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FEELING POLITICAL: AFFECT, EMOTION AND ETHICS IN WESTERN POLITICAL THEORY

by

JOHN MCMAHON

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Political Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York

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This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Political Science to satisfy the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK
ABSTRACT

Feeling Political: Affect, Emotion, and Ethics in Western Political Theory

by

John McMahon

Advisor: Rosalind P. Petchesky

What conceptual and methodological resources would it take for political theory to be able to analyze the emotional and affective dimensions of political life? In this dissertation, I articulate interdisciplinary work on affect and emotion into political theory in order to realize four linked objectives: first, to develop a method of reading and interpreting political theory capable of tracing the theoretical work done by affect and emotion in works of political thought; second, to reassess the boundaries of the political theory canon in terms of the thinkers that ‘count’ as part of that canon as well as the conceptual concerns that ‘count’; third, to provide specific re-readings and re-imaginings of four particular theorists or theoretical movements: Thomas Hobbes, Karl Marx, Marxist feminism, and Simone de Beauvoir; and fourth, to contribute to theories of embodied political ethics emerging from this kind of reading by centering the interactive, material body in ways attuned to emotion and affect. Ultimately, this dissertation argues that ‘the political’ is always emotional and affective.

Building on contemporary work in political theory on materialism and embodiment (e.g. Connolly 1999; Bennett 2001; Connolly 2002; Tambornino 2002; Frost 2008; Protevi 2009; Bennett 2010; Coole and Frost 2010; Washick et al. 2015), I construct and practice a method for doing affective political theory. I make an interdisciplinary move by constructing a relay...
between political theory and the transdisciplinary project of affect theory (e.g. Deleuze 1988; Massumi 2002; Ahmed 2004; Clough 2007; Clough 2010). My approach becomes a method of reading, theorizing, affecting, and being affected by political theoretical texts and concepts, one potentially useful for thinkers and issues beyond those of this project.

The main chapters of the dissertation explore what this looks like for each member of my constellation. The first chapter reads Thomas Hobbes as a precursor to affect theory in his attention to the politics of the body; an encounter between affect and Hobbes’s materialism enables a reinterpretation of the state of nature. Chapter two reinterprets Karl Marx to argue that a critique of capitalist affect is central to his account of capital: on the one hand, capitalism amplifies the potential affective capacity of bodies through its development and organization of productive forces; on the other, it captures this increase in affective capacity to enrich the bourgeoisie, immiserate the proletariat, and reproduce capitalist relations. The third chapter engages in an affective reading of Marxist feminists to construct a theory of social reproduction that focuses on the reproduction of affective capacity within patriarchal and capitalist forces, and to analyze four specific Marxist feminist thinkers and concepts, exploring how affect theory can productively extend and rearticulate the project of Marxist feminism. Chapter 4, in which I read Simone de Beauvoir’s *The Second Sex* alongside Sara Ahmed’s *The Cultural Politics of Emotion*, investigates the emotional valences of phenomenology, subjectivity, gender oppression, power, and social transformation. The conclusion assembles the work of the main chapters to contribute to accounts of embodied political ethics, arguing that ethical considerations emanate from the center of ‘the political’ and that my method can theorize resources for affectively analyzing this intersection of ethics and politics. The conclusion also explores the limitations of affective reading and of the thinkers I examine, including recurring occlusion of racial and colonial
violences, the potential emptiness of affective ethical categories, the status of collectivity and
democratic practice, among others.

This project develops the conceptual and methodological resources necessary to think
through the ways politics is materially felt and experienced by embodied subjects. Ultimately, it
analyzes the political forces that shape, channel, assemble, appropriate, redirect, dampen, and
amplify the material, emotional, and affective powers of the political body in motion.
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At the same time that any research project is an individual work, it is also a collective effort, an intellectual and affective assemblage. Whether in the form of providing feedback on my work, talking about theory and theorists, getting me through the more difficult times of graduate school, making mediocre political theory jokes, and much more, my experience has been one of interdependence. At its best, this dissertation reflects the vibrancy of this community around me.
Introduction
Feeling as Method in Political Theory

“There is a double reading ... [the systematic reading and] on the other hand and at the same time, the affective reading, without an idea of the whole, where one is carried along or set down, put in motion or at rest, shaken or calmed according to the velocity of this or that part” (Deleuze 1988, 129).

Prologue: Three Scenes of Political Bodies

At an August 2015 Bernie Sanders rally in Seattle, Washington, #BlackLivesMatter activists took the stage and disrupted Sanders’s speech, calling out “white supremacist liberalism”, criticizing Seattle’s plan to build a new prison, and attempting to start a moment of silence for Michael Brown on the one-year anniversary of his death. As two black women took over the microphone, members of the predominantly white crowd booed, yelled that the protestors should be arrested, and shouted profanities during the attempted moment of silence (Brunner 2015). In a later interview, Mara Willaford – one of the two protestors to take over the microphone and podium – narrated the experience, including its particularly emotional and embodied dimensions:

We did so much mental, emotional, spiritual prep before the action, because we knew it was going to be controversial. We knew it was going to be a really hostile environment. But there's nothing that can prepare you for what it actually feels like to have thousands of white people yelling at you. … I put my fist up, and I close my eyes. And I tell Marissa [Johnson, the other protestor with Willaford], ‘Hold my hand.’ We stand there. I can hear her breath caught in her body. I can feel her shaking and crying (StoryCorps 2016).

In the moment of this particular rally, demands for and policy proposals to curb police violence, start to dismantle the carceral state, and call for other forms of racial and economic justice are channeled into a politics that works at a visceral level. There is a material politics to the movement, dually legible in the Willaford and Johnson’s embodied presence disrupting the rally and in the discomfort and anger of the (liberal and likely to identify as anti-racist) crowd.

Elsewhere, #BlackLivesMatter expresses itself through the linked power of bodies marching
together on the streets of cities, staging “die-ins” in symbolically loaded spaces, and insisting upon social and political attention to the disposability of black bodies. This visceral politics exceeds customary political theoretical vocabularies of representation, rights, democratic practice, and deliberation.

At content moderation sites – both within the US and outsourced abroad (especially to the Philippines) – over 100,000 laborers spend their workdays viewing violent and disturbing images as they attempt to keep pictures and videos of gruesome car crashes, sexual violence, beheadings, pornography, animal abuse, and other banned material off of social-networking sites and mobile applications (Chen 2014). Visiting one content moderation company in the Philippines working for the mobile app Whisper, Chen (2014) recounts the scene:

A list of categories, scrawled on a whiteboard, reminds the workers of what they’re hunting for: pornography, gore, minors, sexual solicitation, sexual body parts/images, racism. When Baybayan sees a potential violation, he drills in on it to confirm, then sends it away—erasing it from the user’s account and the service altogether—and moves back to the grid [of posts]. Within 25 minutes, Baybayan has eliminated an impressive variety of dick pics, thong shots, exotic objects inserted into bodies, hateful taunts, and requests for oral sex.

As Sarah T. Roberts writes (2016, 8), the “hidden labor” of these workers – where they “view and deal with material that is racist, homophobic, sexist, and disturbing as a regular part of their daily work” – is essential to the “curation and creation of social media sites and the content they disseminate.” One can imagine the embodied experience of these workers. Like many workers today, they face the everyday stresses and pressures of entry-level and/or globalized labor in networks of global neoliberal capital (cf. Ong 2006) as well as the bodily discomfort and eye strain from sitting at a desk staring at a computer screen for long periods. But they also experience a constant assault on their senses all workday, every workday. They are continuously flooded with gruesome, violent, physically draining images. One psychologist who was
interviewed describes the everyday experience of these workers as “like PTSD” as the images leave “a memory trace in their [the worker’s] mind” (Chen 2014). Political decisions about labor regulations and globalization, flows of global capital and digital media, and virulent visual-auditory expressions of gendered, racialized, sexualized, and homophobic violence converge on and assault the body of the content moderator, with long-lasting effects.

In the year 2015 alone, almost two million migrants – many of them refugees fleeing conflict and repression – entered Europe; most of them attempted a dangerous journey across the Mediterranean Sea to migrate, and almost 4,000 people died trying to complete this crossing (BBC 2016; UNHCR 2016). There were over 1.3 million asylum claims in European countries in 2015, yet the number of approved asylum claims or migrants accepted by various countries is far less than this number (BBC 2016). Striking images and narrated experiences of migrant bodies have proliferated: camps in Calais, France where migrants wait to attempt to get into Great Britain; crowds of refugees at train stations in Hungary; groups of Europeans welcoming migrants and protesting their arrival; a dead Syrian toddler on a beach in Turkey. In the so-called “refugee crisis” or “migrant crisis,” bodies in motion confront a panoply of political forces, including but not limited to the state, war, securitizing discourses, capital flows, militarization, international organizations, the fear and hate of xenophobic individuals, bio- and necropolitical regimes, and more.

All of these sketches are narratives about the affective, emotional, and embodied dimensions of political life. These and many other contemporary political phenomena – those who live under constant threat of American drone attacks as well as the situation of drone operators/pilots (Wilcox 2015), emotional appeals in the War on Terror and other international political processes (Ross 2013), emotional and affective responses to climate change (von
neoliberalism’s reliance on emotional and affective labor (Lazzarato 1996; Weeks 2007a; Hochschild 2012; Lordon 2014), and so on – demand that political theory embark upon a deeper engagement with current interdisciplinary work on affect and emotion so as to be able to think through this level of politics.

**Feeling Political**

What would it take for political theory to be able to think through political and ethical responses to the especially embodied dimensions of systemic racism and police violence, the brutal sensorium of globalized, digital labor such as content moderation, or large flows of refugees and migrants? What frameworks and modes of reading and theorizing are necessary for political theory to grasp the range of and potential connections between these scenes? How must we rethink the political theory canon to fully engage these phenomena, especially their particularly material and embodied qualities?

More broadly, what conceptual and methodological resources would it take for political theory to be able to more deeply analyze the emotional and affective dimensions of political life? What are the political forces that comprise, shape, channel, redirect, amplify, dampen, appropriate, reassemble, connect, and disconnect affect and emotion? In this dissertation, I articulate interdisciplinary work on affect and emotion into political theory in order to realize four linked objectives: first, to develop a method of reading and interpreting political theory capable of tracing the theoretical work done by affect and emotion in works of political thought, especially where thinkers are superficially *not* working on the level of affect and emotion; second, to reassess the boundaries of the political theory canon in terms of the thinkers that ‘count’ as part of that canon as well as the conceptual concerns that ‘count’; third, to provide
specific re-readings and re-imaginings of four particular theorists or theoretical movements: Thomas Hobbes, Karl Marx, Marxist feminism, and Simone de Beauvoir; and fourth, to contribute to theories of embodied political ethics emerging from this reading by centering the dynamic, interactive, material body in ways attuned to emotion and affect. Ultimately, this dissertation argues that ‘the political’ has always already been emotional and affective.

I mobilize affect and emotion as a reading-writing-theorizing-feeling practice, one which investigates Pheng Cheah’s question “what is the matter of the political and what is the matter of politics?” (2010, 90). Feeling as a method engages the materiality of affect and emotion to offer one standpoint – or perhaps a Deleuzean line of flight – for answering this prompt and enlivening the study of political theory. Given that affect itself has not generally been part of political theory or of the ways the political theory canon is interpreted (with some exceptions, of course), such a practice and method are necessarily experimental and unsure in advance of what emerges from affective-emotional readings of political theory. Indeed, as I will discuss later, one of my motivations for such an approach is to remain open to where reading the history of political theory beside affect theory can take us. Spinoza claims that we do not yet know what a body can do, and that this fact should impel inquiry into the affects, capacities, powers, and knowledges of the body (Spinoza 2005, pt. III prop. II scholia; Deleuze 1990, 226). In terms of this dissertation, not only do we not yet know what a body is capable of, but we also do not yet know what certain modes of theorizing embodied affect and emotion in political theory can do. I thus mark out one possible elaboration of what affective political theory might be capable of. To do so, I make an interdisciplinary move, setting up a relay and constructive engagement between on the one hand political theory, and on the other work on affect and emotion from cultural studies and cultural theory, social psychology, women’s and gender studies, queer theory, feminist science studies,
literary criticism, and American studies, among others. As a reading and theorizing practice, the intention is to intensify connections of various kinds between political theory and affect theory.

This dissertation builds on contemporary work in political theory on materialism and embodiment (Connolly 1999; Bennett 2001; Connolly 2002; Tambornino 2002; Frost 2008; Protevi 2009; Bennett 2010; D. H. Coole and Frost 2010; Washick et al. 2015), but specifically pursues affect and emotion as means of engaging matter and the body. I argue my approach becomes one way of doing “positive ontopolitical interpretation,” a “strategy of attachment” where “the idea is to interpret actively, specifically, and comparatively” (Connolly 1995, 36–37). Here one “project[s] ontopolitical assumptions explicitly into detailed interpretations” in order to “offer affirmative interpretations and positive ideals” while also “acknowledging that your implicit projections surely exceed your explicit formulation of them” and “challeng[ing] closure in the [ontopolitical] matrix by affirming the contestable character of your own projections” (36-37). In terms of my project, I inject ontological and ontopolitical assumptions of affect and the body into political theoretical texts as a way to actively interpret specific theorists as well as to compare and read across theorists, while recognizing that affect, emotion, and the dynamism of the body will resist closure and exceed our accounts of them. The “affirmative interpretations” this project hypothesizes would include specific readings of particular theorists as well as surprising and fruitful connections between them, while the “positive ideal” involves the contribution to theories of embodied political ethics I outline in the conclusion. That Connolly describes this method of interpretation as a “strategy of attachment” is also noteworthy, considering the importance of the idea of attachment to some strands of affect theory. As Sara Ahmed argues, emotions work to produce movement and attachment at the same time, or more precisely “attachment takes place through movement, through being moved by … proximity”
While Connolly does not pursue the emotional valences of “attachment” as an interpretive method, I would contend that bringing political theory and affect theory into proximity with one another opens up new possibilities for tracking movements within political theoretical texts and to forging new attachments between concepts, traditions, texts, and thinkers previously detached from one another.

I argue that my approach is not just a projection of ontological assumptions, but more so a method of reading, theorizing, and affecting/being affected by political theoretical texts and concepts, one potentially useful for thinkers and issues beyond those of this project. The main chapters of the dissertation explore what this looks like for each member of my constellation.

The rest of this introduction concerns itself most of all with how an affective turn in political theory might unfold, laying out the modes of encountering and interpreting the history of Western political theory that are at stake in such a project. In the remainder of this section, I provide an overview of the main threads of affect theory that I work with, as well as why I deploy them and navigate the tensions within affect theory in the specific way I do. The subsequent section explicitly conceptualizes the method of reading for affect and emotion that I will use in the dissertation, drawing primarily on the work of Eve Kosofky Sedgwick and Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. I then discuss the multiple ways I understand the relationship between political theory and affect theory in this project. The final section of the introduction briefly outlines my interpretations of Hobbes, Marx, Marxist feminism, and Beauvoir.

**Theories of Affect and Emotion**

In this project, I work with two trajectories of contemporary inter-/trans-disciplinary work on affect and emotion. The first develops a concept of emotion that works to problematize binaries such as subject/object or mind/body or reason/emotion while retaining a notion of
subjectivity, exemplified in the work of Sara Ahmed or Ann Cvetkovich. The second – working with a trajectory from Baruch Spinoza to Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari – elaborates an account of affect as an autonomic and asubjective intensity or force, as exemplified by Patricia T. Clough or Brian Massumi, among others. Although a multiplicity of approaches to affect exist beyond the two I describe here, I find these two particular strands especially useful for engaging the thinkers of this study and for highlighting tensions within affect theory. I will explore the differences between the approaches below. Here I want to mark their important shared commitments to thinking through embodiment, materiality, and sensation in a way that rejects dominant tropes in Western theory. Such tropes include: Cartesian dualism; a conception of the subject as atomistic or bounded; a rigid dichotomy between the individual and the social or the biological and the cultural; and purely cognitive conceptualizations of emotion or feeling.

Ahmed insists on the connection between emotion and sensation, and argues that it is through the emotional interpretation of sensations – themselves “responses to the impressions of objects and others” – that “bodily surfaces take shape” (2004, 25). Against both colloquial models of emotion that presume the interiority of emotions – for example ‘I have a feeling, that moves outward from myself’ – as well as “outside-in” social or psychological models in which emotions are assumed to come from outside of an individual and move into them, Ahmed details the way that emotions “produce the very surfaces and boundaries” of the individual and the social and that “objects of emotion take shape as effects of circulation” (10). Emotions move; they are not things we can have or possess. Instead of “positively inhabit[ing]” somebody or something, emotions are part of what Ahmed calls an “affective economy” of circulation, with the subject as only “one nodal point in the economy” (45-46). The crucial question to ask is that of what emotions do. One effect of the movement of emotions is to render certain signs, objects,
and others “sticky,” or “saturated with affect”, for example the way that white fear and hate have become stuck to black bodies (chap. 2-3). Cvetkovich offers an account of affect and emotion similar to Ahmed’s. In her early work, she uses emotion, affect, and feeling more or less interchangeably, for example in the way she discusses “cultural texts as repositories of feelings and emotions”, an “archive of feelings” related to trauma that acts as “a point of entry” to “many forms of love, rage, intimacy, grief, shame, and more” and “represent[s] examples of how affective experience can provide the basis for new cultures” (2003, 7). In her more recent work, she deploys “affect” to describe a collection of “impulses, desires, and feelings that get historically constructed in a range of ways” (2012, 4). In general, for both Ahmed and Cvetkovich, emotion and affect are more or less interchangeable and usually refer back to subjects in some way.

An alternative approach focuses on affect as an autonomic and asubjective force or intensity. This trajectory flows from Spinoza (2005) to Deleuze – including the latter’s texts on Spinoza (1988; 1990) and work with Guattari (1987; 1994) – to more contemporary theory. In Deleuze’s rendering, Spinoza theorizes bodies in terms of capacity to affect and to be affected (Spinoza’s affectus), such that bodies interact in encounters that can increase or decrease this capacity (this change in capacity is Spinoza’s affectio) (Deleuze 1988). For Deleuze and Guattari, these Spinozan concepts give rise to a definition of the body as “the sum total of the material elements belonging to it under given relations of movement and rest, speed and slowness” and “the sum total of the intensive affects it is capable of at a given power or degree of potential” (1987, 260). This mode of individuation – “haecceity” – “consist[s] entirely of relations of movement and rest between molecules or particles, capacities to affect and be affected” (261).
Recent scholarship has expanded this concept and study of affect, in what we may broadly understand as an “affective turn” in critical and cultural theory (Clough 2007). Affect can be conceptualized as “pre-individual bodily forces augmenting or diminishing a body’s capacity to act” that point to a “dynamism immanent to bodily matter and matter generally” (Clough 2010, 207). Massumi links affect to intensity and sensation and contends that it is “autonomous to the degree to which it escapes confinement in the particular body whose vitality, or potential for interaction, it is” (2002, 35). Along similar lines, Kathleen Stewart explains the world of affect as “transpersonal or prepersonal,” with “bodies literally affecting one another and generating intensities” through affects as moving things; as such, the self is what “enfolds the intensities it finds itself in,” understanding the individual (such as it is) as a “collection of trajectories and circuits” (2007, 128; 58–59).

In many ways, these two strands of affect theory stand in marked contrast to one another. Distinguishing her work from Massumi’s, Ahmed contends that sharply distinguishing affect from emotion “can under-describe the work of emotions, which involve forms of intensity, bodily orientation, and direction that are not simply about ‘subjective content’ or qualification of intensity” (2010, 230n1; her emphasis). Moreover, “intensities” themselves may be more directed and qualified, such that even if we could distinguish affective bodily sensation from an attributed subjective emotion, the two “are contiguous; they slide into each other; they stick, and cohere, even when they are separated” (230-231n1). For her, the clear demarcation of affect from emotion occludes far more than it reveals. Conversely, Massumi (2002, 27–28; 35–36) and Clough (2010, 207; 224n1) both emphasize that affect theory in their understanding explicitly does not refer back to a subjective emotion or feeling. Massumi for instance claims that affect and emotion “follow different logics and pertain to different orders” (2002, 27). The two
trajectories of affect theory I work with in this project are thus to some extent incommensurable, one emphasizing the relationship between affect and subjective emotion and the other arguing for the autonomy of affect.

Nonetheless, questions about the potential collapsing, relation, and/or distinction of emotion and affect have been the topic of much debate. Massumi himself acknowledges the difficulty of upholding a rigid contrast “in any final way” even though that distinction remains analytically and ontologically important (2002, 293n17). While maintaining a substantive distinction between affect and emotion, Sianne Ngai argues we should understand this as a “modal difference of intensity or degree” rather than “a formal difference of quality or kind” so that we can pay attention to transitions between the two (2005, 27). Carolyn Pedwell (2014, 20) contends “that it is sometimes useful to make contingent analytical distinctions between these categories” of affect and emotion “without suggesting that they are wholly discrete.” For her, “if affect pertains to emerging and shifting intensities rather than named or recognised entities, we could consider it be less discursively and socially constructed than emotion” (20), yet Pedwell nonetheless chooses to “often use the terms ‘emotion’ and ‘affect’ interchangeably ‘to highlight the fluidity of conceptual [and disciplinary] boundaries’” [Koivunen 2010, 10]” (21). Several thinkers turn to “feeling” as a term encompassing an overlap and/or undecidability between different theories and understandings of affect and emotion. For Cvetkovich, “feeling” functions as a “generic term” that is useful for “spanning the distinctions between emotion and affect central to some theories” and for “acknowledging the somatic or sensory nature of feelings as experiences that aren’t just cognitive concepts or constructions”; she favors the term for its “intentionally imprecise” usage, as it retains the “ambiguity between feelings as embodied sensations and feelings as psychic or cognitive experience” (2012, 4). Rei Terada also argues for
understanding feeling as an overarching concept encompassing embodied, physiological experiences as well as more subjective, cognitive processes (2001, 4–6), while Ngai claims that we should characterize feeling as a category both social and material (2005, 25). Teresa Brennan, conversely, contends that affects, understood as material and energetic, are “the physiological shift accompanying a judgment” and “basically synonymous with” emotions. Although affects are more “physiological” while emotions are more psychological and “longer-lasting” for her, feeling is quite distinct, referring to “sensations that have found the right match in words” (2004, 5–6).

In general, I think we ought to avoid any conclusive decision about whether to maintain a firm distinction between affect as an asubjective force or a subjective emotion, whether to traverse the “circuit from affect to subjectively felt emotional states” (Clough 2010, 207), whether to collapse affect and emotion (and possibly feeling) into each other, or whether to take any other kind of final position. Instead, I suggest that political theory’s encounter with affect theory should pursue a more ecumenical approach, with the adoption of any one kind of affect theory remaining contingent and refusing closure or exclusivity. The strand of theorizing on affect and emotion guiding political theoretical inquiry should always be responsive to the texts, thinkers, and questions at hand; those interrogating what are ultimately asubjective forces in politics require a different conceptual and methodological repertoire than those analyzing the politics of subjectively felt emotional states. At times, a sharp focus on affect as an intensity distinct from emotion may be useful, for example in my reading of Marx and Marxist feminists on the quasi-structural direction of bodily capacities to affect and be affected. At others, the travel between and potential collapse of affect and emotion might become most important, such as in my interpretation of Hobbes and his materialist “train” of embodied processes from an
asubjective sensation to more subjectivized emotion. And in different circumstances, more exclusively tracing subjective, embodied emotion will be most generative, as is the case for my reading of Beauvoir and her language of subjectivity and conscious experience. In each of these instances, the texts and my reading of them govern the kind of thinking about emotion and affect which I engage, as I work with the way that the texts themselves move. This is one place where my situation as the person thinking and feeling the resonance between

The two kinds of affect theory I work with in this project are in opposition to one another in notable ways, but in my view this does not preclude them from being used together in the same project. They each will resonate more with some thinkers than with others, and rather than decide *a priori* the singular kind that is correct or that will be used exclusive of the alternative, I emphasize the need to respond to which one will be most generative in relation to a given theorist. That is, one ought to be flexible rather than rigid with their use of ‘affect,’ ‘emotion,’ ‘feeling,’ and related terminology. In this dissertation, I will uphold a (never final) distinction between emotion and affect along the lines sketched above, using “feeling” as an umbrella term that encompasses both concepts/bodily processes, as well as their relation, crossover, and indistinction.

**Feeling as Method**

This project functions as a relay and constructive engagement between political theory and affect theory, producing an explicit practice of opening the political theory canon to conversation and connection with critical theoretical work from political theory’s elsewheres. Thus, I mobilize conceptual underpinnings for an approach to political theory that are themselves located outside of the field. That is, I explore what other disciplines and theories can do, methodologically, to the traditional questions and objects of study in political theory. This is the case not only at the
level of the project’s general orientation, but also in terms of the specific conceptual resources I
find in developing my methodology. This section surveys these resources and constructs the
approach to feeling as a method that I practice in the subsequent chapters.  

*How* does one carry out political theoretical readings and interpretations – especially in
the history of political thought – incited by affect and emotion? What kinds of practices are
involved, and what sorts of concepts can guide the effort? The most important methodological
impulse of this sort of project asks *what work affect and emotion do and what effects they
generate when one stages an encounter between feeling and political theoretical texts.*

Rearticulating Sara Ahmed’s motivating gesture – asking ‘what do emotions do?’ (2004, 4) – is
helpful here. My claim is that asking, ‘what do affective reading practices do in interpreting X?’,
‘what do affect and emotion uniquely enable us to discover and construct in X?’, or ‘how do
affect theory and political theory resonate with one another?’ promises generative answers. This
set of questions enables us to explore how affect and emotion might be at work in a way
unacknowledged or unanticipated by the thinker yet matter for our ongoing work with and
understanding of that thinker. One of the reasons for this is that, instead of thinking of “emotion
as being ‘in’ texts” that we can go find or not find in some way, the “emotionality of texts”
consists in “how texts are ‘moving’, or how they generate effects” (Ahmed 2004, 14). Affective
and emotional reading practices track a variety of movements in political theoretical texts in
order to open them up anew, accessing important dimensions of their projects, the richest points
that an affective method can disclose.

Crucial to such a commitment and to these kinds of reading and theoretical practices is
that we cannot know in advance what an affective and/or emotional reading of X can or will
produce. Instead, this commitment cultivates a receptivity to the (potentially surprising)
theoretical moments and movements that result from following feeling as a method. This involves putting affect and canonical theory on the same theoretical plane, tracing resonances between affect theory and political theory, following theoretical developments and reinterpretations spurred by affect and emotion, and so on. Such a method resists limiting the possibilities of its interpretative practices in advance, such that they can solely ever discover one and only one form or mode of relation between feeling and theory. For example, it is possible (and likely, I believe) that the relation between affect theory and political theorist X could simultaneously take many of these forms: ‘affect theory adds to X’; ‘affect theory and X resonate with one another’; ‘affect theory fosters a critique of X’; ‘there is a disjuncture between affect theory and X in this way’; ‘X anticipates affect theory in certain ways’; and ‘affective reading can re-describe and re-interpret concepts A and B from X,’ among other possibilities. Even in their tensions with one another, these are some of the kinds of relations one might articulate through intensifying the connections between affect theory and political theory.

Queer theorist and literary scholar Eve Kosofky Sedgwick’s elaboration of “reparative” reading – juxtaposed with “paranoid” reading⁶ – provides a guide for this method. Reparative reading, she contends, enables one to take up old questions and texts in novel and fruitful ways. For the “reparatively positioned reader, it can seem realistic and necessary to experience surprise” (Sedgwick 2003b, 146), as opposed to the oft-default mode in critical theory which “requires that bad news already be known” in advance, places “extraordinary stress” on “knowledge in the form of exposure”, and engages a “knowing, anxious paranoid determination that no horror … shall ever come to the reader as new” (130; 138; 146, her emphasis). In other words, the reparative reading’s sensibility is open to and expectant of surprise, while the paranoid reading’s “hermeneutics of suspicion” emphasizes the register of exposure and demystification at the
expense of other orientations to texts and ideas (Sedgwick 2003b, 139–40; also see Bennett 2010, xiii–xiv). Sedgwick offers a related framing of reading practices in the introduction to her essay collection, where she argues for reading “beside” as a way of doing theoretically informed interpretive work. Reading beside facilitates the interaction of a multiplicity of elements in a way that eschews both “linear logics that enforce dualistic thinking” such as “cause versus effect, subject versus object” as well as the “fantasy of metonymically egalitarian or even pacific relations” between texts and concepts (Sedgwick 2003a, 8).7

In my affective-emotional reading of political theory, reparative reading and reading beside become an important orienting impulse. Above all else, they insist that feeling as method not attempt to know in advance the emotions and affects circulating through a text, the effects that an affective reading might generate, or what political theoretical moments can be disclosed. A “paranoid” reading position might seek to expose the problems and insufficiencies of X’s theory of emotion and/or affect (or their lack of such a theory). Focusing primarily on this mode might lead us to too quickly dismiss thinkers as possibilities for this kind of reading and theorizing. Hypothetically, if this was our concern, we might prejudge a thinker as “obviously” not affective or emotional – perhaps they have a very strong split between mind and body, and/or an exclusively cognitive and rationalistic view of politics – and reject on face the possibility that affective reading might open them up with surprising and theoretically enriching effects.8

What Sedgwick productively suggests for my project is that the reparative queries promote both affective and theoretical openness and generativity. What becomes important is reading X beside affect and emotion in order to track resonances between them and to experiment to see what that reading can generate for political theory. Such reading beside, following Sedgwick, recognizes that tension and incongruence will result from the interpretive-
theoretical interaction between a given theorist/text on the one hand and affect and emotion as a conceptual movement on the other; indeed, it seeks to twist those pressures in productive directions. This enables reading and theorizing to examine complex relations between (political theoretical) text and (affective) concepts – a “wide range of desiring, identifying, representing, repelling, paralleling, differentiating, rivaling, leaning, twisting, mimicking, withdrawing, attracting, aggressing, warping, and other relations” (Sedgwick 2003a, 8) – instead of reductionist relations that would exclusively attempt to render final judgment on whether X is affective. Throughout this dissertation, I work to cultivate a reparative reading practice that puts Hobbes, Marx, Marxist feminists, and Beauvoir beside another, and that puts them individually and collectively beside emotion and affect. Keeping open the kinds of relations one might theorize between affect and political theory as well as the political theoretical effects of such relations ultimately harbors the most critical potential.

I further elaborate conceptual-methodological resources for affective political theory with concepts from Deleuze and Guattari’s *A Thousand Plateaus*. One of my objectives in this project is to construct a “smooth” rather than “striated” methodological and theoretical space. For Deleuze and Guattari, *striated space* is a space of homogeneity “which intertwines fixed and variable elements, produces an order and succession of distinct forms,” is filled by properties, and contains rigidly “formed and perceived things.” *Smooth space* is populated by multiplicities, comprises a “continuous” and “directional” space that is “filled by events and haecceities”, and is an “intensive” “space of affects” (1987, 477–79). A related set of concepts from Deleuze and Guattari is the notion of molar and molecular segmentarity. For them, texts (chap. 8), individuals, and societies (chap. 9) are “plied” by two “segmentarities” – molar and molecular – that do not have the “same terms” or “the same nature” but “coexist and cross over into each other” (213).
They are distinguished by the “nature of the system of reference” between them: the molar refers to large-scale aggregates and collective signifiers and representations, while the molecular refers to flows of desire that conjugate and connect with one another (217-219).

Affective and emotional reading of political theory strives to engage texts and thinkers in smooth (theoretical and methodological) space in a way that attends to their molecular flows. As Deleuze and Guattari claim, smooth space is a “space of affects” (479), so my overall project orients itself to that kind of space. I am interested in the ways that we can become more creative in our interpretation of political theorists, both individually and in their connections to one another, and I think that asking what it would mean to have smooth political theoretical space pushes in that direction. What would it mean for the histories of political theory to be multiplicitous events in continuous variation, as Deleuze and Guattari conceptualize the entities populating smooth space? An affective approach can open up canonical theorists and theories as multiplicities and haecceities by exploring the different kinds of affective and emotional processes that constitute and escape from the more formal entity and its properties.

I situate Hobbes, Marx, Marxist feminism, and Beauvoir in smooth space: following emotional and affective circulations in these thinkers’ works means changing the directions, relations, and compositions of our receptivity to them. Thinking about smooth space and the molecular enables a re-engagement with Beauvoir on the relationship between power, emotion, and phenomenology, or a return to Marxist feminism in order to draw out the affective dimensions of concepts like social reproduction, materialism, and patriarchy. A more striated reading would subsume the less obvious emotional and affective qualities of this theoretical work under more homogenizing signs. Deleuze and Guattari help articulate the background impulses and understandings of what it means to ‘do theory’ that motivate my approach. Feeling
can provide an entry into the molecular flows of desire, energy, intensity, and so on coursing through any given text or theorist, which are likely not captured by interpretive engagements and reading practices that take on theoretical concepts and texts as more molar (collective, representational) entities – as important as such readings are. Affect and emotion can access the microtextures and flows that constitute as well as deconstruct and escape from the molar aggregate.

For instance, Hobbes’s Leviathan is ostensibly one of the most molar entities in the history of Western political theory, the paradigm of undivided authoritarian sovereignty and absolute political power. But, what are the material affects, emotions, desires, flows and intensities that operate to compose the Leviathan, and may work against it? What can an approach emphasizing feeling uniquely help us read out of the fear and other affective and emotional circuits of the state of nature, or of Hobbes’s account of power? To think about this visually, a molar approach to Hobbes focuses on the giant sovereign depicted in the famous frontispiece to *Leviathan*, while a molecular approach examines the multitude of bodies that compose the larger whole. ‘Capitalism’ can also be a massive striated and molar entity. It is often represented in left/ Marxist and in non-Marxist discourses as unitary, singular, and totalizing (J. Gibson-Graham 2006, chap. 1; chap. 11). But upon what operations on and with the affective capacities of bodies does it depend? How can feeling as a method operating at the molecular level pay attention to the processes and bodies that make up capitalism? Can attention to affect open up new components to Marx’s critique of capital, especially in a contemporary moment when affective labor is a central concern of critical scholarship and radical praxis (Negri 1999; Hardt 1999; Hardt and Negri 2000; Weeks 2007a; Berg 2014)? What are the material, feeling-based molecular segmentarities of the Marxist feminist concept of social reproduction and its
deployment as a critique of capitalist patriarchy and of Marxism? These are (some of) the questions the approach I sketch in this introduction asks and the rest of the dissertation seeks to answer. Affective and emotional reading-theorizing practices can elaborate these thinkers into the smooth theoretical space and molecularity that such inquiry requires. They enable us to rearticulate these thinkers in order to generate different political theoretical resources in response to recurrent problems and questions in Western political theory.

This project’s methodology, by paying attention to the circulation of affect and emotion, may provide “lines of flight” from these thinkers. If we take seriously the insistence of Deleuze and Guattari that every process is constantly generating lines of flight from its overcoded molar stratifications, then what are the lines of flight from, for instance, Hobbes’s account of the state nature or Beauvoir’s feminist appropriation of Hegel, existentialism, and phenomenology? Lines of flight are active, real, and immanent, “escaping” and “causing runoffs” from large-scale aggregates and entities (1987, 204–205). For me, feeling as a method lets loose lines of flight from political theoretical texts, enabling creative reinterpretations, surprising connections, and new concepts to emerge.

One way to tie all of these methodological concerns and motivations together is think about what Sedgwick – noting her connection here to Deleuze and Guattari – describes as “planar relations” (2003a, 8) in our reading and theorizing. Various philosophers, philosophies, philosophical becomings and problematics construct the plane their affiliated concepts populate and move around; the plane is the “indivisible milieu in which concepts are distributed” (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 36). My approach to doing political theory in this project lays out a single plane traversed by affect theory and a particular constellation of thinkers. When an encounter is staged between affect, emotion, and the thinkers I consider, what happens to their singular and
collective projects? What features of these projects are made uniquely legible? What distinctive concepts, assemblages, and critical articulations emerge from feeling as method? These are the kinds of questions this project makes possible – and starts to answer.

Ultimately, feeling as a method emphasizes experimentation in reading, interpreting, and theorizing. We do not yet know what a body of affective political theorizing can do; the methodological imperative becomes to reflect on what processes, practices, and experimentations one might engage in when bringing together affect and political theory, and on the kinds of conceptual resources that might guide this effort. Grounded in an intensive and affective view of the subject, Rosi Braidotti insists that it “is urgent to explore and experiment with more adequate forms of non-unitary, nomadic, and yet accountable modes of envisaging both subjectivity” and sociopolitical “interaction” (2009, 144). The method I have sketched is, I posit, one mode of this exploration and experimentation, reparatively attuned to the molecular flows surging through the canon in its reading of affect and emotion beside political theory. Each of the chapters of this dissertation practices feeling as a method with different texts and thinkers.

**Affect Theory and Political Theory**

As articulated by Nicholas Tampio (2015, 147n13), Deleuze engaged the history of philosophy by “citing accurately but arranging elements to say something new” (cf. Deleuze 1995, 6). Such a theoretical practice, Tampio suggests, enables this history to become a “keyboard that may play many songs depending on how the notes are arranged” (131). Taking a cue from this, I argue that my turn to affect theory presents a particularly generative modality for arranging notes differently to play original songs with the keyboard of political theory, offering a vector for re-reading and re-imagining particular theorists in rewarding ways.
The method I develop could, potentially, be used to read any text of political theory, and I find this to be one of its most important features: my hope is that this project motivates affective readings of thinkers beyond those that I study here. This is one of the reasons that I engage four thinkers who do not, on face, ‘fit’ with one another. As a method, affect and emotion can open up surprising – and surprisingly productive – connections. Engaging with thinkers at the molecular level through reading practices focused on feeling shifts the emphasis to bodies, forces, and materialities rather than more molar concerns and significations. This fosters connections across different time periods and theoretical traditions. If one practices an affective method for reading, for instance, how Hobbes and Beauvoir interact in the way they theorize materiality and emotion, then the fact that Hobbes is a sixteenth century contract theorist while Beauvoir is a twentieth century feminist philosopher poses less of an obstacle for reading them alongside each other. If we focused only on those larger categorizations, we might dismiss the possibility of Hobbes and Beauvoir converging to be read alongside one another in the same project, yet this dissertation works to connect them through my overall method, and more specifically through Ahmed’s work on affective economies. Indeed, this dissertation reads across time periods and theoretical traditions: Hobbes is a contract theorist writing in the sixteenth century in the context of the English Civil War and early modernity; Marx appropriates and transforms a Hegelian framework in the midst of nineteenth century Europe, capitalist industrialization, revolutions, and labor organizing; Beauvoir writes at the intersection of phenomenology and existentialism during and after World War II; and Marxist feminism re-evaluates the Marxist tradition in the context of women’s organizing in the middle- to late-twentieth century, with this chapter also touching on Black and postcolonial feminist critiques of Marx and Marxist feminism from the same time period. I move across these contexts and theoretical traditions – with different kinds of
affect theory most resonant for each – in order to demonstrate the wide-ranging capability of my method, and to generate affective and emotional connections across these contexts.

This is one of the merits, I would argue, of thinking through political theory in the terms of reading beside (from Sedgwick) and of the molecular and smooth space (from Deleuze and Guattari). Reading X beside Y entails focusing on twisting, tense, complicated, resonant interactions between texts, rather than the “fantasy of metonymically egalitarian or even pacific relations” between texts (Sedgwick 2003a, 8). Affect and emotion provide a particularly generative way to engage this kind of reading, for theorists may interact and relate to one another on the molecular level and/or in smooth space in ways that more traditional readings might foreclose. Moreover, this project enables the elaboration of varied thinkers together as a multiplicity related through emotion and affect. My theorists might be engaged in different theoretical projects in different historical contexts – and thus seemingly incommensurable – yet they might also be productively read alongside one another in the ways they resonate with affect theory.14 In his survey of corporeality in Arendt, Taylor, Nietzsche, and Hampshire, John C. Tambornino argues that by focusing on the body in bringing together thinkers who are often read separately, we can “weaken familiar groupings” in a way that “attempt[s] to modify materialism” and “understand[s] thinking and politics to occur on multiple, related, nonidentical levels” (2002, 135–36).15 Something similar is the case, as I demonstrate throughout this book, when we focus on affect and emotion.

This project also reassesses the importance of the affect and emotion that have so regularly been excluded from the status of ‘the political’ in Western political theory. In this way my project takes up a feminist lineage, extending critiques of Western philosophy and political theory for its hierarchical binaries of mind/body and reason/emotion, which have associated
white men – and often just propertied white men – with the mind and reason while women, people of color, slaves, colonial subjects, and people with disabilities have been associated with the body and emotion. Politically, these schemas have mapped white men, mind, and reason onto the public political sphere while relegating subjects ascribed to be less human with the body and emotion in the supposedly pre- or non-political private sphere (Okin 1979; W. Brown 1987; W. Brown 1988; Elshtain 1993; Lloyd 1993; Mills 1997, chap. 3; Ahmed 2004, chap. 8; Simplican 2015). None of the thinkers of this current project juxtapose mind and body or reason and emotion in such a hierarchal way, and I will argue in several places that affect theory accentuates their critiques of mind/body dualism. Nevertheless, my project works to further undermine these binary and exclusionary schemas by locating emotion, affect, and the body at the center of political theorizing and political life.

I also make an explicit interdisciplinary move, laying out a set of reading practices and concepts that could open up even the most traditional questions, concepts, and texts in political theory to creative original work. As a relay between affect theory and political theory, this method offers an explicit interdisciplinary alternative to – not a replacement for – methods for engaging canonical thinkers that are more internal to the field (Straussian reading, the methods of Quentin Skinner and the Cambridge School, and so on). This is a method that experiments with what other disciplines and theories can do to the traditional questions and objects of study in political theory. Feeling as a method provides a direct practice of opening political theory to conversation and connection with critical theoretical work ongoing in cultural studies, gender and sexuality studies, queer theory, feminist science studies, literary criticism, and others. As Teresa Brennan contends, “extending attention into the flesh” is an “exploration of the affects” that “energetically” connect individuals to “other living and dead things”; this effort, however,
has too often been “excluded from [the] consciousness” of studies of philosophy and political theory (2004, 161). My project embarks upon this path by bringing recent theorizing on emotion and affect to bear on political theory.

My overall approach is, finally, shaped by one way Sheldon Wolin understands innovation in Western political theory. At times, he writes, innovation in this tradition:

> has taken an existing idea and severed it from the connective thread that makes an aggregate of ideas an organic complex. A connective thread or unifying principle not only integrates particular ideas into a general theory, but also apportions emphasis among them. If the unifying principle should be displaced, propositions within the complex which theretofore were commonplace or innocuous suddenly become radical in their implications (2004, 23–24).⁰¹

My own interpretive project displaces my thinkers from their traditional connective threads and unifying principles. In doing so, I work to make propositions about embodiment, affect, and emotion potentially radically in their implications for our understanding of the particular theorists under consideration and for the fields of political theory and affect theory.

**What Can An Affective Political Theory Do?**

Chapter 1 takes up Thomas Hobbes, primarily *Leviathan* but also some of his works of natural philosophy. I begin by re-evaluating Hobbes’s proclamation of his materialist ontology that “every part of the Universe is Body” (1996, 463) in relation to affect theory, initially situating Hobbes on a plane with Spinoza, Deleuze, and Massumi. From there, I move through his account of interacting bodily processes of motion, sense, imagination, and thought in the first seven chapters of *Leviathan* to further these connections. The chapter then turns to Hobbes’s theory of passion/emotion and to the work of Sara Ahmed. Reading Hobbes and Ahmed alongside one another re-envisions Hobbes as a theorist of affective economies and a critic of mind-body and reason-emotion dualisms. I illustrate this work on Hobbes’s overall philosophical project and
theory of emotion through a sustained reading of the state of nature as an affective economy, highlighting the ways in which Hobbes is more focused on the conditions and production of circulating emotions rather than on the emotions of particular subjects or on human nature in general. Noting that emotions not only circulate in the state of nature to create a state of war but also work to move individuals to leave behind the state of nature, I conclude by sketching the implications of my reading of Hobbes for his account of the social contract and for the possibility of a subdued Hobbesian ethics of the body.

Chapter 2 presents a sustained reading of Karl Marx in relation to a Spinozan-Deleuzean notion of “affective capacity,” the capacity of bodies to act and be acted upon. From different texts and concepts of the ‘early’ Marx, I draw out this figure of the body as I explore his (and Engels’s) concepts of essential powers, historical materialism, the production of life, and consciousness. This opens up onto a reading of Marx’s category of nature, where I evaluate Marx’s anthropocentrism and argue that affect provides a line of flight for a less-dominating understanding of nature in his thought. I then turn to the main section of the chapter, where I affectively read Marx’s critique of capital, especially as presented in the Grundrisse. My main argument here is that a critique of the tension of capitalist affect is central to Marx’s account of capital: on the one hand, capitalism amplifies the potential affective capacity of bodies through its development and organization of productive forces; on the other, it captures this increase in affective capacity to enrich the bourgeoisie, immiserate the proletariat, and reproduce capitalist relations. As part of this section, I argue that Marx’s critique is in part ethical, a reading made possible once we approach Marx from the standpoint of affect and affective capacity. The chapter concludes with a speculative theory of communist affect, re-envisioning Marx’s “communal society of the future” as an affective community.
The third chapter engages in an affective reading of Marxist feminism in order to extend and supplement important Marxist feminist concepts and to problematize the universalizing framework of Marx and my reading of him in the preceding chapter. I begin by outlining the Marxist feminist account of social reproduction and reproductive labor as well as providing an overview of their critique of Marx. I use this as a basis to construct an affective Marxist feminist theory of social reproduction that focuses on the reproduction of affective capacity within patriarchal and capitalist forces. From here, I engage in a reading of four important Marxist feminist thinkers and concepts in order to explore how affect theory can productively extend and rearticulate the project of Marxist feminism: the sex/gender system (Gayle Rubin); social reproduction (Lise Vogel); sex/affective production (Ann Ferguson); and above all the human need for sensation and affect (Rosemary Hennessy). The final main section engages Black and postcolonial feminist critiques of Marx and Marxist feminism in a challenge to the work of this and the preceding chapter, while also pointing out the potential for an affectively-attuned re-reading of thinkers such as Angela Davis and bell hooks.

Chapter 4, in which I read Simone de Beauvoir’s *The Second Sex*, thinks through the emotional valences of questions about subjectivity, gender oppression, power, and social transformation. Since Beauvoir works at the intersection of feminism, phenomenology, and existentialism, I am able to further demonstrate the potential of feeling as a method across a range of traditions. I read Beauvoir alongside Ahmed to throw her engagement with emotion – especially in its connection to phenomenological orientation – into relief. I start by examining Beauvoir’s general theory of subjectivity from the perspective of Ahmed’s work on emotion and phenomenology, outlining a concept of “emotional orientation.” The chapter goes on to examine an emotional, spatial, and phenomenological aspects of oppression as elucidated by Beauvoir in
*The Second Sex.* Here, I focus first on the ways men’s emotions (particularly disgust) and phenomenological orientation toward and around women work to reproduce their power. The section then examines the emotional-phenomenological confinement of women. The rest of this chapter goes on to analyze the way that emotions and phenomenological concerns are also part of the process of liberation in Beauvoir’s work, exploring the emotion of critical wonder and the emotional-phenomenological process of disorientation. Throughout this chapter, I illustrate my Ahmedian reading of Beauvoir with reference to the problematic of “the woman in [heterosexual] love,” underscoring what bringing together Beauvoir and Ahmed can disclose about this situation. Ultimately, the chapter works to move the project in a more explicitly feminist direction – and in so doing claim Beauvoir as a political theorist – and to continue to demonstrate the wide-ranging application of feeling as a method.

The conclusion threads these readings together to contribute to theories of embodied ethics, connecting the work of this dissertation with the Deleuzean ethics of Rosi Braidotti (2006; 2009) and Erinn C. Gilson’s feminist ethics of vulnerability (2011; 2014). With attention to feeling as a method, it becomes possible to articulate an account of the ways that ethical encounters are always politically organized. Once the body is understood in the full range of its dynamism, intensity, affectivity, emotionality, and vulnerability, ethical considerations emanate at the center of ‘the political,’ contra contemporary theorists who claim that attention to ethics in radical political thought may constitute a depoliticizing move (e.g. Rancière 2010a; Rancière 2010b; Mouffe 2013, 15–18). With affect, emotion, and the body as central concerns, when one asks a question such as ‘what legitimates a mode of governance’ or ‘how should a body politic organize its economy’, one is always also asking about the kinds of ethical encounters between bodies that will be cultivated and encouraged and those that will be delimited and constrained.
An embodied political ethics can place its emphasis on how to regularize and organize joyful encounters, the transformation of negative affects, sustainable experimentation toward becoming, cultivation of and responsiveness to vulnerability, and openness to ethical transformation. My contention is that feeling as a method can creatively read and theorize resources for such a project in the thinkers I engage in this dissertation.

These are some of the potential answers to the question of what an affective political theory can do. There are, doubtlessly, other compositions to be created with the new songs that affect and emotion enable us to play with the political theory keyboard. As a method, a turn to affect and emotion ultimately performs a movement of opening and unfolding, creating a provocation to experiment in our political reading, feeling, interpreting, and theorizing. It is also a provocation to develop the conceptual and methodological resources necessary to think through the ways that politics is materially felt and experienced by embodied political subjects in general, or in the specific instance of the #BlackLivesMatter protestor, content moderator, or refugee. What follows analyzes the political forces that shape, channel, assemble, appropriate, redirect, dampen, and amplify the material, emotional, and affective powers of the political body in motion.
Chapter 1
Affect Theory and the Dynamic Hobbesian Body

“…every part of the Universe, is Body, and that which is not Body, is no part of the Universe” (Hobbes, *Leviathan*, XLVI: 463)

“The end or scope of philosophy is, that we may make use to our benefit of effects formerly seen; or that, by application of bodies to one another, we may produce the like effects of those we conceive in our mind, as far forth as matter, strength, and industry will permit, for the commodity of human life.” (Hobbes, *De Corpore*, I: 7)

Introduction: The Body of Philosophy

“The World,” the “whole masse of all things that are,” Hobbes writes in the most wide-ranging articulation of his materialism, is:

Corporeall, that is to say, Body; and hath the dimensions of Magnitude, namely, Length, Bredth, and Depth: also every part of Body, is likewise Body, and hath the like dimensions; and consequently every part of the Universe, is Body, and that which is not Body, is no part of the Universe: And because the Universe is all, that which is no part of it, is Nothing; and consequently No Where (*Leviathan* [hereafter L], XLVI: 463).\

For Hobbes, the entirety of that which exists is body, and this body is, as we will see, dynamic, generative, and as I seek to argue in this essay, affective and emotional. In investigating any phenomenon, whether natural, political, individual, group, etc., one must proceed from the body and its motions. Hobbes’s persistent materialism, I argue, ought to direct us toward reading Hobbes besides recent theorizing on affect and emotion. This chapter deploys feeling as a method in order to explore a number of resonances between Hobbes and affect theory in order to elucidate this connection in his materialism and open up the possibilities for re-interpreting central problematics in Hobbes’s explicitly political thinking, above all the state of nature. I take up Hobbes as a central concern to political theory as such, but do so through an emotional reading that seeks to reanimate his work. Sensing, moving, dynamic, and ultimately affective bodies compose Hobbes’s universe, so inquiry must proceed from body. If all universe is body,
and if Hobbes and affect theory have the connections I argue for, then the entirety of his thought has to be investigated from the perspective I develop.

For Hobbes, methodologically and ontologically it is only “after physics” that we can arrive at moral and civic philosophy (De Corpore [hereafter DC], VI: 72).² His physics entails the study of motion, bodies, sense, and imagination, all of which are in his conceptualization material, embodied processes. These physical processes form the causes of Hobbes’s later objects of inquiry – such as “appetite, aversion, love, benevolence, hope, fear, anger, emulation, envy, etc.”, artificial bodies, bodies politic, and commonwealths – which are “the subject of physical contemplation” and thus can only be understood by investigating “sense and imagination,” that is, physics (DC, VI: 72-73, emphasis Hobbes’s; also see DC, I: 10-11 and Gaskin 2008, xvii-xviii, xx). The subject of philosophy is “every body of which we can conceive any generation” or chain of creation, and can compare with other bodies (DC, I: 10). Philosophy consists in the elements necessary to explain “Conceptions concerning the Nature and Generation of Bodies” (L, XLVI: 463). Moreover, he understands the objective of philosophy to be the study of effects of bodies on one another, in order to organize those encounters in ways we conceive of for the “commodity of human life” (DC, I: 7).

So, philosophy consists in the explanation of bodies and their effects on one another. This chapter explores Hobbes’s account of the body and its corporeal processes, arguing that we can read multiple points at which Hobbes’s articulations open onto connections with contemporary thinking on affect and emotion. I illustrate this mode of interpreting these connections through a close reading of Hobbes’s account of the state of nature. As I read Hobbes, I theorize these resonances between affect theory and Hobbes, focusing on Hobbes’s conceptualization of philosophy, its methodology, and its objective, his rendering of the body, his elaboration of the
embodied processes of motion, sensation, and thought, and his theory of the passions/emotions. In engaging these connections, I construct a basis for a more general reading practice, where an affective reading of the Hobbesian body and Hobbesian philosophical project could also create generative (re-)readings that implicate emotion and affect more fully into classical Hobbesian problematics.

In engaging Hobbes vis-à-vis affect theory, I build most directly upon the work of Samantha Frost (2008) in her superb reading of Hobbes’s materialism. She hints at theoretical space for an affective reading of Hobbes, I would argue, through her close attention to the “matter in motion” and “thinking bodies” at work in Hobbes’s thought. Other commentators have taken up his materialism, account of the body and its relation to politics, and relation to scientific epistemologies emerging contemporaneously with his own writing (e.g. Shapin and Schaffer 1985; Petchesky 1987; Latour 1993, chap. 1; Dungey 2008). This literature informs the way in which I engage his work, but my focus on emotion and affect enables me to build upon these kinds of accounts, which can overlook the force of emotion and affect in Hobbes. In general, analyses of Hobbes’s materialism and engagement in scientific debates situate him in a way that opens up an affective reading, but do not pursue detailed inquiry into the work that emotion or affect do in Hobbes’s philosophy or connections to affect theory. Analyses that focus on a specific feeling or emotion in Hobbes’s work, such as fear and/or anxiety (e.g. Blits 1989; Sokoloff 2001; Robin 2004; McClure 2011), do not engage with the status of emotion, feeling, or affect as such, much less with recent interdisciplinary theorizing on emotion and affect. My reading of Hobbes thus generates new and productive readings of this thinker by specifically attending to the feeling, emotive materiality that comprises the foundation of his thought.
Furthermore, by practicing feeling as a method I position Hobbes as a thinker of living, acting, moving, interacting bodies, not a thinker of crude mechanism or proto-game theory. Frost seeks to recast Hobbes’s materialism against these perspectives through, as she writes “a thoroughgoing concession, a giving-over in which Hobbes’s materialism is articulated in all its depth and breadth, and in which its implications for our conception of ourselves and our world are elaborated as fully and as trustfully as a generous imagination can accommodate” (2008, 3). She also argues that these interpretations lay a Cartesian framework back over Hobbes even as Hobbes’s own thought works against Descartes’s mind-body dualism (chap. 1). My own approach is not only to grant Hobbes his materialism, but to do so and then project current work on emotion and affect into Hobbes’s persistent materialism.

This chapter opens with a reading of Hobbes in relation to Deleuze and Spinoza vis-à-vis embodiment and affect, arguing that they share some philosophical commitments and objectives that connect them to contemporary affect theory and that this connection generates some affinities in their respective ethical projects. From there, I engage Hobbes’s materialist account of motion, sensation, and thought from the perspective of affect theory. I contend that not only does Hobbes’s philosophy of the body in motion resonate with affect theory at multiple points, but that they share the project of upsetting Cartesian dualism. The subsequent section directly takes up Hobbesian emotion, which I theorize in terms of Sara Ahmed’s work on emotion, particularly her concept of an affective economy. After this, I mobilize my interpretation of Hobbes to provide an affective reading of Hobbes’s state of nature that uses the preceding sections to trace the material, affective processes – motions, sensations, thoughts, etc. – at work there; this section argues that the state of nature should itself be read as an affective economy. While this interpretation is the central illustration of my method and general reading of Hobbes’s
overall project, I conclude the chapter first by briefly speculating what an affective reading might do to another important concept from Hobbes – the social contract – and second by questioning whether my approach might be able to draw out an ethics latent in Hobbes’s thought.

**A Spinozan Hobbes?: Affect and the Hobbesian Body**

Even before directly reading Hobbes’s texts for emotion and affect, it is possible to think of the affectivity of his conceptualization of philosophy itself, particularly when situated in conversation with Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza. The methodological imperative here is not to attempt to compare Spinoza and Hobbes. Instead, I seek to connect Hobbes to Spinoza through their shared insistence on philosophizing the body to see what generative readings of Hobbes this connection can stimulate; this is one example of the broader reading practice I try to cultivate throughout this project. I am not seeking to provide a ‘representative’ account of Hobbes (or Spinoza), but to follow feeling as a method and see what lines of flight, planes, and problems we can generate from these kinds of reading practices. In doing so, I seek to pick up on Connolly’s speculation that there is potential “productive dialogue” to be had between Hobbes and Spinoza when it comes to “diversity, ethics, and generosity” if we admit a “generous reading” of the two together (2001, 593n8). This approach is one of the reasons why I am specifically interested in Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza: Deleuze performs, I think, a similar kind of theoretical-methodological initiative, and it is this sort of endeavor that I seek to connect to and carry out with Hobbes and the other thinkers of this dissertation.

In Deleuze’s rendering, Spinoza theorizes bodies in terms of capacity to affect and to be affected – Spinoza’s *affectus* – such that bodies interact in encounters that can increase or decrease this capacity, where this change in capacity is affect – Spinoza’s *affectio* (Deleuze 1988). Deleuze’s Spinoza also situates body as the constitutive element composing the world,
constructing a “single substance of being having an infinity of attributes or modifications of this substance” and laying out a “common plane of immanence on which all bodies, all minds, and all individuals are situated” (Deleuze 1988, 17; 122). Hobbes’s articulation of all that exists in the universe as body and consequent conceptualization of philosophy as the study of bodies and their effects on other bodies resonates with Spinoza’s (or at least the Deleuzean Spinoza’s) construction of this common plane populated by bodies defined affectively. This leads one to Spinoza’s famous provocations, that “we do not even know what a body is capable of” and “we do not even know of what affections we are capable, nor the extent of our power,” in Deleuze’s rendering (1990, 226). As Deleuze contends, not only does this argue against a Cartesian primacy of mind over body, but it also works to incite us to acquire knowledge of the affects, capacities, and powers of the body in order to “discover, in a parallel fashion, the powers of the mind that elude consciousness” (Deleuze 1988, 18; his emphasis). The study of bodies and their interaction holds the promise of provoking understanding of the world. Hobbes offers a similar, albeit less direct, prompting to explore the body, and from there the rest of the phenomena of life. As discussed above, he claims that we cannot engage philosophy until we do physics, but he also asserts that we cannot study physics until we know “first what motions are in the smallest parts of bodies; nor such motion of parts, till we know what it is that makes another body move; nor this, till we know what simple motion will effect” (DC, VI: 71). Both Spinoza and Hobbes intimate that their proposed investigations that start with bodies and their potentials and movements are necessary for any further inquiry, and that insufficient attention has been given to investigating the material, generative body. Hobbes intends for his comprehensive material philosophical project that segues into a bodily political-philosophical project to address the situation of not quite yet knowing what it is the body can do. This injection of uncertainty can
challenge attempts to overstate the certainty that reason can ever achieve, especially when reason is disembodied.

Hobbes and Spinoza further share – albeit in different ways – a commitment to thinking about these bodies that comprise the world in terms of change, relationality, and, ultimately, affect. Hobbes, after defining the universe in terms of Body, describes these bodies as “subject to change,” to “various accidents, as sometimes to be Moved, sometimes to stand Still,” a description which “we attribute to alterations of the Bodies that operate” (L, XXIV: 270).

Philosophy includes the study of bodies involved in “composition and resolution” (DC, I: 10), the way we “distinguish” and “conceive one body to be equal or unequal, like or unlike to another body” is through the way that the motion of various bodies has “effects” on the sense of other bodies (DC, I: 5-6), and part of the philosophical method he sketches involves “consideration of what effects one body moved worketh upon another” (DC, VI: 71). In this sense, Hobbes resonates with Kathleen Stewart’s account of ordinary affects, the “varied, surging capacities to affect and be affected that give everyday life the quality of a continual motion or relations, scenes, contingencies, and emergences” and are “literally moving things – things that are in motion and that are defined by their capacity to affect and to be affected” (2007, 1; 3).

Hobbes’s emphasis on motion, and particularly motions that effect further motions and changes in other bodies, ought to be read in terms of affect. As Stewart demonstrates, concerns about this kind of motion as a force that works on, between, and with bodies situates us in the realm of affect. They generate questions about “where they might go and what potential modes of knowing, relating, and attending to things are already somehow present in them in a state of potentiality and resonance” (2007, 3). Hobbes wants to follow the motion of bodies to see what
forms of knowledge, philosophy, and ultimately politics these moving bodies beget as they interact with one another.

The study of bodies serves as Hobbes’s fundamental intellectual project, and it must be the study of the way that bodies affect other bodies, and of the effects flowing from that interaction. Bodies are not conceived in terms of bounded units that mechanistically act with one another. Instead, an expansive study of bodies must trace the ways that relations between them affect all the bodies in an interaction. I read this beside Deleuze’s rendering of Spinoza, where Spinoza defines bodies not as static essences but as modes and relations characterized by their affective capacities: “a body affects other bodies, or is affected by other bodies; it is this capacity for affecting and being affected that also defines a body in its individuality” (Deleuze 1988, 123). Deleuze’s Spinoza defines the world as populated not just by bodies, but by bodies that are definitionally affective through their interaction with other bodies. Hobbes does not use the term affect explicitly in his multiple articulations of the body. However, his attention to the body induces an affinity with Spinoza’s precise elaboration of the affective body, an affinity that ought to provoke us to think Hobbes together with affect theory more broadly. Both insist on the need to think through the world in the terms of bodies that interact and, in that bodily interface, modify one another. Hobbes’s philosophical project proceeds from the body, and quickly moves to the terrain of the way that bodies interact with and generate effects on and for other bodies as an ineluctable component of inquiry. Through Spinoza, we can (and as this chapter progresses this ‘can’ will slide into ‘ought’) read this concentration on bodies’ capacities for modifying and modifiability in affective terms: when Hobbes writes that the philosophical method entails “consideration of what effects one body moved worketh upon another” (DC, VI: 71), I contend that this implicates affect in Hobbes’s philosophy.
The ethical project emerging from a Spinozan, affective account of bodies as affecting and being affected by other bodies also bears resemblance to the way that Hobbes thinks about the purpose of philosophy and the study of bodies. For Deleuze, Spinoza’s move to thinking about bodies in terms of affective capacity points us to an ethics that considers “the compositions of relations or capacities between different things”; more specifically, the way we might organize compositions of individuals in “sociabilities or communities” where “capacities can compound directly to constitutes a more ‘intense’ capacity of power … while preserving or respecting the other’s own relations and world” (1988, 126). The Deleuzean-Spinozan ethical question is something like ‘how do we organize society so as to maximize the affective capacity of the bodies that populate it?’ Let us then return to the purpose Hobbes ascribes to philosophy: its “end or scope” consists in “mak[ing] use to our benefit of effects” of bodies on one another, “as far forth as matter, strength, and industry, will permit, for the commodity of human life” (DC, I: 7).

Philosophy ought to provoke us, on Hobbes’s account, to use this knowledge generated from studying bodies to organize human life to be more commodious to living bodies – indeed, one might say vis-à-vis the above discussion of Hobbes and Spinoza, to raise the (affective) capacity of bodies to change and be changed. Moreover, both Spinoza and Hobbes recognize some boundaries to this effort, in the above form of Spinoza’s respect for the individual’s “own relations and world” and in Hobbes’s qualifier accounting for the bounds of “matter, strength, and industry.” Philosophy generates, for both, an ethical project to maximize the potential of the active, dynamic body in its relations with other such bodies. While Hobbes does not phrase it in explicitly affective terms, putting Hobbes and Spinoza in conversation with one another helps to elucidate the affectivity of the Hobbesian body and also illuminates the affective quality with which I argue he imbues philosophy. Sensing, moving, dynamic bodies compose Hobbes’s
universe, so inquiry must proceed from body; any reading of Hobbes that deviates from or ignores the body obscures the foundational efforts of his entire project.

**Hobbesian Physics, Affect Theory, and Mind-Body Dualism**

In Hobbes’s texts we find another node to connect to affect theory: his detailed investigation of the various component movements of the body that work together to shape the human: motion, sense, imagination, conception, deliberation, will, appetite, aversion, and passion. All of these processes are material, bodily, and interactive, working in Hobbes’s physics to contravene any attempt to split mind and body or sensation, cognition, and emotion. In this section, I use feeling as a method to trace the interacting bodily processes that Hobbes theorizes, and in so doing assemble another set of connections between his work and that of recent theorizing on affect and emotion. These connections and resonances from Hobbes’s foundational physics – which, as noted above, are for him an absolute prerequisite for studying later compositions of bodies such as a commonwealth – form an underlying relay point for later parts of this chapter. When I theorize the state of nature as an affective economy, it is in relation to this section’s reading of Hobbes’s physics vis-à-vis affect theory.

Hobbes begins with motion, which works as the phenomenon from which all other bodily phenomena proceed, and as the very source of life. “Life itselffe” is, for Hobbes, “but Motion” (*L*, VI: 46); more specifically, it “is but a motion of Limbs” (*L*, Introduction: 9). All that we perceive by sense, and later all that we imagine, think about, endeavor to do, and feel begin with motion, the “one universal cause” for “the variety of all figures” and “universal things” (*DC*, VI: 69). From the beginning of Hobbes’s physics, motion opens up the Hobbesian body to affect theory. What does a body do, Massumi asks to open his *Parables of the Virtual*: “It moves. It feels. In fact, it does both at the same time. It moves as it feels, and it feels itself moving” (2002, 1). We
cannot think the body – especially affectively – without thinking of the connection between movement, affect, and sensation. He challenges critical and cultural theory as well as the humanities more broadly to think through movement and sensation instead of assuming that change in the body is “unmediated,” simple, or as not itself needing to be theorized (2002, 1). We should extend this insight into political theory and connect it to affect theory in doing so. My reading enables us to carry out this task through an affective reading of Hobbes and his emphasis on the moving, changing, sensing body. In Massumi’s reading, Spinoza’s emphasis on movement and sensation comprises a crucial component of his account of body and affect: the capacity, potential, or “power to affect or be affected” involves the “body’s capacity to enter into relations of movement and rest”; thus, affect as something to be inquired into arises in relation to the interplay of movement, sensation, perception, and memory (15). That Hobbes engages these same linked processes directs us, I argue, to an affective reading of his work.

Motion produces sense and sensation. For Hobbes, the motion of some external object (which is itself a body, in the sense of it being a material thing) contacts and thus moves the “organs of sense,” which themselves undergo motion: this “first organ of sense is touched or pressed” by the object-body, causing the “next part” to be pressed, such that “the pressure or motion is propagated through all the parts of the organ to the innermost” part of sensation, which he understands to be the heart (DC, XXV: 390). Thus the “immediate cause of sense of perception consists in” motion provoking a cascading effect throughout the human body, the “internal motion in the sentient” being (DC, XXV: 390-391).

The sensing subject is the living creature itself, not an isolated organ of the living body itself (DC, XXV: 391-2), involving the complicated connection and networking of sense organ, brain, heart, nerves, arteries, and membranes (cf. DC, XXV: 392-393). What may superficially appear to be a simple, mechanistic
account of motion actually implicates a complex concatenation of bodily processes working together. One registers or experiences this somatic assemblage of motions in terms of a “phantasm” that “remain[s] for some time more or less” in and with the body – something Hobbes refers to at one point as “sense itself,” a memory of registering sensation (DC, XXV: 389) – as it generates a “reaction and endeavor” to the cascading motion (DC, XXV: 391).

Hobbes’s account of sensation can itself be read affectively. Massumi describes sensation as “mesoperception,” a “corporeal transformer” that registers the movement of the body and especially its constant displacement through movement, which is itself an affective passage (2002, 62). Importantly, mesoperception or sensation involves the translation of sensation into affect and into further movement (62). That is, sensation is not a phenomenon of merely ‘dumb’ matter passively registering action coming from elsewhere but is actively involved in the experience and translation of that which is being sensed, including the movement of affect. We cannot think affect or the body, he contends, without the “intrinsic connection between movement and sensation” (1). Hobbes thinks this very connection. Sensation is a sort of active network of forces for Hobbes as well: it registers external and internal motions, registering and translating motion into further motion (the “reaction and endeavor”), experience of motion (the “phantasm”), and affect. Indeed, upon an affective reading Hobbes seems to describe sensation as itself the sensation of affect. If we theorize affect as an autonomic and asubjective force or intensity, we can read Hobbes on sensation as articulating something like the sensing of some force that strikes the body, generating a cascading concatenation of bodily effects that tie together sensation, bodily motion, and as we shall soon see, cognition and passion. In Massumi’s reading, the “Spinozist problematic of affect offers a way of weaving together concepts of” movement, sensation, tendency, and intensity by focusing on the moving, changing body (2002,
Spinoza, though, does not have to be our only reference for thinking affect in these terms. Hobbes continuously theorizes an active, dynamic body that can be understood only by tracing its continuous change produced by motion, sensation, and, I would argue, affect.

Sensation is not an endpoint for Hobbes: it immediately generates imagination and cognition. Sense, a product of motion, necessarily weakens when the motion slows or stops, or when the moving body-object is no longer present. However, as this motion and the sense it generates leave an impression on us, they continue to effect and affect us. This is “sense decaying or weakened” by the absence of the object, which constitutes Imagination and Memory (DC, XXV: 396). After an object passes us by or is removed, or after a period of time, our senses continue to receive and be affected by other objects, making our impression of the earlier object/sensation weaker (L, II: 16). Moreover, because of the constant succession of motion and sensation, a corresponding series of imaginations or memories is produced in the individual sensing body. The “succession of conceptions in the mind are caused … by the succession they had one to another when they were produced by the senses” (EL V: 34; also see L, III: 20). This is what Hobbes variably calls a discourse of the mind (EL, IV; DC XXV: 399), train of imaginations (L, III), conception (L, III) and thought (DC, XXV: 398). Conception is always first sensation, and we have no thoughts that are “not subject to sense” (L, III: 23-24). Sensation is never severed from thought, thought is always embodied, and the mind cannot be separated from and set in opposition to the body.

Sensation and thought as well as body and mind operate not in an oppositional or hierarchical model, but in a relation of feedback. Another facet of Hobbes that resonates with affect theory is, thus a commitment to upsetting these kinds of dualisms that have been essential in structuring Western philosophy and political theory since at least Descartes. Doing so through
tending to embodiment is, I contend, particularly illustrative in his account of emotion. In one especially suggestive passage, Hobbes writes:

> And I believe there is a reciprocation of motion from the brain to the vital parts, and back from the vital parts to the brain; whereby not only imagination begetteth motion in those parts; but also motion in those parts begetteth imagination like to that by which it was begotten (EL, III: 27-28).

Here, it is not an elaboration where the mind is primary and works or enlivens the dull, inert body. For Hobbes, body and mind work in conjunction with one another. He gives us, again, a model of the movement of the active, dynamic body in constant reciprocal motion with the mind. This theorization of the body is consistent with Hobbes’s interest in the animate body-machine metaphor (cf. L, Introduction: 9), leading him to understand the body as a set of interlocking, mutually dependent processes. Hobbes presents the reader with a number of illustrations of the mind-body-sensation-thought interplay: “pleasure in the sense” also produces “pleasure in the imagination” (L, XI: 71); dreams connect body, organs, and brain through sensations such as heat and coldness (L, II: 17-18); the brain, heart, and bodily membranes produce and conduct motion to and from one another (DC, XXV: 401). His account of passion evinces a similar understanding of the body, as I discuss below.

This challenge to Cartesian dualism proves to be one of the central concerns of contemporary theorizing on emotion and affect (e.g. Cvetkovich 2012, 4; Brennan 2004, 18–19; 157; Ahmed 2004, 170–172; Deleuze 1988, 17–18; 86–88). Once we shift from thinking about cognition as separate from and superior to bodily processes such as sensation to thinking of thought as always already embodied and working together, as affect theory does, we can no longer separate mind from body, or presume that thought is disembodied. Hobbes, when we pay close attention to his materialism and read him through affect theory, proves to be an early node
from which alternative, embodied accounts of thought, cognition, and ultimately emotion emanate; we can in this way figure him as a sort of proto-affect theorist.

We take notice of sense by “sense itself,” which turns out to be “the memory which for some time remains in us of things sensible” (DC, XXV: 389). So, our registering of sensation automatically implicates memory: it is not necessarily that sensation (something like affect) happens first, with a meaningful duration between its motion pressing on the body, followed by its registering through memory, and then imagination and cognition. Instead, sensation itself instantaneously activates these processes that work alongside sense. Later, Hobbes writes that “sense … hath necessarily some memory adhering to it,” especially in the way phantasms of sense-thought are “distinguished from one another” (DC XXV: 393). There is a striking affinity between Hobbes’s insistence on the implication of memory and bodily history in the receptivity to sensation and Ahmed’s delineation of her position that sensation, cognition and emotion cannot be “separated at the level of lived experience” (Ahmed 2004, 24). Arguing against a separation of “sensation or affect and emotion,” she contends that

this model creates a distinction between conscious recognition and ‘direct’ feeling, which itself negates how that which is not consciously experienced may itself be mediated by past experiences. I am suggesting here that even seemingly direct responses actually evoke past histories, and that this bypasses consciousness, through bodily memories (Ahmed 2004, 40n4). 13

Hobbes and Ahmed both invoke, albeit in different registers, the inseparability of sensation and embodied memory. For both, sensation from the perspective of lived experience of sensation can never be pure or unadulterated by subjective embodied histories and memories.

**Hobbesian Emotion**

This, then, brings us to Hobbes’s conception of the passions, or what we would likely call emotion today. 14 Hobbes moves from imagination to endeavor, appetite, and aversion, and then
to emotion: for him, passions arise from a complex transmission of the motion that strikes the body and is rendered in thought, continuing to affect other parts of the body (and being altered in this transmission), especially in the heart. These “motions of the heart” are generally called endeavors, and take the more specific form of appetites and aversions (DC, XXV. 401; also see L, VI: 37-40). The endeavor towards something is appetite (specific) or desire (general), while an endeavor away from something is aversion. They are, Hobbes writes, commonly called love (appetite toward) and hate (aversion away from) (L, VI: 38; EL VII: 43-44; DC XXV: 406-408). Because these phenomena are bodily motions, bodies sense these changes. Sensing appetite or desire is delight, while sensing aversion is displeasure or offence, such that all appetite and aversion is “accompanied with some” feeling (L, VI: 40). So, there is a sort of feeling that emerges before (so to speak) the emotion itself. These delights or pleasures – for Hobbes switches between the two, at least in Leviathan – can “arise from the sense of an object Present,” “from the Expectation, that proceeds from foresight” of consequences, from displeasure in sense, or from displeasure in “Expectation of consequences”; respectively, these are called Pleasures of Sense, Joy, Pain, and Grief (L, VI: 40-1).

These bodily processes and movements comprise the constitutive components of emotion: all “divers” emotions arise from the “simple Passions” of appetite, desire, love, aversion, hate, joy and grief (L, VI: 41; see also DC, XXV: 409-410). The way that these forces interact with and succeed one another, the effect of that “Alteration or succession it selfe,” the likelihood (or not) of realizing or attaining the object of endeavor, and the nature of that object interact to create the diversity of passions (L, VI: 41). In Leviathan, Hobbes proceeds to catalogue several dozen possible emotions as varied configurations of these forces. For example, an aversion from something, believing that object would lead to a harmful consequence,
constitutes fear, but this passion succeeded by the hope of resisting that hurt is courage (L, VI: 41); joy in imagining one’s own power and ability is glory, and buttressing it with likelihood of efficacy and the experience of previous success is confidence while glory with a low likelihood of attainment and/or low actual capacity is vain-glory (L, VI: 42). In the former set of examples, the nature of the object (it will cause harm) interacts with the endeavor (aversion), producing different emotions depending on whether this is succeeded by hope (itself an “Appetite with an opinion of attainning”) or not. In the latter set, the basic component of the passion (joy) interacts with the object of joy (one’s own power) to produce the passion (glory), which is then refined into different passions (confidence and vainglory) based on the likelihood of attaining the object. Hobbesian emotions are a complex of interlocking and interacting corporeal phenomena which themselves connect to past histories, the particular constitution of the given body, the social environment in which that body is embedded, the other passions that circulate, and innumerable other phenomena.

Passion is a kind of swirling concatenation of bodily motions, processes, feedbacks, and effects that, from a broader perspective, comprises just one node in an entire network of bodies generating diverse emotions and interacting with one another, which will in turn effect and affect the other emotion-concatenations, and so on. Hobbesian emotion is densely textured, saturated with bodily processes, pasts, and interactivities. I thus argue we should read Hobbes through Ahmed’s concept of an “affective economy,” where emotion is produced “as an effect of” the “circulation” of bodies, objects, and signs such that the subject or the individual body is only “one nodal point” in the “affective economy” of circulation and where this “movement of emotions” is “not contained within contours of a subject” (2004, 45–46). Beyond the simple – yet significant – affinity between the two in making emotion distinctively corporeal, Hobbes and
Ahmed share the commitment that emotion depends on motion and does not exclusively reside within an individual body/subject. For Hobbes, only motion from outside the body can, through a chain of bodily forces, generate emotion. Furthermore, the fact that any emotion depends not only on these individual bodily forces but also on exterior factors such as the possible objects emotions can seek, the likelihood of attaining those objects, and the multiplicitous succession of emotions, any given emotion receives its contour not only from the motion that begets it but also the social environment in which the body is embedded. As such, an individual body experiencing any particular emotion is necessarily caught up in a network of bodies and objects that all mutually shape one another, even if Hobbes does not explicitly theorize it in these terms. He is indeed very interested in the workings of the individual body, but in his account of the diversity of passions, he makes recourse to factors that necessarily tether the formation of emotion in the individual body to a wider context. He occasionally gives more direct examples of this kind of implication of the broader social context, for instance his assertion that “the difference of Passions [in different people] proceedeth partly from the different Constitution of the body, and partly from different education” (L, VIII: 53), where this differential education includes a broader social context. Particularly because of Hobbes’s emphasis on motion – which we could read as Ahmed’s circulation – in theorizing emotion, I contend we can read a general resonance between Hobbes and Ahmed when it comes to affective economy.

The connection between Hobbes and Ahmed goes further. Emotions, for Ahmed, impress upon bodies and shape individuals and collectives, but they do not reside within bodies. They are “relational” as they “involve (re)actions or relations of ‘towardness’ or ‘awayness’” (2004, 8). Ahmed notes, as a crucial effect of the work of emotions, the way they are not only bodily but also shape the body through its corporeal orientation. Recall above that the appetites and
aversions that form the basis for Hobbes’s passions are endeavors toward or away from the object. Hobbes insists that he does not mean this metaphorically, but that it is literal motion (L, VI: 38). Here, his theorization of emotion – or at least one essential component of it – describes the corporeal work they do in very similar terms as Ahmed: both want to describe the way that emotions move the body in relation to something outside of it. For Ahmed, when we attribute feelings to an object or an other, it is “an effect of the encounter, which moves the subject” in relation to the other or to the object as an “affective reorientation” (2004, 8). We cannot, she argues, locate emotions exclusively in an object; they receive their shape only as a result of the encounter. Hobbes, at least in his account of the passions, suggests that there is little to no meaning or identity for an emotion outside of the interaction between circulation and a particular body. Emotion only becomes legible after the motion of some outside body-object puts pressure on sense organs, this motion gets transmitted through sensation and experience, and is conducted into appetite and endeavor, interacting with other factors to become emotion. Emotion is indeed not an inherent property of a thing or subject, but only an effect of an encounter.

Hobbes also resonates with Ahmed in his articulation of the direction or regulation of thought by “desire:” that which we “desire, or feare” as well as the objective or “End” of our train of thoughts produce an “impression” that is regularly “strong, and permanent” and is characterized by “greatnesse” (L, III: 21).\textsuperscript{17} Ahmed, reflecting on Hume, insists that, when thinking through emotion and affect, especially vis-à-vis sensation and cognition, we “remember the ‘press’ in an impression,” the way that feeling an emotion is associated with “the very affect of one surface upon another, an affect that leaves its mark or trace” (2004, 6). Emotional, somatic interactions with objects and others “leave me with an impression; they impress me and impress upon me” (6). Circulation involving emotion leaves an impression for Ahmed, and for
Hobbes the object of desire and fear produces an “impression” that I argue we should read as bodily.¹⁸

Hobbes’s account of passion extends his undermining of distinctions between mind and body or thought and emotion. The series of bodily responses leading to emotion begins with Imagination as “first internall beginning” of all “Voluntary Motion,” and it is these “small beginnings of Motion, within the body” that are endeavors (L, VI: 38). More specifically, “appetites and aversions are generated by phantasms, so reciprocally phantasms are generated by appetites and aversions” (DC, XXV: 401). Considering that emotions eventually emerge from interacting endeavors in the form of appetites and aversions, here Hobbes sets up an interactive, multi-layered set of bodily motions that preempt the hierarchal primacy of thought, for thought instantaneously catalyzes a process involved in generating emotions. Even internal to these interrelating processes, there are instances of mind-body feedback, with the reciprocal production of phantasms – which, from above, are thoughts generated by sense – and endeavors. Thought and emotion are thus intimately connected, and both material, corporeal processes. What Hobbes calls deliberation is an alternating of appetite, aversion, hope, and fear concerning some issue, along with the good and evil consequences of the issue coming into thought; deliberation describes “the whole summe” of these processes until an action is done or deemed impossible (L, VI: 44). Because appetite, aversion, hope, and fear are all embodied processes, the form of thought and deliberation involves body and emotion alike.

Furthermore, when specifically writing about the passions, Hobbes retains these connection between mind-body and thought-emotion, arguing that we can pursue the motions that produce conceptions to the heart, where they are transmitted through other bodily forces into passions, and that we are able to connect every passion to conception (EL, VIII: 46; see also EL,
Hobbes demonstrates these mind-body and thought-emotion interactions in an elaborate taxonomy of specific emotions. Pity or compassion, for instance, proceeds from Grief for the harm that occurs to another and is combined with “the imagination that the like calamity may befall” one’s self (L, VI: 43). Admiration consists in joy from the “apprehension of novelty” interacting with “appetite of knowing the cause” of some thing (L, VI: 42). In both examples, emotion is inseparable from thought (imagination of harm, knowing a cause) and both of these are embodied processes. Taken broadly, Hobbes’s theory of emotions intensifies the connection I am constructing between his work and affect theory (or at least certain threads of affect theory). He shares a commitment to thinking about emotion in terms of motion/circulation and as a force that does not reside exclusively within a body or external to one. Intimately connected to sensation, emotion upsets mind/body and thought/emotion dualisms, producing a model of the body caught up in networks of relations with objects and others that shape the body itself.

From Hobbesian Physics, Towards Hobbesian Politics

Hobbes asserts that “man’s nature is the sum of his natural faculties and powers, as the faculties of nutrition, motion, generation, sense, reason, etc. For these powers we do unanimously call natural, and are contained in the definition of man” (EL, I: 21). We should emphasize that all of these faculties and powers that he describes, as well as the appetite, aversion and passions that fill out the et cetera in the quote above, are embodied and material processes. Hobbes’s project proceeds from the body, and ultimately this body ought to be read affectively and emotionally. My reading of his physics – which for him comprises the foundation of all further inquiry – demonstrates the resonance and connection between Hobbes and contemporary theorizing on affect and emotion. His elaboration of philosophy’s method and purpose, conceptualization of embodied processes such as motion and sensation, articulation of a
theory of emotion, and challenge to mind-body and thought-emotion dualisms all render Hobbes as a potential early voice of something like affect theory, and enables us to connect Hobbes to contemporary affect theory. My reading elaborates the numerous linkage points between these two sets of theory that have not been joined in either Hobbes scholarship or affect theory. As I show in the following section, this connection between Hobbes and affect theory enables us to provide original, generative readings of one of the most commonly analyzed aspects of Hobbes’s more explicitly political theorizing, the state of nature. Engaging this kind of reading is possible only by following Hobbes’s own imperative to proceed from and follow the dynamic body in its motions and interactions. Following this path requires an immersion in the resonances between Hobbes and affect theory.

The State of Nature and Hobbesian Affective Economy

If everything existing in the world is body insofar as all phenomena and actions are at bottom an issue of complex, interactive webs of moving matter, sensation, thought, endeavor and passion, and if these are affective and emotional processes as I have claimed, then Hobbes provides the potential to trace any component of his theorizing back to its material, affective processes. My reading-theorizing process of connecting Hobbes to affect theory – a practice that operates as a particular kind of pursuit of Hobbes’s own materialism in a contemporary setting – ought to then open up theoretical space for affectively reading any of these components, no matter how disconnected from his initial physical account they may appear to be. The Hobbesian universe is body, and we are able to – indeed, we should – engage with the moving bodies composing it no matter what part of his universe we explore. We can do this by tracing motions, sensations, and passions, and the effects they generate, in the theoretical composition of these phenomena. That is, Hobbes’s method, and especially my reading of it, gives us warrant and instigation to interpret
the rest of his theory in terms of emotion and affect. The rest of this chapter engages in this kind of theoretical effort in terms of particularly salient, (in)famous, and frequently-discussed aspects of Hobbes’s political theory, focusing on Hobbes’s account of the state of nature, which I read in terms of Ahmed’s concept of affective economy.

As Hobbes’s state of nature is an environment of whirling emotions – a network of saturated material processes and contacts full of embodied subjects that move and interact through it – I argue it should not be read independent of the Hobbesian-affective physics that underlie his project. The state of nature is above all a condition that is viscerally and actively felt through embodied, emotional encounters with the material conditions and the other bodies that circulate through it. Thus, the unit of analysis, so to speak, of the state of nature cannot be a sole autonomous individual, a liberal subject, a disembodied agent, or any model of the person-subject that either pays insufficient attention to or manifestly ignores the nature of bodies as feeling material bodies caught up in the specific affective conditions of the state of nature. As Frost argues regarding Hobbes’s materialism generally, “in many respects, the very concept of the individual is displaced as a central unit of his political analysis … thoughts and desires are constituted and reconstituted intersubjectively and in relation to the material environment” (2008, 7). While Frost addresses Hobbes’s materialism mostly without engaging affect, she in this instance opens up a path to my particular project to engage Hobbesian affect and emotion. We have to shift our framework for interpreting Hobbes from an individualistic one to one that explores the material atmosphere(s) of Hobbes’s theory, of which the (always embodied) individual is only one aspect. I claimed above in account of Hobbesian physics and passions that individuals and emotions take their shape from the motions that precipitate them and from the
material, social environment in which they are embedded; no element of Hobbes’s theorizing elucidates this as demonstratively as his account of the state of nature.

Hobbes states that his account of the state of nature is primarily “an Inference, made from the Passions,” which is also “confirmed by Experience” (L, XIII: 89). Recall from above that for Hobbes, one of the chief modes of Hobbesian philosophical inquiry involves examining the effects that moving bodies have on other moving bodies (DC, I). In this sense, it is relatively clear that if we are to engage his theorization of the state of nature, it must be through the emotions at work in it, as well as the bodily motions, contacts, and effects that underpin them. The focus is not on the individual as such, but the affective conditions in which individuals interact. This resonates with Ahmed’s imperative when it comes to thinking about emotions in terms of economy, as they are the effects of circulations of bodies, objects, and signs instead of statically existing as inherent, contained properties of things or subjects (2004, 46–47).19 Much like I argued in the previous section that Hobbesian emotions are themselves sorts of affective economies, I contend that the particularly emotionally saturated situation of the state of nature is an affective economy as well.

For Hobbes, individuals are relatively equal “in the faculties of body and mind” (L, XIII: 86),20 in a way that shifts the emphasis away from any individual body and to the environment in which there is no common power. While the individual human body is an especially salient node in the affective economy of Hobbes’s state of nature, any analysis must engage and follow the circulations that: generate fear and other emotions; construct an overall environment of inclination to war; and are composed of on certain motions and sensations. In terms of the reading that I develop in this section, individuals are relatively equally constituted for sensing, thinking, and feeling within in the affective economy of the state of nature. They share the
common characteristics of bodies organized as human persons, and will react more or less similarly to the material, emotional conditions of the environment. Hobbes himself immediately turns from the discussion of relative equality of persons that occupies the first two paragraphs of his notorious chapter on the state of nature to an examination of the relational, material, and ultimately affective conditions of the state of nature itself.

What, then, circulates in the affective economy of the state of nature, and what motions and sensations are at work? Hobbes understands the individuals populating the state of nature as having two primary “Ends,” “principally their owne conservation, and sometimes their delectation [happiness or pleasure]” (L, XIII: 87). Here, there is need to think in terms of affective materiality, as understanding these as the specific human ends draws on Hobbes’s concept of the vital motion that animates living human bodies. Frost argues that Hobbesian “vital motion tends toward its own perpetuation,” the “response of a living organism” to the “stimuli” of its environment (2008, 23). A crucial component of the affective economy of the state of nature is thus dynamic matter, organized in the forms of a human, seeking to realize that which is necessary for their continued existence. That is, the particular kind of material embodied subject in the state of nature matters, since the nature of that materiality constitutes the intentionalities of those that act there, and consequently the kinds of relations and interactions that follow. Moreover, there’s a certain kind of emotional relationship between these embodied subjects and these ends, an “equality of hope in the attaining of our Ends” (L, XIII: 87). The emotion of hope, for Hobbes a passion defined by “Appetite with an opinion of attaining” (L, VI: 41), connects the body and the object being sought after. So, the individual – read: an active materiality seeking its own conservation and pleasure – in the state of nature exists in emotional relation to those objects they believe conducive to their perpetuation, with a component of that emotion being an
expectation of realizing that end. Already the state of nature is affectively multifaceted, with material bodies, their nature, their ends, and emotional connections between of all of these. Of course, the situation is much more complex than this lone body connected to these objects, because there is more than one body, and thus more than one set of hopes and emotional relations. In the state of nature, multiple bodies come into conflict with one another when the “desire” that would fulfill their particular ends is the same among multiple individuals; in this event, the bodies “endeavor to destroy, or subdue one another.” (L, XIII: 87).

Let us heed Hobbes’s methodological-ontological commitments, reckon with affect theory in (embodied!) mind, and think through the kinds of motions and sensations at play in encounters in the state of nature. An embodied, sensing, thinking, feeling individual sees some object which will enable the persistence of their vital forces, or they think of it (thought itself being produced by and producing corporeal effects for Hobbes), all generating a panoply of sensations. The interactions of these vital motions, thoughts, and sensations induces an embodied appetite towards that object, which then connects to some embodied thought that one can attain that object, a thought itself bound up with the residue of past sensation-thought-experiences of attaining the object. So, the individual resolves to attain the object, moves toward it, which in turn produces more motions, sensations, and so on in response to the motion and corresponding changes in the body. They approach the object that is conducive to the persistence of the vital motion, but encounter another body, one also with a hopeful appetite of attaining that same end and perpetuating their own vital motion, and with a similar network of motion, sensation, and thought generating that desire. One can imagine the material effects of these bodies interacting with one another: bodies move into defensive postures, muscles tense, bodies sense a tightness, a whole train of thoughts about danger and about the other is activated, perhaps there are threats
and insults and warnings exchanged. They feel the tension in the air, so to speak. This embodied state of “Anticipation” (L, XIII: 87) is part of an affective economy: the circulation of these bodies, the sensations, motions, and words exchanged between them, and the object(s) at play generate the emotional flows that traverse the environment.

These circulations produce the passions that emerge: diffidence, grief, glory-seeking, and fear. For Hobbes, the passion of diffidence is “Constant Despayre,” where despair is “Appetite” without “an opinion of attaining” (L, VI: 41). This diffidence does not preexist the encounter in the state of nature, as the bodies entering the state of nature had hope of attaining their ends upon entering the scenario. When these appetitive embodied individuals interact in the conditions of the state of nature, the affective economy of sensation, motion, and objects transforms this into diffidence, and necessitates “Anticipation” and readiness “by force, or wiles, to master the persons” of all in order to guarantee one’s own “conservation” (L, XIII: 87-88). Again, one can imagine the motions, sensations, and thoughts that accompany this embodied, yet social, passion. This is a situation of “griefe” when there is no common power (88). Grief, “the Expectation of consequences” that are displeasing is a “simple passion” that, in my reading of the statue of nature, must be accounted for as an embodied product of this affective economy (L, VI: 40-41). This condition of diffidence, anticipation, and grief is compounded by glory, the fact that some individuals take “pleasure in contemplating their own power in the acts of conquest, which they pursue farther than their security requires” (L, XIII: 88). Glory, more specifically “Joy, arising from the imagination of a man’s own power and ability” (L, VI: 42) is a result of some previous affective economy – in the sense that all Hobbesian passions are, as I argued above – and enters into the affective economy of the state of nature. It amplifies the emotions already being generated therein, stimulating more exhaustive anticipation, greater grief, and consequently
intensifying the motions and sensations at play. Moreover, with the competition, diffidence and war of the state of nature, the conditions are arguably uniquely prevalent for feeling and enacting glory since there are numerous opportunities to demonstrate one’s power and ability. At the same time, people seeking glory have no common power to prevent them from making “signes of contempt” of one another, leading individuals in Hobbes’s account to exert effort “to extort a greater value from [one’s] contemners,” through damage or example (L, XIII: 88). This is why glory not only augments the emotions being generated in the affective economy, but is itself strengthened.

“[W]orst of all” in the state of nature, Hobbes declares, is the “continuall feare, and danger of violent death” (89). Before this passage – in the ninth paragraph of the chapter on the state of nature – Hobbes mentions fear only once, in a passage mentioning a lack of fear when invading another without a common power.23 It comes after everything I have discussed so far, at least in the order of Hobbes’s text. Hobbes’s declaration - that the creation of this fear is the worst outcome of the state of nature – is especially noteworthy compared to the specific things it is worse than, including the inability to sustain industry, culture, knowledge of the earth, arts, letters, and society. Fear is the most significant “consequent” to the conditions of the state of nature is fear, a consequence that is also the most directly emotional. Fear, like all these other emotions, are products of the Hobbesian affective economy and its circulations, motions, sensations, other passions, and so on.

All of these material conditions and contacts generate a state of war, and I contend that the state of war is itself another kind of affective economy. Individuals in the state of nature are, for Hobbes

in that condition which is called Warre; and such a warre, as is of every man, against every man. For WARRE, consisteth not in Battell onely, or the act of fighting; but in a
tract of time, wherein the Will to contend by Battell is sufficiently known … So the
nature of War, consisteth not in actuall fighting; but in the known disposition thereto,
during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary (88-89).

The state of war is an atmospheric inclination to war tethered to certain kinds of passions, not
warfare itself. It is an affective economy. We could speculate as to the motion and sensations and
passions here as well. The individual living in this perpetual inclination or orientation to war
trains their bodies for potential fighting, will likely experience a greater sense of anxiety, fear, or
anticipation, may sleep less well as a consequence, and their actions will affect any person
around them in a cascading network of emotional orientations in this state of becoming-war.

Whether war breaks out at any given moment proves less important in Hobbes’s account than
this embodied, relational disposition with a temporal, atmospheric character. It shapes the body
in particular ways, is constituted by certain emotional circulations, and produces more emotional
circulations, including the ones that will eventually provoke people to get out of the state of
nature.

More broadly, the concept of affective economy – and attention to emotion and affect
more generally – is necessary for fully tracing the complexities of Hobbes’s state of nature,
especially in terms of Hobbes’s own materialist ontology and philosophical method. We must
insist on all these passions in the embodied sense I outlined above, in order to engage the
intricacy and density of Hobbes’s project. It is important that Hobbes expends so much effort
providing a detailed material ontology in the opening of all his major works. When we read his
account of the state of nature, we will never be able to fully apprehend it in its dense corporeal
complexity without the sort of exegesis I offer here, informed as it is by contemporary theorizing
on emotion and affect. When he portrays some particular passion or competition over some
object, his own method compels us to theorize it in conjunction with his materialism. If “life is
but a motion of limbs” (L, Introduction: 9), we must trace the motions – and consequently, the sensation, thoughts, further motions, passions, and so on – throughout his theory. Overall, the affective encounter in the state of nature produces emotional effects in the interacting bodies. Bodies move and bodies affect one another in relation to objects and the material conditions, producing particular kinds of sensations, thoughts, and ultimately changes in passions. Examining these corporeal interactivities as I have done is one mode of attending to Hobbes’s own philosophical method of examining the effects that bodies have on one another, something his theorizing of the state of nature clearly does. The “three principall causes of quarrel” in the state of nature – competition, diffidence, and glory (L, XIII: 88) – are all caught up in and traverse a dense affective economy of bodies and objects interacting with one another. They are not ‘inputs’ to these kinds of embodied relationalities but are produced by them.

The body of another is not in and of itself fearful, or threatening, or provoking: fear is not an inherent characteristic of a body, but only an effect of the material and affective conditions of the encounter between bodies. Human bodies in Hobbes’s theory are not necessarily naturally conflictual, but enter into relations of conflict in certain affective economies. If the above encounter took place where there was civil law determining possession, or if something about the affective economy was producing a passion like benevolence, or if there were more than one object to satisfy the ends such that competition was itself unnecessary, then it is unlikely that war, fear, and so on would be produced. There is no preexisting emotion behind the encounter and its motions, sensations, thoughts, circulations, and so on; the encounter is everything. Indeed, Hobbes insists that in his account of the state of nature, he very much does not “accuse mans nature in it”; moreover, the “Desires, and other Passions of man, are in themselves no Sin” (L, XIII: 89). It is not that emotion itself is the problem, or that fear has an autonomous deleterious
existence, but that the affective economy in which these passions takes part in and are conditioned by certain modes of movements, emotions, and relationalities, while foreclosing others.

Fear emerges from the conditions of the state of nature. As such, the state of nature may indeed prove effective (and affective) in regards to one of the “ends” of Hobbesian philosophy, “mak[ing] use to our benefit of effects” of bodies on one another, “for the commodity of human life” (DC, I: 7). Hobbes articulates with the state of nature a situation where destructive passions emerge from a delimited set of conditions, thus amplifying the need to theorize alternatives. From this perspective we see another aspect of the significance of reading Hobbes beside affect theory. Once we see that the state of nature – the device through which Hobbes theorizes and justifies the move to civil society – is an affective economy, the project of organizing bodies for the commodity of life, and more specifically the effort to build a theory that gets us out of the deplorable – but not inevitable – situation of the state of war, takes on an added emotional component. It is not just that we need a common power to create and enforce law (although that is most certainly necessary for Hobbes), it is that we also need to organize the material conditions to construct an affective economy radically different than that of the state of nature.24

Interestingly, it is the passions themselves – connected to reason and natural law – that compel people to quit the state of nature. Hobbes concludes his chapter on the state of nature by noting “a possibility to come out of it, consisting Partly in the Passions, partly in [an individual’s] reason”; these “passions that encline men to Peace” are “Feare of Death, Desire of such things as are necessary to commodious living, and a Hope by their industry to obtain them” (L, XIII: 90). Some of the same emotions that circulate in the state of nature thus also move individuals to leave behind the state of nature, and we must read them in terms of their
embodiment and circulation in an affective economy, as I have outlined in this chapter. Desire for things commodious to living and hope to attain them take part in constituting a state of war, but those emotions persist in altered form to come out of that state. Fear is produced by the affective economy of the state of nature – indeed, it is the worst product of it – but in addition motivates efforts to leave those conditions. Emotions generated within an affective economy continue to move and continue to generate effects on, in, and through bodies. Moreover, the specific phrasing of Hobbes regarding the Desire that aids in quitting the state of nature – that it is a desire of that which is “necessary to commodious living” – is very similar to his description of the objective of philosophy in *De Corpore* which I have noted before: the organizing of bodies in their effects on one another “for the commodity of human life” insofar as material conditions permit. In his closing statements on the state of nature, Hobbes thus provides us with a particular instantiation of this end and connects it to desire, linking the specific aim of individuals in the conditions of the state of nature and the overall objective of philosophy itself through the sensing, feeling, emotive body.

Passions/emotions are not the only dimension of the move from the state of nature to civil society, as Hobbes names Reason – more specifically, the “convenient Articles of Peace” that are “suggest[ed]” by Reason as the other part of this transition (*L*, XIII: 90). These articles are the Laws of Nature, which Hobbes defines in the subsequent chapter as “Precept[s], or generall Rule[s], found out by Reason, by which” people are “forbidden” to do something “destructive” of their lives or to not do that which would preserve life (*L*, XIV: 91). This presents a potential contradiction with my account, as Hobbes states earlier in *Leviathan* that Reason contrasts with Sense and Memory in that Reason “is not…borne with us; nor gotten by Experience onely,” but instead “attained by Industry” (*L*, V: 35). Rather than marking this only as a tension with my
affective account of Hobbes, I would suggest that it also provides an opportunity to rethink the
dependent processes in Hobbes are embodied and connected to emotions. Reason
involves a form of calculation or “reckoning” of “the Consequences of generall names”,
conceiving of connections between them “for the marking and signifying of our thoughts” as well
as for beginning at consequences close at hand to “proceed from one consequence to another” (L,
V: 32-33; his emphasis).

Even as Hobbes distinguishes this process from Sense and Memory, it should still be
considered an embodied process, as everything ultimately is for him. Earlier in this chapter I
discussed how Hobbes’s conception of Imagination, itself linked with Thought, works against a
Cartesian framework of disembodied mind and reason. When Hobbes explicitly describes a
process of reasoning in defining the laws of nature, he does so partly in the language of thought,
since one dimension of a law of nature is a “Rule, found out by Reason, by which a man is
forbidden to … omit that, by which he thinketh it may be best preserved” (L, XIV: 91). If Reason
consists partly in thought, and if thought is part of the “trayne” of embodied processes analyzed
earlier in the chapter, then Reason is also embodied. Furthermore, in the passage on moving out
of the state of nature quoted above, Hobbes more explicitly pairs emotion and reason as both
working to motivate action. I would thus argue that Hobbes’s understanding of the place of
reasoning in the transition from the state of nature to civil society provides an opportunity to
reassess the way that cognitive process are always tied to other bodily processes at work in
Hobbes’s thought.

Ultimately, the state of nature details the way that the fear, anticipation, anxiety, desire,
and hope swirling around the state of nature move bodies to change how they relate to one
another politically. Destructive emotional circulations and affective circuits emerge from a
particular set of material conditions, amplifying the need to construct alternatives. The purpose of the state of nature thus has to with the connection between feeling and politics: it is not just that a sovereign power is needed to create and enforce law, but something is needed to organize a different, less harmful affective economy than that of the state of nature.

Theorizing the state of nature necessarily implicates motion, sensation, and passion in Hobbes’s philosophical project and in the components of his theorization of the state of nature. This affective reading, pursuing as it does a variation of the philosophical method that Hobbes himself insists upon, traces the train of motions, sensations, thoughts, and passions that construct an environment in which the social contract surfaces as the most propitious means for following those passions that seek peace and thereby quitting the state of nature. Attending to feeling, emotive materiality is what enables this sort of reading, and thus is one mode of interpretive practice that helps us to track the kind of method Hobbes lays out in a way that generates a more vivid and more materially vital reading of the state of nature, while also preparing an affective reading of other elements of Hobbes’s political theory as well as intensifying the resonance between Hobbes and contemporary theorizing on affect and emotion.

**Conclusion: Hobbesian Lines of Flight**

In this conclusion, I speculate what further reanimations of Hobbes are made possible by my practicing feeling as a method with his thought, in addition to reading the state of nature as an affective economy. While the possibilities are vast – one could reread political power, sovereignty, authority, law, religion, and so on from the standpoint of emotion and affect, here I will first outline what an affective reading of the social contract in Hobbes might entail, and second sketch how my mode of reading Hobbes could draw out a potential embodied ethical vision from his thought.
Hobbes writes that the commonwealth and the sovereign are generated by the compact in which all the soon-to-be subjects “conferre all their power and strength” upon the sovereign, “reduc[ing]” all their Wills “unto one Will,” appointing one sovereign “to beare their Person” and, ultimately, exceeding mere “Consent, or Concord” in order to forge “a reall Unitie of them all, in one and the same Person” (L, XVII: 120). The frontispiece for Leviathan by Abraham Bosse visualizes this striking alchemical formulation. The image portrays the sovereign, a man that Hobbes emphasizes is artificial yet still natural (L, Introduction: 9). He looks over his kingdom (and towards the reader), sword and crosier in hand. The dozens and dozens of bodies that make up the Leviathan are both individuated and an incoherent agglomeration. Their characteristic features are nondescript. They are almost all turned toward the giant head of the sovereign, the only face given detailed characterization. Some are looking up at this machinic, humanized embodiment of political power itself; a few – especially those in the Leviathan’s right arm – are gesturing up to this sovereign head. Bosse’s image really does transfigure and unite all the individual subjects into one body, one person bearing all their persons.

An affective reading of Hobbes could draw out this specifically embodied dimension of the social contract. Perhaps the subjects conferring all their power and strength on the sovereign can be understood to be bringing together their affective capacities, or maybe the appointment of a sovereign to bear the person of the subject is a matter of bearing their affective capacities and channeling certain emotional circulations. This speculative reading would push Hobbes further than he himself went, at least in his earlier work. In Elements of Law Natural and Politic, discussing the constitution of the “body politic,” he notes that “it is impossible for any man really to transfer his own strength to another, or for that other to receive it,” and thus the covenant is more of a pact of submission and non-resistance than an actual transfer (EL, XIX:
107). However, I think that drawing out the affectivity of Hobbes’s overall project enables one to conceive of the transfer of power and strength as an actual physical redirection and interaction of affective capacities. I would observe here that Duncan (2005) argues that Hobbes’s materialism became stronger in *Leviathan* and *De Corpore* than in his earlier *Elements of Law*. This, combined with the fact that no such proviso is found in *Leviathan*, opens a path for pursuing Hobbes’s materialism further than he himself did in this regard. Hobbes’s description of the Leviathan as an “Artificiall Man” – whereby sovereignty is the artificial soul “giving life and motion to the whole body”, the magistrates are the joints, wealth is the strength, counsellors are the memory, concord is health, sedition is sickness, civil war is death, and so on (*L*, Introduction; XXI; XXIX) – is suggestive of this line of inquiry, given the general framework I have constructed for reading Hobbes. For Hobbes, this is an artificial body, but as Deleuze notes in his reading of Spinoza, conceptualizing Nature as a plane of immanence distributing affects/affective capacities works against sharp divisions between natural and artificial (1988, 124). Consequently, one consequence of an affective reading of Hobbes could be to mitigate the salient differences between what Hobbes calls natural and artificial bodies.

If all universe is body, if the point of philosophy is to organize bodies for commodious living, and if Hobbes and affect theory resonate with one another, we should explore the emotional and affective processes that make the sovereign Leviathan a body. From this standpoint the social contract is not just a narrative about a transfer of rights and formation of a sovereign government, but it can also be read to explore the channeling of embodied power. It is an attempt to bring bodies together to construct a different kind of affective economy than the one in the state of nature. It sets up a relationship between subjects and the sovereign that could be read as emotional and affective at the same time that it is conventionally political. This means
we might read the power of the sovereign – “the Greatest of humane Powers,” the “compounded Powers” of those who unite and confer their power on the sovereign (L, X: 62) – as also an emotional and affective power. It uses this power – and in doing so relies on the affective economy of “bodily fear” (L, XXVIII: 206-207) – in order to move and affect bodies. In general, then, one can say that for Hobbes the social contract quite clearly fulfills the challenge he laid down for philosophical inquiry: to study the effects of bodies on one another in order to organize them for commodious living.

This overall project that Hobbes articulates, interpreted in the way I have in this chapter, might also hint at an alternative Hobbesian ethics as a line of flight from the more molar, striated Leviathan that is received as part of the political theory tradition. Samantha Frost argues that a materialist reading of Hobbes makes legible a reading where Hobbes has an ethics that “enjoins people to attend to their relations with others through time” such that “the pursuit of peace is, or at least should be, our primary ethical concern” (2008, 10). At the same time, James Martel emphasizes Hobbes’s method of reading and account of rhetorical representation in order to read him as a radical democratic thinker (2007). Taking a cue from these two interpreters of Hobbes, I want to end this chapter by very briefly sketching the possibility that an affective reading of Hobbes draws out a latent embodied ethics.

Compare, for instance, Hobbes’s objective for philosophy (at least as articulated in De Corpore) to the ethical imperative Deleuze assembles from Spinoza:

The end or scope of philosophy is, that we may make use to our benefit of effects formerly seen; or that, by application of bodies to one another, we may produce the like effects of those we conceive in our mind, as far forth as matter, strength, and industry will permit, for the commodity of human life” (Hobbes, De Corpore, I: 7).

But now it is a question of knowing whether relations (and which ones?) can compound directly to form a new, more ‘extensive’ relation, or whether capacities can compound directly to constitute a more ‘intense’ capacity of power. It is no longer a matter of
utilizations or captures, but of sociabilities and communities. How do individuals enter into composition with one another in order to form a higher individual, ad infinitum? How can a being take another being into its world, but while preserving or respecting the other’s own relations and world? (Deleuze 1988, 126).

This passage from Hobbes – one that helped open this chapter – at the very least creates the possibilities to envisage an embodied ethics as a line of flight from the Hobbesian text. By formulating Hobbes as a thinker concerned with the sensing, dynamic, interactive, emotional, affective body, I situate him and this Deleuzean Spinoza on the same ethical plane. In my reading Hobbes and Spinoza comparably turn our attention to studying how bodies affect one another so that we can reimagine the ways they relate to one another and ultimately shape these interactions for a reciprocal collective and individual affective capacity. Both are interested in what the body can do and in thinking through how bodies might act and be acted upon in different ways. From this perspective, Hobbes’s state of nature could become what Deleuze calls “utilizations or captures,” while an ethics from Hobbes might involve the “sociabilities and communities” of Deleuze’s Spinoza. Furthermore, Hobbes’s “application of bodies to one another” might become a matter of the Deleuzean Spinoza’s “whether capacities can compound directly to constitute a more ‘intense’ capacity or power.” If such an alternative reading of Hobbes is to be articulated, it comes from re-centering the material body – its interactivity, potentiality, and equality inherent in embodiment – in his thought.

This is, admittedly, only a tentative suggestion that merits further exploration. However, it is a promising example of what an affective reading might be capable of, counterpoising to the authoritarian sovereign Leviathan an embodied ethical line of flight that becomes possible when we pursue Hobbes’s materialism from the standpoint of emotion and affect. My methodological framework from the introduction helps think through the character of this suggestive line of flight. In terms of Sedgwick, the affective reading of a Hobbesian embodied ethics is a reparative
one, willing to be surprised when we no longer know in advance the outcome of our reading of Hobbes (pervasive authoritarianism). In terms of Deleuze and Guattari, one might speculate that the authoritarian Leviathan is an attempt to reterritorialize, overcode, striate, and make molar the deterritorialized, decoded, molecular flows of bodies, emotions, and affects that could be said to comprise Hobbes’s thought. Affective reading-theorizing practices in general can work to let loose the molecular flows, and in the case of Hobbes, affectively and emotionally following through on his materialism opens up alternative ethical formations from Hobbes’s account.

Reading Hobbes beside affect theory generates possibilities to reimagine any dimension of his thought in affective and emotional terms. The chapter has worked on multiple levels: first, laying out the general resonance between Hobbes and affect theory; second, reevaluating Hobbes’s general project from the standpoint of embodiment, emotion, and affect; third, tracing the circuits of affect and emotion in Hobbes’s physics and understanding of fundamental bodily processes (sense, imagination, and thought); fourth, reimagining Hobbes’s theory of passion/emotion as a theory of affective economies; fifth, envisioning the state of nature as an affective economy and thus reinterpreting one of the classic political problematics in his thought; and sixth, letting loose other potential lines of flight from his theorizing. If all universe is body, and if Hobbes and affect theory have the connections I have argued for, then the entirety of his thought has to be reanimated through the mode of an affective reading.
Chapter 2
Vital Forces: Marx, the Tension of Capitalist Affect, and the Communal Body

“What experience generally shows to the capitalist is a constant excess of population, i.e. an excess in relation to capital’s need for valorization at a given moment, although this throng of people is made up of generations of stunted, short-lived and rapidly replaced human beings, plucked, so to speak, before they were ripe. And indeed, experience shows to the intelligent observer how rapidly and firmly capitalist production has seized the vital forces of the people at their very roots” (Marx, Capital, Vol. I, 380).

Introduction: An Affective Marx?

What happens to Marx’s philosophical project and critique of capitalism when we read him and affect theory on a singular theoretical plane? If we theorize central Marxian concepts – such as historical materialism, labour power, living labour capacity – in relation to affect theory, what features of Marx’s project are made uniquely legible? What distinctive concepts and critical articulations emerge from an affective reading of Marx’s critique? What is capitalist affect? What is communist affect? This chapter explores these questions and more by theorizing, from different points and concepts in the ‘early’ Marx, a Deleuzean-Spinozan figure of the body in terms of affective capacity – the capacity to affect and be affected. Proceeding from this conception of the Marxist-Spinoza body illustrates the affective stakes of Marx’s critique of capital and vision for communist society. I contend that when it comes to Marx, feeling as method uniquely draws out three dimensions of Marx’s thought: bodily material as dynamically affective in its constant interaction with other bodies, objects, nature, social formations, and so on; affect as an essential component of Marx’s critique of capitalism alongside his account of alienation, the appropriation of surplus value, factory conditions, and other oppressive elements of capital; and communism as an affective project whereby bodies affect and are affected by other bodies such that their individual and collective powers are continually augmented.
Kathi Weeks, in her generative book on the work ethic, post- and anti-work imaginaries, and utopian demands, insists that we pay attention to the capitalist domination of the worker in terms of more than just a “quantitative” logic of exploitation; instead, domination must also “be grasped in qualitative terms, as attitude, affect, feeling, and symbolic exchange” (2011, 236n11). This chapter takes on this task through a return to Marx himself, deploying affect theory to think through Marx’s philosophical project in general and to focus on affective relations of domination and – in communism – freedom. Lyotard enthusiastically declares that “we must come to take Marx as if he were a writer, an author full of full of affects” (1993, 95), charging readers to “show what intensities are lodged in theoretical signs, what affects within serious discourse” since there are “intensities that haunt Marx’s thought” (103-104). Staging an encounter between Marx and affect theory – specifically, in this chapter, Spinoza and Deleuze – I trace the affectivities, forces, powers, capacities, and intensities that traverse Marx’s works. Such a reading indicates that Marx is indeed a thinker full of affects, enabling both a re-articulation of Marx in affective terms and awareness of the import of this reading for our concepts of affect theory.

In doing so, this chapter also has the effect of mapping the potential to more directly orient affect theory toward Marx. That is, building upon other projects taking up Marx and affect in some way (cf. Lordon 2014; Clough et al. 2007; Hardt and Negri 2000; Negri 1999), I suggest that Marx himself can and should be a resource in affect theory’s critical repertoire, given the incisiveness of his attunement to affect that I elucidate throughout the chapter. More specifically, while this chapter emphasizes the lines of flight affect opens for Marx, a related theoretical move is to think through the deployment of (Deleuze’s) Spinoza into the realm of Marxist analysis of economic power and economic relations. In examining the relationship between Marx and
Spinoza, Yovel argues that while often working in a broadly Spinozan framework, Marx’s “more penetrating view of social reality” – such as adding economic dimensions to the Spinozan concept of freedom – enriches Spinoza and expands his scope. The “scholastic bulk of” the volumes of Capital can be articulated as “Marx’s own way, following Spinoza, of discussing ethical vision and powerful human aspirations as if they were points, lines, and bodies,” replacing Spinoza’s “mos geometricus” with “economic analysis” (98).

Marx read Spinoza in 1841, specifically the Theologico-Political Treatise and some of Spinoza’s correspondence (Yovel 1989, 78; Bowring 2014, 24–26). Yovel makes the argument that most readers have systematically underappreciated the Spinozism of Marx, contending that Spinoza is “almost as deeply rooted” in Marx’s thinking as Hegel and that Marx “used Spinoza’s thought far more than he admitted” (1989, 78). Marx sparsely makes direct reference to Spinoza. The most prominent citation occurs in the Introduction to the Grundrisse, where he contends that the “identity of production and consumption amounts to Spinoza’s thesis: determinatio est negatio” (G, 90). Even with the scattered direct reference, Yovel argues “Spinoza is almost always present in Marx’s thought” in a way that “surpasses his direct mention by name” (1989, 79), such that “Spinoza underlies the texture of Marx’s thought, whatever his express judgment of Spinoza” (200n4). He sees Marx as reorienting a Spinozan philosophy of immanence in a more economic and dialectical way, writing that Spinoza’s muted presence is most striking in Marx’s critique of religion, theorization of the relationship between humans and nature, and in the connection between Marx’s ethical vision and his understanding of the scientific quality of his critique of capital (1989, chap. 4). Althusser makes several scattered references to Spinoza vis-à-vis Marx in his contributions to Reading Capital (Althusser and Balibar 1979), and Montag (2008, ix) notes in his preface to Balibar’s Spinoza and Politics that many Western
Marxists have turned to Spinoza in times of “crisis within Marxism.” The most prominent of contemporary “Spinozist Marxists” are Hardt and Negri in their *Empire* trilogy (2000; 2004a; 2009), emphasizing Spinozan power and the joyful affects in their theorizing of the revolutionary multitude. Frédéric Lordon seeks to use Spinoza to answer a question that constitutes for him a ‘gap’ in Marx: especially in contemporary capitalism, how do “a few – we call them bosses – have the ‘power’ to convince the many to adopt their employers’ desires as if they were their own and to occupy themselves in their service” (2014, x)? A reading of money and the employment relation in terms of Spinozan conatus, affect, and desire provides the mechanism that the “structures” of the “capitalist mobilisation of employees … ‘run on’” (x-xi), the way that “master-desires engage the power of acting of enlistees” in the master’s “enterprise” (3).

Given this genealogy, it should not be surprising that I too turn to Spinoza to think with Marx. In doing so, though, I seek to work with a particular rendering of Spinoza, a Spinoza present in contemporary affect theory transmitted through Deleuze (1988; 1990). The shared move that so-called Spinozan Marxists make is to read Spinoza as a materialist, and perhaps the exemplary materialist (Boros et al. 2009). The particular materialities I find most generative for thinking through Marx’s project in an encounter with affect theory involve Deleuzean-Spinozan concepts of affect, *conatus*, and power. Ultimately, in response to those who restrict Marx somewhat exclusively to a dialectical, “organismic” ontology derived from Hegel (cf. Cheah 2003, chap. 4), In deploying feeling as a method, I use affect and Deleuze to twist Marx closer to Spinoza and Deleuze.

I first explore the materialism of the early Marx, using my reading practice to analyze his (and often his and Engels’s) notions of essential powers, the production of life, and the body in terms of affect. This opens onto a discussion of the concept of nature, where I discuss Marx’s
anthropocentrism while contending that an affective reading of Marx provides a line of flight with less nature-dominating potentials. From here, I turn to Marx’s critique of capital, especially as he articulates it in the *Grundrisse*. My central argument is that a critique of the tension of capitalist affect is fundamental to a Marxian account of capital: on the one hand, capitalism amplifies the potential affective capacity of bodies through its development and organization of productive forces; on the other, it captures this increase in affective capacity to enrich the bourgeoisie, immiserate the proletariat, and reproduce capitalism. The final main section of the chapter theorizes Marx’s sketches of communism as a reciprocal, amplifying set of affective relations, with what I call “communist affect” producing consequences for his concepts of class consciousness, the social individual, nature, machines, and most of all freedom.

**Essential Powers: The Affective Material of Historical Materialism**

Marx opens his “Theses on Feuerbach” by critiquing “all previous materialism” – Feuerbach included – for conceptualizing “things, reality, sensuousness … only in the form of the *object or of contemplation*”; Feuerbach’s problem, in Marx’s view, is not conceiving sensuousness “subjectively,” “as *sensuous human activity, practice*” (“Theses on Feuerbach” [hereafter TF], I; emphasis Marx’s). But what is this alternate materialism advocated by Marx? How does Marx take real sensuous activity into account, and how does his and Engels’s historical materialism avoid the deficiency of Feuerbach’s attempted materialism, which in their view appealed to “abstract thinking” and “sensuous contemplation” without “conceiv[ing] sensuousness as *practical*, human-sensuous activity” (TF, V; emphasis Marx’s)? More pointedly, how does affect theory enable a re-envisioning and an enlivening of Marx’s materialism and attention to practical sensuous activity? What is the affectivity of historical materialism? This section focuses mostly on texts from the so-called early Marx – especially *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of*
1844 (EPM), “Theses on Feuerbach” (TF), and The German Ideology (GI) – in order to generate an affective theorization of Marx’s early historical materialism.

**Essential Powers and Affective Capacity**

This sub-section briefly engages Marx’s account of the “essential powers” of the body in a particularly dynamic passage from “Private Property and Communism” in the third of the 1844 Manuscripts as a way of beginning to unspool the important concepts from Spinoza that will resonate with Marx throughout this chapter. Here, the materialism I take up is that of the sensing, relational, and I would argue affective Marxian body. In a discussion of the changing relationality of the body through different socioeconomic formations, Marx conceptualizes the body in a way that productively networks with Spinoza’s conception of power, the body, *conatus*, and affective capacity; these become throughout this chapter the most vital nodes of Spinoza’s thought in elaborating an affective Marx.

In the process of self-objectification, where “man himself becomes the object,”\(^9\) the “objective world becomes everywhere for man in society the world of man’s essential powers” (107-8; Marx’s emphasis). It is the introduction here of the concept of “essential powers”\(^10\) that evokes a connection to Spinoza. In Deleuze’s affirmation of Spinoza, he describes how for Spinoza an

individual is first of all a singular essence, which is to say, a degree of power. A characteristic relation corresponds to this essence, and a certain capacity for being affected corresponds to this degree of power. … Thus, animals are defined less by the abstract notions of genus and species than by a capacity for being affected, by the affections for which they are ‘capable,’ by the excitations to which they react within the limits of their capacity (Deleuze 1988, 27).\(^11\)

That is, for Spinoza, we must define individuals by their characteristic relations and essential power, where “all power [*potentia*] is inseparable from a capacity for being affected” (97). Thinking with Deleuze and Spinoza, Marx’s account of the body co-acting with objects and
others becomes affective. In Marx’s consideration of this body in these relations through the register of “essential power,” we can work with Spinoza to think in terms of capacity to affect and be affected. Indeed, Marx’s interest in this part of the text lies in the interactivity of bodies and objects, in the effects they generate on another and the relations they construct. Marx’s “essential power” is itself relational, in a way that furthers the resonance with Spinoza. The product of an interaction between body and object “depends on the nature of the objects and on the nature of the essential power corresponding to it” (108; emphasis Marx’s). Not only do human bodies have particular essential powers in the form of affective capacity, but objects do as well. The effects of any composition of individual(s) and object(s) are constituted by the affective capacities of those individuals and objects. A Deleuzean-Spinozan affect theory approaches these kinds of interactions similarly: things “act differently according to the objects encountered” and respond by way of “the affections that come from the objects” (Deleuze 1988, 21). For both Marx and Spinoza, essential powers – as the capacity to affect and be affected – interact, causing transformations in the things encountering one another, and being transformed in the process.

The affectivity of the Spinozan-Marxian body extends to the play of essential powers in the affirmation of life. Deleuze’s Spinoza argues that from “the moment the mode exists,” an “essence as a degree of power is determined as a conatus, that is, an effort or tendency … to maintain and affirm existence” (99). Deleuze celebrates Spinoza for constructing a philosophy of affirmation of life and the powers of life, one where the imperative becomes to “arrive at a maximum of joyful passions” in a sociability of interacting bodies forming compounding relations and amplifying affective capacity (27-28). Marx also connects the interaction of essential powers with affirmation. It is the “determinateness of this relationship” between the
“nature of the essential powers” of the interacting objects and bodies that “shapes the particular, real mode of affirmation,” in this case in the form of the objectification of the human self (EPM, 108; emphasis Marx’s). Co-acting essential powers – capacities to affect and be affected – constitute the particular mode that affirmation will take. Moreover, Marx portrays this affirmation as particularly embodied. Not only is this affirmation determined through the essential powers – which I have argued we should read through Spinoza’s account of bodies and affects – but this affirmation takes place not abstractly, but “in the act of thinking” and “with all [the individual’s] senses” (108). Marx and the Deleuzean Spinoza share, I would contend, an extension of the prominence of essential powers in their orientations to an affirmation of life.

For Marx, subjectively, “my object can only be the confirmation of one of my essential powers and can therefore only be so for me as my essential power is present for itself as a subjective capacity” (EPM, 108). The process through which an individual perceives and interacts with an object is shaped by the particularity of their essential powers. Or, in more Spinozan terms, one’s own capacity to affect and be affected and the affectations one is capable of delimit the potential kinds of compositions that may be possible. Marx explains this through recourse to the senses, wherein “the sense of an object for me goes only so far as my senses go (has only sense for a sense corresponding to that object)” (108; emphasis Marx’s). Essential power in general, and the senses in particular, correspond to the characteristic relation of any given body. Individuals, for Spinoza, “designate the complex organization of the existing mode in any attribute,” the composition of “extensive parts … pertain[ing] to a singular essence of mode under a characteristic relation” constituted by “the degrees of power” (Deleuze 1988, 76–77). The singularity of the organization of the modes compose an individual and form its particular ways of encountering and interacting with other bodies. When Marx contends that
one’s subjective senses and essential powers shape their relation to objects, I argue we should read this in terms of Spinoza’s theorization of the individual and its defining affective capacities.

My reading of Marx on essential power helps begin to develop the affectivity of this thought, of interacting bodies generating effects and affects in encountering other bodies. In this affective register, we can understand the Marxian-Spinozan body as one determined by its characteristic affective capacity to affect and be affected, and as constantly interacting with bodies and objects; the outcome of these interactions is constituted by the respective affective capacities. As I continue throughout this chapter – both in my account of Marx’s historical materialism as well in my particular readings of the affectivity of capitalism and then communism, it is with this dynamic figure of the body in mind. This discussion of essential powers – and thus, I’ve argued, of a kind Spinozan affect – occupies only a few pages in the Manuscripts; however, the rest of this chapter demonstrates that something like this conception of the body is at work throughout Marx, from his earlier writings to his more developed critique of capital and sketches of a future communist society.

**Historical Materialism, Activity, and Consciousness**

Marx and Engels’s articulation of their historical materialism, especially in relation to their discussions of consciousness, activity, and matter, provides us another set of resonances between the Marxian project and affect theory. In many ways, their materialism as elaborated in the early sections of *The German Ideology* begins with the body, and particularly its practices, productive capacity, and relations. It extends, as I will demonstrate, the connections I am creating between Marx and strands of affect theory. Marx and Engels insist that, contra Feuerbach’s ultimately idealistic materialism, their historical materialism proceeds from “the real individuals, their activity and the material conditions of their life, both those which they find
already existing and those produced by their activity” (GI, 36-37). Consequently, the “first premise” must be “the existence of living human individuals,” and the “first fact to be established is the physical organisation of these individuals and their consequent relation to the rest of nature” (37). They clarify this notion of physical organization by describing it as the way humans engage in producing actual material life, which is a “definite form of activity” in which they “express their life” and constitute a “definite mode of life” (37; their emphasis). Historical materialism begins from the active body that gains importance and definition through the way it relates to objects, nature, and others and, most importantly, through the way it produces what is necessary for the continuance of life. This production is not merely instrumental, but helps create the meaning of ‘life’ and ‘the human’. Marx and Engels construct a close connection between the fabrication of what is necessary for life and life itself: “producing their means of substance” – the distinguishing character of humans compared to other animals – means humans are involved in “producing their material life” (37).

For Marx and Engels, production of the means of subsistence is the fundamental core of human activity and produces life itself. For Deleuze’s Spinoza, something striving for and working to persist in its own existence is conatus (Deleuze 1988, 21). Both theories engage the experience and real activity of perpetuating being as a fundamental characteristic of life and elaborate this effort as not purely instrumental but instead as creative of meaning for life. Furthermore, both situate this essential mode in relation to the material environment. In pursuing conatus, we are “prompt[ed]” to “act differently according to the objects encountered” such that Spinozan conatus is conditioned “by the affections that come from the objects” (Deleuze 1988, 21). For Marx and Engels, the production of means of subsistence is shaped by the “physical organisation” of humans and the material conditions in which they act, especially the “nature of
the means of subsistence” (GI, 37). Thus, the production of the means of subsistence – which is also the production of life – involves an active creation and transformation of objects and conditions as well as a shaping by those objects and conditions. In the resonance with Spinoza, we might say that the Marxist notion of production of the means of subsistence as a “definite mode of life” (37) necessarily implies a capacity to affect – the activity of production as transforming material conditions – and the capacity to be affected – being formed in part through these material conditions. Indeed, the Spinozan _conatus_ invokes affective capacity, involving as it does both the “tendency to maintain and maximize the ability to be affected” (Deleuze 1988, 99) as well as the “effort to augment the power of acting” and the capacity to affect (101). The physically organized Marxian human produces that which is necessary for it to persist in its body and thus produces life; its material environment also shapes it in its organization and capabilities, such that the human individual is not the only actant. When we proceed, as Marx and Engels do, from the real, productive human body in certain material conditions, we can lead ourselves, again, to the Deleuzean-Spinozan body.

The discussion of consciousness by Marx and Engels in _The German Ideology_ further deepens the connection with Spinoza vis-à-vis the body. Consciousness and bodily activity work in a constant feedback with one another, although in this text Marx and Engels give primacy to material activity and production. The materiality of the active body generates consciousness. “The production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness” for Marx and Engels “is at first directly interwoven with the material activity and the material intercourse of men – the language of real life:” “conceiving, thinking, the mental intercourse of men at this stage still appear as the direct efflux of their material behavior” (GI, 42). In this sense, humans “are the producers of their conceptions, ideas, etc.” when considered as “real, active” humans “conditioned by a
definite development of their productive forces” and by “the intercourse corresponding to these” (42). Consciousness is not some originary or primordial entity that imposes form upon the active body. Instead, real activity produces consciousness.\(^{17}\) By arguing that consciousness emerges out of persons’ “actual life-process” and thus “ascending from earth to heaven,” Marx and Engels situate themselves in opposition to German idealism “which descends from heaven to earth” (42). Humans in their account, “developing their material production and their material intercourse, alter, along with this their actual world, also their thinking and the products of their thinking”; consequently, it is “life that determines consciousness” (42). Marx and Engels’s historical materialism renders practical activity as the primary initiator of consciousness. There is no such thing as “pure” “consciousness” or “mind” independent of “matter” and the activity of matter (49). Given Marx and Engels’s commitment to dialectics, there cannot be only one-sided movement where activity wholly determines consciousness with no other processes at work. At some point in historical development, “real, positive science” begins, which involves “the expounding of the practical activity, of the practical process of development of” humans and replaces “empty phrases about consciousness” with “real knowledge” (43). This mode of thought engages and develops upon real practical activity.

Much as their materialism foregrounds in general the active production of the means of subsistence and the life-process itself in the theoretical imperative of historical materialism, on the level of the individual-in-relation, it underscores the dynamism and productivity of the body in the generation of thought. Not only does the privileging of the body and its activities in relation to the mind potentially link Marx and Engels to Spinoza, it connects them to affect theory more broadly. Affect theory, among many other projects, seeks to challenge Cartesian dualism (Ahmed 2004, 170–72; Brennan 2004, 18–19; 157; Cvetkovich 2012, 4), contending
that we cannot separate mind from body or presume that thought is a pure disembodied activity. Indeed, in *The Holy Family* Marx and Engels criticize Left Hegelians for their insufficient materialism in the way the intellectual movement “separates thinking from the senses, the soul from the body” (cited in Schmidt 2014, 21). Affect theory’s focus on feeling and thinking out of Cartesian dualism differs from Marx and Engels, who adopt a different interlocutor than Descartes, critiquing German Idealism and turning Hegel right side up again, but both force one to reflect on the activity of the material body in experience and thought.

Moreover, in some ways, Marx and Engels engage a variety of the classic Deleuze-Spinoza question, “what can a body do?” Spinoza provokes us, in Deleuze’s rendering, to consider that we “do not even know what a body is capable of” and “do not even know of what affections we are capable, nor the extent of our power” (Deleuze 1990, 226). At best, we know through reason about our “power of action” as “the sole expression of our essence,” but only abstractly; in this situation we “do not know what this power is, nor how we may acquire or discover it,” and must pursue the actions of the body (226). Posing the issue in this way argues against a Cartesian primacy of mind over body and compels one to seek knowledge of the powers, affects, and capacities of the body in order to “discover, in a parallel fashion, the powers of the mind” (Deleuze 1988, 18; his emphasis). Deleuze asserts that Spinoza’s parallelism is one of his great “practical theses” and is crucial to his materialism. Challenging traditional ontologies and epistemologies – especially Cartesianism – Spinozan parallelism “disallows any primacy of” mind over body, or vice versa, and implies that the body and the mind surpass “the knowledge we have” of them (18). Here, “all that is action in the body is also action in the mind” (88). Marx and Engels pose a different – yet echoing – problem of what the body can do. In their
case, it matters what practical activity and production a body engages in. Humans learn and develop powers of the mind because they actualize the powers of their body.

Through the resonances I have been theorizing among materialism, the production of the means of subsistence, conatus, affective capacity, and life, we intensify the connection between Marx (and Engels) and (Deleuze’s) Spinoza and continue to draw out the affectivity at play in Marx’s thought. I continue to develop this affective figuration of Marx – from the earlier reading of the body in “Private Property and Communism” to this interpretation of early passages from The German Ideology, to those readings to come – to provide a grounding from which to theorize the affective component of Marx’s critique of capital.

Nature

The foremost challenge, I think, to a Spinozan-affective reading of Marx is his anthropocentrism. If a “great theoretical thesis of Spinozism” is the “single substance having an infinity of attributes … [with] all ‘creatures’ being only modes of these attributes or modifications of this substance” (Deleuze 1988, 17), then Marx’s (and Marx and Engels’s) dialectics and foregrounding of the human present a major tension between Marx and Spinoza. Where Spinoza theorizes this single substance Marx sets up a dialectical “metabolism” or exchange between human and nature. In this dialectical relationship, one might locate a potential ontological flattening that refuses to privilege human or nature, and thus open the metabolism of human and nature as constantly affecting and being affected. However, upon many readings, Marx forecloses this possibility by creating an anthropocentric philosophical system.

Clough et al. (2007) argue that “affect-itself” moves beyond Marx’s labor theory of value, particularly his emphasis on “the laborer’s body,” the “body-as-organism” as opposed to labor power as “an abstraction that would be befitting not only organic and non-organic bodies but
bodies that are beyond the distinction altogether, that is, bodies that are conceived as arising out of dynamic matter or matter as informational” (62). By moving to “affect-itself,” the “generalized matter beyond the laborer’s body,” they intend to “disregard the bounded-ness of the human body” and thus “trouble[e] the conceptualization” and emphasis in Marx of the “body as the body-as-organism” (65). In doing so, they call attention to the ultimate privileging in Marx’s theory of labor and capital of the discrete individual human body. Instead, they want to focus upon “the ontological dynamism of matter generally” in a critique of capitalism, not the more limited notion of the body-as-organism such as that found in Marx. From the perspective of “vital materialism,” Jane Bennett’s *Vibrant Matter* questions the way that “Marx’s notion of materiality,” including its “anthropocentrism,” has “come to stand for the materialist perspective per se,” with the consequence that materiality in political theory “is itself often construed as an exclusively human domain” (Bennett 2010, xvi). She argues that in general Marx’s historical materialism” privileges the human through its focus “on human power-laden socioeconomic structures” as compared to a less anthropocentric materiality of “matter” (129n51). For example, Marx’s analysis of the commodity and commodity fetishism “show[s] them to be invested with an agency that belongs to humans” upon her reading (xiv).

Alfred Schmidt, writing within the Frankfurt School tradition, pursues a detailed investigation of the status and work of nature in Marx. In his reading, humans and nature interact dialectically such that “society itself was a natural environment” and “nature” must be considered “from the beginning in relation to human activity” (2014, 15–16). Marx’s dialectical method means that there can be nothing like matter as such, “fundamental matter,” or matter as the “fundamental ground of being,” because nature or the “sensuous world” is always a product of society and industry (33-34). In general, then, any theoretical apprehension of nature/the
nonhuman necessarily implicates the human. One can only talk about matter as such from the perspective of humans (63); it cannot have its own existence, agency, or ontological status independent of the human standpoint. Nature can never be “separated … from the degree of power exercised by social practice over nature” (60). While humans also cannot extricate themselves from this metabolism with nature, Marx foregrounds the work that humans do on nature. Nature is crucial for labor – both its Subject and Object (74) – yet even as it “propels forward its process of creation,” this is realizable only through “the agency of human labour” (77). Nature’s own agency is obscure, or maybe even nonexistent; it requires the human for any potentiality in nature to be realized. Indeed, if labor becomes unalienated at some point, then it can truly “redeem” the “slumbering powers’ of the material of nature,” “changing the dead ‘in-itself’ into a living ‘for-itself’” (77; internal quotations to Capital, Vol. I). Reading Schmidt’s definitive work on nature in Marx’s thought, one is struck by the continual preeminence of the human in the metabolism between humans and nature, the human “mastery” over nature or “appropriation” of it. This does not stop with the instantiation of socialism or communism, or with freeing labor from alienation. A communist utopia in Marx, according to Schmidt, does not halt the appropriation of nature. It transforms the “mastery over nature” which benefits the few to “mastery by the whole of society” (13); the “exploitation of nature will not cease” because the “new society is to benefit man alone, and there is no doubt that this is to be at the expense of external nature,” which “is to be mastered with gigantic technological aids” (155-56). While Marx’s dialectics may open a potential assertion of nonhuman agency, or at least a mostly non-anthropocentric system, it persistently privileges the human over the natural.

Marx’s concept of nature opposes him, upon a reading such as Schmidt’s, to Spinoza. Schmidt contends that Marx offers a “critique of Spinoza’s substance,” “attack[ing] the notion
[ascribed to Spinoza] that nature exists ‘in-itself’ without human mediation” (31). Marx’s metabolism between humans and nature contrasts with Spinoza’s substance and his immanence, where Nature becomes an “immanent plane” that “composes all relations and possesses all the sets of intensive parts with their different degrees” (Deleuze 1988, 124; 77), without a dialectical opposition between human and nature.23

Nature thus turns out to be one concept from Marx’s thought that works against an affective reading. I suggest that my reading can open up a less-dominating line of flight from his theorizing. At the least, this line of flight weakens Marx’s anthropocentrism enough so that it does not call into jeopardy the entirety of an affective reading of him, and at most enables this reading to push Marx in a less anthropocentric direction. I do not intend to ‘save’ Marx or suppose that affect provides a panacea that erases his anthropocentrism. Instead, I want to gesture toward the theoretical implications that an affective reading can open, especially in a more difficult area such as Marx’s concept of nature.

As Schmidt notes at multiple points (2014, chap. 2.B), the crucial concept for thinking through nature in Marx is that of metabolism. In the “metabolic interaction,” “nature is humanized” and humans are themselves “naturalized”: not only is nature always “socially mediated,” but also “society is mediated through nature as a component of total reality” (78-79). Turning to Spinoza and Deleuze can, I would argue, more evenly situate humans and nature, although the concept of metabolism has an inextricable dualism between human and nature that is at odds with Spinozan immanence or more contemporary theories such as feminist new materialism. The category of affective capacity crucially insists on attending to the capability for both affecting and being affected. Insisting on both of these movements may bolster the importance of nature’s affecting and human’s being affected by nature in Marx’s thought more
than Marx himself does. For example, even in one of Marx’s especially anthropocentric moments, where he asserts that labour is a “process” by which man, through his own actions, mediates, regulates, and controls the metabolism” between humans and nature, and is a process that “appropriates the materials of nature in a form adapted to his own needs” (C Vol. I, 283), he retains some semblance of nature’s own ability to affect and humans’ capacities for being affected by nature. This process of labour, vis-à-vis nature, “acts upon external nature and changes it”; but, in a sort of formulation that appears in the early and the late Marx, this interaction with nature “simultaneously changes his own nature” (283). The ongoing relationship between humans and nature, while often taking the form of a kind of “appropriation” in Marx’s thought, is not one-sided, for nature affects humans – in an embodied way, as Maria Mies emphasizes (1986, 50–52) – even as it is acted upon by humans.

One important area of Marx’s thought in terms of nature is its relationship to species-being, another place where affect may open up a less anthropocentric reading of Marx’s texts. In the 1844 Manuscripts, Marx asserts in the course of his discussion on alienation that the human “is a species-being”: they self-conceptualize as “a universal and therefore a free being,” and a “physical” component of “the life of the species” is a relation to nature (EPM, 75; his italics). In this sense, “man lives on nature,” which “means that nature is his body, with which he must remain in continuous intercourse if he is not to die”; ultimately “man’s physical and spiritual life is linked to nature” (76; emphasis Marx’s). While the framing of humans “living on” nature implies some mastery or privileging, the absolute importance of nature here – without continual interaction with it humans die – is perhaps also suggestive of a less anthropocentric approach to nature. Here, nature physically composes the human body, and as a result human and nature must
constantly affect and by affected by each other in a way that could center the activity and
dynamism of nature itself, even if the idea of nature itself still implies a binary division.

Yovel reads Marx’s dialectical exploration of humans and nature as akin to Spinoza’s
concept of nature, especially when one considers the context of Hegel and German Idealism. He
argues that Spinoza provides Marx a route out of the “lofty and semireligious heights of the
Hegelian Geist” to a concretized, material “concept of nature and man” (1989, 78). While
acknowledging that Marx’s nature is certainly not Spinoza’s immanent Substance or Spinoza’s
God, Yovel maintains that Marx’s concept of nature serves a similar function in his theorizing as
Nature did for Spinoza. Instead of something like immanent nature or substance, Marx presents
the “dialectical unity” as a sort of “substrate” “in which everything else inheres” (79). This
“dialectical relation” thus “constitute[s] the new immanent totality” that works in a similar
ontological or ontogenic way as “Spinoza’s God or substance” (84). In this interpretation, even if
Nature loses the ontological primacy it has in Spinoza, the reconstituted human-nature
metabolism grounds Marx’s materialism in a way that maintains the activity, force, and
potentiality of nature.

While Schmidt understands Marx as anthropocentric when it comes to nature, he
continues to recognize some active possibility inherent to nature itself. From “the point of view
of the purposes, of human activity,” nature can “be regarded as” materiality as such (2014, 63).
This still situates matter as mediated through the human, but this apprehension of nature opens
up the activity and material dynamism of nature. Here, nature as materiality has its “own laws”
determined “not just” by “history and society” but also “by the structure of matter itself” (63).
This points to the “possibilities immanent in matter” that are then “realized” in a particular
context (63), in one of the most affective renderings of Marx on nature. Schmidt provides a
similar formulation later, discussing the way that in the human labor process that affects nature, “even the most ingenious human discoveries can only unfold the possibilities latent within nature” (78; my italics). In these instances, nature retains some potentiality and thus a greater degree of activity in the flux of acting and being acted upon.

Schmidt describes labor as in part the process by which humans “incorporate their own essential forces into natural objects” (78). This raises the question, though, of whether nature, or objects, could themselves to be said to have their own essential forces. In at least the early Marx, I think this is indeed the case. As discussed above, the early Marx is interested in thinking through the ways human bodies and their senses and “essential powers” interact with the objective world around them. Here, Marx notes that when a human objectifies something external to themselves, the “manner in which they [the objects] become his depends on the nature of the objects and on the nature of the essential power corresponding to it”; moreover, the “peculiarity of each essential power is precisely its peculiar essence, and therefore also the peculiar mode of its objectification” (EPM, 108; Marx’s emphasis). The object is constituted by some essential power of its own that acts upon the human doing the objectifying as well as the particular mode and outcome of any particular interactions that incorporate the objects. Can the same be said of nature itself, which I presume to be not precisely equivalent to “objects” in the 1844 Manuscripts? The two categories – nature, objects – share at least some qualities. Both are something external to humans, something to be grasped or incorporated through human activity. The object is something that relates to the human as “appropriation,” a “thing itself” in “objective human relation to itself and to” humans that, given the right set of relations, “become objects which confirm and realize” human “individuality” (107-108). Nature for Marx is “that which is not particular to the subject … and not identical” with humans “in general” (Schmidt 2014, 27);
it is an “extra-human reality” both independent of and mediated by humans (29). So, “objects” and “nature” similarly relate to humans and the processes of human activity. If this is the case, and if the Spinozan perspective is leveraged, perhaps feeling as a method is able to recover some essential power - an affective capacity – on the part of nature itself in Marx’s thought, even if nature remains dualistically and dialectically distinct from humans in contrast to Spinoza’s immanence. Doing so would emphasize the activity, dynamism and capacity to affect of nature itself, mitigating to some extent Marx’s anthropocentrism.

The Materialist Connection

A vital component of Marx’s account of humanity is the real connection among individuals that comprise it. Existence is social, and awareness of one’s self also constitutes awareness of the self as a social being; in this sense, society is not an abstraction but arises from relationality as a basic element of existence. Marx and Engels contend that “it is quite obvious from the start that there exists a materialist connection of humans with one another, which is determined by their needs and their mode of production, and which is as old as men themselves” (GI, 49). On the most basic level, Marx and Engels seem to imply that because needs and the production to fulfill them necessarily involve multiple people, this material connection exists insofar as their materialism is concerned with the human production of the means of subsistence. I want to argue, though, that there is a further affective component to this connectivity. As I demonstrated earlier, the very claim that materialism proceeds from the real individuals who produce their means of subsistence in given material conditions can situate it in the realm of Spinozan affect. If the social production of means of subsistence and thus life constitutes the materiality of this “materialist connection,” this connection is affective in the way it links together the conatus and capacities for affecting and being affected of these necessarily social
bodies. Moreover, consciousness is “from the very beginning a social product, and remains so as long as men exist at all” (49-50). In its earlier stages, it is limited to consciousness “concerning the immediate sensuous environment” and the “limited connection with other persons and things outside the individual who is growing self-conscious”; it is also consciousness of nature (50; their emphasis). Above I outlined how consciousness for Marx and Engels emerges from the dynamic, productive, and ultimately affective body in its activity and productivity. Here we see that this consciousness is materially tied not only to the affective body, but also to other such bodies interacting with each other, with objects, and with nature. In my broader reading of the Marxian-Spinozan body, we can figure this material connection as in part a connection of interacting affective capacities. Through the mutual interactivity of individuals affecting and being affected by others, objects, and nature, they constitute a material and affective bond.

Deleuze’s Spinoza constructs an affective relationality out of which consciousness emerges. He is deeply interested in interacting bodies and the effects of those relations on the bodies. In Deleuze’s account of Spinoza, “from the standpoint of nature or God, there are always relations that compound, and nothing but relations that compound” (Deleuze 1988, 36; emphasis his). Below I examine the ethical implications of this mode of theorizing vis-à-vis Marx’s critique of capitalism; what is most urgent here is the move Spinoza makes to think in terms of relations and compositions of bodies. The “order of causes” for Spinoza “is therefore an order of composition and decomposition of relations” (19), and composite bodies have different characteristics that come together in diverse formations with other bodies (32). In this schema, consciousness “appears as the continual awareness” of the effects of these compounding relations with other bodies, objects, and ideas, particularly their effects on one’s essential powers and affective capacity (21).
Turning back to Marx, we can now more forcefully theorize his and Engels’s “materialist connection” of humans with one another as affective, for both Spinoza and Marx and Engels seek to account for the way that bodies relate to one another through their activity and dynamism in a way that can underlie an entire philosophical project. If for Spinoza there is nothing from the perspective of nature except compounding relations, then for Marx and Engels there is nothing from the perspective of historical materialism except compounding relations. The Marxian conception of consciousness as arising from productive bodies working vis-à-vis other productive bodies might parallel the Spinozan notion of consciousness as arising from the effects of bodies on one another. In both accounts, I argue that we see a connection emerging from this interactivity, one that is material and affective because that which enables bodies to interact in the first place is defined affectively. That is, the capacity to affect and be affected is the essential power of a body and forms the basis for any interaction between bodies; consequently, any connection generated by interacting bodies is made possible by affective capacity. The Marxian-Spinozan body enters into relations with other such bodies, creating an affective material connection between bodies.

Marx’s Affective Materialism

The affective and relational components of Marx’s materialism that I have articulated thus far are a crucial standpoint from which to engage the rest of Marx’s thought. Approaching Marx without attending to affect thwarts one from ever opening up this strand of the vitality and vibrancy of his work, including that of his critique of capital and vision for a communist futurity. A reading emphasizing affect – and especially in its relational force – insures against reducing Marx’s materialism to an inert mechanism or an overly abstract vitalism, such as the kinds that
Marx and Engels regularly critique throughout the 1840s, for instance in Marx’s “Critical Battle Against French Materialism” section in his and Engels’s *The Holy Family* (chap. 6.3.d).

It also contests recent readings of Marx’s materialism in critical theory. Jason Edwards argues that if materialisms are “philosophical doctrine[s] that concern the nature and multiform manifestations of matter,” they should have “little to do with historical materialism as an approach to social and political analysis”; in his read, most attempts to “import into Marxism philosophical conceptions of materialism” have “proven wanting,” unable to apprehend the “systemic” “reproduction of modern capitalist societies” or “social and political, institutions, practices, and trajectories” (2010, 281). Defining “philosophical” materialisms out of historical materialism, he contends, enables a more critical perspective on everyday practices and lived space, particularly in their relations with larger-scale systems. However, I would argue that attention to the affectivity of materialism is necessary to fully analyze what Edwards calls the “dense but open totality of material practices that constitute and reproduce a given social formation” (291). For a historical materialism lacking something like an affective materialism, a set of practices and their bodily effects – i.e., the ways that capitalism works on and specifically appropriates affective capacity – will always remain inaccessible. Because of this, I think that historical materialism and affect theory ought to be deployed together in political and social analysis, the concerns of each enriching the other, even as they remain in tension with one another. I further discuss this below with regard to my affective reading of Marx’s critique of capitalism.

Pheng Cheah (2010) confronts Marx’s “dialectical materialism” with materialisms from Derrida and Deleuze. His account of Marxist materialism emphasizes it as rational and law-governed, explicable through “empirical science” and focuses on “material reality” as “produced
by negativity,” the negation of “given reality or matter” and “imposition of a purposive form” by humans (71). This rendering of Marx is then contrasted with Derrida’s critique of presence and deconstructive emphasis on radical alterity and the “entirely other” (72-81) as well as Deleuze’s ontology of difference and account of the virtual (81-89). He classifies these as non-dialectical materialisms that deny the “primacy of the negative” at work in Marx (71). My own reading of Marxist materialism makes the affective generativity of interactive capacities – not negativity – the crucial movement in Marx’s ontology and method, and in doing so deemphasizes the work of the negative in Marx. Instead of power as that which “reside[s] in the form of the human subject as the negation of mere matter that nature gives us” (79), I offer a reading of Marx where power involves the ability to act and be acted upon, and is not the exclusive domain of the human. I thus open Marx up to what Cheah refers to as the generativity and affirmation of these non-dialectical materialisms. There are, to be sure, still differences between even this affective materialism and the Derridean deconstructive materialism Cheah outlines, although not nearly as much as when Marx’s materialism is limited to dialectical negation. More importantly for my purposes, my reading orients Marx to Cheah’s account of Deleuze, for whom matter entails “dynamism consisting of speeds and intensities that open up the composition of any individual being, putting it into different connections with other particles, thereby leading to its recomposition” (87). I move Marx in this direction through Deleuze’s Spinoza, making Marx’s matter more about intensities and forces that are then organized as human and nonhuman compositions that enter into relations with other compositions. In doing so, I mobilize Deleuze’s materialism in an explicitly political direction by bringing it together with the critical power of Marx’s project. Indeed, Cheah ends the essay by noting that the political implications of Derrida’s and Deleuze’s materialisms are difficult to trace (88-89). Reading Marx together with
Deleuze and Spinoza for an affective Marxist materialism will make explicit one mode of politicizing the more radical “force of materiality” (89) as the rest of this chapter unfolds.

History as the “active life-process” – a life process I have argued is always affective – “ceases to be a collection of dead facts, as it is with the empiricists (themselves still abstract), or an imagined activity of imagined subjects, as with the idealists” (GI, 43). Not only does the account of active, productive bodies animate history in this way, but so too does the very connection among individuals. The changes of this linkage constitute a certain kind of living history independent of different modes of organizing individuals. “This connection” – the “materialist connection of men with one another” – constantly “tak[es] on new forms, and thus presents a ‘history’ irrespective of the existence of any political or religious nonsense which would especially hold men together (49). Politics or religion do not in themselves create links across time and space or constitute history as such, but the material and affective connections among active, productive bodies do. One of Marx’s critiques of capitalism is that it severs this affective, material connection among individuals. Whereas the individual “appears originally as a species-being,” capitalism “dissolves” and “makes superfluous” the communal being, individuating people such that they stand opposed to one another and to the “true community” (G, 496); capitalism takes species-being and its affective material connections, rendering the isolated, oppositional individual as such in its place.

The Tension of Capitalist Affect

Reading Capitalism Affectively

In the previous section, I read Marx’s materialism for its affective, Deleuzean-Spinozan lines of flight, and in this section I pursue these lines to see where they take us in regards to Marx’s critique of capital. Theorizing the Marxian body in terms of affective capacity, conatus, and
power opens up an additional component of Marx’s critique. The capacities of the body are constituted historically; what it is a body can do is shaped by the material conditions of a given social formation. Recall from above the prominence of the senses in relation to Marx’s account of the “essential powers.” As Marx insists, the “forming of the five senses is a labour of the entire history of the world down to the present” (EPM, 109; emphasis Marx’s). Capitalism produces a particularly inhibited mode of sense, where the “sense caught up in crude practical need has only a restricted sense” (109; Marx’s emphasis). The material social conditions in which the body is enmeshed limit its essential powers, in this case its senses. More broadly, the body-as-affective-capacity I read in Marx’s works does not exist in the same configuration transhistorically, but instead varies in its capacities as well as its expressions and relations of that capacity in response to changing material conditions. The essential powers of different kinds of bodies in a feudalist social formation will differ from those bodies under capitalism, and both will vary in relation to future communist bodies. The gendering, racialization, sexing, colonizing of bodies shapes their vital capacities; the next chapter takes up this point in its reading of Marxist feminism. A Deleuzean-Spinozan reading of Marx directs us to examining the particular configuration and relations of affective capacity of bodies in different epochs, and of course in capitalism most prominently. My engagement with Marx’s critique of capitalist affect thus becomes a necessary mode of this aspect of his affective historical materialism.

Practicing feeling as method and reading Marx affectively, the reach of his critique of capitalism expands. We might summarize Marx’s critique as focusing on alienation and/or exploitation (particularly the appropriation of surplus labor), with any number of composite sub-concerns. I argue that an affective reading of Marx should lead us to consider a connected third feature of his project: in my reading, not only does Marx condemn capitalism for the alienation
and exploitation it engenders, but he also identifies and critiques what I will call the tension of
capitalist affect. On the one hand, capitalism amplifies the potential affective capacity –
understood as the capacity to affect and be affected – of bodies and things through its
development and organization of productive forces; on the other, capitalism transforms this
increase in productive forces so that it enriches the bourgeoisie while immiserating the
proletariat and reproducing capitalism. The amplified force of the laboring body and of the
machine is productive, and it affects and is affected by other bodies and machines. Indeed, it
does so for Marx to a greater extent under capitalism than at any other point in history.
Capitalists, however, redirect these intensified forces and powers for their own enrichment and
increased power, while systematically depriving the laboring body of its real capacity to affect
and be affected. In “striv[ing] toward the universal development” of productive forces (G, 540)
capital creates the potential conditions for bodies and machines to engage in ethical, mutual,
affectively enriching encounters. In actuality, it seizes this potential for its own perpetuation.
Capitalism seizes the vital forces of the affective, material, labouring body, and this constitutes
the central injustice of what I argue is Marx’s critique of capitalist affect.

Marx’s Affect Theory of Labor

My contention emerges from a close reading, inspired by Spinoza and Deleuze, of the
linked recurring concepts of living labour capacity, vitality/vital forces, and capacity more
broadly, primarily as Marx mobilizes them in the Grundrisse. This cluster of related terms
expresses a creative, productive force. Drawing on my earlier reading of the essential powers, I
argue that Marx’s account of labor and capitalism can be read as an account of affective capacity,
where concepts such as living labor capacity or vital forces are capacities to affect – to create, to
give form, to valorize, to give power to, to transfer capacity, and so on – and to be affected – to
enter into relations with the product of labor, with other laborers, with the process of production and be changed by these relations. Deleuze’s Spinoza seeks to define an individual not in terms of a static classification scheme, but by “the affects of which it is capable,” its “affective capacity,” the “capacities for affecting and being affected” (124). When we situate this conception on the same plane with Marx’s account, I argue we open the way to read the laboring body – in its living labor capacity and vital forces, especially in the interaction of these capacities with other bodies, with capitalist social formations, and so on – as an affective body, and thus enliven Marx’s critique of capitalism. Here, I seek to mobilize the project posed by Rosemary Hennessy, but in the affective domain. Hennessy contends that we must follow what E.P. Thompson termed “‘the kernel of human relationships’” in capital – “relationships of exploitation, domination, and acquisitiveness” – through the ways it “imposes its logic at every ‘level’ of society” (2000, 17). My own reading of Marx’s critique explores how these relations impose themselves at the affective level, so to speak, of society.\(^{30}\)

In doing so, I seek to turn the insights of Clough et al. (2007) back onto Marx himself. While, as I discussed above, their article marks a clear difference between a certain kind of theory of affect and Marx’s labor theory of value and emphasis on the “body-as-organism,” the critical emphasis of their project merits engagement with Marx’s own texts. The political question their intervention provokes, they argue, is that capitalist “exploitation must be measured along with oppression, domination, mistreatment and misrecognition as matters of affective capacity, a politics of the differential distribution among populations of capacities for living” (75). This section argues that we can read such a critical encounter with capitalism in Marx himself. Even if the affectivity – in Clough et al.’s sense – of Marx’s own account is to some extent limited by his emphasis on the human body, he deeply engages the challenge they posit of
“speculat[ing] about the ways in which capital is setting out a domain of investment and accumulation” (62) in terms of affect. He sharply theorizes exploitation in capitalism as a redirection and seizure of affective capacity that appropriates the capacity for living from the population of the proletariat to the bourgeoisie. Clough et al. generatively “reconceptualize labor power in relation to affectivity” (62); it is possible and important that an affective reading of Marx can create a similar rethinking such that labor power in Marx’s texts themselves works in the affective register.

Marx regularly depicts labor in an abstract sense in terms of bodily capacity. In a general relation to capital, “labour is the merely abstract form … which exists only as a capacity, as a resource in the bodiliness of the worker” (G, 298). Labor that is “present in time” in a form that will “form the opposite pole to capital” is “value-creating, productive labour” and “can be present only in the living subject, in which it exists as capacity, as possibility” (272; emphasis Marx’s). That which encounters capital becomes a capacity emanating from the body. Labor-as-capacity situates Marx on a plane with Deleuze’s Spinoza. Marx does not define labor or the laboring body in terms of some static essence or inert property; labor is a dynamic, generative potentiality. What does this labor capacity do? It moves, creates, actualizes, affects, and is affected. When it comes into “contact with capital” as well as means and relations of production, it is “made into a real activity” and “becomes a really value-posing, productive activity” (298). Labor capacity acts: it is the subjective “activity … as the living source of value” and “general possibility of wealth” (296; his emphasis). More broadly, “labour capacity” is the “creative power of the individual” (307; emphasis Marx’s).

Labor capacity flows through bodies and relations as a potential power and interacts with other materialities. It is transformed by these interactions, turned as it is into real productive
labor and depleted through the activity of laboring. This capacity also transforms those materials through its creative, value-giving power.\textsuperscript{33} We can read labor as affective capacity especially in Marx’s account of the absorption of labor by capital in the production process. In “being employed,” labor transforms the “raw material” of production by being “materialized” as a “modification of the object” that also “modifies its own form” (300). Here, labor capacity in its actualization affects the material and the labor process.\textsuperscript{34} In this sense, labor is, in a particularly vivid articulation, “the living, form-giving fire” (361). It is also affected by the raw material and by the laboring process. Once “set into motion,” labor capacity is “expended” in the form of “the worker’s muscular force etc.” such that the worker “exhausts himself” (300). In this instance labor capacity is used up in its encounter with material and labour process, and the body it flows through becomes tired and needful of replenishment.

The Critique of Capitalist Affect

Once we read Marx in terms of Deleuzean-Spinozan affect and theorize the body and labor capacity in terms of affective capacity, we extend new zones of Marx’s critique of capitalism. Marx, of course, demonstrated a clear awareness of capitalism’s world-historical power; his ruthless criticism involves a deep apprehension of the revolutionary force engendered by capitalist formations.\textsuperscript{35} This extends to his account of affective capacity under capitalism, which exhibits both an appreciation of the way capitalism amplifies affective capacity and a sharp critique of the capture of affective capacity for a select few. This capture dominates the many and deprives them of the potentially-increased force that capitalism develops.\textsuperscript{36} The particular level and configuration of forces involved in labor are constituted historically: all “natural forces of social labour” are “historical products” (G, 400; his emphasis). The affective capacity in one social system will differ from that of another epoch. The social formation of
capital, in its “universalizing tendency,” “strives towards the universal development of the forces of production” (540). In my reading, it seeks to organize bodies and materials such that productive capacity can be maximized and universally distributed: capitalism aims at, and to some extent enacts, a mass amplification of the capacity to affect and be affected.

Deleuze and Guattari theorize that capitalism “brings about the decoding of the flows that the other social formations coded and overcoded,” but “it substitutes for the codes an extremely rigid axiomatic that maintains the energy of the flows in a bound state on the body of capital” (1983, 245–46). My own reading of Marx clarifies this sort of articulation of capitalism: the decoding of flows becomes the amplification and proliferation of affective capacity, while the rigid capitalist axiomatic binding energies becomes the redirection and capture of that capacity for the reproduction of capitalist social formation. By combining labor, developing powers, constantly expanding, and so on, capitalism generates this continual dynamic regeneration of affective capacity in order to perpetuate itself. In constantly encountering and seeking to further displace barriers to its own development and reproduction, capital requires an ever-increasing capture of affect. It “tear[s] down all the barriers which hem in the development of … exploitation and exchange of natural and mental forces” (410). Capitalism needs labor to be more efficient – to affect and be affected at an ever-increasing rate – if it is to extract more surplus labor and thus reproduce and expand. It needs the creative power of labor capacity to be directed at the creation of goods for capitalist circulation. It requires situating many workers and their capacities together in the same spatial and temporal site – i.e. combining labor – to overcome the limits of the working day (cf. 399-400). Generally, capital “is productive” as “an essential relation for the development of the social productive forces” and it “incessantly whips onward with its unlimited mania” the “development of the productive powers of labour” (325;
emphasis Marx’s). Capitalism does not only produce particular social and economic relations, or particular forms of ideology, or specific types of worker-subjects, but also directly produces an intensification of affective capacity.

The very “concept of capital” contains “the concentration of many living labour capacities” (590). Viewed as a general society-wide formation, it demands an amplification of these forces directed to its own reproduction and expansion. Capital does more than this, however; it also comes to posit itself as the exclusive agent conducting this power. In doing so it conceals the actual bodies generating and actualizing these forces as well as the effects on these bodies of capitalist processes. All the “social powers of production are productive powers of capital,” and the “collective power of labour” becomes “the collective power of capital” (585; emphasis Marx’s). Capitalist processes collectivize and increase affective capacity in a particular mode of production, then put it to work for the benefit of capitalists and the extension of capitalism, but in a way such that capitalism itself appears as the bearer of this power. The individual body realizes the capacity of living labor, but capitalism seizes this force as its own. By placing a mass of workers in the same location and compelling them to work toward the same end and in the same production process, “capital appears as the collective force of the workers, their social force, as well as that which ties them together, and hence as the unity which creates this force” (587). In the process of amplifying affective capacity, capital comes to posit itself as the bearer of and unifying energy behind this collective force. Doing this renders the actual forces themselves – those of laboring bodies – invisible in an affective form of fetishism. By standing in as the representation and unity of concentrated forces that in actuality result from actualization of labor capacities in the form of exploited, alienated laboring bodies, capitalism conceals the fact that the amplification of overall or total capacity it engenders also directly
enervates and destroys the very bodies from which this affective capacity was extracted and realized for profit and further growth.

Upon this reading, alienation in Marx’s works takes on a particularly affective character, as a force that confronts and opposes the laborer: capitalism alienates the worker from their material affective capacity, then opposes a warped affective force against the worker. As a result of the division of labor, “man’s own deed” – read: actualization of affective capacity – “becomes an alien power opposed to him”; the combined efforts of laborers comprise a “social power” that “appears to these individual[s] … not as their own united power, but as alien force existing outside them” that becomes “the prime governor” of human “will and action” (GI, 53-54). The language used by Marx in the 1844 Manuscripts consistently depicts alienation in terms of external force, marking it as: “an alien object exercising power” in terms of the “product of labor” (EPM, 75); an “alien activity not belonging to” the worker – “activity as suffering” – when it comes to the “act of production” (75); and a “being alien to him” when discussing species-being (77; his italics). Similar formulations persist in the more “mature” Marx: for example, in the Grundrisse, the “product of labour … endowed by living labour” becomes “an alien property” (453; Marx’s emphasis) and “labour in general … comes to confront the worker as an alien power” (307; his italics). This external force confronts the worker and drains them of affective capacity. Alienated labor is “external to the worker” in a way that, instead of “develop[ing] freely his physical and mental energy,” “mortifies his body” (EPM, 74).

Alienation thus describes in some ways the embodied experience of the worker in capitalism subject to the seizure or redirection of their affective capacity. Not only do social relations and productive processes capture the ability to act and be acted upon, this process on a mass scale poses an affective force against the worker that works to enervate their own capacity.
As Sara Ahmed notes, alienation in Marx is both alienation vis-à-vis labor in “a kind of self-estrangement” and is “a feeling-structure, a form of suffering that shapes how the worker inhabits the world” given that “the world they have created is an extension of themselves … that is appropriated (2010, 167). For Marx, the “collisions” between individuals “produce an alien power standing above them,” a “process and power independent of them” (G, 197). The worker puts their life – their dynamic mattering, material productive force – into labor, but this results in confrontation with an alien force. Living labour capacity becomes separated from “its own labour;” “alien to it”; as a result, it “has become poorer by the life forces expended” and transferred to the alien product, process, and force (462). Alienated labor means that instead of the laboring body realizing its capacity or power, labor wrests and appropriates this affective force in a way that both lessens the capacity of that body and poses as a warped, confrontational alien power against it. The “social relation of individuals to one another” has become, in a perversion of the potentiality and relational connectivity of affective force, a “power over the individuals which has become autonomous” of them (197). Marx’s account of alienation, like his broader critique of capitalism, centrally engages and works through the dynamics of affect. In the “production process of capital,” labour “appears just as subservient to and led by an alien will and an alien intelligence” in the form of an “animated monster” (470; Marx’s emphasis). This alien(ation) monster, like the capital-as-vampire figure below, feeds on affective capacity.

It is in these many senses of capitalist affect that, as marked in the epigraph to this chapter, “capitalist production” has “rapidly and firmly … seized the vital forces of the people at their very roots” (C Vol. I, 380). When Marx makes this claim, we must read it affectively. Vital forces are not (or at least not only) metaphorical, nor does the statement refer exclusively to the way capitalism conducts and oppresses the proletariat (although it certainly does that).
Capitalism captures the essential powers of individual bodies, their capacity to affect and be affected; it is the usurpation of creative, generative, affective force. It makes labor capacity a force for capital alone. We might thus say that one defining characteristic of the proletariat as a class is its particular mode of enmeshment in these capitalist affective flows. That is, one component of the class status or process of the proletariat is that one’s affective capacities are amplified, but this power is captured for the reproduction of capital and enrichment of another affective class at the expense of one’s own body. The worker becomes “nothing other than labour-power for the duration of [their] whole life,” directing all the worker’s time and activity – education, intellectual development, sleep, social intercourse, the “free play of the vital forces” of “body and mind,” and so on – to the “self-valorization of capital” (375). Capitalism is affective and cannot exist outside of the concomitant intensification and redirection of capacity.

When capital and labor encounter one another under conditions of capitalism, capital “buys [labour] as living labour, as the general productive force,” while the worker sells their labor and thus “surrenders its creative power” (G, 307; Marx’s emphasis). In this exchange, the creative power of labor capacity “establishes itself as the power of capital,” and “capital appropriates [labour as productive force], as such” (307). The buying and selling of labor power is also the appropriation by capital of affective capacity. The purchase by capital is a procurement of the worker’s “vitality,” the “objectified labour contained in his vital forces” (323). Capital “realizes itself through the appropriation of alien” living labour capacity (307; emphasis Marx’s). It depends on this affective capture for its own perpetuation. Consequently, “every increase in the powers of social production … the productive power of labour itself” – and as I have discussed, this increase is something required and continually produced by capitalism – “enriches not the worker but rather capital; hence it only magnifies again the power
dominating over labour; increases only the productive power of capital” (308; his emphasis). Cheah, without any recourse to affect, argues that capital “appropriate[s] the source of life,” by “parasitically draining the life and labor” in a way that “trausmute[s] capital into a vital being” (2003, 197–98). Affect explains how this process works. Any amplification of affective capacity accrues to capital at the expense of the worker, and any increase in the power of the worker increases the power of capital and its domination of labor. Capitalist processes appropriate the worker’s vital forces and essential powers. As Negri contends, “Capital can only subtract life, can only mortify labor” (Casarino and Negri 2004, 180). If we read Marx across his works as exploring the relationships of economic and social power, then we must theorize the affective component of that power that I have elucidated. Ultimately, the “natural animating power of labour … becomes a power of capital, not of labour” (G, 357; emphasis Marx’s). Capitalism seizes the “value-creating possibility … which lies within” the laboring body and becomes “master over living labour capacity” (453). It engages in the constant capture of affective capacity, and this constitutes a central mode of Marx’s critique of capital upon practicing feeling as a method.

This approach to affectively reading Marx and theorizing capitalism brings to the fore one important tension between affect theory and Marx, namely the extent to which affect theory can be part of structural analysis and/or systemic social theory. My argument is, in many ways, a structural one, following Marx: capitalism systematically organizes, amplifies, and captures affect, in a way that maps onto Marx’s structural theorizing about class positions within capitalism. In several ways this is in tension with affect theory. Massumi counterposes cultural and social theory focused on structure – where “nothing ever happens” and where “all eventual permutations are prefigured via self-consistent generative rules” – in contrast to affect as a
“collapse of structured distinction into intensity, of rules into paradox” (2002, 27). In this sense, bringing together affect theory and a structural understanding of Marx becomes quite complicated.

My claim is that an affective reading of Marx can help bridge this divide, even as these tensions remain inextricable. Massumi notes that while “affect is indeed unformed and unstructured … it is nevertheless highly organized and effectively analyzable” (260n3). I understand my reading of Marx to be a quasi-structural analysis of the organization of affect under capitalism at a very general level. Even though affect always exceeds any attempts at containing it – and indeed I discuss this below vis-à-vis Marx’s account of the contradictions in capitalism – this should not preclude attempts to theorize large-scale political, social, and economic patterning of affective flows. Massumi closes the chapter I have been quoting from here by claiming that affect has the “ability…to produce an economic effect more swiftly than economics itself” and is thus “a real condition, an intrinsic variable of the late capitalist system, as infrastructural as a factory”; affect is maybe even “beyond infrastructural, it is everywhere, in effect” (45). I would argue that affectively returning to Marx provides one important route – in addition to, for example, Massumi’s own work on interactions between reason and affect in neoliberalism (2014), which does not engage Marx – for taking on the task of analyzing affect as infrastructural to capitalism and a real condition of economic existence. If I am right that Marx is theorizing capitalism as a social formation that amplifies affective capacities, but at the same times captures it from those actualizing such potentials, then affect is indeed “everywhere, in effect,” to use Massumi’s phrase. At the same time, I argue that my reading also responds to the critique that work bringing philosophical concepts about materialism into Marx has been unable to understand systemic processes and social totalities (Edwards 2010). Instead, I find affect
theory to be a crucial tool for making legible large-scale processes that are constitutive of capitalism. While my work cannot fully resolve the tension between affect theory and structural explanation – my account is arguably too structural for affect theory and not structural enough for structuralists – but it does articulate one way of making that tension productive.

My argument also diverges from some strands of the analytical attention paid to affective or immaterial labor over the past twenty years. In his article “Affective Labor,” Hardt claims that affective labor is “immaterial, even if it is corporeal and affective, in the sense that its products are intangible: a feeling of ease, well-being, satisfaction, excitement, passion – even a sense of connectedness or community” (1999, 96). Hardt in his article (93), as well as Hardt and Negri in Empire (2000, 290–292), trace the importance of theorizing affective labor to what they variably call the postmodern, post-Fordist, postindustrial, and informational organizations of economy. In this account, the increasing shift to knowledge economies, so-called service jobs, carework, computing, and so on makes affective labor more important in late capitalism than in earlier stages. Indeed, for Hardt, while affective labor has never been entirely outside capitalism, “economic postmodernization” has “positioned affective labor in a role that is not only directly productive of capital but at the very pinnacle of the hierarchy of laboring forms (1999, 90). In this sense, affective labor “has become firmly embedded as a necessary foundation for capitalist accumulation and patriarchal order” (100).

Drawing on my account of Marx, I would disagree that there is some subset of labor that is affective and becomes especially prominent in late capitalism. All labor is affective labor – at least from the perspective of a Spinozan reading of Marx. In thinking of affective capacity as the ever-present power of the active body, it becomes difficult to localize affective labor in only one particular kind of labor or economic-temporal formation. When Marx critiques industrial
capitalism, he is critiquing the organization of affective labor, among other things. It is not that the postindustrial, post-Fordist economy newly centers affective labor and displaces other modes of laboring activity, but that the post-Fordist economy organizes and directs that affective labor differently than earlier modes of capitalist production, perhaps even making it more prominently affective. A factory worker performs affective labor: it is a different sort of affective labor than that of today’s migrant careworker, fast-food employee, or social media manager, but is affective nonetheless. When Lazzarato, for example, contends that immaterial affective labor is “the labor which produces the informational and cultural content of the commodity” through post-Fordist changes in labor processes and in activities not always traditionally understood as work (1996, 133), and “appears as a real mutation of ‘living labor’” (138), he obscures the way that industrial labor, including Marx’s account of such labor and of living labor capacity, is affective. The affectivity of labor under capitalism is not bounded to a period of late capitalism but is powerfully present, with severe effects on laboring bodies, in earlier modes of capitalist production.

Ethics and Affect in the Critique of Capital

The vital affective component of Marx’s critique opens up even deeper resonances with a Deleuzean Spinoza, in this case in the realm of power and ethics. As elaborated earlier, Spinozan power is closely tied to the capacity to affect and be affected. There is always both a “power of acting” and a “power of being acted upon” manifesting affective capacity (Deleuze 1988, 27; emphasis his). For Deleuze, this conducts us to a Spinozan ethics – which Deleuze insists is a form of ethology – centered on affective capacity and power as the criteria of this ethics. In his reading, Spinoza constructs an ethics where “everything that is bad is measured by a decrease of the power of acting” and affecting, while “everything that is good [is measured by] an increase
of this same power (72). Interacting bodies constitute this ethics, which appraises goodness or badness in terms of the effects of interactions on these bodies. For Deleuze’s Spinoza, “the good is when a body directly compounds its relations with ours, and with all or part of its power, increases our” own power (22); consequently, “goodness is a matter of dynamism, power, and the composition of powers” (23). The bad, conversely, “is when a body decomposes our body’s relation” and “it still combines with our parts, but in ways that do not correspond to our essence” (22). Within this ethical framework we can classify encounters into two sorts. Joyful encounters involve interactions where “power is added” to the interrelating bodies such that the affective capacity and “power of acting” are “increased or enhanced,” while sad encounters generate “a subtraction” wherein affective capacity and power of acting are “diminished or blocked” (27-28). The ethical imperative thus becomes one of organizing a maximum of joyful encounters so that bodies interact in ways that mutually increase affective capacity and the power of acting.

“Everything that involves sadness serves tyranny and oppression … and must be denounced as bad,” asserts Deleuze’s Spinoza (72). Capitalism, in my reading of Marx, can be denounced on precisely these grounds. Marx, obviously, was deeply attuned to the oppression and destruction wrought by capitalist production. I contend that theorizing Marx in relation to Deleuze’s Spinoza draws out an affective ethical component to his critique of capitalism. What is capitalism, for Marx, if not an organization of sad encounters that systematically decreases the capacity and power of the proletariat collectively and individually? The laboring body under capitalism is constantly acting in a way that actualizes its capacities and powers, yet these are seized by capital, leaving them powerless and dulled. The encounters between laborer and laborer, laborer and boss, laborer and machinery, laborer and nature, and laborer and capital are all sad encounters. The capacity and power of the labouring body enmeshed in capitalist
formations is methodically diminished, and from the perspective of Spinozan affect and ethics, this constitutes tyranny and oppression that ought to be denounced.

Grattan argues that too much Spinozist Marxism – especially that of Negri, with and without Hardt – effaces the way that affect is not only joyful encounters or increases in the power to act; Spinoza also carefully theorizes the ways that encounters may be – and often are – harmful and diminishing of the power to act (2011, 7-8). The problem is that avoiding the possibility of harmful or sad encounters, or erasing them from one’s theory – as Grattan asserts Negri too often does – cannot in fact rid the world of sad affects and harmful encounters. Instead, because they are part of existence, “coming to terms with potential causes of sad affects is crucial to critical practice (7). This is one of the reasons that I find it so necessary to go back to Marx himself in relation to affect and to Spinoza. As I have demonstrated, Marx is perhaps the most incisive critical analyst of the material practices, relations, and conditions that organize life as a series of sad affects and harmful encounters.47

Ruddick notes that the turn to Spinoza in critical theory has “invigorated a radical ethico-politics of ontology,” one “embracing … an indwelling, vital, and immanent concept of power as potentia” that is “set against a parasitic capitalism” (2010, 24). Marx, I contend, provides a uniquely important mode of such theorizing given his vivid articulation of what I have called the tension of capitalist affect. Any affect theory proceeding from Spinoza will benefit from the sort of encounter with Marx that I have elaborated. That is, once we read Marx’s critique of capitalism for its resonances with Deleuzean-Spinozan affect, not only do we generate a newfound apprehension of the affective register of that critique, but also add to the critical repertoire of affect theory.
For Deleuze, Spinoza theorizes how “in sadness our power as a conatus serves entirely to
invest the painful trace and to repel or destroy the object which is its cause. Our power is
immobilized, and can no longer do anything but react” (1988, 101). To a significant extent, this
describes Marx’s account of capital: he details the painful traces of capitalism on the laboring
body (cf. C Vol. I, chap. 10; Cvetkovich 1992, chap. 7), the constitution of the proletariat as a
revolutionary class meant to destroy capitalism (MCP), and immobilization of the power of the
proletarian body and its subsumption to the powers of capital. Capitalism produces a “throng of
people … made up of generations of stunted, short-lived and rapidly replaced human beings,
plucked, so to speak, before they were ripe” (C Vol. I, 380). In its ongoing need to absorb and put
to use labor capacity, capitalist production quickly uses up the forces of the body themselves,
“shortening the life of labour-power, in the same way as a greedy farmer snatches more produce
from the soil by robbing it of its fertility” (376). Capitalism requires the amplification of
affective capacity, but in realizing this necessity it depletes the source from which it seizes that
capacity in the first place. Marx intensely describes this depletion of forces and bodies:
capitalism “oversteps … the merely physical limits of the working day,” granting only “the exact
amount of torpor essential to the revival of an absolutely exhausted organism” and leaving only
“diseased, compulsory and painful” labour-power, “produc[ing] the premature exhaustion and
death of this labour-power itself” (375-6). Perhaps when Marx writes about the “vampire-like”
quality of capital, the way it “lives only by sucking living labour, and lives the more, the more
labour it sucks” (342), we ought to think of capital as the affect vampire, sucking the capacity,
force, and power from the depleted bodies it leaves behind.

The Future Communal Body: Towards a Theory of Communist Affect

Contradictions, Common Notions, and Class Consciousness
Of course, for Marx the “universality towards which [capitalism] irresistibly strives encounters barriers in its own nature, which will, at a certain stage of its development, allow it to be recognized as being itself the greatest barrier to this tendency, and hence will drive towards its own suspension” (G, 410). Given my reading of Marx thus far, I would argue that the affective tension of capitalism – it amplifies affective capacity to ensure its own reproduction, but seizes that affect and systematically destroys the bodies involved in the realization of that capacity – contributes to what Marx understands as the contradictions producing the collapse of capitalism. Capitalism seeks to universalize the development of productive force, even if it can only ever do so partially. As Marx notes, this tendency also constitutes a limit for capitalist development as well as a precondition for the overthrow of capitalism and generation of a communist society.

The “working-out of the productive forces” – in my reading the amplification of affective capacity – constitutes a “barrier to capital” because its “entire development process proceeds in a contradictory way” (541; emphasis Marx’s). This contradiction, though, “is fleeting, and produces the real conditions of its own suspension” (541-542). That is, as capitalism creates “the highest development of the forces of production,” it also generates the possibility for the “richest development” of individuals and their capacities (541). In amplifying affective capacity yet seizing it for the gain of capitalists and the reproduction of capitalism, capitalist production develops the power and force that can – and for Marx often will48 – overthrow it. Capital “possesses” this “tendency” towards the “free, unobstructed, progressive, and universal development” of productive force, but “since capital is a limited form of production,” this tendency “contradicts it and hence drives it towards dissolution” (540). Capitalism initiates a movement of capacities and powers in the direction of their universal development, which would in turn generate real freedom. However, it seeks to halt this movement, appropriating these
intensified forces and destroying the bodies realizing them. This, Marx argues, proves impossible; once unleashed, these affective capacities will work towards their own realization in free conditions, overthrowing the capitalist formation seeking to contain and capture them. In the register of Clough et al.’s “affect-itself,” we might call this movement in Marx his recognition of the way that “with each actualization, there remains a virtual remainder of affective potential,” the “openness of bodily matter to its own unstable, pre-individual capacities” such that affect works as “potentiality, indeterminate emergence, and creative mutation” (Clough et al. 2007, 65). If capitalism “produces, above all, its own grave-diggers” (MCP, 483), then its death is in part affective, and the grave-diggers include the renewed communist force of proletarian affective capacity.

This is one area where it is possible to locate agency, workplace organizing, trade union activism, and resistance. Capitalism cannot become entirely totalizing, such that there are no outsides, nonidentities, or fissures, even if Marx or Western Marxists often represent capitalism in a homogenizing or absolute way (J. K. Gibson-Graham 2006). One particularly affective mode of counterpower might take the form of what Spinoza calls common notions. These notions, arrived at and formed through joyful affects, are “representation[s] of a composition between two or more bodies, and a unity of this composition,” one “express[ing] the relations of agreement or composition between existing bodies” (Deleuze 1988, 54). A basic question for living beings thus becomes “knowing how we manage to form” enriching compositions of bodies and the common notions that embody them in an ideational sense (55; his emphasis). Joyful affects and joyful encounters – those amplifying the power to act and be acted upon – work as the conduits for and catalyzers of common notions in the becoming-rational of material, living modes in relation. In this sense, rationality and affect are sutured together, as reason takes the form of both
“feelings that agree with reason” in the “effort to select and organize good encounters” that
inspire us with joyful passions” as well as “feelings that are born of reason” in the “perception
and comprehension of the common notions” to “deduce other relations” oriented toward new,
“active” experiences (55-6; emphasis Deleuze’s). Upsetting Cartesian (or other traditions’)
attempts to bifurcate reason and the feeling body, Spinozan common notions “represent the
composition of real relations between existing modes or individuals” and hence capture
embodied, material relations (57). Common notions supplement joyful affective relations with
some degree of reasoned design, enabling the more intentional pursuit of compositions of bodies
that increase the capacity for affecting and being affected.

For Deleuze’s Spinoza, the formation of common notions proceeds through a trajectory
of reasoned grasping of the compositions of bodies. The first, most basic common notions are the
least general ones, forming a composition between two bodies, a relation generating joyful
affects. This has the potential to create cascading active affects; if this intensification occurs, the
first common notion and these spiraling affects produce the “force to form common notions that
are even more general,” ones that compose bodies that do not agree with each other in full or are
contrary to one another in some way (Deleuze 1988, 56). From “these new common notions, new
affects of active joy follow,” replacing sad affects and encounters (56). That is, common notions,
fostered in the proper environment, express tendencies to expand and extend themselves,
drawing in greater bodies, relations, affects, and so on.

Perhaps the formation of joyful encounters could be considered to be one of the tasks of a
proletarian movement or of class struggle for the affective Marx. Class-consciousness might take
the form, from the standpoint of affect, of creating and propagating common notions, drawing
sensing, affective bodies together in greater numbers and intensity to overcome modes, forces,
and relations of production that organize sad encounters. The action of these bodies brought together – in the form of organizing in a workplace or in a social movement, or of fomenting revolution – makes these common notions active, and might draw in more bodies into the common project. Simply being situated similarly with regard to the means of production – or to the social organization of affective forces – is not enough; common notions must be struggled for and actively realized by feeling-bodies.

Marx’s writings on the Paris Commune in *The Civil War in France* (1978) provide one example from which we might understand anti-capitalist praxis in terms of common notions and joyful encounters. In Marx’s account, the “working class” of Paris – positioning themselves against the bourgeois ideologists’ screeds accusing them of naïveté – knew “that in order to work out their own emancipation” and the emancipation of society, they would “have to pass through long struggles, through a series of historical processes” because they were engaged in the project of “transforming circumstances and men” (635-36). They embraced “the full consciousness of their historic mission” and “the heroic resolve to act up to it” (636). A self-/class-consciousness operates here, as the Communards in their collectivity forged an understanding of their connection to history and to social upheaval. I argue that this could be theorized as a kind of common notion that becomes more general (in the Spinozan-Deleuzean sense discussed above) as more bodies network together in acts of resistance.

Deleuze writes that from “new” and more general “common notions, new affects of active joy follow” (1988, 56). Such a process might provide an explanation for how and why the Communards bear a certain joyful presence in Marx’s tale. Perhaps these common notions leading to joyful encounters are a source for the way that the Commune was “radiant in the enthusiasm of its historic initiative!” (*Civil War*, 641) or the way it could “afford to smile at the
coarse invective of the gentleman’s gentleman…and at the didactic patronage of well-wishing bourgeois-doctrinaires” (636). In an overwhelmingly difficult situation, the Communards nevertheless fashioned a sense of historical purpose and a capacity for radiance, enthusiasm, and sardonicism, at least in Marx’s telling. The way an expanding network of bodies comes together to both reciprocally enhance their individual and collective capacity to act and to gain expanding common knowledge and joy provides one theoretical framework for understanding this situation. Such an explanation connects to current social movements as well, for instance Read’s discussion of how Occupy Wall Street and anti-student debt movements can be understood as “new collective imaginings” that resemble Spinozan common notions (2015, 13–14). More broadly, the linked concepts of common notions and joyful encounters present one place where questions of resistance and collectivity enter into an affective reading of Marx.

Communist Affect

Affectively reading Marx’s materialism and critique of capital necessarily provokes the question of the affectivity of the future communist society he envisions. My account of the affective component of Marx’s critique of capital provides the crucial departure: if capitalism systematically amplifies affective capacity and force but redirects this intensified force for its own reproduction while destroying the bodies that actualize such a capacity, then communism (among other things) coordinates productive activity so that intensified affective capacity and productive force are organized to feed back into the development of individual bodies and the overall cooperative augmentation of the forces of society. The communal society of the future would be one of joyful encounters, in which, to rephrase Marx and Engels in the Manifesto (491), we shall have an association, in which the free development of affective capacities realized by each is the condition for the free development of affective capacity for all. That is, in
communism bodies affect and are affected by other bodies such that their individual and collective powers are continually augmented.\textsuperscript{52}

Communism would not just be communal direction of the means of production, but would be the communal amplifications of affect, force, and capacity.\textsuperscript{53} Capitalism, especially in the way it produces relations between individuals mediated through the exchange value of commodities, produces “universally developed individuals” who, while experiencing alienation and exploitation, have the “universality and comprehensiveness of [their] relations and capacities” developed (G, 162). Capitalism robs the potentiality of such relations and capacities for its own gain and reproduction, but develops them nonetheless. Only a communal development and organization can fully actualize the powers, capacities, and forces appropriated under capitalism, where the interaction between bodies does not enervate the many while enriching the few, but conducts the intensification of the capacity and forces for all. Unalienated labor, such as would be manifest in Marx’s vision, entails the human “really returning to himself out of the estrangement of his own essential powers, and in making himself at home in the external world transformed by those powers” (Schmidt 2014, 143). Marx’s “demand for the emancipation of all man’s essential powers” (151) is, given my affective reading, a demand for the emancipation of affective potential, unbound and newly capable of realization in transforming others and the world, and in being transformed by them. This “restructuring” of the human enables “human qualities [to] be universally unfolded” (144-45).

When we surpass “the limited bourgeois form,” we find – in a passage that would be just as at home in Spinoza, or in Deleuze and Guattari\textsuperscript{54} – the “universality of individual needs, capacities, pleasures, productive forces,” the “absolute working-out of” the “creative potentialities” of human bodies, the “development of all human powers as such the end in itself,”
and the individual who “strives not to remain something he has become, but is in the absolute movement of becoming” (G, 488). In the end, this is what Marx describes as real or true wealth: “the appropriation of [one’s] own productive powers,” one’s “presence as a social body,” the “development of the social individual” (G, 705). We should, ultimately, read such an expansive vision affectively, especially considering the vivid resonances between Marx and Deleuzean-Spinozan affect that I have traced throughout this chapter. What is the communal development and becoming of creative potentialities, capacities, and human powers in themselves, if not a Spinozan ethic where “powers, speeds, and slownesses [are] composed” such that “individuals enter into composition with one another in order to form a higher individual, ad infinitum” and “capacities can compound directly to constitute a more ‘intense’ capacity or power” (Deleuze 1988, 126)? Feeling as a method enables us to speculate that the free development of the individual and the community in Marx is in part a development of affect, constantly raising bodies in their individuality and relationality to higher, more intense capacities and power. From the standpoint of Deleuze and Spinoza, affective capacity is in the end never a matter of the disconnected or atomized body for which another poses a limit or constraint, nor of “utilizations or captures,” but “of sociabilities and communities” (Deleuze 1988, 126). Communism’s community involves a set of affective relations that reciprocally amplify affective capacity, creating sociabilities that mutually enrich power, rather than a more narrow increase in the ability of some to act at the expense of harming others, such as is the case in more repressive patternings of bodily capacity like capitalism, fascism, or colonialism.

The most fully realized individual in a Spinozan framework seeks out such sociability, and persists in a social organization that enables such relations. As Deleuze renders it, “that individual will be called good (or free, or rational, or strong) who strives, insofar as he is capable,
to organize his encounters, to join with whatever agrees with his nature, to combine his relation with relations that are compatible with his, and thereby to increase his power” (1988, 22-23). The activity of such a notion of freedom is itself crucial. Freedom, for Deleuze and Spinoza, is an active process, a becoming. The individual “is not born free,” but “becomes free or frees himself”: freedom entails an actualization of the body’s powers, a seizing and “com[ing] into possession of [one’s] power of acting … from which active affects follow” (Deleuze 1988, 70–71). At the root of these interrelated conceptions of goodness, freedom, and rationality lies affect in general and the active pursuit of encounters with others that mutually amplify affective capacity more specifically. Marx’s most fully realized individual similarly depends on community. As he and Engels write, “personal power (relations)” can only be seized from their appropriation by the division of labor by individuals in community: “only within the community has each individual the means of cultivating his gifts in all directions; hence personal freedom becomes possible only within the community” and in “real community the individuals obtain their freedom and in through their association” (GI, 86-87). The active taking hold of one’s bodily powers and the communal development of relations cannot be separated from one another. Only in community can individuals mutually amplify their capacities for affecting and being affected.

There is thus an affective sense of Marx and Engel’s claim that the “real intellectual wealth of the individual depends entirely on the wealth of his real connections” (GI, 59). In terms of affect, the connections of individuals as capacities, if augmenting and enhancing to all, condition the expansion of any individual power or movement toward free development. This, I argue, is one aspect of the kind of individuality “not antithetical to a Marxist tradition”: it is not “‘the individual’ conceived as isolated, atomized, exclusive in his possession, disconnected from
larger social fabrics” (Petchesky 1990, 4). Instead, this is the free individual as a social being, a species-being, whose “human essence is no abstraction inherent in each single individual” but “in its reality” is “the ensemble of social relations” (TF, VI). Affect is an inextricable element of this social ensemble – once one theorizes the body as capacity and power – and becomes a precondition for the actualization of the human essence or of free individuality. As such, it comprises one quality of the “just community” that “is required for the full development of free individuality” (C. C. Gould 1980, xiv) when it takes the form of joyful encounters that compound capacities. In Gould’s reading of Marx, justice in the “communal society of the future,” understood as “a condition for the self-realization of all individuals,” “designates social relations in which agents mutually enhance each other” (171). These reciprocal social relations, I claim, must include affect, and they prove to be a particularly Marxist articulation of a society of Spinozan joyful encounters. As Schmidt notes, even if the basis of Marxist materialism is “the possibility of removing hunger and misery,” Marx retains a “eudemonistic impulse”; this leads him to a suggestive prompting, asking “but what is the value of men’s immense and not only theoretical efforts to transcend capitalism, if one of the objects aimed at is not pleasure, and the attainment of the satisfaction of the senses?” (2014, 40). Conceptualized as a fundamental constitutive force and as a rubric for analyzing interacting bodies, any just communist society must provide for affective self-realization – the increase in the capacity to affect and be affected and mutual enhancement as a set of joyful encounters, forming augmentative compositions of bodies. Nonetheless, whether all bodies across their various differences are able to realize joyful encounters is an open question, given Marx’s omissions and exclusions related to gender, race, and colonialism.
Closely bound up in this realm of individual-social-affective freedom and development in communism is the Marxian notion of freedom as it related to human need. These needs, I claim, include an affective need, the need for the social organization to persistently enhance the affective capacities of bodies in their connected individuality and sociality. Petchesky argues that the “end of socialist transformation is ultimately the satisfaction of individual needs, which are always concrete and specific” as opposed to the needs of idealist abstract citizens (1990, 4). She cites Agnes Heller’s The Theory of Need in Marx (1976), where Heller contends that “when the domination of things over human beings ceases, when relations between human beings no longer appear as relations between things, then every need governs 'the need for the development of the individual’” (73). Because Marx’s entire philosophy proceeds from the active, productive, body – one I have insisted we can understand in terms of affective capacity – affect becomes one of the fundamental needs, for no body can produce or reproduce life, subsistence, other humans and so on without some prerequisite capacity to affect and be affected. Here, Rosemary Hennessy’s account of the human need for sensation and affect proves crucial. As she asserts, “affective needs are inseparable from the social component of most need satisfaction, then, but they also constitute human needs in themselves in the sense that all people deserve to have the conditions available that will allow them to exercise and develop their affective capacities” (2000, 210–11). In her account, capitalist production “outlaws” the meeting of this need for affect (215-18). Communism must, then, fulfill some basic need for affect, as a precondition for individual and ultimately human freedom.

An additional feature of these affective relations under communism might be the formation of new kinds of common notions. As I noted above, Marx and Engels state that “it is clear the real intellectual wealth” of people “depends entirely on the wealth of [their] real
connections” (GI, 59). What is the work that the “intellectual” is doing in this assertion? The concept of common notions can help us to think through the intellectuality of these connections in a way that stays true to the historical materialist emphasis on consciousness and the intellectual as always contingent on the active body. Once the connections between people are such that they reciprocally amplify affective capacity in a concatenation of joyful encounters, these real, material, embodied affective connections can enable the intellectual representation of them as well as intentional and social effort toward their communal organization. That is, affectively enriching connections under communism create the conditions required for the ideational comprehension of the connections. There is thus some conceptual specificity to the intellectual wealth of the individual depending on their real conditions: this formulation, I think, suggests something like a Spinozan common notion, and especially so once the Marxist project is read affectively.60

Consciousness – a “social product” – “only arises from the need, the necessity of intercourse with other” humans (GI, 49). Communism, though, can move this intercourse beyond the realm of necessity into an active seizing of social relations to amplify affective capacities. That is, in the pursuit of compositions that enhance power, consciousness can reach true intellectual wealth in its active striving for connection and intercourse. Common notions enable the active grasping of relations as opposed to the mere necessity of relations. Perhaps, then, species-being, as it can be realized in communism, may be read in terms of affect and common notions. Humans realize themselves as species-beings only in “free, conscious activity,” where “man makes his life activity itself the object of his will and of his consciousness,” and does so in a social sense (EPM, 76). This seizing of life activity as object(ive) resembles, I think, the active expression of affectivity in Spinoza’s common notions; both involve a constructive act that
appropriates human capacities for a specific trajectory for enmeshed individual-communal life. Marx writes that one’s “general consciousness” is “only the theoretical shape of that of which the living shape is the real community, the social fabric,” while the “activity of my general consciousness, as an activity, is therefore also my theoretical existence as a social being” (EPM, 105; italics his). This communal vision contrasts with Marx’s “present day,” the rule of private property, where general consciousness “is an abstraction for real life” (105). Conscious activity, properly social, grasps the real lived relations of the community, providing some sort of theoretical account of these relations. Only then does one’s “existence for the other and the other’s existence for” them constitute the “life-element of the human world,” a bond with the species and with nature as a “foundation” of “human existence” (104; Marx’s emphasis).

The common notion marks where the human “becomes free or frees himself,” a “com[ing] into possession” of the “power of acting” in composition with others, generating “adequate ideas from which active affects follow” (Deleuze 1988, 70-71). Realizing species-being involves this sort of freedom. It is a positive apprehension of the capacity for relating to and interacting with others in a mutually enriching way to actualize the species-connection between individuals. This requires the positive transcendence of private property, enabling a “sensuous appropriation for and by” the human of “the human essence and of human life,” appropriating “total essence in a total manner” (EPM, 106). The element of active seizing is what shifts these movements and processes into the realm of common notions, and Marx repeatedly emphasizes the need for positively appropriating essence, capacity, life, activity, relations, the social fabric, existence, and reality. The affectivity of Marx’s understanding of bodies, relations, activity, production, and life itself situate these species-being appropriations in the affective register. Freedom, once private property is overcome and real community is achieved, involves
not just intense, relational, reciprocal affective compositions of bodies, but the forming of common notions that grasp the forces at play in such socialities and strive for the open-ended organization of joyful affects and encounters.

**Nature, Objects, Machines**

One of the limits to Marx’s communist imagination is that it – at least upon some readings – retains and in some ways deepens Marxist anthropocentrism and domination of nature. While I think his utopic vision generates a vivid portrayal of an affectively abundant sociality of interacting bodies, nature most likely does not become enmeshed in organized joyful encounters. Instead, as Schmidt contends in his reading of the relationship between humans and nature in Marx’s “utopia,” the “new society is to benefit [humans] alone, and there is no doubt that this is at the expense of external nature,” which is to be “mastered with gigantic technological aids” (2014, 151). When Marx (and Marx and Engels) critique the “unholy plundering of nature,” the concern is not so much with “nature itself but with considerations of economic utility”: communism signifies not the saving of nature, but the “rationaliz[ing]” of “encroachment into nature,” directing this appropriation for the benefit of all (155-56). Instead of affecting and being affected, it seems that nature in communism is only affected by humans, as it enters into consistent sad encounters depleting nature of its powers. At best, Schmidt argues, there “remains … a vague hope,” that humans will “learn to a far greater degree to practise solidarity with the oppressed animal world” (156), and that when they “are no longer led by their form of society to regard each other primarily from the point of view of economic advantage, they will be able to restore to external things something of their independence (158). In this kind of muted potential, maybe the human “view of natural things could lose its tenseness” and “have something” of the qualities “which surround the word ‘nature’ in Spinoza” (158), however, even this potential in
Marx would retain the human nature/nature dichotomy and dialectic. Affect might serve as a resource for modestly scaling back some of the anthropocentrism and propping up Schmidt’s hopeful anticipation. Spinozan affect always entails not just the capacity to affect but also the capacity for being affected. Explicitly infusing this into Marx through feeling as a method should compel one to hold on to the necessity of conceptualizing the human – even the free, social human of communism – as needing to be acted upon by nature instead of only acting on it and working to ensure nature not only is acted upon but can also act. Affect is not a means of saving Marx from his anthropocentrism or his vision of communism from its mastery over nature, but may provide a resource for “what could be salvaged” (158) from a Marxist vision, despite its non-immanent residual human-nature binary. Here, nature is not dominated but instead interacts with humans in joyful encounters and relations characterized by mutuality and their respective capacities for both affecting and being affected.

Communism, conceptualized from the standpoint of affect, not only systematically organizes joyful encounters, flows of reciprocal, enhancing affective interchanges, common notions, the meeting of affective needs, and so on, but it also reshapes the bodily relationship to objects and to the surrounding world. Marx’s elaboration of this achievement and appropriation of the human “total essence” (EPM, 106) immediately turns to an exploration of the active body as it connects to the world in which it is enmeshed. Transcending private property reorients each person’s “human relations to the world - seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, feeling, thinking, being aware, sensing, wanting, acting, loving – in short, all the organs of his individual being” (106; emphasis Marx’s). Instead of all these bodily processes being directed toward “one-sided gratification” in the way “of possessing, of having,” they relate humans to one another through their mutual relations with objects (106-107; emphasis Marx’s). That is, bodies shift from an
orientation toward the utility of an object to an open-ended, multifaceted orientation toward objects, others, and humanity itself.

Following Sara Ahmed (2004; 2006), we might think through the effects on human relations to objects and others in this communist transcendence of private property in terms of disorientation. For her, emotions work to constitute bodies as they “shape the very surfaces of bodies, which take shape through the repetition of actions over time, as well as through orientations toward and away from” others, objects, and signs (2004, 4). Emotions are thus “relational” and orientated as they “involve (re)actions or relations of ‘towardness’ or ‘awayness,’” such that changes in the way one encounters objects and others entails an “affective reorientation” (8). The circulation of emotions and the orientations of individuals constitute the mode of relations to others and objects. She argues in a subsequent work that the “orientations we have toward others shape the contours of space by affective relations of proximity and distance between bodies” (2006, 3). Orientation is a corporeal relation to objects and others in space, one that entails a directedness toward and away from objects and others. Disorientation, consequently, becomes how we can “face a different way” through questioning “forms of social gathering” (24); it upsets normative “ground” so that bodies can come together in new ways, differently orientated to each other and to the world around them (161-62).

Marx’s vision of sense, species-being, and objects in his discussion of the transcendence of private property can be productively read in terms of orientation and disorientation, which for Ahmed are always bound up with affect and emotion. In the “emancipation of the senses” – and thus the emancipation of relations to humans and to non-human objects – “the object becomes … a social object,” the individual becomes “for himself a social being,” and “society becomes a being” for the individual in the object (EPM, 107; Marx’s emphasis). Individuals shift from a
one-sided, appropriative, utility-driven orientation to others and objects to one that reimagines these objects and others as constitutive of the social world and thus necessary for the individual’s existence in that world. In more Spinozan terms, one could say that the encounters and general orientation of objects and others become joyful encounters that mutually enrich capacities (for Marx, the “essential powers”) instead of one-sided sad encounters that deplete power. “Social organs develop in the form of society” such that “activity in direct association with others, etc., has become an organ for expressing my own life” (107; Marx’s italics). Marx discusses all this within the rubric of the sensing body, where “the senses have therefore become directly in their practice theoreticians” that relate to “the thing” as an expression of “human relation” (107; his italics). The embodied relation, thus disoriented, has undergone a drastic transformation, moving bodies in more enriching and closer proximity to each other and to objects, generating a new form of social gathering. Such shifts, Ahmed shows us, reorganize affective and emotional circulations. In this sense, communist affect is tied to disorientations in the embodied relations between bodies, selves, others, and objects.

The role of machines in a future communist society marks a particularly notable refinement of this reoriented relation to objects. In the Grundrisse, Marx embarks upon a sustained engagement (often deemed the “Fragment on Machines”) with the functions and developments of machinery in capitalism as well as machinery’s relations to labor, alienation, the wage, and surplus value (G, 690-716). In the course of this analysis, Marx makes several provocative suggestions about the potential role of machinery in communism, possibilities being blocked by capitalist forces. With the development of an “automatic system of machinery,” the “most complete, most adequate form” of machinery, the living machinery becomes “a moving power that moves itself,” such that workers are only the “conscious linkages” of machines, but
without “consciousness” of the “science which compels” the machinery (692-93). In this process, the “accumulation of knowledge of skill, of the general productive forces of the social brain,” is “absorbed into capital, as opposed to labour,” and thus “knowledge appears as alien” to the worker” (694-95). Approached dialectically, though, this capitalist development of productive forces produces conditions for capitalism’s own dissolution. Living machinery depends on the coordination of social combination and cooperation to engender “general productive force” (700) while reducing the need for direct human labor – the need for their “expenditure of energy” (701).

These constitute, for Marx, conditions for the emancipation of labor (700-702). Machinery’s development achieves the level of a breaking point in the “moving contradiction” of “capital itself,” that “it presses to reduce labour time to a minimum” while positing “labour time … as sole measure and source of wealth” (706).65 As a “watchman and regulator to the production process itself,” there arises the potential for “the appropriation” of the worker’s “own general productive power” as well as “understanding” and “mastery” of nature through the worker’s “presence as social body”; this is, “in a word, the development of the social individual” (705). With this “transformation,” wealth on the basis of the appropriation of surplus labor “appears a miserable foundation” compared to living machinery, the “surplus labour of the mass” is no longer “the condition for the development of general wealth,” and “production based on exchange value breaks down” (705; his italics). This opens the possibility for the “free development of individualities” (706).

Affectively, this expands the range of the account of communist affect in Marx: the organization of joyful encounters is to incorporate the relation between human bodies and machinic things, not only relations between human bodies. Recall from the first section of this chapter that for both Marx and Deleuze’s Spinoza, essential powers are not exclusive to human
bodies. Marx tells us that interaction between sensing bodies and objects “depends on the nature of the objects and on the nature of the essential power corresponding to it” (EPM, 108; emphasis Marx’s); Spinoza insists that modes “act differently according to the objects encountered” and (re)act through “the affections that come from the objects” (Deleuze 1988, 21). Under capitalism, the affective encounter between worker and machinery is a sad one. Once machinery becomes “living” for Marx, seemingly self-animated, it confronts the worker as a powerful automaton that drains the worker: that “which compels the inanimate limbs of the machinery … acts upon [the worker] as an alien power, as the power of the machine itself” (G, 693). Machinery “confronts living labour … as the power which rules it,” an “appropriation of living labour” in “the form of capital” (693). This is an exemplary sad encounter, as it precisely enacts the sad encounter’s “diminution of the power of acting” of the laboring body as it “encounters another mode” (machinery), that “decomposes it”: the “power of the other mode” is “withdrawn from” the worker, “immobilizing and restraining” that laboring body (Deleuze 1988, 50). As an alien power affecting the worker and subsuming them to this machinic power, machinery decreases their affective capacities. This is the case with knowledge as well, where one could argue that the knowledge-effects of living machinery thwart the development of common notions and adequate ideas. The “accumulation of knowledge and of skill, of the general productive forces of the social brain” redounds to “capital, as opposed to labour” such that “knowledge appears as alien, external” (694-95). If common notions are representations of how bodies and modes enter into compositions to generate higher powers and thus act a catalyst for the intention organizing of joyful encounters, then advanced capitalist machinery doubly blockades their formation. It systematizes sad, not joyful, encounters, but also obstructs the development of knowledge about machinic power and the human-machine interface that would be required to generate common
notions in the first place. The workers engage in no active relation to machinery: instead of both affecting and being affected by machinery, they are only affected, “merely” the “conscious linkages” of the “moving power that moves itself,” the machinery with its “mechanical and intellectual organs” (G, 692).

Once workers appropriate “their own surplus labour” (708), their “own general productive power” (705) and “the power of knowledge, objectified” in machines (706), the affective encounters between workers and machinery become joyful. Instead of confronting the worker as an alien power that drains the forces of the laboring body, machinery enters into relations where human bodies both affect and are affected, in a reciprocally enriching way. The transformation and emancipatory subjectivization of the worker enabled by the temporal labor conditions organized by machinery reorients the relation to machinery and enables the constitution of the genuinely social individual and the freely-developing society. Here, necessary labor time comes to “be measured by the needs of the social individual,” while “the development of the power of social production will grow so rapidly that, even though production is now calculated for the wealth of all, disposable time will grow for all”; in general, now “real wealth is the developed productive power of all individuals” (708; emphasis Marx’s). For Negri, the Fragment on Machines points to a new antagonism and new subjectivity – actualized through changing relations to machinery – for the proletariat “whose power (potenza) becomes more and more immense as the capital tries to destroy its identity,” yet in the “compression of necessary individual labour” Marx theorizes the constitution of “a ‘social individual,’ capable not only of producing but also of enjoying the wealth produced” (1991b, 145; his italics). This immense power, the developed productive power, should be read from the standpoint of affect, as an increase in communal affective capacities. The social individual is in part the individual in
reciprocally augmentative relations of affective capacity, except now the scope of these relations have been expanded to include those with machinic objects. Real wealth, as I have sought to argue throughout this section on communist affect, is affective wealth.

Moreover, common notions may now be formed with a transformed relationship to machinery. Machinery marks how “general social knowledge has become a direct force of production” and the extent to which “the conditions of the process of social life itself have come under the control of the general intellect and been transformed in accordance with it” (706; italics Marx’s). Whereas capitalist organizations of machinic power blockade the vast majority of people from access to the general intellect or social knowledge, transformations in productive relations open up knowledge of – in Spinozan terms – forming compositions of bodies and objects for the organization of joyful encounters and the achievement of higher degrees of power. Social relations themselves become directly productive, and with the development of common notions, community can direct these processes to feedback into the affective potential of all.

The “free time” enabled by a reoriented machinery-human relation – taking the form of “both idle time and time for higher activity” – entails a “natural transform[ation] of its possessor into a different subject,” who “then enters into the direct production process as this” new sort of subject (712). I read this different subject as an affectively-enriched one, whose free time enables the proliferation of affectively reciprocal and intensifying relations, including with machinery. For Marx, this transformed process of production takes two forms. First, it entails the “human being in the process of becoming,” in a particularly Deleuzean moment in Marx (712). Second, it comprises a “practice” or “experimental science” that turns out to be “materially creative and objectifying” in “regards [to] to the human being who has become, in whose head exists the accumulated knowledge of society” (712). The creative material objectification of the self in the
process of production, recall from earlier in the chapter, is itself an affective process of the body acting and being acted upon. The becoming-individual, through a capacious common notion of general, society-wide knowledge produced in concert, realizes the generative potential of labor and thus the affective capabilities of the body. In general, then, the reoriented relation with machinery constitutes an expansion in scope of the unfolding of freer communist affect.

**Conclusion: The Power of the Affective Marx**

To conclude, I turn to two markedly resonant quotes, one from Deleuze’s exegesis of Spinoza (here, he is thinking about the connections between Spinoza and Nietzsche), the other from the final Part of the third volume of *Capital*:

This is what Spinoza calls Nature: a life no longer lived on the basis of need, in terms of means and ends, but according to a production, a productivity, a potency… (Deleuze 1988, 3)

The realm of freedom really begins only where labour determined by necessity and external expediency ends; it lies by its very nature beyond the sphere of material production proper. … The true realm of freedom, the development of human powers as an end in itself, begins beyond [the realm of necessity], though it can only flourish with this realm of necessity as its basis. (*C Vol. III*, 958–59)

The “sociabilities and communities” (Deleuze 1988, 126) imagined here by the two thinkers both offer a vision explicitly beyond need, and beyond utilitarian and consequentialist logics as well – “means and ends for Spinoza,” “external expediency” for Marx. What lies in a realm exceeding necessity is active, dynamic, and I would argue affective power. For the Deleuzean Spinoza, this takes the form of production, productivity, potency; for Marx, the “development of human powers as an end in itself,” as the “true realm of freedom.”67 Perhaps nowhere else do the political-ethical-material-bodily visions of the Marx and Spinoza resonate more strongly.

Deleuze pronounces Part V of Spinoza’s *Ethics* to be a “launching of affects and impulses, a series of whirlwinds” (1988, 130), and in the affective-theoretical resonances
between Marx, Spinoza, and Deleuze, my own embodied experience of this chapter is that of being caught up in the whirlwind. For Deleuze, one way someone can become a “Spinozist” is if they “receive from Spinoza an affect, a set of affects, a kinetic determination, an impulse, and make Spinoza an encounter, a passion” (129). The kinetic impulses that Marx receives manifest in the conceptual, critical, affective resonances I have traced throughout this chapter. The chapter thus works as the kind of Spinozan encounter Deleuze speaks of, making (Deleuze’s) Spinoza an encounter with Marx, and the affects launched as a result entangle me in my thinking-reading-feeling-theorizing process. Following these generates the theoretical endeavor of this chapter, laying out Marx, Deleuze, and Spinoza onto a singular plane in order to trace the resonances, conceptual innovation, and critical power traversing it.

Negri posits that a contemporary reading of Spinoza “shows us that the living alternative to this tradition [of capitalist development] is a material power that resides within the metaphysical block of Modern philosophy” (1991b, xxi). This not only underscores the continued critical importance of Spinoza, but it also points to necessity of reading Marx and Spinoza alongside one another. Marx, perhaps the foremost theorist of capitalist development, prevails as a source of this living material power. This chapter has sought to rearticulate and reinvigorate the combined power of their critical force – the living material power, in the register of affect. The theoretical, ethical, socioeconomic venture that unfolds from mobilizing an affective, Spinoza-inflected reading of Marx reanimates his project, elucidating the generative, affective mode of his materialist philosophy, critique of capital, and vision for a future communist society. Important conceptual foundations for Marx (and Engels) – essential powers, life, production, labor, nature, consciousness, species-being, the human, the object, the body, and so on – take on an affective tonality, interfacing with the Deleuzean-Spinozan account of affect,
affective capacity, and power. The critique of capital becomes not just a critique of capitalist exploitation, appropriation, and alienation, but of the movements of the capture and redirection of proletarian affective capacity – their “vital forces” that debilitate their laboring bodies while reproducing capitalist relations and structures and enriching the bourgeoisie. Finally, Marx’s vision for a future communist society adds an affective project in which the relations of social individuals are organized for the persistent amplification of individual and collective capacities for affecting and being affected.

These are the affective-theoretical repercussions of such a reading of Marx. This project, though, has critical limitations. The next chapter, which shifts to an affective reading of Marxist feminism, elucidates exclusions in Marx’s theorizing in terms of gender. In doing so, it interrogates the viability and reach of the work the current does, problematizing and extending both the Marx and Deleuze-Spinoza frameworks. By engaging in an affective reading of certain Marxist feminists, the next chapter theorizes both that Marxist feminism is critical for continued inquiry into Marx, affect, labor, and capital and that the concept of affective capacity generatively enhances the Marxist feminist project.
Chapter 3
Social Reproduction, Marxist Feminism, and Affective Capacity

Introduction

Not all bodies circulate, produce, and interact in the same way within the relations and modes of capitalist affect, or in a more general sense. Gendered, sexualized, racialized, colonized bodies experience and are constituted by the affective structures of any mode of production in polyvalent ways. That is, there is not a singular capitalist body, proletariat body, or bourgeois body. Through practicing feeling as a method with Marxist feminism, this chapter seeks to problematize and extend the framework I developed in the previous chapter, which deployed the language of a singular body to explore Marx’s resonance with Spinoza and Deleuze and the affectivity of his critique of capitalism. This chapter asks several questions: how can affect theory – and particularly a notion of the body in terms of affective capacity – extend Marxist feminist concerns with reproduction in the term’s multiple valences? To what extent can affect contribute to different elaborations of Marxist feminism? Can an affective reading of Marx remain viable in light of the Marxist feminist critique of Marx and their theorization of interactions between economic and patriarchal forces? To answer these and related questions, this chapter positions Marxist feminism (or at least certain Marxist feminists) as a foundational text for political theory as such, and thus analogous to the status of Hobbes, Marx, and Beauvoir in my project.

I take seriously Weeks’s contention that our discussions of affective and immaterial labor today can and should be enriched by thinking through the lineages of these critical projects located in Marxist feminism, which in her account sought in many ways to grasp what we today call immaterial or affective labor (2007b, 233). I would broaden her claim to argue that Marxist
feminism anticipates some of the concerns of affect theory as such, and does so especially as it rethinks labor and reproduction. This chapter hence renders explicit connections between Spinozan-Marxist notions of affect and Marxist feminism, in a way that expands Marxist feminism. In this theoretical revisiting, I follow Weeks’s call in her engagement with the Wages for Housework movement to construct a “nonlinear” and “multidirectional” relation to feminist pasts, even (perhaps especially) to trajectories such as Marxist feminism that some contemporary narratives about feminism posit as something irretrievably essentialist or superseded and transcended by more recent feminisms (2011, 115–18). Heidi Hartmann contends that one of the central tasks of a Marxist-oriented feminism is to explore the material basis of patriarchal control found in social structures through which the labor of women is controlled and directed (1979, 11–12). Moreover, as Christine Delphy argues, feminism can “annex” the analysis of the oppression of women to a Marxist-oriented materialism that has historically ignored women, sex, and sexuality (1997, 62–63). I argue that my account of Marxist-Spinozan affective capacity proves to be a vital component of this material base for patriarchy, and this chapter reveals the continued importance of Marxist feminism for inquiry into affect, into Marx, into labor, into materialism, and into capitalism.

In its first half, this chapter reaches back to the preceding one to problematize and rearticulate Marx, Spinoza, Deleuze, and affective capacity. I provide an overview of key passages from Marx (and Marx and Engels) on reproduction and reproductive labor, followed by a brief review of the critiques of the Marxist and socialist traditions proffered by Marxist feminists. From here, I sketch an affective, gendered account of social reproduction. In the second half of the chapter, I engage an affective reading of four major works in the Marxist feminist tradition, rearticulating one particularly vital concept deployed by each: Gayle Rubin
and the sex/gender system; Lise Vogel (2013 [1983]) and social reproduction; Ann Ferguson (1989) and sex/affective production; and most of all Rosemary Hennessy (2000) and the human need for sensation and affect. Similar to my above work with Hobbes and Marx, and the subsequent chapter on Beauvoir, I put these Marxist feminist concepts on the same plane with affect theory in order to explore the extent to which they are concerned with affect and the ways that attention to affect reanimates or extends particular components from this mode of theorizing. This reading, by exploring both the generative connections and the disjunctions between affect and thinkers within Marxist feminism, concludes that affect theory most productively works to extend and supplement central Marxist feminist concepts by rearticulating them in an affective register. This additional facet to an affective Marxist feminism – one made legible by feeling as a method – can deepen the reach and impact of its critical project. I conclude by sketching the implications of my account for the concept of freedom, which is complicated by the lack of intersectional and anti-racist analysis in the four thinkers this chapter focuses on.

**Marx and the Reproduction of Affect**

One of the central contentions of Marxist feminism broadly understood is that we must focus not only on production or productive labor as they read much of Western Marxism doing, but also reproduction and reproductive labor. More specifically, Marxist feminists regularly claim that conceptualizing productive and reproductive labor as clearly distinct and more or less mutually exclusive contributes to the oppression of women, especially when a gendered (and/or colonial, and/or racialized) division of labor is overlaid on top of the distinction (Rubin 1975; Hartmann 1979; Mies 1986, 31; Petchesky 1990, introduction; Hennessy 2000, 37–41; Berg 2014, 162–63). In doing so, one of the most frequently turned-to passages from Marx (e.g. Vogel 2013 [1983],
is an early discussion from he and Engels in *The German Ideology* on life, sociality, and production. Here, one can distinguish the fundamental “three aspects of social activity,” all “determined by changing material conditions and social relations” (Petchesky 1990, 8-9). For Marx and Engels, these are: the “production of material life itself,” that is the production of means for satisfying needs; the “creation of new needs” through the “action” and “instrument” of satisfying those prior needs; and the fact that “that men [sic], who daily re-create their own life, begin to make other men, to propagate their kind: the relation between man and woman, parents and children, the *family*” (*German Ideology* [GI], 47-48). Here, reproduction is deeply connected to production, as they all require and are constituted by one another; they comprise three enfolded “moments” or “aspects” (Marx makes it clear they are not “stages”) of “social activity” that “have existed simultaneously since the dawn of history and the first” humans, and “which still assert themselves in history today” (48). The simultaneity and inextricability of production and reproduction makes this formulation promising, as Marx emphasizes that we should not sever these moments from one another, nor set them into successive stages.

Thinking about production and reproduction in affective terms clarifies the importance of their connection. Whether reproduction refers specifically to the reproduction of humans or to the reproduction of labor and the social conditions and relations of labor, affect inheres in these processes. What results when people “re-create their own life” and “propagate their kind” (*GI*, 48) includes bodies understood in terms of affective capacities. If we think of the Marxian human body as interacting essential powers or capacities for affecting and being affected, then the process of creating new humans involves interplay of those very bodies and their powers.
More broadly, re-creating life or social relations entails the replication of conditions, relations, objects, and modes of interacting capacities to affect and be affected.

One of the arguments of this chapter is that attention to affect helps break down too-sharp distinctions between production and reproduction. Gayle Rubin insists that there are processes of both production and reproduction in what is traditionally considered to be the mode of production (1975, 166–67). In the account of Marx and affective capacity I have constructed thus far, affective capacity itself cannot be bifurcated into productive affective capacity and reproductive affective capacity. Bodies as essential powers and capacities for affecting and being affected resist splitting into distinct zones of activity, for affective capacity is not localizable into discrete, separate units in this particular way. The affective capacities shaped by the production of material life or the creation of new needs are the same affective capacities involved in the way humans “daily re-create [their] own life” (GI, 49). Affective capacity or essential powers can only be said to inhabit and act within and trafficking between different realms – whether productive and reproductive labor, or other distinctions such as a liberal division between public and private – if the social organization of those capacities, powers, and bodies channels them into discrete zones in that matter. That is, there is no necessary warrant for bifurcating production and reproduction, but patriarchal capitalist relations may seek to channel affective capacity into dichotomous and disjunctive spheres of activity. Affect itself works across any attempted divisions, and there can be modes of affective exploitation and domination in and across both realms.

This sort of concern with reproduction as it relates to production in general recurs at points throughout Marx’s works, although the further Marx moves through his critique of political economy, reproduction at times loses some of its specific meaning as the production of
new humans. The so-called “mature” Marx is often more concerned with general, more abstract social reproduction than with the reproduction of humans as such. The late Marx echoes the fundamental connection between production and reproduction in the third volume of *Capital*. In the midst of a discussion on ground rent and surplus product in feudalism, Marx makes a far-reaching comment on reproduction in general. He notes that the product of the serf’s labor “must be sufficient in this case to replace his conditions of labour as well as his subsistence” (*C Vol. III*, p. 926). This need to replace the conditions of labor and the laborer’s subsistence, though, is not limited to the feudal mode of production alone. It “is not the result of this specific form but a natural condition of all continuing and reproductive labour in general, of any continuing production, which is always also reproduction, i.e. also reproduction of its own conditions of operation” (926). Here, production is always already reproduction; productive labor is at once reproductive labor.

If we shift to focus more on the reproduction of labor itself, as in the above passage from the third volume of *Capital*, the affectivity of production and reproduction persists. One set of the “conditions of labour” that Marx insists must be reproduced in the labor process itself is, I argue, the capacity to affect and be affected, that vital force of labor capacity that, as I demonstrated in the previous chapter, is a dynamic, generative, capacity of the laboring body in Marx’s thought. If capitalism amplifies affective capacities but directs those toward the enrichment of the bourgeoisie while enervating the bodies of the proletariat, then the capacity that is to be captured must be recreated anew for the continuance of capitalist processes. If the enervated proletarian body was only depleted and destroyed, then it could no longer be a useful source of living labor with which to valorize material for the purposes of profit. Those vital forces themselves must be recreated. Marx provides some elaboration of this reproduction
specific to capitalist formations. He writes that the “labour-power withdrawn from the market by wear and tear, and by death, must be continually replaced by, at the very least, an equal amount of labour power” (C Vol. I, 275). In its destructiveness and power, capitalism demands a mass capture of the sustaining capacities of the body to affect and be affected, and consequently those capacities must be recreated and/or replaced. Because capitalism so enervates affective capacity such that workers are injured or die rapidly, the burden to reproduce more capacity and more bodies to actualize those vital forces increases. Affective reproduction may therefore prove to be especially important within capitalism.

At the most basic level, the “maintenance and reproduction of the working class remains a necessary condition for the reproduction of capital” (C Vol. I, 718). This includes, I would argue, the reproduction of certain kinds of bodies, affective capacities, and essential powers. Their capacity to affect and be affected, as living labor capacity, composes an absolute prerequisite for capitalist production, and must be continually regenerated as such. Given my analysis of capitalist affect, part of what is being maintained and reproduced in this process are the particular relations of affective capacity that situates the working class as a kind of affective class. That is, the reproduction of the working class involves replicating a specific mode of affective relationality and social conditions that structure the capacity to affect and be affected of a particular group of people in a specific way, constituting them as a class. Marx continues from the above quote by noting “the capitalist may safely leave” this reproduction of the proletariat to “the worker’s drive for self-preservation and propagation” (718). By leaving the proletarian’s reproduction to some unspecified drive for self-propagation as opposed to an intervention by capitalist, Marx opens up more space for an affective reading to supplement his account, one accounting for the reproduction of the objects, relations, etc. that sustain bodies and their
affective capacities. If we understand the Marxist materialist body in terms of affect, this drive approximates something like the Spinozan *conatus*, and it connects production, reproduction, and affective capacity. Capitalism requires the reproduction of the working class, including the affective relations of that class and the affective capacities of the individuals comprising that class.

**The Marxist Feminist Critique**

Before proceeding to sketch a framework for a theory of affect and reproduction, it is important to briefly overview central Marxist feminist critiques of Marx. To simplify a multi-faceted literature, the critiqued might be summarized into four categories. First, we can turn to Marx’s notion of production. Maria Mies contends that there is the potential in Marx and Engels’s writing for an expansive definition of production and productive labor, one that consistently understood production in broad terms as the production and reproduction of life and “new life” and would thus not divide out reproductive labor as a separate sphere (1986, 47–52). Had Marx and Engels followed this thread, Mies argues that they would have constructed a theory with great promise for a project of women’s liberation. Instead, she argues there is a reduction – particularly in Marx’s work after the *Grundrisse* – of productive labor to the production of surplus value, in a way that erases non-wage labor, domestic labor, and the like from the realm of production. Hennessy asserts that Marx and Engels both were “blocked by a historical inability to understand the role of domestic labor in capitalist production,” specifically the way that capitalism depended on a “division of labor in the home” and that multiple divisions of labor were “historically regulated by patriarchal gender ideology” (2000, 41).

The second area of criticism concerns the status of the division of labor vis-à-vis women and the family in Marx and Engels. Vogel (2013 [1983], 64–66) argues that Marx and Engels,
despite the potential for a less deterministic and static view, end up conceptualizing the division of labor in naturalistic terms such that women and children appear as naturally inclined to do domestic and/or reproductive labor. The sexual division of labor thus transforms into a natural bifurcation instead of a historical, material product. As such, Marx and Engels come perilously close to a theory where “servile relations naturally constitute the internal organisation of all families in class-society,” in a way that “obscures their understanding of relationships within the working-class household” or attempts at historicizing divisions of labor (64-65).

Third is the question of economism. This category of critique shifts the emphasis slightly, focusing not only on Marx but also on the way that Western Marxism more broadly – and particular socialist, Marxist, and/or communist groups more specifically – articulate a Marxist understanding of the “woman-question,” the common formulation of the issue of gender oppression in much late nineteenth and twentieth century Marxism (Hartmann 1979; Vogel 2013 [1983]). Eisenstein (1979, 11) argues that too often in Marx and Western Marxism, all oppression is reduced to economic relations as the single source of domination. If this is the case, then as Mies emphasizes, the ‘woman question’ becomes a secondary concern, exiled to the realm of ideology, superstructure, or culture (1986, 1; 13). Hartmann writes of integrations of Marxism and feminism that fail for many feminists because concerns about gender are subsumed into and dominated by claims about ‘pure’ economic class relations. As a consequence, she contends, “Marxism and feminism are one, and that one is marxism” (1979, 1). Hennessy contends that social production is separated from reproduction and from sexuality in both Marx and Western Marxist traditions such that sex and desire are dismissed as important concerns for historical materialism (2000, 37–38). In Ferguson’s formulation too much “classical Marxism” is
unable to pose the question of “social organisations of sexuality” outside of “economic class domination” (1989, 23).

Finally, and connected to several of the issues raised thus far, there is the question of women’s liberation. Hartmann (1979, 2-3) critiques the early Marxist tradition in general and Engels specifically for assuming that women’s entry into wage labor from the private, patriarchal family was the key to liberation. The logic of this position, as Hartmann renders it, is that the institution of private property is the most significant factor in women’s oppression, but that capitalism’s effects on the patriarchal family tend to abolish gender difference from the perspective of capital and view all as potential sources of labor from which to extract surplus value. In Hartmann’s view, the political implication of this is the large scale entry of women into wage labor, and the need to join the struggle against capital and private property as such as a proletarian. She critiques this view for insufficiently attending to the differences of gendered experience within the capitalist mode of production, and its occlusion of both the way “women are oppressed as women” and the potential interest of men in the perpetuation of patriarchal systems and forces, including among the proletariat (3).

**Toward an Affective Marxist Feminist Theory of Reproduction**

As the discussion in the previous two sections indicates, reading passages from Marx on reproduction in terms of affect is not only possible, but productively articulates an additional quality of reproduction, the reproduction of affect. However – and this is quite a substantial ‘however’ – there is nothing necessarily gendered about such an account. In this sense, a first and most direct attempt at affectively reading Marx on reproduction itself replicates the problems that Marxist feminists identify in Marx’s work and the Western Marxist tradition. For instance, as Hartmann argues (1979, 7–8), most Marxist categories on their own have no necessary gender
content; concepts like class or wage labor require feminist intervention to be mobilized for any
gendered analysis. For my part, I seek to add particularly affective and gendered content to the
category of reproduction in Marx. Thus, I want to sketch out a possible outline – one especially
informed by Lise Vogel’s work (2013 [1983]) – for understanding the reproduction of affect in
Marx’s theory in gendered terms informed by Marxist feminism, with the subsequent section
exploring this framework’s relation to an affective reading of four major Marxist feminist
concepts.

To outline this framework in a somewhat schematic way, there is an affective component
of Marxian reproduction, whether that reproduction is of life, humans, social relations, or labor
power. At the most basic level, because Marxian bodies in general or labor capacity more
specifically can be read in terms of affective capacity and essential powers, the category of
reproduction in Marx implicates the replication of power and capacity. Affect must be
regenerated, as the organization of affective capacity in a particular mode of production must
itself be reproduced as a basic requirement of the perpetuation of society as such. To gender this
account of reproduction, we can posit that the burden for the activities, processes, and products
that do the work of regenerating affect has historically and materially been governed in most
societies by a gendered, patriarchal division of labor whereby those determined to fall into the
category of woman and/or female must do this labor. Those socially determined to fall under the
category of ‘women’ are thus functionally assigned – usually through violence and coercion
(Mies 1986, 65–71) – the duty for the (re)production of life, a category that includes the
reproduction of affect. Reproduction is an expansive category covering all those activities,
processes, and relations involved in the (re)production of the capacity for labor power (Hennessy
2000, 64–65), and the relations of reproduction are always social in the Marxist sense of the term
This gendered, affective reproduction takes the forms of many activities: procreation, housework, child rearing, cooking, cleaning, care work, sex, sex work, socialization, and more. Ultimately, this framework posits that reproductive labor always includes the reproduction of affective capacity and essential power, and that this affective reproduction is subordinated to a gendered division of labor. One material basis of the domination of women is thus the differential distribution, direction, and shaping of affective capacity.

The point of sketching out the framework in this way – and indeed, the point of the chapter thus far – is not to suggest that Marx was right all along, or that affect ‘solves’ the problems in Marx raised by Marxist feminist critique. Instead, it is to suggest that Spinozan-Deleuzean affect usefully explicates and extends the Marxian category of reproduction, and that this account of affect and Marx is at least tentatively sustainable from a Marxist feminist standpoint in the potential for it to be gendered. Marxist feminist attention to gendered affective reproduction would center gender division in the material organization of affect and its reproduction. This framework also problematizes my claims in the preceding chapter to read all labor as affective, against those who temporally localize “affective labor” in late/neoliberal capital. Such a claim risks obscuring the specificity of domestic work and care work, including its global dimensions (cf. Hochschild 2000; Hochschild 2012; Parreñas 2015; Brown 2016). These modes of work are affective in ways that are particularly salient for understanding gender oppression, as this chapter works to elucidate. Marxist feminism – or other forms of critical sociological and political analysis – emphasizes the need to hold on to the way that labor can be affective in different ways with varying effects even if all labor is affective in some more limited sense.
Marxist Feminism and Feeling as Method

With this reading of Marx on reproduction and tentative framework for a feminist analysis of affective reproduction, I now turn to more directly practice feeling as a method with Marxist feminist theorizing itself. By engaging in an affective reading of four Marxist feminists and through analyzing the extent to which my discussion of Marxist-Spinozan affect can be mobilized with central Marxist feminist concepts, this main section of the chapter explores several questions: to what extent does Marxist feminism anticipate affective concerns with reproduction and labor? In what ways does affect interact, connect, and diverge from Marxist feminist theorizing? When affect does conflict with Marxist feminist work, is this rupture inevitable? Most vitally, can affect theory productively extend and rearticulate the critical project of Marxist feminism? I think through these questions in relation to four major categories from Marxist feminist thought that seek to analyze the intertwining of economic and gendered forces and to deploy materialist feminist analysis to address the aporias in Marx’s own thought: the sex/gender system (Gayle Rubin); social reproduction (Lise Vogel); sex/affective production (Ann Ferguson); and most importantly the human need for sensation and affect (Rosemary Hennessy).

Gayle Rubin: Sex/gender systems

In “The Traffic in Women” (1975), Gayle Rubin articulates the need for analysis into what she terms “sex/gender systems,” the “set of arrangements by which a society transforms biological sexuality into products of human activity, and in which these transformed sexual needs are satisfied” (159). Considering the history of gender oppression, this most often takes the form of a “systematic social apparatus which takes up females as raw materials and fashions domesticated women as products” (158). In a complex reading of Marx and Engels, Lévi-Strauss,
Freud, and Lacan, Rubin seeks to develop a theory where “sex and gender” are not just reduced to or subsumed under the “mode of production” such that the oppression of women becomes “a reflex of economic forces” (203). In doing this, she insists on the need to see production and reproduction, as well as “sexual systems” (209) and “economic and political arrangements,” as intricately and multiply intertwined. In her discussion of Marx and Engels, she conceptualizes sex/gender systems as in part an organizing of bodies and social relations to meet biological needs, one structured by what Marx calls the ‘historical and moral element’ that partially shapes the content of the requirements for the reproduction of the worker. This element determines, for example, that a wife is necessary for the a worker, that women do housework instead of men, and that women do not inherit property or assume positions of religious and political authority (163-64). It is within this sex/gender system that Rubin claims the oppression of women can be located and analyzed.

Rubin’s conceptualization of the sex/gender system interacts productively with the concept of affective capacity and its reproduction. The schema that social and economic forces take “raw material” (in Rubin’s case, biology, or “females”) and transform them into products of these forces (socially constituted means for satisfying needs, or domesticated women) can also model the affective flows and reproduction that I have laid out. Affective capacity is to some extent a “raw material,” the biological needs can include the replenishment of affective capacity, and affect can be channeled, shaped, and appropriated by social forces, for example the affective relations of capitalism I theorized in the previous chapter. Crucially, this can include the direction of bodies into socially shaped roles delimited through the differential structuring of those bodies’ essential powers. Rubin’s framework may enable an examination of the way that the social routing of affective capacities helps constitute the categories man and woman, and the
oppression of one by the other. In this sense, sex/gender systems include an affective component. There is, presumably, a more or less similar affective capacity connected to different kinds of bodies for providing care and nurturance, or to perform the kinds of labor necessary for the reproduction of labor capacity. However, these potentials can be channeled repeatedly over time so that assigning such activities to a limited group appears natural or inevitable in a way that obscures how social forces – i.e., an affective sex/gender system – work on those capacities for reproducing life. I thus claim that an investigation grounded in Marxism and affect becomes one potential project answering Rubin’s call for modes of “Marxian analysis of sex/gender systems” that interrogate these systems not as “ahistorical emanations” but as “products of historical human activity” (204). The kind of Marxist-Spinozan perspective I have developed in this and the preceding chapter could productively take up one variety of this task by historicizing the general theoretical account of affect, the body, and reproduction I have developed thus far to examine particular forces, relations, objects, and historical moments constituting sex/gender systems that oppressively assign the work of reproducing societies, bodies, and life itself to women.

Lise Vogel: social reproduction

Lise Vogel examines Marx, Engels, and the Marxist tradition from the perspective of social reproduction in her *Marxism and the Oppression of Women* (2013 [1983]). Arguing that one occasionally finds in the “mature” Marx the “rudiments of a theoretical foundation for analysing the situation of women from the point of view” of social reproduction and reproduction of labor power (60), Vogel locates oppression in social reproduction (8-9) and asserts that socialist or Marxist feminism must proceed from and expand upon Marx’s account of reproduction. This feminist standpoint on social reproduction starts from the Marxist
observation that labor power has to be reproduced: the “reproduction of labour-power is a
condition of production, for it reposit[es] or replaces the labour-power necessary for production”
(144). In Vogel’s account, most societies organize social reproduction through a division of
labor assigning women the role of performing the labor that maintains and reproduces labor
capacity, especially work that nurtures and socializes children (152). While the “exact form”
dominating relations of social reproduction take varies, the “arrangement is ordinarily
legitimated by [men’s] domination of women and reinforced by institutionalised structures of”
oppression (153). Domestic labor, for example, thus has “a material character” analyzable “in
terms of social reproduction as a whole” when considered in relation to the “maintenance and
reproduction of labour-power” (32-33).

Affective reproduction, as well as an affective reading of Marx, complement Vogel’s
account of social reproduction. Vogel understands labor power as “a latent capacity borne by a
human being,” and “its potentiality is realised when labour-power is put to use - consumed - in a
labour-process”; social reproduction therefore involves the replacement of labor power (143-44).
The language of the labor power being reproduced as a capacity that human laborers bear and
actualize is similar to my own reading of Marx’s concept of labor capacity, although Vogel does
not herself take this theorization in anything like an affective direction. Also, as I discussed
earlier in this chapter, reproduction is always affective reproduction. Vogel claims that Marx’s
discussion of ‘productive consumption’ “implies” a concept of reproduction “operat[ing] at the
level of class-relations and social reproduction as a whole” that “would cover the maintenance
not only of present wage-workers but of future· and past wage-workers (such as children, aged
and disabled persons, the unemployed),” a category that contains “those who are not currently
wage-workers but take part in the process of individual consumption (such as housewives)” (67).
I argue that the maintenance of all of these kinds of people involves a regeneration of their capacities for affecting and being affected. Indeed, Vogel indicates that this productive consumption linked to social reproduction is an expansive category, comprising the consumption of “means of subsistence – food, housing, clothing, and the like” that lead to the result the workers “maintain themselves” (66-67). I suggest we add affective capacity and the essential powers of the body into the “and the like” from Vogel. In a later work reevaluating her earlier account, Vogel notes that the meaning of the reproduction of labor power is continually shifting (2000, 153), and that throughout the 1990s it tended to lose its Marxist and theoretical character in favor of functionalist and/or empirical study (154). Despite these changes, she argues that gendered economic processes and trends in the 1990s demand a renewal in theorizing “capitalist social reproduction” and especially domestic labor’s role in that reproduction (168-69). I suggest that a Marxist-Spinozan and feminist focus on affective capacity in its reproduction is one fruitful critical pursuit along these lines. If we are to locate oppression in the processes and relations of social reproduction as Vogel suggests, then this implicates an exploration of the affective forces that help constitute those processes and relations, especially as they relate to the division of labor.

Ann Ferguson: sex/affective production

Ann Ferguson develops the concept of “sex/affective production” in her *Blood at the Root* (1989). The concept, a “socialist-feminist model,” constructs a “general analytic category” to analyze social formations in a way that examines the interplay of economic and social systems to interrogate “male dominance” (6). These “modes of sex/affective production” are “systems which socially construct ‘sex/affective energy’, that human physical and social interaction which is common to human sexuality, parenting, kin and family relations, nurturance and social
bonding”; “just like economic systems, they are historically various. It is in these systems that male dominance in different forms is perpetuated” (7-8). The “human desires connected to sexuality and love and consequently to parenting and social bonding” are historically organized and shaped by these modes of sex/affective production (77). This notion of sex/affective energy that in Ferguson’s account is structured by modes of production invokes a “‘social energy’ theory of sexuality” that Ferguson situates in a tradition including Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari, and symbolic interactionist sociobiology (chap. 3). Here, sexual energy becomes “merely one form of a social yet bodily based desire to unite with others,” and has “no particular ‘natural’ objects or bodily functions” (78). The oppression of women can operate through these modes of sex/affective production, especially if they have “two major components”: “material forms of domination” such as the patriarchal nuclear family or “segregated wage labour” and “sexual symbolic codes,” sets of “normative regulations and oppositions” (90). When emphasizing the productive material aspects, Ferguson’s framework leads to the consideration of the way that the products, so to speak, of sex/affective production, such as “domestic maintenance,” children, nurturance, and care in the family are often the result of greater work by women than men even as women receive less of these ‘products’ (132-33). In general, Ferguson’s theory of sex/affective production and energy seeks to perform a socialist, materialist, and feminist analysis of a social energy theory of sexuality to explore the interaction between economic and social systems in the creation and sustaining of “male dominance.”

Most obviously in relation to my own project, Ferguson invokes “affect” in her work on sex/affective production. However, writing before the ‘affective turn,’ her use of ‘affect’ is more of a generic term analogous to feeling or passion than it has the theoretical specificity and singularity it acquires more recently after the work of Clough, Massumi, and many others. I
contend that affect in this more precise sense – and particularly in the way I have articulated it in
in relation to Marx, Spinoza, and Deleuze – helps to supplement and clarify the particularly
embodied, material qualities of her socialist feminist concept of sex/affective production,
especially in terms of the historical organization of bodily essential powers for affecting and
being affected. That is, we can use affect theory to shift Ferguson’s account of sex/affective
energy and production into the register of affective materiality. Ferguson herself likens the
concept of sex/affective production to Deleuze and Guattari’s “desiring production” in Anti-
Oedipus, as well as to Rubin’s “sex/gender systems” (77). She critiques Deleuze and Guattari,
though, for “emphasising the materialism of sexuality” so much that they “treat its sociality as
merely an artificial aspect” that “leads them to emphasise the bodily aspects of sex to the
exclusion of the desire for social connection” (73). While I would disagree with this reading of
Deleuze and Guattari – I think the two accounts of the bodily and the social as they relate to
sex/affective energy are closer than Ferguson indicates – the important point is an affective,
Spinozan-Deleuzean Marx illustrates crucial aspects of the way that social relations constitute
and are constituted by bodily and affective matter. This sort of perspective can give rise to a very
rich account of the social desire for social connections, and the prevailing conditions that best
support reciprocal and affirming bodily-social relations.

My account of capitalist affect parallels the structure of the sex/affective production
specific to women under patriarchal social formations in Ferguson. For her, women do most of
the work of sex/affective production – in my terms, they intensify and actualize the generative
capacity to affect – while not receiving the potential benefits: in terms of affect itself, their
affective capacity is diminished and they are organized into relations and networks of sad affects
that dampen the ability to act. In different ways, the proletariat in Marx or women in Ferguson
are oppressed in a material way by the social organization of affective forces, where affect has a more specific meaning. Neither group receives the reciprocal intensity or increased bodily power or relationality that their own affective work produces. Moreover, Ferguson carefully attends to the effects of “sexual symbolic codes” – what might in some Marxist traditions fall into a secondary, purely ideological zone in the superstructure – on sex/affective energy. These codes, such as the construction of exclusive dichotomies like “married woman/prostitute” or “mother/lesbian” work, among other things, to “reduce[e] the sex/affective energy and interactions between women” (90). By shifting Ferguson’s discussion into the register of affect, it is possible to think through the effects of such separations in terms of a reduction in the capacity for bodies to affect and be affected by one another as they prevent, in Spinozan terminology, bodies to form compositions with one another. For Ferguson, women are blocked from forms of “social bonding” between each other that would enable the reciprocal exchange and “ongoing flow of sex/affective energy”; straight women are symbolically separated from lesbian (we might today also say queer) women, white women are separated from black women, and so on (83–90). From the standpoint of affect, these ideological or symbolic codes generate important material, bodily effects not unlike the effects on affective capacity of particular modes of economic organization.¹⁷ In general, Ferguson’s work is crucial in several ways in articulating an affective and feminist reading of Marx through her focus on the organization of material, familial, sexual, and ideological relations that constitute the domination of women; attention to Spinozan-Marxian affect in reading her work illuminates one vital component of these dominating forces.

Rosemary Hennessy: The human need for sensation and a critique of affect
Rosemary Hennessy, in her *Profit and Pleasure* (2000), presents perhaps the hardest case for the viability of my account of affect and reproduction in the context of Marxist feminist theorizing, and for an affective reading of Marxist feminism. She offers a sustained critique of Deleuzean theories of affect from a Marxist feminist perspective, and I consequently want to spend the most time engaging her work. Hennessy provides a challenging opportunity to reevaluate the entire framework I have been developing; it is hence important to explore her broader critique in addition to focusing on a single concept, as I have done with my more selective theoretical encounters with Rubin, Vogel, and Ferguson.

One concept important in Hennessy’s text is that of the human need for sensation and affect, which she understands as one of the “many basic human needs,” the meeting of which “capitalism has outlawed” (22). More specifically, she is interested in the way that “under capitalism sensation and affect have been historically organized so that some ways of meeting these needs have been considered legitimate while others have been” proscribed (22). This framework situates this need for sensation and affect, which she calls a “species need” having the same status as needs for “education, leisure time, health care, food, and shelter” (22). More precisely:

Human needs also include the ability to exercise certain human potentials. As a species, humans have many capacities — for intellect, invention, communication; the capacity for sensation and affect and for affective social relations is another. … Moreover, many human affective capacities are integrated in the satisfaction of vital human needs in that they mediate the social relations through which these needs are provided. Affective needs are inseparable from the social component of most need satisfaction, then, but they also constitute human needs in themselves… (210-11)

Hennessy thus seeks to historicize pleasure and sensation, noting her relation to Ferguson’s work in the process. In her history of the shaping of sexual identity and subjectivity by capitalism, she focuses in part on the way that capitalism organizes, disciplines, and reifies this need for
sensation and affect. This inquiry into the organization of pleasure, sensation, and affect interrogates the “structures of desire” and “formations of subjectivities” these processes produce (35). Her Marxist critique of the capitalist structuring of sexuality, sensation, and need opens onto an alternative political vision. Ultimately, Hennessy argues that if “we no longer ignore affect in the calculus of human needs, we create the possibility of “forging a collective standpoint for oppositional – even revolutionary – forms of consciousness” that “acknowledge how political agency, practice, and commitment are motivated, complicated, and undermined by our human capacity for affect” (208). This relation of affect and need – one foreclosed by capitalism – holds radical potential for her.

Hennessy criticizes Deleuze and Guattari’s account of desire from *Anti-Oedipus* and Massumi’s elaboration of affect, both on their own terms and as they relate to one another (70-72; 212-15). She also explicitly opposes her account of the “human capacity for sensation and affect” to accounts of “sensation-affect” as “the motor of production” – presumably a reference to Deleuze and Guattari – or “prediscursive matter or energy” – apparently referring to Massumi (72). Not only do I want to examine the potential of my Marxian account of affective capacity in light of her theorizing, I want to explore these particular critiques. Hennessy situates Deleuze and Guattari in *Anti-Oedipus* as in some ways the exemplar of what she discusses as the “postmodern left’s” “turn to pleasure and desire as categories of experience outside culture-ideology and prior to all social production” (71-72). “Desire in the form of energy flows between organ-machines” – Deleuze and Guattari’s ‘desiring-production’ – is “the starting point of social life” and the “basis of social production,” and in her reading, Deleuze and Guattari “locate desire,” the “very matter of life,” “outside of history” (70).
Her critique of this notion is threefold. First, she maintains that Deleuze and Guattari make it “impossible” to analyze the ways the “content and the forms the desiring subject has taken change from one historical formation to another and in different phases of capitalism” (70). Second, she claims that in *Anti-Oedipus*, “the separation of sexuality from historical and material production has become complete” and “the structures of exploitation on which capitalist production depends have completely disappeared” even though for her Deleuze and Guattari claim some interest to theorize desire in relation to capitalism (71). Third, and more generally, she situates Deleuze and Guattari as part of broader academic trajectories – along with Butler, Rubin, “avant-garde queer theory,” much of cultural studies, and other discourses – that at best have an “ideological affiliation” with late capitalism and at worst are allied with forces of late capitalism in “helping to consolidate a hegemonic postmodern culture” (68-69). While approving of Massumi’s efforts to work against “postmodern theories” that “ignore emotion and affect” and to develop an interface between affect, consciousness, and “social elements,” she argues that his “reduction of the material to matter” – which she sees as “similar” to Deleuze and Guattari – “undercuts his insights” (212-14). Looking at Deleuze and Guattari and Massumi collectively, Hennessey contends that this sort of affect ends up as “a corporeal energy autonomous from the division of labor” (215).

I disagree with this particular reading of Deleuze and Guattari and of Massumi, and of desire and affect in that sort of theoretical tradition. I would contend that my own project performs precisely the kind of inquiry into the organization of affect under capitalism that Henesssy calls for, and that such a project is at the very least latent in the work of Deleuze and Guattari. The lengthy third chapter of *Anti-Oedipus* presents a quasi-history of varying modes of desiring-production in relation to different “social machines,” including two sections – “The
Civilized Capitalist Machine” and “Capitalist Representation” (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 222–62) – specifically taking up flows of desire as they interact with capitalism and its capitalist machines. While neither historicist nor strictly Marxist – although they continually turn to Marx – Deleuze and Guattari are quite interested in changes in modes of desiring- and social-production and in the desiring subject. Capitalism itself evinces some level of specificity, with its “singular nature of” a “conjunction” of “deterritorialized flows,” which they read into Marx as “the deterritorialized worker” with their labor capacity to sell and the “decoded money that has become capital and is capable of buying” this labor capacity” (224-25). That is, capitalism assembles and channels desire in particular ways, generating singular and contingent modes of production, representation, signification, family, material psychiatry, and so on. Rather than separating desire from social and material production, as Hennessy claims Deleuze and Guattari end up doing, they insist that desire always invests a social field and – even if desire is indeed a kind of “primordial matter of energy flows” (Hennessy 2000, 70) – it always conjoins with particular social machines. As Deleuze and Guattari write, the “truth of the matter is that social production is purely and simply desiring-production itself under determinate conditions” (1983, 29; their emphasis). It is not the case that desiring-production functions in total isolation, but that it constantly interacts with these determinate conditions of particular social formations and their social machines. Nor is it the case that desire itself is exclusive of social organization. As Deleuze and Guattari put it polemically, “There is only desire and the social, and nothing else” (29; their emphasis).20

Moreover, affect or corporeal energy need not be severed from concerns of the division of labor, as Hennessy contends they are. In the chapter on Marx, I demonstrated that affective capacity is channeled and in many ways appropriated through the division of labor: it is in part
the hierarchal division of labor that bifurcates workers – whose affective capacities are intensified but appropriated in the labor process of actualizing that capacity – from the bourgeoisie who benefit from the affective capture in capitalist production. Rather than dividing affect and the division of labor, there is a particular affective component to the division of labor. In this chapter, I have contended that affect helps elucidate the way that society is reproduced, and that one of the effects of the gendered divisions of labor is to disproportionately yoke a certain subset of people to reproductive labor. In other words, in both of these examples affect is at stake in the division of labor, and I would more generally assert that one of the divisions of a division of labor is a differential distribution of affective relations, capacities, and so forth.

Even if one were to concede Hennessy’s claim that Deleuze and Guattari and Massumi present theories of affect that are on their own too ahistorical, or lack specific enough accounts of “structures of exploitation on which capitalist production depends” (2000, 71), it does not follow that affect theories of this kind always necessarily have these potential faults. If anything, Hennessy’s critiques, as well as her broader account of sensation and affect, point to the need to assemble and think through the possible interactions between a Marxist and/or Marxist feminist critique of capital and Deleuzean affect theory, as I do in this and the previous chapter. Ultimately, my argument is that Hennessy’s Marxist feminist project on the one hand, and affect theory proceeding from Deleuze, Guattari, and Massumi on the other, can and should be articulated together, not constructed as exclusive theoretical or political endeavors. In her reading of Elizabeth Grosz on desire, Hennessy contends that theories of desire proceeding from Spinoza, Nietzsche, and Deleuze and Guattari (including Grosz’s), conceptualizations which “formulate desire primarily as production” (194), are effects of or complicit with late capitalism. For her, “knowing desire as freely mobile, indiscriminate micro-energies is itself an effect of late
capitalism,” and the notion of desire as energy flows is particularly well suited to a capitalist regime of hyperconsumption and accumulation” (196-97). I would instead argue that affect, understood in similar ways, has the potential to be a fundamental critical tool for illuminating one particular mode of capitalist reproduction and capitalist domination: the way that it really does seize the vital forces – the affective capacity – of the people at their very root. To fully critique the capitalist organization of need, sensation, desire, and affect, as Hennessy wishes to do, we need an encounter between Marx, Marxist feminism, and this sort of theory of affect as mobile bodily energy.

Indeed, Hennessy regularly discusses affect and sensation in the language of capacity, and hints at the very reading of Marx that I offer. “As a species, humans have many capacities,” Hennessy writes, including “the capacity for sensation and affect and for affective social relations”; ultimately “all people deserve to have the conditions available that will allow them to exercise and develop their affective capacities” (210-11). It is theoretically fruitful to situate such a formulation in a trajectory such as my assemblage of Spinoza, Marx, and Deleuze that engages affect in terms of bodily capacity and essential power. Doing so enables access to the full range of affectivity, corporeality, and materiality of Hennessy’s account, as well to conceptual resources for rearticulating a Marxist critique of capitalism attentive to the affective features of bodily existence. This sort of reading is embryonic in Hennessy’s own work: she suggests at one point that “we might even say affective potential is included in what Marx means by labor,” and that even if Marx does not “explicitly name them as such, affective needs are part of the human potential for ‘self-realization’ that Marx often refers to when he contends that the development of needs is historically contingent on the development of human potential” (215). My own reading picks up this line of flight from Hennessy’s work and takes it back to Marx himself. Instead of
turning away from a Spinozan and/or Deleuzean account of affect, theorizing this besides Marx’s work itself as a way to open up expansions upon Marxist feminist critical projects is, I argue, the most generative way of carrying out the kind project that Hennessy intends.

This becomes clearer when turning to Hennessy’s particular theorization of the capacity and need for sensation and affect, with an affective Marx at hand. She incisively demonstrates throughout the text the ways that capitalism works to organize sensation and affect such that “some ways of meeting these needs have been considered legitimate while others have been” suppressed (22). More specifically when it comes to sexuality – one mode “through which the human capacity for sensation and affect and the human need for social intercourse” are organized – capitalism constitutes patriarchal heterosexuality as the “hegemonic form” of social relation (22). A framework of affective capacity via Spinoza, Deleuze, and Marx helps to clarify and expand a critical account of some of the mechanisms of this organization and reification of heterosexuality and heteronormativity. In this framework, one of the most important potentialities of the body is to enter into relations and compositions with other bodies so that both can reciprocally reach a higher level of power, a greater capacity for affecting and being affected as a result of that composition. These compositions take multiple forms, and one can speculate these include a wide variety of compositions of bodies (and objects) organized around pleasure, desire, sex, and sensation as various ways to meet what Hennessy calls the need for sensation and affect. For instance, one could follow Ferguson – and Hennessy approvingly cites Ferguson’s work – in her claim that sex/affective energy is a broad “desire to unite with others, i.e. to incorporate oneself with a loved other” without any “particular ‘natural’ objects or bodily functions” (A. Ferguson 1989, 78). If, as Hennessy argues, capitalism organizes capacities for meeting that need to proscribe homosexuality, bisexuality, or other modes of fulfilling these sets
of bodily needs and capacities, her work can be extended through a reading of this as the attempted channeling of all affective capacities in the realms of sex and sensation into a highly constricted set of socially sanctioned and organized relations and compositions. Capitalist social formations thus dampen and delimit the vast array of affect as capacity and power in regards to sexuality. This sort of affective analysis deepens the critical reach of Hennessy’s project by rearticulating into an additional register of affect.

Hennessy explores the consolidation of heteronormativity as a “reification of the human capacity for sensation, affect, and social intercourse” in Europe in the mid- and late-nineteenth century (2000, 100). My account of affective capacity can clarify what she identifies here as the “contradictory relationship” of solidified heteronormativity in relation to “patriarchal gender ideology” (101). In her account, “changes in the division of labor, property, and consent law” start to create some small realm of “sexual agency” more open than a “bourgeois gender ideology of passionless womanhood” (101). However, the desire of the feminine subject becomes socially legible and authorized only on the condition of “direct[ing] that desire towards a heteronormative goal in which she was not the agent but the object of desire”; the possibility of lesbian or other non-heterosexual forms of desiring-subjectivity become relegated to an outlaw status (101-102). In terms of affective capacity, this dynamic at least formally resembles the tension of capitalist affect that I constructed in my reading of Marx in the previous chapter: in the fragmentary decomposition of rigid social forces – feudalism on the one hand, patriarchal “Victorian gender hierarchy” (99) on the other – emergent social formations free up affective potentials – labor capacity, sexual desire – to develop and amplify. Capitalist forces and relations then recodify and channel these capacities into oppressive forms – capitalist production’s appropriation of living labor and heteronormative proscription of certain desiring-relations.21
Late nineteenth century sexology could have opened up “all combinations of desiring subject and object” – in my terms, any potential composition of affective bodies – but capitalism’s “investment in a heterogendered division of labor” leads to enforcement of “arbitrary boundaries” of sexuality and gender, “to be secured through heterogendered norms” (102). As a collection of forces channeling desire and sexuality into a heteronormative “component of labor and labor power” that reinforces oppressive divisions of labor and “the exploitation of women’s labor in the wage market” (104), capitalism, heteronormativity, and patriarchy work on, shape, redirect, and attempt to delimit affective capacity itself.

More broadly, my own reading of Marx and affect resonates with Hennessy’s overarching critique of capitalism as such. Within capitalism, she argues, “sensation and affect often get separated from the meeting of human needs” (216). Commodity exchange produces not only commodity fetishism but also “a fracturing of our objective human capacities as sensuous, social beings”: “alienation from sensation and affect underpins the organization of commodity production and consumption and the logic of exchange value” (217). Furthermore, exploitation as the appropriation of surplus labor “requires that workers alienate themselves from their human potentials, including their sex-affective potentials,” because it “is only by severing her human potential to labor from her needs that the worker can present herself as ‘owner’ of her labor power” (217). This is consistent with my account of capitalist affective relations: the basic capacity of the worker under capitalism is in many ways amplified through the organization of productive forces under capitalism, but capitalist relations ultimately sever this intensified potential from the actual, long-term needs, bodily integrity, survivability, and power of those laboring bodies through which the capacity is actualized. Moreover, Hennessy specifies some of the mechanisms by which bodily affective capacity is captured in capitalist social formations.
Not only can my reading of Marx and affect vis-à-vis Spinoza and Deleuze add a crucial affective valence to Hennessy’s project as I have demonstrated over the past several pages, but her account of capitalism and the capacity for sensation and affect – even if affect means something different for her – provides added clarity to my own analysis.

Our projects ultimately share a comparable political-economic-ethical commitment, although I assert that it is a Marxist-Spinozan concept of affect that can help to mobilize these convictions. As “human needs in themselves,” affective needs demonstrate that “all people deserve to have the conditions available that will allow them to exercise and develop their affective capacities” (210-11). In my terminology, the ethical project is to construct prevailing social conditions and relations that conduct and compose reciprocal and joyful encounters between bodies such that the capacities for affecting and being affected intensify. This, in my reading in the previous chapter, constitutes a central component of Marx’s idea of communism. Within this general framework, Hennessy points to the vital need for particular attention on sexuality and gender in such a social-affective vision. She insists that in the processes of making legible and socially sanctioned certain modes of sensation, affect, and desire, “whole areas of human affective potential are effectively outlawed” (217). Just because they are outlawed, however, does not mean they dissolve away: there always are “unspeakable sensations and affects that do not fall easily into any prescribed categories,” for instance in the way that “the interface between the available modes of intelligibility [i.e., socially legible sexual identity] and human affective and erotic capacity is never complete” (218). The “human potential for sensation and affect” always manifests as “much richer than sanctioned identity categories capture” (218). These spaces – affective compositions, relations, and social organizations of bodies – might be a (the?) crucial site of articulating, practicing, and fighting for alternative,
more open futurities. Hennessy suggests reorienting oppositional politics to focus on “addressing and connecting the ways capitalism has outlawed the meeting of so many basic needs,” including the “species need” for sensation and affect (22). Hennessy’s work to situate capitalism, sexuality, and affect on the same plane is vital. In this spirit, there is a profound need to theorize together Marx and affect as it emanates from Spinoza and Deleuze. Rather than setting affect as a bodily capacity and essential power as opposed to a Marxist feminist account of capitalism, sexuality, and need, an interaction between the two is fundamental in order to fully interrogate the capitalist organization and limitation of the human need for sensation and affect.

**Freedom, Marxist Feminism, Whiteness: Material Limits**

It is important here to briefly sketch some of the implications for ideas of collective (as opposed to individual) freedom of this affective reading of Marxist feminism. Perhaps most direct among these is a renewed insistence that one cannot assume that something like the liberation of the working class, or a revolution in the mode of production, is ever sufficient for gender liberation, nor is liberation just about including women in productive labor, as Engels seems to suggest. This, one of the major lessons of Marxist feminism (e.g. Eisenstein 1979; Mitchell 1966, 18–19; Hartmann 1979, 3), extends to the affective realm. The affective flows and circulations of capitalism *qua* economic system help constitute patriarchy and gender oppression, but the affective structure of the latter is not reducible to the bourgeois appropriation of proletarian affective capacity. Affect is itself not reducible to economistic terms alone, and its oppressive channelings similarly extend beyond the economic realm. From the standpoint of an affective reading of Marxist feminism, preconditions for a more liberatory and open sociality of gender proliferate, requiring: a breakdown of oppressive divides between productive and reproductive labor;²² freer relations of the reproduction of affect; an overthrow of the gendered affective
division of labor; more open flows and production of sex/affective energy; the meeting of needs for affect outlawed by interacting capitalist, patriarchal, heteronormative, and racist social organization, and so on.

Affect, then, can offer an additional valence to Eisenstein’s understanding of social contradictions that lead to domination but also open possibilities for transformation and liberation. She locates revolutionary potential in the tension between “real conditions” and “possibilities” in capitalist patriarchal society. For her, Marx’s “revolutionary ontology,” when “extended to women … suggests that the possibility of freedom exists alongside exploitation and oppression, since woman is potentially more than what she is” because “women are structured by what she is today – and this defines real possibilities for tomorrow; but what she is today does not determine the outer limits of her capacities” (1979, 9). In the context of this chapter, we might say a standpoint such as this can theorize the way in which the affective capacities of women exceed the structuring and relations of these capacities – and thus constitute an affective source of transformation. Indeed, Ferguson’s “socialist-feminist vision” posits a “society maximising egalitarian and democratic values” that “would, by that fact, tend to maximise reciprocal sex/affective energy and in so doing would increase the amount of sex/affective energy available to all” (1989, 230). Bodily, affective potential exceeds – or at the very least is able to exceed – its oppressive organization; as a result, one condition of possibility for freedom is the liberated, relational, amplifying flows and interactions of these capacities. As this chapter demonstrates, any such account of freedom must pay attention to the gendered organization of affective capacity, in addition to and in its intertwining with capitalist forces and configurations.

The major problem with this account of affect and Marxist feminist freedom, however, is the lack of engagement with questions of race and colonialism in the four thinkers I have
discussed the most thus far. If Marx “indexes the silences, the aporias, in the discourse of classical political economy” (Spillers 2003c [1991], 453), then one must also interrogate Marx’s own silences. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak discusses a range of issues in her rethinking of Marxism – Marx’s critique of the subject and of agency, the need to insert difference into the dialectic, the philosopher-activist relation, concepts of value and representation, Marx’s account of freedom, and more – but does so in the context of imperial and colonialist knowledge production (1999; see especially chap. 1). Marx, Kant and Hegel engaged in “authoritative ‘universal’ narratives where the subject remained unmistakably European” (8). For example, Spivak provides a deconstructive reading of the idea of the “Asiatic Mode of Production” in Marx’s (and Engels’s) thought, arguing that it “marks the desire to theorize the other so that the object, remaining lost in its own space, can become an ‘Asia’ that can break into the circuit of the same by way of the crises of Revolution or Conquest,” and is not something that is theoretically “unimportant” to Marx (79).24 Denise Ferreira da Silva (2007) notes that while Marx and Marxist historical materialism create tools for challenging the ontological and epistemological underpinnings of Euro-imperialist notions of race and globality,25 they deploy similar notions of subjecthood, interiority and exteriority, transparency, determination, representation, and historicity – just in different registers – that continue to uphold the “ontoepistemological” order of European global racism (182-93). Moreover, Brittan and Maynard contest that Marxist discourses articulate race only within the context of class systems (1984, 38–39); race functions as an additive “to what already exists” that does not “change the character of the model taken as a whole” and denies the way that racial oppression is qualitatively distinct instead of only increasing the “degree of oppression” (69). Racism is ultimately not reducible to class relations (Joseph 1981, 103–104).
Marx is not alone in his colonizing gestures: certain strands of Marxist feminism reproduced many of the exclusions and aporias of Marx himself. While critiquing Marx’s problems in accounting for gender, many early Marxist feminist thinkers exhibited analogous lapses in accounting for race. At the same, third world, women of color, and/or postcolonial feminists – Angela Davis, Chandra Mohanty, Gloria Joseph, Aihwa Ong, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Leela Fernandes, and so on – are engaged in Marxist feminist analysis. Gloria Joseph contends that most Marxist feminism of the 1960s and 1970s was usually “race-blind,” in a way that “do[es] a gross injustice to Black women” (1981, 93). When “the reality of the oppression of race relations within the woman question is denied,” theorists “commit a similar, parallel error” to the one they accuse Marxism of when it “focuses on the class question and shortchanges the woman question” (95). Taking on racism – including racism operating within parts of Marxist feminism itself – becomes a necessary precondition in order to effectuate the “happy divorce of patriarchy, capitalism, and racism” (103; 106).

This occlusion of racial difference and racism operated in several linked ways. First, much feminist work ignored the historical reality and persistent effects of slavery, including the particular ways it violently disciplines black women’s bodies and structures their labor and reproduction (Davis 1983, chap. 1; Spillers 2003a [1984]; Spillers 2003b [1987]). Second, black women in the United States have a different relation to the family, motherhood, and reproduction than white women (Spillers 2003b [1987]). Domestic life was the one sphere of quasi-autonomy for Black women during slavery (Davis 1983, 14–18; Joseph 1981, 95) in a way distinct from more “hierarchal sexual roles” in most white families (Davis 1983, 12), yet feminist work on mothering has often “lacked an adequate … race analysis” (Collins 2009, 188). Family, the domestic realm, and motherhood may be more polyvalent for women of color than much white
feminist theorizing of it allows. Third, ideologies of gender roles operate very differently for black women; the bourgeois notion of the housewife – either as object of critique or of celebration – is meaningful for black women in the US only as an impossibility (Beale 1970, 110–11; Caraway 1991, 100–105). Fourth, the specificity of the presence of black women as domestic workers for white families has gone regularly unacknowledged in feminist literatures (Beale 1970, 111–14; Davis 1983, 90–97; Collins 2009, 13–15). Davis challenged the Marxist feminist wages for housework campaign for obscuring this fact (Davis 1983, 230–42). Finally, categories central to white feminism, including some categories articulated in Marxist feminism, have different meanings, implications, and relations to concrete experience for black women. These include domestic labor – which in white feminist theory often ignores black women’s domestic work – and reproduction, which can occlude the specific struggles fought by black women around fertility and reproduction (Carby 1982). Supposedly universal categories in feminist theory, including that of “women,” are often based in particularistic, white experiences; when difference is brought in, it is often rendered pre-theoretical instead of having broader conceptual import (Baca Zinn et al. 1986, 296–97). While not all these exclusions operated in all or most self-proclaimed Marxist feminist work, according to Joseph the Marxist feminist account of “the woman question” in the 1960s and 1970s “has never truly embraced Black women” (1981, 93).

In the course of discussing white feminist theory and the academy, Hortense Spillers underscores that just because “the feminist writer challenges certain symbolic formations of the past in correcting and revisiting them does not destroy the previous authority, but extends its possibilities”; thus, “the analytical discourse that feminists engage in different ways and for different reasons must not only keep vigil over its procedures, but must also know its hidden and
impermissible origins.” If they do this, they might come “to know the seductions of the father,” and knowing “who, in fact, the father is might also help the subject to know wherein she occasionally speaks when she is least suspecting” (2003a [1984], 168). The Marxist feminists I have most engaged with – as well as my reading of them – might accomplish a certain correction and revision of Marx. Marxist feminism incisively highlights the problems and occlusions of Marx on gender, and constructs conceptual resources for thinking through patriarchy, material relations, and capitalism. I have expanded this by bringing affect into its critique and theoretical elaboration. However, in doing so, these Marxist feminists extended the exclusions in Marx’s authority, and I extend the omissions of them both, yielding to the seductions of the (at this point in the tale, not exclusively male) theoretical fathers. Marx and Marxist feminism, especially when concatenated with affect theory, emanate analytical power. And yet, their enmeshment in colonial discourse and overlooking of race, gender, sex, and sexuality (Marx) and frequent inattentiveness when it comes to the histories and positions of women of color and racism (many strands of Marxist feminism) dampen this potential.

More specifically, while I believe that the sketch of affective freedom I construct above drawing on Marx and Marxist feminism is a vital theoretical vision, its scope and generativity are theoretically and materially limited if the affective bodies of the vision are implicitly white. Attention to racial difference with regard to affect and Marxist feminist theory would help correct this. For example, bell hooks calls on feminists to redefine work with attention to black and lower-class women, arguing that both liberal feminist and Wages for Housework solutions fail to articulate a project that engages the needs of “masses” of women while also challenging white supremacist capitalism (1984, chap. 7). Because of ideologies that “judge [work’s] significance solely in terms of exchange value,” that women receiving no or low wages “is seen
as synonymous with personal failure,” such that “women internalize the powerful’s definition of
themselves” in a way that denies their “expression of dignity, discipline, creativity, etc.” (104).
Angela Davis (1983, chap. 13) takes up the future of labor and gender from a Black and Marxist
feminist perspective, and in the course of doing so intervenes in the Marxist feminist domestic
labor debate to argue that housework-as-social-reproduction is a precondition of productive labor
in capitalism, rather than productive itself (230-36). She also critiques the Wages for Housework
movement for insufficient attention to Black women’s experiences doing housework for white
families and to questions of organizing hypothetical remunerated houseworkers (234-42). Davis
therefore calls for the “abolition of housework as the privatized responsibility of individual
women” as a “strategic goal of women’s liberation” that also “contain[s] an explosive
revolutionary potential” (243-44). Ultimately, there is an imperative for those “those who
understand the workings of capitalism and imperialism to realize that the exploitation of Black
people and women works to everyone’s disadvantage and that the liberation of these two groups
is a stepping-stone to the liberation of all oppressed people” (Beale 1970, 116). Much of Marxist
feminism is included in this category, and if it is to realize its articulated liberatory potential –
most especially, in my project, the affective potentials – its problematization and revision is
essential.27

Conclusion: Affective Marxist Feminism

This chapter indicates that Marxist feminism in many ways anticipates some of the central
concerns of the affect theory to come after it. It thus supports Weeks’s claim that contemporary
discussions of affective and immaterial labor have important lineages in earlier Marxist feminist
theorizing, even if these genealogies are obscured or ignored (2007, 233). This point is most
clear in the work of Ferguson and Hennessy, who both talk about something they call affect that
is different than the later, more theoretically specific valence the term will gain. As the above reading of these two thinkers indicates, their insights can be elaborated upon by affect at the same time that their work should inform discussions of affect today. This broader point, though, is applicable to the entire constellation of Marxist feminist thinkers I have assembled in this chapter. Concepts of reproduction, social reproduction, the sexual division of labor, as well as attention to the body as it is implicated in social forces and to polyvalent modes of power all prefigure central concerns of affect theory. The critique of Marx, focusing Marxist inquiry not just on production but also on reproduction and its connection to production, performs similar theoretical work. Upon an affective reading, Marxist feminism not only connects the reproduction of individuals, society, and life itself or challenges earlier accounts of the preservation and maintenance of the social body, but also accounts for the particularly affective kinds of material power and forces driving that reproduction. It moreover explores how those affective forces differentially shape and position various kinds of bodies.

I have argued that even when Marxist feminist theorizing conflicts with the mode of affect theory I am articulating, the theoretical task becomes to work through the generativity and the conceptual work done by these tensions. Pursuing these lines of discord can, I think, extend both theoretical projects. Working through these divergences between literatures I claim as foundational *qua* political theory – Deleuzean-Spinozan affect, Marx, and Marxist feminism – exemplifies one of the main theoretical and methodological commitments discussed in the introduction: affect theory is a productive resource for exploring and working through divergences and problems between various canonical theoretical movements when they are all put on the same plane. So, in this instance, an affect-Marx-Marxist feminism assemblage, held together with the Deleuzean-Spinozan concept of affective capacity, amplifies these theories
both individually and in relation to one another. Indeed, through the tensions transmitted by and challenging to affect, one might generate new, productive, conceptual resources such as a focus on the affective force of the intertwined material bases of capitalism and patriarchy or a gendered, affective account of social reproduction. This necessitates thinking of affect as a crucial political concern that supplements and in some ways rearticulates other Marxist feminist political discourses, appeals, and resistances, just as it can and should be supplemented and re-elaborated by these others concerns. Affect and Marxist feminism are best understood as constantly and inevitably implicated in and acting upon one another.

The discussion in this chapter underscores one of the limits to certain modes of a Spinozan-Deleuzian framework. If the concept of the “the body” becomes too universalized, too singular, too abstract – temptations that the previous chapters on Hobbes and on Marx, Spinoza and Deleuze as well as the current chapter succumb to in some ways – it is easy to conceal the ways in which bodies are always already multiply gendered, racialized, sexualized, and so forth. There is no guarantee that certain modes of theorizing affect can or necessarily will engage gender – or race, sex, sexuality, ability, class, and so forth. Such a conceptual framework, however, does not inevitably carry out this occlusion. In engaging in an affective reading of Marxist feminism in this chapter, I have sought to read affect together with Marxist-materialist feminists to carry out a gendering of the concept of affective capacity vis-à-vis Marx. 28 Many concepts coming from Marx that, as Hartmann contends (1979, 7–8), are potentially useful in thinking about gender even as they have no necessary gendered content. Likewise, affective capacity as a concept in general, or in the way it mobilizes Marx- and Marxist feminism-influenced accounts of reproduction requires an active theoretical intervention if it is to be useful for feminism.
The next chapter takes up a different thinker – Simone de Beauvoir – and turns to a different trajectory of theorizing about affect and emotion, primarily working with Sara Ahmed instead of Spinoza and Deleuze. Two projects these two chapters share, though, is first of all gendering affect and emotion and hence working to ensure that our contemporary affect theory continues to build upon feminist theories that comprise one of its lineages; secondly, they share a commitment to challenging and rearticulating the boundaries of the political theory canon.
Chapter 4
Emotional Orientations: Emotions, Subjectivity, and Gender in Beauvoir

Introduction: Feminist Thought, Beauvoirian Emotion, and Affect Theory

What is feminist emotionality? What emotions circulate in the emergence of subjects, Selves, and Others? How do concepts of emotion and orientation explain the formation of gendered subjects? Can emotions move us to freer and more reciprocal orientations to others? To explore these queries, this chapter brings to bear the framework and practice of feeling as a method that I have been developing thus far in order to re-read Simone de Beauvoir’s *The Second Sex* (Beauvoir 2011; hereafter *SS*). I provide a reading of the theoretical work that emotions do in Beauvoir’s canonical text in order to think through the emotional valences of the questions she poses for political and philosophical thought, gender, and social-political transformation as well as to catalyze a connection between canonical feminist thinking and contemporary theorizing on affect and emotion. The chapter helps us to explore how one node of contemporary work on emotion can generate productive re-imaginings of feminist philosophy lineages; it also permits us to think through the ways the history of feminist thought can inform our accounts of emotion today. My central contention is that attending to embodied emotion in Beauvoir’s work enables us to trace her construction of a theory of subjectivity – and especially the gendered subjectivity of men and women – through what I call emotional orientations; from this, a feminist project of disorientation emerges.

This chapter picks up from the preceding one by exploring a different tradition of feminist thought, and with a different strand of contemporary work on emotion and affect. It shares with the previous chapter a commitment to mobilizing affect theory in order to return to and build upon earlier feminist thought in a way that enriches the conceptual repertoire of these
earlier thinkers and of current scholarship. It also shares with my reading of Marxist and Black feminists an explicit challenge to and rearticulation of the boundaries of the political theory canon – and produces along with the whole project a mode of reading and theorizing that puts affect and emotion to work in reconstructing the problems, concepts, and methods of political theory. At the level of the chapter’s form and organization, it is like the chapters on Marx and on Marxist feminism in identifying the emotional and/or affective circulations at work in modes of oppression, and then exploring how emotion and/or affect are active in striving to challenge and overthrow that oppression. In focusing on Beauvoir, this chapter practices the reading methods I have been developing throughout the entirety of the dissertation, but in the context of existentialism and phenomenology. Consequently, I continue to demonstrate the wide-ranging potentiality of feeling as method across a range of traditions and texts, in addition to the specific work I do with Beauvoir’s thought itself.

Beauvoir’s theorizations of the struggle for reciprocity between Self and Other and the gendered conditions of men and women are replete with incisive analyses of the circulation of emotion and the way emotions stick to certain symbols, signs, myths, and other gendered bodies. Reading her alongside Ahmed, we throw her engagement with emotions and orientations into relief. In engaging this task, I take up the Beauvoir “renaissance” (Kruks 2005) in feminist theory and philosophy but move that renaissance into underexplored dimensions of her work. A constellation of interpreters have insightfully focused on embodiment in Beauvoir’s work (Andrew 2003; Arp 1995; Bauer 2001, 50–76; Bergoffen 1997; Heinämaa 2003; Kruks 2010; Kruks 2012; Lundgren-Gothlin 1996; Moi 2008, chap. 6; Murphy 2011; Scarth 2004; Simons 2003; Ward 1995), yet not enough detail has been paid to the specifically emotional valence of her project in The Second Sex. Even when emphasizing embodiment, the Beauvoir renaissance
has not directly engaged what precisely emotions are for Beauvoir, the specific embodied processes by which they are composed, or how exactly they work to shape subjects. Most importantly, it has thus far not sought to read Beauvoir’s account of emotion in relation to the affective turn in critical and cultural theory.

Much incisive work in feminist philosophy opens up space for a project such as this one but does not itself take that route. My project is situated as an extension of the Beauvoir renaissance - particularly its turn to materiality and embodiment in her work – by enacting a sustained engagement with emotion. I theorize a more extensive account of the precise embodied composition and material processes of Beauvoirian emotion through an exploration of Beauvoir vis-à-vis Ahmed. This textual pairing provides a full theoretical background and foundation while also exploring particularly salient emotions and emotional relationalities. Readings of Beauvoir regularly gesture at or briefly mention emotion, but do not seek to provide an account of what, specifically, Beauvoirian emotion is, or to identify the processes by which it works. For example, Kruks discusses shame as it relates to investments in femininity and practices of self-discipline (2001, 62–66), and Hengehold (2006) discusses the significance of emotions in parrhesiastic relations based on the practice of truth-telling. Bergoffen (1997) and Scarth (2004) both provide accounts of an ethics of eroticism and generosity in Beauvoir’s work, and they either imply or occasionally note some emotional aspects of this sort of ethics, as in Scarth’s discussion of the bond. In all of these instances, there are brief mentions or engagements with emotion, but no comprehensive inquiry into the composition of emotions or the precise work that they do.

Those taking up embodiment in Beauvoir’s work similarly stop short of a full account of emotion. Vintges contends that in *Must We Burn Sade?* Beauvoir seeks to express emotion as a
“unity of body and consciousness” (1996, 52), and Andrew argues that Beauvoir constructs “a phenomenological description of embodied consciousness in which we experience ourselves as willed bodies, passionate bodies, and thoughtful bodies, both at union with and in contradiction to the natural and the social worlds” (2003, 35). These philosophers, however do not explore how, exactly, emotions connect bodies, consciousnesses, and worlds. Kruks suggests that the “place of affect and emotion in politics is a continuous (if sometimes implicit) theme” of her recent work (2012, 24), but other than a brief discussion of the embodiedness of political judgment (125-27; 149) and some exploration of the emotions attached to the “question of revenge” (chap. 5), this interest in emotion and affect remains implicit. We cannot carry out these ethical-embodied inquiries, I suggest, without retrieving the powerful work that emotions do for situated subjects and the lived body.

Another trajectory of Beauvoir scholarship investigates her engagement with Descartes and her critique of the Cartesian dualistic subject (Bauer 2001, chap. 2; Bergoffen 1997; Vintges 2006). Explorations of this implication of Beauvoir’s work would benefit from a fuller engagement with recent theorizing on emotion challenging the Cartesian model and more fully thinking through the configuration and work of emotion. Our rethinkings of Beauvoir remain incomplete so long as we do not read her work to engage the emotions that flow through her philosophy. Working with contemporary thinking on emotion in general thus becomes crucially important. It enables us to deeply engage an undertheorized element of Beauvoir’s thought in a way that connects her to a dynamic area of contemporary feminist thought. Sara Ahmed’s work on affect and emotion is especially useful as a lens through which to reengage Beauvoir on emotion.
As Ahmed contends, we cannot comprehend the constitution of the “I” or the “we” without close attention to the way that circulations of emotions “create the very effect” of the “surfaces and boundaries” of the “I” and the “we” (2004 [hereafter CPOE], 10). Bodies and subjects emerge through the circulation of emotions that are attached to signs, objects, and others. Moreover, they are also always “orientated”: there is always a “bodily inhabitation of space” that is intentional and is directed in some ways more than others, such that “the bodily, the spatial, and the social are entangled” (2006 [hereafter QP], 6; 181n1; her emphasis). Ahmed contrasts her work with everyday models of emotion that presume interiority and ownership – I have feelings that move out towards objects and others – as well as sociological and psychological “outside in” models in which “emotions are assumed to come from without and move inward” (CPOE, 9–10). Both models assume that emotions are things that we can have or possess instead of something produced only through circulation and motion, in the interactivity of bodies, signs, objects, and environments. Ahmed instead theorizes emotions as circulating, where the subject is only “one nodal point” in the “affective economy” of circulating emotions and this “movement of emotions” is “not contained within contours of a subject” (46). I work with Ahmed and emotion in this chapter rather than Spinoza, Deleuze, Clough, Massumi, and affect because of the specific way Beauvoir thinks through emotion. The emotions at work in critical wonder or the orientations of men and women, for instance, always refer back to a subject. In Beauvoir’s writing, emotions work to constitute subjects and are consciously felt by subjects; indeed, this is the primary reason why I read Beauvoir and Ahmed together rather than Beauvoir and other contemporary theorizing on affect.

Beauvoir’s existentialism – and existentialism more broadly – is not a materialism. György Lukács (1973) provides one of the most classic formulations of this in his critique of
existentialism, arguing that it is compatible with Marxist historical materialism, and that it fails in its attempt to navigate a philosophical alternative beyond idealism and materialism. More generally, the existentialist emphasis on individual freedom can be seen to conflict with different kinds of materialism.¹ Because of this, there is a certain tension between existentialism and affect theory: phenomenological and existential focus on consciousness, or on the subject and its experience, seems to push against many of the emphases of the kind of materialism affect theory constructs. I argue that it is important to read existentialism broadly, and Beauvoir specifically in terms of at least certain kinds of affect theory.² In this chapter, I will demonstrate that reading Beauvoir alongside Ahmed can address some of the central concerns on Beauvoir’s existentialism. The work I do in this chapter is thus suggestive of the ways that emotion (and possibly affect) may be at play in other existentialist thinkers around questions such as subjectivity, freedom, and action, although I do not have the room to pursue that in this project. My sense is that paying attention to emotion with the help of certain kinds of affect theory could help reevaluate the situation of the person making Kierkegaard’s leap of faith or acting out Sartre’s bad faith. In these ways, this chapter seeks to expand the reach of my overall method into the realm of existentialism and phenomenology. I argued in the introduction that feeling as a method could potentially be generative alongside any theoretical or philosophical traditions, and this chapter expands the dissertation by engaging phenomenology and existentialism through Beauvoir.

The possible tension between Beauvoir (or existentialism more broadly) and affect theory is one of the reasons I turn away from the Deleuzean affect theory of the preceding two chapters. Because of the centrality of categories of subjectivity, consciousness, and experience in Beauvoir, Ahmed and the kind of affect theory she practices – one more interested in questions of
subjectivity and emotion than in affect as an asubjective force – become especially important. Beauvoir works at the intersection of a number of theoretical/philosophical discourses – phenomenology, existentialism, historical materialism and Marxism, feminism – that Ahmed herself harnesses. It is also worth noting here that Ahmed, while not engaging with Beauvoir in depth, names her as an influence on *Queer Phenomenology* and describes her as having “convincingly” “develop[ed] a phenomenology of sexual difference” (*QP*, 4; 27). The tension between existentialism and affect theory might render some kinds of affect theory incompatible with Beauvoir or another existentialist thinker, but this chapter will demonstrate that engaging Ahmed reimagines and adds to our understanding of Beauvoir.

The objective of this chapter is thus to engage Beauvoirian emotion in detail through a sustained encounter between Beauvoir and Ahmed. I start by analyzing the imbrication of emotion and phenomenological orientation in Beauvoir’s account of Self and Other as well as the spatial and emotional components of gendered subjectivity. These sections depict the emotional-phenomenological processes and situations that oppress and enclose. The rest of the chapter turns to explore the potential work of emotions to contest this oppressive situation. I first take up the critical potential of the bodily, emotional state of wonder and then read a feminist project emerging from an Ahmadian reading of Beauvoir as an emotional-phenomenological politics of disorientation. Throughout, I illustrate this conceptual and textual work with reference to the problematic of “the woman in [heterosexual] love” (*SS*, 683-708), underscoring what bringing together Beauvoir and Ahmed can disclose about this situation. Ultimately, I make a theoretical intervention and build a reading practice that connects a canonical feminist past to a vital area of our feminist present, in the process working to tell a different textual, temporal, and affective story about feminist theory. It thus joins with the preceding chapter in picking up on Clare
Hemmings’s (2011) challenges with regards to the way we tell stories about feminist theory. I focus on emotion and affect in a different way in order to construct and approach my feminist story: rather than following affect in reading and citations as she does, I use it as the explicit theoretical concern to link thinkers and concepts not often considered together.

**Emotions, Orientation, and Others**

Reading Beauvoir and Ahmed together throws into the relief the emotional phenomenology that constitutes subjects in general and gendered subjects in particular. Before I examine the specific ways Beauvoir analyzes gendered subject-formation, I want to explore her general approach to the struggle for recognition between Self and Other, working with Ahmed to give us a new way of understanding Beauvoir through feeling as a method.

Emotions, in Ahmed’s framework, are bound up in the constitution of individuals and bodies: they “shape the very surfaces of bodies, which take shape through the repetition of actions over time, as well as through orientations toward and away from others” (*CPOE*, 4). Through the circulation of affective economies, our orientations toward these circulations and toward others constitute us as selves. It is in this sense that “emotions are relational” as they “involve (re)actions or relations of ‘towardness’ or ‘awayness,’” comprising an “affective reorientation” (*CPOE*, 8). We relate to others and objects – and thus generate our surfaces and selves – in the circulation and attribution of emotions and the orientations we adopt in these relations. Ahmed expands upon the concept of orientation in her *Queer Phenomenology*. Orientation as a concept turns our attention to “lived experience, the intentionality of consciousness, the significance of nearness … and the role of habitual actions in shaping bodies and world” (*QP*, 2). In situating this work in relation to *The Cultural Politics of Emotion*, she contends that the “orientations we have toward others shape the contours of space by affective
relations of proximity and distance between bodies” (QP, 3). Orientation is a bodily habitation of space in relation to objects and others. It also implies motion and directedness toward and away from these objects and others. Bodies are directed through the impressions of repeated actions and turnings as well as through the work of normativity and are directed in some ways more than others. Some bodies and some orientations can move and extend into space more than others: queer bodies, bodies of color, the bodies of women, and their multiple intersections have a different, much more constrained orientation (QP, 20). In reading Beauvoir and Ahmed together, a concept of “emotional orientation” emerges from Ahmed’s work, in which emotions and one’s phenomenological orientation to others and objects constitute and feed back into one another; such a process is at work in Beauvoir’s philosophy.

The Other, Beauvoir writes, is “as original as consciousness itself”; it is “the fundamental category of human thought” – a One always has an Other (SS, 6). We must follow Hegel in understanding that “a fundamental hostility to any other consciousness is found in consciousness itself; the subject posits itself only in opposition” (SS, 7). In this passage, “posit” (and thus also “opposition”) can have multiple potential meanings. In its usage here, it most straightforwardly reads as putting forth something for consideration (such as positing a question), but “posit” here also invokes associations with “posture” and “position” – indeed, Parshley’s earlier translation of Beauvoir renders the passage as the subject posed in relation to another – as it may also imply a physical meaning of shaping or turning one’s comportment in a certain way or direction. We might read the subject fundamentally “posited” and “in opposition” in relation with others in both of these senses: she is in a metaphysical and symbolic sense able to be considered or to exist only in relation to others, but she also in a very corporeal sense is always posed in a posture towards (or away from) others. She comes into being only in relation to others. Self and Other
forge a “fundamental unit” of “two halves riveted to each other” (SS, 9). There is a physicality to Beauvoir’s use of “riveted together”: the two are in their comportment and material constitution inseparable. Her subject takes shape through her fundamental connection to Others, who themselves take shape in their relation with other Others. Beauvoir’s subjects are orientated. As such, Beauvoir’s theorization of self and other points to understanding these figures as orientated.

This orientation is emotional. “Self” and “other” can surface as subjects only through the circulation of emotions in their orientation toward and away from one another. Beauvoir, reading Hegel, notes a fundamental hostility between self and other, and in doing so underscores the importance of more fully elucidating the interactions between emotion and orientation. This hostility names a certain emotional relationship to an other, and if I am correct that Beauvoir writes of the Self-Other struggle as in part one of physical direction, then this hostility is carried in the body. Furthermore, the hostility between self and other is closely related to fear. Ahmed writes that “fear shapes the surfaces of bodies” and is caught up in the orientation of subjects (CPOE, 8). Beauvoir does not explicitly name “fear” as an emotion circulating between self and other, but we should read it into her text through her invocation of the hostility in the Master/Slave dialectic. Beauvoir’s reading of Hegel’s dialectic is influenced by Alexandre Kojève’s existential reading of the Master/Slave dialectic centering the “fear of death” in the confrontation between Self and Other (Lundgren-Gothlin 1996, chaps. 3–4; Kojève 1996, chap. 1). Mussett (2006) contends that this fear “cannot be overemphasized in Hegel’s account” (284) and reads Beauvoir as describing it in terms of an absolute negativity women experience through oppression and then internalize (285-87). So, if we are to pay attention to metonymy in reading for the emotionality of texts, as Ahmed suggests (CPOE, 12–13), we ought to read Beauvoir as “sticking together” fear and hostility, and then connecting this emotional “figure” to the
surfacing of subjects. Subjects characterized by emotional orientations, in a state of relationality, populate Beauvoir’s theoretical field.

Ahmed thus enables us to more deeply engage the emotional range of Beauvoir’s work in relation to her broader philosophical orientation, particularly the interaction between emotion and phenomenology. This account, though, feeds back into Ahmed’s theorizing as well. In my reading Beauvoir works as a kind of relay between Ahmed’s work that focuses primarily on emotion and her version of queer phenomenology. That is, reading Beauvoir through Ahmed’s own attempts to think through embodiment and orientation fills out connections between different aspects of Ahmed’s theorizing that are not always explicit. Moreover, Beauvoir’s rearticulation and transformation of Hegel may point to the generative potential for a fuller engagement with Hegel in Ahmed’s project of queer phenomenology. Ahmed insists on the need to rework “the orientation of phenomenology” by investigating how that which “appear[s] in phenomenological writings function[s] as ‘orientation devices’” for phenomenology and “offer a different ‘slant’” to “orientation itself” (QP, 3–4). If this is our project, perhaps a Beauvoir-inspired return to Hegel that seeks to disrupt, reorient, or give a new slant to the master-slave dialectic in terms of emotion and embodiment is necessary.

The Emotional Phenomenology of Gender

Men and women, in my reading, are particular kinds of emotionally oriented subjects. Beauvoir concludes her discussion of men’s “Myths” by arguing that there “is a world of significations that exist only through woman; she is the substance of men’s actions and feeling, the embodiment of all the values that seek their freedom. … He projects onto her what he desires and fears, what he loves and what he hates” (SS, 213). Men’s subjectivity is an emotional orientation that acquires meaning through its orientation in relation to women: he acts, inhabits
space, and is directed in relation to these other emotional orientations. Moreover, this orientation is bound up with the circulation of specific emotions between bodies and signs, such as the desire, fear, love, and hate Beauvoir mentions in this passage.

Disgust proves to be a particularly salient emotion in conditioning men’s emotional orientation *qua* subject. Beauvoir describes disgust as circulating between men and women through the signs of Nature, the body/the flesh, and sex, among others. Seeing themselves as transcendent and as having *overcome* the body, men end up feeling disgust because of their desires in pursuing “carnal” relations with women: “[o]nly a body can touch another body; the male masters the desired flesh only by becoming flesh himself,” and “[d]esire often contains an element of disgust and returns to disgust when it is assuaged” (SS, 181-82). As a subject, men project themselves as more than the body, yet still desire the bodily pleasure of sex. This desire and its consummation return them to their bodies, yet women – as Beauvoir points out throughout the “Myths” section – are supposed to be pure body: desire’s fleshly surface is projected through and into women. Disgust also sticks to women in the signs of Nature and life and death itself. Nature, associated with women through the mother and the womb, “provokes disgust because it is made only when it is being unmade”; man is once again returned to his “carnal contingence that he projects on” the feminine subject (SS, 165–167). This disgust is then stuck to other phenomena – menstruation, childbirth, and so on – as well as other emotions – mystery, repugnance, fear, and horror.

What work does this disgust do? Ahmed conceptualizes disgust as ascriptive in the way it “reads the objects that are felt to be disgusting:” it is not about “bad objects” as such but the process that makes “the very designation of ‘badness’” a “quality that we must assume is inherent” in the supposedly-disgusting object or person (CPOE, 82). In this sense, disgust is
performative. As a speech act disgust “can generate effects by ‘binding’ signs to bodies” in a way that obstructs “new meanings” (CPOE, 92). This performativity relies on previous associations, and figurations of disgust depend on extant norms and conventions. Significantly, Ahmed articulates the valence of disgust for power relations. The circulation of disgust hierarchizes space and the bodies that inhabit these spaces, rendering objects of disgust lower than/beneath/less than the subject who feels disgust. Disgust at that which is “below” “functions to maintain the power relations between above and below, through which ‘aboveness’ and ‘belowness’ become properties of particular bodies, objects, and spaces” (CPOE, 89; her emphasis). This disgusting lowness is stuck together with sexuality and the lower parts of the body, with this whole figuration stuck to disgust over women and their bodies. Disgust thus separates one kind (man/mind/reason) from another (woman/body/vagina/sex/dirty) and assigns them qualities of higher/more advanced and lower/less advanced (CPOE, 89).

We see both the performativity of disgust as well as its differential valuation of bodies at work in Beauvoir’s elaboration of men’s disgust. There is nothing inherently disgusting about the bodies designated as disgusting. Naming the woman’s body through association with other signs also named as disgusting renders it as such. Disgust’s effect and affect resonate with historical forms of oppression and denigration, amplifying the adherence of the disgust to the disgusting body. Beauvoir’s account of disgust also invokes the hierarchization of bodies. By rendering the disgusting woman’s body as that which brings man’s body down to nature, sex, and the flesh, man’s body appears higher than woman’s. This disgust is then further associated with the ‘lower’ parts of the ascribed-as-disgusting body, the vagina and menstrual blood (SS, 167–171). Ahmed notes one other aspect of disgust: its ambivalence. There is a desire or attraction for objects that are felt to be repellant. The disgust that pulls us away from the object works along with a desire
that pulls us toward the disgusting object (*CPOE*, 84). Men’s disgust functions similarly: as the man is disgusted by and recoils from the fleshly, natural body that he reads as disgusting, he simultaneously desires it. Overall, reading Beauvoir and Ahmed together enables us to discern how the hierarchization of bodies entrenching power relations works through the performative enunciation of disgust stuck to certain kinds of bodies, and the embodied emotional way that this occurs. As Marso (2012) points out, for Beauvoir the body in particular and biology in general are interpreted in a way that ascribes political and social meaning. Ahmed enables us to think through the embodied processes through which these ascriptions stick to certain bodies, saturating them with these oppressive, hierarchizing meanings, such as in the attribution of disgust.

In their subjectivity, men adopt two linked modes of orientation toward women. In Ahmed’s terminology, the first of these is orientation *toward* others, in which the “otherness of things is what allows me to do things ‘with’ them” and “what is other than me is also what allows me to extend the reach of my body”; as such, this othering is “not simply a form of negation” but also can “be described as a form of extension” (*QP*, 115). Secondly, there is an orientation *around* others that “makes” the other “central, as being at the center of one’s being or action,” it is what “allows us to ‘hold the center,’ or even to constitute ourselves as at the center of those other things” (*QP*, 116).

Orientation toward others is present in the multiple instances in which Beauvoir invokes the woman as the one who enables or helps the man – sexually, in taking care of the house, and so on. For instance, in Beauvoir’s discussion of the way men mythologize and invest symbolic value in women, the woman becomes a source of “pride” in the way the man “forms” her, “educates her, impresses her, put his imprint on her” (*SS*, 193). But the woman as a mode of
extension functions in more subtle ways as well. Emotional orientation toward woman enables the extension of men into space and his affirmation of their existence as active humans, because they are Selves oriented toward Others they view as lesser and inessential. Furthermore, men orient themselves toward women to grant themselves access to the pleasurable realm of the body without losing their transcendent Self, or so they hope. With women, he “ceases to assume his existence” and “situates himself on an inauthentic plane” where he seeks to satisfy his obsessions and whims while he “lets go” (SS, 652). This orientation enables the man to selectively extend into the realm of the body without being permanently tainted by its supposed inferiority.

In their orientation around women, men are able to constitute themselves as the center of these Others. That is, their affirmation as subjects results from their orientation around women. As Beauvoir argues, “it is the Other as such that man wants to possess” (SS, 209). I contend that this taking possession of the Other productively interacts with what Ahmed describes as centering the Other in order to re-center the Self (QP, 116). Here, the man figures himself as the “center” of affirmative subjectivity only as an appropriation of and orientation around the woman. This involves both this affirmation of the Self and also the acquisition of knowledge about the Self through this relation. It is “[t]hrough her, through the best and the worst of her, man learns … about himself” (SS, 213). Beauvoir continues: woman “is the carnal embodiment of all moral values and their opposites, from good to bad; she is the stuff of action and its obstacle, man’s grasp on the world and his failure; as such she is the source of all man’s reflection on his existence and all expression he can give of it” (SS, 213). Here, Beauvoir theorizes the way in which centering the masculine Self requires first centering the feminine Other. Mussett (2006) argues that in Beauvoir’s rearticulation of Hegel’s master/slave dialectic, she theorizes women as a mediator between man and nature and between man and himself in a
way that resembles the slave in Hegel’s dialectic. This kind of orienting relationship, as this section demonstrates, has a particularly embodied and spatial element. These notions of orientation may also explain expressions of anger, violence, and/or denunciations of women who challenge normative modes of femininity. If the self-certainty of a man is predicated on the actions of women, and they refuse to act in a way that affirms that identity, then he has lost a part of the Other through which he orients himself. Rather than grapple with this – for example initiating a relation of mutual recognition – he lashes out and attempts to make sure that women behave sufficiently femininely so that his orientation and identity are retained.

We see how this emotional phenomenology works in Beauvoir’s analysis of men in heterosexual love-relationships dispersed throughout her account of the woman in love. Any enthrallment of love is transient. Men, even in their “most violent passions” or “fall[ing] on their knees before” a woman “remain sovereign subjects” as a result of their socio-historical situation (683); they “view such loves merely as a phase” (685). Their orientations in relation to women, and the disgust they ascribe to them constitute the impermanent way they love. Women enable men’s access to the realm of bodily pleasure and desire, yet men’s sense of selfhood means that their “desire is as fleeting as it is imperious” as “it dies rather quickly” once “satisfied” (699). His particular orientation and the gendered disgust that circulates means he does not want to languish in the supposedly tainted world of sexual desire, but temporarily take pleasure and then return to the world of their transcendent selfhood. Men have no need to “abandon themselves completely,” as women in love do, but instead want to “possess” and “annex” women (683). As Beauvoir writes, men “want to integrate [the woman] into their existence” – in the terms of my discussion, orient themselves toward and around her - and “not submerge their entire existence in her” (683). Ultimately, the woman becomes an emotional and phenomenological means for the
heterosexual man to reinforce his own sense of self as he orients himself to receive a woman’s absolute devotion and temporarily enter the realm of pleasure and sexual desire but ultimately subordinate all of this to the affirmation of his own subjectivity.

Compare these orientations to the situation of women as described by Beauvoir: because of the “domain in which she is enclosed,” her “general attitude concerning her self and the world” is one of confinement (SS, 656). She is oriented but is more often than not following the trajectories of others, accumulated history, norms, and previous orientations (QP, 16). Whereas men can extend in space and can center themselves, in their orientation as Other women are limited in their horizons. One of the consequences of this confinement and shaping is the way that women are blocked and cannot extend into space. Ahmed conceptualizes in her discussion of race and orientalism a “political economy” of “stopping,” in which being stopped (stopped and searched, stopped and detained) is “distributed unevenly,” generating an “affective economy that leaves its impressions” upon those that are stopped (QP, 140). This phenomenological concept of stopping can prompt further insight into Beauvoir’s description of women’s subjectivity in relation to men and to social norms and conditions. Here, the move is not to simply analogize racist and sexist oppressions, but to deploy Ahmed’s concept of orientation to track the different kinds of economies of stopping at work; that is, Ahmed’s political economy of racialized stopping should provoke us to think through the modes of spatial and embodied constraint operating in the oppression of women as Beauvoir theorizes it.

Ahmed writes that “movement for some involves blocking movement for others” (QP, 141). In The Second Sex, men’s movement and directedness – the ability to extend into space and to selectively slide into the realm of immanence – depend on confining women. Thus, on a general level, “woman’s possibilities have been stifled and lost to humanity”; she has been
“confined in immanence” (SS, 751; 754). The social does not extend her body into space, instead leaving its imprints on her. The feminine subject’s “horizon is blocked:” if she “wallow in immanence,” it is because she “was enclosed in it … stifling in a dismal gynaecenum” (SS, 643). She is “enclosed in her flesh, in her home” (639). This is still a kind of orientation – all bodies are orientated – but it is an orientation that impresses upon her to block the extension of her body into space. Commentators regularly describe Beauvoir as linking women’s lived experience to embodied relations with the world; she accounts for “how femininity is shaped” (e.g. Lundgren-Gothlin 1996, 179), and how “we experience – live – our bodies is shaped by … historical sedimentation” of body-world interaction (e.g. Moi 1999, 68). This is of course vital to Beauvoir’s project, and when we engage it we must insist on the corporeality of Lundgren-Gothlin’s “shaping” and Moi’s “sedimenting”. My reading of Beauvoirian emotion through Ahmed thus provides important insight into the theoretical imbrication of gender, phenomenology, emotion, and the body in Beauvoir’s work.

What are the other emotional resonances of this stopping or blocking, and what emotions circulate around women? Beauvoir describes one set of reactions to the condition of femininity in a bodily, affective way. When faced with the “hostility and the injustice of her lot,” she responds with the “moist trace on her cheek” and “burning in her eyes” that somatically display the “tangible presence of her suffering soul” (SS, 648). Beauvoir writes – in words that would be at home in any contemporary affect theorist’s writing – that in so-called “nervous fits” as a form of “symbolic outburst,” she “attempts to express,” “in her body,” “the refusals she cannot carry out concretely. It is not only for physiological reasons that she is subject to convulsive manifestations: a convulsion is an interiorization of an energy that, thrown into the world, fails to grasp any object; it is a useless expenditure of all the power of negation caused by her situation”
Here, Beauvoir links the emotional, the bodily, and the social. The orientation of women generates an excess of negative forces blocked by their inability to act in the world – an inability to extend in space – that are then circulated – interiorized and then exteriorized, with effects and affects on the bodily surface.

The situation of the woman in heterosexual love illustratively underscores this emotional phenomenology. Self-abnegating love remains as an option for the phenomenologically enclosed woman, a dream “of becoming one, of fusing with the sovereign subject” by “losing herself body and soul in the one designated to her as the absolute, as the essential” (SS, 684). In response to her general condition, she seeks to access selfhood and independence through the man she loves. In the terms described in this section, we can understand this as an attempt to use men’s orientation toward and around women for women’s own benefit. Women are confined by the gendered phenomenology of stopping, whereas men use women to extend their own bodies and subjectivities. In love, women “desire to go beyond [their] own limits and become infinite, thanks to the intervention of another who has access to infinite reality” (691); she “feels exalted” by becoming “necessary to a being” who “projects himself in the world” (693). Working with Ahmed, we can also see how Beauvoir is theorizing an affective economy of sorts. Beauvoir depicts the (potentially temporary) situation thus: “it is in man’s eyes that the woman believes she has at last found herself … The woman feels endowed with a sure and high value; at last she has the right to cherish herself through the love she inspires. She is exhilarated at finding a witness in her lover” (687). Indeed, Ahmed discusses the way that love – in her example, love of a nation – involves an idealization of the loved object in which the subjects seeks “to be itself in or through what it has” in the love relationships (CPOE, 128). In Beauvoir, the woman coheres as a subject – “at last [finds] herself” (SS, 687) – only through the circulation between bodies and
signs of love and valuation that stick to her, all put into motion by loving a man. This process sets off a further reaction, the “great joy” that comes with “the magnificent possession of the absolute” (693).

However, this situation in which women seeks to access and put to her advantage the emotional orientation and subjectivity of the man in the end works to further confine her; as Beauvoir writes, this “glorious felicity is seldom stable” but gives way to “the torments of the woman in love” due to the broader oppression of women and to a lack of reciprocity (694). This takes several forms, all of which exemplify the failure of the phenomenological and emotional hopes invested in the condition of heterosexual love. In trying to “abandon herself” to love “to save herself,” she “ends up totally disavowing herself” (691). The lived experiences of total devotion in love, contrary to the idealized relation, further women’s situation as an Other. Love expresses itself as “service,” “integration into his existence,” “tyrannizing herself in the lover’s name,” and allowing “everything she has, every second of her life” to become “devoted to him”; thus the woman in heterosexual love “gives up her transcendence” in the way “she subordinates it to that of the essential” because “all reality is in the other” (691-92). That is, while attempting to extend her body in phenomenological space through the man’s subjectivity and status in the world, she actually expands the way that the man uses the women for his own projects. Her increased devotion enhances the way that men orient themselves toward and around women in order to affirm their own subjectivity, at the expense of women’s phenomenological and spatial possibilities. Moreover, she discovers that the figure she had set up as absolute – and in many ways godly, as Beauvoir insists throughout the chapter – is ordinary, mundane, and mediocre, provoking a “heartrending disappointment” (694). The press of this realization and the self-abnegation of love provoke a host of negative emotional and psychic circulations: demand,
humiliation, tyranny, detesting, suffering, self-deception, panic, delirium, worry, and jealousy (695-705). Ultimately, then, “her love itself disfigures her, demolishes her” and when the woman in love “realizes” this, her “distress” and lack of selfhood are amplified (704). In this sense, the woman in heterosexual love is both a response to and reproductive of a certain kind of emotional orientation.

For Beauvoir, men and women constitute and are constituted by specific emotional relationalities and directionalities. Both are caught up in the circulation of emotions, objects, signs, and symbols. They are bound to one another – emotionally, materially, subjectively, and bodily. Reading Beauvoir and Ahmed together through feeling as a method throws into relief this emotional phenomenology and the way it works to oppress and confine women. However, as the rest of this chapter explores, emotions and orientations are also part of the process of liberation.

**Wonder: What is a Woman?**

If the general emotional phenomenology of gender is oppressive in these senses, how can emotions move individuals to contest and overthrow this condition, and establish more reciprocal relations in its place? One key to this, in my reading, is an understanding of Beauvoir’s project as one of generating an emotion of critical wonder. In her chapter on feminist attachments, Ahmed describes feminism as in part a politics of wonder which can “take us to a different relation to the world in which we live” (*CPOE*, 178). The emotion of wonder works to move bodies toward this different relation. As “an affective relation to the world that one faces and is faced with “as if” for the first time,” wonder “allows us to see the surfaces of the world as made” (*CPOE*, 179; her emphasis). This emotional approach to the world renders it contingent, historical, and produced through work instead of inevitable and given. As such, wonder “opens up rather than suspends [the] historicity” that is “concealed by the transformation of the world into” something fixed and
familiar (CPOE, 179). That is, the recognizability or taken-for-granted-ness of the world covers up the history and sociality that shape the surfaces of the world and the bodies that populate it. The potential of wonder lies in the novelty of the “as if”: to “see the world as if for the first time is to notice that which is there, is made, has arrived, or is extraordinary” (CPOE, 180; her emphasis). The world is something it does not have to be, and because the world was made through action, action can re-shape surfaces and reconstitute relations.

Moreover, wonder is bodily and emotional. It moves bodies – or at least has the potential to do so: the “body opens as the world opens up before it; the body unfolds into the unfolding of a world,” and wonder “keeps alive the possibility of freshness, and vitality of a living that can live as if for the first time” (CPOE, 180). Wonder re-reads the past to see a constrained openness to the future, situating the body in a contingent relationship to the world. It is an emotion of discomposure that refuses to rest one’s relation to the world on a “feeling of comfort,” “ordinary experience,” or “something that is already familiar, or recognizable” (CPOE, 179). From this orientation the world, bodies and collectives can adopt a different, more critical and transformative relationship to it. Specifically, wonder moves the individual to feminism by enabling one to “read” their “own life and the lives of others differently,” and it is “through wonder that pain and anger comes to life, as wonder allows” one to realize that what is unjust can be unmade as well as made” (CPOE, 180-81).

Beauvoir’s project in The Second Sex, I contend, provokes this kind of wonder. She opens by asking “first, what is a woman?” followed shortly thereafter by remarking that even the need to “pose” this question “is significant” (SS, 3; 5). Staging an encounter between Ahmed’s wonder and Beauvoir, I read this passage to insist that we must look anew at what we assume to be given from a wondrous perspective. The oft-cited line that “[o]ne is not born, but rather
becomes, woman” also can activate a set of questions and a posture of wonder toward the (gendered) world (SS, 283). If one becomes a gender, what history produces this gendering? If becoming is dynamic, can there be further change of the present into the future? If one becomes a gender, can gender become something else? The questions prompted by Beauvoir’s formulation reorient a reader to the world. The historicity of gender is called to the front, shattering its given-ness and inevitability. The gendered world is something that was made and does not have to be; “it would be impossible to keep woman from being what she was made” (SS, 761; her emphasis). As Beauvoir opens her conclusion, no “physiological destiny imposes eternal hostility on the Male and Female as such” since humanity “is a historical becoming” (SS, 753). This, she claims, is also true of the specific condition of woman who, as “a product developed by civilization,” is “determined neither by her hormones nor by mysterious instincts but by the way she grasps, through foreign consciousness, her body and her relation to the world” (SS, 761). Throughout her work, Beauvoir challenges the apparent naturalness of the world and of gender relations, exposing them as historical products.

Wonder, Ahmed notes, “involves learning,” coming to “see the world as something that does not have to be, and as something that came to be, over time, and with work” (CPOE, 180). Beauvoir’s general approach to question the ordinariness of women and their situation prompts precisely this kind of wondrous learning. She impels the reader to examine how and why women are Other and how their lived experiences are structured. If wonder “works to transform the ordinary” – that which is “familiar, or recognizable” – into something to be questioned and contested (CPOE, 179), then The Second Sex thus performs and inculcates wondrousness. It confronts the gendered world-as-it-is with a challenge to its given-ness by asking the reader to adopt a different, more critical relation to that world. One could avoid inquiring into the status or
situation of women, and thereby accept the given state of affairs as inevitable, nondescript, or simply ‘the way things are.’ But Beauvoir pushes one to reject this bad faith, ask “what is a woman,” and insist that woman is a becoming, not a static fact. This enacts wonder, the “passion that motivates the desire to keep looking,” a “radicalisation” of one’s relation to the given world (CPOE, 180).

There is a specific embodied, emotional component to wondrous critique. Beauvoir describes women experiencing the world as “a stubborn, indomitable resistance”: woman “experiences the resistance of a duration that the most ingenious machines fail to divide or multiply; she experiences it in her flesh…” (SS, 639). History’s impact through lived experience is affective and impresses upon female bodies in a particular way, as somatic resistance to one’s projects. Forging a different embodied relation to that history facilitates reorientation toward that history and the world it has shaped. Beauvoir advocates critical inquiry that does just this. Describing the characteristics of woman as not eternal but “suggested in negative form by her situation,” she calls for us to “to take a synthetic point of view” that makes it “possible to grasp the Eternal Feminine in her economic, social, and historical conditioning” (SS, 638). Note here the use of the word “grasp,” which carries connotations of understanding and a more physical, phenomenological meaning – one we should likely read as drawing on Merleau-Ponty – of stopping and apprehending. What I identify as this wondrous grasping joining together inquiry and a kind of seizing of history can reorient the subject to the world. The strength of historical continuity she feels in her body can shift into a relation of contingency and transformability. Her conditions “can be overcome as soon as they are grasped from new perspectives” (SS, 763). This grasping, I argue, involves precisely that wonder that “expands our field of vision and touch” (CPOE, 179). Theorizing Ahmed and Beauvoir together, we can say that without wonder
motivating a more critical relationship to the given world, an oppositional perspective cannot be adopted and movement is stifled, even if their situation seemingly calls out for such resistance. From the critical perspective, a new relation to the world is possible, where this resentment (once paired with wonder) can move one to create anew. Once we adopt a position of wonder to the world – viewing it as “a situation that is showing itself to be historical precisely in that it is the process of changing” instead of feeling limited by a “mysterious essence” – the future, in a figuration evocative of Ahmed’s description of wonder, “remains wide open” (SS, 750).

Although she does not invoke or name it as such, we should read Beauvoir, in her general critical position, as a philosopher of wonder.

Wonder is required to apprehend and change the situation of the woman in heterosexual love. The condition of love carries the force of a history where women are made “incapable of being self-sufficient” and sediments it on the body: the situation “weighs on women trapped in the feminine universe” of love (708). It would be easy to simply accept this condition as natural or inevitable; indeed, Beauvoir calls this “injustice” a “destiny,” (708), and women usually experience it as such (707). However, as much as myths about men, women, and love may profess otherwise, “it is the difference in their [men and women’s] situations” and not “a law of nature” that “is reflected” in how women and men act in love (684). The vicissitudes of the individual and relational path that Beauvoir outlines unfold not from the eternal feminine or inherent primordial characteristics of women (or men), but from a condition where “the woman knows herself only as other” (707). Beauvoir’s analysis of the woman in heterosexual love performs (and cultivates in the reader) the move from an acceptance of what is given to a position that understands that situation as made – and thus changeable. That is, it constructs a standpoint of wonder. Love would then lose its mystical qualities to become self-conscious and
worldly (706-708). As a result the situation becomes something to be grasped, interrogated, and – as the next section will detail – disoriented.

**Disorientation**

Beauvoir concludes her introduction to *The Second Sex* with an affirmation of existentialist morality:

> Every subject posits itself as a transcendence concretely, through projects; it accomplishes its freedom only by perpetual surpassing toward other freedoms; there is no other justification for present existence than its expansion toward an indefinitely open future. … Woman’s drama lies in this conflict between the fundamental claim of every subject, which always posits itself as essential, and the demands of a situation that constitutes her as inessential (SS, 16–17).

How should we understand the transformation called for by Beauvoir, given my reading? While wonder plays a vital role in moving one to a critical standpoint, I argue that we also must follow Ahmed’s claim that feminism’s “emotional response” to the world involves a substantial change “of one’s bodily relation to social norms” (*CPOE*, 170–171), and read Beauvoir through Ahmed’s concept of disorientation. A “politics of disorientation might be to sustain wonder about the very forms of social gathering” so that we might “face a different way” (*QP*, 24). It necessitates thinking through, with, and against orientations to trace the breaking points that accumulate when something challenges normative ways of seeing and being. The crucial question is how experiences of disorientation “can impact on the orientation of bodies and spaces,” and what we do with such moments (*QP*, 158). Disorientation involves making familiar things and relations strange, and following “oblique” lines that are generated when things fail to normatively cohere. It can “disturb” the normative “ground,” and in doing so enable bodies to cohere with each other in new ways, orient themselves differently, and set the world in a
different direction \((QP, 161-62)\). Other modes of orientation – other modes of becoming-together – might challenge the kinds of orientations and spaces that men take up.

Might we read Beauvoir as constructing a call for a kind of disorientation? Does reciprocity between self and other, a joint effort toward liberation, constitute a disorientating project in relation to the prevailing situation of women? Beauvoir contrasts the current normative ground of women with a situation in which “freedom throws itself across an open future, emerging beyond any given” \((SS, 645)\). Her language evokes the notion of movement and direction contrary to the limited lines of the present. In liberation, a free subject extends her reach into a world that has been, to use Ahmed’s terms from above, disturbed in a way that unsettles given actuality. Elsewhere, Beauvoir similarly describes transformation as “refus[ing] the limits of” the current situation and “open[ing] paths to the future” \((SS, 664)\). The “only one way” to achieve freedom “authentically” is “to project it by a positive action into” society \((SS, 717)\). This active movement and project – whether considered existentially or even more mundanely – is possible only insofar as the world undergoes disorientation in which the normative ground of oppressive relations is disrupted, a new mode of social gathering is opened, and the world is indeed set in a different direction.

Liberation as reciprocity resituates Self and Other in their bond. Each “will remain an other for the other,” but they mutually “recogniz[e] each other as subject” \((SS, 766; her emphasis)\). This would change the emotional orientation of all subjects: no longer would men orient themselves toward and around feminine others, and no longer would women be blocked in their orientation. Instead, both would forge new lines and directions in a mutual, freer way, disoriented and breaking away from the ‘original’ normative ground of domination. We should understand transformation to be emotional and bodily. Andrew notes that for Beauvoir the
“moment of ethical connection” is in part “bodily” (2003, 30); the corporeality of this connection is also emotional. As I discussed above, we should read Beauvoir’s rereading of the Master/Slave dialectic as in part an emotional orientation involving the circulation of emotion in the orientation of two kinds of subjects vis-à-vis each other. As such, the liberation or transcendence that Beauvoir theorizes is in the end emotional. Re-reading Beauvoir through Ahmed enables us to reconstitute Beauvoir’s notion of liberation in order to recuperate its emotional orientation(s). Ahmed writes that it is through a new kind of emotional “alignment of the ‘we’ with the ‘I’” that “a new grammar of social existence may yet be possible” (*CPOE*, 188). Such an orientation toward liberation, I argue, is something that Beauvoir herself shares with Ahmed.

A challenge to the emotional phenomenology of the woman in (heterosexual) love – and a more reciprocal alternative – would involve such a disorientation. Beauvoir traces the route that love takes to a kind of failure: a woman tries to lose herself in a man as a way to save herself, but because “all reality is” thus “in the other,” she loses herself absolutely, a “dream of martyrdom” turning into “self-mutilation” (*SS*, 691-92). This is disorienting to the woman in love, who was “fooled by a mirage” (685), ends in “catastrophe” (705), and faces a situation where it seems impossible to affirm one’s selfhood or start anew because “how could she begin a new life when outside her lover there is nothing?” (705). However, while acknowledging the riskiness and dread of this initial disorientation, Beauvoir posits that this “failure of love can be a productive ordeal” if “the woman is capable of taking herself in hand again” (706). The normative ground of the woman in love has been disturbed, and Ahmed shows us that such a situation opens possibilities for new social and interpersonal relations to cohere.

Beauvoir sketches possibilities for an “authentic love” (694; 706-708), and Ahmed helps us fill out how it is this process of disorientation can create an alternative reciprocal condition.
For Ahmed, disorientation makes possible new modes of relationality, sociality, and normativity, and new kinds of emotional circulations. Authentic heterosexual love, uninhibited by the stifling emotions and orientations sketched above, becomes for Beauvoir a real “inter-human relation” in which each person “take[s] on the other’s contingence” (694). Instead of a one-sided relation where the man orients himself toward and around women in order to affirm his selfhood at the expense of the phenomenologically and emotionally confined women, this new relationship would be “founded on [the] reciprocal recognition of” each person’s “freedom,” enabling each to “experience” themselves as self and other and to project a “revelation of self through the gift of the self and the enrichment of the universe” (706). The woman in heterosexual love endeavors to “escape from herself” and loves out of the “weakness” of her situation, but a generative disorientation of love – especially if aided by social and economic conditions that promote the independence of women – can move her to love out of “strength,” to “find” and “affirm” herself, and ultimately for the love relationship be a “source of life” rather than “danger” or self-abnegation (707-708). New emotional orientations emerge, and lovers have a new comportment toward to the world as they “reveal values and ends” in it (706). When Bergoffen writes that “the erotic” in Beauvoir brings forth “a paradigm for an alternative understanding of the other, the couple, the ‘we’ and the world” (1997, 108), we should explicitly think of emotion and disorientation as crucial in engendering such a paradigm. The constitution of a new paradigm depends on a disorientation of an ingrained emotional phenomenology opening up new normative ground for a new cohering of selves, others, objects, and worlds.

Beauvoir also underscores some of the substantial, particularly gendered obstacles that make disorientation difficult and points to the need to consider kinds of emotions and orientations that may work against disorientation. Foremost among these is the complicity with
subordination Beauvoir posits. She contends that “woman makes no claim for herself as subject”: she “lacks the concrete means” for freedom, “senses the necessary link connecting her to man without positing its reciprocity,” and “often derives satisfaction from her role as Other” (SS, 10). Not only are women dispersed compared to, for example, workers in a factory, there is a certain “metaphysical risk” of asserting one’s freedom and a linked “temptation to flee freedom” and hence elide “the anguish and stress of authentically assumed existence” (SS, 10). This clearly poses a substantial set of barriers to disorientation. One is unlikely to disturb the normative ground or re-situate themselves to familiar things and relations if doing so disrupts one’s investment and complicity in those norms, relations, and things.

This complicity has distinctively emotional features. Note the emotional valence of Beauvoir’s understanding of complicity: the complicit subject *senses* the necessity of the subordinating bond, *is satisfied* as Other, and seeks to avoid *anguish* and *stress* of taking the metaphysical risk. Complicity is itself an emotional orientation, with a subject emotionally invested in and orientated toward subjugating norms and relations and conditions, even as they may also recoil from or resent them. Shame is especially significant, for it forces a woman to “see herself” as society sees her – as an object – and entrenches “a generalized sense of inferiority” that “induce[s] docility” and investment in normative femininity (Kruks 2001, 64–65). As Kruks argues, “Beauvoir accounts” for “how, through self-objectification and shame, disciplinary power is internalized” so the complicit subject “comes also to be [the] agent” of this power (2001, 68). The interaction between the individual body and the social world is not one of pure opposition but instead a multivalent and often contradictory emotional entanglement. Beauvoir’s account demonstrates the way that emotions may work *against* disorientating practices, and may even function to amplify one’s emotional investment in deleterious or
oppressive situations. It problematizes the prospects for achieving a position of wonder, or for disrupting one’s emotional orientations to the world; Beauvoir thus emphasizes a wide range of emotions at work in any discussion of something like liberation.

Ahmed is aware of the difficulty and complexity of disorientation. Disorientation is risky and precarious, is not always radical, and the unsettling it implicates can cause a loss of supports (QP, 157–58). She is, moreover, interested in the effects of the emotion of shame: it is a “feeling of negation … taken on by the subject as a sign of its own failure,” “consumed by a feeling of badness” that involves a “turning away from” the self and a new orientation to the social world that functions as witness to shame (CPOE, 103–104). With Beauvoir, we are able to specify and expand the kinds of emotions and relationalities mitigating feminist disorientations. This is one reason why the concept of “disorientation” is so rich, especially when Beauvoir and Ahmed are read together. In addition to the meaning Ahmed is most focused on, that of breaking from a normative ground and instituting a new mode of common gathering, disorientation also means confusion, a loss of direction or clearness, and compromised awareness. For Ahmed, disorientation, particularly as a “bodily feeling,” can “be unsettling” as one risks becoming “lost, undone” (QP, 157). Indeed, Beauvoir emphasizes that a kind of safety and stability discourages women from challenging their situation. Any substantive contestation of this situation will necessarily be disorienting, across the whole range of meanings of disorientation: at the same time that it would disrupt the normative ground and generates potential for freer, more reciprocal relations, it would also entail an unsettling and challenging loss of certainty and stability.

In this way, Beauvoir widens the necessary feminist emotions at work in disorientation. Given her account, we might argue that attaining a position of wonder requires first overcoming shame or productively channeling resentment; disorientation might demand a reflective
awareness and break from one’s complicity in deleterious norms and relations, a complicity that Beauvoir throws into stark relief. That is, Beauvoir provides specific articulations of how emotional, orientated investments in oppressive norms and structures work. Not only is shame a turning against the self as Ahmed demonstrates, it is, Beauvoir elucidates, a process that can amplify our investment in the social world that provokes such shame. There can be no single key feminist emotion leading to disorientation; reading Beauvoir and Ahmed together demonstrates the way that a panoply of emotions need to be recognized, reworked, and challenged in order for any sort of feminist disorientation to unfold. There must be disorientation not only of institutional, material, and normative conditions, but also of individual orientations to them, a challenge that demands tracking the emotional intricacies of normative femininity and potential feminist responses.

**Conclusion: Disorienting Beauvoir**

Collective and individual disorientations are the work of feminist theory and feminist politics. As Kruks contends, Beauvoir understands the situation of women as one where there is no “absolute freedom” or pure “‘inner’ subject” but a “range of choices … open as to how one interiorizes, assumes, and lives normalized femininity”; most women live in neither total immanence or transcendence, but “somewhere between, embracing various modes of complicity, compromise, or resistance,” a condition of ambiguity (2001, 67). Emotions circulate throughout this situation. One crucial task for feminism is negotiating collective responses to alter both the range of constraints and the modes of acting that take place within them; reading Beauvoir and Ahmed together highlights the need to tend to the emotional valences of these projects. In thinking about this mode of feminist politics and philosophy, my reading here seeks to provide one response to Daigle’s challenge to read Beauvoir as formulating a positive ethics and politics.
that comprehends the ambiguity of the political subject (2014). In this register, Beauvoir provokes us to ask, what kinds of political and social actions or relationalities can induce a critical wonder? What changes in material conditions might be necessary for an emotional disorientation, and how might disorientation generate collective actions to challenge material conditions? What practices are necessary for challenging masculine disgust or disrupting the blocked feminine orientation, and what emotional circulations are at play in such opposition? What sorts of emotional responses are necessary to combat investments in deleterious norms and social formations, or to construct authentic love?

In addition to such inquiries, further work along the lines I sketch in this chapter should seek to disorient Beauvoir’s own project by thinking through the emotional valences of the generalized default white, heterosexual, cisgendered female and male subjects of *The Second Sex*. Drawing on the work of Spelman (1988, chap. 3), Simons (2001), Marso (2014), and others on race and Beauvoir’s philosophy, one might ask how Beauvoir’s emotional phenomenology is limited in terms of racial differences, and how the emotions and orientations I have worked to illuminate are too universalized. What, for instance, are we to make of the emotional orientation of Black women in Beauvoir’s lament on the differences between the social positioning of women and African-Americans – and thus, what would happen when Black feminist thought meets Beauvoir, in the context of emotion or not? What various kinds of disgust and orientation are felt and constituted when different kinds of men encounter different kinds of women? How did Beauvoir’s intellectual relationship with Richard Wright affect, if at all, her emotional phenomenology? How might we situate Beauvoir’s political activism during the French war in Algeria in relation to questions of emotional orientation and colonialism, and how then might
Beauvoir and another important phenomenological thinker, Frantz Fanon, interact? These questions would bring disorientation and critical wonder to bear on Beauvoir’s own work.

We might also take my analysis of Beauvoir on wonder and disorientation to its logical conclusion and explore the ways that not only is “woman” made rather than born, but to some extent so is gender itself. That is, pushing Beauvoir in a more wondrous and disorienting direction could lead one to revisit her work from the standpoint of queer theory and trans theory.¹² The gender binary, the heterosexual couple, and the fact that all gendered subjects in Beauvoir’s work are presumed to be cisgendered would themselves come in for analysis and critique. Doing so could involve an exploration of the emotional phenomenology of processes of homophobia or homonationalism, it might also analyze the position on ‘radical feminists’ who deny the validity and possibility of transgender existence. One could further engage in more directed emotional readings of other situations theorized by Beauvoir, such as “The Lesbian,” to inquire into the emotions circulating through sexual orientation in Beauvoir’s accounts. All of these kinds of projects would take the insights of Beauvoir, pushing her thinking beyond its own limits.

In pursuing these and related questions we must pay careful attention to the imbrication of emotion with the general project and specific concerns of feminist philosophy and theory. One modality of exploring this is the sort of encounter I have engaged in this chapter, reading Beauvoir’s feminist philosophy alongside Ahmed’s work on emotion. I have explored the emotionality of Beauvoir’s thinking, surveying ways in which Beauvoir analyzes the emotions at work in subjectivity, gender, critique, and liberation. I have explored some emotional strands in Beauvoir’s thinking, surveying ways in which Beauvoir analyzes the emotions at work in subjectivity, gender, critique, and liberation. I have argued that her overall project seeks to evoke
wonder and open new emotional relations to the world, that she creates a figure of subjectivity involving emotional, relational, and oriented subjects, that men and women are particular modes of emotionally oriented subjects and that her notion of transcendence involves an emotional and bodily politics of disorientation that engages difference in a freer, more reciprocal way than what is generally possible in gendered relations.

Finally, this chapter suggests the need for political theory broadly understood to take on questions that Beauvoir prompts for politics about oppression and liberation in general as well as in the specific case of gender oppression. Concepts such as emotional orientation, disgust, men’s orientation around and toward women, wonder, and disorientation are likely to have critical purchase in various political realms and contexts; this is especially the case if they are brought together with the other conceptual resources developed in this dissertation. Beauvoir and Ahmed’s attunement to the emotional phenomenology of subjectivities bound up in networks of power has the potential to become crucial for the traditional concerns, thinkers, and texts of the political theory canon. Lori Marso argues that Beauvoir ought to be understood as speaking to the heart of political theory to offer a situated conception of freedom and the ambiguity of the subject’s situation, as well as a sophisticated analysis of political embodiment that challenges the persistent disavowal of the body in the canon (2012). In the theoretical work I do in this chapter, I draw out the particularly emotional valences of concepts that can speak back to and revisit the tradition of political theory.
Conclusion
Political Ethics of the Body

Embodied Ethics
As I argued in the introduction, feeling as a method could potentially be used to read any text of political theory; as the preceding chapters have demonstrated, it is a mode of reading and theorizing that engages political thought across a range of traditions and theoretical orientations. This method enables one to let loose lines of flight from such texts, opening up creative reinterpretations, surprising connections, and new concepts to emerge from them. In this conclusion, I will articulate the way that one of the lines of flight is an emphasis on embodied political ethics.

Making Affective Political Theory Useless for Fascism

What is to be done with these affective and emotional lines of flight from political theoretical texts and concepts, whether they come from the main thinkers of this dissertation, other theorists and texts, or from political theory more broadly? Deleuze and Guattari insist that there is always the danger with lines of flight that they “turn to destruction, abolition pure and simple, the passion of abolition … a line of death” and that what is important is for a line of flight to be “connecting with other lines and each time augmenting its valence” (1987, 229). Soon thereafter they theorize fascism as a singular example of the danger inherent to the line of flight, for fascism “is constructed on an intense line of flight, which it transforms into a line of pure destruction and abolition,” assembling a “war machine that no longer had anything but war as its object” (230-31). Meanwhile, Walter Benjamin presents an injunction in the opening to his Artwork essay, writing that the concepts he develops therein differ from others because “they are completely useless for the purposes of fascism,” and instead “are useful [only] for the
formulation of revolutionary demands” (2002, 102). We might take this as a general guideline in doing any kind of theorizing, to make that theory completely useless for fascism. Reading Deleuze and Guattari and Benjamin together on these points poses a question for this dissertation along the lines of “how can one make sure that affective political theory is completely useless for the purposes of fascism, but instead cultivates connections for lines of flight and thus prevents them from transforming into lines of destruction?” In other words, affect and emotion can infuse fascist (or racist, or misogynist, or heterosexist, or colonial, etc.) politics just as they can more emancipatory kinds of politics.

This project thus requires a constellation of ethical-political principles, which the rest of the conclusion will work to articulate. While it has been a thread running through the whole dissertation, here I outline how my mode of affective reading helps to uncover the kinds of embodied ethics at stake in the political realm. I will argue that ethics and politics are always implicated in each other insofar as all ethical encounters are politically organized, in response to critics of the so-called ‘ethical turn’ in political theory, who contend that attention to ethics is depoliticizing. Chris Beasley and Carol Bacchi posit the question of “what if we were to start from the levelling meaning” of “shared,” embodied social existence when we participate in “reconceiving political thinking?” (2012, 117; their emphasis). My claim is that the intensive encounter between affect theory and political theory can motivate an embodied political ethics that responds to this challenge.

A specific kind of conceptualization of ethics is required for such a project. Consistent with my mobilization of affect theory, I build on versions of ethics that emerge immanently from interacting materialities, rather than ones that construct universal or transcendental principles, command-based moralities, or categorical imperatives. Deleuze writes that Spinoza constructs an
ethics emphasizing “the qualitative difference” among immanent “modes of existence” and replacing a conception of morality “which always refers existence to transcendent values” (Deleuze 1988, 23). This dissents from attempts to organize behavior on the basis of moral laws that invoke some transcendent authority, articulating instead an ethics that unfolds from interactions between bodies defined by their capacity to affect and be affected. The Spinozan-Deleuzean perspective resonates with Jane Bennett – herself an important reader of these two thinkers – who writes that the “ethical turn” in political theory entails an engagement with “a complex set of relays between moral contents, aesthetic-affective styles, and public moods” that are intimately connected to embodied dispositions and sensibilities, instead of “a set of doctrines” (2010, xii). In her work on enchantment and enchanted materialism, she outlines a “subdispositional attachment to the abundance of life that is deeply installed in [some human] bodies,” one that “provides a positive energetics from which some try to cultivate a stance of presumptive generosity” (2001, 158). The key move Deleuze, Spinoza, and Bennett share – which becomes central to my argument – is to center ethics at the level of encounters between dynamic, energetic bodies. It is these sorts of ethical dispositions that should orient a work such as mine that reads for precisely these kinds of bodies in political theory.

Ethics of Becoming, Ethics of Vulnerability

To assess the conditions, relations, circulations, and configuration of interacting bodies, in this section I engage two articulations of ethics: Rosi Braidotti’s nomadic ethics of becoming and affectivity and Erinn C. Gilson’s feminist ethics of vulnerability. For Braidotti, ethics involves “forces, desires, and values that act as empowering modes of being, whereas morality is the established sets of rules”; this is an “ethical pragmatism” that “is conceptually linked to the notion of embodied materialism and a non-unitary vision of the subject” (2009, 144). This ethics
– a “faithfulness to this potentia, or the desire to become” – emphasizes “the body as an enfleshed field of passions or forces” and focuses on “affectivity and joy” in the “encounters and minglings with other bodies, entities, beings and forces” (2006, 134). As she writes:

At the core of this ethical project is a positive vision of the subject as a radically immanent, intensive body, that is, an assemblage of forces or flows, intensities, and passions that solidify in space and consolidate in time, within the singular configuration commonly known as an 'individual' self. This intensive and dynamic entity is rather a portion of forces that is stable enough to sustain and undergo constant though non-destructive fluxes of transformation. It is the body’s degrees and levels of affectivity that determine the modes of differentiation (2009, 146).

So, in Braidotti’s nomadic, Deleuzean-infused ethics, we focus on the intensive and affective body, the interplay of forces and powers between such bodies, the potential for the transformation of bodies, and subject-in-flux. The ethical task becomes the fostering and sustenance of the enhancement of individual potentia. It also becomes “turning the tide of negativity” as “an ethical transformative process” which “aims at achieving the freedom of understanding” of the boundedness and connections of bodies (2006, 134).

Braidotti ends her 2009 essay with the assertion that “cultivating the ethics of living intensely in the pursuit of change” is “a political act” (158). Braidotti insists that the “ethically empowering option” is what “increases one’s potentia and creates joyful energy in the process”; the crucial aspect of this for my account is that the “conditions which can encourage such a quest” for amplified power and affectivity “are not only historical, but also relational: they have to do with cultivating and facilitating productive encounters” (2006, 136-37). These historical and relational conditions that may potentially cultivate joyful encounters are where I locate politics. I would contend that one political impetus of Braidotti’s ethics becomes how to organize and structure government, economies, various kinds of flows, relations, and more in such a way as to encourage ethical encounters that reciprocally enhance the power of interacting bodies, enabling
them to experiment and to become. What kinds of norms can be shaped by formal and informal institutions in order to accomplish this? How do laws and legislation differentially position bodies with regards to the likelihood of affirmative encounters? How are agonistic disagreements to be negotiated? These kinds of issues are the political questions to ask vis-à-vis Braidotti’s ethics. She herself points us in this direction, avowing that because of the lifeworld that “all subjects share” to some extent, “there is a common ground on which to negotiate these encounters and their eventual conflicts” (2006, 137). The “ontological drive to become” necessarily “involves” what we might call traditionally political concerns: “inter-connection with other forces and consequently also conflicts and clashes”; the “violence” that is “part of this process”; the “negotiations” which “have to occur as stepping stones to sustainable flows of becoming”; and the “understanding of the inter-connections between the self and a multitude of other forces” (2006, 137-38; emphasis added). These inextricable components of the ethical flux direct attention to the political common grounds - the conditions, constraints, processes, norms, structures, regularizations, and institutions – that shape and are shaped by the encounters of bodies.

This is one area where the wide-ranging capacity of feeling as a method in political theory is especially helpful, creating the possibility to affectively engage other political theorists, in this instance for further analyzing the political considerations at work in Braidotti’s account. For instance, a reading of Arendt’s concept of power in “On Violence” might work with Braidotti’s ethics to make affective political theory useless for fascism. An interconnection with others manifesting an ontological drive to become – to use language from Braidotti – might indeed be useful for fascism, racism, colonialism, misogyny, and so on. If we read Arendt’s account of power, though, more fine-grained distinctions become possible. Attempting to think
through power without collapsing power and violence, command, obedience, domination, strength, force, or authority into one another (135-43; 146-50), Arendt offers the following conceptualization:

*Power* corresponds to the human ability not just to act but to act in concert. Power is never the property of an individual; it belongs to a group and remains in existence only so long as the group keeps together. When we say of somebody that he is ‘in power’ we actually refer to his being empowered by a certain number of people to act in their name” (143; her italics).

An affective reading of Arendt might pursue this from the perspective of Deleuzean-Spinozan affective capacity, about the way that ultimately it is *bodies* that come together to act in concert. She insists that power cannot be an individual property, resonating with contemporary understandings of affect that conceptualize it as exceeding the individual. Moreover, power is somewhat open-ended for Arendt: it is the “condition enabling a group of people to think and act” (150) and its legitimacy comes “from the initial getting together” – a getting together of *bodies*, I would insist – and not from “any action that may follow” (151). Affect, similarly, is an enabling and open-ended intensity. We could further speculate that Arendt’s concept of violence might be understood as a decrease in affective capacity in contrast to power as an increase in that capacity, for while power is generated when people come together to act in relation to one another, violence “can always destroy power,” for example the way that “the most effective command” coming “out of the barrel of a gun” can “result in the most instant and perfect obedience” rather than people coming together to act in common (152).

People may connect to embody an ontological drive to become in different ways. If it is to gather people together to act publicly in concert with one another in the act of creating something new – Indian resistance to British colonialism for Arendt (152) or an Occupy movement’s People’s Assembly for the contemporary condition, this manifests a power-full political ethic to be cultivated. If this gathering instead involves a more exclusionary, oppressive
drive to become – the Soviet repression of the Prague Spring in 1968 for Arendt, or a Donald
Trump rally in spring 2016 for us today – this constitutes the kind of violence that, as an
affective reading of Arendt might demonstrate, ultimately amounts to a violent diminishment of
power and affective capacity. If “an ethical life pursues that which enhances and strengthens the
subject without reference to transcendental values, but rather in the awareness of one's
interconnection with others” (Braidotti 2009, 149), then the political question is how to structure
and regularize such a life. The capability of the subject to endure or to become and the
potentiality for ethical encounters depend on political organization. Braidotti’s central question,
found at “the core of the nomadic ethics agenda,” is that of “how can we (simultaneously?)
increase affectivities as the capacity to invent or capture affect and look after affected bodies”; it
is also the question of “what is the ‘cost’ of the capacity to be affected?” (2006, 143). Ultimately,
this is a political question that must have a political answer.  

The other mode of ethical thought I work with is that of Erinn C. Gilson’s feminist ethics
of vulnerability.  Gilson’s analysis is like Braidotti’s in that her focus on the body opens up
important questions about the nexus of the ethical and political realms, yet her understanding of
the body differs from Braidotti, an issue I address below. For Gilson, vulnerability is “pervasive,
fundamental, shared, and something we cannot ever entirely avoid” (2014, 2); it “refers to a
primary and fundamental common condition” (2011, 310). She critiques common notions of
vulnerability that limit it to negativity – as passivity, harm, hierarchy, fixity, stigma, weakness,
dependency, and other disavowed conditions. Such conceptualizations, she argues, lead to a
futile, ignorant, and ultimately oppressive quest for invulnerability (2011). In its place, Gilson
elaborates a fourfold understanding of vulnerability, rendering it “in terms of potentiality (rather
than fixity), ambiguity and ambivalence (rather than negativity), univocity (rather than
inequitable distribution and hierarchy), and a diversity of manifestations (rather than homogeneity)” (2014, 129).  

Vulnerability is “a condition of openness, openness to being affected and affecting in turn” (2011, 310). I read this invocation of affect quite explicitly in terms of affect theory and affective capacity, even though that might not be what Gilson intends. Vulnerability’s status as a basic element of “the shared human condition” rests on a conception of the individual as embodied, such that vulnerability thus takes on concrete meanings and manifestations “only in light of the particularity of embodied, social experience” (311). Vulnerability in this form has critical ethical valence: it can become an “ethical resource” which “forms the basis for ethical obligations and as an experience we undergo that can compel ethical responses to others” (2014, 5). Gilson shares with Deleuzean-Spinozan ethics and with Braidotti’s project a commitment that ethics is always an immanent terrain. From this perspective, “any basis” for “making ethical claims” must be “internal to human life and experience”; it emerges from both “specific instances of vulnerability” as well as from “vulnerability as a common condition” (11). In this sense, “vulnerability forms the basis for any ethics whatsoever,” and “ethical action” takes the shape of “preserving vulnerability” as a basic condition of human embodiment and existence, “condemn[ing] the myriad ways” vulnerability “is exploited,” and “encourag[ing] the cultivation of forms of vulnerability that enhance shared social life” (11-12).

Gilson insists on the imbrication of ethics and politics in her work: ethics, she claims, is a “space of political contestation” and always embedded in “a broader political, socioeconomic, and historical context” that frames the ethical evaluations of “choices and actions” (10). We should, though, further specify what politics consists of in her account. My claim is that the realm of the political shapes the primary vulnerability of existence, and does so in two forms.
First, it plays a substantial role in shaping the disposition of individual subjects in relation to vulnerability and invulnerability. It can cultivate a receptive disposition to vulnerability or can encourage and reproduce the misapprehension of invulnerability, as a disavowal of vulnerability and assumption that vulnerability is always something negative. As she notes, “a certain kind of subjectivity privileged in capitalist socioeconomic systems” – the “arrogantly self-sufficient, independent, invulnerable master subject” – motivates the “denial of vulnerability” (76); invulnerability as “a form of mastery” is “sought because it is the paradigmatic characteristic of an ideal form of subjectivity in present socioeconomic conditions” (79). A background condition of this dynamic is, of course, the autonomous sovereign subjectivity presumed by and rearticulated within some varieties of liberal political theory. Political institutions, ideologies, norms, and so on will shape the relationship that subjects have to vulnerability and invulnerability.

The second aspect of the political constitution of vulnerability relates to one of the qualities of Gilson’s definition of vulnerability – the way it “is manifest in a diversity of forms and kinds of experiences” (140). Drawing on Deleuze, she argues that univocity proves to be a fundamental characteristic of vulnerability such that “all are equally vulnerable” in terms of “open[ness] to being affected and affecting,” yet “it is quite clear that it is not actualized for all equally or in the same way” (137). Numerous kinds of “processes of differentiation that are formative of human subjects,” “patterns of affection,” “social positioning,” work to “constitute us as differentially vulnerable”; these “situate individuals and groups in ways that make them vulnerable to varying extents and in varying ways” (137). This diversity of manifestations of vulnerability results from political processes: institutional and bureaucratic workings, legislation, political inequalities on the basis of race, gender, sexuality, class, ability, and more, the
organization of the economy, and so on all work to differentially distribute the actualization of the fundamentally equal potential vulnerability of bodies.

At first glance, Gilson and Braidotti are two thinkers who appear to be at odds with one another: vulnerability seems to tarry with the negative too much for Braidotti’s emphasis on affirmation. Indeed, one of Braidotti’s essays from which I most draw is entitled “Affirmation versus Vulnerability” (2009), where she contends that we need an “affirmative [ethical] project that stresses positivity and not mourning” (145). I think, however, that Braidotti too quickly discounts vulnerability in general, and that Gilson offers a model of vulnerability through which vulnerability and Bradotti’s affirmative ethics of becoming can reciprocally enhance one another. They share, to varying extents, several components that begin to draw them together: both work with Deleuze; each attends to embodiment and to affect – at least in my reading of Gilson; and they similarly insist on the open, relational subject-body against the bounded, autonomous liberal subject. I would argue that Braidotti underestimates the power and affective force of vulnerability and that Gilson moves vulnerability in a more affirmative direction. Gilson demonstrates how proceeding from vulnerability can generate a philosophy of becoming – and in doing so engages a similar Deleuzean notion of becoming as Braidotti. For Gilson, because becoming “requires openness to unknown others, uncontrollable and unpredictable change, it rests upon vulnerability”; in addition to “presuppos[ing] the openness of vulnerability, becoming comprises the “positive forms that vulnerability can take” (2014, 139).

Central to Gilson’s work is her assertion that vulnerability cannot be understood in the register of the negative if it is to have any ethical generativity; she consistently critiques conceptions of vulnerability as harm, dependency, violence, weakness, and so on. While she understands vulnerability as ambivalent more than as something to be unconditionally affirmed
or negated, Gilson renders the concept more open to the kind of affirmative ethics that Braidotti articulates. I would further argue that there is indeed room for some kind of vulnerability in Braidotti’s project: she notes that “the knowledge about vulnerability, and pain” is “actually useful” for it “forces one to think about the actual material conditions of being interconnected and thus being in the world” (2009, 156). This attention to interconnection characterizes Gilson’s conceptualization of vulnerability, only she enables a more affirmative reading of the concept than Braidotti’s work allows for. Taken together, they elaborate an embodied and affective ethical trajectory, one I find especially crucial for the kind of ethics connected to affective political theory.

The Political Organization of Ethical Encounters

One axiomatic definition of politics in American political science is that it governs the processes that determine who gets what, when, and how (Lasswell 1936); another classic understanding is that politics involves the authoritative allocation of values in a given society (Easton 1965, 21). My claim, grounded in my readings of Hobbes, Marx, Marxist feminists, and Beauvoir – as well as in the work of the ethical theories in this conclusion – is that even if one accepts these most traditional definitions of politics in American political science, then ethics, affect and emotion, and the body are all at play. Both mid-twentieth century American political scientists characterize politics as a mode of distribution: for Lasswell, the “getting” in terms of recipient, thing-to-be-distributed, time of distribution, and process(es) of distribution; for Easton, the allocation of values. In these accounts, politics produces effects through processes of organizing and systematizing.

While I am not myself tied to Lasswell’s or Easton’s formulation, I mark them here to present my account with a ‘hard case’ of two classical behaviorist political science definitions of
politics, and most of all to push them in directions that I very much suspect their originators would resist. I venture that even these most traditional conceptions of “politics” can be read affectively and ethically. Given the kind of ethics – immanent, embodied, interactive – that I work with, I argue that insofar as ethics involves encounters between dynamic bodies, the patterned organization of these contacts marks one imbrication of the political and the ethical. That is, a fundamental component of politics is the organization of embodied ethical encounters, the regularized conditions under which bodies affect and are affected by one another. In Easton’s terminology, the “values” that politics “allocates” become those that shape these encounters – for example, they could be values encouraging ethical generosity such as those taken up by Bennett (2001) or Connolly (1999). In Lasswell’s definition, the ‘who’ becomes a collection of bodies, the ‘what’ coverts into the conditions of ethical interaction, and the ‘how’ is the structuring of those conditions. A directive to organize a maximum of joyful encounters so that bodies interact in ways that mutually increase affective capacity flows from affect theory and Spinozan-Deleuzean ethics. This imperative, I contend, is political. Ethics cannot be severed from its political and affective organization, and politics cannot be divested of the embodied ethical encounters of the bodies that constitute and are constituted by it.

Braidotti and Gilson can help orient my claim about the political organization of ethical encounters. Braidotti’s project demands engagement with the authoritative allocation of (ethical) values, to twist Easton in an affective-ethical definition. Appropriating Lasswell, Braidotti prompts us to think through who (which bodies) are going to get what (resources, capabilities, relations, ethical possibilities) when and how (in a structured and consistent way? in a way that discourages ethical encounters?). The language Gilson uses to think through the transformation of vulnerability from ontological univocity to differential actualization invokes the same kind of
language – constitution, differentiation, situating, positioning, manifesting – resonates with the language of allocation, organization, and distribution from the classical definitions of “politics.” As Easton could ask, how are values cultivating vulnerability or encouraging invulnerability allocated? And as Lasswell could question, who gets vulnerability distributed to them or away from them, and how does this transpire? Once one moves to think through the operations of (in)vulnerability and ethics in society, they come to ask questions about politics – questions an affective political theory is especially well-situated to explore.

One task of political theory becomes to trace the political organization of ethical encounters between affective, intensive, vulnerable bodies in their becomings and relations. Ethical values – of vulnerability and invulnerability, experimentation and endurance, affect, and more – must be allocated. We must work out who (which bodies) get what (becoming, responsiveness, openness), when and how (opportunities, inducements, cultivation, discouragement). Engaging ethical inquiry and practice as Gilson and Braidotti do necessarily implicates such political questions. Furthermore, when one asks a question such as ‘what legitimates a mode of governance’ or ‘how should a society its economy,’ one is always also asking about the kinds of ethical encounters between bodies that will be cultivated and encouraged and those that will be delimited and constrained. Ultimately, an embodied political ethics places its emphasis on how to regularize and organize joyful encounters, the transformation of negative affects, sustainable experimentation toward becoming, cultivation of and responsiveness to vulnerability, and an openness to ethical transformation.

As John Tambornino writes, “seldom are our embodied selves congruent with the moral and political order in which we find ourselves, yet we strive for such congruence”; individuals must “attend to the relation of their embodied selves to the moral and political order to which
they are subject” and “respond to the incongruence” through some combination of “altering their bodies to better align with the order” and/or “challenging the order to better align it with their bodies” (2002, 41–42). This is also a matter of the political organization of ethical encounters relating to how a political order is going to respond to ethical and bodily incongruences. Tambornino also notes that we need reflective political theory that makes the body prominent in order to think through “ethical sensibilities and social arrangements” (42). My contention is that affect theory, Braidotti, and Gilson – especially when assembled together – offer important resources for such a political theoretical project. My account opens up modes of interrogating bodily-social incongruences, the forces at work in creating and maintaining them, and what ethical transformation of them might entail. An affective political theory can pursue these issues at the nexus of political theory and embodied ethics.

The Limits of Affective Political Theory

There are certain limitations to insisting on a formulation like ‘organize joyful encounters and the increase of affective capacity’ as a political and ethical paradigm. One is that making Deleuze’s Spinoza a sort of normative ground to some extent runs counter to Deleuze’s immanent perspective and his critique of Kant. His more categorical formulations, such as those at the end of the shorter of his books on Spinoza about increasing affective capacity (1988, chap. 6) might even be read as an ironic recasting of something like Kant’s categorical imperative. A second and related problem is that a principle like ‘organize reciprocal joyful encounters’ or ‘increase affective capacity’ may function as mostly empty maxims. They can leave open questions about which bodies are and are not included under its aegis, how bodies are to come together and organize to effect an amplification of affective capacity, what does and does not count as a joyful encounter, whether everyone would be not forced to be free as in Rousseau’s
social contract but forced to be happy in the republic of joyful affects, or if solitariness or placidity or kinds of sadness (in the colloquial, not Spinozan sense) could count as an increase in affective capacity.

One implication of these tensions is that the political and ethical actions affective political theory points to are experimental and provisional. In interpreting Deleuze and Guattari’s passage on how to make one’s self a body without organs – or, in political terms, “how does one, as a political actor, maximize joy and minimize sadness?” – Nicholas Tampio counsels thinking of Deleuze’s “practical rules” more as “‘counsels of prudence,’ given the various landscapes we each inhabit” rather than as categorical imperatives “which apply unconditionally” (Tampio 2015, 14–15; internal quotations are to Kant's *Groundwork for the Metaphysic of Morals*).

Tampio argues that on the one hand “Deleuze [and Guattari] clearly presses us to test out (Latin *experiri*) new possibilities of life,” and on the other hand their “advice to ‘keep a small plot of new land at all times’ indicates that we should not gamble everything at once in our experiments” (15; internal quotations are to Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 161). If one directive from this dissertation is to think more fully about how to organize a maximum of joyful encounters so that bodies interact in ways that mutually increase affective capacities, and if that directive risks being too categorical and/or empty, then maintaining some level of caution in one’s political and ethical experimentation becomes a crucial limit on the project’s reach. Moreover, engaging the imbrication of ethics and politics can help mitigate the possible emptiness of the directive. A focus on the necessity for political organization and structure compels one to provide some content – about institutions, policies, groups of bodies, values, and so on – for the axiom to cultivate joyful encounters or reciprocal increases of affective capacity. The multivalent interplay between more traditionally political concerns and ethical experimentation can help address
shortcomings in one another: the affective urgency for ethical experimentation and joyful encounters can provide a critical perspective on the political status quo and push that status quo beyond its limits, while traditionally political concerns can impart concreteness and content to the ambitious yet ambiguous axiom to increase affective capacity.

A further complication of the project of the dissertation is the limits to ethical thinking in political theory identified by critiques of the “ethical turn.” Here, I want to briefly engage one prominent critic of this turn in political theory and political philosophy, Jacques Rancière.14 His position might be categorized into two linked claims. The first is that in the ethical turn, “the political community … tends to be transformed into an ethical community” in which “everyone is supposed to be counted” such that “there is no status for the excluded in the structuration of the community” (2010a, 189). The second is that the ontologization and affirmation of difference associated with the ethical turn becomes a “radical ethical indistinction” that collapses into “pure consent” and consensual politics (2010b, 217).15

I would argue that even though an affective political ethics does indeed involve some (or even a great deal) of overlapping of “the political community” and “the ethical community,” this does not necessarily erase the “status of the excluded” as Rancière claims (2010a, 189). Rather, such an ethics can find its impetus from the excluded, for example in Braidotti’s claim that because “the center” is “dead and empty of active force,” it “is on the margins that the processes of becoming can be initiated” (2009, 157). The ethico-political questions affective political ethics asks can and should center the status of the excluded: who are those excluded from ethical experimentation and becoming? Who receives a differentially high distribution of vulnerability, and is not responded to in their vulnerability? How can political institutions, aesthetics, norms, and so on be organized to transform sad encounters to joyful ones? Who cannot endure openness
to being affected and affecting? Claims for ethical-political transformation in an affective political theory can start from those positioned as the Rancièrean “part of those who have no part” (cf. Rancière 2001), as my readings of Marx, Marxist feminism, and Beauvoir are locate energy and agency necessary for transformative work in those excluded in some (but not all) ways.

Affective readings of other theorists as an extension of this current project would be important here as well, for instance Frantz Fanon’s emphasis on the political affectivity of racist colonial domination and anticolonial struggle. To identify just one example from Fanon’s work, an affective reading might consider the way that he describes how colonial violence sediments in and through the body, such as his discussion of “psychosomatic disorders” in *The Wretched of the Earth* (2004, 216–19).¹⁶ In general, Fanon writes, “there is a pathology of the entire atmosphere in Algeria” and “the organism can respond” or “adapt” to the conflict’s atmosphere in a limited number of ways; more specifically, “the war in Algeria has created its contingent of cortico-visceral illnesses” (216-17). We might think of this in affective terms, where the atmosphere is a particular kind of (violent, oppressive, colonial) affective economy, and certain affects and emotions stick to and sediment on the bodies of those in the atmosphere, producing particular corporeal responses. Fanon observes a phenomenon distinct to the “colonial war in Algeria,” a “systemic muscular contraction” of the colonized subject: “This contraction … [is] a postural concurrence and evidence in the colonized muscles of their rigidity, their reticence and refusal in the face of the colonial authorities” (217). Here, a nexus of political and social forces concentrate in the body as the colonized body channels a concatenation of colonial violence, racism, resistance by the colonized, war, the psychic and material ravages of everyday life, and more in this pathological atmosphere.¹⁷
Importantly, Fanon’s work also involves articulating the material valences of resistance to colonialism. As part of “fight[ing] in order to put an end to domination,” the colonized subject struggles to “ensure that all the untruths planted within him by the oppressor are eliminated” (233; emphasis added). The white supremacist tropes circulated in the colonial affective economy and stuck to colonized bodies must be worked through and expelled. Ultimately, “the national struggle appears to have channeled all this anger and nationalized every affective and emotional reaction” (230). In the context of this conclusion, we might also read this as an ethical project having to do with the affectivity and emotionality of the bodies of the colonized. Fanon thus demonstrates the way that ethical attention to bodies should start from the position of the excluded, those who constitute the part who have no part. They have a political and ethical claim that can motivate radical political theorizing. More broadly, the political organization of ethical encounters – which bodies have access to becomings, responsiveness to vulnerability and in what ways – is in part a matter of interrogating ethico-political exclusions.

As to Rancière’s second concern – that the ontologization and affirmation of difference collapses into ethical indistinction and consensus-oriented politics – I would argue that there is nothing inevitable about that collapse, and more importantly that the kind of affective political theory I have offered may be resistant to consensual politics. For Braidotti, it is only difference that can impel ethical experimentation, and she is wary of the danger of collapsing into homogeneity and indistinction that would sap the energy for becoming. Linking difference to the excluded, Braidotti argues that “only those who have been hurt are in a position” to “make a positive difference”: they become the source of “productive difference” that is not sublated into sameness or indistinction but provides the energy for ethical transformation (2009, 156-57). Perhaps certain versions of an ethics of vulnerability may risk indistinction, but Gilson is careful
to avoid this problem, insisting that even if vulnerability is on some level univocal, there is always “a diversity of manifestations,” “rather than homogeneity” (2014, 129). Rancière may be correct that certain trajectories of the ethical turn collapse into indistinction, but there is nothing necessary about such a reduction, and I suggest that political-ethical theorizing will be generative to the extent that it is propelled by difference. Attention to embodiment and to affect can provide a crucial resource for working against the erasure of exclusion or collapse into indistinction. Affect can enable one to more clearly trace exclusions and operations of power in their effects on bodies in the way it emphasizes force, capacity, debility, race, gender, colonial violence, bodily changes, and more; an affective reading of Fanon would be generative here as well.¹⁸

Even with these considerations in response to Rancière, the critique of the ethical turn and its implications persist in a way that places limits on affective political ethics. As Bonnie Honig argues, political theoretical attempts to ethically ontologize some dimension of existence always have costs, which often take the form of reinscribing some form of humanism and/or of obscuring the agonism and struggle fundamental to politics (2013, chap. 1). I think that a focus on affect and emotion can mitigate against these risks to some extent – by focusing on capacity and generativity, by exploring how oppression and power operate through these embodied modes, and so on – but these limits persist, and in the end ethics alone cannot be a panacea for political theory, affective or not.

This question of agonism – or the lack thereof – in political theory’s ethical turn brings me to a further limitation of this project, its focus on theorizing the emotional and affective conditions of individuals bodies rather than on the collective encounters of bodies coming together for political activity. One finds collective moments in all of the thinkers I engage: Hobbes’s social contract, Marx’s concern for praxis and for the organizing of the working class,
Marxist feminism’s variety of social movements and activism, Beauvoir’s lament at the lack of collectivity among women and later personal participation in various movements. Bridging affect theory with social, collective, and democratic concerns is crucial if affective political theory is to fully engage political life, and future work with feeling as a method in political theory should focus on these and other collective encounters, not only on individual bodies enmeshed in flows of affect and circulations of emotions as I have primarily done in this project. Doing might also rethink the Spinozan category of “joyful encounters” to include the complex and conflicted emotional and affective life of collective political activity.

Judith Butler (2015) and Deborah Gould (2009) – the latter working with strands of affect theory – have insightfully explored the politics of bodies coming together to assemble and protest. Analysis along the lines of this current project needs to engage and build on these works; it could also explore what an affective reading of Arendt on natality, action and the public would entail. This aspect of affective political theorizing is especially important for mitigating the possible obscuring of political agonism in a turn to affect and ethics, as focusing on moments of collective political action would ensure attention to modes of dissensus and areas of contestation. Such work could animate democratic theory in addition to addressing the limitations of my own project in this dissertation by exploring the affective register of bodies coming together to deliberate and work out differences, to act in concert, to resist and dissent, and more. Whether democracy is understood procedurally, deliberatively, agonistically, or in other registers, ultimately bodies are at stake, in ways that traditional democratic theory often misses. Ultimately, the potentiality of an affective political theory lies in its own openness to affecting and being affected, to becoming, and to ethical transformation, including being affected by and responding to the limitations I have laid out in this section.
Affective Political Theory and Embodied Political Ethics

Even with these limitations, one of the crucial promises of affective political theory is the possibility to weave together political theory, affect theory, and embodied ethics in order to contribute to a political ethics of the body. Beasley and Bacchi argue for conceptualizing embodiment “as formed and located within a political sociality” and “operat[ing] as an arena of epistemological investigation, political metaphor, method and democratic political vision” (2007, 287–88). The “political implications” of such an approach to the body “invoke an acknowledgement of interconnection and mutual reliance” (289). One of the lines of flight let loose from political theory in this project is this kind of investigation, exploring different affective currents and emotional circulations at work on and through bodies located within political sociality. Affective readings of Hobbes, Marx, Marxist feminism, and Beauvoir have, to take just a few examples, analyzed ways of conceiving of the political body, how and why bodies form political entities, modes of economic and gendered power bodies affect and are affected by, and much more. I have thus sought to elaborate one way a political theory focused on embodiment might unfold, deploying affect theory as a method to re-read political thinkers and to reimagine what political theory can do.

Doing so illustrates the way that ethics – especially when conceived as immanent and embodied – are politically organized, and the way that politics always has inextricable ethical valences. This applies, as I have sought to demonstrate in the conclusion, even to the most traditional definitions of ‘the political’: if politics is the allocation of values (Easton), these include ethical values; if politics is about who gets what, when and how (Lasswell), this entails which bodies get opportunities for ethical connection and transformation. “A political ethic of embodied intersubjectivity,” write Beasley and Bacchi, “requires us to consider” the
“interconnection” between bodies “as the basis of a democratic sociality” and of “the sorts of institutional arrangements necessary to acknowledge” embodied sociopolitical existence (2007, 292). The kind of political theory I engage in must elucidate what forms this interconnection takes and how it can be responded to, what this democratic sociality might involve, why and how institutions need to undergo ethico-political change, how to affirm embodied existence and becomings, and more.19

To conclude, I want to return to one of the motivations for this project laid out in the introduction: Connolly’s notion of doing “positive ontopolitical interpretation” where “the idea is to interpret actively, specifically, and comparatively” by “project[ing] ontopolitical assumptions explicitly into detailed interpretations” (1995, 36–37). One does this in order to: “offer affirmative interpretations and positive ideals”; “jostle the sense of closure … governing interpretations” by “introducing them as contestable”; and attempt to answer the question of how new alternatives emerge, among other things (36-38). This dissertation can be productively understood as one version of positive ontopolitical interpretation. I have practiced feeling as a method, projecting affect, emotion, and the body into political theoretical texts, generating affirmative interpretations of Hobbes, Marx, Marxist feminists, and Beauvoir and the positive ideal of contributing to a political ethics of embodiment. In the conclusion, I have worked to recognize contestations and resist closure by noting future lines of inquiry to affective political theorizing. I have insisted throughout that attention to affect and emotion is an especially generative way to examine how alternatives emerge – alternative methods, concepts, and interpretations for doing political theory and engaging political life.

Ultimately, this project has examined the way that affect theory enables one to explore how various political theorists conceptualize the political organization of encounters between
bodies. In analyzing each of the thinkers in this study, I have demonstrated that affect and emotion are crucial theoretical tools for rereading and reconstructing the political theory canon, gathering together a subterranean\textsuperscript{20} thread of affective political theorizing. Assembling my thinkers together can induce one to more deeply consider the ways that politics is always about the systematic patterning of ethical encounters, and that questions of ethics are also questions about politics. I want to somewhat programmatically outline what these thinkers collectively tell us about the political organization of bodies, as a way to lay out the overall “affirmative interpretations and positive ideals” (Connolly 1995, 37) my own project has generated.

The human subject\textsuperscript{21} of politics is concrete, material, and embodied rather than ideal, abstract, and disembodied. The body in politics can be productively conceptualized as constituted through concatenations of specific embodied and/or phenomenological processes (Hobbes, Beauvoir), flows of affective intensity (Spinoza, Deleuze, Hobbes, Marx, Marxist feminists), and circulations of emotion (Ahmed, Hobbes, Beauvoir) that construct and are constructed by the material environments in which they act and are acted upon. As dynamic matter, bodies constantly interact with other materialities, generating affective economies and fluctuating affective capacities. Relations and forces of power structure all of this interaction, whether they are those emerging from a lack of formal political entity or the institutions of the state (Hobbes), from capitalist sociopolitical and economic relations (Marx), from the imbrication of capitalist and patriarchal forces (Marxist feminists), or from a particular kind of emotional phenomenology (Beauvoir). Often, these organize bodies in oppressive ways, eradicating the potentiality of ethical interaction or collective political force as a result of the kind of affective economy present in the state of nature, the tension of capitalist affect, a dominating mode of social and affective reproduction, or patriarchal emotional orientations.
However, modes of political-social-economic-ethical alternatives can be articulated on the same theoretical/political plane, even as they may take different forms: connecting bodies together to form a government; radical upheaval leading to the elaboration of a society of communist affect; a movement toward freedom as one dismantles intertwined capitalist and patriarchal power; a disorientation from the gender – and other – norms, orientations, and organizations of power toward a more emancipated alternative. They reimagine the regularized processes, norms, institutions, and relations through which bodies interact and change, in order to cultivate political, social and economic assemblages that could ethically respond to vulnerability rather than differentially (and oppressively) actualize it. The blockage of becomings would be replaced by an allocation of values and resources for ethical and affective experimentation. Intensive, affective, vulnerable bodies (Lasswell’s ‘who’) get opportunities for becomings (his ‘what’). A condition of possibility for the actualization of ethical bodily potentiality is an organization of liberated, relational, amplifying flows and interactions of affective capacity and emotional circulations. Along the way of exploring these, I have rearticulated concepts central to the study of political theory – subjectivity, the state of nature, social contract, power, historical materialism, consciousness, nature, capitalism, oppression, patriarchy, the social, social reproduction, phenomenology, ambiguity, freedom, and ultimately political theory itself – in the register of emotion and affect. Through the method and concepts that I have developed we are able to identify, think through, ask questions of, and re-envision all of these political processes and potentialities.
NOTES

Introduction

1 Videos of the protest are abundant online, for example https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oV-ZSP0zAuI

2 Feeling is a term I will use to collectively refer to affect and emotion; I discuss my use of and the theoretical background behind “affect,” “emotion,” and “feeling” below.

3 As Jason Frank notes, affect “plays a crucial though often neglected role in our understanding of the political culture of a given time or place” (2010, 78). I would expand Frank’s point to argue that also plays a crucial yet neglected role in understanding how political theoretical texts travel from their time and place and circulate today. Thanks to B Lee Aultman for pointing me to this passage from Frank.

4 For a different example, see for instance the way that Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick and Adam Frank take up Silvan Tomkins’s theory of affects (2003). For a “snapshot” of different “orientations” to affect, see Gregg and Seigworth’s introduction to their Affect Theory Reader (2010, especially 6–9).

5 One of the background commitments here is to be self-conscious and explicit about my methodology. As Leopold and Stears argue, the question is not so much whether doing political theory has a method/approach or not, but whether one thinks about it or “carr[ies] on unreflectively” (2008, 2). All of us necessarily approach the texts and concepts with which we work from a particular orientation, and here I desire to make my own approach explicit. It is important to note that feeling as method explicitly implicates the reader, and not only the texts, theories, and concepts. I am the embodied, material, emotional, affective, living political theorist engaging with the texts. Just as there are affective economies at work in the texts, I am myself one node in an affective economy that also involves the texts, political theory as a discipline, previous interpretations of the thinkers I study. The texts work on me as I work on and with and through them; I have my own emotional and affective responses. Any “critical interpretation” necessarily involves “implicit projections” that “exceed [our] explicit formulation of them”, and because this “condition/limit of reflection is unlikely to be eliminated” one of our tasks becomes to “convert” this “into spurs to productive thinking” (Connolly 1995, 36–38). I am struck by and feel connected to my thinkers, they resonate with me: this is a necessary (but far from sufficient) condition for spurring productive thinking that investigates what a body can do or what affective political theory can do. Of course, the essential question is how to ensure my interpretations and theoretical work are not so individuated that they are unable to themselves circulate in the discourses and affective economies of political theory and other fields. Part of mitigating that possibility is being candid from the start about my own implication in feeling as method – in the way that anyone engaging in this or a similar method is necessarily implicated. It is also important to consider this as an invitation for a productive exchange between you the reader, the text that is this dissertation’s own interpretations and affective production, and the political theoretical texts it examines. Also important is the way I remain very close to the texts as they move, produce effects and affects, create concepts, surprise, connect to other texts and concepts, and more. In order to allow my own projections to lead to productive thinking, I work to move with and document texts in a rigorous way even as feeling as a method opens them to new potentialities. Thanks to conversations with Sara Rushing and with B Lee Aultman for helping me think through this particular quality of the project.

6 This distinction draws on Melanie Klein’s psychoanalytic theory to understand reparative and paranoid as positions: they are “changing and heterogeneous relational stances” instead of ideologies or personality types (Sedgwick 2003b, 128). Importantly for me, Sedgwick emphasizes throughout the essay that reading practices are necessarily affective, in a multiplicity of ways, although this is not always explicitly recognized.
A reading practice where “the most salient preposition” is beside is opposed to reading practices focusing on “depth” and “hiddenness” in which the objective is to determine what is going on beneath, behind, or beyond a text or set of texts (2003a, 8).

To be somewhat more specific about it, focusing solely or primarily on ‘is X affective’ might preclude something like Jane Bennett’s superb exploration of Kant’s “subterranean theory of moral motivation, a Kantian picture of the affects of ethics” (2001, 134). Because Kant overtly and “officially resists any association between … moral law and will … [and] somatic affects and material effects” (135), it would be easy to dismiss him as superficially not affective or emotional, and thus miss the opportunity to creatively engage him in the way that Bennett does. For myself, in the conclusion I very briefly sketch what an affective reading of someone like John Rawls would produce.

On multiplicity, see Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 8; 31-38; 482-485. Haecceities “consist entirely of relations of movement and rest between molecules or particles, capacities to affect and be affected” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 261); in my project, affective and emotional transmissions are a kind of haecceity traversing theoretical texts that my methodology enables us to engage in a way that other political theory approaches may not.

For a discussion of lines of molar segmentarity, lines of molecular segmentarity, and lines of flight, see Deleuze and Guattari’s “Three Novellas, or ‘What Happened?’” (1987, chap. 8) and “Micropolitics and Segmentarity” (chap. 9).

See Deleuze and Guattari (1994, chap. 2) on the general notion of the plane, the “plane of immanence of concepts” (35). The history of philosophy involves a multiplicity of planes, and Deleuze and Guattari trace some of these planes in Western philosophy, including their overlaps, connections, and disjunctions (50-58).

Such a project extends Roberto Esposito’s claim that Nietzsche’s “originality … resides in the transferal of the relation between state and body from the classical level of analogy or metaphor, in which the ancient and modern tradition positions it, to that of an effectual reality: no politics exists other than that of bodies, conducted on bodies, through bodies” (2008, 84; his emphasis). My project deploys affect theory as a method of taking seriously and interrogating the implications of understanding politics to be about bodies in effectual reality.

Of course, this method does not preclude or presume to replace more contextual, historically-grounded readings or readings that work through thinkers in terms of a more unified analytical concern.

Additionally, as Sedgwick claims, the “desire of a reparative impulse” is “additive and accretive” (2003b, 149). My accretive desire in this project is to read across different historical and theoretical contexts and traditions. Here, I also draw on the way Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s idea of “reconstellation,” as she constructs her project as in part “to attempt to persuade through the discontinuity of odd connections or reconstellation” (1999, 65). She notes both Marx (90) and Deleuze and Guattari (107) to be engaged in kinds of reconstellation in their work.

Thanks to Nicholas Tampio for pointing me to Tambornino’s book.

They do, though, set up exclusionary schemas in various ways, as I discuss throughout.

Thanks to Corey Robin for highlighting this passage from Wolin.

Chapter 1

For my citations in this chapter, I will provide the chapter number in the referenced text and the page numbers in: Hobbes 1996 for Leviathan, Hobbes 2008 for Elements of Law Natural and Politic, and Hobbes 1839 for De Corpore. De Corpore, gets its common title from the title of the original Latin work by Hobbes (Elementorum philosophiae sectio prima De corpore, 1655), while the English version has the title “Elements of Philosophy: The First Section, Concerning Body.” Hobbes provides a similar formulation to this quote in Leviathan, XXXIV: 270: “For the Universe, being the Aggregate of all Bodies, there is no real part thereof that is not also Body; nor any thing properly a Body, that is not also
part of (that Aggregate of all Bodies) the Universe.” Hobbes goes to great lengths in multiple works to demonstrate that something like an “incorporeal substance” is an “absurdity” (EL, XI: 65-6; L IV: 30; L V: 33-35; L XLVI: 465). As Shapin and Schaffer note, because Hobbes “Hobbes endeavoured to show the absurdity of an ontology that posited incorporeal substances and immaterial spirits ... he built a plenist ontology, and, in the process, erected a materialistic theory of knowledge in which the foundations of knowledge were notions of causes, and those causes were matter and motion” (1985, 19) Notably, in early 1641 he “began a heated exchange with Descartes on mechanics and optics,” arguing that the “Cartesian notion of an incorporeal substance” was one of these absurdities, and that Descartes offered a “false definition of ‘body’” in his natural philosophy (Shapin and Schaffer 1985, 84). Below I more fully discuss the ways that Hobbes articulates a radically different ontology than Cartesianism, especially Cartesian dualism.

2 For an excellent discussion of the inextricability of Hobbes’s materialist ontology and epistemology, political philosophy, natural philosophy, scientific worldview, and religious concerns, see Shapin and Schaffer (1985). As they emphasize, for Hobbes any distinction between science, philosophy, politics, and religion is artificial and destructive to the pursuit of knowledge: “For Hobbes, the activity of the philosopher was not bounded: there was no cultural space where knowledge could be had where the philosopher should not go. The methods of the natural philosopher were, in crucial respects, identical to those of the civic philosopher” (337). There is, in their view a “unity of those concerns” understood as “ethical, political, psychological, and metaphysical” with “philosophy of nature” in Hobbes, one that too often is “dismissed from consideration” of his thinking (8). Petchesky (1987) reads Hobbes’s materialism as in part a (gendered) response to the “epistemological explosion” (8) – one bringing the living body to the forefront – of 16th and 17th century Europe that encompasses and connects religion, political thinking, and science as well as ruptures hegemonic unities in and across these spheres. Consequently, Hobbes involved himself in a number of furious debates that link together these spheres, such as: the proper relationship between organized religion, the state, and social order (L, XLII; cf. Shapin and Schaffer 1985, chap. 3); the metaphysical status of the soul, spirits, angels, eternal life, etc. (L, XXXIV, XXXVIII, XLVI-XLVII; cf. Overhoff 2000, especially chap. 5 and chap. 6); mortalism (cf. Petchesky 1987); the emerging experimental form of life (most associated with Boyle) and its metaphysical, epistemological, religious and political effects (Shapin and Schaffer 1985, especially chap. 4), and so on. On the general historical, scientific, and philosophical context of Hobbes’s materialism, see Tuck (1993, chap. 7) and Kargon (1966, chap. 6). Watkins (1965) also argues for the need to read Hobbes’s “civic philosophy” in terms of his natural philosophy, although I sharply diverge from Watkins in his evaluation of Hobbes’s materialism as overly deterministic and mechanistic such that it cannot account for human complexity.


4 For accounts that compare the two in different ways, see for example: James on thought, passion, and action (1997, chap. 6); Steinberg on the right of nature and obligation (2013, 2.1–2.2); and Curley on power, right (1991). We know that there are historical connections between Hobbes and Spinoza. Spinoza definitely read De Cive – which influenced his Tractatus Theologico-Politicus – and might have read Leviathan (Sacksteder 1980). Spinoza’s arguments in the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus are in part addressed to conceptions of “right” influenced by Grotius and Hobbes (Curley 1991, 103–105), and he was generally influenced by Dutch Hobbesians (Steinberg 2013, sec. 1.2). Hobbes and Spinoza shared a commitment to plenism in the seventeenth century natural philosophy debates between the “plenists” and the “vacuists,” and a related critique of the emerging experimental epistemology and form of intellectual life (Shapin and Schaffer 1985, 253–254). Both are also sharp critics of Cartesian mind-body dualism as well as Aristotelian Scholasticism (James 1997, chap. 6). Spinoza also dissented from Boyle, and in doing so linked Boyle and Descartes (Deleuze 1990, 228).

5 Thanks to Lindsey Whitmore for encouraging me to think about the ways that Stewart might tell us something about Hobbes here.
Notably for Hobbes, all are “equall, in the faculties of body, and mind”, at least in their ability to kill one another (L, XIII: 86-87). Hobbes notes in his discussion of paternal power that “there is not always that difference of strength, or prudence between the man and the woman” (L, XX: 139). This and Hobbes’s broader discussion of gender and paternal power (L, XX: 139-40) – including an invocation of “Amazons” practicing “dominion of the Females” (140) – have led some (e.g. Pateman 1988, 43–50) to read Hobbes as a sort of proto-feminist, or at the very least not justifying patriarchal power to the same extent that later social contract theorists will. For a contrasting view of Hobbes on paternal power, see Nyquist on Hobbes’s “female-free family” (2013, 311–15). In the conclusion, I discuss a kind of ethical project of maximizing the potentials of bodies in relation to modes of difference and to violence.

Movement presents us with the body as “transition,” its “own variation,” such that “in motion, a body is in an immediate, unfolding relation to its nonpresent potential to vary” (Massumi 2002, 4). Hobbes presents us with an image of the body that is to some extent more fixed than Massumi’s account, especially the farther we get away from Hobbes’s direct exposition of the body, but the Hobbesian body does evince some capacity for self-transition or self-variation.

For a similar account of sense, see DC, VI: 77-79 and L, I: 13-14; for a detailed account of the individual senses – and especially sight – see DC, XXV: 402-405.

Recall, for example, that Clough theorizes affect as “pre-individual bodily forces augmenting or diminishing a body’s capacity to act” that point to a “dynamism immanent to bodily matter and matter generally” (2010, 207).

See also L, II: 15, where Imagination is “decaying sense” resulting from an “obscurring” of the motion that caused the sense. For Hobbes, Imagination and Memory refer to the same general phenomenon but slightly different specific aspects: Imagination refers to the decaying sense itself while Memory refers to the way “we would express the decay, and signifie that the Sense is fading, old, and past” (L, II: 16).

For an account that excellently traces the materiality of sense and thought, see Frost 2008, 24-34. I extend this work by connecting sense and thought to affect. My project shares this task of underscoring Hobbes’s critique of Descartes through attention to his materialism with that of Frost, who argues that “Hobbes eschews a Cartesian understanding of matter … Starting with the presumption that there are in fact such things as ‘thinking-bodies’, Hobbes develops a complex account of thinking, desire, and action. And unsurprisingly, the conception of the self that he develops from this notion of animate, thinking matter is radically different from the conception of the self we get through relying on either side of the Cartesian binarism” (2008, 6-7). In my analysis I build upon Frost in my reading of Hobbes beside affect theory and more general focus on emotion as such in Hobbes’s work. On Hobbes’s critique of Descartes on this point, also see James (1997, 126–136), and Gaskin (2008, xxiv–xxv).

For example, see Ahmed, who contends that we ought “to avoid making analytical distinctions between bodily sensation, emotion and thought as if they could be ‘experienced’ as distinct realms of human ‘experience’” (2004, 6).

She makes a similar argument in her later work as well (Ahmed 2010, 230–231n1). Frost’s articulation of Hobbesian sensation could also be used to support this argument, as she contends that any response to external stimuli (possibly, in my reading, something like Massumi’s or Clough’s affect as an asubjective force) is always “textured by the entire complex history of the organism’s experience and responses” (2008, 23). Or, in the terms of my reading, the affective experience of sensation involves an embodied response to some external force, but that response is always colored by previous bodily histories of thought-emotion.

While Hobbes uses the terminology of “passion,” I will use “passion and “emotion” interchangeably in order to make more clearly situate Hobbes in a contemporary register and lexicon. As I will demonstrate, his account of passion as an embodied process connected to both sensation and thought resonates with contemporary work on emotion. Moreover, it is not as if Hobbes himself sets up a distinction between emotion and passion; the word ‘emotion’ does not appear a single time in EL or L. As I hope these paragraphs make clear, we should read Hobbes’s “passion” beside at least some version of contemporary theory’s “emotion.” For a sophisticated account of passions and their materiality vis-à-vis appetite, will
and, perception – albeit one that does not engage with more recent theorizing on emotion or affect – see James 1997, 131-136. I would disagree, though, with James that Hobbes’s “identification of body and mind” (136) is underdeveloped, arguing that the connections (not identifications) between the two are one of the most vital components of his critique of Descartes.

15 From this Hobbes draws a series of further classifications: objects of appetite, desire, and love are that which is called good, while objects of aversion or hate are that which is called bad (L, VI: 39); pleasure is that which helps the “vital motions” of the heart, while pain is that which hinders it (DC, XXV: 406; also see L, VI:40).

16 Or, for example, consider the refining of endeavor into appetite and aversion, an essential movement on the way toward producing emotion, depends on “things as are known by experience” (DC, XXV: 407), such that the appetites and aversions that will help form emotion are not generated anew each time but are instead connected to past bodily histories and environments.

17 For an extended account of the working of desire in directing thought, see Frost 2008, chap. 2, especially pp. 54-64

18 One might also seek to forge some connections between Hobbes and Elizabeth Grosz’s discussion of impressions vis-à-vis perception and memory in Bergson (2004, 164–175) as well as her earlier work on bodily inscription (1990).

19 The reading of the state of nature that follows is deeply influenced by Ahmed’s theorization of affective economy (2004, 44-49); also see 55-56 (on affective economies of hate vis-à-vis hate crime laws) and 71-80 (on global affective economies of fear in regards to the nation, mobility, migration, and “terrorism”).

20 Even here, Hobbes proves interested in how emotions shift focus away from any one particular individual. In discussing the relative equality of peoples’ “faculties of mind,” he notes that people tend to imagine themselves superior and thus NOT equal to others. It is especially the case that “they will hardly believe there be many so wise as themselves” (L XIII: 87). Hobbes grants that this seemingly points to the inequality of faculties of mind; however, since everyone thinks thus, what he understands to be the near-universal overvaluing of one’s own faculty “proveth rather that men are in that point equall, than unequall” (87). The source of this high opinion of oneself is “vain conceit” (87), and is thus related, I would argue, to the passion of Vaine-glory, a “Joy, arising from imagination of a man’s own power and ability” that is “grounded on the flatter of others, or onely support by himself, for delight in the consequences of it” (L, VI: 42). So in this instance, the commonality and shape of a particular passion moves the focus away from the individual and toward the effects that this (widespread) passion generates.

21 While Frost does not explore this potentiality, her account of vital motion’s effort to preserve itself could productively be read beside the Spinozan concept of conatus, the effort of a being to persist in its own existence (Spinoza 2005, bk. III; Deleuze 1988, 20–21; 99–100), as another possible conceptual connection to make between Hobbes and Spinoza.

22 Brennan opens her Transmission of Affect by discussing how one “feels the atmosphere” of the space they enter. This “transmission of affect” is for her physiological as well as social and psychological, such that “the transmission is also responsible for bodily changes” as the “atmosphere’ or environment literally gets into the individual” (2004, 1). Transmitted affects thus “come via in interaction with other people and an environment” (3). This account is broadly consistent with my reading of Hobbes’s state of nature, although I disagree with her brief argument that Hobbes offers a theory of passions where “individualism is reconciled with determinism, and the passions are made equivalent to the soul or psyche” (104). As this chapter indicates, the picture is much richer and more complex than this.

23 The full passage: “And from hence it comes to passe, that where an Invader hath no more to feare, than an other mans single power; if one plant, sow, build, or possesse a convenient Seat, others may probably be expected to come prepared with forces united, to dispossesse, and deprive him, not only of the fruit of his labour, but also of his life, or liberty” (L, XIII: 87).

24 Or, in Spinozan-Deleuzean terms, we need to organize society so as to maximize the affective capacity of each body/mode and their interconnections. For one account reading Hobbes and Spinoza in relation to
one another of the state of nature – particularly in terms of power, right and, natural law – see Curley 1991.

25 I would further note that Hobbes discusses prudence in the same chapter he discusses “traynes” of embodied imaginations related to motion and sense, and in a way that resembles Reason’s attempt to trace consequences. Prudence involves “desiring [ing] to know the event of an action”, thinking “of some like action past” and its consequences, “supposing like events will follow like actions” (L, III: 22).

26 He provides similar articulations elsewhere, for example EL XIX; XX; XXVII.

27 Frost (2008, chap. 4) offers a version of a more sustained, fully-fleshed out materialist ethics emerging from Hobbes.

Chapter 2

1 Here, note the resonances between Yovel’s account of Marx rearticulating Spinoza with Deleuze’s account of rethinking materiality and ontology in a Spinozan way: the body is “composed of an infinite number of particles; it is the relations of motion and rest, of speeds and slownesses between particles, that define a body, the individuality of a body”; life becomes “as a complex relation between differential velocities, between deceleration and acceleration of particles. A composition of speeds and slownesses on a plane of immanence … it is by speed and slowness that one slips in among things, that one connects with something else” (Deleuze 1988, 123).

2 Marx’s footnote reads: “Determinatio is negation”, i.e., given the undifferentiated self-identity of the universal world substance, to attempt to introduce particular determinations is to negate this self-identity” and refers to a 1674 letter from Spinoza to J. Jelles (G, 90n11). Hegel also emphasizes the notion that determination is negation as central to Spinoza’s thought (cf. 1896, 3:252–90), at one point deeming “determinatio est negatio” “Spinoza’s great saying” (Hegel 1892, 1:252).

3 Deleuze and Guattari read Spinoza as the foremost philosopher of immanence: “Spinoza, the infinite becoming-philosopher: he showed, drew up, and thought the ‘best’ plane of immanence – that is, the purest, the one that does not hand itself over to the transcendent or restore any transcendent, the one that inspires the fewest illusions, bad feelings, and erroneous perceptions” (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 60; also see 1994, 48-49). If Yovel and Deleuze and Guattari are correct, it is even more worth explicitly extending the Deleuze (and in the case Guattari) – Spinoza connection to Marx as I do here. Notably, one of Althusser’s more extended discussions about Marx and Spinoza (1979, 187-89) situate them as thinkers of a kind of immanence, albeit within Althusser’s structuralism.

4 Most strikingly, Althusser writes that Spinoza and Marx provide the great, “unprecedented theoretical revolution[s],” and in this sense, “from the philosophical standpoint” we “can regard Spinoza as Marx’s only direct ancestor” (1979, 102). Holland notes that Althusser sought to use Spinoza and Lacan in his effort to purge Hegelianism from Marxism (Holland 1998, paras. 5–6).

5 Negri has long been a prominent theorist of Spinoza, including his book-length treatment of Spinoza (1991b), which contains only a few mentions of Marx but does make the intriguing gesture to a Machiavelli-Spinoza-March “vein of thought” that “counts the ‘sublime’” tradition of Hobbes-Rousseau-Hegel (1991, 265n26). For an overview of his engagement with Spinoza situating his Spinozism vis-à-vis Marx, Deleuze and Guattari, Foucault, and others, see his interview with Casarino (Casarino and Negri 2004).

6 A materialist and/or Deleuzean Spinoza is not uncontroversial – see Boros et al. 2009 for claims that some Marxists misread Spinoza’s materialism. The Deleuzean Spinoza is one of several Spinozas we have available to us today; on the variety of the different Spinozas, so to speak, see Vardoulakis’s edited collection (2011). For another particularly affective rendering of Spinoza – in this case vis-à-vis Negri and Deleuze – see an excellent article by Susan Ruddick (2010). I somewhat turn away from the Spinoza of Negri (with and without Hardt). Grattan (2011) incisively critiques Hardt and Negri’s elaboration of Spinoza, arguing that they fail to engage the full range of Spinozan affect and are not sufficiently materialist in their rearticulation of Spinoza in light of contemporary political-economic conditions;
This theoretical endeavor responds to Grattan’s provocation to practice “thinking Marx ‘with Spinoza.” To this, I would add that such a project, in my own particularly affect- and Deleuze-inflected reading, seeks also to reinvigorate our receptivity to Marx in the present, going back to Marx himself to generate a different kind of Spinozist Marxism. I pursue Spinozism in Marx, but this becomes a particularly affect- and Deleuze-inflected mode of Spinozan affect, conatus, and power that encounters Marx. As I trace resonances between Marx and a Deleuzean Spinoza, I seek to both intensify the connection between Marx and affect theory and to provide a generative reading of affect and embodiment in Marx’s philosophical project and critique of capital.

More specifically, he asserts that idealism in general and Feuerbach in particular develop the idea that one’s understanding of consciousness and activity works against any simple form-matter distinction that is often considered a variant of Aristotle’s hylomorphism. For example, Schwarzenbach contends that “Marx’s naturalistic anthropology and his hylomorphism may be considered a variant of Aristotle’s” (2009, 95). However, the way that Marx and Engels theorize the generativity of active matter in the form of the individual body producing consciousness in its real activity works against any simple form-matter distinction that is often

Ruddick (2010) favors Deleuze’s Spinoza over Negri’s, contending that Negri does not effectively think through the concepts of multitude and difference vis-à-vis Spinoza.

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9 Throughout the chapter, I will leave the supposedly-universal “man” as written when quoting Marx and readers of Marx. As the subsequent chapter will investigate, Marx’s theory may indeed only take up some men, an important limitation that the use of “man” to stand in for all humans spells out.

10 “Essential powers” is Milligan’s translation of Marx’s Wesenskräfte, which Milligan describes as “powers belonging to me as part of my essential nature, my very being” (108n1); this understanding is consistent with my Spinozan reading of Marx. He refers back to discussion in his “Note on Terminology” of the complexity of translating Wesen into English, which notes both the complexity of Marx’s concept of “essence” (the most direct translation), as well as other colloquial and Hegelian shadings of the term (Milligan 1988, 11–12). Another prevalent translation of the Manuscripts, by Gregor Benton, also uses “essential powers” in the passages I work with here.

11 Elsewhere: “…define bodies and thoughts as capacities for affecting and being affected, many things change. You will define an animal, or a human being, not by its form, its organs, and its functions, and not as a subject either; you will define it by the affects of which it is capable. Affective capacity, with a maximum threshold and a minimum threshold, is a constant notion in Spinoza. Take any animal and make a list of affects. … [D]efine bodies, animals, or humans by the affects they are capable of” (Deleuze 1988, 124–125).

12 He writes that the “peculiar mode of each essential power is precisely its peculiar essence” and thus also the mode of its objectification and “objectively actual living being” (EPM, 108; emphasis Marx’s). Marx constructs this essence/essential power as necessarily dynamic, not as a static property but something realized only in relation and transformation.

13 Conatus is the Spinozan notion of appetite, the “effort by which each thing strives to persevere in its being, each body in extension, each mind or each idea in thought” (Deleuze 1988, 21). On conatus, also see Spinoza 2005, pt. III, prop. 6; Deleuze 1988, 99–100. Jason Read (2015, 2–7) emphasizes that Spinoza’s concepts of affect and conatus avoid falling into either social determination or pure or abstract individualism, while accounting for the ways one’s conatus and affects are shaped by social relations. Here, Read builds on the work of Frédéric Lordon (2001; 2014).

14 I return to this in the final section of this chapter, on communist affect.

15 Of course, these constantly feed back into one another; for example, in discussing the “real” individuals and the “material conditions of their life,” the latter include both the conditions “they find already existing” as well as those “produced by their activity” (GI, 36-37).

16 Also important to Marx and Engels, and central to debates in the 1960s-1980s, is the nature, status, and function of reproductive labor, especially as it is performed by gendered and racialized bodies. I return to this in the next chapter, on affect and Marxist feminism.

17 I would thus disagree with accounts of Marx that situate him as a descendant of Aristotelian hylomorphism. For example, Schwarzenbach contends that “Marx’s naturalistic anthropology and his hylomorphism may be considered a variant of Aristotle’s” (2009, 95). However, the way that Marx and Engels theorize the generativity of active matter in the form of the individual body producing consciousness in its real activity works against any simple form-matter distinction that is often
characteristic of hylomorphic philosophies. For a general critique of hylomorphism, one building on the work of Alfred North Whitehead, see Shaviro 2012, chap. 3, particularly pages 52-55.

Reading Marx and Marx and Engels as anti-Cartesians, though, might prove to be theoretically productive. Doing so would likely involve some of the connections to Spinoza I and others engage, as well as a serious reading of the section of The Holy Family on “England and Materialist Philosophy.” Schmidt contends that Marx’s materialism carries the implication that “he who separates thought from the senses, the soul from the body, is incapable of grasping the connection between the content of culture and the sphere of material production” (2014, 21). It is worth noting here that in Schmidt’s analysis of Marx’s epistemology, the Cartesian primacy of the subject is an abstract understanding of what Marx argues is the increasing “subjective intervention” into the “determinations of objectivity” (121-22). Also see Yovel’s brief argument that on the matter of thought and existence, Marx gestures toward Cartesian cogito but turns instead to the Spinozan immanence of thinking-human-in-nature (1989, 86–87).

On Spinoza’s more general ontological and epistemological parallelism, see Deleuze 1990, 113-17 and 126-28.

Levi Bryant, drawing on the work of Manuel Delanda and Graham Harman among others, identifies four “ontological theses” of flat ontology (2011, chap. 6). Most relevant in contrast with Marx are: the third, “refus[ing] to privilege the subject-object, human-world relation” such it that is necessarily metaphysically different (read: superior) than “other relations between objects,” because while humans “have unique power and capacities,” this does not always mean that they have a qualitatively different or richer interaction with objects than objects do with themselves (246); and the fourth, that “all entities are on equal ontological footing and that no entity … possesses greater ontological dignity than other objects” (246). In general, flat ontology seeks to “diminish the obsessive focus on the human, subjective, and the cultural” in political and social theory and philosophy (246-47). Humans, thus “are not at the center of being, but are among beings” (249). It is interesting to note here, however, that Bryant does include “Marx’s mediations on how the money-form, technologies, and factories change our very identities” as an example of attending to “nonhuman agencies,” although he contrasts this with a contemporary “speculative tendency” of “Spinozism” that is not “obliged to relate everything back to the human” (247-48).

In the “indivisibility” of the human/nature metabolism, nature “attains self-consciousness in” humans, and “amalgamates with itself by virtue of their theoretical-practical activity” (79).

Holland also makes the contention between the two explicit. For him, Marx constructs a humanism where humans become “Master” of nature, while Spinoza “offers a kind of anti-humanism” where “productive forces” are “not exclusively or primarily those of humankind, but those of Nature as a whole, of which humankind is of course an integral part, but only a part” (1998, para. 15).

As Mies argues, in the “exchange of matter” between human beings and nature,” humans “not only develop and change the external nature,” but also change “their own bodily nature” (1986, 52; her emphasis). She also contends that the sharp separation in much Western Marxism of historical “development of the means of production” from natural and reproductive processes – which then get read as ahistorical” contributes to the theoretical inability to develop a “historical materialist conception” of women and labour traditionally understood as women’s work (50-51).

Consequently, the “estranging” from nature “estranges the species from” the human, turning the “life of the species into a means of individual life” (76; italics Marx’s).
He describes this movement of “Marx’s naturalism” as “Hegel’s legacy brought back to Spinoza without the Hegelian Geist” (81) in a process where “nature has been humanized” for Marx, but without Hegel’s “spiritualizing” of nature and without “an inherent teleology” vis-à-vis nature (79).

There is an important tradition of reading Marx as a social ontologist; see, for instance, Gould 1980. I do not engage this literature directly, but thinking through how my affective reading of Marx might suggest modifications to accounts of Marx-as-social-ontologist could likely prove fruitful.

For example the “starving man” for whom food exists only in “its abstract being as food,” or the “dealer in minerals” who senses “only the mercantile value but not the beauty and the unique nature of the mineral” (EPM, 109).

Thanks to Alyson Cole for suggesting this phrase to describe my account of affect and Marx’s living labor capacity.

In this sense there is somewhat of an affinity between this chapter and much of Lyotard’s work on Marx in *Libidinal Economy* (1993). See, for example, his argument that “capital captures force and turns it into a means of social labour, countable as time regulated by the clock,” in his broader schema in which “the Marxist dialectic is fulfilled entirely within the interplay of force and system” (144). Where Lyotard reads “force,” I conceptualize affect, but the implications for our theorizations of capitalism are similarly oriented.

Interestingly, immediately after this formulation in the *Grundrisse*, Marx notes that “this marginal remark is an anticipation, must first be developed, by and by” (272). Even in the text itself, Marx creates openings for lines of flight that he may only anticipate and need some further development. Clearly, many of these anticipations are taken up and elaborated in the volumes of *Capital*. I seek to explicitly pursue the affective anticipations of such remarks.

It thus has a specific relation to wages, which arise from “the objectified labour necessary bodily to maintain not only the general substance in which [the worker's] labor power exists, i.e. the worker himself, but also that required to modify this general substance so as to develop its particular capacity” (G, 282-3).

My reading here moves Cheah’s reading of Marx’s ontology in an affective and Spinozan direction. He argues that for Marx human labor is “a process of self-actualization ontologically unique” with its “defining feature” as the “ability to incarnate ideas and actualize the potentiality in nature and the human subject as part of nature” (2003, 191–92). Whereas Cheah situates this central movement in Marx under the aegis of Hegel and German idealism, I theorize it as an affective line of flight running to Spinoza.

Elsewhere, Marx describes it as the “transformation of the material by living labour, by the realization of living labour in the material” (G, 360).

For example, in the famous description of the global, revolutionary scope of capitalism from he and Engels in the *Manifesto* (MCP, 475–476).

Lordon also discusses capitalist “capture” in terms of affect (2014, 117–21), arguing that analysis of the employment relation demands a theory of capture which specifies the object of master/employer capture as the “power of acting” of employees so that the “conative energies of others work” in the “service” of the “master-desire” (117). While I think this is generally correct, I disagree with Lordon in his claim that Marx himself does not have a theory of capture in his account of capitalist exploitation. As I demonstrate throughout this section of the chapter, Marx’s critique of capitalism includes a wide-ranging analysis of the capitalist capture of affect, even if he never explicitly names it as such. Part of the problem is that Lordon limits his engagement with Marx at this part of his book to the appropriation of surplus value. What Lordon understands as an “impasse” in Marx (120) is an underappreciation of the potential for an affective theory of exploitation in Marx himself. It would be generative, I think, to read mine and Lordon’s accounts together to think about the way that the capitalist capture of affect I theorize in Marx works to shape what we might call, using Lordon, the conatus of capitalism itself. If capitalism has a conative impetus to persist in its being, then turning the conatus of workers against themselves and towards the capture of affect that reproduces capitalism and enables it to endure would be crucial.

Soon thereafter, using Fanon to read the revolutionary as an “affect alien” that is alienated from their alienation, Ahmed describes alienation in vivid bodily terms: “As a structure of feeling, alienation is an
intense burning presence; it is a feeling that takes place before others, from whom one is alienated, and can feel like a weight that both holds you down and keeps you apart. You shift, drop your head, sweat, feel edgy and uncertain. Everything presses against you; you feel against the world and the world feels against you” (2010, 168-69). For a different reading of affect and alienation, see Lordon 2014.

39 The system of exchange values “presupposes alien labour capacity itself,” the “separation of living labour capacity from its objective conditions” (G, 510; Marx’s italics). Moreover, living labour capacity, in its realization and transfer in production, becomes opposed to an “alien power” (454)

Moreover, Mies ascribes the “dualistically and hierarchically structured” “colonizing divisions” of mind and body, rationality and emotion, humans and nature, and men and women to “the capitalist-patriarchal paradigm (Mies 1986, 210). Recall that affect theory takes challenges to these polarities as one of its central projects

For more of Massumi’s critique of structural approaches, see 2002, 68-70. Further work on this tension between structuralism, social theory, and Marxism on the one hand and affect, and emotion on the other, should also engage Raymond Williams, particularly his concept of a “structure of feeling” (Williams 1977).


Such a claim, however, risks obscuring the specificity of care work and domestic work, a potential problem I discuss in the subsequent chapter.

44 Negri’s theorization of affect, labor, and value (1999) is more compelling, as it does not delimit affective labor to the degree that Hardt’s article does. Ruddick (2010, 31-33), though, effectively critiques Negri’s affect for still positioning affective labor as the vanguard of labor in the contemporary setting, asserting that “we cannot presume that affect is suddenly ‘present’ at work as was not there previously” (33), among other points. Grattan (2011, 7–8) notes that Negri in his account of affect problematically emphasizes only the power of acting, thus ignoring the power of being acted upon. In different ways, each of these accounts are consistent with my own critique of aspects of the affective labor literature.

On power, in addition to my earlier discussion of Deleuzean Spinozan power vis-à-vis Marx on “essential powers,” see Deleuze 1988, 97-99.

Deleuze argues this replaces a morality based on Good and Evil with an ethics based on good and bad (1988, 23) and thus situates Spinoza in a “lineage from Epicurus to Nietzsche” (72). One might note here that Marx himself wrote his doctoral thesis on the philosophy of nature in Democritus and Epicurus.

Deleuze elsewhere explains it thus: “An existing mode is defined by a certain capacity for being affected (III, post. 1 and 2). When it encounters another mode, it can happen that this other mode is ‘good’ for it, that is, enters into composition with it, or on the contrary decomposes it and is ‘bad’ for it. In the first case, the existing mode passes to a greater perfection; in the second case, to a lesser perfection. Accordingly, it will be said that its power of acting or force of existing increases or diminishes, since the power of the other mode is added to it, or on the contrary is withdrawn from it, immobilizing and restraining it (IV, 18 dem.). The passage to a greater perfection, or the increase of the power of acting, is called an affect, or feeling, of joy; the passage to a lesser perfection or the diminution of the power of acting is called sadness” (1988, 49-50; emphasis Delezue’s).

Indeed, a fully materialist Spinozan Marxism must first “fundamentally challenge the exploitative nature of capitalism” in the organization of daily life (Grattan 2011, 15).

From the perspective of a teleological reading of Marx, it is will; from the standpoint of Spinoza or affect, it is can; thanks to Marc Sable for pointing out this distinction. Marxist teleology is one instance where Marx pushes affect and Spinoza into a realm in which they do not usually dwell. As Eugene Holland notes, teleology is one of Marx’s greatest differences from Spinoza’s immanent materialism (1998, para. 16).

Or, as Deleuze and Guattari render the concept of the limit in relation to capitalism, on the one hand capitalism “is continually surpassing its own limits, always deterritorializing further” in its immanent drive to expand universally; on the other, “capitalism is continually confronting limits and barriers that
are interior and immanent to itself, and that, precisely because they are immanent, let themselves be overcome only provided they are reproduced on a wider scale (always more reterritorialization - local, world-wide, planetary” (1983, 259–60). Again, my own reading of Marx provides some more specificity – in terms of affective capacity – to this sort of theorization.

50 Elsewhere: “…when we encounter a body that agrees with ours, and has the effect of affecting us with joy, this joy (increase of our power of acting) induces us to form the common notion of these two bodies, that is, to compound their relations and to conceive their unity of composition” (Deleuze 1988, 118-19).

51 This would remain solely in the realm of “passive” affects and “inadequate” ideas; see Deleuze 1988, 50-51; 82 as well as Ruddick 2010.

52 This is, admittedly, an optimistic reading that abstracts away from the racial, gendered, and colonial exclusions and omissions that partly constitute Marx’s thinking. Insofar as Marx himself does not incorporate racism, oppressive gender divisions, and patterns of colonial violence, this future communal society will remain unrealizable in the confines of his project alone. I address some of these issues in the subsequent chapter.

53 The two, of course, are intertwined; see Lordon 2014, 127-134 on the interplay between an overthrow of exploitative employee-employer relations and affect.

54 In fact, in an informal poll of about a dozen colleagues familiar with these thinkers, I presented them with this full quote without attribution and asked them whether they thought it was from Marx, Spinoza, or Deleuze and Guattari. Only one answered Marx.

55 As Gould notes throughout her work on Marx’s social ontology (1980), conceptualizing the individual and the community as necessarily opposed to one another is, for Marx, a result of “the limited forms that they [the two concepts] take in both social life and social theory under capitalism” as dichotomous and conflictual (xii).

56 If, as Gould emphasizes, “individuals freely create and change their nature through their activity” (C. C. Gould 1980, xiv), then affect in a Deleuzean-Spinozan register becomes crucial in theorizing this nature due to its emphasis on the creative power of action and being acted upon. Also see Negri on the social individual in communism (1991a, 145–47), especially for my purposes that the social individual entails in part the “expansion of enjoyment, founder of that expansion” (147) – or, the expansion of joyful encounters.

57 It is in this sense that mutuality as “a form of non-instrumental relations among agents” and “the most developed form of reciprocity” constitutes an essential condition of justice and the “full development of positive freedom” in Marx (C. C. Gould 1980, 175).

58 For Schmidt, this “eudemonistic impulse” is something Marx “shared … with the ethical materialists of antiquity” (40). This, I argue, is another reason to move Marx into an ethical realm, as I do in regards to Deleuze’s Spinoza.

59 She expands on this notion thusly: “…we might develop this corporeal-social aspect of experience in terms of human needs. Affective capacities are tied to cognition and to the traces of social contexts that register in them. But as only one of a host of human potentials, they also have a relationship to the body’s other material needs — its dependence on sustenance, shelter, recovery from illness or injury — all of which require some form of social cooperation in order to be met” (214). It is important to note that Hennessy and I deploy different concepts and theoretical lineages when discussing affect; I explore these differences at length in the next chapter, on Marxist feminism.

60 At a more basic level, if Marx’s vision of communism entails the systemic, communal, reciprocal amplification of affective capacity, then the baseline possibility for forming common notions vastly expands when compared to capitalism or feudalism. The widespread augmentation of these positive affects in communism raises the quantity and quality of the joyful encounters that are able to be represented, and generates a more intense and active social reservoir of the joyful affects that provoke and conduct the forming of these common notions.

61 For a discussion of what a Spinozan communism might entail, see Lordon 2014. 156-161.
I think there is some affinity here with Spivak’s reading, in which “Marx attempts to break into that pure outside – pre-originary and post-teleological – of pure nature and humanity” (1999, 328).

The later chapter on Simone de Beauvoir engages Ahmed – including her account of orientation and disorientation in greater depth. My brief discussion here of Marx, communist affect, and disorientation is suggestive of the ways we might think through potentially shared projects between Marx and Beauvoir. Recall here that Ahmed uses “emotion” and “affect” somewhat more interchangeably than more Spinozan- and Deleuzean-influenced affect theory, as I discussed in the introduction.

These passages in Marx have proven important to Italian autonomist Marxism, the Wages for Housework movement, and contemporary discussions of affective and immaterial labor; see, for example, Antonio Negri (1991a, 139–50). Thanks are due to Carol Gould for urging me to think through how the “Fragment on Machines” works within my affective reading, and to Kamran Moshref for helpful conversations on the passage.

As Marx vividly describes it: “Forces of production and social relations – two different sides of the development of the social individual – appear to capital as mere means, and are merely for it to produce on its limited foundation. In fact, however, they are the material conditions to blow this foundation sky-high” (706). This is the point at which “the mass of workers must themselves appropriate their own surplus labour” (708). For Negri, the “Fragment on Machines” becomes “without doubt, the highest example of the use of an antagonistic and constituting dialectic that we can find” in all of the Grundrisse and possibly in all of Marx, as well as “the peak of Marx’s theoretical tension in the Grundrisse” as “the point where the antagonism takes on the form of working class subjectivity” (1991b, 139). The importance of free time and disposable time in the Fragment suggest the possibility for a deeper engagement between this passage from Marx and Weeks’s work on anti- and post-work politics (2011).

As the next chapter discusses in relation to Marxist feminism, the individual – social or not – is a limited one in terms of racial and gender divisions and of colonialism. A fuller articulation of the social individual, including its affectivity, would have to work through the white, male, European default of the social individual.

Such a vision works against the problematic tendency of some Marxist imaginaries that view a future society predominately in terms of unencumbered, creative, fulfilling labor freed from the dominations of capitalist formations. Weeks critiques such productivist visions which she reads as making the “goal” to “restore work’s dignity and worth, not to contest its status as the pillar of social value” in a way that is “hindered by a tendency toward nostalgia for an earlier time,” for example the “romanticization of craft production” (2007b, 86–87). Focusing the critique of “socialist humanism” – especially Erich Fromm – Weeks contends that once labor is conceived of as the primary “human essence, from which we are now estranged and to which we should be restored,” too much emphasis is placed on the individual, and the “self-realization” of the human is limited by being “inextricably linked to the activity of work” (85-86). As she notes, this passage I cite from Marx names the reduction of the working-day the prerequisite for freedom. In her critique of the “work society” and effort to generate “a more radical imagination of postwork futures,” Weeks insists that Marx-inspired futurities must go beyond “a vision of unalienated and unexploited work” (15). Affect enables a more capacious vision, one still grounded in Marx’s texts, for futurities that are not just about work; from the standpoint of affect, the free development and amplification of forces and capacities, the organization of joyful encounters, the augmentations of bodily power imagine something beyond a productivist focus on work.

As such, I would revise Bennett’s critique of the Marxist dominance in political theory and philosophy’s histories of materialism. She argues that “Marx’s notion of materiality – as economic structures and exchanges that provoke many other events – come[s] to stand for the materialist perspective per se” (Bennett 2010, xvi). While Marx is certainly an exemplar of the kind of anthropocentrism that Bennett brilliantly works against, Marx’s materialism is far more capacious, affective, and vibrant than Bennett’s encapsulation. Coole and Frost argue that only a “revised” Marxism able to “accommodate novel approaches and perspectives” that can “forge the conceptual … tools needed
to gain insight into the intricacies of” contemporary global capitalism. I offer my reading of Marx as one way forward in this direction.

Chapter 3

1 For example, the laboring body engaged in productive work has regularly been understood as white and male, and work in general has consistently been masculinized. This renders much of women’s labor, as well as the conditions of that labor, invisible, in a way that reproduces modalities of gendered, racialized, and colonizing power, particularly in the context of global capitalism (Mohanty 1997).

2 While some authors distinguish sharply between socialist feminism and Marxist feminism and materialist feminism, I follow Weeks (2011, 236n15) in preferring the term “Marxist feminism” as a general signifier even when drawing on sources labeled as socialist feminism. As she notes, the “distinction between Marxist feminism and socialist feminism is not always clear” (236n15). Moreover, given my own interest in these strands of feminism vis-à-vis Marx himself, and of the overall project of an affective reading of Marx and Marxism, I use “Marxist feminism” broadly and inclusively; Weeks provides a similar reasoning for her own use of Marxist feminism.

3 In doing so, this chapter admittedly abstracts away from the activism with which Marxist feminist theory is inextricably connected. Much political theorizing, of course, responds to its enveloping political circumstances; Hobbes writes in aftermath of the English Civil War and Marx engages European industrialization, revolutions, and labor organizing, to note the conditions surrounding the thinkers of the previous two chapters. Marxist feminism, though, directly emerges out of social movements and is more tightly bound up with them. In this chapter, I focus more exclusively on its explicit theoretical expressions. See Petchesky 1979 for an account of the relations between Marxist feminist organizing and theorizing, and Cox and Federici 1975 for an example of Marxist feminist theory coming out of the Wages for Housework movement.

4 Weeks cites two narrations of feminism that do this in regards to Marxist feminism (2011, 115-18). One posits Marxist feminism as thesis, radical feminism as antithesis, and socialist feminism as synthesis that transcends earlier versions. A second narrates ‘essentialist feminisms’ of the 1970s – liberal, Marxist, radical, and socialist feminisms – as challenged and surpassed by anti-racist, third world, and poststructural feminisms. Weeks contends that both of these accounts of feminist pasts posit, to some extent, these earlier feminist projects as irretrievably failed, mistaken, and frozen as mere historical artifacts. In response to this, she insists on the need to not bound different theoretical paradigms such that they become unavailable – or worse, seen as antithetical or regressive – to feminist projects today. Ultimately, we can turn to feminist pasts to animate our critical presents while remaining heedful of the problematic elements of those pasts.

5 Engels’s The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State (2010) was a major influence on early Marxist feminist thought, which regularly took the text as both a point of departure and object of critique. In this chapter I focus on the Marxist feminist critique of and work with Marx/Marx and Engels more exclusively. See Vogel 2013, chap. 6 for a thorough Marxist feminist reading of Engels, among many others.

6 This chapter also seeks to show that ‘affect as method’ can perform similar work with a theoretical and political movement just as it can with one particular thinker.

7 This is a position one can extrapolate, for example, from the Manifesto and its emphasis on the supposed dissolution of the family generated by capitalism.

8 I use this formulation of “those determined to fall into the category of woman and/or female” to attempt a slight shift away from the gender binary that nearly all of these Marxist feminist thinkers were embedded in. Throughout this chapter (and the next one, on Beauvoir), the texts – and, ultimately, my work with them – retain to a large extent this binary in a way that neglects trans and gender non-conforming lives and theorizing.

9 In Berg’s recent formulation, reproductive labor is that which produces affects, bodies, desires, social systems, etc., not things (2014, 164). I would add to this account that affect, in the terms in which I have
discussed it in this and the preceding chapter, infuses all of these realms instead of being localizable as a separate object of (re)production.

10 For instance, we might think of affect as raw material in terms of Clough’s theorization of affect as “pre-individual bodily forces augmenting or diminishing a body’s capacity to act” pointing to a “dynamism immanent to bodily matter and matter generally” (2010, 207), or to Massumi’s conception of affect as “autonomous” (2002, chap. 1). It is interesting to note here that Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak reads Rubin alongside Deleuze and Guattari – in addition to Foucault – as engaged in projects akin to one another in the way they talk up the problematic of “value” and “coding” arising out of Marx (1999, 103–109).

11 Vogel is not the only Marxist feminist to focus on social reproduction. See for example: the wages for housework movement (e.g. Dalla Costa 1972; Malos 1978); the domestic labor debate (e.g. Fee 1976; Mackintosh 1979); or Petchesky 1990, introduction. I focus on Vogel for her effort to provide a book-length account of Marx and Marxist feminism from the standpoint of social reproduction and to synthesize many of these debates within the movement.

12 Labor power must be available to set the labor process in motion (144), and the energies of productive laborers must continually be restored (Vogel 2000, 157).

13 Furthermore, “The ruling class, in order to stabilise the reproduction of labour-power as well as to keep the amount of necessary labour at acceptable levels, encourages male supremacy within the exploited class” (153).

14 In doing so, she rejects the idea that we should construct sexuality as either more bodily than social, or as more social than bodily. Instead, she asserts that “humans are basically both social beings and bodies, and our sexuality is a bodily yet social energy to unite with others” (73). To a lesser extent, Ferguson argues that Irigaray and Lacan have social-energy-like theories of sexuality. She also situates Rubin as working within a Foucaultian energy paradigm. Ferguson contrasts all these social energy positions with theories that in her account posit sexuality as an essentialist instinct, ascribed to Mary Daly and Kathleen Barry, or a drive, such as in Freud, Wilhelm Reich, and Herbert Marcuse (chap. 3).

15 In her account these are “supplemented by racist sex/affective productions systems which further divide” people (90).

16 This general framework of Ferguson and sad affects could be historicized through connections with Lauren Berlant’s The Female Complaint, which argues that “starting in the 1830s an intimate public sphere of femininity constituted the first subcultural, mass-mediated, market population of relatively politically disenfranchised people in the United States,” one in which “strategies for new improvisations and adaptations around women’s suffering, emotional expertise, and practical agency became the main register for the sentimental publicity associated with this nondominant population” (2008, xii). Importantly, “embedded in” this “intimate public of femininity” is a “white universalist paternalism, sometimes dressed as maternalism,” part of a history in which “as long as they have had a public sphere, bourgeois white women writers have mobilized fantasies of what black and working-class interiority based on suffering must feel like in order to find a language for their own more privileged suffering at the hands of other women, men, and callous institutions” (6). One effect of the enmeshment in networks of sad affects might thus be the “kind of soft supremacy rooted in compassion and coercive identification” that “wants to dissolve all that structure through the work of good intentionality, while busily exoticizing and diminishing the inconvenient and the noncompliant” (6) that Berlant analyzes. Thanks to Stefanie A. Jones for pointing me to this potential connection with Berlant.

17 In Ferguson’s terms, “historically created sexual symbolic codes can enter materially into the creation of sex/affective energy” (82); my claim is that we can take the materiality of this process further than Ferguson herself does.

18 For example, she reads heterosexuality and heteronormativity as a particular regulation of this need by capitalist forces (cf. 100-106).

19 In the concluding chapter, she summarizes this broader argument thusly: “I have suggested throughout the previous chapters that the disappearance of capitalism in cultural and social theory is not an oversight
but is itself the mark of certain affiliations between a new bourgeois ruling bloc and the emergence of new forms of consciousness for late capitalism” (209).

20 They recapitulate this sort of formulation near the end of the long third chapter, after tracing and then retracing the various quasi-historical modes of social-production: “So we come back to the question: in each case what is the relationship between social production and desiring-production, once it is said that they have identical natures and differing regimes? … In short, the general theory of society is a generalized theory of flows; it is in terms of the latter that one must consider the relationship of social production to desiring-production, the variations of this relationship in each case, and the limits of this relationship in the capitalist system” (262).

21 Further work could explore the particularly affective forms of interaction between the capitalist organization and capture of affective capacity in the form of living labor capacity and of the capacity to enter into sex- and pleasure-centered relations and compositions, building on Hennessy and my own work here. Deleuze and Guattari are likely useful here, interested as they are in the capitalist organization of desire as such and in capitalism as the reterritorialization of decoded flows (1983, 245–46).

22 Although, as Berg astutely argues, feminists ought to be wary of sentimentalizing, and thus becoming uncritical of, reproductive labor (2014, 163); her argument shares with Weeks (2007b; 2011) a critique of ideologies and practices of productivism that bolster the “work society.”

23 Ferguson continues: “This would occur by minimizing the repressive aspect of social hierarchies – husband/wife, parent/child, teacher/student, boss/worker – which reduce the quantity and quality of sex/affective energy by one-way channeling and control” (230). The suggestive resemblances between this formulation, or of an affective reading of Eisenstein, with the argument about communist affect in the previous chapter are striking. Ultimately, these Marxist feminist visions are vital extensions – able to articulated in the register of affect – of the affectivity of Marx’s “revolutionary ontology,” to use Eisenstein’s words. These notions also extend my above reading of Hennessy, and would implicate affect in Mies’s vision in which the “aim of all work and human endeavour is not a never-ending expansion of wealth and commodities, but human happiness (as the early socialists had seen it), or the production of life” (1986, 211–12).

24 This is one way that Marx constructs a “system that will remove difference after taking it into account” (79). Also see Dipesh Chakrabarty’s analysis of universality and history in Marx vis-à-vis time and abstract labor (2007, chap. 2).

25 In more detail, da Silva’s project is to interrogate the European scientific and social-scientific production of “the notion of the racial, which institutes the global as an ontopistemological context— a productive and violent gesture necessary to sustain the post-Enlightenment version of the Subject as the sole self-determined thing. While this statement refuges, as it reconstitutes, the whole field of modern representation, its most immediate effect is to demonstrate how the knowledge arsenal, which now governs the global (juridical, economic, and moral) configuration, institutes racial subjection as it presupposes and postulates that the elimination of its ‘others’ is necessary for the realization of the subject’s exclusive ethical attribute, namely, self-determination” (xii-xiii).

26 A number of white Marxist feminists have incorporated thinking about class, race and colonialism into their work for decades (e.g. Spelman 1988; Petchesky 1990; Eisenstein 1994; Eisenstein 1996). Ongoing theorizing by and critique of white feminism from anti-racist, women of color, third world, intersectional, and postcolonial feminists has had a profound impact on all kinds of feminist theory and the teaching of women’s and gender studies, especially following the publication of the This Bridge Called My Back (Moraga and Anzaldúa 1983) and work by Black feminists such as bell hooks (1981; 1984), Audre Lorde (1984), Angela Davis (1983), and many others.

27 For one potential emancipatory line of flight that carries with black feminist attention to the material body, see Alexander Weheliye’s imagery of “habeas viscus” that “translate[s] the hieroglyphics of the flesh into a potentiality in any and all things, an originating leap in the imagining of the future anterior freedoms and new genres of humanity” (2014, 137). Building upon the work of Hortense Spillers and Sylvia Wynter, he asks “How might we go about thinking and living enfleshment otherwise so as to usher
in different genres of the human and how might we accomplish this task through the critical project of black studies?” (2-3).


Chapter 4

1 Sartre argues in favor of bringing together existentialism and Marxism, against both this general position and against Lukács, in his Search for a Method (1968).

2 As the above review of the “Beauvoir renaissance” indicates, there is much to explore about embodiment in Beauvoir – and I contend that Ahmed’s work is uniquely situated to expand this project.

3 In the conclusion, Beauvoir offers a glimpse at the emotional composition of the dialectic, in its gendered form: “The same drama of flesh and spirit, and of finitude and transcendence, plays itself out in both sexes; both are eaten away by time, stalked by death, they have the same essential need of the other” (SS, 763; my emphasis).

4 The same might be said of Beauvoir’s literary works, with the characters as these kinds of subjects. A generative extension of the current project would be reading for the emotions at work in her novels (e.g. Beauvoir 1991; Beauvoir 1999) and short stories (e.g. Beauvoir 1984).

5 To remain consistent with Beauvoir’s usage, I use “man/men” and “woman/women” in a very general and binary way, aware of the various differences that such usage occludes. I suggest in the conclusion to this chapter the need for further work to attend to the emotions and orientations of difference that are obscured in Beauvoir’s texts, as well as the generative possibilities they may enable.

6 There are, of course, affinities between Ahmed’s discussion of disgust and Kristeva’s notion of the abject (1982). Ahmed discusses this relation (CPOE, 86-87), noting that while both are concerned with the border of the inside and outside of the “I,” she is more interested in the idea of “contact,” especially as it pertains to objects, than Kristeva (87).

7 Thanks to Jordan Cass for initially raising this possibility to me.

8 Future work could examine this point in the context of Iris Marion Young’s work on feminine bodily comportment and spatiality. It could explore for instance whether the concept of “emotional orientation” is salient and generative in Young’s theorizing or whether Ahmed and Young could be productively read together.

9 This is particularly the case in relation to other feminist emotions and attachments, such as anger and hope (CPOE, chap. 8).

10 Perhaps in the way Ahmed discusses the role of anger in feminism (CPOE, 172-78).

11 As Kruks puts it, feminism struggles not only against “institutional dimensions of subordination” but also against “complicity in subordinating and subjectifying practices” (2001, 70).

12 Perhaps, for example, reading Beauvoir in relationship to a recent issue of TSQ: Transgender Studies Quarterly on Trans/Feminisms (Bettcher and Stryker 2016).

13 Marso’s article is part of a symposium on Simone de Beauvoir in Theory & Event (Ferguson and Marso 2012).

Conclusion

1 Tampio (2015) points out the Deleuze’s interpreters have too often underappreciated the extent to which following lines of flight goes together with seeing how those lines close back up on themselves (like an egg, in the image Deleuze gives us).

2 Thanks are due to conversations with Susan Buck-Morss for formulating this as a positive injunction for all theoretical work. On Benjamin, fascism, and aesthetics, see Buck-Morss 1992.
This is starkly evident as I write these sentences in the spring of 2016, observing the hate, anger, fear, and affective charge of Donald Trump, his rallies, and his supporters.

These are not the only possible ethical theories that could be important. For instance, I think a productive exchange could be had between my work here and feminist care ethics, both in general (e.g. Held 2005) and as it has been inflected into political theory (e.g. Tronto 2013). For example, it might explore the affective and emotional valences of Tronto’s claim that “what it means to be a citizen in a democracy is to care for citizens and to care for democracy itself,” such that “to engage in such democratic caring requires citizens to think closely about their responsibilities and to others” (2013, x). Extending my current project could involve such an affective engagement with care ethics.

Such a reading of Arendt would add an affective dimension to the way that feminist philosophers have drawn out and developed a concept of “power-with” in relation to Arendt’s work (e.g. Allen 2002; Young 2003; Gould 2014, chap. 10). To think about how power-with works in political practice, paying attention to its specifically embodied and material valences is important – something my approach is able to do. Moreover, it could connect with her work in The Human Condition on the public realm, reading it as an affective coming together of bodies in speech and action. There are a number of issues and concepts that could be generatively pursued in an affective reading of Arendt, including but not limited to her theory of judgment, her account of thinking, her understanding of totalitarianism and the individual, the concept of the vita activa or of the web or relations, the status of the body in her work, and her relationship to feminist theory. Feeling as a method could also situate Arendt’s claim that “absence of emotions neither causes nor promotes rationality” – that “in order to respond reasonably one must first of all be ‘moved,’ and the opposite of emotional is not ‘rational’” (1972, 161) – in relation to work in affect theory challenging the reason-emotion binary that helps structure Western thought. While questions of “the body are purged … from Arendtian plurality” because of a “quest for purity in the domain of politics” in her thought (Connolly 1999, 181; 184), an affective reading can recover and reconstruct embodied dimensions of her thought.

Braidotti rejects claims by many Kantians and/or Habermasians denying the possibility that poststructuralism can contribute to legitimate ethical thinking (2006, 144); here, she overlaps with work by Bennett (2001) and Connolly (1999), among others. She also critiques the disavowal of poststructuralism that accuses its ethical bent of resulting in apolitical or anti-political tendencies or effects (2006, 143-44). Braidotti contends that: “The positivity of this desire to express one’s innermost and constitutive freedom (conatus, potentia, or becoming) is conducive to ethical behaviour, however, only if the subject is capable of making it last and endure, thus allowing it to sustain its own impetus. Unethical behaviour achieves the opposite: it denies, hinders and diminishes that impetus and hence makes the subject unable to sustain it” (2006, 134-35). The realm of political will shape the likelihood of and conditions under which the subject will or will not ethically endure; this is not, as Braidotti notes under the sole control of the individual/body/conjunction of flows. Unethical behaviors that work against the affectivity of the subject can be induced or discouraged by political processes.

Thanks to Alyson Cole for initially pointing me to Gilson’s work.

There are similarities here between Gilson and Judith Butler’s discussion of the differential allocation of precarity given a fundamental ontological condition of precariousness (2009). Gilson discusses Butler’s work at length in 2014, chap. 2, agreeing with much of Butler’s account, especially in its ties to normativity, but claims Butler makes the link between vulnerability and violence too strong at the expense of a more affirmative account of vulnerability. My account of the political organization of ethical encounters vis-à-vis Braidotti and Gilson would extend to Butler as well. I also find the way that Gilson discusses vulnerability in terms of an openness to affecting and being affected especially relevant to my own concerns with affect and emotion.

Thanks to Emily Crandall for pushing me to clarify this point.

She critiques contemporary theorists of vulnerability – naming Simon Critchley, Jessica Benjamin, Judith Butler, and Jean-François Lyotard – who draw on Heidegger, Levinas, and Derrida in order to (a) engage the “relation between the subject and Otherness in the mode of indebtedness, vulnerability, and
mournig” (145) and/or (b) “locate the constitution of subjectivity in the interrelation to others, which is a form of exposure, availability, and vulnerability” in a way that “entails the necessity of containing the other” (146–47).

11 See, for example, the way that Braidotti emphasizes that her nomadic ethics “enacts the desire for in-depth transformations,” presenting it as an “ethics of changes and transformations” with an “ethico-political project” that “focuses on becomings,” ways to “experiment with different modes of constituting subjectivity and different ways of inhabiting our corporeality” (2006, 133–34).

12 As such, generative work could occur inquiring into how biopolitics – as a form of making live and letting die – and necropolitics – as a form of making some die so that others can be made to live – are implicated in the political-ethical connections I pursue in this chapter. Several of the essays in the Beyond Biopolitics collection (Clough and Willse 2011) would likely prove important to such an endeavor. In a similar vein, future work could also engage the turn to thinking about “affirmative biopolitics” (e.g., Hardt and Negri 2004; Esposito 2008; Hardt and Negri 2009; Vatter 2014) from the perspective I am developing, as well as taking up affect in the context of Alexander Weheliye’s critique from a black feminist perspective of Agamben’s and Foucault’s work on biopolitics (2014).

13 Thanks to Nicholas Tampio for pointing this issue out to me.

14 Rancière is certainly not the only place to go for such debate on ethics and political theory; see for instance Vázquez-Arroyo 2004; Myers 2008; Weeks 2011, 227–28; Honig 2013, chap. 1; Mouffe 2013, 15–18; Cole 2016. Rancière himself names at various turns Levinas, Hardt and Negri, Badiou, Agamben, Arendt, Žižek, Derrida, and Lyotard in his critique of what he sees as the “ethical turn” in political philosophy and political theory (Rancière 2010a; 2010b), although I would argue that his critique would extend to the kinds of arguments I am making here.

15 These two issues concern him given his theory of ‘the political’. He argues that “there is politics inasmuch as ‘the people’ refer to subjects inscribed as a supplement to the count of the parts of society, a specific figure of the ‘part of those who have no-part’;” “whether this part exists is the political issue” (Rancière 2001, para. 19). Politics thus becomes “not a conflict between well defined interest groups” but “an opposition of logics that count the parties and parts of the community in a different way” (2001, para. 19). There is for Rancière a fundamental “wrong” that cannot be settled or addressed through consensus or negotiation, because it “belongs to the original structure of all politics,” “institut[ing] a singular universal” (1999, 39).

16 Also see Sara Ahmed’s work on Fanon (2004, chap. 3; 2006, chap. 3).

17 Also see Fanon’s discussion of the “affectivity” of “the colonized” (2004, 19–20), as well as his account of the “epidermalization” of blackness in Black Skin, White Masks (2008). A more thorough reading of Fanon would work to explore the full range of colonial power’s affectivity and emotionality. It could also extend affect theory’s engagement with Fanon, and would have the potential to connect political theory and affect theory to current work in Afro-Pessimism and Black Optimism, in which some of the debate between these intellectual formations centers on how precisely one reads Fanon (Sexton 2011). Moreover, pairing Arendt and Fanon through attention to affect and emotion would also be generative, since Arendt spends some of “On Violence” critiquing Fanon on the question of violence. An affective reading might offer new perspectives for thinking through this debate – including my above affective reading of Arendt’s power/violence distinction – when race and colonialism are placed at the center.

18 Such attention to the body and affect provides a helpful corrective to the questionable status of embodiment in Rancière. He claims that “the life of political subjectivization is made out of the difference between the voice and the body” (1992, 62). Such a move to potentially occlude the body makes it harder to think through the kinds of bodies presumed by and at work in Rancière’s thinking, or to engage the ways that politics is about bodies. It does mean, however, that we find an opening to bring the body in to Rancière’s theory and thus reimagine aspects of his work.

19 In doing so, it could engage some of the generative work currently taking up the problematic of “flesh” in political thinking. For instance, Diana Coole engages the notion of “flesh” in Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s
phenomenology to ask questions about politics, ontology, and agency. For her, “flesh” enables us to realize “that the way we think about matter and the images we use to do so have far-reaching implications for the way we think” about embodiment, nature, agency, and political sociality (2010, 112). If, as she writes, flesh demonstrates the “immanent generativity of existence” by disclosing how a body “animate[s] other bodies” (106; internal quotes refer to Merleau-Ponty 1968, 140), then affective political theory can examine the way that political processes, norms, institutions, and powers organize and structure this generativity and animating force. In another example, for Roberto Esposito’s affirmative biopolitics, “flesh” opens up “possibilities unknown till now” for political thinking (2008, 166). This notion of the “flesh as such” is “both singular and communal, generic and specific, and undifferentiated and different” (167). I would argue that affect as such shares some of the same qualities as Esposito’s “flesh as such”, and thus this project is well suited to explore the political theoretical implications and intricacies of flesh. My readings – as well as other potential future readings of different theorists – examine how this flesh is acted upon and how fleshly materialities interact with one another in a political sense. A third important line of inquiry into flesh examines it as paradigmatic to racialization. Hortense Spillers makes a central distinction “between captive and liberated subject-positions” in the sense that “before the ‘body’ there is the ‘flesh’, that zero degree of social conceptualization that does not escape concealment … [i]f we think of the ‘flesh’ as primary narrative, then we mean its seared, divided, ripped-apartness, riveted to the ship’s hold, fallen, or ‘escaped’ overboard” (2003b, 206). For Alexander Weheliye – building on Spillers in his critique of biopolitics and exploration of Black feminist theories of the human – flesh can “signal” both “how violent political domination activates a fleshly surplus that simultaneously sustains and disfigures said brutality” and a way “to reclaim the atrocity of flesh as a pivotal arena for the politics emanating from different traditions of the oppressed” (2014, 2). These works fundamentally challenge any attempt to unproblematically foreground flesh as a central category of politics or ethics, while at the same time emphasizing flesh as that which brings forth “a potentiality in any and all things, an originating leap in the imagining of the future anterior freedoms and new genres of humanity” as well as “lines of flight, freedom dreams, practices of liberation, and possibilities of other worlds” (Weheliye 2014, 137; 2). Spillers and Weheliye push future affective political theory to more closely work through the way that racial and colonial domination is in some ways constitutive of what we know today as Western political theory. For instance, extending the work of Charles W. Mills (1997) on the racial contract or Uday S. Mehta (1999) on liberalism and empire by examining the role that affect plays in the structuring exclusions of Western thought could be important for any further research along the course suggested by my project. Here, the fleshly political theory I have worked to articulate must be careful to not reproduce the violences and exclusions that precede it.

I use subterranean in the sense that Bennett does to describe her reading of Kant on moral sentiments: “I gather together the odd bits in Kant that form a subterranean theory of moral motivation, a Kantian picture of the affects of ethics. My aim is to trace the affective topography of his morality and to thematizes more overtly than he does its somatic or energetic dimensions” (2001, 134). My own project gathers together odd bits – or at least an odd mode of reading and theorizing – in order to more overtly thematizes emotion, affect, and embodiment in my thinkers.

Insofar as we could call it a subject, given the way that different strands of affect theory challenge the coherence of and privileging of the subject. I also want to mark here that this dissertation, with the exception of my section on nature in Marx, has indeed anthropocentrically focused on the human as the central unit of political analysis. Future work advancing this project should examine the potential of affective political theory as I have developed it here to productively interact with work in vital materialism (Bennett 2010), feminist new materialism (e.g. Washick et al. 2015), and post-humanism (e.g. Braidotti 2013).
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