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Published as Roger Karapin, "Protest and Reform in Asylum Policy: Citizen Initiatives versus Asylum Seekers in German Municipalities, 1989-1994," *German Politics and Society* 21 (Summer 2003), pp. 1-45.

Protest and Reform in Asylum Policy

Citizen Initiatives versus Asylum Seekers in German Municipalities, 1989-1994

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April 2003

Introduction

Many writers have argued that anti-immigration politics in Germany¹ and other West European countries have been driven by radical-right parties² or the electoral maneuvering of national politicians from established parties.³ Others have argued that waves of violence against immigrants and ethnic minorities have spurred anti-immigration politics,⁴ or that racist ideologies and socioeconomic inequality are the root causes.⁵ By comparison, authors have paid relatively little attention to anti-immigration mobilization at subnational levels, including the public positions taken by subnational politicians and the activities of movement groups, or "challengers."⁶ Nonetheless, research has shown that subnational politicians are often important in pressing national campaigns for immigration controls.⁷ Moreover, as I have argued elsewhere, anti-immigration politicians in Britain and Germany have responded in large part to local challengers, who were aided by political elites at local and regional levels.⁸

In this article, I aim to contribute to our understanding of the role of local challengers and local politicians in anti-immigration politics. I focus on neglected aspects of the anti-immigration⁹ movement in Germany in the period from 1989 to 1994: nonviolent mobilization

by relatively moderate groups that were opposed to asylum seekers at the municipal or neighborhood level. In places as diverse as the city of Munich and small towns in Schleswig-Holstein, citizen initiatives mobilized against growing numbers of asylum seekers. Unlike skinhead and neo-Nazi groups, these citizen initiatives pursued mainly reformist goals, such as blocking or reducing immigration by asylum seekers into their localities, and mobilized mainly in conventional, nonviolent ways, such as attending meetings and circulating petitions.

I make four arguments. First, nonviolent, reform-oriented, tactically conventional mobilization by resident groups against asylum seekers was widespread in this period, at least across western Germany.¹⁰ Counter-mobilization by groups that favored asylum rights and the social integration of immigrants was also common, especially in large cities. Second, nonviolent local mobilization against asylum seekers was spurred by a combination of suddenly increased grievances and alliances between citizen initiatives and local political elites. By contrast, mobilization was not closely related to differences in the localities' social composition (lower, middle, or upper class). This provides support for political-process theories of movements, which hold that challenger mobilization is promoted by elite-provided opportunities and by new threats.¹¹

Third, mobilization by anti-immigration and pro-immigrant citizen initiatives was part of the democratic political process at the local level. It involved mostly nonviolent participation, it helped increase elite competition for public support, especially in large cities such as Munich, and it triggered government concessions that helped reduce conflicts between local residents and asylum seekers. Fourth, local mobilization by citizen initiatives was an important part of the national movement against asylum seekers in the early 1990s. It spurred the elite debate on asylum policy and helped force the adoption of a popular constitutional amendment (Article 16a)

that restricted the right to asylum. In this regard, too, the local citizen initiatives' mobilization was part of the democratic process.

To provide broad support for these arguments, I undertake a cross-sectional analysis of fifteen cases in ten localities in two jurisdictions (the city of Munich and Rendsburg-Eckernförde County in Schleswig-Holstein) during the period from 1989 to 1994. In the next sections, I describe the conflict settings regarding asylum policy and discuss how I selected the cases. Then I present the Munich cases and the Schleswig-Holstein cases in their respective contexts, including one detailed case study in each jurisdiction. Next, I draw conclusions about local cases and their effects on local politics based on a larger set of fifteen cases from both Munich and Schleswig-Holstein. In the final section, I examine how local nonviolent mobilization contributed toward the national movement to restrict the right to asylum.

The Politics of Asylum: Potential for Many Local Conflicts

The surge in immigration to the FRG between 1988 and 1993 suddenly increased the grievances of many German residents against "foreigners," and hence increased the potential for anti-immigration mobilization. In those years, 1.4 million people from Eastern Europe, Asia, and Africa applied for political asylum in the FRG,¹² 1.5 million ethnic German resettlers arrived, and at least 850,000 other refugees arrived.¹³ The surge in asylum applications, which followed smaller surges in 1980 and 1985/1986, was due to the sudden freedom of movement for citizens of communist and former communist countries combined with civil conflict in Eastern Europe and elsewhere. About half of all asylum seekers in Western Europe in this period applied for asylum in the FRG.¹⁴ The popularity of Germany as a destination was due to the country's relative prosperity, the relatively generous asylum rights included (until 1993) in Article 16 of its

constitution, and its geographic location on the eastern frontier of Western Europe.

In the 1991-1993 period, intense intra-elite conflict over a constitutional restriction on asylum rights occurred in the national and *Land* conflict settings regarding political asylum. This had some precedents. In 1978, 1980, and the 1981/1982 and 1985/1986 periods, similar conflicts had led to reforms that restricted asylum policy. These reforms aimed to speed up the processing of asylum applications and to make asylum seem less attractive (consider, for example, the 1980 ban on employment, a 1982 cut in social assistance payments, and requirements that asylum seekers live in group shelters).¹⁵ However, the early 1990s surge in asylum seekers was much larger than those in the 1980s, and until after the peak in 1992 and 1993 (380,000 applications annually), it was not clear for how long the numbers of new applicants would continue to rise or remain at high levels. As citizen initiatives, far-right parties, right-wing skinheads, and neo-Nazis mobilized against asylum seekers, the increase in asylum applications became the focus of a massive public debate.

Therefore, among political elites and most of the public, the argument eventually prevailed that a constitutional amendment was necessary in order to reduce asylum seeking to manageable levels. In 1991, Christian-democratic leaders proposed an amendment to block asylum seekers who arrived from a "persecution-free country" or via a "safe country," categories that were defined to include all the countries bordering Germany and most of the main countries from which asylum seekers bound for Germany have originated.¹⁶ Constitutional amendments in the FRG require a two-thirds majority in both houses of the federal parliament. Since the CDU and CSU controlled only 48 percent of the Bundestag seats after the 1990 elections, and less than a majority of Bundesrat seats after April 1991, this meant they required the agreement of the SPD for this major policy shift. Hence, Christian-democratic politicians became strident in calling for

an amendment, pressuring the SPD in many *Länder* and at the national level.

In addition, a policy of highly decentralized government responsibility for the asylum seekers created the potential for a huge number of conflicts at *Land* and especially local levels. Conflicts in these subnational settings concerned the entry of asylum seekers into German territory, particular *Länder*, and particular localities, and about how and where they were to be housed. Therefore, they can be understood as conflicts about immigration, even though the borders in question were often those of subnational entities rather than the national state.

Officials housed asylum seekers in what were probably more than 1,000 different local jurisdictions, including all the FRG's *Länder*.¹⁷ Those waiting to have their applications for asylum decided were placed under the authority of government agencies, which required them to live in specified housing and to remain within particular town, city, or county borders. Following a 1974 agreement among the *Land* governments, the Federal Office for the Recognition of Asylum Applicants distributed asylum seekers to the *Land* governments in proportion to population. Because of a provision of the unification treaty, the new eastern *Länder* were added to the formula in December 1990.¹⁸ The *Länder* then distributed the asylum seekers to local governments, again mostly in proportion to population and to some extent according to explicit formulas developed by *Land* agencies and parliaments. Many counties received asylum seekers from *Länder* and distributed them to towns and villages. According to the Social Assistance Law, local governments were ultimately responsible for housing the asylum seekers and giving them social assistance payments. Although local governments generally could claim reimbursement from *Land* governments, the latter did not provide adequate compensation for the additional financial burdens on local governments.¹⁹

The decentralized approach to housing, and other ways in which asylum seekers were

treated by government, made local conflicts likely for four reasons. First, beginning in 1980, asylum seekers were barred from employment for periods ranging from two to five years; after July 1991, they were allowed to work, but only if jobs were available that could not be filled by German or European Community citizens.²⁰ Limits on their employment made most asylum seekers dependent on social assistance, which increased resentment by some German residents. The employment ban also forced the asylum seekers to be idle, which led to loitering, drunkenness, and petty crime by some asylum seekers and in turn to increased conflicts between them and their German neighbors.

Second, local elites in administrative agencies, parliaments, and local political parties became the targets of challenger mobilization because of local government decisions on where to house the asylum seekers. Local governments had responsibility for housing and much discretion in doing so, by either renting or buying apartments or houses, converting nonresidential buildings for use as large shelters, building new makeshift shelters, or putting the newcomers in hotels. However, officials in western Germany seldom could rent existing apartments in the early 1990s, because an economic boom in western Germany, relatively strong rent controls, and an influx of eastern Germans and ethnic German resettlers made housing scarce and expensive. Creating housing in industrial areas was usually not permitted by existing land-use laws.

For these reasons, officials often opted to reuse old structures or build new ones in residential neighborhoods. However, this approach spurred opposition from existing residents, mainly Germans. Land-use laws gave neighbors of such housing opportunities to challenge the siting decision in court, based on specific preexisting planning documents (*Bebauungspläne*, *Flächennutzungspläne*) or arguments that the housing would present an "unacceptable burden" for neighbors.²¹ Right-wing and left-wing challengers complicated local officials' tasks further,

by urging the latter to find housing that met humanitarian standards and that was relatively safe from attacks by skinheads and neo-Nazis. Under these conditions, officials were likely to choose sites that many residents considered inappropriate, for example, school or municipal gymnasiums, purely residential neighborhoods without commercial or public buildings, sites near schools or playgrounds, or open fields used for recreation.

Furthermore, some politicians evidently used highly visible sites, such as public parkland, in order to deliberately provoke local opposition and hence strengthen their arguments in favor of restricting asylum rights nationally or reducing their jurisdiction's share of the asylum-seeker population. Officials were also likely to cut costs in ways that make conflicts among shelter residents and between them and neighborhood residents more likely, for example, by housing asylum seekers in makeshift buildings or hiring inadequate staff to counsel and supervise them. Problems within shelters, fights, for example, often spilled out into the neighborhood.

Third, the decentralized distribution policy, combined with many politicians' negative statements about asylum seekers, increased the chances of cultural conflicts between German residents and asylum seekers. Instead of allowing asylum seekers to concentrate in major cities, which already had relatively high concentrations of non-German residents (15 percent to 25 percent), government policy required them to live in many small towns and even villages that had little experience with "foreigners." This was especially a problem in the eastern *Länder*, which had only about 1 to 3 percent non-Germans in the early 1990s. Fourth, the administrative and political difficulties of finding many shelter sites often led to the construction of large, high-density shelters, which made the shelters much more visible and concentrated the potential problems associated with them.

The arrival of asylum seekers created sudden grievances for local residents, initially

expressed as fears. Some fears proved realistic, while others were farfetched, based mainly on stereotypes, prejudices, rumors, and sensational news reports concerning the most difficult shelters. Given hundreds of thousands of asylum seekers living in more than 1,000 shelters in the country, and dozens or hundreds of shelters in each region, inevitably there were some reported incidents of serious crimes such as rape, drug trafficking, or murder. The tabloid press and opponents of asylum rights used such reports to stoke fears. While the largest fears about planned shelters concerned serious crime, the main complaints about operating shelters were much more mundane. Most complaints concerned local environmental problems (noise, dirt), petty crime (shoplifting, trespassing), and violence among the shelter residents.

Case Selection

The politics of asylum in this period were very complex, with conflicts at all levels of government and mobilization by anti-immigration, pro-immigrant, and sometimes immigrant challengers. I focus on anti-immigration challengers at the local level and define cases in terms of conflicts between challengers and their opponents over particular asylum shelters. The neighborhood level provided important conflict settings for anti-immigration challengers, and neighborhood-level conflicts were influential on national politics in this period, yet they have been neglected as objects of study. Since pro-immigrant mobilization also affected the conflicts, it is included in the cases.

In choosing local cases, I followed a strategy of universalizing comparison using a modified type of most-different systems design.²² That is, I chose cases that varied in many background conditions in order to discover how general the phenomenon of nonviolent mobilization against asylum seekers was in western Germany, and in order to identify common

processes involved in the causes and consequences of mobilization. As a first step, I chose two contrasting jurisdictions in western Germany: the large city of Munich, in the CSU-dominated southern *Land* of Bavaria; and the semirural, semiurban county of Rendsburg-Eckernförde (hereafter simply Rendsburg County) in the largely rural, northern *Land* of Schleswig-Holstein. These two jurisdictions varied greatly on many dimensions in the early 1990s: community size (large in Munich, small-medium in Rendsburg County);²³ population density (high in Munich, low in Rendsburg County);²⁴ unemployment rate (low in Munich, high in Rendsburg County);²⁵ non-Germans as share of the population (high in Munich, low-average in Rendsburg County);²⁶ religion (largely Catholic in Bavaria, largely Protestant in Schleswig-Holstein);²⁷ partisan control of local and *Land* governments;²⁸ and skinhead organization and militant attacks on asylum shelters (low in Munich, high in Rendsburg County).²⁹

My second step was to identify within each of those jurisdictions the localities with the largest conflicts concerning asylum shelters. I found large conflicts in seven Munich boroughs (Hadern, Harlaching, Moosach, Pasing, Ramersdorf, Solln, and Südpark) and three Rendsburg County towns (Altenholz, Büdelsdorf, and Kronshagen).³⁰ Finally, I selected two cases for in-depth study (Munich-Südpark and Kronshagen).³¹ I chose these cases because they varied on two important background dimensions: social structure (mainly lower-middle-class in Südpark, upper-middle-class in Kronshagen); and partisan control (SPD in Südpark, CDU in Kronshagen). In the next sections, I present the results of those detailed case studies. After the case studies, I summarize my findings concerning the conflicts that occurred in the whole group of ten Munich and Rendsburg County localities. This will show that the mobilization processes and outcomes in Südpark and Kronshagen were rather typical for the larger group of ten localities.

Munich: The Citywide Conflict Setting

Munich is a large industrial and commercial city with about 1.3 million residents, about 20 percent of whom were immigrants (that is, non-German residents) in the early 1990s. Munich is the capital of Bavaria, a CSU-dominated *Land* with 12 million residents. To help bridge the participatory gap between residents and city government, borough-level political structures were created by the 1950s.³² In the late 1980s, Munich contained 41 boroughs (reduced to 25 in 1992), each of which had a borough council. These councils met monthly and were usually open to public attendance; residents were usually allowed to speak, although they had no formal right to do so. However, the borough councils gave residents relatively little influence, especially in this period. Before 1996, when direct elections were instituted, the borough-level political parties appointed councilors in accord with the city-council election results in each borough. Moreover, before 2000, the boroughs had no budgets, they controlled no administration, and they could pass only non-binding recommendations to the city government.

Borough-level participation in Munich was enhanced in one other way. The Bavarian *Land* constitution required local citizen assemblies to be held at least once a year, called into session by the mayor with the agreement of the borough council.³³ At assemblies, which were often well attended, all citizens could propose and vote on resolutions that could be voted on, but the resolutions had only advisory character. Taken together, these institutions provided residents with easy targets without giving them reliable, routine means of influencing city policies. This combination was almost optimal for producing protests against unpopular policies. In the parlance of social movement theory, the local political opportunity structure was mixed in that it had a combination of open and closed features. By contrast, fully closed structures tend to make protests too difficult or pointless, while fully open structures make protests superfluous since

routine methods of participation are easier and effective.³⁴

The city's mayor, who was Georg Kronawitter (SPD) from 1984 to 1993, and the city council made the broad guidelines of Munich asylum policy in the 1989-1994 period. The council had an SPD-Green majority from 1984 to 1996, with a formal SPD-Green coalition in place from 1990 to 1996. The SPD-Green majority preferred a policy that was relatively generous toward asylum seekers, while the mayor was prone to call loudly for restrictions on the entry of asylum seekers. However, specific recommendations regarding where to create asylum shelters were made by an ad hoc commission (the Staff for Extraordinary Events,³⁵ SAE) that consisted of top officials from the city administration, including the head of the Social Office (Hans Stütze, CDU). Borough councils normally had a chance to register their opinions on the SAE's siting decisions, which required city council approval. The SAE worked with the city's social, housing, and construction offices, which sometimes became directly involving in siting conflicts. The SAE officially tried to distribute the asylum seekers roughly equally across the regions and neighborhoods of the city, a policy formalized in terms of a "distribution key" based 90 percent on population and 10 percent on land area. However, the city administration often fell far short of the goal of proportionate distribution, since they were limited by the availability of buildings and building sites and in some cases by political pressure.³⁶

The SAE made dozens of siting decisions in the 1989-1993 period, as the number of asylum seekers sent to Munich rose sharply to a rate of 7,500 per year in early 1992.³⁷ The Bavarian government distributed asylum seekers to shelters in various administrative jurisdictions, which then distributed them to municipalities. In 1995, two years after the peak, 12,000 asylum seekers still lived in about 90 shelters in Munich, with 30 percent of them in shelters operated by the city government and the rest in *Land*-operated shelters.

Conflicts between the governments of Munich and Bavaria about shelters spurred challenger mobilization because they simultaneously provided opportunities and increased grievances for residents of Munich neighborhoods. These intra-elite conflicts derived partly from the interests that actors in each jurisdiction had in shifting administrative and financial burdens onto each other, and partly from partisan differences in asylum policy. In addition to Munich's "fair share" of Bavaria's asylum seekers, the city government was required to house an excess number because the *Land* government used Munich as the site for the temporary housing of asylum seekers before they were distributed to other municipalities.³⁸ Although these asylum seekers were under Bavarian jurisdiction, they temporarily lived in shelters that were under Munich's authority. As soon as possible, the city government tried to transfer the operation of these shelters to the *Land* government, which would then pay the operating costs.

However, the two sets of actors clashed concerning how to operate shelters that were being transferred from city to *Land* control. The SPD-led city government sought to minimize conflicts with residents and to ease conditions for the asylum seekers. Hence, it preferred smaller shelters (65 people on average), provided counseling as well as security staff, and gave shelter residents cash to buy food before a 1993 federal law required food to be provided in kind. By contrast, the CSU-governed *Land* government sought mainly to limit costs and deter asylum seekers, and hence preferred larger shelters (250 people on average), provided only security staff and no counselors, and gave asylum seekers food rations and only a nominal amount of cash. Because of these differences, shelters run by the *Land* government had a greater potential for conflicts between asylum seekers and their German neighbors than did the shelters operated by the city government. Hence, even the prospect of a shelter being transferred from city to *Land* control could provoke mobilization. At the same time, open conflicts between the two levels of

government increased opportunities for challengers, by increasing the chance that they might influence the outcome of the intra-elite struggle.

Compared with the rest of the FRG, there was a relatively mild potential for militant activity and violence in Munich when a conflict over asylum shelters erupted. Munich, like Bavaria in general, had a relatively low level of skinhead organization, skinhead activity, and police-recorded violence against immigrants. In terms of per capita violence against "foreigners" (bombs, arson attacks, personal assaults), Bavaria had about 25 percent of the national average in 1992, far lower than any other *Land*. Right-wing skinheads and neo-Nazis in Bavaria numbered 460 in 1992, rising to 520 in 1996. Indeed, there were only about 20 right-wing skinheads in Munich in 1991.³⁹ Nonetheless, there was significant neo-Nazi activity and anti-immigrant violence in Munich. During the 1989-1993 period, newspapers reported at least nine demonstrations and other public actions by neo-Nazis, 21 assaults on immigrants, and 10 right-wing attacks on immigrants' housing, mostly arson against asylum shelters.

Südpark-Slevogtstrasse Case Example

The Neighborhood Conflict Setting

The Südpark neighborhood is a mainly lower-middle-class area within a mostly middle-class residential section of Munich, just east of a large park in the southern part of Munich. Originally part of the Waldfriedhofsviertel borough, the neighborhood became part of the Sendling-Westpark borough in 1992. Sendling-Westpark has about 50,000 residents, with slightly lower shares of non-Germans (18 percent) and manual workers (30 percent of those employed) than in the city (21 percent and 31 percent, respectively), and relatively few publicly subsidized apartments (18 percent). The Südpark neighborhood itself has many small owner-

occupied houses (one- and two-family). It was classed as a "purely residential area"—that is, without industry or major commercial activity, although an industrial area dominated by Siemens lay just one kilometer to the southeast of the proposed shelter site, in a neighboring borough. In the 1990 city-council elections, voters in Waldfriedhofsviertel gave 43 percent to the SPD, 30 percent to the CSU, 8 percent to the Greens, and 8 percent to the far-right *Republikaner*, almost identical with the citywide averages.⁴⁰

Authorities' Plans and Residents' Grievances

A combination of suddenly increased, relatively large grievances and strongly mixed political opportunities led to opposition to the shelter in Südpark that was much sharper than usual in Munich neighborhoods. The city government began building an asylum shelter on Slevogtstrasse in Südpark in March 1992 and moved asylum seekers into it in June; they numbered about 300 people from many different countries including Romania, Russia, "Black African" countries, and Albania. The city government's actions created unusually large grievances against public officials as well as the asylum seekers. In the first place, the shelter was larger than most city shelters,⁴¹ designed to house 300 to 360 people in two-story buildings made of prefabricated "containers." Moreover, the building site was a green field, near a school and a kindergarten, for which publicly subsidized housing or another kindergarten had been considered.

Additionally, the political opportunity structure for this conflict setting was strongly mixed, and hence encouraged protests. Residents who were opposed to the shelter felt aggrieved by the apparently disrespectful actions of city officials and the Protestant Church of Munich (which owned the land), but at the same time, the opponents got strong support from local and

national politicians. The city administration (led by the SAE) took several actions that, in retrospect, seem unnecessarily provocative. City officials ignored advice to site the shelter on a nearby site (Ratzingerplatz) that recently had held a temporary shelter built in shipping containers on a traffic island in the middle of a major intersection.⁴² Officials also stated that they were not interested in citizen protests, and they tried to build and operate the Slevogtstrasse shelter without even concluding a lease with the property's owner or issuing a building permit.⁴³

Furthermore, the Protestant church's behavior increased mistrust. The church was working to influence the size, duration, and staffing of the shelter, but it did not publicly inform residents of what it was doing. The church demanded and received from the city government 9,000 deutsche Marks per month in rent and promised to use the money for counseling the shelter residents. However, no counseling was available for the first five months and very little for at least the first nine months. Finally, in September 1992, it became known that the city government planned to transfer the shelter to the *Land* government, a move that probably would have entailed a reduction in the round-the-clock security force and perhaps a reduction in any counseling that the church might provide.

Mobilization by Anti-immigration Groups

A very active citizen initiative formed to oppose the shelter, with a relatively broad range of grievances, demands, and methods. The Bürgerinitiative Slevogtstrasse/Südpark (BISSS) was formed in March 1992, in part by residents who directly abutted the shelter site. By November 1994, the group had about 100 members, mostly middle-class people with modest incomes, ten of whom were active. The BISSS raised DM 30,000 from its members for a series of court cases.⁴⁴ Although the citizen initiative also faced opposition from a parents' council at the school

and from residents not identified as BISS members, it quickly became the dominant voice among those who opposed the shelter's construction and operation.⁴⁵

Opponents made four main arguments against the Slevogtstrasse shelter. First, they argued that the procedure for siting it was too fast, discussion was inadequate, there was no building permit, and the SAE acted arrogantly.⁴⁶ Signs at a rally in March 1992 stated: "Where are the rights of the citizens?" and "Deliberate provocation or political game?" Second, they claimed that the southern neighborhoods of Munich were being assigned more than their fair share of asylum seekers. In fact, if this shelter had remained open in November 1995, Sendling-Westpark would have housed 785 asylum seekers, almost double its "fair share" of 429, according to the "Munich key." This would have made the borough one of the five most "overburdened" boroughs in Munich.⁴⁷ Third, opponents argued that this was a poor site, since it was close to schools, and they feared for the safety of their children. Fourth, opponents feared that shelter residents, who would include many young men from different nationalities, would be sexually aggressive and get into loud fights, and that the shelter would create additional traffic and noise in the form of police interventions, ambulances, and vehicles to supply the shelter.

After the shelter went into operation, complaints concerned mostly noise, unsanitary conditions, and petty crime. Shelter residents often fought among themselves, as first Africans and later Albanians tried to establish dominance.⁴⁸ BISS members observed and documented the activities of shelter residents in painstaking detail, recording some serious conflicts (for example, noisy fights and police interventions late at night) but also many quite small matters (for example, Bangladeshi asylum seekers walking out to sell roses illegally, bottles being dropped into public recycling containers after the specified hour).⁴⁹

The demands of the challengers in Südpark ranged from reformist to radical.⁵⁰ The prime

objective was preventing the opening of the shelter; if that proved unsuccessful, they aimed to close it down. Other reformist demands included improving security nearby (via lighting and emergency telephones), building noise barriers between the shelter and its immediate neighbors, moving the shelter to Ratzingerplatz, maintaining the shelter's round-the-clock security force in the event of a transfer to the *Land* government, and paying the police more. BISSS members also made radical demands, such as dissolving the SAE, firing Hans-Peter Uhl (CSU), a top administration official⁵¹ on the SAE (both voted down by majorities at the April 1992 citizen assembly), and completely stopping the inflow of asylum seekers (supported by the majority at a citizen assembly in October 1992). Moreover, a general antipathy toward "foreigners" lay just below the surface in many of the BISSS's actions, despite claims that the group was not xenophobic. For example, claims that Germans were disadvantaged relative to immigrants were evident at the group's March 1992 rally, where signs read "Germans are *Asylanten*"⁵² in their own country -- economic *Asylanten* out!" and "Are we second class citizens?" A frequent complaint by BISSS members was that "foreigners have more rights than we do."

Actions by the BISSS and other opponents embraced a relatively broad tactical range, focusing on conventional and disruptive actions, but also on militant actions.⁵³ Indeed, the BISSS's initials accurately suggest the pugnacious nature of this citizen initiative, since the English translation of "*Biss*" is "bite." Challengers began with the courts and borough council meetings in March 1992 and quickly focused on a dual strategy of increasing public support for their position while pressing court cases. Conventional actions included undertaking a series of court cases during the 1992-1994 period and participating in at least three well-attended citizen assemblies (April and October 1992, November 1994) and at borough assembly meetings. BISSS also issued press releases and wrote monthly reports on the activities at the shelter, which were

sent to the Protestant church, political parties, and the city administration.⁵⁴ The BISSS did not hesitate to use disruptive actions to try to mobilize residents, gain publicity, and motivate elite allies. They held a rally attended by 500 people in late March 1992, were disorderly (shouting down speakers) at the April 1992 citizen assembly, posed with signs during the filming of a news program that September, and demonstratively presented a white umbrella to Kronawitter (supposedly to protect him from his political opponents) at the citizen assembly the next month.

Finally, the BISSS sometimes used militant threats, and the citizen initiative may have encouraged an anonymous bomb threat through its statements. BISSS members emphasized that they would fight the shelter "with all means," which some interpreted as a veiled threat to use or encourage violence.⁵⁵ On the stage at the March 1992 rally, the BISSS's speaker demonstratively broke a pro-immigrant banner that had been brought by a counterdemonstrator.⁵⁶ This suggested a violent attitude toward those who might oppose the BISSS in Südpark and may have set the tone for later actions. The group also wrote an implicitly threatening letter to the city Housing Office, which said the group might no longer be able to guarantee that one of the neighbors would not do something drastic.⁵⁷ Finally, someone phoned a bomb threat into the shelter a few days after the broadcasting of a television program that dramatized problems at the shelter. The program had stated that "under the surface there seems to be something boiling."⁵⁸ Also, a pro-immigrant group in Südpark reported receiving anonymous threats, including murder threats, by telephone and mail. For their part, BISSS members reported receiving anonymous calls insulting them as Nazis, and someone painted "Nazis out!" graffiti on the group's permanent sign outside a member's residence.⁵⁹

Elite Allies of the Anti-Immigration Groups

The challengers at Südpark had strong, early support from a broad range of political elites representing both the major parties and the neighborhood, city, *Land*, and federal levels of government. This broad elite support may have limited the use of militant tactics by the challengers. Moreover, the mix of reformist and radical positions taken by elites evidently encouraged, and was encouraged by, the mix of reformist and radical positions taken by the BISSS.

Majorities in the borough councils involved in the conflict opposed the shelter as soon as the plans became known. In March 1992, Hans Bauer (SPD), the head of the Obersendling borough council, encouraged residents to call the mayor or the responsible civil servants to register their opposition.⁶⁰ The head of the SPD party organization for the southern district of Munich also registered opposition in March, as did the SPD Landtag deputy Dorle Baumann. However, Baumann was ambivalent at the March rally; after making clear her opposition to a constitutional amendment, she said the site and the city government's procedures were wrong but would not be changed now. Her ambivalence led her to be booed off the stage, an indication that the BISSS and local residents could afford to expect stronger support from their potential allies.

Kronawitter's public attitude toward the BISSS was also somewhat ambivalent, although presumably he was too important as a potential ally to be booed off the stage. Kronawitter wrote to the BISSS that their monthly reports on conditions at the shelter "took his breath away," and he stood on stage with BISSS leader Heinz Schwindler, as they both expressed support for a constitutional amendment. Kronawitter also gladly accepted the white umbrella that Schwindler handed him to protect him from the criticism of the other SPD leaders in Munich.⁶¹ But Kronawitter also tried to reassure the citizen initiative that residents in other neighborhoods had found they could live near asylum seekers, and he contradicted their claims that no counseling

was in place in 1993.⁶² Similarly, the head of the new Sendling-Westpark borough council, Hans-Dieter Simeth, opposed the shelter and pressed the church to explain what it was doing, but also warned against "emotionalization" by the BISSS at the time that the bomb threat against the shelter was made.⁶³

Christian-democratic politicians gave the local challengers more unqualified support. Those opposed to the shelter included a CSU city councilor, Ilse Nagel, whose husband spoke on her behalf at the March rally, and the right-wing federal politician Erich Riedl (CSU), who was a Bundestag deputy directly elected from southern Munich and state secretary in the federal Economic Ministry. Riedl made national headlines in April 1992 when he made a radical statement against asylum seekers just after election victories by far-right parties in Baden-Württemberg and Schleswig-Holstein, and just before the first citizen assembly on the asylum shelter in Südpark. Riedl said that "[t]he situation is chaotic and almost hopeless. The South of Munich must immediately be declared an *Asylanten*-free zone."⁶⁴

Mobilization by Pro-Immigrant Groups

Compared with the shelter's opponents, pro-immigrant groups were not very active at Südpark, and they received little or no public support from elites. Only a handful of counter-demonstrators came to the March 1992 rally, but a pro-immigrant group, *Miteinander Leben* (Live with Each Other), with 60 members became somewhat active by December 1992. This group mainly helped the shelter's residents directly (putting together a small library and a flea market) and pressed the church to provide round-the-clock counseling. Demands for the church to provide the counselors it had promised were also made by residents at citizen assemblies,⁶⁵ and somewhat later even by the BISSS, which publicly implied that the church was pocketing the

rent money.⁶⁶ This shows a potential for common ground between anti-immigration and pro-immigrant groups at the neighborhood level once the shelter was created. Once the shelter was put into operation, BISSS saw opportunities to influence the details of its operation, which caused it to place more emphasis on peaceful coexistence with the asylum seekers and less on having the shelter shut down.

After the deadly neo-Nazi arson attack in Mölln in November 1992, the political climate in Germany shifted toward pro-immigrant and anti-Nazi sentiment, and the BISSS found itself somewhat on the defensive. By April 1993, its permanent sign read, "We are against xenophobia, against violence, but also against the abuse of asylum."⁶⁷ BISSS probably moved toward a more moderate position in part because of the timing of the Südpark conflict within the national wave of mobilization against asylum seekers.

Consequences: Elite Competition and Government Concessions

The above description of the BISSS's allies shows that the Südpark challenge triggered much elite competition on asylum issues. Competition occurred at many levels: between borough council majorities and the city administration and Protestant church; between Kronawitter and the rest of the SPD leadership in Munich; between Riedl (and some CSU politicians who defended his radical statement) and SPD politicians who criticized it; and between politicians and the courts, which generally ruled in favor of the city government (see below). Elites competed for public support concerning a broad range of issues that went well beyond this particular shelter. They disagreed publicly about whether the shelter should be located on Slevogstrasse or anywhere else in Südpark, whether any asylum seekers should be housed in any southern Munich neighborhoods, and whether the city government was justified in its ad hoc

procedures and speed in building the Slevogtstrasse shelter. Elites also disagreed about whether asylum rights should be restricted by constitutional amendment and whether enough was being done to provide counseling for the residents of the shelter. The increased elite competition was most intense in 1992, when the Südpark conflict coincided with the largest inflow of asylum seekers and the largest debates on the issue in national politics.

The challengers also increased the degree of government responsiveness to the public. That is, they influenced government actions in ways that probably corresponded to the preferences of a large majority of those who lived near the shelter. Residents at two citizen assemblies in 1992, who filled a large hall, voted in support of various relatively moderate resolutions opposing the Slevogtstrasse shelter and others in the neighborhood. In November 1994, at a third citizen assembly, residents voted for a resolution to close the shelter, with only four votes opposed out of 300 participants. However, majorities did not support the more radical demands by the BISSS, which indicates a reformist rather than radical center-of-gravity among neighborhood residents.

The challengers had only some partial influence on authorities during the first two years of their mobilization. Administrative courts ruled against them in March and June 1992, citing the "emergency" situation that the city government faced. In July 1994, the Munich administrative court also rejected the BISSS's detailed reports of activities at the shelter as evidence about the noise levels, calling for an objective measure by an independent technical expert instead.⁶⁸

The challengers also had only modest effects on the staffing of the shelter. The city government expected the church to provide all the counseling, and the start of that was delayed for many months. The delay occurred because the church sought additional subsidies from the city government and was hampered by contradictions between the poor construction of the shelter and the stringent legal requirements that the church needed to fulfill in workplaces where

it employed people. For example, there was only one restroom for the four counselors, and the law required one restroom for each sex. However, BISSS pressure may have helped lead to a moderate degree of staffing, as a round-the-clock security force was there by September 1992 and a half-time social worker was in place by November.⁶⁹

However, the city government made some important concessions to the local opposition. It agreed to a three-year lease with the church (compared with the five years it had originally demanded), and slightly reduced the maximum capacity to 300 residents (compared with mentions of 300 to 360 occupants early in the conflict). Furthermore, the city government did not transfer the shelter to the *Land* government as originally planned; the transfer probably would have reduced staffing for the security force and perhaps for the counseling. *Land* officials said they were unwilling to take the shelter since its building permits were not in order, a reference to the litigation being pursued by the BISSS.⁷⁰

Finally, the BISSS later gained important concessions through litigation and a 1995 decision by the Protestant church. After their July 1994 defeat, the citizen initiative won a partial victory when an administrative court ruled that the city government had not provided enough staffing and that the shelter had too high an occupancy. Although the court refused to shut down the shelter, the Protestant church then decided not to renew its lease with the city government, which expired in 1995. Hence, the shelter was closed in October 1995. Officially, church officials said they had decided to build their own facilities on this lot, and eventually the church did build a kindergarten there.⁷¹

Rendsburg-Eckernförde County in Schleswig Holstein: The Countywide Conflict Setting

The conflict settings in Schleswig-Holstein contrasted sharply with those in Munich.

Schleswig-Holstein is a mostly rural *Land* at the northern border of western Germany, with only 2.6 million residents and a relatively low proportion of non-Germans (4.8 percent in 1992).⁷² The largest city has only 250,000 residents. Governed by the SPD alone between 1988 and 2000, the *Land* is divided into 11 counties, each with a county parliament (Kreistag), county administration, and jurisdiction over all the municipalities in its territory with the exception of four "county-free" cities. Rendsburg-Eckernförde County, in the center of the *Land*, contained about 160 municipalities with 250,000 residents, the largest of which, Rendsburg, had only 30,000 residents. The CDU-FDP had a bare majority in the Kreistag in the 1990-1994 period. As the number of asylum seekers housed in Schleswig-Holstein rose from 10,000 at the end of 1990 to 21,000 at the end of 1992,⁷³ the county was responsible for receiving asylum seekers and apportioning them to the municipalities. In contrast to the CSU government in Bavaria, Schleswig-Holstein's SPD-led government pursued a policy of integrating asylum seekers into the local population. This included encouraging a highly decentralized housing policy and a strong stance against right-wing violence, adopted relatively early (in 1992), before the anti-immigrant riots at Rostock in August that year.

Compared to western Germany as a whole, conflicts about asylum shelters in this county had a relatively high potential for involving militant activities by antisystem right-wing groups.⁷⁴ As described earlier, skinhead organization was high on a per-capita basis in this *Land* and in Rendsburg County. In 1992, police observed 220 skinheads in Schleswig-Holstein, and Rendsburg County was one of their centers of activity.⁷⁵ In Schleswig-Holstein, police recorded 47 right-wing arson attacks and 65 assaults in the 1992-1993 period, and the *Land* had a per-capita rate of violence against immigrants that was about 75 percent higher than the national average.⁷⁶ Rendsburg County's residents gave the DVU about average results in the 1992

Landtag elections, ranging from 4.4 percent to 6.8 percent in three electoral districts.⁷⁷

Since Rendsburg County's municipalities were on average very small (1,500 residents), informal contacts between residents and officials were facilitated compared with a large city such as Munich. The municipalities in Rendsburg-Eckernförde County were governed by town councils, which elected the mayors until 1998. Councils and mayors together controlled the town governments' budgets, municipal property, and administrative staff. These officials decided where and how to house the asylum seekers that the county required them to accept. Town council meetings could be either open or closed to the public, and citizen assemblies with an advisory character could be held. Local elections were held in this *Land* in March 1990 and March 1994, which, like the federal elections and the Munich local elections, bracketed the period of peak mobilization against asylum seekers and thus provided no special opportunities to anti-immigration challengers.

Kronshagen Case Example

The Neighborhood Conflict Setting

Kronshagen is a small, largely upper-middle-class town of 12,000 residents in Rendsburg County on the border to Kiel, a port city that has 250,000 residents and is the capital of Schleswig-Holstein. Kronshagen is home to many people with relatively high-paying jobs in Kiel who want to live in a small town and have short commuting times. In the early 1990s, it had quite high proportions of civil servants (26 percent) and private sector, white-collar employees (44 percent), considerably higher than in Rendsburg County and the *Land*.⁷⁸ The town was governed by a council elected every four years and a mayor chosen by the council. In the 1990 elections, the CDU gained 12 council seats, the SPD 10, the FDP 1, and the Greens none, and the CDU

fraction in the town council chose Wolf-Dieter Wilhelms (CDU) to be mayor beginning in October 1991. Under *Land* law, housing asylum seekers was a *Land* government function delegated to the municipalities, and hence fell within the mayor's authority as head of the municipality. In Kronshagen, the mayor thus had the power to choose sites, but the council retained the right to vote on expenditures for renting property or construction.

Authorities' Plans and Residents' Grievances

Between 1990 and 1994, about 100 asylum seekers were distributed to Kronshagen, leading to conflicts over siting beginning in the summer of 1992.⁷⁹ The mayor and council agreed to house them in a highly decentralized way within the town. Usually, no more than 20 were to be housed in any one place, no neighborhoods were to be spared, and asylum seekers were not to be concentrated in areas on the edge of town.⁸⁰ Officials' options were limited because the housing market was tight and the army hospital in Kronshagen failed to make space available for housing asylum seekers.⁸¹ Renting or buying was unattractive, since costs to the town government would be high, and its actions would have made local housing even more scarce and expensive. Officials decided that the least unattractive options were to build small new shelters on previously unbuilt parcels. In trying to implement this policy, they initially tried to incorporate residents in routine participation, partly through town-council meetings.

The first asylum seekers to arrive were Romanians, who lived in low-standard apartments in Ottendorfer Weg on the western edge of the town. By June 1992, 35 were living there and another 24 in a former construction yard in the center of town on Wendenstrasse. As additional asylum seekers were assigned to Kronshagen and the mayor sought new sites to house them, conflicts began concerning all three of the proposed sites. In June 1992, officials proposed setting

up containers for 10 to 20 people on a sports field in the northern Kopperpahl neighborhood, intended to be occupied for five years.⁸² In October 1992, they proposed a small shelter for the garden of a pastor's house bordering the large Eichhof cemetery, for a ten-year period.⁸³ Finally, plans were made in June 1994 for 16 to 20 asylum seekers or ethnic German resettlers at a site just south of the town center on the southern edge of town, at the end of Drewstrasse.⁸⁴

Mobilization by Anti-Immigration Groups

The decentralized approach to housing led to decentralized conflicts, with the level of organization among opponents varying from very little to moderate. Residents' opposition to the housing of asylum seekers in Kronshagen led to the formation of somewhat formal citizen initiatives in at least two cases (the Kopperpahl and Eichhof cemetery sites). In two other cases, including one concerning the operation of an existing shelter at Wendenstrasse, opposition was by ad hoc groups of neighbors or individuals who contacted officials or spoke at public meetings.

Residents' grievances ranged widely. At the Kopperpahl site, members of the citizen initiative feared that a shelter housing 80 to 100 people would eventually be built (because the federal government had recently called for more large shelters). They argued that the site was too valuable as the only green space in the area, used by children and old people, and that more green space was available elsewhere in town. Residents named three alternative sites that they found more appropriate, at least one of which was in the Kopperpahl neighborhood.⁸⁵ In the Eichhof case, opponents complained about the proximity to a school and expressed fears about increased noise, a general feeling of insecurity, and the endangerment of the old fruit trees and the small animals that lived among them in the orchard located at the site.⁸⁶ At the Drewstrasse site, neighbors emphasized that they were not against foreigners or asylum shelters, but found this a

bad site since it was a purely residential neighborhood with small summerhouses in the back yards and an "idyllic" character. They feared a loss of security, orderliness, and cleanliness that would reduce the quality of life and property values.⁸⁷ Finally, neighbors of the shelter at Wendenstrasse complained about problems with noise at night and people walking on and damaging their gardens. The problems, they said, were especially large in the summertime and were not caused by all the 25 asylum seekers living there but rather by several Roma families.⁸⁸

The opponents' demands in Kronshagen were uniformly reformist. At Kopperpahl, Eichhof, and Drewstrasse, residents opposed the construction of the asylum seekers' shelter. At Kopperpahl, alternate sites were proposed, and in the other instances, specific arguments implied that other sites would be better.⁸⁹ At the Wendenstrasse shelter, residents called on the town government to change the shelter's entrance from a residential street to another, busy street.⁹⁰

The shelter opponents' methods were almost always conventional, which reflected their apparently easy access to officials, and their actions often led immediately to negotiations between them and the mayor. At Kopperpahl, residents used leaflets to publicize their cause and mobilize residents to attend a town-council meeting. They also brought a case to the Schleswig administrative court, which ruled against them before the start of construction.⁹¹ At Eichhof, residents used an open letter sent to the mayor and the church that owned the property, eliciting public responses from both. At Wendenstrasse, residents simply met with the mayor to discuss the problems and what could be done about them. Finally, at Drewstrasse, residents overfilled the town hall to attend a town-council meeting, presented 49 signatures on a petition, and said they were considering a court case.

However, several years after the peak of conflict, there were strongly militant actions against the Eichhof shelter, evidently carried out by people who were not present in Kronshagen

during the siting conflicts from 1992 through 1994. In January 1996, a group of young men threatened and attacked the shelter in two incidents. They were led by a known neo-Nazi activist who had recently moved to Kronshagen from another *Land*, and according to a newspaper, the young men who joined him were probably mainly from Kiel. In the most severe of the attacks, they shouted slogans, marched to the shelter, demanded that the shelter's residents (two African families) leave, threw stones (which were also thrown by the asylum seekers), and finally tried to storm the building before police prevented them. Remarkably, the location across from the police station did not prevent these attacks, even though the mayor had argued that this site's proximity to the police station made it the most secure in Kronshagen. Police claimed that they heard nothing, but some observers said the police were afraid to come out and confront the youths. The families were briefly moved out of the shelter, but the neo-Nazis' victory was only temporary, as asylum seekers moved back in.⁹²

Elite Allies of the Anti-Immigration Groups

In clear contrast to Munich, the challengers in Kronshagen gained little elite support, as local political elites largely maintained a consensus on a decentralized housing approach and on the sites chosen by the mayor. When opponents mobilized, the mayor, town councilors, and church leaders usually gave no public support to them, reiterated the need to house the asylum seekers somewhere and the town government's policy of sparing no neighborhood, and sometimes accused opponents of adopting a stance of “not in my backyard” (the “St. Florian's principle” of seeking to shift problems to one's neighbors) or xenophobia.

However, in the Kopperpahl conflict, elites did lend some support, resulting in more challenger mobilization than in the other three Kronshagen conflicts. One SPD town councilor,

who was apparently married to the speaker of the citizen initiative opposed to the shelter, shifted his position markedly in response to neighborhood residents' opposition to Kopperpahl. In June 1992, he suddenly announced that he now thought that a centralized approach to the housing issue would be better, since rising numbers of asylum seekers would make that inevitable eventually.⁹³ (His prediction proved wrong.) This departure from the pattern of elite consensus led to a public insult from a fellow SPD councilor.

This episode was followed by a conflict between the county and the town governments. In July, the Rendsburg County Construction Office refused to give permission for the town to use the site for housing, arguing that the emissions from a neighboring industrial area would be harmful to shelter residents.⁹⁴ After the town government threatened action in administrative court, county officials got advice from the *Land* Interior Ministry, which suggested allowing construction but limiting the shelter to families so as "to not injure the neighborly interests."⁹⁵ By shifting the argument from emissions to the relations between asylum seekers and their neighbors, the Interior Ministry placed itself partly on the side of the Kopperpahl residents against the town government. The local opposition responded to this increased division within the political elites by initiating litigation against the shelter in administrative court.

Mobilization by Pro-Immigrant Groups

Policy-related challenges by pro-immigrant groups were not significant in the 1992-1994 period. However, a local church (the Christuskirche) began pro-immigrant activity in July 1992, with a model project for integrating asylum seekers. The church housed two carefully selected African individuals in a church building, expecting them to work with youths and to translate between Germans and immigrants.⁹⁶ That church's pastor, Klaus Onnasch, was

outspoken in favor of integrating immigrants. He emphasized the interdependence of Germans and people from poor countries, often referring to the origins of the beans for the coffee that Germans drank.

After the Rostock riots in August 1992 and the Mölln murders in November, public support for the church's efforts and other pro-immigrant positions grew in Kronshagen. This buttressed authorities' efforts to site shelters and promote immigrant integration. In December, high school students began setting up a self-help bicycle repair shop for use by asylum seekers and other Kronshagen residents. They also planned to invite immigrants to visit their school in order to counteract right-radical tendencies among the younger pupils. A pro-immigrant church group also began a series of informational evenings for Kronshagen residents and asylum seekers, starting with a meeting concerning Romas.⁹⁷ At the Wendenstrasse and Drewstrasse sites, in October 1992 and June 1994, residents made a point of saying they were not opposed to foreigners, or at least not completely opposed. Similarly, at the Drewstrasse conflict in 1994, many neighbors spoke in favor of the site, backing the mayor and debating with the site's opponents.⁹⁸

Finally, a counselor for asylum seekers arrived in April 1993 with extensive plans for building contacts between asylum seekers and local residents. These included holding "contact evenings" for the Kopperpahl and Eichhof shelters, encouraging Kronshageners to sponsor specific asylum seekers through "godparentships," and trying to integrate the asylum seekers into local associations and schools.⁹⁹ These efforts continued through the 1990s and ultimately led Kronshagen to win third prize in a federal Interior Ministry competition for projects promoting the integration of immigrants.¹⁰⁰

Consequences: Elite Competition and Government Concessions

In sharp contrast to Munich, local anti-immigration challengers had little effect on elite competition in Kronshagen. As indicated above, the mayor and town councilors remained collectively firm concerning the decentralized housing policy, with the council usually strongly backing the mayor's decisions despite neighborhood opposition.¹⁰¹ The Kopperpahl and Eichhof sites were ready for asylum seekers by May 1993 and remained in operation through the late 1990s.¹⁰² Although there is no evidence about Kronshageners' opinions of the decentralized housing policy, it was not so unpopular as to cause electoral difficulties for the parties that supported it. Although in the 1994 local elections the CDU and SPD each lost a seat in the town council, their losses resulted from gains by the Greens, a party that stood for a pro-immigrant policy at the *Land* and federal levels, and the CDU remained the largest party.

At the same time, the challengers triggered significant, albeit small, concessions in almost every case where they mobilized. The mayor was very flexible in making concessions to the shelters' neighbors, apparently made on the spot as soon as opposition was made public. At the Kopperpahl site, the mayor responded to opposition by quickly moving the planned housing from the athletic field to a site next to the field and by changing the planned housing from containers to cheaply constructed wooden houses. Furthermore, after the *Land* Interior Ministry indicated that only families should be housed at Kopperpahl and that the numbers should be limited, the town government housed several families there. The process was similar at the Wendenstrasse site, the mayor offered to try to secure a counselor for the asylum seekers (which was later achieved) and promised to look into changing the shelter's entrance to a different street. At Drewstrasse, local opponents had the greatest effect, as town administrators ultimately gave up on the initially proposed site. However, they chose another site very nearby, in a former train

station, and kept the initial site in reserve should the number of asylum seekers continue to increase.¹⁰³

Town officials also tried to head off conflicts and challenger mobilization. They lobbied the Employment Office to gain a counselor for the asylum seekers. In July 1992, they got a part-time counselor who was based in Kronshagen but also worked elsewhere, and in April 1993, they got a full-time counselor who worked only in Kronshagen. The town government also promised to produce a multilingual brochure to aid asylum seekers in understanding German customs and hence in avoiding conflicts with German neighbors and law enforcement officials.¹⁰⁴

In short, elites in Kronshagen adopted an approach to challengers that was almost ideal for minimizing mobilization, especially unconventional actions. They gave potential opponents early opportunities to voice objections, substantively and constructively engaged opponents' arguments by providing detailed information about sites, gave little support to the opponents' main demands (preventing siting), and rapidly made small concessions that probably eased local acceptance of the housing. Nonetheless, mobilization against shelters occurred repeatedly, because there was a repeated conjunction, in different neighborhoods, of several factors: sudden grievances, low-cost access to officials (including at some town-council meetings), and relatively high success chances when it came to modest concessions. Moreover, militant actions could not be prevented completely, as the 1996 attacks at Eichhof show.

Cross-Sectional Analysis and Conclusions from the Local Cases

Summary of the Cases

An examination of the largest conflicts over asylum shelter siting in Munich and Rendsburg County in the 1989-1993 period shows that the Südpark and Kronshagen cases were

rather typical for their respective jurisdictions. The ten localities with the largest conflicts contained fifteen specific conflicts that are analyzed here, because the decentralized housing policies pursued in the three Rendsburg County towns produced multiple siting conflicts in each of them. In 93 percent of the fifteen cases, including Munich-Südpark and the three Kronshagen siting conflicts described above, anti-immigration challengers used conventional participation to oppose shelter siting. Elite allies were available in 100 percent of the Munich cases, but they were unavailable in 50 percent of the Rendsburg County cases, including Kronshagen-Eichhof and Kronshagen-Drewstrasse. At the same time, disruptive activity occurred in 29 percent of the cases (including Südpark), and militant activity occurred in 50 percent of the fourteen cases for which adequate information was available (including Südpark and Eichhof). Finally, 87 percent of the challenges led to increases in elite competition, including Südpark and Kronshagen-Kopperpahl, and 70 percent led to government concessions, including all those described above.

Social-structural differences within Munich, within Rendsburg County, or between them had little if any effect on the conflicts. Within both jurisdictions, reformist, conventional mobilization against asylum shelters occurred in working-class, middle-class, and upper-middle-class areas. Citizen initiatives formed even in working-class areas,¹⁰⁵ residents were somewhat disruptive even in relative rich areas,¹⁰⁶ and militant actions occurred even in middle-class areas.¹⁰⁷ In Rendsburg County, the three main localities with conflicts had quite different social compositions, as the working-class proportion in Büdelsdorf was 33 percent, in Altenholz 20 percent, and in Kronshagen only 15 percent.¹⁰⁸ Yet the challenges were similar in the three towns: mainly conventional, attracting few elite allies, short-lived, gaining some concessions, and including some violence against shelters.

Democratic and Undemocratic Participation

These fifteen cases of conflicts show that both anti-immigration and pro-immigrant challengers contributed to democratic, nonviolent participation at the local level. Organized citizen initiatives and other, relatively informal groups had mainly reformist goals and conventional tactics, and they carried out much nonviolent mobilization that was oriented directly toward the siting and operation of asylum shelters in particular neighborhoods. Routine participation was very similar across the fifteen cases, but disruptive nonviolent protests were limited to the Munich cases. This may have been due to the greater diffusion of protest tactics from other urban challengers or the greater acceptance of protests by elites in big cities. Counter-mobilization by pro-immigrant actors was also very common in Munich, where pro-immigrant groups appeared in 86 percent of the cases. These were often challengers using conventional tactics, including a strong self-help component. By contrast, in the Rendsburg County cases, pro-immigrant activity was led mainly by elites and occurred in only 40 percent of the cases for which adequate information is available. Presumably, proximity to other urban left-wing challengers as well as a higher degree of party competition was responsible for the higher levels of pro-immigrant activity in Munich.

Although anti-immigration participation usually declined sharply after shelters went into operation, it sometimes continued. For example, in Munich, challengers continued mobilizing well after the peaks of conflicts at Südpark and Solln. Moreover, a sampling of newspaper articles for 1997 showed that residents mobilized against noise and drug dealing at several asylum shelters in Munich that year, at Moosach (Triebstrasse), Sendling (Bodenchrstrasse), and Obersendling (Baierbrunnenstrasse). These three were all unusually large shelters, with 360 to 400 asylum seekers.¹⁰⁹

Remarkably, pro-immigrant and anti-immigration groups ended up with some overlapping demands, for example, higher staffing levels and other measures intended to reduce conflicts between asylum seekers and neighborhood residents. There was a tendency for anti-immigration activity to peak before shelters went into operation, then to decline and continue at a reduced level on issues concerning shelter operation, and to be replaced to some extent by pro-immigrant activity (especially in Munich-Moosach, -Pasing, and -Ramersdorf). This pattern resulted largely from changes in political opportunities: anti-immigration groups tended to demobilize after losing administrative siting decisions, at which time pro-immigrant (and anti-immigration) groups gained chances to influence the operation of shelters.

Although these conflicts were mainly nonviolent, the anti-immigration challengers used mixed repertoires. Militant actions were used in about half of these cases, including violence in one-third of them. However, violent actions dominated only two of the conflicts (Altenholz-Klausdorferstrasse, Büdelsdorf-Birkenklause).¹¹⁰ Militant threats and actions were usually undertaken by skinheads, neo-Nazis, or unidentified challengers. However, in three cases (Munich-Südpark, -Hadern, -Harlaching), a group involved in nonviolent mobilization publicly made militant threats.

Violence and threats were about equally present in the Munich and Schleswig-Holstein cases, but the intensity and per capita rate of violence against shelters were much higher in Schleswig-Holstein. In the three Rendsburg County towns (combined population about 30,000), I found stone attacks on two occupied shelters and one highly successful arson attack. This contrasts with only minor arson attacks on two shelters (one unoccupied) in the seven Munich cases, where the combined population of the boroughs in which the shelters were located was about 350,000. Contributing to these differences were the more decentralized housing policy in

Schleswig-Holstein, which created more potential targets for militant attacks, as well as the generally higher levels of skinhead and neo-Nazi organization and activity.

Causes: Sudden Grievances, Elite Allies, and Opportunities

The timing of the challenges shows the importance of sudden grievances and elite allies in spurring participation. In all fifteen cases, conventional mobilization occurred immediately after residents learned about municipal plans for a shelter site. Thus, the timing of mobilization corresponded to the temporal pattern of authorities' distribution of asylum seekers to municipalities, rather than the pattern of elite competition at higher levels (in Munich, Rendsburg County, *Land*, or the FRG). Nonetheless, almost one-third of the conflicts were affected by higher-level elite competition, which made additional elite allies available for the challengers. For example, the April 1992 Landtag election campaign probably increased elite conflict and challenger mobilization in the Munich-Südpark, -Solln, and -Harlaching cases, and the December 1990 Bundestag elections probably did the same in the Munich-Hadern case.

Declines in grievances, opportunities, and elite allies also helped demobilize the anti-immigration groups. In only four cases (27 percent) did anti-immigration participation continue after the peaks of the conflicts. Typically, mobilization collapsed completely after authorities put the shelter into operation in the neighborhood in question. In such cases, opportunities for reform and grievances both declined rapidly. Once the shelters were built and put into operation, the chances of preventing asylum seekers from living there or reducing the shelters' size dropped sharply. Therefore, the challengers and their elite supporters reduced their activity. Moreover, when shelters went into operation, neighborhood residents gained experience with the asylum seekers, and the initial fears of many residents proved unfounded.

The two jurisdictions show important differences in the availability of elite allies for the challengers. In Munich, elite allies were present in all seven major conflicts, with anti-immigration groups supported by elites in seven cases and pro-immigrant groups in five cases. At the borough level, there was a strong tendency for CSU politicians to support anti-immigration challengers and SPD and Green politicians to support pro-immigrant groups. However, in two cases (Südpark, Ramersdorf), the borough SPD provided early allies to the anti-immigration groups, and the SPD mayor of Munich acted as an ally in two cases (Südpark, Hadern). I will discuss the lack of elite allies in the Rendsburg County cases below.

Consequences: Subnational Elite Competition and Government Concessions

The anti-immigration challengers increased elite competition in all seven Munich cases, mainly pitting the SPD and Greens against the CSU (and sometimes Kronawitter) and the city government against the *Land* government. Elite competition mainly concerned local issues: the size of shelters, the level of staffing (counselors and security personnel), and the transfer of shelters to the *Land* government. However, local challengers in Munich also affected the national debate on asylum, via the interventions of Kronawitter (SPD) and Riedl (CSU), who both seized upon local opposition to argue for a constitutional amendment in the national debate in 1992. These two politicians were relatively radical proponents of restrictions on asylum rights within their respective parties. Kronawitter, the first prominent local SPD politician to endorse a constitutional change, had a major role in leading the SPD toward endorsing a constitutional amendment.¹¹¹

By contrast, local challengers had less effect on elite competition in the three Rendsburg County towns. Local elites remained relatively unified when making siting decisions and usually

left negotiations and concessions to one figure, the town mayor. Several factors can explain the differences between Munich and Rendsburg County in elite allies and elite competition. Political institutions were more complex in Munich, and German elites are more competitive in big cities than in small towns. Furthermore, the *Land* policies affected the potential for conflict between regional and local governments differently. In Bavaria, the CSU-led *Land* government pursued a deterrence-based asylum policy, which increased conflicts between it and the SPD-led Munich government. By contrast, in Schleswig-Holstein, the SPD-led *Land* government's immigrant-integration policies created fewer conflicts with municipalities.

Nonetheless, Munich and Rendsburg County were quite similar with regard to government responsiveness. In both jurisdictions, local officials had a strong tendency to make concessions to mobilized public opinion while still constructing shelters on the initially proposed sites. In 86 percent of the cases, local government stuck to its original siting plans; only in Munich-Harlaching and Altenholz-Klausdorferstrasse did the municipality give up on a site without building a shelter. More often, in 70 percent of the ten cases for which enough information was available, governments granted relatively minor concessions that were designed to placate the mobilized opposition and to reduce conflicts between asylum seekers and neighborhood residents. These concessions included reducing the size of shelters, increasing staffing, blocking or delaying transfer to the *Land* government (in Munich), moving a site slightly in order to accommodate other uses (for example, recreational uses), and building wooden houses rather than using the more unsightly prefabricated "containers."

Reforms that are more far-reaching sometimes resulted from challenger mobilization. In two cases (Munich-Solln, -Südpark), resident opposition led officials to close shelters after three to five years of operation, at a time when demand for shelters was greatly reduced compared with

the peak during the years 1992 to 1993. Furthermore, in Munich, opposition in Westkreuz, Moosach, and other neighborhoods led to the adoption of a citywide policy of providing a high level of counseling staff at shelters operated by the city government.¹¹² These reforms were the results of challenger-elite interactions and most of them probably would not have been adopted without challenger mobilization.

It is very likely that these relatively low-cost but significant reforms were instances of democratic responsiveness. They probably brought government actions closer to what was preferred by most of those directly affected by the asylum shelters—that is, the residents of the shelters' immediate neighborhoods.¹¹³ The available public opinion data suggests that a majority of Germans would have opposed an asylum shelter in their immediate neighborhood. In a 1996 survey, 47 percent said they would find "having an asylum seeker as a neighbor" to be "unpleasant," compared with only 15 percent who would find it "pleasant," thus making asylum seekers much less desirable as neighbors than Turks, ethnic German resettlers, Jews, or Italians.¹¹⁴ If the question had concerned 100 or 300 asylum seekers rather than "an asylum seeker," the answers would presumably have been even more negative.

But government concessions were not simply a matter of "not in my backyard" politics. The reforms were usually partial concessions rather than highly responsive to the challengers' demands. Authorities seldom abandoned sites altogether in response to challenger mobilization, and the resulting distribution of asylum seekers in Munich did not benefit richer or middle-class boroughs.¹¹⁵ Rather, political elites tended to make concessions where opposition was loudest and low-cost modifications were possible. In this regard, they acted as competent politicians in a representative democracy.

Similarly, a majority of Germans probably would have supported increased staffing in

asylum shelters if this would reduce frictions due to cultural differences between themselves and the asylum seekers. A huge majority, 83 percent, agreed that there were strong "lifestyle differences" between Germans and asylum seekers; 37 percent said those differences were "very strong"—that is, at the extreme end of a seven-point scale.¹¹⁶ It is likely that the smaller shelter sizes and higher staffing levels that resulted from challenger mobilization in Kronshagen and in Munich helped to reduce conflicts between asylum seekers and neighborhood residents.¹¹⁷ Therefore, the compromises that usually resulted from the anti-immigration challenges -- original sites were retained, but often with smaller shelters and more staff than originally planned -- helped reduce conflicts and gave neighborhood residents a chance to see that their initial fears about asylum seekers were largely unfounded.

Citizen Initiatives and the Nationwide Anti-immigration Movement

The local challengers described above were part of a larger anti-immigration movement from about 1989 to 1993. True, the citizen initiatives that challenged the siting of asylum shelters in German towns and neighborhoods had few contacts with each other, with skinhead and neo-Nazi groups, and with far-right parties. Hence, they did not consciously coordinate their activities, nor did their mobilization usually continue more than a few years. Nonetheless, for several years, the right-wing challengers were in sustained interaction with elites, shared the goal of opposing the arrival and presence of asylum seekers in Germany at the national, *Land*, and local levels, and had some common allies and opponents. Their common allies were those who called most strongly for restrictions on asylum rights, mostly in the Christian-democratic parties and sometimes in the SPD; their common opponents included most of the SPD and the Greens. Their challenges were sustained for several years because the constitutional stalemate between

the Christian-democratic parties and the SPD made rising numbers of asylum seekers, a vigorous inter-elite debate on asylum rights, and extremely high salience for the asylum issue major features of German politics between 1989 and 1993.¹¹⁸

Changes in National Elite Competition and Government Responsiveness

In national politics, right-wing skinheads, neo-Nazis, and far-right parties were the most visible parts of the anti-immigration movement, but nonviolent citizen initiatives also played an important role. Data on asylum applications, right-wing violence, and right-wing votes were readily available and were used by politicians pressing for restrictions on asylum rights. Hence, the effects of right-wing violence and voting on national politics are evident in the timing of events.¹¹⁹ By contrast, the effects of nonviolent local groups were more complex and diffuse. Any particular local conflict was too small to influence the national debate, and politicians could not make arguments by reference to any data on the total number of local citizen initiatives. Nonetheless, the local challengers had important influence on national politics, in four ways.

First, the neighborhood-level mobilization helped convince local politicians, especially those based in the larger cities, that the anti-immigration cause was popular. This became increasingly apparent as mobilization by residents' groups rose along with asylum applications. For example, in Munich and Rendsburg County, at least seven major local conflicts were ongoing in 1991, and there were eleven in 1992. Indeed, the first major SPD politician to broach the subject of a constitutional amendment, Oscar Lafontaine in 1990, probably was influenced by early, strong local mobilization against asylum seekers in the Saar, a highly urbanized *Land* where he was Premier. Resident initiatives against asylum seekers were mobilizing intense opposition to the housing of 2500 asylum seekers (including 1400 Romas) in Lebach, The Saar

in Summer 1990. This was exactly the time that Lafontaine argued publicly that the "population should not be overtaxed" by asylum seekers and the right to asylum must be changed so that "the population accepts it."¹²⁰

Second, local opponents of asylum shelters found allies among national politicians who favored restrictions on the FRG's relatively liberal asylum policy. CDU politicians tried to use local opposition to mobilize local SPD politicians for a constitutional change. When Chancellor Helmut Kohl (CDU) first floated the idea of a constitutional amendment in 1986, he did so at a meeting of the peak association of county governments.¹²¹ The CDU included local government officials in proposed multi-party discussions of the asylum issue in August 1991 and April 1992.¹²²

More important was the attempt by the general secretary of the CDU, Volker Rühe, to increase the pressure on the SPD in September 1992. Rühe wrote a letter to all CDU local organizations in which he asked them to use the asylum issue against the SPD because of that party's unwillingness to constitutionally restrict the asylum right. He suggested the slogan "every asylum seeker is an SPD asylum seeker."¹²³ Indeed, pressure from municipal-level leaders of the SPD, who were concerned about the local dimension of the asylum issue, was important in the SPD's change toward a more restrictive position during Fall 1992 and Winter 1992-93.¹²⁴ In particular, prominent local SPD mayors (Kronawitter in Munich, Wedemeier in Bremen, Voscherau in Hamburg) played key roles within the intra-SPD debate during 1992, sometimes seeming to offer their cooperation to the Christian-democratic parties.¹²⁵

Third, resident mobilization against asylum seekers gave nonelected local government officials additional reasons to lobby higher levels of government for actions to reduce the numbers of asylum seekers. Local officials already had financial incentives for this, due to

inadequate reimbursement from *Land* governments for social assistance, housing, and administrative costs. However, challenger mobilization added a new dimension that complicated siting efforts and required local administrators to risk or use political capital in defending and justifying siting decisions. The peak association of German cities, the Deutscher Städtetag, ultimately weighed in with a call for a political agreement including constitutional change and laws to regulate immigration.¹²⁶

Fourth, when citizen initiatives and individual residents in the 1980s and '90s increasingly opposed the location or operation of asylum seekers' shelters in many locations throughout the Federal Republic, this put pressure on local and *Land* officials to reduce the proportion of the country's asylum seekers who were to be housed in their jurisdictions. One important result was the decision by a conference of *Land* officials to begin transferring asylum seekers from western to eastern Germany at the end of 1990. This move, presumably inadvertently, placed the asylum seekers in the path of the skinheads and neo-Nazis who enjoyed free rein in many parts of the new eastern *Länder*. Given the weakness of policing in the eastern *Länder* at that time, just after the collapse of the communist system, the transfer of asylum seekers eastward directly facilitated several massive waves of anti-immigrant violence, especially arson attacks against shelters. The violence began in eastern Germany in the spring of 1991,¹²⁷ soon after the arrival of asylum seekers there, and continued through early 1993. The violence was widely reported and became an important source of leverage for proponents of a constitutional amendment, who argued that only reduced asylum applications could prevent further violence.¹²⁸

Conclusions

Among many observers, there is a tendency to see all anti-immigration activity in Germany

as right-wing populist and hence as a threat to democracy, or at least as detracting from democracy. However, it is more realistic to see citizen initiatives against local immigration by asylum seekers as part of the democratic political process, even if one disagrees with these groups' goals. The activities of these groups were largely nonviolent and they seldom embraced antisystem goals. They were in relatively close interactions with local elites, typically forming implicit or explicit reform coalitions that helped to bring people into political participation. The outcomes of mobilizations by the citizen initiatives' usually involved compromises and incremental reforms. At least in some cases, reforms such as reduced shelter sizes or increased staffing helped to defuse conflicts between asylum seekers and their neighbors. Similarly, the overlaps between the demands of anti-immigration and pro-immigrant groups show that the political processes of challenge and response by movements, elites, and countermovements could produce fruitful compromises and political learning that moderated conflicts. These processes reduced the potential for violence that existed where citizen groups received little response from local politicians and administrators, as was common in eastern Germany.¹²⁹

Moreover, these citizen initiatives contributed to democratic politics at the national level. Limiting the numbers of asylum seekers, while arguably a xenophobic or even an inhumane goal, was a highly popular goal in Germany. Over 60 percent supported a constitutional restriction in 1992, although only 22 percent wanted a complete ban on asylum seekers.¹³⁰ Therefore, to the extent that the local citizen initiatives contributed to the adoption of Article 16a, they enhanced the national democratic process by increasing elite competition and government responsiveness to public preferences.¹³¹

Finally, these groups fit well within the mainstream of German politics in another way. The sum of the citizen initiatives' effects on policy and policy implementation were to influence

lower immigration rates by asylum seekers, through Article 16a, while increasing the chances of social integration for asylum seekers already in Germany, through the small, site-specific reforms described above. In this way, they helped to implement the dominant position among national elites in favor of a combination of tighter immigration controls and increased social integration of immigrants.

Notes

1. Throughout, "Germany" refers to the FRG, that is, West Germany before 1990 and unified Germany from that date forward.
2. E.g., Hans-Georg Betz, *Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe* (New York, 1994); Martin Schain, Aristide Zolberg, and Patrick Hossay, eds., *Shadows Over Europe: The Development and Impact of the Extreme Right in Western Europe* (New York, 2002).
3. For example, Dietrich Thränhardt, "The Political Uses of Xenophobia in England, France, and Germany," *Party Politics* 1 (1995): 323-45; Ruud Koopmans, "Explaining the Rise of Racist and Extreme-Right Violence in Western Europe," *European Journal of Political Research* 30 (1996): 185-216; Bernd Siegler, "Der Apparat und die Rechten," in Siegler, Oliver Tolmein, and Charlotte Wiedemann, *Der Pakt* (Göttingen, 1993), 11-117.
4. E.g., Tore Björge and Rob Witte, eds., *Racist Violence in Europe* (New York, 1993); Rob Witte, *Racist Violence and the State* (New York, 1996); Ruud Koopmans, "Asyl," in Wolfgang van den Daele and Friedhelm Neidhardt, eds., *Kommunikation und Entscheidung* (Berlin, 1996b), 167-92; Roger Karapin, "Major Anti-Minority Riots and National Legislative Campaigns against Immigrants in Britain and Germany," in Ruud Koopmans and Paul Statham, eds., *Challenging Immigration and Ethnic Relations Politics* (New York, 2000), 312-47.
5. E.g., Wilhelm Heitmeyer, *Rechtsextremistische Orientierungen bei Jugendlichen*, 4th ed. (Munich, 1992).
6. A challenger is a mobilized group that lacks routine, low-cost access to government decision-making and resources, such as citizen initiatives, skinhead groups, and neo-Nazi organizations; "elites" are those who have such access, including government authorities as well as party and interest-group leaders. See Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (New York, 1978), 52.
7. Martin Schain, "Immigration and Changes in the French Party System," *European Journal of Political Research* 16 (1988): 597-621, here 618; Ted Perlmutter, "The Political Asylum Debates in Germany, 1978-92, paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, August-September 1995; Ursula Münch, *Asylpolitik in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Opladen, 1992); Gerard Braunthal, *The German Social Democrats Since 1969*, 2nd ed. (Boulder, 1994), 313-14. For a related but different analysis, see Jeannette Money, "No Vacancy," *International Organization* 51 (1997): 685-720; *Fences and Neighbors: the Political Geography of Immigration Control* (Ithaca, 1999).
8. Roger Karapin, "The Politics of Immigration Control in Britain and Germany," *Comparative Politics* 31 (1999): 423-44; *Movements and Democracy in Germany* (book manuscript, January 2003), chs. 9-10. See also Paul Foot, *Immigration and Race in British Politics* (Baltimore, 1965); Nicholas Deakin, ed., *Colour and the British Electorate 1964* (New York, 1965); Helmut Willems, et al., *Fremdenfeindliche Gewalt* (Opladen, 1993), 214-17; Susanne Benzler, "Migranten in Wartestellung," in Klaus Bade, ed., *Fremde im Land* (Osnabrück, 1997), 213-48.
9. Asylum seekers' de facto ability to remain in the FRG for long periods makes it appropriate to refer to them as immigrants and hence to consider conflicts about their arrival and presence as conflicts about immigration. On the one hand, in this period over 90 percent of asylum applications were eventually rejected by German courts, which interpreted political persecution rather narrowly. Nonetheless, the Basic Law (Articles 16 and 19) and judicial interpretations of it gave asylum seekers the right to full judicial review of their cases and allowed them to remain in the FRG while their cases were decided, which took an average of six years. Furthermore, about 60 percent of those denied asylum remained in the country, often with "toleration" status from *Land* governments. See Klaus Bade, *Ausländer, Aussiedler, Asyl* (Munich, 1994), 110; Daniel Kanstroom, "Wer sind wir wieder?" *Yale Journal of International Law* 18 (Winter 1993): 155-211, here 190, 199; "The Shining City and the Fortress," *Boston College International and*

Comparative Law Review 16 (1993): 201-43, here 224-25.

10. Citizen initiatives also mobilized in the eastern *Länder*, though apparently less frequently; see for example, *taz*, 6 March 1991.

11. See, e.g., Tilly (see note 6 above); Doug McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970* (Chicago, 1982); Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement*, 2nd ed. (New York, 1998); Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, *Dynamics of Contention* (New York, 2001); Sidney Tarrow, *Democracy and Disorder* (Oxford, 1989), 38-51; Edward Walsh and Rex Warland, "Social Movement Involvement in the Wake of a Nuclear Accident," *American Sociological Review* 48 (1983): 764-80.

12. Since many left the country again or gained a different status as de facto refugees, only about 550,000 asylum seekers were in Germany in 1993.

13. Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für die Belange der Ausländer, "Daten und Fakten zur Ausländersituation," October 1994 press release, Table 12.

14. Wayne Cornelius, Philip Martin, and James Hollifield, eds., *Controlling Immigration* (Stanford, 1994), 421; in this volume, see Philip Martin's chapter, "Germany," 189-225, here 182.

15. Münch (see note 7 above), 83-86, 95-97; Karl-Heinz Meier-Braun, *Das Asylanten-Problem* (Frankfurt, 1980), 61-62, 77; Perlmutter (see note 7 above).

16. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (hereafter *FAZ*), 8 August 1991.

17. The vast majority of the FRG's approximately 400 counties and 100 cities (*Kreisfreie Städte*) were required to house asylum seekers in the early 1990s, and a high proportion of them distributed asylum seekers to multiple towns, boroughs, or neighborhoods within their borders.

18. *die tageszeitung* (hereafter *taz*), 1 February 1991.

19. Achim Thoma, "Die Verteilung und Unterbringung von Asylbewerbern in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Lage der Kommunen," doctoral dissertation, University of Mainz, 1990, 143-44; Willems, et al. (see note 8 above), 213-17.

20. Kanstroon "Wer sind wir" (see note 9 above), 197.

21. Thoma (see note 19 above), 122-31.

22. Charles Tilly, *Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons* (New York, 1984); Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune, *The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry* (New York, 1970).

23. Munich had 1.3 million residents, with about 50,000 in the average borough in 1992; Rendsburg County had 250,000 residents, with about 1,500 residents in the average town and 30,000 in the largest, Rendsburg city. See *Statistisches Jahrbuch München* 1997; Kreis Rendsburg-Eckernförde, *25 Jahre Kreis Rendsburg-Eckernförde* (Rendsburg, 1995).

24. This was about 4,500 people per square kilometer in Munich and about 110 per square kilometer in Rendsburg County; the FRG had about 220 per square kilometer.

25. Unemployment was 2.9 percent in Munich and 7.2 percent in Rendsburg County, vs. 6.6 percent for western Germany in 1992; data from Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, ed., *Arbeitsstatistik 1992* (Nürnberg, 1993), 61, 65.

26. Non-Germans made up about 21 percent in Munich and 6.3 percent in Rendsburg County in 1991, vs. 7.7 percent in Schleswig-Holstein and 7.3 percent in the FRG.
27. In Bavaria, 67 percent were Catholic, while 73 percent were Protestant in Schleswig-Holstein (*Statistisches Jahrbuch deutscher Gemeinden* 1992, 482-83).
28. The SPD and Greens controlled Munich government most of the time after 1984, while the CSU controlled Bavarian government. By contrast, politics was competitive between the SPD and CDU in Rendsburg County after 1990, while the SPD controlled Schleswig-Holstein government after 1988.
29. Bavarian authorities counted 240 right-wing skinheads in 1992 while Schleswig-Holstein counted 220 of them, with a *Land* population only about one-fifth as large as Bavaria's (data from Bayerisches Staatsministerium des Innern, *Verfassungsschutzbericht* [Munich, 1992], 46; Innenminister des Landes Schleswig-Holstein, *Jahresbericht der Verfassungsschutzabteilung* 1992 [Kiel, 1992], 6). Moreover, the differences between Munich and Rendsburg were even greater, since skinhead organization in Munich was lower than average for Bavaria, while in Rendsburg it was about average for Schleswig-Holstein; see Innenminister des Landes Schleswig-Holstein, *Skinheads in Schleswig-Holstein* (Kiel, 1993), 24. In terms of per capita right-wing arson attacks, Bavaria reported about 35 percent of the national average in 1992, while Schleswig-Holstein reported about 175 percent of the national average. These were the lowest and highest rates among the western states (own calculations from data in Partei des demokratischen Sozialismus, ed., *Neofaschistischer und rassistischer Terror* 1992 [Bonn, 1993]).
30. For each jurisdiction, I used two different local archives that contained clippings files (*Münchner Merkur*, *Bayerischer Rundfunk*, *Kieler Nachrichten*, *Norddeutscher Rundfunk*). I defined the localities with the largest conflicts as those for which the largest number of newspaper articles were available in the 1989-93 period.
31. For a third in-depth case, Munich-Moosach, see Karapın, *Movements and Democracy* (see note 8 above), ch. 9.
32. Interview with Alexander Reissl, ex-chair of Moosach borough council (SPD), 11 April 2002.
33. Ibid.
34. Peter Eisinger, "The Conditions of Protest Behavior in American Cities," *American Political Science Review* 67 (1973), 11-28.
35. *Stab für aussergewöhnliche Ereignisse*.
36. Interview with Wolfgang Kurreck, Director, Flüchtlingsamt Munich, 29 April 1998.
37. *taz*, 14 February 1992.
38. *Münchner Merkur* (hereafter *MM*), 22 December 1988.
39. Bayerisches Staatsministerium des Innern, *Verfassungsschutzbericht* (Munich, 1992), 46; idem., *Verfassungsschutzbericht* (Munich, 1996), 18; *MM*, 9 October 1991.
40. *Statistisches Jahrbuch München* 1997, 41-42; Statistisches Amt der Landeshauptstadt München, ed., *Statistisches Taschenbuch* 1987 (Munich, 1987), 179; *Münchner Statistik* 1990 (3), Table 4.
41. In Munich, only two shelters operated by the city government in 1995 had space for more than 200 people. Although 19 shelters operated by the *Land* government in Munich were at least that large, they experienced much less opposition than in Südpark because the *Land* government and politicians were much more difficult to influence than those at the city level.

42. *Süddeutsche Zeitung-München Süd* (hereafter *SZMS*), 16 April 1992.
43. *MM*, 12 March 1992; *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (hereafter *SüZ*), 15 October 1992.
44. *SüZ*, 23 March 1992; *taz*, 12 November 1994.
45. *SüZ*, 11 March 1992.
46. *SüZ*, 10-11 March; *MM*, 12 March 1992.
47. Data from Flüchtlingsamt München; own calculations. However, large objective grievances was not the main factor behind the Südpark protests and their partial success. The four other Munich boroughs with similarly a high degree of "overburdening" (Neuhausen, Allach, Trudering, Aubing) did not experience major opposition to their shelters.
48. *SüZ*, 15 October 1992.
49. *MM*, 22 October 1992; *taz*, 12 November 1994.
50. As I use the terms here, goals are "reformist" if they call for small, policy-specific changes from the status quo, while "radical" goals involved bigger demands that go farther than average public preferences in Germany, yet stop short of calling for changes in the basic character of political and economic systems. In the latter sense, "radical" goals are distinct from "antisystem" goals.
51. *Kreisverwaltungsreferenten*.
52. This was a slightly derogatory term for asylum seekers, used by the tabloid press and politicians who sought relatively harsh measures against asylum seekers.
53. As I use the term here, "conventional" challengers seek to promote their interests with routine methods such as meetings and petitions. By contrast, "disruptive" challengers try to disrupt political routines in nonviolent ways, and "militant" challengers try to intimidate and coerce their opponents through hostile confrontations in which they are willing to fight violently or through threats of violence.
54. *SüZ*, 10, 13 March, 22 September 1992; *taz*, 12 November 1994; *SZMS*, 16 April 1992; *MM*, 12 March, 22 October 1992.
55. *taz*, 12 November 1994.
56. *SüZ*, 23 March 1992.
57. *taz*, 12 November 1994.
58. *SüZ*, 22 September 1992.
59. *taz*, 12 November 1994.
60. *SüZ*, 11 March; *MM*, 12 March 1992.
61. *MM*, 22 October 1992.
62. *SüZ*, 11 March 1992, 15 April 1993.

63. *SüZ*, 22 September 1992.
64. *taz*, 10 April 1992.
65. *SüZ*, 16 April 1992; *MM*, 22 October 1992.
66. *SüZ*, 15 October 1992, 15 April 1993.
67. *SüZ*, 15 April 1993.
68. *taz*, 12 November 1994.
69. *SüZ*, 22 September, 15 October, 23 December 1992, 15 April 1993.
70. *SüZ*, 22 September 1992, 15 April 1993; data from Flüchtlingsamt München.
71. Email from Michael Hoffmann, Sendling borough council, 29 April 2002.
72. *Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland* 1994, 72.
73. Schleswig-Holsteinischer Landtag, "Zahlenmäßige Entwicklung und Situation der Asylbewerberinnen und Asylbewerber in Schleswig-Holstein im Zeitraum 1990 bis 1993," Drucksache 13/2241 (20 October 1994), 15.
74. Far-right activity was very high in the southern and eastern regions of Schleswig-Holstein, including the area on the outskirts of Hamburg and on the former border between East and West Germany, and very low to the north and west. Rendsburg County lies approximately on the line of transition between these two sharply distinct areas.
75. Innenminister des Landes Schleswig-Holstein, *Jahresbericht* (see note 29 above), 6; *idem.*, *Skinheads* (see note 29 above), 21; *idem.*, *Verfassungsschutzbericht* (Kiel, 1993), 18.
76. Innenminister des Landes Schleswig-Holstein, *Verfassungsschutzbericht* (Kiel, 1992), 24.
77. Institut für angewandte Sozialforschung, *Schleswig-Holstein 1992* (Bonn: *idem.*, 1992), App. C, 9; Innenminister des Landes Schleswig-Holstein, *Skinheads* (see note 29 above), 24.
78. The figures for Rendsburg County were 14 percent and 35 percent, and for the *Land*, 12 percent and 38 percent, respectively (1987 census data provided by Statistisches Amt Schleswig-Holstein).
79. *Kieler Nachrichten* (hereafter *KN*), 22 September 1990, 12 June 1992.
80. Interview with Cord-Peter Lubinski, Chair, SPD Fraction in Kronshagen town council, 30 April 1992.
81. *KN*, 23 April 1993.
82. *KN*, 12 June, 29 October 1992.
83. *KN*, 10 October 1992.
84. *KN*, 1 June 1994.
85. *KN*, 12, 18 June 1992.

86. *KN*, 10 October 1992.
87. *KN*, 1 June 1994.
88. *KN*, 16 October 1992.
89. *KN*, 18 June, 10 October 1992, 1 June 1994.
90. *KN*, 16 October 1994.
91. *KN*, 18 June, 29 October 1992; Lubinski interview (see note 80 above).
92. *KN*, 27 January 1996; Lubinski interview (see note 80 above).
93. *KN*, 18 June 1992.
94. *KN*, 21 July 1992.
95. *KN*, 29 October 1992.
96. *KN*, 12 June, 10 December 1992.
97. *KN*, 10 December 1992.
98. *KN*, 1 June 1994.
99. *KN*, 23 April 1993.
100. Lubinski interview (see note 80 above).
101. E.g., *KN*, 1 June 1994.
102. *KN*, 23 April 1993.
103. *KN*, 1 June 1994; Lubinski interview (see note 80 above).
104. *KN*, 12 June, 16 October 1992, 23 April 1993.
105. E.g., Munich-Moosach, Kronshagen-Kopperpahl.
106. E.g., Munich-Solln, Munich-Harlaching.
107. E.g., Munich-Hadern, Altenholz-Klausdorferstrasse.
108. The *Land* average was 30 percent; 1987 census data from Statistisches Amt Schleswig-Holstein.
109. *SüZ*, 3 November 1997; *SZMS*, 30 January, 26 June, 1 October 1997; data from Flüchtlingsamt München.
110. This results in part from the method of case selection used for the cases in this article, which focused on jurisdictions where nonviolent anti-immigration mobilization would be found.
111. *taz*, 11 August 1989, 14 February, 2 March, 10, 13 April, 19 October, 16 November 1992.

112. Interview with Christian Schneider, *Süddeutsche Zeitung* and *Miteinander leben am Westkreuz*, 29 April 1998; Reissl interview (see note 32 above).
113. For a discussion of this sense of democratic responsiveness, see Karapın, *Movements and Democracy* (see note 8 above), ch. 2.
114. ALLBUS 1996 survey, online codebook at www.social-science-geis.de, Question 38 (3). Other survey data showed somewhat less negative attitudes; 41 percent in a 1994 survey said they did not want to have asylum seekers as neighbors (a question requiring a yes-or-no answer) and 34 said they wanted nothing to do with asylum seekers personally in 1995 (data provided by Allensbach Institute).
115. Data from Flüchtlingsamt München; own calculations.
116. ALLBUS 1996 survey (see note 114 above), Question 37 (3).
117. For example, according to Munich-Moosach borough councillor Alexander Reissl (SPD), there were no conflicts between asylum seekers and residents during the first two years in which a shelter operated with high staffing levels in Munich-Moosach (Reissl interview [see note 32 above]); the interview with Schneider (see note 112 above) also supports this point.
118. Manfred Kuechler, "Germans and 'Others'", *German Politics* 3 (1994): 47-74.
119. Koopmans (see note 4 above); Karapın, "Politics of Immigration Control" (see note 8 above), 435-37.
120. *SüZ*, 4 August 1990; *Der Spiegel* 34 (6 August 1990).
121. *FAZ*, 6 June 1986.
122. Perlmutter (see note 7 above), 15-16; *taz*, 9 April 1992.
123. Rühle's letter was re-published in *Die Zeit* on 4 June 1993 (Thranhardt [see note 3 above], 333; Georg Hafner and Edmund Jacoby, eds., *Neue Skandale der Republik* [Reinbek, 1994], 86).
124. Braunthal (see note 7 above), 313-14; Sabine Lemke-Müller and Ingrid Matthäi, "Emanzipatorisches Modell oder Strukturiertes Chaos?" *Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen* 24 (November 1993): 566-87, here 575.
125. *BILD-Zeitung*, 2-3 March 1992; *taz*, 14 February, 7-8 April, 11 May, 4 July 1992.
126. Deutscher Städtetag, press release, 9 August 1992.
127. Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, *Verfassungsschutzbericht* (Bonn, 1991), 75.
128. Karapın, "Politics of Immigration Control," (see note 8 above), 437.
129. Roger Karapın, "Anti-Minority Riots in Unified Germany," *Comparative Politics* 34 (2002): 147-67; *Movements and Democracy* (see note 8 above), ch. 10.
130. Kuechler (see note 118 above), 58; Willems, et al. (see note 8 above), 36; *Die Welt*, 17 September 1992.
131. For a fuller version of this argument, see Karapın, *Movements and Democracy* (see note 8 above), chs. 2, 4.