

2016

Successful Regional Integration in the European Union through Vision and Planning

Joshua Berliner
CUNY City College

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**Successful Regional Integration in the European Union through Vision and
Planning**

Joshua Berliner

December 2015

Master's Thesis

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of
International Affairs at the City College of New York

COLIN POWELL SCHOOL FOR CIVIC AND GLOBAL LEADERSHIP

Advisor: Jean Krasno, Ph. D.

Second Advisor: Jeffrey Kucik, Ph. D.

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Abstract

The community of Europe today is at a crossroads. Recent pressures, many of them external, are severely testing the integrity of the European Union, as well as the long-standing regional cooperation. Widespread inconsistencies in national policies across member states, especially with regards to economic culture and fiscal policy, have presented the EU with an existential crisis.

My hypothesis is that successful regional integration in Europe, however gradual, was not a spontaneous reaction to acute external pressures. Instead, I argue that successful regional integration was the result of a shared vision and careful planning by policy makers and negotiators, who never shied away from addressing lofty ideals even as they attempted to resolve practical considerations.

I will select three historical cases that represent foundational moments in the genesis of the modern European Union. These three cases are the Treaty of Paris (1951) that forged the European Coal and Steel Community, the Treaty of Rome (1957) that established the European Economic Community and finally the Treaty of Maastricht (1992) that called for the establishment of the European Union.

I will employ a specific pattern in order to clearly and consistently analyze the cases relying on reports, speeches and other documents that demonstrate policy thinking. Each case study will focus on the agreement itself and how it addresses, historically and theoretically, the shortcomings of the status quo. Finally, each successful case will be "tested" according to a number of criteria for successful integration that I encountered in the writings of Ernst Haas and Bela Belassa.

The purpose of this exercise is to attempt to understand how European states were able, through the efforts of their leaders, to ultimately sacrifice sovereignty in the name of stability. It would be a stretch to suggest that these issues represent the gravest challenges that have ever divided Europeans, and that the past has nothing to teach us about contemporary conflict resolution. By studying the past, I will discern guidelines for formulating policy to maintain the integration movement in Europe.

Chapter 1: Introduction

The community of Europe today is at a crossroads. For the last several decades, most of Europe has been united culturally, economically and to a limited extent, politically, through informal relationships and through formal institutions, most notably through the European Union. However, recent pressures, many of them external, are severely testing the integrity of the European Union, as well as the long-standing regional cooperation that has dominated the continent since the end of the Second World War. With every passing day, globalization is forcing European states to confront new challenges. From Scandinavia to Greece, EU members are feeling the effects of military adventures in Asia, refugees fleeing conflict in the Arab world and seeking asylum on European shores by the millions, and a devastating world-wide financial crisis and global recession. Widespread inconsistencies in national policies across member states, especially with regards to economic culture and fiscal policy, have presented the EU with an existential crisis.

Since WWII, European unity, particularly through EU membership, has ensured regional cooperation and protected against competition and armed conflict. It was born with just six member states in 1951 cooperating in specific industrial arenas. However, today's EU has swelled in size, counting 28 states in its ranks, and uniting Europe through all sorts of common cultural and economic regimes, including commercial, customs and monetary policy. It is impossible to predict if the EU will sacrifice either its own principles or its own membership in order to save (or destroy) itself as member states attempt to resolve the current crises. However, from examining the history of the EU, particularly the previous milestones of successful integration, and then viewing these

milestones from different perspectives of integration theory, one might be able to distill some insight into the principles that inspired Europe's leaders to consistently choose the path of cooperation over competition.

My hypothesis is that successful regional integration in Europe, however gradual, was not a spontaneous reaction to acute external pressures. Instead, I argue that successful regional integration was the result of a shared vision and careful planning by policy makers and negotiators, who never shied away from addressing lofty ideals even as they attempted to resolve practical considerations.

In order to support this hypothesis, I will argue that leaders negotiating successful integration have demonstrated that they sought to balance long-term idealistic goals alongside practical ones. I will select three historical cases that represent foundational moments in the genesis of the modern European Union. These three cases are the Treaty of Paris (1951) that forged the European Coal and Steel Community, the Treaty of Rome (1957) that established the European Economic Community and finally the Treaty of Maastricht (1992) that called for the establishment of the European Union. I select these cases because they are characterized as economic agreements, each specifically building on the earlier one. They are all progressive agreements in sequence, rendering each previous one obsolete through a call for increasingly evolved policies. Such economically based cases are more useful for study than other integration agreements (such as political or cultural), since we can trace a clear evolutionary path among related agreements. Because economic agreements incorporate literal dollars and cents (or perhaps euros, in our case), an easily identifiable quantitative aspect, the path to integration is more easily discerned than in the case of political agreements, whose

vectors of integration may be more subjective or qualitative, depending on one's perspective.

Each case is a clear example of successful integration. However, they were also preceded by a number of failed or underwhelming attempts at integration or international policy coordination in Europe. As these attempts are contrasted with each test case that takes shape as a successful moment of integration, we might discern a consistent pattern of behavior and diplomatic strategy that affected the positive outcome.

It is not enough to analyze these three cases and their political epochs from just an historical angle. A theoretical analysis of the cases, from schools of both international relations and integration theory, is necessary. A theoretical analysis is important not only because these academic perspectives greatly influenced the fathers of successful European integration, but also because they shine a light on where failed attempts at integration fell short of their intended marks. In the successful cases of integration that I encounter, policy making will be demonstrated through the use and analysis of speeches, reports and other relevant public documents.

Outline

I will employ a specific pattern in order to clearly and consistently analyze the cases, relying on reports, speeches, and other documents that demonstrate policy thinking. Part one of each case study will begin with an historical and theoretical analysis of the status quo preceding each treaty. What was the status of the political environment? What regional and global forces were swirling and churning that led policy makers to pursue a

course of integration? How did previous events fall short, skirt the issue or fail completely, ultimately giving birth to the successful treaty?

The second part of each case study will focus on the successful agreement itself, how it is worded, and how it directly addresses, historically and theoretically, the shortcomings of the status quo. This section will also delve into the genesis of the agreements, touching upon the personalities and political conditions that shaped the accord and maximized the probability for a successful outcome, especially in contrast to previous failed attempts.

Finally, each successful case will be "tested" according to a number of criteria for successful integration that I encountered in the writings of Ernst Haas and Bela Belassa.

These criteria will test for: originality; prescience; responsiveness; perspective; if the treaty is forward-thinking; and finally if the treaty accounts for the global picture. Each of these tests is "qualitative" in nature, though I have carefully defined each according to Haas's own writings. Haas was one of the most prolific theoreticians of integration theory in the post-war era, very active from the 1940s to the 1960s. Europe, and is best remembered as a champion of the neo-functionalist school of integration theory.

Additionally, Haas had a front row seat to the process of European integration, observing up-close the formation of the proto-EU institutions and an active participant at integration conferences following World War II. Belassa observed and wrote about European integration in the 1960s and 70s. He was most concerned with economic integration, and states' compliance with federal regulations and standards. Belassa identifies weak spots and offers his policy recommendations to increase efficiency and coordination.

The purpose of this exercise is to attempt to understand how European states were able, through the efforts of their leaders, to ultimately sacrifice sovereignty in the name of

stability. Although the crises over which today's EU member states are squabbling should not be minimized in their importance, it would be a stretch to suggest that these issues represent the gravest challenges that have ever divided Europeans, and that the past has nothing to teach us about contemporary conflict resolution.

Methodology

Primary sources will play a key role in helping to frame the agreements, and include the clues we need to sift out the impact of visionary leaders behind the scenes at the negotiations. They fall mainly into two groups. The first consists the actual treaties signed by members of the modern European Union. This will consist of the three main treaties that headline each case study, as well as any relevant auxiliary agreements and amendments. The second set of primary sources are those relevant writings that impacted the negotiations and final agreements, penned by those visionary leaders and capable diplomats. In each case, there is always a manifesto, public address or key position paper that strongly influenced the final agreement. Each of these papers expresses an inspired vision for a final agreement, written by a European national leader with a front row seat to the negotiations, and representing a constituency with a large stake in a final agreement.

With respect to the first case, Treaty of Paris (1951) establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, of chief interest is the Schumann Declaration of 1950, a paper blessed by the leaders of France and Germany spelling out a vision for a realistic and sustainable union of major regional powers. In the second case, Treaty of Rome (1957), the visionary foundation was laid in the Spaak Report of 1956, produced by an intergovernmental committee exploring the possibility of further economic integration for European states.

In exploring the inspiration for the final case study, Treaty of Maastricht (1992) establishing the European Union, I'll examine the efforts and leadership of Jacques Delors, whose commissions mapped out a political groundwork for lasting economic federalism in Europe.

Secondary sources fall mainly into two categories, both which will provide a framework of analysis for the primary sources and the cases. The first type of secondary source refers to the political and economic theorists writing, mainly but not exclusively, as firsthand witnesses to the phenomenon of modern European integration. Hailing mainly from the Liberalist school, they provide the academic basis for how and when to identify integration in international and regional systems, as well as the relevant definitions, factors and impacts. Without these sources, it would be impossible to identify integration phenomena. Major integration theorists such as Haas, Belassa, Cantori, Spiegel, in addition to a number of other writers observe modern political history in Europe and around the world, and comment on the forces and phenomena that impact political systems, as nations' interest either align or diverge.

The second type of secondary sources includes those historians and journalists who observed and researched the actual negotiations, correspondence and personalities that affected European integration in each case. They provide historical context in which to place the primary sources. Without their input, there would be no frame of reference for determining the forces and criteria that underlie the success of each case.

Further sources that do not fall within these strict categories include additional theorists not writing specifically with regards to European integration, but perhaps in reference to other broad relevant concepts, such as Liberalism, political psychology, types of

integration and international cooperation, and economics. Similarly, we may encounter some additional sources that further contextualize the phenomenon of European integration without referring specifically to the European experience. By incorporating these auxiliary sources, we will have a better idea of what the past can tell us about successful integration in Europe, and draw conclusions about what such cooperation means for the future of the region and the global community.

Chapter 2: Review of Literature

In light of my topic, a basic source that helps bridge historical and theoretical context for the evolution of the modern EU is *The Community of Europe* by **Derek W. Urwin**.

Urwin's book is subtitled "a history of European integration since 1945," and, as such, places special emphasis on the people and events that shaped the modern EU. Since it encompasses both intergovernmental and sovereign institutions, the EU is a product of decades of diplomacy executed and relationships preserved at the highest level. Urwin focuses on these diplomats and policy makers, as well as their political environments, in order to draw a trajectory of integration from the end of WWII to the present day. In a sense, Urwin's book utilizes an historical perspective to demonstrate theoretical integration.¹

As a complement to Urwin's history is *Europe in Question*, by **R.J. Harrison**. While Urwin details the specific circumstances of Europe's path to unification, Harrison is consumed by the theoretical questions that underlie the local integration movement, and how these paradigmatic considerations should affect policy making. Harrison lays out the different major integration theories that influenced the EU's founding fathers, namely the theories of Functionalism, Neo-functionalism and Federalism, and their specific roles as players in the drama of European unification. At every step of unification, and throughout my three cases, policy makers were not simply acting impulsively or in response to immediate circumstances. They were all heavily steeped in both ideology and many years of integration theory. Harrison focuses on this aspect, and is interested in actually

¹ Derek W. Urwin, *The Community of Europe: A History of European Integration Since 1945* (New York: Longman, 1995).

advising national policy with respect to integration by studying the influences of these theories.²

My hypothesis is supported directly by a foundation of primary sources applicable to each case. *The European Union: Readings on the Theory and Practice of European Integration* is a reader compiled and edited by **Brent F. Nelson and Alexander Stubb** that contains several helpful documents and academic papers.

Nelson & Stubb is the source of the text for the *Schumann Declaration*, a brief address delivered in 1950 by French foreign minister **Robert Schumann** and heavily influenced by Schumann's advisor, Jean Monnet. The declaration is often seen as the metaphorical olive branch accepted by the Germans from the French, triggering the process of negotiation that led to organic integration among major European powers. The speech lays out a foundation for France and Germany that addressed immediate practical concerns while encouraging fundamental alignment of interests in the future. The Schumann proposal, paired with the auspicious political conditions in the international community, is in many ways the "Big Bang" moment for the politically and economically united Europe that we know today.³

As the Schumann Declaration is regarded as a critical point in European political history, Jean Monnet is famous for being the main thinker behind Schumann's statement, and Nelson and Stubb even refer to him as the "father of Europe." If the structures of the

² R.J. Harrison, *Europe in Question* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1974).

³ Robert Schumann, "The Schumann Declaration," in *The European Union: Readings on the Theory and Practice of European Integration*, ed. Brent F. Nelson and Alexander Stubb (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2003).

European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) underlie the modern European Union, and the ECSC originated with the Schumann Declaration, and Monnet's own vision birthed the Schumann Declaration, then Monnet, indeed, deserves quite a bit of credit for the successful unification that took hold in Europe over the decades. Nelson and Stubb include a 1962 essay called *A Ferment of Change in which Jean Monnet*, near the end of his life, reflects on the new regional institution that had since evolved into the European Economic Community. Monnet gives his own perspective, an authorized biography of sorts, on the challenges that are facing a free Europe and the way that nations are banding together to meet them. As a good Functionalist, Monnet concludes with a brief vision of the future of European integration, and the movement's own purpose within the grand scheme of civilization.⁴

Ernst Haas, in my research, appeared as one of the most prolific and influential Neofunctionalist writers. His 1958 essay *The Challenge of Regionalism* was one of the first I encountered. It thoroughly elucidates different political systems and challenges that arise when states encounter each o

very aspect of integration, from political machinery to the economy to civil society.

What sort of issues bring states together in a regional system, and how is the system changed by effective integration? How should ruling elites behave to retain the support of their constituents and win over outsiders? What is the role of transnational interest groups? What does a most stable society look like after integration? What might imperil it? By providing a complete vision of what a united Europe both looks like and does not,

⁴ Jean Monnet, "A Ferment of Change," in The European Union: Readings on the Theory and Practice of European Integration, ed. Brent F. Nelson and Alexander Stubb (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2003).

Haas's essay provides a useful pamphlet for policy makers to reference as they strike a deal on unification. In fact, a number of criteria for my "test" of a successful integration treaty are derived from this essay.⁵

While **Haas** wrote several very well-known papers on integration theory, a second essay of his, *International Integration: The European and Universal Process*, from 1961, also proved extremely useful in informing about the history and political expediency of early European unification. While *The Challenge of Regionalism*, described above, referred to Haas's ideas of general integration "do's and don'ts," *European and Universal Integration* (as it is sometimes known) looks back on the European Economic Community and directly compares the European experience of integration with other existing intergovernmental unions. Haas examines the institutions and methods of these other organizations in comparison to the EEC, and determines the way that the organizations differ from each other, generally falling short in efficacy and scope. Haas actually derives what he calls "lessons" from his research that ultimately serve to distinguish, on paper, the EEC from other international organizations. Finally, and maybe most interestingly, Haas attempts to apply his lessons of European unification to other parts of the globe, such as the Americas, Asia and the Soviet Union, in order to predict the trajectories of their respective regional systems.⁶

⁵ Ernst B Haas, "The Challenge of Regionalism." *International Organization* 12.4 (1958): 440-58. JSTOR. Web. 28 Sept. 2012. <<http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/2704567?ref=search-gateway:9163c649966c85f8f0ee14ad44d27c94>>.

⁶ Ernst B Haas, "International Integration: The European and the Universal Process." *International Organization* 15.3 (1961): 366-92. JSTOR. Web. 28 Sept. 2012. <<http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/2705338?ref=search-gateway:ec65e6f79ed32c51cb1e88a1869fdf80>>.

Although I encountered a number of economic and political theorists in my research, another personality that stood out among the others was **Bela Belassa**. Belassa observes the economic machinery of the European Economic Community in the 1960s and 1970s, and derives his own ideas and theories about the problems and purposes of regional integration. In 1973, Belassa wrote *Regional Policies and the Environment in the European Common Market*. By “environment” here, Belassa refers to the economic conditions both within each member state and also across the regional union. He observes how member states fail to live up to their commitments of respecting regional economic policy, and examines how these policies affect domestic populations and prices, as well as their impact abroad. Belassa goes on to critique existing regional institutions, praising them where he sees merit and mentioning where they fall short. Finally, he recommends measures to strengthen the common market, through better policies at the federal level and promoting compliance and responsibility to good governance among member states.⁷

The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond by **Walter Mattli** is another text that maps a theoretical approach to integration, using modern European history as a backdrop. Mattli writes about the specific impact of integration theories on the European continent, but paying special attention to the economic considerations of the evolution of the EU. After extensively covering European integration, Mattli applies theories of integration to other regional organizations in different geographic and historical settings.⁸

⁷ Bela Belassa, "Regional Policies and the Environment in the European Common Market," *Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv Bd.* 109 (1973): 402-17. JSTOR. Web. 17 Oct. 2012. <<http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/40437694?ref=search-gateway:fa73d9c83f565168bf6ec7276c335e3e>>.

⁸ Walter Mattli, *The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond* (New York: Cambridge, 1999).

France and Germany at Maastricht: Politics and Negotiations to Create the European Union by **Colette Mazucelli** is a detailed account of what went on behind the scenes between Europe's two most important powers on the eve of the formation of the European Union in 1992. In 1950, Schumann stated loud and clear the objectives, ideals and aims of an accord between France and Germany. However, the political landscape and regional institutions at stake in 1992 were far more mature and complex as compared to those of Schumann and Adenauer. Mazucelli's history, that begins with the conditions predating Maastricht and then covers pre-negotiations, and finally ends with the ratification processes in France and Germany, brings to light the challenges, interests, and effects of the agreement. By focusing on the two sides of the debate, those of France and Germany, as well as recounting the numerous gullies and bridges between them, a clear picture of the successful negotiation, in spite of the various challenges, can take shape.⁹

"And Still it Moves!" State Interests and Social Forces in the European Community by **Linda Cornett and James A. Caporaso** appears in Chapter 8 in *Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics*, edited by James Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel. Cornett and Caporaso, in their paper, deliver a detailed view of the history of European integration, from the 1950s to the 1990s, through a lens of both economic and political theory. The benefit to Cornett's and Caporaso's approach is, just as the title suggests, that it very clearly lays out the interests of states and actors in Europe, as well as to how they reacted to stimuli in the system, at different points in the process of integration. Cornett and Caporaso lay a thick blanket of theory over the

⁹ Colette Mazucelli, *France and Germany at Maastricht: Politics and Negotiations to Create the European Union* (New York: Routledge, 2009).

historical narrative. It seems that their insights could be especially useful as policy makers consider contemporary actors and member states in Europe, and how they might react and respond when exposed to different pressures.¹⁰

Reflecting on the overall phenomenon of unification in Europe still inspires reams literature and validates idealistic proponents of cooperation and peace. It is a living tribute to the idea that even the most intransigent political squabbles are temporal, and that suspicion and selfishness are not the most prudent paths to security and prosperity. This paper will not resolve the age-old issue of whether cooperation or competition are the best approaches to international relations. However, it will draw on the above sources, as well as various other works of historical and theoretical literature, in order to glean lessons of the past and decant guidelines for today's policy makers who seek to preserve the European Union.

¹⁰ Linda Cornett and James A. Caporaso, "["And Still It Moves!" State Interests and Social Forces in the European Community](#)," in [Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics](#), ed. James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel (New York: Cambridge University, 1992).

Chapter 3: Theoretical Analysis

Analysis and application of theory to various historical scenarios, and the three cases of this paper in particular, are critical if we can hope to learn what past experience says about contemporary policy making. In my research, I noticed a beautiful and expedient symmetry with regard to my cases and their theoretical underpinnings. There are three dominant theories of international relations that correspond rather eloquently with respect to each of our three cases. Moreover, three paradigms of integration theory also correspond to these cases: The Treaty of Paris (1951) establishing the ECSC, the Treaty of Rome (1957) establishing the EEC, and the Treaty of Maastricht (1992) establishing the European Union.

Theories of international relations

Integration, coordination of interests and competition, as phenomena that describe the dynamic relationships between states and governments, can be viewed through the lenses of the main schools of international relations theory. Most relevant for this thesis are the perspectives of Realism, Liberalism, and Constructivism. Each of these three paradigms adds to the understanding of integration in the three cases.

The Realist school best describes how states relate to each other in an environment of anarchy, in the absence of competent or effective global government. In order to survive, states and their leaders are required to always act selfishly, since power and security in the international community is essentially a zero-sum game. A state that compromises through an alliance with another state surrenders some sovereignty in return for an equally realized gain. Since there are only absolute gains in this system, a state must

benefit disproportionately to all others with respect to any international agreement, if they are to realize any advantage. Otherwise, its security and prospects are inherently diminished.¹¹ It should be noted that “balance of power” is also a dynamic aspect of Realist theory, as competing states seek stability through matching each other’s capabilities.¹² Although a Realist perspective might rule out the possibility of equitable integration, considering this angle helps explain how inherently skeptical leaders can form a trade-off with other states if it is to their advantage.

The Realist perspective is most beneficial for framing the European environment in the inherently uncertain security situation of the 1940s and 1950s. At this time, the embers of the bygone Second World War were still smoldering, economic recovery was still in its infancy, and vast populations across the continent were still living under occupation, rationing and other policies of scarcity. Furthermore, the Cold War was coming into view, casting a long shadow of uncertainty over the international system. Mistrust and suspicion ruled the day, as vast security and economic alliances set West against East.

The Liberal school of political theory is often seen as a direct foil to Realism, as it generally assumes the same anarchic system and therefore the selfish motivations of states. However, Liberal thinkers believe that the international system represents a positive-sum game as opposed to the zero-sum game of the Realist school. According to Liberals, although states in the international system always act purely out of self-interest, they can indeed cooperate in certain configurations to transcend the uncertainty of competition. This means that it is possible for two states to align interests in such a way

¹¹ Jack Donnelly, “Realism,” in Theories of International Relations (Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), page 39.

¹² *Ibid.*, page 37.

that they both come out ahead, with each party objectively gaining in power and prestige from the agreement, though perhaps not equally. In such an arrangement, a self-interested state is only seeking gains that are relative to its partners and rivals, and not absolutely with respect to the system. Naturally, Liberal thinkers play an important role in integration theory, since Liberalism explains the ways that states can appropriately coordinate and join together in order to achieve optimal outcomes for the system and benefit all parties. A strict Realist, by contrast, might insist that there is no possible outcome to cooperation in which all states will benefit. From the Realist's perspective, any realized gains must be directly accounted for by deficiencies from at least one state in the agreement.

The ECSC of 1951 was a rigid agreement that cemented cooperation among member states in very specific realms. However, I believe that my second case, the Treaty of Rome (1957), as well as the ultimate institutionalization of its European Economic Community, is symbolic of the triumph of collaborative Liberalism over cold suspicious Realism in the region. It was in the era of 1960s and 1970s, when the EEC emerged, that the European community seemed to find its stride, leveraging its combined cultural and economic influence to secure and increase prosperity in the face of the Cold War. During this era, the "economic community" not only increased its membership, but also further integrated cultural and civil institutions in order to enhance the European common identity, and not just their checkbooks. The EEC era represents, to me, the power of institutionalized collaboration, and therefore a response to Realism.

One final school of political theory that will be of use when considering the history of successful European integration is Constructivism. The Constructivist perspective is not

so concerned with the inherently anarchic system that drives the analysis of Realism and Liberalism. Instead, Constructivists are concerned with the rules that govern society, as well as their fundamentally fluid nature. Regimes change, say the Constructivists, as do the tendencies and behavior of actors that they influence within the international system. Constructivism is obviously relevant for the study of European integration. Accordingly, the preexisting norms create the regimes and institutions in the images of people's thoughts and perspectives.¹³ Successful international integration, such as when citizens from disparate European states adopt a common regional identity, leaves a deep and reasonably permanent effect on the international system, and therefore necessarily assumes evolving norms and regimes. A Constructivist perspective provides the tools to observe and analyze the trends that make this change possible. Analyzing our cases through a Constructivist lens will shed light on the way that rival European actors overcame their competitive instincts and inspired their constituents to embrace cooperation.

I argue that the Constructivist perspective is best applied to our final case, the Treaty of Maastricht (1992) establishing the European Union. The formation of the EU represents a commitment above and beyond community and sharing. As its name suggests, the EU was a step toward "unification," a paradigm shift that would not only coordinate policies and markers across disparate states. Now, the EU would address identities of European citizens themselves, challenging age-old notions of borders, allegiance and culture that had existed since the birth of the Westphalian Age. Maastricht represents a diplomatic

¹³ Christian Reus-Smit, "Constructivism," in Theories of International Relations (Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), page 212.

milestone in which Europeans were encouraged to change the way that they view themselves and each other, an impossibility without an unconventional perception of the international system and an open mind. Such an approach calls for Constructivist thought.

Theories of integration

In addition to the three major paradigms mentioned above, the phenomenon of integration lends itself to theoretical analysis, according to various schools. Three particular perspectives will help frame the process and interests of European states as they pursued a path of cooperation in lieu of competition. In contrast with Realism, Liberalism and Constructivism, the theories of integration as elucidated below seem to be more empirical in essence. They may help explain how states come to cooperate with one another, though perhaps to varying degrees of relevance in each case.

The first theoretical paradigm of political integration, and the one that perhaps played the greatest role in influencing the initial catalyst to successful European integration, is the school of Functionalism. Functionalists believe that states will be able to find common ground with other states for cooperation and integration if they share a common problem, called a function. When they see eye-to-eye with respect to a certain function, and find that they can procure a solution to it through joining together, the process of integration is under way.¹⁴ The functionalist approach encourages and predicts that competitive actors might embrace their mutual weaknesses, and work together to achieve an optimal possibility frontier, a seemingly Liberal notion. However, functionalists are also sometimes seen as great pessimists, since the only path to peace and cooperation is

¹⁴ Harrison, page 28.

through a universal integration. Our first case, the 1951 Treaty of Paris establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, was very much influenced by Functionalist thinkers.

The second school of integration theory is known as Neofunctionalism. Neofunctionalists stress the importance of the integration process on the meaningful and effective intergovernmental institutions that are formed through international negotiation. The focus is less on the specific issues and problems facing the actors, as well as their mutual solution. Instead, the institutions created through the initial engagement and ensuing agreement are of prime importance, specifically as to the degree that they have achieved prestige and permanence in the eyes of the constituent populace. For Neofunctionalists, successful integration occurs where there has been a Functional spillover from the original mandate of the institution. Seemingly due to its supranational nature, the institution has achieved a runaway degree of prestige in the eyes of the people, who now look to it and similar programs to resolve assorted disputes or implement cultural, commercial or economic norms. Neofunctionalists, in order to affect integration, look for well-established, popular institutions that provide an alternative channel for citizens to engage in cross-border communication and compromises without the direct intervention of their respective governments.¹⁵ Our second case, the 1957 Treaty of Rome establishing the European Economic Community, seems in many respects a paradigmatic validation of Neofunctionalist theory as regional actors embraced supranational institutions.

¹⁵Ibid., page 78.

Key to the success of integration, according to nearly every perspective, is the concept of spillover. Spillover refers to the way that one political, cultural or economic arena inspires another. Very broadly speaking, when one arena, or regime, that has been the target of integration gains the necessary momentum to inspire the mutual cooperation and solution seeking of additional problems (according to Functionalists) or the expansion of supranational institutions, “take-off” has been achieved. Take-off is a vital component of any effective political integration movement, and it has been observed to great effect in all three cases to be studied in this thesis.

One last perspective on integration is Federalism. Federalists are less concerned about the process that leads competitive actors to cooperate so much as they are concerned with the quality and impact of sovereign federal institutions independent of sovereign regional institutions.¹⁶ A Federalist observing European integration might be most interested in the proper construction and implementation of supranational regimes in order to effectively mollify competing constituent states. Powerful federal institutions influence constituent actors and citizens, and themselves become objects of study within the regional system. My third case, the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht establishing the European Union is in many ways a product of Federalist theory, as Europeans consider integration, and grapple with dissolution and reorganization of national identities.

Testing for success

My hypothesis is that successful regional integration in Europe, however gradual, was not a spontaneous reaction to acute external pressures. Instead, I argue that successful

¹⁶ Ibid., page 44.

regional integration was the result of a shared vision and careful planning by policy makers and negotiators, who never shied away from addressing lofty ideals even as they attempted to resolve practical considerations.

Based on my research of critics and observers witnessing European integration in the 20th century, I have compiled a list of six distinct criteria that must be fulfilled if an international agreement will lead to lasting regional integration. These criteria address all manner of issues that negotiators consider or ignore as they craft an agreement: short-term and long-term; practical and idealistic; mundane and lofty. This “test” will be useful for illustrating how exactly these three cases represent instances of successful integration, and how exactly other attempts at policy coordination fell short in this pursuit. Finally, I argue that any diplomatic accord that seeks to resolve any outstanding regional conflict or further European unification must necessarily account for these six criteria, or else risk disappointment. In summation, these six criteria are a means of measuring how each case and treaty conforms to integration theory.

A. Creativity: A successful treaty is necessarily creative as it proposes a settlement in complicated and sensitive negotiations. When the negotiating parties are sincere about improving the status quo and achieving a more beneficial situation, policy makers should be able to provide a vision for not just a better outcome with respect to the conventional arrangement, but an especially different one. When the negotiations stall and parties grow frustrated, a creative negotiator will suggest never-before considered alternatives, shedding a new light on a possible final agreement. Most

- importantly, exciting, novel solutions breathe new life into a summit when negotiations seem to have grown stagnant, or worse, hopeless.¹⁷
- B. Prescience: Visionary leaders should steer negotiations in the direction of trends and institutions that will serve a final agreement well in the years to come. Successful negotiations that result in lasting agreements are necessarily well-equipped to endure through uncertain future circumstances.¹⁸
- C. Responsiveness: A visionary leader is aware of the geopolitical neighborhood in which negotiating parties reside, both internationally and at home. Such leaders are conscious of their reputations, and keep their eyes and ears open in order to work with and address the interests of non-state groups with a stake in the final agreement.¹⁹
- D. Perspective: Visionary leaders negotiating successful agreements have a sharp sense of perspective. In a negotiation, they favor the long-game, opting for absolute gains over relative ones.²⁰
- E. Forward-thinking: Another characteristic of successful deal makers in regional integration is that they give in to strong institutions. This enables them to borrow from the future to politically finance today, in order to get a deal done.²¹
- F. Big picture: Finally, successful integration agreements give special consideration to the fallout and payoffs beyond the immediate geographic scope of the negotiations. In a bilateral negotiation, they account for the larger regional implications. In a regional

¹⁷ Haas (1961), page 368.

¹⁸ Ibid., page 375.

¹⁹ Haas (1958), page 454.

²⁰ Ibid., page 455.

²¹ Ibid., page 450.

summit, they direct an eye toward the global opportunities that may result from a lasting agreement in order to build consensus among members.²²

As mentioned, I will reference directly the articles and preambles of the agreements to demonstrate what about my cases make them examples for successful integration.

Additionally, I will draw upon documents, speeches and essays that have been passed down to us from visionary leaders and negotiators at these agreements that speak to their application with respect to these six criteria.

Using this multi-faceted approach, I will provide a complete picture as to the elements that comprise successful and long-lasting integration agreements. Proficiency in systems theory, integration theory and these academic criteria provide a solid three-legged table on which to base future policy coordination and regional unification.

²² Belassa, page 412.

Chapter 4:

Case #1: The Treaty of Paris (1951) Establishing the European Coal and Steel

Community

In the spring of 1951, European civilization was in a very different place than it is today, particularly with respect to economic and political life. Although there were a number of nascent intergovernmental institutions in operation, each with the aim of strengthening cooperation and prosperity throughout what could be called Western Europe, these bodies were not exclusively of Europeans by Europeans. Instead, they seemed to be mainly directed by foreign or global parties that were acting upon the region of Western Europe, still very much a society licking its wounds from the complete social breakdown of the Second World War. However, this sad state of affairs underwent a subtle yet fundamental evolution, when representatives of six European states signed the Treaty of Paris establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). The treaty was an accord within Europe and for Europe that not only eased the region's recovery, but also set the underpinnings for a strong intergovernmental organization that would one day leverage regional unity to influence international markets and global policy.

Before the 1951 Treaty of Paris, which established the ECSC, there were a number of international institutions already in place since the end of the WWII, to make sure that European states worked together with the international community to align interests and rebuild a devastated society. The backdrop of the Cold War provided major external impetuses in the formation of these organizations, and for forcing European states to

cooperate with each other and the West.²³ The end of World War II saw the international community led by two new-comer states (perhaps, at extreme ends of “the West,”) ascend to opposite poles in a new bipolar system. The European continent, a main World War II theater, was located directly between the two superpowers as the infamous “Iron Curtain.” The Soviet Union, from the east, tried to extend their influence and power westward through Europe, while the United States, from the west, countered communism to promote their own brand of democracy and values.²⁴ Each superpower provided material support to protect and promote the security, economic and political assets that they deemed vital. International organizations were one tool at the disposal of the United States that provided an opportunity to indirectly influence European affairs.

With the threat of Soviet invasion ever-present, security considerations were among the first European interests to be whipped into line by an international institution during the Cold War. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was organized in 1948 to provide a common defense in the West against the Soviet Union. NATO was and is a decidedly intergovernmental organization, respectful of member state sovereignty, and not assuming any supranational institutions in itself. By 1951, it consisted of twelve democratic member states from North America and northern and western Europe (notably excluding “Germany,” the site of the east-west Cold War fault line).

According to the founding treaty, NATO proposes to safeguard democratic principles, as well as each member state. An attack on one NATO member is to be considered an

²³Urman, page 12.

²⁴ Margaret P. Karns & Karen A. Mingst, International Organizations: The Politics and Processes of Global Governance (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2010), page 153.

attack on all, and obligates every member in each other's defense.²⁵ Most notably, this principle sends a signal to the international community that the United States, the dominating member of the NATO security alliance, would be ready to intervene in Europe if a member state seemed vulnerable to Soviet takeover.

On the political front, the most important international organization in the world in 1951 was the United Nations. The UN General Assembly was and is a political body founded on the principles of basic human rights and dignity that welcomes all member states to the table as political equals. In its early years, it was a response to the moral devastation and humanitarian destruction wrought by World War II²⁶, and in this sense attempted to indirectly address the root crises that led to the war, many of which were to be found in Europe. However, as a globally-minded organization, it could not adequately address the needs of Europe, nor could it provide an environment that fused the interest of European countries vis-à-vis the rest of the world. A global body such as the UN could also be susceptible to powerful actors from outside Europe attempting to influence internal European alliances and regional politics.

On the economic front, the most significant international organization in Europe by 1951 was the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). OEEC was a body established by European states in 1948 to help enable the appropriate allocation and distribution of funds provided through the Marshall Plan. The Marshall Plan consisted of American aid provided to European states, possessions and colonies to rebuild Europe after WWII and stave off the spread of communism and Soviet influence.²⁷ Additionally,

²⁵ Karns & Mingst, page 155.

²⁶ Preamble to the UN Charter, San Francisco, 1945.

²⁷Urman, page 18.

it promoted economic stability through supporting American exports and lowering trade and currency barriers.²⁸ However, by working very closely with the United States and Canada in the early years, as well as ultimately welcoming them into OEEC ranks (when they evolved in to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development), OEEC more closely resembled an international organization rather than a regional one.²⁹

One last European organization that bears mentioning is the Council of Europe, most notable for the very general nature of its mission. Founded by European states in 1949 with the stated aim of increasing “unity” and safeguarding “ideas and principles,”³⁰ the treaty evokes separate states working together to promote regional interests. However, very little is actually stated regarding the specifics of such interests, or the actual duties and responsibilities of the Council with respect to European society. By the early 1950s, the Council of Europe seems to have provided a symbolic measure of coordination and consideration between member states, rather than an actual engine of policy.

It is in this challenging environment, of severely weakened European countries clinging to their national identities, that the seeds of meaningful European integration were conceived. Europeans were desperate to reconstruct their societies from the ashes of the war, yet instead of making war on each other, they were now plagued by external political meddling and lingering economic upheaval. Before long, a few visionary leaders stepped forward to shine a light on a real possibility for integration: The European Coal and Steel Community. This bold plan brought a new political course within reach, implementing regional unification on a scale that had previously seemed elusive. In the

²⁸Karns & Mingst, page 153.

²⁹ Urman, page 22.

³⁰Statute of the Council of Europe, London, 1949 (Chapter I, Article 1).

ECSC, particularly realized through the commitment and vision of French and German leaders, Europe embraced efficiency and common institutions while finally blunting the appetite for hostile nationalistic competition over borders and markets.

The European Coal and Steel Community: the beginnings of integration

In April 1951, six states in Europe, most notably the ancient enemies of France and Germany (plus Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg), signed the Treaty of Paris, pledging to form a common market with respect to the coal and steel industries. In addition to finding the consensus points for breaking down economic barriers between the nations, it also established a number of organs to cement these measures in place. There was an intergovernmental Council of Ministers, a professional advisory panel, an assembly of delegates from each member state, a judiciary to settle disputes, and most notably a supranational High Authority that acted as a secretariat in executing the policies of the ECSC. Among the responsibilities enumerated in the treaty, the agreement tasked the High Authority with stabilizing prices and standards throughout the market with respect to coal and steel, improving working conditions, eliminating inter-ECSC tariffs and duties, and coordinating commercial relationships with third parties.³¹

In time, the community had mixed success in its immediate mission of “contributing to economic expansion” and the “rational distribution of production” through the unification of coal and steel, but its real legacy was in the lasting impression it made on the footprint of regional political machinery by establishing a “European ambiance and presence”.³² Before long, the ECSC was deemed popular enough that the community grew both

³¹ Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, Paris, 1951.

³² Urman, page 55.

horizontally (in membership) and vertically (in scope). Within a decade of its execution, more European states lobbied to accede to the agreement, and these member states pursued furthering the fences of this community in order to encompass additional economic and cultural frontiers. The success of this unification could be attributed to the fact that it provided for true regional integration.

The miracle of the ECSC, a firmly embedded regional organization in Europe, was no accident. It was the result of a close-knit group of visionaries leading European countries through the turbulent post-war period. In fact, the very summit that led to the negotiation of the ECSC can be traced to a 1950 address by French foreign minister Robert Schumann, which came to be known as the Schumann Declaration. The Schumann Declaration had two additional parents aside from its namesake: the famous French statesman Jean Monnet and German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, who embraced the ideas of the declaration.

The declaration brazenly proposed nothing short of world peace, an aim that could be achieved through European unification, specifically via a Franco-German union. Given the fact that France and Germany had been at war for hundreds of years, and only five years prior had wrapped up the bloodiest conflict in world history, the plan could have only sounded crazy enough to work. “Any action taken,” wrote Schumann, “must in the first place concern these two countries.” Although France and Germany had been historic enemies, any organic European union that did not include them both was doomed to fail. Schumann explicitly called for a bilateral coal and steel community. These two industries represented fuel and weapons, the very bread and butter of war-making. At the same time, they were critical for infrastructure building, manufacturing and foreign trade.

Combining French and German coal and steel production, stated Schumann, would eliminate economic competition and jealousy, encourage cooperation and demilitarize the seeds of armament.³³

Schumann, Monnet and their team were well positioned to suggest surrendering sovereign authority over French coal and steel production and extending an olive branch to Adenauer, despite France's complicated history with Germany. For one thing, France was facing a potential economic crisis, due to an imbalance in the amount of coal and steel being produced (Urwin 44). French leadership, based on a number of international reports, was convinced that regional coordination of resource production and allocation was the only way to rebuild the local economy. For another, France saw that West Germany was already showing signs of strong economic and industrial recovery. Convincing the as yet vulnerable Germans to join a regional partnership would provide the still dominant French with an opportunity to monitor and influence German recovery better than the cumbersome international monitors that had been in place since the end of the war. Finally, in a common market, France could gain access to cheap German industrial production, specifically steel.³⁴ Also of note, the international crisis of the Korean War brought additional demand to the market for European steel.

From Adenauer's perspective, joining a limited union with the rival French also provided selfish benefits for West Germany. As stated above, it allowed for more local

³³ Robert Schumann, "The Schumann Declaration," in The European Union: Readings on the Theory and Practice of European Integration, ed. Brent F. Nelson and Alexander Stubb (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2003), pages 13-14.

³⁴ Urman, page 45.

supervision over the German industrial recovery and resource production, together with the French, instead of foreign and multinational monitors such as the International Ruhr Authority imposed by the Allied victors. In essence, it repositioned Germans to reclaim their own sovereignty over such capabilities, albeit shared with their French neighbors. Additionally, Germans' accepting of the French overtures of peace, and committing themselves to cooperate in a united European society, could help restore their goodwill and trust with the international community. Ultimately, with this goodwill in hand, Germans could hope that the sanctions imposed by the Allies might one day be removed completely.³⁵

While Schumann seems to have been influenced by political and economic realities in proposing his vision for the ECSC, his advisor Jean Monnet was a fierce integrationist who in time came to be known as the "father of Europe."³⁶ Monnet was a member of the Functionalist school of integration theory, which believed that specific needs known as "functions" were where distinct interest groups could find common ground and achieve integration.³⁷ Where two distinct interest groups share a need, they can also share a solution. Through focusing on their Functional similarities, rivals can team-up to solve problems together through joint institutions, ultimately affecting the way that they see each other and inspiring further spillover integration. Functionalists like Monnet believed that regional integration was a stepping stone to universal integration.³⁸

³⁵ Ibid, page 45.

³⁶Nelson & Stubb, page 19.

³⁷ Harrison, page 27.

³⁸ Mattli, pages 21-22.

In 1962, Monnet looked back on the Schumann Declaration of 1950. With regard to the looming economic and industrial crises in Europe, Monnet wrote that “the resources of a single nation were not sufficient.” France and Germany’s problems “were no longer solely of national concern, but were mutual European responsibilities.” Brokering the ECSC, in Monnet’s perception, “was a technical step, but its new procedures, under “common institutions,” created a silent revolution in men’s minds.³⁹ Common institutions are the key to integration according to students of Functionalism and Neofunctionalism. They are engines that create what scholars call “spillover,” defined as the point when cooperation in one specific area becomes normative, and inspires further cooperation in other sectors. The key to affecting the behavior of nations was to influence their inherently selfish nature. And the way to appeal to that nature was through a gradual “chain reaction” initially set off by a Functionalist approach and such institutions.⁴⁰

Testing the ECSC

The ECSC agreement, in achieving a degree of significant economic unification between Germany and France, also laid the foundations for a political bridge across the historic chasm that separated the two nations. For centuries, these two states, and frequently their neighbors, could not agree on anything. To the contrary, they grasped for every opportunity to antagonize each other. Limitless amounts of blood was spilled in the name of religious, social, and material causes. As I argue, it was the vision and

³⁹ Nelson & Stubb, page 22.

⁴⁰ Ibid., page 19.

commitment imbued into the agreement by its key proponents that was behind the ECSC's lasting feasibility.

Creativity: One aspect in which its fathers' vision played a role in its success was due to the fact that the ECSC proposed a new solution to address an old problem. The immediate objectives facing European policy makers in the late 1940s and early 1950s were rebuilding society from the devastation of WWII and banishing the appetite for military conflict (particularly from Germany). However, the successes of conventional attempts at affecting meaningful organic political cooperation were stunted or inconclusive. The OEEC was not equipped to address the long-term objective of a European peace⁴¹, and the strictly political Council of Europe was little more than a symbolic clearinghouse of ideas, lacking any meaningful influence. With the launching of the ECSC, as proposed in the Schumann Declaration, a lasting Franco-German peace, and ultimately political coordination, could be achieved through economic and industrial cooperation. Instead of leading with politics to affect economic change, or even cynically isolating the realms from one another, the new order envisioned by the fathers of the ECSC proposed achieving the relatively modest aim of finding mutually beneficial economic common ground as a precursor to political unity.

Prescience: The ECSC agreement was particularly well-suited to anticipate future trends and outlast future pressures. Schumann and his team, prior to the declaration, wisely anticipated the difficulties France and other European nations might face in attempting to spur economic development based on existing national capabilities and resources.⁴²

⁴¹Urwin, page 21.

⁴²Nelson & Stubb, page 14.

Through a common market for coal and steel, not only could the domestic market benefit from greater efficiency and economies of scale, but Europe could become a global destination for industrial materials. This return to global power, albeit as a unified entity in a limited commercial arena, might have been an unintended consequence of the vision of the founding fathers.

Responsiveness: The Schumann Declaration, laying the groundwork for an ECSC agreement, is extraordinary in that it is not addressed to the West German government (Schumann's counterparts) or the French cabinet (Schumann's constituency), but instead to the people of Germany and Europe as much as to France. Schumann spoke of increased standard of living, equal access to material and labor, and of course, enduring peace and security. By addressing the pooling of transnational markets, an agreement for a coal and steel community, according to Schumann's declaration, necessarily appealed to civil society and transnational interests. And of course, the final agreement signed in Paris included the necessary institutions to respond to these issues. The High Authority and the ECSC Court of Justice executed supranational policy and mediated disputes. Additional organs, like the advisory panel that recruited common professionals from across the member states and the Common Assembly gave the European public a seat at the table, which was rare for the strictly intergovernmental organizations that predominated during the period.

Perspective: It is true that in proposing and launching the ECSC, Schumann and his colleagues saw the immediate benefits of such an arrangement. Efficient markets for France, and prestige for West Germany. However, the way that the Schumann Declaration and final ECSC agreement played the long game was truly visionary. Until

this point, some organizations like OEEC or NATO carried out short-term objectives well enough with a high degree of political collaboration in the short-term, but did little to aim for any long-term goals or effect significant spillover in that they specifically lacked supranational institutions. The ECSC, by contrast, created a community that was formed along very specific parameters, yet aimed for the long-term. Because the ECSC asked for such a minimal non-threatening commitment from its members (specific industrial cooperation for 50 years), it could count on long-term political cooperation and goodwill.

Forward thinking: The framers of the ECSC were especially forward thinking, in that the agreement is best remembered for the strong institutions that, as we shall see, inspired the Treaty of European Economic Community. namely the High Authority and the Court of Justice. Other groups operating in Europe at the time, such as NATO, OEEC and the Council of Europe, relied on intergovernmental cooperation instead of asking states to defer sovereignty to limited yet independent supranational agencies. In these other organizations, states did not surrender any sovereignty, but they also missed out on any opportunity for integration through membership.

Big picture: Another sign of a visionary agreement is one that addresses not only the immediate jurisdiction and member states, but also the surrounding environment. The ECSC meets this criterion in a number of ways. Most notably, it relieved long-lasting belligerent tensions between France and Germany. Additionally, it showed the super-power potential of a united Europe, when the ECSC took effect and began to participate in international markets and global trade.

In light of the above analysis, the success of the ECSC cannot be considered a mystery or coincidence, but rather a deliberate product of dedicated vision and careful planning.

Over time, this blueprint helped realize similarly positive results in other regional agreements, especially my other cases.

Chapter 5:

Case #2: The Treaty of Rome (1957) Establishing the European Economic Community

Europe's experiences under the ECSC influenced the continent's alliances throughout the 1950s, and raised questions as to the feasibility of integration in other sectors, specifically with regard to the economy, politics and culture. Various attempts at further integration in Europe, inspired by the success of the ECSC consensus, eventually led to my second case, the Treaty of Rome 1957 establishing the European Economic Community.

Shortcomings of the ECSC

After several years since taking effect, it was soon apparent that the ECSC was in many ways less than perfect as an agreement calling for integration, even with respect to its narrow mandate of unifying coal and steel markets. The ECSC had a number of problems executing its mission. It did not succeed in eradicating subsidies across the six member states, and community supranational institutions, as established in the agreement, were poorly equipped to deal with the ensuing issues when national interests prevailed over regional ones.⁴³ In short, ECSC institutions were starkly inadequate from a Neofunctionalist perspective, and these inadequacies came to the fore as economic pressures mounted.

Although Functionalism brought the ECSC together, it was not enough to sustain the integration movement. A European community of states needed stronger central institutions, perhaps a point that was overlooked in 1951 due to the ECSC's Functionalist

⁴³ Urman, page 55.

pedigree. It also is true that, despite its shortcomings, no members ever threatened to leave the agreement.⁴⁴ In other words, the union was sustained even when it failed in its execution of stated aims. This can be seen as a sign of political spillover, as states clung to other ideals beyond the coal and steel community in order to justify their commitment.

As ECSC institutions struggled with execution, member states across the board were reluctant to surrender additional sovereignty that might have directly addressed such challenges.⁴⁵ This seems a direct validation of the Functionalist origins of the ECSC, since member states were invested in the association through their common functions and issues, and not through any supranational organs or regional government. Although the aims of the agreement languished, the union itself flourished, and became a fixture of the international political landscape.

The institutionalization of the ECSC, which paved the way for a greater European community, stands in sharp contrast with another failed attempt at regional organization of the era, the European Defense Community (EDC). The EDC was a brain-child of the 1950s that sought to unite European security interests (perhaps through a common army) in much the same way that the ECSC united states behind a common market for coal and steel. It was born out of the Functionalist idea that total integration in a region can be affected sector by sector.⁴⁶

The EDC had a few characteristics in its “DNA” that seemed antithetical to the genesis of the ECSC, and perhaps figured into its failure as a regional organization. Firstly, the

⁴⁴ Ibid., page 56.

⁴⁵ Ibid., page 58.

⁴⁶ Ibid., page 60.

EDC was specifically designed to ingratiate certain members to join, namely the UK and a rearmed West Germany, whereas the ECSC was an organic initiative of French and German leaders, with other states tagging along. Secondly, an EDC called for non-equality among members, with some states receiving a greater share of responsibility and power. Thirdly, the EDC became linked with other non-regional international organizations, such as NATO. While the ECSC was an independent organization that sought to influence international and regional markets on its own terms, the EDC was conceived in the context that it would support NATO's operations at home and abroad. In 1952, Adenauer anticipated a fundamental challenge to an EDC that precedes even logistical considerations: That a common European army must necessarily assume a common European foreign policy.⁴⁷ In other words, some critical level of political unification must precede security unification.

Although the debate opened a political rift between France and Germany, years of political wrangling around an EDC led to the birth of the Western European Union. It may have represented a step backwards from regional integration in that it strengthened national armies, supported the international NATO, and relegated social and cultural concerns to an outside organization, the Council of Europe.⁴⁸

Despite the failure of idealistic attempts at integration such as the EDC, which called for ambitious attempts at sweeping fundamental integration, the ECSC was poised to provide a platform for meaningful change. Unlike an EDC which sought an uneven distribution of power among members in spite of an extremely sensitive mandate, the ECSC enjoyed

⁴⁷ Ibid., page 63.

⁴⁸ Ibid., page 70.

a total consensus among member states, despite its limited political scope and ranks. Additionally, it had existing supranational institutions that carried viability and credibility with member governments that could be used as a springboard for “political community” beyond coal and steel integration.⁴⁹ This factor in the ultimate formation of the European Economic Community is a validation of Neofunctionalism, how supranational institutions themselves can affect integration.

In 1955, in Messina, Functionalism took the spotlight one last time as ECSC leaders met to discuss coordination of a common nuclear policy. The nuclear issue was a fortuitous function for the community to address, following coal and steel, since it proved extremely attainable and non-controversial. In contrast with some other possible sectors of integration, such as transportation or agriculture, there were very few industrial groups in civil society in 1955 who were directly involved with nuclear industries. This meant that the governments could negotiate at face-value, without having to bargain with trade-unions, political parties or other transnational interest groups. The nuclear issue was basically a one-level game. Secondly, a coordinated nuclear policy could provide member states with a cheap and attractive source of energy for their rapidly industrializing and growing economies.⁵⁰ That same year, the Messina conference directly authorized the formation of a supranational ECSC committee to explore the possibility for further integration in Europe, to be led by Belgian statesman Paul Henri Spaak. Spaak also searched for additional opportunities for integration in the commercial realms, above and beyond coal, steel and nuclear power.

⁴⁹ Ibid., page 64.

⁵⁰ Ibid., page 71.

The Spaak Report framed technical considerations for what a common market and other integrated commercial interests in Europe could look like. In 1957, the six ECSC nations signed the Treaty of Rome establishing the European Economic Community, which encompassed the original ECSC. Concurrently, the same six nations also formed a separate entity (under a separate treaty) called EURATOM, which coordinated the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

The Spaak Report and the Treaty

The Spaak Committee had a rather narrow mandate to explore and ascertain specific instances for a common European market, and this mission is reflected in the very extensive and technical language of the report. However, underneath the tariff rates and percentage points lies a foundation that gives away an agenda of building Neofunctional consensus. For example, the Spaak Report recommends that states in a common market should share the windfall in a particular sector, so that one member will not benefit at the expense of another. It calls for a European Commission, a supranational institution to broker between strong and weaker members, especially when parties are sensitive to certain membership considerations. The Spaak Report calls for a gradual accession to common market standards, in order to accommodate vulnerable states. In the event that one state is struggling to meet the standards and commitments of membership, the European Commission may afford extensions and assistance. One final consideration that stands out in Spaak's language is a respect for other supranational commitments, such as GATT. All of these factors point to a desire to strengthen supranational institutions, and for member states to look to a powerful central body and internal

procedures for settling their disputes, instead of through confrontation with other members.⁵¹

As if there were any doubt as to the motivations of the ECSC six when formulating the European Economic Community, based solely on the text of the Spaak Report, the preamble to the Treaty of Rome removes all of it. Not only does it clearly state the political intentions behind this seemingly technical and commercial accord, but it also invites other European states to join the movement. The preamble references “foundations of an ever-closer union,” “progress,” “steady expansion,” “solidarity” as per the political nature of the United Nations, and explicitly calls to “the other peoples of Europe who share the ideal.” In fact, an equal amount of text in the preamble is accorded to the political and idealistic objectives of the agreement as to the commercial ones:

DETERMINED to establish the foundations of an ever closer union among the European peoples,

DECIDED to ensure the economic and social progress of their countries by common action in eliminating the barriers which divide Europe,

DIRECTING their efforts to the essential purpose of constantly improving the living and working conditions of their peoples,

RECOGNISING that the removal of existing obstacles calls for concerted action in order to guarantee a steady expansion, a balanced trade and fair competition,

⁵¹ The Brussels Report on The General Common Market (A.K.A. The Spaak Report), Luxembourg, 1956 (Title I, Section 2).

ANXIOUS to strengthen the unity of their economies and to ensure their harmonious development by reducing the differences existing between the various regions and by mitigating the backwardness of the less favoured, DESIROUS of contributing by means of a common commercial policy to the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade, INTENDING to confirm the solidarity which binds Europe and overseas countries, and desiring to ensure the development of their prosperity, in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, RESOLVED to strengthen the safeguards of peace and liberty by establishing this combination of resources, and calling upon the other peoples of Europe who share their ideal to join in their efforts...⁵²

The European Economic Community, as put forth in the Treaty, establishes a number of organs to fulfill its mission of coordinating economic policy, establishing a common market and promoting political unification across Europe:

- A Parliament to advise and supervise (equivalent to the Assembly of the ECSC) appointed by member governments;⁵³
- A Council of Ministers to make decisions and coordinate policy;⁵⁴
- A European Commission, totally independent of member governments, to execute the Treaty;⁵⁵

⁵² Treaty of Rome, Rome, 1957 (Preamble).

⁵³ Ibid., Part 5: Title 1: Chapter 1: Section 1.

⁵⁴ Ibid., Section 2.

⁵⁵ Ibid., Section 3.

- A Court of Justice to interpret the Treaty, and hear cases between member states and between the Commission and member states;⁵⁶
- And an Economic and Social Committee.⁵⁷

The Economic and Social Committee was comprised of professionals from member states from various economic, industrial and social backgrounds. It enjoyed advisory status, and specifically included sub committees for transportation and agriculture (as per the treaty). In other words, the European Economic Community was a strict economic agreement, with spillover specifically built into its institutions.⁵⁸

A number of articles throughout the document bear mentioning as to the wisdom behind the agreement, precisely what may have helped the EEC achieve renown among scholars as a “model of peaceful change.”⁵⁹

For example, article 73 of the Treaty of Rome paints a picture of the European Commission as a single administration for three separate communities: The European Coal and Steel Community; The European Economic Community; and Euratom, the aforementioned nuclear agreement also signed in Rome.⁶⁰ In this way, the Treaty seems to paradoxically encourage unification through acknowledgment of diversity. It doesn't blend the separate spheres, it only brings them into an umbrella arrangement.

Article 75 builds high walls around the issues of national security. The agreement respects national security, privacy and arms trading deals in each member state. States that

⁵⁶ Ibid., Section 4.

⁵⁷ Ibid., Chapter 3.

⁵⁸ Ibid., Article 197.

⁵⁹ Cornett & Caporaso, page 220.

⁶⁰ Urman., 73.

join the European Community need not worry about having to disclose or renege on these sensitive deals. In the case of a conflict, the European Commission may broker a solution.

Articles 224-226 are what I call *articles of flexibility*. These articles provide guidance and call for flexibility in order to keep the Community functioning, even though black swan events may rear their heads in certain member states. Such events might consist of political turmoil or economic pressures.

Article 240 differs considerably from a principle established in Paris in 1951. The article states that the Treaty will be in force for an unlimited time, in contrast with the ECSC which was only a 50 year commitment.⁶¹ This *forever clause* indicates how leaders at the Rome summit met with their eyes toward changing the map for future generations.

Testing the EEC

The Treaty of Rome signed by the six states of the ECSC laid the foundation for lasting policy coordination in Europe, by taking a turn toward the Neofunctionalist, in comparison with my first case.

Creativity: Similar to the way that the ECSC represented a backlash of pragmatism to foreign meddling and vapid idealism that constituted other inadequate international organizations, the formulation of the EEC was also conceived in an environment of failed attempts at political integration. The disappointment of the EDC debacle (having given way to an ineffectual WEU) sent ECSC leaders reexamining their own hyper-pragmatic functionalist roots. While steeped in practical discussions around integrating the nuclear

⁶¹ Treaty of Paris, Paris, 1951 (Article 97).

sector, ECSC parties were inspired to reach for political unification by dusting off and repolishing their existing supranational institutions, namely the High Authority (inspiration for the “European Commission” in the EEC) and the Court of Justice. European leaders at Messina discovered the way forward by reviving a path that was long left for dead. In this, they also breathed new life into the movement for political unification in the region.

Prescience: In the preamble, the EEC’s signatories state their ultimate political aims of permanent European unification and peace. However, the treaty does not stop at describing the responsibilities of member states to the agreement with respect to achieving these idealistic aims. Instead, it spends a considerable amount of text regarding flexibility for states in crisis and mediating disputes between states themselves (through a supranational commission) and between states at the periphery and the core (through broad powers granted to the commission and through a judiciary). These aspects made the treaty immediately attractive not only to the six signatories in Rome, but also to all states in the region, be they large or small or rich or poor. The treaty, even in 1957 before any sweeping revisions (which would be made over the decades), was a sincere effort at inclusion, and envisioned a future where a greater diversity of states could be party to the agreement.

Responsiveness: The framers of the Treaty of Rome were very conscious of how the agreement might be accepted and challenged when in effect, and learned from the lessons of other failed attempts at integration. One example that comes to mind is how the Treaty specifically excludes jealously guarded defense-related issues from its purview. Additionally, it encourages member states to appeal to its supranational institutions,

namely the European Commission, instead of each other in the event of a difference of interpretation. Finally, its establishment of an official advisory Economic and Social Committee specifically gives a voice to civilians across Europe who are not necessarily enfranchised through the political establishment, yet represented broad transnational interests. As Haas suggested, this committee provides a unique opportunity for policy makers to understand and influence citizens on a supranational level.

Perspective: Once again, this refers to the way that although treaty framers explicitly reached for the lofty, they asked only for concrete commercial commitments from members, in a practical timeline.

Forward-thinking: The Treaty of Rome was made possible by preexisting supranational institutions held over from the ECSC. By recognizing their importance and by strengthening these institutions, the European Community could now interface and cultivate relationships directly with other states, including those in the region not yet a party to the treaty. This Neofunctionalist consideration played an important role in helping the community expand over the years.

Big picture: The common market of the EEC brought drastic changes within the region. It affected lives by guaranteeing property, movement, employment and tariffs across member states. In a real sense, it forged a solid political block out of the region, and increased the prestige and negotiating power of that block. Although policy expansion and integration in the community slowed during the 1970s,⁶² membership grew

⁶² Cornett & Caporaso, page 222.

substantially and the dreams of Rome's preamble would inspire a new generation to seek unification on an even grander scale in the 1980s.

As I suggested, the formation of the EEC represented both a turn toward Neofunctionalism (as further integration was based on central Functionalist institutions carried over from the ECSC agreement), but this deepening of the political bond between European states also represents a victory for Liberalist theory. With the greater degree of cooperation and the calls for "unity and "solidarity" of the Rome Treaty's preamble, in addition to the deliberate spillover as engineered through the formation of the Economic and Social Committee and subcommittees, the "original six" appeared more optimistic about the prospects of long-term integration, and less apprehensive about empowering their neighbors through mutual collaboration. Additionally, the way that the treaty invited other states in the region to join the movement, as well as the fact that it was only a few years before other major European powers began to consider accession, is also an indication as to the warmer climate in the region towards cooperation instead of suspicion.

This new Liberal outlook and eventual normative shifts that took hold in the region would, over the next few decades, pave the way for a Constructivist leadership to arise in Europe, which would build on the EEC's achievements to establish an even bigger and more powerful regional organization.

Chapter 6:

Case #3: The Treaty of Maastricht (1992) Establishing the European Union

Sometime in the decades that followed the Treaty of Rome and the establishment of the EEC, the idea of regional unification in Europe became a part of the political landscape, an institutional norm driving the community of states toward a formal union. During this process, the community as a distinct political entity expanded greatly in membership numbers and prestige. By the 1990s, even the most enthusiastic anti-Federalist member state in the EEC, the United Kingdom, accepted unification as a foregone conclusion. In this manner, the Treaty of Maastricht on European Union was unanimously signed by all member states in 1992.

The family of Europe grows

Since the late 1950s, when the ECSC was metamorphosing into the EEC, the new regional bloc had caught the attention of other European states. The United Kingdom and the Scandinavian countries had anticipated the growing economic bargaining power of the EEC, and formally established an European Free Trade Agreement in 1960 to protect the markets of regional states who did not wish to join the Community.

Specifically in the case of the UK, interests lay with balancing against the new Franco-German axis, nurturing a close relationship with the United States (instead of aligning with the EEC), and taking advantage of preferential commercial agreements with the Commonwealth and the Sterling zone. However, as the decade wore on, British influence on the world stage and with the United States waned, as did London's authority to dictate preferential terms to the Commonwealth. Faced with the prospect of being left

behind by an increasingly powerful European community of states, applying for admission to the bloc grew more attractive. In fact, trade within the EEC had been doubling in size, and by 1961 represented the “world’s largest trading power.”⁶³ Two separate applications for accession to the EEC were submitted by the UK during the 1960s, as London risked being isolated on the world stage, on the outside looking in at a happy EEC family.

In 1962 and 1967, the UK and other EFTA states with close ties to the British economy applied for membership in the EEC. Both of these applications were vetoed by a wary President De Gaulle of France, who feared that the UK represented an American “Trojan horse” and possibly also because he resented British power and prestige as a threat to France.⁶⁴ As the UK bids were shot down, the other states that had hoped for membership due to their geographic and economic ties to the UK (Norway, Ireland and Denmark) also withdrew their applications. By 1970, however, Charles De Gaulle had left office, leaving in his stead a more agreeable French representation. Additionally, Britain had been feeling more pressure to join the community than ever,⁶⁵ and offered the European Community (EC), as the EEC was known since 1967, its most favorable terms yet for accession. In January 1973, the bid was formally accepted, as were those of Denmark and Ireland. Norway had their bid accepted, but failed to ratify the Treaty of Rome at the domestic level, and declined membership. But the EC had its prize: The third leg of the major European economies counted among its ranks. Additionally, by

⁶³ Urman., page 85.

⁶⁴ Ibid., page 125.

⁶⁵ Ibid., page 128.

welcoming new states for the first time, the community realized an important milestone on the road to long-term regional unification.

Although other states had applied for EEC/EC membership at a steady clip since 1958 (when Israel's application for accession was rejected, presumably on geographic grounds, soon followed by Greece and Turkey), the accession of the UK, Denmark and Ireland were the only full members admitted until the 1980s. However, as Community bargaining power and prestige increased even during years of global economic turmoil, other countries in Western Europe came to lobby for membership. These states included Portugal, Spain, Greece, Turkey and even some EFTA states that were afraid of being locked out of a united Europe.

Steps toward supranationalism

In 1965, the European Commission, the independent body of the EEC charged with administering the Treaty, officially absorbed Euratom and the ECSC, formally taking over responsibilities for those agreements as well (though Euratom exists as a treaty apart from the EEC agreement). Although the intergovernmental European Council (composed of appointed national representatives) had long used its supreme authority to check the power of supranational institutions such as the Commission, 1973's Hague Conference empowered the federal institutions as never before.⁶⁶ The Commission was granted greater access to tax revenues and greater responsibilities, while the European Parliament was given more control over the EC budget. However, intergovernmental

⁶⁶ Ibid., page 156.

wrangling over a number of economic and commercial initiatives stalled further political unification.

Despite the difficulties in executing of its objectives, as before, no member state ever threatened to leave the community. States parties remained bound to the community, committed to the long-term goal of European unification. Without having yet realized concrete objectives as envisioned in the EEC agreement, the members' commitments reflect a Federalist devotion, as the community took on a political life of its own.

Signs of political unification

Although they struggled to unite internally, EC states succeeded in many respects in presenting a united front to the outside world. For one thing, the 1967 rebranding from a European Economic Community to a more general European Community is a clue as to the the long-held vision of states parties' desire to strive for broader unification. By 1983, the EC as an independent unit had signed 30 agreements with more than 100 countries.⁶⁷ Additionally, there were external factors at play that helped shape, on some minimal level, a common European foreign policy. By necessity, the EC had a common policy toward the Commonwealth, the oil shocks and Arab nationalism helped shape policy towards MENA, and the fraying of the Iron Curtain in the 1980s encouraged policy formulation with respect to Eastern Europe for the first time.⁶⁸ In the public sphere, EC representatives spoke for the community of constituent states at several international summits, including the United Nations General Assembly, and EEC ambassadors began to meet at regular, frequent intervals to discuss foreign policy and

⁶⁷ Ibid., page 213.

⁶⁸ Ibid., page 215.

agenda coordination. On the security front, with the fading of Soviet power, European interests began to diverge with NATO, driving even neutral European states to consider joining the EEC, and a revitalized WEU provided a convenient bridge to coordinate strategy with NATO.⁶⁹ Although there was no coordinated EC foreign policy in anything but the most obtuse issues, it could also be said that member states were not disinclined to discuss or seek common ground in international relations.⁷⁰ Time and time again, this open minded-ness seemed to keep states involved in the union and invested in its future, even when policy coordination seemed to falter.

The decade of the 1980s saw an endless series of reports and conferences aimed at moving along political integration in Europe, as leaders seemed determined to tackle the ultimate objective of the Schumann Declaration, issued years before. Each report and conference attempted to address potential conflicts and pitfalls. Some proposals, such as Spinelli's Draft Treaty for a European Union (1984) reached for an idealistic, polished organization of states. Others, such as the Dooge Report and the Milan Conference (1985-6), considered practical policy issues and prerequisites for integration. All of these summit meetings and research, absent of actual action, are perhaps an indication of patience from "unification" advocates within the EC ranks as they accommodated recalcitrant states (led by the UK and Premier Margaret Thatcher) opposed to unification. But by the end of the decade, even dissenting states that supported intergovernmentalism against a rising tide of supranationalism refused to consider leaving the community.⁷¹

⁶⁹ Ibid., page 216.

⁷⁰ Ibid., page 217.

⁷¹ Ibid., page 229.

As Federalist thought established itself among European leaders, the movement for integration took on a new momentum. In 1985, a few EC states signed the Shengen Agreement, which effectively sought to dissolve borders between states (though implementation proved difficult, and is still controversial). In 1986, the EC countries signed the Single European Act, which set a clear road map for regional integration toward a political union of European states. In addition to officially rebranding the EC as “the European Communities,” the SEA also called for a common market by 1992, which was largely a consensus issue even at the fringes of the EC. Although this development was hardly controversial, it was extremely significant in that it was specifically blessed by the European Council. This gave the Commission and the Court, two federal bodies, effective authority over domestic courts on certain domestic issues.⁷² It was a self-imposed step toward supranationalism by member states. With the ball in the court of the EC institutions, 1992 took on the feeling of an inevitability more than a target.⁷³

In the run-up to 1992, the Federalist Jacques Delors became the President of the European Commission. He worked to implement the SEA and also three additional items for a 1992 Maastricht conference that would go beyond simple economic unification: A European monetary union; a social agreement on labor standards and human rights; and a budget. He faced fierce opposition from the UK and Thatcher, who favored expansion of the community over deeper integration, and disagreed with some social components of Delors’s agenda. However, even though Thatcher embodied the

⁷² Cornett & Caporaso page 223.

⁷³ Urman, page 236.

very opposition to unification, even she acknowledged in 1988 the Federalist norm and was in every respect “pro-EU:”

I am the first to say that on many great issues the countries of Europe should try to speak with a single voice. I want to see us work more closely on things that we can do better together than alone. Europe is stronger when we do so, whether it be in trade, in defense or in relations with the rest of the world. ⁷⁴

Delors, in a response to Thatcher the following year, discussed the importance of Federalism for the future of the European Communities. He described how his European union would require sovereignty while respecting pluralism and subsidiarity. This is because Federalism, claimed Delors, in addition to espousing the importance of powerful central/regional institutions (to govern citizens at the most efficient level), also preserves national/local traditions and identities. In a conventional anarchic system, when states are locked in competition, they are forever trying to subjugate and conquer each other, with the aim of unifying the region under a single national and cultural banner. In a Federalist system, by contrast, national boundaries and cultural backgrounds are respected and imbued with formal legitimacy, protected and enshrined within the larger community.⁷⁵

⁷⁴ Margaret Thatcher, “A Family of Europe,” in The European Union: Readings on the Theory and Practice of European Integration, ed. Brent F. Nelson and Alexander Stubb (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2003), page 52.

⁷⁵ Jacques Delors, “A Necessary Union,” in The European Union: Readings on the Theory and Practice of European Integration, ed. Brent F. Nelson and Alexander Stubb (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2003), Page 61

However, uniting Europe was more than a practical matter for Delors. It also hearkened back to the dreams and destiny of Europeans. He acknowledged and emphasized that *necessity* had finally brought European states together and the imperative that states take advantage of this opportune moment in history to realize their destiny. Building a bridge to Schumann and Monnet, Delors echoed the Functionalism that inspired the ECSC founding fathers, by referencing the common challenges facing the members of the European Communities. Only further Federalist coordination could provide the solution to those challenges.

*How are we to find a solution except by strengthening the federalist features of the Community...? How are we to shoulder our international responsibilities and at the same time pave the way for the emergence of a greater Europe, except by pressing ahead with European integration? Only a strong, self- confident Community, a Community which is united and determined, can truly hope to control that process.*⁷⁶

Finally, with a nod to Constructivism, Delors ends his speech by challenging the Community to “make a telling contribution to the next phase of our history.”⁷⁷ People should not fear national dissolution or bureaucratic paralysis from surrendering sovereignty to a regional government. This is the way that European states will be expected to meet their challenges in the future decades, and it is mechanically sound, though perhaps difficult to envision.

⁷⁶ Ibid., page 63.

⁷⁷ Ibid., page 64.

By the time the European Communities got to Maastricht in 1992, a “Treaty on European Union” seemed all but inevitable, especially with a less combative British cabinet following Thatcher’s exit. After its signing, ratification in member states proved controversial at the domestic level, and a final version included numerous revisions listing several state-specific exemptions and opt-outs. However, it was Federalist thinking that pulled the negotiations together over the years, and throughout the ups and downs of ratification, no member state ever threatened to leave the union. The EU has remained an institution ever since. In the words of German Chancellor Helmut Kohl in the run up to 1992, Maastricht “was crossing the Rubicon. There is no going back.”⁷⁸

The Treaty

Despite the reams of state-specific exemptions, exceptions and revisions in the treaty, the preamble and subsequent items speak to the purpose and the vision of the Maastricht summit. Although Maastricht and the EU built on previous economic agreements, the preamble implies that the organization is built on the ideals of political unification, civic involvement and human rights. Firstly, it formally inaugurates “a new stage in the process of European integration undertaken with the establishment of the European Communities,” seemingly jettisoning the “economic” label, once and for all. Next, it affirms the importance of “ending the division of the European continent” and expressed the desire for “deepen[ing] solidarity between peoples,” while respecting their cultural heritage.⁷⁹

⁷⁸ Urman, page 253.

⁷⁹ Treaty of Maastricht establishing the European Union, 1992, (Preamble).

After laying the foundation of idealism underpinning the formation of the EU, the preamble gets down to brass tacks, explaining through what methods it will unite the continent and preserve its culture. A first item referring to the EU machinery calls for a single, federal institutional framework to “enhance further democratic and efficient functioning of institutions.” A financial item proposes a monetary union under “a single and stable currency” to streamline and unite members’ economies. A commercial item calls for a common internal market spilling over into coordinated environmental policy, followed by an item proposing a formal EU citizenship for residents (in addition to national citizenship). The EU also proposes the formation of a common defense and security policy “thereby reinforcing the European identity and its independence,” as well as a Shengen-like agreement facilitating the movement of people across the integrated landscape. Finally, the preamble closes with a commitment by EU institutions to govern directly over EU citizens, sharing sovereignty with the local national governments. This last statement in the preamble charts a direct course away from intergovernmentalism, and leaves national leaders with a strong commitment to supranationalism.⁸⁰ Following the preamble, the former EEC is officially referred to as “the European Community” in the remainder of the treaty.⁸¹

Testing the EU

In many respects, with the norm of European Federalism firmly in place, the Treaty of Maastricht seems as much an affirmation by the region to pursue unification as a commitment to further economic integration. Since its implementation was largely

⁸⁰ Ibid., (Preamble).

⁸¹ Ibid., (Title I, Article A).

economic (though its mandate was very political), my criteria fit the actual text of the treaty only loosely. With this in mind, I suggest that Maastricht provided inspiration to other EU agreements that are in many way more functional though less foundational. For example, the implementation and expansion of the Shengen agreement over the years impacted society in a real way by allowing Europeans to travel across the continent under a single passport. Another example is the Treaty of Lisbon (2009) that provided for a more reorganized and more democratic (and less intergovernmental) political process at the federal level.

Creativity: Although the mechanics of the treaty were hashed out and then revised over the years, the originality shines through in the Constructivist vision presented by Jacques Delors.⁸² Delors advocated a Community that would be accountable, sovereign, effective and a sum of Europe's disparate parts. He acknowledged that realizing such a vision called for reimagining the political world he and his contemporaries inherited, and crafting a new one for themselves. The real originality lay in the way that the EU and future members would collectively impact the international system, in the new political model that they constructed at Maastricht.

Prescience: Maastricht was prescient in that it included frameworks for practical progress in the short term (for achieving realistic objectives), but also approached long-term idealistic objectives. Because of the Federalistic enthusiasm, even among skeptical states, Maastricht as a whole could be focused on the future far more than other agreements.

⁸² Nelson & Stubb, page 65.

Responsiveness: In my opinion, this is the most inspiring attribute of the Maastricht process. For more than ten years, serious challenges and doubts were expressed about unification, particularly from the corner of the expansionists and intergovernmentalists. Yet policy makers lent an ear to the skeptics, and either waited for more favorable political conditions before moving forward or revised whole sections of the agreement in order to win members' approvals. In earlier treaties, this extreme flexibility might have proven a liability, but in an era when European Federalism dominated as a norm, integrationist leaders wisely used this wiggle room to make sure that an EU umbrella could satisfy all its members.

Perspective: The road to Maastricht was very long, spanning not only years, but also incorporating a number of preliminary summits and reports. Even following the signing of the accord, ratification across member states proved an ordeal in and of itself, facing ferocious competition in national capitals. Treaty framers were able to draw on the hundreds of pages of reports, recommendations and deliberations to craft an agreement that would keep the Community moving forward, even incrementally. With Federalism as the established norm, and other European states from EFTA and the Iron Curtain lobbying for membership, they were able to make accommodations to intergovernmentalists with the realization that time was on their side. Judging by the number of EU agreements in the wake of Maastricht, they were proved right.

Forward-thinking: In line with its originality, Maastricht was a first step toward a politically unified region that changed the way that Europeans engaged with other parts of the world. Powerful institutions across the common market made Europe a desirable destination not only for states in the region not of the EU, but also for people seeking a

better life around the world. Additionally, the common currency as proposed by the agreement, although ambitious, gave the world's largest trading bloc a powerful financial tool with which to move markets.

Big picture: Once again, the prevailing Federalist rhythm of European political life made Maastricht most notable, in my opinion, for getting member states to sign on the dotted line. It is true that it called for sweeping reforms and expansion of supranational institutions, but most importantly it reinforced itself and the EU as the consensus center of European political life. In its final form, it gave up much of its Federalist character in exchange for accommodations to signatories. But it laid a groundwork for future agreements, increased the political and economic prestige of the Community on the international level, and inspired other nations across Europe to apply for accession and "join the movement," fulfilling an ideal put forth in the Treaty of Rome 35 years earlier.

By the time that Maastricht was signed in 1992, Constructivist influence permeated EC thinking, especially through the commission president Jacques Delors. Constructivism as a theory depends on societal norms and identity of the actor, as individuals and societies possess the potential to shape their own environments, as opposed to being shaped almost entirely by external forces, as per rational theories such as Realism and Liberalism. In the latter two paradigms, actors must base their desires and strategies on previous experiences and interests. However, Constructivist thinkers recognize social dynamics to identify changing norms. To the Constructivist, tomorrow's world is not bound by the social limitations of today. New organization of politics and cooperation are always possible. Imagining all Europeans as citizens with common rights, privileges and identities, as well as reconstructing the roles of individual nation state.

Chapter 7: Conclusion

What does the future hold?

As the generation that successfully founded modern European integration fades away, regional unity is in the hands of new leaders who face severe challenges. A few of the major crises that have recently confronted EU states, and stoked division in Brussels, include both external and internal pressures. For example, the Euro crisis, brought to the fore by the global financial meltdown of the last decade, has tested Europe's political mettle, as members squabble over how to best implement fiscal stability across the union. Additionally, the free movement of humans across the EU, from migrant laborers to Syrian refugees, present logistical threats to the stability of the community. Finally, Islamic terrorism strikes at the physical security and sustainability of European society inside and out, as transnational militias from the Middle East export ideology, materiel and soldiers, and those soldiers are often enlisted from among Europe's own disenfranchised nationals. All of these major pain points, as well as numerous other issues, are the subjects of fevered debate between regional leaders, as member states struggle to coordinate their corresponding national policies. In many ways, cultural identities across the continent, national fears and aspirations alike, have been exaggerated by these crises.

Assuming that European states resolve their differences peacefully, how will the outcome impact the integration movement in Europe? Will the EU evolve by taking on greater sovereignty at the federal level, binding the community tighter than ever before, as it did

in the Treaties of Paris and Rome? Or will it maintain the union by mollifying unhappy members that seek to reclaim or protect sovereignty at the state level, as it did in the aftermath of Maastricht? Both of these would be acts of preservation for EU leaders. There is also a third unlikely possibility, in which unhappy states leave the union altogether in order to pursue their own national interests and policies.

If history is any guide, EU members will find a way to arrive at a consensus with a mind to resolving these crises. The previous 60 years have seen governments rise and fall and policy regimes come and go. However, the European Union has only flourished, with more states joining and more agreements affirming greater sovereignty at the federal level. All the while, no member state has ever left the union and abandoned the dream of integration, even as it bickered with its peers or wavered in its compliance with EU policies. Margaret Thatcher, the British leader who personified the opposition to federal sovereignty in the EC, described the new Europe as a “family of nations,”⁸³ evoking an imagery of states bound together by a heritage thicker than water. In a biological and social family, non-conformity and even non-compliance do not necessarily lead to expulsion or defection. Perhaps this is so for political blood-relations as well, and part of what Lady Thatcher wanted to convey through this allusion.

Resolving the economic crisis with integration theory

My thesis has presented the significant impacts of the theories of Functionalism, Neofunctionalism and Federalism on regional integration, and the ways that they inspired European states to pursue cooperation instead of competition. However, what theory of

⁸³ Nelson & Stubb, page 54.

integration will provide the inspiration for European leaders to navigate the rapids currently threatening peace and stability in the EU? Will one of these three theories figure prominently over another, or will some other as yet unidentified paradigm present itself?

It is possible that the current political climate is still heavily influenced by Federalism. The importance for global financial markets of European economic integration, and preservation of the common currency, is well established. The EU is still the world's largest market,⁸⁴ and one can imagine the numerous difficulties for both the union and a defector state in stabilizing their markets should one decide to break away. Additionally, with the Euro currency playing such an important role in capital markets, at times appearing to rival even the almighty U.S. Dollar, a state in the European Monetary Union leaving the agreement is, in my estimation, hardly more than a very compelling thought experiment. On a political level, Europe is also bound rather tightly, though subtly. States parties fly the EU flag outside their diplomatic missions abroad. Furthermore, on many occasions, the EU negotiates or mediates political agreements and peace treaties, reflecting a very broad common foreign policy among member states toward certain situations.⁸⁵ Additionally, EU agreements over the last ten years, most recently the Treaty of Lisbon, have put more political sovereignty into the hands of supranational organs, namely the directly elected European Parliament. Finally, the cultural, transportation and commercial standards that are found throughout the EU will not be easy to unravel overnight, should an angry member state choose to defect. In my

⁸⁴ "European Commission Directorate-General for Trade." EU Position in World Trade. Accessed December 15, 2015. <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/eu-position-in-world-trade/>.

⁸⁵ "Office of the Quartet." Office of the Quartet. Accessed December 15, 2015. <http://www.quartetrep.org/>.

opinion, these are all symptomatic of a powerful Federalist influence that continues to prevail. States will stick with the EU because it is a powerful, important institution in itself, sacred in its own right. The *reality* of an integrated Europe is too powerful a norm to defy, and national interests must conform to accommodate compliance.

Perhaps a Neofunctionalist approach will help move the EU forward in the near future, through the power wielded by supranational institutions. In this instance, a state considering defection, or threatening to do so, might risk direct competition with the full economic and political might of the region. Even nations in other parts of the globe, which owe their health and prosperity to Europe's robust markets and commercial girth, might steer clear of a defector. In some cases, Europe's supranational institutions actually possess enough sovereignty to retaliate against a defector state, such as the extremely influential European Central Bank and other regimes. In other words, even a state that is unhappy or alienated from its peers in the EU will still opt to affirm its commitment to membership, due to a Neofunctionalist need to settle its disputes in sovereign supranational institutions.

It is also possible that the cycle of paradigms will come full circle, and see a return to Functionalism to sustain regional integration, as it was during the era of Schumann and Adenauer. States quarrelling over various matters of policy at the federal level, such as with regards to bailout terms or other commercial benchmarks, might be able to overlook political hotspots because they realize that coordination and cooperation is necessary. Frustrated states would stay in the union, but not simply because of they are worried about what the international community might think of them, nor because they fear the EUs institutional power. If influenced by Functionalism, they will just accept that

compromise is worth the cost of membership, since teaming up with other nations in the region happens to be functionally effective.

Addressing the free movement and resettlement issues using the six criteria

My hypothesis is that successful regional integration in Europe, however gradual, was not a spontaneous reaction to acute external pressures. Instead, it was the result of a shared vision and clever planning by policy makers and negotiators, who never shied away from addressing lofty ideals even as they attempted to resolve practical considerations. This careful and sensitive balance that the founding fathers of the EU were able to strike, from Schumann to Spaak to Delors and beyond, provided just the necessary formula to convince states to surrender some of their jealously guarded sovereignty. As I argued, the consensus agreements that they helped forge fulfilled a lengthy set of criteria, in accordance with integration theory. If Europe's leaders expect to be successful in stewarding the integration movement toward a politically united continent, and weathering the current storm of crises, I strongly suggest they abide by the same guidelines.

For example, in the case of resolving the crises around the movement and resettlement of people within the EU, an agreement should be:

Creative: Negotiators in Brussels could review the various disagreements and debates around this issue, and identify the exact points where policy interests diverge. At these cruxes, they should concentrate on suggesting original proposals that would either bridge the gap directly between the disagreeing parties (such as an effective compromise) or take the issue in a new direction entirely. As to the latter, parties need to recognize that

divergent interests in one specific policy area do not presuppose disagreements in another.

Prescience: Any successful agreement among member states should have considerations or mechanisms built in, to anticipate and resist future pressures. A deal done only for today might not last through tomorrow.

Responsiveness: Negotiators will be obliged to consider the reputations of themselves and their constituencies as they hash out an effective agreement. Additionally, they must consider the concerns and vulnerabilities of those who will be indirectly affected by the agreement and account for those interests as well.

Perspective: When negotiating parties reach an impasse, they can consider building in stronger (or weaker) shared institutions down the road in order to coax concessions today from an insecure party.

Forward-thinking: A successfully negotiated settlement to maintain momentum towards regional integration would not just focus on the immediate policy matter. It must also utilize the language of idealism and reference the ultimate goal, as a legal witness to remind states parties why they are cooperating in the first place. This will also provide inspiration for future agreements.

Big picture: Any effective agreement will carefully consider opportunities and threats beyond the immediate scope and geographical reach of the states parties. Considering only the regional impact while ignoring the global effects would leave the agreement vulnerable to unexpected attacks.

Seeking a common security policy to combat terrorism

Terrorism, as perpetrated around the world by groups like Al-Qaeda and ISIS, presents a difficult challenge for polities like the EU and the United States. One reason is because of the fluid and transnational nature of these armed groups' members and organizations. Frustratingly, ideology seems like the most critical export of these terrorist groups, a commodity that is not so easily controlled by commercial regulation and border agreements. In many instances, the terrorists themselves are homegrown citizens of the targeted EU states. As a result, there is no military operation, bombing campaign or sanctions regime that will neutralize the modern terrorist threat overseas. An effective policy must be by parts unconventional and original, so that it addresses the ideological and societal roots of the conflict in addition to carrying the threat of coercive force.

The EU is not a regular government, and does not have a sophisticated foreign policy or particular defense/security apparatus shared among its member states. For the most part, every EU member represents itself in security and defense matters. Coincidentally, terrorism is not a regular security threat, and transnational terrorist groups are themselves not regular armies or governments that can easily be targeted by policy campaigns. Perhaps this uncomfortable symmetry would provide just the opportunity for member states to formulate a consensus of foreign and security policy for the EU, at least with respect to the Al-Qaeda and ISIS threats. The way in which the EU is a political organization that spills over national borders and exerts a magnificent amount of influence and power in global affairs might seem similar to the way that terrorist groups do the same. Perhaps the secret to countering transnational but regionally focused groups like Al-Qaeda and ISIS is through similarly amorphous, yet powerful and united, polities like the EU.

Though Europe is currently facing a number of serious crises, today's leaders would do well to remember the lessons of the last few decades, especially the one that meaningful integration cannot be rushed or conceived out of thin air. As I demonstrated, every single one of my cases was preceded by years of trial, error and extensive deliberation.

European Commission president Jean-Claude Juncker recently remarked, in response to the need for EU members to absorb Syrian refugees, "There is not enough Europe in this union," and "We have to change this now." At the time of Juncker's remarks, leaders of Germany and France, the two core states of European integration, were reported as being on board with the Commission's assessment. "We need to change," said German Chancellor Angela Merkel. "And it won't help to point fingers."⁸⁶ Whether or not Europe can continue along the path to integration is, as we have seen in the run-up to my three cases, independent of how member states adopt a common policy at the domestic level. Instead, it is more about how inspired leaders embrace the vision of a united European identity through shifting norms and patient negotiating. As long as Europeans can trust each other for the long-run, history shows that policy-differences have little chance of derailing the movement toward integration.

⁸⁶ Kanter, James. "E.U. Nations Urged to Accept 160,000 Migrants." The New York Times. September 09, 2015. Accessed December 13, 2015. <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/10/world/europe/europe-migrant-crisis-jean-claude-juncker.html>.

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