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Defoe's *Robinson Crusoe*: "Maps," Natural Law, and the Enemy
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"Literature accommodates many kinds of knowledge. In a novel like *Robinson Crusoe* there is a historical knowledge, a geographical, a social (colonial), a technological, a botanical, an anthropological knowledge." Roland Barthes, "Inaugural Lecture, Collège de France.

"The English live with the turmoil of two incompatible passions: a strange appetite for adventure and a strange appetite for legality." Jorge Luis Borges, "The Labyrinths of the Detective Story and Chesterton"

ROBINSON Crusoe is taken a captive at sea before his shipwreck makes him one on land and the difference between how he characterizes and resists his two antagonists, the "Moor" and the "Savage," respectively, says much about how Defoe links adversity to place in Europe's uneven imperial land and maritime spaces, even as he uses the enemy to shape Crusoe's contentious subjectivity, tying interiority and the external world. The ostensibly empty American island has a counterpart, a crowded Old World, and properly understanding Crusoe as the island's engineer requires understanding Defoe as the architect of a totality, a fictional universe in which an account of an Englishman's life becomes in Rousseau's words "a whole library."¹ Disregarding his father's warnings against leaving "my Father's House and my Native Country" and seeking to rise above the "middle Station of Life," the young Crusoe follows his inclination to go to sea, despite the ill-omened storms he encounters on his first trip.² After he first profitably sails to the "Coast of Guinea" in Africa with the "honest" captain, his ship is captured by "a *Turkish Rover*" and taken to the Moroccan port of Sallee, where he is "kept by the Captain of the Rover as his proper Prize, and made his Slave" (17, 18, 19). For two years

in Sallee, Crusoe suffers “the common drudgery of Slaves about his [Master’s] house,” until a fishing trip ordered by his master gives him the opportunity to break free—in the company of a “Maresco” young man, Xury, who swears allegiance to Crusoe by “Mahomet and his *Father*’s beard” (18, 23).

As Christopher Hill has underscored in a notable essay, most people only think they know *Robinson Crusoe*, a novel largely read in abridgements that open with the shipwreck and the island.³ This sells short the novel’s formal spatial design, which contrasts its hero’s early mobility with his subsequent settlement(s), while concurrently encoding ideas about law, enmity, and sovereignty into geographic constructions. Although it may appear that geography is distinguished by an objective, neutral subject, a genealogy of geographical knowledge reveals that early modern European polemics over the demarcations and legal representations of space were imbued with *polemos* itself, war and conflict. Space articulates the theory and practice of empire; as Lauren Benton argues, “because conflicts were spatially distributed and because legal stories possessed a spatial dimension, associations formed with surprising ease between patterns of law and landscape.”⁴ In this article, I highlight the polemical nature of *Robinson Crusoe*’s spatial experience, maritime and insular. As I shall argue, Defoe’s representations of his hero’s achievements—both Crusoe’s astute seafaring and his later claims to sovereignty and possession of “his” island—build on extraliterary systems of knowledge in which war offers blueprints for grasping colonial encounters and global space.

Undergirding *Robinson Crusoe* in general and its hero’s escape from his Barbary captivity in particular is a remarkable geographical imaginary, internalized though only partly understood by Crusoe. After he slips away in the fishing boat he has

commandeered, Crusoe astutely considers that his Moorish master would surely believe he is heading north towards “the *Straits*-mouth, (as indeed any one that had been in their Wits must ha’ been supposed to do)” (23). Instead, Crusoe sails south, down the African coast well “beyond the Emperor of *Morocco*’s Dominions, or indeed of any other King thereabouts” (24). His is a clever tactic, but Crusoe can only undertake it because the world has been constituted for him, so to speak. Although he cannot properly navigate because he “had no Instruments to take an Observation to know what Latitude we were in,” Crusoe knows that the “Island of the *Canaries* and the *Cape de Verd* Islands,” which lie close to the African coast and well south of Sallee, are European possessions (26). He also knows that European ships ply these waters regularly to engage in Europe’s goods and slave trade, and that all he has to do is to hug the coast and avoid the hinterland. It is worth noting here that Crusoe explains to “his” reader that he had steered south because “who would ha’ suppos’d we were saild on to the southward to the truly *Barbarian Coast*, where whole Nations of Negroes were sure to surround us with their Canoes and destroy us” (23). Still, the novel itself shows that this menace is much exaggerated and that what really saves Crusoe is his knowledge of lived geography and the extent of Europe’s reach.⁵

Travelling as far south as “the River Gambia or Sennegall,” Crusoe seeks to get as close to the Cape de Verde, for “I knew that all the ships from Europe, which sail’d either to the Coast of *Guiney*, or to *Brasil*, or to the *East-Indies*, made this Cape or those Islands” (29). In other words, sailing south will get you North, as, sooner or later, he knows, a European ship would sail by. Crusoe’s maritime know-how and shrewd decision to escape by heading south appear to be instances of what the French Classicists

Marcel Detienne and Jean-Pierre Vernant have called *mêtis*, a “coherent body of mental attitudes and intellectual behavior” which “combine various skills and experience acquired over the years,” a kind of learning that they contrast with *episteme*, the systematic knowledge of the philosophers and mathematicians.⁶ Yet, as we shall see, both Crusoe’s intuitive and studied reactions to danger and hostility underscore that a great number of knowledges, systematic and experiential, that Defoe himself had—that Europe gained and constructed by 1719—of navigating and sailing the world’s oceans and seas, not to mention of settling and possessing the world, were impressed by war. Crusoe’s crafty escape from North Africa as well the novel’s merging of spatiality, psychology, sociability, and war in its representation of his response to the “Savages”—witness the militarized punishments he metes out to them—show Crusoe to be not only a memoirist and a maker of things, but also a strategist, a user and interpreter of space and the knowledges of space.

Defoe’s spatialization of Crusoe’s experience not only builds on but also lays bare the kinds of political and colonial learning that render Defoe’s novel “the essential parable of how geography and conquest go together,” in Edward Said’s powerful words.⁷ This article is part of a longer study that makes the case that the eighteenth-century novel is best understood not as narrating the pacific experience of a self-interested middle class, but rather as the genre that specializes in thick representations and anatomies of human subjectivity, vulnerability, and association in hostile imaginary worlds.⁸ I situate my analysis here at the intersection of two forms of imperial knowledge, cartography and political theory, within which spatiality and war are mutually producing in addition to together constituting a global order of nature. Indeed, *Robinson Crusoe* stages two

distinct modes of belligerent spatial practice, foot-loose adventurism, on the one hand, and colonial-settler autochthonism, on the other hand, as Defoe exploits two related imperial geographical discourses, natural law (and its derivative the Law of Nations, forerunner of today's International Law and Law of War) and cartography, drawing on them for both verisimilar and fantastical representations. Avowedly objective, rational expressions of nature, both maps and the discourse of natural law actually "materialize a view of the mind more than of external reality, project[ing] an order of reason onto the world," as they work to naturalize hierarchical apprehensions of the Earth.⁹

The "history of ideas," insist Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, demands not only a genealogy in time, but also "a geography and geology of ideas."¹⁰ Rather than a mere background and container of historical and temporal events, space "is at once a precondition and a result of social superstructures," argued Henri Lefebvre, perhaps spatiality's central theorist.¹¹ Spatiality underlies human experience, culture, and stories.¹² Still, as Kristen Ross points out, in her remarkable book on the Paris Commune, the spatial critic encounters "the difficulty ... of vocabulary, for while words like 'historical' and 'political' convey a dynamic of intentionality, vitality, and human motivation, 'spatial,' on the other hand, connotes stasis, neutrality, and passivity."¹³ Yet as Lefebvre strikingly notes, "all productive activity is defined by the incessant to-and-fro between temporality (succession, concatenation) and spatiality (simultaneity, synchronicity)."¹⁴ Lefebvre's critique of "everyday life" has demonstrated that to analyze "social space" is to pose it as "the terrain of strategic thought [and] political practice," constituted through "an encounter with history."¹⁵ Necessarily relational, spatial analysis discloses social and political relations. If history smoothly rhymes with individual

memory and consciousness, “endeavoring to decipher discourse through the use of spatial, strategic metaphors, enables one to grasp precisely the points at which discourses are transformed in, through, and on the basis of relations of power,” as Michel Foucault observed.¹⁶

A heightened attention to space and place has marked a number of recent readings of *Robinson Crusoe*, influenced as this article is by the “spatial turn” in the humanities and the social sciences outlined above, as well as by postcolonial theory, itself invested in the “distinctively political essence of geography.”¹⁷ These studies have begun to remedy older scholarship’s neglect of space in favor of the poetics of character and consciousness.¹⁸ If *Robinson Crusoe* is “a magnificent instance of fearful contemporaneity,” as Suvir Kaul wonderfully writes, it is because the “specifics of the new in eighteenth-century English culture” that set the novel apart as a genre, including “individualism and subjectivity,” often depend on “the exotic and the faraway ... the new worlds of mercantile exploration and colonization.”¹⁹ Although I agree with Kaul, I want to stress that the novel’s novelty and commerce with the world are mediated by given cultural discourses; that “realism” is often not achieved by imitating reality but rather by imitating extraliterary discourses that have “already ‘mirrored’ reality.”²⁰ Drawing on the rhetoric of maps and international law, Defoe ties subjectivity and global spatiality.

I shall return to cartography and Defoe’s mapping of Crusoe’s escape a bit later, but I want first to outline how I aim to link space and the political discourse of natural law on the Island of Despair, on which Defoe stitches together heightened representations of everyday life and of bellicose colonial reason. Crusoe’s is a space-inflected subjectivity: Defoe’s depictions of his hero’s psychology, his sense of who he is and his

passions—his present-oriented fear and future-oriented dread, despair, faith, anger, his “secret Kind of Pleasure” in “Possession” (100)—entangles Crusoe’s inner life with the novel’s central setting, a desert island, itself both a “physical” place and a “mental” space produced by a theoretical abstraction.²¹ The “state of nature” underpins European domestic political narratives, even as it also subtends imperial theory. Literary and cultural scholars tend to think of the state of nature as a conceptual device political philosophers used to theorize the rise and development of pacific civic politics and rights from discussions of natural rights. We are used to the narrative that sees John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau opposing an essentially peaceable natural man to Hobbes’s bellicose one. But the state of nature—and here Hobbes and Locke are not far apart—can only be fully understood if we take stock of the fact that natural law was used to theorize the rights of war and peace domestically, within the European state system, and globally in the European colonial context. Indeed, as the political theorists Richard Tuck and James Tully have shown, anatomies of the state of nature in the seventeenth century were often intertwined with novel arguments for rights of war, possession, and punishment.²² Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) invoked the basic rights of men in the state of nature (as Hobbes later dubbed it) to claim the private right to make war, thus justifying the Dutch East India Company’s (VOC) involvement in the seizure of an enormously valuable Portuguese ship, the *Santa Caterina*. He imagined equilibrium of violence in his version of the state of nature. Danger in that condition not only gave the individual the right to defend himself; this right was, according to Grotius and even Locke, the very basis of the state’s own right to punish its own enemies.

The island is, then, both a “realist” space and a discursive space of origin. The walls which define Crusoe’s captivity are not only natural ones, the island’s shores, but also those that early modern European political discourse erected between savagery and civilization, nature and culture. In theorizing the transition from a presumed past simple existence to the conditions of current European civil life, seventeenth-century political thinkers produced imaginary genealogies that began with the putative past experience of “the individual placed in the apolitical or prepolitical condition of the state of nature,” rooting their new science in “the terrible vulnerability of the individual reduced to his or her own forces.”²³ By imbuing the original political scene—as well as “autonomy”—with war and its affect, Grotius and his descendants Hobbes and Locke gave birth to political narratives of association that also reflected and justified the existential reality of the European state at war in the seventeenth century. Solitude, which shapes Crusoe’s psychology on the island, structures how the novel intermeshes his subjectivity and his worldly apprehensions, a word that neatly bundles senses of understanding, fear, and possession, thus epitomizing the very work of Defoe’s novel. That to which *Robinson Crusoe* condemns its hero is what Enlightenment thinkers agreed was the beginning of knowledge.²⁴ Yet not only have hypothetical scenes of solitude shaped modern epistemology, they have also molded modern political thought, underpinning “state of nature” and natural law arguments that, as I shall argue later, structure Crusoe’s stance towards his “barbarian” enemies.

The natural law tradition was widespread in the seventeenth century and, as Max Novak explains, “as a child of his age, Defoe formulated his own scheme of natural law, and by borrowing, combining, and emphasizing various concepts in the writings of

Grotius, Hobbes, Locke, and many other philosophers, he was able to achieve a certain eclectic originality.”²⁵ I want to stress two points here in regards to natural law, which will occupy us later. First, war and judicial thought intertwine in this discourse. War was central because modern natural law and law of nations theory developed in the context of ambitious modernizing European nation states eager both to legitimize their own sovereignty while bracketing religious challenges (Hobbes and Grotius are exemplary in this regard), and to bolster their legal claims in aggressive international competitions over land and resources. Second, fictional *mimesis* transforms learned discourses. *Robinson Crusoe* does not propound natural law, but rather embodies and deforms it in its fictional world. Defoe’s conceptions of natural law “do not float free: they are tied to the speakers by whom they are enounced, and generated from the matrix of individual interests out of which their speakers act in the world.”²⁶ Natural law, as we shall see, allows Defoe to present his hero as both naked and king. Whether Crusoe meditates on his vulnerability or on his right of punishment against the savages, whether he sees himself as a lonely shipwreck or as a sovereign, Defoe brings into play a discursive tradition that helped to smooth out such contradictions, and whose beneficiaries included explorers, profiteers, and monarchs. Analyzed by Puritans and Catholics alike, furthermore, this body of law, with its original fable, allowed Defoe to construct a dialectic between original sin explaining the Cannibals’ depravity in the “state of nature” and the modern day savagery of European colonial exploitation, exemplified by the Spanish “whose Cruelties in *America*,” Friday gives Crusoe to understand, are “remembered by all the Nations from Father to Son” (215).

Mapping the Escape

If modern natural (and international) law was largely a theoretical discourse developed by academic jurists beginning in the sixteenth century to justify and regulate colonial competitive violence, modern maps drew on “centuries of geographical representations and the experiences of thousands of people.”²⁷ Geography, according to Defoe’s biographer James Sutherland, was “one of his most passionate interests.”²⁸ If a “map may constitute itself in words,” then *Robinson Crusoe* vividly maps the physical world verbally, the seas and African Atlantic littoral of Crusoe’s travels, as well as the spaces and places of his American island later.²⁹ Where Crusoe adventures, Defoe maps: the novel frequently presents Crusoe’s motion and even ocular surveys as *hypotyposes* (a rhetorical figure by which something that is not present is brought, “as it were, before the eyes of the hearer or reader”) of different kinds of maps, including navigational charts and topographical maps.³⁰ Crusoe’s escape route from his captivity in Sallee to his eventual rescue by the Portuguese ship doubles as both a desperate traveler’s itinerary (Crusoe’s) and an arm-chair imperial explorer’s world map (reader’s). This in fact may help to explain its Janus-like nature. For, on the one hand, Crusoe’s voyage is wildly implausible: it goes without saying that Crusoe’s escape from his Muslim captors, in a small fishing boat that he himself—an inexperienced young mariner who has not sailed for two years—navigates for almost 1600 miles (from *Sallee*—current-day Salé, a port of Rabat in today’s Morocco—to anywhere near the Capo de Verde islands) is an almost impossible feat. The “map” Defoe verbally portrays does not adhere to “the universal science of measurement and order” that underpinned maps from the sixteenth century on.³¹ Yet, on the other hand, Defoe’s mapping impulse accurately renders the collective

adventure of imperial Europe and its “dream of universality.”³² Maps were central, as Matthew Edney writes, “to a variety of geographical, historical, and political discourses” in eighteenth-century Europe, as they functioned to manage a growing imbalance in scale between European individuals’ experience and the extent of their empires. Ignoring “the realities of geographical space,” maps made available “huge expanses of space” for imagination and exploitation “as *territory*, regardless of the practicalities of actual control or exploitation.”³³ As Harley points out, although maps are “never the reality,” they help “to create a different reality.”³⁴

The distortions and lacunae of Defoe’s verbal map, then, mark “different levels of representation,” superimposing a fantastical itinerary “map” and a fantasized “bird’s eye view” one.³⁵ Less the probable journey of one fictional individual than the motion of Defoe’s finger on a map as reflected in the funny mirror of fiction, limning the colonial adventures of White Europe, Crusoe’s maritime travels entail as well an authorial act of “spatial denial.”³⁶ Verisimilitude here, as it is in respect to some subsequent undertakings by the protagonist that we shall examine later, is perhaps beside the point. For Defoe is perhaps a “realist of a larger reality,” in Ursula Le Guin’s arresting words.³⁷ Crusoe’s route and subsequent trip to Brazil allow Defoe, as Peter Hulme has insightfully pointed out, to “recapitulate the European ‘history of discovery’: the first tentative voyages down the West African Coast, the entanglement with Islam, the crossing of the Atlantic, even the movement of Brazilian expertise to the Caribbean.”³⁸ Hulme’s influential reassessment of Defoe’s novel as a “Caribbean book” interrogates Ian Watt’s seminal enthroneing of *Robinson Crusoe* as the paradigmatic formal realist novel by insisting on its spatially-marked quality as a “colonial romance”(208). He makes the important point

that Defoe has his protagonist follow in the footsteps of Francis Drake and Walter Raleigh who “held in heroic suspension the twin meanings of adventure, as they risked “their capital and their *bodies*” (183). Still, adventure and its correlate language “depends on where it happens,” as Franco Moretti writes, emphasizing “the place-bound nature of literary forms.”³⁹ On the Island of Despair, as I argue below, Crusoe’s romance-like heroism (one would almost say superheroism) rests upon a Eurocentric juridical discourse—not tales of famous English buccaneers—which reconciles Crusoe’s vulnerability and his overwhelming military victory.

Geography, which straddles the given and the made, is a shaping force. In *Robinson Crusoe*, there are English towns and cities from and to which the young Crusoe runs away and occasionally returns (York, Hull, London); sea lanes on which he sails, is captured, escapes, is rescued, sails again and almost drowns; Atlantic islands (the Canaries); African landfalls; the Brazil plantation, and famously, the “uninhabited” Caribbean island on which he survives and which he claims. (There are also the homelands of the Cannibals, especially Friday’s, to which Friday’s father and the rescued Spaniard sail in order to fetch the rest of the Europeans rescued by Friday’s people, an abortive narrative capsule in the novel.)⁴⁰ Defoe maps Crusoe’s ventures on seas and oceans before he takes up his main subject, Crusoe’s marooning on the American Island of Despair (as well as, briefly, his stay in Brazil, where he becomes a planter). Although Crusoe’s maritime adventures are not Defoe’s main concern, it pays to juxtapose the two spaces of Crusoe’s vulnerability, as I have been arguing. Crusoe’s early imprisonment in *Barbary* prefigures his later Caribbean island captivity, complete with a Xury who anticipates Friday and an attempt to escape in a “little Vessel,” successful in Salée but

twice a failure later on the Island of Despair (127,141).⁴¹ But the contrast between the “Moor’s domain” and *America* is fundamental to Defoe’s representation of Crusoe’s self-construction. And what sets the two captivities apart is the difference in the kind of enemy Crusoe faces. Or, rather, to underscore my argument, the difference in the kind of enemy Defoe makes of the enemy. That Crusoe is now, as he says, “out of the ordinary Course of the Trade of Mankind,” sets the desert island and its so-called Savages apart from their North African hostile counterparts (62). To parse the spaces he traverses in the Mediterranean-Atlantic world and their representations is to bring “to light the *internal* logic” of Defoe’s novel.⁴²

“As much as guns and warships, maps have been the weapons of imperialism,” writes the pioneering critical geographer J. B. Harley.⁴³ Reflecting on Crusoe’s escape route, however, helps to expose the ebb and flow of power and the gaps in imperial sovereignty that attended Europe’s encounter with its others—which cartographic practices normally blot out. It might seem tempting to conceive of “the narrative of European empire as generating a slow but steady rationalization of space,” but, as Benton emphasizes, “empires did not cover space evenly but composed a fabric that was full of holes.”⁴⁴ *Robinson Crusoe* knows that the relevant geography of the Western Mediterranean and the Atlantic—the gateway to Europe’s game changing American colonies—is not that of uniform space; that it is instead differentiated by an interplay of amicability and animosity. The hostile “Moor’s domain,” it turns out, is bordered to the south by two overlapping friendly realms, Europe’s and “my friendly *Negroes*,” as Crusoe after all characterizes the black Africans, who supply him and Xury with provisions. Soon, a European ship, a Portuguese, which carries him to the Brasil, rescues

the escaped English slave. Defoe subordinates European conflict (for now) to the one obtaining between Crusoe and the Moors. His treatment on board the ship as well as in Brazil itself is a model of fantasized European ecumenical humanitarianism and commercial harmony, colored by Defoe's characteristic overlaying of sentiment onto capital. (As in *Roxana*, "friend" is a relation with which Defoe reconciles wallet and heart.) As Charles Gildon, Defoe's enviously opprobrious contemporary, mocks, Defoe made his hero "a Protestant in London and a Papist in Brasil."⁴⁵ Crusoe will, after a few years in the Portuguese colony, complete the third leg of the Atlantic slave trade triangle, sailing as an advisor and partner on an extralegal private slaving ship—but intending, it seems, on returning to his slave-operated sugar plantation in Bahia. But shipwrecked in the course of a great storm, "which took us quite out of our Knowledge," he is driven ashore by raging waves, the only survivor. Thus begins Crusoe's second captivity in the novel, on the Island of Despair, where he becomes "a prisoner locked up with the eternal bars and bolts of the Ocean" (113).

Amity is one key to the novel and enmity is another. Nonetheless, as the classical philologist Emile Benveniste has shown, "hospitality" and "hostility" are historically related. (*Hostis*, a Latin word, denotes an enemy, and seems to follow from the term signifying a familiar stranger. Benveniste emphasizes that originally "hospitality" did not mean any kind of "sentimental friendship," but rather a sort of "contract in as much as it relied on an exchange.")⁴⁶ I am less interested here in *Robinson Crusoe* as an emblem of the global nature of capitalism encoded in friendship at sea, or the novel's relation to Defoe's projecting semi-fictional writings (such as *The Voyage Round the World* (1724)).⁴⁷ Crusoe's struggle with the sea, "furious as an Enemy," and terror at his naked

condition set the tone for his relation to his world: he is no indomitable traveler or conquistador taking possession in the name of his monarch. Fear and hostility, which frequently discompose Crusoe's self, structure the novel in general in my view and perhaps even unify it in lieu of a plot. They are the wages of Crusoe's hazardous undertakings. (If realist experience underlies *Robinson Crusoe*, it is the kind of experience that reminds us of the common root "experience" shares with "peril.")⁴⁸

Ostensibly the story of a "private man," as the novel's "Editor" apologizes in the novel's Preface, *Robinson Crusoe* has raised an imperial-colonial myth like no other. Yet, if Martin Green is surely right that although Crusoe eventually erects a colony on the island "fit to belong to the British empire," his story is on the surface an "anti-imperialist story," then Defoe has already begun to shape his reluctant imperialist in Salée and at sea, threading together vulnerability and self-reliance.⁴⁹ Defoe represents a fictional person, even as he encodes a war-inflected set of relations between Europe and its others. In a world populated not only with people but also with the manifestations of power, Defoe knowingly ties place, enmity, and selfhood. Captivity and vulnerability, as Linda Colley has persuasively shown, were inherent to empire, especially when it came to Britain, whose relatively small size and population resulted in notable "imperial overstretch."⁵⁰

We have now largely forgotten, she reminds us, that "between 1600 and the early 1640s, corsairs operating from North African territories seized more than 800 English, Scottish, Welsh, and Irish trading vessels in the Mediterranean and Atlantic . . . Some 12,000 English subjects may have been captured over these decades and in most cases subsequently enslaved for life in North Africa and elsewhere in the Ottoman empire" (43-4). The larger context of Defoe's representation of Crusoe's first imprisonment is the

Ottoman empire's long standing conflict with Europe, one that started at roughly the same time that England's main European antagonists—and Defoe's national bugbears—France and Spain, began their hegemonic expansions in Europe by invading Italy.⁵¹

What sort of adversaries are the Moor and the Turk in *Robinson Crusoe*, then? What sort of relations obtains between the Barbary Coast attackers and Crusoe? Crusoe refers to his captors as “rovers,” but this term, a near synonym of “pirates,” obscures the nature of “the long and complex span of skirmishes between the sailors of Europe and North Africa,” Peter Earle highlights.⁵² The conflict between European and Barbary Coast sailors was an “*eternal war*,” with “no beginning or end.” Granted “a license by [their] sovereign to fit out a ship to attack [their] sovereign's enemies,” these combatants should be “more properly styled corsairs or privateers,” Earle insists (23). Many European jurists, including Christian Wolff and Grotius, reasoned that North African corsairs should not be considered piratical, for “one must determine the character of the antagonists with reference to the nature of association to which they belong.”⁵³ Another Dutch scholar agreed with his compatriot: “The peoples of Algiers, Tripoli, Tunis and Salee [sic] are not pirates,” he wrote, “but rather organized states, which have a fixed territory in which there is an established government, and with which, as with other nations, we are now at peace, now at war.”⁵⁴ Colley, for her part, makes the point that the misnomer hides a more visceral British national anxiety: “Barbary appalled because its corsairs converted the sea from an emblem of commerce, freedom, power, and proud British identity, into a source of menace and potential slavery.”⁵⁵

Crusoe is “perfectly overwhelmed” by “this Change of my Circumstances from a Merchant to a miserable Slave”; later, as circumstances change, astutely prepares his

escape, in the “Shoulder of Mutton” sailboat, a clear instance of *métis* (19). Still, although Defoe gives voice to Crusoe’s experience as a captive, he does not complicate his character’s personal submission. Interested as he may have been in the Ottoman threat, Defoe neither pursues the political nature of an Englishman’s entanglement with the Ottoman Empire in this novel, nor does he theorize the relation between politics and enmity in the Mediterranean.⁵⁶ Rather, as we saw, Crusoe’s escape maps the maritime spatial variations and gaps within European imperial sovereignty. Defoe—and Swift—as Colley writes, recognized that “captivity was an integral part of Britain’s overseas experience.”⁵⁷ Although Colley is right to link Crusoe’s captivity in Morocco to his captivity later on his desert island and to see both as complicating the standard view of Crusoe as “the archetypal conqueror and coloniser,” her shorthand reading of Defoe’s novel does not do justice the full implications of his differential representations of Crusoe’s two captivities (1).

“Every new age and every new epoch in the coexistence of peoples, empires, and countries,” argues Carl Schmitt, is founded on a new *nomos*, an order of the earth.⁵⁸ The “Age of Discovery” ushered in “a balance of land and sea—in the opposition of two orders that determined the *nomos* of the earth precisely in their mutual tension” (173). The sea was henceforth free (the *mare liberum* of Grotius), not subject to possession, in contradistinction to land. Interestingly, Schmitt opens his book by deconstructing the freedom of the sea as a universal norm: “before the birth of the great sea powers, the axiom of the “freedom of the sea” meant something very simple, that the sea was a free zone for booty” (43). Yet, and this is important for our purposes, Islam, Europe’s old foe, did not figure in Europe’s transition to maritime empires. It matters, therefore, that Defoe

chooses the American Carib and not the Muslim Moor as the “structuring” enemy of his novel.⁵⁹ Defoe’s novel participates in a “polemic of possession,” in Rolena Adorno’s felicitous phrase.⁶⁰ Enemies are not given but made; they are chosen and conceptualized in reference to systems of thought that in justifying or banning war, clothe war with particular meanings. Crusoe’s Guinea coast bound trading English ship meets its equivalent, if not its equal, in the Moroccan rover on the Mediterranean. No such correspondence can obtain later in the Caribbean between Crusoe and the subaltern Friday or the “Cannibals.” Whereas Xury knows guns well, proposing to give any dangerous men “the Shoot gun,” Friday is shocked by the “wonderful Fund of Death and Destruction” in Crusoe’s gun. Muskets and gunpowder, themselves tools of reason, “serve as a figure for the violence and warfare that lurk at the foundational moment of sovereignty,” as Christopher Loar insightfully highlights.⁶¹ If, for England and Europe, the “Barbary wars” were proximate geographically as well as being practices waged by and against the commensurate Islamic states of North Africa, Crusoe’s hostile engagements on the Island of Despair, as we shall see, encoded a different kind of war, peripheral, asymmetrical, and yet, essential to philosophically- and theologically-conceived rights of possession and dominion. These rights were justified by the self-serving universalist premises of the discourse of natural rights and “the Law of Nations” (*ius gentium*), which “emerged first [within Roman Law] in the context of what was in practice an aggressive and expansionist power, deeply bound by a highly sophisticated legal culture.”⁶²

For it is in ostensibly empty America that Defoe will equip his hero with discourses predicated on “the state of nature,” where political questions of sovereignty

and possession can be represented in the form of adventures.⁶³ Here, we might pause to observe that the dual individual-collective nature of Defoe's maritime cartographic representation discussed above resembles the dual nature of Defoe's island adventures, where Crusoe advances from potential victim to indisputable victor ("victim, as a matter of fact, descends from the Latin *victima*, a "creature killed in a religious sacrifice").⁶⁴ That the Amerindian "lacked the positive characteristic of equality," allowed war to be veiled, hidden by a discourse of colonial settlement for which, as Carl Schmitt asserts, the "emerging new world did not appear as a new enemy, but as *free space*, as an area open to European occupation and expansion."⁶⁵ For Schmitt, political thought and activity, the political, cannot exist without the figure of the enemy.⁶⁶ Appearing as "free space" is, of course, of the essence in *Robinson Crusoe*, which disavows the original presence of the indigenous population within the self-serving story of a desert island near the mouth of the Amazon.⁶⁷ Yet Defoe does represent Crusoe drawing on natural law and the law of nations (without marking his thoughts as such) to debate with himself his proper political and military role in the Amerindians' wars already in progress. "Adventure" and "legality," it turns out then, are not as distinct as Jorge Luis Borges takes them to be.⁶⁸ For the vulnerability of outnumbered European colonial adventurers—whose own interests overlapped only slantwise with their powerful states'—often made European law a refuge and a central element in their own stories. Vulnerable subjects, whose relation to law was influenced by both geography and topography, they also became carriers of law, which itself took form in the colony in relation to their individual situations.⁶⁹ Crusoe is himself such a carrier of law, as we shall see.

When Crusoe became Europe's paradigm of the isolated natural man, Defoe's novel in effect replaced many earlier narrative avatars of such a story. As Novak writes, "in 1708, the year that Alexander Selkirk was rescued from the island of Juan Fernandez, Ibn al-Tufail's [sic] *The Improvement of Reason*, a fictional narrative about such a solitaire, was translated into English."⁷⁰ Defoe knew both island narratives, but he wrote a "version" of the natural man story that superseded them. Though benefiting from the twelfth-century Islamic-Iberian philosophical narrative, Defoe's novel turned the natural man story into a cultural myth of the new European *nomos*, as it resituated its hero from the Mediterranean (of Ibn Tufayl) and the Pacific (of Alexander Selkirk) to America. Just as *Robinson Crusoe* features an Old World sidekick, Xury, only to abandon him in favor of Friday and the fuller development of his interaction with Crusoe, it turns from Ibn Tufayl's own crowded Iberia to Locke's and Hobbes's "empty" America. That, as Locke proclaims, in the "beginning the whole world was America" was a European intellectual and imperial fantasy and thought experiment, not the historical reality, to be sure. But America's discovery nevertheless provided "a free space, apparently one with neither a history nor any political forms at all."⁷¹ America in *Robinson Crusoe* follows that first chronological encounter of Europe and its Muslim Other, who, Moor or Turk, never figures in Defoe's America, a symptom, fortuitous or not, of the inexorable decline of Europe's old enemy, the world of Islam.⁷²

The Footprint, Fear, and the Rights of War

How Crusoe sets out to appropriate the island's land and recast it in his own culture's image has been well studied by critics—and rewritten in a few of *Robinson Crusoe's*

most ingenious adaptations.⁷³ Yet, as Said insists, “neither imperialism nor colonialism is a simple act of accumulation and acquisition. Both are supported by ideological formations as well as forms of knowledge affiliated with domination.”⁷⁴ As I began to argue above, possession and sovereignty are predicated on spatial legal fictions that aim to define the enemy and authorize his punishment. The stance of a solitary man on a desert island ties *Robinson Crusoe* to the fiction of the state of nature in the natural law tradition, intertwining the settler’s subjectivity with the problem of the enemy’s unsettling presence. To be sure, *Robinson Crusoe* is no more a mere fictional illustration of a politico-juridical doctrine than it is a mere fictional depiction of the real life story of the marooning of Alexander Selkirk. The threat solitary individuals (read Europeans) feel in hostile worlds and their reasoned right to punish enemies are, however, basic structuring principles of both natural law narratives and *Robinson Crusoe*, which alike grant European arrivals in the Americas the language and associated tacit power to legitimate their supposed rights of possession and of punishment.

Seemingly secure in person and property, with “two Plantations,” and a “Country Seat,” which he has enlarged and walled, Crusoe has, from a hunter-gatherer, made himself into a settled landlord and sovereign king. Then, his existence is upended, for

It happen’d one Day about Noon going towards my Boat, I was exceedingly surpriz’d with the Print of a Man’s naked Foot on the Shore, which was very plain to be seen in the Sand. (153)

The footprint Crusoe perceives not only shatters his settled life, but also makes the war theme more explicit in two ways. First, Defoe militarizes Crusoe's actions and language. Crusoe takes to calling his home "my Castle" and considers demolishing his animal enclosures so "the Enemy might not find them" (159). He then fortifies his residence, surrounding his cave with a second wall, "thickened with Pieces of Timber . . . having in it seven little Holes . . . [through which] I contrived to plant the Musquets . . . [which] I planted like a Cannon, and fitted them into Frames that held them like a Carriage, that so I could fire all the seven Guns in two Minutes Time" (161). The island becomes a truly hostile place: Crusoe lives in dread, under "Pressure of Mind, surrounded with Danger, and in Expectation every Night of being murther'd and devour'd before Morning." This "constant Snare of the *Fear of Man*" not only upends his domestic comfort, but also mars his prayers (163). For the first time, as well, he abandons a project (to make beer), after he comes upon "the Shore spread with Skulls, Hands, Feet, and other Bones of Humane Bodies" (165). His "Invention now [running] quite another Way," he "could think of nothing but how I might destroy some of these Monsters" (168). Crusoe fantasizes about blowing up the "wretches" with "five or six Pound of Gun-Powder" which he will hide "under the Place where they made their Fire," or about laying himself in "Ambush with my three Guns, all double-loaded; and in the middle of their bloody Ceremony, let[ting] fly at them . . . and then falling in upon them with my three Pistols, and my Sword" (169). A year and a half later, Crusoe finally comes upon "no less than nine naked Savages, sitting around a small Fire, they had made . . . to dress some of their Barbarous diet." Crusoe execrates their "Marks of Horror . . . the Blood, Bones, and part of the Flesh of Humane Bodies"; he puts himself "in a Posture of Defence," load[s] "all my

Cannon”; and begins “to be mighty impatient for Intelligence abroad, for I had no Spies to send out” (182).

This second “Cannibal feast” and, ultimately, Crusoe’s discovery that a large group of them were about to kill and eat “one of the bearded men,” “a white Man,” “an European,” enrages Crusoe, who attacks the Amerindians and, with the help of Friday and the freed “Spaniard,” kills 17 out of the 21 Savages. Crusoe ends his account of this battle with a remarkable tabular tally of the battle casualties, verifying his earlier judgment that they “had no more Power to attempt their own Escape than their Flesh had to resist our Shot” (237, 235).

Crusoe’s tactics and war knowledge and language—fortifications, gunnery, the horrors of mutilated bodies, reconnaissance—as well as this final battle with the savages and easy victory, ought not, however, to obscure *Robinson Crusoe*’s second—and more fundamental—thinking about and with war. Before finally fighting an all-out battle with the savages a number of years after he sees the footprint, Crusoe arraigns them in his mind for their crimes. Crusoe, the novel emphasizes, does not act immediately. Though abhorring the cannibals’ “hellish Brutality,” he soon puts their threat in perspective and realizes that they pose no danger to him. He has not yet reflected—he realizes after planning his revenge—that he has been designing the “killing twenty or thirty naked Savages” for “an Offence” that he had not yet “entered into a Discussion of in my Thoughts.” Later, possessed of “cooler and calmer Thoughts,” he questions his own authority “to pretend to be Judge and Executioner upon these Men as Criminals,” whom Providence had “suffered in his wise Disposition of the World, to have no other Guide than that of their own abominable and vitiated passions” (170). Crusoe goes on to

emphasize that he has no lawful authority to punish the cannibals. He thanks God on his knees that he had delivered him from the “Bloodguiltiness” of the “Destruction of innocent Creatures” and sensibly decides that “neither in Principle or in Policy, I ought one way or the other to concern my self in this affair” (172). In representing Crusoe’s war, Defoe seems to echo Locke: though he at first hankers for a “passionate and hasty” revenge, he later pursues “a sedate settled design upon” the cannibals, which, according to John Locke, “puts him in a state of war” with them.⁷⁵ Locke himself is a recipient of an old tradition, of course.

Yet Crusoe’s thoughtful hesitation, even psychomachia, conceals the manner in which Defoe expresses Crusoe’s fear, loathing, and moral dilemma with an external language, situating his hero’s interior conflict within a Eurocentric politico-legal discursive frame that limits and sanctions violence. Crusoe reasons from a number of points. First, he has no authority to counter God’s will and plan for the savages. Second, the savages are not mere “Murtheres”: in killing “Captive[s] taken in War,” they do no worse than Europeans in their wars, who “often put whole Troops of Men to the Sword, without giving Quarter, though they threw down their Arms and submitted.” Third, and most importantly, Crusoe reasons that “these People have done me no Injury,” and that to massacre them on account of their barbarity, idolatry, and bloody customs, would be to “justify the Conduct of the *Spaniards* in all their Barbarities practis’d in *America*,” whose “very Name” is “reckon’d to be frightful and terrible to all People of Humanity, or of Christian Compassion” (172). He ruminates that “as to the Crimes they were guilty of towards one another, I had nothing to do with them; they were National and I ought to leave them to the Justice of God, who is the Governour of Nations, and knows how by

National Punishments to make a just Retribution for National Offences” (172-3). By “National,” Crusoe means what today we would call “International,” precisely the domain of relations theorized by the law of nations to obtain among sovereigns. This also highlights that Crusoe regards the Amerindians as political foes. Defoe, in other words, does not here represent formless encounters between Crusoe and the cannibals, but rather he shows Crusoe (though unmarked by him) drawing on “natural law,” a long tradition of legal thought—believed to codify the law of reason “written in the hearts *of* men by God.” Indeed, when Crusoe execrates the example of Spain, we are reminded that Defoe is adapting a political discourse whose central problem was “the phenomenon of Spanish hegemony.”⁷⁶

Natural law, as I argued, was essential both to the struggle over domestic political consent within Europe and to the formulation of the Law of Nations, whose debates amounted to elaborating the settlement of “empty” lands in a doubly hostile context: hostile because of European colonial rivalries and hostile as well in relation to the Amerindian native population. The confluence of these two traditions is important for our understanding of *Robinson Crusoe*, where Defoe “blurs the boundaries of genres” in order to endow Crusoe with a “local” form of knowledge. Law, as Clifford Geertz offers, is a “craft of place.”⁷⁷

Questions regarding the state of nature allowed political philosophers and jurists to both to analyze domestic sovereignty and to engage in thought experiments that supported colonial expansion. It presented legal justifications for “the occupation of vacant land” and addressed “the natural slavery of the non-Christian savage,” building on, and occasionally resisting, Aristotle’s position in the *Politics*. In an age of bloody

religious wars and rapacious colonial expansion, this body of legal thought, universal and international in character, attempted to theorize possession, the just war, and the right to punishment. In his seminal *De Jure Belli ac Pacis* (*The Rights of War and Peace*)—a treatise read by Locke, Rousseau and almost certainly Defoe—Grotius, “the Father of International Law,” argues against “some” who thought that war “is a Stranger to all Justice.”⁷⁸ Grotius goes on, in his encyclopedic three volumes, to offer that war is legitimate precisely because it is natural to man: “for the Mother of Natural Law is Human Nature itself.” Grotius set out to prove that “to make war is not contrary to the Law of Nature” as proved by reason, historical precedent, and general agreement. War is not opposed to Reason because the first duty of both man and animal is to “preserve himself in his natural State” (180). Nature has in fact “given to every animal Strength to defend itself ... A Calf is sensible of its Horns, even before they are grown and will push with his head” (183). This looks like an original narrative, an “In the beginning was war” kind of story. In reality, of course, this is a just-so story. Grotius knew the ending and, to borrow from E. L. Doctorow, he designed “his story to arrive at the ending.”⁷⁹ The now here is the present in which European states are scrambling to claim their piece of the colonial pie, especially to counter Iberian hegemony: Grotius’s negative logic is crucial because it allows him to reconcile “reason” with an already bellicose cosmos. Grotius presents an encyclopedic network of evidence that proves, according to him, the legitimacy of war. Crucially, then, war is not illegal according to the “Law of Nations.”

Grotius, in fact, bases a central strand of his argument on unpacking the “right of punishment,” which “proceeds from the Law of Nature.”⁸⁰ “Most Men assign *three* just Causes of War,” he asserts, “*Defence*, the *Recovery* of what’s our own, and *Punishment*”

(395). War, Grotius goes on to say, is justified because of the natural right of “Punishment”:

We make no Doubt, but War may be justly undertaken against ... those who eat Human Flesh, . . . , and against those who practice Piracy (1022-23).

What is at stake in *Robinson Crusoe*, I am arguing, is not mere conflict but reasoned war. Common sense would seem to dictate that wars are the affair of states, not of single individuals. Crusoe is engaged in war, however, because he is no mere adventurer or castaway fighting haphazard skirmishes or merely defending his own life, but a character whose negotiations of selfhood and descriptions of “experience” lean on moral and intellectual systems deeply influenced by war thought. For the presumed right of a particular kind of private person to wage war was creatively construed in the natural law tradition to prove the right of nations to do so, as well as “justly” to delimit these rights. Remarkably, European juridical thought about war and peace among states often took the form of thinking in terms of the rights and duties of a “stripped-down” individual agent whose paramount goal is self-preservation.⁸¹

In highlighting Crusoe’s puzzlement at the right and precedent of his “punishment,” Defoe sets the stage for his hero’s discursive meditation on the rights of war and peace. Crusoe’s thoughts are informed by a long European tradition of exceptionalism, legalism, and conquest. Immediately after coming upon the grizzly remains of the savages’ feast, Crusoe gives “God thanks that he had cast my Lot in a part of the World, where I was distinguished from such dreadful Creatures.” For the first time, and henceforth, Crusoe recognizes his superior lot in life. Crusoe’s deliberations

gradually transform his stance and political representations in the novel from that of a solitaire living in a “mere state of nature” first to that of a jurist considering normative “rights” and the Savages’ “crimes” and then to a sovereign executing rightful punishment. This paradoxical doubling is the remarkable feat of Defoe’s colonial blueprint in *Robinson Crusoe*.⁸²

NOTES

¹ Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Emile: Or On Education*, tr. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic, 1979 (1762)), 184.

² Daniel Defoe, *The Life and Strange Surprising Adventures of Robinson Crusoe*, ed. J. Donald Crowley (Oxford: Oxford Univ., 1983 (1719)), 4. All subsequent references are to this edition.

³ Christopher Hill, “Robinson Crusoe,” *History Workshop* 10 (Autumn, 1980): 6-24.

⁴ Lauren Benton, *A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400-1900* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ., 2010), 22.

⁵ Whether in *Robinson Crusoe* itself or in *Captain Singleton* (1720) later, Defoe’s portrayal of sub-Saharan Africa and Africans is reprehensibly racist and risibly cartoonish. I will not be taking it up in this essay.

⁶ Marcel Detienne and Jean-Pierre Vernant, *Cunning Intelligence in Greek Culture and Society* (Hassocks, Sussex: The Harvester Press, 1978), 3. Recently Margaret Cohen also raised the importance of Defoe’s poetics of the sea, arguing for a reframing of Crusoe as a “crafty navigator,” rather than a *homo economicus*. *The Novel and the Sea* (Princeton: Princeton Univ., 2010), 59.

⁷ Edward W. Said, "Invention, Memory, Place," *Critical Inquiry* 26, 2 (Winter 2000): 181.

⁸ For a related argument, see Ala Alryyes, "Uncle Toby and the Bullet's Story in Laurence Sterne's *Tristram Shandy*," *ELH* 82, 4: 1109-34.

⁹ Christian Jacob, *The Sovereign Map: Theoretical Approaches in Cartography throughout History*, tr. Tom Conley (Chicago: Chicago Univ., 2006), 2.

¹⁰ Peta Mitchell, "'The Stratified Record upon Which We Set Our Feet': The Spatial Turn and the Multilayering of History, Geography, and Geology," *GeoHumanities*, ed. Michael Dear et al (London: Routledge, 2011), 74.

¹¹ Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), 85.

¹² For an excellent précis of the spatial turn, see Robert T. Tally, Jr., *Spatiality* (London: Routledge, 2013).

¹³ Kristin Ross, *The Emergence of Social Space: Rimbaud and the Paris Commune* (London: Verso, 2008), 8.

¹⁴ Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, 71.

¹⁵ Ross, *The Emergence of Social Space*, 8.

¹⁶ Michel Foucault, "Questions on Geography," *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977*, ed. Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon, 1977), 177. Speaking in 1967, Foucault memorably defined the present moment as "the epoch of space," contrasting it to the nineteenth-century's obsession with history; "space itself has a history in Western experience," averred the French philosopher. "Of Other Spaces," trans. Jay Miskowiec, *Diacritics* 16, 1 (Spring 1986): 22.

¹⁷ Tally, *Spatiality*, 13. In his seminal *Culture and Imperialism*, Said pursued a “geographical inquiry into historical experience.” *Culture and Imperialism* (New York: Vintage, 1993), 7. Other important postcolonial readings of *Robinson Crusoe* and Defoe include Lydia Liu, “Robinson Crusoe's Earthenware Pot,” *Critical Inquiry* 25, 4 (Summer 1999): 728-57; Srinivas Aravamudan, *Tropicopolitans: Colonialism and Agency, 1688-1804* (Durham: Duke Univ., 1999); and Hans Turley, *Rum, Sodomy, and the Lash: Piracy, Sexuality, and Masculine Identity* (New York: New York Univ., 1999).

¹⁸ Thus Brett McInelly argues that “*Robinson Crusoe* illustrates that the vastness of the globe can bring a corresponding enlargement, rather than shrinking, of the venturing self.” And, while Jason Pearl highlights that Defoe works to “reconcile [utopia’s] otherworldly separation with ... the reality of worldly interconnection,” Dennis Todd stresses that “Defoe sets much of his fiction in the Americas,” a place of “piracy and trade,” but more importantly of the institution of “indentured servitude,” which enabled “dramas of moral rehabilitation.” A significant number of recent works make the case for continuity and difference between *Robinson Crusoe* and its two sequels, *The Farther Adventures of Robinson Crusoe* (1719) and *Serious Reflections During the Life ... of Robinson Crusoe* (1720). Robert Markley makes the point that “Crusoe’s *Farther Adventures* . . . [has] troubled critics who come to it with expectations that [it] should continue the project of defining an emergent [bourgeois] selfhood.” Coby Dodwell focuses on the “dramatic shift in the political constitution of Crusoe’s island that occurs between *Robinson Crusoe* and *Farther Adventures*,” underlining “the formation of British civic subjectivity played out in the isolating circumstances of colonial life.” My own argument, which I cannot pursue here, emphasizes that war is fundamental in both

narratives, albeit more explicit and less “philosophical” in the sequel. McNelly, “Expanding Empires, Expanding Selves: Colonialism, the Novel, and *Robinson Crusoe*,” *Studies in the Novel* 35, 1 (2003): 1; Pearl, *Utopian Geographies and the Early English Novel* (Charlottesville: Univ. of Virginia, 2014), 77; Todd, *Defoe’s America* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ., 2010), 6, 9; Markley, “‘I have now done with my island, and all manner of discourse about it’: Crusoe’s *Farther Adventures* and the Unwritten History of the Novel,” *A Companion to the Eighteenth-Century English Novel and Culture*, ed. Paula Backscheider and Catherine Ingrassia (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2005), 29; Dodwell, “‘A Living Law to Himself and Others’: Daniel Defoe, Algernon Sidney, and the Politics of Self-Interest in *Robinson Crusoe* and *Farther Adventures*,” *Eighteenth-Century Fiction* 22, 3 (Spring 2010): 415, 419.

¹⁹ Suvir Kaul, *Eighteenth-Century British Literature and Postcolonial Studies* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh Univ., 2009), 67-8.

²⁰ Roberto González Echevarría, *Myth and Archive: A Theory of Latin American Narrative* (Durham and London: Duke Univ., 1998), 8.

²¹ Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, 11.

²² Tuck stresses that some of the most influential theorists of natural rights, the likes of Hugo Grotius, Alberico Gentili, Hobbes, Samuel Pufendorf, and Locke, were significantly influenced by “the willingness of sixteenth-century humanists to countenance war on behalf of the *respublica* against its enemies.” Grotius and other political theorists “took the *jurisprudence* of war which had developed among humanist lawyers, and derived a theory of individual rights from it.” The Dutch jurist made self-preservation a moral common denominator, the basic “natural law” in a lawless world.

The Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought and the International Order from Grotius to Kant (Oxford: Oxford Univ., 1999), 43, 11. See also Tuck, chapter 6 and Tully, *An Approach to Political Philosophy: Locke in Contexts* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ., 1993).

²³ Pierre Manent, *Metamorphoses of the City*, tr. Marc Lepain (Cambridge: Harvard Univ., 2013), 23.

²⁴ Descartes' remarkable thought experiment, staged in his *Meditations on First Philosophy* (1641), is seminal to epistemological thought.

²⁵ Max Novak, *Defoe and the Nature of Man* (Oxford: Oxford Univ., 1963), 3.

²⁶ J. M. Coetzee, "What is Realism?" *Salmagundi*, 114-15 (1997).

²⁷ Matthew Edney, "Bringing India to Hand," *The Global Eighteenth Century*, ed. Felicity Nussbaum (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ., 2003), 65.

²⁸ James Sutherland, *Defoe* (London: Methuen, 1937), 29. Defoe's Captain Singleton uses maps in his journey across Africa.

²⁹ Tally, *Spatiality*, 46.

³⁰ *Maps: Finding Our Place in the World*, ed. James Akerman and Robert Karrow, Jr. (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago, 2007), chapters 1 and 2. On the island, Crusoe "maps" the sea currents that hindered his maritime escape in the "little *Periagua*" (136ff) and describes terrain as seen from a superior position (99-100).

³¹ J. B. Harley, *The New Nature of Maps*, ed. Paul Laxton (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ., 2001), 97.

³² Jacob, *The Sovereign Map*, 1.

³³ Edney, "Bringing India to Hand," 65-66.

³⁴ Harley, *The New Nature of Maps*, 168. Graham Huggan also notes “the exemplary role of cartography in the demonstration of colonial discursive practices.” “Decolonizing the Map: Post-Colonialism, Post-Structuralism and the Cartographic Connection,” *Ariel* 20, 4 (1989): 115.

³⁵ Jacob, *The Sovereign Map*, 105.

³⁶ Edney, “Bringing India to Hand, 65.

³⁷ Ursula K Le Guin, Speech at National Book Awards Ceremony, Nov. 2014.

³⁸ Peter Hulme, *Colonial Encounters: Europe and the Native Caribbean, 1492-1797* (London: Methuen, 1986), 185.

³⁹ Franco Moretti, *Atlas of the European Novel, 1800-1900* (London: Verso, 1998), 70, 5.

⁴⁰ I lack the space here to discuss the European spaces and places of Crusoe’s story, whether in England or the Iberian states. I also do not discuss his overcoming of the English mutineers who arrive on his island.

⁴¹ Roxann Wheeler has underlined “racial multiplicity in *Robinson Crusoe*,” in which “the color binary of black and white is an inadequate tool for understanding either the representation of race or colonial relations.” “‘My Savage,’ ‘My Man’: Racial Multiplicity in *Robinson Crusoe*,” *ELH* 62, 4 (Winter 1995): 821.

⁴² Moretti, *Atlas of the European Novel*, 5.

⁴³ Harley, *The New Nature of Maps*, 57.

⁴⁴ Benton, *A Search for Sovereignty*, 121.

⁴⁵ Charles Gildon, *The Life and Strange Surprising Adventures of Mr. D---- De F-- , of London, Hosier, . . . In a Dialogue between Him, Robinson Crusoe, and his Man Friday* (London, 1719), viii.

⁴⁶ Emile Benveniste, *Le vocabulaire des institutions indo-européennes*, v. 1 (Paris: Gallimard, 1966), 87. My translation.

⁴⁷ Examinations of Defoe's projecting fiction include Jane Jack, "A New Voyage Round the World: Defoe's 'Roman à Thèse,'" *Huntington Library Quarterly* 24, 4 (August 1961): 323-36, and more recently Markley, *The Far East and the English Imagination, 1600-1730* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ., 2006), chapter 6.

⁴⁸ Yi-Fu Tuan, *Space and Place: The Perspective of Experience* (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota, 2001), 9.

⁴⁹ Martin Green, *The Robinson Crusoe Story* (University Park, Penn: Pennsylvania State Univ., 1990), 23.

⁵⁰ Linda Colley, *Captives* (New York: Pantheon, 2002), 6.

⁵¹ J. R. Hale, *War and Society in Renaissance Europe, 1450-1620* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's Univ., 1998), 16.

⁵² Peter Earle, *Corsairs of Malta and Barbary* (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1970), 6. See also G. N. Clark, "The Barbary Corsairs in the Seventeenth Century," *Cambridge Historical Journal* 8, 1 (1944): 22-35.

⁵³ Daniel Heller-Roazen, *The Enemy of All* (New York: Zone Books, 2009), 110.

⁵⁴ Qtd. in Heller-Roazen, *The Enemy of All*, 111.

⁵⁵ Colley, *Captives*, 47.

⁵⁶ This may be contrasted to Defoe's interest in and possible "continuation" of Giovanni Marana's *The Turkish Spy* (1684-86). See Srinivas Aravamudan, *Enlightenment Orientalism* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago, 2011), pp. 41-50.

⁵⁷ Colley, *Captives*, 3.

⁵⁸ Carl Schmitt, *The Nomos of the Earth: In the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum* (New York: Telos, 2006), 79.

⁵⁹ Jacques Derrida, *The Politics of Friendship* (London: Verso, 1997), 84. To be sure, Defoe was greatly interested in pirates: in *Captain Singleton* and the *King of Pirates*, he reflected on the political nature of piratical communities, often representing them as miniature societies. See Siraj Ahmed, *The Stillbirth of Capital: Enlightenment Writing and Colonial India* (Stanford: Stanford Univ., 2012), chapter 2.

⁶⁰ Rolena Adorno, *The Polemics of Possession in Spanish American Narrative* (New Haven: Yale Univ., 2007), xi, vii.

⁶¹ Christopher Loar, "How to Say Things with Guns: Military Technology and the Politics of *Robinson Crusoe*," *Eighteenth-Century Fiction* 19, 1-2: 1. While I agree that Defoe's novel "offers a meditation on the scene of colonial encounter" (3), I see its relation to "political thought" in a different register.

⁶² Anthony Pagden, "Human Rights, Natural Rights, and Europe's Imperial Legacy," *Political Theory* 31, 2 (April 2003): 177.

⁶³ See Tully, *An Approach to Political Philosophy*, chapter 5 and Barbara Arneil, *John Locke and America: The Defence of English Colonialism* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1996).

⁶⁴ "victim," s.v., *The New Oxford American Dictionary*.

⁶⁵ Heller-Roazen, *The Enemy of All*, 101; Schmitt, *The Nomos of the Earth*, 87.

⁶⁶ Carl Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, tr. George Schwab (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago, 1996), 26.

⁶⁷ As Hulme stresses, “the only uninhabited islands in the (extended) Caribbean were the unapproachable Bermudas” (185).

⁶⁸ See epigraph above.

⁶⁹ See XXX

⁷⁰ Max Novak, “Robinson Crusoe’s Fear and the Search for Natural Man,” *Modern Philology* 58, 4 (May, 1961): 238.

⁷¹ Arthur J. Slavin, “The American Principle, from More to Locke,” *First Images of America: The Impact of the New World on the Old*, ed. Fredi Chiappelli, v. 1 (Berkeley: Univ. of California, 1976), 139.

⁷² My analysis here resonates with Robert Markley’s, who argues that a number of important 17th- and early 18th-century literary works, including several by Defoe and Swift’s *Gulliver’s Travels* “register profound anxieties about the limitations of English economic power, national identity and morality ...” in response to European perceptions of a powerful and cultured East, particularly China. *The Far East and the English Imagination*, 242.

⁷³ These include Muriel Sparks, *Robinson* (1958); J.M. Coetzee, *Foe* (1986); and Michel Tournier, *Vendredi* (1971).

⁷⁴ Said, *Culture and Imperialism*, 9.

⁷⁵ John Locke, *Second Treatise of Government*, III, 16.

⁷⁶ Richard Tuck, *Philosophy and Government, 1572-1651* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ., 1993), 31.

⁷⁷ Clifford Geertz, *Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology* (New York: Basic Books, 1983), 19, 167.

⁷⁸ Hugo Grotius, *The Rights of War and Peace*, ed. Richard Tuck, Bk. I (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2005), 77.

⁷⁹ E. L. Doctorow, *Creationists: Selected Essays, 1993-2006* (New York: Random House, 2006), 4.

⁸⁰ Grotius, *The Rights of War and Peace*, ed. Tuck, Bk. II, 1024.

⁸¹ Tuck, *The Rights of War and Peace*, 8.

⁸² To be sure, *Robinson Crusoe* complicates this view because Crusoe's natural state is not pure. In truth, not only Defoe but also Crusoe himself recognizes that his fate is infinitely superior to that of other castaways because of the supplies he has rescued from the ship, which "the good Providence of God ... had ordered to be cast up nearer to the Shore" (130).