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Senegal's unsustainable economic growth.

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2018-2019 MASTERS THESIS

Acknowledgement

Firstly, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my mentor, Professor Nicholas Rush Smith for the continuous support of my research, for his patience and motivation. The Research Methods course with Professor Smith was the preliminary stage of this thesis, and his mentorship helped me throughout the process.

My gratitude also goes to Professor Jean Krasno, Professor Kimberly Gamble-Payne, Professor Jacqueline Braveboy-Wagner, and Professor Jong Wan Baik in the Program of International Affairs, who have intrigued, and sharpened my thinking throughout the journey. Also, Professor Ahmed Elkhoully's quantitative method course and my friends in the Program of International Affairs.

At last, my deepest appreciation goes to my mother and brother, whose support has been vital to me in the completion of this chapter.


Contents

Acknowledgment	1
Contents	2
Abbreviations	3
Chapter 1	
1.1 Introduction	4-5
Chapter 2	
2.1 Literature Review	6-11
2.2 Democratic-led	6-7
2.3 Market-led development	7-9
2.4 State-led development	9-11
Chapter 3	
3.1 Argument	12-14
Chapter 4	
4.1 Pre-Colonial Senegal	15-18
4.2 Colonial Senegal	19-30
Chapter 5	
5.1 Political Transition	31-46
5.2 Post-Colonialism	46-50
Chapter 6	
6.1 Transition	51-56
6.2 Conclusion	56-59

Abbreviations

AD	Anti-dumping mechanisms
A.O.F	Afrique Occidentale Française (French West Africa)
BDS	Bloc Democratie Senegalais
CFA/ FCFA	Colonies Francaises d'Afrique franc
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HCCT	Haut Conseil des Collectivites territoriales
IMF	International Monetary Fund
LDC	Less Developed Countries
MFDC	Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance
OIF	<i>Organisation internationale de la Francophonie</i>
PAI	Parti Africain de L'Indepondance (African Independence Party)
PSS	Parti Socialiste Senegalais
PRS	Parti pour le Regroupment Africain (Party for African Regroupment)
PDS	Parti Démocratique Sénégalais (Senegalese Democratic Party)
PS	Parti Socialist (Socialist Party)
PTA	Preferential Trade Arrangements
RND	Rassemblement national democratique (National Democratic Rally)
SFIO	<i>Section francaise de L'Internationale ouvriere</i>
UPS	Union Progressiste Sénégalaise (Senegalese Progressive Union)
WWI/ WWII	World War I/ World War II
WB	World Bank
WTO	World Trade Organizations

Map of Senegal



Chapter 1

1.1 Introduction

As with countries in Latin America and Asia, starting in the 1960s, African states have been referred to as part of the Global South, the Third World, less developed countries/region (LDC), or developing countries. Yet, despite these similar terms, in the decades since decolonization, many Asian countries have managed to sustain economic growth, while many African countries have failed to attain a similar economic miracle. What might explain this regional divergence? Many economists argue that the two primary obstacles to development in Africa are the uneven nature of its political institutions and the poor behavior of politicians. Moreover, they argue that the best means for promoting sustained economic growth is the adoption of democratic political systems and market-led economies.

This thesis engages these arguments by looking to a particular case where one may have expected sustained economic development: Senegal. Specifically, the thesis asks, what has impeded Senegal's economic growth. I focus on Senegal because it has been regarded as one of the most stable democracies in Africa and has, in recent years, adopted market-led economic

development plans. However, Senegal has suffered from the same lack of economic growth as many other African states and Senegal's debt spiked in recent years, but it managed to maintain lower external debt than the rest of its neighbors. Moreover, in line with international best practices the economy is increasingly transitioning to a service economy. In the period of 2006-2013, service sectors, such as communications, trade, tourism, financial, and business services were the principal growth industries in Senegal's economy.¹

The question is why Senegal has not experienced sustainable economic growth despite a robust democracy and market economy. I argue that Senegal lagged economically for much of its history because of its colonial legacy. Specifically, in the early decades of independence, Senegal did not sustain economic growth because the regimes in power chose to maintain close relationships with its former colonial ruler, France. Since Senegal gained independence in 1960, the administrations of President Senghor and President Diouf maintained the colonial relationship in which the French dominated the majority of the economic sectors in Senegal. However, in a period of 12 years during President Wade's two terms from 2000 until 2012, Senegal's economy grew. What explains this economic shift? I argue that President Wade implemented an economic plan by attracting diverse external economic partners, rather turning primarily to France for trade, breaking with long-standing patterns from the country's colonial period in which Senegal's political and trading networks had been dominated by the country's *métis* population which had tight relationships to France.

¹Cinyabuguma Matthias, Ndoye Djibril & Taiwo Olumide. *Leveraging the Potential of the Services Sector to Support Accelerated Growth in Senegal*

Chapter 2

2.1 Literature Review

Economists and politicians have debated what engine best drives economic growth or economic development. Some are proponents of democratic led development, while others advocate market-led development, and still others advocate for state-led development. None of these approaches, however, can account for the comparatively poor performance of Senegal's economy, given that Senegal has long had a robust democratic system, adopted a market-led development strategy in the early 1990s, and used elements of a state-led development approach in the 2000s. In brief, these studies misidentify the politics of development.

2.2 Democratic-led

As with many studies of democracy and development, I understand democracy as a political system based upon free and fair elections in which citizens have a right to vote. Democracy is often argued to be an important element for enabling development because democracy can help foster highly functioning institutions. For example, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson argue that institutions are “the fundamental cause of income differences and long-run growth.”² However, political leaders' and elites' commitment problems can impede economic growth as investors worry that their investments might be expropriated by the state. Elections help solve this commitment problem and extend investors' time horizon. Even though elected leaders might not keep their promise once in office, people can vote them out office during the next election. Therefore, if the political leaders want to remain in office, they must deliver on those promises.

²Acemoglu Daron, Simon Johnson, James Robinson. “Institutions as the Fundamental Causes of Long-Run Growth.” *NBER Working Paper Series* 10481: 64-65.

Solving this commitment problem may not necessarily result in quick economic growth. For example, Przeworski suggests that it would be “erroneous” to argue that democracy generated rapid economic growth because “the average rates of growth of total income was about the same” across democratic and non-democratic regimes and dictatorships had higher rate of production.³ Nonetheless, democracies tend to be more efficient than dictatorships in the long-run, suggesting that “democracy is far from perfect, but democracies pay higher wages, use labor more effectively, and benefit more from technical progress.”⁴

Expounding on sustainable development and democracy, Andrea Westall found democracy and development “overlap, interdependent, and reinforcing” through “participation—the ability of people to come together and be involved in decisions about how to live and the goals they want to achieve as societies.”⁵ However, similar to the previous authors’ point about commitment problems, Westall highlighted the inequality and unequal distribution of resources as “tensions and differences” to be resolved in order to foster sustainable development. In sum, democratic-led development requires well-functioning political institutions as prerequisite for development.

2.3 Market-led development

While some scholars focus on the importance of democracy for development, others examine the importance of the market. Since Western, capitalist states allied at the Bretton Woods Conference, market institutions have been an important hallmark in our modern global economic system. Any state could negotiate to join the global economic institutions by agreeing

³Przeworski, Adam. *Democracy and Economic Development*. Department of Politics New York University

⁴Ibid.

⁵Westall, Andrea. 2015. *The Relationship between Democracy and Sustainable Development. Foundations For Democracy And Sustainable Development*

to the liberal principles of “reciprocity and nondiscrimination, which entail the reduction of trade barriers.”⁶ The question is what kind of effect the global free trade regime represented by these institutions has on economic growth.

For example, studies by Crowley point toward the 20th century of trade treaty and multilateral trade agreements of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and World Trade Organizations (GATT/WTO) indicate member countries benefit from trade (even though, the economic size of the country matters).⁷ The production, exports and imports of a particular country serves as important factors in gaining market access in order to spur economic growth. Crowley, like many others accept that there are problems within the economic systems established by the Bretton Woods Conference. Despite the increased membership of the World Trade Organization, this very trade system permitted some forms of discrimination. For example, its members could practice exclusionary policies toward other members. To wit, Senegal has been a member of the WTO, yet it does not have market access to all the members of WTO. One example is the non-reciprocal preferential access between European Union and Senegal.⁸

In examining the market economy based on GATT/WTO, Allee and Scalera pointed out that for automatic joiners, the former colonized countries have no impact on the trade flows, because of protectionist policies and “lack of mandated trade policy changes.”⁹ However, Easterly and De Soto disagreed, and stressed the devastation produced by unregulated market

⁶Crowley, Meredith A.,2003. "An introduction to the WTO and GATT," *Economic Perspectives, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago*, issue Q IV:42-57.

⁷Ibid.

⁸International Trade Center. “ITC by Country Report Senegal 05/12/2014.” <http://www.intracen.org/country/senegal/Domestic-and-Foreign-Market-Access/>: 20

⁹Allee Todd L., Scalera Jamie E. 2012. “The Divergent Effects of Joining International Organizations: Trade Gains and the Rigors of WTO Accession.” *International Organization* 66 (2): 265.

economies. LDC countries have been vulnerable to the shocks of the global market, interest rate, and trade terms.¹⁰ In addition, the dependency of LDC within the market economy was problematic. For example, the mobility of technology and flow of capital were limited and regulated by the developed countries.¹¹ Correspondingly, the global market institutions followed the liberal principle of free trade, but power politics has always been infused in these institutions because states often pursue their individual interests.

The barriers to liberal trade have been the implications of states forming Preferential Trade Arrangements (PTAs) and employing anti-dumping mechanisms (AD), which are flexibility provisions allowed by the World Trade Organization. PTA enables states to maximize benefits, but the majority of the developing countries are at a disadvantage forming PTAs due to the lack of expert representatives.¹² On the other hand, states that imposed AD have substantial benefits, but the implementation of an effective domestic AD legal institution is costly, requiring “time, expertise and resources.” More than one hundred, countries have implemented ADs, but many developing countries abstained from implementing effective ADs because of domestic constraints, and superficial tariff binding commitments.¹³ In reality, the free trade system has never been fully free undermining its benefits, particularly for less powerful states, like Senegal, in the global order.

¹⁰Easterly, William. 2001. “The Lost Decades: Developing Countries’ Stagnation in Spite of Policy Reform 1980-1998.” *Journal of Economic Growth* 6:135-157.

¹¹ De Soto, Hernando. *The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else*. Basic Books, 2000.

¹²Mansfield Edward D., Reinhardt Eric. 2003. “Multilateral Determinants of Regionalism: The Effects of GATT/WTO on the Formation of Preferential Trading Agreements.” *International Organization* 57 (4): 829-862.

¹³Kucik, Jeffrey, Reinhardt Eric. 2008. “Does Flexibility Promote Cooperation? An Application to the Global Trade Regime.” *International Organization* 62 (3): 477-505.

2.4 State-led development

While some scholars advocate for the power of markets to lead to economic improvements, other scholars focus on the importance of the state to lead economic development. East Asian states, like Japan, are commonly used as examples of successful state-led development. Prior to Western colonial expansion in Asia, Japan has had well-functioning domestic institutions. The multiple actors such as the state, communities, and individuals maintained a “national identity,” which allowed Japan to respond well to “external shocks, and used them positively for change and new growth.”¹⁴ The Japanese state competed to catch up with the technological prowess of the west. Japan had certain characteristics that were missing in the former French colonies in Africa. The Japanese state was unified, and accompanied by a strong leadership. However, in the former French colonies like Senegal, the building of national identity started after it gained independence from France.

Equally important, the rapid growth in South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand was also a state led development. Castel-Branco called the East Asia's success “a superior model of accumulation,”¹⁵ which included firms, state intervention, and comparative advantage exports. The states reformed their economies toward complex industrial economies by incorporating technological development. By maintaining a market-friendly orientation, these Asian states intervened to make domestic firms competitive in the global market or to make market correction.

¹⁴Ohno, Kenichi. *The Economic Development of Japan The Path Traveled by Japan as a Developing Country*. Yuhikaku 2005: 4.

¹⁵Castel-Branco, Carlos Nuno. 1996. *What Are The Major Lessons From East Asian Development Experience?*

Within the same region, China's economic rise has been a particularly marked example of the way state-led development can spur rapid economic growth. The World Bank ranked China's gross domestic product (GDP) as second after the United States. On the road to economic development, China excluded privatization, but focused on competition.¹⁶ Furthermore, Chinese leadership implemented a socialist market economy based on "selectively free" economy. Despite being an authoritarian state, with "ultimate control" enforced in all sectors within the society, China had a significant labor force, big domestic market, and engaged with the global markets for foreign investments, technological and other expertise in management.¹⁷

Since the state is the principal political agent in the global system it "has always a role to play in a capitalist system and no country's economy is either purely a state capitalist or free market system, but the degree of government intervention varies within each country and fluctuates over time."¹⁸ Given the Asian cases and the claim made by Przeworski on regime types and the rate of economic growth, the studies focused mainly on European and Asian countries, in which the colonial impact was experienced differently than the countries in Africa. This differing institutional history suggests the need to develop alternative explanations for economic lags across much of the African continent – a task we pursue in the remainder of the thesis with specific reference to Senegal.

¹⁶Weitzman, Martin L.1993. "Economic transition Can theory help?" *North-Holland European Economic Review* 37: 549-555.

¹⁷Zhao, Suisheng. 2010. *The China Model: can it replace the Western Model of Modernization?* The Journal of Contemporary China.

¹⁸Lambin, Jean-Jacques. *Rethinking the Market Economy: New Challenges, new ideas, new opportunities. State-Led Market Economy.* Palgrave Macmillan 2014

Chapter 3

3.1 Argument

By focusing on the role of the actors within specific governing institutions, I argue that we can best explain Senegal's economic lags by understanding its politics. And the key to understanding its politics is understanding the relationship among French and Senegalese elites – relationships that continued to be shaped by the country's colonial history. Specifically, because Senegal's independence was negotiated by the Senegalese political elites and the French political elites, this negotiated independence involved a reproduction of elites, with the effect that this reproduction of elite politics has failed to serve the majority of Senegal's population. The effect of this relationship between the two countries' elites has been to hold Senegal back from diversifying its economic partners regionally and internationally.

The relationship among local and colonial elites matters - especially, the metis nobility, also known as *Signares*, *creoles* or *mulâtres*, a mixed-race population from the union of French officials or traders and Senegalese women. Predominantly concentrated within the French urban communes of Saint Louis, Goree Island, and Dakar, "metis of Senegal were among the earliest groups in West Africa to pursue western education."¹⁹ Furthermore, they were in prominent government positions: military,²⁰ civic, business, and served as the economic and political intermediary between France and Senegal. The metis' economic prospects were linked to France.

¹⁹Jones, Hilary. "Citizens and Subjects: Métis Society, Identity and the Struggle Over Colonial Politics in Saint Louis, Senegal, 1870-1920." Michigan State University Department of History 2003: 138.

²⁰Taylor, Mildred E. "How a Senegalese Mulatto Ended One of Africa's Oldest Kingdoms for the French." *Face2Face Africa*, 31 Jan. 2019, face2faceafrica.com/article/how-a-senegalese-mulatto-ended-one-of-africas-oldest-kingdoms-for-the-french.

Therefore, the metis had to serve France's economic interest in order to safeguard their economic investments – a pattern that continues to impact modern Senegal.

In general, the metis were the first negotiators for certain individual liberties and Senegal's representation within the French colonial system and in its aftermath. Metis replicated the bourgeoisie lifestyle of the Parisian metropole by maintaining strictly French culture, education, and religion “so much so that by 1900 the Africans considered them to be a separate group.”²¹ Indeed, this relationship between Senegalese and French elites is not new. Senegalese institutions have been simply a continuity of colonial France, including all of its governing systems like the constitution, presidential system, judiciary, National Assembly, law enforcement, and military. Informally, President Senghor, President Diouf and President Sall have championed the Francophonie. Although the official state language, French is used only by 15-20% of the population, even as it is the language of governmental administration, effectively cutting out the majority of the country's population from effective participation in governments.

The developmental consequences of these formal and informal continuities with France have been severe. To take one example of the underperformance of the postcolonial government, Senegal has not met all of the millennium development goals²² nor the sustainable development goals.²³ At a deeper level, fundamental state building processes have been neglected by France and the elites in Senegal, including the development of a cohesive national identity. Where the

²¹Curtin, Philip D. *Africa & the West: Intellectual Responses to European Culture*. University of Wisconsin Press 1974: 144.

²²The official United Nations site for the MDG Indicators. (2015). Millennium Development Goals Indicators: Retrieved from <http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Resources/Static/Products/Progress2015/Snapshots/SEN.pdf>

²³Africa SDG INDEX AND DASHBOARDS REPORT. (2018). Retrieved from <http://unsdsn.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/AFRICA-SDGS-2018-Complete-Report-WEB.pdf>

literature shows that many successful Asian developmental states have had high-levels of state unity and political unity, Senegal is frequently divided along linguistic and ethnic lines – divisions that are often historical and reproduced through elite politics. For example, French civilizing values and Islamic values are often at odds and, more importantly, enable the reproduction of multiple different elite classes, including ethnic elites, marabout Islamic elites, and French elites and their associated *Signares* (metis) elites. In sum, because of long-running connections between French elites and Senegalese elites – relationships that rested on historical patterns of colonial rule – Senegal has had a divided political system that has made it difficult to do national political planning, has wedded the Senegalese economy to France, and has prevented the broad-based distribution of the country's wealth to average citizens.

In the following sections, readers will learn how Senegal's politics have been inherited and maintained by an elitist class with strong links to France, and their role in the underdevelopment of Senegal. First, starting with a short background information on the pre-colonial, then colonial period through the post-modern era, and highlighting the importance of unification, and why Senegal has not been effectively unified. Second, an empirical investigation on French's divide and rule within the institutions, including the French civilizing mission impacts in the politics and economy of Senegal. Finally, the readers will be able to understand the impact of the synchronization of traditionalism and Sufism countering French domination, but also the political and economic cooperation with France.

Chapter 4

4.1 Pre-Colonial Senegal

Pre-colonial Senegal included historical links with modern day neighboring countries: Gambia, Mauritania, Mali, Guinea-Bissau, and Guinea were marked by trans-Saharan slave trade issues, and rulership accession conflicts. After the decline of the Wagadu (Ghana Empire) and Mali Empires, the kingdoms in Senegal consisted of Sine-Saloum, Walo (*Oualo*), Jolof (*Djolof* or *Diolof*), Cayor (*Kajoor*), Boal (*Bawol*) located in north-east. Kaabu in the south and Takrur (*Tekrur* or *Tekrou*), Denianke (Great Fulo) and later Imamate of Fouta Toro (Futanke Empire) in the north-West. Walo, which once held Jolof, and Sine-Saloum in a confederacy, was governed by a matrilineal accession of kings, elected through a system of *lamame*, the council of elders. Concerning the people of Senegal, it has been a crossroad of ethnic groups, and each ethnic group could trace its lineage to one of the kingdoms. Relationships through marriages formed the alliances within the kingdoms.

Understanding these precolonial political patterns is important because it continues to impact the ethnic and social makeup of postcolonial Senegal. For instance, although the actual ethnic groups within Senegal accounted for at least fifty ethnic groups, usually with sub-groups related to a major group, since 1971, Wolof, Sereer, Pulaar (Fulani), Jola, Malinke and Soninke were recognized as national languages by Presidential decree – languages that had their roots in precolonial kingdoms.²⁴ The dominant religious practice was ancestral spirit religion, and Islam was introduced in the region in the 10th- through 11th centuries with the Takrur King, War Jabi Ibn

²⁴République du Sénégal: <http://www.axl.cefan.ulaval.ca/afrique/senegal.htm>; Décret n° 71-566 du 21 mai 1971 relatif à la transcription des langues nationales: <http://www.axl.cefan.ulaval.ca/afrique/senegal-decret1971.htm>

Rabis Ndiaye's conversion in 1030, but the Wolof, Serere, Soninke, Fulani, and Mandinka rejected the orthodox Islam that called for total abandonment of African traditional religion. Later Islamic Sufism, the dominant religion in Senegal today, was practiced in Moors Emirate of Trarza (Mauritania), and in Futanke Imamate of Futa Toro,²⁵ located on the Northern part of Senegal.²⁶ Islamic Sufism coexisted with the traditional religion,²⁷ and the presence of the Kounta marabout Quranic teachers of Sufi Qadiriyya of Algeria, and Qadiriyya Clerics Moors of Mauritania/Morocco facilitated the spread of Islam within Cayor in 1800.²⁸ Gradually, Islamic Sufi orders absorbed the traditional ruling class through marriages between members within the royal nobility and Islamic clerics' households.

These religious patterns had political effects. For example, the "advantages of literacy in Arabic meant that Muslim scholar-clerics were maintained in royal courts within the states, regardless of the religion of the ruler himself"²⁹ and the title as a Muslim was a marker of status (pilgrimage to Mecca and literacy were a source of great prestige).³⁰ As mentioned, Sufi Qadiriyya facilitated Islam in the region; the Sufi order (*tariqa*) founder was the Persian, Abdul Qadir Gilani (1077–1166). In Senegal, this Qadiriyya *tariqa* was tolerant as it incorporated or synchronized some forms of African traditions. The reformist Sufi order Qadiriyya, Tidianiã (*Tijani*), was founded by the Algerian Berber (Moor), Ahmad al-Tijani (1737–1815); however,

²⁵Salm Steven J., Falola Toyin. *African Urban Spaces in Historical Perspective (Rochester Studies in African History and the Diaspora)*. University of Rochester Press 2005: 247.

²⁶M'bayo, Tamba. *Muslim Interpreters in Colonial Senegal, 1850–1920: Mediations of Knowledge and Power in the Lower and Middle Senegal River Valley*. Lexington Books 2016: viii-ix

²⁷Gaudio, Attilio *Les populations du Sahara occidental: histoire, vie et culture*. Karthala 1993.

²⁸Glover, John. *Sufism and Jihad in Modern Senegal: The Murid Order*. University of Rochester Press 2007.

²⁹Villalón, Leonardo A. *Islamic Society and State Power in Senegal: Disciples and Citizens in Fatick*. Cambridge University Press 2009: 61.

³⁰Kane Ousmane Oumar. *Beyond Timbuktu*. Harvard University Press 2016.

starting in the 1660s, marked the era of the rise of marabout Sufi Islamic clerics³¹ and late 1770s, marked the era of the Futanke's Torodo Revolution led by the Almamy of Fouta Thierno Souleymane Baal and Abdul Kader Kane. In addition, the late 1840s until 1890s, marked the era of civil war between the Fouta Toro³² Futanke, the Massina Fulbe, and the *Kounta (Kunta)* - *Peul* Qadria, caused by the Tidiania (*Tijani or Tijaniyya*) Futanke, El Hadj Umar Tall³³ and Fulani's jihadism against non-Muslim aristocracy.³⁴

Beginning in the late fifteenth century through the seventeenth century, Portuguese³⁵ and Dutch³⁶ were the first Europeans that conducted trade in Senegal's coastal port of Goree Island. The first metis (*Signares*) population regulating the commercial trade, were descendants of Lebu and Portuguese.³⁷ However, trading between France and Senegal started in 1628, with the Trarza

³¹Curtin Philip D. "Jihad in West Africa: Early Phases and Inter-Relations in Mauritania and Senegal." Cambridge University Press *The Journal of African History* Vol. 12, No. 1 (1971): 11-24

³²But West Africa, the Senegambia in particular, was having its own revolution: a Muslim theocratic revolution. In both Haiti and West Africa these revolutions were of course related to the slave trade. This statement was retrieved from: Miller, Chris. *The French Atlantic Triangle. Literature and Culture of the Slave Trade*. Duke University Press Books 2008: 260.

³³Bruijn Mirjam De. *Rethinking Resistance*: 63.

³⁴Bruijn, Mirjam De and Dijk, Han Van. *Peuls et Mandingues: dialectiques des constructions identitaires*. Afrika-Studiecentrum 1997: 40; Marty, Paul. *Études sur l'Islam et les tribus du Soudan: La région de Tombouctou (Islam songaï) Dienné, le Macina et dépendances (Islam peul)*. E. Leroux, 1920: 193; Bruijn Mirjam De, Abbink Gerrit Jan and Walraven Klaas Van. *Rethinking Resistance: Revolt and Violence in African History*. Brill 2003:63-65.

³⁵M'Leod, Alexander and Phillips, Ulrich Bonnell. *American Negro Slavery: A Survey of the Supply, Employment, and Control of Negro Labor as Determined by the Plantation Regime*. Louisiana State University Press 1966: 12.

³⁶Barry, Boubacar. *Senegambia and the Atlantic slave trade (African Studies)*. Cambridge University Press 1997: 47.

³⁷Islam was less important on Gorée Island, where the small free black population seems to have been a mixture of Muslims, Christians, and believers in traditional religions. Many of them were originally Afro-Portuguese, descendants of Portuguese traders who settled along the coast during the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and clung to their Catholic identity. As in Saint-Louis, this habitant population played a major role in commerce. On the Petite Cote, the area south of Cape Verde, and the various estuaries that marked the coast from the Saalum River, just north of

raiders (*razzias*) of Walo “supplying slaves to the Saharan trade, the Portuguese, and the French;”³⁸ additionally, marking the era of the ‘gun-slave cycle’ trade between African rulers and European merchants.³⁹ The Muslim emirs in Trarza, Brackna and Fouta Toro collected tolls and taxes from the French merchants and metis, especially, Fouta Toro oligarchy controlled the water route from Saint Louis into the interior.

By the 1850s, the Lebu Islamic Sufi community within Cayor would play a crucial role in the relation between France and Senegal. Certain Lebu members, integrated in the French colonial army, and participated in the conquest of Boal, Sine, and Saloum,⁴⁰ In fact, Lebu had political autonomy from Cayor, but France extended its dominion by annexing the Lebu’s land of Goree Island, Dakar and Rufisque, by making them French communes. Given the status of the Lebu as the original inhabitants of the French communes, the Lebu’s language Wolof has been rapidly becoming the lingua franca of Senegal. The metis were accustomed in Wolof culture. Yet despite having Wolof as their main language, the assimilation into French culture, availed metis to gain privileges and it was without France’s application of *politique de races* (1818-1920), which was instrumental in limiting social mobility by race and ethnic grouping. Metis and their counterparts’ Black Frenchmen regarded France as the solution for guiding Senegal’s development.

the Gambia, to Sierra Leone, they traded with Muslim Juula traders from interior areas and with Afro-Portuguese middleman communities scattered along the coast. This statement was retrieved from: Klein, Martin A. “Slaves, Gum, and Peanuts: Adaptation to the End of the Slave Trade in Senegal, 1817-48.” *Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture: The William and Mary Quarterly*, Third Series, Vol. 66, No. 4, *Abolishing the Slave Trades: Ironies and Reverberations* 2009: 898.

³⁸Getz, Trevor R. *Slavery and Reform in West Africa Toward Emancipation in Nineteenth-Century Senegal and the Gold Coast*. James Currey 2004: 14.

³⁹Lovejoy, Paul E and Lovejoy, Paul Ellsworth. *Transformations in Slavery: A History of Slavery in Africa*. Cambridge University Press 2000: 110.

⁴⁰Kesteloot Lilyan, Sylla Assane. 1993. “Le peuple lebou de la presqu’île du Cap-Vert.” *Revue française d’histoire d’outre-mer*, tome 80, n°301:638.

4.2 Colonial Senegal

Senegal's colonial chapter built the basis for Senegal and France's multi-faceted relationship – a relationship built as much on interpersonal relationships as through physical domination. As Hillary Jones writes of the colonial encounter, “The expansion of French rule in Senegal operated as much through the private sphere of marriage and family as it did through military force.”⁴¹ this relationship impacted the social, cultural, political and economic structure of Senegal. From the colonial period until present, Senegal's politics and economy remained under France' sphere of influence, as France replaced preexisting state structures by implementing policies that benefited certain groups or classes within the society. Despite the ongoing relations between the two countries, the two crucial advantages of development, capital and technology that France possessed over Senegal in the colonial era remained unchanged today. Although politics have reformed to a certain extent as time progresses, why has the French economic exploitation of Senegal persisted? The justification isn't complex, simply in the case of Senegal, the institutions and its elites' relationship with France enabled the continuation of Senegal's under-development.

French monopolization of the coastal port of Goree Island came about through wars against the Portuguese and the Dutch.⁴² Additionally, France solidified its presence at the uninhabited portion between Walo and Cayor called Ndar in 1638 and, by 1659, French General Thomas Lambert baptized Ndar at Saint-Louis (tribute to King Louis IX and King Louis

⁴¹Jones, Hilary. *The Métis of Senegal: Urban Life and Politics in French West Africa*; “Religion, Marriage, and Material Culture.” Indiana University Press 2013:76.

⁴²Klein, Martin A. *Historical Dictionary of Slavery and Abolition (Historical Dictionaries of Religions, Philosophies, and Movements Series)*. Scarecrow Press 2002: 191.

XIV).⁴³⁴⁴ Several French policies of assimilation, such as King Louis XIV's *Le Code Noir* (The Black Code) decree of assimilation, governed the lives of the subjects in the settlement and authorized the marriage between the *Signares* and Frenchmen.⁴⁵ In spite of France's decree of 16 Pluiose Year I & II (1792 and 1794) abolition of slavery and declaration that "all men without distinction of colour residing in the colonies, are French citizens,"⁴⁶ the period of direct rule established by Napoleonic Code, redefined the lives of the metis, regulated marriages and reintroduced the slave trade, as it was the only profitable commerce for French merchants and metis.⁴⁷⁴⁸ As a consequence of this revived slave trade, Saint Louis traders sold "ammunition, tobacco, and other valued goods."⁴⁹ In return, clerics and chiefs sold slaves, ivory, and gold dust.

Yet even as the French were trying to expand their commercial dealings in Senegal, the British occupation of Goree Island and Saint Louis for 30 years (1693, 1758-63, 1779-83, 1800-17)⁵⁰ hampered France's economy in Senegal. Together with the implementation of British Slave Trade Act of 1807 and the Congress of Vienna's universal abolition of slavery, "Senegal was of limited value to France, but a vibrant community of Euro-african and African Muslim merchants,

⁴³De Benoist, Joseph-Roger. *Histoire de l'Eglise catholique au Sénégal: Du milieu du XVe siècle à l'aube du troisième millénaire*. Karthala 2008: 62.

⁴⁴Bond, Bradley G. *French Colonial Louisiana and the Atlantic World: An Elegy*. LSU Press 2005: 266.

⁴⁵Bailey, Alexander. *Architecture and Urbanism in the French Atlantic Empire: State, Church, and Society, 1604-1830 (McGill-Queen's French Atlantic Worlds Series)*. McGill-Queen's University Press 2018: 98.

⁴⁶Ba, Sylvia Washington. *The Concept of Negritude in the Poetry of Leopold Sedar Senghor Colonial Senegal*. Princeton University Press 1973: 14.

⁴⁷Jones, Hilary. "Citizens and Subjects: Métis Society, Identity and the Struggle Over Colonial Politics in Saint Louis, Senegal, 1870-1920." Michigan State University Department of History 2003: 93.

⁴⁸Jones, "Citizens and Subjects, 99

⁴⁹Jones, Hilary. *The Métis of Senegal:*

⁵⁰Crowder, Michael. *Senegal: a study of French assimilation policy*. Methuen 1967: 10

sailors, and skilled workers ensured its future.”⁵¹ France's reconquest and negotiation of Goree Island and Saint Louis in 1817, marked a renewal era of imposing Western values under *mission civilatrice*. For example, the Catholic missionaries, Freres de Ploërmel and Soeurs de Saint-Joseph de Cluny, educated the children of the European elite and the metis bourgeoisie.⁵² Although, the Catholic missionary, conflicted with the colonial administration's rule, African traditions, and opposed the *metis marriage a la mode*,⁵³ Governor Blanchot⁵⁴ and General Faidherbe⁵⁵ practiced *metis marriage a la mode* and legitimized their metis children.⁵⁶

These family lineages would have long-run consequences for Senegal's economy, as the metis families and French merchant dominated the politics within the communes. Despite their commercial and political power, this was problematic for France colonial army and their financial backers.⁵⁷ Eventually, France's colonial administration dismantled the metis' political grip, by creating oversight institutions designed for the slaves, local aristocracy and Muslim. Slavery was the engine of the French economy.⁵⁸ On the upper north of Saint Louis⁵⁹ (Richard Toll and

⁵¹Klein, Martin A. “Slaves, Gum, and Peanuts: Adaptation to the End of the Slave Trade in Senegal, 1817-48.” Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture: The William and Mary Quarterly, Third Series, Vol. 66, No. 4, Abolishing the Slave Trades: Ironies and Reverberations 2009: 895.

⁵²White, Owen. *Children of the French Empire: Miscegenation and Colonial Society in French West Africa, 1895-1960*. Clarendon Press 2000:41.

⁵³White, Owen. *Children of the French Empire*: 41.

⁵⁴Le Sueur James D, and Cohen William B. *The French Encounter with Africans: White Response to Blacks, 1530-1880*. Indiana University Press 2003: 125.

⁵⁵Wesseling, Henk. *The European colonial empires, 1815-1919*. Routledge 2004:22; White, Owen. *Children of the French Empire*: 11.

⁵⁶Vandervort Bruce. “Faidherbe, Lugard, and Africa.” In Proceedings of the Meeting of the French Colonial Historical Society, Vol. 21, Essays in French Colonial History. *Michigan State University Press* 1997: 237-247.

⁵⁷Mamigonian Beatriz Gallotti, Karen Racine. *The Human Tradition in the Black Atlantic, 1500-2000*. Rowman & Littlefield 2009: 98.

⁵⁸Jones, Hilary. *The Métis of Senegal: Urban Life and Politics in French West Africa*. Indiana University Press 2013: 210.

⁵⁹Jones, Hilary. *The Métis of Senegal: Urban Life and Politics in French West Africa*. 232.

Dagana), the French implemented, *engages a temps*, a system of indentured laborers similar to the slave trade,⁶⁰ but practiced domestically.⁶¹ This economic slave-based system remained in this form of *engages a temps* with modifications throughout the French occupation until Senegal's independence.

What other resources did Senegal have that were of interest to France? Klein listed three resources: slaves, gum, and peanuts. Walo possessed the majority of the lucrative high quality, gum that was used in various manufacture industries in Europe, such as cooking, medicine and textiles process.⁶² The local traders or *traintants/négociants* metis and France commercial companies based in Bordeaux, benefited from the gum trade. In depth information detailing the economic and political conflict concerning the Senegalese gum, was provided by Great Britain Foreign Office,⁶³ while Diouf⁶⁴ and Eltis⁶⁵ distinguished between the trade of major sources, France extracted for export, and in return, French firms “sold sugar, flour, beer, wine, textiles and not-without grave effects on local warfare.”⁶⁶ Besides the gum trade, France attempted cotton production, but the potential of the peanut was more valuable.⁶⁷ By the mid-1860s, peanuts' export

⁶⁰Macaulay, Zachary. *Memoranda respecting the French slave trade in 1820: Drawn up at the close of that year Unknown Binding – 1820*. Printed by Ellerton and Henderson 1820: 17-20.

⁶¹Miller, Chris. *The French Atlantic Triangle. Literature and Culture of the Slave Trade*. Duke University Press Books 2008: 253.

⁶²Wiseman, Nicholas Patrick (edited). “The Dublin Review, Volume 4.” London 1838: 189.

⁶³ Great Britain Foreign Office. “British and Foreign State Papers 1834-1835 Vol. XXIII.” London: James Ridgway and Sons, Piccadley 1852: 1072.

⁶⁴ Diouf, Sylviane A. *Fighting the Slave Trade: West African Strategies*. United Kingdom Oxford University Press 2004: 209

⁶⁵ Eltis, David. *Economic Growth and the Ending of the Transatlantic Slave Trade*. New York: Oxford University Press 1987: 227.

⁶⁶ Aldrich, Robert. *Greater France: A History of French Overseas Expansion*. Palgrave Macmillan 1996: 37.

⁶⁷Hauser, Henry. “La mise en valeur du Sénégal de 1817 à 1854.” In: *Annales de Géographie*, t. 30, n°166, 1921: 302-303.

“value of approximately \$1.25 million” exceeded the “annual revenues derived from selling slaves in the second half of the eighteenth century.”⁶⁸ Purely profitable to the French, “Senegal accounted for more than four-fifths of the total exports of the colonial Federation of French West Africa.”⁶⁹ However, despite its profitability during the colonial era, the peanut industry caused long-term political and social problems following independence and particularly from 1960-1970, as reliance on one crop made postcolonial farmers very susceptible to market fluctuations.

France's Second Republic, implemented political reforms during the inception of the peanut production. However, the Islamic jihad wars led by EL Hadj Umar Tall, and his disciples, created a hostile atmosphere for the French, Christians and traditionalists. France and Islam came to terms in the communes, as the “first of the Islamic courts in the four communes was opened in St. Louis in 1848, and Africans who became French citizens could still be subjected to the jurisdiction of Islamic courts.”⁷⁰ At this time, the Metis (*Signares*) participated in French elections, in which they “elected a deputy to the national assembly in Paris.”⁷¹ The metis family, Valantin, dominated the gum trade, as well as politics. Barthelemy Durand Valantin served as the metis mayor of Saint Louis and the first Senegalese deputy at France's National Assembly. The author Hillary Jones noted, the General Council in Senegal was the metis' “field of engagement with French officials, sometimes facilitating the consolidation of French rule but at other times

⁶⁸Eltis, David. *Economic Growth and the Ending of the Transatlantic Slave Trade*. New York: Oxford University Press 1987: 227.

⁶⁹Singh, Daleep. *Francophone Africa 1905-2005: A Century of Economic and Social Change*. Allied Publishers Pvt. Ltd 2016: 146.

⁷⁰Christopher E. S. Warburton. *The Evolution of Crises and Underdevelopment in Africa*. University Press of America 2005. 31.

⁷¹ Bob Rabboh & Rob Rabboh. *African Nations: The Socio-political Transformation*. Pearson Education 2006: 97.

contesting colonial practice.”⁷² Economically, the metis were devastated having lost the gum trade competition by French merchants of Marseilles, as well the Bordeaux companies. Throughout the economic hardships, metis remained resilient and the advantage they took on educational opportunities have served them well in economic and politics, enabling political and economic power long after colonialism ended.

By the 1850s until 1880s, the competing forces, France and Fouta Toro Futanke's hegemonic expansion, destabilized the traditional states. France' sphere of influence was the communes, and the Futanke's sphere of influence was Fouta Toro.⁷³ France had a Westernizing “civilizing mission” and Futanke had an “Orthodox Islamization mission,” and Senegal was trapped within these two camps. Yet, despite their rivalry, there were moments of cooperation between the French and Futanke. For example, France sold arms to the Futanke with the aim of using them to conquer the interior.⁷⁴ The appointment of General Faidherbe, as Governor of Saint Louis was crucial to enabling this change. It also proved effective. By 1854, the process of conquest in the interior of Senegal began as a process of *colonisation en douceur*, a friendly approach to diplomacy, involving pacification, and appeasement.⁷⁵ General Faidherbe exploited France's relationship with the metis, the Saint Louis Muslims, the Lebu, and the Wolof. Once he created *Tirailleurs Sénégalais*, the first black military regiments, *engages a temps* was used for

⁷²Jones, Hilary. 2012. “Rethinking Politics in The Colony: The Metis of Senegal And Urban Politics in The Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century.” *The Journal of African History*, 53 (3), 325-344.

⁷³Umar's efforts to conquer his homeland around Fouta Toro led to war with the French (1856-1859). This statement was retrieved from: Dupuy Richard E. *The Harper Encyclopedia of Military History: From 3500 BC to the Present*. HarperCollins 1993:936

⁷⁴Bruijn Mirjam De. *Rethinking Resistance*: 63.

⁷⁵Vandervort, Bruce. *Wars of Imperial Conquest*.

recruitment, but the metis, the Lebu, the Wolof⁷⁶ and the Saint Louis Muslims conscripted to prominent ranks in the colonial army and participated in the conquest of Senegal.

Second, Faidherbe's consolidation of Islamic courts was welcomed by the Muslim habitants of the Qadiriyya order. Prior to the conquest of Senegal, Faidherbe developed an understanding of Arabo-Berber culture and Islam during his service in Algeria. By applying the Algerian Islamic model, Faidherbe appointed Prominent Saint Louis Muslims, Tamsir Hamet Ndiaye and Dudu Seck (*Bu El Mogdad*), as interpreters and judges (*Cadi* or *Kadi*) of the Muslim tribunals within the communes.⁷⁷ Additionally, France started financing the *Bu El Mogdad's* *hadj* pilgrimages to Mecca.⁷⁸ These *Bu El Mogdad* received French education in Saint Louis⁷⁹ and studied under Islamic clerics' *zawiya* (universities) in Mauritania. France and Mauritania Qadiriyya clerics maintained good relations with Saint Louis inhabitants.⁸⁰ After the *Bu El Mogdad* died, France replaced them with their sons to preserve cooperation. The Muslim interpreters were effective in pacifying the clerics and the chiefs in the interior, and in return, it

⁷⁶*Galandou Diouf*, a Catholic educated Muslim Wolof, was the first native Senegalese representative elected in colonial France's four communes municipal. *Diouf's family aligned with the French during colonial expansion; Galandou's great-uncle, grandfather, and uncle (Keta Lagros Diouf) were killed fighting for the French general Louis Faidherbe, and his father was killed during the Bakel siege of Mamadou Lamine in 1885.* This statement was taken from: Akyeampong Emmanuel K. and Gates Jr Henry L. *Dictionary of African Biography*. Oxford University Press 2011:227; Harris Shannon V. *Politics, Discourses and Contradictions: Galandou Diouf in French Colonial Senegal, 1890-1941, Volume 1*. Michigan State University 2009:108-109

⁷⁷Kolapo Femi James, Akurang-Parry Kwabena O. *African Agency and European Colonialism: Latitudes of Negotiations and Containment*. University Press of America 2007:33-44; Jones, Hilary. *The Métis of Senegal*:135.

⁷⁸Lydon Ghislaine. *On Trans-Saharan Trails: Islamic Law, Trade Networks, and Cross-Cultural Exchange in Nineteenth-Century Western Africa*. Cambridge University Press 2012:43; M'bayo, Tamba. *Muslim Interpreters in Colonial Senegal, 1850–1920*: 43

⁷⁹Cantone, Cleo. *Making and Remaking Mosques in Senegal*. Brill 2012: 162.

⁸⁰Himpan, Brigitte and Himpan Sabatier, Diane. *Nomads of Mauritania*. Vernon Press 2018: 137.

provided a line of communication and power sharing with France. Yet, even as such alliances were crucial for France's ability to rule Senegal, its advanced weapons were superior to the weaponry possessed by local Senegalese forces, which enabled military conquest.

Conquering and governing are not the same thing, though. And, in Senegal, General Faidherb was responsible for erecting the majority of the colony's current institutions. This included, the establishment of the first primary and secondary education systems and urban infrastructures. After defeating Walo,⁸¹ Faidherbe established *École des Otages* and granted Walo a dual language French and Wolof constitution in 1859⁸² and ratified in 1871.⁸³ Integrating Senegalese aristocracy as agents of France involved pacification, and *École des Otages*, was a selective institution that groomed and educated the sons of chiefs, as interpreters, and future leaders.⁸⁴ France implemented the politics of association, to facilitate entente and cooperation between rulers and ruled. The graduates of *École des Otages*, Yero Booli Jaawo (Yoro Boly Diaw), and his brother and son Fara Penda from the Djolof aristocracy, were placed in the newly created administrative position such as *Chef de Canton*. The other graduates of *École des Otages*, Walo's Prince Siddiya Joop (1871-1878),⁸⁵⁸⁶ king of Djolof *Bourba* Alboury N'Diaye (1875-

⁸¹ Konaté, Dior. *Prison Architecture and Punishment in Colonial Senegal*. Lexington Books 2018: 37.

⁸²Gann Lewis H, Duignan Peter. *African proconsuls: European governors in Africa*. Free Press, 1978:66.

⁸³Swartz B. K, Dumett Raymond E. *West African Culture Dynamics Archaeological and Historical Perspectives*. Mouton 1980:524.

⁸⁴Senegal. "Feuille officielle du Sénégal et dépendances." Deuxieme Anne 65 Mardi 26 Mars 1864: 154.

⁸⁵Rassoul, Eva. "Sidya Ndaté Yalla, Une Vie D'honneur Et De Courage Pour Le Brack Du Walo – Au Sénégal, Le Cœur Du Sénégal." *Au Sénégal, Le Cœur Du Sénégal*, 14 Aug. 2017, www.au-senegal.com/sidya-ndate-yalla-une-vie-d-honneur-et-de-courage-pour-le-brack-du-walo,14658.html?lang=fr.

⁸⁶Beye A. N, Boissy G, Miollany Joseph. *Histoire 3e: thème, le monde du milieu du XIXe siècle à la fin du XXe siècle*. 2002:47

1895) and his son Mansour Alboury N'Diaye (1895-1921) were enthroned in their respective kingdoms. A key point often not highlighted was that France spent time studying Senegal before engagement; Yero Booli Jaawo, the pioneer of Senegal history, compiled works regarding the Senegalese kingdoms' system of government, customs and the process for the accession of the king. From these works of Jaawo, France devised its policies of pacification and rapprochement.

French colonial governor retained the right of the enthronement of the kings in Walo and Djolof, taken into account the custom practice. France declared king of Djolof *Bourba* Alboury N'Diaye as an enemy, and unenthroned Prince Siddiya for failing to collect taxes, but this collection of taxes, a problem of the colonial era, also has persisted in the post-colonial era. The collection of taxes outside of the communes was challenging because in certain areas of the interior France placed *Chefs de cantons* that did not speak the same language as the locals, and the locals refused to pay taxes. All the power that the local aristocracy once possessed were stripped away, albeit the rightful rulers, received salary from France based on the amount of taxes they collected. Jaawo, the first *chef de canton* of Walo couldn't implement political or economic decisions without the authorization of a French *chef superieur*.⁸⁷ French rule in Walo allowed only limited social and cultural autonomy, although no economic freedom.

Groundnut production fueled by France's oil and soap industries, became the precursor of France's expansion in the interior of Senegal. However, the Islamic reformist Tijaniyya, created an opportunity for France to expand in the interior. During Faidherb's governorship of Senegal,

⁸⁷Sall Ibrahima Abou. *Mauritanie du sud conquêtes et administration coloniales françaises, 1890-1945*. Karthala 2007: 18-190

Futanke deposed the Malinke in Kaabu⁸⁸ and the Futanke leader, Mamba *Diakhou Bâ's* jihad⁸⁹ against the Wolof, Serer, Jola and Mandinka, and annexation of Saloum, weakened the traditional states. When *Mamba* Diakhou Bâ was killed in Sine,⁹⁰ in return, France assassinated the traditionalist Sine's King Maada Ndoffene Famak Joof. Consequently, the French expansion in the region coincided with the Futanke territorial expansion.⁹¹ Despite the Tijaniyya uprising, the Fulbe-Futanke Tijaniyya controlled several states in the interior. Haalpular and Islam, served as their identity, and they established educational institutions by promoting "Islam more actively and placed particular emphasis on Islamic education as a stabilizing social force. ... and religious leadership."⁹² France signed a protectorate treaty with Fouta Toro in 1863, but it couldn't contain the jihad until in the 1890s. The lasting legacy, except the Layene Islamic confrere, all other Islamic confrere founders' ancestors originated from Fouta Toro, but it still remained as a region of traditional religious education, migration, and poverty.

In Cayor, General Faidherbe and his successors, applied *colonisation en douceur*,⁹³ a process involving appeasement to counter the *damels* Birima Ngone Latyr Fall, Macodou Coumba Yande Mbarrou, and Lat Dior Ngone Latyr Diop's refusal of the railroad construction

⁸⁸Klein Martin A. *Slavery and colonial rule in French West Africa*. Cambridge University Press 1998:146

⁸⁹Sanne Lamin O. *Beyond Jihad: The Pacifist Tradition in West African Islam*. Oxford University Press 2016: 206.

⁹⁰Ada Dinkiralu (Mandinka), Bereb-I-Chosaan (Wolof), Tarica Tawal (Fula), Nannin (Jola), Soninke Ada (Serehuli) and I-Mofan Chosan (Serer). *Historic Sites of The Gambia: An Introduction to the Historic Monuments and Cultural Heritage Sites of The Gambia*. National Council for Arts and Culture (NCAC) 1998/2012: 31.

⁹¹Kobo, Ousman. *Unveiling Modernity in Twentieth-Century West African Islamic Reforms*. Brill 2012:48.

⁹²Stump Roger W. *The Geography of Religion: Faith, Place, and Space*. Rowman & Littlefield 2008:201.

⁹³Kesteloot Lilyan, Sylla Assane. "Le peuple lebou de la presqu'île du Cap-Vert." 637; Vandervort, Bruce. *Wars of Imperial Conquest in Africa, 1830-1914*. Indiana University Press 2009.

project.⁹⁴ The following elite sympathizers, Madiodio Deguen Fall (1861/1863-1865) and Samba Yaya Fall (1882-1883) were enthroned by France.⁹⁵ The last *damel* of Cayor, Samba Laobé Fall (Lat Dior nephew), was enthroned by France in 1883. He served as a mediator between the peanut farmers and the colonial administration, and also fought against France. Furthermore, Lat Dior, France's *ennemi héréditaire*⁹⁶ and a *Thiedo/Ceddo* (non-Muslim), that converted to Islam in 1861, formed an alliance with France against El Hadj Umar Tall' son, Ahmadu Ibn Umar Tall in 1875. This alliance was based on mutual interest, France feared that a federation of Islamic states could have a detrimental effect on its economic interest in Senegal, while Lat Dior wanted to regain control of his kingdom. On the other hand, Demba Waar Sall, Lat Dior former general, plotted with France, and Lat Dior was killed in 1886. Additionally, France assassinated Samba Laobé Fall the same year, and appointed Demba War Sall, as President of Confederation of Chiefs (1886-1901). The enthronement of elite sympathizers became France' strategy in securing economic interest, and it was without political assassination of dissidents.

Inasmuch as France abolished the *damels* governing system, it marked the end of the politics between the traditional kings and France. The only exception, France signed a protectorate treaty with the kings of Sine and Saloum in 1888, and placed *Chef-lieu* Foundiougne to serve as a liaison. Walo, Cayor, Baol, and Djolof under France's control became the peanut basin (1885-

⁹⁴Gaye, Mamadou and Faye, Ousseynou. *Sidiya Joop (1848-1878): l'itineraire de Brak Virtuel du Waalo*. Faculte des Lettres et Sciences Humaines, Departement d'Histoire 1999: 25.

⁹⁵Ba, Oumar. *La penetration francaise au Cayor: De regne de Birima N'Gone Latyr a l'intronisation de Madiodio Deguene Codou. Tome I: Premiere et Deuxieme Parties: 16 decembre 1854-28 mai 1861*. Dakar, Senegal 1976.

⁹⁶Faure, Charles. "L' Afrique explorée et civilisée: journal mensuel Volume 4." Geneve J. Sandoz 1883: 76.

1915) and the lives of the subjects, governed by France's *régime de l'indigénat* (*Code de l'indigénat* 1887-1947).⁹⁷

In sum, the territorial conquest involved tenuous alliances and tenuous treaties, yet the divergent elites established institutions to promote their agenda. France eliminated the dissidents and placed Senegalese elites in its established institutions as long they support France's economic interest. The fact these colonial Senegalese elites were limited to social and cultural, the same applied to today's elites.

⁹⁷Konaté, Dior. *Prison Architecture and Punishment in Colonial Senegal* 61.

Chapter 5

5.1 Political Transition

France planned Senegal's political transition prior to independence, and political power was transferred from the French administrators to the metis and then to the Black Frenchmen. The participation of Senegal in French elections (1848-1956), Parliamentary elections (1879-1959), and Referendums (1945-1958), set Senegal apart from the rest of the Francophone countries in Africa. Next, Senegal was the administrative home for the Governor General of Afrique Occidentale Française (A.O.F) also known as French West Africa (1895-1957). Senegal was governed by Governors of Senegal based in Saint Louis under the command of the Governor General based in Senegal's current capital, Dakar, the capital of A.O.F (1907-1958). Furthermore, Senegal was also the administrative home for the High Commissioner (1957-1958). These periods weren't different than the colonial era, in which France experimented with different institutions, and implemented different policies in order to safeguard its economic interest. France kept Senegal separated by limiting political, economic and educational opportunities to certain groups. For example, the *originaires* of the communes had one governing system while the *indigène* of the interior had a separate governing system. Despite the political reforms, France micromanaged Senegal and has continued to do so through the elites' cooperation.

The French's institutional design with its systematic divisions were first challenged by the metis or *Originaires* - Africans born in the French communes. The metis families, Deves and Crespin used the newspapers, *Le Réveil du Sénégal* (1885) and *Le Petit Sénégalais* (1886)⁹⁸ to

⁹⁸July Robert W. *The Origins of Modern African Thought: Its Development in West Africa During the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*. Africa World Press 2004: 244

voice political and economic issues.⁹⁹ The turning point of metis' politics by the year 1897, started with metis' demonstration that called for reforms of the regime' status quo and proclaimed 'Senegal for Senegalese.' France compromised with the metis as it feared the *originaires*' connection within the interior could destabilize its economic interests. The French settlers and metis formed a partnership in the quasi-legislative Counsel. The metis presented their candidacy for the National Assembly, galvanizing support from the Muslim and the Black Frenchmen habitants of the four communes that made up 90 to 95 percent of the votes. Despite the civic duty of voting, Senegal remained divided. Particularly in the interior, the subjects could not vote, and the difficult process of becoming a citizen, was perpetrated by the French officials. Regardless of the loyalty of Senegalese toward France, equality was systematically limited, and the policies created insular classes that focused on their economic interest rather than the interest of the state. Overall, competition between the groups and France's divide and rule strategy impacted Senegal's development.

Wealth and political connection defined the two status of elites in Senegal. Metis families like the Deves, Crespin, Carpot, D'Emeville, Guillabert, and Descemet weren't just politicians, they held positions such as administrators, merchants, mayors, lawyers, and businessmen that maintained commercial networks within the communes and in the interior. More importantly, the advantage of the "electoral institutions afforded the *métis* the ability to develop a degree of autonomy from Bordeaux commerce."¹⁰⁰ The metis' firms were based on the Bordeaux model, and collection of taxes was not an issue for *originaires*, and Muslim habitants of the four

⁹⁹Gellar, Sheldon. *Democracy in Senegal: Tocquevillian Analytics in Africa*. Palgrave Macmillan 2005:77

¹⁰⁰Jones, Hilary. *The Métis of Senegal: Urban Life and Politics in French West Africa*; "From Outpost to Empire." Indiana University Press 2013:118-138.

communes. Their contribution was put toward urban development, and France made the Senegalese pay for the development, but the metis had an advantage largely due to their investment and access in the metropole.

Additionally, marriage impacted the field of electoral politics. Metis practiced the Crespin/Deves dynastic model of marriage, which was a marriage amongst elites to preserve wealth within the families. Similar to the metis' economic status, the Black Frenchmen, *originaires* or *Évolués*¹⁰¹ (African in A.O.F with some level of education, graduate of William Ponty of Senegal, and higher status than *indigènes*), a great member of the them came from well-known noble families that have economic and political relations with the metis and France. For example, Galandou Diouf's family supported French expansion, Blaise Diagne was adopted by the metis family Crespin, Leopold Sedar Senghor's father was adopted by Adrien Mourlan, a French businessman¹⁰² and Amadou Lamine Gueye's came from noble merchant family of Saint Louis. The prominent metis and Black Frenchmen were also members of the Freemason,¹⁰³ an exclusive elitist club that inducted all four Senegalese Presidents.

France's history reminded us that every group must struggle in order to secure its interest and the metis fought for the rights of the *originaires*. Carpot's two terms (1902 & 1914) were crucial in advocating for equal rights, and the metis Governor General, William Ponty (1908-1915) argued "Senegalese deserved keeping their rights because of their long and loyal

¹⁰¹Memoire. L'histoire oubliée des Tirailleurs sénégalais de la Seconde guerre mondiale. Le Manuscrit 2005:46

¹⁰² Dieye, Ndiawar. "Http://Mbour.info - La Petite Côte Dans Le Web." *Diogoye Basile Le Père De Léopold Sédar Senghor*, Mbour.info, 4 Mar. 2014, www.mbour.info/culture/item/4464-diogoye-basile-le-p%C3%A8re-de-l%C3%A9opold-s%C3%A9dar-senghor.html.

¹⁰³Mamigonian Beatriz G, Racine Karen. *The Human Tradition in the Black Atlantic, 1500–2000*. Rowman & Littlefield 2009:93

devotion to France.”¹⁰⁴ Although Ponty improved the *Code de l'indigénat*,¹⁰⁵ in some ways, it was insignificant bringing full structural reforms because of the racial implications, which retained some form of white superiority. On the other hand, the metis mayor Deves led the movement to desegregate the school system, advocated for secular education and provision of social services for the communes.¹⁰⁶ On the positive note, the metis and the Catholic missionary participated in the cultural cultivation and education of the Black Frenchmen (see Mamigonian¹⁰⁷, Bryant¹⁰⁸ and Djoloftv Sénégal¹⁰⁹). Black Frenchmen and metis were fervent patriots of France and their education, military service and wealth enabled them to push for structural reforms. One of the elites' schools, *Ecole Normale* (Ecole William Ponty), a selective institution,¹¹⁰ was instrumental in the education of the African statesmen that ruled the post-colonial states.¹¹¹ Overall, France's universal education design, functioned only theoretically, as it only reproduced an elitist minority. Politics was tied to Senegal's economy and the metis oligarchic model persisted, as today's regime in power, only concerned with protecting their self-interest. These societal cleavages have permeated in political parties, as well in religious group.

¹⁰⁴Lewis H. Gann, Peter Duignan. *African proconsuls: European governors in Africa*. Free Press 1978: 146

¹⁰⁵Fogarty Richard S, Jarboe Andrew T. *Empires in World War I: Shifting Frontiers and Imperial Dynamics in a Global Conflict (International Library of Twentieth Century History)*. I.B. Tauris 2014

¹⁰⁶Bryant Duke Kelly M. *Education as Politics* 133

¹⁰⁷Mamigonian Beatriz G, Racine Karen. *The Human Tradition in the Black Atlantic, 1500–2000*. Rowman & Littlefield 2009:93

¹⁰⁸Bryant Duke Kelly M. *Education as Politics: Colonial Schooling and Political Debate in Senegal, 1850s–1914*. University of Wisconsin Press 2015: 143

¹⁰⁹Djoloftv Sénégal. “LEOPOLD SEDAR SENGHOR : DE LA NÉGRITUDE À L'UNIVERSEL 1ÈRE PARTIE.” *YouTube*, YouTube, 24 June 2014, www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZVzapwYycLI&t=445s.

¹¹⁰Smith, Robert. *The Ecole normale supérieure and the Third Republic*. SUNY Press 1981-82:25.

¹¹¹Senegal. “Senegal Business Law Handbook Strategic Information and Laws.” International Business Publications USA 2013:161

Correspondingly, political transition occurred in the Islamic institution. The Moors that once dominated the Kunta Quadria orders were replaced by four indigenous Islamic confreres such as the Sufi Layene of the Lebu based in the French communes, generated wealth from being fishermen. Next, the two Futanke Tijaniyya confreres of El Hadj Umar Tall's disciples: Sy based in Baol, Tivaoune, and Niass based in Saloum, specialized in herdsman and farming. Finally, the Sufi Mouride with mass Wolof and later Serere converts based in Baol and Saloum, specialized in agriculture. The clerics became powerful in the interior, as the number of converts increased; Muslim clerics married into the households of the local aristocracy to increase political power and fortunes. The Sufi clerics guided the Muslim population, and the followers give the clerics *hadiya* money or other donations instead of paying taxes to the government.

Islamic jihadism was not fully quelled down, and the French's fear of Muslim uprising lingered. Consequently, some *chefs de cantons*, instigated fear of Islamic revolts, and France acted by jailing or exiling the clerics in order to suppress the Islamic movements of the Leyene of Seydina Limamou Laye (1856-1919), and the Mouride of Ahmadou Bamba (1889-1927). France was obligated to take drastic measures of dealing with the Senegalese Muslims in the interior. However, the election of 1902 was a turning point between metis and the indigenous Sufi confreres. France exiled Ahmadou Bamba in Gabon (1895-1902) and in Mauritania (1903-1907), but his disciples used their money earned from cultivating peanut to finance the campaign of the metis lawyer candidate, Francois Carpot. Once in office, Carpot negotiated Bamba's return,¹¹² and since produced the peaceful cohabitation of politics and religion enjoyed by Senegalese. Differentiated from France *Laïcité* (secularism), the religious groups in Senegal have continued to play an important role in politic, economic, as well in the stability of the country.

¹¹²Camara, Sana. *Sheikh Ahmadu Bamba: Selected Poems*. Brill Academic Pub 2017: 20

Diplomacy amongst the elites reversed the hostilities toward French rule, but economically, France benefited while Senegal's gains from such partnership remained questionable. France needed the labor force of the Sufi clerics for peanut production. The two French administrators, Xavier Coppolani and Paul Marty, established the foundation of the social contract between France and the Senegalese Muslim (French Muslim policy).¹¹³ In consolidation, France accepted the clerics to practice their religion without constraints, granted El Hadj Malick Sy to establish Tijani *zdwiya* (Islamic university) in Tivaouane, and authorized the Mouride (Murid) to experiment with Marty's ideas of *daara*, Murid villages based on agriculture and Islamic education,¹¹⁴ in which parents sent their sons to live, study, and work with a marabout.¹¹⁵ Despite what the French labeled the *daara*, which consisted of "rote instruction, poor level of scholarship,"¹¹⁶ it was an alternative educational institution from the selective French schools. Additionally, France financed mosque building projects and continued the tradition of secretly funding "loyal religious leaders and provided logistical support for the organization of the pilgrimage to Mecca."¹¹⁷ In return, Sy¹¹⁸ and Bamba¹¹⁹ commended the disciples to respect the cohabitation of French rule and pay taxes. Above all, France exploited the

¹¹³Diouf, Mamadou. *Tolerance, Democracy, and Sufis in Senegal*. Columbia University Press 2013: 127-129

¹¹⁴Babou Cheikh Anta Mbacké. *Fighting the Greater Jihad Amadu Bamba and the Founding of the Muridiyya of Senegal, 1853-1913*. Ohio University Press 2007: 108

¹¹⁵Beck Linda J. *Brokering Democracy in Africa The Rise of Clientelist Democracy in Senegal*. Palgrave Macmillan 2008:238

¹¹⁶Diouf, Mamadou & Leichtman, Mara A. *New Perspectives on Islam in Senegal: Conversion, Migration, Wealth, Power, and Femininity*. Palgrave Macmillan 2009: 30.

¹¹⁷Kane Ousmane Oumar. *The Homeland Is the Arena: Religion, Transnationalism, and the Integration of Senegalese Immigrants in America*. Oxford University 2011:24

¹¹⁸Johnson, Wesley G. *Naissance du Sénégal contemporain: Aux origines de la vie politique moderne (1900-1920)*. Karthala 1991:163.

¹¹⁹Loimeier, Roman. *Muslim Societies in Africa: A Historical Anthropology*. Indiana University Press 2013: 285

Mouride's main principle of *ndiggel*, a command given to the followers by the *Cheikh*. The *ndiggel* required strong work ethic in agriculture. Under the French, this *ndiggel* served as a political tool,¹²⁰ as well for the recruitment of soldiers during the Great Wars.

France supported the Mouride's expansion in the interior, granted them vast tracts of lands, and applied the systematic investment plan (SIP) for the migration of peasant cultivators in the new lands.¹²¹ The currency of exchange was the French Francs until the year 1945, and the Mouride "followers became rich by growing groundnuts and the *French* benefited by *taxing* groundnut exports,"¹²² but the exploitation of the Mouride labor by France economic interest lasted for decades. The farmers did not counter France's exploitation, and the reason could be France's contribution toward the (*hadj*) trip to Mecca for its loyal Senegalese Muslim clerics, or it could be the Islamic principle about the after-life rewards, prioritized above the actual exploitive condition. The followers of the Sufi orders dedicated their life to their confreres and gave the majority of their hard-earned profit to their spiritual *cheikhs*, *marabouts*, *Khalifas*, or clerics in exchange for divine intervention and promise of entering heaven. Most importantly, the normalization of relations between France and the Islamic spiritual leaders such as Ahmadou Bamba, El Hadji Malick Sy, Seydina Issa Laye, El Hadji Seydou Nourou Tall, and El Hadji Ibrahima Niassé, led to the synchronization of Sufism into Senegal's politic.¹²³ At present, the land that France granted to Mouride, the holy city¹²⁴ of Touba (Mecca of West Africa); a state within a state, Touba has continued to operate its own governmental

¹²⁰Diouf, Mamadou & Leichtman, Mara A. *New Perspectives on Islam in Senegal*:245-269.

¹²¹Waterbury, John. *The Political Economy of Risk and Choice in Senegal*. Routledge 1987:52

¹²²IC Magazines Limited. *New African*. Africa Issues 337-347, 1996: 18.

¹²³Diouf, Mamadou. *Tolerance, Democracy, and Sufis in Senegal* 126

¹²⁴Diouf, Mamadou. *Tolerance, Democracy, and Sufis in Senegal* 129

institutions.¹²⁵ The leadership of the Senegalese Sufi orders, continued to be a family rule, whereas power only passes through the founders' family.

Equally important, the Black Frenchmen, the *originaires* or *Évolués* held the same career professions as metis and shared similar political struggles. The first African political group, *L'Aurore de Saint-Louis (1908)*, club of *Évolués* made up of a voluntary association of young city-dwellers, participated in the local electoral process;¹²⁶ the metis Deves ran with Galandou Diouf based on the mutual interest against French settlers and commercial interests. This General Council elections of 1909, marked the political rise of the Black Frenchmen. However, loyalty to France guaranteed more political rights. As a municipal representative, Diouf served as a lieutenant in the French army during WWI and was one of the founding members of political *Parti- Jeunes Sénégalais (Young Senegalese 1912)* along with its editorial, *La démocratie du Senegal*. The Young Senegalese included clerks, school teachers, interpreters, and letter-writers, which was an elitist pressure group that lobbied for labor rights, extension of political participation, and scholarship educational rights in France.

L'Aurore de St-Louis and *Jeunes Sénégalais* were the precursors of Senegal's political parties,¹²⁷ that paved the way for the nomination of a former custom and duty officer,¹²⁸ Blaise Diagne, elected as the first Black deputy in the General Council elections of 1914. However, the election brought friction between the metis and the Black Frenchmen. Many metis that wanted to retain power, voted against Diagne, but Carpot and other metis including Deves and Crespin

¹²⁵ Tostensen Arne, Tvedten Inge, Vaa Mariken. *Associational Life in African Cities Popular Responses to the Urban Crisis*. Gueye, Cheikh. "Touba: The New Dairas and the Urban Dream." Stylus Pub Llc 2001:107

¹²⁶ Johnson, Wesley G. *Naissance du Sénégal contemporain*:187.

¹²⁷ Hesseling Gerti. *Histoire politique du Sénégal institutions, droit et société*. Editions Karthala 1985: 142

¹²⁸ Mamigonian et al. *The Human Tradition in the Black Atlantic, 1500-2000*. 94.

supported their Freemason partner, Diagne. Interestingly, Senegalese Catholics and Muslim weren't restricted to biased voting. These Senegalese elites were well connected amongst themselves and with France elites (see Hosea Jaffe's *Senegal: From Diagne to Senghor*).¹²⁹ Diagne and his political advisor Galandou, challenged the French administration's limitation of *originaires*' political rights, advocated for Lebu's land rights, and France citizenship rights. Loyalty to France was solidified as Diagne recruited African soldiers to fight for France in WWI (1914-1918) and negotiated citizenship rights for the four communes privileged blacks, in which France approved as the *Loi Blaise Diagne* in 1916, and in "1919 Diagne founded the *Republican Socialist Party*, the first Western-style sub-Saharan African political party, which soon dominated Senegalese politic."¹³⁰ Eventually, the political fallout between Diagne and his political advisor Galandou over French interest,¹³¹ set a precedent for the future Senegalese political elites' factions.

Franco-Senegal's colonial legacy has been sustained through the elites' relationship, consolidated by a long tradition of marriages. The majority of these first and second generations Black Frenchmen political elites, as well the third generation such as Abdou Diouf and Habib Thiam, practiced the metis' *marriage a la mode*, in which they married French women or metis.¹³² From Diagne' statement "I am black, my wife is white, and my children are mixed"¹³³

¹²⁹Jaffe Hosea, Amin Samir. *A History of Africa*. Zed Books 2017; *Senegal: From Diagne to Senghor*

¹³⁰Gates Henry L, Appiah Anthony. *Encyclopedia of Africa*. Oxford University Press 2010:358

¹³¹Bayart, Jean-Francois. *Eta ten Afrique*. Longman 1993:211; Bayart, Jean-Francois. *The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly*. Polity 2009:211

¹³²Jones, Hilary. 2005. "From Mariage à la Mode to Weddings at Town Hall: Marriage, Colonialism, and Mixed-Race Society in Nineteenth-Century Senegal." *Boston University African Studies Center*. *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, Vol. 38, No. 1: 27-48.

¹³³Segalla Spencer D. *Moroccan Soul French Education, Colonial Ethnology, and Muslim Resistance, 1912-1956*. University of Nebraska Press 2009:69

to the first President of Senegal, Leopold Sedar Senghor's remarks, «*Je demeure plus que jamais convaincu que le métissage culture est un idéal de civilisation*»¹³⁴ (the melting pot of France and Senegal cultures to be an ideal civilization). In addition, the second President of Senegal, Abdou Diouf requoted Senghor «*C'est en français que s'incarnent notre identité, notre mémoire et notre avenir. C'est également en français que s'expriment notre fierté, notre solidarité et notre modernité*»¹³⁵ (it is in French that the Senegalese Black Frenchmen incarnated His identity and future).

Senegalese devoted a great time in political struggles against France, but France's economic development (1815-1914)¹³⁶ and economic growth (1974-2014)¹³⁷ indicated France had a slow industrial development. Therefore, France couldn't do much to assist Senegal in developing, because at the same time, France was pondering over Etienne Richet's *Le probleme colonial* (1919) and George Hardy's 1921 dissertation, *La Mise en valeur du Senegal de 1817 a 1854*.¹³⁸ France has continued benefiting from Senegal's resources. By the year 1915, the expansion of the railway from Dakar to Bamako (Mali's capital) was to facilitate the transportation of goods; especially, the groundnut expansion in the new Senegal oriental administrative capital, Tambacounda. Despite, several initiatives taken by French administrators

¹³⁴Lefilleul, A. (2005). *Léopold Sédar Senghor (1906-2001) : à l'orée de son centenaire / Africultures*. [online] Africultures. Available at: <http://africultures.com/leopold-sedar-senghor-1906-2001-a-loree-de-son-centenaire-4244/> [Accessed 24 Mar. 2019].

¹³⁵Diouf, Abdou. "Discours De Son Excellence Monsieur Abdou Diouf." *REMISE DE L'INSIGNE D'OFFICIER AU SECRÉTAIRE GÉNÉRAL DE LA FRANCOPHONIE, SON EXCELLENCE MONSIEUR ABDOU DIOUF*, 19 June 2007, pp. 1–2., doi:ordre-national.gouv.qc.ca.

¹³⁶Clapham John H. *The Economic Development of France and Germany, 1815-1914*. Cambridge University Press 1936

¹³⁷Askenazy Philippe, Freeman Richard. *The Blind Decades: Employment and Growth in France, 1974-2014*. University of California Press 2014

¹³⁸Hodge Joseph M, Hödl Gerald, Kopf Martina. *Developing Africa Concepts and Practices in Twentieth-century Colonialism*. Manchester University Press 2017

in setting lower rates for the railway, suppressing Senegal's tax groundnut exports and imposing duty-free on Senegal's import of groundnut, did not benefit the Senegalese farmers because France controlled the revenues. The beneficiaries of the groundnut, France's Marseilles' oil and soap industries along with textiles woolen industries were better situated to protest France's tariff policies, but not the exploited Senegalese farmers.

France implemented Albert Sarraut's development program, *La Mise en valeur de nos colonies*, a colonial pact of dependence, which was to turn Senegal into an estate or enterprise - basically, obligating Senegal to produce raw materials for the profit of the metropole.¹³⁹ However, such French ideals did not match with Senegalese farmers' realities, because France placed extreme pressure on the Senegalese agricultural sector. France had already intensely exploited the former peanut basin in Wolof territories, which resulted in soil depletion due to lack of crop rotation, and later France moved the peanut basin of Senegal in the Serer's region of the Sin-Saloum. The Serer of this region, became reluctant to switch traditional millet cultivation to groundnut, especially in Sine which remained as an official kingdom until 1969. France used (Sin-Saloum) as "a reservoir of soldiers during World War I and a provider of wealth at the same time."¹⁴⁰ Faye attributed the decline of the agricultural production to 'demographic puncture,' resulting in "fleeing population, end of seasonal farmers immigration, invasions of locusts, fall of the farm gate price, and increase of imported goods price."¹⁴¹ The same process was repeated by the French in Kabuu (Casamance), turning the region as a reservoir of soldiers during WWII.¹⁴²

¹³⁹Hodge Joseph M, et al. *Developing Africa Concepts and Practices in Twentieth-century Colonialism*.

¹⁴⁰ Faye, Valy. "Le cercle du Sine – Saloum (Sénégal) et la grande guerre. (1914-1918). Résumé : Le cercle du Sine-Salou." University of Cheikh Anta Diop UCAD 2015:1-13

¹⁴¹Faye, Valy. "Le cercle du Sine – Saloum (Sénégal) et la grande guerre.

¹⁴²Sembène Ousmane, director. *Emitai*. New Yorker Films, 1971.

The ramification of the single cash crop, peanut was not a concern, but Senegal still struggles to be a food-sufficient state because the peanut production excluded other crops. France exploited the poor farmers and collected taxes from them without meaningful returns for the farmers' social mobility improvement.

A creation of bureaucratization problem and corruption became the norm of developing the interior's agriculture. France established Provident Societies that consisted of a president, vice-president, local African chiefs with added secretary-treasurer in 1930, all whom were appointed by the French administration. However, the system caused a disconnect with the farmers that viewed the appointed officials "not as bodies that sprang from their own needs and wishes, but as an arm of the state."¹⁴³ The economic, administrative, including its courts, chieftaincies and tax were inflexible (Bangura). The chieftain system implemented by France, had majority of the Muslim *chefs de cantons* from the Futanke's nobility in the interior that spoke limited French. However, the force labor persisted as it benefited France and the Futanke's serfdom. The slave issues continued to impact modern Senegal,¹⁴⁴ especially in the region inhabited by the Futanke (Fouta Toro and Casamance) often resulting in lack of public services for the *Maccubés*¹⁴⁵ or *jiyaabe*¹⁴⁶ the descendants of slaves. A recent remark made concerning the development of the rural region, "the three regions composing Casamance (Ziguinchor,

¹⁴³ Waterbury, John. *The Political Economy of Risk and Choice in Senegal* 51

¹⁴⁴BA, Abdourahmane. "« Le Sénégal Au Cœur », L'histoire Aux Oubliettes." *Ferloo*, 16 Dec. 2018, www.ferloo.com/le-senegal-au-coeur-lhistoire-aux-oubliettes/.

¹⁴⁵Ndiaye, Amadou. "Sénégal : Qui Sont Les Esclaves Du Fouta ?" *Le Monde.fr*, *Le Monde*, 23 Mar. 2015, www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2015/03/23/senegal-qui-sont-les-esclaves-du-fouta_4599305_3212.html.

¹⁴⁶Bellagamba, Alice. "The Legacies of Slavery in Southern Senegal." *OpenDemocracy*, 29 Apr. 2015, www.opendemocracy.net/en/beyond-trafficking-and-slavery/legacies-of-slavery-in-southern-senegal/.

Kolda, and Sédhiou) are among the poorest in Senegal,"¹⁴⁷ along with Sine-Saloum (Koalack), "has one of the highest levels of poverty in the country."¹⁴⁸ The poverty in Senegal has been attributed to groundnut trade of the 1930s.

The global economic power of France must be taken into consideration. France was the second largest global creditor with 45 billion francs (1880-1914).¹⁴⁹ Therefore, there could be a strong possibility that France's creditor position, influenced Senegalese elites, who chose continuation instead of severing relations. However, French economic policies were detrimental because France restricted Senegal's exports, leading to the decline of certain products (1917-1919),¹⁵⁰ including groundnut products, cotton, fruit, vegetables, hides and skins. At worse, the politics of seeds (1920-1959) marked the beginning of the economic strangle of Senegal and the rest of the A.O.F. The Senegalese local price of the groundnut was one-third of France's market price. The other problems stem from France's institutional designs that became the major obstacle. Paris' administrators conflicted with the central administrators of A.O.F, and it was in regards of the agricultural provisions and the peasantry cash crop that France wanted to integrate in the world economy. France tried to break the debt exploitation that tied the cultivators to the local merchants, but only to find itself exploiting the local peanut farmers. Consequently, the global economy was rapidly changing, and "heavily capitalized export-import firms had taken

¹⁴⁷Usaid.gov. (2017). *SENEGAL CONFLICT VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT FINAL REPORT DECEMBER 2017*. [online] Available at: https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1860/20180213_Senegal_CVA_Report_External.pdf [Accessed 12 Mar. 2019].

¹⁴⁸SOS-US-EN. (2019). *SOS Children's Village Kaolack*. [online] Available at: <https://www.sos-usa.org/where-we-are/africa/senegal/kaolack> [Accessed 16 Apr. 2019].

¹⁴⁹Adler John H, Kuznets Paul W. *Capital Movements and Economic Development*. Palgrave Macmillan 1967:11

¹⁵⁰Supplement to Commerce Reports: Daily Consular and Trade Reports: Daily Consular and Trade Reports. The Bureau Of Foreign And Domestic Commerce Department Of Commerce, Washington, D.C. Annual Series. No. 72c December 16, 1920: Volume 18: 10-11

over the role in the trading economy from the old Bordeaux firms.”¹⁵¹ Coupled with the falling price of the groundnut, reduction of groundnut cultivation and slow marketing, affected the economic interests of multiple actors such as the farmers, France industries, metis' firms, and the A.O.F administration that benefited half of its revenues from custom duties of the import-export.

France was less interested in modernizing the economy and Senegal's economy remained status quo. To halt development, France placed a quota system on non-French products, and applied a price system for A.O.F products. The policies allowed France to dictate the price of Senegalese goods, as it heavily imported French made products in the Senegalese market. France's implementation of protectionist policies against foreign competitors stunted the industrial development of Senegal and the rest of the A.O.F. Protectionism, a French tradition, became Senegal's problem after decolonization. Henceforth, the implementation of the Zone Franc in 1945 by France introducing the Colonies Francaises d'Afrique franc (CFA) has continued preventing Senegal from being economically independent. This colonial currency (CFA franc or FCFA) fabricated in France has continued circulating as the national currency in Senegal and in fifteen African countries. CFA franc has been labeled as soft power means for France, because it ensured France' sphere of influence in Senegal and the fifteen other African countries using the currency. The current President Sall said that, “Le franc CFA est une bonne monnaie à garder” (“The CFA is a good currency to keep”). This colonial currency (CFA franc or FCFA) and the West African Bank established by France, predated Senegal's independence, and it could be only resolved between the elites.

Senegalese, as well African intellectuals and soldiers that fought for France during WWI and WWII, developed political awareness regarding France's imperialism and the global trend of

¹⁵¹Waterbury, John. *The Political Economy of Risk and Choice in Senegal*: 52

nationalist ideals. However, Senegal was economically limited as capital, means of production, freights and tariff were in France's control. France responded with a deadly use of force in repressing all non-violent protests: *Tirailleurs Sénégalais in Thiaroye (1944)*, Senegalese dock workers and railroad workers' general strike (1945-1946). Lamine Gueye, a lawyer, founder of the Parti Socialiste Senegalais (PSS),¹⁵² and Leopold Sedar Senghor's political mentor, served as the first Senegal's French Senator in the French National Assembly. Gueye implemented *Loi Lamine Gueye*, which extended citizenship throughout French West Africa in 1946.¹⁵³ However, France President De Gaulle desired assimilation policy, or federation, but no policy was implemented concerning reforming Senegal and A.O.F's economy. Although, the political struggle continued with the intellectual Negritude movement,¹⁵⁴ along with the First and Second Black Congress writers,¹⁵⁵ most of these intellectuals were elites affirming black identities theoretically. The main elite intellectuals such as Leopold Sedar Senghor, formed the Bloc Democratique Senegalais (BDS) out of the socialist camp with the economist, Mamadou Dia, a Senator (1948-1956). BDS promoted 'African socialism;' which was an untested idea of development that was influenced by Senghor's Negritude with the support of his Economic Advisor, Father Louis-Joseph Lebret, a French Dominican social scientist and philosopher; surprisingly, Lebret "was a cleric who had never explicitly renounced European imperialism, and

¹⁵² Docherty James C, Lamb Peter. *Historical Dictionary of Socialism*. The Scarecrow Press 2006:326

¹⁵³"Bulletin Des Impôts." *Lexpol*, lexpol.cloud.pf/LexpolAfficheTexte.php?texte=280452; [Lexpol.cloud.pf](http://lexpol.cloud.pf/). (1946). [online] Available at: <http://lexpol.cloud.pf/document.php?document=188590&deb=492&fin=492&titre=TG9pIG7CsCA0Ni05NDAgZHUgMDcvMDUvMTk0Ng==> [Accessed 14 Mar. 2019].

¹⁵⁴Senghor Léopold Sédar. *The Foundations of "Africanité": Or, "Negritude and Arabité"*. French & European 1971

¹⁵⁵Lock, Etienne. "Alioune Diop (1910-1980) • BlackPast." *BlackPast*, 7 July 2015, www.blackpast.org/global-african-history/alioune-diop-1910-1980/.

who continued to defend the importance of Europe's playing a 'civilizing role' in the third world."¹⁵⁶ Senghor disagreed on the political and economic approaches with its African counterparts such as Modibo Keita, Sekou Toure and Mamadou Dia in dealing with France after decolonization– tensions that would continue to create tensions for Senegalese economic policy following independence.

5.2 Post-Colonialism

Independence of the former French African colonies have been debated in terms if it was only political freedom and or if it was also economic freedom. The French word "octroyer" (to grant), was part of General De Gaulle's warning that there is a price to pay if Senegal and other French colonies in Africa choose to be independent. However, the Senegalese Black Frenchmen and metis ruling class, did not break away from the colonial links. Probably many people would be skeptical regarding my argument that Senegal lagged economically for much of its history because of its colonial legacy. The reason skeptics might assert to invalidate the argument, could be that Senegal's economy and politics seized to be in France's direct control following independence in 1960. Nonetheless, the available data indicate France remained as the dominant partner following the postcolonial era and this legacy has been well preserved by the Senegalese elites.

President Senghor reinforced France-Senegal relationship because he did not believe that Senegal could be in charge of its own destiny without French interference, as he advocated for self-determination rather than independence.¹⁵⁷ But did President Senghor have an alternative

¹⁵⁶Chamedes Giuliana. *A Twentieth-Century Crusade - The Vatican's Battle to Remake Christian Europe*. Harvard University Press 2019: 302

¹⁵⁷ Wilder, Gary. *Freedom Time: Negritude, Decolonization, and the Future of the World*. Duke University Press Books 2015.

option, as the President of France, General De Gaulle listed three choices for the French colonies: integration, autonomy, or independence during Referendum 1958? The former French colony, Algeria, gained independence by going to war with France, while Guinea opted for immediate independence and suffered economic repercussions. However, as Gueye's Parti Socialiste Senegalais (PSS) and Senghor's Bloc Democratie Senegalais (BDS) merged to form Union Progressiste S n galaise (UPS, Senegalese Progressive Union), UPS voted "YES" to remain within the French community. Senghor's desire was to remain with France as well. Senghor and most of UPS were not present during De Gaulle's Referendum visit at Dakar on August 26, 1958. The UPS political elites made the agreement to stay with France without consulting the population. However, the mass of the Senegalese population led by religious marabouts, Senegalese women movement¹⁵⁸ (*Les Mamans de l'Ind pendance*)¹⁵⁹ or (*mboatay*) and other political parties like the Parti pour le Regroupment Africain (Party for African Regroupment) (PRS) and Parti Africain de L'Ind pendance (African Independence Party) (PAI 1957-1980) voted "NON" opting for independence instead of autonomy. One of Senghor's party members, Valdiodio N'diaye went against UPS decision and declare Senegal's independence to De Gaulle, but the UPS' "YES" vote was upheld on September 28, 1958.

Why would the newly independent Senegalese elites not exercise full independence? As we saw in the last section, the choice to retain ties can be found in the founding elites' biographies.

¹⁵⁸Sene, Fatou K. "LES MAMANS DE L'INDEPENDANCE DE DIABOU BESSANE : Les Zones D'ombre De L'histoire Politique S n galaise Soulev es." *Xibar.net - L'oeil Critique Du S n gal*, Walfadjri , 18 Feb. 2013, www.xibar.net/LES-MAMANS-DE-L-INDEPENDANCE-DE-DIABOU-BESSANE-Les-zones-d-ombre-de-l-histoire-politique-senegalaise-soulevees_a47769.html.

¹⁵⁹Diop, Baba. "Les Mamans De L'ind pendance, De Diabou Bessane Dix Sept Passionarias Sur Une Longue Liste." *Africin *, Sud Quotidien, 8 Mar. 2013, www.africine.org/?menu=art&no=11388.

For instance, the founding father of the new nation, Senghor, was groomed by France since he was seven years old. Once he earned the Aggregation in French Grammar at the top prestigious French school, Ecole Normale Supérieure of Sorbonne University, France granted him French nationality and he fought to defend France during WWII. Senghor's political career began in academia. He was dean of the French National Schools abroad, taught in several schools in France and trained French officials to better serve Senegal. Influenced by Lamine Gueye to run for election in France's National Assembly, Senghor became Deputy of transportation between Senegal and Mauritania. Despite Gueye's (1951-57) and Senghor's socialist stand and political fallout over 1946 union strike, the socialist influence of Senghor was reinforced in France. Republicanism, socialism, Marxism, communism, nationalism, feminism, universalism and all other political "isms" collided and reconciled in Senghor's world. After resigning from the *Section française de L'Internationale ouvrière* (SFIO) of *parti socialiste* (PSS), Senghor's political party BDS dominated Senegal's legislative elections of 1951. BDS consisted of radical young Senegalese that completed higher education in France compared to the moderate political party of Gueye's PSS. Despite the merging of the two parties as UPS, the division persisted between the moderate and the radical,¹⁶⁰ but Senghor was a moderate like his political mentor Gueye that supported France's interest in Senegal. Next Senghor, held several government positions, serving as advisor to Edgar Faure and Michel Debre, former French Prime Ministers in the 1950s.¹⁶¹ The government position Senghor held as mayor of Thies (one of the city-states of the Serer kingdoms of Sine and Saloum) in 1956, was crucial in getting him acquainted with the interior. Additionally, Under President

¹⁶⁰Gastellu, Jean-Marc. *L'égalitarisme économique des Serer du Sénégal*. O.R.S.T.O.M 1981:454-456

¹⁶¹Mory Catherine. *La littérature pour ceux qui ont tout oublié*. Larousse 2013:445.

Charles De Gaulle's reign, Senghor was a member of the French commissions that drafted the French Constitution in 1946 and 1958.

Senegal, as the capital of French West Africa was a status of grandeur, especially the four French communes' status was no match to any other French colonies. The status served as motivating factor for the elites and the communes vote to remain with France. Taking into consideration that, as anti-colonial sentiment was spreading throughout the colonized world, France itself was going through economic reconstruction and political transformation during the period following the aftermath of World War II (1946-1958). France's dismal economy, and the rise of the two super powers, the United States and the Soviet Union reorienting the geopolitics, left French elites with a nostalgic desire to reclaim its former glory as *le grand empire*. As a result, France passed numerous laws trying to preserve the empire. One such law, the (*loi Lamine Gueye*), and the Senegalese elites were at the forefront, galvanizing support in Africa for France leading the path toward modernization. By the year 1959, Senghor and Modibo Keita negotiated independence for Senegal and French Sudan (Mali) and Senghor and Keita formed the Federation of Mali by following Kwame Nkrumah's idea of Union of African States. This resulted in a successful political strategy that prevented France's balkanization of the African states. Unfortunately, after five months, Senegal and Mali seized federalism due to political struggle. Senegal opted for decentralization and Mali opted for centralization and, eventually, President Senghor governed Senegal by centralizing power.

In actuality, Senegal has been a compartmentalized society created by France, and maintained by the Senegalese elites. The compartmentalized society, as indicated in the previous section, occurred through a gradual transition, involving pacification and violence. Political disunity and state disunity in Senegal derived from French rule. Notably, France cultivated an

elitist political class, and limited the development of Senegal within the four communes. Once Senegal broke away from Mali Federation, and was recognized as an independent state in 1960, President Senghor hired the majority of state officials from the metis families of the four communes to serve as ambassadors, lawyers, magistrates, journalists, and educators of the new nation.¹⁶² However, President Senghor was powerless without the accord of the rulers in the interior; the political elite conflicted with the marabout elite, which exacerbated the ethnic, religious, and regional division (See Jean-Marc Gastellu,¹⁶³ Mamadou Diouf,¹⁶⁴ and F.O. ALALADE¹⁶⁵). Despite King *Buur* Mehacor of Sine, a frequent guest at Senghor father's home, *Buur* Mehacor refused legitimizing Senghor regardless of Senghor's Serer ethnicity, because, Lamine Gueye was the rightful ruler by maternal blood. However, this problem of leadership could be attributed to French rule destroying the traditional rulership. Furthermore, the other issue, Senghor spent most of his time in France; therefore, he was unknown to most Senegalese. Prime minister Dia (1960-62) and President of Senegal National Assembly Gueye (1960-68) supported Senghor in normalizing relations with the spiritual Muslim leaders of the *Mouride* and *Tinajniyyah* brotherhoods. In general, the main problem, President Senghor wanted absolute control. As a result, he fired all of the Senegalese' officials with royal blood or the ministers with expertise and replaced them with officials that supported his rule.

¹⁶² Jones, Hilary. *The Métis of Senegal: Urban Life and Politics in French West Africa*. Indiana University Press 2013.

¹⁶³Gastellu Jean-Marc. *L'égalitarisme économique des Serer du Sénégal*. O.R.S.T.O.M 1981

¹⁶⁴Diouf. *Tolerance, Democracy, and Sufis in Senegal*.

¹⁶⁵Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria. "SENGHOR, THE RISE OF THE DOMINANT PARTY AND RETURN MULTI-PARTY SYSTEM" by ALALADE F.O. Historical Society of Nigeria 1981:36.

Chapter 6

6.1 Transition

Politics and economics have been inseparable in Senegal and France's relationship. It should be made clear that the elitist interest groups remained entrenched in the politics and economy of Senegal. For example, by the year 1961 until 1962, Dia visited heads of states in Scandinavia, Yugoslavia, Washington, London, Brussels. But the visit to Khrushchev of the Soviet Union angered France, as well as Senghor who was an anti-communist. The year 1962 marked a missed opportunity for Senegal's development. UPS was engulfed in crisis, the tensions between President Senghor and his Prime Minister Dia's development approaches conflicted over French interest. Prime Minister Dia's goal was to diversify Senegal's economic partners and not rely solely on Senegal's dependency on France. In contrast, President Senghor favored political clientelism, which enabled corruption in all of Senegal's institutions. On the other hand, Dia's economic reformation, structured the marabout elites' role, and established creditors that benefited the rural farmer. It was an *animation rurale* plan for the educational, political, and economic development of the rural. The plan was not welcomed by President Senghor nor his allies in French industries. In general, it was a dependent relationship between French elites and Senegalese elites, connecting back to the marabout elites' relationship with the state, but also the *talibe* (disciples) farmers' dependency on their marabout.

At the very beginning of its independence, Senegal's institutional design was problematic, and still in need of restructuring. One of the main economic institutions, Chambre De Commerce had a majority of French employees and a French president for decades following independence;

Mr Henry Charles Gallenca, Président de la chambre de commerce de Dakar (1960-1969),¹⁶⁶ and Senegalese political elites in Senghor's camp, plotted a motion of censure against Dia, in which 80 members voted for the motion. As a result, "Four of the Ministers in *Mamadou Dia's* cabinet were tried with him. Ibrahima Sarr (Development), Joseph M'Baye (Rural Economy), and *Valdiodio N'Diaye* (Finance) were sentenced to 20 years imprisonment, while Alioune Tall (Information) received five years in prison plus a 10- year suspension of his civil rights."¹⁶⁷ President Senghor repatriated Jean Alfred Diallo from France to replace the Senegalese Army General Fall for an attempt to neutralize Fall's support of Dia. Interestingly, the third President of Senegal, Abdoulaye Wade, an economist and a lawyer, served as Dia's attorney, only to be pardoned by President Senghor by the year 1974. However, the marabouts elites within Senegal confreres: Falilou Mbacke (Mouride), El Hadj Ibrahima Niass (*Tinajniyyah*), El Hadj Seydou Nourou Tall (*Tinajniyyah*) sided with President Senghor's decision for the imprisonment of Dia, except Abdoul Aziz Sy (*Tinajniyyah*) that remained silent on the matters. This goes to show religion wasn't a factor because Senghor was a Catholic and was supported by marabout elites.

The consolidation of power enabled President Senghor to re-establish the colonial institutions with modifications; a triangular economic reform, in which the marabout elites controlled the agricultural cooperatives. The marabouts would buy the production of the peanut from their disciples with the state's funds. Generally, on an advance payment, and in this case, the marabout replaced French intermediaries. In return, France continued to benefit as the Senegalese

¹⁶⁶SAKHO, Amadou Lamine, and Ibrahima Seydou NDAW. "LE SENEGAL : Un Pays Particulier." *EnQuete* , Enquetepus, 16 June 2016, www.enquetepus.com/content/le-senegal-un-pays-particulier.

¹⁶⁷Africa Special Report: Bulletin of the Institute of African American Relations, Volumes 8-9. *The Institute*, Africa, Sub-Saharan 1963: 9 (IX).

state sell the peanut to France in CFA instead of the French Franc, and the result of such exploitation impacted Senegal's growth rate with a quasi-stagnation of imports (1960-1970). Senegal's Constitution was reformed by President Senghor in 1959, 1960, 1963, as he presented himself as the only presidential candidate for the 1963 and 1973 elections. Senghor's restricted democracy was challenged by the May 1968 Senegalese student revolt, such as Omar Blondin Diop¹⁶⁸ and the general strike of Senegalese workers, which then led President Senghor to establish one-party state rule. More in depth information was provided by Bartlett and Vavrus regarding the transformation of the French control of Senegal's education system that demanded an Africanization reform for more Senegalese faculty.¹⁶⁹ Despite President Senghor's nomination of his *dauphin* or *Protégé*, Abdou Diouf as his Prime Minister (1970-1980), Senegal's economy was in great turmoil as it grappled with drought, coupled with 1970s global energy oil crisis and the great inflation of interest rates.

Finally, once legal opposition was reconstituted, President Senghor granted Abdoulaye Wade to establish his political party, Parti Démocratique Sénégalais (Senegalese Democratic Party-PDS). President Senghor's UPS became Parti Socialist (Socialist Party) (PS), while the clandestine political party, P.A.I remerged with Dia's *Coordination de l'opposition senegalaise unie* (coordinating the Unified Senegalese *Opposition*-COSU).¹⁷⁰ At the same time, Cheikh Anta Diop established *Rassemblement national démocratique* (National Democratic Rally-RND) with its editorials *Siggi* and *Taxaw*¹⁷¹ written in French and Wolof that advocated civic duties and

¹⁶⁸ Zeilig Leo. *Revolt and protest: student politics and activism in sub-Saharan Africa*. Tauris Academic Studies 2007:170

¹⁶⁹Bartlett Lesley, Vavrus Frances. *Critical Approaches to Comparative Education Vertical Case Studies from Africa, Europe, the Middle East, and the Americas*. Palgrave Macmillan 2009: 44.

¹⁷⁰Gellar, Sheldon. *Democracy in Senegal* 45

¹⁷¹Gellar, Sheldon. *Democracy in Senegal* 80

denounced mal-governance. However, President Senghor excluded Dia and Diop's left-leaning political parties' participation in elections. Wade ran as the only opposition candidate against Senghor during the election of 1978, and as riot erupted after the ballot, President Senghor imprisoned Wade for his nationalist political ideologies.

By the year 1981, at 74 years old, President Senghor decided to resign, and handed power to his chosen successor, Abdou Diouf (1981-2000). Before stepping down, President Senghor implemented President de Gaulle's idea of *Organisation internationale de la Francophonie*.

“Senghor soon made use of it to accord legitimacy to African literature. Senghor saw francophonie as a Trojan horse that could introduce African literature into the French universities.”¹⁷² As a member of *Tinajniyyah*, Diouf's twenty years reign, was status quo.

President Senghor had placed key political elites that made President Diouf's transition unchallenged. President Diouf agreed with the establishment of Senegambia Confederation with President Dawda Jawara of Gambia (1982-1989);¹⁷³ however, it was short-lived. Three general elections were held in 1983, 1988¹⁷⁴ and 1993, while Diouf remained unbeaten by Wade; although, Wade was imprisoned for “murder in May 1993 of Maitre Babacar Seye, Vice-President of the Constitutional Council,” the charges were eventually dropped against Wade.¹⁷⁵

The *Diombor*, (the Hare) was Wade, the nightmare of President Diouf; he was “arrested and jailed several times for his political activities, but also served twice as minister under Mr

¹⁷²Lilyan Kesteloot and Ellen Conroy Kennedy. “Senghor, Negritude and Francophonie on the Threshold of the Twenty-First Century.” *Research in African Literatures*, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Indiana University Press Stable, 1990), 51-57

¹⁷³Senghor Jeggan Colley. *The Politics of Senegambian Integration, 1958-1994*. Peter Lang 2008:257

¹⁷⁴Banks William C. *Political Handbook of the World 1994-95*. CQ Press 1995: 7

¹⁷⁵Amnesty International. *The 1995 Report on Human Rights Around the World*. Hunter House 1995:255.

Diouf.”¹⁷⁶ However, in like manner to Senghor, President Diouf faced crises, such as Senegal-Mauritania Border War (1989-1991), an invalid school year in 1988, and in 1994, the riots led by students intensified. Since the 1980s, President Diouf faced growing tensions by Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC) in Casamance, Senegal's southern province; unequal distribution of resources, led MFDC to seek independence, as the local population supported the cause. Coupled with the persistent drought and climate change, Senegal's economy was in bad shape as it was in the recovery phase. At worst, President Diouf's agreement with the devaluation of the CFA franc in 1994 led to more deterioration of Senegal's economy.

After twenty-six years in the opposition, Wade, a member of *Mouride*, was elected President in 2000. Surprisingly, within twelve years at the helm, Senegal experienced a true democracy, as well economic growth. Simply, President Wade had a vision, as he was known as “Gorgui” old-man in Wolof when he assumed power, and also as *LE BÂTISSEUR* (The Builder). All of the recent infrastructure works stem from Wade's time. President Wade restructured Senegal's market by diversifying economic partners, as well the political institutions, along with constitutional reform in 2001. As a former university professor, President Wade had also reformed the educational system. In addition, President Wade was successful to establish peace and restore justice with MFDC. President Wade was re-elected to lead Senegal in the general election held in 2007.

Nonetheless, Wade's presidency was a period of tensions between France and Senegal. France newly elected President Nicolas Sarkozy visited Dakar, Senegal, where he delivered a speech addressing to the Senegalese students at the University of Cheikh Anta Diop. The speech

¹⁷⁶Cornado, Estelle. “Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade's Rise and Rule.” *BBC News*, BBC, 26 Mar. 2012, www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-16905528.

covered various aspects, such as the tragic colonialization, the double traditions shared between Africa and Europe, but the insulting part of such speech, as President Sarkozy said,

Le drame de l'Afrique, c'est que l'homme africain n'est pas assez entré dans l'histoire. Le paysan africain, qui depuis des millénaires, vit avec les saisons, dont l'idéal de vie est d'être en harmonie avec la nature, ne connaît que l'éternel recommencement du temps rythmé par la répétition sans fin des mêmes gestes et des mêmes paroles. Dans cet imaginaire où tout recommence toujours, il n'y a de place ni pour l'aventure humaine, ni pour l'idée de progrès.¹⁷⁷

The African farmer has been and was the main exploited Individual in the colonial legacy of France and Senegal; therefore, as the exploitation persisted, it made it difficult for the farmer to improve its condition. Regardless of such insulting remark, the divorce between Senegal and France would be unthinkable, Senghor was married to a French woman, Diouf married a metise, and Wade married a French woman. Despite the remarkable achievements, President Wade faced backlash from the population (Y'en a marre¹⁷⁸ and M23¹⁷⁹), who refused the alteration of the Senegal's Constitution¹⁸⁰ and grooming of Wade' son to become President; as a result of the 2012 general election, Wade lost to his former Prime Minister Macky Sall.¹⁸¹ In brief, President Sall has been criticized by Senegalese, for being a 'puppet of France;' under President Sall's leadership, Senegal market reverted back to France's control.

6.2 Conclusion

¹⁷⁷Africavenir.org. (2007). *Discours de Nicolas SARKOZY à l'Université Cheikh Anta Diop Dakar, Sénégal, le 26 juillet 2007*. [online] Available at: http://www.africavenir.org/fileadmin/_migrated/content_uploads/REMRES_Redent_dt_frz_03.pdf [Accessed 25 Apr. 2019].

¹⁷⁸Mehler Andreas, Melber Henning, Walraven Klaas van. Africa Yearbook Volume 8 Politics, Economy and Society South of the Sahara in 2011. Brill 2012:172; Africa Yearbook Volume 9 Politics, Economy and Society South of the Sahara in 2012. Brill 2013:177.

¹⁷⁹Mueller Lisa. *Political Protest in Contemporary Africa*. Cambridge University Press 2018:11

¹⁸⁰Clark Msia Kibona, Koster Mickie Mwanzia. *Hip Hop and Social Change in Africa*. Lexington Books 2014: 35

¹⁸¹Gueye Cheikh. *Carnets politiques du Sénégal Regard critique sur la décennie post-alternance*. Editions L'Harmattan 2014:12

Senegal's current international trade has been based on comparative advantage, yet I cannot name a single comparative advantage Senegal has in the global market. When questioned regarding economic growth of a country, the Economist responded by listing the four factors that spur growth: physical capital, human capital, technology, and foreign direct investment (FDI). But a number of studies examined, talk about Senegal's peanut industry as a comparative advantage. Yet, Senegal has been vulnerable to the shocks of the global market, interest rate, and trade term. Politically, Senegal is a country recognized as a model democracy with stable institutions, but economically questioned. Economists divided the factors of production as land, labor, and capital and agreed that no country could be productive in all three because of endogenous and exogenous factors implication. In this context France would be considered an exogenous factor, while the Senegalese elites, the endogenous factor impeding on the development of Senegal.

The recent data shows that FDI is positive and that remittances flow into Senegal. But technology shouldn't be a problem for Senegal if Rwanda is ranked third in technology; Rwanda is being mentioned because in a length of 25 years, its development is a model example in Africa. Given that Senegal is a primary resource exporter, in which its currency is tied to France, and a market dominated by France, the only explanation is blatantly clear that France and Senegalese elites are the causes. Today, multi-corporation companies extract Senegal's natural resources; however, there is no records showing multi-corporation companies' contribution in the overall society. Having recently travel to Senegal, I attest that there is a deep divide between the urban and rural, but such disparity has its origin in the colonial period.

There are many reasons given for the lack of reforms by the Senegalese elites but they particularly fear losing privileges vis a vis France and the fraternity that the two countries share at


the international level. France has been a member of the Security Council at the United Nations, and Senegal has been the most important ally of France in Africa. Perhaps, France's financial approval for Senegal to receive loans from the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) could be other possibilities explaining Senegalese elites' loyalty to France. In fact, Senegal was the first African nation that the WB and IMF approved for loans during the 1970s global crisis. Given that political interest has been prioritized over the national interest, the Senegalese population have been divided politically and economically regarding their relationship with France.

Besides the CFA franc, and France being the dominant economic partner, France has been maintaining a military base with a sizable unit of 1200 soldiers in Senegal's capital, Dakar. France's military presence in Senegal, which dates back to the colonial era, has been also contested. President Wade demanded the closure of the French military base,¹⁸² but the current President Sall reopened the base and reverted back to the old business model. Interestingly, President Sall's regime includes Ousmane Tenor Dieng, President du Haut Conseil des Collectivites territoriales (HCCT) and Moustapha Niass, President of Senegal National Assembly. These are two key elected officials that also have served at top government positions during President Senghor and President Diouf's forty years reign. France and Senegal's relationship has been a renewed affair under President Sall, as Sall has former President Diouf as advisor. Diouf, the second Secretary General of the International Organisation de La Francophonie (OIF) (2003-2014), revealed that Senegal cannot break away from France. President Sall implemented an economic plan, *Le Sénégal émergent*, which focused in the agriculture sector, as Senegal's debt rises. In the year 2016,

¹⁸²France 24. (2010). *French army to close Senegal base 50 years after independence*. [online] Available at: <https://www.france24.com/en/20100609-france-says-it-will-pull-most-troops-senegal-independence-anniversary> [Accessed 26 Apr. 2019].

President Sall amended the Constitution by limiting the president term from seven years to five years. However, corruption remained as an incurable disease, coupled with President Sall's undemocratic principle, the disqualification of opposition¹⁸³ and imprisonment of political opponent;¹⁸⁴ all of President Sall's political maneuvers, serve as a reminder of President Senghor's "elimination of opposition parties."¹⁸⁵

What have we learned? Conflicting elites' interest creates institutional design problems. What have we found is the root of the problem? The colonial legacy maintained by elites. What are the solutions? Log-term investments in education, equal distribution of resources within the urban and rural regions, and equal partnership with France and any other nation in the world willing to do business.



¹⁸³Christensen, S. and Ba, D. (2019). *Senegal blocks popular opposition candidates from presidential race*. [online] U.S. Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-senegal-politics/senegal-blocks-popular-opposition-candidates-from-presidential-race-idUSKCN1P81S5> [Accessed 20 Feb. 2019].

¹⁸⁴Christensen, S. (2019). *Senegal presidential hopeful loses appeal against jail time*. [online] U.S. Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-senegal-politics/senegal-presidential-hopeful-loses-appeal-against-jail-time-idUSKCN1OX17E> [Accessed 12 Feb. 2019].

¹⁸⁵Gellar, Sheldon. *Democracy in Senegal*:45-46.