Development, Security and Displacement: An Ethnographic Case Study of Rocinha and other Key Favelas in Rio de Janeiro

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Key Favelas in Rio de Janeiro.

by

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Abstract

Development, Security and Displacement: An Ethnographic Case Study of Rocinha and other Key Favelas in Rio de Janeiro.

by

Marcos David Burgos

Advisor: Professor David C. Brotherton

This study highlights the complex and generally overlooked relationship between development, urban space, and security, and does so through a multiyear ethnographic study of Rocinha, Brazil’s largest favela (slum/squatter community).

Since 2007 unprecedented resources have been devoted towards improving Rio de Janeiro’s favelas (slums), mainly in the form of large-scale favela upgrading and security programs. Coinciding with the historic improvement schemes in Rio, and in large part responsible for them, Brazil’s economy experienced one of its most sustain period of growth during the first decade of the twentieth century. For the first time, strong economic growth and a historic decrease in income inequality occurred simultaneously. This was a period in which the Workers Party, the PT, rose to the top of political power, a feat not achieved by a leftist party since the military overthrow of João Goulart’s democratically elected government in 1964. Under Lula and then Dilma, the PT era has seen some of the largest development and social assistance programs and policies implemented in Brazil’s history, such as the Program for Accelerated Growth (PAC), My House, My Life (MCMV), and the internationally known Bolsa Família, or Family Grant.

Meanwhile, Brazil and Rio de Janeiro’s pursuit to rebrand themselves as modern and developed through a series of mega sporting event capital of the world also official begins in
Having passed the pilot test with the 2007 Pan-American Games, that same year Brazil won the bid for the 2014 FIFA World Cup. Between late 2008 and early 2009 Rio de Janeiro state began the largest public security program ever, installing Police Pacification Units (UPPs) in strategic favelas. Also in 2009, Rio won the bid to host the 2016 Olympic Games. After over two decades of military dictatorship (1964-1985), a rocky transition back to democracy that was marked by another two decades of harsh neoliberalism and some of the world’s highest levels of inequality and violence, a sense of hope for better times was beginning to emerged among many Brazilians, and especially cariocas (natives of Rio). But as is often the case in the history of capitalism, in order to create change or “progress”, something must inevitably be destroyed.

In April 2010 heavy rains and landslides killed dozens of people in Rio’s favelas. The city’s mayor Eduardo Paes immediately announced what would become the city’s largest favela removal operation since the 1964-1975 military dictatorship campaign. The justification for removing what would have been at least 119 favelas and upwards of 200 thousand residents was based on protecting them from environmental risks, such as landslides and flooding. I was living in one the neighborhoods where the rains caused deaths and which was intensely targeted for removal. Although it was a terrifying experience, in another sense it provided a privileged position for observing how greed and corruption can pervert otherwise benevolent social programs and investments, such as protecting citizens from natural disasters and improving their neighborhoods.

Between 2009 and 2013 between 60-70 thousand residents of favelas were displaced from their communities. Of particular concern are the record numbers of forced removals occurring in areas important to elite lifestyles and capitalist accumulation in general. The figures would have been substantially higher had fierce local resistance not slowed the City’s plans. By mid-2013 the recent political economic crises gripping Brazil had begun and continuing mass removals became politically and by 2014 financially unfeasible. While “area of risk” classification have been responsible for the majority of removals, thousands of families have also
been displaced because of urban upgrading and renewal projects related to the mega-events. I originally hypothesized that alongside the intense real estate speculation revolving around the World Cup and Olympics that favela upgrading and the UPPs would have led to more forced removals and even gentrification in strategically located favelas. These types of displacement have occurred differently than originally anticipated and much of this dissertation looks at the reasons why.

After years of carefully observing transformations from community level vantage point I came to believe that many of the changes produced by favela “improvement” programs are undesirable, and are negatively altering the urban landscape in ways most residents of Rocinha and other impacted favelas did not anticipate. In addition to other concerns, forced removals and incipient gentrification are increasing sociospatial segregation in Rio de Janeiro. Among the main descriptive contributions this research offers are multiyear (and ongoing) firsthand accounts of the specific tactics used in Rio de Janeiro to remove residents of favelas, and the contradictory role improvement schemes, including security programs, play in this process.
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Luzia, the latter whose sensational cooking fed my body and soul for the last 15 years. Thanks to my two little brother Luan Martins and Bruno Calvacante, who I witnessed grow from little boys into true gentlemen. A very special thanks to André Sales Batista and Martins for years of helping me with complex research angels of this project, and for their wonderful friendship. To the Father Marcos Williams, who was my first professor in Brazil, longtime friend, and for providing me employment while I completed my interviews. And once more, to all my beloved friends in Rocinha who became like family and allowed me to be part of their families, and to the trusting and informative participants in my research who allowed me to interview them and record their personal histories, without them this study would not have been possible, All of you in Brazil not only made this research possible but improved my life with your wisdom, knowledge, and patience.

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Glossary
(Abbreviations and Acronyms)

AMAVLVC – Association of Residents and Friends of Vila Laboriaux and Vila Cruzada
AMASCO – Association of Residents and Friends of São Conrado.
Defesa Civil – Civil Defense
AMABB – Association of Residents and Friends of Bairro Barcelos
AP – Municipal Planning Area
BNDES Brazilian Development Bank
BNH – National Housing Bank
BOPE – Battalion for Special Police Operations
CAIXA Federal Savings Bank
CEDAE – State Water and Sewerage Company
COMLURB – Municipal Urban Cleaning Company
CV – Comando Vermelho – Red Command
DED – Displacement By Development
DID – Development Induced Displacement
EMOP – Rio de Janeiro Public Works Company
FGTS – Workers Severance Fund
FGV – Getúlio Vargas Foundation
FIFA – Fédération Internationale de Football Association
FBR – Bento Rubião Foundation
GEO-RIO – Municipal Geotechnical Institute, Rio de Janeiro
IAB – Brazilian Institute of Architects
IBGE - Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (Federal)
IDB – Inter-American Development Bank
IPEA - Applied Economic Research Institute (Federal)
IPP – Instituto Pereira Passos
NUTH – Land and Housing Center (Rio de Janeiro State Public Defenders’ Office)
NGO – Non-Governmental Organization
PAC – Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento – Program for Accelerated Growth
PD – Plano Diretor – Master Plan
PETROBRÁS – Petróleo Brasileiro S/A
PMDB – Brazilian Democratic Movement Party
PMERJ – Rio de Janeiro State Military Police
PMCMV (or MCMV) – My House, My Life Program
PT – Worker’s Party
PUC-Rio – Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro
RA – Administrative Region (Rio de Janeiro Municipal Government)
RIO-92 – Rio Conference on Environment and Sustainable Development RIO+20
SMH – Municipal Housing Secretary
UF – Unidades Federativas – Federal Units (27 federal units: 26 states and one federal district)
UN-HABITAT – United Nations Program for Human Settlements
UERJ – State University of Rio de Janeiro
UFRJ – Federal University of Rio de Janeiro
UNICEF – United Nations Children’s Fund
UPA – Emergency Care Unit (intermediary between community health clinics and hospitals)
UPMMR – Union For the Improvement of Rocinha’s Residents
UPP – Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora – Police Pacification Unit
ZEIS – Special Zones of Social Interest
Introduction

This study highlights the complex and generally overlooked relationship between development, urban space, and security. I have done this through a multiyear ethnographic study of Rocinha, Brazil’s largest favela. The objective is to describe how global as well as local forces and actors contributed to a new era of mass removal targeted on Rio’s favelas, and how this historic purging of “undesirable” classes from valuable real estate areas increases social and racial polarization along spatial lines. Ironically, these negative transformations coincided with the ascension of the “leftist” Workers Party, the PT, to the top of political power and several years of strong economic growth in Brazil. There was also a historic decrease in income inequality, the first such reduction in decades, and unprecedented resources have been invested in “improving” the historically marginalized favelas¹, such as large-scale upgrading and security programs.²

Viewed carefully, many of the changes socially produced by favela “improvement”³ programs are undesirable, and are negatively transforming the urban landscape in ways most residents of Rocinha and other impacted favelas did not anticipate. Of particular concern are the record numbers of forced removals occurring in areas important to elite lifestyles and capitalist accumulation in general. In addition to other concerns, forced removals and gentrification have heightened spatial segregation in Rio de Janeiro. Among the main descriptive contributions this research offers are multiyear (and ongoing) firsthand accounts of the specific tactics used in Rio

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¹ Perlman 2010: 14, 161-162
² In Brazil, the development jargon “slum upgrading” is known as urbanização de favelas (favela urbanization), or more technically as urbanização de assentamentos precários (urbanization of precarious settlements). Because of the distinct connotation of “urbanization” in English language social science literature, I prefer to call this process “favela upgrading”, a jargon already used in some English language scholarly works on favelas.
³ “Improvement” is Tania Murray Li’s phrase of choice in The Will to Improve (2007) for referring to the gamut of interventions that fall under the social science umbrella notion of “development”.

1
de Janeiro to remove residents of favelas, and the contradictory role development (or improvement) schemes play in this process.

My focus is on the local setting and on providing insider descriptions of changes in Rocinha. But extensive field research was also conducted in 12 other purposefully selected favelas. The issues are set against the backdrop of a rapidly transforming and contentious present day Rio de Janeiro. I emphasize ways big business (sporting mega-events included), political agendas, and mechanisms of social control intersect and reveal a broader entrepreneurial objective for the city, one clearly favoring the exchange value of urban space over its use or social value. Ultimately, the analysis attempts to theoretically position the data I collected on displacement through the lens of accumulation, or capitalist urbanism, and how on a wider scale similar processes occur and are resisted in a range of poor and violent spatially vulnerable urban communities throughout Brazil and beyond.

From the time I first stepped foot in Rocinha in 2001, until the completion of this dissertation (during the latter half of 2015), I had lived almost nine years in the community. The first few years were spent devoted to classes at PUC-Rio (a nearby catholic university), personal growth, and simply enjoying life alongside friends.

From 2004 to 2006 shootouts between rival drug factions (“gangs”), or from violent police incursions, were frequent in Rocinha. On numerous occasions my neighbors, roommates, and I were forced to arrive late to or miss social, educational, and professional obligations because it was not safe to be in the streets.

I had roughly the same group of roommates from 2001 until 2006, guys that are still close friends today. They were undergraduate and graduate students at PUC-Rio and later UERJ (the State University of Rio de Janeiro). Two of them were working class Brazilians, Baltazar (who in 2001 first encouraged me to room with him in Rocinha) is from São Paulo’s southern periphery, and Gustavo, now a university professor, is from Campos dos Goytacazes, a midsized city four hours north of Rio. Razack, a native of Cape Town, was conducting comparative research on
social movements in South Africa and Brazil. In 2006 they decided to move to an apartment in Rio’s North Zone because at the time living in Rocinha was not conducive to the metal focus they needed.

The elevated levels of violence from warring drug factions taking place in Rocinha and Vidigal at the time complicate certain North American social theories on why people remain in poor and violent urban neighborhoods. But it wasn’t only groups like my working class but university educated friends who left, as William Julius Wilson (1987: 8) once proposed, though in a different socio-historical context. Numerous residents from a diversity of backgrounds fled Rocinha and the neighboring favela of Vidigal because of the violence in the first decade of the twenty-first century.

My friend Leandro from Vidigal told me, “People were selling their houses for the price of Bananas. Our neighbor literally traded her house for the return trip to Paraiba (a state in northeastern Brazil)”. During this period I was lived only occasionally in Rocinha, as I frequently traveled between Brazil, the Caribbean, and the US, depending on work and studies. But when living in Rio I decided to remain in Rocinha. By the end of 2006 I was involved in a number of local improvement projects.

I moved back to Rocinha full-time in mid-2007, and then I spent the latter half of the year as a visiting student at UERJ. It was during this period I first sensed circumstances were beginning to change, not only in Rocinha, but also throughout the city.

By 2010 I was deeply engaged in activism, mostly in Rocinha but also with wider inter-favela organizations and popular movements. The section of Rocinha where I live, Laboriaux (La-bow-REE-oh), was under attack. In April of that year, immediately after torrential rains caused deadly landslides in several communities, the city government began a fierce campaign of mass eviction calling for the complete or partial removal of 119 favelas (Magalhães 2013: 97). The

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4 Although the levels of violence were staggering for Rio’s South Zone, in dozens of the city’s North and West Zone favelas situations were just as bad or worse.
5 Dissertation interview, Leandro, August 2015.
city’s mayor, Eduardo Paes, ordered the roughly 3,000 residents of Laboriaux to immediately relocate. I was stunned, and my neighbors even more so, with the insistent threats of forced removal. This was an issue younger generations in Rio’s favelas only knew of through oral histories, or in my case from books like Janice Perlman’s *The Myth of Marginality* (1976), or *Passa-se uma Casa* (1978) by Licia Valladares.

Soon the connections between favela removals, international events, and other citywide transformations became obvious. From 2010 to the present my time in Rocinha has been spent dedicated to the themes of this investigation, through activism and dissertation research.

The official dissertation process began in late 2012, and by February 2013 I had institutional approval to conduct interviews with human subjects. The study had officially begun.

In August 2013 I left Rio to complete my doctoral studies, a process that took much longer than anticipated. However, four return visits were made during the writing of this dissertation, one of them an extended stay.

*The Study*

In *Confronting the Favela Chic* (2013) Jason Cummings aptly compares attempts to describe the “forces shaping the city of Rio de Janeiro” to taking “aim at a fast-moving target” (Cummings 2013: i). I would add that in contemporary Rio the “forces shaping the city” represent numerous rapidly changing targets, or objects of analysis.

My analysis is primarily centered on Rocinha, one of Rio’s most dynamic and fastest moving “targets”. But the role of good sociology is not limited to describing quickly shifting events. Instead, sociologists should look for more persistent patterns of transformation and try to reveal links between local level changes and larger socioeconomic and political forces. As Henri Lefebvre emphasized in 1950s, the sociologist often “has to double as a historian” in order to construct a more comprehensive analysis (Lefebvre 2015: 2).
This dissertation aims to extend sociological knowledge through a historical and sociospatial analysis of Rio’s favelas. The first three chapters describe how favelas, and particularly the community of Rocinha, evolved during the twentieth century. For instance, Rocinha began as a sparsely populated settlement in what was then Rio’s isolated southwestern periphery, but since the 1970s has been situated in the midst of the city’s main corridor of expansion. Today the community bustles with activity 24 hours a day, and its population of 150,000 is comparable to that of a mid-sized city. Pinched between two of Brazil’s most expensive residential neighborhoods, Rocinha occupies (.85) square km (.33 square miles) on some of Rio de Janeiro’s most coveted real estate.

Since 2007 unprecedented resources have been devoted to favela upgrading and pacification schemes in Rocinha, and public officials have repeatedly assured residents that investments will continue for many years to come. The federal government’s Programa de Aceleração de Crescimento, (Program for Accelerated Growth – PAC) began in 2007. Next came the Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora (Police Pacification Unit – UPP) program. Rio de Janeiro’s state government runs the UPPs, which were first tested in December 2008 and officially launched the next year. These are the largest and most costly interventions ever executed in Rio’s favelas. Both programs have led to notable changes and controversies in Rocinha and in other affected favelas.

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6 Instituto Pereira Passos (IPP) 2010. According to the city government Rocinha is 1.44 km² (1,440,000 m²) but only 847,629 m² (.85 km²) is occupied, the rest is protected Atlantic Rainforest. See http://portalgeo.rio.rj.gov.br/bairros/rocinha/index_ra.htm and http://uppsocial.org/territorios/rocinha-2/. Last accessed 4/4/2015.

7 Pacification is the local jargon for recent the public security programs in Rio; the terms security and pacification will be used interchangeably.

8 The pilot program for the UPPs was launched in December 2008 in the small Santa Marta favela located in Botafogo. The idea to expand the program to dozens of other strategic favelas was announced in early 2009, and it was clear that Rocinha was on the list. The actual “pacification” process did not begin in Rocinha until November 2011.

9 A large Municipal Government favela upgrading program known as Morar Carioca is potentially of equal importance not in Rocinha but for dozens of smaller and mid-sized favelas throughout the city. Morar Carioca is discussed in Chapters 3 and 4.
Utilizing a sociospatial lens in the commission of critical ethnography this work investigates the ways large-scale investments, upgrading, and pacification schemes in Rio have recently been used to displace, or threaten to displace, significant numbers of residents from key favelas. These occurrences relate to the longstanding ambitions of Rio’s upper classes (Valladares 1978: 33) and ensure propitious business conditions for companies in Rio and beyond.

With these recent changes in mind, this study attempts to better understand the dialectics of space, development, and security in Rio’s strategically located favelas, with the aim of generating knowledge of comparable processes elsewhere. My goal is to contribute to a better understanding of the relationship between geography, development, and security. This study links data my fieldwork produced to relevant methods and theories in critical urban and development ethnography, sociospatial analysis, and critical criminology.

The applied research objective is to better inform program designers, public officials, activists, and especially favela residents, of the possibilities of rising costs of living and substantial removals associated with major improvement schemes in low-income communities located in lucrative real estate markets. Secondly, I offer suggestions on how to reduce to the greatest degree possible the negative aspects of favela upgrading and security interventions.

It is important to clarify that I am specifically referring to the effects of long term programs like the UPPs, and extensive community-wide upgrading interventions, such as PAC in Rocinha or the Morar Carioca project Rio’s municipal government planned to implement in the Morro da Providência favela. Prior community policing and upgrading programs, like the GPAES and Favela-Bairro, while important, were limited or short-lived, and by all measures tiny in comparison to recent developments. All of these programs and details are clearly explained in subsequent chapters.

10 “Development” in this sense is synonymous with improvement or betterment schemes at the local level, as in community development or even municipal or urban development.
The Research Question

This investigation proposes that vested interests operating within the logic of capitalist expansion have attempted to occupy, discipline, upgrade, and socially control the residents of Rocinha and other central favelas in Rio de Janeiro. 11 Concisely, favela upgrading and pacification programs, according to their official guidelines, are supposed to better the quality of life for residents, especially the poorest and most vulnerable. I suggest they serve another important function; one that in some cases is intentional, but in others likely results from the pressures and inner workings of capitalism. I view large-scale upgrading and security schemes as two tactics used by public authorities for removing large numbers of residents from highly dense communities and to relocate them in less spatially valuable areas of the city (Freeman and Burgos 2014). 12 I do not claim that shifting favela populations to remote areas is the deliberate intention of all actors and entities involved in Rio’s upgrading and pacification, or the other improvement schemes covered in this dissertation. However, ethnographic and secondary data collected for this research clearly demonstrate that for certain powerful actors population transfer is the objective. In the last three chapters I provide data to substantiate this statement.

Well before the era of global neoliberalism Lefebvre was already emphasizing the role of urban land and real estate as equally important, or more so, than industrial production for the accumulation of capital (Lefebvre 2003: 159-160). Recently one of today’s most prominent economists, Joseph Stiglitz, demonstrated that the value of land, especially centrally located urban land, continues rising at an astonishing pace and is now the central feature of wealth

11 The adjectives “key,” “prime,” and “central” are frequently used to denote favelas located in areas strategic to continued capitalist expansion, particularly in the real estate industry. They are not used to describe superiority or even geographic location unless specified.
12 Freeman, James and Marcos Burgos. “Accumulation by Forced Removal: The thinning of Rio de Janeiro’s favelas in preparation for the games”. This work has been submitted to the Journal of Latin American Studies, and is currently (June 2015) undergoing suggested revisions. The study focuses on the dispossession side of Harvey’s accumulation by dispossession. The research was presented at the Annual Meeting of the Association of American Geographers, in Tampa, Florida, on April 10, 2014.
creation (Stiglitz 2015 Part I: 23, 31). In short, urban land, or space, is the world’s most valuable commodity. Marx (Capital Vol. 1, Chapter 12) insisted the “coercive laws of competition” are among the driving forces of capitalism. These “laws” compel businesses and governments to compete for control over space and the advantages it bestows. This topic is addressed later in this work. Here the point to be made is that considering the inner-workings of our global economic system, as well as Brazil and Rio de Janeiro’s variants of capitalism, it shouldn’t be surprising that large programs implemented for improving “undervalued” islands of poverty and violence located in “hyper-valued” seas of wealth and relative “security” would result in significant displacements. This would occur not only as a result of upgrading construction projects but also from the economic pressures embedded in capitalist development and security. In highly corrupt, unequal settings like Rio de Janeiro, ruled by a racist and extremely classist elite, these tendencies can be expected to be even more likely. Accordingly, the central question of this dissertation is:

**Under the pretense of improving living conditions in the community are recent improvement schemes contributing to, or threatening, the displacement of a substantial portion of Rocinha and other impacted favela’s populations? If so, how and why?**

To answer this question I relied on ethnographic interviewing, multiyear participant observation, and analysis of secondary sources of data. Secondary sources included public and private archives, government statistics, and an extensive review of the relevant academic literature. I conducted and recorded 135 interviews with 120 research participants who were gracious enough to sacrifice their limited time. These individuals were vital contributors to this study. Throughout this work I refer to all of the individuals I interviewed as “participants”, not “objects” or “subjects” of study, or “interviewees”, “respondents”, or “interlocutors”. They were
fundamental collaborators in this project and deserve the title of research participants. They include residents of Rocinha and other affected favelas, non-residents significantly engaged with Rocinha or their respective communities, and non-residents who recently became active in Rocinha or related favelas.

The quick answer to the above question is yes. I collected sufficient empirical evidence demonstrating that one of the outcomes of upgrading and pacification programs in Rocinha and other relevant favelas is the displacement of a substantial portion of the population. It is neither surprising nor undesirable that interventions of this magnitude would result in some necessary, and even beneficial removals. Instead, the novelty of this research lies in the claim that undesirable effects stand a good chance of outweighing the positive. The data collected and analyzed suggests this is particularly true for the most socioeconomically vulnerable segments of these communities, renters in general, and residents concerned with preserving the positive attributes of their community’s history and culture.

This reveals a significant contradiction embedded in favela improvement schemes. For instance, I obtained documents from an infrastructure specialist at the Federal Ministry of Cities who has worked on PAC 1 and the project plan for PAC 2 in Rocinha. The federal guidelines drafted by the Ministry of Cities, the National Secretariat of Housing, and the National Secretariat of Environmental Sanitation, for PAC interventions in favelas stipulate: “Priority assistance to families with lower per capita income, with more dependents, with female heads of household, the elderly, the disabled, quilombola or black and indigenous ethnic communities, as well as the demands proposed by social movements, associations and groups representative of segments of the population”.

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On the surface it appears counterintuitive that improvement schemes designed for favelas could cause as much harm as good. How could substantial investments in slum upgrading, as the UN and World Bank refer to this type of intervention (UN-Habitat 2003: 127), together with attempts to “pacify” violent and marginalized urban areas produce considerable negative consequences for their most underprivileged residents? If the state has historically underinvested, excluded, exploited, violently confronted, and tried to remove Rocinha’s residents, how could previously unimaginable infrastructure and security investments be disadvantageous?

Politicians, the mass media, and multinational organizations like the UN have positively assessed improvement programs affecting Rocinha and other favelas. In 2012, UN-Habitat bestowed its “Good Practices” award to the state officials who implemented PAC 1 favela upgrading in Rocinha. The award was presented while over one-third of the project remained unfinished, despite being designed for completion in late 2010. PAC favela upgrading programs have been showcased by local, state, and federal politicians during campaigns in every election since 2008, and Rocinha is considered by federal and state officials the exemplary model for all favela upgrading interventions throughout Brazil.

Praise for such programs is easy to understand. According to the 2011 government report *Rocinha: Sustainable Development Plan* (Rocinha PDS) the community has received no significant infrastructure investments since the early 1990s (Rocinha PDS 2011: 36). And community or “proximity policing” had never been experimented in Rocinha prior to 2012.

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14 US$ one billion includes all investments from PAC 1 and the UPP in Rocinha, as well as the R$ 1.6 billion promised as part of PAC 2. Budgetary details are explained in Chapter 3.


16 Rodrigo Dalvi Santana, infrastructure specialist for the Federal Ministry of Cities. Santana has worked on both PAC 1 and PAC 2 (plans) for Rocinha and made this comment to residents at a meeting of Rocinha sem Fronteiras on September 21, 2013.

17 *Rocinha: Plano de Desenvolvimento Sustentável*
One of the advantages of living in the community you study is the ability to separate marketing from the local realities. Not long after the actual upgrading construction began the inconsistencies between reported progress and success stories, and what has actually occurring in the community, began to surface. By the end of 2010 grassroots organizations and activists were mobilizing and exposing irregularities through pamphleting and alternative medias (e.g., *Rocinha sem Fronteiras, SOS Rocinha Saneamento*).

Certain scholars also began highlighting undesirable aspects of favela upgrading and pacification programs in Rocinha and other communities.\(^{18}\) Most critical evaluations viewed these schemes as temporary efforts to renovate and “secure” the city for the string of international sporting events and to boost real estate values in areas where they had been depreciated because of past violence (Bautès and Gonçalves 2011: 2; Freeman 2012: 106). Some provided evidence that the UPP strategy is neither financially nor logistically sustainable in a city with over 1,000 favelas (Freeman 2012: 105). Increasingly, critics argue that their future is also socially and politically uncertain because they are generally unpopular in the communities (Freeman 2012: 105) and after almost eight years the effectiveness of violence reduction is debatable.

In short, the bulk of critical literature argues that recent state interventions in Rio’s favelas have less to do with the desire to improve the lives of poor people and more to do with securing the city for the “games” and with capitalism’s need to continually search for new markets, and the need to ensure markets are in spaces as predictable, controllable, and secure as possible (Cummings 2015: 95). Certain critics have suggested that in Rocinha and other favelas (Martins and Vieira 2012: 40), the transfer of poverty to the periphery has been a tacitly intentional objective of certain corporate groups and the politicians and public officials they command.

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\(^{18}\) For instance, (Bautès and Gonçalves 2011), (Freeman 2012), (Bautès, Fernandes and Burgos 2013), and (Freeman and Burgos 2016, forthcoming).
While these perspectives are helpful, some of the criticisms of the recent transformations in Rio border on conspiratorial. They seem to suggest a cohesive network of powerful politicians and corporate leaders have been colluding to displace poor residents from key areas of the city. Considering the well-known antipathy Rio’s elite have for favelas and the fraudulent manner in which most removals have occurred it is easy to understand the attraction of conspiracy type narratives. But there is paucity of data (historical, qualitative or quantitative) on which to base these arguments. As a result many evaluations appear ahistorical, superficial, and ultimately inaccurate, even if their underlying assumptions might be partially correct. A more cautious historical analysis indicates the likely answers lie in understanding the ways capitalist urbanization (and urbanism) function, especially in highly corrupt and unequal societies.

The idea is not to reject the role of the removers or the agency of the resisters, but to understand the structural forces involved. The internal mechanisms of capitalism alone are sufficient to bring about such transformations. But history has proven that national and local elites, such as Haussmann in Paris, Moses in New York or Pereira Passos (1902-1906) in Rio de Janeiro, often play an important role in local development, as can the people resisting unequal top-down interventions (Everett 1997: 137-140). In Rio de Janeiro, Mayor Eduardo Paes (2009 – Present) has been instrumental in shaping the Rio de Janeiro this dissertation describes, and so have the favela opposition movements.

But global to local forces of capitalism and politics must be taken into account. In order to better understanding these multi-level influences I gathered copious ethnographic and secondary data in order to test whether a convincing case could be constructed that Harvey’s concepts of accumulation by dispossession and creative destruction are occurring throughout Rio and in favelas like Rocinha. Accumulation by dispossession is the primary lens through which I analyze recent events in Rio de Janeiro.

Briefly, accumulation by dispossession is a reworking of Marx’s “original” or “primitive accumulation”. Harvey claims accumulation by dispossession increases (and diversifies) under
neoliberal capitalism (Harvey 2003: 184-185). He describes it as the mechanism by which powerful elites improve their economic conditions not by generating wealth but rather by dispossessioning more vulnerable classes of their wages, benefits, possessions, rights, and socioeconomic livelihoods in general. Similarly, Karl Marx first exposed the crisis averting destructive propensity of capitalism to regularly destroy previous production/productive forces in order to make way for new waves of production in a continuous cycle of capital accumulation.

The economist Joseph Schumpeter popularized creative destruction in the 1940s, but today Harvey is the foremost advocate of the expression, and his version incorporates more themes than production alone. According to Harvey creative destruction is a key process that allows accumulation by dispossession to occur and that power relations and control of space are inherent to both processes (Harvey 2006: 151-155). Accumulation through dispossession is Harvey’s most substantial contribution to the social sciences and it forms the centerpiece of his analysis of capitalism and urbanization/urbanism.

Urban upgrading and pacification are the two improvement schemes I examined in detail. I did so because these are the interventions that originally motivated this study. But they are not the only tactics used to displace residents from centrally located favelas. As time passed and upgrading removals and gentrification by pacification proved slow processes, and after reviewing fieldwork and the relevant secondary data, I concluded that other related tactics were more effective in displacing residents of Rocinha and other favelas. These methods are also documented in this study. Multi-year observations of what has been occurring in Rocinha and comparable favelas have allowed me to understand the mechanism of accumulation by dispossession driving favela removals and reshaping numerous neighborhoods throughout Rio.

Certain maps spatially track favela removals and resettlements and are beneficial for visualizing where processes are taking place (e.g. Faulhaber 2012). Equally important, but largely absent, are clear theoretical outlines, which allow for a deeper understanding of why
such displacements occur. In Chapter 5 I return to this point and provide a theoretical outline for accompanying the recent removals.

A third type of map, probably the most intricate, involves conceptually charting the “nuts and bolts” or inner-workings of removals. A conceptual diagram highlights the complex relationships in the removal process and what sets them in motion, or produces them. In order to facilitate understanding of recent displacements I developed an easy to follow schema based on the principles of causation. The conceptual schema is not intended to serve as an exemplary model of logical causality, an area outside my formal training. Rather, the purpose of the following diagram is to concisely explain (using mainly abductive reasoning) how removals have been happening in contemporary Rio. Further details are outlined in Chapter 4.

**Strategy** = **Capitalist urbanism in order to fuel continued growth and create a city for elites and tourists.** Demolish and remove whatever is in the way of this goal. Because the path of least resistance is more practical and since wealthy locals and visitors don’t want to see poverty and fear being victims of crime, remove as many favelas as possible and resettle their inhabitant to the furthest corners of the periphery.

**Causes** = **Specific Removal Tactics**

1. Environmental arguments used to defend removals, such as “area of risk” or preservation.
2. Displacements by “development”, as in urban renewal and upgrading schemes.
3. Economic Displacement/Gentrification, associated to rising costs of housing.

**Effect** = **Mass Displacement of Residents in Strategically Located Favelas**

- At least 70,000 people removed from their homes, mainly since April 2010.
- Rio de Janeiro has become a more spatially segregated city, and even more antagonistic to the poor and working class than it was before.
Contributory Causes/Factors

- Natural disasters
- MCMV
- Mega-events
- UPPs
- Perception of economic and political stability.
- Political will and influential local elite(s)\(^9\)

Until approximately August 2013 both my own ethnographic research as well as the (limited) secondary data indicated between 7% and 16% of Rocinha’s residents were threatened with displacement through the mentioned removal tactics.\(^2\) Abundant empirical evidence also suggests these methods have been recently utilized in dozens of favelas and other low-income communities throughout Rio.

These are the main removal tactics I observed and collected data on in contemporary Rio de Janeiro. Herein they are viewed as instruments of the larger social mechanisms of displacement (accumulation by disposition) that are responsible for opening and reorganizing strategic spaces for enhanced capitalist accumulation and urban expansion.

Removals associated with “area of risk” tactics and mega-event related construction, are already observable and fairly measurable. But it is still too early (as of late 2015) for conclusive assessments of other ongoing factors. This is particularly the case in regards to the long-term impact of favela upgrading, UPPs, and gentrification. Furthermore, beginning in latter half of 2013 a number of significant events occurred that have forced me to reevaluate initial responses to my research question. These occurrences, such as the mass protest movements of June 2013,

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\(^9\) For the sake of brevity “political will” and “influence of political economic elites” are considered together. They could certainly be two separate contributory causes.

\(^2\) Using the government (IBGE) census estimates of Rocinha’s population (70,000) approximately 16% of the community would be displaced. Utilizing the figure of 150,000 I employ, roughly 7% would be relocated. Population estimates are explained in Chapter 2.
the “where is Amarildo?” campaign in Rocinha and subsequent arrest of the local UPP commander, the immense corruption scandals, and the overall political and economic instability gripping Brazil since 2014, are discussed in later chapters.

With these complexities in mind, the current objective centers on revealing previously unknown (or misunderstood) details of large-scale public investments/interventions in spatially vulnerable favelas. Special emphasis is placed on contradictions embedded in low-income housing and quality of life related interventions, and in particular on favela upgrading and pacification schemes. I sought to understand the role they play in displacing longtime residents or in producing gentrification, or both (Smith 1979: 541-546). For reasons explained in Chapters 2 and 3, I selected upgrading and pacification programs in favelas as primary case studies.

*Guiding Theories and Perspectives*

This section is not a comprehensive review of the literature. Here my sole objective is to present the main theoretical perspectives and substantive areas of the social sciences guiding this work, and to briefly discuss them.

This investigation makes an effort to bridge numerous social science disciplines (and sub-disciplines), and borrows from a wealth of theories (macro to micro). I have also analyzed multiple types of data. Despite the diversity of theories, methods, and data, one macro sociological paradigm has guided the entire investigation: conflict, or critical theory. The critical theory referred to is that which has been influenced primarily by Karl Marx and the subsequent theorists his revolutionary work inspired, such as Henri Lefebvre, Paulo Freire, Jock Young, and David Harvey.

Within the critical macro approach one theoretical perspective stands out, the sociospatial perspective. Henri Lefebvre is considered the pioneer of this spatial approach to sociology. His
paradigm shifting work of the 1960s and 1970s has influenced generations of urban scholars (Gottdiener and Hutchinson 2011: 80).

**Critical Approach**

The theories and perspectives from urban sociology, ethnography, criminology, and urban geography that I employ are all critical, whether the term is included or not. The critical traditions cited below exemplify a type of social science research that can trace most or part of their critical edge to Marx’s analysis of capitalist political economy. Marx was the first to systematically and consistently challenge the entire social structure of capitalist society. It is no coincidence that to varying degrees the bulk of critical social scientists share his work as a common denominator.

The following segment from Brotherton and Barrios’s ethnography on the Latin Kings (ALKQN), a well-known street “organization” in New York City, expresses the plurality of perspectives and theories guiding my research. In describing their theoretical and methodological inspirations, Brotherton and Barrios add:

> Basing our work on the philosophical critiques of normative social-science practices, especially those which emanated from within the neo-Marxian traditions of the Frankfurt School...our orientation begins from the premise that all social and cultural phenomena emerge out of tensions between the agents and interests of those who seek to control everyday life and those who have little option but to resist this relationship of domination. This fundamentally critical approach to society seeks to uncover the processes by which seemingly normative relationships are contingent upon structured inequalities and reproduced...Our approach, therefore, into the life of the ALKQN, is a holistic one, collecting and analyzing multiple types of data and maintaining an openness to modes of analysis that cut across disciplinary turfs (Brotherton and Barrios 2004: 3-4).

**Critical Urban Geography & The Sociospatial Perspective**
The human landscape can be read as a landscape of exclusion...Because power is expressed in the monopolization of space and the relegation of weaker groups in society to less desirable environments (David Sibley 1995: ix).

David Sibley’s quote speaks directly to the sociospatial dynamics of what is occurring in Rio de Janeiro. This section approaches the primary themes that have shaped this study, the critical urban/sociospatial theories of Henri Lefebvre and David Harvey.

By the early 1970s, David Harvey had abandoned a blend of philosophical positivism and “Fabian progressivism” and turned to Marx’s analysis of capitalism as the most fitting perspective for understanding and explaining rising inequality and other social problems increasingly concentrated in cities (Harvey 2001: 4-9). There seems to be an aversion, even if veiled, on the part of Harvey and his admirers to fully acknowledge Lefebvre’s paradigm shifting role and contributions to urban studies and Marxism (centering spatial and urban analysis). Regardless, since the 1970s Harvey has become one of the world’s most influential social scientists and has contributed a number of important mid-range theories to Marxist urban analysis. Beginning with Social Justice and the City (1973), Harvey began building on what Soja, Gottdiener and Hutchinson, and numerous others, refer to as the Lefebvrian approach. Harvey is clear in his conclusion to Social Justice in the City that he was pleased to have discovered Lefebvre’s urban spatial analysis because there was nothing remotely similar to what Lefebvre was proposing at the time, although he laments it was after he had submitted the essays for the book’s chapters that he made the discovery. Although less brazen than Castells in The Urban Question (1972), Harvey was also not willing at the time to concede that Lefebvre was correct, that urbanization and real estate were as important, or more, than industrial production for understanding the survival of capitalism (Lefebvre 2003: 159-160; Soja 1989: 76-77). Harvey’s conversion to the Lefebvrian approach was gradual, and he was able to couch his shift more as if he had found the missing proof Marxist urban scholars needed in order to support Lefebvre’s “abstract” proposals.
In *The Limits to Capital* (1982) Harvey flirted with a Lefebvrian type approach, but in my reading, his real conversion came with the lesser-known *The Urbanization of Capital* (1985). Lefebvre, whom more orthodox urban Marxists criticized (e.g., Castells in *The Urban Question*), spent much of the 1970s on the defensive concerning his urban spatial contribution to Marxism. Brazilian urban legal scholar Edésio Fernandes, paraphrasing Topalov (1989), suggested: “perhaps the path of urban research in France and internationally would have been very different had Lefebvre’s contribution not been put aside by the enormous political and academic influence of Manuel Castells’s *La question urbaine*” (Fernandes 2007: 205). Consequently, by the early 1980s Lefebvre turned to other themes, including one he initiated almost half a century earlier, analyzing everyday life in globalized capitalist society. During the 1980s and 1990s, more of Lefebvre’s work was translated into English, and other prominent English-language geographers, such as Edward Soja, began introducing it to a wider audience. In 1991 Lefebvre passed away, leaving Gottdiener and Soja, and recently even David Harvey, as his primary torchbearers in the Anglo world.

Lefebvre’s sociospatial theories have gained popularity in Brazil. His “right to the city” found its way into a groundbreaking amendment to Brazil’s 1988 Federal Constitution: the 2001 City Statute (Fernandes 2007: 204) and is often cited by students, scholars, protesters and favela residents in framing events unfolding in their cities.

Yet it is David Harvey, enormously indebted to Lefebvre’s trailblazing work, who has emerged as today’s leading Marxist urban scholar, with a legion of devotees and successful protégés, such as the late geographer Neil Smith (1954-2012), a pioneer of gentrification research.

Despite accusations of ingratitude (Gottdiener 1985, 1993; Soja 1996), Harvey has produced the most fruitful material, in quantity and quality, within this perspective. He has fleshed out many of Lefebvre’s ideas and in doing so has constructed helpful concepts along the way. One of

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21 Estatuto da Cidade in Portuguese.
these, accumulation by dispossession, is particularly significant to the research conducted on displacement in Rio de Janeiro’s centrally located favelas. While the right to the city is the concept of hope guiding this work, Harvey’s more somber conceptions form its practical base.

**Accumulation by dispossession, a concise historical overview**

It is worth opening this section by introducing “creative destruction”, a closely related element of accumulation by dispossession. Harvey often raises both concepts in the same passages (Harvey 2003: 162; 2006: 152-155). Creative destruction is a process central to capitalism, whether as originally part of primitive accumulation or later as an element of accumulation by dispossession. It became a common strategy for overcoming some of the practical dilemmas encountered in the 1800s during the implementation of capitalism, particularly in cities. Harvey’s asks, “how could a new world be created, after all, without destroying much that had gone before? You simply cannot make an omelet without breaking eggs” (Harvey 1990: 16). In *The Right to the City* he provides examples of Haussmann in Paris and Robert Moses in New York City (Harvey 2012: 16-17). Harvey describes how “urban transformation has a dark aspect” because the absorption of capital surpluses through renewal/revitalization projects requires frequent cycles of creative destruction (Harvey 2012: 16).

Chapter 1 describes the large-scale urban renewal projects initiated by Rio’s mayor Francisco Pereira Passos (1902-1906), and how they epitomized creative destruction (Benchimol 1992: 131; 318-319). Pereira Passos was studying in Paris as Haussmann carved through centrally located working class districts. Years later, in Rio de Janeiro, Pereira Passos succeeded in removing approximately 20,000 low-income residents from Rio’s downtown during his four years as mayor (Faulhaber 2012: 36-37). Like Haussmann, Pereira Passos did so to open alleys into streets and pave wide avenues, to demolish cortiços (tenements), and to address pressing
health concerns society blamed on the poor overcrowded areas of the city center (Benchimol 1992: 235-244). Since 2010 Paes has embarked on equally ambitious plan of creative destruction, perhaps best exemplified by the mega urban renewal project Porto Maravilha (Marvelous Port) in Rio’s long decrepit port district, a swath of downtown that includes Rio’s oldest standing favela, Morro da Providência.

Harvey points out the class dimension involved in creative destruction. From Haussmann’s Paris, New York City of Robert Moses, or Rio de Janeiro of Pereira Passos, and later Eduardo Paes, it is the poor, the disadvantaged, and those excluded from political power that suffer most from this process (Harvey 2012: 16). In the Americas, where class and race are intimately connected, the process is even more discriminatory, and in urban areas evictions and displacement are often the result of creative destruction.

In *Seventeen Contradictions and the End of Capitalism* (2014) Harvey explains that in order to survive crises of overaccumulation capitalism requires bouts of creative destruction. He describes how:

> Daily life in the city, settled ways of living, relating and socialising, are again and again disrupted to make way for the latest fad or fancy. Demolitions and displacements to make way for gentrification or Disneyfication break open already achieved fabrics of urban living to make way for the gaudy and the gargantuan, the ephemeral and fleeting. Dispossession and destruction, displacement and construction become vehicles for vigorous and speculative capital accumulation as the figures of the financier and the rentier, the developer, the landed proprietor and the entrepreneurial mayor step from the shadows into the forefront of capital’s logic of accumulation. (Harvey 2014)\(^{22}\)

Underlying processes of creative destruction in neoliberal variants of capitalism is a mechanism Harvey calls accumulation by dispossession, and which he argues has been an integral feature of capitalist urbanization since the latter half of the twentieth century.\(^{23}\) He

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\(^{22}\) This citation is from the EBook version of *Seventeen Contradictions and the End of Capitalism* (2014), which does not include page numbers. This quote can be found in final segment before the conclusion, towards the end of the section titled, “Contradiction 17: The Revolt of Human Nature: Universal Alienation”.

\(^{23}\) Harvey 2003, *The New Imperialism*, Chapter 4
bases this concept on Marx’s account of *ursprünglich akkumulation*, known within Marxism as “primitive accumulation”, or literally, as “original accumulation” (Marx 1982: 714).²⁴

Modern capitalism did not mystically spring forth sometime in eighteenth century Europe. The tendencies had long been evolving, and capitalism is an intentional socially produced system. In capitalism you need money to make money. Original accumulation was the process by which the dominant class obtained the initial resources required to get the wheels of industrial capitalism spinning. Marx explains that primitive accumulation is “the historical process of divorcing the producer from the means of production (Marx 1982: 875). He is referring to something very specific in this context:

Communal property - which is entirely distinct from the state property we have just been considering - was an old Teutonic institution which lived on under the cover of feudalism. We have seen how its forcible usurpation, generally accompanied by the turning of arable into pasture land, begins at the end of the fifteenth century and extends into the sixteenth. But at that time the process was carried on by means of individual acts of violence against which legislation, for a hundred and fifty years, fought in vain. The advance made by the eighteenth century shows itself in this, that the law itself now becomes the instrument by which the people’s land is stolen, although the big farmers made use of their little independent methods as well. The Parliamentary form of the robbery is that of ‘Bills for Inclosure of Commons’, in other words decrees by which the landowners grant themselves the people’s land as private property, decrees of expropriation of the people...this history, the history of their expropriation, is written in the annals of mankind in letters of blood and fire (Marx 1982: 885; 875).

More than a century later Harvey explains, “Since it seems peculiar to call an ongoing process ‘primitive’ or ‘original’ I shall, in what follows, substitute these terms by the concept of ‘accumulation by dispossession’” (Harvey 2003: 144).

Since *The New Imperialism* (2003) Harvey has been building this idea. Chapter 4 of *The New Imperialism* is dedicated to introducing accumulation by dispossession, from its roots in Marx’s “primitive accumulation” and the influences of Rosa Luxemburg and Hannah Ardent to

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²⁴ On page 714 of *Capital* Ben Fowkes (the translator of the Penguin Books/New Left Review edition) explains that he preferred the term primitive accumulation because the expression by that point had been established as part of the English language. I prefer the more literal translation of the German word ursprünglich.
its contemporary forms. In many of his subsequent works Harvey provides more succinct outlines of accumulation by dispossession.

In *Spaces of Capital* (2001) Harvey explains that growth under capitalism, according to Marxist theory, points to accumulation of capital as the driver of this “revolutionary force” and the “engine which powers growth under the capitalist mode of production” (Harvey 2001: 237). In *Capital* Vol. 1 Marx wrote:

Moreover, the development of capitalist production makes it constantly necessary to keep increasing the amount of the capital laid out in a given industrial undertaking, and competition makes the immanent laws of capitalist production to be felt by each individual capitalist, as external coercive laws. It compels him to keep constantly extending his capital, in order to preserve it, but extend it he cannot, except by means of progressive accumulation (Marx 1982).

Harvey recalls Marx repeated warning, that economic growth under capitalism is a process of internal contradictions that often erupts as crises (Harvey 2001: 138). Rosa Luxemburg argued that underconsumption is one of the principle causes of capitalism’s recurrent crises. Luxemburg focused on colonial imperialism as a prime example of capitalism looking outside of itself to survive crises. Harvey values Luxemburg’s pioneering contribution to Marxism, her insistence that primitive accumulation should not be relegated to the prehistory of capitalism but rather seen as an ongoing process. He argues, “there is much that is interesting about Luxemburg’s formulation. To begin with, the idea that capitalism must perpetually have something ‘outside of itself in order to stabilize itself’ is worthy of scrutiny” (Harvey 2003: 138-140). Yet Harvey takes issue with two points. First, he counters that crises are mainly caused by overaccumulation not by underconsumption (Harvey 2003: 138-139). Second, while accepting “the idea that some sort of outside’ is necessary for the stabilization of capitalism,” Harvey denies that it is always necessary. He adds, “capitalism can either make use of some pre-existing outside (non-capitalist social formations or some sector within capitalism—such as education—that has not yet been proletarianized) or it can actively manufacture it.” (Harvey 2003: 141).
Harvey (2003: 149) defines overaccumulation as:

A condition where surpluses of capital (perhaps accompanied by surpluses of labour) lie idle with no profitable outlets in sight. The operative term here, however, is the capital surplus. What accumulation by dispossession does is to release a set of assets (including labour power) at very low (and in some instances zero) cost. Overaccumulated capital can seize hold of such assets and immediately turn them to profitable use.

In Rebel Cities (2012) he recapitulates Marx’s insight that capitalism requires the continuous search for surplus value (profit) and that to produce surplus value capitalists have to produce a surplus product. At this point, and drawing heavily from Lefebvre's writing of the 1960s and early 1970s, he contends:

Capitalism is perpetually producing the surplus product that urbanization requires. The reverse relation also holds. Capitalism needs urbanization to absorb the surplus products it perpetually produces. In this way an inner connection emerges between the development of capitalism and urbanization. Hardly surprisingly, therefore, the logistical curves of growth of capitalist output over time are broadly paralleled by the logistical curves of urbanization of the world’s population... The politics of capitalism are affected by the perpetual need to find profitable terrains for capital surplus production and absorption (Harvey 2012: 5).

The circumstances this work has described in Rio de Janeiro probably sound familiar. Much of the slum/tenement eradication and removal that has been occurring in the “Marvelous City” is similar to processes Engels described in nineteenth century England and that occurred in the cities of the United States during the early and middle twentieth century. In The Housing Question, Engels wrote:

The expansion of the big modern cities gives the land in certain sections of them, particularly in those which are centrally situated, an artificial and often enormously increasing value; the buildings erected in these areas depress this value, instead of increasing it, because they no longer correspond to the changed circumstances; they are pulled down and replaced by others. This takes place above all with centrally located workers’ houses, whose rents, even with the greatest overcrowding, can never, or only very slowly, increase above a certain maximum. They are pulled down and in their stead shops, warehouses and public buildings are erected (Engels 1988: 319 [1872]).

From New York to Rio, the “warehouses and public buildings” that once displaced central slums have also been razed in the name of creative destruction, in order to build upper-class housing, hotels, aquariums, tourist attractions, malls, and other elite and consumption related
amenities. These are enduring processes that are an integral part of capitalist history, which Lefebvre insisted, is directly linked to the history of urbanization (Lefebvre 2003: 139).

Harvey adds that after the creative destruction of the nineteenth and early to mid-twentieth centuries had forcefully removed most undesirable classes and their dwellings from central areas, another process began to intensify. He describes:

A far more insidious and cancerous process of transformation occurred through fiscal disciplining of democratic urban governments, land markets, property speculation, and the sorting of land to those uses that generated the highest possible financial rate of return under the land’s “highest and best use.”... It is depressing to think that all of this was written in 1872, for Engels's description applies directly to contemporary urban processes in much of Asia (Delhi, Seoul, Mumbai) as well as to the contemporary gentrification of, say, Harlem and Brooklyn in New York. A process of displacement and dispossession, in short, also lies at the core of the urban process under capitalism. This is the mirror image of capital absorption through urban redevelopment (Harvey 2012: 17-18).

Accordingly, accumulation by dispossession occurs in four primary ways: (1) privatization and commodification; (2) financialization; (3) the management and manipulation of crises; and (4) state redistributions (Harvey 2005: 160-164). Within each of these broad categories he includes numerous somewhat more specific strategies for how accumulation dispossesses vulnerable populations of resources. Through specific practices that were detailed in the previous chapter, the four main elements of accumulation by dispossession Harvey outlines are being exacted upon Rocinha and dozens of other carioca favelas. This work focuses on the fourth element of accumulation by dispossession: state redistributions. First, the other three will be sketched.

I. Privatization and commodification

Harvey describes privatization and “the cutting edge of accumulation by dispossession” to “open up new fields for capital accumulation in domains hitherto regarded off-limits to the calculus of profitability” (Harvey 2005: 157, 160). Privatization is a feature particularly associated with
neoliberal forms of capitalism and liberalization of the market. Privatization and commodification meant that a new round of the “enclosure of the commons” became an objective of state policies (Harvey 2003: 158). He adds:

Assets held by the state or in common were released into the market where overaccumulating capital could invest in them, upgrade them, and speculate in them. New terrains for profitable activity were opened up, and this helped stave off the overaccumulation problem, at least for a while. Once in motion, however, this movement created incredible pressures to find more and more arenas, either at home or abroad, where privatization might be achieved.

Referring to privatization and commodification in Latin America, Freeman explains: “The neoliberal agenda championed by the IMF and the Washington consensus in the 1980s and 1990s in Latin America meant dispossessing urban workers of their industrial and government jobs, dispossessing peasants of their land, dispossessing citizens of public services and dispossessing societies of public goods like pension funds, utilities, telecoms and state run industries – all of which provided outlets for globally overaccumulated capital.” (Freeman 2012: 100).

Chapter 4 detailed how the symbolic conquest and colonization of strategic favelas by Rio’s UPPs opened these communities to market forces in lucrative ways that had not been previously experienced (Freeman 2012: 98-99). At 8:30 A.M. on November 13, 2011, I watched as the Military Police raised the flags of Brazil and Rio de Janeiro State over Rocinha. It conjured images of conquistadors planting the flags of their respective empires on the shores where they had landed. As Eric told me, “Man, Sky entered [Rocinha] practically riding on the back bumper of BOPE’s caveirão, there is no denying this.” In other words, the rapid influx of capital into “pacified” Rocinha was not a subtle process, it was unmistakable and it was aggressive. It was nothing short of a capitalist invasion, with as many satellite TV and cellphone carrier salespersons as there were police. This is akin to the type of imperialist accumulation strategy Luxemburg (2003: 426-432) and Ardent (1973: 135; 148) described.
II. Financialization

To the best of my knowledge financialization, in broadly speaking, and especially as an element of accumulation by dispossession, has not been studied in Rocinha or any other favelas in any systematic way. Harvey references several examples from the world of stock markets and corporate fraud (Harvey 2006: 147). Research for this ethnography revealed that corporate fraud has played a notable role in Rio’s favela upgrading schemes. But here, only one affirmation can be made with confidence. Vast amounts of credit have become accessible to low-income Brazilians in recent years, including residents of Rio’s favelas. Much has been predatory, in the form of credit cards and bank loans with astronomical interest rates that would be illegal in most high-income countries. Car and motorcycle ownership has also skyrocketed among middle and working-class Brazilians, including residents of Rocinha and other favelas (Amann and Baer 2012: 417). Much of this is paid through debt finance as well. The accumulation of debt has not been the focus of this study, as privatization and commodification are still incipient in favelas. If residents of favelas like Rocinha, still mostly informal urban spaces, were to receive private property titles to their homes and businesses, then a frenzy of speculative financial activity would be released. As Hernando de Soto advocates, such a move would resurrect billions of dollars in previously “dead capital” (de Soto 2001: 30).

III. Management and manipulation of crises

Harvey concerns himself mostly with financial crises and with ways high-income countries enrich themselves while dispossessing low and middle-income countries of their resources through strategies like “the debt trap” (Harvey 2005: 162). But there are other types of crises he overlooks, ones covered in this dissertation, such as natural disasters. War is another type of crisis often manipulated. Citing examples from Iraq to New Orleans, Naomi Klein (2005)
describes how war and natural disaster are frequently used to dispossess vulnerable groups of resources and land. In Rio de Janeiro there has been a systematic manipulation of crises related to natural disasters generally caused by heavy rains. Since 2010 these events have been used to dispossess thousands of poor and working-class families from urban spaces strategic to capitalism.

IV. State Redistributions

The fourth manner in which powerful groups and dominant classes dispossess the rest of society is through what Harvey calls “state redistributions.” Accordingly: “The state, once neoliberalized, becomes a prime agent of redistributive policies, reversing the flow from the upper to the lower classes that had occurred during the era of embedded liberalism” (Harvey 2005: 163). The state contributes to accumulation by dispossession in many ways: the privatization of social (or public) housing; revisions in tax codes to favor the wealthy to the detriment of the poor, working, and often middle class; and numerous subsidies and tax breaks to corporations. Harvey also points to the “Displacement of state expenditures and free access to all by user fees (e.g., on higher education)” (Harvey 2006: 155). The idea of charging, sometimes exorbitantly, for attending public universities is still outrageous in most countries around the world. In the United States this particularly perverse form of accumulation by dispossession has trapped millions of young people into a life of inescapable debt. Harvey also mentions that, “The corporate welfare programs that now exist in the US at federal, state and local levels amount to a vast redirection of public moneys for corporate benefit, in much the same way that the mortgage interest rate tax deduction operates in the US as a massive subsidy to upper-income home owners and the construction industry” (Harvey 2006: 155).

He points out that the state also contributes to accumulation by dispossession in the realm of public security (or safety). He cites the increase in, “the use of surveillance and policing” and
that “in the case of the US, incarceration of recalcitrant elements in the population indicate a more sinister role of intense social control” (Harvey 2006: 155).

Since the 1980s Harvey has written about the “project to achieve the restoration of class power” (Harvey 2005: 16). In a 2007 interview, Harvey explains how he had been addressing neoliberalism for years, but that at various moments: “I called it ’post-Fordism’ or, as I preferred, ‘flexible accumulation’; now I prefer to wrap that all together in the term ‘neoliberalism.’” In The Condition of Postmodernity (1990), Harvey employs a flurry of confusing terms in referring to what he now generally calls Keynesian capitalism and neoliberalism. The terms include, “Fordist-Keynesianism”, “Fordist modernity”, “flexible accumulation” and “flexible postmodernism” (Harvey 1990: 124, 339-342). Importantly, Harvey adds that capitalism is rarely either or, and there are always varying degrees of Keynesian and neoliberal capitalisms, “depending on which configuration is profitable and which is not” (Harvey 1990: 344).

In short, the sociospatial perspective adopted in this work can be traced to the seminal work of Henri Lefebvre, although Frederick Engels could be viewed as the earliest contributor. Gottdiener and Hutchinson (2011: 19-21) outline the following points as central to the sociospatial perspective:

(1) The urban and suburban settlement spaces that comprise the built environment are part of a larger metropolitan region, which makes it is necessary to adopt a regional perspective to understand urban areas of the twenty-first century.

(2) Large urban areas are linked to the global system of capitalism where communities are affected by decisions made at the metropolitan, the national, even international levels.

(3) Urban development is affected by government policy, developers, financiers, and other institutions in the real estate industry, and they create incentives and opportunities that mold the behaviors, preferences and choices of individual consumers.

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(4) Spatial arrangements found in urban areas and local communities have both manifest and latent consequences. Spatial arrangements influence human behavior and interaction in predictable ways but also in ways that original planners or developers may not have foreseen. Individuals, through their actions and relations with others, constantly rework existing spatial arrangements and produce new spaces to express their needs and desires.

Gottdiener and Hutchinson also highlight the interaction between society and space and how within cities, social groups and classes differ from one another with respect to lifestyle, attitudes, beliefs and access to political power and influence. As a result, they have varying degrees of influence on decisions about how social space is distributed and structured within and across urban areas (Gottdiener and Hutchinson 2010: 19-21).

**Gentrification, a brief history**

Gentrification is a core theme of this work, but it is important to understand which type of “gentrification” is being referring to in the study. I explain this in the following pages, but first a quick look at the term’s origins and how it has evolved into a leading and argumentative area of research in numerous academic disciplines.

Gentrification emerged as an academic theme in 1964 with *London: aspects of change* (1964) by Ruth Glass. Her frequently cited definition described how:

One by one, many of the working-class quarters of London have been invaded by the middle classes—upper and lower. Shabby, modest mews and cottages—two rooms up and two down—have been taken over, when their leases have expired, and have become elegant, expensive residences. Larger Victorian houses, downgraded in an earlier or recent period— which were used as lodging houses or were otherwise in multiple occupation—have been upgraded once again.... Once this process of “gentrification” starts in a district it goes on rapidly until all or most of the original working-class occupiers are displaced and the whole social character of the district is changed. (Glass 1964: xviii)

On a superficial level, (i.e., phenomena visually detectable and quantitatively estimatable), Glass’s classic and straightforward definition is representative of the type of gentrification I looked for in Rocinha, Vidigal, and other key favelas in Rio. This could also be referred to as the
physical expression of gentrification. Theoretically, I frame gentrification through the lens of what is generally referred to as production side (Smith 1996: 38-39), or state-led gentrification (Less 2010: 156). To a lesser degree I occasionally borrow from demand, or consumption side theories of gentrification, particularly in assessing the role of mostly middle class foreigners in the gentrification of Vidigal, a mid-sized South Zone favela adjacent to Rocinha, but I prefer the term cultural consumer demands gentrification, which is cumbersome but will not be used frequently in this study.

Theories of gentrification induced by cultural consumer demands highlight culture and individual choice, consumption and consumer demand, and the gamut of “neighborhood change” is to be explained primarily in terms of the type of people who moves in and out of gentrifying neighborhoods (Smith 1996: 38). The culturally validated neighborhoods automatically provide middle classes with the collective identity and social credentials they long for (Zukin 1987: 143).

A quick example familiar to many is of Brooklyn, where there was a cultural demand amongst artists, hipsters and other segments of the middle class for authenticity. Living in Brooklyn, close to Manhattan but with a hard-knocks reputation and rich cultural heritage, was an attempt to acquire it. The gentrifiers end up commodifying the culture and history of the area they occupy.

Smith’s production side argument posits that the focus of gentrification research should be first and foremost on capital, such as the real estate, development, and construction, industries, and financial lending institutions, more than on the gentrifiers themselves and the consumer demands and cultural tastes that drive them back into inner cities (Smith 1979: 540). Capital lies at the center of his analysis. Neil Smith came from the neo-Marxists theoretical tradition of urban studies (the Lefebvrian approach), like his mentor, David Harvey. And accordingly, I suggest one of Smith most important contributions to gentrification research was to remind us of a crucial gentrification historical fact. Smith explains that while Glass is credited with the
term gentrification, 120 years earlier Friedrich Engels was explaining the process in detail as it unfolded in industrial England (e.g., Smith 1996: 32-33). I suggest this points to the Marxists origins of gentrification research, and to the creative destruction and accumulation by dispossession inherently involved.

The only issue I take with Smith’s assessment is his capacious definition of gentrification. By the turn of the century Smith was describing gentrification as having evolved by the 1990s into a competitive global urban strategy for municipal public private partnerships, and was a central strategy of neoliberal urbanism. (Smith 2002: 441, 446). In one of his last interviews, a year before his untimely death in 2012, Smith explained in the New York Times how: “The big perspective is that gentrification has changed tremendously since the ’70s and ’80s. It’s no longer just about housing. It’s really a systematic class-remaking of city neighborhoods. It’s driven by many of the same forces, especially the profitable use of land. But it’s about creating entire environments: employment, recreation, environmental conditions”.

I believe there is much truth to Smith’s argument, but it is too expansive, and if I adopted it virtually all types of the displacement covered in this dissertation, or in any city under capitalism, would fall under the rubric of production-side gentrification. At this scale the concept begins to lose explanatory significance. While I believe an entire city can be gentrified, I prefer to call this socio spatial segregation and limit my focus instead on gentrification at the neighborhood or district (zones) level.

Within the relevant literature few scholars distinguish between economic displacement and gentrification, and usually these terms are used interchangeably. While they are closely related, they are not the same processes (Marcuse 1985: 212-216). It could be argued that economic displacement is a precursor to gentrification, where the latter is in high gear once there has been a significant influx of better-off social classes/big business and a notable outflow of earlier

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residents and small businesses (Marcuse 1985: 198-199). Or, if incoming demographics move into newly built housing or previously vacant units then maybe there is little displacement, or perhaps displacement only becomes a major factor in the later stages of gentrification (Henig 1980: 648, 651). I investigate these questions in the final chapters.

**Historical Analysis**

I came to appreciate the importance of history in sociological research through dinner table conversations and arguments with friends in Rocinha. Some of these comrades had been engaged in community activism for decades, such as Martins, Maria Helena and Ronaldo Batista (1960-2013).

C. W. Mills (1919-1962) was a pioneering figure among twentieth century social scientists and one of the first (of the more contemporary sociologists) to assert the importance of history in social science analysis. Mills held that at their most fundamental level the social sciences address problems of the individual, history, and of their intersections within social structures. He criticized the sociology of his day for abandoning this classic tradition. In *The Sociological Imagination* (1959) Mills stated:

> The problems of our time—which now include the problem of man’s very nature — cannot be stated adequately without consistent practice of the view that history is the shank of social study, and recognition of the need to develop further a psychology of man that is sociologically grounded and historically relevant. Without use of history and without an historical sense of psychological matters, the social scientist cannot adequately state the kinds of problems that ought now to be the orienting points of his studies (C.W. Mills 2000: 143).

A few years before C.W. Mills, at the 1956 International Congress of Sociology in Amsterdam, Henri Lefebvre touched on this theme, designating sociology as a field tasked with explaining an array of complex socioeconomic, political and cultural phenomena. Sociologists, according to Lefebvre, strive to thoroughly “penetrate” (pénétrer) social complexities, but

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27 C.W. Mills 2000: 143
mastery of theory and methods are not enough. Inevitably, sociologists uncover additional layers of complexity outside the realm of the intended description. These deeper strata, Lefebvre adds, “belong to another domain, especially to history. The sociologist who wants to understand and know, has to double as a historian. How can one understand the agrarian structure of southern Italy without history? “ (Lefebvre 2015: 2). Lefebvre’s example of agrarian structure in southern Italy is fitting. Being from France he understood the need for historical understanding in sociology, particularly when investigating in foreign lands.

C.W. Mills also assigned enormous importance to historical analysis for sociologists conducting research in foreign countries. At the time the majority of sociologists were white men from Western Europe and North America, and this was the demographic he was addressing. But the principle holds true for any class of scholars conducting research in countries where they were not born or raised. Mills reasoned this point would be clear to any social scientists once they had arrived, “in the Middle East, in Asia, in Africa...to examine the institutions in some different social structure”.

In the study of ‘his own country’ he has often smuggled in the history; knowledge of it is embodied in the very conceptions with which he works. When he takes up a fuller range, when he compares, he becomes more aware of the historical as intrinsic to what he wants to understand and not merely as ‘general background.’ (C.W. Mills 2000: 150).

A number of more contemporary scholars continue emphasizing the importance of history in social analysis. John Comaroff goes as far as to state, “In my own view, there ought to be no ‘relationship’ between history and anthropology, since there should be no division to begin with (Comaroff 1982: 144). He adds that many of the “conundrums” discovered in ethnographies investigating “metamorphosis” or social change, “may only be resolved when the recent transformations are comparatively situated in a broader historical process, a process configured by complex interactions between the systemic logic of local structures and external forces” (Comaroff 1982: 147-148).

28 C.W. Mills 2000: 150
Ethnographer Michael Burawoy (1998: 5) also highlights the difficulty of grasping present
day social conditions or cultures through ethnographic methods without developing a historical
understanding. His version of the *extended case method*29 “applies reflexive science to
ethnography in order to extract the general from the unique, to move from the ‘micro’ to the
‘macro,’ and to connect the present to the past in anticipation of the future, all by building on
preexisting theory” (Burawoy 1998: 5).

I have made an attempt in this study to employ a style of historical ethnography, or
retrospective ethnography (Kornblum 2004: 178)30, that depicts not only today’s Rocinha, but
also the Rocinha early residents likely experienced, and which is steadily being forgotten.

Anthropologist Anne Sutherland, quoted in Kornblum (2004), added:

Historical Ethnography still takes seriously the traditional anthropological method of
intensive, personal fieldwork to find out how people think, what they do and what it
means to them. But traditional ethnography has not usually asked the question: So
how did this culture come to be this way? Today, ethnographers no longer take for
granted that culture (or identity) is a given. Instead it is, something that has to be
explained. If culture persists, or identities of ethnicity and nation are key features of
culture, then we must try to understand how they are constructed and reconstructed
over time (Sutherland 1999:1).

The more longtime residents I interviewed (some who were living as adults in Rocinha
during the late 1950s) and the more early publications on the community I reviewed, the better I
was able to contextualize today’s Rocinha and current events in Rio. This analytical tool helps
describe how Rio de Janeiro has been evolving, and in the case of Rocinha and other favelas,
how and these communities have been transforming in recent years.

In Chapter 3 I explain the historicity of PAC and the UPPs and how they are
linked to larger
social processes. Jock Young, inspired by C. Wright Mills, emphasized the need in social science
research to “move backwards and forwards from the micro to the macro, from the local to the
system as a whole, and back again” (Young 2011: 4).

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29 In its barest form it is a technique that extends the lessons learned from a specific case, or set of
case studies, to formulate logical inferences and to contribute to theoretical constructions on a larger
scale (Burawoy 1998: 5).
30 Historical ethnographic approach (Kornblum 2004: 178-179).
C.W. Mills often referred to “the individual” in his often-cited passages from the *Sociological Imagination*, but the same axiom is applicable to investigations of communities, events and social processes. For instance, in his critique of increasingly superficial research in criminology Young calls for scholars to pay more attention to the “history of the area” (Young 2011: 14).

Before this study began, I though I had considerable knowledge of Rio de Janeiro’s history, including the favelas. These were themes I had been writing about since I was an undergraduate student. But after numerous conversations with Brazilian scholars, such as PUC-Rio Rio de Janeiro/favela historian Rafael Gonçalves, or even more so, with longtime residents of Rocinha, many of who had migrated from other regions of Brazil, I was confronted with the reality that my command of the issues was quite superficial. I had to dedicate substantial time studying Brazilian history and geography before I felt confident enough to discuss the contemporary issues this study considers. In short, the historical sections of this dissertation are not of secondary importance, they should be read as essential to this entire research project.

**Critical Criminology**

The bulk of the world’s poor and virtually all impoverished citizens of urban Latin Americans are entangled within oppressive systems of violence. Most of the poor and working class in Brazil live outside the full protection of law, and in many Brazilian cities the police are among the main perpetrators of homicide and other violent crimes. I chose to analyze past and current public security initiatives in Rio through the lens of critical criminology. By this I mean a critical criminology that views capitalism as the primary source of crime and violence in the world, from political/corporate corruption to street gangs/everyday violence, and the mafias, mobs, cartels, *milícias*, and other organized crime groups that often connect them.

For this I draw mainly on the works of Jock Young, David Brotherton, and Vera Malaguti. Brotherton’s critical ethnography and criminology is particularly relevant. It borrows from a
plurality of methods, including neo-Marxist traditions. Most important, critical criminology frames crime and security in their historical contexts. This means my analysis take pains to dialectically and historically situate the changes taking place in Rocinha and greater Rio, transformations deeply rooted in specific historical conditions and shaped by grassroots resistances as well as larger social forces and processes from above. In short, critical criminology considers crime and security from the starting point that there are serious structural problems that need to be resolved before any serious “progress” can be made.

Recently Gary Haugen and Victor Boutros, in their widely popular *The Locust Effect* (2014), have claimed they are essentially the first anti-poverty crusaders (development practitioners) to place violence at the center of the debate. Haugen in particular likes to take credit for this. But the theme advanced by them in *The Locus Effect* is not new to urban sociology and critical criminology. Their work is helpful only because outside of academic and policy worlds most people don’t read peer reviewed journals and scholarly publications. Haugen and Boutros’s work is relevant because it thoroughly covers two of the leading topics of this study, security (or its absence) and development. Another common theme between their work and mine is a focus on slums and related forms of urban poverty in the developing world. Many of their case studies are based on the violence they assert is endemic to urban slums.

But the potential benefits of *The Locus Effect* are mostly cancelled because Haugen and Boutros, are largely dependent on funders like The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (their the largest), almost so, as could be expected, they completely detach violence from structural corruption, inequality, greed, and racism embedded in global capitalism, an economic system and corresponding culture that for centuries has been controlled by European and North American actors and institutions. The only area in which they hold the “western” world responsible is in regards to long ended European colonialism, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa and India. Not surprisingly, the US, where they and their funding come from, escapes any

31 Haugen and Boutros (2014), middle of Chapter 4 on The Locust Effect e-book.
criticism, and is instead praised in numerous sections. When they speak of inequality and corruption, they blame the backwards societies or corrupt and incompetent “third world” culture and institutions. Obviously corrupt the elements of the middle and low-income countries they focus on are a major part of the problem, and this study also holds actors and institutions in Brazil and Rio de Janeiro highly responsible. But Haugen and Boutros’s analysis completely overlook the large elephant in the room, the parts that would make many readers and almost all funders in the US uncomfortable.

Critical criminology has long recognized the complex relationship between poverty and violence/crime, but much more comprehensively and starting from a different vantage point. In other words, critical criminology views violent crime and poverty as intimately related to structural inequality and corruption, not only at local, regional, and national levels, but ultimately originating from a grossly unjust global economy.

Unfortunately the shortage of well-known black and Latino criminologists in the United States, or criminologists from minority groups in other areas of the world, is a longstanding crisis in criminology, including critical criminology. This lingering hypocrisy has only been modestly addressed since it was first openly identified (Young and Sulton 1991). It is a problem encountered in much of academia, as well as numerous other vocations in which dominant class social and cultural capital are vital to professional mobility. But the situation in criminology is particularly disturbing. African Americans are particularly underrepresented, and this is a tragic irony considering they are the most marginalized and oppressed racial/cultural group in the US, a country where one in three black males are imprisoned during their lives.32 The number of leading female criminologists is also disproportionately low. Criminology, including its critical approach, continues the terrain of privileged white men, the very group historically responsible for the problems criminology purportedly aims to resolve.

32 This statistic comes from on a now outdated 2003 report by Thomas P. Bronczar of the U.S. Department of Justice. As of late 2015 there were no updated official statistics on proportion of African Americans who will pass through the criminal justice system.
The same is true in Brazil, even after accounting for distinct racial and ethnic classifications. I wanted to read and utilize more black and brown Brazilian critical criminologists for this work, but I couldn’t find any well-known scholars who were analytically relevant. I did borrow some from Vera Malaguti, who as a female criminologist certainly offers a minority perspective. The data Brazilian criminologists collect is helpful, and on the sociopolitical spectrum virtually all would be considered left of center. But in the same sense that Lefebvre and Harvey’s openly anti-capitalist sociospatial analysis was fundamental for this research, so too is an avowedly anti-capitalist critical criminology, which, for the most, I find lagging in Brazil. This might relate to the fact that a significant number of leading Brazilian criminologists at one time or another work for state and federal government agencies, and perhaps, as a result, feel the need for political discretion in their writing.

Sociologist (and criminologist) Vera Malaguti Batista is an exception, as is her husband Nilo Batista, a lawyer and professor of criminal law who in 1994 briefly served as governor of Rio when Leonel Brizola stepped aside to run for president of Brazil.

Malaguti and a growing number of critical criminologists in Rio de Janeiro, points to fundamental contradictions deeply embedded within Rio’s initially celebrated Police Pacification Units (UPPs). I highlight these by looking specifically at Rocinha’s UPP.

The critical criminological approach is fundamental to the analysis of crime and security in Rocinha because it uncovers both historic root causes and present-day dilemmas, from the history of slavery and uneven geographic development to the enduring corruption and inequality that produce violence in Brazil. To do this I draw significantly from the work of Jock Young, particularly from *The Criminological Imagination* (2011).

Finally, in the same sense that Lefebvre complained that since the *Universal Rights of Man and of the Citizen* (1789) focus has been disproportionally on the rights of man and not those of citizens, the UN’s *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* does not consider collective rights but instead focuses on 30 individual or personal rights, with no reference to crime and collective
And yet in much of Latin America, and almost all of urban Brazil, corruption and terrifying violence, crime and fear have been ubiquitous features of daily life since at least the 1980s. In light of this I suggest an amendment to Lefebvre's right to the city. I propose that it is time to conceptualize a collective right to security, or safety.

**Critical Development Ethnography**

A third approach germane to this research is located within the subdiscipline of development studies. Critical development ethnography is useful to this study because it focuses on not only individuals or groups, but on communities and regions and the purposeful events and processes that shape them. Ethnographies have comprised a substantial portion of the social science development literature since the 1980s. Examples range from James Ferguson’s *The Anti-Politics Machine: Development, Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho*; (1990), Arturo Escobar’s *Encountering Development* (1995); David Mosse’s *Cultivating Development* (2005); and Tania Murray Li’s, *The Will to Improve* (2007) and more recently *Land’s End: Capitalist Relations on an Indigenous Frontier*). Certain development ethnographies have made important contributions to the way methodological issues are addressed in development studies. Some were so skeptical of orthodox development studies that they espoused abandoning the word “development” altogether. This snippet from Arturo Escobar’s well-known *Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World* (1995) is indicative of this style:

> Science and expert discourses such as development produce powerful truths, ways of creating and intervening in the world, including ourselves; they are instances “where possible worlds are constantly reinvented in the contest for very real, present

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34 The broader critical development research embodied in the works of Polanyi, Braudel, Wallerstein, Gunder Frank, Cardoso, Arrighi, and others is in some respects also important for this work. I do not cover them because they did not use ethnographic methods. Secondly, critical development ethnographies were partially a response to the detached nature of most development research.
worlds.” Narratives, such as the tales in this book, are always immersed in history and never innocent. Whether we can unmake development and perhaps even bid farewell to the Third World will equally depend on the social invention of new narratives, new ways of thinking and doing. (Escobar 1995: 20).

True to its anthropological origins, the bulk of development ethnography has investigated rural settings, including all of the well-known recent works cited above. Still, the events unfolding in Rocinha and other carioca favelas should be viewed as highly relevant to the literature on development or improvement schemes. This novel urban centered analysis is a contribution I hope to make to the relevant development literature.

In recent years development interventions, such as favela upgrading and pacification schemes, have brought small but important improvements to dozens of violent low-income communities in Rio de Janeiro, including Rocinha. It is undeniable that many involved in Rio’s favela upgrading and security schemes are, “intelligent and dedicated people, who are attempting to improve the world despite the odds” and who possess what Tania Murray Li describes as “the will to improve” (Murray Li 2010: 234). Whether they are upper-level technocrats within Brazil’s Federal Ministry of Cities and Rio de Janeiro State’s Public Works Company (EMOP), or PAC community level social workers and the low-paid often unappreciated UPP officers stationed in favelas, most people want to see the quality of life improve in Rio’s historically marginalized communities.

Murray Li cautions scholars against making sweeping criticism of development, and she warns against viewing development (or improvement schemes) dogmatically, as little more than conspiracies orchestrated by elites, or in her words, “regimes of power.” Murray Li (2007: 286) charges Arturo Escobar with making these types of claims in Encountering Development (1995). However, critiquing the structural faults of development and its interventions, even harshly, should not be seen as an attack on the goodwill of the many decent people who strive to better society. It is not conspiratorial, or in my view even radical, to openly acknowledge that there are networks of powerful people, groups, corporations, institutions, and governments that hold
tremendous sway over important decisions affecting the poor, and that these actors really do have the resources and influence necessary to make the structural changes needed to improve the lives of billion of people around the world.

Mabel Sabogal responded to Murray Li’s critique of certain development skeptics by asking: “what would be the consequences for development organizations, governments and major financial institutions in allowing such change? The failure of institutions to deliver their promises, to address the real problems, and to pay attention to (or not ignore) the facts may speak of a predetermined and tacit agenda that is aligned with the main goal of capitalist logic—to expand the market—which contrasts with the needs of villagers” (Sabogal 2009: 79).

In this study, the rural villages are urban favelas. But Sabogal’s question is still highly useful because the sociospatial approach adopted for my analysis of improvement schemes also questions the interaction between society and space, and how within cities like Rio there is tremendous inequality among social groups and classes over the access they have to political and territorial power. This study reveals that there are various degrees of influence regarding decisions on how social space is produced, distributed, and structured in Rio. I also suggests that among certain sectors of Rio and Brazil’s dominant classes there really is a “tacit agenda that is aligned with the main goal of capitalist logic to expand the market”. Among the recent tactics used to achieve this objective has been the perversion of otherwise necessary public investments, such as securing areas of favelas at risk of natural disaster, social housing programs, favela upgrading, and pacification schemes.

This dissertation reveals that the most pressing socioeconomic issues (the basic sanitation crisis in Rocinha for example) have been largely ignored by upgrading programs. Rather than addressing urgent needs most of the large conspicuous infrastructure projects seem instead to be intended mainly for passersby or tourists, or to enrich the construction companies that finance the politicians who award them large projects like PAC, or for use in political campaigns.
All the while residents of impacted favelas have been and will continue to be threatened with relocation “to less desirable environments” (Sibley 1995 ix).

**Reflexive Approach**

Sociology has greatly benefited from those individuals who are cosmopolitan in their outlook – very often those who are Jewish or ethnic minority or socially mobile in their origins; carrying with them a double or triple vision, they are social travellers, perpetual strangers, in Simmel’s sense, caught between cultures, unable ever to see the world as natural and unambiguous (Jock Young 2011: 175).

Finally, there is a critical tradition in the social sciences that encourages what is referred to as *reflexivity*. There is no single agreed on definition of reflexivity, to what extent it should be practiced, or how best to do so. One common version asserts that scholarly inquiry should pay close attention to the researcher’s social position, such as race, class, or nationality, and how this influences the reciprocal relationship formed with the community and individuals studied as well as how this influences the analysis and ethics of the research. The importance of reflexivity in ethnography should be obvious. Randol Contreras (2013) highlights, ethnographies have predominantly been conducted by “upper-middle-class and elite-educated researchers”. This is particularly the case for ethnographies on historically marginalized urban groups and communities (Contreras 2013: 17). In light of this, a movement among critical social scientists during the last few decades has called for greater reflexivity. Since then, considerably more attention has been focused on the researcher’s position within national and international divisions based on race, class, gender, nationality, ethnicity, religion, and so forth (Emirbayer and Desmond 2012: 580-582).

But Steinberg (2012) clarifies, “reflexivity and its revelations did not arise because sociologists decided to turn the analytical gaze upon themselves”. He argues that the social

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sciences turned towards more reflexive approaches primarily as a result of significantly increasing pressure from minority groups emerging out of the civil rights movement (Steinberg 2012: 611).

All of this leads to a fact conservative scholars find uncomfortable, and at times aggressively (or desperately) attempt to counter. The social sciences, and here attention is on anthropology and sociology because of their wide use of ethnography, were formed within the culture and values of industrial capitalism in Western Europe and North America, and within the context of the multiple inequalities it produced in relation to the working class and minority groups at home and colonialism and imperialism in the most of the rest of the world (Connell 1997: 1516-1519). As professional disciplines and departments were established during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the corresponding inequalities on which they were built became integral to research agendas like ethnography.

To put this in the context of this dissertation, when Auguste Compte coined the term “sociology” slavery was still an institution in Puerto Rico, the Untied States, and Brazil, the three regions I have almost evenly spent my life. And when Emile Durkheim founded the world’s first sociology department at the University of Bordeaux in 1895, slavery had only been abolished for seven years in Brazil. Excluded from labor and housing markets, many formerly enslaved black Brazilians made their way up hillsides in and around Rio’s city center in search of housing in proximity to work. They were among the early founders of Rio’s favelas.

Although much has changed, the political economy of academia and the social sciences are still controlled by historically privileged groups. This is particularly the case in the unseen upper echelons, such as the “administrators and trustees controlling your university’s finances and policies” (Collins 1993: 31).

Because of the numerous scales and multiple forms of inequalities involved in professional social science research there have been renewed calls to advance reflexivity beyond the limited
practice of describing the scholar’s social location within racial, ethnic, gender, and class orders (Emirbayer and Desmond 2012: 582).

In recent years ethnographic *insiders* from minority groups (e.g., Contreras 2013) have also employed reflexive methods, and often these are the most important contributions to knowledge production. Such work is often beneficial in highlighting the inherent power relations that exist between the investigator and the research participant, issues related to being an *insider* or *outsider*.

In this dissertation I describe the most important issues raised by my presence in Rocinha since 2001, but I don’t allow myself to get sidetracked. This is already a longer than average dissertation and so most of the more personal issues are discussed in passing and only when necessary. Research with little or no reflexivity should be seriously questioned. It makes evaluations of its methods, ethical standards, and conclusive statements virtually impossible. But I am also skeptical of obsessively reflexive ethnography, which appears at times self-absorbed and “In its extreme form” can led scholars to become “so bound by our own preconceptions that we can do little more than gaze into our biographies” (Burawoy 1998: 13).

I had to face practically all of the controversies inherent to this type of ethnography before my official dissertation research began. Issues such as trust, or racial, class, and nationality based privileges. Having already experienced these challenges was a major advantage.

In 2001 I first faced the reality of being a *gringo* living in a favela. At that time there was less foreigner presence in the Rocinha, especially in the more remote upper sections of the community like Laboriaux, where I have always lived. Living in the community since 2001 leads me to believe that the number of foreigners visiting as part of “favela tourism” and especially the

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37 In Brazil the word “gringo” is rarely used in a derogatory manner. For those familiar with the political, racial and ethnic history of this term in most of Spanish speaking Latin America it is important to understand that in the Brazil, among the vast majority of the general population, it is not meant as an offensive term, even if some foreigners are offended by it. I briefly return to its usage in Chapter 5.
flow of foreigners volunteering at favela NGOs (not just in Rocinha) began a steady increase around 2003, and peaked, in my opinion, around 2012, if not a few years before.\textsuperscript{38}

When I entered the community I was only 21, and since I was not involved in any research projects investigating Rocinha, or earning money or recognition from anything related to the community, I didn’t face thorny ethical research and work related issues. Instead, it was a period of self-discovery and personal transition that my status as a middle class citizen of the US (with enchaining students loan programs) allowed for. Once fairly adjusted in Rocinha I began questioning the structures that created my own privilege. Even more so, I wanted to understand the evil, or horrific injustices that produced the borders of Rocinha with the elite neighborhoods of Alto Gâvea and São Conrado. I thought to myself at the time about how the border between the US and Mexico is the already the most unequal boundary in the world, but how much more insulting would it be if Mexico were located between the US and Canada?

While the geopolitical and scales are incomparable the ideologies that produce these types of divisions are similar, and it was during that period I decided to try my best to understand the causes and possible solutions to such problems. I came to believe the social sciences were my best opportunity to do so.

I traveled back and forth between the U.S. and Brazil during the following years as I tried to figure out where life was leading me. I became fixated with a desire to “better” Rocinha, the community that had given so much to me. In 2006, during my first year of graduate studies at the City University of New York, I co-founded a small non-profit with André Sales Batista, local resident of Rocinha who remains a close friend of mine and with whom I have co-authored two publications. From 2006 to 2010, while helping run the non-profit in Rocinha, I encountered several challenges covered in the relevant academic literature. Questions related to trust, and insider/outside dynamics. The difficulties were not too contentious or overwhelming, but they

\textsuperscript{38} In chapters 2 and 5 claims differentiating foreign visitors and foreign residents are substantiated, and I explain the rationale for believing 2003 was a pivotal year for increased foreigner presence in Rocinha and other relevant favelas.
did open my eyes to the ways structural inequalities and cultural intricacies can influence insider/outsider relationships, whether personal or professional, or both.

The first phase of this dissertation was initiated in 2011, and by February 2013 the proposed project, including future interviews with human subjects, had Internal Review Board (IRB) approval. By that point I had lived in Rocinha off and on for almost 12 years, during which time I had become a committed community activist deeply engaged in local issues. The work of our small organization centered on improving difficulties faced by Rocinha’s disabled and elderly populations from 2006 to 2010, and earned us a certain level of admiration from the numerous residents who knew of our work. Then in 2010 I emerged as one of Laboriaux’s most dedicated activists when the local government began trying to evict our entire area. This further improved relations with my neighborhoods in Laboriaux and in other sections of Rocinha. These factors, and others, made my ethnographic fieldwork a relatively seamless process.

Back in 2001, I realized during the first few months of living in Rocinha that it was a community I wanted to be involved with for the long run, and when I finish my PhD I intend to return to live in Rocinha, where I am partial owner (informally) of a small one-bedroom residence. In other words, I have never viewed Rocinha and my experiences there as stepping-stones to future academic or professional career, and I am confident that the scores of residents who know me well can genuinely sense this.

My distinct critical approach makes a humble effort to challenge certain tendencies common in ethnographic research. For one, a local research team was formed that consisted of four core members and a few others who occasionally collaborated. These four colleagues are longtime active residents I have known for years through local organizations and movements, including the residents’ association of Laboriaux (AMAVLVC)\(^{39}\), the Cultural Forum of Rocinha (Fórum de Cultura da Rocinha), Rocinha without Borders (Rocinha sem Fronteiras), Mundo Real (which I

\(^{39}\) AMAVLVC is an acronym for Associação dos Moradores e Amigos da Vila Laboriaux e Vila Cruzada.
co-founded with André Sales Batista) and the Rocinha Sankofa Museum – Memory and History (Museu Sankofa Rocinha – Memória e História). 40

Not all members of the research team came from these groups. Leonardo de Carvalho (Leo), a twenty-four year old (in 2013) that I have known since he was 12, was a major early contributors. After being trained on how to ask questions, and other matters, like not arguing social and political issue, a favorite pastime in Rocinha, Leo conducted 21 of the 127 interviews for this dissertation. José Ricardo Ferreira (Ricardo), president of AMAVLVC conducted one particularly important interview with Itamar Silva, a lifelong resident of the Santa Marta favela and well-known figure in favela activist movements. André Sales Batista, who has been my close friend since 2001 when we were studied together at PUC-Rio, helped tremendously with gathering historical and other secondary data. Finally, José Martins de Oliveira (Martins) was pivotal during the entire process. Martins helped set up at least 1/4 of the interviews and provided invaluable feedback and advice from start to finish.

We came to an agreement that once I had defended the dissertation and returned to Rocinha, we would then translate the text and begin working on a more accessible version in Portuguese to be used for community purposes. We intend to distribute the text as a collective work to be used as an educational tool in Rocinha and possibly elsewhere. The community-based work would focus even more on the history of Rocinha than this dissertation does, and would draw from dozens of additional interviews conducted by the Rocinha Sankofa Museum since 2008.

I mention these points because they represent my personal ethnographic methodology, which here I will refer to as deep-rooted critical ethnography. This type of ethnography transcends traditional critical ethnography. In practice, deep-rooted ethnography is comparable to a spiritual calling because the ethnographer dedicates a significant portion of their life to the people and places they study, even when that means making considerable sacrifices to comfort.

40 The Rocinha Sankofa Museum of History and Memory is the community’s only museum and is comprised of a small group of dedicated residents. I am the only foreigner who has been voted in since it was founded in 2008.
The goal is to write, publish, and ideally be part of local level processes to improve lives in communities. Intellectually, much of the deep-rooted approach is influenced by the methods of Brazilian educator and social theorist Paulo Freire.

In a community of 150,000 it is only possible to know so many people, even if in my specific case, in densely packed Rocinha, this equals literally several hundred residents. Although rarely, there were times when my lasting presence in the community raised suspicions. I have long been sensitive to accusations of being a *gentrifier*, perhaps because I come from a racial and social class that is generally at the vanguard of residential gentrification. I view Rio’s favelas, particularly those remaining in central areas, as the last refuges of affordable housing in one of the most expensive cities in the world. On one occasion in January 2013, during an animated community meeting in Laboriaux, a resident from another area of Rocinha who didn’t know me shouted “it’s the *gringos* who are causing real estate prices to soar in our communities”. In an almost comically, but also hurtful manner he made an obvious turn and stared disapprovingly straight at me as while making his comment. Immediately residents came to my defense, and one jokingly said, “yeah, but that *gringo* is among the good ones.” Over the years I have also dislike being confused with the packs of white European and North American favela tourists that scurry through Rocinha on sunny days. These minor inconveniences are the most unpleasant insider/outside issues I have faced in Rocinha.

I have been in the community for so long that in time I became a reference to other scholars, journalists, and activists who wanted access to the community for their work or just to walk around and see things and meet people. I have led dozens of professionals, mostly foreigners but also Brazilians, through Rocinha’s alleyways, sometimes assisting with and translating during interviews. In the same way André and Martins have been my “in” over the years, I also became the ethnographic “in” for numerous scholars, journalists, documentary film makers, and other professionals. This is unique social position, outsider but also insider, or vice-versa, has proved advantageous. For example, after helping with interviews I would generally lead these visitors
back out of the community to whatever form of transportation awaited them. Later, I would often come across the same resident(s) that I helped translate the interviews with, and in time I began using these opportunities to learn best practices. I would ask what they liked or disliked about the process and developed a personal style of conducting interviewing that I consider respectful, ethical, and culturally sensitive to vulnerable populations like Rocinha’s. I never did any of this for profit, like some foreigners have done in Rocinha, and in time residents took noticed.

By this point I had known for years about a disturbing trend in the academic and NGO professions. I find it hypocritical and revolting when people from privileged backgrounds, many from the “first world” or Brazil’s upper classes, and virtually all of them “white”, market themselves as experts on all things favela. Despite my passion and interest in this area since the time I was 21, I never wanted to follow this route. But how could I one day get a job in a profession that requires publications or other types of recognition and not come across as the white gringo expert on all things favela?

In Confronting the Favela Chic, Cummings (2013: 2) deftly describes how: “Non-Brazilians who take an interest in favela life are sometimes accused of romanticizing it: nostalgically placing social, cultural, or aesthetic value in favelas that these communities’ own residents, many of whom still suffer through abjectly meager lives, don’t see or experience.” He calls this “the critique of the ‘favela chic.’” Years ago much more than now I romanticized aspects of life in Rocinha. But even then I knew there was something special about the community and others like it. Rocinha offers something unique that I do not want to see disappear, and not just for selfish reasons, but for my neighbors sake and future generations. While the land the community sits on has long been coveted, Rio’s dominant and even middle classes have long reviled Rocinha’s residents. Bur these historically oppressed groups and working class and poor Brazilians in general built Rocinha with very little outside help, and to them the community belongs.
Organization of Chapters

Chapter 1 begins with an explanation of this study’s research design and the social science methods utilized in this dissertation. I discuss the pertinent literature of Mario Luis Small, Michael Burawoy, J. Clyde Mitchel, and others, who address case studies and other issues germane to those found in this study. I also question issues related to generalizability and representativeness, and how ethnographers can avoid the pitfalls of trying to sound scientific. I then present arguments that challenge notions of quantitative superiority, borrowing heavily from Jock Young’s *The Criminological Imagination* (2011). The last section of this chapter focuses on the project design and the ethnographic methods I employed while carrying it out. I describe how I conducted my 135 interviews with 120 participants.

The chapter ends by recounting the evolution of Rio’s favelas, from their origin until the present day, often utilizing Rocinha as a geographic and historical reference point. Emphasis is on the major policies, socioeconomic interventions, and physical/spatial transformations that have shaped Rio’s favelas for over a century.

Chapter 2 focuses on the sociospatial history of Rocinha during the twentieth century, but begins by presenting recent demographic and socioeconomic data on Rocinha. Rocinha can be viewed as a microcosm of Brazilian society. For example, Brazilians from each of the 27 *unidades federativas* (26 states and 1 federal district) can be found living within its overcrowded borders. Rocinha’s 150,000 residents (the best estimate between the plausible low 70,000 and high 200,000 end estimates) live in an area of only 0.85 sq. km (.34 sq. mi). To put this in perspective, the total inhabited area of Rocinha is 94% smaller than the area (13.7 sq. km, or 5.3 sq. mi) of Harlem, in New Yorks City, with almost half (43%) the population of 346,400.41

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Rocinha is among the largest, oldest, and most densely populated favelas in Brazil. After presenting current data on Rocinha I travel back almost 100 years, recounting Rocinha’s evolution. Chapter 2 ends by describing an episode of violence that played a major role in the current transformation of Rocinha and other key favelas in Rio de Janeiro. A three-day gun battle occurred in April 2004 and is known popularly as *A Guerra da Rocinha* – Rocinha’s War. It paralyzed much of Rio de Janeiro’s South Zone for days and made international headlines, and in the words of Agnelo Queiroz, then federal Minister of Sports, threatened to derail Rio’s chance of securing the 2012 Olympics. The episode had lasting effects in Rocinha and beyond.

Chapter 3 begins by describing the wave of civil society momentum that emerged in Rocinha and neighboring São Conrado in the wake of Rocinha’s War. This grassroots activity has since considerably altered daily life in the community, and by 2007 public authorities had confirmed that a historic level of resources would to be invested to improve the quality of life in Rocinha and other selected favelas.

Next, this I introduces the two interventions that form the foundation of this research, PAC and the UPP. The Federal Government’s Programa de Aceleração de Crescimento (PAC) – Program for Accelerated Growth, began in 2007, and the State Government of Rio de Janeiro’s Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora (UPP) – Police Pacification Unit program, was tested in December 2008 and fully launched in early 2009. These are the two largest and most costly interventions.

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4/30/2015. Additional Note: Land area data for New York City’s neighborhoods is slightly complicated because they are classified into “Community Districts”. Harlem is comprised of Community Districts 9 (West Harlem), 10 (Central Harlem) and 11 (East Harlem). In some cases districts consider data for more than one neighborhood, such as the case of Community District 11, which includes data for East Harlem and Randalls and Wards Island.


43 The pilot program for the UPPs was launched in December 2008 in the small Santa Marta favela located in Botafogo. The idea to expand the program to dozens of other strategic favelas was announced in early 2009, and it was clear that Rocinha was on the list. The actual “pacification” process did not begin in Rocinha until November 2011.
public investments ever destined for Rio de Janeiro’s favelas. Both programs have had clear ramifications in Rocinha and numerous other favelas in Rio.

In Chapter 4 I offer my research findings and analysis. I explore the research question, my experience in testing it and the data it produced. I presented some of the abundant data gathered in five distinct sections. (1) Removals based on allegations that houses are located in areas of risk or environmental risk. (2) Relocating residents because of favela-upgrading projects. (3) Evictions resulting from mega-event construction or related issues. (4) The resettlement of residents to recently constructed MCMV housing complexes in Rio’s periphery. (5) Displacement or gentrification caused by rising costs of living, in large part because of the UPPs.

Chapter 5 discusses this research’s contribution to social theory. I link observations, field experiences, and interviews to theories and debates within urban sociology and geography, critical criminology, development ethnography and other relevant academic literature.

Finally, Chapter 6 summarizes this dissertation research. I then describe the end of my fieldwork in Rocinha and my ongoing relationship with the community. Lastly, I reflect on this study’s limitations and offer a few concise recommendations for future research and interventions in favelas and for local groups and movements of resistance.
INTEGRATING THEORY AND DATA

Drawing from a diversity of theoretical frameworks in order to situate past and present trends in Rio de Janeiro, this study links sociospatial and historical analyses to theories and perspectives in critical criminology and critical development ethnography. Favelas embody the numerous protracted and intractable social problems that exist in Brazil and Rio de Janeiro, with their hypocritical and unshameable ruling classes. But Rio’s favelas are also a product of a rigged and highly unjust global economy. Squeezed between two of Brazil’s wealthiest neighborhoods, Rocinha provided the perfect setting for this investigation.

The first part of this chapter explains the methods and research design used throughout this study. But before discussing methods, it is worth quickly noting a few points often taken for granted on relationship between social theory and data.

From its inception in the nineteenth century sociology has been concerned with large-scale theories for explaining social change. By the mid-twentieth century partiality for sweeping macro theories was challenged by sociologists such as Robert Merton and C. Wright Mills. More recently, there has been an attempt to bridge the gulf between the macro and micro with mid-range theories. While the exact phrase “middle-range theory” is attributable to Merton (1949), discontent with the preference for grandiose theorizing had been growing for some time among many social scientists, particularly sociologists, unhappy with the sense of stagnation within their discipline or its generally unconvincing and uninspiring direction.

Raymond Boudon explains that the proposals from Merton and others were essentially what the natural sciences always do: linking theory and empirical research rather than elaborating
complex highly abstract theories (Boudon 1991: 520). Sociologists have a lot to gain from paying closer attention to the methods of the natural sciences specifically in regards to the relationship between theory and empirical research. Positivists may obsess over quantitative analysis but they do so in vain if this fundamental research procedure is overlooked. Hedström defended this viewpoint in describing how analytical sociology, which focuses on middle-range theorizing, “emphasizes the importance of closely integrating theoretical and empirical work, but it is not closely tied to any specific research methodology. The crucial question is what kind of access a certain piece of evidence provides to the causal process of interest, not whether the method being used is quantitative or qualitative, experimental or nonexperimental” (Hedström 2010: 58).

In this ethnography, I have been able to link local level observations and secondary data to the appropriate middle range and macro social theories. I was able to achieve this demanding task because as a member of a community intensely threatened with removal I personally experienced the general strategy and the specific community level tactics that have been used to displace residents from centrally located favelas. The slightly hard part was finding social theories that could adequately explain what I witnessed first hand.

If the community level “nuts and bolts” (Elster 2007) are not properly understood there is little chance of accurately understanding the associated mid-level or macro social phenomenon. Similarly, without adequate micro-level knowledge the chances of those working in action research to prevent the reoccurrence of harmful local processes are diminished, and legally so are the possibilities of holding accountable those responsible for social injustices, like arbitrary mass evictions.

METHODOLOGY
No method is without fallacies, it is a matter of how honestly and openly we approach them. Being accountable to the people we study requires us to recognize our fallibility and, thus, to wrestle with that fallibility. The methodological dogmatists, who declare they have found the flawless method and spend their time condemning others for not following the golden trail, are the real menace to our profession (Burawoy 2013: 527).

Michael Burawoy’s recent quote provides an entry into one of this chapter’s main themes, methodology. Rigorously designed research is paramount, but in the social sciences even the most meticulously planned projects will receive varying degrees of criticism because our methods and theories are never perfect.

The first section of this chapter briefly surveys a number of the relevant methodological concerns frequently encountered in case study research, in particular in ethnographies of communities and neighborhoods. I attempt to, as Burawoy suggests, approach these topics “honestly and openly,” recognizing the imperfection of my research and the need “to wrestle with that fallibility.” Next, I present this investigation’s specific research design and discuss the methods used to collect and analyze data.

**Case Studies, Representativeness, and Generalizability**

In a 2006 essay Bryan McCann reviewed some of the favela literature published in the early twenty-first century. He relates scholarship on the favelas of Rio de Janeiro to a number of the questions Mario Luis Small asks in his work on low-income communities in the United States. One of the methodological questions McCann raises concerns how representative of Rio’s favelas is any particular favela (McCann 2006: 150). For instance, McCann (referencing Lícia Valladares 2005), states, “There is no reason to assume that patterns that held true for the growth and development of Rocinha, the colossal South Zone favela with sixty years of history, will apply to that of Cavanco, a small favela in the western suburbs first settled in the early 1990s” (McCann 2006: 150). His argument epitomizes the most common critique of qualitative
social science research, and in particular of community ethnographies: that they lack rigor and their finding are not generalizable, or both (Small 2009: 8-10).

At the time of McCann’s essay (2006), Rocinha had already been a working class community for approximately 80 years, not 60, and the name of the favela he contrasts to Rocinha is Covanca, not “Cavanca”. More important, this research adopts the view that questions of generalizability are more complicated than either McCann, Small, or other critics before them acknowledge. This holds particularly true for critical ethnographers who, to varying degrees, are guided by Marxist perspectives.

Concerns over sample sizes in community research and whether they are representative are not new. Most criticism of ethnography centers on accusations of limited sample sizes, or the “small-N problem” (Rueschemeyer 2003: 305). Numerous scholars, however, such as John Walton and Dietrich Rueschemeyer have defended the theoretical gains obtainable from the analysis of even a single case (Walton 1992: 124; Rueschemeyer 2003: 332). The results of this divide are clear and imbalanced, with most “top” journals in sociology, criminology, and other social sciences rarely accepting qualitative ethnographic research (Auyero and Joseph 2007: 2; Young 2011: 17). In light of this, many qualitative researchers develop what Jock Young terms “physics envy” and end up improperly adopting scientific and statistical vocabulary in an attempt to sound more quantitatively rigorous (Young 2011: 7).

By the early 1980s Mitchell, an anthropologist in the tradition of the Manchester School, was pioneering methods for avoiding the main criticism ethnographers face from quantitative oriented researchers. One of these alternatives is he called the extended case study, which is better known in the US as the extended case method.44

The Extended Case Method

44 This is because of the influence of Michael Burawoy, a well-known ethnographer based at Berkeley and who is also a product of the Manchester School.
The extended case study is the most advanced type of case study (Mitchell: 1983: 193). Employed throughout this work, the extended case study, as the label suggests, is an extension, or expansion, of the investigation of case material. The case material is extended in the sense that it is studies a chain of events often over lengthy periods. During the study “the same actors are involved in a series of situations in which their structural positions must continually be re-specified and the flow of actors through different social positions specified” (Mitchell 1983: 194). The unique advantage of Mitchell’s extended case study is that it follows actors over a relatively long period and enables researchers to trace how events are naturally interconnected through time. As a consequence, there is a particular focus on uncovering mechanisms and tracing social processes (Mitchell 1983: 194; Small 2009: 22).

Independent of how clearly the basic principles are reflected in any particular case, the question driving most of the criticism of urban ethnography remains: To what extent is the ethnographer justified in generalizing from a particular case to all instances of that type? The critique, Mitchell suggests, rests on the common assumption that the only valid basis of inference is that which has been developed in relation to statistical analysis (Mitchell 1983: 197). Mitchell explains how logical inference is epistemologically different from statistical inference (Mitchell 1983: 200). Causal, or logical inference is the process by which the analyst draws conclusions about the essential linkage between two or more characteristics in terms of some systematic explanatory schema, as in a set of theoretical propositions (Mitchell 1983: 199-200).

By contrast, Mitchell argues, the process of deriving inferences from case studies is only logical and cannot, and makes no attempt to, be statistical. Extrapolability from a particular case study to similar situations in general is established only from logical inference (Mitchell 1983: 200). Therefore, ethnographers can generalize that unique features existing in their particular case study will be relevant to wider populations not because their case is statistically representative but because their analysis, if rigorously constructed, is logically sound and incapable of rational dispute (Mitchell 1983: 200).
Consequently, this research is justified in hypothesizing, or predicting, that in highly corrupt and unequal urban areas, when large-scale favela upgrading and security programs are implemented in spatially strategic (to capital) favelas they will contribute to the displacement of a significant portion of the population that is supposed to benefit from the investments. A few essential qualifications are required before this specific extrapolation could be “extended,” for example, the role of international mega-events or a history of manipulating environmental risk classifications to evict favelas. But for the purposes of this section, this is a logically sound inference.

Among the most important attributes of the extended case study is its focus on uncovering anomalous cases, a theme that since the 1990s has been strongly associated with the ethnographic work of Michael Burawoy (e.g., Burawoy 1991; 1998). But Mitchell (1983) also claimed the advantage of locally situated case studies is the opportunity they provide to demonstrate the positive role of “exceptions to generalisation” as a way of expanding our understanding of social processes. Firsthand knowledge of the relationships of the specific conditions connecting the events in a case, or cases, allow ethnographers the possibility of revealing how the general theories or principles under investigation, for example gentrification, transpire in previously unexpected ways (Mitchell 1983: 206). This was true of my research on favela gentrification in Rio de Janeiro, which I detail in later chapters.

**Critical Ethnography**

Critical ethnography is more than a method, it also a critical epistemology and theoretical perspective. It is committed to the practice of collaborative research, a relationship between those involved that is transparent, mutually respectful, empowering, built on trust, and favorable to all parties (Brotherton 2007: 7). In their collaborative work on gangs and street cultures, Brotherton and Barrios described how research on the inhabitants of poor urban areas has generally been conducted within the tradition of positivistic social science, particularly
studies focusing on members of youth gangs. This type of research tries to imitate the methods of natural science, such as prioritizing the observer's value neutrality, ensuring the scientific rigor of the methods, making sure data is uncontaminated, and producing findings that are generalizable. The ultimate objective is to prove or disprove testable hypotheses (Brotherton and Barrios 2004: 3). They add: “In contrast to this scientific conception of knowledge production and social investigation, what Milles (1959) and others have termed “abstract empiricism,” replete with its male, white, middle-class biases and its discursive appropriation in the service of bureaucratic agencies we have chosen an unabashedly critical approach to the study of gangs and their members” (Brotherton and Barrios 2004: 3).

In his Notes on Methodology in Critical Ethnography (2007) Brotherton explains, “ethnography is about studying the ‘folkways’ of a community, of describing its everyday rhythms, its complex systems of social interactions, its relationship with the broader society and different power structures, and the different meaning systems that cultures and subcultures develop to make life livable.” He suggests that the objective of critical ethnography should be to “engage in an ethnographic research project that will benefit the community, will contribute to a broader humanistic understanding of society, and will enhance our commitment to a more just and equitable world.” According to Brotherton, the role of critical ethnographers is to always be willing to reexamine their own values, prejudices, veiled epistemologies, etc., without completely discarding social theory. Critical ethnography should not be strictly devoted to a particular set of theories but rather to the people and communities it studies.

RESEARCH DESIGN AND PROCEDUREs

Data Collection

While conducting fieldwork I often used what Schensul and LeCompte (2013: 320; 342-345) refer to as the abductive approach, which for this ethnography equates to a blending of
grounded theory and the extended case method (inductive and deductive methods). The “inductive-abductive-deductive continuum” was also engaged while analyzing field notes and interviews (Schensul and LeCompte 2013: 342). For example, inductive or open coding was used to analyze interviews and field notes, a common practice in grounded theory. My objective was immersion in the data and to develop an understanding of Rocinha and other related favelas by carefully reviewing all ethnographic and secondary findings (Glaser and Straus 1967).

I also adopted a procedure similar to those discussed by Williams (1990) and Miles & Huberman (1994: 55-61). For instance, I began with a few broad sociological themes derived from the literature, such as urbanization, development, inequality, displacement, and crime. I decided to research these themes based on my multiyear observations in Rocinha. Gradually I added more themes and subthemes as the investigation progressed, such as corruption, housing, gentrification, and slum upgrading. Because I began with only general ideas, based on my sociological training and knowledge of Brazil and Rocinha, I coded themes into inductive and deductive categories. In other words, when fieldwork began in 2011 this study was still in discovery mode, and as it progressed new themes emerged from observations and other forms of data collected. By the time of IRB approval in early 2013, and as interviewing began, I had narrowed the main objectives considerably.

My approach was “holistic” and involved “collecting and analyzing multiple types of data” (Brotherton and Barrios 2004) from multiple sites (Marcus 1995: 113-114), while considering numerous “modes of analysis that cut across disciplinary turfs” (Brotherton and Barrios 2004: 4). I divided my fieldwork data into three general categories: Group One, active residents; Group Two, everyday residents; and Group Three, active/informed nonresidents. These categories applied to Rocinha and the other favelas I considered. I paid close attention to the relationships between the data and any recurring themes or patterns. The responses, often contrasting, between the three groups and the respective data themes were of special interest.
Ethnographic Interviews

I incorporated data from 135 interviews with 122 participants. But since 2001 I have conducted, or overseen, almost 300 recorded interviews with at least 260 participants in multiple favelas and in three Brazilian capital cities: Rio de Janeiro, Recife and São Paulo. I have also conducted several interviews in a quilombo community in rural Maranhão, where interestingly there has been a significant back and forth cycle of migration to Rocinha since the 1980s. All interviews were either digitally recorded with audio and video devices or handwritten in notebooks. Approximately 265 of the 300 interviews took place in Rio de Janeiro, of which 220 are from Rocinha. Of the 265 interviews carried out in Rio de Janeiro, roughly 210 are specifically related to the theme of this research. And finally, of the 210 interviews relevant to this research, exactly 135 were conducted with 122 participants since February 2013 with IRB approval.

All IRB-approved interviews were recorded with a digital audio device. Interviews were in-depth, semi-structured but open-ended, allowing for rich dialogue and participant responses. The interviews that were not conducted explicitly for this research were mentioned because while I have not transcribed or quoted from them for this research, they have greatly informed my understanding of the relevant themes.

I divided participants into four flexible categories or interview groups, mentioned above. Not all respondents fit neatly into a single group. Sometimes they changed or occupied more than one position. But for the most part this model was helpful.

The interviews provided me with primary source qualitative data. Official statistics from secondary sources were also widely consulted, such as those from the federal Institute for Applied Economic Research (IPEA) and the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics.

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45A quilombo is the name designated to the communities fugitive slaves established, usually in rural hinterlands, until the institution was abolished in 1888. They are largely inhabited today be the descendants of those fugitive slaves. A Quilombola is the term used in Brazil to refer to the residents of quilombos.
(IBGE), or the state and federal Program for Accelerated Growth (PAC). Most local data came from Rio’s municipal Pereira Passos Institute (IPP) and other relevant city databases. The secondary data was used to supplement my ethnographic findings. The official data on Rio’s favelas, whether from IBGE, IPP, PAC or elsewhere, is of inconsistent quality. Government records are highly valuable, but should be used prudently.

Depending on criteria there are between 18 to 24 sub-sections of Rocinha, known locally as sub-neighbourhoods (sub-bairros). I will generally refer to Rocinha’s sub-bairros as “sections”. For example, while conducting this research I lived in the Laboriaux section of Rocinha. To simplify matters this work considers there to be 24 sections of Rocinha. To facilitate interviewing the community was split into four segments: São Conrado side Rocinha, which faces west and borders the elite neighborhood of São Conrado; middle Rocinha; upper Rocinha; and Gávea side Rocinha, which faces east and borders Gávea on the side of the community over the ridge descending from the Dois Irmãos mountain. Interviews with group one and group two were conducted in these four geographic divisions, as were roughly 20% from group three. Additional group three interviews were carried out in participants’ places of work, quiet cafés/restaurants, and in some cases their residences.

During interviews with Groups One and Two I gave priority to residents who had lived at least 15 years in Rocinha as adults (above 18 years of age) because this subgroup was able to offer richer comparisons of today’s circumstances, such as average rents prices or perceived levels of violence, with those of the past. I conducted 16 interviews with residents over 64 years old (3.5% of Rocinha’s population).

Group One included residents who were or still are actively involved in community affairs, in roles such as “local leaders”, government employees, activists, members of grassroots organizations or cultural groups, representatives of NGOs, and local business owners. For the basic interview design I interviewed 44 active residents. Generally, the young participants in this group have more formal education than the Group Two everyday resident equivalents. Group
One had a median age of approximately 45 years. With the exception of cultural pursuits, such as capoeira, dance, or music, there are comparably fewer residents under the age of 30 who are regularly involved in community betterment activities (broadly defined). Surprisingly, this changed in 2013 for reasons that will be addressed later. I interviewed only seven active residents under the age of 30. I conducted no interviews for this study with participants less than 18 years old.

Group Two included interviews with 42 everyday residents of Rocinha. These are the locals who are rarely or never directly involved in community development activities. Group Two included more women (55%) than men, and had a median age of 48 because several elderly residents were interviewed. Still, within this category I interviewed 17 young residents, between the ages of 18 and 34. The everyday residents make up the great majority of Rocinha’s population, and while they may not be directly or consciously engaged in community improvement work they play an essential role in Rocinha’s daily existence.

Group Three included 29 interviews with nonresidents. These are participants who have been actively engaged in Rocinha for an extended period or who are significantly knowledgeable of the relevant themes in other favelas, and in some cases both. This category included active residents of the affluent neighborhoods that border Rocinha (São Conrado and Gávea), politicians, policy makers and state bureaucrats, scholars, activists and representatives of NGOs, business leaders, and tourists who volunteer with various Rocinha groups. Group Three has the highest level of formal education and a median age of approximately 42. It is almost equally divided between women and men.

Group Four included local leaders of the other favelas. These participants fit essentially the same description as the Group One leaders in Rocinha. However, the average age of this group was about 51, and as a whole had slightly less years of formal education. These differences probably resulted from the very small sample.
As research progressed it became apparent that it would be beneficial to conduct a few targeted interviews in other favelas with comparable conditions (i.e., mega-interventions and spatially vulnerable). Neither time nor resources permitted extensive interviewing in these communities. I decided that interviews would be limited to residents widely recognized as activists or leaders who have lived in the community for at least 20 years. While field research was conducted in 12 favelas in addition to Rocinha, I interviewed local leaders (included in group three) in seven favelas: Santa Marta, Vidigal, Tabajaras, Morro dos Prazeres, Morro da Providência, and Complexo do Alemão (a very large, poor and violent favela in the North Zone). In Morro da Babilônia, a favela rumored to be experiencing early stages of gentrification, I took a different approach by interviewing a young foreign student (a citizen of France) who had been renting there for several months and who was, as is often the case with foreign students, well integrated with other young and “adventurous” foreigners in Rio. Past experience as an activist in Rio’s favelas coupled with a form of non-probabilistic “respondent-driven sampling” (K. Dombrowski et al. 2013: 8) helped me locate “local leaders” in these communities.

Six of these communities, four in Rio’s South Zone and Morro da Providência and Morro dos Prazeres in the city center, are also experiencing rapid changes and intense real estate speculation. The exception is the less spatially vulnerable Complexo do Alemão, a large compound of favelas located in a working class area of the far North Zone. Complexo do Alemão has received major funding for improvement schemes, more so than any community during PAC 1 (R$ 843 million, or US$ 422 million). While each community is unique, they share a number of important conditions. Namely, they have all recently experienced large-scale urban upgrading or pacification schemes, or both, and all, with the exception of Complexo do Alemão, have been experiencing displacement via one or more of the five strategies outlined in the introduction.

46 The conversion is based on the 2009 exchange rate because, which was roughly the midpoint of PAC 1 work in Complexo do Alemão.
I interviewed most of my participants using respondent-driven sampling. Our research team included respondents based on our knowledge of Rocinha, Rio’s favelas, and an increasingly refined and continuously re-evaluated understanding of favela removals. Participants received no financial compensation for their interviews.

The interviews covered the seven areas of interest represented in the following outline. The actual interview scripts, which evolved to a certain degree, are included in Appendix IV.

Active Residents, Everyday Residents, Active/Informed Non-Residents

I. **Background information** – Because I collected and analyzed three data sets, background information provided a better understanding of potential differences in educational and cultural values and whether there were notable ideological differences within or between the three ethnographic samples.

II. **Community Involvement and Recent Local Change** – This kind of question served a very practical purpose, mainly to confirm whether the resident was an *active* or *everyday resident*. Although most interviews were targeted beforehand (based on the two criteria previously mentioned) the potential for surprising revelations always exists, and there were indeed a few. The generally rich descriptions active/informed residents and non-residents provided of their activities (past and present) helped guide the rest of the interview and left room for additional relevant and improvised questions.

The second set of question asked for detailed information on the community’s most significant past and recent transformations: whether socioeconomic (e.g., the consolidation of organized crime around drug-trafficking or major accessibility improvements in Rocinha brought on by the introduction of motorcycle taxis in 1998); political; demographic; cultural; or physical (e.g., horizontal/vertical growth, removals, natural disasters, etc.).
III. Development – After a straightforward description of what we meant by “development”, e.g., resources directed to improve infrastructure, housing, health, education, security, and so on, we asked participants to comment on the most significant public investments and interventions they could remember. This sometimes revealed surprising responses but also inevitably led to a discussion of recent favela upgrading and “pacification”. Participants were asked who they thought was responsible for designing development schemes in Rocinha. They were asked whether they thought the government, businesses, or the general population should be responsible for designing/implementing development policies/interventions. We asked participants to describe the most notable recent changes in Rocinha and which changes they considered positive, which negative. Finally, we inquired about participants’ level of involvement in recent improvement schemes, from the planning to the implementation. These questions provided a detailed picture of participants’ opinions of these changes, who and how development schemes were designed and when and why they were implemented.

IV. Public security/safety – These questions centered on the evolution of crime and violence in Rocinha and the community’s relationship with the police. We asked non-leading questions about the timing of the UPPs and whether Rocinha and the bordering non-favela neighborhoods were safer before or after the UPP. Finally we asked what they thought Rocinha needed to reduce violence and be a safer community.

V. Relationship between development and security – These questions centered on possible relationships that exist between development and security and, more specifically, favela-upgrading and pacification programs. We inquired about how commerce in the community and in the bordering neighborhoods had been affected. Some questions focused on links to the sporting mega-events and what kind of community and larger city was being produced by recent activity and who benefits from the programs.

VI. Speculation, Demographic Change, Removals & Gentrification – These questions asked participants if they knew of any residents who were forced out of Rocinha in recent years. The focus was on removals caused by the five tactics outline in the introduction, with special emphasis on “areas of risk,” favela-upgrading construction, or rising costs of living attributable to interventions and pacification. We asked about specific ways the recent interventions affected overall costs of living and especially housing.

VII. Resistance – By this point if negative consequences were reported in relation to recent interventions, participants were asked if there were any local groups or movements doing anything to resist/fight back.

VIII. Thoughts on Community – We asked respondents questions regarding Rocinha as a community: how it compared to the past, how close residents were, whether participants enjoyed living in Rocinha, and why.

IX. Conclusion – This was an open-ended question asking whether there was anything not covered or if they would like to add or give suggestions for future interviews.
The 135 interview recordings were saved in three locations protected by passwords (digital) or locks (mechanical). Interviews ranged from over three hours to as little as 13 minutes. The majority fell between 25 and 50 minutes, with a mean of approximately 38 minutes. The most relevant segments of the interviews (roughly ten percent of the entire process) were transcribed in Portuguese. From the Portuguese transcriptions only segments I deemed essential were translated to English (about half of the 10% percent, or 5% of all the interviews). Much of this 5% is included in this dissertation.

Depending on how interviews were unfolding, related questions were often asked, or participants were asked entirely new questions, if they brought up a relevant theme that had not been included in the script.

I designed 15 personalized interview scripts for particular participants because I had prior knowledge of them beforehand. This was the case with the well-known community leader of the Santa Marta favela, Itamar Silva. I knew of Itamar from books, articles and documentaries and designed his interview accordingly. The interviews with Martins in Rocinha were similar, but they took place on five separate occasions and totaled almost five hours.

The data from my interview and fieldnotes pertained to interview questions in several ways. This section describes the three most direct relationships. First, there were clear discrepancies between interview responses with the “development” planners and practitioners and answers from local residents regarding the level of local participation. Local residents almost unanimously felt there has been very little local participation in the decisions that have been impacting their community. One important exception was the well-known progressive architect Carlos Luis Toledo, who included residents in his team, only to later have the state abandon or grossly alter many of their plans.

Second, everyone I interviewed indicated Rocinha has become more expensive over the years. Some pointed out that this has been going on for decades while other felt it was a more recent occurrence.
The third example is that residents almost unanimously agreed that the UPP was implemented because of the upcoming mega-events. I asked whether the massive urban upgrading projects were spurred on by the mega-events as well. Responses varied by group. The state and the active residents said that PAC 1 had nothing to do with the events, while the activist residents suggested that PAC 2 did, especially the controversial aerial cable car (teleférico). Everyday residents more than other groups tended to think all major recent investments in favelas were a result of the mega-events.

Finally, for this section, there was a general consensus between all groups that many of Rocinha’s poorest residents will not be able to afford to live in the community in the years to come, and that they will be pushed out by the increasing costs of living. Their explanations of how, why, and when this will occur varied widely.

**Observations**

During this study I served as the human instrument via participant observation. The research instrument was a semi-structured but also open-ended interview schedule. Other supplementary instruments included notepads, digital voice recorders, digital cameras and notebook computers.

During interviews the participant and interviewer (me) were generally the only two people present within hearing distance. When family, friends, neighbors or colleagues entered the area where interviews were taking place the recording was paused until the participant and I were the only ones within listening distance. Sometimes (especially for “everyday residents”) participants preferred that a family member or friend be nearby so that they felt more comfortable. In these cases appropriate measures were always taken to ensure the confidentiality of participants, even when they mentioned (and many did) that confidentiality was not important to them.

**Research Protocol**
In Rocinha we conducted most interviews in residents’ homes, which provided a safe and comfortable setting for them and a less noisy environment for recording the interview. Protocol was only slightly more formal for interviews outside of Rocinha with group three, active non-residents. Instead of shorts and sandals I wore pants, shoes and button-down shirts. Approximately 40 percent of these interviews were conducted at the participants’ residences in the early morning or evenings, before or after working hours. The other 60 percent were conducted at their place of work, usually early before they began work or during their lunch break.

**Currency Conversions**

I provide monetary values on a range of topics, from project costs and yearly minimum wages, to the average prices of monthly rents or home values. Since I moved into Rocinha in 2001 the exchange rate between the Brazilian Real and the US Dollar has fluctuated significantly. Three distinct periods are noticeable, 2001-2006 when the Dollar was strong against the Real, 2007-2012 when the Real came closest to parity with the Dollar, and 2013-the present when the real began losing value and the Dollar increased in value, particularly from late 2014 to the present. When considering enormous investments or macro economic indicators changes in the exchange rate between the Real and the Dollar can equate to millions, billions, or even trillions of Dollars. To simplify this I use the annual exchange rate averages provided by the World Bank for the specific year each value, cost, or price was announced or implemented.\(^47\) Conversions are a little trickier for programs like PAC 1 in Rocinha, which had its budget announced 2007, then altered in 2010, and again in 2013. In these types of cases I cite the average annual exchange rate

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rate of the year it was announced, and if I feel there is a need for the sake of clarity I will provide a the most recent annual average 2015 exchange rate.

**Time Line**

It is hard to say when this study began and ended. “Officially” it was carried out between February 2013 and August 2014. Informally it began in 2001 when I moved to Rocinha. Mine is a life project, much like the work of Valladares in Rocinha, which she began in the late 1960s and continues to this day (albeit mostly from France). IRB-approved interviewing took place between February 2013 and April 2014. I conducted my first informal interviews in 2002 when I recorded an interview with a former member of the Comando Vermelho (CV) – Red Command, Rocinha’s then entrenched drug-trafficking faction. Photographs and fieldnotes have been also been collected since 2001. Audio and video recording devices were used to conduct interviews. Because of the delicate nature of openly taking notes, photos, video or audio recordings, some of my fieldnotes are reconstructions of events since 2001, particularly those concerning security, corruption, and organized crime.

**Part II**

DEFINITIONS AND DESCRIPTIONS OF SLUMS, FAVELAS AND SQUATTER SETTLEMENTS

What is a slum/favela? The human settlements known throughout the world as slums or squatter communities when located in Brazil are favelas (UN-Habitat 2003: 10).

Lízia Valladares notes, “Among the various housing alternatives for the urban poor in Brazil, the squatter settlement stands as the most common and important one. Called by different names in different cities – mocambo in Recife, invasão in Salvador, baixada in Belém – such
settlements are best known as *favelas*, the term which originated in Rio de Janeiro and which was soon adopted in São Paulo and other cities” (Valladares 1983: 70).

*The Challenge of Slums* (UN-Habitat 2003: 12) offers several descriptions of what makes a human settlement a slum. Restricted to the physical and legal characteristics of the settlement and excluding the more difficult social dimensions, the operational definition of slums provided in their pioneering 2003 report, a slum area, to various extents, combines the following characteristics:

- inadequate access to safe water;
- inadequate access to sanitation and other infrastructure;
- poor structural quality of housing;
- overcrowding;
- insecure residential status.

Brazilian anthropologist Teresa Caldeira provides an insensitive but still useful description of favelas in *City of Walls* (1996). She depicts favelas as most middle and upper class Brazilians view them, as communities where squatters on invaded land built houses. The wooden shacks of favelas might appear similar to some of the houses in the working class periphery, but she adds, the essential difference between a favela and other poor neighborhoods:

is that in the latter, people either bought the land on which they built their houses (however ramshackle) or pay rent. In a favela, although residents also build their own dwellings and sometimes pay rent, the residences are constructed on illegally obtained land, and their residents are considered to defy the classification of citizens: they live on usurped terrain, they do not pay city taxes, they do not have an official address, and they are not property owners. Moreover, in favelas houses are often made from discarded materials and are usually quite small (again lacking the separations and space allocations of a proper home). As somewhat anomalous residences, that is, ones that do not fit the classification of homes, favelas and *cortiços* are considered unclean and polluting. They coincide, then, with Douglas’s formula by which “uncleanness or dirt is that which must not be included if a pattern is to be maintained.” Excluded from the universe of the proper, they are symbolically constituted as spaces of crime, spaces of anomalous, polluting, and dangerous qualities. (Caldeira 1996: 78–79).
In 1950 the Brazilian Institute for Geography and Statistics (IBGE) established a technical name for favelas that is still used today, *subnormal agglomerations*. According to IBGE 2010 census the distinct area known as a subnormal agglomerate is a grouping of at least 51 (fifty-one) housing units (shacks, houses...), usually lacking essential public services, occupying or having occupied until recently land owned by others (public or private) and generally organized in a disorderly and dense form. IBGE recommends that “subnormal agglomerations” be classified based on the following criteria:

- Illegal occupation of land, or construction on land owned by others (public or private) at present or recently (obtaining of a land title within ten years or less) and with at least one of the following:
  - Zoning codes not conforming to current standards – reflected in narrow roads movement and irregular alignment, lots of unequal sizes and shapes and structures not approved by public agencies, and precariousness of essential public services.

Subnormal Agglomerates may be classified according to zoning plans and/or scarcity of essential public services, in the following categories:

- invasion;
- informal or illegal subdivision, and
- invaded areas and informal and illegal settlements where land tenure has been recognized in recent years.

The term *subnormal agglomerate* is not only cumbersome but it is more offensive than *slum* or *favela*. Nonetheless, it is the classification used by the federal government. Based on IBGE’s definition it is clear that public authorities consider subnormal agglomerates to be entirely within the realm of informality.

48 IBGE is one of Brazil’s most prestigious federal research institutions with a task comparable to that of the U.S. Census Bureau.
THE MARVELOUS CITY AND HER FAVELAS

Relatively little is known about the area that became the city of Rio de Janeiro before European colonization. The major indigenous groups inhabiting the region were part of the larger Tupi-Guarani nation, and in Rio were known as the Tupinambá or the Tamoio. The area where the community of Rocinha is located today was likely populated, or at least visited, by the people of the Guiraguadü-mirim village, which was likely located in today’s new money district of Barra da Tijuca. Also, there was another village nearby, Kariané, which is believed to have been in the proximity of today’s Lagoa Rodrigo de Freitas, also one of today’s most affluent areas of Rio (Freire and Malheiros 1997: 12). The term carioca, used to refer to people or things from the city of Rio de Janeiro, came from the language of these native Brazilians, and the most accepted version is that it derived from the Tupi-Guarani word kari‘oka, meaning house of the white man (Ferreira 1986: 353). Most of these native Brazilians died of diseases brought by the Portuguese. Others were killed, enslaved, or fled for the mountain ranges to the north. Although 200 years before the era of industrial capitalism, Marx described how along with the simultaneous enclosures taking place in England, colonial theft and slavery provided the land and resources, or the original accumulation, necessary for modern capitalism to begin.50

From 1549 until 1763 Salvador, located in the Northeastern state of Bahia, was the first capital of colonial Brazil (Skidmore 1999: 10-14). But the Portuguese first landed in Rio de Janeiro in January 1501 (Godfrey 1991: 27). In 1567 the city was officially founded as São Sebastião do Rio de Janeiro (Burns 1993: 48). To better suit global commercial interests colonial Brazil’s capital shifted to Rio in 1763, at a time when Bahia’s sugarcane economy was stagnating and the Southeast’s mining economy was vibrant.

50 Part VIII Primitive Accumulation, Chapter XXVII, Karl Marx, Capital Vol. 1.
Until around this time, late in the colonial period, the settlement of São Sebastião do Rio de Janeiro remained small. But the discovery of gold, diamonds and other precious gems in the landlocked state of Minas Gerais (Vast Mines)\textsuperscript{51} sparked a mineral boom. Brazil began exporting bulks of precious metals and diamonds to Europe. The Portuguese crown wanted complete control of the trade. They imposed legal restrictions limiting all exports along one series of routes, originally known as the Estrada Real (Royal Road), which wound from Minas Gerais, through São Paulo and to the ports of Rio de Janeiro. As a result, Rio grew rapidly during the late 1700s as bustling port for commodity exchange (Godfrey 1999: 98). From 1808 to 1821 Rio de Janeiro served as the capital of the Portuguese Empire (Benchimol. 1992: 21).

In 1960, Brazil’s capital was transferred once again, this time to the newly constructed Brasília, a city much closer to the geographic center of Brazil that was meticulously designed by planners averse to capitalism. The move was intended to draw the country’s population inland from the coast, but was ultimately unsuccessful because the vast majority of Brazilians continue to live near the coast (Godfrey 1991: 26-27). Highly unequal Brasilia also failed as an egalitarian urban experiment. Finally, in 1975, the state of Guanabara and the state of Rio de Janeiro were merged. The city of Rio de Janeiro was converted into its present form, capital of the state of Rio de Janeiro (Motta 2001: 19).

**Rio’s Favelas**

The history of Rio’s favelas is absorbing, brimming with stories of backbreaking hardship and survival, unremitting oppression met with resourcefulness, collective action, resistance,

\textsuperscript{51} There is debate as to the “Gerais” aspect of the state’s name, but the literal translation is Minas Gerais is “General Mines”. In Brazilian Portuguese the word “geral” becomes “gerais” in the plural, and carries meaning such as, “general”, “all”, “everything” or “vast”. “Vast Mines” is my interpretation based on its most appropriate translation into North American English.
defeats and victories, not to mention optimism amid generations of false promises and violence. Unfortunately time and space do not allow for a thorough historical overview of Rio’s favelas.  

And yet it is worth repeating a point numerous scholars have emphasized, and active residents inherently understand. Throughout *Evolução Urbana do Rio de Janeiro* (1987) and other works Abreu describes with an inimitable conciseness and proficiency how favelas have been essential features of Rio de Janeiro’s urban evolution since the late 1800s (Abreu 1993: 43-44).

According to the most recent IBGE Census in 2010 there were 763 favelas in the municipality of Rio de Janeiro and just over one thousand favelas in the greater metropolitan region (IBGE 2011: 60-61). Since there humble origins in the late 1800s favela have grown impressively in absolute numbers, population, and physical size. This is an impressive feat considering hundreds of communities have been razed and hundreds of thousands of favela residents have been displaced since the 1960s (Perlman 2010: 271).

Many of the English-language histories claim Morro da Providência was the first favela (Perlman 1976: 13). However, Abreu and Gonçalves, among others, claim a number of downtown hilltops (morros) were occupied by the poor prior to Morro da Providência, in particular nearby Morro do Santo Antônio (Gonçalves 2013: 45). This does not diminish the historical value of Morro da Providência. In fact, it was from Morro da Providência, previously known as *Morro da Favella*, that the word first came into usage to describe the shacks being

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53 According to IBGE (2011: 57-69) there in 2010 there were 6,329 favelas in Brazil housing 11,425,644 individuals, 1,332 favelas in the state of Rio de Janeiro housing 2,023,744 individuals, 1006 favelas in greater Rio de Janeiro housing 1,702,073 individuals, and within the city limits of Rio de Janeiro there are 763 favelas housing 1,393,314 individuals.
constructed along Rio’s steep downtown hills (Valladares 2005: 26). Morro da Providência is one of the few favelas in Rio de Janeiro dating back to the 1800s that still exists.\(^{54}\)

The word *favela* comes from a plant called *favela* or *Cnidoscolus phyllacanthas* that is common in many dry areas of northeastern Brazil (Oliveira et. al. 2008: 37).\(^{55}\) Soon, I explain why the favela plant is important to this history, but first it is important to register why and where favelas first emerged.

During the middle and late 1800s the majority of Rio’s poorest residents lived in and around the city center. While the city gradually expanded, living in proximity to Rio’s downtown was the most practical solution for the poor because of expensive public transportation, excruciatingly long commutes, and the precarious labor market in Rio. For example, living in the city center allowed day laborers to be in the streets early each morning in search of work, and close to markets where food was cheap (Turner 1966: 4, Abreu 1987: 42).

In Rio hillside squatter settlements were not universally referred to as “favelas” until later in the twentieth century. Valladares argues that favelas have been socially constructed, or as she claims, “invented.” People living in shacks atop Rio’s hillsides were common through most of the 1800s, as Abreu (1987) earlier pointed out, but these communities were not large, and more important, they did not represent a threat to dominant classes. The main scapegoat and menace to upper-class society at that time were the numerous disease-plagued dwellings known as *cortiços*. These rundown tenement buildings were comparable to those in Manhattan’s Five Points neighborhood during most of the 1800s. Rio’s version of Manhattan’s Old Brewery tenement was called *Cabeça de Porco* (The Pig Head).

\(^{54}\) Unfortunately, since 2009 half of its population has been threatened with displacement because of favela upgrading projects that also include “areas of risk” removals (Gonçalves 2013b: 22-24).

In *City of Walls* (1996) Theresa Caldeira describes cortiços as “liminal spaces” that “house people but not [are] considered proper residences”. She describes cortiços as, “subdivided houses that lack the spaces, installations, and separations that designate a home”, they are “somewhat anomalous” to favelas because they “do not fit the classification of homes”. She adds, “cortiços are considered unclean and polluting” (Caldeira 1996: 78-79). Caldeira uses the present tense because cortiços still exist on a much smaller scale, most notably in São Paulo, but they have been entirely supplanted by favelas as Brazil most marginalized urban communities.

During the 1800s downtown real estate values began dramatically increasing, and by the late 1800s Rio’s upper crust, bolstered by the mass media they controlled, began waging war on the cortiços. At the time few cared about a relatively small number of people living in shacks up on the towering hilltops. They weren’t in anyone’s way and barely visible from the city below.

By the turn of the twentieth century urban revitalization projects in Rio’s downtown resulted in widespread evictions and the demolition of most of the city’s cortiços. Many recently displaced residents used debris from the shattered cortiços to build shacks on the steep surrounding hill, where poor people were already living (Abreu 1994: 36). One example was the Cabeça de Porco cortiço. The large edifice was demolished in 1893 (Abreu 1994: 36) in the exact spot where the João Ricardo Tunnel was eventually constructed in Gamboa, Rio’s downtown port district. Cabeça de Porco was home to more than 2,000 residents when it was flattened (Abreu 1994: 36). Therefore, it is not a coincidence that Morro da Providência, located immediately above the João Ricardo Tunnel, began growing steadily at precisely the time Cabeça de Porco was demolished. It was during this point, when the former cortiços dwellers followed the lead of the other displaced Brazilians living on central hilltops, that favelas began expanding. But there was another important factor.

From 1896 to 1897 there was a short but legendary battle known as the *Guerra de Canudos* that was fought in the interior of Bahia (Gonçalves 2013: 44). Near the village of Canudos there
was a hill where some of the battles were fought, it was called *Morro da Favela* because it was overgrown with the favela plant.

The soldiers who fought in Canudos had been guaranteed free housing for their service. Many were former slaves freed only a decade earlier and had no place to call home. Once the war was over they arrived in Rio to broken promises, the first of many in a history of deceit. The soldiers, with the Army’s consent, hiked their way up Morro da Providência, which is located behind the old Ministry of War, where the evicted residents of Cabeça de Porco had recently established a small community (Gonçalves 2013: 44). This area of Rio’s center became popularly known as “Morro da Favella,” because of the soldiers who had recently fought on the famous hill in Canudos, Bahia (Gonçalves 2013: 44-45).

**Favelas before industrialization, the paradox of Rio de Janeiro**

Squatter communities have been associated with rapid urbanization and industrialization since the late 1700s (Turner 1968: 113). This is because of their role in absorbing much of the population migrants/immigrating from rural areas where sustaining agricultural livelihoods is less feasible for the poor, and as work opportunities shift to industrializing cities (Berner 2001: 293).

The process has long been associated with rapid industrialization. In *The Conditions Of The Working-Class In England* (1845), Friedrich Engels luridly chronicles the slums many migrants moved into, mentioning, “They are drawn into the large cities where they breathe a poorer atmosphere than in the country; they are relegated to districts which, by reason of the method of construction, are worse ventilated than any others; they are deprived of all means of cleanliness, of water itself...”56 He continues in length to depict the putrid living conditions in

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56 Preface to the second German edition of *The Housing Question* (1887) and the section titled Results from *The Conditions Of The Working-Class In England* (1845). From the Online Version: Issued (and re-issued) as a pamphlet. Reprinted by the Co-operative Publishing Society of Foreign Workers. Transcribed by director@marx.org during June 1995.
England, Ireland and Scotland’s industrializing cities. Later, in *The Housing Question* (1887), Engels described how disposed peasants continued moving into cities that were not prepared for such an influx. The infrastructure (sanitation, transportation, housing etc.) of swelling cities could not keep pace with the large number of arriving migrants, and so Engels adds, “At the very time when masses of workers are streaming into the towns, workers’ dwellings are pulled down on a large scale. Hence the sudden housing shortage for the workers”. Engels was certainly not alone in depicting the connection between the capitalist industry and the expansion of cities and slums. From Balzac to Dickens to Riis, this relationship was well documented during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This theme is developed in later chapters.

THE RACISM/CLASSISM NEXUS THAT PRODUCED RIO’S FAVELAS

Today they say that we are free,
Only to be chained in poverty.
Good God, I think it’s illiteracy;
It’s only a machine that makes money.

Bob Marley and the Wailers – Slave Driver (1973)

Here the important point is that Rio de Janeiro presents a minor paradox. While Rio was integrated into the global capitalist economy of the 1800s and early 1900s the city would not enter a phase of marked industrialization until the 1930s (Gonçalves 2013: 101). Why then did the favelas steadily grow in pre-industrial (or light industrial) Rio de Janeiro? Campos (2004) and Gonçalves (2013) provide an important part of the answer.

The 1849 census indicated that the city of Rio de Janeiro had 266,466 inhabitants, 110,602 of whom were slaves. 57 This bestows upon the city of Rio the dubious honor of having, in absolute numbers, the largest urban slave population in history. 58 Slavery was abolished in 1888

and afterwards masses of former slaves in Rio de Janeiro found themselves “free” but with nowhere to live. To make matter worse, as slavery was ending dominant classes embarked on the “Política de Branqueamento” (Whitening Policy), a process of trying to “whiten” Brazil’s population inspired by social Darwinism.

Incentives were offered to attracted waves of European immigrants to labor in coffee production and a variety of other jobs in the city’s agricultural and textile sectors (Gonçalves 2013: 37). Campos adds that between 1890 and 1900 almost 2 million workers, mainly European, arrived in Brazil, many settling in Rio de Janeiro.59 This meant that a large part of Rio’s black population was excluded from the city’s labor market, even though blacks had previously performed much of the work under slavery. But the dominant groups of light skinned Brazilians wanted European workers to help whiten the city and country. This produced, Gonçalves points out, a large “reserve army” of labor that was predominantly non-white (Gonçalves 2013: 37).

It is no wonder then that from 1888 to 1890 the population of Rio’s residents living in cortiços doubled to 100,000 people (Gonçalves 2013: 38). Most blacks in Rio found themselves struggling to find steady work and affordable housing. Many moved into downtown cortiços, but by the turn of the century a large portion of cortiço dwellers had been evicted from the city center by the sweeping reforms of Rio’s mayor Pereira Passos. Those without the economic means of residing in formal areas of Rio’s downtown moved up into the unregulated hillside favelas nearby.

By the late 1800s a strong relationship was already noticeable in pre-industrial Rio de Janeiro between the sociospatial factors of race, class, geographic location of affordable housing, and working class employment. Public transportation improvements were designed to allow

workers to live in the cheaper but distant suburbs. But the time it took trains to travel back and forth to Rio was overwhelming, as were the costs of transportation for the working class. Employment opportunities were concentrated in the city center, and so the poor were forced to live within walking distance of where they could look for work on a daily basis (Gonçalves 2013: 38).

Favelas steadily expanded around the city center during the first decades of the twentieth century, eventually replacing the cortiços as the physical embodiment of Rio’s most pressing social problems (Gonçalves 2013: 69). Between 1914 and 1920 the word “favella” (now favela) was adopted by the media and Rio’s public authorities to describe all of the squatter settlements mushrooming along the city’s hillsides (Abreu 1994: 40; Gonçalves 2013: 71-72).

Public authorities employed methods of social control, as they had with the cortiços, by also classifying favelas as “areas of risk,” an effective and recurrent maneuver. The types of risk favelas allegedly present have been modified several times over the decades. In the early 1900s, though, as they were first being noticed on a significant scale, favelas were considered areas of hygienic/sanitary risk or areas of aesthetic risk to the beautiful nature of the Marvelous City, or both (Gonçalves 2013: 72).

**First Mega-Event Removal**

Much has been made of the recent favela removals resulting from the string of sporting mega-events being held in Rio since 2007 (e.g., Freeman 2012, Magalhães 2013). However, this type of urbanistic opportunism can be traced back almost a century. In 1922, Brazil celebrated its 100th anniversary of independence from Portugal. Rio de Janeiro, the capital of the Republic, hosted the main attractions. In preparation, Mayor Carlos Sampaio initiated a campaign of *beautifying* various hilltops in and around the city center. One of these large hills, *Morro do Castelo*, he ordered to be leveled in 1921. Morro do Castelo was the geographic location where Rio de Janeiro was founded in 1567. Up until the time it was removed in 1921, the sizeable hill
housed roughly five thousand people, mostly poor workers who lived in cortiços and favela-like housing. All were displaced.

Morro do Castelo was located on prime downtown real estate. Demolishing it allowed authorities to upgrade a strategic area by opening it for more profitable office towers and large-scale commercial opportunities. The removal of Morro do Castelo was also the first time Rio public authorities used the pretext of preparing for an international mega-event to displace the poor and working class (Abreu 1987: 76-77). The leveling of Morro do Castelo and Morro do Santo Antonio, which suffered the same fate in 1950, are generally considered two of the most regrettable urbanistic errors committed in Rio de Janeiro because of the rich history that was destroyed with the hills (Abreu 1987: 76; Gonçalves 2013: 83).

By the late 1920s, the hygienic, aesthetic, and environment based rationales for the sporadic urban interventions used to socially control the favelas gradually gave way to a more systematic approach. A new vision was being created of Rio, one highly influenced by the consolidation of the city’s real estate market, where a new spatial division would better contribute to capitalist accumulation. As Rio’s upper classes increasingly looked for ways of eradicating them, the favelas lost whatever partial right to the city they may have once possessed (Gonçalves 2013: 95).

The 1930s marked the beginning of the first favelization process (i.e., accelerated favela expansion), and consequently also the passing of the 1937 Código de Obras (1937 Public Works Code). The 1937 Public Works Code was a landmark municipal decree that would continue to influence urban policy in Rio until 1970 (Gonçalves 2013: 117). An important section of the 1937 law addressed “unhealthy” and “informal” settlements such as cortiços and favelas (Gonçalves 2013: 117-121). For the first time, legislation officially acknowledged and prohibited various types of “illegal” housing in the city (Gonçalves 2013: 117). The extensive law addressed zoning issues, such as height restriction laws, building codes and other guidelines for Rio’s urban landscape. Already socially condemned by upper classes, the 1937 Public Works Code officially

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60 Abreu 1987: 76-77; Ferreira and Miranda 2012: 104-106; Gonçalves 2013: 83.
classified favelas as *illegal*. In practice favelas continued to be regarded as “sui generis”, and tolerated—in large part because of robust clientelistic relationships between the political sphere and favela residents in Rio de Janeiro (Gonçalves 2013: 122).

In 1930 there was a *Golpe do Estado* (coup d’état) in Brazil that put populist Getúlio Vargas in place as president. The new industrial phase that was ushered in with the military coup witnessed a marked increase in Rio’s favela population (Gonçalves 2013: 104). Abreu indicates that from 1930 to 1964, even as socioeconomic inequality increased there was a decrease in spatial inequality/segregation in Rio de Janeiro. He attributes this trend to a few sociospatial phenomena.

First, Abreu explains that compared to previous epochs there were a number of populist politicians in power during the Vargas era (Abreu 1987: 95). Public authorities continued their social control of favela residents, checked their expansion, and there were even a few notable favela demolitions that took place – the most significant being Morro do Santo Antonio. But during that time favelas were not systematically targeted, as they would be from 1964 until the mid-1970s.

This period (1930–1964) also marked Brazil’s first phase of intense industrialization and capitalist urban development, especially in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. Industries flourished in the North Zone and peripheral suburbs of Rio, as the South Zone steadily became the center of upper-class carioca society. The industry and construction boom demanded cheap labor. Thousands of rural migrants, mainly from the Northeast but also from the bordering state of Minas Gerais and from the smaller cities and villages of Rio de Janeiro state, flooded the city. Abreu stresses that Rio grew, from 1.4 million inhabitants in 1930 to approximately 2.5 million in 1950, or 55 thousand people annually for 20 consecutive years.

In *The Myth of Marginality* Janice Perlman explains that “squatter settlements of the Third World” always exhibit “the same interplay of social forces” (1976:12). Perlman explains: “Because ‘standard’ housing is so scarce relative to need, and even the least expensive dwelling
units cost so much more than the low-income family’s ability to pay, vacant lands in and around the center city become natural squatting grounds for thousands of migrant families” (Perlman 1976: 12). John Turner, who was among the first to systematically document squatter settlements in South America, said essentially the same thing. Unable to afford the high cost of formal housing, once migrants arrived in quickly growing cities they had immediately find a place to live as close as possible to work and other necessary amenities. Often migrants would build in any “unguarded and unused plots of private land, public land”, spaces, such as “hillsides or rocky outcrops”, “marshes and areas to flooding”, “verges, ravines, embankments” or just about any unoccupied “interstices of the cities”, which upper classes do not value at the time (Turner, 1968: 115-116). This reflects the scenario Friedrich Engels described over a century earlier. Describing Manchester, England, Engels wrote, “wherever a nook or corner was free, a house has been run up; where a superfluous passage remained, it has been built up; the value of land rose with the blossoming out of manufacture, and the more it rose, the more madly was the work of building up carried on” (Engels 1845).

By this point in Rio de Janeiro industry was flourishing in the city’s North Zone and northern periphery, as was a housing boom in the South Zone. These factors modified the sociospatial configuration of work in the city. Compared to the turn of the century opportunities for employment were no longer as centralized in and around Rio’s downtown. It was not as necessary for the poor to live in the city center in order to meet their daily needs, even if public transportation remained onerous and expensive. The majority of migrants streaming into Rio ended up moving to the working-class peripheral suburbs, the favelas of the North Zone, or the bourgeoning favelas of the South Zone (Abreu 1987: 96).

Dozens of favelas formed near North Zone industries and in the northern periphery, as well as in the residential South Zone. Abreu emphasizes the irony in the fact that the cheap labor

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performed mainly by migrants allowed for the rapid construction of upper class housing in the South Zone. The building boom increased the South Zone’s land value. While there were already a number of older favelas in Rio’s South Zone, others soon began sprouting up near the construction sites, keeping real estate speculation in check (Abreu 1987: 95).

Rio’s unique geography partially explains the expansion of favelas during this period. The formal urban spaces that were eligible for registration and under official bureaucratic control were generally located in flat areas of the city, which at the time were more appealing to the real estate industry because it was easier to construct new high rises or to renovate older buildings. Favelas on the other hand, proliferated informally on the city’s many vacant steep hillsides and marshes, areas that at the time were considered undesirable (Abreu 1987: 95).

The rate of favela expansion was highest during the 1940s (Abreu 1987: 106; Gonçalves 2013: 129). The first systematic studies of favelas began in the 1940s, marking the beginning of the period in which it was necessary for the authorities to gather concrete data so that they could better control urban poverty and the spaces in which it arose (Valladares 2005: 56). The first policy interventions designed specifically for favelas resulted from their official recognition in the 1937 Code and the ensuing need to collect data on them (Burgos 2004: 25).

Valladares claims that much of the pioneering favela research of the late 1930s/early 1940s had a paternalistic and subtly racist bent and formed the basis for the state’s first noteworthy favela policy: the parques proletários, or proletarian parks, which were initiated during the Vargas administration (Burgos 2004: 27). Rio’s mayor Henrique Dodsworth initially intended for 300,000 favela residents to be housed in the proletarian parks, where re-education/socialization lessons, strict curfews, and other rigid guidelines, such as abstinence from alcohol, were compulsory. Proletarian park residents were promised that once their former communities were upgraded they would be able to return to them, but the ambitious plans to end favelas were a failure (Gonçalves 2013: 130; Burgos 2004: 28). Between 1941 and 1943 just over four thousand former favela inhabitants were moved into just three proletarian parks, one
each in Gávea, Leblon and Caju. Furthermore, residents were never allowed to return to their favelas, which the city never upgraded. Instead their former communities were razed and eventually tuned into residential, commercial, or recreational spaces for South Zone elites.

Most of the deceived families remained in the resettlement housing for years. The proletarian parks were designed in the form of simple army barrack like structures but lack of public investment caused them to gradually morph into favelas. In the late 1960s the ramshackle proletariat parks were demolished as the value of the land they inhabited increased dramatically, particularly in Gávea and Leblon (Burgos 2004: 28). Most people strolling through today’s neighborhoods of Gávea and Leblon are likely unaware that until the 1960s sprawling favelas and proletarian parks once occupied the spaces where exclusive properties and facilities now sit.

There was at least one unintended consequence resulting from the entire debacle. If favela residents were leery of public officials before the proletarian parks, afterwards they came to see Rio’s public authorities as almost completely untrustworthy and essentially engaged in an unrelenting war with the favelas. The experience served as an embryonic phase in organizing and mobilizing favela residents on issue of housing (Burgos 2004: 28).

**The Return of Democracy and Clientelism**

By 1945 Vargas’s paternalistic and populist dictatorship ended. Electoral democracy returned to Brazil and with it so did the clientelistic vote garnering relations between politicians and favela residents. During this period, Rio’s public officials and many among the dominant classes and within the hierarchy of the Catholic Church became concerned that leftist political parties were gaining ground within the favelas. As a result, two historically important organizations were founded in a partnership between the Catholic Church and Rio’s Municipal Government: the Fundação Leão XIII in 1947, and Cruzada São Sebastião in 1955 (Gonçalves 2013: 150).
Fundação Leão XIII’s main objectives were education, health, and housing in favelas (Gonçalves 2013: 150). It was a paternalistic institution (McCann 2014: 7-8), which in functioned like a shepherd caring for the favela residents (its flock) and guiding them down the right path (away from communism and activism). It also promoted self-help initiatives and encouraged community organizing within favelas in an attempt to create new community-based groups that would steer residents away from the left-wing political parties.

The Fundação Leão XIII intervened in 34 favelas between 1947 and 1954 and maintained eight social centers in the principal favelas of the city, Rocinha included. Community improvement projects were the responsibility of local residents, which they organized through mutirões, or collective efforts (McCann 2014: 48-50). The role of mutirões is central to understanding how squatter settlements develop, not only the favelas of Brazil but throughout Latin America (Perlman 1986: 43). In Rio for example, until the 1970s extremely few basic services were provided by the state or private sector. Residents had to count on family, friends and neighbors to build houses and alleyways, or for services like rudimentary sewage systems and water collection. In many countries, from Peru to Brazil, governments romanticized and often exploited the practice of local self-help and mutirão, usually in an effort to save money by having favela residents voluntarily complete manual labor in their communities. Perlman critiques this early form of slum upgrading, claiming: “‘Self-help’ is neither romantic nor a way to relieve government of the burden of housing. It is a survival strategy based on the widest possible freedom of choice to allocate scarce time and resources.” (Perlman 43: 1986).

Fundação Leão XIII’s interventions and subtle anti-communist strategy were not enough to prevent left-wing activists from gaining support in favelas. This was partially because during the 1950s there were a number of noteworthy attempts to remove favelas, mainly by private groups and individuals claiming ownership of the lands on which the communities had located. As a

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62 Mutirão (plural mutirões) is a Tupi-Guarani word signifying a collective effort or labor.
result, many residents sympathized with the only entities defending their cause, left-wing movements and political parties.

During the 1950s the real estate industry increased pressure on certain favelas. The purported rightful owners of these areas threatened to remove numerous communities. Several of these cases were dragged out in the courts (Gonçalves 2013: 152). As a response to the threats residents of the Borel favela (located in the middle-class North Zone neighborhood of Tijuca) formed what is considered the first official favela residents’ association in 1954. The União dos Trabalhadores Favelados (UTF) – Favela Workers’ Union, had initially sought to raise funds to fend off legal challenges to their right to remain on the land. Attorney Antoine de Magarinos Torres, a left-leaning, upper middle-class activist, who was not from the community, tirelessly aided the UTF. The mass media and public authorities at the time considered Magarinos Torres a threat (Gonçalves 2013: 152-153). The UTF eventually widened its objectives and activities and became a model for other favela residents’ associations.

The broadly popular Bishop of Rio de Janeiro Dom Helder Câmara, a prominent figure in the early liberation theology movement, created Cruzada São Sebastião in 1955. Cruzada São Sebastião began as a private entity with the objective of upgrading, humanizing and “Christianizing” the favelas (Gonçalves 2013: 154). Similar to the Fundação Leão XIII, Cruzada São Sebastião is also generally considered to have been a paternalistic organization (Burgos 2004: 28-31). Nonetheless, it played an important role in advocating for favela-upgrading over the wholesale removal of communities. Many segments of Rio’s upper classes viewed Dom Helder Câmara as a socialist and disapproved of him as Bishop. Eventually they succeeded in having the soft-spoken priest relocated to the other end of the country, to the northeastern city of Olinda, bordering Recife (Gonçalves 2013: 157).

The Return of the Dictatorship
The 1960s were the start of what would be the tumultuous decade not only for Rio’s favelas but also for Brazilian society in general. The number of favela residents in Rio doubled from 169,305 in 1950 to 335,063 in 1960 (IBGE 1968: vi). From 1961 to 1964 João Goulart served as Brazil’s first socialist president, but his presidency did not last long. As might be expected Goulart proved unpopular among upper-class Brazilians and in Washington. In 1964 a right-wing military coup backed by the United States overthrew his government by (Weiss 1993: 141).

Meanwhile, conservative opposition candidate Carlos Lacerda was elected governor of the newly founded Guanabara State (today’s Rio de Janeiro state). This sparked a heated debate between ideologically opposed citizens and political parties on whether to upgrade or completely eradicate the favelas (Cardoso 2007: 224; Gonçalves 2013: 211). Guanabara State officials placed José Arthur Rios in charge of managing Rio’s favelas. Similar to the approach espoused by the Fundação Leão XIII, Rios focused on community development models and the creation of local associations and self-help projects. (Gonçalves 2013: 213).

Simultaneously, in Washington the “Kennedy Doctrine” was established as the official soft diplomacy approach to foreign policy in Latin America. It supported social projects in what was an attempt to ward off inclinations towards communism, especially in light of Washington’s concern about Cuba’s influence in the region (Gonçalves 2013: 214-215). Considerable resources were directed through the State Department’s US Agency for International Development (USAID) to Rio de Janeiro as part of the Alliance for Progress program (Benmergui 2009: 309-314; Gonçalves 2013: 215).

Discontented elites, politicians, conservative sectors of the Catholic Church, and especially the barons of Rio’s booming real estate industry wanted resources from Washington to clear favelas off valuable land in the South Zone and to resettle residents in housing projects in the distant periphery. These events instigated what is today regarded as an egregious human rights violation – the forced removal of thousands of families from strategically located favelas. The
1937 Public Works Code was finally being applied to justify systematic favela eradication (Gonçalves 2013: 215, 222, 232).

Rio’s governor Carlos Lacerda succeeded in removing 42,000 favela residents and demolishing 8,078 houses between 1962 and 1965 (Gonçalves 2013: 218). The magnitude, haste and callousness of wholesale eviction campaign even disturbed funders in Washington. Both the Alliance for Progress and USAID complained that according to their calculations Rio’s authorities could have spent half of what they did by upgrading the favelas instead of: (1) demolishing them; (2) removing the substantial wreckage; (3) building entirely new housing complexes; and then (4) transporting former residents to the new outposts (Gonçalves 2013: 218).63

Even so, in March 1964 the United States sanctioned military coup overthrew the democratically elected president João Goulart. The military takeover had a profound influence on urban policy in Brazil. With presidential elections halted and the regime rigging local elections, it was no longer necessary for politicians to seek clientelistic relationships with favela residents. Political party or views no longer mattered much (Gonçalves 2013: 218). With Washington critical, mainly for budgetary reasons, of forced mass evictions, Rio authorities sought additional sources for financing favela demolition and public housing construction from the newly created Banco Nacional de Habitação (BNH) – National Housing Bank (Gonçalves 2013: 218, 222, 231).

In 1965 Carlos Lacerda’s political rival Francisco Negrão de Lima was elected governor of the state of Guanabara. Initially Negrão de Lima was against removals. He even formed the Companhia de Desenvolvimento de Comunidades (Codesco) – Communities Development Company in 1968 with the help of USAID. Three communities were chosen as pilot projects for

63 Gonçalves does not mention the four points listed above. They are based on information attained during interviews with specialists who worked from 2011 to 2014 on infrastructure projects in the Laboriaux section of Rocinha. In 2010, Laboriaux was marked for removal but the City reversed its position after being pressured by organized residents to invest in rather than remove the community.
CODESCO favela upgrading (Brás de Pina, Mata Machado, and Morro União), but in only one, Brás de Pina, was the upgrading carried out (Gonçalves 2013: 244).

Research on Brás de Pina’s urban upgrading of demonstrated as early as the 1970s that a relationship exists between slum-upgrading, rising costs of living, and removals resulting from construction projects (Sousa 2003: 55; Gonçalves 2013: 246-247).

While he campaigned on an anti-removal platform, Governor Negrão de Lima eventually buckled under the pressure of powerful groups aligned with the real estate industry. The abrupt shift became particularly apparent after torrential storms in 1966 and 1967 caused numerous landslides and deaths, which were concentrated in and around Rio’s favelas. These tragic events provided the perfect excuse to continue the Lacerda era policy of favela removals. Negrão de Lima caved in to pressure and mass removals continued until 1976 (Gonçalves 2013: 247-248). During Negrão de Lima’s administration at least 70,000 favela residents were evicted. From 1962 to 1974, between 139,000 and 175,000 inhabitants of 80 favelas were uprooted (Valladares 1978: 39; Perlman 1976; Gonçalves 2013: 217).

Despite the decade’s long, intense and systematic effort on the part of public authorities to eradicate Rio’s favelas— for over 10 of those years the official state policy was systematic forced eradication and resettlement—the number of people living in them actually increased considerably. IBGE’s cautious figures indicate that between 1960 and 1980 the number of people living in Rio’s favelas increased by approximately 293,170. (Gonçalves 2013: 29)

Valladares (1978: 45-46) asserts that the removal policy was an overwhelming failure in terms of either improving affordable housing conditions or in preventing favela growth. It was a period of widespread human rights violations. Valladares adds, however, that the forced evictions were monumentally successful in freeing up valuable land now occupied by Rio’s dominant classes (Valladares 1978: 31-32). What is clear though is that the deep-seated racial, social and cultural prejudices of Rio’s elite, who wanted all signs of poverty as far away from
their neighborhoods as possible, played a role in the policy. But the campaign was primarily a highly successful method for achieving what Harvey calls “accumulation by dispossession.”

In 1977, three years after the official favela eviction policy had ended, powerful players within the real estate industry demanded that the Vidigal favela be removed. The official reason was that Vidigal was located in an area of environmental risk. Yet, Vidigal, a medium-sized beachfront favela, is situated along a hillside where the company Rio Towers planned to construct a luxury hotel (Gonçalves 2013: 263). Just three years earlier, in 1974 the U.S. chain Sheraton built a towering hotel in front of Vidigal.

The push to evict Vidigal was intense and it mobilized the community and other favela activists who were determined to prevent another era of mass evictions, and the real estate industry’s attempt ultimately failed. The ordeal and the resistance led Rio’s Archdiocese to create, in 1978, the Pastoral das Favelas (Pastoral Outreach for the Favelas), a division of the Archdiocese that advocated on behalf of the city’s favela residents. Additionally, the attempts to remove Vidigal resulted in formulation of a new legal classification, the Zona Especial de Interesse Social (ZEIS) – Special Zone of Social Interest. The ZEIS law was adopted by the Federal Government in 1981. Soon afterwards, Vidigal was declared a ZEIS, as was Rocinha and most other favelas in Rio (Gonçalves 2013: 282, 266).64

The Secretaria Municipal de Desenvolvimento Social (SMDS) – Municipal Secretary of Social Development was established in 1979 (Andrade 2002: 72).65 By the early 1980s the SMDS was involved in numerous favela infrastructure projects throughout Rio. Two of these were in Rocinha where the SMDS played an important role financing two of Rocinha’s most significant sanitation projects to this day: the rerouting of two separate, large open sewer streams that

64 ZEIS are just as often referred to as AEIS, or Área Especial de Interesse Social – Special Area of Social Interest.
65 The SMDS was originally founded as the SMD. “Social” was added to “Development” in the early 1980s, and so the SMD became the SMDS.
during heavy rains inundated houses in low-lying sections of the community (Leitão 2009: 132-133).

In 1981 the SMDS created the Projeto Mutirão, a favela-upgrading project for which local residents initially provided volunteer physical labor. After 1985 many of the local workers were paid, and Gonçalves points out, the “know-how” acquired from the favela upgrading of Projeto Mutirão would benefit the more famous municipal government Favela-Bairro upgrading program of the 1990s (Gonçalves 2013: 270). In short, the 1980s and 1990s were a period in which favela eviction policies became politically and socially taboo (Magalhães 2013: 90-93).

Leonel Brizola of the Partido Democrático Trabalhista (PDT), Democratic Labor Party, was governor of Rio from 1983 to 1986, and again from 1991 to 1994. During his first term, Brizola prohibited violent police operations in favelas, a virtuous decision that produced results generally considered disastrous (Burgos 2004: 43). Ending the violent incursions would have been a sensible policy during the 1960s and 1970s when military police also regularly harassed, tortured and executed favela residents. But by the mid-1980s the scenario had dramatically changed. Historic factors, including the U.S. War on Drugs, created the circumstances in which cocaine began flooding Rio’s favelas in the 1980s (Gay 2005: xvii-xviii; Perlman 2010: 177). With the cocaine came vast amounts of money that allowed once small-time dealers to organize into hierarchical drug and arms trafficking factions that quickly took control of Rio’s favelas. When he reduced the police presence in the favelas, Brizola created the conditions in which these communities, already neglected by the state for decades, became even more socially isolated. Local factions took advantage and consolidated their power, evolving into the large drug factions they are today (Burgos 2004: 43-44; Perlman 2010: 175).

The second Brizola era policy change was the implementation of basic public services to the favelas, for instance, running water from CEDAE, the State Water and Sewage Company of Rio

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66 This information was gathered during interviews and is buttressed by the relevant literature.
de Janeiro. Interviews in Rocinha point to the delivery of running water as one of the most
significant quality of life and health improvements in the community's history.

Finally, Brizola initiated the first attempt to provide favela residents with property titles
through a 1983 program called *Cada Familia Um Lote* – Each Family One Lot (Perlman 2010:
274; Gonçalves 2013: 273-274). The halt of violent police incursions (despite certain negative
consequences), the provision of basic services such as water (even if not ideal), and the start of a
property titles programs indicate that Brizola recognized the favelas as a legitimate form of
housing for Rio's poor and working classes. This was a major contrast to the prevailing
dominant class view of favelas. Historically, they were viewed as a practical but highly
undesirable response to housing crises and inadequate transportation infrastructure. They were
to be endured until eventually their residents could be removed and transferred elsewhere
(Gonçalves 2013: 28-33, 373). This is the logic behind authoritarian forced removals and why
favelas have historically been neglected. Why would the state invest in a community that would
probably be demolished soon enough? In this sense, I suggest that the recent wave of significant
public investments in key favelas are revolutionary (in urban Brazil at least) for allowing the
state stimulated market to remove favela residents through what may be considered production
side gentrification.

1988, THE RETURN TO DEMOCRACY AND THE NEOLIBERAL 1990S

The return to democracy was a momentous change in Brazil. With the drafting of the 1988
Federal Constitution various changes occurred that would soon have a positive impact on favelas
and other important urban issues. Articles 182 and 183 are particularly significant, and one of
the many points addressed within them is the requirement that a *Plano Diretor* (Master Plan)
be passed every 10 years in all Brazilian municipalities with more than 20,000 inhabitants.
Accordingly, Articles 182 and 183 stipulate that Master Plans must be participatory and include
citizens from a diversity of social classes, organizations, movements and groups within each city (Gonçalves 2013: 293).

By the 1990s major transitions were occurring behind the scenes. Formidable global and domestic political economic forces were shaping cities and communities throughout Brazil. These forces were affecting dozens of low-income communities throughout Rio de Janeiro (Bautès, Fernandes and Burgos 2013: 4).

The term most social scientists use to describe this global phenomenon is neoliberal capitalism (i.e., neoliberalism). David Harvey claims that by the mid-1970s there was an accelerated turn towards neoliberal ideology in the United States and Britain (Harvey 2005: 22). But in Rio de Janeiro this global force would not be markedly felt until the early 1990s. It was during this period that Rio’s dominant classes took advantage of global forces in veering the city towards neoliberal urbanism (Vainer 2000: 81-83, 105-107; Freeman 2012: 97). Steered by mayor Cesar Maia’s administration it was during this period that Rio de Janeiro adopted an “entrepreneurial city” model (Vainer 2000: 85-86).

The 1992 election of mayor Cesar Maia was an important rupture in the city’s political history, marking the end of an era of center-left political groups like Brizola’s PDT (Gonçalves 2012: 325-326). Maia, a bullish politician, became the leader of Rio’s right-wing politics. He was elected mayor three times (1993-1996, 2001-2004, 2005-2008), and then, after losing a 2010 bid for the federal Senate, he was elected to Rio’s City Council in 2012. During the 1990s Maia and other influential actors began marketing Rio as an exotic and unique urban brand. Their goal was for the Marvelous City to compete with other municipalities around the world for the increasingly mobile capital associated with neoliberalism.67

Cesar Maia skillfully circumvented much of the progressive urban policies included in the 1988 Federal Constitution, as well as various inclusive laws and rights advanced within legislation passed in the City and State of Rio de Janeiro (Gonçalves 2013: 324-326). For example, Maia disregarded the constitutionally required Master Plan. In its place his administration began working on their own strategy for the city, one that clearly favored big business and marketing (Vainer 2000: 105-108). They called it the *Plano Estratégico*, or Strategic Plan (Gonçalves 2013: 325). The Strategic Plan was drafted by a multidisciplinary international team, and was heavily influenced by World Bank doctrine that advocates a leading role for metropolises in economic growth (Davidovich 2000: 124).

As part of the Strategic Plan, Maia began a number of noteworthy *beautification* projects, including the *Cidade da Música* (Music City), which today is known as *Cidade das Artes* (City of Arts), a project that has finally come to fruition after years of delays and costs running over US $250 million. Essential to the Strategic Plans was an aggressive campaign against informality and disorder (Valverde 2009: 28-30). Maia was inspired by Brattonesque broken windows enforcement, the types of policies that helped turn Manhattan and other areas of city into the “vast gated community for the rich” (Harvey 2008: 38) that it is today: the model for all aspiring entrepreneurial cities. In a telling 2000 interview in the weekly news magazine *Revista Época*, Cesar Maia expressed concerns about and strategies to contain the urban disorder that were strikingly reminiscent of Giuliani’s New York. He brazenly stated:

What differentiated my administration from the others was the boldness to confront urban disorder. Unfortunately, present day Rio is living through a similar situation to the one we had

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Translated by the author.


before 1992. We have lost control of the urban territory. Invasions are once again occurring throughout the city, and there has been a revival of street vending. (...) I am talking about the type of disorder that promotes the sale of stolen goods and even the sale of drugs, which causes incidents of petty crime, such as robbery and theft, to increase.

**Favela-Bairro: Rio’s First Citywide Favela-Upgrading Program**

In what at first may seem a contradiction, during Cesar Maia’s administration Rio’s first significant favela-upgrading program was initiated. It gained much national and international attention and became the subject of considerable praise (Gonçalves 2013: 326). Through the Favela-Bairro program the municipal government partially upgraded dozens of midsize and small favelas. It is hard to say how many favelas benefitted from the program because it is difficult to ascertain whether Favela-Bairro is still being implemented. According the its principal funder the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) it received another US $150 million loan in December 2010 for Phase III of Favela-Bairro which was to begin in 2011.⁷⁰ Even so, it has recently been suggested that as of late 2013 Favela-Bairro had partially upgraded 191 favelas in Rio, falling short of its initial goal of nearly 500 (Gomes and Motta 2013: 8).

The main objectives of Favela-Bairro were to improving living conditions and to integrate favelas with the rest of the city. The program aspired to provide the favelas with basic sanitation services that would be maintained by government agencies; to spatially reorganize the favelas by connecting their streets to those of the surrounding city and to create spaces for collective use; to provide social services aimed at low-income segments of the population; and to legalize land tenure (Pamuk and Cavallieri 1998: 456). Favela-Bairro communities received infrastructural improvements and social services, including street paving, hillside stairways, recreational facilities, water provision, and infrastructure for preventing landslides, such as slope retaining

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⁷⁰ According to the IDB Favela-Bairro is currently in its III phase, for which it received an additional US$ 150 million loan in December 2010.
walls and hillside concrete reinforcements (Pamuk and Cavallieri 1998: 456). The first two phases of the favela-upgrading scheme ended in the early 2000s but a number of projects apparently continue. Thus far the program has combined approximately US$ 120 million from Rio’s municipal government and over US$ 540 million from the IDB since 1996 (IDB). Gonçalves points out that the Favela-Bairro program caused the price of housing in many upgraded favelas to increase 97% between 1995 and 1997 (Gonçalves 2013: 332). Furthermore, apartments situated in proximity to affected favelas also increased 20% in value during the same period (Gonçalves 2013: 332). Perhaps the most important aspect of the Favela-Bairro experience was that it proved large-scale upgrading of favelas was possible (Gonçalves 2013: 333-334), and that eviction was not only unnecessary but also generally more expensive.

Favela-Bairro received praise and international accolades. A joint 2004 IDB and World Bank report stated, “Probably the best-known urban upgrading program in Latin America, the Favela-Bairro program is considered a reference for urbanization of informal settlements” (IDB/The World Bank 2004: 1). But for many favela residents, activists, and scholars, Favela-Bairro was a disappointment because it prioritized surface-level beautification schemes in selected communities (Rocinha was not one of them) over more pressing socioeconomic needs (Perlman 2010: 281). In addition, many of the upgrades were completed in haste and cheaply. Some were never finished, which resulted in numerous projects soon needing additional expensive repairs.

The favela-upgrading and beautification schemes had a broader agenda, and Vainer suggests that it did not take long for the underlying objectives of Maia’s Strategic Plan to surface. He adds, that at its core the Plan was designed to legitimize the interests of certain dominant groups in Rio, such as the power players in the real estate, development, construction and tourism industries, and their plans for the city (Gonçalves 2013: 326). Strategic marketing campaigns

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attempted to downplay Rio’s infamous inequality and violence and Maia’s administration actively promoted a fictional image of the city to potential investors. Advertising highlighted expansive city beaches, urban ecotourism, and the healthy athletic carioca lifestyle, as well as *samba, capoeira, caipirinhas, açaí*, and other local attractions. The ads commodified Rio, packaging the Marvelous City as an exotic, cosmopolitan tropical playground with a vibrant cultural scene. Rio de Janeiro already had the world’s largest street parties, its famous yearly carnival and New Year’s Eve celebration. But officials sought even more money-generating distractions. They were producing a new Rio de Janeiro in which the predominant development model was based mainly on securing an endless string of ephemeral mega-events.\(^{72}\)

James Freeman highlights that the phenomenon:

>The cornerstone of Rio’s strategy, and the Holy Grail in the entrepreneurial city competition, has been to host the summer Olympics. Rio bid unsuccessfully to host the 2004 and 2012 games before winning the right to host the 2016 Summer Olympics. Rio is also one of 12 Brazilian cities that will host the 2014 World Cup. International mega-events, such as the Olympics, are seen as a way to showcase a city, a kind of coming-out party, which will consolidate that city’s brand and leave a lasting impression on the world that will attract capital for years to come (Freeman 2012: 97).

The implication is that large international spectacles like the World Cup and Olympics also provide an opportunity for much needed infrastructure investments and real estate speculation. Controversy centers on the fact that many of the ensuing transformations are done in ways that circumvent standard political processes, causing what Carlos Vainer in *Cidade de Exceção: reflexões a partir do Rio de Janeiro* (2013) calls a “city of exception,” where the concession of privileges for powerful interests become the rule. Giorgio Agamben previously studied this topic in *State of Exception* (2005). Freeman argues that this type of governance is emblematic of

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\(^{72}\) The importance of international sporting mega-events in shaping modern Rio de Janeiro cannot be denied, but is not the central theme of this dissertation.
neoliberalism, in which corporate and political coalitions, along with representatives of international capital such as the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and FIFA, influence local policy decisions without public accountability (Freeman 2012: 97).

Unsurprisingly, there was no popular participation in designing this new vision for the city. Authorities acted as if the Plano Director did not exist (Gonçalves 2013: 325-326). Maia’s hope was that the stupefied masses, distracted by the constant supply of “bread and circuses,” would overlook their city’s teeming social problems.

By 2000 IBGE claimed there were 1,092,958 people living in Rio de Janeiro’s favelas with the majority of favela population growth occurring in Rio’s West Zone (Cavallieri and Vial 2012: 6-9). But in the elite South Zone the population of people living in favelas was also increasingly (Cavallieri and Vial 2012: 6), even though the horizontal space they occupy decreased (Lopes, Amorim and Cavallieri 2011: 5-9). This is attributable to the vertical growth of buildings in South Zone favelas, and to a lesser degree because more families are living in single-family homes. José Martins explained that when he arrived in Rocinha in 1967, “you could count the number of houses with more than one story.”

In 2001 an important amendment to the Constitution passed, the City Statute Law, which was influenced by Henri Lefebvre’s “right to the city’ (Gonçalves 2013: 293; Fernandes 2007: 202). In 2003 the recently elected President Lula da Silva established a Ministry of Cities, which reestablished the Federal Government’s role in urban planning and policy, and for the first time, in a notably progressive manner.

Despite the major steps forward, Rio’s favelas and the urban poor in general were still despised by a considerable portion of the upper and even middles classes, in no small part because of the tremendous sway Brazil’s elitist media have on forming public opinion. The influence of Rio’s mass media was exemplified by a series O Globo began running on informality and illegality in Rio’s favelas in September 2005 under the catchphrase of “Illegal. E daí?”

73 Dissertation Interview, May 2013.
(Illegal. And so what?). By far Brazil’s most widely read newspaper, *O Globo* also owns the most popular TV channels and radio stations. Because of Rocinha’s size and “privileged” South Zone location, the community received the bulk of the media’s negative attention. The series lasted several months. One of the first of numerous pieces made the front-page of *O Globo* on September 28, 2005. Alongside two large photos the article was sarcastically titled “Eleven Stories in Rocinha…and only the city government hasn’t noticed.” The piece focused on an impressive 11-story building in Rocinha. Like virtually all others in the community it was constructed without proper titles and without the consultation and inspection of licensed engineers, architects, or in accordance with official building codes.

The *O Globo* series forced the question of illegality in favelas back into the spotlight and incited Rio’s upper classes, which are overwhelmingly concentrated in the South and immediate West Zones (Gonçalves 2013: 341). *Globo’s* newspaper articles and corresponding TV news reports clearly represented the collective sentiments and desires of Rio’s elite. In retrospect, this episode was an obvious hint that powerful forces were conspiring to bring about another era of oppressive favela interventions and removals. The informality and alleged disorder in favelas was being blamed for much of the city’s vices especially, violence. This trend only increased in light of the constant gun battles taking place between rivaling favela drug factions during the first years of the twenty-first century. Even so, for most favela residents and activists it seemed highly unlikely that the state would target them again for mass removal. After all, during the 1980s leftist governor Leonel Brizola notably relaxed pressure on favelas, ending violent police incursions and initiating property title programs. And even during the 1990s and early 2000s under the leadership of conservative mayor Cesar Maia, the Favela-Bairro program seemed to indicate that favelas would remain in place and be upgraded. And finally, the significant national

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74 The series, “Ilegal. E daí?” began on Saturday, September 24, 2005 on page 6 of *O Globo*, in the “Opinion” (Opinião) section, under the heading “Letters from Readers” (Cartas dos Leitores).
and international condemnation Brazil received after the dictatorship-era mass removals suggested to many that authorities would not dare try again, especially in the age of social media. In fact, the fear of eviction that so many older favela residents remember was an issue that I did not come across once in Rocinha between 2001 and 2009.

At the time, national and international attention focused on ever more brazen acts of violence in Rio’s favelas, many of which by the early 2000s were run by small armies of heavily armed young men. Authorities tried to link the problem to unfettered growth, informality, and disorder within these communities. “Rocinha’s War” in April 2004 was arguably the tipping point. The conflict brought a few of Rio’s wealthiest neighborhoods, where some of its most power residents live, to a standstill for days. At the time of the shootout, Mayor Cesar Maia and his daughter both owned luxury beachfront apartments in São Conrado, the elite neighborhood most affected by the violence in neighboring Rocinha.

The city scrambled to present a safe and sanitized image to international financiers in order to prevent episodes like Rocinha’s War from thwarting investment plans. Rash ideas were suggested, including the complete removal of Rocinha’s 150,000 residents (Coelho 2004: 83). Two days after the shootout ended, Rio’s vice-governor Luiz Paulo Conde proposal a plan featured on the front-page of O Globo (2004, April 12). He suggested that a concrete wall, three meters tall, be built around Rocinha, essentially enclosing the entire community. In time, less absurd ideas prevailed. Rio’s officials began looking for answers among other places, in Colombia, and in particular in Medellín, where internationally praised slum upgrading and community policing interventions purportedly played a major role in returning a sense of peace and stability to a city that for years was the murder capital of the world.76

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76 In “Medellin: The Peace of the Pacifiers” Forrest Hylton describes how Medellin became more expensive, as “a deepening of neoliberalism” occurred there (Hylton 2008: 41-42), in a process that I suggest shares traits with Giuliani/Bloomberg’s New York City and Rio de Janeiro from Cesar Maia to Eduardo Paes.
In 2007 the federal favela upgrading scheme known as PAC was announced for five favelas in greater Rio. Four in the city of Rio de Janeiro, and one in Morro do Preventório, in the neighboring city of Niteroi. Rocinha was the first and symbolically most important favela selected.

In December 2008, the first UPP was installed in the Santa Marta favela in the South Zone neighborhood of Botafogo. These two programs (PAC and the UPPs) represent by far the most significant interventions in the over 100-year history of Rio’s favelas.

Finally, in 2009, Eduardo Paes, a former protégé of Maia’s turned political adversary, became mayor of Rio de Janeiro. His first favela “improvement” interventions was Programa Morar Carioca, an upgrading scheme even more ambitious than Favela-Bairro. Morar Carioca aimed to upgrade 253 favelas and had an initial budget considerably larger than the three phases of Favela-Bairro combined (Gonçalves 2013: 348; Gomes and Motta 2013: 9). But beyond scale, there was a major differences between Favela-Bairro and Morar Carioca because the former removed relatively few residents while the latter was to removals substantial sections of favelas during construction projects and for environmental reasons, including from designated “areas of risk” (Gonçalves 2013: 348). However, since the latter half of 2013 the ambitions Morar Carioca program stalled, likely because of the uncertain fiscal and political scenario that began around the same time, and because of mounting protests centering on arbitrary forced removals and corruption. As of late 2015 Morar Carioca had intervened in few communities.
Chapter 2

THE LOCAL SETTING

Demographic and Socioeconomic Information

Rigorous data collection and analysis, whether quantitative or qualitative, is indispensable to sociological research. There is an impressive amount of socioeconomic and demographic data available on Rio’s favelas, but unfortunately it is not too reliable. Some statistics are better than others, for example the numbers of Light (Rio’s private electricity provider) subscribers in favelas. Others, especially population estimates in the large dense favelas, are much less reliable. When I asked Martins how many times he had been interviewed over the years by IBGE for their census estimates on Rocinha he responded, “I arrived here [Rocinha] in 1967 and not once has anyone from IBGE stopped by my house.”

Martins’ experience is not anecdotal. Similar comments were made during dozens of interviews and informal conversations with residents of Rocinha and ten other favelas in Rio de Janeiro.

Government data provides a decent panorama the socioeconomic landscape in favelas, but should not be solely relied on for sociological analysis. This research relies on equilibrium between official data, previous social science research and my own sociological fieldwork in order to arrive at rational estimates and to formulate careful logical inferences based on them.

It is likely that the population of Rocinha falls within the range of 120,000 and 160,000, or is approximately 140,000.

IBGE 2000 estimated 56,338 residents of Rocinha lived in 16,731 houses, while that same year, Light, Rio’s private electricity provider, projected that the community had closer to

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77 Dissertation Interview, José Martins de Oliveira, June 2013)
More recently, when the state government of Rio de Janeiro carried out their census research from 2008 to 2009 for the PAC 1 favela-upgrading program, they found 98,319 residents living in 34,576 houses with a population density of 2.9 people per house (Rocinha PDS 2011: 77). PAC Census takers counted 38,140 buildings in Rocinha, of which 34,576 were identified as houses. Photo 7 illustrates the extreme housing density found in most areas of Rocinha and the ensuing difficulties census takers face such communities. The intense crowding is among the contributing factors to the high rates of Tuberculosis (TB) in Rocinha: according to lifelong resident and public health official Maria Helena de Carvalho – director of Rocinha’s local health clinic, Posto de Saúde Albert Sabin.

According to the PAC Census (2009) Rocinha’s population is 51.5% female and 48.5% male. Children and adolescents (up to 18 years) represent 32% of Rocinha’s population, and 29% of Rio de Janeiro’s, according to IBGE 2010. 57% of the local population is under 30, and only 3% of the community is 65 or older, the official definition of senior citizens in Brazil (IBGE 2010; Rocinha PDS 2011: 77-78). Rocinha is 39.5% white and 10.25% black, making it the “ whitest” favela in Rio. But Rocinha ranks second only to Maré favela (49.7%) in the percentage of “brown” (pardo) residents (49.3%). The comparatively high percentage of white residents is directly related to the large percentage of Rocinha’s population that comes from the state of Ceará in Brazil’s Northeast. Historically, Ceará stands out among the Northeastern states (which as a whole have the highest percentage of black Brazilians), for having one of the low percentages of black inhabitants (4.65%), and a high percentage (62%) of inhabitants of mixed “white” and indigenous background (IPECE/IBGE 2012).

According to IBGE 2010, Rocinha’s Gini coefficient was (.45). The Gini coefficient is a number between 0 and 1, where 0 is equivalent to perfect equality (all incomes are the same) and 1 corresponds with complete inequality (where all income is concentrated in one individual, leaving zero income for the rest of the population) The 2014 Gini coefficient in the U.S. was (.48)

José Martins considers Light’s 2000 estimate to be the most accurate.
and in Denmark it was (.24). With a coefficient of (.45) there is considerable income stratification within Rocinha, a fact crucial for scholars, policy makers, or others responsible for social interventions to consider.

There isn’t a Gini coefficient available for the favela of Vidigal alone, which is unfortunate because Vidigal is the favela most associated with gentrification in Rio. However, Cardoso (2004: 103) reveals a Gini coefficient of (.74) when comparing the average monthly incomes of residents of Vidigal with those is wealthy São Conrado.79 The figure is over ten years old, and has likely declined along with the general drop in inequality throughout Brazil and as a result of recent gentrification in Vidigal, but a coefficient of (.74) is remarkably high. Considering recent data indicates Rocinha’s mean and median monthly incomes are lower than Vidigal's, it is likely that the Gini coefficient of the combined incomes of Rocinha and bordering São Conrado is even greater than the elevated level between Vidigal and São Conrado. The extreme level of inequality that exists between Rocinha and its two immediate neighbors of São Conrado and Gávea is critical to understanding the research environment.

This brief review of the data makes clear that favelas cannot be grouped into neat homogenous categories. Racially, Rocinha shares more in common with the distant Maré complex of favelas in the North Zone than with its neighbor Vidigal. Culturally Rocinha is more similar to the sprawling West Zone favela Rio da Pedras. This is in large part because in both communities migrants from the northeast make up the large majority of residents and because historically there has been a steady back and forth interurban migration between the two favelas.80 Economically, Rocinha shares more in common with the poorer North and West Zone favelas than with its comparatively “better-off” South Zone favela neighbors. According to the official data, Rocinha also has the youngest population among Rio’s favelas (IPP/IBGE 2010).

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80 I personally know dozens of residents of Rocinha and Rio das Pedras who have lived in both communities.
This is the setting of the dissertation research. A highly dense, low-income community with a rather high level of internal inequality (considering many outsiders think all Rocinha’s residents are equally poor) that is located between Rio’s most affluent neighborhoods. Gávea and Lagoa lie to the east and São Conrado and Joá (the wealthiest neighborhood in Rio) lie to the immediate west. New money Barra da Tijuca, known as the “Brazilian Miami,” begins immediately after Joá (Carvalho 2004: 32). The following historical sections provide the context for understanding contemporary Rocinha, its struggles and resistance.

Rocinha, Early 1900s to the Turn of the Century.

The aim of this section is to provide a concise but informative history of Rocinha within the context of Rio de Janeiro’s twentieth century urbanization. There are few published studies, and none in English, that do Rocinha’s rich history justice. I focus on: (1) Rocinha’s origin as a peripheral rural setting; (2) its rapid growth since the 1960s; (3) the major transformations that began in the 1980s as democracy returned to Brazil, including the first significant investments made in Rocinha and the drug trafficker’s consolidation of power; and (4) the April 2004 shootout that led directly to PAC 1 favela upgrading in Rocinha as well as playing an indirect but important role in the 2009 UPP program.

There are still elderly residents of Rocinha who vividly recollect what the community was like in the 1940s and 1950s. Compared to today’s standards these residents describe a hard life, but one recounted with nostalgia. They depict a Rocinha as a natural paradise, a tropical hillside abounding in Jack Fruit, Mango, Guava, and Avocado trees, with clear streams and waterfalls, and only a short walk to the beach. This older generation recalls a beautiful area that endured mostly unspoiled until the 1960s when overcrowding and inadequate sanitation became major concerns.81

81 Based on information gathered from dissertation interviews with longtime residents of Rocinha, February to July 2013.
The official boundaries of Rocinha are located between the neighborhoods of Gávea and São Conrado, in an area that was rural in the early twentieth century. Rio’s population at that time was concentrated mainly around the city center, in the working-class suburbs of the North Zone, and in the first few South Zone neighborhoods just outside the city center. A range of mountain peaks and precipitous hills separate the core of Rio’s South Zone from São Conrado, its last stretch of land before the South Zone transition into the expansive West Zone. A few important farms were located in this land, on the west side of the steep ridge. In the early 1900s, one of the larger plantations, the Fazenda São José da Alagoinha da Gávea, was divided into smaller farms to be sold (Farias 2009: 65). One of these new farms was the Fazenda Quebra-Cangalha, which hired the financial services of the Castro Guidão Company (Castro Guidão & Cia.). Adriano Castro Guidão owned the enterprise, and I was lucky enough to interview his great grandson, João Castro Guidão, for this investigation.\(^82\) João explained that the Fazenda Quebra-Cangalha farm primarily cultivated sugar cane and mamona, or castor bean plant, which produces castor oil (and the poison ricin). Later, as the literature explains and local historians told me, coffee and a variety of other agricultural products were harvested in the area (Farias 2009: 65).

During the 1800s Rio de Janeiro transitioned from a sleepy colonial town still largely rural in nature and dependent on slave labor, to an emerging metropolis (Abreu 1987: 35-37). The flat base where the entrance to Rocinha from São Conrado is located today was likely one of the many farms or plantations where slaves toiled. After 1888 European immigrant workers who were part of the country’s “whitening process” began replacing black labor around Rocinha, as was the case in other areas of the city and throughout Brazil (Oliveira 1996: 74).\(^83\) Antonio Carlos Firmino, local resident, geographer and one of the founders of the Rocinha Sankofa Museum of History and Memory, cautions that the history of Rocinha disproportionately

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\(^{82}\) Dissertation Interview, João Castro Guidão, August 2013.

\(^{83}\) There are several studies to support this hypothesis, Oliveira (1996) is but one.
focuses on its European past, and that more research should be attentive to other groups who
initially inhabited the community and its vicinity.

The Castro Guidão Company was essentially a bank, and it managed the finances of the
Quebra-Cangalha Farm. Its office was in Rio’s downtown and its owners (Adriano Castro
Guidão’s family) lived in Laranjeiras, a South Zone neighborhood near the city center. When the
owners of the farm went into default, the Castro Guidão Company assumed possession and
divided the Quebra-Cangalha Farm into numerous 270-square-meter plots. They parceled off
a total area of approximately 550,000 square meters (Segala 1991: 82), which is two-thirds of
Rocinha’s current 847,629 square meters.

By the 1920s and early 1930s Rio de Janeiro was steadily expanding south, and slowly west
(Carvalho 2004: 32). Workers were trickling into adjacent areas like Jardim Botânico and Gávea,
and there was suddenly a demand for housing in the vicinity of the farm (Leitão 2009: 78).
According to João Castro Guidão, his grandfather sold the plots to poor workers, who were
mostly Portuguese merchants or other European immigrants who labored in the textile factories
of Gávea (Andrade 2002: 65; Leitão 2009: 78). João told me his grandfather’s fatal mistake
was selling the land informally, and shortly I will explain why.

Today Gávea and Jardim Botânico are tree and park lined residential oases for Rio’s rich, but
the numerous mills and factories located in these two South Zone neighborhoods during the
early twentieth century explain why Rocinha originated in the 1920s, far from where Rio’s
economic activity was concentrated. The map below, taken from Abreu (1994), shows Rio’s first

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84 João Castro Guidão also referred to his great grandfather’s company as the Casa Bancária Castro
Guidão
85 The address of their main office was, 7 Rua Primeiro de Março.
87 More research is needed on the role European immigrants played in inhabiting Rocinha. One of
my next-door neighbors, Seu Manoel, passed away in 2009 at the age of 98; he was Portuguese and
had lived in Rocinha for many decades. He was a kind soft-spoken man, lucid until his final hours,
but at the time, I did not think to interview him.
favelas, those that originated prior to the 1930s. There are two spatial outliers, the Andaraí favela and Rocinha, which was even more peripheral, further in absolute distance.

Rocinha is located on the western side of the steep ridge that descends from Dois Irmão Mountain and the area was not easy to access at the time. But donkey-pulled streetcar routes were introduced in Gávea by the mid-1800s (Abreu 1987). These bondes, as they are called, connected Gávea, within walking distance from Rocinha, to Rio’s downtown, roughly 17 km (10.5 miles) away. This form of transportation allowed poor workers who had nowhere else to live, to make their way up Estrada da Gávea (at the time unpaved but today Rocinha’s main thoroughfare) where they built small shacks in the thick jungle where Rocinha is located today (Rocinha PDS 2011: 32). Accordingly, by the mid-1800s the desire to live close to work would cause Rocinha to grow rapidly.

It was around this time that the name Rocinha emerged, according the most popular version. In Portuguese the word roça means “country” or “rural area”. When the diminutive inha is added, becoming rocinha, it denotes a plot or farm, or even garden depending on how it is used. Early residents of the area would sell the fruits and vegetables they grew on their small farms at the nearby market in the Largo das Três Vendas plaza, which today is the Santos Dumont Plaza, close to PUC-Rio, the prestigious Catholic university. It is alleged that the produced sold by residents was sought after for its quality, and when patrons would inquire as to its origins, vendors would reply, “da minha rocinha”, or “from my little farm” (Rocinha PDS 2011: 32).

Until 1971 there were only two routes leading to Rocinha from the rest of the city, and one of them was fairly inconvenient (UPMMR 1983: 36). The only route that could be considered moderately direct was through Gávea and via Estrada da Gávea (Leitão 2009: 79), which had existed as a dirt road since 1767. The other route was Avenida Niemeyer, completed by the

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88 Varal de Lembranças: Histórias da Rocinha.
Commander Conrado Jacob Niemeyer, a great uncle of the renowned architect (Abreu 1987: 57). Avenida Niemeyer is a winding road that zigzags around the base of Dois Irmãos Mountain, with sharp cliffs on one side that fall into the rocky shore some 35 meters below. The road enters São Conrado along the beach, about less than 2 km (1 mile) from the base of modern Rocinha.

Though their residents frequently call Rocinha’s “invaders” (invasores), the bordering elite neighbor of São Conrado, did not officially exist until 1916. Before then it was still part of Gávea, which is why the towering mountain between São Conrado and Barra da Tijuca is know as Pedra da Gávea (Gávea Rock).\(^{90}\) The neighborhood split from Gávea and earned its name after Conrado Jacob Niemeyer finished Avenida Niemeyer in 1915, which he did with his own resources and then handed it over to the city in 1916 (Abreu 1987: 57).

In the 1920s the area where Rocinha sits today was still inaccessible but beginning to gain attention as Rio’s population grew south and west. The informal selling of the plots by the Castro Guidão Company did not comply with the existing land regulation laws of the 1930s. These zoning laws became even stricter after the 1937 Public Works Code (Leitão 2009: 78). For example, in the 1920s when the Castro Guidão Company began selling plots in Rocinha they did so without regard to existing regulations. By the 1930s, when the situation had become known to the authorities the Castro Guidão Company no longer had the funds to install the infrastructure required to legally sell the land.

The Castro Guidão Company drew up an initial plan with clearly marked streets, which at the time were footpaths and are now narrow alleyways. They did not actually build the streets before selling the plots, and they did not provide other basic infrastructure required by law (Andrade 2002: 65). The City put an embargo on all sales until regulations were met, refusing to grant the property titles that the Castro Guidão Company had assured to buyers.\(^{91}\) Despite that

\(^{90}\) Segala 1991: 393
\(^{91}\) Drummond 1981: 11.
early residents purchased the land, almost all of Rocinha, to this day is officially considered an illegal land invasion.

By the late 1930s, despite having sold dozens of lots, the Castro Guidão Company lacked the necessary resources and failed to comply with City codes (Leitão 2009: 78). More financial problems arose and soon the company went bankrupt. Sadly, according to most reports Adriano Castro Guidão took his own life shortly afterward, a claim his great grandson João rejects, insisting that he was killed in an unsolved murder. In a transaction that remains rather murky the land rights were passed on to a construction company, owned by a mysterious man named Durão. As the story is told, Durão then passed the property off to a Mr. Renato Caruso who appeared in the 1940s claiming he was the rightful owner of the land. But during the 1930s the area was known as the “ownerless lands” (terras sem dono), or considered abandoned government property (Leitão 2009: 78). During the late 1930s and early 1940s, an influx of poor and working people claimed a piece of Rocinha.

Despite decades of chaotic growth many of the original Castro Guidão Company boundaries still exist in Rocinha. As the rural community morphed into a sprawling favela these demarcations became blurred.

While the Castro Guidão Company was informally selling the plots of land (and landing in a bureaucratic quandary) workers and migrants were populating the area. Andrade points out that a 1933 census found Rocinha already had 354 shacks located along the Estrada da Gávea and 13 shacks along the trail winding up to Laboriaux – at the time known as the Caminho do Laboriaux (Andrade 2002: 66). The average household size was much larger then. IBGE 1960 (the furthest back I could find demographic data on Rio’s favelas) indicated that 63% of favela

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households had four inhabitants or more, and one-third of had six inhabitants or more (IBGE 1968). Accordingly, the 1933 census indicates the population of Rocinha in the early 1930s was close to 2,000. Drummond, in contrast, cites a 1940 IBGE estimate of approximately 1,000 inhabitants (Drummond 1981: 11).

By 1940, residents occupied three distinct sections of Rocinha: the level areas around the base of the steep hillside, spaces in proximity to the Estrada da Gávea, and the locale known as Caminho do Boiadeiro, which was then no more than a path (Drummond 1981: 72). I would add that community members insist the first generation of residents also lived along Rua 4, Rua 3, Rua 1 and even in the Dionéia sub-bairro. Drummond illustrates, literally, as he is an architect, and makes ample use of personal photos and sketches, that during this epoch the majority of Rocinha’s structures (mainly houses with some small commerce) were precarious, essentially patched together with whatever scraps the owners could secure (Drummond 1981: 19-22). These circumstances, he explains, partially resulted from Rocinha’s relative isolation from the rest of the city in the early and mid-twentieth century (Drummond 1981: 72). Therefore, the factors mentioned above, namely, the textile mills that employed blue-collar workers in nearby Gávea and Jardim Botânico, the bankruptcy and subsequent abandonment of the land, and the fact that Rio de Janeiro was steadily growing south and west, intensified the haphazard occupation of Rocinha. Leitão adds that power lines installed along the Estrada da Gávea in 1935 and then its paving in 1939-1940, were also important factors (Leitão 2010: 78).97

Political clientelism, a practice that was pervasive during much of the twentieth century in Rio, and that continues to this day, was another important factor that contributed to Rocinha’s expansion during the 1940s. Renato Caruso, who claimed ownership of a large part of the land

96 IBGE Demographic Census of 1960 in (Nascimento 2006: 15). This was only the second census to include favelas, the first being IBGE 1950. However, the IBGE 1950 census data on Rio’s favelas, while confirming that families were larger, does not provide average household size.

97 Further evidence comes from a government bulletin announcing the approval to pave (in concrete) the Estrada da Gávea in the May 18, 1939 edition, in section II, and mentions that the project must be finished within five months. Diário Oficial (Secção II) Quinta-feira 18, Maio de 1939. Diretoria de Obras Públicas. Boletim N. 109.
the Castro Guidão Company abandoned, ran for city council in 1945 and allowed the destitute to build on his land in exchange for their votes. The area immediately flooded with rural migrants, who erected shacks virtually overnight from the northeast state of Ceará. Caruso lost the election but his clientelistic exploits contributed to the community’s informal growth (Andrade 2002: 67). Amando da Fonseca, in his 1957 campaign for state deputy employed a similar strategy, but having been elected to office was more successful. Fonseca exploited Rocinha’s misery to win, but even so, some residents remember him as one of the few early politicians who actually fulfilled promises, which included paving a few passageways and implementing water boxes in areas of the community. These two instances are representative of a historic trend in the state’s relationship with favelas, one where politicians trade the promise of favors for votes (Gay 1999: 49). The exploits of those like Caruso and Fonseca were possible because of the 19-year window of democratic rule in Brazil, between the end of Vargas’s Estado Novo dictatorship (1930-1945) and the start of the United States-backed military dictatorship in 1964 (until 1985). Indeed, by the end of the authoritarian Estado Novo, favelas had been turned into strategic spaces that politicians coveted in their campaigns primarily because massive inequality made it easy to trade votes for small favors and because of compulsory voting in Brazil.

99 Varal de Lembranças: Histórias da Rocinha (UPMMR 1983: 37). From 1958 to 1961 Fonseca was an Alderman for the Federal District of Rio de Janeiro and then transitioned to State Deputy (Representative) for the newly created Guanabara State. Information from the website for Rio de Janeiro State’s Legislative Assembly (ALERJ).
100 A water box, or caixa de água, is a large container for water storage. Today the 500 or 1,000 liter versions dot the rooftops of virtually all houses in Rio’s favelas. The water boxes Fonseca installed were larger water tanks that dozens, maybe hundreds of residents would rely upon, and back then, before CEDAE entered the community, water collected from wells or fresh waterspouts filled the boxes.
104 (Andrade 2002: 67; Gay 1999: 63-64)
The 1940s marked a period when public authorities, sectors of carioca society, and especially the Catholic Church began looking more charitably and more paternalistically at favelas (Andrade 2002: 67). For example, in 1944 the Church established Rocinha’s first ambulatory healthcare clinic, run by the Franciscan laypersons Dr. Alfredo Mauricéia Filho and his wife Dona Lía Mauricéia. The ambulatory clinic operated out of the church rectory and was only open on Sundays. Another result was the previously mentioned Fundação Leão XIII, which was founded in 1946, became the first social entity solely dedicated to Rio’s favelas (Silva and Barboso 2005: 41). In 1949, the Fundação Leão XIII created the São José Center for Social Action in Rocinha. While the ethical legacy of Fundação Leão XIII is debatable, it did leave an important mark in Rocinha. In 1962, it became a government institution. Dona Gonçalina was born in 1941 in Ceará, had been visiting Rocinha, where she had family, since the late 1950s. She moved to the community in 1963 and she remembered Fundação Leão XIII as a government entity. I asked her:

MB – Dona Gonçalina, what did the Fundação Leão XIII do in Rocinha?

Dona Gonçalina – Ah, they had some doctors, they had, ahhh, they didn’t do much. Oh, they had a little school called the Escolinha São José. There are still a lot of residents in Rocinha who studied there. It was just for children though. There were no schools at that time for middle and high school.

Although Fundação Leão XIII closed decades ago the site where it was once located, adjacent to the church, is still known by many residents as Fundação and it is a space that continues to play an important role in community life to this day. In short, during the 1940s Rocinha began transitioning from the semi-structured pattern that the Castro Guidão Company initiated

105 Silva, Jailson de Souza e and Barbosa, Jorge Luiz. 2005: 41
107 Burgos 2004: 29; Rocinha PDS 2011: 33. Marcelo Burgos alludes to this fact, the Rocinha PDS states it specifically.
in the 1920s, to a more improvised informal community, albeit one still rather sparsely populated. This improvisational growth process would notably accelerate in the next decade (Drummond 1981: 72-74).

During the 1950s Rocinha’s precarious shelters were steadily being replaced with more solidly built wooden houses (Drummond 1981: 72-73). As housing gradually improved in the original areas of occupancy, new haphazard shelters were being constructed in higher more precipitous sections of the community. Rocinha continued expanding in this pattern, steadily overtaking the hillside, but with Estrada da Gávea, Rua 1, 2, 3 and 4 still the main areas of growth. Drummond hints that around this time the community’s first internal sociospatial divisions emerged, with the somewhat more established residents located closer to the base of the community and along Estrada da Gávea, while the poorer, newer migrants clustered in harder-to-access, more elevated locations (Drummond 1981: 74).

The first official census conducted in Rocinha occurred in 1950 and revealed the existence of 4,513 inhabitants in a setting that was still more rural than urban (Leitão 2009: 79). A comprehensive survey of Rio’s favelas titled “Humane Aspects of the Carioca Favela” (Aspectos Humanos da Favela Carioca) indicated that Rocinha had about 30,000 inhabitants by the end of the 1950s (Leitão 2009: 82). Leitão explains that while favelas near Rio’s downtown increased in density, Rocinha’s residents experienced a community with a small town feeling (Leitão 2009: 79). Indeed, Rocinha’s first official samba composition was released in 1962, and it captures the essence of the nature and small-town beauty that still existed until the mid-1960s.

Dona Gonçalina, who arrived in Rio sometime around 1957, in her words, “still a minor,” described to me the rustic nature of Rocinha:

MB – What was Rocinha like in the late 1950s and early 1960s?

Dona Gonçalina – I remember the first time I came here [Rocinha] was with my brother. My brother invited me, he said “Gonçalina, let’s go visit our cousin in Rocinha,” so I went along...It was completely different. Everything was so bright, people were out socializing. I saw people
drawing water from wells, children playing. There was a little stream behind my cousin’s house, can you believe it had fish in it!

MB – Fish

Dona Gonçalina – It had fish. There were gardens everywhere, people growing carrots and all sorts of things. There were palmito palms here. . . . Ahhh, back then people here cooked with lenha [sticks]. People put the pots and pans over three or four stones and sparked a stick fire underneath, that’s how we cooked back then. . . . Up there [pointing up the hill] it was very poor.

MB – But if it was so poor why did so many people like your cousin, and then you, come from other areas of Brazil to live here?

Dona Gonçalina – It was hard, and many people who came here suffered a lot, but at least most found work. In the north [northeast] there was poverty and no work. Here there was poverty and some work, so it was better to migrate.

Dona Gonçalina told me that the São Conrado beach, which today is located approximately 2 kilometers from the base of Rocinha, came up to within 100 meters of where the community is located today, the spot where now there is a grocery store called Super Market:

MB – What about the tunnel [Zuzu Angel] and expressway?

Dona Gonçalina – They hadn’t been built yet. At high tide the ocean came all the way up to where Super Market is today. We used to go down there with pots and wood and make fires on the beach and boil tatuí [little crustaceans known as sand fleas/crabs] and put them in the rice. It was delicious. People from way up on the hill [Rocinha] used to come down with tin cans and fill them with tatuí. Little by little they filled-in the area with land [it is now a residential section of São Conrado].

Dona Gonçalina described to me a very different Rocinha than the one I have known since 2001. Her interviews, and those of Seu Raimundo, Seu Antônio and others who have lived as adults in Rocinha since the late 1950s and early 1960s, portray a community significantly poorer by today’s standards, but much more united and pristine.
The early history of Rocinha touches on a number of important sociologic themes. For instance, the sections above that covered Rocinha from the 1920s to the end of the 1950s reveal the relationship between capitalist urbanism, technology and space, or time-space compression (Harvey 1990: 240, 284-285, 306-307). Located roughly 17 km (10.6 miles) from Rio’s downtown the land on which Rocinha sits had a low exchange value because of the absence of transportation infrastructure and technology. This began to abruptly change in the late 1960s with the announcement of the Lagoa-Barra Expressway, which required the 1590-meter (1 mile) long Zuzu Angel Tunnel. In 1971 the tunnel, originally known as the Dois Irmãos Tunnel for the mountain peak it runs under, was completed. Soon, luxury high-rises were erected in proximity to the beach in São Conrado, which until then had been desolate except for some old plantations and Rocinha. By the early 1980s the remainder of the costly Lagoa-Barra Expressway, a series of tunnels, expressways and bridges, was finished. These achievements greatly eased transportation between the core of Rio’s South Zone and São Conrado, located at the western edge of the South Zone. And from São Conrado the improvements allowed for the rapid development of new money Barra da Tijuca, the first West Zone neighborhood upon exiting the South Zone (Carvalho 2004: 32-35; Ferreira 2011: 98-101).

While the report *Humane Aspects of the Carioca Favela* (1959) counted roughly 30,000 inhabitants in 1959, IBGE claimed there were approximately 14,793 residents of Rocinha in 1960 (Segala 1991). One year later (1961) the residents founded one of Rio de Janeiro’s first favela residents’ associations: the União Pró Melhoramentos dos Moradores da Rocinha (UPMMR).¹⁰⁹ Dona Gonçalina, smiling from ear to ear, told me she was the first President of UPMMR. When I politely asked her how that was possible, she had not moved into Rocinha until around 1963, she told me that UPMMR had in fact been founded in 1961 but it was inactive. She took over a new leadership in 1965 and was elected president. Soon after UPMMR, the Catholic social organization Ação Social Padre Anchieta (ASPA) was founded as another

¹⁰⁹ Varal de Lembranças: Histórias da Rocinha 1983: 83
institution representing local residents. Still in the 1960s, Father Barbosa, one of the first directors of ASPA in Rocinha, asked Dona Gonçalina if she wanted to help him start a preschool, because the state was not taking care of the community’s children.

Dona Gonçalina – I jumped at the idea and we opened Rocinha’s first preschool. Can you believe UNICEF found out and came looking for us. I never studied [formally], but I am proud to say I used the method of Paulo Freire to teach literacy to children and adults in Rocinha.

Dona Gonçalina and the other women who voluntarily ran Rocinha’s only preschool (crèche) began gaining the attention of middle-class and affluent women running preschools in Leblon and other South Zone neighborhoods. Soon they had the interest of foreigners, mainly French speaking Europeans, who came to work in the crèches and adult literacy programs. Dona Gonçalina was running her own school by then, within the confines of ASPA, but independently. By the late 1970s and early 1980s, UNICEF was following their activities and after a time paid the women a small salary so they could dedicate themselves full-time to the crèche. They eventually founded their own crèche in another area of Rocinha with UNICEF funds. Dona Gonçalina’s preschool was known as Alegria das Crianças, or The Children’s Joy. It still exists.

During the 1960s, Rocinha saw minor improvements, such as additional crèches similar to ASPA, and an increase in the number of residents with access to expensive and poorly maintain electricity. In 1964, the company Companhia Cristo Redentor began parceling off a large plot of vacant land bordering the base of Rocinha, an area that became known as Bairro Barcelos. The populating of the new sub-bairro accelerated Rocinha’s growth during the 1960s and early 1970s. By the early 1970s Rocinha had become the largest favela in Rio de Janeiro, mainly because of continuing mass migration from the northeast but also because of the thousands of displaced people Rocinha absorbed from nearby favelas that were demolished, in some cases by the Military Police, in the 1960s and early 1970s (Pandolfi and Grynszpan 2003: 19). Most

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110 Andrade 2002: 69; Rocinha PDS 2011: 35.
111 Varal de Lembranças: Histórias da Rocinha 1983: 57
important, because of significant social transformations taking place in the city and in the community, the 1960s and 1970s were the period when the community first began organizing (Leitão 2009: 96-97) and the seeds of resistance were being sown.

Rocinha, like many other favelas, experienced an increase in popular resistance and community organizing in the late 1960s, and especially during the 1970s. This pulse of solidarity continued steady up until the mid-1980s (Bautès, Fernandes and Burgos 2013: 19). In Varal de Lembranças, Dona Guilhermina recounted how during the late 1930s and early 1940s, residents pressured the City to pave the community’s mains road, Estrada da Gávea, and they succeeded (UPMM 1983: 43). Dona Gonçalina, Martins and Padre Cristiano tell of the 2,500 signatures they gathered to compel the city to build a pedestrian bridge over the newly built Lagoa-Barra Expressway. The thruway was built along with the Zuzu Angel Tunnel in the early 1970s and in those first years many residents of Rocinha, including children, were killed or injured trying to cross the new, heavily trafficked expressway. Residents pressured the state into building a pedestrian footbridge, a passarela, which was considered a major victory for the community, and the Governor Negrão de Lima even came for the inauguration, according to Dona Gonçalina. Unfortunately, during PAC 1 in Rocinha, the state demolished the passarela in order to build a new more elaborate footbridge designed by then 101-year-old Oscar Niemeyer, at a cost of R$15 million. Dona Gonçalina said she almost cried when she found out the state was going to demolish the passarela that she and many others fought for.

The first notable mobilization within living memory developed in the late 1960s and early 1970s, in the section of Bairro Barcelos, where residents pressed CEDAE, the State Water and Sewage Company of Rio de Janeiro, to install running water. Martins, born in 1947 in Ceará, is

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113 Bittencourt (2012) explains how favela social movements began as early as the 1930s. Nevertheless, most favela resistance movements started, or at least intensified, during the in the 1970s.
among a small group of active residents who were engaged in community work as far back as the late 1960s and early 1970s.114

Martins – By the early 1970s, we were organizing around the question of property titles in Bairro Barcelos and, parallel to that, the question of running water. The property titles have been a long fight we still are engaged in. So let’s start with the story of water.

MB – When you arrived in Rocinha where did you get water?

Martins – From wherever we could, from wells, the different spouts, like the Bica das Almas, we had to carry it in buckets on our shoulders.

Dona Gonçalina added, as Martins crossed his arms and rolled his eyes:

Dona Gonçalina – There was a waterspout [from a fresh underground source] called bica das almas. People used to form a long line to get water from there to drink. For washing and other tasks we used well water.

MB – So there was no running water when you arrived?

Dona Gonçalina – No, that began with Martins and his former father-in-law [ex-sogro]. His ex-father-in-law was an older man; he had some experience working for CEDAE or something like that. In short, he had knowledge of how CEDAE worked. Eventually Martins assumed leadership, everyone got to know Martins back then. Martins is an excellent articulator, he helped organize the area’s residents and he was president of the residents association [it was actually still a commission of residents, not yet an association]. And CEDAE used to come to some of our meetings, and little by little we bought the pipes.

The conversation with Martins continued:

MB – So how did you all do this?

Martins – Like Gonçalina was saying, there was a man, actually he was my ex-wife’s father, my ex-father-in-law. He was with the city and knew how to navigate through the bureaucracy.

114 The conversation on water was a dissertation interview conducted in April 2013 with Martins and Dona Gonçalina in her living room.
He started talking about getting running water for Bairro Barcelos in 1969 and, soon after, he started a petition.

Martins – The water was implemented in 1976, but we began years before that. We were the first favela, or section of a favela to have running water provided by CEDAE.

MB – So, this was a huge victory in the history of the favelas. You mean until 1976, before you all pressured CEDAE to implement running water here, no other favelas had running water?

Martins – There might have been some favelas with running water, they might have perforated some pipes or had it from some other source, but as far as I know, we were the first area to have regular service officially provided by CEDAE. So, he left me with the petition he had delivered to CEDAE and eventually they approved the project.

...One fine day he came by and said CEDAE had approved the project but that the residents had to buy the material. No one was too excited, thinking it would be impossible to raise those funds.

MB – Did they at least give you all a list or something?

Martins – They gave us a plan that listed all the tubing necessary and everything else.

MB – How much did it all cost?

Martins – At the time, it was 300,000 cruzeiros\footnote{This total does not seem correct, but martins asserted it is and that he still has the official receipt to prove it. There have been several versions of the Cruzeiro. In light of this, and the complexity of calculating inflation, I decided to not even try and convert this amount to dollars.}...The government approved the project and gave us the list of materials to raise money for.

Martins continued with the story of how a well-known resident of Rocinha known as Batista, wanted to put up most of the money himself for the material and supplies for the water system to privatize the community's water. Batista had done the same thing years earlier with electricity. He made a small fortune from essentially privatizing Lights (Rio’s electricity company) service within Rocinha. It was not easy to raise the money, and on a few occasions Martins offered to return the money because he was not raising enough for the materials. Residents encouraged
him to continue trying. Martins turned to the local Catholic Church, which was led at the time by Father Cristiano. The church began participating in the meetings, which gave the movement credibility, and the church loaned them 30 percent of the money they needed.

Martins – By that time, we had formed various local committees: a street commission, a fundraising commission, a commission to inspire residents. With the 30 percent the church lent us, we began walking up and down the alleyways chanting, “Look at the pipes we have acquired so far, can you help us raise the rest?” This energized the movement; within 18 months to two years we had enough money, and we bought the material. So, CEDAE installed the general network down all the alleyways but did not make the home connections. Residents had to connect the pipes in the alleys to pipes in their houses in order to get water to their sinks and bathrooms. That experience, the struggle for running water, it was like I was bitten by a bug, and ever since I have been infected with this virus. I haven’t stopped fighting since [smiling].

MB – And AMABB, why did you organize it?

Martins – Roughly 15 to 20 percent of the money raised for the water was left over; so, we held meetings and decided to use that money to found the Associação de Moradores e Amigos do Bairro Barcelos, AMABB, or the Bairro Barcelos Residents and Friends Association. . . . Because UPMMR wasn’t really doing anything, and Bairro Barcelos at the time was new and we had, in a way, a separate identity from the rest of Rocinha.

By 1974 a new census, conducted by Rio’s Secretary of Public Security, found 33,790 living in 7,500 houses in Rocinha (Leitão 2009: 83). The community had grown large and become quite dense. Sanitation had become a critical concern. Groups began organizing during the mid-1970s to demand the state provide the community with basic sanitation.

Martins and other longtime residents all recommended that Father Cristiano be interviewed. Cristiano was a Jesuit priest until leaving the priesthood in the mid-1980s: but old-time residents still call him “Father” to this day. He was born in 1944 in Antwerp, Belgium and arrived in Brazil in 1964, the year the military regime began. By 1974 he was active in Rocinha.
Father Cristiano is widely considered, by those old enough to remember, to be one of the community’s most dedicated activists during the 1970s and early 1980s. Before the interview was even underway\textsuperscript{116}, the tall 70-year-old pipe smoking Belgian began with his own series of questions. In one, he asked:

Cristiano – Do you know why Rocinha still exists?

MB – Still exists?

Cristiano – Yes, do you know why Rocinha still exists? Because in 1976 or ‘77, I was working in Rocinha, I wasn’t living there yet, but they [the city] had just done away with the South Zone favelas. One in Humaitá [Macedo Sobrinho], I witnessed them demolishing it. And the plan of the militares’ [military officers] was to eradicate all of them. In ‘76, Martins could also tell you about this, it was ‘76, a friend of mine came up to me and asked, “Cristiano, what do you think about the City’s plan to remove Rocinha?” I laughed, because Rocinha was already so large. He said, “Oh, you don’t believe me, they are already constructing the buildings out near Bangu.”

MB – Where the community would be resettled?

Cristiano – Yes. So, I went out there to see with my own eyes. I wasn’t dressed as a priest, of course, because I was already on the militares watch list. It was out there past Bangu near Campo Grande. I couldn’t believe my eyes. I came back and told some residents. We ended up renting a kombi [VW Van], filled it with residents and we drove past the construction site. We didn’t get out because the place was surrounded by militares. None of this was being reported in the press. We came back and....

MB – What was it? A housing complex? It must have been enormous.

Cristiano – It was huge! And they were still building it. Half of it was still only walls and foundations. I don’t know who lives in it now. We came back and started having meetings, 10 or more, I don’t know how many, to decide what were the most pressing issues in the community.

MB – Where were the meetings?

\textsuperscript{116} Dissertation Interviews, February 2013 and June 2013.
Cristiano – They were in ASPA, which was located in the church that the residents built in only three months. We didn’t spend a penny, residents went to different South Zone parishes every Sunday asking for donations and built the church themselves, which before was just a small chapel located in a shabby little structure. At that time everyone wanted crèches, and if you go to any favela or poor neighborhood in the periphery today, that is what residents still demand first.

Many old time residents point out that ASPA played a fundamental role in many of the early movements for community improvements.

Cristiano – So, at the meeting in ASPA, we finally decided to do, and record this well in your memory, um mutirão de limpeza das valas [a collective cleaning of the sewage ditches]. Martins must have told you this by now. And we did this EVERY Sunday in 1976. Eventually Veja [Brazil’s largest weekly news magazine] dedicated six full pages, right in the middle of the military regime, to our efforts. Can you believe that? I don’t know how they had the courage to do the report during the middle of the military era. Finally, the result, Rocinha was not evicted. Because they discovered that it was an organized community, and the militares had a tremendous fear of liberation theology.

MB – Why did you start with sanitation? I mean, the crèches and then sanitation, why was sanitation the next priority?

Cristiano – We had all those meetings, over ten; we thought about so many issues. The idea was that Rocinha was going to be removed. So we asked ourselves, “What can we do to stop Rocinha from being evicted, what could we do that would attract the most attention, what is the biggest problem in Rocinha?” Let me tell you, while I was living in Rocinha sewage invaded my house three times up to here [hand held up to his neck]. Thank God I lived on the second floor.

MB – How many residents participated?

Cristiano – In the beginning some people said, “Ah, this won’t change anything.” We started with 10, then there were 20, 30, 50 or more, and there were another 20 people who prepared
lunch for the workers, at 2 PM inside the church, because there was no other space for us. It was at that time that I fell in love with a French woman, she was actually an atheist, but she would come and help every Sunday, clean the sewage ditches with us. I ended up leaving the priesthood because of her. I was with her for six years, but then, well, that is another story. Listen, ask anyone, well, they would have to be old enough, about the *mutirões de limpeza*, the young generation doesn’t know anything about this, ask the old time residents and they will tell you the same story. Ask Martins.

ASPA served as a nexus for many of the early movements. By 1968, ASPA was very active in Rocinha. Long before the mass arrival of NGOs and then favela-upgrading and pacification programs ASPA was fostering collective consciousness and educating on the rights of citizenship.

Rocinha’s population continued to grow, and the community became increasingly dense during the 1970s and early 1980s (Leitão 2009: 92). UNICEF’s 1981 report on sanitation in Rocinha, conducted in partnership with the SMDS estimated the population at around 80,000 in 1980 (Shlugar/UNICEF 1981: 6). When the “official” data became available a few years later, IBGE claimed Rocinha had merely 32,966 residents, once again illustrating the persistent challenge of estimating favela populations (1990: 70).

As previously mentioned, in 1971 the Dois Irmãos Tunnel (now Zuzu Angel Tunnel) was opened. In regards to real estate speculation and overcrowding, I view the opening of the Lagoa-
Barra Expressway and the Zuzu Angel Tunnel as among the most pivotal events in Rocinha’s history. This is further discussed in Chapter 4.

In March 2013, I asked 81-year-old Seu Raimundo, who arrived in Rocinha in the early 1960s from Ceará before the tunnel was built:

MB – What was it like here when you arrived?

Seu Raimundo – When I arrived here, this [Bairro Barcelos, Via Apia] was all jungle.

MB – It was jungle?

Seu Raimundo – Yeah, all jungle. Then they started selling [plots of land] in Bairro Barcelos [1964]. At the time, transportation, we didn’t have [direct] buses. We had to take the lotação [name of the bus that literally meant ‘full capacity’] along Ave. Niemeyer and then another bus in Leblon to get to the city.

MB – The tunnel wasn’t there?

Seu Raimundo – No, soon after I arrived they started building it. Before the tunnel there was no [direct] transportation here.

MB – What about to get to Barra?

Seu Raimundo – It was a different route, not all that [pointing towards the roads, bridges and tunnels] was there. There wasn’t really anything in Barra back then. It was just being developed.

Seu Antônio, born in 1937 in the state of Rio Grande do Norte, arrived with his parents in Rocinha even earlier, in 1949 when he 12. He went to live in the area around Rua 2, where he told me many people were already living, “but you could still count them.”

When I asked him where he used to get water when he was younger, he told me:

Seu Antônio – Over there where the tunnel is today, it was all jungle; there was no tunnel back then. There was a bica [freshwater spout] of clean water that came out of the side of the mountain. We used that water to drink, bathe, cook....
By the mid-1960s, his family moved from Rua 2 to Bairro-Barcelos, where they bought a plot of land from the aforementioned Cristo Redentor Company. I asked Seu Antônio what was the first project he remembered the government engaged in Rocinha. His response was interesting, because he pointed to a project that was not intended for Rocinha but that drastically affected Rocinha.

Seu Antônio – The first project was the Estrada Lagoa-Barra in the 1970s, in 1971. The first project was the tunnel.

MB – Did the tunnel change the reality here in Rocinha?

Seu Antônio – After the tunnel many things changed. Rocinha grew more, there were cars passing by the community. But it was not until the 1980s when they finished the acoustic tunnel and expressway that runs next to PUC that the transportation really got better, because before that, the traffic was horrible. After the tunnel, you had to turn into Marques de São Vincente and go via Gávea because the route to Leblon and Lagoa was not finished until the 1980s.... Once they finished the direct route, transportation got much better and Rocinha grew even more. The population grew and grew, and today we have all sorts of transportation here going to all parts of the city.

From the time the tunnel was being planned, until it was finished in 1971, and then continuing during its next few years, there was pressure to remove all or most of Rocinha. This corresponds with the dates that Cristiano (1975/1976) and Andrade (1968, 1971 and 1975) point to in which public authorities succeeded in evicting sections of the community (Andrade 2002: 72). Real estate speculation in and around Rocinha greatly intensified as the construction of luxury condominiums and apartments in neighboring São Conrado accelerated (Carvalho 2004: 32). The speculative boom quickly flowed westward as a new series of expressways, tunnels, overpasses and bridges were built, connecting São Conrado to the new neighborhood of Barra da Tijuca (Carvalho 2004: 31-36).
The mobilization of Rocinha’s residents not only created a sense of pride in the community but also attracted attention from the outside. Documentarian Sérgio Péo became interested and in 1977 he produced, *Rocinha Brasil 1977*, the first film to focus on Rocinha and its residents. Residents interviewed for the film during the 1970s made it abundantly clear that their primary concerns were: being evicted, the sanitation crisis and, and believe it or not, real estate speculation.

In 1980 the city’s Secretary of Municipal Planning indicated that there were 97,945 residents living in 19,489 houses in Rocinha. That same year, according the city government Rocinha occupied 453,440 m², which is less than the original 554,000 m² Quebra-Cangalha Farm that the Castro Guidão Company parcelled off in the 1920s. And, in 1985, according to data gathered by the Catholic Church’s Pastoral das Favelas, Rocinha had 250,000 residents (Lourenço de Oliveira 2008: 42). Leeds also indicates that the range of 200,000-250,000 is often cited in the press (Leeds 1996: 48). Most important, however, the grassroots activity eventually caught the attention of the newly created SMDS, which, in 1982, widened and canalized the overflowing sewage ditch with reinforced concrete (Andrade 2002: 72-73). Narrow footbridges were built in three spots allowing residents to cross over the sewage canal. The SMDS also paved a new road parallel to the canal, wide enough for cars and delivery trucks (Leitão 2009 97-98). The large sewerage project required seventy-three families to be removed from the section of Rocinha known today as Valão. The seventy-three families were resettled in seventy-five houses in the newly founded Laboriaux section of Rocinha in 1982. According to Martins, who was part of the process from beginning to end, this occurred because residents demanded they be resettled in Rocinha rather than displaced as the city initially intended.

The city and state governments continued to be active for a few years, in what was the first wave of significant public investments in Rocinha. Even UNICEF got involved on some projects. The major development schemes of the time included: the channeling of another overflowing sewage ditch along Rua 3; the opening of Rocinha’s first public health clinic, the Centro
Municipal de Saúde (CMS) Albert Sabin\textsuperscript{120} in 1982; the subsequent founding of a CEDAE headquarters in 1983/84; and the inauguration in 1986 of the City’s XXVII Administrative Region in Rocinha (Alem 2010: 4).

Martins and engaged residents who lived in the lower portion of the community, spurred on by the sense of unity and recent victories, founded Rocinha’s second residents’ association, the Associação dos Moradores e Amigos do Bairro Barcelos (AMABB), in 1982.\textsuperscript{121} For several months prior to the CMS Albert Sabin opening, they ran an ambulatory health center out of AMABB that received donations for basic equipment and survived on $500 a month sent from France. These meager funds allowed them to pay a medical student (because they were cheaper) to work there and treat residents. Dona Gonçalina and other, mainly female, residents who were active in the community’s crèches pressured the state to found another public middle school in the community. By the mid-1980s, they were successful, as the state founded the CIEP Bento Rubião.

The early resistance movements in Rocinha resulted in partial but important victories. First, Rocinha residents avoided eviction, as occurred in so many of the neighboring favelas. Luck played a role in this as well, because the city could not remove all South Zone favelas at once. The second reason the collective mobilizations were considered a partial victory is because they produced a small but important group of activists that were mentioned above. Throughout the years the network of critically conscious residents grew. Many of them, such as Dona Gonçalina and Martins are still engaged. Third, the mobilizations were a success because residents demonstrated that by pressuring the authorities in an organized manner, it was possible to urbanize favelas. Finally, it was also a victory because the residents, whom the city removed from the area where the government channeled the sewage ditch, were resettled within the community, in the new sub-bairro of Laboriaux. This was a victory because city officials initially

\textsuperscript{120} Municipal Health Center Albert Sabin.
\textsuperscript{121} Association for the Residents and Friends of Bairro Barcelos.
planned to transfer them to some distant housing complex in the West Zone of Rio. Indeed, displacing favela residents to the most distant corners of the city has always been the principal strategy of the public authorities and Rio’s dominant classes. Only a few years before residents were resettled in Laboriaux, Martins, in an interview with the newspaper Última Hora, stated, “The government would spend a lot less money upgrading the favela than removing the 150,000 residents (of Rocinha) to a distant periphery” (UPMMR 1983: 102).

Declining Collective Efforts

Unfortunately, after this first wave of resistance and mobilization, there was a period of significant decline in community organizing and in public investments. Ironically, this slowdown came at a time when the military dictatorship was ending in Brazil and democracy was making a slow but steady comeback. In many of Rio’s favelas, however, the climate for resistance movements and public investment worsened in the 1980s and 1990s, as heavily armed drug traffickers took control of communities like Rocinha (Andrade 2002: 1975). In addition, as Landy and Bautès suggest, the 1980s and 1990s were a period when the presence of NGOs increased greatly in Rocinha and other Rio de Janeiro favelas (Landy and Bautès 2013: 6). In Rocinha, the effects of the violent drug war between rival factions and police as well as the growth of careerist-type NGOs, contributed towards diminishing collective efforts and grassroots movements. As Martins told me: “We always had a hard time getting residents involved. But at a certain point no one would do anything voluntarily anymore. If you ask someone for help with a community event or to start a local organization the first thing they ask is how much will you pay them.”

Interviews conducted in Rocinha indicate that three additional factors played a role in the waning of social movements. First, the diminished threat of forced eviction during the 1980s

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122 According to one of my interviews with José Martins. Also mentioned in Varal de Lembranças: Histórias da Rocinha 1983: 132-133.
and 1990s led to a reduced sense of urgency. Second, the relative improvements of the 1980s created a sense of complacency among many residents. The third factor, increased individualization, I attribute to the general effects of global neoliberalism and its culture of consumption, which spread rapidly in Brazil during the 1990s.

Alongside a decline in community activism, Rocinha continued growing as the threats of forced eviction that had been so pervasive during the 1960s and 1970s virtually disappeared from political discourse (Andrade 2002: 75). According to Drummond (1981: 74), by 1980 all spaces capable of being inhabited in Rocinha had already been occupied. He noted that in the lower part of the favela housing had reached a maximum density, and poorer households were pushed to the favela’s periphery. “The favela,” he noted, “is now saturated with people, limited by inaccessible hillside cliffs and the highway connecting the new neighborhood of São Conrado to the city.” (Drummond 1981: 74) With the population increasing but the horizontal space restricted and saturated, Rocinha began growing vertically, a trend that continued essentially uninhibited until 2009/2010. The City became more vigilant toward Rocinha, and other favelas, even demolishing a few large buildings and threatening to do so with others.124

It was mentioned above that in 1986 Rocinha became the city’s XXVII Administrative Region, or Região Administrativa. Rio de Janeiro’s municipal government is complex, partially because the city is so large, but also because of local idiosyncrasies quite different from those of many large US cities. With (1,225 sq. km/475 sq. miles) Rio is over 1.5 times larger than New York City (785 sq. km/303 sq. miles) and slightly larger than Los Angeles (1215 sq. km/469 sq. miles).125 It is divided into seven large sub-prefectures, similar to New York’s five boroughs, and each sub-prefeitura, is administered by a sub-prefect, or sub-prefeito. Rocinha is located within the South Zone sub-prefect. The City is also broken down into 33 administrative regions, and in

1986 Rocinha became the 27th, or XXVII as they are usually designated. In becoming Rio’s XXVII Administrative Region, the City also formally decreed Rocinha an “Official” Neighborhood of Rio de Janeiro, a feat signed into law in 1993 (Leitão 2007: 153). José Martins was the first director of Rio XXVII Administrative Region, before the entity even had a physical space in which to operate (Leitão 2009: 86). By the 1990s, the city had built and inaugurated a local headquarters for Rio’s XXVII Administrative Region, a spacious two-story building adjacent to the CSM Albert Sabin Health Clinic and the local CEDAE office. Since 2008, the period in which most of this research was conducted; its director has been Jorge Collaro. The mayor, the seven sub-prefects, and the directors of the 33 administrative regions represent the City of Rio de Janeiro’s executive branch, and they are responsible for administrating the City’s 161 neighborhoods, or bairros. Being its own administrative region and designated an official Rio de Janeiro neighborhood are considered two important victories for Rocinha. Many residents fought for these advancements and believed they would help finally integrate the community with the rest of the city, guaranteeing residents equal treatment as formal citizens. Unfortunately, as Andrade and many residents such as Martins point out, the official titles, which in the early and mid-20th century would have been unimaginable, are largely symbolic and have neither significantly altered Rocinha’s marginal position in Rio de Janeiro, nor significantly improved the quality of life for its residents (Andrade 2002: 79-81; Pandolfi and Grynszpan 2003: 54).

In the 1980s when military rule was ending, heavily armed drug traffickers began asserting domination over Rocinha and other favelas (Arias 2006: 297). It was also when favela-based residents’ associations were being co-opted by local drug factions (Arias 2007: 114-115). This was the case with two of Rocinha’s three resident associations.

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126 Jorge Collaro is the son of Portuguese immigrants. He is not from Rocinha, and has never lived there, but Collaro has been active in the community since the early 1980s when he became one of Rocinha’s first Coca-Cola distributors. At the time, he was known as Jorge da Coca, a name he told me he had to remind people stood for Coca-Cola, and not for the product derived from coca leaves that was increasingly transforming the community. Jorge resigned from his post in early 2015.
The 1990s

IBGE 1991 claims there were 42,892 residents of Rocinha living in 11,900 homes. While no major investments were made in Rocinha, there were major changes taking place in the community and throughout all of Rio de Janeiro. Since the mid-1980s drug trafficking intensified and violence steadily increased (Arias 2006: 297). In 1982, the homicide rate in Rio de Janeiro was the same as New York City’s (23 per 100,000); in 1989, the rate in Rio had leaped to 63 per 100,000 (Zaluar 2004: 213). By 1995, the homicide rate in Rio de Janeiro had reached 70.6 per 100,000 and then dropped, by 1999, to 59.2 per 100,000 (Waiselfisz 2012: 183). Although the increase in homicides began during the 1980s, it was during the 1990s that violence became pervasive in Rio de Janeiro, as well as in other Brazilian capital cities (Zaluar 2004: 213). The favelas, once again associated with vice and marginality, were largely blamed for the rise in violence (Andrade 2002: 75) and targeted with violent police incursions. In 1995 alone, the Rio de Janeiro police killed 358 people, essentially one person per day, almost all from favelas (Arias 2006: 57). In light of the significant changes that took place during the 1980s and 1990s, Gonçalves emphasizes that any sociopolitical study of the favelas over the last few decades must, take into consideration violence, and especially the total control the drug traffickers began exercising in favelas like Rocinha (Gonçalvez 2013: 315).

For more than a century the state and favelas have had an antagonistic relationship leavened with considerable paternalism. The government and political class’s inattention to the needs of favela communities has on occasion alternated with their selective presence (clientelism). Coupled with rising inequality, the on-again-off-again attention created space for alternative actors to assume an expanded role in the social, economic, and political life of Rio’s favelas (Leeds 1996: 48). Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) began flooding Rio’s favelas, especially the favelas in the city’s South Zone, in an attempt to fill the considerable void left by
the state in the provision of basic services (Leeds 1996: 48) – a void NGOs have not been able to fill.

More powerful than the NGOs were a set of non-state actors that could “fill the vacuum”: drug traffickers. Coinciding with the shortcomings of the transition to democracy and the deleterious effects of neoliberalism was the growth of what some have called Latin America’s first indigenous multinational enterprise and its first true form of economic integration: the production, processing, and international distribution of cocaine (Leeds 1996: 48). While the specifics differ from country to country, the political and economic consequences of cocaine-related activities in all countries have fallen primarily on those racial and economic sectors that have long been oppressed and in the Brazilian case, those who have been denied the benefits of democracy, e.g., residents of favelas (Leeds 1996: 48).

Although obsessed over by the media there is a dearth of scholarly material covering the details of Rocinha’s drug trade. Gerônimo Leitão’s 2009 work is one of the few, but as he admits, it is not an easy subject to research because of the strict “lei do silêncio”, (literally “law of silence”) that exists in the community (Leitão 2009: 112). This code of silence and fear varies from favela to favela, with residents in some favelas, as Gonçalves points out, suspicious of almost everyone, even their neighbors (Gonçalves 2013: 316). In Rocinha, residents discuss the drug trade among themselves (at least within their family and friendship networks), and within the community there is a general understanding of its history and how it works (Leitão 2009: 112). This is partially explained by Rocinha’s kingpins, who have always been from the community, often with large families and friendship networks in the community. Outsider kingpins do not have the same ties to the favelas in which they operate, which often leads to a further breakdown in trust and rise in fear (Gonçalves 2013: 316).

I have waited until this section on the 1990s to cover the drug trade in Rocinha, although it had been steadily growing since the 1970s. It was not until the 1980s that drug traffickers would

take on new sociospatial importance, becoming the undisputed power within the community (Leitão 2009: 103). Gonçalves adds that with the intensification of the drug trade, favelas became even more isolated and criminalized as “urban enclaves” (Gonçalves 2013: 316). Some have referred to the drug traffickers as a form of “parallel state”; dictatorships funded with money from cocaine that essentially privatized Rio’s favelas (Leeds 1996; Burgos 2004: 44).

Before the 1980s the drug trade, which was comprised of several loosely organized groups (Leitão 2009: 103), shared control of the community with other forms of organized crime, such as illegal gambling (e.g., *Jogo do Bicho*). There were periods when Rocinha was split, some say, between the Comando Vermelho (Red Command) and the Terceiro Comando (Third Command), while others say it was between two local factions of the Comando Vermelho.128 Residents indicate that there were periods when lower Rocinha was run by a certain group and upper Rocinha run by another, as if it were two favelas. Residents have told me about being stopped at checkpoints on their way to see friends or family and that in some areas they even had to pay “tolls” to pass by, if they were not from that section of the favela.

The man who controlled drug points on the top of Rocinha was Denis Leandro da Silva, while the lower elevations of the community were controlled by Emanué.129 By the late 1980s, Denis, through a string of strategic murders, had consolidated control and consolidated Rocinha’s drug points a single command, the Red Command. Denis became Rocinha’s first major *dono* [drug kingpin] and is credited as the first faction leader to practice social assistance policies in Rocinha that later would become famous in Rio’s favelas.

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128 There are three major drug factions in Rio de Janeiro. The first was the Comando Vermelho formed in the late 1970s; the second emerged in the 1980s from a division within the CV and became known as the Terceiro Comando (TC) or Third Command and more recently as the Terceiro Comando Puro (TCP), or Pure Third Command. The most recent drug faction is the ADA, which formed in the late 1990s in order to rival the dominant CV.

129 The sections on Rocinha’s drug trade are based on multi-year observations, countless casual conversations, dozens of dissertation interviews, and a review of the relevant literature and media archives.
Leeds describes an incident that unfolded on live television in 1987. Rocinha “erupted in a show of violence against its middle-class surroundings,” an episode the local and national press sensationnally labeled a class-based “civil war” (Leeds 1996: 48). According to the explanation provided by Rocinha’s UPMMR residents’ association, the event began as a peaceful demonstration against chronic police violence in the community. Leeds explains that off record details emerged indicating that residents were protesting the transfer Dênis (who had recently been arrested) from a prison where he maintained contact with the community to a tighter security prison where access was more difficult (Leeds 1996: 48). The incident was representative of increasing inequality in Brazil and in Rio, what Leeds refers to as growing “structural violence” (Leeds 1996: 48). It was also illustrative of the increasing terror Rio’s police imposed on favela residents and provides a historical context as to why the UPP in Rocinha and other favelas have been a failure in regards to gaining trust and respect of residents.¹³⁰

Drug kingpins [donos] rise and fall according to the structure of their citywide factions, idiosyncrasies within each favela and relationships with rival factions and the police. The disposition of the kingpin(s) who rule favela drug markets often has a tangible effect on life in the community. In Rocinha this is illustrated from the case of Lulu. Barely out of his teens, Luciano Barbosa da Silva (Lulu) took over in 1999 under an agreement that he would relinquish power to Dudu once the latter was released or had escaped from prison. According to several residents interviewed for this dissertation, including a young man I will call Ryan, Dudu (Eduíno Eustáquio de Araújo) “was a real son of a bitch”, Rocinha’s most feared and hated kingpin.¹³¹ Lulu, in contrast, was as benign as a drug kingpin protected by a small army of

¹³⁰ This episode and numerous others from the late 1980s also highlighted exemplary structural shifts, such as the US War on Drugs in Colombia, which multiplied new smuggling routes south, through Bolivia and Paraguay and into Brazil, as well as micro level changes taking place in favelas in general and in Rocinha, more specifically. For the first time organized crime in Rocinha was concentrated on drug trafficking and its kingpins became the undisputed authority figures in the community.

¹³¹ Based on numerous dissertation interviews between February 2013 and July 2013.
heavily armed soldiers could be. His five-year reign was widely considered to have been the most peaceful in Rocinha’s recent history. He was widely popular in the community (Sneed 2008: 73).

With a reputation for being cool headed and using violence as a last resort, Lulu restored the local drug trade’s practice to a style many residents interviewed claimed was common during the mid- and late 1980s and early 1990s, when local factions were more involved in social assistance within the community. Lulu also continued a strategy other kingpins before and after him performed, paying off corrupt police so they would not enter the community. For this tactic to work traffickers have to make it abundantly clear that any internal misconduct (murder, rape, assault, robbery, etc.) would be severely punished. The logic is simple. If word of serious crimes becomes known outside the community, especially if reported by the media, the police would have to enter Rocinha in order to conduct standard procedures, such as making arrests and investigating. Thousands, perhaps millions, in drug sales would be lost depending on how long police would interrupt business and whether they decided (if bribes were unsatisfactory) to seize drugs and guns as well.

With Lulu in charge Rocinha enjoyed an era of relative calm. It was clear that he was not going to surrender his position of power and recent prosperity back to Dudu. After all, Rocinha’s residents generally despised Dudu. The problem was Dudu held higher rank than Lulu within the Comando Vermelho.

This was the Rocinha I entered. And at the age of 21, I was intrigued by the notion of “cocaine Robin Hoods.” At that time, most of my friends in Rocinha were young, in their late teens and early to mid-20s and I knew few of Rocinha’s long-time dedicated leaders, like José Martins, Ronaldo Batista, and Maria Helena. My peers would tell me about Lulu and how under his rule the drug-traffickers helped residents in need, and I believed them because I wanted to believe their story. I went to a cookout one night in 2002 with friends, in the Terrerão section of Rocinha. The next day one of my friends asked me if I remembered meeting a man they introduced me to as the organizer of the event, a guy I shook hands with and spoke to briefly. I
“of course.” I had no idea the young man was Lulu. He was respectful, seemed ordinary, and I only remember him smiling and thanking me for coming to the party. From that brief encounter I could understand why many residents liked him, and why he did not want to return Rocinha to Dudu.

By mid-2004 neither Lulu nor Dudu were running Rocinha, and a power vacuum had formed in the community. One after another, high-ranking gangsters muscled their way into command, but they were all killed within days or weeks. After weeks of infighting and numerous assassinations the young and ostentatious Bem-ti-vi rose to power as Rocinha’s kingpin. He was known for throwing wild parties and reveling (often depicted in the media) with Brazilian celebrities. Bem-ti-vi paraded through Rocinha with his famous gold plated guns. He met his death at the hands of the police in October 2005, leaving another power vacuum to be filled.

Finally, Rocinha was again split, the top part of the community controlled by Joca and the base by Nem. There were no restrictions on going to certain sections, but there was a tension between the top and bottom of Rocinha. In 2006, Joca fled with millions from the drug trade. He was arrested about a year later in the northeast of the country. Nem was left the sole leader of Rocinha. Interviews conducted with longtime active residents indicate that Nem was Rocinha’s most politically minded and shrewdest drug trafficker. He institutionalized relations between the corrupt residents’ associations, the police, unscrupulous business owners, and politicians (local and outside). Nem played a crucial role in the election of Rocinha’s first resident to the Rio de Janeiro City Council (a well remunerated position of influence in Rio). Also according to numerous dissertation interviews, Nem, the city councilman he empowered, and the corrupt residents’ associations began forging ties with more politicians. Strategic relations were even solidified with politicians in Rio’s State Legislature (ALERJ). It was clear the kingpin’ ambition was to turn Rocinha into a type of drug money fueled, clientelistic political machine, along the lines of what Pablo Escobar achieved in Medellin’s slums during the
1980s.\textsuperscript{132} The UPP dashed those hopes in November 2011 when he was arrested and imprisoned.\textsuperscript{133}

Interviews with longtime active residents revealed only partially true the popular notion that drug traffickers, in the absence of the state, act as providers of security for residents. A middle-aged resident I will call Remo told me: “They kill or torture rapists, murderers, pedophiles, men who beat women, thieves and other vacilões [screwups] as long as it is not one of them. But they do whatever they want. Who is going to confront them if they kill a cidadão [literally means citizen, but is slang for innocent resident] or rape a moradora [female resident]?” When Remo cited Dudu an as example of a cruel kingpin (known for raping local women and girls) I pointed out that he was the leader, and that I had never heard of the lower rank soldiers and dealers doing such things and going unpunished. Remo agreed that in Rocinha it is only the higher ranks that in theory could get away with anything, but that “ainda assim tá errado” (“still, it is wrong”).

**Favela Tourism**

Ironically, during the early 1990s “slum” or “favela tourism” started booming in Rocinha (Freire-Medeiros 2009: 50). This was a period in which the local drug trade was gaining access to war arms and as violence was increasing in Rocinha and throughout Rio (Zaluar 2004: 213). Freire-Medeiros asserts that there is wide agreement that organized favela tourism in Rio began with the 1992 United Nations Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro (Freire-Medeiros 2009: 50). Concisely, favela tourism began as groups of officials who were being shuttled around Rio by

\textsuperscript{132} This information is based on a combination of interviews, casual conversations, archival research and ethnographic observations over the span of several years.

\textsuperscript{133} Under the administration of Maj. Edson Santos Rocinha’s UPP declared war as much on corrupt business and political leaders as on the local drug trade. Dozens of powerful and violent people (including notable big name politicians whose clientelistic base was Rocinha) suddenly found it considerably more difficult to exert the power they once held in the community. The “logical arguments” I mentioned in the introduction that certain interviewee’s expressed on Maj. Santos being framed center on this point.
tour guides, in safari type jeeps donated by the military for the event, asked one guide if they could drive into Rocinha (Freire-Medeiros 2009: 50). Father Cristiano laughed when I mentioned this version. He told me: “During the early 1980s I was taking groups from Europe and elsewhere through Rocinha a few times a month. By the time Father Thierry (another Jesuit priest from Belgium) arrived in Rocinha a few years later we were receiving even more foreigners, a lot! Martins used to accompany us on many of the visits. But we never charged anything. So maybe that is what they [Freire-Medeiros] are talking about.” The business aspect is what Freire-Medeiros refers to because favela tourism has become big business in Rocinha and a few other favelas.

In 2006 Mayor Cesar Maia signed a law including Rocinha in the City’s official tourism and cultural destination (Law 4405/September 9, 2006). This is not the moment to expand on this topic, but it is worth noting that favela tourism is one of the most lucrative industries in Rocinha. There is no lack of controversy surrounding favela tourism in Rocinha and elsewhere. Especially in light of the fact that most profits flow out of the community to nonresident tourist agencies (e.g., such as Exotic Tours, Jeep Tour and Favela Tour) and because many residents, activists and scholars view it as exploitative and voyeuristic, a type of “poverty safari.”

Finally, it was interesting to come across a comment on the relationship between the widely popular Brazilian movie City of God (2002) and foreign interest in Rio’s favelas that Jason Cummings (2013: 10) mentions in his masters thesis and in his chapter for Global Gentrification (2015: 87). I certainly noticed something similar in Rocinha and nearby Vidigal around 2002-2004 as the period in which there seemed to be a tangible increase in foreign visitors to favelas. There is no way to prove this, but after City of God there were a string of similar type favela movies and documentaries that followed, many of them quite popular in North America and Europe. I am confident, and dozens of conversations throughout the years

134 Dissertation Interview, Cristiano, February 2013.
135 During the last several years more locals have started there own favela tourism business and most of them rely on less visually offensive foot tours.
with young foreigners visitors in Rocinha indicate, that these films had at least some influence on adventurous type foreigners visiting and even living in favelas, perhaps in a way comparable to how Spike Lee’s numerous movies about Brooklyn had a similar effect there.

**Nongovernmental Organization (NGOs)**

During the 1980s and early 1990s the drug trade in Rocinha and other favelas was widely purported by the media to be operating as a form of “parallel power”, flooded with drug money that was partially used to filled voids left by the state (Morais 2006: 128-130; Da Silva and Leite 2007: 551). For reasons too complex to describe here, another type of organization was simultaneously attempting to pick up where the state left off: nongovernmental organizations, or NGOs. The two primary macro factors that facilitated to rise of NGOs in Brazil were the return of constitutional democracy and the accent of neoliberal capitalism (Landim 1997: 366). Local factors, such as the influential 1992 UN’s Earth Summit in Rio, and the beginning of Cesar Maia’s “entrepreneurial” three terms as mayor also played a role.

Social assistance organizations have traditionally attempted to fill “areas abandoned by the state” (Landim 1993: 69; 1997: 352). There is a strong and longstanding relationship between the state and the Catholic Church in Brazil (Landim 1997: 352-354). It is well known that the Brazilian state has long oppressed or neglected certain groups and the spaces they occupy. Throughout the twentieth century the Catholic Church, strongly aligned with and partly funded by the state, served as the main institution offering services to vulnerable groups in Rio de Janeiro and elsewhere in Brazil that were unmet by the state.\(^\text{136}\) Important to this study is the fact that during the dictatorship certain sectors of the Catholic Church from within Brazil and abroad began to help favela residents organize against the oppression and for improvements (Landim 1997: 354). Cristiano, the former Jesuit priest from Belgium, is part of this history, and he recounted the intimidations and constant harassment he faced from the Military Police.

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during his active years in Rocinha.\textsuperscript{137} Priests like Cristiano were part of a movement in the Catholic Church often associated with Liberation Theology. In many favelas they played an important role in fostering critically conscious local groups and movements (Levy 180: 2009).

Only since the 1990s has the presence of “NGOs” become pervasive in Rocinha and other favelas (Pandolfi and Grynszpan 2003: 47-48). The groups that can trace their origins to the Catholic Church (whether its conservation or progressive initiatives) are often considered the precursors to NGOs in Brazil. In Rocinha some of these organizations with Catholic origins later became registered NGOs, such as the previously mentioned ASAP, or the well-known Bento Rubião Foundation, which works mainly on issues of property rights and titles, and where Martins has coordinated local efforts since the 1980s.

In 2006, I conducted a census of NGOs in Rocinha with André Sales Batista. We found there were almost 100 that met our designation of an NGO. Defining NGOs analytically and legally is complicated, however, and in the end we reduced the number to around 55 NGOs that we could conclusively verify. One of them was our little organization, Mundo Real.\textsuperscript{138} The state government of Rio suggests there are well over 100, but they officially catalogued 93, the ones they could confirm by 2010 (Rocinha PDS).

**Turn of the Century to 2003: Stagnation, Lulu and Relative Calm**

From the late 1990s to early 2004 not much changed in Rocinha. This was a phase of relative peace in which there were few if any headline making shootouts. Residents describe the first few years of the twenty-first century in Rocinha as one of the most tranquil in recent memory. But it was also a period of noteworthy economic stagnation, a phase that began in the early 1990s, and

\textsuperscript{137} Dissertation Interview, Cristiano, February 2013.
\textsuperscript{138} Martins told me in an informal conversation in June of 2010 that he had conducted a similar census for the Bento Rubião Foundation, around the same time I did. He said he identified 90 to 100. The website Rocinha.org suggests there are over 400 third-sector entities in Rocinha, but it is likely that many of these are religious organizations, like the evangelical churches that have multiplied in recent years.
during which no significant public investments or community betterment initiatives were undertaken.

On the other hand, commercial activity in Rocinha was flourishing. Outsiders were also increasingly interested in securing a niche within Rocinha’s haphazard but lucrative business world. McDonald’s opened a frozen treat parlor (ice cream, milkshakes, sundaes) in 2000, only to close it a few years later, most likely due to the increasing violence described below.

In 2004 I made an extended visit to Rocinha, for nine weeks, gathering details on the events that had taken place a few months earlier. Previously Dudu had sworn he would regain the community from the younger more popular Lulu. Dudu had declared war on Lulu from prison, where he had already served several years and had recently been granted permission to leave prison for weekend visits. In early 2004 he did not return to prison after visiting his mother. He went into hiding in the nearby Vidigal favela; where he planned a large-scale attack to retake Rocinha (Sneed 2007: 237). Dudu had the blessing of Rio’s largest drug faction, the Red Command or Comando Vermelho (CV) or Red Command. Conscious of the fact Dudu would have access to Red Command arms and soldiers Lulu knew he would have to look for protection elsewhere. He was essentially forced to reach out to a large rival drug faction, the Friends of Friends or Amigos dos Amigos (ADA). He turned Rocinha over to the ADA upon discovering that Dudu escaped and had the Red Command’s support (Sneed 2007: 237). Dudu invaded Rocinha with at least 50 soldiers on the Thursday before Easter 2004, at around midnight (Sneed 2007: 237). After two days of gunfire, Dudu failed to retake Rocinha and was forced to flee through the thick jungle of Tijuca National Forrest. On the third day the shots continued as police stormed the community. On that day Lulu was killed by BOPE, the elite unit of the Military Police. The media reported between 12 and 14 deaths attributable to the episode.

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139 Several interviews and casual conversations mentioned, and I observed as well, the tremendous amount of money there was to be made in informal unregulated communities like Rocinha where there was little to no police presence. This does not even include the drug trade.
however, casual conversation, dissertation interviews and previous ethnographic research (Sarayed-Din 2009: 70) indicate there were more.

The weekend skirmish made national and international headlines. In the immediate aftermath a confluence of several important turning points occurred in Rocinha and throughout Rio. The shootout itself was not directly attributable to bringing about the looming transformations, but it certainly served as a catalyst.
Chapter 3

Early Twenty-First Century Rocinha: An Era Of Transformation.

The previous chapter situated Rocinha socially and spatially within the context of Rio’s twentieth century development. This section begins where the last chapter left off, with the April 2004 shootout. Utilizing a sociospatial and critical criminological perspective I explore how the intimate relationships between inequality and violence in favelas, and the policies designed to address them, cannot be detached from questions of corruption.

ROCINHA’S WAR

Rocinha’s War was an important turning point within the community and its repercussions were felt throughout Rio de Janeiro. The Easter weekend shootout was triggered by internal conflicts within the drug faction that once ruled Rocinha. The commotion it caused led bordering neighborhoods, which are among the most affluent in Rio, to come to a standstill for days (Rocinha PDS 2011: 38). The chaos concentrated attention on long neglected areas of the city. The state’s inability to respond adequately to episodes of violence led to scathing criticism, mainly within Rio but also throughout Brazil, and sparked substantial civil society mobilization in Rocinha and São Conrado.

Three years later another tragic event of particular significance occurred. First, on May 2, 2007, in the lead up to the 2007 Pan-American Games, over 1,300 state and federal police officers stormed Complexo do Alemão (Caceres, Ferrari and Palombini 2014: 166-167), a sprawling compound of 12 favelas located in a formerly industrial section of the city’s North Zone. The police operation lasted until the completion of the international competition in late July. From May to July 2007 44 people were killed and 78 injured (Filho 2010: 18). June 27 was
the most violent day of the occupation when just before the 2007 Pan-American Games began the police (Civil and Military) massacred at least 19 residents and over nine (Filho 2010: 18-19). This incident became known as the “Pan Massacre”, (*Chacina do Pan*). Soon reports surfaced indicating that 8 of 19 victims had no ties to criminal activity, three of them were minors, and many of the dead, autopsies revealed, were clearly victims of summary executions at point blank range (V. Araújo/O Globo 2007, July 3; Filho 2010: 49-53).

Not since the two infamous 1993 massacres had there been so many sensational and brutal acts of violence committed against the city’s poor at the hands of Rio’s police.\(^{140}\) While the incidents in both Rocinha (2004) and Complexo do Alemão (2007) shaped the public interventions this chapter describes. The focus below is on Rocinha.

PAC and the UPP (Police Pacification Unit) are the most significant interventions in Rocinha’s history, and likely the largest, in regards to budget and scope, ever implemented in Brazil. I first became aware of PAC (Program for Accelerated Growth) while browsing through a March 2007 *O Globo* article, that announced that almost R$1 billion (US$526 million) would be invested in urbanizing three large favelas in Rio de Janeiro – Rocinha, Complexo do Alemão, and Manguinhos. Rocinha would receive R$160 million, of which R$60 million was set aside for the elaboration of architect Luiz Carlos Toledo’s favela urbanization project.\(^{141}\)

**PAC PRIMER**

The Program for Accelerated Growth (PAC) was first announced in early 2007. At the national level PAC is mainly an infrastructure and housing program that was intended to

\(^{140}\) On July 23, 1993, eight street children were gunned down while they slept on the steps of the Candelária Cathedral in downtown Rio. A month later 21 residents of the Vigário Geral favela in the North Zone were slaughtered. Fifteen of them had not ties to criminal activity.

stimulate Brazil’s economy through extensive construction projects while addressing some of the country’s critical and long-standing infrastructural needs.

Despite obvious differences, the scale of investments and economic role of PAC are comparable to the public works projects of the New Deal in the United States (Santos et. al. 2010: 118; Martins 2011: 35-38). According to one of Brazil’s chief economists, Marcelo Neri, there are similarities between the New Deal and PAC, but the former, he added, was largely a response to the Great Depression while in Brazil PAC preempted the Great Recession of 2008 and was therefore an important factor in allowing Brazil to stave off serious crisis (Neri 2009: 64; Santos et al 2010: 118).

The parallels are even stronger when PAC is considered alongside the two other hallmarks socioeconomic platforms the Worker’s Party (PT) launched during Lula’s administration. The first, in 2003, was the well-known intervention Programa Bolsa Família (Family Grant Program). Bolsa Família has since emerged as an internationally celebrated cash transfer scheme that allocated approximately R$ 121.6 billion (US$ 69 billion) to Brazil’s poorest families (Brazilian Federal Budget) between 2007 and 2014. The third (following PAC chronologically) noteworthy federal undertaking is the Programa Minha Casa, Minha Vida (MCMV) – My House, My Life Program, which addresses Brazil’s persistent shortage of adequate housing. Lula launched MCMV in April 2009 (UN-Habitat 2013: 32).

MCMV was in its second phase (MCMV 2) during the time of this research and was playing an important role in PAC 2, the second installment of Program for Accelerated Growth. Although PAC 2 was introduced nationally in 2011, it would not affect Rocinha for another two

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143 Conversion calculated using the 2010 annual average exchange rate. Bolsa Família began in 2003, but I have included the fiscal data only from 2007-2014 to coincide with PAC. During its first few years it was budgeted at much smaller amounts. This is public information that can be researched online from Brazilian government websites, including those of the Ministério do Desenvolvimento Social e Combate à Fome (Ministry of Social Development and Fight against Hunger) and the Orçamento Geral da União (Federal Budget).
144 The MCMV program in the city of Rio de Janeiro is crucial to this analysis because of its role as a driver of mass removals. This is further elaborated in Chapters 4 and 5.
years. The primary role of the MCMV 2 installments for PAC 2 has been to provide resettlement housing for the numerous families living in “areas of risk” or uprooted during construction, whether for favela-upgrading schemes other infrastructure projects (PAC 2014: 194-209).\textsuperscript{145}

Since it commenced, a portion of PAC resources has been used for upgrading favelas in several Brazilian cities. Approximately 2.5\% of the budget for PAC favela-upgrading projects is set aside for social work programs: for example, favela censuses, capacity building, or assisting and counseling residents when homes need to be removed for PAC construction projects.\textsuperscript{146}

In addition to political/administrative changes large public interventions also involve constant fiscal adjustments and following the when, why, and to what degree they change is an onerous task.\textsuperscript{147} PAC is a prime example. The frequent delays and modifications to the initial PAC intervention (now usually referred to as PAC 1) have left approximately one-third of the projects incomplete (throughout Brazil), as of August 2014. Furthermore, the budget for PAC 1 has already been adjusted since this research began and will likely be altered again before PAC 1 is officially completed.\textsuperscript{148} These factors complicate attempts to provide up-to-date accurate administrative and financial information.

Before advancing a semantic concern needs to be clarified. Technically there is only one PAC, the nationwide program that Lula announced in 2007, which involved hundreds of projects through virtually all corners of Brazil. Since 2011 PAC has been classified into phases (PAC 1, PAC 2, PAC 3, etc.). This slightly confounds the descriptions that follow because from 2007 until early 2013, during most of my fieldwork, everyone in Rocinha simply referred to the upgrading


\textsuperscript{146} Dissertation Interview, Ruth Jurberg, May 2013. Ruth Jurberg was the former coordinator of the PAC’s social work division in Rio, known as PAC Social. Currently she heads the Office for Special Projects for Rio de Janeiro’s Public Works Company (EMOP).

\textsuperscript{147} This is remains true despite Brazil’s recent Federal Access to Information Law (No. 12.527 – 11/18/2011).

scheme as PAC, or PAC in Rocinha. I will do my best in the following sections to be clear about which PAC is being referred to, whether in Rocinha or elsewhere.

PAC – A FEW PARTICULARS

According to the Ministry of Planning, Budget and Management, the first phase of PAC (PAC 1) included a budget of approximately R$ 657.4 billion (US$ 346 billion). This had not changed as of early 2015. The official figures for PAC 1 in Rocinha are even less reliable than those for the program at the national level. Inconsistencies exist not only between the data from Rio’s state government and the federal government but also within various state and federal agencies. Examples can be viewed on the government websites listed in the footnote below.

Residents established a community-based organization known as SOS Rocinha Saneamento (SOS Rocinha Sanitation) in 2013, and requested that Rio’s Public Ministry investigate PAC 1 delays and purported misuse of funds. In May 2014 the Public Ministry provided SOS Rochina Saneamento with a response to the ongoing investigations explaining that all federal and state agencies responsible for PAC 1 would be given an extension until November 11, 2014 to complete the project. On November 26, 2014, SOS Rocinha Sanitation filed a complaint with the Rio de Janeiro State Public Ministry detailing that of the eleven PAC 1 Rocinha construction projects listed in the official plan, two remained unfinished and two have not even been initiated.

149 Ministério do Planejamento, Orçamento e Gestão
151 EMOP cites R$ 259,147,585,00 spent by 2010, plus R$ 26,185,818,00 in additional funds needed to complete projects, for a total of R$ 285.3 million (US$ 150 million). The additional PAC 1 funds were supposedly requested and approved sometime in 2013. Retrievable from: http://www.emop.rj.gov.br/trabalho-tecnico-social/pac-1/. Figures from within the Federal Government differ as well. One example can be found on page 192 of the PAC, 11th Complete Budget Report, Four Years of PAC (2007-2010) cited in the footnote above, which mentions R$ 267.4 million (US$ 140.7 million), then on page 208 of the 11th Complete PAC 2 Budget Report, 2011-2014. The amount has increased to R$ 278.8 million (US$ 146.7 million). Both reports can be downloaded from, http://www.pac.gov.br/sobre-o-pac/publicacoesnacionais. Last accessed 5/2/2014.
152 Reference Number 164/2014, Civil Inquiry URB 694. Documentation provided by community
This is why active residents of Rocinha are angered that PAC 2 has been in progress at the national level since 2011. Throughout Brazil, PAC 2 is projected to spend R$ 1.59 trillion by the end of 2014. Together PAC 1 and PAC 2 have promised more than R$ 2.24 trillion (roughly US$ 1.18 trillion) to develop Brazil’s infrastructure: roads, railways, bridges, dams, ports, low-income housing, sanitation, favela-upgrading, and numerous social programs.\textsuperscript{153}

In early 2014 President Dilma Rousseff declared that by 2015 she would launch the third installment of PAC.\textsuperscript{154} Then, on June 14, 2013 Rio’s Governor Sérgio Cabral and Dilma paid a visited to the PAC 1 financed sports complex that borders Rocinha. During the widely reported political event, they announced PAC 2 would soon begin in Rocinha. Although the second phase of PAC Rocinha had been alluded to during a community meeting in November 2011, it was only in 2013 that commotion and controversy over the mega-intervention began.

Before 2007, comparatively few resources had been advanced to improve Rio’s favelas. Favela-Bairro was a significant investment, the first on such a large scale (US$ 660 million for Favela-Bairro I, II, and III), but its entire budget for upgrading hundreds of favelas throughout Rio de Janeiro was smaller than PAC’s (I and the proposed PAC II) for Rocinha alone (Gouvêa Vieira 2007: 7; IDB 2010).\textsuperscript{155}

The bulk of PAC funds derive from investments made by state companies (R$ 219 billion), of which Petrobras was by far the largest contributor (R$ 172 billion, or US$ 94 billion, roughly 25% of the entire PAC 1 budget)\textsuperscript{156}. Funds also came from the federal government’s fiscal budget and


\textsuperscript{154} Dilma was scheduled to make an official announcement in August 2014 but was apparently dissuaded by the same critical August 3, 2014 Folha de São Paulo article referenced above. She delayed the announcement because of incomplete PAC 1 projects and because Folha de São Paulo criticized the announcement she was expected to make two months before the October 2014 elections as opportunistic.


\textsuperscript{156} Conversion based on 2008 annual average exchange rate.
social security. Finally the private sector, incentivized by the large public investments, invested (R$ 217 billion, or US$ 119 billion), or almost as much as the state companies.\textsuperscript{157}

According to Felix Garcia Lopez, research coordinator at the federal government’s Institute for Applied Economic Research (IPEA), there are a number of reasons more money was circulating in recent years. One of these was speculation on Petrobras’s oil reserves. Brazil’s GDP growth also accelerated from 2004 to 2010 (2009 was an exception). This growth was largely driven by domestic and foreign demand for commodities, (mainly primary products). China and other emerging markets fueled much of this demand (De Negri and Cavalcante/IPEA 2014: 16-19). As China’s commodity hungry economy grew at an astounding pace, Brazil’s economy also fared well. Lula’s left leaning administration found itself with more available resources than previous administrations of the new democratic era (De Negri and Cavalcante/IPEA 2014: 16). This period also witnessed historically low levels of inflation.

The governing Worker’s Party (PT) took important steps towards raising the minimum wage (which still remains too low) and towards better allocating the country’s wealth. Access to credit almost doubling from 2000 (30\% of GDP) to 2010 (50\% of GDP).\textsuperscript{158} As a consequence, millions of working-class and poor Brazilians have emerged as avid consumers: a circumstance previously restricted by their scarce or non-existent discretionary incomes. This new consuming class also contributed to economic growth during this period.\textsuperscript{159} All of these factors have been important in providing the federal government with ample resources to spend on favelas and other social objectives. This is not to say that during other periods their were insufficient resources for extensive infrastructure and social programs in favelas, but what it does suggest is that for the first time the federal government had both the resources and the political will necessary for such investments.

\textsuperscript{158} De Negri and Cavalcante/IPEA 2014: 20.
\textsuperscript{159} Dissertation Interview, Felix Garcia Lopez/IPEA, July 2014.
Despite the profusion of resources recently available for upgrading in Rocinha there have been constant project delays and cost overruns on the part of the Rio de Janeiro State Public Works Company (EMOP) and the subcontracted three member private construction consortium *Novos Tempos*. Most delays and overruns “coincidentally” occurred after the November 2010 state and federal elections, further contributing to accusations of graft. Officials and bureaucrats involved with PAC 1 Rocinha have typically responded to accusations with comments such as: “The costs in construction projects of this size [PAC 1 Rocinha] always run over. There are always unpredictable factors that cause delays and financial adjustments, even when specialists do their best to anticipate and budget for possible overruns”.\(^{160}\) This is often true. However, one of the chief architects of the original PAC 1 Rocinha project who had become disillusioned with the implementation of the program s/he designed, countered: “the [financial] inconsistencies make it easier to steal. I mean you have no idea how much money disappeared. PAC [in Rocinha] was a *roubalheira danada* [spectacular robbery]”.\(^{161}\)

ORIGIN(S) OF PAC FAVELA-UPGRADING

The manner in which public officials speak of PAC favela upgrading in Rio de Janeiro gives the impression that sometime around 2007 politicians and their respective parties suddenly and magnanimously began investing large sums of resources in Rocinha and other favelas. Fieldwork for this study was still being conducted in Rocinha when President Dilma visited a nearby community on June 14, 2013 to announce PAC II in Rocinha, the second phase of PAC in the community. Dilma mentioned at one point, “I want to remind you all of something Lula said. He said that I am the mother of PAC in Rocinha, and that Pezão, is the Father of PAC in Rocinha” (Digital recording of the event, June 2013). Luiz Fernando de Souza, known popularly as Pezão

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\(^{160}\) Dissertation Interview, with PAC 1 Rocinha Rio de Janeiro State bureaucrat, September 2013.

\(^{161}\) Dissertation Interview, PAC 1 Rocinha chief designer, May 2013.
(Big Foot), was Sérgio Cabral’s vice-governor until mid-2014, when he took over as Rio’s interim governor so that Cabral could run for the Federal Senate. Meanwhile, at the rally in Rocinha, Dilma was trying to boost her campaign for president and Pezão’s upcoming campaign for governor. Both candidates won their elections in the second round. As far as Dilma’s comments regarding the “mother” and “father of PAC in Rocinha” are concerned, to engaged residents, activists, and architects of the initial urbanization project that was eventually turned into PAC 1, this could not be further from the truth.

There has been little effort in Brazilian literature, and even less in English, to explain the primary factors that led to PAC in Rocinha. Critical scholars would describe the benevolent state angle touted by officials in Brasília and Rio de Janeiro during election campaigns as a typical top-down “development” scheme (Bebbington 1993: 284; Fernando 2003: 59). A strong case can be made that PAC 2, the UPPs, and MCMV are transforming numerous Rio de Janeiro favelas through interventions organized from the top ranks of federal and state governments, but they do not allow for meaningful community involvement. However, the first installment of PAC in Rocinha has local origins.

Emerging from a community tragedy, the roots of PAC in Rocinha are stained in blood. Rocinha’s War led to considerable grassroots mobilization, one of the more concrete results of which was an impressive community-driven upgrading plan that existed over two years before the federal government created PAC. Once politicians, government agencies, and private construction firms entered the scene the “Sustainable Plan for the Upgrading of Rocinha” morphed into a largely top-down scheme that became known as PAC Rocinha. Only after the state coopted “the Sustainable Plan” were Lula, Dilma, Cabral, and Pezão able to make claims to the project’s “paternity.” To critics there is little to boast about considering the child (the Sustainable Plan) was forcefully adopted, given a new name (PAC Rocinha), and then spoiled.

\[162\] In the end Cabral did not run because of political agreements made between his party, the PMDB, and Cesar Maia’s DEM. Cesar Maia ended up running for the spot and in October 2014 lost.
As of early 2015, Rocinha’s first large-scale urbanization project had become much less attractive as a result of the state’s parenting.

I spoke with resident and geographer Robson Lopes on a number of occasions between 2011 and 2013 regarding contemporary transformations in Rocinha. During one interview (March 2013) I asked about the relationship between Rio’s sporting mega-events and PAC in Rocinha. Robson provided insights on PAC’s history in the community:

MB – Do you think all these schemes, PAC 1, PAC 2, the UPP, are related to preparing the city for the World Cup and Olympics?

Robson – Not PAC 1. I don’t believe so; PAC 1 was not part of the [mega-event entrepreneurial city] project. They hadn’t quite formed the Olympic City Project. Rio de Janeiro was heading down this path, it wanted it at the time, it had tried, but I don’t think PAC 1 was part of the Olympic City Project. I think it emerged much more out of the context of trying to put the brakes on Rocinha’s continuous un governed development [expansion]. Now, PAC 2 is totally within the logic of entrepreneurialism that Rio de Janeiro has set upon with its games, the mega-events trajectory.

MB – And the UPP?

Robson – The UPP also fits within this context. PAC 2 and UPP fit within this context [the mega-event entrepreneurial city]. But PAC 1 is different, in my opinion. Because at the time there was an incident that brought a lot of negative attention to Rocinha. I am talking about when Dudu invaded the community.

MB – In 2004?

Robson – Yeah, 2004. You see, the government had to find some way to intervene, to find a way in here [Rocinha], understand? That’s when all the talk about, “ah, we have to start some kind of favela upgrading plans inside” [Rocinha], you know, all those meetings and discussions. This was the context in which PAC emerged, but it wasn’t even PAC, it was that project, the public
contest at the IAB,\footnote{IAB is the abbreviation for the Institute of Brazilian Architects (Instituto de Arquitetos do Brasil). In this study all references to the IAB are specifically referring to the IAB-RJ, or the Rio de Janeiro division of the national IAB.} and from there Toledo’s Master Plan was selected. Then the Master Plan was tucked away in some file cabinets for a while. But it re-emerged you know, because they were like “ah, we need interventions in the favelas,” you know? So, then they went and pulled Toledo’s Plan out of the file cabinet and turned it into PAC 1.

VIOLENCE AND THE CONFLUENCE OF FACTORS THAT PRODUCED PAC

“We had to find a way out”

José Britz, President of AMASCO
São Conrado’s Residents’ Association

Reconstructing the origins of PAC in Rocinha proved a valuable lesson in ethnographic interviewing. While dozens of people participated in its early stages, only about 15 were fully dedicated from the start: eleven were interviewed for this investigation. Because this research population was small it was possible to triangulate the data, and luckily I was able to conduct follow-up interviews in 2013 with five of the 11 participants I first interviewed in 2011. Under such circumstances arriving at the truth might seem easy, but each person tells a slightly different version, and in time memories fade. Focus groups were helpful, but I was able to conduct only two focus group interviews: one at AMASCO’s headquarters, with José Britz and two other representatives of São Conrado’s residents’ association, who were essential to this history, and a second with two active residents of Rocinha whose identities will remain protected because of their more critical stance towards PAC 1 Rocinha.

There are only two systematic studies that have been published on the history of PAC in Rocinha. The first was conducted by anthropologist Sarayed-Din, A Ponte do Rio (2009). The second detailed report, the Rocinha PDS (2011), was produced by the same State Government administration that carried out the intervention. Although Sarayed-Din’s work ended while PAC
1 Rocinha construction was only beginning she approaches the origins of the program in more
detail, and the ethnographic data her study produced corresponds closer to the information I
gathered: likely because we interviewed many of the same people.

An account based on patterns that emerged during interviews with 11 of the people fully
involved with PAC 1 Rocinha from the beginning is provided below. The data this research
produced were then cross-referenced with A Ponte do Rio and the Rocinha PDS.

A core issue and common denominator that emerged from the two previous studies and my
work is that the grassroots momentum sparked by the violence of April 2004 was not
concentrated solely in Rocinha. The São Conrado residents’ association (AMASCO) was involved
from the outset and continues to play a central role in PAC Rocinha to this day. To a lesser
extent so were concerned residents of the other affluent South Zone neighborhoods; such as
Gávea and Leblon, and even Barra da Tijuca in Rio’s immediate West Zone. Residents from
most neighborhoods near Rocinha, which represent the most expensive real estate areas in
Brazil, were involved to varying degrees. Rocinha and São Conrado, however, led the movement.

This research and A Ponte do Rio illustrate how contrasting incentives led residents from
Rocinha and their wealthy neighbors to become involved. It would be disingenuous to suggest
that none of the more affluent actors cared about Rocinha; some certainly did and still do. Dona
Marlene from AMASCO is a prime example of an upper-middle-class resident of São Conrado
who regularly spends time in Rocinha and who has for years shown a sincere concern for the
community, especially in regards to protecting and advancing its culture. But during
conversations with a number of key players it became abundantly clear (some openly admitted)
that the plummeting real estate values caused by the violence in Rocinha (and to a lesser degree
Vidigal) was a principal factor for their keen involvement. In this light, José Britz’s comment,
“we had to find a way out” evokes Jacob Riis’s 1889 How the Other Half Lives where he
describes how: “There came a time when the discomfort and crowding below was so great, and
the consequent upheaval so violent that it was no longer an easy thing to do, and then the upper half fell to inquiring what was the matter” (Riis 1957: 1).

For São Conrado’s elite, including Mayor Cesar Maia and his extended family, the driving motivation for engagement came from: (1) a sense that the state had completely lost control of vast areas of the city and was unable to provide a sense of security for even the most affluent classes. And most important, as José Britz explained in an interview for this dissertation,\(^\text{164}\) (2) because the violence was negatively effecting local business (e.g., the Fashion Mall), and “the value of our property was steadily dropping.”

An additional theme raised during a number of interviews relates to the vast power differentials that exist between Rocinha and São Conrado. This topic is illustrated in segments of a 2011 conversation with one of Rocinha’s most recognized residents, William de Oliveira, who was then interviewed a second time in July 2013.

William de Oliveira, who gave himself the title of William da Rocinha [William of Rocinha], is among the most important and polarizing figures in modern day Rocinha. He is charismatic, loves the limelight, and is a master of using social media; a skill he was developing in the early 2000s while most of Rocinha was still offline. William was the former president of UPMMR, Rocinha’s oldest and largest residents’ association. Despite our discussion of sensitive issues, William gave permission to use his name, stating: “I’m not scared of anyone. Anyway, I don’t have anything to worry about because meu rabo não esta preso,” which means something analogous to, \textit{there are no skeletons in my closet}. He was arrested and imprisoned for over a year a few months after our first interview. William played a pivotal role in securing funds for the project that became PAC 1 Rocinha.

The first interview took place five months before his front page December 2011 arrest, which was his second in as little as seven years as a “community leader.” The follow-up conversation occurred in June 2013, six months after William was released on the grounds of \textit{habeas corpus}.

\(^{164}\) Dissertation Interview, May 2013.
Both of his arrests were on charges of political association with drug-trafficking. In total he spent almost two years in prison. As of December 2014 all previous charges against him had been dropped.

The conversation with William centered on April 2004, on leadership in the community, and on the mobilization that began after Rocinha’s War. He was president of UPMMR at the time of the 2004 shootout, a position of considerable power within Rocinha, and to a lesser extent in greater Rio—Rocinha has at least 38 thousand voters (Rocinha PDS 2011: 59).

MB – Can you tell me the about the historical context in which PAC originated?

William – I was vice president of UPMMR from 2000 to 2001 and then left because I didn’t agree with what was going on there. I won the election in 2004 and became president. I spent a few months in prison in 2005, but before that we went through a war here in 2004. The 2004 war was a moment in which Rocinha was faced with the serious question of where we wanted to go as a community. We had to decide...The next day [after the shootout] I received a call from the Rodrigo Bethlem, who was a government secretary at the time. He called, I don’t know if it was [José] Britz who told him to, but he set up a meeting with Conde [the vice-governor at the time], and we began a dialogue about what could be done in Rocinha. We then started meeting in Rocinha. We created a discussion group call the Forúm Dois Irmãos (Two Brothers Forum) that met in Rocinha. It was mostly residents of Rocinha, but Viva Rio participated, and other institutions. We joked that it was “the poor people’s forum.”

The Fórum Dois Irmãos was encouraged by the state government, primarily through Rio’s SEMADUR (Rio’s State Secretary for the Environment and Urban Development). But state officials never got too involved in the actual meetings. It held around 15 meetings at Microlins, a small business incubator in Rocinha, with the primary objective of drafting the guidelines for public interventions in Rocinha (Rocinha PDS 2011: 42). William mentioned that roughly 12 to 15 residents of Rocinha regularly attended the meetings, which lasted less than two months, and
in the end the *Forum Dois Irmãos* was unable to produce anything substantial (Sarayed-Din 2009: 73). In São Conrado another meeting was also taking place that did produce results. William – I got a call from Dr. [José] Britz [president of AMASCO] on the Monday after the shootout. He said, “William, let’s do something to improve the quality of life in Rocinha.” In collaboration with the residents’ association of São Conrado we began thinking about what we could, and what we should do to benefit [despite] all the violence. We launched the Fórum Técnico de Urbanização da Rocinha [Technical Forum for the Upgrading of Rocinha]. We met at the Inter Continental [a luxury hotel in São Conrado]. In Rocinha we called these meetings “the rich people’s forum.” We met three times a week, AMASCO, the three residents’ associations of Rocinha and certain residents we selected to come on board.

Before the Fórum Técnico’s first meeting José Britz had taken advantage of the media frenzy caused by Rocinha’s War and published an announcement in the “Opinion” section in the *Jornal do Brasil* (April 21, 2004) newspaper. He announced that the upcoming meeting, which was to take place at the Intercontinental Hotel in São Conrado, would be an opportunity for “concerned citizens” to work together in search of practical solutions and interventions. The aim was to attract as many volunteer architects, engineers, and urban planners as possible. Most of the announcement was sympathetic to the everyday residents of Rocinha and critical of the government’s abandonment of the favelas. However, towards the end of the *Jornal do Brasil* article, José Britz added: “the definitive solution is the removal of the favelas. Since this takes time, the set of solutions proposed by AMASCO could be a pilot test later applied in other favelas.”

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165 Where 30 tourists were taken hostage at gunpoint by drug traffickers from Rocinha who were fleeing from the police in late 2011, since changed its name to the Tulip.
MB – So who participated in the meetings other than the four residents’ associations and the few residents from Rocinha that you invited?

William – They also included [active residents and organizations from] Gávea, Leblon, Barra da Tijuca, the IAB, CREA, ADEMI, PUC and various other institutions.\(^{167}\)

MB – How did these other groups get involved?

William – With good sense we began inviting groups we thought might be able to contribute to the objective of upgrading Rocinha.

William continued to elaborate the meetings. Architect Mauro Guaranys joined the movement after reading about the *Fórum Técnico* meetings in the *Jornal do Brasil*. His professional ties to the Rio de Janeiro branch of the Institute of Brazilian Architects (IAB-RJ) boosted the *Fórum Técnico*’s credibility. By this point, several residents of Rocinha were already participating in the meetings; one of them was Aurélio Mesquita, who is known for his wit and piercing candidness. After quietly sitting and listening for over an hour to mostly upper-middle-class and elite professionals offer suggestions on what Rocinha needed in order to improve, Aurélio jumped up and exclaimed:

This is all a bunch of bullshit and won’t change a damn thing! Rocinha doesn’t need any more piecemeal solutions. What we need are major interventions because the violence is a result of the abject living conditions within the alleyways.\(^{168}\)

His comments lie at the heart of organic critical criminology, and this work considers them not only central to the history of PAC in Rocinha but also fundamental in explaining the (thus far) failure of the UPPs. Mauro Guaranys was impressed. During the next few weeks he traversed the streets and alleys of Rocinha with Aurélio and then began to sketch the community’s first systematic urban intervention.

\(^{167}\) See Abbreviations and Acronyms section located immediately before the Introduction.

\(^{168}\) Dissertation Interview, Mauro Guaranys, June 2013.
Francisco Mauro Halfeld Guaranys was 74 years old at the time of our May 2013 interview. He is semi-retired architect who lives in Ipanema. Mauro’s mother was German and his father was an indigenous Brazilian (hence the surname Guaranys). He likes to call himself a “true Brazilian” because of his mixed heritage and Tupi Guarani bloodline. Mauro embodies the bohemian spirit of Vinícius de Moraes and Tom Jobim’s Ipanema, an ethos tragically lost decades ago to snobbery, vanity, and perverse real estate speculation that has since produced the most expensive square meter property values in Brazil (SECOVI RIO 2014: 5). Guaranys explained about his role in PAC 1 Rocinha and how he initially got involved:

Mauro Guaranys – in 2004, Britz, the President of São Conrado’s residents’ association was interviewed in the newspaper [Jornal do Brasil] for a piece on violence in Rocinha. He was explaining that the residents of Rocinha, the association in São Conrado and Gávea were trying to form a group, a group of planners, to work on a project that would improve Rocinha, since the state já não dava mesmo bola pra aquilo [didn't pay any mind to things there anyway]...When I saw that it was Britz leading things in São Conrado I called him. Because, by coincidence we have known each other since we were both 18 and serving in the Army together, but we hadn’t spoken in ages.

Mauro Guaranys could be considered to PAC 1 Rocinha what Myles Horton of the Highlander Center was to the civil rights movement in the United States: a central figure who has remained underappreciated, a fact that he is okay with. Like Horton, who was white, Mauro, who lives in elite Ipanema, is also an outsider. Yet, if there is someone who can be called “the father of PAC in Rocinha” it is Mauro Guaranys, at least in regards to the actual project designs. Still, because of his unassuming nature and his involvement to help, not for praise, relatively few people know of his important role.

169 “Panorama do Mercado Imobiliário do Rio de Janeiro 2014”. First Semester, 2014 SECOVI RIO is the oldest branch of Brazil’s main housing association (syndicate).
One of the most noteworthy features of Mauro’s upgrading plan for Rocinha was called the Projeto Espaço Semente – Project Seed Space. His conception, designed specifically with Rocinha’s unique infrastructural needs and incredible density in mind, is a brilliant approach to favela upgrading, and one Mauro may well have been the first to elaborate: at least in Rio de Janeiro. His idea was partially inspired by another classic Aurélio Mesquita outburst.

Aurélio commented on numerous occasions between 2004 and 2006: “while upgrading the alleyways and sewers of Rocinha is important, those projects alone will not be sufficient, it will also be essential to urbanize the minds of local residents.” This was an intentionally vague comment. What does it mean to upgrade one’s mind? He was playing on the new obsession in Rocinha and Rio de Janeiro with the notions of urbanização (upgrading), and in particular, urbanização de favelas (favela upgrading). Those who know Aurélio knew what he meant: that in addition to sanitation and other crucial infrastructure projects, Rocinha also needed major investments in education and culture.

With a multiple needs model (infrastructure, education, culture) in mind; Mauro began working on the Plano Setorial da Rocinha – Sectorial Plan for Rocinha, which included proposals for improving and increasing health facilities, sanitation, recreational areas, cultural spaces, urbanization processes, security, schools, etc. (Rocinha PDS 2011: 38). A key component of the Sectorial Plan was a large apartment complex that would be located at the base of Rocinha. It was known as Project Seed Space, and it included several four-story apartment blocks that would share a community and cultural center, a number of open areas such as small plazas and organic gardens, a theater, a library and spaces for workshops and professional training.

In addition to housing residents, the Seed Space would also foster critical thinking and knowledge. But the truly innovative feature of Mauro’s plan was that it allowed for the upgrading of Rocinha without causing the substantial removals so common to slum-upgrading schemes in dense communities. Residents would not live in the Seed Space permanently.

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170 Dissertation Interview, Mauro Guaranys, June 2013.
Instead, they would stay for ten-month intervals, while the state implemented the intensive upgrading needed in whatever section of Rocinha they lived in. After their area of Rocinha was completed, they would leave the Seed Space and move back to their upgraded areas and into their renovated homes. The Seed Space would continuously house residents whose sections were being improved. In this way, Mauro provided a practical and original solution for one of the primary problems of slum-upgrading. Unfortunately, the state never seriously considered the plan, except for a modified version of Mauro’s community and cultural center, known as the Biblioteca Parque (Library Park), or Rocinha’s Centro de Convivência, Comunicação, Cultura e Cidadania C4 – Center for Community, Communication, Culture and Citizenship.171

There were other groups in Rocinha meeting and organizing for solutions. Often their participants also attended the larger Forum meetings. The Fórum Técnico, however, was the only group that lasted more than a few months and the only one that produced tangible results. But a significant number of engaged residents were skeptical of the Fórum Técnico and some of the people leading it. I asked Miguel, who has been active for decades in Rocinha, he thought about the early mobilization.

MB – Did you participate in the early mobilization that eventually led to PAC?
Miguel – I participated before, during and after. My commitment to Rocinha didn’t begin with PAC...Anyway, I did participate in one of the Forums, and indirectly still do. The Cultural Forum of Rocinha was one of the groups that emerged from that period...I always followed what was going in their meetings, but usually through others who attended. Rarely did I directly participate in the Fórum Técnico meetings unless something was being held [event, meeting] in Rocinha.

As the Fórum Técnico grew, participants eventually gravitated towards one of the four broad thematic groups established to facilitate meetings and narrow the focus on specific themes for improving life in Rocinha. The thematic groups generally meet separately. They were: (1)

171 Dissertation Interview, Mauro Guaranys, June 2013.
urbanism, transportation and infrastructure; (2) education, health, culture and sports; (3) the environment; and (4) institutional support, which was responsible for obtaining the official/institutional information other groups needed for their work and for networking with the government agencies whose support was deemed essential. The institutional support thematic group was coordinated by São Conrado’s resident’s association, AMASCO. The only meeting that produced proposals that were funded and implemented was the urbanism, transportation and infrastructure thematic group. It did not take long for the urbanism, transportation and infrastructure group to become virtually synonymous with the Fórum Técnico, while the others, like the Cultural Forum, diverged and had to fend for themselves. Asked why he chose not to participate actively with the Technical Forum Miguel responded:

Miguel – Because it was controlled by elites in São Conrado who, regardless of what they say in public, would do away with Rocinha once and for all if they thought they could get away with it. Also, most of the representatives from the community that met with them were from the banda podre da associação [rotten group from the residents’ association].

Miguel was not merely being cynical. He had an acute understanding of the issue based on decades of experience as a public servant and activist in the community. In many of Rio de Janeiro’s favelas the local residents’ associations are viewed as corrupt (Gay 1994: 12, 97-98; Arias 2006: 2-3, 8). There are exceptions to every rule. One example literally close to home is Laboriaux’s residents’ association (AMVLVC), which is viewed as respectable within and outside of Rocinha. The same cannot be said of the community’s two larger residents’ associations. Every community differs, but since the mid-1980s the two large resident associations at the foot of Rocinha have forged shady relationships with drug traffickers and crooked politicians and

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172 This is not a biased statement, but rather based on almost 15 years living in Rocinha during which time I have not heard (or read about) AMVLVC referred to as corrupt. In comparison Rocinha other two residents’ associations are well known to be corrupt and have had several leaders arrested and even killed over the for their connections to the drug trade. Furthermore, contrary to the other lucrative associations, AMVLVC has never had a source of income nor an office that wasn’t a resident’s home.
businesses throughout the city and state. Irrespective of Miguel’s personal opinions (which are justified), the meetings in São Conrado were crucial in shaping Rocinha since April 2004.

GETTING THE STATE INVOLVED

Until this point the mobilization in the wake of Rocinha’s War was entirely grassroots—civil society—driven. The main actors involved knew they would need the institutional and financial support of the state, if any significant changes were to be produced. William described how the movement garnered the state support:

William – So, we started the meetings and soon we began inviting residents of Rocinha. Sometime 50, 10, sometimes 30 people attending. At this time there were no representatives of the government involved, it was still all civil society. So we asked Conde if there was anything he could do for us.

Eventually, the spirited activity in Rocinha and São Conrado led to meetings with then vice-governor of Rio de Janeiro, Luiz Paulo Conde, the same politician who only a few months earlier had recommended enclosing Rocinha behind a large concrete wall. Conde took a shellacking for his hasty proposal and later he emerged as a supporter of the “development” movement’s objectives. Collaborating with Conde, the Fórum Técnico formalized and published the first systematic upgrading plan for the community, known as the Plano Setorial da Rocinha, or the Sectorial Plan for Rocinha. William continued:

William – After we reached out to Conde, who was the vice-governor and State Secretary of the Environment, he started helping us a lot. You asked earlier about Toledo, this was when he began participating, because you know, he is an accomplished architect and we needed to further develop our upgrading project. We produced a Master Plan for Rocinha
The Fórum Técnico, Vice-governor Conde and IAB-RJ began working through the details of organizing a public bidding process to select the team that would be responsible for implementing Rocinha’s first large-scale favela upgrading scheme.

In October 2005 the state government of Rio de Janeiro in partnership with IAB-RJ announced a national bidding process, calling it the Concurso Nacional de Idéias para a Urbanização da Rocinha, or the National Competition for Ideas on Upgrading Rocinha (Rocinha PDS 2011: 42-43). The Concurso Nacional was a national competition among architects to choose which firm would be responsible for designing and implementing Rocinha’s first large-scale upgrading scheme. The competition put up for bid would select the proposal with the best and most practical plan for the community, while also offering detailed solutions on how to control Rocinha’s expansion. Mauro Guaranys agreed to allow the Sectorial Plan that he designed with residents of Rocinha and São Conrado to serve as the model for the competition. A solid model was necessary because most contestants had little if any knowledge of Rocinha. In fact, most of the over 70 contestants had little experience with upgrading projects in favelas because this is a very particular area of urban planning and architecture that has only been attempted on any noteworthy scale in Brazil since the mid-1990s with Favela-Bairro.

William told me that: “Conde set up the public bidding with the IAB. Over 70 architects from all over Brazil competed. Of the over 70 contestants, 12 went to the final round. In the end Toledo won.” The event was historic, because for the first time a favela resident was allowed to sit on an IAB-RJ public competition jury, which up until that point had only been open to formally educated architects, engineers, and other credentialed professionals. The representative from Rocinha was none other than Aurélio Mesquita.

On January 30, 2006 the winner of the public contest was announced, and as William mentioned, the award was given to the architectural firm M&T Arquitetura, headed by Luiz Carlos de Menezes Toledo, who is warmly known in Rocinha as Toledo.
MB – What do you think are the main reasons Toledo won, beyond the obvious fact that he is talented?

William – beyond his merits, he had been involved virtually since the beginning with the community, with the Technical Forum. He knew more about Rocinha’s needs than the other candidates.

Toledo assembled a diverse team, composed of 22 professionals, eight trainees and two local leaders, Paulo César (PC) and Edgler Vaiana (Rocinha PDS 2011: 38). During a conversation with William, he stressed: “The truth is, Toledo’s Master Plan included much more than what the state ended up doing.” Since 2005 Toledo’s team had already been hard at work. The interdisciplinary group, working alongside residents of Rocinha and São Conrado, produced a crucial document, the “Socio-Spatial Master Plan for the Sustainable Development of Rocinha,” more commonly known as the Plano Diretor da Rocinha – Rocinha’s Master Plan.

The full version of Toledo’s original Master Plan has taken on an air of a sacred text among community leaders, activists and scholars. When I asked William about his opinion of the Master Plan, he exclaimed, “Ahhh, it was all about saneamento básico [basic sanitation]. That was primary, number one”.173

After I had reviewed Toledo’s participatory Master Plan, which is over 1,000 pages divided into several folders and documents, it was clear William was correct. The sanitation interventions designed in the original Master Plan were among the centerpieces of PAC 1 Rocinha. The Master Plan took the socioeconomic needs of the community into consideration and included everything from funiculars to transport residents up and down Rocinha’s steep slopes to cultural preservation. The Plan’s main proposals for Rocinha included:174

1. Completing infrastructure and facilities for potable water, sewer, and storm water as well as for the collection and removal of solid waste (garbage);

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174 These proposals are based on an aggregation of dissertation interviews with Toledo, William and others, as well as on the Master Plan and other official PAC 1 Rocinha texts.
Ensuring better accessibility by improving traffic conditions on Estrada da Gávea (Rocinha’s main road), extending as far as possible the other smaller streets that serve the community, creating parking areas, and removing the physical barriers that now hinder the movement of pedestrians;

Establishing limits on Rocinha’s horizontal and vertical growth through eco-limits and by implementing zoning plans that consider local characteristics;

Approving a Housing Plan that would allow families forced to leave their homes due to upgrading or because they live in areas of risk to relocate within the community;

Building a factory in Rocinha that would manufacture prefabricated panels made of reinforced concrete to be used for the floors, walls and ceilings of the new PAC 1 housing, for drainage channels and for siding to prevent slopes from eroding or collapsing;

Valuing Rocinha’s culture and identity by creating a “cultural corridor” and preserving the history of the neighborhood by conserving important and irreplaceable buildings and spaces. Creating a strong cultural infrastructure through cinema and theater, cultural centers, libraries, and small spaces for the development of the arts, music, dance, etc.;

Special treatment of the contact areas between Rocinha and the adjacent neighborhoods of Gávea, and in particular São Conrado, where Rocinha will be the neighborhood’s main center of commerce and services, if it isn’t already;

Implementing facilities of common interest in the areas of transition between the formal and the informal city that can attract people from Rocinha and other neighborhoods;

Building in Rocinha a series of urban facilities including two model preschools, a public market, outpatient care unit, technical school, etc.

With the public bidding contest over and Toledo’s team victorious, a second wave of civil society momentum was necessary to ensure the project would be funded and implemented. Dedicated residents and leaders of Rocinha and São Conrado met regularly during 2006 to insure the project moved forward, which proved a challenge. This would, after all, be the first significant public investment in Rocinha since the early 1990s when CEDAE began providing water and basic sewage infrastructure, which it has been mentioned is in critical need of repairs and expansion. It was at this point that William made a shrewd move. He told me:

William – So, the public bidding was over, Toledo had won, Garotinho [the governor] was leaving the government, and Conde put me in contact with Sérgio Cabral, who at the time was a
[federal] senator. SO I went and took the project [Rocinha’s master plan] to Sérgio Cabral, who was still technically a senator...Cabral asked if he could use the project in his campaign for governor and he made a public commitment to do the works. As soon as he was sworn-in he called me to a meeting, on the 17 of January 2007, with all his secretaries. The secretaries went to a meeting with Lula. This is how the master plan entered into PAC, because the master plan was for Rocinha and when we had the meeting with Lula, I had already spoken to the minister Márcio Fortes [de Almeida, then Minister of the Federal Ministry of Cities]. He helped us tremendously, a great guy, a partner. The minister got R$ 100 million for Rocinha. Understand. Because the budget for PAC was larger [than the states’]. Because the government [Rio de Janeiro state] didn’t have any project for Rocinha, like they do today.

William took advantage of a campaign stop in Rocinha by then candidate for governor of Rio de Janeiro, Sérgio Cabral Filho. He asked Cabral, as he is known in Rio, if he were to win the election would he support and fund Toledo’s upgrading plan for Rocinha. Cabral, surrounded by cameras and microphones, was put on the spot and had little choice but to agree to support the plan if he were to win (Sarayed-Din 2009: 121). It is worth noting that Rocinha represents a large number of voters, upwards of 38,000, and can certainly boost any campaign (Rocinha PDS 2011: 59). Cabral won, and at least in regards to funding the favela upgrading work, he kept his word – although the state would soon impose itself and alter much of Toledo’s collaborative plan. The timing was perfect and Cabral, realizing that his promise to upgrade Rocinha was a blessing in disguise, seized the moment. He knew what he was doing from the start; he knew that if he did even a little upgrading in Rocinha that he could use that in his election in 2010 and get supporters elected as well.

In 2007, the federal government initiated its historic nationwide PAC development program, one of the socioeconomic cornerstones of Lula’s administration. By late 2006 Toledo’s plan was beginning to gain attention, especially among circles of urban scholars and architects. While still not referred to as PAC, Rio’s recently elected governor Sérgio Cabral announced on December 21,
2006 that Lula’s administration would be investing R$ 60 million (US$ 31.6 million) in Rocinha. The money would be used for the favela-upgrading project designed by Toledo. Cabral said during a 2008 interview in the Revista Fator Brasil that:

Just after being elected, I sent, via e-mail, the project to President Lula, and he liked it so much that he called me right back to say he would complete the work outlined in the project. After I took over, we formalized the partnership, and we not only included Rocinha’s project in PAC but we incorporated new resources and the initial investment of $ 60 million was raised to the current $ 180 million.

Once hostile to each other, Lula’s PT and Cabral’s PMDB had already struck a strategic alliance, federally and in Rio de Janeiro. The PT knew that upgrading Rocinha, Brazil’s most recognizable and symbolic favela, would also serve them well in future campaigns. Increasingly federal money, mainly from the state bank Caixa, was set aside for Rocinha, as the recently created federal Ministry of Cities (2003) established the guidelines on how the process would take place.

Problems Emerge

Until around 2008 it seemed that the Master Plan, with significant participation of local residents, would redefine Rocinha in positive ways. But serious problems began to emerge when the state government essentially thanked Toledo for all the hard work and then sent him on his way. The original Master Plan is considerably different than what the state government ended up implementing in the community. William told me:

William – The truth is Toledo was contracted to come up with the Master Plan. He put it all together with the collaboration of residents and then later the contract ended and it wasn’t renewed. And that’s when EMOP took over. EMOP took what Toledo had been planning to do and changed a lot of it. That’s where our fight began. The UPA was supposed to be a [full scale] hospital made of bricks and concrete, not that thing over there [plastic temporary siding], for example. Rua 4, they were supposed to remove the other side of the alleyway, this side [pointing]...and the changes they would make, always come already decided upon, from the top-down.

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175 Jungblut, Cristiane. “União Libera Recursos para Urbanizar a Rocinha.” O Globo. December 22, 2006. Page 33. This was before the project was known as PAC.
And the current administration [of UPMMR] never contested anything, and so the government did as they pleased.

The reasons for this are complex, but the initial 72 million the federal and state governments had pledged to Rocinha quickly dried up. By 2007 Cabral was governor, and all of the funds for the Master Plan had been spent. This is when the federal government really got involved and when PAC 1 in Rocinha was born. It is crucial to understand that PAC 1 in Rocinha, as well as the PAC 1 slum upgrading programs in Complexo do Alemão and Manguinhos, were born out of Rocinha’s Master Plan, which residents crafted with Toledo after the Three Day War in 2004.

PAC in Rocinha soon became a key political tool for Cabral in his 2010 re-election campaign, which in certain respects was already underway in 2008. The federal government had now officially launched PAC in Rocinha, with a budget of close to R$ 300 million, or about $170 million dollars. PAC 1 Rocinha (then simply known as PAC because there was no PAC 2) became equally important for Lula’s protégé President Dilma Rousseff. Toledo’s Master Plan included a full-scale hospital; instead a UPA was built, which is essentially a large health clinic with a first assistance unit. The UPA was finished in 2010, in time to appear in Cabral and Dilma’s campaigns.

Why was PAC a disappointment to so many of the residents and outsiders active in community development in Rocinha? To begin with, the previously omnipresent drug trade and the highly corrupt resident association interfered in negative ways. This was a theme highlighted by numerous research participants during interviews.

Toledo has expressed great concern and sadness regarding how PAC 1 remains unfinished. One of his proudest contributions to the Master Plan for PAC 1 was point five mentioned above: installing a factory in Rocinha that would manufacture prefabricated materials with reinforced mortar to be used for the new PAC 1 housing, drainage channels and for siding to prevent slopes from eroding or collapsing. He told me:
Toledo — I am really disheartened that certain important projects were scratch from the Plan. One of particular importance was the installation of a factory that would have built the material for the housing units using a much more advanced technology and at a cheaper cost. Local residents would have built all the material in Rocinha so it would not have been necessary to hire outside contractors to bring it in.

Toledo touched on a very important point, the role of private contractors in Rio’s favela upgrading. Much of the criticism of PAC 1 Rocinha, and of PAC 1 favela upgrading in Rio de Janeiro in general, has been focused on the state government, and to a lesser degree the federal government. But in one of interviews Toledo mentioned that the major problems began once the private contractors got involved. A consortium of three construction companies was responsible for the upgrading that took place in each of the three large favelas that received PAC 1 resources, Rocinha, Complexo do Alemão and Manguinhos. In Rocinha the consortium was called Novos Tempos and it was comprised of the following three corporations: Queiroz Galvão, Carioca Engenharia, and Caenge. EMOP and the Novo Tempos consortium have been under federal investigation since March 2014 for allegedly rigging the favela-upgrading bidding processes, along with the other two large consortiums that implemented projects in Complexo do Alemão and Manguinhos. The first two, Queiroz Galvão and Carioca Engenharia are also under investigation in numerous other criminal investigations, including the recent Petrobras scandal. The third contractor, Caenge S.A - Construcao Administracao E Engenharia, is a shadowy enterprise that none of my interview participants had ever heard of and which has no website where more information could be found. Even the company’s name, Caenge, appears spelled differently in government documents and the media, sometimes as Caerenge.177

Related to this, Toledo also criticized the teleférico (aerial cable-car, or simply “cable-car”) that is planned for Rocinha, which in his view is being built to enrich the construction

177 This is but one example from the Rio’s State Government’s website. http://www.intranet.rj.gov.br/exibe_pagina.asp?id=1743. Last accessed 4/12/2015.
companies, for political propaganda and for tourists. Toledo explained that Pomagalski S.A. (Poma) the company supplying the parts for Rio’s favela cable-cars, is French, and that all parts will have to be imported and are this much more expensive than domestic technologies such as funiculars, which Toledo planned for a number of areas in Rocinha. Poma is also under investigation for their involvement in PAC 1 Complexo do Alemão. He was adamant about his opposition to the cable car, which he said would consume the majority of the PAC 2 resources. He also said that it would require thousands of residents’ displacement during its construction and later for its maintenance. He said that the massive costs of the cable car could be better used for finishing some of the PAC 1 projects that remain incomplete and for other cultural and social activities.

IN THE NAME OF PEACE: UPPS, SOCIAL CONTROL & THE FAILED ATTEMPT TO REBRAND A CITY-SIZED FAVELA

In 2009, Rio’s state government officially unveiled the UPP program, based on a pilot experience that began in December 2008 in the favela of Santa Marta, located in the primarily middle- and upper-middle-class South Zone neighborhood of Botafogo (Cano 2012: 4). Instead of the emblematic combative operations conducted sporadically in search of drugs and criminals, the police decided to remain in Santa Marta. The aim was to reclaim control of the “territory” and to avoid intense gun battles.

178 According to research on aerial cable cars in urban environments conducted by Alshalalfah et al. (2012: 256-257) the technical jargon for the type of cable-car EMOP designed for Rocinha is known as a “monocable detachable gondola”.

The government of the Santa Marta quickly spread an account of highly positive results throughout the media. Officials claimed shootouts almost completely ended in the community and the police’s constant presence forced the armed drug factions to relinquish their territory. Public opinion polls showed societal support for the idea of the UPPs, and soon the private sector demonstrated significant interest in the project as well. For the first time businesses became notably engaged in a public security intervention (Cano 2012: 4). Rio’s winning of the Olympic bid in late 2009 and the subsequent marketing of the UPPs multiplied the intervention’s national and international visibility and strategic importance. From that point on the UPPs emerged as the cornerstone of the Rio’s public security policy (Cano 2011: 4).

After only two months, the experimental UPP in Santa Marta proved to be so popular that a second UPP was established. The second UPP was established in the notorious Cidade de Deus, City of God, located in Jacarepaguá, a lower-middle and working-class neighborhood in Rio’s West Zone. With 36,500 inhabitants, Cidade de Deus was seven times larger than Santa Marta (IBGE 2010). The intensity and violence associated with the local drug trade made Cidade de Deus a more challenging site. Additionally, there existed an acrimonious relationship between the police and the community’s residents (Cano 2012: 17).

Two days later, on February 18, 2009, the third UPP was established in Jardim Batan, a small favela in the working-class West Zone neighborhood of Realengo. The actual extent considered “favela” (informal) is relatively small (app. 5,000 residents, or 21% of the policed area). But the Jardim Batan UPP patrols a region interspersed with low-income “non-favela” (formal) neighborhoods and small favelas, with a total population of 24,000 (IPP, IBGE 2010). To this day, the Jardim Batan UPP is the only unit implemented in an area with a history of milícia (paramilitary criminal organization) activity.

These first UPPs reported a drastic reduction in the presence of armed criminals, as well as a considerable decrease in the number of homicides. Authorities claimed the police occupation of
communities also increased perceptions of security among favela residents (Gonçalves and Bautès 2011: 3). From this point the UPPs consistently expanded.

By early 2015 there were 38 UPPs in Rio’s favelas, established at a rate of about one every two months. Public security officials assert that 9,543 specially trained police officers serve 1.5 million people, living in 264 pacified “territories,” which have been reclaimed by the state. The goal for 2014 was to reach 40 UPPs in 2014, a feat Rio just missed.

If the numbers do not seem to add up it is because many of the UPPs patrol several areas. For example, the one in Complexo do Alemão patrols 12 bordering favelas. The Borel UPP covers the area of eight neighboring favelas. And the Coroa, Fallet and Fogueteiro UPP controls nine adjacent favelas.

UPPs are coordinated by the Rio de Janeiro State Military Police (PMERJ), who claim the special units are equipped with officers specifically trained and educated in how to pacify favela communities. The UPPs and the PMERJ are under the jurisdiction of Rio’s Secretaria de Estado de Segurança (State Secretary of Security), which is headed by the Secretary of Security. Selected for the post by the recently elected governor Sérgio Cabral (late 2006), José Mariano Beltrame has been Rio’s Secretary of Security since 2007, a key position he has held longer than any previous administrator. Known popularly as Beltrame, he is a former Federal Police Deputy and central figure in the history of Rio's UPPs who describes the “mission” of the UPPs as an effort to “regain impoverished territories dominated for decades by traffickers and armed milícias” and “bring peace to communities” (Mello and Cunha 2011: 273).180

INSTITUTIONS OF PUBLIC SECURITY AND THE POLICE IN BRAZIL

This section clarifies a few key points regarding the police in Brazil. To begin with, the term used in Brazil in reference to the larger institutional sphere that includes the federal and state

180 Author’s translation
police, as well as the municipal/civil guards is “public security” rather than “public safety” or “citizens’ security,” which are common terms in other countries (Cano 2006: 133). Secondly, in Brazil there are no municipal police forces, in other words, there are no equivalents of the New York Police Department (NYPD) or Los Angeles Police Department.

Public security in Brazil has always been the responsibility of the states (Cano 2006: 142). Under the federal model, state public security forces play the foremost role in combating and investigating crime. Each state has its police forces, the Civil Police and the Military Police. The Civil Police investigate crimes and conduct police inquiries, while the Military Police are a uniformed force responsible for routine patrolling and maintaining public order (Costa 2011: 23, 31).

Integrating public security policies has been made considerably more difficult by the continuation of two separate police forces. Generally, the Military and Civil Police engage law enforcement independently, with little coordination. Consequently, neither agency performs the full scope of policing, from prevention to fighting crime. Predictably, this contributes to overlap and rivalry between the two forces (Costa 2011: 27). As Brazil re-established civilian government and democratic institutions many hoped for the demilitarization and consolidation of the Military and Civil Police. But the Constitution of 1988, despite many progressive additions, essentially preserves military jurisdiction as well as the separation of the two agencies (Costa 2011: 27, 30-31).

The federal government’s primary role within Brazil’s public security apparatus is in designing policies and funding statewide police agencies. It provides resources to encourage interventions in states that meet specific technical and political requirements (Cano 2006: 134). The Federal Police are the only federal level security agency presented in this section; though, there are others such as the Força Nacional de Segurança Pública (National Public Security

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Force). The main responsibilities of the Federal Police are: investigating political crimes, suppressing drug trafficking, providing border security, handling customs duties, and investigating other types of interstate and federal crimes (Cano 2006: 134). In 2010, there were approximately 12,000 Federal Police agents in Brazil, a number that is significantly lower than many state police forces, such as Rio de Janeiro’s. Considering their wide-ranging responsibilities the limited work force impedes the efficient execution of their duties.

The principal role of local (municipal) governments within the larger public security system is one of prevention, although in Rio de Janeiro and other cities the expansion of the Guarda Municipal, Municipal Guard, has come to include regulation of informality and the forceful repression of dissent (Cano 2006: 134; Gonçalves and Bautès 2011: 11). The 1988 Federal Constitution mandates state and federal control of public security and leaves the municipal guards to the municipalities with no mandate to act in the defense of citizens.

Municipal authorities, while severely limited in their ability to combat violent crime, have played an increasingly important role in social control, particularly in Rio de Janeiro in the build up to the World Cup and Olympics. Paes has made wide use of the Municipal Guards and enforced strict policies based on those implemented in New York City by Mayor Giuliani. His Choque de Ordem (Shock of Order) is a revamped version of broken window’s style social control policies. The Guarda Municipal has not only waged a war in recent years on street vendors, the homeless, informal parking attendants, and other unregulated and undesirable workers/citizens, they also are present at favela demolitions of buildings constructed without permits (which essentially includes all edifices and houses in favelas). There have been

\[183\] Official website of the Brazilian Federal Government, accessible at: http://www.brasil.gov.br/governo/2011/01/policia-federal-apresenta-banco-de-2010. In addition to the 12,000 agents, there are also nearly 3,000 administrative positions within the Federal Police. Last consulted 4/29/2014.
\[184\] For instance, there is no equivalent of the U.S. Border Patrol in Brazil. While the Armed Forces take part in patrolling Brazil’s porous border, the Federal Police are also responsible for this arduous task.
hundreds in Rocinha alone that the city has marked for demolition to control internal real estate speculation and disorderly growth.

Through the course of history the Police, as an institution, have been shaped in accordance with the existing socioeconomic and cultural context in Brazil. Despite changes in socioeconomic and cultural circumstances, many scholars argue that certain forms of *habitus* (Bourdieu 1990: 52-55) have persisted among the police (Sousa and Morais 2011: 2). Costa analyzes two of the world’s largest police institutions – the police of Rio de Janeiro and the NYPD – and he concludes that numerous practices (e.g., torture, extrajudicial executions) that are common to Rio’s police are remnants from the right-wing military dictatorship in Brazil (Costa 2008: 416). He suggests this phenomenon is present to varying degrees in all Brazilian police forces. He clarifies, however, that while this is may be the case, Brazil’s police have been a violent and oppressive institution since their inception in the early 1800s, particularly in their treatment of blacks and the poor (Costa 2011: 30). The problems of violence and corruption are profoundly ingrained. Costa offers a discouraging conclusion, but one central to critical criminology. He explains that any attempts to address public security problems are complicated by the animosity between the police and society that is a mere reflection of historically systemic inequalities in Brazil, “characterized by a logic of social exclusion, spatial segregation, and police brutality” (Costa 2011: 31). With this in mind, Coimbra adds:

> It is important to remember that, in that recent past, the political opponent was kidnapped, tortured, isolated, killed, hidden and secretly buried as an indigent, thus perpetuating the torture of their family and friends. Today, the same practices are applied to the poor in general, to the excluded, to the so-called

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“dangerous,” who are annihilated as mere objects. The extermination of the
subaltern has been fully justified as a necessary “social cleansing,” applauded by
many elites and middle-class segments of our society. Today, in these neoliberal
times, as during the period of the military dictatorship, the “enemy within” must
be not only silenced, but also exterminated. The relationship between poverty
and crime – intensely manufactured and disseminated throughout the twentieth
century – has been upgraded to the present day through the discourses of those
defending the militarization of public security, who are fearful of the waves of
violence that the media sensationalizes. It is also present when one believes their
claims that our country is experiencing a “civil war,” and that it is natural for
suspects – because they are poor – to be tortured and even disappear. Such
beliefs were prevalent throughout the entire last century – at least – in the
thoughts, perceptions, feelings and behaviors of Brazilians (Coimbra 2001: 17-18).

Costa (2011: 20), Holloway (1997: 50), and others remind us that from their early nineteenth
century origins the police in Brazil have been an institution designed to protect the interests of
elites and readily willing to inflict terror and lethal force upon the sectors of society perceived as
undesirable or a threat. This was true over a century before the Vargas era or 1964 military
dictatorships. Prior to the Vargas Regime, the bulk of violence was directed towards slaves and
after their abolition, to the so-called “dangerous classes” (Costa 2011: 20). While the poor have
always been recipients of police oppression, from the early 1930s until the early 1980s the
targets of Brazil’s security forces shifted to a certain extent, to include groups such as
communists, Jews, homosexuals, blacks, unions, left-leaning intellectuals/students, and
particular immigrant groups (Costa 2011: 20). Costa emphasizes: “In this regard, it does not
seem useful to analyze state violence as an ‘authoritarian legacy.’ Police brutality has been a
constant presence in the region and has historically been tolerated by society” (Costa 2011: 20).

While rejecting the premise that the dictatorships are responsible for police brutality in Brazil,
Costa, however, clearly believes the increased militarization of the police from the 1930 to early
1980s has made it extremely difficult to reform state level forces. He mentions that during the
dictatorships, “the military introduced a series of institutional changes that even today make it
difficult to control these institutions” (Costa 2011: 20).

Even in the twenty-first century, the police are still trained with the spirit of the military and
its methods. They are trained in how to annihilate the enemy rather than how to protect citizens.

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Carvalho emphasizes the extraordinary levels of corruption within the contemporary police. A significant number of them are also increasingly involved in organized and street crimes. When disciplined and expelled from police forces, officers turn into potential career criminals, with countless cases of them organizing underworld firms specializing in contract killing or favela milícias that extort entire communities for protection (Carvalho 2008: 213).

PUBLIC SECURITY IN RIO DE JANEIRO

As of 2006 there were no comprehensive state-level security policies in Rio de Janeiro. The schemes in place lacked planning, details of specific objectives, or mechanisms for evaluation. They were also generally reactive in nature; based on violently suppressing crime rather than attempting to prevent it (Cano 2006: 136). The objective of police operations has been to totally annihilate the “enemy,” often with complete disregard for the social consequences (Cano 2006: 137).

Cano claims that Rio’s police forces have generally viewed their main obstacle to fighting crime as matter of caliber (gun size/power), and so their search for solutions has been limited to guaranteeing officers have superior firepower over their “enemies.” Participant observations in Rocinha and other Rio de Janeiro favelas confirm the issue of “caliber.” Until the UPP process began in Rocinha, for example, it was common to hear people from all walks of life describe how the community’s drug traffickers had more and better firepower than the police: even if most people understood this was an exaggeration.

The ostentatious displays of bravura are almost impossible to describe. Rocinha’s drug traffickers paraded through the community carrying excessively powerful weapons: such as bazookas, rocket/grenade launchers, grenade belts and even anti-aircraft (.30 mm) machine guns, often mounted on tripods in truck beds. In Rocinha, shootouts involved AK47s, AR15s and other assault rifles, while the more powerful war grade weapons were rarely used. They
functioned as deterrence, essentially warning the police and rival factions that depending on their actions, “all hell could break loose.”

The official reaction is that police operations in poor areas like Rocinha resemble military operations in enemy territory: complete with invasions, occupations, checkpoints, curfews, and so on. Within this militarized context, it is obvious that there will be countless abuses of human rights, above all concerning the use and abuse of physical force. Shootouts in poor communities produce staggeringly high death rates, including “accidental” victims (Cano 2006: 137). In 2014 the police killed 541 people in greater Rio de Janeiro, and another 43 (total 584) in the remainder of the state (ISP 2012). To put these figures in perspective in 2014 Rio de Janeiro’s police killed almost the same amount of people as were killed in all homicides (593) in New York City (333) and Los Angeles (260).188

Police killings have dropped notably since their high in 2007, when they killed 1,330 people in the entire state of Rio, of which approximately 1,300 were in greater Rio. The steady drop occurred while the city and state of Rio de Janeiro came under increased domestic and foreign pressure to reduce crime. It also coincided with the December 2008 introduction of the UPPs and the securing of the 2016 Olympics one year later. Curiously, police killings in the state dropped from 1,330 in 2007 to 416 in 2013, while at the same time the number of “missing persons” steadily increased from 4,633 in 2007 to 5,822 in 2013, a fact many find suspicious.189

Interviews I conducted correspond with what the literature indicates: Young men, particularly from high-violence favela communities are often tortured once arrested and


imprisoned (Cano 2006: 13). It is no surprise that most young residents of Rio’s favelas view
the police an adversary because the police, as an institution, unquestionably view them as the
enemy. Each favela is unique, but it is common for residents to be more frightened by the police
than drug dealers who generally are raised in the communities where they operate, and because
the traffickers, although often extremely violent, are more predictable. In light of the fact that
the Rio de Janeiro State Military Police When the police in greater Rio kill 541 people in a year
(2014) fear of them is not hard to understand.

In favelas, police corruption occurs on various scales. Misconduct ranges from small bribes
residents pay to avoid minor infractions, such as motorists or passengers on motorcycle taxis
(mototaxis) not wearing helmets; or when officers confiscate (either for personal use or out of
spite) expensive items like TVs or gold chains from residents if proof of purchase (receipts)
cannot be promptly provided. Since the 1980s Rio’s police have also frequently engaged in
illegal activities for profit, from kidnapping for ransom to association with drug traffickers
(Leeds 2004: 246). While the practice is not new, by the turn of the century there have been
growing incidents of police officers forming favela crime units known as milícias that specialize
in protection rackets (Misse 2007: 154). In the worst cases, Rio’s security forces form “killing for
hire firms” or are often involved in revenge-driven massacres that have killed up to 29 people in

The public security crisis that began during the 1980s, the same time that Brazil’s homicide
rate began steadily climbing, led to a demand for increased federal intervention in public
security (Zaluar 2004: 2013; Cano 2006: 134). In 2007, the federal government launched the
National Public Security with Citizenship Program (PRONASCI), committing itself to invest
US$ 3.746 billion, until the end of 2012 (Soares 2007: 92). Pronasci was situated within the
framework of the opening of the 12th Congress of the United Nations on Crime Prevention and
Criminal Justice (Gonçalves and Bautès 2011: 3). According to a number of PRONASCI’s chief
proponents, many of whom were from the federal Ministry of Justice, the Program represented
a new paradigm in Brazilian politics because it attempted to fuse the implementation of security policy with socioeconomic objectives, with a clear emphasis on identifying the root causes of violence and crime (Gonçalves and Bautès 2011: 3). In theory, it was a national policy influenced by critical criminology.

Federal authorities were to put PRONASCI into operation with the active collaboration of organizations at the federal, state and municipal levels, as well as with the participation of families and entire communities (Gonçalves and Bautès 2011: 12). Municipal authorities sought to improve public security by ensuring social mobilization and civil society participation.¹⁹⁰

Among PRONASCI’s main objectives were to improve the harsh reality of Brazil’s public security professionals (e.g., salary increase, benefits and training in human rights), to reform the prison system, to combat police corruption, and to foster the commitment of low-income residents in preventing violence. PRONASCI targeted 15-24 year olds who were most at risk of becoming involved in drug-trafficking (Gonçalves and Bautès 2011: 13; Dowdney 2003: 165).

PRONASCI also recommended the creation of a community-based police force and required that state and local authorities guarantee more participation of communities in the management and control of local law enforcement initiatives. Despite its preventive and community-based discourse, Article VI, Section V, of Federal Act No. 11.530 (10/24/2007), required state police forces to commit to “territorial pacification,” i.e., favela pacification. Practically speaking, in Rio de Janeiro this denotes bellicose invasions of favelas followed by permanent occupation. It was out of this framework that recommendations were made to “pacify” numerous territories (favelas), and in December 2008, the first Police Pacification Unit (UPP) was created as Rio de Janeiro’s institutional response (Gonçalves and Bautès 2011: 3).

COMMUNITY POLICING IN RIO DE JANEIRO: SITUATING THE UPPS

¹⁹⁰ Carvalho and Silva 2011: 66; Gonçalves and Bautès 2011: 13
The constant attention Rio’s UPP program has been receiving since 2009 gives the impression that it is the first attempt to implement community policing in the city’s favelas (Costa 2011: 26). Community/proximity policing has been tried on a number of occasions in Rio since Brazil began transitioning to democracy in the early 1980s. Costa mentions: “Rio de Janeiro’s public security policies have wavered between these two kinds of policing strategies. Sometimes the use of force is privileged as the primary mode of action, and sometimes alternative strategies are embraced. This oscillation can be seen in the contrast between strategies of ‘confrontation’ and attempts to implement community policing” (Costa 2011: 26).

The first community policing efforts were made in 1983 in the neighborhoods of Grajaú, Laranjeiras, and Urca. This trial run influenced a number of other proximity policing initiatives during the 1980s (Montandon and Ribeiro 2014: 238-243). Experiments with proximity policing began in the 1990s, including a well-known effort (considered the first systematic attempt) in 1992 in Copacabana. Next was, the program known as Grupamento de Aplicação Prático Escolar (GAPE) – School Practice Application Group. The initiative’s name derives from the young officers who had recently graduated from a special community-policing curriculum within the Rio’s Military Police Academy. It was first implemented in the city’s oldest standing favela, Morro da Providência, in 1993 (Montandon and Ribeiro 2014: 246-247).

From 1995 to 1999, the discourse and practices of Rio’s Military Police took a dramatic turn away from community policing. This was the period of the “Wild West Bonus” policy, so named because of salary increases granted to police who killed “criminals” during confrontations (Montandon and Ribeiro 2014: 247-248). This marked the official return of the infamous favela confrontation policy and a period in which police killings increased considerably (Costa 2011: 27-28).

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The immediate predecessor of the UPP project was a program titled *Grupamento de Policiamento em Áreas Especiais* (GPAE) – Special Area Policing Group, and it is the best-known effort prior to the UPPs. The GPAE was first implemented in 2000, in a hillside favela region that adjoined the communities of Morro de Cantagalo and Pavão-Pavãozinho. Situated between the affluent neighborhoods of Copacabana, Ipanema, and Lagoa, GPAE was to replace the police’s deep-rooted reliance on violent, sporadic incursions with a policy of permanent community policing that involved close relations (hence *proximity policing*) with local residents. The goal was to reduce gun-related incidents through social programs rather than engage criminals in active combat (Cano 2006: 138).

Fontoura, Rivero and Rodrigues explain that the architects of Rio’s GPAEs defended the public security intervention in favela communities because authorities believed that processes of rapid urbanization and intense migration without proper planning or adequate involvement of the state contributed to the “disorderly growth” of favelas.\(^\text{192}\) These factors purportedly produced unorganized urban physical characteristics that were ideal circumstances for the proliferation of urban disorder and criminal activity (IPEA 2010: 178). The rationale for proximity/community policing was clearly based on the idea of controlling *informal* areas, urban spaces where *order* needed to be imparted through ideas based on broken windows theory. They were to focus their activities on reducing gun-related incidents rather than combating crime in general (Cano 2006: 139; IPEA 2010: 177-178).

GPAE quickly lost credibility in the pilot communities as institutionalized brutal tactics proved irrepressible. Whatever hope existed prior to implementation was almost immediately dashed as local residents lost trust and faith in the program (IPEA 2010: 181). The only way the GPAE program could have proved successful in the eyes of the community was if it had been

\(^{192}\) In 1979, Federal Law 6.766 created the Zona Especial de Interesse Social, or Special Zone of Social Interest (ZEIS), which is a legal instrument that covers guidelines on land regularization and urbanism in informal settlements and includes mechanisms to protect these “spaces” from arbitrary evictions and even real estate speculation. Today most favelas in Rio de Janeiro and many other Brazilian cities are designated as ZEIS (Gonçalves 2013: 266; 284).
accompanied by sufficient and efficient social projects, but social investments were limited and
the population constantly felt monitored and pressured to snitch on neighbors (IPEA 2010: 181).
This lack of local-level support coupled with a series of bureaucratic fumbles and limitations in
police culture ultimately led to the demise of the program (IPEA 2010: 181).

After the GPAE community policing program failed Rio’s police refocused on the long-
standing policy of confrontation (Ribeiro, Dias and Carvalho 2008: 6). Former governor (2007-
April 2014) Sérgio Cabral, the official most strongly associated with Rio’s UPPs (after state
security secretary José Mariano Beltrame) ran his 2006 campaign as a public security hawk
(Ribeiro et al. 2008: 6) and the next two years Rio’s police killed record numbers. Cabral
regularly asserted that he would not back down and that the state would hunt, kill, or capture
favela drug traffickers (Ribeiro, Camilla and Dias 2008: 6). In the end, the program also lacked
political will because, as usual, short-term election based interests proved more influential than
the risks involved in any possible long term gains (IPEA 2010: 181;183). During his first two
years in office Cabral was perceived as one of the most aggressive governors in Rio’s history, in
regards to violent favela operations. Many have forgotten this history, or find it ironic, since he
is known for his “road to Damascus” transformation with the well marketed UPPs.

POLICE PACIFICATION UNITS

UPPs are Rio de Janeiro’s latest public security intervention. The program was proposed as a
possible answer to Rio’s urgent public security challenges, and equally important if not more so,
for the need to significantly reform police tactics. UPPs have been marketed as a form of
innovative community or “proximity policing” (Mello and Cunha 2011: 272-273).

UPPs differ from previous community policing programs because of the significant federal,
state and private resources involved. For instance, the federal Ministry of Justice budgeted for
the National Secretary of Public Security (SENASP) from 2008-2011 (Lázaro 2012: 101-102).
Mindful it would be spent on entrenched strategies of oppression and confrontation; during the same period SENASP reduced funding specifically directed towards *policamiento* (policing or law enforcement). Instead, historic investments were made for police training, citizenship and social programs and on the better treatment of public security professionals (Lázaro 2012: 125-129, 131-133). Between 2008 and 2011 77% of PRONASCI’s budget went towards *Bolsa-Formação* (Training-Grant), an R$ 433 (US$ 230) monthly allowance for all police officers (meeting the grant requirements) undergoing PRONASCI’s unique educational and training program.193

The political will, mainly at the federal level, that facilitated this unparalleled funding for alternative methods of policing has allowed the UPPs to far exceed previous community policing programs in Rio’s favelas. José Mario Beltrame (known as Beltrame) recently described Rio’s UPPs as, “an unprecedented attempt anywhere in the world, we created a type of community policing in more than 200 favelas” (Beltrame 2015: 5).194

PRONASCI’s 2008-2011 budget, with counterpart state and private sector funding, allowed for the training and hiring of the large number of Military Police officers involved (Gonçalves and Bautès 2011: 3). As more officers were sent into favela based UPPs tensions increased within the Military Police and between the Military Police and unsatisfied residents of non-favela neighborhoods, who alleged that fewer officers were patrolling their communities. Police Pacification Units are also unique because they are comprised of generally younger recently graduated officers who receive the monthly Training-Grant for completing a special human rights and community policing oriented curriculum. This approach was intended to reduce corruption in UPPs by filling the posts with officers who had not yet been exposed to the traditional corruption and brutality endemic to Rio’s Military Police (Cano 2012: 18-20). To this, *WikiLeaks* released a September 2009 United States Consulate cable titled “Counter-Insurgency

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193 In Lázaro 2012: 105-106 and from the official PRONASCI website.
194 Beltrame, José Mariano. Cadernos VivaRio. Ano 1, N. 1. April 2015. Beltrame has been
Doctrine Comes To Rio’s Favelas”. The communication was prepared by the Consul General in Rio, Dennis Hearne, who mentioned: “UPP commander Colonel Jose Carvalho – a former United Nations Peacekeeping Commander – told us on August 25 that only new police academy recruits are selected into the UPP program. ‘We need fresh, strong minds, not a Rambo,’ Carvalho stated. ‘The older generation of cops is more oriented to kicking down doors and shooting people.’”\(^{195}\)

Still, numerous scholars have been quick to point out that installing UPPs in tactical areas has also served important economic interests (Freeman 2012: 117). For example, Consul General Hearne communicated in the same September 2009 cable:

Some economists have forecast an increase of 90 million Brazilian Reals (45 million USD) in new property and service taxes that would go towards the Rio municipal government, should all favelas come under the authority of Rio state. The president of Rio electricity provider “Light” estimated the economy of Rio de Janeiro could grow by around 38 billion Brazilian Reals (21 billion USD) through increased commerce and new jobs. According to Andre Urani, an economist with the Institute of Labor and Social Research (IETS), Light loses at least 200 million USD per year due to pirated electricity in the favelas. Emphasizing the potential market in favelas, Urani stated, “Imagine the revenue increase if Light could successfully turn the one million illegal users of its services into customers (Hearne 2009).

The cable ends, as Freeman (2012: 117) notes, with Hearne adding: bolstered by private enterprise lured by the prospects of reintegrating some one million favela residents into mainstream markets, this program could remake the social and economic fabric of Rio de Janeiro.”

The immediate economic connection between the sporting mega-events and UPPs is clear, but as Freeman and numerous other scholars argue the relationship is intended to serve more

longitudinal interests as well. Dominant political and economic groups in Rio clearly indicate this is the intention, and not only in classified documents like WikiLeaks cable, but openly in the media. Since their launch in 2009 UPPs have contributed to intensified real estate speculation in areas close to where most have been inaugurated (Gonçalves and Bautès 2011: 4). Studies also indicate that the UPPs have had an even greater effect on speculation and rising costs within the informal real estate markets of pacified favelas (Neri 2011).

There were numerous pre-UPP attempts, with some large enterprises lasting (e.g., Itaú, Pacheco, Caixa Econômica Federal) and others leaving after a short period (e.g., McDonalds). But it was only during the speculative lead-up, and particularly after the installation of the UPP, that a significant entry of large-scale outside businesses, and even international corporations, established themselves in Rocinha. Among them, Banco do Brasil, Ricardo Eletro, Casas Bahia, Yes!, Cacao Show, Mundo Verde and the North American fast-food chain Subway.

In recent years virtually all of Rio de Janeiro became more expensive, but as Neri (2011) and others have suggested the rise in cost of living has been even greater in “pacified” favelas. As Mariana Pereira (pseudonym) mentioned, thousands families and individual in Rocinha now having to budget, or get second jobs, to pay utilities like electricity (to Light, a private corporation) that they had previously not paid. Many already paid, according to José Martins roughly 70 percent before the UPP and close to 85 percent afterwards, and many wanted to anyway. More residents now pay for water (to CEDAE, a state owned company), and eventually, it is rumored, they will pay the IPTU, property taxes. Paying the generally expensive IPTU is largely dependent on the progress of land regularization and property title programs in Rocinha, which have been moving at a snail’s pace for a decade now. Harvey refers more to privatizations, as in public institutions and companies being privatized, here I am highlighting the influx of private business, much of it large-scale that until recently had been largely deterred by perceptions of poverty, violence and general social disorder. Perhaps the best examples were

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196 Dissertation interview, May 2013
satellite TV carriers like Claro, Embratel and Sky. UPP Rocinha is a prime example of surplus absorption through the opening of new geographic regions.

Alongside the sporting mega-events and UPPs large urban renovation schemes have also been initiated in several key areas of the city (Bautès and Gonçalves 2011: 3-4). Favela upgrading is an important part of Rio’s renewal, but the most expressive example is the massive *Porto Maravilha* revitalization project in Rio’s downtown port district. The mega-events and urban renovations in strategic “non-favela” areas of Rio are the main factors explaining the increased influx of national and international capital in the form of real estate (Bautès and Gonçalves 2011: 3-4). I agree with Freeman (2012: 111) that this is only possible through massive social spending in favelas, specifically through the UPPs and favela upgrading schemes. The UPPs are a clear indication that public security, or at least the perception of it, is vital to stability in Rio de Janeiro and the image publicized by authorities (Bautès and Gonçalves 2011: 14).

But informality is not only pervasive in favelas, as the media often propagates. To address this fact the City’s “zero tolerance” policy (Shock of Order) has been rigorously enforced by the Municipal Guards since 2009 in an additional attempt to accelerate capital accumulation by making Rio appear more orderly to potential investors (Bautès and Gonçalves 2011: 11). Critics counter that Rio’s state official used PRONASCI federal funds disproportionately on establishing UPPs in favelas, at the expense of numerous other urgent security needs (Bautès and Gonçalves 2011: 13).

During an April 2013 dissertation interview with resident and local activist Roque, he echoed what many critics of the UPPs have been arguing, that the program was designed primarily as a marketing tactic for the World Cup and Olympics, and that they do not address Rio’s broader security needs. Rio’s state government pledged 40 “pacification” units by the 2014 World Cup
and 100 by the 2016 Olympics, but as of January 2016 there were only 39 UPPs in Rio de Janeiro.\footnote{Information from UPP website, retrievable from: http://www.upprj.com/. Last Accessed 1/26/2016.}

One of the main reasons it has not been as easy to keep adding new units is because UPPs are expensive. According to an interview with public security secretary José Mariano Beltrame in June 2011, each UPP soldier costs R$60 thousand a year (or US$ 36 thousand) and the average UPP has 250 police.\footnote{Conversion based on 2011 annual average exchange rate.} Currently (January 2016) the UPPs employ 9,543 police at an annual cost of about R$573 million, or US$ 244 million.\footnote{Conversion based on 2014 annual average exchange rate, the most recent year data is available from the World Bank.} The goal of 40 UPPs by the 2014 World Cup was not achieved. If the 100 UPPs goal for the 2016 Olympics were reach there would have to be at least 25,000 soldiers and R$ 1.5 billion (US$ 640 million) in annual expenditures.\footnote{Conversion based on 2014 annual average exchange rate, the most recent year data is available from the World Bank.} Rio’s Military Police force had 38,872 officers before the UPP program (Freeman 2012: 105). According to Freeman (2012: 105) by 2016 the UPP officers would account for two-thirds of the entire force and more than one-third of the state security budget, which was R$5 billion (US$ 2.84 billion) for 2010. Freeman explains that when Rio’s officials submitted their Olympic bid in September 2007 they budgeted R$2.5 billion (US$ 1.3 billion) in security expenditures that “apparently did not include UPP expenses”. But, he adds, an even greater challenge than money “is training new recruits fast enough to keep up with the time-table” (Freeman 2012: 105).

**ROCINHA’S UPP**

Local activist Roque was sharply critical of the UPP in Rocinha and in Rio de Janeiro in general. He expressed an opinion that at the time most residents of Rocinha would probably...
have considered a bit harsh. Since then these types of sentiments have become increasingly common, particularly in light of events that unfolded after August 2013.

Roque – I think that in the short and mid-term [the UPP’s] is a negative strategy. I won’t even waste time contemplating the kind of results the UPPs might bring in long-term because they won’t last. This so-called “security policy” is not a policy designed to benefit everyone, it is a policy of the dominated and the dominators, the exploited and the exploiters. They [UPPs] are here just to show that for the two mega-events that will take place in Rio de Janeiro, the favelas are occupied, as in, “don’t worry, those uncivilized beings are under control, you all [tourists/visitors] can do as you please.” After the events they [the UPPs] will leave and the traffickers will remain...The secretary of public security says he has handed back the territories [UPP favelas] to the people, to the workers. LIAR! Everyone knows that all the UPPs still have drugs and heavily armed traffickers operating in them. It’s nothing but a façade to appease the investors and tourists.

SHOCK OF PEACE: D-DAY IN ROCINHA

Here I provide a description of the day security forces invaded and occupied Rocinha in November 2011. That year my birthday fell on the date thousands of police and military officers stormed Rocinha, a day locals called “D-Day” in reference to the US Armed Forces storming the shores of Normandy, France in World War II. At 4:00 AM on Sunday, November 13, Rocinha was invaded and occupied, as security forces declared peace was finally being bestowed on the community. The police occupation was only the first phase of the state’s official pacification process. Rocinha’s UPP would be inaugurated nine months later, in September 2012.

The day before the invasion I was relaxing at my apartment in Laboriaux, Rocinha, enjoying a small cookout my friends had arranged. By 9:00 PM neighbors passing by our place were warning it would be wise to wrap things up and get inside the house. The word on the street and
in the media was that the mega-operation would begin shortly after midnight. We ended the festivities early and within a couple of hours were in a peaceful slumber. Rocinha was uncharacteristically silent. The apartment I was renting at the time was located at the highest point in the community, only a meter from Laboriaux’s main road, Rua Maria do Carmo. At approximately 4:15 AM Sunday morning a noise terrifyingly loud roared up the street, causing the ground to tremble and violently rattle windows. It was so intense that despite my almost uncontrollable curiosity and desire to take pictures to record the historic event, I did not venture out into the dark of the early morning to see what was happening. I was afraid that upon simply opening my front door I might be shot or run over. It became obvious the thundering noise was from military tanks and other heavy vehicles. Among them, Rio’s infamous terror-inducing armored vehicle, known as the Caveirão, or Giant Skull. The Caveirão is painted black and exhibits BOPE’s official badge: a diabolical skull stabbed with a dagger through the cranium, with two gold pistols crossed behind it. The heavy vehicles ripped up sections of pavement and crushed some of the bricks that once lined Rua Maria do Carmo. Approximately two hours later, there were helicopters buzzing above our houses while the tanks that had climbed up the steep road earlier were descending, dragging behind them wire nets filled with guns, ammo and other contraband they claimed to have found stashed in the jungle that surrounds Laboriaux.

*Operation Shock of Peace* was the embodiment of shock and awe. The police invasion was a sensational show of force, but surprisingly, not a shot was fired the entire day. During the invasion police in helicopters and in jeeps had dropped and posted UPP propaganda leaflets. On some of them there was information explaining, “this is a shock of peace”, on others there were photos of Rocinha’s most wanted men, although the vast majority of them had fled to other communities, been arrested, or disappeared in the previous days and weeks. The propaganda also warned residents to stay inside and to report to the authorities any knowledge of remaining gangsters, their hideouts or caches of drugs, money, or arms. As cliché as it sounds, the day of the invasion was a surreal experience. It was as if an invading force in an official war zone had
just entered a smoldering city where the defeated enemy had recently fled. But the tension was still thick enough to cut with a knife, and it seemed that at any second violence might erupt. But it didn’t. BOPE, or the Battalion for Special Operations for Rio’s Military Police, were the main force in action. It is their role to shock and awe the communities being pacified and to comb through the alleyways and streets searching houses for any remaining criminals or their stockpiles. The BOPE remained in Rocinha until January 2012, at which time an assortment of military and civil police units replaced them, and continued the occupation of Rocinha until September 2012, when the UPP was officially inaugurated.

I ventured out into the streets by 7:30 AM the morning of the occupation, once it seemed safer and calmer. Globo reported 3,000 security agents were involved in the invasion and occupation of Rocinha that day.201 As I walked around the community with my friend and neighbor, Itamar, we noticed two particularly unusual details. Until mid-morning there were very few people in the streets. It was bizarre because a few of the areas we were traversing could compete with New York’s Times Square (at rush hour) for pedestrian congestion. Rocinha’s principle thruway, Estrada da Gávea, was desolate. Oddly, several sections of the street were covered in a thick coating of sawdust. Itamar explained that the sawdust had been dispensed by BOPE to absorb the pools of oil that were poured from large drum barrels the night before. I had seen this before, but not on this scale. The lower-level drug traffickers who for whatever reason or command decided to stay in Rocinha, along with some of their sympathizers, had dumped the oil the night before to slow down the initial surge of police and military vehicles. This tactic worked but only for a matter of minutes until the sawdust absorbed most of the oil. Afterwards, the tanks, BOPE’s 4x4 trucks and jeeps and their Caveirão were able to navigate Estrada da Gávea on their way up and down Rocinha.

By the time Itamar and I meandered our way down Estrada da Gávea from Laboriaux, a distance of approximately 3.5 kilometers, it was after 10:00 AM. By this point, there were many people in the streets but curiously, we both noticed as many Sky Satellite TV sales representatives as police officers. In the next few days, this corporate trend increased as other big businesses such as Claro and Embratel followed suit. Some set up tables and stands, while others shuffled through Rocinha on foot with TV satellites slung over their shoulders and contracts in hand.

WAS “PEACE” DELIVERED AS PROMISED, OR DID SOMETHING ELSE OCCUR?

From the time Rocinha’s UPP process began in November 2011 until late 2013 there were fewer shootouts. In 2014, however, violence increased notably, and residents agree that Rocinha has not been so dangerous since the series of intense shootouts between 2004 and 2006. Still, most gun battles are concentrated in roughly six to eight sections of Rocinha and now typically involve handguns rather than heavy firearms. Despite the Military Police’s “Pacification Units,” the perception of war and the use of combat metaphors continue.

Rocinha’s UPP was officially inaugurated on September 20, 2012. The UPP website reports that Rocinha’s UPP counts on 700 police officers. The first “commander” (comandante), as they known, was Maj. Edson Santos. Next, Maj. Pricilla de Oliveira Azevedo or Major Pricilla, as she is known, took over. Maj. Pricilla is considered the compassionate public face of Rio’s UPPs. Having once escaped a dramatic kidnapping, she was the best choice the authorities had in replacing the publicly disgraced former commander, Maj. Edson Santos. Major Pricilla did not remain long in Rocinha. In November 2014 she too was replaced, by Major Leonardo Nogueira. In February of 2015 Norgueira was also substituted, leaving his sub-commander, Captain Yeddo

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de Abreu, temporarily in command of Rocinha. A few months later Captain Yeddo was replaced by Maj. Sidnei Robson Pazini da Silveira, who as of December 2015 was still the Commander in charge of Rocinha.

In short, from September 2012 to August 2015 Rocinha has had five commanding officers (who are generally the only police officers residents know). Regularly changing commanders is official UPP policy, and yet it seems an odd approach for trying to create trusted and successful community policing programs.

The only commander I had been able to interview was Maj. Edson Santos, who I spoke to in May 2013. Being the first commander of Rocinha's UPP but especially because of the scandal that rocked his tenure, Major Edson has also been the most significant UPP commander in the community thus far.

Relatively young (early forties in 2013), Major Edson glowed with confidence, fearlessness. A former BOPE soldier (the elite and deadly police unit that sends chills down the spines of even hardened favela traffickers) he did not hide his abhorrence of drug dealers and the web of political corruption they empower in Rio's favelas. Major Edson was friendly, even humorous, but it was not hard to sense I was interviewing a man who had closely witnessed and participated in terrifying acts of violence. Our interview was enlightening.

Major Santos – I first came to Rocinha in 1998...Then in 2004, I returned, already a police officer, a second lieutenant of BOPE [Rio's infamous elite military police unit]. During my first operation with BOPE I had to carry the body of my close friend and fellow officer out of Rocinha. He was killed in Laboriaux, April 8, 2004. [This was during the three-day war, shortly after BOPE killed Lulu and his security guard, also in Laboriaux].

MB – you have known Rocinha longer than I have, what are the big changes you have noticed?

Major Santos – I look at things through my experience with BOPE, through the lens of public security. In 2004, when we entered [during the three day war] we found a notebook that
was Lulu’s. The notebook had four pages that were filled front and back, and each page had a
gun that someone was responsible for. There were roughly 200 *fuzis* [assault rifles, e.g., AR-15].

MB – That was in 2004? After that were there more or less?

Major Santos – More, without a doubt. But since the occupation [November 2011] we no
longer see this type of firepower anymore. The territory is ours now, even if there are still guns
in the community. We still find assault rifles, since April 2012 [interview was in April 2013] we
have apprehended 7 assault rifles. It has been a year now [since they began a specific operation
of confiscating guns] and we have also confiscated 20 pistols, and 23 thousand *papelotes* [paper
packaging of unspecified size] of cocaine. But the territory is ours now, they [traffickers] are the
outsiders here now, but we keep on fighting. Because, Rocinha before, was a community where
the police didn’t enter. Imagine an area with the population of a city where the police don’t enter.
The territory was totally dominated by them.

In an interview with Aurélio Mesquita, Rocinha’s de facto cultural ambassador and resident
since the 1980s, he mentioned something similar but more nuanced. Always critical of authority,
he said:

Aurélio – I would not say I feel safer here now, but I will admit, it was unbearable taking my
son to school at 7:00 AM on Monday morning [Sunday night has traditionally been the biggest
party night in Rocinha, and revelers typically stay out in the streets until 8 or even 9 AM] and
having to ask drug users and dudes dancing around with guns, intoxicated, smoking marijuana,
yelling cursing, breaking bottles, to please let us pass by.

Marcos Barros, born and raised in Rocinha and with a degree in Communications from
PUC-Rio told me:

Marcos Barros – The traffickers never messed with me, not once in my life. I grew up with
guys, neighbors, classmates, who entered that lifestyle. I never feared them and they never
disrespected me. But I was offended, visually offended, by their presence. I was offended by
constantly seeing and living side-by-side with heavily armed people. With the UPP,
unfortunately I still live with heavily armed people, but there are degrees of absurdity and before it was worse, at least visually.

Continuing my interview with Major Santos, I asked about improving security and quality of life in Rocinha and other favelas:

MAJOR – here you have to change mentalities. For more than 40 or 50 years the state was not present here. There is a lot of talk about people from comunidades [favelas]. I am from a favela. Development is more than public works. It is a cultural change. It is about education. I am from the favela, but I never allowed myself to become accustomed to that reality. The reality of people living without basic sanitation, who don’t seek to educate themselves, who are not trying to personally develop. So, it doesn’t matter if you give these types of people everything in the world, you have to make them learn how to earn those things, to value them.

MB – How do you do that?

MAJOR – Sincerely, I don’t know, there has to be a cultural change. Rocinha was abandoned, left to the traffickers for so long, today there is an enormous internal consumption of drugs in Rocinha, beyond what is normal.

MB – More than in other communities, proportionally?

MAJOR – I honestly believe so. To give you an idea. In one year we confiscated 23 thousand papelotes of cocaine. That represents about one tenth of what was sold. You have lived here for a long time, you must remember how it was, back when the police didn’t enter here. They sold cocaine like it was candy, out in the open. The kids and adolescents who grew up seeing that thought it was normal. So we [the police] need to help change the culture, let people understand that the culture. Tell them, ‘listen up, the culture that you had here was not normal, it is not the reality of Rio de Janeiro and the rest of Brazil. How do we change this? By having, a massive influx of social organizations enter the community and a massive anti-drug educational campaign. A massive campaign of getting kids back in school. There has to be enormous social
spending here. My friend, if you want to change the reality of Rio de Janeiro you have to prioritize the favelas. And this favela is the largest in Brazil. It has to serve as an example.

MB – Do you think that is happening?

MAJOR – Very slowly, but if it was up to me it would be much heavier, more intense so that we could remove these people from their social vulnerability and change their culture.

A SECONDARY INVASION OR A CONTINUATION OF PREEXISTING TRENDS?

Accompanying the invasion of Rocinha in November 2011 was a second invasion, one virtually all favela residents noticed but few paused to contemplate. In fact, many seemed delighted by this second type of invasion. I am referring to an invasion of “official” private enterprise. Recall the earlier discussion of satellite TV vendors who appeared almost immediately after security forces secured Rocinha. One of my research participants, who I will call Eric, a mid-level state bureaucrat, described their appearance with alarm: “Sky entered practically riding on the back bumper of BOPE’s caveirão.”

Most probably there had been collusion between the security forces and a number of companies eager to secure new markets. Had the satellite TV providers entered Rocinha within the first few days or weeks, little by little, testing the grounds, that would have been a fairly normal market reaction to the “pacification” of a community with tens of thousands of consumers. But in the case of Rocinha, and in other pacified favelas, companies had obviously been forewarned and were in communication with the police as the pacification took place. They stormed the favelas well prepared, with dozens of employees with hundreds if not thousands of TV satellites ready to go. It may seem like a cliché to speak of Harvey’s notion of capitalism constantly searching for new spaces to absorb surplus value and create new profits, but how else can this be viewed?

203 Dissertation Interview, Eric, January 2013
Sky Brasil is part of Sky, an international television service company, which in Brazil is majority owned by DirecTV, an American multinational. Sky Brasil, known as Sky, is the largest television service provider in Latin America and second largest in Brazil, after Net. A ranking, and rather disgruntled, state bureaucrat who had worked directly on planning and carrying out the pacification process, admitted what so many critical residents, activists and scholars had been suggesting, that the “pacification of selected favelas in Rio is a necessary part of capital accumulation strategies at various scales” (Freeman 2012: 98). Freeman describes how Rio’s favelas should be viewed “as territories with limited penetration of capital that represent potential outlets for surplus absorption through what David Harvey calls ‘accumulation by dispossession.’” Freeman suggested, “contrary to neoliberal free market ideology, the violence of state military power has always been essential in paving the way for outwardly peaceful market based economic activity” (Freeman 2012: 98-99).

To be sure, commerce, real estate speculation and capitalist activity in general have been robust in Rocinha since the late 1960s and especially since the 1990s. It is not as if Rocinha had been without television service before the UPP process began. Those who could not afford TV service, or who simply did not want to pay, accessed its channels via illegal connections known colloquially as *gatos* (cats). Television *gatos* represented approximately 30% of the community households watching TV. The day after the invasion the pirated cable television system were disconnected, and Rocinha was almost immediately filled with representatives of cable companies, first Sky, then Claro and Embratel. Freeman (2012: 96) comments on what happened next:

As in other “pacified” favelas, television providers have been followed by the electric company, the water company, bank branches, chain stores and tourism. Housing prices in and around occupied favelas have risen anywhere from 50 to 400%, sometimes even before the police arrive. One commentator for *MoneyWeek*, in advising UK readers on investment in Brazil, wrote recently: “[I]f you were to ask me where I think the most money is going to be made in the coming years, I would say it’s from the emergence and development of the favelas”.

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Reality, though, may be a bit more complex. For example, long before the UPP Rocinha already had three bank branches, two of them Itaú (formerly Banerj) and Caixa have been in the community since the 1980s. After Rocinha was occupied one more bank, Banco do Brasil, was opened in the community. With the advent of UPP in September of 2012, Rocinha saw the arrival of a Subway (restaurant), and several new big name nationwide stores like Ricardo Eletro, Casas Bahia, Mundo Verde and Cacau Show. Tourism began in the early 1990s in Rocinha, but, according to interviews and casual conversation, as well as my own participant observations, it probably peaked during the first decade of the twenty-first century. Favela tourism in Rocinha is still a major industry, but since the inauguration of the UPP it has either stagnated or slightly declined.204

I asked Eric what he thought PAC 1 and the UPP changed Rocinha, and part of the response answer was:

Eric – “Real estate speculation and real estate growth [with the arrival of the UPP process] in Rocinha was immense, immense! I witnessed this. I saw entire areas of Rocinha, like areas over there near Cachopa, that were areas where the standard was [buildings with] two or three floors and now are areas with six floors, all the buildings, six or seven stories, entire areas [of Rocinha], that grew like this, because of people renting.

And the municipal government had absolutely no control over this. The mechanism that the municipal government set up for this, which is called the Programa de Regularização Urbanistico, POUS, does not function, it doesn’t function. It was not prepared for this.

Marcos – This was because of the real estate speculation?

Eric – Yes, because of the idea, a guy sees, in the context of pacification, you are pacified [your community], you see a way to make money from this. You build a studio [apartment] on top of your house, you build another, and another, and another, think what you will make, renting

204 Slight declines might be attributable to the growth of tourism in other favelas “pacified” since 2009/2010.
each one for R$ 450, paying no [property] taxes. In Brazil the salary [minimum wage] is about R$ 680. Imagine a domestic house cleaner from Rocinha who makes R$ 680 a month, if she builds a studio and rents it for R$ 450 she is practically doubling her salary.

Marcos – Is this [speculation] good or bad or some combination of both?

Eric – a combination, it’s both good and bad.

As Eric stated, both PAC and UPP bring positive and negative results as they evolve. These are the two programs that have had the greatest influence on community life in Rocinha's history. It is important to understand who benefits and who doesn’t. The next two chapters consider this question.
Chapter 4

Findings & Analysis

In ethnography the analysis of data is not a distinct stage of the research. In many ways, it begins in the pre-fieldwork phase, in the formulation and clarification of research problems, and continues through to the process of writing reports, articles, and books. Formally, it starts to take shape in analytic notes and memoranda; informally, it is embodied in the ethnographer’s ideas and hunches (Hammersley and Atkinson 2007: 158).

This work adopted the view that sociological analysis should play an integral role in ethnography from start to finish (Hammersley and Atkinson 2005: 158). As Hedstrom states: “Analytical sociology focuses on explanation. Unlike descriptions, which typically seek answers to ‘what’ questions, explanations provide answers to ‘why’ questions. Explanations account for why events happen, why something changes over time or why states or events co-vary in time or space” (Hedstrom 2005: 2).

CONFIRMATION OF HYPOTHESIS WITH QUALIFICATIONS

Sufficient ethnographic evidence was collected in order to confidently state that in contemporary Rio de Janeiro favela upgrading and pacification are components of broader social forces and mechanisms displacing the residents of strategically located favelas. Although a few important qualifications are needed, the pattern holds true for Rocinha as well, where displacement is affecting the most socioeconomically vulnerable residents, a still inchoate trend I predict will increase. This exposes a worrying contradiction embedded in upgrading and community policing interventions targeting geographically sensitive low-income communities.

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Authorities consider the residents living in the most precarious areas of Rocinha, or those in the most vulnerable socioeconomic positions (e.g., teenage boys and young men from broken homes who are most likely to enter the drug trade), as their target population in massive social programs such as favela upgrading and pacification. The justification for upgrading and pacifying communities conveyed to the public, the media, investors and ultimately the community, emphasizes improvements to quality of life, particularly for the most marginalized residents. This is clear from the literature and marketing of the planners and implementers, whether in the form of architectural master plans, government guidelines, and reports from multinational organizations like the UN, IDB or World Bank.

In contrast, my research indicates there is good reason to believe that these are the very families or individuals most likely to be displaced by such programs. Curiously, secondary and ethnographic data suggests the tactics employed in Rocinha have been more successful in other favelas. Under these circumstances, the confirmation of my research question involves important qualifications. These issues are explained in the following sections.

My findings substantiated this dissertation’s main proposition, or research question. I questioned whether or not recent interventions meant to better the quality of life in Rocinha are displacing a substantial portion of the community. If they are, I inquired, by what means, and is there sufficient evidence to confidently predict removals will increase during the coming years?

From the onset I centered on favela upgrading and pacification because these programs are unique in that they are designed with the specific intent of improving the quality of life in favelas. In other words, they are not meant to displace beneficiaries but rather to make the communities they live in better. Other tactics have proved more effective for removing large swaths of the poor from prime locations such as Rocinha. But only favela upgrading and pacification are implemented with the intention of residents remaining instead of being removed, and therefore they are the most contradictory.
The data demonstrates removals are occurring primarily through three interrelated tactics. A section is assigned to each of the three tactics displacing residents from key favelas. Rather than divide this chapter into one half “findings” the other “analysis”, I chose to include a brief theoretical evaluation following each corresponding section on removal tactics and contributory causes. First, the tactics used to remove residents are described alongside substantiating data. Then a subsection offers a brief sociological analysis based on the relevant literature.

The following tactics and sub-tactics of removal could be organized through other schemas or by using a variety of other jargons. The following outline is simply the one that most help me understand the overall strategy and specific tactics employed by certain actors in government and business to remove thousands of families and individuals in a short timespan.

THREE TACTICS USED IN FAVELA EVICTIONS AND MASS REMOVALS

From the onset of this research project I focused mainly on favela upgrading and pacification programs. I did so because little rigorous research has been conducted on the contradictions often embedded in these types of improvement schemes for poor and violent urban communities. The strategy and tactics are the “nuts and bolts” of capitalist dispossession in modern Rio de Janeiro. These local level “gears” allow Harvey’s (2003 145) larger mechanism of accumulation by dispossession to operate so efficiently.

Strategy = Capitalist urbanism in order to fuel continued growth and create a city for elites and tourists. Demolish and remove whatever is in the way of this goal. Because the path of least resistance is more practical and since wealthy locals and visitors don’t want to see poverty and fear being victims of crime, remove as many favelas as possible and resettle their inhabitant to the furthest corners of the periphery.
Causes = Specific Removal Tactics

1. Using environmental arguments to defend mass removals.
   - Generally occurs when residents are classified as living in an *area of risk*, or of residing in an area of environmental preservation.

2. Justifying displacements in the name of “development”.
   - Displacement by development (DBD) in contemporary Rio de Janeiro has fallen under two categories. (1) Urban renewal/upgrading projects calling for removals so that degraded areas can be revitalized and for the construction of infrastructure such as expressways or parking lots. In Rio the recent urban renewal projects have been associated with hosting international sporting events. (2) Favela-upgrading, a relatively new and unique type of urban upgrading, carves through sections of highly dense communities in order to install or improve infrastructure and public facilities.

3. Permitting, and possibly incentivizing, economic forces to remove residents, especially the housing market.
   - For the sake of simplicity, these types of removals are viewed as a relatively new form of gentrification.

Effects = Mass displacement of residents in strategically located favelas

- At least 70,000 people removed from their homes, most since April 2010.
- Rio de Janeiro is a more spatially segregated city today than it was a decade ago (2005/2006).

Contributory Causes

Also known as partial causes, these are factors that increase the likelihood removal tactics will be effective, but they may not be necessary or sufficient for the effect.

206 The torrential rains of April 2010 (natural disaster) and mega-events are mainly covered in the “areas of risk” and “DBD” sections.
1. Natural disasters
2. Mega-events
3. MCMV
   - Without tens of thousands of apartment units built since 2009/2010 in Rio’s periphery the majority of removals would not have been possible because there would not have been any available resettlement housing. The timing of the construction of MCMV apartment complexes (the first large scale housing initiative since the 1970s) and the mass removal campaign can either be viewed as an incredible coincidence or an important factor contributing to the strategy aiming to reduce the physical size and population of favelas and relocate their residents to far corners of the city.
4. UPPs
5. Perception of economic and political stability.
6. Political Will and influential political economic elite(s)\(^{207}\)

I have identified these as the essential tactics the city and state have used to uproot either entire favelas or sections of them. Together with the three tactics above, the contributing factors or causes also greatly contributed to the fastest favela removal campaign in Rio’s history.\(^{208}\)

While the general strategy is the same for all favelas in the city of Rio de Janeiro, the tactics are employed distinctively in each setting, depending on local circumstances and other factors. Each point is explained its relevant section.

THE REMOVALS

\(^{207}\) For the sake of brevity “political will” and “influence of political economic elites” are considered together. They could certainly be two separate contributory causes.

\(^{208}\) The bulk of the 60-70 thousand Eduardo Paes era removals took place in just 2.5 years, from April 2010 to roughly mid-2013 when protests and political economic factors made removals less feasible.
This investigation has closely followed attempts to remove thousands of families from Rio’s favelas since April 2010, including the approximately 3,000 inhabitants of Laboriaux. There are complex questions involved in whether removal campaigns are effective. These issues are addressed appropriately as this chapter progresses.

First, an important qualification needs to be made before continuing. In Rocinha, systematic displacement is inchoate. Beginning in April 2010, and gaining momentum throughout the next couple of years, by mid-2013 the prospects of mass removal began encountering a series of roadblocks. As of August 2015, proportionally few residents of Rocinha had been forced to leave their homes. It is crucial to understand, and central to this investigation, that this is the case because two large-scale removals have been prevented since April 2010. Attempts to relocated thousands of Rocinha’s residents were first met with intense local resistance and followed by a precipitous decline in certain factors that contribute to or facilitate mass removals. Before presenting citywide figures on displacement two examples of local resistance thwarting the city and state’s attempts are worth noting.

The roughly 3,000 residents of Laboriaux, who were threatened with “immediate eviction,” fought an uphill battle for over three years against the city, and won. According to José Ricardo, president of Laboriaux’s residents’ association,\(^{209}\) of 3,000 or more inhabitants, approximately 300 to 350 left as a direct result of the city’s April 2010 “area of risk” eviction campaign. José Ricardo also explained, and my experience living there confirmed that by December 2015 at least ten of the families (or roughly 30 individuals) previously displaced from Laboriaux had decided to return. Ricardo said there are probably many others but these ten he knew of for sure. Others tried but found homes and rents had increased too much since 2010.\(^{210}\)

\(^{209}\) Associação de Moradores e Amigo do Laboriaux e Vila Cruzada (AMA-LVC).
\(^{210}\) Based on interviews with residents who left Laboriaux before or soon after the April 2010 removal campaign.
The case of Laboriaux is an anomaly. Such exceptions have forced certain conclusions to be reexamined, because it was not until late 2013 (after dissertation writing had begun) that the city halted its crusade to remove Laboriaux. Furthermore, since April 2010, the city has removed thousands of families from keys favelas using the same tactics directed towards Laboriaux. Among other questions this scenario raises is, why removal worked in some low-income communities and not others? Clyde Mitchell explained that contradictory cases “can provide the opportunity to demonstrate the positive role of exceptions to generalisation as a means of deepening our understanding of social processes” (Mitchell 1983: 45).

Public authorities in Rio regularly go back on their words and even on official decrees. Still, the fact that the resistance to removal succeeded (so far) does not refute that the city made a concerted effort to evict thousands of residents from Rocinha.

Second, there would have been a much larger number of removals in Rocinha by now (mid-2015) had the State government been capable of initiating PAC 2 Rocinha on its terms. The official PAC 2 Rocinha project has been ready since 2012 and was presented to a handpicked group of residents in early 2013. It calls for the removal of a minimum of 2,400 properties (housing a minimum of 7,000 residents). This phase of mass removals, which according to authorities includes 1,200 houses located in areas of risk and another 1,200 in the path of favela upgrading, has been slowed down by organized residents. Groups such as Rocinha sem Fronteiras, SOS Rocinha Saneamento and activist residents in Laboriaux have mounted a fervent opposition to what are widely viewed as irregularities with PAC 1 and PAC 2 in Rocinha, particularly in regards to the controversial cable-car (Fernandes, Bautès and Burgos 2013: 18-19).

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211 Figures from Rodrigo Dalvi Santana, infrastructure specialist for the Federal Ministry of Cities. Dalvi Santana works on both PAC 1 and PAC 2 in Rocinha and presented these figure to residents at a meeting of Rocinha sem Fronteiras on September 21, 2013.

The 7,000 to 10,000\textsuperscript{213} removals required for the implementation of PAC 2 Rocinha as it was presented to the community, are projected to still take place. But resistance has delayed the process and may reduce significantly the number of households dislodged.

Burawoy mentions: “The extended case method applies reflexive science to ethnography in order to extract the general from the unique, to move from the ‘micro’ to the ‘macro,’ to connect the present to the past in anticipation of the future, all by building on preexisting theory” (2009: 21). He explains how:

We begin with our favorite theory but seek not confirmations but refutations that inspire us to deepen that theory...we elaborate existing theory. We do not worry about the uniqueness of our case since we are not as interested in its representativeness as its contribution to reconstructing theory. Our theoretical point of departure can range from the folk theory of participants to any abstract law. We require only that the scientist consider it worth developing. But what distinguishes a “progressive” from a “degenerate” reconstruction?...we seek reconstructions that leave core postulates intact, that do as well as the preexisting theory upon which they are built, and that absorb anomalies with parsimony, offering novel angles of vision. Finally, reconstructions should lead to surprising predictions, some of which are corroborated. These are heavy demands that are rarely realized but ones that should guide progressive reconstruction of theory (Burawoy 2009: 43).

This work has also attempted to connect the present to the past to make reasoned forecasts on how social processes and mechanisms will transpire in the future, and in other geographic locations. Both Mitchell and Burawoy emphasize exceptions and that only sometimes do exceptions corroborate predictions. This is a thought expressed by the words of José Martins when he affirmed: “It all depends on how unified the residents are [‘Tudo depende da unidade dos moradores’]. Because when people act alone the public authorities do as they please. But if there is unity, if residents act collectively, then they can change things”\textsuperscript{214}

REMOVALS IN NUMBERS

\textsuperscript{213} Ten thousand is the estimate of other specialists who have studied the PAC 2 Rocinha plan.\n\textsuperscript{214} José Martins voiced his belief, using almost the same wording, during two of our three interviews recorded for this dissertation. The two referenced interviews took place in May 2010, and July 2013.
Despite the recently passed and extensive federal Access to Information Law (No. 12,527 – 11/18/2011), municipal authorities, and in particular by Rio’s Municipal Housing Secretary (SMH), closely guard removal details. Even so, this investigation was able to locate credible sources. While they are merely cautious approximations, they do provide a rational way to gauge the magnitude of removals.

The most conservative figures come from Rio de Janeiro’s Popular Committee for the Cup and Olympics. The Popular Committee is comprised of university professors, NGO representatives, activists, and favela residents. As of June 2014 it listed 4,772 families (14,602 individual) in Rio already displaced because of mega-events and another 4,916 (15,042 individual) who are threatened with removal. The Popular Committee’s data are limited to cases its members are able to validate, and its focus is on removals linked to the World Cup and Olympics. It does not include data on Rocinha and Complexo do Alemão, for example, nor the full scope of Geo-Rio’s areas of risk removals (Dossier June 2014: 36).

Architect Lucas Faulhaber’s 2012 thesis quotes data obtained during interviews with the SMH’s division of Land and Resettlement Management. Citing SMH figures, Faulhaber finds that as of April 2012, the city had removed 10,577 households from Rio’s favelas (Faulhaber 2012: 95-100). By September 2013 Amnesty International had revealed that the Rio provided their office with data indicating 19,200 favela families had been removed since Mayor Paes took office in January 2009. In May 2014, Simone Rodrigues, friend, resident, activist, and as of late 2014 doctor of jurisprudence, from Laboriaux who has collaborated extensively on this project, interviewed two SMH bureaucrats from the division of Land and Resettlement Management. She received data citing 22,000 houses removal between January 2009 and May

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215 Comité Popular da Copa e das Olimpíadas do Rio de Janeiro.
216 Gerência de Terras e Reassentamentos

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2014. This information is included in Rodrigues’s law school thesis (Rodrigues 2014: 68). On average there are 3.06 members per household in Rio de Janeiro’s favelas (IPP/IBGE 2010), indicating that approximately 67,320 individuals were forced to leave their homes from early 2009 to May of 2014. Finally, this year, after updating his research, Faulhaber had his findings published in a co-author book, SMH 2016 Remoções no Rio de Janeiro Olímpico (2015). Armed with updated findings, Faulhaber and Azevedo claim the city removed 20,299 families between January 2009 and December 2013 (2015: 16). Simone spoke to the SMH roughly six months after Faulhaber and Azevedo’s research ended, and her findings are the most reliable recent data I am aware of. Writing in the latter half of 2015, and aware of additional small-scale removals since Simone spoke to the SMH in May 2014, I use the round number of 70,000 individuals removed during Eduardo Paes two terms as mayor. And I prefer to speak in terms of individuals rather than households or families because doing so makes each removal more personal and the higher figures accentuate the tragedy of what has recently occurred. The bulk of these removals occurred after April 2010. In the following section I describe the city’s strategies to remove 70,000 favela residents in roughly four years.

I. HOW THE TECHNICAL NOTION OF RISK IS USED TO DISPLACE THE POOR

In contemporary Rio de Janeiro environmental removals have occurred in two distinct manners. The first and most successful happens when public officials classify sections, or entire favelas, to be located in natural disaster areas of risk. The use of this technical description is highly effective because of emotional and scientific questions involved. The two most common natural disasters in the Southeast region of Brazil, where Rio de Janeiro is located, are flooding and landslides, both caused by excessive rain in a short span of time (CEPED 2011: 30-34).

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Another environmental defence used to remove families is environmental protection/preservation. According to Raquel Rolnik, UN Special Rapporteur the UN on Adequate Housing and Professor at the University of São Paulo (USP), this pretext is often used hypocritically, as in the notable recent cases, of the 520 families in the process of being removed from the community of Horto. Similar preservation arguments were previously made to remove the emblematic community Vila Autódromo from the site of the Olympic Village (Vainer et al. 2013: 8-9). By far most removals have been based on the natural disaster areas of risk classifications (Faulhaber 2012: 50). For this reason I focus almost exclusively on this displacement tactic.

This section addresses tactics used by the city to remove residents from sections of favelas classified as areas of risk. In some cases entire favelas are labeled areas of risk, for instance Morro dos Prazeres in 2010. There is a long history in Rio de Janeiro of using environmental risk as a justification to remove favelas (Gonçalves 2013: 263). Areas of risk removals involve complex technical questions, and clearly some favela residents do live in environmentally unsafe areas. Even so, there is a substantial amount of hypocrisy involved in the entire areas of risk classification. Environmental risk is as much a socioeconomic issue as it is technical. Dozens of favelas were leveled during the twentieth century (and again recently) on the pretext of being located in environmentally precarious areas where improvements and upgrading were either impossible or not cost-effective. Later, many of these same spaces were developed into housing, commerce, parks and other amenities for Rio’s upper-middle class and elites. For example, the hillside Catacumba favela – where Janice Perlman lived while conducting research on The Myth


\footnote{From Raquel’s Rolnik’s official blog. Retrieveable from: https://raquelrolnik.wordpress.com/2013/05/08/jardim-botonico-rio-de-janeiro-mais-um-capitulo-infeliz-de-uma-questao-nao-resolvida/. Last accessed 8/30/2015.}

\footnote{This was confirmed in my own field research with residents and activists from Vila Autódromo. The justifications for removal, they told me and also reported by the research of (Vainer et al 2013), have changed several times since the city first began threatening to evict the community in the 1990s.}
of Marginality (1976) – was removed in October 1970 on the basis of risk that could not be improved. Perlman (2010: 83) relates:

Immediately after the demolition of Catacumba, every trace of human existence there was razed, and the area was closed off with a high chain-link fence. Negrão de Lima, the governor responsible for the removal, was planning to turn the area into a monument to his achievements: the Parque de Catacumba, an outdoor sculpture garden with a trail leading up to the stunning view from the top of the hillside. On the portion of the hillside closer to the Rebouças Tunnel, several luxury high-rise condominiums with multimillion-dollar apartments were built.

The fate of the Praia de Pinto favela, which was then the largest in Rio’s South Zone (larger than Rocinha), is the most tragic. Residents put up an intense struggle, hundreds even stood their ground on the day the Military Police showed up to evict them. Later that night the police returned and set fire to the community, leaving the entire population homeless and several dead (Perlman 2010: 75-6). After the arson, Perlman recounts: “Soon, dense blocks of towering apartment buildings rose on the site: subsidized housing for the military that became known as the Selva de Pedra (Stone Jungle)” (Perlman 2010: 76). She probably should have mentioned for unfamiliar readers that during the dictatorship military officers were among the upper crust of Rio’s dominant class.

There are few methods more efficient for evicting low-income people from valuable urban spaces than declaring their communities areas at risk. If the risk-definers are questioned, as they were in Laboriaux, they attempt to delegitimize and discredit their challengers as lacking formal education or knowledge of science and engineering. Skeptical residents and outside activists were accused through the media of trying to perpetuate poverty and maintain vulnerable populations in risky areas instead of allowing them to be resettled in safe areas with decent housing. Fieldwork in Laboriaux, and five other favelas (or sections) branded as “at risk” revealed that residents of low-income communities face tremendous challenges when

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confronting the managers of risk. And in an emotionally charged post-disaster atmosphere, these difficulties are exacerbated.

I have closely monitored and documented events taking place in Laboriaux since April 2010. Since then residents have fought, often alongside those of other threatened favelas, to avoid eviction. Laboriaux is a one of Rocinha’s 22 sub-neighborhoods and is situated at the highest point in the community. From Laboriaux there is a stunning view of Rio’s South Zone, from Cristo Redentor all the way to São Conrado beach and Pedra da Gávea. Laboriaux’s main road is Rua Maria do Carmo, which extends for roughly 1 km. The road dead-ends in thick Atlantic Rainforest, part of Tijuca National Forest. Rio’s municipal government inaugurated Laboriaux in September 1982 when 73 families were resettled in 75 houses along the main road (Leitão 2009: 97-98). The resettlement was part of the first significant favela-upgrading project in Rocinha: the covering of a large open sewage ditch in an area known as Valão where the families previously resided (Leitão 2009: 97-98). In contrast to recent trends the resettlement of the 73 families to Laboriaux in 1982 was properly conducted because residents were provided the option of being relocated nearby.

A DOUBLE TRAGEDY

In April 2010 severe rains caused mudslides in favelas throughout the city of Rio and the greater metropolitan region. The worst case was the Morro do Bumba favela in the city of Niterói, across the bay from Rio. Within Rio most deaths occurred in the Morro dos Prazeres favela, in Santa Teresa, where an avalanche of mud and debris killed as many as 38 people (Fernandes, Bautês and Burgos 2013: 20). Paes promised to take decisive action to prevent future catastrophes, and Geo-Rio carried out a new survey of Rio’s favelas. Geo-Rio determined that 21,000 houses in 117 communities were at immediate risk of succumbing to landslides and needed to be removed. Area of risk maps began appearing in Rio’s favelas, coded red for “risk”
and green for “safe.” Concurrently, in most of the 117 communities, the city condemned community houses deemed unsafe by marking them with the letter “H,” Habitação (Habitation), or letters “SMH” for Secretaria Municipal de Habitação (Municipal Housing Secretary), followed by a serial number. Residents, community organizations, and allied experts quickly disputed the actual risk in many of these cases and saw this program as a pretext for arbitrary mass removal.

The April 2010 rains caused damage to approximately 150 of Laboriaux’s 830 houses\(^\text{223}\) and resulted in the death of two residents. In the following days while neighbors were still putting their lives in order, Paes declared he would immediately begin the process of removing all Laboriaux’s residents, because the city, in an about face, suddenly considered the whole area at risk.\(^\text{224}\) Many of Laboriaux’s residents had been resettled there by the same city government almost three decades earlier. The community was in shock. According to the mayor the classification of risk was confirmed by a Geo-Rio technical report. Central to the city’s strategy was the process of depoliticizing the argument for removal. Declaring the need to remove these communities as technical in nature did this. The life altering removal campaign was detached from previous political and historic conflicts as well as from events currently taking place in the city.

During the first of out two interviews, Rafael Gonçalves, favela historian and PUC-Rio professor, commented:

Certain rights that were fought for, with plenty of sweat, during the last two decades, were washed away after just two days of rain. Now they have to be reconstructed, the rights that guarantee through certain measures, specific protections for the favela population. We need to understand that above all, with


the discourse of risk, you can get away with anything. So, in what way can we manage this more democratically? Because whoever defines risk, possesses an extremely important power.

He was referring to the rights favela residents fought for during the 1970s and 1980s, during and after the military era policy of arbitrary forced eviction. After the rains of April 2010, the city marked favelas, or section of favelas, for eviction, although in many of these communities no deaths or injuries had occurred. When the public authorities that possess the power to decide who is and is not living in areas are members of Rio’s dominant classes, who have been vying for years to remove the rest of the South Zone favelas, then you have a recipe for evictions.

Add this to the demands FIFA and the IOC have been placing on Rio’s official (e.g., better transportation infrastructure, more hotel accommodations, more security, etc.) and you have a recipe for the mass removal of the city’s undesirables and dangerous classes. At a Pastoral de Favelas assembly for communities undergoing or being threatened with removal in late 2010, a Rio de Janeiro State Public Defender told residents of several communities (including Laboriaux) of his experience defending against forced evictions. He stated: “In order to win the bids for the World Cup and Olympics, authorities had to guarantee many improvements. There is no way to implement these types of large projects without upsetting certain groups. The authorities always chose the path of least resistance, which in our city means the favelas.”

AREA OF RISK REMOVAL TACTICS

Municipal Civil Defense entered Laboriaux just days after the April 2010 rains ended, marking houses and small businesses with spray-paint. The Civil Defense marked all of Laboriaux’s properties with a large ‘H’ followed by the numerical order of the property,

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225 For instance, the section of the Tabajaras favela in Botafogo known as Estradinha 1014 and the Vila Autódromo favela in the West Zone.
226 Derived from my fieldnotes. I was present during this conversation, along with four other residents of Laboriaux.
227 Defesa Civil do Município do Rio de Janeiro.
beginning with ‘H1’ and ending shortly after ‘H800’. Civil Defense workers went door-to-door pressuring residents to sign notices of condemnation known as *autos de interdição*. Their actions were illegal because city social workers are required by law to be present during evictions to properly explain the details to grieving residents. The Civil Defense aimed to collect as many signed *autos de interdição* as possible so that the SMH could later return and begin negotiating removals and resettlements.

During the next several days representatives of Civil Defense and other city functionaries traversed Laboriaux with notepads and measuring tapes. In many cases they virtually forced their way into homes. They warned residents that if they did not leave immediately they were placing themselves and their families in imminent risk of injury or death from impending landslides. Some of the Civil Defense engineers were aggressive with local residents. Typical was an encounter José Ricardo, president of the local residents’ association, described: “I got into a verbal altercation with one of the engineers. He actually got in my face as if he was ready to fight. Later I took his photo and reported the incident.”

Fieldwork documented several cases in which authorities threw their college education and credentials in the face of residents who questioned them. They appeared to have no respect for Laboriaux’s residents, blaming them for a lack of formal education and their economic vulnerability.

The relationship between the public and risk experts was often contentious, even in less imbalanced scenarios. William Leiss describes how:

> Professional risk managers are uneasy having to share close quarters with these other tenants. It is hard for them to understand why citizens who evidently cannot grasp the simplest scientific descriptions should want to meddle in such matters at all, rather than leaving them in the hands of capable experts. They are dismayed to hear that they are regarded by many as untrustworthy. It often offends them to be told that their findings and judgments are disputed by those who have no expertise in the relevant technical disciplines (Leiss 2001: 4-5).

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228 Dissertation Interview, June 2013.
Leiss mentions that when the managers of risk are challenged by the public, the risk-definers generally reject “the issues as represented by other interested parties are at all significant – and that those parties have any business meddling in such matters anyway.” They also contest that the management of risk “should be open to dispute by those who are not ‘experts’ in the relevant scientific disciplines” and they deny “that the public’ really needs to be involved in the intricacies of evaluating scientific research results and the other messy aspects of doing risk assessments.” Leiss emphasizes that research proves otherwise, because:

The case studies of risk controversies to date show, alas, that those instincts are unreliable guides to effective risk issue management. In all cases the opposite propositions are the better guides – namely, that public perceptions of risk are legitimate and must be treated as such, that risk management subsists in an inherently disputable zone, and that the public ought always to be involved (through good risk dialogues) in discussions about the nature of risk evaluation by scientists and risk managers (Leiss 2001: Preface xi-xii).

In support of his contention, only seven months after the city specialists and risk manager declared all of Laboriaux an area of risk, residents gathered to ask one of GEO-Rio’s top slope engineers, a veteran of more than 20 years working on geotechnical projects in Rio, who was surveying the area, a couple of questions. The official provided this response when a resident asked, in late 2010, “is all of Laboriaux really at risk, is it necessary to remove the entire community?” The engineer spoke off record, but the six residents present at the time clearly remember what was said.230

Modern engineering is capable of making any area of Rio de Janeiro safe to live in. The question is not so much about risk but about resources and priorities. If the city doesn’t see this [area] as a priority [to invest in] now, then everyone will have to leave. If you all make enough noise and bother them enough, you might have a chance of remaining (GEO-Rio Technician).

230 A record of the conversation was promptly included in my fieldnotes.
THREATS AND THE IMBALANCE OF POWER

After my front door had been vandalized with a large H519, I walked down the block to the entrance of my neighbor’s house, which the Civil Defense was about to mark. Maria Aparecida is blind and her husband was working. I told the officials that they were exaggerating, terrifying residents, and abusing their authority. One engineer, likely the same man who threatened José Ricardo, became belligerent and shouted: “I am an official, an engineer commissioned by the city, and you are interfering with the direct orders of the mayor of Rio de Janeiro, and jeopardizing the lives of the residents. I have total competency and authority to condemn these houses for being located in an area of extreme risk of landslide.” He then sputtered a litany of curse words and made what was clearly a tacit threat. Knowing that further escalation would not resolve anything, and worried about my soon to expire visa, I stepped aside, shaking my head.

The Civil Defense made their way to Maria Aparecida’s house. She was home alone with her fifteen year old daughter. Knowing her husband was working I followed them up the stairs to the house. They began telling Maria Aparecida that she lived in an area of extreme risk and that they had some paperwork to sign so that the city could take the appropriate measures to guarantee her family’s safety. Maria Aparecida was sitting on small plastic bench on her rooftop veranda trying to absorb some of the sun’s warmth. Like everyone in Laboriaux that day Maria Aparecida was already aware of what was taking place. She tilted her head up towards the man addressing her. Sporting her hallmark oversized black sunglasses, she snapped, “can’t you see that I am visually impaired? I have never signed anything in my life, my husband takes care of these things.”

Maria Aparecida’s case represents gross unprofessionalism and abuse of power, but it was not an isolated incident. Numerous female residents described how city officials, the upper ranks of whom were all male, exploited lingering class and gender inequalities in Brazil.
Knowing most husbands and boyfriends were out working they took advantage of this opportunity to get the more vulnerable women to sign eviction notices.

That same week a local resident, who had no previous health conditions according to his widow, suffered a stroke. The stroke began approximately one hour after he was coerced into signing an eviction notice (auto de interdição) and told he needed to evacuate the area immediately. Over the years he had built and added on to his family’s house where he lived with his wife and two children. They moved to Laboriaux in the 1980s. He died three days later in the Miguel Couto public hospital. Another long-time resident who had significant health problems also died of a stroke two days after his house was condemned.231

While direct causation is impossible to prove, family members blame the city for shocking them with the unbearably bad news. The widow of the first stroke victim described how her husband returned home after signing the eviction notice with his head down and speechless. He had no idea where they would go or what they would do. She said the authorities told her husband, a man with the equivalent of a fifth grade education, that “it would be better to sleep under a bridge than stay here and risk having your entire family killed in a landslide. Do you want that on your conscience?” Coming from elite educated city-commissioned engineers the imbalance of power could not have been greater. Residents began calling the city’s actions “psychological terrorism,” a term coined by Elisa Bradão, president of Morro dos Prazeres’s residents’ association.232 Naomi Klein explains how the United States Armed Forces used similar tactics dubbed “Shock and Awe”:

Shock and Awe are actions that create fears, dangers, and destruction that are incomprehensible to the people at large, specific elements/sectors of the threat society, or the

231 Based on three dissertation interviews, two with the widow of the first deceased residents and one with the other, June through July 2010.
232 Interview June 2010
leadership. Nature in the form of tornadoes, hurricanes, earthquakes, floods, uncontrolled fires, famine, and disease can engender Shock and Awe.²³³

Whatever damage the storm caused in Laboriaux it was greatly outweighed by the city’s immediate Shock and Awe campaign of psychological terrorism of. The reaction of the city constituted an egregious human rights violation because during natural disasters public authorities are supposed to protect and comfort the afflicted and the vulnerable not torment them.

It is now widely accepted that public officials in Rio de Janeiro were partially complicit in the deaths of dozens of people during the April 2010 rains (Loguericia 2013: 129-135). The worst case of governmental negligence occurred in the Morro do Bumba favela, in neighboring Niteroi, where 47 people were killed in a landslide that was preventable (Loguercio 2013: 120, 129-135). Time and space do not allow for those details in this work. Here two brief examples will suffice, from Laboriaux and the Morro dos Prazeres favelas, where fieldwork was also conducted.

In Laboriaux, a large water pipe cracked a few weeks before the rains and was leaking continuously into a slope near the end of Rua Maria do Carmo. CEDAE was notified numerous times by residents, including José Ricardo, but nothing was done. The already damp soil became increasingly saturated during the three days of rain and was unable to contain the weight of the trees and debris above. An avalanche of earth and trees slid down the hill and crushed a house approximately 40 meters below the leaky pipe, killing two women. In 2006 the City had condemned the area where the family lived, a small stretch of Laboriaux with no more than ten houses. But City workers never followed through. Elected officials changed as did priorities, and they never returned with social workers to have the ten families assisted in resettling to a nearby area.

A second example comes from Morro dos Prazeres, where up to 38 residents were killed in the worst disaster within city limits. The most damaging landslide took place in the exact spot the city had condemned six years earlier but had done nothing to resolve: no slope retaining walls, no drainage infrastructure, no resettlements to nearby areas, nothing.

From the outset, one of the underlying themes of the Laboriaux area of risk gambit was the complete lack of information from the public authorities and a refusal to allow residents to participate at any stage of the process. Residents were never involved in any decision-making. The city did not allow for any local participation in defining Laboriaux’s areas of risk, or how to manage them. Eviction of the entire community was the only option offered. Finally, there was limited participation in the resettlement process. Practically speaking, the city gave residents three resettlement options: entry into the MCMV program (generally on the western periphery of the city) in exchange for handing over their house, monetary compensation (often in one upfront cash payment), or compra assitida (assisted purchase) of a house in another area.

Local activists never denied that certain houses were located in areas of risk, but the idea that everyone had to go was viewed with acute skepticism. And although most people in Laboriaux have never heard of David Harvey, they organically understand his concept of accumulation by dispossession.

The UN recognizes this as a strategy unscrupulous leaders and elites often employ, and warns, “In both rural and urban areas, disasters can be exploited to evict tenants and usurp land” (UN-Habitat 2010: 18). Naomi Klein describes the same trend: “Despite all the successful attempts to exploit the 2004 tsunami, memory also proved to be an effective tool of resistance in some areas where it struck, particularly in Thailand” (Klein 2007: 463). According to Klein, “Thailand's politicians were just as eager as those elsewhere to use the storm as an excuse to evict fishing people and hand over land tenure to large resorts” (Klein 2007: 463). But, she explains:

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234 UN-Habitat. 2010. Land and Natural Disasters: Guidance for Practitioners
Yet what set Thailand apart was that villagers approached all government promises with intense skepticism and refused to wait patiently in camps for an official reconstruction plan. Instead, within weeks, hundreds of villagers engaged in what they called land "reinvasions." They marched past the armed guards on the payroll of developers, tools in hand, and began marking off the sites where their old houses had been. In some cases, reconstruction began immediately. “I am willing to bet my life on this land, because it is ours” (Klein 2007: 463-464).

Similar to Thailand, knowledge of broken promises and mass removals of the past, coupled with the blatant hypocrisy and lack of transparency they were experiencing in the present, produced consequences Rio’s public authorities did not anticipate: intense grassroots resistance. Residents of Laboriaux put up an admirable fight to an eviction campaign that seemed insurmountable during the first several months. I explain this in more detail in the anomalies section.

II. DISPLACEMENT BY DEVELOPMENT (DBD)

Forced displacements that occur because of development exemplify an inherently perverse contradiction in the context of development. This is why I selected favela upgrading and pacification schemes as my primary case studies, because these programs are supposed to improve poor and violent communities, not remove their residents.

During the 1980s and 1990s approximately 10 million people around the world were displaced by development programs each year, or roughly 200 million in total (Cerna 2000: 3659). As alarming as these figure are many specialists consider them conservative (Grabska and Mehta 2008: 2). Development is one of the primary causes of forced displacement in the world, and removals actually increased from 1990 to 2010, representing 250 million people forced to relocate during that period because of development (Hoshour and Kalafut 2010: 1) claim.
Development induced displacement (DID or DIDR)\textsuperscript{235} is one of the more common descriptors found in the literature to designate urban renewal and favela upgrading type removals. Although he doesn’t focus much on this type of dispossession, development induced displacement fits perfectly within Harvey’s rubric of accumulation by dispossession. I chose not to use the term development induced displacement because it reproduces World Bank, UN, mega-NGO development terminology this work aims to avoid of as much as possible. Secondly, the DID literature focuses heavily on rural displacement and while the theme is certainly relevant, here I am focused on cities. I previously mentioned my preference for the term “displacement by upgrading” because it strikes a balance between the critical development and urban sociospatial perspectives I try to bring together. Upgrading is a better description in largely informal cities like Rio because the favelas were mainly built through mutirão, or the collective efforts of residents. If the neither the state nor private sectors ever invested significantly in favelas then there is little to renew and much to improve, or upgrade.

Urban Renewal Removals

As of June 2014 the Comitê Popular estimated that 3,507 families, or approximately 12,275 individuals from 24 communities, had been removed from their homes because of urban renewal projects directly related to sporting mega-events in Rio de Janeiro. They added that another 4,916 families from 16 communities still at significant risk of mega-event related removals (Comitê Popular 2014: 21).\textsuperscript{236} The data published by Lucas Faulhaber and Amnesty international, that they acquired through the SMH, indicates considerably more removals, but also included more on area of risk and favela upgrading style removals. Still, the more

\textsuperscript{235} Sometimes DID is abbreviated DIDR, signifying “Development induced Displacement and Resettlement”.

\textsuperscript{236} The Comitê Popular began tracking removals in 2011, when they started actively campaigning against forced removals and other mega-event violations. They have produced some of the best ethnographic research on favela displacement. Unfortunately, and the Comitê Popular admits this (2014: 21), their data is conservative because they only publish figures they can unquestionably verify through their community contacts and local research.
ethnographic type data specifically related to sporting mega-events is the Comitê Popular’s strong point, and for this research it is consider effectively reliable.

The principal urban upgrading schemes removing low-income residents from their homes in Rio da Janeiro are from: the series of new BRT lanes built mostly in Rio’s West Zone, areas around sporting event stadiums or arenas that are bing turned into parking lots, or one of the largest renewal programs in recent history, the Porto Maravilha project in Rio’s downtown port district. Porto Maravilha has an estimated budget of R$ 8.2 billion (until 2016) and includes the “revitalization” of a huge 500 million square meters (almost 2 square miles) section of the port district. Within this 2 square miles there are a number of small but historic low-income communities, including the oldest standing favela in Brazil, Morro da Providência. The Porto Maravilha project has had severe consequences for Morro da Providência.

**Favela Upgrading Removals**

Favela upgrading is comparatively recent type of urban upgrading that falls outside the realm of urban renewal for the simple reason that the term “renewal” implies previous bouts of urbanism. In many slums or favelas where upgrading is taking place there has never been significant urban development schemes.

**PAC 1 Rocinha**

This research closely followed the PAC 1 Rocinha favela-upgrading intervention, a project that continues as of August 2015. As usual, reports vary on the number of dwellings and individuals removed. In all probability, PAC 1 Rocinha construction dislodged no more than 400 households. Sources working directly for PAC 1 Rocinha reported that approximately 365 families (1058 individuals) were removed from 2008 to 2010 as a result of upgrading projects.

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One source, Catarina, led a team of social workers charged with registering and assisting all households forced to relocate between 2008 and 2010. The sources correspond with information published by Rio’s state government indicating, “almost 400 families were removed” (Rocinha PDS 2011: 52).

Of these, 291 were dislodged during the opening of Rua 4, which was transformed from a 500 meter long, 1.5 meter wide tuberculosis ridden alleyway into a 4.5 meter wide road (Diagnóstico 2012: 36). To the credit of EMOP, in regards to removals the original Master Plan was partially respected, and 144 apartments were constructed on the corner of Estrada da Gávea and Rua Quatro to resettle many of the displaced families. The 75 families whose homes were demolished along Rua Quatro reportedly moved into 75 of the adjacent apartment units.\textsuperscript{238} The others 216 families (approx.), according to Catarina, moved to other areas of Rocinha (in her estimate around 60%) or left the community. They did so with compensation money or through a procedure known as \textit{compra assistida} (assisted purchase).

In this sense, PAC 1 Rocinha construction did not contribute to significant displacements. This is partially attributable to the pre-PAC influence of the early plans, which involved local participation and were drawn up by Mauro Guaranys and ultimately improved and completed by Luiz Carlos Toledo. EMOP took over in 2008, and in the words of Toledo, “they destroyed our plan.”\textsuperscript{239} Toledo’s Master Plan would have involved more removals, but he designed at least five times more resettlement housing within the community (Rocinha PDS 2011: 42-43).

EMOP’s involvement in PAC 1 and PAC 2 Rocinha raises another exceptional case to the related theory theories of “creative destruction,” “accumulation by dispossession” and “supply-side gentrification.”

**PAC 2 Rocinha – “O Estronda” – The Explosion**

\textsuperscript{238} Dissertation interview, Catarina, June 2013.  
\textsuperscript{239} Dissertation Interview, Toledo, April 2013.
PAC 2 Rocinha is so expansive that the phrase “favela-upgrading” does not do it justice. Taken together, PAC 1 and PAC 2 Rocinha likely represent the largest urbanization scheme ever planned for an individual favela/slum community, not just in Brazil but anywhere. And this does not even include PAC 3, PAC 4 and so on, that the federal and state governments have promised Rocinha.

With a budget of R$ 1.6 billion (US$ 800 million) PAC 2 Rocinha, as Realtor Kauã stressed in an interview, is going to completely transform Rocinha. That is, if EMOP, the state government of Rio de Janeiro, and the federal Ministry of Cities are able to implement the project on their terms and according to official project plan. The official estimate of necessary removals is being carefully guarded by Rio’s authorities. EMOP is the government entity with the best estimate because they subcontract out the production of favela upgrading project plans and the actual construction work. During interviews, one with a high-level EMOP official and the other with the CEO of a firm subcontracted by EMOP for PAC 2 Rocinha, removal estimates were expertly dodged.

This study has been able to arrive at a few reliable approximations. It was previously mentioned that 2,400 families would be displaced because of PAC 2 Rocinha. Dalvi Santana (Ministry of Cities) was not clear, however, whether this figure includes removals caused by the controversial cable-car project. According to the 2008/2009 PAC 1 Household Census there was an average of 2.9 people per household in Rocinha. If Dalvi Santana’s numbers are correct, then approximately 7,000 residents will be uprooted during PAC 2 Rocinha construction.

Estimates published by the state government in October 2012 indicate that 2,788 households (8,085 individuals) need to be removed, of which 2,310 are classified in the report as being located in areas of risk (2012: 350-351). This figure is independent from the 7,000 PAC 2 Rocinha construction displacements mentioned above.

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Interviews were conducted with several specialists and officials working on recent interventions, whether in favela upgrading or public security, or both. Two of these “experts” spoke off the record and asked that their identities not be revealed. They mentioned that after carefully studying the PAC 2 Rocinha project prepared by EMOP, the estimate of 7,000 residents to be removed is probably conservative. For example, Eric, an upper mid-level government technocrat who was highly active in Rocinha from December 2011 until January 2013, offered an assessment of the PAC 2 Rocinha project:

Eric - The project they [EMOP] showed us estimates the removal of upwards of 2,000 houses, but it’s going to be much more...we are talking about buildings from areas like Rua 1 that are four stories tall or more. We are talking about more than 10,000 people that will be removed. So, in my opinion whoever does this is going to be transforming the entire history of Rocinha...this guy [the designers/implementers of PAC 2 Rocinha] honestly has no idea about what is going to happen in Rocinha, what it will turn into... practically no one has an idea of the magnitude of this process and how it will transform Rocinha. It is going to generate enormous consequences...massive numbers of people will be removed. Rocinha will increasingly politicized. The local leaders who are defending the cable-car, huh, eventually it won't be easy for them, people will see what it is doing to the community. I think Rocinha will have a renewal of local leaders as PAC 2 begins.

MB – A renewal of local leaders?

Eric – Yes, because historically speaking, in Rio de Janeiro the residents of favelas have organized when the public authorities mobilized to remove them. That is when leadership arises.

So, if [José] Martins is unable to do something, if [the residents of] Laboriaux, and you and others are not able to do something, if the people in general who are against the cable-car are unable to stop it from being built, someone, one of the guys whose house is gonna be

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241 Dissertation Interview, Eric, January 2013
demolished, he will do something. Some of the people being removed will become furious with the injustice and they will do something. Neighbors being removed will come together, they will join the larger opposition.

Toledo, who created the Master Plan with his team of architects and residents, railed: “It’s a monstrosity! They are going to do away with Rocinha. To accomplish the projects the way they have planned them, they will need to remove at least 8,000 residents”.

It is easy to understand why somewhere between 7,000 and 10,000 residents would be displaced. A few photos from the PAC 2 Rocinha project EMOP presented in March 2013 can be viewed below. EMOP revealed the scheme, which will cost almost a R$ 1.6 billion and which will affect the lives of up to 150,000 people, during a closed gathering to a preselected group that included only 25 residents. I was one of the residents invited.

The red lines represent either entirely new streets or ones such as Estrada da Gávea, and alleys that will be widened and improved. Below is another view. Up close, the reality is clearer. Consider Rua do Valão, before and after. Or the opening of Rua 1, Rocinha’s longest alleyway, at approximately 3 km in length. Eric is correct in stating that opening Rua 1 will displace an enormous number of residents. To the left is a photo of a group of European tourist on a guided tour, walking down Rua 1. The purple line represent “mechanical facilities/installations” such as the controversial cable-car and to the bottom left, with the purple “M” in a circle, Rocinha’s new metro/subway station.

ANALYSIS OF SLUM/FAVELA-UPGRADING REMOVALS

This type of removal is different in a number of ways from the removal of 140,000 favela residents from 1964 to 1975. While both technically result from development (broadly speaking), the removals of the military era were largely based on real estate speculation (Valladares 1978: 242)

Dissertation Interview, Toledo, April 2013.

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Rio’s upper classes wanted to remove the undesirables, usually an entire favela at a time, to develop those urban spaces in ways more propitious to capitalist urbanization. This was the implicit goal, even if never stated publicly. Instead, the state used a number of justifications, such as, certain favelas needed to be removed because they were located in “areas of risk,” or closer to the argument this work is trying to construct because they were situated in areas that were claimed to be *não-urbanizáveis* (un-upgradable). The difference is that the dictatorship removals were almost always total, as in complete favelas and were done to acquire the coveted urban space the poor had “invaded.” There were no efforts to systematically upgrade any South Zone or Central Zone favelas until Favela-Bairro in the 1990s.

Favela upgrading removals result from interventions marketed as improving something, whether the economy or quality of life. At the national, regional and local levels DID occurs during the construction of dams, ports, industrial complexes, interstate highways, urban expressways and other mega-projects. At the community level, DID often comes in the form of neighborhood beautification or slum-upgrading schemes. Hoshour and Kalafat warn:

> With rapid urbanization occurring on a global scale, projects aimed at providing transportation, housing, electricity, water, sanitation, and other services to rapidly growing cities have emerged as major drivers of DIDR. Urban renewal and beautification schemes—often aimed at making cities attractive to tourists—have displaced entire neighborhoods. It is likely that the number of people affected by DIDR will continue to grow in the coming years; with urban growth rates exceeding six percent annually, the UN estimates that more than two billion people will be living in large cities with populations of more than one million people by the year 2025 (2010: 2).  

In Rio de Janeiro, evictions resulting from favela urban upgrading schemes often coincide with evictions based on “areas of risk” arguments. The Laboriaux section of Rocinha illustrates this convergence. By the July of 2010, once the city came to appreciate the intensity of the resistance movement, they backed down, a little. The city then returned in 2011. Officials informed residents that only one side of the community needed to be removed in order to widen

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the Maria do Carmo road and to properly build the remainder of a slope retention wall they were constructing. This meant that roughly 140 houses would be removed, down from the previous estimate of 830. While some residents showed signs of relief, Laboriaux’s activists viewed this as a typical divide-and-conquer tactic, and refused to stop protesting. The “140 houses only” strategy remained the city’s official position until August 2013.244

It is well known that slum-upgrading and other types of urban renewal projects often displace the poor. Mike Davis in *Planet of Slums* states:

> Urban segregation is not a frozen status quo, but rather a ceaseless social war in which the state intervenes regularly in the name of “progress,” “beautification,” and even “social justice for the poor” to redraw spatial boundaries to the advantage of the landowners, foreign investors, elite homeowners, and middle-class commuters. As in 1860s Paris under Haussmann, urban redevelopment still strives to simultaneously maximize private profit and social control (Davis 2006: 98).

The first notion, “progress” is more closely aligned with the mass evictions of the military era, whereas, “beautification” and “social justice for the poor” displacements are the type that have been investigated in Rocinha and other key favelas. The removals based on notions of “environmental risk” are particularly pernicious and cleverly framed as beneficial to the poor by the risk managers and the media. The terms slum or favela-upgrading, urbanização de favelas, and pacification imply that these interventions are done for the individual’s good. Yet there is a scarcity of empirical research documenting how slum-upgrading, also known in the literature as sites and service schemes, can be detrimental to the populations they allegedly benefit. Erhard Berner warns:

> The overall performance of upgrading and sites and services schemes is disappointing. Werlin goes as far as to call slum upgrading a "myth." Again, planning standards for upgrading are often unrealistically high. This leads in turn to rising living costs and the uprooting of considerable parts of the population, of course usually the poorest. Their resettlement, sometimes welcomed as “decongestion,” entails social, political, and financial costs...The market price for urban land in (more or less) attractive locations has also hampered sites and

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244 Confirmed during a 2012 conversation, and a 2013 recorded interview with Jorge Collaro, director of the City’s XXVII Administrative Region – Rocinha.
services schemes. Prime land is of course not available for this purpose...In effect, most sites and services projects are carried out in remote peripheral locations, often 30-40 km away from the city centres. Only people without any choice will accept these conditions...In more central locations, serviced sites ended up in the hands of affluent groups, often after being subjected to various forms of speculation (Berner 2001: 296).

The literature on removals directly attributable to slum-upgrading construction is limited. There is a bit more content focused on the ways slum-upgrading schemes often cause the cost of living in communities to rise, which can push poorer residents out (Shlomo 1983: 19; Sampaio 1998: 244; Leitão 2009: 167; Gonçalves 2013: 244-247).

But there is a shortage of research on actual construction projects displacing residents. The scarce material that does exists comes mostly from cases in South East Asia where the World Bank began loaning billions of dollars in the 1970s for these types of infrastructure projects (Davis 2006: 70). Arif Hasan, a distinguished Pakistani urbanist, who is cited in Berner’s quote above, has published extensively on this particular topic, as has Jan van der Linden, likewise cited above.

In Rocinha, three recent cases immediately come to mind in this regards. The first in Laboriaux, where it was mentioned that the city threatened to remove 140 families to widen the Maria do Carmo street, an unnecessary project that was dropped because of protests. Second, the PAC 1 Rocinha widening of Rua 4, which was a very necessary and welcomed undertaking in which a significant percentage of those removed were offered resettlement options in the community. Third, PAC 2 in Rocinha plans for opening several tight alleyways into roads. This would also be a welcomed accomplishment if dislodged residents were to be offered the option of being resettled nearby, as Toledo’s Master Plan specified.

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245 Increases in the cost of living do not always expel poor renters from prime zone favelas, at least not in communities meeting certain conditions, like Rocinha. This unique finding was uncovered during fieldwork and signifies another way the case of Rocinha highlights important exceptions to the aforementioned theories on displacement: especially in regard to favela gentrification.

246 Unfortunately I have not been able to locate much of their published work on this specific issue.
The most controversial PAC 2 intervention in Rocinha is the previously mentioned cable-car, which is technically as “monocable detachable gondola” (MDG). According the officials from the state government, the Rio’s favelas cable cars are inspired by the (MDGs) in Medellín, Colombia (EMOP 2012: 369). Even the same French company, Poma, was contracted for the work in Rio, where there are already two favela MDGs thus far.247 One was built in the Complexo do Alemão favela and completed in 2010. Dilma has referred to it as “a symbol of PAC” (um símbolo do PAC).248 The other cable car was constructed in Rio’s oldest standing favela, Morro da Providência, located in the city center. The Morro da Providência MDG was built as part of the Morar Carioca municipal favela-upgrading program and completed in 2013. But it has never been used (as of May 2015) for reasons that I will explain in the next chapter.

In Rocinha frustrations center on the high costs and the numerous families that would be removed from extremely dense areas of Rocinha in order to set the cable-car’s support towers and to build its six large terminals.249 Concern over the consequences of such a costly project in Rocinha led several locals groups to begin protesting against the cable-car and for more sanitation projects. The response from the state was strikingly similar to that of GEO-RIO when residents of Laboriaux first began protesting their removal. Officials from EMOP, and urban planners they subcontracted for the PAC 2 proposal, brushed aside local concerns. They claimed residents lacked expertise to debate such issues. This caused local activists to seek more technical confirmation for their argument that the money would be better spent on more


249 I do not have a copy of EMOP’s official design for Rocinha’s aerial cable-car. It is possible one does not even exist because protests broke out and resources began drying up as they were presenting the proposal for it. Until April 2015 I had never heard of such a document, only the project summaries EMOP presented to the community from early to mid-2013. A video version of their PAC 2 Rocinha project proposal is available at the following website: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=03-IYUMGt-U. In the video presentation of Rocinha’s cable-car it is clear that the plan includes approximately 3-5 support towers between each terminal. I estimate, if they built the cable-car, it would include approximately 20 of these gigantic support towers.
pressing needs in Rocinha. Based on preliminary research commissioned in 2013 by Rio esteemed Engineer’s Club (Clube de Engenharia do Rio de Janeiro) Critics claim there will be too many removals in relation to negligible gains in transportation. The cable-car project symbolizes the best example of exceptional cases to theories of gentrification. I return to this theme towards the end of Chapter 5.

In the literature, especially the policy literature (e.g., World Bank, IDB, UN, USAID), short, favela upgrading is lauded as benevolent. There are vociferous critics of slum upgrading programs, for reasons independent of displacement concerns. In Planet of Slums (2006) Mike Davis covers a few of these critics and their rationale. He describes how in the place of more difficult, but longer lasting, “top-down structural reform of urban poverty, as undertaken by postwar social democracy in Europe” the “less ambitious goal” of “improving rather than replacing slums” was adopted by governments and multinational organizations (Davis 2006: 71).

It is unclear exactly what Davis means by “replacing slums” but it appears he is espousing a dangerous viewpoint; one I have noticed is popular among the certain types of leftist who do not have much real contact with poor communities in low and middle-income countries. The position I am referring to defends that the best measures for addressing housing crises (e.g., favelas) are decided from the top-down, and that it is best to raze “the wretched” favelas and relocate their residents into model housing complexes. But recent research indicates, including this study, that in societies that are robustly capitalist and corrupt, like Brazil, resettlement housing is almost always located in less expensive peripheral lands. And thus the contradiction. Replacing (removing) favelas that are located in prime real estate locations serves the interests of dominant classes who history proves immediately usurp these liberated urban spaces for private use. The better alternative is to improve them to the point that they are no longer considered favelas.

Each country, city and slum is unique, and the massive investments in contemporary Rocinha, Complexo do Alemão and Manguinhos have been almost entirely financed by the
federal and state government, as well as to a lesser degree the city. Nonetheless, these interventions still generally apply World Bank, UN, IDB type slum-upgrading best practices.

Initially, the R$8 billion municipal upgrading scheme Morar Carioca was as momentous as the federal PAC 1 and 2 for Rio’s favelas was. Morar Carioca has sometimes been referred to as a continuation of the previous municipal Favela-Bairro program, but in reality is a separate initiative. Morar Carioca was announced through a considerable marketing campaign in 2010 with the ambitious objective of “urbanizing all of Rio de Janeiro’s favelas by 2020” (Gomes and Motta 2013: 13). In 2011 the program had a controversial start in Rio’s longest standing favela, Morro da Providência, which is located in the port district of Rio’s downtown where the R$ 9.3 billion Porto Maravilha project is revitalizing the area’s longstanding negative association with urban decay. The fact that Morar Carioca began quickly in Morro da Providência, and because it called for the removal of a substantial portion of the local population raised suspicions among residents, activists, and scholars (Gomes and Motta 2013: 13; Gonçalves 2013b: 24). Research I conducted alongside FACI (UFRJ) on Morro da Providência and Rio’s port district indicates that between one-third and one-half of the community’s 5,500 residents have been threatened with Morar Carioca related “area of risk” and favela upgrading removals since 2010 (Fernandes, Bautès and Burgos 2013: 10-11; Gonçalves 2013: 348). However, in 2012 favelas upgrading in Morro da Providência came to a virtual standstill when Rio de Janeiro State Public Defenders had an embargo placed on all construction, except for the cable car, which the City successfully appealed, in order to investigate widespread accusations of fraud and rights abuses (Gonçalves 2013b: 21-24).

III. RISING COSTS OF LIVING REMOVALS

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The final tactic of favela removal I investigated focused on whether rising costs of living are displacing Rocinha’s residents and more generally, if the recent allegations that Rio’s favelas are undergoing processes of gentrification are merited. This is the most difficult process to analyze because of the complete lack of systematic data on the issue and because of enduring debates in the literature as to what exactly constitutes or causes gentrification, and whether it is a good or bad thing for residents of poor neighborhoods.

I begin this section by presenting a number of noteworthy excerpts from my interviews with residents on the topic of rising costs of living and gentrification within Rio’s favelas. Approximately ten interviews were carried out during five research related visits to nearby Vidigal, a community I have visited on dozens of other occasions since 2001. I also visited and recorded conversations on gentrification with “local leaders” as well as foreigners living in other favelas, such as Complexo do Alemão, Santa Marta, and Morro da Babilônia. As with this dissertation’s other themes, the bulk of gentrification interviews were conducted in Rocinha with local residents. When I asked Maicon (April 2013), a college educated 31-year-old homeowner who was born and raised in Rocinha, about economic displacement and gentrification he provided some valuable insider information.

MB – Do you know of any residents who have been pushed out by rising cost of living?

Maicon – I don't know anyone off the top of my head who left directly because of the rising cost of housing, but I know several people who returned to their cities in the Northeast because they were not achieving the upward mobility they dreamt of when they came [to Rocinha]. Because these days you must have a college education if you want to make more than twice the minimum wage [R$1,350 during the time of the interview, April 2013]. Exceptions to this rule are extremely rare. That wasn't the case in the past. I think we are only just beginning to enter a phase in which lower income residents and workers without college degrees or certificates from technical schools will start reconsidering the type of life they will be able to live here.
MB – Have you noticed new demographics moving in, people with better economic situations?

Maicon – A little, but not in all parts of Rocinha, only in some sections like along Estrada da Gávea Road, and other key areas.

MB – Have you noticed more foreigners moving in?

Maicon – The usual flow. There were always some gringos living here, it hasn’t changed. Over in Vidigal, a lot more gringos have moved in. I know residents of Vidigal who only rent to gringos now, there is so much demand there that they can be selective.

MB – Do you think the middle classes will consider moving to Rocinha

Maicon – The upper-middle classes from places like Barra, no. There is too much prejudice. But I imagine people from the middle, and lower-middle class moving here, from places like Taquara, Jacarepaguá, or even Tijuca.

Unlike Vidigal, Maicon did not think there was an influx of new demographics moving into Rocinha. Instead, he suggested, “more than moving here the trend seems to be that pessoas de fora [people from the outside] are opening businesses and buying properties to rent here [in Rocinha], because that is where the real money is and where outsiders will increasingly play a role.” Maicon’s point is noteworthy because though Rocinha is not experiencing notable residential gentrification (as of January 2016), for several years the community has been experiencing the most advanced stages of commercial gentrification of any favela in Rio. Commercial gentrification was the type of gentrification most residents of Rocinha fear the most.

Martins spoke expressed his trepidation of a scenario in which outsiders increasingly exploit Rocinha for profit. In a June 2013 interview he told me that the kind of gentrification he is strongly opposed to is one where commercial developers and corporations moved in and began constructing superstores and high-rises like those found in other areas of the city. He explained, however, that considering Rocinha’s physical layout and the existing zoning and building codes this would be an unlikely scenario, unless the current laws are changed.
Martins then proceeded to describe how he envisions gentrifications occurring in Rocinha. He suggested it would become increasingly common for social classes slightly better off than today’s average resident (as of the June 2013 interview) to gradually move into the community. Then, in time, social classes even better off would follow, in a gradual form of gentrification (Gales 1984).

In countless interactions with residents of Rocinha since 2001 I only came across two who openly disliked the idea of outsiders moving into Rocinha. During a casual conversation he told me, “sejam playboys ou gringos” [Brazilian playboys or foreigners]. It is a somewhat uncomfortable moment when someone you are speaking to mentions they don’t want your type moving into their community. But I understand the context, and to a degree even agree with these sentiments, which are in fact extremely rare in Rocinha. Most residents I spoke with desire more socioeconomic and cultural diversity in Rocinha, including Martins, who qualified his comments by adding, “diversity is a good thing as long as the community remains affordable for the working class who built it and our unique cultures are preserved.”

Maicon said essentially the same thing in our conversation, and then he touched on a theme often neglected in the gentrification literature.

Maicon – I think one of the main reasons people are finding it harder to afford living in Rocinha is because there have been no significant investments in education and professional training [technical degrees]. For example, if you invest here, say, in improving the sewage infrastructure and the quality of electricity or garbage collection, etc., then eventually landlords will start charging more in rent as the quality of life increases. But the problem is most residents are still earning the same salary working at the same types of jobs. The opportunities for educational and technical advancement which people need more now than in the past to earn decent salaries are not rising at the same rate as the cost of living. This is what will force many people to leave the community.

251 Dissertation interview with Martins, June 2013.
To that end a Federal Technical University (IFRJ, previous known as CEFET) is soon (as of May 2015) to open in the immense Complexo do Alemão favela in Rio’s far North Zone. Having a properly functioning sufficiently funded technical college located in Complexo do Alemão would be a huge victory for that community and something the more gentrification vulnerable South and Central Zone favelas urgently need as well.

Despite the fact that Maicon is knowledgeable well beyond his 31 years (at time of 2013 interview) I also wanted to speak to residents who have lived in the community prior to the 1980s. Dona Gonçalina moved to Rocinha in the early 1960s at the age of 17. In her words she arrived, “with nothing but the clothes on my back.” Our first recorded conversation took place in March 2013 at the house she owns in the Bairro Barcelos section of Rocinha. At the time she owned seven other rental properties and a one-bedroom newly remodeled house for sale. The latter is located in Rocinha’s Cidade Nova section, about 30 rugged stairs down an dauntingly steep alleyway from Estrada da Gávea. She was asking R$60,000. Dona Gonçalina touched on the issue of rent during our conversation.\textsuperscript{252} I asked her:

MB – What effect have the recent investments, such as PAC and the UPP, had on property values and the overall cost of living in Rocinha?

Dona Gonçalina – Rocinha was already expensive when I arrived, but it has become even more so.

MB – Was there a period when you really noticed things getting more expensive, like more than usual?

Dona Gonçalina – Well, I guess during the 1990s. That’s when I noticed things getting much more expensive here.

MB – Do you think the tendency is for things to continue to become proportionally more expensive for Rocinha’s residents?

\textsuperscript{252} The house was located in the bottom third of the community, approximately 35 meters off the main road, Estrada da Gávea, within a steep narrow alleyway. She has been trying to sell it since 2011, and the last time I spoke to her she was asking R$ 55,000 (in cash).
Dona Gonçalina – The tendency is for os pobres [the poor] to no longer be able to live here. I mean, whoever owns something [property] can probably stay, if not, they likely won’t be able to afford to remain here.

MB – Do you know anyone who has had to leave because they could no longer afford to live in Rocinha, pay rent and what not?

Dona Gonçalina – I know people, yes. I had a tenant who was unable to pay her rent. She fell several months behind.

MB – How much was her rent?

Dona Gonçalina – It was R$400 a month. She ended up leaving, returned to Ceará, where she had been building a house. Probably why she fell behind in rent [smiling]. It is getting increasingly difficult for many people. I know of others who voltaram pro norte [returned to the Northeast].

MB – But for people like you with rental properties, this will be good for you right?

Dona Gonçalina – I don’t know. Soon, I will probably have extra expenses, like property taxes, and added costs to the bills I already pay, like water, light, television, and others. But I don’t mind, because I will be able to cobrar deles (hold them accountable) [the state and private companies] for services if I am paying everything correctly. The same way they do on the outside [outside the favela].

Dona Gonçalina, like so many other residents I interviewed, believed renters would suffer most from Rocinha’s rising real estate speculation. But field observations and a few strategic interviews I conducted indicate that rising rents may not necessarily pushed out Rocinha poorest residents in ways that have frequently occurred in North American and European cities. This seems to suggest that Rocinha represents an atypical case of gentrification, a theme returned to in the next chapter.

Ten Dollar Rent: Multiyear analysis of gentrification in Rocinha
In late 2001 National Public Radio (NPR) aired a piece investigating whether real estate prices in key areas of Rio were pushing the middle classes and foreigners to move into the city’s favelas, particularly those of the South Zone. A correspondent for the program interviewed me. Our conversation took place on the tiny patio of my first residence in Rocinha, a small one-room dwelling (approx. 25 sq. meters/269 sq. ft.) with a bathroom, kitchen area, but no separate bedroom. In front, between the house and Maria do Carmo Street, there was an enclosed rectangular patio area (approx. 12 sq. meters/126 sq. ft.). Street level open spaces like patios have since become extreme rarities in today’s constantly denser Rocinha. I split the living/dining/sleeping area with two working class Brazilians, neither of whom were from Rio de Janeiro but were also studying at nearby PUC-Rio. Our rent was only R$90 a month (US$30 at the time), which we split evenly. In retrospect, it is difficult to believe that in 2001, in one of the world’s most expensive cities (then and now), that my portion of the rent was only US$ 10.00 a month.

The journalist questioned me on the experience of being a foreigner living in Rocinha. Rumors existed at the time that because of the exorbitant rental market in the formal city certain South Zone favelas were attracting adventurous foreigners (e.g., exchange students like myself) and young local professionals or other segments of Rio’s middle-classes. She was particularly interested in favelas close enough to walk or bike to PUC-Rio, such as Rocinha, Parque da Cidade (a small favela in Alto Gávea), and Vidigal. The reporter came to Rocinha to find out more, whether it was true and whether students and young professionals should consider moving to the favelas as a response to the high cost of living in the formal city.

I was 21 at the time and only vaguely knowledgeable of gentrification as an academic theme. The impression I had of gentrification was simple, and negative. I understood it as the process in which more privileged groups moved in large numbers into poorer neighborhoods, causing “things” to become more expensive and therefore pushing former residents out.
In 2001, as today, I had an unfavorable opinion of gentrification, and in this sense my responses to the NPR correspondent’s questions, while honest, were also selective. I downplayed as much as possible how much I valued the solidarity with my neighbors, the strong sense of community and the proximity to nature, the beach and other South Zone amenities. In case “potential gentrifiers” might listen to the program I tried to give the impression that living in Rocinha had advantages, such as cheap rent (back then) and proximity to PUC-Rio (a 20-25 minute walk from Laboriaux). But I focused more on the negative. I described horrible public and private services as well as frequent shootouts and I mentioned that several days a month our house lacked running water. I told of how internet access was extremely limited and that electricity went out regularly. I ended by accentuating the fact that heavily armed young men openly patrolled the community.

A month later my two roommates and I moved to a larger apartment (approx. 65 sq. meters/700 sq. ft.) located 12 houses up Maria do Carmo Street. Considering housing standards in Rocinha the new house was spacious, with a large tiled kitchen, living room, a separate dining room, a bathroom and two bedrooms. In the back there was an enclosed porch where we did laundry and occasionally cooked out. In 2002 we paid R$180 a month, or US$20 each. Then the time the Dollar was worth three times the Real (during much of 2001 and 2002), and the minimum wage in Brazil was a mere R$180.00 a month in 2001. It rose slightly to R$200.00 in January 2002 (approx. US% 0.28 an hour), the month we moved in. As of January 2015 it was R$788.00 (about US$ 1.10 an hour).

Today, the quaint little house with the enclosed front patio that we rented in 2001 for R$90.00 is now a large two story edifice. The owner moved back into the first floor, which now extends to the street where the front patio used to be. The second floor is rented for R$600.00/month (as of September 2014). As for the two-bedroom apartment for R$180.00/month, it was sold a few years ago at a considerably higher value, one the owner
From my interviews with Rocinha’s main real estate agencies I came up with the average price for a two-bedroom apartment in 2014: R$1,200 at the bottom of Rocinha and about R$800 in Laboriaux. You can still find unit for single room occupancy (not studios) in Rocinha for as low as R$150/month, but they will almost certainly be in poor condition and in less accessible areas of the community. The average rent for a studio in Rocinha as of mid-2014 was R$450 (US$220.00) a month.

Virtually all of my interviews suggest renters being the demographic most susceptible to economic displacement in Rocinha. Renters make up almost 40 percent of Rocinha (EMOP 2012: 47), and most do not have the financial means to buy housing in the community. Because of this, and also because necessary controls are not in place, and those that exist are not enforced, I initially predicted Rocinha’s low-income renters would be, in large part, negatively affected by the increased real estate prices and costs of living associated with favela-upgrading and pacification schemes. It is still too early to know for sure. My preliminary hypothesis was that this should have been the case, but as of January 2016 displacement was not occurring on a significant level in Rocinha.

For the intent of this dissertation I am only concerned with gentrification as it refers to steady socioeconomic and demographic changes taking place at the level of neighborhood, which could include multiple adjacent neighborhoods, city zones, boroughs, districts, etc.), for instance, the possible gentrification of Rocinha and Vidigal (neighborhoods) or Rio’s downtown (a large part of the Central Zone).

Although I view gentrification as a process that is part of, and often plays an important role in, the larger mechanisms of accumulation by dispossession and creative destruction, throughout this work I limit its analysis to the neighborhood or adjoining communities level. This is the reason I have made a clear distinction in this work between neighborhood or favela

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253 There are many people who know I lived there and the house would thus be easy to identify. The owner did not want any financial figures on the informal sale made public.
gentrification and the “areas of risk” and urban renewal/favela upgrading tactics of displacement mentioned above.

This is a significant departure from my original hypothesis. Early in this research project I held that favela gentrification is a desired objective, or perhaps semi-unintentional consequence of large-scale improvement schemes. In line with the limited “slum” gentrification literature I anticipated that gentrification in strategically located favelas would only be possible after these overly dense, violent communities, deficient in basic infrastructure and sanitation, receive substantial investments for decongestion, upgrading, and “pacification”. But for reasons developed in subsequent sections, certain community case studies caused me to reconsider this premise, particularly those of Rocinha and Vidigal.

**Previous Gentrification Research in Brazil**

Murmurs of favela gentrification surfaced in late 2009 and by early 2010 were amplified. At the time UPPs were expanding in South Zone favelas, Rio had won the bid to host the 2016 Olympics, and in April 2010 the City’s “areas of risk” eviction campaign gained full force. Intense real estate speculation related to the start of the “pacification” process in Rocinha and Vidigal in 2011 furthered fanned rumors of favela gentrification. The media covered numerous cases of foreigners buying houses and establishing hostels or posadas (pousadas) in favelas and had many convinced gentrification was virtually inevitable. From late 2010 to mid-2013 this was a popular narrative being spread by corporate media, NGOs, and activist circles, although for different obviously different reasons.

A careful look at the relevant but limited literature reveals the theme of favela gentrification dates back to at least the early 1990s. This was also the period when Democracy was being reestablished in Brazil and the city of Rio de Janeiro (and Brazil in general) adopted an increasingly neoliberal style of urban governance (Vainer 2000: 115-118; 2013: 59), Parallel to the rise of neoliberal urban governance, Favela-Bairro, Rio’s first major favela upgrading
program, was also proposed during the early 1990s. Initially, these two movements seem contradictory. If neoliberalism demands limited social spending why at that time would the City begin its first serious investment in the favelas? I provide a possible explanation at the end of this section.

Gentrification is a comparatively new academic topic in Brazil. A number of scholars, such as Arantes (2000), Leite (2002; 2010), and Nobre (2002), have published on the theme since the early 2000s. However, their focus has been less on residential areas and more on central business district of urban centers such as São Paulo or the historic quarters of cities like Recife or Salvador. There has been little published work done on gentrification of any type in Rio. When applied to the city’s favelas, there is a scarcity of scholarship on gentrification.

The paucity of favela gentrification research is probably best explained by the fact that the phenomenon has never occurred on a significant scale. Chapter 1 highlighted the reasons, the most important being the constant threat of removal. Even if the general perception of a particular community believed it was unlikely to be displaced it would not have mattered too much because until the 1980s favelas had even worse public and private services than they do today. It was only after the CODESCO experiment in the North Zone’s Brás de Pina favela (1968) that the relationship between favela upgrading and costs of living began slowly appearing in the literature. And it was not until the 1990s, and especially the early 2000s, that certain favelas received the degree of upgrading necessary to, theoretically, induce gentrification. Furthermore, then as now, the vast majority of houses in Rio’s favelas lack freehold property titles, even if since the 1980s small advances have been made in this direction (Perlman 2010b: 11).

The little data that exists is qualitative. On the one hand this is important because ethnographic type studies are often the first to highlight important issues that can later be complimented with carefully collected descriptive statistics on gentrification. Unfortunately

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254 An exception is the relatively threat free period between the 1980s and 2010.

255 It is highly likely that among the thousands of theses and dissertations on Rio’s favelas, especially
there is no quantitative research on favela gentrification. For the time being the important but limited (in hard numbers) qualitative studies and media reports are all that is available.

The earliest publication I was able to locate on this theme is from a 1992 article in Cadernos do Terceiro Mundo by Maria Helena Guimarães Pereira, titled “A favela não é mais aquela” or roughly, “The favela isn’t like that anymore”. The article was timely, published the year César Maia was first elected Rio’s mayor and one year before Maia’s Strategic Plan (Plano Estratégico).

Few publications came out on favela gentrification after Valladares work in the early 1990s. The shocking violence that spiked and then remained high in most of Rio’s favelas for over a decade beginning in the mid-1990s might explain why favela gentrification was virtually absent from public and scholarly discourse. But Around 2009, with the perception that UPPs were making favelas safer, theme resurfaced. The stream of local rumors, NGO reports, stories in the media, and eventually scholarly works on favela gentrification is directly traceable to the era of UPPs.

I am unaware of any thorough investigations of gentrification in Rocinha. Jason Cummings conducted 10 interviews in the community and the helpful but limited data he collected for his research formed the basis of his 2013 master’s thesis Confronting the Favela Chic (2013), as well as his chapter in Global Gentrifications: Uneven Development and Displacement (2015). Other than Cummings (2013 and 2015) I am unaware of any studies on gentrification in Rocinha. Despite limited data (20 interviews in total, 10 in Vidigal and 10 in Rocinha) Cummings’ conclusion is perceptive and of particular importance to my research.

Based on the data he collected and analyzed Cummings (2013) determined that “in Rocinha the conditions for gentrification exist, but the evidence of it is difficult to isolate from other factors (city-wide housing shortages, PAC investment, and the UPP takeover).” Vidigal, he

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from local universities UFRJ, UERJ, UFF and PUC-Rio, that there exist studies that have investigated gentrification in the city’s favelas.

concludes, “exhibits the beginning stages of gentrification as, primarily, economic and, secondarily, cultural.”

Cummings asserts that processes of gentrification, impending in Rocinha and already nascent in Vidigal, are a result of investment opportunities aided “by the actions and policies of the state and not significantly by a shift in consumer demand, foreign or otherwise”. In other words, in Vidigal and Rocinha gentrification is overwhelmingly production-side. Sufficient demand has always been present for redevelopment and upgrade, given adequate conditions for predictability, stability, and security (Cummings 2013: 42). He attributes greater gentrification in Vidigal to the community’s smaller population in relation to its larger “reservoir of external demand”. Then Cummings accurately points out, there has been less state intervention in Vidigal.

This detail, that Vidigal has received few upgrading investments, and I add, very few “area of risk” removals in recent years, but is still experiencing the city’s most advanced stages of residential favelas gentrification is largely what caused me to reconsider what I previously held to be essential relationship between needing to upgrade and decongest (e.g., through “area of risk” removals) and economic displacement.

After years of observations and months of interviewing for this dissertation I arrived at a similar conclusion as the one offered by Cummings. But the years I have spent living in Rocinha (and visiting adjacent Vidigal) have provided a substantial amount of data and my analysis includes several important qualifications and nuances, which I present below.

Furthermore, it is impossible for me to say with any precision whether Rocinha and Rio de Janeiro are more expensive now when considering wages, exchange rates, and inflation, not to mention the recent but surely temporary speculation caused by the mega-events. I attempted to develop methods for approaching the topic of gentrification in informal areas like Rocinha

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where little or nothing has been systematically studied previously. I present a few of these calculations below.

**Synopsis: Insufficient Data on Gentrification**

There are no official figures (reliable or not), longitudinal studies or rigorous ethnographic research on favela gentrification, or any type of gentrification in Rio de Janeiro for that matter. With the resources at hand I carefully examined this theme in Rocinha, and to a lesser extent in the other 10 favelas this dissertation investigated. Before I would be willing to consider my study of favela gentrification “rigorous” it would be necessary to return to these communities (probably best after the 2016 Olympics) to compare my findings from 2013-2015 with more recent data, to broaden the sample (of residents and communities), and to update the focus of interview questions. Still, the research conducted for this dissertation should bolster future studies on gentrification in Rio’s favela and other vulnerable areas of the city, and potentially in other areas of the world where informality is widespread.

A number of important inferences can be drawn on gentrification in Rio’s favelas by examining a few of the most recent demographic figures. Doing so allows for one immediate assertion: the official data on the number of favelas in Rio, their spatial distribution throughout the city, their socioeconomic composition and population estimates, do “not” support the argument that Rio’s favelas are experiencing significant gentrification. After presenting some relevant statistics I provide three qualifying statements necessary for sustaining the “no widespread gentrification” claim.

The data paints an interesting sociospatial portrait of Rio’s favelas. As of 2011, of the city’s 1,035 favelas 896 of them (87%) were located in the West or North Zones, in areas widely perceived to be less vulnerable to gentrification than favelas in Rio’s particularly expensive city
center and South Zone.\textsuperscript{258} In 1960 the scenario was much different. Then, 59 of Rio’s 147 favelas were located in the city center or South Zone, or approximately 40 percent of the city’s total, compared to just 13% currently located in these areas.\textsuperscript{259}

Furthermore, of the 13%, only 6% of Rio’s favelas are located in the city’s AP2, or \textit{Área de Planejamento 2} (Planning Area 2). AP2 is called the South Zone Planning Area, but its borders misrepresent social reality because AP2 includes the only four North Zone neighborhoods considered part of Rio’s middle/upper-middle class: Grajaú, Andaraí, Vila Isabel and Tijuca. Furthermore, there are literally dozens of favelas located in these four neighborhoods, including some of Rio’s oldest, best-known and most notorious, such as, Morro do Andaraí, Morro dos Macacos, Morro do Borel, Morro do Salgueiro, Morro da Formiga, and Morro do Turano.\textsuperscript{260} Including the four mentioned North Zone neighborhoods within AP2 inflates the actual number of favelas presently situated in the gentrification vulnerable city center and South Zone. I estimate (arrived at by literally counting each favela and dividing the total by 1035) the total number of favelas located in the “actual” South Zone (not AP2) does not surpass 4% of the city’s total, although this would include Rocinha, Brazil’s largest. Of this maximum of 4% Rocinha comprises 40% of the population, and I know for a fact Rocinha is not undergoing gentrification. Therefore, I do not believe widespread or even moderate processes of gentrification are occurring in Rio’s favelas when considered comprehensively, which is the only way serious scholarship should investigate such claim.

Instead, the type of real estate speculation that often drives gentrification is occurring in neighborhoods that before the era of mega-events and UPPS were more affordable middle-class neighborhoods, like Tijuca, Lapa, Botafogo, Flamengo, and even in formerly working class

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{258} Lopes, Amorim and Cavallieri 2011: 4
\item \textsuperscript{259} Calculations based on IBGE 1960 and 2010, found in Valladares (1978: 31) and (Lopes et. al. 2011: 4).
\item \textsuperscript{260} Morro do Turano is divided by AP2 and AP3.
\end{itemize}
districts, such as the area around Rio’s port and the expansive West Zone neighborhood of Jacarepaguá.²⁶¹

QUALIFICATIONS TO “NO SIGNIFICANT FAVELA GENTRIFICATION” CLAIM

The first relates to the reliability of official data. While the number of favelas and their spatial distribution is for the most part indisputable, information on socioeconomic composition and population are less dependable. This is why critical ethnography and collaborative research are so important, because in the case of Rocinha, for example, our research team was able to significantly contribute when we felt secondary data was unreliable or completely absent.

Secondly, the claim that Rio’s favelas are not being gentrified depends largely on which definition of gentrification is being considered. If an expansive interpretation of gentrification is applied, such as the argument that it is one of several important processes falling under the wider concept of “accumulation by dispossession” (Harvey 2003: 158; 2008: 34), then claims could be made that production side gentrification is occurring in scores of Rio de Janeiro’s favelas. In this sense the “popularly understood view” above is part of gentrification but should be viewed as an element of a much broader process of urban socioeconomic and spatial restructuring (Smith 1987: 165-169).

But in this work I evaluate the narrower and more popularly understood view of gentrification as the outflow of pre-gentrification residents and businesses from low-income neighborhoods as a result of more affluent groups moving in and the associated increases in property values.

An in this sense my findings suggest only one of the city’s approximately 1,035 favelas are currently experiencing gentrification.²⁶² Furthermore, virtually all of the other favelas that have

²⁶¹ Mosciaro 2010; Gaffney 2013; Jorge 2013.
²⁶² I estimate no more than ten favelas are currently undergoing gentrification (as of January 2016).
been rumored to be experiencing gentrification are located in AP2, such as the famous case of Vidigal, the community most strongly associated with gentrification. The fact that not many favelas are currently experiencing gentrification does not mean those cases are insignificant for scholars, policy makers, activists, and most importantly, pre-gentrification residents. Theoretically, if notable gentrification were occurring in only one small South Zone favela it would still be a valid and important issue to understand and properly address.

The data I collected indicates that noteworthy gentrification is only occurring in Vidigal. Vidigal is the only favela in Rio de Janeiro tangibly experiencing residential gentrification, but it is entirely possible that in the coming years many more residents could be at risk of being displaced from South Zone favelas, such as Chácara do Céu, Babilônia/Chapéu Mangueira, Parque da Cidade, Tabajaras/Morro dos Cabritos, Cantagalo/Pavão-Pavãozinho, and even Rocinha. This will depend mainly on future political economic trends and levels or security in these communities, or at least public perceptions of violence and crime. From 2009 to 2012 violent crime dropped in the city of Rio de Janeiro, but since then it has remained stagnant or slightly increased (as the case in both 2013 and 2015). The political and economic crises in Brazil, together with stagnant or slightly rising levels of drug related violence in Rio and many of its UPP occupied communities, does not seem to favor conditions that would facilitate the expansion of favela gentrification.

The stigma attached to living in Rocinha would prevent most middle and upper class Brazilians from moving into the community. I suggest the same holds true for other favelas, such as Morro da Providência and Morro dos Prazeres, that would likely be experiencing processes of gentrification had Brazil and Rio’s political and socioeconomic crises not interrupted the swift “area of risk” removals and favela-upgrading schemes that were so effective from 2010 to mid-2013. These 20-30 communities are all located in the South Zone, city center, or the middle/upper-middle class North Zone neighborhoods of Tijuca, Vila Isabel and Andaraí.


There are another 20-30 favelas, such as Morro da Providência and Morro dos Prazeres, that would likely be experiencing processes of gentrification had Brazil and Rio’s political and socioeconomic crises not interrupted the swift “area of risk” removals and favela-upgrading schemes that were so effective from 2010 to mid-2013. These 20-30 communities are all located in the South Zone, city center, or the middle/upper-middle class North Zone neighborhoods of Tijuca, Vila Isabel and Andaraí. 

although living in smaller less violent South Zone favelas would probably be less shameful socially. Neil Smith and others have mentioned have an almost pioneer spirit when it comes to moving into “native” lands Further complicating this topic is the fact that despite a the lack of empirical data a persuasive argument could be made that gentrification is the only process of displacement purportedly occurring on a wider scale in the city’s non-favela neighborhoods. It would be a classic hasty generalization to state that Rio's favelas are gentrifying. There are 1.4 million people living in over 1,000 favelas in greater Rio de Janeiro (Cummings 2013: 4; 14). While I extrapolate based on my case studies of Rocinha and ten additional favelas located in the South Zone, city center, and far North Zone, I am careful throughout this work not to make sweeping generalization about the gentrification of Rio’s favelas. There are over 1,000 favelas in Rio and as of May 2015 the only one experiencing noteworthy processes of gentrification was Vidigal, and perhaps a couple others in Rio’s South Zone

**Contributory Causes:**

For the purpose of this investigation, contributory (or partial) causes are factors that increase the likelihood of favela removals. After careful consideration I propose these causes increase the probabilities of removals but they are not always necessary or sufficient to produce the effect.

(1) **Profiting from disaster**

The rains of April 2010 caused mudslides in favelas throughout the city of Rio and the greater metropolitan region. The worst tragedy occurred alongside the Morro do Bumba favela in the city of Niterói, across the bay from Rio. Within Rio most deaths occurred in the Morro dos Prazeres favela, in Santa Teresa, where an avalanche of mud and debris killed as many as 38 people (Fernandes, Bautès and Burgos 2013: 20). Paes promised to take decisive action to
prevent future catastrophes, and Geo-Rio carried out a new survey of Rio’s favelas. Geo-Rio determined that 21,000 houses in 117 communities were at immediate risk of succumbing to landslides and needed to be removed. Although originally a natural phenomenon (rain and mudslides), human socioeconomic and political actions play a major role in many natural disasters. This was certainly the case in Rio. Torrential rains and loss of life in 1966 and 1967 greatly facilitated the mass removals during mayor Negrão de Lima’s administration (Gonçalves 2015: 116). The same can be said of the April 2010 rains and Eduardo Paes’ removals. But as the torrential rains and loss of life in 1988 demonstrate, natural disasters are neither necessary nor sufficient for causing mass removals (Gonçalves 2015: 108-113). By 1988 the pressure local residents and activists had been placing on public authorities for over a decade had resulted in numerous favela improvement schemes. In addition, the local political environment, run by left leaning bureaucrats and politicians, such as Leonel Brizola, was relatively sympathetic to the plight of favela residents. In 1988 Rio’s dominant classes were unsuccessful in exploiting the rains and tragic deaths in order to further their desired sociospatial agenda. Favela removals were politically taboo during from the mid-1980s until recently. It was in April 2010, just days after the rains, that Eduardo Paes defended the reinstatement of the politically and socially charged term “removal” back into the local political discourse.

(2) My House, My Life (MCMV) – A Critical Introduction

Brazil’s federal social housing program *Minha Casa, Minha Vida* (MCMV) – My House, My Life, has played a unique role in the Eduardo Paes era mass removal of favela residents in Rio de Janeiro.\(^\text{264}\) The way MCMV was exploited in the city of Rio de Janeiro allowed for the uprooting of thousands of favela residents while simultaneously creating a more sociospatially polarized

\(^{264}\) Programa Minha Casa, Minha Vida (My House, My Life Program) is the official name of this historic housing intervention. Many publications, because it is an official “program” use the abbreviate PMCMV. I prefer to drop the “P” and use MCMV, which is slightly less onerous and more familiar to most Brazilians.
city. I identified this trend during fieldwork and recently it has been increasingly common in the emergent literature. MCMV is the most important supply-side contributory cause. The manner in which Rio’s public authorities and private developers administered the federal My House, My Life Program (MCMV) has been condemned by resettled former favela residents, activists, scholars, and representatives of multinational organizations such as UN-Habitat. It would have been logistically impossible to displace 60-70 thousand people from their homes without the 49,820 housing units built (as of April 2015) for low-income families through MCMV. For Rio’s public authorities MCMV conveniently coincided with their removal campaign.

The My House, My Life Program (MCMV or PMCMV, I prefer the former) is a national initiative aimed at addressing Brazil’s persistent shortage of affordable housing. Lula launched the program in April of 2009 (UN-Habitat 2013: 31). MCMV is managed by the federal Ministry of Cities, which draws up the guidelines and passes resources on to Brazil’s largest state bank, Caixa Econômica Federal (Caixa). The initial phase from 2009-2010 had a budget of R$34 billion (US$18 billion) (UN-Habitat 2013: 31). Since 2011 MCMV has increasingly complemented projects that are part of PAC. Caixa lends money mainly to private developers for housing construction, and provides subsidies to the low-income beneficiaries of the MCMV program. The state bank defines the technical criteria for project design and, through its local agencies in Brazil’s municipalities, plays a role in implementing and monitoring MCMV projects (UN-Habitat: 2013: 33). States and municipalities are responsible for selecting and enrolling housing applicants.

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265 UN Special Rapporteur Raquel Rolnik has been a constant and detailed critic of the way local authorities and private contractors have thwarted the enormous potential benefit of the MCMV. The follow link from her blog illustrate is but one of many examples: https://raquelrolnik.wordpress.com/2014/11/10/programa-minha-casa-minha-vida-precisa-ser-avaliado-nota-publica-da-rede-cidade-e-moradia/. Last accessed 1/23/2016.

266 According to Rio’s Municipal Housing Secretary a total of 69,270 units were built as of April 2015, of which 16,450 units were designated for middle-income families. Retrievable from: http://www.rio.rj.gov.br/web/smh/minha-casa-minha-vida. Last Accessed 8/20/2015.
The Federal government expects states and municipalities to contribute with project counterpart funds (*contrapartidas*), which can be in cash or through the provision of services and land. In Rio, the matching contributions have mainly been in the form of land. Specialized local government bodies are also responsible for issuing project licensing and thus play an important role in the location of projects within the urban fabric. In Rio de Janeiro, the primary local agency tasked with this responsibility is the SMH. In the state of Rio de Janeiro a handful of private developers have been responsible for the majority of MCMV construction (Cardoso and Corrêa do Lago 2013: 14).267 These companies then become responsible for housing design, negotiations with the target population and choice of location (Cardoso et al. 2013: 143-144).268 The developers can commercialize the units they build for income ranges higher than three minimum wages (Groups 2 and 3).

For Group 1, the poverty level group, the state bank Caixa manages the supply, and once construction is completed, distributes units to selected beneficiaries (UN-Habitat 2013: 34). One of the core objectives of the first phase of MCMV was to guarantee that 40% of the units constructed be set aside to attend to the housing deficit faced by the lower income group that earns three times the minimum wage or less (Cardoso and Corrêa do Lago 2013: 12). The second phase has pledged to dedicate 60% of the housing built to the 0-3 minimum wage group (Marques and Rodrigues 2013: 161).

Following market logic, the private construction firms usually designate peripheral land as the sites for the construction of MCMV housing for Group 1 (their profit margins are lower with this group). This is mainly because of the lower cost of land in these more distant neighborhoods,
such as Campo Grande (Cardoso et al. 2013: 144). As a consequence, the distance from the center and areas of work imposes great difficulties on low-income families who “benefit” from MCMV. Rolnik and Nakano (2009) warn:

In addition to the increased costs of extending urban infrastructures, which are forced to reach more distant locations, the distance between workplaces, urban facilities and areas of housing deepen sociospatial segregation and raise the costs of urban mobility. The long daily commutes between home and the workplace or education congest the roads and public transportation, damaging the collective quality of life. Moreover, the vast preference for options using tires – especially cars that use fossil fuels and emit carbon dioxide – contributes to air pollution, global warming and climate change, whose effects are already affecting millions of people worldwide (Quoted in Cardoso 2013: 48).

Examined more carefully, the MCMV scheme in the city of Rio de Janeiro is complex and controversial. In Rio, the matching contributions have mainly been in the form of land donations. Bairro Carioca for example, was built in the old abandoned industrial grounds that once house the regional power company, Light. The city donated the unused land as part of the matching funding for MCMV (UN-Habitat 2013: 53). In Rio, the current context of housing production, including social interest housing, privileges corporate interests. In this sense, the state is no longer the protagonist, but serves to mediate and facilitate these interests. Therefore, in many respects the state assumes a passive/cooperative position to the business sector in decision-making process of implementation of social housing developments. This is true particularly in regards to the dynamics of design conception, negotiation with the target population and choice of location of properties (Cardoso et al. 2013: 143).

Cardoso and Aragão (2013: 48-49), warn that MCMV is running the serious risk of repeating the errors of the 1960s and 1970s when BNH/COHAB-GB built large apartment complexes in the western periphery of the city to house the thousands of residents removed from South Zone favelas. They suggests that this spatial tendency should have been considered within the context of the enormous priority given to the private sector as the primary agent stimulating the construction of social housing, almost entirely overlooking alternative options, such as the use of

269 See Abbreviations and Acronyms section located immediately before the Introduction.
state companies or self-management, whether collective or individual. History has shown that in Rio when private companies are contracted to construct social housing they always operate by the logic of capitalism, building on the cheapest land and buying the cheapest materials in order to maximize profits. In Rio this means building in the distant periphery (Cardoso and Aragão 2013: 44-45; 54).

Cardoso et al. reveal that in addition to a housing finance scheme, MCMV has been used in the city of Rio de Janeiro to induce a resettlement policy. The city is not only donating land but also buying Caixa housing constructions and giving them, with no expected return, to the resettled families, as the following cases from Rocinha exemplify. Cardoso et al. describe how the municipal government gains nothing from financing the housing of the low-income families forced to leave “areas of risk” and communities in the path of mega-event interventions, or from residents of other favelas who often after being persuaded chose to leave their homes for a variety of reasons (Cardoso et. al. 2013: 144-145; 149-150). One reasonable explanation as to why the municipal government would provide these unprofitable housing grants is that in doing so Rio’s dominant classes have been able to remove thousands of residents from extremely valuable urban spaces. Countless more would have been displaced had it not been for intense local resistance.

There is a clear preference for commodifying social/public housing within Rio’s city management, which since the 1990s has functioned similar to a private corporation. Under the entrepreneurial city model real estate values have skyrocketed in Rio de Janeiro. In “area of risk” favelas and others receiving significant public interventions, MCMV is contributing to spatial polarization by allowing for the relocation of thousands of low-income favela families to new privately developed housing projects located almost entirely in the urban periphery (Cardoso et. al. 2013: 157-158).

**Three local cases**
This section begins with a case of removal that in many regards is positive. In fairness, fieldwork for this dissertation uncovered a number of similar stories. Paulina had lived in Laboriaux since the mid-1990s, in a small dingy unventilated room (approximately 25 m²), with two adolescent children (one is an adult now). In the wake of the April 2010 landslides City officials marked her house for removal as an at-risk property. Since August 2013 the same area has been classified “not at risk” or safe to live in. But in consideration of the few opportunities available for socioeconomic mobility, especially in an increasingly expensive Rocinha, Paulina decided to sell the house.

Paulina’s house has since been demolished, and in early 2013 she moved into a new two-bedroom apartment in the sprawling MCMV housing complex known as Bairro Carioca, located in the North Zone neighborhood of Triagem. The commute from Laboriaux to Bairro Carioca is approximately one hour and 20 minutes, in moderate traffic. Another 30 families from Laboriaux, or 70 to 90 residents, also decided to negotiate exchanges with the SMH for housing in Bairro Carioca.

Bairro Carioca is made up of 11 condominium schemes with 112 blocks, 5-stories each, none with elevators. Its 2,240 apartments are roughly 43 m² with two bedrooms/one bath, and open living/dining room, and a side area where the kitchen and laundry area are located. The housing units have no private open space or balcony. Facilities and public space are on the ground floor, such as a kindergarten, playground, etc. Each condominium is fenced off and has private, controlled access. Bairro Carioca’s 2,240 apartment units are already home to thousands of low-income former favela residents. All apartment units are reserved for households earning 0-3 times the minimum wage.

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\(^{270}\) Based on multiple conversations with Paulina from 2010 to July 2014. Paulina has been a friend since at least 2005. But several years ago her husband was murdered. Because of this, and other personal reasons, Paulina, like many residents of Rocinha, does not speak on record. However, she did give me permission to use information from our conversations.
The range of incomes is more homogenous, and the concentration of poverty is greater, in Bairro Carioca than Rocinha. Therefore, the level of social isolation Paulina is now experiencing is likely higher, particularly when considering the surrounding neighborhoods (elite São Conrado/Gávea and working-class Triagem). But for Paulina this was an exercise in social mobility. While leaving the more convenient (and high-status) South Zone for a working class area of the North Zone, Paulina took what was viewed as an opportunity to improve her family’s living conditions. She could not afford to wait for rumored gentrification to raise prices in Laboriaux. Paulina’s story is similar to those of numerous other critically poor residents of Rio’s favelas, some of who truly lived in areas of risk. Paulina was a local personality and left behind a large social network.

Nico arrived in Laboriaux from Ceará in 1988, where he lived with his wife and three children in a spacious three-bedroom house with rooftop veranda and panoramic view of Rio’s South Zone. In April 2010 his house, like all others in Laboriaux, was marked for eviction by the Civil Defense. Nico explained that after the rains his family decided to move because they trusted the City officials who informed them that their house could tumble down the hill during the next intense rainstorm. The SMH offered Nico a mere R$29,500 for his large house, a value he rejected. Because Nico earned over three times the minimum wages (R$1,600) he could not qualify for housing under the MCMV-SNHIS. Nico had his father, who has a lower income, sign as owner of the house so the family could qualify to live in a MCMV-SNHIS unit. His family entered a waiting list, during which time the family moved, in mid-2010, to the West Zone neighborhood of Freguesia. Between 2010 and 2013 they received R$400 a month through the city’s Aluguel Social (Social Rent program), to assist with rent while they awaited a vacancy in a MCMV apartment complex. During this period they moved three times (each time within the West Zone), a cost not covered by the city. Their three children changed schools as many as five times.
When I interviewed Nico the family of five had been living in “a nice” two-bedroom apartment in the vast *Vivendas das Rosa e das Orquídeas* MCMV housing complex in the West Zone neighborhood of Campo Grande. Nico who works in Ipanema six days a week, explained that his main complaint was: “My daily commute increased from 30 to 40 minutes round trip to now between 6 and 7 hours, sometimes more, because I work the nightshift when there are fewer buses. I have to take three buses now. They told us we would be moved into a complex in Frei Caneca [in the city-center], but that didn’t work out, so we ended up way out here.” Nico added, “I miss some of my neighbors and family in Laboriaux, being close to them, but you know, I didn’t spend much time in the street, just work and home, so it’s not that bad.”

Nico described many benefits of living in the MCMV housing complex. “We never lack running water here, or electricity, and there is much less noise. And even though a *milícia* controls the complex, we almost never hear gun shots and no one uses drugs here, at least not openly.”

MB – You have seen the *milícias*, do they openly carry their guns like in Rocinha?

Nico – Not like in Rocinha, but we know who they are, and we sometimes see them walking around with guns. [laughing] But, we came from Rocinha, so it’s nothing new. And they don’t mess with us because we don’t do anything to upset them.

MB – Do they charge residents for services, like water, gas, TV, internet, like the newspapers have reported?

Nico – Not us, they don’t charge us anything, but they do charge local business a monthly fee [for protection]. Since we don’t have a business, they don’t mess with us.

MB – Are you worried that the complex might one day become like Vila Kennedy, Cidade de Deus, Vila Aliança and other housing complexes that after being essentially abandoned, transformed into violent favelas?

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Nico – I have thought about that, but everyone here takes care of things, so, until now this hasn’t been a concern, although they say some of the complexes are already experiencing this. But if it does occur, it won’t be the fault of the government. If Vivendas das Orquídeas becomes a favela it will because of the residents who came from favelas and who couldn’t adapt to another environment to better themselves.

Nico seemed insecure as to whether his decision to move was a wise. Most of his neighbors remained, and then, from 2011 to 2012, the City built slope retaining walls behind the area where his now demolished house stood. During the interview Nico appeared uncertain about the move, and a little anxious. I decided not to ask any more difficult questions. The interview took place while Nico was on a lunch break, and although several years my senior he asked, “O senhor acha que foi uma boa ideia ter mudada pra lá?,” or “Sir, do you think it was a good idea to have move out there?” There was a silence, but eventually I replied, “If you and your family are happy then of course.” Nico replied:

Nico: We are. I think people are just scared of change. This has been a major change but we are going to make it work. Many people who left are better off now. Do you know my former neighbor, the one who was always partying, who sat on the corner all day joking with everyone passing by?

MB – Paulina?

Nico – Yes, Paulina, do you know her?

MB – [laughing], of course, we have been friends for a long time.

Nico – Did you ever see Paulina’s house? She lived in a dark basement with no ventilation, no windows nothing. It wasn’t even a basement, it was a hole in the wall, and she lived there with two children, dark and with mold everywhere. Now she lives in a brand new spacious two-bedroom apartment with windows and near the metro [subway] in Triagem. For her it was a great move.
Nico ended the interview feeling good about moving, and I agreed to visit his family in their new MCMV apartment. Two points are worth reflecting on. First, the outrageous increase from a 40-minute round-trip commute to the current 6-7 hour expedition on three buses. The distance from the South Zone and city center (Rio’s main work hubs) imposes considerable difficulties on low-income families transferred to MCMV housing in the far West Zone. As of 2009, 57% of formal employment in Rio de Janeiro was concentrated in Planning Zones 1 (city-center) and 2 (the South Zone). Only 7 percent was located in the far West Zone, or Planning Zone 5 (Osório da Silva 2011: 83). Yet, as of 2012 Planning Zones 1 and 2 combined represented only 1.4 percent of built MCMV housing, while 86 percent of housing units were located in Planning Zone 5. And 51 percent of the entire city’s MCMV housing for the 0-3 minimum wage group is located in only two Planning Zone 5 neighborhoods: Campo Grande (where Nico lives) and Santa Cruz (Barandier Junior 2012: 60).

A second point concerns the multiple moves and school changes for his three children, one of whom is special needs. The expenses related to multiple moves, which Nico mentioned, is not even addressed in the critical literature on MCMV. Moving is stressful for any family. Because of a lack of affordable and reasonably located housing, working-class Brazilians move a lot, and it can be a significant strain. Low-income Brazilians generally have to rent expensive fretes (informal moving trucks or vans) and then they carry out the job themselves, usually with the help of friends and family. This was the case for Nico and Nelson, both who work five and half days a week. Saturday afternoons/evenings and Sundays were the only time they had free to make the many moves.

Nelson also left Laboriaux in 2010, where he originally settled in 1983. Nelson has two children, both born during the 1980s, and he was more integrated into the community than Nico, who was somewhat of a homebody. Nelson also recently settled into the Bairro Carioca housing complex. While being interviewed, Nelson expressed frustration with the transition,

\footnote{Dissertation Interview, May 2014.}

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complaining, “we had to move five times before ending up here [Triagem MCMV]. The city didn’t help us with the cost of all the moves, we spent a fortune”:

MB – Why did you move so many times?

Nelson – Well, it is not easy to find a decent place to rent in Rio de Janeiro with the R$400 a month the city provides. For that price the only place you could afford to live would be in another area of risk in some other part of Rocinha or some other favela. So, we looked for places in the West Zone. We always ended up paying more than R$ 400, and we lived in a couple places that seemed nice at first but later turned out to have major problems...Like one apartment, we moved into near Rio da Pedras [large West Zone favela], flooded after the first heavy rain. We woke up with water running down the walls.

Nelson spent “a lot!” on moving:

Nelson – Of course, we lived there for almost 30 years. Child1 and Child2 were raised in Laboriaux. Child1 has her/his family and her/his own house there, and neither wanted to join us here, but Child2 will probably end up leaving soon, and maybe coming here, because now s/he is struggling to pay rent, you know, because before s/he lived with us.

Nelson was sad about leaving Laboriaux, and mentioned how he returns almost every week to visit old friends, neighbors, and his children. Nelson said that the daily commute to work in Botafogo is the same as before, roughly 40 minutes, or even slightly less, because now he takes the metro [subway] from Triagem.273

Dona Dores left Laboriaux in early 2013, leaving behind a quaint two-bedroom house with Spanish tile roofing, a small front patio, a larger back patio, and a fabulous view of the city and sea.274 Dona Dores related the reason for leaving:

Dona Dores – Marquinho275, I lost my husband and two sons here. [one son in his 40s had passed away only weeks before the interview]. I am leaving because everything here reminds me

273 A new subway line will be finished next to Rocinha in 2016, and the estimated time to Botafogo will then only be about 25-30 minutes.
274 Dissertation Interview, May 2013
of them, not because I don’t like it here. I simply cannot stand being constantly reminded of them, seeing all the people they grew up with or were friends with and coming back every day to the house where we all lived together as a family. I cry every night and want a change in my last years of life [Dona Dores began to cry. The interview was stopped and a more casual comfortable conversation ensued].

In July 2014 I was pleasantly surprised to see Dona Dores at Itamar’s Pizzeria Veneza in Laboriaux, our favorite local establishment. She was all smiles and told me she never moved into the MCMV apartment. Dona Dores had been living in another section of Rocinha with her self-described “namorado” (Brazilian portmanteau of boyfriend and husband), while awaiting an opening in the Bairro Carioca MCMV apartment. In late 2013, Dona Dores backed out at the last minute and moved back into her old house once she discovered the City was no longer going to remove Laboriaux. Luckily it had not been demolished. Time had passed and some of the heartache as well, and in a reversal of what was previously expressed, Dona Dores said smilingly, “Marquinhos, I could never leave Laboriaux, this is where I raised my children, I love it here.”

In April 2013 Inaê was interviewed in the Dionéia section of Rocinha. Inaê, a widow, left Laboriaux under unfortunate circumstances that would require too much time and space to describe here. But in short, the SMH offered her a low amount for her one-bedroom recently tiled house – a meager R$29,000 (US$14,500). Still, Inaê, decided to sell. She told me, “I needed the money to help one of my son out of an urgent situation”. Ícaro, a shrewd neighbor found out before any paperwork was signed and offered to buy the house instead: half up front in cash, and the rest in monthly payments. He told Inaê that if the City later succeeded in removing the house that he would even give her part of the indemnification. And if they did not buy it, he would still eventually pay Inaê a little something extra. Inaê felt better about selling to a neighbor than to the City, because the latter would demolish the house. The offer was accepted.

275 Marquinho or Marquinhos is the diminutive name of Marcos, like Marquito in Spanish. Many of the older residents in Laboriaux and Rocinha affectionately call me by this name
However, the only housing R$29,000 will buy in contemporary Rio de Janeiro would be a smaller property in a poorer section of Rocinha, or in some distant favela. In December of 2010, the Inaê sold the home she had lived in since 1982 to the neighbor. She temporarily moved into a small room only seven houses down the street before transitioning into a one-bedroom apartment in Dionéia, which in March 2011 was R$500/month. Elderly Inaê went from owning a home to paying rent.

Meanwhile, when I asked Ícaro in July 2014 how much he would sell the house for, he told me that he would not sell it for less than R$50,000. That is an almost twofold increased in just four years. Then, with a slightly guilty look he added, “I paid off the house in 2012 and tried to give Inaê a little more, she wouldn’t take it.”

Like Inaê, the majority of the 300 to 350 residents who left Laboriaux between 2010 and mid-2013, received the short end of the stick. During fieldwork numerous heart-wrenching stories were related. One final example is of Gloria, who in a state of anxiety sold a lovely spacious two-story house to the City in 2010, for an undisclosed amount. Gloria’s home had an incredible view of Rio’s South Zone. The City quickly demolished the house. By the end of 2012, the compensation money Gloria used to pay rent in Magé [a municipality 75 kilometers from Rocinha] ran out, and she ended up returning to Laboriaux. Apparently the reimbursement from the SMH was not enough to buy a comparable house, not even in distant Magé. Dispossessed of her beautiful home, Gloria now lives in cramped conditions with relatives.

(3) Mega-events

The modern FIFA World Cup and Olympic Games should be known equally for the real estate speculation, forced removals, and gentrification they cause as for the actual sporting events and merchandise they are famous for. Mega sporting events like the World Cup and Olympics facilitate displacement by development in two important ways. First, as Vainer (2013),

276 Dissertation Interview, Ícaro, July 2014
Broudehoux (2007), Gaffney (2010, 2013), and others have described, they create exceptions that accelerate removals that would otherwise be more lengthy bureaucratic processes. In the frenzied preparation for the 2008 Olympic in Beijing, for example, numerous “shantytowns were razed” and ultimately 1.5 million people were forced from their homes from 2001 to 2008 (Broudehoux 2012: 199). I view mega events like the World Cup and Olympics as important partial causes. Large international events are not necessary in order to produce widespread forced evictions, as demonstrated in numerous cities around the world where they have not been held.

The northern Brazilian city of Belem (capital of Pará), for example, there have been no significant international or even national spectacles, but in one low-income dilapidated central area of the city alone as many as 10,000 residents have been threatened with forced removal in recent years (Belem 2007: 79, 166; Leão 2015: 2). The reason, an urban renewal and favela upgrading scheme known as the Urban and Environmental Rehabilitation Program of the Estrada Nova Basin (Promaben). The Estrada Nova district of Belem is mainly comprised of favelas and other low-income informal neighborhoods. Promaben is being financed by a variety of sources, including the IDB, PAC, and the local government. Similar to Rio de Janeiro, most of the complaints in regards to Belem’s removal process have resulted from inadequate compensation for demolished housing and unsatisfactory housing in the resettlement units (Leão 2015: 11-15)

The World Cup and Olympics do not always cause major housing and human rights violations. The sociospatial pressures mega-events impose on a city depend largely on the settings in which they take place. Whether or not, and the degree to which, rights are abused hinges mainly on the historical, socioeconomic (e.g., levels of inequality) and political contexts of the city and country where they are held (Gaffney 2010: 8).

(4) UPPs
Taken as a whole, data I collected strongly suggests residents, and those whose livelihoods depend on Rocinha, believe property values are consistently rising and that in the last few years the pace has increased noticeably. It could be reasoned, as realtor Marcelino argued, that this is simply “a natural process in cities”.\textsuperscript{277} Marcelino stressed, “Property values and the cost of living always increase, this is true in any big city. It is normal. With or without PAC, the UPP, the Cup, or Olympics, the cost of living in Rocinha would increase.”

But there was period when real estate prices depreciated. I argue that this is one of the fundamental explanations for PAC and especially the UPP. During the first decade of the twenty-first century property values stagnated or even decreased in Rocinha and São Conrado, and in much most of the city.\textsuperscript{278} Property values in São Conrado, as in several other middle-class, upper-middle-class, and elite neighborhoods bordering favelas, had suffered as a result of the increased violence during the 1990s (Souza Silva and Brasileiro 2007: 1; Martins 2012: 15).\textsuperscript{279} In Chapter 2 the constant shootouts in Rocinha (between 2004 and 2006) were described.

Citywide, by the early 2000s morale in Rio de Janeiro was low and for the upper classes it was rock bottom. Rio seemed stuck in a spiral of degradation that began in the 1960s (Godfrey 1991; 1999). From the mid-1990s to the early 2000s the city experienced it highest homicide rates, for instance, 71/100,000 in 1995 and 63/100,000 in 2002 (Waiselfisz 2011: 183-184). There seemed to be a collective sense of hopelessness regarding the future of the city.\textsuperscript{280} Favela related violence had taken its toll on real estate values in many areas of the city. There is little organized data on the relationship between violence and square meter property values in Rio de Janeiro for the periods this investigation considers, but Junior (2003: 108-111) was able to

\textsuperscript{277} Dissertation Interview, Marcelino, March 2013.
\textsuperscript{280} This subjective statement is based on popular knowledge acquired while living in Rio during this period as well as countless casual conversations and dozens of dissertation interviews.
demonstrate a 1.2% drop in value for each incident of violent crime in the greater Tijuca region of Rio’s North Zone, as well as an R$ 18,000 decrease in total value for every kilometer a property was closer to the nearest favela (Junior 2003: 108-109). After the UPP process began in Rocinha in November 2011, Leonardo Schneider, vice-president of SECOVI RIO (Brazil’s leading housing association) was interviewed regarding his opinion on the influence the UPP would have on São Conrado’s property values. He predicated a 30% increase in the first six months. He added: “São Conrado is a great location with excellent condominiums, great infrastructure and spacious properties. The market there had been declining as an option for the upper middle class during the past 15 years. Rocinha contributed negatively to this. Fifteen years ago, the neighborhood was the most sought but lost its appeal.” Schneider wasn’t too far off, according to Fipe Zap, the most respected real estate value indicator in Brazil, by May 2012 São Conrado’s property values increased by 20%.

While still very high by international standards, the homicide rate in Rio began to drop notably by 2007 (42/100,000) and 2008 (35/100,000) (Waiselfisz 2011: 183). In 2007 Cabral and Lula announced significant investments for PAC 1 in Rocinha and two other large violent favelas, Complexo do Alemão and Manguinhos. By the end of 2007 Brazil was chosen to host the 2014 World Cup. Even so, I suggest that it was not until late 2009, once Rio de Janeiro won the bidding for the 2016 Olympics and the UPPs were increasingly popular, that property values began steadily climbing. This is confirmed using data from FIPE ZAP [INSERT].

The *FIPE ZAP Index of Advertised Property Prices* is an indicator of housing prices produced in partnership between FIPE ZAP Properties; it is the foremost barometer of the Brazilian real estate market. FIPE ZAP unfortunately do not provide 2004-2006 data, supports this proposition. The first graph indicates the sale value of property in Rio de Janeiro increased

almost 250% from December of 2007 to January of 2014. The price of rent went up during the same period by 138.1%.

The second graph shows fluctuations in the value (for sales) of a square meter in for São Conrado and Gávea, the two elite neighborhoods bordering Rocinha. We can see that the value of a square meter increased from December 2007 to January of 2014 by 181% in São Conrado and 193% in Gávea, and the square meter value used to estimate rent prices increased 204% and 210%, respectively.

I interviewed a few families who left during this period. Most moved out to working class peripheral areas of Rio de Janeiro widely considered calmer, and less stigmatized. For example, one of my neighbors, Luciano, moved with his parents in 2007 to the neighborhood of Pedra de Guaratiba, approximately 40 kilometers west of Rocinha. They moved just before PAC, the UPPs and Rocinha’s metro station would have an effect on the community, and before the mega-event hysteria began. I would rarely see Luciano, and it was only in 2014 that we had another chance to talk.

MB – In retrospect, what do you think about your family choosing to move [from Rocinha] at that moment?

Luciano – *Pisamos na bola* [colloquialism for, *we screwed up*]. My mom wanted to move because things were getting worse. At the time it seemed like nothing was going to improve. So, my mom sold the house [in Laboriaux]...*Cara,* [dude] many people were leaving Rocinha at the time. This place was a mess, and my mother wanted to get out badly. Then when they [the city] condemned Laboriaux [April of 2010] she was like “See, it was a good idea to leave, we would have had to anyway.” Now that they backed down from the removals and with Rocinha constantly in the media, and everything increasing in value, the UPP, and crime going up out there [West Zone]...In some ways we regret leaving Rocinha. We even thought about returning but thing are too expensive now.
During that same period, 2004-2009/2010, real estate values decreased in São Conrado and Alto Gávea because of the constant shootouts in Rocinha.\textsuperscript{282} It is estimated that between 2004 and 2010, the value of real estate in São Conrado decreased 30% or up to 50% if facing Rocinha.\textsuperscript{283} In the newspaper, \textit{O Estado de São Paulo}, Jarbas Coutinho, from \textit{Gávea Rio Imoveis} (Properties), mentions how potential buyers were always worried about stray bullets in São Conrado.

The principle means by which the UPPs contribute to displacement and gentrification is through real estate speculation associated with \textit{perceptions} of increased security in former \textit{no-go} areas (favelas). It is important to accentuate the idea of \textit{perceptions} of increased security because most residents I have spoken to believe Rocinha is as insecure (or more) today as it was before the UPP process began.

Neri’s 2011 investigation on the influence UPPs have on real estate markets in favelas is a good representation of what Jock Young would have referred to as “fake scientificity” (2011: 17). Unfortunately, up until the date this dissertation was completed (January 2016) there were no other \textit{quantitative} studies considering the impact UPPs have on rent prices in the \textit{formal} city and in favelas.

Neri’s Fundação Getúlio Vargas report focuses on Rio’s two largest favelas, Rocinha and Complexo do Alemão, and relies on data collected between 2007 and 2009 to arrive at hypotheses. One of the many problems with the study is that while the pilot UPP was launched in December 2008 in Santa Marta, the UPPs did not receive much attention until early and especially mid-2009. Furthermore, it was not until November 2010 that Complexo do Alemão’s military/police occupation began (UPPs inaugurated mid-2012), and not until November 2011 that the police occupation began in Rocinha (UPP inaugurated September 2012). There was


very limited UPP data to comb through from 2007 to 2009, yet Neri was able to arrive at what appear to be confident quantitative conclusions.

Neri asserts that after the implementation of UPPs the cost of rent in "pacified" favelas increased 7 percent more than the cost of rent in the formal city (Neri 2011: 31). Another significant problem results from the lack of any indication of how much the value increased in the formal city. Neri pronounces that rent increased 7% more in favelas than in the “formal city” because of the UPPs, but there is no “formal” city rent data provided. By not including the “formal” city rent prices it is unclear whether they increased three percent or 250 percent, and therefore there is no way of determining in absolute value how much prices increased in UPP favelas, only that it was 7% more than the “formal” city.

Despite these criticisms, Neri’s hypothesis that prices would increase in both “formal” and favela communities after the installation of UPPs, and that in favelas the increase would be higher, is a perfectly “logical inference”. There was no need to dress these conclusions up with “hard data”. The report’s suggestion that in Rocinha the cost of rent should increase more than the 7% experienced in the other UPP favelas considered because of its prime location (Neri 2011: 31) is also a perfectly rational hypothesis.

Pulling from the same 2011 FGV report, Cummings states:

> Because of economic growth and upcoming mega-events, Rio's real estate markets have experienced rapid inflation. According to a time series of the commonly used FIPE ZAP index published on the Brazilian internet portal ZAP’s website, the formal housing sector has experienced a doubling in prices since 2008. Demand pressures on real estate in the formal city cascade into the informal market. (Cummings 2013: 8)

As word of the UPPs spread throughout the city and beyond (international media closely follows Rio) some venture capitalists and investors have done well. Cummings describes one of these venturesome investors, the case of an Austrian national who in 2009 (two years before Vidigal’s UPP process began) purchased a rundown building at the top of Vidigal for US$ 10,000. The building has an incredible view of the ocean and parts of the South Zone (Cummings 2015: 93).
The Austrian entrepreneur soon turned it into Alto Vidigal, a trendy hostel and nightspot that cater mainly to adventurous foreigners. Alto Vidigal was the first, according to their website284, but others soon followed. Today there about 20 hostels (albergues) in Vidigal and by 2014 the local residents association estimates that over 1,000 foreigners already call the community home.285 The same article in the O Dia newspaper cites the current president of Vidigal’s residents’ association, Marcelo da Silva: “This change has been taking place for a few years, but it became, yes, stronger after the pacification. It is difficult to be precise, but I believe that today 30% of the community is comprised of new people, from the middle-class, foreigners, people who did not originate here.”

The implementation of Vidigal’s UPP, according to my interviews, observations, and also based on the relevant literature, is the main factor explaining the spike in the cost of living and subsequent surge in processes of gentrification. Other related factors include, the string of sporting mega-events, the citywide rise in cost of living and the lingering affordable housing shortage in Rio de Janeiro. But Vidigal’s UPP alone cannot explain why similar processes have not occurred on a significant scale in other UPP occupied favela communities, such as Santa Marta, Manguinhos, Complexo do Alemão, or even Rocinha, which neighbors Vidigal.

São Conrado’s residents’ association, AMASCO had little contact or involvement with Rocinha prior to the 2004 “War in Rocinha”. When there was communication it was generally deriding. A persuasive argument could be made that the main reason AMASCO became so engaged in pushing for improvements in Rocinha was because of their plummeting property values, especially after the April 2004 shootout. In order for real estate in São Conrado and Gávea to remain high or increase in value the giant favela crammed between these elite neighborhoods needs to be as safe as possible and at least superficially efforts must be made to “beautify” Rocinha’s intimidating physical appearance.

In Rocinha, four of five local real estate agents told me that as the PAC 1 construction began taking form property values immediately increased in certain locations of Rocinha. This was particularly the case along Rua Quatro, which was finished in 2010.

The same holds true for Vidigal, which also borders São Conrado. My interviews with the upper echelons of AMASCO confirm this, though they were expressed in a more tactful manner. Seu Britz, a retired engineer in his early 80s and president of AMASCO since the early 2000s told me:

Seu Britz – Excuse my expression, but if Rocinha farts, São Conrado knows immediately. Some people here [in São Conrado] don’t want to admit this, but São Conrado and Rocinha are integrally connected. If things are bad there, things are bad here. We knew we had to get involved and do something to make things better there, or things wouldn’t improve.

MB – Have things gotten better since PAC and the UPP? Has the value of real estate increased in São Conrado?

Seu Britz – Definitely, things are better and real estate has increased for sure.

Residents and non-residents active in Rocinha overwhelmingly believe that in the future many of the community’s poorest inhabitants, those unable to adapt quickly, will be forced out in search of cheaper housing. The administrators of the five local real estate agencies I interviewed in Rocinha – who together manage between 1,200 and 1,500 properties in the community – also confirmed that prices are going up. All except Marcelino (the real estate agent) pointed to PAC, the UPP, the World Cup and the Olympics as primary reasons. When I asked about the subway station being built at the base of Rocinha, they quickly added that it was already contributing to the speculation and steady rise in rents and home values. Realtor Lucero seemed to think the subway, which is scheduled to be finished in 2016, is the main contributor

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286 Three of the five provided me with specifics regarding the number of rental properties they currently administer or an average of the properties they sell and have for sale on any given month. Using these three figures and considering the other two who did not want to comment, I came up with this range of 1,000 – 1,500.
to speculation and that it will be the primary factor behind additional increases in housing values. In this sense, the subway will likely play a role similar to that of the Zuzu Angel Tunnel in the early 1970s, causing a spike in speculation because of significant improvements to transportation.

Here I cover some of the ways these schemes influence prices in Rocinha. In April of 2013 I asked the erudite Maicon his opinion. Maicon is a self-described black Brazilian in his early thirties (April 2013) who was born and raised in Rocinha. He pays rent in Rocinha although until November 2011 he owned two houses in the community. Maicon sold one after the UPP entered and rented the other, then moved into a cheaper apartment than the one he rents. This is a common practice in Rocinha. Maicon is a graduate of PUC-Rio with a B.A., in Journalism. He speaks English well and has traveled to California for pleasure on at least one occasion. At the time of the interview Maicon was unemployed and looking for work and was getting by on the money from the home sale and the rent. I asked whether Rocinha had become proportionally more expensive (in relation to income, inflation, etc.) during the last few years. Here are a few relevant lines from our lengthy interview.

Maicon – Things are much more expensive, much more. Especially real estate.

MB – Why do you think this happened? Do you think PAC and the UPP caused this?

Maicon – I wouldn’t say it is all because of the UPP, it more about supply and demand. For example, today it is virtually impossible to find a house with a quintal [enclosed yard/patio].

Over the years the houses that had patios turned them into spaces they could rent.

MB – Do you pay rent?

Maicon – For the last several months yes, but I own a house in Rocinha, but I rent it [laughs].

MB – Did you increase the rent after the UPP entered?

Maicon – Actually I only started renting it after the UPP entered and I just did what others were doing, I followed the same trends.

MB – Was the trend to increase the rent?
Maicon – Yeah, but not by as much as many did, it was expected to increase like 20 percent but in fact it doubled, a 100 percent increase. Houses that were selling for R$ 25,000 are now selling for R$ 50,000.

MB – You mean rent actually increased 100% after the UPP? Do you have any concrete proof?

Maicon – Well, I can't say for sure because I didn't rent before the UPP but I assume it did because I know many residents who doubled the value of their homes after the UPP. I did. I literally doubled the price in just one day, but ended up dropping it to about 75% because I wanted to sell quickly, but I would have gotten 100% if I had waited. I sold it to someone who already lived in Rocinha, who was paying rent before. I know a waiter who was making like 1000 or 1,300 a month and paying 500 a month in rent before 2011, then the rent went up to 800 or maybe 900 a month after the UPP. People like this are starting to consider moving to Rio das Pedras [a favela 12 km away in West Zone] where the speculation is not quite as intense, or even back to the Northeast...But I want to be clear, I don't think the speculation is all about the UPP and mega-events, I think the demographic growth in Rocinha, the large population, creates the demand. The UPP was one factor, that's true, but all the speculation cannot be blamed on the UPP.

(5) Political Will and Influential Local Elites

There is always ample public support in Brazil for eradicating favelas. But rather than addressing the deep-rooted problems that produce homelessness, favelas, and debilitating violence, the public generally just wants to see favelas demolished homes and their residents moved far from sight.

Social will to displace favelas varies in accordance to a number of more important issues, such as the economy or perceived levels of political and corporate corruption. This has been the case in Brazil since the latter half of 2013. Influential political and economic elite(s) can bolster
Political will. The influential role of local politics and powerful elites is a theme that until recently was largely neglected by critical development (Everett 1997: 138-139; Walters 2013: 21).

Even in democratic systems, sometimes an assertive individual or small group or network of influential actors holds disproportionate power over major development decisions. This has been the case with Eduardo Paes, Sergio Cabral, Pezão and a few others in contemporary Rio de Janeiro. The Paes is in the ranks of Lacerda and Negrão de Lima (both during the military dictatorship) as the mayors who have succeeded in removing and demolishing the most favelas. But Paes is still only a political figurehead for even more powerful actors and forces.

What happens behind the curtains of power is the domain of conspiracy theorists. Really understanding who pulls the strings is information few have access to. Still, in the case of contemporary Rio da Janeiro a number of facts on the influence of local elites can be made with confidence. Groups of powerful state and local elites have perverted social programs and policies so that instead of improving the lives of historically marginalized populations, such as residents of strategic favelas, they have often made them worse. In modern Rio de Janeiro the intimate ties forged between unscrupulous politicians and top-level public officials with powerful actors in the construction, real estate, and development industries best represent this trend.

A number of corporations and CEOs stand out, including Eike Batista. Once Brazil’s wealthiest individual and the seventh richest in the world, Batista was valued at US$ 30 billion until the end of 2012. During my field research and anti-eviction activism I noticed that among many favelas residents an urban legend formed around the figure of Eike Batista and his role in deciding which communities would receive UPPs and when. Although impossible to prove it is not too far fetched, because from their inception in 2008 Batista was the single largest private donor, giving R$ 20 million per year to the UPP program, until 2013, when he went bankrupt. Furthermore, the year UPPs were first tested, in 2008, Batista created the newest branch of his

corporate empire, REX, a real estate company. REX then bought depreciated (because of years of violence) properties in several areas usually months before a UPP was announced in the nearest favela.

The multinational conglomerate Odebrecht Organization has played a pivotal role in urban renewal and favela upgrading projects, as have other large conglomerates, such as OAS, Queiroz Galvão, Carioca Engenharia, and Andrade Gutierrez. But Odebrecht stands out because of two of the conglomerates holdings headquartered in Rio de Janeiro, Construtora Noberto Odebrecht, the largest construction company in Latin America, and Odebrecht Transport, one of the largest transportation corporations in Brazil. Odebrecht Realizações Imobiliárias, Odebrecht’s real estate company is also influential. In July 2015 Odebrecht’s CEO Marcelo Odebrecht, was arrested and imprisoned for his role in the colossal Lava Jato Petrobras scandal.

Another name that comes to mind is that of the vivacious 91-year-old (in August 2015) Carlos Carvalho, founder and CEO of Carvalho Hosken. Carvalho has been dubbed by the local media as the “King of Barra.” Located in the West Zone, Barra da Tijuca is the only elite neighborhood outside of the South Zone, and is where the 2016 Olympic Park and Athlete’s Village is being built. Rio Mais is the consortium constructing the Olympic Park, and Odebrecht, Carvalho Hasken and Andrade Gutierrez run it. Carlos Carvalho is now the 13th richest man in Brazil, almost entirely because of the fortune he has made with mega-event real estate speculation in Barra da Tijuca.

But in order to built new Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) lanes and for other infrastructure developments, many small favelas have been removed from Barra and surrounding West Zone neighborhoods in the lead up to the international sporting events. The Olympic Village is being constructed in an area of Barra where the small favela Vila Autódromo has been local for almost 50 years. The gradual destruction of the Vila Autódromo community is probably the most symbolic of all Rio’s forced removals since Eduardo Paes has been personally trying to have the
favela demolished since he was in mid-twenties and serving as subprefeito district mayor of Barra da Tijuca where the community is located.288

No other individual has been more influential in the favela removal campaign than Rio’s mayor, Eduardo Paes. While other influential elites operate behind closed doors, Paes has been the poster child of forced removals since he entered office in 2009. In regards to the city’s poorest and most marginalized populations he has played a transformative role comparable to that of Haussman, Moses, and Pereira Passos. Paes resuscitated the politically buried term remoção (removal), arguing that it should no longer be viewed as taboo, but rather an essential process for the Rio’s development. At times, particularly during most of 2010 and 2011, Paes seem hell-bent on removing as many favelas as possible, making favela removal, in practice, an official government policy for the first time since the 1960s.

The individuals and companies listed above represent a class of local, regional and national elites who have played an essential role in transforming hundreds of thousands of Rio’s favela residents. So many elements come together in development schemes affecting the poor that it is impossible to known if there would have been as many favela removals had Fernando Gabeira not lost the 2008 municipal election to Paes by 1.5%. Without the winning bids for the World Cup and Olympic, and without the landslides of 2010 and the bustling economy of the Lula era, it is unlikely the political or social will would have existed for such drastic measures.

(6) Perception of a stable/strong economy

The two largest favela removal campaigns in Brazilian history have both coincided with two of the country’s most significant economic boom eras, the Brazilian Miracle and the Lula era (The Economist, Sept. 28, 2013: 1-2).289 The Brazilian Miracle witnessed impressive GDP growth from 1968 to 1973 (Veloso, Villela and Giambiagi 2008: 222). However, despite growth by the

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mid-1970s income inequality had increased (The Economist, Sept. 28, 2013: 1). I am unaware of any studies that examine possible links between the two most substantial favela removal campaigns in Rio history and the national and local economic booms of the Brazilian Miracle and the Lula era. In the absence of systematic investigation it is possible the relationship is merely coincidental. But it is known that during both periods urban renewal projects and the construction of massive social housing complexes employed thousands of workers and the removal of key favelas opened numerous valuable and strategic spaces for Rio’s voracious real estate market (Gonçalves 2013: 231). This points to a strategy of accumulation by dispossession. While Brazil’s national macro economic success was likely a trivial factor, further research should be done on the relationship between the removals and Rio de Janeiro state and city’s economic booms, particularly in relationship to the real estate, development, construction, and tourism industries and whether the heavily publicized reduction of economic inequality during the Lula era has been affected. Spatial inequality has undoubtedly increased since 2010, but at the time this writing (August 2015) there were no new figures on economic (income or wealth) inequality.

One of the most captivating considerations of this dissertation is also the least mentioned in any studies on Rio’s recent urban transformation. Crude oil has played a fundamental role in virtually all major public urban development schemes since 2007, since the discovery of the pre-sal (pre-salt layer) oil reserves that same year. This was the same year PAC favela upgrading in Rio began and in 2007 Rio also won the bid to host the 2014 World Cup. Brazil’s majority state owned oil company, Petrobras, has been one of the primary sources of revenue for many improvement schemes throughout Brazil, including Rio’s favela interventions, such as PAC, MCMV, and the UPPs. In the case of the latter Petrobras involvement was indirect but significant, because of the enormous resources Eike Batista’s OSX and OGX raked in from Petrobras. When Batista’s oil related speculations began drying up he cancelled his substantial
funding of the UPPs in 2013. That and other social factors already covered contributed to the precipitous decline in public support of the UPPs that same year.

Housing and oil, or rather, real estate, oil and the construction industry they depend on, have been central to virtually all of Rio and Rocinha’s recent changes. Perhaps most intriguing is that these same three economic sectors drove the Brazilian Miracle of the late 1960s and early 1970s, an economic boom that coincided with the only other mass favela removal campaign. These are themes that deserve much more attention. Unfortunately, it was only towards the end of this dissertation that I began to see the connections between these topics. In the concluding chapter I briefly return to them. Here the important point, for all intent and purposes, is highlighting the crucial role of economic forces at various scales, from the global, to the national and local, in the transformation and sociospatial polarization of Brazilian cities, most of all in Rio de Janeiro.

DISPLACEMENT SUMMARY

I have examined the issue as comprehensively as possible, proposing that since 2010 there is a process of favela decongestion or “thinning” (Freeman and Burgos 2014) occurring in strategically located Rio de Janeiro favelas. Displacements have primarily resulted from forced removals, especially resulting from “areas of risk” classifications and secondly because of urban renewal schemes (including favela upgrading) often linked to international sporting events. My data strongly indicates removals and upgrades are contributing to rising costs of living in impacted favelas, a circumstance further exacerbated by the implementation of UPPs and the likely short-term but dramatic speculation surrounding the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympics.

290 Freeman, James and Marcos Burgos. “Accumulation by Forced Removal: The thinning of Rio de Janeiro’s favelas in preparation for the games”. This work has been submitted to the Journal of Latin American Studies, and is currently (May 2015) undergoing suggested revisions. The study focuses on the dispossession side of Harvey’s accumulation by dispossession. It was presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Geographical Society in Tampa, Florida on April 10, 2014.
My research, which pulled from official and ethnographic data, leaves no doubt that record numbers of residents from spatially key favelas have been displaced or continue under the threat of removal. The numbers, although still incomplete, are now well known and undeniable. However, little has been published on the specific tactics and social processes involved in decongesting key favelas. Since 2010 most of the approximately 70,000 residents displaced from strategic favelas were removed for reasons related to living in “areas of risk” or areas in the way of the sporting mega-events. Little of this would have been possible without the large supply of peripheral housing produced under the federal MCMV program. The two main focuses of this investigation, favela upgrading and UPPs, have also proven to be contributors to removals, albeit not in the way I originally hypothesized. Intense resistance has stymied upgrading removals. Rising costs of living and gentrification, largely considered to be resulting from the UPPs and sporting mega-events, has not yet proved to be significantly contributing displacing favela residents. Using the ample data collected on recent transformations in Rio I attempt to build on certain sociospatial theories in the next chapter.
UNEXPECTED RESULTS: SETBACK OR OPPORTUNITY?

By April 2010 attempts to remove a significant portion of Rocinha’s population (the 3,000 plus residents of Laboriaux) were already underway. From 2011 to 2012 Laboriaux’s residents lived in a constant state of insecurity, as the media and city officials provided contradictory information on the removal process. During numerous casual conversations and dissertation interviews residents argued this was an attempt by the city to weaken the resistance. By early 2013 the looming mega-events and the UPP were having a palpable effect on real estate and the sweeping interventions of PAC’s second installment (PAC 2) had just been announced. It seemed obvious that upgrading and pacification induced gentrification would soon join “area of risk” strategies in removing swaths of Rocinha’s residents.

A preliminary review of data collected between 2010 and mid-2013 seemed to support my initial hypothesis that favela upgrading and pacification were contributing to, or threatening, the displacement of a substantial portion of Rocinha’s residents, and even more so in other favelas I studied. Based on the available data I made a logical inference that if trends were to continue removals would intensify in the coming years within these favelas.

Then, as the 2013 FIFA Confederations Cup and the Catholic Church’s World Youth Day were taking place in the city, the June and July 2013 protest movements erupted throughout Brazil, Rio and Rocinha. Demonstrations were immediately followed by news of the torture and disappearance of Amarildo de Souza, a bricklayer in Rocinha, whose story made international
headlines and eventually brought down the local UPP commander, Maj. Edson Santos.291 This prompted a significant rearrangement of Rocinha’s UPP. The restructuring was followed by undesirable changes within the community’s internal power structure.292 Major Santos was arrested in October 2013 just as I was beginning to make progress writing this dissertation.

These contentious incidents, and the political economic environment behind them, altered the scenario in Rocinha, throughout Rio, and eventually Brazil. By early 2015 the federal Ministry of Planning, Budget and Management predicted the economy would contract by (0.9%), the largest decline in GDP since 1990, which was before the Real was adopted in 1994.293 The same report forecasts slight improvements for 2016 (1.3% GDP growth). Stated simply, the “removers” do not have the leverage they exerted from 2009 to early 2013.

A few years earlier Brazil’s economy was much stronger, the euphoria surrounding the mega-events had not turned to disillusion, and the tragedy caused by the April 2010 rains was still fresh in the minds’ of cariocas. By the end of 2014, and especially during 2015, as I reexamined the data, conducted a number of strategic follow-up interviews, and revisited (twice) the research setting, it became apparent that displacements, and intimidations of removal, had diminished from the previous accelerated pace. In Rocinha threats of removal have virtually halted since late 2013, with the exception of PAC 2 removals.


292 This is the type of ongoing and potentially dangerous issue an ethnographer who lives in the community has to be careful discussing in detail. Therefore, I will keep details of Maj. Edson Santos’s arrested and imprisonment on charges of torture, disappearance and murder of Amarildo de Souza, on a superficial level. Amarildo became an international martyr figure used against not only Rocinha’s UPP but the entire program. Small segments of the community believe Maj. Santos was framed by organized crime and corrupt politicians who had lost influence in Rocinha after the UPP was established. My interviews with key informants presented a logical case as to why this might be true. Nonetheless, the charges he and several former Rocinha UPP officers were charged with are horrendous, and there is significant evidence that they are guilty as charged. I suggest this episode represented the beginning of the end of popular support of the UPP program in Rio de Janeiro. Romero, Simon.

In this sense, the numerous frustrating delays in writing this dissertation provided the time needed to more thoroughly appreciate certain complexities. I was able to more clearly observe how a number of the cases that formed the basis of my initial hypothesis challenged certain aspects of accumulation by dispossession and many of the “Anglo-American” theories of gentrification (Lees 2012: 166). For example, I now consider Rocinha and Vidigal, when compared, as fairly unique cases of the phenomena investigated.

Clyde Mitchell (1983: 203-206) referred to unique cases as “atypical” cases or “exceptions”, while Michael Burawoy (1998: 5, 16) called them “anomalies”. Exceptional cases are one of the four pillars of the extended case method (Burawoy 1998: 20).

THE EXTENDED CASE METHOD, ANOMALIES, ABDUCTION & THEORY BUILDING

At times data collected during ethnographic fieldwork does not mesh well with leading theories. Burawoy (1998: 16; 20-21) claims “refutations” can serve as constructive opportunities because case anomalies have the potential to help researchers improve, or “deepen” existing social theory. He adds, the only justification needed for reconstructing theory is the scholar’s belief that building on preexisting theories could contribute to more comprehensive understanding (Burawoy 1998: 16).

Burawoy (1998: 16) emphasizes the importance of not altering “core postulates” when attempting theory reconstruction, and that any modifications must be at least as explanatory as the existing theory they are built upon. As such, theory building should “absorb anomalies with parsimony, offering novel angles of vision” (Burawoy 1998: 16). Finally, reconstruction social theory should produce “surprising predictions” that at times will be proven correct. Burawoy’s method is ambitious and difficult, and so accordingly he admits, “These are heavy demands that are rarely realized but ones that should guide progressive reconstruction of theory” (Burawoy 1998: 16).
Burawoy’s “extended case method” is similar but different (in important ways) to the “extended case study” employed by his predecessors, Gluckman and Mitchell (Small 2009: 21). Likewise, the version I employ shares more with Mitchell’s than Burawoy’s method because I am more interested in the potential to derive “logical inferences” (Mitchell 1983: 200) based on my case studies and the rigorous ethnographic data I collected, than in trying to extend my theorization of social process observed in Rio’s favelas “to theorization of the broader social forces” (Burawoy 1998: 21).

There is another reason Mitchell’s extended case study is more applicable to my multiyear investigation. Mitchell’s (1983) version holds that the most important aspect of the extended case study is the way it closely follows events over considerable timespans. This provides the ethnographer with a unique opportunity to be involved with the case study’s main actors and communities for extended periods, in my case for over 14 years. In this sense the “processual aspect” is particular important. The extended case study allows the ethnographer to better trace how “events chain on to one another and how therefore events are necessarily linked to one another through time” (Mitchell 1983: 194). For example, my multi-year research allow for careful focus on seemingly isolated incidents and ongoing processes, which in turn allowed me to better understand the relationships between events, policies, programs and other social phenomena this dissertation considered.

Burawoy’s (1998: 19) approach could be considered “integrative or vertical” and the objective of comparing cases in his extended case method is to “causally connect the cases”. Burawoy’s model is not inductive because it is not interested in minimizing cases so they fit within a general law, but rather to understand the important connections they have to other cases (Burawoy 1998: 19).

In a similar but still unique vein I used an abductive approach throughout this study, one that combined elements of grounded theory and the extended case method, of induction as well as deduction. I did not begin this research with a “favorite theory” (Burawoy 1998: 16), but a set
of preferred theoretical agendas (Duneier 1999: 341), such as critical urban studies and criminology. These evolved into the sociospatial perspective and finally tightened into more specific theories, such as Lefebvre’s right to the city and urban revolution, Harvey’s accumulation by dispossession, and Jock Young’s critical criminology. While some of the local level phenomena I observed and data I gathered challenged aspects of preexisting theories, none of my cases refuted them. For instance, my data on recent events in Rocinha and other key favelas did not fit neatly with “Anglo-American urban theories” of gentrification (Lees 2012b: 166). However, in recent years numerous scholars have already mentioned how incongruous the “Euro-American template” of gentrification is in explaining comparable phenomenon in low- and middle-income countries (Ghertner 2014: 1554).

I wasn’t seeking refutation. But I discovered afterwards that some of my cases actually were rather unique and if carefully studied could modestly build on existing theories by enhancing them with prevailing theories (and methods) from areas the respective theorists probably had not considered. For example, adding a critical criminological and critical ethnographic aspect to Harvey’s sociospatial theories.

**Guiding theories**

Within the sociospatial perspective the primary theories that have guided this research are Lefebvre’s right to the city and urban revolution, as well as Harvey’s accumulation by dispossession. These theories share a historic relationship, even if Lefebvre’s right to the city is not so much a theory and more of an ideal, or urgent demand and urban praxis. Both Lefebvre and Harvey place Marx’s concepts of use and exchange value at the center of critical urban analysis.

Henri Lefebvre’s right to the city and urban revolution. I have emphasized that the principal continuous process explaining the presence and exponential growth of favelas, their removal and subsequent regrowth in Rio de Janeiro, has been capitalist urbanization and urbanism.
During the 1960s and 1970s Lefebvre was the first scholar to proclaim that urbanism was supplanting industrialism as the most important factor for explaining the enduring survival of capitalism.\textsuperscript{294} Much of Harvey’s creative destruction and accumulation by dispossession rest on Marxist concepts updated with ideas Lefebvre pioneered on cities, such as his original analysis on the essential political, socioeconomic, and cultural features of urban development, and in particular on the dynamics of urban land markets under capitalism (Lefebvre 2003: 159-160; Fernandes 2007: 205).

In \textit{The Urban Revolution} (1970), for instance Lefebvre introduced the idea of dual circuits of capital, the first, industrial, and the second, urbanism or more specifically urban space such as real estate (2003: 159). He explained that urbanism, the second circuit of capitalism, absorbs surplus values during shocks/crisis in the first, industrial capitalism, and thus serves a fundamental role in the survival of the system (Lefebvre 2003: 159-160).

\textbf{The Right to the City}

Attoh claims Lefebvre’s notion of rights was “sketchy at best” and that the numerous conflicting attempts to interpret the right to the city have only made things more confusing (Attoh 2011: 674). But Attoh omits any discussion of two of the most important scholarly works related to the specificity and applicability of the right to the city, Lefebvre’s \textit{Du Contrat de Citoyenneté} (1990) and Edésio Fernandes’s “Constructing the ‘Right To the City’ in Brazil” (2007). Fernandes, an authority on Lefebvre and scholar of urban-legal policy in Brazil, explains that despite fairly recent recognition of Lefebvre, the full extent of his original contribution to urban research has not yet been properly appreciated internationally. He adds:

\begin{quote}
Although the concept of the ‘right to the city’ was first proposed in two of his books, \textit{Le droit à la ville} (1968) and \textit{Espace et politique} (1973), I would argue that Lefebvre’s most consistent elaboration on the nature of this concept can be found in a lesser-known book, \textit{Du contrat de citoyenneté} (1990), in which the original concept
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{294} For example, The Right to the City 1967; The Urban Revolution 1970; The Survival of Capitalism 1973
was further developed and given more socio-political content, and in which the importance of reforming the longstanding liberal tradition of citizenship rights was strongly argued (Fernandes 2007: 205).

The not as well known, and mostly untranslated, Du Contrat de Citoyenneté (1990), or “The Contract on Citizenship” is rarely cited by those who find fault in Lefebvre’s right to the city. Lefebvre was an unabashedly Marxist. He was a leading member of the French Communist Party (PCF) for 30 years. When considered through the context of Marx’s ideas on private property and value, particularly use and exchange value, and understanding the degree to which Lefebvre looked to Marx for inspiration for his own ideas and analysis of capitalist urbanization, then it is easier to understand Lefebvre’s right to the city. I argue that any interpretation or contribution to the right to the city that aim to “leave core postulates intact” (Burawoy 1998: 16) must be framed within Lefebvre unique urban Marxist perspective.

Criticism of Lefebvre also centers on the right to the city’s real world applicability (Attoh 2011: 674). Peter Marcuse has brushed this type of criticism aside. To his view using the word “right” was not the best choice of expression, “because it was not intended to be taken literally: not a Right in the sense of a legal claim enforceable through the judicial system, but a moral right, an appeal to the highest of human values” (Marcuse 2014: 5). Edésio Fernandes (2007) also understood these limits and considered them perfectly normal and expectable. He acknowledges the right to the city was more of a political-philosophical proposal and did not directly consider how, or the extent to which, the legal order has determined the exclusionary pattern of urban development (Fernandes 2007: 208). But Fernandes, a jurist and urban planner/scholar, stresses the utmost importance of contributing specific legal stipulations to the

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295 Du Contrat de Citoyenneté is a collection of essays organized by Lefebvre in which he produced the introductory essay, “Du Pacte social au Du Contrat de Citoyenneté”. In Henri Lefebvre: Key Writings (2006), Elden, Lebas and Kofman include a translated version of Lefebvre’s opening treatise. Unfortunately, some of the other essays, (composed by ten of his accomplished protégés), also help frame the right to the city but are not available in English, to the best of my knowledge. Together these scholars formed the Groupe de Navarrenx, after the town in the Pyrenees where Lefebvre settled in his later years and where he passed away in 1991.

296 For mainly political reasons Lefebvre intentionally had himself expelled from the PCF in 1968.
right to the city, adding:

Lefebvre’s work has given us fundamental elements to understand the socio-economic, political, ideological, and cultural aspects of the urbanization process. However, there is no articulated discussion on the critical role of law in the urbanization process to be found in his work. Such a full understanding of the crucial role played by the legal order is the very condition for the promotion of a profound legal reform, which in turn is the condition for the promotion of urban reform leading to social inclusiveness and sustainable development (Fernandes 2007: 208).

He also mentions how, “Perhaps more than anywhere else in the world, Lefebvre’s concept of the ‘right to the city’ has been extremely influential in Latin America, and since the mid-1970s a consistent socio-political mobilization has tried to realize it in both political and legal terms” (Fernandes 2007: 208). For instance, the role of Lefebvre’s the right to the city played a role in shaping Brazilian urban policy as the country transition back to democracy in the late 1980s, including the 1988 federal Constitution and most importantly in a 2001 amendment known as the City Statue (Fernandes 2007: 211-212). In my view, these are some of the most progressive land and housing laws existing in any capitalist country in the world. And it’s a tragedy they are so frequently disrespected and circumvented by those with power.

**Details on Lefebvre’s right to the city and his vision of citizenship**

Lefebvre’s writings on cities, citizenship and rights have been a major influence on my general theoretical perspective and have guided much of this work. One of the driving principles behind Lefebvre’s work was his belief that international acceptance of broad human or individual rights has been overly prioritized when compared to citizen or more collective type rights.

It has been almost 230 years since France’s National Constituent Assembly approved the *Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen* in 1789. Throughout this period much has changed, particularly in regards to the combined processes of industrialization, urbanization, and technological advancements. Lefebvre strongly urged for an updating of the latter half of the
historic document, which focuses on the *Rights of the Citizen*. He insisted that the profound socioeconomic transformations that have taken place since the late 1700s have resulted in a gulf separating the updated *rights of man* (know today as *human rights*) and the now archaic *rights of the citizen*. This preference for once set of rights over the other, Lefebvre believed, threatens the very existence of modern democratic order (Fernandes 2007: 206). Fernandes explains Lefebvre’s belief that doing so would allow for “new legal-political conditions” to be created that would uphold the concept of social citizenship, which is more aligned to contemporary social relations, or the “new relations that have been formed between individuals, within society, and between individuals and society” (Fernandes 2007: 206).

In a concise but astute manner Fernandes explains how the contemporary context of economic globalization and neoliberalism has generated new forms of dependency and interdependency among nation-states, societies, and individuals (2007: 207). Add to this other dynamics, such the numerous ways modern global society has been shaped by mass migration/immigration, and the rapidity of technological advancements and the rights of citizens can no longer be reduced to those important but minimal rights approved in 1789. The rights of citizens cannot remain “frozen as manifestations of that particular historical period” (Fernandes 2007: 207). What is called for is the formulation and materialization of a new political contract of social citizenship. This new contract or pact, would recognizes and legalizes the rights of citizens to fully and actively participate in political and civil society and would form the foundation for the expansion and deepening of democracy (Fernandes 2007: 206).

In today’s urban society, where over half of all human beings live in cities (UN-Habitat 2013), the expansion of citizenship rights is even more imperative for advancing much needed forms of urban democratic governance. After all, the Lefebvrian perspective emphasizes “cities and citizenship are ultimately the same subject” (Fernandes 2007: 206). Formulating a new political contract, Fernandes explains, would then supplant the foundations of the traditional
notion of ‘social pact’ that has determined the longstanding framework of liberal legalism, which is still governing in Brazil and throughout Latin America (Fernandes 2007: 206).

In his work, Lefebvre suggested some of these interrelated political rights still need to be fully recognized: the right to information; the right of expression; the right to culture; the right to identity in difference and in equality; the right to self-management, that is, the democratic control of the economy and politics; the right to public and non-public services; and above all the ‘right to the city’. The ‘right to the city’ would basically consist of the right of all city dwellers to fully enjoy urban life with all of its services and advantages – the right to habitation – as well as taking direct part in the management of cities – the right to participation. In other words, Lefebvre stressed the need for the full recognition of use values in order to redress the historical imbalance resulting from the excessive emphasis on exchange values typical of the capitalist production of the urban space. This vital link between cities and citizenship has become an imperative given the escalating urbanization of contemporary society at a global level. (Lefebvre 2007: 205-208). The most important aspect of the right to the city in regards to my study of Rocinha is Lefebvre’s emphasis on the need for the full recognition of use values in order to redress the historical imbalance resulting from the excessive emphasis on exchange values typical of the capitalist production of the urban space.

**The hypocrisy of value**

While living in Laboriaux and visiting numerous other favelas undergoing removals, I witnessed first hand the inherent hypocrisies of the urban land and housing markets. When housing and land are treated as commodities the consequences can be dire for socioeconomically marginalize groups like most favela residents. When Marx and Lefebvre’s ideas on use are supplanted by capitalist exchange values the lives of the urban poor are almost always negatively affected. I learned more about the Lefebvrian approach to urban studies from the forced removal campaign in Rocinha and other favelas than I did in any of my university
courses, particularly through the contradictory appraising of favela home values and the coercive negotiations between officials and residents.

This vital link between cities and citizenship is imperative given the escalating urbanization of the world's population (Fernandes 2007: 208). I recently described strategies the city employed to usurp valuable land from residents of favelas. I documented cases where the SMH compensated evicted residents with as little as R$ 10 thousand (US $ 5.5 thousand) for houses located in one of the most expensive real estate markets in the world, Rio’s South Zone.297 To put this in perspective, in 2012/2013 R$ 10,000 was the median price of one square meter in Rio’s South Zone, and that was the price some families received for the homes they had built over the years, which had an average size of 35 square meters.

In case I documented in the community of Estradinha, a family left their house in 2010 for R$ 8 thousand, or US$ 4.5 thousand at the 2010 annual average exchange rate. These compensations represent the lower end of the pricing spectrum I documented during field work, but José Ricardo, President of Laboriaux’s residents’ association, and Alberto Peres, the Treasurer, informed me that the average value of houses appraised by the SMH in Laboriaux between 2010 and 2012 was a mere R$ 27 thousand, or US $ 15 thousand.

Dona Dores’s (pseudonym) house was evaluated at 17,500 reais or approximately US $ 200 per square meter, while the mansions no more than 150 meters below her house, in the lavish neighborhood of Alto Gávea, are appraised at a median value of US $ 4,500 per square meter.

Perhaps more than anything, the case of Aparecida summarizes Lefebvre’s focus on use value and exchange value or urban space (Lefebvre 2003: 159). Aparecida, who is blind, has a spectacular view of Rio de Janeiro, as do many of Laboriaux’s residents: vistas that any speculator would covet. The view from her house alone would be worth a fortune in Rio’s formal real-estate market. Yet Aparecida has never seen this view, she does not even care

297 Conversions for this section on removals in Laboriaux are based on the mean (US$ 1 = R$ 1.79) of 2010, 2011, and 2012 annual average exchange rates because those were the three years most residents were displaced or coerced into selling their homes to the City.
about it. In 2010 when the SMH offered her husband US$ 51 thousand, he didn’t turn it down because it was a low value, which it was even if at the higher end of the compensations in Laboriaux. He turned it down because he built the house, with his family, and they have lived in it since 1993. Their two daughters were raised in it. They know all of their neighbors, who often help Aparecida with daily tasks. Most importantly, Aparecida has spent the much of the last two decades teaching herself how to expertly maneuver through her house and up and down the three staircases to the main road (Maria do Carmo) below. Irrespective of its exchange value, Aparecida’s home holds an immeasurable use value and is an integral part of her “life support system” (Harvey 1973: 160). She told me, “I feel safe here. I feel protected. I can’t imagine trying to get around in another house or apartment, in some other part of the city, surrounded by neighbors I don’t know.” Aparecida’s house contains an incalculable social value for her and her family that the City’s low offer could not even begin to calculate.

One of the issues that continually jumped out at me I soon realized was a principle tactic the city and state use to dispossess favela residents of their homes and displace them to distant peripheries. I am referring the housing appraisal table the city and state use in negotiating the value of houses located in favelas.

Neither time not space will allow me to translate the spreadsheet used by the SMH to appraise the value of favela homes when removing them. They use a model based on the value per square meter. Below the City’s spreadsheet is data I have collected from newspapers and articles on the square meter value in São Conrado and Gávea, and Leblon the neighborhoods that border Rocinha. São Conrado and Gávea are the two neighborhoods that literally touch Rocinha. Leblon is slightly further away, but its border with Gávea is the next area after Rocinha when traveling northeast through the Zuzu Angel Tunnel from Rocinha/São Conrado. The inconsistencies are alarming, even if not surprising.

Lefebvre’s right to the city would place utmost precedence on use value or urban space.
It is worth noting that the origins of PAC 1 in Rocinha followed a pattern rather consistent with Lefebvre’s notion of the right to the city in regard to popular participation in the planning of Rocinha’s *Plano Diretor*. Notions of use and exchange value, however, were absent, as were those regarding ‘democratic management’ of surpluses. The notions of use vs. exchange value, my interviews clearly revealed are issues Rocinha’s residents understand implicitly: they live them, even if they cannot cite them by name.

This is why Lefebvre’s notion of the right to the city is still relevant and why it was useful in drafting the City Statute of Brazil’s Federal Constitution. It is essential to integrate the favelas, in a truly participatory manner, into the city so that these spaces are not merely located *in the city* but rather viewed as social spaces that are considered integral parts *of the city*. Upgrading and security programs, however, must be taken into account. Measures must be taken so that the most pressing social problems are not merely transferred, as they have been in the past, to the urban peripheries or to other cities and regions of Brazil.

**Jock Young’s critical criminology**

From the 1970s until his untimely death in late 2013, Jock Young was one of the world’s most insightful criminologists. He was one of the founders of cultural criminology and later, critical criminology (Brotherton 2014: 227). Criminology is an academic field highly dominated by positivistic notions of science (Young 2011: 17) and despite relative acclaim, to my view Young never received the recognition his scholarship deserved. His last major project was a three part series on socioeconomic exclusion, criminology, and an array of social theory and research methods in late modernity. The trilogy included, *The Exclusive Society* (1999), *The Vertigo of Late Modernity* (2007) and *The Criminological Imagination* (2011).

Young offers much to pull from, in methodology as much as theory. But for this research I mainly borrow from *The Criminological Imagination* (2011). On pages 215-216, he presents, “The Ten Ironies” of critical criminology. The “ironies” aim to “turn establishment criminology
on its head”. Of the ten ironies or paradoxes, the six listed below are the most relevant to my dissertation. Young highlights in *The Criminological Imagination* (2011):

Socialization: That the core values of competitiveness, acquisitiveness, individualism and hedonism are close to the motivations for crime, so that the well-socialized person is more likely to offend than the undersocialized.

Seriousness: That crime occurs throughout the social structure and that the crimes of the powerful are more serious in their consequences than the crimes of the poor. That structural violence is more serious than criminal violence.

Contradictions: That the ideals and institutions that legitimate and hold the system together are the very ones that society thwarts and the frustrations generate deep dysfunctions in the system.

Function: That the system called forth deviance and disorder focuses on “the criminal,” “the other,” creating a major mechanism of governance that reverses causality so that instead of an unequal and unmeritocratic system creating problems, it is the scapegoats themselves who are seen to be the major problems of society. Systemic dysfunctions are then transformed into the very material which helps hold the fabric of society together.

Counter-productivity and self-fulfillment: That the prison and criminal justice system produce criminals rather than de-fusing criminality.

Secondary Harm: That the primary harm of a social problem is frequently of a lesser order than the secondary harm accruing from the intervention to control it. The prime example of this being the regulation of drug use. (Young 2011: 215-216)

These assertions represent serious paradoxes found in criminal justice systems around the world, and particularly those found in most countries of the Americans, Brazil and the US serving as two prime examples. The first four, which are structural in nature, are central to the theoretical contributions below.

**Harvey’s accumulation by dispossession**

Harvey borrowed heavily from Marx and Lefebvre, and then the more difficult task, made improvements by expanding and adding new explanatory sociospatial concepts. Harvey for example, has focused more intently on broader ways neoliberal urbanism supports capitalist expansion, such as through the powerful financial institutions local in large cities, or the “state-
finance nexus” that enacts policies to help the wealthy at the expense of other social classes, and on the destructive, violent tendencies characteristic of dispossession.

This chapter focuses largely on Harvey’s accumulation by dispossession, and the related concept of “creative destruction”. Based on a number of unique cases from my multiyear ethnographic research, and some of the unexpected findings they uncovered, I attempt to update accumulation by dispossession in the context of a large city in the “developing” world, a metropolis with staggering levels of corruption, inequality, violence, and with a vast informal housing market.

David Harvey (2008; 2012) recently revisited several of Lefebvre’s formulations while offering his own take on the right to the city in the twenty-first century. Like Lefebvre, Harvey situates the concept of the right to the city within a Marxist analysis of urbanization. The rise and transformation of cities, Harvey argues, must be viewed as central to the reproduction of capitalist society. Cities, Harvey asserts, play an active role ‘in absorbing surpluses’ (Harvey, 2008: 25; see also Harvey 1982) and staving off crises of overproduction and/or under consumption. Urbanization and cities is crucial to filling capitalism’s perpetual “need to find profitable terrains for capital surplus production and absorption’ (Harvey, 2008: 24). If cities are spaces where surpluses are absorbed, distributed, and produced, then, for Harvey, the right to the city has a very particular meaning. Harvey’s right to the city is more specific in the sense that he urges that the right to the city’ is to have some command over both the use and distribution of urban surpluses. Neoliberalism, He argues, marks a period in which the right to the city is exclusively exerted by private interests and in which an increasingly small urban elite produces and manages surpluses for their own ends. Harvey maintains that the key task for social movements, must be to democratize this right and ‘adopt the right to the city as both a working slogan and a political ideal’ (Harvey, 2008: 40). In claiming the right to the city, such movements, Harvey argues, must aim to establish ‘democratic management’ over the very surpluses upon which cities necessarily arise (p. 37). The right to the city, for Harvey, ‘depends
on the exercise of collective power to reshape the process of urbanization’ (p. 23).” (Attoh 2011: 676)

This study demonstrates how the relationship between accumulation and dispossession works in practice. Some critics claim Harvey’s analysis of accumulation by dispossession is highly abstract and focuses too heavily on the US. They argue that critical ethnography is needed in order to provide the practical examples and details on how accumulation by dispossession occurs at the local level (Gregory 2006: 22). For the most part I agree with this particular assessment of his work. Even when Harvey attempts to provide specific examples, his four broad categories of accumulation by dispossession still seem removed from local realities and distant from the grassroots resistance he admires.298

Still, in certain ways Harvey has made important contributions to issues at the local level. Regarding Rio de Janeiro, Harvey has warned about real estate speculation and favelas removals since at least 2008. That same year he cautioned, “if present trends continue, within fifteen years all those hillsides now occupied by favelas will be covered by high-rise condominiums with fabulous views over Rio’s bay, while the erstwhile favela-dwellers will have been filtered off to live in some remote periphery”.299

Harvey made the warning in 2008, two years before the April 2010 removal campaign began, and at a moment when hope, progressive policies and social spending were at an all-time high, especially among the rural and urban poor. While he was being figurative by suggesting strategic favelas would be displaced within 15 years he obviously felt it would happen sooner than later. Harvey is not an expert on Brazil or Rio de Janeiro. The fact that he was able to warn of this

298 Harvey has hinted at the detached nature of his writing. For instance, on a December 2014 visit to the coastal city of Recife in northeastern Brazil, he was filmed telling a group of activists gathered at a rally against destructive real estate speculation, that for years he had written about “the right to the city” (which was their mantra), but they were practicing it, and their task, he said, is much more important.

299 The quote was originally published in Harvey’s article The Right to the City (2008) and later reprinted in Rebel Cities (2012). The slightly modified version above is from page 20 of Rebel Cities.
impending threat, before any of the leading favela scholars and local activists, points to the strength of accumulation by dispossession as one of the central features of capitalism.

Rocinha and Laboriaux, as well as the other favelas where fieldwork was conducted, provided key information for unlocking one of capitalist urbanization’s proverbial black-boxes. The focus has been on meticulous case studies in Laboriaux, Rocinha, and a limited number of other favelas in Rio de Janeiro. Ethnographic details were provided on the strategies socioeconomically and politically powerful actors employ to remove swaths of low-income families from locations beneficial to capitalist accumulation. There was even a clever pun repeated by numerous research participants in almost the same manner that declared, “the problem is not that we live in an área de risco (area of environmental risk), the problem is that we live in an área de rico (area of rich people).” Harvey’s accumulation by dispossession best explains the primary mechanism used in Rio de Janeiro to remove undesirables from “areas of rich people.”

The elements of accumulation by dispossession that this research has focused on fall within the broad categories of privatization and commodification; management and manipulation of crises; and state redistributions. While not a topic systematically investigated, financialization, also plays a role within the multilayered realm of corporate fraud involved in upgrading and pacifying strategic favelas, and in the broader creative destruction of other non-favela areas of the city, such as the Porto Maravilha project.

STRENGTHENING ACCUMULATION BY DISPOSSESSION BY ANALYZING UNIQUE CASES

I. Contributions to Gentrification

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300 This play on words was expressed in strikingly similar ways by 14 research participants between 2011 and July 2013.
A different model is needed

Well-known gentrification scholar Loretta Lees makes an important point in describing gentrification as “a very Anglo-American” process, “rooted in the social and economic changes occurring in postwar cities in Britain and North America” (Lees 2012a: 241). Asher Ghertner provides specific examples of how the “Euro-American template” (2014: 1554) of gentrification is unhelpful for understanding gentrification in India and most other cities located in low- and middle-income countries that have distinctive patterns of urbanization, legal systems, and cultural values (Ghertner 2014: 1568-1569). He suggests while they are also abstract concepts, urban revolution and accumulation by dispossession, more clearly allow for the comparative analysis of displacement in the case of India’s cities. But Lees is not opposed to gentrification research in the “global south”, as her recent Global Gentrifications (2015) edition proves. Earlier Lees mentioned, “I would like to see gentrification researchers learning through different (non Anglo-American) urban theory cultures of the city” Only a truly comparative urbanism of gentrification will tell us how and why gentrification has emerged around the world (Lees 2012b: 166-167).

And yet, Vidigal and a few other South Zone favelas are unique cases of gentrification. Jason Cummings provides the perfect description for the type of people gentrifying Vidigal, he calls them “hyper-mobile internationalists”. Many of the foreigners I have met living in South Zone favelas have lived and extensively traveled in through much of Latin America, Asia and elsewhere.

The problem with European and American theories of gentrification, particularly the latter, is the enormous emphasis, in both state-led or consumer demand approaches, on the historic and cultural phenomenon of suburbanization. This is completely incompatible with prevailing models of urbanization in Brazil, where the word suburb (subúrbio) has been synonymous with poverty and the working-class for almost a century (Abreu 1987). So much of the North American gentrification research rest on the notion that middle class whites abandoned center
city areas for the peripheral suburbs, and that years later the depreciated inner-city neighborhoods offered the perfectly located stock of low cost housing once productive forces or consumer demands began shifting attention from the suburbs back to downtown areas. But in Rio upper classes always inhabited areas close to downtown and along the coast, and most of the small but extremely valuable spaces of land in the center city and south zone were opened up for elite commercial and residential development during the forced slum removals of the 1960s and 1970s. A couple dozens favelas remain in areas near the center city and coast but these have been bastions of upper class living for decades and there is no shortage of elite housing stock. Instead, the severe shortage is in affordable housing. In other words, with a massive middle class back to the center city movement, who is going to gentrify these areas? Certainly not the elites. They already live in the South Zone and in Barra, and own the downtown businesses, and they hold tremendous prejudices against the favelas.

**Rocinha and Vidigal. A Tale of Two Gentrifications**

Why would David Beckham, Kanye West, and Madonna purportedly buy properties in Vidigal and not in neighboring Rocinha? They are both “favelas”, so why do the rumors of celebrities buying in favelas almost always pertain to Vidigal? These rumors eventually turned out to be little more than a marking ploy by real estate agents trying to profit from celebrity-induced speculation in Vidigal. Even so, no one would have believed them to begin with if it was alleged they were buying houses in Rocinha. But then why would national and international brands (e.g., Casas Bahia, Bradesco, Banco do Brasil, Mundo Verde, and Subway) open business in Rocinha and not Vidigal?

Rocinha and Vidigal, the two largest favelas in Rio’s South Zone, represent interesting cases of displacement and gentrification. Vidigal is experiencing visible signs of residential

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301 This information came from residents of Vidigal I interviewed, including one with SPD Imobiliária, the only real estate company located in Vidigal.
gentrification, but this statement requires important qualifications. I view both as atypical cases of displacement and gentrification, meaning they are not ideal for easily confirming hypotheses, but can prove highly useful for advancing new understandings of how displacement and gentrification occur in Rio de Janeiro’s favelas, and possibly in other cities within and beyond Brazil where high degrees of inequality, violence and informality are prevalent.

When pressed as to why gentrification is more advanced in Vidigal than Rocinha or elsewhere for that matter, approximately 90% of the people I asked replied, something along the lines of “the spectacular vista” or “the view of the ocean”. Vidigal’s vistas are stunning, so area those from the higher elevations of Rocinha, such as the section where I live, Laboriaux. The panoramic views from the Terreirão and 199 sections of Rocinha are spectacularly beautiful as well, but these are sections only accessible through twisting alleys and steep staircases and where gun battles occur regularly. I do not accept Vidigal’s vistas as the main reason the community is gentrifying. Because of Rio’s mountainous topography and proximity to the ocean there are spectacular views from the upper elevations of most South Zone favelas, and the same can be said of many hillside favelas in others areas of the city. This is not a privilege Vidigal has the monopoly on.

The key to understanding displacement and gentrification in Vidigal lies elsewhere. Rocinha is unique among Rio’s South Zone favelas not only because it is larger than most of them combined, but also because of the intensity of violence, abysmal sanitation problems, and its overall low socioeconomic indicators. Data support popular opinion that North Zone and West Zone favelas are the city’s poorest and most violent (Cano 2012: 26). Still, all favelas in Rio’s South Zone are legally classified as low-income “Special Zones of Social Interest” (ZEIS). Their residents endure sporadic episodes of intense drug related violence, systematic racial and socioeconomic discrimination, and regular police harassment. The South Zone is where the bulk of Rio’s wealthy live and there is also the city’s most unequal district.
Despite Rocinha’s spatially privileged location in Rio’s elite South Zone, in many ways the community shares more in common with large North Zone favelas such as Complexo do Alemão, Complexo da Maré, and Jacarezinho. This is not only because of Rocinha’s population, insalubrious residential density, deplorable sanitation conditions, and high levels of poverty, but also because of the size and deeply rooted nature of the community’s drug faction(s). All but three favelas in Rio’s South Zone (Rocinha, Cantagalo/Pavão-Pavãozinho, and Vidigal) have less than 5 thousand inhabitants. With 150 thousand residents (70 thousand “officially”) Rocinha resembles medium sized city. In order for residential gentrification to reach noticeable levels in Rocinha a absolutely massive influx of new socioeconomic demographics and equally substantial outflow of pre-gentrification residents would be required, a occurrence highly unlikely to take place anytime soon. This is one of the reasons residential gentrification is occurring much slower in Rocinha even as the cost of living there is among the highest of any favela.

In this way Rocinha is comparable to Harlem (West, Central, East), which has a population 2.3 times greater than Rocinha’s but in an area 16 times larger. Residents, activists, and scholars have been warning of gentrification in Harlem since the 1980s (Schaffer and Smith 1986: 362-363), and new articles, blogs, books, reports, and documentaries regularly sound the alarms about gentrification in the historically black New York City community. On the other hand, gentrification in the Lower East Side (LES) of Manhattan, a small but dense community of between 39,000 and 155,000, moved swiftly, and more visibly altered the areas demographics.

But more importantly, a community’s size is only one of several factors that influence if or how fast an area gentrifies. Although small compared to Rocinha, Vidigal is a mid-sized

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302 Data from Rio’s and New York City’s Municipal websites, the specifics of which I explained in this dissertation’s Introduction (towards the end) as well as in the summary of Chapter 2.
303 The LES’s vast range in population estimates is due to the difficulties in dividing NYC neighborhoods by census tract data which often do not coincide with the political, historical, or local population influenced boundaries.
favela, and together with Cantagalo/Pavão-Pavãozinho, two communities forming one “favela”, Vidigal is the second largest in the South Zone after Rocinha. There are a couple dozen South Zone favelas smaller than Vidigal, all of them also located in the South Zone’s prime real estate market, but which are not experiencing the same pace of residential gentrification as Vidigal.

I suggest that the case of Manhattan’s LES can inform on certain aspects of displacement and gentrification in Vidigal. It is important to first state the obvious, there are vast sociohistorical, political economic, cultural and linguistic differences between the LES, New York City, the US, and Vidigal, Rio de Janeiro, and Brazil. Still, there are a few interesting similarities in regards to gentrification, and the LES served as a famous case study of of this process in Neil Smith’s *The New Urban Frontier* (1996) an influential study in gentrification research and critical urban studies in general.

One relevant point, for example, is that the East Village was once part of the Lower East Side’s northwest corner. This is where two similarities between the LES and Vidigal intersect. New York City’s Landmark Preservation Commission (NYC-LPC) explains that during the 1950s “slum clearance programs were threatening to destroy much of the area’s historic character” and yet at the same time “new residents undaunted by or unaware of the potential for displacement was beginning to move into the neighborhood. As is often the case, artists and writers formed the vanguard of this movement and by the early 1950s they had discovered the Lower East Side (NYC 2012: 35) during the 1960s realtors began “marketing this area as the Village East, and later as the East Village, to differentiate it from the less gentrified blocks to the south” (NYC 2012: 35).

In this sense two interesting comparisons can be made between the otherwise dissimilar LES and Vidigal. First, both neighborhoods had two fairly unique communities within them, sharing a blurry historic and physical boundary. Vidigal is a more complicated area in which to study residential gentrification than Rocinha. For example, like Rocinha, Vidigal is an official *bairro* of
Rio de Janeiro, but unlike Rocinha, the neighborhood of Vidigal contains two distinct adjoining communities where the socioeconomic boundaries are clearer than the physical ones.

Anticipating the favela gentrification trend Janice Perlman (2010b) released a report on real estate in Rio’s favelas in which she specifically considered the case of gentrification in Vidigal. Perlman touched on the point my research raises when she mentioned in regards to Vidigal: “in any other city, this real estate would be occupied by the elite of the elite. In Rio it is a favela—on one side of the main street, that is. On the other side properties are legitimately owned and were once occupied by famous artists and musicians including Gal Costa and Caetano Veloso” (Perlman 2010b: 30). In short, part of Vidigal is considered favela while the other is unmistakably not favela, yet both lie within the boundaries Vidigal (the official neighborhood). Any study of gentrification in Vidigal, or the numerous other favelas where physical and social boundaries are obfuscated, that does not take this into account is omitting a crucial sociospatial reality.

In Rio de Janeiro, and dozens of other cities throughout Brazil and hundreds around the world, it is common for informal and formal areas to integrate a single heterogeneous community that is socially and politically regarded as a single homogenous favela (i.e., poor, informal, dangerous, etc.,). Or in other cases, for multiple communities with various sections ranging from middle class to extremely poor to be classified as an official neighborhood. This is the case in much of Rio’s North and West Zones. A good example of this is the 29th (XXIX) Administrative Region of Rio’s municipal government, which is also one of the city’s 160 official neighborhoods. The area is widely considered a sprawling compound of a dozen or so favelas, all of which are lumped pejoratively into one mammoth favela compound known as Complexo do Alemão. In reality, Complexo do Alemão varies from “formal” middle class sections (the minority) to “informal” areas that range from low-income to destitute (IPP 2012: 2).304 Most of the North and West Zone mixed neighborhoods identified socially and politically as individual

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favelas or “complexes” of favelas are comprised of social classes ranging from the very poor and working class to the middles class (mainly lower-middle class).

Vidigal is a unique case for being among the few 160 official neighborhoods in Rio de Janeiro that is made up of an informal low-income section and a formal middle/upper-middle income section. The problem for studies of gentrification on Vidigal is that the authorities, (e.g., IPP and IBGE) do not disaggregate socioeconomic data. Unless careful attention is paid to this issue information will be skewed for income and rent among other indicators in the neighborhood of Vidigal.

For instance, if an investigation were to base its analysis on real estate prices listed on FIPE ZAP, the largest resource on Brazilian real estate and pricing indicators, it would not distinguish between the two Vidigal communities. A perfect example of this is presented in the chart below in which FIPE ZAP indicates that the value of a square meter in Vidigal increased from approximately R$1,400 per square meter in 2008 to R$8,896 per square meter in January of 2014. This is based on a sample of only 13 properties, which are almost certainly all in “non-favela” Vidigal. R$8,896 is a very high square meter value, almost equivalent to the prices found in elite Gávea, and does not represent the reality of informal “favela” Vidigal, even if the latter has certainly become more expensive during the last few years as well.

The same FIPE ZAP indicators are not even available for Rocinha, a community approximately six times larger than Vidigal. This is because properties in Rocinha, as those in “favela” Vidigal, are sold and rented within the informal favela real estate market, which operates without most of the bureaucracy and official documentation required in the formal city.

It could be argued that economic displacement is a precursor to gentrification, where the latter is in high gear once there has been a significant influx of better-off social classes/big business and a notable outflow of earlier residents and small businesses (Marcuse 1985: 198-199). In Vidigal there is an obvious influx but not much of an outflow. In Rocinha there has been

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a clear influx of big business but not of more affluent social classes, and it is hard to ascertain if there has been any significant displacement in either community. The difference is obvious in Rocinha where real estate speculation has skyrocketed in recent years but unlike neighboring Vidigal there are no clear signs of residential gentrification.

Therefore, the key factors favoring gentrification in Vidigal are the community’s distinctive history, which included several famous “artistic type” early residents, and the dual socioeconomic composition of the community. This unique history amplified forces of gentrification once it was known, as early as 2009, that Vidigal would soon be pacified. By the time the UPP process officially began, in 2011, previous condition had paved the road for Vidigal’s accelerated residential gentrification.

**“Gringo” induced Favela Gentrification**

Throughout the city favela residents, activists and scholars (e.g., Gaffney 2013; Cummings 2013, Cummings 2015) have suspected foreigners are contributing to the gentrification of Rio’s favelas. This was one of Cummings’ primary questions in *Favela Chic* (2013). On the surface these suspicion makes sense. After all, most middle and upper class Brazilians carry deeply ingrained prejudices against favelas. Similar to other highly unequal cities, the neighborhood where one lives is an instant class identifier in Rio. And like Harlem or Compton in the U.S., virtually all Brazilians know of Rocinha. In Rio most cariocas have seen the enormous favela while passing through São Conrado on the Lagoa-Barra expressway, one of the cities main thoroughfares. If not they certainly know of Rocinha from the constant and generally negative media attention. Most associate the community with overcrowding, poverty, disorder and violence. Despite Rocinha’s prime location and recent wave of investments, none of the 120 participants interviewed for this dissertation believed upper classes would consider moving into the community. The stigma is too strong among Brazilians of more economically privileged
classes, but it is not such a big deal for the “adventurous” foreigners from high-income countries rumored to be the main contributors to favela gentrification.

Cumming ultimately concluded by 2013, when his field research ended, that there was no empirical evidence that foreigner demand for housing in favelas was contributing to gentrification, not even in Vidigal (Cummins 2013: 42). But he added alongside recent upgrading and security investments in favelas that the fascination foreigners have in them, “particularly by the vanguard of young, bourgeois travelers and adventure-seekers”, is potentially enough to attract open minded Brazilians to certain favelas. As of 2013, Cummings added, foreigner interest in living in favelas had “not fully progressed to the stage of being a precursor to middle class demand.” However, Cummings rightly noted that in Vidigal, foreigner demand has unquestionably contributed to rising property values. He concludes by suggesting that foreigner interest is reinforcing a pre-existing trend that “is empirically observable in Vidigal, but not readily observable in Rocinha” (Cummins 2013: 42).

I wanted to investigate the increasing rumors of foreigner induced gentrification myself. Rumors (boatos or rumores) and gossip (fofoca) are powerful forces in most tightknit working class neighborhoods. Whether harmless or pejorative, in Rocinha they serve a fundamental role in the way residents receive updates on issues public authorities and the media ignore, underreport, or misrepresent (deliberately or by mistake). Word of mouth information is often embellished, piecemeal or completely fabricated, but sometimes it is accurate and rumors plays an important social function in favelas like Rocinha (Moulin 2010: 352-354, 358).

In Rocinha and other South Zone favelas one rumor widely circulating (since 2010) is that the foreigners moving into favelas have been causing prices to increase. Some take this further, adding that rising costs of living caused by foreigners is displacing longtime residents. The media and certain groups and actors within Rio’s real estate industry have been feeding these rumors. Since the UPP process began in Rocinha and Vidigal (November 2011), the media, domestic and international, has heavily focused on favela gentrification, especially in Vidigal.
Media reports have included success stories of Europeans opening bed and breakfasts and hostels in South Zone favelas, or of young gringos partying all night at trendy new favela bars and nightspots (often part of the same B&Bs/hostels). Numerous articles have also claimed “adventurous” foreigners are increasingly moving into the favelas on a more permanent basis. Some have been more sensational, such as the many reports (rumors) that celebrities like David Beckham, Kanye West and Madonna are buying properties in Vidigal.

I asked my geographer friend from Rocinha, Robson Lopes, what he thought of these assertions. Robson told me he believes this is little more than the state and certain groups aligned with the tourism and real estate industries using the media to paint a positive image of South Zone favelas. He explained, “This serves a few important functions. For one, it is good marketing because it give the appearance that the UPPs are really making these communities less dangerous, you know, like safe enough for gringos to move in. This is good propaganda for the politicians who take credit for and use the UPPs in their campaigns.” Robson added, “it also reinforces the idea that favelas with UPPs are finally safe so that property values continue rising in the wealthier surrounding neighborhoods.” Finally, he mentioned that the idea of foreigners buying in previously “no-go” favelas “give the impression the city is safe for the international mega-events”.

Adding to Robson contributions, I suggest the recent attention on “gringo” induced favela gentrification could possibly produce a ripple effect that might actually persuade hesitant foreigners or even more affluent and open-minded Brazilians (like stereotyped “artistic types”) to move into key favelas. In essence creating demand for “favela chic” life styles where relatively little previously existed.

Predictions aside, I wanted to better understand the present scenario (up to December 2015) in Rocinha, so I asked dozens of residents and nonresidents familiar with the community what

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Dissertation Interview, Robson Lopes, April 2013.
they thought. A participants politely respond, when I asked what they thought was causing costs of living in Rocinha to increase and if displacement was occurring, with comments such as:

Catarina – Marquinhos, please don’t take this the wrong way, but it’s people like you, gringos, who are causing the prices to go up. People like you are moving into the favela. Opportunistic residents are noticing and raising prices. This is making it more difficult for the poorer residents to continue living here.

In some ways I hoped this was true, it would have simplified my research. But when pressed my participants struggled to come up with any specifics and usually ended up saying something along the lines of, “This is what everyone is saying,” or “In Rocinha, [pause]...I heard of an American girl who lives in Vila Verde, and [pause], there are others gringos living in Cachopa, I think...I know there are many gringos in Vidigal.”

Without the aid of official statistics and with only a limited sample from my interviews, I decided to traverse as much of Rocinha as possible between March and July 2013 (and once again in July 2014). Walking through Rocinha’s is something I do regularly, when visiting friends or distributing flyers for community events such as the monthly meetings of Rocinha sem Fronteiras. My goal was to discover foreigners living in Rocinha. I also interviewed five real estate agencies in Rocinha, since together they manage somewhere between 1,000—1,500 rental properties and home sales. Another method utilized relies on the relative social connectedness of the gringo community in Rocinha. Some are loners, especially the older more settled foreigners, like the two German nationals who are often married to Brazilians and have lived for quite some time in Rocinha. But most are part of a social network. It is extremely likely

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307 I did not included the approximately two dozens foreigners I came across or heard about who were spending anywhere from a few days to several months in the community, volunteering, conducting research or in one case, starting a favela AirBnB franchise. Although I doubt it, this could have been a methodological weakness. While I have not seen anything in the literature on the relationship between temporary residents or visitors and gentrification, one might exist. Further research needs to be carried out on this issue.

308 Two of the five realtors were evasive as to how many properties they were managing, but by being persistent and carefully asking around I was able to arrive at what I believe are fairly accurate figures.
that I would have encountered or at least heard of any gringos living in Rocinha for more than six months, particularly in light of the fact that I was specifically questioning longtime residents, and other gringos, from all geographic sections of Rocinha, about this very issue.\textsuperscript{309} Interviews with longtime residents indicate that compared to periods prior to the 1970s there are undoubtedly more foreigners (from high income countries) living in Rocinha, proportionately an in absolute numbers. But when considering the last 15 to 20 years little seems to have changed in regards to foreigners buying properties in Rocinha or renting for extended periods there.

There are no official data on whether more, less, or roughly the same proportion of foreigners are living in Rocinha in 2016 as compared to 2001. Interviews with long-time residents representing all areas of Rocinha coupled with my daily experience in the community led me to conclude that in absolute numbers there are only slightly more foreigners living in Rocinha today than at the turn of the century when I moved there. But Rocinha’s historically characteristic demographic, comprised mainly of migrants from the poorer northeast, their descendants, and working-class Brazilians in general), grew at a much faster rate than the influx of foreigners, and residents interviewed unanimously stated that proportionally the figures have not changed significantly.

I uncovered little evidence to support the rumors and reports that since 2007 (the mega-event, upgrading, and pacification era) more foreigners have moved into Rocinha to stay. By late 2015 I was only able to locate seventeen foreigners (including myself) still living in the community who have been there for more than a year. When raised to two years the number dropped to twelve, and includes the Father Thierry, a priest from Belgian who has arrived in the 1980s, a couple years after his friend Cristiano, the former Belgian priest interviewed in Chapter 2.\textsuperscript{310} I stipulate

\textsuperscript{309} For this study I defined “living in Rocinha” as residing in the community for over 18 consecutive months. I did so because of the large number of foreign students, researchers, and volunteers who stay for weeks or months then return home.

\textsuperscript{310} For several years Father Thierry has lived in Brasilia, but he maintains an apartment in Rocinha,
“still living” because I know a few foreigners who lived years in Rocinha but who have since permanently moved, Cristiano being an emblematic example.

If anything, I was surprised to observe a number of working-class citizens of other countries, mostly South American neighbors, such as Peru, Bolivia and Colombia. In fact four of the twelve foreigners I identified as having lived in Rocinha for over two years were from other South American countries. For instance, two Colombian brothers who own a bustling motorcycle repair shop on Rocinha main strip, Estrada da Gávea. There are likely more residents of Rocinha from neighboring countries, but in most cases, like that of the brothers from Colombia, they do not stand out physically from the “typical” residents of Rocinha. There is also an Italian woman in her early thirties who has lived for about twelve years in Rocinha. As long as I have known of her she has been living a humble life in Rocinha as a single mother raising her daughter. The child’s father is a Brazilian raised in Rocinha.

In less intimidating South Zone favelas foreigners are buying properties and turning many of them into B&Bs and trendy nightspots. By less intimidating I am not only referring to violence in Rocinha, but also the sheer size, density, constant noise, and frenetic pace of vehicular and pedestrian traffic. Other South Zone favelas are significantly calmer, particularly at night.

One of the foreigners I interviewed for this research (May 2013) was renting in the Morro da Babilônia community in the South Zone neighborhood of Leme. He is a French citizen who was studying in Rio. The 26 year old told me there was a growing population of foreigners in the community, and that some of them moved there with intentions of staying. He cited a German friend of his who had recently bought a one-bedroom apartment with a small bar on top, located adjacent to the hillside with a panoramic view of Copacabana and the ocean. He paid R$150 thousand up front. At the time of the interview in July 2013 this was about $72 thousand. In one visits about once a month and is very much part of the community.

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of the world’s most expensive cities the price seemed more than reasonable for a small bar attached to a one-bedroom apartment with a stunning vista of Copacabana, surrounding hilltops, and the sea. Unfortunately, R$ 150 thousand, up front in cash, is not an expense many residents of Morro da Babilônia can afford, at least not the pre-gentrification residents. This is a figure out of the reach of Rio’s working class in general, especially without financing options available in “formal” areas of the city. When I asked how his friend bought the house, he said he had to put the house, and whatever documents he obtained in the sale, in the name of a Brazilian friend of his, a risky transaction not everyone would be willing to make.

I have a friend, Leandro, in his early 30s, who was born and raised in Vidigal. Leandro still lives in there with his wife, who is from Rocinha and whose family I have been close to for years. He told me (August 2015) that Vidigal is inundated with foreigners, not just visiting, but living there. I already knew this, having many friends in Vidigal I often visit and when I’m not in Rio we talk through social media or apps like Whatsapp. But Leandro provided some interesting data and perspective. He told me that during the wars in Vidigal, around 2004 to 2008, which were related to the wars in Rocinha, that residents were “selling their homes for the prices of bananas in order to leave as soon as possible”. One tragic case was the story of his neighbor, who in 2006 was so desperate to leave Vidigal because of the violence, that she sold her house to neighbor for the price of her bus ticket and moving van back to her native state of Paraíba. The man who bought her house, located at the top of Vidigal, added another level to the house. The added level has a panoramic view of the ocean and part of the South Zone. Leandro told me that only a few weeks before we spoke, a foreigner offered his neighbor R$ 400 thousand for the just the upper level. The neighbor who has no intentions of moving, declined, but admitted he was tempted. I couldn’t help but think of the woman who sold the bottom floor of that house the price of returning to Paraíba, only 4 years before real estate values in Vidigal exploded.

Leandro told me a foreigner also offered his father, who lives next-door to him, R$ 400 thousand for his two-story house, and that many residents had sold houses for $R 150 thousand,
R$ 200, up to R$ 500 thousand foreigners. When I asked him where they went, he said, “probably back to the Northeast” where many of Vidigal’s residents also come from. The same type of information I attained from speaking to the former president of Vidigal’s residents association. They both told me of how in 2005 (I ask how is was ten years before to compare) you could rent a studio in Vidigal for R$ 300 or $400, and that after the UPP it has become very difficult to find anything for under R$ 800 and month. And yet, they and others I spoke to in Vidigal, couldn’t name one person they knew who left because they could no longer afford to remain in the community. But displacement is occurring in the form of house sales so expensive that upper middle class foreigners are pretty much the only ones who purchase them, and also in the form of landlords who no longer rent to Brazilians. At least not the type of working class Brazilian who prior to the UPP made up almost 100% of Vidigal’s renters.

To my surprise, all of the participants I spoke to and interviewed in Vidigal agreed that the relationship between the foreigners and local residents is extremely positive. There are always going to be exceptions, but this was very clear from speaking to numerous local residents in Vidigal. The lack of conflict thus far could be because, displacement is still small in scale, and from what I heard, often beneficial for the migrant who came to Rio from the Northeast or some other probably rural area, and ended up selling their house for a comparatively large sum of money and the possibility to moved back to their home town.

To better understand this phenomenon I interviewed one of the most important figures PAC 1 in Rocinha, an individual I will call Maurício. Although very aware of the issue he raised, I had never considered it in light of the prevailing gentrification literature.

MB – Do you think that favela-upgrading schemes and programs like the UPP can be harmful to residents of communities like Rocinha? Do they cause the most vulnerable segments of the population to leave the community?

Maurício replied, and I am paraphrasing for brevity, that PAC 1 undoubtedly caused housing prices to increase and this was essentially a good thing. He indicated that favela upgrading
programs bring benefits to the community because most people in Rocinha own their house, so if there is speculation it is a benefit to the majority. Mauricio mentioned that gentrification is great, because:

Mauricio – if I owned a house in Rocinha and in a short span of time its value greatly increased, I would love that. If my house was worth 10 (thousand R$) and then suddenly it was worth 40 (thousand R$), are you kidding me, I would sell dammit, and I would be better off. So, the rising prices, in my opinion, are wonderful. I don’t see why so many people are worried about this issue.

Maurício, who lives in an upper middle class South Zone neighborhood, did not specify whether in this hypothetical situation he would sell and move to another area within Rocinha, or somewhere outside the community. The suggestion was the move would be to another community/neighborhood. This seems to be the prevailing relationship between current favela improvement schemes and actual outflow of longtime residents. Many homeowners see it as a positive process that allows them a unique chance at economic mobility. Maurício then acknowledged that, “renters are the most vulnerable in the community in regards to the increasing prices,” though, he was not aware that in Rocinha such a large percentage of the community rents (roughly 40%). Furthermore, it is known that in some neighborhoods significant displacement only becomes a major factor in the later stages of gentrification (Henig 1980: 648, 651).

And yet the same phenomenon of selling recently valued houses to outsiders is not occurring on a significant scale in Rocinha. One foreigner I interviewed in June 2013, who I will call Kelly, raised an issue important to the plausibility of residential gentrification in Rocinha. Kelly is a white woman from the United States. She was in her late 20s (in June 2013), and had been living in Rocinha off and on for about a year and a half. She told me that she had rented in four different sections since moving to Rocinha and at one time considered buying a house. She had the resources to do so, but Kelly told me that the prices were too high in light of the numerous
infrastructural and social problems in Rocinha. As examples she described how on several occasions she had gone days without running water.\textsuperscript{312}

I suggest that in Rocinha the lack of gentrification induced by foreigners (or “adventurous” Brazilians from more privileged classes) is primarily the result of the community’s many infrastructural and social problems coupled with overinflated real estate values. The insecurity of not having property titles is another issue that prevents Brazilians and foreigners from buying in the favelas (but not from renting). The third major reason I have alluded to is that large sections of Rocinha are still un-gentrifiable. Rafael Gonçalves and others have suggested that the UPPs will likely change this. With a new sense of “security” outsiders with resources will increasingly move in.

This is partly true. The “pioneering” foreign gentrifiers are less concerned about violence than the outside the favela middle-class Brazilians. When I asked the young American woman mentioned above about crime in Rocinha, she responded, “Crime, really, what crime?” She was imagining home entries, muggings, rape, and assault in the streets, and she rightfully said, “I don’t think there is much crime at all in Rocinha.” I had to remind her that there were still dozens of young men selling drugs in Rocinha and heavily armed and that inside the becos (alleyways) there are shootouts almost every day. She said, “oh yeah, well I do not feel threatened by that.” She raises an interesting point. Unless the crime issues relate to break-ins, physical assault, rape, murder or other serious violent crimes then I do not think the presence of armed men would deter gringos from buying and renting in the favela. Days without running water, power, unreliable internet connections, or having to walk next to or over open sewage will, however. There are still too many social problems for foreigners (and high real estate prices) and too much of a perception of violence for the outside middle-class Brazilians to gentrify Rocinha. Shootouts are still common in Rocinha, and within the alleyways young men still walk around heavily armed. These events are very unnerving to residents and one of the

\textsuperscript{312} Dissertation Interview, Kelly, June 2013.
reasons gentrification still does not seem a viable possibility in the short or mid-range. In other words gentrification is occurring slowly, but it is not demand-side gentrification. It is supply-side because it hinges on the state’s ability to make these areas desirable.

**How informality favors forced removals and complicates gentrification**

Ever since the 2010 forced eviction campaign I cringe when I read Harvey (2012: 20), or hear my leftist friends who don’t live in favelas, speak of the dangers of property titles represent, because they will stimulate gentrification in well-located favelas. Lack of full property titles was an argument the city consistently used in Laboriaux and numerous other favelas. And in the numerous cases I documented from Vidigal and Babilônia, the lack of full freehold private property titles has not keep foreigners from buying. But it almost certainly has slowed the pace for reasons I will now explain.

According to Martins, who has work on land regularization and property titles programs for over 25 years in Rocinha, only one percent of Rocinha’s residents have all the required documentation necessary to establish legal ownership of their houses (as of May 2015). Brazilian law considers the other 99% as residing “on illegally obtained land” (Caldeira 1996: 79) mentions, “illegal occupiers”. This is changing slowly and currently some 20,000 houses in Rocinha are in the (slow) process of receiving official property titles. Martins’ works for the Bento Rubião Foundation, which is responsible for approximately 8,000 of the cases. He is obviously in favor of residents receiving full freehold titles. Many on the left, including those inspired by Harvey and Smith, scholars who have long studied gentrification and displacement, warn that these types of property rights programs could make communities like Rocinha susceptible to outside speculators who have so far avoided investing heavily in favelas because of a lack of legal property titles. On several occasions, I have raised this point with Martins. It is important to remember that he arrived in Rocinha in 1967 as a 20 year-old, at a time when thousands of favela residents were being forcefully displaced from nearby communities under
the pretext that they did not have titles, that they had invaded the property they lived on, and that anyway, they were located in areas of risk that could not be upgraded anyway (high-rises and mansions now fill these risky spaces). Lawyers from the Center of Land and Housing (NUTH) of the State of Rio de Janeiro’s Office of Public Defender, explained to a group of Laboriaux’s residents (I was present) the importance of saving legal documents in fighting forced evictions. Also, Martins is in favor of property titles because the issue is not just about evictions but also about rights. He believes that with property titles Rocinha would be, in theory, considered a *formal* part of the city. By paying light, water and property taxes (there are mechanisms for controlling the rate poor people pay) favela residents could more forcefully demand the upkeep of the infrastructure and basic services, as do residents of *formal* Rio de Janeiro neighborhoods.

This relates to claims that foreigners would initiate gentrification in Rocinha. Turns out that he was on to something. In the case of Vidigal the lack of full freehold property titles has not stymied gentrification, as I had imagined. Contrary to certain reports (e.g., Handzic 2010: 12; Cummings 2013: 17) relatively few of Vidigal’s residents own “concession of right to use” titles. It is not easy to arrive at a confident figure. However, field research and the most recent official data available indicate that by May 2015, out of Vidigal’s roughly 3,234 households (this is the conservative IPP/IBGE 2010 estimate, the resident’s association places the figure closer to 5,000), between 688 and 1,068 possess “concession of right to use” temporary property titles. In short, relatively few residents hold the temporary concessions and less than 1% own full freehold property titles.³¹³ Foreigners who are not married to Brazilians or who do not have a permanent visa would be taking a considerable risk in buying favela property. Curiously, in favelas like Vidigal, Morro da Babilônia and Chácara do Céu this does not seem to be much of deterrence.

Mauricio then cited a specific example, the transformation of the Rua Quatro alley into a 4.5-meter wide street of the same name. He added, “Rua 4 was great for the proprietors in that
area, but for the renters it would have been better had it never occurred, because the rents
doubled and they have had to leave.” He clarified, however, that the tenants who leave places
they rented because of increasing prices do not generally leave Rocinha, and that speculation
alone will not push the poorest residents out of the community.

At this point, Maurício made a fascinating point. First, it is important to qualify that a
significant portion of Rocinha’s poorest residents live in unventilated basements, stockrooms,
storage spaces and closet-size add-ons that unscrupulous proprietors rent, and in some cases
even sell, to the community’s neediest inhabitants. The word typically used in Rocinha to refer
to these small basement type areas is porão, or porões in the plural form. Generally, these
miniscule spaces lack windows and plumbing, and those living in them are forced to shower
with buckets of collected water and to relieve themselves in plastic bags and other containers.
Maurício made an interesting point in relation to this, one that I had never given much
consideration before.

Mauricio – I know people in Rocinha who have had to leave the places they rented because
prices increased, but most of them migrated within the community to cheaper locations,
representing a loss in their quality of life. So, some guy lived in a bad place, the rent increased
and he had to go find an even worse place to live within the same favela. A place harder to
access, far from the bus stop, or located on a steep slope. But what is really going to cause an
impact, an exodus of the poorest people from Rocinha, the single most important factor, is going
to be the day that they [public authorities] ban people from living in the porões. Here in
[upper-middle-class neighborhood where Mauricio lives] if I rent the porão under
the house and the City finds out, I will be penalized. I can’t do that here. In Rocinha PAC 1
improved, at least to certain degree, the quality of life, but there were no mechanisms in place to
ensure people would not be living in deplorable places like porões. There will always be horrible
places for people to live in Rocinha. The thing that will force the poorest residents to leave will
be when the authorities enforce a ban on the subhuman condition that many people there live
in. Until that day, even with prices increasing, there will always be very poor people living in Rocinha. And this is a problem for favela-upgrading schemes, because when we have to demolish a house for a construction project we have to compensate the owners and take care of any tenants they have. We found the poorest residents of Rocinha living in spaces that were designed for storage, and so a space that by law should be only used for storing things has human beings living in it, and we have to get them on social assistance. But the way many residents of Rocinha see it, if they have a small space below their house, why store belongings, an old mattress or a bicycle, when you know there will always be someone or even a family desperate enough to rent it?

The local and systemic forces driving displacement in Rocinha and other key favelas may eventually prove that Rocinha and Vidigal, and other relevant communities, were only temporary unique cases. For instance, in a July 2015 dissertation interview with Jota, a 26-year-old college educated resident born and raised in a dangerous section of Rocinha deep within the tangle of alleyways, I asked why he thought so many foreigners were moving into neighboring Vidigal and not Rocinha. He responded:

Jota – Up until now the UPP is still working in Vidigal, in terms of coercing the armed [drug] traffickers to stay out of sight and not cause problems. The seed were already planted by older generations of artists and actors, then the UPP contributed to more gentrification. But I don’t think anyone expected it to advance so rapidly. Now it is the opposite, it is the gentrification in Vidigal that keeps the UPP more effective than here or other communities. Enough to be keep things calm until now. But with the way things are going [in general with the UPP program] there is no way it [perceived peace] will hold up for long.

But the last sentence of Ruth Glass’s classic description challenges Jota’s fascinating analysis. Glass explained, Once this process of ‘gentrification’ starts in a district it goes on rapidly until all or most of the original working-class occupiers are displaced and the whole
social character of the district is changed” (Glass 1964: xviii). More time is needed for better analysis, but as of May 2015 both Rocinha and Vidigal continued on their respective paths.

But interviews with residents in two other allegedly (by the media, and certain activists and scholars) gentrifying South Zone favelas challenge Glass’s theory. In Morro da Babilônia and Canta Galo, for example, there have been recent reports that armed drug traffickers are heavily present and apparently not very worried about the presence of the local UPPs. One participant told me that there were less foreigners living in Morro da Babilônia now (in August 2015) because the presence of young men walking through the community armed and the sounds of gunshots was making some of the nervous. Both Morro da Babilônia and Cantagalo could be experiencing effects of the slow season for tourism. As the 2016 Olympics approach the scenario could change again. Concisely, the answers are not straightforward, and as I approached the end of this dissertation I decided to try and makes sense of these exceptional case in light of the relevant literature.

II. Slums through the lens of capitalism’s survival strategies

Through critical ethnography this study has been able to demonstrate the limitations of accumulation by dispossession as an explicatory tool when detached from concrete local occurrences. Without “rich descriptions” accumulation by dispossession is just another academic buzzword, great for publishing scholarly works and lofty speeches at conferences, but far removed from the people it most affects.

Furthermore, favela (or slum) removals represent a type of accumulation by dispossession to which Harvey pays little attention. I suggest that this might be the case because slum removals represent a hybrid of primitive accumulation and accumulation by dispossession. James Freeman indicates that in Rio it is a solution more along the lines of looking outside of the

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314 In his published writings. Harvey has mentioned accumulation by dispossession in light of slum and favela removals in numerous recorded interviews during the last few years.
formal system into spaces that have limited capital penetration (Freeman 2012: 100). Freeman mentions, “As Harvey argues, capital requires an outside to expand into. The formerly colonized world has always served this function. Latin America, Brazil, Rio de Janeiro and Rio’s favelas have also been territories that have been externalized from the main global circuits of capital accumulation and devalued at different times, making them available for later re-colonization and re-valuation” (Freeman 2012: 121-122). On the one hand Rio’s favelas have long been integrated into capitalist markets, as any resident or local business owner will tell you. On the other Freeman specifically mentions “the main global circuits of capital accumulation” and in this case he is correct, and I return to this shortly. But beyond this point, I take a unique view of Harvey’s work on accumulation by dispossession because I see the recent events occurring in Rio de Janeiro as an amalgam of outside and inside solutions to the crisis of over accumulation, but tend more towards later. After all, Rio’s favelas are a product of capitalist urbanization.

Throughout the twentieth century, creative destruction and accumulation by dispossession have occurred on a large scale in Rio de Janeiro. Chapter 1 explained that forcefully removing favelas became politically and socially taboo by the 1980s. Vainer, Freeman, and others, however, suggest that since the 1990s Rio has been pursuing an increasingly entrepreneurial model of development, one based largely on securing significant international mega-events (Vainer 2000: 76-82; Freeman 2012: 97). The roots of this movement began in the early 1990s but it was only in 2010 that the specter of forced removals once again began terrifying residents of strategically located favelas. Recently, powerful forces have conspired to raze houses in dozens of centrally located favelas, forcefully taking possession of terrain occupied for as many as 3 or 4 generations.35 Many of these communities had (or have) been inhabited for decades or in certain cases since the 1800s. Chapter 1 explained that Morro da Providência, where the name favela originated, is the oldest standing favela dating back to the 1890s. By 2010 half of Morro da Providência’s 832 houses were marked for removal. But there was fervent resistance that

353 Megaeventos e Violações dos Direitos Humanos no Rio de Janeiro 2012, p.8
significantly reduced the city’s goal, and as of January 2015 the actual number of removals was closer to 140 houses, which is still roughly 17 percent of the community.316

The creative destruction most strongly associated with mayor Pereira Passos during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries allowed Rio to continue capitalist accumulation and urban expansion (Abreu 1987: 141-147). From the 1930s to the 1970s Rio de Janeiro began absorbing and reproducing a significant amount of capital through heavy industry and construction. Freeman notes Rio was an urban area “important for non-coercive accumulation processes during the post WWII period and the economic miracle of the 1960s and 1970s” (Freeman 2012: 101). During periods of growth, favelas served as important spaces for social reproduction because they expanded largely as a result of informal building that was based on unpaid family labor and communal “mutirão” labor. Even though their role was important, as Perlman pointed out in The Myth of Marginality, favelas remained “largely outside circuits of accumulation” (Freeman 2012 101).

But it was also during “the economic miracle of the 1960s and 1970s” (Freeman 2012: 101) that early forms of accumulation by dispossession were harshly inflicted upon Rio’s most vulnerable citizens. Chapter 1 described how the dispossession of at least 140,000 favela residents from valuable areas during the 1960s and 1970s represented a form of forceful accumulation of valuable land that did not succeed in halting favela growth but did greatly benefit real estate and construction sectors (Valladares 1978: 31-39).

When Brazil’s political capital was transferred from Rio to Brasilia in 1960, the Marvelous City began a slow but steady decline (Godfrey 1999: 98). Freeman describes how Rio was subsequently “devalued and subject to disinvestment and dispossession during the debt crisis and inflationary period of the 1980s and early 1990s,” adding that favelas became increasingly marginalized “during the period of devaluation as they absorbed externalized workers and became territories relatively autonomous from circuits of capital accumulation (Freeman 2012: 101).”

316 Dissertation interview, June 2013; Gonçalves 2013b; Comitê Popular 2014: 36.
Freeman suggests, “By the early 1990s Rio was devalued and ready for urban-scale neoliberal accumulation strategies” (Freeman 2012: 101).

Freeman argues that the UPP project is at the core of neoliberal accumulation strategies aiming to turn Rio de Janeiro into a competitive entrepreneurial city. He adds, however, “capital accumulation by non-coercive means has its limits, and the role of the state has long been to conquer and control territories militarily and appropriate assets to create new fields of operation for private capital” (Freeman 2012: 121-122). Whether referring to MCMV, PAC, Morar Carioca, or the UPPs, most of the recent transformations occurring in Rio have been depicted as “public-private partnerships and the agency of private capital” (Freeman 2012: 121). This is exemplified by the large private contractors and construction consortiums building MCMV housing or upgrading PAC favelas like Rocinha, or through the corporate sponsorships of the UPPs from Coca-Cola to Light. Freeman argues, “the role of the state in facilitating private capital accumulation has never been clearer. The state is always the agent of accumulation by dispossession” (Freeman 2012: 121-122). Finally, he emphasizes:

The state is finally asserting its monopoly of legitimate violence in territories that have been largely ignored by public power from their first inhabitation. This is a necessary step that should have been taken long ago. But the process is flawed because it follows the logic of neoliberal governance. Instead of being a security strategy for the whole city, the UPP initiative is a security strategy dictated by the needs of the games, construction companies, real estate interests and those who see favelas as potential markets. Decisions are made behind closed doors with a lack of transparency, participation or democracy at every level down to the daily functions of the UPPs in communities (Freeman 2012: 122).

With this in mind, one contribution this research adds to Harvey’s notion of accumulation by dispossession is that not only is there an inner connection between capitalism and urbanization (and obviously industrialization) but also of favelização (favelization). I suggest the growth of slums is as fundamental a part of capitalism as it is of urbanization and this has been the case since Engels described slums during the 1800s.

Above Harvey mentions, “the logistical curves of growth of capitalist output over time are broadly paralleled by the logistical curves of urbanization of the world's population” (Harvey
2012: 5). In the forward to UN-Habitat’s pioneering *The Challenge of Slums* (2003) then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan provided a startling statistic, “Almost 1 billion people, or 32 per cent of the world’s urban population, live in slums, the majority of them in the developing world.” *The Challenge of Slums* (2003) was one of the first systematic global studies of slums and testified that “the logistical curves of growth of capitalist output over time are broadly paralleled by the logistical curves of” the favelization of the world’s population. The rapid expansion of slums throughout the twentieth century was the key factor allowing for the steadily paced urbanization of the world’s population.

At the time of UN-Habitat’s report almost 1 in 6 people in the world lived in slums, a fact that cannot be overemphasized, especially for understanding the consequences of modern capitalism from its inception until the present, as well as one of its strategies for surviving crises. Capitalism could not have prevailed as the world’s leading political economic system with slums, a point I have never come across in the literature.

This is not to say that slums are indispensable to capitalism’s future, but until now they have played an indispensable role. Capitalism is an adaptable system capable of overcoming crises, and in a hypothetical world without slums (and other types of informal poor urban neighborhoods) it would likely find other means of persisting. But slums and their armies of workers, along with the ubiquitous potential for creative destruction and accumulation by dispossession that they embody, have been essential to the continuation of capital accumulation and expansion, a fact that has not been adequately appreciated in the literature.

The lack of acknowledgment accorded to the pivotal role of slums can be partially explained, I suggest, by their historical disparagement, even by Marxists, and perhaps especially by early Marxists, including Karl Marx himself. Marx’s greatest error was his narrow-minded vision of industrial workers as the heart and soul of the proletariat. Marx and early Marxists saw slum dwellers and the homeless as plagues on society, and on the potential for revolutionary movements. He coined a special term for these parasitic masses, which historically had never
existed on the scale Marx encountered them during the industrial revolution(s). He called them lumpen proletariat, one of the most common terms that came out of Marxism. In the first section of The Communist Manifesto (1848), “Bourgeoisie and Proletariat” Marx and Engels describe “The ‘dangerous class’, lumpenproletariat the social scum, that passively rotting mass thrown off by the lowest layers of the old society, may, here and there, be swept into the movement by a proletarian revolution; its conditions of life, however, prepare it far more for the part of a bribed tool of reactionary intrigue.”

The most fascinating point is that in English versions of Marx’s work, and of the work of early Marxists such as Karl Kautsky, the term lumpenproletariat is translated as “slum worker”, “mob” or “dangerous class”. But at the time slum, mob and dangerous class were synonymous.

UN-Habitat’s The Challenge of Slums claims the term slum first appeared during the 1820s as a slang word in London. (UN-Habitat 2003: 9). The slang or “cant” slum was used to label the poorest quality housing and the most unsanitary conditions, living conditions that were considered “a refuge for marginal activities including crime, ‘vice’ and drug abuse; and a likely source for many epidemics that ravaged urban areas – a place apart from all that was decent and wholesome” (UN-Habitat 2003: 9). But Mike Davis in Planet of Slums, indicates that the word slum was actually first published in 1812 in Australian convict writer James Hardy Vaux’s Vocabulary of the Flash Language where it was synonymous with criminal activity (Davis 2006: 21).

Often lumpen proletariat is not translated at all, so I was unaware until relatively recently that it basically means “slum worker”. Some of my Marxists friends in favelas, or who are part of favela resistance movements, become outraged when I point out this historical fact. It shocks them that the ideology to which they dedicate their lives would have considered them worthless

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317 I briefly researched this 1812 work and found the actual name is, A New and Comprehensive Vocabulary of the Flash Language. Slum, according to Vaux, was a slang term for “a room” or as Davis mentions, a “racket.” Also, by the 1830s, Mike Davis explains that slum had come to mean the spaces in which the poor were living (Davis 2006: 21), and increasingly lost its meaning of mob, racket or gang.
parasites and counterrevolutionary. They argue that the *lumpen proletariat* were essentially drifters and the homeless, common criminals, but not slum workers, as if it is somehow better to disparage the urban homeless, who along with landless peasants cling desperately to the only rung lower on the capitalist ladder than slum dwellers. Furthermore, the relationship between slum dwellers and the homeless has always been close. In Rio, most of the children and adults seen sleeping on the streets have at one time or soon will be living in a favela.

In *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (1852) Marx specifically refers to the *lumpen proletariat* as, “scum, offal, refuse of all classes” comprised of “vagabonds, discharged soldiers, discharged jailbirds, escaped galley slaves, swindlers, mountebanks, lazzaroni, pickpockets, tricksters, gamblers, maquereaux [pimps], brothel keepers, porters, literati, organ grinders, raggpickers, knife grinders, tinkers, beggars — in short, the whole indefinite, disintegrated mass, thrown hither and thither” (1852: 38). These are all groups and classes of people who when not imprisoned or enslaved spent their lives in the streets or in slums, or drifting between them. Based on my own research I believe *lumpen proletariat* primarily meant slum worker, for the same reasons that the largest Marxist achieve in the world defines the term as such.318

I only realized this relatively recently while reading a version of *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon* translated by Daniel de Leon, the well-known socialist politician, journalist and union leader. In this particular translation, de Leon chooses the term “slum-proletariat” in place of lumpen proletariat. But this meaning is obvious in numerous other writings by prominent early Marxists. For instance, Karl Kautsky, who dedicated Chapter 3 “The Slums” of his influential *The Class Struggle* to diminishing slum dwellers and beggars. Kautsky rightly points out how: “The capitalist system of production has given strong increment to the slums; it steadily sends to them fresh recruits; in the large centers of industry it constitutes a considerable portion of the population.” But he also derides slum workers as lazy and immoral opportunists

318 https://www.marxists.org/glossary/terms/l/u.htm
who, “has satisfied itself with exploiting and corrupting every revolution that has broken out, and to be ready to betray it at the earliest opportunity”.

These points were raised not to point out a critical flaw in Marx’s analysis (although it is one), and not because I wanted to highlight the sociohistorical origins of the term *lumpen proletariat* and slum, although the history is captivating. Rather, I wanted to underscore the critical relationship between capitalism, cities, slums and accumulation by dispossession. Although he doesn’t spend focus on slums, Harvey clearly acknowledges that Marx didn’t appreciate the fundamental importance of cities and urbanization to capitalism. But then Harvey overlooks the role of slums in the survival of urbanization. Lefebvre first raised this point but Harvey has provided the sustenance. Harvey understands, as Mikhail Bakunin, Frantz Fanon and other before him, the errors in Marx’s analysis of class-consciousness and resistance. I soon return to the theme of slums and resistance, but first I would like to introduce another slum related theme the last section of this chapter will address.

Finally, before moving on the final section of this chapter, I need to highlight another reason I discussed slums and early Marxist attitudes towards them. As noted, the word slum originally meant mob or in modern vernacular, gang. From the time they began rapidly expanding in industrial England slums were synonymous with criminal activity. The importance of this fact for this research cannot be overstated. Slums played an essential role in the establishment of the world’s first modern police force, the Metropolitan Police of London, founded in 1829. The relationship between capitalist development and the need for security, between urbanization and slums and between accumulation, social control and displacement (forced or economic), is clear from the start. In the following section I continue the discussion of the intimate relationship between these themes.

**BUILDING ON THE RIGHT TO THE CITY BY FUSING THE SOCIOSPATIAL, CRITICAL CRIMINOLOGY, & “DEVELOPMENT”**
The Collective Right to Security/Safety

Below, I borrow from Jock Young and David Brotherton in explaining why Rocinha’s UPP, and Rio’s UPPs in general, are failing residents of occupied favelas as well as ironically, failing the mechanism of accumulation by dispossession.

By focusing virtually all violence/crime reduction effort on Rio’s poorest urban communities the UPPs are missing a fundamental point espoused by Young’s critical criminology. For instance, six of

In Chapter 3 I provided a segment of Roque’s comments on the UPP in Rocinha, in which he rightfully complained about the hypocrisy and inequality inherent to the entire UPP process. Roque also made the prediction that after the 2016 Olympics the police would leave Rocinha, once again.

This could be the case, and if so, it would further bolster my hypothesis that Rio’s public authorities are superbly incompetent at accomplishing one of the upper-classes most enduring and exigent objectives: to completely rid all central, beachside or any other strategic areas of low-income residential communities. If they really wanted to achieve this goal, one well documented in the literature (Valladares 1978; Abreu 1987; Gonçalves 2013) of expelling the poor, working and even lower-middle classes from central areas of the city it would be necessary to maintain the UPPs, at least those in Rio’s South Zone, downtown and immediate North Zone. This way they would continue assisting in a more mid/long-term favela reduction strategy, one coupled with upgrading/urbanization schemes like PAC and Morar Carioca. While it would be no surprise if funding for UPPs located in areas less immediately purposeful to capitalist urbanization were significantly reduced or even cut all together. I seriously doubt, however, that the UPPs, or possibly some other large-scale policing social control strategies, will end in key favelas until they have been sufficiently transformed and tamed for business.
If Roque’s negative forecast proves correct in Rocinha, as dozens of participants I interviewed believe it will, I suggest it will be a result of the incompetence and corruption of Rio’s state and municipal authorities. Abandoning Rocinha’s UPP would be an outcome stemming from their inability to deliver results to potential investors, real estate speculators and developers, the affluent neighbors in bordering São Conrado and Gávea, and the dominant classes in general. An example of a metropolis that was able to deliver to interested parties is New York City since the mid-1990s, where the NYPD and other powerful local and global groups efficiently achieved the numerous social control and other security objectives that were necessary to remake the city into a playground for the extremely wealthy and for tourists. With Roque’s impassioned quote about the looming failure of the UPPs in mind, this chapter covers what I suggest is a second pivotal conjuncture in Rocinha’s recent transformation, the Unidade da Polícia Pacificadora, UPP, or Police Pacification Unit. The launching and marketing of Rio’s UPPs has had profound consequences on favela communities and the image of Rio de Janeiro throughout the world.

Institutionally, the UPPs, like the Military Police that train and run them, are highly corrupt. If they were significantly less corrupt, they would have reduced the perception of violence/crime in occupied favelas considerably more than they have. Regardless of the social priority, the UPPs, as with Giuliani’s NYPD, could have reduced levels of violence/crime and perceptions of it, much more. Of course, like the late twentieth century/early twenty-first century NYPD, this would have entailed numerous human rights abuses. Mass arrests/imprisonments, long sentences and excessive targeting/harassing and occasionally killing young men of color, a logical inference could be made, would have produced comparable results in UPP occupied favelas. Instead, many UPPs have been characterized by pervasive corruption, including significant interactions with the world of drugs and arms trafficking and other organized crime in favelas. This has made efforts at confronting illicit power structures in UPP favelas virtually futile, and has made changing the public’s perception of police corruption impossible. Further
exacerbating the situation has been the UPPs crime fighting tactics, which have been concentrated at two polar ends. The UPPs have either ignored vast areas of favelas like Rocinha, where they know most of the illegal activity takes place, or they have, at the other end of the extreme, made use of the enduring military police tactics of torture and execution. This was the case of Amarildo in Rocinha. Such tactics have further eroded their already volatile relationship with communities.

A convincing argument could be fashioned that suggests that had the NYPD not reduced violence/crime in neighborhoods like Bedford Stuyvesant that processes of gentrification in these once feared Brooklyn neighborhoods would be delayed. Furthermore, in a July 2014 follow-up on my research in Rocinha, I found that a growing number of residents felt increasingly unsafe in Rocinha. Not only was the perception that the community had not improved but nearly every residents I asked said Rocinha was more dangerous than before the UPP. In fact, they told me that it had changed significantly in the eleven months I spent abroad. Residents told me not to walk the alleyways (which I know well and always traversed), because the UPP stays away from them and young men from other favelas have taken over some of them.

In certain favelas where the confluence of strategic space (location) and perceptions of security have been socially controlled, processes of gentrification are much more advanced. Vidigal is the most cited case, but similar statements can be made about Morro da Babilônia and a number of others.

The collective right to security is a concept I suggest could strengthen Lefebvre’s right to the city. Lefebvre and Harvey both concentrated overwhelmingly on urban Europe and the United States, as did Smith, Zukin, Ley and other pioneers of gentrification research. This likely explains one of the main reasons they do not pay sufficient attention to the urgent issue of violence and crime, of insecurity in cities. In Lefebvre’s defense, although he lived through two World Wars, cities everywhere were much safer during most of his life, particularly in regards to organized and street crime, and everyday violence.
Resistance

Manufacturing, heavy industry, factories, and they like played a central role, Marx's critique of class relations, production and revolutionary movements. Harvey has pointed to errors in Marx's analysis of dispossession and resistance (2003: 169-171). The primary one being Marxist exclusive focus on the proletariat (waged workers deprived of access to or ownership of the means of production) as the vanguard of historical change. The fundamental conflict was between capital and the workers in regards to production. Trade unions and political parties whose aim was to procure state power in order either to regulate or to supplant capitalist class domination were the main instruments of working-class organization. The focus was on class relations and class struggles within the field of capital accumulation understood as expanded reproduction. All other forms of struggle were viewed as subsidiary, secondary, or even dismissed as peripheral or irrelevant (Harvey 2003: 169-171). He claims this was a “fatal mistake” (Harvey 2003: 171).

Harvey is in not suggesting Marx was wrong about the role of workers struggles in relation to resistance. He thinks Marx was correct. The resistance movements that focused on workers rights may not have brought about revolution but they did greatly contribute to many of the progressive labor and social policies of the twentieth century (Harvey 2003: 170). The fatal mistake was that this was the only perspective though which Marxists viewed class relations and conflict (Harvey 2003: 171).

During struggles over accumulation by dispossession people being displaced from their homes start and lead many of the protests and movements, whether in rural or urban areas. These types of struggles are often more complex than workers movements. According to Harvey this is because movements instigated by people being displaced of home or livelihood are ideologically less homogenous in regards to political economic claims (Harvey 2003: 162, 166-
Labor movements, while also diverse, generally stem from ideologies and demands at least partially associated with Marxism, socialism or some form of anti-capitalism.

I have detailed how favela residents, or favela workers, have recently been victims of accumulation by dispossession and how they were the first to begin protesting, a full three years before the rest of Brazil woke up and flooded into the streets. Although still miserable, wages have substantially increased in recent years and income inequality has decreased. Brazilian industrial workers, as a class, were not at the vanguard of resistance, it was the favela residents, some of whom are industrial workers, others such as Irmã Fatima from the devastated Estradinha favela in Botafogo, were unemployed housemothers. I personally know of three residents of Rocinha who partook in protests who were once drug traffickers, another was once a member of an illegal gambling racket called cacanique in Rio. Others, such as Alberto (Belo) Martins and Itamar Pontes, from Laboriaux are bar and restaurant owners. Seu Izaldo was a retired brick mason. Simone was a college student. Ricardo was a retired Marine. Harvey is correct, dispossession is the defining feature of capitalism.

This still continues, but as Marx, Lefebvre and Harvey note, capitalism needs to constantly destroy what existed before in order to recreate landscapes and industries to better suite the needs of accumulation. In the process many are dispossessed, and of the dispossessed, slum and favela residents, and their rural counterparts, make up a substantial portion. It is my belief that contrary to Marx’s writings, these dispossessed masses play a central role in resistance movements.

When entire communities are being threatened with removal a diversity of actors appears on the front lines of resistance. My research in Laboriaux and in other favelas threatened with removal confirms this. In the case of Laboriaux, for example, very few of the leading activists would be considered socialists or leftists. Some, including the ex-marine José Ricardo, the president of Laboriaux’s residents’ association and most fervent activist, are quite conservative socially and politically. Harvey maintains that the diversity of actors resisting accumulation by
dispossession complicates contemporary anti-capitalist movements, and that we must begin to envisage new forms of resistance (Harvey 2003: 162).

By April 2010 the mechanism of accumulation by dispossession intensified in Rio de Janeiro. It was immediately met with resistance that was sporadic and small scale, mostly limited to a few dozen passionate and persistent favela residents and activists. Although it was passionate and persistent and in certain cases defeated the city’s removal attempts. By mid-2013 accumulation by dispossession was being met with widespread resistance. State security forces, numerous center and right wing politicians, and the media at times viciously attacked both movements. Harvey describes how “in the developing countries, where opposition to neoliberalism and accumulation by dispossession can be stronger, the role of the neoliberal state quickly assumes that of active repression even to the point of low-level warfare against oppositional movements” (Harvey 2006: 155). Curiously, the police and mass media did not attack the third major protest movement, although certain left leaning politicians and alternative media outlets did.

In early 2015 more large-scale protests erupted in Brazil. While protests attracted a varying diversity of actors each movement is identifiable with a particular group, or class. The 2010-2011 manifestations were largely made up of favela residents facing eviction, radical grassroots activists and a small minority of middle class Brazilian university students, left leaning lawyers and professors. The 2013 resistance movements were more diverse. Although workers unions, favela residents, left leaning activist and everyday citizens participated, the movement was sparked by middle class college students using social media. The protests from 2010 to 2013 were progressive in nature, although the 2013 protests involved anarchists and so called “black bloc” groups, the majority of protestors held left leaning beliefs.

Finally, the most recent protests were initiated almost entirely by conservative upper-middle class and elite Brazilians. Their four slogans were “Out with Dilma” (fora Dilma), Impeachment! (impeachment já), “Out with the PT” (fora PT) and “No More Corruption!” (basta or chega de
Frighteningly the next most common theme was “Military Intervention!” (intervenção militar!). Brazilians from all groups and classes participated in the large rallies held mainly in São Paulo. But black and brown Brazilian’s were not well represented, even thought they make up approximately 53% of the country’s total population (IBGE 2010). Video and photography of the events clearly showed a vast sea of white faces, leading many on social media to ask if the protests were in Brazil or Finland.

Of the three recent protests movements only the most recent (2015) was instigated by groups, or classes, (Brazil’s version of the bourgeoisie) that Marx regarded as revolutionary. And revolution is what many of the middle and upper class protestors were demanding. It was incredible to witness so many Brazilians, mostly from educated and privileged backgrounds, demanding military intervention after only 30 years of democratic rule of law.

Harvey points out that “in the developing countries, where opposition to neoliberalism and accumulation by dispossession can be stronger, the role of the neoliberal state quickly assumes that of active repression even to the point of low-level warfare against oppositional movements” (Harvey 2006: 155). This points to both strengths and limitations in Harvey’s analysis.

But the common theme between the three protest movements to the streets was a unique aspect of accumulation by dispossession that until very recently Harvey has written little about. Recently Harvey has discussed a theme I have long wish someone of his capacity would, the centrality of corruption and violence in capitalism (Harvey 2014).319 His comments are not some cliché rant on the evils of capitalism but rather they are a direct and sincere attack on the legal and ethical legitimacy of the entire system. Capitalism is a system born from and dependent on corruption and violence. Marx and Engels highlighted this when they spoke of capitalism’s origins emanating from original accumulation when the European peasants were stripped of the land they descendants had lived and worked on for centuries. Original accumulation was

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319 These passages on corruption and violence inherent to capitalism come from the first several paragraphs of Chapter 4 “Private Appropriation and Common Wealth”, in the e-book version of Seventeen Contradictions and the End of Capitalism (2014).
followed by profiting from the theft and colonization of the lands of racial and ethnic minorities. It is well known and unfortunate that Marx defends these first bouts of creative destruction as probably beneficial in the long run, an argument I completely disagree with. and the horrors of transatlantic slavery (Marx and Engles 1848).

And yet there was a common theme that united the protest movements of favela residents, radical activists, middle class university students, workers unions, anarchists and upper class Brazilians.

Here I am referring to the contradictory effects of corruption, and how on the one had this has been one of the main drivers of the recent removals. On the other hand the corruption and incompetency of Rio’s public authorities and certain relevant corporations has been so unorganized and extensive that it has backfired, at least for the time being. Initially, I forecasted that the forces driving displacement in key favelas would eventually cause these anomalies to dissipate, a circumstance that may well occur in the coming years. But as of December 2015 they remained. And so it was only as this dissertation was approaching its end that I decided these exceptions are too important to disregard.

The state government took over in 2008, and in the words of Toledo, “they destroyed our plan.” EMOP chose to focus construction on a number of superficial projects easily visible from outside Rocinha, such as the large sports complex located on the Rocinha/São Conrado border, and a wasteful R$ 14 million (US$ 7 million) pedestrian bridge connecting Rocinha to the sports complex that was designed by the late Oscar Niemeyer (101 year old at the time). Toledo’s plan would have involved more removals, but he designed at least five times more housing within the community for displaced residents (Rocinha PDS 2011: 44-45).

There are numerous problems associated with PAC 1 in Rocinha, with the bulk of the criticism centered on PAC 1’s abrupt termination within days of the federal and state elections in November 2010 (Bautès et al. 2013: 18-19). As of mid-2014, According to José Ricardo, president of Laboriaux’s residents’ association, and José Martins, local activist and coordinator
of the Bento Rubião Foundation’s property title program in Rocinha, roughly 30 percent of PAC 1 construction work in Rocinha remains incomplete. This has frustrated a considerable portion of Rocinha’s residents, including the grassroots organization Rocinha sem Fronteiras and the organized residents of Laboriaux, who have questioned how the R$280 million (US$140 million) from PAC 1 had been used when one-third of the construction remained incomplete.

This indignation boiled over in early 2013 as the federal and state (Rio de Janeiro) governments announced R$1.6 billion (US$800 million) more would be invested in the community as part of PAC 2 Rocinha—the largest favela-upgrading investment planned for a single community in Brazilian history. Not only did they announce this mega-intervention, they presented a completed project for it, without any community consultation. Along with the lack of participation and information, the main point of contention between government authorities and the people of Rocinha has pivoted on the imposing idea of the teleférico, an aerial cable-car that would consume approximately one-third of the R$1.6 billion destined for PAC 2 in Rocinha. The price tag of the cable-car has been one of the main points of contention, considering Rocinha has one of the most deplorable sanitation problems in Rio de Janeiro. Another important issue of controversy concerns the large number of removals that will be necessary to build the six station teleférico. EMOP has told residents that it will be necessary to first remove thousands of houses so that roads can be opened allowing trucks to carry the cable-car’s support columns to chosen locations.

The interview with Eric was conducted in January 2013 and by June 2013 his prediction of a renewal of grassroots activism was already proving partially correct. Rocinha sem Fronteiras, active residents of Laboriaux, the June 2013 Rocinha Residents’ Committee, SOS Rocinha Saneamento, and others have been relatively successful in pressuring the state government to

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320 This is according to Rodrigo Dalvi Santana, who mentioned “Rocinha is the Federal Ministry of Cities’ model for all favela-upgrading schemes in Brazil.”
321 Teleférico estimate from Rodrigo Dalvi Santana, infrastructure specialist for the Federal Ministry of Cities. Dalvi Santana works on both PAC 1 and PAC 2 in Rocinha and presented these figure to residents at a meeting of Rocinha sem Fronteiras in September 21, 2013.
finish PAC 1 construction. These groups and others have also slowed PAC 2 plans, demanding that before any PAC 2 construction begin that there be a more democratic discussion with residents and local organizations, particularly about the cable-car.

By that time the resistance movement in Laboriaux had further aligned with wider community based resistance movements, especially with Rocinha sem Fronteiras and the June 2013 Rocinha Residents’ Committee. Active residents of Laboriaux had previously collaborated with Rocinha sem Fronteiras, but the relationship deepened as both groups joined wider resistances simmering throughout Rio de Janeiro. Feeling pressured from all angles, Mayor Paes visited Laboriaux for the first time in August 2013, where he made a public promise that no more houses would be removed.

With federal and state elections approaching in 2014 conscious residents were disgusted. Rocinha’s resistance was even covered by the international media in late June 2013. Initially the movement centered on the unfinished PAC 1, and the soon to come PAC 2, favela-upgrading projects. With a sanitation crisis in Rocinha the costs associated with the PAC 2 cable-car revolted many residents. By July 2013 a separate mobilization joined the resistance. This mobilization was in reaction to the abuses being committed by the local UPP, and was sparked by the torture and murder of bricklayer Amarildo de Souza. The pressure brought down Maj. Edson Santos, causing an upheaval in the local UPP. Since then the entire UPP process in Rio de Janeiro has lost considerable credibility. The UPP credibility has been further eroded by a spike in violent crime of over 13 percent in 2013. The year-to-year rise in 2013 was the greatest rise since 2009 (ISP 2009-2013)\textsuperscript{322}. Small and localized protests against the UPP continue in Rocinha.

PUC-Rio professor Rafael Soares Gonçalves noted that the April 2010 rains and landslides at least one positive effect:

Rafael Soares Gonçalves – Well, the only point I consider positive and interesting is that there has been a resurgence of favela social movements that had been dormant for a while. Now there is communication and solidarity between favelas that had been missing for some time, perhaps because of the traffickers, or perhaps because of the very nature of Brazilian democracy

**Laboriaux**

Laboriaux resisted eviction in collaboration with other threatened favelas; grassroots activists/organizations; a volunteer engineer, Mauricio Campos, who challenged the city’s bogus reports; Rio’s Public Defenders; the Pastoral das Favelas; local and international NGOs; and anyone who would contribute. Not only were they able to resist eviction, residents pressured the city into investing over R$20 million (US$10.5 million) since 2011; an extraordinary feat considering the city had essentially abandoned Laboriaux since its foundation in the early 1980s. Slope retaining walls have been built and the road was paved for the first time since it was laid in 1982. The couple dozen houses that were demolished, residents agree, were the few that were located in areas of risk.

After nearly four years the positive results of the fight against removal in Laboriaux began showing promising results. In August 2013, Paes, under political pressure from various movements against removals in Rio’s favelas, finally visited Laboriaux and declared that there would be no more removals of the local population. Paes promised, with the support of the governor, that more investment would be made in Laboriaux.

The repression awoke a sleeping giant. Laboriaux has emerged as Rocinha’s most politicized and unified sub-bairro. Laboriaux’s organized residents are active in virtually all important decisions taking place in Rocinha today, and together with grassroots organization like Rocinha sem Fronteiras are at the forefront of the anti-teleférico campaign. The resistance movement in Laboriaux is evidence that the global neoliberal forces driving uneven urbanization and the local practices of accumulation via dispossession can be contested from below. José Martins told me
that: “It’s true that technical assistance is important, that the help of the Public Defenders is
important, that the involvement of the Pastoral das Favelas is important, all of that is important,
but, I think the most important thing, the most powerful thing, is the unity of the residents.
Alone we can’t do anything, we can only resist in union.”

SUMMARY

I suggest the removal of undesirable classes from prime real estate areas has less to do with
political systems than the economic models that drive them. Removal has been the objective of
Rio’s ruling elites since the early 1900s when favelas supplanted cortiços as the city’s most
reviled communities (Gonçalves 2013). This was true during Brazil’s dictatorships as well as in
periods of “democratic” rule. The common denominator is capitalism. Lefebvre was among the
first to point out how dependent capitalism, in each of its variations, is on the commodification
of urban space. Through creative destruction, the real estate, development, and construction
industries help avert crises by absorbing surpluses and opening new spaces for continued cycles
of accumulation by dispossession, because there will always be pressure to remove anything or
anyone in the way of growth. Each system utilizes the most practical means to achieve a similar
goal, forced removals during dictatorships, when voting and elections do not really matter, and
relying on market forces for evictions when constitutional rights are in place and election results
are important. In cities with numerous areas and communities that exemplify substantial
informality (e.g., robust informal economy, lack of property titles, housing inspections and
building codes), where there also exist high levels of political economic corruption, then
mechanisms of “accumulation by dispossession” will favor forced removals using the types of
strategies outlined in this dissertation. In cities with tight restrictions on informality, even in
low-income neighborhoods, and with less corruption (particularly in its most brazen forms),
then “accumulation by dispossession” in regards to housing will tend more towards processes of gentrification, whether supply-side or demand side, or both.

Undoubtedly, in many cities, especially those not part of the OECD, accumulation by dispossession will unfold via a mix of forced evictions and gentrification. In Rio de Janeiro, a large urban area that epitomizes the first scenario, poor and working-class residents of key favelas and other low-income marginalized areas have been forcefully removed since the recent eviction campaign of 2010.

One contribution to accumulation by dispossession proposed here relates to informality and corruption, which are also associated. When Harvey speaks of accumulation by dispossession in regards to privatization and commodification and financialization, and even management of crises, he is largely referring to strategies that occur within the formal sectors of capitalism. But within capitalism, especially in highly unequal and corrupt societies, there is always a great deal of informality. This is particularly true in societies that experience forms of capitalism still strongly influenced by elements of colonial and patriarchal pasts, like Brazil. In these types of societies there has been little incentive to regularize (or formalize) large sectors of economy and society, especially favelas.

Multyear participant observations and robust ethnographic data indicate that even in the case of a mass forced eviction campaign in a highly unequal, violent, and corrupt city, intense resistance significantly altered the plans of the agents of dispossession. The same research also indicates that scholars utilizing North American and European ideas of gentrification should take corruption and informality more seriously, and not only in regards to property titles. This research suggests that complete lack of housing inspections (particularly rental) is a significant factor hindering the displacements usually associated with gentrification.

Furthermore, the short-termism and elevated levels of corruption on the part of the “upgraders” and the private contracting firms they hire actually serve to hinder displacement caused by gentrification. This is illustrated in the case of the cable-car in Rocinha, which in the
short- and possibly medium-term will benefit the political parties associated with PAC Rocinha and the corporations that will build it and then administer it. But the cable-car project will consume at least 1/3 of PAC 2 Rocinha funds while improving very little in the community. As local resistance movements insist, the hundreds of millions to be spent on the cable-car could be instead spent on the much less visible but much more urgent tasks of basic sanitation or opening up keys roads and resettling residents. These demands are what the main resistance movements Rocinha sem Fronteiras, the July 2013 Protest Movement Residents’ Commission and SOS Rocinha Saneamento put forward.

Even more residents would be removed if the state abandoned the cable-car and focused on opening roads and implementing community-wide micro-sewage, which are the shorter but exponentially more numerous linkages that would connect the larger macro-sewage canals to the homes of individual residents.\footnote{Dissertation Recording, September 21, 2013, Rodrigo Dalvi Santana. Federal Ministry of Cities.} Ironically, if this were the case, even more residents would be forced from their homes if grassroots groups succeed in pressuring the state to modify their plans.

PAC 2 Rocinha removals, with or without the cable car could be greatly alleviated, if the state did what they are constitutionally obliged to do: offer removed residents resettlement housing in or near Rocinha. As of early 2015 it appears that only a fraction of the thousands of households that will be removed will be able to remain in or near the community. Therefore, either way Rocinha will be significantly decongested, especially in its poorest most violent sections. If thousands of families are removed from the community’s poorest most violent sections and mostly housed far away, it is completely logical to assume that Rocinha would become more desirable.

If resettlement plans, either the type of innovative ideas Mauro Guarany and Luiz Toledo proposed or others, offered sufficient housing nearby, then much of what this dissertation has argued would be irrelevant. There is a large 18-hole golf course adjacent to Rocinha that is
barely used. With even a fraction of the Club’s land, if it were to be donated, most of Rocinha’s displaced residents could be housed. But the Gávea Golf and Country Club (located entirely in São Conrado) is a cherished icon among Rio’s elite. Here the issue of use-value and exchange-value are complicated, as the club serves an important symbolic use for the city’s elite, even if zero social use. It also increases the exchange-value of São Conrado’s luxury condos. Hugo Chaves infuriated Venezuela’s elite when he confiscated golf courses to house the poor. It is a delicate issue but one that certainly has the best interest of society in mind.

The cable-car will contribute to gentrification but much less than opening more streets and fixing the massive problems with sewage. If more streets were opened then more vehicles could circulate through Rocinha, including the police. With the cable-car much of Rocinha will remain inaccessible by car or bus and continue overflowing with sewage after rains. In addition, the cable-car in the Complexo do Alemão favela has been shut down numerous times during shootouts between drug traffickers and the police, there is sufficient reason to believe this scenario would also play out in Rocinha.

Beyond issues of sanitation and security there is a final reason to believe the cable-car in Rocinha would slow gentrification, although it would contribute to displacement. At this point this is an admittedly speculative proposal because nothing has been published on this issue, but it is a topic raised in interviews and mentioned during numerous community meetings. Where in the world would middle-class or upper-class families allow cable-cars to zip immediately above or to the sides of their houses all day? The cable-car in Rocinha, according to the plans presented by EMOP, would in many areas pass only meters above the house in Rocinha. To this 26-year-old Gilvan complained, “I don’t want to live in an aquarium with tourists peering down at me all the time while I still have to step over flooding sewage in the alleys. Residents of
Ipanema and São Conrado would never allow such a waste of money and invasion of privacy, why should we?"\textsuperscript{324}

Neoliberal “democracy” is less solidified in Brazil than in most OECD countries. Although there is a ruling class consisting of political, economic, and even religious elites in Brazil, compared to the US, where big business and politics are fully integrated, in Weberian sense, there is less cohesion between ruling classes in Brazil. Recent events in Rio clearly demonstrate this. While the type of short sighted corruption prevalent in Brazil favors more contentious types of immediately successful forced displacements, and draws unwanted international attention, it hinders the more gradual but effective (in the mid- and long-term) gentrification-type-removals common to established neoliberal “democracies”.

\textsuperscript{324} Dissertation Interview, Gilvan, June 2013.
Chapter 6

*Synthesis: Limitations and Conclusion*

This chapter concludes my doctoral research. In the sections that follow there are three objectives. The first is to summarize the findings this investigation revealed on the relationship between improvement schemes (favela upgrading and pacification) and displacement in contemporary Rio de Janeiro.

Next, this chapter describes how fieldwork for this dissertation in Rocinha (and Rio de Janeiro) ended. In doing so I discuss the most current research related events that have transpired. I also comment on any new data that was gathered after my initial departure from Rocinha in August 2013 to finish this dissertation, including that which was collected on two recent visits in July 2014 and February 2015. Lastly, I describe my existing relationship with residents, research participants and the community.

The closing section of this dissertation briefly highlights what in retrospect I believe to be this study’s main limitations. After mentioning the limitations I provide possibilities for future research on comparable topics. Finally, in proposing opportunities for future research I provide a short list of prospective contributions to the main substantive areas covered in this investigation, improvement schemes (upgrading and security) in favelas as well as grassroots activism/community organizing. I could not bring myself to end this dissertation without at least citing a few prescriptions to the questions addressed by my doctoral research. Because at this point there is neither time nor space for details, the recommendations are advanced epigrammatically.

**SUMMARY OF DOCTORAL RESEARCH AND FINDINGS**
The forces of global capitalism and neoliberal urbanism have created the conditions propelling Rocinha and numerous other strategic favelas into an era of substantial physical, demographic and cultural transformation. Although residential gentrification is not yet a major factor a vastly different Rocinha is still in the process of being socially produced.

Whether these historic changes are mostly positive or negative depends on the ideological lens through which they are viewed. For residents, like Sérgio (a successful local businessman), the changes are long awaited. They signify new beginnings, a chance to finally thrust aside the heavy stigma long associated with Rocinha. For others, such as Maria Helena, the longtime coordinator of Rocinha’s first community health clinic, the changes represent, “the complete loss of our identity as a community, our history, culture, struggles and social achievements.” Maria Helena, who holds advanced degrees in Nursing and Public Health, is well aware that reducing neighborhood change to either positive or negative produces a false dichotomy. The subject is too complex for a binary analysis. But Maria Helena is devoted to the community of yesteryear, a poorer but more unified Rocinha that for over 80 years provided waves of disadvantaged Brazilians an affordable space to live near their work and a place to raise a family in Rio’s most expensive district, the South Zone. This is the Rocinha she feels is in the process of being relocated to various corners of the city, state, and country.

There is no denying I am that I have long been among those who oppose gentrification. And in this sense, there is no doubt that over the years I have romanticized life in Rocinha, especially during my first five years there. I have also done this in other low-income urban communities where I previously lived. Despite a certain degree of sugarcoating negative aspects, I also know there are certain cultures, attitudes, and social relations, that even in 2001, I did not want to see change, and why I felt, like Maria Helena, that gentrification would likely erode these ways of

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325 Maria Helena is the daughter of Portuguese merchants who immigrated to Rocinha in the 1940s. She was born in the late 1950s and raised in Rocinha, and has worked at the local health clinic, Posto de Saúde Albert Sabin, since its inauguration in 1982, and been its director since the late 1980s.
urban life. There are deep-rooted personal ethics and ideological foundations support my anti-gentrification position. Marcos Barros evoked some these sentiments when (April 2013) we were discussing the decreasing interpersonal trust among neighbors and the fading sense of unity in Rocinha, phenomena he argues date back years before PAC and the UPP arrived. He said, “Perhaps one of the principal causes of increasing individualism and lack of unity has been the increase of capital circulating through Rocinha over the last couple decades. Capitalism is crazy. When everything is reduced to questions of money and financial transactions it becomes much harder to unite people.”

This investigation’s methodological and theoretical considerations were ambitious, but the primary research question and subsequent empirical statement were straightforward. I wanted to know: whether in a city like Rio de Janeiro – rife with corruption and inequality, and coping with two of the world’s largest sporting events – if the intensive favela-upgrading and public security programs have been playing a prominent role in displacing the very target populations they were designed to benefit?326

The simple reply to this question is “yes”. The more complex answer is also, “yes”, but not to the degree I initially projected. Removals related to favela-upgrading and “pacification” (e.g., gentrification) have been occurring in ways that long-term critical ethnography is particularly appropriate at explaining. Furthermore, to date, the majority of favela removals have been associated with the “areas of risk” classification and with broader citywide urban renewal questions related to the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympics, such as opening new expressways, parking lots, or building housing and game venues.

I was able to collect sufficient ethnographic and official data indicating that record numbers of low-income favela residents have been removed from their communities since 2010. Never in Rio de Janeiro’s history have so many people been removed so fast.

326 This is a qualified version of my research question.
In order to adequately describe this scenario and the urban evolution that led to it, I began with two chapters offering the historical context necessary to properly frame the central issues investigated. Admittedly, in this work I integrated considerable more historical analysis than the “standard” ethnography. I could have excluded many of the historical sections. I wrestled with this option but ultimately included them for two reasons. First, because time and space play an absolutely fundamental role in understanding contemporary Rocinha. The very name of the community, which means, “little farm”, is indicative of this.

The remoteness of Rocinha partially explains the survival of the community from the violent removals of the 1960s and 1970s. From 1964 to 1975 between 139,000 (Valladares 1978: 139) and 175,000 (Perlman 1976) favela residents were displaced. The majority were resettled in distant housing complexes that latter transformed into some of the city’s most violent favelas. This surge of evictions occurred at the height of Brazil’s Military Dictatorship, but there were few elites living around Rocinha at the time, and thus the pressure was less than elsewhere in the South Zone. Rocinha absorbed thousands of displaced families while continuing to receive waves of migrant workers from rural Brazil, particularly the Northeast. The community grew rapidly, and by the time the Dois Irmão Tunnel (today Zuzu Angel Tunnel) was completed in 1971 Rocinha was an enormous favela. I reason that with their hands tied removing and resettling numerous South Zone favelas closer at the time to elite enclaves, that if Rio's officials had also attempted to remove immense Rocinha it would not have impractical and not cost effective.

A few years later the “official” removal policy ended. But for the next several years, as upper classes moved in to São Conrado, the threats of removal continued, as they did in neighboring Vidigal where a the prospect of a new luxury hotel threatened to remove that community. But, in Rocinha the fight for running water and basic sanitation had already shaped a generation of critically conscious residents who wanted nothing to do with removal to distant apartment complexes. The organizers were successful in pressuring the state to implement the
community’s first major infrastructure development, running water in the Bairro Barcelos section of Rocinha.

Almost concurrently the movement for basic sanitation resulted in Rocinha’s second notable upgrade, the canalization of an overflowing sewer ditch in the area known then as Campo de Esperança and today as Valão. The upgrading required dozens of families to be removed. Residents demanded to remain in the area, and in 1982 a total 73 families were resettled in the newly founded (by the city) section of Rocinha known as Laboriaux.

In the years that followed arbitrary favela removals came to a virtual halt and even mentioning the topic publically was considered politically taboo (Magalhães 2013: 90-93). It was largely held that such an obvious violation of rights and major policy failure would not be repeated in democratic times.

Meanwhile, as the transitional 1980s and then the neoliberal 1990s passed, inhabitants of most large Brazilian cities felt increasingly disillusioned with skyrocketing violence, corruption, inequality and poverty. Slowly decaying since the 1960s, the city of Rio de Janeiro perhaps best epitomized this cynicism. At the age of 21 I moved into Laboriaux, where I have remained a presence to this day. The Rio and Rocinha I first knew were grittier and according to official data, even more violent. Rocinha was also a poorer community.

The twenty-first century ushered in several important transformations. Initially there was a sense of hope as a grassroots leftist political party took office and initiated a series of important policies that have helped lift millions out of extreme poverty, or misery (miséria) as they say in Brazil. In Rio, cariocas were excited about the winning bid (2002) for the 2007 Pan-American Games.

In the run-up to Rio’s first mega-event in decades the 2004 three-day shootout, known as Rocinha’s War, took place. It was an event that would have lasting significance in the community and beyond. Relatively dormant since the late 1980s, the tragedy resulted in a new wave of community activism. Rocinha’s affluent neighbors in São Conrado were just as active,
but as fieldwork revealed, for quite different reasons. Decreasing real estate values and a general fear of constant gunfire in Rocinha were the main stimulus for the involvement of AMASCO and the residents of São Conrado. Even so, their leaders, such as José Britz and Dona Marlene, were acutely aware that the main problem was the state’s decades long neglect of Rocinha.

A movement began that demanded the state improve conditions in Rocinha. It resulted in a Master Plan for the community, which considered an array of the most pressing local concerns. Toledo may have been the chief architect, but the Master Plan was as participatory as practically possible in a community of 150,000 inhabitants. Soon the state and then the federal government pledged millions to help upgrade (urbanizar) Rocinha. After the tragedy of 2004 and another in 2006, much of 2007 was a hopeful moment in the community and for many cariocas who proudly celebrated the winning bid in 2007 for the 2014 World Cup.

But by 2008 the Master Plan was quickly co-opted by the state government of Rio and the three private contractors hired to carry out the work. PAC was turned into an electoral strategy for state and federal politicians and it became a lucrative business deal for the corporations that, according to key informants, falsified payment applications to increase profits. Corrupt residents’ associations and the drug trade took their piece of the PAC pie as well. The project scheduled to be finished in late 2010 remained 20% incomplete by August 2015, even after millions of dollars in additional funds had been requested.

Despite fraud and delays a few key projects, such as the opening of Rua 4 and the nearby construction of 144 housing units, are widely viewed to have been positive interventions, even if interviews indicate the cost of housing along and around Rua 4 increased as a result. Meanwhile the UPP process that was launched in early 2009 had residents of Rocinha guessing on when it would finally arrive for them. This and the winning bid for the 2016 Olympics (in late 2009) led to more real estate speculation, over a year before the UPP process began in November 2011. Few could have envisioned the perfect storm that was brewing.
First, in late 2009, coinciding with Rio’s winning bid for the 2016 Olympics, there were a number of threats and minor attempts to eradicate smaller favelas in the West Zone, such as the emblematic community of Vila Autódromo. These incidents were largely unnoticed, or underreported. In April 2010, just months after securing the bid for the 2016 Olympics, the city began its fraudulent eviction campaign in Laboriaux, and in dozens of other favelas throughout Rio. For the next three years favela communities in Rio were terrorized with removals. Between 2010 and 2013 Paes was able to remove more residents from favelas than any previous authority except governor Negrão de Lima in the late 1960s and early 1970s. But the removals during Paes first term were the fastest on record.

It was not until April 2010 that I came to appreciate the history of resistance in Laboriaux and Rocinha, when Paes attempted to remove the entire close-knit community under what is well known now to have been the false pretense of risk. The rains provided the removers with an ideal opportunity and the impetus to begin their campaign.

The mass removal campaign would emerge in full force following heavy rains and mudslides that killed approximately 240 residents of greater Rio, almost entirely in favelas. Despite being politically taboo (Magalhães 2013: 90-93) and in the face of significant resistance, Paes succeed in displacing approximately 70,000 favela residents since he took office in early 2009. Well-documented lessons of the past were ignored as history repeated itself. Most of the displaced were again pushed out to the city’s periphery. Thousands of families have been resettled into MCMV housing complexes located even further from Rio’s central areas than those of the Military era.

Meanwhile, the UPP process began in late 2011 and by September 2012 was official inaugurated in Rocinha. That same year, as the 2014 World Cup was quickly approaching and news spread of a new subway line to be built at the foot of Rocinha, real estate speculation and costs of living continued their ascent. By this time many activists and some scholars were worried about the possibility of economic displacement, especially in neighboring Vidigal.
It seemed that the UPPs would play an important role in displacing residents, mainly because of rising costs of living. I predicted that once strategic favelas were sufficiently de-densified through “area of risk” and upgrading removals that the added perception of security brought by UPPs would further contribute to rising costs of living and removals. However, the role of favela upgrading and UPP related removals have not been as significant as initially predicted. Part of this is because of local resistance movements, such as the active residents of Laboriaux and Rocinha sem Fronteiras.

But there was another reason related to the favela resistance movements of recent years. In early 2013 the state government announced PAC 2 in Rocinha, and presented their ready-made scheme to a select group of residents. The designing of PAC 2 could not have been more different than that of PAC 1. Residents were given no voice in regards to the massive interventions that would soon be occurring around them for the next several years. PAC 2 also contributed to increasing real speculation, and Kauã, one of Rocinha’s main realtors, even described the intervention as “Rocinha’s big bang”, as in the beginning of an entirely new reality.

Large construction projects of every type imaginable were booming in Rio and across Brazil. Brazil’s biggest construction companies were heavily involved in favela upgrading, PAC infrastructure projects in general, and in heavy industrial building for Petrobras and Eletrobras, the state oil and power companies. The real estate industry never made so much money. Creative destruction was in high gear and for most politicians and business elites these were times of plentiful accumulation. But for low-income residents near Rio’s downtown, tourist areas, or in the path of construction, it has been a tragic phase of dispossession. Based on the political and economic environment at the time, it seemed inevitable the removals would continue and that PAC 2 would force thousands of families from Rocinha.

When I began writing this dissertation Rio de Janeiro and numerous favelas, such as Rocinha and Morro da Providência, were experiencing authoritarian forms of upgrading. Residents felt frustrated and excluded from the course of development in their communities.
New forms of urbanism began replacing the old, and they were often bizarre, such as cable car lifts transporting tourists zipping by day and night overhead. Under this neoliberal mega-event urbanism residents are forced to redefine the kind of person they must become in order to survive. For thousand this means working two or three jobs or moving in with family to share expenses in overpriced favelas, or for others it signifies starting over in distant areas of the city and commuting five or six hours daily.

By mid-2013, in Rio and several other Brazilians cities, all but the wealthy were starting to feel suffocated by constantly rising costs of living and congested cities that, in the case of Rio, looked and sounded more like one sprawling noisy construction project than a charming metropolis. Rising rents and bus fair, worsening traffic jams and the constant roar of construction might have been tolerated if a constant stream of corruption scandals were not being exposed.

But as Harvey mentions, discontent alienated individuals “periodically erupt in riots and potentially revolutionary movements” (Harvey 2014). And so it happened. In June 2013 the most substantial protests since the end of Brazil’s military dictatorship broke out across Brazil. The largest took place in downtown Rio de Janeiro. Residents of favelas threatened with removal had been protesting since 2010. In this sense they were like the miner’s canary, sounding the first alarms that not all was well.

After Amarildo disappeared and Maj. Edson Santos was arrested the UPP lost credibility in Rocinha, which it has not been able to regain. The situation was replicated in numerous UPP occupied favelas.

At the same time Brazil’s economy began a slow decline, and 2015 is expected to be the worst year since 1995. More scandals were exposed. Suddenly, most of the powerful groups and actors responsible for removing and threatening to remove favela residents found themselves with significantly less leverage.
Some favelas, such as Vidigal, appear to be nearing (as of August 2015) points of no return in regards to gentrification. Other communities were simply razed to the ground before resistance could mount. The history of thousands of migrants who came to Rio, in some cases decades ago, and who built housing in areas conducive to work and where they could raise their families, was not considered be the removers.

In Rocinha, with its rich history of resistance, neither the city nor state has been able to realize their objectives. Had resistance not occurred, at least 11,000 residents would have been forcefully removed because of environment risk and favela upgrading. There is reason for cautious celebration. Berenice told Cabeleira, in the now classic favela film *City of God* (2003), “malandro não para, malandro da um tempo” (hustlers don’t quit, they just takes breaks).

In the penultimate chapter I made an attempt at a synthesis. I described the major theories and social science perspectives that have guided this research. David Harvey’s creative destruction and accumulation by dispossession, as well as Henri Lefebvre’s second circuit of capitalism, urban revolution and especially his right to the city, were inspirational to me. I provided a few possible contributions as well.

However, what my research revealed is that the corruption and incompetency of the authorities, as much or more than the resistance(s), is what will most inhibit their ability to uproot Rocinha’s residents. The UPP may have allayed the fears of most tourists, but cariocas and local residents know that Rocinha is not a pacified or peaceful community, and the residents interviewed for this dissertation overwhelmingly believe that the corruption and incompetence of the UPP and the larger PMERJ are largely to blame. The power structure of crime in the community was handed a blow, but new forms of violence and organized crime replaced it. Or, as others insist, it is many of the same actors, even those imprisoned, still running things in different ways.

The point here was not to recant the entire history, but rather to demonstrate how all these seemingly loose ends weave together to construct an intricate but hopefully coherent narrative
of development, security and displacement, and of community and resistance, one that continues to this day.

Since their origin the dominant classes have tried numerous forms of eliminating the favelas and socially controlling their residents. Many of these strategies have amounted to little more than sweeping problems under the rug, the farthest corners of the rug. Most residents evicted from favelas resettled in far removed public housing complexes, but these public housing complexes themselves morphed into favelas. The most famous case is the City of God community, which began as public housing but was soon abandoned. There are numerous other similar cases. The century long attack on favelas and the urban poor waged by Rio’s ruling classes has proved a colossal social policy failure. Favelas have increased in absolute numbers, physical size and population. But the battle proved successful in freeing up valuable land (Valladares 1978: 31-31) that today is the most expensive in Brazil. In 2010 Mayor Paes boasted that for the first time on record, the absolute number of and physical area occupied by favelas had diminished (Lopes et al. 2011: 4-5). In the South Zone, the area occupied by favelas shrank by 3.2% since 2004. But at the same time the population of Rio’s favelas, including those in the South Zone continued growing, 15% in the South Zone alone since 2000 (Cavallieri and Vial 2012: 6). What this suggests is that Paes succeeded in reducing the valuable land that favelas occupy even while their populations grew. Favela growth since Paes took office has been almost exclusively vertical. This creates a situation severely detrimental to sanitation and other health issues like tuberculosis, according to public health experts in Rocinha interviewed for this dissertation.

Now with historically unprecedented spending, favelas in the city’s South and Central Zones are becoming too expensive, and the residents who should be benefiting are in many cases being displaced (Martins and Vieira 2012: 36-42).

But there is a tendency to forget how bad things were in Rio’s favelas were in the past and for the poor and working class in Brazil in general. The advances made since the turn of the century
have been historic not just in favelas but across Brazil, especially in the rural areas of the historically deprived Northeast where most of Rio and São Paulo’s favela residents originate. For most of the twenty first century minimum wages steadily rose, inflation remained at record lows, unemployment was down, and income inequality fell on the Gini index, while GDP rose, as did the incomes of the upper classes. Today more favela residents are earning college degrees than ever and the social disparities between favela and non-favela residents in Rio have diminished. Since 1995 federal spending on social assistance and public programs for poor and working Brazilians has consistently risen, with the biggest increases since 2003 (IPEA 2011: 5). The list goes on and yet there is extensive room for improvement in Brazil and in Rio de Janeiro. And to make matter worse, the political and economic instability gripping Brazil since at least 2014 has put into question the sustainability of many of the recent improvements.

THE END OF DISSERTATION FIELDWORK

Since I began writing this dissertation in the fall of 2013 two additional visits were made to Rocinha. I also revisited Vidigal. A third visit was made to an impoverished area of Brazil’s Northeast where dozens of my neighbors and acquaintances in Rocinha came from. One of my first research related stops during the June 2014 trip was to the office of Kauã, a top realtor I first interviewed approximately one year earlier. At the time, early June 2013, he was ecstatic about Rocinha’s real estate prospects. Newly elected Pope Francis would soon be in Rio for World Youth Day. Millions of Catholics from throughout Brazil and the world would be arriving in Rio and the Confederations Cup was going to begin in just days, in preparation for the World Cup the following year. Kauã, who was born and raised in Rocinha, told me at the time that unfortunately Rocinha would not be a place for poor people much longer. But, a firm believer in the market, real estate and the larger capitalist system it is part of, he told me:
That is just the way it is, some make it some don’t. Those that can’t handle the pressure, I’m sorry to say, but they will soon have to leave. But for those who have made it, Rocinha is going to be the best location in Rio to live. Cara, [man] imagine the new subway, the game changing improvements coming from PAC 2. Meu irmão [Brother], we are in the South Zone of Rio de Janeiro, practically on the beach, surrounded by tropical forests, with stores and bars that stay open 24 hours and day. Come on! I don’t care if you are from New York or Paris, you know this is the greatest city in the world, and Rocinha is its best neighborhood.

His pitch was so good if I had had the money I might have bought something from him then and there. But then two weeks later protests broke out and things began to change. When I spoke to Kauã a year later in late June 2014, during the World Cup, he was not in his usual lively mood. I asked him if prices had continued rising over the last year. He responded,

Kauã – Not really. We hit the limit here, in pretty much the whole city but definitely in Rocinha. Rents are about the same, still long lines, plenty of demand and little supply. But home sales are down.

MB – What do you mean, the Olympics are still two years away and so is the completion of the subway. I thought things would remain hot for a while.

Kauã – They might pick up again, but the hysteria has gotten the better of people’s judgment. I have people asking R$ 100,000 for a one-room apartment and over R$ 150,000 for two rooms. Man, there are shootouts almost everyday and sewage spilling over into the streets. Not to mention the regular water shortages and power outages. I am actually embarrassed trying to sell houses here for the prices people want. And to be honest with you, the biggest problem is that the houses in Rocinha are all built on top of older houses, they just keep stacking up but over the years they have been built without architects and engineers. Most houses in Rocinha need serious structural repairs. People don’t like to hear it but you can’t be asking 75,000 or even 100,000 for a one-room apartment that is part of a stack of houses that are probably in questionable structural condition, not with all the other problems here. A lot of houses look nice
from the outside and inside, but you wouldn’t believe the plumbing and electrical work in most of these places.

MB – Not even to foreigners?

Kauã – Especially not to foreigners. I don’t know what is going on in Vidigal, but people from, you know, New York, Canada, France, *do primeiro mundo* [from the first world], they are used to living in homes designed by licensed professionals that have to pass inspections, you know, high quality. These houses in Rocinha are in need of major repairs for the prices people want.

I spoke to Martins on both visits and afterwards on the phone. As of August 2015 roughly 20% of PAC 1 still remained incomplete, but Martins told me two of the last big projects were underway, a *plano inclinado* (funicular) and the *Mercado Popular* (Popular Market). On January 13, 2015, EMOP published a notice in the state’s *Diario Oficial* (government daily journal) stating that the contract period of the firms hired to design PAC 2 in Rocinha would be suspended until April 30, 2015 because of: “*indisponibilidade de créditos orçamentários para o exercício de 2015*”, or unavailability of funding for 2015” (Process N. E-17/402.257/2011). As of August 2015 there was no word as to when PAC 2 would begin.

But while prices may have hit a temporary ceiling, things are not getting cheaper. With many sensing the distraction of authorities with corruption scandals and economic crises, real estate speculation is causing the biggest wave of new construction in Rocinha since at least 2008, the year before the Paes administration began rigidly regulating new construction in the city’s South Zone favelas.

Sadly, I finally encountered a verifiable case of economic displacement. A single mother and close friend of mine was forced to leave her home because old piping from the apartments above were causing leaks in her neighbors house. This is exactly what Kauã was referring to in 2014. She had to move out for at least six months while her landlord started the costly and labor-intensive project. She found a temporary place to stay for a month with a friend but had to leave because her friend needed to remodel the apartment as well. She told me she couldn’t find
anything in Laboriaux for under R$ 600 a month. She ended up moving with her six-year-old son to Petropolis, a mountainous municipality some 1.5 hours north of the city to live with her “not-too-serious” boyfriend, a move she was not at all happy about. Only in Rio since 2010, she told me she was seriously considering returning to live with her family in the Northeastern state of Pernambuco, where she is originally from.

Whether processes of gentrification occur or not Rocinha will remain an interesting and dynamic community for a long time, and a fascinating milieu for future ethnographers. As more residents graduate from college and even graduate school, hopefully some of the future works will be produced by them. However, since my arrival in Rocinha I have noticed it changing rapidly and obviously from a *gemeinschaft* to *gesellschaft* type of community. This shift is not just a result of some natural time-space progression, but has been enormously spurred by capitalist urban development, and more precisely, large bouts of creative destruction and accumulation by dispossession. If a local resident is to one-day conduct critical ethnography on Rocinha it will necessarily be one that draws even more heavily than this dissertation from what Bill Kornblum describes as retrospective or historical ethnography.

By that time, Rio de Janeiro will be a different city. There will be other favelas, some new and some older favelas with larger populations. Additionally, the numerous low-income MCMV housing complexes that have been recently built in the periphery and post-industrial North Zone will soon be attracting their fair share of social scientists as well. With this in mind, I anticipate that much of the MCMV housing complexes built during Eduardo Paes administration will eventually morph into more informal favela like communities, much as Cidade de Deus, Vila Kennedy and Vila Aliança. In fact, the follow-up interviews I conducted with several resettled residents in late 2014 and early 2015 were already suggesting this to be the case.

The speed at which this will occur, or if it continues at all, is largely dependent on which form of capitalism predominates in Rio de Janeiro and Brazil. Powerful groups have been pushing Rio towards the entrepreneurial city model since the 1990s, a metropolis economically
fueled by spectacles (mega-events) and real estate speculation suited for elites and rich tourists. And yet the federal government of Brazil has been largely social democratic since 2002. Activists, movements and certain institutions, like the federal and state Public Ministries and the state Public Defenders Offices, have helped slow these local and macro trends, albeit to a small degree.

Much will depend on how Brazil, Petrobras (a major source of revenue for Brazil’s development schemes) and Rio de Janeiro weather the current crises. If economists are correct and things begin to pick up again in 2016, by the time of the Olympics, then much will depend on which groups emerge in the lead.

In a greater sense, gentrification, as unsettling as it is for many, is mostly “a first world problem”. This is why, in Rocinha at least, residents are more concerned about current violence, the sanitation crisis, top-down upgrading projects like the unwanted cable car, and potential GEO-RIO or PAC 2 forced removals. The prospects of possible economic displacement are of concern in the community, but not near the top of the list.

Furthermore, I too became worried after witnessing, in February 2015, the recent surge of construction in Rocinha. By early May 2015, according to Martins, the pace had not slowed down and André sent me dozens of photos depicting new buildings and additional floors on existing structures being constructed in various section of Rocinha, stacked one on top of the other. One of these buildings is now nine-stories, supported by increasingly old brick structures, the first floors of which probably date back to the 1970s or earlier. The higher the buildings grow the denser Rocinha becomes, and the more sewerage, garbage, water and electricity the insufficient infrastructure must contend with. Rocinha cannot support more growth and several sections need to be urgently decongested, a fact Toledo’s Master Plan took very seriously. The density contributes to the community’s elevated rates of tuberculosis and other public health and security concerns. Yet the public authorities do nothing to limit the growth. I will be closely
following whatever the future holds for Rocinha and the other favelas considered in this investigation.

LIMITATIONS OF THIS STUDY

**Personal Burnout**

Few scholars admit personal failures as limitations to their scholarship. But in keeping with the tradition of reflexive social science it is important to point out that for this work personal burnout has been among the most significant limitations. I am confident in the quality of the research I conducted. Still, in consideration of the years I spent in the field, my “unique insider and outsider” perspective, and the copious data collected, I know the written aspect of investigation could have been considerably better. Mental exhaustion has proved the greatest limitation to producing a more concise, better-organized and better-written dissertation. Fortunately, this shortcoming can be remedied by improving this work once I am mentally refreshed.

**Lack of official or rigorous quantitative data**

The questions this research pursued are not easy to answer. Geographer and Rocinha native Robson Lopes pointed out during one of our interviews that research in areas like Rocinha, where informality predominates, presents distinct challenges to rigorous social science investigation.\(^{327}\) The main hurdle is collecting reliable data. Relying on the growing but still limited official data also presents obstacles. During a June 2013 interview with longtime active resident José Martins de Oliveira (Martins) he explained: “I arrived here [Rocinha] in 1967 and not once has anyone from IBGE stopped by my house.”\(^{328}\)

\(^{327}\) Dissertation Interview, Robson Lopes, March 2013.

\(^{328}\) IBGE is the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics, roughly equivalent to the US Census
Collecting data on the favela’s shadier socioeconomic worlds—such as organized crime, certain residents’ associations, and much of Rocinha’s informal real estate market—is even more complicated. This dissertation considered all three of these problematic spheres, which are tightly intertwined, at least in Rocinha.

By far the greatest methodological limitation to this study has been the difficulty in obtaining reliable data on Rocinha and other favelas. These urban enclaves are a world of informality, and even the official data that exist is incomplete and inconsistent. If analysis and conclusions were drawn relying on the official data on Rocinha and other favelas they would be sociologically irresponsible. This limitation has led many scholars to abandon systematic research on favelas, opting instead for highly subjective easier targets. Real estate speculation in Rocinha and gentrification in Vidigal are prime examples of sociological themes that need significantly more reliable quantitative data.

**Fear and Lack of Trust: The Code of Silence in Favelas**

A third limitation is the code, or “law” of silence that predominates in Rio’s favelas. This certainly represents a limitation to any social science research. Living for years in Rocinha greatly helped me in this regards. Residents I have known for years felt comfortable speaking to me, while I digitally recorded interviews, often on issues that would never be commented on with strangers. Even so, most of the participants that were interviewed were people I did not know well or at all. Leonardo Carvalho, born and raised in Laboriaux, helped me in this regards. Still, I had to conduct dozens of interviews myself with residents I did not know. In certain sections of Rocinha, such as Valão, Roupa Suja, Rua Um, Rua Dois, Rua Tres, Macega, Terreirão, residents are even more careful about what they say. These were also the areas where I (we) got the most rejections, even when I promised not to ask sensitive questions. Many residents in those areas, and a few others, live in states of perpetual anxiety because of the Bureau.
constant gunfire, something residents of Laboriaux, and many other areas of Rocinha, do not have to cope with on a daily basis. In fact, in April 2013 one interview in Macega was interrupted by several minutes of gunfire followed by intense shouting and the sound of several people dashing down the alleyway. All of this was recorded while we ducked for cover. But with the help of José Martins and Leonardo Carvalho I was able to conduct numerous interviews in these more dangerous areas, where roughly 45% of Rocinha’s residents live.

**Limited resources**

Lack of resources was another limitation this study underwent. In the community since 2001, time was never really an issue, but I did not spend those years just hanging out. Much of that time was spent scrambling for ways to survive while attending universities and trying to live in an increasingly expensive city. With sufficient resources a group of qualified ethnographers could gather a wealth of data on the issues I addressed and provide even more illuminating details. There is a danger in reducing the value of scholarly work to the material resources at the researcher’s disposal. If this were the main factor defining the quality of scholarly work then the knowledge produced by students and researchers from underprivileged populations and institutions would always be inferior to that of the more affluent or well funded. This is not the case, but resources undoubtedly make a big difference.

**The entire city is an atypical case of the issues I investigated**

A fourth limitation relates to the mega-events taking place or soon to begin in Rio de Janeiro. Rio is the first city in the world to ever host the two largest international sporting events back to back, and the largest single event period (World Youth Day 2013) in a span of only three years. There is a large body of literature documenting the pressures that sporting mega-events exert on the cities where they are hosted. Often considerable evictions and mass removals occur in ghettos, slums and favelas, as well as other violations and attacks on
homelessness and informality in general. This is especially true in cities of middle and low-income countries where powerful global forces may be able to exert even more pressure and where local elites may be even more likely to use them as opportunities to remake cities in ways more propitious to capitalist expansion. In short, Rio is a unique case. This is a limitation in two primary ways. The first is related to case representativeness, which I have explained in Chapter 1 was not my aim. Even so, Rio de Janeiro is not only an atypical case, it is a solitary case. Never have so many large and expensive international events taken place in the same city within such a short span of time. This obfuscates analysis of real estate speculation, forced removals, security schemes, gentrification, and pretty much all of the themes I have covered.

I believe similar but even more rigorous studies of other urban areas around the world would be helpful in light of the extreme uniqueness of modern Rio de Janeiro. However, I feel it is important that this valid point not diminish this study. Through a historical analysis I attempted to demonstrate that institutional corruption and systemic police violence have endured since the arrival of the Portuguese royal family and the subsequent foundation of the Civil and Military Police, in 1808 and 1809 respectively. Real estate speculation and the ideology of removing undesirable classes and races from sight existed amongst Brazil’s dominant classes since the 1822 independence from Portugal and especially after the abolition of slavery in 1888, when numerous “free” but oppressed blacks moved in mass into cortiços and then favelas. Furthermore, evidence of similar ideologies and practices abound throughout history in cities around the world, from Victorian London and Haussmann’s Paris to modern Nairobi, Manila or Mumbai. Under capitalist political economic systems the phenomena I described in this dissertation would likely occur in most of the world’s cities, especially the more corrupt areas in middle and low-income countries. In fact, in today’s high-income countries they already have and continue to through a diversity of accumulation by dispossession.

The other mega-event limitation relates to the one above. The fact that while I did mention the events on numerous occasions and provided limited analysis of their effects on the city, I did
not grant them analytical primacy as some authors elect (e.g., Freeman 2012; Gaffney 2010). In short, I do not deny that these instrumental events are of utmost significance for cities and even entire countries. They influence local and national policies in unexpected ways (Gaffney 2010). A city, however, need not host the World Cup or Olympics, or both, back to back in Rio’s unique case, in order to fit the entrepreneurial city model, or in order for related inequitable sociospatial processes to unfold. Medellin is a city Rio’s public officials have copied many of their recent favela interventions from (e.g., PAC Cable-cars, PAC Library Parks and the UPPs). But Medellín has received no mega-events, and neither has New York, which Eisinger (2000) focused on in his description of “building the city for the visitor class”.329 Within Brazil, capital cities overlooked by international mega-events, such as Belém, São Luis, João Pessoa, Maceio and Vitória, just to name a few, have been facing similar struggles over spatial inequality, top-down non-participatory urban planning and more generally, the right to the city and the right to collective security. Harvey, in his often-cited 1989 article on urban entrepreneurialism, does not dwell on large international sporting or entertainment events, and in his more contemporary publications he assigns them, at most, moderate analytical importance.330 I reiterate this because so much has been made of the mega-events in Rio, especially the World Cup and the Olympic Games. These events play a part in my analysis, but I do not allocate them analytical primacy. I believe doing so can be disadvantageous to building on social theories, which is part of the extended case method. I accentuate this because allotting these events too much precedence would complicate attempts at explaining how transformations occurring in Rocinha and Rio de Janeiro are comparable, in many ways, to those in a range of urban areas around the world. This is explained in more detail in the potential contributions section.

POTENTIAL FUTURE RESEARCH

Study similar processes in cities without international mega-events.

Studies could be carried out controlling for these factors even within Brazil, in cities with numerous favelas and serious problems of crime and poverty like Maceio, Alagoas, São Luís, Maranhão or Vitoria, Espirito Santo, which did not host any World Cup games and will not be affected by the Olympics. Also, further research should more thoroughly compare recent trends in centrally located favelas and peripheral favelas.

Future study would focus more on corruption

I opted in this dissertation to assign more weight to the significance of white collared crimes and corruption than to street crime/violence, such as favela level drug trafficking. I suggest this is in keeping with the core principles of critical criminology, particularly as championed by Jock Young in The Criminological Imagination (2011). The plurality of scholarship on criminal activity and violence in Rio de Janeiro has focused on drug-trafficking and other forms of loosely organized crime in favelas. This work aimed to contribute to critical criminological research on favelas by emphasizing, more than most previous investigations: the destructive root causes of crime, violence and social disorganization in Rio de Janeiro’s white collared political and corporate corruption. Rocinha’s drug trade was discussed in detail due to the role it played in PAC 1 Rocinha and because I had ample ethnographic experience to assist me in doing so. The upper level actors widely believed to be involved in corruption affecting Rocinha and other favelas proved significantly harder to access than even armed drug traffickers in Rocinha. For example, at one point I secured an interview with the most important player in favela upgrading construction projects, only to have that person abruptly cancel once they received word from another top upgrading official, who has known for years, that I am “sympathetic to local groups resisting the PAC 2 Rocinha cable-car”.

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The 2014 *Operação Lava-Jato* Petrobras scandal (R$ 2.1 billion/US$ 893 million) and the 2015 *Operação Zelotes* Tax evasion scandal (R$ 19 billion/US$ 8.1 billion) epitomize the pervasive culture of corruption in Brazil. Six of the nine mega developers that comprised the three construction consortiums, (three per consortium) that EMOP subcontracted to implement favela upgrading in Rocinha, Complexo do Alemão and Manguinhos, are under investigation in the *Lava Jato* scandal, and all nine corporations are under investigation for their work in Rio’s slums. Here, my research is original because I have provided ethnographic evidence of substantial contradictions and irregularities that are part of favela-upgrading schemes, which, it must be remembered, are assumed to bring only benefits to low-income communities like Rocinha.

The problem is corruption, which in contemporary Brazil has become ubiquitous with the capitalist power forces. Corruption and inequality are close companions, which is why it is so difficult to correct either. This point was recently illustrated in an April 2015 article in *The Atlantic*, “Brazil: Where Free Universities Largely Serve the Wealthy”. The title explains the premise. Upper class white Brazilians attend expensive private schools, score higher on the rigorous standardized college entrance exams, and as a consequence enjoy the bulk of public university vacancies. Poor Brazilians, who are disproportionately brown and black, attend free but dysfunctional public schools, score lower on entrance exams, and subsequently often end up attending the less selective private colleges, which are more expensive and less prestigious, if at all.

However, in Brazil state incompetency is also part of the corruption/inequality connection (Landim 1998: 53). I argue that this opens paths for resistance that might be narrower in more efficient and institutionally unjust societies. The following metaphor may seem a bit eccentric

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331 Both conversions are based on the 2014 annual average exchange rate, the last year rates are available from the World Bank.
and clichéd, but I believe it is useful. I view the corruption in contemporary Rio de Janeiro (and throughout Brazil) as flamboyant and individualistic as their national football team (*a Seleção*) in the 2014 World Cup. Brazil’s squad was a collection of ambitious and flashy players, each striving for attention (to enhance their trade and contract values), and practically incapable of working as a team. This made them highly vulnerable to counterattacks (resistance) from organized teams. For example, Brazil was trounced 7 to 1 by an exponentially more efficient German squad that touted few showy superstars. The following example from my research illustrates the relationship between corruption, inequality and inefficiency that has both led to historic removals since 2010 and a more recent declining economic picture. At the same time it has spurred substantial resistances and ultimately a much less amiable socioeconomic environment for continuing the removal policy, a fact particularly true in Rocinha.

The original resettlement housing Rio’s state authorities planned for the large-scale PAC 2 Rocinha upgrading removals. While still largely insufficient, the project presented in 2013 to the community and media, planned to build 440 housing units in and around Rocinha. This proposal would have provided adjacent resettlement housing for approximately 14-18% of the seven to ten thousand residents this research estimates PAC 2 would have to remove while upgrading Rocinha. But by early September 2013 AMASCO, São Conrado’s residents’ association, requested an urgent meeting with Icaro Moreno, the president of EMOP. They complained about the proposed housing units, two thirds of which would be located in São Conrado just outside Rocinha’s socially imposed boundary in São Conrado. AMASCO’s original complaint centered on two points. The first, which while very hypocritical is mostly legitimate, complained that EMOP would have to cut into small sections of nationally protected Atlantic Rainforest to build the resettlement housing in São Conrado. While mostly true, this is insincere because it was an issue when the adjacent mansions in Alto São Conrado were built, since the 1970s. The second argument was that the “housing projects” would have a negative impact on
real estate in São Conrado. Moreno confirmed that EMOP would no longer build any housing units in São Conrado. This infuriated the residents of Rocinha attending the meeting. A heated argument ensued at which point Icaro Moreno chose to leave. Since then AMASCO has focused their argument on the environmental issues, and have not mentioned anything about real estate.

A number of important political steps have been made to improve the situation, and I suggest this partially explains the relatively recent increase of corruption scandals being exposed. But much more needs to be done at the state and especially municipal levels.

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333 From dissertation interview, July 2014, with an attendee of the meeting who will remain anonymous and from internet archival research.
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