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Locke's "God" Problem: Predicating God and Liberty Amid the Secularizing Effect of "Uneasiness"

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Locke’s “God” Problem:
Predicating God and Liberty
Amid the Secularizing Effect of “Uneasiness”

by
Kathleen M. Ryan

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Philosophy in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York

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This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Philosophy in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK
Abstract

Locke’s “God” Problem: Predicating God and Liberty
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Advisor: Professor Bernard Baumrin

Notorious among philosophy texts, Locke’s Essay stands between the God-intoxicated 17th century and the science-intoxicated 18th century and has had a significant role in the transition of the one intoxication to the other. That the Essay itself underwent major revisions before it emerged in the posthumous form we’ve canonized for our enlightenment today obscures many of the issues Locke was contending with at the time to which he may not have found the kind of final answers we’ve come to attribute to him. This dissertation attempts to justify an examination of one particular chapter in the Essay -- the “Of Power” chapter of II.xxi -- in terms of its troubled creative history and with regard to some of the particular individuals who were most instrumental in its changes, with an eye to the possibility that what has been seen as Locke’s final and “fixed” account of human liberty may actually be a posthumously-executed editorial distortion of it. (1-3)
Acknowledgements

I’d like to first of all thank my dissertation committee comprised of Prof. Joseph Dauben, Prof. David Rosenthal, Prof. Peter Simpson and Professor Catherine Wilson, all of whom offered me extremely thoughtful and probing questions prior to and during my defense. Notable too were the period classes I’d had earlier with Professors Dauben and Wilson which had initially prompted my thirst for understanding the issues girding Early Modern Philosophy and which broadened my field of vision as to what else might be going on when Locke was working out his theories. More insight into the metaphysical issues came in the EMP and Locke conferences I’d attended in 2012 and 2013 (sponsored by Kenneth Winkler and Jessica Gordon-Roth) during which I tried to informally rehearse some of the hypotheses I would later develop here. Special gratitude also goes to my friends Adriana Renero-Castillo, Ken Weissharr, Patricia Willard, and Joe and Linda Brindley for their everlasting patience in hearing out my philosophical arguments and for their encouraging calls to “hang in there” when I was most obviously flagging with anxieties.

My biggest debt, however, is owed to my thesis advisor, Prof. Bernard [Stefan] Baumrin, whose infamous irascibility belies the extraordinary generosity with which he is imbued. Ever indulgent with his time and wisdom, he was the one who first introduced me to the history of ideas and the notion that scholarship could be built upon the supposition that odd paths may lead to new discoveries. It was Prof. Baumrin’s being particularly honed in to the religious and metaphysical debates swirling during Locke’s time that gave me a better sense of what the epistemic limits
necessarily entailed, thus allowing me to find ways to develop my thesis and to clarify and firm up my initial rather flimsy premises.

Though Prof. Baumrin likely will never quite “appreciate” Locke’s loquacious literary style in the way I did, I dearly thank Prof. Baumrin for trying his level best to curb my own penchant for verboseness as best he could. While I never was able to achieve the kind of elegant terseness Prof. Baumrin has able to master in his own work, may I only plead that this weakness of mine is probably the central reason for my feeling a special affinity for Locke.
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**Appendix XI:** Ngrams for English texts printed between 1600-1800 regarding “liberty of indifference,” the five “graces,” Pelagianism, and “Uneasiness” 268
Parmenides: Well, whatever else partakes of knowledge itself, wouldn’t you say that god more than anyone else has this most precise knowledge?
Socrates: Necessarily.
P: Tell me, will god, having knowledge itself, then be able to know things that belong to our world?
S: Yes, why not?
P: Because we have agreed, Socrates, that those forms do not have their power in relation to things in our world, and things in our world do not have theirs in relation to forms, but that things in each group have their power in relation to themselves.
S: Yes, we did agree on that.
P: Well then, if this most precise mastery and this most precise knowledge belong to the divine, the gods’ mastery could never master us, nor could their knowledge know us or anything that belongs to us. No, just as we do not govern them by our governance and know nothing of the divine by our knowledge, so they in their turn are, for the same reason, neither our masters nor, being gods, do they know human affairs.
S: If god is to be stripped of knowing, our argument may be getting too bizarre.
P: And yet, Socrates, the forms inevitably involve these objections and a host of others besides ... 

-- *Parmenides* 134d-135a¹

“There are many puzzles and difficulties raised by saying, as Empedocles does, that each set of things is known by means of its corporeal elements and by reference to something in soul which is like them ... Further, each of the principles will have far more ignorance than knowledge, for though each of them will know one thing, there will be many of which it will be ignorant. Empedocles at any rate must conclude that his God is the least intelligent of all beings, for of him alone is it true that there is one thing, Strife, which he does not know, while there is nothing which mortal beings do not know, for there is nothing which does not enter into their composition.”

-- *De Anima* III.5: 410a.27-410b.8
Chapter I

Preliminaries

A. My Argument (4-14):

Protestations and selectively targeted self-publications notwithstanding, Locke’s muddled notion that there must be a Divine Providence axiomatically informing our moral behavior belies what I believe was his evolving skepticism regarding this claim, which he fails to sufficiently hide in his confounding “Of Power” chapter (II.21), a major entry in his Essay that in all its edited permutations neither he nor his readers ever found clear or satisfying. At issue is whether Locke’s liberty account could either (a) satisfy the extant criteria for free will, and thus locate Locke’s work within the “safely conventional” (or what we might understand to be the moderately Calvinist theological schemes of the time); or (b) qualify only as a description of material determinism, which would place Locke somewhere in the realm of “Hobbist” thought and make him religiously suspect. ²

Contrary to much recent scholarship placing Locke’s account within the first, “theologically-secure” option best correlating with free will,³ I claim that Locke’s account not only better fits the second view, but his equivocating references to a “divine providence” adequately justified the misgivings many of the religious believers of his own day had of his position on human freedom. For in his attempt to preserve the analogical argument that we are free consequent to the two
premises of (1) God’s being free and (2) our being modeled after God, Locke would formulate such a preposterous defense of freedom that not even a posthumous patchwork of corrective propositions added later could save it. Unwittingly wandering into theologically-challenging territory beyond that which even Hobbes had staked out, not only would Locke’s substitution of “uneasiness” in place of his earlier predication of “the good the greater good” plunge Locke into the determinist realm he’d tried to avoid; by doing this in an effort to be more empirically accountable, he’d instead delinked the divine deduction he’d thought necessary to secure its accountability -- and consequently seems to be reducing both God and liberty in the effort.

No doubt Locke likely wanted to write a philosophical account that fully demonstrated human freedom; he even adopted some of his least-loved Scholastic formulas in order to launch it. But the epistolary record shows that when Locke got offered some theological buffers that might have helped him smooth over those causal “inconveniences” that the Scholastic formulas couldn’t handle, Locke demurred from the suggestions with an aversion that was striking. This failure to privilege a divine role in human knowledge and action meant that a case for human freedom was something Locke in the end either could not or would not prove.

That Locke’s “final” account was oddly persuasive enough to be seen now as providential in the establishment of political freedom (for reasons of its own) does not negate the fact that its arrival was drenched in a theological ambiguity Locke was unable to resolve even for himself. In reviewing the evolution of the views Locke held during the writing of the “Of Power” chapter, then, I hope to demonstrate how this ambiguity and its effect led to not only to our
misimpression of Locke’s overall theological position at the time, but also led to our overlooking one of Locke’s most interesting “errors” whose effect actually helped transform the core of our theories of explanation today. That error is the one that was centered in the belief that "God" could be “the explanation of all things.”
B. Hypotheses explaining why previous Locke commentators failed to understand Locke’s “Of Power” chapter properly (15-19):

(1) Not enough attention in the Lockean scholarship on the chapter has been paid to the epistolary record over time that accompanied the chapter’s development. The discourse between Locke and correspondents Molyneux, Limborch, Masham, Tyrrell, etc., often reveal most helpfully the issues that prompted Locke’s revisions.

(2) There has been too little appreciation of the embedded assumptions in Locke’s text, and correspondingly too much reductionism in viewing the text as fixed, eternal, and autonomous vis-a-vis its environment (both in ideas and in events). Context-setting is essential in understanding the way Locke is presenting his views.

(3) There has been too much of a tendency to treat Locke as a compatibilist, which, though it may be descriptively apt, as a term is theistically neutral and erases the explosive character an appellation like “determinist” would have invoked in the religious scrutinies of the 17th-century. A compatibilist reading of Locke consequently hampers our recognizing the challenges he faced in trying to carve out his notions of liberty amid the minefields of potential religious persecution are greatly obscured. One need not go as far as Strauss to acknowledge that certain designations had certain consequences.

(4) There has been too much of a tendency to either view Locke (1) within a pro/con religious domain alone (i.e., as a possible warrior for or threat to some theism-directed constitutional governance), or (2) wholly outside a religious domain (i.e., as a metaphysical naturalist whose epistemology can be dissected without referencing any of those nasty little theological
presuppositions that happen to be inhering in it). This falls from the tendency to use a professed analysis of Locke as an opportunity to proclaim one’s own views of human freedom, without identifying such views as something apart from corresponding textual references by Locke himself.

(5) There has been little or no recognition of the analogical predication error that I want to emphasize here, especially in how it highlights Locke’s insistence on the “uneasiness” motivation, and what its inclusion entails regarding the relationship of God and freedom.
C. Special Note: Thesis limits (20-22):

In order to make clear what limitations I want to preserve for this dissertation, let me assert what I do and don’t intend to prove: not only am I not arguing either for or against the existence of God here, my claim is also not about whether Locke’s empiricism is “in truth” to be seen as more correlated with the actuality of the world than what the rationalists provided from abstract theory. To the same effect, I am not taking a personal position on whether a motivational state like “uneasiness” that causes one to act does indeed constitute a determined act and not a free act, which is what Locke seems to believe. My claim is only that Locke’s deployment of empirical language like “uneasiness” tended to privilege the human experience we think we know over the divine experience we can only speculate about, and that this represents a true and valuable innovation to our view of the world. That Locke seems loathe to admit this very publicly only makes his expositional presentation -- though not its actual content -- especially problematic in its persuadability. I am therefore pointing out how Locke’s analogical predication fails as a set of logical propositions -- God or no God --, even as they may separately disclose other epistemically-interesting realizations, which I believe they do (such as the inconsequential impact of a providential God on us in the first place).

Motivating me to a considerable extent are the startlingly polemic footnotes to the 1894\textsuperscript{5} version of the Essay written by 19th-century Scottish philosopher and theist Alexander Campbell Fraser.\textsuperscript{6} Even while coming almost two centuries after Locke’s death, these footnotes serve as provocative flags for the secular reader of the 21st-century who might be otherwise oblivious to
many of the interstitial theological battles that were part of Locke’s time. It’s true that Fraser has in recent years been subject to deserved criticism from a new generation of Locke specialists who find his editing skills in general sloppy and inaccurate (especially in his documentation of the various drafts Locke undertook for his “Of Power” chapter), and this change alone has certainly made more dubious the value of his subjective (and yes, often inappropriate) line-by-line analyses (see esp. Fraser’s footnotes to sections §§4, 20, 29-31, 48, 49, 57, 74 EF). Despite these criticisms, however, Fraser’s mini-commentaries provide a far keener sense of the religious climate from which Locke emerged than what these more rigorously professional scholars seem currently able to offer. For my purposes, then, Fraser’s comments offer us a more insightful guide as to how Locke’s arguments might have succeeded or failed within the actual context of Locke’s own readership than what scholars insistent on working only with Locke’s final texts been able to produce.
Chapter II

Introduction: The “‘God’ Problem”

[I]f you will argue for or against liberty, from consequences, I will not undertake to answer you. For I own freely to you the weakness of my understanding, that though it be unquestionable that there is omnipotence and omniscience in God our maker, and I cannot have a clearer perception of any thing than that I am free, yet I cannot make freedom in man consistent with omnipotence and omniscience in God, though I am as fully perswaded of both as of any truths I most firmly assent to. And therefore I have long since given off the consideration of that question, resolving all into this short conclusion, That if it be possible for God to make a free agent, then man is free, though I see not the way of it. *10

“God made Mr. Locke, now Mr. Locke makes God.”11

A. Back Story (23-28):

In what started out as a relatively short and conventional chapter in his Essay about causality, which Locke called “Of Power” (in Book II, Chapter xxii12 ), Locke opens a discussion about what it is that happens when “simple ideas” change or are altered, believing that a crucial hook in the epistemological quest lay in finding out whether changes in “simple ideas” come from
Necessity or from Freedom. The discussion’s purpose was to ground the assertion that determinist accounts of change in the natural world are reconcilable with accounts of human liberty and reason.\textsuperscript{13} In seeking out examples of what would clarify the epistemic and ontological distinctions he wanted to make between active and passive activity, Locke’s chapter would take us through his conception of “Power” as it expresses itself in simple mechanics, then move to the more revisionist “metaphysics” of Locke’s own construction, and finally go to the role this idea of “Power” plays in notions of morality and “free will.”\textsuperscript{14} In his first published iteration of the chapter Locke seemed to have accepted the scholastic postulation that men were motivated to act by “the good the greater good,”\textsuperscript{15} because men were modeled after God, and this is how a free God is motivated. It is upon this simple analogical predication that Locke’s position of human freedom gets started.

Unfortunately for Locke, though, the book in which the chapter resides had already encountered quite a bit more confusion and resistance than Locke seems to have expected. As soon as the \textit{Essay} was offered to the public in 1690, questions came up demanding to know why Locke chose to talk about \textit{both} the existence of “thinking matter” \textit{and} the non-existence of innate ideas, or why Locke could only describe “Substance” as “\textit{something, he knew not what},”\textsuperscript{16}; or why Locke said he wanted to \textit{limit} the claims of what we knew, rather than expound upon how vast and certain our claims must necessarily be when properly associated with God’s mind.\textsuperscript{17} Critics came to various conclusions about the \textit{Essay}’s being too Socinian, or too materialistic, or too “Spinozoistic,” or (of course) too “Atheistic.”\textsuperscript{18} “Mr. Locks new Book,” one scribe wrote, “has ten Enemies for one friend.”\textsuperscript{19} Locke himself wrote he’d heard that a “short epitome” of his
Essay was already “by some condemned without reading it because innate ideas were denied in it.”

As more reviews trickled in, Locke set himself the task of revising the Essay to refine his positions. The chapter which came in for the most revisions would be “Of Power.” Many took umbrage at the failure of Locke’s narrative to provide a more robust analogical account of morality which acknowledged a metaphysically “real” view of the world (in which the individual human mind encountered an object in the world separate and independent of that mind) rather than the “ideistic” one that Locke seemed to feel entitled to construct on his own (seen by critics as an arrogant vanity on Locke’s part all too dismissive of the role of the “true” Creator because all understanding would be a function of ideas agreeing or disagreeing within an individual human mind).

So though initially appearing as a small conventional narrative in its first edition, the chapter came to be like barnacles of miscellaneous propositions in the Essay’s second and subsequent editions. Though Locke admits making a significant number of “alterations” in the Essay overall for the second edition, what got changed in the “Of Power” chapter constitutes the only material upon which Locke will admit he’d actually done some mind-changing. Yet in reading the long version of the chapter accessible to us now, over three hundred years later, charity only prompts us to call it an organizational mess. Much of it finds Locke getting caught up in unwieldy self-contradictions, usually emerging from the accidental obfuscations so frequently encumbering his language. Stylistically, there seems to be little overall design to the chapter, no
sense of how its heuristic narratives might have been most efficiently constructed. Though Locke does move from point to point, starting small, then reaching more broadly, it is right in the middle of the chapter where he seems to crescendo elaborately, with a sometimes cryptic series of passages that truly capture our attention even as they escape their own commitment to what seems to logically follow. Then suddenly, at the very apex of his account, just as we begin to wonder if Locke really meant to articulate not only the “unspeakable,” but also the “unthinkable” -- i.e., *that God's operational authority over our behavior remains forever stunted by the incommensurable attributes we've derived from our separate realms* -- Locke suddenly pulls away and never quite discusses again, except in abstract reference, the issue it seemed he had intended to discuss. Instead, he just repeats much of what he’d already said. We are left with a “what just happened here?!?” feeling of having missed something monumental while blinking.

A.C. Fraser, Locke scholar and editor of the later 1894 edition of the *Essay*, declared in his own afterward to the “Of Power” chapter that what had finally emerged from its many revisions was an “inharmonious conjunction,” making the chapter now “perhaps the least satisfactory in the *Essay.*” And so too seemed to have been the reactions of many others. The editor of the *Essay’s* 1824 edition reported that “that well-known chapter of Power has been termed the worst part of [Locke’s] whole essay and seems indeed the least defensible.” Jack Davidson, a more recent Locke scholar, observed how Locke’s account of human liberty “has proved a serious stumbling block for commentators,” and lamented that “[a]fter three hundred years, serious scholarly disagreement remains about even the central orientation of Locke's views on freedom.” One thus wonders why Locke, who otherwise was so actively intent on making his *Ideas*
“determinate or determined,” if not necessarily “clear and distinct,” could not do so here. Was it a matter of his being merely insensitive to the expositional problem he created? Had Locke’s editorial focus simply slipped here, and despite the many revisions he put his Essay through, he would never be able to reconcile the correspondence problems inherent in this chapter? Did he just not know what in the world he was talking about? Was he striking out into new territory for which rhetorical conventions had not yet been comfortably developed?

Or was he actually conflicted about his whole project, finding himself in this chapter coming to radical theological conclusions that left him holding views he simply wasn’t ready yet to defend, but wasn’t quite ready to drop, either?

What exactly happened in the “Power” chapter?

I believe it was Locke’s substitution of “uneasiness” in the Essay’s second edition as that which motivates the exercise of self-reflection prior to action – and that the motivation was not simply that of the “good” which Locke had used in the first edition -- which exposed how increasingly Locke had been prepared to deflate the role of a “divine influence” in deliberations involving moral decision-making. For all protestations and subsequent self-publications defending himself notwithstanding, Locke’s muddled notion that there did remain a religious providence that informs and guides our moral behavior could not belie what I think was his growing sense that he could not justify this claim through the empirical method he so cherished, work around the problem though he might try. As ridiculously mundane as it was outrageously insightful, then, it
would be this desacralizing use of “uneasiness” that made it evident to Locke the possibility that to preserve perfection and to preserve freedom -- long the standard terms upon which Christian morality set up its divine teleology -- would be to preserve incoherence: a condition that Locke, as much a man of reason as he was a man of science, felt obligated to repudiate.  

And yet the chapter remains incoherent. Though very long -- the longest in the Essay, tallying up to a hefty 73 separate sections\(^{37}\) -- it is never clear what position Locke is actually taking, or where Locke’s points of emphases were supposed to be highlighted. He truly did not seem to recognize the larger implications of what he was positing. Nonetheless, Locke’s constant attention to the chapter and his defenses of it over such a long period of time is evidence of how important it was for him to get it worked out right. Consequently, figuring out where the sources of his difficulties with it lay -- which I believe have been inadequately pursued thus far in the scholarship -- ought to be an important task for us now, as we begin questioning our own notions of God, morality, and the epistemic consequences of human activity.

**B. The Chapter’s Three Stages (29-31):**

I believe that there is a way of deriving some clarity about how Locke is trying to elicit from himself an account of power and freedom in the chapter by breaking down its fourteen-year development into three stages, each one reflected in subsequent updated versions of the Essay. In “Stage One” of the “Of Power” chapter (the 1690 version), Locke had laid down a claim contending that we act motivated by the “good, the greater good” (herewith designated as
“GTGG”) 38 because we are, though imperfect, of God’s making, 39 and that is how God who is perfect must act, because God necessarily acts according to universal and unchanging natural law. 40 Parallel with this analogy is the one contending that, because we are likenesses of God and because God is free: so, too, must we be. With these two postulates Locke seemed to have believed he’d “proven” enough to close his account of human freedom. I will call this first version, “LF1.” 41

In my suggested logical form, we might state it thus:

*Version LF1*

If to have freedom is to have the choice of acting good or not good, then:

(1) God is “free” (because he always acts according to the GTGG)

(2) Man is free (because [like God] he always acts according to the GTGG)

*Therefore*: both God and man are free.

- Argument: *Valid*

However, in “Stage Two” of the chapter (editions two through four, from 1694 to 1700), Locke removed the emphasis on the “greater good” claim of the first edition, 42 and asserted instead that we act necessarily from feelings of “uneasiness” that we are anxious to alleviate through action. 43 This was to account for Locke’s worry that he’d neglected to address man’s “weakness of will” in LF1. Locke now also added a “suspension mechanism” to the mind’s understanding here so that those uneasinesses which needed to be addressed first could be evaluated and
scheduled. Locke would continue to emphasize that the will’s role was solely to carry out whatever the last judgement of the understanding ordered it to do. And God’s perfection still entailed his acting necessarily from the “good.” Both God and man were still free. These additions remained not only in editions two through four, but in the posthumous 1706 edition as well. I will call this version, “LF2.”

Our form now is:

**Version LF2**

If to have freedom is to have the choice of acting good or not good, then:

1. God is free (because he always acts according to the GTGG)
2. Man is free (because [unlike God] he always acts according to his uneasiness)

**Therefore:** both God and man are free.

- Argument: invalid if analogical predication is based on argument from freedom (2nd premise false by definition)
- Argument: possibly valid iff AP form were restated as holding two conditions for determinism (i.e., not freedom), of which God would meet one condition and man would meet the other (“determinism” meaning “cannot act other than ‘X’”).

**Hence:** Neither God nor man is free.

“Stage Three” of the chapter accounts for what it became in its posthumously published form. While it did preserve most of what had been entered into it from before, included in it was an additional insertion now allowing the will to reverse on its own the verdict of the last judgement
of the understanding, and possibly substitute the will’s own separate and independent judgement in its stead. 48 Thus the mind could now be changed even after the understanding issued its last best assessment, and the will would now have at least parity, if not superiority, over the long dominant understanding itself. 49 But with no other adjustments being done to any of the previous material in the chapter (including Locke’s earlier inclusion of his notion of “uneasiness”), though this addition now established an apparent route to a form of “free will,” the newest “addition” eroded the force of what had been offered in the important second edition version of the chapter -- that is, that the last judgement of the understanding controlled what the will would carry out. This of course meant the chapter was now reaching a maximum level of inconsistency. 50 For if the original uneasiness still remained to cause the chain of events to proceed determinatively, what could possibly be allowing for this sudden intervention of the will, given that this move seemed contrary to what Locke had so obstinately held to when he was alive? Generally, there is only one explanation for those “mysteries” that otherwise defy explanation (of which Locke, while alive, seemed more likely to feel lay beyond our epistemic understanding). That explanation of course typically rested in the ever-resourceful “magic bullet” of the supernatural: i.e., God. I will call this final version -- the one we usually are given now as Locke’s “intended” version -- “LF3.”

Our final form might then be:

Version LF3

If to have freedom is to have the choice of acting good or not good, then:

(1) God is free (because he always acts according to the GTGG)
(2) Man is free (because [unlike God] he always acts according to his uneasiness, and uneasiness ≠ “GTGG”)

Therefore: both God and man are free.

-Argument: invalid if analogical predication is based on argument from freedom.

-Argument: possibly valid if and only if AP form was restated as holding two conditions for determinism, of which God would meet one condition and man would meet the other (“determinism” meaning “cannot act other than ‘X’”).

-Argument: beyond scrutiny given questionable nature of “suspension” mechanism.

Hence: Inconclusive as to liberty status of either God or man.

ERROR?

C. Three questions prompted by the sequence of revisions which seem in need of answering

(32-34):

In order to determine what was going on here, three major questions prompted by this sequence of revisions to the account seem in need of answering:

(1) What did Locke think was at stake when he changed his mind from what he stated in his liberty account in his first edition of Ch. 21 to the versions he offered in his second, third and fourth editions? That is, what caused Locke to change his mind from the scholastic notion of
“good” as an action-motivator in the first edition to one containing the more desire-based solution of “uneasiness” thereafter?

(2) Why did Locke seemingly leave unexplained at his death his new story of how the will might after all have a chance to review the last judgement of the understanding and thereby order something different (i.e., what is now contained in LF3), after he had spent the previous fourteen years denying that his action theory could even allow for such a shift (as is preserved in LF2)? Or had Locke even been the one who actually made this change?52

(3) What was the central analogical error in the account overall that so bothered Locke throughout his representations that it ultimately prevented him from resolving it (even if by dissolving it) and to consequently move the account forward coherently?

D. Initial answers to the first two questions (35-38):

Of the first two questions, some initial answers might be formulated thusly:

(1a) Locke wanted to challenge the notion of “innate ideas” and realized he could not defend the use of “the good, the greater good” as an explanatory motivator without being forced to acknowledge it as a mind-independent property of God’s Universe for which our minds were innately hard-wired to access. 53 The contingent nature of the state of “uneasiness” allowed Locke to defend his stance from a position he was more comfortable with -- that of human experience -- which enabled Locke to take “motivation” out of the religio/Scholastic sphere.54 Locke’s professional interests in the new empirical methods of diagnosis and prescription (he
had a degree in medicine as well as philosophy) would additionally suggest he’d prefer a simple observable *physical* explanation for an effect’s cause rather than any other possibly more abstract explanation.

(1b) Locke’s Puritan/Calvinist upbringing might also have inclined him to be more sympathetic to the tenets of Baconism and the newer “experimental” philosophy than to the abstract logic embedded in the Scholastic approach coming from Roman Catholic/Anglican tradition. This Calvinist Puritanism might also have predisposed Locke to instinctively resist the notions of “free will” otherwise given more positive regard in Catholic/Anglican dogma. 55

(2) The additions and subtractions posthumously altering II.21, based (ostensibly) on what Locke’s French translator Pierre Coste chose to extrapolate from one of Locke’s in his final letters,56 may or may not have been what Locke actually intended to include in II.21 -- particularly that subtracted from section §2357 and added to sections §56 and §71. This claim of mine would likely be disputed, but there may be grounds to investigate it for this essay -- both in Coste’s behavior regarding Locke’s reputation after he died, and in Anthony Collins’ suspicions of Coste’s views (and in Collins’ own response to the ‘‘*God*’ problem” of free will, which seems intent on resurrecting Locke’s position, but from a better supported series of premises).58
E. Answer to Question #3 lies at the core of Locke’s error of logic, and is what needs to be disentangled (39-40):

However, the answer to Question (3) concerns what lay at the core of the error of logic in the LF2 analogy that Locke failed to perceive, and is what I wish to disentangle. I believe that the source of Locke’s apparent error serves as a significant but hitherto unrecognized pivot point that will transform the polarizing rational-theism arguments of Hobbes and Cudworth (to be discussed next) into the psychological humanism which would eventually lead to Hume.

The progression of these stages demonstrates how the reductive logic in the divine/human relationship which Locke assumed existed served instead to undermine him in his account of human freedom, since in each stage Locke would posit particular propositions which in some way he would have to challenge, if not overturn, by its succeeding stage. However, since Locke unfortunately failed to clear out from the text those passages which seemed to have been superseded elsewhere in the text (nor did he even appear to recognize how important it was that some culling needed to be done to keep his thesis clear), drawing any conclusions about what Locke might have actually intended in that final version does seem to be especially hazardous. Nevertheless, I will make my own contrarian speculations about what was going on.
I believe Locke left a failed account for three reasons: one philosophical, one circumstantial, and one prudential:

1. The **philosophical thesis** (41): Locke made a poorly-formed formula of **analogical predication** when he claimed both God and man are free; hence his unintentional **analogical error**, which suppressed the capacity for his account to resolve itself in favor of human freedom.

2. The **circumstantial thesis** (42-43): Key sections added to the chapter in the posthumous edition of the *Essay* that suddenly impute a theological benefaction Locke had long denied may have been added by a literary executor acting not entirely with Locke’s epistemological interests in mind. This “last-minute” imputation in the face of what we see from Locke in correspondence he had with a trusted interlocutor just before his death in 1704 confuses what I still maintain was Locke’s ever more solidly determinist position in the free will debate.\(^{59}\)

3. The **prudential thesis** (44-45): Locke let **social and political expediency** force a theological rationale for human freedom and thus confuse his reasoning. This prudentialism would
disrupt the path he seemed to be on which might have better accounted for what was unique about being human *independent* from what was being construed about the character of the divine. Nevertheless, Locke’s account stands as a passable gesture authorizing his correspondent project establishing “political” (if not metaphysical) human freedom.

Although all three of theses contribute to Locke’s failed account, I will be primarily focusing on the philosophical and circumstantial theses, and only briefly on the prudential, since I believe it’s already been well-covered elsewhere (and given his own personal aspirations and the particular environment Locke lived in is to some extent self-evident). For the philosophical thesis, I will first identify what I think is the analogical error troubling it by posing against it the two logically- *sound* positions of the Euthyphro argument (with its competing forms represented separately by Hobbes and Cudworth) and show how Locke’s introduction of the notion of “uneasiness” in his Essay’s second edition puts a cramp on the formal analogical form. Then I will subdivide the thesis into what I think are its three components -- the “Baconist” one, the “Calvinist” one, and the “Collins” one -- with the first two especially coming into focus after being prompted by separate sets of correspondence Locke has with friends William Molyneux and Philip Limborch during the fourteen-year period he spent working out and revising the “Of Power” chapter, and the third one coming after Locke dies, when Locke’s disciple and upcoming philosopher in his own right, Anthony Collins, takes on the most contentious parts of Locke’s “determinist” account of human liberty and repackages them into a genuinely secular and coherent whole. It will be Collins who in fact dares to question the “allure” of free will claims in the first place, recognizing that in following Locke’s account of personal identity free will claims
more likely provide evidence of an *irrational self* rather than some perfect correspondence
between the rational mind and the independent moral objects in nature, as had been maintained
by many of Locke’s free will antagonists. I believe that the Collins account may most ably
represent the view Locke himself held but failed to so adequately produce.

For the circumstantial thesis I will give an assemblage of what I think is evidence supporting my
claim that the version of the liberty account of Locke’s that *does* get published posthumously in
1706 does *not* truly reflect Locke’s intentions but was instead rather selectively “massaged” in
order to cater to the more Christianized agenda of Locke’s French translator and literary
assistant, Pierre Coste. Motivating this claim is the fact that Collins himself seems to have found
Coste’s behavior after Locke’s death worthy of suspicion. But it is also due to the private
correspondence Coste has with Leibniz after the fifth edition’s appearance, when Coste details
the changes he made in light of the Locke-Limborch correspondence. I believe Coste
misconstrues what remained: i.e., that Locke was *not* changing his mind regarding his earlier
dismissal of a “liberty of indifference,” though Limborch certainly encouraged him to do so; and
that Locke’s “suspension” mechanism was consequently more bark than bite in being a means to
vouch for the existence of free will. Nevertheless, what Coste constructed is what is considered
Locke’s final word on human liberty now.

I will briefly conclude with what I call the “Prudential” thesis of Locke’s failed account: that
Locke let social and political expediency force a theological rationale for human freedom and
hence disrupt the path he seemed to be on which could have better accounted for what was
unique about being human independent from what was being construed about the character of the divine.67 This “prudentialism” of Locke’s incorporates not only a general scorn for many of the religious skeptics and agnostics who sought his favor (with some justification thinking Locke would be a natural and sympathetic ideological ally of theirs);68 it also incorporates an acknowledgement of Locke’s instrumental urge to preserve for his political project some notion of a distant but caring “placeholder-God” device to reassure those worried about his challenge to the divine right doctrine.69

B. Most important to keep in mind overall (46):

Throughout this essay I wish to keep tracking Locke’s attachment to the notions of uneasiness, suspension and indifference -- including what their relationship to “the greater good” might be --, and note how their presence in Locke’s account prompts what I’m calling an ebbing of the conviction that God could be the explanation of all things.
Chapter IV

(1) The philosophical thesis: In what I’m calling the philosophical thesis, I am claiming that Locke made a poorly-formed formula of analogical predication when he claimed both God and man are free. This led to the unintentional analogical error in the liberty account which so troubled him, the concerns being reflected in both the account’s many revisions, and in the correspondence I detail which accompanied these revisions. I believe the failure to untangle this analogical error is what suppressed the capacity for Locke’s account to resolve itself in favor of human freedom.

A. The Analogical Error (47-49):

In order to identify the analogical error into which I believe Locke unwittingly lets himself get trapped in the free will argument, the philosophical thesis will start by reviewing the definitional issues regarding God/creature relations prior to and of Locke’s time, especially those concerning both (1) analogical predication and the “intellectualist” vs “voluntarist” positions involved in the Euthyphro dilemma, and (2) the quest for happiness via the “good the greater good” predicate (which Locke of course abandons for the “uneasiness” substitution). I will then pose against each other two equally valid arguments about free will that have Euthyphro in mind: the one from Hobbes (who denies human FW against the opposition of his major rhetorical foe, Archbishop John Bramhall) and the one from Cudworth (who defends human FW against the opposition of his major rhetorical foe: Thomas Hobbes himself). I believe that by formalizing the
arguments of Hobbes and Cudworth we can see how their validity is sustained, even though each defends the reverse of the other’s position. This dual-formalization will provide me with a schema of what might be had of available FW-model options, from which I’ll identify the “error” Locke makes that continues to entrap him in his FW set-up, no matter what predicate Locke chooses to insert within it as an action-motivator (i.e., either “the good the greater good” or his notion of “uneasiness”).

B. Question[s] (50-51):

In order to set up the unstated premises of the argument, one must remember how the question would first be posed: must there be a God for there to be human freedom, such that from the syllogism

1) God is free.

2) We are created in God’s image.

3) Hence we are free.

all moral propositions can be deduced? Or can an argument for human freedom be established independent of all prior theological attachments, including any deduced from a proposition making claims to an Imagio Dei -type concept? Though some modern day skeptics and atheists claim human freedom can exist without a knowledge of [a] God, and that those otherwise obligatory and universal moral truths normally attached to a God and within which human
freedom is exhibited do not disappear with His (or Her or Its) “absence,” so routinely have we been trained to think of the necessity of an externalized agent who has the capacity to initiate such things that it seems logically impossible to contemplate any objective reality containing universal and obligatory moral truths if there were no creator interested enough to command this reality to exist. So when the theist asks what it is that is grounding the atheist’s obligatory and universal truths and thus enabling this “freedom,” the atheist’s reply seems quite paltry, at least according to the theists’ more transcendentally-expansive standard. Usually the atheist’s only available option seems to be a relativist one in which moral truths emerge on a case-by-case basis, given that the atheist’s world is often a naturalist one, composed only of arbitrary contingency and not eternal immutability. But such a provision grounding on the theist standard seems to make moral commitments unsustainable if any sort of universally-enforceable moral obligation is expected to be accompanying them.

Yet if atheists find it difficult to produce agreement on what grounds the entailed obligations of their moral beliefs, neither have theists historically been able to fulfill their part of the argument, or at least agree among each other on who God is, what their relationship with God might be, and what it is that justifies why anyone should be “obedient” to something that for some is nothing more than an immaterial product of the human imagination.
C. Moral philosophers debated (52-54):

Seventeenth-century British moral philosophy in particular was consumed with debates among just the theists about things like (1) whether God was knowable to us and whether we were to him; (2) whether God actually cared about us enough to suffer when we suffered, or was too transcendentally remote to be affected by anything corporeal or temporal like us at all; and (3) whether God chose to make a universe that is “moral” because he made it and called it so, or whether he chose to make a universe that is moral because that is what it was and he happened to recognize it as being so and told us that is what he found it to be. Analysis of the first item -- whether God was knowable to us and vice versa -- would come to be systematized under the concept of *analogical attribution/predication*, and had a role in our determining whether the properties and character of man were at all derivable from what we projected were the properties and character of God (the alternative being that whatever God was could only be discussed as to what he was *not* -- i.e., *not* like us). Analysis of the second item -- whether God “cared” about us in our contingent activities or was instead too remote from our immediate, individual lives to take much notice -- would come to be systematized under the concept of *divine passability/impassability*, and had a role in our determining whether the God being conceived *Himself* suffered or derived pleasure from things he created (the alternative being that it was inconceivable that the being of God could be “base” enough to contain human notions of concern or empathy). Analysis of the third item -- whether God willfully or arbitrarily designated a “moral universe” for us with laws *he* felt no obligation to obey himself, or created through his own intellect a “moral universe” whose laws both he and we by necessity must obey --
constituted the two-horned dilemma developed in Plato’s *Euthyphro* and would come to be systematized under the concepts of *voluntarism* and *intellectualism* respectively.

The theists’ debates were in part a way to develop the best arguments against those suspected of harboring “atheist” tendencies (which often included not only the infamous Hobbes, but also men from such disparate creeds as Socinian, Arminian, Anabaptism and Epicureanism). The debates were meant to demonstrate that not just *any* asserted belief in God would be sufficiently convincing; important as well was whether the principles underlying such a belief were so irreconcilably distinct from each other -- that is, were not adhering to proper syllogistic argumentation -- that grounds for, say, a particular volunteer or intellectualist position would be shown wanting. This might arise especially if the principles came from tenets which had long lost their initial justifications, which is what I maintain happened to Locke when he rather inadequately (and only half-heartedly?) deployed a form of analogical predication to back his syllogism defending human liberty.

**D. Analogical Predication (55-60):**

Analogical predication is an explanatory method meant to convey, through the comparative use of models and images that are already well known, that which may superficially seem incomparable or unknown. It has been an important heuristic in portraying the more complex doctrines of cosmology, theology, natural science, ethics and politics. Ancient philosophers like Anaxagoras said it was a way of making “phenomena the vision of things that are obscure.”
Philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle, however, found the method deceptive in demonstrative arguments albeit persuasive in probable and rhetorical ones. In the medieval period, theologians frequently adopted analogical predication to prove God’s existence; it was through analogy that Aquinas could take predicates for the imperfect forms of the visible (e.g., created objects like us) and apply them to those of the perfected form of the invisible (i.e., notions of God and the divine), thus providing a rational warrant to the apprehension and confirmation of the essence of the divine. When a later interest in the investigation of the human character of knowledge became more prominent, the move was reversed. Biblical passages like Genesis 5.1 (“In the day that God created man, in the likeness of God made he him.”) would now be used to propose the notion that the attributes of man might be discovered from what had already been ascribed to God. It is this last reverse form of analogical predication that I am claiming was running through Locke’s mind as he channeled his way through the initial writing of his Essay.

Analogical predication became quite the mode in 17th and 18th century theology and philosophy. Analogies were compared to the use of metaphor, with arguments actually breaking out as to whether one of the two was more piously accurate than the other in conveying the otherwise hidden or “inexpressible” aspects of the divine. Since these disputes even emerged about whether resorting to the use of metaphor or analogy at all was properly “respectful” of the distance between God and man, it seems that all ventures into theology or metaphysics had to make some gesture at one of their altars and appear to take a position therein.
And so I’ve suggested that threading through this chapter is an analogical motif to which Locke himself is (for the most part) trying to adhere. Its “layout” is what he discloses in the Molyneux letter passage above, even while that layout is barely discernible in the sprawling “Of Power” chapter itself.

The analogy I’m ascribing to Locke takes the premise that, being that we are creatures of God and most likely modeled after God, we are entitled to infer from properties we detect in God’s perfection that those same properties would be adhering in us, though in a less-than-perfect manifestation (note the reverse operational logic Locke uses as early as 1671\textsuperscript{82} and also the ascending and descending “chain of being” Locke claims can be found via analogy in the Essay’s “Degrees of Assent” chapter in IV.xvi.12\textsuperscript{83}). Since in Locke’s first edition, both we and God are motivated by the good (we by aspiration\textsuperscript{84}; God by definition\textsuperscript{85}), and because resemblance in terms suggests (if not confers) resemblance in proportion and relation, we are by analogy entitled to infer the existence of human freedom given what freedom we believe exists for God. I believe a reading of the first edition, then, assumes that Locke felt he had sufficiently shown by a familiar analogical demonstration that man, like God, is free.

That no one would likely have challenged the “truth” of this thinly-filled out proposition makes it all the more significant that Locke felt compelled to have another look at it. Noteworthy is the fact that the information conveyed in the “confession” letter to Molyneux posted above confirms that while Locke had at least initially (1) believed he could account for what we might call “metaphysical libertarianism” (“I cannot have a clearer perception of any thing than that I am
free”\(^{86}\) and (2) *assumed* he could validate or secure the account through a kind of deductive logic based on an analogical modeling of man and God (i.e., God is free/powerful; God makes us; if anyone could make us free, God could),\(^{87}\) he was convinced he’d failed at doing this (“[I]f you will argue for or against liberty, from consequences, I will not undertake to answer you ... I see not the way of it.”) -- and *did not know why he’d failed* (“I own freely to you the weakness of my understanding.”).\(^{88}\)

My establishing that such an analogy is being threaded throughout the chapter is central to my thesis, since it is my contention that Locke’s “failure”\(^{89}\) to satisfactorily uphold the analogical premise he initially thought he could just toss off “by rote” is what makes for his unintentional undermining of the long-held notion that God is the explanation for all things.\(^{90}\) Locke’s failure in this formula rested on his first making *resemblance* his predicate term relation (i.e., asserting that both God and man are motivated by “the good the greater good”), even as such a claim otherwise violated the empirical standing of the substance of his assertions (at least according to his own observations and intuitions regarding man’s frequent weakness of will); then “remedying” this empirical violation by restoring the experiential foundation of his terms in the second and subsequent editions to make *them* conform more to his actual observations (i.e., that man is motivated to act by his passions, as expressed in his *uneasiness*). But that then meant that the ostensible resemblance of those terms -- and hence their being necessarily valid for the divine/created analogy to work -- would have to vanish in turn (i.e., that “GTGG > God” \(\neq\) “uneasiness > we humans” as motivator\(^{91}\)).
E. What counts for success in analogical predication (61-64):

That successful analogies regarding liberty relationships can be made is evident in the analogical predication forms I present for two philosophers influential to Locke appearing just prior to Locke’s “active” time. Their formal analogical forms resemble neither Locke’s nor each other’s -- thus making my point on at least what a successful formal validity might look like, and why Locke might have felt he’d lacked it. I am therefore deeming “successful” what I see as the analogical predication forms in the accounts of Hobbes and Cudworth. They are relevant to my argument not only in their stark ideological contrasts but even in their proximate relationship to the life and work of Locke himself. Both Hobbes and Cudworth put together positions that at least within the required demands of logic were consistent. They are offered not only as successful foils against Locke’s “misfired” formulations but to also demonstrate why such measures of “success” in regard to the seeking of logically valid truths are, as Locke would likely have claimed (had he recognized what was going on), inadequate and unproductive nevertheless. I will follow this demonstration of successful analogical predication by repeating again the three main versions of Locke’s account that I noted earlier in the “Chapter’s Three Stages” section, and assign to each of them a “validity” value according to their analogical structure.

Though analogical predication is usually identified as the four-term proportional relationship embraced by Greek philosophers that takes the form “A is to B as C is to D,” my proposed form will be more of a conditioned syllogism. It starts with a conditional premise (“If Predicate
$P$ is defined as Behavior $B$), adds two or more provisional conclusions (“Agent $Ax$ is Predicate $P$ because Behavior $Bx$” and “Agent $Ay$ is Predicate $P$ because Behavior $By$”), and finally concludes with the conjunct of the provisional conclusions (“Therefore Agent $Ax$ and Agent $Ay$ is Predicate $P$”), with the conclusion’s validity and soundness to be determined from there.

Three kinds of evaluative criteria will be invoked here: (1) what it is that primarily motivates our actions; (2) what exactly the nature of the agency is behind our actions -- i.e., is it one of freedom or one of necessity? --; and (3) what the nature of the analogy being established is that makes the first two sets of criteria binding upon both each other and upon whatever relationship there is between God and man. The analogical formula is meant to deliver a justification for the necessary existence of the first two sets of criteria because their existence is to be explained only by some description of what God’s reciprocating relationship and interest to man is supposed to be as promised in the third set of criteria. If that description is not adequately or satisfactorily accounted for, the necessary existence of the first two sets of criteria would not be considered justified. In fact, their status as being necessary at all might be placed in jeopardy -- i.e., either or both of the first two sets might be seen as arbitrary or unnecessary, or even dangerous. Thus the praiseworthiness of one’s motivation and agency depended entirely on how God’s authority over man was to be comprehended. One way of examining this would be to take all the predicating forms and relations and match them up against a background of the Euthyphro problem.
F. Calling on *Euthyphro* (65-67):

*Socrates*: Consider this:—Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious,
or is it pious because it is loved by the gods? 95

The Euthyphro problem was of continuing interest among the religious and moral philosophers of the 17th and 18th centuries because of its efficient way of defining freedom and necessity in a moral universe. Notions of liberty being inextricably tied up with debates about free will and determinism, it was in what both began and followed from arguments from either position that expose the ideologies supporting it. Free will being generally understood as the power to act or not act at one’s own discretion without the constraint of necessity or fate has tended to find its support only within a religious belief system with a Supreme Being both powerful enough to grant the free will and indulgent enough to allow its exercise. Determinism, on the other hand, is understood as one’s having no agency whatsoever to either will or prefer, or to not will or prefer, instead acting only like a cog in a machine. (In some descriptions of determinism this is pushed a further step of being unable to will *to do or not do*). 96 Thus while free will most often finds its justification only in theological domains, determinism has somewhat paradoxically found support in both religious and non-religious -- and even atheistic -- belief domains. 97

Often the conflicts that appear between differing traditions come merely in how each tradition allocates its free will or determinism preference to its chosen agents, and how this distribution maps up against what is understood as the source of the state of affairs in the system as a whole
at the time. For example, if we use as our two primary agents of interest God and man, and vary the source of the state of affairs in the system as a whole between one created by God or man, and one independent of both God and man, we see that we have differing assumptions about the state of affairs emergent in each position, and different consequences obtaining from them, depending on how we decide to arrange the various elements.\textsuperscript{98}

The medieval period provided representations of two combinations of these elements. One was that of voluntarism, generally seen as being used by adherents of Augustine. The other was that of intellectualism, usually seen as being used by the adherents of Aquinas. Voluntarism represents the tradition of the first state of affairs, where it operates subject to an agent’s active and changing will. In voluntarism, “X” is considered good or right because God says so.\textsuperscript{99} Intellectualism represents the tradition of the second state of affairs -- that is, it operates independently of a continuous governing agent. In Euthyphro terms, if “X” is good, God will say it is -- good being intrinsically good, whether or not God says so.\textsuperscript{100}

Hence the two representations of free will and determinism coming out of the medieval period are little more than versions of Euthyphro’s two prongs, which we can now transpose to the vigorous debates of the 17th-century between free will and determinism. Here the role of the second agent – i.e., man -- comes to have more import, and will bear more directly on the problem I believe Locke was having. The logical validity of the arguments of Hobbes’s voluntarism and Cudworth’s intellectualism highlights Locke’s difficulty in representing his own position with any similar consanguinity.

As a materialist -- that is, one who believed in the doctrine that nothing exists except matter and its movements and modifications -- Hobbes maintained that consciousness and will were wholly existent due to material agency, and that all events, including human action, were ultimately determined by causes external to the will. For Hobbes, this view meant that any notion of human freedom had to be limited solely to the state of being physically unrestricted, or of being able to move easily, and that otherwise we are driven by our appetites without reflection. So not only did Hobbes think man could not choose to will other than what he had not already preferred to will; he could not choose to do otherwise than what he himself willed; he found choosing to do other than what he willed or preferred to do was the sign of irrationality. Of course, Hobbes considered the notion of “free will” itself to be a category mistake wherein the faculty of the “will” was mistakenly presumed to have its own independent agency outside the living being in which it resided and upon which it depended. But to some extent that complaint was beside the point, and was only meant to force the libertarian to speak directly of an agent’s passive receptivity to a desire that determined his or her choice to act rather than an internal little man within an agent’s “self-determining” an action. Nor did free will have any value to Hobbes as an instrumental application to moral theory, since Hobbes regarded morality itself as something artificially designated by the only entity who truly was considered free -- that is, that powerful sovereign authority able to choose ascriptions of good and evil at his own whim for the purposes of ultimate command. So with goodness not being represented as independent or outside God’s
particular whims, good and evil, especially as they would appear to man, would be utterly
relative and without any independent anchoring. Man would have to survive accordingly to his
fate within this view of natural law, and hence would be determined by it.

Hobbes represents the first prong of the Euthyphro argument, then -- that is, the voluntarist one,
since Hobbes gave freedom to [his version of] God, but granted relatively little freedom to men.
Hobbes writes in *Leviathan*:

As in the water, that hath not only liberty, but a necessity of descending by the Channel:
so likewise in the Actions which men voluntarily doe; which, (because they proceed from
their will) proceed from liberty; and yet because every act of mans will, and every desire,
and inclination proceedeth from some cause, and that from another cause, which causes
in a continuall chaine (whose first link in the hand of God the first of all causes) proceed
from necessity. So that to him that could see the connexion of those causes, the necessity
of all mens voluntary actions, would appeare manifest. And therefore God, that seeth, and
disposeth all things, seeth also that the liberty of man in doing what he will, is
accompanied with the necessity of doing that which God will, & no more, nor lesse. For
though men may do many things, which God does not command, nor is therefore Author
of them; yet they can have no passion, nor appetite to any thing, of which appetite Gods
will is not the cause. And did not his will assure the necessity of mans will, and
consequently of all that on mans will dependeth, the liberty of men would be a
contradiction, and impediment to the omnipotence and liberty of God. And this shall
suffice, (as to the matter in hand) of that natural liberty, which only is properly called liberty.\textsuperscript{103}

In viewing Hobbes’ analogical predication, then, we might posit it thus:

\textit{(necessarily from power)}

\textbf{If} to will freely is to have the power to do whatever one chooses, then:

(1) God can will freely (because he is powerful enough to do what he chooses)

(2) Man cannot will freely (because he is not powerful enough to do what he chooses)

\textbf{Therefore}: God is free and man is not.

-Argument: \textbf{valid & sound}

Whether one finds Hobbes now enough of a compatibilist to neutralize any apostasy aspersions, Hobbes’s action theory was received by the intellectual environment of the time (and long subsequent) as an atheist provocation. This view remained salient even though Hobbes’s move in granting the most limiting of freedoms to humans also meant he’d ironically given supreme freedom to an absolute ruler or sovereign -- call him/her king, tyrant, or God.\textsuperscript{104} \textsuperscript{105} Nevertheless, many commentators became caught up in the challenge to defeat Hobbes’s theory, which seemed even more heinous for the supple literary arrogance in which it was delivered. Stern warnings
were given to those who dared to even venture into the territory of mechanical theories or materialism; such inquisitive drifters were immediately labeled theologically suspect.
b. Cudworth (71-73):

Among those most disturbed by Hobbes’s determinist thunderbolts was the Cambridge Platonist Ralph Cudworth, who represents the other prong of the Euthyphro fork in my framing. Mindful already of the damage the Calvinist challenge had already brought to England with its severe doctrine of “unconditional election” run by the absolute sovereignty of God, Cudworth found Hobbes, with his appetite-driven materialism, equally a step too far in the other direction. Not only did Cudworth expend hundreds of pages of philosophical disquisition denouncing what he felt were Hobbes’s clear atheist positions; most abhorrent to Cudworth was Hobbes’ denial that nature itself contained any normative account of good and evil upon which we might exercise our “freewill” and hence be morally accountable for our subsequent acts. Cudworth found Hobbes’s determined materialism to be as cruel and capricious as that propagated by Calvinism in that it accounted for no independent agency based on any reflective ethics. While Calvin had offered a God who willfully chose among those whom he wanted for salvation many who were seemingly unworthy, Hobbes’s account focused on setting up whatever conditions might be necessary for autocratic rule to keep those it ruled from killing each other. Cudworth was an “intellectualist,” and saw both projects leading towards a cynicism which offered no hope whatsoever for inculcating a common, universal, mind-independent morality available and applicable to all. He writes in his Treatise of Free Will:

It appears from what I have declared that this *liberum arbitrium* or freewill, which is properly ... a power over oneself ... the foundation of commendation or blame ... is not a
pure perfection (as many boast it to be) but hath a mixture of imperfection in it. So that it
cannot belong to God or a perfect being to have a self-intending and self-remitting
power, a self-advancing and self-depressing, to deserve praise, commendation and reward
on the one hand (it being observed by Aristotle that it does not properly belong to God ‘to
be praised, to be blessed’) much less to deserve blame and punishment. But to be mutable
or changeable in way of diminution, lapsable or peccable, is an essential property of a
rational creature. Moreover a perfect being cannot have any such power of stretching its
judgement beyond certain knowledge, or of eking out the defect of knowledge or
understanding, and supplying or lengthening it out, by faith and probable opinion. A
perfect being can neither be more nor less in intention or being a pure act, it can have no
such thing as self-recollection, vigilant circumspection or diligence in execution, but it is
immutable or unchangeable goodness, and wisdom undefectible. Arius and his followers
maintaining the Logos, the word and Son of God by which all things were made, to be a
creature, did consentaneously thereunto assert, that he was endowed with this kind of
*liberum arbitrium* which is an essential property of every rational or intelligent creature.
Accordingly as Origen had before declared that the Logos, being essentially wise intellect
itself, could therefore never degenerate into folly. And the Holy Ghost, being essentially
holiness itself could not degenerate into unholiness, and so neither of them could have
that *liberum arbitrium* which is the original of lapsability and peccability. And thus St.
Jerome: ‘Only God cannot sin. Since all other things are endowed with free will, they can
turn either way.’\textsuperscript{110}
Inverse in terms but equally valid as an argument, then, is the analogical predication of **Cudworth**, which will represent the second prong of the Euthyphro argument, given his claim that men necessarily possessed freedom but *God* notably did not:

\[(necessarily \text{ from goodness } ... \text{ that has the capacity to choose to act from badness})\]

**If** to have *free will* is to have the choice of acting good or not good, then:

1. Man has free will (because his imperfection means he can choose to act or not act good)
2. God does *not* have free will (because his perfection means he cannot choose other than to act good)

**Therefore:** Man is free and God is not.

-Argument: **valid & sound**

What I want to show here is that whether one finds more compelling Hobbes’s voluntarism, in which “X” is considered good or right because God or a sovereign says it is, or Cudworth’s intellectualism, in which *if* “X” is good or right, God or a sovereign *must* say it is, both Hobbes’s and Cudworth’s accounts are logically valid and sound as formalized by their terms.
G. Back to Locke (74-81):

Let’s look back again, then, at how I formulated Locke’s three predicated analogies as he proceeded through his “Of Power” chapter revisions.

In “Stage One” (the 1690 version) we have the “GTGG” motivation: that is, Locke claimed we act motivated by the “good, the greater good”\textsuperscript{112} because we are, though “intermediate” and hence imperfect, apparently of God’s making,\textsuperscript{113} and that is how God who is perfect must act, because God necessarily acts according to a universal and unchanging natural law.\textsuperscript{114}

This is what I gave as my suggested logical form:

\textit{Version LF1}

If to have \textit{freedom} is to have the choice of acting good or not good, then:

(1) God is “free” (because he always acts according to the GTGG)

(2) Man is free (because [like God] he always acts according to the GTGG)

Therefore:

\textbf{Conclusion:} both God and man are free.

-Argument: \textbf{Valid}

However, for “Stage Two” of the chapter (editions two through four, from 1694 to 1700), Locke had removed the emphasis on the “greater good” claim of the first edition,\textsuperscript{115} and asserted instead
that we act necessarily from feelings of “uneasiness” that we are anxious to alleviate through action.\textsuperscript{116}

[I]t seems so establish’d and settled a maxim by the general consent of all Mankind, That good, the greater good, determines the will ... But yet upon a stricter enquiry, I am forced to conclude, that good, the greater good, though apprehended and acknowledged to be so, does not determine the will, until our desire, raised proportionably to it, makes us uneasy in the want of it. ... as long as he [Man] is content with the latter [i.e., the “handsome conveniences of life”], and finds no Uneasiness in it, he moves not; his will never is determin’d to any action, that shall bring him out of it... [T]he present Uneasiness determines the will to the accustomed action ... (§35)\textsuperscript{117}

Yet while this addition of the notion of uneasiness in §35 makes it look like the will’s role was solely that of carrying out whatever the last judgement of the understanding ordered it to do vis-à-vis its “present uneasiness” -- and hence we are definitely in the territory of determinism --,\textsuperscript{118} Locke also added a “suspension mechanism” to the mind’s understanding so that those accumulating “uneasinesses” which needed to be addressed could be evaluated and scheduled according to the understanding’s preferred ordering. Nevertheless, the will’s role was still solely that of carrying out whatever the last judgement of the understanding ordered it to do;\textsuperscript{119 120} And God’s perfection still entailed his acting necessarily from the “good.” Both God and man were still free.\textsuperscript{122}

I gave as my suggested form Version LF2:
If to have *freedom* is to have the choice of acting good or not good, then:

(1) God is free (because he always acts according to the GTGG)

(2) Man is free (because [unlike God] he always acts according to his uneasiness)

**Therefore:**

**Conclusion # 1:** both God and man are free.

-Argument: invalid if analogical predication is based on argument from freedom

-Argument: possibly valid iff AP\(^{123}\) form were restated as holding two conditions for determinism, of which God would meet one condition and man would meet the other \(^{124}\)

**Conclusion # 2:** *Neither* God nor man is free.

-Argument: Valid

As I show here, the only way to validate this analogically predicated syllogism is to make both God and man *determined*, since neither can be analogically “free” based on the new, separate conditions Locke makes available to them --- i.e., God’s “good” motivation and Locke’s “uneasiness.”

But a common claim for determinism or “necessity” doesn’t *seem* to be where Locke wants to go.\(^ {125}\) Conveniently, then, it is within this Euthyphro frame that we can see where Locke’s error of predication is located, for it is here where we can identify the relation of the nature between created and absolute liberty against how they’re being set up vis-a-vis created and Creator beings
and law. If it is accepted that the two views of Hobbes’s and Cudworth’s form the two prongs of Euthyphro, Locke’s equivalence claim holding that both God and men possess freedom must fail, since Euthyphro’s validity holds only in the non-equivalent claims (i.e., if God is free, man isn’t; and if man is free, God isn’t) that both Hobbes and Cudworth make. So we can see that it is this equivalence claim which starts to trouble Locke’s account. If we humans are free because we are, according to Locke, modeled after God, and if Locke meanwhile claims God is free, how does that explain Locke’s privileging human “uneasiness” as our motivator for action? It would seem Locke is suddenly making an intentional claim about a property only available to humankind: our uneasinesses come from our yearning to close a gap being exposed by our imperfections -- our desire for the things we lack. None of these ascriptions (uneasiness, yearning, desire, gap, imperfections) can be assignable to God’s own experience.

This must be true regarding the effects of uneasiness as well. Depending on what we use to ameliorate the uneasiness (or fill those gaps), we experience happiness or pain, and submit to either reward or punishment. Thus what supplies the terms of what we call freedom for us is our assuming we are being held accountable for whatever it is that we choose to fill the uneasiness gap, and bearing the consequences of whatever it is that we’ve decided. (Locke offers a variety of unranked consequences that may come from a poor choice of gap-filling, ranging from an upset stomach to a possible afterlife of unspeakable horror.)

On the other hand, God’s perfection logically entails his having no uneasinesses to fill. Hence he would have no experience of happiness or pain as a response, and consequently would not be
subject to reward or punishment on the basis of any choices he makes. After all, from whom
would he be rewarded or punished -- himself?\textsuperscript{132} Anthropopatheia, or when human emotions are
ascribed to God that have a figurative, not literal meaning, is not possible here.\textsuperscript{133}

When Locke therefore couples the assumed natures of God and men in some relationship of
equivalence, it sets up an indefensible premise from the very beginning about the nature of
freedom, responsibility, accountability, and punishment -- all properties of that morality that
Locke still hadn’t sufficiently delineated, beyond leaving it up to individual preference. Thus it is
the analogy that makes evident Locke’s problematic inclusion of God in the equation in the first
place, since all we can actually know -- and worry about -- are our own choices to act. Locke’s
coupling of God and man is thus not informative; it is disruptive. Locke, however, at this point,
is writing in too muddled a way to recognize this and come, properly, to a God-less account of
human freedom. So Locke’s equivalence only leads to determinism -- of God and men acting
only from necessity. If Locke wanted to hold onto the “uneasiness” motivation -- which he
seemed to want to do -- he needed to decouple the relationship and find a way to establish a
human freedom independent and distinct from God’s.

Yet as I asserted in my introductory section, though LF\textsuperscript{2} would be the last version of the chapter
that was published before Locke died, it is not the rendered version we’re familiar with now. My
“Stage Three” segment of the chapter’s evolution accounts for what it became in its
posthumously published form -- that is, LF\textsuperscript{3}.\textsuperscript{134} Though LF\textsuperscript{3} did preserve most of what had been
entered into it from before -- the uneasiness, the postulation of God’s goodness, the attempt to establish human freedom through God -- included in it now would be an additional insertion allowing the will to reverse on its own the verdict of the last judgement of the understanding, and possibly substitute the will’s own separate and independent judgement in its stead. And it is this version and the claim that Locke intended to leave this earth with this remaining extant that I challenge.

It comes about in a subtly functional equivalence being alluded to between Locke’s second-edition insertion of the “suspension” mechanism and the theologically-contentious notion called “the principle of the liberty of indifference” -- a submission which to some implicated an affirmation of free will. Locke had long referenced the notion of “indifferencey” from nearly the first drafts of the chapter, but such referencing had always contained a considerable but puzzling amount of Lockean scorn (to the point where it seemed to far exceed whatever a modern reader might otherwise expect). Now, suddenly, in this posthumous edition, the notion of “indifferencey” had been unaccountably inflated in status, becoming the missing guarantor that Locke was professing a libertarian kind of free will and not a determined operation of the will. Thus the mind was able to be changed even after the understanding issued its last best assessment, and the will would be given, if not superiority, then at least parity, over the long dominant understanding itself.

Since this final version is the one we usually are given now as Locke’s “intended” version, our final form -- Version LF3 -- might then be:
If to have freedom is to have the choice of acting good or not good, then:

(1) God is free (because he always acts according to the GTGG)

(2) Man is free (because [unlike God] he always acts according to his uneasiness)

Therefore: both God and man are free.

-Argument: invalid if analogical predication is based on argument from freedom

-Argument: possibly valid iff AP form were restated as holding two conditions for determinism, of which God would meet one condition and man would meet the other (“determinism” meaning “cannot act other than ‘X’”).

-Argument: beyond scrutiny given questionable nature of “suspension” mechanism

Hence: Inconclusive as to liberty status of either God or man.

(ERROR?)

Yet with no other adjustments being done to any of the previous material in the chapter (including Locke’s earlier inclusion of his notion of “uneasiness”), though this addition now established an apparent route to a form of “free will,” the newest “addition” eroded the force of what had been offered in the important second edition version of the chapter -- that is, that the last judgement of the understanding controlled what the will would carry out. This of course meant the chapter was now reaching a maximum level of inconsistency. For if the original uneasiness still remained to cause the chain of events to proceed determinatively, what could
possibly be allowing for this sudden intervention of the will, given that this move seemed contrary to what Locke had so obstinately held to when he was alive?

Generally, there is only one explanation for those “mysteries” that otherwise defy explanation (of which Locke, while alive, seemed more likely to feel lay beyond our epistemic understanding). That explanation of course typically rested in the ever-resourceful “magic bullet” of God.¹⁴⁰

H. The competing pressures driving Locke to formulate his account the way he did:

Locke’s “Of Power” account of human freedom (E II.xxi.), which I believe unwittingly peers into the abyss of non-theistic belief, gets ever so close to investigating the possibilities of such a human freedom without God that I think it might have frightened him; but then he unsatisfyingly retreats back into its more theistically-familiar zone in which there is neither comfort found nor knowledge produced (or does he? possible issue of curatorial misconduct here? See later discussion re Coste in my chapters 7 and 8). A theist by acculturation but an atheist by instinct, Locke is initially ready to start with those first principles about divine and human freedom that he thinks “by authority” (i.e., religious) are metaphysically objective and grounded, but he ends up being most committed to the psychological phenomena he believes himself to have experienced that do nothing but fritter those first principles away. What he’s left with is a barnacle of arguments (not helped by later sections added without compensating excisions) that seem to prevent his intended claims to stay clearly in sight. Yet though I consider his account a
failed one as it stands on its own -- and plan to show it to be so --, we need to look at the competing pressures driving Locke to formulate his account the way he did.¹⁴¹
Chapter V


*** Key word: “Uneasiness” ***

... What I told you formerly of a storm coming against my book, proves no fiction. Besides what you will see I have taken notice of in my reply, Mr. Serjeant, a popish priest, whom you must needs have heard of, has bestowed a thick 8vo. upon my Essay, and Mr. Norris, as I hear, is writing hard against it. Shall I not be quite slain, think you, amongst so many notable combatants, and the Lord knows how many more to come? (Locke to Molyneux\textsuperscript{142})

...And I have endeavoured, with great success, to recommend it [i.e., the Essay] to the consideration of the ingenious, in this place. Dr. King, bishop of Derry, when he read it, made some slight remarks on the foremost parts of the book; but his business would not permit him to go through it all. What he did, rough as it was, he gave to me, and they are at your commands, when you please. (Molyneux to Locke\textsuperscript{143})

Once again, it is not as though Locke himself hadn’t recognized this problem of validation. It should be remembered that though the first version of Locke’s analogical argument (‘‘Version
“LII”) was logically valid (“both God and man are free”), Locke had found it empirically dishonest in its substantiated terms -- i.e., man is *not* consistently motivated by the “GTGG.” And so the Baconist component in fact is set within the context of the debate between the “speculative Rationalists” and the “experimental Empiricists,” and is to be seen structurally in Locke’s disputes with these rationalists throughout the 1690s, especially the well-known one with Bishop Stilligfleets, but also the lesser-known ones with John Sergeant, John Norris, and William King, all of whose opposition to Locke was first brought to Locke’s attention in the correspondence Locke had with his young friend, William Molyneux between the years 1693 and 1697 (the correspondence only ending when Molyneux prematurely died in his native Ireland in 1698). It might be said that it is this stream of correspondence which provokes Locke into reworking the first edition of the *Essay* (especially in the “Of Power” chapter) in order to produce the more controversial second and subsequent versions. For while Locke had initially grounded his “Of Power” chapter with those first principles about divine and human freedom that he thinks “by authority” (i.e., religious) are metaphysically objective, as the correspondence with Molyneux became more intense (and as Molyneux spots out more of the opposition and sets it in front of Locke), the chapter’s later iterations do show Locke’s being even more committed to the causal determinism and psychological phenomena he believes himself to have experienced (such as his “uneasinesses”) even as he tries to adhere to many of those so-called “first principles” of freedom which the Rationalists were advancing.
A. The Sergeant/Norris-type challenge (83-85):

The primary arguments advanced by Lockean opponents like Sergeant and Norris\(^ {149} \) would attack Locke for what they saw as his “ideism” and his claims that they felt were more psychological than metaphysical in nature (especially when it came to Locke’s vague moral motivation theories). They believed that Locke’s evident empiricism could not yield valid knowledge of the world independent of certain rational principles.\(^ {150} \) Often cloaking themselves in some version of Scholasticism, the opponents maintained that because God fixed reality and truth, all truths could be deduced from the syllogisms available to us according to the fixed and timeless metric of God’s universe.\(^ {151} \) Maxims brought forth knowledge because they reaffirmed and provided the \textit{foundation} for all knowledge.\(^ {152} \) And because God would never let us be deceived, the certainty that our ideas corresponded directly with actual things in the world guaranteed that all of our ideas also had to be operating in tandem with other souls. Therefore no claims of a “private realm of ideas” -- which they felt Locke had illicitly made -- could be considered legitimate, since that would privilege the “knower” of ideas over “the things themselves” and thus constitute a challenge to God’s authority. It was “things” that were certain, they maintained; not “knowers,” as Locke seemed to assert.

Locke’s view, of course, was that phenomenal data could be understood best if it were gathered without one’s coming with any preconceived conclusions about what their ontological or metaphysical status might be. And thus his account of ideas professed to compare sets of ideas and the data points of phenomena \textit{within} our minds rather than as seeing them as corresponding
with each other outside us. Like other Baconists, Locke saw his method as more likely to lead to the new ideas and new concepts so necessary to science and to the extension of human knowledge. Of the maxims so important to the Rationalists, Locke found them useful only in their ability to *structure* identity and to quantify the differences between identities more clearly; no new knowledge could be developed through the maxims alone.\textsuperscript{153} So while Locke’s Rationalist opponents found Locke’s Baconist tilt to be pushing things too far -- for them, there was no need to find more than what was already there in God’s plan -- Locke felt they too often justified their “truth values” *after* the fact, since their method was about fitting things into preconceived frameworks rather than in thinking that there was new knowledge that we had yet to identify.\textsuperscript{154}

With Locke’s talents clearly more in alignment with the experimental Empiricists than with the Scholastics or Rationalists,\textsuperscript{155} then, the question remains as to why, in Chapter 21, Locke seemed set on both preserving the analogical argument he started with which had been based on a Scholastic’s deductive logic he would openly despise, *and* on giving place to the newly introduced empiricist account he derived from the psychologically contingent that he now seemed to favor (i.e., like the “uneasiness” motivation). A bead on this might be drawn from the other two [non-analogically-predicating] questions I set forth at the end of my Chapter II (nos. 32-34). Those questions were: (1) what caused Locke to change his mind from the scholastic notion of “good” as an action-motivator in the first edition, to one containing the more desire-based solution of “uneasiness” thereafter? and (2) why did Locke seemingly leave unexplained at his death his new story of how the will might, after all, have a chance to review the last
judgement of the understanding and thereby order up something different from what that last judgement commanded, after he had spent the previous fourteen years denying that his action theory could even allow for such a shift?

B. The King Challenge (86-89):

I suggest a crucial impetus that might help answer these questions later down the road might be found in an exchange initiated on Locke’s behalf in 1692 by Molyneux; the exchange would in fact be between Molyneux and his friend and fellow Irishman William King, then the Bishop of Derry.156 King’s name doesn’t come up much in the Lockean literature -- especially in any central role; but if one looks at the timing of the Molyneux initiation, King’s brusque remarks in response, and Locke’s rather smug dismissal of those remarks in a letter to Molyneux but subsequent revisions in the chapter’s direction in the second edition mere months after reading those remarks, it appears that it was King’s obvious impatience with what Locke had written in the first edition that most prompted Locke to work on a dramatic reframing of the chapter for its second edition. True: this reframing would not accede to King’s critique; to the contrary. Not only did Locke not delete the substance of what King quibbled with; he intensified its thrust and pulled it even further from what King favored by the time he released the second edition of the Essay. But I believe it is this reframing of Locke’s -- taking place so soon after his reading of King’s comments, and along with Locke’s insistence throughout the rest of his life that he still abided by this reframing he’d done -- that makes what appears in his posthumous edition even
more suspect; meaning that conclusions which have been drawn by others who suggest Locke’s final view might be much closer to something like King’s are simply wrong.

Molyneux and Locke had only just begun their own correspondence with each other when Molyneux notified Locke in late August 1692 of his outreach to King and of his asking for King’s impressions of Locke’s *Essay* (see second quotation above that opens this chapter), which had just been published in its first edition. King was an Anglican divine and student of logic, with a special interest in metaphor, analogical predication, and issues of free will. Perhaps because he hadn’t sought the *Essay* out on his own, King’s response to the *Essay* overall was rather terse and preemptory, his eight pages serving more as quarrelsome notes than as finally developed replies. It was clear King didn’t like much of what he’d read of the *Essay*, though he did concede it was a “book of value.” Of the six pages that were not of the ”Of Power” chapter, for example, King’s critiques of Locke’s innate ideas and Locke’s consequent claim that notions are defined by what we need them to be and not by what they “are” in the mind of God parallel the observations Sergeant and Norris had about Locke’s epistemology. Like them, King was not impressed by Locke’s reliance on experience as the means we learn about “ideas” like heat, or morality, or infinity, and not only found Locke’s problems with substance “trifling,” but Locke’s attributing to Indians the story about elephants supporting the earth “unphilosophically applied.”

The disproportionate share of King’s more focused attention, however, did come in his remarks to Locke’s “Of Power” chapter, where King’s skepticism about Locke’s adopting experience as a
basis for his knowledge claims is intensified. King devoted two of his eight pages to that chapter alone; they may well comprise the earliest feedback Locke had yet received to the first edition of his human liberty argument. King chose to comment on ten of its then-38 sections.\textsuperscript{168} The following discusses some of his key remarks.

While King does seem to agree with Locke in the chapter’s §4(1Ed), where Locke observes that, due to our own misapplied reflections, we often attribute to inanimate objects which are being operated on by natural forces a self-driven active agency Locke thinks they don’t warrant,\textsuperscript{169} by §6, King offers that Locke’s emphasis on how the uncertainty of what we know is starting to venture into highly unjustified territory, especially when Locke claims we must keep to simple notions like perceiving and preferring \textit{only} (which according to Locke correspond somewhat to the understanding and the will respectively\textsuperscript{170}). King thinks this empirical reach of Locke’s involves a methodological approach no less certain than the kind Locke has been objecting to (usually one regarding notions like “soul,” which King would likely have favored). Sneers King about Locke’s procedure: “[T]he power of preferring one action to another is even as lyable to mislead men as the faculty of willing.”\textsuperscript{171}

So when Locke says in §14(1Ed) that “[I]t is as insignificant to ask, whether Man’s \textit{Will} be free, as to ask whether his Sleep be Swift, or his Vertue square: \textit{Liberty} being as little applicable to the \textit{Will}, as swiftness of Motion is to Sleep, or squareness to Vertue,”\textsuperscript{172} King is troubled by Locke’s construction of the problem, finding that Locke is confusing what King thinks \textit{is} human agency
(i.e., a condition ripe with the potential for active freedom, as in the raising of one’s own arm) with the unresisting passivity of inanimate objects (the gravity example again):

this is a new discovery that it is as absurd to ask if the will be free as if virtue be square. I cannot see why it is an absurd question to ask whether the motion of my arm be a free act; that whether I might not have for born it. and then why may not I ask whether my will be not free, that is whether I might not have for born chosing what I did chuse. it is true that the will is the power of doing or for bearing an action. I hope we may ask whether this power determines itself to one of these or is determined by something without. if it be; all its actions are as necessary as the falling of a stone, and it is a passive and consequently a necessary agent. that is, it doth not act but as is acted upon.\textsuperscript{173}

King is also bothered by how in §16(1Ed) Locke wants to keep the two entities of Will and Freedom so far away from each other -- what King sees as Locke’s “the will is one power and freedom another” view\textsuperscript{174} -- since King feels they comprise a more dynamic relationship, one that grants freedom a privileged place, and whose robust presence is especially necessary for King’s ultimate view of moral agency. “[N]o Sir,” responds King to Locke’s attempt to separate the two and to reduce freedom’s overall role. While trivially conceding to Locke that the two terms might be conforming to different ontological properties, King claims that what’s relevant is that they together comprise a binding relationship of mutual dependence. “[W]ill is a power and freedom the modus of it, by which one power is distinguished from another. one power acts necessarily and another freely,” he writes.\textsuperscript{175} Hence King’s crusade is to establish that the domain
of freedom should be seen as that internal condition from which an agent is able to self-initiate prior to or at the “preference” stage; it is not to be defined as that external condition by which an agent is constrained at a given “action” stage. King admits that true ascriptions of freedom are not easy to parse out, but they are actually answerable, and making the effort to do so is necessary: “‘Tis true the will is a power to prefer etc but the question is whether it be necessitated to prefer the thing it doth prefer or doth it freely.” 176

For Locke, of course, who rarely meets an anthropomorphized metaphor he likes, 177 the will does not act (that is, can not “act”), and thus cannot be characterized as being “free” or “unfree,” but is merely the subordinate power which executes the [separate] last judgement of the understanding. Unlike how many of our contemporary students of Locke would have it, 178 that King at least understands what Locke’s idea of freedom entails -- that it is merely a description of the status of an externalized environment wherein the inherent limitations of the physical may or may not be binding on a given object -- is quite clear. When Locke says in the edition of §23(1Ed) that King would have seen 179 is that it doesn’t even make sense to think that an agent’s act of willing can be initiated (or reversed in progress) without a prior external cause (and a cause prior to that, and another one prior to that, etc. ad infinitum):

That willing, or volition, being an action, and freedom consisting in a power of acting or not acting, a man in respect of willing [*] 180, when any action in his power is once proposed to his thoughts, [**] cannot be free. The reason whereof is very manifest: for it being unavoidable that the action depending on his will should exist, or not exist: and its
existence, or not existence, following perfectly the determination and preference of his will; he cannot avoid willing the existence, or not existence of that action; it is absolutely necessary that he will the one, or the other; i.e. prefer the one to the other; since one of them must necessarily follow; and that which does follow, follows by the choice and determination of his mind, that is, by his willing it; for if he did not will it, it would not be. So that in respect of the act of willing, a man [***] is not free: liberty consisting in a power to act, or not to act; which, in regard of volition, a man, [****] has not. [***** 181] 

Besides to make a man free after this manner, by making the action of willing to depend on his will, there must be another antecedent will, to determine the acts of this will, and another to determine that, and so in infinitum: for wherever one stops, the actions of the last will cannot be free. Nor is any being, as far I can comprehend beings above me, capable of such a freedom of will, that it can forbear to will, i.e. to prefer the being or not being of anything in its power, which it has once considered as such. 182 183

King erupts that the very definition of will entails an active self-initiation, and an ability to change one’s mind mid-stream:

if this be tru a man is no more free then a milston. whereas he argues that there must be an antecedent will to determin this will and so in infinitum this were tru if the will were a passive power. but ‘Tis an active power determines it self in its choice and is not determined by another. and he that doth not understand this understands nothing of
liberty, which doth not consist he supposes in a power to act or not to act, but likewise in
a power to chuse or not to chuse to prefer or not prefer. every one being conscious that
when any thing is proposed to the mind, he can either chuse or reject it. will or not will it.
this is the native idea of liberty that no sophistry will ever destroy, and all arguments
against are but like Zeno’s argument against motion and proceed merely from our
ignorance of spirits.¹⁸⁴

This clearly establishes how far King’s own support for contra-causal freewill is from the
position he interprets Locke as having. While King wants to press the view that freedom entails
our being able to choose or forbear choosing a given act (the key word being the “free choice” of
acting),¹⁸⁵ Locke will grant only that freedom entails those acts we have chosen to do or not do
(the key word being the “free doing after” the choice has been made).¹⁸⁶ Thus the Lockean
choice seems deliberatively not self-starting, or not happening absent some earlier event
prompting the an agent’s decision or desire. The choice is merely part of the causal chain, and
likely arrives after particular passions prior to it affect it or have some impact on it.

If we wonder where, or how, King intends to define that opportune moment in which the Will
that he thinks is self-initiating ignites, it comes in his quibble about Locke’s use of the word
“indifference” and in his problem with the way Locke is considering the long-standing “good the
greater good” motivation. In both areas, King’s objections might well puzzle us.
Of the second, King seems to object to Locke’s attempt in §29(1Ed) to use an expression like *good the greater good* to smuggle in a determinist moral world via what would appear to be an uncontroversial Scholastic trope. Locke has made “the good” a property of high value standing outside the will, and hence it’s become an external cause actively impacting upon the [passive] agent, not a passive entity being impacted by the [active] agent. The expression is introduced as Locke continues the list he started in §27(1Ed) of “what must be remembered by [the term] ‘freedom.’” For number three, Locke wrote:

> That the will or preference is determined by *something without itself.* ..... [*T*he cause of every less degree of pain, as well as every greater degree of pleasure, has the nature of good, and *vice versa*, and is that which determines our choice and challenges our preference. *Good, then, the greater good, is that which determines the will.*]^{188}

Benign as this “good” might seem to us -- and as unenthusiastically as Locke seems to have even endorsed it in the end --, one might say that Locke at least gave lip service to what had been deemed for many great moral thinkers a noble end.^{189} But King actually seems to find something *evil* in the mission of the *GTGG* itself -- or finds at least a potential evil in a Lockean God who might design a world which Locke seems to think would be *determined* by this so-called “good”:

> this good is from the idea impressed on the mind, and the idea is impressed on the mind by outward objects and outward objects are ordered by God in an absolutely necessary
chain and so God necessitates a man as much to kill his father as the sun to move. and this is the perfection of man that he is as necessarily damned as born.  

Might King be suggesting that following such a dubious “good” makes all worshippers of it blind to what King thinks would be the freely-chosen true moral world, and hence slaves to whatever dictates a theoretically immoral God might order up? If so, it might be appearing that King is ready to align himself with the “intellectualist” horn of the Euthyphro dilemma, in which we and God choose freely to follow what is seen as an objective good which stands outside ourselves, and would not be aligning with the “voluntarist” horn he seems to be claiming is Locke’s position here (i.e., that we and God just willfully follow our often-logical dictates without any apparent consistency or reflection).

But King is not always consistent on this position, as we shall soon see (and Locke, of course, in the second and subsequent editions, upends the GTGG formula altogether, substituting the notion of “uneasiness” for the GTGG motivator -- which, of course, would only wrench up King’s anxiety about Locke’s potential determinism claims about ten notches higher). But King still needs a temporal mechanism that might trigger the opportunity for an agent’s freedom to happen. King sees it in the “indifference” notion that Locke so despises.  

Locke sees the notion only as an insult to the rational character of a perceiving and preferring being. He uses the term negatively five times in section §30(1Ed) alone. An excerpt of the section makes clear Locke’s hostility towards the concept:
A perfect indifferency in the will, or power of preferring, not determinable by the good or evil that is thought to attend its choice, would be so far from being an advantage and excellency of any intellectual nature, that it would be as great an imperfection as the want of indifferency to act and not to act, till determined by the will, would be an imperfection on the other side. \(^{193}\) \(^{194}\)

So already Locke shows no embarrassment in admitting the positive role of preference and passion to the justly deliberative spirit (and this comes still prior to his introduction of the notion of “uneasiness” as a primal motivator). But apropos Locke’s line in §28(1Ed) of “a man is indifferent to be pleased or not pleased,”\(^ {195}\) King is ready with an insult:

I answer wherever he is free he is indifferent or can make himself indifferent, nor is the preference determined by any thing without it self, otherwise it would be a passive power as much as motion is in matter. ‘Tis plain the author has no idea of an active power or he would never put together so many words to so little purpose.\(^ {196}\)

And when Locke insists that even that “perfect” God of ours is determined by -- i.e. (at least by process of elimination), could not by definition be indifferent to -- the good, King shouts back that the two visions Locke says he finds contradictory are all but so:
The freedom of the almighty hinders not his being determined by what is best. All things are **indifferent** to God. Nothing better than another therefore his freedom cannot consist in chusing what is best. His power is such that amongst infinite things proposed to him to be done none is better than another in itself, but he can make any of them best. If therefore he stay till the consideration of best determine him, he must never do any thing. It is best of all to act freely. Pleasure is the only good, and perhaps the reason one thing pleases and not another is because the agent chuses or prefers it, and then good is the object of choice or preferring and not preferring of good. Agents then that can prefer one thing to another are capable of pleasure and none else. 197

In the sections upon which King more confusedly remarks -- that is, the ones on “indifferency,” we see only glimmers of how King might be seeing the notion of “indifference” positively, and in service to freedom, in contrast to Locke’s obvious introduction of “indifference” only as that insult to rationality, perception and partiality. Both perspectives might confuse the modern reader, who is left to speculate whether an impartial definition of the notion is supposed to suggest a refined state of being non-judgemental or objective -- so that an agent has time to reflect without passion or pressure upon which of two or more options is *ideally* better (which is how King seems to view this); or whether the notion only indicates a crude state of being apathetic or unreflective, so that whatever the options being posed to the agent might be, whichever one is finally chosen matters little (which is how Locke seems to view this). While King amplifies his position even more sharply in later years (for example in Chapter V of his *De origine Mali*, which was later attacked by Leibniz in one of his *Théodicée* appendices), and
Locke not only attacks the notion of indifference numerous times in this first edition throughout this chapter, but throughout all the editions of this chapter ... nevertheless, Locke admitted confusing his position terribly in his second edition, when he introduces, out of the blue, along with his famous notion of uneasiness, his “mechanism of suspension” (of which I will address shortly).

C. Consequence of King’s input (90-93):

Importantly, though Locke had vaguely assented to receiving King’s response, he had actually been waiting to get a more studied exegesis from the pen of Molyneux alone -- an exegesis presumably more substantive than the one Molyneux had earlier delivered to Locke, which had fawned: “I will plainly confess to you, that I have not in my Life read any Book with More Satisfaction, than your Essay; Insomuch that a Repeated perusal of it is still more pleasant to Me.” And in fact Locke had already given Molyneux a list of what he claimed he wanted to see from him (though one might also see it as Locke’s self-interested way of packaging his own modesty in order to ward off a potential critique he couldn’t handle or accept). However, the glitch or misunderstanding in the mailing sequence of the letters between Locke and Molyneux led to Locke’s seeming to blow off King’s negative remarks when he finally got a chance to read them, thinking that a detailed recitation of the Essay’s virtues was yet to come from Molyneux himself. So when Molyneux actually ended up sending something a bit less flattering and a bit more edgy than Locke seems to have expected, particularly for the “Of Power” chapter, it was no doubt Molyneux’s “delayed” response -- one that though incisive
was hardly alarming\textsuperscript{205} -- that probably gave greater retrospective weight to King’s remarks in Locke’s eyes. Concerning the “Of Power” chapter alone, Molyneux had said:

\begin{quote}
\text{[R]equiring some Farther Explication is Your Discourse about Mans Liberty and Necessity. this Thread seems so wonderfully fine spun\textsuperscript{206} in your Book, that at last the Great Question of Liberty and Necessity seems to Vanish. and herein you seem to make all Sins to proceed from our Understandings, or to be against Conscience; and not at all from the Depravity of our Wills. Now it seems harsh to say, that a Man shall be Damn'd, because he understands no better than he does.}
\end{quote}

I believe it is this passage -- along with the King remarks -- which led to Locke’s seeming to have sunk into the depression that gets reflected in the famous Jan 20, 1693 letter excerpt I’m using as a prompt for my thesis.\textsuperscript{207} Within six months, Locke had emerged with his second edition “Of Power” monster.

Certainly his failure to publicly engage with sharp but insightful and publicly vocal critics like Sergeant, Norris,\textsuperscript{208} and King hurt Locke’s chances of remedying his analogical error, and impinged on Locke’s developing a strategy to meet the attacks on him later.\textsuperscript{209 210} Whether we can reduce the terms of the epistemic dichotomy by saying that the Protestants of the Reform or “Calvinist” stripe, like Locke, tended to be more sympathetic to Baconist approaches, while high church Protestants and “soft Calvinists” like Sergeant, Norris and King tended to be more sympathetic to Scholastic approaches coming out of the Roman Catholic tradition, such a split
does seem to have some historical justification. A clearer glimpse of what that failure of Locke’s might entail philosophically comes in the next chapter.
Chapter VI

The Calvinist Component: How Locke’s Puritan Origins Kick In At the End and Preserve His Original Theological Determinism against the Anglican form of “Free Grace” prior to the posthumous Fifth Edition of the Essay:

*** Key word: “Suspension” ***

[W]e do not seem to agree in the definition of liberty. For you say: ‘Liberty for me is the power of a man to act or not to act, according to his will.’ This definition seems to me to be too narrow ... I do not see how any liberty is left in a man ... 212

A. The Limborch challenge (94-109):

The Calvinist component emerges in Locke’s resistance to what I call the “Arminian rescue” he’s being offered by his long-time friend Philipp van Limborch during the course of eight key letters exchanged between them in the last few years of Locke’s life.213 A Dutch Remonstrant theologian and friend of Ralph Cudworth and the Cambridge Platonists, Limborch shared with Locke a growing concern about issues around religious intolerance,214 as well as an interest in contemporary and historical philosophical ideas. The two men had originally met in Holland in 1684, both having joined an informal and somewhat secretive group called the “Collegium privatum medicum,” which consisted of various theologians, scientists, and physicians across England and the Continent, all of whom found themselves united in dissenting from the particular religious and political views of their home countries.215 Locke and Limborch
continued to cordially correspond with each other even after Locke returned to England in 1689, each keeping the other up to date on various publications and events they’d noticed, and often focusing particularly on instances of religious persecution and the corresponding legal documents to which they might have had access. What remains remarkable about these final letters between the two of them, which came just a few years before Locke died, is that Limborch was able to deliver what was probably the sharpest and most acute critique against Locke’s ostensible claim of defending free will in the “Of Power” chapter that anyone had yet been able to get away with. Here Locke was to find that the “suspension of desire” mechanism he’d been so proud of introducing to the second edition of his liberty account -- that is, where Locke wrote that

the mind having in most cases, as is evident in experience, a power to suspend the execution and satisfaction of any of its desires, and so all, one after another; is at liberty to consider the objects of them, examine them on all sides, and weigh them with others. In this lies the liberty man has ...  

-- would be taken as synonymous with the “liberty of indifference” mechanism that Scholastic tradition used which Locke had found so objectionable, where Locke writes that

a perfect Indifference in the Will, or Power of Preferring, not determinable by the Good or Evil, that is thought to attend its Choice, would be so far from being an advantage and excellency of any intellectual Nature, that it would be as great an imperfection,
as the want of Indifferency to act, or not to act, till determined by the Will, would be an imperfection on the other side. 219

It is thus this Limborch-provoked match-up in one place of two [superficially?] similar notions -- that of “suspension” and that of “indifference”; only one of which Locke had ever accepted -- which finally forced Locke to explicate on the topic more specifically, and confirm (if it hadn’t been clear enough already with the “uneasiness” insertion) what others of his time had long sensed was his authentically determined and secularized anti-libertarian perspective.220

Since this particular correspondence is where some of the passages inserted into the posthumous version of the Essay that I find problematic got what I believe was their misguided start, it might be worth going through the ideas being raised to see why I claim the posthumous version of the chapter produced by Coste could be seen as suspect, since the “revisions” in the Essay’s fifth edition have been defended in part by way of what supposedly emerged here in the Locke-Limborch letters.

This particular period of correspondence between Locke and Limborch took place between October 1700 and September 1702, at a point in Locke’s life when he no doubt assumed his difficulties with the “Of Power” chapter that had first been published in 1690 had long come to an end. Being one of the few of Locke’s otherwise interested friends who had not yet gotten a chance to read the Essay,221 Limborch nevertheless was already on record as being in accord with Locke’s denial of innate ideas and in what Limborch termed Locke’s notion of the soul’s not
being in “bare cogitation,” So it would not have been surprising to see Limborch’s initial analysis of the *Essay* as rather sympathetic. In fact, it was enthusiastic. “Everything pleases me wonderfully,” he wrote to Locke in October after his first reading. As for the “Of Power” chapter in particular, Limborch was most effusive, exclaiming, “I scarcely think that I shall disagree with you about anything, so greatly do I approve of everything.”

Prematurely believing that in it Locke had in fact *supported* human liberty in both thought and action, then, it was only upon further probing that Limborch began to find Locke’s “power and freedom” picture a bit more sketchy, and so sent memos to Locke trying to “fill out” the gaps he saw with his own characterizations of what he thought Locke was actually *trying* to say, in order to “help” Locke. But Locke, having apparently already satisfied himself at this point that he’d done all he could or at least intended to do with the chapter, found Limborch far too keen about softening the role-distinctions Locke wanted to preserve, and far too fastidious in the dissection of operational activities Locke wanted to generalize. For the most part Locke actively resisted Limborch’s interpretations. But Limborch seemed ready to push on nevertheless, and while always being diplomatic, got Locke to become more engaged and forthcoming on the topic than he’d ever allowed himself to be before -- or at least more than he’d shown in the already published editions of the text themselves. And so it is in this pushback of Limborch’s suggestions that Locke reveals a far clearer picture of his schema of the faculties of the mind.
Limborch began his closer analysis of the chapter by saying that he concurred with Locke’s designating “uneasiness” rather than “the good” as what it was that measured whether one was happy or not:

[Y]ou declare in §29 and the following paragraphs that the will is determined by an inquietude [“uneasiness”] that a man experiences in himself from either the presence of pain or the absence of a good, or rather pleasure, in which he places the whole, or at least a part, of his felicity ... In this I readily agree with you. Thence you rightly deduce that a good rouses desire in us, but that it does not follow thence that a greater good always rouses greater desire in us. That is very true and you prove it well. 225

Limborch also wrote of his appreciation of how he thought Locke had deduced liberty: that is, that a man “can suspend the fulfillment of any of his desires and has complete liberty to consider them one after another, to examine their objects, to observe them from every side, and to compare them one with another, before he determines himself to acting.” 226 But Limborch found Locke’s rendering of the term “indifference” problematic and so sought to rephrase it, thinking Locke could not really have meant simply “that an indifferency which cannot be determined by the last judgement that a man makes of the good and evil by which he thinks his choice would be followed, is the highest imperfection of an understanding nature,” because that would mean “that when that last judgement, in which the act of volition properly consists, has been made, nevertheless a man’s power of acting is indifferent and is not determined by the will.” Limborch suggested that perhaps what Locke meant instead about the liberty of man was something closer
to Remonstrant thinking -- that is, that when one is called upon to decide on something (an action or opinion, say), one enters into a kind of state of “guarded indifference”\(^\text{227}\) in order to grant to oneself the possibility of choosing among all options; but that when one’s will finally \emph{does} decide to step in and make its presence known with a finding, the prior state of indifference “steps out” in deference to the will’s command: “[B]efore that decree of the will a man has liberty to determine himself to this or that side, and is not determined to one only of opposites,” since “when that decree of the will, or act of willing, is added, that indifferency is taken away, and the power is determined to acting or to not acting.” \(^\text{228}\)

Locke’s immediate response to this, however, was that Limborch’s formulation was \emph{not at all} what he was thinking (“I hope that you will forgive me for wishing to warn you about that way of speaking,” Locke wrote back sternly\(^\text{229}\)); and that his “suspension” in fact was not meant to refer to any kind of indifferency, since not only would that \emph{not} signify the domain of man’s liberty, which “consists solely in a power to act or not to act according to the determination of the will”; it would be a denial or denigration of man’s \emph{reason} -- that is, of what should be seen as the instrumental value of one’s desires/preferences to the understanding’s subsequent judgement in the first place:

[T]o speak freely, that antecedent ‘indifferency’ of a man, by which he is supposed, before the determination or decree of the will, to have liberty to determine himself to one or other of opposites, seems to me not to have any bearing at all on the question of liberty ... For who would ask, or what does it avail to ask, whether a man can determine himself to one or
other of opposites when he is in a state in which he is altogether unable to determine himself? ...[A]ll those disputes that are carried on about liberty to determine oneself to one or other alternative before the judgement of the understanding seem to me (forgive me for saying so) in no respect to pertain to the question of liberty: which should not and cannot even be supposed in a state in which it is manifest that a man as a free agent cannot act, since liberty, as I have said, consists solely in the power to act or not to act consequent on, and according to, the determination of the will. But so it often happens ... 230

Still convinced that Locke was not quite articulating yet what he really meant to convey, though, Limborch offered some further “refinements” to Locke’s expressed notions in hopes that they might bring Locke’s characterizations more in alignment with what Limborch was sure Locke believed in. For example, Limborch observed that when Locke used the expression “the last judgement of the understanding” he must have really meant to append to it “the last practical judgement of the understanding”; and that when Locke referred unqualifiedly to the term “Reason” alone, he must have really meant to designate the more edifying version of it -- that is “right reason,” Limborch however admitting (rather patronizingly) that “These two things are nevertheless confused by many people.” Invoking the word “dominion” as what it was that conditioned human freedom, Limborch then suggested Locke also think about signifying a distinction between “completed Desire/Will” and “incompleted Desire/Will” when showing where the borderlines of free will lay. 236
But Locke accepted none of the modifications. Locke found Limborch’s “dominion” to be little more than a nonsensical tautology, and would later quip, “[W]hether it be a figurative word or for some other reason, [dominion] seems to me just as obscure as the word Liberty, if not more so, and therefore not less to need definition.” As for any of the remaining “enhancements” Limborch had offered to divert Locke from his dangerously Hobbsian path, Locke overruled Limborch, signaling that these suggested enhancements of Limborch’s imputed too many of those circumscribed value-inferences Locke had been quite intentionally going out of his way to rule out. According to Locke, reason and judgement were driven by desire, and worked from desire. Empirically understood, neither reason nor judgement preceded or enjoyed any prerogative over desire; the terms “practical” or “right” had no hold here:

What has led you to a different [opinion] seems to me to be this: that you seem to confuse the last judgement of the understanding with mature and right judgement ... But that is not the last judgement of which I am speaking. I am speaking of that judgement which in every volition immediately precedes Volition; which is in reality the last judgement, whether it has been well pondered and recast by mature deliberation, or is extemporaneous and sprung from a sudden impulse; and equally determines the will, whether or not it is in accordance with reason.

And as for Limborch’s identifying “complete/incomplete Desire/Will” as part of his project: that, too, would ascribe an internalizing value judgement; of this, Locke would admit only to a notion of “effective/ineffective Will,” this being one evaluated only by whether external circumstances
actually permit a chosen action -- which is of course all Locke’s definition of “freedom” will concede. And so in admonishing Limborch, Locke tried to demonstrate that Limborch’s “complete/incomplete desire” notion actually served to *blunt*, not enhance, his overall point:

The distinction that you bring forward of ‘complete and incomplete Desire’ or of ‘complete and incomplete Will’ seem to me not to help your argument in any way. For if there is any ‘incomplete desire’ or ‘incomplete will’, which I greatly doubt, that will never make it true that Will is directed to a good ... I readily recognize ‘ineffective volition’, as when a paralytic wills to move his palsied hand; I grant that that volition is ineffective and without result, but not that it is ‘incomplete’... In the same way the desire of some proposed good, the pursuit of which we neglect because of a greater good that is incompatible with it, is not an ‘incomplete desire’ or an ‘incomplete Will’, but a complete desire quickly terminated, not proceeding so far as to impel us to willing the actions by which can be obtained that good to which that short-lived desire was directed ...239

Repeating in this letter, then, much of what he’d said in a more scattered way in the “Of Power” chapter, Locke reiterated that it was the understanding, the sole examiner of arguments for or against action upon a sent desire, which reigned supreme, and that the will was subordinate to it, its role being merely to serve as the executor of those judgements upon the desire that the understanding had already made. Hence the action-invoking procedure can only go in one-direction, flowing only *from* the understanding *to* the will:
To say that ‘the Will is master of our actions, and governs them according to its choice’, and to argue thence that ‘unless the Will is free there will not be any liberty in a man, is, it seems to be, to plunge us into error by the force of that metaphor. Liberty for me is the power of a man to act or not to act, according to his will: that is to say, if a man is able to do this if he wills to do it, and on the other hand to abstain from doing this when he wills to abstain from doing it: in that case a man is free. ..[I]t follows thence that Liberty does not in any way appertain to the Will, as I have shown in §14. 240

And since freedom for Locke is available only in the external world after the decision process has been completed -- that is, when whatever judgement the understanding has issued finds no externalities preventing its effect once it is put into motion by the will and sent forth into the world -- it [i.e., freedom] by definition could not be available before or during the attempt of the volition’s execution. This meant that the suspension mechanism that Limborch found so coincidentally useful for his argument would have much less effect than he thought it would; suspension in fact contains in itself the infinite regress that Limborch claims it and his “liberty of indifference is astutely evading. Locke tries to demonstrate why Limborch’s view would have to fail: 241

[Liberty cannot consist in a power of determining an action of willing contrary to the judgement of the understanding because a man does not possess such a power. For an action of willing this or that always follows a judgement of the understanding by
which a man judges this to be better for here and now. From this it is easy to understand what I mean when I say, Before the last judgement of the understanding a man is altogether unable to determine himself. And you can easily reconcile this with what you quote from §47 about the suspension of the fulfillment of any desire, if only you remember that every single volition is always preceded by some judgement of the understanding about the thing to be done, and that that judgement that immediately precedes the volition or act of willing is in that case the last judgement of the understanding.²⁴²

But while Limborch in turn concedes that if all rests only on the last judgement of the understanding, infinite regress would indeed rule, and hence necessity would inevitably reign:

"If the will is determined by the understanding, and the action of the understanding is necessary, all things will be necessary; for the will is necessarily determined from the beginning, that is, by the judgement of the understanding; the actions are determined by the will; and thus a man is determined to his actions, and although he has a power of doing what he wills and of not doing what he does not will; nevertheless that power is determined in every case by the antecedent determination of the will. And thus pure necessity would rule in the actions of a man ..."²⁴³

he also still insists that the will can, on occasion, circle the routinized procedure back and grant for itself the authority to order a judgement different from what the understanding had initially
produced. This secondary judgement from the will would now be able to defeat the primary judgement coming from the understanding. Since in Limborch’s schema the separation between the understanding and will is penetrable in certain circumstances -- those specifically, in fact, when a state of *indifference* has been achieved -- it is in these circumstances where the opportune moment when Limborch’s will is able to demand some “freedom” for itself is nurtured and created. And so it is here where Limborch tried to reel in the “suspension” trap to which Locke had always left himself vulnerable and consequently deny Locke his gambit to have it both ways -- that is, to be both in favor of *suspension*, and to be *against* any notion of there being such a thing as a “*liberty of indifference*”:

... It seems plain to me that a man determines his judgement because he wills to acquiesce in the reasons that he has pondered; again, that he suspends his judgement because he does not yet will to acquiesce, but wills either to ponder the reasons more carefully or to inquire whether there are more reasons by which his judgement may be changed; and so it seems plain to me that the determination of the last judgement, by which a man decrees that this is to be chosen or done, is, if not wholly, at least very largely, an action of willing. 244

But note how Limborch refers to his suspension as the *suspension of the judgement* emerging *out of* the understanding (“he suspends his judgement because he does not yet will to acquiesce”), after which the will can (as it were) “renegotiate” or overturn any outgoing “determination” made by the understanding about an act to be done or not done (i.e., where “[a
man] wills either to ponder the reasons more carefully or to inquire whether there are more reasons **by which his judgement may be changed**); while Locke’s suspension is of the suspension of the competing desires/uneasinesses which need to be ranked in terms of priority **before** one of them is selected to stand in judgement by the understanding, **after which** the understanding’s determination regarding whether an act is to be done or not done gets dictated to the will and carried out by it without resistance or reconsideration (“For the mind having in most cases, as is evident in experience, a power to suspend the execution and satisfaction of any of its desires, and so all, one after another; is at liberty to consider the objects of them, examine them on all sides, and weigh them with others. In this lies the liberty man has; ... we have a power to suspend the prosecution of this or that desire ... For during this suspension of any desire ...”²⁴⁵).

In other words, Limborch’s suspension is coming **after** the understanding’s issued judgement/determination; Locke’s is coming **before**. Since the certainty of Locke’s ordering here is what makes §56 in the posthumous version of the chapter so suspect, given that the posthumous version suddenly refers to a “**suspension of determination**” (which comes closer to Limborch’s formulation, and thus offers the gateway to a defense of free will -- determination being in Locke’s jargon what is assigned **to** the will, not what the will itself **selects**), we might want to ask why there is such a misalignment here, and why its existence is so important.

Limborch will explain that he attributes his own parsings of liberty to the disputes about the description of “indifference” that his Remonstrants had had with “those theologians” -- i.e., hard Calvinists²⁴⁶ -- “who hold that the Understanding and Will are two faculties distinct in fact from
the soul and from each other, of which one only understands, but does not will, the other only wills, but does not understand.” Arguing that with such a rigidly-partitioned scheme separating the two faculties, “either all liberty is taken away or every action of a man is rendered brute and devoid of reason ... because the will is supposed not to understand, but only to will,” Limborch said that this was how the Synod Calvinists characterized “indifference.” In contrast, he went on to explain that the Remonstrants decided to append to the word the prefix “passive,” in order to fence off the Calvinist’s necessitarian description of “indifference” (i.e., in which a view of the soul denotes a case in which all appraising takes place in the understanding faculty alone); and instead promote what constitutes for the Remonstrants/Arminians the domain of free activity, or “that energy of the spirit by which, when all requisites for acting are present, it can act or not act ... as it pleases.” This “active’ indifference” of the Remonstrants/Arminians is meant to reside in the will alone, after the judgement of the understanding has done its thing:

Again, when I say ‘that he [the agent being discussed] can act and not act’ my meaning is not that he can at the same time act and not act; or, neither act nor not act, or neither will nor not will; for this is contradictory; but that the power is determined to neither, and that therefore of two opposites he can choose whichever he pleases; and what is more, when he has already determined himself to acting, that he can stop his action and determine himself again to the opposite: that is, that he has dominion over his action. When a man does not have this dominion he is not free.
Locke’s response to this recitation of etymological history by Limborch is both impatient and dismissive. Refusing to indulge in Limborch’s theological parsings, he keeps the language of his response naturalistic and common-sensical:

[W]hen you say that ‘Liberty is the dominion that a man has over any of his actions’ this does not seem to me to be a definition of Liberty, since it says nothing other than that a man has the dominion over his actions which he has, which only comes back to this, that Liberty is the liberty which a man has over any action of his; from which it can follow that a man has no liberty whatsoever, for as you know there are some men who deny that a man has any dominion over his actions, but [hold] that all things are governed by predetermined and ineluctable fate. But if you say that you suppose that a man has dominion over his actions and that Liberty consists therein, then I ask what the Dominion of a man over his actions may be. For Dominion, whether it be a figurative word or for some other reason, seems to me just as obscure as the word Liberty, if not more so, and therefore not less to need definition. And thus I shall keep on questioning until the simple ideas, from which the Idea of Liberty is composed, are reached.250

Nevertheless, though Locke thinks he’s caught Limborch in a snare of infinite-regress, he is ironically failing to address Limborch’s discerning that the “liberty of indifference” move of the Dutchman differs little from Locke’s own “suspension” contrivance. Repeating again his own determinist position even while reprimanding Limborch for the anthropologic slippage Limborch has accidently allowed himself to engage in again, Locke continues with some tetchiness:
I see from this letter of yours how great is the force of custom and how constantly it steals in upon the unthinking, even against their wills. You acknowledge, and you acknowledge candidly, that the Will is a faculty of the soul and that faculties are not Agents: and yet, to omit other things, you say here, ‘If my [sc. Locke’s] definition of Liberty is approved it is certain that Liberty in no way appertains to the will’, for Liberty can in no way appertain to the Will unless the Will is recognized as an Agent. Inasmuch as Liberty belongs only to Agents. I know that you can excuse yourself by the example of Episcopius who, at the beginning of his dissertation strenuously rejecting operations by Faculties, nevertheless now and then falls back into reasonings in which they are supposed to be Agents. Allow me, however, to give you a friendly warning that, unless you are very careful, you will cause yourself much trouble in this matter, and very often obscure it for yourself. 251

But as if some realization suddenly struck him that his insistent stubbornness might soon dampen a long-held friendship, however, Locke in the end offered to insert “here and there” some amendments to the chapter for the next edition of the Essay252 “about which you seem to be in doubt.” Yet while he was not specific here about what he would say, he didn’t sound as though he was ready to concede that Limborch had at all changed his mind; only that he’d likely confirm what he -- Locke -- had been saying all along; albeit perhaps in more diplomatic language.253 And this seems to be what Limborch is anticipating, too, for in his next letter, he expresses some wariness about what’s about to come from Locke:
... Now, even regarding those things that you have added by way of explication, I am uncertain whether you hold that that judgement, after whose formation there is no longer in a man liberty of not willing, is purely an action of understanding, and whether you hold that that action of understanding is free or necessary. If you recognize that a man is free in eliciting it I do not see what disagreement remains between us as to the chief point of the matter ...\(^{254}\)

It may thus come as a surprise that Locke’s final letter to Limborch seemed to be saying something about the will’s being free to operate/not operate -- that is, the “turn-on/turn-off” button is not just on what the will may be able to either do or not do, but also on what the agent may be able to either will or not will. This would be important since the dispute between Locke and the libertarians was always about where in the decision process the moment of “freedom” was to be found, with Locke’s having insisted it could only be within the first condition (the “doing/not”), but with Limborch’s having suggested that, should it be only within the first condition and not the second (the “willing/not”), the moment can’t really be about a will’s freedom after all. Locke’s specially numbered “principles” here in this letter are perplexing to say the least, since now he seems to be implying that one can both will and not will at [presumably] the same time:

[Y]ou appear to doubt whether I hold that a man is free in Willing or in Understanding, for so I interpret your question; you also ask whether the action of willing or
understanding is free. To this question I answer thus: ¶ 1. Generally, indeed, that in my opinion a man is free in every action, as well of willing as of understanding, if he was able to have abstained from that action of willing or understanding; if not, not. ¶ 2. More particularly, as regards the will: there are some cases in which a man is unable not to will, and in all those acts of willing a man is not free because he is unable not to act. In the rest, where he was able to will or not to will, he is free. ¶ 3. As regards the act of understanding: I surmise that there lurks an ambiguity in that word ‘understanding’, for it can signify an action of thinking about some subject, and in that sense a man is for the most part free in actions of the understanding of that sort: for example: I can think about Adam’s sin, or remove my cogitation thence to the city of Rome or to the art of war in the present age. In all these actions and in countless others of the kind I am free because I am able at my pleasure to think or not to think about this or that. Or [however - my term] an act of understanding can be taken for that action by which I perceive that something is true, and in this action of understanding, for example, that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, a man is not free because when the demonstration has been examined he is unable not to understand this. For the most part a man is able not to open his eyes or not to turn his gaze to this or that object, but when his eyes are opened and turned to the sun or moon he necessarily sees the brightness and the shape that present themselves to his observation. What I have said of the eyes may be transferred to the understanding: the principle is the same for both. But enough of this. If you are satisfied I am glad. But if any doubts remain please use your freedom ...255
One wonders how alert Locke was when he wrote this letter, for in its sketchiness not only does it seem to conflict with much of what he’d asserted earlier; it seems to be working at odds even within itself -- both between items and within an individual item. For example, Locke had never previously recognized the possibility of an agent’s being able to “abstain” from willing something he otherwise felt compelled to will. Now he seems to be saying he does. Of the second item, since Locke is failing here to give any example of what would constitute the “some cases in which a man is unable to will” situation, we have no clue as to what it is “in the rest” of the cases that would now suddenly allow a man to will or not will “freely.” So without appending the necessary distinguishing details, he appears to be coming close to embracing nothing less than a contradicting absurdity “P/~P.”

Meanwhile, the consequences of his “last judgement of the understanding” strategy seems to be finally hitting home in the third item, where Locke suddenly begins to quibble with the description of a faculty he’d otherwise been invoking as if it never needed explanation -- i.e., the understanding -- although the quibble emerges precisely because he’s been permitting the understanding to harbor a good many provisional “last” judgements before he’s ready to assure us that some single, final, gold-stamped Hobbsian “last last judgement” has been issued. Moreover, Locke’s demonstrations of this -- or at least the implications he says he’s deriving from the demonstrations he’s giving -- are so trite in this letter (“I can think[/not think] about Adam’s sin, or remove my cogitation thence to the city of Rome or to the art of war in the present age.”) that, contrary to what we might expect at this point, they don’t really get to the
heart of how what goes into a moral decision might differ from, say, how I understand the relation of parts in a triangle. Locke’s comments at the end of this — “But enough of this. If you are satisfied I am glad. But if any doubts remain please use your freedom ...” — are laughable because nothing of what he’s just said seems to clarify anything.

And yet while this passage is said to signify the crucial turn that justifies the revisions in the 1706 posthumous version of the chapter and supposedly makes Locke a newly-converted libertarian (especially given the addition to §56), upon closer review, nothing of what he’s said here in this letter is really so different from anything he said in the Essay, especially from its section §7 onwards. He is not introducing a soteriological privilege here; and Locke’s application of freedom is still being limited to cases of a mobility of action or activity -- whether they involve an action or activity of my body, or that of my thinking; or even that of my willing -- which for Locke remains respectable if semantically considered as an action or nonaction, accomplished if consequent to my willing it and absent any constraint to the alternative being possible (in which case it would be classified a voluntary action, not a “free” one). Locke is thus still holding to his view that when the will or willing is being read as a desire, or a wanting or preference -- that is, as an agent of sorts that can either foster its own independent self-determined agenda or fall under the auspices of Limborch’s “liberty of indifference” principle -- Locke thinks it isn’t even a coherent term, especially if happens to appear in a proposition associated in any way with a state of being free.
Though Limborch in response will do his best to reshape Locke’s words so that he can allow himself to provisionally “agree” with his friend, it’s a diplomatic objection at best. Locke here is still describing his faculty of understanding as the final arbitrator, and not the will; Limborch, on the other hand, believes a mind that’s been changed due to new or reflected information means the Lockean-type judgement issued from the understanding has already been discharged from the understanding, and now can only be re-adjudicated in the will.

For us, it may seem to be a difference without a distinction whether or not a reconsidered decision takes place in an antiquated conception of the “understanding” or in an antiquated conception of the “will.” But such distinctions were important in 17th-century philosophy of mind: just as Locke is adamant about keeping the more important processing activity in the faculty of the understanding and has so built a cognitive operation that is simple and relatively contained and automatic, so also is Limborch adamant about advocating for the virtues and role of the will in a process that is sui generis and more permissive as to the intervention of the divine. Indeed, the contrast is enough to keep them apart. While Limborch is (1) willing to concede the possible affective influences impacting an agent after its understanding has made a final judgement, and (2) willing to try to help Locke rework the “triangle/moral” sprawl Locke was trying to sweep together in order to bracket off the conclusions he thinks are logically incontestable (and thus determined) from the more interesting ones which aren’t incontestable (wherein Locke’s “suspension” might well kick in), in the end, Limborch seems to be asking Locke just how many chances does Locke’s understanding get to resubmit a “This-Time-It’s- Final” last judgement to itself anyway?:
I acknowledge with you that a man is free to turn away his contemplation or cogitation from one object and to direct it to another, and that in this respect he can be said to be free in actions of the understanding. But this action, if we want to speak carefully, is properly an action of willing, not of understanding; for a man turns away his cogitations from one object and directs them to another because he does not wish to continue his former cogitations, and because he wishes to start new ones.\textsuperscript{266}

Thus we see it’s the pastoral side of Limborch who seems to be chomping at the bit to get his position into what is his more comfortable theological domain. For not only does it suit this clergyman better rhetorically; Limborch actually thinks the pastoral language can also better accommodate Locke’s chosen framework. Limborch gently nudges the divinity in again:

\textbf{I believe also that our faith is a mixed action of this kind}, as I have explained in my \textit{Theologia Christiana}, bk. V, ch. ix, §§21, 22, 23, where I show more fully how the actions of understanding are combined in Christian Faith; only that through an inveterate habit of speech I have used the words understanding [\textit{intellectus}] and will, by which I denote the actions of understanding and willing, in accordance with what I had already declared in bk. II, ch. xxiii, §§1, 2. I think that these things should be considered separately in this way. But I should not very much wish to contend whether that liberty should also be said to belong to the action of understanding, so long as it is agreed that a man is free in that action, and that he turns himself freely
from one cogitation to another ... I think that we agree about these things, and so there will be no disagreement in the chief point of the matter, although there is perhaps some variance in the manner of setting it forth...\textsuperscript{267}

But Locke essentially ignores this pitch.\textsuperscript{268} And now it is clear the two men have been talking past each other. For Limborch, freewill is always going to be a positive virtue that’s offered by the grace of God and is associated with its Christian latitudinarian roots -- with one’s position on it being a reflection of one’s theological underpinnings regarding divine punishment and the generosity of soteriological grace. Hence the Arminian’s comfort in reaching for the “liberty of indifference” principle as a helpful assist to Locke’s struggle in justifying the presence and operation of his suspension mechanism when Locke’s own account on the notion of “freewill” itself is so otherwise contemptuous.

Locke, however, has already made clear that in his eyes, the two mechanisms -- suspension and indifference -- are not at all equivalent. And that is because Locke’s ascriptions to human freedom cannot really be found anymore in an \textit{Imago Dei} deduction, let alone in anything being underpinned by a specific story of Christian salvation and grace. Locke’s suspension mechanism not only fails to meet the salvific sanctuary test synonymous with what Limborch finds in the freedom of indifferency; with Locke’s finding the term “indifference” itself a philosophical insult,\textsuperscript{269} we see the first signs that Locke not only believed in a \textit{determined} moral world, but that Locke is moving towards the notion that it may well be free will itself, if seen at the supposed sufferance of God, which ultimately blunts reason and fosters human \textit{irrationality}. 
Chapter VII

The circumstantial thesis: Posthumous Confusion (110-116)

Les corrections considerables et les additions que Mr. Locke a fait, regardent l’article de
la Liberté. Une dispute que Mr. Locke eut par lettres quelque temps avant sa mort avec
Mr. Limborch, donna occasion aux corrections que vous venez de voir. Quelques
objections de Mr. Limborch lui firent connoître qu’il s’étoit trompé en soutenant
qu’absolument l’homme n’étoit jamais en liberté de vouloir ou de ne pas vouloir une
chose qui est en sa puissance, lorsqu’elle est une fois proposée à son esprit. Du reste, Mr.
Limborch ne put lui faire goûter la Liberté d’indifference, si fortement soutenue par les
Arminiens. Et c’est pour en faire voir l’absurdité que Mr. Locke a inseré dans son Livre
cette derniere addition. Mr. Le Clerc 270 prétend que Mr. Locke a voulu refuter ce qu’il
n’entendoit pas fort bien, Bibliotheque choisie Tom. XII p. 403 etc. Non nostrum inter
illos tantas componere lites. Je n’ose vous prier, Monsieur, de m’apprendre ce que vous
pensez de ce démêlé: mais je ne puis m’empecher de souhaiter d’avoir sur cela les
lumières d’un genie aussi penetrant que le vôtre. 271

While we know Locke had planned some revisions to the chapter in preparation for what would
become his posthumous edition, as we have seen in the last chapter, those changes were
relatively minor and designed to reinforce what Locke had already argued, not to overturn it -- or
at least not overturn it without sufficient explanation. After all, minor changes which we know
had previously been creditably authorized by Locke usually came accompanied by considerable
if not unnecessarily extravagant fanfare on Locke’s part as well.272 So given the positions Locke
seemed to hold at the end of his correspondence with Limborch,273 why shouldn’t we challenge
the assumption that the version of the “Of Power” chapter that remains so canonically to our
philosophy texts 274 had indeed been written entirely by Locke’s hand? Can we be so sure that it
might not instead have been altered in some of its parts by unauthorized contributions from
someone else? Can we really be confident that Locke’s French translator and all-around
amanuensis Pierre Coste, who had the most control of the disposal of Locke’s work after Locke
died, actually had Locke’s best interests at heart when he had been authorized to make some
posthumous changes?

My suspicion is directed in particular at four major revisions that can be found in the posthumous
version. They all either challenge what Locke had held elsewhere in the chapter or prompt one to
ask why Locke would have made such changes at all since they weren’t obviously moving his
own present arguments forward.275 Three of them are mentioned by Coste in his letter to Leibniz
(§§ 48, 56, & 71). One of those three can be independently confirmed as coming from Locke
himself (§71).276 A fourth change is one that I list but Coste unaccountably does not (§23).

Following is a chart which details these distinctions:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of section (§)</th>
<th>on Coste’s list?</th>
<th>evidence Locke authorized?</th>
<th>Addition or Deletion?</th>
<th>Substance of change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>§23</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>deletion</td>
<td>infinite regress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§48</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>addition</td>
<td>self-determination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§56</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>addition</td>
<td>free will</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§71</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>addition</td>
<td>liberty of indifference</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The most dubious addition in the posthumous version comes in the lengthy paragraph added to section §56\textsuperscript{277} which makes it appear that the “free will” Locke had long dismissed as a categorical mistake might now be back on the table again, since it suddenly shifts Locke’s original standardized-language locution “suspension of ‘desire’” (which he had iterated a notable ten times in the chapter\textsuperscript{278}) to that of “suspension of a ‘determination’” in the posthumously-added passage of §56 (which he uses only in this instance: “... He had a Power to suspend his determination: it was given him, that he might examine, and take care of his own Happiness, and look that he were not deceived ...”\textsuperscript{279}). “Suspension of ‘desire’” having been Locke’s locutionary preference throughout all his first four editions, it was a distinction for which Locke had argued quite vociferously in order to dash any hopes Limborch might have had that Locke would eventually embrace Limborch’s own view (see previous chapter). This view of Limborch’s had taken the “suspension” mechanism that Locke had been so proud of introducing to the second edition of his liberty account -- that is, where Locke said that
the mind having in most cases, as is evident in experience, a power to suspend the execution and satisfaction of any of its desires, and so all, one after another; is at liberty to consider the objects of them, examine them on all sides, and weigh them with others. In this lies the liberty man has... 280

-- to be little more than an implication of the same causal network that the “liberty of indifference” mechanism that Limborch and the Scholastic tradition had long been endorsing. But the liberty of indifference mechanism had been part of the very causal network which Locke had found so objectionable, about which Locke wrote:

a perfect Indifference in the Will, or Power of Preferring, not determinable by the Good or Evil, that is thought to attend its Choice, would be so far from being an advantage and excellency of any intellectual Nature, that it would be as great an imperfection, as the want of Indifference to act, or not to act, till determined by the Will, would be an imperfection on the other side. 282

Nevertheless, because a “suspension of determination” locution would suggest that Locke had capitulated at least somewhat to Limborch’s soteriologically-based affirmation that free will is something we possess by way of God’s gifting so us, the locution’s sudden posthumous appearance in the 1706 edition of the Essay has had consequential interpretations, and has been heralded by many as providing the ultimate proof that Locke had indeed “changed his mind”
about the nature and source of human freedom. But I believe that would be true only if Locke had also assented to the “liberty of indifference” principle -- which it is clear Locke did not do, despite Coste’s confusing report to Leibniz in his 1707 letter updating him about the posthumously-done “revisions” to the Essay (as seen in the Coste quote with which I open this chapter).

The other two substantial changes to the “Of Power” chapter (II.xxi) -- an addition to §48 acknowledging that the mind at least had an interest in thinking its volitions were self-induced and spontaneously coming from a “soul-like” source within and not from the naturalized world without; and a deletion to §23 removing the problem of infinite regress so troublesome to theistic commitments -- could also be understood as offering the free will support that the addition to §56 does; these passages, too, emerge from seemingly nowhere, shorn of any prior language remnants yet found that might have been constructed from Locke’s own hand. One can only conclude that these these changes, along with the one on “indifference” (which as noted we know can be attributed to Locke), either stand as testimony to Locke’s being unable to hold a consistent position on human liberty, or betray the monkey wrench which ultimately exposes Coste’s subterfuge and throw the “free will aroma” now deduced from the changes off the track of plausibility entirely. In fact, given the loquacious emptiness and redundancy of the new “indifference” passage added to §71 -- Locke said nearly the same thing in the original §48, albeit in fewer words -- that Coste even gave Locke’s unnecessary “indifference” restatement much of an explanatory gloss in the first place beyond the sort of “new text” recitation he’d made available regarding the other revisions makes the absence of any Coste commentary
regarding the other changes that much more suspect, since we can assume Leibniz would have been just as interested in Locke’s reasoning as to how those items got in as well -- had there actually been any additional changes actually coming from Locke, that is. After all, Locke’s occasional intellectual reversals were generally quite transparent. So given the fact that Coste wasn’t volunteering to Leibniz a backstory sufficiently accounting for Locke’s additional “changes,” one might easily surmise that that was because Locke himself hadn’t requested the changes in the first place.

Yet the upshot of the changes that do emerge posthumously have come to suggest that the “freewill” Locke had long dismissed as a categorical mistake might now have become part of Locke’s philosophical playing deck, and that those who wanted to view Locke’s epistemology as being fundamentally theistic in its grounding and not just naturalized might have some additional justification for taking that view. Since in my judgement this is not at all how Locke intended to close his chapter, we must consider whether the chapter might have been tampered with at some point without Locke’s official permission.

Indeed, in LeClerc’s own review of the chapter – the one supposedly giving Coste cause to attribute the claim that Locke had both acceded and failed to comprehend Limborch’s use of the term indifference -- LeClerc expresses continued amazement at why Locke would feel compelled to post an addendum at all. For one thing, the addendum was inadequate, especially with what LeClerc regarded as Locke’s inappropriate set of examples ostensibly entailing the indifference principle. For another thing, the addendum was redundant, given LeClerc’s belief that Locke
had already shown his assent to the principle’s “true” definition since it had been contained in his basic statement on liberty -- which, claimed LeClerc (rather presumptively), “is the power to do or not do, which is commonly called ‘indifference’”

Interestingly, while LeClerc did not seem to find it worthy of note that Locke, in his “revised” §56, suddenly shifted his entire thesis by having the mind’s suspending not the long-held object “desire” he’d emphasized those 10 times in the rest of the chapter, but the long-resisted object “determination” he deployed in this one instance alone, he nevertheless felt compelled to use Locke’s suspension mechanism to “checkmate” Locke regarding his denial of indifference, which Limborch quite astutely had tried to bring on himself in his correspondence with Locke. In his casual neglect of the redundancy issue, however, LeClerc still implied that something like the suspension mechanism was operating, and exasperatedly wondered why Locke had not exploited it more fully for his own defense.

LeClerc saw the issue of indifference quite simply: it is the tool we’re given by God that allows us to consider “whether we continue or not to do what we started”; it’s necessary, therefore, that we not conceive its place of operation as something among “the abstract ideas of the faculties” which “multiply in many human beings,” but rather as the home of the “soul” itself, since it is there where indifference “means not that the soul is not more inclined to act than not to act, but only that it is necessarily determined neither to the one nor to another.” LeClerc saw Locke’s view, on the other hand, as too often involved in unjustifiably redefining (and thereby distorting) terms that were actually of easy and common understanding. Why hadn’t Locke used “soul” for “will,” for example? LeClerc worried that Locke’s ineffectual choice of words
meant that, contrary to his hopes, too much of Locke’s text would be beyond the understanding of the vast majority of readers. 299

LeClerc certainly does an admirable job trying to dissect the admittedly confused text of his longtime friend, the man with whom he’d privately discussed many of these same issues over the years in person and via letter exchanges. LeClerc had no problem with Locke regarding a few key points, such as in Locke’s noting that there are some necessary truths out there that we must accept — for example, that once we know that 2 plus 2 equals 4, we can never not see that this must be so; 300 and that since it is an indisputable principle that we love happiness and hate woe, we can not not wish for our own happiness. 301 LeClerc also went along with Locke’s assertion that despite claims otherwise, we are determined almost solely by our uneasinesses and rarely aspire to the highest good. The proof of this, observed LeClerc, is in the empirically verifiable fact that the promises of heaven’s rewards in the “future” rarely seem to motivate us sufficiently enough to be good now. 302

But while no stranger to either Coste or Locke, LeClerc 303 nevertheless believed Locke’s overall account of liberty remained unnecessarily complicated, 304 and complained at the start of his review that for the sake of a more focused efficiency he wished Locke had just rewritten the whole thing once again. 305 For not only did LeClerc find Locke making ill-advised distinctions between what he was calling “voluntary” and what he was calling “free” (which LeClerc thought got Locke into trouble when Locke then claimed men and God were equally free despite his giving as his premises [1] God’s being being determined solely by the good (so where’s HIS
freedom “to do otherwise,” huh? 306), and [2] men’s being determined by either their uneasinesses or the necessary truths in the world (which also makes freedom little more than a joke). 307

LeClerc also wonders why Locke would even want to say in §48 that being “determined” by one’s own judgement does not destroy liberty, since such a characterization, by Locke’s own logic, would ”necessarily” be closing off any way of believing otherwise than what one’s own judgement was determining. 308 Perhaps what is making Locke’s project especially difficult, LeClerc thought, was his mistakenly conflating his own [well-justified] claims about happiness and desire with his [highly dubious] claims about how freedom ought to be defined. 309

LeClerc’s view would be persuasive, however, only if one accepted the claim that, but for some ill-chosen phrasings, Locke in the end did accept a “freedom to will or not will to do,” and not merely a “freedom to will to do or not do” formula. Though the posthumous revisions to §56 suggest Locke might have shifted to the ”will or not will” position, the written correspondence between Locke and Limborch pre-posthumous publication cannot be the basis of confirming that he did. Some more evidence from Locke’s own hand seems needed -- something that gives us a history of how that extra paragraph had been constructed. Attributing its words or even intent to what Locke wrote to Limborch in the eleventh letter of Sept. 28, 1702 is not convincing. 310

Since no other “evidence” has been suggested or produced as yet, the posthumous changes remain, for me, under suspicion. 311
Chapter VIII

The Coste Component: Why I think the version of the liberty account of Locke’s that does get published posthumously in 1706 does not truly reflect Locke’s intentions but was instead rather selectively “massaged” by his French translator, Pierre Coste:

*** Key word: “Sabotage (?)” ***

A. Coste’s problem w/ Locke (117-118):

THE CHARACTER OF Mr. LOCKE; BY Mr. PETER COSTE:

with A LETTER relating to that Character, and to the Author of it.

A LETTER to Mr. * * * * * *.

SIR,

London, Feb. 4, 1720.

BEING informed, that you design to publish several new pieces of Mr. Locke, I here send you, at the request of some of his friends, the translation of a letter, attempting his character, and containing several passages of his life and conversation; which you are desired to prefix before that collection.

The author of that letter is Mr. Peter Coste, who has translated into French Mr. Locke’s Thoughts concerning Education, his Reasonableness of Christianity, and Vindications thereof; with his principal work, the Essay concerning Human Understanding.

Mr. Coste lived in the same family with Mr. Locke, during the seven last years of that great man’s life; whereby he had all possible opportunities to know him.
The letter was written some time after Mr. Locke’s death; and appears to be the production of a man in raptures, and struck with the highest admiration of Mr. Locke’s virtue, capacity, and of the excellency of his writings; and under the deepest affliction for the loss of a person, to whom in his life-time he had paid the most profound respect, and for whom he had constantly expressed the greatest esteem, and that even in writings, whereof Mr. Locke did not know him to be the author.

And therefore Mr. Locke’s friends judge its publication necessary, not only, as they think it contains a just character of Mr. Locke, as far as it goes; but as it is a proper vindication of him against the said Mr. Coste, who in several writings, and in his common conversation throughout France, Holland, and England, has aspersed and blackened the memory of Mr. Locke, in those very respects, wherein he was his panegyrist before.

For, they conceive, the eulogium contained in the following letter must stand good, till Mr. Coste thinks fit either to deny his own experience, or to confess, that the same things, which he then thought praise-worthy, have since changed their nature. I am,

SIR,
Your most obedient humble servant,

*  

While it may not be universally recognized that Locke’s French translator and all-around amanuensis Pierre Coste had had “issues” with Locke in Locke’s final years, Coste’s somewhat erratic behavior in the tending of Locke’s reputation in the years following Locke’s death certainly demonstrate that, despite the continental “entrée” Coste’s association with Locke provided him, the man overall had not been happy in his dealings with the renowned philosopher. Compare, for example, the lavish, almost “over-the-top” 4600-worded tribute Coste gives to Locke in what would be Locke’s formal obituary (“He was born for the good of mankind ... Since Mr. Locke departed this life, I have hardly been able to think of any thing, but the loss of that great man, whose memory will always be dear to me; happy if, as I admired him for many years, that I was near him, I could but imitate him in any one respect!”), and the
bitter commentary regarding that obituary reported anonymously fifteen years later by Locke’s friend Anthony Collins (“Mr. Coste, ... in several writings, and in his common conversation throughout France, Holland, and England, has aspersed and blackened the memory of Mr. Locke, in those very respects, wherein he was his panegyrist before.”). This dissonance, and the fact that Coste had had the most control of the disposal of many of Locke’s works after Locke’s death, certainly makes possible my hypothesizing that some unauthorized “tampering” in the posthumous 1706 liberty account by Coste could have been done that explains the sudden shift of Locke’s position on liberty. Signs which might further support this tampering hypothesis is the fact that (1) the timeline demarcating the shift, at least as offered by Coste and others, seems unnecessarily confusing; (2) it had become increasingly clear that Coste not only felt that Locke, while alive, had treated him like an inferior; but also that Coste himself, being at heart a philosophical classicist, found Locke’s skeptical empiricism and seeming obliviousness of what the ancients had to offer equally unimpressive; and (3) the fact that Coste’s misgivings about Locke’s thinking and work had been heartily endorsed by Anthony Ashley Cooper, the third Earl of Shaftesbury, who’d had an even more intimate history with the famous Denier of Innate Ideas, having been inculcated in childhood by Locke himself until he finally turned against him with a roaring vengeance.

I will deal with each of these signs of potential treachery in turn, with a special focus on the story of the timeline.
B. The proffered timeline, and what remains puzzling (119-130):

Much of the accounting for the gap in the provenance chain concerning exactly *what* and *why* material was gained and lost between the 4th and 5th English editions of the Essay hangs on tracking the confusing narrative regarding the preparation and issuance of these two editions and the preparation and issuance of the intervening French translation, done by Coste. Most critical is the fact that the fourth edition of the Essay, coming out in 1700, would have been the last English version of the Essay to which Locke would have been alive to directly write and supervise; while the fifth and posthumous edition of the Essay, coming out in 1706, would be the first English version under which Coste alone had control. Within this six-year period, we can mark at least five significant events or categories of activities which had a relevant impact: (1) the aforementioned publication in 1700 of the fourth edition of the English version of the Essay; (2) the publication of the first French translation of the Essay by Coste in 1700; (3) the publication of the first Latin translation of the Essay by Ezekiel Burridge in 1701; (4) Locke’s final 12-letter exchange with longtime friend Philipp van Limborch between mid-1700 and late-1702; (4) Locke’s own death in late 1704; and (5) Coste’s subsequent meeting and growing friendship with Locke’s former tutee, the young Earl of Shaftesbury. An important but overlooked event also occurs a few decades later with (6) the appearance of the second edition of the French translation of the Essay in 1729, which Coste had finally put together long after he’d been out of the late Locke’s intellectual orbit.
While we can again acknowledge that Locke had told Limborch before he died that he would make some revisions to the *Essay* so as to clarify a few items over which the two of them clashed, we also need to emphasize as well that the most critical changes that were eventually produced for the posthumous edition of which I am concerned were *not* among the revisions Locke outlined with Limborch.\(^{324}\) The last we’d seen in the correspondence, in fact, suggests there would be no reason to expect Locke would have been ready to accede to Limborch’s efforts, given the stubborn resistance Locke had exerted against the rest of Limborch’s arguments on liberty. Nor is there anything else extant in Locke’s notes that could be presumed to be a vehicle that might set-up or anticipate any of the language newly introduced into the posthumous text in sections §48 and §56,\(^{325}\) or that admits to any dissatisfaction with what Locke had originally written in §23.\(^{326}\) How and why, then, did the counterintuitive revisions get into the 1706 posthumous English edition, and where is the evidence that what got in were words that Locke had actually generated?

One vague reference that might start us off, which probably originated from Coste’s “workshop” but got passed on somewhat misleadingly to a number of additional “sources” by LeClerc, is that the changes made to the posthumous edition were revisions initially generated as a response to Limborch, and that because it so happened that Locke and Coste were preparing anyway for the imminent publication of the first French translation of the *Essay*,\(^ {327}\) advantage might be taken to have the Limborch response placed in this rollout edition of the French version first. That means we could pin the revisions’ construction and placement to a time just a few months *after* the publication of the 1700 fourth English edition (i.e., when Locke would have still been alive) but
before the release of the first French edition a few months later, also in 1700, after which the French revisions would just be transferred in English *pro forma* to the 1706 posthumous edition. Now something of the shorthand “standard story,” this account was certainly perpetuated by the 19th-century Locke scholar and philosopher/editor A.C. Fraser,328 who, in his 1894 edition of the *Essay,*329 tacked on to Locke’s “Epistle to the Reader”330 fifteen rather questionable paragraphs331 -- the 15th and final one being paragraph particularly insidious to the overall scholarship regarding the changes produced for the posthumous edition:332

In the Sixth Edition there is very little added or altered. the greatest part of what is new, is contained in the twentyfirst [*sic*] Chapter of the second Book, which any one, if he thinks it worth while, may, with a very little labour, transcribe into the margin of the former edition.

Why is this insidious? First of all, it is unclear who the author is anymore. Could it really still be Locke himself, continuing along addressing us, the “Reader,” just as he supposedly had in all the 28 paragraphs prior?333 ... then “presaging” for us what was yet to come in the editions to be produced after he died? It doesn’t help that the edition here is erroneously listed in Fraser’s edition as the “Sixth” edition (which is now officially accepted as the innocuous one which appeared in 1710), when the passage should actually have been called the *fifth* edition (i.e., the posthumous one we’re concerned with appearing in 1706).334 Moreover, what exactly could the writer of this consumer’s report of a passage have intended us to take away when he says that this edition contained “very little added or altered” that was really new -- *other than* that which
had been appended in the very II.xxi “Of Power” chapter we’re concerned with, but which is described so meagerly and unenthusiastically here that the reader is actually encouraged to simply transcribe its revisions to the margins of an older edition of the Essay rather than feel called upon to actually purchase this new edition?

Whoever its writer originally was, however, in contextualizing it, Fraser’s footnote does at least give it the proper year:

“The Sixth Edition, issued in 1706, two years after Locke’s death, with these two sentences appended to the ‘Epistle,’ contains a few slight additions and alterations. Most of them had appeared in Coste’s French Version of the Essay -- prepared at Oates under Locke’s eye. ‘The author being present, says Le Clerc, ‘he corrected several places in the original, that he might make them more plain.’ Coste was Locke’s amanuensis, and lived with him at Oates for some years till his death.”

So now Fraser explains that “most” of the revisions that are part of the posthumous 1706 posthumous edition first appeared in Coste’s French version of the Essay, having been “prepared at Oates under Locke’s eye.” And as that French version could only be the 1700 version (since the next French version with discernible changes wouldn’t come out until 1729, when Locke would have been long dead), this would seem to secure the fact that Locke would have been around and alive after all to wholeheartedly approve the revisions for the French edition at least. Hence no accusation about possible sabotage is valid any more, and Locke’s authorization and
provenance regarding the revisions to the posthumous 1706 English edition should no longer be in question.

But we still may have a problem here. For Fraser supports his claim by attributing its sourcing to LeClerc’s *Elogé*, written in 1705, when in the aftermath of Locke’s late 1704 death, LeClerc had tried to scratch together something of a Locke chronology. LeClerc runs through the chronological picture:

> Ce fut l'année 1690 que son ouvrage de l'Entendement parut in-folio pour la première fois en Anglois. Il a été publié en cette même langue trois fois depuis, en 1694, en 1697, et en 1700. Cette dernière année on le publiia en Française à Amsterdam chez M. Schelte. M. Coste, qui demeurait alors dans la même maison que l'Auteur, le traduisit avec beaucoup de soin, de fidélité et de netteté sous ses yeux, et cette version est très-estimée. Elle a fait connoître ses sentimens deçà la mer, avec plus d'étendue que l'abrégé, qui avoit paru en 1688, ne pouvoit le faire. Comme l'Auteur étoit présent, il corrigea divers endroits de l'original, pour les rendre plus clairs et plus faciles à traduire, et revit la version avec soin; ce qui fait qu'elle n'est guere inférieure a l'Anglais, et qu'elle est souvent plus claire. *Cet Ouvrage a aussi été traduit en Latin en 1701, par Mr. Burrig. Il y en a encore un petit abregé en Anglois, par Mr. Wynn.* La quatrième Edition Anglaise est la meilleure & la plus augmentée. Ceux qui les ont comparées ont pû remarquer un effet de la sincerité, & de l'amour de la Verité, dont l'Auteur faisait profession, dans le Chapitre XXI. du Livre second, où il traite du Pouvoir, ou de la Faculté; puisque, conformément à l’avis de ses
Amis, il y a changé plusieurs choses dans l’idée qu’il avoit donnée de la maniere dont nous nous déterminons à vouloir. Peu de Philosophes sont capables de se résoudre à corriger leurs pensées, & il n’y a rien qu’ils ne fiffent, plutôt que d’avouër qu’ils se sont trompez. Mr. Locke aimoit trop la Verité, pour les imiter, & il avouë lui même, dans sa préface, qu’après un plus mûr examen, il avoit changé de sentiment.”  

With LeClerc’s thus affirming that (1) the Essay had been published in English four times -- in 1690, 1694, 1697 and in 1700; (2) “this last year” the Essay was published in French”; (3) because of the fact that Coste had been living in the same house as Locke at the time, he’d been able to more easily translate into French those changes Locke directed him to make from Locke’s English and get them inserted into that French edition; (4) “[t]he Fourth Edition English is the best and most increased”; and (5) the changes to the latest edition especially included those made for II.xxi. “Of Power,” done because Locke, “under the advice of his friends ... [had] had a change of heart,” we might think that, numbering problems aside, Fraser’s attributions have been vindicated, and we should conclude that there is no gap between the 1700 and the posthumous 1706 English versions because Locke’s hand had never surrendered ultimate authority over “his” revised words after he died after all.

But wait again: LeClerc wrote this in 1705. The posthumous English version which I’m concerned about didn’t come out until 1706. And if we recall from Coste’s letter to Leibniz in 1707, where Coste had claimed that the changes which we see in the posthumous 1706 English edition to which he was notifying Leibniz were a result of Locke’s response to the disputes he
was having with Limborch, we see that the changes inserted into the 1700 French text could \textit{not} have been a result of the disputes Locke had with Limborch 6-12 months \textit{later}, from mid to late 1701 -- meaning that the “changes” LeClerc was talking about in his viewing of the 1700 French version can \textit{not} be constituting the changes I’m concerned about in the posthumous 1706 English version.

And indeed, a perusal of the actual 1700 French edition shows that the changes made to the posthumous 1706 English edition had not at all been introduced here. Unsurprisingly, the 1700 French edition that LeClerc was viewing was in fact a near mirror translation of the 1700 English edition, and nothing more. \textbf{The changes introduced into the posthumous 1706 English version with which I’m concerned do not appear in any French edition until the publication of the 1729 \textit{Essay} edition in French!!}

So the 1700 French edition was \textit{not} the entryway for the changes we see in the posthumous 1706 English edition, and consequently the gap between the 1700 English and the 1706 posthumous editions remains unexplained.

\textbf{Looking at the Coste-translated \textit{Essay} editions themselves}

I now have before me pdf scans of the 1700, 1714, 1723, 1735 and 1774 French editions, and two separately published versions of the 1729 French edition. A comparison of what is listed where is highly informative. The front matter is most illuminating. The 1700 French edition
contains not only what we see in our current Nidditch English editions -- i.e., a portrait of Locke, the title page, the “Epistle Dedicatory to Lord Pembroke/Montgomery” (“Epitre”), the “Epistle to the Reader” (“Préface de l’Auteur”), and the Table of Contents (“Table des Matieres”); it also includes the one-paragraph “Monsieur Locke au Librarie” (Locke’s statement to the bookseller asserting his approval of the translation) and the eight-page “Avertissement du Traducteur” (”Notification from the Translator”).

The “Monsieur Locke au Librarie”

The “Monsieur Locke au Librarie” in the 1700 French edition seems to be Locke’s personal authorization of Coste’s translation and his reassurance to us, the readers, that not only could he certify from his own scrutiny of the work that the translation was solid (for if it wasn’t, the passage says Coste had given Locke the opportunity to fine-tune the language long before the manuscript got sent out); Locke says he also ran the Coste translation past some of his friends who were native French speakers who carefully checked it out and assured Locke that the translation was as good if not better than what Locke himself had rendered in his own original English. In this passage Locke goes on to extensively praise Coste for the respect Coste showed for his work, and for Coste’s being inventive when there seemed to be no obvious French counterpart for particularly abstract or obtuse Lockean concepts or expressions.338

The “Avertissement du Traducteur”
The “Avertissement du Traducteur” in the 1700 French edition comes from Coste’s own hand and is comprised of ten paragraphs which, after first reciprocating in praise Locke’s own original work, tries to give the reader a sense of how difficult Locke’s work actually was to translate. We might see it as Coste’s self-serving, preemptive, “CYA apologia” for his own translation. Here Coste sends some rather mixed messages about what he actually thinks of Locke’s product. Though the “Avertissement” fails to provide any concrete detail of the kind that might explain how the revisions in the 1706 posthumous English edition could have come about, it does give us a sense of the attitude Coste carried with him in the translation and editing process when Locke was still able to supervise him directly.

The following eight paragraphs are my English paraphrases from the original French text:

Coste confesses that while as a non-native speaker he found it been hard to get into Locke’s mind, he knew he could always go to Locke to get his assistance if he had difficulty with certain passages. Pleading for the reader’s patience in attempting to digest the material, Coste noted how often even Locke himself had second thoughts about what he’d written after getting a first reading of his work by Coste. Sometimes Locke had to reread it again several times in order to be sure that what he wrote was clearly expressing what he meant in translation.

Coste offered much advice to the reader about how to surmount the translation. Try to read Locke with an open if not empty mind, suggested Coste, rather than with a mind full of already-set arguments derived from other famous philosophers like Plato, Aristotle, Gassendi or
Descartes, with whom it might be tempting to compare Locke. Locke tended to focus on common things, Coste observed, though he often presented them in unusual and original ways. Never having been burdened with much consideration or respect for what had been said in the past, Coste noted, Locke’s work must be judged by the nature of things, and not by the canonical theories of writers already established.

And don’t read his work too quickly, added Coste, for it was all too easy to mistake one of his inherently solid ideas for an erroneous fantasy that could then be dismissed. Even his English readers had been tripped up by him; that meant French readers in particular ought to read Locke with extra care lest they really be thought of as foolish, cautioned Coste. And for those who declaimed that all they wanted to do was learn from others and therefore didn’t need to consider Locke’s work because they weren’t “searching for the truth per se” (because they thought they’d already found it and just wanted to disseminate it): just because Locke found many things uncertain, it didn’t mean his method of comparing two ideas and finding out where they agree or disagree was not highly useful nevertheless. [This next part, from “So ...” on to “... it,” does not appear in the 1729 version] So superior in intellectual ability was Locke that no good offense had been mounted against Locke’s ideas yet; many people who have attacked Locke for his thinking have found out years later how many other people they admire have come to find him worthy of approval. Bishop Bold, for instance, called Locke’s book the best philosophical treatise yet that advanced the truth, and that only something from the most divinely-inspired thinkers could top Locke at this point. So the longevity of the Essay must be proving something, for while Locke may have often been attacked for it, the great men have already given their approval of it.
Regarding the translation itself, Coste said he had not tried to interpret or dispute Locke’s remarks as he translated them since Locke was one of the best writers of Europe. Coste said he’d only tried to render Locke’s text as accurately as possible in French. Coste asserted he was taking his lessons from Cicero, who cautioned that it was inappropriate in books of pure reason [as this Essay is] for a translator to freely take advantage of a text by adding a few things here and subtracting a few things there, making it all too easy to unintentionally distort a writer’s philosophical message. Such procedures can actually disguise the truth and prevent the text’s ability to show us its natural beauty. Coste claimed that if he had taken some liberty with the text, he was grateful that Locke had still known enough French to check Coste on it and tell him how to adjust it. Without such permission Coste said he couldn’t properly represent Locke’s thought. He was therefore thankful that his work was not so limited that he couldn’t enjoy its benefits at the same time.

Coste also said that while the only freedom he gave to himself unconditionally was to speak with as much unbridled freedom as was possible, he did try to use the same word repeatedly to avoid equivocation -- taking advantage of as much grammar as he could remember to keep the French smooth and clear and well-functioning and away from false reports. Sniffing that the English were not as scrupulous about words as the French were, when in doubt, Coste said he tried to see if he could avoid translating the text into French at all because French distinctions -- much prized -- were too fine for the coarse meaning being transmitted. Coste claimed that his scruples often
forced Locke to change his English text in a number of places for the 4th edition to make those passages more distinct and accurate.

At the same time Coste said that some feel English is actually more abundant in terms than French and adapts better to creating words for all that is new. So Coste asserted that grammar rules should not dampen the freedom he took to use words not known out in the world to be able to express new ideas. Coste insisted that he never took this freedom rashly, and did not want to be like the most learned of Romans who so admired the purity of their own language that they were afraid to take the liberty of reinventing it sometimes for philosophical purposes. Cicero nevertheless had a special ability to soften his harsh ideas with his charming eloquence, noted Coste, and it paid off well in the beautiful rhetorical new tools he then had available to him. Though modesty did not allow Coste to compare himself to Cicero, Coste wanted us to at least let him use as a model those modern philosophers whose use of new words would soon prove themselves over time either worthy of our usage or not.

[(not in the 1729 edition or thereafter was Coste’s brief tribute to LeClerc’s earlier Abrege (the French translation of the early Essay abstract), much of which Coste had copied and used as a model for his own translation -- esp. whole paragraphs from IV.x.): It would be nice, said Coste, if his own work came close to mimicking LeClerc’s in style and flowering.]

Coste concludes by again heralding Locke for having had the honesty to publicly testify to his approval of Coste’s translation (in the “Monsieur Locke au Librarie” section). Humility,
however, only allowed Coste to accept that while he might have entered into Locke’s meaning, in no way could he claim he’d totally exhausted it. Just because Locke read his translation before it went to the printer did not mean mistakes hadn’t been able to escape nonetheless. Even good expressions do not always capture the thought, mused Coste -- the Errata being good proof of this. On the other hand, Coste added that not all of the typos he caught and marked up were his fault alone. Some of them ought to be blamed on the printer, he said. And most of the typos were not that big a deal anyway, even though some did spoil the sense entirely. Coste acknowledged that it was always better to correct them before reading the Employer (??) so that the reader is not stopped unnecessarily, conceding that he did not doubt that others would discover still more errors in the future. But Coste said that whatever anyone else might think of this translation, he’d no doubt still find more mistakes than those more enlightened than him, because there’s no way anyone would be able to claim to have examined the translation any more carefully than Coste himself had done.

While we might accept Coste’s claims vis-à-vis his comments in the front matter of the 1700 French edition, since Locke would have been around to affirm it, what is puzzling to the textual archaeology I’m concerned with is that these claims defending the 1700 French edition also comprise the claims defending the “second” French edition of the Essay which came out 29 years later, long after Locke had died. And it’s the 1729 French edition and not the 1700 French edition which actually houses in French the changes made to the “Of Power” chapter of the 1706 posthumous English edition. Can we really accept that the purported “approval” statement of Locke’s that convincingly authorized the 1700 French translation can be legitimately carried
over unamended to the very much revised 1729 translation?\textsuperscript{342} How about the presumptive CYA/apologia\textsuperscript{343} of the 1700 French edition, plus or minus a few less than urgent chunks?\textsuperscript{344} One can only speculate what the value of the authorization and “CYA/apologia” was supposed to be if the same language was able to legitimize two vastly different texts, with no attached qualifying comments being offered at all. But there they were, no doubt helping Coste establish a reputation for scrupulousness.

And although the front matter for the 1729 French edition does include a new, \textit{third section},\textsuperscript{345} in it Coste discusses not what had significantly changed in \textit{Locke’s} viewpoint between the critical fourth (1700) and fifth (1706) English editions (which I would have assumed would be of critical interest to Locke scholars of the time), but what he -- i.e., \textit{Coste} -- had decided to change stylistically to his own 1700 French translation in hopes of tweaking what he could of what he now seemed to feel were Locke’s poor rhetorical skills and repetitiveness.\textsuperscript{346} While Coste does aver to his having added in this 1729 French edition some passages that Locke had supposedly “corrected” in the \textit{Essay} before he died, Coste does not detail what they were, implying only that Locke had at some point delivered the corrections verbally to Coste, and that Coste himself had not included them in any of the English texts previous to this French one that he had managed and translated.\textsuperscript{347} The three-page section called “Additions et Corrections” that Coste attaches to the end of the “Mr Locke au Librarie” statement in the 1729 French edition\textsuperscript{348} contains mostly typos and minor word-form changes. No mention is made of the major paragraph revisions done to the “Of Power” chapter’s §§ 23, 48 and 56; there is only notice of two word changes: from “\textit{qu’ils}” to “\textit{qu’elles}” in §55, and from “\textit{donnerons}” to “\textit{donneront}” in §56.\textsuperscript{349}
Clearly Coste never seemed to feel the urge to cite a specific chain of reference as to how it came
to be that Locke would have believed before he died that desire alone could be “suspended”\textsuperscript{350}
(and with that only happening prior to the will’s being determined by the understanding), but
believed after he died that suddenly the will, too, could be suspended\textsuperscript{351} (prior understanding’s
determination now being damned on occasion, apparently). More importantly, Coste never
accounted for where the new language in §48 and §56 in particular came from. Yet we see that
not only had Coste felt the need to go out of his way in 1707 to warn Leibniz about the §48 and
§56 additions; he’d also oddly provided complete texts of them \textit{in French}\textsuperscript{352} -- even though until
this point in 1707 they’d only appeared in English in the 1706 posthumous edition I’m
contesting. Since Leibniz was likely working with either the 1700 French edition or the 1701
Latin edition or both, this notice to Leibniz stands as a sign of Coste’s recognizing that the
revisions might have an impact on Leibniz’s ultimate critique of Locke’s views.\textsuperscript{353} But why were
they only sent to Leibniz? And when would the French copy have been written? We see that by
1707 Coste astonishingly had at the ready 186 extra words in French for §48,\textsuperscript{354} and 518 extra
words in French for §56.\textsuperscript{355} Since Coste doesn’t seem to have mentioned these revisions to
anyone else,\textsuperscript{356} or explained (a) how this new textual material came into his hands, or (b) when
or why Locke would have come to write it (and yet not send it on to Limborch for comment, as
he had for §71?), or (c) why these revised views of Locke’s had never been reaffirmed
elsewhere, far too many questions remain unanswered.
Even recognizing that this would have been a time when publishing broadly for a continental “Republic of Letters” would have still been fairly nascent, when scruples about accuracy or provenance might not have been so high, one might still hope that an unexplained jump in a philosopher’s thought would have compelled some greater exegetic chain of evidence than there seems to be for it on Coste’s part on behalf of scholars. But perhaps the translation-sleight-of-hand that Coste may have successfully pulled off was conditioned by the reality that few readers would have had the time or access to go to the trouble comparing paragraph-by-paragraph a translation with its original, or an original with its ancestor, and checking out whether the formers had indeed been faithful to the latters. And certainly Locke himself would have found it an advantage just having his work circulated among as many non-English readers on the continent as possible. Perhaps there was a counterintuitive principle acting against the impulse of rooting out all discrepancies in the evidentiary chain. That is, might Locke himself have willingly excused some inaccuracies (and “misspellings” of his name) just for the opportunity of his work being talked about at all?

It’s true that Locke was known throughout his life to be a notorious revisionist, producing a proliferation of notes and letters around whatever he was currently discussing with his vast network of friends and fellow intellects, and often incorporating various thoughts emerging from these writings into later iterations of his already-published texts. And even when Locke did apparently change his mind, the resultant textual “shift” usually became one more of addition than substitution, since Locke rarely excised an item he’d once been impressed with. Little of Locke’s work seems so fixed that one doesn’t find Locke seeming to both assert and deny a
given argument within a matter of a few pages. So inconsistencies of the kind I’m concerned with can already be found throughout the chapter under what we know to be Locke’s signature alone. Perhaps Coste’s editorial services to Locke need to be seen in the light of what Coste was actually able to do, and in the end to be pitied as much as to be distrusted.

But the fact that there’s no evidence that Locke approved the new copy -- other than according to Coste’s own report -- does keep throwing the suspicion on Coste for his having initiated on his own the most baffling of changes in §56. Whether this insertion constitutes treachery or not, it’s hard to disclaim Coste’s being bereft of the motivation to commit such sabotage, given the way he apparently felt about Locke.

C. Coste’s biography and relationship with Locke (131-134):

That no one seems to have questioned Coste’s handling of these works remains a puzzle. For there may have been reason enough -- at least from Coste’s point of view -- for Coste to have acted duplicitously in his dealings with Locke. A Huguenot refugee from France, Coste seems never to have felt at home -- not in the Netherlands, which first gave him sanctuary and an education; not in England, which had given him a new language and at least over forty years of employment opportunities, including an extended “association” with one of the most famous intellectuals in England; and not in the France in which he was born and finally buried, which only had given him a French passport allowing him to remain in the nation safely and securely after he’d married the daughter of a French army officer late in life at the age of 66. The
persecuted tenuousness of his status may have made him feel not only like a hunted animal,\textsuperscript{359} but, as with all the refugees, made it necessary for him to become a bit of a fawning hustler when it came to making connections and getting new work.\textsuperscript{360} No doubt this should be remembered in any final assessment of him.

Coste started out having studied philosophy and theology from various schools in Geneva, Lausanne, Zurich and Leiden, and had been granted a ministerial acceptance by the Synod of Amsterdam after his studies. He drifted instead into LeClerc’s circle of “Dutch journalists” where he’d write occasional reviews and help edit, proofread and translate for the various literary books and journals LeClerc was associated with. In order to get possible employment abroad, in 1695 LeClerc encouraged Coste to try translating Locke’s \textit{Some Thoughts Concerning Education} into French; this was then followed by Coste’s doing the same with the first part of Locke’s \textit{Reasonableness of Christianity} in 1696. LeClerc’s targeted strategy apparently worked: when Locke was sent the translation of \textit{Some Thoughts}, he was impressed enough to accept LeClerc’s suggested placement of Coste in August 1697 as a children’s tutor in the Masham family household where Locke was also residing.\textsuperscript{361} Once ensconced there, Coste was able to continue his translation of Locke’s \textit{Essay}, already having been commissioned by a Dutch publisher to do so prior to his arrival in England.\textsuperscript{362} Now working under the close supervision of Locke himself, Coste would soon be tasked for still other translations, including some of Locke’s replies to Stillingfleet’s attacks on \textit{Reasonableness}. \textsuperscript{363}
Coste, however, seems to have become growingly unhappy and resentful in these close quarters with Locke, and over the six years they spent together in the Masham household, Coste reportedly found Locke stingy, secretive, nationalistic, and self-centered, among other annoyances. Nor could the two men meet eye-to-eye philosophically. Among other intellectual insults, Coste felt Locke was unbecomingly disrespectful of the philosophical “greatness” of Descartes and Malebranche, and was unnecessarily dismissive of Coste’s own philosophical thoughts. Coste would come to be further disturbed by what he felt was Locke’s misattribution of Christ’s role in Locke’s *The Reasonableness of Christianity*, and he found Locke’s “egoistic account of human motivation” discomfitting -- especially when Locke seemed to be equating “Virtue” with the “Law of Opinion.”

More practically, Coste grew irritated at how Locke seemed to assume Coste would be doing specified translation work for him while meanwhile failing to disclose beforehand both the nature of the work and whether or not he’d planned to pay Coste at all for doing it (Locke hadn’t; remuneration for Coste would only come from the Mashams and only for the tutoring -- not for the translating or editorial assistance). The final straw for Coste seems to have emerged as a result of the paltry offering Locke had left Coste in his will. A parcel of some sort, accompanied by a letter long lost since, seems to have been a manuscript Locke had intended Coste to translate -- i.e., yet another uncompensated work order tying him once again to the Lockean ghost. Expecting and feeling entitled to much more from Locke’s estate than what the will provided, the embittered Coste seemed to use this demonstrated lack of Locke’s appreciation for him as reason to bar no holds. Little that was discovered of what Locke had written now
impressed Coste much, and Coste was even said to have sniffed at what was revealed when Locke’s correspondence with Molyneux was published in 1708, calling its contents illustrative of Locke’s preferring to be surrounded by slavish lackeys rather than peers who could actually challenge him intellectually.  

D. Shaftesbury’s Role (135-139):

In Shaftesbury Coste would find a similarly embittered associate and particularly sympathetic ear. Never having apparently liked or respected Locke’s moral philosophy in the first place, Shaftesbury’s dismissal of Locke might have been as much an Oedipal need to rebel against a surrogate father as it was a matter of the two of them representing “oil and water” philosophical temperaments. Where Locke was a materialist, Shaftesbury was an idealist. Where Locke preferred to stay grounded in the most minimal of epistemological claims, Shaftesbury soared towards the most literary and imaginative ones. Where Locke chose to use Scripture as a basis for his faith, albeit in only the most astringent way (i.e., conditioned on the notion that one’s probative personal conduct can only strengthen the likelihood of one’s being rewarded with a happy afterlife), Shaftesbury was ready not only to abandon doctrine and Scripture entirely, but to endorse the kind of spiritual enthusiasm Locke found abhorrent, and to recognize virtue for virtue’s own sake, not as an express ticket to heaven. No doubt crucial in supplying much of the fuel that kept Coste’s anti-Locke sentiment boiling, Shaftesbury, too, would leave a trail of commentary that feebly commended Locke in public but would be scathing about him in private
-- his skepticism regarding nearly everything involving Locke wrote and did only confirmed as more posthumous reports of Locke’s less-than-attractive behavior towards others came in.  

Shaftesbury’s letters show his growing disregard for his former tutor. Within two months of Locke’s death, for example, Shaftesbury was able to obtain a copy of Locke’s final letter to Anthony Collins and, in the guise of writing a letter “to a friend,” would acidly deconstruct Locke’s missive to his new mentee with cynical precision. Soon after that, when Peter King, Locke’s executor, discovered a copy of Locke’s drafted recollections of Shaftesbury’s grandfather and decided to return them to Shaftesbury, Shaftesbury used them as a means of heading off LeClerc’s request for Shaftesbury’s own personal tribute to Locke. Pleading “exhaustion” to LeClerc for not being able to help him with anything more than a few impressions of Locke’s relationship with his grandfather, Shaftesbury did express gratitude for Locke’s being his “Friend and Foster-Father,” confessing that Locke might have found him, the oldest of seven children, a “peculiar charge” to test his educational theories on. But Shaftesbury’s inability to offer up any real personal anecdotes about his old tutor meant LeClerc was stuck hurriedly piecing together whatever he could so that some sort of tribute to Locke could be published in a timely way.

Though Coste had already been writing to Shaftesbury during the period he’d been at the Masham household with Locke -- presumably because he found Shaftesbury’s views more to his liking -- it was the elder Shaftesbury recollections that first brought Coste and Shaftesbury together face-to-face. Shaftesbury requested Coste’s help in translating Locke’s draft into French,
and by the time Coste picked it up, the swirl surrounding the semi-public exposure of the contents of the mysterious letter from Locke that had accompanied the package Locke had left Coste in his will had become sufficiently hot in the Republic of Letters circle.\textsuperscript{387} Said to be so repellant that anyone’s reading it with a previously positive regard for Locke would likely lose even the smallest smidgen of it immediately, Shaftesbury had been one of the first notified of its details -- meaning that he and Coste no doubt had plenty to talk about at their first meeting in April 1705.\textsuperscript{388}

What Coste and Shaftesbury seemed to find most appalling about Locke, aside from what they thought was his enormous ego, was his distain for virtue,\textsuperscript{389} the moral attribute to which Shaftesbury would become so renowned (devoting much of his own philosophical studies and analysis to it). Like Coste, Shaftesbury was an anti-empiricist innatist, and revered the timeless discussions of nature, morality and aesthetics propounded by classical Roman and Greek philosophers over what he thought were the dubious opinions of moderns like Locke and their emphasis on personal observation and experience. Since for Shaftesbury, anyone found blind to true beauty and deaf to the wisdom of the ancients could already be regarded as intellectually suspect, Locke’s greatest sins included his reification of what looked to Shaftesbury as the contingencies of happiness, and his Hobbsian-like relativism of good and evil, which Shaftesbury saw as a dubious substitute for the eternal certainties of virtue and vice.

Shaftesbury’s letters to Michael Ainsworth and General Stanhope seem torn from the kind of conversations Shaftesbury must have been having with Coste at the time. While pre-
acknowledging Locke’s “sincere” and “zealous” Christianity and his astuteness regarding government and economic policy, for example, Shaftesbury tells Ainsworth that he nonetheless found Locke all too credulous regarding the reports now coming from the recently discovered New World. The discipline of anthropological diversity quite obviously not being among Shaftesbury’s interests, he used its precepts to dam Locke’s conclusions:

THUS virtue, according to Mr. LOCKE, has no other measure, law, or rule, than fashion and custom: morality, justice, equity, depend only on law and will: and GOD indeed is a perfect free agent in his sense; that is, free to any thing, that is however ill: for if he wills it, it will be made good; virtue may be vice, and vice virtue in its turn, if he pleases. And thus neither right nor wrong, virtue nor vice are any thing in themselves; nor is there any trace or idea of them naturally imprinted on human minds. Experience and our catechism teach us all! I suppose ’tis something of like kind, which teaches birds their nests, and how to fly the minute they have full feathers.

And in the letter to General Stanhope, Shaftesbury even takes aim at Locke’s rhetorical presentation:

Thus have I ventured to make You the greatest Confidence in the World, which is that of my Philosophy, even against my old Tutor and Governour, whose Name is so establish'd in the World; but with whom I ever conceal'd my Differences as much as possible. For as ill a Builder as he is, and as little able to treat the home-points of Philosophy; he is of
admirable Use against the Rubbish of the Schools’ in which most of Us have been bred up. But if instead of the Phantom he opposd, [innate ideas?] and had allways before his Eyes, he had knownd but ever so litttle of Antiquity, or been tolerably learn’d in the state of Philosophy with the Antients, he had not heapd such loads of Words upon Us, and for want of a sound Logick (in which he shews himself pretty diffident) imposed on himself at every turn by the sound of Names and Appellations, whilst he is continually giving the Allarm and cautioning others against the Deceit. These You will find easily in him upon your reading, if You take but any one remarkable Word of his.  

There’s little doubt that Coste picked up on Shaftesbury’s use of virtue as a standard, and found Locke wanting in it. By 1708, Coste’s frequent appeals to Shaftesbury’s way of framing things starts to show up in his letters to him. For example, when he’s been asked to help put out a second edition of his translation of the *Reasonableness of Christianity*, it was to Shaftesbury that Coste first wanted to vent:

Je vais prendre la liberté, Milord, de vous consulter sur une affaire à quoi je suis persuadé que vous prenez beaucoup d’intérêt. Il se présente une occasion fort naturelle de defender la Vertu contre les attentats d’un Philosophe de nôtre connoissance. On me demande de Hollande le Livre que Mr. Locke a fait pour prouver que la Religion Chrétienne est raisonnable. C’est un Livre que j’ai traduit en Français avant que de venir en Angleterre. L’édition est vendue, et on veut le reïmprimer. Je dois envoyer une Copie corrigée qu’on
donnera à l’Imprimeur. En relisant cet Ouvrage, j’y ai trouvé que Mr. Locke pour faire
valoir l’utilité qui revient aux hommes de la connaissance de l’Evangile, dit entr’autres
choses que Jesus Christ nous a procuré un grand avantage en nous fournissant de puissans
motifs pour nous porter à bien vivre. Pour relever l’excellence et la nécessité de ces
motifs, il soutient que la Vertu et le bonheur ne se trouvent guere souvent ensemble, et
qu’à cause de cela elle n’avait pas, avant Jesus-Christ, un fort grand nombre de
Sectateurs.395

And then once he’s actually enmeshed in reexamining Locke’s *Reasonableness of Christianity*
text again for the first time in over ten years, Coste finds it necessary to inform Shaftesbury that
he finds Locke’s “theological hedonism”396 so disgusting that he’s ready to add his own personal
notes to the sections 397 to express his disapproval. These include concerns that, according to
Locke, virtue has no beneficial effect on its own in this world absent the expectation of great
happiness after this life, since otherwise one might as well be “fourbe que sincére; ingrat que
reconnaissant; dur et sans compassion que généreux et bienfaisant, etc.”398 (which Coste claims
only exhibits Locke’s own ignorance regarding what philosophers actually argued for regarding
virtue399). It’s as though whatever respect or indulgence Coste might have held for Locke’s
words while he had been in his living presence had now come completely undone in the presence
of Shaftesbury. Coste asks Shaftesbury if he thought it was worth adding the notes, since, while
he found Locke’s remarks appalling, he anticipated the public would hate him for pointing this
out:
Sardanopale auroit pu raisonner de cette manière: mais Epicure n’aurait pu écouter un tel discours. Je crois donc, Milord, que je ne risque rien, si je me déclare publiquement contre une satire si scandaleuse. Elle me choque, quoi que j’avoûë que sans vous je n’y verrais encore rien de choquant. Voici maintenant mot pour mot la Note que j’ai résolu de faire imprimer au bas de la page où se trouvent les passages que je viens de citer.

Though these notes in the end don’t go in, others like them will. For example, he is able to insert a passage reflecting his general irritation of Locke’s approach in the 1715 *Reasonableness of Christianity* “Avertissement du Traducteur.” Figuratively pulling his hair out at the translation obstacles some of the chapters contained for him once he really began at the beginning, Coste admits:

Pour moi je prendrai la liberté de déclarer ici, que je n’adopte pas tous les raisonnemens de Mr. Locke, quoi que je me sois donné la peine de mettre son Livre en Français. On en verra des preuves en un ou deux endroits de cette nouvelle Edition. Il m’aurait été facile d’en grossir le nombre, si j’eusse voulu critiquer les deux ou trois premiers Chapitres du Prémier Volume, où sur des explications de quelques Passages de l’Écriture, assez incertaines, Mr. Locke s’est engagé dans des raisonnemens qui ne paroissent pas fort solides. . .

While Shaftesbury’s love lay with the ancients, Coste’s lay with the Cartesians, and frequently accused Locke of being a blatant if not ignorant thief of the Modernist French school. So when
Coste supervised the production of the 1735 translation of the *Essay*, he recalled his battles with Locke over the “Some farther Considerations concerning our Simple Ideas” chapter regarding primary and secondary qualities and inserted a note therein indicating this (II.viii.14):

> Lorsque je vins à traduire cet endroit [II. viii. 14] de l’Essai concernant l’Entendement humain, je m’apperçus de la méprise de M. Locke, & je l’en avertis: mais il me fut impossible de le faire convenir que le sentiment qu’il attribuait aux Cartesiens, étoit directement opposée à celui qu’ils ont soutenu ...

With both Coste and Shaftesbury now writing private notes and letters back and forth to each other and continuously disparaging Locke’s thinking, it was inevitable that at some point they’d eventually be overheard gossiping about Locke and Locke’s activities in the “aspersing and blackening” way Collins found so disturbing. The 1720 letter Collins had sent to Desmaizeaux mentioned above was not his first to Desmaizeaux. He’d also sent one in 1716:

> However, this much I owe to the memory of Mr Locke, as to think of some plan of a vindication of him from the treatment of Mr Le Clerc and Mr Coste; who both servily flatterd him during his life and made panegyricks upon him immediately after his death. Me Coste not only in his Travels thro France and Holland, but in republishing works, which he thought it a glory to translate, has acted the part of a calumniator both in the manner of attacking him, and in the attacks themselves which are the efforts of a man
who has Persons and not things in view. I think that deserves to be call'd servile flattery, which is said to a man in his life time, and contradicted afterwards.406

And it was because of these known hostile feelings of Coste’s towards Locke that Collins and others were determined to protect Locke’s legacy. They all watched Coste in particular with suspicion, worrying that Coste’s access to much of Locke’s work left the work vulnerable and subject to potential corruption.407 For where there’s smoke, might not fire soon follow? Indeed, Milton casts some suspicion on Coste’s editorial intrusions even for the period when Locke was still alive -- such as in an annotated 1698 copy of the third edition of Locke’s Two Treatises, whose script was not in Locke’s hand but did bear some familiar idiosyncrasies of Coste’s.408

So though Milton does not list the Essay itself as among the works falling under these suspicions, I don’t see why it mightn’t, given that, as I’ve attempted to show, the posthumous fifth edition, and more specifically key sections in the “Of Power” chapter, did come out with a number of somewhat unexpected (and unexplained) changes attributable at least instrumentally to Coste.

Coste can’t have much appreciated Locke’s early impressions of him in the letters.409 Only eight letters of Coste’s to Locke are available now (in French); most contain rather mundane reports and inform Locke about details regarding publication issues. Anything Locke may have written back to Coste in response hasn’t yet surfaced (and given that the two men were usually within household distance, most communication would probably have been verbal as a matter of course). But Locke also seemed to have a strong inclination not to befriend or inquire much into
the personal feelings of his “inferiors” anyway (that is, of the people who worked for him). Nor was Locke really self-reflective enough to imagine what his cool distain and lack of appreciation for Coste might cost both of them personally. While Bastide called Coste “merely a compiler and translator” who “would be quite forgotten today if, by a singular piece of good luck, he had not translated Locke’s *Essay* into French,” Milton both acknowledged Coste’s subservient status (“Coste may have lived in the same house as Locke, but he was never among his closest and most trusted friends”), and recognized how unappreciative Locke was vis-a-vis Coste’s service to him (“Coste’s translation made Locke’s main philosophical work accessible to a European readership, and in the eyes of many observers it created a debt that Locke did not adequately pay.”) One only wonders if maybe what Coste rendered in Locke’s name after he died constituted true compensatory wages after all.
Chapter IX

The Prudential thesis: The “Uneasiness Encounters Self-Abasement and Topples It”

Component (140-146)

[T]his winter, considering diligently wherein the Christian faith consists, I thought that it ought to be drawn from the very fountains of Holy Writ, the opinions and orthodoxies of sects and systems, wherever they may be, being set aside. From an intent and careful reading of the New Testament the conditions of the New Covenant and the teaching of the Gospel became clearer to me, as it seemed to me, than the noontide light, and I am fully convinced that a sincere reader of the Gospel cannot be in doubt as to what the Christian faith is. I therefore set down my thoughts on paper, thereby the better to survey, tranquilly and at leisure, the agreement of the parts with one another, their harmony, and the foundations on which they rested. When everything in this creed of mine seemed everywhere sound and conformable to the word of God I thought that the theologians (that is, the Reformed) ought to be consulted, so that I might see what they thought about the faith. I went to Calvin, Turrettini, and others, who, I am compelled to admit, have treated that subject in such a way that I can by no means grasp what they say or what they mean; so discordant does everything in them seem to me with the sense and simplicity of the Gospel that I am unable to understand their writings, much less to reconcile them with Holy Writ.\footnote{136}
Coste’s possible textual manipulation aside, it was Locke’s addition of a “suspension mechanism” in the second edition which was meant to temporarily shut down any cacophony of desires or uneasinesses that created a problem for Locke that he never quite understood or appreciated. That the mechanism suddenly seemed to allow space for the possibility that the will might actually have some agency of its own was precisely what Limborch thought he’d discovered in Locke’s account -- its apparent “family resemblance” to the “liberty of indifference” principle had seemed too obvious for him to resist pointing out. But Locke’s insistence that the suspension mechanism was only a way to temporarily shut down persisting desires prior to the understanding’s adjudication, 417 and not a way to shut down whatever determinations the understanding had ordered the will to execute once its judgement had been made, meant that Locke believed he had not unknowingly stepped into the free will trap, even though that was what Limborch was sure he’d done if he could get Locke to locate the suspension mechanism after the understanding’s judgement had been rendered.

And yet why would Locke find the indifference principle so abhorrent that he wouldn’t even grant, for the purposes of charitable association alone, its similarities in behavior to the suspension mechanism? All the principle substantively ventured forth was an “intended … exception to universal mechanism in the sense that its possession allowed behaviour that, unnecessitated, could have been otherwise” 418

Beyond the fact that it flew in the face of the mechanical theory of nature that Locke had long endorsed, I think Locke’s resistance to it is also attributable to his unconscious search for some
motivating explanation that might allow him to escape the “self-abasing” demands of the salvation doctrine narratives pressing so hard in the Christian sectarianism surrounding him at the time. For as benign as the indifferency principle might seem to our ears now, where one stood on the question of its validity in the late 1690s foretold where one stood in the expectations of God’s grace -- or to which confessional team you were willing to put your post-Reformational lottery ticket on. And danger awaited whichever your choice.419

The narratives were not easy to master. Were you among the “Pelagianists,” or those sunny optimists 420 who’d conceived of a Christ/God whose offering of free grace and compassion allowed for the fostering of a “self-determining second cause,”421 or a kind of post-facto state of “non-preferentiality” in the soul or mind of fallible man within which free will could supposedly be deduced even after the judgement had already supposedly arrived at a determinant form of action? If so, the liberty of indifference principle served as your last-chance card, with Christ being the one to hand it out. On the other hand, were you to be among the “Augustinians,” or those hardened, pessimistic Calvinists who’d declared that since everyone but God’s tiny chosen elect were damned to their foreordained fates anyway, the only proper epistemic standpoint was one of submission and self-abasement to God’s higher power,422 and no liberty of indifference card would be available for you: your option was only the showing of a little more public self-flagellation. Clearly in Locke’s late 17th century England more candidates would fall into some version of the latter camp than the former (even among Locke’s circle of friends and colleagues, where Limborch was about as close to theological Romanism as any of Locke’s community were liable to be, Limborch himself was fiercely anti-clerical and anti-Catholic), meaning that the
outstanding moral divide now really involved whether one was ready to swallow the whole of
the “justification/satisfaction/sanctification” debtor ontologies of the Calvinists with all their
fastidiously predestinarian articulations, or whether one wanted to make some minor modifications
of them, and consequently risk being deemed either a vicious atheist or a drunk-and-whoring
priest-lover.

Thus the simple diagrammatic Euthyphro formula I claim Locke had listlessly tried to put forth
initially in Stage One was simply no longer going to be enough in a sectarian world where one’s
own behavior, whether good or bad, could never clear the multiple bars of eternal penance all
mankind was supposed to bear for the “sins” of the First Man, or for the suffering of the
Tripartite one. One might say in fact that it was the “liberty of indifference” principle that had
hijacked the abstract, atemporal dialectic of the Euthyphro -- the moral formula which had
originally involved balancing a choice between two simple options (i.e., “if this, then not that;
and if not this, then that”) --and was now being replaced by a performative event about an
audacious worldview fused with the temporized personage of a multi-specified Christ.\textsuperscript{423}

And woe to those who were unable to get the language right. Locke had already spent much of
the second half of the 1690s trapped in a rhetorical buzzsaw where his crediting Christianity with
being “reasonable”\textsuperscript{424} and worth “vindicating”\textsuperscript{425} still subjected him to accusations of his being
both a Socinian and an atheist, since he had also failed to ascribe properly the full status of Jesus
and the ultimate meaning of His Acts. Wrote persistent nemesis John Edwards of Locke’s
Christian views:
He makes Christ and Adam to be the Sons of God in the same senses, viz, by their Birth, as the Racovians generally do, and so he interprets Luke 1.35. John 5.26. according to their Standard. When he proceeds to mention the Advantages and Benefits of Christ’s Coming into the world, and appearing in the flesh, he hath not one syllable of his Satisfying for us, or by his Death purchasing Life and Salvation, or any thing that sounds like it. This and several other things which might be offered to the Reader, shew that he is all over Socinianized; and moreover that his design was to exclude the belief of the Blessed Trinity in this Undertaking of his, viz. to prove that the believing of Christ to be the Messiah is the only Point of Faith that is necessary and saying. All the other Articles and Doctrines must fall a sacrifice to the Darling Notion of the Antitrinitarians, namely that Christ is not the True God, and coessential with his Father. For the sake of this one Point they are all dispatch’d out of the world, and are made by him Martyrs to this Cause. One could scarcely imagine that a person of Ingenuity and Good Sense should go this way to work. Which inclines me to think that the Ingenious Gentleman who is suppos’d by some to be the Author of this Treatise is not really so ... 426

Edwards would unnerve Locke enough that Locke’s two subsequent Vindications were almost entirely a response to this cranky divine, though both still failed to satisfy the rigorous zealotry of Edwards and other like-minded reformists who saw nothing but a covert Hobbist in any of Locke’s formulations. 427 428
It might then be easier to understand that if the idea that one’s position on the indifferency principle was what could telegraph one’s attitude vis-à-vis one’s relationships to God and Jesus -- and with Locke’s already standing accused of having insufficiently described this relationship --, it’s no wonder why Locke might have wanted to avoid succumbing to anything denoting a “liberty of indifferency” principle like the plague, so obviously fraught was its theological weight and value. 429

True: given Locke’s puritan roots,430 one might be tempted to think a strong Calvinistic urge and Locke’s well-established anti-Catholic reputation was playing its hand with Locke’s response to Limborch regarding a will’s potential for freedom. For Locke, like the Calvinists, was refusing to accede to the kind of opening to the free will option that the more “catholic” Anglican and Arminian sects readily accepted. Certainly Locke was not immune from the rigid cultural articulations of the kind of Calvinism that formed his early upbringing.431 And as hedonically-inclined as he was philosophically, his own personal principles of conduct were particularly abstemious.432 But after his exposure to other Protestant sects in Holland -- some of them “dangerously” anti-Trinitarian if not nearly deistic/Socinian/atheistic 433 -- it seems that, at minimum, Locke’s political campaigns for religious toleration and for a constitutional monarchy compelled him to dilute all publicly-expressed theological doctrine to the barest foundation possible.

Yet as noted, this attempt to be pithy in his Christian ascriptions did not spare Locke from being drawn into the religious wars anyway, or for finding himself denounced for not being sufficiently
self-abasing. Locke’s concurrent 1695 religious tracts honoring Jesus as “the messiah” and as a superior role model for ethics simply would not compensate for his supposed failure to properly grovel at the reformist formula that God’s gift of “unmerited grace” came through God’s supposedly sending his son Christ down to earth to suffer and be crucified for the “satisfying of the debt” man owed to God for man’s eternal waywardness (due to the legacy of Adam’s first sin for which all subsequent generations must pay, etc.). While Locke may not have been able to properly operate the Euthyphro formula, neither could he work with this reformist “performance” formula which demanded from him an absurd position of submission to which Locke constitutionally was simply unable to abide. It was Locke’s failure to repeatedly speak the script as it was given that led to his being severely sanctioned and rebuked by many in the “self-righteously ‘self-abasing’” community.

I suspect that Locke’s dual inventions -- the “uneasiness” motivation and the vague but non-theologically-loaded “suspension mechanism” — were central instruments in Locke’s unconscious strategy to circumvent these doctrinal wars, his hope being that space might be carved out wherein freedom could be defended on its own within the context of a naturalist philosophy and without the enlisting of a divine intervention. That Locke failed to be able to honestly account for this circumvention is what led to the utter confusion of the “Of Power” chapter (and perhaps the Essay itself) in the first place.
Chapter X

Conclusion

A. How I got here (147-152):

I have been trying throughout this paper to point out how the dissonance in Locke’s position on liberty in his “Of Power” chapter cannot be disassociated from the ambivalence Locke felt regarding the theological disputes of the time and how he should have negotiated through them. Yet these disputes and their impact on Locke’s framing of his account have played almost no role in contemporary discussions being done on the chapter, where Locke’s position has often been reduced to one fixed package deducible only from what was contained in the posthumous version, with the text’s implicit dissonance and ambivalence being either watered down or removed. In contrast, I have tried to examine “Of Power” more in view of its troubled creative history and with regard to some of the particular individuals who were most instrumental in its changes, with an eye to the possibility that what has been seen as Locke’s final and “fixed” account of human liberty may actually be a posthumously-executed editorial distortion of it.

It’s only when one now looks over the troubled correspondence Locke maintained with his friends and enemies alike (along with the somewhat intemperate remarks of 19th-century Essay editors like Fraser) that one suspects more might have been going on in Locke’s expository delivery than the tedious proximity we judge from the chapter today. In fact, so often verbose and
discursive is Locke that we can almost forget that his *Essay* and Chapter 21 (Bk II) had been considered notorious among philosophical texts of the time. But Locke’s own incapacity to state anything simply and crisply should not excuse us from the need to discern concepts being implied to which we no longer have insight, and to understand that Locke had been smack in the midst of that churning transition between what I had designated\(^437\) as the “God-intoxicated” 17th-century and the “science-intoxicated” 18th-century, where focused long-view perspectives were unavailable and articulate and accurate present-moment account renderings were impossible. Left with what we have, then, we need to look at less obvious markers to figure out Locke.

Though the provisional title of my dissertation is “God and Liberty in Locke’s *Essay,*” its subtitle, “Predicating God and Liberty Amid the Secularizing Effect of “Uneasiness,” is meant to direct the reader’s attention to the main theory I wanted to advance. That is, that Locke’s act of substituting in his account of human liberty the notion of “uneasiness” as that which motivates human action rather than the “good the greater good” that he had offered originally has been underrated if not overlooked entirely as a momentous shift from prior accounts of liberty which had rested on analogical appeals to the theological domain. I base this “momentousness” on what I see as the problematic nature of Locke’s analogical construction, which, though failing as logic,\(^438\) is what exposes Locke’s urge towards a new paradigm for action theory in general, and what the conditions might be for moral theory in particular. While Hume will pull off a similar move far more deftly fifty years later,\(^439\) I suggest Locke may have been the first to stumble towards some enlightened foresight in finding a way around a theological justification for
morality. But because I think Locke himself failed to realize this, no one else has either. Here I try to carry the idea through and make of it what I can by considering it within the times and environment Locke was inhabiting.

A reader might be wondering why I chose to deal with this text at all, and how I came to the thesis I did. After all, hadn’t Locke been sufficiently well-covered over the last three hundred years since he died? If this thesis notion that I’m claiming is new hadn’t been mentioned thus far, wouldn’t that mean it must be wrong? Surely someone must have thought of this angle before if it was worth bringing up in the first place.

Perhaps. What I know is when I first read the chapter for a class on Empiricism, I found the chapter both confused and fascinating, full of tensions and inconsistencies, with a few ventured postulations on Locke’s part that made me uncertain whether what I was thinking Locke was trying to say about man’s relationship with God regarding divine and human freedom was what Locke actually was trying to say, or was something I was imposing on the chapter in order to give more legitimacy to my own personal view of the divine/human relationship regarding freedom. I have a personal interest in the origins of secularism (or even atheism) in the intellectual communities of the 17th century and how they finally came to replace long-standing divine explanations for our experiences. Protagoras aside, when did we feel able to claim the virtues of our own versions of freedom and responsibility based on our being the “measurement” of our self-constructed selves and not on what we think God expects of us? When were we ready to say, “God or no God: all I know is what I understand, through my experience of the world
along with other fallible beings like me. Would a ‘perfect’ God even be capable of experiencing ‘what it is like to be’ fallible, and then be properly positioned to help those like us trapped within such a domain?”

Given Locke’s empirical bent and medical background, there were parts in this chapter where such expressions seemed to be coming through, though awkwardly and perhaps amidst some camouflaging. Not knowing of the chapter’s own problematic history, to see if I was on to something, I sought assistance from secondary sources better informed than I of these things.

A few but not many of these sources cited the existence of an earlier first edition of the chapter said to be far different from what I was reading now (which is what we all read – a version of the fifth edition; i.e., the posthumous version). That took me to the Fraser-edited 1895-version of the Essay, where Fraser not only tries to make very clear what was in the first edition and what came in and went out in subsequent editions: he also through his own footnotes lent considerable support for my hunch that Locke’s theological position was quite “wobbly,” to say the least.

Fraser was taking particular issue with many of the more naturalistic claims Locke was making -- claims I admittedly failed to recognize right away, as I was simply ill-equipped then to recognize those remarks that might fall outside the more conventional theological vantage-point of the time. So while it is generally seen as a bit untoward for an editor to be offering so many of his own opinionated comments to a text he was ostensibly simply presenting to the public on Locke’s behalf, I also welcomed the “intrusions,” as Fraser’s attacks seemed to support my intuitive impression that Locke had been doing all he could to keep his theological commitments as astringent as possible. Certainly Fraser, himself a devout theist, had not been satisfied with
what Locke was delivering. Fraser also provided in his footnotes solid references to the enormous correspondence of Locke’s that gave much background to the issues Locke saw at stake in the chapter. After tracking down the correspondence, I found even more circumstantial evidence that supported my reading of the chapter, especially in the material mentioned in Locke’s letters to Molyneuex and then later in the arguments Locke was having with Limborch in the few years before Locke died.

Nevertheless, I felt I still hadn’t quite got a handle on the chapter. None of the secondary sources also reading the chapter were really backing up my a-theistic intuitions, though at first I thought Darwall did in his chapter on Locke’s “Of Power” in his *British Moralists*. First of all, Darwall seemed as intrigued by the peculiar quality of the chapter as I was, and made mention of the chapter’s evolution through his own addenda to his chapter. Darwall also was the first one I saw who mentioned Passmore’s connecting Locke’s ideas to Cudworth’s because of Locke’s possible physical access to the then-unpublished Cudworth archives -- Locke of course having carried on a still unclear relationship with Cudworth’s daughter Damaris Masham from about 1684 until he died resident in her house in 1704. Darwall claimed Passmore had said Locke had more or less stolen his ideas on freedom and uneasiness from Cudworth. If true, that would make my thesis on Locke’s secularist-bent less tenable, as Cudworth, a church divine as well as one of the more important members of the Cambridge Platonists, had notably advocated the existence of innate ideas -- which Locke notably did not. But I’m not sure Passmore did claim this kind of direct inheritance between Cudworth’s unpublished works and Locke’s positions, other than in suggesting that Locke had expropriated many of Cudworth’s terms for himself.
Nevertheless, Passmore hadn’t made much of a case of it that went much deeper conceptually. And when I looked more closely at Darwall’s claims on their own, I found him portraying Locke as much more of a theist and less of a denier of innateness than I felt was merited. I therefore think Darwall is wrong about his assessment of Locke.450

But Darwall did help me see Cudworth in a new way. Not as a progenitor for Locke’s views, but as a philosophical foil for them. And a more logically coherent one as well. When I saw how Cudworth viewed man’s imperfection as that which allowed for man’s freedom and not God’s,451 I suddenly became aware of the problem Locke was having with his account of liberty: Locke had asserted freedom for both a perfect God and imperfect men -- though admittedly it took me awhile to identify this insight with the name “analogical predication.” And then when I noticed Hobbes’s view -- who of course was Cudworth’s main target -- constructing a similarly orthogonal analogous predication set-up, but in the exact opposite way to Cudworth’s,452 I saw a potential philosophical framework in which to measure Locke’s “problem” in the “Of Power” chapter -- i.e., that Locke had unconsciously committed an analogous predication “mistake” with his “God is free because he is motivated by the good, the greater good / Man is free because he is motivated by his uneasiness” structure. And that was why Locke’s account couldn’t help but defend the material determinism of nature absent the kind of liberty of intention which would have supplied the moral force the theists demanded.453

Nevertheless, was that to be the end of the story? I still wanted to know why Locke was so intent on keeping “uneasiness” as a motivator -- especially without seeming to couple it up with any
enobling aspirations towards the good or moral. Why pick a passion so outside any mode of
God’s representations? Was Locke actually suggesting that God’s operational authority over our
behavior remains forever stunted by the incommensurable attributes we’ve derived from our
separate realms? God did not experience uneasiness. Only man. Was Locke really on the verge of
articulating not only the “unspeakable,” but also the “unthinkable”?

This is when I tracked down more of the literature on the “liberty of indifference” principle and
its burning controversies in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and saw how the
theological views paralleled the contentiousness with which Locke dealt with the issue. The
Jesuits and the Calvinists were at each others’ throats, their rival moral cosmologies resting on
worldviews that would defy both logic and testability. Seeing that their dogmas rested on absurd
narrative arguments for which only memory and recitation skills were requisite, Locke tried to
skate the borders on the narrowest of blades.

Locke appears to be torn between a desire to shed himself of divine explanations in toto and a
desire to preserve for his political project at least some notion of a distant but caring
“placeholder-God” device to reassure those worried about his challenge to the divine right
doctrine. Was Locke’s failure to figure out the source of a problem he might have peculiarly
intuited the existence of in fact exposing embedded new insights he also had which forced his
bad argument to be constructed in this problematic way -- i.e., by awkwardly starting his account
from an analogy no longer reflecting necessary truths? Of course I think it was.
The problem with Locke was that he did not always seem aware of his own experience in a very self-reflective way, despite his many acute observations about human experience in general. That he did recognize he had a “problem” regarding his “Of Power” chapter relative to its account of human liberty gives the chapter a significance that justifies our further investigation into it, I believe. If I were to offer a concise summation of my thesis here, it would be that Locke’s failure to derive a defense of human freedom from the knowledge he thinks he has of God’s “omnipotence and omniscience” was because he was blind to the need to “free his freedom” from such a form of “divine knowledge” in the first place, even though his very own arguments were continuously implying that he should, and even though he was particularly well-placed in the intellectual world to have access to thinkers who would.

B. The Collins Component (153-162):

Only when we see what Collins had come up with can we imagine how Locke might have concluded his investigation – and in a much more coldly efficient way. Collins in fact went so far as to demonstrate the false allure of free will altogether, and thus may have made a better case for Locke’s determinist account than Locke himself ever managed to pull off. Calling determinism (or “Necessitarianism”) the true perfection, and freedom (or “Liberty”) the true imperfection, Collins finds it only following that God’s [so-called] perfection would therefore make God a necessary agent and not a free one. And while Collins does not say man is “perfect,” Collins does claim that our determined nature is such by analogy -- meaning that our being modeled after God makes us necessary agents and not free ones as well. Collins
pays particular attention to the questions Limborch had raised with Locke regarding the “liberty of indifference” and not only goes out of his way to deny its virtue;\textsuperscript{463} he goes on to vigorously deny the substituted version Locke seemed to approve of in the last posthumous edition of his \textit{Essay} as well: that is, the “suspension mechanism.” Asserting that there were usually two questions concerning “this matter” -- that is, (1) “Whether we are at liberty to will or not to will,” and (2) “Whether we are at liberty to will one or the other of two or more objects” -- Collins denies the possibility of the second option,\textsuperscript{464} and uses the first option to eliminate suspension as a viable consideration altogether.\textsuperscript{465}

Absent those external constraints that otherwise might proscribe our ability to \textit{do or not do} what we will or desire, then, Collins clearly believed that as rational, sensible beings, we should find it \textit{irrational} to imagine any freedom to will or not will to do something \textit{against} our desires. For him, the need to preserve one’s psychological continuity was what was most at stake with the determinism/liberty debate; it trumped any need to declare what was obviously the more popular “Jesuit-like” claim of there being a libertarian ideal. Referring to LeClerc’s definition in his 1707 review of Locke’s “Of Power” chapter,\textsuperscript{466} Collins responded:

\begin{quote}
If Liberty be defined a power to pass different judgements at the same instant of time upon the same individual propositions that are not evident (we being, as it is owned necessarily determined to pass but one judgement on evident propositions), it will follow that men will be so far irrational, and by consequence imperfect agents, as they have that freedom of judgement.\textsuperscript{467}
\end{quote}
What Collins brought to the discussion, then, was the rhetorical firepower that made determinism look much more laudable than that fickle notion of freedom most everyone had come to valorize in that period. Priestly would come to be so convinced by Collins’ views that in 1790 he decided to republish Collins’ now-dormant *Philosophical Inquiry*, claiming he himself had become a determinist precisely because of it.468 Collins’ *Inquiry* also survived the critical eye of A.C. Fraser, who, though himself a committed theist and avowed libertarian, claimed Collins had “state[d] the arguments against human freedom with a logical force unsurpassed by any Necessitarian”469 (and we might observe that, as much as Fraser respected Locke, Fraser had never found him actually meeting the kind of high rhetorical standard he thought Collins had accomplished).

*On the other hand*: while Collins’ determinist narrative had more ably carved out enough ground to make the existence of God470 an irrelevant if not moot consideration for one’s cultivating and nurturing a morally accountable life, Collins’ rhetorical certainty and admirable directness might also have come with a cost – and one that Locke’s occasional uncertainty and indirectness avoids. For example, agent necessitarianism for Collins meant that there was little reason to offer rehabilitative pathways in penal planning,471 even though Collins admitted that the operative power of the pleasure/pain response might suggest that punishment for an individual’s past bad behavior might serve as a deterrent for that individual’s possible future criminal behavior.472 More frightening might be Collins’ view towards the children of such criminally-driven individuals, which was radically different from how Locke regarded the “debts” of children vis-
a-vis the “sins of their fathers.” Conversely, Collins saw no reason to praise a man for a job or act well done: as that would have been understood as being part of “his nature” in the first place, such acts should be expected from such men and thus would be undeserving of any special commendation or esteem.

So while Collins’ forceful and spirited voice happily cuts through some of the inconsistent claims Locke had produced in his own account of human liberty, Collins’ pessimism about the possibilities of human rehabilitation has a sour note that Locke’s version simply doesn’t evince.

C. What Locke could have done (163-164):

And yet it can’t be Collins’s dropping of the “God” explanation that produces this pessimistic projection in an otherwise “freeing” argument against the obligatory freedom commitment. For had Locke been more alert to what was in his own work all along, he might have seen the connections he could have emphasized between the “uneasiness” quotient he’d introduced in the “Of Power” chapter and the “forensick” quotient he’d briefly offered in his newly introduced piece on “Identity and Diversity,” which appeared just six chapters later and from which his own account of human agency could have been given a more secure -- and secular -- foundation.

Locke had applied the term “forensick” to that “psychological continuity of persons” idea that Collins had originally appropriated from Locke. Unfortunately, Locke only mentions the term once -- in §26 of the “Identity and Diversity” chapter -- and never developed it beyond that
elsewhere in his writings (to many a scholar’s lament). Yet clearly the “forensick” component, along with the novel conception Locke was offering of personal identity,\textsuperscript{477} could have grounded or anchored Locke’s denial of free will without leaving him vulnerable to accusations of amorality or Godlessness or involved him in the complex spiderwork-retributiveness of the Calvinist determinist narratives. Nor would human creativity or inventiveness need to be denied in such an account, as long as they remained in service to an authentically true rendering of the character of an individual reflective person. How would we measure what was “authentically true”? We’d measure it by the levels of “uneasiness” emerging from the contemplation of whether our individual acts or decisions are being done according to, or in correspondence with, whatever is our particular self-conception of ourselves.\textsuperscript{478} The “moral” (or “forensick”?) course would thus be that which most authentically aligns with this representation, and need not be described as an expression of our moral “freedom” since, in the interest of our desire to preserve the historical cohesiveness of our self-conceived personhood, we are actually being compelled -- nay, determined, even -- to maintain the alignment, else we be at risk of ever more uneasiness being brought on to warn us of a pending misalignment.

No doubt a look at how the contemporary “reframing” of the “free will” / “uneasiness” / “morality” calculus that so flummoxed Locke would also have been useful here, given that the problems Locke faced concerning the essential properties of moral freedom remain unresolved for us even today. For it is clear that not only will the issues of deductive reasoning and inductive probability continue to challenge each other for the claim of explanatory supremacy, just as they did in Locke’s time; so, too, does the hunger for some “Divine Being”\textsuperscript{479} continue to exercise its
irrational pull on many of us skeptics today. Yet as I just mentioned with my brief nod towards Locke’s chapter on personal identity, I believe Locke could have formulated a position wherein what we experience has great heuristic benefits for us precisely because of our imperfections (detected in our “uneasy” responses), even though such a view might challenge the supremacy of a Divine for whom such imperfections are not only impossible, but also unknowable (being as such imperfections are inaccessible to It). A response enabling us to create, through our own trials and errors, a better, happier, more enriching life seemed to actually be the direction Locke had been heading towards in the chapter -- trial-and-error and hands-on-experience being the operative notes. Note Locke’s words in §69.

The last inquiry, therefore, concerning this matter is, whether it be in a Man’s power to change the pleasantness and unpleasantness that accompanies any sort of action? and to that, it is plain, in many cases he can. Men may and should correct their palates, and give relish to what either has, or they suppose has none. The relish of the mind is as various as that of the Body, and like that too may be alter’d; and ‘tis a mistake to think, that Men cannot change the displeasingness or indifferency that is in actions into pleasure and desire, if they will do but what is in their power. A due consideration will do it in some cases; and practice, application, and custom in most ... [A]ny action is rendred more or less pleasing, only by the contemplation of the end, and the being more or less perswaded of its tendency to it, or necessary connection with it: But the pleasure of the action itself is best acquir’d or increased by use and practice. Trials often reconcile us to that, which at a distance we looked on with aversion; and by repetitions wear us into a liking of what possibly, in the first essay,
displeased us. Habits have powerful charms, and put so strong attractions of easiness and pleasure into what we accustom ourselves to, that we cannot forbear to do, or at least, be easy in the omission of actions, which habitual practice has suited, and thereby recommends to us. Though this be very visible, and every one’s Experience shews him he can do; yet it is a part in the conduct of Men towards their Happiness, neglected to a degree, that it will be possibly entertain’d as a Paradox, if it be said, that Men can make things or actions more or less pleasing to themselves; and thereby remedy that, to which one may justly impute a great deal of their wandering. Fashion and the common Opinion having settled wrong Notions, and education and custom ill habits, the just values of things are misplaced, and the palates of Men corrupted. Pains should be taken to rectify these; and contrary habits change our pleasures, and give a relish to that which is necessary or conducive to our Happiness. This every one must confess he can do; and when Happiness is lost, and misery overtakes him, he will confess he did amiss in neglecting it, and condemn himself for it: and I ask every one, whether he has not often done so?483

But for some reason (modesty? lack of imagination?), Locke fell far short of defending what might have been a providentially human self-determination.484 In the end, he still seemed to feel he was obliged to find God as the the explanation for all things.
D. In sum

I’ve tried to construct this in a way that makes a philosophical argument first, and a historical one second. However, as this order of priorities is not really my wont, the philosophical part might seem a bit strained. I realize the history of free will and existence of God arguments is long and complicated. I just think the history and background development of this particular chapter of Locke’s offers something unique that adds to the soil of philosophical thought -- problematic though both might be.
Chapter XI

Ideas/Topics for Future Investigation:

Is Locke’s “Identity and Diversity” chapter, along with his *Some Thoughts Concerning Education* treatise, a richer, better answer to how human decisions can preserve moral integrity than the highly-flawed -- and God-necessary -- freewill account suggested in the “Of Power” chapter? Was Collins on the verge of concluding this?

Had there been in the 17th-18th centuries an undetectable theo-philosophical shift from earlier “Euthyphro-dilemma” forking concerns denoting a singular, atemporal, absolute Deity to the post-Reformation Calvinist predestination concerns reifying “the elect” as denoted by Jesus’s temporally-placed death and resurrection? How did this affect moral philosophy?

Are there any more instances of philosophical thinkers like the characters in *Parmenides* and *De Anima* mentioned above finding “existence of God” arguments moot since any proof or disproof of them still wouldn’t assist us in how morally/constitutionally imperfect and inadequate beings like ourselves should live/behave, it being impossible that such Gods would know what it’s like to be us?

Is there any credible course to be seen that traces Locke’s “uneasiness” on through to Hutchison’s ”benevolence” or Hume’s “sympathy”?
Is there any link between Locke’s view of forensic identity and Adam Smith’s idea of moral sentiments?

Did Damaris Masham one way or the other influence Locke regarding his religious commitments?

Would Locke’s *Conduct of the Understanding*, had it been published within the confines of the *Essay* as planned, have answered more questions or filled in the gaps produced by the “Of Power” chapter? Did Coste have a role in the *Of the Conduct of the Understanding*’s creation or final outcome at all?

How did the “liberty of indifference” principle play itself out in Calvin vs. Jesuit (and degrees in between) doctrine? Feature Locke, King, Leibniz, LeClerc.
Note also A.E. Taylor’s comment on this section of Parmenides: “The gravest difficulty of all has yet to be faced [re: disc. between Parmenides and Socrates]. It is that the recognition of two ‘worlds’ presupposed by Socrates, a world of forms and an ‘other’ world of ‘things’ which somehow ‘partake’ of the forms, leads direct to complete scepticism (133a-135c). For the world of which each of us is a member is ex hypothesi not the world of forms, but the ‘other’ world (since it had been observed at the outset that each of us is a man, none of us is the ‘form of man’). Consequently the relations between forms will belong exclusively to the world or system of related forms; corresponding relations of which ‘we’ are terms will belong to ‘our world’ and will have their correlates within ‘our world.’ There will be a relation between ‘master’ as such and ‘servant’ as such, and the terms of this will be the form of master and the form of servant. But each of us will be master or servant to another man, and the relation between this pair will fall outside the world of forms; it will connect one man with another man, not with a form. So the correlate of the form of knowledge will be Reality as such. But the correlate of our knowledge will be such reality as the objects of our world possess. And it is admitted that ‘our’ knowledge is not the form of knowledge (that is, the knowledge we have is partial and imperfect). Its counterpart therefore is not the completely real. We are precluded from knowing what real good is, for the counterpart of a merely relative and partial knowledge must be a relative and partial reality. And we may invert the argument with even more startling results. God, at any rate, might be supposed to possess ‘absolute’ or ‘perfect’ knowledge. But by our previous reasoning, it follows that God knows nothing of our imperfectly real world. And in the same way, we may deny the rule of God over us, on the ground that the correlate of human subject is human superior. In a word, the consequence of a theory of two distinct ‘worlds’ or ‘orders’ will be that every relation falls wholly within one of the two; there can be no relation connecting a member of the one world with a member of the other.” [“The Parmenides,” Plato: The Man and His Work, pp. 358-9]

2 Clearly few scholars if any would classify Locke’s work as strict Calvinist, according to which the will, being bonded to sin and enslaved to evil post-Fall, had to be ceded to God’s judgement and subject to exclusively deterministic constraints -- including that of eternal damnation should the sinner not otherwise be chosen among God’s elect (see my additional disc. in my Chapter IX).

3 As found in Darwall, Schouls, Yaffe, Waldron, Gauthier, Tetlow.

4 though it does perhaps show how anxious contemporary theists are about insuring their competitive influence in the secular world we live in now.

5 Though this edition of the Essay has since been replaced by the more rigorously circumspect version of 1979 edited by Peter Nidditch, it had been the accepted standard version for everyone for almost an entire century.

*Please note: since I will be speaking of both the 1894 Fraser-edited version of the Essay [now updated in a two-volume 1959 Dover edition] and the more “modern” 1979 Nidditch-edited version of the Essay, I will henceforth distinguish them by referring to the Fraser version as the “F-Essay” [usually indicating just vol. I] and the Nidditch version as the “N-Essay.” Note, too, that later in my paper I will also be referring to the many (and confusing!!) “pre-modern” versions of the Essay as well.

6 For Fraser’s “Philosophy of Theism” Gifford Lecture, see <http://www.giffordlectures.org/Browse.asp?PubID=TPPOTO&Cover=TRUE>
Aarsleff in a footnote writes: “The true import of the revision of the chapter ‘Of Power’ for the second edition has been obscured by A.C. Fraser’s very misleading information in his edition of the Essay (2 vols. Oxford, 1894), which seems to have gained general acceptance. In a note to that chapter, he says that the sections after section 27 ‘were in great part omitted in the Second Edition, and in place of them thirty-five others (sections 28-60) were introduced.’ He then prints the original sections 28-38, immediately followed by this contradictory statement: ‘In the first edition chapter xxi consists of 47 sections only. Those reproduced above were omitted in the second and succeeding editions.’ This is false. Section 28 is the only one which does not appear in the second edition. Sections 29-38 are included (some almost verbatim, others with some omissions) in the following sections in the second edition: 41, 42, 48-50, 54-5, 56, 58-60. The new sections in the second edition are: 28-40 (from which the revised argument can be understood by reading the section summaries), 43-7, 51-3, 57, 68-9, 71-2 (summary of the chapter, different of course from the original 46). Fraser’s chapter has 75 sections because he, without the authority of any text that I have ever seen, makes a separate section (39) of the second paragraph in 38 and likewise makes two sections of 56 (of which the first paragraph first appeared in the Coste translation and first in English in the fifth edition as part of and preceding the original section 56 in the second, third, and fourth editions).” (“The State of Nature and the Nature of Man,” John Locke: Problems and Perspectives, ed. John Yolton, pp. 111-2). Note that Aarsleff’s comments come in 1969; the 1979 Nidditch edition of the Essay has since been considered the most reliable in terms of Lockean scholarship, See also Peter Schouls’s lacerating criticisms of Fraser in Reasoned Freedom: John Locke and Enlightenment, pp. 117, 119, 122-4, 125, 128, 132, 137.

Esp. Peter Schouls, who devotes a significant portion of his thesis in Reasoned Freedom attacking Fraser’s claim that Locke had been a determinist, and blames Fraser for getting everyone else off on the wrong foot with Locke as well through his footnotes. Deploring Fraser’s digressions, Schouls writes that “Fraser presents Locke as a vacillating thinker who dearly wanted to preserve human freedom but who found himself forced into halfhearted determinism by the tendency of other doctrines to which he was otherwise committed.” (RF, p. 122; see pp. 117-143 overall).

Fraser’s view will be more fully explored in in my Chapters 7 (“Circumstantial Thesis”) and XII (“The Coste Component”), when I discuss the posthumous edition of the Essay published by Pierre Coste in 1706.

Locke to Molyneux: 30 Jan 1693; The Correspondence of John Locke, IV, pp. 625-6 [#1592].

* All bold type in quotations mine, for emphasis.

Scrawling in Nat. Library of Scotland copy of Locke’s Essay at 2.21.53, as noted in John Colman, John Locke’s Moral Philosophy, p. 269 (11n).

henceforth “II.xxi.”

or what we’d now call a compatibilist position -- though I tend to agree with those critics who question the soundness of the compatibilist position, such as Galen Strawson, who notes, “Many ... think that the Compatibilist account of things does not even touch the real problem of free will. For what is it, they say, to define freedom in such a way that it is compatible with determinism? It is to define it in such a way that an agent can be a free agent even if all its actions throughout its life are determined to happen as they do by events that have taken place before it is born: so that there is a clear sense in which it could not at any point in its life have done otherwise than it did. This, they say, is certainly not free will or moral responsibility. How can one be truly or ultimately morally responsible for what one does if everything one does is ultimately a deterministic outcome of events for whose occurrence one is in no way responsible?” (“Luck Swallows Everything,” Times Literary Supplement).

which is, of course, such a lamentable misnomer to Locke that he goes on and on rather repetitively about it, commenting on it in at least five sections in this chapter (§§ 6, 14, 16, 21, 22).

henceforth abbreviated as “GTGG”

other than that it was analogous to the answer the Indian gave about what exactly the tortoise who bore the elephant was standing on (see Essay II.xiii.19; II.xxii.2).
As contemporaries like John Sergeant and John Norris believed Locke should have done.


21 After the *Essay’s* first 1690 appearance the book would appear in three more editions just up until Locke’s death in 1704 (that is, in 1694, 1695, and 1700), after which a fifth and somewhat “final” version appeared posthumously two years later, in 1706 (Peter Nidditch’s 1979-issued paperback of the *Essay* constitutes the 12th edition). Interestingly, in almost none of the revisions had Locke capitulated to anyone’s suggested “corrections”; instead he often responded by adding material that would invite even more criticism. Additional chapters that were added after the *Essay’s* first edition included: the Molyneux problem in II.ix.8; “Of the Association of Ideas” (II.xxiii); “Of Identity and Diversity” (II.xxviii); “Enthusiasm” (IV.xix); a major revision of the “Of Power” chapter (II.xxi); and additions to the “Epistle to the Reader.” “Of the Conduct of the Understanding” was supposed to be in the “Of Power” chapter, but its increasing length prompted its becoming a separate book entirely. **See also Charlotte Johnston’s critique of Peter King’s suppression of some of Locke’s works in her “Locke’s Examination of Malebranche and Norris” paper (*Journal of the History of Ideas*, p. 551).**

22 See Mattern, Yolton and John Sergeant

23 Notably, the issues of freedom and necessity don’t seem to appear in what’s known as “Draft ‘A’” of the *Essay*, believed to have been written as early as 1671, nor do the passions like “desire,” “pleasure,” and “pain,” which become so prominent in the *Essay* itself. Versions of the word “suspend” do appear in “A”, however (*Early Draft of Essay*, §42, pp. 63, 66 & 67), and the passions and notions of “Willing/voluntas,” “suspend” and even “unesainesse” [sic] appear in one particular 1676 journal entry ... though, interestingly, not the “good” (“The simple Ideas that we have from the minde are these ¶ 1. Perception and the several species of it as Thinkie, considering, understanding, guesseing doubting assenting &c. ¶ 2. Willing voluntas i.e. wherein the minde doth after consideration or at least some thought begin continue change or stop some action which it finds in its power soe to doe Now all the actions that I imagine we have any notion of being either thought or motion and we findeing that there be some both of the thoughts of our minde as well as motions of our bodys (for all are not soe) that we have a power to / begin continue vary stop or suspend as we thinke fit, when any variation in any of these is made upon thinkeing we ascribe it to the will. Soe that the power of determining our facultys of thinking or motion to act or not to act, to act this way or that way in all cases where they are capeable of obedience is that I thinkie which we call the Will. ¶ Besides these two great and copious Ideas which the minde derives from its owne operations within there seeme to me to be two others which joyne themselves upon occasion and are produced by allmost all the Ideas both of body and minde and these are those of pleasure or delight on one hand and pain or disturbance on the other. In our English language we call that which / is an uneasiness in the minde trouble or greife and that which rises from any impressions on the body pain, but the Latins and Greeks cald both very well by one name as Dolor. ¶ These I suppose are the four simple Ideas we have from the minde for as for considering judging assenting doubting beleiveing and all the passions I beleive upon consideration they will be found but to be modifications and complex Ideas made up out of these.” 7/13/1676, *Early Draft*, pp. 80-1).
In the Jan. 20, 1693 letter to Molyneux, Locke himself admitted that the consideration of liberty had been something of an afterthought, and that he’d never really followed his claims through before he wrote it: "I do not wonder to find you think my discourse about liberty a little too fine spun, I had so much that thought of it my self, that I said the same thing of it to some of my friends before it was printed, and told them that upon that account I judg'd it best to leave it out, but they persuaded me to the contrary. When the connection of the parts of my subject brought me to the consideration of power, I had no design to meddle with the question of liberty, but barely pursued my thoughts in the contemplation of that power in man of choosing or prefering, which we call the will, as far as they would lead me without any the least bypass to one side or other; or if there was any leaning in my mind, it was rather to the contrary side to that where I found my self at the end of my pursuit. But doubting that it bore a little too hard upon man's liberty, I shew'd it to a very ingenious but professed Arminian [LeClerc?] and desired him, after he had consider'd it, to tell me his objections if he had any, who frankly confessed he could carry it no farther. I confess, I think there might be something said, which with a great many men would pass for a satisfactory answer to your objection; but it not satisfying me, I neither put it into my book, nor shall now into my letter. If I have put any fallacy on my self in all that deduction, as it may be, and I have been ready to suspect it my self, you will do me a very acceptable kindness to shew it me that I may reform it." (Correspondence IV, p. 625 [#1592]).

In his prefatory “Epistle to the Reader,” Locke says his bookseller had more or less demanded Locke “make amends for the many faults committed” in the first edition of his Essay before he [i.e., the bookseller] would sign on to the selling of the second edition. Whether Locke meant the “faults” remark to signal either false modesty on Locke’s part or that it was an expression indicating some actual dissatisfaction coming from his bookseller, Locke tells us that, other having added one entirely new chapter, the “many additions and amendments” he’d made elsewhere were “either farther confirmations of what I had said, or explications, to prevent others being mistaken in the sense of what was formerly printed, and not any variation in me from it” -- except that material he’d put forth in Ch. 21 (N-Essay, p. 11).

Locke himself admits in the “Epistle to the Reader” at the beginning of the Essay that “[t]his discontinued way of writing may have occasioned, besides others, two contrary Faults, viz. that too little, and too much may be said in it. If though findest any thing wanting, I should be glad, that what I have writ, gives thee any Desire, that I should have gone farther: If it seems too much to thee, thou must blame the Subject; for when I first put Pen to Paper, I thought all I should have to say on this Matter, would have been contained in one sheet of Paper; but the farther I went, the larger Prospect I had: New Discoveries led me still on, and so it grew insensibly to the bulk it now appears in. I will not deny, but possibly it might be reduced to a narrower compass than it is, and that some Parts of it might be contracted" the way it has been writ in, by catches, and many long intervals of Interruption, being apt to cause some Repetitions. But to confess the Truth, I am now too lazie, or too busie to make it shorter.” (N-Essay, p. 7-8). And later Locke boasts how "... in writing about these things I have neither followed other men's opinions nor so much as consulted any writings at all, but have set forth in the most suitable words in my power what the things themselves have taught me, so far as they could be compassed by investigation and meditation.” (2 May 1701; Correspondence VII, p. 328 [#2925])
And yet we might be entitled to anticipate something of a potentially “dangerous” nature, since we do
know that on Locke’s own account he remarks: “Were it fit to trouble thee with the History of this Essay, I
should tell thee, that five or six Friends meeting at my Chamber, and discoursing on a Subject very
remote from this, found themselves quickly at a stand, by the Difficulties that rose on every side. After we
had a while puzzled ourselves, without coming any nearer a Resolution of those Doubts which perplexed
us, it came into my Thoughts, that we took a wrong course; and that before we set ourselves upon
Enquiries of that Nature, it was necessary to examine our own Abilities, and see, what Objects our
Understandings were, or were not, fitted to deal with. This I proposed to the Company, who all readily
assented; and thereupon it was agreed, that this should be our first Enquiry. Some hasty and undigested
Thoughts on a Subject I had never before considered, which I set down against our next Meeting, gave
the first entrance into this Discourse; which having been thus begun by Chance, was continued by
Intreaty; written by incoherent parcels; and after long intervals of neglect, resumed again, as my Humour
or Occasions permitted; and at last, in a retirement, where an Attendance on my Health gave me leisure,
it was brought into that order thou now seest it.” N-Essay, p. 7. Locke’s once-upon-a-time college friend
but later only frequent “man-servant” James Tyrrell reports that the discussion had been about “the
Principles of morality, and reveald Religion” ibid. p. xix], and that the very provocation that started Locke’s
writing the initial editions of the Essay had been this collegial argument among Locke and his friends
about where human understanding would lay if one did not take into account that form of “knowledge”
held by faith via divine revelation.

Incidentally, a modern secularist reader less exposed to the particular theological battles of the past might
be particularly aroused by Fraser’s polemical footnotes which had attacked Locke for his supposed “anti-
God” tendencies. If anything might serve as a an illuminator for us about for how people of Locke’s time
and thought might have responded to his words, Fraser provides the relevant theological argot. See esp.
his footnotes to sections §4, 20, 49, 57, 74 (F-Essay I)

James Augustus St. John, British author and traveler (1795 – 1875)

Chapter: PREFACE by the EDITOR [Anon.?]. Accessed from http://oll.libertyfund.org/title/761/80702 on 2012-06-11 (with the quote continuing: “... and
what gave himself the least satisfaction, after all the pains he [Locke] and others took to reform it ... which
might induce one to believe that this most intricate subject is placed beyond human reach; since so
penetrating a genius confesses his inability to see through it.”).


whose value he questions in the “Epistle to the Reader”: “Clear and distinct Ideas are terms, which,
though familiar and frequent in Men’s Mouths, I have reason to think every one who uses, does not
perfectly understand. And possibly ‘tis but here and there one, who gives himself the trouble to consider
them so far as to know what he himself or others precisely mean by them; I have therefore in most places
chose to put determinate or determined, instead of clear and distinct, as more likely to direct Men’s
thoughts to my meaning in this matter. By those denominations, I mean some object in the Mind, and
consequently determined; i.e. such as it is there seen and perceived to be. This, I think, may fitly be
called a determinate or determin’d idea, when such as it is at any time objectively in the Mind, and so
dermined there, it is annex’d, and without variation determined to a name or articulate sound, which is
to be steadily the sign of that very same object of the Mind, or determinate Idea.” (N-Essay, pp. 12-13).

And Collins will demonstrate this in his “Philosophical Inquiry Concerning Human Liberty.”

The next chapter of any size is the one called “Of the Names of Substances” (III.6), coming in at 33
pages with 51 sections.
"That the Will or Preference, is determined by something without itself: Let us see then what it is
determined by. If willing be but the better being pleased, as has been shown, it is easie to know what 'tis
determines the Will, what 'tis pleases best: everyone knows 'tis Happiness, or that which makes any part
of Happiness, or contributes to it; and that is it we call Good ... Happiness then is the utmost Pleasure we
are capable of, and Misery the utmost Pain ... therefore what has an aptness to produce pleasure in us is
that we labour for, and is that we call Good; and what is apt to produce pain in us, we avoid and call Evil,
for no other reason, but its aptness to produce Pleasure and Pain in us, wherein consists our happiness
our misery ... Good, then, the greater good, is that which determines the will." §29; Essay 1690 (1st
dition).

Inferred in §2, all editions ("Whether matter be not wholly destitute of active Power, as its Author GOD
is truly above all passive power; and whether the intermediate state of created Spirits be not that alone
which is capable of both active and passive Power, may be worth consideration ..."); also, as noted in an
earlier version of the Essay -- that is, what is known as “Draft A,” (1671): "... [E]ven the best notions or
Idea we can have of god is but attributing the same simple Ideas of thinkeing knowing willing existence
without beginning, power of motion, and all those powers [fn: “i.e., power to make power to move and
power to make thinke”] and operations we finde in our selves, and conceive to have more perfection in
them then would be in their absence, to him in an higher and unlimited degree, and though we are told
that there are different degrees and species of angels and spirits, yet we know not how to frame destinct
specific Ideas of them, not out of any conceit that the existence of more species then one of spirits is
impossible, but because haveing noe more simple Ideas (nor being able to frame more) aplicable to such
beings, but only some few operations of our owne minds, or souls, or what ever you will call it, we can
noe otherwise destinguish in our conceptions the severall species of spirits one from another but by
attributing those operations and powers we finde in our selves to them in a higher or lower degree.” §2,
pp. 9-10 (much of this section later became part of his “Degrees of Ascent” in Essay IV.xvi.12). (Imago
Dei??) See also my fn #83.

See F-Essay, p. 376, 1st Ed., §31 (this claim remains throughout the editions in §49). See also my fn
#85


see F-Essay I note to §63 p. 356 about “GTGG” (or “and always pursue the greatest apparent good”)
only appearing in First edition.

"...[T]he motive, for continuing in the same State or Action, is only the present satisfaction in it; The
motive to change, is always some uneasiness; nothing setting us upon the change of State, or upon any
new Action, but some uneasiness. This is the great motive that works on the Mind to put it upon Action,
which for shortness sake we will call determining of the Will ..." (the “revised” §29 [1694]). To which Fraser
adds: "Then the so-called ‘agent’ is himself, in each particular ‘act’ of willing, ultimately the passive subject
of a natural necessity consequent upon ‘uneasiness,’ he is merged in nature, and is not the agent of the
action that is nominally his. A motive thus is the physical cause of a volition. The supposed ‘freedom’ of
man is only the freedom of external nature: whatever that may be." (F-Essay, p. 331)
§47: “There being in us a great many uneasinesses always soliciting and ready to determine the will, it is natural, as I have said, that the greatest and most pressing should determine the will to the next action; and so it does for the most part, but not always. For the mind having in most cases, as is evident in Experience, a power to suspend the execution and satisfaction of any of its desires, and so all, one after another; is at liberty to consider the objects of them, examine them on all sides, and weigh them with others. In this lies the liberty Man has; and from the not using of it right comes all that variety of mistakes, errors, and faults which we run into in the conduct of our lives, and our endeavours after happiness; whilst we precipitate the determination of our wills, and engage too soon before due Examination. To prevent this, we have a power to suspend the prosecution of this or that desire, as every one daily may experiment in himself. This seems to me the source of all liberty; in this seems to consist that which is (as I think improperly) called Free will. For during this suspension of any desire, before the will be determined to action, and the action (which follows that determination) done, we have opportunity to examine, view, and judge of the good or evil of what we are going to do; and when, upon due Examination, we have judg’d, we have done our duty, all that we can or ought to do in pursuit of our happiness; and ‘tis not a fault, but a perfection of our nature to desire, will, and act according to the last result of a fair Examination.” (§47) N-Essay, 263-4. See also §§ 50, 51, 52, 56, 71. See also Fraser’s “pushback” footnote to this in F-Essay, p. 345 (as I note in my fn #280), as well as in my Chapters 7 and 8 in general.

45 sections saying the Will is determined: §§ 25, 30, 35, 38, 39, 43, 44, 47, 48, 49, 50, 52, 56, 68, 71 (also noted at my fn #118).

46 See my fn #280.

47 the Essay’s fifth edition of 1706

48 insertion by Locke’s French translator Pierre Coste (not in previous editions): “These things duly weigh’d, will give us, as I think, a clear view into the state of human Liberty. Liberty, ’tis plain, consists in a Power to do, or not to do; to do, or forbear doing, as we will. This cannot be deny’d. But this seeming to comprehend only the actions of a Man consecutive to volition, it is farther inquired, “whether he be at Liberty to will, or no.” And to this it has been answered, that in most cases a Man is not at Liberty to forbear the act of volition: he must exert an act of his will, whereby the action proposed is made to exist, or not to exist. But yet there is a case wherein a Man is at Liberty in respect of willing, and that is, the choosing of a remote Good, as an end to be pursued. Here a Man may suspect the act of his choice from being determined for or against the thing proposed, till he has examined whether it be really of a nature in itself and consequences to make him happy, or no ... If the neglect, or abuse, of the Liberty he had, to examine what would really and truly make for his Happiness, misleads him, the miscarriages that follow on it must be imputed to his own election. He had a Power to suspend his determination: it was given him, that he might examine, and take care of his own Happiness, and look that he were not deceived. And he could never judge, that it was better to be deceived than not, in a matter of so great and near concernment.” (§56; N-Essay, pp. 270-1.)

49 Or so is this last edition version of §56 interpreted now. See my Chapter VIII.

50 In Kantian terms, how was Locke now able to explain and reconcile both the relentless determinism of nature and the spontaneous “first cause” causal property of freedom? Kant said they couldn’t both be understood epistemically in the same moment from the same location in the same way. [Antinomy #3, Critique of Pure Reason]

51 i.e., is it offering the will the space (or “grace”?) to intervene in the understanding’s last judgement -- a rare moment of “freedom” being smuggled in for Locke’s otherwise determined will? or is it merely a Hobbsian-like period of time when an agent imaginatively runs through different narratives but ends up choosing the one he would always and inevitably have chosen -- the one that most immediately satisfied the desire at hand?
Previously Locke had consistently held to his claim that the last judgement of the understanding was the sole determiner of what the will was to do, and that the will had no voice of its own in the matter. In fact, in this passage of his “Epistle to the Reader” (which ostensibly was written for the last edition of the Essay that was published while he was alive? See my discussion of this in my Chapters 7 “The Circumstantial Thesis” and XII (B) “The Coste Component -- Timeline”), Locke says his “Bookseller” desired Locke to let it be known of the “alterations I have made in Book 2. Chap. 21” that “What I had there Writ concerning Liberty and the Will, I thought deserv’d as accurate a review, as I was capable of: Those Subjects having in all Ages exercised the learned part of the World, with Questions and Difficulties, that have not a little perplex’d Morality and Divinity, those parts of Knowledge, that Men are most concern’d to be clear in. Upon a closer inspection into the working of Men’s Minds, and a stricter examination of those motives and views, they are turn’d by, I have found reason somewhat to alter the thoughts I formerly had concerning that, which gives the last determination to the Will in all voluntary actions. This I cannot forbear to acknowledge to the World, with as much freedom and readiness, as I at first published, what then seem’d to me to be right, thinking my self more concern’d to quit and renounce any Opinion of my own, than oppose that of another, when Truth appears against it. For ‘tis Truth alone I seek, and that will always be welcome to me, when or from whencesoever it comes...” (Essay 1975, p. 11).

Locke actually goes through a list of actions we perform that contain a variety of motivators and non-motivators that don’t seem responsive to our aiming for “the good” (mostly things we do because of some “pain of the body” or “disquiet of the mind” [§31], rather than when we’re enjoying some “perfect contentment” with the state we’re in [§35]). And note how Locke wants to answer the “weakness of the will” problem without drawing from reference to a Biblical “originality,” for example; also interesting is how Locke tries to separate out those actions he calls “voluntary” and “involuntary”/reflexive from actions that he considers “free”: see §8 (“[S]o far as a man has a power to think, or not to think; to move, or not to move, according to the preference or direction of his own mind, so far is a Man **Free**. Wherever any performance or forbearance are not equally in a Man’s power; where-ever doing or not doing, will not equally follow upon the preference of his mind, there he is not **Free**, though perhaps the Action may be voluntary.” (does “Weakness of Will” ref. come in letter to Molyneux? / “depravity” does)

Note: my claim will not be that Locke’s empiricism was more correlated with the actuality of the world than what the rationalists provided from abstract theory. Nor will I take a position on whether a motivational state like “uneasiness” that causes one to act indeed constitutes a determined act and not a free act, which is what Locke seems to believe. **My claim is that Locke’s deployment of empirical language like “uneasiness” helped privilege the human experience we think we know over the divine experience we can only speculate about.**

I’m relying here on Leo F. Solt’s highly informative article, “Puritanism, Capitalism, Democracy, and the New Science,” The American Historical Review, 73, pp. 18-29.

to Limborch

See Fraser fn#5 (F-Essay, p. 326), upon which Fraser had commented, “The argument supposes that ‘freedom of will’ means determination of volitions by previous volitions, as part of the mechanism of nature, instead of independence of that mechanism altogether; and this on the ground that no events, volitions included, can come to pass, without a previous physical or caused cause of their occurrence.” [Essay, 1700]

While I concede that Locke left us with three indications that he’d be making some changes to his next [and what would be the posthumous] edition of the Essay, none of them quite explain the gap I illustrate here, and for which I submit an alternate narrative (my Chapter VIII). The first set of indications Locke makes comes in a letter Locke writes to Limborch on August 12, 1701, where Locke says he wants to clarify what he means by “indifferencey” (Locke to Limborch: Correspondence VII, pp. 412-414 [#7 #2979]). The second set of indications comes in a letter Locke writes to Limborch on Nov. 19, 1701, where Locke says he’d be “inserting here and there in chapter xxi some explications by which I may make my meaning clearer where it is set down perhaps rather negligently or obscurely, so that it may in future be plain to the reader, even if, as happens, he is in a hurry, provided that he does not disdain keeping in mind what has been set down. I hope that you will be fully satisfied when you have read them through heedfully and have compared them with the rest of what I have set forth in that chapter ...” (Locke to Limborch: Correspondence VII, pp. 504-5 [#9 #3043]; see also my fn #252 and 310). The third set of “indications” comes in a reference Locke makes in his will (“Whereas there is intended speedily another Edition of my Essay concerning Humane Understanding wherein there will in the 31 Chapter of the second book be some small alterations which I have made with my own hand ...” Correspondence VIII, 426).

Of the first set of indications I have no problem; I acknowledge that its provenance from listing to appearance is clear, and that the passage it cites actually appears in the text as proffered. Of the second and third set of indications, however, I do have problems. In that Nov. 19 letter to Limborch, for example, we do not see Locke’s rendition of any of the “explications” he is supposedly about to insert in the letter itself. Though other Locke scholars don’t seem to worry whether the changes we do see in the fifth edition do in fact contain the clarifications of which he is informing Limborch (Matthew Stuart admits there’s a worrying gap but says the draft notes of the changes must simply have been lost: Locke’s Metaphysics, 488; see also my fn #252), this break in the chain of evidence remains puzzling to me, since (1) what is new in the fifth edition seems at odds with the direction into which Locke’s correspondence with Limborch was otherwise heading (as I explain in my Chapters 6 and 7), and (2) what those other Locke scholars always use as their secondary backup -- the reference in Locke’s will -- actually refers to a chapter “31” and not a “21” (the “Of Power” chapter being numbered the latter). And as yet, no “correction” has been made to what one would think is an important chapter number discrepancy (if it actually is indeed a discrepancy).

Hence, though Occam’s Razor might warn me to be parsimonious and not go out of my way to find a complicated explanation to the fifth edition shifts if a simple (albeit evidentially-inadequate) one might be more likely, I do want to advance my own alternative and admittedly circumstantial narrative, which I do in my Chapter VIII.

as opposed to (or in correspondence with) divine freedom

particularly those of “suspension” and “indifference”
Among the more notable contemporary antagonists of Locke being the little-discussed antagonist William King, who intrudes himself into the very beginning of the Lockean narrative and continues his antagonist relationship not only with Locke, but also with Collins and some other surprising thinkers of the time (Toland, Leibniz, Clarke and Berkeley) long after Locke dies. King’s notions of both analogical predication and the “liberty of indifference” principle emphasize the “God as explanation” framework, and may have been what led Locke to adopt positions we today tend to see as awkward or puzzling. Interestingly, the “liberty of indifference” principle will find new life when Peter Schouls recapitulates it in a more secularized form in his *Reasoned Freedom: John Locke and Enlightenment* (1992). [Oddly enough, King and Locke ally Molyneux were great buddies, sharing similar dreams about the fate of Irish independence (7)]

Fraser himself credits Collins with improving on Locke in his footnote for section §74 (F-Essay, p. 370), saying that “The idea of human liberty which makes mechanical necessity the complete intellectual system of the universe, implied on the whole in Locke’s reasoning, was carried more luminously to its conclusion by his friend Anthony Collins in his *Philosophical Inquiry concerning Human Liberty.*”

which, for the most part, comprises in full the text we use today

Collins in fact points this out in an anonymous letter now attributed to him which warns a publisher about to print an obituary on Locke written by Coste that its overstated ravishments belie Coste’s own reported post-death remarks about Locke (see opening of my Chapter VIII).

And apparently accepted without reservation by the likes of Peter Schouls, Stephen Darwall, etc.

as opposed to (or in correspondence with) divine freedom

Locke instead seemed to prefer the company of the more elite members of British/Continental society, who by definition would be expressing some sort of public theism.

in his *Two Treatises on Government.* However, though positing this caring but abstracted “force from a distance” might have saved Locke’s governing plan from the clutches of an Adam-deriving Sir Robert Filmer, it only pushed the problem further down the road when it came to defending human reason as the only legitimate resource for political debate.

and -- as alluded to earlier -- for which hangs much irony, given that Locke in this period is devoting much time in debates over the merits of abstract Scholastic reasoning vs. those of probabilistic induction in cases of new knowledge.

See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Imagio_dei

So as not to appear anachronistic, from now on, I will ascribe a male configuration for God when speaking in the context of Locke’s time.

in which some regulative laws of governance in nature might be perceived, but not going so far as being valid to a claim of their being eternal and immutable, and reliant on a greater and more powerful supernatural being.

whose existence, according to Berman, many theists paradoxically believed was both logically impossible and a threat nevertheless; See also Berman's reference to Schopenhauer’s comment in A History of Atheism in Britain (p. 27): “Until the time of Kant, there was a dilemma between materialism and theism, in other words, between the assumption that blind chance, or an intelligence arranging from without according to purposes and concepts, had brought about the world, neque dabatur tertium. Therefore, atheism and materialism were the same thing: hence the doubt whether there could in fact be an atheist, in other words, a person who really could attribute to blind chance an arrangement of nature, especially of organic nature, which is immense, inexhaustible, and appropriate.” (from the Appendix of Schopenhauer’s World as Will and Representation (1819). Berman, however, doubts whether no one until Kant was able to square materialism properly.


Stephen notes that Archbishop William King, in his Sermon on Predestination, was wary that we could give ascriptions of wisdom and foreknowledge to God only 'by way of resemblance and analogy.’” More comfortable using metaphors instead, King said regarding God that to reason upon his attributes might be to ‘extend the parallel further than that very instance which the resemblance was designed to teach us,’ and was to fall into such errors as would beset a man who inferred from the resemblance between a map and a country that the country was really made of paper” (History of English Thought, vol. I, pp. 114-5). Peter Browne’s 1733 Things Supernatural and Divine Conceived by Analogy with Things Natural and Human extends this idea and in fact attacks King for his preference to use metaphor, worried as Browne was (according to Stephen) that a metaphor, being a literary flight of fancy at its heart, did less work in ascribing some sort of proportional similarity of God to man and therefore was less able to guarantee man’s automatic surrender to the will of God (Stephen, pp. 113, 116). On the other hand, Joseph Butler expressed no compunction whatsoever in using such a metaphorical system for his Analogy of religion treatise, wherein his “proofs” conveniently consisted of declaring that the temporal world was either (1) perfectly organized and “good” -- thus lending credence to the likelihood that there naturally must be something even more perfectly organized and good beyond our full knowledge about it presently (Butler, pp. 57-90) or (2) confused and perplexingly imperfect (being seemingly evil as well as virtuous) -- thus lending credence to the likelihood that since we often find the present world we occupy to be at times mysterious and unexplained, why should we expect that a world beyond our ken would be suddenly comprehensible and explainable? (Butler, pp. 179-96)

See §2 of “Draft ‘A,’” where Locke writes “[A]fter the same maner the minde haveing noe Ideas from without but material ones and none from within but of its owne operations which may belong to spirit it hath nor can have noe other notion of spirit but by attributeing all those operations it findes in its self to such beings without consideration of matter, and even the best notions or Idea we can have of god is but attributing the same simple Ideas of thinkeing knowing willing existence without begining, power of motion, and all those powers [i.e., power to make power to move and power to make thinke] and operations we finde in our selves, and conceive to have more perfection in them then would be in their absence, to him in an higher and unlimited degree, and though we are told that there are different degrees and species of angels and spirits, yet we know not how to frame destinct specific Ideas of them, not out of any conceit that the existence of more species then one of spirits is impossible, but because having noe more simple Ideas (nor being able to frame more) applicable to such beings, but only some few operations of our owne minds, or souls, or what ever you will call it, we can noe otherwise destinguish in our conceptions the severall species of spirits one from another but by attributing those operations and powers we finde in our selves to them in a higher or lower degree.” (Early Essay, pp. 9-10). Note this was all only one sentence!
§31, 1st edition (F-Essay, p. 376): "... [W]hat has an aptness to produce pleasure in us is that we labour for, and is that we call Good; and what is apt to produce pain in us, we avoid and call Evil; ... For the cause of every less degree of pain, as well as every greater degree of pleasure, has the nature of good, and vice versa, and is that which determines our choice and challenges our preference. Good, then, the greater good, is that which determines the will."

§31, 1st edition (F-Essay, p. 376): "... [I]f it were fit for such poor finite creatures as we are, to pronounce what infinite wisdom and goodness could do, I think we might say that God himself cannot choose what is not good: the freedom of the Almighty hinders not his being determined by what is best." See also my fn #40.

(though I maintain that given Locke’s epistemological psychology, such a libertarianism was never in the cards for Locke: he’d be a determinist to the end)
Locke’s argument being that, given the “omnipotence and omniscience” of God being what Locke will also say in §2 of II.xxi is “the clearest idea of [“God our maker’s”] active powers,” it would have to be “possible for God to make a free agent”; hence “man [would likely be] free.”

Fraser notes this disjunction in his footnote to §8, which, along with the comments to Molyneux that I used, adds his own view: “The idea of ‘power,’ as suggested by voluntary activity, is the subject of the remaining sections of this chapter, with which Locke himself was still dissatisfied, even after the many changes which they underwent in successive editions. This appears in his correspondence with Molyneux. The difficulty of reconciling free power to will, in a finite agent, with the supremacy of Divine power and perfection of Divine knowledge, was obvious to him ... [Fraser then provides Locke’s comment to Molyneux, and continues:] ... The reasoning in this chapter presupposes that volitions follow motives in a natural sequence, not recognising that their supernatural character of a volition is implied in the accountability of the agent. The ultimate relation of the mechanism of nature itself, by which they are thus supposed to be determined, to the ‘omnipotence and omniscience of God’ is not contemplated; nor is the answer to the question raised about the will seen to be the turning point between philosophical materialism and a spiritual philosophy.” (F-Essay, p. 316). And Peter Schouls, too, who unlike me defends a libertarian view of Locke’s position, agrees such a view will have to rest on Locke’s “intuitionism” and not access to a demonstrative argument: “It is experience rather than demonstrative argument which is to acquaint us with this unconditioned freedom. Indeed, demonstrative argument would persuade us otherwise. Like Descartes, Locke cannot see a way to reconcile this human freedom with divine omnipotence and conscience... [Schouls recites in a footnote Principles I, 41 and a 3 Nov 1645 letter Descartes writes to Elizabeth] ... Given the existence of God, demonstrative arguments would rule out human freedom ... Locke accepts both divine omnipotence and omniscience, and human freedom. In this instance he sets limits to the power of demonstration.” (Schouls, Reasoned Freedom, p. 153).

in his judgement, at least, following from what he says in the letter to Molyneux.

It also, I suggest, foreshadows a coming challenge to the notion that human freedom is actually worth having, at least in the terms heretofore generated for it.

Is this also why in II.xxi.28 Locke switched from “things” to “actions” in the 2nd edition? (“things” = “GTGG”; “uneasiness” = “actions”). See Locke’s comment regarding this in II.xxi.71.

Hobbes vs. Cudworth being most immediate to Locke’s moment, but see also paired disputes between Augustine/Pelagius, Luther/Erasmus, Calvin/Sadoletto, Hobbes/Bramhall, Whitfield/Wesley & even Locke/Limborch -- all having to do with Calvinist/Anglican/RCatholic differences regarding availability of free will.

Hobbes being the philosopher from whose thinking Locke’s enemies most associated him with (Locke often even baiting them into doing so as well -- see my fn #428 regarding “Mr. Locke’s Reply to the Right Reverend the Lord Bishop of Worcester’s Answer to His Second Letter” and “Remarks Upon Some of Mr. Norris’s Books”), and Cudworth being father to Damaris Masham (of whom Locke had a very close -- and at one point “romantic” -- relationship, and in whose household Locke would spend most of his final years until his death in 1704).

That is, A:B::C:D, whereby A and C are generally subject or agent terms, and B and D are predicate terms.

Determinism being the primary fulcrum for both Calvinist-derived theological traditions (like Presbyterians, Congregationalists, and Baptists), and nature-derived speculative traditions (like science and astrology).
Modern day skeptics and atheists like Shelly Kagan, Michael Martin, and William Rowe have tried to claim human freedom can exist without a knowledge of [a] God, and that those otherwise obligatory and universal moral truths normally attached to a God and within which human freedom is exhibited do not disappear with His (or Her or Its) "absence." Their success has been hampered, however, by a failure to agree on an alternate narrative and a consensus on the conditions required to support it. This is not to say that theists have been unified themselves in the delivery of narratives and conditions. They’ve just enjoyed a longer stretch of time during which sufficient carrots and sticks have made their accounts’ appeals much more “persuasive” to a folk public. Most of these free will advocates -- what might be called “libertarian incompatibilists” -- are also Christian confessants, like William Craig, Alvin Plantinga, Peter Inwagen, Richard Swinburne (?), Roger Scruton (?), Aloysius Martinich.

See Leibniz’s breakdown of the two positions from “Reflections on the Common Concept of Justice” (Philosophical Papers, pp. 561-573), where he says: “It is generally agreed that whatever God wills is good and just. But there remains the question whether it is good and just because God wills it or whether God wills it because it is good and just; in other words, whether justice and goodness are arbitrary or whether they belong to the necessary and eternal truths about the nature of things, as do numbers and proportions. The former opinion has been held by certain philosophers and by theologians, both Roman and Reformed. But the Reformed theologians of today usually reject this teaching, as do also all our own theologians and most of those of the Roman church as well. ¶ As a matter of fact it would destroy the justice of God. For why praise him for acting justly if the concept of justice adds nothing to his act? And to say, Stat pro ratione voluntas -- ‘let my will stand for the reason’ -- is definitely the motto of a tyrant. Moreover, this opinion would hardly distinguish God from the devil. For if the devil, that is, an intelligent, invisible power who is very great and very evil, were the master of the world, this devil or this god would still be evil even if we were forced to honor him, just as certain peoples honor imaginary gods of this kind in the hope of bringing them to do less evil. Consequently, some people, overly devoted to the absolute right of God, have believed that he could justly condemn innocent people and even that this may actually happen. This does violence to those attributes which make God love-worthy and destroys our love for God, leaving only fear ...” (Philosophical Papers, p. 561). Yet while Leibniz is favoring the intellectualist view here, note editor Loemke’s comment following the piece about the earlier voluntarist view Leibniz held in 1666 (Philosophical Papers, p. 573). We also see Leibniz carry the metaphysical argument forward in his arguments with Clarke over Newton’s positions regarding absolute vs. relative space and whether God needed or chose to intervene post-creation (Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence).

In Euthyphro language, “X” is “of a nature to be loved because it is loved” (11a5). Thus God designates what is good; good is established by God; God determines the good willfully. This is seen as God’s doing this voluntarily. Generally, Calvinist and Reformed religious traditions (along with many of those associated with Islam) find this orientation more useful for their doctrines.

That is, “X” is “loved because it is of a nature to be loved” (11a6). God is thus governed by the good, and is viewed as being unable to determine the good based on his own willfulness -- good exists outside God, and God must conform to it. Generally, Roman Catholic, Arminian, and more lauditudinarian Anglican traditions find this orientation more useful for their doctrines.

Hobbes felt the term “free will” gave illegitimate agency to a mere human faculty, as if it were a separate human agent unto itself (Leviathan Part I, Ch. 5: p. 113). Locke would share this view.

Why the absolute sovereign is needed even for civil authority, to set that positive law it chooses and enforce it vigorously to maintain peace.

Leviathan, Part II, Ch. 21: p. 263.

Some scholars now claim that Hobbes’ notion of free will -- or lack thereof -- was more tied to his political agenda than to any intentional desire of his to destroy God and religion (and so one might wonder how deeply Hobbes believed in free will’s dubiousness, beyond his objection to its being a misnomer). See Mintz,, The Hunting of Leviathan, p. 135, 143.
In this way, Hobbes's view paralleled Calvin's. A central doctrine of Calvinism was predestination, which held that it was God alone who "freely and unchangeably ordained whatsoever comes to pass" because man's will was in bondage to sin and thus unable to actualize a true freedom for itself (from the Westminster Confession of Faith).

Hobbes’s having it ignore the Aristotelean framework that the later Scholastics had so carefully constructed to justify their claims of God's guidance in all things.

who can and does exclude from his kingdom of heaven even those who seemed to be the most “deserving” of his flock on earth if he so chooses.

See especially Cudworth’s first few hundred pages in his True Intellectual System of the Universe (to which Newton expresses some quibble. Note his objections in the early 1680s to some of Cudworth’s philosophical conclusions in his brief transcriptions from the Cambridge Platonist’s works ["Out of Cudworth," The Newton Project <http://www.newtonproject.sussex.ac.uk/view/texts/normalized/ THEM00118>]).

Cudworth found it equivalent to the cruel capriciousness of Calvinism, which had offered only a God which exercised enormous power over us while making up his own mysterious rules based on nothing but sheer willfulness.

Ch. xiv: p. 185-7.

See Stephen’s History of English Thought re discussions about “analogy” and “metaphor” in terms of the “good” during this time (III.21,22,24: pp. 93-119).

“Good, then, the greater good is that alone which determines the will.” See N-Essay, p. 251, fn for §29; F-Essay, p. 376, also notes that it is in §29 in 1st edition.

§2, all editions; also, as derived from Locke’s letter to Molyneux in 30 Jan 1693 (Correspondence IV, pp. 623-8 [#1592]). (Imagio Dei??)

See F-Essay, p. 376,1st Ed., §31 (this claim remains throughout the editions in §49).

See Fraser note to §63 p. 356 about “GTGG’s” only appearing in the First edition (F-Essay).

The uneasiness was to account for Locke’s worry that he’d neglected to address man’s “weakness of will” in LF1 -- that is, why we would not choose the greater good, but instead choose what we only perceive as the good in front of us at the moment.

N-Essay, p. 253. See also §§ 29, 31-40, 43-7, 53-6, 57, 59, 60, 62, 64-5, 71. (Interestingly, Prof. Dauben points out how Locke’s language focusing on uneasiness’s being “a change of state” bears some resemblance to Newton’s discussion regarding whether or not he saw gravity as an inherent quality or innate property of matter. Dauben refers us the archival history provided by Cajori in his appendix to the Principia which established how Newton, after being somewhat misinterpreted during his interactions with Boyle, Bentley and Cotes, felt the need to correct matters regarding his gravitational claims in a newly added General Scholium for the Principia’s second and third editions. Rather than being left vulnerable to accusations that Newton had needed occult or preternatural forces to initiate such “action from a distance,” Newton came to recognize the advantage of remaining “agnostic” over what it was that might cause one body’s being attracted to another body [though it might be concluded that Newton did have an “intelligent designer” in mind to explain it]. Cajori, Principia, 632-4)

Sections saying the Will is determined: §§ 25, 30, 35, 38, 39, 43, 44, 47, 48, 49, 50, 52, 56, 68, 71 (also noted at my fn #45).
There being in us a great many uneasinesses always soliciting, and ready to determine the will, it is natural, as I have said, that the greatest and most pressing should determine the will to the next action; and so it does for the most part, but not always. For the mind having in most cases, as is evident in experience, a power to suspend the execution and satisfaction of any of its desires, and so all, one after another; is at liberty to consider the objects of them, examine them on all sides, and weigh them with others. In this lies the liberty man has; and from the not using of it right comes all that variety of mistakes, errors, and faults which we run into in the conduct of our lives, and our endeavours after happiness; whilst we precipitate the determination of our wills, and engage too soon before due examination. To prevent this, we have a power to suspend the prosecution of this or that desire, as every one daily may experiment in himself. This seems to me the source of all liberty; in this seems to consist that which is (as I think improperly) called free-will. For during this suspension of any desire, before the will be determined to action, and the action (which follows that determination) done, we have opportunity to examine, view, and judge of the good or evil of what we are going to do; and when, upon due examination, we have judged, we have done our duty, all that we can or ought to do in pursuit of our happiness; and it is not a fault, but a perfection of our nature to desire, will, and act according to the last result of a fair examination."

Section §47 is one of Locke's most confusing passages, since the suspension mechanism seems at first to tease out a possible dalliance with free will, but closes with a slight tilt more in line with Locke's earlier conditions for determinism (meaning, without directly saying as much, that there remains the distant and inconclusive pull of determining passions like uneasiness); which is then immediately followed by what is nothing less than a rant concerning the notion of "indifferencey" in §48:

§48: "This [?] is so far from being a restraint or diminution of freedom, that it is the very improvement and benefit of it: it is not an abridgment, it is the end and use of our liberty; and the farther we are removed from such a determination, the nearer we are to misery and slavery. A perfect indifferency in the mind, not determinable by its last judgement of the good or evil that is thought to attend its choice, would be so far from being an advantage and excellency of any intellectual nature, that it would be as great an imperfection, as the want of indifferency to act or not to act till determined by the will, would be an imperfection on the other side. A man is at liberty to lift up his hand to his head, or let it rest quiet; he is perfectly indifferent in either; and it would be an imperfection in him, if he wanted that power, if he were deprived of that indifferency. But it would be as great an imperfection if he had the same indifferency, whether he would prefer the lifting up his hand, or its remaining in rest, when it would save his head or eyes from a blow he sees coming: it is as much a perfection, that desire, or the power of preferring, should be determined by good, as that the power of acting should be determined by the will; and the certainer such determination is, the greater is the perfection. Nay, were we determined by any thing but the last result of our own minds, judging of the good or evil of any action, we were not free: the very end of our freedom being, that we may attain the good we choose. And therefore every man is put under a necessity by its constitution, as an intelligent being, to be determined in willing by his own thought and judgement what is best for him to do: else he would be under the determination of some other than himself, which is want of liberty. And to deny that a man's will, in every determination, follows his own judgement, is to say, that a man wills and acts for an end that he would not have, at the time that he wills and acts for it. For if he prefers it in his present thoughts before any other, it is plain he then thinks better of it, and would have it before any other; unless he can have and not have it, will and not will it, at the same time; a contradiction too manifest to be admitted!"

Though see my fn #44, 46 and 280 regarding Frazer's footnoted comments of Locke's "free will" claims of N-Essay §47; F-Essay §48, p. 345: [fn1].

i.e., Analogical Predication

I.e., (1) God can not act other than according to GTGG, and (2) man can not act other than according to his uneasiness (determinism meaning "cannot act other than "X").

The question is what exactly Locke imagines his suspension mechanism entails. Is it something of a "sacred space" Locke’s carved out wherein one’s psychic causal mechanisms can be interrupted and perhaps redirected away from where they’d been headed moments earlier? Or is it just a most narrow eyehole gateway to the judgement, through which only the most fluid and persistent uneasiness is able to penetrate?
126 See also Borst paper noting Leibniz’s attracting the same accusation (i.e., of problems with “God and man are free” formula): “Leibniz And the Compatibilist Account of Free Will,” Studia Leibnitiana, p. 51.

127 For more references to “uneasiness” and its relationship to pleasure and pain, see Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy “Notes to ‘Pleasure’” (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pleasure/notes.html), esp. fn#3, where Katz calls Locke’s uneasiness “pleasure’s equally conceptually evil twin.”

128 G.A.J. Rogers states it well: “The state of ‘mediocrity’ -- a word Locke often uses -- in which we find ourselves was for him central to the human condition, and with it came a very clear view about the fallibility of the human intellect” (“The Intellectual Setting and Aims of the Essay,” The Cambridge Companion to Locke’s ‘Essay Concerning Human Understanding,’ p. 14.

129 Though others would do it for him as a form of ridicule: See Isaac Watts’ critique of Locke’s analogical predication re “uneasiness” on the same grounds I’m arguing. Watts’ calls “uneasiness” an “evil” that should never be associated with the character of God, unless Locke wanted to take on the role of a heretic. Watts’s focus on Locke’s “Of Power” chapter comes in his 1753 “An Essay on the freedom of will in God and in Creatures; Of liberty and necessity, and how far they are confident”: “Is it uneasiness that determines the blessed God, and all the holy and happy spirits in heaven, to do what they do? Would it not have a profane sound to say, that present uneasiness determined God to make beasts and men, birds and flowers, to create a heaven and an earth? Can we believe that present uneasiness determines every angel to chuse [sic] and love God the chief good, or to will the several actions wherein he obeys his maker, and executes his orders? Or that it is some present uneasiness that causes the saints in heaven to perform their several acts of duty and adoration, or to will their continuance in the service and enjoyment of God?” (Watts, “Discourses, Essays and Tracts on Various Subjects,” from “Works Published by Himself”: Vol. 6, pp. 375-84).

130 See “Of Power” §63.

131 See “Of Power” §70.

132 Wolterstoff offers one deductive formulation of God’s constitution here: “The propositional content of an emotion along with one’s negative or positive evaluation of that content, plays a central role in the identification of an emotion. But it is not the whole of the emotion. There is no emotion unless the belief and evaluation cause a physiological disturbance in the person (the sympathetic nervous system being central here), along with certain characteristic feelings which are, in part, awareness of one’s physiological disturbance. ... It is the appetitive component in emotions that accounts for the fact that emotions can function as motives for intentionally undertaken actions ... [I]t follows directly that God has no emotions: No grief, no anger, no fear, and so forth. For a person can have an emotion only if that person is capable of being physiologically upset. And God, having no physiology, is not so capable ...” (“Does God Suffer?” Questions About God, pp. 122-3).

133 See also http://blog.rbseminary.org/2009/02/there-is-no-pain-you-are-misreading-is-god-comfortably-numb/ ... And Locke seems to be ruling out divine possibility as well. See W. von Leyden intro for Locke’s Essays on the Law of Nature. [There may be something relating here vis-a-vis Locke’s and Masham’s long-time dispute with Malebranche and Norris against Occasionalism -- see Locke’s posthumous essay on Malebranche in “Remarks Upon some of Mr. Norris Books,” Works X, 247-259, and Masham’s book against Malebranche, Discourse Concerning the Love for God.]

134 the Essay’s fifth edition of 1706

135 insertion by Locke’s French translator Pierre Coste, upon Locke’s supposed instructions left before he died (see my fn #59).

136 Or so is this last edition version of §56 interpreted now. See my Chapters 7 and 8.
i.e., is it offering the will the space (or “grace”?) to intervene in the understanding’s last judgement -- a rare moment of “freedom” being smuggled in for Locke’s otherwise determined will? or is it merely a Hobbssian-like period of time when an agent imaginatively runs through different narratives but ends up choosing the one he would always and inevitably have chosen -- the one that most immediately satisfied the desire at hand? See also Hobbes on “delibration”: “[C]onsideration, understanding, reason, and all the passions of the mind, are imaginations. That to consider a thing is to imagine it; that to understand a thing is to imagine it; that to hope and fear are to imagine the things hoped for and feared. The difference between them is that when we imagine the consequence of anything, we are said to consider that thing; and when we have imagined anything from a sign, and especially from those signs we call names, we are said to understand his meaning that makes the sign; and when we reason, we imagine the consequence of affirmations and negations joined together; and when we hope or fear, we imagine things good or hurtful to ourselves: inasmuch as all these are but imaginations diversely named from different circumstances, as any man may perceive as easily as he can look into his own thoughts ... [T]here is no such thing as an ‘indefinite consideration of what are good and fit means’; but a man imagining first one thing, then another, considers them successively and singly each one, whether it conduces to his ends or not.” (Hobbes and Bramhall on Liberty and Necessity, §26(a), p. 81-2). See also Locke’s “Draft ‘A’” (§42(d/2, pp. 66-7).

Lennon, however, points out that Fénelon did maintain that this kind of analogy would hold -- i.e., that divine will and human will both existed and were both free (“Descartes and the Seven Senses of Indifference in Early Modern Philosophy,” Dialogue, p. 586).

In Kantian terms, how was Locke now able to explain and reconcile both the relentless determinism of nature and the spontaneous “first cause” causal property of freedom? Kant said they couldn’t both be understood epistemically in the same moment from the same location in the same way. [Antinomy #3]. Interestingly, Fraser says Kant and Locke both recognized the same antinomy, but derived opposite claims from its attributes: “... It is curious that Locke holds the existence of God to be within the sphere of our unconditionally certain knowledge, and that he excludes from that sphere the phenomena and laws of nature, as to which he says we can rise only to presumptions of probability, and that Kant on the contrary vindicates a pure à priori physics, and denies that the existence of God can be known by pure reason.” (IV.x.19 [F-Essay vol. II, p. 324, fn #1]).

Fraser at least seems to think it would take a “God” to make the case work at all, though Fraser’s footnote betrays his skepticism that this is what Locke is properly getting at: “If the connection between the ‘general desire of happiness,’ as a motive, and a voluntary determination to act, be as constant or ‘uniform’ as in a mechanical sequence, how can he [i.e., Locke] find the volition, its effect, ‘suspended,’ even for a time; unless man, in virtue of his accountability for his volitions, is mysteriously able to arrest them, by an act which originates in himself, supernaturally, i.e. independently of the mechanism of physical causality, with its not less mysterious outcome of an ‘infinite’ succession of dependent, or caused causes?” (F-Essay footnote for § 73, p. 367, fn1)

I do believe Locke’s “uneasiness” insertion prepares the ground for Hume’s more heralded shift over half a century later when the Scotsman made “sympathy” rather than God the true conduit for morality. See Herdt’s “The Rise of Sympathy and the Question of Divine Suffering,” The Journal of Religious Ethics.

142 11 Sept 1697; Correspondence VI, p. 191 [#2311].

143 27 Aug 1692: Correspondence IV, p. 508 [#1530].

that is, those philosophers more favorable to the abstract logic of the Scholastics and the Cambridge-Platonists

or those philosophers more favorable to the inductive nature of the “new science” (of whom Bacon is seen as the father, with the early natural philosophers/scientists such as Boyle and Gassendi being among its adherents) (For a discussion on whether Locke served as Newton’s philosophical “front man” – as he had often been accused of being – see Lisa Downing’s “Locke’s Newtonianism and Locke Newtonianism,” Perspectives on Science, pp. 285-310).
Molyneux is also the person to whom Locke confesses his initial reservations about the soundness of his “Of Power” chapter in the quote I used heading my Chapter II.

Though Locke had not always responded directly to his attackers by name -- both they and Locke went through periods when they wanted their ideas public but not their identities -- evidence that Locke was made aware of arguments against him came through in this correspondence with his “lookout man” Molyneux, who was now screening the landscape for Locke’s potential philosophical antagonists. Locke generally followed up on these notices from Molyneux by notes and marginalia of his own, some of which scholars are just beginning to track down. Locke’s views of Sergeant, for example, can be seen only in the margins of a recently-discovered copy of Sergeant's book *Solid Theory* (which Locke himself came to own via Molyneux), and to some extent in lesser-known books of Locke’s, such as his *On the Conduct of the Understanding and Some Thoughts on Education*. These “offline” documents evidently contain some of Locke’s response to many of the arguments made against Locke in public at this time -- albeit they understandably come to us in frustratingly disconnected and oblique ways.

which bear a remarkable likeness to Hobbes' determinative alternations of “appetite” and “fear” (see *Hobbes and Bramhall on Liberty and Necessity*, pp. 91-2).

as well as William King, Edward Stillingfleet, others

Wrote Molyneux to Locke first of Sergeant: """"You have already Answerd some of my impertinent inquiries in that Letter. you tell me therein, who J.S. is that writes against You. I do not now wonder at the Confusednes of his Notions, or that they should be unintelligible to me. I should have much more admired had they been otherwise. I expect nothing from Mr. Serjeant but what is abstruse in the highest degree""""; and then of Norris: """"...I look for nothing else from Mr. Norris; I thought that gentleman had enough on it, in his first attempt on your *Essay*; but he is so over-run with father Malebranche, and Plato, that it is in vain to endeavour to set him right, and I give him up as an inconvincible enemy."""" (4 Oct. 1697: *Correspondence* VI, pp.219-220 [#2324])

Although interestingly enough, Sergeant, like Locke, denied the notion of innate ideas -- or so Yolton claims (""""Locke’s Unpublished Marginal Replies to John Sergeant,"""" *Journal of the History of Ideas*, p. 543).

And also, according to Sergeant, had the additional benefit of helping one “win” in dispositions!! See *Marginalia in John Sergeant’s Solid Philosophy*, Digital Locke Project, pp. 368-9.

Locke claimed he was not inclined to regard “winning” such disputations a high priority as Sergeant apparently did. Or at least it was not a factor in Locke’s evaluation of maxims. See *Marginalia in John Sergeant’s Solid Philosophy*, Digital Locke Project, pp. 368-9.

Ironically the attacks now against the so-called “philosophers of science” (among whom Locke might have aligned himself) tends to come more from the modern-day scientific community itself, resulting in the recent efforts of such philosophers to defend their own reason for being at all -- see this apologetic to Stephen Hawking by Christopher Norris: [http://philosophynow.org/issues/82/Hawking_contra_Philosophy](http://philosophynow.org/issues/82/Hawking_contra_Philosophy)

Though Locke, along with Descartes, is often perceived as a man of the world trying to straddle both sides, according to Peter Anstey’s blog post “Locke’s Proof” at [https://blogs.otago.ac.nz/emxphi/2012/05/locke-proofs/](https://blogs.otago.ac.nz/emxphi/2012/05/locke-proofs/) More common is the view described in John Yolton’s article, “Locke’s Unpublished Marginal Replies to John Sergeant,” *Journal of the History of Ideas*, pp. 528-559, as well as in work by Wilbur Samuel Howell, the Digital Locke Project, Paul Schuurson, Brian Toomey, etc., which holds Locke to be an empiricist alone.

1691-1703; King eventually became Archbishop of Dublin from 1703-1723.

like Peter Schouls

And Greenberg seems to believe that King’s reference to the word “uneasiness” in his *De Origine Mali* show that King had to have been reading Locke’s subsequent *Essay* editions after his initial comments on the first edition, though Greenberg doubts King tracked very consciously Locke’s own evolution in thought (""""Leibniz on King: Freedom and the Project of the *Theodicy*,"""" *Studia Leibnitiana*, p. 213, fn #22n).
with Locke’s having written a thank you letter to Molyneux on 16 July 1692 for Molyneux’s flattering references to Locke’s *Essay* in the introduction of Molyneux’s own *Dioptria Nova* treatise (*Correspondence* IV [#1515]).

More would come later from King after 1702, when we see him engaged in various philosophical contretemps with the likes of Leibniz, Berkeley, Clarke and Collins.

To Molyneux, King writes, “Dear Sir / I have read most of your [i.e., Locke’s] book. I have as I usually do when I read any book of valu made some remarks on some part on it. I intended to go thro if time had permitted me. I have not had leisure to read them over or to make English of them where words were left out but I dare leave the perusal of any thing to you that I write tho never so imperfite therefore I have sent them with the humble service of Yours / W:D.” [sic] (Included in Molyneux’s Oct. 15, 1692 letter to Locke along with King’s actual notes -- *Correspondence* IV [#1544]). As for demands on his time, King’s own autobiography shows how by 1692 King’s hands were more than full trying to rebuild and restore the network of Anglican-Irish churches left in charred ruin (along with most of their Catholic counterparts) due to the destructive violence wrought in the religio/political wars preceding the victory of the Williamites in Ireland (*A Great Archbishop*, pp. 31-36).

“The whole 2d chapter seems to me a mere Jangle ... They that use the word innate ideas tell what they mean by them. ‘Tis hard they may not be allowed to make their own dictionary without a chap: written against them. It is no argument that there are no notions graven in the mind by nature antecedent to all sence because men do not immediately think of them any more than it is an argument that a philosopher never knew any thing in his life because he is hard to be awakened out of sleep.” (King to Molyneux: *Correspondence* IV, p. 534 [#1544])

“He seems to confound the observation of a principle with the use of its terms. but many use this principle in reasoning that the same thing cannot be and not be at the same time that never observed the terms. ... Notions may be said to be innate because God has so framed the nature of man and placed him in such circumstances that he cannot, without violence to his mind, reject or dissent from them or so much as miss them” (King to Molyneux: *Correspondence* IV, p. 534 [#1544])

“Seems a quarrel about words. Some actions bring so great inconveniencys on the actor that as soon as his reason begins to act he will certainly discover the inconveniency and se himself obliged to avoid it. Such actions, as have by nature these inconveniency so annexed to them, that we cannot tell when we first obser’ved it, may be said to be ill from nature. and the principle of avoiding them may be called an innate principle of morality, this may I confess be over ruled by a further consideration of some good that may be obtained by induring the evil immediately consequent to the action, but to argu from thence that this is not from an innate principle because it may be conquered is as good a conclusion as to say the stone doth not naturally tend down wards because a pully may raise it.” (King to Molyneux: *Correspondence* IV, p. 534 [#1544])

“he endeavours to shew us how he come to the Idea of immensity before he proves that we have any idea of it. All that continuall addition shews us, is that more may be added than we can adde and consequently that number is bigger than ou(r [page torn here, says editor] b)ut not that it is infinite.” (King to Molyneux: *Correspondence* IV, p. 536-7 [#1544])

“his objection against the idea of substance is very trifling. ‘Tis plain when I conceive (suppose) wax; that I can conceive it either hard or soft. n( [page torn here, says editor] con)ceive the same thing turned to flame or air and after resolved into dew. Then into honey and then into wax and yet there is something that still continues the same in it. now that, which continues still the same, is that I call the substance... The story therefore of the Indians supposing the earth supported by a elephant is very unphilosophically applied ...” (King to Molyneux: *Correspondence* IV, p. 537 [#1544])
That is, sections §§ 4, 6, 14, 16, 21, 23, 28, 29, 30 & 31 (1Ed*)

* The Essay edition King responded to was, as mentioned, the first edition (i.e.: 1E). In contrast, the Nidditch “Of Power” edition we read today has 73 sections, having been expanded from the second edition onwards. Fraser’s 1895 edition, on the other hand, had 75 sections, with Fraser’s having unaccountably divided §38 & §56 into two separate sections each.

with Locke saying that “if we will consider it attentively, Bodies, by our Senses, do not afford us so clear and distinct an Idea of active Power, as we have from reflection on the Operations of our Minds” (Nidditch, p. 235), and King giving as his own example how we mentally process gravity’s effect on a dropped bullet: “in as much as here there appears no agent this seems to suggest to the mind an active power of moving it self in a body.” (King to Molyneux: Correspondence IV, p. 539 [#1544])

Locke saying in §6(1Ed): “These Powers of the Mind, viz. of Perceiving and of Preferring, are usually called by another Name: and the ordinary way of Speaking, is, That the Understanding and Will are two Faculties of the mind; a word proper enough, if it be used as all Words should be, so as not to breed any confusion in Men’s Thoughts, by being supposed (as I suspect it has been) to stand for some real Beings in the Soul that performed those Actions of Understanding and Volition. For when we say the Will is the commanding and superior Faculty of the Soul: that it is, or is not free; that it determines the inferior Faculties; that it follows the Dictates of the Understanding, &c. though these, and the like Expressions, by those that carefully attend to their own Ideas, and conduct their Thoughts more by the evidence of Things, than the sound of Words, may be understood in a clear and distinct sense; Yet I suspect, I say, that this way of Speaking of Faculties has misled many into a confused Notion of so many distinct Agents in us, which had their several Provinces and Authorities, and did command, obey, and perform several Actions, as so many distinct Beings; which has been no small occasion of wrangling, obscurity, and uncertainty in Questions relating to them.” [N-Essay, p. 236-7]

King to Molyneux: Correspondence IV, p. 539 [#1544].

N-Essay, p. 240.

King to Molyneux: Correspondence, Vol. IV, p. 539-40 [#1544].

with Locke’s actually saying “the Will is nothing but one Power or Ability, and Freedom another Power or Ability: So that to ask, whether the Will has Freedom, is to ask, whether one Power has another Power, one Ability another Ability; a Question at first sight too grosly absurd to make a Dispute, or need an Answer.” N-Essay, p. 241.
(Fraser’s challenge: “[A]ccording to Locke’s argument, an agent may will when he has no ‘freedom’ to execute what he wills -- the only freedom here contemplated. But does not moral freedom mean the power of the voluntary agent to originate his own moral or immoral volitions, so that he is their absolutely ultimate cause?” F-Essay, p. 321)

King to Molyneux: Correspondence IV, p. 540 [#1544].

King to Molyneux: Correspondence IV, p. 540 [#1544].

See sections §§ 6, 14, 16, 21 & 22 (1Ed) of II.xxi. for references to Locke’s “‘free will’ is a misnomer” theme.

Such as Schouls, Darwall, Yaffe, Waldron, ...

i.e., the first

Here, the following words would not have been what King would have seen in the first edition, nor would they be seen in any version of the text while Locke was alive. They are meant to fill in at their corresponding asterisk (“[*]”) clusters to demonstrate the new words put into the posthumous [i.e., the Coste] edition alone. So: “[*]” represents where “or the act of volition” would have gone; “[**]” = “as presently to be done,”; “[***]” = “in such a case”; and “[****]” = “upon such a proposal,”.
These asterisks represent the following material added to the fourth edition of §23 -- hence, though the modern reader would be familiar with them (as would Locke, in that they were added during Locke’s lifetime), King would not have seen them: “For it is unavoidably necessary to prefer the doing or forbearance of an action in a man’s power, which is once so proposed to his thoughts: a man must necessarily will the one or the other of them, upon which preference or volition, the action or its forbearance certainly follows, and is truly voluntary. But the act of volition, or preferring one of the two, being that which he cannot avoid, a man in respect of that act of willing is under a necessity, and so cannot be free; unless necessity and freedom can consist together, and a man can be free and bound at once.”

And in a footnote following this passage, Fraser as usual offers up his own personal view: “Here at last Locke comes to the idea of a free power to act for which the agent is accountable; but without an adequate estimate of it, as the turning point between materialism or naturalism, and a spiritual philosophy of the universe. He concludes, under this inadequate conception, that, in his volitions, man is under causal necessity to avoid uneasiness, so that he cannot be under higher law than mechanism of nature, even in his voluntary determinations.” (F-Essay, p. 326)

For these words I show in bold, Fraser claims they were shown in neither the posthumous English version edited by Coste -- hence we don’t see them now in our current “contemporary” versions of the text -- nor were they in any of the French versions translated by Coste; but they were shown in the four English versions published in Locke’s lifetime (i.e., the 1690, 1694, 1695, and 1700 ones), as well as in the Latin version of 1701.

And Fraser again feels the need to add his own editorial remarks in his accompanying footnote, saying: “The argument supposes that ‘freedom of will’ means determination of volitions by previous volitions, as part of the mechanism of nature, instead of independence of that mechanism altogether; and this on the ground that no events, volitions included, can come to pass, without a previous physical or caused cause of their occurrence.” (F-Essay, p. 326)

King to Molyneux: Correspondence, Vol. IV, p. 540 [#1544].

with such a choice beginning with the self-determined agency we have which alone instigates the process of motion

with such a capacity being based solely on externalities (i.e., whether or not physical impediments can constrain us, or on factors lying beyond our control, such as those internal passions which unexpectedly provoke or satisfy us)

albeit a “relative” high value -- see §§34-8 (1Ed). An example, from §34(1Ed), is: “If our minds be determined by good,-- How it comes to pass that men’s wills carry them so contrarily, and consequently some of them to what is evil? And to this I say, that the various and contrary choices that men make in the world, doe not argue that they do not all chuse good; but that the same thing is not good to every man. Were all the concerns of man terminated in this life; why one pursued study and knowledge, and another hawking and hunting; why one chose luxury and debauchery, and another sobriety and riches, would not be, because every one of these did not pursue his own happiness, but because their happiness lay in different things: And therefore ’twas a right answer of the physician to his patient that had sore eyes: If you have more pleasure in the taste of wine than in the use of your sight, wine is good for you: but if the pleasure of seeing be greater to you than that of drinking, wine is naught.”

§29(1Ed). [Fraser “Note,” F-Essay, p. 376]

i.e., “the Good”

King to Molyneux: Correspondence IV, p. 541 [#1544].
As we see in King's later production, *Key to Divinity: or, a Philosophical Essay on Free Will*, which reflects the impact Locke's second edition revision must have had on King. Here King writes of the people promoting determinism: "If this opinion be true, mankind must despair of happiness: which, on these principles, is so far from being in our own power, that it will entirely depend upon external things. our happiness, (if there be any such thing) according to them, must arise from a perfect enjoyment of things agreeable to our appetites. where, either things contrary are present, or things suitable wanting, we must be uneasy and unhappy. upon this hypothesis therefore it follows, that our happiness necessarily requires such an enjoyment, as is impossible. for, what man can hope that all external things, that may affect him, will be temper’d to his wishes, so, as that he shall never want what he wishes, or be forced to bear things contrary to his natural appetites" (*Key* was taken from section V of his *De Origine Mali*, which was originally written in 1702: *Key* being translated into English by Solomon Lowe in 1715): p. 7.

That is, the "liberty of indifference," which was a Scholastic principle signifying what Lennon calls the "exception to universal mechanism in the sense that its possession allowed behaviour that, unnecessitated, could have been otherwise" (Lennon, "Descartes and the Seven Senses of Indifference in Early Modern Philosophy," *Dialogue*, 578-587). See esp. my “The ‘Uneasiness Encounters Self-Abasement and Topples It’ Component” section in XIII for more explanation.

The complete version of §30(1Ed) is as follows: "This is not an imperfection in man; it is the highest perfection of intellectual natures; it is so far from being a restraint or diminution of freedom, that it is the very improvement and benefit of it: 'tis not an abridgment, 'tis the end and use of our liberty: and the further we are removed from such a determination to good, the nearer we are to misery and slavery."

"A perfect indifferency in the will, or power of preferring, not determinable by the good or evil that is thought to attend its choice, would be so far from being an advantage and excellency of any intellectual nature, that it would be as great an imperfection as the want of indifferency to act and not to act, till determined by the will, would be an imperfection on the other side. A man is at liberty to lift up his hand to his head, or let it rest quiet" he is perfetly indifferent to either; and it would be an imperfection in him, if he wanted that power, if he be deprived of that indifferency. But it would be as great an imperfection, if he had the same indifferency, whether he would prefer the lifting up his hand, or its remaining in rest, when it would save his head or eyes from a blow he sees coming: 'tis as much a perfection, that the power of preferring should be *determined by good*, as that the power of acting should be *determined by the will*; and the certainer such determination is, the greater the perfection." [Fraser footnotes here: "The loss of power to will what is good is the 'slavery' in which, by abuse of moral liberty in a finite person, reason and will have become subject to sense and passion. The subjection of the individual to the universal will is the right use of freedom, but is not human freedom itself." Fraser “Note.” F-Essay, p. 376]

The totality of Locke's section being: "Secondly, In the next place we must remember that volition or willing, regarding only what is in our power, is nothing but the preferring the doing of anything to the not doing of it; action to rest, and contra. Well, but what is this preferring? It is nothing but the being pleased more with the one than the other. Is then a man indifferent to be pleased, or not pleased, more with one thing than another? Is it in his choice, whether he will or will not be better pleased with one thing than another? And to this I think every one's experience is ready to make answer, No. From whence it follows ...." [Fraser “Note,” F-Essay, p. 375]

(King to Molyneux: *Correspondence* IV, p. 541 [#1544])

“(King to Molyneux: *Correspondence*, Vol. IV, p. 541 [#1544])

“The remarks of that learned gentleman you mention, which you say you have in your hands, I shall receive as a favour from you.” (Locke to Molyneux: 27 Aug 1692; *Correspondence* IV, p. 507-9 [#1530])

August 27 letter of 1692: *Correspondence* IV, pp. 507-9 [#1530]
Locke having asked of Molyneux on Sept. 20, 1692: “[I] desire your advice and assistance about a second edition of my Essay, the former being now dispersed. You have, I perceive, read it over so carefully, more than once, that I know no body I can more reasonably consult about the mistakes and defects of it. And I expect a great deal more from any objections you should make, who comprehend the whole design and compass of it, than from any one who has read but a part of it, or measures it, upon a slight reading, by his own prejudices. You will find, by my epistle to the reader, that I was not insensible of the fault I committed by being too long upon some points, and the repetitions, that by my way of writing of it, had got in, I let it pass with, but not without advice so to do. But now that my notions are got into the world, and have in some measure bustled through the opposition and difficulty they were like to meet with from the receiv'd opinion, and that prepossession which might hinder them from being understood upon a short proposal; I ask you whether it would not be better now to pare off, in a second edition, a great part of that which cannot but appear superfluous to an intelligent and attentive reader. If you are of that mind, I shall beg the favour of you to mark to me these passages which you would think fittest to be left out. If there be any thing wherein you think me mistaken, I beg you to deal freely with me, that either I may clear it up to you, or reform it in the next edition. For I flatter my self that I am so sincere a lover of truth, that it is very indifferent to me, so I am possess'd of it, whether it be by my own, or any other's discovery. For I count any parcel of this gold not the less to be valued, nor not the less enriching, because I wrought it not out of the mine my self. I think every one ought to contribute to the common stock; but to have no other scruple or shyness about the receiving of truth but that he be not impos'd on, and take counterfeit, and what will not bear the touch, for genuine and real truth. I doubt not but, to one of your largeness of thought, that in the reading of my book you miss several things, that perhaps belong to my subject, and you would think belongs to the system: If in this part too you will communicate your thoughts, you will do me a favour. For though I will not so far flatter my self as to undertake to fill up the gaps which you may observe in it, yet it may be of use where mine is at a stand, to suggest to others matter of farther contemplation. This I often find, that what men by thinking have made clear to themselves, they are apt to think, that upon the first suggestion it should be so to others, and so let it go not sufficiently explained; not considering what may be very clear to themselves, may be very obscure to others. Your penetration and quickness hinders me from expecting from you many complaints of this kind. But if you have met with any thing, in your reading of my book, which at first sight you stuck at, I shall think it a sufficient reason, in the next edition, to amend it for the benefit of meaner readers.” (Locke to Molyneux: Correspondence IV, p. 507-9 [#1530])

“I return you my humble thanks for the papers you did me the favour to send me in your last. But am apt to think you agree with me that there is very little in those papers wherein either my Sense is not mistaken, or very little wherein the argument is directly against me. I suppose that learned gentleman if he had had the leisure to read my Essay quite through would have found several of his objections might have been spared. And I can easily forgive those who have not been at the pains to read the third book of my Essay, if they make use of expressions that when examined signifie nothing at all, in defence of hypotheses that have long possess'd their minds. I am far from imagining myself infallible: but yet I should be loath to differ from any thinking man, being fully persuaded there are very few things of pure speculation, wherein two thinking men who impartially seek truth can differ if they give themselves the leisure to examin their hypotheses and understand one another.” (Locke to Molyneux 26 Dec. 1692; Correspondence IV, pp. 608-9 [#1583])

“I presuming you to be of this make [see previous footnote re “any thinking man”], whereof so few are to be found (for 'tis not every one that thinks himself a lover or seeker of truth who sincerely does it) took the liberty to desire your objections, that in the next edition I might correct my mistakes. For I am not fond of any thing in my book because I have once thought or said it. And therefore I beg you if you will give your self the Pains to look over my book again with this design to oblige me, that you would use all manner of freedom both as to matter, stile, disposition, and every thing wherein in your own thoughts, any thing appears to you fit in the least to be alter'd, omitted, explain'd or added. I find none so fit nor so fair judges as those whose minds the study of mathematicks has open'd, and disintangl'd from the cheat of words, which has too great an influence in all the other which go for Sciences: And I think (were it not for the doubtful and fallacious use is made of those signs) might be made much more sciences than they are.” (Locke to Molyneux 26 Dec. 1692; Correspondence IV, pp. 608-9 [#1583])
“Had I known I should within so few days have receiv’d the favour of such a letter as is yours of 22. Dec. I should not have troubled you with mine, that went hence but a little before the receipt of yours.” (Locke to Molyneux 20 Jan. 1693, Correspondence IV, p. 623 [#1592])

For some reason this letter had not come with the King comments, which Molyneux sends on Oct 15, 1692 (#1544), but rather a few months after (Molyneux’s own letter is dated Dec 22, 1692 (#1579); Locke’s comments in his Dec 26, 1692 (#1583) reflect only his getting the King comments. It is in the Jan. 20, 1693 (#1592) letter to Molyneux that Locke admits getting Molyneux’s comments, and it’s on July 15, 1693 (#1643) when Locke announces to Molyneux his new view of human freedom, which includes a notion of uneasiness. These come only in notes, and not yet in the revised chapter.

“after so long Consideration of the Matter, as between that and this, and Consulting some Ingenious Heads here about It, I can say but Little; Only that the same Judicious Hand, that first form’d it, is best able to reform it, where he sees Convenient. I never quarrel’d with a Book for being too Prolix, especially where the Prolixity is pleasant and tends to the Illustration of the Matter in hand, as I am sure yours always does.” (Molyneux to Locke 22 Dec. 1692; Correspondence IV, pp. 599-602 [#1579])

“Finely spun” in relation to liberty seems to have its own understood slur-power for that period that seems to have escaped our post-modern notice/usage -- see King’s “Key to Divinity: or, a Philosophical Essay on Free Will,” p. 11-12: “I confess that they [i.e., determinists who …] bring solutions to these difficulties [i.e., how one makes decisions according to an unknown or uncertain standard]; but they are so fine-spun, so obscure, and so much above the conceptions of the vulgar; that many, offended with them, have deserted the cause of freedom, as desperate; and fallen in with the former sect. but if any one would more clearly and fully express the common opinion, or undertake to produce solutions of the difficulties that encumber it; I should be so far from opposing; that I should be ready to assist in the enquiry, and assent to the discovery. This is a thing very much to be wish’d for: in the mean time I shall endeavour, as well as I can, to explain these things somewhat differently, and more evidently.” [in Subsection 2, entitled, “The common opinion consider’d, that Freedom is no less from Necessity, than from Force”]

* Interestingly, King’s “Part I” subhead to his “Key” leads with a quote from Locke: “He that takes away Reason, to make way for Revelation, puts out the light of Both; and does much what the same, as if he should persuade a man to put out his eyes, the better to receive the remote Light of an invisible star by a Telescope. - Lock. Ess. concerning Hum. Underst. IV.xix.4"

Which he opens with a confession of his own initial surprise at reading what Molyneux had to say: “Had I known I should within so few days have receiv’d the favour of such a letter as is yours of 22. Dec. I should not have troubled you with mine, that went hence but a little before the receipt of yours. I was afraid, in reading the beginning of yours, that I had not so great an interest in you as I flatter’d my self, and upon a presumption whereof it was that I took the liberty so confidently to ask your advice concerning the second edition of my book. But what follow’d satisfied me, that it was your civility, and not reservedness, made you tell me, that the same hand which first form’d it is best able to reform it. Could I flatter my self so as to think I deserv’d all that you say of me in your obliging letter, I should yet think you a better judge of what is to be reform’d in my book than I my self. You have given the world proofs of your great penetration, and I have received great marks of your candor. But were the inequality between us as much to my advantage as it is on the other side, I should nevertheless beg your opinion. Whatsoever is our own, let us do what we can, stands a little too near us to be view’d as it should: and though we never so sincerely aim at truth, yet our own thoughts, judging still of our own thoughts, may be suspected to overlook errors and mistakes. And I should think he valued himself more than truth, and presum’d too much on his own abilities, who would not be willing to have all the exceptions could be made by any ingenious friend, before he ventur’d any thing into the publick. I therefore heartily thank you for those you have sent me, and for consulting some of your friends to the same purpose: and beg the favour, if any thing more occurs from your own thoughts, or from them, you will be pleased to communicate it to me, if it be but those Errata Typographica you meet with, not taken notice of in the table. I confess, I thought some of the explications in my book, too long, though turn’d several ways, to make those abstract notions the easier sink into minds prejudiced in the ordinary way of education, and therefore I was of a mind to contract it. But finding you, and some other friends of mine, whom I consulted in the case,1 of a contrary opinion, and that you judge the redundancy in it a pardonable fault, I shall take very little pains to reform it…” (Locke to Molyneux 20 Jan. 1693; Correspondence IV, p. 623-8 [#1592])
For as Yolton documents (see my Chapter V.a), Locke apparently did make extensive notes at least in the margins of works he’d obtained of Sergeant’s, and had written a long-winded responding challenge to Norris’s remarks about him … to which Locke allowed only a posthumous release (“Remarks Upon some of Mr. Norris Books,” Works X, pp. 247-259).

including the earlier-mentioned one coming from logician Isaac Watts regarding Locke’s analogical presumption (see my fn #129).

although it might be argued that had he woven into his “Of Power” chapter his Conduct of the Understanding (written partly in response to attacks from Sergeant and Norris but never published in his lifetime), he might have found the unifying principle he’d need to overcome the error. Note opening section to the COTU: § 1. The last resort a man has recourse to, in the conduct of himself, is his understanding: for though we distinguish the faculties of the mind, and give the supreme command to the will, as to an agent; yet the truth is, the man, who is the agent, determines himself to this, or that, voluntary action, upon some precedent knowledge, or appearance of knowledge, in the understanding. No man ever sets himself about any thing, but upon some view or other, which serves him for a reason for what he does: and whatsoever faculties he employs, the understanding, with such light as it has, well or ill informed, constantly leads; and by that light, true or false, all his operative powers are directed. The will itself, how absolute and uncontrollable soever it may be thought, never fails in its obedience to the dictates of the understanding. Temples have their sacred images, and we see what influence they have always had over a great part of mankind. But, in truth, the ideas and images in men’s minds are the invisible powers, that constantly govern them; and to these they all universally pay a ready submission. It is, therefore, of the highest concernment, that great care should be taken of the understanding, to conduct it right, in the search of knowledge, and in the judgements it makes. ¶ “The logic, now in use, has so long possessed the chair, as the only art taught in the schools, for the direction of the mind, in the study of the arts and sciences, that it would perhaps be thought an affectation of novelty to suspect, that rules, that have served the learned world these two or three thousand years, and which, without any complaint of defects, the learned have rested in, are not sufficient to guide the understanding. And I should not doubt, but this attempt would be censured as vanity or presumption, did not the great lord Verulam’s authority justify it; who, not servilely thinking learning could not be advanced beyond what it was, because for many ages it had not been, did not rest in the lazy approbation and applause of what was, because it was; but enlarged his mind to what it might be. In his preface to his Novum Organum, concerning logic, he pronounces thus, “Qui summus dialecticæ partes tribuerunt, atque inde fidissima scientiis præsidia comparari putârunt, verissimè et optime viderunt intellectum humanum, sibi permìssum, merito suspeximur esse debere. Verum infirmior omnînè est malo medicina; nec ipsa mali expers. Siquidem dialectica, quæ recepta est, licet ad civilia et artes, quæ in sermone et opinione positæ sunt, rectissimè adhibeatur; naturæ tamen subtilitatem longo intervalllo non attingit, et prensando quod non capit, ad errores potius stabilindos et quasi fugendos, quam ad viam veritati aperiendam valuit.” ¶ “Those who have bestowed the highest parts of the Dialectical, and from thence they thought fit to be compared to the strong holds of the sciences most faithful, most truly and in the best they have seen the human intellect, left to itself, the merits of suspect ought to be. But the weakness is very bad medicine, not even a bad experience. If, indeed, dialectical, that is received, it is allowed to the civil and the arts, and that is in the word, and beliefs of mankind are, most rightly is to be used; subtlety of nature after a long interval, however, does not attain, and that it can not be catching, as it were, and the establishing of proving, to the errors rather than to the way of the truth opening was successful.” ¶ ¶ “They, says he, who attributed so much to logic, perceived very well and truly, that it was not safe to trust the understanding to itself without the guard of any rules. But the remedy reached not the evil, but became a part of it, for the logic, which took place, though it might do well enough in civil affairs, and the arts, which consisted in talk and opinion; yet comes very far short of subtlety, in the real performances of nature; and, catching at what it cannot reach, has served to confirm and establish errors, rather than to open a way to truth.” And therefore a little after he says, “That it is absolutely necessary, that a better and perfecter use and employment of the mind and understanding should be introduced.” “Necessariò requiritur ut melior et perfectior mentis et intellectûs humani usus et adoperatio introductur.” http://oll.libertyfund.org/?option=com_staticxt&staticfile=show.php%3Ftitle=762&chapter=80854&layout=html&Itemid=27
See esp. Leo Solt, who, while looking more closely at the causal-arguments trying to link post-Reformation impulses and the Enlightenment’s drive towards democratic government, avers: “It has been argued that Protestantism gives greater encouragement to individual initiative and individual responsibility than does Catholicism or, for that matter, Anglicanism. From a doctrinal point of view, it is contended that the Protestant ‘concept of faith and salvation is one of subjective individual experience, in which all responsibility is with the individual and none with an authority which could give him what he cannot obtain himself.’ Actually, both Roman Catholicism and Arminian Anglicanism assert individual responsibility by their insistence upon man’s good works, in addition to faith, in the salvation process. But Lutheranism and Calvinistic Puritanism annihilated ‘the individual self as the essential condition’ of salvation either by a reliance solely upon God’s saving grace or upon God’s arbitrary and immutable decrees of predestination and election. This extreme emphasis upon the sovereignty of God disposed obedient Puritans to accept authority in politics, science, or business that had its sanction from above, not from below.” (“Puritanism, Capitalism, Democracy, and the New Science,” The American Historical Review, p. 20). See also Henry (“Atomism and Eschatology: Catholicism and Natural Philosophy in the Interregnum,” Seventeenth Century British Philosophers, pp. 203-231); Lennon (“Jansenism and the Crise Pyrrhonienne,” Journal of the History of Ideas, 297-306).

Limborch to Locke: 3 Oct 1701; Correspondence, VII, pp. 458, 463-4 [#8 3010]

See my Appendix II for list of dates and #s

Especially within the Roman Catholic church in continental Europe -- notable because it also reminds us of Locke’s deep antipathy to Catholicism (perhaps even more pronounced than that found in Limborch), which may subconsciously have had a greater role in Locke’s determinist views than has been otherwise accounted for in the scholarship.


Limborch, for example, was writing a history of the Spanish Inquisition, and Locke through his vast intellectual network became quite instrumental in obtaining some testimonial papers relevant to Limborch’s inquiries.

the rest of it being: “...; and from the not using of it right comes all that variety of mistakes, errours, and faults which we run into in the conduct of our lives, and our endeavours after happiness; whilst we precipitate the determination of our wills, and engage too soon before due examination.” [my boldface] ¶ (§47) N-Essay, pp. 263-4. See also §§ 50, 51, 52, 56, 71. See also Fraser’s “pushback” footnote to this (as I note earlier in my fn #39).

(read: Roman Catholic)

(in 1690 first edition, this is expressed at §30, p. 124; in N-Essay, it is in §48, p. 264).
For example, in his 1895 footnotes to these sections (such as §47), Fraser is clearly less convinced of Locke’s “free will” claims even when the “suspension mechanism” is added: (for N-Essay §47; F-Essay §48, p. 345) “1. Free agency with Locke thus consists at last in ‘power to suspend’ volition. But unless in this man rises above a merely natural causation of motives, he is no more ethically free in suspending the voluntary execution of a desire than in any other exercise of will. A power to suspend volition, necessarily thus dependent, leaves man still a part of the mechanism of nature. 2. This recognition of power in the agent to ‘suspend’ conversion of desire into will is the nearest approach Locke makes to recognition of the spiritual freedom that is supernatural. But after all, on his premises, the suspension must be the natural issue of uneasiness.” (for N-Essay §48; F-Essay §49, p. 345-6) “3. He that wills must conceive what he wills, and must have some motive for acting. Intelligence, so far from being inconsistent with a moral or supernatural liberty to act, is essential to it; although free acts are not in harmony with reason, when the fallible, finite agent abuses the freedom for which he is responsible.” (F-Essay, p. 346-7) “3. If men are determined, in willing, to follow their judgement of what is best, under a physical necessity, how is it possible for them to will immorally, be their judgements ever so erroneous in estimating pleasures and pains? If the man, by a law of external nature, cannot resist his erroneous judgement, and could not have judged differently, how can he be blamed for the resulting volition? Locke only shows that intelligence is one of the conditions of moral freedom -- not that volition is the necessary outcome of judgement. A so-called volition that is intellectually blind cannot of course be a morally free or really voluntary determination. 1. Are our determinations to suspend our desires necessarily necessitated by uneasiness, or is this ‘suspending’ not a voluntary determination at all; and if not an act of will, what is it?” (N-Essay §52; F-Essay §53, p. 349) “2. Does this mean that in the voluntary act of ‘suspending’ desires, with a view to test their rationality, the so-called agent is somehow independent of the ‘chain of consequences,’ and is not the passive subject of ‘uneasiness,’ and of those natural consequences of uneasiness which are abusively called his own acts?

That is, not until May 1700. Limborch knew no English -- he and Locke corresponded only in Latin -- so he had to wait until the Essay had been translated first into French by Coste in 1700, and into Latin by Burridge in 1701. Both texts were needed since each had its problems for Limborch: the Latin text had not yet been seen or reviewed by Locke, and so Limborch’s referring to it vis-a-vis page references was likely awkward; and as for the Coste translation, Limborch’s own French was pretty meagre. And apparently Locke found the French text defective anyway when it was read back to him -- or so Coste tells Leibniz six years later in a 1707 letter to Leibniz: “Permettez moi, Monsieur, de vous dire un mot, avant que de finir, d’une nouvelle que j’ai apprise il y a quelque temps. C’est que vous avez travaillé à refuter l’Essay Philosophique sur l’Entendement. Si cela est, je ne puis m’empêcher de souhaiter pour l’amour de la vérité, que vous ne fassiez pas au Public de cette refutation. On m’a dit que vous vous étiez reglé sur la traduction française. Il faut donc que je vous fasse part de quelques corrections que j’ai faites par l’avis de Mr. Locke, à qui j’ai relu ma traduction depuis qu’elle est publique. Il m’y a fair remarquer des fautes dont quelques unes sont assez considérables. Il est absolument nécessaire que vous les voyiez de peur qu’en suivant ma traduction vous ne refutiez des choses que Mr. Locke n’a pas dites. Si vous voulez donc que je vous les envoye, Monsieur, je le ferai avec plaisir, et je joindrai à ces corrections quelques additions que Mr. Locke insera peu de temps avant sa mort, dans le chapitre où il traite de la Liberté. Je suis avec un profond respect etc. (Coste to Leibniz letter 20 April 1707; Die Philosophischen Schriften, p. 391).

See also DeBeer’s report of the Limborch/Locke correspondence during the “Of Power” chapter in Correspondence VII pp. 268-70 and his note on p. 269 specifically: “That Coste’s [translation] was defective, despite Locke’s supervision, emerged when, after it was published, Coste read it again to Locke.”

However, Limborch himself tells Locke in letter #8 (Oct. 3, 1701) that, in deciding to read the Essay again because he so esteemed the rest of the book beyond the “Of Power” chapter, he found the French translation “much better than the Latin; I consult it from time to time when the Latin is rather obscure, whether the translator or the printer is to blame.” (Correspondence, VII, p. 464 [#8 3010]).

Limborch letter to Locke 3 Oct 1701: Correspondence, VII, p. 464 [#8 3010].

Limborch letter to Locke 19/30 Oct. 1700: Correspondence VII, pp. 239-241 [#3 #2857]; Limborch letter to Locke 19 March 1701: Correspondence VII, pp. 274-278 [#4 #2881].

Limborch letter to Locke 7/18 Feb 1701: Correspondence VII, pp. 168-9 [#2 #2795].
Limborch to Locke 19 Mar. 1701: Correspondence VII, p. 275-6 [#4 #2881].

Limborch to Locke 19 Mar. 1701: Correspondence VII, p. 275-6 [#4 #2881].

(my words)

Limborch to Locke 19 Mar. 1701: Correspondence VII, p. 276-7 [#4 #2881].

Locke to Limborch 21 May 1701: Correspondence VII, p. 328-9 [#5 #2925].

in §48?

with Limborch explaining thus: "The last judgement of the understanding is the name commonly given to the judgement by which a man decrees what he ought to do; and it is called the practical last judgement of the understanding. But this judgement is an act not so much of the understanding as of the will, or at least it is a mixed act, in the completion of which the will joins. Moreover a judgement which is an act of the understanding alone proceeds no further than 'This ought to be done, this ought to be forborne.' If it proceeds further some action of the will intervenes." (Limborch to Locke 8 July 8 1701: Correspondence VII, p. 369 [#6, #2953])

in §53? 67?

These two things are nevertheless confused by many people. Now my opinion is that when a man acts in accordance with right reason he always wills what his understanding judges ought to be done; nevertheless he can also act against reason and determine his will to the contrary; more than that: before his understanding, after a careful examination of the reasons, has judged what ought to be done he can by brute impulse do, not what is in accordance with reason, but what carnal desire dictates." (Limborch to Locke 8 July 8 1701: Correspondence VII, pp. 369-70 [#6, #2953])

I think that we will two things, an end and the means that lead to an end. We desire many things which nevertheless we do not will. For there are complete desire and incomplete desire, just as there are complete will, which last is called in the schools by the barbarous denomination 'velleity'² by which we denote not what a man wills, properly speaking, but what he might will. A prudent man will choose from many desirables, and set before himself as the end of all his actions, that one which is perfect in all respects and in which are joined all the reasons that make a thing desirable. But that choice is not made without a determination of the will by which a man decrees that he will set before himself this good, which he judges to be preferable to all the rest, as the end of all his actions. I have accordingly believed that it can rightly be said that the will of a man is directed to a good, and that that good is always apprehended by him as agreeable. But if you believe that the action by which we are directed to that good is improperly called will, but ought to be called desire, because it is directed to an absent good, I shall not contend about the term, so long as we are agreed about its signification. In order therefore to avoid all ambiguity let us say that desire is directed to a good and that will governs actions. But let us take care not to confuse all sorts of desires, and let us distinguish complete desires from the incomplete, which are wont to be called 'velleities', a word much used in the schools." (Limborch to Locke 8 July 8 1701: Correspondence VII, pp. 366-7 [#6, #2953])
237 Complete quote: “[W]hen you say that ‘Liberty is the dominion that a man has over any of his actions’ this does not seem to me to be a definition of Liberty, since it says nothing other than that a man has the dominion over his actions which he has, which only comes back to this, that Liberty is the liberty which a man has over any action of his; from which it can follow that a man has no liberty whatsoever, for as you know there are some men who deny that a man has any dominion over his actions, but [hold] that all things are governed by predetermined and ineluctable fate. But if you say that you suppose that a man has dominion over his actions and that Liberty consists therein, then I ask what the Dominion of a man over his actions may be. For Dominion, whether it be a figurative word or for some other reason, seems to me just as obscure as the word Liberty, if not more so, and therefore less to need definition. And thus I shall keep on questioning until the simple ideas, from which the Idea of Liberty is composed, are reached.” (Locke to Limborch 19 Nov. 1701: Correspondence VII, pp. 502-4 [#9 #3043])

238 (Locke to Limborch 12 Aug. 1701: Correspondence VII, pp. 409-411 [#7 #2979; pp. 409-411]). What is interesting is that Hobbes said almost the exact same thing in one of his replies to Bishop Bramhall’s “tweaking” of Hobbes’s “last judgement” appellation: “[T]he Bishop is mistaken in saying that I or any other patron of necessity are of opinion that the will follows always the last judgement of right reason. For it follows as well the judgement of an erroneous as of a true reasoning; and the truth in general is that it follows the last opinion of the goodness or evilness of the object, be the opinion true or false.” (Hobbes and Bramhall on Liberty and Necessity, p. 73-4 [§7(a)])

239 Complete quote being: “The distinction that you bring forward of ‘complete and incomplete Desire’ or of ‘complete and incomplete Will’ seem to me not to help your argument in any way. For if there is any ‘incomplete desire’ or ‘incomplete will’, which I greatly doubt, that will never make it true that Will is directed to a good. I doubt, I say, whether there can be any ‘incomplete Volition’; for, if I am not mistaken, ‘Will’ is here taken for an act of the Will, that is, for a Volition. I readily recognize ‘ineffective volition’, as when a paralytic wills to move his palsied hand; I grant that that volition is ineffective and without result, but not that it is ‘incomplete’. For the act of willing is in this case just as complete as it was formerly when the hand complied with the volition. In the same way the desire of some proposed good, the pursuit of which we neglect because of a greater good that is incompatible with it, is not an ‘incomplete desire’ or an ‘incomplete Will’, but a complete desire quickly terminated, not proceeding so far as to impel us to willing the actions by which can be obtained that good to which that short-lived desire was directed; nor where there is no volition at all, can ‘will’ be called ‘incomplete’, even if the schools like to call it Velleity. But if that short-lived desire proceeds so far as to rouse us to willing some action, that ‘Will’ is not ‘incomplete’, but is a complete act of willing even though, through the omission of further action, it is ineffective for obtaining the proposed good, which is neglected when the desire ceases. In these and similar actions of the mind the motions of the spirit are so swift and so connected with one another that it is not strange that, as happens, matters are often confused that, for one who considers them more heedfully, are to be distinguished in order that we should rightly form our concepts.” (Locke to Limborch 12 Aug. 1701: Correspondence VII, pp. 404-5 [#7 #2979])

240 Locke to Limborch 12 Aug. 1701: Correspondence VII, pp. 407-7 [#7 #2979].

241 And in case Limborch thinks he can still cash out some value from the “liberty of indifference” principle, Locke famously tacks on a few pages after this passage a supplementary text wherein he outlines the contained and weak configuration he is willing to describe to the notion of “indifference.” This will become important in establishing the provenance of the revisions appearing in the posthumous edition. Note my Chapters 7 and 8. The supplementary text submitted to Limborch does survive intact in §71, and is the only posthumous revision that can be traced directly to Locke’s own hand. (Locke to Limborch 12 Aug. 1701: Correspondence VII, pp. 412-414 [#7 #2979]).

242 Locke to Limborch 12 Aug. 1701: Correspondence VII, pp. 410-411 [#7 #2979]. For more detail, see my Chapters 7 and 8.
 Writes Limborch: "[I]f the will is determined by the understanding, and the action of the understanding is necessary, all things will be necessary; for the will is necessarily determined from the beginning, that is, by the judgement of the understanding; the actions are determined by the will; and thus a man is determined to his actions, and although he has a power of doing what he wills and of not doing what he does not will; nevertheless that power is determined in every case by the antecedent determination of the will. And thus pure necessity would rule in the actions of a man ... " (Limborch to Locke 3 Oct 1701; Correspondence VII, p. 463 [#8 #3010])

244 (Limborch to Locke 3 Oct 1701; Correspondence VII, p. 459 [#8 #3010])

245 from II.xxi.47, which is what Limborch’s letter of 19 March 1701 [#4 #2881] had referred to.

246 or more specifically, those hard-line Dutch Calvinists who’d led a severely repressive campaign against the Arminians/Remonstrants in Holland after the Synod of Dordrecht took place in 1618-19

247 (Limborch to Locke 3 Oct 1701; Correspondence VII, pp. 451-2 [#8 #3010])

248 (One imagines here two separate and impenetrable faculties in the mind/soul that are barely aware of each other)

249 (Limborch to Locke 3 Oct 1701; Correspondence VII, p. 453 [#8 #3010])

250 (Locke to Limborch 19 Nov 1701: Correspondence VII, pp. 502-3 [#9 #3043])

251 (Locke to Limborch 19 Nov 1701: Correspondence VII, pp. 503-4 [#9 #3043])
As to Locke’s upbraiding Limborch for committing the “categorical error” (that is, metaphorically characterizing the will as an agent and not a faculty -- a problem seemingly inevitable in such discussions -- I myself having been a major perpetrator of such semantic misbehavior just in the last many paragraphs of this paper), it was not the first time he’d done it in the correspondence. So by now we should see it as a mistake to think Locke is only being a grammatical fussbudget here. For Locke, such powers as Will and Volition, which are used to indicate those faculties of the mind that either precipitate action or command its forbearance, were merely the passive powers of the human or animal agent actively possessing them, and were not to be understood as sovereign entities unto themselves. Though Limborch initially seemed to understand and appreciate Locke’s emphasis of this category mistake, Locke’s continued repetition of this “correction” -- in the face of Limborch’s being ready to move on -- begins to suggest Locke was making more than just a semantic point here.

252 (which turns out to be the posthumous edition of 1706; see my fn #310 regarding the dispensing of these “insertions”)

253 “As regards the remaining things about which you seem to be in doubt, lest the reply should extend to too great length and bulk I think that I shall give satisfaction better and more compendiously by inserting here and there in chapter xxi some explications by which I may make my meaning clearer where it is set down perhaps rather negligently or obscurely, so that it may in future be plain to the reader, even if, as happens, he is in a hurry, provided that he does not disdain keeping in mind what has been set down. I hope that you will be fully satisfied when you have read them through heedfully and have compared them with the rest of what I have set forth in that chapter ... [offers to explain further if necess.]” (Locke to Limborch 19 Nov 1701: Correspondence VII, pp. 504-5 [#9 #3043])

254 (Limborch to Locke 16 Oct 1702: Correspondence VII, pp. 518-520 [#10 #3055])

255 (Locke to Limborch: 28 Sept 1702: Correspondence VII, 680-1 [#11 #3192])

256 -- one of which finally claims the designated status able to emasculate the ranking of the will that everyone but he (and Hobbes) had been heretofore elevating.

257 (with this unaccounted for “stamp of legitimacy” being coupled with Locke’s failure to tell us how we are to know when the process of suspension itself properly begins and ends)

258 at least by the likes of Fraser, Chappell, Darwall and Glauber
where the locution “He had a Power to suspend his desire,” which Locke had been indefatigable in repeating, suddenly becomes “He had a Power to suspend his determination” (with the revision seemingly appearing without provenance; of that, more in my Chapter VII).

#1 being like §§ 8 and 21; #2 being like §§ 11, 12, 13, 15, and 24; #3 being like §§ 8, 23, and 50.
such as my willingly staying in an otherwise locked room or cell (§10).

(a reading of which both he and Limborch and probably nearly all of us avail ourselves unthinkingly)

see §30: “But, in the way to it, it will be necessary to premise, that though I have above endeavoured to express the act of volition by choosing, preferring, and the like terms, that signify desire as well as volition, for want of other words to mark that act of the mind, whose proper name is willing or volition; yet it being a very simple act, whosoever desires to understand what it is, will better find it by reflecting on his own mind, and observing what it does when it wills, than by any variety of articulate sounds whatsoever. This caution of being careful not to be misled by expressions that do not enough keep up the difference between the will and several acts of the mind that are quite distinct from it, I think the more necessary; because I find the will often confounded with several of the affections, especially desire, and one put for the other; and that by men, who would not willingly be thought not to have had very distinct notions of things, and not to have writ very clearly about them. This, I imagine, has been no small occasion of obscurity and mistake in this matter; and therefore is, as much as may be, to be avoided. For he that shall turn his thoughts inwards upon what passes in his mind when he wills, shall see that the will or power of volition is conversant about nothing, but that particular determination of the mind, whereby barely by a thought the mind endeavours to give rise, continuation, or stop, to any action which it takes to be in its power. This well considered, plainly shows that the will is perfectly distinguished from desire; which in the very same action may have a quite contrary tendency from that which our will sets us upon. A man whom I cannot deny, may oblige me to use persuasions to another, which, at the same time I am speaking, I may wish may not prevail on him. In this case, it is plain the will and desire run counter. I will the action that tends one way, whilst my desire tends another, and that the direct contrary way. A man who by a violent fit of the gout in his limbs finds a doziness in his head, or a want of appetite in his stomach removed, desires to be eased too of the pain of his feet or hands (for wherever there is pain, there is a desire to be rid of it) though yet, whilst he apprehends that the removal of the pain may translate the noxious humour to a more vital part, his will is never determined to any one action that may serve to remove this pain. Whence it is evident that desiring and willing are two distinct acts of the mind; and consequently that the will, which is but the power of volition, is much more distinct from desire.”

“I do not deny that in inevident knowledge of this kind it can happen, indeed it very often happens, that without the accession of any new light or a more distinct perception a man either elicits a full assent or changes his opinion; but that change of opinion, or assent, proceeds not from any action of understanding but from one of willing; doubtless because the man, although not enlightened by a new reason, wills to incline his judgement to the other side. We know that our passions strongly affect our judgements; therefore by yielding to any passion that drives me to the other side I can also incline my judgement and assent to it. And so this judgement of mine will be a mixed action, partly of understanding, partly of willing: in so far as it is an action of understanding, or as it perceives a thing, it is necessary; but whatever in a judgement is free proceeds from an action of willing, in so far, that is to say, as I will to be satisfied with the adduced reasons in order to form a judgement.” (Limborch to Locke Oct. 16, 1702: Correspondence VII, p. 693 [#12 #3200])
"But as to the action of understanding by which a man perceives that something is true: you say rightly that it is not free; and this applies in perceiving both those things which Philosophers say are learnt through the intelligence [intelligentia] alone, as, twice two are four, the same thing cannot at the same time be and not be, etc.; and those which, as you very well say, are learnt when a demonstration has been examined, viz. the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles. I think that the same applies also in other acts of understanding when a thing is obscure or doubtful and there are no reasons clearly proving it, or the reasons for either opinion are of equal weight: for a man then is necessarily in suspense, or doubts, or asserts only slightly, yet as if he thinks that he can be mistaken. Thus the action of understanding is accommodated to the reasons and arguments by whose weight it is inclined to this or that side. There are many such [occasions] in human life. Moreover that action of understanding is not changed as long as no new reasons accede, or a clearer and more evident perception of the reasons on which the truth of the matter rests." (Limborch to Locke Oct. 16, 1702: Correspondence VII, pp. 692-3 [#12 #3200])

Limborch to Locke Oct. 16, 1702: Correspondence VII, p. 692 [#12 #3200]

Limborch to Locke Oct. 16, 1702: Correspondence VII, pp. 693-4 [#12 #3200]

Locke’s next and final letter to Limborch is dated Aug. 4, 1704; Locke himself dies Oct. 28, 1704.

Added to posthumous edition: § 71: “I know that liberty by some is placed in an indifferency of the man, antecedent to the determination of his will. I wish they, who lay so much stress on such an antecedent indifferency, as they call it, had told us plainly, whether this supposed indifferency be antecedent to the thought and judgement of the understanding, as well as to the decree of the will. For it is pretty hard to state it between them; i.e. immediately after the judgement of the understanding, and before the determination of the will, because the determination of the will immediately follows the judgement of the understanding: and to place liberty in an indifferency, antecedent to the thought and judgement of the understanding, seems to me to place liberty in a state of darkness, wherein we can neither see nor say any thing of it; at least it places it in a subject incapable of it, no agent being allowed capable of liberty, but in consequence of thought and judgement.” [Locke’s Essay §71 E 2.21]

(1657-1736) Like Limborch, an Arminian theologian from Amsterdam, and friend to those of similar intellectual interests such as Locke, Shaftesbury, Coste, Bayle, etc. LeClerc seemed to be the godfather of French-speaking Amsterdam religious refugees in England in particular, since if he was not calling on their writing or editorial skills themselves he was able to place them in English families as tutors or serving assistants (which is how Coste got his job in the Masham household where Locke lived).

Coste is writing here to Leibniz in 1707 to alert him as to what Locke had "changed" for the 1706 posthumous edition of the Essay. Coste knows Leibniz has been writing his own response to the Essay (what will turn out to be Leibniz’s New Essays On Human Understanding) and thus knows Leibniz would not want to be caught commenting on items that may have since been revised in the update. The quotation cited here comes at nearly the end of a long August 25th letter Coste has written to Leibniz listing the changes (Leibniz, Die Philosophischen Schriften, III, 398-9)).

The original French:
"Les corrections considerables et les additions que Mr. Locke a fait, regardent l’article de la Liberté. Une dispute que Mr. Locke eut par lettres quelque temps avant sa mort avec Mr. Limborch, donna occasion aux corrections que vous venez de voir. Quelques objections de Mr. Limborch lui firent connoître qu’il s’étoit trompé en soutenant qu’absolument l’homme n’étoit jamais en liberté de vouloir ou de ne pas vouloir une chose qui est en sa puissance, lorsqu’elle est une fois proposée à son esprit. Du reste, Mr. Limborch ne put lui faire goûter la Liberté d’indifference, si fortement soutenue par les Arminiens. Et c’est pour en faire voir l’absurdité que Mr. Locke a inseré dans son Livre cette dernière addition. Mr. Le Clerc prétend que Mr. Locke a voulu refuter ce qu’il n’entendait pas fort bien, Bibliotheque choisie Tom. XII p. 403 etc. Non nostrum inter illos tantas componere ilites. Je n’ose vous prier, Monsieur, de m’apprendre ce que vous pensez de ce démêlé: mais je ne puis m’empecher de souhaiter d’avoir sur cela les lumières d’un genie aussi penetrant que le vôtre.” (Philosophischen Schriften. v. 3, pp. 398-99)

Meaning any changes absent such fanfare seem ever more ripe for suspicion. See also my footnote #59 for references to documented “change” citations.
the last substantive letter of Locke’s coming two years before he died

which is also known as the Essay’s fifth edition, and is the one so familiar to Locke scholars and students today over 300 years later (the 1979 Nidditch edition, though technically considered the Essay’s twelfth edition, nevertheless constitutes the contents of the posthumous fifth)

Nor do they meet the lingering question left over from the correspondence Locke was engaged in with his friend Philippus van Limborch which Coste had mentioned above -- more on this later in the paper.

Wrote Locke to Limborch at the end of the Aug. 12, 1701 letter: “After I had written the above it occurred to me that it would not be unsuitable if I inserted in my book something to elucidate the nature of the ‘Indifferency’ in which liberty consists for the sake of those who value ‘Indifferency’ so highly in this argument that they think that, if it is laid aside or omitted, nothing can be rightly or clearly established about liberty. Here then is what I think should be added to §71, I wrote it in English; Mr. Coste has translated it into French, and so, if you approve, you can insert it in the French translation of my book.” (Correspondence VII, pp. 412-414 [#7 #2979]). To which de Beer, the editor of the Correspondence, added this footnote: “The additional passage is inserted in the fifth edition of the Essay, where it forms the later part of II.xxi.71, following ‘guided by his own Judgement’; and with slight variations in the second and later editions of Coste’s translation, but not in the piracy of 1723 (it was not inserted in the later editions of the Latin translation). Coste, writing to Leibniz on 25 August 1707, states that Locke made this and other additions and alterations to controvert van Limborch’s views: Leibniz, Phil. Schriften, ed. Gerhardt, iii. pp. 392-9; he also calls attention to Le Clerc’s remarks on this addition in Biblioteque choisie xii. 99-105.” (DeBeer, ed., Correspondence VII, p. 413).

See my Appendix III.

For example, in §50 it takes the form of “That in this state of ignorance we short-sighted creatures might not mistake true felicity, we are endowed with a power to suspend any particular desire, and keep it from determining the will, and engaging us in action.” [italics mine] See also §47, where a version of “suspend ... desire” occurs 3x; and likewise in §51 (1x); §52-(4x); and §71 (1x).

[italics mine]

[italics mine ]; the rest of it being; "...; and from the not using of it right comes all that variety of mistakes, errors, and faults which we run into in the conduct of our lives, and our endeavours after happiness; whilst we precipitate the determination of our wills, and engage too soon before due examination.” (II.xxi.47) Nidditch, ed., Essay, 263-4 (see also §§ 50, 51, 52, 56, 71; as well as the final page of my “Conclusion” in my Chapter X). Interestingly, Fraser’s “pushback” footnotes to what Locke says in §47 (Fraser’s §48) demonstrate that he at least is not buying Locke’s particular rendering of freedom: “Free agency with Locke thus consists at last in ‘power to suspend’ volition. But unless in this man rises above a merely natural causation of motives, he is no more ethically free in suspending the voluntary execution of a desire than in any other exercise of will. A power to suspend volition, necessarily thus dependent, leaves man still a part of the mechanism of nature”; and “This recognition of power in the agent to ‘suspend’ conversion of desire into will is the nearest approach Locke makes to recognition of the spiritual freedom that is supernatural. But after all, on his premises, the suspension must be the natural issue of uneasiness.” Fraser, ed., Essay, 345, fns 1-2 (see also my fn #44, 46 and 122).

See also my fn #192.

In the 1690 first edition, this is expressed at §30, p. 124; in the 5th [Nidditch] edition, it is in §48, p. 264 [italics mine].

It is in lieu of this “change” that others such as Chappell (“Locke on the Freedom of the Will,” [pdf] pp. 9-10), Darwall (The British Moralists and the Internal ‘Ought,’ pp. 162-75), Schouls (Reasoned Freedom: John Locke and Enlightenment, pp. 117-72), Colman (John Locke’s Moral Philosophy, pp. 207-20), and Yaffe (Liberty Worth the Name: Locke on Free Agency, pp. 27-64; and “Locke on Refraining, Suspending, and the Freedom to Will”) allow for various degrees of libertarian attribution to Locke.

§48 being the only one to which Coste alerts Leibniz in his 1707 letter.
Molyneux had warned Locke about the dangers of the Essay’s even alluding to infinite regress in his April 18, 1693 letter to Locke (i.e., “Hobbsianism” lurks): “I know tis none of your Busines to ingage in Controversy, or remove Objections; save only such as seem immediately to strike at your Own Positions; and therefore I cannot insist upon what I am now going to mention to you; However I will give you the Hint, and Leave the Considerations thereof to your own Breast. The tenth Chapter of your fourth Book is a Most Exact Demonstration of the Existence of a God. But perhaps it might be more full, by an Addition against the Eternity of the World, and that all things have not been going on, in the same Manner, as we now see them, *ab æterno*. I have known a Pack of Philosophical Atheists, that reley much on this Hypothesis; and even Hobbs himself does somewhere alledge (If I am not forgetful tis in his Book de Corpore in the Chapter de Universo) that the same Arguments, which are brought against the æternity of the World, may serve as wel against the æternity of the Creatour of the World. [sic]” *(Correspondence IV, pp. 667-9 [#1622])*.

(although it must be admitted that it is a limpid support; one makes an effort to find it so -- and indirectly -- only because the changes don’t otherwise signal much of an alternative rationale for their actually being necessary. See my Appendix III).

(because Locke himself makes it transparent in that August 12, 1701 letter to Limborch when he submits the whole text to Limborch for Limborch’s review *(Correspondence VII, pp. 412-414 [#7 #2979]*)

See my Appendix VIII.

See my footnote #18.


See my Appendix VI, #21.5.

See my Appendix VI, #21.

See my Appendix VI, #20. 6.

All other 10 instances of the word “suspend” (or some derivation thereof) appearing in the chapter come accompanied by the word “desire,” not “determination.”

See my Appendix VI, ##21.2,3.

See my Appendix VI, #21.4.

See my Appendix VI, #5.

See my Appendix VI, #4. 3.

Then again, LeClerc suggests there is a “theological” context that he doesn’t want to go into regarding how God’s graces can be spread throughout the human race to to help a wicked man that Locke references take steps to correct himself. (See my Appendix VI, #11).

See my Appendix VI, #2. 1.

See my Appendix VI, #3. 2.

See my Appendix VI, #12.

(1657-1736) Like Limborch, an Arminian theologian from Amsterdam, and friend to those of similar intellectual interests such as Locke, Shaftesbury, Coste, Bayle, etc. LeClerc seemed to be the godfather of French-speaking Amsterdam religious refugees in England in particular, since if he was not calling on their writing or editorial skills themselves he was able to place them in English families as tutors or serving assistants (which is how Coste got his job in the Masham household where Locke lived).

See my Appendix VI, #13.
I’d like to think that Matthew Stuart would agree with my interpretation that “bears on the question of whether [Locke thought in the end] it is possible to forbear willing” when Stuart writes “[t]hese new passages [in the fifth edition] have been said to show that at the end of his life he changed his mind about that issue, which would also mean changing his mind about whether it is possible to will freely. Yet a closer look at the circumstances in which the new passages were composed tells against the idea that he had any such change of heart.” Thus while Stuart differs with me in that he thinks whatever textual material Locke was referring to in his correspondence with Limborch prior to his death is reflected in the fifth edition (which I don’t), Stuart (1) believes others like Chappell and Yaffe have nevertheless made more of Locke’s supposed pre-deathbed conversion in favor of a free will view than is warranted (i.e., Locke never changed his view; moreover, Limborch never believed he’d changed his view; nor did Locke ever change Limborch’s view), and (2) admits that the lack of an evidentiary trail regarding those “here and there” explication insertions that Locke tells Limborch he’ll introduce is worth lamenting, since it means that readers of the fifth edition will draw mistaken conclusions about what Locke actually intended. As Stuart notes, “It seems quite likely that the lost enclosure contained the passages that were added to II.xxi.23–25 and II.xxi.56 in the fifth edition [[Stuart fn#15: “Chappell simply says that the material added to II.xxi.56 was in the enclosure, as though this were a known fact (Chappell 1994a, 119). One might dispute the idea that the passages added to II.xxi.23–25 and II.xxi.56 were in the enclosure. For Locke says that the enclosure is meant to clarify matters on which van Limborch still has questions, and at that point van Limborch was no longer pressing him on the issues addressed in those passages. Van Limborch did still have questions about Locke’s view of the roles played by the understanding and the will, and at II.xxi.48 [5th] Locke inserts a passage about that. Presumably this passage was in the missing enclosure. Yet it consists of just a few sentences. Surely the enclosure must have contained more than that? Besides the addition to II.xxi.71 -- which Locke had sent van Limborch earlier -- the only other significant fifth edition changes to II.xxi are the additions to sections 23–5 and 56. What seems likely is that these passages were in the missing enclosure, and that Locke addressed the questions that van Limborch had raised -- not just the ones that he was still pressing -- because Locke was writing not just for van Limborch but for future readers of the Essay.”]]. This is significant because in his letter Locke makes it clear that the material in the enclosure is meant to prevent the misunderstanding of views that he had already advanced, not to change his position on matters of consequence. If the enclosure contained the passages later added to II.xxi.23–25 and II.xxi.56, this is a reason for thinking that Locke did not intend those passages as retractions of any sort. ... What [Locke] did not do is take sufficient care to ensure that the inserted material made it clear to a reader of the Essay how little Locke was actually conceding. He did not take sufficient care that the new passages would be understood as he knew that van Limborch would understand them, and as he meant for them to be understood. To explain this editorial failure, we might remind ourselves of the excuse that Locke offers van Limborch in the letter that included these interpolations: ‘If there are in your letter any things that you think I have not answered clearly enough,’ he says, ‘please make allowance for uncertain health, which renders me more languid and less fit for writing’ (Corresp., 7, #3043, 505).” (Stuart, Locke’s Metaphysics, pp. 482-493).
Incidentally, it’s not as though Locke were the only “confused” philosophical renegade on the notion of the freedom of indifference, despite Coste’s implying otherwise. Even Leibniz, to whom Coste had submitted the record of fifth-edition revisions in 1707, held a wavering view on indifference and seemed to change his position upon reflection of Locke’s pre-posthumous premises. While Leibniz had originally been on record endorsing both the notion of freedom of indifference and its link to the suspension mechanism during his 1680s correspondence with Arnauld, where he would emerge writing that “[i]n an absolute sense the will is in a state of indifference insofar as this is the opposite of necessity, and it has the power to act otherwise or also to suspend its action entirely, since both alternatives are and remain possible” ([§30, *Discourse on Metaphysics*, http://www.anselm.edu/homepage/dbanach/Leibniz-Discourse.htm#XXX; see also Frankel, “Being Able to do Otherwise,” p. 191), Leibniz’s response to Coste’s inquiry about the term in late 1707 was that he himself only accepted a generalized freedom of indifference because it “saves us from necessity.” An “absolute indifference of equilibrium,” on the other hand, would be a step too far since it “exempt[ed] us from determining reason” and hence became “a chimera which shocks the principles of good sense.” (Letter to Coste on 19 Dec 1707: *Philosophical Essays*, pp. 193-5).

By 1710, however, Leibniz would so refine his position on indifference that he actually went head-to-head with Locke’s old antagonist William King in an effort to destroy King’s extravagant endorsement of the principle. Leibniz’s critique against King centered on King’s 1702 essay on freewill, which had comprised the final and best-known chapter of King’s *De Origine Mali*. King’s blatant abandonment of reason in favor of the will (and its partnership with the state of indifference) had shocked Leibniz, who’d put so much weight on his own principle of sufficient reason as fulcrum of all argument. Hence King’s defense of the indifference principle became Leibniz’s target of attack (see Leibniz’s Appendix to his *Theodicy*).

Milton minimizes Coste’s status under Locke -- disputes Coste’s being Locke’s “philosophical secretary” or “intellectual aide” or “amanuensis” or “manservant” (Milton, “Pierre Coste, John Locke, and the Third Earl of Shaftesbury,” *Studies on Locke: Sources, Contemporaries, and Legacy*, p.197).

appearing in the *Nouvelles de la République des Lettres* in 1705 written with the help of LeClerc’s notes which he’d written upon request from Damaris Masham (see English version in “The Character of Mr. Locke; in a Letter to the Author of the Nouvelles de la Republique des Lettres,” *A collection of several pieces of Mr. John Locke, never before printed, or not extant in his works*, iv-xxiii. See also my Appendix III).

This letter emerged “anonymously” when Collins heard in 1720 that mutual friend Pierre Desmaizeaux would be publishing a volume of Locke’s posthumous works which would include Coste’s *Eloge* among its introductory documents (see my fn above), Collins made sure Desmaizeaux would be at least aware of and hopefully include a counterview of Coste as well (“The Character of Mr. Locke; by Mr. Peter Coste: with a Letter relating to that Character, and to the Author of it. A Letter to Mr. * * * * * *.” *A collection of several pieces of Mr. John Locke, i-iii*). According to Bastide, Collins, having been told of a letter Coste had sent to an “Abbé Dauxi” which allegedly confirmed the worst Dauxi had heard about Locke and his “impiety,” became outraged. But when Coste found out about this accusation he denied it and made sure everyone understood his denial by reprinting his Locke obituary in the 1729 second edition of his French translation of the *Essay*, writing “If my voice is useless to the glory of Locke, it will sere at least to witness that having seen and admired his fine qualities, it was a pleasure for me to perpetuate their memory.” (Bastide, *The Anglo-French Entente in the Seventeenth Century*, p. 182). See also my fn #340.

(it had been at the bequest of his grandfather, the 1st Earl of Shaftesbury, who worried that his son / Shaftesbury’s father had been too mentally handicapped to cultivate his grandson properly [Shaftesbury, “Indented Letter from the Earl of Shaftesbury, Author of the ‘Characteristicks,’ to Le Clerc, Respecting Locke,” *Notes and Queries: Medium of Inter-Communication for Literary Men, Artists, Antiquaries, Genealogists, Etc.*, pp. 98-9])
and first “full” translation. (In 1688, an earlier “abstract” (Abrege) of the Essay had been translated into French by LeClerc at Locke’s request for publication and review in one of LeClerc’s literary magazines)

Locke knew enough French to read and translate French texts into English (he’d translated and had published Pierre Nicole’s Essais de morale in 1677-8: <http://www.libraries.psu.edu/tas/locke/bib/ch0k.html#Nicole>), and hence would have presumably been able to assess whether Coste’s translation more or less mirrored his English text. But he did not apparently know enough to confidently translate English texts into French himself.

(Limborch only being able to access the decade-old text with any comprehension after the aforementioned first French and Latin translations had come out. See my Chapter VI)

29 August 1632 – 28 October 1704

though an unchanged republication of the first 1700 French translation appeared in 1714, and a pirated version of the second edition of the Essay’s French translation appeared in 1723.

(i.e., by this time he’d been doing much freelance work elsewhere on the continent)

Other than the 528-worded text for §71 that Locke appended to his Aug. 17, 1701 letter (the text of which matches word-for-word, albeit in French, what will appear in the posthumous 1706 English 5th edition of the Essay -- see [#2979]; Correspondence, VI, 412-414); see also my fn #310.

(as in the 159 words added to §48 [out of a total of 438] and the 274 words added to §56 [out of a total of 343])

((which had 102 fewer words in the posthumous edition [the previous 1700 4th edition text had 304 words])

(as a result of much pleading from the non-English speakers on the continent who’d long heard about this intriguing natural philosopher from England and wanted to read his work for themselves).

Alexander Campbell Fraser (1819-1914)

(which had been the edition most used in libraries and classrooms until the [more carefully-edited] Nidditch version came along in 1979)

In the “Epistle,” Locke had tried to defend himself against his critics by giving his readers a sense of the background circumstances which prompted his writing the Essay in the first place (the famous “five or six friends meeting at my chamber ...” section -- see Fraser, ed., Essay, 9-10) and a rationale for its overall design and execution. The “Epistle” itself got updated slightly upon each successive edition -- with Locke’s having clearly added in his own hand an update for the important second edition changes (including a special paragraph devoted to his remarks regarding the “Of Power” chapter alone, where he says, “What I had there writ ["in Book II. Chap. 21"] concerning liberty and the will, I thought deserved as accurate a view, as I was capable of; those subjects having in all ages exercised the learned part of the world, with questions and difficulties, that have not a little perplexed morality and divinity; those parts of knowledge, that men are most concerned to be clear in. Upon a closer inspection into the working of men’s minds, and a stricter examination of those motives and views they are turned by, I have found reason somewhat to alter the thoughts I formerly had concerning that, which gives the last determination to the will in all voluntary actions. This I cannot forbear to acknowledge to the world with as much freedom and readiness, as I at first published what then seemed to me to be right; thinking myself more concerned to quit and renounce any opinion of my own, than oppose that of another, when truth appears against it. For it is truth alone I seek, and that will always be welcome to me, when or from whence soever it comes.” [F-Essay, p. 16]).

“questionable,” because it quickly becomes clear when reading them (and Fraser’s well-intentioned footnotes) that Locke’s authorial “voice” had already been substantially interfered with over the years. While the 15th and final paragraph is the one with which I’m most concerned, the footnoted history Fraser gives us for the prior fourteen tacked-on paragraphs first prompts my finding the significant 15th paragraph particularly insidious.
Of the final fifteen tacked-on paragraphs listed in the Fraser, he says the first five appeared in the 2nd-4th editions but were “omitted in the posthumous editions” ((they had concerned moral rules and were apparently directed towards some criticism Locke had received from James Lowde in his Discourse Concerning the Nature of Man in 1694). [F-Essay, p. 17, fn #2; Nidditch puts the passages of these paragraphs on a later page, in footnotes, and not in the text itself]); the 6th paragraph was inserted into the posthumous edition (encouraging the reader to really try to understand Locke’s words and intentions even when Locke admits he might be less than clear [F-Essay, pp. 20-1]); the 7th paragraph had apparently always been there (documented in a footnote in both the Fraser and the Nidditch); the 8th paragraph appeared in the Essay’s 1694 [second] edition but was omitted in the 1700 [fourth]; and the 9th through 14th paragraphs had been added to the 1700 [fourth] edition.

(i.e., the fifteen paragraphs I’ve just mentioned, plus the thirteen previous to them which were already in the “Epistle” by at least the Essay’s second edition of 1694)

Fraser long being seen as having his own nonsensical numbering system, the “sixth” edition being referred to now is understood by Nidditch as the fifth, and thus was what appeared in our notorious 1706 posthumous edition (the 1710 edition had few changes). Note Nidditch’s final “Epistle” paragraph, which reads: “In this fifth Edition, there is very little added or altered; the greatest part of what is new, is contained in the 21 Chapter of the second Book, which any one, if he thinks it worth while, may, with a very little Labour, transcribe into the Margin of the former Edition.” [N-Essay, p. 14]

with the help of details provided privately to him by Damaris Masham and the 3rd earl of Shaftesbury

LeClerc’s Elogé (Bibliothèque Choisie VI, 1705) pp. 379-80.

usually given as 1695.

See my Appendix VII for text.

this does not appear in the 1729 edition

(the 1729 edition incidentally includes more obviously some Coste-chosen extracts from Locke’s letters to Stillingfleet and from Coste’s Eloge Historique tribute to Locke, which Coste had originally written in French with Damaris Masham’s apparent approval for the Nouvelles de la république des lettres newsletter of Feb. 1705 (this latter item is the tribute which became the cause of so much consternation in the Collins camp in 1720, which is what Collins would submit along with his own Coste-disparaging letter to the publisher about to publish Locke’s previously-unpublished works. See also my fn #316)

(the “Monsieur Locke Au Librarie” section in the front matter)

(which, remember, had still been published 23 years after the release of the important 1706 posthumous English edition)

(i.e., the “Avertissement du Traducteur”)

i.e., from paragraphs ¶¶ 2, 5, and 9,27 along with an additional line to ¶728, explanation for which is predictably not given)

(the “Avis sur cette Seconde Édition”)
It was only his own self-restraint and prudence, boasted Coste, which prevented his taking more license to correct and improve on what Locke had said -- though he also admitted that had he actually "amended" anything, critics would likely have been all over him in protest for his having "interfered" with the great man's words: "En relisant l'Ouvrage de M. Locke, j'ai été frappé d'un défaut que bien des gens y ont observé depuis long-temps: ce sont les répétitions inutiles. M. Locke a pressenti l'Objection; & pour justifier les répétitions dont il a grossi son Livre, il nous dit dans la Préface, qu'une même notion ayant différens rapports, peut être propre ou nécessaire à prouver ou à éclaircir différentes parties d'un même discours, & que, s'il a répété les mêmes argumens, ça été dans des vuës différentes. L'excuse est bonne en général: mais il reste bien des repetitions qui ne semblent pas pourvoir être pleinement justifiées par-là. ¶ Quelques personnes d'un goût très-delicat m'ont extrémement sollicité à retrancher absolument ces sortes des répétitions qui paroissent plus propres à fatiguer qu'à éclaircir l'esprit du Lecteur: mais je n'ai pas osé tenter l'aventure. Car outre que l'entreprise me sembloit trop pénible, j'ai considéré qu'au bout du compte la plùpart des gens me blâmeroient d'avoir pris cette licence, par la raison qu'en retranchant ces répétitions, j'aurois sort bien pû laisser échaper quelque réflexion, ou quelque raisonnement de l'Auteur. Je me suis donc entierement borné à retoucher mon stile, & à redresser tous les Passages où j'ai cru n'avoir pas exprimé la pensée de l'Auteur avec assez de précision." (Coste, tr., Essai philosophique concernant l'entendement humain, 1729, xxi-xxii)

"Ces Corrections avec des Additions très-importantes faites par M. Locke, qu'il me communiqua lui-même, & qui n'ont été imprimées en Anglois qu'après sa mort, ont mis la Seconde Edition sort au dessus de la Primiére, & par conséquent, de la Reimpression qui en a été faite en 1723 en quelque Ville de Suisse qu'on n'a pas voulu nommer dans le Titre." (Coste, tr., Essai, 1729, xxi-xxii)

in the first run of the 1729 edition, at least (there seems to have been two separate printings -- or at least have two separate and slightly different pdf scans for 1729).

(and there is only notice of two word changes in the back matter of the 1735 edition: from "qu'ils" to "qu'elles" in §55, and from "donnerons" to "donneront" in §56. (Coste, tr., "Corrections & fantes d'impression," Essai (back matter not paginated in this edition))).

as he repeats ten times in the chapter, in §47-(3); §50-(1); §51-(1); §52-(4); and §71-(1).

in section §56 alone

(given that at that point in 1707 they'd only appeared in the 1706 posthumous English edition; where would the French copy have come from? We're talking 186 extra words given in French to Leibniz for §48 [which would add up to 159 extra words in the 1706 English edition itself], and 518 extra words given in French to Leibniz for §56 [which would add up to 274 extra words in the 1706 English edition itself])

(I cannot as yet find an instance of Leibniz's having puzzled over these unexplained additions to §48 or §56 at all -- at least not in the way I have)

[which would add up to 159 extra words in the 1706 English edition]

[which would add up to 274 extra words in the 1706 English edition]

(or at least in any other obvious venue that I can find)


(and like others, forced at one time to flee when Louis XIV revoked the Edict of Nantes in 1685)

Coste's own brother had been beheaded by Louis XIV troops while plotting an insurrection -- with, interestingly enough, Abraham Mazel, a leader in 18th-century Camisard (Huguenot) uprisings, who also was beheaded. Coincidentally, Abraham Mazel is believed to be (possibly) a relative of David Mazel, who happened to be the French translator of Locke's *Two Treatises* (Savonius, "The Du Gouvernement Civil of 1691 and Its Readers," *The Historical Journal*, p. 59. See also Vartanian, "Review: 'Lettres Inddites de Le Clerc à Locke,' Edited by Gabriel Bonno," *Modern Philology*, p. 223).
After viewing the LeClerc letters, Vartanian speculates on the difficult situation the Huguenot refugees must have faced: "We observe, for instance, that Le Clerc had a more practical and even opportunistic bent than was previously recognized, although, given his circumstances, one can hardly reproach him for it. If he never got the much coveted sinecure in England, it was, we learn, through no lack of maneuvering and compromise on his part. The letters also show him, now and then, in a slightly ridiculous light, as when, made no doubt overweening by his universal erudition, he scorned Leibniz’s critical comments on the Essay, which were brought to his attention in 1697 by an acquaintance: ‘Je croi ... qu’il ne vous entend pas, et je doute qu’il s’entende bien luimême, ce qui soit dit entre nous’ (p. 99). But the confidences made to Locke are perhaps most revealing about the deep discontents of the life of exile that Le Clerc’s religious convictions had led him to choose: ‘c’est une misère que de demeurer en Hollande, où il n’y a point d’espérance pour l’avenir, ni de douceur pour le présent’ (p. 770). Neither unremitting work nor European fame, it would seem, cured the bitterness of his soul. The niggardly and patronizing ways of the Dutch merchants and booksellers, on whom Le Clerc depended for his livelihood, offended his self-respect, not only because of the celebrity he had earned in the Republic of Letters, but also because he was a son of one of the ‘magnifiques seigneurs’ who had ruled the Republic of Geneva. The correspondence with Locke [and LeClerc] may be read, in many places, as a témoignage personnel about the psychological and sociological condition of the French Protestant émigrés, mirroring their sense of disillusionment and disinheritance which, in the thinking of certain exiles -- Bayle, in particular -- was to contribute subtly to the formation of the mentality of the enlightenment.” (Vartanian, “Review: ‘Lettres Inddites de Le Clerc à Locke,’” Modern Philology, p. 223. Vartanian page numbers within his text come from Bonno, ed., Lettres Inédites de Le Clerc a Locke, 1959).

The daughter of Ralph Cudworth, Damaris Masham had married the widower Francis Masham and become mother to his eight (or nine? the sources differ) children. While Masham and Locke had had a romantic interest in each other prior to her marriage, a warm friendship between them grew after that, and Locke was welcomed into the Masham household in 1691 and resided there until he died in 1704.

Despite their seven years together, Coste would not be Locke’s sole French translator, nor would Locke be Coste’s sole “client.” Nor would French be the only language from and/or into which Coste translated original works. Coste’s earlier studies had helped him pick up some facility in Italian, Latin, Greek and Hebrew; English he’d pick up w/ LeClerc’s prodding. So various other work projects of Coste’s included Gregorio Leti’s Oliver Cromwell (from Ital.), Francesco Redi’s De animalculis (from Ital.), Xenophone’s Hieron (from Grk), Newton’s Opticks (from Latin), William Stephens’ “A Lady’s Religion” (from English), and even Damaris Masham’s A Discourse Concerning the Love of God (from English). Most relevantly, perhaps, for the continued feeding of Coste’s Locke obsession was Coste’s translation into French of Shaftesbury’s Essay on the Freedom of Wit and Humour (from English).


regarding the issue of Locke's asserting that all that the Christian doctrine mandated was that one recognize that Christ was the Messiah and a good moral role model -- meaning that acknowledging Christ's divinity and resurrection was not so mandated. Coste vehemently disagreed with this, and made his opinion more prominent in his *The Reasonableness of Christianity* translation notes as the years went on. (Milton, “Pierre Coste,” pp. 212-3).

Of equal interest are Nuovo’s comments about Coste’s handling of the *Vindications*’s 1703 French translation: “[A]lthough it is largely composed of Locke’s own words rendered faithfully into French, it is not, in its composition, Locke's own work, nor is there any evidence that Locke closely watched over its design and execution, nor was he the originator of the plan to publish it. The very idea of producing a French version of the *Vindications* and the initiative to proceed with it seems to have originated with Coste and his publisher ... ¶ His translation of *The Reasonableness of Christianity* departs from the original format of a continuous text by the addition of chapter divisions and transitional sentences composed by the translator. His translation and abridgement of the *Vindications* differs even more. It belongs to the genre of a review or presentation of a work to the Republic of Learning through large extracts linked by commentary by an interpreter who pretends impartiality. By virtue of its impartiality the reviewer’s voice is elevated above that of the author and assumes a greater authority ... ¶ In the English versions, Locke, although remaining unnamed, is the presenter of his own thoughts. He entered the forum of public opinion to mount a spirited defence of himself and his work against his accuser and, finally, in the *Second Vindication*, to answer each and every charge made against him, relentlessly challenging his accuser to provide evidence for what he was sure were false and irresponsible accusations. Reputation was as much his concern as truth, for, in the public sphere, it was taken as a guarantee of an author’s truthfulness. In Coste's version, an impartial narrator and editor comes forward, who, to be sure, presents Locke's thoughts sympathetically in long direct quotations rearranged to give prominence to what is supposed to be the overall design or authorial intention. Mixed in with these extracts are comments and transitions by the ever present editor. On occasion Coste paraphrases rather than translates, and, on rare occasions, embellishes. In sum, whereas in the English *Vindications*, Locke speaks directly to the world; in the French, he is quoted and his voice calmed so that the substance of what he intended might be more objectively discernible to readers unfamiliar with their original context. It should not be surprising, then, that Coste has reduced the contents of Locke’s original work by one-third. The *Second Vindication* is, characteristically, a repetitious work, and it is fair to say, as readers may judge for themselves, that nothing of substance has been left out by Coste. The change in style has made the repetitions and rhetorical excesses of the original unnecessary. ¶ Coste has also reordered the contents of the English *Vindications*, arranging them under a set of eight heads that represent the main charges made by Edwards. The charges are recast as objections designed to seek understanding rather than as accusations meant only to vilify the accused.” (Nuovo, “Introduction to Pierre Coste’s French Version of the *Vindications*,” xcviii-cxii)


374 speculation including it being a new translation of the *Two Treatises* (Milton pp. 201-5), which had been originally (unsatisfactorily?) translated by David Mazel in 1601 (Milton, “Pierre Coste,” p. 204).

375 Locke’s stingy provisions for Coste were seen even by many of Locke’s friends and associates as unnecessarily callous, if not outright mean. (Milton, “Pierre Coste,” pp. 199-201, 204, 221)
Letter to Shaftesbury, 5 Sept 1708:
“J’ai employé depuis peu une journée à lire un volume de Lettres de Mr. Locke. Je doute que vous ayiez la patience d’en faire autant. Mr. Locke s’est admirablement bien peint lui-même dans ces Lettres, dont il fait lui seul le continuel sujet. On n’y parle que de lui, et de ses Livres qui sont comblez d’éloges sans fin. Son ami qu’il n’avoit jamais vu [William Molyneux], ne se fait connôitre à lui que par cette admiration constante de tout ce qui part de sa plume; et dès lors Mr. Locke tout penetré d’estime pour lui, le regarde comme un sincere amateur de la verité, auquel il ne saurait trouver son egal dans toute l’Angleterre. C’est presque à tout ce que contient cet amas de lettres. Je comprens fort bien que cet entretien devoit être fort agreable à Mr. Locke; mais je doute qu’il plaise beaucoup au Public, qui voit par ses propres yeux le fort et le foible des Livres de Mr. Locke, et que les éloges de Mr. Molineux ne sauraient lui faire trouver meilleurs. Pour moi j’aurois empêché la publication de ces Lettres par respect pour Mr. Locke, si la chose eut dependu de moi: mais puisqu’elles sont publikes je souhaite pour l’amour de Mr. Churchill qu’on s’empresse de les lire.80.” (Milton, “Pierre Coste,” p. 212.)

At the same time one might say Coste had tried to run interference regarding the “facts” of Locke’s life at least once. When an engraved portrait of Locke appeared in 1739 portraying him in a cape which signified his certification as a physician, Coste complained to the engraver, informing him that Locke had not formally received such certification but had only been awarded an honorary nod by King William, of which Locke refused to accept, since he still resented his being denied the license originally by Oxford authorities angered by his “anti-religious” philosophy. Bastide, *The Anglo-French Entente in the Seventeenth Century*, pp. 179-80.

Their friendship lasted from shortly after Locke’s death until Shaftesbury himself died in 1713.

Shaftesbury’s grandfather was the first Earl of Shaftesbury [1621-1683], intimate friend and well-placed political mentor of Locke’s during the 1680s when had to flee England because of his anti-Catholic views. Locke later was hired to serve as the younger Shaftesbury’s tutor and surrogate father as his own father, the second Earl of Shaftesbury [1652-1699], suffered with mental health problems all his life.

Apparantly Locke had failed as well to leave anything for his longtime friend and literary assistant James Tyrrell, who was central to the “circle of friends” with whom Locke was speaking when he came up with writing his Essay in the first place (Milton, “Pierre Coste,” p. 201. See also my fn #29). Milton notes the 1705 report from Amsterdam that De la Motte gave to Des Maizeaux about the quickly tarnishing reputation Locke was acquiring in the aftermath of his death, esp. regarding his treatment of Coste: “Vous avez raison de trouver estrange que Mr. Locke n’ait rien laissé par son Testament à M. Coste. Il y a peu de gens qui ait autant d’estime pour ce Grand homme que moi. Mais je ne saurais m’empêcher de regarder sa conduite à cet égard comme une tâche à sa Memoire. Il y a dans cette ville beaucoup d’honnêtes gens qui connoissoient et estimoient extremement Mr. Locke, mais tous ont été scandalisez de son ingratitude. Je suis presque assuré que si il pouvoit entendre tout ce qu’on a dit l à dessus, il se repentirait bien d’avoir négligé Mr. Coste.” Des Maizeaux himself would write Shaftesbury a few weeks later: “Voila Mr. Locke, qui avoit de si belles Qualités, et qui étoit si riche: ne s’est il pas, en quelque Maniere, deshonoré à sa Mort, par la maniere bizarre dont il a disposé de son Bien. Il en a comblé des gens à qui il ne le devoit pas, et n’a pas donné un sou à des personnes qui l’avoient servi utilement pendant plusieurs Années.” (Milton, “Pierre Coste,” 200-201)

(who? recipient not identified. Almost seems like it could have been Coste, but Shaftesbury and Coste had not yet met in person at this point. Would there have been anyone else with whom Shaftesbury could have dared share such thoughts so soon after Locke had died? Doubt it. Had Shaftesbury perhaps written the “letter” for himself, using its form instrumentally to record his own private thoughts?)

“It puts me in mind of one of those dying speeches which come out under the title of a Christian warning piece. I should never have guessed it to have been of a dying philosopher... Life is vain (‘tis true) to those that make it so. And let those cry vanity, for they have reason..... O Philosophy! Philosophy! ... the philosophers of our days are hugely given to wealth and bugbears; and philosophy seems at present to be the study of making virtue burdensome and death uneasy. ...[etc.]” (*The Life, Unpublished Letters, and Philosophical Regimen of Anthony, Earl of Shaftesbury*, pp. 344-7.)
the medical condition causing Locke and his grandfather to first meet, how Locke assisted his
grandfather in political affairs, how Locke agreed, upon the First Earl’s request, to find a wife for his son,
i.e., Shaftesbury’s father.

(Shaftesbury, “Inedited Letter from the Earl of Shaftesbury,” 98-9, for LeClerc’s “ Eloge de feu Locke” in
the Bibliothèque Choisie)

His letters have apparently been lost, though (Milton, “Pierre Coste,” p. 207, fn 50).

Years later De la Motte would write Des Maizeaux of the letter Locke left to Coste, leaving off the final
word for the reader’s imagination: “Je parle de la Lettre que M.L. lui écrivit deux jours avant sa mort pour
lui être rendue après sa mort. Il n’avait qu’à publier cette Lettre, et les gens les moins amis de la vertu,
conviendraient c’est le trait d’un ...” (Milton, “Pierre Coste,” p. 201)

It was only because the publisher that Des Maizeaux wanted to send them to had just published
Coste’s own Eloge that the letter never appeared in public -- the publisher being reluctant to follow up the
excessively lavish obituary so soon with such a vicious counter narrative (Milton, “Pierre Coste,” pp.
200-1).

Shaftesbury writing in one of his letters that “‘Twas Mr. Locke that struck at all Fundamentals, threw all
Order and Virtue out of the World, and made the very Ideas of these (which are the same as those of
God) unnatural, and without Foundation in our Minds.” (Letter to Michael Ainsworth of June 3, 1709: The
Life, Unpublished Letters, and Philosophical Regimen of Anthony, Earl of Shaftesbury, p. 403)

(by but faith alone, Shaftesbury thought, not by reason)

(which is what allowed him to avoid the concluding “poysen” of Hobbes’ philosophy -- spelled “poison”
in the spell-corrected Shaftesbury, The Life, Unpublished Letters, and Philosophical Regimen of Anthony,
Earl of Shaftesbury, p. 403)

“Then comes the credulous Mr. LOCKE, with his Indian, barbarian stories of wild nations, that have no
such idea, (as travellers, learned authors! and men of truth! and great philosophers! have inform’d him;) not
considering, that this is but a negative upon a hearsay, and so circumstatiated, that the faith of the
Indian denyer may be as well question’d, as the veracity or judgement of the relater; who cannot be
supposed to know sufficiently the mysteries and secrets of those barbarians; whose language they but
imperfectly know; and to whom we good Christians have by our little mercy given sufficient reason to
conceal many secrets from us; as we know particularly in respect of simples and vegetables: of which tho'
we got the peruvian bark, and some other noble remedies; yet ’tis certain, that through the cruelty of the
Spaniards, as they have own’d themselves, many secrets in medicinal affairs have been suppress’d.” (The Life, Unpublished Letters, and Philosophical Regimen of Anthony, Earl of Shaftesbury, pp. 403-4)

Milton’s words (“Pierre Coste,” p. 220, fn 113)

For example, as Coste quotes one section in his own “English” from his French translation of the
Locke version: “And ’tis no wonder She [virtue] prevailed not much in a State, where the Inconveniences
that attended her were visible, and at hand; And the Rewards doubtful, and at a distance. Mankind ... Could not but think themselves excused from a strict observation of Rules, which appeared so little to consist with their chief End, Happiness; Whilst they kept them from the enjoyments of this Life; And they had little evidence and security of another.” (from, according to Milton, Locke’s Reasonableness of

Dans la suite Mr. Locke entreprend de nous parler des opinions des Philosophes sur le chapitre de la Vertu, et il en parle comme un homme qui ne connoissoit ni ces opinions ni leurs Auteurs." (Milton, "Pierre Coste," p. 213)

Sardanapalis being a decadent [literary? mythical?] figure from approx. 7th c. BC whose self-indulgent life ended in an orgy of destruction.

Ironically, Collins’ power to later expose Coste’s hostility towards Locke more comprehensively was limited by the fact that so much of the evidence bore as many Shaftesbury’s fingerprints as it did of Coste’s (Milton, "Pierre Coste," 220). Nor were Shaftesbury and Coste alone in criticizing Locke for his selfishness and obliviousness to the feelings of others (Milton, “Pierre Coste," pp. 196, 200-1).

Or so do Peter Laslett and others believe. Milton asks whether the alterations seen in a posthumous edition of the Two Treatises had been based on annotations coming before or after Locke’s death. The provenance of the annotations is important since the posthumous edition of the Two Treatises was published with Coste’s guidance and control. (Milton, “Pierre Coste," pp. 201-5)

For example, Locke related to Molyneux that he’d heard from LeClerc that Coste had been proceeding “exceedingly slowly” in his translation of Locke’s Essay when Coste was still in Holland: (Locke to Molyneux: 3 May 1697: Correspondence VI, p. 107 [#2254]). And when Coste actually arrived and had been deployed at the Masham household, Locke answered a specific question of Molyneux’s about Coste’s skill in mathematics and natural history: “I think it is not much, but he is an ingenious man, and we like him very well for our purpose.” (Locke to Molyneux 1 Oct 1698; Correspondence VI, p. 294 [#2376])

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In his paper, “Descartes and the Seven Senses of Indifference in Early Modern Philosophy,” Thomas Lennon breaks down the various renditions of the word “indifference” and examines possible reasons why the version we are most interested in vis-à-vis Locke became so remarkably cogent in the 16th-18th centuries. Calling it “a residue of late Scholasticism,” he attributes its resurgence in part to a nervousness about the growing number of mechanization theories about the world coming out of the new science and philosophy of the time, where the principles of the gears moving inside a clock in the Strasbourg cathedral were seen as having “the same mechanical necessity” as the celestial tableau in the sky and in human behavior here on earth. This meant that the new explorations of an “undirected causality” were inevitably going to upset prior theological beliefs assuring people of God’s moral guidance in their lives. According to Lennon, these mechanistic theories were “perceived to threaten human freedom and responsibility” such as never been seen before — “to a degree unprecedented even by Stoic fatalism in antiquity or by predestinarian theories of grace in the Reformation,” he adds. And so the “freedom of indifference” principle was seen as “a block to [this] deterministic threat” being represented here by the machine metaphor of inevitable regularity. (Lennon, pp. 577-8)

If one can believe the google ngram analysis of the instances when the term “indifference” comes up in the written discourse in English letters between 1600 and 1800 (that is, in scanned English books, documents, etc., which is how google comes up with these charts), one might note that a particularly “noisy” period for the expression “liberty of indifference” comes in the middle of the 17th-century (that is, just a few decades prior to the time in which Locke was writing), with the expression “freedom of indifference” coming (or re-emerging) in the second half of the 18th-century. (See my Appendix XI)

(generally Jesuits, or other non-Jansenist Roman Catholics, along with those Anglicans like William King who situated themselves closer to the Roman Catholics in eschalogical doctrine.)


How absurd the narrative is becomes most clear when one listens to the contemporary theologian/philosopher Alvin Plantinga enthusiastically describing “a scenario very like the Christian story”: “Think about it: The first being of the universe, perfect in goodness, power and knowledge, creates free creatures. These free creatures turn their backs on him, rebel against him and get involved in sin and evil. Rather than treat them as some ancient potentate might — e.g., having them boiled in oil — God responds by sending his son into the world to suffer and die so that human beings might once more be in a right relationship to God. God himself undergoes the enormous suffering involved in seeing his son mocked, ridiculed, beaten and crucified. And all this for the sake of these sinful creatures,” (<http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/02/09/is-atheism-irrational/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0>)

The Reasonableness of Christianity, as Delivered in the Scriptures (1695).

A Vindication of the Reasonableness of Christianity, &c. from Mr. Edwards’ Reflections (1695); A Second Vindication of the Reasonableness of Christianity, &c. (1697).
John Edwards, *Some Thoughts Concerning the Several Causes and Occasions of Atheism*, pp. 112-114. Edwards would pummel Locke for two years regarding the *Reasonableness* for Locke’s having used only the gospels and acts of the apostles and not the apostles’ epistles (*STCTSCAOOA*, p. 110); for Locke’s having “contemptuously” limited Jesus’s role to being only the Messiah and *maybe* the son of God but not to being of a divine nature or of being part of a triune (*STCTSCAOOA*, pp. 105, 106, 109); for Locke’s being an elitist and having too much self-pride by intentionally trying to withhold the more complicated elements of the Christian doctrine from the illiterate and uneducated (*STCTSCAOOA*, pp. 110-113); for Locke’s being insufficiently self-loathing (Edwards, *Socinianism Unmask’d*, p. 18); and for Locke’s possibly holding Roman Catholic views (*SU*, pp. 44-51) or Islamic views (because of the proximity of Socinians to Muslim converts in E. Europe) *SU*, pp. 52-5).

(Nor, by the way, was Locke Edwards’s sole “natural philosopher” target. Snobelen points out how Edwards, in his 1714 work *Some Brief Critical Remarks on Dr. Clarke’s Last Papers*, had similarly attacked Newton and the General Scholium he’d added to his *Principia* for its apparent anti-Trinitarian or Socinian views. According to Snobelen, the Edwards attack came primarily from Newton’s having chosen to make the defining principle of God not one of absolute ontological substance but rather one of “relative” sovereignty and dominion, thus relegating the status of the “Son of God” -- i.e., Christ -- to that of a mere provisional “God” or ruler; one subordinate to and of a different nature from the Father, and corresponding to something not unlike how Moses would be “God” to his brother Aaron or the Pharoah. [“Isaac Newton, Socinianism and ‘The One Supreme God,’” pp. 276-283. See also pdf link for Edwards’s notes in *Newton Project Canada*: <http://isaacnewton.ca/newtons-general-scholium/>] It is also known now that the private libraries of both Locke and Newton contained controversial Socinian works, with Newton being a frequent borrower from Locke’s more extensive collection of at least 43 Socinian texts)

Locke might not have been a Hobbist -- that is, someone who, as Lambrecht outlines the political typology in four tenets, believed that “(1) God made man such a beast and rascal that he inclines universally to malice and fraud ...; (2) [No real distinction lies] between moral right and moral wrong ...; (3) A *de facto* ruler is always justified in all his ways...; [and] (4) Appeal to law as a protection of popular rights is essentially invalid... “ Nor in fairness could any of these more “maximal” attributes be imputed to Hobbes himself, either (Lambrecht, “Hobbes and Hobbsism,” 32-3). But clearly, on key metaphysical issues like materialism, nominalism, determinism, ethical relativism and egoistic psychology, Locke evinced similar, albeit far less boldly stated Hobbsian views (Mintz, *The Hunting of Leviathan*, 81). It is mostly in his political theory where Locke supports the idea of a constitutional monarchy rather than the all-powerful sovereign of Hobbes’s where their differences are most stark.

On the other hand, atheist reputation aside, there has been some minor contestation about whether even Hobbes was not a Calvinist of some sort or not. See the lively dispute between Curley and Martinich in *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, pp. 257-285. Here Martinich, himself a Reform Calvinist, takes Hobbes’s words on revealed religion at face value, whereas Curley thinks many of Hobbes’s so-called Calvinist commitments were intended to be ironic.
Nowhere in Locke’s work does Locke admit to having endorsed any of Hobbes’ arguments, let alone to have read many of them other than secondhand. For example, when Locke sought to find out whether Filmer had based any of his Patriarcha arguments regarding Adam’s sovereignty on Hobbes’s own Leviathan (Locke believed he had), Locke wrote as though he had to take Filmer’s report about Hobbes’s view as his single source rather than admit that he had independently consulted the original source himself (First Treatise on Government, §14). On the other hand, Locke became quite expert in turning the tables of his Hobbes-hating accusers against them by alluding to their having what we might call an “all-too-close philosophical acquaintance” with the Leviathanian author. When Richard Willis accused Locke of having used some of Hobbes’s arguments for the tenets comprising his own Reasonableness of Christianity, for example, Locke rather self-righteously insisted that his arguments were deriving only from “the writers of the four Gospels and the Acts,” and that it was perhaps Willis who should be seen as the one more preferring Hobbes to Scripture (Second Vindication, Works VI, 420-421). Locke used the same strategy when Stillingfleet accused Locke of having absorbed Hobbes and Spinoza regarding Locke’s speculations about “thinking matter” and what that might imply regarding the notion of the Trinity. Feigning surprise and pleading his own “ignorance” of their work, Locke instead suggested that perhaps it was the Bishop of Worcester who shared a closer acquaintance with the two (“I am not so well read in Hobbes or Spinoza, as to be able to say what were their opinions in this matter,” Reply to Stillingfleet’s Second Letter, Works III, 477)). And Locke went on the offensive even more so against John Norris, using the Hobbes-Spinoza cudgel against Norris’s Malebranchean Occasionalism as a way of better illustrating what Norris’s philosophy actually contained (“A man cannot move his arm or his tongue; he has no power; only upon occasion, the man willing it, God moves it. The man wills, he doth something; or else God, upon the occasion of something, which he himself did before, produced this will, and this action in him. This is the hypothesis that clears doubts, and brings us at last to the religion of Hobbes and Spinoza by resolving all, even the thoughts and will of men, into an irresistible fatal necessity. For whether the original of it be from the continued motion of eternal all-doing matter, or from an omnipotent immaterial being which, having begun matter, and motion, continues it by the direction of occasions which he himself has also made; as to religion and morality, it is just the same thing. But we must know how every thing is brought to pass, and thus we have it resolved, without leaving any difficulty to perplex us. But perhaps it would better become us to acknowledge our ignorance, than to talk such things boldly of the Holy One of Israel, and condemn others for not daring to be as unmannerly as ourselves.” Locke, Remarks Upon Some of Mr. Norris’s Books, Works IX, 255-6 [§16]).

Whether one believes Locke’s pointed association of these various critics of his with Hobbes and Spinoza was truly serious or merely a Straussian gesture meant to deflect the focus of his own adoption of much of their metaphysics likely depends on how much one assumes Locke was enjoying his rejoinders in general.

Lennon offers a number of additional sources describing this principle. He quotes King as saying “[T]ho’ [an agent] be naturally free from any determination, yet the Nature of the thing requires, that it should be determined in every particular occasion [to act or not]: and since there is nothing external to do this, it remains that it determine itself. We shall call this Determination an Election; for as it is naturally indifferent to many things, it will please itself in electing one before another.” (“Descartes and the Seven Senses of Indifference,” fn#1, p. 595). Paraphrasing Fénelon, Lennon says that “[W]illing is, in a sense, blind. ‘Objects might entice me to will them with all their pleasures; reasons for willing might be presented to me with their full allure; [God] might draw me with His most persuasive inspirations. But in the end, [despite all this,] I still remain master of my power of willing or not willing ... ’I know of no reason for choosing other than my willing itself.’ Just as God acts without constraint or necessity in creating when He says, ‘Let there be light,’ so we act in our volitions.” (pp. 586-7) Paraphrasing Lucretius, Lennon renders libertarian volition as something that “occurs fortuitously, capriciously, as a surprise even to the agent, and that is not anything that would be described as voluntary for it just happens, out of the blue. However, something voluntary should not be capricious or fortuitous; it is something for which the agent is responsible, for which he stands up and says, ‘It is mine; I did it.’” (Lennon pp. 578-587)

Marshall says Locke had originally accepted the teachings of his childhood that man had inherited considerable sin from Adam’s lapse, and that this was further strengthened when he translated a few chapters from Nicole’s Discourses in the early 1670s. But this started to shift in the late 1670s (Marshall, John Locke: Resistance, Religion & Responsibility, p. xx). Marshall claims that in the end Locke attributed man’s sinful nature not to the Fall but rather to the natural effect of man’s being “fragile” (p. 27). In fact, Locke would come to attack the Calvinist version of the Fall altogether (pp. 29, 388-, 397).
“when Calvinism was the fashion in England,” Masham reportedly wryly noted. (Marshall, JL: RR&R, p. 331)

See his advice on meals in Some Thoughts on Education (§14), where he advises that a diet of dry bread and water alone cures most gastro-intestinal problems. Works VIII, pp. 15-17.

Masham herself apparently found this change highly amusing, and reportedly attributed it to Locke’s “being unaccustomed to hear ‘theologians speak in such a reasonable manner’” (Marshall, JL: RR&R, p. 331).

MacIntyre’s moral genealogy also detects a major change that occurs after Calvin’s Reformation regarding the place of reason, though he sees the state of affairs before Protestantism as being a combined Nichomachean “present actuality / future potentiality” joined by rational judgement which then gets a theistic medieval gloss when attached to God’s divine law (“Moral sentences are thus used within this framework to make claims which are true or false,” summarizes MacIntyre). Once Protestantism and “Jansenist Catholicism” come onto the scene, however, a “new conception of reason” appears -- one that can offer “no genuine comprehension of man’s true end; that power of reason was destroyed by the fall of man. [With] ‘Si Adam integer stetisset’, on Calvin’s view, reason [is now] powerless to correct our passions … Reason does not comprehend essences or transitions from potentiality to act; these concepts belong to the despised conceptual scheme of scholasticism. Hence anti-Aristotelian science sets strict boundaries to the powers of reason. Reason is calculative; it can assess truths of fact and mathematical relations but nothing more. In the realm of practice therefore it can speak only of means. About ends it must be silent.” MacIntyre recognizes in Hume (“one who was brought up a Calvinist”) many of these same views. MacIntyre, After Virtue, pp. 53-4.

If what were suspended were desires and not determinations -- see problem with §56.

Actually, many of those who regarded themselves as empiricists found the “liberty of indifference” part of the supernatural they were leery of recognizing, seeing it as providing a kind of convenient serve-up of divine mystery that closed off any further explanation of the world for which just simple and careful observation might offer its own profitable insights.

On the other hand, corresponding to the overall thesis I am trying to advance in this paper, in 1989 Draper introduced a wholly distinct “hypothesis of indifference” [“HI”] and defined it according what it did not claim: “[N]either the nature nor the condition of sentient beings on earth is the result of benevolent or malevolent actions performed by non-human persons. Unlike theism, HI does not entail, that supernatural beings exist and so is consistent with naturalism. But HI is also consistent with the existence of supernatural beings. What makes HI inconsistent with theism is that it entails that, if supernatural beings do exist, then no action performed by them is motivated by a direct concern for our well-being.” ("Pain and Pleasure: An Evidential Problem for Theists," p.332)

which I’d used in my “Shoe Horn” (Ch. I of this paper). Credit for the original coinage is wholly attributable to that of my advisor, Prof. Stefan Baumrin.

(especially as contrasted with the parallel constructions designed by Hobbes and Cudworth, each of which remains logically valid despite being comprised of entirely opposed philosophical positions)

(and indeed renewed attention has been given to Hume’s use of human sympathy as the sole grounds for morality – see Herdt, "The Rise of Sympathy and the Question of Divine Suffering," The Journal of Religious Ethics; see also my fn #453, where I sketch out Herdt’s mapping of influences in her paper.)

See also my opening excerpts from Plato’s Parmenides and Aristotle’s De Anima in my front matter.

Certainly the notion that it might be a camouflage found support from the Straussian school, but since (1) Strauss seems to find such camouflaging in everyone in the philosophical canon he chooses to talk about -- Plato, Maimonides, Spinoza, now Locke -- that in itself doesn’t serve as a particularly useful item of distinction anymore; and (2) Strauss seemed to allow for more craftiness in Locke than I think the often inelegant expositor deserved.

See particularly my Chapter I.d and my fn ## 47, 57, 88, 140, 220 and 280.
Though as I note elsewhere in the dissertation, Fraser has since been taken to task by many current scholars like Schouls and Aarsleff who found much simple factual error in the Fraser edition, especially in the dropped, replaced or “added-to” assertions – see my fn ## 7, 8, 58.

(where Locke first unveils his “uneasiness” thesis, after having conceded to Molyneux that “if it be possible for God to make a free agent, then man is free, though I see not the way of it” – see my fn #203)

(where Limborch and Locke continue to dispute where the last judgement of the will falls in the sequence of a decision to do or not do – see my fn #242-250)

Darwall, *British Moralists*, pp. 149-175.

*Special note*: I want to thank my advisor Stefan Baumrin for his having introduced me to, among many other things, the precepts of Calvinism, which would not only enlighten my uninformed intuitions about the possible genealogical derivations of notions like hypocrisy, free will, and determinism, but would also help me match these notions against the more arcane work of the 17th/18th century moral philosophers/scientists who either deployed or ignored the Calvinist operators to drive such notions forward.


(and so do some others, like Sarah Hutton ...)

(because God was perfect and solely determined to the “good,” not just occasionally, as man was – see my Chapter IV.f.a.)

(Hobbes’ God had the power to do what he wanted, which man did not, and thus, the issue of “goodness” aside, God was free and not man – – see my Chapter IV.f.a.)

Interestingly, though, while I’ve marked Cudworth as being a model of logical consistency and Locke’s being an exemplar of the logically compromised, Herdt actually attributes to *Cudworth* the original seventeenth-century theistic conundrum that is so important that it will accelerate the philosophical division between the religiously-committed (of the Laditudinarian type) and the religiously-disinterested (of the sentimentalist type) that we see in the eighteenth-century. Demonstrating how Cudworth’s allegiance to the principle of divine sympathy (which, as Herdt notes, the Stoics would have regarded as “morally weak” – p. 369) compromises those “consistent” free will assignments of Cudworth’s that I so lauded, Herdt argues that Cudworth “could not fail to notice that his claims about a sympathetic God were in tension with the divine attribute of impassibility. God certainly does not have passions, if they are understood as ideas a mind has because it is joined with a body, but ‘passion’ can mean many things: being acted upon or affected by an external agency, suffering negative feelings or sensations, or experiencing an overwhelming outburst of anger or wave of amorous feeling … But how can an impassible God be affected by, suffer from, what goes on in the world? If it is problematic for the active human soul to be subject to passive passions, how much more problematic is it for God, the ultimate source of all life and action, to be passive and subject to passion, even passion sympathetically experienced? Divine sympathy and divine impassibility seem irreconcilable.” (pp. 373-4). Herdt will go on to show how the “divine sympathy” part of the Cudworthian horn will further a “compassionate Jesus” focus (originating with the Latitudinarians, but later reformulated to respond to what were seen as the extraordinary human tragedies of the 19th and 20th centuries), while the “divine impassibility” part of the Cudworthian horn will further an interest in human-to-human sympathy (put forth by Shaftesbury, Hutchinson, and most importantly for Herdt, Hume) but will also prompt the dismissal of the importance of God role in human affairs. Herdt’s argument thus somewhat follows mine, except Herdt is tracking Cudworth and the [potentially absurd] notion of divine sympathy, while I am tracking Locke and the [potentially absurd] notion of [divine] uneasiness.
Locke also held a general scorn for many of the religious skeptics and agnostics who sought his favor (with some justification thinking Locke would be a natural and sympathetic ideological ally of theirs); Locke instead seemed to prefer the company of the more elite members of British/Continental society, who by definition would be expressing some sort of public theism.

See again Locke quotation in my Chapter II at the beginning of this paper (from Locke’s correspondence with Molyneux).

See quotes from Plato and Aristotle at the beginning of this paper.

Locke’s actual correspondence with the much younger man was only between the narrower period of mid-1703 and 1704; they’d met face-to-face just in the mere days before Locke died in 1704. Nevertheless Locke demonstrated a high degree of affection towards Collins, especially in those letters. Many of them carry tones similar to this one from Locke: “YOU, in yours of the 21st, say a great many very kind things: and I believe all that you say; and yet I am not very well satisfied with you. And how then is it possible to please you? will you be ready to say. Think that I am as much pleased with your company, as much obliged by your conversation, as you are by mine; and you set me at rest, and I am the most satisfied man in the world. You complain of a great many defects; and that very complaint is the highest recommendation I could desire, to make me love and esteem you, and desire your friendship. And if I were now setting out in the world, I should think it my great happiness to have such a companion as you, who had a true relish of truth, would in earnest seek it with me, from whom I might receive it undisguised, and to whom I might communicate what I thought true freely... ¶ “Believe it, my good friend, to love truth, for truth’s sake, is the principal part of human perfection in this world, and the seed-plot of all other virtues; and if I mistake not, you have as much of it as ever I met with in any body. What then is there wanting to make you equal to the best; a friend for any one to be proud of? Would you have me take upon me, because I have the start of you in the number of years, and be supercilious, conceited, for having in a long ramble travelled some countries, which a young voyager has not yet had time to see, and from whence one may be sure he will bring larger collections of solid knowledge?” (Locke to Collins 29 Oct 1703: Correspondence VII (?)).

“[I]t is a perfection to be necessarily determined in our choices, even in the most indifferent things; because if in such cases there was not a cause of choice, but a choice could be made without a cause, then all choices might be made without a cause, and we should not be necessarily determined by the greatest evidence to assent to truth, nor by the strongest inclination for happiness to choose pleasure and avoid pain; to all which it is a perfection to be necessarily determined. For if any action whatsoever can be done without a cause, then effects and causes have no necessary relation, and by consequence we should not be necessarily determined in any case at all.” (Collins, A Philosophical Inquiry Concerning Human Liberty, p. 60)

“If Liberty be defined a power to pass different judgements at the same instant of time upon the same individual propositions that are not evident (we being, as it is owned necessarily determined to pass but one judgement on evident propositions) it will follow that men will be so far irrational, and by consequence imperfect agents, as they have that freedom of judgement..” (IPICHL, p. 51)

“I cannot give a better confirmation of this argument from the consideration for the attributes of God than by the judgement of the late Bishop of Sarum ... [who] allows that a vast difficulty arises from it against the Liberty of God. For, says he, the immanent acts of God being supposed free, it is not easy to imagine how they should be one with the divine essence; to which necessary existence does most certainly belong. And if the immanent acts of God are necessary, then the transient must be so likewise, as being the certain effects of his immanent acts; and a chain of necessary fate must run through the whole order of things; and God himself then is no free being, but acts by a necessity of nature. And this necessity, to which God is thus subject, is, adds he, no absurdity to some. God is, according to them, necessarily just, true, and good, by an intrinsic Necessity that arises from his own infinite perfection...” (PICHL, pp. 57-8)

(contra Cudworth but in synch with Hobbes)
Indeed it seems strange that men should allow that God and angels act more perfectly because they are determined by reason; and also allow that clocks, watches, mills, and other artificial unintelligent beings are the better, the more they are determined to go right by weight and measure; and yet that they should deem in a perfection in man not to be determined by his reason, but to have Liberty to go against it. Would it not be as reasonable to say, it would be a perfection in a clock not to be necessarily determined to go right, but to have its motions depend upon chance? (PICH, p. 59)

“Morality or Virtue, consists of such actions as are in their own nature, and upon the whole pleasant; and immorality or vice, consists in such actions as are in their own nature, and upon the whole painful. Wherefore a man must be affected with pleasure and pain in order to know what morality is, and to distinguish it from immorality ... But if man be indifferent to pleasure and pain, or is not duly affected with them, he cannot know what morality is nor distinguish it from immorality, nor have any motive to practise morality and abstain from immorality; and will be equally indifferent to morality and immorality or virtue and vice. Man in his present condition is sufficiently immoral by mistaking pain for pleasure and thereby judging, willing, and practising amiss; but if he was indifferent to pleasure and pain, he would have no rule to go by, and might never judge, will, and practise right.” (PICH, pp. 63-4)

Collins will quote from “an ingenious author” -- i.e., Locke -- and write “to ask whether a man be at liberty to will either motion or rest, speaking or silence, which he pleases, is to ask whether a man can will what he wills, or be pleased with what he is pleased with. A question that needs no answer.” (PICH, pp. 39-40)

"Whether we are at liberty to will or not to will, it is manifest we have not that liberty ... Hence appears the mistake of those who think men at liberty to will, or not to will, because, say they, they can suspend willing, in relation to actions to be done to-morrow; wherein they plainly confound themselves with words. For when it is said man is necessarily determined to will, it is not thereby understood that he is determined to will or choose one out of two objects immediately in every case proposed to him (or to choose at all in some cases -- as whether he will travel into France or Holland), but that on every proposal he must necessarily have some will. And he is not less determined to will, because he does often suspend willing or choosing in certain cases; for suspending to will is itself an act of willing; it is willing to defer willing about the matter proposed. In fine, though great stress is laid on the case of suspending the will to prove Liberty, yet there is no difference between that and the most common cases of willing and choosing upon the manifest excellency of one object before another. For, as when a man wills or chooses living in England before going out of it (in which will he is manifestly determined by the satisfaction he has in living in England) he rejects the will to go out of England; so a man who suspends a will about any matter, wills doing nothing in it at present, or rejects for a time willing about it; which circumstances of wholly rejecting, and rejecting for a time, make no variation that affects the question. So that willing, or choosing suspension, is like all other choices or wills that we have.” (PICH, pp. 38-9)

See my Chapter VII, and my fn #292.

Collins, PICH, p. 51.


F-Essay, p. 372, fn #1.

His occasional references to God notwithstanding, Collins was considered a deist in his time (though O’Higgins, his primary biographer of recent times, seems not to want to agree with this -- see O’Higgins’ Anthony Collins: A Man and His Works, 19-22, 76, 91, 171-4. On the other hand, Berman is the primary current proponent of Collins’ being an atheist, and claims O’Higgins -- a Catholic priest as well as biographer -- is in denial about Collins’ views. See Berman’s A History of Atheism in Britain, from Hobbes to Russell, pp. 70-1, 75-6).
“It is objected that if men are necessary agents, and do commit necessarily all breaches of the law, it would be unjust to punish them for doing what they cannot avoid doing. ¶ To which I answer that the sole end of punishment in society is to prevent, as far as may be, the commission of certain crimes; and that punishments have their designed effect two ways; first, by restraining or cutting off from society the vicious members; and secondly, by correcting men or terrifying them from the commission of those crimes.” (PICHL, pp. 64-5)

Added Collins to his assertion that even persons who could not act otherwise deserved the certainty of punishment: “It may not be improper to add this farther consideration from the law of our country. There is one case where our law is so far from requiring that the persons punished should be free agents, that it does not consider them as voluntary agents, or even as guilty of the crime for which they suffer: so little is free agency requisite to make punishments just. The children of rebel parents suffer in their fortunes for the guilt of their parents, and their punishment is deemed just, because it is supposed to be a means to prevent rebellion in parents.” (PICHL, p. 66).

“Men have at all times been praised for actions judged by all the world to be necessary. It has been a standing method of commendation among the epic poets, who are the greatest panegyrists of glorious actions, to attribute their hero’s valor, and his great actions, to some deity present with him and assisting ... But can there be a finer commendation than that given by Velleius Paterculus to Cato, that he was good by nature because he could not be otherwise? For that alone is true goodness which flows from disposition, whether that disposition be natural or acquired. Such goodness may be depended on, and will seldom or never fail. Whereas goodness founded on any reasonings whatsoever, is a very precarious thing; as may be seen by the lives of the greatest declaimers against vice who, though they are constantly acquainting themselves with all the topics that can be drawn from the excellency of goodness or virtue, and the mischiefs of vice; the rewards that attend the one and the punishments that attend the other; yet are not better than those who are never conversant in such topics. Lastly, the common proverb, gaudeant bene nati, is a general commendation of men for what plainly in no sense depends on them.” (PICHL, pp. 68-9)

Essay II.xxvii. It was written as a result of Molyneux’s prompting in his March 2, 1693 letter to Locke (Correspondence IV, p. 650 [#1609]).

(with Locke’s “person” being used as a “forensic” term having normative implications. As he writes in II.xxvii.26: “… Wherever a man finds what he calls himself, there I think another may say is the same person. It is a forensick term appropriating actions and their merit; and so belongs only to intelligent agents capable of a law, and happiness and misery. This personality extends itself beyond present existence to what is past, only by consciousness, whereby it becomes concerned and accountable, owns and imputes to itself past actions, just upon the same ground, and for the same reason that it does the present. All which is founded in a concern for happiness, the unavoidable concomitant of consciousness; that which is conscious of pleasure and pain, desiring that that self that is conscious should be happy. And therefore whatever past actions it cannot reconcile or appropriate to that present self by consciousness, it can be no more concerned in, than if they had never been done: and to receive pleasure or pain, i.e. reward or punishment, on the account of any such action, is all one as to be made happy or miserable in its first being, without any demerit at all ...”)
(i.e., the cohesive kind of authenticity in an individual mind which while accounting for a certain acceptable rate of change did so only via an explanatory chain of determinative associations -- as opposed to arbitrary and disconnected ones suddenly arising "spontaneously" from nowhere)

A kind of “virtue ethics” may be what best defines Locke’s approach to his disciplined form of morality, despite Locke’s anti-Aristotelianism on other issues.

(whose guidance is seen as so strong that we not even need to think about which explanations have value)

Essay II.xxvii.

Hobbes had suggested something of the same thing in his discussion of “deliberation” (see my fn #137).

The significance of this is also mentioned by Schouls, Reasoned Freedom, pp. 169-72; though Losonsky’s review of Schouls’ RF (1995) counters Schouls by suggesting something along the lines I want to offer (pp. 293-314). It might also be claimed that Locke does some of the work that goes missing here in his Some Thoughts Concerning Education, though that book doesn’t have the “uplifting” impact the kind of account I’m suggesting would.

To which Fraser footnotes: “All this concerns the effects not the origin of our voluntary determinations, or whether motives (e.g. the uneasinesses of which men are conscious), necessitate voluntary determinations, as natural sequences, in which the voluntary determinations form a link. That the reasonable will can, by determining habits, indirectly alter and elevate our natural tastes and desires, is presupposed in the duty of educating taste and desire.” (F-Essay, pp. 363-4)

Again, I think Collins tries valiantly to make his own argument based on something like this and, to my mind, nearly succeeds.
Appendix I

Analytic Table of Contents

Abstract:
1. Notorious among philosophy texts, Locke’s Essay stands between the God-intoxicated 17th century and the science-intoxicated 18th century and has had a significant role in the transition of the one intoxication to the other.
2. Nevertheless, because the Essay itself underwent major revisions before it emerged in the posthumous form we’ve canonized for our enlightenment today, many of the issues Locke was contending with at the time to which he may not have found the kind of final answers we’ve come to attribute to him have been woefully obscured.
3. This dissertation therefore attempts to justify an examination of one particular chapter in the Essay -- the “Of Power” chapter of II.xxi -- in terms of its troubled creative history and with regard to some of the particular individuals who were most instrumental in its changes, with an eye to the possibility that what has been seen as Locke’s final and “fixed” account of human liberty may actually be a posthumously-executed editorial distortion of it.

Chapter I
Preliminaries

A. My Argument:
4. Locke’s muddled notion that there must be a Divine Providence informing our moral behavior belied his evolving skepticism regarding this claim, which he failed to sufficiently hide in his “Of Power” chapter.
5. At issue was whether Locke’s liberty account could either (a) satisfy the extant criteria for free will -- thus locating Locke’s work within the moderately Calvinist theological schemes of the time; or (b) qualify only as a description of material determinism -- thus placing Locke somewhere in the realm of “Hobbist” thought and making him religiously suspect.
6. While current Locke scholarship seems to support (a), the position of this paper is (b).
7. Locke’s equivocating references to a “divine providence” justified the misgivings many of the religious believers of his own day had of his position on human freedom.
8. It was through analogical predication that Locke initially tried to claim we are free -- i.e., that because
   -(P1) God is free, and acts by nature according to the good, and
   -(P2) we are modeled after God, and therefore share his attributes, then
   -(C3) we are free because we, too, act by nature according to the good.
9. Locke’s initial claim was generated without much reflective thought.
10. As Locke reflected more deeply about our relative attributes and reconsidered his revised data (by allusion) through a Euthyphro formula, his determinations of the actual place of Freedom and Necessity no longer seemed obvious to him. Neither would the triangulating shift he had to make from the Scholastic formulas of argumentation to those of (a) scientific
induction and empirical probability, and (b) the Christological narrative and the anxiety over competing doctrines of salvation. Both accounts presented challenges to philosophy in general and Locke in particular.

11. Locke’s substitution of “uneasiness” in place of his earlier predication of “the good the greater good” (“GTGG”) would plunge Locke into the determinist realm he’d tried to avoid; by doing this in an effort to be more empirically accountable, he’d instead delinked the divine deduction he’d thought necessary to secure its accountability -- and consequently seems to be reducing both God and liberty in the effort.

12. Locke wanted to write a philosophical account that fully demonstrated human freedom, and was willing to use the Scholastic formulas he despised to get there.

13. Nevertheless, Locke rejected the various theological buffers that might have helped him smooth over those “inconvenient” consequences derived therefrom.

14. Locke’s failure to satisfactorily account for human freedom came from his unwitting 17th century error which maintained that "God" had to be “the explanation of all things.”

B. Hypotheses explaining why previous Locke commentators failed to understand Locke’s “Of Power” chapter properly:

15. Failure to consider epistolary record.

16. Failure to recognize embedded assumption and environmental context in text; insistence instead on seeing it as fixed and eternal.

17. Contemporary view of Locke as a “compatibilist” is anachronistic; “compatibilist” as a term inherits no theological power -- certainly not of the kind Locke faced within the moral philosophical sphere of 17th century Britain.

18. Contemporary views of Locke more likely reflect theological/ideological agendas of said readers rather than those of Locke himself.

19. No recognition of analogical predication error when “uneasiness” is added.

C. Special Note: Thesis limits:

20. I’m not arguing for/against existence of God.

21. I’m not arguing whether Locke is “right” or “wrong” regarding human liberty, or whether his empirical descriptions do or do not match “facts” of the world.

22. Contrary to present-day critics who dismiss the relevance of A. Fraser’s discursive comments and footnotes in the Essay’s 1894 edition, I find them of great assistance as they signal metaphysical concerns important to Locke’s time (and Fraser’s) of which we are largely no longer even aware.

Chapter II
Introduction: The “‘God’ Problem” (Molyneux quote; scrawl text)

A. Back story:

23. “Of Power” started out as a relatively short and conventional chapter about causality.

24. The chapter’s purpose was to ground the assertion that determinist accounts of change in the natural world are reconcilable with accounts of human liberty and reason.
25. In his first iteration Locke seemed to have accepted the scholastic postulation that men were motivated to act by “the good the greater good,” because men were modeled after God, and this is how a free God is motivated.

26. Many critics of the time nevertheless found Locke’s overall views “problematic.” Locke’s denial of innate ideas was usually central to their critiques. Locke started to refine his positions.

27. The “Of Power” chapter in particular went through several extensive published revisions from 1689 to 1706 (the 1706 version being the first edition published after Locke’s death in 1704). More material got added than got subtracted; much of the new material seemed to conflict with what remained. Disappointment grew over the chapter’s apparent lack of organization or consistency. Scholars continue to disagree now over what Locke intended to affirm.

28. Might there nevertheless be a rationale for the chapter’s now “barnacle-burdened” nature?

B. The Chapter’s Three Stages:

29. “Stage One” (1690): Locke says we act motivated by the “GTGG” because we are, though imperfect, of God’s making, and that is how God who is perfect must act, because God necessarily acts according to universal and unchanging natural law. Additionally, since God is free, we by analogical predication would also be free.

30. “Stage Two” (1694): Locke removed the emphasis on the “GTGG” claim of the first edition; asserts instead that we act necessarily from feelings of “uneasiness” (this is to account for Locke’s earlier neglect of man’s “weakness of will” in Stage One). A “suspension mechanism” is also added to the mind’s understanding; the will’s role will be delegated only to the carrying out whatever the last judgement of the understanding ordered it to do. God’s perfection still entailed his acting necessarily from the “good.” Both God and man were still free.

31. “Stage Three” (1706): Additional [posthumous] insertion now allowed the will to reverse on its own the verdict of the last judgement of the understanding, and possibly substitute the will’s own separate and independent judgement in its stead. Hence the mind could now be changed even after the understanding issued its last best assessment, and the will would now have at least parity, if not superiority, over the long dominant understanding itself.

C. Three questions prompted by the sequence of revisions which seem in need of answering:

32. What caused Locke to change his mind from the scholastic notion of “good” as an action-motivator in the first edition to one containing the more desire-based solution of “uneasiness” thereafter?

33. Why did Locke seemingly leave unexplained at his death his new story of how the will might after all have a chance to review the last judgement of the understanding and thereby order something different? Or had Locke even been the one who actually made this change?

34. What was the central analogical error in the account overall that so bothered Locke throughout his representations that it ultimately prevented him from resolving it (even if by dissolving it) and to consequently move the account forward coherently?
D. Initial answers to the first two questions:
35. Locke wanted to challenge the notion of “innate ideas”; realized he could not defend the use of “GTGG” as an explanatory motivator without being forced to acknowledge it as a mind-independent property of God’s Universe for which our minds were innately hard-wired to access.
36. The contingent nature of the state of “uneasiness” allowed Locke to defend his stance from a position he was more comfortable with -- that of human experience. This enabled Locke to take “motivation” out of the religio/Scholastic sphere and allowed him to offer a simple observable physical explanation for an effect’s cause rather than an abstract theological one.
37. Locke’s Puritan/Calvinist upbringing inclined him more to the tenets of Baconism and the newer “experimental” philosophy than to the abstract logic embedded in the Scholastic approach coming from Roman Catholic/Anglican tradition. This Calvinist Puritanism might also have predisposed Locke to resist the notions of “free will” that Catholic/Anglican dogma favored.
38. The additions and subtractions posthumously altering II.21 due to Locke’s French translator Pierre Coste may or may not have been what Locke actually intended -- particularly that subtracted from section §23 and added to sections §§ 48, 56 and §71. Coste’s behavior regarding Locke’s reputation after he died and Anthony Collins’ suspicions of Coste’s views help contribute to the suspicion that the chapter had been altered without Locke’s express authorization.

E. Answer to Question #3 lays at the core of Locke’s error of logic, and is what needs to be disentangled:
39. The reductive logic in the divine/human relationship which Locke assumed existed served instead to undermine him in his account of human freedom.
40. The source of Locke’s apparent error may be a significant but hitherto unrecognized pivot point that will transform the polarizing rational-theism arguments of Hobbes and Cudworth into the psychological humanism eventually leading to Hume.

Chapter III
The Case for Disentanglement: Three Competing Theses for the Resolution of Locke’s “‘God’ problem”

(1) The philosophical thesis:
41. Locke made a poorly-formed formula of analogical predication when he claimed both God and man are free; hence his unintentional analogical error, which suppressed the capacity for his account to resolve itself in favor of human freedom.

(2) The circumstantial thesis:
42. Key sections added to the chapter in the posthumous edition of the Essay that suddenly impute a theological benefaction Locke had long denied may have been added by a literary executor acting not entirely with Locke’s epistemological interests in mind.
This “last-minute” imputation, especially given Locke’s extensive correspondence with Limborch in 1702, confuses Locke’s ever more solidly determinist position in the free will debate.

(3) The prudential thesis:
44. Locke let social and political expediency force a theological rationale for human freedom and thus confuse his reasoning. This prudentialism would disrupt the path he seemed to be on which might have better accounted for what was unique about being human independent from what was being construed about the character of the divine. Nevertheless, Locke’s account stands as a passable gesture authorizing his corresponding project establishing “political” (if not metaphysical) human freedom.

B. Most important to keep in mind overall:
45. Locke’s attachment to the place of notions like uneasiness, suspension and indifference -- including to what their relationship to “the greater good” might or might not be -- prompts what I’m calling an ebbing of the conviction that God could be the explanation of all things.

Chapter IV
The philosophical thesis

A. The Analogical Error:
47. Priors: the definitional issues regarding God/creature relations re:
   - (1) analogical predication and the “intellectualist” vs “voluntarist” positions involved in the Euthyphro dilemma;
   - (2) the quest for happiness via the “good the greater good” predicate (which Locke abandons for the “uneasiness” substitution).
48. Two models reflecting equally valid arguments in the literature about free will that capture the two forks of the Euthyphro argument:
   a. Hobbes’s (who denies human FW)
   b. Cudworth’s (who defends human FW)
49. The two schemas serve as models of consistency against which the “error” Locke makes would continue to entrap Locke in his own FW set-up, no matter whether the predicate Locke chooses to insert as an action-motivator is “the good the greater good” or his notion of “uneasiness.”

B. Questions:
50. Is syllogism: [(a) God is free; (b) We are created in God’s image; (c) Hence we are free.] enough?
51. Is “God” necessary? Could human freedom be demonstrated w/out the existence of “God”? How? What grounds each?

C. Moral philosophers debated:
52. (1) whether God was knowable to us and whether we were to him;
53. (2) whether God actually cared about us enough to suffer when we suffered, or was too
transcendently remote to be affected by anything corporeal or temporal like us at all; and
54. (3) whether God chose to make a universe that is “moral” because he made it and called it so, or whether he chose to make a universe that is moral because that is what it was and he happened to recognize it as being so and told us that is what he found it to be.

D. Analogical Predication:
55. AP is an explanatory method meant to convey, through the comparative use of models and images that are already well known, that which may superficially seem incomparable or unknown.
56. AP is a way to take predicates for the imperfect forms of the visible (e.g., created objects like us) in order to apply them to those of the perfected form of the invisible (e.g., notions of God and the divine), thus providing a rational warrant for the apprehension and confirmation of the essence of the divine.
57. Threading through this chapter is an analogical motif to which Locke himself is (for the most part) trying to adhere. The motif of this “layout” is what Locke discloses in the Molyneux letter passage, though the layout is barely discernible in the sprawling “Of Power” chapter itself.
58. My establishing that such an analogy is being threaded throughout the “Of Power” chapter is central to my thesis. My contention that Locke’s “failure” (in his judgement, at least, following from what he says in the letter to Molyneux) to satisfactorily uphold the analogical premise he initially thought he could just toss off “by rote” is what makes for his unintentional undermining of the long-held notion that God is the explanation for all things.
59. My proposed form demonstrating this is that of a conditioned syllogism. It starts with
   - (1) a conditional premise (“If Predicate \( P \) is defined as Behavior \( B \)
   - (2) adds two or more provisional conclusions (“Agent \( A_x \) is Predicate \( P \) because Behavior \( B_x \)” and “Agent \( A_y \) is Predicate \( P \) because Behavior \( B_y \)”), and finally
   - (3) concludes with the conjunct of the provisional conclusions (“Therefore Agent \( A_x \) and Agent \( A_y \) is Predicate \( P \)”), with the conclusion’s validity and soundness to be determined from there.
60. Three kinds of evaluative criteria are to be invoked here:
   - (1) what it is that primarily motivates our actions;
   - (2) what exactly the nature of the agency is behind our actions -- i.e., is it one of freedom or one of necessity? and
   - (3) what the nature of the analogy being established is that makes the first two sets of criteria binding upon both each other and upon whatever relationship there is between God and man.

E. What counts for success in analogical predication:
61. Hobbes and Cudworth put together positions that within the narrow confines of logical form were consistent.
62. The two positions are not only successful foils against Locke’s “misfired” formulations but also demonstrate why such measures of “success” in regard to the seeking of logically valid
truths are, as Locke would likely have claimed (had he recognized what was going on), nevertheless inadequate and unproductive.

63. The analogical formula is meant to deliver a justification for the necessary existence of the first two sets of criteria because their existence is to be explained *only* by some description of what God’s reciprocating relationship and interest to man is supposed to be as promised in the third set of criteria.

64. One way of examining this would be to take all the predicating forms and relations and match them up against a background of the Euthyphro problem.

**F. Calling on Euthyphro:**

65. If we use as our two primary agents of interest God and man, and vary the source of the state of affairs in the system as a whole between one *created by* God or man, and one *independent of* both God and man, we can see that we will have differing assumptions about the state of affairs emergent in each position, and different consequences obtaining from them, depending on how we decide to arrange the various elements.

66. Voluntarism represents the tradition of the state of affairs which operates subject to an agent’s active and changing will. In Euthyphro terms, “X” is considered good or right because God says so -- God being the sole determiner of what the good is.

67. Intellectualism represents the tradition of the state of affairs that operates independently of a continuous governing agent. In Euthyphro terms, if “X” is good, God will say it is -- good being *intrinsically* good, whether or not God says so.

**a. Hobbes:**

68. Hobbes maintained that consciousness and will were wholly existent due to material agency, and that all events, including human action, were ultimately determined by causes external to the will.

69. Morality itself being something artificially designated by the only entity who truly is considered free, the powerful “controlling” authority is able to choose whatever ascriptions of good and evil he/she desired for the purposes of ultimate command. Good and evil as they appear to man are relative and without any independent anchoring.

70. Man would have to survive accordingly to his fate within this view of natural law, and hence would be *determined* by it. God, on the other hand (or the sovereign), would be *free*. (i.e., here God operates in a voluntarist system).

**b. Cudworth:**

71. Cudworth found Hobbes’s determined materialism to be as cruel and capricious as that propagated by Calvinism in that it accounted for no independent agency based on any reflective ethics.

72. Cudworth believed there was a common, universal, mind-independent morality available and applicable to all men, inconstant though they always prove to be.

73. Cudworth claimed that while men’s fallibility was prerequisite to the potential exercise of freedom, that God was considered infallible meant that freedom was necessarily closed off
for God. Therefore while men necessarily possessed freedom, God notably could not, because his goodness and perfection were determined (i.e., here God operates in an intellectualist system).

G. Back to Locke:
74. The logical validity of the arguments of Hobbes’s voluntarism and Cudworth’s intellectualism highlights Locke’s difficulty in representing his own position with any similar consanguinity.
75. Locke’s equivalence claim holding that both God and men had freedom fails, since Euthyphro’s validity holds only in non-equivalent claims (i.e., if God is free, man isn’t; and if man is free, God isn’t).
76. This is especially true if Locke privileges human “uneasiness” as our motivator for action. For it means Locke would be making an intentional claim about properties or ascriptions only available to humankind (such as uneasinesses, yearnings, desires, gaps, imperfections). None of these properties or ascriptions can be assignable to God’s own experience.
77. This problem of equivalence carries itself through to the effects of uneasiness as well. If what we use to ameliorate the uneasiness (or to fill its gaps) leads to our experiencing happiness or pain and hence being subject to either reward or punishment, then what supplies the terms of what we call freedom for us is our assuming we are being held accountable for whatever it is that we choose to fill the uneasiness gap with, and bearing the consequences of whatever option it is that we’ve decided upon.
78. Since God’s perfection logically entails his having no uneasinesses to fill, he would have no experience of happiness or pain as a response to what he’s chosen, and consequently would not be subject to reward or punishment on the basis of any choices he makes.
79. Thus it is the analogy that makes evident Locke’s problematic inclusion of God in the equation in the first place, since all we can actually know -- and worry about -- are our own choices to act. There being no God to model ourselves after, since what “God” faces and is emotionally affected by is both dubious as a proposition in itself and unlike what we would face and be affected by should this proposition be “true,” Locke’s coupling of God and man is thus not informative; it is disruptive.
80. Since Locke’s equivalence formula can thus only lead to determinism -- of God and men acting only from necessity --, if Locke wanted to hold onto the “uneasiness” motivation, he needed to have decoupled first the “created”/”Creator” relationship and then found a way to establish a human freedom independent and distinct from God’s.
81. Locke’s failure in so finding that independent human freedom means the additional posthumous insertion allowing the will to reverse on its own the verdict of the last judgement of the understanding, and possibly substitute the will’s own separate and independent judgement in its stead, remains suspect as a true reflection of Locke’s final thoughts on the matter.

H. The competing pressures driving Locke to formulate his account the way he did

Chapter V
The Baconist Component:
82. The Baconist component is set within the context of the debate between the “speculative Rationalists” and the “experimental Empiricists,” and is to be seen structurally in Locke’s disputes with these rationalists throughout the 1690s.

A. The Sergeant/Norris challenge:
83. The primary arguments advanced by Sergeant and Norris attacked Locke for what was seen as his “ideism” and his claims that Sergeant and Norris felt were more psychological than metaphysical in nature (especially when it came to Locke’s vague moral motivation theories).
84. Because God fixed reality and truth, Sergeant and Norris believed all truths could be deduced from the syllogisms available to us according to the fixed and timeless metric of God’s universe.
85. Locke’s view was that phenomenal data could be understood best if it were gathered without one’s coming with any preconceived conclusions about what their ontological or metaphysical status might be. This would more likely to lead to the new ideas and new concepts so necessary to science and to the extension of human knowledge. Locke’s epistemic account professed to compare sets of ideas and the data points of phenomena within our minds rather than as seeing them as corresponding with each other outside us.

B. The King challenge:
86. King was an Anglican divine and student of logic, with a special interest in metaphor, analogical predication, and issues of free will. King’s initial response to the Essay overall was terse and preemptory, his eight pages serving more as quarrelsome notes than as finally developed replies.
87. King’s crusade was to establish that the domain of freedom should be seen as that internal condition from which an agent is able to self-initiate prior to or at the “preference” stage; it is not to be defined as that external condition by which an agent is constrained at a given “action” stage. King thought that the very definition of will entails an active self-initiation, and an ability to change one’s mind mid-stream.
88. King had a problem with the way Locke discusses the long-standing “good the greater good” motivation, finding something evil in the mission of the GTGG itself -- or finding at least a potential evil in a Lockean God who might design a world which Locke seems to think would be determined by this so-called “good.”
89. Because of this, King was inclined to view the notion of “indifference” positively, and in service to freedom, in contrast to Locke’s obvious introduction of “indifference” only as that insult to rationality, perception and partiality.

C. Consequence of King’s input:
90. King’s obvious impatience with what Locke had written in Chapter 21 in the first edition of the *Essay* prompted Locke to work on a dramatic reframing of the chapter for its second edition.

91. Though this reframing would not *accede* to King’s critique (Locke did not delete the substance of what King quibbled with; he instead intensified its thrust and pulled it even further from what King favored), it does make what appears in the posthumous edition even more suspect because the conclusions which have been drawn by others who suggest Locke’s final view might be much closer to King’s can find no proof of it here.

92. I believe King’s response, along with Molyneux’s own reservations about the chapter, led to Locke’s seeming to have sunk into the depression that gets reflected in the famous Jan 20, 1693 letter excerpt I’m using as a prompt for my thesis.

93. Whether it’s appropriate to reduce the terms of the epistemic dichotomy by saying that the Protestants of the Reform or “Calvinist” stripe, like Locke, tended to be more sympathetic to Baconist approaches, while high church Protestants and “soft Calvinists” like Sergeant, Norris and King tended to be more sympathetic to the Scholastic approaches coming out of the Roman Catholic tradition, such a split does seem to have some historical justification.

Chapter VI
The Calvinist Component:
*How Locke’s Puritan Origins Kick In At the End and Preserve His Original Theological Determinism against the Anglican form of “Free Grace” prior to posthumous Fifth Edition of the Essay*

A. The Limborch challenge:
94. The Calvinist component emerges in Locke’s resistance to Limborch’s “Arminian rescue,” after Limborch had delivered what was probably the sharpest and most acute critique against Locke’s ostensible claim of defending free will in the “Of Power” chapter that Locke had yet faced.

95. Locke was to find that the “suspension of desire” mechanism he’d been so proud of introducing to the second edition of his liberty account would be taken as synonymous by Limborch with the “liberty of indifferencce” mechanism that Scholastic tradition used which Locke had found so objectionable. In this correspondence with Limborch, Locke was forced to explicate on the topic of liberty more specifically, in order to make the two claims operationally distinct.

96. Limborch found Locke’s rendering of the term “indifference” problematic and so sought to rephrase it.

97. Limborch suggested that perhaps what Locke meant instead about the liberty of man was something more like when one is called upon to decide on something, one enters into a kind of state of “guarded indifferencce” in order to grant to oneself the possibility of choosing among all options; but that when one’s will finally *does* decide to step in and make its presence known with a finding, the prior state of indifferencce “steps out” in deference to the will’s command.
98. Locke’s response to Limborch’s conclusion about the Lockean idea of suspension was that his “suspension” in fact was not meant to refer to any kind of indifferency, since not only would that *not* signify the domain of man’s liberty, which “consists solely in a power to act or not to act according to the determination of the will”; it would be a denial or denigration of man’s *reason* -- that is, of what should be seen as the instrumental value of one’s desires/preferences to the understanding’s subsequent judgement in the first place.

99. Limborch offered some further “refinements,” in hopes that they might bring Locke’s characterizations more in alignment with what Limborch was sure Locke believed in. They involved:
   - (1) “the last judgement of the understanding” vs. “the last *practical* judgement of the understanding”;
   - (2) “Reason” vs. “*right* reason”;
   - (3) human “freedom” vs. human “dominion”;
   - (4) “completed Desire/Will” vs. “incompleted Desire/Will.”

100. Locke knocked them all down.

101. As for the suspension mechanism that Limborch found so coincidentally useful for his argument against Locke’s resistance to the “liberty of indifference” principle, Locke claimed it contained in itself the infinite regress that Limborch claimed it and his “liberty of indifferency” was astutely evading.

102. Limborch conceded that if all rested only on the last judgement of the understanding, infinite regress *would* indeed rule, and hence necessity would inevitably reign. But he also continued to insist that a secondary judgement from the will could still grant for itself the ability to defeat the primary judgement coming from the understanding, since in Limborch’s schema the separation between the understanding and will would be penetrable in certain

103. Limborch referred to his suspension as the suspension of the *judgement* emerging *out of* the understanding, after which the will could (as it were) “renegotiate” or overturn any outgoing “determination” made by the understanding about an act to be done or not done.

104. Locke referred to his suspension as the suspension of the competing desires/uneasinesses which needed to be ranked in terms of priority before one of them could be selected to stand in judgement by the understanding, after which the understanding’s determination regarding whether an act is to be done or not done would get dictated to the will and be carried out *by* it without resistance or reconsideration.

105. In other words, Limborch’s suspension would be coming *after* the understanding’s issued judgement/determination; Locke’s would be coming *before*.

106. The certainty of Locke’s ordering here is what makes §56 in the posthumous version of the chapter suspect, given that the posthumous version suddenly refers not to a “suspension of desires/uneasinesses,” but rather to a “suspension of determination,” which comes closer to Limborch’s formulation, and thus offers the gateway to a defense of free will (“determination” being in Locke’s jargon what is assigned to the will, not what the will itself selects).

107. Though this may seem to be a difference without a distinction, in the terms of 17th-century philosophy of mind, just as Locke is adamant about keeping the more important processing
activity in the faculty of the understanding and has so built a cognitive operation that is simple and relatively contained and automatic, so also is Limborch adamant about advocating for the virtues and role of the will in a process that is *sui generis* and more permissive as to the intervention of the divine.

108. For Limborch, freewill is always going to be a positive virtue that’s offered by the grace of God and is associated with its Christian latitudinarian roots -- with one’s position on it being a reflection of one’s theological underpinnings regarding divine punishment and the generosity of soteriological grace. Hence the Arminian’s comfort in reaching for the “liberty of indifference” principle as a helpful assist to Locke’s struggle in justifying the presence and operation of his suspension mechanism when Locke’s own account on the notion of “freewill” itself is so otherwise contemptuous.

109. Locke, however, still insists that the two mechanisms -- suspension and indifference -- are not at all equivalent. And that is because Locke’s ascriptions to human freedom cannot really be found anymore in an *Imago Dei* deduction, let alone in anything being underpinned by a specific story of Christian salvation and grace. Locke’s suspension mechanism not only fails to meet the salvific sanctuary test synonymous with what Limborch finds in the freedom of indifferency; with Locke’s finding the term “indifference” itself a philosophical insult, we see the first signs that Locke not only believed in a *determined* moral world, but that Locke *is moving towards the notion that it may well be free will itself, if seen at the supposed sufferance of God, which ultimately blunts reason and fosters human irrationality.*

Chapter VII
The circumstantial thesis: Posthumous Confusion

110. Coste’s 1707 letter to Leibniz informing him about the changes he made for the production of the posthumous edition of the *Essay* asserts that LeClerc had felt Locke did not understand the argument Limborch was making in favor of the “liberty of indifference” principle.

111. It is not clear whether Locke approved (or would have approved) Coste’s changes to the *Essay* -- and especially those of §§ 23, 48, and in particular that of §56.

112. Of §71, there is no question about provenance, but there is a problem about how Coste’s comments on the section’s added material may have distorted §71’s later import among Locke scholars.

113. The addition to §48 would acknowledge that the mind at least had an interest in *thinking* its volitions were self-induced and spontaneously coming from a “soul-like” source within and not from the naturalized world without.

114. The deletion to §23 removed the problem of infinite regress so troublesome to theistic commitments.

115. The lengthy paragraph added to section §56 made it appear that the “free will” Locke had long dismissed as a categorical mistake might be back again, since it suddenly shifts Locke’s original standardized-language locution “*suspension of desire*” (which he had iterated a notable ten times in the chapter) to that of “suspension of a *determination*” in the posthumously-added passage of §56 (which he uses *only* in this instance).
116. LeClerc’s supposed view that Locke had been persuaded by Limborch’s efforts would be convincing only if one accepted the claim that, but for some ill-chosen phrasings, Locke in the end did accept a “freedom to will or not will to do,” and not merely a “freedom to will to do or not do” formula. Though the posthumous revisions to §56 suggest Locke might have shifted to the “will or not will” position, the written correspondence between Locke and Limborch pre-posthumous publication cannot be the basis of confirming that he did. Some more evidence from Locke’s own hand seems needed -- something that gives us a history of how that extra paragraph had been constructed.

Chapter VIII
The Coste Component:
Why I think the version of the liberty account of Locke’s that does get published posthumously in 1706 does not truly reflect Locke’s intentions but was instead rather selectively “massaged” by his French translator, Pierre Coste

A. Coste’s Problems with Locke:
117. “Anonymous” letter from Anthony Collins to Pierre Desmaizeaux calling Coste duplicitous in his public and private remarks about Locke.
118. Coste’s behavior suspicious due to these factors:
   - (1) the timeline demarcating the shift, at least as offered by Coste and others, seems unnecessarily confusing;
   - (2) it had become increasingly clear that Coste not only felt that Locke, while alive, had treated him like an inferior; but also that Coste himself, being at heart a philosophical classicist, found Locke’s skeptical empiricism and seeming obliviousness of what the ancients had to offer equally unimpressive;
   - (3) Coste’s misgivings about Locke’s thinking and work had been heartily endorsed by Shaftesbury, who’d had an even more intimate history with Locke but came to turn against him.

B. The proffered timeline, and what remains puzzling:
119. Much of the accounting for the gap in the provenance chain concerning exactly what and why material was gained and lost between the 4th and 5th English editions of the Essay hangs on tracking the confusing narrative regarding the preparation and issuance of these two editions and the preparation and issuance of the intervening French translation, done by Coste.
120. The fourth edition of the Essay (1700) was the last English version of the Essay to which Locke would have been alive to directly write and supervise; the fifth and posthumous edition of the Essay (1706) was the first English version under which Coste alone had control.
121. Events or categories of activities which had a relevant impact:
   - (1) the publication of the fourth edition of the English version of the Essay (1700);
   - (2) the publication of the first French translation of the Essay by Coste (1700);
   - (3) the publication of the first Latin translation of the Essay by Ezekiel Burridge (1701);
- (4) Locke’s final 12-letter exchange with longtime friend Philipp van Limborch between mid-1700 and late-1702;
- (5) Locke’s own death (late 1704);
- (6) Coste’s subsequent meeting and growing friendship with Shaftesbury;
- (7) the appearance of the second edition of the French translation of the *Essay* in 1729.

122. There would be no reason to expect Locke would have acceded to Limborch’s views.
123. There is nothing else extant in Locke’s notes that might have set-up or anticipated any of the language newly introduced into the posthumous text in sections §48 and §56, or that admits to any dissatisfaction with what Locke had originally written in §23.
124. Extant explanation: the changes made to the posthumous edition were revisions initially generated as a response to Limborch, and that because it so happened that Locke and Coste were preparing anyway for the imminent 1700 publication of the first French translation of the *Essay*, advantage might be taken to have the Limborch response placed in this rollout edition of the French version first. This explanation was perpetuated by Fraser, who attributes it to LeClerc & his review of 1705.
125. But LeClerc was using the French edition of 1700, which had the same material as the 1700 English version (he wouldn’t have had access to an updated French version that would be reflecting the 1706 English revisions until 1729). This discrepancy is not generally noted.
126. Coste’s remarks about the *Essay* while Locke was alive are more favorable than they are after Locke dies, at which point Coste first meets Shaftesbury.
127. Lack of provenance might be attributable to its being a time
    - (1) when publishing broadly for a continental “Republic of Letters” would have still been fairly nascent;
    - (2) when scruples about accuracy or provenance might not have been so high;
    - (3) when few readers would have had the time or access to go to the trouble comparing paragraph-by-paragraph a translation with its original, or an original with its ancestor; or
    - (4) when Locke himself might have found it an advantage just having his work circulated among as many non-English readers on the continent as possible, whether what was being circulated was an entirely accurate rendering of his thoughts or not..
128. Locke was known throughout his life to be a notorious revisionist.
129. Even when Locke did apparently did change his mind, the resultant textual “shift” usually became one more of addition than substitution. This can already be found throughout the chapter under what we know to be Locke’s signature alone.
130. Coste’s editorial services to Locke perhaps need to be seen in the light of what Coste was actually able to do, and in the end Coste may deserve to be pitied as much as to be distrusted.

**C. Coste’s biography/relationship with Locke:**
131. There may have been reason enough -- at least from Coste’s point of view -- for Coste to have acted duplicitously in his dealings with Locke.
132. A Huguenot refugee, Coste reportedly did not like Locke’s personality or Englishness.
133. Nor could the two men meet eye-to-eye philosophically. Coste felt Locke was (1) unbecomingly disrespectful of the philosophical “greatness” of Descartes and
Malebranche; (2) unnecessarily dismissive of Coste’s own philosophical thoughts; (3) misattributing Christ’s role in Locke’s *The Reasonableness of Christianity*; (4) celebrating an “egoistic account of human motivation”; and (5) equating “Virtue” with the “Law of Opinion.”

134. The final straw for Coste seems to have emerged as a result of the paltry offering Locke had left Coste in his will.

**D. Shaftesbury’s Role:**
135. Shaftesbury’s dismissal of Locke might have been as much an Oedipal need to rebel against a surrogate father as it was a matter of the two of them representing “oil and water” philosophical temperaments.
136. Shaftesbury was an idealist and a spiritual enthusiast who valued virtue above all. He found Locke hostile to his views.
137. Shaftesbury, too, would leave a trail of commentary that feebly commended Locke in public but would be scathing about him in private -- his skepticism regarding nearly everything involving Locke wrote and did only confirmed as more posthumous reports of Locke’s less-than-attractive behavior towards others came in.
138. Coste and Shaftesbury wrote private notes and letters back and forth to each other disparaging Locke’s thinking.
139. It was inevitable that at some point Coste and Shaftesbury would be overheard gossiping about Locke and Locke’s activities in the “aspersing and blackening” way Collins found so disturbing.

**Chapter IX**

**The prudential thesis:**

**The “Uneasiness Encounters Self-Abasement and Topples It” Component**
140. Limborch had a point in thinking that Locke’s favored “suspension mechanism” and the “liberty of indifference” principle Locke so vigorously denounced actually resembled each other.
141. Belief or disbelief in the “liberty of indifference” principle was a 17th-18th century indicator of where one stood regarding soteriological questions.
142. Locke was often found to be insufficiently abject in his presentation of Christian scripture.
143. Locke’s unbending embrace of his “uneasiness” motivator and his corresponding (and unwitting) failure to assume the posture of an appropriately self-abasing Christian sycophant meant his Christian *bona fides* would be constantly challenged.
144. The “uneasiness motivator and the suspension mechanism were used to circumvent the doctrinal wars but were not meant to thwart Locke’s attempt to deduce freedom via his *Imagio Dei* -based form of analogical predication.
145. The circumvention ultimately failed because Locke was oblivious to the circumvention’s effect on his proposed double-analogy model.
146. Meanwhile, the rising significance of the crucified Christ figure and its accompanying resurrection narrative overtakes the earlier Euthyphro question regarding the triadic
relationship between Creator, creation, and the moral world they’re situated in. Locke got hopelessly entangled in both frameworks.

Chapter X
Conclusion

A. How I got here:
147. Though the dissonance in Locke’s position proves Limborch’s point about the theological divide underpinning their debate, this divide has played almost no role in contemporary discussions being done on Locke’s liberty chapter. It’s only when one now looks over the troubled correspondence Locke maintained with his friends and enemies alike (along with the somewhat intemperate remarks of 19th-century Essay editors like A.C. Fraser) that one suspects more might have been going on in Locke’s expository delivery than the tedious prolixity we judge from the chapter today.
148. In fact, Locke’s act of substituting in his account of human liberty the notion of “uneasiness” as that which motivates human action rather than the “good the greater good” that he had offered originally has been underrated if not overlooked entirely as a momentous shift from prior accounts of liberty which had rested on analogical appeals to the theological domain. But Locke himself failed to realize fully the implications of what he was entering into.
149. Confusion about the details in the primary and secondary literature about the “Of Power” chapter forced me to pursue unusual leads.
150. Darwall’s mistaken claims furthered my curiosity.
151. Throughout, I kept seeking answers for why Locke was so intent on preserving his notion of “uneasiness” throughout the many “Of Power” editions.
152. The significance of the “liberty of indifference” principle served as an important fault-line.

B. The Collins Component:
153. Collins was protective of Locke’s legacy, and would come to be an important extender of Locke’s ideas, even reshaping some of them to make them fit a more concise deistic mapping.
154. Collins’ own work on both human liberty and personal identity took the contentious elements Locke had already set forth but had never adequately or coherently assembled, and persuasively unified them, thereby becoming the punching bag who had to answer for Locke after Locke died.
155. Collins’ starting position in his A Philosophical Inquiry Concerning Human Liberty is that it’s determinism (or “Necessitarianism”) that is the perfection, and freedom (or “Liberty”) the imperfection.
156. God’s perfection makes Him a necessary agent and not a free one, and our being modeled after God makes us necessary agents and not free ones as well.
157. Collins does not say we humans are “perfect,” but that our determined nature is such by analogy. With particular attention to the questions Limborch had raised on the “liberty of indifference,” Collins not only went out of his way to deny its virtue; he went on to
vigorously deny the substituted version Locke seemed to approve of in the last posthumous edition of his Essay as well: that is, the “suspension mechanism.”

158. Absent external constraints that we do have the liberty to do or not do what we will or desire, Collins believed that as rational, sensible beings it would be irrational to relish the “freedom” to will or not will to do something against our desires -- a key distinction Locke, like Hobbes, was trying to make all along, however fitfully it might have come across to Locke’s readers.

159. Collins brought rhetorical firepower to the discussion, making determinism look much more laudable than that fickle notion of freedom most everyone had come to valorize in that period.

160. His occasional references to God notwithstanding, Collins carved out enough ground to make the relevance if not the existence of God a moot point for the cultivation and nurturing of a morally accountable life.

161. At first glance, Collins’ forceful and spirited voice serves as the best defense of Locke’s own more repressed vision of human liberty. His is the account best representing the view Locke himself might well have held but had failed in the end to adequately produce.

162. Yet as Collins threw out liberty, he also threw out other possibilities regarding behavioral reform. Punishment and reward were not seen as motivators in human agency in Collins’ world. Locke had felt otherwise.

C. What Locke could have done:

163. The key to Locke’s being able to resolve his “Of Power” chapter and the moral implications potentially contained within might have been hidden in the “forensick” term Locke references in his “Identity and Diversity” chapter (Essay II.xxvii). But Locke failed to show the links between the two, or develop the notion of “forensick” more thoroughly, and instead just uselessly struggled (and failed) with the “God” explanation for his flailing defense of human liberty.

164. Despite his unfocused, confusing and prolix presentation, however, Locke’s argument in favor of the “trial-and-error” learning capacity we imperfect human beings are able to master is a triumphant example of Locke’s ultimate optimism about the human spirit.

D. In sum:

165. Locke’s failure to derive a defense of human freedom from the knowledge he thinks he has of God’s “omnipotence and omniscience” was because he was blind to the need to “free his freedom” from such a form of “divine knowledge” in the first place, even though his very own arguments were continuously implying that he should, and even though he was particularly well-placed in the intellectual world to have access to thinkers who would.

166. A certain amount of unconscious social and political expediency may have played a part in this blindness.

167. Additionally, there is evidence of substantial curatorial insufficiency over the years that may still be keeping out alternative documents suggesting Locke’s potential agnosticism.

Chapter XI: Ideas/Topics for Future Investigation
Appendix II

Publication dates of various Essay editions:

1690  the first edition
1694  the second edition*
1695  the third edition
1700  the fourth edition
1706  the fifth (posthumous) edition*
1710  the sixth edition

1700  Coste’s French translation; first edition
1701  Latin translation of Essay by Ezekiel Burridge; first edition
1729  Coste’s French translation; second edition

1894  Clarendon Press; edited and with commentary and footnotes by A.C. Fraser
1959  Dover edition (from Fraser’s 1894 edition)
1975  Clarendon Edition; edited by Peter Nidditch**
1979  Clarendon paperback edition; edited by Peter Nidditch **

* significant changes made
** (this edition, according to PN, p. xxv, is based on the Essay’s fourth edition. If so, though, why are fifth edition revisions incorporated in it? [for example, see II.xxi.§56])
SIR,


YOU must have heard of the death of the illustrious Mr. Locke. It is a general loss. For that reason he is lamented by all good men, and all sincere lovers of truth, who were acquainted with his character. He was born for the good of mankind. Most of his actions were directed to that end; and I doubt whether, in his time, any man in Europe applied himself more earnestly to that noble design, or executed it with more success.

I will forbear to speak of the valuableness of his works. The general esteem they have attained, and will preserve, as long as good sense and virtue are left in the world; the service they have been of to England in particular, and universally to all that set themselves seriously to the search of truth, and the study of christianity; are their best eulogium. The love of truth is visible in every part of them. This is allowed by all that have read them. For even they, who have not relished some of Mr. Locke’s opinions, have done him the justice to confess, that the manner, in which he defends them, shows he advanced nothing that he was not sincerely convinced of himself. This his friends gave him an account of from several hands: “Let them after this, answered he, object whatever they please against my works; I shall never be disturbed at it: for since they grant I advance nothing in them but what I really believe, I shall always be glad to prefer truth to any of my opinions, whenever I discover it by myself, or am satisfied that they are not conformable to it.” Happy turn of mind! which, I am fully persuaded, contributed more even than the penetration of that noble genius, to his discovery of those great and useful truths which appear in his works.

But, without dwelling any longer upon considering Mr. Locke in the quality of an author, which often serves only to disguise the real character of the man, I haste to show him to you in particulars much more amiable, and which will give you a higher notion of his merit.
Mr. Locke had a great knowledge of the world, and of the business of it. Prudent without being cunning; he won people’s esteem by his probity, and was always safe from the attacks of a false friend, or a sordid flatterer. Averse to all mean complaisance; his wisdom, his experience, his gentle and obliging manners, gained him the respect of his inferiors, the esteem of his equals, the friendship and confidence of the greatest quality.

Without setting up for a teacher, he instructed others by his own conduct. He was at first pretty much disposed to give advice to such of his friends as he thought wanted it; but at length, finding that, “good counsels are very little effectual in making people more prudent,” he grew much more reserved in that particular. I have often heard him say, that the first time he heard that maxim, he thought it very strange; but that experience had fully convinced him of the truth of it. By counsels, we are here to understand those which are given to such as do not ask them. Yet, as much as he despairs of rectifying those whom he saw taking of false measures; his natural goodness, the aversion he had to disorder, and the interest he took in those about him, in a manner forced him sometimes to break the resolution he had made of leaving them to go their own way; and prevailed upon him to give them the advice, which he thought most likely to reclaim them; but this he always did in a modest way, and so as to convince the mind by fortifying his advice with solid arguments, which he never wanted upon a proper occasion.

But then Mr. Locke was very liberal of his counsels, when they were desired; and nobody ever consulted him in vain. An extreme vivacity of mind, one of his reigning qualities, in which perhaps he never had an equal; his great experience, and the sincere desire he had of being serviceable to all mankind; soon furnished him with the expedients, which were most just and least dangerous. I say, the least dangerous; for what he proposed to himself before all things was to lead those, who consulted him, into no trouble. This was one of his favourite maxims, and he never lost sight of it upon any occasion.

Though Mr. Locke chiefly loved truths that were useful, and with such fed his mind, and was generally very well pleased to make them the subject of his discourse; yet he used to say, that in order to employ one part of this life in serious and important occupations, it was necessary to spend another in mere amusements; and when an occasion naturally offered, he gave himself up with pleasure to the charms of a free and facetious conversation. He remembered a great many agreeable stories, which he always brought in properly; and generally made them yet more delightful, by his natural and agreeable way of telling them. He was no foe to raillery, provided it were delicate and perfectly innocent.

Nobody was ever a greater master of the art of accommodating himself to the reach of all capacities; which, in my opinion, is one of the surest marks of a great genius.

It was his peculiar art in conversation, to lead people to talk of what they understood best. With a gardener he discoursed of gardening; with a jeweller, of a diamond; with a chymist, of chymistry, &c. “By this, said he himself, I please all those men, who commonly can speak pertinently upon nothing else. As they believe I have an esteem for their profession, they are charmed with showing their abilities before me; and I, in the mean while, improve myself by their discourse.”
And indeed, Mr. Locke had by this means acquired a very good insight into all the arts, of which he daily learnt more and more. He used to say too, that the knowledge of the arts contained more true philosophy, than all those fine learned hypotheses, which, having no relation to the nature of things, are fit for nothing at the bottom, but to make men lose their time in inventing, or comprehending them. A thousand times have I admired how, by the several questions he would put to artificers, he would find out the secret of their art, which they did not understand themselves; and oftentimes give them views entirely new, which sometimes they put in practice to their profit.

This easiness, with which Mr. Locke knew how to converse with all sorts of men, and the pleasure he took in doing it, at first surprised those, who had never talked with him before. They were charmed with this condescension, not very common among men of letters; and which they so little expected from a person, whose great qualities raised him so very much above all other men. Many who knew him only by his writings, or by the reputation he had gained of being one of the greatest philosophers of the age, having imagined to themselves before-hand, that he was one of those scholars, that, being always full of themselves, and their sublime speculations, are incapable of familiarizing themselves with the common sort of mankind, or of entering into their little concerns, or discoursing of the ordinary affairs of life; were perfectly amazed to find him nothing but affability, good humour, humanity, pleasantness, always ready to hear them, to talk with them of things which they best understood, much more desirous of informing himself in what they understood better than himself, than to make a show of his own science. I knew a very ingenious gentleman in England, that was for some time in the same prejudice. Before he saw Mr. Locke, he had formed a notion of him to himself under the idea of one of the ancient philosophers, with a long beard, speaking nothing but by sentences, negligent of his person, without any other politeness but what might proceed from the natural goodness of his temper, a sort of politeness often very coarse and very troublesome in civil society. But one hour’s conversation entirely cured him of his mistake, and obliged him to declare, that he looked upon Mr. Locke to be one of the politest men he ever saw: “He is not a philosopher always grave, always confined to that character, as I imagined; he is, said he, a perfect courtier, as agreeable for his obliging and civil behaviour, as admirable for the profoundness and delicacy of his genius.”

Mr. Locke was so far from assuming those airs of gravity, by which some folks, as well learned as unlearned, love to distinguish themselves from the rest of the world; that, on the contrary, he looked upon them, as an infallible mark of impertinence. Nay, sometimes he would divert himself with imitating that studied gravity, in order to turn it the better into ridicule; and upon this occasion he always remembered this maxim of the duke of la Rochefoucault, which he admired above all others, “that gravity is a mystery of the body, invented to conceal the defects of the mind.” He loved also to confirm his opinion on this subject, by that of the famous earl of Shaftsbury*, to whom he took a delight to give the honour of all the things, which he thought he had learnt from his conversation.

Nothing ever gave him a more sensible pleasure than the esteem, which that earl conceived for him, almost the first moment he saw him, and which he afterwards preserved as long as he lived.
And, indeed, nothing set Mr. Locke’s merit in a better light, than the constant esteem of my lord Shaftsbury, the greatest genius of his age, superiour to so many great men that shone at the same time at the court of Charles II; not only for his resolution and intrepidity in maintaining the true interests of his country, but also for his great abilities in the conduct of the most knotty affairs. When Mr. Locke studied at Oxford, he fell by accident into his company, and one single conversation with that great man won him his esteem and confidence to such a degree, that soon afterwards my lord Shaftsbury took him to be near his person, and kept him as long as Mr. Locke’s health or affairs would permit. That earl particularly excelled in the knowledge of men. It was impossible to catch his esteem by moderate qualities; this his enemies themselves could never deny. I wish I could, on the other hand, give you a full notion of the idea, which Mr. Locke had of that nobleman’s merit. He lost no opportunity of speaking of it; and that in a manner, which sufficiently showed he spoke from his heart. Though my lord Shaftsbury had not spent much time in reading; nothing, in Mr. Locke’s opinion, could be more just than the judgment he passed upon the books, which fell into his hands. He presently saw through the design of a work; and without much heeding the words, which he ran over with vast rapidity, he immediately found whether the author was master of his subject, and whether his reasonings were exact. But, above all, Mr. Locke admired in him that penetration, that presence of mind, which always prompted him with the best expeditious, in the most desperate cases; that noble boldness, which appeared in all his public discourses, always guided by a solid judgment, which, never allowing him to say any thing but what was proper, regulated his least word, and left no hold to the vigilance of his enemies.

During the time Mr. Locke lived with that illustrious lord, he had the advantage of becoming acquainted with all the polite, the witty, and agreeable part of the court. It was then that he got the habit of those obliging and benevolent manners, which, supported by an easy and polite expression, a great knowledge of the world, and a vast extent of capacity, made his conversation so agreeable to all sorts of people. It was then too, without doubt, that he fitted himself for the great affairs, of which he afterwards appeared so capable.

I know not whether it was the ill state of his health, that obliged him, in the reign of king William, to refuse going ambassador to one of the most considerable courts in Europe. It is certain that great prince judged him worthy of that post, and nobody doubts but he would have filled it gloriously.

The same prince, after this, gave him a place among the lords commissioners, whom he established for advancing the interest of trade and the plantations. Mr. Locke executed that employment for several years; and it is said (absit invidia verbo) that he was in a manner the soul of that illustrious body. The most experienced merchants were surprised, that a man, who had spent his life in the study of physic, of polite literature, or of philosophy, should have more extensive and certain views than themselves, in a business which they had wholly applied themselves to from their youth. At length, when Mr. Locke could no longer pass the summer at London, without endangering his life, he went and resigned that office to the king himself, upon account that his health would permit him to stay no longer in town. This reason did not hinder
the king from entreating Mr. Locke to continue in his post, telling him expressly, that, though he could stay at London but a few weeks, his services in that office would yet be very necessary to him; but at length he yielded to the representations of Mr. Locke, who could not prevail upon himself to hold an employment of that importance, without doing the duties of it more regularly. He formed and executed this design without mentioning a word of it to any body whatsoever; thus avoiding, with a generosity rarely to be found, what others would have earnestly laid out after; for by making it known that he was about to quit that employment, which brought him in a thousand pounds a year, he might easily have entered into a kind of composition with any pretender, who, having particular notice of this news, and being befriended with Mr. Locke’s interest, might have carried the post from any other person. This, we may be sure, he was told of, and that too by way of reproach. “I knew it very well, replied he; but this was the very reason why I communicated my design to nobody. I received this place from the king himself, and to him I resolved to restore it, to dispose of it as he thought proper.” “Heu prisca fides!” Where are such examples, at this day, to be met with?

One thing, which those who lived for any time with Mr. Locke could not help observing in him, was, that he took a delight in making use of his reason in every thing he did; and nothing, that is attended with any usefulness, seemed unworthy his care; so that we may say of him, what was said of queen Elizabeth, that he was no less capable of small things than of great. He used often to say himself, that there was an art in every thing; and it was easy to be convinced of it, to see the manner in which he went about the most trifling thing he did, and always with some good reason. I might here descend into particulars, which probably, to many, would not be unpleasant: but the bounds I have set myself, and the fear of taking up too many pages in your journal, will not give me leave to do it.

Mr. Locke, above all things, loved order; and he had got the way of observing it in every thing with wonderful exactness.

As he always kept the useful in his eye, in all his disquisitions, he esteemed the employments of men only in proportion to the good they were capable of producing; for which reason he had no great value for those critics, or mere grammarians, that waste their lives in comparing words and phrases, and in coming to a determination in the choice of a various reading, in a passage that has nothing important in it. He cared yet less for those professed disputants, who, being wholly taken up with the desire of coming off with the victory, fortify themselves behind the ambiguity of a word, to give their adversaries the more trouble. And whenever he had to deal with this sort of folks, if he did not beforehand take a strong resolution of keeping his temper, he quickly fell into a passion. And, in general, it must be owned, he was naturally somewhat choleric. But his anger never lasted long. If he retained any resentment, it was against himself for having given way to so ridiculous a passion; which, as he used to say, may do a great deal of harm, but never yet did the least good. He often would blame himself for this weakness. Upon which occasion, I remember, that two or three weeks before his death, as he was sitting in a garden taking the air in a bright sun-shine, whose warmth afforded him a great deal of pleasure, which he improved as much as possible, by causing his chair to be drawn more and more towards the sun, as it went
down; we happened to speak of Horace, I know not on what occasion, and having repeated to
him these verses, where that poet says, of himself, that he was

- Solibus aptum;
- Irasci celerem, tamen ut placabilis essem:

“That he loved the warmth of the sun, and that, though he was naturally choleric, his anger was
easily appeased.” Mr. Locke replied, that, if he durst presume to compare himself with Horace in
any thing, he thought he was perfectly like him in those two respects. But, that you may be the
less surprised at his modesty, upon this occasion, I must, at the same time, inform you, that he
looked upon Horace to be one of the wisest and happiest Romans that lived in the age of
Augustus, by means of the care he took to preserve himself clear of ambition and avarice, to
keep his desires within bounds, and to cultivate the friendship of the greatest men in those times,
without living in their dependence.

Mr. Locke also disliked those authors that labour only to destroy, without establishing any thing
themselves: “A building, said he, displeases them. They find great faults in it; let them demolish
it, and welcome, provided they endeavour to raise another in its place, if it be possible.”

He advised, that, whenever we have meditated any thing new, we should throw it as soon as
possible upon paper, in order to be the better able to judge of it by seeing it altogether; because
the mind of man is not capable of retaining clearly a long chain of consequences, and of seeing,
without confusion, the relation of a great number of different ideas. Besides, it often happens,
that what we had most admired, when considered in the gross, and in a perplexed manner,
appears to be utterly inconsistent and unsupportable, when we see every part of it distinctly.

Mr. Locke also thought it necessary always to communicate one’s thoughts to some friend,
especially if one proposed to offer them to the public; and this was what he constantly observed
himself. He could hardly conceive how a being of so limited a capacity as man, and so subject to
errour, could have the confidence to neglect this precaution.

Never man employed his time better than Mr. Locke, as appears by the works he published
himself; and perhaps, in time, we may see new proofs of it. He spent the last fourteen or fifteen
years of his life at Oates, a country-seat of sir Francis Masham’s, about five and twenty miles
from London, in the county of Essex. I cannot but take pleasure in imagining to myself, that this
place, so well known to so many persons of merit, whom I have seen come thither from so many
parts of England to visit Mr. Locke, will be famous to posterity, for the long abode that great man
made there. Be that as it may, it was there that enjoying sometimes the conversation of his
friends, and always the company of my lady Masham, for whom Mr. Locke had long conceived a
very particular esteem and friendship, (in spite of all that lady’s merit, this is all the eulogium she
shall have of me now,) he tasted sweets, which were interrupted by nothing but the ill state of a
weakly and delicate constitution. During this agreeable retirement, he applied himself especially
to the study of the Holy Scripture; and employed the last years of his life in hardly any thing else.
He was never weary of admiring the great views of that sacred book, and the just relation of all its parts; he every day made discoveries in it, that gave him fresh cause of admiration. It is strongly reported, in England, that those discoveries will be communicated to the public. If so, the whole world, I am confident, will have a full proof of what was observed by all that were near Mr. Locke to the last part of his life; I mean, that his mind never suffered the least decay, though his body grew every day visibly weaker and weaker.

His strength began to fail him more remarkably than ever, at the entrance of the last summer; a season which, in former years, had always restored him some degrees of strength. Then he foresaw that his end was very near. He often spoke of it himself, but always with great composure, though he omitted none of the precautions, which his skill in physic taught him, to prolong his life. At length, his legs began to swell; and, that swelling increasing every day, his strength diminished very visibly. He then saw how short a time he had left to live, and prepared to quit this world, with a deep sense of all the blessings which God had granted him, which he took delight in numbering up to his friends, and full of a sincere resignation to his will, and of firm hopes in his promises, built upon the word of Jesus Christ, sent into the world to bring to light life and immortality, by his gospel.

At length, his strength failed him to such a degree, that, the 26th of October, 1704. two days before his death, going to see him in his closet, I found him on his knees, but unable to rise again without assistance.

The next day, though he was not worse, he would continue a-bed. All that day he had a greater difficulty of respiration than ever, and about five of the clock, in the evening, he fell into a sweat, accompanied with an extreme weakness, that made us fear for his life. He was of opinion himself, that he was not far from his last moment. Then he desired to be remembered at evening prayers; thereupon my lady Masham told him, that if he would, the whole family should come and pray by him in his chamber. He answered, he should be very glad to have it so, if it would not give too much trouble; there he was prayed for particularly. After this, he gave some orders with great serenity of mind; and, an occasion offering of speaking of the goodness of God, he especially exalted the love which God showed to man, in justifying him by faith in Jesus Christ. He returned him thanks, in particular, for having called him to the knowledge of that divine Saviour. He exhorted all about him to read the Holy Scripture attentively, and to apply themselves sincerely to the practice of all their duties; adding, expressly, that “by this means they would be more happy in this world, and secure to themselves the possession of eternal felicity in the other.” He past the whole night without sleep. The next day he caused himself to be carried into his closet, for he had not strength to walk by himself; and there in his chair, and in a kind of dozing, though in his full senses, as appeared by what he said from time to time, he gave up the ghost about three in the afternoon, the 28th of October.

I beg you, sir, not to take what I have said of Mr. Locke’s character for a finished portrait. It is only a slight sketch of some few of his excellent qualities. I am told we shall quickly have it done by the hand of a master. To that I refer you. Many features, I am sure, have escaped me; but I
dare affirm, that those, which I have given you a draught of, are not set off with false colours, but
drawn faithfully from the life.

I must not omit a particular in Mr. Locke’s will, which it is of no small importance to the
commonwealth of learning to be acquainted with; namely, that therein he declares what were the
works which he had published without setting his name to them. The occasion of it was this:
some time before his death, Dr. Hudson, keeper of the Bodleian library at Oxford, had desired
him to send him all the works with which he had favoured the public, as well those with his
name as those without, that they might be all placed in that famous library. Mr. Locke sent him
only the former; but in his will he declares he is resolved fully to satisfy Dr. Hudson; and to that
intent he bequeaths to the Bodleian library a copy of the rest of his works, to which he had not
prefixed his name, viz. a Latin “Letter concerning Toleration,” printed at Tergou, and translated
some time afterwards into English, unknown to Mr. Locke; two other letters upon the same
subject, in answer to the objections made against the first; “The Reasonableness of Christianity,”
with two Vindications of that book; and “Two Treatises of Government.” These are all the
anonymous works which Mr. Locke owns himself to be the author of.

For the rest, I shall not pretend to tell you at what age he died, because I do not certainly know it.
I have often heard him say, he had forgot the year of his birth; but that he believed he had set it
down somewhere. It has not yet been found among his papers; but it is computed that he was
about sixty-six.

Though I have continued some time at London, a city very fruitful in literary news, I have
nothing curious to tell you. Since Mr. Locke departed this life, I have hardly been able to think of
any thing, but the loss of that great man, whose memory will always be dear to me; happy if, as I
admired him for many years, that I was near him, I could but imitate him in any one respect! I
am, with all sincerity, Sir, your, &c.

[*] That letter was printed in the Nouvelles de la Republique des Lettres, for the month of
February, 1705, art. II. page 154, with this title, A Letter of Mr. Coste to the author of these
Nouvelles, written on occasion of the death of Mr. Locke.

[*] Chancellor of England in the reign of Charles II.
Appendix IV

Changes mentioned in various versions of Locke’s “Epistle to the Reader” (Essay)

from OLOL; end of Locke’s “Epistle to Reader”:

“In the sixth edition, there is very little added or altered; the greatest part of what is new, is contained in the 21st chapter of the second book, which any one, if he thinks it worth while, may, with a very little labour, transcribe into the margin of the former edition.”*

from Nidditch, p. 14 (1975); end of Locke’s “Epistle to Reader”:

“In this fifth Edition, there is very little added or altered; the greatest part of what is new, is contained in the 21 Chapter of the second Book, which any one, if he thinks it worth while, may, with a very little Labour, transcribe into the Margent of the former Edition.”

from Fraser, p. 24 (1895); end of Locke’s “Epistle to Reader”:

“In the Sixth Edition there is very little added or altered. the greatest part of what is new, is contained in the twentyfirst Chapter of the second Book, which any one, if he thinks it worth while, may, with a very little labour, transcribe into the margin of the former edition.”**

* (<http://oll.libertyfund.org/?option=com_staticxt&staticfile=show.php%3Ftitle=761&chapter=80706&layout=html&Itemid=27>)

** (this is followed by Fraser’s footnote (2), which states: “The Sixth Edition, issued in 1706, two years after Locke’s death, with these two sentences appended to the ‘Epistle,’ contains a few slight additions and alterations. Most of them had appeared in Coste’s French Version of the Essay -- prepared at Oates under Locke’s eye. ‘The author being present, says Le Clerc, ‘he corrected several places in the original, that he might make them more plain.’ Coste was Locke’s amanuensis, and lived with him at Oates for some years till his death.” Fraser: p. 24)
Appendix V

Le Clerc’s comment on Coste’s first French translation of the Essay:

w/ Le Clerc reporting (from Miller p. 892)

“Ce fut l’année 1690 que son ouvrage de l’Entendement parut in-folio pour la premiere fois en Anglois. Il a été publié en cette même langue trois fois depuis, en 1694, en 1697, et en 1700. Cette derniere année on le publia en Française à Amsterdam chez M. Schelte. M. Coste, qui demeurait alors dans la même maison que l'Auteur, le traduisit avec beaucoup de soin, de fidélité et de netteté sous ses yeux, et cette version est très-estimée. Elle a fait connoître ses sentimens deçà la mer, avec plus d'étendue que l'abrégé, qui avoit paru en 1688, ne pouvoit le faire. Comme l'Auteur etoit présent, il corrigea divers endroits de l'original, pour les rendre plus clairs et plus faciles à traduire, et revit la version avec soin; ce qui fait qu'elle n'est guere inférieure a l'Anglais, et qu'elle est souvent plus claire. Cet Ouvrage a aussi été traduit en Latin en 1701. par Mr. Burrig. Il y en a encore un petit abregé en Anglois, par Mr. Wynn. La quatriéme Edition Anglaise est la meilleure & la plus augmentée. Ceux qui les ont comparées ont pû remarquer un effet de la sincerité, & de l'amour de la Verité, dont l'Auteur faisait profession, dans le Chapitre XXI. du Livre second, où il traite du Pouvoir, ou de la Faculté; puisque, conformément à l’avis de ses Amis, il y a changé plusieurs choses dans l’idée qu’il avoit donnée de la maniere dont nous nous déterminons à vouloir. Peu de Philosophes sont capables de se résoudre à corriger leurs pensées, & il n’y a rien qu’ils ne fiffent, plutôt que d’avouër qu’ils se sont trompez. Mr. Locke aimoit trop la Verité, pour les imiter, & il avouë lui même, dans sa préface, qu’après un plus mûr examen, il avoit changé de sentiment.” (LeClerc’s Elégé (Bibliothèque Choisie VI, 1705) pp. 379-80).

Appendix VI

The important Le Clerc text, re the change to §71 based on Locke’s correspondence w/ Limborch (BX XII, pp. 80-105; bold numbers in brackets mark cites mentioned in my text):

""Je ne mets pas ici le titre de ce célèbre Ouvrage de feu Mr. Locke, pour en donner un Extrait. Je l'ai fait autrefois affiez au long, dans les Tomes VIII & XVII. de la Bibliotheque Universelle, & l'Ouvrage même ayant été mis en Latin & en Français, depuis ce tems-là, il n'est pas besoin d'y revenir. J'ai dessein seulement, après avoir dit en un mot ce qu'il y a de particulier dans cette Edition, de faire quelques remarques sur deux endroits de ce Livre. Elles pourront servir ou à mieux entendre l'Auteur, ou peut-être à avoir une idée plus nette de certaines matieres, sur lesquelles je voi qu'on se trompe. L'estime & l'amitié, que j'ai euës pour feu Mr. Locke & les louanges que j'ai données à ses Découvertes, dont j'ai beaucoup profité dans mes Ouvrages Philosophiques, comme je l'ai témoigné dans la Dédicace de ma Logique, m'engagent à expliquer quelque chose, que l'on a mal pris & à donner une idée plus juste de quelques questions, qu'il n'a pas crû devoir examiner à fonds. Quoi que je me serve, en cette occasion, de toute la liberté philosophique, qu'on peut prendre; cela n'empêche pas que je ne demeure dans les mêmes sentimens d'estime pour l'Auteur & pour ses Ouvrages, que j'ai toujours témoignez.

"Cette Edition, qui est en plus grand papier & en plus gros caracteres, que les autres, est principalement augmentée des endroits des réponses de Mr. Locke à Mr. Stillingfleet, Evêque de Worcester, qui servent à éclaircir & à défendre cet Ouvrage. On les a mis au dessous des pages, pour les conserver; de peur que de petits Livres Eristiques, qu'on n'imprime ordinairement qu'une fois, étant perdus, ces pensées de l'Auteur ne se perdissent aussi. Il se pourrait faire que quelques personnes, qui n'entendraient pas mieux les sentimens de Mr. Locke, & qui ne seraient pas plus exercées dans la Philosophie, que ce savant Evêque, proposeraient de semblables objections, dont on trouvera les solutions ici.

"Il n'y a que très-peu de choses, qui aient été changées, ou ajoutées dans le Texte. On en verra un exemple dans le Liv.II.c.21. §71. dont je parlerai un peu plus bas.

[1]: “I. L'un des Chapitres de Mr. Locke, qui peut faire naître le plus de difficulté, est ce même Ch. XXI. où il traite de la Puissance, ou de la Faculté, en général, & en particulier de la Liberté. Il témoigne lui-même qu'il n'avoir pas eu d'abord les idées, qu'il a eùës dans la suite, & qu'il a crû, sur les avis d'un de ses Amis, devoir y changer quelque chose. Il auroit peut-être été à souhaiter qu'il eût refait un Chapitre tout entier là-dessus, parce que les parties en seraient plus jointes, & qu'il y auroit plus d'ordre. Quoi qu'il en soit, j'ai dessein d'examiner, avec autant de briefveté que je pourrai, ce qu'il dit de la Liberté. Je suppose qu'on ait lû ce Chapitre avec attention, ou qu'on l'aït devant les yeux, pour ne pas être obligé de le copier, pour me faire entendre. Je n'ai nullement dessein de l'examiner en détail, ni de marquer tout ce que je voudrois
que l'Auteur eût exprimé, ou redressé. Je me contenterai de faire là-dessus quelques remarques générales.

[2]: “1. Il établit [fn: "§7 & suiv..."] avec raison -I- que la Liberté n'est autre chose que le pouvoir que notre Ame-a d'agir, ou de n'agir pas. Par le mot d'agir, il faut entendre les actions de l'Ame & non celles du Corps, qui n'a aucune part dans la Liberté dont il s'agit ici. Les hommes peuvent empêcher les actions dont le Corps se mêle, mais ils ne peuvent pas empêcher celles de l'Ame seule, qui est toujours libre à leur égard. Outre cela Mr. Locke distingue, avec raison, le Libre, du Volontaire; car je veux bien croire, par exemple, que deux & deux sont quatre, mais il ne m'est pas libre de ne point le croire. Je veux encore être heureux, & c'est un désir, que je forme avec plaisir en moi-même; mais il ne m'est pas possible de se le former pas, ou que le Bonheur en général soit une chose indifférente pour moi, ni que je me souhaite du Malheur.

[3]: "2. Mr. Locke a encore raison de dire que la Liberté [fn: “§9”] suppose l'Entendement & la Volonté; parce que sans cela il n'y a point d'action, dans les Etres Intelligens, & que sans action il n'y a point de Liberté d'agir, ou de n'agir pas. Mais il ne faut pas croire qu'il suffît que l'Entendement & la Volonté interviennent, pour agir librement; ce seroit confondre le Libre & le Volontaire. Par exemple, après avoir examiné avec soin une proposition d'Euclide, dès que je l'ai comprise je m'y rends avec connaissance de cause & volontairement, mais il ne m'est pas libre de ne m'y pas rendre. Au contraire, lors que j'ai examiné un raisonnement, qui n'est que probable, telles que sont la plupart des conjectures des Physiciens, il est en mon pouvoir de l'embrasser, ou non; & c'est en cela que je suis libre. De même encore lors qu'il s'agit d'actions, qui regardent le Bonheur & le Malheur, quoi que j'emploie mon Entendement & ma Volonté à examiner le Bien & le Mal; il ne m'est nullement libre de souhaiter d'être malheureux, & je suis porté de moi-même invinciblement à souhaiter le Bonheur. Mais s'il s'agit de choses, ou indifférentes, ou qui ne me rendent ni heureux, ni malheureux; je suis libre de les souhaiter, ou non.

[4]: "3. Il est certain aussi que, comme le prouve Mr. Locke, il vaut mieux dire que [fn: "§14 & suiv."] l'Ame est libre, que de dire que c'est la Volonté; parce que l'on attribue mieux la Liberté à un Agent, comme l'Ame, qu'à une Faculté. On dit donc que l'Ame est libre, ou qu'il est libre à l'Ame de croire & de faire quelque chose, lors qu'elle peut s'abstenir de la croire & de la faire. Mr. Locke se sert à la vérité du mot d'Homme au lieu de celui d'Ame, en cette occasion; mais il vaut mieux, ce me semble, employer le mot d'Ame, parce que le Corps n'entre pour rien ici, où il s'agit de ce qui se passe dans notre Esprit. Au contraire on embarrasse les questions, en mêlant ici l'Esprit & le Corps.

[5]: “Mr. Locke obscurcit en suite sa matiere, faute de distinguer ce qui n'est que volontaire de ce qui est libre; [fn: "§21"] en distant que l'Homme est libre, lors qu'il ne fait que ce qu'il veut; car assurément on ne fait que ce qu'on veut bien faire, lors qu'on se rend à une vérité évidente & mathematique, & lors que l'on souhaite un Bonheur parfait; mais il ne nous est pas libre de ne le pas faire. Il ajoute encore dans les articles 22. & suivants jusqu'au 28. diverses considerations subtiles, qui ne servent, comme je croi, de rien à l'explication de la nature de la Liberté, & qui même l'obscurcissent; en introduisant un Langage nouveau, sans nécessité. Il a de la peine à se
faire entendre, en des choses communes & dont tout le monde convient avec lui parce qu'il ne les dit pas, en termes communs.

[6]: "Après avoir établi la nature de la Liberté, ce qu'elle suppose, & le sujet dans lequel on doit la chercher; on demande ce que c'est, qui détermine l'Ame à faire un certain usage de sa Liberté. Mr. Locke répond [fn: "§29"] avec raison que c'est l'Ame elle même, qui se détermine, & il soutient que c'est une certaine inquiétude (uneasiness, comme il parle en Anglois) qui est le principe & la source de nos déterminations. Par là, il semble entendre une certaine disposition, qui ne permet pas que nous demeurions dans la suspension, mais qui nous fair agir d'ame certaine façon; comme croire, ou non; souhaiter, ou non. Il croit, avec raison, que ce n'est pas toujours l'idée du plus grand Bien, qui nous porte à agir, comme si nous ne faisions rien, que ce que nous jugeons le meilleur, & que nous ne passions pas suivre d'autre lumiere que les présentes; de sorte que dans le fonds nous ne pourrions faire autre chose, que ce que nous faisons. [fn: "§35 & suiv."] Mr. Locke fait plusieurs réflexions là-dessus, qui sont sans doute véritables, mais qui ne répandent pas une grande lumiere sur cette matiere. Ce qui me surprend c'est qu'il dissipe des ambiguitez, qui ne font, que je sache, de la peine à personne; comme celle de Desir & de Volonté, que l'on ne confond guere; & mêle des questions, qui font perdre le fil du sujet, aussi bien que les répétitions fréquentes de la même chose, en différents terms.

[7]: "Il me semble, qu'il vaut mieux remarquer, en cette occasion, qu'il n'y a que deux sortes d'actions de nôtre Ame. L'une regarde des choses purement spéculatives & s'appelle juger, & le jugement n'est que l'acquiescement de l'Ame à une certaine Verité qu'elle croit avoir découverte, & dont elle se persuade. L'autre sorte d'actions, qui regarde les choses de pratique, se nomme vouloir, & l'action de vouloir ou la volition n'est autre chose que la résolution, que nous prenons en nous mêmes d'agir. On pourrait subdiviser ces deux sortes d'actions, en diverses autres; mais comme cela est inutile, pour l'explication du Sujet dont il s'agit présentement, savoir, de la Liberté; je ne m'y arrêterai pas.

[8]: "A l'égard des Jugemens, qui concernent les choses spéculatives, il y a bien des choses qui nous déterminent, ou qui aident à nous déterminer. I. L'extrême evidence nous détermine & cela d'une maniere invincible, de forte qu'il ne nous reste point de Liberté, à cet égard. Nous ne sommes pas en état de croire, ou de ne pas croire bonne une Démonstration d'Euclide; dès que nous l'entendons, il faut nécessairement s'y rendre. II. Ce qui n'est pas évident n'est que vraisemblable, ou douteux. La plus grande, ou la moindre vraisemblance, le plus & le moins de sujet de douter nous frappent diversement, & nous avons plus ou moins de penchant à recevoir les choses, dont il s'agit, selon qu'elles nous paroissent plus, ou moins douteuses, ou vraisemblables; lors que d'ailleurs aucune passion, ou disposition antécédente ne nous fait pencher d'un côté, ou d'autre. III. Ces passions, ou cette disposition antécédente nous déterminent très-frequentement, à croire ce qui y est conforme, comme je l'ai fait voir dans la **. Partie de ma Logique Chapp. VIII. & IX. IV. Nous nous déterminons aussi à embrasser un sentiment, par pur caprice, & parce que nous le voulons; sans qu'il y ait aucune raison qui nous y engage, ni même de passion, au moins violente, qui nous y porte. Quelquefois tout cela joint ensemble nous détermine, & quelquefois une partie seulement suffit pour le faire.
[9]: "Mais je soutiens qu'il n'y a rien qui nous détermine invinciblement, en sorte que nous ne puissions point ne pas faire un jugement, que nous faisons; que la seule évidence. Ainsi nous sommes libres, dans tous les jugemens sur des choses spéculatives, qui ne regardent pas des propositions évidentes.

[10]: "Quand je des que nous sommes libres, j'entends, selon la définition de la Liberté, qu'absolument parlant je pourrois juger que ce que je juge vrai ne l'est pas, & que, quand je m'examine moi même, je me sens à cet égard dans une disposition toute différente, qu'à l'égard des propositions évidentes. Je sens que je ne puis ne pas croire les dernieres, & je sens que je puis douter des autres. Mais on ne doit pas s'imager, que pour être libre, en cette occasion, l'on doive avoir un égal penchant à croire, ou à ne pas croire, il suffit pour cela que l'on ne soit invinciblement porté, ni à l'un, ni à l'autre. Cela est si vrai, que pendant qu'on croit une Proposition douteuse, on sent bien, si l'on rentre en soi-même, qu'on n'y est pas attaché avec la même force qu'à une persuasion fondée sur une démonstration; & que l'on peut abandonner cette opinion, pour en prendre une autre, au lieu qu'on n'abandonne jamais, pendant qu'on est en son bon sens, des sentiments prouvés d'une manière mathématique.

[11]: "Pour les choses de pratique, il est certain que le Bonheur en général, ou le Souverain Bien, que l'on aime, sans avoir la Liberté de ne l'aimer pas; ou que le Malheur en général, que l'on haïsse indispensablement. Tous les autres biens particuliers, de quelque manière qu'ils se présentent à notre Esprit, n'attirent point inévitablement son amour. II. Quelquefois ils ne nous touchent qu'à proportion, qu'ils sont propres à nous rendre heureux; lors que nous nous laissons conduite à la Raison. III. Souvent la disposition, où nous nous trouvons, de longues habitudes, des passions fortes nous portent à aimer quelques uns de ces Biens particuliers. IV. D'autresfois il y a beaucoup de fantaisie dans nos goûts, que nous régions affez capricieusement. Tous ces motifs sont souvent joints, pour nous gagner le coeur; souvent il n'y en a que quelques uns, qui agissent sur nous. Mais quoi qu'il en soit, nous sentons que l'amour des Biens particuliers n'est pas si maître de nos Ames, dans le temps même qu'elles en sont possédées, que nous ne puissions nous en défaire, & il n'est pas rare que nous nous en défassions; au lieu que nous souhaitons toujours d'être heureux, & que ce désir ne peut être diminué en nous, en quelque état que nous soyons. Quoi que je soutienne que nous sommes tous convaincus interienrement de cette Liberté, on entendrait fort mal ma pensée, si l'on s'imaginait que je crois les hommes toujours maître de nos Ames. Un homme de bien, confirmé dans la Vertu, par une longue pratique de ce qui est conforme aux Lois Divines, ne saurait devenir tout d'un coup ni indifferent pour la Vertu & pour le Vice, ni scélérat; & un méchant homme ne peut pas non plus devenir en un moment homme de bien, ni même se mettre dans une disposition, où il soit en équilibre, à l'égard du Vice & de la Vertu. Mais je dis que le plus homme de bien, sur cette Terre, peut commettre des fautes particulières, quoi qu'opposées à ses habitudes, & que peu à peu il pourrait effacer ces mêmes habitudes, & devenir un mechant homme: de même qu'un méchant homme, dans quelque intervalle où il n'est pas fort agité par ses
passions, peut faire de bonnes actions contre sa coûte, & prendre des mesures pour se corriger peu à peu. Je n'entre pas ici, dans la controverse Théologique de la nécessité des secours extraordinaires du Ciel, pour se tirer d'une mauvaise habitude, & des graces que Dieu peut répandre sur le genre humain pour cela. Ces questions me mèneraient trop loin & ne contribueraient point à faire connaître la nature de la Liberté. Il suffit d'établir en général, que nous ne sommes déterminés nécessairement ni au bien, ni au mal.

[12]: "Voïla ce qui fait que les hommes sont ici bas sous des Lois, qui leur promettent de grandes récompenses, s'ils demeurent attachez, ou s'ils retournent à la Vertu; & qui les menacent de peines terribles, s'ils tombent dans le Vice, ou s'ils n'y renoncent. Ces Lois supposent qu'il n'y a aucun attachement tout à fait invincible, sur cette Terre, ni à la Vertu, ni au Vice; sans quoi elles seraient ridicules. Il serait absurde de nous commander, ou de nous défendre de nous rendre aux démonstrations, que nous savons, & que nous entendons; nous ne pouvons pas ne les point croire. Il ne serait pas plus raisonnable de nous exhorter à vouloir être heureux, ou d'essayer de nous détourner de ce souhait; il ne peut arriver, que ce à quoi la Nature nous porte invinciblement.

[13]: "Il m'a toujours semblé que cette idée de la Liberté est plus simple & plus naturelle, que quelle cherche avec beaucoup de peine hors de nous mêmes, & par des raisonnement abstraits, qui sont contradits par notre sentiment interieur. Dans les choses, dans lesquelles nous sommes libres, nous nous déterminons nous mêmes, à la vuë des objets, dont nous avons parlé, sans y être portez par rien d'invincible; quoi qu'il y ait des objets & des motifs, qui agissent plus fortement sur nous les uns, que les autres.

[14]: "5. Mr. Locke après cela, [fn: "§41 & suiv."] dit plusieurs choses du Bonheur & du Desir, qui sont la plupart vraies, mais qui, comme il me semble, ne servent pas beaucoup à éclaircir la nature de la Liberté. Il a raison de dire que ce n'est pas toujours le plus grand Bonheur, qui nous frappe le plus; parce que ce n'est pas la seule Raison, ou la nature des choses considerées en elles-mêmes, qui nous détermine, mais aussi très-souvent la disposition, où nous sommes, & le caprice. C'est à peu près la même chose, que ce qu'il appelle inquietude.

[15]: "Mais j'ai été surpris qu'après les définitions, qu'il a données lui-même de la Liberté il entreprenne [fn: "§48 & suiv."] de montrer qu'être déterminé par son propre jugement n'est pas une chose qui détruise la Liberté; ce qui ne se peut dire, que d'une détermination libre. Il est visible que se rendre à une démonstration de Mathematique, c'est à cet égard perdre la Liberté; parce qu'on ne peut plus croire le contraire. De même acquiescer dans la jouissance du Souverain Bien, dont on aurait une idée claire & dont on seroit en possession, ne seroit pas être libre à cet égard; parce qu'on ne peut point n'en être pas satisfait. Je ne disconviens pas qu'on ne soit alors dans un état plus parfait & plus souhaitable, que lors que l'on est dans un état d'incertitude, ou d'indifférence; mais ce dernier état est celui dans lequel nous sommes ici bas, & dans lequel il faut que nous soyons, pour être soumis à des Lois. Les Etres créez, qui sont dans l'état du Bonheur, n'ont plus de Liberté, étant attachez invinciblement à leur devoir, par la jouissance actuelle de la Félicité.
[16]: "Aussi n'ont-ils ni peines, ni récompenses à attendre. Dieu lui même n'est pas libre à l'égard de la Vérilité, pour s'y rendre ou ne s'y pas rendre; parce qu'il la connoit, avec la dernière évidence. Il ne l'est pas non plus, en ce que ses vertus demandent indispensible qu'il fasse; mais seulement à l'égard des choses, qu'il peut faire, ou ne pas faire, sans blesser en aucune manière ses perféctions. Il est nécessairement Bon & Juste, par exemple; & ne peut violer ni l'une, ni l'autre de ces vertus. L'excellence de son être consiste, en grande partie, dans son immutabilité, & on ne peut pas dire qu'il lui soit libre d'être plus, ou moins parfait. Mais pour les Hommes, qui sont sujets au changement, & qui peuvent devenir pires & meilleurs, pendant qu'ils sont ici bas, ils demeurent libres à cet égard. Cette qualité les élève au dessus des Étres destitués de connoissance, parce que la Liberté n'est jointe qu'avec l'intelligence; & même au dessus de celles, qui peuvent avoir quelque connaissance, & qui étant nécessairement portées à ce qu'elles font, ne peuvent pas améliorer leur condition, en agissant autrement.

[17]: "C'est une objection assez commune, dans les Écrits [fn"Vide August. contra Julian. Oper. Impers. Lib. VI. c.10"] de ceux qui confondent le libre & le volontaire, que de dire que Dieu & les Bienheureux ne laissent pas d'être libres, quoi qu'ils soient nécessairement attachés aux règles immuables de la Sainteté. Mais ils abusent du mot de libre, en cette occasion; comme on le peut voir, en faisant application de ce mot aux Hommes, qui sont ici, sous les Lois Divines, soutenues par des récompenses & des peines. On dit, par exemple, qu'Adam a pêché librement, & qu'il pouvait ne point pêcher; sans quoi, il ne seroit pas punissable, pour son pêché; comme il n'auroit pas pû avoir de récompense, s'il avoit obéi, supposé qu'il n'eût pas pû faire autrement. C'est de quoi tous les Théologiens conviennent. Personne ne peut dire, en ce sens, que Dieu soit saint librement; car il ne peut pas n'être pas saint, étant immuable comme il l'est. On ne peut pas dire non plus, que les Bienheureux aient la même Liberté, par rapport à la Sainteté, qu'Adam avoit à l'égard de l'innocence, & qu'ils puissent la perdre. Si cela étoit, leur Bonheur seroit incertain, & par consequent imparfait. On ne doit donc pas dire qu'ils sont libres, dans le bien; sans avertir que c'est dans un sens tout différent, que celui auquel les hommes sont libres sur la Terre.

[18]: "Quand on demande pourquoi Dieu, ou les Hommes établissent des Lois, auxquelles ils veulent que l'on obéisse, & pourquoi ils punissent les infracteurs de ces Lois; on ne manque pas de répondre, que Dieu & les Hommes supposent qu'on peut observer ces Lois, & que c'est par leur faute que les infracteurs les violent. Si l'on disoit que les coupables sont entièrement hors d'état d'observer ces commandemens, il n'y aurroit point de leur faute. S'ils ne le faisoient pas, parce qu'ils seraient aussi invinciblement déterminés à faire ce qu'ils seraient, que tous les Hommes le sont à embrasser une Proposition évidente, & à aimer le Bonheur en général; on les disculperait entièrement & l'on attribueroit à Dieu & aux Législateurs une injustice, qu'on ne saurait excuser. Ce seroit se moquer que de dire que les infracteurs des Lois ne laissent pas de pêcher librement, parce que c'est leur volonté, qui pêche, quoi qu'ils ne puissent pas changer de volonté. Ce mot ne peut pas rendre coupable un homme, dont la volonté est déterminée invinciblement à faire ce qu'il fait; mais on s'en sert, pour jetter de la poudre aux yeux; parce qu'on voit que tout le genre humain se souleverait, contre ceux qui diraient que l'on est puni pour
des pechets, que l'on n'a pas commis librement. On garde donc le mot, & l'on y attache une autre idée.

[19]: "C'est de quoi je n'accuse nullement Mr. Locke, mais je suis surpris, je l'avoue, qu'après avoir bien défini la Liberté, il donne à ce mot un autre sens; lors qu'il dit que Dieu est libre, quoi que déterminé nécessairement par ce qu'il y a de meilleur, & que l'on souhaite le Bonheur librement; ce qui n'est pas vrai, selon la définition, qui dit que la Liberté est le pouvoir de faire, ou de ne pas faire.

[20]: “6. Je ne m'arrêterai pas [fn: "§51 & suiv."] à diverses remarques, que Mr; Locke fait, sur la recherche du Bonheur, sur les mauvais choix & sur les faux jugemens des hommes. La plupart de ce qu'il dit est assurément vrai, quoi qu'à certains égards on y pourrait donner un autre tour. Je rapporterai seulement ce qu'il a ajouté en cette Edition à l'article 71 où après avoir donné une petite recapitulation de son sentiment, il parle ainsi: "Je sait que quelques ..

[21]: [§71 insert] "Comme je sait ce qui a donné occasion à notre Auteur d'ajouter ces paroles, je dirai en général, qu'il est surprenant que Mr. Locke n'eût pas mieux compris le sentiment de ceux qui établissent la Liberté dans l'Indifference; puisque ce sentiment est parfaitement conforme à la définition, qu'il a lui-même donnée de la Liberté, qui est le pouvoir de faire, ou de ne faire pas; ee que l'on appelle communément l'Indifference. Il paraît par ses objections, qu'il n'avait presque pas d'idée du sentiment, qu'il entreprenait de réfuter. 1. Quand on parle de la Liberté de notre Ame, dans ses actions; on dit qu'elle est indifférente, dans ses actions libres; non quand elle n'y pense pas, car on ne fait alors aucune réflexion fur la Liberté de l'Ame: ni quand elles sont faites, car elle est alors déterminée; mais pendant qu'elle délibère si elle les fera, ou non, jusqu'au moment auquel elle agit; parce que rien ne la détermine nécessairement à agir, ou à n'agir pas. Par exemple, il s'agit de savoir si je consenterai à quelque proposition, que l'on me fait, ou non. Pendant que je délibère, comme je ne suis déterminé par aucun motif, ni par aucune raison invincible, je suis dans l'Indifference. 2. On pourrait encore dire, que l'on est, après le consentement donné, dans l'Indifference, pour savoir si l'on continuera, ou non de faire ce que l'on a commencé. 3. L'Indifference, ou la Liberté (car c'est ici la même chose) n'est pas dans les Facultez Operatives, comme il les nomme; mais dans l'Ame même qui délibère, & qui se détermine librement. 4. Il vaudrait beaucoup mieux ne parler que de l'Ame, sans faire entrer ici les idées abstraites des Facultez, qui multiplient l'Homme en autant d'Etres, que l'on distingue de Facultez, & qui embrouillent cette matiere, au lieu de l'éclaircir. Il faut dire que, pendant que l'Ame délibère, elle est libre, ou dans l'Indifference; qu'elle la perd, à l'égard d'une action particulière, dès qu'elle l'a faite; mais qu'elle la conserve, pour la suite. Remarquez que le mot d'Indifference ne signifie pas ici que l'Ame n'a pas plus de penchant pour agir, que pour n'agir pas; mais seulement qu'elle n'est déterminée nécessairement, ni à l'un, ni à l'autre. 5. Les exemples que Mr. Locke apporte, de remuer la main, ne sont pas commodes; parce que l'Ame n'agit pas moins, lors que ses volontez ne sont pas exécutées au dehors, que lors qu'elles le sont. Cela n'a point de rapport essentiel, avec sa Liberté, qui est toute renfermée en elle même. Toutes les actions de l'Ame consistent en ses jugemens & en ses volitions, qui ne sont libres, que lors
que rien ne l'y détermine nécessairement; c'est à dire, quand il ne s'agit ni de l'Evidence, ni du Bien en général.

[22]: "C'est là ce que j'avois à remarquer sur le Chapitre XXI du II Livre de nôtre Auteur. J'ai crû le devoir faire, dans un tems, où d'autres se sont embarressez sur la même matiere; faute de bien définir les mots, dont ils se servent, ou de demeurer constants dans la définition, qu'ils ont une fois employée."
Appendix VII

Coste’s front matter to French translations of the Essay

Monsieur Locke au Librarie
(in 1700 & 1735 French edition of the Essay):

La nettété d’Espirit & la connoissance de la Langue Françoise, dont M. Coste a déjà donné au Public des preuves si visibles, pouvoient vous etre un assez bon garant de l’excellence de fon travail fur mon Essai, sans qu’il fût necessaire que vous m’en demandassiez mon sentiment. Si j’étois capable de juger de ce qui est écrit proprement & élegamment en François, je me croirois obligé de vous envoyer un grand éloge de cette Traduction dont j’ai ouï dire que quelques personnes, plus habiles que moi dans la Langue Français, ont assureé qu’elle pouvoit passer pour un Original. Mais ce que je puis dire à l’égard du point sur lequel vous souhaitez de savoir mon sentiment, c’est que M. Coste m’a lu cette Version d’un bout à l’autre avant que de vous l’envoyer, & que tous les endroits que j’ai remarqué s’éloigner de mes pensées, ont été ramenez au sens de l’Original, ce qui n’étoit pas facile dans des Notions aussi abstraites que le sont quelques-unes de mon Essai, les deux Langues n’ayant pas toujous des mots & des expressions que se répondent si juste l’une à l’autre qu’elles remplissent toute l’exactitude Philosophique; mais la justesse d’esprit de M. Coste & la souplesse de sa Plume lui ont fait trouver les moyens de corriger toutes ces fautes que j’ai découvertes à mesure qu’il me lisoit ce qu’il avoit traduit. De sorte que je puis dire au Lecteur que je présume qu’il trouvera dans cet Ouvrage toutes les qualitez qu’on peut desirer dans une bonne Traduction.

AVERTISSEMENT DU TRADUCTEUR
(the warning from the translator [i.e., Coste] from 1700 transl. of Essay)

1. Si j’allois faire un long Discours à la tête de ce Livre pour étaler tout ce que j’y ai remarqué d’excellent, je ne craindrois pas le reproche qu’on fait à la plupart des Traducteurs, qu’ils relevent un peu trop le merite de leurs Originaux, pour faire valoir le soin qu’ils ont pris de les publier dans une autre Langue. * car je suis assuré que tout ce que je dirois sur ce sujet, seroit confirmé par le suffrage des plus savans hommes de l’Europe. * Mais outre que j’ai été prévenu dans ce dessein par plusieurs illustres Ecrivains Anglois, qui tous les jours sont gloire d’admirer la justesse, la profondeur, & la netteté d’Esprit * qui paroit dans cet Ouvrage, un Eloge de ma part ne seroit d’aucun poids dans la République des Lettres, où mon nom n’est pas même connu. J’aurois beau dire, que je n’ai jamais lu aucun Livre où il y ait plus à profiter, & que plus je le lis, plus je l’admire, l’on ne s’en rapporteroit pas à moy: & s’il faut dire la vérite, dans des matières
de cette nature l’on * ne doit en croire que son propre jugement, comme M. Locke nous l’a recommandé lui-même, * dans cet Ouvrage, où il * remarquer * plusieurs * fois, que la soumission aveugle aux sentiments des plus grands hommes, a plus arrêté le progrès de la Connaissance qu’aucune autre chose. Je me contenterai donc de dire un mot de ma Traduction, & de la disposition d’Esprit où doivent être ceux qui voudront retirer quelque profit de la lecture de cet Ouvrage.

2. Ma plus grande peine a été de bien entrer dans la pensée de l’Auteur ; & malgré toute mon application, je serois souvent demeuré court sans l’assistance de M. Locke qui a eu la bonté de revoir ma Traduction. *Fort souvent après m’être bien tourmenté, je croyois enfin avoir attrapé le véritable sens d’un passage, & il se trouvoit au bout du compte que j’en étois fort éloigné: Je ne doute pas qu’une partie de ces difficultez ne doivent être attribuées à la petitesse de mon genie. Mais il est pourtant certain que * le sujet de ce Livre & la manière profonde & exacte dont il est traité, demandent un Lecteur sorit attentif. Ce que je ne dis pas tant pour obliger le Lecteur à excuser les fautes qu’il trouvera dans ma Traduction, que pour lui faire sentir la nécessité de le lire avec application, s’il veut en retirer du profit. Sur quoi je croi qu’on sera bien aise d’apprendre une petite Histoire qui est venue à ma connaissance. Lorsque cet Ouvrage parut pour la première fois, un des Amis de l’Auteur, homme d’Esprit, l’ayant lu d’un bout à l’autre comme un Roman Philosophique, le trouva fort à son goût. Mais quelque temps après, l’ayant voulu relire, il y vit quantité de choses qu’il n’entendoit point. Il se fit alors une affaire plus sérieuse de la lecture de cet Ouvrage. Il le lut & relut jusqu’à trois fois avec toute l’application dont il étoit capable, & il découvrit enfin toute la beauté de ce merveilleux Edifice dont il n’avoit d’abord vû que la face & les ornements extérieurs. Ceux qui voudront profiter de la lecture de ce Livre, ne feront pas mal d’imiter cet exemple.

3. Mais on doit faire encore deux choses, à mon avis, pour retirer quelque fruit de cette lecture. * La première est, de laisser à quartier toutes les Opinions dont on est prévenu sur les Questions qui sont traitées dans cet Ouvrage, & la seconde, déjuger des raisonnemens de l’Auteur par rapport a ce qu’on trouve en soi-même, sans se mettre en peine s’ils sont conformes ou non à ce qu’a dit Platon, Arisio, Gassendi, Descartes, ou quelque autre célèbre Philosophe. C’est dans cette disposition d’Esprit que M. Locke a composé cet Ouvrage. Il est tout visible qu’il n’avance rien que ce qu’il croit avoir trouvé conforme à la Vérité, par l’examen qu’il en a fait en lui-même. On dirait qu’il n’a rien appris de personne, tant il dit les choses les plus communes d’une manière originale ; de sorte qu’on est convaincu en lisant son Ouvrage qu’il ne débite pas ce qu’il a appris d’autrui comme l’ayant appris, mais comme autant de vérités qu’il a trouvées par sa propre méditation. Je croi qu’il faut nécessairement entrer dans cet esprit pour découvrir toute la structure de cet Ouvrage, & pour voir si les Idées de l’Auteur sont conformes à la nature des choses.

4. Une autre raison qui nous doit obliger à ne pas lire trop rapidement cet Ouvrage, c’est l’accident qui est arrivé à quelques personnes d’attaquer des Chimères en prétendant attaquer les sentiments de l’Auteur. On en peut voir un exemple dans la Préface même de M. Locke. Cet avis regarde sur tout ces Avanturiers qui toujours prêts à entrer en lice contre tous les Ouvrages qui
ne leur plaisent pas, les attaquent avant que de se donner la peine de les entendre. Semblables au Heros de Cervantes, ils ne pensent qu'à signaler leur valeur contre tout venant; & aveuglez par cette passion démesurée, il leur arrive quelquefois, comme à ce désastreux Chevalier, de prendre des Moulins-à-vent pour des Géans. Si les Anglois, qui sont naturellement si circonspects, sont tombés dans cet inconvénient à l'égard du Livre de M. Locke, on pourra bien y tomber ailleurs, & par conséquent l'avis n'est pas inutile. En profitera qui voudra.

5. * Pour les * Déclamateurs qui ne songent ni à s'instruire ni à instruire les autres, * ils n'ont pas besoin de * cet avis * parce qu'ils * ne cherchent pas la Vérité, on ne peut leur souhaiter que le mépris du Public; juste recompense de leurs travaux qu'ils ne manquent guère de recevoir tôt ou tard! Je mets dans ce rang ceux qui s'aviseront de publier; pour rendre odieux les Principes de M. Locke, que, selon lui, ce que * Dieu nous a révélé * n'est pas certain, parce * que Mr. Locke * distingue la Certitude d'avec la Foi; & qu'il n'appelle certain que ce qui nous paraît véritable par des raisons évidentes, & que nous voyons de nous-mêmes. Il est visible que ceux qui seroient cette Objection, le sonderoient uniquement sur l'équivoque du mot de Certitude qu'ils prendroient dans un sens populaire, au lieu que M. Locke l'a toujours pris dans un sens Philosophique pour une Connaissance évidente, c'est-à-dire pour la perception de la convenance ou de la disconvenance qui est entre deux idées, ainsi que M. Locke le dit lui-même plusieurs fois, en autant de termes. Comme cette Objection a été imprimée en Anglois, j'ai été bien aise d'en avertir les Lecteurs Français pour empêcher, s'il se peut, qu'on ne barbouille inutilement du Papier en la renouvellant. Car apparemment elle serait sifflée ailleurs, comme elle l'a été en Angleterre. * Je ne puis m'empêcher de dire ici que bien des gens ont fait reflexion sur ce déchaînement d'Ecrivains qui ont paru tout d'un coup sur les rangs pour attaquer le Livre de Mr. Locke, après l'avoir jouir plusieurs années d'une approbation générale. Cela leur a paru d'autant plus surprenant qu'on n'a rien vu de solide dans toutes ces attaques redoublées. Ne seroit-ce point, disent-ils, ce qu'a remarqué [Horace, Epist. Lib. II. Epist. 1] un bel Esprit de la Cour d'Auguste, que dès que quelqu’un excelle dans quelque art, il devient insupportable à certaines personnes, 

\[Urit enim fulgore suo, qui praegravit Artes infra se positas?\]

S’il étoit ainsi, je ne ferois pas difficulté d'ajouter, Êxtinctus amabitur Idem, & on l'aimera quand il ne sera plus; quelle foiblesse! Quoi qu'il en soit, voici ce que vient de dire sur cela Mr. Bold, savant Théologien de l’Eglise Anglaise, qui joint à une grande pénétration d’Esprit un amour ar Jens & sincere pour la Vérité. Après avoir déclaré en termes expres, qu’il “ne croit point rabisser les Ouvrages de qui que ce soit, ni relever l’Essai de Mr. Locke au delà de ce qu’il merite, en disant que c’est le Livre le plus propre qu’il connosse, à avancer les intérêts de la Verité, Naturelle, Morale & Divine, & que c’est le meilleurs & le plus important Ouvrage qu’il ait jamis lu, excepté ceux qui ont été écrits par des personnes divinement inspirées, il ajoute, [* This excellent Treatise having been published several years, and received through all the Learned World with very great Approbation, by those who understood English, a mighty Outcry was at last, all on the sudden, raised against it here at Home. There was, no doubt, some reason or other why so many hands should be employed, just at the same time, to Attack and Barter this Essay, tho’ what was the weighty consideration, which put them all in motion, may, perhaps, continue a long time a Secret. Some considerations on the Principal Objections and Arguments which have been publish'd against Mr. Locke's Essay. Pag. 1, 2] Cet excellent Traité ayant été public depuis
plusieurs années, & ayant été reçu avec une très-grande approbation parmi tous les Savans qui entendent l’Anglois, on l’a enfin attaqué tout d’un coup à grand bruit dans notre Ile. C’a été sans doute pour quelque Raison particulière que tant de personnes ont été employées justement dans le meine temps à dresser leurs batteries de ce côté-là, quoique peut-être ce puissant motif qui les a ainsi mis tous en mouvement, continuera d’être un secret pendant long-temps.

6. Pour revenir à ma Traduction, je n’ai point songé à disputer le prix de l’élocution à M. Locke qui est, dit on, une les meilleures Plumes d’Angleterre. Ce n’est point en traduisant des Ouvrages comme celui-ci qu’il faudroit tenter d’encherir sur son Original. Cela sied bien dans des Harangues & des Pièces d’Eloquence dont la plus grande beauté consiste dans la noblesse & la vivacité des expressions. C’est ainsi que Ciceron en usa en mettant en Latin les Harangues qu’Eschine & Démosthène avoient prononcées l’un contre l’autre: Je les ai traduites en Orateur, dit il, & non en Interprete. Dans ces sortes d’Ouvrages, [*Nec conversi__ Interpretes, sed__ Orator. De optimo genere Oratorum, Cap. __*] un Traducteur ajoute bien des choses, & en retranche d’autres, qu’il ne peut faire valoir; ** quae desperat tractata nitescere posse, relinquit.

Mais qui ne voit que cette liberté seroit sort mal placée dans un Ouvrage de pur raisonnement comme celui-ci, où une expression trop foible ou trop forte déguise la Vérité, & l’empêche de se montrer à l’Esprit dans sa pureté naturelle? Je me suis donc fait une affaire de suivre scrupuleusement mon Auteur sans m’en écarter le moins du monde; & si j’ai pris quelque liberté (car on ne peut s’en passer) ç’a toujours été sous le bon plaisir de M. Locke qui entend assez bien le Français pour juger quand je rendois exactement la pensée, quoi que je prisse un tour un peu différent de celui qu’il ait pris dans la Langue. Sans cette permission je n’aurois osé en bien des endroits prendre des libertez qu’il falloit prendre né cessairement pour bien représenter la pensée de l’Auteur. Sur quoi il me vient dans l’Esprit qu’on pourroit comparer un Traducteur avec un Plenipotentiaire. La Comparaison est magnifique, & je crains bien qu’on ne me reproche de faire un peu trop Valoir un métier qui n’est pas en grand crédit dans le Monde. Quoi qu’il en soit, il me semble que le Traducteur & le Plenipotentiaire ne sauroient bien profiter de tous leurs avantages, si leurs Pouvoirs sont trop limités. Je n’ai point à me plaindre de ce côté-là.

7. La seule liberté que je me suis donné sans aucune réserve, c’est de m’exprimer le plus nettement qu’il m’a été possible. J’ai mis tout en usage pour cela. J’ai évité avec soin le stile figuré dès qu’il pouvait jeter quelque confusion dans l’Esprit. Sans me mettre en peine de la mesure & de l’harmonie des Périodes, j’ai repété le même mot toutes les fois que cette repetition pouvoit sauver la moindre apparence d’équivoque; je me suis servi, autant que j’ai pu m’en ressouvenir, de tous les expédiens que nos Grammairiens ont inventé pour éviter les faux rapports. Toutes les fois que je n’ai pas bien compris une pensée en Anglois, parce qu’elle renfermoit quelque rapport douteux (car les Anglois ne sont pas si scrupuleux que nous sur cet article) j’ai tâché, après l’avoir comprise, de si * la déterminer si nettement * en Français, qu’on ne put éviter de l’entendre. C’est principalement par la netteté que la Langue Françoise emporte le prix sur toutes les autres Langues, sans en excepter les Langues Savantes, autant que j’en puis juger. Et c’est pour cela, dit *le P- Lami, * quelle’ est plus propre qu’aucune autre pour traiter les Sciences parce qu’elle le fait avec une admirable clarté. Je * ne suis pas si vain pour prétendre * que ma Traduction en soit une preuve, mais je puis dire que je n’ai rien épargné pour me faire entendre; .
8. Cependant, comme il n'y a point de Langue qui par quelque endroit ne soit inférieure à quelque autre, j'ai éprouvé dans cette Traduction ce que je ne savois autrefois que par ouï dire, que la Langue Angloise est beaucoup plus abondante en termes que la Françoise, & qu'elle s'accommode beaucoup mieux des mots tout-à-fait nouveaux. Malgré les Règles que nos Grammairiens ont prescrites sur ce dernier article, je croi qu'ils ne désapprouveront pas la liberté que j'ai prise d'employer des mots * qui ne sont pas sort connus dans le Monde, pour pouvoir exprimer * de nouvelles Idées.* Je n'ai guère pris cette liberté que je n'en aye fait voir la nécessité dans une petite Note. Je ne sai si l'on se contentera de mes raisons. Je pourrois m'appuyer de l'autorité du plus savant des Romains, qui, quelque jaloux qu'il fut de la pureté de sa Langue, comme il paroit par ses Discours de l'Orateur, ne put se dispenser de faire de nouveaux mots dans ses Traitez Philosophiques. Mais un tel exemple ne tire point à conséquence pour moi, j'en tombe d'accord. Ciceron avoit le secret d'adoucir la rudesse de ces nouveaux sons par le charme de son Eloquence, & dédommageoit bientôt son Lecteur par mille beaux tours d'expression qu'il avoit à commandement. Mais *la Modestie ne me permet* pas d'autoriser la liberté que j'ai prise, par l'exemple de cet illustre Romain; qu'on me permette d'imiter en cela nos Philosophes Modernes qui ne sont aucune difficulté de faire de nouveaux mots quand ils en ont besoin; comme il me seroit aisé de le prouver, si la chose en valoit la peine.

9. Je ne veux pas finir sans apprendre au Lecteur que le petit Abregé de cet Ouvrage qui fut traduit en François par Monsieur Le Clerc, and inféré dans la Bibliotheque Universelle, [*Tom. VIII. pag. 49*] m'a été d'un grand secours. J'en ai transcrit des paragraphes entiers au commencement du Chapitre X. du Quatriéme Livre. Il seroit à souhaiter que toute la Traduction sut de la même main, pour que cet Ouvrage pût paroître en François dans toute sa fleur.

10. Au reste, quoi que M. Locke ait l'honnêteté de témoigner publiquement qu'il approuve ma Traduction, je déclare que je ne prétens pas me prévaloir de cette Approbation. Elle signifie tout au plus qu'en gros je suis entré dans son sens, mais elle ne garantit point les sautes particulières qui peuvent m'être échappées. *Quoi* *que M. Locke* *ait our lire* *ma Traduction avant* *qu'elle ait été envoyée* *à l'Imprimeur,* *comme j'ai déjà dit,* cela n'empêche pas qu'il n'aît pû *laisser passer* *bien* *des expressions qui ne rendent pas exactement la pensée. L'Errata en est une bonne preuve. Les sautes que j'y ai marquées, *& dont quelques-unes* *doivent être misées sur le compte de l'Imprimeur* ne sont pas toutes également considérables; mais il y en a qui gâtent entièrement le sens. C'est pourquoi l'on fera bien de les corriger, avant que de lire l'Ouvrage, pour n'être pas arrêté inutilement. Je ne doute pas qu'on n'en découvre plusieurs autres. Mais *enfin* *quoi qu'on pense de cette Traduction,* je que j'y trouverai plus de défauts que bien des Lecteurs, plus éclairez que moi, parce qu'il n'y a pas apparence qu'ils s'avisent de l'examiner avec autant de soin que j'ai résolu de faire.
Avis sur cette Seconde Édition

Quoique dans la première Edition Françoise de cet Ouvrage, M. Locke m’eut laissé une entière liberté d’employer les tours que je jugerois les plus propres à exprimer ses pensées, & qu’il entendit assez bien le genie de la Langue Françoise pour sentir si mes expressions répondoient exactement à ses idées, j’ai trouvé, en lui relisant ma Traduction imprimée, & après l’avoir depuis examinée avec soin, qu’il y avait bien des endroits à reformer tant à l’égard du stile qu’à l’égard du sens. Je dois encore un bon nombre de corrections à la critique pénétrante d’un des plus solides Écrivains de ce siècle, l’illustre M. BARBEYRAC, qui ayant lu ma Traduction avant même qu’il entendit l’Anglois, y découvrit des fautes, & me les indiqua avec cette aimable politesse qui est inseparable d’un esprit modeste & d’un coeur bien fait.

En relisant l’Ouvrage de M. Locke, j’ai été frappé d’un défaut que bien des gens y ont observé depuis long-temps: ce sont les répétitions inutiles. M. Locke a pressenti l’Objection; & pour justifier les répétitions dont il a grossi son Livre, il nous dit dans la Préface, qu’une même notion ayant différents rapports, peut être propre ou nécessaire à prouver ou à éclaircir différentes parties d’un même discours, & que, s’il a répété les mêmes argumens, ç’a été dans des vuës différentes. L’excuse est bonne en général: mais il reste bien des repetitions qui ne semblent pas pourvoir être pleinement justifiées par-là.

Quelques personnes d’un goût très-delicat m’ont extrêmement sollicité à retrancher absolument ces sortes des répétitions qui paroissent plus propres à fatiguer qu’à éclaircir l’esprit du Lecteur: mais je n’ai pas osé tenter l’aventure. Car outre que l’entreprise me sembloit trop pénible, j’ai considéré qu’au bout du compte la plupart des gens me blâmeroient d’avoir pris cette licence, par la raison qu’en retranchant ces répétitions, j’aurois sort bien pû laisser échaper quelque réflexion, ou quelque raisonnement de l’Auteur. Je me suis donc entierement borné à retoucher mon stile, & à redresser tous les Passages où j’ai cru n’avoir pas exprimé la pensée de l’Auteur avec assez de précision. Ces Corrections avec des Additions très-importantes faites par M. Locke, qu’il me communiquâ lui-même, & qui n’ont été imprimées en Anglois qu’après sa mort, ont mis la Seconde Edition sort au dessus de la Prémiére, & par conséquent, de la Reimpression qui en a été faite en 1723 en quelque Ville de Suisse qu’on n’a pas voulu nommer dans le Titre.

Pour rendre la Seconde Edition plus complete, j’avois d’abord résolu d’insérer en leur place des Extraits fideles de tout ce que M. Locke avoit publié dans ses Réponses au Docteur Stillingfleet pour défendre son Essai contre les objections de ce rélat. Mais en parcourant ces Objections, j’ai trouvé qu’elles ne contenoient rien de solide contre cet Ouvrage; & que les réponses de M. Locke tendoient plutôt à confondre son Antagoniste qu’à éclaircir ou à confirmer la Doctrine de son Livre. J’excepee les Objections du Docteur Stillingfleet contre ce que M. Locke a dit dans son Essai (Liv. IV. ch.III §6) qu’on ne scouroit être assuré que Dieu ne peut point donner à certains amas de matiere, disposés comme il le trouve à propos, la puissance d’appercevoir, & de penser. Comme c’est une Question curieuse, j’ai mis sons ce Passage tout ce que M. Locke a imaginé sur ce sujet dans sa Réponse au Docteur Stillingfleet. Pour cet effet, j’ai transcrit une bonne partie de l’Extrait de cette Réponse, imprimé dans les Nouvelles de la Republique des

Enfin pour transmettre à la Postérité (si ma Traduction peut aller jusques-là) le caractère de M. Locke tel que je l’ai conçu, après avoir passé avec lui les sept dernières années de sa vie, je mettrais ici une espece d’Eloge Historique de cet excellent Homme, que je composai peu de temps après sa mort. Je sais que mon suffrage, confondu avec tant d’autres d’un prix infiniment supérieur, ne saurait être d’un grand poids; mais s’il est inutile à la gloire de M. LOCKE, il servira du moins à témoigner qu’ayant vu & admiré ses belles qualités, je me suis fait un plaisir d’en perpétuer la mémoire.
## Appendix VIII

### Pertinent Molyneux (M) - Locke (L) correspondence list
(July 1692 - July 1693; *Correspondence IV*)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>#</th>
<th>Page(s)</th>
<th>Summary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>July 16, 1692 (#1515)</td>
<td></td>
<td>479-80</td>
<td>Locke initiates correspondence w/ Molyneux, thanking him for referring to him and the <em>Essay in M's Dioptrica Nova</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 27, 1692 (#1530)</td>
<td></td>
<td>507-9</td>
<td>M replies enthusiastically, tells L he gave copy of <em>Essay</em> to W. King and that King has returned it with some rough remarks. M also asks L to add a Moral treatise.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 20, 1692 (#1538)</td>
<td></td>
<td>522-5</td>
<td>L tells M he'd appreciate getting those remarks if M wants to send them. Says he will write that Moral treatise.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 15, 1692 (#1544)</td>
<td></td>
<td>532-3</td>
<td>M sends L the King remarks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 22, 1692 (#1579)</td>
<td></td>
<td>599-602</td>
<td>M gives L his own thoughts about the <em>Essay</em>, referring to L's &quot;wonderfully fine spun&quot; take on &quot;the Great Question of Liberty and Necessity,&quot; &quot;which seems to vanish ... to make all Sins to proceed ... not at all from the Depravity of our Wills ...&quot; M also asks again for a Moral treatise (and a Logic treatise)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 26, 1692 (#1583)</td>
<td></td>
<td>608-10</td>
<td>L has apparently received M's Oct. 15 letter but not the Dec. 22 letter, thus blows off King's remarks but pleads for M to send his own response to L's <em>E</em>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 20, 1693 (#1592)</td>
<td></td>
<td>623-8</td>
<td>L realizes he wrote the 12/26 letter not knowing of M's 12/22 letter. Hence his tone is now more humbled; this letter is the one where he confesses he's lost on Ch. 21 (long long letter here ...).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 2, 1693 (#1609)</td>
<td></td>
<td>647-52</td>
<td>M apologizes to L for his tardiness (he's been sick), flatters L's ego (sensing its sensitivity?), presents quite a few additional typographic &amp; other errors he's spotted in <em>E</em>, requests a Moral treatise from L again, and introduces situation which later becomes known as the &quot;Molyneux Problem&quot; re blind man newly given sight (though he'd originally written L about it earlier, in July 1688, before they knew each other. At the time, L must have ignored or not seen it).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 28, 1693 (#1620)</td>
<td></td>
<td>663-6</td>
<td>L expresses relief that M is not disappointed in him, says he greatly appreciates all of M's comments and criticisms, asks for any more M might spot; sends his regards to M's brother.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr. 18, 1693 (#1622)</td>
<td></td>
<td>667-9</td>
<td>M thanks L for regards re brother, congrats L for progress on manuscript &amp; its printing, wants more clarity on L's view of existence of God (esp. against Malebranche's view) and wants clarity on L's view re eternity of the Will.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 15, 1693 (#1643)</td>
<td></td>
<td>700-1</td>
<td>L mails to M his new view of human freedom, which now includes the &quot;uneasiness&quot; condition. This will form the nucleus of his 2nd &quot;Of Power&quot; edition version and will remain the major thrust of all subsequent editions.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix IX

Pertinent Limborch (P) - Locke (L) Correspondence list
(July 1700 - Oct. 1702; Correspondence VII)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>P or L &gt; L</th>
<th>Page range</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>July 9/20, 1700 (#2742)</td>
<td>P &gt; L</td>
<td>pp. 101-5</td>
<td>P receives French translation of Essay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 19/30, 1700 (#2795)</td>
<td>P &gt; L</td>
<td>pp. 167-9</td>
<td>P reads much of it; wants to reread II.xxi (“Of Power”)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 7, 1701 (#2857)</td>
<td>P &gt; L</td>
<td>pp. 238-42</td>
<td>P reads most of it, likes it; wants clarification on parts of II.xxi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 19, 1701 (#2881)</td>
<td>P &gt; L</td>
<td>pp. 270-8</td>
<td>Limb. thinks for L when L says in §24 “liberty consists in power to act and not act,” that means both external and internal actions, “that is, to our cogitations” (274-5) // “inquietude” (2X: “uneasiness”?) // “a good rouses desire in us,” but not necess. a greater good (§75?) - of indif. that is not determined by the last judgmt that a man makes of the good and evil ... is the highest imperfection of nature, etc.” P agrees, accdg to Remonst belief (276)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 21, 1701 (#2925)</td>
<td>L &gt; P</td>
<td>pp. 325-30</td>
<td>L says Limb. is right - L d/n restrict to external only in §24 - see §8, §38 and other. But Limb. is wrong in &quot;whatever a man wills is considered by him to be agreeable&quot; as that means Limb. is confusing Will with Desire. Will is only directed to our actions and stops there. But will rarely acts unless desire leads, though they are distinct (see ¶20, 40). Longing is a passion moved by an absent good. Volition is an act of the will exercising command over the operative powers of a man. Desire ... Will. Separate. VIP (327) // L says his “Indif.” what he has researched. He’s not talking about “antecedent indif” -- i.e., that indif before the determinations of the will ... or before the last judgment of the underst., which is incoherent. How can liberty determine one way or the other at either point? before judgment he can’t</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**July 8, 1701 (#2953)**  
#6 - pp. 363-72  
P > L

Limb. to L: "I have not perceived there is that agreement betw'n us which I believed there was when I read -21- (p. 365). OK's distinc L makes in Will vs Desire. But we will 2 things (366), an end and a means to an end. We s/t desire things we do not will. "Complete" vs. "incomplete" desire/will // the Schools call "velleity" ("barbarous denomination") = what a man might will

Let's agree" "desire is directed to a good" and "will governs actions"

But let us also disting comp and incomplete desires (velleity for Remonst, indif is energy of the spirit by which it can act/not act. "I see we disagree about the thing" [i.e., antece. indif.] itself 9368). For Limb., "liberty consists solely in a power by which a man can determine, or not determine, an action of willing ..." p. 366 (i.e., not solely liberty = power to act/not act).

"I scarcely understand what you mean when you say 'Before the' last judgment of the underst. a man is altogether unable to determine himself..." - 369. ["Explain 'last j. of u.', L"] -- "it is called the 'practical' last judgment of understanding" // But this judgment is an act not so much of underst. of will -- or it is a 'mixed' act, in "the completion of which the will joins ... a judg which is an act of the U alone proceeds no further than 'this ought to be done, this ought to be forborne.' (369) ... Further, some (370) action of will intervenes ... when a man acts in accordance with right reason [??} or weakness of will] [or do brute impulse/carnal wishes] liberty = suspending this action. Like your §47 where you say the same thing. But your letter contradicts this -- says before judgment of U a man is unable to determine himself.

**Aug. 12, 1701 (#2979)**  
#7 - pp. 401-14  
L > P

L > Limb.: if "Will" = power a man has to begin, stop, or forbear any action of his mind or body (§5)  
Will "terminates solely in our actions and cannot be further extended to any thing else or directed to a remote and absent good." [If you, Limb., say Will is directed to a good as an end, you are receding from my idea ... What do you mean by 'Will'?"] p. 403  
The "complete/incomplete desire/will" stuff of yours is crap. Will not turn "Will" towards a good. I doubt there's anything called an "incomplete volition" (and I think you're mistaking Will/Volition). I do recognize "ineffective volition" (paralytic + raised hand) -- there volition is w/out result. But not "incomplete." // lg misuse

L: "Liberty does not in any way appertain to the will" (see §14) p. 407  
"antecedent indiff before the decree of the will ~ [Question of liberty]. Re your "indiff = energy of the spirit by which X it can act/not act is judgment of U, or cogitation, one of the Xs? If yes, "It will never prove the will is free bec. when any action has been proposed to the U the Will is not in an act/not act state (407)

" L objects to Limb.'s previous "last judgment of the understanding" based on "mature and right judgment". No, it's just last judgment, good or not. p. 411
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Oct. 3, 1701 (#3010)</th>
<th>P &gt; L</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>#8 - pp. 448-65</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Limb.&gt; L - maybe we differ less in opinion and more in choice of words. Let's list -- what we agree on, where we differ.</strong></td>
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<td>± Will; Desire ~ WeS.</td>
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<td>For Remons., liberty = man's dominion over his actions (451).</td>
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<tr>
<td>A. Underst. necessarily implies will (i.e., with nada between them)</td>
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<td>B. Underst.-snails unto itself; will-snails unto itself. Action knows nothing, is brute impulse.</td>
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<td>For other (sects?), Root of liberty is in Underst where there is indifferency.</td>
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<td>U and Will are distinct from the soul and from each other -- none knows the other (does &quot;soul&quot; negotiate between the two??) &quot;Underst. // Will&quot; divided by indefensible wall between them</td>
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<tr>
<td>Remonst comment: this is only &quot;passiv indif&quot; like with eye reception (i.e., not free to refuse)</td>
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<tr>
<td>● if liberty is in indif., it must be in active indif which resides in the Will (p. 452)</td>
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<tr>
<td>= dominion over our actions</td>
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<td>= all reg. for acting incl. judgment of underst. otherwise action of willing is devoid of reason</td>
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<tr>
<td>liberty = can always change mind</td>
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<td>- but case is different in internal/mind alone actions (adulterous lust for another man's wife who is inaccessible ≠ adultery)</td>
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<td>- brute impulse = precipitate action ? still = liberty (454)</td>
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<tr>
<td>- indif ≠ a state of nonpreferential equilibrium / = state where a man can determine opposite to what he wills (i.e., why &quot;indif&quot; creates problems for Remonst. to others)</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Limb.: “last judgment of Understanding” is both: (1) &quot;mature /right / prudent&quot; judgment (right reason), and (2) “wrong and precipitate” judgment (brute impulse)</td>
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<td>- liberty is both (1) of internal actions - not evaluationable? (2) of external actions - evaluation based on whether action willed was carried out (complete/incomplete)</td>
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<td>-Limb. to L: your defin. of “liberty” is too narrow. If it is what you say, then liberty does not ‘appertain’ to the Will” (458) For me, liberty ≠ my dominion over my actions - bth of actions and of willing / volition itself (459)</td>
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<tr>
<td>- “Underst. necessarily leads to will”. Limb. to L&gt;: Agree?</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Understanding is either (1) purely theoretical (“speculativa”) -- action of underst. of absolute necessity; or (2) purely practical (“practica”)</td>
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<td>Possible that Underst necessarily implies Opinion = Underst. necessarily implies doubt</td>
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<td>Reason necessitates judgment (weigh value/truth of reasons &gt; &quot;guides will&quot; but does not determine will. (command only of persuasion which the will can disobey)</td>
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<td>Limb. to L: actually, you sound more like a pure determinist (p. 473)</td>
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<tr>
<th>Nov. 19, 1701 (#3043)</th>
<th>L &gt; P</th>
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<tr>
<td>#9 - pp. 501-5</td>
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<tr>
<td>L&gt;Limb. L read Episcopius Treatise on FW (look up)</td>
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<td>- If you think my liberty is &quot;too narrow,&quot; please produce your own</td>
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<tr>
<td>- I d/n understand your &quot;liberty = dominion&quot; crap. Define &quot;dominion.&quot; It could mean “fated / predestined” ... ~ Liberty</td>
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<td>(quibble about &quot;faculties do&quot; annoyance) (lg. traps)</td>
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<td>- says he'll adjust some things; radical changes then appear in §48, 56, 71, and §8, 23-5 in the 5th (posthumous) edition [Q remains: did Locke agree to THESE changes??]</td>
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<tr>
<th>Dec. 23, 1701 (#3055)</th>
<th>P &gt; L</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>#10 - pp. 518-21</td>
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<tr>
<td>Limb. &gt; L : my apologies re careless lg.</td>
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<tr>
<td>“dominion over actions” = “liberty is a man’s faculty of eliciting or not (both required avail. for liberty) eliciting his action” -- any action whatsoever / still confused about you, L.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Reference</td>
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| Sept. 28, 1702 (#3192)  
#11 - pp. 679-81 | L > Limb. : What “Understanding” means is sticky. Do I have freedom to *not* find s/t which is analytically True/not True? Understanding must, like the eye, deal with what it gets. |
| Oct. 16, 1702 (#3200)  
#12 - pp. 690-5 | P > L                  |
Appendix X

Charts comparing revisions between Essay editions 4 & 5, etc.

Chart outlining Coste’s posthumous revisions for four sections in Essay II.xxi. (§ 23, 48, 56, & 71)

Four major revisions that can be found in the posthumous version either challenge what Locke had held elsewhere in the chapter or prompt one to ask why Locke would have made such changes at all since they weren’t obviously moving his own present arguments forward. Three of them are mentioned by Coste in his letter to Leibniz (§§ 48, 56, & 71). One of those three can be independently confirmed as coming from Locke himself (§71). A fourth change is one that I list but Coste did not (§23).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of section (§)</th>
<th>on Coste’s list?</th>
<th>evidence Locke authorized?</th>
<th>Addition or Deletion?</th>
<th>Substance of change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>§23</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>deletion</td>
<td>infinite regress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§48</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>addition</td>
<td>self-determination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§56</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>addition</td>
<td>free will</td>
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<tr>
<td>§71</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>addition</td>
<td>liberty of indifference</td>
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</table>
Full texts of Coste’s posthumous revisions for three sections in *Essay II.xxi.* (§ 23, 48, & 56)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1700 version</th>
<th>1706 (posth.) version</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>§23: That willing, or volition, being an action, and freedom consisting in a power of acting or not acting, a man in respect of willing the act of volition, when any action in his power is once proposed to his thoughts, as presently to be done, cannot be free. The reason whereof is very manifest: for it being unavoidable that the action depending on his will should exist, or not exist: and its existence, or not existence, following perfectly the determination and preference of his will; he cannot avoid willing the existence, or not existence of that action; it is absolutely necessary that he will the one, or the other; i.e. prefer the one to the other; since one of them must necessarily follow; and that which does follow, follows by the choice and determination of his mind, that is, by his willing it; for if he did not will it, it would not be. So that in respect of the act of willing, a man in such a case is not free: liberty consisting in a power to act, or not to act; which, in regard of volition, a man, upon such a proposal, has not. For it is unavoidably necessary to prefer the doing or forbearance of an action in a man’s power, which is once so proposed to his thoughts: a man must necessarily will the one or the other of them, upon which preference or volition, the action or its forbearance certainly follows, and is truly voluntary. But the act of volition, or preferring one of the two, being that which he cannot avoid, a man in respect of that act of willing is under a necessity, and so cannot be free; unless necessity and freedom can consist together, and a man can be free and bound at once. Besides to make a man free after this manner, by making the action of willing to depend on his will, there must be another antecedent will, to determine the acts of this will, and another to determine that, and so in infinitum: for wherever one stops, the actions of the last will cannot be free. Nor is any being, as far as I can comprehend beings above me, capable of such a freedom of will, that it can forbear to will, i.e. to prefer the being or not being of anything in its power, which it has once considered as such.</td>
<td>§23: That willing, or volition, being an action, and freedom consisting in a power of acting or not acting, a man in respect of willing the act of volition, when any action in his power is once proposed to his thoughts, as presently to be done, cannot be free. The reason whereof is very manifest: for it being unavoidable that the action depending on his will should exist, or not exist: and its existence, or not existence, following perfectly the determination and preference of his will; he cannot avoid willing the existence, or not existence of that action; it is absolutely necessary that he will the one, or the other; i.e. prefer the one to the other; since one of them must necessarily follow; and that which does follow, follows by the choice and determination of his mind, that is, by his willing it; for if he did not will it, it would not be. So that in respect of the act of willing, a man in such a case is not free: liberty consisting in a power to act, or not to act; which, in regard of volition, a man, upon such a proposal, has not. For it is unavoidably necessary to prefer the doing or forbearance of an action in a man’s power, which is once so proposed to his thoughts: a man must necessarily will the one or the other of them, upon which preference or volition, the action or its forbearance certainly follows, and is truly voluntary. But the act of volition, or preferring one of the two, being that which he cannot avoid, a man in respect of that act of willing is under a necessity, and so cannot be free; unless necessity and freedom can consist together, and a man can be free and bound at once.</td>
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<td>§48: This is so far from being a restraint or diminution of freedom, that it is the very improvement and benefit of it: it is not an abridgment, it is the end and use of our liberty; and the farther we are removed from such a determination, the nearer we are to misery and slavery. A perfect indifferency in the mind, not determinable by its last judgment of the good or evil that is thought to attend its choice, would be so far from being an advantage and excellency of any intellectual nature, that it would be as great an imperfection, as the want of indifferency to act or not to act determined by the will, would be an imperfection on the other side. A man is at liberty to lift up his hand to his head, or let it rest quiet; he is perfectly indifferent in either; and it would be an imperfection in him, if he were deprived of that indifference. But it would be as great an imperfection if he bad the same indifference, whether he would prefer the lifting up his hand, or its remaining in rest, when it would save his head or eyes from a blow he sees coming: it is as much a perfection, that desire, or the power of preferring, should be determined by good, as that the power of acting should be determined by the will; and the certain such determination is, the greater is the perfection. Nay, were we determined by any thing but the last result of our own minds, judging of the good or evil of any action, we were not free.</td>
<td>§48: This is so far from being a restraint or diminution of freedom, that it is the very improvement and benefit of it: it is not an abridgment, it is the end and use of our liberty; and the farther we are removed from such a determination, the nearer we are to misery and slavery. A perfect indifferency in the mind, not determinable by its last judgment of the good or evil that is thought to attend its choice, would be so far from being an advantage and excellency of any intellectual nature, that it would be as great an imperfection, as the want of indifferency to act or not to act determined by the will, would be an imperfection on the other side. A man is at liberty to lift up his hand to his head, or let it rest quiet; he is perfectly indifferent in either; and it would be an imperfection in him, if he wanted that power, if he were deprived of that indifference. But it would be as great an imperfection if he had the same indifference, whether he would prefer the lifting up his hand, or its remaining in rest, when it would save his head or eyes from a blow he sees coming: it is as much a perfection, that desire, or the power of preferring, should be determined by good, as that the power of acting should be determined by the will; and the certain such determination is, the greater is the perfection. Nay, were we determined by any thing but the last result of our own minds, judging of the good or evil of any action, we were not free: the very end of our freedom being, that we may attain the good we choose. And therefore every man is put under a necessity by its constitution, as an intelligent being, to be determined in willing by his own thought and judgment what is best for him to do: else he would be under the determination of some other than himself, which is want of liberty. And to deny that a man’s will, in every determination, follows his own judgment, is to say, that a man wills and acts for an end that he would not have, at the time that he wills and acts for it. For if he prefers it in his present thoughts before any other, it is plain he then thinks better of it, and would have it before any other; unless he can have and not have it, will and must will it, at the same time; a contradiction too manifest to be admitted!</td>
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</table>
§56: What has been said may also discover to us the reason why men in this world prefer different things, and pursue happiness by contrary courses. But yet, since men are always constant, and in earnest, in matters of happiness and misery, the question still remains, How men come often to prefer the worse to the better; and to choose that, which by their own confession, has made them miserable?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1700 version</th>
<th>1706 (posth.) version</th>
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<tr>
<td>§56: What has been said may also discover to us the reason why men in this</td>
<td>§56: These things duly weigh’d, will give us, as I think, a clear view into the</td>
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<td>world prefer different things, and pursue happiness by contrary courses. But</td>
<td>state of human Liberty. Liberty, ‘tis plain, consists in a Power to do, or not to</td>
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<td>yet, since men are always constant, and in earnest, in matters of happiness</td>
<td>do; to do, or forbear doing, as we will. This cannot be deny’d. But this</td>
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<td>and misery, the question still remains, How men come often to prefer the</td>
<td>seeming to comprehend only the actions of a Man consecutive to volition, it is</td>
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<td>worse to the better; and to choose that, which by their own confession, has</td>
<td>farther inquired, “whether he be at Liberty to will, or no.” And to this it has</td>
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<td>made them miserable?</td>
<td>been answered, that in most cases a Man is not at Liberty to forbear the act of</td>
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<td>volition: he must exert an act of his will, whereby the action proposed is made</td>
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<td>to exist, or not to exist. But yet there is a case wherein a Man is at Liberty in</td>
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<td>respect of willing; and that is, the choosing of a remote Good, as an end to be</td>
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<td>pursued. Here a Man may suspend the act of his choice from being</td>
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<td>determined for or against the thing proposed, till he has examined whether it</td>
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<td>be really of a nature in itself and consequences to make him happy, or no . If</td>
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<td>the neglect, or abuse, of the Liberty he had, to examine what would really and</td>
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<td>truly make for his Happiness, misleads him, the miscarriages that follow on it</td>
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<td>must be imputed to his own election. He had a Power to suspend his</td>
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<td>determination: it was given him, that he might examine, and take care of his</td>
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<td>own Happiness, and look that he were not deceived. And he could never judge, that</td>
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<td>it was better to be deceived than not, in a matter of so great and near concernment.</td>
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What has been said may also discover to us the reason why men in this world prefer different things, and pursue happiness by contrary courses. But yet, since men are always constant, and in earnest, in matters of happiness and misery, the question still remains, How men come often to prefer the worse to the better; and to choose that, which by their own confession, has made them miserable?
Full text of Locke’s requested posthumous revision for §71 in *Essay II.xxi.*

<table>
<thead>
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<tr>
<td>§ 71. To conclude this inquiry into human liberty, which as it stood before, I myself from the beginning fearing, and a very judicious friend of mine, since the publication, suspecting to have some mistake in it, though he could not particularly show it me, I was put upon a stricter review of this chapter. Wherein lighting upon a very easy and scarce observable slip I had made, in putting one seemingly indifferent word for another, that discovery opened to me this present view, which here, in this second edition, I submit to the learned world, and which in short is this: “Liberty is a power to act or not to act, according as the mind directs.” A power to direct the operative faculties to motion or rest in particular instances, is that which we call the will. That which, in the train of our voluntary actions, determines the will to any change of operation, is some present uneasiness, which is, or at least is always accompanied with, that of desire. Desire is always moved by evil, to fly it: because a total freedom from pain always makes a necessary part of our happiness: but every good, nay every greater good, does not constantly move desire, because it may not make, or may not be taken to make any necessary part of our happiness. For all that we desire, is only to be happy. But though this general desire of happiness operates constantly and invariably, yet the satisfaction of any particular desire can be suspended from determining the will to any subservient action, till we have maturely examined, whether the particular apparent good, which we then desire, makes a part of our real happiness, or be consistent or inconsistent with it. The result of our judgment upon that examination is what ultimately determines the man, who could not be free if his will were determined by any thing but his own desire, guided by his own judgment.</td>
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Texts comparing Locke’s 1702 letter to Limborch and the posthumous revised text to §56

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<th>Locke’s 1702 letter to Limborch</th>
<th>1706 (posth.) version of §56</th>
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<td>“... I now have before me your letter of 3 January, in which you appear to doubt whether I hold that a man is free in Willing or in Understanding, for so I interpret your question; you also ask whether the action of willing or understanding is free. To this question I answer thus: // 1. Generally, indeed, that in my opinion a man is free in every action, as well of willing as of understanding, if he was able to have abstained from that action of willing or understanding; if not, not. // 2. More particularly, as regards the will: there are some cases in which a man is unable not to will, and in all those acts of willing a man is not free because he is unable not to act. In the rest, where he was able to will or not to will, he is free. // 3. As regards the act of understanding: I surmise that there lurks an ambiguity in that word ‘understanding’, for it can signify an action of thinking about some subject, and in that sense a man is for the most part free in actions of the understanding of that sort: for example: I can think about Adam’s sin, or remove my cogitation thence to the city of Rome or to the art of war in the present age. In all these actions and in countless others of the kind I am free because I am able at my pleasure to think or not to think about this or that. Or an act of understanding can be taken for that action by which I perceive that something is true, and in this action of understanding, for example, that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, a man is not free because when the demonstration has been examined he is unable not to understand this. For the most part a man is able not to open his eyes or not to turn his gaze to this or that object, but when his eyes are opened and turned to the sun or moon he necessarily sees the brightness and the shape that present themselves to his observation. What I have said of the eyes may be transferred to the understanding: the principle is the same for both. But enough of this. If you are satisfied I am glad. But if any doubts remain please use your freedom ...” [Locke to Limborch Sept. 28, 1702 [#11 3192; pp. 680-1]</td>
<td>“These things duly weigh’d, will give us, as I think, a clear view into the state of human Liberty. Liberty, ‘tis plain, consists in a Power to do, or not to do; to do, or forbear doing, as we will. This cannot be deny’d. But this seeming to comprehend only the actions of a Man consecutive to volition, it is farther inquired, “whether he be at Liberty to will, or no.” And to this it has been answered, that in most cases a Man is at Liberty to forbear the act of volition: he must exert an act of his will, whereby the action proposed is made to exist, or not to exist. But yet there is a case wherein a Man is at Liberty in respect of willing, and that is, the choosing of a remote Good, as an end to be pursued. Here a Man may suspend the act of his choice from being determined for or against the thing proposed, till he has examined whether it be really of a nature in itself and consequences to make him happy, or no .. If the neglect, or abuse, of the Liberty he had, to examine what would really and truly make for his Happiness, misleads him, the miscarriages that follow on it must be imputed to his own election. He had a Power to suspend his determination: it was given him, that he might examine, and take care of his own Happiness, and look that he were not deceived. And he could never judge, that it was better to be deceived than not, in a matter of so great and near concernment. “What has been said may also discover to us the reason why men in this world prefer different things, and pursue happiness by contrary courses. But yet, since men are always constant, and in earnest, in matters of happiness and misery, the question still remains, How men come often to prefer the worse to the better; and to choose that, which by their own confession, has made them miserable?”</td>
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Texts comparing the 1700 French transl. of §56 with the 1729/35(F1) version

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<th>§56 (1700-F)</th>
<th>§56 (1729 [+1735 F1])</th>
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| Ces choses duement considérées nous donneront, à mon avis, une claire connaissance de l'état de la liberté de l'homme. Il est visible que la liberté consiste dans la puissance de faire ou de ne pas faire, de faire ou de s'empêcher de faire, selon ce que nous voulons. C'est ce qu'on ne sauroit nier. Mais comme cela semble ne comprendre que les actions qu'un homme fait en conséquence de sa volonté, on demande encore si l'homme est en liberté de vouloir ou non. A quoi l'on a déjà répondu, que dans la plupart des cas un homme n'est pas en liberté de ne pas vouloir; qu'il est obligé de produire un acte de sa volonté d'où s'ensuit l'existence ou la non-existence de l'action proposée. Il y a pourtant un cas où l'homme est en liberté par rapport à l'acte de vouloir: c'est lorsqu'il s'agit de choisir un bien éloigné comme une fin à obtenir. Dans cette occasion un homme peut suspendre l'acte de son choix: il peut empêcher que cet acte ne soit déterminé pour ou contre la chose proposée, jusqu'à ce qu'il ait examiné si la chose est, de sa nature & dans ses conséquences, véritablement propre a le rendre heureux ou non. Car lorsqu'il a une fois choisi, & que parla elle est venue à faire partie de son bonheur, elle excite un désir en lui: & ce désir lui cause, à proportion de sa violence, une inquiétude qui détermine sa volonté, & lui fait entreprendre la poursuite de son choix dans toutes les occasions qui s'en présentent. Et ici, nous pouvons voir comment il arrive qu'un homme peut se rendre justement digne de punition, quoi qu'il soit indubitale que dans toutes les actions particulières qu'il ve, il veut nécessairement ce qu'il juge être bon dans le temps qu'il le veut. Car bien que sa volonté soit toujours déterminée à ce que son entendement lui sait juger être bon, cela ne l'excuse pourtant pas; parce que par un choix précipité qu'il a fait lui-même, il s'est imposé de fausses mesures du bien & du mal, qui toutes fausses & trompeuses qu'elles sont, ont autant d'influence fur toute sa conduite à venir, qui si elles étoient justes & véritables. Il a corrompu son palais, & doit être responsable à lui-même de la maladie & de la mort qui s'en ensuit. La loi éternelle & la nature des choses ne doit pas être altérée pour être adaptée à son choix mal réglé. Si l'abus qu'il a fait de cette liberté qu'il avoit d'examiner ce qui pourroit servir réellement & véritablement à son bonheur, le jette dans l'égarement, quelques mauvaises conséquences qui en découlent, c'est à son propre chix qu'il faut en attribuer la cause. Il avoit le pouvoir de suspendre sa détermination: ce pouvoir lui avoit été donné afin qu'il pût examiner, prendre soin de sa propre félicité, & voir de ne pas se tromper soi-même: & il ne pouvoit juger qu'il valût mieux être trompé que de ne l'être pas, dans un point d'une si haute importance, & qui le touche de si prés. //

Ce que je viens de dire suffit pour montrer comment les Hommes se déterminent dans ce Monde à différentes choses, & recherchent le bonheur par des chemins opposez. Mais comme ils ont constamment & serieusement les mêmes pensées à l'égard du Bonheur & de la Misére, il reste toujours à examiner. Comment il arrive que les Hommes préfèrent souvent le pire à ce qui est meilleur, & choississent ce qui, de leur propre aveu, les a rendus miserables?
Appendix XI

NGRAMS for English texts printed between 1600-1800 regarding “liberty of indifference,” the five “graces,” Pelagianism, and “Uneasiness”:

1. “liberty/freedom of indifference”

2. the five kinds of “grace”
3. Pelagianism

4. “Uneasiness”
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