not mean to perpetuate hatred. Rather, we want to secure a better future for our relations.” Also, Wen said, “the Chinese people will never forget Japan’s support of China during our opening, reform, and modernization.” 122

Similarly, during President Hu Jintao’s May 2008 visit to Japan, in a speech at Waseda University, he told the audience, “This brief unhappy period of history (Sino-Japanese wars) brought deep disaster to the Chinese people, and also brought deep suffering to the Japanese people. We emphasize history not for hatred, but because it can be a mirror, reflecting to the future, [teaching us to] treasure peace, maintain peace, and ensure that the Chinese and Japanese

people live together peacefully for future generations, so that the people of the two countries can enjoy everlasting peace.”

During the same visit, China and Japan made a joint statement aiming at “Comprehensive Promotion of a Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests,” which stated, “The two countries’ sole option [peace, stability, and development of the Asia-Pacific region and the world] is to cooperate to enhance peace and friendship over the long term.”

By 2010, endeavors by the Chinese government to amend relations with Japan had been made, relations with Japan had returned to relative normalcy. As James Reilly (2012) observes, the Chinese government has developed a mechanism for tolerating and responding to sporadic instances of public emotion while maintaining it overall foreign policy trajectory.

In sum, Sino-Japanese relations, more than 60 years after WWII, were still haunted by China’s historical memories during the wars and both the Chinese people and the government were still sensitive toward the attitudes and behavior of Japanese politicians on the reflections of the wars. Nevertheless, the Chinese government also deliberately constrained the public anger to prevent further damage to Sino-Japanese relations, which could be antagonized by the victimhood memories of the masses.

Sino-Japanese dispute on Diaoyu Islands

Sino-Japanese disputes over the sovereignty of Diaoyu Islands, which Japan calls the Senkaku Island in the East China Sea, is another case demonstrating that China’s

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hypersensitiveness over sovereignty influenced by the victimhood identity can escalate relations between the two countries. On the other hand, in spite of firmly standing up with its sovereignty claims on Diaoyu Islands, China has been avoiding direct military conflicts with Japan that may negatively affect China’s path toward peaceful internationalism.

The dispute existed even before the two countries formally built up diplomatic relations in 1972. The Chinese attitude until 2012 had been that despite the efforts of nationalist groups on both sides trying to escalate the disputes, the Chinese government had been restrained in its claim and cooperated with the Japanese government to prevent the territorial disputes from harming bilateral relations. For instance, in 1972, Premier Zhou Enlai told Japanese delegates for the normalization negotiation, “There is no need to mention the Diaoyu Islands. It does not count as a problem of any sort compared to recovering normal diplomatic relations” (He 2007:4). In the 1970s Deng told Japanese Foreign Minister Sonoda that Diaoyu Islands disputes could be “on hold for 20 or 30 years, we will not touch” (Huang 2011:327). After China and Japan signed the Peace Treaty in 1978, during the meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Fukuda, Deng said, “Perhaps the next generation will be much wiser than we, and can find a practical solution” (Huang 2011:337-338). In a way, Chinese leaders were in no hurry to solve the territorial disputes with Japan, and neither made it a problem in developing bilateral relations until the 2000s.

First, Diaoyu Islands becoming a focal point of disputes between China and Japan in 2012 was provoked by the Japanese government, which triggered China’s hypersensitivity over sovereignty and past humiliations. The dispute over Diaoyu Islands reached a critical juncture in 2012, when the Japanese government nationalized the islands from private Japanese citizens’

125 For a history of Diaoyu Islands dispute, see Reilly 2012:88-91.
hands. Different from before, in addition to launching strong vocal protests, the Chinese government began to send the Chinese Navy and Air Force to patrol Diaoyu Islands and its surrounding areas. After the Japanese government nationalized Diaoyu Islands, as a countermeasure, the Chinese government declared the creation of an Air Defense Zone in the East China Sea, which was considered by both the United States and Japan as a provocative reach by the Chinese military and increased tensions in the disputes. Once facing former imperialist powers, the sentiment of “never repeating the humiliation” resulted in China firmly standing up against such a power. As Peter Gries argues, the identity of “China as victor” narrative in dealing with Post-WWII Sino-Japanese relations has been challenged by Chinese victimization during WWII after the death of Mao (2004:79).

Second, despite tensions between China and Japan in the East China Sea since 2012, there is little evidence that China would shift its conflict avoidance pattern of foreign policy, which could be considered a break from peaceful internationalism. So far, the Chinese government has not claimed that it will consider using force in Diaoyu Islands, in contrast to its policy toward Taiwan that all options are possible. For instance, Chinese Ambassador to the U.S., Cui Tiankai (who was the former Chinese Ambassador to Japan) told media in 2013 that China did not want to see any military conflicts erupt over the territorial disputes with Japan, which would hurt the interests of all parties.126 In addition, after analyzing the daily records published by the Japanese Coast Guard on Chinese patrols within the territorial waters of Diaoyu Islands, Taylor Fravel and Alastair Johnston find that Chinese patrols have dropped by about half since October 2013 (2014). According to them, one possible explanation is that China is using a

reduction in patrols to signal a willingness not to escalate further conflict with Japan, and

Nonetheless, the Chinese compromise on Diaoyu Islands disputes did not come without
costs. Although the disputed offshore islands do not pose much strategic or economic
significance, since the 1990s, the Chinese people have constantly criticized the Chinese
leadership of being weak. Yinan He argues that the much disputed Chunxiao gas field was
estimated to have 36.9 million tons of crude oil, which was equivalent to Japan’s natural gas
consumption for one month, hence it is not obvious that economic incentives have led either side
to the dispute (2008:171). James Reilly argues that Chinese leaders have had to balance public
anger and China’s broader strategic interests with Japan (2012:91). Thus, the territorial disputes
could become a contradiction between an identity and foreign policy choice of standing up
firmly against a former victimizer and using peaceful means to solve disputes, both of which are
embedded in the contemporary Chinese national identity. It can potentially threaten peaceful
internationalism and increase the risk of a collision that could escalate into a conflict between the
two countries if such victimhood deepens. But so far, the behavior pattern of China seems to
suggest the conflict will de-escalate. However, there is a risk of the two sides creating serious
incidents during the confrontations because of the escalation of such victimhood identity. This
may become a factor shifting China from its principle of non-use of force in solving disputes
over the past three decades. In this scenario, national pride and nationalism will triumph over a
realist and rational calculation of costs and benefits, to serve the purpose of preserving national
dignity and a justice that had been missing in China’s past, with the possibility of using force to achieve this goal.

Both liberal and realist approaches provide alternative explanations of the Sino-Japanese conflicts. From an economic perspective, a stable Sino-Japanese relationship is plausible.\textsuperscript{128} China and Japan maintain close economic and trade relations. China replaced the U.S. as Japan’s largest trading partner since 2004, and Japan has long been China’s top trade partner. For liberal scholars, such economic relations suggest a stabilizing relation between the two countries because economic interdependence should facilitate a harmony of interests and maintenance of peace. However, for the Chinese government and Chinese people, Japanese leaders’ visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, an issue that seemed to be under the domain of Japan’s domestic affairs, escalated the national wounds of China’s past humiliations, hence China was acting not according to its rational economic interests, but more according to its national identity of never repeating the humiliation by standing firmly against a former victimizer.

For realists, Sino-Japanese relations after the end of the Cold War should have been worse. Some realists believe that the uneven economic growth between China and Japan and the multipolar structure in post-Cold War East Asia has set the stage for Sino-Japanese strategic rivalry and dampened their incentives for cooperation. These factors have even contributed to extreme Chinese nationalism, potentially a hindrance to peaceful internationalism in the future. Furthermore, the collapse of the Soviet Union, which left China as the only regional power, could potentially threaten Japan. In addition, unresolved territorial disputes and entrenched historical tensions can all promote “rivals for pre-eminence,” using the words of David

\textsuperscript{128} For instance, from 1979 to 2006, the Japanese government’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) to China totaled more than three trillion Japanese yen, equal to over US$ 30 billion.
Shambaugh (1996) or lock the two countries in a “strategic rivalry” (Park and Taeho 1998). Although Sino-Japanese relations appear to have deteriorated, I argue that this cannot be fully explained by realism, but rather reflects China’s national identity toward a former imperialist power that brought catastrophe to China.

**China and India: Competitors or Partners?**

The end of the Mao era in the late 1970s brought Sino-Indian relations back to the path of normalization as the two countries put aside issues of territorial disputes. In 1976, China reopened its embassy in New Delhi and India also sent an ambassador to Beijing. China’s foreign policies toward India in the post-Mao era were dominated by the themes of peace maintenance and compromise, determined by China’s conflict avoidance identity pattern and a wish to move toward peaceful internationalism.

In contrast to foreign policy during the Mao era, China tended to use peaceful and non-unilateral mechanisms to solve territorial disputes with India. Both policies were consistent with peaceful internationalism. During India’s 1997 Nuclear Tests Crisis, facing provocations and accusations from the Indian side, China constrained its behavior to avoid further escalating tension with India. Some Western scholars, like Susan Shirk argue that China sought to improve relations with India to create a peaceful environment for the implementation of economic reforms (2004).

**Peaceful Negotiations of the Border Disputes**

When Deng Xiaoping came to power in 1978, more than a decade after the Sino-Indian border war, China called for comprehensive improvement in relations between the two countries despite the unsolved territorial disputes. Afterward, negotiations continued over the border issues
until the 1990s when both countries reached consensus on a peaceful resolution of the border issues and developed bilateral political and economic relations. In the post-Mao era, while being firm on sovereignty claims, China advocated peaceful negotiations in solving territorial disputes with India and called for strengthening the overall Sino-Indian relations. Deng Xiaoping met Indian Foreign Minister Vajpayee in February 1979, and put forward proposals for a package deal on border issues, similar to what China offered in the 1950s: the Chinese side would make concessions in the Eastern section while the Indian side would make concessions in the Western part. In addition, Deng told his Indian counterpart that the border disputes should not hinder Sino-Indian relations and can be put aside as long as both sides maintain stable relations (Huang 2008:406-407). Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua laid out three further points to settle border disputes: (1) both sides should maintain the status quo; (2) the border issues should not hinder overall relations between China and India; (3) both sides should have further engagements in terms of border negotiations (Huang 2008:407). In 1982, during a meeting with a delegation from India, Deng Xiaoping stated, “The problem between China and India is not a serious one. Neither country poses a threat to the other. The problem we have is simply about the border” (Holslay 2010:58).

Since then, after more than a decade of negotiation, the two countries signed the Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the Line of Actual Control in the Sino-Indian Border Areas in 1993, followed by the Agreement on Confidence-Building Measures in the Military Field and the Line of Actual Control in the Sino-Indian Border Areas in 1996. These agreements reaffirmed the “principle of good faith and mutual confidence” in the “settlement of differences that may arise in that process.”129

129 Agreement on Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility, Article VIII.
Each of these agreements stated that border disputes should be resolved through peaceful and friendly negotiations, and neither side should use or threaten to use force against the other by any means (Huang 2008:420). After reaching the consensus, border disputes continued to be resolved. For instance, in June 2003, during Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee’s trip to China, Beijing offered to recognize Sikkim in the Himalayas as part of India, something that it had not done before. In 2005, India and China signed the *Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question*. The agreement asserted, “The two sides will resolve the boundary question through peaceful and friendly consultations. And neither side shall use or threaten to use force against the other by any means.” This is the general principle guiding the resolution of the border problem. *Article VI* says, “The boundary should be along well-defined and easily identifiable natural geographical features to be mutually agreed upon between the two sides.” This implies that China would agree to maintain the *status quo* in solving the border problem. In the latest round of talks, the Special Representatives of India and China announced that they had established a working group to prepare a framework for the settlement of the border issue. Both countries agreed, “The differences on the boundary question should not be allowed to affect the overall development of bilateral relations.” On the other hand, the case of the Sino-Russian border settlement offered an example of what the Chinese government might do in order to settle the undecided issues with India.¹³⁰

¹³⁰ In 2005, China and Russia signed the treaty that finally settling the border between China and Russia. However, the treaty was mainly based on the unequal treaties made in imperialist Russia in the nineteenth century. Based on the explanation from the Chinese government side, it followed the principle of “seeking truth from facts” to face and solve the border problem. But behind the treaty, the real reason is that China was eager to build up the “strategic partner relationship” with Russia, and on the other hand, the Russian’s *de facto* controlled the disputed land.
By removing the obstacle of the border issue, China and India will also remove a barrier to the development of peaceful relations in the future. Although Sino-Indian border disputes have not yet been solved, since reaching these agreements in the 1990s, the Sino-Indian border has witnessed peace and stability. In the post-Mao era, despite no clear economic interest driving Sino-Indian reconciliations, China’s relationship with India was the fastest improved among its neighboring states.

*China’s Responses to India’s 1997 Nuclear Tests*

India’s 1997 nuclear tests, were a temporary setback to Sino-Indian relations, but had no long term impact due in large part to China’s constrained response. In the post-Mao era, Sino-India relations were tested several times, and the incident of India’s 1997 nuclear tests was among the most severe. China’s responses to India’s 1997 nuclear tests were influenced mainly by India’s perception of a China “threat,” and Sino-Indian relations recovered in the next several years after India increased dialogue with China through this case. The Chinese national identity pattern of conflict avoidance was vivid in this case.

When India initiated its first nuclear weapon test in 1997, it had been more than 30 years since China acquired nuclear weapons. Scholars have argued that the motive for India to develop nuclear weapons was not primarily a military requirement or a “China threat,” but a demonstration of modernity and world-class power, which could guarantee India’s strategic autonomy and capacity to resist outside powers (Perkovich 2004:186). In addition, India’s nuclear test came at a time when international society had reached a consensus regarding bans on
nuclear tests.\textsuperscript{131} Thus, India’s nuclear test received unanimous condemnation from the international community.\textsuperscript{132} Nevertheless, China’s initial response to the tests was rather modest and restrained. The official press agency Xinhua only reported the news, without comment. On May 12, a foreign ministry spokesman set out China’s position as a firm supporter of the ban and destruction of nuclear weapons while expressing grave concern about India’s nuclear testing (Tang 2011:492-493).

However, on May 13, \textit{The New York Times} published Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s secret letter to President Bill Clinton alluding to the “China threat” as the justification for the nuclear tests. In the letter, Vajpayee named China as “the country that committed armed aggression against India in 1962… To add to the distrust that country has materially helped another neighbor of ours to become a covert nuclear weapons state.”\textsuperscript{133} Even before the five nuclear tests, India’s Defense Minister George Fernandes had claimed in an interview on May 3 that the potential threat from China was greater than that from Pakistan, and it was “India’s number-one threat” (Tang 2011:494-495). Such a letter came at a time when Sino-Indian relations had experienced a decade of marked improvement, following Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s 1988 visit to China. Furthermore, the letter published by \textit{the New York Times} served as a public insult to China. As the letter suggested, the Indian government justified the development of a nuclear weapon in order to balance against China’s growing strength.

\textsuperscript{131} The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was concluded at the end of the 1960s, and in September 1996, the UN Assembly passed the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which was signed by more than 150 countries.

\textsuperscript{132} For instance, U.S. president Bill Clinton said that India made a terrible mistake to endanger security in the region and posed a direct challenge to the NPT. The United States later imposed economic sanctions on India.

China’s response to India’s later tests was both swift and determined. On May 14, 1998, the Foreign Ministry of China made a solemn statement on the Indian nuclear tests that the Chinese government was shocked and strongly condemned the testing. The state said, “The Chinese government is deeply shocked by this and hereby expresses its strong condemnation. This act of India’s is nothing but an outrageous contempt for the common will of the international community for the comprehensive ban on nuclear tests and a hard blow on the international effort to prevent nuclear weapon proliferation. It will entail serious consequences to the peace and stability in South Asia and the World at large” (Dittmer 2005:151-152). In contrast to the United States, and despite India having suggested a “China threat” as its rationale for conducting nuclear tests, China did not use economic sanctions or other means to cause further setbacks in Sino-Indian relations. Instead, China joined with the United States and other major powers to defend the international nuclear arms control and nonproliferation regime against the Indian violation (Shirk 2004:84). China did not respond to such an accusation with provocative language, nor did it take actions to “counter-balance” against India.

Instead, China tried to solve the crisis through diplomacy and dialogue. A year later, during his meeting with Jaswant Singh, the deputy chairman of the Planning Commission of India, Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan offered four suggestions for improving Sino-Indian relations. First, neither country should view the other as a threat; second, as developing countries, China and India share similar histories and should focus on developing their economies, eliminating poverty, and improving people’s living standards; third, China’s top priority was economic development, for which a favorable neighboring environment was

134 Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan and Secretary Albright called a meeting of the permanent members of the UN Security Council in Geneva to condemn the Indian tests also to come up with a strategy for preventing a nuclear arms race in South Asia.
essential; fourth, a few unresolved matters should not become obstacles to the development of bilateral relations (Tang 2011:520). Singh responded that India’s nuclear testing was not targeted at any specific country, and India hoped that the two countries could work together with a forward-looking attitude to advance bilateral relations (Tang 2011:516-517). Even the hawkish Indian Defense Minister Fernandes admitted in a 2004 speech, after calling China a “potential threat number one,” that “there has been a very positive tenor in the Sino-Indian relationship…The future prospects are promising” (Martin 2010:105). Ultimately, Sino-Indian relations did not suffer further setbacks due to India’s nuclear tests and its offensive attitude towards China. When Manmohan Singh became the Indian prime minister after the 2004 elections, he surprised Beijing by unilaterally suggesting that India, Pakistan and China should coordinate their nuclear strike doctrines (Martin 105). Then in 2005, when Premier Wen Jiabao visited India, the two countries formally established the Strategic and Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Prosperity.

These events contradict the predictions of some realist observers who were pessimistic about the prospects for Sino-Indian relations in the 1990s. For instance, Monhan Malik states, “Historic rivalries and common sense suggest that a fair amount of tension between these continent-sized neighbors is inevitable” (1993:354). However, today, the 3,500-kilometer Sino-Indian border, over which the two countries fought the 1962 war, is now tranquil. Even when India launched the nuclear tests in 1997 and claimed China was the primary incentive for its acquisition of nuclear weapons, bilateral relations have not suffered a significant setback. Today, in spite of having gone to war with India and in spite of an unresolved border issue, India is the
only country China considers to be a “strategic partner.” To paraphrase Jonathan Holslag, Sino-Indian relations have followed a Himalayan trail, a bumpy road marked by sudden changes in the landscape (2010:76).

**Chindia: a Strategic Partnership**

Like China’s relations with many other developing countries, economic cooperation and trade have dominated Sino-Indian relations since the 2000s. Chinese and Indian leaders’ decisions to form a “strategic partnership” in 2005 opened up a window for the two countries to build a “long-term constructive partnership” for peace and prosperity in the twenty-first century. Jairam Ramesh, India’s Environment Minister, adopted the notion of “Chindia,” to represent the “rise of the rest.” Since 2009, China has become India’s largest single trading partner. However, the trade patterns and economic growth models of China and India appear different. China has relied primarily on exports of manufactures to North America and the European Union. Within manufactures, China has relied heavily on exports of finished goods and labor-intensive goods. India’s exports, by contrast, are frequently of capital and skill-intensive goods and services, such as information technology (IT) in which India has notably outstripped China. Overall, the trade/GDP ratio in China is currently 70 percent versus India’s 25 percent (Varshney 2005:567-569). According to Edward Luce, India has a long way to go before it can match the manufacturing capacity of China, despite its huge potential labor force (2007). While China has emerged as the “factory of the world,” India’s IT industry and service outsourcing industry have

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135 Russia had board wars with China but had been solved in the 1990s; Vietnam had wars with the PRC but was not considered as a strategic partner of China.
136 In 2002, India’s IT exports were almost $10 billion, compared with $1.5 billion from China. Although growth of China’s service and merchandise exports far outpace average growth of world exports, its merchandise exports grew much faster than service exports. In contrast, India’s service exports are growing at about double the rate of its merchandise exports, and if current trends continue, the share of service exports in total exports will exceed 50% in a decade.
gained recognition. It is possible, therefore, that the complementary strengths of the two economies can be exploited for mutual benefit, rather than merely fierce competition (S. Bhattacharya and B. Bhattacharya 2007).

Opportunities for better cooperation and enhanced bilateral economic ties between the two nations exist in many areas, such as manufacturing, services, and investment. Both countries need to cooperate in terms of economic development, not only because they can each benefit from complementary patterns of economic structure, but also because they face similar problems related to economic development. Chinese President Hu Jintao said during his visit to India in 2006, “Asia will dominate the next century if China and India can strengthen their trade and business links,” and he urged turning the relationship “into a bond of good neighborliness and mutually beneficial cooperation” (Holslag 2010:45). As rapidly developing countries with dreams of modernizing their economies, both China and India benefit from globalization. For China and India, the two largest developing countries and emerging markets, economic cooperation can be mutually beneficial.

A Sino-Indian strategic partnership formed in 2005 did not aim at balancing any regional powers, but at promoting the geo-economic buildup of both countries. In the past, the United States, Japan and China would not consider India an important state (Cohen 2001). As Holslag argues, with the announcement of a strategic partnership, Beijing symbolically confirmed India’s status as a friendly power (2010:70). Despite the unsolved border issues, Sino-Indian relations experienced their best period since the 1962 border war in terms of maintaining peace and stability. And a peaceful and stable relationship between China and India—the world’s two most

137 In order to enhance bilateral trade and promote economic cooperation, both China and India have started negotiations for a FTA.
populous countries and fastest growing economies—has profound implications for what constitutes the “rise of the rest” in the twenty-first century.

Despite the growing economic and military capacity of both countries, which has the potential to create a “continuing rivalry” and balancing situation in the region (Malik 1995; Mattoo and Kanti 2000, and Nathan 1999), when Sino-Indian relations entered the twenty-first century, border disputes were no long a major obstacle to develop their relations. Instead, geo-economic cooperation appears to dominate the Sino-Indian relationship.

Conclusion

This chapter has argued that in the post-Mao era, China’s relations with India, Japan, Vietnam, and North Korea have been influenced by China’s contemporary national identity, which gradually moved toward that of a responsible and status quo power compared to China’s revolutionary identity during the Mao era. In sum, in China’s foreign relations with neighboring states, rarely, if ever, did China acquire material gain using its own military might or coercion.

Among the case studies in this chapter, China’s relations with North Korea and Vietnam symbolize asymmetrical relations between a big power and minor powers in international relations. During the Cold War, both China’s strategic interests—to prevent encroachment by the U.S. and its revolutionary anti-hegemonism worked to make Sino-North Korea and Sino-Vietnam relations strong. The Chinese foreign policy shifted during the post-Mao era toward peaceful internationalism, which associated with a policy of defensive posture, conflict avoidance and the promotion of pluralism, accounted for China’s multilateral diplomacy on the Cambodian issue and the North Korean nuclear crisis. Sino-Vietnamese relations deteriorated because of Vietnam’s aggressive policy in the region, and only improved after Vietnam stopped its own provocative foreign policy toward other states. The Sino-North Korean relationship
today is increasingly affected by North Korea’s nuclear policy, a factor influencing regional stability. On many occasions, including the Six-Party Talks and at the UN Security Council, China has used its leverage to push for denuclearization in the Korean Peninsula, aiming at maintaining peace and stability in the region. Thus, China’s identity patterns, rather than solely its material interests and balance of power considerations, serve as complementary tools for explaining its behaviors toward these two small states.

In addition, China’s foreign policy in handling Sino-Vietnamese relations and the North Korean nuclear crisis in the post-Mao era, from a rationalist perspective, also helped to maximize China’s regional power and improved strategic status in the region. In the case of the Sino-Vietnamese border war in 1979, although China did not gain materially by launching a military attack on Vietnam, it effectively curbed the Vietnamese-Soviet encirclement campaign toward China. During the Six-Party Talks on the Korean nuclear crisis, China’s mediation effectively de-escalated the tension in the Korean Peninsula, but non-proliferation in the Korean Peninsula also served China’s strategic interests by preventing both South Korea and Japan from developing their own nuclear weapons programs.

Despite having territorial disputes with both Japan and India, post-Mao era Sino-Japanese and Sino-Indian relations have been moving in different directions. On the one hand, Sino-Indian relations have been upgraded to a “strategic partnership,” focusing on economic cooperation while putting territorial disputes aside. With India, under the influence of peaceful internationalism, territorial disputes have been downplayed compared to the mutual benefits that the two countries gain from a close relationship. On the other hand, Sino-Japanese relations have been locked in chronic historical and territorial disputes. A realist analysis of the increasing Sino-Japanese disputes would be that Japan and China are “ripe for rivalry” in the region as both
countries aim at dominating Asia. A combination of nationalism, power rivalries, historical animosity, arms buildups, and energy needs should lead Sino-Japanese relations to further deteriorate. Although such trends were less prominent in Sino-Indian relations, as each country attempts to maximize its own power, conflict between may be escalated by territorial disputes. In sum, from a rationalist perspective, following the rise of China, Asia as a whole is primed to become the next hot spot of world politics and the moment of reckoning has yet to arrive.

This chapter leaves that the possibility Sino-Japanese relations may still deteriorate further, depending on a mix of factors. Both the Japanese government and the Chinese masses could provoke China’s bitter historical memories of war with Japan. The perception of a non-apologetic Japan infringing on Chinese nationalist sentiment could trigger China’s victimhood identity, thereby allowing hypersensitiveness about sovereignty to shape China’s peaceful tendency. Thus, the Chinese government encounters a dilemma. On the one hand, it needs to contain such aggrieved nationalism in order to maintain regional peace and stability; on the other hand, it needs to harden its position on issues on sovereignty to prevent repeating the humiliations experienced in the past. All these add uncertainties to the future Sino-Japanese relations.
Chapter 7 Conclusion

This dissertation presents patterns of Chinese foreign policy using Chinese national identity as a variable. It uses Chinese national identity to anticipate China’s future foreign policy behavior and its interaction with the liberal international order. This study suggests that the foreign policy behaviors of a resurgent China are too complicated to be explained by a single paradigm, namely realism, liberalism or constructivism. As the previous chapters demonstrate, Chinese foreign policy in different periods of its history follows certain patterns associated with its national identities. Thus, using national identity as a “road map” to define China’s interests and intentions serves as a complement to existing IR theories in explaining Chinese foreign policy. In this concluding chapter, I will first review my major empirical findings and their implications for theories of foreign policy about China. Then, I will ponder the implications of peaceful internationalism for the current liberal world order, particularly on future relations with the United States.

Major Findings on Chinese Foreign Policy

Over the last six decades, realism, liberalism and constructivism, have each provided insights about Chinese foreign policy. However, as China is an ancient and complex country, the behavioral patterns associated with its resurgence are too complicated to be explained by a single approach. In most of the cases studied in this dissertation, Chinese foreign policy was motivated by a mix of geopolitical, economic, and military/security interests, alongside non-material national interests—national identity. National identity, presented in this work, is a complementary national interest that helps to explain both the PRC’s past and current foreign policy behavior. As emphasized in previous chapters, the national identity argument does not
preclude the role of material national interests in conducting foreign policy. In fact, national identity will redefine national interests, not only in terms of rational material interest, but also in terms of the types of interests that are important. Thus, national identity theory provides a useful road map for gauging the direction of a state’s foreign policy.

The contemporary Chinese national identity, which I define as the “phoenix rising” identity, includes components of Confucian identity, victimhood identity and revolutionary internationalism. I argue that Chinese foreign policy driven by the phoenix rising identity has directed China toward peaceful internationalism within an American-led liberal international world. Peaceful internationalism serves as a complementary explanation for Chinese foreign policy behavior over the past thirty years and helps paint a picture of future Chinese foreign policy behavior. In sum, this work does not intend to downplay the merit of established IR theories in understanding China’s foreign policy, but to shed light on China’s foreign policy by taking into consideration the Chinese national identity.

In sum, over the past three decades, IR scholarship on China’s security behavior can be divided into at least three schools. They all have merits, and among them, realism provides a classic understanding of the behavior of a rising power, not just China. However, the liberal and constructivist schools offer more useful frameworks for interpreting China’s foreign policy behavior in the context of its resurgence. While the case studies can be explained through both rationalist and ideational approaches of IR theories, I believe that these two approaches provide complementary, rather than competing answers to the questions.
Victimhood Identity and Chinese Foreign Policy

In both the Mao and post-Mao eras, Chinese national identity, particularly victimhood identity, has influenced China’s foreign policy behavior. For most of the Mao era, China confronted both superpowers, and its victimhood identity associated with the so-called century of humiliation helped explain China’s antagonism toward both superpowers during the bulk of the Cold War era. From the 1840s to the 1940s, China lost a tremendous number of territories and was treated as inferior by the Western powers. In other words, China’s sovereignty and equal status within the international system was absent during the “century of humiliation.” These experiences resulted in China’s victimhood identity, which emphasizes the protection of sovereignty from encroachments by other countries. The ability and the determination to defend its sovereignty functions to bolster the domestic legitimacy of the ruling CCP as well as the state’s international legitimacy as a “responsible and non-expansive power.” In sum, China’s previous traumatic introduction to the international system has had a constraining influence upon the way that Chinese elites view sovereignty and intervention since the PRC was founded.

The cases that I analyzed on China’s victimhood demonstrate that actual, even potential infringement on China’s sovereignty and perceived humiliations have played major roles in Chinese foreign policy in the past six decades. Perceived infringement on China’s sovereignty and national autonomy drove Sino-Soviet relations from amity to enmity. Taiwan’s separation would be less threatening if it were not viewed through the lens of China’s 150 years of humiliation at the hands of Western imperialist powers. Chinese leaders would not have seen the U.S. policy on Taiwan crucial for CCP rule if they did not also believe that Taiwanese separation might trigger another national humiliation after the Communist revolution succeeded and supposedly brought the country out of “century of humiliation.” This effect would then risk the
CCP’s claim to preserve China’s territorial integrity, as well as the legitimacy of its rule. As for the Sino-Indian border war in 1962, despite sharing the experience of victimhood, because of each country’s commitment to “never repeat historical humiliations,” China and India were both unyielding on territorial disputes. Eventually a border war broke out and, when China won the war, it did not actually claim any material interests from it.

There is no denying that other factors also contribute to explaining for the above events. For instance, in analyzing the Sino-Soviet split of the late 1950s and the border war in 1969, an alternative understanding would be that a Sino-Soviet rivalry within the Communist camp turned into Sino-Soviet confrontation. In initiating the Sino-Soviet border clashes, the PRC was using force to alter long-term trends that were running against China’s security interests, after concluding that the Soviets posed a greater threat to China than the Americans. Mao’s strategy was to attack the Soviets in order to send a tough signal before Moscow was fully ready to launch a war with China. Nonetheless, Mao miscalculated the Soviet response, thus failing to achieve the goal of “internal balancing” against the Soviet Union. In sum, both rational considerations and identity can account for China’s relations with the United States and the Soviet Union during the Mao era.

On security matters, the so-called century of humiliation also serves as a double-edged sword in the post-Mao era. China may bandwagon with the superpowers on military issues that are not directly involved with it in order to avoid direct confrontation. However, on issues that China deems to be its “core” national interests, such as the issue of Taiwanese independence, its posture remains firm and unyielding. Beijing advocates the peaceful settlement of conflicts, but on both material and psychological matters, it may stand up to former colonial powers in serious
conflicts of interest. Furthermore, as a former victim of imperialist powers, its empathy toward other developing countries has a significant influence on its foreign policy.\textsuperscript{138}

The cases best reflecting China’s post-Mao era national identity are the 1999 bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade and the 2001 EP-3 collision in the South China Sea. In both cases, the Chinese government firmly demanded formal apologies from the U.S. as the only ways of solving the crises. In both cases, the Chinese government and media made a connection between the incidents and the “century of humiliation.” From the perspective of national identity, it was this sense of victimhood and righteousness that led the Chinese government to demand formal apologies, which were largely symbolic issues in international politics. For China, both incidents fit into the Chinese “victimization narrative” that reflected China’s long history of suffering at the hands of Western powers, and apologies from the U.S. were a way to claim moral justice, a precondition for maintaining a normal relationship with the U.S. Furthermore, seeking apologies rather than revenge indicated a mild and peaceful response from the Chinese government toward perceived humiliations, and thus served China’s national interests—preventing a derailment of Sino-U.S. relations over non-essential bilateral issues.

Another case that illustrated the claim that China’s national identity has played a significant role in making Chinese foreign policy in the post-Mao era is the deterioration of Sino-Japanese relations over issues of history and sovereignty. The Japanese government’s attitude toward its crimes during WWII, specifically Japanese leaders’ repeated visits to the Yasukuni Shrine despite opposition from, not only China, but also South Korea, were considered deeply

\textsuperscript{138} For example, non-intervention in the domestic affairs of sovereign states, UN votes, and long standing aid to Africa. In addition, Empathy for—not just interest concurrence with—the “underdog” is reflected in its foreign policy principles toward developing countries (for example, identification with developing states in the UN and the WTO or refusal to join the G-8).
offensive to the Chinese people. Such incidents might have been a Japanese domestic issue, were it not for the symbolism of paying respects to alleged war criminals have hindered Sino-Japanese relations. Despite China and Japan having mutual economic interests and the fact that more than six decades has passed since the end of WWII, China’s bitter historical memories of the wars with Japan still influence China’s foreign policy toward Japan. Furthermore, such matters have been worse once the two countries locked themselves into territorial disputes over the status of the Diaoyu Islands. In recent years, the Chinese government has been increasingly assertive on the claim of its sovereignty over these uninhabited rocks. From a Chinese national identity perspective, after the Japanese government “nationalized” these islands, without assertive actions to reclaim the Diaoyu Islands, they would have suffered a repeat of the victimization experienced during the “century of humiliations.” On the one hand, although the Diaoyu Islands do not pose much strategic or economic significance compared to the China’s overall economic relations with Japan, the Chinese government had little choice but to stand up firmly against the Japanese claims triggered by the aggrieved nationalism in Chinese society. On the other hand, the Chinese government has so far acted carefully not to make the disputes a trigger to alter China’s tendency toward a peaceful foreign policy. Specifically, it has opted not to use force to resolve disputes with Japan. However, if the confrontations persist, national pride and aggrieved nationalism might triumph over a rational calculation of costs and benefits, and China may pursue a more aggressive foreign policy toward Japan.

In sum, by using China’s national identity to explain China’s relationship with other states, I aim to add non-material interests into the basket of China’s national interests, thereby providing a complementary understanding of China’s foreign policy behavior for the past six decades.
In the case study sections of the dissertation, besides ideational reasons I analyzed, realist calculations of the PRC’s foreign policy clearly influenced China’s decisions to enter the Korean War and to form the Sino-Soviet alliance during the 1950s. Notwithstanding the risk of joining the Korean War, the fact that the U.S. had occupied Taiwan, and the perception that the U.S. was planning an invasion of the Chinese mainland, pushed Chinese elites to fight the Americans in Korea, rather than later in China. Thus, at a time when the PRC had barely emerged from its own civil war, fighting the U.S. was not aimed at balancing against the U.S., but was considered vital to China’s own stability. However, the side effect of the war, in which a weak military power stood up to the world’s strongest power, was to strengthen China’s confidence in anti-imperialism, an important component of China’s revolutionary internationalism.

China’s alignment with the Soviets in the early 1950s is another case that illustrates realist considerations in foreign policy. However, from the perspective of national identity theory, such an alignment was problematic from the very beginning. On the one hand, China’s economic and strategic concerns were the predominant reasons for the alignment with the Soviet Union. Not only did the Soviet Union support the Chinese Communist revolution, but it also provided material aid and diplomatic support to the new regime, something China could not obtain from the U.S. at that time. On the other hand, the Chinese government made significant concessions, reflecting a compromise of its sovereignty and equality with the Soviets. Thus, aligning with the Soviet Union entailed a trade-off for the Chinese: tolerating an inferior status in order to maintain regime stability. Nonetheless, a weakness of realism is revealed by the Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s. By simultaneously opposing both superpowers, China’s foreign policy behavior
contradicts realist explanations, which would predict that China would remain in aligned with the Soviet Union.

In the post-Mao era, when China has been increasingly integrated into the world, balance of power and balance-of-threat behaviors have been largely absent from Chinese security behavior. Balance-of-power theory predicts that a rising Chinese military and economic power will transfer its power to balance against U.S. primacy. However, such behavior has been missing since the end of the Cold War. In the beginning of the post-Mao era, the Chinese economy was less than one-tenth of that of the United States. Furthermore, China has neither tried to align with U.S. nor to balance against it. China’s increasingly close relations with Russia, and even India, Brazil and other developing countries, could potentially be considered external balancing behavior. However, there is little evidence that China is constructing anti-U.S. alliances or undermining U.S. alliances globally or regionally, and its behavior is nowhere near the degree to which the Soviet Union competed with the U.S. during the Cold War.

However, China’s post-Cold War security behavior is consistent with the power maximization tendency predicted by neo-realism. Post-Mao era China has seized every opportunity to maximize its economic and military power in the region. Nonetheless, China’s power maximizing behavior in the post-Cold War era is not rooted completely in insecurity generated by structural changes in the international system. It is also rooted in its national identity, in particular, its identity of being a past victim from military and economic backwardness. Thus, the Chinese leadership believes that a relatively peaceful post-Cold War era provides a window of opportunity to increase China’s relative capabilities rapidly and thereby enhance its international status in order to prevent itself from potentially being bullied by others.
Liberalism and Chinese Foreign Policy

In the post-Mao era, on most of my cases, Chinese foreign policy behavior conforms to neo-liberal expectations in some degrees. The Sino-Soviet reconciliation of the 1980s and the Sino-Russian partnership of the 1990s clearly illustrate that the pursuit of economic cooperation and development trumped China’s concerns of military security against the former USSR and later Russia. China’s post-Mao era identity change allowed it to focus on economic development as the United States and the Soviet Union intensified their hostility during the Reagan years of the 1980s. On the one hand, with the phoenix rising identity and a pragmatic foreign policy, China was able to have a balanced relationship with both the U.S. and the Soviet Union. On the other hand, China’s “three conditions” for Sino-Soviet reconciliation, which took the two countries almost a decade to achieve, also indicated China’s anti-hegemonic national identity.

After the end of the Cold War, Sino-Russian relations mainly focused on economic cooperation and stability in the region, rather than military alignment. From China’s vantage point, Russia’s role in the Sino-Russian relationship is as a provider of energy resources for China’s economic development, and not a strategic partner for confronting or counterbalancing U.S. power. As a declining power, the Russian motivation in the Sino-Russian partnership also appears to be an economic one—keeping Russian industries and energy exports afloat—and not primarily an anti-American strategic one. From the national identity perspective, a rising China has not further exploited Russia’s weakness to gain extra economic and military advantages through a strategic partnership.

In the post-Mao era, Chinese foreign policy toward its neighbors also illustrates a liberal approach to international relations. Realism would predict that small powers like Vietnam and
North Korea, both of which maintained close ties with China during the Mao era, ought to make alliances with China. In return, China would provide security umbrellas to these countries or use them to balance against the U.S. Nonetheless, China’s multilateral diplomacy in solving the Cambodian issues, its active brokerage on the Six-Party Talks in solving the North Korean nuclear crisis, and its increasingly close relations with India in the post-Mao era, illustrate that the neo-liberal perspective is more useful to understand China’s foreign policy toward small states.

In fact, in the pursuit of economic development and regional stability, China made compromises in military security. Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia in 1978 pushed ASEAN countries closer to China, and in the UN they formed a successful united front in blocking Vietnam’s expansion in Southeast Asia. It was China’s first major endeavor of multilateral diplomacy in an international dispute since the PRC was founded. In the end, after more than a decade’s negotiations, Vietnam retreated from Cambodia peacefully and regional stability was restored. In the North Korean nuclear crisis case, when North Korea threatened the peace and stability of the region, along with the U.S., China made efforts to help rein in North Korea through the Six-Party Talks and the UN Security Council. The Chinese government appeared to believe that stability on the peninsula would best be realized by economic development. In the end, China’s efforts to curb North Korea’s nuclear ambitions appear not to have been sufficient to change Pyongyang’s policy since the multilateral negotiations on the North Korean nuclear issue have thus far been fruitless. Nonetheless, there is no evidence that China is using North Korea as a buffer state or to balance against the U.S.

The post-Mao era’s Sino-Indian relations, from enmity to partnership, can also be explained through neo-liberalism. Since the post-Mao era, China has put aside issues of territorial disputes
with India, and effectively brought Sino-Indian relations back to the path of normalization and development. In the 1990s, both sides reached agreements that border disputes should not affect economic cooperation. On account of this concern, the Chinese government has been restrained in response to India’s 1997 nuclear tests. Even after China was labeled the primary “threat” to India, Sino-Indian relations resumed normalcy after this brief setback was over. Today, China and India have forged a strategic partnership primarily concerned with the development of the two countries’ economies and strengthened economic cooperation. Although not all realist observers predict that the current Sino-Indian peaceful and cooperative relations can persist, for the pursuit of mutual geo-economic benefits explain the tranquility of Sino-Indian relations in the post-Mao era.

Multiple Theories and Chinese Foreign Policy

In the end, Chinese foreign policy in some of the cases I studied can be explained by multiple theories, each providing partially but persuasive explanations. In these cases, the causes of Beijing’s foreign policy behavior are eclectic—integrating collective memory, pragmatic calculations, and external normative and material influences within its frame. In IR studies, it has gradually become acceptable to have an eclectic approach toward foreign policy behavior. In fact, some versions of liberalism converge with some types of constructivism with regard to the significance of ideas, values, and multilateral institutions in constraining actors and reshaping their preferences (Haas 2001). In addition, many constructivists share with classical formulations of liberalism a normative concern for progress predicated on the idea that the relevant actors and their interests are not fixed, but variable, embedded in a wider set of social relationships and amenable to the pressure of social norms and moral persuasion (Reus-Smit 2001).
In the case of the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis and the case of China’s 2009 refusal to form a G-2 with the U.S., both involve rational and ideational considerations in China’s foreign policy making. In the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, the cause was the U.S. granting a visa to the Taiwanese president, considered by the Chinese as both a “deliberate provocation” and a change of U.S. foreign policy from the “one China policy.” Such an overreaction was rooted not in a rational calculation on U.S. politics, but more of a demonstration of China’s non-compromising stance on its sovereignty claim over Taiwan and perceived humiliations from the U.S. side, which was also associated with China’s own victimhood identity. For a rationalist, the issuing of an entry visa to the Taiwanese president was largely a trivial issue, and may not have resulted in China’s antagonism. But the Chinese government, facing an increasingly popular Taiwanese independence movement, was also eager to know the political intentions of the U.S. on this issue. Hence, eventually by using the tactics of missile launches over the Taiwan Strait, the Chinese government aimed to send signals to the U.S. that it was serious about deterring Taiwanese independence, and the U.S. would bear heavy costs if it confronted the “one China policy.” As a response, the U.S. also sent its own signals to the Chinese that it was serious in defending Taiwan by deploying two aircraft carriers to the Taiwan Strait. In the end, both sides got signals from each other, and neither side had any intention of changing the status quo, thus, the crisis was solved peacefully. In sum, both rationalist and Chinese national identity theories can explain the Chinese foreign policy moves on the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis.

In addition, China’s refusal to form a G-2 with the U.S. can be explained by both rationalist and ideational factors in Chinese foreign policy. From the perspective of Chinese national identity, joining the G-2 to co-manage world affairs with the U.S. indicated that China was willing to become a “co-hegemon” with the U.S. However, such a stance would have been
antithetical to China’s long-held national identity of anti-hegemonism. In addition, China has been associated with the developing countries and held a non-alignment foreign policy dating back to the 1960s. Instead, the post-Mao era Chinese foreign policy has been advocating pluralism in world affairs. All of these ideational factors moved China to oppose the G-2 proposal. From a rationalist perspective, the Chinese government had reasons to doubt the sincerity of the U.S. offer of G-2 status to China. It might have been from the practical perspective that the U.S. needed China during the Global Financial Crisis, but once the crisis had passed, the U.S. was not ready to share world leadership role with China. In addition, China lacked the material capacity, particularly compatible military strength to match the U.S. All these rational considerations may also be reasons that the Chinese government turned down the G-2 proposal. The above cases combined both a rationalist and ideational understanding of Chinese foreign policy and, in the end, it is difficult to conclude which approaches serve as a better framework to understand Chinese foreign policy.

Implications for IR Theory of China’s Resurgence

Following these three IR paradigms, current scholarship on the behavior of a resurgent China is divided into three schools, each of which anticipates its consequences for the current liberal world order. Among the pessimists, the “China threat” school exemplifies the realist paradigm. It argues that a rising China, like all rising powers in history, causes instability in the existing system by threatening the dominant powers. The “engagement school,” following the neo-liberalism paradigm, argues that since the late 1970s China has benefited from the existing geo-economic state of affairs, and has followed the rules and norms established by the Western countries. Hence, China is a “stakeholder” rather than a challenger to the status quo of the current international system. Finally, an “alternative civilization school,” as opposed to the
standard of “civilization” (a Westphalian system), follows the constructivist approach, which emphasizes the importance of ideas and norms in international relations. This approach argues that in order to explain the foreign policy behavior of a resurgent China, one must first understand the historical foundations of East Asia and China. My work employs this approach, using Chinese national identity in different eras to understand and explain the contemporary Chinese foreign policy behavior.

**Realism and the Resurgence of China**

Classical realists and structural realists converge in their assumption that great powers balance against the military strength of emerging powers (Waltz 1979; Morgenthau 1967). Realism, drawn in particular from the experiences of refugee scholars’ from wartime Europe, sees every rising power as a threat (Hoffman 1977). This balance-of-power theory proposes that states join in alliances in order to avoid domination by stronger powers. Mearsheimer, notably, argues that China will follow in the footsteps of other great powers, and is bound to be “unpeaceful” (2006, 2009). Lynch argues that realism remains the *Ti* (basis) of China’s foreign policy decision-making (2009). Others focus on China’s growing military capabilities that pose threats to its neighbors’ security, and may eventually threaten U.S. security (Goldstein 1997; Shenkar 2006; Fishman 2005). Friedberg sees the U.S. as failing to act expeditiously enough to counter China’s growing strength and offers a “wake-up call” to U.S. leaders and policymakers arguing that a contest for supremacy between the two countries will shape the international politics of the twenty-first century (2011). Martin Jacques believes that because it is not a stakeholder in the existing order, a resurgent China will demand new agendas for organizing the basic logic and principles of international order. Thus, he believes that China will use its growing power to push world politics in an illiberal direction (2009). Sharing the assumption of the
inevitable collision between China and the U.S., Hugh White argues that the two need to reach a power-sharing agreement in Asia to prevent a military conflict (2013). For instance, White argues that President Obama’s policy of reasserting U.S. primacy in Asia to contain China could be dangerous. In sum, realists tend to believe that a resurgent China threatens the dominance of the U.S. both militarily and economically.

Among modified realist arguments, Henry Kissinger attributes China’s rapid military buildup in recent years to the avoidance of encirclement by the United States and its allies (2011). He anticipates that the United States and China will fall into strategic conflict, similar to the pre-World War I European structure, with each bloc seeking to undermine the others’ influence and reach (Kissinger 2011:518). Still other scholars speculate that domestic pressures within China—increasing income and wealth disparities, divergent interests among different government institutions, and problems with the legal system—may affect China’s international behavior (Peerenboom 2007). David Shambaugh, thus, calls China an “incomplete superpower” with a series of competing and sometimes conflicting international identities (2013). Overall, for these scholars, China lacks the capacities to match the United States, despite its resurgence.

The “China threat” arguments suffer from deficiencies on both theoretical and empirical grounds. Theoretically, realist theory in the West is extrapolated from a predominantly Western historical IR experience and draws heavily from the patterns of the first-time rising powers such as Britain, Napoleonic France, post-Meiji Japan, Germany after Bismarck, and the Soviet Union. European countries and Japan asserted their newfound power in relentless expansions at the expense of other nations (Hsiung 2009, 2012). This theory has an inherent weakness in not being able to account for how a former leading power returns after a long eclipse. Although China was the world’s leading economy and the center of an Asian system of international relations from
the eighth and ninth centuries until the Western powers arrived in the 1820s, international relations scholars have long ignored China’s behavior during its ancient predominance. Among the exceptions, Needham (1978), Frank (2004), Mahbubani (2008), Hui (2005), Kang (2007, 2010) and Hsiung (2009, 2012) provide good historical and analytical insights on what may be termed China’s long-term predominance (713-1820 A.D.). In addition, as Steven Van Evera right points out, realism fails to “go beyond geopolitics to geo-economics” (2008).

Empirically, ample evidence points to the opposite of realist assumptions. David Kang has demonstrated effectively that the East Asian states are not balancing against China but accommodating it (2008). Kang criticizes the realist assertions that sooner or later Asian states will balance against China by arguing that in the absence of a specific time frame, the “just wait” response is unfalsifiable and mere rhetorical wordplay designed to avoid troubling evidence (2003:64). In addition, Taylor Fravel shows that China has rarely exploited its military superiority to attain its disputed territories. For example, out of its twenty-three territorial disputes with neighboring countries, all of which result from imperial intrusions or meddling in modern times, China has offered concessions in seventeen, or over 70%, of these conflicts (2008). Finally, another weakness of the realist interpretations of China is that they come mostly from scholars who do not specialize in Chinese or Asian political scholarship. Their analyses thus proceed from a priori assumption that may not fit with a country that is as large, complex and ancient as China. The realist literature on China as a rising power is rarely, if at all, informed by knowledge of historical and contemporary Chinese texts or of China’s foreign policy behavior during its long predominance in history. All of these factors are crucial for understanding contemporary Chinese behavior.
In sum, my findings demonstrate that, although in some cases realist theory can correctly explain China’s foreign policy behavior, such as the initial Sino-Soviet alliance in the early 1950s, exclusive use of realist theory to explain all Chinese foreign policy behavior over the past six decades suffers from shortcomings. For example, in the later Mao era, it fails to account for the shift in Sino-Soviet relations from amity to enmity, and in the post-Mao era, it fails to account for the fact that China has maintained stable relationships with both the U.S. and Russia. Finally, a single-country test of realist propositions is insufficient to either confirm or undermine all realist claims. Despite China’s being a major power that should be more acutely sensitive to structural constraints, this study merely points to some of the potential shortcomings of the realist paradigm.

*Liberalism and the Resurgence of China*

Liberalism focuses on economic integration substantiates the cooperative bent of China, particularly in the post-Mao era. This approach argues that great powers can induce the alignment of secondary powers through the use of strategic trade and investment policies (Hirschman 1986). Through mercantilist behavior, states with disproportionate economic power can take advantage of weaker states’ dependence on their large markets. In this way, economic dynamics can be carried over to bear on strategic alignment behavior. The rise of China is an excellent example to test this theory since China's power in East Asia is due in large part to its position at the center of the region’s increasingly integrated economy.

Indeed, area specialists tend to support this point of view that China has been learning and engaging the world since the late 1970s. Among them, the MIT economist Edward Steinfeld argues that China’s growth is fortifying American commercial supremacy because “China is playing our game” and thus reinforcing the dominance of U.S. companies and regulatory
institutions (2010). John Ikenberry argues that although China has yet to become fully embedded in the liberal international order, it nonetheless profits from its existence, which reduces the possibility that an alternative global order will be created (2011:9). Ian Johnston, the IR expert on China at Harvard, explores the degree to which Chinese leaders are maintaining the status quo and indicates that China is becoming increasingly disposed to international norms and rules (2003). Similarly, Fred Bergsten suggests that the United States might take steps to solidify a constructive relationship with China (2008). In contrast to the realist approach, this school places economic cooperation and engagement with China as the primary concern for foreign policy making in the West.

Notwithstanding its explanatory powers, the exclusive reliance on neoliberalism to understand all of China’s post-Mao era foreign policy has its dissatisfaction. Unlike liberal aspirations that a resurgent China will further integrate with liberal norms and rules, China’s peaceful internationalism associated with its national identity has its own distinct characteristics. Peaceful internationalism differs from the liberal order in its objection to the imposition of one country’s norms and practices on other states, especially if coerced. First, China’s hypersensitivity over sovereignty issues and assertiveness about national autonomy are unlikely to be compatible with such liberal notions as the universality of democracy and human rights. Second, its defensive posture on the use of force as a means of last resort contradicts Western norms of “humanitarian interventions,” and doubts the morality of “democratic peace.” Third, China’s non-alignment policy prevents it from further engaging with Western countries on matters of sovereignty and national security. For instance, China’s refusal to join the G-2 (China and the United States) arrangement reflected such concerns. Last, China generally opposes unilateralism in world politics while supporting multilateralism and mechanisms for the peaceful
resolution of conflicts, contradicting the privilege of powerful states in a liberal world. For the above reasons, I argue that China’s foreign policy behavior cannot be fully accounted for by liberal theory.

**Constructivism and The Resurgent of China**

Constructivist theory, focusing on culture, history and institutions, provides alternative causal mechanisms to explain foreign policy behavior that defies rationalist analyses. It is based on the fundamental view that ideational structures mediate how actors perceive, construct, and reproduce the institutional and material structures they inhabit as well as their own roles and identities within them. (Johnston 2001; Wendt 1999; Finnemore 1996). In this perspective, China’s security behavior is rooted in East Asia’s past normative and security order, and should thus be treated differently from the European Westphalia model. Not surprisingly, area experts again dominate this line of argument. David Kang, an IR scholar on East Asia at USC focuses on historical and identity factors that provide a stable hierarchical structure of power relations in East Asia both in the long periods prior to European colonialism and in the present (2007, 2010). Amitav Acharya, an IR scholar at American University, argues for an analysis that focuses on emerging East Asian regional norms, combining these with institutions to explain the stable balance of power in East Asia (2009). James Hsiung, an IR scholar on China at NYU, argues that IR theory mainly draws examples from first-time rising powers in the international system, but has nothing to say about a country rising a second time. Looking back to how China behaved in the past can be used to enhance our understanding of China’s current behavior (2009, 2012). Victoria Hui, a political scientist at the University of Notre Dame, argues that the origins of state making in China and Europe are different, as they have different views on inter-state relations (2005). These “alternative civilization” perspectives are particularly useful to understand the rise
of a non-Western country, as it adopts a view similar to path dependency theory drawn from economics. Because China is different and has behaved historically in a certain way, the country will behave differently than other powerful states or rising powers today.

Constructivism is not a specific theory of international relations, but an approach in understanding state’s behavior in addition to material interests. The alternative civilization arguments primarily explain, “what China is not,” but fall short of answering “what China is.” Among these scholars, Peter Katzenstein calls the resurrection of new Confucianism a state ideology, in the sense that it revives Confucianism as a hierarchical, reciprocal, and morally based value system in contemporary China (2012:28). Nevertheless, studies in this school have yet to give sufficient attention to changes in China’s self-perception and identities in two significant historical periods: the hundred years of semi-colonialism and humiliation from the mid-1800s to the mid-1900s and since the communist revolution of 1949. The gaps between China’s traditions and present behavior need to be bridged. For instance, Kim, Fidler and Ganguly propose that an “Eastphalia” approach will emerge as Eastern states grow and curtail the influence of Western ideas and power that have dominated the international system, particularly after the 2008 global economic crisis (2009).

My study, using Chinese national identity as a variable, aims to enrich the current constructivist literature. I identify the phoenix rising identity as the contemporary Chinese national identity, a synthesis of China’s past identities— the Confucian identity, the victimhood identity and the identity of revolutionary internationalism—to understand and explain China’s foreign policy in the post-Mao era. I argue that China’s contemporary foreign policy behavior is influenced by the five patterns associated with the phoenix rising identity, resulting ultimately in peaceful internationalism.
In response to the neo-realist argument that a rising China will de-stabilize the current world order by challenging U.S. primacy, China’s rise is, in fact, supportive of the stability of the current world order. However, it also seeks to amend the liberal order to reflect to China’s own national interests. The case studies of the Mao era, when compared with those of the post-Mao era, demonstrate that Chinese national identity has played an important, if not determining, role in the making of Chinese foreign policy.

In sum, in the post-Mao era, following its resurgence, China will face a trade-off between the erosion of such a narrow idea of protecting sovereignty and the provision of more public goods to the world. That is to say, the growing interest in China of portraying itself as a responsible member of the international community has pushed the Chinese to make more compromises on issues regarding the sovereignty-intervention nexus. But faced with perceived provocations from countries associated with the historical suffering of China, a more aggrieve Chinese foreign policy may also be an option for the Chinese government to adopt in order not to repeat “the century of humiliations.”

**Implications for the Future Liberal World Order**

In spite of the endogenous historical and domestic factors that account for the emergence of China’s phoenix rising identity and its pursuit of peaceful internationalism, the fact that they mesh together could only be possible under the post-Cold War world order, namely the American-led liberal international order. In this order, the U.S. has been the dominant power since the end of the Cold War. However, the U.S.-led liberal international order was created and has evolved over the past 60 years largely without China’s participation. Consequently, contemporary China maintains a dual function in this order: as a beneficiary and a potential reformist power. China has interests and responsibilities both to maintain the current world
order, as well as to amend the system in accordance with its own identity and vision. Facing this dilemma, IR scholars have offered different analyses anticipating the impact of a rising China on the existing world order.

The vast majority of the nations in the world have lived and live in an American-led liberal international world. The rise of the United States as a dominant power after the end of WWII was accompanied by the rise of its identity and a grand vision of a new world order. To quote one liberal scholar, this amounts to an “order that is relatively open, rule-based, and progressive” (Ikenberry 2011:1-2). President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points speech to Congress delivered in 1918 was arguably the most important statement of American foreign policy in the twentieth century (Ikenberry 2009:10). President Wilson was eager to build a new world order in which the United States would lead but not dominate the world in order to make it a better place.139 Although President Wilson’s idea of liberal internationalism was not accepted by other powers at that time, most of his ideas were advanced and became the basis of American foreign policy. Even realist scholars like Henry Kissinger concedes, “Wilsonianism is the dominant tradition of American foreign policy” (1994:30).

There are two Chinas speaking of the relations with the American-led liberal world order. One is the China before and during the Mao era, which was largely precluded from participating

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139 According to John Ikenberry, six ideas make up Wilsonianism. First, a peaceful order must be built on a community of democratic states; second, free trade and socioeconomic exchange have a modernizing and civilizing effect on states; third, international law and cooperation can promote peace and strengthen the fabric of international community; fourth, a stable and peaceful order must be built around a “community of power;” fifth, democracy, trade, law, collective security were possible as the world was moving in a progressive and modernizing direction; in the end, the United States was at the vanguard of this movement and it had special responsibilities to lead, direct, and inspire the world (2009:11-13).
in the liberal international world. The other is the China of the post-Mao era, which is not only a beneficiary, but also increasingly a “stakeholder” in the current world order.

When American liberal internationalism was formed in the early twentieth century, China was precluded from either making or participating in the world order. When President Wilson laid out the Fourteen Points at the Conference of Versailles in 1919, despite standing next to Allied countries, China’s Shandong province was transferred from a defeated Germany to Japan. Feeling it was treated unequally and deprived of international justice, the Chinese government became the only victorious country not to sign the Treaty of Versailles. The May Fourth Movement, which was launched by furious students to protest the treatment China received from the Western powers during the conference, was considered one of the defining events leading to the Chinese communist revolution. After the CCP won the civil war against the KMT government supported by the U.S. in 1949, the PRC was once again precluded from the mainstream international community. There were no formal diplomatic relationships between China and the West for two decades. The PRC had no seat in the United Nations as it would not accept “two Chinas”— the coexistence of mainland China and Taiwan in the UN or any international organization. The Korean War during the 1950s was actually a war between the PRC and the U.S.-led UN forces. For China, back to the 1950s and the 1960s, international organizations were dominated by the Western powers, and in them, developing countries like itself would not find the justice and equality they promised. China only rejoined the international community in 1971 when Taiwan was stripped of its seat in the United Nations. An embrace of the market economy and free trade came seven years later, only after Deng Xiaoping regained power in 1978.
In the post-Mao era, China has become a beneficiary of a liberal international world order. In a little more than three decades’ time, China has become the second largest economy in the world next to the United States. Given its current economic growth rate, it will surpass the United States to become the world largest economy measured by Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) by the end of 2016. On the other hand, the liberal world order has been built around free trade, open markets, and capitalism organized internationally as opposed to national, regional or imperial lines (Ikenberry 2007:15). The United States does not only serve as the protector of a liberal international order, but also the engine of global economic growth, provider of public goods of security, protector of market openness, and sponsor of rules and institutions (15).

Given that China benefits from the peace, stability and development of the current world order, China has no reason to challenge or even overthrow it. Nonetheless, instead of completely embracing the liberal international order, China has reservations about the universality of democracy and human rights. As Rana Mitter observes, China appears to have been gradually socialized into the Wilsonian international order, however, Chinese at all levels of society have always found talk of self-determination and the restoration of China’s sovereignty much less convincing than those in the West (2003:213). Instead, led by its national identity, China advocates an idea and a policy to promote non-conflictual, non-hegemonic and non-unilateral mechanisms of dispute resolution, which I term peaceful internationalism, in essence a pluralist international environment as an amendment to the current liberal order. Similar to the formation of American liberal internationalism in the twentieth century, it is logical to see the formation of

peaceful internationalism influenced by contemporary Chinese national identity (“Phoenix rising” identity) over the past three decades.

Is China’s peaceful internationalism compatible with a liberal world order? In history, the rise of a great power is accompanied with the rise of its national identity. Identity, for some historians and political scientists, is also a dimension of power (Mann 1986; Doyle 1986; Lieven 2001). In the early twentieth century, the rise of the United States symbolized the rise of liberal internationalism, which later competed with the communist world order and triumphed. If history repeats itself, China’s resurgence will be accompanied by the rise of peaceful internationalism.

Some liberal scholars argue that the liberal world order has been challenged by the so-called “rise of the rest,” particularly the rise of China, not just as an economic superpower, but as a different civilization embedded in different identities and cultures (Ikenberry 2008). For the U.S., the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s also symbolized the vindication of the Wilsonian vision. Using the words of John Ikenberry, after the end of the Cold War, a distinctive type of liberal international order was created: a liberal hegemonic order, within which “the United States did not just encourage open and rule-based order, it became the hegemonic organizer and manager of that order” (2011:2). During this period, the United States enjoyed special rights and privileges (2). In addition, the 2008 global financial crisis and the subsequent world economic downturn originated in the United States and spread to other Western countries, further demonstrating that the model of liberal capitalism may have internal flaws that can damage the reputation of the United States even without a rising China. Despite recognizing the crisis of the

\[\text{141}\text{ However, the crisis of the order gradually erupts in two dimensions. In a short term, it was caused by the unilateralism of President George W. Bush’s “war on terror,” the invasion of Iraq and the skepticism about multilateral rules. When the world order gradually becomes unipolar, the incentives for the United States to bind itself to the global rules and institutions have diminished as seen during the “war on terror.”}\]
liberal world order, liberal scholars argue that it is a crisis of governance, rather than a crisis of principles, and that it can be amended through political bargains. In sum, liberals see the current world order as hierarchical with liberal characteristics, and this foundation is still strong given the dominant power of the United States and an array of postwar rules and international institutions (Ikenberry 2011:7).

In the dissertation, according to the ideas and policies embedded in China’s peaceful internationalism, China’s resurgence may undermine certain special rights and privileges the U.S. enjoys. But essentially, peaceful internationalism and American-led liberal internationalism share many fundamental principles, such as the market economy, inter-state cooperation and international institutions. In order to maintain regional peace and stability, the system must guarantee the survival and coexistence of states, strong or weak, in a system of sovereign states. My work provides little evidence that a resurgent China exploits its own unequal power over subordinate states through alliance systems or imperial systems, or that it will move to balance against the United States in the twenty-first century.

Currently, China is a “stakeholder” in the current world order, and the United States needs to engage further with emerging powers, such as China, through a new bargain of power and shared interests. According to John Ikenberry, the United States needs to “renegotiate its relationship with the rest of the world…giving up some of the rights and privileges” (2011:10). With regard to future Sino-U.S. relations, as China becomes a dominant state, the United States needs to engage further with it, while yielding to it in various ways (356).

On the other hand, China’s phoenix rising identity can be a double-edge sword. It can feed, amidst China’s material rise, a rising populism that views China’s frictions with other
countries through the lens of victimhood and self-righteousness. In recent years, populist nationalists have written books with titles like “China Can Say No” and “China Is Unhappy,” complaining about the West’s perceived unjust treatment of contemporary China from human rights criticisms to military sanctions. Such populists urge the Chinese government to stand up firmly against any type of provocation in foreign affairs and grumble about its characteristic wimpiness.

Though the government ignores such voices, Chinese media does not always do so. In a frantically commercialized world that is today’s China, even state owned media try to “catch eyeballs” by going the sensational route. Hawkish pundits from the military get on the TV to comment on latest international conflicts. Though they often get things wrong, their neo-nationalism can be “chicken soup” for some segments of the population who may struggle precariously to survive in China’s Darwinian market economy today but somehow find solace and pride in China’s overall rise. With the booming of social media, such populism can constrain even an authoritarian government in external disputes involving sovereign issues, such as territorial disputes in the East and South China seas. For a government that stakes its legitimacy on overcoming the “century of humiliation,” it can be difficult to take less than non-compromising stands on those disputes. Thus one observes the interesting but sustained phenomenon that the Chinese state avoids conflict in those disputed areas, but maintains hardline an unyielding stand on sovereignty.

Finally, China’s foreign policy pattern of non-alignment may not always promote peace in the large sense. For it entails that unlike the United States, China has no intention or mechanism to mobilize a coalition of to exercise collective power in dealing with global crises, security or humanitarian. Moreover, there is not even moral justification for collective
intervention in China’s paradigm of peaceful internationalism, as it may involve violating sovereignty of the intervened states. This aspect of China’s peaceful internationalism, thus, may serve and benefit China itself more than it can be an alternative to the current liberal order.

In retrospect, contemporary Chinese foreign policy moves toward peaceful internationalism. Internationalism differs from unilateralism and hegemonism in that it substitutes the idea of the cooperation of free nations for the idea of a single world dominion, and implies a belief that social well being is best served by supporting international institutions (Legro 2000:256). China endorses the virtues of stability and economic prosperity in a liberal world order. However, it is increasingly dissatisfied with the imposition of the “standard of civilizations” on other states, that is, the use of one’s own normative paradigms of universality, rationality and secularity to judge other states, despite the latter’s different cultural and historical legacies.

China can best be conceptualized as a reformist power in the current international system or a pursuer of “peaceful internationalism,” which is both an idea and a policy to promote non-conflictual, non-hegemonic and non-unilateral mechanisms of dispute resolution. As a normative and behavioral pattern in world politics, peaceful internationalism differs from liberal internationalism in that it is neutral about the “standards of civilization” and normative values while seeking to resolve frictions with any other state within the framework of the current world order. It is, then, essentially compatible with the current liberal international world order.

In the end, I agree with liberal scholars that the future world order relies on political bargaining between different actors, mainly between the United States and China. So far, an alternative to the liberal world order has not yet crystallized. China’s peaceful internationalism
indicates Chinese foreign policy patterns and will guide China’s future foreign policy behavior, but it will not yet be considered an alternative world order due to its own nature and limitations. Future Sino-U.S. relations may entail disagreements and confrontations. However, both countries seem to share the wish for peace and stability in the world. This commonality determines that China and the United States, despite maintaining distinctive political systems, histories and values, share a similar dream—a peaceful and stable world order.
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