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## Multiple Baskets: Diverse Racial Frames and the 2016 Republican Primary

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**N.B. This is a pre-publication draft version of the paper published in *New Political Science*.**

Donald Trump stands out from other postwar US presidents. He is the first modern president to enter office with neither political nor military experience. His speeches are laced with braggadocio, he openly denounces the media, pointedly refused to accept the results of the election before it took place, and continued to allege voter fraud without evidence, even after winning the 2016 presidential election. Yet one of the most important ways in which Trump differs from most postwar presidents is his employment of explicitly racist rhetoric and policies targeting immigrants and non-whites.<sup>1</sup> Political scientists need to understand the reasons racist rhetoric is proving successful in the United States and the European Union.<sup>2</sup>

Trump used overtly racist framing throughout his political career: he launched his presidential campaign calling large numbers of Mexicans rapists and murderers; his policy proposals included a wall between the United States and Mexico, mass deportation of undocumented immigrants and a ban on Muslims entering the United States; he declared an Indiana-born judge unfit to judge him because of his Mexican heritage; he equivocated about disavowing an endorsement by former KKK grand wizard David Duke, he circulates internet

<sup>1</sup> I do not mean to suggest that Trump is the first American politician to appeal to voters on a basis of race, merely that his rhetoric and policy proposals stand out in their overt embrace of racism.

<sup>2</sup> It can be a challenge to demarcate what populism is. Right-wing populism can be distinguished from left-leaning varieties in its attempt to use the language of popular sovereignty to limit minority rights. The call for “illiberal democracy” by Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán would be a prototypical example. Many contemporary populist movements avoid xenophobia. The Five-star movement in Italy, Podemos in Spain, Syriza in Greece, and the Bernie Sanders campaign in the United States might be thought of as examples of left-leaning populism. Some democratic theorists continue to believe that populism remains an essential element of democracy, for instance see: Laura Grattan, *Populism’s Power: Radical Grassroots Democracy in America* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2016).

memes infused with symbols and bogus statistics familiar to white nationalist groups; and he insists that African-Americans live in crime-ridden inner cities.<sup>3</sup> In office, President Trump has largely adhered to an anti-immigration agenda – constrained only by the limits of presidential power. On January 27<sup>th</sup>, 2017, with little prior warning, he signed an executive order banning travel from seven predominantly Muslim countries. Thousands of people – including green card holders, refugees, and even some that had aided American troops during the Iraq war – were held in detention in airports, or were informed that their visas had been provisionally revoked.<sup>4</sup> Although nation-wide protests and subsequent legal challenges overturned elements of the travel bans, some of its provisions remain in effect. Additionally, the Trump administration encouraged Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officials to redouble efforts to round up undocumented immigrants; while the pardon of Joe Arpaio, a sheriff convicted of violating a court order to halt racial profiling of Latinos, sends the message that law enforcement need not fear repercussions of overreach. Trump’s presidency may also be inspiring mobilization by hate groups. Five days after the election, the Southern Poverty Law Center reported a large spike in

<sup>3</sup> See, for instance: Michelle Lee, “Donald Trump’s False Comments Connecting Mexican Immigrants and Crime,” *Washington Post* July 8, 2015, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2015/07/08/donald-trumps-false-comments-connecting-mexican-immigrants-and-crime>. Brent Kendall, “Trump Says Judge’s Mexican Heritage Presents ‘Absolute Conflict,’” *Wall Street Journal* June 3, 2016, <http://www.wsj.com/articles/donald-trump-keeps-up-attacks-on-judge-gonzalo-curiel-1464911442>. Glen Kessler, “Donald Trump and David Duke: For the Record,” *Washington Post* March 1, 2016, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2016/03/01/donald-trump-and-david-duke-for-the-record/>. J. M Berger, “How White Nationalists Learned to Love Donald Trump,” *Politico* October 25, 2016, <http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/10/donald-trump-2016-white-nationalists-alt-right-214388>. Nick Gass, “Trump defends telling black voters ‘what do you have to lose?,”’ *Politico* September 21, 2016, <http://www.politico.com/story/2016/09/trump-what-have-you-got-to-lose-228462>.

<sup>4</sup> Justin Jouvenal, Rachel Weiner, and Ann Marimow, “Justice Dept. Lawyer Says 100,000 Visas Revoked Under Travel Ban; State Dept. Says About 60,000,” February 3, 2017, [https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/government-reveals-over-100000-visas-revoked-due-to-travel-ban/2017/02/03/7d529eec-ea2c-11e6-b82f-687d6e6a3e7c\\_story.html?utm\\_term=.036e390e5731](https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/government-reveals-over-100000-visas-revoked-due-to-travel-ban/2017/02/03/7d529eec-ea2c-11e6-b82f-687d6e6a3e7c_story.html?utm_term=.036e390e5731).

<sup>5</sup> The Courts used Trump’s own language from the campaign trail as evidence that the executive order was conceived with an explicitly discriminatory intent.

attacks on minorities.<sup>6</sup> President Trump also uses the bully pulpit to provide covering fire for white nationalists. After a white nationalist protestor in Charlottesville, Virginia drove a car into a crowd of counter-protestors, killing 1 and injuring 19, President Trump criticized violence “on both sides,” drawing equivalency between those sporting Neo-Nazi or Confederate symbols and those protesting against them.<sup>7</sup>

Understanding the role of racist appeals in Trump’s victory is important for political scientists. Right-wing populism is not merely an American phenomenon – far-right parties have become increasingly successful in recent years. In 2014, Viktor Orbán, Hungarian Prime Minister since 2010, gave a speech outlining a vision of “illiberal democracy” – democracy lacking such elements as the protection of minority rights. Since 2014, many politicians representing distinct flavors of illiberal democracy have moved from the fringes of power to being serious contenders for national office. On May 9<sup>th</sup>, 2016, Filipino voters elected Rodrigo Duterte as President. Since his election, Duterte encouraged police to kill suspected drug traffickers, drug users, and even human rights activists, pardoning officers in cases of legal challenges. Human Rights Watch estimates that Filipino police have killed at least 7,000 people since the election.<sup>8</sup> On June 23<sup>rd</sup>, 2016, British voters voted to leave the European Union following a “Brexit” referendum campaign characterized by frequent attacks on immigrants and Muslims. In France, the Netherlands, Greece, Finland, Sweden, Denmark, and Austria, far-right

<sup>6</sup> Southern Poverty Law Center, “Update: More Than 400 Incidents of Hateful Harassment and Intimidation Since the Election,” *Southern Poverty Law Center* November 15, 2016, <https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2016/11/15/update-more-400-incidents-hateful-harassment-and-intimidation-election>.

<sup>7</sup> Reuters, “Trump, Again, Casts Blame on Both Sides for Deadly Violence in Virginia,” *New York Times* August 15, 2017.

<sup>8</sup> Human Rights Watch, “Philippines: Duterte Threatens Human Rights Community,” *Human Rights Watch* August 17, 2017 <https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/08/17/philippines-duterte-threatens-human-rights-community>.

parties are now significant contenders for power.<sup>9</sup> All of this is enough to make one wonder whether we are in the throes of a moment like that described by Karl Polanyi, where aggressive counter-movements against globalization shatter democratic institutions around the world.<sup>10</sup>

Understanding why voters favored Trump over Clinton, but also over *other Republicans*, is important for predicting which elements of Trump's political coalition are likely to endure, and influence policy. A venerable tradition in American politics examines the impact of "realigning elections" where shifts in the political coalitions underlying parties foster long-term change.<sup>11</sup> If indeed Trump has created a fundamentally new Republican party, the impact might last for decades. In contrast, it is possible that the coalition around Trumpism and perhaps other illiberal democrats is an ephemeral one, prone to fracture.

In this article, I focus on the question of whether and how Trump's political base differs from that of other Republicans. Many Trump voters indicated they had an "unfavorable" view of Trump, suggesting divergence within the Republican coalition.<sup>12</sup> Perhaps evangelical conservatives voted for Trump to ensure the appointment of conservative Supreme Court justices, while others perhaps acted out of partisan loyalty to the Republican Party. It is important to understand not only those voters that supported Trump enthusiastically, but also those who voted for Trump reluctantly, because those voters occupy the center-ground of American politics. I consider four broad arguments about what drove Trump's success. Some

<sup>9</sup> Respectively, the far-right parties are: the Front National in France, Party for Freedom in the Netherlands, the Golden Dawn in Greece, the True Finns in Finland, the Democrats in Sweden, the Danish People's Party in Denmark, and the Freedom Party in Austria.

<sup>10</sup> Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Times*, (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 2001).

<sup>11</sup> Bense, Richard, *Sectionalism and American Political Development* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987).

<sup>12</sup> CNN, "Exit Polls," CNN 2016, <http://www.cnn.com/election/results/exit-polls/>.

accounts argue that Trump was able to appeal to economically anxious voters struggling from the ravages of the 2008 financial crisis, globalization or rural decline. In this account, the appeal of racist rhetoric could be secondary to voter behavior. Others believe that the politics of race was important to Trump's victory. Perhaps Donald Trump's base resembles the Republican Party's long-standing "southern strategy" coalition between free market conservatives and voters with racial resentment towards African-Americans. If true, Trump may not differ so much from other Republicans. Alternatively, Trump's success might depend upon rallying voters that identify strongly with whiteness. It is useful to look at which factors best predicted Trump support, particularly during the 2016 primary, when Republicans were split between numerous contenders.

Drawing from the American National Election Study (ANES) pilot data<sup>13</sup>, I argue that Trump's racist rhetoric was central to his political success. However, I do *not* find evidence that Trump support relied on strong attachments to white or American identity.<sup>14</sup> Rather, Trump was able to appeal to a diverse coalition of voters with different racial anxieties. Although most Republican candidates attracted favorable views among voters with resentment toward African-Americans, Trump also drew admiration from voters with diverse anxieties about Muslim-Americans and Hispanic-Americans. I contend that the prominent presidential campaigns of two Hispanic-Americans (Ted Cruz and Marco Rubio), Republican efforts to appeal to minority voters following their 2012 defeat, and the rhetoric of Donald Trump may have heightened the fears of xenophobic voters. Trumpism (ca. January, 2016 when the ANES pilot was conducted)

<sup>13</sup> American National Election Studies, *American National Election Study: 2016 Pilot Study* (Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, 2016), [http://www.electionstudies.org/studypages/anes\\_pilot\\_2016/anes\\_pilot\\_2016.htm](http://www.electionstudies.org/studypages/anes_pilot_2016/anes_pilot_2016.htm).

<sup>14</sup> See John Sides, Michael Tesler and Lynn Vavreck, *Identity Crisis: The 2016 Campaign and the Battle for the Meaning of America* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2018).

was a quilt, stitching together voters with different racial anxieties. It is possible that coalescence around common media organs like Breitbart, and agenda-setting powers of the presidency may yet fuse the constituent parts of Trump's electoral coalition into a cohesive white nationalist voting bloc.

This article proceeds as follows. First, I discuss three hypotheses about Trumpism, developing analytical narratives for each story about whether they fit Trump's rise. I challenge the view that Trump's rise is a response to economic anxiety, noting that he does not draw particularly strong support from lower-income voters. Next, I explore the idea that Trump is similar to other Republicans, continuing a long tradition of dog-whistle racism. Drawing on the 2016 ANES pilot study, I present some evidence that, although all Republicans drew support from racially anxious individuals, those favorable to Trump had different racial anxieties from those preferring other Republicans. I also examine the idea that Trumpism flows from ethnocentrism or white nationalism. Here again, the stylized facts do not support the claim – Trump's support among voters with strong identification with the white race, or an American ethnocultural identity, was not particularly high. Moreover, hostile attitudes toward outgroups are diverse, and do not overlap in the way an ethnocentrism story would suggest. Lastly, I introduce my own interpretation – that Trumpism is a quilt of different voters drawn by different racial frames. I test this proposition by examining the relative favorability of ANES respondents toward Donald Trump and other Republicans. I find that fears of a Latino President and the belief that Muslims are violent substantially differentiated Trump supporters from supporters of other Republican primary contenders.

## *Trumpism as Economic Anxiety*

In 2008, I sat on a bus in Indianapolis, reading an economics textbook. A man sitting next to me asked how I felt about globalization. Following my “on the one hand...” answer, he cut to the chase, telling me that he “hates Chinese and Indian people” because they stole his job. Eager to clarify that he was not racist he added “but I’ve got no problem with the blacks, they gave us rock’n’roll.” The idea that voters suffering from economic hardship might be attracted to racist rhetoric is an intuitively appealing one. We know voters respond negatively to adverse economic conditions, and the political economy of trade literature has long emphasized such connections.

Many works discuss the link between economic forces and backlash politics.<sup>15</sup> Modeling the international impact of globalization on incomes across different income percentiles, Milanovic finds that globalization looks like an elephant. The global middle class (for example, Chinese and Indian workers) and the richest 1% have seen enormous gains from 1988-2008, the poorest countries were shut out of the global system, while the global upper middle class (working class people in developed countries) fared poorly. The ravages of the financial crisis may have exacerbated the pain of long-simmering challenges. David Autor et al, in turn, emphasize trade more specifically, positing that exposure to Chinese imports was strongly

<sup>15</sup> Peter Gourevitch, *Politics in Hard Times: Comparative Responses to International Economic Crises* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986). Kenneth Scheve and Matthew Slaughter. 2007. “A New Deal for Globalization,” *Foreign Affairs* 84: 4 (2007), pp. 1-33. Jeff Guo. “Stop Blaming Racism for Donald Trump’s Rise,” *The Washington Post* August 19, 2016, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/08/19/stop-blaming-racism-for-donald-trumps-rise/>. Branko Milanovic, *Global Inequality: A New Approach for the Age of Globalization* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016).



predictive of Trump support at the county level, although they do not offer other controls.<sup>16</sup> Alternately, when Shannon Monnat examined the correlates of Trump support at the county level, she found that counties suffering above-average deaths of despair often swung from Obama to Trump. In her telling, economic distress is filtered through a politics of place – voters in struggling communities become more pessimistic, and more susceptible to ideologies like Trumpism.<sup>17</sup> Economic explanations are appealing because they can explain the simultaneous eruption of backlash coalitions across many countries. Moreover, if voters are responding to economic anxiety, the policy solution is clear – we can combat far-right discontent with measures that reduce income inequality and protect voters from the vagaries of economic globalization. John Lilla makes a corollary point, arguing that an overemphasis on “identity politics” is hurting the Democratic Party.<sup>18</sup>

However, there are some serious problems with an economic anxiety explanation of Trumpism’s appeal. First, although Trump fared better than past Republicans among low-income voters, exit polls showed he *lost* voters earning under \$50,000 by 11 points.<sup>19</sup> Philip Klinkner’s statistical analysis of the ANES pilot data found that family income had no predictive impact on respondent preferences for Trump over Clinton, nor did economic anxiety (after controlling for respondent approval of President Barack Obama).<sup>20</sup> Second, if voters were responding to economic uncertainty or stagnant wages, it is surprising that so few Hispanic and African-American voters backed Trump in the Republican primary and subsequent election. Finally,

<sup>16</sup> David Autor, David Dorn, Gordon Hanson and Kaveh Majlesi, “A Note on the Effect of Rising Trade Exposure on the 2016 Presidential Election,” *Working Paper* (2016), <http://www.ddorn.net/papers/ADHM-President2016.pdf>.

<sup>17</sup> Shannon Monnat, “Deaths of Despair and Support for Trump in the 2016 Presidential Election,” *Research Brief*, <http://aese.psu.edu/directory/smm67/Election16.pdf>.

<sup>18</sup> For instance, see: Mark Lilla, *The Once and Future Liberal* (New York, NY: Harper Collins, 2017).

<sup>19</sup> CNN. “Exit Polls,” *CNN* 2016, <http://www.cnn.com/election/results/exit-polls>.

<sup>20</sup> Philip Klinkner, “The Easiest Way to Guess if Someone Supports Trump? Ask if Obama is a Muslim,” *Vox* June 2, 2016, <http://www.vox.com/2016/6/2/11833548/donald-trump-support-race-religion-economy>.

there may be reasons to question the implicit argument underlying the “economic anxiety” claim – that redistributive programs could act as a palliative against racial resentments. Katherine Cramer conducted extensive interviews with rural Wisconsinites, a group vital to Trump’s victory in the 2016 election.<sup>21</sup> The voters she talked to interpreted the world through the lens of their rural community. They were often resistant to broad-based income redistribution schemes, believing the bulk of federal largesse would go to more politically influential urban residents.<sup>22</sup> Voter beliefs about economic issues are often embedded in, and inseparable from the identifications that shape their perceptions of political reality.

### *Trumpism as the Southern Strategy*

Donald Trump’s racial rhetoric might be seen as the culmination of a long-standing trend in American politics. In 1964, Republican presidential candidate, Barry Goldwater, ran in opposition to the Civil Rights Act. Although Goldwater lost to Lyndon Johnson in a landslide, his victory in the “solid south” signaled the potential for a new coalition. In 1968, Alabama Governor George Wallace, famous for standing in a schoolhouse door to deny entry to black children, ran for President as an independent, winning some southern states and 14% of the vote. Since 1968, Republican political candidates employed a “southern strategy,” using dog-whistle language to simultaneously appeal to racially resentful working class voters, while enacting anti-

<sup>21</sup> Katherine Cramer, *The Politics of Resentment: Rural Consciousness in Wisconsin and the Rise of Scott Walker* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2016).

<sup>22</sup> The maintenance of a two-tier welfare state, with some programs (like Medicare) framed as entitlements, and others (like food stamps) framed as “welfare” could further notions that the welfare state merely serves others.

poor policies.<sup>23</sup> When Richard Nixon invoked the need for “law and order,” or referred to his constituency as “the silent majority,” racially-conscious voters knew what he was talking about. Similarly, when Ronald Reagan spun stories of avaricious “welfare queens,” he could appeal to racist voters without using overtly racist language. Even Democrats have made symbolic gestures to diminish their disadvantage among white Southerners. As a Presidential candidate, Bill Clinton campaigned for welfare reform, reprimanded Jesse Jackson’s Rainbow Coalition for inviting a controversial rap artist, Sistah Souljah, to speak at a function, and returned to Arkansas during the campaign to preside over the execution of a mentally incapacitated African-American man convicted of killing a police officer.<sup>24</sup>

Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the targets of dog-whistling broadened, with Muslim-Americans portrayed as dangerous and Hispanic-Americans as illegal immigrants.<sup>25</sup> The election of an African-American president, Barack Obama, in 2008 may have exacerbated sorting among white voters, decisively shifting racially resentful voters to the Republican Party. Newly installed as President, Obama pushed for a stimulus package, prompting significant resistance from the Republican “Tea Party”. Launching into a rant on the floor of the Chicago Board of Trade, CNBC commentator, Rick Santelli, decried a government policy that gave mortgage bailouts to “losers”. Given that greater shares of underwater mortgages were held by minorities<sup>26</sup>, bailouts were a heavily racialized issue. Republican opposition to President Obama,

<sup>23</sup> Ian Haney Lopez, *Dog Whistle Politics: How Coded Racial Appeals Have Reinvented Racism and Wrecked the Middle Class* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2015).

<sup>24</sup> Linda Williams, *The Constraint of Race: Legacies of White Skin Privilege in America* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania University Press, 2003). Joe Soss, Richard Fording, and Sanford Schram, *Disciplining the Poor: Neoliberal Paternalism and the Persistent Power of Race* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2011).

<sup>25</sup> Ian Haney Lopez, *Dog Whistle Politics: How Coded Racial Appeals Have Reinvented Racism and Wrecked the Middle Class* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2015).

<sup>26</sup> Facing discrimination in mortgage markets, minorities were more likely to rely on subprime loans even controlling for income levels according to Richard Williams, Reynold Nesiba, and Eileen Diaz McConnell, “The Changing Face of Inequality in Home Mortgage Lending,” *Social Problems* 52: 2 (2005), pp. 181-208.

in the form of the Tea Party, and the presidential campaign of Mitt Romney, frequently employed a dichotomy between “makers” and “takers”. When Romney decried the 47% of Americans that did not pay income taxes, he continued this long tradition.


Donald Trump might be characterized as a Southern Strategist trading in his dog-whistle for a megaphone. If true, Trump may not differ from other Republicans. Philip Klinkner analyzed the ANES data, examining which factors best predicted the gap in respondent’s relative preference for Trump over Clinton.<sup>27</sup> He found convincingly that racial resentment toward African-Americans was a strong predictor of respondent’s relative preference for Trump over Clinton. A swing from the lowest to the highest levels of racial resentment, while controlling for other factors, predicted nearly a 30-point swing in relative preference toward Trump.

At the same time, racial resentment toward African-Americans may not uniquely explain Donald Trump’s rise within the Republican Party. I was curious about the degree to which racial resentment might also predict favorability for *other* Republicans, relative to Hillary Clinton. Replicating Klinkner’s model (although I used tobit regression), I found that racial resentment toward African-Americans was strongly predictive of favorability for *all* Republicans relative to Clinton, with the exception of Jeb Bush (see Figure 1).<sup>28</sup> Trump was unique in his ability to appeal to voters with racial animus *other* than resentment toward Black Americans. For instance, a belief that Muslims were violent yielded substantially greater favorability to Trump (and, to a lesser degree, Jeb Bush), but little to other Republican primary candidates. Although Trumpism relies on elements of racial appeals borrowed from the past, it is also something new.

<sup>27</sup> Specifically, Klinkner used data from a 0 to 100 feeling thermometer for Trump and Clinton, subtracting the latter from the former.

<sup>28</sup> The variables and methods employed are discussed later. The sample in question included all white ANES 2016 pilot study respondents.

Figure 1: Gain in Relative Preference for Five Republicans vs. Hillary Clinton Following Shift from Bottom 5<sup>th</sup> Percentile to Top 5<sup>th</sup> Percentile of Resentment Scale and Belief that Muslims are Violent



### *Trumpism as White Nationalism*

Trumpism may have succeeded by speaking to and reinforcing an imagined community around whiteness. Hostile attitudes to outgroups, then, cannot be understood without considering the role of white nationalism in defining the interests and identities of in-group members. Three different traditions emphasizing different mechanisms behind identity formation are of particular relevance. First, the “authoritarian personality” personality argument emphasizes psychological mechanisms behind hostility to outsiders. Seeking to explain the appeal of fascism in Nazi Germany, T. W. Adorno et. al argued that certain individuals exhibit an “authoritarian

personality,” entailing a strong attachment to their own ethnic group, distaste for others, and a preference for strong leaders.<sup>29</sup> In times of perceived threat, authoritarians are especially prone to accept strong leaders, and outgroup denunciation. The theory initially received considerable criticism around sample bias and measurement issues; however, more recent works may have corrected some of these flaws. One study of Trump support used attitudes toward parenting to gauge “authoritarianism,” indeed finding that those favoring strong discipline were more likely to support Trump.<sup>30</sup>

A number of other studies into the correlates of far-right support in Europe argue that hostility to minorities starts with strong ties to ethno-cultural ingroups.<sup>31</sup> For instance, Paul Sniderman argues that ‘prejudice is blind’ – voters exhibiting racial prejudices toward one outgroup often express hostility to other outgroups as well.<sup>32</sup> One limitation of Sniderman’s work is his focus on European cases, where all outgroups were immigrants, and not long-standing citizens. Kinder and Kam used ANES data to examine xenophobic attitudes among Americans. They find a strong link between voters with an “American” identity, and prejudiced beliefs toward all out-groups.<sup>33</sup> They conclude that racist or xenophobic voters do not begin with

<sup>29</sup> TW Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel Levinson, and R. Nevitt Sanford, *The Authoritarian Personality* (Oxford, UK: Harpers, 1950).

<sup>30</sup> MacWilliams, Matthew, “Who Decides When the Party Doesn’t? Authoritarian Voters and the Rise of Donald Trump,” *PS: Political Science* 49(4): pp. 716-721.

<sup>31</sup> Paul Sniderman, Louk Hagendoorn, and Markus Prior, “Predisposing Factors and Situational Triggers: Exclusionary Reactions to Immigrant Minorities,” *American Political Science Review* 98: 1 (2004), pp. 35-49. Paul Sniderman, and Louk Hagendoorn, *When Ways of Life Collide: Multiculturalism and its Discontents in the Netherlands* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007).

<sup>32</sup> Another possible explanation for overlapping prejudices might lie in the connection between views of “the other” and pathogen sensitivity. For instance, Horner and Rule explore the restrictionist presentation of immigrants as sources of “contagion,” at times literally (for example, immigrants suffering from HIV are often subject to additional restrictions and attacks) or morally. Jed Horner, and John Rule, “The Politics of Space and the Spacialisation of Politics: New Directions for Examining the Connections Between Immigration and Contagion,” *New Political Science* 35: 3 (2013), pp. 463-478. Another forthcoming paper finds evidence that anti-immigrant views are best predicted by pathogen sensitivity: Lene Arøe, Michael Petersen, and Kevin Arceneaux, “The Behavioral Immune System Shapes Political Intuitions,” *American Political Science Review* (forthcoming).

<sup>33</sup> Donald Kinder, and Cindy Kam, *Us Against Them: Ethnocentric Foundations of American Opinion* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2009).

outgroup hostility, but rather, have their politics framed by ethnocentrism. During times of threat, ethnocentric voters exhibit hostility to all outgroups.

One of the limits of ethnocentrism studies is that they treat identity groupings as exogenous. Nancy Love's *Trendy Fascism*, and the symposium on it featured in *New Political Science*, overcomes this limitation by looking at the emergence of white supremacy as a global, transnational movement. Nancy Love examines how white power music crafts an imagined community, pushing white working class individuals to view their challenges in racial terms.<sup>34</sup> Love argues that liberalism fails to address white supremacy, first because liberal policies generate and disempower a precariat through a form of "inverted totalitarianism," and secondly because liberalism's insistence on rational discourse ignores the power of aesthetic arguments. Many of the former white supremacists interviewed by Love describe how white power music's expression of white decline twinned their precarious circumstances with an emotional call to action. Noting the successful conversion of white supremacists, Love notes the importance of empathy and exemplars, rather than rational persuasion. Some caution should be exercised, however, there may be limits in applicability of these exceptional cases to a larger white public that professes color-blindness while endorsing policies that attack non-white and immigrant communities.<sup>35</sup> Moreover, music may not be the only forum where these ideas are given voice, and there may be room to challenge far-right narratives with factual reality.<sup>36</sup> Consider, for instance, the intersections between medical pseudoscience and the far-right. Alex Jones, the host

<sup>34</sup> See Nancy Love, *Trendy Fascism: White Power Music and the Future of Democracy* (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2016) and Nancy Love, "Singing Alone is Not Enough: A Response to Reviewers," *New Political Science*, 39(2): pp. 295-297.

<sup>35</sup> Bruce Baum, "Music to Their Ears: Nancy Love's Trendy Fascism, White Nationalism, and the Future of Whiteness," *New Political Science*, 39(2): pp. 269-277.

<sup>36</sup> María Pía Lara, "On Trendy Fascism," *New Political Science*, 39(2): pp. 283-288.

of *Infowars*, can move breathlessly between denunciations of “mass-migration” to hawking supplements that will restore purity, and avert the physical decline of his customers.

Some aspects of Trump’s candidacy might seem to support the idea that part of his success lies in an appeal to white nationalism.<sup>37</sup> One reporter described the development of Trump’s long courtship of extreme nationalists by reading discussions of Trump on websites like *Stormfront*, a prominent far-right message board. While Trump’s repudiation of Obama’s birth certificate in 2011 put him on the radar of far-right posters, many remained skeptical, believing he was a “secret Jew”. By retweeting images and Twitter accounts familiar to White Nationalists, and refusing to disavow the endorsement of former KKK grand wizard David Duke, skepticism turned to acceptance and admiration.<sup>38</sup> And some studies have found identification with whiteness to be strongly predictive of Trump support in the general election.<sup>39</sup>

Yet, there are also two key reasons to doubt that Trump’s capture of the Republican Party hinged exclusively on white nationalism.<sup>40</sup> Consider the ANES pilot data on racial and ethnic identity. White respondents favorable to Trump were not much more likely to say that their racial identity was extremely or very important than respondents favorable to other candidates (see Figure 2). A similar pattern holds up if one swaps racial identification for attachment to an American identity. Voters favorable to Trump are barely distinguishable from other Republicans in terms of their attachment to American identity.

<sup>37</sup> In contrast with most other post-9/11 Republicans, Trump frequently avoids the rhetoric of American exceptionalism and nationalism.

<sup>38</sup> J. M Berger, “How White Nationalists Learned to Love Donald Trump,” *Politico* October 25, 2016, <http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/10/donald-trump-2016-white-nationalists-alt-right-214388>

<sup>39</sup> See John Sides, Michael Tesler and Lynn Vavreck, *Identity Crisis: The 2016 Campaign and the Battle for the Meaning of America* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2018).

<sup>40</sup> Whether President Trump and his staff espouse white nationalist views is a separate question – the aim here is simply to examine what drove his support.



Figure 2: Percentage of White ANES Respondents Favorable to Each Candidate Indicating that Their Racial Identity is Very or Extremely Important to Them






Figure 3: Percentage of ANES Respondents Favorable to Each Candidate Indicating that American Identity is Very or Extremely Important to Them



Second, if Trump has tapped into fearful white nationalist voters, we should expect considerable overlap between frames expressing different racial anxieties. Yet, there is not much

evidence of clusters of “all-of-the-above” racists the white nationalism hypothesis would expect. While racial prejudices exhibit some correlation, racial *frames* do not always overlap. Figure 4 depicts the distribution of white ANES respondents with anti-black attitudes (appearing in the most resentful 25% of a racial resentment index<sup>41</sup>), anti-Muslim attitudes (a belief that Muslims were violent), and anti-Hispanic attitudes (a belief that a Latino president would enact policies favoring immigrants or a belief that a Latino president would favor Latin America<sup>42</sup>). While many white respondents (68.5%) endorsed at least one hostile racial frame, there is no particular clustering of racial animus among all-of-the-above racism.

Figure 4: Distribution of Hostile Frames Toward Minority Groups Among White ANES Respondents



<sup>41</sup> Respondents were considered more resentful if they agreed with statements that “Irish, Italians, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors,” and “It’s really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites.” Disagreement with statements that “Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class,” and “Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve,” was also considered more resentful.

<sup>42</sup> ANES respondents were asked different questions about favoritism from a Latino president.

## *Trumpism as a Quilt*

In a multicultural society, voters may have opinions about members of many other groups, each varying in salience, explicitness, and complexity. Many Americans harbor implicit or explicit prejudices about some groups, are indifferent about other groups, and possess affinity to others. Nancy Love's call to investigate aesthetics as political discourse is a good one – much of the literature suggests that racially resentful voters can be activated by particular frames. Branton et al examined the 2000 and 2004 ANES data and found that the attitudes of non-Hispanic white Americans toward immigration changed, as the American news-media emphasized Latino immigration.<sup>43</sup> Hopkins ran a similar experiment to see how people would react to a news video featuring a Latino speaking accented English relative to one speaking unaccented English.<sup>44</sup> Survey participants exposed to the latter exhibited more positive views toward immigration than those viewing accented English. Numerous analyses of the outcome of the 2016 general election find evidence that racist (and sexist) attitudes were powerful predictors of Trump support, but more needs to be done to explore the role of distinct racist appeals.<sup>45</sup>

<sup>43</sup> R. Branton, EC Cassese, and BS Jones, "All Along the Watchtower: Acculturation fear, anti-Latino affect, and immigration," *Journal of Politics* 73: 3 (2011), pp. 664-679.

<sup>44</sup> D J. Hopkins, "The Upside of Accents: Language, Skin Tone, and Attitudes Toward Immigration." *British Journal of Political Science* 45: 3 (2015), pp. 531-557.

<sup>45</sup> See, for instance, John Sides, Michael Tesler, and Lynn Vavreck, "How Trump Lost and Won," *Journal of Democracy* 28(2): pp. 34-44; Brian Schaffner, Matthew MacWilliams, and Tatishe Nteta, "Understanding White Polarization in the 2016 Vote for President: The Sobering Role of Racism and Sexism," *Political Science Quarterly*, forthcoming.

Racist politicians may rise up, not by appealing to well-formed group identities, but by forging a quilt of different resentments, each activated by the right frame. John Hultgren's exploration of the history of how historical American immigration restriction campaigns appealed to *environmentalist* frames is an even more dramatic example of how diverse anti-immigration frames might even draw in ostensibly progressive individuals.<sup>46</sup> Alternately, Pim Fortuyn rose from the fringes of Dutch politics by attacking Muslims as being out of synch with tolerant Dutch values.

Applying the quilt model, it might be possible to understand American political parties as ever-shifting coalitions, defined by their triangulations. For instance, despite the racist character of the "Southern Strategy," Republicans were able to win support from some minority groups. For decades, strong opposition to Communism, and the Castro regime in Cuba, won Republican support among Cuban-American voters. Prior to 9/11, Republicans may have been competitive among Muslim-American voters.<sup>47</sup> In the 1992 and 1996 elections, exit polls showed Republicans winning a plurality of the Asian-American vote – even while losing both elections.<sup>48</sup> As recently as 2004, President Bush may have won 44% of the vote among Hispanic-Americans.<sup>49</sup>

Donald Trump won the 2016 Republican Primary by employing a consistently effective formula. He adopted threatening language and tied threats to outgroups, particularly Mexican-Americans and Muslims. Trump also loudly advocated for policies that targeted these out-

<sup>46</sup> John Hultgren, "The "Nature" of American Immigration Restrictionism," *New Political Science* 36: 1 (2014), pp. 52-75.

<sup>47</sup> Alexander Rose, "How did Muslims Vote in 2000?" *Middle East Quarterly* 8: 3 (2001), pp. 13-27.

<sup>48</sup> Admittedly, exit polls should be taken with a grain of salt. Not only do they have small sample sizes, they may also exhibit sampling bias. For historical exit polls, see: Roper Center, "How Groups Voted," *Roper Center for Public Opinion Research* <http://ropercorner.cornell.edu/polls/us-elections/how-groups-voted/>.

<sup>49</sup> CNN, "Exit Polls," *CNN* 2004, <http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2004/pages/results/states/US/P/00/epolls.0.html>.

groups, including the construction of a border wall, mass-deportation, and a ban on Muslim entry into the United States. Although other candidates endorsed some of these policies, Trump's stance on these issues was less ambiguous. In the 2016 primary, Trump effectively exploited racial anxieties about terrorist attacks and the long-term loss of political power for white Americans. This kitchen sink approach was successful, not because of clearly expressed white nationalism, but rather, because of widespread indifference to the harms of repressive policies on others. Protected by a chorus of "I'm not a racist, but..." voters could support Trump's denunciation of groups they were hostile to, while discounting his attacks on others. Thus, Republican voters stuck with Trump through the general election campaign.

During the November 10, 2015 Fox Business debate, Republican Senator Ted Cruz was asked a question about undocumented immigration. His answer is instructive about how he saw his own political liabilities in a racially charged Republican primary. Cruz argued that "the politics of it [illegal immigration] would be very, very different if a bunch of lawyers or bankers were coming across the Rio Grande, or if a bunch of people with journalism degrees were coming over and driving down wages in the press."<sup>50</sup> Later, as Election Day loomed in New Hampshire, Cruz ran ads depicting mostly white, upper middle class professionals crossing the Rio Grande wearing suits. In another debate in January, Cruz derided Trump's "New York values" without explaining the meaning of the term. Cruz was desperate to recast the primary along the lines of class or region. As a Cuban-American in a party whose racialized fears of undocumented immigration had been intensified by Donald Trump, Cruz wanted voters to think about race as little as possible.

<sup>50</sup> New Republic, "Ted Cruz: Invasion," *New Republic Campaign Ad Archive* January 5, 2016, <https://newrepublic.com/political-ad-database/ted-cruz-invasion/MS81LzE2OkludmEzaW9u>.

Yet, in many respects the very candidacy of Ted Cruz and Marco Rubio was part of the animus driving voters to Trump. In the aftermath of the 2012 Republican defeat, Democracy Corps<sup>51</sup> conducted three focus groups consisting of Tea Party supporters, Evangelicals, and moderate Republicans. The conversation in the former two groups soon drifted toward the idea that the Democratic Party was creating a permanent majority by encouraging immigration and buying the votes of immigrants with government handouts. Many media accounts following the election, and the stated strategy of the Republican Party, seemed to *agree*, pushing the idea that demographic change doomed Republicans. The effects of this messaging should have been predictable. Studies of anti-immigrant or racist attitudes consistently find that voters overestimate the proportion of people from outgroups, and that higher estimates correspond with deeper animosity to immigration and integration.<sup>52</sup> Even subtle cues, such as hearing a Spanish conversation on a train can heighten hostility.<sup>53</sup> The prominent candidacy of Jeb Bush,<sup>54</sup> whose wife Columba is from Mexico, and two Cuban-Americans, Ted Cruz and Marco Rubio, may have amplified the very fears percolating through much of the Republican base.

<sup>51</sup> Democracy Corps is run by James Carville, a Democratic Party strategist. Nonetheless, it is striking how closely the talking points found among “Tea Party” and “Evangelical” participants resembles increasingly common discourses about immigration in the United States. Democracy Corps, “Inside the GOP: Report on Focus Groups with Evangelical, Tea Party and Moderate Republicans,” *Democracy Corps* October 3, 2013, <http://www.democracycorps.com/Republican-Party-Project/inside-the-gop-report-on-focus-groups-with-evangelical-tea-party-and-moderate-republicans/>.

<sup>52</sup> The effects of an actual increase in immigration are less clear. Sides and Citrin found that friendship with immigrants predicted less support for anti-immigrant politicians. Hainmueller and Hopkins, in turn, summarize conflicting findings about the impact of contact with immigrants in the American political context, with effects hinging on whether individuals expect to encounter outgroup members or not, and whether contact is personal or not. John Sides and Jack Citrin, “European Opinion About Immigration: The Role of Identities, Interests and Information,” *British Journal of Political Science* 37: 3 (2007), pp. 477-504. Jens Hainmueller and Daniel Hopkins, “Public Attitudes toward Immigration,” *Annual Reviews of Political Science* 17 (2014), pp. 225-249.

<sup>53</sup> Ryan Enos, “Causal Effect of Intergroup Contact on Exclusionary Attitudes,” *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America* 111:10 (2014), pp. 3699-3704.

<sup>54</sup> Jeb Bush had even listed himself as “Hispanic” on a voter form. See: Alan Rappeport, “Bush Marked Himself “Hispanic” on 2009 Voting Form,” *New York Times* April 6, 2015, <https://www.nytimes.com/politics/first-draft/2015/04/06/jeb-bush-listed-himself-as-hispanic-on-voter-form/>.

### *Assessing the Quilt Model*

Each of the stories discussed above are empirically testable, using the 2016 ANES January pilot data.<sup>55</sup> Prior to the 2016 primary, prospective voters were asked to rate each candidate on a 0 to 100 feeling thermometer. Subtracting one thermometer from another, it is possible to see which factors best predicted relative support for one candidate over another. Accordingly, I ran a tobit model using the feeling thermometer gap between Donald Trump, Ted Cruz, Marco Rubio and Jeb Bush as my dependent variable. The feelings thermometer gap runs from -100 (strongly favoring a candidate other than Trump) to 100 (strongly favoring Trump).

Tobit models are designed to examine data that is censored – some distinctions between answers are unobserved.<sup>56</sup> Because my dependent variable (the feelings thermometer gap) runs from -100 to 100, some distinctions between respondent preferences may be obscured by the scale. For instance, imagine that both Hillary Clinton and an unsatisfied attendee of Trump University happened into the ANES sample. Conceivably both might have rated their feelings

<sup>55</sup> Some caution is, doubtless, in order. The ANES pilot study is smaller than the CCES. However, it was conducted during the 2016 primary, a time when preferences toward Republican primary contenders was relatively high-profile.

<sup>56</sup> For background on the appropriateness of Tobit models see Lee Sigelman, and Langche Zeng, “Analyzing Censored and Sample-selected Models with Tobit and Heckit Models.” *Political Analysis* 8: 2 (1999), pp. 167-182.

toward Trump as 0, however, if given a scale from -100 to 100, either might give different ratings.

If the quilt model best predicts favorable sentiments toward Trump, we should expect a range of different negative attitudes toward minorities, particularly Hispanic-Americans and Muslim-Americans, to predict a relative preference for Trump. To gauge the power of these attitudes I included two variables: a belief that a Latino President would favor immigrants,<sup>57</sup> and the belief that Muslims are violent. If Trump support is the result of economic anxiety, we should expect negative assessments of the economy to be predictive of a favorable attitude toward Trump. In addition, respondent attitudes toward free trade might be predictive, if in fact, Trump's appeal lay in his promise to impose tariffs on other countries. If Trump was primarily tapping into the voters targeted by the Southern Strategy, we might expect voters with resentful attitudes toward African-Americans to prefer Donald Trump. Finally, if Trump was successful by appealing to white nationalism, we might expect racial or cultural identification with in-groups to predict a relative preference for Trump. As a result I included variables measuring respondent's identification with their race and with their culture.

In addition to these factors, I controlled for other variables that have historically proven important in analyses of voting behavior, namely: gender, religiosity, party ID, ideology, family income, assessments of Obama's presidency, education, age and assessments of the current state of the economy. In addition, I included a variable gauging respondent attitude toward legal immigration, in case it was possible that Trump's appeal was based on policy preferences rather

<sup>57</sup> The ANES asked different people different questions about a Latino president. Half of respondents were asked if they felt a Latino President would favor immigrants, the other whether a Latino president would enact policies favoring Latin America. In my analysis I show the two questions both jointly and separately.



than outgroup animus. Descriptive statistics for each of these variables are summarized below in Table 1.

**[Table 1 about here]**

### *Results*

Observing relative support for Donald Trump against Marco Rubio, Ted Cruz, and Jeb Bush, there is clear evidence that respondents worried about a Latino president favored Trump over the alternatives (see tables 2-4). In every specification of the model, and in both formulations of the question (that is, were respondents worried about a Latino president favoring immigrants or favoring Latin America), the results were statistically significant. A belief that Muslims are violent was a statistically significant predictor of Trump support in model 1, while resentment toward African Americans tended to be statistically significant in model 5. Finally, strong attachment to an American identity was not predictive of positive assessments of Trump.<sup>58</sup> In fact, in the instances where American identity was statistically significant, Trump fared better among voters that were *less* attached to American identity.

**[Tables 2-4 about here]**

Some economic factors were also predictive of respondent's relative preference for Trump, while others were not. Family income was statistically significant in all but the model 5

<sup>58</sup> I have run this model using racial identity instead of American identity. When controlling for hostile frames, racial identification loses its statistical significance.

matchup between Trump and Cruz, suggesting that Trump's success is probably not the product of voter reaction to inequality. Economically anxious voters were more likely to rate Trump positively in some incarnations of the model, although the statistical significance of economic anxiety varied. Opposition to free trade too, appeared to predict relative preferences for Trump over Rubio and Bush, but not Ted Cruz. Yet it is not entirely clear that opposition to free trade flowed directly from individual economic concerns. Other research has found that when voters are primed to think of cultural threats, they grow more opposed to free trade.<sup>59</sup>

It is also useful to take stock of some other variables, many of which have received considerable attention from the press and from academics. In Model 1, which examined all respondents, white respondents did not exhibit relative favorability toward Trump over Rubio or Bush (white voters did favor Trump over Cruz). This result may help explain something that is undoubtedly part of the story of the 2016 election overall. Non-white and immigrant voters also have anxieties and resentments toward other racial groups. For instance, some Chinese-language sites covering the election were critical of Hillary Clinton, tying her to affirmative action policies targeting Chinese people.<sup>60</sup> Women also assessed Trump more negatively than Rubio in Model 1, and assessed Trump more negatively than Jeb Bush across all incarnations of the model. Despite much discussion of evangelical concerns about Donald Trump, and Ted Cruz's explicit appeals to born-again voters, religiosity was not statistically significant in most incarnations of the model. Ted Cruz did, however, fare substantially better among respondents that were ideologically conservative. To some extent, this outcome may help explain why so many voters

<sup>59</sup> Yotam Margalit, "Lost in Globalization: International Economic Integration and the Sources of Popular Discontent," *International Studies Quarterly* 56: 3 (2012), pp. 484-500.

<sup>60</sup> Ma Tianjie, "Western Liberalism is Dying in China: Why educated Chinese are Embracing Donald Trump's Winner-Take-All Worldview," *Foreign Policy* November 16, 2016, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/11/16/the-peoples-republic-of-donald-trump-why-educated-chinese-are-spurning-western-liberalism/>.


ended up voting for Trump in the general election, despite their reservations. “Never Trumpers” were disproportionately the most conservative voters, and thus highly unlikely to support Clinton in the general election. Education was not statistically significant in any incarnation of the model, despite endless media portrayals of Trump’s particular appeal to less educated voters. Opposition to Obama was not predictive of relative preferences for Trump over Rubio or Cruz, although respondents that strongly disapproved of Obama were more likely to favor Trump over Jeb Bush. Finally, for an election in which immigration was a significant issue, surprisingly, respondent views on legal immigration had no statistical significance, while controlling for the other frames.

The effect of different variables on a respondent’s relative preference for Trump is also illuminating. Because I am constrained by space, I focus on Model 1 of the Rubio vs. Trump model. For each non-binary variable, I illustrate the impact of a swing from the least Trump-friendly 5% to most Trump-friendly 5%, observed within the data, holding all other variables at their mean.<sup>61</sup> Observing the results, it is clear that fear of a Latino President and the belief that Muslims are violent were vital to Trump’s victory, representing swings of 21.21 and 10.208 points in the relative feeling thermometer.<sup>62</sup> Opposition to free trade and economic anxiety, too, appeared to push voters toward Trump, but their collective effects were smaller than hostile racial frames.

<sup>61</sup> All binary variables were held at 1 (essentially assuming a white male). Although this changes the predicted level of support for Trump and Rubio, it does not alter the gap between the two.

<sup>62</sup> In model 3 (just white respondents), the impact of a swing from least to most worried about a Latino president, netted Trump 23.586 points. In model 5 (just Republicans), the same swing netted Trump 31.939 points.

Figure 5: Impact of Swing from the 5<sup>th</sup> to 95<sup>th</sup> Percentile of Various Factors on Relative Support for Trump Over Rubio



## *Conclusion and Discussion*

Fifty years ago, the Caucus for a New Political Science founded *New Political Science* with a view that as we study politics, our destinations matter. The symposium on the “roots of resurgent racism” that this article is part of was conceived with a similar view. At a minimum, far-right populism threatens the institutions upon which the practice of political science depends. If you don’t believe me, you have but to look to Hungary, where Victor Orbán is trying to shutter Central European University. There are times when it is useful for authors to eschew the pretense of sharing “both sides” of an issue.

What role did Trump’s racist rhetoric play in his 2016 victory in the 2016 Republican Primary and the 2016 general election, and how might we use those lessons to better construct an anti-racist politics? Donald Trump’s ability to stoke racial resentments and anxieties played a large role in allowing him to win the Republican primary. While resentment toward African-Americans was widespread among voters favorable to most Republican candidates, Trump enjoyed a substantial edge among those fearful of Muslims and those worried about the prospects of a Latino President. Republican outreach to Hispanic voters sounded threatening to Republicans fearful of whites becoming a minority. By making a loud appeal to different groups of racially anxious voters, Trump cobbled together an unbeatable coalition in the Republican primary. Supporters of other Republican candidates may not have shared the same racial animus of Trump’s core supporters, but were sufficiently indifferent to Trump’s racism that they still ended up voting for him. In turn, the backlash to Trump’s racial appeals was likely diminished by the collective action problem created by targeting many groups at once. Indeed, even some

immigrant voters supported Trump, perhaps sharing some of the hostility he expressed to other groups, while disbelieving that they were genuinely his targets.

Rather than being the result of too much “identity politics” by the Democratic Party, Trump’s ability to form a quilt coalition of individuals with diverse prejudices and indifferences depended on the narrative of colorblindness itself. In the film, *Strangers on a Train*, the main characters swap murders, in order to avoid suspicion by the authorities. In the 2016 US Presidential election, voters with distinct racial anxieties, evangelical conservatives, and pro-business conservatives made a similar pact. The glue keeping the coalition together was not a shared penchant for white bedsheets, but rather, indifference to the plight of millions of Americans. Broad-based opprobrium, like labeling Trump supporters “a basket of deplorables” failed because most voters express (and refrain from) some forms of racial hostility themselves. Rather than understanding racism as a binary, it is more useful to think of attitudes along a continuum from hostility to indifference to affinity, sometimes explicit, sometimes implicit and highly sensitive to framing and intergroup contact.

Although broad-based economic redistribution may be desirable on its own terms, it is unlikely to defeat Trumpism, which draws heavily on racial anxieties, not economic ones. Robust welfare states have not prevented the emergence of far-right politics in France, Finland, Sweden, Denmark or the Netherlands. We need to find ways to develop empathy and common interests between targeted groups and indifferent voters, while defusing hostile frames. Rather than thinking about racism as a singular force, it may be useful to think about how to counter specific racist frames effectively. The organizational muscle necessary to combat resurgent racism is underdeveloped. When Barry Goldwater ran against the Civil Rights Act in 1964, he was challenged by a well-organized civil rights movement. Today, prominent civil rights groups

advocating for Muslim-Americans and Hispanic-Americans may be under-resourced. There may be additional challenges in developing common language that weaves together the aims of divergent civil rights movements.

As Nancy Love illustrates so well, there is nothing paradoxical about transnational fascism. Xenophobes, racists, white nationalists, and others are meeting, sharing ideas, and mobilizing the world over. 4chan, “white power” musicians, and misogynistic “red pill” forums are dotting the global info-sphere with rabbit-holes leading to a place of pure hatred. Although the majority of individuals do not identify with white nationalism, more are falling through these rabbit holes. Transnational white supremacy requires a transnational, pluralistic anti-racism to combat it. There are no panaceas. We need to find every hateful burrow, discover the tactics, strategies, coalitions, and frames, and help those falling deeper to escape back to the surface.

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics<sup>63</sup>

Variable	Bottom 5%	Mean	Top 5%
American Identity Unimportant	1 (Extremely important)	2.141	5 (Not important)
Not Worried about Latino President <sup>64</sup>	1 (Worried)	3.516	5 (Not worried)
Legal immigration	1 (very good)	2.899	6 (very bad)
Free trade	1 (support)	3.871	7 (oppose)
Muslims not violent	1 (Extremely good descriptor)	3.224	5 (Not at all)
Resentment toward African-Americans	-8 (low resentment)	1.358	8 (high resentment)
Presidential Job Approval	1 (approve)	4.207	7 (disapprove)
Assessment of Current Economy	1 (much better)	3.061	5 (much worse)
Economic Anxiety	4 (less anxious)	9.107	14 (more anxious)
Education	1 (lower)	3.337	6 (higher)
Party ID	1 (Strong Democrat)	3.62	7 (Strong Republican)
Ideology	1 (Very Liberal)	3.024	5 (Very Conservative)
Less Church Attend.	1 (> Once/week)	4.303	6 (Never)
Family Income	1	5.825	12
Gender	1 (Male)	1.508	2 (Female)
Age	23	48.989	76
White	0 (non-white)	.751	1 (white)
Trump vs. Jeb	-54 (Favor Jeb)	3.646	80 (Favor Trump)
Trump vs. Cruz	-55 (Favor Cruz)	-.897	60 (Favor Trump)
Trump vs. Rubio	-57 (Favor Rubio)	-3.548	57 (Favor Trump)

<sup>63</sup> Note: Respondents with missing responses to any variables were dropped.

<sup>64</sup> For ease of interpretation, I reversed the order of this variable in the regression, such that higher indicated greater worry.



**Table 2: Factors Predicting a Trump vs. Rubio Feeling Thermometer Gap**

	Model 1 All respondents	Model 2 Whites	Model 3 Whites	Model 4 Whites	Model 5 Repub.
White	4.144 (2.751)				7.551 (6.526)
Age	.172** (.065)	.253*** (.076)	.134 (.11)	.392*** (.107)	.133 (.132)
Female	-4.69** (2.093)	-3.808 (2.365)	-2.355 (3.52)	-5.424* (3.136)	-8.4** (3.788)
Family Income	-.224 (.329)	-.267 (.367)	.03 (.651)	-.467 (.422)	-.82 (.512)
Less Church Attend.	-.679 (.672)	.095 (.771)	.019 (1.096)	-.164 (1.12)	.889 (1.145)
Ideology	-1.333 (1.378)	-1.47 (1.707)	-2.92 (2.794)	-.487 (2.135)	-4.783 (2.924)
Party ID	.631 (.892)	1.048 (1.034)	2.276 (1.669)	-.23 (1.278)	3.086 (2.514)
Education	-.05 (.747)	.617 (.869)	-.427 (1.37)	-.778 (1.1)	-1.813 (1.34)
Eco. Anxiety	.778** (.368)	.84* (.434)	.314 (.686)	1.439*** (.552)	.749 (.674)
State of Economy	.391 (1.213)	.599 (1.452)	3.000 (2.215)	-1.107 (1.939)	1.198 (2.405)
Obama Approval	1.116 (.913)	.827 (1.094)	.259 (1.714)	1.439 (1.372)	-.461 (1.841)
Resentment of black Americans	.55* (.306)	.425 (.355)	.045 (.534)	.777* (.464)	1.516** (.7)
Muslims not violent	-2.56*** (.945)	-3.302*** (1.101)	-4.23** (1.753)	-1.953 (1.423)	-1.59 (1.631)
Oppose free trade	2.092*** (.677)	1.959*** (.778)	2.248* (1.169)	1.339 (.984)	2.444* (1.269)
Oppose legal immigration	-.669 (.707)	-.245 (.873)	-.099 (1.314)	-.688 (1.202)	.638 (1.171)
Not Worried about Latino Pres.	-5.319*** (.892)	-5.918*** (1.105)			-8.075*** (1.513)
Latino Pres. Won't favor immigrants			-5.603*** (1.725)		
Latino Pres. Won't favor L. America				-7.395*** (1.487)	
American identity Unimportant	-.302 (.907)	.466 (1.085)	.301 (1.719)	.776 (1.429)	.131 (2.196)
Constant	.078 (9.296)	4.887 (11.383)	5.37 (15.368)	7.811 (17.033)	16.197 (22.76)
N	934	704	338	366	336
F-statistic	12.12***	13.8***	6.38***	9.11***	7.78***

Robust Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < .1$ , \*\*  $p < .05$ , \*\*\*  $p < .01$

**Table 3: Factors Predicting a Trump vs. Cruz Feeling Thermometer Gap**

	Model 1 All respondents	Model 2 Whites	Model 3 Whites	Model 4 Whites	Model 5 Repub.
White	6.76** (2.675)				10.497* (6.119)
Age	.304*** (.063)	.39*** (.074)	.292*** (.112)	.503*** (.098)	.445*** (.126)
Female	-2.488 (2.069)	-2.264 (2.347)	1.248 (3.464)	-5.273* (3.138)	-5.208 (3.669)
Family Income	.121 (.321)	.166 (.371)	-.058 (.58)	.34 (.445)	-.834* (.461)
Less Church Attend.	.968 (.654)	.507 (.733)	-1.015 (1.1)	.593 (1.046)	1.213 (1.049)
Ideology	-4.811*** (1.393)	-6.479*** (1.718)	-8.4*** (2.641)	-5.327** (2.245)	-10.613*** (2.718)
Party ID	1.324 (.85)	1.523 (1.052)	4.063** (1.708)	-.872 (1.27)	6.118*** (2.325)
Education	-.256 (.734)	-1.07 (.869)	-.875 (1.357)	-1.322 (1.105)	-.797 (1.329)
Eco. Anxiety	.744** (.365)	.886** (.437)	.748 (.653)	1.157* (.608)	.134 (.641)
State of Economy	-.45 (1.235)	-.294 (1.439)	1.922 (2.08)	-1.575 (1.962)	-1.697 (2.217)
Obama Approval	.129 (.876)	.963 (1.069)	-.82 (1.582)	2.583* (1.327)	-2.778* (1.656)
Resentment of black Americans	.53* (.296)	.403 (.341)	.307 (.502)	.584 (.465)	1.823*** (.63)
Muslims not Violent	-1.85** (.94)	-1.947* (1.116)	-2.342 (1.71)	-1.103 (1.493)	-.338 (1.57)
Oppose free trade	.636 (.653)	.653 (.752)	.851 (1.114)	.063 (1.025)	.81 (1.149)
Oppose legal immigration	.955 (.726)	1.36 (.869)	1.469 (1.24)	.933 (1.242)	2.366** (1.184)
Not Worried about Latino Pres.	-3.425*** (.879)	-3.865*** (1.057)			-5.576*** (1.462)
Latino Pres. Won't favor immigrants			-3.208* (1.665)		
Latino Pres. Won't favor L. America				-5.315*** (1.42)	
American identity unimportant	-.863 (.842)	-1.335 (.984)	-2.314** (1.507)	-.779 (1.342)	-2.475 (1.904)
Constant	-6.821 (9.109)	-1.671 (11.068)	-6.772 (15.236)	5.835 (15.229)	-2.271 (23.248)
N	937	707	340	367	334
F-statistic	6.12***	6.74***	3.19***	5.56***	5.09***

Robust Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < .1$ , \*\*  $p < .05$ , \*\*\*  $p < .01$

**Table 4: Factors Predicting a Trump vs. Jeb Bush Feeling Thermometer Gap**

	Model 1 All respondents	Model 2 Whites	Model 3 Whites	Model 4 Whites	Model 5 Repub.
White	1.578 (2.784)				3.505 (6.964)
Age	.188*** (.065)	.219*** (.077)	.138 (.117)	.32*** (.101)	.145 (.129)
Female	-6.529*** (2.162)	-7.617*** (2.481)	-5.222 (3.711)	-9.371*** (3.278)	-17*** (3.903)
Family Income	.34 (.344)	.427 (.4)	.588 (.617)	.298 (.477)	.131 (.557)
Less Church Attend.	1.509** (.668)	1.087 (.781)	-.212 (1.108)	1.498 (1.137)	1.765 (1.095)
Ideology	.359 (1.395)	.236 (1.734)	-1.692 (2.767)	1.648 (2.145)	-.792 (2.846)
Party ID	.866 (.914)	.724 (1.132)	3.72** (1.761)	-1.851 (1.356)	2.011 (2.541)
Education	.566 (.737)	-.286 (.851)	.014 (1.31)	-1.187 (1.076)	.404 (1.28)
Eco. Anxiety	.653* (.375)	.669 (.444)	.749 (.733)	.62 (.56)	.287 (.692)
State of Economy	1.816 (1.265)	2.121 (1.51)	6.792*** (2.206)	-1.01 (2.014)	5.321** (2.509)
Obama Approval	2.084** (.947)	2.186* (1.168)	-.389 (1.726)	4.198*** (1.449)	-1.443 (1.877)
Resentment of black Americans	1.309*** (.304)	1.328*** (.354)	1.595*** (.529)	1.149** (.466)	3.365*** (.682)
Muslims not violent	-3.812*** (.942)	-4.678*** (1.123)	-4.568*** (1.698)	-4.498*** (1.57)	-3.864** (1.603)
Oppose free trade	1.877*** (.686)	2.148*** (.784)	2.487** (1.161)	1.561 (1.02)	3.406*** (1.28)
Oppose legal immigration	.121 (.728)	-.215 (.878)	-.093 (1.356)	-.759 (1.16)	.048 (1.186)
Not Worried about Latino Pres.	-4.145*** (.916)	-4.781*** (1.147)			-6.998*** (1.553)
Latino Pres. Won't favor immigrants			-4.994*** (1.751)		
Latino Pres. Won't favor L. America				-5.269*** (1.635)	
American identity unimportant	1.272 (.888)	2.155** (1.025)	3.384** (1.687)	1.41 (1.334)	.219 (2.041)
Constant	-16.48 (9.342)	-8.224 (11.352)	-21.867 (15.634)	6.876 (16.098)	8.058 (21.843)
N	933	710	340	370	338
F-statistic	23.21***	24.25***	13.94***	14.15***	12.48***

Robust Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < .1$ , \*\*  $p < .05$ , \*\*\*  $p < .01$