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Radical-Right and Neo-Fascist Political Parties in Western Europe

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Hans-Georg Betz, Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1994.

Paul Hainsworth, ed., The Extreme Right in Europe and the USA, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1992.

Herbert Kitschelt (in collaboration with Andrew J. McGann), The Radical Right in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis, Ann Arbor, Mich., University of Michigan Press, 1995.

Peter H. Merkl and Leon Weinberg, eds., Encounters with the Contemporary Radical Right, Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1993.

ABSTRACT

Far right-wing parties have gained dramatically in many West European countries since the early 1980s. Recent cross-national studies distinguish between neo-fascist parties, which are anti-democratic and anti-capitalist, and radical right-wing parties which combine anti-immigration appeals with pro-capitalist, neo-liberal economic positions, social conservatism, and a basic acceptance of representative democracy. While the former have been stagnant and unimportant, the latter have been gaining. Yet there are also borderline cases where it is more difficult to determine whether the party rejects fascism and accepts democracy, a problem which the theoretical literature has neglected. The far right's success is largely due to the politicization of immigration issues, political alienation, and backlashes against welfare states.

Introduction

Once thought to represent a set of cleavages established in the 1920s,¹ West European party systems recently have undergone important changes. Beginning in the 1970s, left-libertarian, ecological parties captured small but significant shares of the vote in many countries and helped to define a new dimension of conflict in many party systems. More recently, far right-wing parties have gained dramatically, taking votes from established parties and pressing their issues onto political agendas. Today the most successful of these parties are the Front National in France and the Freedom Party in Austria, but Denmark, Norway, Italy, Belgium, Germany, and Sweden have also seen important challenges by far-right parties. Despite important differences among them, these parties' positions put them in what is commonly understood as the far-right part of the political spectrum. Much more than established parties, they favor law-and-order, tax cuts, and limits on immigration, and oppose policies favored by social-democratic parties (social equality, economic regulation) and by left-libertarian or ecological parties (a multi-cultural society, women's equality, environmental protection).

By the late 1980s, far-right parties were gaining rapidly in many countries, by attacking immigration and drawing voters from both the center-right and center-left parties. Their nationalistic or ethnocentric aspects have come into high relief at a time when efforts at increasing European integration are proceeding apace. This leads to two sets of questions. First, how extreme are these parties' goals? To what extent do they accept the main features of the post-war order in Western Europe -- liberal democratic politics, capitalist market economies, the post-1945 national borders -- and to what extent do they advocate or intend fundamental changes in them? To what extent are they in this sense anti-system, or even "fascist"? Second, why have

many far-right parties recently gained at the polls, while others have failed?

Single-case studies are a good place to start in answering these questions. These studies typically characterize a single national-level far-right party, describe its development, and offer an explanation for its recent success. This literature has offered four different views of the parties' goals and the reasons for their growth.

The first view focuses on immigration.² Immigration into Western Europe increased in the late 1980s and early 1990s, especially from the former Yugoslavia, Eastern Europe, and the former Soviet Union. According to the immigration thesis, the social effects of immigration, along with high levels of economic insecurity, benefitted far-right parties, which argued against immigration on the basis of its supposed connections with unemployment and crime. In this view, these are single-issue parties, which represent popular xenophobia.

The second explanation rests on political alienation.³ Many voters' general dissatisfaction with how established parties have responded to various issues (economic growth, unemployment, corruption, crime, drugs, immigration) has led them to distrust all established parties and politicians. The resulting potential for protest voting has been exploited by the far right, aided by its anti-establishment message and lack of governing experience. The electoral prospects of far-right parties depend inversely on the credibility of established parties and political systems, and does not necessarily signal a deeper movement by voters toward far-right positions on substantive issues.

The third approach, which is most common in the popular press as well as among some academic authors, holds that the far-right parties reflect a resurgence, in somewhat new forms, of interwar fascist movements.⁴ According to the neo-fascist thesis, successful far-right parties

today have organizational or personnel connections to pre-1945 Fascists or Nazis, adopt programs that are similar to fascism, and are attempting to resurrect or create fascist regimes. Hence they use quasi-fascist appeals to play upon the resentments of the present period, such as immigration and unemployment, and try especially to mobilize petty bourgeois support.

To make this argument intelligible requires defining "fascism." The debate over the concept of fascism has shown that important differences exist among supposedly fascist parties and that no definitive set of characteristics will be equally valid in all cases.⁵ For example, the extreme racism of the German National Socialists and the commitment to corporatism by the Italian Fascists are not general features of all fascist parties, although they may distinguish two sub-types.⁶ Nonetheless, a number of features are shared by these two important cases, as well as many others, and these are adequate for defining a group of fascist parties distinct from other families of political parties in twentieth-century Western Europe. Therefore, I define fascist parties as those whose goals focus on national unity against internal and external enemies, empire or national expansion, an authoritarian state, and a highly state-regulated economy which could be either capitalist or socialist. In this conception, fascist parties are also distinguished by their methods of organizing and action, which center on charismatic leadership, mass organizations, close alliances with paramilitary organizations, and violence against political opponents.⁷ Hence "neo-fascist parties" are those which, in the postwar period, have substantially fascist goals and organizing methods.

The fourth view is that the far-right parties react against the ecological, left-libertarian parties and their issues, which became stronger in the 1980s.⁸ According to this view, far-right parties are part of a backlash against the post-materialist, left-libertarian demands associated with

the citizen mobilization of the 1970s and '80s (e.g. feminism, gay rights, environmentalism, multiculturalism, citizen participation) and left-wing ecological parties, which in turn arose because of post-industrial changes in occupational structures and values. Hence the far-right parties mobilize voters on the same issues as the left-libertarians by taking opposing positions.

Scholars recently have completed several cross-national comparative studies of the far right, providing a good opportunity to assess these four approaches and focus attention on some aspects which had been neglected.⁹ Two of these are anthologies. The Extreme Right in Europe and the USA, edited by Paul Hainsworth¹⁰ and Encounters with the Contemporary Radical Right, edited by Peter H. Merkl and Leonard Weinberg,¹¹ are useful references on the nature of post-war, far-right parties in a broad range of countries. They are largely descriptive in intent and format, although individual chapters often suggest explanations of the success or failure of particular parties and the introductions to both books provide generalizations. Both of these books survey a number of European countries, focusing on the most successful far-right parties in each and also including cases of electorally unsuccessful parties.

The other two books, Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe by Hans-Georg Betz¹² and The Radical Right in Western Europe by Herbert Kitschelt (with Anthony J. McGann),¹³ offer general theories of the recent rise of far-right parties backed with evidence from a variety of country studies, although Kitschelt's book relies more heavily on several cross-national data sets. Although they differ in detail and emphasis, Betz and Kitschelt provide similar and complementary theories of the rise of far-right parties. They reject the neo-fascist explanation, draw on the immigration and alienation theses with qualifications, and focus on the political responses to social changes. These books make significant conceptual and theoretical

contributions, which will probably serve as reference points for the next decade of research into this phenomenon.

Taken together, this work leads to two main conclusions about far-right parties. First, their success is inversely related to their proximity to neo-fascist groups or parties. Western Europe has not experienced an upsurge in neo-fascism, but rather the growth of a new kind, or new kinds, of radical right-wing parties. Second, the causes of the far-right parties lie in the responses of both established and challenging political parties to social and political-economic changes which have altered the conditions of electoral competition.¹⁴ More specifically, these causes include: the breakdown of traditional cleavages and the rise of issue voting; the crisis of the welfare state; the perceived failure of established parties to resolve major problems such as unemployment, corruption, crime, and immigration; increased political alienation; the appeals made by the far-right parties; and the failure of the mainstream parties to adapt.

A new, democratic radical right, or a revival of old right-wing extremism?

What distinguishes the goals of far-right parties? Three of these books (all but Encounters) agree that the parties are characterized by nationalism on immigration issues and neo-liberalism on economics. Beyond that, these works have important disagreements and sometimes define the phenomenon too broadly. By defining far-right parties in Western Europe as a single phenomenon, which includes neo-fascist parties or factions together with parties which accept democracy, markets, and existing national borders, the two anthologies do not address systematically the relation between these parties and the established system. Indeed, they may contribute to the common tendency to see all far-right parties as part of the revival of a

fascist movement.¹⁵

In his introduction to Encounters, Weinberg characterizes these parties as "radical right," but the case studies in the book are more heterogeneous than the concept suggests (a problem shared by Hainsworth's The Extreme Right); several cases do not fit the concept at all. A key part of Weinberg's definition is "radical"; by this is meant that the parties use "dirty tricks" or violence rather than playing by the rules of the democratic game, are unwilling to compromise on their goals, and harbor "a desire to shut down the democratic enterprise."¹⁶

However, of the significant contemporary West European parties included in Encounters, only one is anti-democratic (the British National Front), one accepts democracy (the French Front National), and the other two are borderline cases. For example, the Front National calls for stronger authority but does not oppose the Fifth Republic; Safran, in accord with other authors, concludes that this party supports neo-liberal economic policies "within the existing political system," along with the strengthening of existing social hierarchies such as traditional families.¹⁷

By contrast, the National Front in Britain is a far-right party which clearly did not accept the liberal democratic order. While this party's public face emphasized immigration problems, and compulsory repatriation of non-whites was its main plank, the inner core of the party favored a National Socialist dictatorship like Hitler's Third Reich. Indeed, the National Front's leaders John Tyndall and Martin Webster broke from the British National Party in the 1960s because, although they supported Nazism, they advocated "a covert approach, stressing British roots" in order to gain popular support.¹⁸

Assessing other far-right parties on the question of democracy is more complex, and perhaps nowhere more so than in Germany. Ekkart Zimmermann and Thomas Saalfeld analyze

three German cases, including anti-democratic parties such as the Socialist Reich Party of the early 1950s and the National Democratic Party, whose support peaked in the late 1960s at 5-10% of the vote in many states and just under 5% at the national level. These parties were mainly composed of former Nazi party members and advocated important parts of the Nazi program, including (in the case of the Reich Party) the centralization of power in a national leader and a corporate parliament.

Determining positions on democracy is made difficult by the fact that parties which overtly oppose parliamentary democracy are likely to be banned by the German Constitutional Court, a fate which befell the Socialist Reich Party and was evaded by the National Democratic Party only through its lip service in support of the Basic Law. Therefore, party positions concerning the Nazi regime and Nazi organizations are probably the best evidence of German far-right parties' orientations toward democracy. By that standard, the Republicans, the third party in Zimmermann and Saalfeld's chapter, are on the borderline between rejection and acceptance of democracy. The Republicans' relatively moderate wing, which was led until the early 1990s by the former Waffen SS officer Franz Schönhuber, presented the Republicans as a pro-system party and opposed ties to parties which contain many neo-Nazis, but at the same time the Republicans sought to rehabilitate the Nazi regime's image and to reopen questions about eastern territory lost in World War II.¹⁹

The Italian Social Movement (since the early 1990s renamed the National Alliance) is another borderline case. The party is the successor to Mussolini's Fascist Party, but has undergone divisive conflicts between pro-system and anti-system factions and increasingly has supported democracy.²⁰ The Italian Social Movement supported the Christian Democratic

government against communism in the 1950s, formally decided to accept democracy in 1969, and vacillated between fundamental opposition and support for the mainstream parties in the 1980s in order to buttress the Socialist against the Communist Party.²¹ At the same time, the presence of many neo-fascist cadre and persistence of fascist ideological traditions in the Italian Social Movement makes it difficult to consider the party pro-system.

Radical-right vs. neo-fascist parties The diversity of the far-right parties raises the question of their relation to fascism, which can best be answered by distinguishing the far-right parties of contemporary Western Europe according to two ideal types. First, "neo-fascist parties" have fascist programs, methods, and organizational ties as defined earlier. Second, "radical right-wing parties" call for stronger authority while accepting liberal representative democracy, oppose immigration and immigrants while accepting existing national borders, and embrace market economics to a much greater extent than parties of government.²²

It is true that much about the radical-right parties -- their nationalist criticism of ethnic minorities, populist attacks on the political class, and advocacy of stronger authority -- resembles the appeals of fascist parties. But the differences between the radical-right and fascist parties are even larger than the similarities. The radical right's nationalism is focused narrowly on issues related to immigrants and usually does not include border issues, except for regionalist parties like the Northern League and Flemish Bloc, which advocate fragmenting rather than expanding their nations. Their authoritarianism is mild, calling for modifying existing democratic systems through centralization and stronger leadership rather than fundamental constitutional change. Furthermore, in the clearest departure from fascist parties, their economic programs are in most

cases strongly neo-liberal, attacking the welfare state and favoring individual economic freedom.

Finally, the far-right parties are organized as "framework parties," with very strong leaders (Le Pen, Haider, Bossi, Schönhuber, etc.) and centralized organizations, but minimal member participation and a nearly exclusive focus on electoral campaigns.

Since both neo-fascist and radical-right parties have focused on immigration and related issues in recent years, they have often been conflated; moreover, there are also mixed or borderline cases. But as Kitschelt and Betz both argue, the radical-right parties represent a new and distinct synthesis of right-wing ideas and practices. This combination of appeals is exceptional and important not only because it is novel in post-war Western Europe, but also because it has the potential to build a cross-class alliance between entrepreneurs and the working class. That potential, of course, brings to mind the efforts of interwar fascist parties to do something similar, but this resemblance does not by itself obviate the distinctive nature of the radical right.

Types of radical-right parties While the radical-right parties are distinct from neo-fascist and mainstream conservative parties, there are also important differences between them. For example, some parties advocate regional interests (e.g. the Northern League, the Flemish Bloc) while most are nationalist; some are not strongly xenophobic (e.g. the Northern League), while others are not especially neo-liberal (e.g. the Republicans). To address this problem, Kitschelt has created a typology which is useful for understanding differences in the parties' social bases and success as well as their programmatic appeals, in which there are three ideal types of radical right-wing parties: "new-radical-right," "populist anti-statist," and "welfare-chauvinist" parties.²³

These differ on two basic dimensions: neo-liberalism; and xenophobia combined with authoritarianism. "Authoritarian" in this context means favoring stronger authority for political and social institutions, though not necessarily opposing competitive party democracy; here I will use it interchangeably with "socially conservative" and "law-and-order." The new-radical-right parties, which, according to Kitschelt, are found in France, Denmark, Norway, and perhaps Belgium, are neo-liberal on economics, and socially conservative and xenophobic on political and cultural issues. Thus they form an antipode to the left-libertarian ecological parties, which promote a multi-cultural society, individual self-expression and citizen participation, and social solidarity through government regulation and redistribution. By contrast, populist anti-statist parties, found in Austria and Northern Italy, are economically neo-liberal but not very xenophobic or socially conservative. Finally, welfare-chauvinist parties, e.g. in Germany, are socially conservative, culturally xenophobic, and strongly nationalist (hence the term "chauvinist"), but defend welfare programs rather than advocating neo-liberalism.

The method by which this typology was constructed and tested results in some drawbacks

as well as advantages. It is derived mainly from factor analyses using the 1990 World Values Survey, which asked voters twenty issue questions, making it a uniform data source for all advanced industrial countries. The answers to those questions are taken as indicators of the parties' appeals to voters; hence, unlike the other works reviewed here, Kitschelt treats the far-right parties primarily as parties-in-the-electorate rather than party organizations or groups of leaders. This method helps to make the link from party to voters but it tends to leave the content of party programs or ideology and the intentions of leaders and activists unexplored. Further, reliance on the World Values Survey limits the analysis in certain ways: to the issue areas tapped by the questions included in the survey; to voter attitudes on set questions rather than the salience of the issues to them; and to a snapshot of conditions in 1990 rather than over a longer period.

For Kitschelt, as for many of the radical-right parties in Western Europe, the French Front National is an exemplary case, not only because of its dramatic electoral success but because of its virulent combination of political appeals. Indeed, the Front National embraced neo-liberalism by 1981, calling for lower taxes, less state intervention, and a major reduction in state bureaucracy, and the party's anti-immigrant positions and racism became prominent in the early 1980s. In its policy on European integration, where market economics and nationalism are generally in conflict, the Front National compromises by accepting the European Union but demanding "a Europe of the nations," on a federal basis rather than via supranational authorities.²⁴ Although it accepts the political system of the Fifth Republic, the party tends toward socially conservative positions, opposing abortion and feminism (though it favors family allowances and a maternal wage), and favoring a strong state, including the death penalty. Authoritarianism or social conservatism in the new-radical-right parties complement free-market

economics; both the traditional family and the market should encourage individuals to work hard and subordinate their personal desires. Self-employed people and blue-collar workers are represented disproportionately in the Front National's electorate, as are men and those with less education, all groups which are relatively neo-liberal or xenophobic or both.²⁵

It is not clear, however, if any parties other than the Front National, such as the Danish and Norwegian Progress Parties, fit the new-radical-right type. Kitschelt's multi-variate analysis of Danish Progress Party support shows that market liberalism and authoritarianism are both significant factors, although racism is the strongest factor in the analysis, and that no traces of libertarianism can be found; the Danish Progress Party's voters tended to respect authority and reject participation in demonstrations, women's rights, and postmaterialist values, though not to a greater extent than Conservative voters.²⁶ Yet among the questions used to construct the neo-liberalism factor reveals, there were no questions on social spending.²⁷

Others find that the Danish Progress Party and its voters on balance supported the welfare state.²⁸ Although the Progress Party proposed tax cuts, they were intended for the lower, not the upper, strata; in parliament, the Danish Progress Party helped to pass government budgets maintaining social programs which favored lower-income groups while reducing their tax burdens in 1989 and 1990.²⁹ Support for social spending seems relatively firm in Denmark, even among radical-right voters who prefer less state and more market competition in other areas. On other issues, too, the Danish Progress Party does not seem to fit the new-radical-right type. Eurobarometer data shows its voters are also much more accepting of democracy and value liberty no less than the supporters of other parties, and much more than far-right voters in France, Germany, and Italy.³⁰ The upshot is that if data other than the World Values Survey are

considered, the degree to which the Danish Progress Party could be characterized as neo-liberal and/or socially conservative is open to question.

Although law-and-order and xenophobic positions have been important to the radical right, not all of these parties rely on them. The Italian Northern League and the Austrian Freedom Party break from the new-radical-right model in important respects and can be classified as populist anti-statist parties. While, as Betz stresses, all radical-right parties are populist in the sense of attacking the political class, the Austrian and northern Italian far-right parties rely largely on populist appeals such as opposing state bureaucracy. The Northern League's program and voters emphasize anti-corruption and pro-efficiency measures and call for privatization of state enterprises; the party benefits mainly from a negative coalition against the established parties and their practices of public-sector patronage. Populist anti-statist parties are not strongly socially conservative, and do not strongly or consistently oppose left-libertarian positions. Thus, while xenophobia has been crucial to many other radical right-wing parties, and recently has become more important to the Austrian Freedom Party, the Northern League used the issue only until about 1992 and then mainly as part of attacks on national political elites. The Northern League's reliance on broad anti-statist appeals attract a broad electorate, in which no occupational groups are strongly overrepresented.³¹

Welfare-chauvinist parties represent still a third sub-type of radical-right party, somewhat closer to neo-fascist parties; the Republicans in Germany form the only obvious major example. Welfare-chauvinist parties make socially conservative and racist appeals to voters, but depart from other radical-right parties in defending the welfare state -- although, of course, immigrants are to be excluded from welfare-state protection.

Their combination of appeals makes them more similar to neo-fascist parties than the other radical-right parties are, but are welfare-chauvinist parties actually neo-fascist? The Republicans occupy a gray area between radical and neo-fascist parties, although any assessments of proximity to neo-fascism are difficult and apt to be controversial. Their activists are divided between radical and pro-Nazi wings, resulting in compromises and contradictions within and between the parties' programs and speeches. Their nationalism verges on being anti-system, since they want Germany restored to the borders of 1937, though that presumably would mean breaches of international treaties and war. Like more overtly neo-Nazi parties in Germany, the Republicans subtly attempt to defend the Nazi regime, e.g. by using National Socialist terms such as "deutsches Volk" and "Lebensraum." On the other hand, they take a compromise position on European integration similar to that of the Front National. The Republicans have also verged on opposition to the present democratic system; their 1987 program attacked pluralism and called for subordinating group interests to the national interest, e.g. by restricting labor unions and putting the mass media under the control of new public authorities. In the early 1990s, their racism and anti-semitism, especially in campaign speeches and advertising, was obvious enough -- for example, referring to the main Jewish interest group in Germany as "the fifth occupying power" -- to trigger nationwide surveillance by the Germany's Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution.³²

Explaining far-right party success

While far-right parties have gained dramatically in many West European countries since the 1980s, there have been important differences in their levels of success (see Table 1). The

most successful have been the Front National in France and the Freedom Party in Austria, which averaged 11-16% in national parliamentary elections during 1980-95. Next come a group of relatively successful parties, which have gained 6-9% of the national vote. This group clearly includes parties in Italy, Denmark, and Norway. The third group, of marginally successful parties, has averaged 2-4% of the vote and includes cases which are difficult to classify. The Swiss Automobilists Party (an anti-environmental party) and the Flemish Bloc struggled in the mid-1980s (and hence averaged only 4% for the 1980-95 period), but they may have moved into the relatively successful group with their strong showings (5-8%) in the early 1990s. The Swedish New Democracy has campaigned only since 1991 and has been erratic, as have the Republicans; they reached a 7.1% peak in the 1989 European elections, then struggled around 2% in national elections in 1990 and 1994, yet have scored high and stable results (9-11%) in the populous region of Baden-Württemberg in the 1990s. Finally, and by contrast, far-right parties in Britain and the Netherlands have been unsuccessful, with the British National Front and the Dutch Center Democrats averaging less than 1% of the national vote. All of the successful parties gained their first significant levels of support during the 1980s or '90s, except the Italian Social Movement (which was strong in the 1950s) and the two Progress Parties (which arose in the early 1970s, declined in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and then resurged in the late 1980s).³³

-- Table 1 about here --

Table 1: Electoral Support for Far-Right Parties in National-Level Parliamentary Elections in Western Europe, 1980-1995³⁴

Country	Party	Average support 1980-95	Peak support post-1970	Year of peak	First year at 5%
<u>MOST SUCCESSFUL:</u>					
Austria	Freedom Party	16.1% 21.9%	1995	1986	
France	Front National	10.7	12.7	1993	1986
<u>RELATIVELY SUCCESSFUL:</u>					
Italy	Northern League	8.6	8.7	1992	1992
Norway	Progress Party	6.8	13.0	1989	1973 & 1989
Denmark	Progress Party	6.5	9.0	1988	1973 & 1988
Italy	Italian Social Movement/ National Alliance	5.9	6.8 & 13.5	1983 & 1994	1953
<u>MARGINALLY SUCCESSFUL:</u>					
Sweden	New Democracy	4.0	6.7	1991	1991
Switzerland	Automobilists' Party	3.9	5.1	1991	1991
Belgium	Flemish Bloc	3.8	7.8	1995	1991
Germany	Republicans	2.0	2.1	1990	----
<u>UNSUCCESSFUL:</u>					
Netherlands	Center Party/ Center Democrats	1.0	2.5	1984	----
Britain	National Front	< 1.0	0.6	1979	----

All results are popular vote shares in those national parliamentary elections which were contested by the party through December 1995; presidential and European Parliamentary elections are excluded. Average figures for the Italian Social Movement and the Center Party cover only 1980-92.

Why have radical-right parties gain at the polls since the early 1980s? Why have they been more successful in some countries than in others? Besides the four hypotheses mentioned earlier, below I will assess four additional explanations proposed by Betz and Kitschelt. First, there have been important changes in the context of West European politics in the last thirty years. Increased international economic competition and the crisis of the welfare state have made left-right issues salient and neo-liberal positions attractive, especially for workers and employees in the private sector and for self-employed people.³⁵ Moreover, changes in occupational structures and communications due to the transition from industrial to post-industrial society have undermined traditional political cleavages as well as increased voters' general disaffection from established parties.³⁶ Second, where mainstream parties have converged on economic issues, far-right parties have opportunities to recruit voters via strongly neo-liberal positions.³⁷

Third, the far-right parties must adopt optimal appeals if they are to take advantage of the opportunities which the mainstream parties afford them. Since the far-right parties draw on diverse, cross-class social bases, they require diverse appeals (usually neo-liberalism plus nationalism and authoritarianism) in order to do so successfully.³⁸ Parties which fail to adopt neo-liberal positions, because of their ideological commitments or organizational connections with neo-fascists, will sacrifice votes. Fourth, the specific mix of appeals which is optimal for a radical-right party depends on its political context. When partyocracies, which Kitschelt defines as "the fusion of state, party, and economic elites in politico-economic networks characterized by patronage, clientelism, and corruption," fall into crisis, challenging parties do best if they use a diffuse anti-establishment message rather than authoritarianism or xenophobia.³⁹

The crisis of the welfare state The welfare-state thesis receives support not only because of the importance of neo-liberal appeals and the timing of the far right's recent success, but also from cross-national correlations. Where there is no large welfare state, there has been no major backlash against the welfare state, and so there is no potential demand for neo-liberalism to the right of the center-right parties. For example, in countries where economies are not post-industrial and large welfare states do not exist (e.g. Spain, Portugal, Greece, Ireland), radical-right parties are not at all successful.⁴⁰ In multivariate regressions, Swank and Betz also find that per capita GDP are predictors of far-right voting success.⁴¹ Similarly, Taggart has found moderate correlations between far-right party voting and indicators of welfare-state decommodification.⁴²

The political construction of immigration issues There is a link between immigration and far-right parties' success, but it is an indirect one. Hence, two qualifications of the immigration thesis are necessary. First, radical-right parties did not begin to succeed in the 1980s until they discovered that concerns about immigration could benefit them at the polls. The immigration issue was not simply made by the fact of ethnic diversity or immigrant influxes, but could only arise and benefit a far-right party if that party could dominate the construction of the issue. This occurred much earlier (1983) in France than in other countries which faced similar objective problems with immigration, such as Germany. Second, immigration and other issues appealing to xenophobia are only part of a larger package of policies in which neo-liberal economic policies are typically key ingredients. Indeed, overreliance on the immigration issue and neglect of other issues, especially neo-liberalism, has hampered far-right parties in Britain and Germany.

Immigration to Western Europe, initially from Asia and Africa and then from Eastern

Europe and the former Soviet Union, increased sharply during the mid-1980s, a trend which continued after the collapse of communism in eastern Europe led to economic crisis and civil conflict in several countries. Betz argues that this immigration -- against a background of rapid social change and economic insecurity -- has spurred increased xenophobia, and, in turn, xenophobes became strong supporters of the far right.⁴³

In fact, the first of these links is supported by opinion surveys. During 1989-91, there was a sharp increase, from about 45% to about 60%, in most West European countries in the number of respondents agreeing with the statement that there are "too many foreigners" in their country.⁴⁴ Moreover, the shares of non-EU populations correlate highly with levels of xenophobia across West European countries.⁴⁵ But the link between xenophobia and far-right party success is much less clear. There is little correlation between far-right-wing voting and either popular xenophobia or immigrant shares.⁴⁶ For example, far-right parties have done better in some countries with low shares of foreign-born population (Italy, Austria, Denmark, Norway) than in some countries with relatively many foreigners (Germany, Britain).

In part, this is because even where xenophobia is high, overreliance on immigration issues is not a reliable basis for building a far-right party, as seen by the case of the Republicans. On issues of immigration and competition for housing and jobs, and only on these, the Republicans' voters had more confidence in their party than in the other parties in 1989, showing the party's heavy reliance on the issue.⁴⁷ Moreover, Republicans' voters are distinguished from Christian-Democratic voters mainly in their responses to questions concerning their acceptance of a neighbor of a different race or nationality, or whether members of their own nationality should have priority in the labor market. The Republicans, like their predecessors on the far right in Germany, gained

dramatically when they enjoyed something like a monopoly on these issues.

But the party was vulnerable to changes in the salience of immigration issues and the other parties' credibility on them. After its 1989 surge in support (which occurred only several months before the Berlin Wall was breached), Chancellor Kohl's leadership of German reunification left the Republicans unable to regain the offensive, even though the party had strongly promoted reunification in the mid-1980s. The Republicans rose again in state-level elections in 1992, during a crisis concerning Germany's relatively liberal right to asylum, but declined once more in the 1994 national elections, after the major parties had adopted a constitutional amendment to restrict the asylum right the previous year.

Fascist legacies and far-right party strategies

The neo-fascist explanation of the far-right parties' success can be almost completely rejected. There is widespread agreement that radical parties have been much stronger and dynamic than parties which are closer to fascist legacies.⁴⁸ Parties with neo-fascist elements (the Republicans, the National Front, and the Italian Social Movement) are relatively unsuccessful electorally; the Republicans failed to get over 2% nationally after 1989, and the National Front got a negligible vote share after 1979. Conversely, the greatest successes of far-right parties, in France and Austria since the 1980s and in Denmark and Norway in the 1970s, were linked to strong neo-liberal elements in their parties' programs and appeals to voters. The main exception to this correlation is the Italian Social Movement, but that party was in decline during the 1980s and gained in 1994 only because the center-right and center-left parties collapsed in the wake of massive scandals and prosecutions of party leaders for corruption.

Indeed, organizational and ideological continuities with fascist parties have inhibited the success of far-right parties. The Republicans could not take neo-liberal positions because, as Kitschelt argues, Germany's small but virulent network of neo-Nazi sects and clubs interfered with vote-maximization. Whenever a far-right party has gained votes in postwar Germany, neo-Nazi militants are attracted to the party, not least because of the strong chances of gaining local offices in the decentralized governmental system. The new activists pull the party toward neo-fascist positions and spoil its reputation among prospective voters. This process befell the briefly successful National Democrats in the 1960s and also the Republicans after its striking gains in 1989.⁴⁹ As militants joined, power struggles ensued and party leaders could not keep the party on a radical rather than neo-fascist course. Neo-Nazi militants had at first supported Franz Schönhuber's takeover of the Republicans leadership in 1985, soon after he had published the memoirs of his experiences as an SS officer, but later Schönhuber was cast in the role of trying to hold together moderate and neo-Nazi factions; evicted as the Republicans leader by neo-fascists in 1990, he returned to his old position later that year⁵⁰ but was ousted again in 1994. The Republicans' intraparty conflicts clearly hurt the party at the polls, and the specter of neo-Nazism within its ranks has limited its potential support.

Similarly, the Italian Social Movement's explicit links to fascism have made it difficult for the party to gain far-right, neo-liberal voters like the Northern League has. Even though this party's voters responded to its use of neo-liberal appeals in 1990, the party's electoral strength was still stagnant. Apparently, the Italian Social Movement's neo-fascist reputation made it difficult for the party to credibly assert neo-liberal positions.⁵¹

While neo-fascism is reliably linked with electoral failure, there is at least one exception

which suggests that the potential for anti-system and even neo-fascist parties depends on the salience of nationalist issues in West European countries. The Flemish Bloc in Belgium makes regionalist, xenophobic, anti-welfare-state, and anti-gay and anti-abortion appeals.⁵² In these ways, it fits the new-radical-right type. However, the party also has important connections to the neo-fascist right in Flanders, which originated in groups which collaborated enthusiastically with the Nazi occupation during World War II. When the neo-fascist paramilitary group Flemish Order of Militants, which had strong international contacts with neo-Nazis, was banned in 1983, some of its members went to the Flemish Bloc, where they may have helped move the party toward anti-immigrant positions.⁵³ The Flemish Bloc has made overt appeals to neo-Nazis by calling for an unconditional amnesty for Nazi collaborators, and its leader has expressed nostalgia for the Nazi occupation.⁵⁴

Furthermore, many the Flemish Bloc's nationalist statements verge on anti-system positions. In the 1990s, the party's main campaign issues have been extremely nationalist: calls for an independent Flemish state with its capital in Brussels; the slogan "Our own people first," and calls to deport immigrants. The party also calls for recovering lost Flemish territory and bringing together all Flemish people in one independent state. Yet the importance of extreme nationalist issues to the party's recent gains is difficult to assess. The party's voters are attracted mainly by its anti-immigrant message, which is prominent in its campaign literature; 66% of its voters said that the immigration issue was the main reason they voted for the Flemish Bloc.⁵⁵

Despite the Flemish Bloc's neo-fascist ties and pro-welfare-state positions, the party does not fit the pattern of marginal success which most scholars predict for such parties. The Flemish Bloc is at least a relatively successful far-right party, gaining about 6% of the national vote in 1991

and 1994, after struggling in the 1980s, and with 10-12% of the vote in the Flanders region.

What might account for the Flemish Bloc's greater success compared with the Republicans? The economic crisis has been unusually long and severe in Belgium, the country's linguistic divisions have remained major sources of potential conflict, and political elites tried to accommodate those divisions via constitutional reforms in the 1980s which actually gave new resources to Flemish nationalists.⁵⁶ This suggests an unsettling conclusion: if mainstream parties allow nationalist issues to become polarized enough, anti-system and even neo-fascist parties might do much better at the polls than they have in most West European countries in the post-war period.

Political alienation Clearly, increased political alienation is not the entire explanation for far-right success. Far-right parties make more specific campaign appeals and attract voters with more distinct ideological profiles -- neo-liberal, socially conservative and xenophobic, or both -- than would be expected if they were purely protest parties. But does political alienation play a role in far-right voting? Voters who say they are dissatisfied with politics are more likely than other voters to endorse far-right parties.⁵⁷ Yet this strong association between distrust and far-right voting leaves open the question of causation. Since the parties put out a "distrust" message, voters may have chosen to vote for the far right for other reasons (e.g. neo-liberalism, racism) and then have answered political-trust questions in ways which conform to the parties' positions.

Evidence at the cross-national level, however, also suggests that increased alienation has played a role. Various measures of general political alienation -- such as disbelief that politicians are interested in citizens' opinions, disbelief that politicians care about people, distrust in

parliament, dissatisfaction with democracy, declines in party membership, weakening party identifications, and falling voting turnout -- show that some countries have experienced major increases in alienation since 1975 while others have not. France and Sweden had experienced clear declines in political trust by 1990, while Germany and Italy experienced sharp crises in the early 1990s.⁵⁸ On the other hand, Norway, Denmark, Belgium, Britain, and the Netherlands did not have clear declines in political confidence after 1975, at least through 1990. The first group of countries, those with strongly increasing political alienation, has averaged much lower levels of far-right voting than the second group.⁵⁹ Moreover, most of the anomalies are easily explained. Germany had rising political alienation yet weak far-right voting, because the Republicans did not capitalize by adopting neo-liberal positions. Denmark and Norway had increases in far-right voting despite mostly stable levels of political alienation in the 1980s, but in both cases, political alienation had risen sharply to high levels in the early 1970s, when it was associated with a major increase in voting for the Progress Parties.

Mainstream party strategies and crises in partyocracies Political alienation is also related to the degree of convergence between the major left- and right-wing parties of government on economic issues.⁶⁰ This accords with one of Kitschelt's main arguments: that convergence among the major conservative and left-wing parties is necessary before a far-right party can use radical neo-liberal agenda to attract many voters. Indeed, there is a strong correlation between mainstream party convergence and far-right party success.⁶¹ Where mainstream parties have advanced neo-liberal policies (e.g. Britain, the Netherlands), the far right has done poorly.

The Front National has been particularly adept at exploiting the mainstream parties'

convergence and loss of credibility, initially through by using secondary, low-stakes elections to gain media attention. In the mid-1970s, the conservative government of Giscard d'Estaing moved to the center, as did the Socialist Party in 1983, soon after it had finally become the party of government. Moreover, in the 1980s, the center-right was increasingly fragmented and its neo-liberal wing was led by Chirac, a leader identified with the statist policies of the Gaullist party. Hence the mainstream parties lacked credibility on neo-liberal economic issues and the Front National was able to step into a gap. A strong result for the Front National in the first round of the Dreux municipal elections in 1983 was followed by a successful electoral pact with the center-right parties for the second round and then a national debate among conservatives about whether to ally with the radical anti-immigrant party. This debate boosted the popularity of the Front National, even though the ultimate result was that the established parties usually did not join forces with the Front National. The Front National's vote took off in the 1984 European Parliamentary elections and the 1986 Assembly elections.

Kitschelt also illuminates far-right voting in cases of great political alienation and mainstream party convergence, where countries have been governed by "partyocracies." As education levels have risen, middle-class, white collar voters have demanded political participation and transparent government; their demands, together with the extraordinary degree of left-right convergence by mainstream parties in Austria and Italy and the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, have led to a crisis of confidence in these partyocracies. In such cases, far-right parties can attract a broad cross-section of voters with appeals to anti-statist attitudes, and hence the far right does better if it tones down its xenophobic and authoritarian messages, which tend to alienate centrist voters.

For example, the Northern League did quite well at the polls without relying much on anti-immigrant appeals because it benefitted from widespread attacks on the Italian patronage system in the late 1980s. In this environment, the Northern League did well in regional elections in 1989. This gained the party much publicity, which, although largely negative, linked the party to its main issue of opposing corruption.⁶² Poised for success, the Northern League experimented with a mix of issues. Initially it used xenophobia, targeted at southern Italian migrants, as a way of criticizing the political establishment; after the 1991 elections, the party began to drop its xenophobic appeals but continued its success.⁶³

Anti-left-libertarianism The final thesis of the single-case literature, of a backlash against left-libertarian parties, has received little attention. Yet the thesis has been supported in several ways. It is consistent with the argument that the new right-authoritarian parties help to define an axis of political conflict between themselves and left-libertarians.⁶⁴ Moreover, there is a strong cross-national correlation between left-libertarian and radical-right parties. Further, in all cases except France and Finland the ecological parties preceded the radical right. In the outlier cases, or where a long lag has intervened between the emergence of the two opposing parties, it can be explained in terms of the strongly neo-liberal positions of mainstream parties (e.g. in Sweden, the Netherlands) or the integrative capacities of left-center parties (e.g. in France).⁶⁵

The relation of right-wing nationalism and authoritarianism to left-libertarianism deserves more study. In the cases where both movements are strong or weak, do the two movements tend to develop in parallel simply because they are shaped by the same party systems, welfare states, and post-industrial occupational structures? Or have the far-right parties reacted directly to the left-

libertarian parties and political agenda, as Minkenberg suggests?⁶⁶ Do the ecological and radical-right parties address similar issues in each country? Does the radical right directly attack the left-libertarian parties or movements, or rather the mainstream parties for making policy concessions to the libertarian left?

Conclusions

Radical-right parties are likely to remain political factors past the turn of this century. Continued economic insecurity in a context where foreign residents are a fixture and women's rights and environmental protection have influential advocates will likely continue to lead to resentment and occasional races to find scapegoats, races which may be won by far-right parties as often as by the mainstream parties. Should the perceived failures of the political establishment continue cumulating, disaffection from all political parties will remain at high or even rising levels, providing opportunities for all kinds of outsider parties. Most far-right parties are not dependent on the immigration issue and hence cannot be permanently undercut by the maneuvering of mainstream parties on it. Even if their current issues should fade or be captured by the established parties, the continued presence of left-libertarian groups, parties, and issues in most West European countries might provide new targets to vilify. As long as most voters are moderates, the mainstream parties will have strong incentives to remain centrist and leave their fringe voters to the far right.

Yet the continued success of far-right parties is not inevitable, since favorable structural conditions are necessary but not sufficient for their success. Political interactions between the far-right parties and the established parties, and even between factions within the far right, influence

their prospects, at times decisively. Where they benefit from a current revulsion against partyocracies, as in Italy, they may not survive the political establishments against which they rebel. Where they ride the immigration issue, they risk being repeatedly outmaneuvered by the mainstream parties. Where fascist parties were strong in the interwar period, they risk being swamped today by neo-fascist activists who interfere with vote-maximization. And if they continue to be successful and gain an aura of respectability, they may be invited to join in government, which would rob them of their apparent innocence and might require skillful leadership to avoid destructive conflicts between neo-liberal and authoritarian representatives of these parties' diverse electoral bases. Since they operate in democratic societies, the far-right parties have a degree of internal democracy, which together with diverse activist bases can result in sharp internal conflicts when a party is unsuccessful, like the British National Front, or when its successes create spoils in the form of party finances and public offices, like the German Republicans.⁶⁷

In general, the nature of contemporary electorates seems to dictate that far-right parties' electorally optimal position between the center-right parties and anti-system positions. But this pattern suggests potential dangers for democracy, too. Parties like the Front National, the Republicans, and Flemish Bloc, even if themselves "merely" radical, seek radical policy changes which go some distance -- how far has not been adequately and dispassionately studied -- toward extreme nationalist and authoritarian agendas. If the overall background conditions for politics should change dramatically, e.g. via economic crisis or regional war, the far right could become a much more effective conduit for the transmission of anti-system ideas and political forces into the political mainstream. Hence especially the borderline cases such as the Flemish Bloc call for

further analysis of the nature of the parties and the causes of their success. To understand better the nature of the far-right parties, further research should employ sharp conceptual tools and a variety of approaches in order to focus on the extent to which these parties accept or reject democracy, market capitalism, and the existing state system. A greater variety of indicators and data sources would also help in assessing the parties' likely trajectories, especially where activists' commitments diverge from the appeals to which voters are responding. The party as an organization of activists as well as the party-in-the electorate need to be examined, and the two need to be related to each other.

Finally, the works reviewed here suggest that the process of issue definition, e.g. regarding immigration and citizenship policies, should be investigated dynamically. Since large numbers of foreigners will certainly remain in Western Europe, far-right parties will have chances to raise issues related to them and to benefit from doing so. The interactions among parties and voters, and between factions within far-right and mainstream-right parties, could be analyzed. What does it take for a party to gain credibility as the organization most trusted to solve a public problem, or, inversely to discredit the governing parties on an issue? Do timing and tactics affect whether a far-right party or mainstream party wins this contest? How is such credibility, or distrust, reproduced, and for how long? Does it make much of a difference for public policy if mainstream parties succeed in coopting such issues (as in Britain and Germany) instead of playing catch-up (as in France)? Can counter-mobilization by pro-immigrant groups and multi-cultural policies by government inhibit and not just spur xenophobic voting? These questions, along with the conceptual and methodological tools suggested here, might be profitably applied especially to the cases, like the Republicans, the Flemish Bloc, and the Italian National Alliance, where parties

which stand closer to neo-fascism have had some success, in order to explore the current limits of far right-wing politics in Western Europe.

NOTES

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1. Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments," in idem., eds., Party Systems and Voter Alignments (New York: Free Press, 1967), pp. 1-64.

2. For example, see Christopher Husbands, "The Other Face of 1992: The Extreme-Right Explosion in Western Europe," Parliamentary Affairs 45, 3 (July 1992), pp. 267-84; Peter Fysh and Jim Wolfreys, "Le Pen, the National Front and the Extreme Right in France," Parliamentary Affairs 45, 3 (July 1992), pp. 309-26, esp. p. 313; Paul Furlong, "The Extreme Right in Italy: Old Orders and Dangerous Novelties," Parliamentary Affairs 45, 3 (July 1992), pp. 345-56, esp. p. 355; David Arter, "Black Faces in the Blond Crowd: Populist Racialism in Scandinavia," Parliamentary Affairs 45, 3 (July 1992), pp. 357-72; Gerrit Voerman and Paul Lucardie, "The Extreme Right in the Netherlands: The Centrists and Their Radical Rivals," European Journal of Political Research 22, 1 (July 1992), pp. 35-54, esp. pp. 48, 51; Piero Ignazi, "The Silent Counter-Revolution: Hypotheses on the Emergence of Extreme Right-Wing Parties in Europe," European Journal of Political Research 22, 1 (July 1992), pp. 3-34.

3. Work which develops this argument includes: Dieter Roth, "Volkparteien in Crisis? The Electoral Success of the Extreme Right in context -- The Case of Baden-Württemberg" German Politics 2, 1 (April 1993), 1-20, esp. pp. 3, 12-14; Bettina Westle and Oskar Neidermayer, "Contemporary Right-Wing Extremism in West Germany," European Journal of Political Research 22 (July 1992), pp. 83-100, esp. pp. 95-97; Geoffrey K. Roberts, "Right-Wing Radicalism in the New Germany," Parliamentary Affairs 45, 3 (July 1992), pp. 327-44; John Fitzmaurice, "The Extreme Right in Belgium: Recent Developments," Parliamentary Affairs 45, 3 (July 1992), pp. 300-08; Nona Mayer and Pascal Perrineau, "Why Do They Vote for Le Pen?" European Journal of Political Research 22, 1 (July 1992), pp. 123-41; Carlo E. Ruzza and Oliver Schmidtke, "Roots of Success of the Lega Lombarda: Mobilisation Dynamics and the Media," West European Politics 16, 2 (April 1993), pp. 1-23; Ignazi, "The Silent Counter-Revolution."

4. Those making the neo-fascist argument include: Erwin K. Scheuch and Hans D. Klingemann, "Theorie des Rechtsradikalismus in westlichen Industriegesellschaften," Hamburger Jahrbuch für Wirtschafts- und Gesellschaftspolitik (Tübingen: J.B.C. Mohr/Paul Siebeck, 1967), pp. 11-29; Geoffrey Harris, The Dark Side of Europe: The Extreme Right Today (Savage, Md.: Barnes and Noble Books, 1990), pp. 11-12, 15, 16; Jaroslav Kreja, "Neo-fascism -- West and East," in Luciano Cheles, Ronnie Ferguson, and Michalina Vaughan, eds., The Far Right in Western and

Eastern Europe, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman, 1995), pp. 1-12, esp. pp. 6-8; and Voerman and Lucardie, esp. p. 51. In "Contemporary Right-wing Extremism," pp. 93-95, Westle and Neidermayer explain the far-right parties in terms of the links which their activists or voters have to movements like National Socialism without directly invoking a concept like neo-fascism.

5. For overviews of the debate on the concept of fascism, see Stanley Payne, Fascism: Comparison and Definition (Madison, Wisc.: University of Wisconsin Press, 1980); Juan Linz, "Some Notes toward a Comparative Study of Fascism in Sociological Historical Perspective," in Walter Laquer, ed., Fascism: A Reader's Guide (New York: Penguin Books, 1976); and Roger Eatwell, "Towards a new model of generic fascism," Journal of Theoretical Politics 4, 2 (1992), pp. 161-94.

6. Payne, pp. 196-200.

7. This definition is adapted from Payne, pp. 6-14 and F. L. Carsten, The Rise of Fascism, 2nd ed. (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1980), pp. 230-36.

8. For example, see Michael Minkenberg, "The New Right in Germany," European Journal of Political Research 22 (July 1992), pp. 55-81, esp. pp. 56, 58, 60; Ignazi, "The Silent Counter-Revolution." Minkenberg extends his argument to other cases in "The New Right in Comparative Perspective: The USA and Germany," Western Societies Program, Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y., Occasional Paper No. 32, 1993, esp. pp. 2-3, and in "The New Right in Western Democracies: France and Germany in Comparative Perspective," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York, September 1994, esp. pp. 2-3.

9. Several other cross-national studies of a more limited scope are also available. Those which offer explanations based on multiple cases include: Ignazi, "The Silent Counter-revolution"; Scheuch and Klingemann; Minkenberg, "The New Right in Germany" and "The New Right in Comparative Perspective"; and Paul A. Taggart, The New Populism and the New Politics: New protest parties in Sweden in Comparative Perspective (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996). Some other cross-national works do not offer much in the way of explanations: Klaus von Beyme, "Right-Wing Extremism in Post-War Europe," West European Politics 11, 2 (April 1988), pp. 1-18; Paul Taggart, "New Populist Parties in Western Europe," West European Politics 18, 1 (January 1995), pp. 34-51.

10. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992.

11. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1993.

12. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994.
13. Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press, 1995.
14. In combining social changes and the political responses of elites into integrated theories, Betz and Kitschelt follow the general path taken by theorists of earlier far right-wing parties, e.g. Scheuch and Klingemann.
15. Works which conflate the radical right with neo-fascism include Glyn Ford, Fascist Europe: The Rise of Racism and Xenophobia (London: Pluto Press, 1992); Harris, The Dark Side; Cheles, Ferguson, and Vaughan, The Far Right, esp. chs. 12, 16; and Husbands, "The Other Face of 1992."
16. Leonard Weinberg, "Introduction," in Merkl and Weinberg, p. 5.
17. William Safran, "The National Front in France," in Merkl and Weinberg, pp. 21-22.
18. Roger Eatwell, "Why Has the Extreme Right Failed in Britain?" in Hainsworth, p. 177.
19. Zimmermann and Saalfeld, "The Three Waves of West German Right-Wing Extremism," in Merkl and Weinberg, p. 55; Hans-Georg Betz, "The Two Faces of Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe," Review of Politics (Fall 1993), p. 680.
20. Piero Ignazi, "The Changing Profile of the Italian Social Movement," in Merkl and Weinberg, pp. 75-92.
21. Ibid., pp. 79, 82, 84.
22. Ignazi, "The Silent Counter-Revolution" makes a similar distinction, as does Kitschelt.
23. For a somewhat similar distinction between national populist and neo-liberal populist parties, see Betz, "The Two Faces."

24. Jonathan Marcus, The National Front and French Politics (New York: New York University Press, 1995), p. 119.
25. Betz, Radical Right-Wing Populism, pp. 98-99, 156; Kitschelt, pp. 77, 113.
26. Kitschelt, pp. 65, 74, 140, 146, 150, 155.
27. There were questions on state ownership, income equality, and competition.
28. The relevant responses were worded as "the social reforms in our country should be maintained at least at the present level" and "social cuts have gone too far" (Jorgen Goul Andersen, "Denmark: the Progress Party -- Populist Neo-Liberalism and Welfare State Chauvinism," in Hainsworth, p. 200).
29. Andersen, pp. 197, 200.
30. The wording of the questions were "liberty valued more than equality" and "democracy is the best political system under any circumstances." The numbers of far-right voters responding, however, were small (77 in the case of Denmark), as they were in the case of the World Values Survey (Kitschelt, p. 137).
31. Betz, Radical Right-Wing Populism, pp. 160; Kitschelt, p. 191.
32. Thomas Saalfeld, "The Politics of National-Populism," German Politics 2, 2 (August 1993), pp. 177-99.
33. The Austrian Freedom Party had success before the 1980s, but did not become a far-right party until 1984-85.
34. Sources: Data for 1980-94 from Betz, Radical Right-Wing Populism, p. 3; additional data for Britain: Eatwell, "Why Has the Extreme Right Failed in Britain?" p. 180; for the Netherlands: Husbands, "The Netherlands," in Hainsworth, pp. 104-5; for Italy: Stephen Hellman, "Italy," in

Mark Kesselman and Joel Krieger, eds., European Politics in Transition (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1992), p. 355; additional data for 1994-95 from the annual data yearbook edition of the European Journal of Political Research; average figures for the Italian Social Movement and the Center Party are from Kitschelt, p. 52.

35. Betz, Radical Right-Wing Populism, p. 109; Kitschelt, pp. 5-6.

36. Ibid., pp. 27-35.

37. Kitschelt, pp. 16-17, 53-54.

38. Kitschelt, ch. 1; Betz, Radical Right-Wing Populism, ch. 4.

39. Kitschelt, p. 161.

40. Ibid., pp. 52-53.

41. Duane Swank and Hans-Georg Betz, "Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe: The Impact of Structural Change, Political Institutions, and Economic Performance on Party Electoral Fortunes in 16 Nations," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, August-September 1995.

42. Taggart, New Populism and the New Politics, pp. 53, 58.

43. Betz, Radical Right-Wing Populism, p. 104.

44. See Manfred Kuechler, "Germans and 'Others': Racism, Xenophobia, or 'Legitimate Conservatism'?" German Politics 3, 1 (April 1994), p. 64.

45. For example, see Jens Alber, "Toward Explaining Anti-Foreigner Violence in Germany," Working paper no. 53, Harvard Center for European Studies, 1994, Graphs 1-5.

46. Kitschelt, pp. 60, 62.
47. Zimmermann and Saalfeld, p. 72.
48. In addition to Betz, Radical Right-Wing Populism and Kitschelt, see Ignazi, "The Silent Counter-Revolution"; Taggart, "New Populist Parties in Western Europe."
49. Kitschelt, pp. 210-11, 217-18.
50. Ibid., p. 217.
51. Ibid., p. 182.
52. Christopher Husbands, "The Extreme Right in Postwar France," in Hainsworth, pp. 29-50.
53. Patrick Hossay, " 'Our People First': Understanding the Resonance of the Vlaams Blok's Xenophobic Program," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Northeastern Political Science Association, Newark, N.J., November 1995, p. 21; Husbands, "Belgium," in Hainsworth, p. 132; Ford, Fascist Europe, pp. 9-10.
54. Hossay, p. 14.
55. Betz, "The two faces," p. 680; Husbands, "Belgium," in Hainsworth, p. 137; Hossay, p. 27.
56. Hossay, p. 11.
57. Betz, Radical Right-Wing Populism, pp. 42-59.
58. I classified countries based on data in Hans-Dieter Klingemann and Dieter Fuchs, Citizens and the State (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 42, 106-07, 139, 273-76, 304, 351; and Betz, Radical Right-Wing Populism, pp. 42-59. Using the seven indicators mentioned in the text, I considered a country to have clearly rising alienation if more than one indicator, at least one

of which concerned political distrust or dissatisfaction (i.e. the first four items), was clearly rising from 1975-93.

59. The average level of far-right voting during 1980-95 was 9.5% for the five countries with strongly increasing political alienation and only 3.8% for the other countries; the average peak in far-right voting support in each country was 13.1% for the first group and only 6.6% for the second group. For this analysis, I added Austria to the first group based on the available measures.

60. In the first group, the average left-right distance was 12.89, as rated by experts; in the second group, it was 18.95; the maximum possible distance was 38.00 (data from Kitschelt, p. 54; own calculations).

61. Ibid., p. 54.

62. Ibid., p. 174.

63. Betz, Radical Right-Wing Populism, pp. 122-23.

64. Kitschelt, ch. 2; Michael Minkenberg, "The New Right in Comparative Perspective," pp. 25, 51-57.

65. Kitschelt, pp. 57-58.

66. Minkenberg, "The New Right in Western Democracies," p. 2.

67. On infighting in the Republicans, see Norbert Lepszy and Hans-Joachim Veen, "Rechtsradikale in der parlamentarischen Praxis," Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen (May 1994), pp. 203-16.

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