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THE ARCHDIOCESE OF NEW YORK: TRANSITION FROM URBAN POWERHOUSE TO SUBURBAN INSTITUTION, 1950-2000
A CASE STUDY

by

Henry Sheinkopf
This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Political Science in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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Abstract

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From 1850-1950, the New York Archdiocese welcomed newly arriving Irish and Italian Catholics and forged a political block that influenced local, state and national politics with political leverage sufficient to influence the city’s commercial sectors. This mobilization transformed the once penniless and discriminated-against Irish, and later Italians, by enabling the Archdiocese of New York, through the power of the vote, to promote its religious interests as its adherents rose to positions of political and economic power. The Archdiocese of New York became the owner of vast real estate, a provider of social and educational services, and an arbiter of morality and power. In essence, the Archdiocese functioned not only as a religious entity but as a political institution, relying on a large population of parishioners as the foundation for its ability to affect local democratic governments.

As the latter half of the twentieth century approached, however, the descendants of those whom the Archdiocese had helped left the city for the suburbs. The deindustrialization of the New York economy coincided with growing preferences for the suburban lifestyle, which included single family homes with ample parking, consumer amenities, and good schools. Low cost VA / FHA mortgages, as well as the interstate highway system, encouraged this exodus. Although it is well-documented that, in the decades after World War II, large numbers of white, Catholic, blue-collar workers moved to the suburbs of New York City, research has typically
focused on why they left and what impact this newly mobile population had on suburban demographics and culture. Missing from these accounts has been how the political vacuum left by diminished Catholic populations in New York City undermined the political influence of the Archdiocese.

In fact, New York City in 1950 was about to enter a period of great political flux. Aside from the flight of Irish and other white Catholics, the Archdiocese would have to contend with a number of radical alterations in the fabric of New York City that would challenge its power. These included: the mass immigration of Puerto Ricans; the end of the waterfront as both a job creator and ethnic enclave; the decline of manufacturing in New York City; the rise of the reform Democratic movement and the decline of Tammany Hall; the rise of public sector labor; and the new politics mobilizing women, minorities, and gays. These unforeseen social and political movements were highly significant agents of change in the American urban landscape and its institutions, including New York’s Catholic Church.

Faced with all these factors, the Archdiocese of New York could have adopted a number of strategies to either replenish its numbers or find new instruments of political influence in city politics. Indeed, there were many nascent political institutions—public sector labor unions, groupings of new immigrant populations, and civic organizations—that evolved during this period. Evidence suggests that the Archdiocese was aware of the transformative environment around it. But its fall from political grace over the next 50 years is apparent, demonstrated in particular by the Archdiocese’s inability to stop the passage of laws that eroded its moral authority, including measures that liberalized divorce and legalized abortion.

Given the Archdiocese of New York’s prominence and influence for over a century, its failure to rebuild its power base when confronted with change, followed by its subsequent
transition from an urban to a suburban powerhouse, raises questions this dissertation will seek to address. Why did the Archdiocese of New York not use its political power to save jobs, protect industries, and keep its flock from leaving? Were the failures caused by Irish domination and the inability of the Archdiocese’s hierarchy to adjust to new ethnic realities? Were the factors confronting the Archdiocese simply too much for it to adjust to at that time? Why did this organization, perceived in the city to be powerful and perceived by its flock to be infallible, appear to falter? What in this organization led to its changed role as an urban political power player? In short, did the Archdiocese of New York foster the loss of its own political influence? This dissertation will show the extent to which the Archdiocese was organizationally rigid and impervious to signals in the environment, and how this rigidity was linked to domination by the Irish, who were disinclined to allow other ethnic groups to have leadership or decision-making roles.

This dissertation will describe the socioeconomic and political landscape of New York City in the mid-twentieth century, the problems facing the New York Archdiocese, and its reaction to the above issues. Further, this dissertation frames the Archdiocese’s shifts in power as it transitioned from a classic urban powerhouse to a more suburban institution. The research illustrates these shifts over the last half century based on an understanding of the changing Catholic population; of a different definition of the “American Catholic”; of the still potent but more nuanced Catholic power in the financial, labor and political arenas; and finally, of a new understanding of the charismatic Catholic.

It is hypothesized that the Archdiocese functioned well in a static environment but was incapable of adjusting in times of flux because of its lack of flexibility in maneuvering to accommodate changing realities and its adherence to rigid policies. Citing the reservoirs of
information noted above and focusing in particular on urban power research, this dissertation will show that the Archdiocese of New York's rigidity resulted in a decline in its political influence and power within the city. This decline precipitated the Archdiocese's changing focus from the city to the suburbs so that it could survive and begin to exercise power and political influence within its new suburban constituencies.
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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION

Located just east of St Patrick’s Cathedral at 452 Madison Avenue is the “Powerhouse,” the residence of the Archbishop and head of the New York Archdiocese. So called because its resident once had as much pull as almost anyone in New York politics, the Powerhouse still attracts dignitaries, but they are less likely to come as supplicants. Mayors used to come to the Powerhouse for advice on appointing city commissioners and ties between local parishes and Tammany Hall were strong. An urban powerhouse and a cradle-to-grave social safety net, it fostered loyalty among millions of immigrant Catholics and their descendants who settled in New York (Dolan 1973).

With arrival of Catholic immigrants from Europe—first Germans followed by the Irish and then Italians—the Church not only offered spiritual succor but created a system of social and material solidarity anchored in individual parishes and supported by Archdiocesan-wide institutions. It offered protection from anti-Catholic protesters, provided parochial school education, jobs and access to political power through its relationship with Tammany Hall (Dolan 1973). The relationship was symbiotic: the Archdiocese of New York provided people and Tammany received workers, consequently increasing the power of both. In the first half of the 20th century, the Archdiocese became a significant political force. Few elections were won or appointments made to bureaucratic positions without input from the Cardinal (Cunningham 2009). Parish priests were even charged with getting out the Catholic vote before Election Day (McManus 2009). When New York City mayors faced important political decisions, they often made pilgrimages to the Powerhouse. Further evidence of the Archdiocese’s importance was the ubiquity of Catholic institutions, which dotted the landscape to such an extent that by 1950 the Archdiocese had become one of the city’s largest landowners.
At the same time, New York City sat on the precipice of volcanic and unexpected change. On the one hand, Cardinal Francis Spellman’s role in the 1950s and 1960s as a Catholic leader was at its zenith. He held sway over one of the nation’s largest archdioceses and exerted power that went beyond his titular role in the Church. His influence extended to “New York State, and even nationally and internationally — from influencing Rome’s selection of other American bishops to helping City Hall choose commissioners and high ranking officials” (Quinn 2007, 168). Yet, with the erosion of the City’s manufacturing base and its decline as America’s preeminent port, the Catholic working class found opportunities within Manhattan and the Bronx considerably constricted. The trickle of blue-collar workers following jobs and dreams of a better life in the suburbs that began in the post-World War II era soon became a veritable flood.

Demographic change meant that the half of all New Yorkers who were first and second generation white ethnics in 1952 had fallen to nearly one-third by 1970 (Zeitz 2007, 13). In the 1940s less than half a million white New Yorkers left the City, during the 1950s, 1.2 million left, and during the 1960s, another half million. It was “an outmigration on a scale associated in world history with forced departures or natural disaster” (Freeman 2000, 172).

Statement of the Question

How did the Archdiocese of New York lose its ability to influence political decision-makers, social and labor movements, and its own parishioners during the last part of the twentieth century? This dissertation seeks to explain the transition of the Archdiocese of New York from the urban powerhouse it had been before 1950 to its present status as a less urban, more fractured, and less influential religious institution. It locates the Archdiocese’s declining influence in internal and external forces. Internally, the Archdiocese increasingly relied on an
inward-looking leadership wedded to an overly narrow social base of Irish Americans. It’s socially narrow and inwardly oriented leadership proved incapable of adapting to demographic changes, the decline of machine politics, deindustrialization, and the secularization of its parishioners.

The Archdiocese of New York lost considerable political influence, which it had amassed as its congregations had swollen in the first half of the century, after World War II when millions of Catholics left the city for the suburbs. It appeared either reluctant to share power with later immigrant groups or unable to assist in their ascension. In addition, the Irish viewed themselves as Catholic leaders who would fight “to hold onto political power while simultaneously reinforcing religious influence in the affairs of the home and the family” (McDonnell 2011, 1). This attitude put the Archdiocese and its allies in Tammany Hall in direct conflict with newer immigrants, who sought help not from the Church, but from political reform movements working to register Puerto Ricans and other Latinos to vote (Badillo 2009).

**Definitions of Power**

From where does the Archdiocese gain its power? One model describes it as organizationally immobile and inert, deriving its power and organizational design from the Vatican. “It exists in a highly controlled environment, not subject to innovation; and the ability of local administrators—even at the level of cardinal—to act is constrained by the decisions of political superiors” (Wilson 1989, 13). Yet this stylized model where decision making of consequence is controlled and directed by the Vatican still allows for autonomy in daily decision-making. The Archdiocese and its various entities can exercise discretion so long as they do not violate doctrine. This protection of doctrine is maintained through “coercive persuasion”
(Stewart et al. 2012).

“Coercive persuasion” might include expulsion. Threatening the norms of the Roman Catholic Church and certainly those of the Archdiocese of New York could result in sanctions. The Church maintains the threat of expulsion and the denial of secular rights, which include access to local parish priests, schools, hospitals, orphanages, nursing homes, social service agencies, and other church instrumentalities (Stewart et al. 2012, 380).

An incentive to conform—both for the Archdiocese of New York to Vatican norms and for parishioners, who depend upon the Archdiocese of New York for religious and social service provision—is based upon an understanding that rules must be followed. Breaking rules means suffering consequences. In the case of the Archdiocese of New York, there can be no deviation from the rules set down by the Pope and the Vatican. In the case of local parishes, there can be no deviation from the rules set by the Cardinal and the Archdiocese of New York. To deviate might result in expulsion. The “coercive persuasion” described by Stewart and his colleagues is even more powerful than the threat of death.

The Archdiocese is a hierarchy controlled by the Pope, who delegates power to the Cardinal, whom the Pope may remove or reassign at any time. The coerciveness of power promotes conformity, which in turn reduces the possibility of adjustment to dynamic change, such as the changes that occurred in New York City during second half of the 20th century.

The leadership tradition of the New York Archdiocese, like that of many bureaucracies, did not promote adjustment to change but rather the opposite. “The sentiment of tradition, in cooperation with an instinctive need for stability,” writes Michels, “has as its result that the leadership represents always the past rather than the present. Leadership is indefinitely retained…simply because it is already constituted” (Michels 1966, 121). Because of the
inviolability of the Archdiocese’s mission and its bureaucracy, it was easier to ignore changes in the environment.

Could the Archdiocese of New York, which in this dissertation is defined as Manhattan and the Bronx, have directed its adherents to remain in New York rather than exiting to the suburbs by refusing to empower construction of suburban churches? Interestingly, the exodus from the city to the suburbs occurred with greatest intensity at the time of the Archdiocese’s greatest political power. Could the Archdiocese have used that power to direct its adherents to stay in the city by refusing to empower construction of suburban churches? Could the Archdiocese have used that power to force the city and state governments to provide tax assistance to protect businesses from closing and leaving the city? Could it have pressed the state legislature to provide tax incentives to stop the outflow of waterfront based industries? Could it have executed various measures to impede what was a crisis for the city? Or was it impervious to signals and changes within its urban environment?

The changes in New York were a test of Tammany, which, though imperfectly democratic, incorporated the immigrant working class. “Facing competition in the electoral marketplace, big-city bosses found it in their interest to serve as ethnic middlemen, quickly naturalizing and registering successive waves of immigrants. “In this way, machines ostensibly assimilated the newcomers, fashioning multiethnic ‘rainbow’ coalitions” (Erie 1990, 237). Alongside the political and social roles that political machines played for urban workers, the Church had its extra-spiritual role. For Catholics in New York, Boston, and other cities, the parish offered stability. It “was a fortress for old line residents. They strongly maintained familiar

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1 The Archdiocese of New York is in fact 10 counties: Staten Island (Richmond), Manhattan (New York), the Bronx (Bronx) and seven counties in the lower Hudson Valley, north of New York City. This dissertation focuses only on Manhattan and the Bronx for several reasons, but for the purposes of this discussion most important is that Tammany Hall, the regular Democratic Party organization and ally of the Archdiocese, was headquartered in Manhattan and equally influential in the Bronx.
rituals, social events . . . and the neighborhood’s disappearing ethnic character, re-enforcing for white Catholics the permanence of the parish's commitment to the neighborhood in a time of change” (Gamm 1999, 239). Hence, the concept of power attained via the ballot box and based on constituent voting was implemented by new ethnic "powerhouses." Yet, as Catholic voters transitioned from New York City to the suburbs, their votes followed them, and no longer reliant on the political favors of Tammany Hall or social safety net of the Archdiocese their affiliations began to broaden beyond the Democratic Party and their parishes.

This dissertation will examine power and influence won and lost, power no longer tied to a concentrated, urban parish. It will examine shifts in power that occur among other influential entities to understand why the Archdiocese of New York could do so little to stanch the diminution of its base and its power. Despite the Archdiocese’s clear, coherent values and faithful adherents, organizational imperatives prevented it from adopting institutional responses to changes in the urban metropolis that occurred from 1950 to 2000. It was a challenge the institution could not confront (O’Reilly 1989).

Wilson’s notion that political power gained by bureaucratic entities—which can be generalized from his description of political bureaucracy—occurs “by the growth of an administrative apparatus so large as to be immune from popular control, by placing power over a …bureaucracy of any size in private rather than public hands” (Wilson 1975, 2). The Archdiocese of New York is a bureaucracy whose authority is believed to be derived from the Pope, whose authority is derived from the heavens. It is thus a bureaucratic entity whose power on earth and in the domain in which it governs is unchallengeable. And as we learn from numerous interviewees Wilson’s point that “from the point of view of their members, bureaucracies are sometimes uncaring, ponderous, or unfair" (Wilson 1975, 2) is an accurate
reflection of parishioners’ experience.

Summary of the Argument

As the Second World War ended, the Archdiocese of New York was a central institution in the political structure of New York City. It maintained a close advisory relationship with City Hall and involved itself in key legislative battles at the state level. The institution spent more than a century amassing such influence, attaining a power that is hard to quantify. Yet in a period no longer than two decades after the war’s end, the prominence of the Archdiocese of New York as a power actor had diminished considerably.

Traditional explanations for the City’s post-war urban decline focus on the exit of white ethnics, primarily Irish and Italians, from Manhattan and the Bronx to the suburbs because of post-war incentives for relocation. These included government guaranteed mortgages, newly constructed highways that supported greater mobility, and the promise of a better life. These arguments, however, do not deal specifically with conditions in the post-World War II New York City setting and do not address all of the issues the powerful Archdiocese of New York had to confront during this period of urban change. Suburban exodus was an important element but not the only one; the Archdiocese was confronting a host of other issues that would contribute to its political decline. They included external factors such as the shift of power centers from the waterfront and manufacturing industry to other power centers; the replacement of traditionally white ethnic, blue collar jobs with public sector jobs and the expanded role of public sector unions in the City’s political structure. Factors internal to the Church included the inability of the Archdiocese of New York to integrate newly arrived immigrants from Puerto Rico; Vatican II’s liberalization of Roman Catholic doctrine in a period of major societal changes; and the
Archdiocese’s decision to follow the Vatican’s position against birth control. It was during the post-Francis Cardinal Spellman era, continuing through the reign of John Cardinal O’Connor era that the Archdiocese's greatest loss of power occurred. Lindblom’s 1959 treatise *The Science of Muddling Through* explains well the Church’s strategic response.

A highly significant challenge the New York Archdiocese had to face was the arrival of an estimated 750,000 Puerto Ricans who were poor, uneducated, unemployed, Spanish-speaking, and who, although Catholic, neither brought with them clergy nor shared the forms of liturgical practice that the hierarchy had instilled in New York parishes. The inability of the Archdiocese to absorb these new migrants contributed significantly to a reduction in its ability to maintain dominance in the political life of the city. Competing arguments do not explain why, if the Archdiocese was indeed powerful, it would not try to block such an exodus, or at minimum not seek to slow the exodus down and maintain its own power base. In addition, the protection of its physical plant alone had inestimable value: churches, schools, youth facilities, orphanages, hospitals, colleges, nursing homes, convents and other real estate. The Archdiocese of New York needed adherents to remain and likely government assistance to persevere. Yet during this period of greatest change, the Archdiocese of New York continued to function in the same manner it had for nearly a century, eventually to find its influence dramatically reduced and its real estate unoccupied.

The internal decision-making process of the Archdiocese of New York vested all power in the cardinals. New York State statutes governing charities aided the centralization of power in the Archdiocese by uniquely granting institutional control not to a board but to the Archbishop. No other religious entity has such legally binding authority. The process served to protect the status quo but failed in promoting change, such as adopting new immigrant parishioners or to
addressing increasingly salient social issues of civil and women’s rights and a growing anti-Vietnam War movement. The power amassed remained with the powerful and encouraged organizational stagnation (Michels 1966). The Powerhouse proved unable to reverse its decline through persuasive authority or moral suasion.

To substantiate my arguments and to gain a sense of what occurred and why, I include interviews with Catholic clergy and administrators, members of the news media who covered the politics of the era, labor leaders, community activists (including Puerto Rican activists who witnessed the destruction of their neighborhoods), political leaders, historians, and other first-hand participants. While the interviews are anecdotal, they detail the transition of power within the Archdiocese of New York from city to suburb, and contradict the simple, purely numerical analysis that population out-migration was the primary agent responsible for the decline of the Archdiocese's political power.

What is unique about this research is how it refutes the argument that the Archdiocese lost power because its parishioners moved. Instead, it is a narrative of how political, religious, and economic factors no longer protected the Archdiocese from outside attack. Catholic out-migration was largely balanced by in-migration. As established Catholics tended to move away from the inner boroughs to the suburbs, newer immigrants moved in to take their place. The Archdiocese power diminished in New York City not because of fewer Catholics but because the Archdiocese became unable or unwilling to press its influence with the more recent migrants to the city.

**Alternative Explanations**

A counter-interpretation of the New York Archdiocese's loss of urban power and its
ultimate transition to a second base in the suburbs is one of effective adaptation. One could say that the Archdiocese adapted well to changing post-World War II conditions, moving along with its parishioners from the central city to the suburbs, and shifting from being allied solely with the Democratic Party to building links with Republicans. Consequently, then, the Archdiocese didn't unwittingly lose power in New York City, it just "went with the flow, and it went with the dough." One also could say that the election of Governors George Pataki, Mario Cuomo, and Andrew Cuomo represented the maintenance of Catholic influence. Perhaps the New York Archdiocese did not give up on the city, but rather sensibly shifted its resources to where its population was located. And in truth it had little economic choice.

A third counter-interpretation draws from Jelen's treatise “The American Church: Of Being Catholic and American,” which states that “democracy and toleration also change[d] American Catholicism...[T]o serve as a genuinely prophetic voice in political and social life; the American church must maintain some vestige of its moral teaching authority” (quoted in Manuel, Reardon, and Wilcox 2006, 83). By dint of its historical commitment to representing New York immigrants and position of power in an era of dramatic and significant change, the Archdiocese of New York had to meet the challenges posed by the new immigrants or see its moral authority and political power in a secularizing environment put at risk.

**Scope of the Study**

The Archdiocese of New York includes New York County (Manhattan), Bronx County, and Richmond County (Staten Island). This study examines only New York City and the Bronx because the factors which are of interest for examination in this study of urban change were greatest in Manhattan and the Bronx: 1) New migrants came primarily to Manhattan and the
Bronx and later exited for other boroughs before ultimately moving out of the city; 2) The Archdiocese had more access to money and power because of its physical location in Manhattan; 3) Manhattan until recently remained the “capital” of the city; 4) Tammany, the old line Democrat organization, was Manhattan-based with deep alliances within the Bronx; and 5) The waterfront was a huge base of employment for the entire city, primarily in Manhattan.

Evidence of Change and Transition
Deindustrialization

Deindustrialization weakened the Archdiocese’s hold on key Catholic niches in the New York City's labor force. Between 1950 and 1966 industrial jobs in New York began to leave the city's boundaries as its work force moved to the suburbs. “Industrial relocation entailed two related events, decentralization of industry within the New York region and movement away from it . . . [T]he change took place gradually. In 1953 New York City has fifty-six per cent of the region's manufacturing jobs; in 1960, fifty-four percent. By 1966 the majority of jobs lay outside the City” (Freeman 2000, 143). Factory jobs lost to the suburbs meant a shift of blue collar workers from out of the City's center.

The port collapse was especially costly to the parish memberships. As Zeitz notes, “Once the mainstay of New York's urban economy, the city's waterfront and its sub-culture changed almost overnight. Its decline was one chapter in the story of postwar New York's economic shakeup. In 1946, forty one percent of Gotham's labor force worked blue collar jobs. By 1970 that figure had declined to 29 percent, nearly matched by the 27 percent of New Yorkers who held secretarial and clinical jobs” (Zeitz 2007, 148). The Archdiocese of New York proved powerless to stop the outflow of jobs and blue collar workers from leaving the city, although
Gamm argues that white Catholics, particularly Irish Catholics, stuck it out in deteriorating neighborhoods far longer than did Jews because of parish attachments (Gamm, 1999; Skelly 2011). As neighbors left or died, or children moved away, it became more difficult to stay. The parish remained open, but the community was no longer accessible.

Politics and Patronage

Some writers identify the loss of patronage jobs as a catalyst for the Archdiocese’s loss of power. Ware argues that the Tammany of old was not the Tammany of the 1960s and 1970s because traditional patronage ceased to exist (1985, 126). The patronage jobs and the livelihood of Tammany-affiliated operatives, loyal Catholics, were lost due to civil service and the fiscal crisis. Moreover, patronage was controlled by the Irish, who dominated Tammany and “who conceived of the Party as a defensive weapon to protect hard won advantages that cannot easily be replaced” (Litt 1970, 46).

Increasing numbers of Irish and Italians embraced a conservative world-view often as a response to newcomers and the changes they brought with their arrival (Rieder 1985, 1). Despite discomfort with the culture of post-World War II liberalism, ethnic whites in municipal employment found themselves relying on left-leaning unions. The Transport Workers, District Council 37, American Federation of State County and Municipal Employees, and others may have had politics different than their Irish and Italian members, but the power the unions brought to the bargaining table would improve members’ lives significantly.

The primary loss the Archdiocese sustained, however, was private sector and waterfront jobs too costly to maintain, not public sector jobs. Freeman writes: “With 36,000 of the 62,000 jobs added by the New York City government between 1953-1971 filled by African-Americans
or Puerto Ricans, municipal unionism became a movement of and for non-whites” (2001, 225). Then the question of defining a “Catholic job” presented significant difficulty. Interviewees in this study noted “manufacturing” or “police and security” as defining the jobs of the late 1950s and 1960s (Dunne 2011). Construction would also seem to remain an area defining Catholic employment. As Freeman noted the industry was overwhelmingly white (2001, 46). Manufacturing in the city, however, was declining in the postwar years as firms moved to the suburbs to cut costs. Their work force of white ethnic men followed.

Population Shift

The movement of Catholics out of the city and into the suburbs is well noted in New York Archdiocesan history. “[T]hough the three [NYC] counties in the Archdiocese lost 166,956 people between 1940 and 1970, the situation was different in the suburbs. “The seven counties there gained 744,669, of whom almost 323,129 were in Westchester” (Cohalan 1983, 296). Westchester Catholics remained part of the New York City Archdiocese. Those moving to Long Island created the base for a wholly new archdiocese. The population shift was so intense that in “1957, the Archdiocese of New York announced the creation of a new diocese, the Diocese of Rockville Center, to serve the nearly 500,000 Catholics now living in the Long Island counties of Nassau and Suffolk—a service that would include driving lessons for people accustomed to the New York City transit system” (Barry 2008, 192). This new diocese was taken from the Brooklyn Diocese. Hence “as more and more upwardly mobile college educated Catholics followed the new highways to the suburbs, the century-old tight-knit world of urban Catholicism, with the parish church and school as its center, unraveled” (Quinn 2007, 169).

The loss of parishioners was particularly hard felt because while they were mobile the
Church’s infrastructure was not. Church closings and school shuttering did not become common until the 21st century. A parish priest noted in an interview that if the Church were a business it would have failed some time back. It created buildings for large growing groups, most built during the 19th century. Getting smaller was how to survive (Sakano 2011). But the Archdiocese centrally owned all the property. Hence it remained a central decision-making system, slow moving and highly resistant to making changes in governance. Yet the pressure to change could not be entirely ignored. Much of that pressure fell on the parish priests who remained in the city and provided services to the changing population of new immigrants. Despite their sometimes heroic efforts, as the shortage of priests and nuns grew, there was less free labor available to staff hospitals, nursing homes, and schools. The Archdiocese could no longer afford to be in those businesses. The outcome was the loss of hospitals and nursing homes from its control and the closing of schools.

Women's Movement

Further, the rising numbers of women in the municipal civilian labor force was to become a bane to the New York Archdiocese. Although Vatican II provided promised reform, the Church's decision to maintain opposition to birth control was contrary to the goals of the women's movement, which had become powerful and politically significant. In New York, public sector labor unions, especially, and a majority of the general population stood in support of women and the right to abortion. The pro-choice movement was followed by the gay rights movement to which the Roman Catholic Church was adamantly opposed.
New Arrivals

Puerto Ricans arrived in New York during the 1940s and 1950s and changed neighborhoods almost overnight. Although they were predominately Catholic their devotion to the Archdiocese of New York depended on their reception. The Irish-dominated Archdiocese looked upon their practice with suspicion, and its refusal to permit the creation of national parishes for Puerto Ricans—a system that worked well for Italians, Slavs, Hungarians and others within the Archdiocese—made the failure to minister to them in Spanish almost inevitable.

Portes and Rumbaut describe a rigid structure of ethnic hierarchies and an inherent resistance to newcomers, which indeed was the case when Puerto Ricans met with the ruling Catholic establishment on the mainland (2006). The Archdiocese had seemingly little room for Catholics of color, especially ones who did not speak English. Although the new migrants’ needs rivaled those of earlier waves of Irish immigrants, the Irish were responsible for building the Archdiocese of New York and held onto their power within it. The result was that Pentecostal churches found a receptive audience among the Catholic Puerto Rican community, and the Archdiocese lost an opportunity to organize a voting bloc that might have extended the century-old system created by John Hughes, New York City’s first Archbishop, and nurtured by Cardinal Spellman.

Parishioners migrated not just out of the City. Within the City, Puerto Rican migrants settled largely in East Harlem, but a shortage of housing created a new migration to the Bronx, much as had occurred with previous groups. With each re-location there was conflict at the local level between typically older white-ethnic populations and recently arrived Puerto Ricans. As Jonnes writes, “Those who stayed and filled the old working class enclaves of the Bronx found neighborhoods simmering with racial and class tensions. When Father Banome, a Catholic priest
at St. Joseph's Church in Tremont arrived in the Bronx from East Harlem...no doubt the appearance of a Spanish speaking priest must have carried an unsettling message to the Irish: ‘I was just amazed at the struggle between them, the absolute hatred and disregard. . . . All the Irish here disliked me intensely. If this neighborhood could not be like they wanted it they moved’” (Jonnes 1986, 114). Such attitudes were certainly not the policy of the Archdiocese, but they existed.

New York’s Archdiocese in a Changing Urban Environment

What position did Terrance Cardinal Cooke have regarding the urban chaos happening mere miles from the Powerhouse? Did the post-Spellman Archdiocese have sufficient residual power to fight for the new flock? Immigrants residing in this urban landscape, filled with new Federal anti-poverty programs, new Democrats, and new interest groups were not as dependent on the Archdiocese of New York as were former immigrants. Ultimately, this landscape proved to be a difficult one for the Archdiocese of New York to navigate despite its customary influence and power.

The waterfront on the Manhattan side was Irish dominated, as were transit and semi-skilled manufacturing jobs (Fisher 2009, Freeman 1989 and 2000). But since workers in traditional Catholic occupations within the public sector such as police and fire services were permitted to live outside the city, those occupations did not suffer a decline in white ethnics. But there was little the cardinals could do to stop the outflow of jobs in the era before government created public-private partnerships and joint nonprofit-government activities. Job creation was not in the parish priest's job description.
Research Design

The Research Questions

In examining the decline in the Archdiocese’s relative power and position, this study will address several subsidiary questions: Were Puerto Ricans and the other new immigrants marginalized the way the Irish-dominated Archdiocese had marginalized Italians? What affected the Archdiocese of New York’s ability to absorb new immigrants? Why did the Archdiocese not organize Puerto Ricans into national parishes as it had done for other ethnic groups before them? Might the “white ethnic,” i.e., the Irish and Italian, exodus from the city be explained using Hirschman’s (1970) model of exit, voice, and loyalty? What might the Archdiocese have done to stem the outflow of the flock to the suburbs and beyond?

This dissertation will describe the social, economic, and political landscape of New York City in the mid-twentieth century to examine how the Archdiocese reacted to the issues it faced at the pinnacle of its power. Adopting urban power research and an in-depth examination of the Archdiocese of New York and its actions, I will show that it was the very nature of the Archdiocese of New York itself that did not allow it to remain the urban political powerhouse it had been.

Models of Power

I will first examine the nature of power and influence observed in the Archdiocese of New York as World War II ended by focusing on how people perceived this power and how it was related to the size of the white ethnic population within the New York City boroughs of Manhattan and the Bronx. I will examine the Archdiocese’s power through the lens of three models described by Dahl (1957), Bachrach (1967), and Gaventa (1982). The strength of the
Archdiocese’s power will be assessed via an historical analysis of the Archdiocese’s population and practices that affected particular populations from 1900 to 1950; Catholic electoral achievements defined in light of favorable legislative outcomes; and information derived from in-depth interviews. My interviews focus on the power wielded by the Archdiocese. Specifically, I explore how the Archdiocese of New York scouted political aspirants that it might be able to support (Badillo 2009), exercised influence over Democratic Party political club activity (McManus 2009), and was involved in legislative issues before the City Council (Vallone 2009). Interviews will provide a descriptive profile of the Archdiocese’s political activity that sought to protect its adherents and their institutions.

The Structure of the Relationships Between the Archdiocese and Its Constituents

In addition, this study will examine the nature of the relationship of the Archdiocese of New York with its blue-collar constituents. The post-World War II collapse of the port as an economic engine, corruption, and crime were significant factors in the disposition of power in New York City. These influences and the limitations of a Manhattan-based port led the shipping industry to relocate to the New Jersey side of the harbor, which diminished the power of the Archdiocese of New York. As manufacturing, port facilities, and related industry jobs left the city, so did those who once worked them. The increasing power of the less Catholic public sector unions served to reduce the political power of the Archdiocese. Labor leader Edward Ott (2009) notes that the private sector labor movement was so successful in protecting workers and raising standards of living in the post-war era that workers rarely depended on the Archdiocese of New York. Thus, the "cradle-to-grave" service delivery of the New York Archdiocese—a creation of
John Cardinal Hughes and sustained through the Francis Cardinal Spellman years—was no longer as important. I will also show how increasingly secular, more mobile, and wealthier populations grew distant from the Archdiocese when it could no longer provide tangible benefits such as political power. With the emergence of "Cafeteria Catholics" among white ethnics and other groups of workers the task of corralling the faithful became a much more difficult if not impossible task (McLaughlin 2009).

Fractured Political Alliances

Evolving political alliances and the breakdown of traditional parties and coalitions will be the next area of study. Shifts in the Catholic electorate included a growing number of politically conservative, anti-communist Irish Catholics who defected from the Democratic Party, as well as the fall of Tammany Hall, which had served as a buttress against reformist efforts and Irish defections to the Republicans (Glazer and Moynihan 1963). Such shifts reflected a loosening of the Church’s grip on its New York flock, further reducing the Archdiocese’s perceived political power. Tammany’s demise, the rise of reform, and changing social conditions left the Archdiocese politically weakened, with reduced local and statewide power to protect its interests and express its political will.

The Archdiocese’s Response

The Archdiocese of New York employed little of its political power to respond to events occurring in its community, in essence contributing to its own decline. This research will look at the previously noted events and document through both historical and anecdotal accounts the Archdiocese of New York’s lack of action. James McManus, Paul Crotty, and Monsignor Bergin,
in their interviews, contended that the Archdiocese under Terrence Cardinal Cooke could take no action to stop the flock from leaving Manhattan and the Bronx (McManus 2009; Crotty 2011; Bergin 2011). Bergin noted two important factors. First, the Archdiocese followed the Catholics as they left the city; Second, Cardinal Cooke created a system for richer parishes to send subsidies to poorer parishes as a way to help the newly arriving immigrants and those left behind by the exodus. Hence, mass closures of schools and parishes were put off until the early 21st century. In addition, the Archdiocese took a hands-off approach to the repeal of the Lyons law, which mandated that municipal workers reside in the city. Its repeal ensured that the bulk of the municipal labor force need not live within the Archdiocese of New York.

Other options that might have stemmed the flow of parishioners to the suburbs remained largely untried. For example, the Archdiocese of New York might have registered newcomer Catholic voters to demonstrate its political force. Instead the newcomers' allegiance was increasingly to the newly-formed public sector unions and not to local parishes. The Archdiocese of New York could have required its adherents who served in public office to vote to protect its interests in Albany and at the city council, but it did not. Such strategies were implemented in Boston and Chicago), although they actually only delayed the decline of Catholic power.

In addition to the Lyons Law, the Archdiocese of New York opposed several pieces of legislation that challenged the heart of its moral vision. These include: divorce liberalization in 1966; 1970 state legislation liberalizing strictures on abortion; the City Council’s 1986 liberalization of civil rights statutes to include specific protections from discrimination against gays; and the 2011 Marriage Equality Act, which permitted same sex marriage. An examination of attempts to thwart these legislative acts will show the limits of Archdiocese’s power to influence city and state legislative bodies.
The Lyons Law, passed in 1937, but repealed in 1962, required public sector workers to live inside the city’s boundaries for three years prior to their being hired. “Residency requirements for city workers originated in the nineteenth century when local ward bosses hired public employees, including policemen and firefighters,” writes Roth. "Their residency ensured ward bosses that they would be continually elected. Policemen were also used to collect bribes and protection dollars for the ward bosses” (2010, 314). The Archdiocese of New York's failure to block 1966 divorce liberalization in the New York State legislature provides clear proof that its moral vision held little sway over the secularization of family law.

The Archdiocese's position on abortion pitted it against the legislature again in 1970 when New York legalized a woman’s right to abortion. Again, this tested the Archdiocese's ability to ensure that its doctrine was reflected in state law. In 1986, the City Council of New York passed an anti-discrimination ordinance, also opposed by the Archdiocese of New York, outlawing discrimination against homosexuals, and in 2011, the state legislature passed the Marriage Equality Act, permitting same sex couples to enjoy the same civil benefits as those enjoyed by married couples. The measure passed both houses of the legislature and was then signed into law by Governor Andrew Cuomo despite public opposition by the Archdiocese.

Data Collection Process

Recorded interviews were a major basis for analyzing the areas under study, and for drawing conclusions about those who played policy roles in Archdiocese affairs. Interviewees, many of whom have had a long personal history with the Archdiocese of New York and extensive experience in city and state politics, were selected for their specific knowledge and expertise in this area. Their participation was essential to establishing an historical perspective.
Other interviewees have information important to the study due to their professional positions as journalists, educators, or policy-makers. Also among interviewees were media figures that covered the Archdiocese of New York, individuals who had relationships with Archdiocesan officials, public non-elected officials who served in decision-making policy positions, and elected officials past and present. Their first-hand accounts proved essential to describing the issues that dominated the period under study. The interview questionnaire is appended to this dissertation, as is the list of interviewees identified by their vocation or position.

It should be noted that no officials presently in positions of power within the Archdiocese of New York were interviewed. In fact, none were asked because the author chose to draw data and ultimate analysis from the outside looking in.

**Outline of Chapters**

The research and primary data of this dissertation have been organized into three areas.

Chapter Two provides the historical context for the “rise and fall and rise again” of the Archdiocese of New York’s power.

Chapters Three, Four, and Five provide a successive outline of sets of challenges that the Archdiocese of New York faced over the last fifty years. Chapter Three specifically outlines issues of shifting Catholic power, including the rise of secularism, lack of loyalty among parishioners, and hierarchical issues. Chapter Four discusses Catholic leadership and the cult of “Catholic personality,” delving into leadership development and the importance of the individual men who were in power at St. Patrick’s Cathedral. Chapter Five focuses on the challenges of changes within the New York City body politic, within labor, and the mores that had set the tone within Catholic schools.
Chapter Six offers a discussion of the shifting demographic narrative that becomes the underpinning for the ultimate reorganization of the Archdiocese of New York in 2006. Finally, Chapter 7 offers conclusions about the nature and extent of power wielded by the Archdiocese of New York from 1950 to 2000.
CHAPTER II. HISTORICAL CONTEXT: A RISE TO POWER

This chapter outlines the history of ethnic groups within the Archdiocese of New York, their evolution, and their competition for power. In particular the study examines the Irish who constituted a white ethnic majority in the early 1900s, followed by Puerto Rican migrants and other Hispanic groups that followed and constituted a significant influx of Catholics into New York parishes in the second half of the century.

New York City has always been in near constant change. During the second half of the nineteenth century, a massive influx of Catholics would again redefine its landscape. Most of the first Catholics were Irish and faced difficult conditions on their arrival. They soon bonded, however, via their poverty and their religion, finding in the Archdiocese of New York a unifying and benevolent institution.

Unity and desperation made them attractive fodder for the local political machine, which co-opted them by promising economic safety and physical protection in return for their votes. “[N]ineteenth century immigrants arrived to find important political groups eager to satisfy their material needs” (Schier 2002, 16). Janelle Wong stipulates in Democracy’s Promise: Immigrants and Civic Institutions that the importance of immigrant groups was a function of need. Political organizations needed those votes, and the voters needed the services, both tangible and political, that the political organizations were able to provide (Wong 2006).

In time the Irish came to dominate the very machine that introduced them to politics. They wielded their influence—over everything from jobs to local housing—through the infamous Tammy Hall, a remarkably effective political machine,—from the era of John Cardinal Hughes (1842-1864) through Francis Cardinal Spellman (1939-1967). Thus, the Archdiocese of New York was brought into power by its adherents, the Irish, and began realizing the perks of
The Italians followed. Unlike their predecessors, however they were not universally embraced by the Archdiocese and its political and economic engine. The changing economic life of the city left little room for those who could not speak English, had no formal education, and were unskilled. But the cradle-to-grave safety net provided to previous Catholics by the Archdiocese and the regular Democratic organization, Tammany Hall, had wider gaps for this wave of Catholic immigrants. The unbalanced relationship between the Irish and the Italians in their mutual quests for power would linger for generations.

By the beginning of the twentieth century, the city’s Catholic population was significant, and the Archdiocese of New York itself had amassed considerable power. It would wield this power without reservation, and Tammany would control the government via the services and contracts it doled out. This state of play would continue for decades, until the very world around the Archdiocese of New York began to change.

The Archdiocese’s History in New York City

New York City’s roots were hardly Catholic. Dutch and later English Protestant dissenters founded the city, and for many years there was a strong streak of anti-Catholic fervor among the general population. Papists were viewed with suspicion, suffered local legal discrimination, and were subject to restrictions in commerce. Of 70,000 New Yorkers in 1806, a sizeable portion, about 10,000, were Catholic. Starting in the 1840s, however, immigration swelled the population so rapidly that by the end of the Civil War nearly half of all New Yorkers were Catholic.

German Catholics arrived first but were soon followed by the Irish. As Glazer and Moynihan wrote: “In the 1840s Irish and Germans, who had of course been present in the city in
some numbers before this time, began to enter in much larger numbers, and soon became
dominant. . . . By 1855, the Irish-born made up 28 per cent of the city, the German-born 16 per
cent of the city" (1963, 7-8). From 1820 until 1920 “some four million Irish immigrated to the
United States. Most of them were young Catholics fleeing from poverty and discrimination in
their homeland. New York was a favorite point of entry” (Shelly 2006, 52).

Arrival of the Irish

The first Irish immigration wave arrived in 1845 and brought more than three million
people to American shores. The immigrants “landed in America like tired migratory birds.
Prisoners of their own poverty, they were confined to the cities in which they landed” (Brown
1956, 328). These points of confinement were generally the large east coast port cities,
specifically New York and Boston. This migration created the “first great ethnic majority in
America’s cities” (Sowell 2007, 17). Poor and illiterate, Irish immigrants crammed into the
poorest parts of the cities, which quickly “became frightful slums as property owners converted
existing buildings into tenements to house as many families as possible” (Foner and
Frederickson 2004, 242). Forty-two percent of the nation’s 1.8 million Irish-born lived in the
twenty-five cities with populations greater than fifty thousand. In contrast, only ten percent of the
country’s twenty-nine million native born whites lived in these big cities (Erie 1990).

Irish immigrants were forced to live in squalor. Despite their crushing poverty, they chose
to stay in the cities; in fact, “in 1890 when the number of Irish-born in the United States was the
highest, less than 15 per cent were engaged in agriculture; the remainder was bunched in the
great cities with 190,418 in New York” (Brown and McKeown 1997, 329). The ghettoization of
the Irish, and the refusal of American society to accept the new immigrants with their odd
accents and Catholic religious practices, was bolstered by the Irish’s own “voluntary segregation reinforced by economic necessity” (Brown and McKeown 1997, 17). The Irish became “the first ethnic group in American history to be concentrated in urban neighborhoods where problems of poverty, crime and alcoholism were acute” (Cochran and Carroll 2003, 590). Today we find Irish Americans comfortably distributed throughout the nation’s power elites in its cities, suburbs, and countryside. But both before and after they left the ghetto, the Irish were to alter in multiple ways the fabric of American society, particularly its political structure (Portes 2006, 121).

Scholars have noted that being able to speak English provided the Irish with their primary source of upward mobility (Barron 1949). They were “exploited and proscribed poor; used but not accepted by the Protestant majority” (Brown 1956, 329), and their movement into mainstream American society was not to be easy. They greatly benefited, though, from the Archdiocese’s cradle-to-grave care.

The Irish were greeted by the virulent xenophobia that had welcomed earlier immigrant groups, which fueled and still fuels America’s long and ongoing debate over immigration. The goal for the new immigrants was to survive, move up, and move out. As Nathan Glazer writes, “[t]his was certainly a far distance from the idyllic world thought to be the future by Emerson when he wrote: ‘In this continent—asylum of all nations—the energy of the Irish, Germans, Swedes, Poles and Cossacks and all the European tribes—of the Africans and the Polynesians—will construct a new race, a new religion, a new state, a new literature, which will be as vigorous as the new Europe, which came out of the smelting pot of the dark ages’” (Glazer 1964, 128).

In the case of New York County (Manhattan)—headquarters of the Archdiocese of New York—the greater the dislike of the Irish and Catholicism, the stronger the Archdiocese became. The anti-Catholic vitriol of intransigent nativists served only to produce results opposite to their
intended purpose. In rallying to defend their Church, the Irish created institutions such as schools, hospitals, orphanages, and old age care facilities that paralleled those of the society that sought to reject them. In so doing, these Irish Catholics became foundations of the political order and hated by their enemies, particularly those who sought to reform politics.

It was ironic that “one of the principal functions of nativist campaigns has been to strengthen the legal and collective clout of immigrant minorities, giving them greater voice in the political process through mobilization of defense of their rights” (Portes and Rumbaut 2006, 347). The Irish viewed threats to the Archdiocese as threats to themselves. In response to these threats, they bound together, seeking power through politics to support their community, to preserve their identity, and to further their commercial interests (Elkin 1987). While their religion protected the spirit of the Irish, the Irish constructed the “brick and mortar Archdiocese of New York,” thus providing the physical sites for organization and action; politics would provide the power (Sakano 2011). Over a 50 year period, “the Archdiocese of New York constructed thousands of cathedrals, rectories and convents, parochial schools, colleges” (Miller 1985, 527). This power would protect their institutions, guard them against physical attack, and ensure that the political spoils came to them and not to later arrivals from other immigrant groups.

**The Archdiocese of New York and the “Cradle-to-Grave" System**

James McManus is district leader of the Midtown Democrats and a member of the McManus family, who have been Democratic Party/Tammany stalwarts since 1892. Referring to the political club now led by James McManus, the *New York Times* wrote that “the McManus club has controlled politics in Hell’s Kitchen and beyond for more than a century. It was created by Mr. Manus’s great grand-uncle, Thomas J. McManus, who in 1892 defeated the legendary
George Washington Plunkitt for district leadership.” “Mr. McManus, who at age 26 took over in 1963 from his father, Eugene McManus, still holds office hours” (Kilgannon 2012).

They were from Manhattan’s Hell’s Kitchen, once dominated by the Irish and later upscaled with the name of Clinton. McManus pointed to the Archdiocese of New York as the single most important institution to shape both materially and symbolically Irish urban existence (McManus 2009). His analysis focuses on his neighborhood experience, but it also describes the general ethnic experience of pluralistic societies, where “ethnic-based forms of social organization and collective action . . . embedded in inter-personal networks” are critical because “these forms of organization and action generate and distribute resources” (Sanders 2002, 330).

The Archdiocese provided support in the poverty stricken ghetto and granted salvation from its difficult conditions. This became a religious and political process: first, neighborhood residents were mobilized in defense of their besieged religious institution; second, sometimes they brought other immigrant groups along as allies, inducting them into the political clubs. Irish collective action fed the resident poor and the Catholic religious and political institutions that grew to fill immigrant needs. Eventually the Irish dominated the social and political realms into which they had entered.

As Gaventa notes, “[p]owerlessness within the organization still represented power relative to what might have been the case without it” (1982, 194). In other words, the new immigrants had nothing, and their lives were controlled by local politicians. Their powerlessness gave way to a sense of group belonging, even as they were not in a position to question the power of Tammany or the Archdiocese. Thus “leadership was not to be questioned and exit was not a choice, then loyalty was the only response possible for the powerless” (Ibid).

That an immigrant group came to dominate New York’s political system is likely no
surprise (Wong 2006). Previous immigrant waves reached to the heart of US politics while subsequent newcomers “arrived to find important political groups eager to satisfy their material needs. Political party organizations, especially the many urban political machines, did their best to get them” (Bedolla 2005, 73). Erie writes that “the Irish capture of the urban Democratic party depended on a large Irish voting bloc . . . the Irish mobilized politically much more quickly than other ethnic groups. Irish naturalization and voter registration were the highest of the immigrant groups. The Irish talent for electoral politics extended to high turn-out rates and bloc voting for machine candidates” (1990, 28).

The Archdiocese of New York became a corridor to political power as well. It served as a locus for organizing and for collective action McManus explained that in every neighborhood the Church created ethnically homogeneous parishes, including national parishes created to serve immigrant groups in their own languages and in many cases with their own liturgies. The parishes catered to the spiritual and material needs of parishioners:

On 40th Street between 10th and 11th, we had a Polish Catholic Church with a grammar school. On 41st Street, we had an Italian Roman Catholic Church with a grammar school. On 42nd Street, we had an Irish Church. On 47th Street, we had a Belgian Catholic Church. On 46th Street, we had a Lutheran Protestant Church and on 49th Street, we had a German Catholic Church with a grammar school. On 50th Street we had a Slavic Catholic Church, and on 51st Street we had another church where the Irish went (McManus, July 2009).

It may be, as Erie suggests that the Irish were just better than others at organizing and mobilizing. Of equal importance was McManus’s observation that “[t]he Irish were just the dominant group—there were more . . . Irish here than any other group in population and power” (McManus 2009).
The Irish Become Democrats

The affinity that the Irish had with the Democratic Party was a product of their outsider status and the Democrat’s antagonism to Republicans. Erie offers the following explanation, “[w]ith the nativist reaction of the Know-Nothing party and by the subsequent shift of many Protestant groups into the Republican Party, Irish Catholic identification with the Democratic Party was further solidified” (Erie 1990, 33). A major purpose of Democratic organizations was to provide material assistance and basic sustenance to the immigrant masses, which reinforced the organizations’ ranks and was the source of their strength. “Spending, borrowing, and patronage soared in the early 20th century. “Lavished on a single ethnic group, patronage tamed the restless Irish working class” (Erie 1990, 53).

The improvements in the quality of life offered by the Irish-dominated political machines were not limited to the provision of bread. Erie notes:

Irish machines did more than mobilize immigrant voters. They also increased the size of the public sector in order to reward new voters . . . . Boss Tweed [the infamous New York City Tammany Hall leader imprisoned for corruption] for example embarked on a program of massive debt financing . . . in part to enlarge the city’s payroll (Erie 1990, 53).

The machines created a patronage system that would ultimately result in economic hardship for the city, but those who once opposed the Irish and discriminated against them found they could tolerate it (Shefter 1994).

Structural alliances and established voting patterns enabled the Irish political clans to serve and control their community by manipulating the political system through collective action. The Irish success story can be contrasted with contemporary immigrant groups who seem unable to mobilize within the political arena to realize their communal self-interest (Teixeira and Rogers 2001). Thus, Irish collective action fed the machine’s need for growth, and the ultimate
result was Irish—and Catholic Archdiocesan—domination of the politics of the age.

**The Power of the Irish and Tammany**

Urban political machines were hungry for immigrant support and workers, but hungry mostly for their votes (Bedolla 2005). The Irish had mobilized in defense of the Archdiocese, sometimes accepting other immigrant groups as allies along the way. In turn the urban Democratic political machine mobilized them. And the greater was the attack, the greater the allegiance, strengthening Tammany and the Archdiocese. The Irish and the Catholic Church rallied against nativism, which had a long history in the United States and New York. With the immigration of German and Irish Catholics in the 1840s anti-Catholic and anti-immigrant hostility found expression in the Know Nothing movement. The “American Party” emerged as a potent, if short-lived, expression of political anti-Catholicism. Popularly known as the Know-Nothings (because members of a related nativist organization customarily replied ‘I know nothing’ when asked about their activities), the American Party exploited anxieties over immigrants and Catholics” (Fisher 2000, 55). Political nativism in New York had an even earlier genesis. In 1842, the American Republican Party was founded in New York City, and within the year it had won nearly a quarter of votes in local elections. In 1844, the Party elected its candidate James Harper to City Hall. He proceeded to enact a nativist program that sought to limit the number of immigrants on the city’s payroll and push the poor and dependent classes further to the margins of New York society. Nativist sentiments boiled over in the spring of 1844 with a street battle in Brooklyn and serious rioting in Philadelphia. When local xenophobes decided to greet a delegation of Philadelphia nativists, the head of the Archdiocese, Bishop John Hughes mobilized 1,000 parishioners to stand guard at local churches. When Mayor Harper
queried Hughes if he feared his churches would be attacked, the bishop replied, “No sir, but I am afraid that some of yours will be burned” (Burrows & Wallace, 1999: 632-33).

While the Archdiocese would mobilize parishioners when it had to, it preferred a strong relationship with City Hall, and Tammany’s ability to deliver Irish Catholic voters for their candidates ensured that the Archdiocese’s political needs would be met.

From its inception as the Society of St. Tammany in 1789 its members sought advantage in the city’s political structure, whose “authority was exercised through a wide array of boards and commissions as well as through city councils and mayors . . . [A]ppointments to schools, police forces, and the various administrative agencies were made on the basis of patronage or acquaintance with the appointing agent” (Elkin 1987, 24; see also Myers, 1917).

For the Democratic Party political machine patronage and the other spoils of the electoral system provided a way of life and echoed Weber’s warning about professional politicians who “live off politics” (Shefter 1985, 15). Golway writes:

Tammany Hall’s leaders delivered social services at a time when City Hall and Albany did not. They managed justice at a time when the poor did not have access to public defenders. In addition, they found jobs for the unemployed when the alternative was hunger and illness . . . for generations of immigrants and their children in Manhattan, the face of government was the face of the local Tammany ward heeler. And it was a friendly face (2008, A23).

Besides winning votes through public services and jobs, political goods that were by their nature limited, the Democratic machine turn out the vote to secure their power against challengers. In a sense they were providing a public good of which New York’s immigrants could take advantage:

Tammany, also appealed for the support of immigrants by defending them against assaults upon their political rights and civil liberties. The machine fought against the efforts of Republicans and upper class New Yorkers to reduce the political influence of immigrants by altering election laws and restructuring the institutions of municipal government; it opposed the efforts of Protestants to proselytize the children of Catholics
in public schools; and it defended its constituency against the efforts of prohibitionists 
and sabbatarians to enact legislation regulating the sale of liquor. The machine also 
nominated members of the city’s largest ethnic groups for public office (Shefter 1985, 
16).

Dahl, in contrast, emphasizes the source of ethnic politics as arising from an almost 
inevitable self-organization to:

[E]nlarge the opportunities for ethnics to rise without undue discrimination in a system 
that contained built-in inequalities in the distribution of resources. Political leaders and 
their ethnic followings combined to use the political system in order to eliminate the 
handicaps associated with ethnic identity rather than to reduce disadvantages stemming 
from the distribution of resources by the existing socioeconomic order itself (Dahl 2005, 
33).

Distribution, however, was their objective, and it often flowed into the hands of the few. But the 
passage of civil service testing and non-political appointments reduced the machine’s ability to 
provide such items as turkeys at Thanksgiving and other amenities. Responsibility for providing 
the social services once provided by Tammany most often fell to the Archdiocese. In sum the 
Irish were the best known of the political entrepreneurs, and they remained so until late in the life 
of the political machine. Hence they played a major role in the development of the Manhattan 
and the Bronx:

Edward Levine similarly argues that the Irish working class consciously rejected the 
middle-class Protestant value of economic achievement. Alienated from Protestant values 
and institutions, the Irish constructed the Democratic Party and the Catholic Archdiocese 
of New York as mutually reinforcing institutions rooted in working-class Irish Catholic 
values. For the Irish, power and security, not money or status, represented the highest 
values. Reinforcing their separateness from the Protestant mainstream, politics enveloped 
the Irish, becoming the approved secular career (Erie 1990, 243-244).

The Italians Arrive

In the early 20\textsuperscript{th} century an estimated 1.5 million Italians resided in the United States, 
with about 400,000 in New York (Baily 1999). For both the Irish and Italians, America—
specifically New York—was a place where their labor was needed and their lack of skills no
detriment:

Italian mass migration to the Americas can best be understood within the context of
capitalist development. As capitalism expanded during the second half of the nineteenth
century, it brought new exchanges of technology, capital and labor within the Atlantic
economies….Italy became part of the periphery supplying labor to the industrial core
areas of northern Europe, to the commercialized agricultural areas of South America, and
to the industrial core of the United States” (Baily 1999, 23).

Not all Italians chose to go to America. Some went to other European nations and to
South American countries, with a substantial migration to Argentina. Like the Irish, however,
“[b]eyond the putative pastoral ‘stability’ of the village could be found a struggle offering little
hope of amelioration for the peasant and farm laborer faced with eroded land, exploitative
absentee owners and a government at best indifferent to their plight and at worse abusive” (Baily
1999, 24). Parenti (1975, 26) adds: “Overwork, malnutrition and, in some regions, malaria were
common conditions. . . . [H]opeless poverty, draft evasion, and desire for change and
opportunity, these were the main reasons why many embarked upon the long journey.” Of those
Italian immigrants, at least 95 percent were of Catholic background (Parenti 1975, 24)

The rapidly industrializing American economy, in which New York City and its port
played critical roles, needed a large, mobile, unskilled labor supply (Iorizzio 1970). Workers
were in demand, and in fact “[b]y 1900 it was virtually impossible to find an English-speaking
laborer doing common railroad work. The demand for such labor was met by immigrants from
southern and eastern Europe” (The Floating Immigrant Labor Supply 1907-1910, 331, 339; U.S.
Bureau of Labor Bulletin). New York’s economic possibilities acted as a magnet for immigrants,
particularly so for those from southern Italy:

New York was, over the period of 1890 to 1931, the biggest American city with the
greatest number of Italian immigrant residents. Between 1901 and 1913, a little less than
a quarter of Sicily’s population departed for America, most living in New York for a time
if not setting up permanent residence there (Critchley 2009, 4).

**The Archdiocese of New York and the Italians**

Italians came as the Irish had come before them, to escape economic deprivation. But unlike the Irish, they did not experience the religious discrimination in their homeland that had colored the Irish experience. The problems between Irish and Italians in New York began with conflicts over differing liturgical practices. This was compounded by the desire of the Irish to control the flow of “cradle-to-grave” goods and services emanating from the Archdiocese. They worked diligently to retain these benefits for themselves alone.

While the Irish utilized the Archdiocese and their command of English to begin their climb to power, Italians struggled to learn English:

> The Italians in New York confronted significantly greater cultural differences than their counterparts . . . . The English language was difficult to learn, Protestantism was the major religion [in New York], and even the growing Catholic Archdiocese of New York was dominated by Irish hostile to the way the Italians practiced the religion. As a result, the Italians had problems with the language, were subjected to religious prejudice, and had greater difficulty understanding the values of the host society. Clearly, the cultural encounter of the Italian immigrants was most traumatic in New York (Baily 1999, 75).

To add to their difficulties, unlike the Irish, Italians arriving in a rapidly growing and multi-lingual New York City had strong regional and language dialect variations. Former New York City Schools Chancellor Frank Macchiorola noted liturgical differences and regional variations among Italians, recalling from his youth that “Loretta was a small parish. It was a Sicilian parish. Our Lady of Nativity was a Neapolitan parish. So, if you were an Italian Sicilian, you went to one parish. If you were an Italian Neapolitan you went to another parish. You didn’t have to fight for territory” (Macchiorola 2009).

Nativist anti-immigrant and anti-Catholic sentiments were not directed solely at the Irish. Increasingly, most Americans stereotyped Italians as:
Ignorant, volatile, “priest ridden,” dishonest, dirty—as criminals and strikebreakers who clustered in urban ghettos and refused to assimilate. Sicilians were specifically singled out for scorn as swarthy Mafiosi, as transients who came and went at the beck and call of agents and padroni. The anti-Italian sentiment was also manifested in local discriminatory legislation designed to exclude Italians from certain jobs. Although in 1894 and 1895, New York State had temporarily excluded all aliens from jobs on state and local public works projects, it was some years later before a body of exclusionary legislation was enacted into law. In 1909, New York made citizenship a requirement for becoming a lawyer or a detective (Baily 1999, 87).

Irish Discrimination Against the Italians

Italians, who first had to deal with English, were then forced to face their co-religionists—Irish Catholics—who held official positions in the Archdiocese of New York hierarchy. The Irish seemed to believe that Catholicism as practiced by the southern European Italians was of a different religious tradition altogether.

For Italians the Archdiocese appeared incapable of fully integrating them into its religious and communal structure. This may have also been the result, however, of geographic distinctions created by Pope Gregory XVI when he created two separate dioceses, in 1850: the New York Archdiocese (consisting of Manhattan, the Bronx, Westchester, Orange, Putnam, Sullivan, Ulster, and Dutchess counties) and the Archdiocese of Brooklyn (Kings and Queens counties). The prestige, power and financial resources rested with the New York Archdiocese, parts of which—Manhattan and the Bronx—are examined in this study. The New York Archdiocese demanded that each parish balance its own budget with income drawn from its own territory. The creation of diocesan distinctions made the locus of centralized control more diffuse and created a “prayer system based on geography” (Brown 2008, 113).

Irish resistance to Italian immigrant liturgy proved an obstacle to their integration, but as important, the requirement that parishes become self-supporting, undermined the integration of Italians who lacked Irish access to resources and were more likely to harbor more resistance to
the Church hierarchy. Italians remained loyal to Catholicism but not necessarily to its Irish-invented and maintained boundaries. If “religions try to soothe emotional trauma by offering alternative authority for one’s self-identity and social presence” (Carnes & Karpathakis 2003, 18), then Italians clung to their previous systems of authority to soothe the trauma inflicted upon them by the Irish and the Irish-dominated Archdiocese. The liturgical and cultural chasm between the earlier arriving Irish Catholics and their later arriving Italian co-religionists were skirmishes in the battle for control of vital political resources, access to networks of power, and ultimately economic power—all of which were controlled by the Irish and their political organ Tammany. The Irish won the cultural and political battles but not without signaling that they were limiting Italian access to the Church. They would repeat the same power play with Puerto Rican parishioners, but in that case push these new arrivals to Protestant Evangelicalism and away from the Archdiocese’s alliance with traditional Democratic Party politics.

As Diaz-Stevens writes, “[t]he traditional Catholic upper class, or politicians, are oriented to the power structure of secular society and look to outside groups for support, protection and legitimization” (1993, 36). The Archdiocese of New York similarly sought its protection from political and even physical attack from within their political world, which was controlled by the Irish and the Manhattan and Bronx Tammany political machines. Little room existed for anyone but the Irish who were the “upper class” of Catholic New York. The Italians, their Catholic devotion aside, were outsiders.

The cleavage spanned beyond differences in language, social structure, or religious nuance. The fight was also over jobs and economic survival. The struggle viciously played out with grave consequences for the Archdiocese and the long-term economic health of the region. For example, the power struggle over public housing construction siting resulted in the
demolition of Italian neighborhoods and left Italians as losers. Sharman (2006) details how the Italians of Manhattan’s northern First Avenue were displaced to make room for public housing. McManus noted how not one such housing development was built in the Tammany-controlled Irish West Side of Manhattan (2009). His description of the power structure mirrors Bachrach and Baratz’s model—forcing non-decision as power (1962). The West Side/Tammany Hall/Catholic dominant McManus clan made non-decisions about locating public housing on the West Side.

Of course, the power struggle between the established Irish and more-recently-arrived Italians did not confine itself solely to the Archdiocese of New York. Rather, it began with a basic inequity in access to low-level manual jobs, a primary source of newly available employment and a bastion of Irish control. The Irish erected a hierarchical structure dominated by Irish business interests, which were aligned financially and spiritually with the Archdiocese’s elites, largely Irish: the Port of New York and the businesses attached to it. Fisher writes: “Italian American dockworkers outnumbered the Irish everywhere in the port save Manhattan’s West Side. Even though an Italian neighborhood initially created just east of Sixth Avenue in Greenwich Village was twice as populous” (2000, 32).

Italians disproportionately occupied lower levels of the socioeconomic sphere. Only three percent of those identified as first generation Italians had work that could be categorized as professional or technical. For the second generation it was not much better at only six percent. The percentage of craftsmen dropped to 22 percent from 24 percent between first and second generations. Managers, officials, and proprietors of businesses fared not much better. Thirteen percent could be so identified in the first generation and then only ten percent in the next generation (Zeitz 2007).
Italian Americans never achieved full access to employment. For many years Italian dockworkers were regularly hired by only one among the many steamship companies housed at the Chelsea Piers. In addition, they were largely restricted to coal handling, a job unacceptable to Irish longshoreman. Further, as the Catholicism of the Italians was questioned by the dominant Irish, so too were their politics. Communism, an anathema to the Archdiocese, was condemned by the Irish and Archdiocese officials. Moreover they suspected that the Italians “were vulnerable to capture by the communists . . . [T]he formation of waterfront Italians as Christians and citizens was not yet complete, an attitude very widely shared by the overwhelmingly Irish-dominated catholic clergy of New York City and the Irish waterfront’s rank and file” (Fisher 2000, 136).

Thus while both groups came from nations with high levels of Catholicism and poverty, the earlier-arriving Irish maintained their role as gatekeepers and blocked the Italians from full Diocesan participation and from the employment market. The Italians found themselves cut off from opportunities for status and protection in the Irish-dominated labor unions, as well as from gaining access to the higher reaches of the Diocesan structure. With few English language skills, their access to the middle-class was also blocked. Their loyalty was questioned and their worship styles were found lacking. The Italian “on the docks of New York might be called a dago or told that it takes three of him to make one ‘white man’” (Tomasi and Engle 1970, 150).

Discrimination also extended to communal and social networks. For example, the Archdiocese and the Democratic political machine might have provided them with the basic entry card to New York and the nation’s middle class, but Italians arrived when the Irish already held positions of power. The pews of the Archdiocese served as a status symbol but only for the Irish, who likewise had sole access to Tammany’s jobs and patronage.
Hindered from achieving equality through religious and political means, many Italians sought a new direction:

The Italians in the big cities, not sharing in American entertainments and deprived of the peasant communal life of old, sought conviviality in a host of informal associations that began in grocery stores, barbershops, coffeehouses, and later crystallized into, or were supplemented by, formally organized clubs founded either on provincial consanguinity or city block and neighborhood (Parenti 1975, 31).

Having created an alternative to Irish dominated locales, Italians returned home to their social clubs and other familiar groups. These associations, based often upon the geography that corresponded to parishes in city neighborhoods, were alternative structures to the political clubs that constituted the feeding system of the Archdiocese of New York. But the Irish-dominated Tammany municipal jobs and union hiring halls remained closed to them. Indeed, the Irish had found Tammany as the way to rise to the head of the “ethnic queue” (Lieberson 1980).

As an alternative, Italians frequently placed their trust in the padrone system. Adapted from Italy, it was a means for middlemen to connect those at the bottom of the social ladder with those further along. The padrone system was a response to “the absolute infrequency of literacy among peasants [, and it] promoted the influence of intermediate power brokers who for a fee, or a favor, would read a letter, explain a contract or witness a document. . . . [T]he gap between peasant literacy and the need to write . . . gave great impetus to the padrone system” (Bell 1979, 161). Parenti writes, almost apologetically, that “since the days of the padrone system, they [the Italians] had become accustomed to look for some individual for help and advice. No questions of political philosophy impaired this relationship” (1975, 31).

The padrones helped the new immigrants by recreating Italian social roles in New York. The padrone system offers an explanation of the beginnings of organized crime within the Italian community, although without a similar system Irish gangs predated Italian-based organized
crime in this country. The importance of the padrone system should not be overestimated, though. Its ability to smooth the rough edges of assimilation could not compensate for Italians’ lack of access to resources and power. The obverse side of the padrone-client relationship was restricted social networks and the stereotyped exaggeration of connections to organized crime (Parenti 1975).

This failure of the Archdiocese of New York to meet the needs of the later-arriving Italians, plus the discrimination against them, helped decimate their neighborhoods and facilitated their exodus from the city to its suburbs. The failure to help the Italians integrate into the city hardened into a pattern the Archdiocese would follow with later immigrants, which would prove nearly fatal for the city and for the Archdiocese as well.

The Archdiocese of New York and Models of Power

Access to power meant more than social mobility or even the ability to vote. It meant access to social, work, and political organizing locales, and often to the Archdiocese of New York itself, as McManus pointed out (See also Portes and Rimbaut 2006). Access to work mattered greatly and recommendations from Archdiocese-friendly employers and employment activists carried weight. Such recommendations might also mean accessing even the smallest portion of the Tammany-protected and -controlled patronage trough, which included lucrative long-term business contracts and the jobs that went along with them and those provided via organized crime’s growing influence on Tammany (Allen 1993). Irish domination of Tammany Hall was to end with the ascension of its last powerful leader, Carmine DeSapio, who later was toppled by a then little-known activist named Edward Koch.

But before that, the Irish came to control a good deal of the governing structure of the city
through Tammany Hall. The political power of the Archdiocese extended beyond Tammany’s political operations directly into daily city government activities. That Manhattan’s Irish West Side was exempted from construction of the housing developments of the New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA) is evidence of this power and influence (McManus 2009).

Compounding the Archdiocese neglect that weakened their neighborhoods, Robert Moses sited public housing on upper First Avenue and forced Italians to relocate from their neighborhoods. On the other hand, when Fordham University wanted access to land around Lincoln Center the Archdiocese garnered support for the project. Badillo writes that:

[W]hen Jesuit-led Fordham University wanted to open a campus in midtown Manhattan [they] brought Moses into the picture. He used his sweeping powers as slum clearance committee chair and city construction coordinator to oust hundreds of tenants from six prime acres of real estate adjacent to his Lincoln Center Title I development. Many of the displaced residents at the location where the Fordham campus was planned were themselves Catholic (2006, 183-184).

Badillo underscores that in New York City governance, and in the politics that made that governance possible, the Archdiocese and associated institutions such as Fordham played a significant role. Gaventa's "total power paradigm" is more descriptive in this case than Bachrach’s "non-decision model" or Robert Dahl's writing on the "participatory model" of urban decision-making. What the Archdiocese of New York wanted, it was likely to achieve; what it did not want was less likely to become reality. If democracy is about “including those who are potentially affected by collective decisions in making those decisions,” then democracy mattered little to an institution powered by the Divine (Warren 2011, 683).

In mid- twentieth century New York the Archdiocese resembled an independent nation “effectively consolidating power by controlling territory, developing administrative capacities, and regularizing sovereignty through constitutional means” (Warren 2011, 685). It organized in territorial fashion through its parishes and developed the administrative prowess to manage and
control its many interests, including schools, nursing homes, hospitals, universities, and orphanages. The Archdiocese shored up its considerable powers by seeking the protections of civil law and influencing which laws were passed in the state legislature, including those exempting it from public oversight and laws that went beyond those granted to other non-profit entities.

Under New York State law, all non-profits, including churches, are required to respond to pressures from members as expressed individually or through controlling boards or trustees. But such is not the case for the Catholic Archdiocese of New York (*New York State Religious Corporations Law*, Article One, Section 2b). All power rests with the “consent of the archbishop or bishop of the diocese to which such Archdiocese of New York belongs or in case of their absence or inability to act, with the consent of the vicar general or administrator of such diocese,” but not with the civil government (*New York State Religious Corporations Law*, subsection (e)).

David Samuels, a legal expert on non-profit organizations in New York State, notes that “congregants in most religious organizations are memberships with the rights of members. The Catholic Archdiocese of New York is a hierarchy. The members do not control what happens at their Archdiocese of New York.” According to Samuels, the Archdiocese of New York is not required to keep membership lists, unlike other non-profit organizations. “In the not-for-profit corporation law [there are provisions that] . . . relate to keeping a list for what they call a record date for the annual meeting of members. And we don’t have that with the Catholic Archdiocese of New York.” The Archdiocese of New York is able to function as it does with the full support of the state and its structure remains protected by statutes in place since 1909 (Samuels 2011).

The issue of the Archdiocese’s lack of permeability is compounded by its sustaining
notion of infallibility, specifically “papal infallibility and papal primacy” (Reese 1989, 36). This was fully confirmed as doctrine at the Vatican I Council (1869-1870). It was not until Vatican II (1962 - 1965) that power was returned to some extent to local bishops as “responsible [agents] for their dioceses . . . [with] a role in the governance of the universal Archdiocese of New York” (Reese 1989, 24). All power ultimately belongs with the Pope, but flows to the bishops as his agents. In New York State, their power cannot be challenged by the normative legal means used by members of other non-profit or religious entities who might find themselves in disagreement with their organizations.

To this day power within the Church remains with the Archdiocese, unchallenged. Brown called it a “tiered system of tolerance” in which the hierarchy managed parish autonomy (1956, 53-65). In Manhattan, which was the richer, more politically potent and prestigious locale, diocesan power determined where parishes could and could not be located, as well as which populations were permitted linguistic variations in the service. Thus the hierarchy maintained total control. Irish adherents, who were in New York the longest and thus the most entrenched, were the most fearful of losing power. They exercised their ability to impede the access of other ethnic groups to decision-making power.

**Summary**

To contextualize the eventual shift in power of the Archdiocese of New York, this chapter focused on the rise of the city's white ethnic Catholic population, specifically on the arrival and ultimate supremacy of the Irish and the later influx of working-class Italian Catholics, who served as a harbinger of the ”third wave” immigration of Puerto Rican and Hispanic populations. Each holds a key to the eventual change in power that occurred in the latter part of the last
century. For the Archdiocese of New York, the past is, indeed, a prologue.
CHAPTER III. CHALLENGES EMERGE: SHIFTING CATHOLIC POWER

This chapter is the first of three that incorporates thirty-five separate interviews conducted over a six-year period from 2009 through 2014. These interviews spanned more than an estimated sixty hours of in-person communication.

My interview subjects represent a broad spectrum of thought leaders who could speak to the present, past, and future power and position of the New York Archdiocese. From politicians to policy experts to educational experts, from members of the Catholic clergy to lay leadership within the Archdiocese of New York—and members of the news media who had covered the Archdiocese and its leadership—all were generous with their time and responses. Each interview was a series of questions outlined in a questionnaire (see Appendix B) and answers were carefully coded during more than two months of organizational work.

After coding, I categorized responses into twelve groupings. During the interviews, respondents raised similar themes: the rise of secularism; shifting loyalties; changes in the 1960s; the Archdiocese of New York’s adaptation to the changes in its environment; hierarchical reorganization; and ways of thinking and responding to single issues.

Interviewees cited the role of secularism in changing the Archdiocese's political environment and noted a perceived decline in religious practice and a lack of commitment to Catholic tenets, Indicative of changes outside the Church were government sanctioned policies such as condom distribution in city schools. Politically, congregants displayed decreases in loyalty to the Democratic Party and a greater affinity for Republicans. In practical terms, the Archdiocese failed to rally New York City Catholics to block abortion rights and liberalized divorce laws, and other pertinent social issues.

The Archdiocese of New York’s faced two difficulties: adapting to changes in the
political and social environments, and maintaining the status quo within the Church as new conditions, demographic and political, seemed to shift almost daily. This chapter concerns itself with demographic changes that occurred during the 1960s. Changing social norms affected parishioners’ views on the Archdiocese. And those views were also the result of an expanding secular knowledge and orientation that often accompany increased wealth and suburbanization. New York City Catholics, including the Archdiocese’s Irish working-class base were unsettled by Vietnam antiwar protests, the 1968 New York City teachers’ strike, and the increased importance of money in politics.

In this chapter interview respondents also weigh in on the failure of the Archdiocese of New York to integrate Puerto Ricans and its failure to maintain its influence with its long-standing parishioners. They consider the role of reform politics, which challenged and defeated the Tammany system, and the influence of Vatican II on the ability of the Church to adapt.

Challenges Emerge

The relationship between the Archdiocese of New York and Tammany Hall was one of convenience and symbiosis. The power of each institution fed off the power of the other, although their essences were quite different. After all, Tammany Hall was not a religious institution in any way, but it expressed to a significant degree the wishes of the Irish Catholic hierarchy of the Archdiocese. Similarly, the Archdiocese was not in the “business” of government but surely exerted significant power over appointments—especially during the Spellman era (1939-1967)—and power over government operations and private sector labor.

The accepted rationale for the decline of the Archdiocese’s political influence is the decline of its membership. As the twentieth century progressed, white Catholics in New York
City exited the city due to a variety of factors, including economic advancement, which was facilitated significantly by new highways and transportation accessible to the city or between suburbs. With the loss of population came a loss of political influence, but this was just one of several issues that contributed to the Archdiocese’s decline in power.

While many Catholics were leaving, many more were arriving. Puerto Ricans began moving to New York City in large numbers starting in the late 1940s. In most cases, they faced many of the same issues as previous new immigrants: lack of jobs, poor housing, and being cast as outsiders. The Archdiocese would have to determine how to absorb this new demographic and incorporate them into the fold in order to replace the existing whites, but Puerto Ricans were different culturally and religiously.

At this same point in time, New York City’s important source of economic power, the Manhattan ports, began to decline. For the Archdiocese of New York, this had implications. Port business leaders contributed significant sums to the Archdiocese of New York, and the waterfront workforce was Catholic (Fisher 2009). The exodus of both business owners and workers significantly reduced the clout of Tammany and the Archdiocese. The port succumbed to the pressures of increased competition and internal corruption, resulting in a drastic decline in union activity and importance, and the Archdiocese lost an economic cudgel it had used to wield power in the political sphere.

The weakening of dock and other private sector unions coincided with the rise of public sector unions. This labor movement was vastly different than the one to which the Archdiocese had been accustomed. Its roots lay outside of the traditional blue-collar working class.

All the above factors contributed to the decline of Tammany Hall, the Archdiocese’s longtime foundation of political power. The old ways of politics were dying, and new methods of
organizing and exerting influence in politics were rising. Moises Naim writing in *The End of Power* states quite unequivocally that “[e]verywhere party bosses are back on their heels, as they contend with candidates and leaders emerging from realms outside the proverbial smoke-filled back rooms” (Naim 2013, 6). Moreover, New York City’s culture and politics were generally growing increasingly liberal, in stark contrast to the politics of the Archdiocese and Tammany Hall.

With the Archdiocese facing an overwhelming shift in its environment, its decision making process came under increasing pressure. While theologically and as a matter of papal authority, roles within the Church were fairly clearly sketched out, the everyday life of the Archdiocese proved more complicated. The Church could rule bureaucratically, but its traditional constituency, loyal, church-going Irish immigrants and their descendants, had their own interests. The Church hierarchy tended toward oligarchy, but as Michels (1966) suggests, the alternative to oligarchy is to increase the size of the group making decisions within the bureaucracy. The possibilities for such an enlarged group within the Archdiocese were unlikely, though. The model was that authority derived directly from the Pope or the Almighty, and historically the archbishop had been able to run the Church’s affairs through personal charisma and organizational authority.

**Rise in Secularism**

Yet, the Church faced social challenges to its authority, and the charismatic authority of individual archbishops proved incapable of stemming those social forces. Monsignor Thomas Bergin, Pastor of St. Charles, pointed to the rise in secularism. He believed that it accounted for the decline of the power of the Church and that it had caused Catholics to leave the religion.
Further, he felt that the failure of Catholic politicians to stand for the principles of their faith had been a significant factor in the Archdiocese’s transition to reduced power.

“I believe that secularism has taken its toll on any power that we may have had,” parish priest and former Vicar for Education in the Archdioceses Monsignor Bergin said, “We’ve lost so many people, and we’re all aware of so-called Catholic politicians . . . . [W]hoever is supporting their campaign . . . that’s where they seem to follow . . . . I’m upset by that sort of thing” (Bergin 2011). Former New York City Schools Chancellor Frank Macchiarola, a prominent Catholic layman, agreed. “What we are threatened with is secular—the opposite of a Catholic is not a Jew, is not a Muslim. The opposite is a non-believer.” He responded further that the way to protect Catholicism and its institutions was to more closely adhere to Catholic doctrine. “[T]he only way you convince a non-believer . . . is by living your own faith and having him witness that. And that’s the way it has to be done" (Macchiarola 2009).

Like Monsignor Bergin, Macchiarola also blamed politicians for the decline of institutions. Macchiarola said, “[T]his is not understood by those people who run the political institutions, who think Catholic is a label. . . . [W]here the strength of the Church lies is not in its political structure. The strength of the Church lies in its ability to convert. . . . To run hospitals, to run social agencies, to do ministry” (Macchiarola 2009).

Long-time newspaper reporter Sam Roberts said that the perceived power of the Archdiocese declined slowly over time. He noted that, “…you had all of these little things that were tests of the Church’s power, and it just became whittled away” (Roberts 2009). Roberts alludes to secularization, citing government policies that the Archdiocese might have once been able to prevent. “[B]y the time you reach the ‘70s, [and] ‘80s, certainly the ‘80s, you have condoms being distributed in the schools, totally against the wishes of the Catholic Church.
They try to effect a compromise which gives an opt out . . . . Even that fails,” he said (Roberts 2009). Evidence of the diminished influence of the Archdiocese was an ineffective attempt by Mayor David N. Dinkins (1990-1994) to use the Archdiocese to pressure City Council Speaker Peter Vallone to pass legislation. “You have the Peter Vallone story about Dinkins calling the Cardinal to pressure Vallone on the Anti-Crime Bill . . . and Vallone, the ardent Catholic, gets really totally pissed off at the fact that the Mayor is using a major figure in his church to influence him on a secular issue. And it didn’t work” (Roberts 2009).

Whether its power had diminished or not, people of prominence still believe that the Archdiocese has power. In Roberts’ opinion, “all of these things add up. So the power just evaporates after a while. It [the Archdiocese] is powerful as a social service institution; it’s powerful to some extent as a political force. You don’t want them against you” (Roberts 2009). The perception is it can still use power to sanction individuals who oppose whatever political agenda it might have.

Joseph Strasburg, counsel to City Council Speaker Peter Vallone explained how the Archdiocese achieves its desired political ends: “[t]hey just do it.” He added, though, that secularization and societal changes had a negative impact. “I think [secularization] also added to the diminution of influence by the churches . . . and it translated itself to a point where . . . in the ‘90s when I was around, early ‘90s, nobody thought about the impact of religion” (Strasburg 2011). He also noted the pedophile scandals affected the Church locally and nationally by undermining its integrity. “Of course then you had the problems with the church and the priests and . . . which at that point, if they had any credibility . . . that was out the window. Nobody was going to line up with them, with religion, against the social policy” (Strasburg 2011).
**Shifting Loyalties**

The concept of Catholic loyalty came under scrutiny during interviews. There was a sense among respondents that Catholics no longer voted as a block. Former New York City Board of Education President Stephen Aiello remarked: “I think if you look at Democrats for Reagan . . . and look at the ethnicity and the religious affiliation you’re going to see a lot of Catholics going there and you’re going to see white working-class Italians, Polish, Eastern Europeans, and Irish” (Aiello 2009). Aiello also saw 1973 as a transitional year. “You can use this [1973] as a seminal year, and I think it makes a lot of sense if you look at that [and] . . . if you look at the power of . . . the county leaders.” It was the last year New York City’s five Democratic Party county leaders were united and were effective. He also saw a breaking up of the traditional Democratic Party base specifically because white ethnic Catholics no longer voted as “a block,” a euphemism for leaving the fold and voting Republican. Aiello stated:

I think what was happening was the Democratic Party, for whatever reasons, was moving away from the Roosevelt coalition . . . people like my cousin Dominic and others who bought into the whole American Dream were now seeing that there were two sets of standards. The rhetoric was the Land of Opportunity, and it still is . . . if you work hard and you want a better life for your children. But other people who they didn’t see as working as hard, who felt they were entitled to this, were taking their place (Aiello 2009).

The traditional base of the Democratic Party, according to Aiello, was shifting. That base of white ethnic Catholics, loyal to the Democrats in most instances since 1932 and the election of Franklin Delano Roosevelt to the presidency, was moving away from its roots. As secularization increased loyalty decreased. One of the outcomes was a changing Democratic Party no longer welcoming or hospitable to people such as Aiello’s cousin Dominic. “The Republican Party,” Aiello said, “to their credit were reaching out to those folks. So I think . . . it starts with the decline and fall of the WASP [White Anglo Saxon Protestants] . . . and the [appearance of the] unmeltable ethnics” (Aiello 2009).
Former New York City Council Speaker Peter Vallone agreed. Catholics no longer voted as Catholics, nor did they take their political advice from the Archdiocese. Vallone opined, “I think that you can’t consider . . . an Italian and an Irish-Catholic vote anymore. I think you can consider possibly an ethnic vote, possibly an Italian vote, Irish. But Catholics, unlike other denominations, do not vote in a block” (Vallone 2009). Lobbyist and former *Daily News* columnist Martin McLaughlin flatly dismissed the idea that the Archdiocese was a serious political entity. “I think the power is tremendously diminished. And I think part of the reason it diminished, [is that] you have a very divided Catholic Church right now. You have what I am accused of being, which is a ‘cafeteria Catholic’” (McLaughlin 2009). Again, he alludes to the factor cited by many of those interviewed. Cafeteria Catholic implies increased secular behaviors, and non-block voting implies lack of loyalty.

The “lack of loyalty” concept mattered even to political expert and long-time Hell’s Kitchen Democratic Party district leader James McManus:

Well, number one, the Catholic Church isn’t as organized as they used to be. You know the parishes were really parishes where all the Catholics went to the church, the priests knew them all and they knew the political organizations and they [the parish priests on Manhattan’s once heavily Irish West Side] go along with the political organizations in many cases. In some cases they wouldn’t be able to, but they still wouldn’t hurt the organization, and between the Church and the organization, they got the vote out (McManus 2009).

McManus' responses define a closer relationship between Archdiocese of New York parishes. He noted that fewer Catholics attend church, and thus organizational effectiveness had declined.

The wide net of social organizations that the Church had cast mattered as well. Peter Quinn, author and former chief speechwriter for Governors Hugh L. Carey and Mario M. Cuomo spoke about the Catholic parochial school system and its significance. “Well, you know,” Quinn said, “the Catholics, we had our own school system. I can say growing up . . . in an Irish Catholic
family, the public schools were not anything that concerned us. We didn’t go to them. We didn’t use them. They could teach anything they wanted, it really didn’t interest us” (Quinn 2011).

Quinn went on to speak about the political transition that was ensuing in the Church and the nation:

A confluence of things [took place]. The Catholic Church of New York, it had a large Italian population, but it was an Irish Church. It was run, staffed and operated along Irish lines. Religion for Italians is part of their culture. Religion for the Irish wasn’t a culture. I think one thing [that] happened is when Kennedy gets elected, is the kind of symbolic end [to group politics] because what holds ethnic groups together is not self-love. It’s all infighting. What holds people together is a common enemy. And with Kennedy’s election the enemy went away (Quinn 2011).

With the 1960 election of John F. Kennedy, the Irish once vilified and discriminated against were no longer the object of derision. The election of one of their own meant that they had arrived as equal players in the American political scene and within American society itself.

In Quinn’s view the Kennedy election and Catholics’ new status made movement from the city to the suburbs more likely. Kennedy’s electoral success “kind of exacerbated the suburban move out to the suburbs. They [the Archdiocese] lost their power base. And they lost that sense of the Catholic Church as a citadel” (Quinn 2011). Irish Catholics experienced a new sense of freedom that allowed them to take advantage of the changing American secular culture of the 1960s and 1970s:

They [Irish Catholics] went into this defense crouch when they came to the United States. And it essentially lasted from about 1845 to 1960. Very defensive. My parents were . . . very suspicious of leaving New York, going out to the rest of the country. They were suspicious of the Republican Party. Prohibition. Nativism. . . . [Y]ou stayed together, and you were safe in your neighborhoods. I don’t think after 1960 they felt they had to stay together anymore. There was no need. The enemy went away (Quinn 2011).

Fox News contributor and Catholic Church lay leader Andrew Napolitano saw that “family life changed. As the church’s grip on people changed, the politicians had less claim on . . . the Italians and the Irish” (Napolitano 2014). In his opinion, the movement out of the city
to the suburbs significantly altered the voting patterns of white ethnic Catholic voters, who had generally been reliable Democratic Party supporters. Political leaders, Napolitano said, thought that the Irish and Italian were “always going to vote for Democrats—suddenly some Republicans popped up in that group, something that would have been inconceivable, unheard of in the ‘50s” (Napolitano 2014). Echoing the sentiments of other interviewees, Napolitano spoke of lack of loyalty and secularism but uniquely he identified those factors as helping Catholics loosen their ties to Democratic loyalty.

Aureo Cardona, life-long resident of the South Bronx and former Democratic Party district leader, added geographic specificity to his view of the Church’s political decline: “by the mid-1960s, late ‘60s it was over for the Catholic Church,” in at least the South Bronx.

I think it ended when [Bronx County Democratic Chairman Patrick] Cunningham left. Because in Cunningham they [the Archdiocese] had an ally, a political ally, and I thought that he was the last political power-player who kind of engaged the Catholic Church in some kind of . . . viable position of strength. Once he left, nobody gave a shit. Then . . . when [Bronx County Democratic Party Chairman Stanley] Friedman took [over], the last thing Stanley Friedman gave a shit about was the Catholic Church. He wanted to get the Puerto Ricans out so he could continue his powerbase with the Jewish community, which he did for a while (Cardona 2011).

For Cardona, the Archdiocese of New York could only provide spiritual relief. This allowed the Irish to dominate political and religious affairs in alliance with the political machine. The Democratic Party leaders were only concerned about the needs of the particular ethnic or religious groups to which they personally belonged. In fact, he conjectured that by doing nothing, the Archdiocese had effectively assisted in the deterioration. “But I think it [the Archdiocese] never adapted to the diversity of New York. It never adapted. I mean you can’t say with the great Hispanic population . . . in New York City that the Church is a Hispanic church” (Cardona 2011). Even with the rise in the Puerto Rican population the Irish continued to dominate.
When exactly did the Archdiocese lose its aura as an institution of power? United States District Court Judge Paul Crotty tied the changes to attitudes among the city’s—not the Archdiocese’s—leaders:

I think the mayors changed. [Mayor Abraham] Beame certainly never consulted with the Catholic Church during the fiscal crisis. [Governor Hugh L.] Carey—you read the books about Carey, who was, I think, a great governor and an unsung hero for many years—he never consulted with the Church. But power? The Church lost its power. The Democratic Party was losing its power at the time, too. So the structures that used to talk and intermediate with one another were gone. It is a perfect storm if you think about New York. [When Terrence Cardinal] Cooke becomes his Excellency [Cardinal] the political structure is falling apart, the waterfront is falling apart, the manufacturing sector is falling apart, the Catholic, blue-collar middle class is leaving. What does he walk into? [It's a] formula for failure politically, and he’s lost his clout. That’s what happened (Crotty 2011).

For Crotty, the demographic shifts, changing political leadership, suburbanization of white blue-collar Catholic ethnics, shifting power centers, and the changing Democratic Party—a result of Catholic voting pattern changes all occurring in the same time period—worked together to create conditions under which the powerful and less powerful alike were less likely to listen to the Archdiocese.

Seeking an answer to the question of why the Archdiocese of New York’s leadership decided not to create national parishes as a means to retain Puerto Ricans, filling church pews left empty by exiting Irish and Italians, Monsignor Peter Finn, former associate superintendent of schools in the Archdioceses and past rector of Saint Joseph’s Seminary, said: “I think the reason they didn’t create national parishes for anyone is because the experience with national parishes was totally alien to what we then called the melting pot and unity, and it caused some very big problems” (Finn 2011). What had worked for other ethnic groups was not to be utilized with Puerto Ricans. They were expected to integrate. Instead of integrating, according to former Bronx borough president Herman Badillo, Puerto Ricans became Protestants
The Archdiocese’s Adaption

Sociologist Douglas Massey writes that “[a]s an ethnic group’s socioeconomic status increases, its spatial segregation from the majority should decrease” (Massey 2001, 642). The exact opposite occurred within the Archdiocese structure. Although Irish Catholics have increased their social and economic status, they remained spatially segregated from the majority. With laws protecting it the Archdiocese isolated itself. Despite the success of the Irish the Archdiocese of New York perceived itself as an institution under attack. In fact, anti-Catholic sentiment became more pronounced during the rise of social movements in the 1960s: pro-choice, women’s rights, gay rights and anti-Vietnam war.

If the Catholic Church and by extension the Archdiocese felt itself an institutional victim of oppression and persecution, then to adjust to the new urban realities, it needed to find ways to define “a set of principles and organizational design that might help it redefine its view of itself” (Denhardt 2004, 56), Historically, the American Roman Catholic Church, according to Reese (1989, 272), “prospered under religious freedom and the separation of church and state.” Yet this freedom from state control isolated the Church from changes within American society. Moreover, the Archdiocese’s exemption from civil laws that held other nonprofits accountable and Diocesan law that kept the leadership unaccountable to parishioners prevented it from easily adapting.

Ian Buruma writes in *Taming the Gods: Religion and Democracy on Three Continents*, de Tocqueville saw that “the difference between France and Britain, or indeed [France and] . . . the United States, is the role of the Catholic Church.” As de Tocqueville pointed out, European unbelievers attacked the church for political more than religious reasons because the Catholic Church was an extremely powerful political institution, “with vast wealth in land and treasure. The Vatican was a source of absolute truth and the authority of priests was almost total” (Buruma
Hierarchical Organization Maintains the Status Quo

Democratic practices were not the standard *modus operandi* historically within the Catholic Church—even though in America the “Catholic Church was now to be allowed to function openly and equally among the other national religious institutions, but its long history of oppression had left it in a highly demoralized state” writes A. Daniel Frankforter in *A History of the Christian Movement, The Development of Christian Institutions*. The positioning of the Catholic Archdiocese of New York and elsewhere created anxiety among other Protestant leaders who were:

[S]uspicious of attempts to plant the Catholic Church in the midst of their democracy, for the Protestant values of the American way of life were at odds with traditional Catholic belief and practice. . . . None was more troubling than the patently undemocratic structure of the Church itself. Catholics believed that God himself delegated absolute authority to the pope, who in turn mediated it to the bishops and the lower clergy. The people stood at the bottom of the divine hierarchy, and had no control over their Church (Frankforter 1978, 256).

The complexity and apparent contradictions within the national social policy undertakings of the Church can be seen within the 1891 encyclical of Pope Leo XIII entitled “Condition of the Working Classes” in which the Pope clearly defines the supremacy and protection of private property. Yet in the same encyclical, Leo called on business owners to recognize the rights of labor to organize. As virtually all subsequent Church leaders and scholars came to believe this was a cause for celebration for those who believed in protecting private property but who also subscribed to a reasonable redistribution of wealth through a fair and balanced tax system, such as public sector labor unions. Although he attempts to dilute the meaning of the Pope’s encyclical, professor of economics and Jesuit Father Bernard W. Dempsey writes: “[t]he state in
its legislation must be careful not to abolish private property by any enactment that would in
effect be socialistic” (1958, 185). Dempsey goes on to argue—unconvincingly—that this
protection of private property is in no way reflective of the desire of the Church to protect its
extensive property holdings from seizure. It is as if the Pope ignored the criticisms of the Church
and its empire because he reported only to the Divine. The same set of behaviors would be
culturally indefensible in New York and the rest of America.

As organizational theorists March and Simon have noted, “[w]hatever increases
[organizational] efficiency is good; whatever does not is bad . . . [But] this stance is only what
one would expect of a theory of administration that sees efficiency as its primary aim” (Denhardt
2004, 74). If the Church’s goals were to maintain a structure that allowed for democracy or
permeability, then Denhardt’s rationale would be reasonable. Increasing organizational
efficiency, however, was not the Church’s primary goal. Its goals also included material gain and
retention of property. As change swept through its most politically prominent precincts in New
York, the Archdiocese continued to operate as it always had, consistent with its internal goals and
established policies.

How successful was the Archdiocese’s organization leadership? If its goals were survival,
its leadership protected itself and followed its historical experience of adapting enough to
survive. However successful it may have been at surviving, if its goals were maintaining and
adopting new bases of power, the Archdiocese was certainly less successful.

**Vatican II**

Up to this point, I have stressed the demographic changes related to the movement of
Irish, Italian, and Puerto Rican parishioners into and out of Manhattan and the Bronx.
Additionally, I have pointed to New York City’s changing economy and especially the loss of jobs in manufacturing and the declining importance of the Port of New York. Secularization affected parishioners’ loyalty to the Church and their practice of Catholicism, which in turn had an influence on the political power of the Archdiocese. What I have up to this point neglected is the importance in the Catholic Church’s changing interpretation of its theological mission.

The Second Vatican Council, popularly known as Vatican II, took place between October 1962 and December 1965. It was convened by Pope John XXIII and closed by Pope Paul VI. What Vatican II is most known for is its revisions of the liturgy, especially the celebration of the Mass in the vernacular. Besides services in English, the Council encouraged forward-facing priests, increased use of scripture in the liturgy, and other changes that bolstered lay involvement in the Church. It was not convened to settle a question of doctrine or resolve a power struggle. Its purpose was to reinvigorate Catholicism and the faithful. The changes it ushered in were profound.

Yet, opening up “the windows of the Church to let in some fresh air,” as supporters of the Council were wont to say, exposed the Church to a different set of problems. It potentially diminished the power of the hierarchy and threatened the authority and otherworldly nature of the Catholic experience.

Andrew Napolitano noted that the diminution of Archdiocesan power occurred in the context of waning Catholic traditionalism:

I think all of those things. But remember, this is preceded by something bigger than the Church in New York and bigger than the Church in the United States. It’s preceded by Vatican II. And it was the problem with Vatican II—it’s not Vatican II—it’s the reaction to Vatican II. It’s the belief—nowhere articulated in the documents—that we can loosen our belts; we can water down everything. We can make the liturgy frivolous. That’s in writing, because Paul the VI really destroyed the Mass. And all of those things almost sent a signal to Catholics, all those old rules—you’re gonna go to Hell if you eat a hotdog on a Friday; you’re gonna go to Hell if you don’t fast for three hours before you receive
communion on Sunday—all those old rules were gone. And [it had] mocked the old discipline and just unleashed . . . radical new ideas about the relationship of the Catholic Church to society. And it happened intensively here, because there are so many Catholics in New York City. . . . [B]ecause Spellman had had such an iron grip on the city government when he was Cardinal. I think it’s all of those things. I think it’s part of the watering down of Catholicism that was the reaction to Vatican II—the trivialization of the liturgy, the weakening of Catholic identity, the lack of desire to be part of a Catholic group (Napolitano 2014).

Paul Crotty added that the Archdiocese may have been unable to respond because the change was overwhelming. This change was first spurred internally by the reforms of Vatican II:

I think older Catholics were alienated simply because it [Vatican II] represented change in what they had been used to for so long, so you know the one true holy Catholic Church is supposed to be stable . . . it wasn’t stable and for the people who were liberal, it didn’t live up to its expectations because it became more conservative again but the conservatism wasn’t enough for people who said you changed everything on me so why should I believe you? (Crotty 2011).

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Interest was growing in civic and religious reforms, but reforms outpaced the Archdiocese’s ability to control its members, to protect its accumulated power, and maintain its standing as the all-powerful arbiter between eternal life or “fire and damnation.” Henry Pratt writes in *Churches and Urban Government in Detroit and New York, 1895-1994*: “[m]achine dominance in a given city tends to shape the political environment in which interest groups of all kinds, urban church federations included, must operate; ‘reform’ tends to produce an equally distinct environmental impact” (2004, 3). That environmental impact was outside of the Church’s control and included the growth of the welfare state and an increase in the power of unions, which diminished the need for Diocesan-provided services such as medical care, homes for unwed mothers, soup kitchens, and other cradle-to-grave services.

It is important to note that since the Great Depression, the Church and the Archdiocese’s
cradle-to-grave services were partially supported by the federal government. Depression-era urban unemployment was high, and most Catholics supported Church and government agency cooperation to tackle social services as it became clear that neither religious nor secular charities could properly supply much-needed community services. Yet in order to receive public funding, religious charities needed to meet secular criteria (Pratt 2004). As a result, the Church lost autonomy. In later years, parishioners could seek services from the government or Diocesan institutions. Or those social services became the benefits of union membership.

The Archdiocese of New York, which defined ethnicity, politics, social standing, identity, and cradle-to-grave stability, also required cradle-to-grave obedience and compliance. Loyalty, support and votes were similarly required to its political partners. As Berger states, “[r]eligion manifest[ed] itself as public rhetoric and private virtue” (1967, 134). In other words, the Archdiocese tried to establish in America what the papacy had created in Europe. But it could not be successful in a changing modern democracy. The Archdiocese continued, however, to provide values and a definition of what a civil society should represent and provide. Where this private virtue becomes a public theology is where it creates “a republic as an active political community of participants [with] . . . a purpose and a set of values” (1975, 177). The Archdiocese sought, in a religious context, to provide that set of values, that purpose and that definition of what a society should represent. In view of its positions on contemporary issues, it was not fully successful in being the model for the civil society of which it was part, as it could not stray far from its theology.

The Archdiocese of New York: Hierarchy and Its Leadership

The complexity of the new multicultural, multireligious, and highly secular urban
environment proved too difficult for the Archdiocese to navigate in a way that would allow it to wield power as it had done earlier. The insular attitudes of its leaders were clearly diminishing its political power. But why were there no dissenting voices or factions that could have turned the tide? Robert Michels offers one answer. In Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy, he explains that organizational leadership inevitably becomes hierarchal and less democratic: never democratic in any event, the Church seemed to have flourished because it did not function democratically. It was able to “focus, simplify, and reduce the flow of information. . . . Hierarchy thus provides effectiveness by a process of simplification. It simplifies the knowledge environment, limits processes of communication, lowers costs, and systematizes tasks” (Michels 1966, 23).

As the civic and cultural environment became more complex, the hierarchical structure of the Archdiocese became cumbersome. It could only do what it was designed to do: respond meekly and report to the Church in Rome. It is not that the Archdiocese of New York failed; rather, its hierarchy could not adapt functionally to the new environment. Instead it carried on as it always had. The hierarchy maintained itself, but in a period of political and social change it did so with fewer allies and significantly reduced political power. It became more of what it had always primarily been: a religious organization with a defined mission—but whose protective environment was gone.

It could have attempted to engage in the rapidly-changing realities that defined the mid-twentieth century. Instead, its leaders withdrew into themselves. The organization that mattered most to the Archdiocese’s hierarchy was the Archdiocese itself. The critical leadership of Cardinals Spellman and Cooke contributed to the decline of its political power – in the case of the former, because he was too rigid and in the case of the latter, because he had little interest in
New York Politics

New York had institutionalized political equality as a mere pretense in the 1893 Constitutional Convention when it consigned whole cities to be controlled by upstate political leaders:

The convention represented delegates from every legislative seat as well as two dozen at-large. Republicans held every at-large seat as well as a majority of the delegates chosen in legislative districts. New York City, a Democratic stronghold, was badly over-matched. The convention defined new districts, giving the Republican city of Buffalo its fair share of seats at the expense of New York City. In addition, the convention crafted district boundaries within the City, ensuring at least four new Republican seats. One district connected Wall Street to the upper west side, two highly Republican areas, and ran through Hell’s Kitchen and other immigrant neighborhoods and contained many people but few voters. . . . [T]he handful of Republican delegates from New York City went along with their party’s plan, even though the new apportionment plan would reduce substantially the City’s political voice and power (Ansolabehere and Snyder 2008, 59).

Power was what mattered, and the rational approach was to hold onto it in any way possible.

New arrivals were thus disempowered at every level, and it would have consequences much later. There would be no Puerto Rican political boss of the Bronx—head of the Bronx County Democratic Party—until 1985, despite the Bronx being the first New York City borough to have a majority minority population. Manhattan’s first minority county Democratic Party leader, Herman “Denny” Farrell, was elected in 1981. Still, the movement to ensure dominance by non-minority politicians in both counties predated the election of both those men. Political party mattered to those in power, and they wanted to remain in power.

The isolation of Puerto Ricans fit into national political trends. Clearly, significant portions of the Catholic population were moving rightward, and the entire labor movement was changing. The 1972 landslide victory of Republican Party presidential candidate Richard Nixon
was among the biggest in American history. Nixon took the electoral votes of forty-nine states, sixty-two percent of the popular vote and surprisingly 57 percent of the blue-collar vote (a 22 point increase for Nixon since 1968) and 54 percent of the union vote (a 25 point gain since 1968). He was even the first Republican presidential candidate to receive a majority of Catholic votes (Cowie 2010, 121-122).

The movement rightward for Catholics was further helped by the staunch anti-Communism of Archdiocese leaders, notably Francis Cardinal Spellman. His ideology even trumped what might reasonably have been predicted to have been his stronger interest in helping to elect the first Catholic president, John F. Kennedy, in 1960. It appears that Cardinal Spellman and the Archdiocese hierarchy were unenthusiastic Kennedy supporters (Nasaw 2012). After the election, Cardinal Spellman openly attacked Kennedy’s education proposals, noting their lack of assistance to parochial schools. The isolation of the Catholic hierarchy from its flock included not only alienation from the new arrivals, the non-Irish, non-English speaking Puerto Ricans, but even from those Catholics who chose not to toe the ideological line most comfortable to this older regime.

Change in the 1960s

Pre-1960s

In attempting to describe what he identifies as the power of the Archdiocese of New York, Herman Badillo relates a personal story that occurred during the early part of his political career:

When I got started in politics in the late 1950s, the Catholic Church had an enormous constituency in New York City. Cardinal Spellman spoke Spanish fluently and was all over the news at all times, and you had the Irish and Italian constituents living in New York City and contributing money so that the Catholic Church had plenty of money. There was no danger that parochial schools or parishes would have to be closed, and so it was a time of glory for the Catholic Church and Cardinal Spellman, and then it all began
to fall apart after that. To show you how powerful the Catholic Church was in the end of
1950s. I spoke once at LaGuardia House on 116th Street between 2nd and 3rd Avenue,
and then I got a call from a Monsignor saying that we would like to see me at the
Cardinal’s office. I was then only about twenty-seven or twenty-eight. I just had become
a lawyer a couple of years earlier so I went to the Cardinal’s office, and there I was met
by a very high ranking monsignor who said to me, “young man we heard you speak at
LaGuardia House last week, we were very much impressed with you and we think you’re
a young man who’s going to go very far in the city and we’re always looking for young
Catholics that we can push along,” and I said “thank you very much. But you know
unfortunately I cannot become a Catholic because I come from a Protestant background
in Puerto Rico. My family is said to have smuggled the first Protestant bible into Puerto
Rico, and for generations in the 1800s the Badillos were either ministers or lawyers. The
ministers would practice the Protestant religion, and the lawyers would get them out of
jail. So I’m kind of stuck with being a Protestant as well.” [The Monsignor replied,]
“inany event, we think you’re a terrific guy.” So can you imagine that the Catholic
Church was so powerful that they had scouts out looking for young Catholics to push
along. That’s the best example I can give you (Badillo 2009).

The “change in the 1960s” made an impression on my interviewees. Michael Long saw a
cultural change that took place in the City of New York. “Demographics started to change.
Asians started to come in. Even though we still have a pretty significant amount of Catholics
living here in the city of New York, I think the type of Catholic has changed” (Michael Long,
July 2009). Long also refers to Vatican II, which was in session from 1962 to 1965, and
considers the reforms it inaugurated significant. “I think in 1965, just from the Church’s point of
view, Vatican II sort of opened up the windows and let the fresh air in, but the problem is, the
storm, the tornado went right through the whole building” (Long 2009).

Way of Thinking

Monsignor Bergin gave his impression of the social turmoil the Church faced and the
decline in its power:

’69 was Woodstock. . . . [T]he Vatican Council was just before this in some way. There
was a revolution in the way people led their lives. They didn’t want to be told what to do.
Using the old sixties terminology, they’re going to do their own thing. And the only
group around that seemed to tell people, this is right, this wrong, is the Catholic Church.
People didn’t want to hear that. They didn’t want to be told that this is wrong . . . you shouldn’t be doing this. Nobody else does this. It’s the do your own thing, go out and do what you think is good, you know, away from no longer listening to what the church tells you what to do. This was the beginning of the decline in the church’s influence. This is in the middle of this big revolution, the sixties revolution, the rock revolution and so on. I mentioned ’69 was Woodstock and so on. And the Vatican II [Council], opening the doors, opening the windows, letting in a lot of air. A lot of people overreacted or took this: Oh the freedom, I can do what I want to do. I’m no longer going to be told by the Church what I have to do. I’ll pick and choose. We’ve used the term cafeteria Catholicism for the last number of years. You know, pick and choose what you want, and I’m still a good Catholic, I’ll still come marching up to communion on Sunday, when I go, when I choose to go and so on. There’s no idea, anymore, it seems to me, though of serious influence and so on. This was all part of what we’re all about. Maybe there was an overreaction to that, by going so far to the left, you know, they never really got back to the middle. They left and kind of upped. We just lose people right and left. They’re no longer here. They’re no longer coming to us (Bergin 2011).

“After World War II, this Church, the country, became the biggest and the strongest in the world,” said former New York City Council Speaker Peter Vallone. For a while the Church matched that success, but the Archdiocese could not sustain it in New York City.

“I believe the exodus [from the Church] started as I grew up,” said Vallone. “Most of my friends—and that would be in the ‘50s and ‘60s—my father started the largest Boys’ Club, Boys’ and Girls’ Club in the country, private. And there was a raffle in 1950, that the winner would have a new house in Long Island. And they raised a million dollars” (Vallone 2009). Those who left their local communities, their parishes, to move to the suburbs in fact were supported by their friends; and further, that moving made them wealthy or possibly the very idea of suburbanization for those in the Vallone circle meant wealth versus the economic stagnation of those who remained behind in the city. Again, this appears to be an example of a change in the “way of thinking” noted by other interviewees.

Daniel Chill (special counsel to the New York State Assembly), credits some of the change in the “way of thinking” cited by others to the new politics of the 1960s:
It happened in the late ‘60s . . . the other thing that changed it, is the rise of radical politics . . . the Vietnam War triggered not just liberal thinking anymore. Liberal became radical. I’ll give you the example of Ocean Hill-Brownsville. You would think that if the Blacks came in and said anti-Semitic things and got two of the teachers fired, the ACLU would be on the side of the Jewish teachers. It turns out the ACLU was never on the side of Jewish teachers. They were on the side of anti-Semites, where they’ve been ever since. So, in my neighborhood in the west side of Manhattan, [United States Senator Robert F.] Kennedy was running against [Eugene] McCarthy. Kennedy, regarded now as a liberal was murdered [in the primary election in New York] by Eugene McCarthy, Kennedy was no liberal in the eyes of many. And you still have a cadre of what they call red diaper babies . . . Jews primarily but very, very leftist, radical, SDS and the whole. Now the Church was conservative. And still is conservative, so the society, at least in the New York area became radicalized and he church was having none of it (Chill 2009).

Crotty suggested that the new politics of the sixties could prosper because of the failure of the old politics:

It was a complete failure in the political structure because the parties . . . the Church was not seen as the structure for communicating Catholic views. The Vietnam War, you had riots in the streets down in Wall Street, you had the disintegration of financial networks. The city was in a lot of trouble. We had the rent strikes in the city about those times. All engines of authority were under simultaneous attack so . . . I think the political structure was looking backward rather than forward . . . as we were trying to recall the glories of old and they weren’t really in tune with what was going on (Crotty 2011).

“You know Catholics were the majority of people living in the city at one point,” said Father Duffell, immigration reformer and parish priest at the Church of the Ascension on Manhattan’s west side:

That’s why it [the Archdiocese of New York headquarters] was the Powerhouse. We were the largest group. In the 1960s that began to change dramatically—shifts of neighborhoods, movements of people into the suburbs after the war. It really kind of hit the high water mark I think in the 1960s. The Church in the minds of some politicos controlled a lot of votes in the City of the New York and in the State of New York, Cardinal Spellman was . . . an interested guy, he knew his way around but in the beginning he wasn’t even in New York a lot. He was doing a lot of the military stuff I think (Duffell 2011).
Monsignor Peter Finn sees New York as the epicenter of the societal changes that went on in the 1960s, affecting many traditional institutions including the Archdiocese of New York, but saw Cardinal Cooke—Spellman’s successor—as a moral force, as opposed to a political one:

Here in New York, even more than that it was a tsunami of cultural change within our society one of which was the sexual revolution certainly, the Civil Rights Movement. The day he [Cardinal Terrence Cooke] was installed, he went with [Mayor John] Lindsay and walked in the Bronx when Martin Luther King Jr. was shot dead. He was also the man who had no political power but he was the one that [President] Ronald Reagan called and he spent two to four hours with him in the White House (Finn 2011).

Frank Macchiarola comments on what others imply about changes in “the way of thinking.” “In many, many ways people of the last generation did things because of the conventions,” he said:

I was taken every Sunday to my grandmothers and grandfathers house for Sunday dinner because that’s what we were supposed to do. That’s where all my cousins were. They all came to the house. We had a way of practicing our family and our religion and our culture that’s lost today. It’s just doesn’t exist. When people are living next to each other, I could tell you who was in each apartment in the neighborhood I lived in. I knew all of those people and I could walk home from school and be watched by everybody; if I did anything wrong or got in trouble, my mother would hear about it. It was a community. There was a sense of identity and there were a sense of rules. Today’s kids don’t understand the rules. The society doesn’t understand that. You know I have psychiatrist, professor of psychiatry in NYU, child psychiatry, head of the department, tells me his ten year old won’t go to church, “what do you think I should do”? This is a professor of psychiatry he’s asking me what he should do. I said “you take the little bastard and take him to church” (Macchiarola 2009).

Lack of Focus

Daniel Chill said: “[The Catholics] weren’t interested in political life after Spellman. . . . Cooke was kind of spiritual, he didn’t focus on politics and so they lost elections, they lost” (Daniel Chill, May 2009). The idea that the Archdiocese of New York had a generalized lack of focus was also mentioned frequently. Daniel Chill spoke about politics. Others cited the Church’s compromised moral position.
Conservative Michael Long said:

Moral issue, I think the Church really lost ground with its constituency meaning its own members, those of a conservative bent, when the abortion law was passed in New York State. There are those who are conservative-minded like myself who felt that the bishops and the Cardinal made an awesome mistake of not standing up, getting in the plane, ascending on Albany all at the same time in red rose and saying hey guys, don’t pass this bill. They blinked and it was that same time that the legislature started to change and the attitude of doing business in New York started changing whereas whether it was member items or finances for the Church, for the hospitals, for the schools. So there are many of us that believe that one point in history the Church blinked, blinked on the issues, were worried about losing their status, losing their tax status in the Churches, losing their money for their hospitals, because we [Catholics] were running very successful hospitals at the time (Long 2009).

Long believes the Archdiocese of New York may have traded off moral standing on religious issues to protect its social service empire, and the funding received by the Archdiocese of New York from the state legislature to support it.

“I don’t want to use the word corrupt,” continued Long:

The money made them blink in their philosophical beliefs and I believe the Church leadership itself withdrew from putting their finger in the eyes of elected officials who were doing, in their eyes, the wrong thing. The Church had gotten softer (Long 2009).

Other of my interviewees saw the Church’s narrow focus as a hindrance. “The Church’s agenda has changed over the years, which is much more long-term. The Catholic Church focused more on life before birth than it does unfortunately on life after birth,” said John Marino, an advisor to Governors Mario and Andrew Cuomo, again mentioning abortion and the Archdiocese’s controversial position among non-Catholics:

Having said that, they still do wonderful things whether it’s Catholic charities and all that. But the focus has become very different. Remember, it was a very, in the ’50s, a very doctrinaire church. We still hadn’t had [Pope] John XXIII, we hadn’t had Vatican II, so the Church itself was very doctrinaire. I think the Church did a good job. So I think at some point the Church kind of lost its bearings when it came to wanting to control. I think they had other issues that they were dealing with. And you know what? It may have been in the ‘50s, it may have been in the ‘60s, it may have had something to do with the larger changes that were taking church, in the Church, changes taking place in the Church, the liberalization of the Church. It may have something— I think it has a lot to
do with a lot of different things. Cardinal Cooke was never viewed as a strong cardinal—nice guy, but not a strong Cardinal (Marino 2009).

Responsiveness

How did the Archdiocese of New York respond to the demographic, social, and political changes that were occurring in the era under study? Was its response planned passivity? Did it have any choice in how it could respond? “I don’t think it’s just the Church’s power that disintegrated,” Michael Long said. “I think at that period of time it was the whole society in New York that was deteriorating and losing” (Long 2009).

Peter Powers, Giuliani administration deputy mayor, said:

The church lost influence because it first lost influence with its members, then obviously it lost influence with government. The only way it would have influence in government is if it could move its members, and the reason it lost influence with its members is the Church refused to democratize. In other words, it was still run by old men; bishops, cardinals, and the people in the parishes really never had a say in running of it, so they became more divorced from it, as society became more independent of religion generally. I think organized religion, at least the Church, had less relevance . . . they just didn’t listen in the same way. As the mores of the society changed the church didn’t (Powers 2009).

Herman Badillo returns to the problems Puerto Ricans experienced and the failure of the Archdiocese of New York to more aggressively work to bring them into the mainstream of the Archdiocese, especially in the post-Cardinal Spellman era:

They did not reach out, they didn’t meet with the people, and that began to happen in the ’60s, and they also made a number of mistakes. For example, when I was running for President of the Bronx in 1965, the Catholic Church closed Saint Francis Hospital . . . a very important hospital in the South Bronx and I pledged when I was running that I would build a new Lincoln hospital, get it approved within six months after I was elected borough president. I did get a new Lincoln hospital built, and the Catholic Church lost out because they lost the value of having a hospital. The Catholic Church in those days ran not only parochial schools but also hospitals as well. The activities that got the Catholics to continue going to church like parochial schools which they’re now closing, and parishes which are now closing, have led them to lose their constituency even more. . . . [T]he Archdiocese has been very passive in Manhattan and the Bronx. The
Catholic Church in Brooklyn has been more active and the difference has always been that the Catholic Church in Manhattan and the Bronx has been predominantly Irish, and the one in Brooklyn and Long Island has been Italian, and the Italians have always reached out more to the Puerto Rican and Hispanic community than the Irish (Badillo 2009).

Although believing that during the worst of the destruction of the South Bronx, the Archdiocese of New York should have acted, forcefully, community activist Aureo Cardona never specifies what the Archdiocese of New York might have done or realistically been able to do. “I don’t think they looked the other way, I just think it was their dogma that they were interested in, not the condition of the community . . . the only relief it [the Archdiocese of New York] provided was a spiritual relief to people who would walk into the Church and believe that when they die, they would get their reward.” Should it have done something else, something beyond attempting to provide spiritual relief? Cardona responded:

Absolutely . . . it didn’t, it didn’t do anything. When the Irish were in the power and its constituents were Irish, the Church was powerful. Oh yeah, it just dissipated . . . they didn’t get modern, they didn’t get . . . homogenized they didn’t get . . . all kinds of people, they didn’t do it, and they could have, and they had the resources to do that (Cardona 2011).

Did the Archdiocese of New York respond by reinforcing and/or expanding its political relationships or creating coalitions with those same political actors? “The only time the Church came [to Albany] was on divorce and abortion,” said Daniel Chill (Chill 2009).

Judge Crotty added:

The Church can probably do more in creating a conversation about the values that you need in the civic society to have a democracy. You know democracy can’t be when the heaviest purse is the highest priest. You know you got to have some of the value structure that we all agree on, and I don’t know if we will ever agree on but we can certainly discuss values; what are the values that we really respect? You know they are in the Declaration of Independence, they are in our Constitution, and we never talk about them (Crotty 2011).

Former City Council member Walter McCaffrey notes the Archdiocese of New York’s inability to manage the then growing Puerto Rican population as major factor in its lack of
response to social and political changes:

[T]hey didn’t have priests who understood the importance of speaking Spanish. So if you were a parishioner in my church and I’m an old Irish pastor, you can come to Mass, but dammit, I’m not going to speak Spanish to you. You’re going to speak my language. That was the type of schism that went on. It’s a problem for the Church because they want to have some power, and they sort of bristle at the fact that they’re ignored, but they’re not doing anything to help themselves in terms of that. And touting, you know, kill a commie for Christ. And what happens now is the neighborhoods, and I saw this, you know, my neighborhood lost the largest number of war dead in Vietnam of any community in the United States... and when those kids were coming home, that turned people against the war (McCaffrey 2011).

“The Catholic Church wasn’t equipped to handle people with different languages—especially the Puerto Rican influx. They needed a tremendous amount of help, and the schools that the Catholics . . . ran, didn’t have the people back then to teach in Spanish. So those kids had to go to public schools,” said Fordham University Vice President for External Affairs Thomas Dunne (Dunne 2011). From Dunne’s point of view the Archdiocese proved unable to respond to the Puerto Rican population, unable even to bring them into the parochial school system, which Cardinal Hughes created to insure the integration of new immigrants. Martin McLaughlin added:

Obviously, they had a language problem. Also they lost all their religious teachers. I had Dominican nuns for all of my teachers. Well, there are no more Dominican nuns. Nuns are gone. There are hardly nuns anywhere. You . . . barely have Sisters of Charity at St. Vincent’s anymore. So they had all that free labor . . . I went, took my daughter down to Georgetown, just as an aside. And this girl was taking her around the campus and she said, one thing you must do if you come here, before you graduate, have a Jesuit as a teacher. If you went to Georgetown when I went there, you couldn’t have anything else but a Jesuit . . . That’s a big factor. You lost the clergy (McLaughlin 2009).

If the Church found responding to changing demographics and cultural attitudes difficult, what could it do? Monsignor Bergin answered that the response was to build:

[N]ew parishes up in the sticks . . . People have the freedom to do what they will and we kind of follow them. If people are leaving, we follow them and we build churches. My
own parish, I grew up in the Bronx, Riverdale. Then came World War II, all building stopped, and then there was the flight of the Jews . . . building the places upstate, building the places out on Long Island, Levittown. I mentioned that and some of these other communities where they moved out of the city out of the apartment houses in the Bronx to get a patch of land. The GI Bill let guys go to college. There were loans that enabled them to build homes and so on, and they did so (Bergin 2011).

It was not as though there was no response to the social changes that were occurring all around. From his perspective, the Archdiocese's response to issues facing the city was to follow the flock. To that were a set of incentives that failed to address the changes within the city.

We built schools . . . they made you a monsignor if you built a school alright? So the move was on in the ‘50s to build schools, the big high school building was around ‘58 or ‘59 and around that time that was when they built a diocese in high schools. They built Cardinal Stephen in White Plains in ‘48. We built a school in ‘63. That wasn’t the reason for it—to meet the needs that the people were in the parish. This was one of the places they were moving out to, to Staten Island. The church followed the people where the people went. Well, they built bigger churches or new churches where they [those exiting to suburbia] were going. Rockland County, Duchess County, Nassau and Suffolk and so on, they left the inner city parishes then. It may have been an endowment there may have been money in the bank from the Irish and Italians but that went very quickly because the people who came in . . . no, I think they used it for the people who came in who were poor (Bergin 2011).

**How Single Issue Politics Diminished the Power of Catholics**

Asserting Catholic political power required bringing to bear the Church’s moral vision and its political resources. Corralling Irish and Italian votes in defense of an immigrant identity and as a strategy to improve life chances had its challenges, but the Church proved an institutional and cultural bulwark against nativism and deprivation. Catholic morality had the advantage of emphasizing communal values and an “us vs them” ethos. The alliance of the Archdiocese and Tammany Hall worked to both parties’ advantage. But with the ascendance of secularism, liberalism, the rise of minority political power, and the decline of Irish social and political power, and a host of other changes this research has noted the Archdiocese also saw its
moral compass under strain. Speechwriter and author Peter Quinn observed that the Church staked its moral position on a narrow set of concerns, concerns that many parishioners no longer held:

You can’t survive in politics, and have the relationship with the Church the Church wants you to have. You can’t get elected in New York and say you’re against abortion. It’s just not going to happen. You’re not going to be the mayor of New York. Right? So they’re not going to take it, once you stop taking orders on that. You got to separate . . . you got to have a little sunlight between you and the Church now. The Church has nailed its whole identity to sexual issues. Which most of the practicing Catholics I know are on the other side of. They just don’t listen. So that whole message there, the power to command obedience has been seriously diluted. They can spout all they want about gay, I think they’re going to lose the gay marriage thing. I think most Catholics don’t give a shit anymore about gay people getting married. So if they’re talking about, you sort of go across the issues, you just generally tune them out (Quinn 2011).

In fact, a Catholic, Governor Andrew Cuomo, supported the passage of same sex marriage, approved by both chambers of the New York State Legislature in 2011.

“Yeah,” Quinn continued:

[I] think you can’t outlaw abortion. We wouldn’t, my wife wouldn’t have one, but the law shouldn’t be there. And even if you outlaw it, it’s just going to go back rooms. It’s going to be prohibition. It’s going to do what alcohol, what prohibition . . . [did, it] made it more widespread than less. You see, I think that’s one of the things the Church itself, staring with John Paul, has identified [and] focused on these sexual gender issues. It used to have a voice in social justice issues. You hardly ever hear that anymore (Quinn 2011).

“Now all you hear is, you know, if the Cardinal is in, or the Archbishop is in Albany, it’s about gay marriage, or abortion funding,” Quinn concluded (Quinn 2011).

Speculating about issues that are theologically based, including abortion, Andrew Napolitano opined that all these actions were diminishing the Archdiocese of New York and the larger Church:

[I]t's a march of many decisions. I don't think any cardinal said I want to diminish my power. But if Cardinal Timothy Dolan traded tempering his opposition to abortion and same-sex marriage in favor of financial assistance to Catholic schools, that continued that march of lessening the effect of and influence of the Catholic Church (Napolitano 2014).
“Pope John Paul II was rigid when it came to issues of doctrine and issues like abortion, whether priests would be celibate, whether they could be married. And most Catholics I think in America and specifically in New York, they make independent judgments about this. They’re Catholics but they pick and choose certain things” (Cunningham 2009).

He continued, saying that those he knew had a much more liberal attitude about such matters:

[T]hey’ll say, well, we’re Catholics but we think maybe it’d be okay for priests to get married. Everybody has free will. Maybe the one thing you learn in Catholic school that you never forget is that we have free will. Then it’s okay for me to think differently than the Bishop or the Archbishop or the Cardinal. And society is totally different on all of these issues. It wouldn’t have been just a Catholic who would be opposed to abortion fifty years ago. It would have been a whole range of society. It wouldn’t be the position of just the Catholic Church about gay marriage. It would have been all of society (Cunningham 2009).

“There was definitely a lessening, over the years, of the moral force of the Church. There was a gay rights issue. There were . . . birth control, abortion. All these issues came to the fore, and there was [less] hold on the loyalty of parishioners,” said veteran newsman Gabe Pressman (Pressman 2011).

Abortion

On the issue of abortion, the pollster Douglas Schoen believes that when the Archdiocese of New York was unable to stop the passage of legalized abortion in New York State, elected office-holders and those seeking office no longer believed the Archdiocese a factor in their success or failure. Schoen said:

I would tell you this, the number of people who focused on what the Church was up to—and there was one other issue, one other thing, which was abortion—I think the law changed in ’72 and basically the clear perception was, that if the Church couldn’t stop that, and if Catholic politicians could get elected, being pro-choice, that you didn’t have
to fear the Archdiocese (Schoen 2009).

Is there room within the Archdiocese of New York for those whose issue positions are different than those of the Archdiocese and its clerical leaders? Frank Macchiarola effectively said that attempting to pressure people to publicly take those positions—opposing abortion and same sex marriage—hurts the Archdiocese:

I think the Church sees an inappropriate role for people who are involved in public life when the values in the society . . . don’t resemble the values of Church believers. So that you can’t ask, I don’t think it’s fair to ask people . . . to come out against . . . abortion. In public life a Catholic candidate can’t say that abortion isn’t one of those rights that people have. I don’t think public policy can parallel the view of Church believers in that. Now, in saying that, I realize I’m not standing where a lot of Catholics stand. A lot of Catholics put it all together. On the issue of gay rights and gay marriage, for example, my own position on it is . . . and I think many priests would agree with me . . . that the concept of what is now legal marriage should not be a bar to people of the same sex. It has with it certain implications for rights that one has for the sharing of assets and for survivorship rights, etc. And . . . so that’s important for lots of people. It shouldn’t be denied because there’s such a thing called a religious marriage. My feeling on it is the Church never should have been in the business of performing civil marriages. I think the confusion comes when the Church assumes two roles in the same act—a civil union, a civil marriage, and a religious marriage (Macchiarola 2009).

Martin McLaughlin summarized what he believes to be a more prevalent view among Catholics he knows on the abortion issue:

I’m pro-choice. And I think abortion is a big mistake. Not because [the Church] opposes it. I have no problem with that. Because I don’t support abortion, I support choice. And there’s a big difference between choice and abortion . . . I just don’t want to say, create a law that says you got to go get a wire hanger because you can’t go to a doctor and get a goddamn abortion. Okay? And you don’t have the right to do that to a woman. It’s her choice. And that’s what I believe . . . And I believe God gave them intelligence and a soul so they can make these choices. And I would hope that she wouldn’t abort the kid . . . I’d hope she’d have the kid and do something with it, whether put it in foster care, find a foster parent. I had a friend of mine whose daughter got knocked up. She went to Ireland. They found a beautiful family. She had the baby, gave it over to the family because she was too young . . . And there was a loving family (McLaughlin 2009).
The social movements in the 1960s and 1970s created challenges for society at large but for the Archdiocese the drive for abortion rights and the gay rights challenged Catholic theology.

Daniel Chill observed:

[T]he growth of the women’s movement was very, very important . . . the church had an unpopular stance, it was anti-choice. And that alienated many, many Catholic[s] because they were having sexual relations, and they didn’t want to have babies. Pro-choice is wildly popular with women, so they lost the Catholic women (Chill 2009).

Father Duffell also sees the abortion issue as impossible to navigate for the Archdiocese:

[S]ome people pick and choose what they want. I don’t think it’s that. I think people . . . young people find it difficult when they hear bishops kind of crying out against certain things like the whole abortion question. People can be opposed to abortion, but how you affect policy change is important. And I think that’s where the Church has lost its sense of faith and trust (Duffell 2011).

Karen Keogh, former State Director for then-United States Senator Hillary Clinton said:

We [her Catholic mother and herself] don’t discuss choice at all, at all. I know what her position is. She’s firmly right to life, a thousand percent, and nothing is ever going to move her off the position. We just don’t discuss it . . . I think she probably knows I’m pro-choice. I’ve worked for obviously many, many pro-choice candidates, but it doesn’t come up (Keogh 2009).

Same Sex Marriage

Bruce Gyory, a former senior advisor to Governors Hugh Carey, Eliot Spitzer, and David Paterson, said:

I think . . . [political attitudes toward gay people] started to change in the Lindsay administration. Koch was solicitous of them because of the coalition he was trying to keep. The Church was not allied with the labor movement or the machines, it couldn’t produce the votes any more . . . and then as the gay issue developed you have now where politicians actually debate should I march in the Saint Patrick’s Day parade, whereas it used to be you know you had to march in the Saint Patrick’s Day parade, as recently as twenty years ago (Gyory 2009).

John Marino elaborates:
Abortion. Abortion is the issue that drives most. Homosexuality drives people crazy too. They don’t think the Catholic Church should be getting involved in issues like that. They think the Catholic Church—and I’m not only talking about Democrats here—I’m talking about most people you talk to who think the Catholic Church should stay out of it. If it wants to get involved in abortion, fine; it does not need to make it the big issue. They don’t even think the Catholic Church should talk about the death penalty. But if you want to talk about abortion you should talk about the death penalty . . . Gay rights, why are you getting into the whole issue of homosexuality? But why is the Catholic Church involved in that kind of issue? What right does it have in that kind of issue (Marino 2009)?
CHAPTER IV. LEADERSHIP PAST AND PRESENT:

THE CULT OF CATHOLIC PERSONALITY

Leadership and Lack of Leadership Development

No Replacement Catholic Leaders

The Archdiocese of New York’s transition owed much to its leadership. Interview respondents noted that the nature of the personalities within the Archdiocese significantly affected how the Archdiocese was perceived by outsiders. They also cited the Archdiocese’s inability to replace Catholic leadership and to develop new leaders that would create a dynamic organizational structure attracting others.

Herman Badillo referred to the Archdiocese as a business that was being run improperly. He blamed the lack of leadership on the Cardinal, a leader who could influence political outcomes but failed to attend to internal dynamics:

If you’re running a business, and that’s what the Cardinal does, you’ve got to pay attention to the business. You’ve got to pay attention to where your money is coming from. You’ve got to pay attention to who your constituents are. You’ve got to pay attention to the public officials because you’ve got to help elect some of those public officials. So if you want legislation in Albany or in Washington or in the [City] Council you’ll be getting the support . . . In the old days it was a prerequisite if you wanted to be elected to my office, to set up a meeting with the Cardinal. (Badillo 2009).

In discussing the same issue, Frank Macchiarola indicates that the locally-based leadership, which at one point meant white ethnic Catholics, was quite different:

The political leadership, which was community-based, has been replaced. Who replaces it? The government itself? We have a government that runs the government. What is an Assemblyperson supposed to be? Assemblyperson is supposed to be a person from the community who brings to the legislature a point of view. What are they now? They are the direct force of the political power. And you know they’re politically powerful because they’re always reelected (Macchiarola 2009).
And what is the impact today of the Archdiocese of New York in politics, in community leadership? “[The] Church has nothing—no one has anything to say with it. It’s all government stuff” (Macchiarola 2009).

No Development of Future Catholic Leaders in Politics and Public Life

If the Archdiocese of New York had been able to develop either a lay leadership or clerical leadership who could have participated more publicly in the city’s political affairs, Herman Badillo skeptically opined, there would have been little difference in the perception of the Archdiocese as a political force. Could the Archdiocese develop leadership to engage the political community on behalf of its adherents?

They could, but they don’t because nobody cares anymore. In the old days, for example, [we had] mayors who were Catholic like Wagner, and even Impelliteri, names like that, and they all received this stamp of approval from the Catholics. And the [Democratic Party] county leaders would make sure that there would be a Catholic who would be running for office. And the last one who really tried to get the support of the Catholic Church was Biaggi . . . After he went down the drain I don’t really remember any Catholic aspiring for citywide office. . . . [T]he only thing that counts in New York City is the Democratic Party . . . Unless you’re Rudy [Giuliani] . . . Rudy being Catholic but being very much on the outside . . . he did not come in with the support of the Church, he came in because people were furious at [David] Dinkins. (Badillo 2009).

Aureo Cardona reflected when, as a young man, he became involved in politics the opportunity to develop as a Catholic leader had largely disappeared. Other forces had moved to the forefront of New York City politics:

I was probably the youngest district leader in the South Bronx . . . I remember that [Democratic County Committee Chair Patrick] Cunningham was a very powerful Irish leader, and politics in the Bronx were primarily Irish. You had a strong Irish hand. When I became district leader for a short term, the district leaders had no power. The people before us, years before us, would be able to dole out jobs and . . . for some reason unions got involved, and unions took over basically the power of the political leaders. . . . The South Bronx was predominantly Catholic. There were Churches everywhere full of people, mostly Latino (Cardona 2011).
Judge Paul Crotty served in the mayoral administration of Edward I Koch (1978-1990) and thought that the Archdiocese had but an informal influence on the Mayor:

I talk about my own political experience; I know that Ed Koch appointed me in 1984 and I’m quite sure he was sensitive to the issue of Catholics in his administration and liked to have Catholics in his administration, [although] he never consulted with the Archdiocese or the Cardinal about who those choices ought to be. He had a particularly warm and close relationship with Cardinal O’Connor where they talk about things (Crotty 2011).

What would a new leadership look like? Michael Long alluded to a new model, but it was really a reflection of the past when there had been active and effective Catholic leaders:

Hugh Carey, Tom Manton, there were really big identified [with the Church and with the Archdiocese of New York] guys . . . all of them didn’t always defend the principles of their faith, but they were identified as Catholic. They had good relationships with the Bishop I think . . . and the Church doesn’t seem to have that clout anymore, because they don’t have the people they can go to anymore . . . Even Nelson Rockefeller, while he was not Catholic, was smart enough to pay attention to the Catholic leadership down here in the City of New York and most likely around the State of New York, but he was smart enough to do that. So you had . . . people like Moynihan, you had people like . . . as I said Tony Travia, you had Matt Troy . . . these are all somewhat icons that really worked real well in the political system. They started to disappear (Long 2009).

In former City Council member and land use expert McCaffrey’s opinion, the clergy who had the most potential to create new leadership were being lost to the parishes.

[They had] tended to be the individuals who would be the greatest activists in terms of the neighborhood. And so you ended up [in the Manhattan and Bronx parishes] with older clergy who were . . . used to doing the same thing. They’ll go to the Rosary Society meeting but the idea about doing anything outside in the neighborhood, that was something that you rarely saw (McCaffrey 2011).

What McCaffrey was alluding to is that changes in demographics, coupled with the rise of secularism and other social change, seemed to curtail the development of new leadership within the Archdiocese. More community-based leadership would typically be a formula for a leadership more activist in its outlook and less tethered to conservative doctrinaire behavior. But
the older neighborhood-oriented clergy were dying off and not being replaced.

What does the future look like, and how will the creation of a new leadership affect the Archdiocese? Monsignor Sakano, who was a pastor on the Lower East Side and worked to preserve housing in Manhattan and the Bronx, says about the future that:

[A] lot of it is going to depend on our leadership in the church and I’d like to think that there’s a vacuum now, and I think there is. And there can be a period of calm before somebody or some people step in and provide leadership. And then you might see some codification and definition to what Catholicism is. But I don’t think it’s ever going to return to the Cardinal Spellman period. That’s an interesting chapter. It’s just gone. It went. Part of an evolutionary process. But I don’t know whether it’s going to happen or not, I can only hope that it does. That there [will be] an effective leadership that comes in and solidifies and strengthens the Catholic faith (Sakano 2011).

The "Powerhouse": The New York Cardinal

Frequently interviewees answered questions regarding the future of the Archdiocese of New York in New York City politics by turning the discussion to the personalities of its leaders, past and present.

In a city filled with power brokers, no other leadership group was able to combine the temporal, political, and spiritual like the succession of New York cardinals in the second half of the twentieth century. It is not surprising then that most of the interviewees noted a “cult” of personalities among those in residence at Saint Patrick’s Cathedral.

Stephen Aiello saw two sides to the Church: its organizational presence that provided “schools and everything else” and tried to “promote its agenda” but also its “personalities.” “Who’s the face of the church, outside of the local parishes? I remember the local priests, the nuns. [It was] the Cardinal [who] was out here, but I think the face and interfacing with the powers that be, are the personalities, and [their] strengths (Aiello 2009).
Andrew Napolitano, as he had when responding to other questions, had a view more attuned to religious doctrine. He saw the fate of the Church depending on moral leadership, which rested on individual cardinals and the direction of the Church’s religiosity.

You had the watering down of Catholicism structurally and liturgically and politically that followed Vatican II. The exception to that is Cardinal O’Connor. But Cardinal Cooke, a wonderful and saintly man, was not into politics. Cardinal O’Connor was into politics. Cardinal Egan was not. By the time Cardinal Dolan got here, the influence of the Church had been radically diminished because the Church’s grip on Catholic politicians had been diminished. Could you imagine if Cardinal Spellman were still here today—would he give communion to Rudy Giuliani who’s divorced and remarried many times and is in favor of abortion? Probably not. But yet Dolan will. Same church, same teachings, same rules; just different discipline (Napolitano 2014).

Dagger John

The spirit of John Joseph Hughes, who served as Archbishop of the New York Archdiocese from 1842 through 1864, provoked comments from several of my interlocutors. Hughes reacted aggressively to then-common attacks on Catholics and on churches. He fought for the creation of a separate Catholic school system, founded Fordham University, and began the construction of St. Patrick’s Cathedral. He was nicknamed Dagger John for the way in which he signed his name, always followed by a cross which resembled a dagger. He was noted for his savvy leadership, a leadership role that might again surface in the Archdiocese.

William Cunningham saw his leadership in the creation of unique institutions:

Look, it goes back probably to Archbishop Hughes, Dagger John. It goes back to the immigration after the potato famine followed later on by the Italians coming in. These waves of Catholics from Ireland, from Italy then Eastern Europe, the Church was a parallel institution that was built up. It was a social as well as a religious institution. It had a hierarchy. The Irish, particularly coming out of a British system, understood politics. They understood control and command to use today’s phrase, organizations, they understood how power flowed down (Cunningham 2009).

Paul Crotty offered an assessment that was more critical of Hughes legacy, though:
I know that they've done a great job in rehabilitating St. Patrick's Cathedral. The expenses are far exceeding the income, what are we doing? We are closing down schools? We are closing down parishes, pretty much like the post office. I think the Church started out as a pilgrim church. We didn't have big buildings, and we didn't have big hospitals and all those. The Catholic schools in many ways are response to Cardinal Hughes [who thought that] we are going to become Protestants as opposed to good Catholics. So we need a separate structure, I don't know if we need a separate structure. I don't think we can afford a separate structure (Crotty 2011).

Cardinal Spellman

Reverend Thomas J. Reese, writing more than two decades after the death of Francis Cardinal Spellman, lists what he considers the qualities needed to be an effective Archbishop:

The ideal archbishop is a pastorally-sensitive administrative genius who can prophetically preach the gospel in a non-threatening way and provide extensive social services and educational programs at low cost with few bureaucrats. He must govern in a way that is widely consultative, decisive, innovative, collegial, orthodox, and that keeps everyone happy. He must be prophetic in his concern for the poor and raise money from the rich. He must convince his priests that they are the most important people in the archdiocese without alienating religious and laity by being excessively clerical (Reese 1989, 1).

But this was not Francis Cardinal Spellman, who served as Archbishop of the Archdiocese of New York from 1939-1967. He presided over the Archdiocese during the exodus of the Catholic white ethnics to the city’s northern and eastern suburbs, a wave of migration to the city from Puerto Rico, the post-Vatican II liberalization of Church doctrine and practice, and the decline of the port and related industrial sectors of the city. The Catholic population by 1965 would swell to over seven hundred and fifty thousand.

“Spellmanism”

“Spellmanism” was style of leadership, unwavering in its conservatism and anti-communism. It labeled those who disagreed with any element of that conservatism “anti-Catholic.” It supported foreign wars and right-wing dictatorships as long as they protected
Catholics and Catholic interests in the world. It was an exclusionary ideology in which no dissent was brooked and the punishment of political pressure was a constant threat to those not of the Faith or who publicly disagreed with the Cardinal’s positions. Catholics who violated the hierarchical lines of command structure within the Archdiocese would find their careers derailed or reassigned.

Jesuit theologian Avery Dulles outlines in *Models of the Church* what defines the Church as an institution: sacrament, communion, herald, and servant. Clergy were expected to lead in each of these aspects of Church practice. Canon law refers to bishops as “teachers of doctrine, priests of sacred worship and ministers of governance” (Dulles 1974 quoted in Reese 1989, 7). Spellman appeared most concerned about governance, which translated as an exercise of total control of the political and social environment within which the Archdiocese of New York operated.

Spellman was described as unafraid to exercise that control. According to Quinn, he “played [a role] in matters of church and state, from influencing Rome’s selection of other American bishops, to helping City Hall choose commissioners and high ranking officials, especially in the heavily Catholic police and fire departments . . . A supporter of Senator Joseph McCarthy, he was unbending in his anticommunism” (2007, 168).

There were examples where Spellman freely exercised his will over municipal affairs: for instance, when Joseph Papp, the late theater producer, attempted to convince City Parks Commissioner Robert Moses to allow Shakespearean plays to be staged in Central Park at no charge, Mayor Wagner “was seriously handicapped by his fear of the political power of the Catholic Archdiocese of New York; if there was one man in the city sure to be influenced by Moses’ innuendos that Papp was a left winger it was Francis Cardinal Spellman” (Caro 1974,
Moses, by most accounts the most powerful man in the history of New York, had business to do with Cardinal Spellman and the Archdiocese. He came to ask Spellman to partner in slum clearance on the Upper West Side of Manhattan to reserve space for the construction of Fordham University’s downtown campus. The relationship between Moses and Cardinal Spellman had paid previous dividends for the Archdiocese of New York. The West Side Irish kept their neighborhood intact when other neighborhoods faced the wrecking balls of New York City Housing Authority urban renewal (McManus 2009). It didn’t turn out as well for the Italians, who lived on upper First Avenue and saw their homes destroyed by Moses to build high rise public housing, all done with likely support from the Archdiocese and Cardinal Spellman.

Spellman’s decisions had grave consequences for the future of the Archdiocese. Badillo notes many attempted to bring Puerto Ricans into the New York church after their arrival on the mainland, but the Cardinal took few steps to make it happen (Badillo 2009). He recalls that many priests, and even at times Cardinal Spellman, may have understood the future demographic needs of the Archdiocese and the ability of Puerto Ricans to fill Archdiocese pews vacated by the white ethnics. Yet, the Cardinal did little besides convening conferences to discuss the issue, and no one could force him to do more. Despite growth in the poorest parishes in the Archdiocese, “the Spellman administration opened fewer new parishes than any since that of Bishop Dubois (1826-1842). Of the forty-five new parishes, only thirteen were in the city. In spite of its declining population, Manhattan got five, the Bronx five” (Cohalan 1983, 345). Instead, Cardinal Spellman opted to follow his membership. More churches were built in suburban locations in Westchester, Rockland, Orange, Dutchess, Putnam, Sullivan and Ulster counties, all within the geographic territory of the Archdiocese and all increasingly accessible by the new interstate
roadway system.

_Censorship_

Cardinal Spellman also tried to assert his moral authority, attempting in 1950 to prohibit the film _The Miracle_ from being shown. The Archdiocese described this foreign film as sacrilegious and ensured that the New York City Commissioner of Licenses banned further showings. The ban was upheld by the local courts and the New York State Court of Appeals. Even the State Board of Regents weighed in on behalf of Cardinal Spellman. The priesthood was silent on the matter. Priests, judges and Regents all likely owed their appointments to the Cardinal, and disagreeing with him and the Archdiocese could have consequences for career advancement. The United States Supreme Court ultimately overturned the ban, citing its violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.

Similarly, in 1956, the Catholic Legion of Decency condemned the film _Baby Doll_. The United States Supreme Court held that movies were forms of entertainment and entitled to the full protection of the First Amendment. “That in effect killed all local censorship” (Cohalan 1983, 344). It would thus be no surprise that when the Times Square area of Manhattan turned from an area of legitimate entertainment into a center of pornography, the Archdiocese of New York felt it had no avenue to influence a change.

Spellmanism was a metaphor for an unstoppable drive to censor materials that the Cardinal deemed unfit. It meant using power when he chose to; and when he didn't, it meant looking away while Moses destroyed the housing of the Italian Catholics and dislocated them. It meant attempting to ban from public view ideologies that veered to the left. In the case of the 1949 gravediggers’ strike it meant breaking a union and denying workers the right to be
represented by a union of their choice. The Cardinal thought the union dominated by Communists.

*Authority*

Wilner quotes Weber’s observation: “It is the recognition on the part of those subject to authority which is decisive for … charisma,” and that such judgments about charisma are found when we “look at the responses of the followers, not the leader, in order to know whether a charismatic relationship has been established” (quoted in Wilner 1984, 18-19). Using the concept of “leader-image” he writes that it:

consists of beliefs that identify the leader with realms beyond the human . . . (1) beliefs assimilating the leader to the divine or semi divine and (2) beliefs that the leader possesses otherwise superhuman, supernatural, of exceptional powers or capacities. The second category denotes unconditional acceptance of the personal authority of the leader. It can also be divided into two subcategories, one in the domain of belief, and the other in the domain of action. The first relates to the "idea-acceptance” dimension and consists of convictions of truth of the leader’s statements. The second subcategory refers to the “compliance” dimension and comprises unconditional obedience to the leader’s directives (Wilner 1984, 19).

The argument continues that the leader then becomes indispensable to its adherents.

Adherence to ultimate authority is consistent pedagogically with the concept that power throughout all portions of the Church flowed from Rome and the Pope. Even under the liberalizing reform of the Second Vatican Council in 1962, Cardinal Spellman’s authority in his Archdiocese was beyond challenge. Many believed his power also extended to the selection of diocesan officials throughout the nation including Archbishops:

To many New Yorkers the clearest proof of his great influence in Rome came after the death of Thomas E Malloy, Bishop of Brooklyn, when the Diocese of Rockville Center was cut out of Brooklyn and it was announced on April 6, 1957, that both dioceses had been filled by former members of Spellman’s staff (Cohalan 1983, 359).

In the Spellman era, the authority of the Archdiocese of New York was vast and its temporal
authority unquestioned. “Eventually, it struck some priests at the Chancery that the archbishop’s political power in New York knew few limits. But even they were baffled by the ways in which Spellman managed to maneuver behind the scenes” (Cooney 1984, 106).

“As far as I was concerned,” says the Reverend Albert Nevins, who worked for twenty years in New York and is quoted by Cooney, “he [Spellman] controlled Tammany Hall. . . . He made judges and other appointments, but you could never prove it. There was never anything on paper in New York politics. It was always done through the back door” (Cooney 1984, 106).

Cardinal Spellman’s decline in influence is mirrored by the growth of social movements in the 1950s and 1960s, which included the women’s movement, the civil rights movement and the movement for equality for gay men and lesbian women. The Archdiocese either did not actively participate in these movements for change or actively opposed them. Vatican II’s mission to reinvigorate Catholicism undermined the power of the Church hierarchy for many traditional Catholics by suggesting that a group of men, not the heavens nor the solely Pope, could affect the rules of prayer (Massa 2001). The Archdiocese was not meant to create reform from the bottom up. Spellman allowed no compromise, and as a result the Archdiocese continued as it always had, regardless of changes occurring in society and in the city.

Despite Irish domination of the Archdiocese's power structure and the politics of the city that, as I have chronicled protected Spellman and the Church, other influences undermined Spellmanism: the out-migration of Catholic white ethnics from New York City to its suburbs, the decline of the New York port and manufacturing base, and the growth of public sector labor, which owed nothing to the Archdiocese and replaced the Archdiocese’s cradle-to-grave network. The inability of the Archdiocese of New York to cede sufficient authority to permit integration of the newest migrants, Puerto Ricans, and the decline of the Archdiocese’s ally, Tammany Hall,
were also significant factors (Diaz-Steven 1993). Under Cardinal Spellman “the old -style Irish machines did not fashion multi-ethnic rainbow coalitions [or reward] each group with a fair share of the prizes drawn from a sizable pot of municipal gold” (Erie 1980, 190).

Cardinal Cooke

Terrence Cardinal Cooke succeeded Spellman. Cooke’s leadership style, despite their close relationship, proved unlike his predecessor’s. Cooke became a member, in 1957, of Spellman’s inner circle and rose in rank steadily. A social worker, he served as secretary, vice-chancellor, chancellor, vicar general for the Archdiocese and lived with Cardinal Spellman from May 1958 until the Cardinal’s death (Cohalan 1983, 376). Many thought Cardinal Cooke to be Spellman’s chosen successor. Terrence Cooke “was a hands on administrator with an intimate knowledge of the Archdiocese, but he preferred to work in the background and not in front of the media.” Quoting an unnamed director of Catholic Charities for New York, Reese continues: “Cardinal Cooke was very good on advocacy, but he tended to low-key his advocacy. . . . A few years ago we were pushing for a moratorium on (apartment) conversions, which was another way of getting rid of [poor] people and gentrifying. Cardinal Cooke was behind us and he would meet with Mayor Beame, but he wouldn’t go public on it” (Reese 1989, 12).

Societal Changes

Lacking the bombastic style of his predecessor, Cooke did not seek the media’s attention, nor did he desire Spellman’s celebrity with non-Catholics. Cardinal Cooke presided over a period of even greater tension and change in American society when, according to Monsignor Thomas J. Shelly, “The combination of the Vietnam War and the civil rights movement helped to make
the late 1960s and early 1970s one of the most turbulent periods in American history” (December 23, 1999 edition of Catholic New York).

There were the Archdiocese’s own internal challenges as well. In his The History of the Archdiocese of New York, Thomas Shelly continues: “In addition to the turmoil in American society, American Catholics had to contend with the changes introduced into the Archdiocese of New York by Vatican Council II. In New York, the responsibility for guiding the Archdiocese of New York through this difficult period fell upon Terrence J. Cooke” (Shelly 1999, 57).

The economic and demographic challenges that were facing the Archdiocese under Cardinal Spellman only accelerated under Cardinal Cooke’s tenure. The Archdiocese had to deal with the fallout from the corporate sector exodus from New York, the flight of white ethnic Catholics, and the decline of the port, plus other factors such as the rise of organized crime, corrupt unionism, government programmatic interventions, lack of local investment, and the Archdiocese’s own passivity (Fischer 1995; Danielson and Doig 1982, 328-333; Mello 2010). With the government doing more of the work that the Archdiocese of New York had done providing cradle-to-grave services, all things were in flux. Stein notes, “[l]eft governments made welfare expenditures—income maintenance, education, health care—the central part of public expenditures. In the United States, federal aid to education, Medicare, Medicaid, and various job programs put more flesh on the scrawny American welfare state” (Stein 2010, 13).

The political parties were in decline and factionalized; regular Democrats—Tammany-style political leaders and clubs—faced off against Democratic reformers. The difference for the Archdiocese was that the reformers were not Irish nor in many cases Catholic. They did not share the values of the Archdiocese and differed with it on social issues. “Part of this shift was represented by the decline of political parties in the United States, and with that decline came the
disappearance of the close connection between the local politician and the individual,” writes Allen (1993, 283). Similarly the close connection between parishioners whom the Archdiocese served, and to whom its hierarchy was ethnically akin, weakened along with city demographic and power sector shifts.

Making matters more difficult, Cooke did not have the same tools at his disposal as had previous Archbishops. He could not avail himself of a Tammany Hall in its prime or of unchallenged diocesan power; Tammany’s power was diminished by largely non-Catholic reform Democrats, and the Archdiocese's power was diminished by the passage of divorce reform, the legalization of abortion, and by the liberalizing force of Vatican II.

New World

All this led to a much different administration under Cardinal Cooke. Cohalan writes:

It was expected that [Cooke’s] administration would concentrate on local affairs and would continue the policies and programs of his predecessor. In fact, [Cooke’s] administration differed greatly from Cardinal Spellman’s because Cooke's administration encountered three major long term, unrelated, and almost simultaneous events, the full dimensions of which were unforeseeable in 1968 and have changed many things in New York: the effects of Vatican Council II, the great changes in moral standards of the country that showed themselves from the early 1960s on (Cohalan 1983, 279).

So how did Cardinal Cooke respond to this new world? Shelley writes:

A native New Yorker with a genial personality and an enviable capacity for hard work, Cardinal Cooke made no effort to imitate Cardinal Spellman as a national or international figure. Instead, he made his contribution on the local scene, bringing to the leadership of the Archdiocese two qualities much needed at the time: pastoral sensitivity and managerial skills. Critics faulted him for lack of vision (1999, 57).

Was Cardinal Cooke’s duty to project vision, or was it more important to protect the Archdiocese in a time of crisis? According to Vigoda-Gadot, leadership might be defined as “behavior that gives purpose, meaning, and guidance to collectivity by articulating a collective
vision that appeals to ideological values, motives, and self-perception of followers" (2007, 662). He further notes that the outcomes of such behavior are heightened awareness of organizational values, unusual levels of effort, and the forgoing of followers’ self-interest for the good of the collective.

In a time of great change, Cardinal Cooke opted to protect the Archdiocese from outside influences while maintaining its own inner hierarchical structure. The result was that the Archdiocese seemed impervious to the world. Twenty minutes north of Saint Patrick’s Cathedral, fires raged in the South Bronx and neighborhoods crumbled. Even closer to the Archdiocese offices crime rose, and in Upper Manhattan heroin dealers became the celebrities of the day. That turmoil could have led to absolute revolt among the parishioners or the priesthood. Cooke’s job was to insure that the hierarchy remained intact, if possible, and that he maintain institutional power with full and total control.

This attitude was necessary as the very makeup of the flock changed with the times. The world of the “good Catholic” had changed. Massa writes that “good Catholics—that is Catholics who regularly attended Mass, did their Easter duty, and made sure that their children attended Catholic school—could also be counted on to dutifully pay their taxes, show respect for Police Officers, and send their sons to fight America’s wars” (Massa 1999, 112). Now, “good Catholics” certainly were among those protesting daily during the Cardinal Cooke years. They milled about at the Whitehall induction center in lower Manhattan and were among those going to fight in Vietnam.

The Common Good

What it meant to be a good Catholic shifted in the eyes of many parishioners in this
period from a strict doctrinal understanding to an appreciation of the common good. Influenced by social movements and a changing cultural ethos, lay Catholics in New York understood the common good differently than the Archdiocese. One example was the legalization of abortion in 1970 in New York State despite vociferous opposition by the Archdiocese. Supported by liberal Republican Governor Nelson Rockefeller, a Protestant, the legislation signaled the end of Tammany control of Manhattan, the Bronx, and of both chambers of the state legislature.

One analysis might be that the passage of abortion reform was a victory for those whom social scientists have referred to as “cosmopolitans.” Richard Hofstadter writes:

The fundamentalists are “locals” in Robert Merton’s terminology: that is, they take their values from the traditions of local society; the modernists are "cosmopolitans" in that they are more au courant with what is going on in the nation-wide mass society, whether or not they approve of it. Both are engaged in politics, but the fundamentalists have a special edge because they want to restore the simple virtues of a bygone age and they feel themselves to be fighting in a losing cause (Hofstadter 1952, 88-89).

Many who had seen themselves as “fundamentalists” had likely made their way from the city to the suburbs. The reformers were dominating Manhattan politics and were waging battles in the Bronx that resulted in the 1965 election of Puerto Rican reform Democrat Herman Badillo as Bronx borough president. Badillo would then run in the Democratic mayoral primary in 1969 against former Mayor Robert F. Wagner and Mario Procaccino. Mayor Wagner was closest to the Archdiocese but sufficiently cosmopolitan to keep out of the abortion fray, which he could have entered as a respected public citizen and Catholic. Wagner hurt the Archdiocese of New York politically by refusing to further empower the last of the Tammany bosses, Carmine DeSapio, who within a few years would be sent to prison on federal corruption charges.

[I]n the Wagner administration [1953-1965] in particular there was an unspoken rule against the granting of any favor that if published could reflect on the good name of the administration. This stemmed from the mayor himself. He was jealous of the good name of Wagner, and he was independently wealthy enough to scorn opportunities to make more money (Moscow 1971, 193).
John V. Lindsay, with the support of Governor Nelson Rockefeller and the help of the largely Jewish Liberal Party, beat Wagner in 1969. Catholics would find their way to the newly founded Conservative Party and their candidate *National Review* editor William F. Buckley. Lindsay, a cosmopolitan, won the election—and re-election in 1969—further isolating the Archdiocese and making it less relevant. Cardinal Cooke could have broken with the past to become an influential connection with the reigning cosmopolitan political culture, but he did not.

The passage of divorce liberalization in 1966 and abortion legalization in 1970; the election of John Lindsay coupled with the flood-like urban exodus of white ethnic Catholics; the increasing migration of Puerto Ricans in New York City and the Archdiocese's failure to absorb them as equal parishioners; the changing of power centers brought on by the shift away from industry domination by the docks and manufacturing—all influenced Cardinal Cooke’s apparent decision to primarily attend to the administration of the Archdiocese and to exit from the temporal political world of his predecessor.

**Cardinal John O’Connor**

John Cardinal O’Connor’s position within the pantheon of Archdiocesan leaders was paradoxical. With American cultural life, and even more so New York’s, representing the culmination of social movements—feminism, civil rights, sexual liberation, and personal choice—that lifted traditional constraints from individuals and social groups. how would the Church make its morality understood? Was there a leader who could assert the primacy of religiosity in an increasingly secular world? One approach was to recast the Church as the guarantor of the values that motivated the social movements of the 1960s and 1970s. Monsignor Peter Finn extolled Cardinal O’Connor as a leader capable of guiding the Archdiocese in that
direction. While discounting the Archdiocese's opposition to abortion and birth control, Finn called O’Connor a defender of women. “The homeless, the AIDS victims, and the whole question of women’s rights—no one was more pro-women than John O’Connor. He was incredible with women, incredible in the best sense of the word and a whole bunch of other things.” Finn added that “he was also well connected and politically skilled,” which was the sort of leadership the Archdiocese needed:

[Political leadership] brings you through doors and sanctuaries where otherwise you have no input at all. I sat with O’Connor in the Wall Street towers with the Ambassador of the United Nations, a personal friend of John O’Connor. He was able to influence, reach out to the Middle East and the problems over there for Catholics. We went to Ireland on a peace mission and he met with all of the authorities in the south and then went up to Belfast in the north (Finn 2011).

Gabe Pressman described O’Connor’s style of political leadership as highly visible:

There are two different political types. Spellman worked behind the scenes. O’Connor was more overt. He became a buddy of Mayor Koch. And his whole attitude was very open and embracing to all groups. I’m sure he had Jewish, Irish, Italian friends. He certainly was open to all the minorities. He was an Irish Catholic. He was a quintessential New Yorker in many ways, even though he was an immigrant from Philadelphia. He had a gift for embracing people and making them feel as though they were well liked and that he understood them. I remember when he took on the AIDS situation. He would go over at night, without a camera or anything like that, he would go over at night to minister to the victims of AIDS at St. Clare’s Hospital. And he had a warmth about him that I’m sure made the patients feel good. He didn’t do it for as a show, he did it because he really cared about people. He loved people (Pressman 2011).

Cardinal O’Connor as a model for the kind of leadership that would help the Archdiocese adjust to new political and social realities:

With the exception of Cardinal O’Connor, there’s been a lack of flexibility in the leadership of the church. I think O’Connor, had he lived longer, would’ve probably accomplished more in the way of embracing perhaps a new philosophy. I’m not sure what he would’ve done. He was a labor leader in Philadelphia. He was rigid in his ideology, I guess, as far as the church was concerned. But he also was a very practical guy. And I think he might’ve eased the pathway a little bit toward great diversification and power for the Church, or at least put a stop to the slide in power (Pressman 2011).

Pressman went on:
[O’Connor] would’ve recognized the new immigrant groups and maybe helped them, induce them to follow the teachings of the church. I don’t know, perhaps he was a creature of his times. He happened to be more mellow and more tolerant than some other leaders of the Church (Pressman 2011).

“O’Connor played a real role pushing hospital executives to deal with 1199 [the Hospital Workers Union] and bring them in and they made a break from some of the other hospitals that were treated [bargaining] as a management/labor dispute,” said Bruce Gyory, who, along with Gabe Pressman, credited O’Connor with being the type of leader the Archdiocese needed to ease its transition into the constantly changing cosmopolitan political culture.

John Marino had mixed feelings about O’Connor’s ability to unite the flock, restore the Archdiocese to its service mission, and provide the relationships that would result in a new political relevance:

I listened to O’Connor when he was in Pennsylvania, in the Poconos, wherever it was . . . give a sermon. It was all about abortion. And that was his unbelievable … narrow focus when he came here. Did he do good things? Was he a good cardinal? In certain ways he did. He was certainly a more outgoing guy than Egan was and less defensive. But I think that we had a weak cardinal [Cooke] and then we had a cardinal [O’Connor] who was much more focused on issues of saving souls, in his mind, than in building a Church and the power base of the Church (Marino 2009).

John Marino said:

They [pastors and priests] liked O’Connor because they felt O’Connor cared more. I think of O’Connor as this anti-abortion cardinal mainly because I was in the political world dealing with it on a daily basis. But they view him as a guy who cared about poor people and didn’t shut those parishes and didn’t do a lot of the things that Egan did because he didn’t want to hurt those people (Marino 2009).

Cardinal Edward Egan

Frank Macchiarola recalls the first time he met John Cardinal O’Connor’s successor Edward Egan:
My recollection is . . . the [mayoral] inaugural. And there was a line of dignitaries across the front row, dignitaries. The last seat of the first row was occupied by Cardinal Egan. He was the most forlorn-looking person. And I thought to myself, wow; if Spellman had been here, he would have been front and center. So that to me was a graphic illustration of what had happened over time. Has it [the power of the Archdiocese] eroded? The answer is absolutely yes (Macchiarola 2009).

Nor was Gabe Pressman’s description of Egan flattering:

Egan was a rigid guy. I don’t know that he was a bad guy. He made his mark in canon law. He’s an expert in canon law. So he was not of this world, he was kind of a clerical nerd. A nice guy, but not a man who really had a great deal of insight, as far as I can observe, into the mechanics of reaching out to a city (Pressman 2011).

“Egan was petrified,” said lobbyist Martin McLaughlin:

Egan was afraid because of all the pedophilia in Hartford . . . and that he didn’t do anything about it. And I know for a fact, when we were doing real estate for them, and I would say to Dave Brown, what the fuck is wrong with them? He says, he’s not going to sell anything because he doesn’t want to be accused of pooling money to defend pedophilia cases (McLaughlin 2009).

“Sure, I mean, the church is only trying to survive,” said Vincent Pitta:

I think there was a marked change in both the role and the complexion of the Catholic Church during Cardinal Egan’s tenure, much different certainly from Archbishop O’Connor. I think the new Archbishop is trying to reclaim both the Church’s stature, its influence in the community, its touch with the common man, while at the same time, hanging on to the Church’s core principles, but certainly about survival (Pitta 2009).

With changes in the social composition of the Archdiocese Eagan has faced different problems than his predecessors. The precarious financial position of Catholic education was the culmination of social trends that the Archdiocese had managed to avoid. “Most immigrants can’t pay tuitions necessary to keep Catholic schools open, and the best source of Catholic education has always been Catholic schools” (Pitta 2009). Egan would preside over school and parish closings, and the sale of Archdiocese-owned real estate within the city, the first head of the Archdiocese to do so, while planning for the future needs of a growing suburban population.
“Egan, when he came in, we had some meetings, Puerto Ricans and Hispanics met with him, but he never followed up, and the word was that Egan was only interested in going back to Rome, that he loved Rome and he really didn’t like New York and as you may have noticed . . . he made really no impression in New York at all” (Badillo 2009). At times Eagan seemed politically clueless. William Cunningham remembered attending an event:

One time I was invited to the Cardinal’s residence. And it was Cardinal Egan and Cardinal Egan was looking to raise money for the two hundredth anniversary of the Church, and he had a group there. And Mayor Bloomberg showed up that night. And Cardinal Egan was speaking and he saw Mayor Bloomberg and sort of nodded and acknowledged that the mayor was there. And then he told a story which he used an awful lot about how Rudy Giuliani had said he couldn’t run the city without the Catholic Church, because of the hospitals, the schools, and the social programs that they ran. And that was a very big thing with the Cardinal (William Cunningham, May 2009).

Mugavero and Spellman

Stephen Aiello raised the issue of personality and leadership in a different context, comparing Cardinal Francis Spellman—the head of the New York Archdiocese during a period that many interviewed described as a time of great power and influence—and Bishop Francis John Mugavero who led the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Brooklyn from 1968 to 1990:

Power, like energy, just doesn’t disappear. Yes, [Mugavero and Spellman were] very similar to the extent that they really were thought to be real shepherds to their flock. They were out there, took strong positions, had political contacts, civic contacts, and community contacts. So yes, similar personalities. I think what you’re seeing now is declining authority and power, something you see generally that’s happening to the Catholic Church throughout the country and in New York in particular (Aiello 2009).

Conclusion

Each cardinal, with his own individual leadership style, embodied the ability of the Archdiocese of New York to wield influence in social, economic, and political arenas. Further, each cardinal was able to shepherd and mold future leaders within the Archdiocese's own ranks.
The Archdiocese of New York is not creating leaders like these any longer. There is a class of leader being created, but it is a differently styled leader.
CHAPTER V. NEW YORK POLITICS, LABOR AND THE CATHOLIC SCHOOLS

The historic loss of Catholic political power, of labor and union influence, and of the preeminence of the New York Catholic school system is the focus of this chapter. Drawing from interviews, the literature on economic and political transformations in New York, and an analysis of the evolution of Catholic thought, I explore the evolution of the Archdiocese of New York’s organizational infrastructure and its political decline. My inside interlocutors ask whether the Church has lost its political and moral authority and what it means to be a Catholic.

Tammany Hall

Catholic political power, at least through the Spellman era, owed its strength to a combination of the Archdiocese’s identification with the Irish, a powerful demographic force that simultaneously existed as an outsider group; the alliance the Church had with Tammany Hall, the city’s preeminent political powerhouse through the first half of the 20th century; and the quality of its leadership. Those forces that brought power to the Archdiocese had a logic that could not be sustained as the city evolved in the latter half of the century.

I have sketched out the Irish community’s dramatic encounter with nativism and Archbishop Hughes daring defense of his parishes but would like here to focus on a political struggle over education and social service funding, which had a lasting effect on the Church’s communal identity, its organizational coherence, and its alliance with Tammany Hall. During the 1840s Hughes sought public funding for parochial schools to counter the Protestant orientation of the public school system. When his demand to the state legislature for equal public funding for Catholic schools went unheeded, Hughes turned inward and committed the Church to financing an independent parochial school system (Brown and McKeown 1997, 14).
Through the early 1840s control of New York City schools rested with the Protestant-controlled Public School Society until the passage of the Maclay Bill created a new school system in which religious instruction was prohibited and denominational schools went unfunded. Rejecting schools without religious instruction the Archdiocese saw no option but to build its own school system. “To preserve their religious heritage,” noted Catholic historian Jay P. Dolan writes, “and remain loyal to their past, Catholic immigrants were forced to challenge the Protestant sectarianism of American schools” (Dolan 1975, 104). But having lost the battle to fund Catholic schools, the Archdiocese’s constituency and leadership found themselves further isolated.

While unable to procure funding for parochial schools, social services were an entirely different matter. The Roman Catholic Orphan Asylum (RCOA) “received its first share of state funds in 1833, and in 1846 the Common Council [equivalent to today’s New York City Council] leased property on Fifth Avenue and Fifty-first Street to the asylum to build a new institution. The RCOA also began drawing public school funds from the [New York City] Board of Education and in 1859 received $5,875 from that source and an additional $4,000 grant from the state legislature (Brown and McKeown 1997, 15). It was in social service funding that the relationship between Tammany and the Archdiocese of New York would begin, and it was through social service funding that it would continue.

Archbishop Hughes’s leadership style proved to be “the voice of politically enraged American Catholicism. He was not a member of Tammany Hall. But he was, to be sure, the boss.” In his rise to prominence he not only demanded equal justice for Catholics but challenged the popular linkage of Americanism with Protestantism (Golway 2014, 32, 33). Along the way he personified the emergence of boss rule in the Church. Later, that boss rule would foster the
Archdiocese’s coherence and aid in its quest for power. “The variety of national groups demanded a degree of control to prevent schism in the church; at the same time the rapid expansion of the city required ‘a new mode of government’ to consolidate church affairs. Boss rule effectively met these needs” (Dolan 1975, 175). This need for “boss rule” to control and effectively contain and neutralize group schisms also made room for pluralism. Hughes publicly espoused inclusion for all ethnic and religious groups in New York City and within the nation, and Hughes “provided Tammany Hall’s future leaders with one of their core beliefs: New York contained multitudes, and those multitudes deserved a share of political power rather than lectures in Americanism” (Golway 2014, 37).

In severing that “linkage between Americanism and Protestantism,” Hughes increased the flow of funds from public coffers to Archdiocese of New York programs for the poor. His strategy had lasting effects. Notably, “during the second half of the nineteenth century, Catholic institutions grew to the point that they received the lions’ share of public support…by 1900 nearly 20,000 children were cared for yearly in Catholic institutions with public support” (Brown and McKeown 1997, 15).

The practice of using private non-government agencies in New York City began in the era of Archbishop Hughes as the struggle over getting and spending should not be underestimated. Political scientist John Mollenkopf notes that “Government and politics shape the city’s trajectory….public services help to organize public life.” (Mollenkopf 2011, 171). The child care system was to become a battle ground between the Archdiocese and the Children’s Aid Society, a Protestant institution. Hughes saw Protestants use the Society to remove children in need from Catholic homes and thus from the religion of their parents.

“Catholics soon came to regard,” wrote Brown and McKeown, “the Children’s Aid
Society as an unqualified menace that had caused thousands of Catholic children to lose their religion and thus their only hope of eternal salvation…Catholic leaders used the threat of child removal to build their case for new and enlarged Catholic child-caring institutions to which poor parents might turn to preserve their children from the reach of Protestant child-placers” (1997, 17).

It was knowing how to work the political system that determined the flow of public dollars to charities in mid-nineteenth century New York, and the Archdiocese used its knowledge, and ties to the Democratic Party, to considerable gain. “Irish immigrants quickly discovered the advantages of party politics in the United States and developed their potential as political brokers through membership in the Tammany organization. The Irish presence in New York Democratic politics offered a growing advantage for Catholic child-care institutions in the pursuit of public funds” (1997, 15).

Ironically, Tammany, was originally controlled not by Catholics but by Protestants until after the fall of William “Boss” Tweed. In fact, Tammany’s first Irish-Catholic boss, in 1874, was “Honest John” Kelly who “was also devoutly religious and had originally intended to study for the priesthood” (Welch 2008, 24). Kelly, apparently following Hughes’ boss rule tactics, “purged Tweed’s supporters from [Tammany] the Hall. According to some observers, the new leader tightened Tammany’s chain of command by using the Catholic Church as his model, and made himself more of a boss than Tweed had ever been” (Ibid., 25) It was during Kelly’s Tammany leadership that New York City elected its first Irish Catholic mayor, William Grace.

Tammany Hall’s need for votes to elect its own, and the Irish Catholic propensity (Erie 1990) to engage in politics coupled with Hughes’ leadership style served as the model for Tammany operations (Golway 2014; Welch 2008), which continued until the mid-twentieth
century when white ethnic Catholics left the city for the suburbs, radically altering the population of the Archdiocese and undermining Tammany control.

**Failure to Include the Left**

A century after Hughes came to the aid of Irish immigrants another group of migrants, Puerto Ricans, arrived in large numbers in New York City. The Archdiocese failed to meet the needs of its new migrant constituents, and it missed an opportunity to take advantage of the growing labor movement and liberal ideas. The rise of the public sector unions could have allowed for a new power base for the Archdiocese, much as the ports and construction trades had functioned in previous generations. There was, however, a deep undercurrent of distrust of organized labor, and wariness about the increasing liberalization that was sweeping the country, all of which made it unlikely that the Archdiocese would adapt to the changing times.

The rise of the reformers and progressive social movements began to erode the institutional thinking outside the Archdiocese of New York and ultimately within it. At a time when priests in movies and books were portrayed as populist and progressive heroes in the battle against corruption, the Archdiocese’s hierarchy rejected such sentiments. Similarly during the post-World War II period, when Russians and Communism were America’s foes, they became the focus of the Archdiocese's spiritual concerns. The historic antipathy between the Archdiocese and any person or institution defined as “communist” or left-leaning was well established, but the rejection of leftist progressivism isolated the Archdiocese and its leadership from its adherents. According to Massa, Chancellor of the Archdiocese James Francis McIntyre:

> viewed with suspicion or even outright hostility priests who evinced anything like progressive sympathies. Any cleric who publicly voiced pro-union sentiments; who supported ecumenical or interdenominational programs . . . all such liberals quickly received disapproving letters with more than a subtle hint of threat (2001, 89).
Just as organized labor was gaining political power, the Archdiocese moved away from
the movement that was to become so dominant in New York City. The Church’s fear of
communism stopped it from leveraging the newfound power of the labor movement to its
advantage.

The Gravediggers’ Strike

As it was for Pope Pius XII, battling communism in all its forms was a critical
commitment of the Archdiocese. But Catholics in the city were far less concerned with
communism than with making up for sacrifices they had made during the war years.
Gravediggers at Calvary Cemetery in Queens went on strike seeking a reduction in hours—from
48 to 40 hours—and extra pay, plus time and a half for Saturday labor. Spellman saw the 1949
strike as the work of Communist agitators and his animosity served as a rejection of all things
reminiscent of left-wing social activities (Freeman 1989). After all, Cardinal Spellman was a
leader of the anti-communist crusade and Vicar to the American armed forces. He went so far as
to voice concern when the National Council of Bishops took a position against the use of nuclear
weapons (Cooney 1984).

Spellman’s behavior during the 1949 gravediggers strike was hardly surprising. Like the
waterfront workers, most of the city’s gravediggers were union members. And he usually treaded
lightly around unions. This time it was to be different. One thousand dead Catholics needed
burial, and the Cardinal ordered seminarians to work as scabs (Zeitz 2007). Spellman determined
that the strikers, members of a local of the left-leaning Food, Agricultural and Allied Workers
were Communists. The union was an affiliate of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO),
whose leadership contained Communists. The idea of Catholics being Communists or affiliated
with Communists was unacceptable, and he “escorted (scab) seminarians into service.” The impact on the Archdiocese of New York and its relationship to labor would be long-term as the “image of seminarians working as strike breakers—literally digging up the earth and burying corpses—was powerful enough to overcome the community’s allegiances to organized labor. Without the support they needed from other unions and Catholic leaders, the striking gravediggers went back to work” (Zeitz 2007, 71-72).

Father Robert Sirico, president of the Action Institute, a free-market think tank, came to Spellman’s defense:

There is a popular distortion about how Catholic social teaching views unions. Even in the 1949 gravedigger strike, Cardinal Spellman only acted after the union had rejected an offer of a three percent raise. There were also 1,000 bodies awaiting burial. This should be a clear example of the legitimacy of breaking a strike (Sirico 2011).

Siricio was wrong, however, according to Joseph J. Fahey, writing in *The Catholic Worker*:

“Spellman alleged that the workers had come under the influence of Communist agitators and that he was ‘proud’ to ‘be a strikebreaker’” (2010, 1).

An article that appeared in the *Catholic Herald* without a byline, announced the strike-ending settlement and played up the decision of “the grave-diggers, who were nearly all Catholics … to transfer” to another union (Fahey 1949). In a *United Press International* wire story Spellman crowed it was “the most important thing I have done in my ten years in New York” (Spellman 1949).

The Archdiocese never absolutely supported unionization. At best, it was always a marriage of convenience. Robert Caro, writes in *The Power Broker*:

The relationship between Archdiocese of New York, Irish-Catholic contractors and the Irish-Catholic building trades unions, had traditionally been close and directed toward pressuring the City for more public works, which provided simultaneously jobs for Catholic parishioners and through the contractors’ religious contributions, funds for Catholic parishes and charities. Moreover, the Archdiocese, perhaps the largest owner of
real estate in the City, constantly needed favors from the government (1974, 741).

The AFL and ILA

During the post-war era, the Archdiocese of New York’s relationship with its bastion of labor support on the docks was always complicated and uneasy. Karl Malden’s romantic portrayal in the 1954 film *On the Waterfront* of a priest fighting against mob control of the docks rang true. In fact his character modeled after the real life Jesuit, Father Peter Corridan, detailed in James Fisher’s *On the Irish Waterfront: The Crusader, The Movie and the Soul of the Port of New York* (2009) had a less happy ending. The mob-dominated International Longshoreman’s Association (ILA) with support from the employer’s group, the New York Shipping Association (NYSA), would ultimately win a fierce election battle, beating back an attempt to clean up the piers.

Reasons for the ILA victory were complex, but certain factors are clear. The AFL attempted to portray the ILA as Communist-dominated because of the supposed involvement of Harry Bridges in a series of wildcat strikes. Bridges was leader of the west coast longshoreman’s union, who although he never admitted to being a Communist Party member, was certainly a fellow traveler. Public officials aligned with Governor Thomas Dewey who aligned himself with Father Corridan and the AFL against the ILA. James Fisher quotes from a letter found in *Communion of Immigrants* sent to Corridan by a dockworker: “Why should I vote AFL when it is using the same high-handed tactics and employs the same type of low characters as the ILA?” (2000, 284). Corridan was attacked by the very men he had sought to protect. “Corridan’s partisan advocacy generated a backlash that worked in the ILA’s favor by inciting longshoremen to defend their piers militantly against any and all threats from the outside” (Ibid., 285).
It was Catholics telling outsiders to stay away, and it was Catholics overwhelmingly loyal to the Democratic Party who resented the involvement of Republican Governor Dewey. The ILA remained in power. Ted Jelen writes of the longshoremen who defended their turf, that “many Catholic immigrants migrated to ethnic enclaves in large cities in the eastern and Great Lakes regions of the United States. For many such immigrants and their descendants, religious and ethnic identities were difficult to distinguish” (2006, 72).

Yet even the pleas of a priest were rejected when it came to making the decision to exclude outsiders from the heavily-Catholic environment of the waterfront. The position of the Archdiocese became clear after the ILA victory: Father Corridan was sacked. The McCormack family, who were major participants in NYSA and leaders of U.S. Trucking, were also major financial contributors to the Archdiocese. Fisher writes that McCormack’s power was such that the head of the ILA served at McCormack’s pleasure, and that McCormack was a “pillar of the New York Archdiocese and the universal Archdiocese of New York, reaping the honors and accolades befitting a recipient of investiture as a Knight of Malta and later a Grand Knight of the Holy Sepulchre and a Knight of the Grand Cross, all bestowed by papal appointment” (Fisher, 2009, 48), all honors that would have been vetted by the Archdiocese (Cooney 1986).

*Decision-Making Model*

Cardinal Spellman had an unusual and often thorny relationship with organized labor. Though a champion of the poor and a public enemy of Communism and all things that appeared to deviate from prevailing conservative social norms, he would pick and choose when to invoke his higher principles. Corruption on the waterfront and support for priests working with the victims of organized crime seemed less important to him than protecting important financial
backers of the Archdiocese of New York. Further, the McCormack family was also aligned with Tammany, which had a well-documented relationship with organized crime (Allen 1993; Glazer and Moynihan 1964; Jacobs 2006).

Here, the Archdiocese’s decision-making process resulted in a non-decision. Spellman did not intervene on behalf of the labor force against the ILA in the port battle (Bachrach and Baratz 1980). He appeared to condone the corruption and exploitation. Revelations of the relationship between organized crime and the remnants of Tammany Hall illustrate that the Archdiocese was further isolated from wielding its influence and political legitimacy. It was forced to remove itself from public view and was left to focus instead on its core missions, which were not overtly political. These missions included managing and operating schools, hospitals, nursing homes, and universities, and overseeing the work of the priests and the nuns, who provided largely unpaid labor for those enterprises.

Public Sector Worries

The Archdiocese had no control over public sector unions, nor could it rival their power. Nor did it politically identify with public sector unions, which were considerably more progressive than those in the private sector. For example AFSCME, American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, actively opposed the war in Vietnam and public funding for Catholic schools, and it supported unionization of Archdiocese-operated hospitals and nursing homes. In addition, some unions employed publicly identified Communist Party members. Such was the case of Jack Bigel, who was an advisor to the New York City Sanitation Men’s Union—a Teamster affiliate—who though for a time was blacklisted lived to play a major role in the resolution of the city’s 1975 fiscal crisis.
At the other end of the political spectrum, the AFL-CIO’s leader George Meany supported the war in Vietnam, as did Raymond Corbett, the head of the New York State AFL-CIO, and the construction trades—some members of which participated in attacking and injuring scores of anti-war demonstrators in lower Manhattan in 1970. Support for the war was the position of the Archdiocese of New York; not surprisingly those individuals and many in the trades mentioned above were Catholic.

Furthermore, fears of communist activity continued to be a factor that influenced the Archdiocese’s decision-making. This was especially significant considering that one of the major labor leaders of the era, Transport Workers Union president Mike Quill, was a Communist as were many of the union’s organizers. These were not the Irish the Archdiocese of New York had known.

In fact, the whole of the left agenda was antithetical to the Church, but it was not just the ideological orientation of the labor left that was inimical to mainstream Catholicism. The social basis of public sector unionism was outside of the Archdiocese’s social milieu. For example, “when asked what was the key to DC37 success . . . union leaders answered without hesitation: ‘Lillian Roberts’” (Maier 1987, 53). Roberts was a District Council 37 organizer, an African American, and a woman. Her presence was sure to remind the Archdiocese of New York that despite the Vatican II reforms, reproductive issues remained a dividing line separating the Archdiocese from the emerging women’s movement. Furthermore, a black leader with no ties to the Archdiocese was not a likely acolyte to an institution beginning to find its power base diminished. The Archdiocese had limited, if any, influence with the new forces in New York City politics. Public sector unions and their leaders were responsive only to their local union memberships. They did not need the Archdiocese to act as an intermediary.
Concerns about Communism and leftist political activity were a serious focus for Cardinal Spellman who had traveled officially to lend his support to anti-communist, proto-fascist dictators in the Dominican Republic and Guatemala, among other places. His decision after the 1955 Conference on the Spiritual Care of Puerto Rican Migrants to locate the missionary organization for Puerto Ricans in New York was a significant one. The choice to locate it in an existing parish where, although their numbers were diminishing, Irish, Italian and other white Catholic ethnics still worshipped, was a unique configuration in New York. In addition, the office established in the Chancery, the Office of the Coordinator for Spanish Catholic Action, reported directly to the Cardinal, and was to be a central point of coordination. Its mission was “articulating a principle of unity for pastoral action on behalf of Hispanics and calling for an integration of these, our newest and numerous Catholic citizens, into the existing pattern of archdiocesan life so as to avoid the unhappy and undesirable evolution, in effect, of a separate diocese within the archdiocese” (Ferree, Fitzpatrick and Illich 1955, 104). Cardinal Spellman saw the Archdiocese activities as a “necessary effort to stop the spread of communism among the poor and such a notion was doubtless part of his motivation to take a new initiative among Puerto Ricans” (Diaz-Stevens 1993, 98).

No Longer All on the Waterfront: The Port Changes

The New York port had through the years been a stalwart and a symbol of Catholic support and power. The unions were presided over by Catholics, the men who worked on the ports were Catholic, and the businesses directly located at the port were run by Catholics.

Towards the end of World War II, however, the port began a steep decline. In truth, the decline of the New York side of the port had been on-going, but accelerated towards the middle
of the century. New York City was changing rapidly. Private sector labor unions were losing members, jobs were relocating to the suburbs, and so were the families that had been part of the white ethnic blue-collar world that comprised the Archdiocese's churches, schools, and regular Democratic voting block.

Mello writes of stark changes that occurred in less than twenty years through a combination of regulation by government agencies (often assisting port management at the expense of port workers), disinvestment in the New York piers, union battles, purposeful exclusion of left-leaning workers, and containerization (2010). The West Side was strictly Irish territory and remained that way when it came to port employment until the time that the Manhattan side of the harbor became desolate and empty, and the once-thriving port was dead. “By the mid-1960’s, not only would containerization drastically reduce the number of working longshoremen in the port, but also the greatly increased size and weight of container ships would render the finger piers of the west side . . . obsolete” (Fisher 2009, 294). All had cut significantly into the port bastion of blue-collar white Catholic labor. With the decline of the port, the Archdiocese could no longer rely on the influence and wealth that prominent port-centered businessmen supplied. There would be no replacement for this relationship with the private sector business world.

The Waterfront Commission

Changes in the industry and a decline in port employment accelerated with the formation of the Waterfront Commission. Created in 1953 as a result of the New York State Crime Commission report, the Waterfront Commission was meant to address “the health of the great port . . . imperiled by inefficiency, corruption, and ‘deplorable conditions involving unscrupulous
practices and undisciplined procedures, many of which [were] criminal or quasi-criminal in nature” (Fisher 2009, 234). Although the Waterfront Commission had been created to remove corruption in hiring and to act against the influence of organized crime on the docks, its powers were expanded to include the licensing of all dockworkers. Mello argues that this commission was especially harmful politically as it strove to remove radical longshoremen and leaders from the docks. Mello confirms two other important factors. First, he writes, “[t]he Commission increasingly attempted to place itself between the shipping companies and the longshoremen, often serving as a strong arm to enforce the employers’ demands” (Mello 2010, 124).

The Waterfront Commission presided over an on-going economic disaster for those who performed the manual labor that fueled the profits of the shipping companies and other industries connected to the waterfront. Over approximately ten years, as a result of increased Waterfront Commission enforcement, the population of longshoremen working at the port dwindled to half its previous size. A primary contribution to the corruption was the system of hiring longshoremen, which had relied on daily gatherings of men seeking work with many turned away for unspecified reasons. This created an environment of distrust and despair ripe for loansharking, payoffs and extortion, adding to the corruption of labor unions and the growth of organized crime. This system would now be “legislated out of existence and replaced by an industry-wide system of licensing, registration and hiring information centers all controlled by the Waterfront Commission” (Mello 2010, 124). The Commission would have the full authority and police powers of the states on both sides of the harbor—New York and New Jersey—and the compact between the two states would be approved unanimously by the New York and New Jersey state legislatures. Passage of the bi-state compact was also required by the United States Congress, which voted to do so nearly unanimously. The Waterfront Commission was initially
the idea of the same Jesuit, Reverend John “Pete” Corridan, who was the model for the Karl Malden character in *On the Waterfront*.

*The Port Authority*

Meanwhile, the cost of moving goods through the New York side of the port was substantially higher in a constantly unstable labor market. “Longshoreman at the close of the war had staged a series of debilitating wildcat strikes, repeatedly shutting down almost all waterborne commerce in the city,” write Glanz and Lipton. The City, which “already boasted the highest docking fees of all the major Atlantic ports,” had invested little in the modernization of its valuable waterfront (2003, 48). The Port Authority of New York preferred to invest in New Jersey. “[B]y 1955 the Port Authority had invested more than $22 million in Port Newark, cargo handling at the port had expanded steadily, and the authority announced plans to create a new marine terminal adjacent to Port Newark, in Elizabeth” (Danielson and Doig 1982, 329-330). Ten years later that investment in Port Newark would increase nearly four times, and the bi-state agency would invest nearly $200 million in Port Elizabeth.

During the same time period, the Manhattan waterfront languished. The Port Authority would take control of Manhattan’s aged piers, if the City of New York would agree to accept payment of several million dollars a year in return. The Port Authority recognized the problems—modernizing the city’s 200 docks and piers—facing New York as its waterfront’s prospects declined. The aged piers rotted while the politically victorious Port Authority created the region’s future harbor and its work force in New Jersey. “At the end of the 1970s, the authority’s facilities in New Jersey were handling 10 million tons, seven times the cargo passing through its New York terminals. The City department, now re-named Ports and Terminals, still
controlled large number of piers and other waterfront facilities” (Danielson and Doig 1982, 333). The fiscal crisis of 1975 likely made any significant pier investment impossible. In the competition between agencies, the Port Authority had won. The Port Authority had structured the battle so that it could win (Doig 2001, 258-259).

Public Sector Unions Grow

As the private sector and unions representing private sector workers declined, public sector unions grew. “In 1954 just under 35 per cent of the nonfarm workers in the nation belonged to unions, but within 20 years this skidded to 21.9 per cent. Facilitating this erosion in union organization and influence was a long-term structural shift in the U.S. economy. Employment growth flattened out in traditional union strongholds like manufacturing” (Bellush and Bellush 1984, 157). New York City reflected these national trends, and for Puerto Ricans this trend meant fewer opportunities. For the Archdiocese of New York it meant another ally, private sector labor, would be less available to assist.

The general decline of the city’s private sector labor force injured the political ability and influence of the Archdiocese. In contrast, public sector labor unions were growing in numbers, power, and political capacity. Firefighters and police officers remained heavily Catholic, and attempts to increase minority hiring by those agencies ultimately required legal battles and federal court intervention. Unionization had created better pay and opportunities for suburban-dwelling public safety workers who traveled to the city solely to work.

The rise of public sector unionization also created opportunities in non-uniformed civilian agencies for minority group members and non-Catholics. They were also able to organize and compete in these new political campaigns. The campaigns no longer relied on
Tammany to turn out new immigrants to ensure victory, wherein power, patronage jobs in the public sector, and contracts for the private sector entities sufficiently connected would remain with the few. In the new campaigns, unions played greater roles, as did professional consultants and field organizers. No longer would the word going out from the parishes or pastoral letters or even hints from the pulpit have the same value. The Archdiocese would no longer be protected politically, nor would it get its way in Albany, which had once been the case when Tammany supplied the Archdiocese with votes it needed to impress the state legislature.

The self-interest of labor and the politicians who needed labor’s money, members, and organizing ability trumped the need for life support for dying regular Democratic Party organizations and the interests of the Archdiocese. Allen writes, “[g]iven the new political realities of New York . . . Tammany’s traditional wellsprings of power—its control over patronage, its ability to command the loyalty of immigrant groups whom it had befriended and helped, and its skill at manipulating elections—were all virtually defunct” (1993, 261).

In 1953, then-Manhattan Borough President Robert F. Wagner was elected mayor, and “between 1956-1965, Wagner moved the City toward full recognition of unions for its employees” (Maier 1987, 47). In 1961, Wagner was elected to a third term on a reform platform that challenged the regular Tammany Democratic Party organization. Defeating Tammany and investing the unions with power had clear effects on the Archdiocese and the old order. The willingness of District Council 37, which was the largest of the non-uniformed public sector employee unions, to strike was a key structural change which characterized the new era. In addition, recasting the struggle to organize and bargain collectively as a civil rights issue—during the period when civil rights, women’s rights, and gay rights—were to become critical arguments and reasons for collective action, upset forever the calm needed for strict, hierarchical
organizations such as the Archdiocese to function.

*The Power of the Municipal Unions*

Municipal unions had taken over the roles of both Tammany Hall and the Archdiocese. They provided access to the political system for the powerless and the cradle-to-grave services the Archdiocese of New York had provided for generations. Union contracts would offer health care and even choices of plans for union members. In the case of District Council 37—the largest of the public sector unions—free-standing clinics would be established to provide care on demand. This same model found its way into the private sector when a Sicilian immigrant, Vito Pitta, who was a former stevedore and hotel worker, negotiated joint industry/union operated health care clinics for the City’s twenty-five thousand unionized hotel workers. The unions negotiated contracts that provided payment for work, uniforms and other clothing required at work, including eyeglasses. The contracts also provided educational benefits from high school through graduate school, pre-paid legal representation, and legally-protected pensions. It was Tammany and the Archdiocese rolled into one. In the 1970s laws and regulations were put in place mandating automatic dues collection and the agency shop for city workers, thus institutionalizing the above benefits and securing union control. There was in the case of particular unions “a satisfactory harmony with the relevant needs and desires of the great majority, if not with all of the members of the organization, and of the persons served by it” (Likert 1961, 116).

For those who could not speak English, taking and passing civil service tests were not easy tasks, and city employment was hard to obtain. “Despite prosperous incomes, generally for whites and for a growing minority middle class, the city’s welfare rolls mounted rapidly between
1960 and 1970,” The Latino population—still largely Puerto Rican in those years—was unable to find work. Nearly “half of the city’s Hispanics were on relief, and almost a third of Blacks, as compared with less than 4 percent of the white population” (Bellush and Bellush 1984, 366).

During this period although there was limited growth in the private sector, local public sector employment increased. Furthermore the wealth of the public sector grew as the role of government increased. What the municipal unions did in usurping the roles of Tammany and the Archdiocese was to redefine the city’s political structure, even in the midst of an unstable environment. They also usurped the role once held tightly by the dwindling private sector unions, which had been “responsible for the material production of wealth . . . [Hence] political labor sets the conditions under which the wealth is appropriated” (Collins 1979, 50).

Political Action

Federal funds for urban renewal, highway construction, and welfare payments would increase the need for public sector workers, giving their unions a growing constituency and cause for collective action. Political action by the unions to protect their members’ gains would grow, giving members further incentives to act as a collective entity (Olson 1968). Unions registered their members to vote, trained them to participate, and made significant financial contributions to friendly candidates’ campaigns. In addition, union phone banks, printing presses, members working to “get out” the vote did as much or more than traditional old-style Tammany Democratic organizations had done for favored candidates. Clearly, politicians would pay attention to organizations that had the power to turn elections. As Mayhew has written, politicians would seek to remain in office in part by engaging in constant “credit claiming,” currying favor with the new political bosses, the municipal labor unions and their officers
Voting for legislation supported by the union helped ensure reelection.

The public sector unions filled the political vacuum left by the fading port and private sector jobs that were lost as the port’s importance dwindled. These unions filled the roles once held by Tammany Hall and the Archdiocese—to provide the troops to win elections and to make sure the loyal were rewarded—and a network of cradle-to-grave services.

Coinciding with the changes in the structure of the city’s politics, the machine was replaced not by reformers but by unions. While reformers raised the concerns of the new social movements as a means to shear Tammany of its power, and those movements generated structures that would ultimately replace the machine and reap some of its rewards, it was only the unions that had the raw political power that was once solely the province of political bosses. Although the unions fought for those without power, they were not reformers. Their job was to ensure their own power, and the simplest form of power—to get one actor to do what it does not want to do—was their model (Dahl 1989).

Political scientist David Truman cites a study of “local unions led by communist officials but largely made up of Catholics . . . those Catholics in the union who most closely approximated the communist view ‘tended to withdraw from the religious fold’” (1993, 163). The Archdiocese began to withdraw from overt political activity during the reign of Cardinal Cooke. Most members of municipal unions were not Catholic, nor did the unions have any allegiance to Tammany Hall, and as a result there was no sanction, material or moral, to force Catholic compliance. Thus it was easier for politicians to work with the left-leaning municipal unions. They watched them do battle against the conservative and Catholic dominated construction and trade associations, whose daily operations were managed by the state and national AFL-CIO. For municipal unions, the national and state bodies had little value. It was the municipal unions who
had the troops, the printing press, the checkbook and the bodies with which to organize. The “best’” of the Archdiocese of New York had left for the suburbs and moved from its base in Manhattan and the Bronx. The left and the traditional Irish Archdiocese of New York were not an easy fit.

Ideology could and did trump religion in Truman’s study. Trade unionism in its purer form had little corruption at its onset, lacked a religious component, and certainly leaned to the left of the political spectrum. Furthermore, the new trade unionists, Victor Gotbaum and Lillian Roberts of District Council 37, for example, had allegiance only to union members.

Left behind were the poorest of the poor: Puerto Ricans. They were not part of the private sector or public sector labor. Tammany did not value them nor did the reformers; nor were they important to the Archdiocesan hierarchy. Only to the struggling parish priests in Bronx neighborhoods were Puerto Ricans significant. In addition, the neighborhoods in which Puerto Ricans remained behind presented great challenges—crime-ridden and drug-infested, they either were or would soon be on fire.

Tammany No Longer Matters

Tammany Hall was in decline, as was the enforcement mechanism needed to sustain the political power of the Archdiocese of New York. The fall of the longstanding political machine further compounded changes in the city’s private labor sector. In 1953, then-Manhattan Borough President Robert Wagner was elected mayor on a reform platform that challenged the Tammany Democratic Party organization. The cascading effect of Tammany’s downfall continued with the rise of the reform movement, which successfully used organizational skills fueled not by patronage but volunteerism to oust Tammany’s last boss, Carmine DeSapio, and install a little-
known activist named Edward I. Koch.

The creation of power bases that relied neither on Tammany nor the Archdiocese but replaced both as organizing locations for newly-arriving migrants was new in New York politics. The unions could provide services through welfare funds, free-standing health clinics, employer-paid health insurance, and other benefits based on collective bargaining. All of this constituted much of what the Archdiocese of New York once provided for its immigrant adherents: life-long support services, which later extended to higher education programs for union members.

*Civil Service Reform*

The new political soldiers were not Tammany patronage jobholders who knew that their jobs could disappear if another candidate or reformer were to beat the Democratic organization regulars. Civil service reform, competitive examinations, and background investigations of city employees ended much of the patronage system. What made it more striking was that the new political soldiers were people of color, women, and later gays, all of whom were rising up to defend their rights and protect their political gains.

The old political soldiers were leaving, being replaced, or becoming inconsequential after Mayor Wagner’s defeat of Tammany in 1961. His 1965 executive order institutionalized collective bargaining for city unions. Puerto Ricans bypassed the Archdiocese when seeking power. Instead, they would in many cases cede their votes to new local bosses in the Bronx. Ramon Velez, for example, used poverty programs to create a service empire that eclipsed other political organizations, even the Archdiocese. New York’s most recent arrivals would find recourse in ethnic nationalism and align themselves with reformers like Herman Badillo, who became the first Puerto Rican elected as Bronx borough president and first Puerto Rican member
of Congress elected from the mainland. It was the same sense of ethnic identity that drove the Irish to protect their Archdiocese

The Tammany-Archdiocese coalition still existed, albeit with less influence, but the effect of its actions remained the same: It sought to direct “the provision of goods for the broader public and [to] concentrate rewards toward regime elites and core coalition members” (Trounstine 2008, 39). The work of the unions answered to a different set of constituents, however. The unions were no more noble than the political realists of the Archdiocese, but it was in their interest to expand government—that brought more union jobs—by bringing goods and services to the broadest possible public, a different mandate than the Tammany/Archdiocese coalition’s.

Factionalism/Retrenchment

The unions, then, effectively became the new Archdiocese, and union locals symbolically became the new parishes. Union leaders became leaders of the new Archdiocese, providing the power and muscle to ensure that their members’ will of members was enforced and gains protected. The actors changed their names and titles, but the roles remained the same. The union hall became the new church, led by a new collection of cardinals – heads of public sector labor.

In the future, however, this realignment would result in a politics of retrenchment. Why? Shefter writes that retrenchment policies arise when a group—in this case unions—“has recently gained political power [and] begins to assert claims upon the government for greater public benefits or a larger slice. . . . [T]he government responds to these claims because it is allied with the group in question or because it cannot withstand its opposition” (1994, 234). In this case, the claims on the government were increased wages and benefits for union members, and the unions
had the muscle to back up their claims. They could stop the government from functioning by striking or by taking job actions. They could use their members as foot soldiers in political campaigns to help friends and punish foes.

The New Democrats

New forms of income for the city would be required because the foundation that supported Tammany could no longer be counted upon. The city was leaking private sector jobs and its base of white ethnic middle-class taxpayers. As Teaford notes:

[n]o city invented taxes more readily or raised them more quickly than did Mayor Wagner’s New York. Though faced with financial crisis, Wagner opposed increasing the burden on real estate and kept the property levy relatively stable. . . . New York City thus resorted to increases in the cigarette tax, the sales tax on meals and liquor, the general business tax, and the financial business tax (1990, 142).

The unions would be blamed for these increases, and it was primarily the poor who would suffer because of them.

Issues fomented by changing economics, changing populations, non-English speaking new-comers, and shifting power centers were further complicated by the social issues of the 1960s. The New Democrats—much different from Tammany stalwarts who once dominated New York City politics—were more interested in opposing the war in Vietnam or participating in the battles for women’s equality and gay rights.

These social issues prevailed in reformer movements and society at large. The Church’s positions should be understood as a partial rebuke to Vatican II, which had threatened the Archdiocese's authority. Cardinal Spellman, head of the Archdiocese and Vicar General of the Armed Forces, supported the war in Vietnam and was a backer of the China Lobby, which was drenched in the anti-communistic rhetoric of the era. Similarly, the Archdiocese abided by the
Catholic Church and opposed passage of laws prohibiting discrimination against gay individuals. Pope Paul VI’s *Humanae Vitae*, warning Catholics about birth control in the face of the pill’s growing popularity, created further dissent (Massa 2010). Last, newspapers, such as the *Journal American* and the *Daily Mirror*, that once faithfully transmitted the Archdiocese’s conservative views ceased publication after the 102-day 1962 newspaper strike.

Scholars write: “Individuals who are more active in the Archdiocese of New York are more likely to pick up political cues from clergy and fellow parishioners, thus providing a closer link between religious belonging and beliefs on the one hand and political behavior on the other hand” (Layman 2001, 57). The cradle-to-grave care provided by the Archdiocese to its once largely Irish flock, and now to its again changing population through a constricted and controlled parish structure, ensured political continuity—so long as the system of operation did not change. Minority population growth within Manhattan and the Bronx would challenge this long-functioning system. In fact, the population shift increased the overall costs of city residence as:

[T]he city’s operating expenditures [began] to increase at a faster rate than its annually recurring revenues as a result of: the increasing power of non-whites and their political allies, reflected in the rapid growth of expenditures on programs serving Black and Puerto Rican clienteles; the inability of mayors, for political and institutional reasons, to finance these increases by holding the line on expenditures flowing to other segments of the city’s population, especially white working class voters and municipal employees; and changes in the structure of New York politics that reduced the influence of taxpayer interests relative to those demanding expenditures (Shefter 1985, 113).

Simply put, the Irish and Italian Catholics were being asked to pay more for services they might not use and to receive less, while the opportunities for Puerto Ricans in both municipal and private sector employment would decline.

**Labor and the Changing Role of Catholic Power in Labor**

My interviewees shared their varied thoughts on the union ascendancy. “The victory
accorded for municipal unions was when Wagner allowed municipal unions to be organized,” said Frank Macchiarola. “Once that movement occurred, the municipal unions were able to accumulate enormous political power, and they took that power because the government itself was highly centralized, and they didn’t have to fight store by store or employer by employer. They took the whole system on” (Macchiarola 2009). Peter Vallone makes a direct comparison between the power of municipal unions and the Archdiocese, using the analogy of voting blocks. “I think it’s an indication of the reality today that politicians react more to people of voting blocks, and that unions are a definite voting bloc. The Catholics are not a definite voting block any longer” (Vallone 2009).

Reverend John Jenik, who spent most of his career as a parish priest, confirms that municipal unions had little direct impact either on him or on his parishioners. “A handful of people in the parish that would have good [union] jobs. Just a handful. There are a couple of teachers, they grew up in the parish. They still live there. There's a fireman married to a teacher. They're the exception” (Jenik 2011).

Peter Powers, speaking about the rise of municipal unions, saw them competing with the Archdiocese for the loyalty of working people:

I think the unions have failed and then it’s just a question of whether the church could spurn the unions. The unions are given a special pass in our society and my dad was a labor organizer. So I grew up understanding unions, and they are there to organize the underclass and I think they’ve done a very lousy job of doing that. I think they’ve done a good job of holding to what they have, but they haven’t gone out there, I think, enough to organize the poor guys and the underclass and that’s where I think unions fail. If they had organized that, they’d be much stronger and have much more political influence today and I think we’d all be better off. And frankly I think the church would have more influence because a lot of the underclass are members of the church (Powers 2009).

Talking about the positioning of the Catholic Church nationally, which has been seen by some to be liberal on social issues, Powers said:
Catholics for years [are] very public about social related issues and I’m not talking about abortion and things like that. I’m talking about basic human rights. You know fair wages, right to education, I mean all these things that matter to the church . . . Unions were a way to organize people together because they would organize around a common economic or a justice thing. People won’t organize through the church on that. Unions were a way to do that and it could have been useful I think [if] the church and the unions work[ed] together . . . it could have been a very valuable tool (Powers 2009).

Commenting about private and public sector unions and their relationships with the Archdiocese, reporter Gabe Pressman observed:

When I look at the whole picture, the evolution of the unions, say on the waterfront, I see the economics of the unions influencing the power of the Church. I didn’t think of it as the power of the Church, but there was definitely a link between the unions and the men on the waterfront. And I guess . . . when you look back, the Church was very, very . . . dexterous. Or they were nimble. . . . [T]he members of the church, and the leaders, were able to latch on to each group, each demographic change. And worked to exploit the power they derived from that. But as New York has changed, and the immigrant population of New York has changed, the Pentecostals, and all these other religions, and non-religious people. . . . I guess it really involves the decline of the formal church structure. The real power of the Church now has to reside in the individual clergymen and how well they relate to people. And I’m not sure I know who’s going to win that competition (Pressman 2011).

It can be argued that old line Democratic Party clubs, like the McManus organization in Hell’s Kitchen, has performed many of the services now performed by the public sector unions.

From James McManus’ perspective, Tammany Hall Democrats, including his family, did the job of unions for generations:

We were . . . too effective, we got the people their thirty-five hour week, we got them good salaries. We got them guaranteed their jobs, we got laws protecting them in their jobs where they didn’t need to go to the Church or the unions to really hold on . . . You know people would say to me, especially you know people from the media . . . you think organizations will come back and I said yes, when things get so bad for the . . . people that they have to organize to get things done, you know, we haven’t reached that point but you know I see it coming especially with this economy. The companies that different things are using this as an excuse to not to give raises or even cut salaries. No more overtime and so the working class is being very, very . . . hit (McManus 2009).

But Edward Ott, former New York City Central Labor Council leader, explains that “The odd
thing is, is by the time you get to 1972, a couple of other things are going on”:

Not only had the executive and managerial group moved out of the city, corporations begin to leave, pull their headquarters out of the city for other places. The old manufacturing and light industry jobs that were New York’s to give, they were going. 1960, you’re talking a million barges a year across the Hudson. By 1968, that’s down to like a hundred thousand and dropping like a barometer in a hurricane. Why? They made a decision: disconnect the railroad from the main part of the city. The warehousing industry, everything collapses (Ott 2009).

He continued:

Prior to this period, the character of this labor movement is unions fighting with private sector bosses, garment strikes, even the rail and bus lines were private until the last one goes, Fifth Avenue Coach goes in the late 60s under Lindsay. Everything’s municipalized and they’re taken over by the state because of funding. So things that were private before give a certain character to the labor movement. Private sector unions are in economic combat every day with employers. Public sector unions, they learn to lobby and litigate. It’s a very different skill and consciousness. In the hospital sector, 1199 takes a bunch of disparate unorganized hospitals and turns them into a hospital industry. The Hospital Association is formed. The League of Voluntary Hospitals is formed in response to the potential power of the union . . . . By the time Rudy Giuliani runs for mayor, his low key campaign message to business was very clear. We’ve got to find ways to strengthen the private sector—twenty- six percent of the city’s economy is in the non-profit and public sector. That’s what he was telling the Wall Street guys. That was his message. It was getting hard to attract people to the city with a public sector that was such a big part of the economy. You’ve got to remember, the ‘70s fiscal crisis is not over power. It’s over who’s going to pay for what. (Ott 2009).

What Ott was referring to was happening all across the country, but in the national discussion it was “the death of New York.” From the vantage point of the Archdiocese, this seemed like a unique situation. Many of the jobs lost in the private sector belonged to its parishioners. Many of the public sector jobs at risk were those of minority group members who had limited relationships with the Archdiocese.

It was not only the Archdiocese or Tammany Hall that was missing out on opportunities in changing economic and social trends. Labor lawyer Vincent Pitta identified a weakness of the labor movement. “I think frankly there was a lack of foresight”:
Unlike the church, which built churches and dioceses outside of the city, the labor movement by and large did not build institutions in the outlying regions. Most of the developments in Nassau and Suffolk County, the surrounding areas, came from New York City people who [purposely] relocated businesses and industry outside of New York City. Labor officials in those areas were shortsighted and thought that as long as their members in New York City had jobs or were being taken care of, they didn’t have to worry about anything else . . . only to wake up ten and twenty years later to find out that the industry and the jobs that relocated to Nassau, Suffolk and Westchester counties are competing with industry here. Because they didn’t organize the people in Nassau, Suffolk and Westchester counties, those companies operated either non-union or operated at a substantially lower wage and benefit base so that they competed unfairly (Pitta 2009).

The collateral damage from the movement of industry and jobs disproportionately fell on Catholics and continued the erosion of Catholic social power. Over time, union jobs were replaced by non-union jobs, even as the Archdiocese of New York expanded to the suburbs to meet its flock outside the confines of the city.

As usual, Conservative Party chairman Michael Long tersely notes:

[T]he coalition that made the Church powerful was the police, the firemen, the Teamsters, [and construction workers] . . . If you remember Vietnam . . . the silent majority, the parade of hard hats down through the canyon. . . I marched in that parade . . . those guys were Irish, Italian, the cops in those days . . . quite frankly a large number of them all joined the Conservative Party, registered. The Fire Department members were involved in the Conservative Party. There was . . . clearly a patriotic, religious fiber. While the Conservative Party had certain planks in their platform that didn’t bode well with the unions. The membership, even some of the leadership, overlooked them because they saw the Conservative Party and the Church as their allies in the fight for holding back the social changes that were taking place in their communities, their neighborhoods. Those are the very people I talk about that have picked up [and moved away,] and they all came from a different generation. You have to remember . . . many of those cops, firemen, Teamsters, and ironworkers, they all served in the military, either were drafted or volunteered. The cops of today are very non-political, you can’t look at a New York City Police Department and say, what conservative guys these guys are, that’s not the case anymore (Long 2009).

The response to the demographic changes, according to Long, was that some adopted a vociferous conservatism that combined patriotism and Catholicism.
Did the unions replace the Archdiocese of New York in a power role? Pollster Douglas Schoen says yes. He saw the changing nature of labor unions, the rise of municipal labor and the changing role of Catholics in the labor movement as:

[A] reflection of changing ethnic roles and where the money was. Anyway, so I think the union issue is an inter-ethnic change in power that has more to do with, not only an ethnic movement, but also a resource movement. Put another way, the Working Families Party is what the Church used to want to be . . . A receptacle for immigrants, aggregating interests, moving blocks of votes and money (Schoen 2009).

Herman Badillo had once been a candidate for political grooming by the Archdiocese, but realities had drastically changed:

When I was running for office, my basic support, ninety-nine percent of it, was from the unions, and they were not Catholic unions, they were public service unions, [with leadership from] Dennis Rivera, and all the others. The same thing with the blacks. Those are the people that sustained the elected officials. In the Bronx all of these guys would not get elected, if it wasn’t for the unions. That’s the problem in Albany. The unions control Albany because they elected Albany. Catholics [as an entity] could have endorsed candidates and gotten and made contributions to them . . . politicos as you know, respond to those who contributed to their campaigns. I’m one of the candidates who can tell you, they [the Archdiocese] have not provided any substantial support to people who are running for office in New York. We’ve also lost the business . . . and the waterfront really no longer exists. It has moved to New Jersey and the church did nothing to prevent that, and so that influence went to New Jersey. [The Archdiocese] never got involved in trying to get office people unionized. They’re not organizers, let’s put it that way. They don’t seem to be, the Catholics (Badillo 2009).

When Paul Crotty was growing up the Church had an influence in the labor movement. It was not just that union members also happened to be Catholic. The Church had a cultural influence. It was as though Leo XIII’s Rerum Novarum still had a hold over rank-and-file Catholic workers. “We always had them around the house [union members], always talking about Catholic doctrines, the right to organize, the right of working men to have decent wages, to have living wages so they can buy a house, educate their children, provide some opportunity so they wouldn’t have to be a steel worker. … The Catholic Church … they were always very
supportive” (Crotty 2011):

William Cunningham drew an explicit portrait of a strong cultural bond between faithful Catholics and their involvement in labor unions:

It’s an interesting analogy to draw between labor and the Church because they both use a lot of the same language, brotherhood, family, all of the sort of rituals that you go through. Earlier groups achieve a certain level of success and then they move on, and then a new group comes in and needs the old structure to raise itself up. So in the case of labor I think what you saw is people came in, they fought for labor unions, they got labor unions, they rose through the ranks, their children went to college, their children went to law school, the children aren’t in labor unions. And so you saw declining membership in the traditional labor unions in the private sector, in factory work … [Then] you have people coming in who perhaps don’t speak the language that well but they get a job they get a menial job as the saying goes and a labor union is their protection. It’s how they get from eight dollars an hour to nine dollars an hour, and that’s where 1199 [the hospital workers union] comes in, fighting for the people, as Dennis Rivera used to say, the people who clean the bed pans for the frailest and weakest among us. And he always cast his members as though they were doing Mother Theresa’s work, and they were getting paid very poorly. He used religious analogies that way. And I think in labor you have a growth in the public sector unions, and a decline in the private sector unions and an overall decline in people in unions just as a function of the way society and the economy changed over the last 40 years (Cunningham 2009).

Father Duffell wondered about the extent of influence unions “still” had:

[T]he unions on the West Side, when I was there I mean we had a lot of Teamsters. They’re still here and of course the dockworkers I mean . . . it’s still some but they’re not on the West Side, they’re out in Brooklyn . . . I mean they’re still on the super-liner piers down there but the waterfront spread out a great deal. When I was down there, it was very active. A lot Irish, there’s a lot of Italians in there (Duffell 2011).

Rather than the symbolic culture of ideas and values Thomas Dunne emphasized the ethnic lineage and material support that labor unions shared with the Church. Those connections had less political efficacy than they once had, though:

The head of the AFL-CIO was Dennis Hughes today, before that Eddie Cleary, Corbett. It was Corbett, Cleary, Hughes, and . . . they all touched base with the Church. They all raised money for the Church. But when it came to politics, there was a divide. They didn’t listen. They endorsed their own candidates. They didn’t listen to the Church. The
Church . . . they wouldn’t even consider talking to them. . . . They would be . . . a proper respect, but the Church never dictated to them who they should endorse. I think most of the labor leaders today . . . are Catholics. Eddie Malloy, Dennis Hughes, Ahern. I think they’re all Catholic. I think they still go forward, but I don’t think labor is as powerful as it used to be. Nor is the Church (Dunne 2011).

Dunne mentions private sector labor leaders but does not note the powerful public sector labor leaders of this or past generations. Missing from his comments are names like Victor Gotbaum, Barry Feinstein, Albert Shanker, or Lillian Roberts, all well-known and important municipal labor union leaders.

Advisor to Governors Mario and Andrew Cuomo, John Marino saw a natural affinity between organized labor and the Archdiocese. He also talked of the relevance of religious and ethnic ties to that connection:

My father was . . . driven to organize labor. I mean, as a Teamster. And he saw them as the salvation. And for working-class people, the labor union, whether it was the Teamsters or whatever it was, that was the guy that was fighting for you. And I think that there would be a natural connection between the Catholic Church and unions. First of all, because the unions were run by the ethnics, by the Irish, the police and the fire [department]. And then the sanitation, and the Italians, and transit. So you have all of these unions. And I’m sure the Church was [close] to some of the labor leaders. All of these guys had ties to the church (Marino 2009).

Speaking about Italians and Irish, Monsignor Don Sakano credits labor unions for their economic rise. “I think the labor unions had something to do with it as they became professionals. Everybody I meet . . . their sons and daughters are artists, and everything else but laborers . . . [this was] done by unions” (Sakano 2011). Sakano also said that he thought the national economic shift from manufacturing which had significant impact on New York City and thus the parishes of the Archdiocese made unions overall less relevant. “We’re much less a manufacturing nation. We’re more service oriented. . . . But in terms of unions in general, just look at the clothing industry. It’s gone” (Sakano 2011). When asked about public sector or municipal unions and their impact on the Archdiocese of New York, Sakano asked a valuable
question. “Where do Catholics work? . . . Most think of the police department or fire department. This is in terms where you know you’re going to find a Catholic, right? Teachers” (Sakano 2011). But he admitted that when he thought of jobs as Catholic, he thought about blue collar jobs.

Changing Catholic Culture on the Ground:

What Does It Means To Be a Catholic?

The structure of New York’s economy was changing as was the power of various actors: labor, the Church, racial minorities and ethnic groups. Women were stepping up, and traditional political machines were waning in their influence. And the cultural rebellion of the 1960s, and its conservative backlash, had repercussions throughout the city. I have noted some of the doctrinal and liturgical effects of Vatican II, but what did it mean to be a Catholic in everyday life?

Andrew Napolitano places the question squarely in the religious realm, and his reference was pre-Vatican II:

Pope Paul VI made it so easy for Catholics to get annulments, which allowed them to get remarried. That the concept of whom God has put together let no man put asunder, was a joke. And this removed the pressure for Catholic spouses to stay married no matter what, because they could still go to Mass after they remarried because of this mumbo-jumbo that you never were really married; it was an annulment and it was mumbo jumbo—and so divorce became acceptable. And once that was acceptable, one of the last things that the Church would ever imagine approving, a lot of other things became acceptable. And this all watered down the tradition of Catholic identity. And that weakened Catholic politicians because they couldn’t command the groups anymore (Napolitano 2014).

Liberalization and secularization according to Napolitano weakened the Archdiocese of New York and its ability to determine and promote behaviors consistent with its belief system. The “watering down” mentioned by Napolitano might also have extended to the declining pressure on Catholics to attend parochial schools.
Changing Catholic culture redefined appropriate Catholic behavior. “Well some of them are practicing Catholics and some of them aren’t practicing Catholics,” says Thomas Dunne about his co-religionists. “By that, I mean they don’t go to Church on a weekly basis. They don’t contribute money to the Church. [They] assimilated into American life” (Dunne 2011).

Dunne elaborated on this assimilation:

[T]hey’re into the general population. They’re not denied jobs because of their Catholicism. So they’re in the mainstream. They work on Wall Street. They work in the law firms. There’s some lingering prejudice out there, but it’s usually hidden. But sometimes you hear it, usually from the wealthy. But they’ve [Catholics] assimilated. They’re not denied a job because of being Irish, or what Church they go to... [P]eople say they’re Catholic. [But that means] you are a Catholic because your parents are Catholic. Why are you a Democrat? Because your father was a Democrat. Why are you a Republican? Because your father was a Republican. You registered as your family did (Dunne 2011).

Catholicism, has become a label that identifies people with their religious history but not necessarily a set of religious practices.

Decreased Church Attendance

One of the strongest indicators of a change in religious practice is the decline in regular church attendance. Catholics are expected to attend Mass every Sunday and receive the sacrament of Eucharist at least once every Easter season. Confession in preparation for Communion is mandatory as well. Data on the precise number of Catholics attending Mass, their frequency of attendance, and the accuracy of those reports are hotly debated topics among social scientists and Church scholars and leaders. There is, however, a consensus that the number of Catholics attending Mass and their frequency of attendance has declined since the 1950s. James McManus said people just stopped going to Church as much as they once did:

[I]n the 1960s everything started to change. In the 1960s . . . younger people . . . [were] not going to church . . . and that really influences the older people. They stopped going
to church and then the . . . Church started to have to deal with the Republicans too, because . . . they grabbed a few seats, so they kind of tried to stay out of politics. . . . [W]e don’t get involved in politics and of course they were under a lot of criticism by a lot of these left-wing groups that . . . were too involved in politics. So they pulled out of the political arena and today other than probably Madison Avenue with the Cardinal having influence with the mayors and governors and such, the local parishes don’t get involved at all in the politics (McManus 2009).

McManus acknowledges that the local parishes did in fact serve as organizing locales and that the parish priests did help in getting Democratic machine loyalist voters to the appropriate polling location. Edward Ott calls attention to the fall in church attendance among all Catholics:

[I]t’s not unique to New York. They’re not church-going religious people anymore. They’re basically secular Catholics. People used to sweat bullets if they couldn’t find a place to get some non-meat on Friday [prior to Vatican Council II reforms eating of meat on Fridays was prohibited]. If they couldn’t’ get their kid into Catholic School it was a family crisis. Not anymore. Sorry, it’s just not. People are not religious in the same kind of way. The Church is not the cultural icon that it once was (Ott 2009).

Monsignor Don Sakano agrees that fewer are attending church. Furthermore, he stated:

[E]ven those that are, I think . . . the statistics tell us that fewer Catholics are going to church on a regular basis. Fewer marriages. . . . When I was eighteen people got married before they were twenty-five. A lot of people associate the success of the church with bigness. Both materially and in members, even in suburban parishes. The Church, as a whole, in the United States is diminishing (Sakano 2011).

What does the decline in church attendance mean? Has it affected aspects of the Church’s mission? Is the Archdiocese of New York still reflective of and dedicated to the most needy? Does the Church’s mission have anything to do with the decline in church attendance within the Archdiocese? Is it still dedicated to the immigrants it has served, and who continue to arrive in New York? Stephen Aiello addressed this issue in his interview:

I think it’s the Church of those folks [who use] social services. I still think it’s the Church of a number of very successful wealthy people who see themselves as members of the Knights of Malta or the Holy Sepulchre . . . and still give to the Church. You still have a number of people like that and they’re not all that old. I have friends who are in those orders who give to the church not only financially but their time, their expertise, so . . . I don’t know why [attendance has declined] except in the general [context of the] diminishing of influence and authority of religion per se. This whole pedophile thing has
been a disaster for the Church, and I think its impact will be seen in the participation of Catholics in their organized Church. I think people have moved away from authoritarian religion to a great extent (Aiello 2009).

Catholic culture relying and its religious practices, according to Aiello, has been affected by education and technology, which have increased secularization. “I think it’s been education. I think it’s been technology. I think we’ve become a much more secular society regardless of the mega evangelical Christian churches” (Aiello 2009).

William Cunningham sees many forces at work that explain the decline in attendance. In fact, Cunningham sees a more “scattered flock,” less confined to local parishes, requiring that the Archdiocese follow the flock wherever it may go rather than expecting the flock to remain in its once packed urban parish locales. Cunningham said:

I think what happened is all of these forces have had an impact on the Church, and so today you’re seeing Archdioceses of New York and the Archdiocese in Brooklyn closing parishes and it’s very emotional to the people who remain there. But instead of one thousand people at the Sunday masses in some of these parishes there’s one hundred, there might be fifty at a weekday mass, there might be thirty, even fewer in some parishes. And the upkeep of those buildings, they require maintenance. They have to be where their flock is. I mean that’s the teaching of the Gospel: You got to go out and preach the Gospel, you have to go where the flock might be. That’s what the shepherd does. Well, the flock is scattered. They’re not clustered the way they were years ago (Cunningham 2009).

Michael Long blames reform for changes in the emotional quality of services which in turn transformed the relationship between congregants and their parish priests. He blames Vatican II for reduced church attendance. From his perspective, weakening of the “rules” made it much easier for Catholics to re-define their individual relationships with the Archdiocese and its priests.

They just changed the whole dynamics and . . . no longer could you go to Church and hear . . . hell and brimstone speeches. Latin was going out the door, guitars were coming in, the modernization of the Church. Our Churches weren’t empty. Our Churches became empty after... I mean I lived through it, and I saw the decline in attendance because it wasn’t important anymore. You know they started changing holidays, they
started changing the rules of the Church. All those people who were obeying all those rules said, “look if they can change that easy, what’s the sense of worrying about going?” (Long 2009).

“The Church had its own problems within the Church,” said lobbyist Martin McLaughlin.

“People left. People became, as the Pope calls them, cafeteria Catholics. They didn’t go to church anymore. Half of these churches are empty” (McLaughlin 2009). McLaughlin saw the Archdiocese experiencing difficulty in adjusting to the reforms and to the changing social environment. The decline in attendance meant the local parish was no longer a central point in Archdiocesan lives. He compares the 1960s and 1970s to behaviors of his youth:

[T]he Catholic Church was very great at exercising control. And if you go back to old Ireland, the priest was the most powerful guy. And even when I grew up, the priest was more powerful than anybody. You did your dances at the church. You did your basketball games at the church. The church was an integral part of your life. No more. No more. But it used to be, you did everything at the church. Everything functioned out of the church. So that disappeared. I was in a choir, I played basketball in my church, I went to dances in my church: It was the nucleus. Even when I went away to high school, I came back to the church. But after a while, it moved away. You got away. And the churches got smaller; they contracted. A lot of the gut Catholics had gone. Churches got bigger in Westchester. They got bigger, and all the guys from the Bronx, Frank McLaughlin, they all were Bronx guys. Where did they go? They went to Yonkers, and then they went further up in Westchester. So you lost that nucleus of middle-class Catholics. And when you lost them, you lost a lot of power because they were all votes. They were all votes (McLaughlin 2009).

McLaughlin continues:

The parishioners were the voters. Now you see these churches closing. If you go down to the Lower East Side, we just closed a whole bunch of churches down—or said we were going to close. You walk from St. Bridget’s and just walk in a circle, [and] you’re going to walk by fifteen churches. And they’re all empty. They cost a fortune to heat and run, and nobody’s going there. So they’re not collecting any money from the tithing or anything else. And they don’t tithe like the Jews do or the Protestants. They always get by with the basket. (McLaughlin 2009).

In Hell’s Kitchen single people replaced the Catholic families who were once one of the Archdiocese’s strongest church-going groups, according to Democratic District Leader James McManus:
The families moved out of Manhattan and you have pretty much just single people, and they don’t go to Church as much. They’re not involved in the Church. Family people are usually involved in the Church because the kids are going to the Catholic schools and they keep close watch on the Church and the school because their kids are there. So I think it’s the loss of families here in the New York. We lost a lot of the Catholics (McManus 2009).

Apathetic Attitudes

Peter Quinn sees a correlation between leaving the inner city parishes of the Archdiocese and ignoring Church edicts. For Quinn the Archdiocese and its priests lost their authoritative nature. Quinn explains:

I think when there was that cohesiveness, the Church was this voice of authority, and in some ways it was a conflict to have an authority like that. You listen to them. You listen to the priest. What the Cardinal said was important. I don’t think it’s terribly important to most Catholics anymore. And they are a decreasing number. I have a daughter at Fordham Law School, and my son’s at Fordham. They have a total different relationship with the Church than I was raised up on (Quinn 2011).

He adds that ritual was more important when he was being raised in the local parish church.

“[T]he ceremonies, they were the center of their lives. Like Benediction . . . It was very ritually rich and comforting in a way. It could be stultifying. But they’re in another world.”

Judge Andrew Napolitano, biting in his remarks, expresses dismay about the Church losing its religious value. He sees the Archdiocese as a religious institution much more than a cultural or social entity.

Same church, same teachings, same rules; just different discipline. So in the years that you’re interested in, the Church loses its authority over its flock. And its flock loses respect for tradition and teaching. And Catholic politicians believe that they have more freedom to pursue interests and political avenues of richness that are inconsistent with the Church teaching, because the Church will not strike back at them. In a nutshell, that is what happened all over the country, with some exceptions (Napolitano 2014).

Why were Catholics no longer listening? What does it mean? Monsignor Donald Sakano reflected:
We just don’t have a constituency that listens effectively to the political opinions of the Church. Gosh, the mind goes in so many different directions. I’m just thinking how the Church became perceived as being not wishy-washy, but it changes its mind on things. So, you know, during that era, eating meat on Friday was a mortal sin. You’d go to hell if you had a hamburger on Friday, to oops, that no longer counts.

Those sorts of changes rattle people a bit and so to reduce the confidence that what the Church says is true all the time. At the same time people are becoming much more educated, and they can make their own decisions about things. Add to that what people felt was wrong about the birth control issue. Even if, and I’m not even commenting on whether or not they were right in saying the church was wrong. But the majority of people by dint of the number of children that Catholics have, it was wrong. And so the Church does not have a moral voice that dictates how they should vote, ergo the Church loses its political power (Sakano 2011).

Monsignor Sakano further explained how a perceived loss of faithful followers affected the Archdiocese’s influence:

It lost its constituency. Politicians notice that . . . the Catholics voters are not persuaded, even influenced by the Church leaders. They [unwed couples] all live together and say it with impunity. Now that indicates they don’t care about the church’s teaching in that regard. And if they don’t care about the teaching from that part, they don’t care about the teaching of the Church in other parts, whether it’s birth control, divorce . . . right down the line. I mean, they don’t even know what it is much less think that they are obligated to it, or should be obligated to it (Sakano 2011).

Father Duffell puts a sociological spin on reform, power, and the Church doctrine. The power of large numbers and efficacy of community affect the Church’s influence politically and morally:

[I]’t the people that God gathered in a particular place and their numbers are stronger or weaker in terms of the numbers of people that are there. I mean politicians had to listen to the Church. [E]ven . . . today with all of its limitation, any politician would give their right arm to get twelve minutes on a Sunday morning with whatever group of people it might be. People have to make their decisions, but they’re got to be guided. . . . if the preaching is really real, it’s not telling people what to do, but it’s pointing out. The preacher is supposed to know his people so well that he knows their problems, that he speaks the Word of God in such a way that they can bring their problems to him and find some answers. But they’re challenging things too, I mean a lot of times people don’t even preach about social justice which I don’t think you can preach the Word without talking about justice. They go hand in glove. I mean you have to give life to your faith (Duffell 2011).
Moral vision and social justice provide the means through which faith is transmitted, and that if more preaching of this sort were done, parish priests might likely have fewer empty seats during Mass.

“Can the Catholic Church influence by preaching correctly,” asked long time Cuomo advisor John Marino:

Yeah, I think they [can] probably influence . . . other than the most conservative Catholics, very few Catholics pay attention to what the Catholic Church has to say about anything that relates to politics. You think a monsignor or a priest is going to be able to get up at a pulpit a week or two before the election the way it might in a synagogue and say, this Obama is a great guy? People aren’t going to pay attention to that. People don’t give a hoot what the priest says about politics. People don’t give a hoot what the cardinal says about politics.

They want to hear them talk about religion. They want to hear them talk about how they themselves can make it to heaven, how they can live a better life. That’s what they want to hear from the pulpit. And you’ll see people paying attention to the priest doing that. And you know you don’t see that as much in New York anymore as you do in other places. I mean, you go outside New York, you still hear Catholic priests acting like Southern Baptists, you know, with "the Supreme Court has . . ."—I heard about a guy in South Carolina do that . . . : "We have a Supreme Court that decides to legislate things that are immoral.” I don’t hear that kind of stuff locally. And I go to Mass upstate. I’ve actually been pleasantly surprised that they’re not trying to do the politics from the altar anymore. (Marino 2009).

Changing Mores of Catholic Education

We return to the importance of Catholic schools because of their power in creating a flock of faithful congregants. The viability of Catholic schools remains a reflection of the fortunes of the Archdiocese as well. John Marino explained:

Now Catholic schools are falling apart. I don’t understand fully why, but our Catholic schools are falling apart People send kids in the city to Catholic schools is only not to send them to public schools [but also] not to send them either with minorities, which is unfortunate. Or they think the Catholic schools are better. The truth is, I went to Catholic school my whole life until I went to NYU for my second graduate degree, and I didn’t get as good an education as somebody who went to public school. That’s why I’m such a dope. . . . I didn’t get as good an education. I went to Fordham struggling because I went to Catholic school. I thought I knew Latin; I didn’t know Latin, I had not been taught Latin, despite that I went to a Catholic school, Catholic high school. . . . there are good
Catholic schools, but I’ll tell you something, you go to Westchester now where our Catholic school was—and we had a good Monsignor—but we have in our Catholic school maybe eight to ten kids in each class, in some cases, twelve or thirteen. You’re talking about eight grades or nine grades including kindergarten of hundred kids maybe, a little more than a hundred kids, maybe one hundred and fifty kids in an entire school. That school is only kept open because it’s a wealthy parish.

There are these schools in Brooklyn where people send their kids only to keep them away from the public schools but the education is not as good. Teachers aren’t trained the way they are in public schools. There are some lousy public school teachers, sure, but the truth is, is public school teachers are better than the Catholic school teachers and I can make a case that in our area, our public school teachers are probably better than most of these fancy expensive private school teachers but the Catholic schools. I hate to put it this way, but even Catholics look down on the Catholic schools. I love when Monsignor comes over and tells me how, you know, he got two kids, they got two kids into Regents this year, that’s terrific, right? . . . There are smart kids everywhere (Marino 2009).

Catholics No Longer Sending Catholic Kids to Catholic Schools

Monsignor Peter Finn spoke about the disadvantages parochial schools experienced. Among other things they lack Catholic students and can no longer rely on Catholic teachers. He puts a positive spin on the situation but through faint praise he suggests their identity and quality suffer:

Great efforts have been made to make sure that people that we do bring in to our system have a Catholic identity. It’s a part of a whole new realization which I am part of too and to make sure that they were confident and trained. You get good people [as teachers] and I had one here before school opened this last year in mathematics, Columbia graduate. We knew we wouldn’t have her for long. We had her for a year, [and] they call her up before school opens and offer her a job and she has no choice. The money differential is too big so she goes (Finn 2011).

Fiscally Untenable

The Archdiocese’s fiscal stability put in question its ability to maintain its institutions. Stephen Aiello noted that “at a time when [churches, hospitals and social service facilities] were built . . . you had many more students going to parochial schools that you don’t have now. Now,
as far as the numbers are concerned, I think it’s just a matter of finance; they can’t support the systems that they have” (Aiello 2009).

“I know the schools declined,” Reverend Jenik said, blaming tuition and an increase in demand for Catholic school education from families who did not have the financial wherewithal. James McManus agreed that the fiscal situation was untenable:

[T]hey lost parishioners. They lost money. They lost their schools in many cases. The Archdiocese had to support the different schools that they wanted to keep open and the whole system kind of broke down. With the lack of money from the Archdiocese, [there was] a lack of influence. When you give money you have a lot of influence, and they lost it. The Church just went down with the neighborhoods (McManus 2009).

McManus cites a specific example to make his point:

[T]he Archdiocese has been supporting Holy Cross Catholic School, which is on 42nd Street and Sacred Heart Catholic School which is on 51st Street. You know they only have four hundred, five hundred students in that. When I went there, there was fifteen hundred. You know but there’s only four or five hundred and even with that, they have to charge tuition because the Church no longer can keep the schools running, for many reasons, not only the lack of . . . money coming in. It’s also the expense for teachers. You don’t have the nuns and the brothers who were cheap labor. You know with nuns, you feed them and the brothers, you feed them. You gave them a roof over their head and you had twenty-four hour workers seven days a week. So a lot of them have lay teachers because they don’t have the religious people (McManus 2009).

Monsignor Finn held a somewhat more positive view. “Truthfully,” he said,” the Church continued, at a pretty steady pace, even today. I think some of the statistics show that people are still there and with us,’ but, he admits that the people are “not in the numbers they were in terms of regular participation in church life. I lost people [from school] this year that had no desire to pull their kids out but they can’t afford it. This, in the face of the fact that we are the only democracy in the world that doesn’t support non-public education…that, to me, is very sad.”

The Archdiocese faces a structural problem; parents cannot afford to pay tuition. “Three hundred something per month. [The school] sustains itself by fundraising. It sustains itself by whatever we can get from the parish collections. We underwrote the school this year with $145,000” (Finn
Journalist Sam Roberts agreed:

[The Archdiocese of New York] scaled back its activities because things were expensive; because the teachers unionized. They used to have free teachers, in effect. The expenses went up. Maintenance of the facilities went up, and they lost a lot of the wealthy power base that supported it, a middle-class power base that supported it (Roberts 2009).

*Schools Located in Parts of the City Where Catholic Kids Don’t Live*

The demand for Catholic school education is not new to the present era. Aureo Cardona remembers that in the 1950s “grammar schools were full. If you remember, the Catholic elementary schools had one grade, one class per grade. That grade was full so I couldn’t go there. So what they did was they bused me from St. Antoninus on Fox and Tiffany St. to St. Catherine of Siena on 86th between York and 1st” (Cardona 2011). He admits leaving the South Bronx for the Upper East Side to attend school was difficult. “I went over there, and I was first fighting with the Italians and then Irish and the German kids. But eventually I became part of the family. It was okay. Some of the kids that were on the bus, darker kids, darker skin, Latino kids, it was hell and they never really integrated” (Cardona 2011).

Returning to the social issues he perceived to be responsible for the changes confronting the city and the Archdiocese of New York, Michael Long noted:

There was a force . . . I think the biggest exodus was because of forced school busing. They didn’t want their kids to be shipped to another end of town. People had bought their homes or rented apartments in places like Maspeth and Cyprus Hills and Glendale and all of a sudden strangers show up. Blacks were being boarded to these schools. Schools started to decline because of racial problems. So people just picked up, sold their houses, g[0]t out of their apartments and went out to Long Island because of education. So I think education was a key factor that young people just picked up and left. The answer is you have now almost four million people living out in Long Island, in Nassau and Suffolk County (Long 2009).

Reacting to the idea that Catholic schools were lingering in places where Catholics had
been moving away, Monsignor Sakano remarked: “Certainly large attendance was gone. A struggling school was there, I taught in the school in the 1970s. And the student body was from all over New York City. It was not an indigenous local school” Sakano 2011).

*Competing with Other “Choices”—Charters, Good Public Schools*

The white ethnic exodus created a condition that had not existed before for the Archdiocese’s schools. Parochial school education kept the loyal faithful. Now it had competition from city schools. And competition with free schools had its consequences.

Stephen Aiello noted that the Archdiocese:

voiced issues of financial problems and competition from non-Catholic schools. People now had other choices.

To his credit, [Cardinal] Egan put the financial house in order, but looked to close [schools]. They want to lease those schools for specialty districts like District 2 in Manhattan, District 6 in Manhattan. [When] they talk about a declining enrollment, enrollment of people going to school, it may not be a declining number in the population. And remember I think to hear, one of the concerns of the Catholic Church in New York is the growing number of Hispanics who kind of moving towards an evangelical Protestantism away from Catholicism so I think that’s part of it too (Aiello 2009).

Competition is not simply for school attendance, finances and stature, but also for the newest immigrants’ loyalty.

Peter Powers felt that:

The Church’s strength was always in urban settings. You had a lot of poorer people who needed the church [to] come in. People got more educated, they moved away. They didn’t need the church as much. They found other things to do. There was more likelihood they’d go to public schools because they always moved to a district with great public schools. Did you ever see a couple buy a house first time, their first house with kids, did you hear them say, I bought this house and it’s got a lousy school district? The first thing they say it’s got a school district because that’s what people look for. We didn’t need the Catholic schools at this point.

Herman Badillo noted the different perceptions of public and parochial schools when he was growing up:
[W]e felt the parochial schools were inferior to the public schools because we had standards in the schools but now there are no standards in the schools. Ask anybody—Puerto Rican, black or whatever background—given the choice, they’ll go a parochial school. In closing down parochial schools, the Catholics are closing down what is a basic constituency for them and a loyal constituency and the parochial school kids do far better than the public school kids, even though they may be Hispanic. They’re going to go to parochial high schools and they’re going to go to religious colleges like Fordham . . . and they are going to bring in money and they would contribute to the church, like Sonia Sotomayor does. She’s a product of the parochial schools, not of the public schools (Badillo 2009).

**Conclusion**

The decline of the Church’s political power that these interviews suggest is directly related to the reduction in private sector unions and the decline of Catholic schools as the unique and only choice of Catholics. Therefore, as the cradle-to-grave system created by Archbishop Hughes unraveled, the spiritual and physical reasons for the parish and Church to remain connected were severely diminished.
CHAPTER VI. DEMOGRAPHIC SHIFTS

Major demographic changes within the boundaries of the Archdiocese have underpinned many organizational and political shifts of the Catholic Church in New York City. As I have outlined throughout this dissertation they include: a decline in the number of parishes and churches in the Bronx and Manhattan; a dilution in the religious identity of Catholics in the region; a decline in the number of priests and nuns, including those teaching in the parochial school system; a change in the importance of Catholic education; new patterns of migration; and an exodus of a significant percentage of the Catholic community from the city to suburbia.

Questions remain: What sense did parishioners make of the changes enumerated above? And how could the Archdiocese of New York operate within its new political and demographic realities?

Many of my interlocutors saw the social and political shifts in the city, the exodus of white ethnic Catholics from the Archdiocese and the in-migration of Hispanic Catholics to the city, as equally significant factors in creating new realities. Interviewees were critical of the Archdiocese for failing to plan for these changing realities and for failing to respond to the changes as they occurred.

The problems the Archdiocese faced were not unique to New York City. In fact, archdioceses throughout the nation were facing similar issues but their responses were quite different in most cases. The 2003 National Study of Parish Reorganization by the Conference for Pastoral Planning and Development found that: “Many dioceses and parishes have little or no experience with the conditions, issues, and structures that are encountered in the course of parish reorganization. The experience is frequently one of exploring uncharted territory and devising new ways to respond to these new conditions” (Conference for Pastoral Planning and
Development 2003). The Archdiocese of New York was organizationally ill-prepared for such changes. Confronted with comprehensive shifts in its environment, it failed to mount a formal planning process to address these shifts effectively.

Some have argued that the New York Archdiocese may have over-anticipated the “market” for its goods and services. During the Spellman era a building program of schools and parish churches within the Bronx and Manhattan was undertaken to serve European Catholic immigrant populations and provide them with communal, religious and social service facilities. The construction included hospitals, schools, parish churches, universities, nursing homes, and orphanages. But the Archdiocese had no insider knowledge of the shifting Catholic population. Nor could it affect where Catholics lived. The Archdiocese believed that the poor were the responsibility of the Church (Brown & McKeown 1997). And so where there was space, multiple facilities were built in the same neighborhoods. As populations shifted beginning in the mid-20th century, re-siting these facilities was not a consideration. Franciscan Father Michael Weldon describes the institutional dilemma the Church faced in ministering to peripatetic souls while maintaining a real estate portfolio:

There is no indication that Catholic Christianity is dying out in this country. The latest statistics in fact show growth with infant and adult baptisms every year. Still, the skylines of our cities are marked with the spires of an age of Catholic Church life now gone, shattered by history and social movements beyond all of our control, and maybe the best we can do is grieve as well (Weldon 2004, xviii).

In what was probably a long-term stance of denial, the New York Archdiocese did not even begin to adopt a formal re-organization plan until the early 21st century, commissioning studies that were made public only in 2006. New York Times reporter Michael Luo describes the situation the Archdiocese had to address:

[The church confronted] a growing shortage of priests, coupled with the changing demographics of the archdiocese, which in its entirety stretches from Staten Island in the
south to the Catskills in the north. Some churches in the northern suburbs have been bulging at the seams, while others in the city have struggled to get by, often requiring large financial subsidies from the Archdiocese (Luo 2006).

Other Catholic jurisdictions faced with the same issues responded earlier. For example, the Diocese of Syracuse produced a 200 page document in 1988, “Reconfiguration: A Diocesan Study Document,” (Lang 1988). The Archdiocese of Chicago, with an estimated Catholic population of 2.3 million, commenced planning for a different future, in 1992, and issued Tomorrow’s Parish, a guidebook to set the course (Archdiocese of Chicago 2006). Planning for the future was described as a means to allow Chicago to be “an evangelizing Church that reaches out to transform our society into a civilization of love” (Archdiocese of Chicago 1998, 3). Such planning was considered to be within the context of the mission of the Archdiocese of Chicago and implied that re-organization was a religious duty. San Francisco's Archdiocese, experiencing an exodus to the suburbs by white ethnic Catholics, began its realignment process in 1989 (Weldon 2004). In contrast, like its counterpart across the East River, the Diocese of Brooklyn did not announce a clearly defined planning process until 2005 (Brooklyn Diocese Pastoral Planning Mission Statement 2005).

**Population Growth**

The area the Archdiocese of New York covers—New York County (Manhattan), Bronx County, Richmond County (Staten Island), and Putnam, Orange, Dutchess, Rockland, Sullivan, Westchester and Ulster counties—experienced population growth into the 21st century. Data gathered from the 2000 U.S. Census show that in the geographic area covered by the Archdiocese of New York there were 5.5 million residents, an eight percent increase over the previous census (U.S. Census 2000). The population growth was most significant in the northern
portion of the Archdiocese and not in the city. The Archdiocese issued a statement from Cardinal Edward Egan on March 13, 2006, in which he said:

Over the past 50 years, there has been an extraordinary change in where the Catholic faithful of the Archdiocese reside. For example, somewhat more than 25 per cent of our parishes are located in the borough of Manhattan, even though only around 12 per cent of our people currently live there. In large numbers, Catholic families have been moving to the so-called “upper counties,” such as Rockland, Orange, Dutchess, and Putnam, where they clearly and urgently need to be served (Egan 2006).

In a press release issued on March 28, 2006 discussing the “re-alignment” of its operations, The Archdiocese announced the closure of 15 parishes, including eight in its New York City boroughs and seven in Westchester, Orange, and Dutchess counties. Fourteen schools were also recommended to be shuttered. A longer list of parish mergers and school and parish closings was issued in January 2007. Of new churches to be built in this “realignment” two of nine churches were located in New York City, St. John Neuman in Staten Island and St. John Nam, in the Bronx, which was mandated to be relocated (Archdiocese of New York 2007).

In 1908, one hundred years after the Archdiocese of New York was established, the Bronx, Manhattan, and Staten Island together contained four times the population of the remaining northern counties of the Archdiocese. By 1970, however, approximately 35 percent of Archdiocesan members lived in its northern counties. In 2000 that number rose to 40 percent.

**Realignment**

The closings of schools and parishes announced in 2006 under the “realignment” were a precursor. In January 2007, an additional twenty-one parishes were slated to be closed.

“Cardinal Egan originally intended to plunge into the redrawing of parish lines soon after he became archbishop in 2000, but the scandal over sexual abuse by priests made him put it off” (Luo 2007).
What role did race and ethnicity play in the Archdiocese of New York’s decision to reorganize? Did the Archdiocese officials simply decide to “follow the money” to the suburbs while abandoning the New York City boroughs within its territory? Data from the United States Census give a sketch of changes occurring in the demographics of the area that the Archdiocese covers. For example, 51 percent of the population of the ten counties the Archdiocese includes was white (U.S. Census 2000). Interestingly, its black population nearly doubled from the 1990 to the 2000 census, from nine to sixteen percent. The white population had declined by five percent while the Hispanic population had grown by 25 percent from the 1990 to the 2000 census. The 2000 census also shows that in 2000, 24 percent of the area's population was under the age of eighteen—approximately 1.5 million—15 percent higher than in the 1990 census (U.S. Census 2000; U.S. Census 1990).

The Archdiocese’s Irish Hierarchy

The Irish domination of the Archdiocese of New York has historical and sociological roots that stretch back centuries. The Church’s diocesan structure was created in the twelfth century and has lasted with few changes into modern times (Richter 1988). This relatively unchanging organization explains, at least in part, the rigidity of its decision making. Additionally, British colonialism lent political legitimacy to Irish Catholicism as its religiosity took on an oppositional ethos. The poverty and oppression that the Irish suffered at the hands of the British created the social conditions that allowed for the flourishing of religion and otherworldliness in opposition to daily life. The identification of the Church with a collective solidarity would serve Irish immigrants and their offspring well in New York. Marx and Engel’s description of the power of religion is apt, although most believers would reject its call for the
Religious distress is at the same time the expression of real distress and also the protest against real distress. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of the heartless world, just as it is the spirit of a spiritless condition. It is the opium of the people. To abolish religion as the illusory happiness of the people is to demand their real happiness. The demand to give up illusions about the existing state of affairs is the demand to give up a state which needs illusions. The criticism of religion is, therefore, in embryo the criticism of the vale of tears, the halo of which is religion (Marx and Engels 1975, 38).

The Irish used politics to protect the Church from political power imposed from outside. In writing about the Catholic Church in Ireland, social scientist Ted Titley notes that “the sphere of influence of the Catholic clergy . . . extended into Irish political life,” with the goal of “preserving the purely Catholic nature of [their] institutions . . . [T]hey supported the stance taken by the hierarchy on the question of state versus Church control” (1983, 10). The laity and membership of the Church in Ireland did not have a voice in the conduct of Archdiocesan activities. Ttitley writes:

The relationship between these two groupings [clergy and laity] is by definition a paternalistic one, for the clergy purport to teach a body of divinely-revealed truths and dispense spiritual favors….Theological suppositions are not the product of consensus opinion, but of revelation which comes down through the clerical hierarchy. In a world of unquestionable eternal verities there is little room for individual inquiry or democratic debate (Titley 1983, 151).

It is not a surprise then that the institutional behavior of the Catholic Church in Ireland would be replicated as much as possible by the Irish-dominated Archdiocese of New York. Although they ministered to congregations, the priests in Ireland and in New York were not decision-makers—that role rested with the bishops and authorities, in Rome. The local clergy remained messengers within “a system of beliefs in a divine or superhuman power and practices of worship or other rituals directed towards such a power” (Argyle and Beit-Hallahmi 1975, 1).

What both the Church in Ireland and in New York did was to practice a religious model
much different from the one practiced in continental Europe. Michael Argyle and Ben Beit-Hallahmi contend in *The Social Psychology of Religion*, that the traditional church and practice of the religion were “pushed to the periphery of modern life, while in the US . . . religion has undergone a process of internal secularization, which has kept it ‘modern’ and visible. Much of the functions—[be] they social, psychological, or cultural—fulfilled by American churches should be considered secular rather than religious in the traditional sense” (Argyle and Beit-Hallahmi 1975, 27). It can certainly be argued that the cradle-to-grave service delivery system practiced by the Archdiocese fits that description; the system was critical to bind new Catholic immigrants to the Archdiocese (Wood 2002).

**Catholic Schools Play a Role**

Catholic schools hoped to provide a “moral-political content” in the face of this assimilation and acculturation:

The Catholic Church had long offered schools for its own faith community, and beginning in the 1970s, as public schools in poor inner-city neighborhoods deteriorated, urban Catholic schools opened their doors to non-Catholics. For instance, in New York State, minority [non-Catholic] enrollment in Catholic schools increased from 12 per cent in 1970 to 36 per cent in 1991. In the New York City borough of the Bronx, the minority enrollment in the early 1990s was up to 85 per cent (Cimino and Lattin 1998, 165).

The development of the Irish school system was profoundly influenced by the presence of a politically powerful Catholic priesthood because of the traditional importance the Church attached to the priesthood’s educational functions. The Church claimed “a special place in the education of youth . . . [It sought] the sole right to direct the education of Catholic children, including the supervision of all secular teaching, to insure the exclusion of ideas contrary to the faith” (Titley 1983, 5). The management of education would be the responsibility of local parish priests and local dioceses. Sociologist Grace Davie explains in *The Sociology of Religion*, “[i]t
may indeed be the case that one function of religion is to mitigate the hardships of this world and so disguise them” (2007, 27). In this country, the Catholic Church certainly functioned in part to create a parallel America, a self-governing Catholic America with its own rules that determined whether its adherents would find eternal rest in heaven or eternal damnation in hell. Such beliefs had a powerful hold on American Catholics, prompting them to follow diocesan dictates without much question at least until the convening of the Second Vatican Council.

**Puerto Ricans Have Trouble Integrating**

The difficulties that Puerto Rican migrants experienced integrating into the Catholic community in New York were summarized in a 1972 letter to Terrence Cardinal Cooke:

> One half of the Catholics are Spanish speaking. Of the 407 parishes of the archdiocese, 97 provide services in Spanish. Among the over 1,100 diocesan priests, 134 speak some Spanish and for four of them, it is their native language. In the parishes staffed by religious orders, there are 68 Spanish-speaking priests, 16 of them native speakers. In addition there are 76 native Spanish-speaking priests working in our parishes, although for the most part, they are considered visitors to the Archdiocese (Diaz-Stevens 1993, 205).

This was not news to the Archdiocese. To address the issues it convened a conference in 1955 in San Juan, Puerto Rico under the direction of Cooke’s predecessor Cardinal Spellman. The objectives were to identify strategies to confront the Archdiocese’s changing demographics. In the dedication of the *Report of the First Conference on the Spiritual Care of Puerto Rican Migrants*, Cardinal Spellman himself wrote that:

> Puerto Ricans are Catholics, ninety per cent of them at least. In fact, in New York City about one of every four baptized persons is probably Spanish-American. They arrive on our Continental mainland with the Cross about their necks and in their hearts…but with no priests to attend their migration. Theirs is the first such Catholic group in the history of American migration (quoted in Ferree, Fitzpatrick and Illich 1955, 7-8).

Unlike other immigrant groups, they brought no priests with them because there were
none to bring. The Conference reported that one parish in Puerto Rico contained “92,000 souls and seven priests . . . [in a] geographical area, sometimes approaching a hundred square miles, covered by a single parish—so often by a single priest” (Ibid., 17). With a terrain that was often mountainous, priests traveled by foot or mule. And to the chagrin of many a Catholic on the mainland Puerto Rican culture bore little resemblance to the Catholicism of the American Archdiocese of New York. While the Irish and Puerto Ricans shared a colonial legacy, times had changed and Puerto Rican nationalism was at odds with the ideological staples of the conservative Cardinals Spellman and Cooke.

A Cultural Divide

The cultural divide between the Archdiocese’s hierarchy and its Puerto Rican congregants may have been as significant as any other factor in explaining the inability to bring Puerto Ricans into the pews to replace departing white ethnic Catholics. The decentralized and egalitarian Pentecostal sects managed to succeed where the city’s largest religious denomination could not by harnessing the power of culture. “The Pentecostals,” Herman Badillo recalls, “came up with the idea of having more than just sermons in the church and they began to have music and entertainment and they brought in even more people, Puerto Ricans and other Hispanics, to the church because they became a form of entertainment” (Badillo June 2009). While in:

1961 there were 42 Catholic parishes in New York City with Spanish-speaking Roman Catholic priests, but only one was Puerto Rican. By contrast, preachers and ministers of Pentecostal churches in New York were almost all Puerto Ricans, which meant that in such churches members could rise rapidly…. [F]ully 50 per cent of Puerto Rican marriages were being conducted in Protestant churches (Badillo 2006, 83).

Catholic education existed in Puerto Rico, but was barely a factor in daily life. It might have accustomed Island parishioners to the necessity of a religious education, but, as in parish
life, the Church struggled to meet the needs of its members. The Cardinal’s Conference report of 
1955 found “25,000 children in parochial schools, [and] 500,000 in public schools. . . . It must be 
assumed, therefore, that a greater number of the Puerto Ricans still lack instruction in even the 
basic essentials of their religion” (Ferree, Fitzpatrick and Illich 1955, 19).

The Archdiocese frequently concentrated its energies on what was different about New 
York’s new arrivals. They spoke a different language and had, according to the Archdiocese, a 
different sense of basic morality. The 1955 Conference reported that in Puerto Rico:

[T]he most serious moral problems are centered in the family, in attitudes toward sexual 
behavior, in consensual unions, in the broken family, in the care of children. This creates 
serious problems for the family on the Island; it also leaves the family exposed to serious 
problems when they come to New York. . . . Consensual unions account for about 25 per 
cent of the marriages in Puerto Rico. About 30 per cent of the children are illegitimate 
(Ferree, Fitzpatrick and Illich 1955, 30).

The report noted that the same trends were continuing in the Puerto Rican community in New 
York City.

No National Parishes

Puerto Ricans, however, were not to be given the same community-based parish support 
that had begun with the Italians and extended to other immigrant groups. National parishes 
existed in areas throughout the Archdiocese. On Manhattan’s West Side, for example, parishes 
where liturgy was conducted in parishioners’ native language were well established. The national 
parishes, instrumental in creating social networks to conquer New York’s vast and often clannish 
job market, became launching grounds for political action and were the norm in the Archdiocese 
(McManus 2009).

The concept of the national parishes is well defined by Fordham University sociologist 
Reverend Joseph P. Fitzpatrick who wrote:
In Catholic life, [the] immigrant community was centered in the national parish. It seems very doubtful that the immigrant would have kept the Faith, had he not had the constant support of his own people in this type of community which more or less reproduced in the United States the little village from which he or his people had come. It is becoming more widely recognized today that the practice of the Faith is much more a cultural matter than we had previously been willing to admit . . . the national parish provided an opportunity for a gradual transition to American ways. The slow drift from the national parish was associated with a gradual adjustment to American customs and a growing familiarity with the ways in which the Faith was practiced in the United States. Therefore, by the time the immigrant children had become American; they had learned also how to be Catholic in an American way (1955, 84).

But an alternate decision was made regarding the Puerto Rican immigrant community, which was to integrate Puerto Ricans into existing parishes. The fear was that the Puerto Ricans were not “culturally” suited to be part of the Catholic fabric of New York. In the minds of the Archdiocese’ leadership Puerto Ricans were hardly proper Catholics in behavior, liturgy, or basic education. The Cardinal concluded after the 1955 Conference that the only way they would be brought to the faith was to be integrated into the Archdiocese. No national parishes for Puerto Ricans.

These were hardly the Catholics desired by New York white ethnics as pastoral partners, nor, based upon Fitzgerald’s writing, were they accepted by its priests. Dolan goes on to write that:

[T]his clash of cultural emphases and presuppositions at the religious level led American Catholics to complain about the religious “bad habits” of the Puerto Ricans, precisely at the level of authority and sexual morality. Accustomed to measure Catholic loyalty by a strict fidelity to institutionally mandated practices such as regular attendance at Mass, compliance with one’s “Easter duty” and to the laws of fasting and abstinence, American Catholics were shocked at the Puerto Ricans (Dolan and Vidal 1994, 67).

White Ethnics

In Democracy’s Promise: Immigrants & American Civic Institutions, Janelle Wong writes that “scholars who have traced European groups as they evolved from marginal to full-
fledged members of the white majority argue that contestation over white status and the
construction of whiteness are critical elements for understanding the unequal distribution of
social, economic, legal, and political power” (2006, 18). Blue-collar, Catholic ethnics judged
Puerto Ricans to be other than white despite the lack of status those same white ethnics had
experienced and the prejudice they had faced.

Puerto Ricans’ “bad Catholicism” and the stigma of being non-white made them unquestionably unacceptable. They faced these hostilities without recourse to their own community, i.e., the national parishes (Ferree, Fitzpatrick and Illich 1955). If integration of these “bad Catholics” was to be achieved at all, it would only be through their “bleaching,” which in Cardinal Spellman’s era required political re-education. After all, the hero of New York’s Puerto Rican community was Vito Marcantonio, a stalwart of the Communist Party’s popular front and American Labor Party congressman, who by Cardinal Spellman’s measure was a communist.

Differential Decision-Making

Archdiocese policies that were in force during the Irish and Italian waves of immigration were not in evidence for the newest and most numerous Catholics arriving in New York. The Archdiocese kept its parishes operating while the Bronx burned and urban renewal uprooted existing communities, but the needs of the Puerto Ricans overwhelmed the social service networks and were only modestly addressed by the post-Spellman Archdiocese. And Puerto Ricans did not fit into the Archdiocese’s power triangle in the same manner as the Irish had, as Tammany was dying. They were even less purposeful to the reformers or new Democrats whose sights remained focused on issues very different from the needs of the struggling migrants.

Puerto Ricans were hardly accepted in local parishes. As Ana Maria Diaz-Stevens (1993)
documents, they were banished to the basements of parish churches where they would hold services. The same discrimination against Puerto Ricans in their local churches was extended to the priests who ministered to them in Spanish. Thus rather than creating a sense of unification, integration and assimilation, Cardinal Spellman created instead a centrally controlled two-tiered Archdiocese, where the hierarchy defined those who worshipped “upstairs” and those who worshipped “downstairs.” Consequently, it was only in the Protestant and Pentecostal churches where Puerto Ricans could become leaders. The same pattern continued during Cardinal Cooke’s era, when issues confronting the increasing number of new migrants were consigned to the Office of the Spanish Speaking Apostolate.

The Seventies

The demand-making that accompanied rising social movements around the country during the 1970s did not spare the Archdiocese. Although conservative clergy headed the Office of the Spanish Speaking Apostolate (but the Office did employ many Latinos), they demanded changes. The Office sought a Spanish-speaking Vicar General within the Chancery who had power to create change: the appointment of auxiliary bishops who were Hispanics plus community involvement in decision-making.

The Cardinal and the Archdiocesan hierarchy responded, and the result was a “series of inconclusive meetings and exchanged memorandum. . . . [T]he final strategy was to reduce the staff of the Office of the Spanish-Speaking Apostolate” (Diaz-Stevens 1993, 214). Priests who had not been involved with the Office were in some cases rewarded with promotions, while those identified with the Office and its activism were shunted aside. Ultimately, the office was reduced to insignificance. The Archdiocese in the Spellman and Cooke years came “to see its ministry to
Puerto Ricans in terms of converting them from a defective form of Hispano-Caribbean Catholicism to an American form of Catholicism, and to hope this could be done in one generation” (Dolan and Vidal 1994, 69).

The Archdiocese did not in the immediate post-Spellman period use its moral clout nor its perceived political clout to fight for its newest parishioners. Similarly the political machine was consumed by its fight against reformers. It sought instead to follow a pattern of New York State politics dating back to the Constitutional Convention of 1894: keep the less powerful powerless by allowing them little representation or access to power. Those overtures that were made to Puerto Ricans were heroic actions initiated by parish priests who saw a human disaster and sought with their limited budgets and tools to help those that they could. The result would be an Archdiocese in crisis during a radically changed political environment.

White Flight

White ethnics in New York City were involved in a proto-social movement of their own. Fueled by resentment, fear, and a large dose of beckoning opportunity blue-collar Catholics from the city hovered somewhere between being activists and foot soldiers in a movement of white flight. Robert Tierney, former New York City Landmarks Preservation Commission chair and aide to Mayor Edward I. Koch, speaks to why whites left the city:

I think it’s all kinds of motivations. Sort of better, you know, go over the border, better yourself, do better than the next generation. I think those are the sort of higher motives that affect every series of generations. And then I think things were not so good . . . there were periods of, say you go back to the ’70s, crime and other things where whole neighborhoods were really teetering and I think that helped push so-called “white flight” . . . huge swaths of the Bronx and huge swaths of Queens and Brooklyn . . . underwent that and I think it was just that a huge sociological, political event (Tierney 2009).

Tierney saw suburbanization as the desire for a better life, as did Bishop Jenik., White flight,
however, would seem to include concerns about the rise of the non-white, possibly non-Catholic population. Sam Roberts was more blunt:

Blacks. They were afraid of blacks. You know, starting after the [Second World] War, you had the suburbs opening up. New York was becoming the anti-suburb. The suburbs became the anti-city. . . . [P]eople wanted that Levittown backyard and little house for their kids and stuff. And part of it was the city was becoming more threatening racially and ethnically. It was not the city that they remembered. It was not the old story, the Ed Koch story of the woman who asked him to make it like it was, the woman he met on the boardwalk and [Koch] said he never had the heart to tell her it never was really what she thought it was. But people had this image of much better times, totally forgetting the Depression and all sorts of other things, and wanted to relive that, and felt more and more threatened in a city that seemed to be going out of control. You go back to 1960 and people were terrified of crime. So everything is relative. They were terrified of crime, and . . . more and more of the crime was being committed by blacks, by Puerto Ricans… white people wanted to move away from that (Roberts 2009).

Wanting a better life and moving to the suburbs meant escaping from non-Catholic newcomers; and from not only crime but also the fear of crime. Former city councilmember and land use lobbyist Walter McCaffrey noted racist reasons for many Catholics leaving:

[T]hey didn’t want to end up being now in a situation where they were going to be living next to African Americans or Latinos. So you saw for example in housing projects that had a high concentration at one time of Irish Catholics living there, now those folks were starting an egress. In some cases they would go to the northern Bronx, for example. Eventually they would end up going into Westchester, or you would see in Long Island. You would see that exodus heading in that type of direction. Also they tended to do better financially now with jobs, coming from union jobs they were able to afford buying a house on the Island (McCaffrey 2011).

Perhaps the answer to what motivated whites to leave the city includes several factors. Stephen Aiello alludes to a confluence of reasons that suburbanization appealed to many New Yorkers:

Well I can tell you from family experience. We stayed in the city, the Aiello family, but here was a time when I was born through the time that I got married and left about ninety percent of our families left. I didn’t see it as much as after [the] Second World War, but after the Korean War, I would say close to half of my relatives who were just married, or they were married a few years, started to move out and why? Because they could get as they saw much better value for their money. Two, the value also meant that they could get a little back yard. Italians also have a thing about you know the land, and you could get that the Levittowns, the developments in East Islip, in Patchogue, in Brentwood, where
else did they go? I’m trying to think but one was just on an economic basis. That was number one. You could get more for your money and you’d have some space and there was the thought too that places in the city were becoming less desirable. The taxes were going up, minorities were moving in . . . crime went up, so I think there was a little bit of racial bias involved in it. Team that with the economics and you thought you could get a better way of life by leaving the city (Aiello 2009).

New York’s white ethnics left their city and their parishes; and if they chose to remain practicing Catholics, they took their ethnic identities and their Catholicism with them to new locales. Unlike its counterpart in Boston, however, the Archdiocese in New York took no steps to stop the exodus of its flock (Gamm 1999).

Black Power

The movement of whites to the suburbs had a corollary: Black power. It was both a cause of and reaction to the white exodus from the nation’s cities. As my interlocutors have explained racial anxieties and fears motivated some of the flight to the suburbs. In addition, that flight created a partial political vacuum taken up by minority politicians and social movements. The social and political movements were accompanied by cultural movements that asserted Black is beautiful, championed Afrocentricity, and advocated Puerto Rican pride. The Black Panther Party and Young Lords captured the attention of radical youth and the fear and loathing from older and conservative whites.

Stephen Aiello pinpointed the beginning of the Black power movement, the reaction of the non-black population to it, and its influence on the Archdiocese:

I think you started to see the diminishing of the so-called Roosevelt Democratic coalition [in] 1968. I believe you started to see the increased influence in the Democratic Party of communities of color but specifically then African American, the somewhat beginnings of the feminist movement. You had the Voting Rights Act three years before, you have the Civil Rights Act, four years before. I believe you started to see the real beginning of change in the Democratic Party, the loss of influence by white working class ethnic Catholics, and by the Italian American group. I think that culminated if you can do this historically, in the 1980 election of Ronald Reagan (Aiello 2009).
Peter Quinn answered why blacks organized to create power: “As this industrial base of small industries died in New York, there were no jobs . . . nobody planned that. You had the greatest migration in American history is from the South – of American blacks to northern cities when the industrial base is dying,” (Quinn 2011).

Aureo Cardona said:

Remember now, how blacks when they came to the city, especially . . . I’m talking about my community. When they came to my community, they were used to very strong social justice preaching and they were used to going to the Church to hide from social injustice. You run the Church so the Klan doesn’t burn you out. So the Church was an important place for them. Much different than for Puerto Ricans. We didn’t have to do that because nobody chased us except the cops. So we always accepted our priests as . . . they walk on water, whatever they do. They don’t have to do anything for me but my soul. Black communities were used to . . . the firebrand preachers. And because it was a movement going on in this country at the time. So when the blacks moved into the South Bronx it was a different black community. They didn’t want to go into our churches and hear Latin, preaching bullshit you couldn’t even understand, and then go back into social injustice of the street and not have them say anything about it. They’re not going to buy that . . . and the Catholic Church wasn’t going after them, wasn’t reaching out to them (Cardona 2011).

“You had the rise of Black Power which scared the shit out of anybody who wasn’t black, at the time,” remarked Daniel Chill. “The city was dirty. The city was crime ridden. The city was racist. The city was broke. The parents . . . they left the neighborhoods for a better life” (Chill 2009). And based upon Daniel Chill’s analysis, they were scared by Blacks and ran from them to what they perceived as safer neighborhoods. Empowerment and Black Power had a positive meaning for Blacks, but a negative meaning for non-blacks.

Former labor leader Edward Ott casts the effects of the Black power movement in a more positive light than some of my interlocutors.

[T]hey’re not Catholics. Let’s go back. . . . pre-Voting Rights Act . . . white ethnic politics makes complete sense because blacks are almost barred from voting even in places like New York. They come out of the South, they’re not voters. They believe that they’re going to be creating problems if they show up at the polls. Once the Voting
Rights Act is passed, this country begins to change dramatically. The validation of African Americans as voters, which Johnson signs, sends a message to every other group and women’s movement takes up the banner . . . the same rhetoric as the civil rights movement. Gays take up the same thing. The whole politic changes. The whole thought process is the how deals are made. It’s completely changed once the Voting Rights Act passes. Everybody’s in the game, and you’ve got to let African American’s vote, in America, everybody can vote (Ott 2009).

“Here the Church has taken a much more principled stand on the immigration issue than it did on the racial issue in civil rights," Bruce Gyory observed:

It [the Archdiocese of New York] wasn’t outright hostile to civil rights, but it wasn’t in the vanguard of civil rights. Neither [Cardinal Francis] Spellman nor [his successor Cardinal Terrence] Cooke had the same kind of pastoral influence. The Irish were always pitted against the blacks and . . . you had that. Now we’ve had a diminution in that now towards the blacks. It was almost I think in the Catholic opinion there was a revolution (Gyory 2009).

According to Frank Macchiarola, Blacks, just as the Catholics had done, used their churches as organizing locales. Theology, according to Macchiarola, became less important than the ability to create power for communities that had felt powerless:

[T]he way the blacks get to where they are was to find leaders in religious communities. But that’s not a religion. There’s no religion there. There’s a group of churches that have a political agenda. But there’s, the depth, theological depth of most of the church ministers who are in the social leadership, the theological depth is about four inches. Political activism gets them there. And . . . you see the ripple effect . . . in parishes that gradually changed over. The next generation, the generation of people moving in [today] are much more tolerant. If you deal with this generation, you see enormous change. I mean, that’s what makes Obama very believable as a candidate. It’s a point of pride. Once the blacks elect somebody, the blacks start to judge those people on the same basis that they judge everybody else. They’re not stupid. They say, you fooled me once, I’m not being fooled again (Macchiarola 2009).

For Macchiarola, Black Power was a creation of leaders nurtured by the religious community, but not of religion itself, which was quite entirely different from the Irish experience.

The Arrival of Puerto Ricans

The Puerto Ricans in the post-World War II era moved to a city amidst a social, economic
and demographic revolution. The Archdiocese had lost its tools for maintaining solidarity in the rapidly changing white ethnic neighborhoods of Manhattan and the Bronx. It had to contend with six hundred thousand new Catholic migrants from Puerto Rico who arrived in New York City during the period of 1940-1960 (Cohalan 1983, 296). By 1965, their number increased to 750,000 with nearly 250,000 settling in the Bronx alone (Cohalan 1983, 296). Puerto Ricans maintained the Catholic population’s equilibrium in terms of absolute numbers, but unlike the Germans, Irish or Italians who had come before, they were poorer, illiterate, and non-English speakers arriving in an era that offered dwindling urban possibilities for entry level work. In the early 20th century about 40 percent of New York City workers had manufacturing jobs (Gonnerman 2011), and now those jobs were disappearing as were the jobs at the port. The new immigrants brought little of what previous groups had brought. “Airport surveys showed that half those coming to New York had no work experience at all,” writes Jonnes, “while eighteen per cent had been farm laborers . . . at a time when one in two New Yorkers had finished high school, [and] only one in ten Puerto Rican migrants had. Seventy per cent had not completed the ninth grade” (Jonnes 1986, 102).

The economic changes, as well as the shifting of power centers, made life more difficult for the new arrivals. For example, Glazer and Moynihan write, “[i]n 1950 there were 246,000 Puerto Ricans in the City. By 1960, this number had increased by two and one-half times to 613,000, or 8 per cent of the city’s population. In 1950, the average hourly earnings of manufacturing production workers in New York City ranked tenth in the nation. By 1960 they ranked thirtieth” (1964, 299). In addition, in 1959 the “median family income for Puerto Ricans was $3,811 as against $6,091 for the all of the city’s families (and $8,052 in the suburbs of Westchester)” (Glazer and Moynihan 1964, 300).
Declining Job Market

As non-English speakers with low levels of formal education, Puerto Ricans found themselves in a declining job market with housing in short supply; and unlike the Irish, they had no political structure to bolster them. Like their Italian counterparts the progression from arrival to parish to voting booth to job was simply not available for Puerto Ricans. Puerto Ricans seemed to have arrived at the wrong time to the wrong place. “The industrial base that had in the past provided the first jobs and glimmers of financial security for newcomers had ceased to expand. As the city moved from manufacturing to finance and professional services, Puerto Rican labor rested on tenuous foundations, positioned in marginal or declining sectors” (Karrol 1983 quoted in Trounstine 2008, 4). Additionally the patronage machine provided little help: those in power wanted the votes, but they didn’t want Puerto Ricans as neighbors much less as candidates.

The failure to assist Puerto Ricans extended surprisingly to sectors of the labor movement where a lack of solidarity appeared counter-intuitive. The left-leaning International Ladies Garment Workers Union (ILGWU) appeared to exemplify anti-Puerto Rican discrimination so deep that it traversed the political spectrum. In testimony before the United States House of Representatives, Herbert Hill, labor secretary of the NAACP, testified that the ILGWU discriminated against Puerto Ricans. He described steady wage losses for unskilled and semiskilled garment workers, an ever-increasing number of whom were Puerto Rican, “with no gains in leadership positions for Black or Puerto Rican members. When charged with systematically hindering the advancement of the union’s Black and Puerto Rican members . . . ILGWU officials insisted, ‘We are not an employment agency’” (Thomas 2010, 188). For
outsiders there were few jobs, limited protections provided by the union, and few possibilities of advancement within the union structure. The more time they spent in New York, the less possible it seemed that Puerto Ricans would become upwardly mobile.

Perceptions of race were also a factor. In describing his own experience growing up Catholic and Puerto Rican in the South Bronx, community activist, former Democratic Party District Leader, and real estate developer Aureo Cardona said, “Some of the kids . . . darker kids, darker skin, Latino kids, it was hell and they never really integrated” (Cardona, March 2011). It was during this period that the Bronx deteriorated very significantly and became a national symbol of urban squalor and the decline of the City of New York.

_Government Programs_

So as white ethnics were leaving the city, the poorest, least educated, and least skilled—Puerto Ricans—were left behind, unlikely to follow whites to the suburbs (Wilson 1987). Also, New York’s housing stock was aging in the Bronx and in areas of Manhattan—the Lower East Side, for example—where Puerto Ricans resided. Hoyt argues that aged housing drives change in ethnic populations: those who can afford to leave do so, and those who can’t pay for better housing are left behind (1933). The movement out of the city was abetted by government programs including loans to veterans, mortgage guarantees for returning servicemen and women, and a national highway program led in New York by building czar Robert Moses, which would splinter traditional ethnic neighborhoods into pieces (Caro 1974).

The politicians appeared to allow the destruction of those neighborhoods in the Bronx populated by Jews, blacks, and newly arriving Puerto Ricans almost as if it were permissible public policy. As Shefter writes:
Those who governed New York during the 1950s defused opposition by accommodating its major organized interests. The downtown business community was satisfied because control over the development programs that were of prime interest to them was placed in the hands of Robert Moses and/or various public authorities responsible only to their bondholders (1994, 239).

Puerto Ricans were not likely to be bondholders nor were they part of the downtown business community.

The Reformers

The reformers, those who opposed the traditional political machines that had controlled the Bronx and Manhattan, also provided little assistance to recent arrivals. In fact, the drive to reform was primarily a non-minority movement which “produced leaders who thought that the liberal middle class could win elections without the party’s historic constituencies . . . they were a middle class rooted in postindustrial sections of U.S. society” (Stein 2010, 52). Minorities and unions didn’t matter. They were not of the same social class and the private sector unions were too often conservative to seriously be considered as part of the new politics (Stein 2010). What Puerto Ricans needed was a locale for organizing as the Irish had had—the Archdiocese of New York parishes. They also needed jobs and patronage and a way into the political machinery and into the Archdiocese in order to replace the Catholics exiting the city. But they got none of this. Solutions, the reformers believed, had little to do with empowerment but rather with fundamentally changing Puerto Rican neighborhoods through urban renewal. It was easy to destroy neighborhoods where little political capital existed: no major institutions defended those who lived in what the reformers and their allies thought were slums. Unfortunately, urban renewal destroyed not only slum buildings but whatever social networks existed within them. The Archdiocese rejected its role as a power and instead assumed a pastoral role. Consequently
there was no political machine, no politically strong Archdiocese, and no educated class with access to power to stand between homes and the wrecking ball. Subsequently, riots and fires later destroyed much of what was not demolished by government order in the South Bronx.

_Urban Renewal_

The federal government provided the funds for urban renewal, tightly controlled by a redevelopment bureaucracy in the grip of Robert Moses (Caro 1975). During the Moses period:

New York City alone accounted for 32 per cent of all construction activity under the federal law [urban renewal funding]. Moses cultivated a wide array of allies from New York’s liberal political circles. These activists, drawn from various civic organizations, labor groups, chambers of commerce, local planning bodies, neighborhood groups, hospitals and university boards, and elite non-profit community betterment organizations were determined to save their immediate areas from slums and blight. If their ally Robert Moses emphasized practical, achievable goals, they often imbued slum clearance and rebuilding with lofty ideals (Zipp 2010, 164).

These same lofty ideals were not used to protect the homes of the First Avenue East Harlem Italians or blacks or Puerto Ricans, but they were certainly in play when neighborhoods like the Hell’s Kitchen of the McManus family were concerned. More and more urban renewal seemed to mean minority removal.

On the political front, it would make no sense for those in power to cede control to Puerto Ricans. Even though the white ethnic- and Irish-dominated political machines were dying, they still maintained some local power. Winning elections was the way to power no matter the ethnic or political make-up of a geographic political area. Winning elections was also the means to spoils—accruing gain through the creation of a government (Downs 1957). Without the Archdiocese acting as an intermediary, Puerto Ricans would find their way out of poverty, substandard housing, declining city services, and a hostile economic environment in only one way: gaining power by electing sympathetic candidates.
Demographic Shifts

White Ethnic Catholics Move Out

What consequences flowed from the white ethnic movement to the suburbs? Former New York City Central Labor Council leader Edward Ott saw suburbanization occurring among two groups: Executives and managers moved out, and blue-collar workers followed. “Not only did large numbers of white ethnics leave the city, but more importantly, the executive and managerial class moved out into the suburbs. People who actually run companies, make decisions, and develop networks” (Ott 2009). Citing personal experience, Ott explained the consequences for those who remained in the city:

So here’s what happened. My sister goes to St. Pious the Fifth High School. We live in South View Projects. She, Catholic girl, Catholic school, gets a job, second year of high school, American Home Products. Who from? Someone who has a relationship with that high school. Fifteen years later, that’s not possible, because those contacts have moved out to the suburbs, and those relationships moved out to the suburbs. So a kid from Nassau County has a better shot at getting a job on Wall Street or Midtown Manhattan in a corporation based on those networks than a kid who’s still living in the South Bronx or, or even North Bronx. So, that’s one big factor you can’t underestimate (Ott 2009).

For author Peter Quinn, the exodus to the suburbs seemed the outgrowth of natural forces, motivated by an extension of the American dream. It started with the construction of parkways and a lack of investment in public transit:

It’s not a New York phenomenon. I mean, New York, in a way, has done better. It was one of these great national movements in American history, of immigrants. They didn’t come here to live in apartments. They came here for the American Dream, which is a house, a better job, a car, your kids go to college. So some part of it was . . . self-propelled. They wanted something else (Quinn 2011).

He noted that suburbanization predated World War II, but its biggest boost came from post-war legislation:

The industrial base in the city began to erode in the Depression, in the ‘30s. Those small industries that started to go, I think actually the Depression slowed it down. I think it would’ve happened faster without the Depression . . . they were moving out of industrial
jobs. The explosion of education! In 1900, I think this is correct, there were 3,000 college students in New York state. Three thousand... I think the greatest piece of social legislation of American history is the GI Bill. It was all about education. It was like, after World War II [there was] this wave of prosperity, nothing like it in history has ever happened. And these people rode. My parents were in the same apartment for forty-four years. They didn’t want to move. It was just the way they were. But everybody around us couldn’t get out fast enough (Quinn 2011).

Quinn cited other factors as explanations for which ethnic groups moved out the city quickest:

The cumulative effect of the social welfare programs from the New Deal and the postwar prosperity [was] this pent up energy just burst out. So I think it begins slowly. It’s kind of slowed down even more by the Depression and the war. And then after that it’s an explosion, from 1945 to 1960, 1965. The Irish and the Jews [went first]. The Italians tended to buy houses rather than, like the neighborhood where I lived, Parkchester, we lived, Irish and Jews together. I think there were early rumblings maybe in the ‘20s with the automobiles. People wanted a car. Better jobs. People got better jobs. The great introduction, the thing that changed America; credit. You know, I don’t think you can isolate one factor. It’s one of these gigantic confluence of different social factors come in. And how much of it is crime and minorities coming in? Driving people, are they fleeing that? Or are they following a dream? (Quinn 2011).

Monsignor Don Sakano, a former head of the Catholic Youth Organization (CYO), recognized the positive role the government played after World War II. "[A]fter the war you had opportunities that weren’t there before, FHA, VA and mortgage insurance was a major factor. The building of the roadways, people out of the city and back into the city as a workplace, rather than a residential place,” Sakano said. But he also noted a redefinition of Catholic life. “The me-ism . . . fewer children, more money available to sink into assets like home ownership and swimming pools and those sorts of amenities people look for in a better life. And [they] invested in a better life not having children” (Sakano 2011).

Peter Powers, campaign manager for Mayor Rudolph Giuliani’s two successful mayoral campaigns, saw the demographic shift and out-movement of white ethnic Catholics outside the city boundary as:

Just people moving up, they grew up in one area, they got educated and for other reasons, they wanted to live in other areas . . . as society became more mobile, especially after
World War II, people didn’t want to live in ethnic enclaves anymore. They wanted to get out there and experience different things, because they tended to have Irish neighborhoods, Jewish neighborhoods and Italian neighborhoods. You don’t see that anymore because people just wanted I think [to] move on and live out the American dream. They wanted to also get a nice house which between road building and trains, they could get a nicer house for less money, a little bit away and still work in the city. I think it’s a normal part of immigrant groups to come, stay together in one area and then kind of move out, I think there’s a history of that (Powers 2009).

Labor lawyer Vincent Pitta agreed with Peter Powers:

I think there was tremendous increase in the financial well-being and income growth, most of those people who were primarily in . . . white collar profession after the Second World War. They wanted a piece of *terra firma* that they couldn’t afford in the city. They also wanted privacy, which living in a tenement doesn’t afford you. They wanted better schools for their kids, and the same reasons have always held true (Pitta 2009).

The desire for a “better life” and government incentives cited by Sakano—Veterans’ loans, HFA mortgages, new highways—increased the speed of the demographic shift which made the Archdiocese more reliant on the newcomers, Puerto Ricans, to fill now emptying parish pews.

Dean of the New York City press corps Gabe Pressman who has covered city politics for newspapers and television for sixty years speaks to the issue of race. “There was a lot of anti-black feeling. And I think their main motivation [in leaving for the suburbs] was to have an enclave, an area to go to where their children can be brought up without crime” (Pressman 2011).

Father Francis Skelly, a South Bronx priest agreed. He said white Catholic families simply wanted “to raise their kids. My sister moved to Rockland. Everyone but my other brother was an engineer. He moved to Rockland. They all moved because they didn't want to raise their kids in a city that was dangerous” (Skelly 2011). An increasingly dangerous and foreign city populated by strangers as their co-religionists motivated more white collar ethnics to leave for the "better life" described by so many I interviewed.
School Chancellor Frank Macchiarola, like Walter McCaffrey, later defines the mass exit from the city by white Catholics as a two-step process begun by economic need:

It’s economics. Now most of my family who has left the city, they left it for economic reasons. . . . [T]he Italians in my family, they went to Staten Island, and after Staten Island they went to Jersey. And it was all economics. And they have money . . . the housing crunch in the City of New York pushed a lot of people out to Nassau County, Levittown and places like that. And the idea that you could own your own car, which began to happen not immediately, but pretty soon after. And the roads. And it was status. It was status (Macchiarola 2009).

Andrew Napolitano stated:

I think the exodus began in the 50s. And I think they all started making more money. . . . I was raised in a row house on Ampere Parkway in Bloomfield, New Jersey, which my grandparents bought out of foreclosure in 1929. Somebody that lost it in the Depression. A three-family house that they owned and they lived on the second floor. They rented the first floor one-bedroom flat to my parents. And they rent the third floor, a very, very tiny – what we would call today a studio apartment – to the same tenant for forty years. My parents had a desire to give their children more than they got. They wanted my brothers and me to have a backyard. They wanted a place to park the car. They wanted us to be able to walk to school. So they saved their money, and we moved to the other end of town where a developer bought a golf course and developed it into a sort of Levittown-looking development where the houses were all cookie cutter—they were one size or another, small or big—but there were trees and there were backyards. And that was just the normal, natural thing to do. Who replaced us in my grandparents’ house? Tenants after tenants. Not the stability that was the case when we were there. I couldn’t go upstairs and have a poached egg. I couldn’t go upstairs and have the homemade pasta. It was a task to do that now. So that attenuated family ties as well. It gave my brothers and me a better environment in which to be raised. We could walk to the park and play baseball. We didn’t have to worry about cars going past the house at forty miles an hour, because this new neighborhood, nobody drove at that speed (Napolitano 2014).

Marino cites the speed with which demographic changes came, a view shared by many of those interviewed. The quality of life and the fear of crime attached to racial change occurred quickly. “[T]hat changed literally overnight . . . this is 1956. So by the late ‘50s there’s this exodus to the Bronx, not outside the city at that point for a lot of people, but to the Bronx and then also from Brooklyn to Long Island, Bronx to Westchester, New Rochelle . . . because it
became this steady exodus almost north and east” (Marino 2009). For many, as previously noted, the movement to suburbs was transitional; first to the outer boroughs and then to suburban living outside the city’s boundaries.

Douglas Schoen, a pollster for Mayors Edward Koch and Michael Bloomberg, Governor Hugh Carey and President Bill Clinton, pinpoints the demographic shift to the ‘50s and ‘60s when people wanted to pursue a better life outside the city:

New Jersey, Long Island, Westchester. Better life, cheap real estate, better schools. . . . What happened was, the work—for city employees, particularly the police—there was no work requirement that the police live in the city. So they end up living on Long Island. And so . . . the question is, why would you stay? What was the incentive to stay in a city that was, by all accounts, declining, real estate was not appreciating, and the quality of life was fraying (Schoen 2009).

Furthermore, Aiello responded to how he saw the church being affected:

I think that the Church lost some of its members. I think the impact was also people were moving away from the Church to some degree and whether that was the war experience, whether it was the beginnings of, especially as the ‘60s started, the beginnings of some real social upheaval in this country and people thinking for themselves . . . you really don’t see that lack of power of the Church until late ‘60s, early ‘70s (Aiello 2009).

Herman Badillo added:

The indication, is that there are not that many Catholics left in the city. There aren’t, if you look at the [fact that] blacks are predominantly Protestant. The Hispanics are now overwhelmingly Protestant. The Jews are still there, and they’re still very powerful. About the only place you have Italians left now is in Staten Island and some parts of Brooklyn. You don’t have enough Italians left to run for office (Badillo 2009).

Asked when did the exodus of white ethnic Catholics begin, Badillo said:

The exodus really started after the Second World War and it started because after the Second World War [there was] the GI Bill of Rights where people who had served in the armed forces were able to go to college. Also because the fact that it was easy to build in the outlying areas, places like Levittown and there was a huge housing boom outside of the city. The Irish, Italians and the Jews felt that they were living in housing conditions that were not so great and here they had a chance because of the GI Bill of Rights, to buy a house and get a mortgage with a very low interest rate, payable over a long period of time. People who hadn’t had the opportunity to be homeowners, suddenly found that they
could be part of the American dream and they jumped at that chance (Badillo 2009).

Badillo further explained:

[T]hey were young soldiers who came back. They wanted to have children and this was the ideal conditions to bring up children, go to the suburbs. They had better schools in the suburbs, and they could commute to work in New York City which was then very cheap as well, so it was the ideal world for them. So they left in huge numbers during a very short period of time (Badillo 2009).

Daniel Chill, in discussing the demographic shift, returned to its political implications:

So, if you want to get to the bottom line, dispersal of the Irish Catholic immigrant class into the suburbs and out of the cities, was the major cause of the Church losing its control over the political and cultural part of the city of New York primarily . . . they moved away, they went out to Long Island and I don’t know what they do in Long Island, the political power, but certainly not in the city of New York anymore . . . you take demographics, blacks moving in, Catholics moving out, radicalism on the left and the Catholic Church lost its sense of balance (Chill 2009).

Discussing demographic shifts, Paul Crotty identifies the 1960s as a time that had a marked impact on the city and on what remained of the formerly dominant white ethnic populations:

[T]hat’s the time Co-op City [a large North Bronx housing development] got going and then emptied out all the white neighborhoods in the South Bronx. Those who couldn’t afford to get to Westchester and Nassau, they moved to Co-op City. So, all the Irish, all the Italians all the Jews are gone. Those structures and their families, their neighborhoods and their cultural organization all of which had blended together, were dissipated. And the neighborhood was abandoned to poor people. They were exploited and then when they couldn’t pay their rent, you know they set the buildings on fire. (Crotty 2011).

Father Duffell talked about people “having something and getting out of the city. I guess in the 1960s, well the 1960s was a wild time too. Some people kind of fled” (Duffell 2011).

The demographic shift, according to consultant Bruce Gyory, affected the ability of the Archdiocese of New York and Catholics to affect public policy in New York City:

When they moved to the suburbs so you had a diminution. Whereas the Catholic vote
used to be forty years ago, thirty to thirty-five percent, it’s now down to . . . the white Catholic vote is now down to somewhere between seventeen and twenty percent of the general election . . . you had a diminution of the white Catholic vote, because of the way the Catholic Church, the institutional hierarchy, is. While they’re friendly to the Hispanics on issues like immigration, it’s still an Irish-run church so they, so what you have is a number of things got undone, their link to the labor movement largely got severed as the labor movement became more driven by the public sector unions which meant it had more of a Jewish and then a black and a Hispanic flavor but not the old Irish. (Gyory 2009).

Gyory continued:

It’s the Ralph Cramden factor . . . when you look at the Honeymooners [the 1950s television program starring Jackie Gleason, Art Carney, Audrey Meadows, and Joyce Randolph] and you see what people lived in back then, and saw the opportunity that the suburbs represented for a home in Levittown, and other developments. It was a nice place to raise your kids. It was open space and it was a natural draw to the upward mobility (Gyory 2009).

Hispanic Catholics Moving In

The health of the Catholic Church in the United States depends on Hispanics and new immigrants. Currently, 40 percent of the Catholic Church in the United States is Hispanic. Were it not for immigrants the Church would be shrinking as present-day members drift away or die off at rates faster than Catholic children are baptized. Among parishes with Hispanic ministries attendance at Mass is 22 percent higher and participation in sacraments is relatively high (Paulson, 2014). But according to the Pew Research Center on Religion and Public Life, one in four Hispanic Americans is a former Catholic (Pew Research Center 2014). New York State Conservative Party chair Michael Long concurs that the Church’s future depends on Hispanics: “Well, I think the Hispanics certainly are important to the future of the Church here in the City of New York and I think . . . I think the Hispanic are definitely important for the future of the Church. I believe they will be the . . . they are the Irishmen of the future, they are the Italians of the future” (Long 2009).
Peter Powers responded in a similar manner:

I think they’re important to the church, in the sense that they are Catholics, they want their kids to go to Catholic school. The Church helps by keeping the schools open. That is the way that the church helps. I don’t think that they attract through the leadership of the Church and I don’t understand that, why maybe I just don’t follow the leadership that closely . . . I think you would think that they would be expecting that, to have more the Latino or a Spanish name up there, but the Church does perform a lot of social services for them, especially in education . . . where the local public schools aren’t as good as the Catholic schools and they give these kids a lot of education that they wouldn’t get (Powers 2009).

James McManus spoke strongly about the value to the Archdiocese of New York of the Hispanic Catholics:

It’s getting more important and it’s getting more important as we get along the Hispanics especially who are Catholic and ninety percent of the cases are . . . getting involved in the Church, remember they were always outsiders back in the 1950s, ‘60s, ‘70s because the Church was run by the Irish Catholics and of course in those days the Hispanics were mostly Puerto Ricans. Even though they were Catholics, they weren’t welcome into the Church (McManus 2009).

McManus conveys what could be termed an everyday understanding that non-Hispanics had for the prejudice that their fellow Hispanic Catholics experienced. Acknowledging that Puerto Ricans faced discrimination, he nonetheless notes that it was part of the natural order of social life.

[T]here’s always somebody at the low rung on the ladder. One time it was the Jews. Next time it was the Irish and you know . . . and it works its way down. So the Hispanics never really got involved in the Church. They went to Church but you know they could never be sexton or work on the fundraising or anything like that unless it was to lick envelops. But now that the Irish Catholics have moved away. . . (McManus 2009).

Walter McCaffrey seeks to spell out the reason for a lack of acceptance of the Puerto Ricans:

There was still a reluctance because they were outsiders. They were new, so perhaps the clergy, in good heart, wanted to accept but the internal structures within the parishes did not accept. Again, who were the clergy at that point? They were not Latino- based; they did not have that type of appreciation. They were in many cases now old Irish clergy, old
German clergy and so they just did not have that ability to make that type of change. And I think as a result they did not have the ability to reach out (McCaffrey 2011).

“The church lost its constituents and did not work to build up the new constituents who came in” observed Herman Badillo bluntly:

The Puerto Ricans who were Catholics, the Puerto Ricans who came here from Puerto Rico [in early waves of immigration] were not Pentecostals at all. They were one hundred percent Catholic practically and in Puerto Rico there were very few Protestants. Puerto Rico had been part of Spain since before 1898 and being a Protestant or a Jew was prohibited. The legend is that the first Badillo came in the 1840’s. When he died he was buried a half a mile from the cemetery because since he admitted to being a Protestant the church would not allow him to be buried because he said on his tomb, he said Antonio Badillo and in Spanish loyal Protestant follower . . . because the tomb said loyal Protestant follower, the Catholic Church said no, no, he cannot be buried in the cemetery. In fact, the town hall, the plaza, in the town where I come from, it’s a typical example. You had the other side of the city hall . . . the Catholic Church. And people say that if you wanted to get anything done, you went first to the Catholic Church and got approval, then you went to city hall because the Church was that powerful in Puerto Rico. When I was growing up, there was only one tiny church, there was only Protestant church—way out of the way, I had to walk about a mile every Sunday to get there, and that was the only Protestant church so that shows you that this is just before the war, when the Puerto Rican migration began and continued after the war (Badillo 2009).

Aureo Cardona, when asked about the Puerto Rican Catholic in-migration, immediately cited his sense that the Puerto Ricans were not accepted as equals within Archdiocese parishes:

[T]here’s no integration, New York City doesn’t integrate, it tolerates and that’s okay and we live with that. The Catholic Church didn’t know how to kind of bring in the new players that believe in its God and it’s dogma. The Irish just didn’t know how to do it. Now I’m not saying… maybe I’m wrong, maybe they’re just so damn racist that they didn’t want to do it. I’m believing that’s not the case (Cardona 2011).

Father Skelly said that when the Puerto Ricans came they weren’t accepted at first in a lot of churches. He recalls only one parish having a Spanish speaking mass which began in 1958.

“Some priests resented that they were bringing Latinos into the church—because it was a change. People always fight change” (Skelly 2011).

Monsignor Finn, in contrast, believes the Archdiocese did its best to deal with the needs of the newly arriving Puerto Ricans:
I think they are overwhelmed because it was new. I hope this doesn’t sound wrong but I have often wondered if the fact that the Puerto Rican population, could make a quick hop back and forth to Puerto Rico, if that wasn’t something that slowed down (their absorption into local parishes). Because the Irish couldn’t hop back to Dublin….They (the Puerto Ricans) were transient and again, Americans in the sense that they never voted for to be in the United States. I find that interesting too (Finn 2011).

Another differing view comes from political consultant Bruce Gyory:

It’s fascinating. Also the other thing to watch is the Hispanics like the Italians. The Hispanics are not looking to the Church for their political leadership. [New York State Assembly member and former Bronx County Democratic Party leader] Jose Rivera, and [State Senator Ruben] Diaz, they’re not looking to call up [Cardinal] Dolan and say politically I want to discuss a problem here the way that [one-time Bronx County Democratic Party Chair] Charlie Buckley might have called Spellman (Gyory 2009).

Could the Archdiocese of New York have taken action to stem the flight of white ethnics, and would such action, had it been possible, protected the Catholic school system? Long responded:

I'm not sure they would have stemmed the flight, they might have held on to their power. Okay, they wouldn’t have stopped the flight of people who were . . . jumping out because their kids weren’t in Catholic school. They might have stemmed the flight . . . at that point in history I don’t think the citizens—and I certainly am one of them—felt the Church was standing up to what was happening in the City of New York when John Lindsay took office (Long 2009).

Long, a leader of a successful anti-Lindsay administration ballot initiative to stop an independent Civilian Review Board to monitor the city’s Police Department, is an ideological conservative and who opposes “that whole type of thinking”:

[T]hat whole type of thinking drove people out of the city. The Catholic schools started to empty out as people and their neighbors moved. Their neighborhood was changing because the neighbors who might have been in public school were moving out. The next thing that happened was the Catholic parents started to move out for a better way of life (Long 2009).

But Walter McCaffrey saw the attraction of the suburbs—as opposed to the problems of the city—as an important motivator, “I think again, because the ability of people to be able to now move into a better housing setting for themselves and their families, a desire to end up
having what were better schools in the suburbs. . . . Better than the Catholic schools in some cases, yes, absolutely” (McCaffrey 2011).

**A Failure to Include**

The political structure of the city shifted quickly as Democratic Party and Tammany control of Manhattan and Bronx machine politics was ending. Yet the New York Archdiocese, unlike Boston, took no action to stop the out-migration (Bergin 2011; Gamm, 2001). Puerto Ricans, the “marginal Catholics,” might have regenerated the numbers needed to fill the empty parish pews. The Archdiocese might have replaced the clout it had wielded among the port-based labor force by building up its powerbase among public sector unions. The question, then, is what did the Archdiocese do to try to find solutions to the organizational, political, and demographic challenges it was facing? What actions did it take to deal with the crises it and the city faced as a result of those challenges? What did it do to manage its relationships with the newest Catholics, Puerto Ricans, and the newest worker organizations, public sector unions?

The Church was aware of the issues facing it but did little to address them. It and its Irish leadership were apprehensive and perhaps a bit dismissive about the new migrants and the city's progressive, public unionization. Although at times the Archdiocese had brought in new constituencies, historically it had not been an inclusive institution. As New York changed, the Archdiocese had trouble changing with it because of its inherent apprehension of outsiders, an apprehension that it projected onto the new groups taking their place within the city's power structure.
Immigration and the Archdiocese’s Declining Political Power

The world that the Archdiocese of New York had known – in which protecting its adherents from physical assault, abuse and discrimination was paramount—had ended as the political power shifted to local governmental control. The cradle–to–grave welfare system no longer served its purpose for the Irish in particular. The Archdiocese's way of controlling competition between groups of members was to establish national parishes for each new immigrant group, which it did not do for Puerto Ricans. “Competition between newcomers and insiders takes the form of conflict over the ethnic niche,” which might be an apt description of the situation between newly-arriving groups and the well-ensconced Irish (Waldinger 1996, 3).

Although migrants start at the bottom:

[T]hey enter the economy under the auspices of friends or kin, which means that they begin with connections . . . Networks funnel the newcomers into specialized economic activities; as newcomers flow into the workplaces where earlier settlers have already gotten established, ethnic concentrations, or niches, gradually develop. The path up from the bottom involves finding a good niche and dominating it—which means good jobs are reserved for insiders, leaving the next wave of outsiders excluded. Thus, the search by an earlier migrant group for labor market shelters eventuates in barriers that the next round of arrivals must confront (Waldinger 1996, 3-4).

In New York, however, the power of the Archdiocese remained with the Irish even as the outflow of these ethnic New Yorkers became a veritable flood to the suburbs. Power did not transfer to the new urban immigrants, and, as we have seen, the Archdiocese rectified the situation neither through symbolic action nor tangible deed. “The tendency of power holders to adopt a negative assessment of those with lower status is confirmed. . . . [S]tudies show that high social status stimulates the perception that subordinates are chronic shirkers of responsibility, who require constant supervision and motivation” (Blaug 2010, 12).
The Irish Catholic Archdiocese’s Failure to Integrate Italians

Stephen Aiello, a former New York City Board of Education president, observes that when you view the history of the Archdiocese of New York, it “continues to be essentially an Irish Archdiocese of New York”:

The Irish Catholic Archdiocese of New York I’ve always described somewhat more Calvinistic than the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of New York, much more rigid in how they interpreted dogma . . . and there are individuals that, you know, that belied what I’m saying, but generally speaking the Irish Archdiocese of New York reflected to a great deal the political establishment. And especially in the Democratic Party where we were guineas, we were wops, we were good for certain things, but certainly not for leadership. So you see a parallel…the Irish were the Americans. They weren’t like us and their Archdiocese of New York was a very rigid Archdiocese of New York (Aiello 2009).

Writing about 1960s New York City, Kantrowitz observes: “Catholicism seems to form no integrative bond between the Irish and the Italians” (1973, 30). This group cleavage remained unchanged over time. More to the point, “ethnic segregation . . . even Irish Catholic from Italian Catholic, has declined little over a generation; then it would appear that, in reality, primary groups—whether in the family, Archdiocese of New York, or other institutions—may still rely on face-to-face interaction made easier by residential propinquity” (Kantrowitz 1973, 7). Simply put, the Irish and the Italians seemed not to like each other very much. The idea that “many Italian immigrants felt unwelcome in Irish Catholic churches,” might be a serious understatement (Carnes 2003, 3). Carnes adds that the “vast Irish immigrant population gave New York Catholicism a pronounced Irish lilt that offended the Italians” (Carnes 2003, 9).

John Marino grew up Italian Catholic in New York City in the 1950s, becoming a state Democratic Party chair and an advisor to both Governors Mario and Andrew Cuomo. He recalls vividly the manifestations of this ethnic division with the Irish and how it took precedence over any sense of religious unity. “I think that the little beating up that we would take—I don’t mean physically from the Irish—they were immigrants who had come before us; they thought they
were better than us.” But despite the animosity, he notes that his parents “became big fans of President Kennedy . . . because even though he was Irish, he was Catholic, and it excited them to have a Catholic president. And let’s face it: everything else attached to him, the young guy and all that, beautiful wife . . . it was exciting for them” (Marino 2009). Marino continues:

But for the most part, they always felt that the Irish thought “who the hell were they?” and you know we were below them because we were Italians, “guineas” to the Irish quite often. And I had never actually heard the word actually until I moved to Throgs Neck [a neighborhood in the northeast Bronx], never heard the word. But I was old enough to know what it meant when I was called it . . . [I]n that little neighborhood we were totally segregated from anybody else’s group. It was all Italian until the Latinos and particularly the blacks moved in . . . I think that you know the Irish control of the Archdiocese of New York which remains until this day, this Archdiocese, has always left Italians . . . can’t do anything for you, you know. And now we don’t even have the Pope (Marino 2009).

The Archdiocese of New York and the New Migrants

Although coming from very different cultures, Puerto Ricans and Italians shared two characteristics. Neither the Italian immigrants nor Puerto Ricans had English proficiency, and both groups had significant liturgical distinctions from the dominant Irish in their Catholic observance. Skilled jobs and union jobs belonged to those who had arrived before, who in most cases had created the unions, staffed the unions, and made sure the jobs that helped the unions to survive went to their namesakes. Puerto Ricans arrived in New York City at the very time when “skilled manual occupations had begun to overtake common labor. . . . Unions in the American Federation of Labor generally did not recruit Puerto Rican carpenters, bricklayers, tailors or barbers” (Badillo 2006, 56).

Previous Catholic populations had helped create the physical, financial, and political structure of the Archdiocese:

[T]he original Irish immigrants, with whom the Puerto Ricans were compared, had had
the further advantage of arriving with their own Archdiocese and their own priests. The hundreds of Catholic churches and schools all over New York testified to the great accumulated influence and wealth . . . the Puerto Ricans, while nominally Catholic, did not have their own clergy nor were they considered particularly devoted parishioners (Jonnes 1986, 112).

Was it the economic distinctions that made integration unlikely? Was it discrimination because of color or language? Was the safety net created by the Archdiocese for previous generations of the flock no longer capable of keeping the new arrivals in the Archdiocese?

Cohalan writes that “because of their rapid arrival in such great numbers (they were the chief reason for an estimated 80 per cent Archdiocese population increase from 1940-1970) their poverty and their lack of religious personnel, no effort was made to organize the Puerto Ricans into national parishes” (1983, 296). On the other hand, Cardinal Spellman “acted to strategically integrate different Latino Catholic ethnic groups with European-origin ethnics, rather than setting them off in ‘national parishes’ as had been done with Europeans or requiring total homogenous ‘territorial’ parishes” (Ibid.). He stressed the importance of clergy fluency in Spanish, but he died in 1967 as the crisis in New York City was worsening (Badillo 2009). Herman Badillo—the first Puerto Rican borough president, a candidate for mayor, a congressman, and deputy mayor in the Koch administration—recalls that many Catholic Puerto Ricans became lost to the Archdiocese when they joined the Pentecostal movement because, unlike the Irish Catholics, the Pentecostals spoke Spanish (Badillo 2009). Finke and Stark dispel the idea that “all the priests had to do was to stand at the gangplanks and enroll the faithful as they disembarked” (1992, 9). Difficult organizational work was required to counteract Protestant missionary activity and to create a feeling of group identity among Catholics.

The Archdiocese’s success as an institution may have worked to its disadvantage because
a sense of oppression within groups often contributes to group cohesion. “Ironically it is only where the Catholic Archdiocese is in the minority and is somewhat embattled that it can generate the vigorous participation we have come to associate with American Catholicism” (Ibid.). When formerly impoverished Catholics entered the mainstream socially and economically, the nature of their relationship with the Archdiocese was affected. The Archdiocese no longer remained an institution based on devotion to ideals reinforced by a feeling of societal rejection. Daily survival was no longer the question for the dominant Irish. Oates writes, “[b]y the 1940s and 1950s, Catholics were joining the ranks of the middle and the upper class at a very rapid rate” (1999, 290). It was an established Irish hierarchy that no longer related to the challenges of new immigrant Catholic communities.

Rise in the Non-White, Non-Catholic Power and Population

Evangelical Hispanics and Non-Hispanics

Interviewees noted a perceived increase in the numbers of evangelically connected Hispanics. Community and housing activist Aureo Cardona noted the religious attraction of Evangelical Protestantism: “[P]eople were hearing things they wanted to hear. People want to hear, we have to get better here. That . . . God wants us to have a good life, not live in dire poverty and die waiting a payoff in the next world” (Cardona 2011). Monsignor Peter Finn agreed: “Pentecostals made tremendous inroads in the Puerto Rican population. . . We didn’t have the people [clergy] to be in that group in the numbers, I mean we have them and we have some strong places but not enough. It’s overwhelming” (Finn 2011).

Is the Evangelical impact as significant as many of those interviewed seem to think? Peter Quinn says yes: "I think they [Hispanics] find their values are reflected there more. I
mean . . . the Pentecostal, which is taking off, it’s not because they’re more liberal than the Catholic Church. In many ways they’re much more politically conservative” (Quinn 2011). For Conservative Party leader Michael Long, the answer to the Archdiocese of New York’s loss of newly arriving immigrants is a return to Church doctrine, which in his view will help restore the “Catholic power base.” Long said:

I believe the Catholic power base can wake up but we need the leader that’s going to wake it up. We need the issues that’s going to cause it to wake up and . . . I hate to say this, I just spoke at a Save Marriage rally in Albany, we had a nice crowd, six hundred, seven hundred people, I think; without inflating the figures maybe it was a thousand I don’t know . . . It was mostly black and Hispanic ministers. It wasn’t Catholic priests. In my day . . . we had these guys who were very outspoken and . . . most of them happened to be Irish and no nonsense guys, tough men. They were not just priests; they were tough men and I think that’s the other thing that took place and happened to our church. And I’m sure, some of the priests hear me say this, and are upset with it, but they were tough men. I went to Catholic grammar school. I had tough priests and I looked up at them, they were my heroes and my leaders. They were . . . hats were cocked all the time, toothpick in the mouth. They were tough guys. They were a different breed of guys at the time (Long 2009).

Frank Macchiarola appeared to agree. “The Hispanics with the strongest moral positions are not Catholic. They’re Evangelicals” (Macchiarola 2009). Douglas Schoen, mayoral, gubernatorial and presidential pollster was also in strong agreement:

They are Pentecostals. They may go to church, to Catholic Church if they’re Catholic. But they’re not organized politically as Catholics. Moreover, the Catholics are not Irish and Italian; they’re Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, Dominicans, Nicaraguans, El Salvadorians. So there’s a disparate ethnic makeup. And there are a lot of very small churches that don’t have anything other than a storefront and a charismatic preacher (Schoen 2009).

Conclusion

The Archdiocese of New York was late in responding to post-1960s changes in the social, economic and political environment, especially when compared with other dioceses. A more timely and appropriate response might have helped the Archdiocese preserve its power, or at
least might have helped it to realign and refocus its power.

Although the ethnic composition of the Catholic population within the Archdiocese had changed, its numbers had not significantly shrunk, and the Archdiocese highly valued its parochial schools as a means to ensure transmission of Catholic belief to that population. Yet, the Archdiocese continued to maintain schools—and parishes—at great financial cost within its urbanized core, where significant numbers of an interested and involved Catholic population no longer resided. Until the realignment of 2006, parish priests tended to remain at their posts in the city’s most dangerous inner neighborhoods, ministering as the schools did to the poorest and perhaps the least “Catholic” of their flock.

There was a failure of the Archdiocese of New York to integrate these poor Puerto Ricans migrants and organize them into national parishes to serve as spiritual and organizing locales. The Archdiocese thus denied Puerto Ricans what it had granted to earlier immigrants: the opportunity to create social networks within its own traditions and culture that might have resulted in greater upward mobility. The data indicate that this failure to absorb Puerto Ricans, coupled with white flight, weakened the Archdiocese of New York and sapped its remaining post-Spellman era political power. The flight of this whiter flock impaired the ability of the Archdiocese to influence public policy and facilitated the severing of its link with the labor movement. It missed an opportunity to replenish its faithful from among the growing Puerto Rican population.
CHAPTER VII. CONCLUSION

In November 2013, Democrat Bill de Blasio became the first white Roman Catholic New York City mayor of either major political party since Rudy Giuliani left office at the end of 2001. The oath of office was administered on January 1, 2014, by the nation's 42nd President, William Jefferson Clinton, a Southern Democrat and a Protestant. Mayor de Blasio’s wife, an African-American, stood at his side. There were many speeches at the inauguration events held outside City Hall. The city’s ethnic and racial hues were represented on the faces of those sitting above the lectern, important for a city where in one of its five boroughs, Queens, as many as 170 languages are spoken daily.

Missing from the assembled crowd to welcome the new mayor was Timothy Cardinal Dolan, the Archbishop of New York. The new mayor had campaigned for office on a platform that included taxing the rich and reducing the ever-growing income disparities between the city’s rich and poor. Servicing the less fortunate had always been a staple of the Church’s work. Clergy representing several different faiths spoke at the inaugural ceremony. The leader of the Archdiocese of New York, however, gave no speech or invocation.

Two weeks later, Mayor de Blasio and Cardinal Dolan met at the Cardinal’s residence. One headline proclaimed: “Mayor de Blasio and Cardinal Dolan meet, vow to try to bring Pope to New York” (Durkin 2014). De Blasio described himself in another story as not religious but as a man of faith. The reporter wrote that the discussion between the two included talk about the recently rejected East Midtown zoning plan that the Bloomberg administration had supported (Durkin 2014). Also reported was that the Church-owned property in the area that would have been rezoned would remain as is, since the city council had rejected the entire plan.
De Blasio and the Church both share deeply-held concerns about the poor. But de Blasio won the elections with support from left-wing labor unions, the LGBT (lesbian/gay/bisexual/transgender) community and abortion rights activists. He was a candidate of the left-leaning Working Families Party, which certainly would have been anathema to Cardinal Spellman. De Blasio’s life-long support for wealth redistribution and other social reforms bore no resemblance to Church’s traditional posture. He came to the Powerhouse not as a mendicant but as a mayor, meeting the leader of another of the city’s many constituent groups. The meeting was unremarkable.

Restating of the Question

The social, economic, and political shifts described in this dissertation comprise part of the increasingly unstable urban environment of the second half of the twentieth century, an environment that definitively affected the Archdiocese of New York. I asked prominent New Yorkers with years of experience working with or for the Archdiocese about the last half century, its tumultuous times and their effects on the Church. I consulted a voluminous literature on the City, ethnic relations, the Catholic Church, and local politics. Drawing as well on demographic data, I found that my interlocutors offered insights into Archdiocesan influence and power, and they provided answers about how the Archdiocese lost its ability to influence political decision-makers, social and labor movements, and its own parishioners during the last part of the twentieth century. This dissertation refutes the argument that the Archdiocese lost power because its parishioners left for the suburbs.
I contend that the Archdiocese lost opportunities to capitalize on the changes that were going on around it, and these lost opportunities ultimately resulted in a diminution of its power base. In 1962, Pope John XXIII convened Vatican II, which produced reforms that were meant to bring the Church into the modern world. Despite these reforms, however, the Church was headed instead for a collision with emerging social movements that sought improved standing for women, minorities, and the LGBT community. And although the Church perceived itself as embracing diversity, the Archdiocese did little to work with or help Puerto Ricans, the newest Catholic migrants. Many of these new arrivals shifted their allegiances from the Catholic Church to the Evangelical movement and thus were lost to the Archdiocese as a group that could have refreshed its old power base of suburbanizing white ethnics.

The Archdiocese lost not just loyal individuals: As the public sector unions became prominent, as waterfront jobs were being shipped to New Jersey, as the Democrat reform movement took hold, and as Tammany's clout declined, the Archdiocese lost considerable political influence. Its adaptations were too little and came too late to bring the Archdiocese back to its former position of influence and power within the cultural and political tumult that was the New York City of the period.

The Archdiocese tried to wield its influence throughout the times of urban unrest in New York City, but it simply could not find a toehold in the shifting cultural and political landscape after it suffered the losses noted above. In addition, the structure of the Church hierarchy made finding that toehold even more difficult. As Wilson has indicated, the Archdiocese's lack of nimbleness was woven into the very fabric of its structure. Far from being able to create a "specialized unit" to deal with changing times, and despite Vatican II, he noted that bureaucratic
entities, such as the Archdiocese, possessed “… an administrative apparatus so large as to be immune from popular control” and by extension the winds of popular change (Wilson 1975, 2). Most of my interview respondents agreed that the Archdiocese exemplified Wilson's idea that “(F)rom the point of view of their members, bureaucracies are sometimes uncaring, ponderous, or unfair” (Ibid.). Certainly this particular ecclesiastical bureaucracy was not responsive and agile in the way it needed to be to retain the weight of its influence.

Church and State: Inherent Conflict

The Church continues to believe that it must be involved in public affairs. In Catholics, Politics & Public Policy: Beyond Left and Right, Cochran and Cochran ask: “What does public life need from Catholics?” And then they answer:

[A]ction. Public life needs involvement of faithful Catholic people. In particular, the Church sees it as a special vocation of the laity to take an active role in civic life. Even though deacons, priests, bishops, and religious women may from time to time speak and act on political issues that are not their special calling. Instead, laypersons deeply immersed in the world are responsible for bringing their faith to bear on public life (Cochran and Cochran 2003, 6).

That is precisely what Catholics, directed by the Church’s instruction on the morality of action, had always done as participants in New York City’s public life. Providing that direction might have been how Cardinal Spellman saw his role, as he was considered the “political priest.” Both he and Cardinal Cooke, the “administrator priest,” were most concerned with protecting the institution they served, certainly attempting to preserve its temporal influence within its religious constraints, but ultimately they saw that influence diminish. It is as though they rediscovered Matthew 6:24, that “No one can serve two masters.” The Archdiocese of New York opted, however, to serve structural rigidity and bureaucratic habit over its parishioners’ needs.
Did Cardinals Spellman and Cooke consider rationally and comprehensively the extent that their actions would or would not protect the Archdiocese and preserve its influence? Stone writes that rational decision-making can be defined as “. . . not deciding by habit, intuition, voting or other ways. . . The ideal of perfect rationality would require a person (or an institution) to consider all possible alternatives . . . and evaluate all the possible consequences of each” (Stone 2002, 233). Both cardinals certainly decided by habit and precedent. And although they might well have attempted to evaluate what the consequences of their actions or non-actions portended, it would have taken a crystal ball to predict the scope and depth of the changes going on in urban America and the extent to which those changes would affect the Church.

Although the Archdiocese never had direct decision-making authority or power in political or sociocultural arenas, the Church had a history of strong influence and a collection of powerful proxies. In Dahl's paradigm, the Church had virtual power, able to produce votes from its parishioners. Thus, it could “force” the government to do what the Church wanted it to do (Dahl 2005). After the liberalization of the urban landscape that occurred in the second half of the twentieth century, however, the influence of the Church and its allies declined significantly. On votes of importance to the Church—divorce liberalization, abortion reform, gay marriage, and residency requirements—the Church failed to influence city and state legislatures to vote its interests. Although the Church could not control what went on in the temporal world, it could continue its own mission to ensure that “people of faith,” as Cochran and Cochran describe, would make their voices heard in the public arena (Cochran and Cochran 2003).
The Church as Integrator?

The Church saw itself as the great integrating agent and Americanizer of its flock, a view supported by Cardinal Spellman’s service as vicar general to the Armed Forces and as staunch defender of the American way against communism. But as we have seen, the Archdiocese was of little use in helping Puerto Ricans and others considered non-white integrate, and its lack of accommodation might well be viewed as isolating these newer arrivals from their Catholic co-religionists and, initially, from the American mainstream. Non-white Catholics had indeed been integrating into mainstream America but largely without the help of the Church.

Immigrant groups do not necessarily remain stuck in their status for extended periods. “Most fundamentally, groups rise and fall over time. The fortunes of WASP elites have been declining for decades,” write Chua and Rubenfield (2014). Dahl writes that the purpose of political activity by ethnic groups is “to enlarge the opportunities for ethnics to rise without undue discrimination in a system that contained built-in inequalities in the distribution of resources” (Dahl 2005, 33). What Dahl is saying is that ethnic groups fight discrimination not the system itself. Thus if the Archdiocese of New York had the sort of power described by the Dahl model it would object to those who appeared to impede its parishioners' upward mobility, and to use its power to counter the offense through the electorate.

Power, Past and Present

How much power did the Archdiocese actually have? My findings suggest that the Archdiocese had far-reaching, substantial influence and power, but such influence and power no longer exists.
Did the Archdiocese have sufficient power under Cardinals Spellman and Cooke to force other public actors to do what they did not want to do? During the Spellman era, the answer appears to be yes. Cardinal Spellman understood the political usefulness of linkage to various social networks in creating power, and during his era, political strength derived from such linkages. But during the Cooke era, the correct answer appears to be maybe. Certainly, the Archdiocese had strongly opposed legalization of abortion; regardless, the law passed in 1970 during the Cooke era. Did the Archdiocese of New York have the power to force legislatures to maintain restrictive laws, or to prevent the passage of more liberalizing laws? The ultimate answer is no. On votes of importance to the Church cited in this dissertation—divorce reform, abortion liberalization, gay marriage, and residency requirements—the Church failed to influence city and state legislators to do its bidding.

Summary

This study seeks a greater understanding of the significance of religion in the history of late 20th century New York City politics. In particular, it focuses on the Archdiocese of New York and how it addressed the demographic changing of the guard that occurred when Puerto Rican migrants came to New York City and Irish and Italian Catholics left for the suburbs.

Suburbanization came to mean a new life—cleaner, healthier, and whiter, and less reliant on the Church for temporal goods. The American dream of the post-war era, then, seemed to mirror the cliché of a white picket fence surrounding a suburban back yard where young children could play, unafraid of crime, neighborhood tensions, and the threat of diversity. New communities in the suburbs filled by those fleeing the city would loosen their ties to the communal and social structures that had allowed their descendants to climb from poverty to the
middle class.

Suburbanization was a transformation brought about by a mixture of social carrots and sticks. The federal government initiated an interstate highway system that made exodus from the old city to the new suburbs easier; supported programs and agencies that helped returning servicemen gain access to higher education—ending their reliance on working-class jobs and working-class wages—and low-cost guaranteed home mortgages; and unleashed an unplanned urban renewal process that destroyed neighborhoods. Other forces affecting the Archdiocese’s position in this shifting urban landscape had local antecedents: the altered labor and economic environment that led to the rise of the municipal union; and the loss of waterfront jobs—once the economic engine of regional commerce. Municipal unions, not political machines, would lead the new minority middle class, fueled by an ideology at odds with both Cardinal Spellman-style “Americanism” and Cardinal Cooke's passivity. New York’s minority communities and social movements—civil rights, gay rights, women’s liberation—dominated the political discussion. The Archdiocese of New York and Catholic theology appeared tied to an outdated urban past and to a politics that the quickly secularizing younger generation raised in the suburbs sought to put behind itself.

A confluence of changes, then, confronted the Archdiocese, an institution that remained reluctant to change and interactive only with the secular world when it needed the power temporal political forces could provide. That system worked well until the mid- to late 1960s. Passage of divorce law reform in 1966 and the legalization of abortion in 1970 quickly informed those who thought otherwise that the Archdiocese and the Cardinal were indeed mortal, and to challenge them did not result in public humiliation and eternal damnation.

Communities suffering from the destruction and isolation of urban exodus and the rapid
changes in the city’s power centers and economics might have believed the Archdiocese could have done more to relieve their distress. Although institutions generally fled areas like the South Bronx, it was the Archdiocese with its individual parish priests, seen by many as heroes possessing great faith and bravery, who remained at their posts. Parish priests ministered to New York City’s new arrivals and to others left behind during the great exodus. They were the face of the Archdiocese to those who had been discriminated against and who had little hope for the future.

It has been said that the Archdiocese fled the city for the green suburban grass and left behind those John Cardinal Hughes’s immigrant church pledged to serve. But the Archdiocese did follow the flock: New churches and schools were built as the population to be serviced moved from the city. Despite, however, clear financial strains, the Archdiocese did not plan or publicly present closure plans for urban churches and schools until 2006. It maintained its facilities in the city far longer than prudent fiscal management would have dictated.

Finally, it is not that the Archdiocese is without power today. Any entity with such large real estate holdings and so many followers cannot be discounted. But the nature of its power has changed. It has become less of a temporal, institutional force within the city and more of a spiritual force within the ranks of its faithful. The power of the Archdiocese rests with the ability of its leaders to minister to its flock and not to the politicians it hoped would protect it.


Stephen Aiello, PhD, served as president of the New York City Board of Education from 1975-1980. A former New York City high school teacher, Aiello was spokesman and chairman of the Italian-American Civil Rights League.

Badillo, Herman. Personal Interview. 15 June 2009.

Herman Badillo was elected Bronx borough president in 1965 and ran for mayor of the City of New York in 1969, 1973, 1977 and 1985. He was elected to the US House of Representatives and served from 1971-1977. He was also a deputy mayor during the administration of Mayor Edward I. Koch. Badillo was the first Puerto Rican elected and appointed to those posts. He also served as New York City commissioner of relocation, responsible for the relocation of citizens displaced by urban renewal/slum clearance programs during the administration of Mayor Robert F. Wagner in the early 1960s.

Bergin, Monsignor Thomas. Personal Interview. 7 September 2011.

Thomas Bergin is the former Vicar for education for the Archdiocese of New York under Cardinal Terrence Cooke. He is today a parish priest and serves as chairman of the Staten Island Catholic Schools Board, appointed by Cardinal Timothy Dolan.


A life-long resident of the South Bronx, Aureo Cardona is a former Democratic Party district leader. Cardona developed affordable housing and oversaw rehabilitation of burned-out apartment buildings in his community while working at the South Bronx Housing Corporation and at SEBCO, both locally based non-government organizations.

Carey, Donald. Personal Interview. 11 October 2011.

Donald Carey, active in education reform, has been an investment banker and insurance company executive. He also served as an unpaid advisor to his father, Governor High Carey, who is credited with saving New York State and New York City from bankruptcy in the 1970s.


Daniel Chill, a graduate of Yale University Law School, has served as chief counsel on the Assembly side of the New York State Task Force on Demographic Research and Reapportionment for more than thirty years. He is an expert on population shifts and on census-driven alterations to legislative districts in New York City and New York State.
Crotty, Paul. Personal Interview. 21 September 2011.

A United States federal judge, Paul Crotty was New York City finance commissioner and Department of Housing Preservation Development commissioner for the City of New York. In addition, he served as New York City corporation counsel where he appeared before the United States Supreme Court.

Cunningham, William. Personal Interview. 5 May 2009.

William Cunningham was an advisor to Governors High L. Carey and Mario Cuomo. He also served as chief of staff to US Senator Patrick Moynihan. Cunningham has also been communications director for Mayor Michael Bloomberg.

Dunne, Thomas. Personal Interview. 6 April 2011.

Thomas Dunne presently serves as vice-president for Governmental Relations and Urban Affairs at Fordham University. Active in politics and political campaigns in New York City, Dunne—former vice-president of Public Policy and External Affairs at Verizon—has also been an administrative judge for the New York State Department of Social Services and vice-chair of the New York State Workers’ Compensation Board.

Dufell, Father John. Personal Interview. 4 October 2011.

Father Duffell served as pastor of the Church of the Ascension located in Manhattan’s West Side. He has been an advocate for immigration reform and for changes in church doctrine on homosexuality. His parish has been noted for new programs and parish religious activities to increase immigrant religious participation.

Finn, Monsignor Peter. Personal Interview. 14 September 2011.

Monsignor Finn, ordained in 1965, and named a monsignor in 1986, has been associate superintendent of schools in the Archdiocese of New York and also served as rector of St. Joseph’s Seminary, Dunwoodie, where future priests are trained.

Gyory, Bruce. Personal Interview. 16 July 2009.

Bruce Gyory has been a senior advisor to three New York governors: Hugh Carey, Eliot Spitzer and David Paterson. He is an adjunct professor of political science at SUNY Albany. Gyory traces his political roots to the old Liberal Party in which his father Nicholas Gyory—an official of the Furriers Union—was an officer.


Father Jenik has served as pastor of Our Lady of Refuge parish. He has spent 40 years working in the Bronx, witnessing the destruction and resurgence of neighborhoods. He is noted for battling to rid communities of crime, drug use, prostitution and other urban ills.
He has been a leader in creating affordable housing and has been vicar of the northwest Bronx.


Karen Persichelli Keough served as director of New York operations for then-US Senator Hillary Clinton. The daughter of a New York City police officer, Keough, has also worked for New York City public sector union District Council 37, chief of staff to a city councilmember, and on the campaign to elect David Dinkins as mayor.


Michael Long is chairman of the New York State Conservative Party. A former Marine and the father of nine children, Long managed the campaign that in 1966 defeated Mayor John Lindsay’s police/civilian complaint review board proposal. Long served as a Brooklyn city councilman-at-large from 1981-1983. He is a death penalty proponent, and is opposed to abortion and same sex marriage.

Macchiarola, Frank, PhD. Personal Interview. 11 May 2009.

Appointed by Mayor Edward I. Koch, Frank Macchiarola served as New York City school chancellor. An active Roman Catholic layperson, Macchiarola ran unsuccessfully for New York City comptroller, but served in many appointed positions including the New York City Campaign Finance Board. Frank Macchiarola was a faculty member at Baruch College, CUNY, Columbia University, Saint Francis College, and was vice-president of the CUNY Graduate Center.


A former New York City teacher and East Harlem native, John Marino has been a senior advisor to governors Mario and Andrew Cuomo, and campaign manager for three of Governor Mario Cuomo’s elections. He also served in the administration of Governor Hugh Carey.


Walter McCaffrey, the son of Irish immigrants, served on the New York City Council for sixteen years, and as chair of its powerful Zoning and Franchises Subcommittee of the Land Use Committee. He was also chief of staff to Manhattan Borough President Andrew Stein.

McLaughlin, Martin. Personal Interview. 6 May 2009.

Former Daily News reporter and George Polk Award winner Martin McLaughlin was raised in Manhattan and attended parochial schools. He was communications director for the Manhattan borough president’s office, and a congressional staffer in Washington.
Later in the mid-1980s after serving as Mayor Edward Koch's press secretary during Koch's unsuccessful New York State gubernatorial campaign, McLaughlin became a lobbyist representing commercial interests. He remains a financial supporter of Roman Catholic parochial schools.


James McManus has led the McManus Mid-Town Democratic Club since 1963. Located in Clinton, formerly known as Hell’s Kitchen, the McManus Club has been a local and family institution since 1892 and is one of the last Tammany-era political clubs still functioning in New York City.

Napolitano, Andrew. Personal Interview. 2 January 2014.

Andrew Napolitano, graduate of Princeton University, author and former judge, is the political and senior judicial analyst for the Fox News Channel. Napolitano, an active Roman Catholic layman, is pro-life, opposes capital punishment, and believes the government should not prohibit same sex marriage.

Ott, Edward. Personal Interview. 19 October 2009.

Edward Ott served as executive director of the New York City Central Labor Council, representing an estimated 1.3 million union members in 400 organizations including both private and public sector unions. After the conclusion of a forty year-long career in the labor movement, Ott is now distinguished lecturer in labor studies at the Murphy Institute, CUNY School of Professional Studies.


Vincent Pitta, a New York City labor lawyer active in Roman Catholic organizations including the Catholic Legal Immigration Network, grew up in a labor family. He serves as counsel to many labor organizations, including the 25,000-member New York Hotel/Motel Trades Council. His Father Vito Pitta, an immigrant from Sicily, was a longshoreman who changed professions and became president of the New York Hotel/Motel Trades Council, building it into one of the city’s most powerful entities.


Peter Powers, graduate of Bishop McLaughlin High School, Manhattan College, and New York University Law School, was the campaign manager for Mayor Rudolph Giuliani’s two successful mayoral campaigns. He was the city’s first deputy mayor from 1994-1996, and today heads a business consulting company. Peter Powers is a director of the Partnership for New York City.
Pressman, Gabe. Personal Interview. 1 August 2011.

Gabe Pressman, the senior correspondent for WNBC-TV, has been a reporter covering politics in New York City for more than sixty years. The winner of eight Emmy Awards, an Edward R. Murrow Award, and Peabody Award, he has covered the leaders of the Archdiocese of New York since Francis Cardinal Spellman.

Quinn, Peter. Personal Interview. 11 May 2011.

Peter Quinn earned a Bachelor of Arts from Manhattan College and a Master of Arts from Fordham University. He served as chief speechwriter for Governor Hugh Carey and Governor Mario Cuomo. Peter Quinn, author of a 1984 speech delivered by Governor Cuomo at Notre Dame that addressed religion and politics, is a board member of the American Irish Historical Society.

Roberts, Sam. Personal Interview. 3 June 2009.

Sam Roberts is an award winning newspaper reporter who today serves as the urban affairs correspondent for the New York Times. A former city editor and political editor for the New York Daily News, Sam Roberts is the co-author of a biography of Governor Nelson Rockefeller, and editor of a book about Mayor John Lindsay's impact on the city.

Sakano, Monsignor Donald. Personal Interview. 30 August 2011.

Monsignor Donald Sakano is pastor of the Basilica of St. Patrick’s Old Cathedral located in lower Manhattan. He served as director of the department of neighborhood preservation, Catholic Charities. While in that post he worked to protect middle-income housing in Manhattan at the direction of Archbishop John O’Connor. Monsignor Sakano is president and chair of the non-profit Highbridge Community Development Corporation, which owns and operates 2400 South Bronx housing units.

Samuels, David. Personal Interview. 16 September 2011.

David Samuels attended Harvard University and Harvard Law School. He is a former deputy chief of the New York State Attorney General’s Charities Bureau and is an expert on legal issues confronting charitable and religious organizations in New York State.


Douglas Schoen was the pollster for the campaigns of Governor Hugh Carey, mayors Edward Koch and Michael Bloomberg, and President Bill Clinton.


Reverend Francis Skelly, pastor of the Immaculate Conception Church in the south Bronx, grew up in the parish in which he has served for decades. He is a founder of South
Bronx Churches, an advocacy group whose activities have included organizing to force the New York City Housing Authority to repair its apartment units.

Strasburg, Joseph. Personal Interview. 27 September 2011.

Joseph Strasberg is president of the Rent Stabilization Association of New York (RSA), a landlord trade association. Previously, he was counsel to New York City Council Speaker Peter Vallone and deputy counsel to Peter Vallone’s predecessor, Thomas Cuite.


Robert Tierney was counsel to Mayor Edward Koch and assistant counsel to Governor High Carey. Mayor Michael Bloomberg appointed Tierney to be chairman of the New York City Landmarks Preservation Commission. He has also been a visiting scholar at New York University's Taub Urban Research Center.

Vallone, Peter Sr. Personal Interview. 1 May 2009.

Peter Vallone Sr. was the first speaker of the New York City Council, a position created after a landmark legal case resulted in the re-organization of city government. Prior to this, Vallone had been a councilman representing his native Astoria. He is a graduate of Fordham University and Fordham University Law School. Active in Catholic lay organizations, Vallone was an unsuccessful candidate for mayor in 2001.
APPENDIX B: INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE

1a. Is it still the case that the NYC government has input from the Archdiocese (the Power House) regarding major appointments?

2a. Was the Biaggi withdrawal and BEAME endorsement for Mayor the seminal event indicating the change in the decline of the ethnic and Catholic power block in city elections?

2b. Did this mean that Catholic politicians were less likely to hold power?

2c. Why do you think this is?

3a. Why did the Catholic, Irish and Italians leave the city?

3b. What was their motivation?

4a. Did this exodus affect the Church?

5a. Does the Church have a role today in city politics?

5b. If so, what?

6a. Are the new ethnic groups important to the Church?

6b. If so, how?

7a. Is the shift of power from organized labor in NYC to public sector unions reflective of: Ethnic Shift / Changing Role of The Church?
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