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**An Analysis of the Efficacy of Post 9/11 Security Policy in Countering Violent
Extremism and Reducing Acts of International Terrorism**

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Master's Thesis
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Abstract

Terrorism is a phenomenon that baffles even the most experienced of researchers within academia. Understanding what constitutes terrorism is important to the field of international relations because combatting terrorist violence yields no straightforward method of prevention and protection. This paper examines four measures of counterterrorism taken by the U.S. government after the September 11th attacks. The methods included in this study and the framework in which they are congruent with are: The War on Terror as a defense strategy, torture and “enhanced interrogation techniques” as a deterrence method, targeted drone attacks in Pakistan and Afghanistan as a compellence force, and public diplomacy as a feature of negotiation. This paper examines which methods, if any, were successful as counterterrorism measures by whether they could neutralize al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden without contributing to recruitment and further organized attacks against the West.

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Introduction

Terrorism is a phenomenon that baffles even the most experienced of researchers within academia. Understanding what constitutes terrorism is important to the field of international relations because combatting global violence in the name of political ideology yields no straightforward method of prevention and protection. One of the biggest challenges of terrorism studies includes the lack of a cohesive definition of the phenomenon, as well as the contextual notion of terrorism changing through historical circumstance. Regardless, most scholars agree that the function of contemporary terrorism is to achieve maximum impact through extreme violence and coercion. While terrorism is not a political ideology nor an end goal, it is a powerful tool intended to bring political change. Further, scholars contend that terrorism is primarily a tool of non-state actors that are difficult to control, which does not allow an easily recognized method of predicting when an attack is to occur.

When addressing terrorist organizations and examining methods to prevent and counter violent acts, states are generally faced with a few options. Coined by Thomas Schelling, *compellence* involves the ability of one state to coerce another state into action, usually by threatening punishment.¹ Its opposite, *deterrence*, is a strategy intended to dissuade an adversary from taking an action not yet started, or to prevent them from doing something that another state desires.² Meanwhile, measures of *defense* include a direct reaction to attacks and instigation with the use of counter force. Finally, international *negotiation* is often a process of power-based dialogue intended to achieve

¹ Petersen, W. J. (1986). Deterrence and Compellence: A Critical Assessment of Conventional Wisdom. *International Studies Quarterly*, 30(3), Page 269.

² Petersen, W. J. (1986). Deterrence and Compellence: A Critical Assessment of Conventional Wisdom. *International Studies Quarterly*, 30(3), Page 270.

certain goals or ends, and which may or may not thoroughly resolve a dispute or disputes to the satisfaction of all parties.³ Luckily, the period of post 9/11 counterterrorism measures was so varied that we can examine at least one measure which ostensibly falls under each category, and will do so later in this paper.

In this study, I will attempt to answer the following: How do states combat incidences of international terrorism proliferated by non-state actors such as Al Qaeda and ISIS? What methods are the most effective for states at stopping further terrorist attacks? In answering these questions, I will examine the post 9/11 policy period in the United States and specifically four main methods used in direct response to the attacks of September 11th which fall under each of the four options in which states are presented in response to terrorist action: deterrence, compellence, defense and negotiation. These methods include: 1.) targeted drone attacks in Afghanistan and Pakistan (compellence) 2.) United States and United Kingdom's military presence in Iraq and Afghanistan during the War on Terror (defense) 3.) torture of captured combatants (deterrence) 4.) public diplomacy and intercultural relations (negotiation). Upon discussion of these four key methods, I will determine which of these methods, if any, has been most effectual in states' abilities to address and defeat international terrorism by non-state actors and why. The post 9/11 policy period is a key timeframe, as much of the literature on the subject focuses on the reactionary policies, and because 9/11 changed the nature of how we view terrorism today.

For this paper, I suggest that the success of a counterterrorism method is measured by not producing a result of unintended consequences and negative side effects

³ Müller, H. (2004). Arguing, Bargaining and all that: Communicative Action, Rationalist Theory and the Logic of Appropriateness in International Relations. *European Journal of International Relations*, 10(3), Page 406.

that could undermine the intended purpose of the method itself. In the post 9/11 sphere, this includes measures which do not contribute to the recruitment and radicalization of new terrorists. For example, targeted drone strikes of key Al Qaeda figures by the Obama administration in Pakistan and Yemen resulted in strengthening the solidarity in the support environment of the targeted individuals, resulting in further civilian casualties.⁴ Within these communities, these drone strikes united them in their shared hatred of the West and served as a catalyst for further radicalization.⁵ In examining these methods, I claim that their success in combatting terrorism is determined by their ability to defeat the intended individual or group responsible for a terrorist act with a targeted method that does not result in civilian casualties or the violation of civilian human rights, and cannot be used as a tool for further recruitment by the communities that they effect. Another measure for success that will be considered throughout this paper is the ability of each method to neutralize the threat of the organizations. This can expand to any method which severely hindered the ability of terrorist organizations to continue large scale attacks, acquire new territory, and increase recruitment.

This paper will first discuss the working definitions of “terrorism” that are used in the political sphere and are referenced by academics. Chapter 2 will examine the four aforementioned methods used to combat terrorism in the post 9/11 period using the following mechanisms: compellence, defense, deterrence, and negotiation. Chapter 3 will continue with an examination of the War on Terror as a defense policy. Chapter 4 will discuss torture and “enhanced interrogation” as deterrence policy. Chapter 5 will engage

⁴ Khan, A. N. (2011). The US’ Policy of Targeted Killings by Drones in Pakistan. *IPRI Journal* 9(1), Page 22.

⁵ O’Connell, M. (2010). Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones: A Case Study of Pakistan, 2004–2009. *Shooting to Kill: Socio-Legal Perspectives on the Use of Lethal Force, Notre Dame Law School*, 09(43), Page 26.

targeted drone attacks as compellence policy, while Chapter 6 will conclude with public diplomacy as negotiation.

I intend to discuss these findings and illustrate some of the theoretical, practical, and empirical challenges that require further and careful attention. I will address the residual impact these responses had on the communities they effected, as well as what evidence was presented for their justification. Last, I hope to provide recommendations for the future of combatting terrorism, including re-examining its current definition and suggesting alternative methods for study in the field of terrorism prevention; with realistic alternatives that include allying with the Muslim community and reforming policy that properly addresses domestic threats. I intend to use this data to determine that the degree which these policies was not only ineffective in bringing convictions and deterring future attacks, but further fueled a divide between Muslims in the United and were used as recruiting tools for extremism.

Although the media and government often consider terrorists as irrational actors who are incapable of being deterred, under this framework I will consider non-state actors who engage in terrorist acts, such as al Qaeda and ISIS as rational actors with rational intent and strong motivations. I will do this because the state's approach to counter-terrorism continues to exhibit intent to deter terrorist organizations and terrorists, a method that assumes the rationality of actors. Some of these approaches will be addressed in the later part of this paper. Further, even the most motivated and prepared individual or group intending to carry out this mass violence will choose the option of minimal risk of intervention, allowing for the assumption of rationality.

While most of these strategies may yield short-term benefits, such policies have proven unable to remedy the issue of terrorism in the longer term. This is particularly relevant to the counterterror methods used in response to 9/11. Given the research on terrorism available and the methods used for this study on what is effective in defeating it, I propose that public diplomacy, states' use of soft power, and cooperation with the Muslim community is the most effective and long-term solution to combatting international terrorism. Additionally, I intend to show that this measure is the only method out of the four I shall examine that does not result in hostility or be used as a successful terrorist recruitment tool.

Literature Review

Scholars and policy makers alike remain polarized on how to best address acts of terrorism. This is not surprising given that the very definition of terrorism is not a generally agreed upon concept. Bruce Hoffman details the importance of defining terrorism in a political context to distinguish it from other types of violence and crime, as well as emphasizing the threat of the violence itself. Hoffman suggests a broad enough definition to include all types of political violence- a concept that scholars disagree with as they contend to zero in on a specific definition.⁶ Additionally, Hoffman distinguishes that those who are labeled as terrorists very rarely see themselves as such.⁷ This offers a unique perspective as scholars do not typically consider the mindset of those committing the violence. Further, Hodgson and Tadros consider fair labeling of the word terrorism, and state the importance of the law to distinguish between legitimate freedom fighters

⁶ Hoffman, B. (2006). *Inside Terrorism*. Columbia University Press. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7312/hoff12698>. Page 5

⁷ Hoffman, B. (2006). *Inside Terrorism*. Columbia University Press. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7312/hoff12698>. Page 19

combatting autocratic regimes and terrorists who hope to create chaos through violence.⁸

Lanier Burns suggests a definition that focuses on the semantics of the words used and includes the propaganda surrounding the use of terror rather than just a broad conception of political violence.⁹

In studying the War on Terror, Byman and Pollock believe that the War on Terror posed a greater threat to national security than anything that preceded it. Byman and Pollock argued that a withdrawal of troops without the establishment of a governing system and without instituting community-based systems of support would further radicalize the local population.¹⁰ They argue that military presence created a flourishing of terrorist activity rather than quelling it because forces were occupational and not designed to strengthen the Iraqi community. The authors call for a bolstering of Iraqi democratic systems, and support for the surrounding areas as they experience an influx of refugees who are vulnerable to radicalization.¹¹

Ty Solomon argues that the Bush administration's normalization of the invasion and occupation of Iraq as the correct response to the 9/11 attacks reconstructed public opinion on the efficacy of the war in avenging the attacks and preventing future violence. Solomon claims the War on Terror after 9/11 became a social background through which a variety of threats could be reconstructed, whether those threats came from non-state terrorist groups or Iraq.¹² The author states the restructuring of the concepts of American

⁸ Hodgson, J. S. and Tadros V. (2013). The Impossibility of Defining Terrorism. *New Criminal Law Review* 16(3), Page 525

⁹ Burns, L. (2011). Toward a Contemporary Definition of Terrorism. *Forum on Public Policy: A Journal of the Oxford Round Table*, 2011(3), Page 23.

¹⁰ Byman, D. L. and Pollock, K. M. (2008). Iraq's Long-Term Impact on Jihadist Terrorism. *The Annals of the American Academy*, 618, Page 55.

¹¹ Byman, D. L. and Pollock, K. M. (2008). Iraq's Long-Term Impact on Jihadist Terrorism. *The Annals of the American Academy*, 618, Page 67.

¹² Solomon, T. (2009). Social Logics and Normalization in the War on Terror. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 38(2), Page 271.

“freedom” being under attack by a foreign enemy created a narrative of defense which continues to affect the discursive dynamics after 9/11 still today.¹³

The use of torture and excessive force was at the forefront in the post 9/11 period as the United States used the attacks to justify torture of combatants at U.S. bases. In many cases, “excessive force” and “torture” is subjective as the international community struggles to find a universal definition and the United States continues to manipulate loopholes in international torture laws.¹⁴ Jamal Barnes states that the semantics of the redefinition of torture to “enhanced interrogation techniques” after 9/11 changed the nature of the Western perception of torture and its justifications.¹⁵ He argues that this redefinition of torture removed its negative connotations and deemed it as necessary to the defense of freedom.¹⁶

John W. Schiemann details how there is little consensus among governments and policy makers on whether interrogational torture is effective or not. Additionally, he states that torture will always operate at a level that does not decrease in intensity or frequency, given that if the detainee gives up information, the interrogator knows what works, and if the detainee fails to divulge, the force will increase.¹⁷ This shows a frightening standard, and makes the necessity of condemnation by governments imperative.

Avery Gordon offers a sobering critique of torture in Abu Ghraib, stating that a long history of prison abuse and excessive force by the U.S. military created a torture culture. Gordon states the normalization of prisoner abuse in the prison system evolved

¹³ Solomon, T. (2009). Social Logics and Normalization in the War on Terror. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 38(2), Page 278.

¹⁴ Alvarez, J.A. Torturing the Law. *Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law*, 37(2), 175-223.

¹⁵ Barnes, J. (2015). The ‘War on Terror’ and the Battle for the Definition of Torture. *International Relations*, 30(1), Page 102.

¹⁶ Barnes, J. (2015). The ‘War on Terror’ and the Battle for the Definition of Torture. *International Relations*, 30(1), Page 105.

¹⁷ Schiemann, J. W. (2012). Interrogational Torture. *Political Research Quarterly*, 65(1), Page 15.

into normalization of combatants after 9/11, and were simply an extension of this violent culture.¹⁸ Gordon states that the images of abuse released from Abu Ghraib closely mirrored those documenting the American prison system, and that it was no wonder that these methods were deemed as acceptable guard behavior and that nobody was held responsible.¹⁹

Though accurate data of the number of civilian casualties of drones remains elusive, scholars contend that drone attacks in Afghanistan and Pakistan had a profound effect on the nature of counterterrorism. While many policymakers defend their use because of drone assistance in capturing and assassinating bin Laden and eliminating key ISIS figureheads, drone casualties remain high even as their technology evolves. Akbar Nasir Khan argues that the tactical move of using the drones is counterproductive and unwittingly helping terrorists in their recruitment process which resulted in the continuance of the cycle of violence, killing more civilians than the terrorists who were intended targets.²⁰ Khan claims drones are also a product of norm socialization in the War on Terror, despite the evidence stating their ineffectiveness, as they pose an easy method of inflicting violence on an enemy with little human effort and minimal cost. Khan advocates for closer examination of the legality of the use of drones, as the unintended consequences of further radicalization far outweigh the benefits of their potential use.²¹

Mary O'Connell claims that the U.S. use of combat drones in Afghanistan between 2004 and 2009 appears to fall far short of meeting the international law rules

¹⁸ Gordon, A. F. (2006). Abu Ghraib: Imprisonment and the War on Terror. *Race & Class*, 48(1), Page 48.

¹⁹ Gordon, A. F. (2006). Abu Ghraib: Imprisonment and the War on Terror. *Race & Class*, 48(1), Page 49.

²⁰ Khan, A. N. (2011). The US' Policy of Targeted Killings by Drones in Pakistan. *IPRI Journal* 9(1), Page 22.

²¹ Khan, A. N. (2011). The US' Policy of Targeted Killings by Drones in Pakistan. *IPRI Journal* 9(1), Page 38.

toward armed force and the conduct of armed force using military technology. Further, O'Connell claims that the Pakistani authority never consented to the use of drones, and that the CIA operatives controlling the drone attacks are not lawful combatants with the privilege to kill during an armed conflict. O'Connell argues that drone use is unlawful because CIA operatives are not trained in the use of force and that drones kill many unintended victims for each intended one, raising questions of proportionality- making them virtually ineffective in quelling terrorist attacks.²²

In the period following the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. government severely underutilized its soft power and diplomatic weight. Peter Van Ham argues that following 9/11, the Bush administration set in motion a flurry of initiatives aimed at rebranding the USA as a compassionate hegemon rather than a global bully with the argument that ordinary people have greatly distorted, but carefully cultivated images of the USA to dispel the images of hostility that breed extremism.²³ Van Ham argues that public diplomacy is important as a long term resolution to terrorism and creates a more sophisticated approach in American security policy more than forceful methods of tackling terrorism. Further, Van Ham argues for diplomacy as the main component to restoring U.S. credibility in the international community.²⁴

As evidenced, the information collected on the study of terrorism and the scope of the methods used to defeat it remain as broad as they are varied. For the duration of this paper, I will examine this literature and its concepts on a micro level, and conclude the areas for further study that are necessary to address the convoluted issue of international

²² O'Connell, M. (2010). Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones: A Case Study of Pakistan, 2004–2009. *Shooting to Kill: Socio-Legal Perspectives on the Use of Lethal Force, Notre Dame Law School*, 09(43), Page 26.

²³ Ham, P. V. (2003). War, Lies, and Videotape: Public Diplomacy and the USA's War on Terrorism. *Security Dialogue*, 34(4), Page 428.

²⁴ Ham, P. V. (2003). War, Lies, and Videotape: Public Diplomacy and the USA's War on Terrorism. *Security Dialogue*, 34(4), Page 442.

terrorism.

Research Design

As the phenomenon of terrorism evolves into our modern understanding, the intricacies of each factor involved in the foundation and motivation of terrorist groups continues to prove chaotic for scholars and academics. The factors that contribute to terrorist ideology along with the factors that make an individual susceptible to recruitment and violent action are convoluted and stretch outside the realms of this paper. Still, these factors remain crucial to the strategy of preventing future violence and combatting terrorist activity. Unfortunate for scholars and policy makers, the chaos of terrorist groups and the individuals who sympathize with their ideology serve to be complicated for many reasons. First, the lack of centralized and monitored location of training camps and terrorist cells make pinpointing them difficult. Although it was known that al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden operated out of Afghanistan, military presence in the region failed to capture him or other high ranked officials within the organization. More recently, as ISIS insurgents take land by force and demand sovereignty, sympathizers of the organization from outside the region are encouraged to administer lone wolf attacks, making external cell locations difficult to identify.

Rationale along with purpose of outcome varies among terrorist groups. What one terrorist organization seeks to accomplish with violent methods may not be the same motivation for action as another organization. For example, French revolutionaries employed violent attacks for freedom from aristocratic rule. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) sought the establishment of a republic, the end of British rule in Northern Ireland,

and the reunification of Ireland. Similarly, the Palestinian Liberation Organization used armed struggle to establish a similar sense of sovereignty. ISIS and al Qaeda hoped to determine a caliphate and impose Islamic law in the areas they control, eventually spreading to the rest Muslim world while raising anti-American sentiment and bleeding the United States of powerful resources through provoked attacks. Organizational goals vary from liberation of occupation to hostile sentiment, and are not readily quantifiable.

Because of the sporadic nature of these terrorist groups, this paper is relegated only to the information that is available. While the field of terrorism studies hosts a breadth of knowledge, much of the key intelligence regarding al Qaeda and other Islamic extremist cells is not accessible to the public and to scholars alike. For example, determining whether key intelligence was released during the torture of captured combatants at U.S. bases in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Cuba is regulated by the released CIA report. The sensitivity of the information disclosed is dictated by the administration's desire to release as much or as little to the public as they want. Due to this restriction of information, terrorism studies are limited in the statistics available to measuring the efficacy of counterterrorism strategy. Further, terrorist radicalization has multiple social and cultural factors which can not be explicitly quantitatively linked to any specific counterterrorism strategy. Despite these limits, much of the field has valuable qualitative studies which provide key insight into the outcomes of these counterterrorism strategies and the implications for further conflict. This paper will examine qualitative studies of the variety of counterterror strategies in response to the 9/11 attacks including U.S. military presence in Iraq and Afghanistan during the War on Terror, the use of enhanced

interrogation techniques, targeted drone strikes and the dissemination of propaganda and use of soft power to exert American influence in the Middle East.

For the purpose of examining counterterrorism strategy, the attacks of September 11th serve as a strong case study. The attack on the Twin Towers, Pentagon, and downed plane in Pennsylvania killed 3,000 people and was the largest terrorist attack on American soil. The event propelled American security to the forefront of the international stage, placed al Qaeda as a strong adversary and launched a global campaign to defend American values. Because of such a large-scale attack, the United States employed large-scale responses that had domestic and international implications. The strategies employed in response to the attack spanned over almost 20 years, two different 8-year presidencies, and continues today. Both the Bush and Obama administration deployed a variety of techniques to administer justice for 9/11, suppress radicalization against the West, deplete terrorist organizations, and prevent future attacks. The administrations explored military presence, surveillance of citizens, travel restrictions, targeted drone attacks, military presence, and torture and excessive force to name a few. The variety and severity of each method created a huge financial burden, redefined American presence and relations with the Middle East, and drew sharp criticism from the international community.

American security policy after the 9/11 attacks had a profound effect on the international realm and the reputation of the United States. After the attacks, international focus turned to the history between the United States and Iraq for the occupation, Afghanistan for harboring al Qaeda fugitives, and Saudi Arabia as the origin of Osama bin Laden. Further, as a strong international ally, the United Kingdom supported U.S. forces in the War on Terror and distributed a small number of troops while conducting

their own surveillance on British citizens back home, as tensions among the British Muslim population rose. The destabilization of Iraq after Obama withdrew troops allowed extremism to take advantage of the vulnerability of the region, as ISIS capitalized on existing sectarian conflict, damages incurred and absence of government, and the neighboring civil war in Syria to continue the mission for an Islamic caliphate and encouraged more violent attacks on the West.

In the years following the September 11th attacks, radicalization and recruitment experienced an upsurge in Europe, the United States and Africa, with extremist sympathizers traveling to Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria to join insurgents against the West. Islamic extremists encouraged follow up attacks in Brussels, Paris, New York, London and San Bernadino to name a few. Terrorist organizations used counterterror methods such as the War on Terror and torture in Guantanamo Bay for justification of these attacks. Indeed the 9/11 attacks themselves had a profound effect on American security, but the response of the United States and measures employed changed the course of history and contributed to the growth of terrorist activity across the globe. For these reasons, studying security measures and administration response to the September 11th attacks is a key feature of international relations and international terrorism studies, as the subject is convoluted and has several state and non-state actors. Scholars who embark upon sorting through the tricky subject of international terrorism have no shortage of information, and theory at their disposal.

Chapter 1: The Challenge of Defining Terrorism

One of the most monumental challenges for scholars in understanding terrorism is the lack of a clear and cohesive definition of the phenomenon. This is a challenge that is not only prevalent in the academic world, but has serious political and social consequences as states struggle to understand it. Even today, UN member states still don't really have a working and agreed upon definition²⁵. Generally, dictionaries define terrorism as an unlawful, violent act or threat against people or property to intimidate or coerce an enemy for political or ideological reasons²⁶. Still, even though we are often secure in our knowledge that a terrorist attack has been committed when we see it, a credible definition of terrorism eludes scholars and governments alike²⁷.

According to scholars and historians, the term “terrorist” dates back to the French Revolution, and was popularized as a revolutionary and anti-government act by non-state or subnational actors²⁸. The term had a positive connotation and was linked to the ideals of democracy, as revolutionaries used extreme measures to fight oppressive establishment forces. By the late 19th century, Irish revolutionary campaigns such as the Irish Republican Brotherhood utilized bombings against British rule, inciting chaos and adopting the title of terrorists. The term was appropriated again in the early 1930's to describe the rise of dictatorial regimes in Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and Stalinist Russia²⁹. After WWII, the term shifted back to include antigovernment and revolutionary groups, particularly against former colonial powers. These freedom fighters, however,

²⁵ Burns, Lanier (2011). Toward a Contemporary Definition of Terrorism. *Forum on Public Policy: A Journal of the Oxford Round Table*, 2011(3), page 2.

²⁶ Burns, Lanier (2011). Toward a Contemporary Definition of Terrorism. *Forum on Public Policy: A Journal of the Oxford Round Table*, 2011(3), page 11.

²⁷ Hodgson, J., & Tadros, V. (2013). The Impossibility of Defining Terrorism. *New Criminal Law Review: An International and Interdisciplinary Journal*, 16(3), 500.

²⁸ Hoffman, B. (2006). *Inside Terrorism*. Columbia University Press. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7312/hoff12698>. Page 3.

²⁹ Hoffman, B. (2006). *Inside Terrorism*. Columbia University Press. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7312/hoff12698>. Page 14.

argued that oppressed parties who fought against colonial rule should not be labeled with the lexicon of terrorist; and adapted names with words like “freedom” and “liberation”, such as the Palestinian Liberation Organization³⁰. Many of these former colonies owe their independence to the freedom fighting independence groups who utilized violence against the state.

By the 1980’s the term was redefined toward calculated means to destabilize the West, as suicide bombings in the Middle East against American targets came to dominate the definition and served as a root to the definition we know today. By the 1990’s, terrorism came to denote threats against nation states by non-state actors and non-governmental processes and organizations. The concept of terrorism transformed in the public and political sphere from being about individual phenomenon to involving irregular forces in a multifaceted war. This led to the attacks of September 11th, which redefined terrorist attacks on a grander scale and marked the advent of modern, international terrorism by political groups under the guise of Islam ³¹.

According to theorist Bruce Hoffman, terrorism is “violence – or equally important, the threat of violence- used and directed in pursuit of, or in service of, a political aim.”³² Hoffman states that definition is broad enough to include anything that scares or “terrorizes” the general population by anyone who attempts to further his political views by coercive intimidation³³. Hoffman suggests that defining terrorism in a political context is important to distinguish it from other types of violence and crime.

³⁰ Hoffman, B. (2006). *Inside Terrorism*. Columbia University Press. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7312/hoff12698>. Page 26.

³¹ Hoffman, B. (2006). *Inside Terrorism*. Columbia University Press. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7312/hoff12698>. Page 27.

³² Hoffman, B. (2006). *Inside Terrorism*. Columbia University Press. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7312/hoff12698>. Page 3.

³³ Hoffman, B. (2006). *Inside Terrorism*. Columbia University Press. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7312/hoff12698>. Page 2.

Terrorism is an organized and intentional means of violence and extreme measures to further a political belief- a particularly unique system. The nature of this distinction lies in the fact that the threat of violence or actual violence is planned, calculated and systematic³⁴. Further, he attests that the defining characteristic of terrorism is the violent act itself rather than the justification behind it or the identity of the perpetrators³⁵. Still, this distinction of violence is not made between state and non-state actors, forging a confusing chasm in the potential definition of terrorism.

In addition to the historical fluidity of the term, finding a cohesive definition for terrorism continues to be monumental as the actors involved do not self-identify with the label. Hoffman claims that self-denial distinguishes terrorists from other politically identifying groups. This is distinct from other revolutionary and anti-establishment groups, as they seek to develop a core identity to convey their political goals and recruit for their cause. Those who are the subject of the violence view it as terrorism, while those who aren't are more sympathetic³⁶. These sympathetic parties will seek explanation as to how the victims provoked the attackers to take violent action. This lack of self-identification with the word terrorist makes it difficult for scholars and political actors to create a general profile of who a terrorist is and what their specific aims are- allowing for the definition to remain flexible over various historical periods.

Martha Crenshaw suggests that efficacy is the primary standard by which terrorism is compared to other methods of achieving political goals³⁷. Often it is in

³⁴ Hoffman, B. (2006). *Inside Terrorism*. Columbia University Press. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7312/hoff12698>. Page 3.

³⁵ Hoffman, B. (2006). *Inside Terrorism*. Columbia University Press. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7312/hoff12698>. Page 25.

³⁶ Hoffman, B. (2006). *Inside Terrorism*. Columbia University Press. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7312/hoff12698>. Page 22.

³⁷ Crenshaw, M. (1998). The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Choice. *Terrorism and Counter Terrorism*. 2(1). Page 8.

examining the level of damage and terror inflicted that efficacy is measured. The strategy of terrorism has always been to bring about political change using violent and shocking means, however the strategy has changed over time to adopt new outcomes. This change in strategy and outcome makes a clear definition seem impossible. Terrorism may be a reasonable and calculated response to a specific set of circumstances- a subject worthy of further study in its entirety. Crenshaw does not believe terrorism should be treated as irrational, a notion that I argue in this paper, and that terrorism is often used when following the failure of other methods and a constraint of viable options³⁸.

Crenshaw claims that after the attacks of September 11th, President Bush's liberal use of the word terror encompassed the emotional state of being scared or terrified rather than the specific political phenomenon of terrorism, a sentiment which has only grown exponentially in today's socio-political sphere³⁹. The word became synonymous with anything that Americans irrationally feared, which for this political period is exclusively Islamic extremism. The use of the word "terror" put forth by President Bush was such an abstract entity that Americans needed an adversary to embody what that meant- opening an opportunity for the use of various techniques to try to defeat it. Thus, The War on Terror served as a reaction to the security threats facing the nation and accounts for the way terrorism was defined in the early 20th century⁴⁰.

Lanier Burns suggests using the semantics surrounding the word terrorism to create a working definition of the term. Although the Oxford definition of terrorism includes "government by intimidation", a terrorist is someone who attempts to further his

³⁸ Crenshaw, M. (1998). The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Choice. *Terrorism and Counter Terrorism*. 2(1). Page 10.

³⁹ Crenshaw, M. (1998). The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Choice. *Terrorism and Counter Terrorism*. 2(1). Page 19.

⁴⁰ Hoffman, B. (2006). *Inside Terrorism*. Columbia University Press. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7312/hoff12698>. Page 11.

views by a system of coercive intimidation. Burns criticizes the current definitions of terrorism by claiming the working definition should involve non- contemporary incidents, as it is only an immediate assessment to look at modern examples of how we understand terrorism today.⁴¹ Burns continues that the problem of identifying a definition is the minefield of semantic equivalences that blend terrorism with various kinds of extreme violence such as war, massacres, insurgency, riots and criminal activity. These equivalences lack semantic clarity, according to Burns.⁴²

Burns argues a comprehensive and interdisciplinary definition of terrorism is simply not possible. He continues by suggesting that a working definition should include propaganda of the deed, rather than political violence because including violent acts alone is too large and too broad of a conceptual idea. He claims that the threat of terrorism should not be included, nor should it be equated with a state of hostility.⁴³ This lack of definition and understanding of the circumstances that cause it make it difficult to address it, hence why the US has tried many methods.

⁴¹ Burns, L. (2011). Toward a Contemporary Definition of Terrorism. *Forum on Public Policy: A Journal of the Oxford Round Table*, 2011(3), Page 17.

⁴² Burns, L. (2011). Toward a Contemporary Definition of Terrorism. *Forum on Public Policy: A Journal of the Oxford Round Table*, 2011(3), Page 19.

⁴³ Burns, L. (2011). Toward a Contemporary Definition of Terrorism. *Forum on Public Policy: A Journal of the Oxford Round Table*, 2011(3), Page 23.

Chapter 2: Overview of the Four Discussed Options in Response to Terrorism

With roots in the Cold War threat of nuclear attack, *deterrence* became the central recourse for sustaining international and internal security and stability among and within states in an era of serious conflict. After the attacks of September 11th, this framework was utilized in the attempt to understand and conceptualize the cause of such a large-scale attack, as well as the prevention of future attacks. As a result, deterrence theory with respect to terrorism is a relatively new study, with research dating back to only the last couple of decades— particularly as a solid definition of terrorism is still elusive.

In international relations, deterrence is a strategy with the intent to dissuade an adversary from taking an action they have not yet started, or to prevent them from doing something that threatens the state⁴⁴. This theory is crucial because unpacking terrorism allows us to think about deterring all levels of its actors including militant leaders, religious ideologues, financiers, recruiters, bomb-makers, foot soldiers, suicide bombers, and state, societal, and community supporters⁴⁵. As each actor in terrorist organizations operates on a multilevel scale, measures of deterrence differ based on their motivation and intent. Deterrence is a difficult measure to use against terrorist groups, as each group is usually scattered in location and shares a broad ideology. What works as deterring one organization may not be a universal method against all organizations, particularly as non-state actors. Further, states need both capability and the credibility to administer punishment for deterrence to be a viable option.

⁴⁴ Van Ginkel, Bibi (2015). The (In-)Effectiveness Of "Deterrence" As an Instrument Against Jihadist Terrorist Threats. *Clingendael Magazine*. Accessed online: <https://www.clingendael.org/publication/effectiveness-deterrence-instrument-against-jihadist-terrorist-threats>. [Accessed March 4, 2018].

⁴⁵ Van Ginkel, Bibi (2015). The (In-)Effectiveness Of "Deterrence" As an Instrument Against Jihadist Terrorist Threats. *Clingendael Magazine*. Accessed online: <https://www.clingendael.org/publication/effectiveness-deterrence-instrument-against-jihadist-terrorist-threats>. [Accessed March 4, 2018].

Regarding *compellence*, four clusters of factors all intertwined are especially worthy of consideration: who is to be compelled, how important U.S. stakes are, what threats or inducements are relevant, and who is doing the compelling. In all cases considered, the United States had or could assemble overwhelming force. The question then became whether that force could be credibly applied to the American purpose, even as a threat.⁴⁶ Diplomatic initiatives in compelling non-state actors face challenges because the real leaders of the organization cannot easily be identified, or because those who can be identified do not have the power to control their forces. Military force is also problematic because terrorists are often dispersed, with no large and obvious targets.⁴⁷ Additionally, compelling a target is more difficult than deterring one, because if the target has committed to an action in front of its people, backing down entails at least a loss of face and a risk that not many terrorists want to take.⁴⁸

Finally, compelling requires targeting the adversary's mind and identifying their goals to manipulate them. The proximate targets of compellent campaigns are states or groups, but the ultimate targets are individuals, i.e., leaders able to decide. This is difficult with terrorist organizations who often change leadership and whose individuals' statuses continually change. The ambiguous cases are so for just that reason: who is in charge, and how completely is unclear. The challenge is to get inside the adversary's head, to threaten or hold at risk what he or she cares most about. This goal holds true for all war, perhaps all foreign policy, but it holds especially true when the United States seeks to prevail without using force and without necessarily defeating the adversary in

⁴⁶ Treverton, G. F. (2000). Framing Compellent Strategies. RAND Publications. Retrieved https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/2009/MR1240.pdf. Page 9.

⁴⁷ Treverton, G. F. (2000). Framing Compellent Strategies. RAND Publications. Retrieved https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/2009/MR1240.pdf. Page 10.

⁴⁸ Treverton, G. F. (2000). Framing Compellent Strategies. RAND Publications. Retrieved https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/2009/MR1240.pdf. Page 11.

the military sense.⁴⁹ In the case of terrorism, this proves difficult as motivations vary between sovereignty, political power and governmental control, decline of Westernization and colonialism, etc.; and when faced with an adversary who defaults to force.

Whether states can use force against terrorists based in another country is much discussed. Some scholars and government officials believe the right to take military action on the territory of another state is at the core of *defense* policy and why it is of concern to international society. O'Connell states that governments have decided they cannot eliminate the right to use force in self-defense in all cases but they have, through international law, limited force in self-defense to the most exigent circumstances- including terrorist attacks. Articles 2(4) and 51 of the United Nations Charter prohibit the unauthorized use of force except in self-defense against an armed attack, and even then only until the Security Council acts. The charter clearly licenses at least one kind of resort to force by an individual member state: namely, the use of armed force to repel an armed attack.⁵⁰

O'Connell continues to argue that armed force in self-defense must have defense as its object. Force in self-defense must aim at stopping an attack in progress, defending against a future attack once an attack has occurred, or ending an unlawful occupation. Lawful self-defense is not meant to be a mere act of punishment or revenge. Armed force to send a message or to generally deter is unlawful by definition of the United Nations and not a good function of democracy. Further, armed counterattack must have the aim of more specific defense and not just a use of retaliating force against an enemy. Where a

⁴⁹ Treverton, G. F. (2000). Framing Compellent Strategies. RAND Publications. Retrieved https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/2009/MR1240.pdf. Page 16.

⁵⁰ O'Connell, M. (2010). Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones: A Case Study of Pakistan, 2004–2009. *Shooting to Kill: Socio-Legal Perspectives on the Use of Lethal Force*, Notre Dame Law School, 09(43), Page 891.

significant armed attack has already occurred but is not on-going, the defending state must show at least by clear and convincing evidence that future attacks are planned. In the case where no actual attack has yet struck its intended target, the defending state may act only where it has clear and convincing evidence of an incipient attack—one that is underway, requiring an instant response.⁵¹

The argument against *negotiation* with terrorists is straightforward: Democracies must never give in to violence, and terrorists must never be rewarded for using it⁵². Officials argue that negotiations give legitimacy to terrorists and their methods while undermining actors who have pursued political change through peaceful means. Informal talks with terrorist organizations can destabilize the negotiating governments' political systems, undercut international efforts to outlaw terrorism, and set a dangerous precedent. When it comes to negotiating with terrorists, there is a clear disconnect between what governments profess and what they do.⁵³

The key objective for any government contemplating negotiations with terrorists is not simply to end violence but to do so in a way that minimizes the risk of setting dangerous precedents and destabilizing its political system. Additionally, the distinction between supposedly rational terrorists and irrational ones is often in the eye of the beholder. This is then left up to governments to decide the legitimacy of a terrorist organization and whether they are worth negotiating with. Further, governments will

⁵¹ O'Connell, M. (2010). Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones: A Case Study of Pakistan, 2004–2009. *Shooting to Kill: Socio-Legal Perspectives on the Use of Lethal Force, Notre Dame Law School*, 09(43), Page 893.

⁵² Neumann, P. R. (2007). Negotiating with Terrorists. *Foreign Affairs*. Accessed online: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2007-01-01/negotiating-terrorists>. [Accessed Mar 1, 2018].

⁵³ Neumann, P. R. (2007). Negotiating with Terrorists. *Foreign Affairs*. Accessed online: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2007-01-01/negotiating-terrorists>. [Accessed Mar 1, 2018].

inevitably encounter tremendous difficulties in constructing an inclusive negotiations process.⁵⁴

Although terrorists tend to portray themselves as belonging to tightly knit organizations, the secret conditions under which they operate make it nearly impossible for them to maintain a perfect chain of command, making negotiation with a central leadership figure virtually impossible to administer. In terrorist networks such as al Qaeda and Islamic State, the leadership hardly plays any operational role at all, merely providing ideological inspiration and moral sanction to its associated networks, and often acts a symbolic figurehead than a functional means of leadership. Governments eager for progress may be too quick to jump at any sign of a strategic juncture. This impulse may be well intentioned, but it can turn out to be counterproductive.⁵⁵

⁵⁴ Neumann, P. R. (2007). Negotiating with Terrorists. *Foreign Affairs*. Accessed online: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2007-01-01/negotiating-terrorists>. [Accessed Mar 1, 2018].

⁵⁵ Neumann, P. R. (2007). Negotiating with Terrorists. *Foreign Affairs*. Accessed online: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2007-01-01/negotiating-terrorists>. [Accessed Mar 1, 2018].

Chapter 3: The War on Terror

Following the attacks, the Bush administration strongly pushed the agenda that the Iraq invasion was the correct defensive response to the attacks, as Saddam's regime posed a threat to American "freedom". Faced with an angry American population who insisted on direct response, the Bush administration capitalized on the fear and ignorance displayed by its staunchest supporters and chose a compellence strategy through the mobilization of military force. Bush's assertion that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction created the main driving force for the justification of invading Iraq as a defensive strategy against terrorism, costing billions of dollars and increasing U.S. presence in the region which was already destabilized by sectarian conflict and corruption. Further, the War in Iraq exacerbated recruitment as a potent global recruitment pretext (dramatically raising the risk of future attacks against the West), created a vacuum in which ISIS could have a foothold and increased the necessity of focused counterterrorism strategy for the years following until today. Indeed, the War in Iraq has shaped the prospect of our contemporary understanding of terrorism and is undeniably linked to counterterrorism strategies, as it was a failed defensive policy and catalyst to growing terrorism.

There's little debate among scholars and citizens toward the notion that the Iraq and Afghanistan invasion was the most controversial and expensive national security policy in the aftermath of 9/11. The War on Terror was a defensive military campaign to invade Iraq and Afghanistan launched by the Bush administration in response to 9/11. The Bush administration marketed the war as a defensive strategy against al Qaeda and terrorists, by claiming that toppling Saddam's regime and destroying his weapons of mass

destruction would administer justice for the attacks while curbing any future threat of violence.

According to the FY2018 budget, the total cost of the war added a little over \$2 trillion to the national debt, with \$1,774 trillion spent by the Bush administration and \$807 billion incurred by the Obama administration. Aside from the financial toll, the human cost was equally astronomical. Since the U.S. went to war in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, about 2.5 million members of the Army, Navy, Marines, Air Force, Coast Guard and related Reserve and National Guard units have been deployed in the Afghanistan and Iraq wars. 9500 British troops were sent to Afghanistan. Of those, more than a third were deployed more than once. As a result, 4,488 U.S. soldiers were killed and 32,226 more were wounded.⁵⁶

In a seemingly endless war, as of 2017, nearly 37,000 Americans had been deployed more than five times, among them 10,000 members of guard or Reserve units. Additionally, records also show that 400,000 service members have done three or more deployments.⁵⁷ Adding to the financial toll, the human toll was tremendous. Over a million civilian casualties were reported as of 2015, a number believed to be realistically much higher.⁵⁸ The deadly War on Terror fueled an insurmountable national debt, human loss, a surge in homeless and mentally ill veterans, and incited further radicalization within the region.

The normalization of the War on Terror was a crucial component to framing it as a justifiable policy response to 9/11. Ty Solomon argues that there was just as much

⁵⁶ Amadeo, K. (2018). War on Terror Facts, Costs, and Timeline. *The Balance*. Accessed online: <https://www.thebalance.com/war-on-terror-facts-costs-timeline-3306300> [Accessed February 1, 2018].

⁵⁷ Amadeo, K. (2018). War on Terror Facts, Costs, and Timeline. *The Balance*. Accessed online: <https://www.thebalance.com/war-on-terror-facts-costs-timeline-3306300>. [Accessed February 1, 2018].

⁵⁸ Physicians for Social Responsibility. (2015). Body Count. Casualty Figures after 10 Years of the “War on Terror”. *Physicians for Global Survival. IPPNW Germany*. Page 10.

concern for how the war was perceived to the American people and to the world as the war itself⁵⁹. One of the most controversial elements of the war was the absence of visible ties between Iraq and the 9/11 attacks. Egyptian, Saudi, Emirati and Lebanese hijackers carried out the attack formulated by a Saudi mastermind linked to an Afghan based extremist group. In contrast, selling the Iraq war to the American population proved to be less difficult than anticipated. Solomon links studies which showed that the high levels of public support for the war was due to the Bush administration's linking of Iraq to the War on Terror. He argues the subtle and rhetorical moves that bonded Iraq to the War on Terror were key in garnering public support. Bush's convincing use of rhetoric mixed with high emotions after the attack and Saddam Hussein's long-standing antagonistic relationship with the United States meant that most Americans were willing to assume Iraq's complicity in the 9/11 attacks.⁶⁰ Additionally, a black-and-white understanding of international politics concurrent with the stigmatization of the Muslim community blurred the distinction between Iraq and al Qaeda.

The Bush administration successfully reproduced U.S. identity by frequently referring to the attacks as an attack on American "freedom". The frequent invocation of "freedom" after 9/11 served the purpose of simplifying American values while linking "terrorists" and "terrorism" as the antithesis to these values⁶¹. As these words were continually used in a binary spectrum, public interpretation was one that terrorism is a problem of the sort that must be addressed by a "war".⁶² Solomon states that the terms

⁵⁹ Solomon, T. (2009). Social Logics and Normalization in the War on Terror. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 38(2), Page 271.

⁶⁰ Solomon, T. (2009). Social Logics and Normalization in the War on Terror. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 38(2), Page 271.

⁶¹ Solomon, T. (2009). Social Logics and Normalization in the War on Terror. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 38(2), Page 278.

⁶² Solomon, T. (2009). Social Logics and Normalization in the War on Terror. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 38(2), Page 280.

“terrorist”, “outlaw regimes” and “terror states” were frequently found in the same sentence in late 2002 and early 2003 and used congruent with “weapons of mass destruction”. For the American people, the othering was distinct, as the administration drove home the notion that foreign actors practicing a foreign faith in a foreign land posed as a violent and uncompromising threat to the United States. The stage of good versus bad was clearly solidified, as a powerful nation was pressured to take immediate action.

After the attacks, the linkage between terrorists and state sponsors of terrorism was a decisive move by Bush administration officials to justify the war, and was further repeated by major elites, pundits, institutions and media who condensed many of the elements of what “terrorists” and “regime” meant.⁶³ The inclusion and linkage of these terms was made much more explicitly and frequently after the ‘axis of evil’ State of the Union speech in late January 2002.⁶⁴ Just as “freedom” was under attack from terrorists, such was repeated as being threatened by Saddam Hussein and Iraq.⁶⁵

Though Byman and Pollock’s research is from 2008, they make starkly accurate predictions of the vulnerability of further radicalization in Iraq should the U.S. withdraw troops. They believe one of the biggest mistakes of the Iraq War was that the United States diverted its military might to Iraq rather than consolidating its victory in Afghanistan and increasing its chances of hunting down Osama bin Laden.⁶⁶ They state that Iraq has indeed become a “central front” in the war on terrorism – largely because of

⁶³ Solomon, T. (2009). Social Logics and Normalization in the War on Terror. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 38(2), Page 282.

⁶⁴ Solomon, T. (2009). Social Logics and Normalization in the War on Terror. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 38(2), Page 283.

⁶⁵ Solomon, T. (2009). Social Logics and Normalization in the War on Terror. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 38(2), Page 284.

⁶⁶ Byman, D. L. and Pollock, K. M. (2008). Iraq’s Long-Term Impact on Jihadist Terrorism. *The Annals of the American Academy*, 618, Page 56.

the Bush administration's policies, which have created a Salafi terrorist problem in Iraq where none existed. The authors warned that, the problem of terrorism emanating from Iraq will not go away if the United States abandons the country to strife, the arguable result of withdrawal from the region which opened the door for ISIS to rise among the destabilization.

Since the U.S. occupation of Iraq began in 2003, foreign-born Salafi extremists have flocked to Iraq, making it the new center of their "jihad" by attracting the local displaced population and taking advantage of existing sectarian conflict. Unfortunately, the authors were correct in predicting that this may be one of the most lasting effects of the U.S. invasion and occupation: the emergence of a domestic extremist movement in Iraq where none existed before.⁶⁷ Byman and Pollock are correct in assessing that the U.S. war in and occupation of Iraq had benefited the al Qaeda movement in many ways, including providing a valuable recruiting tool among surviving civilians whose lives, homes, and families were taken during the war. Further, a study by Peter Bergen and Paul Cruickshank concluded that the Iraq War has generated a stunning increase in the yearly rate of fatal jihadist attacks, amounting to hundreds of additional terrorist attacks and thousands of civilian lives lost—a figure which includes an increase in attacks in Iraq itself, as well as the rest of the world.⁶⁸

Not surprisingly, Iraq became the center of al Qaeda's fund-raising and recruitment efforts. Because of the war, fighting the United States was a tremendously popular notion among radical and even mainstream Islamist circles and proof of bin Laden's "far enemy" theory: that for Muslims, the offenses of their own governments are

⁶⁷ Byman, D. L. and Pollock, K. M. (2008). Iraq's Long-Term Impact on Jihadist Terrorism. *The Annals of the American Academy.* 618, Page 57.

⁶⁸ Byman, D. L. and Pollock, K. M. (2008). Iraq's Long-Term Impact on Jihadist Terrorism. *The Annals of the American Academy.* 618, Page 59.

overshadowed by the actions of Western nations. Byman and Pollock state that even Muslim scholars and leaders who were originally critical of al Qaeda's mission began to vocalize the struggle in Iraq as a legitimate defensive jihad, even in countries that are close allies of the United States. Indeed, for extremists, the War on Terror became a palpable example of the West's war with Islam.

The authors believe the United States occupation in Iraq fostered a new brand of jihad, providing a place where new and curious Salafi insurgents gain hands on combat experience and network with other extremists whose allyship they can count on even if they leave Iraq.⁶⁹ Most worrisome, Iraq became a new "field of jihad," a place where extremists come to meet, train, fight, and create bonds that last when they leave Iraq for the West or for other countries in the region.⁷⁰ The region itself proved a solid base for recruiting, providing real time combat experience along with a vulnerable and displaced population. The authors argued that beyond military actions, the United States must work hard to increase the governmental capacity of neighboring states – an action which failed when President Obama withdrew troops leaving behind prime recruits for extremism in a new generation of young displaced men and an overwhelming flow of uprooted refugees.⁷¹ Ultimately, the war in Iraq vindicated Osama bin Laden's main argument that the primary enemy of the Muslim world was not the local autocrats but the "far enemy" of the West and particularly the United States.

Similarly, Jonathan Gilmore makes the strong assessment that the movement towards counterinsurgency is inappropriate as a platform for the protection of human security and

⁶⁹ Byman, D. L. and Pollock, K. M. (2008). Iraq's Long-Term Impact on Jihadist Terrorism. *The Annals of the American Academy*. 618, Page 62.

⁷⁰ Byman, D. L. and Pollock, K. M. (2008). Iraq's Long-Term Impact on Jihadist Terrorism. *The Annals of the American Academy*. 618, Page 63.

⁷¹ Byman, D. L. and Pollock, K. M. (2008). Iraq's Long-Term Impact on Jihadist Terrorism. *The Annals of the American Academy*. 618, Page 67.

unlikely to be successful as a long-term strategy to address the underlying social and political problems that contribute to the violence in Iraq and Afghanistan. He argues that the War on Terror's method of counterinsurgency functions as an instrument directed towards victory against a terrorist insurgency rather than as an end, and does nothing to bolster or repair existing tensions between the United States and Muslim led nations.⁷²

Gilmore maintains that motivations for insurgents and combatants is not monolithic, as motives for participation in violence in a conflict-affected society are likely to vary considerably and may be influenced by a variety of ideological, local political, economic and personal agendas.⁷³ He states that a more empirically grounded analysis would have provided some response to criticisms of Western interpretations of Afghanistan and the notion that the Taliban are “one-dimensional zealots, imprisoned within their culture of extremism and tribal honor”.⁷⁴ As a result, the scope of the research is limited only to that which is useful in justifying U.S. forces in a War on Terror campaign. Gilmore accurately states, “the implicit acceptance and the relative stability of the War on Terror narrative reflect its central importance in providing a justification to the U.S. electorate for long-term and hazardous overseas military deployments where U.S. security interests may not be immediately evident”.⁷⁵

Under the guise of toppling Saddam's regime and “introducing democracy” through state-building, the Iraq occupation succeeded in the disempowerment of local populations, dependency on international interveners, and a compromised sense of self-

⁷² Gilmore, J. (2011). A Kinder, Gentler Counter-Terrorism: Counterinsurgency, Human Security and the War on Terror. *Security Dialogue* 42(1), Page 28.

⁷³ Gilmore, J. (2011). A Kinder, Gentler Counter-Terrorism: Counterinsurgency, Human Security and the War on Terror. *Security Dialogue* 42(1), Page 29.

⁷⁴ Gilmore, J. (2011). A Kinder, Gentler Counter-Terrorism: Counterinsurgency, Human Security and the War on Terror. *Security Dialogue* 42(1), Page 30.

⁷⁵ Gilmore, J. (2011). A Kinder, Gentler Counter-Terrorism: Counterinsurgency, Human Security and the War on Terror. *Security Dialogue* 42(1), Page 31.

determination and state sovereignty—all factors which make the region ripe for radicalization.⁷⁶ Gilmore suggests people-centered approaches, which are focused on community building and diplomacy. He states while the U.S. counterinsurgency concept stresses the need for local legitimacy and the introduction of Western society, the inhabitants of the societies subjected to counterinsurgency programs like in Iraq and Afghanistan remain disempowered and have no opportunity to contest the War on Terror narrative within which it operates. War creates a vulnerable population, particularly in Iraq, which was already reeling from decades of autocratic rule on top of existing tribal conflict. Gilmore argues that community based programs aimed at facilitating post war reconstruction, the development of cultural understanding and empowerment of local populations are not conducted as ends in themselves, but rather only employed in the service of U.S. security interests.⁷⁷

Further, the narrative surrounding the purpose of the invasion is crucial, as the elements set forth by the Bush administration normalized Western presence and dictated military motivation. Gilmore argues that cultural knowledge obtained by U.S. forces remained conditioned by the overarching War on Terror narrative put forth by the administration and encouraged by the American population. He claims sociocultural knowledge is only obtained to support preordained War on Terror strategic objectives rather than to potentially challenge the premises upon which campaigns are conducted—an accurate notion when examining the lack of community building post withdrawal.⁷⁸

⁷⁶ Gilmore, J. (2011). A Kinder, Gentler Counter-Terrorism: Counterinsurgency, Human Security and the War on Terror. *Security Dialogue* 42(1), Page 32.

⁷⁷ Gilmore, J. (2011). A Kinder, Gentler Counter-Terrorism: Counterinsurgency, Human Security and the War on Terror. *Security Dialogue* 42(1), Page 33.

⁷⁸ Gilmore, J. (2011). A Kinder, Gentler Counter-Terrorism: Counterinsurgency, Human Security and the War on Terror. *Security Dialogue* 42(1), Page 34.

Scholar Joseba Zulaika attests that since the United States believed future nuclear attacks by terrorists were only a matter of time, they justified waging a war preemptively, even in a nuclear context, thus breaking the historic assumption that nuclear arsenals were for deterrence, not for actual usage. What justifies the use of a “just war” in the nuclear era is the *desire* of terrorists for having the weapons of mass destruction the U.S. claims they possess. There is nothing evil or irrational about having or using them, as it is an established fact that terrorists desire them and one day will have them. Thus, the formula of “not if, but when” becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. The counterterrorist thinking makes it an imperative that the war must start now – against Saddam Hussein, against al Qaeda and against all potential terrorists. This is how the American public, including the liberal media, accepted the rationale to go to war against Iraq.⁷⁹

Despite a declared interest in local engagement during the War on Terror, the objectives sought by U.S. in Iraq centered on the maintenance of Iraq as a compliant government and the reconstruction of the state as a minimally democratic ally in combatting terrorism.⁸⁰ Gilmore argues a general concern for the well-being of the local Iraqi and Afghan populations, less military security focus and distinctive development have a more positive effect toward human security and combatting radicalization.⁸¹ Unfortunately, these principles were not heavily considered during the Iraq occupation and subsequent withdrawal of troops, solidifying jihadi justification for more violence and creating a vacuum in which they could successfully continue to operate.

⁷⁹ Zulaika, J. (2012). Drones, Witches and Other Flying Objects: The Force of Fantasy in US Counterterrorism. *Critical Studies on Terrorism*, 5(1), Page 59.

⁸⁰ Gilmore, J. (2011). A Kinder, Gentler Counter-Terrorism: Counterinsurgency, Human Security and the War on Terror. *Security Dialogue* 42(1), Page 35.

⁸¹ Gilmore, J. (2011). A Kinder, Gentler Counter-Terrorism: Counterinsurgency, Human Security and the War on Terror. *Security Dialogue* 42(1), Page 36.

In using the war as a method of defense, the United States paid its own price in the form of a massive debt, disabled veterans, and fodder for radicalization. The occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan in direct response to the attacks was normalized by the Bush administration and unquestioned by the American public who so desperately supported the administering of justice in the wake of the largest attack in history— even if justice was directed inaccurately. The cost incurred, civilian damage inflicted, veteran trauma aroused, and destabilization of the occupied region placed a heavy toll on both sides and proved counterintuitive as a counterinsurgency strategy because it provided solid base for further radicalization and continued violence. The initial War on Terror failed in its mission to apprehend Osama bin Laden (an operation which was successfully completed by President Obama in the later part of the war) and destroy al Qaeda, instead fueling the ideology of extremism and exacerbating the binary between American “freedom” and values and jihadist perceived “War on Islam”. By turning the war on terrorism into a conflict of “us” versus “them”, the Bush administration made it hard to bridge the gap between domestic and foreign audiences for many years to come.⁸²

⁸² Ham, P. V. (2003). War, Lies, and Videotape: Public Diplomacy and the USA’s War on Terrorism. *Security Dialogue*, 34(4), Page 438.

Chapter 4: Torture, Excessive Force and “Enhanced Interrogation Techniques”

In December of 2014, the Senate Intelligence Committee released 525 pages of a 6,000-page report detailing the use of torture during CIA detention and interrogation on captured combatants and suspected extremists after 9/11. Though the remaining pages are still classified, the report details actions by CIA officials including torturing prisoners using what they dubbed as “enhanced interrogation techniques”, providing misleading or false information to the media, impeding government oversight and internal criticism, and mishandling the program. Additionally, the report revealed the existence of previously unknown detainees, the severity of the treatment that detainees were subjected to, and that more methods of torture were used than previously disclosed. The report concluded that torturing prisoners did not help acquire actionable intelligence or gain cooperation from detainees and that the program damaged the United States' international standing.⁸³

Torture has a complicated history in the international realm. The UN Declaration of Human Rights gave way to the Convention against Torture, which offered a more narrow scope on addressing the issue. Article 1.1 of the Convention describes torture as:

“any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity”⁸⁴

Torture is prohibited and it does not recognize any excuse of states to use it in emergency situations. Even a single act of torture is prohibited by international law under any

⁸³ United States., & Feinstein, D. (2014). *The Senate Intelligence Committee Report on Torture: Committee study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program*.

⁸⁴ UN General Assembly, Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 10 December 1984, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1465, p. 85, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3a94.html> [Accessed April 24, 2018]

circumstances. The prohibition also extends to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, as the Convention distinguishes between torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment on a variety of bases.

Manfred Nowak details the essential elements of torture are the following: involvement of a public official, infliction of severe pain or suffering, intention of the perpetrator and a specific purpose, and powerlessness of the victim. Infliction of severe pain or suffering is a requirement for both torture and cruel or inhuman treatment and punishment.⁸⁵ If a treatment inflicts severe pain or suffering, it qualifies as cruel or inhuman treatment and, if the additional requirements of powerlessness of the victim, intent and purpose are fulfilled, also as torture.⁸⁶ Nowak emphasizes the intent of the act within the definition of torture by stating the threshold of torture is only reached if such conditions are deliberately inflicted on a particular group of detainees for the purpose of punishment.⁸⁷

While a huge justification for the use of torture is that it is a successful deterrent for future violence, as a deterrent method torture doesn't work. Given that the purpose of a deterrent is to prevent, torture is an act which takes place in retaliation to a violent act. Once torture is in use, it has failed as a proper deterrent method because the action had occurred despite the threat of torture. That said, torture can still act as a deterrent by fear, albeit not a very good one. On the one hand, the use of torture is meant to punish perpetrators convicted of violent crimes, and on the other hand its use is intended as a

⁸⁵ Nowak, Manfred (2009). "Torture and Enforced Disappearance". *International Protection of Human Rights: A Textbook*. Åbo Akademi University Institute for Human Rights. Retrieved from http://bim.lbg.ac.at/files/sites/bim/Nowak_textbookchapter_torture&enforced_disappearances.pdf. Page 154.

⁸⁶ Nowak, Manfred (2009). "Torture and Enforced Disappearance". *International Protection of Human Rights: A Textbook*. Åbo Akademi University Institute for Human Rights. Retrieved from http://bim.lbg.ac.at/files/sites/bim/Nowak_textbookchapter_torture&enforced_disappearances.pdf. Page 155

⁸⁷ Nowak, Manfred (2009). "Torture and Enforced Disappearance". *International Protection of Human Rights: A Textbook*. Åbo Akademi University Institute for Human Rights. Retrieved from http://bim.lbg.ac.at/files/sites/bim/Nowak_textbookchapter_torture&enforced_disappearances.pdf. Page 160

warning to quell future violence. Additionally, governments justify their use of torture as a means to extract information, though several studies show information gathered under torture is unreliable. States torture combatants when they believe that those tortured will release secrets, which might aid the state in its attempts to identify and eliminate domestic threats. Further, states engage in torture as a form of punishment. Finally, states engage in torture to instill terror in the surrounding population.⁸⁸

Still, torture studies present several complications. Torture itself is difficult to quantify as scholars and civilians do not have access to intelligence that is provided during interrogations and are dependent upon what is conveyed by governmental institutions. Although torture is practiced in nearly all counterinsurgency campaigns, the evidence properly documenting torture's effects is severely limited and inaccessible to scholars. Regardless, the theoretical arguments contend that torture is ineffective for reducing killings perpetrated by insurgents because it both fails to reduce insurgent capacities for violence and because it can increase the incentives for insurgents to commit future killings by creating a hostile environment.⁸⁹

Though much of the CIA report remains unknown, the public is aware that "enhanced interrogation techniques" were administered on detainees by various components of the U.S. Armed Forces at black sites around the world, including Bagram, Guantanamo Bay, and Abu Ghraib by individuals authorized by officials of the George W. Bush administration. Some methods used included beating, stress positions, sleep deprivation, sexual abuse, and waterboarding to name a select few.

⁸⁸ Sullivan, C. M. (2014). The (In)effectiveness of Torture for Combating Insurgency. *Journal of Peace Research*, 51(3), Page 387.

⁸⁹ Sullivan, C. M. (2014). The (In)effectiveness of Torture for Combating Insurgency. *Journal of Peace Research*, 51(3), Page 388.

The CIA only admitted to waterboarding Abu Zubaydah, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and Abd al Rahim al-Nashiri.⁹⁰

Jamal Barnes accurately proclaims that after 9/11, the United States created a pro-torture culture that promoted an “us vs. them” mentality between the United States and terrorist groups and operatives, removed Geneva protections from terrorist suspects and re-defined torture and what was a justified use of force. The desire for immediate justice in the aftermath of the attacks opened the door to arguments for the use of torture to a point where torture has become an accepted practice within the United States.⁹¹ By re-defining torture practices as “enhanced interrogation”, the Bush administration redefined the acceptance of pain and suffering with unnecessary violence. The new definition removed the negative connotations associated with torture and brought it within “civilized” and “necessary” conduct to be relinquished on a foreign enemy who was a direct threat to American values.⁹² Further, Barnes proclaims that the Bush administration cleverly dubbed its torture practices as “enhanced interrogation” because the United States knew it could not openly challenge the torture taboo in the international community and employ torture to fight terrorism. Challenging this torture taboo would have challenged the U.S. identity as a “humane” state and de-legitimized American values while spawning further material for extremist recruitment.⁹³

No military base exhibited the horror and inefficacy of torture quite like Abu Ghraib. In late 2003, a whistleblower submitted photos to the press confirming what human rights organizations suspected—that Iraqi detainees were being tortured and

⁹⁰ United States., & Feinstein, D. (2014). *The Senate Intelligence Committee Report on Torture: Committee study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program*.

⁹¹ Barnes, J. (2015). The ‘War on Terror’ and the Battle for the Definition of Torture. *International Relations*, 30(1), Page 108.

⁹² Barnes, J. (2015). The ‘War on Terror’ and the Battle for the Definition of Torture. *International Relations*, 30(1), Page 103.

⁹³ Sullivan, C. M. (2014). The (In)effectiveness of Torture for Combating Insurgency. *Journal of Peace Research*, 51(3), Page 106.

abused by American soldiers under the justification of national security. Unfortunately, the Abu Ghraib photographs did not expose a few “bad apples”, or an exceptional instance of brutality or perversity, but instead the dehumanization of a desperate administration with power in its disposal.⁹⁴ Avery Gordon accurately proclaims that the actions and policies of military prison guards reflect accepted civilian prison norms. Excessive force, civil disability and the loss of internationally guaranteed rights, and indefinite detention are central means by which the War on Terror are executed and normalized among Americans who believe freedom is being preserved by these actions.⁹⁵

General Antonio Taguba who investigated Abu Ghraib found that numerous incidents of sadistic criminal abuses were inflicted on several detainees. The graphic photographic evidence amounted to well over one thousand images and nearly one hundred video files of detainee abuse. Taguba stated that the systemic and illegal abuse of detainees was intentionally perpetrated with the specific purpose to cause harm.⁹⁶ Indeed as more detainees were admitted into both Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo, and no information continued to be provided, the swelling population had produced a frustrating lack of actionable intelligence. High-value or low-value, the tortured detainees yielded embarrassingly little—even with the assumption that the system was capable of distinguishing between them.⁹⁷

Aside from the physical effects of enhanced interrogations, techniques for “breaking” prisoners are different from standard forms of interrogation, most notably due to its focus on psychological pain. Furthermore, the infliction of injuries would be difficult to detect

⁹⁴ Gordon, A. F. (2006). Abu Ghraib: Imprisonment and the War on Terror. *Race & Class*, 48(1), Page 49.

⁹⁵ Gordon, A. F. (2006). Abu Ghraib: Imprisonment and the War on Terror. *Race & Class*, 48(1), Page 43.

⁹⁶ Danchev, A. (2006). “Like a Dog!”: Humiliation and Shame in the War on Terror. *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, 31(3), Page 263.

⁹⁷ Danchev, A. (2006). “Like a Dog!”: Humiliation and Shame in the War on Terror. *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, 31(3), Page 267.

since the scars remain deep inside the psyche and inadmissible for blame.⁹⁸ As officials were aware that those who participate in the use of such techniques could face criminal sanctions, key procedures were further refined to leave no marks (such as waterboarding).⁹⁹

Gordon believes that while Abu Ghraib shows abundant cause for moral outrage and disgust, there is no warrant for being surprised or shocked that military personnel of the United States tortured, abused and ritually humiliated other human beings and that the country's political and military leaders covered up their authorization of it.¹⁰⁰ The normality of the abuse exhibited by the administration trickled down to the American population, as everyday citizens believed this level of force was necessary to keep innocent people safe and protect democracy. This assumed normality also explains why, when interviewed by the FBI, no one reported observing any misconduct or mistreatment of those detained at Abu Ghraib.¹⁰¹ It is no shock that no member of, or contractor to, the U.S. Department of Defense in Iraq, Cuba, Afghanistan or elsewhere has been charged with torture, inflicting cruel and unusual punishment or war crimes. The lesser order of charges against the lowest ranking officials were crumbs thrown to an angry press and agitated public.¹⁰²

Author Christopher Sullivan believes that justifications for torture do not rest on the reliability of the information provided, but on arguments that engaging in torture will allow state agents to somehow reduce insurgent perpetrated violence. Neither outcome was presented in the post 9/11 period with the use of torture. Like the abuse, the pressure

⁹⁸ Welch, M. (2009). American 'Pain-ology' in the War on Terror: A Critique of 'Scientific' Torture. *Theoretical Criminology*, 13(4), Page 454.

⁹⁹ Welch, M. (2009). American 'Pain-ology' in the War on Terror: A Critique of 'Scientific' Torture. *Theoretical Criminology*, 13(4), Page 465.

¹⁰⁰ Gordon, A. F. (2006). Abu Ghraib: Imprisonment and the War on Terror. *Race & Class*, 48(1), Page 44.

¹⁰¹ Gordon, A. F. (2006). Abu Ghraib: Imprisonment and the War on Terror. *Race & Class*, 48(1), Page 49.

¹⁰² Gordon, A. F. (2006). Abu Ghraib: Imprisonment and the War on Terror. *Race & Class*, 48(1), Page 48.

was systemic, starting at the top and trickling all the way down. With the passage of time the demand for proof was overtaken by the demand for results.¹⁰³ The information provided by tortured detainees as part of post 9/11 CIA torture programs failed to provide valuable information regarding those responsible for the 9/11 attacks, and preventing future violence. Still, rather than questioning whether those detainees were terrorists and perhaps instead innocent persons, military officials toughened coercive interrogation tactics along with other aspects of the conditions of confinement. The notion that the interrogation techniques didn't work or that the detainees were not active insurgents was never considered.¹⁰⁴ In short, the agony of torture created an incentive to speak, but not necessarily to speak the truth.¹⁰⁵

Jose Alvarez details a disturbing loophole in the Torture Convention employed by the Bush administration under the asserted excuse of self-defense and necessity in war time.¹⁰⁶ Alvarez states that in a government issued memoranda, the Bush administration concluded that the relevant obligations on interrogation techniques in the third and fourth Geneva Conventions do not apply to al Qaeda or Taliban detainees or to "unlawful combatants" generally, claiming they did not fall under traditional "POW" status.¹⁰⁷ The Torture Convention's constitutional constraints were said not to apply to aliens outside the United States, according to the memo writers. The Convention does nothing to avert torture when the U.S. acts against aliens abroad.¹⁰⁸ Further, Alvarez claims the

¹⁰³ Danchev, A. (2006). "Like a Dog!": Humiliation and Shame in the War on Terror. *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, 31(3), Page 273.

¹⁰⁴ Welch, M. (2009). American 'Pain-ology' in the War on Terror: A Critique of 'Scientific' Torture. *Theoretical Criminology*, 13(4), Page 464.

¹⁰⁵ Welch, M. (2009). American 'Pain-ology' in the War on Terror: A Critique of 'Scientific' Torture. *Theoretical Criminology*, 13(4), Page 485.

¹⁰⁶ Alvarez, J.A. Torturing the Law. *Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law*. 37(2). Page 184.

¹⁰⁷ Alvarez, J.A. Torturing the Law. *Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law*. 37(2). Page 180.

¹⁰⁸ Alvarez, J.A. Torturing the Law. *Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law*. 37(2). Page 183.

administration justified away a great deal of heinous acts after 9/11 because they were not narrowly defined as "torture".¹⁰⁹ Finally, the torture memo asserts that international law does not bind the U.S. military because it is not federal law, while President Bush's determination of the detention of Al Qaeda and Taliban members overrides any customary international law.¹¹⁰

There are substantial reasons to doubt the effectiveness of enhanced interrogation. Further, it is worth noting that excessive force and torture tactics have been condemned by psychologists commissioned by the Intelligence Science Board, who reported that the harsh techniques were "outmoded, amateurish and unreliable". In 2008, the Senate Armed Services Committee released a report explicitly rejecting the Bush administration's contention that tough interrogation methods were successful in keeping the country and its troops safe. The report stated that those harsh methods damaged the U.S. government's ability to collect accurate intelligence, strengthened the hand of extremists, and compromised U.S. moral authority.¹¹¹ Increasingly apparent was the notion that many individuals detained in Iraq and Afghanistan by the U.S. government had no connection to terrorism, often sold for bounties and poorly assessed by military intelligence who had little knowledge of the region and its actors.¹¹²

To date, eight people in U.S. custody have been tortured to death.¹¹³ An estimated 24,000 interrogations have taken place at Guantanamo, a figure believed to be much

¹⁰⁹ Alvarez, J.A. Torturing the Law. *Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law*, 37(2), Page 184.

¹¹⁰ Alvarez, J.A. Torturing the Law. *Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law*, 37(2), Page 186.

¹¹¹ Welch, M. (2009). American 'Pain-ology' in the War on Terror: A Critique of 'Scientific' Torture. *Theoretical Criminology*, 13(4), Page 464.

¹¹² Welch, M. (2009). American 'Pain-ology' in the War on Terror: A Critique of 'Scientific' Torture. *Theoretical Criminology*, 13(4), Page 465.

¹¹³ Danchev, A. (2006). "Like a Dog!": Humiliation and Shame in the War on Terror. *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, 31(3), Page 274.

higher.¹¹⁴ The extent of prisoner abuse after 9/11 indicates forms of expressive punishment and scapegoating. Consequently, the exposure of torture at U.S. military bases provided valuable recruiting material for extremists and fueled further vitriol toward the West, with some former detainees emphatically radicalizing where they hadn't before. Indeed, as Gordon states, the reality of the "foreign" enemy captured, tortured, ritually humiliated, detained indefinitely reproduced the death of law and morality to be presented as the necessary price for Western safety and security.¹¹⁵

¹¹⁴ Welch, M. (2009). American 'Pain-ology' in the War on Terror: A Critique of 'Scientific' Torture. *Theoretical Criminology*, 13(4), Page 462.

¹¹⁵ Gordon, A. F. (2006). Abu Ghraib: Imprisonment and the War on Terror. *Race & Class*, 48(1), Page 48.

Chapter 5: Targeted Drone Attacks

One of the most prominent features of the Obama administration's approach to defeating international terrorism was his use of targeted drone attacks— particularly in Pakistan, where bin Laden was ultimately killed. Heavily popularized due to its ease, pilotless drones flying at 10,000 feet and operated by CIA agents 7,500 miles away in the Nevada desert perfected the strategy of warfare at a distance.¹¹⁶ In 2012, the United States military had more than 7,000 drones with an additional 12,000 more on the ground. In 2011, these drones carried out hundreds of strikes in six countries, transforming the way our democracy deliberates and engages in what we used to think of as war.¹¹⁷

The strength of the robotic weaponry of drone attacks lies in their ability to see and think outside the realm of human functions. The drones can program a destination and fly by themselves; they can follow a target for days from the invisible altitude, while the faraway operator is never in danger of being killed from below. Unmanned machines such as drones do not have desires of their own, intentions, or feel subjectively responsible for their actions. As machines they cannot commit war crimes, as the required intent to commit them is missing. The killing itself might perhaps now be done in a subjectless manner by machines finding out who the terrorists are and acting on their own.¹¹⁸

Further, drones can be used for any battlefield operation: surveillance, reconnaissance, precision attacks, targeted killings, etc. As any other robot, a drone can

¹¹⁶ Zulaika, J. (2012). Drones, Witches and Other Flying Objects: The Force of Fantasy in US Counterterrorism. *Critical Studies on Terrorism*, 5(1), Page 53.

¹¹⁷ Singer, P. W. (2012). Do Drones Undermine Democracy? The New York Times. Accessed online at <https://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/22/opinion/sunday/do-drones-undermine-democracy.html>. Page 1. [Accessed March 15, 2018].

¹¹⁸ Zulaika, J. (2012). Drones, Witches and Other Flying Objects: The Force of Fantasy in US Counterterrorism. *Critical Studies on Terrorism*, 5(1), Page 53.

be used to carry out dull, dirty or dangerous battlefield operations, nor do they suffer from human weakness. Similarly, drones can continue flying longer than a human pilot.¹¹⁹ Economy of resources is also critical because drone costs 4.5 million dollars and it is 30 times cheaper than a jet fighter and there are no human costs even in case of failure of a mission, if any. The frightening level of detachment involved in a weapon designed to target and kill became a central force in Obama's efforts in destabilizing al Qaeda and ISIS, and capturing Osama bin Laden. However, this was not without consequence.

It is hard to know how many people have been killed by drones (some estimates include between 2,000 and 3,000), let alone how many of them are civilians, as each side paints a different picture of the number of casualties. Some Western estimates put the number of militants among the dead at 85%. In contrast, Pakistani newspapers calculated that of the 708 people killed in 2009, only five were known militants. Another newspaper in Pakistan, *The News*, estimated that of the 701 people killed by drones between January 2006 and April 2009, only 14 were known militants. Unfortunately, the area is sealed by Pakistan, with the CIA and Pakistani secret services being the main sources of intelligence and holding on to this information. Of the people killed, the CIA knows the names of only 125 people and considers a meager 35 of them as high value targets. Given this discrepancy, it is not surprising therefore that reliable information is extremely hard to get, as American and Pakistani official sources issue wildly divergent claims.¹²⁰

Counterinsurgency expert David Kilcullen told Congress in April 2009 that in 3 years of drone strikes in Pakistan, Americans killed 14 senior al Qaeda leaders; while in

¹¹⁹ O'Connell, M. (2010). Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones: A Case Study of Pakistan, 2004–2009. *Shooting to Kill: Socio-Legal Perspectives on the Use of Lethal Force, Notre Dame Law School*, 09(43), Page 5.

¹²⁰ Zulaika, J. (2012). Drones, Witches and Other Flying Objects: The Force of Fantasy in US Counterterrorism. *Critical Studies on Terrorism*, 5(1), Page 54.

the same period drones killed 700 Pakistani civilians in the same area. He stressed that the drone strikes are highly unpopular and are deeply aggravating to the population, giving rise to a feeling of anger that coalesces the population around the extremists and leads to spikes of extremist activity. Kilcullen observed that the ratio of civilians killed for each militant is 50:1, that is, 98% of drone casualties are civilians— despite the United States’ insistence that drone attacks create technological precision. Kilcullen claimed, “Every one of these dead non-combatants [creates] an alienated family, a new desire for revenge, and more recruits for a militant movement that has grown exponentially even as drone strikes have increased.” He stressed his main concern with the formation of “the accidental guerrilla” – ordinary people caught in the fight who end up supporting the local fight against the outsiders and who would be impossible to distinguish from the terrorists, except by accident.¹²¹

Given the fact that drone strikes have targeted weddings and funerals and appear to be seriously fuelling the insurgency, it is no surprise that Taliban recruits increased as a result. Airstrikes are prominent in motivating suicide attacks, a UN report concluded; while surveys show direct links between family members killed and joining or supporting the insurgency. One concrete instance of such links was provided by Faisal Shahzad, the Pakistani-American known for the failed bomb in Times Square in May 2010, who declared in his trial that he was avenging the civilians in the drone attacks. Zulaika concludes that the drone war in Afghanistan and Pakistan is losing the fight against and increasing the threat of terrorism, and making further terror attacks on America more

¹²¹ Zulaika, J. (2012). Drones, Witches and Other Flying Objects: The Force of Fantasy in US Counterterrorism. *Critical Studies on Terrorism*, 5(1), Page 56.

likely, not less.¹²² In general, studies show that military force has rarely ended terrorists groups in comparison with law enforcement approaches and political processes.¹²³

Similarly, Akbar Nasir Khan believes the tactical move of using drones was counterproductive and unwittingly helping terrorists in their recruitment process which resulted in the continuance of the cycle of violence.¹²⁴ Khan states that in the post 9/11 period, drone justification was based upon the premise that failed or near failed states, allegedly like Pakistan, did not have the capacity or willingness to deal with terrorists who are a threat to the U.S. interests, its people and soldiers. Further, this incompetency of such states confers more authority on the U.S. to take necessary steps, like drone attacks to neutralize these threats. The U.S. has been using drones to target suspected terrorists in Pakistan since 2004, with a sharp upsurge during Obama's presidency. Journalist David Ignatius cites an anonymous U.S. official who claims there were 55 Predator drone strikes in 2010 in the Pakistani tribal regions— nearly double the peak level during the Bush years, which reached the mid-30s in 2008. There are different claims and counterclaims about the number of strikes and body counts, though the consensus is that civilians were killed at an exponentially larger rate than combatants.¹²⁵

Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann of American Foundation compiled a report named “The Year of the Drone” in which they studied 114 drone raids in which more than 1,200 people were killed. Of those, between 549 and 849 were reliably reported to be militant fighters, while the rest were civilians. The true civilian fatality rate since 2004 according to the Foundation's analysis is approximately 32 percent. Pakistani

¹²² Zulaika, J. (2012). Drones, Witches and Other Flying Objects: The Force of Fantasy in US Counterterrorism. *Critical Studies on Terrorism*, 5(1), Page 55.

¹²³ O'Connell, M. (2010). Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones: A Case Study of Pakistan, 2004–2009. *Shooting to Kill: Socio-Legal Perspectives on the Use of Lethal Force, Notre Dame Law School*, 09(43), Page 2.

¹²⁴ Khan, A. N. (2011). The US' Policy of Targeted Killings by Drones in Pakistan. *IPRI Journal* 9(1), Page 22.

¹²⁵ Khan, A. N. (2011). The US' Policy of Targeted Killings by Drones in Pakistan. *IPRI Journal* 9(1), Page 25.

authorities claim something different, that for each al Qaeda and Taliban terrorist killed by U.S. drones, 140 innocent Pakistanis also had to die. They claim over 90 percent of those killed in the deadly missile strikes were civilians.¹²⁶

While the accurate accounts of civilian deaths by drones in Pakistan differentiate, little can be argued against the notion that the death of innocent people gives the victim's family strong reason to join the Taliban rather than working against them. Journalist Rahimullah Yusufzai says, "Drone attacks are radicalizing other people who may not have supported the Taliban". The Taliban leaders have used the unpopularity of the drone attacks and stated that suicide bombings in Pakistan are a reaction to drone attacks in Pakistan, citing a direct link between drone attacks and extremist violence. This is not unfounded, as every one of the dead non-combatants represents an alienated family, a new revenge feud, and more recruits for a militant movement.¹²⁷ Still, many facts about the use of drones are classified, so it is difficult to get a full and accurate picture.

¹²⁶ Khan, A. N. (2011). The US' Policy of Targeted Killings by Drones in Pakistan. *IPRI Journal* 9(1), Page 28.

¹²⁷ Khan, A. N. (2011). The US' Policy of Targeted Killings by Drones in Pakistan. *IPRI Journal* 9(1), Page 31.

Chapter 6: Public Diplomacy and the American Brand

Although no negotiation between the U.S. and any members of al Qaeda took place after 9/11 in the traditional sense of direct contact, the U.S. utilized its soft power following the attacks to negotiate its public image. The use of public diplomacy was the closest to negotiation that was allowable to take place. Al Qaeda's remote location, the elusiveness of Osama bin Laden's whereabouts, and the detraction of U.S. credibility through the Iraq and Afghanistan invasion made traditional negotiation to take place. These factors combined with the U.S. tradition of refusing to negotiate with terrorists created a circumstance in which the use of soft power and public diplomacy was the closest to traditional negotiation that was possible.

Traditionally, the concept of public diplomacy and soft power are not generally considered to be legitimate counterterrorism strategies. Public opinion almost always equates defeating terrorism with the use of direct and brutal force. Soft power is not an often-explored option because it involves more community based efforts and does not yield immediate results. In fact, while utilizing public diplomacy and soft power to defeat an ideology has longer lasting benefits, it can often take generations before these benefits come to fruition. A counterterrorism campaign that embraces soft power approaches that include a genuine commitment to rehabilitation, de-radicalization, counter-radicalization and welfare and community based services is likely to achieve better results than sole reliance on brute force.¹²⁸ Truthfully, soft power is a long-term strategy, as it takes time to derive legitimacy from soft power and it is quicker to lose than hard power. Rather than a quick surgical operation, the soft power approach to counterterrorism seeks to

¹²⁸ Tella, O. (2017). Boko Haram Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: The Soft Power Context. *Journal of Asian and African Studies*. Accessed online: <http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0021909617739326>. Page 2.

provide humanitarian and developmental initiatives and a counter-narrative to dissuade potential members from joining terrorist organizations.¹²⁹

While the founder of soft power theory Joseph Nye acknowledges that non-state actors such as multinational corporations, nongovernmental organizations and terrorist groups exercise soft power, there is little discussed as to whether the use of soft power exerted on to a non-state actor is effective.¹³⁰ However, as previously evidenced, military force, enhanced interrogation and other brutal measures have an antithesis effect on countering extremism and in fact assist in exacerbating recruitment. Because the United States utilized soft power so little in its strategy after 9/11, few empirical studies exist on its intended effect in countering terrorism. That is not to say that it is not an effective method, as many studies successfully relate the impact of community services to overall well-being. The uncompromising use of hard power and the neglect of soft power in counterterrorism has serious, unpalatable long-term consequences.

Oluwaseun Tella believes that effective strategy for diplomacy in counterterrorism entails a people centric approach of capacity building, economic development and an effective counter-narrative to terrorist recruiters' narratives and ideologies. It also involves a concerted effort to provide public education including mobilizing leaders and religious organizations to challenge the ideology and violence perpetuated by terrorist recruiters and providing counseling for vulnerable populations.¹³¹

Tella continues that soft power employed as counterterrorism entails two critical issues. The first is identifying and deploying significant individuals within the state to dampen

¹²⁹ Tella, O. (2017). Boko Haram Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: The Soft Power Context. *Journal of Asian and African Studies*. Accessed online: <http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0021909617739326>. Page 6.

¹³⁰ Tella, O. (2017). Boko Haram Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: The Soft Power Context. *Journal of Asian and African Studies*. Accessed online: <http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0021909617739326>. Page 4.

¹³¹ Tella, O. (2017). Boko Haram Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: The Soft Power Context. *Journal of Asian and African Studies*. Accessed online: <http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0021909617739326>. Page 5.

the terrorist ideology, while the second is employing a multilateral diplomacy by drawing on the assistance of other states to tackle terrorist acts. For example, the importance of counter-narratives by religious leaders and other eminent personalities or groups to undermine terrorist activities is crucial to dispelling myths of religious justification for violence that is encouraged by recruiters. The second strategy is relevant given that in the wake of the September 11th attacks, Bush's nationalistic unilateral policies regarding the war in Iraq did not employ the cooperation of other states in its War on Terror.¹³² Bush's over-reliance on hard power had a significantly negative impact on the U.S. economy and on its soft power. This is most evident in increasingly negative global perceptions of the U.S. and its legitimacy in the wake of the 2003 war in Iraq.

In the period after 9/11, the U.S. was not only fighting a war on international terrorism by classical, military means but was also engaged in efforts to win the moral and political support of the Muslim world. After 9/11, the U.S. government actively neglected cultural diplomacy that involved cooperation with Muslim communities and solidifying relations. The attacks were not so much a confrontation with U.S. capabilities as it was the identity of the U.S. as a superpower. Instead of fostering communication and pacification between the U.S. and Muslim communities both domestic and international, much of post 9/11 public diplomacy policy entailed a rebranding of the United States. Peter Van Ham claims that the Bush administration put forth a group of initiatives aimed at rebranding the U.S. as anything but a bully to touch ordinary citizens of Muslim countries. Since public diplomacy often involves intercultural communication, new

¹³² Tella, O. (2017). Boko Haram Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: The Soft Power Context. *Journal of Asian and African Studies*. Accessed online: <http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0021909617739326>. Page 5.

marketing, PR and branding methods were used to communicate and adapt the USA's political message to reflect the cultural sensitivities of foreign audiences.¹³³

Van Ham believes that unfortunately, the Bush administration used public diplomacy as a reason to extend the notion of western supremacy and salvaging U.S. reputation rather than to engage in democratic, non-coercive communications with the Muslim world.¹³⁴ Van Ham continues that the events of 9/11 triggered renewed efforts to market the brand of the U.S. and its policies while the rhetoric of war and American values served to help American society justify brutal force overseas. Ad campaigns showed U.S. citizens of different races and religions (including many Muslims) expressing their patriotism to reposition and recharge the American brand, both at home and abroad.¹³⁵ Further, Washington used the wave of post 9/11 patriotism to push through its international agenda, starting with the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and continued pressures for 'regime change' in the wider Middle East.

Van Ham argues that 9/11 – which became a successful global brand in its own right – was used to dominate political discourse and to discipline potential critics in the U.S. and overseas. For the Bush administration, the temptation was overwhelming to use public diplomacy as a soft power tool for controlling and dominating political discourse, both at home and abroad.¹³⁶ This is not only reflected in U.S. public diplomacy but also in the plans of the Bush administration to democratize the wider Middle East. This concept was based on the optimistic assumption that once the Iraqi people were freed

¹³³ Ham, P. V. (2003). War, Lies, and Videotape: Public Diplomacy and the USA's War on Terrorism. *Security Dialogue*, 34(4), Page 430.

¹³⁴ Ham, P. V. (2003). War, Lies, and Videotape: Public Diplomacy and the USA's War on Terrorism. *Security Dialogue*, 34(4), Page 431.

¹³⁵ Ham, P. V. (2003). War, Lies, and Videotape: Public Diplomacy and the USA's War on Terrorism. *Security Dialogue*, 34(4), Page 434.

¹³⁶ Ham, P. V. (2003). War, Lies, and Videotape: Public Diplomacy and the USA's War on Terrorism. *Security Dialogue*, 34(4), Page 435.

from the yoke of the Saddam Hussein, U.S. military forces would be greeted as liberators, after which stability will dawn upon the region. Van Ham argues that it remains doubtful that it will take mere regime change in Baghdad to achieve a stable and democratic – let alone Western-oriented – Iraq.¹³⁷

Stephen Emerson claims that while the military instrument of power has once again become the centerpiece of American counterterrorism efforts and provides some immediate measure of success, the tendency to rely on the military to deal with what are ultimately complex political and socioeconomic problems has limited utility and is incredibly short sighted. Indeed, it may provide a false sense of confidence in the ability of the U.S. to stem the spread of terrorism through the exercise of American military power. Ultimately this approach to counterterrorism is likely to fail, as was proven during the Iraq war.¹³⁸ Emerson boldly suggests that if the United States is to be successful, it must find a way to address the underlying sources of instability and violent extremism from the base up and not seek to impose an Americanized version of security. Most importantly, the U.S. must be willing to pursue a strategy that bridges divergent views of security and build upon areas of common concern for the benefit of all.¹³⁹

Although U.S. public diplomacy and soft power is an essential (and still underdeveloped and undervalued) component of its overall policy towards the Middle East, it will take more than better communications to address the USA's credibility and image problems in that region. Using diplomatic power merely as a tool to increase the positive image of the U.S. doesn't work in the long term because it still operates under

¹³⁷ Ham, P. V. (2003). War, Lies, and Videotape: Public Diplomacy and the USA's War on Terrorism. *Security Dialogue*, 34(4), Page 432.

¹³⁸ Emerson, S. (2014). Back to the Future: The Evolution of US Counterterrorism Policy in Africa. *Insight on Africa*, 6(1), Page 54.

¹³⁹ Emerson, S. (2014). Back to the Future: The Evolution of US Counterterrorism Policy in Africa. *Insight on Africa*, 6(1), Page 55.

the model of Western supremacy and makes no acknowledgement of its audience. Using public diplomacy to counter terrorism will do better to work within the Muslim community at a grassroots level to quell terrorist recruitment and mitigate hostility. The previous models of using diplomacy haven't worked because they are still Western centric and capitalistic and do not focus on commonalities. While public diplomacy and soft power takes time and the effects may not be seen for generations, they often yield longer lasting results when community engagement is prioritized. For now, U.S. public diplomacy aspires to enter a dialogue with the Muslim world, a dialogue that hardly exists now— particularly in the current climate.

Conclusion

As evidenced, examining the period after the September 11th attacks offers a unique study in mechanisms for Western response to terrorist attacks. The United States employed several measures to administer justice, neutralize al Qaeda, and prevent future attacks. The variety of policies presented in the years following the attacks include methods of deterrence, compellence, defense, and negotiation. Since the threat of international terrorism remains at the forefront of American politics today, examining the success of past methods remains ever imperative.

Given that none of the 9/11 hijackers had Iraqi roots, had no funding from the Iraq government and no al Qaeda presence or training took place in Iraq, the War on Terror was doomed for failure at its inception. As a defensive policy, the war in Iraq held no merit as Iraq held no clear threat to attack the United States. Additionally, the ramifications of the long-term military presence, the destabilization of the Iraqi government, and civilian casualties opposed the intended effort of defeating extremism

by creating a new breeding ground for radicalization and creating opportunity for the future inception of the Islamic State.¹⁴⁰

What's worse, the destabilization of the region brought about by the toppling of the Hussein regime, occupation and destruction of Iraq and negligence in creating local support systems established a vacuum in which the Islamic state would later use to rebrand extremism and establish key regions in Iraq and nearby Syria for its caliphate through guerilla warfare.¹⁴¹ The notion presented by the Bush administration of the War on Terror as a defensive measure was determined unsuccessful given that Iraq was found to have no links to the 9/11 attacks, the colonial style occupation of Iraq only further fueled recruitment into terrorist activity, and there was no enemy in the region to neutralize since al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden had no base in Iraq. Indeed, the failure of the War on Terror cost a huge financial and social burden on the United States with ramifications the global community is still experiencing today.

While several studies show torture is an ineffective method for information retrieval, the U.S. unabashedly employed it as a method of deterrence. As concluded in the CIA torture report, the use of excessive force on detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Abu Ghraib, Bagram, and other U.S. bases retrieved no useful intelligence against those responsible for the attacks, nor revealed imperative information on future attacks, training cells, or bin Laden's whereabouts.¹⁴² In short, torture as a deterrent is not marred with success because if torture must be employed then the threat to deter was not effective from the start. As deterrence is dependent upon preventing the other party from action, torture is a direct response to action and thus fails at its inception. Additionally, torture is

¹⁴⁰ Feldman, N. (2012). *The Fall and Rise of the Islamic State*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Page 24.

¹⁴¹ Feldman, N. (2012). *The Fall and Rise of the Islamic State*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Page 59.

¹⁴² United States., & Feinstein, D. (2014). *The Senate Intelligence Committee Report on Torture: Committee study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program*.

generally conducted in desperation and a method of direct action and revenge rather than for the extraction of reliable information. The nature of torture is built to dehumanize and break down an enemy and not for a specific policy of success. Further, given that torture and enhanced interrogation failed to yield evidence that it aided in the suppression of al Qaeda activities, and that the revelations of the abuse were used in recruitment tools by extremists, excessive force and torture after 9/11 was a resounding failure.¹⁴³

Targeted drone strikes in Afghanistan and Pakistan remained the central method of terrorism strategy during the Obama administration. While, successful compellence requires displaying to the adversary the will and capability to cause terrible pain if the adversary does not change its behavior, it is unlikely at first glance that policymakers would choose to use drone strikes to cause pain to an adversary by deliberately targeting innocents. In terms of causing pain to the adversary directly, the death or threat of death to a plotter is an organization's cost of doing business, not a taste of suffering to come if it does not change its behavior. Although the appeal of using drones make them seem like an economically sound choice with least chance of human casualty, the inaccuracy of these targeted strikes was at an alarmingly high percentage despite all the technological advancements involved.

Given that exact figures vary on how many civilian casualties were produced per drone strike, an accurate assessment of their success is up to speculation. However, accounts detailing casualty numbers as high as 90%¹⁴⁴ show a frighteningly disproportionate rate of civilian to militant deaths. While drone attacks under the direction of President Obama were indeed successful in eliminating key al Qaeda and

¹⁴³ Sullivan, C. M. (2014). The (In)effectiveness of Torture for Combating Insurgency. *Journal of Peace Research*, 51(3), Page 388.

¹⁴⁴ Zulaika, J. (2012). Drones, Witches and Other Flying Objects: The Force of Fantasy in US Counterterrorism. *Critical Studies on Terrorism*, 5(1), Page 56.

ISIS figureheads, the destruction caused to the civilian population and resentment fueled into radicalization far outweighed the victories of assassinated combatants as many new ones rose to replace them. The efficacy of drones as a successful measure of counterterrorism is one that needs further study and I concede that in the compellence framework it was not successful.

At the beginning of this paper, I intended to argue in favor of public diplomacy and soft power as a successful method of counterterrorism. Unfortunately, little scholarly evidence exists to present the U.S. as using traditional diplomacy in the period after 9/11. Due to the U.S. traditional hard line stance on negotiation with terrorists, soft power and public diplomacy after 9/11 were the best source for negotiation by proxy, establishing the best opportunity for the United States to engage with its Muslim American community in identifying and intervening in extremism. Instead, the Bush administration felt it more prudent in the period after 9/11 to establish the American brand of “freedom” and marketing “9/11” as a brand of justification for human rights abuses on its citizens and abroad.

The negligence in capacity building and cooperation with the Muslim American community and prioritization in the preservation of the American exceptionalism did little to nothing in countering violent extremism and remains a heavily underutilized and undervalued concept still today. While there is no evidence to show that this diplomacy through marketing and propaganda of the American brand was used in recruitment, there is no evidence to conclude that it was successful in defeating existing combatants either.

Under the guise of combating terrorism, U.S. counterterrorism considers itself legitimized to overrule national sovereignties and flaunt international law; in short, to

establish a state of exception by which actions that ordinarily are illegal and immoral are suddenly tolerable because the fight against the terrorist demands it. Perhaps it is the very nature of the term itself that lends to complications in policy. For example, in examining the state of violence within U.S. borders, an overwhelming number of casualties of American citizens is through gun violence at the hands of white supremacists. Deaths by shootings far outweigh deaths by individuals and groups who hold radical Islamist beliefs. The expansion of the concept of what a terrorist looks like and believes in would truly transform the framework with which we view terrorism today.

As unfortunate as the lack of engagement with the Muslim American community after 9/11 is, it is never too late to employ this method of diplomacy. Allying with the community rather than alienating it has far greater effect, especially considering most plots are foiled through family members reporting loved ones rather than sting operations. Unfortunately, given the history of counterterrorism policy as dictated by xenophobic and colonial aspirations, this shows no sign of being prioritized within the near future— particularly as President Trump’s Muslim ban continues to be proposed and supported by a frightened and misled fan base and imperious administration. Similarly, the United Kingdom’s role in assisting the U.S. in the post 9/11 period has little research available— a perspective which would be helpful in terrorism studies. However, until the U.S. is willing to work in engaging its Muslim, immigrant, and refugee population, counterterrorism is doomed to act as a self-fulfilling prophecy by continually creating an enemy to defeat said enemy as justification for subjugating oppressed civilian populations to violence and control for Western hegemony.

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