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Israeli, Palestinian and Egyptian Explanations of Political Actions in the Middle East

Bethamie Horowitz
Graduate Center, City University of New York

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Israeli, Palestinian and Egyptian explanations of political actions in the Middle East

Horowitz, Bethamie, Ph.D.

City University of New York, 1987

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ISRAELI, PALESTINIAN AND EGYPTIAN

EXPLANATIONS OF POLITICAL ACTIONS

IN THE MIDDLE EAST

by

Bethamie Horowitz

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty
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Executive Officer

Stephen P. Cohen

Mary Brown Parlee

Charles Kadushin

Supervisory Committee

The City University of New York

Abstract

ISRAELI, PALESTINIAN AND EGYPTIAN EXPLANATIONS OF POLITICAL ACTIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

by

Bethamie Horowitz

Adviser: Professor Stephen P. Cohen

This study investigated how people affiliated with different parties in an international conflict understand their own actions and the actions of their adversaries. Using data gathered in the Middle East in 1982, the study examined the explanations offered by 1336 Israeli Jews, Palestinians (living in Israel) and Egyptians to three political events in the Middle East: 'Israeli Air Force conducts a raid on Beirut,' 'Palestinians attack a bus on the Haifa - Tel Aviv highway,' and 'A peace treaty is announced between Israel and Egypt'.

The study, an exploratory analysis, was carried out in a sequence of stages. First, the analysis involved a

comparison of the substantive interpretations of the 'same' events by people from three Middle Eastern societies. Second, a typology of responses to the three political events was developed which identified different cognitive orientations toward the conflict environment. Third, distinctive patterns of response across the three political events were identified using latent class analysis (Lazarsfeld, 1954, 1959; Goodman, 1974).

It was expected that parties to a conflict would explain the 'same' events differently. The extent of these differences, however, varied not only by nationality, but with each type of event. War events were seen as more familiar and predictable in their causes and consequences than peace events. Thus, the study revealed parallel ways of thinking about war events across societies. In contrast, a peace action generated differences in interpretation among all three of the national groups. At the cognitive level the peace action appeared to unsettle the stereotypic expectations that each party has of the others, implying that rather than trying to change perceptions by addressing them directly via cognitive techniques, more types of events are needed which can shake up the closed perceptual system created by ongoing hostile events.

Acknowledgements

A dissertation is the product of more than the intellectual work which it embodies. It represents the culmination of years of graduate school, years of one's life, and is a central event in the formation of one's professional identity. I have been supported all along the way by my family, and by several friends, colleagues and teachers and mentors.

I entered graduate school in order to study with Stephen P. Cohen, whose vision about peace remains inspirational. His belief in me and his unflagging support were transformative elements in my own life. I hope my work reflects well upon my friend and teacher.

I am grateful to Mary Brown Parlee for agreeing to serve on my dissertation committee. One could not ask for a better reader: her comments were always smart, subtle, incisive, and all intended to make for a better piece of scholarship. More than any other committee member, she oversaw the writing of the dissertation.

Charles Kadushin has been an important teacher during my years in graduate school. As a member of my dissertation committee he recognized the relevance of latent class analysis to my analytic problem. This 'discovery' of the

applicability of LCA to my work pulled together the dissertation into a coherent analysis, and signaled the turning point in the analytic work. Under David Rindskopf's guidance I mastered the latent class analytic technique.

Edward Azar influenced me early on in graduate school in the course of his collaboration with Steve Cohen. His important ideas about protracted social conflict have been influential in my thinking about the transition from war to peace in the Middle East. That he agreed to be a reader on the committee was an honor.

My intellectual training was enriched by my working with Stanley Milgram, until his death in 1984, when I was in the first stages of the dissertation proposal. I remain inspired by his unique socio-psychological vision and insight into the important problems of our day.

Herb Kelman has been a friend and teacher since my first year in graduate school. The numerous problem solving conflict resolution workshops I have observed have been a central element in my understanding of conflict and the problems of conflict resolution.

The "Images in Conflict" project was the single most important element in my graduate school training. Conceived of by Stephen P. Cohen and funded by USAID and the Ford Foundation, the project provided an historic opportunity in

both its process and its products for learning about conflict resolution. I am fortunate to have been a participant and a 'producer' in my own right, and to have had the opportunity to work in such a unique enterprise. In particular Harriet C. Arnone's friendship and encouragement over the years, in and outside of the "Images" project have been deeply important to me.

My husband Barry Holtz has been at the emotional center of my life for many years. His cheer and good humor, love and affection and support have made the completion of graduate school a joy and a healthy accomplishment.

The dissertation is dedicated in memory of my mother, Sophia Newman Horowitz, and in honor of my father, Philip Horowitz. They made me feel confident and able to pursue my heart's desire.

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Introduction

Attribution theory, a topic which has dominated social psychology for the past two decades, can be understood as an attempt to consider "the ways in which people represent to themselves their understanding of the social world in which they live" (Tajfel and Fraser, 1978, p. 231). Despite this broad scope, much of the research has been more narrowly focused on how individuals perceive or infer the causes of interpersonal events, and has not considered actions involving ethnic or cultural groups or nations. This study explores people's understanding of events occurring in the context of international conflict. More specifically, this study investigates how people affiliated with different parties in a conflict understand their own actions and the actions of their adversaries.

Attribution theory attempts to explore the differences in definition of the situation as experienced by actors and observers of a particular action. The actor tends to explain his/her own behavior in terms of cues in the environment, whereas an observer tends to give more weight to the actor's role in the scene. The point is that actor and observer present divergent accounts of the supposedly same event (Jones and Nisbett, 1971). Although the phenomenon was originally termed 'the fundamental attribution error' (Ross, 1977), for the present purposes its significance lies not in the question of accuracy of

perception implied by the term 'error,' but in the fact that observers and actors seem to attend to such different aspects of the total field. The researcher can be viewed as scrutinizing both accounts, attempting to explain how both explanations can arise out of the supposedly 'same' scene.

The general trend among attribution theorists has been to reformulate the goal of the researcher: "...the task of attribution theory is not to explain why our explanations conflict - because they don't - much less to explain our errors; it is to explain why, from our different perspectives, we tend to emphasize different parts of the same total explanation" (Locke and Pennington, 1982, p. 218). Yet, as Billig (1982) specifically notes, "there are times when different explanations most certainly do conflict..." (p. 186), for instance, as in wartime. The present investigation offers a case in point: a study of how Palestinians, Israelis, and Egyptians interpret events occurring in the course of the Middle East conflict, such as air raids, terrorist attacks and peace treaties.

In epistemological terms conflict can be said to involve a conflict over the definition of the situation. Billig, not writing about attribution theory, notes that certain research traditions have had little to do with the "problems related to enemies who are not members of a coherent higher group and who are struggling violently to impose their contrasting world-views upon each other"

(Billig, 1977, p. 421). The same could be said of attribution literature as it stands. Formulated in this way, the problem touches on an underlying issue in social theory -- the extent to which theory deals with conflict and consensus in social life. On the one hand, Roger Brown has noted regarding causal attribution that where there is social consensus, there is no need for explanation: "So long as we agree about the causes of social action we do not notice that causes have to be worked out by a process of induction." (Brown, 1986, p. 131). Yet when explanations conflict, many attribution researchers attempt to determine error or bias in order to reconcile the accounts, as if to say that there must be a unitary (and 'correct') explanation, rather than attending to the meaning of the existence of divergent accounts. There seems to be an assumption (or expectation) of consensus underlying all of this.[1]

To speak of 'bias' in an international conflict misses the point that actions may have different meanings to different parties in a conflict.[2] Thus, an event like

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[1]Billig (1982) makes this point about much theory in social psychology.

[2]Kruglanski and Ajzen (1983) have argued that attribution theorists should adopt the more subjective notion of 'bias' in place of 'error', pointing out that "all knowledge is subject to bias, but not all knowledge need be experienced as erroneous".

Sadat's 1977 visit to Jerusalem was not in itself a single thing to be perceived or misperceived: it meant different things to different people, depending on where they stood in the conflict (Azar and Cohen, 1979). And it continues to be interpreted and reinterpreted in light of more recent events and developments. At the same time, there may have been a basic consensus at a 'pre-perceptual' level of how people viewed Sadat's visit to Jerusalem: that it was something momentous which boded change in the status quo. But there was no agreement on whether it was good or bad, on why it was happening, or on what the consequences would be. Even the 'whatness' of the event was problematic -- what the Egyptians called "Sadat's visit to Jerusalem" Israelis termed "Sadat's visit to Israel". The difference in meaning is significant, implying for Egyptians on the one hand that Sadat visited Jerusalem (and not Israel), and suggesting for Israelis on the other hand that an Arab leader had finally come to Israel.

Similarly, the 1982 war in Lebanon takes on very different meanings if it is termed "Israeli invasion of Lebanon," "Sharon's invasion," "Operation Peace in the Galilee," or "the Israeli-Palestinian War." Partly the words involve propaganda, the conscious use of language to manipulate images. But partly these reflect and perpetuate basic perceptual differences.

Regarding a conflict, the relevant question for the

social psychological investigator is not 'what are the true
(unbiased) facts?,' rather, 'what does the interpreter see
as the relevant facts?'. This reformulation is an important
one because it redirects any argument over 'the facts' to
the clash in world views or "reality worlds" (Cantril, 1958)
of the arguers. A more encompassing view of the situation
would be one which included the competing views of the
conflict, rather than one which depended on an agreed-upon
set of 'facts'. Rendering the issue this way the researcher
can seek to identify and compare the "preferred modes of
reasoning" (Harre, 1981) or the preferred modes of
perceiving of different parties within a conflict setting.[3]

In the present study some of these relationships are
examined systematically, using data gathered in the Middle
East in 1982 as part of the "Images in Conflict" project.[4]
The study explores how Israelis, Egyptians and Palestinians
view certain types of political events that have occurred in
the Middle East conflict: 'Israeli Air Force conducts a
raid on Beirut,' 'Palestinians attack a bus on the Haifa -

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[3]In a parallel vein Eiser (1983) points out that the
very selection of a particular script by which to make sense
of incoming experience is an event in itself, from which
particular consequences follow.

[4]"Images in Conflict" was a cross-cultural study about
the Arab-Israeli conflict which was conducted in the Middle
East and the United States. It is described in detail in the
'method section' of this paper.

Tel Aviv highway,' and 'A peace treaty is announced between Israel and Egypt'. In addition to these questions, the respondents were interviewed about their perceptions, expectations and desires about conflict and peace, so that it is possible to relate people's explanations of political events to a larger body of images, beliefs and feelings about their experience in the Middle East.

The availability of these data presents an opportunity to consider a wider range of questions about peoples' social perceptions than is usually possible in attributional studies[5]. In particular, three areas of inquiry are of interest. The first involves the comparison of the substantive interpretations of the 'same' events by people from three Middle Eastern societies. Are there 'preferred modes of perceiving' within each national group? The second focus of the research is to explore how people within three societies involved in a conflict make sense of new developments in the political environment. Do underlying outlooks change to accommodate new types of events, or are 'new' events assimilated into existing interpretive frameworks? Finally, the overall purpose of this research

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[5]Kelley and Michela (1980) identify a gap in attributional research: "If attribution theory requires, by its very nature, a detailed analysis of the common person's causal categories, it also requires understanding of the natural context in which the process occurs." (pp. 490-491)

is to explore the implications of these questions for conflict resolution. The examination of these substantive issues, using empirical data gathered in a large-scale study in the Middle East, offers systematic consideration of problems central to peacemaking in the Middle East.

A Conflict Resolution Perspective

So far the rationale for this study has been expressed by proposing that the consideration of the case of international conflict can expand social psychologists' understanding of the dynamics of causal attribution, by providing a 'hot' context within which to consider the competing causal analyses offered by the various parties involved in a conflict. The present study also emerges out of an interest in peacemaking, however. From this perspective, attributional analysis might be seen as a useful tool or starting point for researchers interested in conflict and conflict resolution, since it can help to sharpen each party's awareness of the existence of diverse accounts for the 'same' event.

The dissertation falls within a tradition in the field of conflict resolution that is distinctly socio-psychological (Kelman, Cohen, 1979; Deutsch, 1973; Lewin, 1948; Simmel, 1955; Sherif, 1967; Rapoport, 1960, 1974; Swingle, 1970). This perspective starts from the assumption that the parties' apparent resistance or inability to

'reason peacefully' is a result of the dynamics and context of conflict, rather than due to inherent evil or stupidity of the parties themselves. This approach to conflict resolution has neither focused on the history and origins of the conflict, nor attempted to identify a specific substantive solution. Rather, it has addressed the kinds of processes which escalate conflict and those which lead towards conflict resolution.

Research from within this perspective has contributed certain ideas to the analysis of conflict. For example, the asymmetry of knowledge for parties within the conflict system (knowing more about one's own side than about the other side) has been identified as a basic characteristic of conflict (Azar and Cohen, 1979). Compounded with the virtual lack of interaction between the societies in an ongoing conflict, such asymmetry leads to a predominance of strategic thinking, wherein any information received about the enemy is interpreted in terms of its presumed destructive intent. For would-be conflict resolvers the challenge becomes one of finding ways for the parties to communicate accurately and credibly to each other in the face of these strong countervailing tendencies. Ultimately this approach to conflict resolution suggests that the problem of peacemaking involves not only changing each party's actual intentions (desires) regarding peaceful relations, but also increasing the capacity of each side to

believe that the other side has changed.

The Problem-solving Workshop

One research setting which has proved fruitful for identifying the requirements for credible communication has been the problem-solving workshop (Kelman, Cohen, 1979; Cohen, Kelman, Miller & Smith, 1977; also Doob, 1970, Doob and Foltz, 1973 and Burton, 1969 for related approaches). Within this mini-environment of four participants from each side (e.g. Israelis and Palestinians) and a third party of social scientists there is an opportunity to explore a powerful phenomenon in international conflict: the strong differences between the different societies' social constructions of reality, and the major behavioral consequences that follow from those formulations.

In the course of the problem-solving workshop it becomes quickly apparent that despite even the most genuine desire to communicate openly with the other side, the participants lack a common set of concepts for discussing the volatile issues between them. Zionism, PLO, terrorism, racism, national identity -- these terms have different meanings within each national group. A joke which seems funny to one group is insulting to another; a unifying symbol proposed by one group in the cooperative spirit of the workshop cannot really be embraced by the other because it is seen as ultimately coopting (for detailed examples see Cohen, et al., 1977). These moments of divergent reactions

to the same stimulus could be considered 'events' within the
workshop. Probing these differences in meaning can provide
experiential rather than simply intellectual learning for
the participants about the deeper feelings, values and needs
underlying the political issues, and offers the participants
a chance to begin to reassess their basic assumptions about
the nature and goals of the other side, as well as their own
group's identity and purposes.

Above all, the problem-solving workshop is a rich
micro-setting for exploring communication in conflict; it is
a source of hypotheses, although not the place to test
hypotheses systematically on a broader scale.[6] One of its
analytic contributions has been to identify (and even
engineer) the types of experiences between the adversaries

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[6]Some have situated the importance of the socio-
psychological approach in the "pre-negotiation" stage of
resolving the conflict -- that is, in getting the parties to
even agree to sit together at the negotiating table --
rather than as a substitute for negotiation over the basic
issues involved in the conflict. A protracted conflict,
such as the one in the Middle East, calls for a different
conflict resolution strategy than 'simple' interstate
disputes, since much more is included in the conflict than
different positions and material considerations. In this
case, mediation alone is not sufficient:
     "Mediation was not successful in modifying basic Arab
or Israeli attitudes, nor has it resolved the Arab-Israeli
conflict. The root causes of the conflict are too complex
and too deeply embedded in national ideologies. Such
conflicts can be resolved only as a result of
transformations in national values and ideologies,
transformations that may come about as a result of gradual
evolution, rather than skillful mediation." (Touval, 1982 p.
331).

that can break through the routinized or hardened ways of thinking that have evolved in each society. In particular, the experiences in the problem-solving workshop provide powerful anecdotal evidence of the importance of examining differences within and between societies in the meaning and understanding of significant events. Each workshop offers such examples, but not in ways which have been verified empirically beyond the small group. The present study will explore these differences systematically on a larger scale, although without the component of direct interaction between people from different sides, in order to identify patterns and regularities in the understanding of broader segments in each society.

Events Data Analysis

Where the problem-solving workshop might be characterized as excelling at the interpretative level (i.e. the exploration of the meaning and significance of the issues in conflict for the different parties), the "events data" approach to international conflict and cooperation developed by international relations scholars (Azar, 1980; Azar and Ben Dak, 1975; Azar, McLaurin, Havener, Murphy Sloan & Wagner, 1977) has emphasized the examination of regularities at the behavioral level. While the workshop approach shines in providing rich evidence, it falls chort when it comes to empirical verification, whereas the events data approach has the advantage of being empirically

verifiable, although it has the disadvantage of assuming an 'objective' basis for deciding the meaning of an event.

Events data research emerges out of a concern for developing an empirical basis for studying the patterns of international conflict and cooperation. In this approach, events have been treated as data about the flow of international interactions, rather than as stimuli for examining differing constructions of reality (i.e. the flow of consciousness) as in the problem-solving workshop. These scholars have analyzed trends in conflict and peace by recording the numerous 'transactions' which occur between nations day by day -- such as trade accords, ambassador exchanges, border skirmishes, attacks, treaties and summit talks -- as reported in various newspapers. The analyst codes each event according to a standardized scale which assesses the cooperative or conflictive nature of the activity. These collections of events provide the data for exploring behavioral patterns of relations between nations over different time periods. This approach attempts to consider the system-level of international relations, rather than the view of any particular nation.

Difficulties arise at the operational level, in that the evaluation is based on the sender's intent only, and does not consider the receiver's perception of the sender's intent (Burgess and Lawton, 1975). For instance, Sadat's visit to Jerusalem might be coded as highly cooperative from

the viewpoint of Egypt, but it might be seen as a more hostile or suspect action from the viewpoint of another actor in the interaction system. The problem here is that the database, by excluding the various interpretations of the receivers and observers of a particular international act, and by emphasizing the view of one actor over the other participants in the system, does not in fact capture the system-level of behavior. Thus, this approach does not permit the researcher to consider the selection process involved in international behavior -- what is perceived or not perceived, what is communicated versus what is received.

The events data approach has contributed some important concepts to the study of conflict and cooperation. Most relevant for the present purposes is the notion of a 'normal relations range' between nations (Azar, Jureidini and McLauren, 1978). This concept refers to the stabilization of relations among actors in a system, when a relationship comes to be characterized by a limited range of behavior, or pattern of interaction, beyond which acts tend to be unlikely or improbable at both conflictive and cooperative extremes. These equilibrium ranges, "whether mainly conflictive, mainly cooperative, or somewhere in between, tend to be wide enough to accommodate the perceptions of the parties as to what is predictable in light of the behavioral experience and structural conditions; they can also shift depending on various situations and constraints" (Azar and

Cohen, 1979, p. 164). When actions take place which push
the boundaries of the range, either they are experienced as
crises, or they are perceived in terms consistent with the
status quo, the equilibrium range (e.g. a 'peaceful' act is
understood as in fact being a ploy, or as a conflict-
escalating action). Thus in the case of a protracted
conflict it is possible to think of 'peace as crisis and war
as status quo' (Azar and Cohen, 1979).

This conceptualization is important for the present
study because it emphasizes the context formed by past
actions, a context within which subsequent occurrences take
place. Thus it allows us to pose a socio-psychological
question about how people and societies deal with unexpected
events and subsequent changes in their environment.

These two research efforts -- the problem-solving
workshop and the events data approach -- emphasize different
aspects of international conflict: the problem solving
workshop is more depth-oriented in tracing the meanings and
understanding which develop within each society about the
relations between them, whereas the events data approach
emphasizes the ongoing patterns of relations between the
interacting nations. Each approach acts as a corrective to
the other: the workshop provides insight about some of the
internal thinking and feeling within each society which the
events data approach ignores, whereas the events data
approach tracks the changing historical environment of

interrelations among nations. The present study seeks to link these two approaches by considering on the one hand how different types of actions are digested within each of the societies in conflict, and on the other hand, in what way changes in the inter-nation environment affect the mental frameworks used to make sense of political actions.

The Explanation of International Actions

In theoretical terms the study develops a typology of explanation of international actions. Proposing such a theory requires drawing on work from three areas in social psychology: the analysis of causal attribution, conflict resolution, and cognitive social psychology. Attribution theory will be considered first, and later the insights gleaned from conflict resolution and from cognitive social psychology will be incorporated. In shifting from attributions within the interpersonal world to explanations of events between nations, the traditional attributional framework needs to be modified to account for differences in both the structure of the event to be described (the attribution 'scenario') and the functions of explanation in the conflict setting. Attribution researchers have traditionally examined only the attributional processes of individuals about other individuals, without considering the larger social and contextual factors that structure the social world within which the individual operates.

Certainly in the case of attributions within the conflict
environment, the perceptual and evaluative dimensions used
to explain events result from the conflict itself, and are
not located solely within the individual. Thus an overall
adjustment needed for such a theory of explanation of
political events involves shifting attributional analysis
from an inter-individual (often merely dyadic) orientation
to a more genuinely socio-psychological stance.

Attributional Analysis and the Conflict Environment

At its core, attribution theory is a theory about
salience: it involves the notion that a particular aspect of
a total scene may be so salient to the interpreter that it
floods his/her view of what happened (Heider, 1958). For
the observer the mere activity of the actor within the scene
captures the attention, whereas the actor 'looks out on' the
environment, so that the salience depends on the perceptual
vantage point of the interpreter. The importance of this
perceptual orientation within traditional attribution
research is further heightened by considering work of Storms
(1973) which demonstrates how easily the observer's causal
attributions can be altered by simply shifting the
observer's visual focus from taking in the overall scene to
attending specifically to the actor. This has also been
explained in terms of getting the observer to empathize with
or take the role of the actor (Regan and Totten, 1975). The
researcher can shift the observer's cognitive perspective

simply by redirecting the observer's perceptual attention (see also Taylor and Fiske, 1978, and Brown, 1986).

The conflict environment changes the nature of the salience from largely perceptual to overwhelmingly evaluative. It presents a context in which the formal, positional differences in the perspectives of the parties are further transformed by the evaluative aspects of adversarial relations: "the enemy is evil, but we are moral". Thus, as Hewstone and Jaspars (1982) have written about intergroup attribution, "...behavior does not always engulf the field. Rather, the strength and content of the prior beliefs about the other group may be dominant. Indeed, if we take these beliefs to be part of the Gestalt 'field', we might say that 'the field engulfs the behavior'." (p. 111).

Although attribution theory appears to be relevant to the analysis of conflict because it is a theory which takes into account the different perspectives of two parties located in different parts of the physical space, it also presents some serious shortcomings when applied to the situation of international conflict. First, it is limited by its spatial orientation. In the traditional attributional paradigm the actor and observer coexist in their neutral noninteraction; neither one cares particularly about the other's explanation (In fact, they don't have any relationship whatsoever!), whereas in a real conflict

situation the difficult relationship between the two parties itself lies at the core of the conflict, and their divergent positions are not able to calmly coexist.

The conflict environment places a unique limitation on the attributional problem. The built-in tension between the parties in a conflict yields a situation in which there are either adversaries or allies but rarely neutral parties. Here there is no easy manipulation of perspectives to get the parties to look at things differently; such a technique tends to be perceived by parties in serious conflicts as disingenuous, a superficial attempt by third parties to smooth over deeply felt problems (Cohen, et al., 1977).[7]

In this light the traditional attributional paradigm can be seen as a 'minimally constrained' scenario, since it

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[7]This distinction is further amplified by noting that traditional attribution theory has been built on the idea of two individuals, whereas in conflicts between groups many more elements are involved: not only one person's view of another, but also the relations between the groups, and between individuals and their groups, as well as the collective and individual images and ideologies, memories and expectations of the conflict (Horwitz and Berkowitz, 1975; Moscovici, 1981; Rapoport, 1974). Moreover, the implications for conflict resolution differ significantly in the case of two individuals versus two collectivities. One way to resolve a conflict between two individuals is to simply separate them, as in a divorce or in an organizational setting (Walton, 1969). But when the parties are groups of people, whole social structures and ideologies are involved, and the conflict is no longer 'resolvable' via physical separation, because whether or not the parties wish it, they will continue to interact within the social (or regional) system. In other words, interaction between the parties cannot be reduced to zero.

is evaluatively neutral. It is surprising that the views of actor and observer diverge at all. In contrast the conflict environment is nearly over-determined (maximal), and the expectation is that accounts given for the 'same' event will be radically different.[8]

Thus, in terms of the scenario itself, several considerations distinguish the events used in the present study from the types of events used in traditional attribution studies. First, both actors and observers in the present study are affiliated with various parties in the conflict: the actors in the three events to be examined are 'the Israeli Air Force', 'Palestinians', and 'Israel and Egypt', and the observers/interpreters (respondents) are individual Israelis, Egyptians, and Palestinians. This element of identity implies that there is more at stake than simply being an outside, unaffiliated observer of an action (Rosenberg and Wolfsfeld, 1977; Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Wilder, 1986), in that persons interpreting an event which involves their own group will be keenly aware of the implications for their own group of the action in the

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[8]This contrast has implications at the practical level: in traditional attribution studies the researcher must describe a scene or create a plausible vignette (in writing, or shown as a film, e.g.) for the subject to interpret. In the present study, simply mentioning the 'headline' of the event was sufficient to evoke recognition by the respondents of occurrences that were very plausible or salient within the conflict environment.

scenario. Moreover, the events described in the present study include a 'target' or recipient of an action in addition to the actor, a feature which connects the interpreter even more to different scenarios by virtue of identification with either the actor or the target/recipient/victim of the action.[9] In this regard it will be important to consider the extent of the interpreter's affiliation or identification with the group, since this may vary across individuals.

Second, whereas the standard scenario in traditional attribution studies involves an individual actor and an individual observer, the scenarios in the present study concern a different type of actor altogether: the actors are corporate entities -- 'the airforce', 'Palestinians', and 'Israel and Egypt', while the observers are individuals. The explanations that individuals give about group/corporate behavior may differ in significant ways from individuals explaining other individuals' behavior, particularly when these corporate actors are nations.

Finally, the actions being performed in these scenarios take place within an overall climate of conflict and peace:

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[9]Farr and Anderson (1983) have noted that Jones and Nisbett's 'actor-observer' terminology loses the relational aspect of 'person-other' in Heider's original work: self in relation to other. "The distinction [is] a possible basis for differing states of awareness which might alternate within one person." (p 63)

'bombing Beirut', 'attacking a bus in Israel', 'a peace
treaty'. In this regard individuals' interpretations of any
event must be considered in relation to their broader ideas,
beliefs, feelings, desires and expectations about this
environment, since it is within this context that the
particular event takes on meaning.

Explanatory Categories for Understanding Events

Given these differences between the situations covered
by the traditional attributional framework and the conflict
environment, the value of using the situational-
dispositional (external-internal) distinction as a relevant
dimension in analyzing people's understanding of
international conflict can be evaluated in terms of the
contributions and limitations of the attributional
framework. There have been at least two attributional
studies related to the Arab-Israeli conflict (Heradstveit,
1979, Rosenberg and Wolfsfeld, 1975), which found that one
side's own 'good' act and the enemy's 'bad' act are seen as
arising out of the acting party's disposition, whereas one
side's own 'bad' act and the enemy's 'good' act are seen as
due to the situation. Thus people's interpretations of
actions reveal themselves as moral, good, justified, and the
enemy as evil, unjustified. 'When we do a bad act we were
forced by circumstance, whereas they did it by design.'
Underlying the use of situational/dispositional distinction
in the case of conflict is the assignment of credit or

blame, which is ultimately an evaluative process.[10] The
value of this type of analysis is that it sharply displays
the parallel structure of each side's perception of the
conflict. But once it is known that these cognitive
tendencies exist, and that the conflict setting only
heightens the distinctions between the parties and thrusts
the explanations of action into a moral evaluative
framework, it is worthwhile to examine these evaluative
factors more directly and specifically.[11]

Another reason to move beyond the situational-
dispositional distinction in the case of international
conflict is that the distinction itself may not be among the
natural categories that people use in understanding actions
even in their inter-individual environment (Antaki, 1982;
Eiser, 1983). It is important to consider what other
dimensions emerge in the eyes of the beholders, rather than
limit the explanations in advance to a situational-
dispositional formulation. Leddo, Abelson and Gross (1984)
suggest that the script or knowledge-structure approach

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[10]In a sense this view of the conflict setting
resembles the 'new look' work in perception, in that
motivation -- prior beliefs, values and needs -- is seen as
exerting a powerful effect on perception and cognition.
Kelley (1973) raises this question about the effects of
motivation and prior beliefs for attribution theorists.

[11]Billig (1985) raises a similar point: "prejudice [is]
more than perception." (p. 85)

would be more fruitful (see also Eiser, 1983). Buss (1978) suggests that 'reasons' will be offered by actors, whereas 'causes' will be given by observers, when they are asked to explain what brought about an event.

Finally, Kruglanski and Ajzen (1983) write that "person-environment (internal-external) categories do not seem basic to the process of attribution; instead they appear restricted to cases in which the information contained in these particular categories may in some way further the individual's objectives" (p. 26). Instead, they argue, the goals or interests of the person, as well as momentary salience or mental availability of particular constructs, have more to do with the eventual attributions or explanations that people make. It is possible to extrapolate from these comments to the interpretations made at the group, collective level.

The Social Dimension

The present study considers how people make sense of the changing stream of events involving their society and other societies in a conflict. A missing element so far in the analysis offered by attribution theory is the social nature of the attributional process, and the important effects of the societal context on the explanatory processes.

In a situation of protracted conflict in particular, the societal context plays a central role in shaping

people's understanding of political events which have
meaning at the group level, in that individuals' responses
are mediated via various channels of social communication
which have already filtered the ways of seeing the events --
the views of the media, statements of leaders, rumors, etc..
Hewstone and Jaspars (1984) identify the social nature of
attributions on three levels. First, the events (objects of
attribution) themselves involve societies, not simply
individuals; second, the 'digestion' process involves more
than individual perceivers, in that people develop their
understanding of the events via their membership in larger
groups (or subgroups within societies); and third,
individuals can draw on the shared (social) beliefs, images,
representations as a source of schemata about social events.

Thus, recent research in causal attribution has
expanded the focus from the processes of individual
perceivers to include the social-contextual aspects of those
processes (Hewstone and Jaspars, 1982; Deschamps, 1983;
Eiser, 1983; Taylor and Jaggi, 1974; Doise, 1978; Tajfel,
1981; Moscovici, 1981). One line of research in intergroup
perception and attribution has considered how people
perceive the actions of other individuals who belong to
different social groups. For instance, Duncan (1976)
studied the 'perceptual readiness' of white observers to
label the behavior performed by black actors as more violent
than the same behavior performed by whites. Rather than

merely identifying prejudiced individuals as though they existed outside of a particular societal context, Duncan suggests that it makes more sense to consider the social environment that underlies this labelling tendency. In a much earlier study Pettigrew (1958) found that the C-scale (conformity) was as good a predictor of racial attitudes among South African whites and among whites in the South U.S. as the F-scale (authoritarianism). He concluded that socio-cultural factors play an important role in heightening racial prejudice (in addition to personality factors), particularly in areas where there has been a history of racial intolerance. These studies demonstrate the importance of considering the socio-historical context in making sense of individual processes [12]

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[12]Thus, in certain research problems the apparent disposition is due to the situation. Consider, for instance, Milgram's study of obedience to authority (Milgram, 1974). Prior to the study psychiatrists and other predicted that only 'beasts' would actually obey the experimenter's command to shock the learner (a dispositional prediction). Contrary to their expectations a significant number of subjects actually did obey. However the compliance rate changed substantially over the course of the study's situational variations of the experimental condition, and the F-scale was not a predictor of tendency to comply. Thus what appeared to be a beastly disposition was due to the situation (and the fundamental attribution error was committed by the outside observers!). Unlike the Authoritarian Personality, which was designed to explore prejudiced personalities, the obedience study was designed to permit researchers to understand the strength of situational factors.

Another line of research has emphasized the importance of images at the broader social level for understanding both the content of individual-level perceptions and the nature of the evolving relations between groups. Moscovici (1981) describes the importance of social representations -- the images, beliefs, myths, stereotypes -- that develop in a society about various domains in human experience, over and above the particular attitudes of any individuals. These representations serve to make the unfamiliar familiar and the unexpected or unusual predictable. Social representations link the individual and social levels together, providing building blocks or mental categories at the social level for individuals to draw upon, as if from an existing and constantly evolving store of images, ideas and 'arguments' (Billig, 1985).

> If the social aspect of commonplaces or representations is stressed, then the implication is that contrary elements are liable to be widely disseminated in a given society. Apart from a minority of professional ideologues...the majority will possess both pro and con elements... (p. 98)

In these formulations, processes which exist independently of the psychological processes of individuals operate at the social level, much as langue lies over and above parole (Saussure) or Durkheim's "social facts" differ from individual behavior.

Similarly, Tajfel (1981) has considered the role of social stereotypes in intergroup relations, rather than concentrating only on the functions of stereotypes for the

individual. He has suggested three main functions that social stereotypes might serve: 1) explanations of social causality -- explaining why an event occurs; 2) justification of actions by one group towards another group; and 3) differentiation of identity between groups. It makes sense to examine and categorize people's explanations of various events in the Middle East conflict in terms of their apparent functions at the group/social level as Tajfel describes.

On this point Doise (1978), Kelley (1983) and Hewstone and Jaspars (1982) have commented on the important causal role that intergroup attributions play in intergroup relations. The way people explain the actions of the other side can change how the relations between groups unfold. The implication is that it should be possible to spell out different types of intergroup reasoning and to delineate the implications of different types of explanation for the unfolding relations between the groups.

These last points bring us to a final concern in the present study, a concern which the attributional framework leaves unexplored and unanswered: how people's mental categories or causal schemata change over time and circumstances. A theory of explanation of international actions must take a fluid, dynamic approach in order to consider the evolution of mental categories or frameworks that people use to interpret the sequence of happenings in

their environment and the way that each new event

potentially modifies the mental frameworks. For certain

events there are readily accessible categories (Bruner,

1957); for other events, new categories emerge or are

readjusted.

Neisser (1976) has written about individual

perception:

> ...perception is directed by expectations but not
> controlled by them; it involves the pickup of real
> information. Schemata exert their effects by selecting
> some kinds of information rather than others, not by
> manufacturing false percepts or illusions. The old
> joke that the optimist sees the doughnut while the
> pessimist sees the hole does not imply that either is
> mistaken. It does suggest, however, that each of them
> will be confirmed in his mood by what he has seen. If
> the environment is rich enough to support more than one
> alternative view (and it usually is), expectations can
> have cumulative effects on what is perceived that are
> virtually irreversible until the environment itself
> changes. But environments do change, and thus loosen
> the grip of the old ways of seeing. The interplay
> between schema and situation means that neither
> determines the course of perception alone. (p 43-44)

Of course, Neisser is writing about the perception of

generalized individuals within a vaguely defined, general

environment, rather than about group or societal

expectations in and of a conflict. In the situation of

international conflict people may have come to expect more

hostilities, yet they do not simply fit all that they

encounter into preset categories. At times, new events

(like a Sadat's visit to Jerusalem) require a change in the

mental categories which would not otherwise be able to

assimilate them. Then the mental structures must shift to

accommodate the new information.

The present study does not permit the examination of changes in people attributions or explanations over different time periods, since there are data available from one study only. However, the study examines the explanations given for different types of events. Certain types of events (typical, hostile ones, like attacks or raids) are likely to be assimilated into existing mental structures, and other events (atypical, or peaceful, cooperative ones) to require more accommodation of peoples' mental frameworks.

The Method

The study reported here uses data gathered in 1982 in the "Images in Conflict" project,[1] a unique cross-cultural social scientific inquiry about the Arab-Israel conflict which was designed and implemented by scholars from four national groups (American, Egyptian, Palestinian and Israeli). Since the data examined in the present analysis were gathered as part of the "Images in Conflict" project, it is necessary to outline the overall method and design of the Images study before focusing specifically on the questions about political events.

The goal of the "Images in Conflict" project was "to analyze, understand and overcome barriers to equal status and peaceful relations among the peoples in the conflict:

Palestinians, Israelis, Egyptians and others" (Cohen, 1983).
This was accomplished by assembling a group of researchers
with different national backgrounds (American, Palestinian,
Israeli and Egyptian, and others) and with different
disciplinary affiliations (psychology, sociology,
psychiatry, political science, and anthropology), in order
to design and implement a cross-national study in four
societies. The "Images in Conflict" study is the only
scientific work of its kind about the Middle East or any
other conflict arena; it is unique in studying people's
attitudes about an ongoing conflict, gathering data
simultaneously in different societies, using a common
research design devised by researchers affiliated with the
different societies involved in the conflict. In terms of
the present inquiry regarding people's perceptions and
cognitions within different societies about conflict and
peace events in the Middle East, the simultaneous gathering
of data is an essential feature, because the overarching
contextual variable of "historical conflict time" must be
set at the same moment for all societies under
consideration.

Design and Pretesting

The way that the "Images in Conflict" project was
accomplished -- a cooperative project about an ongoing
conflict carried out by individuals from societies involved
in the conflict -- was as worthy of study as the survey

itself. However, for the present purpose it is sufficient to note that the entire questionnaire was the product of extensive negotiation among the project directors, and that the questions about political events to be considered here are but one element within a broader multi-method approach to the study of attitudes, beliefs, feelings and opinions about the Middle East conflict. The study was designed, pretested and refined between August, 1981 and January, 1982.

Subjects and Sampling

In the "Images in Conflict" project investigators gathered data in 10 samples in the Middle East and the United States. Over 4000 interviews were completed between March 1 and April 24, 1982, a sampling period timed to end prior to the Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai peninsula on April 25, 1982.

Two sampling principles were critical to the project: (1) that the best possible representation of the population in question be drawn, to guarantee the accuracy with which the study data reflect the group's opinions, and (2) that the samples be directly comparable across national groups. To reconcile these principles, quota samples were drawn in the three populations in the Middle East (Israeli Jews, Palestinians in Israel and Egyptians), and additional random samples of Israeli Jews and Palestinians in Israel were also drawn.

In the present analysis, three of the ten samples are used -- the quota samples of Israeli Jews, Palestinians in Israel, and Egyptians. The quota samples are used instead of the representative samples in the case of the Israeli Jewish sample and of the sample of Palestinians living in Israel, in order to have samples that are directly comparable with the Egyptian sample, for which no representative sample could be drawn.

These three samples were drawn using an adaptation of network or snowball sampling techniques (Granovetter, 1976). Each national team used its network of personal acquaintances (e.g. friends, students) to begin generating a list of potential interviewees. In order to increase the restricted pool of names generated by this procedure, each person approached was asked to recommend potential respondents differing from him/her on predetermined dimensions, as a practical means of penetrating other political networks at further removes from the research team's own network (Granovetter, 1973). A name was not added to the list of potential respondents until it was at least two steps away from the research team's own circle of acquaintances. Diversification within samples was achieved by striving to fill with an equal number of respondents each of the 32 cells of the following 2 to the 5th power property space:

- sex

- age (above/below 35)

- education (above/below 12 years of schooling)

- religion/ethnicity[2]

- location (urban/rural)

The sample sizes are: Israeli quota, 555; Palestinian quota, 251; Egyptian quota, 530.

The demographic profile of the Israeli Jewish sample is: 54% male, with an average age of 33 years (s.d. = 12.9), and an average of 12.25 years of schooling (s.d. = 4.4). The sample is 36% Ashkenazi, 45% Sephardi and 19% 'Israeli' (i.e. both respondent and respondent's father were born in Israel). Most of the respondents are urbanites (30%) or suburbanites (43%), and the remaining 27% live in rural areas.

The sample of Palestinians living in Israel is made up of 49% males, with an average age of 32.6 years (s.d. = 12.2), and an average of 10.4 years of schooling (s.d. = 4.7). Most of the sample is Moslem (70%) and the remaining 30% are Christian. Most of the respondents are urbanites (77%), and 23% live in rural areas.

The Egyptian sample is 53% male, with an average age of 31.8 years (s.d. = 11.8), and an average of 12.6 years of schooling (s.d.= 7.2). Three quarters of the people in the

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[2] These were specific to each subsample: Israelis -- Sephardi/Ashkenazi; Palestinians -- Moslem/Christian; Egyptian -- Moslem/Copt.

Egyptian sample are Moslem, and the remaining quarter are
Coptic. Most people in the sample live in urban areas (58%)
and the remaining 42% reside in rural areas.

The interviewing was carried out by teams of
researchers and their assistants in each of the societies.
In Egypt the bulk of the interviewing was done by graduate
assistants who had been trained to administer the
questionnaire. In Israel the Dahaf Research Center handled
the interviewing, using Jews to interview Israeli Jews and
Palestinians to interview Palestinians living in Israel.

Data Preparation

All data were transferred to the United States and
prepared for analysis by (1) coding the closed-ended survey
data for entry onto computer tape, and (2) translating the
open-ended text material from Hebrew and Arabic into
English, in preparation for the 'pre-coding' stage.

Bilingual staff members (native speakers of either
Arabic or Hebrew) working on the project in New York
translated the original interviews into English. A
subsample of interviews from each sample was drawn in order
to develop a 'pre-coding scheme' for classifying the open-
ended text material. Lists of verbatim answers were
compiled from each of the national samples, and from these,
coding schemata were devised. The rest of the material was
precoded according to these categories, which were refined
and adjusted as the precoding took place.

The Interview

The study was designed to investigate the respondents' experiences of the Middle East conflict at a variety of levels, using open-ended and close-ended formats. Individual interviews were used to explore the following six aspects the respondent's experience. (1) The interview asked about the respondent's personal experience with people from different national backgrounds, and about his/her willingness to become involved with people from different national backgrounds 'now' and 'in time of peace'. (2) The respondent was asked about his/her basic image of the conflict -- Who are the main parties involved in the conflict and what parties needed to resolve the conflict? What is the nature of the relations between the various actors in the conflict? What are the underlying issues and key dimensions which affect the outcome of the conflict? (3) The interview tapped the respondent's attitudes about the dominant political issues of the day -- status of West Bank/Gaza, the status of Jerusalem, and the future of Israeli-Egyptian relations. (4) The interview probed the more emotional and motivational aspects of the respondent's experience regarding political conflict, through the use of photographs and other semi-projective techniques. (5) Respondents were queried about various political events (including the events questions to be considered in the present study). (6) The interviewer recorded basic

background information about the respondent, including sex, age, religion, marital status, education, as well as questions about political identity.

The present inquiry focuses primarily on the questions about political events, and will draw secondarily on data from other sections of the "Images in Conflict" study in interpreting the patterns of thinking within each society about these events.

The Present Analysis

As part of the "Images in Conflict" project respondents were asked to discuss (using an open-ended format) "what would bring about and what would result from" the following three events in the Middle East:

1. Israeli Air Force bombs Beirut

2. Palestinians attack a bus on the Haifa - Tel Aviv highway

3. A peace treaty is announced between Israel and Egypt

The analysis of these interpretations forms the basis of the present report.

A particular typology was built into the choice of the events used in the "Images" project: two stereotypic, hostile events, where one side is the aggressor and the other side is victim; and one unusual event (because peace is by definition unusual in the case of a protracted conflict) between two of the actors. In the present study

it was possible to compare responses to events in which one group is the aggressor and the other is the victim and vice versa (events 1 and 2); and responses to negative and positive events (events 1 and 2, and event 3). In terms of the three events taken as a set it is possible to consider whether explanations of events offered by people in different societies reveal a consistent, coherent analysis of the conflict and of the relations between societies, or whether different events call up different analyses, myths, scenarios in each case.

The study, an exploratory analysis, was carried out in a sequence of stages, each one building upon the findings of the prior stage. The first stage examines the content of the responses to each of the three events; in the second stage a typology of responses to the events is developed; in the third stage the distinctive patterns of response across the three events are the focus.

Stage One: The content of the interpretations

The content of responses to the interview questions was examined in the first stage of the data analysis. What are the basic understandings or meanings of each event within each of the societies involved in the conflict? What are the natural categories people use in thinking about events in international conflict? What aspect of an event do people attend to (the nature of the actor? the effect on target? strategic aspect? humanistic aspect? moral nature

of the act as good or as evil, unjust or aggressive?)? When
an event occurs, do people consider the basic goals and
intentions of actors in the conflict? How do they see
their own national group and the other societies in the
conflict?

The goal of this stage of the analysis was to identify
the basic issues and images that emerge in each society
regarding each event, and to consider to what extent there
is consensus about the meaning of an event. This was
accomplished by examining the marginals of the precoded data
about political events.

Stage Two: Developing a typology of responses

In this stage of the analysis a typology of responses
to the events was developed which identified different
cognitive orientations toward the conflict environment.
These outlooks can be thought of as 'indexed' by the various
types of answers. In this stage the precoded data about the
events were recoded into various types of responses.

What are the frameworks or categories which are used to
make sense of different types of events -- hostile versus
peaceful, own side versus other side? Do different types of
events elicit different types of thinking? Or does the
thinking remain consistent across events?

Are there different frameworks for thinking about
events -- such as moral versus strategic, or expressive
versus adaptive or instrumental? Are there different types

of thinkers or different types of thinking (i.e. do people
think consistently across events, with different people
having different styles of interpretation, or does each type
of event elicit a particular type of thinking across
individuals?)?

Stage Three: Patterns of thinking across events

Finally, the existence of distinctive patterns of
thinking or outlooks or modes of reasoning about the three
events taken as a set are considered. Are there differences
in cognitive style or types of thinking which cut across
national groups, or do national groups have distinctive
patterns of interpretation?

These questions are important theoretically because
they address the extent to which societies or subgroups
within societies develop coherent cultural styles, and to
what extent those styles change and are changed by the
evolving conflict environment. How does each particular act
relate, if at all, to broader images of the conflict, of
possibilities for peace and justice, or revenge and
victimization, or reconciliation?

In this stage latent class analysis (Lazarsfeld, 1954,
1959; Goodman, 1974) is used to identify the existence of
distinctive patterns of response in the data. If patterns
are shown to exist in the data, the analysis lends support
to the notion that the existence of underlying (latent)
variables account for the observed patterns.

Hypotheses:

Attribution research has demonstrated that the mere difference in perspective yields a difference in the interpreter's explanation of an action. Experience in the problem-solving workshop suggests that societies engaged in conflict develop very different "social constructions of reality" about the meaning of events in a conflict. In this light it is expected that parties to a conflict explain the 'same' events differently: Israelis, Palestinians and Egyptians are expected to "read" the three political events in ways that reflect their particular socio-historical and practical concerns.

The extent of these differences, however, is expected to vary not only by nationality, but with each type of event. Both events data theory and research on social cognition have emphasized the importance of the larger environment in shaping and changing the mental categories or expectations that people and societies have regarding the ongoing flow of events they experience. War events are expected to be more familiar and predictable in their causes and consequences than peace events. Thus, it is expected that there will be parallel ways of thinking about war events across societies. The response of an Israeli to a Palestinian attack on a bus in Israel may resemble a Palestinian's response to an Israeli raid on Beirut. This resemblance could be explained in terms of "role" similarity

within the same interaction system: comparing instances when one's own group is the aggressor versus when one's own group is the victim in a political event, irrespective of nationality.

In contrast, a peace action is expected to generate differences in interpretation among all three of the national groups. At the cognitive level the peace action is expected to unsettle the stereotypic expectations that each party has of the others --expectations either of alliance or of rejection.

Finally, it is expected that each society will be characterized by different patterns of thinking or reasoning. These will be distinctive in each of the societies.

Preparation of the Data for the Present Analysis

Interviewers for the "Images in Conflict" study posed the questions about the three political events using an open-ended format, and recorded each respondent's answer verbatim . As indicated above, the answers were translated and then precoded soon after the interviews took place (Summer and Autumn, 1982), using a precoding scheme which was devised based on a subset of answers from each of the national groups sampled. The precoding schemes are lists intended to capture the wide range of answers offered in response to the questions about events (see Appendix A). For each question the coder could record up to two responses

for 'what led up to' each event and two responses for 'what
results from' each event. Thus the intent of the precoding
phase was to capture as much of the phrasing and meaning of
the original (raw) answers as possible, while at the same
time reducing the types of answers enough to permit use of
computer-aided analytic techniques. All of these steps took
place as part of the "Images in Conflict" project.

The present study takes the precoded data as its
starting point. Two decisions about technical aspects of
the data were made at the start of this study. First, since
only a minority of people in each sample offered more than
one answer for "what led up to" an event or "what results"
from it, only one response to "cause" and one response to
"result" for each of the three events is included in the
analyses that follow. Thus there are six variables for each
respondent -- one cause and one result for each of the three
events: Israeli raid, Palestinian bus and Egyptian-Israeli
treaty.

Next, it is apparent from the marginals that the
proportion of precoded answers to answers coded as "other"
(i.e. not precoded) is not uniform throughout the total
sample, either by group or by event [see Table I.]. This
suggests that certain types of answers within certain groups
were not "captured" by the precoding scheme, and that these
answers need to be reviewed in order to equalize the
proportion of pre-coded to "other" answers.

Table 1
Percentage of Answers Coded as "Other" per Sample
for Each Event

	Egyptian (n=530)	Palestinian (N=251)	Israeli (N=555)
Raid			
cause	24.0	10.0	4.3
result	12.8	9.2	3.6
Bus			
cause	12.6	8.4	5.0
result	11.3	10.0	3.2
Treaty			
cause	19.2	10.0	5.2
result	10.6	19.5	7.0
Overall average	15.1%	11.2%	4.7%

At this point it is not feasible to retrieve and code anew the large number of responses coded as "other" in the precoding (particularly in the Egyptian sample). However, attempts were made to impute the meaning of the "other" responses wherever possible, particularly in the case of the one fifth of the Palestinian sample whose responses to results of the treaty were precoded as "other".

The "other" answers were handled at the technical level in two stages. Initially, cases with "other" answers were eliminated from the description of the marginals (in the next section and from subsequent section where the data are recoded into a typlogy of orientations towards conflict). Later on, when the patterns of response were the focus, attempts were made to include as many cases as possible,

wherever the meaning of an "other" answer can be ascertained from the overall pattern of a person's responses.

Stage One

Basic Marginals

The aim of the first stage in the data analysis was to describe the basic understanding that each national group has of the three events. This was done in two parts. First, the pattern of missing answers was considered. Unlike the data coded "other," where a relatively large number of cases with "other" answers might suggest inadequate precoding of the data (a technical problem), "missing" answers can be said to have a substantive meaning under certain conditions. Since the present study was designed to consider preferred modes of perceiving, it is important to examine areas of "non-perception" or rejection among the three events. It may be that the refusal to deal with an event, either by refusing to discuss it or even by denying its occurrence is a characteristic of intense conflict.

Second, the precoded answers were rank-ordered from the most frequently occurring responses to the least frequently occurring responses in each sample (see Appendix B). Based on these rank-ordered responses, the view of each national group for each event was summarized in aggregate terms in order to paint each sample's understanding in broad strokes. This descriptive process has two aspects. One is to identify key issues elicited by each event within each society. This means that in examining a particular sampling

group's responses to an event, precodes that seem to mean the same thing are combined. A second aspect of description involves identifying the areas of consensus and of cleavage within each of the national groups in order to determine whether there is a modal response to an event, or whether there are several different responses.

PART ONE: The Pattern of Missing Answers

There appeared to be a pattern in the "missing" data. At the aggregate level, the pattern of "missing" answers suggests that selective perception of the events was operating. Table 2 displays these results.

Table 2
Percentage of "Missing" Answers Coded per Sample
for Each Event

	Egyptian (N=530)	Palestinian (N=251)	Israeli (N=555)
Israeli raid			
cause	24.3	7.2	11.2
result	27.0	8.4	15.0
Palestinian bus attack			
cause	24.5	7.6	11.4
result	28.1	6.0	9.4
Egyptian-Israeli treaty			
cause	4.0	4.8	5.2
result	5.5	8.4	8.1
Overall average	18.9%	7.1%	10.1%

One fourth of the Egyptian respondents do not answer the questions about the Israeli raid or the Palestinian attack, but most Egyptians have something to say about the

Israeli-Egyptian treaty. A pattern of response like this could be read in substantive terms: there appears to be a reluctance, hesitation or resistance by many Egyptians to respond to the Israeli and Palestinian hostile interactions, compared to Egyptian readiness or enthusiasm in responding to the treaty. Or, nearly every Egyptian has heard of the treaty, but not about the raid or the bus attack (Some of the verbatim answers read, "I have not heard about this event"). In contrast, Israelis and Palestinians have more similar response rates across the three events, -- around 85 - 93% of those sampled answered the questions (i.e. percentage not "missing"). However, the Israeli response rate to results of Israeli raid appears to be significantly higher than Israeli response rate to the other events. This could be examined further to see whether non-responses is indicative of, say, Israeli disapproval about a raid on Beirut.

There were some systematic differences between those who respond to the events questions and those who do not in each sample. In the Egyptian case socio-demographic factors seem play a role. For each event those who answered and those who did not were compared in terms of age, sex, education level, religion and urban-rural. For each event these two types of respondents differed significantly by age and by sex: the Egyptians who do not answer the questions tend to be young women. For Egyptians the treaty is more

than a political event, in that it penetrates beyond the usual level of political awareness of much of the population.

For Egyptians and Israelis the Egyptian-Israeli treaty seems to be more salient than the other two events, as suggested by the improved response rate for the Egyptian-Israeli treaty in comparison to the response rates of these samples for the Israeli raid and the Palestinian bus attack. However, for Palestinians this is not the case. Similarly, both the Israeli and Palestinian samples have more missing responses in the case of the results of the Israeli raid and in the case of the cause of the Palestinian bus attack.

The differences among the political events raise certain questions for this research. The Israeli raid and Palestinian bus attack involve hostile, Israeli-Palestinian interaction, while the Egyptian-Israeli treaty is a more peaceful, Israeli-Egyptian event. Either or both of these aspects (nationality and hostile/peaceful nature of the event) may explain the tendency of Egyptians to respond to the questions about the Egyptian-Israeli treaty, but not to questions about the Israeli raid or the Palestinian bus attack. Put another way, who are the (88/530 = 17%) Egyptians who answer questions about the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty only? These questions are examined in greater depth in the course of this analysis.

In examining the content of responses to the political

events, cases with "missing" or "other" responses are not included in the calculation of percentages presented below. Later on, in Stage Three of the data analysis, most of these cases will be included in the analysis of patterns of response across the three events.

PART TWO: The Content of the Responses to the Events

I.   "Israeli Air Force conducts a raid on Beirut"

A.   Israeli View

Most Israelis feel that the Israeli raid on Beirut was carried out in retaliation for prior attack:

71%	"retaliation for terrorist attacks"
10	"retaliation for Palestinian or PLO attacks"
19	miscellaneous coded categories
100%	(n=469)

There is very little variation in the distribution among categories. Nearly all of the answers (97%) involve these elements: retaliation or protection from terrorist or PLO-related attacks out of Lebanon.

There is less agreement, however, about the results of the raid:

30%	"reduce conflict"
17	"more war, conflict"
15	"PLO weakened"
14	"negative world opinion" or "UN response"
9	"people or innocent people killed"
9	"terrorists killed"
6	miscellaneous coded categories
100%	(n=452)

Approximately half of the Israeli sample think that the most
salient result of the Israeli raid is that the raid
accomplished something, and that it did so by weakening the
PLO and killing terrorists. However, nearly a third of the
Israelis expect the most salient result to be more war,
increased casualties or an increasingly negative response to
Israel in the world arena as a result of an Israeli raid.

B. <u>Palestinian</u> <u>View</u>

The Palestinian sample responded in a variety of ways
about the cause of the Israeli raid:

26%	"Israeli aggression against Arabs"
24	"desire to destroy Palestinians"
24	"retaliation for attacks" ["Palestinian," "PLO," "terrorist" or "Lebanon" attacks]
9	"Israeli expansionism"
8	"war, hatred"
9	miscellaneous coded categories
100%	(n=208)

These respondents could be divided into 1) the approximately
half of the Palestinians who view the Israeli raid on Beirut
as due to Israeli aggression and Israeli intent to harm
Palestinians, and 2) the nearly one quarter of the sample
who consider the raid a form of Israeli retaliation in
response to attacks on Israel.

Most of the Palestinian sample expect an Israeli raid
to result in more war and casualties; a smaller percentage

of Palestinians expect some form of Palestinian or PLO

retaliation as a result.

```
45%    "more conflict"
28     "people/innocent people/terrorists will be
       hurt or killed"
 9     some form of Palestinian or PLO retaliation
 9     miscellaneous coded categories
100%   (n=207)
```

C. Egyptian View

The Egyptian sample has a range of ideas about what

would lead up to an Israeli raid on Beirut:

```
29%    "Israeli expansionism"
18     "Israeli aggression against Arabs"
15     "Beirut is a PLO stronghold"
13     "Israeli retaliation for Lebanon attacks"
 9     "Israeli attempt to destroy Palestinians"
16     miscellaneous coded categories
100%   (n=274)
```

To most Egyptians the Israeli raid is evidence of Israeli

aggression and expansionism. But more than one quarter of

this sample views the Israelis as acting in response to

attacks.

The question "What will result from the raid?" elicits

greater consensus. Almost two thirds of the responses coded

involve increased conflict and casualties:

```
43%    "more war"
30     "people killed"
 7     "retaliation" by Palestinians or PLO
 6     impact on the peace treaty -- (4% negative
       impact, 2% positive impact on peace)
14     miscellaneous coded categories
100%   (n=319)
```

It is noteworthy that a very small percentage of the

Egyptians explicitly considered the Israeli raid in terms of its potential impact on the peace process.

D. Discussion

Most Palestinians and Egyptians in the study feel that an Israeli raid on Beirut is caused by Israeli 'disposition' rather than in retaliation for attacks. However, Egyptians emphasize Israeli 'expansionism' in the region -- a territorial concept -- while Palestinians cite Israeli aggression and malevolent desire to destroy Palestinians -- a people concept. In contrast, most Israelis view the raid as a form of retaliation for prior attacks, or as a pre-emptive strike carried out to prevent future attacks. Thus, for many Israelis, security requirements lead up to (and justify) such a raid.

II. "Palestinians attack a bus on the Haifa - Tel Aviv highway"

A. Israeli View

Most Israeli Jews believe that terrorism and hatred of Jews lead up to a Palestinian attack on a bus in Israel:

37%	"terrorist activity"
22	"hatred of Jews"
9	"attempt to terrorize civilians"
5	"interrupt 'normal life' in Israel"
4	"policy of the PLO
23	miscellaneous coded categories
100%	(n=464)

A substantial number of Israelis expect Israel to retaliate for such an attack. Many others focus on the civilian casualties and ongoing conflict which result.

44%	"Israeli retaliation"
26	"people killed"
16	"more war"
14	miscellaneous coded categories
100%	(n=485)

B.   Palestinian View

Palestinians explain the Palestinian attack in two main ways: 1) as a reaction to prior Israeli actions and policies; 2) as an action in the name of Palestinian political resistance.

45%	"retaliation for Israeli attacks"
13	"Palestinian resistance"
10	"response to Israeli policies"
6	"make demands heard"
6	"desire world attention"
4	attempt to "regain Palestinian homeland"
16	miscellaneous coded categories
100%	(n=211)

One could say that more than half the Palestinian sample sees such a bus attack as provoked by Israeli actions toward Palestinians, while nearly a third of the sample sees the bus attack as a form of political expression -- purposive behavior in terms of "making demands heard", to "regain Palestinian homeland", motivated by a "desire for world attention".

Most of the Palestinian sample expect increased conflict and Israeli retaliation to result from the

Palestinian bus attack, but a small minority of the

Palestinian sample expects the attack to accomplish

something:

```
38%     "more war"
24      "retaliation by Israel"
16      "people killed"
11      attack as achieving its purposes, such as
        "force Israel to recognize Palestinian
        rights"
11      miscellaneous coded categories
100%    (n=211)
```

C. Egyptian View

Nearly half of the Egyptians see the Palestinian attack

as a response to prior Israeli actions, compared to more

than a quarter of the sample who see it as politically

expressive or motivated.

```
36%     some sort of Palestinian or PLO retaliation
28      Palestinian resistance
10      "response to Israeli policy"
26      miscellaneous coded categories
100%    (n=333)
```

Egyptians explain the results in 3 terms, which, taken

together, point to an escalation of conflict:

```
36%     "more war"
24      "people, innocent people killed"
23      "retaliation by Israel"
6       "affect peace talks negatively"
11      miscellaneous coded categories
100%    (n-321)
```

It should be noted that, again, as in the case of results of

the Israeli raid, Egyptians are unique among the three

samples in remarking upon the effects of the bus attack on

peace talks (although only a small group of Egyptians

mention this). As in the case of the pattern of missing data in the Egyptian sample discussed above, where the peace treaty elicited a much higher response rate among Egyptians than did the Israeli raid or the Palestinian attack, Egyptians appear to have a different outlook about the two hostile actions than either Israelis or Palestinians. In this case the small group of Egyptians who think about the Israeli raid and the Palestinian attack in terms of how these actions might effect the peace process seem to be operating out of an analytic framework which is to be contrasted with the more prevalent notions of either blaming the aggressor or justifying the action.

D. **Palestinian, Egyptian and Israeli answers compared**

Whereas Israelis see the Palestinian bus attack as an act of terrorism and hatred of Jews which was internally motivated, most Palestinians and Egyptians talk about this event in terms of retaliation for Israeli attacks or in response to Israeli policies, in other words, externally motivated. However, a third of each of the Arab samples understands the attack in terms of Palestinian resistance, or as an attempt to gain world attention in order to make demands heard. A greater percentage of Egyptians than Palestinians use the actual code "Palestinian resistance" (Egyptians - 29%, Palestinians - 13%), suggesting perhaps that Egyptians admire and support the Palestinian cause in

general, whereas Palestinians in Israel are possibly less
sympathetic to or supportive of "Palestinian attacks" as a
means. Still, 16% o the Palestinians see some sort of
political motivation for the attack.

There is consensus within Israeli society about the
results of a Palestinian attack: more than half of the
Israelis expect some form of Israeli retaliation. The
Palestinian and Egyptian samples are split between two main
responses: approximately one quarter of each sample
explicitly expect Israel to retaliate and more than one
third of each sample expect "more war", which probably
includes Israeli retaliation as one element. 18% of
Palestinians and 6.5% Egyptians expect that the attack will
accomplish something.

III. "Israel and Egypt announce a peace treaty"

A. Israeli View

Three main answers account for three quarters of the
Israeli sample's responses:

33%	Sadat
26	compromise, concessions
15	Egyptian desire for peace
26	miscellaneous coded categories
100%	(n=492)

Nearly half of the Israeli sample attributes the treaty to
Sadat and/or Egypt's desire for peace. But a quarter of the
sample views the treaty as a joint Israeli-Egyptian action

rather than a purely Egyptian initiative, and at least 7%
emphasize the specifically Israeli-based origins or impetus
of the treaty (whereas only approximately 3% Egyptians or
Palestinians mention even a joint effort).

When asked about the results of the treaty, Israeli
respondents offered two main answers: the possibility of at
least minimal peace or reduced tensions, and concern about
the Sinai peninsula.

21%	"increased chance for peace"
17	"bilateral Israeli-Egyptian peace"
16	"normalization of relations"
14	"lessening of tensions"
7	"short-term peace"
15	Sinai -- "loss of", "transferral of", "withdrawal from"
10	miscellaneous coded categories
100%	(n=471)

Overall, there seems to be a consensus among Israelis (75%)
that the treaty will move relations in a calming direction.
However, for many Israelis this could be a bounded
expectation: nearly one third of this group feels that the
treaty will bring peace limited to the short-term or to
bilateral Israeli-Egyptian interaction, as opposed to more
extensive peaceful relations. Moreover, 15% of the entire
samples mention the loss of Sinai, which adds to the range
of reactions which exist in Israel about the treaty:
enthusiasm, ambivalence, and skepticism.

Thus, although half of the Israelis sampled expect
positive effects from an Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty,
there nonetheless is a clear awareness in Israeli society

about what peace 'costs' them. This is expressed in terms of concessions, need to compromise, giving up Sinai and the security it offered.

B. Palestinian View

Most people in the Palestinian sample emphasize the Egyptian causal role in bringing about the Egyptian-Israeli treaty. For them it is an Egyptian-initiated action, and not a bilateral event, in that around three fourths of the responses involve 'things about the Egyptians':

21%	Egyptian desire for peace
21	"Sadat"
15	"Sadat's treason"
8	"Egyptian desire to regain land"
8	"economic and social pressure in Egypt"
27	miscellaneous coded categories
100%	(n=214)

However, the Palestinian sample seems to be divided concerning the evaluation of the treaty itself: 42% Palestinian sample view "Egyptian desire for peace" and "Sadat" as responsible for the treaty (without a spelled out evaluative aspect), whereas at least 15% of the responses indicate a clearly negative evaluations of Sadat -- for instance, "Sadat's treason". It seems clear that many Palestinians in Israel are dissatisfied about the Israeli-Egyptian treaty, which they believe left the Palestinians out of the arrangements. The proportion of the responses would be expected to be even more negative for other Palestinian samples interviewed outside of Israel.

The Palestinian sample's expectations about the results of the treaty support this the feeling of foreboding: around one quarter focus on inter-Arab and Israeli-Arab tensions, whereas around one third see a chance of [Israeli - Egyptian] peace and normalization of relations. If "bilateral peace" and "short-term peace" can be considered to be qualified answers or mixed evaluations about the aftermath of a treaty, the answers can be arranged in a scale ranging from those who see a chance for peace more enthusiastically to those who expect negative results from the treaty:

28%	increased chance of peace)	optimistic
6	normalization of relations)	
10	bilateral I-E peace)	mixed expectations
4	short-term peace)	
15	loss of Arab support for Egypt)	
		pessimistic
8	increased conflict)	
71%	[subtotal]	
29	miscellaneous coded categories	
100%	(n=181)	

Palestinians also mention Sinai (12%), almost as much as Israeli Jews. Approximately 6% mention that economy will improve as a result of the peace treaty, which is not mentioned at all by Israelis, and is mentioned much more by Egyptians than Palestinians.

C. Egyptian View

Most Egyptians view Egyptian national desires as
responsible for the Israeli-Egyptian treaty:

```
49%    Egyptian desire for peace
15     Sadat
16     Egyptian desire to regain land
20     miscellaneous coded categories
100%   (n=407)
```

Sadat is seen as the cause of the treaty less often in the
Egyptian sample than among Palestinians or Israelis.

When asked about the results of the treaty, around half
of the sample mentions the possibility of Israeli-Egyptian
peace, while around a third emphasize geopolitical and
economic aspects of the treaty. Compared to Israelis and
Palestinians, Egyptians appear to be unbridled in their
enthusiasm about the peace treaty and its by-products:

```
47%    increased chance of peace
19     Israeli withdrawal from Sinai
15     better economy
8      bilateral Israeli-Egyptian peace
3      normalization
8      miscellaneous coded categories
100%   (n=445)
```

D. Israeli, Palestinian and Egyptian samples compared

A large percentage of each sample indicates that
Sadat's leadership and/or the Egyptian desire for peace
constitute central factors leading up to the Israeli-
Egyptian peace agreement:

```
Egyptians      Palestinians    Israelis
   64%             41%            48%
```

However, most Egyptians emphasize the desire of the Egyptian

people, whereas most Israelis and Palestinians emphasize
Sadat's personal role in the peace treaty. This suggests
that Egyptians emphasize their own [authentic, bottom-up,
rather than top-down] will or impetus (or disposition)
regarding peace, and that Israelis and Palestinians see
Sadat, more than the Egyptian people, as responsible for the
treaty. But many Palestinians blame Sadat and see the
treaty as a result of a "black-top image" (R. K. White,
1972) -- the Egyptian people forced into an undesirable role
by a treasonous leader, whereas Israelis credit Sadat rather
than the Egyptian people (and thereby temper optimism and
enthusiasm about the treaty with skepticism about the
stability of the Sadat's regime). In comparison to the
Palestinian view of Sadat, the Israelis' view could be
termed a white-top image.

No clear scenario about what the treaty will bring
emerges from the responses of the three samples. Each
population seems to emphasize aspects of the future which
embody its own particular concerns. Thus Egyptians more
than Israelis or Palestinians mention the effects of peace
in improving the economy (cf. "peace and prosperity" slogan
under Sadat); Palestinians envision increased conflict and
inter-Arab tensions. Israelis expect a reduction in
tension, but stop short of expressing full-blown enthusiasm
over the possibility of peace "increased chance of peace".

SUMMARY:

From the marginals it is clear that Israelis, Egyptians and Palestinians offer different explanations for the causes and results of the three events. In fact, it is possible to identify what could be called 'Israeli' answers or 'Palestinian' or 'Egyptian' answers, since certain explanations are nearly unique to a given population. For instance, more than 80% of the people who think about the results of the bus attack in terms of its effect on the peace treaty are Egyptians. There are also examples of distinctively Israeli or Palestinian answers for the three events: Only Israelis see the Palestinian attack as motivated by the desire "to murder women and children"; only they see the peace treaty as coming about due to "Israeli concessions". An example of a distinctively Palestinian view is the sense that "Sadat's treason" brought about the Israeli-Egyptian treaty.

There seems to be a changing pattern across events of similarities and differences among the views of the three national groups. In the first two events, which involve Israeli-Palestinian hostile interaction, the Egyptian answers resemble the Palestinian answers. But in the case of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty the views of all three groups diverge regarding the meaning of the event. This seems to be the case despite the fact the a large portion of each sample mentions "Sadat" and "Egyptian desire for peace"

as leading up to the event, and "increased chance of peace" as a result of the treaty. In examining the answers which characterize each sample, two points emerge: that each society has its own set of underlying concerns and hopes about a treaty (i.e. the is a lack of consensus across all samples), and that the answers about the treaty seem less stereotyped than in the case of the two hostile Israeli-Palestinian events.

Stage Two

Categorization of the Variables

In the second stage of the data analysis the goal was to determine which answers are simply variations on a common theme and which are representative of different types of thinking. The description of the marginals in the first stage of the data analysis showed how various responses about an event are connected thematically within each national sample. For instance, in the case of the Israeli sample's explanations of the Israeli raid on Beirut the following responses seem linked together -- "Beirut is a PLO stronghold", "pre-emptive strike","prevent attacks" "reduce conflict", "weaken the PLO", "terrorists killed". Technically the goal of the second stage of the data analysis is to reduce the detailed precoding schemes into a simpler typology of responses.

The second stage involved combining answers that are similar and separating those which are different. To do this it was necessary to make a judgement about the basic meaning of the phrase as used by the respondent. Generally this judgement is rather straightforward, as in the case of factors leading up to the attack on the bus: "desire to murder women and children" is coded as "blame", and "to regain Palestinian land" is coded as 'political-strategic'.

However, sometimes the meaning of an answer is more ambiguous. For instance, one explanation of what led up to the Palestinian attack on the bus is "it is the policy of the PLO". This could be categorized as 'political' (part of Palestinian resistance) or as 'blame' (i.e. terrorism). Since mainly Israelis say this, it has been recoded as 'terrorism,' but were it mainly a Palestinian answer, it might have been called 'political.' Had this category been offered by Israelis and Palestinians (and/or Egyptians), its meaning might have been judged to be different, and a way would have been sought to recode it meaningfully across the samples. In such cases, the meaning of the response is clarified by considering which national group offers a particular response.

Even within a sample, the meaning of a response can be unclear. For instance, in the case of the Israeli sample's explanations of what results from the Palestinian attack on the bus, "terrorists killed" could be judged as being in the same category as "people killed" and "innocent people killed" or as belonging to a different category of response. This ambiguity was resolved by examining the correlations of these responses and various attitude measures from other sections of the "Images" study, which reveal that they behave similarly. Thus, they were collapsed into one unit.

These examples illustrate a process in the data analysis which could be called 'disambiguation' -- an

attempt to clarify the meaning of a particular expression by referring to who uses it or how it is used (in relation to other variables). In this study it was essential to identify the anthropological meaning or 'meaning in context' of the response provided by the speaker, rather than simply relying on a supposed 'dictionary' meaning of an expression. The process is one of reconstruction: trying to place the particular phrase or expression within the larger contextual framework that it comes from -- a framework which, in this study, is left unspecified in the interaction between the respondent and the interviewer since both people are from the same national background and share common assumptions.

A final issue regarding the categorization strategy emerges when the researcher examines the list of answers to the questions about political events. It is clear that not all responses involve comparable elements, because people responded to the questions in a variety of ways: some answers emphasize what is going on, as in the case where "peace talks" are seen as leading up to the Israeli-Egyptian treaty. Other answers reveal the speaker's evaluation of the action, as well as an emotional tone or mood: "Sadat's treason", "it couldn't happen", "they were afraid to attack the army".

The coding schemes used in this study are developed to capture the range of responses about each of the events, in order to define distinctive orientations about conflict and

peace. The assumption is that different types of responses index, albeit imprecisely, different orientations towards conflict and peace. The broad goal is to identify these underlying outlooks about political events.

Coding Schemes Used

From the examination of the precoded data in Stage One it was evident that the questions about the Israeli raid on Beirut and the Palestinian attack on the bus (both cause and result) elicit a comparable types of response, while the questions about the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty call up a different set of responses altogether. Thus the two hostile Israeli-Palestinian events (raid and bus attack) are coded using a common scheme, whereas the treaty requires a separate formulation. The scheme used to code the hostile events is discussed first, followed by the coding schemes used for the peace event. Appendix C contains detailed tables of all coding schemes.

I. Hostile Events: Israeli Raid and Palestinian Attack

The typology of responses for 'what led up to' and 'what resulted from' the Israeli raid and the Palestinian attack is presented first (in part A.), followed by a comparison of the distributions of types of responses for each national group (in part B.).

A. Typology of Responses to the Hostile Events

The coding scheme divides the responses into four types of answers about what leads up to hostile actions: retaliation, political-strategic, blaming, or conflict-for-granted. These are assumed to be discrete types of answers about the causes of hostile political events such as a raid or an attack, which reflect different cognitive orientations or outlooks about the nature of ongoing conflict.

1) Retaliation for enemy's actions. The reasoning here is that the action took place because of the other side's prior action, 'we do it because they do it'. In other words, this is a reactive, stimulus-response orientation. This mode of response blames nobody in particular for the hostile action, although the respondent has automatic sympathy with one group rather than the other by virtue of his/her affiliation. The cycle itself is not morally tinged -- one just has a preferred side, like a favorite team in a game. The actions themselves do not arouse surprise or strong emotions. Thus, "The Israeli Airforce conducted a raid on Beirut" because "they had been attacked". Likewise, "Palestinians attack the bus in response to Israeli attacks", or "in response to Israeli policies".

2) <u>Political-strategic goals or concerns</u>. Political
    scientists, economists or game theoreticians might
    term this the 'rational actor model': an actor
    engages in the rational pursuit of its [perceived]
    interests, and seeks to achieve certain strategic
    goals. In the case of the Israeli raid this outlook
    is expressed by answers which emphasize Israel's
    security needs ("Beirut is a PLO stronghold", "pre-
    emptive strike". In the case of the Palestinian
    attack this category includes answers which
    explained the attack in terms of Palestinian
    resistance, liberation of Palestinian homeland,
    making demands heard. This type of answer involves
    goal attainment by the acting side.

3) <u>Blaming the perpetrator of the hostile action</u>.
    Answers in this category explain the hostile act in
    terms of the evil or diabolical disposition of the
    actor. There is an attribution of purposive, self-
    motivated choice of violent methods   In the
    Israeli raid this category include "Israeli
    aggression" "Israeli desire to destroy
    Palestinians". In the case of the Palestinian
    attack this category subsumes "terrorism", "hatred
    of Jews", "desire to terrorize civilians, murder
    women and children" and "they were afraid to attack
    the army".

4) <u>Conflict-for-granted</u>. In this category hostile
    events are situated beyond the realm of normal
    causes and effects. In this mode the conflict
    itself has become a permanent part of the
    environment, like floods, earthquakes and other
    natural disasters. This fatalistic attitude is
    characterized by answers in which the ongoing
    conflict environment is seen as the reason for
    violence. For instance this category includes
    answers in which "status quo", "war, hatred", or
    "no reason" are offered as leading up to either the
    Israeli raid on Beirut or Palestinian attack on a
    bus.

The <u>results</u> of the hostile events were categorized

according to a similar scheme:

1) <u>Retaliation by the attacked party against the
    perpetrator</u>. The reasoning here is that 'if one
    side starts it, the other will respond', a

stimulus-response model in which these are the 'rules of the game'. As a result of the Israeli raid on Beirut there will be 'Palestinian retaliation', or 'Israeli retaliation' in the case of the Palestinian attack.

2) <u>Achieve goals</u>. The actor is seen as being successful in attaining particular strategic or political goals as a result of the action. This category includes responses which seem to be ideologically-based, in that the particular action which leads to such results is understood as part of a larger, coherent plan. In the case of Israeli raid this category includes "reduction of conflict", "weaken the PLO". In the case of the Palestinian attack this includes "world attention", "achieve the objective of stating their cause".

3) <u>People killed</u>. This category includes responses which blame the perpetrator of the hostile action, in that where there are inhuman causes of evil actions, there are human costs which result. These answers focus on the destruction of people, "innocent people" -- individual lives.

4) <u>More war</u>. This category involves a fatalistic stance about the results of hostile actions. It probably includes aspects of the other categories, such as "retaliation" and "people die" as elements of a more general image of what follows from a hostile action in a protracted conflict. Some answers consider the results of the hostile action in terms of ongoing conflict, more hatred, anger, and hostility. Other response include "nothing".

B. **Comparison across Samples of Coding Schemes for Cause and Results of Hostile Events**

1. **Comparison of Explanations of Cause of Hostile Events**

Table 3 shows a comparison across the three national samples of the types of responses used to explain 'what would bring about an Israeli raid on Beirut' and 'what would bring about a Palestinian attack on an Israeli bus'.

Table 3
Comparison Across Samples of Explanations of Cause of
Hostile Events   (reported in column percentages)

1. ISRAELI RAID

	Sample: Egyptian	Palestinian	Israeli
Response:			
Retaliation	13.5%	23.6%	80.2%
Strategic	21.9	10.6	15.6
Blame	57.3	62.0	2.3
Conflict	7.3	3.8	1.9
Totals	100 %	100 %	100 %

n =   951 = 274   +   208   +   469

chi-square statistics:
  pearson   463.0
  likelihood ratio 543.60
degrees of freedom   6
significance   .001

2. PALESTINIAN ATTACK

	Sample: Egyptian	Palestinian	Israeli
Response:			
Retaliation	45.6%	54.5%	4.3%
Strategic	35.4	28.9	9.1
Blame	10.2	11.8	80.8
Conflict	8.7	4.7	5.8
Totals	100 %	100 %	100 %

n = 1008 = 333   +   211   +   464

chi-square statistics:
  pearson   535.99
  likelihood ratio 603.67
degrees of freedom   6
significance   .001

Most Israelis view the raid as retaliation for prior
actions, whereas the majority of Palestinians and Egyptians
blame Israel for the raid. In contrast, the Palestinian bus

attack produces the opposite response: Israelis blame
Palestinians for the attack, whereas most Palestinians and
many Egyptians view the attack as a retaliation for prior
actions. The victimized blame, whereas the aggressors
justify, or at least explain away the action. There is more
consensus about this among Israelis than for either
Palestinians or Egyptians. Nonetheless this is the modal
response for each of the national groups.

However, subgroups within the Palestinian and Egyptian
samples see the Israeli raid as retaliation, similar to the
Israeli interpretation. Similarly, subgroups within the
Palestinian and Egyptian samples talk about the Palestinian
attack in terms of blame (i.e. emphasizing the aspect of
intentional harm of the attack). It is possible that the
Palestinian and Egyptian respondents who explain the bus
attack as an intentional action are either supporting or
condemning the action. It is impossible, however, to
determine from the marginals alone which is the case,
although ultimately the analysis of patterns of response to
the events (in Stage Three) may illuminate this point.

Political-strategic thinking appears to be a secondary
response in explaining one's own actions for all of the
samples, especially among Egyptians. The percentages of
each sample responding in strategic terms seems to increase
when a group explains its own side's aggressive act: More
Palestinians and Egyptians use political-strategic terms to

explain the Palestinian attack than they do to explain the Israeli raid. More Israelis use strategic terms to explain the Israeli raid than they do to explain the Palestinian attack. Thus political-strategic reasoning seems to function as an alternative form of justification for the hostile action of one's own side. Rather than the sort of justification which denies that the action was intended by the actor, political-strategic explanations describe the actor as having longer term, more thought-out motives, and as acting with these goals in mind, while not particularly seeking to do harm or to punish, as in the blaming mode. In contrast to the retaliatory explanation, in which the actor is at the mercy of the Other's prior actions, the political-strategic outlook reasserts the control of the actor over the environment.

Only a small percentage of people in each sample explain these hostile events in terms of the conflict environment ('conflict-for-granted'), although a larger percentage of Egyptians seem to think this way compared to the other two samples. This Egyptian tendency appears in other sections of the questionnaire as well.

2. Comparison of Explanations of Results of Hostile Events

Table 4 shows a comparison across national samples of the types of responses used to describe results of the two hostile Israeli-Palestinian interactions.

Table 4
Comparison Across Samples of Explanations of Results of
Hostile Events (reported in column percentages)

1. ISRAELI RAID

| | Sample: | | |
Response:	Egyptian	Palestinian	Israeli
Retaliation	12.9%	18.8%	21.2%
Achieve goals	7.5	4.9	45.8
People die	30.7	29.5	17.7
More war	48.9	46.9	15.3
Totals	100 %	100 %	100 %

n = 978 = 319 + 207 + 452

chi-square statistics:
  pearson   255.86
  likelihood ratio   276.74
degrees of freedom   6
significance   .001

2. PALESTINIAN ATTACK

| | Sample: | | |
Response:	Egyptian	Palestinian	Israeli
Retaliation	25.9%	25.1%	52.4%
Achieve Goals	6.5	18.5	2.7
People Die	24.3	16.0	26.8
More War	43.3	40.2	18.1
Totals	100 %	100 %	100 %

n = 1017 = 321 + 211 + 485

chi-square statistics:
  pearson   153.95
  likelihood ratio   149.71
degrees of freedom   6
significance   .001

"More war" is the modal answer among Palestinians and
Egyptians for both the Israeli raid and the Palestinian

attack. "People die" is the second choice in discussing the results of an Israeli raid. Are these expressions indicative of distinctive outlooks or are they different ways of expressing the same thing? Functionally they seem to operate similarly, in that they are used more often by the population which identifies with the victim in an action (i.e. Palestinians and Egyptians in the case of "Israeli Airforce conducts a raid on Beirut", and Israelis in the case of "Palestinians attack a bus on the Haifa - Tel Aviv highway"). They seem to express a degree of despair and victimization in the face of ongoing conflict.

'Achieve goals' (i.e. reduce conflict) is the modal response among Israelis concerning results of the Israeli raid, and most Israelis expect Israeli retaliation for the Palestinian attack. Both of these categories imply a degree of Israeli efficacy or responsiveness toward the conflict. However, a portion of the Israeli sample expects Palestinian retaliation for the raid (Palestinian responsiveness), and, in the case of the Palestinian attack, many Israelis talk about the results in terms of people dying (helplessness or despair brought on by the conflict).

3. Explanations of Cause and Results of Hostile Events

Comparing the information gained from looking at 'causes' and 'results' of hostile actions, it is clear that 'what results from' a hostile action generates fewer

differences between the national groups than 'what leads up to' a hostile action. Among Palestinians and Egyptians there seems to be a constant percentage of people who say that "more war" will result from these events, whereas Israelis seem split between those who view Israeli actions as being efficacious (Israeli raid will "reduce conflict", and Palestinian attack will result in "Israeli retaliation".) and those who are more despairing.

Many people expect more war and ongoing conflict to result from hostile actions, but very few people see the conflict environment as the cause or antecedent of these sorts of actions. This suggests the psychological nature of cause of hostile action, as compared to the pragmatic nature of consequences. In other words, a wider range of expression is elicited by 'what led up to' an action than by 'what results from it', and one could probably identify a respondent's nationality on the basis of his/her explanation of the what led up to a hostile action, but not on the basis of 'results' of an action. In general, the explanations of results of the hostile events seem less helpful or explanatory than explanations about the causes of the hostile events in revealing the different orientations underlying explanations of the events.

II. **Peace Event: Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty**

From the beginning of the data analysis it appeared
that this event would require a different coding scheme from
the one used to categorize the responses to the hostile
events, because the way people talked about the peace treaty
seemed to differ from how they explained the raid and the
attack. Peace is a different matter than war. It is not
simply the opposite of war; it is less familiar and it has a
different logic. Two different schemes are used to recode
'what would bring about' the treaty, and two for 'what would
result from' the treaty. For each of the coding schemes the
rationale for the scheme is presented along with a
comparison of the distribution of responses across national
samples, before moving on to the subsequent scheme.

A. **Coding Schemes for Cause of the Treaty**

1. **Cause of the Israeli-Egyptian Treaty: Scheme #1**

One way to differentiate the explanations of 'what
would bring about' the Israeli-Egyptian treaty was to divide
the responses according to which people's concerns or needs
are expressed in a particular answer. Thus, one group of
answers could be called 'Israeli needs' (e.g. "Arab
recognition of Israeli") and a second could be called
'Palestinian needs' ("recognition of Palestinian rights").

A third group of responses involve Egyptian desire for peace

and/or Sadat's contribution. A fourth group of answers

includes more pragmatic or instrumental concerns:

a) Israeli contribution, concerns, requirements. For instance "Begin", "Israeli concessions", "Arab recognition of Israel".

b) Palestinian contribution, concerns, requirements. For instance, "recognition of Palestinian homeland", "Sadat's treason", "can't happen", "extra-regional involvement".

c) Egyptian contribution, Sadat. "Egypt's desire for peace", "Sadat", "Sadat the visionary".

d) Pragmatic concerns. "Desire for a better economy", "1973 War", "Egyptian desire to regain land", "negotiations".

The results of this coding scheme are displayed in

Table 5.

Table 5
Comparison of Across Samples of Explanations of Cause of the Israeli-Egyptian Treaty (reported in column percentages)

	Sample:		
Response:	Egyptian	Palestinian	Israeli
Israeli Concerns	3.7%	6.5%	36.6%
Palestinian Concerns	4.9	27.6	3.2
Egyptian Concerns or Sadat	61.7	40.7	47.5
Pragmatic Concerns	29.7	25.2	12.7
Total	100 %	100 %	100 %

n = 1118 = 407 + 214 + 497

chi-square   311.14
degrees of freedom   6
significance   .001

Although all three samples acknowledge Egyptian impetus leading up to treaty, each group has its own outlook about the treaty: Egyptians emphasize pragmatic aspects of their experience, such as improving the economy, the October (1973) War and regaining the Sinai; Israelis speak especially of "mutual desire, compromise", suggesting they want an interchange with a negotiating partner; Palestinians talk about "Sadat's treason" and "extra-regional involvement" as leading up to a treaty of which many disapprove, on the one hand. On the other hand, a subgroup of Palestinians describes the treaty as coming about due to Egypt's pragmatic concerns about Sinai, the economy, and internal social pressure.

2. Cause of the Israeli-Egyptian Treaty: Scheme #2

The second recoding scheme was based on an underlying notion of volition or motivation for the peace treaty, in that each of the parties desires in different degrees to join into or to acknowledge the Israeli-Egyptian agreement about a peace treaty. These responses vary according to the extent that the respondent is willing to join in the responsibility for the agreement:

a) The peace treaty was adopted because there was something to be gained. Answers such as "economy" or "regain land" are included here.

b) A negotiation framework made the peace treaty possible, and the various parties or leaders sought the treaty. This category included "Sadat",

"Egyptian desire for peace", "Israeli desire for
peace", "leadership", "Egypt, Israel, USA",
"Begin", "negotiations".

c) **Exchanges or concessions** made the treaty possible.
"Israeli concessions", "recognition of Palestinian
rights", "Arab recognition of Israel".

d) **Circumstances forced the parties into the treaty**.
"The 1973 (October) War", "extra-regional
involvement or pressure".

e) **The Israeli-Egyptian treaty is a betrayal**. The
answers subsumed here include: "it can't happen",
"Sadat's treason".

The results of this coding scheme are displayed in

Table 6.

Table 6
**Comparison of Across Samples of Explanations of Cause of the
Israeli-Egyptian Treaty** (reported in column percentages)

Response:	Sample: Egyptian	Palestinian	Israeli	
Things to be Gained	22.4%	12.6%	4.8%	
Negotiation Framework	68.3	51.4	59.4	
Exchanges or Concessions		3.7	5.1	27.6
Forced or Betrayed*	5.7	30.9	8.2	
Total	100 %	100 %	100 %	

n =   1118   = 407   +   214   +   497

chi-square statistics:
  pearson   250.15
  likelihood ratio   240.96
degrees of freedom   6
significance   .001

* The categories 'forced to make peace' and 'the treaty
is a betrayal' are combined in this table.

The majority of people in all three samples speak of

negotiations involving various combinations of Egypt, Sadat,

Israel, Begin, USA, etc. as leading up to an Israeli-

Egyptian treaty.   These are elements in an idealistic

conception of peace.

The secondary responses for each sample reveal greater variation among the three national groups: a) Egyptians think about the treaty in terms of things to be gained or incentives; b) Israelis emphasize concessions, or what they feel they must exchange or give up for peace; c) Palestinians respond to the treaty in terms of its involuntary nature -- they view the participants as being forced by circumstances or themselves as being betrayed by the evolution of such an agreement at all. Differences among the secondary responses of the three samples indicate that in each of the societies there are substreams of thought about the peace treaty, aside from the dominant or modal response, which appear to involves a more pragmatic conception of peace, compared to the essentially idealistic image contained in the modal response.

B. <u>Coding Schemes for Explanations of Results of the Treaty</u>

1. <u>Results of the Israeli-Egyptian Treaty: Scheme #1</u>

Two ways of grouping the responses to the question 'what results from the Israeli-Egyptian treaty' were used. In the first scheme expressions about the possibility of peace are separated from those involving worsening relations and from concern about the Sinai, or about the economy. This scheme preserves somewhat the distinction between more idealistic aspects of peace ('peace' versus 'increased

tensions') and pragmatic aspects of peace ('economy' versus 'Sinai'):

a) **Peace**. "increased chance of peace", "reexamine Arab attitudes toward Israel", "lessening of tensions", "normalization of relations", "short-term peace".

b) **Sinai**. "Israeli withdrawal from Sinai", "transfer of Sinai", "loss of Sinai and the security it provided".

c) **Increased Conflict**. "increased conflict", "loss of Arab support for Egypt", "Sadat's assassination", "bad for Israel", "bad for Palestinians", "bad for Egyptians", "it can't happen".

d) **Economy**. "Better economy".

The results of this coding scheme are displayed in Table 7.

Table 7
Comparison of Across Samples of Explanations of Results of the Israeli-Egyptian Treaty (reported in column percentages)

Response:	Sample: Egyptian	Palestinian	Israeli
Chance of Peace	60.7%	49.1%	74.9%
Sinai	18.7	12.2	15.1
Increased Tensions	5.5	31.6	6.0
Economy	15.1	5.5	3.6
Total	100 %	100 %	100 %
n = 1097 =	445 +	181 +	471
chi-square	163.00		
degrees of freedom	6		
significance	.001		

This scheme shows that in each of the three samples there are people who expect peace to result from the treaty:

three-fourths of the Israeli sample speak of the possibility
of peace arising from the treaty compared to nearly two-
thirds of the Egyptians and around half of the Palestinian
sample.

Secondarily Israelis think about the transfer of the
Sinai, as do the Egyptians. However, for Israelis the "loss
or transferral of Sinai" is a consequence or effect of
peace, whereas for Egyptians (and probably for Palestinians)
"regaining the Sinai" is part of the content of peace. The
Egyptians also show a concern about improving their economy;
in contrast a strong minority of Palestinians expect an
increase in tensions to result from the treaty.

2. __Results of the Israeli-Egyptian Treaty: Scheme #2__

The second recoding scheme about results of the
Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty is based on the evaluative
aspect of the action, which vary in the three societies.
The answers are divided into good, bad or uncertain results.
Two codes, "withdrawal from Sinai" and "Sinai transferred"
are coded as 'good' for the Egyptian and Palestinian
samples, but as 'unclear' for the Israeli sample.

a) __Good results__. These answers have an optimistic
aspect to them: "increased chance for peace",
"better economy", "reeexamine Arab attitudes
towards Israel", "lessening tension",
"normalization".

b) __Unclear or mixed results__. "short-term peace",
"bilateral peace (only)", "no results".

c) **Negative results**. "loss of Arab support for
Egypt", "Sadat's assassination", "loss of Sinai and
security", "bad for Israel", "bad for
Palestinians", "bad for Egypt".

The results of this recoding scheme are displayed in

Table 8

Table 8
**Comparison of Across Samples of Explanations of Results of
the Israeli-Egyptian Treaty** (reported in column percentages)

Response:	Sample: Egyptian	Palestinian	Israeli
Good Results	85.3	52.5	54.5
Unclear or Mixed Results	9.9	17.1	37.2
Bad Results	4.8	30.5	8.3
Total	100. %	100.1%	100 %

n = 1097 = 445 + 181 + 471

chi-square statistics:
  pearson   199.25
  likelihood ratio   181.40
degrees of freedom   4
significance   .001

This scheme indicates that Egyptians are overwhelmingly

enthusiastic about the results of the peace treaty, although

around half of the Palestinian and Israeli samples could be

said to be optimistic. More than a third of the people in

the Israeli sample express reservations about what the

treaty will bring, and nearly half of the Palestinians

interviewed expect bad or at least uncertain results from

the treaty.

III. <u>Construct Validity</u>

It was necessary to devise one coding scheme for the hostile events and a separate scheme for the treaty, a finding which lends support to the proposition that conflict and peace occupy different domains of reasoning. The commonalities in the interpretation of the events by the three samples underscores or confirms the underlying structure of the events as a series: two hostile or war events -- one carried out by Israelis and one by Palestinians -- and one cooperative or peace event between Israel and Egypt.

The Israeli raid and the Palestinian attack can be treated as nearly symmetric, in that each group interprets its <u>own</u> hostile action in justificatory terms and explains the <u>other group's</u> hostile action in terms of desire to kill, terrorism, or intentional aggression. Aggressor and victim have polarized views, no matters whether Israelis or Palestinians are in the actor's role. This occurs despite the structural differences that no doubt characterize Israeli and Palestinian societies: one with a state and an army, and borders, etc., and one without (but with a national identity and national aspirations and a liberation movement..).

The peace treaty elicits areas of consensus or agreement across groups: Egypt and/or Sadat are strongly associated with the treaty, and the treaty is discussed in terms of a negotiation framework. But strong differences emerge between the groups, too:

1) Egyptians credit themselves and speak about expected benefits or gains as incentive for joining in the treaty. "Peace and prosperity" was the carrot leading up to the treaty, and there is overall optimism about what the treaty will bring.

2) After crediting Sadat and the negotiation framework, Israelis look at the treaty in terms of what they must give up to get it (concessions). As a consequence, there is a large percentage of Israelis who are uncertain about what the treaty will bring, although most people are optimistic.

3) Palestinians are split between those who credit the Egyptians and those who blame Sadat or Egypt for the treaty (thus they see the treaty as a <u>hostile</u> action.). Expectations are divided about whether the treaty will bring positive or negative results.

Thus, the Israeli-Egyptian treaty is not perceived uniformly as a peace action. Egyptians and Israelis do not agree about its meaning, although people in each society may view it as a 'peace-related action', whereas among Palestinians there is a group of people who view its impact as outright hostile.

Another way to evaluate the structure of the three
stimulus actions taken as a set (construct validity) was to
examine the pattern of between-group differences across the
events. The recategorization of the six events variables in
Tables 3 - 8 indicates that there is a strong association
between nationality and type of explanation which holds for
all three events, as indicated by the statistically
significant chi-square statistics in these tables. In other
words, for each of the political events there are
differences between the explanations of the events offered
by each of the three national groups. However, the pattern
of similarities and differences between the responses of
groups was expected to differ for hostile and peace-related
events. For instance, the views of Egyptians and
Palestinians may be more similar for the hostile events
(Israeli raid and Palestinian bus attack) than they are in
the case of the Egyptian-Israeli treaty.

Table 9 shows the changing pattern of 'alliances' or
similarities and differences in outlook, based on the
partitioning of the likelihood ratio chi-square statistics.
These statistics are taken from Table 3 (cause of Israeli
raid and Palestinian bus attack), Table 4 (results of
Israeli raid and Palestinian bus attack), Table 6 (cause of
peace treaty, using the 'volition' coding scheme) and Table
8 (results of peace treaty, using coding scheme #2 -
'evaluative'). For each event this table lists: 1) the

overall likelihood ratio chi-square statistic, indicating the extent of differences between the views of the three national groups; 2) the amount of difference due to Arab (Palestinian + Egyptian) versus Israeli differences in outlook; 3) the amount of difference accounted for by Egyptian versus Palestinian outlooks.

The two hostile Israeli-Palestinian events were expected to elicit strong Arab - Israeli differences (i.e. large chi-square statistic) and weak inter-Arab (Palestinian - Egyptian) differences. In contrast, the treaty was expected to produce divergent accounts (large chi-square statistics) among the three national groups.

Table 9
Partitioning of Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square: Comparing the
Pattern of Differences between the National Groups[*]

Samples Compared:	RAID1 (cause) chi-sq.	df	sign.
Egyptian - Palestinian - Israeli	543.60	6	.001
Arab samples - Israeli	524.62	3	.001
Egyptian - Palestinian	18.97	3	.001

Samples Compared:	RAID2 (result) chi-sq.	df	sign.
Egyptian - Palestinian - Israeli	276.74	6	.001
Arab samples - Israeli	272.20	3	.001
Egyptian - Palestinian	4.53	3	.21

Samples Compared:	BUS1 (cause) chi-sq.	df	sign.
Egyptian - Palestinian - Israeli	603.67	6	.001
Arab samples - Israeli	596.61	3	.001
Egyptian - Palestinian	7.06	3	.07

Samples Compared:	BUS2 (result) chi-sq.	df	sign.
Egyptian - Palestinian - Israeli	149.71	6	.001
Arab samples - Israeli	129.56	3	.001
Egyptian - Palestinian	20.15	3	.001

Samples Compared:	TREATY1 (cause) chi-sq.	df	sign.
Egyptian - Palestinian - Israeli	240.96	6	.001
Arab samples - Israeli	167.80	3	.001
Egyptian - Palestinian	73.16	3	.001

Samples Compared:	TREATY2 (result) chi-sq.	df	sign.
Egyptian - Palestinian - Israeli	181.40	4	.001
Arab samples - Israeli	97.25	2	.001
Egyptian - Palestinian	84.15	2	.001

[*]The chi-square statistics used here are taken from Table 3
(RAID1, BUS1), Table 4 (RAID2, BUS2), Table 6 (TREATY1) and
Table 8 (TREATY2).

Table 9 shows that the two hostile actions (RAID and BUS) produce a similar pattern of response across the three groups -- The Palestinian and Egyptian samples respond to these actions in a similar way, whereas Israelis respond differently. The overall differences between the three groups on the RAID1, RAID2, BUS1 and BUS2 is made up of two component parts: the larger chi-square statistic based on Arab - Israeli differences in explanation, and the much smaller chi-square statistic summarizing Egyptian - Palestinian differences in explanation (Although the Egyptian-Palestinian difference for RAID1 and BUS2 are statistically significant, the sheer magnitude of the Arab - Israeli comparison predominates.).

However, the chi-square statistics for these between-group comparisons change regarding the Israeli-Egyptian treaty (TREATY). The differences between the views of each of the three national groups are more pronounced for TREATY1 and TREATY2 than in the case of the first two hostile actions (RAID and BUS). This is seen in the larger chi-square summarizing the difference between Egyptian and Palestinian outlooks, which in the case of TREATY2 (results of the treaty) are nearly as pronounced as the Arab - Israeli differences. No 'alliances' in outlook could be said to exist regarding the treaty.

The notion of patterns of response across events is useful not only at the between-group level. There are varying degrees of consensus within societies in response to the different types of events. Table 10 shows the patterns of modal answers identified in each of the samples. Israelis clearly agree among themselves about when they are victims, in the case of both hostile events. Egyptians display consensus about their role in initiating the peace treaty, and about what they will gain from it. Lower percentages for the modal responses of the Palestinian sample suggest that this sample is characterized by two streams of thought in response to each event, rather than a unified point of view.

Table 10
Modal Responses to the Events in each of the Samples

	Egyptian	Palestinian	Israeli
Raid			
cause:	blame 57%	blame 62%	retaliation 80%
n =	(274)	(208)	(469)
result:	more war 49%	more war 47%	less war 46%
n =	(319)	(207)	(452)
Bus			
cause:	retaliation 46%	retaliation*59%	blame 81%
n =	(333)	(211)	(464)
result:	more war 43%	more war 40%	retaliation 52%
n =	(321)	(211)	(485)
Treaty			
cause:	negotiation 68%	negotiate 51%	negotiate 59%
n =	(407)	(214)	(497)
result:	good 85%	good 52%	good 55%
n =	(445)	(181)	(471)

* 'Retaliation' for the Palestinian sample includes 'conflict-for-granted', also.

So far the discussion has focused on the results of the analyses of the aggregate data for Israelis, Palestinians, and Egyptians. Modal answers have been identified in each of the samples about each of the political events. In the third stage of the research, the patterns of answers given within each of the populations were analyzed, to determine whether there are different types of thinkers or thinking within each society and who or what constitute these substreams. The task involves identifying patterns of perceiving across events within each of the national samples.

Stage Three

Patterns of Thinking Across Events

Prior to this stage the responses to the three political events have been treated in aggregate terms on a sample by sample basis. In Stage Three the response patterns of individuals within each sample are analyzed to determine how the understandings of the three events are linked by individual people. The main question is whether there are distinctive patterns of response within each of the national groups. The modal answers identified for each national group in Stage Two form the basis of an analysis of patterns of response within each of the three samples. Using latent class analysis (Lazarsfeld, 1954,1959; Goodman, 1974; Clogg, 1977), patterns of modal and non-modal responses within each national group are examined statistically for the existence of characteristic patterns of interpretation across the three events.

The rationale for latent class analysis is that the empirical data are an imperfect measure of an underlying construct which itself is not directly observable or measurable. Use of latent class analysis enables the researcher to identify characteristic patterns among the responses to a set of categorical items and to test whether the patterns observed in the empirical data can be accounted for by positing an underlying, latent construct. Instead of restricting the analysis to the examination to the

intercorrelations between individual pairs of items, use of latent class analysis permits examination of the patterning among a set of items as a whole (in this case the responses to the questions about political events). In the present research the existence of latent classes would lend support to the notion that different outlooks, worldviews or reality worlds within each national group result in different patterns of response to the questions about political events. If the responses to the items are random (i.e. no patterning is identified by latent class analysis) then either there is no underlying construct or the items do not accurately reflect an underlying construct which in fact exists.

This approach represents an intrinsic analysis of the data about political events, as opposed to an approach which evaluates the data in relation to an outside criterion (Lazarsfeld, 1954). However, once underlying classes are identified for each group, a further analysis is done to relate the classes to background information about respondents and to other attitudinal variables from the "Images in Conflict" study. The discriminant analysis is used to examine the construct validity of the classes identified using latent class analysis, in order to gain a fuller understanding of the substantive meaning of the particular pattern of thought represented in each of the latent classes.

Stage Three is divided into three parts, each one a within-group analysis of one of the national samples using latent class analysis. For each national group: 1) The responses are divided into dichotomous values of 'modal' versus 'non-modal' responses to each of the questions about the events; 2) The total number of possible combinations of responses is evaluated in relation to the observed distribution of patterns, to see if the distribution can be said to represent two or more underlying classes, and if so, what combinations of variables are most likely to represent each of the classes; 3) Finally, if latent classes are identified which explain the patterning of the data, the respondents are assigned to classes on the basis of their responses, and a discriminant analysis is carried out to explore further how the underlying classes are differentiated.

I. Palestinian Sample

165 cases are included in the latent class analysis. These are the 'complete' cases out of 251 total cases in which responses to all variables used in the latent class analysis were available (i.e. not coded as "other" or "missing"). However these cases include 49 individuals who provided answers for all three of the events, but whose response to 'results of the treaty' was coded originally as "other" (49/251 = 19.5%). For these cases an "other"

response could be treated as equivalent to 'unclear' or 'bad' results of the treaty (based on a series of comparisons of the means).

Four out of the six variables form the basis of the analysis: cause of the Israeli raid on Beirut; cause of the Palestinian attack on the bus; cause and result of the Israeli-Egyptian treaty. Modal and non-modal responses have been identified for each of these questions. The distributions for the sample as a whole as compared to the smaller set of 'perfect cases' are listed in Table 11.

Table 11
Palestinian Modal Answers for Variables included in the
Latent Class Analysis

	Overall	n	'Complete Cases' n=165
Cause of Israeli raid		(208)	
(0) retaliation, etc.	38%		36%
(1) blame	62		64
Cause of Palestinian attack		(211)	
(0) resistance/terror	41%		38
(1) retaliation	59		62
Cause of treaty		(214)	
(0) betrayal/forced	49%		48
(1) negotiation	51		52
Result of treaty		(230)	
(0) good results	41%		42
(1) unclear/bad results	59		58

Two variables are not included (results of raid and results of bus attack) because they do not seem to add much to the understanding of each of the events in this sample. For instance, knowing how a person understands what led up

to the Israeli raid on Beirut tells the story of how they see the raid. Whether a person sees the results in terms of 'more war' or 'people killed' does not seem to add to the overall picture. The same could be said for results of the Palestinian attack on the bus. Thus the latent class analysis is based on four dichotomous variables, yielding a total of 2^4 = 16 possible patterns of response.

The first step in latent class analysis is to determine whether the variables are related at all. In this case the chi-square statistic (Pearson = 28.057, Likelihood ratio = 27.575 with 11 degrees of freedom) is significant, indicating that there is a relationship among the variables.

Next, a two-class model (unrestricted) is tested. This model fits very well, indicated by the low significance level of the likelihood ratio chi-square testing the difference between the expected values of the two-class model and the observed patterns in the data (likelihood ratio chi-square = 6.723 with 6 degrees of freedom). A three class model was tested also, and although it fits, it does not represent a statistically significant improvement over the two-class model. Moreover the two-class model is more parsimonious, so that its results are described here.

Table 12
Percentage of Palestinian Respondents with Modal Responses
to Events according to Latent Class

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(0) = non-modal response
(1) = modal response

	Class 1	Class 2
Cause of Israeli Raid		
(0) Aggression	100%	39%
(1) Retaliation	0	61
Cause of Palestinian Attack		
(0) Resistance	58	25
(1) Retaliation	42	75
Cause of Israeli-Egyptian Treaty		
(0) Betrayal	62	39
(1) Negotiation, exchange	38	61
Result of Israeli-Egyptian Treaty		
(0) Good results	22	55
(1) Bad results	78	45
Latent Class Probabilities	.40	.60

likelihood ratio chi-square   6.72   df = 6
percentage of cases correctly allocated   82.12%

The two latent classes contain different 'readings' of the three events. The distribution of responses for class one indicates that a person in this class would tend to say that: Israeli desire to destroy Palestinians leads up to the Israeli raid on Beirut; the Palestinian attack on the bus comes about due to Palestinian resistance; the Israeli-Egyptian treaty is a form of betrayal (or comes about because the parties were forced to join in); and the treaty will have bad results -- increased tensions, etc. This pattern of response can be called the 'conflict maintenance'

pattern, since the interpretation of the three political events is consistent in terms of maintaining or escalating hostilities between the various involved parties. People with this outlook see Palestinian national aspirations as facing a hostile environment, in which Israel is a main actor, and see the Egyptian-Israeli treaty as a bad omen for the Palestinian cause. The conflict maintenance class (outlook) comprises 40% of the sample.

Palestinians in class two tend to feel that: the Israeli raid is a form of Israeli retaliation for prior attacks; the Palestinian attack on the bus is a form of retaliation or response to prior Israeli policies/attacks; the Israeli-Egyptian treaty came about due to negotiations (Egypt, Sadat), and will have positive results (chance of peace). This pattern can be termed 'reactive' in that each action is interpreted according to an outlook where actions are responded to 'in kind'. In comparison to the conflict maintenance outlook, the reactive outlook does not include as hostile an image of the environment. Israel is not seen as malevolent, but as facing its own problems (i.e. attacks) and the peace treaty is seen as a sign that change in the environment is possible, even if it involves only Egypt and Israel. This outlook is held by 60% of the sample.

The statistical program, MLLSA (Clogg, 1977), reported that 82% of the cases are correctly allocated to the classes, indicating a high degree of confidence in

differentiating the classes. Since the latent class analysis succeeded in separating the data into different classes, a further analysis was warranted to examine the differences between the conflict maintenance class and the reactive class in terms of variables which were not included in designating the classes, but which were expected to correlate with the latent classes. This is a test of construct validity, as well as a means of fleshing out more fully the substantive meaning of the two classes.

Several substantive working hypotheses were spelled out regarding the factors that were expected to distinguish the two patterns of thinking identified in the Palestinian sample. People in the the conflict maintenance class were expected to be more pessimistic than people in the reactive class regarding the likelihood of peaceful relations in the region. Since the reactive pattern seems to contain a less hostile image of Israel than the conflict maintenance pattern, people in this group were expected to be more open to 'compromise' solutions regarding Israeli-Palestinian relations. People in the reactive class were expected to be older, more traditional, and less politicized than people in the conflict maintenance class, and, consequently, they were expected to identify with the term 'Palestinian' to a lesser degree than people in the conflict maintenance class.

A discriminant analysis was carried out to see the extent to which differences in background and attitude

characterize the two classes. Discriminant analysis is a
multivariate statistical method for distinguishing between
two or more groups, in this case the two underlying classes
(conflict maintenance and reactive), identified using latent
class analysis. Based on the predictor variables included
in the analysis, the technique forms one or more linear
functions which express in a single index the maximum
separation between groups (Klecka, 1975). The results are
displayed in Table 13:

Table 13
Discriminant Function Analysis on Latent Classes:
Palestinian Sample (n=143)

Groups: Conflict Maintenance (0)
       Reactive (1)

Variable	Wilks' Lambda	F	sign
+ optimism about peace	.927	11.03	.001
+ views on Palestinian autonomy on W.B.	.933	10.05	.002
+ importance of foreign influence	.948	7.64	.007
+ extent of Israeli-Arab identity	.956	6.49	.01
+ importance of God's will, justice	.963	5.28	.02
+ Moslem religious identity	.970	4.30	.04
- education	.974	3.82	.052
+ importance of strength	.974	3.78	.054
+ extent of Israeli identity	.988	1.78	.18
+ Arab unity, justice, leadership	.989	1.60	.21
+ Pal. state within '67 or '47 borders	.992	1.13	.29
+ Arab territories	.993	1.01	.32
+ Jewish territories	.994	.84	.36
+ age	.995	.73	.40
+ Israeli-Palestinian coexistence	.996	.65	.43
religion	.996	.52	.47
+ willingness for intergroup contact	.998	.35	.56
urban/rural residence	.999	.21	.65
sex	.999	.73	.87
- extent of Palestinian/Arab identity	.999	.00	.97

after discriminant function:
canonical correlation: .47   Wilks' lambda: .78
                    chi-square = 32.36, df = 20
                    significance = .04

Before the discriminant function is formed, the predictors are described in univariate terms according to two measures shown in Table 13: 1) Wilks' lambda indicates the relative strength of each variable in discriminating between the groups: the lower the lambda, the more discriminating power. 2) For each predictor variable the F statistic compares the mean scores of each of the latent classes. Once the discriminant analysis has been completed, the discriminatory power of the predictor variables taken together as a set is indicated by the canonical correlation, which is a measure of the discriminant function's ability to distinguish between the groups. The square of this correlation is the proportion of variance in the discriminant function explained by the groups. (In the two-group situation the canonical correlation is equal to the Pearson correlation coefficient between the discriminant score and the binary group variable.) Finally, Table 13 shows Wilks'' lambda for the discriminant function (indicating the proportion of the total variance in discriminant scores explained by differences among the groups), as well as its associated chi-square test of significance which tests the null hypothesis that group means on the discriminant scores are equal.

Table 13 indicates that the two latent classes are associated with other attitudinal and demographic measures.

In univariate terms at least six predictor variables differentiate between the two classes, as indicated by the lower lambdas and the higher F ratios.

Of the demographic variables included in the analysis only schooling is reasonably effective (but not statistically significant) in differentiating between the two latent classes: People in the conflict maintenance class are likely to be better educated than people in the reactive class. Although the age does not differ significantly between the two groups, there is a slight tendency for people in the conflict maintenance class to be younger than the people in the reactive class. Neither religion (Moslem - Christian), rural-urban differences nor sex differentiate between the two groups.

The remainder of the predictor variables included in this analysis were attitudinal measures which summarize five major sections of the "Images in Conflict" study. These sections included: 1) attitudes towards nine different proposals regarding the future of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; 2) perceptions about the importance of 14 different elements in determining the outcome in the Middle East conflict; 3) perception of the nature of relations (hostile-peaceful) between Israelis, Egyptians and Palestinians in the past, present and future; 4) extent of political identification measured by assessing the acceptability to the respondent of different 'labels' (e. g. Palestinian,

Arab, Israeli-Arab, Israeli, Moslem, Christian, Druze); 5) A
social distance measure regarding the respondent's
willingness to interact with Israelis in various degrees of
social intimacy. Each set of questions was summarized by
creating indices based on principal component analysis.
Fifteen indices which summarize these attitudinal measures
were included in the discriminant analysis.

The greatest discriminatory power of any of the
predictor variables is exhibited by an optimism-pessimism
index regarding the expectations about future Israeli,
Egyptian and Palestinian relations. People in the reactive
class are likely to be more optimistic about the possibility
of peace than people in the conflict maintenance class. It
is not surprising that this variable differentiates between
the two outlooks, since the results of the Israeli-Egyptian
treaty are coded in terms of good/optimistic or
bad/pessimistic results.

Another strong predictor variable taps a person's views
about Palestinian autonomy and/or a limited form of an
independent Palestinian state in the West Bank as acceptable
options regarding the future of the West Bank and Gaza:
people in the reactive class have more positive views about
this as an option than do people in the conflict maintenance
class, who oppose the more limited 'compromise' solution.

The role of foreign influence (U.S. power, world Jewry,
Russian influence, European influence and U.S. opinion) was

seen as more important in affecting the outcome of the Middle East conflict by people in the reactive class than people in the conflict maintenance class. This suggests that people with the reactive outlook think that changes in the conflict environment can originate in forces outside of the region.

People in the reactive class are also more likely than people in the conflict maintenance class to use the terms 'Israeli-Arab', 'Christian' or 'Druze' or 'Moslem' about themselves. Moslem religious identity also differentiates between the two classes. The factor measuring 'Palestinian' and 'Arab' identity does not differentiate between the two groups, although people in the conflict maintenance class were expected to prefer these labels to a greater degree than the people in the reactive class. This suggests that the reactive outlook is related to a political identity which has more than one possibility: it is not less Palestinian, but more open to other group identifications. Some might call this ambivalence; others might call it cognitive complexity. The emerging picture is that the reactive class is more traditional, religious, and politically conciliatory towards negotiations with Israel than the conflict maintenance group.

The canonical correlation of .47 indicates that the group variable (the two latent classes) accounts for 22% of the variance in the multivariate discriminant function (i.e.

of the full set of twenty predictor variables included in
the analysis). The results of the discriminant function
analysis support the notion that there are two distinctive
outlooks among the sample of Palestinians in Israel.

II. Israeli sample

309 'complete cases' out of 555 cases are included in
the analysis of patterns across the three political events.
In this analysis, five out of the six variables are used:
cause and result of Israeli raid on Beirut; cause of
Palestinian attack on a bus; cause and result of Israeli-
Egyptian treaty. 'Results of the bus attack' was excluded
since it does not appear to add to the meaning of the bus
attack. The distribution of responses for each of the five
variables is displayed in Table 14. The five dichotomous
variables yield a total of $2^5 = 32$ possible response
patterns.

Table 14
Israeli Modal Answers for Variables included in the Latent
Class Analysis

	Overall n	'Complete Cases' n=309
Cause of Israeli raid	(469)	
(0) strategic	20%	20%
(1) retaliation	80	80
Result of Israeli raid	(452)	
(0) more war/retaliation	54%	54
(1) reduce conflict	46	46
Cause of Palestinian attack	(485)	
(0) retaliation/strategic	19%	20
(1) blame (terror)	81	80
Cause of treaty*	(497)	
(0) Israeli contrib. etc.	53%	51
(1) Egyptian desire/Sadat	47	49
Result of treaty	(471)	
(0) unclear	45%	44
(1) good	55	56

*Coding scheme #1 for treaty cause.

The chi-square test of independence (Pearson = 36.725;
likelihood ratio = 41.546 with 26 degrees of freedom)
indicates that the variables are related.

A two-class model (unrestricted) is tested first; this
model fits the data reasonably well (chi-square = 26.6 with
20 degrees of freedom, p=.15). A three-class model
(unrestricted) is tested next, and represents a statistical
improvement over the two-class model (chi-square = 14.87
with 14 degrees of freedom), as well as a substantive
improvement (since it differentiates into two separate
classes the large clump of responses (over 80%) identified
as a single class in the two-class model). The three class
model is shown in Table 15.

Table 15
**Percentage of Israeli Respondents with Modal Responses to
Events according to Latent Class**

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(0) = non-modal response
(1) = modal response

	Class 1	Class 2	Class 3
Cause of Israeli Raid			
(0) Strategic	50%	0%	58%
(1) Retaliation	50	100	42
Result of Israeli Raid			
(0) Retaliation, people die	33	58	66
(1) Reduce conflict	67	42	34
Cause of Palestinian Attack			
(0) Retaliation, resistance	17	25	8
(1) Terror	83	75	92
Cause of Israeli-Egyptian Treaty			
(0) Israeli Concessions	76	40	57
(1) Sadat, Egyptian desire	24	60	43
Result of Israeli-Egyptian Treaty			
(0) Unclear, mixed results	0	47	100
(1) Good results	100	53	0
latent class probabilities	.23	.62	.15
likelihood ratio chi-square	14.87	df=14	
percentage of cases correctly allocated		83.13%	

The first point to be noted about this model is that
the bus attack does not differentiate between the three
classes. The latent class analysis did not unmix those
Israelis who view the attack as a form of terrorism (81%)
from those who did not explain the attack in terms of
terrorism (19%), indicating that there is a shared
interpretation about the attack on the bus: it is a
terrorist action. Israeli consensus about this is very high

across all of the classes.

Class one could be termed the 'efficacy' outlook, in that the pattern of answers reveals a sensibility where Israel is seen as an active agent able to affect and change its environment. The first variable, cause of the Israeli raid on Beirut, indicates that people in class one are as likely as not to offer a retaliation explanation for the raid. However, whatever they say about the cause of the raid (whether in terms of retaliation or strategic considerations), they view the raid as resulting in reduced conflict or fewer attacks. The bus attack is seen as due to terrorism. The treaty is seen as arising from Israeli concessions and exchanges, and is seen overwhelmingly as having positive results. In other words, when Israel acts, either to defend itself or to procure a treaty, it is effective in moving in its desired direction. The efficacy pattern comprises 23% of the sample.

Class two, the largest class of the three identified among Israelis (62%), 'loads' most strongly on cause of the Israeli raid. The raid is seen as a form of retaliation for prior attacks, but in contrast to the efficacy outlook, the raid is not expected to reduce conflict. The bus attack is seen as a terrorist action. The treaty is seen as arising due to Sadat's initiative and/or Egyptian impetus, and the expectations about results of the treaty are not clearly differentiated for this class. These responses are

stimulus-related: 'When they are bad, we will hurt them, and when they're good, we'll see'. The philosophy implicit in this outlook is that 'Israel exists within a volatile environment; when the environment is hostile, respond in kind, when the environment is conciliatory, respond in kind. This class could be termed the 'reactive' pattern.

Class three, accounting for the smallest percentage of the responses (15%), could be called the 'hostile environment' pattern. These people view the Israeli raid in political-strategic terms of security, as a pre-emptive strike, where Beirut is seen as a PLO stronghold. However, they do not see the raid as being effective in reducing conflict; on the contrary, they see more war, Palestinian retaliation, people killed, etc. The Palestinian attack on the bus is nearly unanimously viewed as a terrorist action. The Israeli-Egyptian treaty is seen in terms of Israeli concessions and exchanges, but the treaty is expected to have unclear, possibly negative results. The sense here is that no matter what Israel does, whether to attack, to protect itself, to negotiate and give up things for the sake of a treaty, nothing good (peaceful) will come of it. The hostile environment is seen as unchanging. People with this outlook could be expected to be more pessimistic about the possibility of peace in the Middle East than the people with efficacy or reactive outlooks.

Israelis in the three classes identified using latent

class analysis were expected to be differentiated on several points. The efficacy outlook contains an image of Israel that is self-sufficient, whereas the hostile environment class contains an image of Israel under siege. Consequently, people in the efficacy class were expected to place less weight on the importance of foreign influence in determining the outcome of the Middle East conflict compared to people in the hostile environment class. In addition, it was expected that people in the efficacy class would prefer to retain or annex the West Bank and Gaza Strip as part of Israel and would tend to reject 'compromise' solutions regarding the territories. The hostile environment class was expected to be the most pessimistic and despairing about future Israel-Arab relations.

A discriminant analysis was carried out to explore further the differences among the three classes. The results are shown in Table 16.

Table 16
Discriminant Function Analysis on Latent Classes: Israeli
Sample (n=286)

Variable	Wilks'' Lambda	F	sign
pessimism re: peaceful Is-Eg relations	.966	4.93	.008
extent of Israeli identity	.969	4.50	.01
acceptability of Palestinian state	.978	3.18	.04
importance of foreign influence	.983	2.67	.07
optimism re: Israeli-Palestinian rlns	.983	2.49	.09
willingness for contact w/ Palestinians	.983	2.48	.09
sex	.989	1.58	.21
willingness for contact w/ Egyptians	.990	1.48	.23
ashkenazi/sephardi background	.990	1.46	.23
religiosity	.992	1.18	.31
importance of justice/faith	.992	1.10	.34
acceptability of annexation of W.B.	.992	1.05	.35
view of Palestinian-Egyptian relations	.993	1.01	.36
school	.994	.90	.41
optimism re: future I-E relations	.994	.75	.47
age	.997	.48	.62
ethnic-Jewish identification	.998	.27	.76
importance of strength	.998	.26	.77

after discriminant function:

	canonical correlation	Wilks'' lambda	chi-sq df	sig.
function #1:	.37	.79	63.82 36	.003
function #2:	.28	.92	22.9 17	.15

Only three of the predictor variables differentiate
between the three latent classes to a significant degree at
the univariate level. The first, which measures the extent
of pessimistic expectations about the future of Israeli-
Egyptian relations, differs significantly across the three
latent classes: The efficacy class is the least pessimistic
(x = 1.9, s.d. = .98); the modal class slightly more (x =
2.3, s.d. = 1.05) and the hostile-environment class is the
most pessimistic of the three (x = 2.6, s.d. = 1.15).

The second predictor variable which differentiates between the groups measures the extent of Israeli identity. (Respondents in the Israeli sample were asked to indicate how much they identified with various groups: Israelis, Israeli Jews, Jews, Ashkenazim, Sephardim.) People in the reactive class identify more consistently with this term ($x = .77$, s.d. $= .42$) than do people in the other two classes (efficacy $x = .60$, s.d. $= .49$; hostile environment $x = .60$, s.d. $= .50$).

The third predictor variable with any univariate discriminatory power involves the acceptability of a Palestinian accommodation of some sort on the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The efficacy class is the least open to this notion ($x = .68$, s.d. $= 1.0$), the hostile environment class is slightly more open to this notion ($x = .88$, s.d. $= 1.2$), and the reactive class is the most open to this ($x = 1.11$, s.d. $= 1.2$). This predictor variable is one of several used to summarize a set of questions about the future of Israeli-Palestinian relations on the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Of the nine options regarding the future of Israeli-Palestinian relations and the status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, none were clearly acceptable to the Israeli population in general (On a 5-point scale where 1 = unacceptable and 5 = acceptable, no proposal had a mean reaching 3.0 in this sample.). None of the remaining predictor variables separated the three classes

significantly at the univariate level, including the demographic variables.

The discriminant function analysis results in two functions, shown in Table 16. The first has a canonical correlation of .37, where the division into the three classes accounts for 14% of the variance among the predictor variables taken as a set. The second function, with a canonical correlation of .28, has a lambda of .92 (chi-square = 22.9 with df = 17) indicates that the amount of discriminating information of the remaining variables is not statistically significant for differentiating between the groups. In other words, the three classes could be ordered linearly in terms of a single discriminant function, and using an additional dimension in the form of a second function does not add to the separation of the three groups.

III. The Egyptian sample

178 out of 530 cases are included in the latent class analysis of the Egyptian data. These represent the 'complete' cases in which coded responses are available for each of the three political events.

Four variables are included in the analysis: cause of the Israeli raid, cause of the Palestinian attack, and cause and result of the Israeli-Egyptian treaty. The four dichotomous variables yield a total of 2^4 = 16 possible response patterns. The modal answers for the entire sample

are shown in the column headed "Overall" in Table 17; the modal answers for the subset of 178 cases included in this analysis are shown in the column headed "Analysis #1".

Table 17
Modal Responses for Egyptian 'Complete Cases'

	Overall n	Analysis #1 (n=178)	Analysis #2 (n=497)
Raid Cause	(274)		
retaliation/etc.	43%	47%	23%
blame	57	53	31
"other"	--	--	24
"missing"	--	--	22
Bus Cause	(319)		
resistance/etc.	53%	50%	29.5%
retaliation	47	50	36
"other"	--	--	13
"missing"	--	--	21.5
Treaty Cause	(407)		
pragmatic/land	38%	32%	30%
Egypt/Sadat	62	68	50
"other"	--	--	20
Treaty Result	(445)		
unclear/bad*	15%	14%	24%
good results	85	86	76

*For Analysis #2 this category includes responses originally coded as "other" (56/530=10.6%).

The chi-square of independence for this sample is very low (likelihood ratio = 10.541, Pearson = 10.40, with 11 degrees of freedom), indicating that there is no association or relationship among the four variables. Thus only one class is necessary to account for this pattern, and no further latent class analysis would be fruitful. (A two-class model was tested, but it did not represent a statistical improvement over the model of independence.)

Given the pattern of "missing" answers described in Stage One of this study (see Table 2), in which there is a tendency for Egyptians to respond to questions about the Israeli-Egyptian treaty, but have missing responses to questions about the Israeli raid and the Palestinian attack, it is possible that a significant body of opinion was left out of the analysis above. A parallel problem exists in terms of answers coded as "other" for this sample (see Table 1). For this reason a second latent class analysis is done to include a broader range of cases from the Egyptian sample.

The second set of latent class analyses uses 497 out 530 Egyptian cases. These include people whose responses to the Israeli raid and/or Palestinian attack were coded as "other" or "missing" (The percentages for each event are reported in Table 1 and Table 2.). Four variables are used in the analysis: cause of the Israeli raid on Beirut; cause of the Palestinian attack on the bus; cause and result of the Israeli-Egyptian treaty. A total of 96 response patterns are possible, based on two 4-level variables (raid cause and bus cause), one 3-level variable (treaty cause) and one dichotomous variable (treaty result). Table 17 shows the distribution of responses in the column headed "Analysis #2".

This time the chi-square test for independence is high (likelihood ration chi-square = 331.52, Pearson chi-square =

364.69, with 82 degrees of freedom), indicating that there is a relationship among the variables.

A two-class model was tested first, but it did not fit. Next, a three-class model (unrᴊstricted) was tested, which resulted in an excellent fit between the model and the observed data (likelihood ration chi-square = 70.42 with 67 degrees of freedom). A four-class model was also tested, and although it fit, it did not represent a statistically significant improvement over the 3-class model. The results of the three-class model are shown in Table 18.

Table 18
Responses of Egyptian Respondents to Events according to Latent Class

	Class 1	**Class 2**	**Class 3**
Cause of Israeli Raid			
Retaliation/etc.	36%	4%	16%
Aggression	40	7	36
"Other"	17	10	49
"Missing"	8	79	0
Cause of Palestinian Attack			
Resistance/etc.	50%	7%	9%
Retaliation	44	0	50
"Other"	5	4	35
"Missing"	0	89	6
Cause of Israeli-Egyptian Treaty			
Pragmatic reasons/land	26%	37%	31%
Egyptian desire/Sadat	68	51	13
"Other"	6	12	56
Result of Israeli-Egyptian Treaty			
Unclear/bad/"other"	22%	24%	28%
Good results	78	76	72
Latent Class Probabilities	.51	.22	.26

likelihood ratio chi-square	70.42	df=67
percentage of cases correctly allocated		86.87%

The latent class analysis results in three basic response patterns for Egyptians: the modal response group; the people who do not answer raid or bus cause (i.e. "missing"); and the people who answer "other" on cause of raid and cause of treaty. These patterns corroborate what seemed apparent from the initial examination of the Egyptian data -- that there were three types of answers -- coded substantively, coded as "other" and coded as "missing". The latent class analysis thus far reveals that these response propensities hold across the variables taken as a set and constitute distinct types of response.

Despite the existence of these distinct groups, the latent class analysis points to a strong Egyptian consensus about the of results of the treaty, which holds irrespective of a person's latent class membership: about three quarters of the sample is enthused about the chance of positive results from an Israeli-Egyptian treaty, and one quarter of the sample is more skeptical.

For class one the substantive meaning of the pattern of response is clear. For both the Israeli raid and Palestinian attack the probabilities are nearly evenly divided between viewing 'retaliation' and 'aggression' as bringing about the Israeli raid, and between viewing 'resistance' and 'retaliation' as bringing about the Palestinian bus attack. The view of the Israeli-Egyptian

treaty is more clearly defined: people see it as due to Egyptian desire for peace and/or Sadat, rather than due to pragmatic considerations, and most people expect positive results from the treaty. This class comprises 51% of the sample, and can be termed the 'modal response'.

Latent class two is made up of those people who do not provide an answer for either cause of the raid of cause of the bus attack, but who do respond to the questions about the Israeli-Egyptian treaty. This class will be called the 'treaty only' class. People with responses falling into this class rather than other classes are more likely than others to attribute the cause of the treaty to things other than Egypt/Sadat, although Egypt/Sadat remains the majority response. The treaty only pattern includes 22% of the sample.

Latent class three is made up of people who view the Israeli raid either in terms of Israeli aggression or as "other", the Palestinian bus attack either as retaliation or as "other", and the cause of the Israeli-Egyptian treaty either as "other" or as due to pragmatic considerations and concern about regaining the Sinai. Given that the "other" answers have a meaning that is not retrievable for the purposes of the present analysis, the question is whether the meaning of the responses in class three can be approximated on the basis of the patterns across the variables. If the substantive responses which fall into

this class can be taken as indicative of the outlook of this group, this class might be seen as more skeptical about peace than the majority of the Egyptian sample. This pessimism seems to emerge even in the case of results of the treaty, where this class appears to be more negative than class one respondents about the consequences of the treaty. This pattern can be termed the skeptical outlook, and it includes 26% of the sample.

Background factors were expected to differentiate among the three response patterns in the Egyptian sample. The treaty only group was expected to include younger women with less education living in rural areas -- this group of people was expected to be more politically naive or aware of regional politics in the Middle East than other Egyptians. People in the "other" class were expected to be better educated, older, possibly part of the Egyptian opposition in that they appear to be more skeptical about the peace treaty than people in the other two classes.

A discriminant analysis using both background and attitudinal variables was carried out next, to differentiate between the people in the three latent classes. The results are shown in Table 19.

Table 19
Discriminant Function Analysis on Latent Classes: Egyptian Sample (n=463)

Variable	Wilks' Lambda	F	sign
sex	.925	18.47	.00
age	.944	13.68	.00
optimism re: peaceful Is-Eg-Pal relations	.973	6.47	.002
importance of strength	.979	4.98	.007
urban/rural residence	.983	3.94	.02
importance of leadership/Arab unity	.989	2.52	.08
religion	.990	2.38	.09
importance of russian influence, Jewry	.990	2.26	.11
acceptability of Arab-Jewish state	.990	2.22	.11
importance of justice, passage of time	.993	1.41	.25
acceptability of Palestinian state	.994	1.38	.25
school	.994	1.35	.26
view of past Is-Eg-Pal relations	.995	1.04	.35
acceptability of Jewish state	.998	.57	.57
religiosity	.999	.53	.59
willingness for task-related Is. contact	.999	.38	.69
expectations re: future Is-Eg relations	.999	.29	.75
willingness for intimate contact w/ Is.	.999	.26	.77
importance of Western influence	.999	.11	.90

after discriminant function:	canonical correlation	Wilks' lambda	chi-sq	df	sig.
function #1:	.37	.80	100.30	38	.00
function #2:	.27	.93	34.01	18	.01

Of the demographic variables included in the analysis sex, age, urban/rural differences and religious affiliation each differentiate significantly between the three latent classes. Class one is 65% male, older (x= 33.1, s.d.= 11.7), 59% urban and 77% Moslem. Class two is 58% female, younger (x=26.0, s.d.= 10.3), more rural than the sample overall (46% compared to 39%) and more often Coptic than people in the other two classes. Class three is 65% female,

older than people in class two (x=31.4, s.d.= 11.2),
mostly urban (73%) and Moslem (74%).

Of the attitudinal variables included in the analysis,
two differentiate between the three classes at the
univariate level. The group means on optimism about future
Israeli - Arab relations suggest that people in the treaty
only class tend to be more hopeful than people in the other
two class (and they may be more naive, too.). The variable
measuring the role of strength (economic, military and
demographic) in determining the outcome of the Middle East
conflict is seen as more important by people in modal class
or in the skeptical class than by people in treaty only
class.

In multivariate terms two discriminant functions were
formed, both of which are useful in differentiating between
the three groups. The first, with a canonical correlation
of .37, accounting for 14% of the variance, is highly
correlated with age (+), optimism (-) and religious
affiliation (moslem). The second function, with a canonical
correlation of .27, accounting for 7% of the variance,
correlates highly with sex (female), urban/rural differences
(rural), role of leadership (important), and role of
strength (important).

The discriminant analysis indicates that background
variables (socio-cultural differences between groups of
respondents) are significantly related to type of responses

given to the political events by Egyptians, suggesting
variations in the political culture of Egyptian society
(along the lines of traditional, non-politicized versus more
educated, male, politicized). The pattern of
differentiation of attitudinal variables suggests that the
main difference is between people in treaty only class and
other Egyptians -- between the ignorant and the
knowledgeable.

Discussion and Conclusions

This study involves an examination of the responses,
explanations and interpretations offered by Israelis,
Palestinians and Egyptians to three political events related
to the Middle East conflict. The discussion of the key
issues and findings of this study is divided into several
sections. In the first part the major findings of this
study are reviewed, findings regarding differences in
outlook among the national groups, as well as variations
within each national group about the meaning of the
political events. In addition, the stimulus set used in
this study is evaluated. The second part focuses on the
utility of studying perceptions of political events as a
means of getting at: 1) within-group variations in outlook
or 'worldview' or 'reality worlds;' and 2) the conflict
interaction system via common ways of looking at different
events at the between-group level. Finally, the
implications of the study for conflict resolution theory and
practice are explored.

A. Major Findings

The responses to the events often seemed truncated, or
at least so well understood that there was no need for the
respondent to spell out the meaning of the response to the
interviewer. Thus it became clear that the overall task in

the data analysis was to reconstruct the meaning or to
excavate the underlying framework by which people in a
society make sense of the changing stream of events and
actions in the political environment. The first step in the
'excavation' involved examining the differences in the views
of the three national groups.

The study shows that each national group has a
distinctive way of interpreting the 'same' event, to the
point that the single stimulus event must be thought of as
eliciting responses which reflect the particular concerns of
each national group. However, within each national group
there are various types of thinking about the three events
taken as a set -- and probably about conflict and peace in
general.

a. **Palestinian sample** (living in Israel). The study
revealed two basic outlooks within this population: 1) The
conflict maintenance outlook: Israeli hostile action is
understood as an attempt to destroy Palestinians; the
Palestinian attack on an Israeli bus is seen as an action in
the name of Palestinian resistance; the Israeli-Egyptian
peace treaty is seen as a form of betrayal for which Sadat
is to blame, and the treaty is expected to bring increased
conflict and tensions. Thus, change in the ongoing conflict
environment is seen as unlikely, and the 'peace treaty' is
understood as resulting in increased tensions. At the heart
of this way of thinking lies an image of Palestinian

identity under siege, and as especially threatened by
Israel. In this light the interpretation of the treaty as a
hostile event can be understood: since the Egyptian/Sadat
treaty was not a help to the Palestinian cause, it is seen
as a hindrance.

2) The reactive outlook: The Israeli raid on Beirut is
understood in terms of Israeli retaliation for prior
attacks, the Palestinian bus attack is seen as a retaliation
or response to Israeli policies or attacks; Egypt and/or
Sadat are credited for the treaty, which is expected to
bring positive results. This group of people sees change in
the conflict environment as a possibility --war actions are
expected to result in more war, and a peace initiative is
expected to bring peaceful results -- although the locus of
change is the Other rather than the Self. Israel is seen in
more conciliatory terms, and there is some optimism among
people with this outlook that peace between Israel and Egypt
does not negate Palestinian aspirations. This group of
people has a stronger 'Israeli-Arab' identity compared to
the conflict maintenance group, although both groups
identify strongly (first and foremost) as "Palestinians" and
as "Arabs". Finally, further evidence of a more
conciliatory stance towards Israel among this group of
people is seen in their readiness to accept Palestinian
autonomy on the West Bank and Gaza Strip as an acceptable
solution to the problem of Israeli-Palestinian relations.

Background factors did not differentiate to a statistically significant degree between these two groups of people, although schooling and age were somewhat correlated with latent class membership: younger, better educated people tend to have a conflict maintenance outlook, whereas older, less well educated, more traditional people tend to have a reactive outlook. This pattern resembles studies of American Blacks and extent of radicalism (cf. Marx, 1967). Similarly, Tajfel (Tajfel, 1981; Tajfel and Turner, 1979) has remarked upon the changing social identity of dominated groups. The findings of the present study lend support Smooha's (1984) typology of political identity of Arabs living in Israel (based on data collected in 1976). He identified three basic orientations among Arabs in Israel: accommodating, reserved and dissident. The conflict maintenance group resembles the Smooha's dissidents, and the reactive group seems to combine the accommodating and the reserved orientations.

b. **Israeli (Jewish) sample**. Three basic patterns of thinking emerged regarding the political events. The **efficacy outlook** contains an image of Israel as successful in influencing the environment in the direction desired to achieve Israel's aims. Thus the Israeli raid on Beirut is seen as effective in reducing conflict. Similarly the treaty is brought about through Israeli concessions and

exchanges in order to achieve good results -- namely, peace. This is an image of Israel in control of the environment and of the conflict, rather than an image of Israel at the mercy of the Other. This is apparently a super-hawkish outlook, in that among the three outlooks, people with the efficacy pattern place the greatest emphasis on the importance of tangible strength, and are the most in favor of options regarding the West Bank which involve annexing the territories and even expelling the Arab populations. They are the least open to 'compromise' solutions regarding the West Bank. They identify less strongly as 'Israeli' compared to people in the reactive pattern (but they identify to a degree comparable to the hostile environment group).

In contrast, the reactive pattern is based on a notion that 'what comes around, goes around,' wherein each event is interpreted in terms of what provoked it. The Israeli raid is seen as a response to prior attacks, and is expected to result in more attacks and retaliation by the other side. By the same token the treaty is perceived as a positive overture by Sadat and as evidence of Egypt's desire for peace, and it is expected to have positive results. People with this pattern are more open to changes in the political environment than the other two groups, but they see change as originating in other actors, rather than being initiated by Israel.

The third class, the <u>hostile environment outlook</u>, is particularly concerned with Israel's survival in the face of a hostile world. These people see the raid on Beirut as strategically motivated as an attempt to rout out terrorists, but consider it ultimately ineffective in reducing conflict. Rather, in the long run the conflict is expected to persist and to remain unresolved. The bus attack is seen almost unanimously in terms of Palestinian terrorism and hatred of Jews, more so than by the other two classes. The treaty is seen as coming about due to Israeli concessions, but its results are seen as unclear or negative. Thus, Israel is felt to be at the mercy of a hostile political environment, which Israel can do nothing to change. More than the other two groups, this group of people places more emphasis on the importance of outside (foreign) influence in determining the outcome of the Middle East conflict, a feeling which goes along with the analysis that without outside help, Israel can do little on its own to survive.

Demographic factors did not differentiate among persons with the three outlooks identified among Israeli respondents. This finding is to be contrasted with the general point made by a group of political scientists about Israeli society, namely, that there appears to be an overwhelming consensus in Israeli society about national security, irrespective of 'social location' (cf. Arian,

Herman and Talmud, in press). The present study suggests
that although Israelis may agree that terrorism against
Israelis is a horrible thing, there is variation at the
cognitive level regarding issues such as how Israel ought to
handle terrorist actions or what 'peace' means. These
cognitive differences did not have demographic correlates in
this study, but the differences exist, despite consensus on
certain specific points.

c. The Egyptian sample is essentially unified in
outlook about the events, despite the existence of different
styles of response that are demographically correlated. No
clear consensus emerges about the meaning of either the
Israeli raid or the Palestinian bus attack, whereas Egyptian
views about the treaty and Egypt's leadership role in it are
very clear. The treaty itself has taken on nearly symbolic
meaning for Egyptians. The people who offer coded responses
to the events tend to view the treaty in terms of idealistic
peace -- Sadat and the Egyptian people initiated peace
because they desired it, because they felt that negotiations
were important. People whose responses to the hostile
events had been coded as "other" had a more skeptical view
of what peace brings than other Egyptians. People who "had
not heard" of the two hostile events tended to view the
treaty idealistically, although more of them viewed the
treaty in pragmatic terms than did people in the modal
group.

Egyptians view the others, Israelis and Palestinians, as the cause of the conflict. Either they ignore the others and their hostile actions (i.e. which resulted in missing responses to the questions about the Israeli raid on Beirut and the Palestinian attack on the bus in Israel) and attend only to the one event that involves their society in a central way, or they blame both Palestinians and Israelis (in fact they blame Israel a little more) and they see Egypt as stepping into the fray to make peace.

d. Methodologically, latent class analysis used in this study proved to be an advance in terms of how to handle problematic data. The Egyptian sample in particular appeared problematic at the outset of this study because not only was around one quarter of the sample's responses coded as "missing" for two out of the three stimulus events, but in addition nearly one quarter of the sample had responses that had been coded as "other" for these events. Analysis of the remaining cases resulted in a set of responses which did not differentiate the population (and it was only 178/530 cases), so that it appeared that the sampling in Egypt had not been done well and had not succeeded in reaching a range of people within Egyptian society.

The use of latent class analysis to analyze for patterns of response using the full set of cases made it possible to retrieve the meaning of these types of response to the political events. It showed the systematic nature of

the missing data. From these patterns it became clear that in fact the sampling had been done quite well in terms of reaching various segments of the population, but that the response tendencies for some of these segments tended to differ. Young, often Coptic women with less schooling who live in rural areas responded to the hostile events with "I haven't heard about this" or "I don't know", whereas well educated, urban, Moslem women responded to these events in terms that were not captured by the clearly inadequate coding scheme used to code the data. (In contrast an adequate scheme would have been sufficient to capture these responses.) Zeisel (1947/1985) has discussed the handling of different types of 'missing' data (See also Davies and Jacobs (1968)).

In contrast, demographic factors were not especially helpful in differentiating between the various patterns of thinking in the Palestinian and Israeli cases. Latent class analysis identified various patterns of thought in the Israeli and Palestinian samples which cut across demographic factors. However in the Egyptian case the demographic factors were essential and highly correlated with response type. To explain the difference in the role of background variables in the three samples one can refer to several types of similarities between the Israeli and Palestinian samples which distinguish them from the Egyptian case. At the level of sampling there could have been a difference.

But all three samples are quota samples, based on the attribute space described in the methods section of this study.

More likely is a difference in the nature of the societies and their respective political cultures. It should be noted that the Palestinians in Israel and Israeli Jews were drawn from among people living within Israel, so that at least in purely geographic terms these people share the same space, and probably they are informed by many of the same or similar media communications. (This is an argument about similar contexts for the Israeli Jews and this group of Palestinians). A still more effective argument is that Israeli and Palestinian societies (wherever they are sampled in the world) are more politically engaged and concerned about the Arab-Israeli conflict, because it involves them more centrally than it affects the Egyptians. Thus the patterns of thinking about political issues cut across demographic factors, more or less in both of these populations. This pattern of Israeli and Palestinian engagement and Egyptian distance seems to be true for other Israeli, Palestinian and Egyptian samples from the Images study (sampled in the USA, for instance.)

As represented in this sample, Egyptian society appears to be of a different sort -- more stratified, with more layers of difference based on social location than is the case for either Israeli Jews or Palestinians living in

Israel. There seems to be a traditional sector and a more
developed sector, a difference which is related to age, sex,
education and urban/rural differences. Irrespective of
sector, the treaty and Egypt's initiating role have
penetrated into all strata of Egyptian society.

2. War and peace actions

The structure of aggregate-level responses for the
three events taken as a set suggests that there are
distinctive ways of perceiving or explaining war (Israeli-
Palestinian) actions which differ from perceptions or
explanations regarding treaty-related (Israeli-Egyptian)
actions. This was indicated in two ways: first, the types
of interpretation offered for hostile actions differed from
the interpretations about the peace treaty. Second, the
pattern of similarities and differences in outlook among the
three national groups was constant for the two hostile
events but changed in relation to the peace treaty.

The type of explanation offered for the cause of a
hostile action has to do with the relationship between the
interpreter's nationality and the national actor's 'role' in
the stimulus action. The aggressor justifies the action,
whereas the victim blames the aggressor. The hostile
actions elicit conflict-related interpretations from each
party: We are victims; they are aggressors. The two hostile
actions, the Israeli raid on Beirut and the Palestinian

attack on a bus in Israel, result in mirror images, and thus can be considered as functionally equivalent actions, in that they generate comparable types of explanation. Egyptian/Palestinian ('Arab') versus Israeli differences predominated for the hostile Israeli-Palestinian actions. What Arabs blamed, Israelis justified and what Israelis blamed, Arabs justified. Egyptian-Palestinian differences in interpretation of the hostile interactions were minuscule compared to the Arab-Israeli differences.

The peace treaty resulted in different types of explanation as well as in an altered pattern of Arab-Israel differences (mirror images) and Egyptian-Palestinian similarities in interpretation. The sorts of explanations offered for cause and results of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty were different enough from the explanation about the hostile actions to warrant a separate coding scheme. The treaty elicited a set of concerns different from the ones elicited by war actions: what peace 'costs,' what is to be gained, what is not being addressed by a treaty. The structure of explanation was different, although because there was only one peace action it is difficult to determine what the explanations would have looked like if Israel had initiated a peace action. However, a subgroup of Palestinians viewed this event as a hostile action, for which they blamed Sadat. Consensus about the meaning of the treaty was high among Egyptians, the initiators of the action, but lower among Israelis and Palestinians.

Consensus within each national group shifted in relation to the different stimuli. For Israelis and Palestinians, events where a group sees itself as victimized (Israeli raid for Palestinians and Palestinian attack for Israelis) resulted in more extreme responses (blame) and greater consensus than other events. For Egyptians this was true about the treaty, regarding which Egypt sees itself as the central actor, the initiator of positive change. These areas of consensus can be taken as evidence of 'negative' and 'positive national identity' (S. P. Cohen, personal communication, Autumn, 1982), where negative identity emphasizes aspects of the nation's history which are seen as part of an ongoing experience of victimization (exile, diaspora, suffering and destruction). In contrast, positive national identity is a national self-image which emerges out of the pursuit of the nation's ideals and goals for national development. In the present study the hostile actions elicited explanations involving negative national identity, whereas for Egyptians the peace treaty elicited aspects of positive national identity.

The calculus or logic of war is different from that of peace. In the hostile actions the Other is blamed for instigating an action or forcing the Self to defend itself or assert its existence. The environment is seen as changing for the worse, because of the Other. To deal with this hostile environment, each side must assert itself and its needs.

One factor which differentiates war from a period of transition towards peace is that the goals and motivations in wartime are clearer than they are in changing from war to peace. In all-out war, the presumption is that 'they are out to get us'. In transition time, the motivations become more suspect: 'they may be trying to trick us.' Even if 'they are sincere,' 'they are only a minority and the majority will topple their decision'. Each optimistic, hope-based idea is subject to the 'reality principle' of skepticism and mistrust.

3. <u>Evaluation of the stimulus set</u>

a. It is unfortunate that the order of the three events in the stimulus set was not varied within each of the populations. The fact that the three events in this study were presented to respondents in only one order probably underscored the Egyptian and Palestinian tendency to see a sequence as 'first Israelis raid, then Palestinians retaliate'.

b. Various types of responses were elicited by the different stimulus events: hostile interactions resulted in 'self-as-victim', whereas the treaty shifted the focus to 'what is gained or lost' in the name of peace. Unfortunately the range of stimuli was rather limited; only one peace-related action was used, and it involved Israel and Egypt only (whereas the hostile actions involved Israel and Palestinians only).

The stimulus set did not include an Israeli-Palestinian cooperative action, or, an Egyptian-Israeli conflict action. Thus it is hard to tell whether the 'peace treaty' aspect of the third stimulus, as distinct from the Israeli-Egyptian nationality (alliance) aspect of the action (or from some interaction of these elements) distinguishes the third stimulus from the first two. These dimensions are confounded in the stimulus set as given.

This particular set of stimuli managed to tap only so much of the outlook of each group. This limitation might explain, for instance, the absence of the leftists/peace-niks from the patterns uncovered in the Israeli sample. They do not emerge particularly in the latent class analysis, because the areas of contention on which they would be expected to differ the most from their compatriots are not tapped by the three stimulus events. If additional stimuli had been used (such as "Israeli professors and students demonstrate on the West Bank in support of reopening the Palestinian Bir Zeit University, closed by Israeli authorities"), perhaps a wider range of sentiments would have been expressed.

As consideration of the stimuli used in this study indicates, it is difficult to apply an experimental, system-based framework to an historically grounded phenomenon. As Parsons (1965) has commented, this sort of study has an "irreducible historical element" that controlled

experimental studies do not have. "In other words, the kind of asymmetry that I suggested has been operating in the organization of living systems generally involving the irreversibility factor, applies here at the methodological level" (p. 65). The point is that with historically-based data, as opposed to theoretically-derived data, there are necessarily empty cells in the stimulus set (i.e. this was not a fully crossed design). The three of the stimulus events used in this study were historically factual -- they had actually happened. It would be interesting to speculate about how the use of counter-factual events would be received by respondents. For instance, how would Arabs react if Israel made a peace overture? This question is relevant for the design of a study and more important in historical terms. A large number of missing answers would be expected, because many people would probably reject this concept out of hand. Such an inquiry would be a way of using socio-psychological data to 'try out' the reactions of the populations at large to new types of political actions. This would be an advance over the types of laboratory simulations that political scientists often have tried (c.f. Guetzkow (1959) for instance).

B. **Utility of looking at interpretations of political events**

The comparison of the explanations given by people in three societies about various political events seems interesting in the first place because it is one 'window' into the deeper set of beliefs which people/societies use to make sense of the world they inhabit. Certainly this is related to the core belief ideas of Leites and A. George, and O. Holsti, as well as to operational code approach used to understand key decision-maker's choices and policy decisions. The difference in this study is partly one of scope: rather than examining the belief system of an important individual political actor or at the views of elites and influentials in the involved societies (cf. Heradstveit, 1979), this study analyzed the outlooks among the general populations of three societies involved in the conflict. Thus the content of people's understanding of the political world is in itself a worthy object of study, since there are no prior public opinion studies about Arab and Israeli attitudes .

The present research presents a snapshot of people's outlooks at a single moment in time. In a study like this one, which was undertaken in order to examine some processes involved in a transition from war to peace in the Middle East, the *type* of explanation became the object of interest, once the content of the explanation was understood. It was

hoped that the types of explanations about the various political events offered by people in the three national groups would serve as an index about the cognitive changes involved in moving from war to peace. The change in attributions or cognitions were difficult to examine with the present data-set, which is cross-sectional, but not longitudinal.

A preferable means of studying a transition from war to peace is to use a longitudinal design: to tap the responses of people in different societies to various changes in their world at various points in time. In this way the real world would be treated as a sort of giant laboratory and the political events occurring in it would be used as stimuli for a large-scale unplanned experiment. Cantril (1958) did use this rationale in 1956 for looking at how people viewed the Hungarian Uprising, which happen to occur while he was studying the "protest voters" in several European societies. This approach would be a more powerful 'manipulation' than a laboratory experiment with people in different 'conditions' which would be used to approximate the real world (or to distill the essence of a real world situation in a laboratory situation), because the people come from the experience under scrutiny. However, the real-world approach is also more 'messy', as the problems pointed out regarding the present study show.

Geertz (1973), in his essay "Thick Description", talks about the 'natural experiment' as one of the (unfortunate) ways that ethnographers attempt to link the particular research they do to the general world at large. He argues that the rationale of the natural experiment is problematic, because although there is certain to be variation in the world's cultural forms, "the context in which it occurs varies with it.." (p. 22-23). This criticism could be leveled at the type of research described here. However, regarding the cross-national study of attitudes and explanations about political events, the basic justification for comparing the responses of people in different societies is based on the fact that the comparison itself is not a hypothetical one originating in the mind of the researcher. Rather, it emerges directly from the existence of ongoing conflict between nations or societies, and lies at the heart of conflict resolution. It relates to the question of how adversaries, who start at such diametrically opposed and competing positions, can come to coexist in an environment, with a lower level of violence and hopefully ultimately in peace. The interaction system created by the conflict is the object of study.

Alker (1968) has noted regarding cross-national studies of modernization and development that there is a need to improve how longitudinal inferences are made from cross-sectional results. Several types of inferences are sought

based on the data about political events. First, the study has shown that the response patterns are different in the three national groups (i. e. same stimulus produces different effects within each of the groups.). Second, the hostile events are comparable, in that they produce symmetric patterns of response among the three groups (i. e. similar stimuli result in comparable patterns of response among three different groups, suggesting that they are actors in the same interaction system.). Finally, the peace treaty differs from the hostile actions in that it changes the pattern of response among the actors in the system. It should be clear, also, that the cross-national data are used **as if** the three national groups were interrelating within an interaction field that is really impossible to capture.

Campbell (1958) wrote an article called "Common fate, similarity and other indices of the status of aggregates of persons as social entities," which deals with the issue of when it is reasonable to treat an aggregate as an entity in terms of objective and subjective validity. This conception seems relevant to the approach taken in this study, namely, that it makes sense to look at the parties to an international conflict as part of the same system, in relation to a common social structure.

Built into the set of inferences made in this study is the moving back and forth between levels of analysis within the conflict interaction system. The study began with an

analysis of the meaning of three events within each national group. Then an analytic scheme was devised for coding events across the three national groups. Next, the changing pattern of 'relations' among the three national groups was examined in terms of the similarities and differences in response (in the frequency distributions) to the stimulus events. Finally the data were examined for the existence of within group variations, rather than allowing the analysis to 'rest' merely at the point of uncovering between-group differences, which were to be expected in the first place.

C. Once these different ways of understanding events in conflict and peace are identified, how useful is this for conflict resolution?

The attribution scenario of actor and observer explaining to the 'same' stimulus action has been treated like a microcosm for understanding the basic socio-psychological dynamics of international conflict. Whatever the shortcomings of using such an analogy, the essential point remains, that there are different ways of interpreting an action, depending on the interpreter's relationship to the action: actor, victim/recipient, interested other, bystander.

The language of perception has been used in discussing this study. Perception involves aspects of the field that the perceiver must perceive in addition to characteristics

of the perceiver's own internal make-up -- underlying concerns, or a basic template for looking at certain types of events. Attribution theory makes this a social process, in the sense that social position in relation to the action becomes a variable, too.

The analysis of attributions between enemies reveals the parallel structure, the mirror images offered by people affiliated with the various parties in a conflict. The analysis is helpful because it lays out the differences in perception between the adversaries. However, the existence of symmetric, mirror accounts of the 'same types of actions' does not mean that there is also a rationality assumption thrown in, too (i.e. "in your shoes I'd do the same thing"). A. Rapoport's (1960) distinction between opponents in a game and adversaries in a fight is apropos. In a game, while there may be irreconcilable differences between the parties, the opponent is essential to the game, and one prefers a worthy opponent to a weak one. The behavior of both parties is determined by the same rules; the outcome is a function of interdependent moves. In a fight the adversary is someone to be removed from the field or destroyed. Thus, although to an outsider the symmetric aspects of the preferred modes of reasoning in conflict may be apparent (and quite elegant), each of the adversaries is faced with or engulfed by more essential concerns: survival, security, recognition, rather than a neat exercise in symmetry.

The original stance taken at the start of this study was to link people's interpretations of political events to the framework used by researchers in causal attribution -- actor-observer differences in explanations of the 'same' action. At the end of this study it seems clear that a more appropriate context for considering the cross-national interpretations of political events is a widened, more macro-level socio-cultural perspective, rather than a purely cognitive social psychological perspective.

It is not sufficient for the purposes of conflict resolution to show that adversaries offer divergent accounts of the 'same' thing. Such an analysis does not deal with the meaning and substance of the attribution, which are essential to know in trying to solve a conflict.

In conflict resolution some attention has been given to explaining one's own side and one's view of the adversary. The present study showed the built-in tendencies for seeing one's own side as victim in hostile interactions, but also for focusing on one's own party's interests and needs in relation to a peace action. Including the treaty as an stimulus event is important as a first step in learning more about the gray areas of attribution in times of transition from war to peace. A broader range of events may expand the range of images of the nation which are possible.

The implication of the present study is that more types of events are needed in the interaction system which can shake up the closed perceptual system created by ongoing hostile events. Social psychologists have tended to ask, 'how can perceptions be changed?,' implying that the way to resolve conflicts is to deal with the perceptions that seem to perpetuate hostilities, and to try to change them by addressing perceptions directly via cognitive techniques: teaching people about their different perceptions, talking about them and so on.

The perspective taken in this study is that the way to change perceptions is to change the stimuli -- events -- which are the material to be perceived, in order to provide opportunities for different types of perceptions. In this light the effectiveness of the problem solving conflict resolution workshop (Kelman, Cohen) can be explained: it becomes an event by being a live instance of communication across groups which succeeds in being credible for the Israeli and Palestinian participants, more important than any sort of substantive outcome that might emerge from the workshop.

Attention needs to be given to designing peaceful actions which can be perceived as peaceful by the involved parties. From the present research it was clear that such actions need to be directed at all of the particular groups. For instance, even though the Egyptian-Israeli treaty was

intended as a peace action (intended by Egypt, perceived
that way by Israelis; also, it was intended to be the one in
the stimulus set that was about peace), the peace treaty was
perceived by many Palestinians as a hostile action because
it did not deal with Palestinians and it was not directed
toward them.

To assess change in a social system a particular
attribute, like social structure, needs to be examined
before and after change has occurred. In this vein it is
useful to conceptualize social structure as a cluster of
traits.. and 'traits' as abstractions from the contentions
among groups of people within a system of society:

> "..Social structures are defined by a set of issues
> which comprise the characteristic areas of contention
> among the constituent groups of a society. If we then
> say that one social structure has ceased to exist and
> another has taken its place, we mean that the terms of
> reference have changed by which the issues are defined,
> relationships maintained or contentions resolved."
> (Bendix, 1968, p. 72)

About the case at hand we can say that the issues
defined by the parties are the same, so that in a conflict
like the one in the Middle East, which has gone on for
decades/generations (i.e. 'protracted') the parties have
become part of the an 'emergent' social structure, based on
their ongoing [hostile] interaction. Changing the conflict,
resolving it, involves fundamental changes within and
between the parties: the development of a new language as a

cause and consequence of new deeds, new framework for making
sense of the world.

APPENDIX A

PRECODING SCHEMES

APPENDIX A

Precodes for Events Questions

RAID1: "The Israeli Air Force conducts a raid on Beirut.
What would bring about this event?"

        01 = Retaliation for Palestinian attack or
             military activities
        02 = Retaliation for PLO attack or military
             activities
        03 = Retaliation for terrorist attack or military
             activities
        04 = Israeli aggression, against
             Arabs/Palestinians (i.e. desire to attack,
             kill, etc.)
        05 = War, hatred
        06 = Pre-emptive strike, to prevent attack
        07 = Political move
        08 = No reason, nothing
        09 = Beirut is a PLO stronghold/ (attempt to
             weaken or destroy PLO)
        10 = Israelis are terrorists
        11 = Palestinians are terrorists
        12 = U.S. support of Israel
        13 = Israeli expansionism
        14 = Status quo, the situation
        15 = Israel's justification for its security
        16 = PLO - Israeli conflict over southern Lebanon
        17 = Attempt to destroy or exterminate
             Palestinians
        18 = Israeli economic or internal problems
        19 = Retaliation for Lebanon attack
        88 = Other
        99 = No answer/refused to answer/'don't know'

Precodes for Events Questions

RAID2: "Israeli Air Force conducts a raid on Beirut.
What would be its results?"

```
01 = People killed,death, destruction (general)
02 = Innocent people killed, hurt
03 = Retaliation (unspecified)
04 = Retaliation  by Palestinians
05 = Retaliation  by PLO
06 = More war, conflict, hostility, anger, hatred
07 = Revenge by both sides
08 = Terrorists killed, hurt
09 = Reduce conflict, reduce terrorist attacks
10 = World opinion -- negative towards Israel
     (against Israel)
11 = World opinion -- positive towards Israel (in
     favor of)
12 = Too much media attention (no right to so much
     coverage)
14 = Nothing, no result
15 = U.N. response
16 = Unity of Arab countries against Israel
17 = U.S.A. reaction
18 = More unrest and demonstrations (in the West
     Bank and Gaza)
19 = Lebanon's response to the PLO
20 = Lebanon's response to Israel
21 = Israeli victory
22 = PLO strengthened
23 = PLO weakened or destroyed
24 = End of peace with Egypt
25 = Negative impact on peace/autonomy talks
26 = Annexation of Lebanese territory
27 = Palestinian will or determination is
     strengthened
28 = Positive effect on peace talks (i.e. no more
     PLO influence)
88 = Other
99 = No answer/refused to answer/'don't know'
```

Precodes for Events Questions

BUS1: "Palestinians attack a bus on the Haifa-Tel Aviv
Highway. What would bring about this event?"

01 = Retaliation for Israeli attacks
02 = Response to Israeli policies
03 = Palestinian resistance, struggle against
     Israel
04 = Terrorist activities
05 = Desire for world attention -- no right to
     attention
06 = Desire for world attention for their cause
07 = War, hatred
08 = Hatred of Jews, desire to hurt Israelis
09 = No reason, nothing
10 = Personality characteristics of Palestinians;
     that's the way they are
11 = Attempt or desire to interrupt "normal" life
     in Israel
12 = World attention
13 = Attempt or desire to make demands heard;
     (e.g. release of prisoners)
14 = Policy of PLO
15 = Attempt or desire to regain Palestinian
     homeland
16 = Attempt or desire to terrorize civilians,
     murder women and children
17 = Afraid or unable to attack the army
88 = Other
99 = No answer/refused to answer/'don't know'

Precodes for Events Questions

BUS1: "Palestinians attack a bus on the Haifa-Tel Aviv Highway. What would be its results?"

01 = People killed, death, destruction (general)
02 = Innocent people killed, hurt
03 = Terrorists killed, hurt
04 = Retaliation by Israelis
05 = Retaliation by Israelis (large-scale military assault)
06 = Retaliation by Israelis in the West Bank
07 = More war, conflict, hostility, anger, hatred
08 = World opinion (negative) against Palestinians
09 = World opinion (positive) in favor of Palestinians
10 = Achieve the objective of stating their cause
11 = Reduce conflict
12 = Force Israel to recognize Palestinian rights to land
13 = Media attention (negative coverage)
14 = Media attention (positive coverage)
15 = World attention
16 = Increase Israel's military
17 = Security tightened in Israel (administrative and political)
18 = Nothing
19 = Expel Jews from Palestinian land/get rid of Jews
20 = Affects peace talks negatively
88 = Other
99 = No answer/refused to answer/'don't know'

Precodes for Events Questions

TREATY1: "A peace treaty is announced between Israel and Egypt. What would bring about this event?"

```
01 = Desire for a better economy
02 = Negotiations, discussions, peace talks
03 = Egypt's desire for peace, acknowledged it
     can't win the war, tired of fighting
04 = Extra-regional involvement, U.S., U.N.,
     U.S.S.R. pressure, influence or intervention
05 = Sadat
06 = Sadat's treason
07 = Sadat the visionary
08 = Begin
09 = USA
10 = No reason, nothing will bring it about, can't
     happen
11 = Arab recognition of Israel
12 = Recognition of Palestinian homeland
13 = Recognition of Palestinian autonomy and
     rights
14 = Desire to isolate Egypt from Arabs, divide
     Arab countries
15 = Israel's desire for peace, acknowledged it
     can't win the war, tired of fighting
16 = U.S., Sadat, Begin
17 = Egypt's desire to regain land (Sinai)
20 = Mutual (Egypt and Israel) desire, compromise,
     concessions
21 = Economic and social pressure within Egypt
22 = Leadership change
24 = Sadat's/Egypt's desire for U.S.
     support/alliance
25 = October (1973) War
26 = Sadat's (personal) self-interest
27 = Sadat's/Egypt's/general deception
28 = Israeli concessions (one-sided, heavy)
88 = Other
99 = No answer/refused to answer/'don't know'
```

Precodes for Events Questions

TREATY1: "A peace treaty is announced between Israel and Egypt. What would be its results?"

01 = Better economy
02 = Increased chance for peace in the Middle East; more peaceful world; it would stop the killing
03 = Loss of Arab support for Egypt, Egyptian isolation
04 = No results, nothing would happen, no difference
05 = Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai
07 = Sinai transferred, loss of Sinai
08 = Loss of Sinai and the security it provided
09 = Increase in the conflict
10 = Reexamination of Arab countries' stand towards Israel
11 = Continuation of occupation and conflict
12 = Lessening of tensions
13 = Sadat's assassination
14 = Normalization of relations
15 = Bad for Israel
16 = Bad for Palestinians
17 = Bad for Egypt or Egyptians
18 = Bilateral peace Egypt/Israel only; end war Egypt/Israel only
19 = Short-term peace (general)
20 = Increased power for Israel; increased attacks on other Arab states; Israel free to do as she pleases
21 = U.S. interests served
88 = Other
99 = No answer/refused to answer/'don't know'

APPENDIX B

Israeli Quota Sample:

Cause of Israeli Raid on Beirut

70.8%	retaliation for terrorist attack (3)
9.4	Beirut is PLO stronghold (9)
5.8	retaliation for PLO attack (2)
3.6	retaliation for Palestinian attack (1)
2.6	pre-emptive strike (6)
1.9	Israeli security (15)
1.7	political motive (7)
1.1	Israeli aggression against Arabs (4)
0.9	PLO-Israel conflict over south Lebanon (16)
0.6	war, hatred (5)
0.4	Israeli expansionism (13)
0.4	destroy or eliminate Palestinians (17)
0.2	Israelis are terrorists (10)
0.2	Palestinians are terrorists (11)
0.2	No reason, nothing (8)
0.2	status quo, the situation (14)
100.0 %	(N=469)

[Codes not used: U.S. support for Israel (12); Israeli economic or internal problems (18); retaliation for Lebanon attack (19).]

Result of Israeli Raid on Beirut

29.9%	reduce conflict (9)
14.6	PLO weakened (23)
14.6	(negative world opinion [12.4] (10)
	(UN response [1.5] (15)
	(too much media [0.7] (12)
12.6	more conflict (6)
8.6	terrorists killed (8)
9.1	(people killed [7.3%] (1)
	(innocent people killed [1.8%] (2)
4.4	(retaliation [2.2%] (3)
	(retaliation by Palestinians [.7%] (4)
	(retaliation by PLO [1.5%] (5)
2.7	nothing (14)
0.7	revenge by both (7)
0.7	positive world opinion (11)
0.4	Israeli victory (21)
0.4	Palestinian will strengthened (27)
0.2	Arab unity against Israel (16)
0.2	US reaction (17)
0.2	unrest on West Bank (18)
0.2	Lebanon's reaction to PLO (19)
0.2	Lebanon's reaction to Israel (20)
0.2	PLO strengthened (22)
99.9 %	(N=452)

[Codes not used: end peace treaty (24); negative impact on peace (25); annex Lebanese territory (26); positive impact on peace (28).]

Palestinian Quota Sample:

Cause of Israeli Raid on Beirut

25.5%	Israeli aggression vs. Arabs (4)	
23.6	destroy or eliminate Palestinians (17)	
17.3	retaliation for Palestinian attack (1)	
8.7	Israeli expansionism (13)	
4.3	retaliation for PLO attack (2)	
4.3	Beirut is PLO stronghold (9)	
4.3	Israelis are terrorists (10)	
2.9	war, hatred (5)	
2.4	political motive (7)	
1.4	pre-emptive strike (6)	
1.0	retaliation for terrorist attack (3)	
1.0	retaliation for Lebanon attack (19)	
1.0	Israeli security (15)	
1.0	Israeli economic or internal problems (18)	
0.5	US support for Israel (12)	
0.5	status quo (14)	
0.5	PLO-Israel conflict over south Lebanon (16)	
100.2 %	(N=208)	

[Codes not used: Palestinians are terrorists (11), and nothing, no reason (8).]

Result of Israeli Raid on Beirut

44.9%	more conflict, war (6)
29.4	(people killed [22.7] (1) (innocent people killed [4.8] (2) (terrorists killed [1.9] (8)
8.6	(retaliation by Palestinians [4.3] (4) (retaliation by PLO [2.4] (5) (retaliation [1.9] (3)
3.9	negative world opinion (10)
1.9	UN response (15)
1.4	positive world opinion (11)
1.4	Palestinians strengthened (27)
1.4	Arab unity against Israel (16)
1.0	PLO weakened (23)
1.0	nothing (14)
0.5	reduce conflict (9)
0.5	revenge by both (7)
0.5	US reaction (17)
0.5	Lebanon's response to PLO (19)
0.5	Lebanon's response to Israel (20)
0.5	Israeli victory (21)
0.5	PLO strengthened (22)
0.5	end of peace treaty (24)
0.5	negative impact on peace (25)
0.5	annex Lebanese territory (26)
0.5	positive impact on peace (28)
99.9 %	(N=207)

[Codes not used: too much media (12); more unrest and demonstrations (West Bank/Gaza) (18); PLO strengthened (22)]

Egyptian 1st Wave:

Cause of Israeli Raid on Beirut

28.8%	Israeli expansionism (13)
17.9	Israeli aggression against Arabs (4)
14.6	Beirut is a PLO stronghold (9)
13.4	(retaliation for Palestinian attack [8%] (1)
	(retaliation PLO attack [2.9] (2)
	(retaliation terrorist attack [1.8] (3)
	(retaliation for Lebanon attack [.7] (19)
9.1	Israeli desire to destroy Palestinians (17)
4.0	war, hatred (5)
4.0	political motive (7)
2.2	PLO-Israeli conflict in south Lebanon (16)
1.8	pre-emptive strike (6)
1.5	Israel justification for security (15)
1.1	Israelis are terrorists (10)
0.7	no reason (8)
0.4	status quo (14)
0.4	Palestinians are terrorists (11)
99.9 %	(N=274)

[Codes not used: Israeli economic or internal problems (18); US support for Israel (12)]

Result of Israeli Raid on Beirut

43.3	more war (6)
30.4	(people killed [28.5] (1)
	(innocent people killed [1.9] (2)
6.9	(retaliation [3.1] (3)
	(retaliation by Palestinians [1.9] (4)
	(retaliation by PLO [1.9] (5)
3.8	negative impact on peace (25)
3.1	annex Lebanese territory (26)
1.9	positive impact on peace (28)
1.9	nothing (14)
1.6	negative world opinion (10)
1.3	PLO weakened (23)
1.3	Lebanese response to Israel (20)
0.9	revenge by both (7)
0.6	unrest/demonstrations in West Bank (18)
0.6	Lebanese response to PLO (19)
0.6	PLO strengthened (22)
0.3	terrorists killed (8)
0.3	reduce conflict (9)
0.3	UN response (15)
0.3	Arab unity against Israel (16)
0.3	Israeli victory (21)
0.3	Palestinian will strengthened (27)
100.0 %	(N=319)

[Codes not used: end peace treaty (21); US reaction (17); too much media (12); positive world opinion (11)]

Israeli Quota Sample:
Cause of Palestinian attack on Bus

37.3	terrorist activity (4)
22.4	hatred of Jews (8)
8.6	terrorize civilians (16)
4.5	war, hatred (7)
4.5	interrupt normal life in Israel (11)
4.1	Palestinian resistance (3)
4.1	Policy of PLO (14)
3.7	(desire for world attention [2.6] (6)
	(desire world attention - no right [.9] (5)
	(world attention [.2] (12)
3.2	retaliation for Israeli attacks (1)
2.6	Palestinian personality (10)
1.3	no reason (9)
1.1	response to Israeli policies (2)
1.1	make demands heard (13)
1.1	regain Palestinian homeland (14)
0.4	afraid to attack the army (17)
100.0 %	(N=464)

Result of Palestinian Attack on Bus

22.9	retaliation by Israel (large-scale) (5)
21.0	retaliation by Israel (4)
16.3	more war, conflict, hostility (7)
13.2	innocent people killed (2)
13.0	people killed (1)
5.6	Israeli security tightened (17)
2.3	negative world opinion (8)
1.4	nothing, no results (18)
1.0	achieve goals (10)
0.8	world attention (15)
0.6	terrorists killed (3)
0.4	reduce conflict (11)
0.4	affect peace negatively (20)
0.2	retaliation by Israel in West Bank (6)
0.2	positive world opinion (9)
0.2	force Israel to recognize Palest. rights 12)
0.2	negative media attention (13)
0.2	increase Israel's military (16)
99.9%	(N=485)

[Codes not used: 'expel Jews from their land' (19); 'pro-Palestinian media attention' (14).]

Palestinian Quota Sample:
Cause of Palestinian Attack on Bus

45.0	retaliation for Israeli attacks (1)
12.8	Palestinian resistance (3)
9.5	response to Israeli policies (2)
6.2	make demands heard (13)
5.7	desire for world attention (6)
4.7	war, hatred (7)
4.3	interrupt normal life in Israel (11)
3.8	regain Palestinian homeland (15)
2.4	hatred of Jews (8)
2.4	terrorist activity (4)
1.4	desire for world attention - no right (5)
0.5	terrorize civilians (16)
0.5	policy of PLO (14)
0.5	Palestinian personality (10)
0.5	world attention (12)
100.2 %	(N=211)

[Codes not used: 'no reason' (9); 'afraid to attack army' (17).]

Results of Palestinian Attack on Bus

37.9	more war (7)
10.4	people killed (1)
10.4	retaliation by Israel (4)
10.0	retaliation by Israel - largescale (5)
7.1	force Israel to recognize Pal. rights (12)
4.7	innocent people killed (2)
4.3	achieve goals (10)
3.3	reduce conflict (11)
1.9	negative world opinion (8)
1.9	positive world opinion (9)
1.4	increase Israel's military (16)
1.4	affect peace negatively (20)
0.9	terrorists killed (3)
0.9	retaliation by Israel in West Bank (6)
0.9	world attention (15)
0.9	nothing, no result (8)
0.5	negative media attention (13)
0.5	positive media attention (14)
0.5	expel Jews from Palestinian land(19)
99.8 %	(N=211)

[Code not used: 'Israeli security tightened' (17).]

Egyptian 1st Wave:

Cause of Palestinian Attack on Bus

36.0	retaliation for Israeli attack (1)
28.2	Palestinian resistance (3)
9.6	response to Israeli policy (2)
8.7	war, hatred (7)
5.4	hatred of Jews (8)
3.9	(desire for world attention [2.1] (6)
	(world attention [1.5] (12)
	(desire world attention - no right [.3] (5)
3.0	attempt to regain Palestinian homeland (15)
1.8	terrorist activity (4)
1.5	interrupt normal life in Israel (11)
0.6	Palestinian personality (10)
0.6	make demands heard
0.3	policy of PLO (14)
0.3	afraid to attack the Israeli army (17)
99.9 %	(N=333)

[Codes not used: 'no reason' (9); 'terrorize civilians' (16).]

Result of Palestinian Attack on Bus

35.8	more war (7)
24.3	(people killed [20.2] (1)
	(innocent people killed [2.5] (2)
	(terrorists killed [1.6] (3)
22.4	(retaliation (general) [15.6] (4)
	(retaliation, large-scale [4.0] (5)
	(retaliation on West Bank [2.8] (6)
6.2	affect peace talks negatively (20)
2.8	negative world opinion (8)
2.5	achieve their goals (10)
1.2	reduce conflict (11)
1.2	nothing, no result (8)
0.9	world attention (15)
0.6	force Israel recognize Pal. rights (12)
0.6	positive world attention (9)
0.6	Israel tightens its security (17)
0.3	expel Jews from Palestinian land (19)
0.3	positive media attention (14)
99.7 %	(N=321)

[Codes not used: 'negative media attention' (13)]

Israeli Quota Sample:

Cause of Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty

26.2	compromise, concessions (20)
24.7	Sadat (5)
14.7	Egyptian desire for peace (3)
8.0	Sadat the visionary (7)
4.0	Begin (8)
3.8	October 1973 War (25)
3.4	Egyptian desire to regain land (17)
3.0	Israeli desire for peace (15)
2.0	leadership change (22)
1.6	negotiations, discussions, peace talks (2)
1.6	economic/social pressure within Egypt (21)
1.4	desire for a better economy (1)
1.2	extra-regional involvement, pressure (4)
0.8	Sadat's treason (6)
0.8	Arab recognition of Israel (11)
0.8	US-Sadat-Begin (16)
0.6	Sadat's deception (27)
0.6	Israeli concessions (28)
0.4	USA (9)
0.2	no reason, can't happen (10)
99.8 %	(N=497)

[Codes not used: 'recognition of Palestinian homeland' (12); 'desire to isolate Egypt' (14); 'Sadat's self-interest' (26).]

Result of Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty

20.6	increased chance for peace (2)
17.4	bilateral Israeli-Egyptian peace (18)
15.7	normalization of relations (14)
14.0	lessening tensions (12)
6.6	Sinai transferred (7)
6.6	short term peace (19)
5.1	Israeli withdrawal from Sinai (5)
3.6	Better economy (1)
3.4	loss of Sinai security (9)
1.5	loss of Arab support for Egypt (3)
1.3	Bad for Israel (15)
1.1	no results, no change (4)
1.1	increased conflict (9)
0.6	re-examine Arab attitudes re:Israel (10)
0.4	increased Israeli power (20)
0.4	US interests served (21)
0.2	continued occupation and conflict (11)
0.2	bad for Palestinians (16)
0.2	bad for Egypt (17)
100.0 %	(N=471)

[Codes not used: Sadat's assasination (13).]

Palestinian Quota Sample:

Cause of Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty

21.0	Egyptian desire for peace (3)
17.3	Sadat (5)
14.5	Sadat's treason (6)
7.5	Egyptian desire to regain land (17)
7.5	economic/social pressure within Egypt (21)
5.1	desire for a better economy (1)
4.7	US pressure, outside involvement (4)
4.7	USA (9)
4.2	negotiations, discussions, peacetalks (2)
2.3	Sadat the visionary (7)
1.9	Israeli desire for peace (15)
1.4	October 1973 War (25)
1.4	Sadat's self-interest (26)
0.9	recognition of Palestinian homeland (12)
0.9	no reason, can't happen (10)
0.9	US-Sadat-Begin (16)
0.5	leadership change (22)
0.5	desire to isolate Egypt (14)
100.0 %	(N=214)

[Codes not used: 'Begin' (8); 'Arab recognition of Israel' (11); 'Sadat/Egyptian desire for US support or alliance' (24); 'Sadat's deception' (27); 'Israeli concessions' (28).]

Results of Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty

27.6	increased chance of peace (2)
14.9	loss of Arab support for Eg. (3)
10.5	Israeli withdrawal from Sinai (5)
9.9	bilateral Israeli-Egyptian peace (18)
7.7	increased conflict (9)
6.1	normalization of relations (14)
5.5	better economy (1)
4.4	short-term peace (19)
2.8	increased power for Israel (20)
2.2	bad for Palestinians (16)
1.7	Sinai transferred (7)
1.7	continued occupation and conflict (11)
1.7	US interests served (21)
1.1	no results, no change (4)
1.1	reexamine Arabs' stand re:Israel (10)
0.6	Sadat's assasination (13)
0.6	bad for Egypt (17)
100.1 %	(N=181)

[Codes not used: 'loss of Sinai security' (8); 'lessening tensions' (12); 'bad for Israel' (15).]

Egyptian 1st Wave:

Cause of Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty

49.1	Egyptian desire for peace (3)
15.5	Egyptian desire to regain land (17)
11.5	Sadat (5)
6.6	desire for better economy (1)
3.9	negotiations, discussions, peace talks (2)
2.7	October 1973 War (25)
2.5	mutual compromise, concessions (20)
1.2	Sadat's treason (6)
1.2	USA (9)
1.0	Sadat the visionary (7)
1.0	extra-regional involvement - USA/UN/USSR (4)
0.7	US - Sadat - Begin (16)
0.7	Sadat's self-interest (26)
0.7	Israeli desire for peace (15)
0.5	Recognition of Palestinian rights (12)
0.2	Sadat's desire for US alliance (24)
0.2	Arab recognition of Israel (11)
0.2	Recognition of Palestinian autonomy (13)
0.2	Israeli concessions (28)
99.6 %	(N=407)

[Codes not used: 'Sadat's self-deception' (27); 'leadership change' (22); 'economic and social pressure within Egypt' (21); 'desire to isolate Egypt' (14); 'no reason, can't happen' (10); Begin (8).]

Result of Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty

46.5	increased chance for peace (2)
17.1	Israeli withdrawal from Sinai (5)
15.1	better economy (1)
8.1	bilateral Israeli-Egyptian peace (18)
3.4	normalization of relations (14)
3.1	Egyptian isolation/loss Arab support (3)
1.6	lessening tensions (12)
1.6	Sinai transferred (7)
1.1	short-run peace (19)
0.7	no results (4)
0.7	increased conflict (9)
0.4	increased Israeli power (20)
0.2	Sadat's assassination (13)
0.2	Bad for Egypt (17)
0.2	Bad for Israel (15)
100.0 %	(N=445)

[Codes not used: 'US interests served' (21); 'Bad for Palestinians' (16); 'continued occupation and conflict' (11); 're-examination of Arab attitudes towards Israel' (12); 'loss of Sinai security' (8).]

APPENDIX C

Israeli raid: "What would bring about this event?"

	EGYPTIANS n=274	PALESTINIANS n=208	ISRAELIS n=469
Retaliation			
1) ... for Palestinian attacks	8.0%	17.3%	3.6%
2) ... for PLO attacks	2.9	4.3	5.8
3) ... for terrorist attacks	1.8	1.0	70.8
19) ... for Lebanon attacks	.7	1.0	--
	13.4%	23.6%	80.2%
Political-Strategic (Beirut, security)			
6) pre-emptive strike	1.8	1.4	2.6
7) political motive	4.0	2.4	1.7
9) Beirut is a PLO stronghold	14.6	4.3	9.4
12) US support of Israel	--	.5	--
15) Israeli security justification	1.5	1.0	1.9
18) Israeli economic or internal problems	--	1.0	--
	21.9	10.6	15.6
Blame (Israeli aggression)			
4) Israeli aggression vs. Arabs	17.9	25.5	1.1
10) Israelis are terrorists	1.1	4.3	.2
11) Palestinians are terrorists	.4	--	.2
13) Israeli expansionism	28.8	8.7	.4
17) destroy or eliminate Palestinians	9.1	23.6	.4
	57.3	62.0	2.3
Conflict-for-Granted			
5) war, hatred	4.0	2.9	.6
8) no reason, nothing	.7	--	.2
14) status quo	.4	.5	.2
16) PLO-Israel conflict over south Leb.	2.2	.5	.9
	7.3	3.8	1.9
TOTAL	99.9%	100.0%	100.0%

Palestinians attack: "What would bring about this event?"

	EGYPTIANS n=333	PALESTINIANS n=211	ISRAELIS n=464
Retaliation			
1) retaliation for Israeli attacks	36.0%	45.0%	3.2%
2) response to Israeli policies	9.6	9.5	1.1
	45.6%	54.5%	4.3%
Political-Strategic (Palestinian resistance)			
3) Palestinian resistance	28.2	12.8	4.1
6) desire for world attention	2.1	5.7	2.6
12) world attention	1.5	.5	.2
13) to make demands heard	.6	6.2	1.1
15) to regain Palestinian homeland	3.0	3.8	1.1
	35.4	29.0	9.1
Blame (terror, hatred of Jews)			
4) terrorist activity	1.8	2.4	37.3
5) desire world attention - no right	.3	1.4	.9
8) hatred of Jews	5.4	2.4	22.4
10) personality characteristic of Pal.	.6	.5	2.6
11) interrupt 'normal' life in Israel	1.5	4.3	4.5
14) policy of PLO	.3	.5	4.1
16) terrorize civilians, murder	--	.5	8.6
17) afraid to attack the army	.3	--	.4
	10.2	12.0	80.8
Conflict-for-Granted			
7) war, hatred	8.7	4.7	4.5
9) no reason, nothing	--	--	1.3
	8.7	4.7	5.8
TOTAL	99.9%	100.2%	100.0%

Israeli raid: "What would be its results?"

Retaliation	EGYPTIANS n=219	PALESTINIANS n=207	ISRAELIS n=452
3) retaliation	3.1%	1.9%	2.2%
4) retaliation by Palestinians	1.9	4.3	.7
5) retaliation by PLO	1.9	2.4	1.5
7) revenge by both sides	.9	.5	.7
10) world opinion negative against Isr.	1.6	3.9	12.4
12) too much media (no right)	--	--	.7
15) UN response	.3	1.9	1.5
16) unity of Arab countries vs Israel	.3	1.4	.2
17) USA reaction	--	.5	.2
18) more unrest in West Bank and Gaza	.6	--	.2
20) Lebanon's response to Israel	1.3	.5	.2
22) PLO strengthened	.6	--	.2
27) Palestinian will is strengthened	.3	1.4	.4
	12.8%	18.7%	21.1%
Achieve Goals (reduce conflict)			
9) reduce conflict, terrorist attacks	.3	.5	29.9
11) world opinion positive toward Israel	--	1.4	.7
19) Lebanon's response to PLO	.6	.5	.2
21) Israeli victory	.3	.5	.4
23) PLO weakened or destroyed	1.3	1.0	14.6
26) annexation of Lebanese territory	3.1	.5	--
28) positive effect on peace talks	1.9	.5	--
	7.5	4.9	45.8
People Killed			
1) people killed, death, destruction	28.5	22.7	7.3
2) innocent people killed, hurt	1.9	4.8	1.8
8) terrorists killed, hurt	.3	1.9	8.6
	30.7	29.4	17.7
More War			
6) more war, conflict	43.3	44.9	12.6
14) nothing, no result	1.9	1.0	2.7
24) end peace with Egypt	--	.5	--
25) negative impact on peace	3.8	.5	1.3
	49.0	46.9	15.3
TOTAL	100.0%	99.9%	99.9%

Palestinian attack: "What would be its results?"

	EGYPTIANS n=321	PALESTINIANS n=211	ISRAELIS n=485
Retaliation			
4) retaliation by Israelis	15.6%	10.4%	21.0%
5) Israeli large-scale military assault	4.0	10.0	22.9
6) retaliation by Israel in West Bank	2.8	.9	.2
8) world opinion negative vs. Palest.	2.8	1.9	2.3
13) media coverage (negative)	--	.5	.2
16) increase Israel's military	--	1.4	.2
17) Israeli security tightened	.6	--	5.6
	25.8%	25.1%	52.4%
Achieve Goals			
9) world opinion favors Palestinians	.6	1.9	.2
10) achieve objectives of stating cause	2.5	4.3	1.0
11) reduce conflict	1.2	3.3	.4
12) force Israel to recognize Pal rights	.6	7.1	.2
14) media attention (positive coverage)	.3	.5	--
15) world attention	.9	.9	.8
19) expel Jews from Palestinian land	.3	.5	--
	6.4	18.5	2.6
People Killed			
1) people killed, death, destruction	20.2	10.4	13.0
2) innocent people killed, hurt	2.5	4.7	13.2
3) terrorists killed, hurt	1.6	.9	.6
	24.3	16.0	26.8
More War			
7) more war, conflict	35.8	37.9	16.3
18) nothing, no result	1.2	.9	1.4
20) affect peace talks negatively	6.2	1.4	.4
	43.2	40.2	18.1
TOTAL	99.7%	99.8%	99.9%

Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty: "what would bring about this event?"

	EGYPTIANS n=407	PALESTINIANS n=214	ISRAELIS n=497
Israeli Needs or Contribution			
8) Begin	--	--	4.0%
11) Arabs' recognition of Israel	.2%	--	.8
15) Israel's desire for peace, tired war	.7	1.9%	3.0
20) mutual desire, compromise	2.5	4.2	26.2
22) leadership	--	.5	2.0
28) Israeli concessions (one-sided)	.2	--	.6
	3.6%	6.6%	36.6%
Palestinian Needs or Contribution			
4) extra-regional involvement	1.0	4.7	1.2
6) Sadat's treason	1.2	14.5	.8
9) USA	1.2	4.7	.4
10) no reason, can't happen	--	.9	.2
12) recognition of Palestinian homeland	.5	.9	--
13) recognition of Palestinian rights	.2	--	--
14) desire to isolate Egypt from Arabs	--	.5	--
26) Sadat's self-interest	.7	1.4	--
27) Sadat's deception	--	--	.6
	4.8	27.6	3.2
Egyptian Contribution			
3) Egypt's desire for peace, tired war	49.1	21.0	14.7
5) Sadat	11.5	17.3	24.7
7) Sadat, the visionary	1.0	2.3	8.0
	61.6	40.6	47.4
Pragmatic Concerns			
1) desire for better economy	6.6	5.1	1.4
2) negotiations	3.9	2.8	1.6
16) USA, Sadat, Begin	.7	.9	.8
17) Egyptian desire to regain land	15.5	7.5	3.4
21) economic and social pressure in Eg.	--	7.5	1.6
24) Sadat's/Egypt's desire US support	.2	--	--
25) October (1973) War	2.7	1.4	3.8
	29.6	25.2	12.6
TOTAL	99.6%	100.0%	99.8%

Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty: "what would bring about this event?"

	EGYPTIANS n=407	PALESTINIANS n=214	ISRAELIS n=497
Things to be Gained			
1) desire for better economy	6.6%	5.1%	1.4%
17) Egyptian desire to regain land	15.5	7.5	3.4
24) Sadat's/Egypt's desire US support	.2	--	--
	22.3%	12.6%	4.8%
Negotiation Framework			
2) negotiations	3.9	2.8	1.6
3) Egypt's desire for peace, tired war	49.1	21.0	14.7
5) Sadat	11.5	17.3	24.7
7) Sadat, the visionary	1.0	2.3	8.0
8) Begin	--	--	4.0
9) USA	1.2	4.7	.4
15) Israel's desire for peace, tired war	.7	1.9	3.0
16) USA, Sadat, Begin	.7	.9	.8
22) leadership	--	.5	2.0
	68.1	51.4	59.2
Exchange or Concessions for Peace			
11) Arabs' recognition of Israel	.2	--	.8
12) recognition of Palestinian homeland	.5	.9	--
13) recognition of Palestinian rights	.2	--	--
20) mutual desire, compromise	2.5	4.2	26.2
28) Israeli concessions (one-sided)	.2	--	.6
	3.6	5.1	27.6
Forced to Make Peace or Betrayal			
4) extra-regional involvement	1.0	4.7	1.2
21) economic and social pressure in Eg.	--	7.5	1.6
25) October (1973) War	2.7	1.4	3.8
6) Sadat's treason	1.2	14.5	.8
10) no reason, can't happen	--	.9	.2
14) desire to isolate Egypt from Arabs	--	.5	--
26) Sadat's self-interest	.7	1.4	--
27) Sadat's deception	--	--	.6
	5.6	30.9	8.2
TOTAL	99.6%	100.0%	99.8%

Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty: "what would be its results?"

	EGYPTIANS n=445	PALESTINIANS n=181	ISRAELIS n=471
Chance of Peace			
2) increased chance of peace	46.5%	27.6%	20.6%
10) Arabs' reexamine stance re: Israel	--	1.1	.6
12) lessening of tensions	1.6	--	14.0
14) normalization of relations	3.4	6.1	15.7
18) bilateral peace Egypt-Israel only	8.1	9.9	17.4
19) short-term peace	1.1	4.4	6.6
	60.7%	49.1%	74.9%
Sinai			
5) Israeli withdrawal from Sinai	17.1	10.5	5.1
7) Sinai transferred, loss of Sinai	1.6	1.7	6.6
8) loss of Sinai, security it provided	--	--	3.4
	18.7	12.2	15.1
Increased Tension			
3) loss of Arab support for Egypt	3.1	14.9	1.5
4) no results, nothing	.7	1.1	1.1
9) increase in the conflict	.7	7.7	1.1
11) continuation of occupation, conflict	--	1.7	.2
13) Sadat's assassination	.2	.6	--
15) bad for Israel	.2	--	1.3
16) bad for Palestinians	--	2.2	.2
17) bad for Egypt	.2	.6	.2
21) US interests served	--	1.7	.4
20) increased power for Israel	.4	2.8	.4
	5.5	33.3	6.4
Economy			
1) better economy	15.1	5.5	3.6
	15.1	5.5	3.6
TOTAL	100.0%	100.1%	100.0%

Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty: "what would be its results?"

	EGYPTIANS n=445	PALESTINIANS n=181	ISRAELIS n=471
Good Results			
1) better economy	15.1%	5.5%	3.6%
2) increased chance of peace	46.5	27.6	20.6
10) Arabs' reexamine stance re: Israel	--	1.1	.6
12) lessening of tensions	1.6	--	14.0
14) normalization of relations	3.4	6.1	15.7
5) Israeli withdrawal from Sinai	17.1	10.5	***
7) Sinai transferred, loss of Sinai	1.6	1.7	***
	85.3%	52.5%	54.5%
Unclear or Mixed Results			
4) no results, nothing	.7	1.1	1.1
5) Israeli withdrawal from Sinai	***	***	5.1
7) Sinai transferred, loss of Sinai	***	***	6.6
18) bilateral peace Egypt-Israel only	8.1	9.9	17.4
19) short-term peace	1.1	4.4	6.6
21) US interests served	--	1.7	.4
	9.9	17.1	37.2
Bad Results			
3) loss of Arab support for Egypt	3.1	14.9	1.5
8) loss of Sinai, security it provided	--	--	3.4
9) increase in the conflict	.7	7.7	1.1
11) continuation of occupation, conflict	--	1.7	.2
13) Sadat's assassination	.2	.6	--
15) bad for Israel	.2	--	1.3
16) bad for Palestinians	--	2.2	.2
17) bad for Egypt	.2	.6	.2
20) increased power for Israel	.4	2.8	.4
	4.8	30.5	8.3
TOTAL	100.0%	100.1%	100.0%

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