Intimate Relationships: Reality and Normativity

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INTIMATE RELATIONSHIPS: REALITY AND NORMATIVITY

by

JASON V. ALTILIO

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Philosophy in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York

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This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Philosophy to satisfy the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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Close interpersonal relationships are a part of everyone’s life at some point. For most people these relationships are actually prominent parts of their everyday lives. As such, it is important to figure out whether and how they fit into different normative theories of ethics. Relationships like those that exist as romantic couples, close friendships, and parent-child relationships share certain features with other close interpersonal relationships that I define as “intimate relationships” in this dissertation. Intimate relationships are those that exist between people when they wish one another well, act for one another, do so mutually, treat one another as ends in themselves, and trust one another. If a normative theory is to account for moral value in intimate relationships then it must meet a set of necessary and sufficient conditions. My purpose in this dissertation is to synthesize these conditions after analyzing four distinct normative theories’ accounts of moral value in intimate relationships: Kantianism, G.E. Moore’s consequentialism, Aristotle’s virtue ethics, and Virginia Held’s ethics of care. These four theorists’ approaches to normative ethics were selected because each theorist claims to value intimate relationships yet each provides a different account of that value. I first show that each theorist considers intimate relationships to be morally valuable and then analyze their theories’ abilities to account for that value using four value terms: intrinsic good, extrinsic good, instrumental good, and final good. I then identify the components of each normative theory that either allow it to capture or prevent it from capturing the moral value of intimate relationships. This leads to the conclusion that a normative theory must allow for value in each of the components of an intimate relationship and appraise the relationships themselves to be more than
instrumentally valuable in order to account for any moral value in the relationships. Those people who treat the intimate relationships in their lives as having moral value will be able to gauge the applicability of a particular normative theory to their lives by that theory’s ability to meet the aforementioned criteria.
Acknowledgements

In the dissertation that follows I refrain from arguing for a conclusion that many, myself included, already believe and treat as being true: that intimate relationships, or close interpersonal relationships, have moral value. I instead show that several philosophers also treat this claim as being true before I synthesize a set of necessary and sufficient conditions that a normative theory must meet in order to account for such moral value.

I owe the strength of my conviction in this belief and my interest in the topic of intimate relationships to many of the same people to whom I owe thanks for helping me on my way to completing this dissertation. It is my pleasure to be able to thank at least some of those people here, and being a dissertation on interpersonal relationships there are a lot of people to thank.

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I also owe Virginia Held special thanks for all the help she has offered me on this dissertation and in understanding the ethics of care. When I decided to audit her course on new developments in the ethics of care I made perhaps the best decision I made while in the program. That semester I began to see the ethics of care as more than just a critique but as a source of exciting positive advances in ethics. I credit Virginia Held’s teaching during the course and her
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It was at Long Island University’s Brooklyn Campus that I was first exposed to and came to appreciate philosophy generally. It was there too that the foundations of this dissertation were laid. Thus, I am very grateful to Kristana Arp, Margaret Cuonzo, Joe Filonowics, and Melissa Grant for their role in my education. Kristana was my first philosophy professor, led me through my first independent study on the philosophy of friendship, and was the philosopher I chose to talk to when I was trying to decide whether to give up a career in pharmacy in an attempt to become a professional philosopher. Clearly, without her involvement my time at LIU would have been very different and I might well have never started this dissertation. Margaret, in addition to suggesting I apply to the Graduate Center and hiring me to my first adjunct position as a philosophy professor, taught me as a student how far philosophy extends beyond the classroom walls. Joe’s constant encouragement with my writing and continual effort in making the environment at LIU conducive to philosophical thought and community solidified my belief that I could succeed in philosophy after graduating from LIU. Melissa Grant was the first to introduce me to the ethics of care in a course on theories of feminism that still sticks out in my mind as one of the most well taught classes I have ever had the privilege of taking.
I am also incredibly fortunate to have developed four close interpersonal relationships, long lasting friendships, with Shivang Shah, Jason Farbman, Steve Altman, and Jared DelRosso. I have known Shivang since Middle School and our relationship has deepened through the years as we have shared countless experiences that have impacted the directions of our lives and our thoughts on innumerable topics with one another. Jay and I have sincerely discussed some of the most meaningful questions philosophy has to offer as well as the most personal details of our lives with one another. Steve and I have cultivated a relationship of mutual care and concern out of our deep appreciation for baseball and the New York Mets. Jared’s intellectual curiosity has consistently provided us with probing conversations that enlarge the boundaries of our own interests. It is the four of you that originally rooted my interest in friendship at the outset of my commitment to philosophy and it is with the four of you, and our wives, that I have come the closest to having detailed conversations about the concrete meaning of this dissertation. With intellects such as yours surrounding me since high school it is no wonder that I grew to love philosophical discussion, so I thank the four of you for providing me with the relationships I needed to see my work on this topic flourish.

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Table of Contents

Chapter 1: Introduction ................................................................. Page 1

Chapter 2: Value from Intrinsic to Instrumental ............................... Page 15

Chapter 3: Intimate Relationships................................................. Page 33

Chapter 4: Kant and the Value of Intimate Relationships ................. Page 51

Chapter 5: Moore and the Consequentialist Value of Intimate Relationships........ Page 70

Chapter 6: Aristotle and the Value of Intimate Relationships............Page 90

Chapter 7: The Value of Care and Relationships in the Ethics of Care ........Page 109

Chapter 8: Conclusions................................................................. Page 122

Bibliography ........................................................................ Page 138
Intimate Relationships: Reality and Normativity: Introduction

Close interpersonal relationships are undeniably part of real human lives. Everyone has parents, most people have at least one close friend, and many people have siblings, children, or other family members with whom they have close relationships. Some of these relationships are ones people are born into and others are formed, but without question these relationships are significant to the people that create and foster them.

The constant presence of such relationships in real lives has given rise to many theories about relationships as well as the role they should play in human lives. Questions about close interpersonal relationships have been addressed in works of philosophy and literature. While Western thought owes a great debt to the authors of antiquity and the middle ages, I would like to focus on Giovanni Boccaccio’s *Decameron* as a work that tackled these issues and in doing so influenced, or at least prefigured, a great deal of subsequent thought and literature about intimate relationships.¹ The stories of *Decameron* are especially interesting because they detail several different components of close interpersonal relationships that are of enduring importance.

One noteworthy characteristic of the stories of *Decameron* is that they do not necessarily equate sex with love. This is an important distinction for the purposes of this dissertation because the close interpersonal relationships that will be defined in chapter three as intimate may or may not include a sexual component: the love at the heart of these morally valuable relationships is not dependent on sex. Many stories in *Decameron* detail relationships that involve sex without love and others which involve love without sex.

For example, the fifth story of the third day of *Decameron* describes the relationship between Ricciardo the Magnifico and the wife of Signoir Francesco. Ricciardo is a young wealthy man without any court status that is so well mannered and dressed that he is called the Magnifico as a sign of respect. Signoir Francesco is a Knight who is stingy despite possessing an abundance of riches and is married to a beautiful and virtuous woman. Ricciardo has for a long time secretly courted Signoir Francesco’s wife without any success. Word of Ricciardo’s interest in her eventually makes it to Signoir Francesco. Someone suggests to Signoir Francesco that if he asks Ricciardo for his horse Ricciardo will give it to him for love of Signoir Francesco’s wife. Though Signoir Francesco can afford to buy the horse he jumps at the opportunity to get such a splendid animal for free. Under the pretense of buying the horse, Signoir Francesco invites Ricciardo to his home. Ricciardo does, in fact, offer the horse to Signoir Francesco for free under the condition that Ricciardo can speak to his wife out of anyone else’s earshot. Signoir Francesco agrees after privately telling his wife not to say anything in response to Ricciardo’s words. Signoir Francesco’s wife is displeased with the request since she does not want to hear Ricciardo’s words or entreaties. Nevertheless, she agrees to comply with her husband’s request. Upon doing so and hearing Ricciardo’s words “she began to finde that in her, which (before) she never felt, namely Love.”\(^2\) Though she keeps her promise to her husband and does not offer any verbal response, the quick thinking Ricciardo sees the non-verbal cues of someone affected by his words and figures out Signoir Francesco’s plan. Ricciardo then speaks as if speaking for Signoir Francesco’s wife and expresses the gratitude and sentiments that she could not verbalize. Signoir Francesco receives his horse and leaves for Milan as his wife is left to contemplate Ricciardo’s words and suggestion for a subsequent meeting.

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This story makes the distinction between sex and love quite clear. Though Signoir Francesco and his wife had certainly had sex before his wife’s conversation with Ricciardo, it was Ricciardo’s speech that first engendered feelings of love in Signoir Francesco’s wife. Furthermore, this love is felt by Signoir Francesco’s wife and by Ricciardo without them having had sex with one another. Additionally, at the end of the story the reader is left in suspense about whether the two lovers ever physically consummated their love.

Boccaccio also included stories that explore familial love in *Decameron*. This indicates that Boccaccio saw relationships marked by familial love as worthy of consideration alongside those relationships containing a romantic sense of love.

The eighth story of the second day provides one example of such familial love. In this story the Count D’Angiers is appointed Governor of France while the King and his son are away at war. In the course of fulfilling his obligations the Count catches the eye of the prince’s wife. However, when the honorable Count rejects her advances she accuses him of attempted rape. Knowing the danger he faces the Count quickly flees from France and arranges care for his daughter and son. The Count himself begins a very tough life as serving man to an Earl in Ireland. The Count’s daughter, Violenta, through several turns of good fortune marries the son of one of the King of England’s marshalls. Lewes, the Count’s son, through similar good fortune marries into the position of another of the King of England’s marshalls situated in Wales. Eighteen years after the Count first fled France he leaves Ireland to search for his children. He is overjoyed at his children’s circumstances and considers all the hardships he has endured in Ireland as nothing in light of his discovery. Without revealing himself as Violenta’s father or his grandchildren’s grandfather, he is taken into Violenta’s house because of his grandchildren’s natural affection for him. Meanwhile, the prince of France’s wife, now Queen, becomes ill and
confesses her sin against the Count asking that he and his children be reinstated to their former honor if they still live. After hearing an official proclamation to this effect, the Count finally reveals himself to his son and son-in-law. The Count then has his son-in-law present him to the King of France to claim the reward promised in the proclamation as a retroactive dowry for his daughter’s hand in marriage. Finally, the Count is also reunited with his daughter and the entire family is elated as the Count is reinstated to an even higher position in France than he held before he was forced to flee from the country.

The inclusion of this story among those of *Decameron* shows that the love shared between a father and his children is worthy of mention alongside the love shared between romantic couples. The Count’s decision to remain anonymous even after finding out his children’s prestigious lots in life shows that he loves his children for their own sakes. He gives up the opportunity to be released from his lowly position in life so as not to upset his daughter’s happiness. Only after he knows that revealing himself will help his children does he do so. Additionally, his children’s response to seeing their father alive again shows the love they clearly feel toward him. The number of stories detailing romantic love in *Decameron* may far outstrip those addressing familial love, however the stories that deal with familial love never feel out of place amongst the one hundred stories. Though different, the two categories of love are both significant when describing love’s place in actual human lives.

Another reason that Boccaccio’s *Decameron* is important is that many of its stories stress the value of mutuality in close interpersonal relationships. The stories as a whole emphasize the point that close interpersonal relationships cannot be unidirectional. In the stories of *Decameron* love must be felt by both members of the relationship toward one another for the relationship to work.
One particularly poignant example of mutuality’s necessity in close interpersonal relationships appears in the ninth story of the fifth day of *Decameron*. In this story Frederigo falls in love with a Gentlewoman named Giana. In an effort to curry Giana’s favor Frederigo spares no expense to lavish her with many expensive gifts and honors. However, Giana has no feelings for Frederigo and is unmoved by his expenditures. Nevertheless, Frederigo spends the majority of his fortune trying to garner the affection of Giana and is ultimately left with only a small farm, a couple of servants, and a treasured hunting falcon. Frederigo’s love for Giana never falters and only increases, yet he is unable to continue his extravagant attempts to win her heart. Eventually Giana’s husband dies and she moves to the country near where Frederigo’s small farm is located. Her son enjoys hunting with trained dogs and falcons and comes to greatly desire Frederigo’s falcon, yet cannot bear to ask him for it since it is obvious that it is one of Frederigo’s only remaining valuable possessions. Giana’s son suddenly falls very ill and tells his mother that if she can obtain Frederigo’s falcon he will surely recover. Giana feels guilty asking Frederigo for the one possession that still gives him joy knowing that her inability to reciprocate the love Frederigo feels for her is in part responsible for Frederigo’s situation. Nevertheless, her love for her son prompts her to visit Frederigo with the intention of asking for his falcon. When she arrives Frederigo tells her that he considers all his losses insignificant in light of his feelings for her and that he will happily accept the honor of having her dine with him. Unfortunately, Frederigo has no food worthy of Giana and decides to have his prized falcon cooked for her pleasure. Giana and her attendant enjoy dinner without knowing they are eating the falcon she had come to request. When she requests the falcon of Frederigo after dinner, Frederigo is devastated that he cannot grant her request. Giana deeply appreciates Frederigo’s gesture, but is sad to return home without the falcon for her son. Soon afterward her son dies. After grieving
and further reflecting on Frederigo’s kindness Giana tells her brethren that she will only accept Frederigo as her second husband, despite their protests to the contrary. The two are in fact married and “…they lived, and loved together in equal joy and happiness.”\(^3\)

This story shows the necessity of mutual feelings of love to the existence of close interpersonal relationships. Frederigo loved Giana and ardently sought to prove his love to her and engender similar feelings in her. In fact, he spent all his wealth in his efforts to win her heart. Nevertheless, the relationship could not become a close one until Giana was able to reciprocate that love at the end of the story.

Trust is another part of close interpersonal relationships that the stories of *Decameron* stress. Many of the problems that the characters in *Decameron*’s stories face are caused by a lack of trust. Several stories go as far as showing how close interpersonal relationships break down without trust.

Perhaps the clearest example of this appears in the fifth story of the seventh day of *Decameron*. A very rich merchant living in Arimino was married to a beautiful woman. This merchant, however, was extremely jealous and because he thought her beauty would cause others to fall in love with her he kept her locked away in his home. As the story states “many persons condemned to death, have en[j]oyed larger libertie in their imprisonment.”\(^4\) The merchant’s jealousy, though, was unfounded as his wife had not thought to love another. Eventually the wife, justifiably upset by her confinement and overall situation, decided to attempt a tryst as revenge for her poor treatment by her husband and as a reprieve from the boredom she experienced. Despite her confinement she is able to contact a young Gentleman named Philippo. Then, she tells her husband that she needs to confess her sins as the feast of

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\(^3\) *Ibid.* pg 484.

\(^4\) *Ibid.* pg 582.
Christmas approaches. He allows her to go, but specifies the particular church and Chaplain that she is to confess to and installs himself in the confessional. Despite his preparations to the contrary, she recognizes her husband as the confessor. She tells her husband of a fictitious friar who she sleeps with every night despite all the locked doors and her husband’s presence. She then has her husband, disguised as a priest, promise not to tell her husband of her sins. As her husband sets himself up with armor and weapons to meet the made up friar at the door, the wife invites Philippo to climb over a wall and through a window into her room. The same scenario repeats itself for many nights until her husband is too frustrated to continue his watch. Finally, he accuses his wife of the sins she revealed to him. She replies that he was the friar with whom she had been sleeping as she recognized him as her confessor and embellished the story to teach him a lesson. Her husband, unaware of her actual unfaithfulness, does learn his lesson and gives up his jealous ways. As a result, his wife, free to enjoy living a more normal life, no longer felt it necessary to be unfaithful to her husband.

This story emphasizes the importance of trust to close interpersonal relationships by examining both the possibility of a close relationship without trust and a close relationship with trust. The merchant and his wife’s relationship was stifled by the merchant’s lack of trust in his wife. The jealousy the merchant felt as a result of his lack of trust drove his wife to find a more satisfying relationship with Philippo. However, once the merchant began to trust his wife his relationship with her was revitalized to the point that she no longer needed to find companionship with someone else despite having a greater opportunity to do so.

There are even a few stories in Decameron that suggest the importance of treating others in close interpersonal relationships as ends in themselves. Though the idea of treating others in interpersonal relationships as ends in themselves is not made explicit in any of Decameron’s
stories, several of them show the pitfalls of failing to treat the other as an individual with his or her own desires and goals.

The tenth story of the second day of Decameron is one such story. Signoir Ricciardo de Chinzica, a wise judge of poor physique, decides to take a beautiful young wife named Bertolomea. However, on his wedding night his attempt to consummate the marriage fails to satisfy his new wife. In response to this, and to avoid further discomfort on his own part, he explains to his wife that almost every day is a holy day on which it is inappropriate for the couple to have sex. As a result, Bertolomea becomes increasingly frustrated with her husband’s lack of interest in her desires. One day, on a recreational fishing trip, Bertolomea is kidnapped by a famous pirate named Pagamino. While she is at first very upset, Pagamino’s kind treatment of her wins her over. Ricciardo de Chinzica is able to meet Pagamino and ask for his wife to be returned to him. Pagamino tells Ricciardo that he will let Bertolomea leave with him if she so desires it. When Bertolomea comes before Pagamino and Ricciardo she acts as if she does not know Ricciardo. Ricciardo gets Pagamino to allow Bertolomea to speak with him privately at which point she tells Ricciardo that she knows who he is but that he does not know her because he has blatantly ignored her desires and interests by treating her more as student than a wife. She goes on to argue that her parents too ignored her good when they promised her to Ricciardo as a wife. Conversely, Pagamino treats her as a true wife: with honor and respect. Despite his protests Ricciardo is forced to leave Pagamino without his wife. As a result he is disgraced and miserable in his home town and dies shortly thereafter. At that point Pagamino and Bertolomea officially get married.

Bertolomea is frustrated and upset by her treatment at the hands of Ricciardo because her wishes, goals, and desires are ignored. She makes the same complaint against her parents.
effect, she is unhappy with those relationships because she is not being treated as an end in herself, but as a means to something else. Ricciardo marries her because he thinks his prestige as a judge entitles him to a beautiful wife. In contemporary vernacular Ricciardo treats Bertolomea as a “trophy wife.” Her parents, by marrying her to a man unfit for her, also seem to be after some end that is not in line with Bertolomea’s wishes. Pagamino, despite holding a much less respectable post than Ricciardo, earns a close relationship with Bertolomea’s by treating her with respect and acknowledging her own wishes. For example, when he tells Ricciardo that Bertolomea is free to return to him if that is what she so desires he treats Bertolomea as an end in herself. For that reason, Bertolomea decides to pursue a relationship with Pagamino rather than Ricciardo.

*Decameron* touches on each of the pieces of a close interpersonal relationship that will be discussed in chapter three as defining features of what this dissertation terms “intimate relationships”: love, mutuality, trust, and treating the other as an end in himself or herself. Chapter three will add to this list that those people involved in intimate relationships must wish one another well and act for one another. These characteristics are discussed in the stories already mentioned as well as most other stories in *Decameron*. While no one story in the one hundred that make up *Decameron* describes all six of these components clearly, the fact that each of them plays a role in some story shows that interpersonal relationships with these traits captured the attention of Boccaccio and his readers. The interest in what will be referred to as “intimate relationships” is not a new phenomenon. Those authors whose own stories or writing were influenced or prefigured by *Decameron* show, through their own work, that this interest is enduring.
These relationships, then, have long been and still are a part of human lives. They are also significant and interesting else there would not be so many influential works of literature detailing their existence. The question that remains, the question that this dissertation will examine, is whether and how that significance is translated into moral value by particular normative theories.

Despite the long history of interest in close interpersonal relationships and the roles they play in real human lives, the question of how they fit into moral life has not been tackled philosophically as rigorously and as often as it has been in the last fifty years. In 1971 Elizabeth Telfer gave a talk on friendship at the Meeting of the Aristotelian Society in London and later published the talk in the meeting’s proceedings. The paper aims to address three questions about friendship “… what it is, how morality bears on it, and why it is thought to be important.” Whether intentional or not, whether causal or coincidental, Telfer’s attempt at defining friendship and exploring its place in normative theories preceded several important papers and books over the next few decades on the subject. Two years after Telfer published her article, Bernard Williams’ “A Critique of Utilitarianism” attacked utilitarianism’s concept of negative responsibility on the grounds that it alienates people from their commitments to projects and relationships. That same year, 1973, Michael Stocker published “The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories” which criticizes Moore’s consequentialist theory of ethics, among others, for its inability to endorse loving others as ends in themselves. Both Williams and Stocker went on to publish other articles that focused and bolstered the claims they made in their 1973 papers.

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6 Ibid. pg 223.
1977 saw the publication of three articles that explored the connections between Aristotle’s ethics and friendship by Julia Annas and John Cooper. In 1980 Lawrence Blum published Friendship, Altruism and Morality, the first part of which is devoted to criticizing Kantianism for its inability to explain and value close interpersonal relationships.\(^9\) In the same year Sara Ruddick published “Maternal Thinking” as the beginning of an alternative way of doing ethics that is grounded in the relationship of mothering.\(^10\) This was followed in 1982 and 1984 by Carol Gilligan’s In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development and Nel Noddings’ Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education, respectively.\(^11\) Both books continued in the tract that Ruddick had started a couple years earlier: they proposed alternate approaches to ethics grounded in interpersonal relationships rather than the well established classifications of deontology and consequentialism. Peter Railton also published “Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality” in 1984 as a consequentialist answer to the problems posed by Williams and Stocker.\(^12\) Railton’s article explicitly attempts to make room for the concept of friendship within the consequentialist framework. In 1985 Ferdinand Shoeman published yet another article on the value of friendship in Aristotle’s moral theory.\(^13\) In 1987 Neera Badhwar published “Friends as Ends in Themselves” as a detailed analysis of friendships in which the friends treat one another as ends in themselves. In the last paragraph Badhwar makes a connection between friendships and morality.\(^14\) In 1991 Badhwar


focused more explicitly on the ties between friendship and morality in an article criticizing consequentialism for on its inability to value the relationships she defined in her 1987 article. Finally, in an introduction to a reader that Badhwar edited which was published in 1993, she undertakes the project of examining several different normative theories’ abilities to explain and value friendships as a means of introducing the articles collected in the reader.\textsuperscript{15}

While the above history is far from complete, it highlights some of the more significant work on the ability of specific normative theories to incorporate the value of close interpersonal relationships between 1971 and 1987. Many more articles on the connections between ethics and interpersonal relationships have been published since 1987, but 1987 is significant because it marked the first of Badhwar’s papers on friendship and its relation to normative ethics. Her interest in the topic grew and deepened into the closest approximation to the project that this dissertation takes up: a systematic analysis of multiple normative theories’ failures to account and successes in accounting for the value of close interpersonal relationships.

Badhwar’s attempt at this project was impeded by several factors. First, the purpose of the project was to serve as an introduction for a reader. This prevented Badhwar from developing her argument in sufficient detail. Second, the value terms she uses in the article obscure differences between the theories she examines.\textsuperscript{16} Third, she does not compare the conclusions she reaches about each normative theory that she examines. As a result she is unable to draw any wider conclusions about normative theories in general. These are three problems I plan to avoid in this dissertation.

I will analyze four theories of ethics in order to show that any normative theory which hopes to account for the value of intimate relationships (a sort of close interpersonal relationship)


\textsuperscript{16} This will be discussed in detail in chapter 2.
must meet a series of necessary and sufficient conditions. So long as one admits that such relationships are morally valuable, this set of necessary and sufficient conditions is an invaluable tool with which to appraise any normative theory’s practical plausibility.

In order to synthesize the set of necessary and sufficient conditions that a normative theory must meet to account for the value of intimate relationships several concepts needed in the analysis of the normative theories must be defined. Since value itself is a multifaceted term the several most relevant and theoretically neutral classifications of value will be identified and precisely defined in chapter two. Only then can the value terms be useful in an unbiased analysis of very different normative approaches to close interpersonal relationships. In chapter three, the close interpersonal relationships themselves will be examined as the term “intimate relationship” is defined to be more *inclusive* than the term “friendship.” The value terms explained in chapter two will then be applied in the succeeding four chapters to analyze the way in which Kantianism, G.E. Moore’s consequentialism, Aristotle’s virtue theory, and Virginia Held’s ethics of care assign value to the relationships defined in chapter three.

These four theorists and the theories they propose have been selected for two reasons. First, each theorist explicitly or implicitly claims that intimate relationships, or some subset of intimate relationships, are morally valuable. Second, each theory assigns intimate relationships a different sort of value. The respective failures and successes of each theory to account for the value of intimate relationships serve as premises in the argument for a set of necessary and sufficient conditions. Accordingly, the first half of chapters three through six will show that the theorist being investigated discusses interpersonal relationships that qualify as intimate relationships *and* argues that such relationships have moral value. The later part of each chapter will examine whether each theory is able to account for the normative value of intimate
relationships that the theorist acknowledges they possess. Then, chapter eight will collect the conclusions of the analyses that take place in chapters three through six and use them to create the set of necessary and sufficient conditions that can be used to appraise any normative theory’s ability to value intimate relationships. For actual people who treat their intimate relationships as having moral value these conditions will be a guidepost toward determining which normative theories are applicable in their lives.
Chapter 2 – Value from Intrinsic to Instrumental

There are four categories of value that will be used in this dissertation to discuss the moral worth of interpersonal relationships: intrinsic, extrinsic, instrumental, and final value. These terms are used imprecisely and even interchangeably leading to confusion in debates about moral theorists’ appraisals of interpersonal relationships. This problem becomes more significant when one attempts to compare the value of interpersonal relationships across different moral theories. In order to address this problem and figure out how intimate relationships are valued one must clearly define these four kinds of value and show that they are theoretically neutral. It will be helpful to start with an analysis of the many possible interpretations of the most general notion of positive value in ethics, or the good, and then move on to a more detailed examination of the specific senses of the term that are most relevant to a discussion of interpersonal relationships’ value. W.D. Ross and A.C. Ewing examine many possible meanings of the word “good” in their works and each will be reviewed to see whether it is significant to the present inquiry. Both refer to G.E. Moore’s attempt to answer the question ‘What things have intrinsic value and in what degrees?’ in Principia Ethics. He explains the concept of intrinsic value further in “The Conception of Intrinsic Value,” hereafter referred to as CIV. While doing so, Moore also lays the foundation for a definition of extrinsic value that will help categorize the kind of good that interpersonal relationships may possess. Fred Feldman examines Moore’s view and offers several competing definitions of intrinsic value in his article “Hyperventilating about Intrinsic Value.” Each of these must be discussed to figure out whether Moore’s concept of intrinsic good is the most useful for an analysis of value across different moral theories.

Christine Korsgaard considers Moore’s view of intrinsic value too and concludes that final value should be defined as distinct from intrinsic value. In so doing, Korsgaard also sets up instrumental goodness as distinct from extrinsic goodness.

Part I: Various Uses of “Good”

“Good” and “positively valuable” will be used interchangeably in this dissertation; yet, both phrases have many meanings in the English language and they vary significantly. Saying that a particular relationship is good can therefore mean many different things. In chapter four of Ewing’s The Definition of Good, hereafter DG, he identifies ten different ways to define the word “good.” Many of the same definitions are discussed by Ross in chapter three of The Right and the Good, hereafter RG. These definitions can be roughly grouped into four categories: instrumental goodness, comparative goodness, specific goodness, and intrinsic goodness. Some of these are vital to the discussion of intimate relationships which follows this chapter, and others are beside the point of this dissertation.

Ewing’s first four definitions of “good” all relate to what this dissertation will refer to as instrumental goodness. Instrumental goodness in its most general form is Ewing’s fourth definition of “good.” Rather than use the term “instrumental goodness” Ewing simply writes that something good in the fourth sense of the word is a means to an intrinsically good end (DG 113). This general type of good is also exemplified by Ewing’s first three definitions of “good.” Ewing first identifies goodness with something which is pleasant or liked (DG 112). Next, he examines the idea that “goodness” can be attributed to that which will satisfy one’s desires. Ewing’s third definition for “good” is performing a particular function efficiently; this is one of

23 By specific I merely mean that they cannot be applied to as broad a range of objects than Ewing’s other definitions.
the “root ideas” expressed by “good” according to Ross (DG 112, RG 65). In fact, Ross writes that the first two definitions that Ewing mentions reduce to this third definition (DG 112, RG 65). Particular relationships can be, and often are, good in each of these ways. However, these are not the uses of “good” on which this dissertation will focus. Intimate relationships do provide pleasure, satisfy desires, and perform certain functions efficiently. Yet, if the entire goodness of intimate relationships is captured by any of these features, then their goodness can be more generally described as instrumental: good for the sake of the effects they produce. Whether the relevant effect is the production of pleasure, satisfaction of desire, or performance of some function will be beside the point because the more general characterization of this goodness as instrumental will be sufficient for the arguments in the following chapters. Instrumental goodness will be discussed again later in this chapter as a contrast to final goodness.

The fifth definition of “good” described by Ewing also deals with efficiency: rather than describing something or someone that is efficiently performing a function, this meaning of “good” is for something or some action to be efficient (DG 113-114). The difference between definitions three and five is the difference between calling the swing of a baseball bat good for causing a homerun and calling the same swing good because of its internal mechanics, even if it results in a strikeout. In a sense, Ewing’s fifth definition is a comparative evaluation in light of other things of the same kind. Ross identifies a similar meaning of “good” when he writes that it can refer to an object or person that is an above average member of its kind (RG 66-67). Ross explicitly states that good in this sense is used as a comparative to indicate that a thing is better than the average of its kind. This directly links to Ewing’s fifth definition when Ewing writes that the “good of a species” meaning of “good” reduces to definition five when it is meant to indicate that a thing is efficient at doing what that sort of thing does (DG 117). Relationships
can be compared to one another in this way too. Certain relationships could be termed more efficient and thus better than others; in other words, certain relationships might fulfill the defining features of that sort of relationship better than others. The goal of this dissertation, however, is to examine the value of a particular category of relationship as a whole rather than to make comparisons within the category. Therefore, the fifth definition of “good” that Ewing identifies will not be relevant to this dissertation.

The eighth, ninth, and tenth definitions of “good” that Ewing identifies apply to characteristics, actions, and persons respectively. The eighth type of good describes a characteristic that makes objects that possess it good (DG 116). According to Ewing, this type of characteristic can make an object good intrinsically or as a means to an intrinsically good end (DG 116). Ewing’s ninth and tenth definitions of “goodness” deal with moral goodness. “Good” when used to describe an action’s moral value is being used in Ewing’s ninth sense (DG 116). Ross seems to be in agreement when he identifies actions as the sort of things that can be intrinsically good (RG 134). He writes at the beginning of his chapter entitled “What Things Are Good?” in a similar vein to Ewing,

The first thing for which I would claim that it is intrinsically good is virtuous disposition and action, i.e. action, or disposition to act, from any one of certain motives, of which at all events the most notable are the desire to do one’s duty, the desire to bring into being something that is good, and the desire to give pleasure or save pain to others” (RG 134). The moral goodness of actions, specifically actions that comprise and perpetuate intimate relations, will be a central focus of this dissertation. “Good” can also be used to describe a person’s moral character and this is the usage indicated by Ewing’s tenth sense of “good” (DG 116). Ross too notes this definition of “good” along with its moral connotations (RG 66). The
moral character of the person will be discussed briefly in chapter six: Aristotle discusses character as it relates to interpersonal relationships.24

The sixth and seventh definitions of “good” Ewing mentions both relate to intrinsic goodness. The sixth definition of “good” that he discusses he terms “intrinsic good,” but it is defined differently by Ewing than it is by Moore since he says this sense of good means “good as an end” (DG 114). In fact, Ewing’s description of “intrinsic goodness” seems more similar to what will be termed “final value” later in this chapter as he explicitly sets it up as the opposite of good as a means (DG 114). Contrary to what will be explored later as Moore’s view of intrinsic value, Ewing says that intrinsic good does not mean good in all contexts or if everything else in the universe was different (DG 114). Ross too discusses intrinsic value as the second predicative type of good, but his definition is much closer to that of Moore (RG 68). Moore’s definition will be discussed later in this chapter as well.

Ultimate goodness, also a Moorean concept, is that which Ewing describes as the seventh type of good, and Ross describes this as the third type of predicative good (DG 114-115, RG 68-72).25 Both Ewing and Ross explicitly follow Moore’s definition of ultimate good which leads to their similarities. Ultimately good things are either intrinsically good unities, that is they have no pieces, or comprised of pieces which are all individually intrinsically good. Things that have neutral or bad parts, but are still good overall, could be intrinsically good; however, they could not be ultimately good. The definition of ultimate goodness implies stricter criteria than that of intrinsic goodness. The applicability of ultimate goodness to intimate relationships may be interesting but is not argued for by any of the normative theorists discussed in this dissertation.

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24 Specifically, this will be brought up to deal with the question of whether two people must be morally good people in order to be friends.
25 Ross questions the importance of the distinction between ultimate and intrinsic goodness, but does grant the truth of the theoretical distinction.
Moreover, it is unnecessary to the claims of this dissertation that intimate relationships be ultimately good.

**Part II: A Further Explanation of the Relevant Uses of “Good”**

Despite the many uses of the word “good,” investigations into the moral value of relationships focus on four senses of the word: intrinsic goodness, extrinsic goodness, instrumental goodness, and final goodness. However, even these terms need to be clearly defined since different philosophers use them differently. The first step in defining them is to see which account of intrinsic goodness will best serve the purpose of categorizing different accounts of value without simultaneously judging certain normative theories to be inferior to others. Once that task is completed extrinsic value can be defined as intrinsic value’s opposite. Finally, final goodness will be distinguished from intrinsic goodness since it describes a different theoretically neutral facet of value.

Moore writes that to figure out which things have intrinsic value, in the sense referred to by Ross, “… it is necessary to consider which things are such that, if they existed in themselves, in absolute isolation, we should yet judge their existence to be good …”\(^{26}\) This method of considering the goodness of something alone and separate from everything else in existence has become known as the “isolation test” of intrinsic goodness. According to Moore, this test accomplishes two tasks essential to determining whether something is intrinsically good. First, it shows that the thing is not merely a means to some other good since, according to the thought experiment, nothing else exists for the thing in question to effect. Second, it allows one to accurately compare the relative goodness of one piece of a larger whole to the goodness of that whole.

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This sense of intrinsic value is unbiased. The fact that object A’s value is independent of other objects does not affect the value of object A. Object A is not bad, nor less good, if its value is dependent on object B. Moreover, investigating whether object A’s value is dependent on other objects or circumstances does not necessarily influence the appraisal of a normative theory of ethics. One can classify the goodness of the Kantian good will or pleasure as intrinsic or not without claiming that the good will is better or worse than pleasure or that Kantianism is a more accurate account of morality.

In his later article entitled “The Conception of Intrinsic Value,” Moore explicitly defines intrinsic value when he writes, “To say that a kind of value is “intrinsic” means merely that the question whether a thing possesses it, and in what degree it possesses it depends solely on the intrinsic nature of the thing in question” (CIV 260). Moore then goes on to explain the implications of this definition. First, he specifies that value of this sort depends on the internal properties of the object. Thus, the value must be exactly the same at all times under all possible, rather than merely actual, circumstances (CIV 267). Moore is explicit about this in order to eliminate the possibility that the examined object’s interaction with actual causal laws results in the object’s value, making the value reliant on its relationship with causal laws rather than its intrinsic properties. He goes on to state that numerical difference is not enough to affect intrinsic value; two objects that are exactly the same, or copies of one another, must also share the same intrinsic value despite being two separate objects (CIV 262). In other words, the physical distinctness of two objects cannot make a difference to their intrinsic properties because that distinctness is a relational feature as opposed to an intrinsic one. Moore is also careful to point out that two objects do not need to have different qualities for them to have different intrinsic
values (CIV 264). A difference in the extent of a quality, like fluorescence, could be enough to change the intrinsic value of a diamond, for example.

According to Moore intrinsic value is something to be gauged in isolation from other objects in order to confirm its non-relational and non-circumstantial nature. For example, to decide whether a painting was intrinsically valuable according to Moore one would imagine that painting as being the only thing that ever existed in the universe. In this case the painting’s value could not come from any observer, interest in the painting, or the historical context of the painting’s creation.

Ralf Barton Perry in his General Theory of Value offers a contradictory view to Moore’s account of intrinsic value by arguing that all value is related to an interest taken in something. As he writes “Any object, whatever it be, acquires value when any interest, whatever it be, is taken in it.” On this view all value comes from an object’s relationship to a person’s interest. For example, an autographed baseball is valuable insomuch as someone has interest in it. This theory seems opposed to intrinsic value’s existence because it deems all value to be relational. This is problematic because intrinsic value is supposed to be non-relational by definition. Nevertheless, Perry maintains that his theory leaves room for intrinsic goodness. Perry writes that Moore’s isolation test is a serious objection to his own view: “value would shine by a reflected glory having no original source.” He then addresses this problem by appealing to the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments. Synthetic judgments of goodness would require a distinct subject to make them, thereby failing the isolation test. One could judge synthetically whether the autographed baseball was valuable, and this judgment would require a

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28 Ibid. 132.
subject to determine whether the baseball was valued. Analytic judgments, on the other hand, would not necessitate a subject. A desired autographed baseball is valuable analytically and independent of a subject according to Perry.

Ross, however, spends the first half of chapter four in *The Right and The Good* disputing Perry’s claim that his theory of value, or others like it, can allow for the existence of intrinsic value. Ross, as a response to Perry’s claim that all value is related to an interest taken in something, writes:

If ‘good’, then, be defined as Professor Perry defines it, nothing can be intrinsically good. And his attempt to get over the difficulty of the apparent necessity (for a relational view of value) of denying that anything has intrinsic value, by means of the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgements, comes to nothing. ‘O-desired-by-S’ is not a different object which can truly be said to possess intrinsic value when it is denied that any O apart from being desired has intrinsic value. ‘O-desired-by-S is good’ is simply another way of saying ‘any O has value not in itself but by virtue of the co-existence with it, and in a certain relation to it, of S’. And to say this is to deny intrinsic value to anything (*RG* 77-78).

Thus, Perry’s argument that analytic judgments of value pass Moore’s isolation test and can be considered intrinsically valuable fails. Perry’s theory of value is incompatible with Moore’s definition of intrinsic value and would be more accurately understood as a theory about final value than Moorean intrinsic value.

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29 Perry uses fairness, or beauty, as the example of intrinsic value but presumably intrinsic goodness would be explained the same way. *Ibid.* 132.
Feldman discusses Moore’s definition of intrinsic value alongside several others in his article “Hyperventilating About Intrinsic Value.”\(^{30}\) Feldman first lists eight different ways in which philosophers have used the phrase ‘intrinsic good.’ Moore’s isolation test and definition account for two of those eight.

Drawing on Aristotle and Plato, the first meaning of intrinsic good that Feldman identifies is unimprovable goodness. Something that is an unimprovable good cannot be made better by the addition of other goods. A painting that is unimprovably good cannot be made better by adding anything to it. However, Feldman ends up rejecting this meaning of intrinsic good because it conflicts with a pluralistic account of goodness: a pluralistic account of goodness will always allow for the addition of a different sort of good to improve overall goodness.\(^ {31}\) To return to the example of the painting, it might make sense if the only good were beauty. It might be possible that the painting was unimprovably good in the sense that it was unimprovably beautiful, and if beauty were the only good then unimprovably beautiful would be identical with unimprovably good. However, if one allows for other goods like accessibility or a pleasant smell, then surely the unimprovably beautiful painting can be made better by adding accessibility and a pleasant smell. The sense of intrinsic goodness identified with unimprovability must be rejected for the purposes of this dissertation: this sense of intrinsic goodness could only sensibly apply to non-pluralistic accounts of ethics. As a result only non-pluralistic accounts of ethics could consider intimate relationships good in this sense. Since this dissertation is examining pluralistic accounts of ethics using the unimprovability criterion of intrinsic goodness would bias the results of the analysis against those theories of ethics.


\(^{31}\) Ibid 350.
The second meaning identified by Feldman comes from Aristotle: that intrinsic goodness is identified with the most final good. Final goodness, however, will be dealt with next as separate from intrinsic goodness. The purpose in separating intrinsic goodness and final goodness is that the two terms can be used to identify different features of the same value.

Kant’s use of unqualified goodness is the third definition of intrinsic goodness examined by Feldman. This definition can be taken literally to mean that intrinsic goodness needs no qualifier, yet this would be an odd interpretation since “intrinsic” is already a qualifier. On the other hand, by unqualified goodness Kant might mean incorruptibility which is the seventh possible meaning for intrinsic goodness identified by Feldman.

The fourth definition of intrinsic goodness is attributed to Brentano. He argues that intrinsically good things are the correct objects of intrinsic love. To accept this definition one must first accept Brentano’s theory of psychology and the fittingness of emotions such as love. Yet to do so would be to accept so many of Brentano’s premises that the application of this account of intrinsic value to other normative theories would either not make sense or simply indicate a theory’s agreement or disagreement with Brentano’s. This definition of intrinsic value has too much theoretical baggage to be used as unbiased criterion by which to measure different normative theories of ethics.

The fifth and sixth definitions that Feldman examines are Moore’s. Each has already been discussed.

The seventh, again, is incorruptibility. Feldman attributes this definition to Kant and Chisholm. The idea is that incorruptible or necessary goods are good regardless of the
circumstance, and in all possible worlds. This definition is usable because, like Moore’s
definition, it does not change the goodness of an object to describe it as incorruptible. Nor does
identifying a theory’s ability to assign incorruptible goodness to an object make that theory a
more plausible account of ethics.

Finally, Feldman discusses Chisholm’s view that intrinsically good things are those
which ought to exist. Yet, similar to Brentano’s definition, one must accept a particular view of
what ought to exist in order to understand and accept this definition. It would be exceedingly
difficult, if not impossible, to evaluate each of the normative theories discussed in this
dissertation on the basis of this definition since some do not even address whether objects or
events ought to exist. Furthermore, even those theories that do address things that ought to exist
would be judged by Chisholm’s standard if this account of intrinsic value were utilized to
evaluate different moral theories: those theories that agreed the most with Chisholm’s view
would be favored by this account of intrinsic value. However, the point of this dissertation is to
use value classifications in an unbiased analysis of different normative theories. Thus, this
account of intrinsic goodness will not meet the purpose of this dissertation.

Feldman concludes his review of the possible meanings of intrinsic value by claiming
that two of the eight original definitions seem promising, but are incomplete and point in
different directions: Moore’s view that intrinsic goodness is dependent on intrinsic nature and the
view that intrinsic goodness is incorruptible. Feldman calls them incomplete because neither
criterion identifies a specifically moral sort of goodness. This sort of incompleteness, however,
is not problematic from the point of view of this dissertation. Whether “intrinsic goodness” can
be applied to non-moral goods such as the validity of an argument is beside the point of figuring

32 Ibid 353.
out which of the normative theories that will be examined in this dissertation can be said to attribute intrinsic goodness to intimate relationships. Furthermore, it is not clear that the two definitions do point in completely different directions. Reliance on intrinsic nature and incorruptibility do offer distinct interpretations of intrinsic goodness, but Moore’s careful definition in “The Conception of Intrinsic Value” reveals some important similarities.

According to Moore, because intrinsic value is determined by a thing’s intrinsic nature it does not change between possible worlds. Moore even writes “A kind of value is intrinsic if and only if, when anything possesses it, that same thing or anything exactly like it would necessarily or must always, under all circumstances, possess it in exactly the same degree” (*CIV* 265). A thing’s intrinsic nature is independent of how it is utilized by someone or how it interacts with different causal laws. For example, if a baseball bat is intrinsically good on Moore’s definition it is also incorruptible. On Moore’s view, the baseball bat’s intrinsic properties, such as the type and quality of wood it is made from, would be the source of its goodness. The baseball bat’s intrinsic properties remain unchanged whether in the hands of a sweet-swinging third baseman, a terrible hitting pitcher, or a murderer; therefore, its intrinsic goodness too would remain unchanged. Even in the hands of a murder the bat would be considered intrinsically good: since its intrinsic properties are not changed by the murder it cannot become intrinsically bad or even intrinsically less good which is why Moore considers intrinsic good incorruptible. Moore’s definition is stricter than that of incorruptibility and necessity since it may be possible for these properties not to be based entirely on intrinsic nature. For example, if object A’s incorruptible or necessary goodness relied on some extrinsic relationship that existed between it and object B in every possible world and every possible circumstance, then object A would still not be intrinsically good: its goodness would rely on something other than its internal properties even
though that something (object B) existed in every possible world and circumstance. However, any intrinsically good object must also be incorruptible and necessarily good; since object A’s goodness is not reliant on anything in the world it will be good regardless of the possible world or circumstance into which it is placed.

Intrinsic value’s opposite, extrinsic value, is marked by its relational and/or circumstantial nature. Relational aspects of an object’s value include the relationships between an object and a larger whole, to a causal chain, or to an observer. An example of relational value is the value of speed in a baseball player. Speed alone is worth very little in a baseball player because without any other skills that baseball player cannot help his team win. However, the value of speed in a baseball player increases dramatically when coupled with other skills such as the ability to consistently make solid contact with pitches or fielding prowess. Circumstantial aspects of an object’s value are often related the object’s particular history. For example, the value of a sacrifice bunt in a particular baseball game is largely determined by the plays that precede and succeed it. The important feature of extrinsic value is its reliance on features outside the object rather than internal ones. Extrinsic value, like intrinsic value, is also theory neutral. Classifying a value as extrinsic does not necessarily bear on the positive or negative nature of that value; in other words, objects may be extrinsically good or bad. Simply identifying that the location of an object’s value as outside the object or related to some other object does not change the value of the object either.

Korsgaard, in “Two Distinctions in Goodness,” argues that intrinsic goodness and final goodness are importantly different. According to Korsgaard the two concepts answer different questions. Intrinsic goodness describes “… the location or source of goodness rather than the
way we value the thing.”

Final goodness, on the other hand, is a concept that identifies how we value something: as something good for its own sake rather than the sake of its consequences. To claim that something has final goodness is to value it for what it is rather than for that to which it may lead. Intrinsic goodness is sometimes posed as the opposite of instrumental goodness, but this conflates questions about the source of a thing’s goodness with questions about how a thing is valued. One need only reflect back on Moore’s definition of intrinsic goodness to clarify this distinction. An object is intrinsically good because of its internal features, or intrinsic properties. Its goodness comes from itself. Conversely, for Moore the question of an object’s intrinsic goodness has nothing to do with how someone treats the object. Whether a person treats an object as a means or an end has no bearing on that thing’s intrinsic goodness on Moore’s view. On the other hand, whether an object is treated as a means or an end does determine whether that object can be considered to be a final good. Korsgaard admits that it is possible for intrinsic value and instrumental value to be opposites, but only under the influence of a specific normative or metaphysical theory. One could claim that all intrinsically good things should be valued as ends or final goods, but this would require either a large normative assumption or significant argument. Korsgaard explains some of the impossibilities that result from ignoring the distinction between intrinsic and final goods. If all final goods were intrinsically valuable, then no object with a value dependent on relational properties could be valuable as more than a means to some other end. However, certain objects are valuable as ends despite that value relying on relational or circumstantial features. For example, the famous T-206 Honus Wagner baseball card’s incredible value comes from its rarity, a clearly relational property. Yet, someone who purchases the card could value its rarity for its own sake rather than as a means to pleasure or future financial gain. The card would then have final value but lack

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intrinsic value. Therefore, final goodness and intrinsic goodness must be separable. Their opposites, instrumental and extrinsic goodness respectively, are also separable.

Like intrinsic and extrinsic value, final value and instrumental value are theory neutral. The terms “final value” and “instrumental value” are merely tools for classifying how a good is valued: as an ends or a means. Defining a particular good as instrumentally valuable does not change its value. Additionally, classifying the goods identified by a particular normative theory as instrumental or final does not make a theory more or less plausible as such.

C.I. Lewis provides an example of extrinsic value that is not merely a means to some other end when he describes contributive value. According to Lewis, experiences have contributory value if they modify the felt value in another experience rather than merely causing the felt value. The felt value is the value recognized by the person experiencing the value. The modification can be either unidirectional or bidirectional and can directly affect final value. Lewis provides the example of a boy working for the price of a circus ticket. The work is not merely instrumentally valuable if the boy’s enjoyment of the circus is increased by having earned the enjoyment through his own work. If the good of working was merely instrumental, then the boy would get \( x \) amount of pleasure from the circus whether he earned the ticket or got it for free. However, in Lewis’ example the boy gets \( x+y \) pleasure from attending the circus after earning the ticket: the extra pleasure denoted by \( y \) marks the good that was contributed by the work to the boy’s overall experience of pleasure. Thus, the work is not an end in itself. Nor is it merely a means to the pleasure he gets from only experiencing the circus. The work, by

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34 Since felt value is a concept that relies on an experience of that value it can never be intrinsic.
changing the experience of the circus for the boy, is neither instrumentally nor finally valuable; it has contributory value.

Final goodness is correctly contrasted with instrumental goodness. Objects that are instrumentally good are not valued for their own sakes but as stepping stones to some other goods, or means to some other ends. For example, the goodness of cash is instrumental in most cases. Cash is usually valued for its ability to get something else: either another instrumental good or a final good. All instrumental goods must eventually lead to some final good which is valued for its own sake. One might use instrumentally good cash to purchase a baseball cap that one considers to be valuable as an end, as a souvenir. Alternately, the cap may be instrumentally valuable in keeping one’s head warm and providing a more pleasant experience during a windy game (the pleasant experience being the final good in this case). The monetary value of the cap may be the same, but its value to the purchaser in each case is different. As a souvenir the cap is treated as good for simply being what it is: a cap bought at a baseball game. As something that will keep one’s head warm the cap is only valuable insofar as it leads to the final end of a more pleasurable experience of the game.

This dissertation will utilize the four types of goodness just discussed to evaluate each normative theory’s treatment of intimate relationships in chapters four through seven. The importance of whether intimate relationships are intrinsically, extrinsically, instrumentally, or finally valuable will be examined in chapter three. These four terms, as they have just been defined, are especially useful in comparing values of different moral theories because they do not, in and of themselves, have normative significance. This allows one to apply them to a theory without altering or prejudging the theory. Chisholm and Brentano’s accounts of intrinsic
goodness were rejected precisely because they did not share this characteristic. Their views of goodness are not normatively neutral. The only ways to apply them to Aristotle’s view of interpersonal relationships’ value would be either to judge Aristotle’s view as incorrect or to alter Aristotle’s view of interpersonal relationships to fit the general view of value. This is not the case with Moore’s view of intrinsic goodness. Interpersonal relationships are either intrinsically good or not according to Moore’s definition of intrinsic goodness. One need not make a further normative judgment about the importance of intrinsic goodness to an accurate account of morality in general or interpersonal relationships in particular.36 The same is true of extrinsic, instrumental, and final goods.

36 The importance of intrinsic goodness to an accurate account of intimate relationships’ values will be discussed, but completely separate from the categorization of a theory’s value.
Chapter 3: Intimate Relationships

Part I: Definition

There are many different types of interpersonal relationship and each might be valuable in some respect. Yet, to examine the value of every type of interpersonal relationship on each type of normative theory would be too large a project. Instead, the scope of relationships examined in this dissertation will be limited to the set of relationships I define below as intimate relationships: relationships between individuals that are supposed to be significantly closer than acquaintances but not restricted to only the closest of friends. The purpose of this definition is to separate out the sorts of relationships that are endorsed by Immanuel Kant, G.E. Moore, Aristotle, and Virginia Held in the subsequent chapters. The resulting definition points to those relationships most likely to be considered morally valuable without leaving out morally significant relationships that do not fall under the standard definitions of friendship.

Intimate relationships are those in which the involved individuals love, wish each other well, and act for each other as ends in themselves. Loving, wishing well, and acting for one another as ends are often discussed as necessary conditions of friendship; however, here the conditions of loving, wishing, and acting for one other as ends will be both necessary and sufficient for an interpersonal relationship’s description as intimate. This is dissimilar to discussions of friendship which commonly add other requirements to the list of sufficient conditions such as: equality between the relations and choice in the creation of the relationship. Loving, wishing, and acting for each member of the relationship for her own sake are the distinguishing marks of an intimate relationship; they have also been seen as necessary.

The adjective “intimate,” when applied to the noun “relationship” is sometimes used to indicate that a relationship is sexual in nature. In this dissertation “intimate” is used to indicate the intellectual and emotional closeness of the relationship but is not meant to indicate whether the relationship is sexual. Intimate relationships, in the sense used here, may or may not include a sexual component.
conditions for the best sort of friendship. The idea of loving, wishing another well, and acting for another as an end in herself can be broken down into six component pieces, each of which is important to close relationships: loving another, wishing another well, acting for the other person, doing so in a way that regards the other person as an end in herself, doing so mutually or for one another, and trusting that the other loves and wishes one well as an end in herself.

To love another, in terms of intimate relationships, means to have strong positive emotions toward the other person that give rise to pleasure when in the presence of the other person. Additionally, the positive emotions and the pleasure one experiences when in the presence of the other person are stronger than those experienced in the presence of someone that is liked rather than loved. Aristotle points out that, while not merely for the sake of pleasure, the best kind of friendship is certainly pleasant. Elizabeth Telfer explains the positive feelings friends experience in one another’s presence as part of the “passions” of friendship. She writes that there is a desire to be with one’s friends and that this desire gives rise to pleasure when one spends time with one’s friends. Neera Badhwar, in examining the question of love, writes: “This exclusion of pleasure from the phenomenon of love is, however, false to experience… one cannot love a person without delighting in her under some aspect…” David Annis too identifies the liking of one’s friend with the enjoyment of her company and makes both necessary pieces of friendship.

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38 I do not intend to give a more detailed analysis of what exactly the emotion of love is than this simple one, but this definition follows the description of love given in discussions of close friendships. It is likely that the common usage of “love” includes some, if not all, of the other defining features of an intimate relationship, but the usage in this paragraph seeks to capture a sense of “love” not already detailed by those other features.


43 The question of whether the pleasure that comes from spending time with one’s intimate relations conflicts with valuing those relations as ends in themselves will be explored in part three of this chapter.
Wishing the other person in the relationship well is the second component of friendships that is also an important part of intimate relationships. To wish another well simply means to want good things for that person. Wishing another well can mean, among other things, wishing for the other’s happiness, health, and/or success. Aristotle writes in the *Rhetoric* “We may describe friendly feeling towards any one as wishing for him what you believe to be good things, not for your own sake but for his… A friend is one who feels thus and excites these feelings in return…” Telfer claims that affection is a necessary condition of friendship and writes “I define 'affection' as a desire for another's welfare and happiness as a particular individual.” Badhwar echoes the same sentiment when she writes “The best, most complete friendships are those in which friends love and wish each other well as ends in themselves…” The desire for the other person’s good is seen as distinct from, but complimentary to, the pleasure one gets from the other’s company.

Wishing another well as an end in herself is not enough without taking action for the other person’s sake. Reciprocal goodwill is an important part of intimate relations, but when it consistently fails to result in any action there is reason to doubt that the relationship is an intimate one. Annis, in discussing friendship, writes

It isn't merely that it is nice for friends to help, to provide psychological support, but that we expect friends to act this way, are surprised if they don't, and frequently feel betrayed and not just harmed if they intentionally let us down… Not helping seems inconsistent with the friendship, and if it happens often, the friendship has been abandoned.

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44 Rhetoric. 1380b35
Telfer agrees and lists several tangible examples of things friends are expected to do for one another: “… to help the friend when under attack (physical or verbal) or in need or trouble of any kind; to proffer advice and criticism, not only when asked for but also when not asked for but needed.”48 Intimate relationships also require that wishing the other well translates into acting for the other in some cases. The form such action must take, however, will vary greatly depending on the individuals involved in the relationships and their abilities.49 One’s actions for the other may be outstripped by one’s wishes for the other. This point becomes important when considering whether relationships between two individuals with different abilities can be considered intimate.50

The third component of close relationships is that the other is loved, wished well, and acted for as an end in herself. This is a vital component of intimate relationships like close friendships because it differentiates them from less personal relationships. The condition of loving, wishing, and acting for another as an end in herself, in the context of intimate relationships, means two things: treating the other as a goal rather than a means to some other good and treating the other as a particular individual rather than an abstract representation.

As Aristotle makes clear in Nicomachean Ethics, relationships in which friends participate in order to gain some utility or pleasure are not of the highest sort.51 Neither the relationship itself nor the other person is the targeted value in relationships where the others are not loved or wished well as ends in themselves; instead, there is some other value aimed at by continuing the relationship. Furthermore, in these relationships the other person is a means to utility and/or pleasure and might be replaced with a more efficient means or when the use and/or

49 This issue will be discussed in greater detail later in this chapter when examining the criterion of equality in intimate relationships.
50 Relationships between individuals with different abilities will be discussed in further detail later in this section.
51 NE 1156a10-20
pleasure is no longer obtained from that person. As Badhwar writes, “A friend who is loved as an end is numerically irreplaceable in the sense that she is not a means to a happiness which can be better or as well served by another.”\(^{52}\) Annis adds that “At least part of the concern in friendship must be altruistic, that is a concern for our friend’s welfare for the sake of the friend.”\(^{53}\) Therefore, loving, wishing, and acting for another as an end in herself are indicative of the irreplaceability of the other in the relationship, one person valuing the other and/or relationship directly, and one person making the other the object of concern in the relationship.

Badhwar and Telfer both argue that treating a friend as an end in herself also necessitates recognizing that friend’s particular nature. Badhwar’s article, “Friends as Ends in Themselves,” is devoted to explaining the difference between means love and ends love in friendships and concludes that loving someone as an end in herself means loving the “unique and irreplaceable” in that person.\(^{54}\) Badhwar arrives at this conclusion by comparing the love that exists in friendship to unconditional or blind love.\(^{55}\) She argues that the love involved in friendships is a response to the friend’s particular qualities and the sort of love that is bestowed without regard to such qualities cannot be the foundation of friendship.\(^{56}\) In comparing particular types of unconditional and instrumental love Badhwar writes “Their difference is only that in one the individual target is regarded as an end, in the other, as a means. But in neither is the individual loved for the unique character or personality that makes him the distinct person he is, as he must be in the end love of friendship.”\(^{57}\) Telfer notes that the desire for another’s good in friendship is “… to be distinguished both from sense of duty and from benevolence. For these motives

\(^{55}\) *Ibid.* Pg 5-6.
prompt us to seek others’ good in general, whereas we want to say that those who feel affection feel a concern for another which they do not feel for everyone.”\textsuperscript{58} Both argue, in effect, that the other person in a friendship must be loved for who she is as an individual as opposed to being loved for her human dignity, autonomous nature, or some other generally shared quality. As mentioned previously, for two people to be close friends there must be positive feelings toward each other that give rise to pleasure when in each other’s company. If the pleasure they take in each other’s presence is not significantly different than the pleasure taken in a stranger’s presence, then love fails to differentiate between friends and strangers. Yet, this is empirically false because the pleasure and positive emotions felt for a friend are different than those felt for a stranger; in fact, this is part of what differentiates a friend from a stranger.

Mutuality is the fourth component of intimate relationships. For two people to be intimate relations both must love, wish the other well, and act for the other as an end in herself. Intimate relationships cannot be unidirectional. Aristotle writes “But to those who thus wish good we ascribe only goodwill, if the wish is not reciprocated; goodwill when it is reciprocal being friendship.”\textsuperscript{59} The love, wishes, and actions must be granted to each member of the relationship for it to count as intimate rather than some other type of relationship.

In discussions of friendships the requirement of equality is sometimes added to the criterion of mutuality. For example, Badhwar writes “I define friendship as a practical and emotional relationship of mutual and equal goodwill, affection and pleasure”\textsuperscript{60} Laurence Thomas argues that deep friendships are marked by the absence of authority of one friend over another.\textsuperscript{61}

\textsuperscript{59} 1155b32-34.
However, other writers do not see equality as a necessary component of friendships. Aristotle writes:

> In all friendships implying inequality the love also should be proportional, i.e. the better should be more loved than he loves, and so should the more useful, and similarly in each of the other cases; for when the love is in proportion to the merit of the parties, then in a sense arises equality, which is certainly help to be a characteristic of friendship.\(^{62}\)

Equality here might mean a couple of different things. It might mean that the people involved in the relationship are moral equals or of equal moral worth; however, Badhwar, Thomas, and Aristotle seem to mean something quite different.\(^{63}\) Rather than discussing whether friends must be moral equals, Badhwar asserts that friends must reciprocate equally at least on an emotional level. Thomas is primarily concerned about two friends being on equal authoritative footing over one another. Even Aristotle discusses the possibility of two socially unequal people being friends. Yet, two people do not need to be equal in any of these ways to love, wish the other well, and act for the other as an end in herself. Furthermore, the love, wishes, and actions that each member of the relationship undertakes for the other’s sake may be uneven in intimate relations. For example, the number and complexity of the actions that a parent performs for a child may be far greater than those that a child performs for a parent. As long as the child acts for her parent for the parent’s own sake as an end, that child would still meet the mutuality criterion of intimate relationships (in terms of acting). In light of these points and the fact that the term ‘intimate relationships’ is intended to describe a wider range of relationships than just

\(^{62}\) 1158b24-29.

\(^{63}\) Aristotle discusses both moral and social equality and those issues will be addressed in much greater detail in chapter 6.
the deepest friendships, there is no need for intimate relationships to meet such equality criteria as those discussed by Badhwar, Thomas, and Aristotle.\footnote{Aristotle’s take on the question of equality will be addressed in more detail in chapter 6.}

The final component of intimate relationships is trust that the other will love, wish one well, and act for the other as an end in herself. Annis and Thomas both identify trust as central to close friendships.\footnote{Annis, D. B. 1987. “The Meaning, Value, and Duties of Friendship.” American Philosophical Quarterly 24(4): 350.} Thomas, for example, includes “an enormous bond of mutual trust” as one of the three defining features of companion friendships.\footnote{Thomas, L. 1987. “Friendship.” Synthese 77(2): 217.} Annette Baier’s article “Trust and Antitrust” delves into the variety and significance of trust in interpersonal relationships.\footnote{Ibid.} She provides the following definition of trust: “Trust, on the analysis I have proposed, is letting other persons (natural or artificial, such as firms, nations, etc.) take care of something the truster cares about, where such "caring for" involves some exercise of discretionary powers.”\footnote{Baier, A. 1986. “Trust and Antitrust.” Ethics 95(2): 231-260.} In the case of intimate relationships the something being cared for is the other person and the care being offered takes the form of loving, wishing well, and acting for the other’s sake. Baier also explores the psychological aspect of trust indicating that it may be unconscious, conscious but unchosen, or consciously cultivated.\footnote{Ibid. pg 240.} This is important to the definition of intimate relationships because it allows children and mentally disabled people who may not understand the concept of trust to participate in intimate relationships despite an inability to consciously chose or cultivate trust.\footnote{Ibid. pg 244-245.}

\footnote{Ibid. pg 244-245.} The larger point here being that even young children and some mentally disabled people, depending on the level of their disability, would have little trouble meeting most of the criteria of intimate relationships. By using Baier’s concept of trust the component of intimate relationships that requires the most significant mental faculties is the ability of people in intimate relationships to conceive of one another as ends in themselves and even this is not an incredibly restricting criterion.
Additionally, it also opens up the possibility that trust need not be acknowledged in a relationship. For example, Steve and Jared may reveal what they consider secrets to one another in conversation without explicitly asking one another to keep the conversations private. Instead, they may unconsciously rely on one another’s discretion and well wishing to prevent their words from being repeated to other people. As Baier writes, proper trust must be able to survive its revelation but need not actually be revealed. Baier is also careful to point out that trust is not always morally good and sets out to distinguish morally good trust from morally problematic trust. She concludes

A trust relationship is morally bad to the extent that either party relies on qualities in the other which would be weakened by the knowledge that the other relies on them. Where each relies on the other's love, or concern for some common good, or professional pride in competent discharge of responsibility, knowledge of what the other is relying on in one need not undermine but will more likely strengthen those relied-on features.

Since intimate relationships are marked by each person relying on the other’s loving, wishing, and acting, they exhibit a morally positive form of trust.

One criterion sometimes identified with close friendships that is not a component of intimate relationships is choice in the formation of the relationship. Telfer and Thomas, for example, both discuss choice as being an important part of deep friendships and contrast friendships with the parent-child relationship. Yet, including choice as a criterion of intimate relationships is problematic for two reasons: it is unclear what level of choice is required of

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72 This is a significant departure from Telfer’s definition of friendship which requires an acknowledgement of the relationship. pg 230.
73 Ibid. pg 235.
74 Ibid. pg 256.
friendships and there is no need to restrict intimate relationships to those that are freely undertaken. Despite the fact that Telfer and Thomas include choice as one of the components of friendships, they both admit that the choice to become friends is partial at best. Telfer includes involuntary passions as part of her account of friendship and must therefore admit that choice’s involvement in friendship is limited. She writes “In this way my two necessary conditions are compatible with, and themselves imply, choice in friendship—though they also imply that we cannot choose to be a friend of just anyone, since the relevant passions cannot be summoned up at will.” Thomas concedes: “Yet, it is all too obvious that as a rule we do not self-consciously choose our friends in the way that we choose, say, the clothes that we wear.” Even if choice is a vital part of friendships, it is not a necessary part of the definition of the intimate relationships that this dissertation will examine. Whether choice is a significant part of a relationship may be philosophically interesting and consequential, but it does not necessarily bear on the moral value of the relationship itself.

**Part II: Application of the Definition**

The definition of intimate relationships can be applied in order to see which sorts of relationships can and cannot meet the aforementioned criteria. Deep friendships such as those described by Aristotle, Badhwar, Telfer, Annis, and Thomas would be one subcategory of intimate relationships. Relationships that are sometimes seen as more distant, such as those between playmates or sports teammates, might also count as intimate relationships: so long as the concern of each member of the relationship for the other extended beyond their roles in the mutual interest. Many parent-child relationships could also count as long as the child was able to appreciate her parent as an end in herself. Married couples, whether the result of arranged or

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freely chosen marriage, could be intimate relations. Even a romantic couple in which one or both members are cheating on their significant others could be in an intimate relationship with one another if both members of the couple could meet the aforementioned criterion of trust in addition to all the other criteria. A mentally disabled person and her unrelated caretaker might be intimate relations too as long as the mentally disabled person possessed the mental faculties to understand her caretaker as an end in herself.

Other relationships could not count as intimate ones. For example, the relationship between two strangers would not meet the requirement of loving the other as an end in herself even if they both bore general goodwill to everyone. Siblings whose competitiveness prevented them from sincerely wishing each other well as ends in themselves could not be intimate relations. Two sports stars who mutually admired and even loved one another but never realized that admiration or love by acting for each other’s good would not be intimate relations. A newborn baby cannot be a part of an intimate relationship because she cannot recognize another person as an end in herself. Someone who loves, wishes well, and acts for another as an end in herself but whose love, wishes, and acts are not returned by the other is not in an intimate relationship.

Intimate relationships are similar to close friendships because close friendships are one form of intimate relationship. Thus, the two share the criteria of loving, wishing the other well, and acting for the other as an end in herself. Each of the criteria is performed mutually and with trust in both intimate relationships and close friendships. This is a good sign since Kant, Moore, and Aristotle directly discuss friendships. However, intimate relationships include other relationships too. By excluding the criteria of equality in the relationship and choice in the formation of the relationship from the definition of intimate relationships, the term “intimate
relationship” is able to include close relationships, like familial ones, that the term “friendship”
cannot. This too is important for the purposes of this dissertation since Aristotle and Held
discuss relationships that do not fit into the category of friendship.

The added benefit of including close friendships, close familial relationships, and
romantic relationships under one more general heading is that these are the three categories of
relationship most often attributed value by actual people in the world. These are the relationships
that almost everyone has, that authors have written about for millennia, and that are prime
candidates for moral value. If any category of relationship has moral value it is one or more of
these three. Other relationships may have moral value too, but what seems incredibly unlikely
and contrary to human experience is that some other category of relationship that does not fall
under the definition explained above has moral value while those relationships defined above as
intimate do not. That is the risk of restricting the discussion about the moral value of
interpersonal relationships to only friendships, only familial relationships, or only romantic
relationships: that one ends up examining the moral value of a sort of relationship that does not
have moral value while some other category of relationship does have moral value. By using a
broader definition than that of friendship while retaining a majority of the features of friendship
that have made it philosophically interesting I hope to mitigate that risk.

Intimate relationships, then, are the relevant set of emotions, desires, and actions of two
people that meet the aforementioned requirements for some length of time. An intimate
relationship exists between the time that each member develops the relevant emotions and

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78 It is possible for intimate relationships to occur between more than two individuals at once, but to avoid
unnecessary complexity this dissertation will focus on dyadic relationships. This is all I will say about the
metaphysics of intimate relationships. Since the final goal of this dissertation is to understand which components of
a normative theory help and hinder a theory’s ability to account for the value of intimate relationships it is important
to keep metaphysical criteria for intimate relationships to a minimum. To do otherwise would risk deeming a
normative theory incapable of accounting for the value of intimate relationships due to the theorist’s particular
metaphysics rather than the properties of the normative theory itself.
desires and at least one member loses them.\textsuperscript{79} The time it takes for the psychological development and fading of these emotions and desires in actual people acts as a natural constraint on the length of intimate relationships.\textsuperscript{80} For example, loving someone else as an end in herself requires knowledge of that person and love in the face of such knowledge. Yet, both the development of love and learning enough about another person to appreciate her as an end in herself take time. Even if love for another were to appear before one had sufficient knowledge of another person as an end in herself, that love would not be enough to qualify the relationship as intimate until it survived the acquisition of the relevant knowledge. Intimate relationships can end more quickly than they begin, as the trust required of intimate relations can sometimes be lost in a moment. However, in many cases trust, loving another as an end in herself, and wishing another well as an end in herself persist for a significant amount of time even if there is little to no contact between the individuals involved in the relationship. Thus, intimate relationships take a significant amount of time to form but once formed their length is more often measured in years than days.

\textbf{Part III: Intimate Relationships and Value}

Intimate relationships and various types of value have been clearly defined, so the intersection of intimate relationships and value now bears examination. The two questions about value that Korsgaard identifies in “Two Distinctions in Goodness” can be applied to intimate relationships: what is the location of an intimate relationship’s goodness and how does one value an intimate relationship.\textsuperscript{81} An intimate relationship may be good in-itself or its goodness might be related to something other than the relationship itself. In neither case does the account of the

\textsuperscript{79} Since the number and type of actions required of intimate relations varies depending on the individuals in the relationship, it is less relevant to the determination of the relationship’s length.

\textsuperscript{80} It also acts as a natural constrain on the number of intimate relationships one person can have when one considers the limited time any person has to devote to relationships.

value’s location conflict with the idea of an intimate relationship. However, the way in which one values a relationship does determine whether that relationship can be considered an intimate one. One who values one’s relationship with another person as merely instrumentally good cannot, by definition, be involved in an intimate relationship with that other person. Only relationships that are valued as final goods are viable candidates for intimate relationships. The subjectivity or objectivity of intimate relationships’ value also warrants discussion due to the partiality that such relationships require of their participants.

Intimate relationships can be described as having either intrinsic or extrinsic value. Intimate relationships have intrinsic value if their value comes from their intrinsic nature. Perhaps the simplest way to intuitively gauge whether intimate relationships have intrinsic value is to subject them to Moore’s isolation test: is the existence of an intimate relationship, in absolute isolation from everything besides the people involved, judged to be good? Moore supposes that an affirmative answer to this question would indicate that the goodness of intimate relationships must depend, at least in part, on their intrinsic properties since only these properties would exist in such simple universes. On the other hand, negative answers to these questions would indicate that the goodness of intimate relationships is merely extrinsic: that it must depend on the association of the intimate relationship with other objects rather than the relationship’s internal features. Each of the theorists discussed in the subsequent chapters will offer an account of intimate relationships’ value that can be classified as at intrinsic or extrinsic.

The differences between the theorists’ stances on the intrinsic or extrinsic nature of intimate relationships’ value does not impact an agent’s ability to foster such relationships.

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82 Of course relationships valued as ends in themselves may also, as a matter of fact, be useful; therefore, close interpersonal relationships in which the members treat another as ends in themselves and find the relationship to be instrumentally good can be intimate relationships so long as they meet all the other criteria of intimate relationships.
Many of the philosophers that define and discuss the connection between friendships and value describe friendships as intrinsically valuable, yet intrinsic value is neither necessary nor sufficient for a relationship to be described as intimate. Relationships that pass Moore’s test are intrinsically valuable but may still fail to be the final ends of those people involved in the relationships. Thus, they would be unable to meet the defining criteria of intimate relationships. For example, Steve and Leonard might love, wish, and act for one another as means to some other end, such as their own increased pleasure when watching Mets games. Even if such a relationship could be considered intrinsically valuable, it still could not be considered intimate because it is treated by Steve and Leonard as instrumentally good rather than as an end in itself. Conversely, a relationship that is extrinsically good could still be considered intimate. The goodness of a particular relationship in which each of the people involved loved, wished, and acted for the other as an end might depend on circumstantial features of the relationship, yet this would not prevent the relationship from meeting the requirements of an intimate relationship. For example, even if the relationship between John Stuart Mill and Harriet Taylor was only good because it existed at that particular time in history and would have been bad had it existed in any other time period, the relationship could be considered an intimate one: as long as they loved, wished, and acted for one another as ends in themselves the relationship would still meet the relevant criteria.

Conversely, how a relationship is valued does directly affect whether that relationship can be considered intimate. Final goods are valued for their own sakes, as ends in themselves, rather than as means to some other goods. A theory that does not allow for the possibility of relationships having final value cannot address the value of intimate relationships. In order for two people to be intimate relations, they must love, wish each other well, and act for each other
as ends in themselves. Thus, two people involved in a close interpersonal relationship must value one another as final goods for that relationship to meet the definition of an intimate relationship.\textsuperscript{84} The alternatives, not valuing one another at all or valuing one another only as instrumental goods, are psychologically incompatible with the existence of an intimate relationship. One simply cannot feel strong positive emotions toward a person for his own sake without valuing that person. Furthermore, strong positive emotions for a person as an end in himself are indicative of the value placed on that person as a final good. Similarly, to love a person for himself is to value him as more than a means to some other end. If Steve values his close friend Shivang merely as a way to further enjoy his trips to New York City, then Steve cannot be said to love Shivang for himself.\textsuperscript{85} There is an undeniable connection, then, between loving a person for himself and valuing that person as an end in himself: one must value a person as an end in himself, as a final good, in order for one to be able to love a person as an end in herself.\textsuperscript{86}

Badhwar in “Friends As Ends In Themselves” discusses a counterargument to the preceding claims: the possibility that the pleasure that comes from loving someone makes all love instrumental. It seems undeniable that the experience of love comes with some amount of pleasure. If this pleasure is the actual goal of love then it would be impossible to love anyone as an end in herself. In this case, all lovers would be treating their loved ones as an instrumental means to the end of pleasure that comes from love. This would then make it impossible for any relationship to meet the criteria of an intimate relationship. Badhwar compares this argument to that of psychological egoists who would claim that everything is done for self-interested reasons.

\textsuperscript{84} To be clear, they can value one another as final goods AND as instrumental goods and still be intimate relations.
\textsuperscript{85} At best Steve might be said to love New York City.
\textsuperscript{86} It is possible, though, to value a person as an end in himself without loving him.
Bishop Joseph Butler’s counter to the psychological egoist would also seem applicable in this situation: one cannot get pleasure from loving someone unless that person is genuinely the goal of the love.\footnote{Butler, J. 1726. \textit{Fifteen Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel}. Reprinted in part in \textit{British Moralists}. Ed. Raphael (1991), Vol. I, Pg 365.} Despite her agreement with Butler’s argument, Badhwar pursues the issue further in order to see whether love is ultimately a means to the final good of happiness.\footnote{Badhwar, N. K. 1987. “Friends as Ends in Themselves.” \textit{Philosophy and Phenomenological Research} 48(1):11.} She formulates two arguments against the claim that love must be instrumental. First, she compares love to the instrumental good of seeing green valleys.\footnote{Ibid.} She notes that the desire to obtain the instrumental good of seeing green valleys ends once the final good of happiness is attained. Yet, this is not the case with love. Love does not end after one is made happy. In fact, it is often augmented. The desire to see a green valley and the happiness that comes from the fulfillment of that desire can exist separately. However, this is not the case with happiness and love. Badhwar writes,

Happiness is related to end love not as a goals to a means, but rather, as an element to a complex whole. So when x is loved as an end, the happiness cannot, logically, exist apart from the love: different end loves bring different forms of happiness. By contrast, when x is loved as a means, the happiness is a further goal of love, and can, logically, exist without it: different means loves can bring the same form of happiness.\footnote{Ibid. pg 13.}

Love and the pleasure and happiness that result from it are too closely bound to be separated into a traditional means-ends relationship.

Another question about intimate relationships is whether their value can be objective despite the subjectivity entailed by their defining criteria. Two constituent features of intimate relationships are the emotions and desires of the individuals involved. The relevant emotions
and desires are subjective, existing only in the minds of particular subjects, yet subjective psychological states may still be objectively valuable. In other words, the value of the relevant psychological states may be a real part of the world separate from any other psychological states of the two subjects involved in the relationship and separate from the psychological states of any other subject. If value supervened on psychological states, then some of these subjective states would be objectively valuable. Thus, it is at least possible that subjective psychological states such as emotions and desires can be the bearers of objective value and there is no inherent conflict between the subjectivity of the psychological states necessary for intimate relationships’ existence and the objectivity of their value.

Intimate relationships are interpersonal relationships in which those people involved love one another, wish one another well, act for one another, do so in a way that regards one another as an end in herself, do so mutually or for one another, and trust that the other loves and wishes one well as an end in herself. These relationships may have intrinsic or extrinsic value, but that value must be a final value as opposed to an instrumental value. The love for the other as an end in herself that is, by definition, a necessary component of intimate relationships is incompatible with valuing the relationship only as a means to some other end. Furthermore, because the pleasure that results from an intimate relationship is inseparable from the relationship and does not end when either party is happy, intimate relationships are not all instrumental to the production of pleasure or happiness. Finally, the subjectivity of the psychological states that help make up intimate relationships does not imply that the value of those relationships is also subjective.
Chapter 4: Kant and the Value of Intimate Relationships

Despite many criticisms that Kantian theory is inimical to the development and maintenance of intimate relationships, Kant did write about such relationships and consider them valuable. Part one of this chapter will argue that Kant’s discussion of friendships treats them as extrinsic, final goods. In part two of this chapter, Kantian friendships will be shown to be a subset of intimate relationships: they share all the defining characteristics of intimate relationships but add additional requirements that the relationships must meet to be considered Kantian friendships. Part three will consider the criticisms of Bernard Williams, Michael Stocker, and Laurence Blum who all claim that Kant’s theory is problematic because of its treatment of intimate relationships. Part four will evaluate Barbara Herman’s replies to these criticisms. Finally, part five of this chapter will explain why, despite Herman’s attempts, Kantianism still fails to account for the value of intimate relationships. It will also pinpoint the theoretical components of Kantianism from which the failure stems.

Part I: Value in Kantian Friendships

Kant is clear in the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, hereafter FM, that the good will is the only unqualifiedly good thing when he writes “Nothing in the world – indeed nothing even beyond the world – can possibly be conceived which could be called good without qualification except a good will.” \(^{92}\) Despite this clarity two pertinent questions about the goodness of the good will are: what sort of value does Kant attribute to it and how does that value intersect with the value of actions.

\(^{91}\) Herman’s account will be relied on heavily because she specifically attempts to provide answers to the problems created for Kantian theory by its supposed inability to account for intimate relationships and because she attempts to do so without modifying Kant’s theory.

Unqualified goodness is, for Kant, both an intrinsic and final value. Fred Feldman argues that unqualified goodness, charitably conceived, means incorruptibly good. He writes, “When a thing is [incorruptibly] good, it has a sort of goodness that things have of necessity. It continues to have just as much of this goodness in all possible worlds and in all possible circumstances.”

All other characteristics or objects, such as intelligence or money, are only good in certain conditions and therefore their value is corruptible. For example, intelligence and money are good when possessed by a moral exemplar but can be quite bad in the hands of a vicious person. Conversely, the goodness of the Kantian good will is not changed by any circumstance or different in any possible world. Kant’s claim that the good will is unqualifiedly good, then, amounts to a claim that the good will is intrinsically good in Moore’s sense. As discussed in chapter two, something that has unqualified goodness also meets one of the conditions for intrinsic goodness: that the value remains the same under all possible circumstances. The value of the good will is positive and uninfluenced by anything external to it; in other words, its goodness is not located outside itself but is internal and therefore intrinsic in Moore’s sense. For Kant, the value of the good will is also a final value. He writes “The good will is not good because of what it effects or accomplishes or because of its adequacy to achieve some proposed end; it is good only because of its willing, i.e., it is good of itself” (FM 10). Kant here explains how the good will is valuable specifically pointing out that it is not instrumentally good but good as an end in itself, as a final value.

Though the good will is the only thing with unqualified goodness, actions that derive from the motive of duty also have moral worth:

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[Thus the first proposition of morality is that to have moral worth an action must be done from duty.] The second proposition is: An action performed from duty does not have its moral worth in the purpose which is to be achieved through it but in the maxim by which it is determined. Its moral value, therefore, does not depend on the realization of the object of the action but merely on the principle of volition by which the action is done, without any regard to the objects of the faculty of desire (FM 16).

The same question asked about the value of the good will can be asked of morally worthy actions: what type of value do they possess? According to Keith Simmons actions with moral worth are manifestations of the good will.\(^95\) Barbara Herman argues in *The Practice of Moral Judgment*, hereafter *PMJ*, that “The point of saying that it is actions that are credited with moral worth is to highlight the relationship between an action and its motive (via the action’s maxim), which is where moral worth resides…”\(^96\) Both Simmons and Herman locate the worth of the action outside the action itself; therefore, the moral goodness of actions is extrinsic. The second question about the value of morally good actions is how they are valuable: as means or ends. As evidenced by the previous quotation from *FM* the value of actions is final since an action’s goodness exists regardless of its outcome. Thus, the action is not merely valuable because it leads to some morally valuable consequence. Additionally, the action is not valuable because it makes the will good or better. Herman writes of Kantian theory

The number of morally worthy acts performed, however, is not proportional to the will’s goodness… Moral worth is an expression of good will in our actions. It is not a quantitative measure of good will… as A is prepared to act beneficently, he has a good

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will. It will not be improved if he acts, nor will it be diminished if... he refrains from action” (PMJ 35).

The good will does make the action coming from it good, but the implication is only unidirectional. The goodness of an action is not a means to some other end, but an end in itself. As a result, actions that constitute intimate relationships can have final extrinsic value.

Kant discusses friendship most extensively in two of his works: The Metaphysics of Morals, afterwards abbreviated MM, and the Lectures on Ethics, hereafter LE. In MM Kant writes that “striving for friendship... is a duty set by reason, and no ordinary duty but an honorable one” (MM 261). Lara Denis expands on Kant’s point and argues that “Kant praises friendship because he understands it as a relationship that embodies love and respect for others, preserves self-respect, and fosters self-development.” In LE Kant claims that there are two motives to action for humans, self love and love of humanity (LE 200). It is the second of these that Kant identifies as the moral motive and then associates with friendship (LE 202). Stijn Van Impe writes that the idea of friendship according to Kant is “‘true’ and ‘necessary’, not from the natural point of view of what we will do, but from the moral point of view of what we ought to do.” Thus, Kant sees friendships as morally valuable relationships. Since friendship is a duty set by reason, actions that initiate or perpetuate a Kantian friendship can be seen as extrinsically good, final ends.

**Part II: Kantian Friendships as Intimate Relationships**

Kantian friendships, however, may or may not meet the criteria of intimate relationships. Kant actually notes that there are several types of friendship in both MM and LE, but attributes

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the previously discussed moral goodness to what he terms moral friendships (LE 203 and MM
263). An examination of moral friendships shows that they are a subset of intimate relationships
since they involve love between those in the relationship, wishes and actions for the other’s
good, the treatment of the other person as an end in herself, mutuality, and trust.

Kant describes the sentiments involved in friendships in the Vigilantius notes of the
Lectures on Ethics, hereafter referred to as V.¹⁰⁰ He speaks of the “sweet delight in the
enjoyment of friendship.” He also discusses the importance of well-liking and well-wishing as
separable components of friendship (V 407). He says “well-liking can never be wrung from us,
by inclination, without an occasion; so it can never be commanded as a duty” (V 408). Together
these points show that according to Kant friends do feel pleasure when together and, therefore,
satisfy the criterion of love for the other person that is a component of intimate relationships.

Kant also writes that in the closest form of friendship friends wish and act for one
another’s benefit:

How one wishes for a friend in need (one who is, of course, an active friend, ready to
help at his own expense)… friendship cannot be a union aimed at mutual advantage but
must rather be a purely moral one, and the help that each may count on from the other in
case of need must not be regarded as the end and determining ground of friendship – for
in that case one would lose the other’s respect – but only as the outward manifestation of
an inner heartfelt benevolence…”(MM 262).

Kant here details a relationship that clearly addresses wishing and doing good for the other and
references several additional criteria of intimate relationships. For example, this quotation refers
to the way in which friends act for one another as ends in themselves. This account also

discusses the reciprocal nature of friendship. Kant expands on this component of friendship when he writes,

Well-wishing towards others is, however, more closely and strictly coupled with the idea of friendship, if the criterion of reciprocal well-wishing is attached to it; for in sensu lato, the expression to have true friendship for another is not necessarily associated with the idea that this other is also grateful in return, and harbours the same well-wishing towards ourself. There can therefore be amor unilateralis; but strictly such well-wishing changes into friendship (amicitia) through a reciprocal love, or amor bilaterialis” (V 408).

Trust is also a component of the highest form of friendship according to Kant. He defines this form of friendship in MM as “the complete confidence of two persons in revealing their secret judgments and feelings to each other, as far as such disclosures are consistent with mutual respect” (MM 263). This definition coincides with the trust criterion of intimate relationships. Kant goes on to discuss the importance of this trust as a fulfillment of one’s need to disclose one’s thoughts to another: “We all have a strong impulse to disclose ourselves, and enter wholly into fellowship” (LE 206). Yet, one can only do this if she is confident the disclosed information will not be used against her or be detrimental to the respect the other person has for her. Kant writes that someone without such a relationship, would like to discuss with someone what he thinks about his associates, the government, religion and so forth, but he cannot risk it: partly because the other person, while prudently keeping back his own judgments, might use this to harm him, and partly because, as regards disclosing his faults, the other person may conceal his own, so that he would lose something of the other’s respect by presenting himself quite candidly to him (MM 263).
The major difference between Kant’s account of friendship and intimate relationships is Kant’s focus on equality (V 408 and MM 262). This added criterion simply makes Kant’s definition of friendship more restrictive than the definition of intimate relationships; nonetheless, a Kantian friendship would still count as an intimate relationship because it meets all the criteria necessary for the relationship to be categorized as intimate. Using Kant’s more restrictive term friendship as a proxy for intimate relationships has some important consequences. If Kant can successfully account for the moral value he grants friendships, one might still criticize Kant for failing to account for the moral value of other sorts of intimate relationships. On the other hand, if Kant cannot account for the moral value of friendships, relationships which he admits are morally valuable, then his theory falls short of justifying even his own claims about these relationships.

Part III: Kant’s Critics

Williams, Stocker, and Blum each attempt to show that the theoretical constraints of Kant’s moral theory prevent thorough-going Kantians from actually having and valuing the sort of friendships about which Kant writes. Herman sorts the various criticisms into three main objections: 1. Kantians must be more concerned with fulfilling duty than the objects of duty, 2. Kantians must disavow the emotions as morally valuable motives, 3. Kantians’ attachment to living according to the dictates of morality undermines their commitment to other people.

The first of these objections claims that the Kantian insistence on acting from the motive of duty precludes a real concern for the objects of action. This would prove problematic for intimate relationships because people in intimate relationships are supposed to act for one another as ends. For example, if one has a duty to teach one’s child philosophy, then a moral Kantian’s motive and end in fulfilling this duty must be to respect the moral law. Neither the
teaching of philosophy to one’s child nor one’s child herself is the direct end of the action but simply a means to acting morally: the goal of the action is to respect the moral law not to help the child. Stocker and Blum both give examples that attempt to show the problematic relationship between moral motives and ethical ends. Stocker explains how visiting someone in the hospital from the motive of duty does not indicate a concern for that person or her health as an end.¹⁰¹ He writes “When someone acts for the sake of goodness, the goodness is his goal.”¹⁰² He also argues in “The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories” that the motive of doing the right thing conflicts with the correct objects of those motives. For example, Adam promises Ryan that he will help him study for a test. The question is what Adam’s motive is for keeping the promise. According to Stocker, the object of Adam’s motive is Ryan: Ryan is the person Adam is helping study. However, Stocker believes that a Kantian’s motive must be “to do what is morally right” which makes no mention of Ryan whatsoever. This makes some objects of morally good actions, such as intimate relationships, impossible.¹⁰³ Blum contrasts the motives of two people helping a third. He argues that the person motivated only by Kantian duty would not be concerned with the person being helped. This reveals the unimportance of that person as an object of morally motivated action.¹⁰⁴ Blum explicitly denies a Kantian connection between acting from a duty to benefit someone and acting for the end of that person or her benefit.¹⁰⁵

The second objection facing Kantians is that they view the emotions as insufficient motives for moral action. This implies that many of the emotions and desires that constitute intimate relationship do not have moral worth. According to this characterization of Kant, an action motivated by an emotion, or anything other than duty, is not morally good. He writes,

¹⁰² Ibid. 127.
¹⁰⁵ Ibid. 119.
Thus, for instance, I should seek to further the happiness of others, not as though its realization was any concern of mine (whether because of direct inclination or of some satisfaction related to it indirectly through reason); I should do so merely because the maxim which excludes it from my duty cannot be comprehended as a universal law in one and the same volition (FM 60).

This is seen by Williams and Blum as an impoverished view of morality generally and specifically the moral worth of actions. Williams writes that certain actions have value precisely because they are “the product of an emotional response.”

Blum’s entire book *Friendship, Altruism and Morality* offers an argument for the moral value of emotions. He writes that

> The Kantian view of feelings and emotions and its view of morality constitute a powerful and influential tradition of thought, which would deny a substantial role to sympathy, compassion, and concern in morality and moral motivation.  

Blum also offers a couple of reasons for Kantians’ dismissal of emotions as moral motives. First, Kantians believe emotions are not reliable enough to motivate consistent, principled, moral action. Acting on the dictates of rationality will always result in consistent action because rationality will not vary from one situation to another. On the other hand, emotions are dependent on the circumstance and can lead to contradictory actions. The circumstantial nature of emotions also makes universalizing them as a motive problematic, and for Kantians universalizing the maxim of an action ensures its impartiality.

The final objection against Kantianism is that its followers must alienate themselves from their interpersonal relationships to live a moral life. In order to act morally Kantians must put

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108 Ibid. 30-36
respect for the moral law above all other commitments. According to Williams this sort of requirement is an attack on an individual’s integrity. Williams writes that “impartial morality, if the conflict really does arise, must be required to win; and that cannot necessarily be a reasonable demand on the agent” because “there can come a point at which it is quite unreasonable for a man to give up, in the name of the impartial good ordering of the world of moral agents, something which is a condition of his having any interest in being around in that world at all.”

A moral agent is required to make every other commitment in her life secondary to her commitment to the moral law. To illustrate the problematic nature of this point Williams uses the example of a man who may save one person among many from drowning after a shipwreck. The man’s wife is one of the people drowning. According to Williams, a Kantian would be required to “check” the permissibility of saving his wife rather than someone else in order to be truly impartial. Yet, this sort of “check” is at odds with the man’s commitment to his wife and could indicate a lack of appropriate concern for his relationship with her. The man’s integrity is threatened because his Kantian leanings force him to violate his commitment to his wife by placing morality above that commitment; furthermore, the man’s devotion to his wife is a central part of his identity that he must question in the face of morality’s dictates.

**Part IV: A Kantian Response to Criticism**

Herman attempts to respond to each of these three criticisms in *PMJ*. She writes that the charge that Kantians are concerned only with respecting the moral law when they act rests on an incorrect assumption about the relationship between the motives and ends of actions. Herman also seeks to clarify the role of emotions in moral action on a Kantian view in an attempt to

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overcome the criticism that the emotions fail as moral motives. Finally, Herman disagrees that one must be alienated from other people in order to live up to Kantian standards.

Herman argues that the motive for an action and the object of that action are not necessarily one in the same. The object of an action is the end, or goal, of that action: what one is trying to accomplish by acting. The motive for an action explains an agent’s reasons for choosing a particular end. To return to a previous example, the goal of one’s action could be that one’s child learns philosophy. This end might be motivated by several distinct desires: a desire to respect the moral law, a desire to discuss philosophy with one’s child, a desire to increase the child’s ability to reason critically, or even a desire for one’s child to earn a scholarship to college via the increase in the child’s standardized test scores that often accompanies the study of philosophy. The same end, one’s child learning philosophy, may have multiple motivating desires. Similarly, the objects of a single motive may change based on the circumstances accompanying the motive. A desire for one’s child to earn a scholarship may lead to different objects of action depending on the child’s natural talents: if the child has superlative hand eye coordination but less than stellar test scores the object of this particular motive might be to have one’s child practice baseball rather than study philosophy. Herman uses the example of promise keeping to make this point. She writes,

Consider a case of acting from the motive of duty according to the principle, “Keep the promises you make.” (Call this principle $P$.) The motive of duty prompts me to act as morality (or $P$) requires: to do what is right. What the motive of duty prompts me to do, then, is to keep my promise. The object of my action in following $P$ is to do whatever it is I promised to do. I am moved to do this thing because $P$ requires it; that is my reason for doing it, the nature of my interest in it. I am not trying to bring about “kept promises”
or even “my kept promises.” (I will not have made the world a morally better place if I make and keep more promises than I now have reason to do.) I am trying to do what I promised because I promised to do it: that is, I act from the motive of duty (PMJ 25-26).

In fact, Herman describes an action motivated by duty with the object of conforming to duty “rule-fetishism” and contrasts it with acting dutifully (PMJ 27). Of helping dutifully she writes, “Again, one does not help in order to satisfy a moral rule; the rule requires that you take the need of another as a reason to help” (PMJ 29). To return to the example of Adam promising to help Ryan study, Herman argues that, as a Kantian, Adam’s object in keeping his promise would be to help Ryan study. If instead Adam did not keep his promise with the object of helping Ryan, but simply because he is trying to keep all the promises he makes then he is missing the point of Kantian morality: that other people are ends in themselves. On this account, a Kantian can be motivated by duty to act for the other in an intimate relationship and the resulting action will have moral worth: Adam can be motivated by duty to act for Ryan’s sake when he keeps his promise and his action will have moral worth.

Herman examines the emotions’ role in Kantian moral motivation in an attempt to show that Kantians are not as opposed to the emotions’ involvement in moral actions as some of their critics suspect. First, Herman addresses the notion that Kantians dismiss the emotions as moral motives because they are unreliable. Herman argues that the real problem Kantians have with the emotions is not their unreliability in leading to moral action but their lack of connection to moral duty. She writes, “Emotion-based motives fail to support the necessary internal connection between the motive and the rightness of a proposed action. This is why Kant holds that maxims of action based on the motive of sympathy have no ‘moral content’” (PMJ 30).110 Nevertheless, Herman admits that this position too is at odds with Williams’ critique of

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110 The problem Herman identifies is similar to the aforementioned second problem indentified by Blum.
Kantians: that they are unable to respond to others in ways that are appropriate given their interpersonal relationships. Herman revises the objection: “The worry is that if the Kantian agent is required to act from the motive of duty, then when morality is at issue, his responses to others will be less personal, less an expression of his feeling for them” (PMJ 31). She responds to this objection by noting that many actions that one would undertake for another are not matters of perfect duty; thus, in such cases the moral law is only a limiting condition (PMJ 31). Respect for the moral law, when acting as a limiting condition, is not a motive for action; therefore, emotions can be morally acceptable motivations for many of the actions that support intimate relationships. Herman also argues that Kantians can be emotionally motivated to help others rather than being motivated out of a sense of duty to act beneficently. She writes this despite the fact that the dutiful act would be morally valuable and the emotionally motivated act would not. Her justification for this claim is that the good will’s value is unaffected by the number of acts to which it leads (PMJ 35). A lost opportunity to act from the motive of duty is morally unimportant as long as the good will is ready to act should the emotional motivation prove insufficient to effect the morally called for action. For example, imagine Jenn has a perfect duty to keep her promise not to cheat on Jared, but Jared would prefer that Jenn keep her promise out of a sense of love than a sense of duty. Critics would argue that to be an upstanding Kantian Jenn would have to disappoint Jared and keep her promise out of a sense of duty rather than love. Herman’s point is that Jenn does nothing immoral according to Kant if she keeps her promise out of a sense of love rather than a sense of duty because there is no moral imperative to maximize instantiations of the good will (PMJ 36).

This leads Herman to reject the third objection to Kantianism: that living a moral life leads to alienation and violations of one’s integrity. She admits that the projects and people one
commits to can tempt one toward immoral actions, but she disagrees that Kantianism necessarily alienates one from those commitments in a way that destroys one’s integrity. Herman disputes these claims by focusing on morality’s role as a limiting condition and the possibility of one’s commitment to a moral life. As previously discussed, the moral law’s role as a limiting condition enables a Kantian to be morally motivated by non-moral desires and act for non-moral ends in a wide range of cases. Thus, one can be directly motivated by a desire to care for a friend or act for the good of one’s parent. When there is no conflict between morality and one’s commitments, integrity is clearly not threatened. Herman writes,

For morality to respect the conditions of character (one’s integrity as a person), it must respect the agent’s attachments to his projects in a way that permits his actions to be an expression of those attachments. Kantian morality, understood as a morality of limits, can do this (PMJ 39).

However, Williams is also seriously concerned about cases in which the two do conflict. Herman deals with this concern by introducing the idea that some people commit themselves to living a moral life:

[Williams’] sketch of the relations between the conditions of character and morality places morality outside the projects that give meaning to a life, even when the projects the agents identifies with have moral content. But an attachment to impartial morality can itself be a project that gives a life meaning. It is a defining feature of Kantian morality that one basic attachment, one self-defining project, is morality itself… As one can define oneself in part through a variety of impersonally described roles (American, feminist, university professor), so living a moral life can be partially constitutive of character (PMJ 38).
Even if Williams acknowledged this point, he might still argue that morality’s precedence over all other projects violates one’s integrity. Herman disagrees. Any two commitments may conflict at any time and an agent would be forced to choose between them. Such occurrences are commonplace, yet they do not qualify as violations of integrity. One may take morality to be a guiding and life-defining commitment without threatening her integrity. Williams gives no reason to think that morality is a less appropriate commitment to guide one’s life than any other or that the choice to make an overriding commitment to something else is morally irreproachable. For example, a parent’s overriding commitment to her child can lead her to act immorally toward other children despite the positive moral value of the relationship.

Furthermore, a Kantian could criticize the overriding nature of the commitment to the child without condemning the commitment itself. One can combine these points to offer a response to Williams’ example of a man saving his drowning wife. First, it should now be clear that the man can be motivated by his love for his wife to act for her sake in saving her. Second, while Kantianism is a limiting condition even in this case its role as such does not alienate the man from his wife or violate his integrity. Herman writes “What the Kantian requires is only that he not view his desire to save his wife as an unconditionally valid reason. This does not stand in the way of the direct expression of attachments in action” and adds in a footnote “We do not want to forget that a normal moral agent knows things: he does not have to figure out whether it is permissible to save his wife. He knows it is, and that partly explains why he can act spontaneously, from feeling, and yet according to principle” (PMJ 42). This is made even clearer when Williams’ example is changed so that the man must do something immoral in order to save his wife, such as tipping over a lifeboat filled with several small children and one adult.
In this modified example there is no clearly inappropriate violation of his integrity or his commitment to his wife when the man consults morality before deciding whether to save her.

**Part V: Kantian Friendships Are Morally Permissible But Not Valuable**

Herman’s responses to Kant’s critics successfully show that Kantians can have intimate relationships, but these relationships do not have moral value. It is morally permissible for Kantians to love other people. Herman’s discussion of the emotions’ role in Kantian ethics shows that emotions such as love are not morally problematic as long as they are constrained by the dictates of the moral law. The Kantian moral prohibition against actions that violate the moral law is not a moral imperative that all actions that can be motivated by duty must be motivated by duty. Thus, it is morally permissible to be motivated by love to act for the other in an intimate relationship even in cases where the action motivated by love is a perfect duty. Moreover, this allows one to be sufficiently committed to one’s friends and does not necessarily alienate one from one’s friends. However, neither these permitted actions nor the emotions that motivate them have moral worth. Herman is quite clear that according to Kant’s moral theory emotions such as care and love are morally permissible motives, but they cannot give rise to morally valuable actions:

Let us first survey the kind of room that Kantian ethics provides for actions motivated by care and concern for the other – what I will call “motives of connection.” … But permitting action from motives of connection does not fully resolve the problem. Even though there is nothing wrong with acting from a motive of connection in circumstances of obligation, the Kantian is likely to insist that action so motivated has no moral worth. The Kantian position is that the value signaled by moral worth is action done from a motive that tracks morality (the motive of duty): only then is there a maxim of action
with moral content. A dutiful action done from a motive of connection has a maxim with a different content (PMJ 186).

This forces her to question whether the value of relationships is moral (PMJ 187). Despite her best efforts to show that morality and relationships are not necessarily at odds with one another, she never explains how actions that derive from motives of connection can be considered morally valuable. Moral value and the value of intimate relationships must be seen as distinct on Kant’s view. Therefore, one of the necessary constituents of intimate relationships, love for another, does not have moral value. Kant claims that friendships, a type of intimate relationship, are morally valuable, but his system of ethics cannot account for that value. This conflict stems from Kantianism’s inability to regard actions that result from any motive besides respect for the moral law as morally valuable.

Kant does find moral value in well-wishing toward others and acting for others as ends in themselves. In V, Kant describes well-wishing as a duty: “For well-wishing to others is the universal duty of love, which we owe to every man, since we must absolutely make it our maxim to promote goodness in others” (V 408). Furthermore, the second formulation of the categorical imperative obligates one to treat everyone as an end in himself or herself: “Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means only” (FM 47). These components of friendship, then, are not merely permissible but morally valuable according to Kant. Yet, according to Kant these are duties each person owes to every other person, when possible, not just friends. These duties are, in fact, fulfilled through intimate relationships and countless other relationships. Therefore, the moral goodness Kantians can impart to intimate relationships according to the fulfillment of these duties is no different than the goodness imparted to much more transient relationships. Additionally, according to
Kant the mutuality of a relationship does count towards the relationship’s status as a friendship, but the mutuality of the well wishing or treatment of the other as an end in herself cannot add to the goodness or moral worth of an action on his theory (V 408 and MM 263).

Baier, in her article “Trust and Antitrust,” further criticizes Kant, and others, for focusing an account of trust on the trust that exists between equals. She writes, “But a complete moral philosophy would tell us how and why we should act and feel toward others in relationships of shifting and varying power asymmetry and shifting and varying intimacy.” Kant does spend time in V endorsing the existence of trust between friends as being central to the relationship and grounded in the dual obligations of love and respect (V 408). Nevertheless, Baier’s criticism is still applicable because Kantian friendships must exist between equals. Though applicable, Baier’s criticism is an unnecessary addition for the purposes of this dissertation. Her criticism would be more important to this project if Kant could account for the moral value of friendships: it would then serve as a critique of his inability to accurately depict the moral intricacies of other intimate relationships. However, since Kant cannot sufficiently account for the moral value of relationships without imbalances in power and with relatively stable intimacy, such as friendships, and does discuss the moral importance of trust between equals, Baier’s critique is not needed to show that Kant’s account of the moral value of intimate relationships is problematic.

According to Kant, actions are extrinsic final goods that are morally valuable. Combinations of these actions could comprise morally valuable Kantian friendships, relationships which Kant himself deems morally good. It is morally permissible for Kantians to have friendships in which the friends love one another. Friends who wish each other well, treat each other as ends in themselves, and trust one another act in ways that have moral worth.
However, these same actions initiated by casual acquaintances have the same moral worth. When a Kantian acts from a motive of love, care, or concern for a friend the action has no moral worth. This is problematic because, though Kant includes inclinations such as well-liking as an important part of friendships, these necessary conditions of intimate relationships have no moral value on his view. Therefore, a Kantian is left unable to account for the moral value of friendships. While some of the actions that partially constitute friendships may be morally valuable according to Kant, their moral value does not differ from that of actions carried out by mere acquaintances.\footnote{This central issue here, the insufficiency of general benevolence to meet the criteria of intimate relationships, was addressed in greater detail in chapter 3 part I.}
Chapter 5: Moore and the Consequentialist Value of Intimate Relationships

Consequentialist arguments for the value of intimate relationships might at first seem simple and straightforward: intimate relationships, on the whole, lead to more good consequences than bad ones. This is an empirical claim and few philosophers are willing to argue that intimate relationships lack instrumental value. However, the questions that have given rise to more controversy are 1. whether consequentialist obligations allow for the cultivation of intimate relationships and 2. whether consequentialists can account for final value in interpersonal relationships in a way that is compatible with the definition of intimate relationships such as close friendships. An interpersonal relationship may be instrumentally good and worthy of cultivation according to consequentialist views, but interpersonal relationships that lack final value according to the normative framework of consequentialism will not qualify as intimate relationships.\(^\text{112}\)

G.E. Moore’s account of normative ethics is an important test case for consequentialism’s ability to capture the final value of intimate relationships because Moore, more clearly and specifically than other consequentialists, defines friendship and sets friendships up as one of the goods to be maximized. In one of Moore’s early papers, “Achilles or Patroclus?,” abbreviated AP from this point on, he analyses friendship. He identifies it with love and explains the importance of loving and acting for others.\(^\text{113}\) In chapter six of the Principia Ethica, hereafter PE, Moore discusses the value of human intercourse stating:

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\(^{112}\) Throughout this chapter the terms instrumental value, final value, intrinsic value, and extrinsic value will be used according to the definitions outlined in chapter 2 and as described by Korsgaard in: Korsgaard, C. 1983. “Two Distinctions in Goodness.” The Philosophical Review 92(2): 169-195. Instrumental and final value refer to how things are valued, as means or ends-in-themselves respectively, while intrinsic and extrinsic value describe the location of a thing’s value, as contained in the thing or mediated by factors outside the thing respectively.

By far the most valuable things, which we know or can imagine, are certain states of consciousness, which may be roughly described as the pleasures of human intercourse and the enjoyment of beautiful objects. No one, probably, who has asked himself the question, has ever doubted that personal affection and the appreciation of what is beautiful in Art or Nature, are good in themselves; nor, if we consider strictly what things are worth having purely for their own sakes, does it appear probable that any one will think that everything else has nearly so great a value as the things which are included under these two heads.\(^\text{114}\)

Moore treats the pleasures of human intercourse, which he also calls personal affection, as one of many intrinsic goods. His description of personal affection in *PE* connects to his explanation of love in *AP*.\(^\text{115}\) The aforementioned axiology, in conjunction with his expression of a consequentialist normative theory in chapter five of the *PE*, leads to a pluralistic form of consequentialism that holds friendships as one of the goods to be maximized (*PE* 149).

Part one of this chapter will detail Moore’s account of friendship and show that Moorean friendships qualify as intimate relationships and that Moore considered those relationships to be


\(^{115}\) Moore does not make any mention of *AP* in *PE*, and it is therefore impossible to know just how much of the view he wrote about in *AP* changed in the nine years between the presentation of *AP* and the publication of *PE*. However, there are several reasons to believe that *PE* is not a complete departure from the views in *AP*. First, the lofty value Moore assigns to human interaction in *PE* on pages 188-189 aligns with his claim in *AP* that friendships are immensely valuable on page 1. Second, Moore claims on page 203 of *PE* that the object of personal affection is also intrinsically valuable and friends are certainly objects of personal affection. Third, in both *AP* (4) and *PE* (203-204) there is a similar recognition of the physical component that may accompany friendships along with similar acknowledgements that the physical component is less important than the mental component which indicates that some core components of Moore’s views about interpersonal relationships went unchanged in the interceding nine years (Carroll, L. 2009. “Notions of Friendship in the Bloomsbury Group: G.E. Moore, D.H. Lawrence, E.M. Forster, and Virginia Woolf.” Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pittsburgh. Pgs 56-58). Finally, it is worth pointing out that even if the G.E. Moore who wrote *AP* had a very different view of friendship than the G.E. Moore who wrote *PE* it is enough for the purposes of this dissertation that at some point Moore thought highly enough of friendships to write *AP* and acknowledge the fact that friendships are morally valuable. If he later changed his mind completely, which seems doubtful given the above evidence, his views in *PE* might still conflict with his views in *AP*. This being the case one might fairly ask the Moore who wrote *PE* what the Moore who wrote *AP* would say in response to his later self proposing a moral theory that is incompatible with the notions of friendship he wrote about in *AP*.  

Page 71
valuable. In part two, the views of those who criticize consequentialism on the basis of its inability to account for intimate relationships will be examined. Part three will evaluate potential responses to the problems posed in part two. Finally, part four will see which of the problems identified in part two persist and what piece of Moorean consequentialism’s structure is at the root of its inability to acknowledge the value of intimate relationships.

**Part I: Moorean Friendships**

Moore details the requirements of a loving friendship in *AP*, in so doing he explains interpersonal relationships that are quite similar to intimate relationships: both involve people loving one another, wishing one another well, acting for one another, doing so in a way that regards one another as an end, doing so mutually or for one another, and trusting that the other loves and wishes one well as an end. He later explains the value inherent in such relationships.

Moore writes that the passion of friendship is the permanent emotion he terms love (*AP* 3). He then goes on to list the identifying features of this passion. Moore explains that the desire to see another person again is one of the first indicators of a developing friendship (*AP* 4). This desire becomes an attraction to the other person. Moore writes “We are attracted not only by his face, his voice, his manner, but also by his understanding, his morals, his feelings” (*AP* 4). The desire and attraction lead to enjoyment whenever in the other’s presence: “…whether talking or silent we shall shew that his presence gives us delight” (*AP* 4). This coincides with the explanation of love that is part of an intimate relationship’s definition. Moore also writes “Lastly, we shall always prefer his good to our own; we shall always be trying to give him pleasure; and, if need be, shall be eager to die for him” (*AP* 5). This indicates that a Moorean friend wishes well and acts for his friend’s good. Moore does not specify that one does this for his friend’s own sake. Yet, the ideas that one’s friend’s good and life come before one’s own do
make the conclusion more likely especially when coupled with Moore’s claims in the *PE* that one’s friend is intrinsically valuable (*PE* 203). Moore addresses the necessity of mutuality to his concept of friendship when he writes:

I have been describing friendship throughout on the understanding that it is mutual between the two friends. If it be not, and one have a very strong passion for the other, which is not at all or but little returned; then that man is as far the most miserable of men, as he, whose love is returned, is the happiest. Such a passion, it seems to me, can never really be as strong, as one that is satisfied: for it shews that there is something in the object of love not perfectly sympathetic; his want of love for us, at all events, we cannot love: therefore our love is not perfect (*AP* 5).

Finally, while Moore does not explicitly discuss trust between friends, he does write that “From him we shall have no secrets at all; all that concerns him will be interesting to us; and we shall not scruple to speak to him plainly, what we think, of all those persons and things which may seem to affect him most nearly; it will be impossible for us to wound his prejudice or his pride” (*AP* 5).

The secrets and open discussions Moore here discusses fit with Annette Baier’s claim that “Trust, on the analysis I have proposed, is letting other persons (natural or artificial, such as firms, nations, etc.) take care of something the truster cares about, where such "caring for" involves some exercise of discretionary powers.” Moore indicates that friends allow each other to take care of secrets, thus he implies that trust too is a vital part of friendships. Moore’s account addresses each component of an intimate relationship: the love one feels for the other,

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116 Moore also seems to imply here that the passions of friendship need not be equal; however, Moore’s claims about just how even the passions must be are ambiguous. Since intimate relationships can, but need not, be equal Moorean friendships meet the requirements of intimate relationships in either case.

the wishes and actions for the other’s good, the treatment of the other person as an end-in-himself, and the mutuality and trust involved in the relationships. Though Moore’s account uses the word “friendship,” his analysis of friendship meets all the requirements of an intimate relationship’s definition as established in the second chapter. Thus, Moorean friendships count as intimate relationships. In fact, Moore is also open to the possibility of friendships existing between two people who are unequal. The premise of AP is to explain how Achilles and Patroclus can be perfect friends despite Achilles’ clear superiority (AP 1). Moorean friendships and intimate relationships are the same things.118

Moore clearly considers friendships valuable as one of his goals in AP was to “… prove friendship so immensely valuable…”(AP 1). By the time he wrote PE he considered personal affection to be one of two ideal goods: goods that are highly valuable as ends in themselves (PE 184, 188-189). On Moore’s view personal affection is a highly complex organic unity made up of the relationships between states of consciousness and the persons in which they exist and to which they pertain (PE 189). Personal affection is a highly valuable intrinsic good because, like aesthetic appreciation, it is an appropriate emotional response to the cognitive recognition of an object’s beauty as well as true belief about the existence of the object and its beautiful qualities. The emotional response is what links Moore’s account of intrinsic good in PE to his account of friendship in AP. Moore defines friendship as the permanent emotion of love in AP, so friendship can be an appropriate emotional response to the cognitive recognition of an object’s

118 Moore does discuss the sexual nature of his friendships, and whether his discussion is read as sarcastic or sincere (the sarcastic interpretation seems more likely), he appears to leave open the possibility of friendship without a sexual component (AP 6). However, even if this is not true and Moorean friendships must involve a sexual component they would simple be a subset of intimate relationships. In this case, the examination of Moorean friendships would parallel the previous chapter’s examination of Kantian friendships: Using Moore’s more restrictive term friendship as a proxy for intimate relationships will mean that if Moore can successfully account for the moral value he grants friendships, one might still criticize him for failing to account for the moral value of other sorts of intimate relationships. On the other hand, if Moore cannot account for the even the moral value of friendships, relationships which he admits are morally valuable, then his theory falls short of justifying even his own claims about these relationships.
beauty. In other words, friendship is one form of personal affection. When personal affection is good, and Moore is clear that it is not always so, the love one feels for one’s friend is an appropriate response to one’s accurate understanding of the friend’s beautiful character and true belief about the friend’s existence (PE 203). Furthermore, the friend is intrinsically valuable to a high degree (PE 203).\textsuperscript{119}

In chapter five of \textit{PE} Moore explains how valuable unities fit into his larger consequentialist theory. In a statement of the classic consequentialist normative structure Moore writes:

“Our ‘duty,’ therefore, can only be defined as that action, which will cause more good to exist in the Universe than any possible alternative. And what is ‘right’ or ‘morally permissible’ only differs from this, as what will \textit{not} cause \textit{less} good than any possible alternative. When, therefore, Ethics presumes to assert that certain ways of acting are ‘duties’ it presumes to assert that to act in those ways will always produce the greatest possible sum of good” (\textit{PE} 148).

The rightness of an action is determined by the good it causes. Moore argues throughout \textit{PE} that good cannot be analyzed down to some natural property but is a property in its own right (\textit{PE} chapters 2-4). This goodness, which he does not distinguish as being either moral or non-moral, can be possessed by different organic unities (\textit{PE} 188-189). As previously stated, personal affection is one such unity. Thus, it is one’s duty to produce sums of good that include, but are not limited to, the friendships he describes.

\textbf{Part II: Consequentialism’s Critics}

\textsuperscript{119} For Moore it is this last point that makes personal affection different than aesthetic appreciation, since the object of aesthetic appreciation has minimal or no intrinsic value of its own.
Many philosophers have criticized consequentialists’ ability to account for the value of close interpersonal relationships like friendships. Moore is able to avoid some of these criticisms simply by advocating a form of consequentialism that identifies the good with more than one object. Thus, criticisms that target only a standard utilitarian system that sets up pleasure or happiness as the singular good to be maximized and therefore must admit that interpersonal relationships are always instrumental will not be addressed. The criticisms that remain can be divided into two subcategories: those that target the consequentialist agent and those that criticize the theoretical framework of consequentialism.120

The two most frequent criticisms of moral agents attempting to live by a consequentialist system of ethics are that such agents, when motivated directly by their friends or family, cannot be acting morally and that such agents become alienated from their friends and family. Both criticisms are also leveled against Kantian moral agents as discussed in the preceding chapter.121 Michael Stocker specifically targets Moore’s version of consequentialism for separating reason and motive when he writes:

The problem is not simply that pleasure is taken to be the only good, the only right-making feature. To see this, consider G. E. Moore's formalistic utilitarianism, which tells us to maximize goodness, without claiming to have identified all the goods. If, as I would have it and as Moore agrees, love relations and the like are goods, how could there be any disharmony here? Would it not be possible to embody Moore's justifying reason as a motive and still love? I do not think so. First, if you try to carry on the relationship for the sake of goodness, there is no essential commitment even to that activity, much less to the

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120 Clearly these two categories are closely connected, because a flawed theoretical framework will create problems for a moral agent trying to live by it. Nevertheless, a line can be drawn between the two as a rhetorical device in order to sort through the various critiques of consequentialism.

121 See Chapter 3 Part III.
persons involved. So far as goodness is involved, you might as well love as ski or write
poetry or eat a nice meal or … Perhaps it would be replied that there is something special
about that good, the good of love treating it now not qua good but qua what is good or
qua this good. In such a case, however, there is again an impersonality so far as the
individuals are concerned. Any other person who would elicit as much of this good
would be as proper an object of love as the beloved. To this it might be replied that it is
that good which is to be sought with emphasis on the personal and individual features, the
features that bind these people together. But now it is not clear in what sense goodness is
being sought, nor that the theory is still telling us to maximize goodness. True, the theory
tells us to bring about this good, but now we cannot separate what is good, the love, from
its goodness. And this simply is not Moore's utilitarianism.\textsuperscript{122}

If Stocker is right, then a thoroughgoing consequentialist will be unable to morally love another
as an end in himself and be unable to have intimate relationships.\textsuperscript{123}

Moreover, according to Bernard Williams a consequentialist moral agent becomes
alienated from his friends and family when abiding by an overriding commitment to an
impersonal moral theory, whether Kantian or consequentialist, interferes with personal
commitments to one’s friends and family. In “A Critique of Utilitarianism” Williams attributes
this flaw to the strength of negative responsibility in consequentialism and writes:

For, to take the extreme sort of case, how can a man, as a utilitarian agent, come to regard
as one satisfaction among others, and a dispensable one, a project or attitude round which


\textsuperscript{123} The general problems for valuing intimate relationships that are caused by a normative theory’s reliance on
universal standards of rightness will be explored in greater detail in the conclusion.
he has built his life, just because someone else’s projects have so structured the causal scene that that is how the utilitarian sum comes out?\textsuperscript{124}

In Moore’s case one could replace “satisfaction” with “good” or even be more specific and replace it with “object of personal affection.” In either case the force of Williams’ question remains: a commitment to Moore’s consequentialism seems to undermine one’s commitment to one’s intimate relationships.

In Neera Badhwar’s article “Why It Is Wrong to Always Be Guided By the Best,” she deals with several objections to consequentialist accounts of friendship including those just discussed. However, rather than merely focusing on the problems a consequentialist agent has being a good friend she traces those problems back to the structure of consequentialism. She discusses two features of consequentialist theories that make their valuation of intimate relationships problematic. First, the goods that are to be maximized are not moral goods. Second, the goods that are to be maximized are not final goods.

Badhwar explains that the right and the good, the normative structure and axiology, of consequentialism are completely separate from one another. The normative structure of consequentialism explains the moral obligation to maximize good in the world. It does not address or define the good. That is left to the axiology of the theory. For example, the normative structure of Moore’s, John Stewart Mill’s, and Bentham’s accounts of consequentialism are basically the same. What differentiate the three theories are their differing axiologies: or definitions of the good. This complete separation, according to Badhwar, is one of the reasons that consequentialism cannot account for the value of friendships. She writes, “The heart of the problem, as I see it, lies in the very idea of morality (the right, the justified) as a

means to an independent nonmoral good rather than as partly constitutive of the good (teleology)…”

She expands on this point in a footnote stating

… there is an occasional tendency to refer to the intrinsic good to be maximized as a moral good. But the word ‘moral’ here merely signifies that morality is concerned with maximizing goodness and not that there are different kinds of good, namely, the moral, the immoral, and the nonmoral. This being the case, the use of the word ‘moral’ to qualify “good” is at best redundant, and at worst misleading, since it blurs the contrast with theories that do distinguish among moral, immoral, and nonmoral goods.

Badhwar is arguing that the complete separation of normative structure from axiology employed by consequentialism prevents the consequentialist from categorizing any set of goods as particularly moral. Thus, even Moore’s theory that explicitly states personal affection and its objects, such as friendships, are good cannot accurately term them “morally good” since the consequentialist axiology has no direct connection to its normative framework, the one piece of the theory that is particularly moral. So according to Badhwar, it is impossible to assign moral value to friendships on a consequentialist theory such as Moore’s.

Badhwar’s second objection to consequentialism is that it requires an instrumental justification for friendship. Moore is clear about the intrinsic value of personal affection, but the structure of consequentialism requires that each intrinsically valuable object’s existence be justified by its place in the whole. In other words, despite the goodness of friendships being

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127 Throughout the article Badhwar contrasts instrumental value/justification with intrinsic value. As discussed in chapter 2, this comparison is misleading. Badhwar concludes that friendships cannot have intrinsic value according to consequentialism. However, in the terms set out in chapter 2 (also see footnote 112), her premises lead to the conclusion that friendships cannot have final value according to consequentialism. They do not effectively conclude that friendships cannot have *intrinsic* value. In light of this fact and for clarity’s sake, the rest of my discussion of Badhwar’s argument will explain it as if she is arguing toward the conclusion that friendships cannot have *final* value even though she uses the phrase “intrinsic value” in the article.
located in the friendships themselves, consequentialism still requires that their value be appraised in relation to their place in the maximally good state of affairs. Badhwar writes:

For the problematic feature of [consequentialism] is not that it sometimes calls for a renunciation of friendship on account of its consequences but that it sees the moral worth of friendship as entirely dependent on its total consequences, with no independent moral weight assigned to its worth for the individuals involved. However, within a moral theory that regards friendship as moral in its own right… the fact that a certain friendship is promoting net disvalue… does not entail that the friendship is unjustified.\(^\text{128}\)

Badhwar believes consequentialism is unable to account for the final value of friendships; furthermore, Badhwar argues that friendships are justified by themselves, not their relationship to a state of affairs with the most goodness in it. However, according to Moore’s consequentialism even the ideal goodness of personal affection is not an end-in-itself. It is a means to the final good: the state of affairs in which good has been maximized. Badhwar explains, “The problem confronting [consequentialism] might be summarized thus: consequentialist teleology defines intrinsic value in morally neutral terms and morality as a means to [final] value.”\(^\text{129}\)

**Part III: Consequentialist Responses**

Moore, himself, did not respond to these criticisms; however, later consequentialists with normative views similar to Moore’s have responded to the charges leveled against their theories. Peter Railton in “Alienation, Consequentialism and the Demands of Morality” (abbreviated \textit{ACD} from this point on) argues that an objective form of pluralistic consequentialism, similar to Moore’s, can overcome Stocker’s and Williams’ critiques.\(^\text{130}\) Additionally, when Moore’s

\(^{128}\) \textit{Ibid.} pgs 498-499.

\(^{129}\) \textit{Ibid.} pg 503. I have replaced the word “intrinsic” with “final” toward the end of the sentence as per footnote 127.

axiology is compared to Kant’s it becomes clear that Moore’s desire not to qualify goodness is not a problem for consequentialism’s appraisal of friendships as Badhwar claims.

Railton agrees that Stocker’s and Williams’ points, if accurate, would be problematic for any moral theory to which they apply. He writes

First, we must somehow give an account of practical reasoning that does not merely multiply points of view and divide the self - a more unified account is needed. Second, we must recognize that loving relationships, friendships, group loyalties, and spontaneous actions are among the most important contributors to whatever it is that makes life worthwhile; any moral theory deserving serious consideration must itself give them serious consideration (ACD 139).

Railton also admits that certain forms of consequentialism are subject to the problems that Stocker and Williams identify:

One mistake of dominant consequentialist theories, I believe, is their failure to see that things other than subjective states can have intrinsic value. Allied to this is a tendency to reduce all intrinsic values to one – happiness. Both of these features of classical utilitarianism reflect forms of alienation (ACD 148).

However, Moore’s consequentialism has neither of these features and Railton proposes a pluralistic version of consequentialism that is reminiscent of Moore’s (ACD 149,152). On this view, Railton believes that one can avoid the pitfalls described by Stocker. Railton writes:

It becomes a complex matter to describe the psychology of intrinsic value. For example, should we say that one values a relationship of solidarity, say, a friendship, because it is a friendship? That makes it sound as if it were somehow instrumental to the realization of some abstract value, friendship. Surely this is a misdescription… Similarly, a friendship
is itself the valued thing, the thing of a valued kind. Of course, one can say that one values friendship and therefore seeks friends, just as one can say one values happiness and therefore seeks happy experiences. But this locution must be contrasted with what is being said when, for example, one talks of seeking things that make one happy. Friends are not "things that make one achieve friendship" they partially constitute friendships, just as particular happy experience partially constitute happiness for an individual. Thus taking friendship as an intrinsic value does not entail viewing particular friendships instrumentally (ACD 149-150 in a footnote).¹³¹

Railton couples the above point with a description of a sophisticated consequentialist agent that is able to avoid Stocker’s concerns. A sophisticated consequentialist is one who strives to lead an objectively consequentialist life even at the cost of using non-consequentialist decision making procedures (ACD 153).¹³² For example, if Shivang is a sophisticated consequentialist that recognizes friendships as one of the intrinsically good things in the world to be maximized, then he will strive to make friends. A consequentialist decision making procedure, however, would likely hinder Shivang’s ability to make friends by turning his focus to efficiency and speed in the development of a friendship rather than on the person with whom he is building a relationship. After all, questions about another’s efficiency at friend-making are more likely to send a potential friend running in the other direction than to open him up for conversation. Then, it is only by focusing on the other person in non-consequentialist ways that Shivang can fulfill the consequentialist maxim of creating more good by building friendships, and this is not problematic for the sophisticated consequentialist that Railton describes. Elinor Mason even

¹³¹ This echoes Barbara Herman’s point about the difference between the object and motive of duty in defense of Kant.
¹³² Moore did not specifically address this distinction but his claim that the fundamental moral rules should never be broken does show his disagreement with a strict adherence to a purely consequentialist decision procedure. PE. pg 162.
argues that one can be motivated directly by the other person in an intimate relationship without contradicting background consequentialist motives.\textsuperscript{133} She does this by using a consequentialist standard to evaluate the dispositions that an agent should cultivate. Mason claims that such a standard would dictate that consequentialists develop dispositions to act out of concern for others so long as friendship in general is consequentially worth pursuing. Once this disposition takes hold and there is genuine concern for others, acting from that concern need not raise consequentialist objections since the disposition was approved through consequentialist justification and there is no new reason to doubt that justification.\textsuperscript{134} Railton gives several of his own examples to show that a doing a consequentialist calculus may prevent an agent from maximizing the good; therefore, in order to increase one’s chances of maximizing the good, one can often use non-consequentialist reasoning.\textsuperscript{135} This can be applied to one’s interactions with the other in an intimate relationship: one should not, according to consequentialism’s normative structure, constantly calculate how to maximize the good when dealing with one’s intimate relationships if doing so will harm or destroy those relationships (\textit{ACD} 154). One can be committed to the others in an intimate relationship as ends rather than means to abstract good since doing so will in fact be the only way to maximize the abstract good on consequentialist theories like Moore’s. Additionally, one need not ask oneself whether one’s particular intimate relationships are the maximally good ones at every moment. Even when the relationships are


\textsuperscript{134} \textit{Ibid.} pg 258-259.

\textsuperscript{135} Railton also argues that this seeming contradiction is not a problem for consequentialism as it merely reflects the difference between an ethical theory’s truth conditions and its acceptance conditions. A theory’s plausibility will be judged by its truth conditions. On the other hand, the acceptance conditions are those that one uses to decide whether one will adopt the theory. This is a division he claims is accepted in other branches of philosophy and even terms the division a “virtue.” He adds to this that, though one might object that morality cannot separate the two sets of conditions because of the idea that ethical theories must be able to be recognized publically as true and thereby disseminated, criticizing consequentialism on this basis would be question begging: if consequentialism is true, then a consequentialist assessments of the requirement to make ethical theories meet the aforementioned publicity clause might well reject the publicity clause as morally good. (\textit{ACD} 155).
maximally good, questioning the relationship will threaten to destroy that good, for example, by
destroying the trust that exists between those in an intimate relationship. At the same time, there
is still room for normative reflection on one’s intimate relationships, in terms of the good they
create or destroy, in case they are leading one to grossly immoral acts (ACD 151).

This leads into Williams’ objection that the negative responsibility entailed by
consequentialism alienates practicing consequentialists from their relationships. The negative
responsibility entailed by even Railton’s version of consequentialism could force one to give up
or violate one’s intimate relationships. According to Williams, the realization that
consequentialism will sometimes clearly obligate an agent to choose some action over one’s
relationship alienates that agent from the other person in the relationship. Against this view
Railton argues that even such deeply held commitments as those made to intimate relationships
must, at some point, be morally evaluated in order to preserve one’s ability to make autonomous
decisions. Additionally, Railton points out the inevitability of conflict between any two
depthly held commitments:

It might be objected that one cannot really regard a person or a project as an end as such
if one’s commitment is in this way contingent or overridable. But were this so, we would
be able to have very few commitments to ends as such. For example, one could not be
committed to both one’s spouse and one’s child as ends as such, since at most one of
these commitments could be overriding in cases of conflict. It is easy to confuse the
notion of commitment to an end as such (or for its own sake) with that of an overriding
commitment, but strength is not the same as structure. To be committed to an end as

136 For instance, a father may be forced to choose between his child’s life and the lives of a million other people.
137 In Moore’s case the moral evaluation will be a consequentialist one.
such is a matter of (among other things) whether it furnishes one with reasons for acting that are not mediated by other concerns (ACD 141-142).  

For example, one may have a sophisticated consequentialist commitment to both one’s child and one’s spouse and not necessarily be alienated from either relationship, even in cases when one commitment must override the other. For example, choosing to console one’s child rather than one’s spouse when both are upset need not alienate one from one’s spouse. Additionally, as Herman noted in her defense of Kant, morality itself can be one of these deeply held commitments, it too can override other commitments without causing any more alienation than the previous example. Therefore, the sophisticated consequentialist who chooses to fulfill his obligation to save one million lives by sacrificing the life of his spouse, thereby showing a commitment to consequentialism over a commitment to his spouse, is not necessarily alienated from his spouse or other loved ones. Railton’s point is that it is normal for commitments to conflict. When the commitment to a particular morality causes a conflict, that conflict is not significantly different from the conflict caused by the commitment to two different people. Williams’ argument fails as a criticism of a consequentialist theory’s ability to value intimate relationships.

Moore not only addressed Badhwar’s claim that the value that a consequentialist theory seeks to maximize is not specifically moral, he embraced it. Moore made a point of explaining good as its own-unanalyzable non-natural property in PE (PE 8-10). Goodness was not divided up into different subcategories like moral and nonmoral. There was only one normative concept

140 Here it is important to recall that the commitment to the spouse according to Railton is justified by consequentialism but not through a consequentialist decision making procedure. See page 82 in this chapter.
according to Moore: general goodness. Therefore, friendships are not *morally* good, but simply *good*.

Kantian ethics is also unable to account for the moral goodness of intimate relationships.\textsuperscript{141} This forced Herman to wonder whether friendships had a different, nonmoral, sort of goodness.\textsuperscript{142} On this basis the Kantian account of intimate relationships’ goodness was found deficient.\textsuperscript{143}

It would seem that Moore’s consequentialist account of intimate relationships’ goodness would be unacceptable for the same reason. However, this is not the case. The Kantian account is problematic because by failing to assign moral goodness to intimate relationships it relegates any goodness they possess to the realm of nonmoral goodness. Whatever this type of goodness is, it must be different from moral goodness and could potentially conflict with it. A Moorean consequentialist account fails to assign *moral* goodness to intimate relationships because for Moore no such separable goodness exists: there is only general goodness. Moore’s discussion of goodness in chapters two through four of *PE* is an attempt to establish the unanalyzable nature of goodness. Subsequently, he asserts in chapter six that personal affection is good in this unanalyzable way. Thus, on Moore’s view intimate relationships do possess this single version of goodness. Furthermore, this goodness does not conflict with morality; it guides moral action. Morality obligates people to maximize goodness, so goodness and intrinsically good objects guide right action (*PE* 148). While intimate relationships are not *morally* good according to Moore because nothing is *morally* good, they are still good generally and so must be taken into account when acting morally: they are one sort of intrinsically good object that can contribute to the maximally good state of affairs. They are also at least as relevant to morality as any other

\textsuperscript{141} See Chapter 4
\textsuperscript{143} See Chapter 4.
good. In fact, Moore’s claims about the magnitude of intimate relationships’ goodness would seem to make them more relevant to morality than many other goods: Moore’s consequentialist normative framework emphasizes maximizing good and the large quantity of goodness of intimate relationships will often outweigh other objects that are less good (PE 188-189). Morality is concerned with the good of intimate relationships according to Moore’s consequentialism, but the same cannot be said of Kant’s theory.

**Part IV: Moorean Relationships Are Intrinsically Valuable But Not Final Goods**

Badhwar’s second objection to consequentialism also targets a piece of consequentialism’s theoretical framework that Moore explicitly endorses. Moore is clear that moral rightness is associated not with individual intrinsically good objects but with maximally good states of affairs (PE 148). This means that, on Moore’s account of morality, states of affairs are final goods; intrinsically good objects such as friendships are not. A final good is something valued for its own sake. Yet, intrinsic goods are not valued for their own sake according to Moore’s theory. They are instead valued for their place in a maximally good state of affairs. A friendship may contain its value in itself and therefore meet Moore’s criteria for intrinsic goodness; nevertheless, the friendship’s place, or lack thereof, in a maximally good state of affairs is still paramount according to the theoretical framework of consequentialism. The very same logic shows that friends cannot be assigned final value either according to consequentialism’s normative structure: the friend is not the goal of consequentialist action but a means to producing a maximally good state of affairs. The intrinsic goods of Moore’s theory are only instrumentally good since their value relies on their connection to the final good: the maximally good state of affairs. This may not be troublesome when accounting for the value of intrinsic goods such as beauty which need not be a final value, but this is a serious problem for

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144 For a more thorough explanation refer back to chapter 2.
friendships. As discussed in chapter three, friends cannot be valued as only instrumental goods. Friends who are not valued as final goods are not in an intimate relationship with one another because the friends are numerically replaceable, do not value one another and/or relationship directly, and do not make the other the object of concern in the relationship. If, in Badhwar’s terms, a relationship must rely on its place in the maximally good state of affairs for its justification, then interpersonal relationships cannot be valued as ends in themselves. Therefore, they are not intimate relationships.145

This creates a conflict between Moore’s account of morality and his account of friendship. Friendships are supposed to be one of the most valuable organic unities that exist, but his consequentialist view is unable to register the final value of the relationships that he deems so valuable. In failing to register the final value of interpersonal relationships, consequentialism belies its inability to recognize intimate relationships. The theory is only able to assign instrumental value to interpersonal relationships, so no interpersonal relationship could ever meet the definition of intimate relationship on Moore’s view.

Moore is able to claim that friendships have intrinsic value based on intuition (PE 188-189). His axiology, itself, does not present a problem for intimate relationships. However, once this axiology is combined with the normative structure of consequentialism the resulting moral theory is incapable of according final value to any of the intrinsic goods recognized by his axiology. All the intrinsic goods are valuable as means to the creation of a state of affairs in which the good has been maximized. Particular intimate relationships may or may not be constitutive of this final good.146 When a relationship is not part of the maximally good state of affairs it may be intrinsically good but is certainly not finally good. Intimate relationships such

145 See chapter 3 for more on the conflict between instrumental valuation of interpersonal relationships and those relationships' ability to meet the definition of intimate relationships.
146 Intimate relationships as a whole are not necessarily part of the final good either.
as friendships require that particular people in interpersonal relationships be final goods, or ends in themselves. An interpersonal relationship may not be good. The goodness of an interpersonal relationship may be superseded by some other final good forcing someone who wants to fulfill his moral obligation to choose the other final good over the relationship. In either case, the relationship could still meet the definition of an intimate relationship. Yet, a normative theory that appraises the value of the other in an interpersonal relationship or the relationship itself to be instrumental only cannot account for the value of an intimate relationship.

Moore speaks highly of interpersonal relationships’ value in both AP and PE. He describes friendships as the sort of interpersonal relationships that meet the criteria of intimate relationships and explains that they possess significant intrinsic goodness. In PE personal affection is the greatest of the goods Moore describes. Despite Moore’s best efforts, his pluralistic version of a consequentialist moral theory fails to account for the final value of any interpersonal relationships and so cannot be said to even recognize the existence of those relationships that are accorded final value by their participants: intimate relationships. According to the normative structure of consequentialism only maximally good states of affairs have final value and it is this feature of Moore’s moral theory that creates inconsistencies between his account of morality and his account of the value of friendships. Moore’s axiology explains that intimate relationships have intrinsic value. However, this is not enough to allow his overall theory of moral rightness to capture the value of intimate relationships. The normative framework of any maximizing form of consequentialism will prevent people in intimate relationships from being accorded final value since the value of all relationships will depend on the relationship’s place in a maximally good state of affairs. Thus relationships, on Moore’s consequentialist view, cannot qualify as the friendships he describes.
Chapter 6: Aristotle and the Value of Intimate Relationships

Aristotle’s account of ethics is well known and oft discussed. Aristotle directly addresses friendships’ place in his ethical theory in books eight and nine of *Nicomachean Ethics*, hereafter *NE*. The discussion of friendships in *NE* explores both the defining characteristics and value of friendships. It is for this reason, perhaps, that Aristotle’s account of friendship has been the focus of many articles on friendship and its specific place as part of a moral theory. The combination of Aristotle’s own detailed discussion of friendships and their place in his moral theory and the subsequent philosophical interest in his accounts of these subjects make his view of ethics one that must be examined in any discussion of interpersonal relationships and their value. Aristotle examines several forms of friendship, but the criteria he uses to define character friendships qualify these relationships as intimate ones and part one of this chapter will explain this link. Aristotle also provides a couple of arguments for the value of character friendships. These arguments will be discussed in part two of this chapter to figure out what they conclude about the value of character friendships. Finally, in part three of this chapter the conclusions of part two will be analyzed and compared to the results of the analysis of G.E. Moore’s consequentialist theory. This will paint a clearer picture of the categories of value character friendships fall into according to Aristotle.

Part I: Aristotelian Friendships as Intimate Relationships

Aristotle uses the word “*φιλία*” to discuss many different interpersonal relationships even though it is most often translated to the English word “friendship.” Some of the relationships that Aristotle delineates with the word “*φιλία*” are much more casual than intimate relationships while others meet all the criteria of intimate relationships’ definition. This raises three questions

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148 See pages 10-11 of Chapter I.
that must be addressed before proceeding to questions about the value of intimate relationships according to Aristotle: 1. what criterion unifies Aristotle’s various uses of the word “φιλία,” 2. what criteria separate the highest form of φιλία from its other forms, and 3. how do the criteria that Aristotle sets for the highest form of φιλία measure up to the criteria of intimate relationships.

Aristotle identifies three kinds of friendship in NE: friendship based on pleasure, utility, and character (NE 1156a7). The reason people form a friendship, or the object of love in a friendship, is what distinguishes one kind of friendship from another (NE 1155b17). Nevertheless, all three relationships are friendships according to Aristotle because in all three the friends wish one another good for their own sake (NE 1156a3). Aristotle reiterates this definition in the Rhetoric, when he writes “We may describe friendly feeling towards any one as wishing for him what you believe to be good things not for your own sake but for his, and being inclined, so far as you can, to bring these things about” (Rhetoric 1381a2). A.D.M. Walker argues in “Aristotle’s Account of Friendship in the ‘Nicomachean Ethics,’” hereafter AAFNE, that mutual goodwill, along with reciprocal affection and a mutual awareness of the affection and goodwill, makes up necessary and sufficient conditions of any friendship. Yet, the idea of wishing another well for her own sake seems to be at odds with the self gratifying nature of pleasure and utility friendships. Aristotle writes “Now those who love each other for their utility do not love each other for themselves but in virtue of some good which they get from each other. So too with those who love for the sake of pleasure” (NE1156a10). Despite the concept of selflessness that seems to be involved in the unifying criterion of friendship, Aristotle also seems

151 Walker describes the problem without offering a concrete resolution to it (AAFNE 195).
clear that the reason for the love involved in friendships of pleasure and utility is a self serving one.

John Cooper addresses this apparent conflict in his article “Aristotle on the Forms of Friendship,” hereafter AFF. Cooper examines three possible interpretations of Aristotle’s claim that there exists mutual well wishing for the sake of the friend in all three kinds of friendship: that one wishes well for one’s friend so that one can get a benefit, that one merely wishes well for one’s friend but not for the friend’s sake, and that the well wishes are responses to the relationship and so grounded as much in the relationship’s past as its future.

First, Cooper is clear to explain what is and is not meant by Aristotle’s concept of wishing or acting “for the other’s sake.” He writes that it means “…at least, that the fact that the other person needs or wants, or would be benefited by, something is taken by the agent as by itself a reason for doing or procuring that something, and that he acts for that reason” (AFF 621). It also means that this reason is sufficient but not necessarily the only or even the strongest motivating reason behind the action (AFF 621-622). Additionally, Cooper points out “Nothing specific is implied about the psychological source or nature of the agent’s concern for the other person…” (AFF 622). The concern may be motivated out of either a specific emotional attachment to the friend or a much more generic concern for the welfare of others.

When Aristotle writes “To be friends, then, they must be mutually recognized as bearing goodwill and wishing well to each other for one of the aforesaid reasons” one might interpret him as meaning that one could wish one’s friend well for the object of the friendship (NE

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153 It should be noted that while Aristotle says in NE 1157a25-35 that the three forms of friendship are unified only by resemblance Cooper argues in AFF 644 that this is because Aristotle thinks that the well wishing in the three kinds of friendship are sufficiently different from one another to be distinguishable. Nevertheless, at a broader level of inspection there is enough of an overriding similarity between the three kinds of well wishing to use well wishing for the friend’s sake as a unifying criterion of all three kinds of friendship as can be seen from the arguments in AAFNE.
1156a3-5, *AFF* 631). This does not pose a large problem in the case of character friendships, but is problematic when applied to pleasure and utility friendships; to wish one’s friend well for the pleasure or utility it will bring one does *not* qualify as wishing one’s friend well for her own sake. For example, Michelle is Heather’s friend because she gets pleasure out of trying new ice cream parlors with Heather. In this case, if Michelle wishes Heather well at her job simply so that Heather can continue to afford going to new ice cream parlors with Michelle, then Michelle is not wishing Heather well for her own sake but for the sake of Michelle’s continued pleasure. Thus, a charitable reader of Aristotle will reject this problematic interpretation.

A second possibility is that Aristotle means that all friends must wish each other well, but not necessarily for their own sakes (*AFF* 632). This possibility could be supported by the text in *NE* 1155b32-1156a5 where Aristotle declines to add the idea of the well wishing being for the friend’s own sake to the more isolated idea of well wishing he is examining. However, Cooper argues that this too is unlikely considering how many other times in *NE*, the *Rhetoric*, and *Eudemian Ethics* Aristotle does combine the two ideas when discussing friendship (*AFF* 632).

Finally, by examining why one wishes one’s character friend good for her own sake Cooper suggests that one wishes one’s pleasure and utility friends well in light of, or as a response to, the fact that they bring one pleasure and utility (*AFF* 633). In this sense, one wishes one’s friends well for their own sakes not so much for prospective but for more retrospective reasons: more in appreciation for past good done for one than in anticipation of future good one might receive (*AFF* 633). To return to the previous example, Michelle and Heather are pleasure friends whose relationship is founded on the pleasure they get from trying new ice cream parlors together. Michelle may wish her pleasure friend Heather well because she genuinely wants Heather to be well as a result of their relationship. In this case, Michelle does *not* wish her well
simply for the purpose of receiving more pleasure from their friendship. She is not, for example, wishing Heather well at her job simply so that she can continue to afford going to new ice cream parlors. Importantly, as Cooper points out, Michelle would not wish Heather some good that would prevent further pleasure coming from the relationship or impede their relationship and the continuance of the pleasure Michelle received from the relationship, at least not as part of the well wishing that constituted their friendship.\footnote{Of course, the form of this reasoning is not too different from that of the character friend who does not wish that her friend becomes a god (NE 1159a8-11).} So, Michelle would not wish that Heather go on a diet that involved giving up ice cream even if doing so would make Heather more temperate (so long as the two are merely pleasure friends). Certainly relationships like that of Michelle and Heather do exist in real life. Teammates in casual sports leagues might often fall into this sort of relationship: they enjoy playing the sport together, may be familiar enough with one another to wish each other well, but not familiar enough with one another to wish them some good that would prevent the fielding of a full team and put a stop to the pleasure of playing the sport on a consistent basis.

It, then, does seem possible that all three kinds of friendship are unified by the criterion of mutual well wishing for the sake of the other. This means that character friendships must be distinguished from pleasure and utility friendships by some criterion other than the selflessness of the well wishing that exists in all friendships. Perhaps the most significant difference between character friendship and the other two kinds of friendship is the object of the relationship. In a character friendship one is attracted not to the pleasure or utility that may come from one’s character friend but to the friend herself (NE 1156a7-8). For this reason Aristotle points out that character friendships aim at the essential rather than incidental features of friends (NE 1156a18-20, 1156b11-12, 1157b3-4). Elijah Millgram writes “Being virtuous is a large part of what it is
to be a human being, whence of what it is to be the virtuous person that one is. On the other hand, being useful to me and being pleasant to me are not a part of being who one is.”

It is the friends’ natures that give rise to the friendly feelings that are the foundation of character friendships (NE 1156b10-11). These are importantly different from the incidental features that give rise to the friendly feelings that ground pleasure and utility friendships. For example, Michelle and Julie’s generosities are virtues that are essential parts of their characters, or who they are according to Aristotle: those generosities can give rise to friendly feelings that form the basis of a character friendship between the two. Conversely, the pleasures Michelle and Heather get from trying new ice cream parlors together are incidental features of the two: the additional pleasures they get from enjoying the ice cream together are not a part of their characters, but they are what the two aim at in their pleasure friendship. Cooper writes:

Bearing in mind these important differences between character-friends and the other two types, one might say, with some justice, that only character-friends really love one another, that only they really wish one another well for one another’s sake. By this, one would mean that only character-friends concern themselves with the actual persons, themselves, that their friends are (AFF 640-641).

Michelle may wish Heather well in her job without being directly concerned with her ability to afford her trips to new ice cream parlors, but Michelle’s lack of willingness to wish Heather the good of temperance shows that she is not concerned with Heather’s character as she is with that of Julie. As a result, on Aristotle’s view Michelle is not concerned with Heather as an individual even when wishing Heather goods completely unrelated to Michelle’s pleasure.

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156 Millgram and Walker argue for the same conclusion: Ibid and AAFNE 189.
A final difference between the kinds of friendship that Aristotle mentions is their durations (NE 1156a23-24, 1156b11-12, 33). Character friendships last a long time due to their foundation in relatively stable moral characters (NE 1156b17). On the other hand, “… the useful is not permanent but is always changing. Thus when the motive of the friendship is done away, the friendship is dissolved…” (NE 1156a23-24). The same is true of pleasure friendships (NE 1156a33-36). This makes pleasure and utility friendships as transient as the pleasures and utilities they grant the friends: much more transient than character friendships.

Character friendships share the criterion of wishing others well for their own sakes with the other two kinds of friendship and are separated from them by their focus on the essential features of the friends. Both of these criteria are important in identifying character friendships with intimate relationships in which the members love, wish, and act for one another mutually as an ends in themselves while trusting one another.

Aristotle specifically addresses each of the components of intimate relationships in his account of character friendships. The word Aristotle repeatedly uses to convey the love that exists in friendships is “στέργειν” (NE 1156a15, 1157a11, 28, 1161b18, 25, 1162a12, b30, 1164a10, 1167a3, 1168a2, 7, 22). Cooper writes that στέργειν “… is used most often to apply to a mother’s love for her children and other such close family attachments” (AFF 629). στέργειν then conveys the idea that friends have strong positive emotions toward one another. The affection Aristotle is discussing can exist in different levels and between different types of partners. It would cover some of the feelings that exist between lovers, parents and their children, and those who share a close friendship as understood in a more colloquial sense. Aristotle writes about a social virtue that “For the man who corresponds to this middle state is very much what, with affection added, we call a good friend. But the state in question differs
from friendship in that it implies no passion or affection for one’s associates” (*NE* 1126b20-23). This emphasizes the necessity of affection as a component of friendship. He adds “Now since friendship depends more on loving, and it is those who love their friends that are praised, loving seems to be the characteristic virtue of friends, so that it is only those in whom this is found in due measure that are lasting friends and only their friendship that endures” (*NE* 1159a33-35). Moreover, Aristotle discusses the pleasure character friends will take in one another’s presence: “So too they are pleasant; for the good are pleasant both without qualification and to each other, since to each his own activities and others like them are pleasurable, and the actions of the good *are* the same or like” (*NE* 1156b15-18). Thus, character friends and people in intimate relationships both feel love for one another and take pleasure in one another’s company. The criteria of wishing one another well and acting for one another is clearly defined to be part of friendships in the aforementioned quotation from the *Rhetoric*: “We may describe friendly feeling towards any one as wishing for him what you believe to be good things not for your own sake but for his, and being inclined, so far as you can, to bring these things about” (*Rhetoric* 1381a2). This quotation also mentions the idea of acting for the other as an end in herself, which was discussed previously as an identifying criterion of character friendships as opposed to pleasure and utility friendships. Character friendships are based in the essential features of the friends so when one loves, wishes, and acts for one’s character friend one must also recognize those features of the friend that make her an end in herself. Aristotle is also very clear that friendships must be mutual relationships when he writes “But to those who thus wish good we ascribe only goodwill, if the wish is not reciprocated; goodwill when it *is* reciprocal being friendship” (*NE* 1155b32-34).157 He also writes about the role of trust in character friendships

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157 As Walker concludes, mutuality is a necessary component of any friendship, not just character friendship (AAFNE 185).
stating that potential friends do not actually become friends until trust exists between them \((NE 1156b28)\). He adds “… and it is among good men that trust and the feeling that ‘he would never wrong me’ and all the other things that are demanded in true friendship are found” \((NE 1157a22-24)\).

Two other issues that Aristotle addresses are the equality of those involved in friendships and the ability of imperfectly moral people to be character friends. The two issues are related to one another because if both people in a character friendship must be equals and morally perfect, then Aristotle’s definition of character friendship will be applicable to very few people. Any value that such relationships have would be infrequently realized in the real world. Aristotle writes that people who are quantitatively unequal will have difficulty being friends: “This becomes clear if there is a great interval in respect of virtue or vice or wealth or anything else between the parties; for then they are no longer friends, and do not even expect to be so” \((NE 1158b35)\). He also writes “Perfect friendship is the friendship of men who are good, and alike in virtue” and “But it is natural that such friendships should be infrequent for such men are rare” \((NE 1156b6\) and b24-25). Cooper writes that this “… seems to imply that only to fully virtuous persons – heroes of intellect and character – is it open to form a [character friendship]” \((AFF 624)\). Despite the seeming force of these points Aristotle also writes about friendships between unequal people such as fathers and sons and husbands and wives in book VIII chapter seven of \(NE\).\(^{158}\) In the former case the two people are unequal in the authority they have over one another and in the second, according to Aristotle, unequal morally \((AFF 628)\). Nevertheless, “… the friendships of such persons will be abiding and excellent” as long as each party renders what

\(^{158}\) For example, \(NE 1158b11-15\): “But there is another kind of friendship, viz. that involves an inequality between the parties, e.g. … that of man to wife…” Aristotle’s view about the inequality of wives is certainly misguided; nonetheless, it is useful in proving a point about Aristotle’s willingness to admit friendships between two people of different moral standings. Even if one discards the notion that wives are not morally equal to their husbands, Aristotle’s belief in the ability of morally unequal people to become friends remains.
they ought to the other (NE 1158b20-25). He also writes “… for not only can equally good men become friends but a better man can make friends with a worse…” (1162a36-1162b1). Thus, even those unequal in virtue can be character friends. Cooper writes “So in this case we will have a virtue-friendship where the superior person likes the inferior for such virtues as he has (or some of them), while recognizing that his character is not totally good” (AFF 628). This leaves open the possibility that neither friend needs to be morally perfect to engage in a character friendship.

**Part II: Aristotle’s Arguments for Friendships’ Value**

Aristotle explicitly states “… friendship to be desirable in itself” (NE 1159a25). Yet, Kant and Moore also claim that friendship is valuable as an end in itself and their theories could not account for such final value. Aristotle, though, provides two arguments to support his claim: the arguments that a friend is necessary for self-knowledge and encourages virtuous activity. Each of these arguments concludes that friendship has contributory value to the final good. However, to fully understand the value of character friendships in Aristotle’s theory, one must first understand the general relationship of friendship to the highest of all goods: *eudaimonia.*

Aristotle famously claims that “every pursuit aims at some good” and that the highest good is *eudaimonia,* which is identified with “living well and doing well” (NE 1095a13-19). It is *eudaimonia* that is what “… we call final without qualification that which is desirable in itself and never for the sake of something else” (NE 1097a34-35). One who is living well is *eudaimon* and can be said to be happy and flourishing. Aristotle admits that other things are valuable as ends in themselves too such as pleasure, reason, and virtue (NE 1097b1-3). Aristotle also states that to live a flourishing or *eudaimon* life one must possess certain external goods as well (NE 1153b17–19). At the outset of his discussion of friendship Aristotle classifies friendship as one
of the most important of these goods when he writes “For without friends no one would choose to live, though he had all other goods” (NE 1155a2-3). Friendship then, and character friendship in particular, is a necessary component of the final or chief good in Aristotle’s view. It has contributory value because it modifies the value experience of one’s life in a way that is not merely causal. It is a necessary component of a flourishing life in the same way that earning money to buy something one wants is a necessary component of the value experience one has when enjoying the purchase. Aristotle, then, must explain how and why character friends contribute such value to the final good of human life with the self-knowledge argument and the argument that character friendships encourage moral activity.

The basic idea of the self-knowledge argument is that through one’s friend one can better see one’s own desires, actions, and actualized conception of the good life. Aristotle writes:

… we can contemplate our neighbours better than ourselves and their actions better than our own, and if the actions of virtuous men who are their friends are pleasant to good men (since these have both the attributes that are naturally pleasant) – if this be so, the supremely happy man will need friends of this sort, since his purpose is to contemplate worthy actions and actions that are his own, and the actions of a good man who is his friend have both these qualities (NE 1169b34-1170a4).

This gives rise to a couple questions: what is the importance of knowing one’s own desires, actions, and actualized conception of a good life and why is it that a character friend is necessary to acquire this knowledge? The answer to the former question lies in Aristotle’s prerequisites for a virtuous life and the answer to the latter lies in a more commonplace observation about human nature.

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159 See chapter 2 for more on this example which will be discussed again later in this chapter as well.
Throughout *NE* Aristotle shows that one must have self-knowledge in order to live a good life. In book three he explains that in order to act virtuously a man must know who he is, what he is doing, the principle he is acting on, and the end of the action (*NE* 1111a3-6). In book two he emphasizes the need for the emotions to be felt at the right time, with the right motive, to the right object, and in the right way (*NE* 1106b20-23). In order to habituate these emotions one must first *know* what one feels and that those emotions are right. Moreover, one must have the practical wisdom to know “… what sorts of thing conduce to the good life in general” (*NE* 1140a28). As Cooper puts it in “Friendship and the Good in Aristotle,” hereafter *FGA*,

… having a good character, on Aristotle's theory, requires not merely correct practical *judgments* (having a certain reasoned conception of how one ought to live) but also, and even more, having this conception embedded in one's desires and thereby making it effective in one's actions. Thus to know one is virtuous requires knowing (1) what the desires are that in fact motivate one's actions, and (2) that these desires depend upon the same scheme of ends as one's reasoned conception defines for one's life.\(^{160}\)

Thus, for Aristotle one must know and choose the good life in addition to leading it to actually be considered flourishing.

According to Aristotle, character friends play a vital role in gaining the self-knowledge necessary for a human to flourish. In character friendships friends are alike in virtue (*NE* 1156b6-7). Thus, character friends will act similarly. Each friend will benefit from the relationship by observing similar virtues and virtuous actions from a distance: this is conducive to greater objectivity. Personal biases commonly affect one’s appraisal of one’s character and work: one’s perception of vices is repressed and virtues amplified. The closeness to, and similarities, with a character friend give one access to a mirror-like image in which it is often

easier to recognize fault. For example, when Michelle witnesses Julie’s tendency to be overly
generous with her time she can come to recognize similarly excessive expressions of her own
generosity. Aristotelian character friends are close to one another, but their separateness
prevents at least some personal bias from interfering with judgments of one’s friends’ actions
and virtues. At the same time, the acknowledged similarity of character friends makes the
reapplication of those judgments to oneself relatively obvious. Cooper further explores the
usefulness of a character friend in self-assessing the character of even a perfectly virtuous
person:

To be sure, the qualities in himself he thinks virtuous are so, and he has no faults; but
how is he to be sure that he is not deceiving himself in thinking these things, as he must
be if he is to know what he is like? It is plausible to suggest, as our text does, that
mistakes of this kind are not so apt to occur where one is observing another person and
his life; here the facts, both about what are faults and what are virtues, are more likely, at
least to speak for themselves (FGA 298).

Nancy Sherman argues that the differences between character friends can provide significant self
knowledge as well:

But if another self need not be exactly similar, then self-knowledge might involve
contrasting oneself with another, and considering how another would have acted in the
same circumstances given that individual’s different point of view. Aristotle’s
introductory remarks in Metaphysics A have application here: ‘All human beings desire
to know by nature… and especially delight in discriminating differences’ (980a22-28).
Self-knowledge, as a sub-species of knowledge, requires, ultimately, the discrimination of what is peculiarly one's own. Another and separate self facilitates that discovery.\textsuperscript{161}

For example, it is worthwhile for Michelle to compare her actions to those of Julie because, though they are both virtuous, the relative mean of their generosities and the opportunities to express that virtue might be significantly different. Thus, in contrasting her actions to those of Julie, Michelle may come to learn something about her own virtue or its expression through action.

The second argument that Aristotle gives to explain the value of character friendships is that they promote activity. He writes

Further, men think that the happy man ought to live pleasantly. Now if he were a solitary, life would be hard for him; for by oneself it is not easy to be continuously active; but with others and towards others it is easier. With others therefore his activity will be more continuous, and it is in itself pleasant, as it ought to be for the man who is supremely happy (\textit{NE} 1170a4-9).

The happy man is, according to Aristotle, a virtuous one whose activities exemplify the virtues (\textit{NE} 1169b30-34). Therefore, the friendships that such a man fosters will help keep him continuously active in ways that will exemplify the virtues. Unfortunately, Aristotle does not go on to explain how friends are important to continuous activity. Cooper argues that no subject matter is intrinsically interesting enough to continuously hold any individual’s attention indefinitely (\textit{FGA} 308). Instead, some external influence must compliment a person’s natural attention in order to maintain her interest in even the most worthy of pursuits. He then goes on to identify three reasons character friendship can be the supplement that humans need to

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maintain interest in an activity: friends provide one another with reinforcement that their pursuits are meaningful, they increase one’s interest in and attachment to one’s activities, and they enlarge the scope of one’s activity (FGA 308).162

By sharing one’s activity with a friend one is provided with the sense that one is not the only person who finds a particular interest worthwhile: when Michelle and Julie volunteer together they receive concrete evidence that they both see their work as important. Furthermore, a character friend is someone who is morally good, so the confirmation comes from a reliably moral source. Character friends share moral and intellectual pursuits. This means that the kinds of activities being reaffirmed as valuable are those most vital to a flourishing life. Cooper realizes that affirmation of an activity’s value need not come from character friends. One could get such affirmation from the recognition that any other person one respects engages in it, but Cooper writes

… what is in question here is not a person’s mere abstract knowledge that something is valuable and worthwhile but his actual direct experience of it as worthwhile… In a shared activity one knows of the commitment of others to the goodness of the activity in no mere abstract theoretical way. It is concrete and immediate. Hence it is only through participation in such activities that the confirmatory knowledge of others’ evaluations is likely to be both constantly and directly present to one’s consciousness (FGA 306).

Thus, character friendships are necessary to maintain the virtuous activity that is a flourishing life.

Cooper also argues that by sharing an activity friends can increase their attachment to, and interest in, the activity. Michelle and Julie might enjoy working separately to raise money

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162 Cooper is clear that a shared activity is one that two or more people engage in together as opposed to one engaged in parallel with another person (AFF 304).
for the Special Olympics, but their character friendship and the experience of the effort as mutual will likely increase their commitment to raising money and the effort they are willing to exert in order to successfully raise money. Again, in cases like this the activity is shared with a character friend so the commitments being supported are moral ones that are a necessary part of any flourishing human life.

The third way that Cooper thinks friendships can keep one active is by expanding the scope of one’s actions. Cooper argues that by being a member of a group working toward a common end one indirectly participates in the work of other group members (FGA 307). He bases this in the claim that “… one’s enjoyment, and so one’s interest in what one is doing, is not limited just to what one directly does oneself” (FGA 307). If this is true, then even when one is not actually active one can be said to be pursuing the activity indirectly through the efforts of other group members; one is active in a sense that one pursuing a purely private interest cannot be. According to Cooper, when Julie spends time during the week to organize a kickball fundraiser for the Special Olympics and Michelle helps run the same fundraiser on Saturday and Sunday morning, both are active all week long in the shared pursuit.163

**Part III: Aristotelian Friendships: Not Intrinsically Valuable But Necessary to Final Goods**

On Aristotle’s view, unlike Kant’s and Moore’s, intimate relationships are necessary to the realization of final value. Kantianism cannot account for the moral value of intimate relationships at all because motives based in emotion or interpersonal connections do not have moral worth.164 On the other hand, Aristotle grants that motivations that spring from the right emotions, which include love and affection in certain cases, are part of what make an action

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163 Millgram agrees with Cooper that friends influence one another’s virtue in these ways and goes on to argue that this endears friends to one another as procreators love their progeny. Millgram, E. 1987. “Aristotle on Making Other Selves.” *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 17 (2): 369-372.
164 See part IV of chapter 4 for additional explanation of this point.
morally right (NE 1106b20-23). Moore is able to grant that intimate relationships have intrinsic value, that their value comes from their internal properties, but is unable to recognize intimate relationships as having final value because of the constraints of consequentialism’s normative framework. Aristotle claims that friendship is desirable in itself and then provides the arguments from increased self knowledge and increased activity to explain the value of the intimate relationships he terms character friendships (NE 1159a25).

Aristotle makes the cultivation of appropriate emotional responses to situations a central part of his general ethical theory. The doctrine of the mean explains that virtues involve feeling the emotions neither too much nor too little, but always in the right amount, at the right time, to the right object, and in the right way (NE 1106b18-23). Aristotle writes “Now virtue is concerned with passions and actions, in which excess is a form of failure, and so is defect, while the intermediate is praised and is a form of success” (NE 1106b24-26). For Aristotle morally appropriate emotional responses are important to any virtuous endeavor, including friendships. For example, in his discussion of unequal friendships he writes “In all friendships implying inequality the love also should be proportional…” (NE 1158b24-25). Additionally, as previously explored, emotions are themselves a vital part of character friendships.\(^{165}\) Thus, how and when one feels any of the emotions helps determine one’s moral character. As a result, the emotions particularly related to intimate relationships, such as love for one’s friends or family members, are of equally moral import according to Aristotle: how much love a father shows his son or a woman shows her lover reveals part of those people’s moral characters.

Aristotle states that friendships are desirable in themselves (NE 1159a25). This might indicate that intimate relationships have intrinsic and/or final value on his view. However, the two arguments he gives to explain the value of character friendships seem to lead to a different

\(^{165}\) See page 96-97.
conclusion. Neither the argument that character friends serve as second selves nor the argument that they encourage moral activity show that intimate relationships have intrinsic value. Both argue for the conclusion that character friendships are necessary components of the final good: a flourishing human life. The value to be found according to these arguments is not in the character friendships themselves but in their relationship to human life. If humans were constituted differently, then character friendships might not be valuable at all.\(^{166}\) Thus, intimate relationships are extrinsically valuable according to Aristotle. Yet, this fact does not prevent them from contributing necessarily to the final value of a flourishing human life.

The normative framework of consequentialism subordinates the value of all intrinsic goods to their place in a state of affairs that contains the maximal amount of goodness. On the other hand, Aristotelian ethics recognizes the necessity of intimate relationships to the final good of *eudemonia*. According to Moore’s theory, no particular friendship must be a part of the maximally good state of affairs that is the end of moral action. In fact, it is possible that no friendship at all would exist in a maximally good state of affairs.\(^{167}\) However, Aristotle’s two arguments for the value of character friendships show that particular friendships must be a part of a particular person’s flourishing, part of that person’s final good. Character friendships are irreplaceable parts of the final good in Aristotle’s ethics and, therefore, have contributory value. Alternately, they are eminently replaceable in Moore’s conception of the final good and, thus, only instrumentally valuable. A return to Lewis’s example of contributory good can further clarify this point.\(^{168}\) The work a boy does to earn the money for a circus ticket is not merely a means to the pleasure he gets from going to the circus; the work is necessary to the final good of pleasure that the boy gets. Without the work he puts into earning the ticket, the final good would

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\(^{166}\) This is most clearly shown in Aristotle’s discussion of a god’s lack of need for friendship (*NE* 1159a8-11).

\(^{167}\) See chapter 5 part IV for additional explanation on this and the prior point about Moore.

\(^{168}\) This example was first introduced in chapter 2
be qualitatively and quantitatively different. According to Aristotle’s arguments for the value of character friendships, the same is true of the good in a human life with friendship: it would be both qualitatively and quantitatively different without the friendship. Yet, Moore’s consequentialism cannot recognize the qualitative difference between two scenarios. The quantitative difference a friendship makes in the final good is of sole importance in Moore’s view, which is why any friendship is replaceable by any other good that would have the same quantitative impact on the final good; in other words, no friendship is necessary to or has contributory value towards the final good according to maximizing forms of consequentialism. For Moore, all friendships must be only instrumentally good. Aristotle’s ability to recognize the centrality of friendships to the final good of human flourishing enables his theory to avoid the criticism leveled at Moore’s theory: that treating relationships as instrumentally valuable is incompatible with recognizing them as intimate relationships. Aristotelian character friendships have contributory value so Aristotle can consistently claim both that one should treat one’s friends as ends in themselves and that those friendships are morally valuable even without arguing for their intrinsic value.

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169 This point is explained in greater detail both in chapter 3 and chapter 5 part IV.
Chapter 7: The Value of Care and Relationships in the Ethics of Care

The ethics of care is a much younger approach to ethics but it is an approach built around the idea that interpersonal relationships have moral value. As a result, the role of these relationships and their value in the normative structure of the ethics of care is a bit more straightforward than it is in the normative structure of any of the previously discussed theories. A clear discussion of the value of care and relationships according to the ethics of care must begin with an analysis of care itself and proceed to an explanation of the connection between care and interpersonal relationships. Then, one can better appreciate value’s place in the ethics of care and understand what type of value intimate relationships have according to the theory. One of the clearest and most comprehensive accounts of care’s meaning in the ethics of care is given by Virginia Held in *The Ethics of Care: Personal, Political, and Global*, hereafter *EOC*. Thus, Held’s account of the ethics of care in *EOC* will be the specific version of the theory explored in this dissertation.

**Part I: What is Care and How is it Tied to Interpersonal Relationships**

One would be correct to assume that a theory of ethics called the “ethics of care” places a moral premium on the concept of “care.” Each theorist that considers himself or herself to be developing an ethics of care defines “care” in a slightly different way. According to Held care has several meanings: it is an activity, a practice, a standard, and a value.

Care is an activity in the sense that it is a “form of labor” in which people care for others and, in so doing, form caring interpersonal relationships. Held and, as she notes, many other ethicists of care stress the idea that the work of actually caring for others is an important

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171 *EOC*. pgs 36,38.

172 *EOC*. pg 36.
component of care’s definition.\textsuperscript{173} Actively caring for others can include actions without direct contact between the people giving and receiving care.\textsuperscript{174} She also writes that care cannot be broken down into individual events or even a string of such events (EOC 42). Rather, along with the standard of the activity of caring they form a practice.\textsuperscript{175}

Care is a standard as well as an activity according to Held, and in combination the two form a practice. As a standard care can be used to judge the effectiveness of an actual caring activity, the motive for the activity, whether it builds trust, whether it builds mutual concern, and whether it builds connection (EOC 36, 42). A beneficent activity done without consideration for the effectiveness of the activity cannot be considered good care. Such activities might harm rather than help another person, and a lack of concern over this possibility shows a lack of care. For example, if Steve tries to help Jared by having him drink excessive amounts of water when Jared’s sodium levels are already depleted from a marathon, then Jared may be harmed by Steve’s actions. Furthermore, if Steve is unconcerned with the effectiveness of his help or the possibility of harming Jared, then he cannot be said to be caring for Jared. The practice of caring for Jared would entail Steve actually doing what it takes to replenish Jared’s nutrients and fluids effectively, motivated by his affection for Jared, in such a way that builds trust, mutual concern, and connection between Jared and Steve. Thus, the reason one is helping is also relevant to the activity’s qualification as care. Held writes, “Yet all care involves attentiveness, sensitivity, and

\textsuperscript{173} For example Joan Tronto, Berenice Fisher, Diemut Bubeck, and Sara Ruddick. EOC. pgs 31-33.
\textsuperscript{174} EOC pg 30-31. This is important because it allows the ethics of care to be applied to cases and relationships that extend beyond one’s immediate sphere of influence. For example, Jared’s work to raise awareness of the stories of individual victims of torture can be considered care activity even if he has never met those victims as long as his work meets the criteria of care as a standard (which will be explored in the next paragraph).
\textsuperscript{175} It is worth noting that many animals, especially mammals, can care for other animals in the sense that care is an activity. Some non-human animals may even have the conceptual apparatus to judge the effectiveness of the care they give. However, non-human animals cannot judge the motives for the care; doing so would necessitate an ability to distinguish and judge nuanced motives behind the similar actions. Furthermore, it is extremely unlikely that non-human animals have the conceptual ability to appraise care as being morally, as opposed to instrumentally, valuable.
responding to needs” (*EOC* 39). The motive behind an action must be appraised before judging whether an action or practice can be considered caring. This point is made clearest in Held’s evaluation of welfare policy: even if the dictates of justice are met fully by making substantial payments to those with little or no income, without the correct motive the aid cannot be considered good care. Without attentiveness, sensitivity, and responsiveness to the needs of those receiving the payments such aid can be psychologically harmful and isolating (*EOC* 40). Additionally, caring activity helps form and strengthens caring relationships by building trust, mutual concern, and connection.176

Care is also a moral value on par with justice according to Held. As a value, care picks out particular morally salient features of practices, people, and relationships (*EOC* 38). Thus, rather than generally claiming that a particular practice of helping another is morally good, saying that the practice is a caring practice would mean it is morally good in a specific way: it meets or exceeds the standards of a caring practice previously discussed. Alternately, saying that a particular interpersonal relationship is a caring one would mean that it is morally good because it involves mutual concern, trust, responsiveness to the needs of the members of the relationship, and feelings of connection between the members. Held later explains the source of care’s moral value:

Care seems to me to be the most basic of moral values. Without care as an empirically describable practice, we cannot have life at all since human beings cannot survive without it. Without some level of caring concern for other human beings, we cannot have any morality. These requirements are not just empirical givens. In every context of care, moral evaluations are needed. Then, without some level of caring moral concern for all other human beings, we cannot have a satisfactory moral theory (*EOC* 73).

176 This will be explored in greater detail in Part III.
One of the features of the ethics of care that makes it different from the previously discussed theories of ethics is the centrality of interpersonal relationships. Most ethicists of care, including Held, criticize the liberal individualism of Kantianism, utilitarianism, and even Aristotelian ethics. They find the idea that the ideal, or even normal, moral human agent is an unencumbered individual actor influencing the world around her to be dramatically flawed. This view misrepresents the actual state of human beings as necessarily dependent on others at least during their youth and, frequently, interdependent on others throughout their lives (EOC 14).

Yet, the view that humans act as individuals uninfluenced morally by their relationships is the one that informs Kantian and consequentialist ethics. Kant places the highest value on the good will, the cultivation of which requires no help or relationships with others.\textsuperscript{177} Similarly, Moore’s version of consequentialism envisions the moral agent as an individual who must objectively choose whichever action creates the most good.\textsuperscript{178} Even Aristotle for the greater part of the \textit{Nicomachean Ethics} focuses on the individual’s cultivation of a virtuous character.\textsuperscript{179}

In contrast, Held emphasizes the connectedness of individuals to one another. She clearly states “It is characteristic of the ethics of care to view persons as relational and as interdependent… to many care theorists persons are at least partly constituted by their social ties” (EOC 46). She also points out that autonomy itself can be conceived of as a relational ability:

Often, we learn to be autonomous through our interactions with others though we are not prisoners of our upbringings and circumstances. Our personal, familial, social, political,

\textsuperscript{177} See chapter 4 for more on Kant and the good will. 
\textsuperscript{178} See chapter 5 for more on the decision procedure of Moore’s consequentialist normative theory. 
\textsuperscript{179} See the section II of this chapter for a more detailed examination of the differences between virtue ethics and the ethics of care.
and economic relations with others enable or inhibit our access to significant options.

And we are both enmeshed in and capable of shaping such relations (EOC 48).

Thus, each individual human is necessarily involved in some interpersonal relationships.

It is this environment in which caring as an activity, practice, standard, and value can be cultivated. Caring, in all its forms, is necessarily tied to the existence of interpersonal relationships which are a necessary part of human life. The caring that Held discusses cannot take place outside of interpersonal relationships. Held stresses the ties between the concepts of caring and interpersonal relationships repeatedly. She writes, “Caring is a relation in which carer and cared-for share an interest in their mutual well-being” (EOC 34-35). She adds, “In my view, as we clarify care, we need to see it in terms of caring relations” (EOC 36). She drives home the point again as she writes:

Care is not the same as benevolence, in my view, since it is more the characterization of a social relation than the description of an individual disposition, and social relations are not reducible to individual states… The values of care are especially exemplified in caring relations, rather than in persons as individuals (EOC 42).

Of course, not all interpersonal relationships are caring relationships, in the sense that they are morally valuable. Some relationships may be morally neutral and some may be morally bad (EOC 37). However, caring in all its forms occurs only in the midst of interpersonal relationships.

Part II. The Ethics of Care as Distinct from Virtue Theory

One important question facing the ethics of care is how it is different from virtue ethics. This question is significant for the status of the ethics of care as a distinct approach to normative ethics but also for the purposes of this dissertation. If the ethics of care collapses into virtue
theory, then the actual value of intimate relationships may not be different on Aristotle’s and Held’s views. Some theorists often labeled as ethicists of care do describe normative theories that are very similar to virtue ethics. Michael Slote and Lawrence Blum both describe care as a virtue.\textsuperscript{180} Sara Ruddick too spends a great deal of effort discussing the virtues.\textsuperscript{181} However, Held clearly draws a line between her version of the ethics of care and virtue theory. In criticizing Blum’s approach to care, Held writes:

… he sees the care virtues, in line with the virtue theory tradition, as altruistic dispositions of individuals and psychological motivations. This misses the heart of what goes on in practices of caring and misses what is of most value in them, which is that they are caring relations. What I am suggesting is that care, if not the traditional virtues, can extricate us from the overly personal perspective of the virtue tradition and the excessive contemporary focus on individual psychology… (EOC 35).

Held also argues that viewing care as a virtue entails too much of a focus on dispositions and motives thus losing sight of the equal import morality should accord actual work (EOC 35, 51). For example, Jared may ascribe to virtue theory and focus his attention on cultivating his sensitivity to and affection for Steve at the expense of actually helping Steve when he needs assistance. One might wonder how this is possible when many virtue theorists, such as Aristotle, try to tie action so closely to virtue.\textsuperscript{182} While virtue theorists do discuss the importance of action, the moral value of action is often less clear. The virtues and character of the individual become the focal point of moral value. Thus, according to Held, Jared may act whenever Steve needs assistance, but by following virtue theory he risks losing sight of the moral importance of those


\textsuperscript{182} NE. 1098b30-1099a6.
actions relative to the virtues as well as the moral importance of the relationship itself. Were Jared to subscribe to the ethics of care instead of virtue theory he would remain aware of his motives and dispositions while assigning equal value to the labor of caring for Steve. This would also help reinforce Jared’s concern for the effectiveness of his efforts in caring for Steve. According to Held, then, there are significant differences between virtue theory and the ethics of care: virtue theory is unable to directly assign value to the relationships themselves or the work that helps constitute them.

**Part III. Intimate Relationships as Caring Relationships**

The definition of caring relationships explained by Held is broader than the definition of intimate relationships. Nevertheless, relationships in which the members love one another, wish one another well, act for one another, do so mutually or for one another, and trust that each loves and wishes the other well as an end in himself are a subset of caring relations. Held references each component of intimate relationships in her discussion of relationships that embody all four meanings of care, which will hereafter simply be termed “caring relationships.”

The most notable difference between a caring relationship’s and an intimate relationship’s requirements is that the members of the relationship love one another. This is not a necessary component of a caring relationship, but it does support the requirement that the members of a caring relationship feel connected with one another. Additionally, in explaining her disagreement with Diemut Bubeck’s ethic of care Held supports the idea that properly aimed affection does contribute to some caring relationships (*EOC* 32). This is again reflected in Held’s focus on the motive behind an action as being an important piece of a caring practice (*EOC* 33). Therefore, though love is not necessary to a caring relationship it can certainly help by providing connectedness and the right motive to support a caring practice.
Held addresses the importance of wishing one another well in a caring relationship when she discusses the importance of concern for others in a relationship and the appropriate motives involved in caring practices. She mentions several times that mutual concern is a vital part of caring relationships (EOC 36, 38, 42). Moreover, she explains that “… merely going through the motions of a caring activity and doing the work – for instance feeding the infant, but without any of the appropriate feelings or intentions of seeking her well-being – would not be caring either” (EOC 54). Thus, the people in caring relationships do wish one another well as do people in intimate relationships.

Perhaps more important to Held, however, is the idea that people in caring relationships do not stop at merely wishing one another well but act on these wishes to help one another be well. The activity of care is, after all, considered “work” and “labor” in the sense that it is helping others (EOC 36). As discussed previously, actively caring for others is a central part of the definition of care that can only take place in relationships.

In intimate relationships each member of the relationship is treated as an end in herself. Held’s discussion does not, on the surface, address this as a requirement for caring relationships. Yet, a closer look shows that there are strong similarities between how people in intimate and caring relationships treat one another. Throughout Held’s explanation of caring relationships there are many instances in which it becomes apparent that people in caring relationships do not treat one another merely as means to some other end. The notions of mutual respect and mutual autonomy to which Held refers offer strong evidence to suggest that caring relationships, like intimate ones, involve people who treat one another as more than means to other ends. In comparing caring relationships to relationships that are ultimately harmful, Held concludes that “The person who participates in an admirable practice of care will not only respect himself but

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183 My italics.
will foster mutual respect and mutual sensitivity” (*EOC* 56). The idea of mutual respect not only implies self respect and respect of the other in a relationship, but would also seem to be at odds with the treatment of either member of the relationship as a means to an end. This is further supported by the examples of harmful relationships, a servile housewife and martyr mother, in which the women are treating themselves as means to some other ends (*EOC* 56). Held’s exploration of mutual autonomy also bolsters this view:

> Mutual autonomy… includes mutual understandings and acceptances of how much sharing of time, space, daily decisions, and so on there will be, and how much independently arrived at activity… The tendency to equate caring with a kind of overbearing attention, benevolent but smothering, is a distorted but widespread view of care. Care as a disposition often misleads people into thinking they are caring when they only have the good motives of wanting to care, to help others, to be benevolent, and so on, however much the intention misrepresents the recipient’s wishes and perceptions and however much such good intentions may fail to contribute to a caring relation (*EOC* 55).

The idea that the understanding and acceptance of decisions must be mutual supports an inference to the conclusion that people in caring relationships must treat one another as goals not means, especially when coupled with the previously mentioned focus on people not treating themselves as a means to an end. The importance of mutual understanding and acceptance of decisions is especially evident in the practice of care that exists for hospice and palliative care patients. In these instances it is vitally important that there is a strong emphasis on communication between the patient and caregiver so that the goals of both are clear and aligned. Held’s critique of non-caring relationships also shows that benevolent intentions are not enough to ground caring relationships. Moreover, in several instances she asserts that people in caring
relationships respond to and are motivated by one another as particular persons and not as mere representatives of humanity or by universal principles of benevolence.\textsuperscript{184} Thus, people in caring relationships treat one another neither as means to an end nor as the objects of universal benevolence: people in caring relationships treat one another much the same as those in intimate relationships. One might then, justifiably, wonder why Held does not ever mention treating others in caring relationships as ends in themselves. The reason for this omission may lie in Held’s belief that the caring relationship is not completely distinct from the individuals in it (\textit{EOC} 46, 101). The relationship is an end in itself, and to envision each individual in the relationship as an end in himself that is completely separable from the relationship would be to skew what Held sees as the reality of caring relationships.\textsuperscript{185} Alternately, Held may simply believe that the notion of respecting others covers the relevant moral considerations.\textsuperscript{186}

Nevertheless, what is important about people in intimate relationships treating one another as ends in themselves is captured in Held’s description of how people in caring relationships should treat one another: that they treat one another as goals rather than means and as particular individuals.\textsuperscript{187}

For a relationship to be considered a caring one, the relationship cannot be unidirectional: there must be some reciprocation. This point is addressed in several places in \textit{EOC}. Held states that “A caring relationship requires \textit{mutuality} and the cultivation of ways of achieving this in the various contexts of interdependence in human life” (\textit{EOC} 53). She also writes of mutual concern between members of a caring relationship and pursuing mutual interests.\textsuperscript{188} Held adds that “In normal cases, recipients of care sustain caring relations through their responsiveness – the look

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{184} \textit{EOC}. pgs 14,20,80, 91,171 (footnote 23)
\textsuperscript{185} This will be addressed in greater detail in section IV.
\textsuperscript{186} In fact this is what Held herself has suggested to me. V. Held, personal communication, May 2014.
\textsuperscript{187} See Chapter 3
\textsuperscript{188} \textit{EOC}. pgs 53 and 157 respectively.
\end{footnotes}
of satisfaction in the child, the smile of the patient” (EOC 36). The importance of mutuality is also acknowledged indirectly when Held describes harmful relationships that become too one-sided such as those that become dominating or exploitative (EOC 37). Held is also clear in stating that the mutuality does not have to be even and that the members of a relationship need not be equals.189 For example, the previous quote references the “look of satisfaction in the child” and “the smile of a patient” which, most often, do not approximate the work of a parent or health care practitioner in garnering those responses. Furthermore, neither parents and children nor health care practitioners and patients are equals in terms of authority or power over one another.190 Caring relationships, then, are the same as intimate relationships in that both require mutuality between the members but do not require that the reciprocation between members or the members themselves be equal.

Held is very clear that trust is also a necessary component of caring relationships. She explains that “Care is not the same thing as trust, but caring relations should be characterized by trust, and caring and trust sustain each other” and “… good caring relations require and are characterized by [trust]” (EOC 42, 56). Thus, both intimate relationships and caring relationships must be trusting relationships.

**Part IV. The Final Value of Intimate Relationships in the Ethics of Care**

Intimate relationships are a subset of caring relationships, distinguished primarily by the love one feels for the other in an intimate relationship. Thus, whatever value caring relationships are accorded by Held will be shared by intimate relationships. Held never uses the terms intrinsic, extrinsic, or final value in EOC but there is evidence that implies she views caring relationships as valuable in their own right.

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189 To be clear, they do need to be treated as moral equals, but not equal in terms of authority over one another, power, socio-economic status, etc.
190 Held also discusses the idea that those of differing power over one another can be involved in caring relations on pg 56 of EOC.
relationships as having final value. For example, in comparing virtue theory’s emphasis on dispositions to the ethics of care she writes: “Caring relations have primary value” (EOC 19). Later, she decries the view that relationships should be valued only instrumentally as serving individual interests (EOC 101). She also explains on several occasions that caring as a practice, and by implication the relationships in which caring takes place, is a value as morally important as that of justice.\footnote{EOC. pgs 41-43,66,92,96,99,102} It is clear that deontological theories of justice see justice as more than a means, but as an end in itself.\footnote{After all one of the criticisms often leveled against traditional utilitarians is that they do not see justice as an end in itself, but only as a means to securing the maximal good.} It also seems clear throughout Held’s writing, in which caring relationships have such a central role, that these relationships are not mere means to some other ends but are valued as ends-in-themselves, as final goods. If the ethics of care places the highest value on the notion of care as a practice, then certainly the relationships that embody that care are a close second if not inseparable first.

On the other hand, it is a bit less obvious whether caring relationships are intrinsically or extrinsically valuable according to the ethics of care. If forced to choose between the two Held believes that caring relationships are intrinsically valuable.\footnote{V. Held, personal communication, May 2014. Yet, she is “unclear” on this point. One might well argue that according to the ethics of care relationships have extrinsic value: the emphasis that ethicists of care place on the embeddedness of people in the physical world and in relationships would seem to indicate that care and caring relationships are extrinsically valuable. For example, the isolation test for intrinsic value would seem opposed to Held’s concept of a person and relationships as particular things in the world dramatically influenced and constituted by their own unique histories. Furthermore, there is a striking similarity between Aristotle’s and Held’s views that humans are not self-sufficient organisms. Aristotle claims that gods do not need friends because they are self-sufficient (NE 1159a8-11). Held bases her argument for care as “the most basic moral value” around the idea that humans can neither survive nor have morality without it (EOC 73). In both cases the arguments for the value of human relationships would not work were humans constituted so that they were self sufficient from conception. Thus, like Aristotelian friendships, Held’s caring relationships could be considered extrinsically valuable. In the end, as will be argued in the chapter 8, whether the value is intrinsic or extrinsic is inconsequential to the conclusions of this dissertation.} Since caring relationships are central to the ethics of care it makes sense to think of them as intrinsically valuable. An ethicist of care applying G.E. Moore’s isolation test to caring relationships would be unlikely to deny the
worth of a caring relationship even if it were the only thing that exists. Thus, unlike Aristotelian friendships caring relationships, and by implication intimate relationships, are valuable as final and intrinsic goods according to Held.
Chapter 8: Conclusions

Intimate relationships are those interpersonal relationships that deeply connect people with one another. Some of these relationships are entered into freely and exist between people with no authority and power over one another such as those between close friends. Other intimate relationships are established in large part by the circumstances of one’s birth and exist between people of unequal authority and power over one another such as those between parents and their children. In both cases, however, relationships in which the members love one another, wish one another well, act for one another, do so mutually, and trust that each loves and wishes the other well as an end in himself are morally valuable. On this point each of the theorists this dissertation examines agrees. Immanuel Kant declares that there is a duty to cultivate friendships, a subset of intimate relationships.\textsuperscript{194} G.E. Moore considers the goods of friendships to be highly intrinsically valuable.\textsuperscript{195} Aristotle writes clearly at the beginning of book VIII in Nicomachean Ethics, “For without friends no one would choose to live, though he had all other goods.”\textsuperscript{196} Virginia Held recognizes caring relationships, of which intimate relationships are a subset, as focal points of moral value.\textsuperscript{197} The normative theories proposed by Kant and Moore, however, fail to accommodate their own views on the moral import of friendships. Aristotle’s and Held’s normative theories can successfully account for the moral value they attribute to intimate relationships. An examination of each theory’s failure or success reveals some of the necessary and sufficient conditions that a normative theory must meet in order to account for the moral value of friendships. Additionally, several other notable conclusions about the value of

\textsuperscript{194} Kant, I. 1797. Metaphysics of Morals. Trans. M. Gregor. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1991. Pg 261. See also Chapter 4, especially part I.
\textsuperscript{195} See Chapter 5, especially parts I and II.
\textsuperscript{196} Aristotle. 1941. “Nicomachean Ethics.” In The Basic Works of Aristotle. Trans. W.D. Ross. New York: Random House. 1155a5-6. See also Chapter 6, especially parts I and II.
\textsuperscript{197} See Chapter 7, especially parts III and IV.
intimate relationships according to normative theories can be made from said examination: intimate relationships need not be assigned intrinsic value, morally valuable relationships need not be restricted to friendships, it is helpful for a normative theory to acknowledge humans’ social natures, and it is helpful for a normative theory to recognize the moral value of particular things in the world.

**Part I: Necessary Conditions for a Normative Theory’s Ability to Capture the Value of Intimate Relationships**

Kant’s ethics is unable to account for the value of intimate relationships such as friendships because on his view motives of attachment, such as love, and the actions to which they give rise have no moral value.\(^{198}\) Kant’s insistence that the sole moral motive is reason’s respect for duty causes two interrelated problems when his theory is used to appraise the worth of intimate relationships. First, a necessary component of intimate relationships, the love that exists between the members of the relationship, remains morally unappreciated by Kant’s view. Kantians can assign positive moral value to other components of intimate relationships, for example the members’ willingness to act for one another as ends. However, the lack of moral focus on love and the attachment between those in intimate relationships leaves any moral value that exists in these relationships unconnected to the particular individuals in those relationships. In other words, even when two close friends treat one another as ends in themselves, and are motivated by reason alone, their actions are not morally different from two similarly motivated strangers treating one another as ends in themselves. Furthermore, insofar as the actions that nurture intimate relationships are motivated by love of the individual other rather than reason they are not morally valuable at all: treating another as an end in himself is morally good only so long as one is doing so in response to duty’s dictates. Kant’s unwillingness to admit either

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\(^{198}\) See Chapter 3, especially parts IV and V.
emotions or particular other people as moral motivations results in his normative theory’s inability to recognize friendship, or any other intimate relationship, as morally valuable.\(^{199}\)

This leads to the first condition that a normative theory must meet in order to acknowledge the moral value of intimate relationships.

\textit{Necessary Condition 1: The love that exists between those in intimate relationships or the actions motivated by this love must be candidates for moral goodness. Not every instance of love between intimate relations or every action motivated by love must be morally good according to a normative theory but at least some must.}

Kantianism’s failure in this regard forces Barbara Herman, who would like to salvage the value of intimate relationships in Kantian ethics, to conclude that their value lies outside the sphere of morality.\(^{200}\) Love for another as an end in himself is a necessary component of intimate relationships. Any normative theory that excludes love or all actions that are motivated by love from the realm of moral value will be unable to capture the value of intimate relationships. Therefore, it is a necessary condition of a normative theory’s ability to recognize the value of intimate relationships that the theory includes some instances of love or some actions motivated by love among the valuable things in the world.\(^{201}\) This condition is necessary, but not sufficient. Moore’s theory is an example that proves this to be true. Though Moore’s, Aristotle’s, and Held’s normative theories all value love as good or as a good motive for action, Moore’s theory is still unable to account for the value of intimate relationships such as

\(^{199}\) Part II will further address the issue of Kantianism’s failure to address particulars and that failure’s impact on Kantianism’s ability to acknowledge the moral value of intimate relationships.


\(^{201}\) Not every action motivated by love will be morally good. For example, the person who is motivated by love to commit murder.
friendships.\textsuperscript{202} The ability of Moore’s consequentialism to assign value to love and actions motivated by love is not enough to ensure that the theory can appreciate the value of intimate relationships.

Moore’s consequentialism assigns intrinsic value to friendships, but it is unable to account for the value of intimate relationships because only maximally good states of affairs have final value.\textsuperscript{203} Moore’s consequentialism combines his particular value theory with the traditional consequentialist normative structure. In terms of valuing friendships, his axiology is promising. Unlike Kant, Moore’s axiology highly values love in the form of personal affection. However, the normative structure of consequentialism recognizes only states of affairs containing the greatest amount of good as final ends. According to Moore’s consequentialism the only thing that is an end in itself, the only thing that is a goal rather than a means, is that attainable version of the world that contains the greatest amount of good. This valuation of goods is incompatible with the recognition of intimate relationships. Intimate relationships by definition, including friendships by Moore’s definition, exist between people who value one another and the relationship that exists between them as final goods, or ends in themselves.\textsuperscript{204}

No particular Moorean friendship is a necessary part of the maximally good state of affairs that is the final good according to consequentialism. For example, Steve must value Shivang and the relationship that exists between them as final ends for that relationship to meet the criteria of an intimate relationship. However, consequentialism’s normative structure makes it unable to recognize either Shivang or the relationship between Steve and Shivang as a final end: both Shivang and the relationship may need to be sacrificed as a means to the production of a

\textsuperscript{202} See Chapter 5 Part I and IV, Chapter 6 Part I, and Chapter 7 Part III respectively for additional discussion of these issues.
\textsuperscript{203} This is fully detailed in Chapter 5 Part IV.
\textsuperscript{204} See Chapter 5 Part I and IV for more details on this issue.
maximally good state of affairs. On the other hand, if Shivang and the relationship are a part of the maximally good state of affairs according to Moore’s consequentialism they are preserved or further cultivated only as a means to their part in the maximally good state of affairs. They can in neither case be accorded final value by Moore’s consequentialism.

This provides the basis of another condition that any normative theory must meet in order to accurately detail the value of intimate relationships.

*Necessary Condition 2:* A normative theory must value individuals in relationships as final ends, or ends in themselves.

This condition, in conjunction with the first, allows for the induction of several more necessary conditions.

Normative theories that cannot assign final value to individuals cannot address the value of intimate relationships because they fail to recognize a component piece of those relationships. An interpersonal relationship that qualifies as an intimate one must involve individuals who recognize one another as final goods. Similarly, a normative theory that recognizes only instrumental value in individuals cannot acknowledge the existence of intimate relationships as morally valuable entities, because it denies the existence of one part of intimate relationships: people who have final value. This condition of a normative theory’s ability to capture the value of intimate relationships is necessary because any theory that fails to accommodate the view that people have final value cannot recognize the existence of intimate relationships as morally valuable.

This problem parallels the problem which gives rise to the first necessary condition for a normative theory’s ability to account for the value of intimate relationships. In both cases the condition arises as a result of a normative theory’s failure to value one component of an intimate
relationship’s definition. In the first case it is Kantianism’s inability to accept love or actions motivated by love as morally good that leads to the conclusion that all normative theories must admit that some instances of love or some actions motivated by love have moral value in order to appreciate the moral value of intimate relationships. In the second case, it is Moore’s theory of ethics that fails to leave room for a particular piece of an intimate relationship’s definition: that the people in intimate relationships are ends in themselves. In both cases the conditions are necessary but not sufficient. The parallels of these two examples provide the premises of an induction to further necessary conditions:

\textit{Necessary Conditions 3-6: A normative theory that can account for the value of intimate relationships must not explicitly or implicitly exclude the moral value of all instances of wishing one another well, acting for one another, doing so mutually, and trusting one another.}

These conditions, like the two already addressed, are each necessary: the failure of a normative theory to meet any one of them would prevent that theory from acknowledging the existence of intimate relationships. However, no one condition is sufficient as is evidenced by Moorean consequentialism’s satisfaction of necessary condition 1, Kantianism’s satisfaction of necessary condition 2 and both theories’ failures to account for the value of intimate relationships.

Each of these six necessary conditions is more conservative than it might be. An alternate version of necessary conditions 1-6 is:

\textit{Aggressive Version of Necessary Conditions 1-6: any normative theory that can account for the value of intimate relationships must assign value to some instances of loving another, wishing one another well, acting for one another, doing so in a way that treats the other as an end in himself, doing so mutually, and trusting one another.}
In addition to the more precarious nature of the aggressive conditions, these conditions also have the drawback of being uncharitable when applied to various normative theories. This is why I will not defend the more aggressive versions of the conditions. My reason for wanting to remain charitable in applying these conditions to particular normative theories will be made clearer when I examine the sufficient condition for a normative theory’s ability to account for the value of intimate relationships in the next section. Furthermore, I will also address whether or not these conditions are jointly sufficient to a normative theory’s ability to account for the value of intimate relationships in the next section.

**Part II: A Sufficient Condition for a Normative Theory’s Ability to Capture the Value of Intimate Relationships**

Aristotle’s and Held’s normative theories succeed where Kant’s and Moore’s fail: they are able to capture the value of intimate relationships. Their theories do not explicitly or implicitly deny the value of any of the criteria of intimate relationships. Additionally, both theories grant that intimate relationships are more than merely instrumentally valuable. This leads to a sufficient condition for a normative theory’s ability to capture the value of intimate relationships: any normative theory that recognizes intimate relationships as more than instrumentally valuable will be able to assign value to intimate relationships.

Aristotle provides two arguments to explain his claim that friendships, which are intimate relationships, are good: the argument that friendships aid in the acquisition of self-knowledge and the argument that friendships encourage moral activity. Each of these arguments supports the contributory value of friendships to the final good. The final value of *eudaimonia* cannot be reached without friendships. Friendships, according to Aristotle, are not simply valuable as a

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205 See Chapter 6 Part II for a more complete analysis of these arguments and the other points made in this paragraph.
means to eudaimonia, but as a vital component of the sort of life that can achieve the final good. Friendships do not just cause the value of eudaimonia, but actually modify the experienced value of a well-lived life. Aristotle also notes the centrality of interpersonal relationships to the definition of a human. He writes: “…man is a political creature and one whose nature is to live with others.”

Furthermore, he notes “Between man and wife friendship seems to exist by nature; for man is naturally inclined to form couples…”

Held goes even further than Aristotle and argues that caring relationships, of which intimate relationships are a subset, possess final and intrinsic value. According to Held, caring relationships are ends in themselves. Held too explains the necessity of caring relationships to human life when she writes “Without care as an empirically describable practice, we cannot have life at all since human beings cannot survive without it.” Caring relationships act as a locus for caring activities, a place for those activities to occur.

Aristotle and Held’s success in capturing the value of intimate relationships is directly related to their arguments for the value of intimate relationships as being more than instrumental. Both normative theories meet the necessary conditions described in the previous section, but they also go further and attribute more than instrumental value to intimate relationships themselves. Therefore, another condition for a normative theory’s ability to recognize the value of intimate relationships is:

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207 Ibid. 1162a16-17.
208 See Chapter 7 Part IV for a more thorough explanation of these claims.
210 The phrase “more than instrumental value” is used to mean either final value or a value that is necessary but not merely a means to final value. A value that is contributory to final value qualifies as being “more than instrumentally valuable.” For more on the precise definitions of each of these values see Chapter 2.
Sufficient Condition 1: A normative theory must ascribe more than instrumental value to intimate relationships.

This condition is sufficient, because any normative theory that can consistently describe the value of intimate relationships as being more than instrumental will be able to capture the value of intimate relationships. It is also important to note that any theory that can consistently explain the value of intimate relationships as being more than instrumental will also meet all the necessary conditions mentioned in the previous section. There would have to be inconsistencies in any normative theory that explicitly or implicitly denied the value of any component piece of an intimate relationship and still assigned final value, for example, to intimate relationships. Many normative theories, however, may fail to specifically address the value of each component piece of an intimate relationship’s definition. Yet, if a normative theory assigns final goodness to some intimate relationships and there is no evidence that the theory explicitly or implicitly denies the value of any component piece of these relationships one may charitably grant there are no internal inconsistencies in the theory and that it does successfully capture the value of intimate relationships. This is the reason I chose more charitable formulations of the necessary conditions explained in the previous section. It is also worth noting that even when combined necessary conditions 1-6 are not coextensive with the sufficient condition currently under discussion. The necessary conditions discussed in the previous section only require that a normative theory allow for some value of the component pieces of intimate relationships. Those conditions do not specify that the value of the component pieces must be final values, except in the case of necessary condition two where treatment as a final value is part of the criterion itself. For example, the mutuality that exists in intimate relationships could be appraised by a normative theory as a means to each person’s happiness rather than as a final good. This value
judgment would be logically compatible with the existence of an intimate relationship. So even if individually valuing each component of an intimate relationship was equivalent to valuing the relationship as a whole, there is still a difference between the kind of values addressed by the necessary conditions discussed previously and the sufficient condition under present discussion. Aristotle’s and Held’s successes in accounting for the value of intimate relationships, along with Kant’s and Moore’s failures, would also support an induction to the conclusion that this sufficient condition is also a necessary condition. Kant’s and Moore’s theories fail to meet the necessary conditions discussed in the previous section but they also fail to meet the sufficient condition. Kantianism’s inability to assign moral value to love or any action it motivates prevents Kantianism from assigning value to intimate relationships themselves. Moore’s version of consequentialism is no better at treating intimate relationships as final goods or necessary to the final good than it is at treating the people in an intimate relationship as final goods or necessary to the final good. Thus, the two theories that fail to appreciate the moral value of intimate relationships cannot assign final value or value necessary to final value to intimate relationships. On the other hand, the two theories that successfully account for the value of intimate relationships both recognize those relationships as having more than instrumental goodness. Despite this evidence, it may still be logically, if not actually possible, for a normative theory to meet the necessary conditions described in the last section, assign intimate relationships only instrumental value, and still capture the value of intimate relationships. This logical possibility makes it equally difficult to answer whether the necessary conditions described in the previous section are jointly sufficient for a normative theory’s ability to recognize the value of intimate relationships. To be clear:
If appraising the value of intimate relationships as more than instrumental is a necessary condition of a normative theory’s ability to capture the value of intimate relationships then the necessary conditions are not jointly sufficient. Conversely, if appraising the value of intimate relationships as more than instrumental is not a necessary condition of a normative theory’s ability to capture the value of intimate relationships then the necessary conditions are jointly sufficient for a normative theory’s ability to capture the value of intimate relationships.

**Part III: Other Conclusions**

Through the examination of the four normative theories’ abilities to capture the value of intimate relationships several other important points about these abilities have been revealed: it is unnecessary for a normative theory to assign intrinsic value to intimate relationships, it is unnecessary to limit the sphere of valuable relationships to friendships, it is helpful for a normative theory to understand humans as necessarily social or co-dependent beings, it is helpful for a normative theory to be particularistic as opposed to universalistic.

The point made in chapter three, that assigning intrinsic value to intimate relationships is unnecessary to a normative theory’s ability to capture the moral value of intimate relationships, was verified by the examination of the four normative theories. Moore’s consequentialism as well as Held’s ethics of care both assigned intrinsic value to intimate relationships, yet Moore’s theory still ultimately fails to appreciate the value of these relationships. Conversely, while neither Aristotle’s nor Kant’s theories understand intimate relationships as being intrinsically valuable only Aristotle’s is able to account for the moral value of those relationships. The preceding discussion proves that it is neither necessary nor an impediment to a theory’s ability to account for the value of intimate relationships to assign intrinsic value to intimate relationships.
This is important because normative theories have been criticized because of the inability to assign intrinsic value to intimate relationships.\textsuperscript{211}

The discussion of the previous chapters also shows that restricting the set of morally valuable relationships to friendships does not help a theory capture the moral value of relationships. Kant most explicitly limits the set of morally valuable relationships to friendships by emphasizing the need for equality between friends as a result of the tenuous nature of friendship’s balance of respect and mutual love.\textsuperscript{212} This description is in line with Neera Badhwar’s and Laurence Thomas’ descriptions of friendship which each contain a criterion of equality between those in the relationship.\textsuperscript{213} Yet, Kant’s focus on equality does not allow his theory to acknowledge the moral value of such relationships. In fact, Aristotle and Held, who are both willing to value relationships between unequals, are the theorists who propose normative theories that successfully capture the moral value of some interpersonal relationships.

One cannot conclude from this that friendships are no more valuable than other forms of intimate relationships. One can, however, conclude that the criterion of equality, when added to the other criteria of intimate relationships more generally, does not specially entail moral value of relationships that would otherwise not contain any moral value.

A noteworthy similarity between Aristotle’s and Held’s account of intimate relationships’ values is the place they give relationships in human life. Both see interpersonal relationships as an absolutely necessary piece of any human life. For Aristotle, what it means to be human and what it means to lead a good human life are interconnected. Thus, after explaining that “…man

\textsuperscript{211} For example, Badhwar argues against consequentialism on this basis in Badhwar, N. K. 1991. “Why it is Wrong to Always Be Guided By the Best: Consequentialism and Friendship.” \textit{Ethics} 101. Though, Badhwar in this article seems to mean final value rather than intrinsic value as understood by the definitions used in this dissertation.


is born for citizenship” it comes as no surprise that his account of moral life includes intimate relationships as a necessary component. 214 Books IIX and IX of Nicomachean Ethics are necessary to a full explanation of a good human life because part of what it means to be human according to Aristotle is to be enmeshed in social relationships. Held recognizes the centrality of interpersonal relationships to human life as well. In arguing for the necessity of care to human life she points out the fact that humans cannot survive without others. 215 Human infants are biologically incapable of caring for themselves. Thus, everyone who survives past infancy must have some interpersonal relationships. Furthermore, anyone who survives to an age at which one can live a solitary life can only do so as a result of one’s past interpersonal relationships that nurtured the capability to live alone. Held’s acknowledgement of these points transitions smoothly into an argument for her conclusions about the moral value of intimate relationships. On the other hand, Kant’s and Moore’s normative theories are, in a sense, disconnected from their views about interpersonal relationships. Kant’s view of morality is grounded in a human’s ability to rationally recognize one’s moral duties, and one requires no other person to exercise it. For Moore, though intimate relationships are intrinsically valuable, they are not necessary to the final good at which every moral human must aim. By setting up interpersonal relationships as a necessary part of human life, both Aristotle and Held make it easier to incorporate the moral value of intimate relationships into their normative theories. Assigning moral value to intimate relationships is a logical step for a normative theory that acknowledges the necessity of interpersonal relationships to human life as part of its foundation. A theory such as Kant’s or Moore’s that is not grounded in similar views about what it means to be human will need to

make a more circuitous, less obvious, argument for including intimate relationships among the set of morally valuable objects. This is not to say it is impossible for a theory with a different foundation to acknowledge the moral value of intimate relationships, but it would likely be more difficult.

Another revealing similarity between Aristotle’s and Held’s normative theories is their focus on the value of particular objects. Neither theory acknowledges universal rules of morality that must be followed or universal standards to justify moral value, but both are able to explain the moral value of intimate relationships. Kant’s and Moore’s theories, on the other hand, do appeal to universal standards of right and wrong and have trouble accounting for the moral value of intimate relationships. These connections may be more than mere correlation. The problem with appeals to universal moral standards is that they make it difficult to admit of the value in particular objects. This issue was described in the introduction in relation to the Christian concept of agape: when love is universal it also fails to distinguish between individuals. However, the love that exists between those people in intimate relationships must distinguish between the other in the relationship and others with whom one is not in a relationship. In fact, part of what it means to treat the other in an intimate relationship as an end in himself is to recognize her as an individual. This is partially responsible for Kantianism’s problem recognizing the moral value of intimate relationships: even when one treats another as an end in himself, for the action to have moral worth it must be motivated by abstract reason and an appeal to a universal standard of goodness as opposed to love, which focuses on the particulars of another person. Moore’s version of consequentialism is prevented from acknowledging the value of intimate relationships by its appeal to the universal rule that the morally right action is

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216 See the introduction and Chapter 3 part I for more on this point.
217 See Chapter 4 part V for further explanation of this point.
one that maximizes the good. Due to the theory’s appeal to a universal rule all particular goods are made instrumental to the realization of the final good: that state of affairs in which the good has been maximized. Therefore, no particular other person or intimate relationship can be a final good.\textsuperscript{218} Aristotle’s and Held’s normative theories do not need to resolve such conflicts between universal rules or justifications and particular intimate relationships. As a result, they have fewer obstacles to impede their valuation of intimate relationships. This does not prove that it is impossible for a normative theory that appeals to a universal rule or standard to recognize the moral value of intimate relationships, but it does give one reason to think that normative theories that lack such appeals have an easier time recognizing intimate relationships’ values.

Intimate relationships are deeply valuable to those people involved in them and this value is not merely subjective. There is moral value in intimate relationships: those relationships in which the members love one another, wish one another well, act for one another, do so mutually, and trust that each loves and wishes the other well as an end in himself. In order for a normative theory to account for this value it must necessarily not explicitly or implicitly exclude the moral value of all instances of wishing one another well, acting for one another, doing so in a way that treats the other as an end in himself, doing so mutually, and trusting one another. Furthermore, any normative theory that values intimate relationships as more than instrumentally good can account for the moral value of those relationships. It is unnecessary for normative theories to assign intrinsic value to intimate relationships or to narrow the range of valuable relationships to friendships in order to assign moral value to interpersonal relationships. It is easier, though, for a normative theory that recognizes the necessity of interpersonal relationships to human life and the value in particular objects and people to account for the moral value of normative relationships. Theories like Kant’s and Moore’s fail to meet the necessary conditions that in

\textsuperscript{218} See Chapter 5 part IV for a deeper analysis of this.
order to account for the value of intimate relationships a normative theory must not explicitly or implicitly exclude the moral value of all instances to some instances of loving another, wishing one another well, acting for one another, doing so in a way that treats the other as an end in himself, doing so mutually, and trusting one another. Therefore, they lack the ability to describe the moral value of romantic couples, close friendships, parent-child relationships, and other intimate relationships that are part of everyone’s life from time to time. They act as filters that fail to capture some of the moral landscape’s most interesting colors. Theories like Aristotle’s and Held’s, on the other hand, that meet the necessary conditions described above and the sufficient condition of assigning more than instrumental value to intimate relationships more faithfully capture these colors and the way in which they tint our moral view of the world.
Bibliography


