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Shades of Dispossession: Neoliberalism and the Social Production of Credibility, In Machu Picchu, Peru

Pellegrino A. Luciano

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Shades of Dispossession:
Neoliberalism and the Social Production of Credibility,
In
Machu Picchu, Peru

By
Pellegrino A. Luciano

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Anthropology in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York.

2005
This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Anthropology in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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ABSTRACT

Shades of Dispossession:
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In
Machu Picchu, Peru

By
Pellegrino A. Luciano

Advisor: Professor Shirley Lindenbaum

This dissertation ethnographically examines the inconsistencies experienced by district residents in the historic and nature Sanctuary of Machu Picchu, over the Peruvian government’s drive to implement neoliberal policies. Heritage conservation in the southern Peruvian Andes is increasingly shaped by current neoliberal policies. The people who live in the district of Machu Picchu live in a protected area that gives the state expropriating powers to claim the land as a public good. The central problem is that under neoliberalism, a public asset is used for private gain at the expense of residents. Inhabitants experience changing juridical relationships as a contradiction between the neoliberal claim of a free market, and the hand of the government creating conditions that select some over others.
My inquiry focuses on the actions of a mobilization formed out of small-middle scale entrepreneurs’ operating in a tourism economy. I explore the intersection between governance and the market economy through the lens of dispossession, and I argue that by reframing public goods in neoliberal terms, the stage was set for dispossessing inhabitants. Heritage conservation and economic structural adjustment involve incompatible forms of credibility that either justify the “takings” of rights, civil-status and the public resources accommodating larger capital investments, or discredit the legitimacy of governing authorities.
DEDICATION

To My Dear Wife Ruth
Acknowledgments

My most profound debt is to the people of Machu Picchu for receiving me so warmly and for their patience and tolerance while I conducted my research among them. I especially thank Teresa & Luis Callañaupa, Emilio Callañaupa and Raul Sanchez for their assistance in getting me situated during the early phases of the fieldwork. I am no less indebted to the members of Frente de Defensa de los Intereses de Machu Picchu, Oscar Valencia Aucca, Margarita Kaiser, Charo Castillo, Corina Condori Quispe, Regina Zapata and Marina Arias. I also thank Graciela Fernandez and Hector Alegria for their kindness during my stay. I hope that those who are not mentioned by name will also accept my thanks for taking the time to teach me and to make me feel welcome in Machu Picchu. Conscious of all the kindness they have shown me, I wish them all the best, and personally have only the kindest regards for them.

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## List of Acronyms

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<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AATC</td>
<td>Asociación de Agencias de Turismo del Cusco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGOTUR</td>
<td>Asociación de Guías de Turismo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONSETTUR</td>
<td>Consorcio de Empresas de Transporte Turístico</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COPESCO</td>
<td>Plan Turístico y Cultural de la Comisión Especial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COTUR</td>
<td>Corporación de Turismo del Perú</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTAR</td>
<td>Consejo Transitorio de Administración Regional, Cuzco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EGEMSA</td>
<td>Empresa de Generación Eléctrica Machupicchu, S.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frente</td>
<td>Frente de Defensa de los Intereses de Machu Picchu.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INC</td>
<td>Instituto Nacional de Cultura</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INRENA</td>
<td>Instituto Nacional de Recursos Naturales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDDE</td>
<td>Maryland and Delaware Railroad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMP</td>
<td>Programa Machu Picchu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PromPeru</td>
<td>Comisión de Promoción del Perú.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UGM</td>
<td>Unidad Gestión Machu Picchu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROFONANPE</td>
<td>Fondo Nacional para Áreas Naturales Protegidas por el Estado.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Above: Map of Peru (Location of Machu Picchu highlighted)
Below: Basic Map of Cusco Region (Machu Picchu shown relative to the City of Cusco)
Investment Portfolio using a photo of the Mayan ruins of Palenque in Chiapas, Mexico.
INTRODUCTION:

Privatization is when the government comes in and takes away your property.
(Privatización es cuando el gobierno viene y se apodera de tu propiedad)
~Mario, Community of Huayllabamba, Machu Picchu
(Fieldnotes5-25-02)

This dissertation seeks to contextualize political change in Peru through an analysis of the experiences of people who live within the boundaries of the nation’s preeminent symbol – the Sanctuary of Machu Picchu. The study is based on the premise that the politics of heritage conservation in Machu Picchu is a venue for understanding some of the social issues raised under the neoliberal agenda of Peru. The central problem is that a public asset is used for private gain at the expense of residents. Residents experience a fundamental contradiction between the neoliberal claim of a free market, and the hand of the government creating conditions that select some over others.

Specifically, this study will focus on the actions of a mobilization formed out of small-middle scale entrepreneurs’ operating in a tourism economy. Hypothetically, under neoliberalism, public goods in the form of state managed resources are privatized, but this observation does not tell us the complete story of the cultural processes and social relationships involved in the transformation. Drawing on the work of Erving Goffman, I use a critical dramaturgical approach to analyze interactions between the mobilization of participants and authorities in terms of an impression management process. I argue that by reframing public goods in neoliberal terms, the stage was set for dispossessing inhabitants. I connect heritage to economic structural adjustment through dispossession defined as practices involving “takings” of rights, civil status and the public
resources that accommodate for larger capital investments. In response, residents, though differently positioned socially, develop various strategies for coping with conservation mandates, and also organize collectively to challenge state policies. The following questions are examined: how is dispossession connected to positions of power; what is being taken; how is neoliberalism involved; finally and perhaps most difficult to answer, what effect does dispossession have on building public trust in governance?

**Background to the Problem**

In 1981 the Peruvian government established Machu Picchu as a national trust. At that time the state claimed most of the land comprising the district of Machu Picchu as a public good — as an “intangible” national resource; an area of 32,592 hectares was thus made a historical and natural sanctuary. The rationale for the state’s expropriation of the land was the protection and conservation of natural and cultural resources such as the Inca Trail, the Inca Citadel of Machu Picchu, native plants and fauna. Thus, people who live in the district of Machu Picchu now live in a state-managed and protected zone. In 1983 the geographical area was inscribed onto the United Nations World Heritage List as both a cultural and natural monument in recognition “of the Inca Civilization” and “the beauty of the landscape.” To UNESCO’s World Heritage

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1 The term “public goods” is here used similarly to Charles Taylor’s notion of “irreducibly social goods,” defined as things valued not for the economic benefits of individuals, but something shared. As Taylor says, they are things acknowledged to be “not just for me and for you, but for us” (1995: 139). This is not to maintain that social goods are to be treated as a-historical or viewed homogenously by people, but rather as the product of culture around which collective responsibilities are engaged and notions of the public good recognized and even manipulated (see Craig Calhoun 1998).

2 Sometimes also written as one word Machupicchu
Committee this dual cultural and ecological aspect represents the ideal relationship of man to nature, symbolizing a past when man was in “harmony” with nature.

Over time, and certainly by the mid-1990s, state conservation agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGO), international governing bodies like UNESCO, foreign governments and large-scale private corporations, entered the area and encroached upon the jurisdiction of the district and took firm control on what local people considered to be their land. From the state’s perspective, however, the residents that control or have access to land are defined as “posesionarios,” (possessors); that is, they are granted possession or usufruct rights only and not ownership in the form of property titles. In terms of political control, many residents feel that money and power interests in the sanctuary trample upon the sovereignty of their district governance. Both state control and privatization efforts undermined what people see as democratic participation at a time when, after the Shining Path war and the end of the Fujimori regime, democracy seemed possible.

The ethnographic focus of this study is on residents in the district of Machu Picchu confronting heritage conservation efforts. In this account, I describe how a group of residents came to believe that possession status was not sufficient to protect their economic and social status under neoliberal reforms, and hence sought to obtain property titles. Two conflicting spatial categories, the District and the Sanctuary, came to a clash under privatization efforts. The state continues with the preservation rationale for expropriation and restrictions on
local people, but has contracted services in the Sanctuary to large-scale corporations that make competition impossible. What we see in the case of Machu Picchu is how deregulation, privatization, market solutions, and cutting expenditures for social services are advanced under the concept of cultural heritage (patrimony). My standpoint is that the best way to see this connection is not to focus only on the discursive constitutions of heritage sites, but examine it as part of a politics of public goods. A focus on heritage in terms of the politics of public goods sheds more light on how neoliberalism restructures social relationships as those goods are usually implicated in privatization policies. From this angle, we can assess at what point certain resources cease to be public goods, how they are threatened, and eventually who will be blamed for putting them in jeopardy.

**Neoliberalism and Latin America:**

Studies on neoliberal changes in Latin America have increasingly used and called for the need to use ethnographic methods in order to understand the human impact of the processes and consequences involved in reforms (Phillips 1998; Loker 1999; Edelman 1999; Gill 2000; Nash 2001; Colloredo-Mansfeld 2002; Chase 2002; Goldstein 2004). These studies have moved beyond the abstract idea of globalization in terms of uniform local-global processes, and incorporated cultural and historical factors underlying the way people interpret change (Barlett 1999; Edelman 1999). Different identities have been implicated differently through reforms, and some have sought to understand the social
dynamic shaping ethnicity, race, class and gender. In the Andes, for instance, neoliberal reforms have been shown to concurrently reproduce subordinate gender and racial categories through market interactions (Seligmann 2004). This dissertation adds to this growing body of ethnographic literature by providing a fine-grained analysis of how actors encounter and contend the current political economy of Peru. I seek to convey some of the ambiguities and binds that neoliberalism presents to social life in Peru.

Like globalization, the term neoliberalism can be a vague concept. As such, the development of neoliberalism must be understood in Latin America, as elsewhere, as a process (Gledhill 2004). Neoliberalism can be defined as the unyielding conviction that the market economy is both the most proficient and moral means for distributing goods in society and provides the theoretical framework supporting a capitalist form of production (Loker ibid: 11). Neoliberalism is also a set of policies organized around a political project that uses the idea of an unfettered market economy to organize society, but also varies in terms of geography and history (Gill 2000; Phillips 1998; Gledhill 2004). This definition is useful in that it does not lose sight of historical continuities, but also captures the current material as well as the juridical dimensions. The latter is important as anthropologists working in Latin America such as Hojman (1994), Gill (2000) link global capitalism to the growing trend in the use of state force and coercive practices involving the state apparatus, as well as vigilante “justice” as a response to state policy (Goldstein 2004). Others have argued that there is a trend to consolidate governance with free market ideology (Sanabria 1999), and
also have documented how mega corporations investing in Latin America can wield a great deal of political power in negotiating contracts with the government (Vilas 2004). Despite the neoliberal emphasis on free market dynamics over state intervention, these ethnographically informed studies point to the fact that global capitalism appears to require strong state efforts for its facilitation (Blim 2000).

Most recently, the emergence of neoliberalism in Latin America is connected to the debt crisis of the 1980s. However, such ideologies can originally be traced back to the philosophy of Adam Smith on the nature of markets, John Lock on the notion of private property, and later developed by the great classic economists such as David Ricardo and Thomas Malthus (Green 2003: 11). In Latin America, liberalism deeply inspired the actors behind the early 19th Century struggles for independence and the formation of the republics. By mid-19th Century many Latin American countries oriented their economic policies around an “export-led model” guided by liberal free-market policies (Bulmer-Thomas 1964: 46-118). Yet, liberalism was, as neoliberalism is today, not just an economic ideology of the market, but a philosophical movement by those who identified themselves as “free thinkers,” (pensadores liberales), and saw themselves as progressives, espousing notions of citizenship, individual liberty and private property (Mayer 2002: 292). One cannot think of dispossession in Latin America only as a consequence of liberalism. Dispossession has a history that reaches as far back as the conquest of the Americas. In fact, the emergence of liberalism had its share of aspirations for
repossession. Mallon (1995) showed that liberalism was not always the discourse of the elites, arguing that in mid-19th Century Mexico, some indigenous people interpreted and fought for their own versions of liberal reform. In Peru, Nugent (1997) shows that some communities initially embraced the ideals of a free market in view of breaking free from aristocratic relationships.

However, despite participation by subaltern people giving their own shape to liberalism, the practical consequences of such a political economy furthered dispossession because it was put into action through preexisting inequalities and power relations skewed against Indians. In the Andes, for example, Larson (2004) ties the rise of liberalism in the mid to late 19th Century to issues of race and Indian identity via the struggle to create modern nation-states. While liberal ideology led to the fall of the reviled Indian tribute system, it also meant that indigenous peoples were no longer entitled to “communal lands, local self-rule, and state protection” (ibid: 7). In some areas of Peru, the undermining of such rights played a crucial role of converting ethnic affiliations into what Larson calls a “racialized laboring underclass” (ibid: 164). In other areas, people nevertheless found ways of preserving communal ownership of lands by turning it over to the authority of their municipality, hence bypassing liberal reforms that promoted the privatization of lands de-legitimating indigenous claims (ibid: 12; Mayer 2002: 300).

The market crash that led to the great depression made many policy makers weary of liberalism, at least the laissez-faire kind (Green 2003: 11). After the 1930s, Latin America elites drew on Keynesian ideas to develop its Import
Substitution Industry model (ISI). The ISI paradigm attempted to develop domestic industry by protecting locally manufactured goods from foreign competition through tariffs on imports. In addition to tariffs, Latin American governments spent a great deal of capital building the necessary infrastructure for developing industry, imposed “price subsidies on basic foods,” and nationalized vital sectors such transportation, “oil, utilities, and iron and steel” (Green 2003: 23). Finally, countries inflated exchange rates to make imports cheap, and to keep inflation down (ibid).

While there were some successes, the broad trends of the ISI had both internal and external faults. Internally, poverty in many places throughout Latin America meant that the ISI had difficulty sustaining the domestic industry, and export production was in many cases uncompetitive as a result of the inefficiency of the ISI model. Although goods were produced domestically, machinery and other materials were imported to the extent that, in some cases such as in Costa Rica, the ISI model made local industry more dependent on foreign markets, rather than less (ibid: 22-27; Edelman 1999: 74). The oil crisis of 1973 increased the cost of petroleum, which increased the cost of everything from transportation to food production. Less developed countries were severely affected by the crisis leading ultimately to steep deficits in trade balance. As banks and lending institutions filled with “petrodollars” they offered loans to third world countries at low interests (Green 2003: 27-30).

As the balance of payment deficits for imports and development costs increased, Latin America became ever more dependent on foreign loans.
Throughout the 1970s most Latin American countries borrowed heavily from Western banks at low interest rates in pursuit of development, but those rates eventually increased, and ultimately along with trade deficits and extensive inflation, led to the debt crisis by the 1980s as Latin American countries (as in most of the “third world”) defaulted on payments (ibid). As a result, foreign creditors became determined in forcing their economic perspectives on reducing government intervention and promoting free market policies. The World Bank and the IMF\(^3\) intervened to impose structural adjustment programs that reflected the economic ideals of the Washington Consensus. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) put forward structural adjustment policies as a condition for debtor nations to obtain additional loans. The adjustment entailed the “triple prescription” of privatization, liberalization and deregulation, meaning privatizing many state operated sectors, integrating trade and investment with the global economy, and reducing state regulation of the economy (ibid: 39-46). Structural adjustment programs were not implemented across Latin America in uniform fashion, and neither were the practical consequences the same. Under Pinochet, Chile began its reforms in the 1970s. Ecuador phased in reforms more gradually, whereas first Bolivia in 1985 and then Peru in 1990 adopted a more abrupt “shock treatment” approach (Conagham et al 1990: 3-5; Pastor and Wise 1992, Phyllips 1998).

In Peru, along with the debt crisis, the 1980s saw *Shining Path* insurgents engaged in a violent revolutionary struggle against the state. The war had

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\(^3\) Both institutions are creations of the Bretton Woods Conference of 1944 to establish an international monetary system.
devastating social repercussions. Rural inhabitants were often caught between the violence of the military and that of the Shining Path (Degregori 1990, Poole & Renique 1992). However, in the early nineties, the military gained the upper hand on Shining Path with the capture of its leaders. President Fujimori made an international effort to attract direct foreign investments and to change the image of Peru as a dangerous place. A strong effort needed to be made to demonstrate to foreign investors the government’s commitment to transform the economy. As the U.S. Undersecretary of International Affairs of the Treasury commented on Latin America in 1992, “The countries that do not make themselves more attractive will not get investor’s attention. This is like a girl trying to get a boyfriend. She has to go out, have her hair done up, wear makeup” (Green 2003: 103-104). Hence, one of President Fujimori’s creations was PromPeru\(^4\) an organization charged with coordinating and fostering activities related to the promotion of Peru to a global audience and for attracting foreign investment. PromPeru also used foreign media to help build a tourist market by creating interest in the Peruvian pre-Columbian past by diffusing information through sources such as the New York Times and the Discovery Channel. Nationally, PromPeru advanced social and cultural projects meant to increase local awareness of the significance of tourism for the economy, offering workshops on improving services.\(^5\)

Machu Picchu reflects these structural adjustment and political shifts in Peru in a number of ways. First, the state-operated train system from Cuzco to

\(^4\) It stands for the Commission for the Promotion of Peru.

\(^5\) Interview with PromPeru representative: July 16, 1999, (Fieldnotes).
the town, and two major state operated hotels in the Sanctuary were sold to the multinational corporation *Orient Express*, leading to an extremely unbalanced competition with residents working in the local tourist economy. Second, Machu Picchu factors into debt repayment issues through a “debt for nature” swap with Finland. Since 1995/6, a debt-for-nature exchange has existed between the Finnish government and Peru. Generally, a debt-for-nature exchange is a method of providing funds for nature conservation programs in third world countries, while simultaneously reducing their international debt. A first world government or an NGO buys a portion of a developing country's debt from a commercial bank on the international secondary market, usually at reduced prices. Usually, once the exchange is worked out, a national NGO carries out the selected conservation programs. The basic benefits to a recipient country include the reduction of debt and access to hard currency (Patterson 1990). In the case of Machu Picchu, the debt-for-nature exchange was based on Finland’s debt forgiveness over a loan default. The agreement required that a portion of that default be directed for nature conservation purposes. As a result the state directed approximately seven million dollars from the Finland loan towards the Sanctuary through the formation of the multinational and multi-institutional organization *Programa Machu Picchu* (PMP).

Third, the Sanctuary is the most important part of the burgeoning tourism industry of Peru encapsulating the interests of small, middle and large, as well as local, national and international stakeholders. Fourth, Machu Picchu is not just an asset for tourism but its iconic nature makes it a marketing tool to attract direct
foreign capital, and a symbol representing not just Peru’s Pre-Columbian past, but the new Peru as safe, secure and trustworthy for foreign investors.

**Heritage and Structural Adjustment:**

In Peru’s 2000 presidential elections, Fujimori won under dubious conditions. Under the pressure of the Organization of American States (OAS) reelections were held a few months later in which Fujimori lost to Alejandro Toledo. One of the striking aspects of this election was the role race played in the campaigns. Since Toledo has what are seen as “Indian features,” it seemed he was able to manipulate this quality to gain votes in the Andes, as his greatest support came from the sierra region. He represented himself as part of Peru’s pre-Columbian past and gained popular support, especially in Cuzco, the seat of the former Inca Empire. For the first time in Peruvian history, Toledo held his inauguration ceremony at the Citadel of Machu Picchu, using the site to call attention to Peru’s pre-Columbian origins. Unlike Fujimori, Toledo’s pre-election campaign emphasized anti-privatization policies, in particular, a promise to keep the hydroelectric companies in state hands. When Toledo entered office in July 2001, there were media discussions that a new Peruvian democracy was emerging after Fujimori’s ten-year authoritarian rule and the protracted war against the Shining Path.

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6 Racial categorizations in Peru differ from that of the United States in that it is not based on conceptions of blood-line. In Peru definitions of race often allude to cultural differences such as education, dress and custom rather than biological notions—(See de La Cadena 2000).
Toledo placed a great deal of emphasis on increasing tourism in Peru. He, like his predecessor, stressed tourism as one of Peru’s greatest economic options and thus began seeking avenues to further develop the industry. However, in spite of his pre-election anti-privatization platform, once in office, he continued Fujimori’s neo-liberal agenda under the demands of the IMF. In less than a year, Toledo lost support even in the sierra. It seemed as though he was attempting to sell everything under state authority. Popular dissent followed, and in Cuzco anti-neoliberal protests invoked Machu Picchu as a rallying flag against the privatization efforts taking place. The politics of privatization merged with that of heritage conservation on both sides of the neoliberal debate.

The two major themes running through the heritage studies literature are “the nation” and “globalization.” The relationship between cultural heritage, nationalism and nation-building is well established (Handler 1985; Hewison 1987; Walsh 1992; Clifford 1997; Kirshenblatt-Gimblet 1998), as is the way representations of the past factor into contentious politics, and are hegemonic sites where people struggle over the interpretation of the past, and to redefine identities (Handler and Gable 1997; Bender 1998; Meskell 2002). Barbara Bender’s (1998) innovative ethnographic study of Stonehenge is instructive to showing how heritage is a locus for identity struggles. Bender explores the multiple ways in which the history of the Stonehenge landscape is told in order to analyze how points of view and access to the ruins are embroiled in a hegemonic struggle of class and marginalized identities. Commendably, Bender’s pluralistic approach includes such contemporary points of view as Druid worshippers,
generally excluded from participating in the public record of heritage interpretation because they do not fall within the boundaries of official history. Nevertheless, Bender fails to mention that Stonehenge, like Machu Picchu, is also a world heritage site with links to international institutions like UNESCO, which despite its attempt to preserve culture from the forces of globalization, has its own global codifying effects (Nas 2002: 142). Also, unlike Machu Picchu, Stonehenge is not entangled in a debt-for-nature agreement where one state can use the foreign debt of another in return for influence over conservation.

Several authors have linked the growth of the heritage industries to economic restructuring, and the development of media and information technologies. Some scholars have noted how the global economy is the basis for a proliferation of cultural images and signs (Lash and Urry 1994), and the marketing of culture and history (Featherstone 1991). Greater emphasis is being placed on examining heritage as a product of globalization in terms of development projects connected to international conservation efforts. Numerous scholars have linked the growth of heritage sites around the world since the 1970’s to the creation of UNESCO’s World Heritage Committee (Handler 1991; Walsh 1992; Lowenthal 1998; Edinsor 1998; Nas 2002). However, less attention has been paid to how pressure from the international financial system, (in addition to conservation institutions), influence governance, and to how heritage factors into state reorganization under such pressures.
The state, like the nation is also socially constructed, reified, as well as its territory and authority represented symbolically. Heritage designations play a role in the construction of the state in a number of ways. Heritage can play a role in giving shape to projects that define and represent the state to the rest of the world. For example, heritage can be drawn on to represent state economic policy and used for attracting direct foreign investments (see illustration page xiii). Heritage entails boundaries codified by jurisdiction. As is the case, in Peru heritage is legally designated and managed under the auspices of the central government, as opposed to provincial or local governments. Finally, through heritage, we see a particular way in which the “retreating” neoliberal state reappears with different institutional arrangements and forms of coercion. Heritage provides the state with expropriating power that can be a venue for an accumulation by dispossession strategy.

Some scholars, such as Harvey (1990, 2003) and Brenner (1998), have reasoned that one of the main driving forces behind neoliberal reforms is the use of global capital reaching out to find ever-new places for investment. These geographers have noted how the control of space factors into global capitalism in terms of “accumulation strategies” or the “scalar fix.” In order to accumulate surplus value investors need to sidestep geographical barriers, as well as control territory (ibid.). Harvey argues that increasingly common on a global scale is the trend to sidestep juridical and cultural barriers, often thought of as rights or forms

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8 In contrast, heritage in the United States can be designated federally or by state and even counties.
of protection that block new areas of investment. Drawing on Marx’s notion of “primitive accumulation,” he examines the factors involved in separating people from situations that obstruct capitalism (2003: 145).⁹

Harvey ties the imperial impulses of global capital to dispossession of land and property as a way of clearing away smaller property holders to make way for larger investments, and for producing cheaper labor, identifying state force as the primary means (149). This “taking from Peter to give to Paul,” involves investment opportunities that may “lie idle,” blocked for investments by property titles, land rights and many other juridical entanglements.¹⁰

Dispossession strategies in the form of seizures and expulsions can free assets cheaply, releasing them for use (ibid.). Harvey defines neoliberalism as “the cutting edge of accumulation by dispossession,” and argues “the state, with its monopoly of violence and definitions of legality, plays a crucial role in both backing and promoting these processes…” (ibid: 157).

While concurring with much of Harvey’s position, from an ethnographic perspective dispossession becomes difficult to understand because one sees up close more of the convoluted and contradictory details. First, not only land but also civil-status is threatened, and social identities are implicated. Second, dispossession in this case study is as much about creating a social order prescribed by an economic ideology, as it is about capital accumulation. Third,

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⁹ Roger Bartra (1974) did a similar analysis in which he applied the notion of a “permanent primitive accumulation” in the case of Mexico. He argued that the contradiction between the necessity of a peasantry and the penetration of capitalism into the Mexican countryside makes the process of primitive accumulation an unresolved and ongoing process.

¹⁰ A possible example drawn from the United States is when local governments use the rationale of Urban Renewal to invoke the power of eminent domain and expropriate smaller holds of private property both for larger capital investments, as well as for generating local tax revenues lost under economic restructuring.
understanding forms of dispossession under Peru’s structural adjustment program requires consideration of the country’s historical particulars, specifically the way the civil war violence of the 1980s between government forces and Shining Path shaped state – citizen relations. Hence, I argue that dispossession under neoliberalism includes pressures from the global economy, as well as local cultural and historical factors that combine to form a hegemonic process. Cultural hegemony is understood here, not simply as the attainment of consent, but as a process around which people of differing power positions struggle over how situations should be defined (Roseberry 1994: 366). It is socially expressed as Raymond Williams puts it, as a “[C]omplex of experiences, relationships and activities, with specific and changing pressures and limits…. It has continually to be renewed, recreated, defended and modified” (1989:112). Included in this process is also the notion of “counter-hegemony” (ibid). That is to say, the other side of the neoliberal reordering of life and its relation to dispossession that needs to be included in an analysis is the consequence of contestation, in terms of both opposition to and incorporation in that reordering. Under threat, subordinate groups are themselves at times willing to sacrifice other, less powerful people on the altar of dispossession. For instance, in Machu Picchu residents struggling against corporate intrusions to carve out their own niche may exclude other local people who occupy more marginal economic positions. I am ambivalent about calling the struggle that takes place between small-scale capital holders competing to control the fringes of an economic niche as a capital accumulation strategy, without failing to consider the power dynamics that give
people little choice; perhaps this struggle is better described as a survival strategy. As subordinate groups search for economic and political security, as well as autonomy, they also, as Lagos points out, create new forms of domination (1994: 4). In order to place dispossession in its proper social context, it will be useful to consider from different angles how public goods, and structural adjustment involve managing credibility or discrediting subjects as a way of unraveling rights to things.

**The Dramaturgy of Dispossession:**

Erving Goffman’s dramaturgical approach is a style of organizing social interaction in terms of a theatrical performance, in which social actors are seen as creating “impressions” congruous with their goals (Goffman 1959: 17). Individual actors or teams are involved in mutually shaping each other’s presentations to the effect that each actor must “manage” the kind of information communicated to the other. The crux of impression management is that people must constantly demonstrate to an audience that they are who they say they are. Goffman asserts that, “when an individual plays a part he implicitly requests his observers to take seriously the impression that is fostered before them. They are asked to believe that the character they see actually possesses the attributes he appears to possess, that the task he performs will have the consequences that are implicitly claimed for it, and that, in general, matters are what they appear to be” (ibid). However, impressions are also regularly challenged by others.
Phillip Manning’s (2000) insight into Goffman’s theatrical metaphor is particularly useful in this case. Manning argues that impression management is understood best not so much as theater, but as the “production and reproduction of credibility” (ibid: 8). This approach to dramaturgy has the advantage of providing a better framework for demonstrating how the social interactions described ethnographically bear out consequences reflective of broader social processes because one is better able to see a connection between a given impression and what is at stake in the performance. Goffman’s work on stigma to a great degree illustrates this approach to dramaturgy, and also to how it is tied to various forms of dispossession. Goffman saw stigma as a characteristic that is “deeply discrediting” but more as expressive of relationships, rather than the attributes of given individuals (Goffman 1963: 3). As Goffman noted, we all carry some kind of information about ourselves that can discredit our worth (ibid. 128-29). Hence, the conceptual tools posited by Goffman in Stigma can be treated more broadly as a cultural theory of power and domination that is to some degree implicit in all social interactions. The dramaturgy of stigma is useful to understanding social struggles such as those involved in economic survival in that the stigmatized like the discredited is “discounted” legally or informally from rights, merits and access to resources (1963: 5).

Applied to the case of Machu Picchu, the social production of credibility involves demonstrating that actors are either protecting or damaging a public treasure. Conservation efforts bring into play a process of discrediting that attempt to dissolve rights, individually and collectively. For the inhabitants of
Machu Picchu being discounted is based on having inappropriate identities relative to the ideals of the landscape. That is to say, their activities either destroy nature or they do not have the “authentic,” viz. commercialized, Andean identity appropriate for the expectations of tourists. In short, their presence spoils the Sanctuary for investors, and that spoilage also provides the rationale for separating people from claims to property. Counter maneuvers on the part of residents involve claims that attempt to discredit authorities as incapable of protecting a public good. For instance, a mobilization of residents exerted pressure on state authorities to bring legal charges against a beer company that damaged the *Intihuatana* (sun dial) of the citadel during the filming of a commercial in which local authorities were accused of providing fraudulent authorization. In addition, the mobilization argued that the state was not doing enough to return artifacts said to have been illegally taken by Hiram Bingham, the “discoverer” of the Machu Picchu citadel (taken up in the next chapter) and currently in the possession of Yale University.

While Goffman did not discuss “things,” it should be noted that property, land and possessions can be seen as stigmatized, as in the case of toxic spills, murder and suicide scenes, spirit haunting, areas deemed susceptible to natural disasters, or other social stains that negatively affect value or marketability. They can even entail a dispossession of a population if places are defined as public

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11 In September 2000 the U.S. publicity firm “J. Walter Thompson” filmed a commercial for a subsidiary of Backus and Johnson, Peru’s largest beer company. While the film crew received permission from regional Instituto Nacional de Cultura (INC) representatives it was not officially cleared at the central level. Also the film crew used an unauthorized 1000-pound crane not suitable for the terrain.

12 I do not know what artifacts from the Bingham expedition, if any, actually is in Yale University’s possession. The point here is not to claim that Yale University does indeed have such artifacts, only that many residents believed they did.
hazards and people moved for their own welfare. These cases might also factor into accumulation strategies in that property can later be purchased at below market prices and with time or some investment can be cleaned up, disassociated with the negative image or perhaps even turned into a tourist attraction. In Machu Picchu there is such a factor in that the pueblo is in a location susceptible to landslides and flash floods. The state has drawn plans to relocate the population for its own safety, but unsurprisingly it makes no plans to stop tourism, the PeruRail train service and major hotels from operating in those areas. Indeed, according to one disaster study, the anticipated trajectory of a flash flood from one of the rivers heads directly into the large scale Pueblo Hotel, but no suggestion has ever been made that they be moved.\textsuperscript{13} Interestingly, when such contradictions are pointed out, disaster prone land too gets turned back to stigmatizing residents, in that their activities are often blamed for setting them in motion.

What this dissertation shows through the social production of credibility is how the Machupiccheños struggle with authorities and themselves to define the role of the state, the nature of public goods, under whose auspices those goods should be controlled, and what should or should not be privatized. In this clash, actors simultaneously demonstrate incompatible positions to different audiences that challenge credibility and results in blame over who destroys the Sanctuary. How do residents defend themselves and negotiate existence in this institutional maze of local, national and international organizations, often staffed by people

\begin{footnote}{See Plan Para la Mitigacion de Desastres del Poblado de Machu Picchu – Aguas Calientes, 2001. Note map of security zones and escape routes.}\end{footnote}
with conflicting interests? How do authorities maintain credibility with a population largely against neoliberalism and also appear credit worthy to international financial institutions and investors, not to mention consistent to the citizenry with the government’s own ideological commitments? These questions will be explored in the following chapters.

A Note on Methods and Data:

In my fieldwork I followed a grassroots mobilization community made up largely of small-scale entrepreneurial residents of the district of Machu Picchu, located in the Sanctuary of Machu Picchu. The mobilization challenged the national and international authorities that converged with big business to appropriate lands in the region; it provides the analysis with the social contexts for assessing how power relationships associated with dispossession are shaped and disputed. While I focus on the actions of this mobilization, this is not an account of heroic resistance or absolute oppression. It is, rather, a portrayal of the dilemmas and contradictions faced by the residents of different occupational and class status as they understand and deal with the power of large-scale investors and government control. In their encounters with economic reforms, people attempt to redefine social relationships in ways that broaden their range of possibilities, collectively and individually.

The data collected from September 2001 until July 2002 consists of visual and audio taped interactions of mobilization participants engaged in formal dialogue with state conservation authorities, as well as semi-structured
interviews, non-taped conversations and discussions with the participants and other pueblo residents about these problems. My study also includes the standard ethnographic methods such as participant observation in daily life activities in the pueblo and rural areas. Though the district demarcates the basic research unit, (and considering the history of the area there is good reason for such a focus), I move on to a broader social field related to inequality, cultural differences, urban-rural dynamics and beyond, and call attention to the internal schisms of the district. I do not assume that people are homogenous in their positions. I seek to show how people are variously positioned, engage the issues differently, and are simultaneously brought together or pulled apart by the processes. As the title “Shades of Dispossession” suggests, I maintain that people are implicated in different ways and stand to lose different kinds of resources in the state’s push to implement neoliberal policies.14

As in all ethnographic writing, the untidy mixture of actual life is given order. As a way of giving the reader a sense of my subject positioning, and my subjective positioning of the main actors and the topics encountered in the following pages, I begin my description of Machu Picchu with an event that took place towards the end of my fieldwork. However, it must be noted that the actors are numerous and complex, and motivated by multiple purposes that at best a description allow us to capture only a slice of the multifaceted players involved.

14 There is a large anthropological literature on the concept of community in Latin America, particularly how people develop an awareness of community, and the ideological role it can play in class formation. See in particular, Wolf 1957 and 1986. Also see Roseberry 1989, Smith 1989, and Lagos 1994.
The Pollada Fundraiser:

In mid-April 2002, the members of Frente de Defensa de los Intereses de Machu Picchu (The Front in Defense of the Interests of Machu Picchu, hereby referred to as Frente)15, the local nongovernmental association elected as the watchdog group to protect the interests of the district, decided to hold a “pollada” to raise money to hire a lawyer. A pollada is essentially a chicken grill fest popularized in Peru during the debt crisis era of the 1980’s as a fundraising strategy used by people to draw on neighborhood resources, often to help pay for personal expenses such as medical, home improvements or family debts. The organizer sells tickets for the event to his neighbors who, because of the personal relationships involved, often feel compelled to participate. The organizer provides the chicken (and meat), the beverages as well as the music, and sets up a party stand in a communal location. On this occasion, Frente saw raising money for a lawyer as necessary to begin the legal process to change the sanctuary law that they felt divests them of property titles, hence they thought of the pollada as an event in the interest of all Machupicheños; as we will see others saw it differently.

The preparations began in the morning hours. I hurried down to the plaza to film the event. On my way down I waved to Emilio who was busy sweeping the front of his hotel. When I first arrived to the pueblo, Emilio took me in at the recommendation of his niece in Cuzco, Teresa, who worked as a tour guide, and who I had interviewed on an earlier fieldwork trip. It was Teresa who first alerted

15 This form of organization is not unique to Machu Picchu. Many communities throughout Peru have Frente watch dog groups.
me to many of the problems experienced by the residents of Machu Picchu. Her Uncle, Emilio, was active in one of the barrio associations, and he played an important part in my fieldwork, as it was he who negotiated my residency with the municipality and my acceptance into the pueblo.

I reached the plaza where I found Charo preparing the grill. Charo, a woman in her mid-thirties, and a hotel owner, held the office of secretary in the Frente group. She is outspoken and sharp witted, and probably at the time, the closest ally of Oscar Valencia, the President of Frente. Oscar Valencia, the president of the local watchdog group Frente de Defensa de los Intereses de Machu Picchu was well suited for the task. He carefully inspected the laws and rules of the Sanctuary to form strategies against conservation authorities. Oscar was a contentious figure in that many related his disputes with authorities to his political ambitions to be mayor. Furthermore, Oscar had a powerful communication instrument at his disposal; he was the director of Radio Machu Picchu, one of two stations broadcasting in the pueblo, and used it often as a platform for building support for his politics.

Be it as it may, though Oscar’s subordinate, Charo was in her own right a master of the art of rebuttal, in both joking exchanges as well as more serious ones. Next to Charo were Eber and a few other men involved in assembling the gazebo and arranging chairs and tables. Eber and his wife were steadfast supporters of Frente. While Eber made a living as a mystical tour guide, his wife belonged to one of the oldest families and perhaps one of the largest land possessors in the pueblo. Corina arrived with her husband Guillermo who went
over to help Eber. Corina, worked for Frente as treasurer, but was also the president of an artisan association. She owned an artisan and jewelry shop on the main street of the pueblo. I saw Corina as having a wonderful combination of elegance and humility.

As the grill was ready, and firewood delivered, Charo pulled the marinated chicken pieces out from their basins to begin cooking. Alberto arrived to help set up the radio for the music, and so he searched for an electrical outlet. He found one just off the plaza on a narrow street leading to the market that was occupied by small vendors. The vendors shared the outlet and the electrical costs but Alberto wished to use it for the festivities. One of the market women protested asking him who would pay the bill. Alberto argued that it was for a just cause and that she should allow them the use of the outlet. “The pollada is for helping the whole pueblo fight this law” he said, “You know very well that no one here owns their land.” The woman quipped back, “That doesn’t concern me, I have no land I have to rent.” At this, Alberto, a restaurant and hotel owner became angry. His response was telling of the kinds of divisions one finds in the pueblo, and of the politics of belonging. He shrieked, “Damn you get out of this pueblo, what are you doing here!” The woman let out a slew of insults in retaliation saying, “Who are you to kick me out.” They went back and forth with insults until Alberto agreed to pay half of the electric bill. Nevertheless, they parted angry at each other. Making sense of class difference was a challenge during fieldwork, not from a broad perspective but in considering the subtleties that complicate neat categories. The market woman does have a market-stand and a claim on
property that could benefit from a title whereas street vendors with no market space cannot. She is however, speaking not so much as a market vendor but as a resident with no claim to land and must rent her living space. The distinction stresses, along with wealth differences in the pueblo, the politics of belonging.

Marina walked about the plaza with the tickets, inviting people to participate. Marina is a restaurant and artisan shop owner and was also an elected member of Frente. At the cashier table, Regina and Marta exchanged the tickets for the food. They, along with Marina, Charo and Corina were five of the most politically engaged women of the pueblo; and there were many others. Marta, Alberto’s wife was a caring mother, leader of one of the pueblo’s artisan association, and also actively managed the family restaurant and hotel business. She like many of the women described in these pages do most of the work in the family, domestic and business, and still finds the time to be actively concerned with pueblo life and politics. Regina was an office holder in Frente, but unlike Marta was not as economically well off, making a living at running a small food stand in the market; she was however, equally as caring for her family and as hard working as Marta. The political actions of women in the pueblo cannot generally be understood as subordinate to men, as their participation in the public sphere was often equal to men and at times dominant. However, domestically women were burdened with greater labor demands that were often
valued as something less. It illustrates how different spheres of life can bring together dominant and subordinate definitions of gender (Lagos 2002).¹⁶

The food was ready to be served. Margarita, the Vice President of Frente came down from her hotel “Gringo Bill’s,” nicely dressed, covered in a fine alpaca shawl, to eat lunch. Margarita, originally from the town of Paucartambo in Cuzco, arrived to the pueblo of Machu Picchu in the early 1980’s shortly after marrying her American husband Bill. Margarita was perhaps the most “cosmopolitan” of the pueblo residents with whom I interacted. I often thought of Margarita as a shrewd businesswoman, though she credited her now estranged husband for much of their initial success. Together they invested early during the growing tourism economy of the pueblo and as a result built one of the most successful local hotels. Margarita would often recall with amazement at how the pueblo had grown from the time she opened her business, when there were only two other local hotels to approximately thirty today.

People sat under the gazebo eating and drinking; local families gathered at the tables but soon after eating left to make room for others. Even a few tourists joined, eating alongside their large backpacks. Raúl drank beer with two acquaintances at the end of a row of tables. Raúl was the president of one of the barrios and had become very active in pueblo activities, organizing sports events for the children. I thought of Raúl as a kind man, very caring of the children in the pueblo. He, like Emilio, played a crucial role in helping me get established in the town. Raúl was nevertheless a controversial figure. Though he did not hold

¹⁶ There is a large body of literature discussing women as key protagonists in social change in Latin America. See Jelin 1990, Bose and Acosta-Belen 1995, Stephen 1997.
an office in Frente he was a staunch supporter of it and he had aspirations of becoming Mayor. In fact, some six years earlier he had been the Lieutenant Mayor of the pueblo, but left under a cloud of allegations of misappropriations by mixing his business and political affairs to create and invest in a municipal bus company. He was one of the most vociferous of the mobilizers, and one who often added a strong nationalist tone to the protest rhetoric.

Raúl was not the only one with political aspirations. The fieldwork took place during an election year, and many, particularly those in Frente had interests in holding office in the local government. I often found weighing in the role that political ambition played in the mobilization against sanctuary authorities and corporate interests difficult. Assessing the ultimate motives of the protest created a mix of feelings. On the one hand the protest was clearly a response to the abuses of sanctuary authorities favoring corporate capital, but on the other hand the protest was often embroiled in political campaigning. However, I was satisfied with the realization that local politics is an ever present feature of life and what must be considered most in this study is how strongly it addressed issues of neoliberalism, and to what consequence.

By evening the Pollada got spicier as people drank beer and danced. Alberto and Margarita danced wildly in the tap dance style of Huayno music. Many, including myself, were inebriated but I continued filming. Eber caught sight of me and pointed an accusatory finger, saying, “Pendejo! Eres un
pendejo!” (You are a pendejo). Eber, who was really just teasing me in a friendly manner, was nevertheless commenting on my taking advantage of the role I was assigned by the protestors, and one which I welcomed as ethnographer, to visually document the interactions between the mobilizers and the authorities of the sanctuary. Most anthropologists take cameras, video equipment, tape recorders and microphones to the field as a way of documenting their ethnography. The technological gadgets associated with the “consumer-crazed” North American and European countries often enter into the Serrano definition of the “gringo” and what one comes to expect of them. This can be seen in the modern renditions of the *pishtaco* (human fat stealers) figures that are often said to be gringos who come to steal human fat to fuel the machineries of the North. Gadgets, particularly cameras are also often what one comes to expect a tourist to have, and as they are most often gringos, it is a short step to make an association. In one sense, the role of cameraman perhaps allowed people to keep me at a certain distance by positioning me to the more familiar behavior expected of tourists, since they understood that I, like a tourist, was not really implicated in the problems they endure. In another sense it was more and that will be examined in more depth later.

The women gathered in a corner by the radio, singing together the sad romantic lyrics of huayno music. Corina yelled over to Eber to put on the song

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17 “Pendejo” is a Spanish slang term that changes in meaning and intensity depending on the context and country it is spoken; its meaning can alternate from someone who is sneaky and clever to someone who is dim-witted. Here the term refers to someone who is being sneaky or crafty.
“El Mal Paso”\textsuperscript{18} (The Bad Stumble). It had become inspirational to their mobilization, and the strength it provided represented to me the subjective and enigmatic dimensions of life that no ethnographic eye or camera could penetrate.

Charo hurried Eber to find the CD adding that the song is “our” song, a dedication to Frente de Defensa. As Eber searched, the women sang the lyrics:

\begin{quote}
Todo el mundo se admiró del mal paso que yo di,
Como no me admiro yo de otros que hacen peor que yo.
[The whole world was astonished at my bad stumble, I am not astonished at others who stumble worse than I]

Al fin todo terminará, al fin todo se acabará,
La mala huella de tu querer con retirarme se acabará.
[In the end everything is over, everything comes to an end, The bad traces of your love will be over when I leave]

Por confiada te entregue la llave de mi corazón,
Quiero que me la devuelvas porque mañana me voy.
[In trusting you I gave you the key to my heart I want it back because tomorrow I am leaving]

El hilo de mi destino, a donde me llevará,
Lo que siento es por mi cholo\textsuperscript{19}, en que brazos se quedará
[Where will the thread of my destiny take me? What I feel is for my sweetheart, in whose arms will he end up]
\end{quote}

Rosa, Alberto’s sister turned to me and said, “Pellegrino, por favor” please put the video camera away. Eber located the CD just as Charo grabbed and swung me onto the plaza where others convened, forcing me to leave my camera behind. As the song came over the radio, the evening train brought Oscar who quickly joined the circle, as we all started to dance.

\textsuperscript{18} “El Mal Paso” sung by Nancy Manchego produced by “Sentimiento Peru” Lima, Peru.

\textsuperscript{19} In Peru “cholo” is a highly loaded word that often refers to race. It can be used pejoratively, but also as in the song it can be used as a term of endearment. In this context I translate the term as sweetheart.
Chapter Summary

This extended essay is divided into seven chapters. The first chapter gives the reader a basic description of the district of Machu Picchu. The chapter begins with an overview of the history of the Sanctuary of Machu Picchu, focusing on the role of intellectuals in the United States and Peru. I then focus on the growth of the district and the pueblo, examining the role of shifting agrarian relations and economic development efforts. The latter entails the building of the current railroad system as a means for transporting natural resources for export in the world economy, and later for the growth of tourism.

The historical context inserted into neoliberal efforts underscores the rationale for inclusion and exclusion of certain individuals. That is, the historical conjunctures provide a framework for interpreting the value Machu Picchu has to the State’s neoliberal vision for Peru.

The second chapter introduces the reader to the salient relationships in the district of Machu Picchu and describes in more depth the social, political, and economic changes created by neoliberalism. This chapter shows what neoliberalism means for the inhabitants, relative to their particular economic conditions and social positions. Finally, chapter two examines the factors behind the mobilization in the pueblo, and the class dynamics of its organization.

Chapter three starts the main focus of this dissertation as I turn my attention to the processes leading to dispossession. I begin by discussing the elements drawn into the process, namely identity and the public good characterized by the state as the intangible value of nature. I draw on Erving
Goffman’s work on asylums to describe how law and market forces converge to create an institutional rationale to dispossess people of their rights and belongings. This chapter tries to show how adaptations to the institutional environment escalate the stakes for the actors involved. On the one hand, it provides governing officials with further reason to dispossess, but on the other hand there is a dialectical tension motivating people into new levels of political organizing.

The fourth chapter continues the theme of the third. It goes on to describe how residents organized to protect their holdings and discuss the challenges they faced in encountering the governing hierarchies. If chapter three examines dispossession mainly in terms of property, chapter four highlights the role of political dispossession in facilitating corporate interests.

Next, I examine in detail the official meetings between the pueblo protestors and the state authorities, and with others. I focus on the language of neoliberalism through which actors attempt to construct a global reality most suitable to their cause. To untangle these discussions I use a dramaturgical approach to make sense of the way players reposition each other around an imaginative audience. Here I pay a great deal of attention to the way the framework for discussions is put together in various contexts to show in Roseberry’s terms (1994) why they work or fail, and what makes them fragile. I examine why changes were made on the part of the pueblo that can be considered advancing neoliberal re-organization. In chapter six I relate the formal meetings in chapter five to discussions that unfolded outside the purview
of authorities, but in response to them. Hence I juxtapose the framework for official interactions with a more hidden set of developments that led to a full stoppage. This chapter analyzes the decision-making style of the mobilization, and examines how credibility defines their situation in terms of a course of action.

Finally, in chapter seven, I assess the outcome of protest. I discuss how people came to different conclusions about their activities, and how residents were empowered in some ways but fragmented in other ways, as a re-enforced Machu Picchu identity also entailed exclusionary results.
“In the first place our pueblo is not called Aguas Calientes; we are the Pueblo of Machu Picchu!”
(En Primer lugar el pueblo no se llama Aguas Calientes, somos el Pueblo de Machu Picchu).
~Eber, the Pueblo of Machu Picchu (Fieldnotes 6-28-02)

Preludes and Contexts:

The Quechua term *Machu Picchu* basically translates into “Old Mountain” or “Old Peak.” As a place name, the term initially referred to the name of a mountain located on the eastern slope of the southern Peruvian Andes about 70 kilometers east of the City of Cuzco. However, over time a political district, a rural town, an archeological site, and a nature reserve also came to be called Machu Picchu.

The district of Machu Picchu is located in the province of Urubamba in the Department of Cuzco, Peru. The district was established in 1941, some forty years prior to the state’s creation of a historical and natural sanctuary in 1981, forty-two years before it was inscribed in UNESCO’s World Heritage List in 1983, but thirty years after the discovery of the Incan Citadel. The district is comprised of a pueblo, which is the capital of the district, and four rural campesino communities. Like the district, the pueblo capital is also called Machu Picchu, though many in Peru and even in the City of Cuzco, not to mention foreigners, refer to it as “Aguas Calientes,” (Hot Springs). For many in the town,
the term in the form of “Machupicheño” has, since the formation of the Sanctuary, slowly evolved into a symbol of identity connoting one’s right to live in the pueblo. This identity aspect, of who or who is not a Machupicheño, as we shall see later, factors heavily into a rhetoric of defense against the intrusions by corporate and state control. Unfortunately, it is also part of a politics of exclusion whereby some residents claim to have more right to live in the Sanctuary than other more recent arrivals.

In addition, Machu Picchu refers to the famous Citadel. The Citadel of Machu Picchu rests on a ridge cradled between the mountains Machu Picchu and Huayna Picchu. It is not known what the Incas called their Citadel or the mountains between which it is positioned. The Citadel harbors the same name as one of the mountains, but reference to these mountains can be dated only as far back as the mid-19th Century (Tamayo Herrera, 1981). The use of the name *Machu Picchu* for the Citadel became common after the historian and explorer Hiram Bingham popularized the area with the account of his “discovery” expedition. In his writings, Bingham often used the name of the mountain and the archeological ruins interchangeably, leading to the current popular usage. A New York Times article on Bingham’s discovery provided one of the first public accounts:

He [Bingham] has just announced that he has had the superb good fortune to discover an entire city, two thousand years old, a place of splendid palaces and temples and grim encircling walls hidden away so thoroughly on the top of a well-nigh inaccessible mountain peak of the Peruvian Andes…. He calls it Machu Picchu. (NYT, Jun. 15, 1913).

21 Huayna Picchu is also a Quechua term generally translated into English as “Young Mountain” or “Young Peak”
Finally, both the Citadel and the mountain of Machu Picchu are located in a national park of over 32 thousand hectares that is officially called “El Santuario Historico de Machu Picchu” (The Historical Sanctuary of Machu Picchu).

It is important to note the various intersecting spaces called “Machu Picchu” because the development of each is based on different but overlapping historical processes, leading to conflicts in administration and control among diverse governing authorities. Moreover, it connotes the different ways the Machupicheños are implicated in conservation regulations that would otherwise be obscured by the generic use of the same name. A probe into the history that shaped the current social relationships in the district is necessary for understanding the way differently located residents deal with their specific problems.

**Intellectuals and the making of the Landscape:**

Whatever it may have meant to the Inca, it is clear that as knowledge of the archeological site spread throughout the world, Machu Picchu came to mean many things to many people. The Citadel of Machu Picchu has been the subject of popular myths, legends, novels and poetry, and an attraction for spiritual groups, and tourists. The Chilean poet Pablo Neruda made Machu Picchu the topic of an epic poem on human suffering and aspiration. The monument’s history as an icon for different ideologies and identities has often placed it at the center of regional, national and international politics.
As noted above, the modern image of Machu Picchu and its surrounding landscape began with the 1911 expedition by the Yale historian Hiram Bingham, who “discovered” what he believed to be Vilcabamba, the city to which the last Incas had retreated from the Spanish Conquest. In a series of photographs published in the *National Geographic Magazine*, Bingham’s presentation of Machu Picchu captured the imagination of North American and European audiences. His vivid descriptions of the Andes combined with his description of the site helped to make Machu Picchu one of South America’s most spectacular tourist destinations. The Andes, as Poole notes had already captured the imagination of many North Americans prior to Bingham, in the romantic artistic depiction of Frederic Edwin Church’s *Heart of the Andes* in 1859 which featured in exhibitions in the Metropolitan Museum of Art and other New York locations, as well as an Andean engraving by Ephraim George Squier in 1868 (Poole 1998: 108). Poole’s subtle visual genealogy of the Andes connects visual culture to economic and political relations between the North/South by noting the way visual representations are given material shape. Just as the landscape portraits of the 19th Century American transcendental movement helped construct notions of the American Nation and the “future of the country,” Poole argues that they fed into government notions of “Manifest Destiny” which by Bingham’s time meant a “Pan-American” control on the part of the United States (ibid: 110).

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22 For a biography on the life of Hiram Bingham see Daniel Cohen 1984
23 For a discussion of Bingham’s archeological interpretations see James Norman 1968. For an autobiographical account of Bingham’s expedition see Hiram Bingham 1930 and 1981 [1948].
Scientific expeditions such as Bingham’s were often implicated with, or co-opted, by Euro-American imperialist projects, with negative consequences (Smith: 1994 & 2003). Godlewska and Smith (1994) have argued that geographical knowledge played an important role in the European and American colonial expansion. The supposed objective stance of scientific expeditions often concealed specific sets of social relations that assisted in the conquest and governance of territories (ibid.: 3). In addition, the National Geographic Society also played a significant role in constructing an image of non-Western cultures as exotic others (Rothenberg 1994). Lutz and Collins (1993), for instance, show that images in the National Geographic Magazine was a common way that many North Americans learned about other cultures (ibid.: 1). In the case of Machu Picchu, Flores Ochoa (1996) notes how tourist guidebooks for Cuzco began appearing within only a few years of the National Geographic publications.

Bingham transformed his expedition into a “discovery and adventure narrative,” common to the western genre of “great explorers” (Said 1994). In his book *Machu Picchu: A Citadel of the Incas* (1930) we find photographs with captions entitled “The Most Inaccessible Corner of the Most Inaccessible Section of the Central Andes” (Bingham in Poole 1998: 123). Not surprisingly, his account was to become many years later the inspiration for the fictional character “Indiana Jones” in the film *Raiders of the Lost Ark* (A. Bingham 1987.) The beauty of the landscape deeply inspired Bingham. He compared it with “the majestic grandeur of the Canadian Rockies” and the beauty of his native land of

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24 For further reading on the imperialistic relationship between images of the Andean landscape and the United States see Poole “Landscape and the Imperial Subject.”
Hawaii (Bingham 1948). His discovery narrative was interwoven with western romantic notions of nature as pristine, describing it with phrases like “matchless charm,” and referring to “the power of its spell” (Bingham 1948). From the Citadel of Machu Picchu, he observed, “[T]here is no valley in South America that has such varied beauty” (Bingham 1913: 403).

By making constant reference to how nature defended and protected the Incas, Bingham, participated in uniting ideas of man and nature in a specific relationship. This is not uncommon, as ideas of nature have been shown to express social and material relationships (Williams 1973, 1980; Smith 1996). And although Bingham showed great respect for the ancient Incas, the indigenous population was at that time often described in a denigrating fashion. “For centuries it has reared the sky its giant ruins half-buried in tropical vegetation, known only to a few ignorant Indians of the neighborhood. Where the magnificent city was three poverty stricken half naked Indian families now live: On the site of the central plaza, of its shrines and mansions and fortification, they sow their little patches of corn (NYT Jun. 15, 1913 Italics mine).

Bingham’s archaeological history was instrumental in separating the achievements of the Incas from the contemporary population of the sierra. Those accomplishments were for Bingham “achievements of a bygone race” (Bingham 1913: 403). This is a recurring theme in the way Euro-North Americans have in interpreted indigenous pasts to excuse racist policies, as Robert Silverberg illustrates in his account of early American explanations for the

origins of Native American Indian mounds in the Eastern United States that were described as the achievements of a “lost prehistoric race.” By detaching the history from the population, such discourses facilitated policies that uprooted people from their homes, dispossessing them of land (1968: 48). Like the English in the United States, Spain’s encounters with indigenous populations were no different. Gesa Mackenthun (1997) argues that in terms of dispossession the English and Spanish had similar explanations, responses and “legitimating strategies” (16).

Bingham’s account, which merged archeological knowledge and western views of nature, fed into the growth of current ecological/cultural tourism in the Andes. With the publication of the Bingham’s article in the National Geographic Magazine on April 1913, Machu Picchu became a North American version of what Deborah Poole calls “the visual economy of the Andean image world,” by which she means that visual representations of the Andes, “the circulation of images, fantasies, ideas and sentiments” moved between Europe and the Andes (Poole 1997). In the later part of the 20th Century Machu Picchu became a dominant Andean symbol in a global “visual economy,” one that bound conceptions of identity and history to an idea of nature (Poole 1997, Femenías 1999, de la Cadena 1995). In Bingham’s case the National Geographic presented a fantastic collection of 250 photographs entitled “In the Wonderland of Peru” and portrayed Bingham, as he did himself, as the heroic “discoverer” of Machu Picchu. In addition to the National Geographic, Bingham’s photos were shown in schools to, “civic groups” as well as displayed in the Museum of Natural
However, Bingham was not the only one to display Machu Picchu. Peruvian intellectuals in Cuzco had long known about the existence of the Citadel, and had in fact informed Bingham of its general location (Bingham 1987). Although the credit given to Bingham’s discovery has been criticized and modified, he is still officially acknowledged as the “scientific” discoverer of Machu Picchu. Jose Luis Valcárcel, a Peruvian intellectual of the time, took issue with Bingham’s claim. As an ethnologist, Valcárcel played a key role in the development of a number of Peruvian museums, and was also very active in the collecting, categorizing and documenting Indian artifacts, past and present (Femenías: 1999). In 1915 when Bingham returned to Peru for follow-up research on Machu Picchu, he was to engage in a debate with Valcárcel that concluded with Valcárcel accusing Bingham of stealing Peru’s national treasures (Zapata Velasco 1999).

26 “Cuzco Indigenismo,” one of the most notable intellectual movements to emerge in defense of the “Indian” began in the Andean City of Cuzco. This regional movement was led by a group of intellectuals and artists that defined what is known as “The Golden Age of Cuzco Indigenismo,” from 1910-193026. The figures behind this movement made Cuzco a contested site in the battle for Peruvian national identity (Poole 1997). What these individuals did was to reclaim Inca history and geography as their own by valorizing Indian culture in their art, national heritage and state policy (ibid). The key figures behind this movement played an important role in the spatial and cultural politics of nation making. They advocated regionalism and promoted a special autonomous status for the Andes that sought to thwart state intrusions and the influence of Creole culture. Second, through artistic and literary productions they re-scaled the geography of the nation in order to make the Andean landscape the central feature in defining the nation of Peru. Finally, many of these intellectuals played a decisive role in the shaping of important cultural institutions such as the Museo Peruano de Arqueología that accentuated pre-Columbian achievements in Peruvian national history (Femenías 1999).

27 Martin Chambi was another very interesting intellectual and artist in this movement. He was very influential in idealizing the Andean landscape through photography. Further research is needed to explore his influences, but due to the limited space in this paper I will focus on Valcárcel.

28 It is clear that most of the artifacts excavated at Machu Picchu are on display at the Peabody Museum at Yale University28.
Geographic issue was published, Valcárcel wrote 30 *Tempestad en los Andes* (1927) his own powerful polemic romanticizing the Andes and the unbroken Indian purity of the serranos (Valcárcel 1927: ). With fiery energy and colorful language, Valcárcel demanded justice for Indians, declaring - “From the Andes will flow, like rivers, the currents of renovation that will transform Peru....All of the timeless virtues of the Indian still pulse through his blood” (ibid: 103-104). “Peru is Indian!” declared Valcárcel (ibid: 112). In 1964 Valcárcel wrote a book on Machu Picchu declaring it the most famous archeological monument of Peru.

Like Bingham, Valcárcel created an ideal Andean man and bound him to an ideal concept of nature. Bingham’s discourse and visual depictions influenced a different network of institutions which helped commercialize Machu Picchu for the west; Bingham’s was crucial in understanding how, as Poole states, “North Americans would come to perceive, imagine, dream about, and act on that part of Latin America known as ‘the Andes’” (1998: 131). Valcárcel’s connections, on the other hand, were with the Peruvian National Museums that also shaped the site into an icon. Both played a role in informing the views of such current institutional players as the UN World Heritage Committee, the Peruvian State and others whose views have helped construct the Machu Picchu Citadel and landscape into a world heritage site and a successful tourist commodity for Peru. Finally, both had the effect of encouraging state ownership and control of the land.

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29 According to Zapata Velasco, in Valcárcel’s 1964 publication of Machu Picchu: el Mas Famoso Monumento Arqueologico del Peru he reconciled his differences with Bingham.

30 This is not to imply that Valcárcel was directly responding to Bingham.
Dispossession and the struggle for land are not new in Peru, and elsewhere in Latin America. In Peru, under the Velasco government, the agrarian reform of 1969 promised to redistribute land among the tenants. Despite the state’s expropriation of land from the hacendados, the legal redistribution of land in Peru did not occur evenly throughout the country or at the same time (Seligmann 1995). There was considerable variation across the country in the way the new system of land tenure was put in effect, as there were differences in the intensity of peasant struggles in diverse locations (Guillet 1979; Smith 1989; Seligmann 1995; Mayer 2002). In addition, we are witness to the history of different peasant revolts, uprisings, and strategies indigenous people employed to negotiate on their behalf during colonialism and leading up to the reforms of the 1960’s (Mallon 1983; Stern 1987). In fact Velasco was not the first to implement agrarian reforms in Peru. The Belaunde government, in response to land invasions and violent uprisings in 1964, made small gestures toward legislative reforms in favor of the campesino struggles (Seligmann 1995: 57). There were differential responses to the agrarian reform by many different kinds of social actors. Mayer (1991) warns that one should not interpret ensuing conflict in terms of simple dualities such as differences between urban/rural and traditional/modern. However, the tensions and turmoil after the 1969 reforms played an important role in the rise of Shining Path (ibid; Seligmann 1995: 154). Not long after agrarian reform laws swept across Latin America, were counter-
reforms enacted to reverse the benefits by privatizing credit agencies, technical assistance and other features of the agrarian industry (Kay 2002). Belaunde, the same man who was initially acquiescent towards the campesino land struggles, initiated counter-reform laws in 1980 (Seligmann 1995: 73). His second regime took a much more liberal stance towards private ownership, allowing for individual property titles of land parcels. The break-up of the peasant cooperatives created conflicts of wealth among Campesinos. In many cases the wealthier peasants reemerged as mini hacendados (Hunefeldt 1997: 112).

However, it was not until Fujimori’s neoliberal agenda that the final rupture with the ideals of the agrarian reform occurred. In 1991 and more comprehensibly in 1995, new land laws further encouraged individual ownership (Crabtree 2002: 141). Following the advice of Hernando De Soto, Fujimori implemented a plan that in theory would give small rural producers the opportunity, through private ownership, to better profit from market liberalization. In promoting the legal titling toward property, it was expected that campesinos would have the security to obtain loans and mortgages; but this did not happen as expected (ibid: 143). Moreover, liberalization signaled the end of the Agrarian Bank, a significant no interest credit reserve for campesinos. Fujimori cut agrarian services considerably, and privatized state assets such as forests (ibid; Seligmann 1995: 73). What compromised the efforts of campesinos to benefit from loans were the very neoliberal policies that on the one hand, sought to make rural inhabitants more competitive, but on the other hand undermined their ability to compete by allowing for “cheaper food imports” to enter local markets.
Yet one legacy of these efforts, for both rural and urban inhabitants, is the concern to obtain property titles as imperative to survive in the new economy. This is evident in the case of Machu Picchu.

In Machu Picchu, the rural communities were formed out of different haciendas, and the campesinos within the district organized themselves according to these boundaries. The area now considered a sanctuary (El Santuario Historico de Machu Picchu) was formed by the state out of four separate family-owned haciendas: San Antonio de Torontoy, Quente, Santa Rita de Q'ente and Mandorpampa. The redistribution of land took different paths according to the different haciendas in question (Maxwell 2004: 319).

First, the hacienda of Mandorpampa was never expropriated in accordance with the agrarian reform law, but rather remained in the control of the hacendado family, and campesinos lived as tenants (ibid). Tourism developers eventually purchased some of the land from this hacienda (ibid). In the mid-1970s the campesinos in the former hacienda of San Antonio de Torontoy received land parcels from the state. By 1978, the beneficiaries repaid their agrarian loans for their land, but as of today they have not received property titles nor are they officially recognized in the public registry (ibid). Nevertheless, the residents here have a degree of security since they paid for their land and are recognized as beneficiaries of the agrarian reform (ibid). However, in Quente and Santa Rita de Quente there was a different process. As in Torontoy, the...

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31 Diagnostico Participativo del Sector Rural del Santuario Historico Machu Picchu. Centro Bartolome de las Casas/Pacifica, S.A., Lima, Peru 2001 [115-118].
32 A full discussion of the land tenure system in Machu Picchu is not within the scope of this study. For a thorough discussion see Maxwell 2004.
state also expropriated the land from these two haciendas and distributed them to the campesinos, with the old hacendado of Quente receiving four hectares of land (ibid: 320). In fact, the former hacendados are allegedly still listed as owners in the public registry, although some conservation authorities maintain that ownership was registered on fraudulent grounds. Concurrent with these events, the state pushed to define heritage areas. In 1981, the state defined the existing boundaries of the sanctuary of Machu Picchu and declared it to be a national trust. Prior to this, only the archeological ruins fell under conservation laws, and it was not clear as to how much land surrounding the sites could be expropriated.33 Shortly thereafter, in 1983, UNESCO declared the Sanctuary of Machu Picchu to be a World Heritage Site that represented universal values of man in harmony with nature. In 1991 a law invalidated the expropriation of agrarian reform land, and placed it under the control of the Instituto Nacional de Cultura (INC), the state archeological conservation agency (ibid: 321). Those who were to receive land from the agrarian reform were now greatly restricted in the use of that land. As a result, the campesinos were never given property titles nor recognized as property holders; the state would neither recognize the permanence nor the antiquity of the population. Moreover, according to the 1991 law, the INC superseded the authority of the Instituto Nacional de Recursos Naturales (INRENA), the agency in charge of conserving the natural resources (ibid). What made matters more complicated is that the former hacendados have

33 Based on Law 6634 of 1929, Art.5 gives the state the right to expropriate property around which the archeological ruins are situated. However, this law is many years prior to the formation and conceptualization of the current sanctuary boundaries, and does not state how much area around unmovable human remains should be expropriated to be sufficient for their protection.
used the invalidation of the agrarian reform laws to try and regain possession of the land, arguing that the 1991 law gives the INC control but not ownership (ibid). The state agencies, the hacendados and the campesinos have thus been in a long drawn-out legal battle. The problem is that laws and arguments are constantly used in contradictory fashion according to the expediency of the particular situation. Keely Maxwell describes the clashes succinctly:

“The claims of particular stakeholders are sometimes internally inconsistent from one court case to another. State agencies reject any legality of the agrarian reform process in Machu Picchu in one court case. The same agencies depend on certain aspects of agrarian reform having occurred in Machu Picchu in another case to justify their own claims to land. Similarly, hacienda owners accept nullification of agrarian reform because Machu Picchu is historic patrimony in one case. They reject both this nullification and claims to Machu Picchu being historic patrimony in another case” (ibid: 322).

**Rural Life:**

The life ways and problems of the people in the rural areas differ from those in the pueblo and among each other. Since Machu Picchu is on the eastern slope of the Andes, it borders the jungle – the area often referred as “ceja de selva,” meaning the “eye brow of the jungle” and translated into English as “the high jungle” or “cloud forest.” The ecology can vary greatly in just a short distance, and so the rural communities can differ in what they cultivate. For the most part, agricultural production is for subsistence, but according to one study approximately 12% of the yield is sold commercially in local and provincial
markets.\textsuperscript{34} As mentioned above, a more important aspect involves the different histories each former hacienda had after the agrarian reform - that is, whether or not they managed to get some kind of recognition for their land. Economically, another factor is whether the rural communities are located along the Inca Trail. If they are located along the Inca Trail, the residents have the possibility of drawing on the tourism economy by selling water, chicha, candy, and crackers to tourists and porteadores. However, it is in these locations that state conservation agencies most stringently enforce the conservation laws. In these areas, one finds a sort of cat and mouse game being played between the state and the campesinos. For the purposes of this discussion, I will focus on only two rural sectors with different histories: \textit{Corihuaryachina} and \textit{Huayllabamba}.\textsuperscript{35}

The communities of Huayllabamba and Corihuaryachina are located about five kilometers apart, on opposite sides of the Vilcanota River. Huayllabamba, part of the old hacienda of Q,ente and Santa Rita de Q,ente, is located on the border of both the Sanctuary and the district of Machu Picchu. Just opposite Huayllabamba, across the narrow Cusichaca River that runs perpendicular to the Vilcanota River, is the district of Ollantaytambo. On this borderland, one can note most vividly the contrast between living in or outside of the Machu Picchu Sanctuary. The residents in Huayllabamba do not hold property titles, as do those of Ollantaytambo.\textsuperscript{36}

\textsuperscript{34} Diagnostico Participativo del Sector Rural del Santuario Historico Machu Picchu. Centro Bartolome de las Casas/Pacifica, S.A., Lima, Peru 2001: Page iv.

\textsuperscript{35} Corihuaryachina is part of San Antonio de Torontoy. Huayllabamba is sometimes spelled Wayllabamba. See map on p. xii.

\textsuperscript{36} The term Ollantay is often used locally as the diminutive for Ollantaytambo.
Nevertheless, tourism is a variable in the local economy and men do take advantage of it if opportunities arise, such as if a tour group needs extra porters to carry baggage. There is a gendered dimension to the work. Women’s work has a good income capacity insofar as one of their activities is concerned. Women make and sell chicha\textsuperscript{37} mainly to the large number of local porters that pass through the area.\textsuperscript{38} As Susana, a resident of Huayllabamba explained, making chicha requires a lot of cooking and hence a large amount of firewood. However, conservation enforcements prohibit the use of gas stoves and also restrict her from obtaining firewood for her stove; people are not allowed to cut wood from surrounding native trees. Although there is a commons specified by INRENA where tree branches from non-indigenous trees can be cut for the collection of firewood, it can be a good distance away from where many residents live. The opportunity exits for people to cross the river to obtain firewood outside the Sanctuary, but that only creates inter-community tensions with residents of the district of Ollantay. The point is that opportunities for exploiting the tourism economy depend on the location of the community. Huayllabamba is situated on a main artery of the picturesque Inca Trail through which thousands of tour groups hike annually. Therefore, unlike Corihuayrachina and other communities, tourism plays a more direct role in the economy.

\textsuperscript{37} Chicha is a fermented corn drink popular throughout the Andes.

\textsuperscript{38} Tourism also plays a role in Corihuayrachina, but since the year 2000 tourists are no longer allowed to hike the Inca Trail without a tour agency and without being accompanied by a tour guide. Since tour agencies start the Inca Trail at Kilometer 82 on the opposite side of the Vilcanota River, tourists no longer get a chance to pass through Corihuayrachina on their way to the Inca Trail.
The community of Corihuaryachina is located at Kilometer 88 on the Cuzco-Machu Picchu train line. It is a core campesino sector of the old hacienda called San Antonio de Torontoy. This hacienda extended from a place called Choqellusco at kilometer 82 up to part of the current Pueblo of Machu Picchu at kilometer 110 on one side of the Vilcanota River.

After the national agrarian reform of 1968/69, the people who worked this hacienda, unlike those from Huayllabamba, became the beneficiaries of the land. As such, they sought to legalize the status of their community. According to Francisco Bacahuaman, the current President of the Campesino Organization of San Antonio de Torontoy, the campesinos had paid their agrarian debts to the state since the mid 1970’s. Later, the state created INRENA as a state conservation agency. The apparent goal of the state bureaucracy was, as Bingham had portrayed, to re-create the image of a pristine state of nature that only the Incas lived with in harmony. As one INRENA ranger explained in an effort to tie an idea of nature with the Incas said, “Could you imagine if Machu Picchu [the archeological ruins] were built in the middle of the Sahara desert? Machu Picchu without [this] nature would not be Machu Picchu,” that is, that there is an ideal fit between the constructions of the Incas and the ecology.

The Pueblo of Machu Picchu:

In contrast to the growth of the rural communities and the formation of the Sanctuary boundaries, the Pueblo of Machu Picchu grew out of a different

39 The Quechua name Corihuaryachina glosses in English for Where gold dust blows in the wind.
process; it was neither established out of the agricultural economy nor tourism. Although the pueblo was formed out of pieces of the haciendas Mandorpampa and San Antonio de Torontoy, the development of the pueblo is one of progressive growth based on state modernization and industrialization. In the late 1940’s the pueblo began to grow as a result of the building of the train line along the Urubamba (Vilcanota) River, as a location for train workers and their families (Tamayo Herrera 1981). It was locally referred to as “Maquinachayoc” Quechua for “the place where the engine is located.” However, this is not to say that prior to the railroad developments no campesino families lived in the pueblo area. Chela recalls her parents saying that the location of what is now the tourist train station and sports stadium was once used for her family’s cattle grazing. Both this areas and the pueblo area where the first-class Pueblo Hotel is currently located were part of the hacienda of San Antonio de Torontoy.

From a North American perspective, even today, the pueblo seems like a “frontier town.” The first train ran from Cuzco to the pueblo. The station was then moved down about a kilometer away to Puente Ruinas (Ruins Bridge), across the River Vilcanota from the path leading up to the Citadel. Eventually the rail was extended all the way to the city of Quillabamba located at the verge of the jungle, the state’s primary goal. As some older members of the pueblo, like Don Teofilo, recall, the train line had benefits. It allowed campesinos to transport agricultural products to Cuzco markets cheaper and faster than by road. Men

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40 The Quechua diminutive –ayoc glosses in English for a place where something is located.
41 I use the term “Frontier” here in the sense of the mythology of the American western frontier, as opposed to the Latin American notion of “frontier” as a border.
worked on the trains and rails and women sold food and produce to people who came from Cuzco or Quillabamba. However, it was not for farm produce that the train was built, but to carry raw materials, mainly rubber, but also timber and other products, from the jungle to factory and for export (ibid).

According to local account, initially, the train station was named *Puente Ruinas* after the bridge that crosses the River Vilcanota. From Don Teofilo’s account, the name of the station did not appeal to the station chief because it implied it was in ruins. The name did not connote a modern image. As a result, the station chief changed the name of the station to Machu Picchu and then it became customary among the train workers to distinguish the pueblo from the station by referring to the pueblo as *Aguas Calientes* (hot springs) after the hot springs located there. However, the name of the pueblo had always been Machu Picchu, and legally so, despite the fact that the tourist industry as well as many Peruvians continued to popularize the name Aguas Calientes.42

The tourist industry was built on a series of developments dating as far back as 1924 with the formation of the *Touring Y Automóvil club del Perú* (Deforges 2000: 178). However, it wasn’t until the 1960’s that the state began playing an increasing role. With the formation of the *Corporación de Turismo del Perú* (COTURPERU) the government set up a chain of hotels to generate income for the state (a number of these hotels including Sanctuary Lodge Hotel were eventually, under neoliberalism, sold off to the corporation Orient Express). In 1965 there was the *Plan Turístico y Cultural de la Comisión Especial*

42 Based on the law 9396 that founded the district of Machu Picchu in 1941 art.2 states that the capital of the district (the pueblo) takes the same name as the district.
(COPESCO plan), a cooperative effort between the state’s COTURPERU and UNESCO to restore the archeological ruins and particularly the ruins of Machu Picchu (ibid: 182; Peña Berna 2001:36). The state funded approximately 70% of the plan, which it used for the “construction of roads, airports, transport and energy links as well as the development of tourist sites” (ibid: 183). One such development was the construction of a road between the pueblo and the Hiram Bingham Road, which encircles the steep mountain to the Citadel. These initiatives of the 1960’s and 70’s may have been one of Peru’s most successful state-led investments as the income generated by tourism went from 44 million to 201.6 million from 1970-1979 (ibid.). It also laid the infrastructural foundation for the burgeoning tourism economy of Cuzco in the 1990’s.

In the 1940’s tourism in Machu Picchu was in its nascent stages with only a half a dozen or so visitors arriving a day, in contrast to the year 2000 when approximately 2500 arrived per day during the high tourist season. The railroad and many of the laborers who built it settled in the pueblo, turning what was largely a rural area into a small town, an urban zone in a largely rural district. The entire district has a long history of being a place of intense movement and activity. Today, thousands of tourists come and go daily. Rural inhabitants come to the pueblo to sell goods. Additionally, hundreds of young men and women from all over Peru come annually to the pueblo looking for jobs in the restaurants and hotels. Tour guides and large numbers of porteadores\(^\text{43}\) working in the Cuzco tourism industry take groups of tourists on a 3-4 day hike through the Inca Trail.

\(^{43}\) Porteadores are porters that carry equipment such as portable stoves, gas canisters and food for tourists hiking the Inca Trail.
trail on a trip that ends in the pueblo.

Since the district attracts many people who take up temporary residence throughout the year, it is difficult to discern the actual total population. However, according to the last national census conducted in 1993, the district population was officially at 2,298 residents, divided into 1,141 living in the pueblo and 1,157 in the rural areas.\textsuperscript{44} A local census taken of only the pueblo in 1999 counted 1,601 inhabitants (Peña Berna 2001: 28). In 2002 town officials estimated that the total population of the district was about 5000 inhabitants, but according to some approximations only about 3000 are permanent residents, 1200 in the pueblo and 1800 in the rural communities.

The municipal building is located in the pueblo, as is a well supplied medical station and a cultural center, built by the INC, but which contains a small library and an auditorium for use by the townsfolk. Although a church was built in 1984, a priest makes only a few visits a year, largely during festivals. As of 2002 the residents did not have potable water and there were numerous complaints about parasite infections. However, most residents have running water, though certain barrios have frequent outages. People without water, or do not have hot water, are able to use communal baths that draw water from the hot water springs.

The town is comprised of four barrios settled in the following order: Huiñay Huayna,\textsuperscript{45} Imperio de los Incas, Las Orquideas and El Mirador. In brief, Huiñay Huayna is the first settlement that grew alongside the principle Avenue

\textsuperscript{44} Instituto Nacional de Estadisticas Informatica (INEI)

\textsuperscript{45} Huiñya Huayna is a Quechua word that roughly translates into English as “Forever Young.”
Pachacútec, which leads to the hot water springs. In general, the older more established Machupicheños live in this location; this area also contains many of the pueblo’s restaurants and hostels. The second settlement, Imperio de los Incas, developed around the local train station and also includes many hotels and dining establishments that parallel the train tracks, but the distinguishing feature in this area is the location of the artisan market. The Aguas Calientes River divides las Orquideas from the other two barrios. Despite the fact that this barrio holds the tourist train station, Las Orquideas is mainly a residential area, and also contains the town cemetery and a sports field. Most of the establishments in this location, except for a small section of artisan merchants, are grocery stores or other shops that sell goods for local consumption. In addition, this barrio holds many of the newer residents who rent their living quarters, and where some attempted a land invasion. Finally, the most recent barrio, El Mirador, was developed out of a land invasion on the slope of a mountain that perched above Las Orquideas. Eventually the occupants won legal status and the municipal authorities organized them as a barrio. Mostly recent migrants live in El Mirador, which is undoubtedly the poorest section of the pueblo.

As expected, livelihoods in the pueblo vary. The town hall employs a number of people on a permanent basis to carry out different tasks such as administrative, construction, sanitation, and the enforcement of municipal codes. Some residents work in state conservation agencies doing archeological restorations and manual labor. There is a central market where mainly women
operate small stands selling meat and agricultural produce, while others run lunch counters. There are some twelve family-owned grocery shops selling a variety of packaged goods. Also, bread is produced daily in a local bakery.

However, since tourism is the mainstay of the pueblo, economic activity is comprised mostly of domestic enterprises such as restaurants, hostels and artisan/merchants who sell ceramics, textile products and memorabilia tailored for tourist consumption. There are approximately forty-five family-owned restaurants and twenty-eight hostels, excluding the four large-scale first class hotels: Hotel Machu Picchu and Sanctuary Lodge (both owned by Orient Express), Pueblo Hotel and Hatuchay Towers. The local hostels are relatively small averaging around nine rooms each (the largest containing twenty-eight and the smallest four rooms. Compare this to the Pueblo Hotel at eighty-five rooms and the other major hotels respectively at around forty). In addition to hotels and restaurants there are four artisan/merchant associations comprised of about 215 members.

A major source of revenue and employment for the district comes from the bus transportation service that brings tourists to and from the Inca Citadel. The service is administered by CONSETTUR, Consorcio de Empresas de Transporte Turístico, a consortium made up of six companies. The bus service was initially a state run company but was eventually decentralized to be operated by the

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46 This number pertains only to those restaurants tailored for tourism and does not include the eateries used by the townsfolk.
47 Peña Berna 2001: 201-203
48 Sindicato de Artesanos y Pequeños Artesanos, Asociación de Artesanos y Pequeños Productores Joyitas, Asociación de Ambulantes de venta de Polos Turísticos, Asociación Korichaska.
regional government. In 1995 it was privatized to form CONSETTUR. The two largest of these companies, owning six buses each, is a company made up of ex-employees of the regional government service. The second company is owned and operated by the Municipality of Machu Picchu; in total there are twenty buses (ibid: 55).

One of the more colorful livelihoods revolving around tourism is that of the *chasqui boys.*49 Some boys, generally between the ages of 9-12, dress up as Chasquis, who served as the messengers of the Inca Empire. These boys wait at the Citadel entrance for departing buses to bring tourists back to the pueblo. While the bus travels down the winding mountain road, the chasquis boys dash down a more direct footpath beating the bus to the next road level. As the bus load of tourists pass, the boy cries out a hearty “goodbye” and then dashes down to the next level and does it again all the way down; at the bottom the driver allows him to get on the bus to collect tips from tourists. Since the boys depend on the drivers to take them up to the Citadel and to stop for them to collect their tips, the boys will repay the drivers by doing chores for them, such as washing and cleaning the bus. However, the chasqui boys are not without controversy. Some Machupicheños feel that the boys should be in school rather than working. Nevertheless, many children throughout Peru work out of economic necessity, and some accommodations are made for them through night school programs.

Finally, no examination of the Machu Picchu tourist economy is complete without a discussion of the hundreds of men and women who come from all over

49 Referred to locally by the exact term.
Peru to work in the restaurants and hotels. Although I describe the local restaurants and hotels as domestic enterprises in the sense that they draw mainly on family labor, many hire at least one person during the low tourist season and two or three during the high tourist season. People are employed to wait tables, clean rooms and draw in customers (jaladores) from the train station, or when they pass the restaurants. Typically the workload is seven days a week, twelve hours a day (sometimes Saturdays and Sundays are a few hours less). While pay varies, a waiter, for instance, generally receives 10% of the customer’s check. During the high tourist season, workers can make between 400-600 soles or about 115-170 U.S. dollars a month. Hotel employees are generally given room and board, but restaurant employees must find a room to rent, an additional cost. Rent is a great economic burden for many, costing 100-150 soles a month. As a result, workers will share a room with two or three other people.

Many come to work in the pueblo to escape conditions of extreme poverty. Nancy, a 23-year-old woman with a four-year-old daughter came to the pueblo from rural Quillabamba, where her family cultivated coffee for a cooperative. The family cultivates about 400 kilos of coffee beans per year, which sells for 200 soles ($60 U.S). In the pueblo, Nancy makes 400 soles a month working as a waitress in a popular restaurant. Others come to work in the pueblo during the school vacation in order to save money to help pay for tuition. Rosa, a young woman in her early twenties, came to the pueblo from Cuzco where she studied

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50 The low tourist season is from October to May and the high season is from June to September.
nursing. She found a job in a restaurant where she worked 12 hours a day at 10%. The day I spoke to her she made only 10 soles ($3 U.S.) for those long hours. A good day for her is making 30 soles or higher.

Despite the long hours, many workers I spoke to would tell me they prefer the tourism economy of Machu Picchu rather than in the City of Cuzco, where the economy is saturated with people looking for work; also the competition in Cuzco is greater, and the pay is generally less. However, not all people working in the pueblo work for local businesses. At fifteen, Carmencita came to the pueblo from Cuzco to sell ice cream for a company. Her arrival to the pueblo was for work, but as is often the case for many young men and women, also for fun and adventure. Carmencita loved to dance. In the evenings she and her teenage friends would “chase” each other from club to club. In the morning, however, she was ready to pick up the batches of ice cream arriving from Cuzco on the local train, and then walk through the plaza selling cones and cups. Businesses in Cuzco do send merchandise by train to sell by an employee posted in the pueblo. But there is a point of diminishing returns. During the low tourism season, when sales are down, it becomes no longer profitable to pay for transportation fees. Carmencita eventually lost her job but stayed on in the pueblo looking for work in the local establishments.

The train itself is a source of livelihood in the pueblo. When the incoming train sounds its horn there is a rush of people running through the plaza and to the station. Some of these people, aside from passengers, are cargadores. Cargadores, unlike porteadores who make their living carrying tourist bags on the
Inca Trail, carry loads for people from the train to their houses, hotels or places of business. There are about 20 cargadores in the pueblo, waiting for train passengers, merchants and market vendors to arrive. When I met Florentino Ayma, 45 years old, he had been working as a cargador for about a month and a half, arriving form his rural community where he cultivated potatoes, corn, barley and wheat for consumption. Now he typically unloads concrete blocks, and wood planks from the cargo compartment. On a good day, he can make as much as 20 soles ($5 U.S.).

For many, Machu Picchu offers economic opportunities not found elsewhere, though those opportunities are not always realized as imagined or at all. Miguel, thirty years old, came to the pueblo from Lima, but first stayed in Cuzco looking for work. He told the story how in Cuzco he was robbed of all his belongings. “How ironic,” he would say, “that a person from Lima gets robbed in Cuzco when the stereotype is that of a Serrano taken advantage of in the big cosmopolitan City of Lima.” In Machu Picchu, Miguel, who had the advantage of speaking some English, got a job quickly working in a restaurant. The proprietor promised to pay for his room, but during the low season the boss reneged and Miguel ended up sleeping on the restaurant floor. At times Miguel would complain to me that he was not receiving his ten percent and was constantly badgered for not doing enough to bring people into the restaurant. Eventually, he left for another restaurant; replacing him was Carmencita. This is not uncommon. There is a constant reshuffling of employees, especially when tourism is down. Workers are fired or let go for not bringing in enough business
and others are hired, while the former search for new jobs. So when the tourists descend from their visit to the Citadel, and perhaps a chasqui boy is getting ready to wash a bus, jaladores surround the visitors with menus in hand, trying to “pull” customers into their restaurant. For the jaladores, each day the same is more or less repeated; perhaps what changes is the menu they carry.

**Concluding Remarks:**

This chapter has sought to show how Machu Picchu developed into the space it is today. It was not created in a decade or simply with the designation of the Sanctuary in 1981. Rather there were many historical factors that went into its production. Beginning during the 1980’s, new processes associated with globalization and later the implementation of neoliberal policies in Peru created significant changes in Machu Picchu.

Throughout the 1980’s the government agencies were preoccupied with civil war. Fujimori seized dictatorial power shortly after being elected in 1990, through an *autogolpe* (self coup) claiming that it was necessary to defeat the Shining Path insurgents. Although he promised to re-establish a democracy, he continued to concentrate power in the executive office and gave the national intelligence service extraordinary powers. In 1992, Fujimori dissolved the congress, suspended the constitution, and dismissed many judges and half of the Supreme Court justices. In 1993 Fujimori reformed the constitution permitting him to stay in office for a third-term and expelled a tribunal opposed to this constitutional change (Bowen 2000).
Even though Shining Path did not occupy the area of Machu Picchu, it was presumed both by residents and the military that the iconic nature of the Citadel would make it a prime target for the insurgents. In fact, at one point in 1986 a time bomb exploded on the train bound for Machu Picchu just as it was about to leave the Cuzco train station. The bomb exploded in the last car of the train, killing seven people and injuring thirty-eight. Most of the killed and injured were foreign tourists; at least one American tourist was among the dead.\footnote{New York Times newspaper article June 26, 1986.}

Margarita remembers the period as being some of the most difficult times for the pueblo, saying, “Everyone was scared, the terrorists were said to be hiding in the Jungle and there were rumors they wanted to take over Machu Picchu.” According to Margarita, tourism came to a halt and the pueblo emptied as many left it to take up safer residency in Cuzco.

However, throughout the 1990s, tourism in Cuzco had grown more rapidly than the development of an infrastructure to support the increase. Hotels and restaurants were simply not able to provide the services the tourists expected, such as a regular flow of hot water, or even enough space to accommodate them. Restaurants struggled to provide food and a dining atmosphere akin to a European experience that tourists often sought. In Cuzco, those short on capital either got bank loans or simply lost out to larger capital holders often from Lima or abroad (Silverman 2002: 887; McTigue 1997).

In 2000 a law regulating space in Cuzco prohibited street vendors from selling artisan crafts, post cards, food, as well as shoeshine boys from the Plaza
de Armas (the central plaza of Cuzco), thereby excluding even those who struggle on a daily basis to survive, from the tourism market. That is, the neoliberal state, far from freeing the market from state control favors large capital interests. In addition, Orient Express made large investments in Cuzco, purchasing two of the most expensive hotels: El Monasterio Hotel and Hotel Plaza de Armas.

Nevertheless, it is important to point out that this is not to say that Fujimori and Toledo's push towards privatization had only detrimental results for all the residents of Machu Picchu. The growth of tourism did after all develop under the leadership of these two presidents, and with the growth of tourism new classes began to emerge in the pueblo. But the same forces that created these new classes also jeopardized their status; it is to this subject that we will turn to next.
Chapter Two
THE VICISSITUDES OF CLASS DYNAMICS AND GLOBAL ENTANGLEMENT:

“Globalization is the new political economy in fashion.”
(La globalización es la nueva política económica que está de moda)
–Chela, the Pueblo of Machu Picchu (Fieldnotes 5-18-02)

The residents of the pueblo connected their struggle to the wave of anti-
privatization demonstrations and protests against neoliberal developments taking
place across Peru. This chapter shows how people’s response to the
consequences pertaining to neoliberalism has much to do with their particular
conditions and social positions. It examines the factors behind the mobilization in
the pueblo, and the class dynamics of its organization. Class is defined largely in
terms of level of wealth, means of livelihood, and social standing. Three
additional issues that factor specifically into class formation in the Sanctuary, and
that shaped the meaning of and response to neoliberalism for the residents of the
pueblo are discussed – the issue of possession rights, corporate investments
and local politics in the form of factions and the politics of belonging. While
privatization under neoliberalism is often depicted objectively, I draw attention to
the material but also the culturally specific portrayals given to the class
relationships involved, and how these facets shaped political awareness of social
problems (Smith 1989). Finally, the chapter seeks to impart to the reader the
sense that while the Machupicheños are disadvantaged in the struggle against

52 For a discussion on the role of cultural politics in different forms of collective action in Latin-America see Cultures of
politics, Politics of Cultures: Re-visioning Latin American Social Movements. Sonia E. Alvarez, Evelina Dagnino, and
corporate capital, they are neither submissive nor powerless, but take a politically active role in creating their social realities. 53

From the start of 2002, much of Peru was engaged in a series of anti-privatization protests. At the center of the social turmoil was a serious disenchantment with President Toledo’s government. In Arequipa, the protests over the sale of the state-owned electrical company became violent. The mayor of the city backed the efforts of the protestors and even threatened to secede from the state. 54 In the end, the protests prompted Toledo’s government to alter its privatization program, at least in Arequipa. In Cuzco, protests were also intense but less violent. There were rumors that all of Machu Picchu was going to be privatized, and these rumors helped fuel nationalist and regionalist sentiments. A chant one could hear repeatedly during protest marches was “Toledo, listen, Machu Picchu is not for sale” (Toledo, escucha, Machu Picchu no se vende).

For the Machupicheños, things were somewhat different. In addition to the greater enforcement of sanctuary regulations and the bureaucratization of life, possession rights as opposed to property titles further disadvantaged residents economically. More stringent conservation efforts made people hesitant to make costly investments to upgrade their services without the assurance of property titles; there is a sense that people can be evicted at any time making all investments high-risk ventures. While the degrees vary, the sense of risk runs from the more established restaurant or hotel owner to the

53 For a historical discussion on active roles of peasants in political action in the Andes see Stern 1987.
54 It should be noted that Arequipa is popularly characterized in Peru as a rebellious region with separatist leanings.
newer residents invading a terrain. In addition, while the increase of tourism generated growth in the pueblo, many complained that possession status makes getting bank loans for economic development next to impossible if land controlling residents have no other form of collateral; this is not to mention the interest rates charged in reflection of high risk. This was mainly true for hotel and restaurant owners as they sought to expand to accommodate the increasing number of tourists. Hence, the experience of many was that possession status left people more susceptible to the encroachments of larger capital investors such as Orient Express. Also, possession status entails restrictions on the sale of buildings on land. Possessors must offer the state first bid at government prices. Only if the state turns down the offer can possessors sell privately for the best market price. These concerns preoccupied small and middle-scale entrepreneurs who had possession rights to land. They were primarily restaurant and hotel owners and to a lesser extent micro-entrepreneurs such as artisans. The poorer or more recent migrants did not possess land. Neither did the numerous wealthier mid-level entrepreneurs from Cuzco nor elsewhere possess land, but rather rented space to run their establishments. On the other hand, many of the poorer campesinos in the rural areas did have possession status. Class formation and divisions in Machu Picchu, and particularly in the pueblo, is based as much on land possession rights as on overall wealth. The following illustrate how people connected property restrictions to neoliberal developments.
Alienable Possessions:

It was February, still the low tourist season, when I spotted Rosa dashing across the plaza. She called out to inform me that an important pueblo meeting was taking place at the Cultural Center. Rosa said that a demonstration, a stoppage, or both was being planned. The purpose of the meeting was to organize a challenge against state property regulations in the sanctuary. Rosa was straightforward about the problem: “We are not property owners here” (No somos propietarios acá).

Since the formation of the sanctuary, the state was lenient about what the pueblo and rural residents could do with possession rights. With little state supervision some Machupicheños managed to negotiate through local and provincial bureaucracies and register their holdings in the public registry. However, vast political and economic events soon accelerated a process of conservation enforcement changes in 1995/96. At that time a debt-for-nature exchange with Finland was put into action leading to the creation of Programa Machu Picchu (PMP), an organization charged with closely monitoring conservation in the Sanctuary. The efforts of this organization concentrated on environmental studies that residents felt either ignored their existence or accused them of environmental degradation.

55 While many third world countries around the world are involved in debt-for-nature swaps they were first implemented in South and Central America in 1987. The first agreement was in Bolivia and then Ecuador and Costa Rica quickly followed, See Patterson 1990. Debt for nature agreements in Latin America have had mixed results, but have generally fallen short of greatly diminishing debt as well as meeting conservation ideals, see Edelman 1995.

56 The exclusion of local populations from involvement is a well documented complaint about debt-for-nature agreements, and at least in the case of Bolivia helped launch a political mobilization against the government by native people in the eastern lowland City of Trinidad, see Jones 1985.
As discussed in the introduction, a debt-for-nature program offers funds for nature conservation programs in third world countries, in exchange their international debt. In the case of Machu Picchu, the Finland/Peru agreement meant debt forgiveness over a loan default, and approximately seven million dollars applied towards Sanctuary conservation. The Finland/Peru exchange increased Peru’s political and financial stakes in Machu Picchu, and produced a greater incentive to dispossess the inhabitants through enforcement of more stringent conservation laws (discussed in the next chapter). In 1998 a study conducted by the *Instituto Nacional de Recursos Naturales* (INRENA), the PMP and the *Instituto Nacional de Cultura* (INC) resulted in the implementation of a “Master Plan” (Plan Maestro) for the Sanctuary of Machu Picchu that hardly considers the population other than to describe it in terms of “chaos” and “disorder.” While the plan speaks of “disorder” and “chaos” of the Pueblo, the book cover displays an inverted photo of the Machu Picchu Citadel showing Huayna Picchu pointing in the wrong direction.

The plan never received any input by the Machupicheños, allowing vested interests to circumvent pueblo scrutiny. One of the most important outcomes of the master plan was to give support to the project to build a cable car (*teleférico*) that would stretch from the train station to the Citadel, arguing that it was a more ecologically sound mode of transportation (Plan Maestro: 70-73). In 2000 the residents witnessed the privatization of the train service and also began to experience the implementation of the 1998 plan that cleared the way for yet another subsidiary of Orient Express, *Peru Hotels S.A.*, to build the cable car.
The cable car would undercut the current pueblo bus company, a major source of district income. The project sparked protests in Cuzco and in Machu Picchu as people became alarmed by the progress of privatization in the Sanctuary. The plan was put on hold when UNESCO intervened and threatened to terminate the world heritage status of the site.\footnote{Nevertheless, the state continues to search for less intrusive locations for the cable car. According to an article written by John Roach for National Geographic News April 15, 2002 the Vice Minister of Tourism, Ramiro Salas spoke publicly about the possibility of locating the cable car on the backside of the ruins. The author goes on to suggest that “pressure exerted by Orient Express and its partners may be succeeding.”} One of the main arguments against the cable car was that it ran the risk of causing more landslides. It was also argued that it would do damage to the environment, although proponents countered by saying that the cable car would be more ecologically sound than the current buses because of exhaust pollution, and the effect of their weight on the mountain terrain.

Prior to 2000 the management of forestry resources in Peru’s protected areas fell more broadly under the responsibility of the Ministry of Agriculture, but afterwards it became the sole responsibility of INRENA, a decentralized subdivision of that Ministry. Although INRENA’s juridical mandate\footnote{Based on National law 25902} claims that one of its functions is the promotion and support of small agricultural producers, operationally INRENA’s main responsibility is the protection of the environment and not rural development. Campesinos cannot even invite NGO’s or non-profit organizations specializing in agricultural development for help, since these institutions are not given permission to work in the sanctuary. Furthermore, in 2000 a new state institution, the \textit{Unidad Gestión Machu Picchu} (UGM) was
created in the sanctuary to mediate the squabbles between INRENA and the INC over the control of funds, as well as the Sanctuary itself. However, the UGM became embroiled in the same issues of control, only leading to a greater bureaucratization of life for the Machupicheños, not to mention unnecessarily wasting away part of the debt-for-nature funds granted by Finland. Finally, that same year, the law #001-2000, was passed reaffirming state ownership of all land and redefining the possession rights status of the residents.  

This law created great concern among the Machupicheños, not because they finally became aware that they only had possession rights, but rather they understood possession status had different consequences under privatization efforts. Understanding these consequences requires reconsidering the nature of dispossession. Generally dispossession is understood as either the taking away of tangible property such as land or the removal of people from land or access to resources. While it is true that residents felt insecure that the more stringent conservation enforcements might lead to their expulsion from the Sanctuary, and that property titles would give them greater legal leverage to hold on to their belongings, no one had actually been removed. Property titles might give people greater security and legal recognition, but this would be a limited view on what dispossession could entail. Rather, dispossession in this case and throughout much of Latin America can be thought of as an inbuilt part of neoliberal policies. The state, in privatizing services to Orient Express, created such gross inequalities in competition between corporate capital and the residents of Machu Picchu as to risk the livelihoods of the

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59 This law is an updated version of 001-81 that established the Sanctuary in 1981.
latter without taking responsibility for physical dispossession. This was a primary catalyst that resulted in questioning the motives of all governing entities in the district.

At the Cultural Center, Rosa and some one hundred Machupicheños were discussing a plan for a pueblo-wide protest against a list of state institutions, the local government, the conglomerate of state and non-governmental organization (NGO) called *Fondo Nacional para Areas Naturales Protegidas por el Estado* (PROFONANPE) that is the administrative body for protected areas in Peru, the PMP as well as Orient Express. Oscar led the event. The discussion centered on state law 001-2000 that annulled all land titles listed in the Public Registry granted after the 1981 declaration of the sanctuary, since those titles were now deemed illegitimate. However, to reaffirm, the regulations that govern restrictions on property are not recent. Rosa had explained to me the property restrictions in an interview some five months before when I first arrived to the pueblo. Residents had been living with property restrictions since the declaration of the sanctuary, but never had there been an attempt to organize a pueblo-wide or a district-wide protest against the regulations. These Machupicheños now connected their struggle over land rights to the broader nation-wide dissent against neoliberal policies. However, in Machu Picchu, privatization entails a hierarchy of relationships that shape property rights, redistribution and political participation. Wealthier hotel and restaurant owners that possessed land initiated the challenge to privatization and conservation policies in the district. In order sustain a wider form of dissent in the district, class gaps had to be bridged.
The next section examines why others, especially less wealthy artisans, joined the fight against Orient Express. It examines the integration of global-local relationships associated with Machu Picchu and how local actors must negotiate them. An analysis of space/time and movement is important for illuminating how privatization affects life.

**Corporate Intrusions:**

*Transportation and Movement:*

The summer is a wet time of year in Machu Picchu.\(^{60}\) It rain heavily almost on a daily basis, and in January (the wet season) Carnival festivities begin.\(^ {61}\) During (Jugar) Carnaval, (to play carnival), the Machupicheños participate in flirtatious water fights between men and women. On the day before Lent\(^ {62}\), the fun reaches boisterous heights as children, adolescents and adults throw water balloons and even buckets of water at each other and at unsuspecting passers-by; no one is spared regardless of status. Pranksters, playfully splash even the train, wetting the passengers through open windows, and momentarily drawing the train into their cultural world as it crosses the rural landscape. [Fieldnotes: 2-12-02]

The train is an important reality of life in the district of Machu Picchu. The movement of the train marks daily life. The rhythm of activity in both the pueblo and the rural communities is nested in the time schedule of the train.\(^ {63}\) For example, early each morning, as the first rays of light break into the canyon above the pueblo, traveling residents and departing tourists gather at the train tracks to wait for the Cuzco bound train. As they line up at the ticket window or wait around the platform, local women stand by ready to sell cakes, sandwiches and hot drinks. Cargadores walk through the pueblo or gather in the plaza

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\(^{60}\) I am referring to the summer season of the southern hemisphere From December through March.

\(^{61}\) Carnival observances fluctuate yearly. I am referring specifically to the arrival of Carnival for 2002.

\(^{62}\) Also the last day of Carnival, this was in the year 2002 on February 10.

\(^{63}\) Another means of transportation to Machu Picchu is by helicopter. They often suspend operations but when operating, usually in the high tourist season, it costs about $100 US dollars and is quite obviously not meant for local transportation.
searching for people who need help carrying baggage. There is only one morning Cuzco-bound train. Once it departs, the local buses are then ready for their first trip up to the Citadel, and the women move over to the waiting buses to sell their morning snacks to the tourists extending their visit.

On one trip traveling on the local train service from Cuzco to Machu Picchu, I braced myself for the usual experience - a trip jam-packed with passengers transporting goods and produce. I arrived at the PeruRail train station early to avoid struggling through a bottleneck of passengers boarding the train. Surprisingly, things were proceeding rather smoothly and there were fewer cargo carrying passengers than expected. As I took my seat I spotted some familiar faces; Doña Marta waved to me from the other end of the car. Soon the train departed and we climbed out of the Cuzco Valley in zigzag motions. It takes about four hours to reach Machu Picchu from Cuzco; the train stops at many communities in the countryside. During the rainy season the landscape turns into a lush green and is dotted with yellow and purple flowers. The snows from the mountains melt, exposing the jagged peaks. The Vilcanota River turns earth red and is swollen to the edges of its banks as it travels fiercely down the eastern slope of the Andes into the Montaña, the jungle.

At the first stop, it became clear why there were so few cargo-carrying passengers. As people tried to board the train with their goods, they were forcefully directed by security to the cargo compartment, a new and relatively

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64 Cargadores, similar to porteadores, make a living carrying cargo on their backs. In Machu Picchu, the cargadores by and large make their living loading and unloading cargo from the train.

65 There is only one road in the pueblo permitting the use of vehicles. It connects to the Hiram Bingham Road that leads up to the ruins.
costly procedure for poorer inhabitants. In the past, people just packed their
goods onto the wagon rather than pay the cargo fees. This was a tolerated
practice when the train service was run by ENAFER[^66], the state-operated
agency. However, the train system was privatized in 2000 under the Fujimori
presidency. Orient Express, purportedly an English company, purchased the
state train route and Sanctuary Lodge, the five-star hotel located next to the
Citadel, as well as Hotel Machu Picchu located in the pueblo.

The governance structures of global corporations are often difficult to trace as
a result of international mergers. Corporate entities are often deceptively
presented as national or even of specific cultural origin. Perhaps as a result, anti-
privatization movements are often nationalist in orientation. PeruRail is actually a
joint venture between Peruval, a Peruvian company, and Orient Express, LTD.
Orient Express, LTD is the “leisure division” of Sea Containers, LTD that owns
47% of the equity of Orient Express. While Orient Express is called an English
company, Sea Containers is registered in Bermuda with operating headquarters
in London, England but is nevertheless, owned primarily by U.S. shareholders.[^67]

Under Fujimori’s neo-liberal policies, PeruRail was given a 30–year tax-
exemption, plus an extra 5-year grace period to recuperate any losses incurred
during that time. Many residents cannot afford the PeruRail train system.
Pueblo and rural residents complain that PeruRail does not put much effort into
the local service; in short, PeruRail is in the tourist business and not into
transporting local people. Furthermore, PeruRail is not just in the business of

[^66]: ENAFER stands for Empresa Nacional de Ferrocarriles
[^67]: See [www.seacontainers.com](http://www.seacontainers.com) & [www.perurail.com](http://www.perurail.com)
transportation but also in selling “romantic” landscape views. While such a specialty makes PeruRail locally useless, it allows them to justify the exorbitant rates charged to tourists for such a short distance of travel. Since the service is now considered private property, residents have little opportunities for recourse. Machupicheños of the entire district thus have little control over their only form of transportation. PeruRail offers residents a local service it considers a “social service,” and uses it to argue that they fulfill a moral obligation towards residents. But for the Machupicheños and frequent local riders, the train is a necessity that up until recently was thought of something akin to a public transportation system.

A major issue between PeruRail and residents concerns the quality of transportation service they offer them. For instance, many pueblo residents express discontent at the uncomfortable conditions the porteadores create for them; porteadores or porters carry baggage for tourists hiking the Inca Trail. Once the Inca trial ends in the Pueblo of Machu Picchu, the porteadores take the local train back to Cuzco, making it overcrowded. Residents have asked PeruRail to add an additional car to make more room for everyone. However, PeruRail refuses, citing the costs. I once counted approximately 150-200 porteadores boarding the train. During the high tourist season there would be more. Porteadores carry backpacks, portable stoves and gas canisters. The gas canisters on the train also create a dangerous situation. PeruRail insists that the problem is that the porteadores don’t want to use the baggage compartment for cultural rather than economic reasons in that they are unable to abide by “rational” rules. However, because of PeruRail’s time pressures, the porteadores
are given only a couple of minutes to board, making it virtually impossible to do anything else but storm into the train. Even if the porteadores all placed their cargo in the baggage compartment, the train would still be brutally overcrowded. If PeruRail ran such a service in England or the United States they would probably be indicted for creating hazardous travel conditions, and yet the implication on the part of the company is that the Machupicheños should be thankful for the “handouts” they are given. Residents often point out to PeruRail that as ticket paying customers, the porteadores are entitled to a seat and therefore PeruRail should provide the appropriate accommodations by adding an extra coach. Still, PeruRail refuses to add an extra car because of the cost, arguing that the “social service” is already causing a loss of profit.

It was still mid-January when people of the local restaurant, hotel and artisan associations gathered in 2002 to discuss PeruRail’s and the Sanctuary Lodge’s proposed promotional package that included in the price of the train ticket, a meal at the Sanctuary Lodge hotel and restaurant. Already the two sister companies had leased out artisan concessions on the tourist train and around the hotel. By capturing the artisan, hotel and restaurant markets, Orient Express can monopolize the entire tourism economy – the mainstay of the pueblo.68 Spatially, the privilege of operating in a location adjacent to the Citadel already gives Sanctuary Lodge the advantage of exploiting a picturesque

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68 It is not clear if the privatization of the railroad even improved the conditions of the train workers. One rail employee, “Enrique” who previously worked for ENEFER, the state run service, and now for PeruRail says that his life did not improve economically. One of his main complaints is that the company does not pay overtime whereas ENEFER did, even though PeruRail expects workers to work past their hours. Enrique further grumbled that at least the employees of ENEFER were once able to eat free meals from the station kitchen, but that changed with PeruRail.
landscape view from high above the valley. By contrast, Machupicheños are prohibited from engaging in commercial activity by the Citadel.

In order to appreciate the monopolistic significance of Orient Express’ control of transportation and key locations, one must understand tourist movements to Machu Picchu. The bulk of tourists arrive at Machu Picchu by train in the late morning and are forced to catch the only train back to Cuzco in the late afternoon—that is, if they don’t want to be stranded in the pueblo for the night. Therefore, after touring the Citadel for five or six hours, tourists descend to the pueblo to wait for the train. In the interim, they might purchase a meal and shop in the local artisan market. However, with this new promotion, the townsfolk now feared that Orient Express would capture what little time tourists had left before catching the train since, again, Sanctuary Lodge is the only hotel and restaurant privileged to be situated on the mountain precipice just outside the Citadel entrance.

Finally, Sanctuary Lodge and PeruRail contracted with a dealer to sell arts and crafts on the tourist trains, and Sanctuary Lodge sub-contracted part of their space to two large chains: Ilaria, which sells fine jewelry and Alpaca 101, fine alpaca wool products. Sanctuary Lodge argued that these expensive artisan items were of a higher quality than the merchandise being sold in the pueblo, and thus not in competition with them. However, the issue they fail to mention is that choice is being taken away from the consumer. Under time pressure, tourists are more likely to make the convenient purchases offered by the expensive

69 As opposed to tourists who arrive after hiking the Inca Trail and the occasional wealthy tourist who comes by chartered helicopter service.
companies. The company knows perfectly well that tourists tend to extend their economic means by purchasing items they normally would not buy at home, especially if they are visiting a place construed as “exotic.”

Furthermore, catering to wealthier tourists has been the trend since PeruRail increased its tourist train fares, hence making services largely accessible only to the upper and middle classes, and reducing the number of less well-off tourists, often from Latin America, or the young, college-age adventure tourists who can afford to make the trip. These last two categories of tourists constitute a major source of income for local restaurants, hotels and artisan merchants, as they are more likely to spend their money at the less-expensive local establishments, rather than Sanctuary Lodge by the Citadel or Hotel Machu Picchu in the pueblo. What exacerbated the harsh economic conditions for the townsfolk in this period was the fact that it was already the low tourism season, and the September 11 attack on the World Trade Center further halted travel plans for many. Adding to the concerns of the townsfolk was a proposal asserting that Sanctuary Lodge and PeruRail planned to reconstruct an old train station about a kilometer from the pueblo (Puente Ruinas) to take tourists directly to the foot of the Citadel where they would then sell their own arts and crafts to tourists before or after their visit to the Citadel. This possibility fueled a sense of outrage and insecurity, and made Orient Express’ control of the tourism economy more apparent. As Margarita once said, “With a thirty-year contract, if PeruRail and Sanctuary Lodge are not challenged they will destroy the pueblo.”
Consequently, for the people of Machu Picchu privatizing the train system has led to an enormous loss of control over their district. For residents of the pueblo, the privileges granted PeruRail and Sanctuary Lodge are the standard by which they measure the inconsistencies of privatization policies in the Sanctuary. Those privileges also expose as a façade the state’s alleged impartial respect for private property and the idea of a free market. Chela, the president of one of the artisan associations, helped organize a “commercial” protest against Sanctuary lodge, saying, “after all, why don’t we have the right to locate our commercial activities [by the Citadel] if Sanctuary Lodge can?” After the Lodge rented space to two commercial chains to sell stylish artisan goods at the Citadel, the artisans and small merchants\textsuperscript{70} went up to Sanctuary Lodge, began selling their products to tourists, and arranged their goods in an orderly fashion along the grounds, being careful not to block the entrance to either the Citadel or the hotel restaurant (see photo 4 p.254).

The artisans and merchants expected to do better business by the Citadel, but many were surprised at the dramatic increase of sales in comparison to their sales in the pueblo. It demonstrated that even wealthy tourists would indeed purchase more local products rather than, or along with, expensive name brands, if they were available. However, as mentioned, the Machupicheños are prohibited from conducting commercial activity near the Citadel. Sergio, a young resident in his twenties, nicely expressed his resentment of this double standard. When I asked Sergio, who was selling small memorabilia, if he was having more

\textsuperscript{70}By small merchants means those who sell rather than produce artisan products, as well as t-shirts and cloth products.
success with customers at the Citadel, he declared unequivocally, “Of course,”
and questioned the rationale for prohibiting residents from doing business there:

If they say this is a free market and there should be competition then why can’t we come here to sell and compete equally with them [Sanctuary Lodge] here—if they are allowed to sell their products here then why can’t we? Why is it not equal? There are people in Machu Picchu that need to bring home ‘the bread’ on a daily basis in order to cover their costs. If no one is allowed here, then no one should be allowed here, otherwise what kind of competition are we talking about in neoliberalism or in this globalized world, as they call it? Give us something consistent! It’s only a free market for the rich. If you have money you can grab the market but if you don’t have money, you don’t have possibilities…. This competition is not legal. This is not competition!

Sergio’s comment on the need to “bring home the bread” evokes Gavin Smith’s observation of how “political struggle must be reintegrated into the parallel experience of each participant in trying to keep bread on the table” (1989: 170). As Smith showed in his analysis of the struggle to undermine the hacienda system among the Huasicanchinos in Central Peru, it was precisely the threat to livelihood that united different groups and interests for political action (ibid.). Likewise, in Machu Picchu, the less wealthy artisans and other micro-entrepreneurs, directly connected to the tourism economy began seeing it in their interests to join the restaurant and hotel owners in their protest. Such alliances, while generally not long lasting, are not uncommon in Latin America since neoliberal reforms have also posed difficult circumstances for small businesses as many find themselves unable to compete with direct foreign investments (Shadlen 2000: 101; Durand 1998: 276). Typically, small family and even middle-sized businesses often lack resources and expertise, information and
technology compared to mega corporations making it difficult to protect their
interests separately (Shadlen 2000: 74). However, this alliance as Lagos points
out in her study on peasants and merchants in Cochabamba, Bolivia does not
suggest that class differences are overshadowed by common political ground,
nor that their efforts in collective action will bring the comparable returns (1994:
132). In Machu Picchu, others who were less directly involved in the tourism
economy, such as the women of the central market or those who did not possess
land, proved more difficult to organize. The issue of class and wealth differences
is shown in the attempt by a number of people to form a train company that
would compete with PeruRail. Making the pueblo company work required a
sufficient number of Machupicheños willing or able to make the investment, and
the ability to attract international investors that would put forward a large share of
the necessary capital; in some respects the latter was easier than the former, as
the following meeting illustrates.

Mobilizing Pueblo Capital:

The townsfolk fought back against the monopoly of PeruRail and their
control of the transportation system that gives them a great deal of power over
the district economy. A group of Machupicheños proposed a plan to create a
train company with six cars to run in a similar fashion to PeruRail. Raúl was
nominated as president of the company; Charo, Héctor, Oscar and Regina were
on the board of directors. In an interview, Oscar summarized the rationale:
“We want access to the economic opportunities of tourism. Tourism brings a lot of wealth, but not everyone in the pueblo has access. We believe this company to be the future of the pueblo, that everyone in this pueblo improves their economic situation.” He continued, “We are not satisfied with PeruRail. We believe that Fujimori created total corruption in Peru. Companies [like PeruRail] were given special contracts and preferential treatment. In Peru there should not be monopolies! With this in mind, the people of the pueblo decided to create a company.”

After the plan was developed, the directors went house to house throughout the pueblo asking for interested investors. To their credit, they did not discriminate in the asking. However, despite the democratic philosophy behind the company’s creation, the price of membership was too steep for many households. It was first estimated by the directors that each participant must commit about $1,200 U.S. In this regard some have, in Oscar’s idiom, more access to the wealth of tourism than others. However, there was another reason why some decided not to participate. While the directors kept participation open to everyone who had money for the investment, social tensions between older and newer residents created problems of trust. Ana, for example, one of the more recent and poorer residents in the pueblo was asked to participate, but she rejected the offer and confided to me that she did not trust the motives of the more established residents and was afraid she would lose her money. Short on capital, one of the main dilemmas for the fledgling company was whether or not it should be open to outside investors. If they were to seek outside investors they would have to contend with negotiating yet another element of control.

As January wore on, a meeting was held to discuss the issues of local and outside participation. More importantly, the list of willing participants was starting
to dwindle, and so this meeting was also about reinforcing confidence in the plan. There were over a 100 pueblo participants in attendance. Charo recorded the minutes while Regina shuffled papers at her side. Raúl, Oscar, and Héctor sat up front facing the audience. After Charo’s roll call, Raúl stood up to speak. He was charged with moderating the meeting. The crowd quieted as Raúl announced that out of the 150 people who agreed to be partners, eight had not officially signed up in the public registry. Each person had to pay 50 soles up front (about $15) to register in the public registry in order to be considered a legal partner. Originally, the formation of the company began with 250 participants but that number quickly dwindled when they realized how much overall participation would cost. Therefore, it was important to alleviate fears of losing money in order to thwart what would eventually happen – a further withdrawal of participation.71 The financial problem was a serious limitation for many. The partners were a mixed group of people in terms of class. Some were restaurant and hotel owners, while others were small-scale artisans, and yet others like Oscar were resident tour guides, and so the risks of participation were uneven.

Since Oscar played a key role in developing the idea, he also addressed the group. He spoke about the continued search for companies interested in partnership with the pueblo. Oscar explained that they needed to select the company that had the most experience in transportation and train service. He

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71 The number of partners further dwindled down to 100 a couple of weeks after this meeting.
informed the crowd that thus far two companies had expressed interest, one from China and the other from Bolivia.  

After passing out the information, Oscar quickly turned his attention to the eight abstainers who had promised participation. He seemed upset. Oscar vigorously emphasized that no additional money was required at this time, only signatures. Later the investment share required by each would be another issue. Each partner would have to pay from one to two thousand soles (about 300-600 U.S. dollars) depending on the final number of Machupicheños that decide to be business partners; the lower the number of participants the higher the financial burden for each. For a moment people chatted amongst themselves. Some were confused because they did not understand the procedures involved in an investment and thus expressed concern about losing their money. Some people did not trust the board. Margarita spoke in an effort to motivate those who abstained. She said, in a somewhat antagonistic way that she believed it would simply be better to invite outside interests from Cuzco, since they would provide better contacts than the abstainers to promote the train service.

The discussions continued. At one point Charo called out the names of the abstainers. One agreed to sign. The discussion intensified over what to do with the rest. Oscar pressured them - “There are people in Cuzco waiting, so all must sign!” (Hay gente en Cuzco esperando, todos deben firmar). Señor Paulino stood up from the rear and made an appeal on behalf of the abstainers. He drew

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72 As it turned out just shortly after this meeting, it would be neither of the two but rather an American company – Maryland and Delaware Railroad (MDDE). Maryland and Delaware Railroad was formed out of the State Conrail mergers of the mid-1970 and completely privatized in 1987. MDDE has about 155 miles of track and is a short line freight service on the Delmarva Peninsula. The Delmarva Peninsula is comprised of the states of Delaware, Maryland, and Virginia.
on a sentiment of pueblo solidarity on behalf of the abstainers saying, “They are people from here (the pueblo), not outsiders” (son gente de acá, no de afuera). They should be given more time, at least until Monday.” Raúl diminished the force of Paulino’s appeal, “We are all brothers of the pueblo,” apparently communicating in his tone of voice the notion that it was no reason to give people more time. There was a perceptible element of distrust in the room. Oscar spoke again. He began explaining the procedures in order to alleviate fears. His voice became louder and stronger in tone as he explained the function of the board of directors; “the money is placed in a bank account where all transactions are visible on monthly statements. Money can only be removed with the authorization and signature of the directors, so it can’t simply be stolen by anyone. One can still remove one’s money through the directors, if he wanted his money back.” There was silence. Margarita went into a homily on the importance of this business venture, she said:

You have to think about the future of the pueblo, PeruRail is a monster.73 They have six pages on the Internet, when most only have one or two. [She spoke about how PeruRail bullied other business owners in the past, using metaphorical terms] they broke their arms... but as a pueblo, PeruRail would have to go house to house in order to break our arms. We have to continue our struggle because it is not only for our future but the future of our children.

Margarita took her seat and Marta stood. She addressed the members and began talking about her morning train ride -“this morning I was witness to the abuses of PeruRail” (En la mañana fui testigo de los abusos de PeruRail). She recounted the story of how throughout the entire trip; local women carrying

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73 Residents often refer to PeruRail and Sanctuary Lodge with the Term “monster.”
produce were forced to pay to put their cargo in the baggage compartment. Marta mentioned how a woman and her daughter were rejected from entering the train when they tried to board with a sack of potatoes! Marta became visibly emotional as she conveyed her observations to the crowd saying, “She [the woman] was crying because her [little] daughter was [already] on the train [as the woman was barred from entering].” At this people became noticeably more attentive and listened until the end, at which point Raúl affirmed, “So many abuses” (Tantos abusos)! Her story resonated with the experience of other people, who were not hotel and restaurant owners. Problems with PeruRail did manage to bring different social and economic groups into alliance.

It was nearing the end of the meeting. The majority voted to exclude those who had yet to sign as partners in the public registry. It was concluded that everyone had a week’s time to submit the full investment money. Margarita turned to me and said, “That’s the majority of the group;” she made a face to express disbelief in the possibility of people coming up with the money. Margarita believed a staggering 2.5 million dollars investment was needed. Before the meeting broke up, Oscar concluded with a warning - “We are going to compete with a monster,” (Vamos a competir con un monstruo).

Ultimately, it was decided that they would search for a major outside investor, making it a partnership of three groups. The company would be a consortium of the pueblo, a company in Cuzco formed by ex-ENAFER employees, and Delaware and Maryland Railroad. The three would create a conglomerate called “Ferrocarril Expreso Machupicchu” Still, the attempt to
establish the company was not without criticism in the pueblo. The feeling by many was that it simply would not be economically sustainable; people would lose their money. Emilio, a hotel owner and also an interested participant, privately expressed serious doubts about the plan saying, "I don’t think it’s possible" (Yo no creo que sea posible). From Emilio’s perspective the cost was too great. Even if everyone could contribute the full investment required, one thousand soles per person would not be nearly enough to operate a train company – not even one thousand dollars per person would be enough. As an experienced businessman, he pointed out the many hidden costs in maintenance and insurance, not to mention hiring engineers, conductors and mechanics. More importantly, he even questioned whether it was politically feasible. Emilio believed that state officials in Lima have a personal stake in Machu Picchu by being financially involved with Orient Express. He supposed that some officials were making their own profit and consequently they would not be willing to put their money in jeopardy. Emilio buttressed his sentiments with a contemptuous smile and the remark, “this would not be new” - “Así es Perú” (that's the way Peru is). In short, Emilio was skeptical that the state would grant permission to rent out the rail system to the pueblo company. The sweet deals given to Orient Express by the state sounded suspicious to Emilio.

While Emilio is a sympathetic critic, others were more strongly against the pueblo forming a train company. “Que lastima” (What a pity) blasted Juan Carlos, an elderly restaurant owner and lifetime resident of the district. We sat

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74 The rail itself remains government owned. Even PeruRail rents the use of the tracks paying $4 a kilometer per trip.
outside his farmhouse adjacent to the train tracks in the community of
Pampacahua some 16 kilometers from the pueblo. As he spoke we looked
down to the railway and the Vilcanota River that parallels it. “These people are
going to lose their money. It’s impossible that they can generate the money
needed…. That’s a lot of money for them….what these leaders are doing is a rip
off – every nutcase has his own scheme” (La gente va a perder su plata. Es
imposible que puedan generar la plata que se necesita….La plata es mucho
para ellos, lo que están haciendo estos líderes es un engaño - Cada loco con su
tema). “Well what can they do to challenge PeruRail,” I asked. He leaned
forward, extended his finger out towards the vista and said, “Build a road”
(construir una carretera). That’s the best way to undermine the PeruRail
Monopoly,” he concluded. Perhaps, Juan Carlos is correct in assuming that a
road would be the best way to undermine the PeruRail monopoly by allowing
cheaper bus services to enter the business of transporting tourists. On the other
hand, it would also be the best way to undermine the world heritage status
Machu Picchu has with UNESCO because it would further increase tourism to an
unsustainable magnitude. It would also jeopardize the debt-for-nature
agreement with Finland that included close to seven million dollars of
conservation money and a twenty-five million dollar debt exemption.
Presumably, the state would sooner get rid of the population before permitting
the building of a road. Nonetheless, while the formation of the company was
never realized, the active search for an international investor on the part of the
pueblo residents is impressive in that it shows that people are not hapless victims
to corporate capital. In fact, the bid from such small level capital holders to attract international investors shows that people seek out new global alignments on their own terms and may intertwine global corporate capital with local capital (Nash 2005).

**Land Rights and Pueblo Politics:**

The measure for deciding who is from the pueblo and who is not is usually ascertained simply by the amount of time one has lived there. Most residents in the town originally come from somewhere else, but some have been in the pueblo longer than others. Those who have possession rights to the land where they built local hotels and restaurants tend to be more from “here”. Possession rights and territorial claims converge to form a special kind of “propertied” class. It is common for people who claim that they are from Machu Picchu but born elsewhere to qualify their claim with phrases like “but I’ve been here for 20 years or more.” In other words, they establish some kind of lineage that connects them to land entitlement. Indeed, much of pueblo life is defined by the politics of belonging and about deciding who can or cannot claim possession rights to land.

On a cool rainy evening in October 2001, about 30 residents of the pueblo gathered in the lounge of Margarita’s hotel, *Gringo Bill’s*. A meeting was held by Oscar Valencia, the president of the local watchdog group *Frente de Defensa de los Intereses de Machu Picchu*. While the meeting was open to everyone, many knew of Oscar’s political ambitions to be mayor and thus largely his supporters were present. The agenda that commanded attention was the issue of land
invasions. A number of people considered pueblo outsiders had set up shanties and cut down trees in violation of state ecological laws.

The meeting was called to order but it took a while to quell the outrage expressed by those present. There was great concern over the growing number of people in the pueblo. An elderly man pounded his fist on the table and declared there was a population explosion in the pueblo. Others echoed his sentiments and claimed the pueblo was in chaos. “People are coming from everywhere to live in the pueblo, and the mayor continues to grant them residency,” proclaimed one woman. The elderly man cried out again, “There is a mafia in the Municipio.” Oscar sympathized with the concerns, but he emphasized the larger contradictions. He noted that while the Unidad Gestión Machu Picchu (UGM) rebuked the pueblo for cutting trees, they were quick to grant Orient Express permission to build a controversial cable car that would maul the landscape. Luis, a local flute artisan, stood up and read a “nasty gram” written by the UGM. This stated that the invasions and the subsequent cutting of trees threatened the UNESCO agreement with the Peruvian government and thus jeopardized the World Heritage Status of Machu Picchu.

Many of the older residents resent the building on invaded land. During my stay in the pueblo, Rangers from INRENA forcibly removed two of the most recent invasions. As they argued, invasions damage the beauty of the environment, and since the structures are built on slopes or along rivers, they run the danger of being destroyed in landslides or floods. Interestingly, a significant

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75 In Peru when land is invaded in large numbers it is often referred to as invasiones.
portion of the landless came to the pueblo after a natural disaster in the nearby communities of Santa Teresa and Ccollpani destroyed their homes and fields. As Ana, originally from Santa Teresa, recalls, when she arrived in the pueblo some of the older residents began linking the floods with the people that “flooded” the pueblo.

Many of the women who work in the central market fall into the category of newer residents. These newer residents conversely resent the older land holding groups, claiming that the “old guard” see themselves as the only ones who have the right to make a living in the pueblo. As one market woman put it to me “Because they own houses they believe themselves to be the owners of the Sanctuary” (Porque tienen casas se crean dueños del Santuario). As we will see in later chapters, this central division in the pueblo posed a serious challenge to uniting people in the mobilization against state laws, and large-scale private enterprise.

A major factor leading to organized protest was the growing dissatisfaction among the older, more established land possessors with the incumbent Alcalde (mayor). The Alcalde built a constituency by attending to people who are relatively new to the pueblo and have no access to land. He accommodated new comers by allocating what little land there is or assigned them market space. In addition, the feeling, mainly amid the restaurant and hotel owners, was that the Alcalde favored large capital interests over the interests of local businesses (an example of this is described in the last chapter). This antagonistic relationship

76 However, it must be noted that the politics of allocating space is not new in Machu Picchu, but rather is a long standing practice connected to patronage and favoritism.
led many, such as Margarita and the leaders of Frente such as Oscar, Charo, Cori, Regina and Marina, to feel excluded from major decisions on the spending of municipal money. The situation came to a head shortly before the first protest meeting when it was discovered that the Alcalde used municipal money to invest in the building of a Cuzco-based hotel, allegedly to increase income for the pueblo. Many residents were furious that there was no public meeting to discuss the issue, and by the time they found out, it was too late to pull back from the investment.

Some of the residents, concerned about the way the Alcalde was using municipal funds, accused him of misappropriation. Pueblo workers had not been paid for two months. Many, like Emilio, could not believe that the municipal government would be short funds to pay the pueblo construction workers. The problem was a bureaucratic one. The workers were being paid by state funds that were the result of a contract between the INC and the municipality to set aside a portion of the Citadel entrance fee for district development projects. The municipal authorities failed to provide the INC with project budgets on time. One such project was the building of a sports stadium, which now would be discontinued without further notice, and the workers left unpaid. Nevertheless, to Emilio, the district government was swimming in money, and from his perspective, it was outrageous that it should default on paying the workers’ wages. The accusations that district funds were unaccounted for was further compounded by the fact that it was the start of a local election year. Many members of the mobilization had political aspirations of their own and the mayor
seemed already to be involved in campaign efforts. His opponents claimed that he was dipping into municipal funds for his own campaign efforts. The problem stemmed in part from the fact that a great deal of capital passed into the hands of the municipal authorities, yet the pueblo was in such disrepair. The following conversation with Emilio illustrates the amount of money that goes into the municipal government of Machu Picchu and the frustration in accounting for it:

*Where's the Money?*

As I passed Hotel Pachacútec, Don Emilio waved to me to come in and take a seat. He informed me that one of the *regidores* (district councilmen) had come looking for me; members of the municipal administration were taking an official trip to the district communities, and they wanted to see if I would be interested in going with them. Emilio explained that elections were approaching. He spoke openly about the politics of the pueblo, as if to enlighten a lost anthropologist. The trip to the communities was all about campaigning and promises in order to win votes for the Alcalde. “The Alcalde is worried” (El Alcalde esta preocupado), Emilio said, making clear by his tone of voice that he was against him. Pre-election estimates indicated that close to half of the district residents wanted to revoke his status in recall elections (*revocatoria*). Emilio focused his eyes on me as if concentrating on an idea. “The Alcalde does nothing for the pueblo. He's from Cuzco, not from the pueblo” (El Alcalde no hace nada para el pueblo, es de Cuzco no del pueblo). From Emilio’s perspective, the invasions of outsiders were caused by the Alcalde; he claimed
that the Alcalde sought to attract new residents to add them to his constituency. “Three hundred new people are now residents, where did they come from?” (Hay como trescientas nuevas personas como residentes y no se sabe de dónde han venido) said Emilio with irritation. Inhabitants must officially change where they are registered to vote to be officially considered residents—cambio domiciliario, as he called it. This requires paying a fee, and he charged that the Alcalde used his authority to waive the fee for many. Emilio stressed that the restaurant and hotel workers or the workers from the hydroelectric station nearby, as well as the PeruRail employees are not residents, but he believed that they are the ones who have been able to change their resident status through the Alcalde’s efforts. Interestingly, Emilio’s accusations came on the heels of media allegations that PeruRail paid its employees to change their residency status in order to throw votes toward favorable candidates. These people were referred to as las golondrinas, after the swallow, which is considered a bird of passing, with no fixed residence, migrating from north to south in different seasons. It is impossible to know whether or not PeruRail was guilty of this seduction or whether the Alcalde is responsible, for certainly, he would not be alone in attempting to win patrons. Nevertheless, this concern among the older established townsfolk called attention to the strategic importance of controlling the municipal government if they were to survive the onslaught of Orient Express.

The Alcalde was now going to concentrate his political efforts in the communities in order to promise the campesinos development projects. When I

77 Although I left the field in July 2002, just before the elections some six months later in November, my field assistant informed me that it was estimated that the number of legal residents had grown to 940 extra voters.
asked Emilio where the municipality would get the money to fund projects, he laughed. “You think the municipality doesn’t have any money?” The municipality has six buses that transport tourists up to Machu Picchu. Each bus holds up to thirty tourists, and each tourist pays $9 U.S. round-trip; the buses make at least three or four trips per day. The municipal government makes more or less an average of $3,000 (U.S.) per day on that alone. In addition, the municipality also collects the entrance fee of five soles (approx. $1.50) per tourist who enters the hot-water springs. And finally, the Instituto Nacional de Cultura agreed to set aside an escrow account of $2 for every $10 entrance fee to the Citadel of Machu Picchu; that can amount to half a million U.S. dollars per year.

Considering the size of the pueblo, that intake of money makes it perhaps the wealthiest rural district in Peru. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the pueblo is a highly stratified town, and the size of the municipal budget is not an absolute indicator of the wealth of the residents, as shown by the unpaid workers. Emilio’s point was that despite the money that “flows” through Machu Picchu, the district has little to show for it. The big mystery for Emilio was, “Where’s the money?” (Donde esta la plata?).

Finally, there was additional dissatisfaction with the Alcalde’s handling of NGO-designed projects for the pueblo. Aside from the INC-funded projects, major, potentially life-altering projects were funded through the Finland–Peru debt-for-nature exchange. The most important of these projects entailed the building of a reservoir for potable water. Also two other projects were being planned: the construction of a new artisan market and the channeling of a small
river (Rio Aguas Calientes) that cuts through the pueblo and is noted for flash floods. Planning for these projects did not include any public consultation or pueblo participation. Many of the older, prominent members of the pueblo were angry and alarmed over the fact that their advice had not been sought. In part this was because many of the older members had dealt with natural disasters, having endured forest fires, landslides, and flash floods, and some, who had a great deal of experience with their natural environment, saw the lack of consultation as an affront to their knowledge. Moreover, these concerns cut across class lines and political affiliations. Many, even those who did not participate in the mobilization, were worried about the precarious location of the reservoir. Once built, the reservoir would be perched above the pueblo on a slope noted for landslides. This added to a vague aura of fear among some pueblo residents that state authorities, Orient Express and the PMP were bent on clearing the Sanctuary of Machupicheños, either through property expropriation or disaster. The Alcalde was characterized as incapable of protecting the pueblo from outside institutional intrusion.

However, the Alcalde was not without support. As a medical doctor and a practitioner at the health station before his election, he was thought of kindly by many in the pueblo and in the rural areas, as one who has extended his services. Also, many of the poorer, newer inhabitants were grateful for his help in gaining residency status. He competently managed the disaster relief after a 1998 flood of the Aobamba River that destroyed the homes of many in the district communities of Ccollpani and Intiwata, as well as communities on the opposite
side of the flooding Aobamba River in other districts, such as Santa Teresa in the Province of Quillabamba. A sizable number of these disaster victims settled in the Pueblo of Machu Picchu, and, under the auspices of the Alcalde, many found jobs and were allotted market stands. Some of the market women expressed a degree of allegiance to the Alcalde, as it was under his administration when the central market was built. Furthermore, as already mentioned, a number of these residents, particularly the women in the central market felt some contempt toward the older, more established townsfolk. One market woman, “Micaela,” rebuked previous municipal authorities for their false promises of giving her a piece of land, and then rejecting her on the grounds of being new to the pueblo. She spoke kindly of the incumbent Alcalde:

/What do you think of this Alcalde’s administration?/ “Fine, I have nothing bad to say about him. For me he’s not like previous Alcaldes I’ve experienced here... their lives were drink, drink and drink, that’s what they’re known for.... This Alcalde that’s now in office, listened to me, understood me when I told him about the games they played with me about not being from this pueblo [and not giving her a piece of land]... I know that if some land would be available this Alcalde would offer it to me.

Real life situations are complicated and it should be noted that the Alcalde had many pueblo supporters. I can only assume that the Alcalde apparently felt secure in his constituency, and brushed off the mobilization as nothing more than party opposition in an election-year. In meetings with state authorities during the early phases of the protest movement, he publicly mentioned that the actions expressed the complaints of only a handful of troublemakers, his opponents, largely the members of Frente. No doubt the political ambitions of some of the leaders in the mobilization, particularly Oscar’s, played a role in organizing protests. The fact that election year politics played a role in the forming of the
mobilization cannot be underestimated, but it can be misunderstood. The Alcalde, detached from the malaise in district life, did not see how the ranks of the mobilization grew around him despite the fact that many who joined the ranks were not necessarily political opponents. The protestors had often asked him to join them in helping communicate their problems when they encountered state representatives; he had participated with reservation and in an unassuming manner. Had he claimed a greater leadership role, he may have won back popularity. The mobilization grew out of the contradictory experiences the Machupicheños had with the state’s neo-liberal policies. While the Alcalde of places like Arequipa was aligned with the anti-privatization protests and gained political approval, the Alcalde of Machu Picchu at least appeared to be apologetic on behalf of the groups that were being challenged, (an issue described in the last chapter) constantly emphasizing the diplomatically sensitive nature of the demands being made by the protestors.

**Concluding Remarks:**

Collective action is difficult to analyze ethnographically because the details uncover the many contradictions of real life (Edelman 2001: 286). The mobilization in Machu Picchu primarily grew out of the concerns and interests of small and mid-level entrepreneurs, mainly restaurant and hotel owners, who were doubly threatened by the corporate intrusions into their economy and the possibility of losing land-possession status; most, but not all, of the leaders were from this group. Many other stakeholders like micro and small-scale merchants
gradually joined. Mid-level entrepreneurs without possession status, and often not officially registered as residents of the district, were more reluctant to get involved, as were the newer residents such as the poorer market women. In part, the lack of participation from these latter groups had to do with their loyalty to the Alcalde, as he was blamed by the older residents for many of their problems with large-scale corporate capital. Rural residents proved more difficult to analyze in this study. Many backed the support of the pueblo Frente, as they too shared issues with possession status. On the other hand, rural residents interviewed generally expressed a distrust of town politics and its rhetoric. Some rural leaders more loyal to the Alcalde sought to organize their own Frente to represent their interests. Nevertheless, once the pueblo Frente began its mobilization, the leaders claimed to speak on behalf of the campesinos.

I was sometimes asked by the leaders of Frente and others to film their formal encounters with the authorities, seeing me as a person who could help legitimate their cause. On many occasions, the protestors would tell authorities who were reluctant to allow me into their meetings that I was their “CNN man,” often lightheartedly tacking on an additional N (CNNN…). In a sense, they were suggesting that I connect their problems to a larger audience, perhaps the world. Some of these expressions also refract the history of the north/south power relations that define Latin American life. For example, both the authorities and some of the participating Machupicheños would jokingly say “They have their own gringo on their side” (Tienen su propio gringo a sus lado). But, what does it mean to have a gringo at your side? What does it do? Does it lend credence
and prestige to a group’s cause? These practical expressions coupled with actions such as the attempt to form a train service in order to beat PeruRail at their own game, or even the distrust people express amongst themselves about their investments, are attempts to negotiate and manipulate the politics and economics of a changing world they do not control. Rather than retreat, the Machupicheños depicted here display in their different ways, a determination to survive in a place where corporate and governmental forces would prefer that they disappear (Nash 2005). Yet, life in the pueblo had its local factions. Furthermore, as mentioned before, there was a degree of distrust among campesinos over the idea that people in the pueblo could properly represent them.

Although a concrete plan was still in the making, the leaders of Frente decided to challenge a number of groups, like INRENA, INC, PMP, UGM and Orient Express, not to mention the Municipal government and the provincial authorities of Urubamba. Confronting one institution would have been a formidable task, but to take on all of them seemed to some, and to me, a highly ambitious project. Nevertheless, far from seeing themselves as helpless victims, the pueblo endeavored to become “the mouse that roared.” The Machupicheños were cognizant of the “global” nature of their problems, and they had their own ideas of how to confront them. They were ready to defend themselves against all “invaders.”
Chapter Three

THE PRODUCTION OF BLAME:
SECONDARY ADJUSTMENT AND THE DOUBLE BIND

“We are the only pueblo in Peru that has no identity.”
(Somos el único pueblo en Perú que no tiene identidad.)
Raúl - The Pueblo of Machu Picchu (Fieldnotes 9-23-01).

The Tangible Lives of an Intangible Place:

When I arrived in Machu Picchu in September of 2001, the pueblo was in the midst of its big festival – the 60th anniversary of the founding of their political district. As part of the festivities, a dance competition was planned. I was asked to lend a hand with the preparations by Raúl and Emilio, two of the prominent members of the Barrio Huiñay Huayna, and the organizers of one of the dance groups. Raúl had spent the last few weeks preparing his dance group for the evening contest. In designing the dance he called “Rito al Dios Sol” (A Rite to the Sun God), Raúl wanted to create a dance to represent the Pueblo of Machu Picchu. For that reason this dance differed from those of the other contestants' who mainly copied the dance, dress and music from diverse locales of the sierra. Although Raúl knew little about dance or choreography, he took it upon himself as the president of the Huiñay Huayna Barrio Association to organize some of the local children and a few adults. Raúl explained, “The pueblo does not have an identity and creating its own dance would offer something unique to Machu Picchu.” “We are the only pueblo in Peru that has no identity,” he declared (Somos el único pueblo en Perú que no tiene identidad).

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78 Dance and dress are highly symbolic in the Andes. They are strong markers of community and region, but the Pueblo of Machu Picchu does not have a specific dance or dress of its own.
In the afternoon, we gathered in a shed just off of Avenida Pachacútec, the principal street of the pueblo. Raúl, the children, and two women (Doña Regina and Doña Irma) were busy preparing the costumes. The children spray-painted their sandals gold, while the women cut and styled an assortment of colorful fabric into dance garbs. The bamboo staffs they had peeled the previous day were now dry and decorated with adornments that for Raúl symbolized the Andean past. His aspiration was to create a dance expressive of pre-Columbian times at Machu Picchu (see photo 7 p.255).

That evening, spectators crowded the plaza waiting for the competition to begin. All participants were from the pueblo with the exception of those dancing for the Instituto Nacional de Cultura (INC). Some objected to their participation, claiming that these dancers were outsiders. Since the winner would receive a prize of one thousand Soles, some maintained that the INC didn’t need the money because it is already a rich government bureaucracy. Still others asserted INC involvement was unfair because it had contracted professional dancers from the City of Cuzco. When it was time for Raúl’s group to dance, he entered the stage to explain to the audience that this was their new dance created to represent ancient times in Machu Picchu. He stressed to the pueblo that they should accept this dance as theirs because, “our pueblo does not have its own dance.”

At last, all the dance groups performed. The judges decided that the INC had won. Raúl and his group began shouting, “fraud;” Regina cried out, “It’s unfair, they’re not from the pueblo, they’ve been contracted from Cuzco, they’re
professional [dancers], why didn’t the old fat archeologists do the dancing.” She then turned to me to justify her rationale. “The money could have gone to the school or to one of the barrios in the pueblo, the INC already has plenty of money and it is not fair to the pueblo if they could bring in outsiders to compete in a local event.”

Raúl was furious. He insulted the panel of judges made up of officials from the municipality. “Incompetents,” he cried. He expressed the feeling that the Municipio had betrayed the pueblo. He explained, “They don’t represent us, but rather the powerful.” The group marched to the front of the Municipal building and shouted: “The festival is for the pueblo and not for the Mayor.” They then stormed through the plaza and departed for their barrio, verbally blasting the INC and the local government.

The anniversary is a special event for the people of Machu Picchu. It is perhaps their most important festival, a time when the district reasserts its jurisdictional autonomy over the sanctuary designation. Celebration of the district can become an encounter with the intersecting spaces of district and sanctuary. Festival activities are often about emphasizing the existence of the district prior to the formation of the sanctuary. “When was the district of Machu Picchu founded,” the master of ceremony asks a young contestant in the beauty contest. “1941,” she replies and the crowd cheers. As will be discussed below, the felt need by many, such as Raúl, to create a Machu Picchu identity, raised the question of what is considered an appropriate identity for the pueblo and why having one had become urgent.
Between Utopia and Total Institution:

The people of Machu Picchu live in a landscape promoted and defined by the tourism industry, state institutions, and international bodies like UNESCO that consider the area a heritage for all humanity (*patrimonio de la humanidad*) to be a utopia. How do the laws of heritage conservation that seek to maintain this image, impinge on the lives of those who reside in such an area? The landscape is designated to be an “intangible zone” whereby biodiversity and cultural heritage are seen as a quality and existing people are seen as a quantity. The Sanctuary is a place where anyone’s given strip of land holds the potential for being defined as archeologically significant, not just to the nation, but also to the world? Sergio, a pueblo resident, responds to my question: What do people mean when they say Machu Picchu is an intangible resource?

/What is the meaning of intangible?/ They say the Historic Sanctuary of Machu Picchu is intangible—everything that you see [points to the landscape] is intangible. But this intangibility is only for the poor, it’s not intangible for them [points to Sanctuary Lodge]. [T]hey say it’s prohibited to construct buildings with concrete but in reality they [the state authorities] don’t care. They can violate the rule [pertaining to intangibility] but for the campesinos that have been living here for years, and understand the ecology, only they are [said to be] destroying the environment. We see this hypocrisy with our own eyes and feel it in our hearts [points to his eyes then places his hand on his chest].

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79 According to UNESCO Legislative Resolution 23349 Peru is required “to identify, protect, conserve, restore and transmit to future generations” its world heritage sites.

80 Peruvian National law has expressly declared the Machu Picchu monument a cultural heritage of the nation in Article of Law 24047. Article law 23765 maintains that the state has the obligation to protect from all attempts to alter its intangible nature. Crimes committed against heritage sites are defined under Peruvian law under Article 230 of the penal code that states that destroying or altering a cultural asset constitutes a crime.
Intangibility is a vague concept highly subject to competing interpretations. Generally, intangible is held to mean that the Sanctuary expresses a quality of symbolic value and is greater than its physical properties. Depending on the rigidity of interpretation for conservation enforcement, it is easy to blame the activities of inhabitants for disturbing that value. It should not be a surprise that within the notion of the “intangible” we find a “microphysics of power” that structures social relationships as well as the field of possibilities for people (Foucault 1977). Governing agencies systematically manipulate the concept to promote some interests above others, and limit a population for the purpose of giving larger investors more opportunities to make money. Dominant groups strategically use the concept of intangibility to serve neoliberal policies. However, in order to assess and determine the ramifications of this assertion, we need a proper theoretical framing of social action.

Restrictions on rural activities became particularly stringent after 1997 when campesinos were blamed for a forest fire, even though there is no conclusive evidence that it was their fault. The campesinos claim it could have easily been a tourist’s cigarette. Unrelated to the fire incident, in 2002, thirty-three campesinos were charged with various ecological violations, such as cutting tree branches, and if they were found guilty could lead to their eviction from Sanctuary grounds. Moreover, because of INRENA’s drive to conserve an ideal nature, the rural inhabitants are not allowed to have electricity because lights disrupt that vision, which is largely commercial in perspective. Ironically, a major hydroelectric plant is located within the Sanctuary boundaries, and high-
tension wires pass through some of the communities. Access to electricity is sometimes a point of conflict between campesinos and INRENA rangers because the latter use expensive solar-powered electricity for their barracks, which are equipped with televisions as well as lights. As Victoria, a resident of Corihuayrachina pointed out, campesinos are not even permitted telephone lines in the rural areas of the sanctuary, making them dependent on INRENA for radio communication. In addition, if there is a medical emergency, the closest medical post is in Choquellusca (K82) about 15 kilometers away from their community. Fifteen kilometers may seem like a short distance but in the sanctuary, considering the difficult terrain, transportation and communication systems, it often means death to whoever requires immediate medical assistance. In addition, people are restricted from obtaining firewood for their wood burning fireplaces. Campesinos must build only with adobe, whereas INRENA uses concrete blocks for their station, and campesinos cannot expand their houses or build a second floor.

Another major complaint made by campesinos is the restriction placed on cultivation and the breeding of animals. As the INRENA Director for the Sanctuary explained in an interview, “cows are a danger to tourists and they dirty the Inca Trail with dung.” He lightheartedly explained, “We have to constantly tell tourists that it’s good luck to step on shit.” On the other hand, campesinos retort that tending livestock has been a part of their lives for generations, not to mention that a cow has never attacked a tourist, and manure is for them a reality of nature. Humans have no place in the director’s conception of nature, unless
they have the appropriate identity. For the director, the campesinos are not “Indian” enough. For INRENA the only future for campesinos in the sanctuary, if any, would require them to adopt a sort of commercialized Andean identity that never existed. As the director explained, the campesinos should substitute llamas for cows because they are smaller and more attractive. According to the director the campesinos reject the idea because in his words “they think “llamas are for Indians, “(Ellos creen que las llamas son para los indios) but it is clear that INRENA would prefer the campesinos give up rural production altogether and, like the townsfolk, enter wholly into the tourist economy. However, as numerous campesinos argue, the ecological zone of Huayllabamba is not one in which the llama thrives. The promotion of llamas in a location in which they do not thrive is a further indication that INRENA’s commercialized conception of nature seeks to tie an idealized western image of Andean life to the local landscape.

The townsfolk face similar problematic restrictions as those in the rural communities. For them, the year 2000 was a particularly intensive year of change. That year a study funded by Finland was published by PMP (Programa Machu Picchu), as was the Master Plan of 1998 (noted in the last chapter). The new study, “The Urban Plan” (Plan de Ordenamiento Urbano), which cost forty-five thousand U.S. dollars, examines social, economic and demographic aspects of life. Like the Master Plan of 1998 this plan reiterates the notion that the pueblo is the embodiment of disorder, a visual eyesore and is responsible for ecological damage (Plan Urbano: 16). It also notes that the population is “without collective
identity,” claiming they have no traditional festivals, such as those for patron saints, inaccurately asserting that unlike other Serrano communities, “the [population does not participate in the] Festival of the Cross in May and the [Festival] of the Virgin of Carmen in July” (La celebración de la Cruz en Mayo y la de la Virgen Del Carmen en Julio no convocan, por ejemplo, a la población. Los espacios urbanos presentan poca vida social) (Plan Urbano: ibid, 31). It further claims that there is little social life, and even makes a disingenuous comment that the only interest pueblo residents have in Machu Picchu is economic (Ibid).

The objective of the urban plan was to implement a strategy to prevent further urban growth, create order, and make the pueblo an attractive place for tourism. Yet a simple conversation with a few Machupicheños would have clarified some of the inaccuracies. The three-day “Festival of the Cross” is one of the most elaborate festivals in the pueblo, beginning with religious dancers dressed in elaborate costumes. Cross-bearers lead processions throughout the pueblo. The different cargo holders dedicated to their particular cross distinguish each barrio in the pueblo (see photo 9 p.256); the crosses are kept on public display, marking the four different Barrios. Cargo holders fulfill their obligations using their own money to give away large quantities of food and alcohol to the population. People set up stands in the plaza to sell punch made from lima beans, along with plenty of activities such as a puppet theatre and a nighttime fire-works show. There is even a local myth about one cross marking which is said to identify the location of an alleged miracle that occurred in the pueblo when, during the 1995 flood of the River Aguas Calientes, a boulder blocked
debris from crashing into homes. A cross, placed on the boulder, is only removed for the procession on the Festival of the Cross. The claim that the pueblo has neither identity nor tradition is part of an overall process to discredit the population and to suggest that the Machupicheños have no cultural claim to their land. Actually, the urban plan further argues for the relocation of the entire pueblo to a place outside of the Sanctuary called Piscacucho located at kilometer 82 along the Cuzco-Machu Picchu train route. The rationale for such a move is the risk of natural disaster; hence the move is for their protection.

The criteria for inclusion and exclusion involve having the right identity for the landscape. The director of INRENA emphasized that the campesinos are not “traditional.” Traditional to him meant Quechua-speaking descendent of the Incas. For the director, there is only one population left that meets those criteria, the Huayruros who live in neighboring Ollantaytambo. In his words “All others are migrants.” To him, the rural inhabitants do not form communities, but are just a disorganized horde of people. Rather than refer to the rural communities as communities, it is common for INRENA to refer to them as “grupos humanos,” or human groups. In short, maintaining that the rural inhabitants do not form a community is a way to de-legitimize their right to live in the Sanctuary. The state institutions and their plans have constructed an identity based rationale to de-legitimize the right of the inhabitants to live in the sanctuary in order to open the way for private investment. The idea of intangibility and a manipulative notion of the “social good” turn the screw on the Machupicheños.
Framing Social Action

It might stretch the imagination to think of the residents of Machu Picchu as “inmates,” living in a “total institution” (Goffman 1961), because the conservation institutions of the state are not designed for the management of people in the same sense as is a prison or hospital, but rather that of a heritage zone. Moreover, people are not confined behind physical walls and cut off from the wider society, as are people in a total institution. Also residents are not brutally “stripped” and “leveled,” in Goffman’s sense, of status and identity, as they would be in a prison. And of course the residents of the district don’t quite live in “batches” where all activities are carried out in the constant presence of others (Goffman 1961: 4-28).

Nevertheless, sanctuary life shares similarities with life in a “total institution.” For instance, while people are not confined, exit and entry into the Sanctuary is highly controlled, and it is difficult for a resident to receive a family member or friend without the guest paying tourist entrance fees. Furthermore, the privatization of the railroad has meant that residents are subject to fare hikes that in effect limit their movement. While residents of Machu Picchu do not live in “batches,” INRENA rangers constantly watch their movements, and from the perspective of the director, the status of community identity is denied to the campesinos. At least in his eyes, residents are nothing more than a chaotic mass of people.

Moreover, the semblance of a total institution arises when governing institutions integrate neoliberal policies into their management of the Sanctuary.
We can see how corporate and governmental interests come together to impose an intensified order of spatial inclusion and exclusion. Residents are now “stripped” in the sense of having their possessions taken or constrained for the financial benefit of others, and “leveled” in the sense of having a new commercialized identity imposed on them as a qualification to live in the sanctuary. Equally important, people must respond to the strict rules and regulations of the sanctuary. What we see is something akin to what Goffman referred to as “secondary adjustment” where people adapt to an institutional order often through secretive and deceptive practices. These are, “practices that do not directly challenge staff but allow inmates to obtain forbidden satisfactions or to obtain permitted ones by forbidden means” (Goffman 1961: 54).

The concept of secondary adjustment bears striking similarity to Michel De Certeau’s (1984) view of “tactics” and James C. Scott’s (1985) notion of “weapons of the weak.” De Certeau is concerned with the practices by which ordinary people subvert the hegemonic order from within. Likewise, Scott examines these subversive everyday tactics, but to critique the commonly viewed definition of resistance as possible only through collective and organized action. As Scott points out, everyday forms of resistance such as “foot dragging…feigned ignorance” or small acts of sabotage have been overlooked in favor of holding outright revolution as the prototype for resistance (Scott 1985:29). Both authors see tactics as uncoordinated, improvisational and idiosyncratic. Unlike Scott, however, De Certeau places a great deal of emphasis on the force of “tactics” in subverting a hegemonic order. On this note
Scott and Goffman coincide. Secondary adjustments like weapons of the weak are not attempts at subverting social hierarchies, but rather mitigations to harsh circumstances. Goffman saw secondary adjustments in the setting of a total institution as modes of adaptation to power, and likewise, for Scott, those mitigations, though considered forms of resistance, are done secretly to avoid confrontations with power. The following description provides an illustration.

*Tactics, Weapons and Secondary Adjustments:*

As Machu Picchu is part of a configuration of “tourism icons” in Cuzco, and the city of Cuzco in particular is a kind of tourist “gateway” to the Sanctuary (van den Berghe and Flores Ochoa 2000: 8), we might expect investment interests producing similar types of relationships that result in comparable forms of adaptation on the part of local people. A cursory examination of these adaptations in neighboring areas outside of the district of Machu Picchu is useful in linking conservation enforcement to the implementation of neoliberal privatization policies, and to show how they work in concert to increasingly favor some over others.

Up until 1999 the Plaza de Armas (central plaza) in the city of Cuzco was teeming with small-scale merchants selling artisan goods arranged on the pavement, along the portals, and under the balconies that encompass the plaza. *Ambulantes*, men and women without the resources to rent pavement space ambled around the plaza as they carried their goods, such as clothing, jewelry or food, to sell. Shoeshine boys scurried from bench to bench looking for customers among the townsfolk and tourists. Boys and girls sold postcards or
posed in traditional Cuzco garb with a llama or a lamb, and for a small fee offered tourists a photo opportunity. Street comics attracted some tourists, but mainly local people of all social classes gathered around to watch the slapstick comedians perform their skits of mockery. And of course the plaza area was also filled with tourist establishments such as tour agencies, artisan shops, restaurants and bars. At the turn of the millennium all of that changed. The wealthier establishments were left untouched, but the merchants selling their wares on the portal pavements were sent off to a newly built artisan market located about a mile away from the plaza where most foreigners never go. The rationale was that they were unsightly and that they posed a hazard to tourists by attracting criminal elements. In contradictory fashion, another artisan market was constructed for them near the central market, an area where many tourists are specifically told not to go because it is considered dangerous and unsightly. These markets are also not well advertised and tourists tend to make their purchases in the establishments in or around the plaza. The displaced small merchants thus suffered great economic loss. Anyone familiar with the Cuzco tourism economy knows that foreign tourists are generally “plaza-centric.”

The pedestrian activities of North American or European tourists rarely go beyond the peripheries of the Plaza de Armas, and when they visit the sights in and outside the city, a bus usually picks them up at their hotel. Hence, just as the Orient Express captures the high-end tourist market in Machu Picchu, plaza space is regulated to capture the dollars of wealthier western tourists by
removing competition and the temptation of customers purchasing cheaper goods or memorabilia.

A more dramatic alteration of plaza space in Cuzco can be seen in the laws that prohibit street sellers of any sort from entering the plaza. Whereas once poorer families could reasonably benefit from the tourist economy by selling goods without having any overhead costs, now they cannot. Furthermore, this kind of spatial control is not only in the Cuzco Plaza de Armas. Spaces such as plazas, which are predominantly social and public spaces, where many kinds of economic interactions occur, are not only converted into “tourist spaces” as described by Urry (1990), but are organized according to the interests of wealthier propertied classes. The plazas are in effect “cleaned up” of poorer people who do not look well educated or cosmopolitan, and are thus viewed as “racially” different.

Nevertheless, people do adjust to the laws governing their built environment. People sneak goods into the plaza hidden in bags, under vests and the like. They make their products visible only when they approach potential buyers. However, now there is a need for vigilance. On one occasion, a child of about 10 years tried to sell me postcards, but when a police officer passed by he shoved his package of cards under his shirt. Police can confiscate a person's goods if they are caught in the act; hence, special tactics are necessary to avoid suspicion. Those who sell food are often faced with the problem of arousing

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82 For an excellent discussion of race in Cuzco, see Marisol de la Cadena 2000.
police attention because customers tend to eat purchased food openly. A popular option for the sellers is to camouflage the economic transaction as a personal exchange between friends. Once while I was sitting in the Cuzco plaza, a food seller sat down beside me, feigning a personal relationship by pretending to be engaged in a conversation. While this might work when dealing with the denizens of Cuzco, or a curious anthropologist, it is often much harder with foreign tourists because of language barriers and because tourists are likely to interpret such behavior with distrust. Western tourists often come to Peru with preconceptions that it is a dangerous “third-world” country. Tourists may thus mistake such action as an attempt at being swindled, or perhaps being offered contraband or stolen goods. In the nearby community of Fortaleza similar problems occur. The community is located above the City of Cuzco in the park and archeological site of Sacsayhuaman, a popular tourist destination, and also the place where the Inti Rymi winter solstice ritual is held. Most of the residents were not granted permits by the INC to sell artisan goods to tourists, even though they live next to the ruins. As one woman explained, “we have to [quietly] chase after tourists as if we were delinquents [trying to rob them].” For performing their otherwise benign economic activities they are in fact breaking laws. In another incident, as I waited for a friend in the Cuzco plaza, I noticed some commotion. Three police officers chased a man, grabbed and beat him. A crowd gathered of people I recognized as those who try to use the plaza to engage in economic activities. Some yelled “abusivo” (abuser) at the police officer. One woman cried out, “Why don’t you hit me.” Someone handed the arrested man a napkin for his
bloody nose gained in a scuffle with the police officer as he resisted arrest. The middle-aged man had been selling cigarettes in the plaza when he was told by police to leave. He refused, claiming he was only on the periphery of the plaza and not in the plaza itself.

However, in contrast to the city of Cusco, in Machu Picchu the boundaries of the Sanctuary not only define the market space (a tourist must pay to enter the sanctuary to have a “heritage experience”), but also the sanctuary as a public good, and the commodity sold. In Machu Picchu, the changes in Sanctuary laws affect the interactions between tourists and residents with profound economic consequences. Here, great effort is made to separate tourists from rural residents. For example, tourists were once allowed to hike the Inca Trail alone, crafting their own kind of “authentic” experience through interactions with inhabitants. Residents could also make some extra money by renting a bed to a hiker. At that time tourists were far more likely to attempt to engage in conversation and to receive local interpretations of Inca monuments. Also, before privatization, tourists could, if they chose, take the local train either to the point from where they would start their hike on the Inca Trail, or they could go directly to the pueblo to visit the citadel. They also purchased local goods not generally marketed for the tourist economy, such as fresh agricultural produce and locally baked foods from merchants boarding the train at different stops along the route. While it was crowded and not the most comfortable ride, many tourists chose the local train not just because of cost, but also to be engaged with the realities of a contemporary population of the sierra. With a shortage of seats,
a tourist might be asked to share a seat with a child to lighten a mother’s load. From a resident’s perspective these interactions were also opportune moments to make connections with foreigners that can also lead to economically significant co-parent relationships.

Now the tourists are no longer allowed to use the local train. Tourists are also no longer allowed to hike the Inca Trail alone, but must go through tour agencies that provide a tour guide; historical and contemporary life is now interpreted by a professional tour guide who echoes official versions of the past. The tour company provides all the food and there is much less interaction between the Machupicheños and tourists. Tourists no longer rent beds in a local adobe house or spend the evening with local people talking about anything from local myths about the machus or sirenas to the agricultural cycle or the political situation in Peru. Tour groups have designated campsites that, while often located near homes, offer few opportunities for interaction with rural inhabitants. The little interaction that does take place between the residents and tourists is largely confined to the purchase of a bottle of water or a candy bar as they pack their gear to leave; for tourists, gone are the days of choclo and

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83 The exception is found in agencies that specialize in mystical tourism. The explanations of the past offered by such tour guides vary but it is often a highly romanticized narrative that caters to the western imagination and “new age” beliefs. Hence it is not surprising that many Cuzqueños refer to these tour guides as “chisticos,” which is comprised of two words condensed into one: Chiste meaning joke and mistico meaning mystic.

84 Machu or the plural Machus refers to the “ancestors” usually pre-Incan people who are said to be of a different bodily form. It is popularly believed that they inhabit caves or smaller natural openings along mountains. There is a gender component to the beliefs in that Machus are male and are dangerous to women whom they try and kidnap.

85 Sirena translates to mermaid. I do not know the history and reasons for the popularity of mermaid beliefs in the Andes; mermaid stories largely come from ancient Mediterranean cultural sources. Nevertheless it is held particularly among many campesinos that mermaids inhabit rivers and streams, and being female lures male fishermen into the water where they drown.
Residents must pick other moments and places to sell to tourists directly, often tagging behind them as they walk. Hence, conservation goals have become synonymous with elite economic interests leading to greater policing efforts and more stringent laws.

What we find in the situations described above is that people’s actions are closer to Goffman’s and Scott’s view as being forms of adaptation. Contrary to De Certeau, it is difficult in this example to see how tactics undermine hegemony. As the police event in the plaza shows, a challenge to hegemony occurs only when a tactic is uncovered, and the challenge is not from within as De Certeau would have it, but by direct confrontation on the part of the plaza street sellers. In fact, Goffman’s dramaturgical emphasis on the importance of appearances clarifies some of De Certeau’s framing of behavior, and to some degree even diminishes Scott’s stress on acts of resistance. Hegemonic groups and those who enforce their rules may be concerned only with appearances, as in cases when police “look the other way” as long as infractions are not done too openly and the proper image of order is maintained. Dominant groups may not be concerned with the small change earnings of a few subordinates, only that the relations of dominance are not challenged. Upholding the proper image of order may already encompass all the concrete concerns of dominant groups. Effectively, a covert “tactic” may be so intricately woven into a credible performance of compliance so as to perform it, means to uphold the hegemonic order. Perhaps another interpretation in the case of the Cuzco street seller who

86 Choclo is the local term for corn and is often eaten with a piece of cheese. Chicha as mentioned in a footnote in the last chapter is a fermented corn drink.
was arrested in the plaza, is that after his tactic was exposed and he was
warned, he in turn challenged the officer’s definition of the plaza boundaries
instead of appearing to comply with the order and return later, as do many street
sellers; hence the man’s covert selling tactic can be seen as a mode of
adaptation, while his open challenge to the officer can be seen as an act of
resistance. But more importantly, Goffman shows how, as the institutional setting
become more encompassing, secondary adjustments or tactics can backfire and
be made to serve the interests of those who are in control. This dialectical
aspect is not captured quite as well by De Certeau. Goffman’s notion of “looping”
describes how the secondary adjustments inmates need to make to survive the
rigors of the institutional order, can then be used by the staff to further justify the
rationale for their incarceration. Rather than forms of resistance, the use of
covert tactics responds to the level and need of subordinate groups to appear as
credible subjects.

Another issue pertains to how people are affected by the kinds of tactics,
weapons and secondary adjustment they carry out. Perhaps what is most
interesting about secondary adjustments is the possibility that local people can
create narratives that provide for them a sense of historical awareness about
their own actions and behaviors. Contrary to the criticism of Goffman’s role
theory of the self as being one that lacks an “inner story,”87 the notion of
secondary adjustment shows how people use personal narratives to draw on
“inner resources” to adapt to rigid institutional conditions (Manning 2000).

Press.
Following Manning, I argue that through such adjustments we can give Goffman’s interacting subject some historical depth. On this question, Goffman and De Certeau compliment each other. De Certeau’s forte is in illustrating how spatial practices such as walking inspire narratives that can appropriate a built environment to meet one’s own ends (1984: xiv). Regardless of whether we call such practices “tactics” or “secondary adjustments,” the narratives that unfold can help organize common experiences in a way that unifies participants and fosters larger collective forms of action. In Machu Picchu, local people create narratives about their own actions and behaviors that differ from conservation framings. I argue that the dialectical relationship found in making “secondary adjustments,” in the residents’ repeated encounters with the logic of dispossession encourages the creation of a narrative that recasts power relationships in ways more amenable to protest, as the following event illustrates.

_Huayllabamba and the Hacendado, Old and New:_

One Sunday morning in May during an extended stay in the community of Huayllabamba, I stopped at a house along the Inca trail where the previous day I had helped harvest corn from the fields. I planned to talk to one of the older members about how life had changed in the community since the agrarian reform. It was with that idea that I first approached “Don Marcos.”

When I arrived, Don Marcos was chatting with the two INRENA rangers. It was sunny and warm so the three sat in the shade drinking large glasses of chicha. It seemed like a friendly conversation; they joked and spoke about the

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88 Chicha is a drink made from fermented corn.
What was not initially apparent was the “cat and mouse game” they were playing. The rangers were apparently inspecting the house for signs of ecological violations. Once the INRENA rangers left, Don Marcos apologized for keeping me waiting. He handed me a glass of chicha with some mote and asked me to wait some more because he wanted the INRENA rangers to clear the area. It was not plain to me why he was so apprehensive. I was going to help him cut fodder for the animals and he was going to tell me about his life in the old hacienda. After a half an hour, we departed. Don Marcos had an axe in hand, partially hidden under his poncho. He was wearing a blue colored wool chullo on his head, blue sweat pants and, as is common for campesinos, he wore sandals on his feet. However, the real attention grabber was that Don Marcos wore a purple long sleeved shirt that, appropriate to the situation of insubordination, read: “The King and I Performance.”

We crossed the cornfields and continued down the slope to a meadow adjacent to a river. There, we approached a capuli tree he had singled out the day before. He turned to me and said, “I’m not really going to cut grass for fodder but a tree branch instead” – an act he believed was prohibited by INRENA. From his perspective, it was his neighbor’s tree from whom he had secured

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89 While the rangers do superintend the actions of the campesinos it would not be fair to depict their interactions entirely as negative. Friendships do develop and cooperation does occur but by the same token this fact should not detract from the realities of the power relationship that exist between them.
90 Mote refers to roasted kernels of corn.
91 A chullo is a traditional wool cap particularly used the sierra.
92 The t-shirt was made for a high school play performance from Annandale High School, whereabouts unknown.
93 INRENA distinguishes plants and wildlife according to whether it is native or exotic to the zone a distinction not generally made by rural inhabitants. Exotic trees may be cut with permission but many residents either do not secure permission or do not know INRENA classifications of exotic.
permission to cut a branch the previous day. Nevertheless, he knew he still had to conceal his intentions and actions from the rangers. Don Marcos climbed to a branch. He wrapped one arm around the tree trunk while using the other to begin chopping. We took turns chopping the branch until it fell. Once it was on the ground, we carefully climbed over the large limb dragging the log to an open area where Don Marcos began to trim off the leaves and smaller twigs.

As Don Marcos stripped the limb, I inquired about the old hacienda. Only half paying attention to my question Don Marcos provided his own perhaps more interesting reflection saying: “Peru [the state] is like the hacendado, it’s as if we live in a hacienda” “Why?” I asked. “Those from UGM and INRENA prohibit everything, they don’t want us to work, they don’t want us to cut trees, work the fields, they don’t want us to do anything, yeah just like the hacendados they watch everything and prohibit everything, and yeah those from UGM and INRENA are just another Zavaleta.”94 The Zavaleta family owned the hacienda prior to the agrarian reform. Don Marcos described the hacendado - peasant relationship: “The hacendado from kilometer 88 would come to see how many animals we had, how we worked. He watched our families, each week a different family. Sometimes everybody, women and children, had to work. That’s the way the condition was, by week and by turn.”

We were ready to go. We lifted the tree trunk; he took the front and I the rear. It was heavy but we walked quickly in a coordinated fashion as if performing a military log drill. We took a short rest midway. Then, Don Marcos

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94 The Zavaleta family was one of the hacienda owners up until the agrarian reform. The boundaries of his hacienda actually encompassed the citadel of Machu Picchu.
continued talking about the hacienda, but again for him the past and the present were not so different. As he remembered it, just prior to the agrarian reform there were about 30 people living in the hacienda working as tenants cultivating corn in the valley and tubers (olluco and occa) in the higher altitudes. They would cultivate additional crops like potatoes, barley, beans for the hacendado in “la casa grande,” (the big house)⁹⁵ – the hacendado’s house on kilometer 88. He explained that the work done for the hacendado was referred to as la condición, or “the condition,” referring to the contract that allowed them to cultivate the hacendado’s fields.

Don Marcos said in a sarcastic tone of voice: “People say it’s a Sanctuary, at least that’s what INRENA tells us all the time.” Don Marcos continued with his comparison of INRENA and the hacendado. For Don Marcos the campesinos shifted from living by the conditions of the hacendado to those of INRENA. For example, the park rangers now organized local people for unpaid garbage collection assignments on the Inca Trail. He said, “we collect two or three sacks, that’s the condition to continue here, we have to carry the garbage to kilometer 88, always kilometer 88 just like with Zavaleta. It’s the same, I mean we didn’t use the name Sanctuary then, but now that’s what they call it, a name given by INRENA and the INC.”

In sum, the mammoth growth of the tourist industry in Peru turned Machu Picchu into a commodity that commercializes an image of the past. That image dictates the kinds of identities acceptable within the sanctuary boundaries. Both

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⁹⁵ The term La Casa Grande (The big house) is a term used by many campesinos in the area to refer to the hacendado’s (landlord) house.
rural and urban residents are forced to find ways to contend with this image.
Race and Indian identity are not merely implicated in the above-mentioned dance
carnival but are also more directly embedded in the history of the area, the
development of a tourism economy and the subsequent incursions of state
institutions of conservation. For the conservation authorities of the state, under
the pressures of UNESCO, and the expectations of the tourism industry, an
idealized nature must be populated by nothing short of an idealized Indian. The
current population is out of place, because they do not fit well with the
romanticized notion of an Incan past, symbolized by the citadel.
This politics of identity underscore the dispossession process that takes place
between residents and the governing authorities, and the rationale to make or
reject property claims. It is drawn into the struggle for district control.

_Fear and Trust in the Peruvian Wonderland_⁹⁶:

**Nature and Uncertainty:**

Once past the veneer of nature as harmonious, peaceful and tranquil,
maintained by the tourism industry, national, international institutions, as well as
the townsfolk, local experiences with nature evoke sentiments of fear, risk and
distrust that are intimately tied to political struggle. For many, particularly those
involved in “the mobilization,” their feelings of fear and uncertainty crystallized

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⁹⁶ In 1913 Hiram Bingham presented a collection of 250 photographs in the National Geographic Magazine under the title
“In the Wonderland of Peru. See Hiram Bingham 1913 in this bibliography.”
into observations about the violent unpredictability of nature, the economy and the state.

When the first protest meeting held in the cultural center concluded, the exact details of what the proposed demonstration would entail had not taken shape. Would they shut down the pueblo, and stop all commercial activity with tourists? One sure way to gain attention would be to block the PeruRail train from entering the pueblo, thereby preventing tourists from visiting the Citadel. This possibility concerned some of the townsfolk, since it would threaten the Cuzco tourism industry, and could stop tourism altogether, and damage their own economy. As one can imagine, residents’ feelings were mixed. The tendency was for people who were more directly involved in the tourism economy to be against blocking the train. A restaurant owner like Juan Carlos for example was against blocking the train, but Regina, a Frente leader with no direct business interest in tourism, was not.

Equally important were the legal risks that would be incurred if they were to block the train. In part, due to the frequent attacks on the train, PeruRail had announced that it would take legal action leading to criminal prosecution for sabotage against anyone or any group placing anything on the tracks. In order to block the train, protestors would thus have to risk their own safety by standing in front of it. The leaders of the protest had every intention of staying within the boundaries of both safety and the law. In fact, when the date of the demonstration drew near, a contingent of the mobilization went to Cuzco to inform the department authorities of their intentions.
One day before the demonstration was to take place, a series of landslides isolated the participants, leaving a contingent in Cuzco (see photo 10 p.257). The landslides occurred on the perimeters of the pueblo, so no one was injured. However, the train was blocked from service and the tracks needed repair, which would take a few days for clean-up crews to accomplish. Thus, it was a natural event and not a planned demonstration that prevented tourists from arriving. To go ahead with the demonstration under these conditions would be pointless, as it would have no political or economic impact. It was decided to postpone the event until the landslides were cleared and normal train service resumed.

For a couple of days after the landslides, the pueblo was quiet from the lack of normal tourist activity. Electrical services were severed, and the pueblo had a different social atmosphere, as people were somewhat free from the routines of daily life. Even the central market could not receive its daily supply of produce. The landslide deposits of mud, trees and boulders just outside the pueblo became something of a local attraction. Many saw in such events premonitions of a more serious disaster that would lead to the destruction of the pueblo. It is common, especially during the rainy season, for people to start their mornings by discussing their nightly fears of landslides and flash floods. It is not difficult to see how nighttime makes some people nervous during the rainy season. At this time there is hardly a horizon in this canyon, and under the cover of darkness, one can only make out the mountain silhouettes looming over the pueblo as ominous mists of clouds roll down from their tops. The hard rain
patterning on tin roofs, along with thunderclaps, can leave one anticipating the roar of falling landmass or rushing water (see photo 1 p. 251).

“I couldn’t sleep all night,” a market woman living by the river said to me. “I kept hearing the grinding sound of rocks being dragged by the river.” Many, who have experienced flash floods, or more specifically, *huaycos*, often recall the strong smell of vegetation as it is torn and carried forward by mud and water. With these recent events, the context was set for the townsfolk to give nature politically relevant meanings. Throughout the pueblo, conversations and commentaries about the landslides abounded. Nature was the talk of the town, and one could see how narratives of the environment could take shape in the telling of local history, as well as political expressions about life in the Sanctuary. In the plaza, one man said, “Even nature is protesting against the abuses of the ‘big’ people.” “Yes, nature too is supporting our cause, but just as it screws up business for them, it screws up business for us, too,” responded another. For one woman, the landslides meant only more abuse, this time by nature. She declared, “If it’s not the powerful screwing with us, not letting us live and work in peace, it’s another, even more powerful [force], that screws with us—nature, the *Pachamama*” (Si no son los grandes que nos joden y joden, que no dejan vivir y trabajar en paz, es ya también otro grande pero más poderoso que es la naturaleza, la Pachamama). For some, especially the women of the market, the

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97 “Huayco” is a Quechua term that refers to flash floods caused by mudslides that dam a river until it creates enough pressure to carry forward everything in its path. Smaller rivers are more susceptible to being dammed by debris and thus are more likely to cause huaycos. Residents stay very attentive to the flow of the rivers. When a river stops flowing or slows to a trickle, it is taken as a sign that a huayco is coming. During my stay in Machu Picchu, there were false alarms that sent people running out of their homes with blankets in hand to the highest possible ground.
landslides brought forth harrowing tales of the Santa Teresa and Ccollpani floods of 1998. Some people mentioned the possibility of a similar event happening in Machu Picchu. “There are lagoons high up in the mountains,” said a woman cooking and selling anticuchos by the train tracks. “And a landslide up there could bring all that water tumbling down on us.”

Even in the absence of the landslide, everyday talk about nature, its danger and the inability to control it when a natural disaster occurs is seen as caused by the greed of others, or because some current inhabitants are outsiders, reflecting the conflicts over possession rights and the experience of dispossession. “That’s why I say no one owns this land,” said Olimpia, a young woman from Cuzco working as a waitress in one of the pueblo restaurants, in reference to her friend Antonieta’s narrow escape from a rising river. “Only the mountains truly own this land,” she concluded. Neither of the women have possession rights to land, but Antonieta, a survivor of the 1998 flood in the community of Santa Teresa, is one of the residents of Machu Picchu who, with others, settled on land by the River Alcamayo, an area known as very dangerous for flash floods. Antonieta abandoned her squatter claim and rented a room for her family after her squatter tent was nearly washed away one night when the river rose high. She proudly pointed to the fact that she left for her safety and was not forced out by law. Two days later, INRENA and the police evicted the

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98 Meat skewers usually made from cow hearts.
99 It was a capillary of this river that caused two of the four landslides discussed above.
100 On the 10th of April 2004 as I was in the process of writing this dissertation, a large mudslide (huayco) came down from the River Alcamayo destroying a segment of the pueblo and killing at least 11 people, one of whom was a prominent engineer, Roberto Rossel Gutiérrez.
remaining squatters on the grounds that they were violating conservation rules by taking land, clearing brush and trees. “The people of the pueblo are bad (son malos) and if a disaster occurs, it’s because of their malevolence,” said Maria, a market woman originally from Santa Teresa. She implied that the more established townsfolk do not accept her as a member of the pueblo. “Why are they bad?” I asked. Tying nature, property and the sanctuary together in one sentence, Maria replied: “Because they have houses they believe themselves to be the owners of the Sanctuary” (Porque tienen casas se creen dueños del Santuario).

Concluding Remarks:

The Neoliberal Double Bind:

As Goffman notes, secondary adjustments may be categorized according to degree, so that certain activities that occur outside the formal context of a “total institution” can also be thought of as adjustments (1961: 197). I apply that reasoning to situations in the market economy. In these cases, market interactions are loaded with secondary adjustments organized around their relationships to the primary economic adjustments involved. I offer the concept of secondary adjustment here as a way of understanding how people respond to economic conditions designed to favor more powerful interests. In effect I am giving the reader an ethnographic walk-through local response to the “cleaning up” of the market place for larger investors.
Many low level secondary adjustments resemble De Certeau’s description of “poaching in countless ways on the property of others” (1984: xii). As long as the adjustments do not go beyond a certain point, they are accepted. From the “injured” party, one might, at most, receive scowling stares, or as the saying goes, “a piece of one’s mind,” for conducting activities that might be considered crude and inappropriate. Foucault’s term for such secondary adjustments is “necessary illegality.”

Foucault explains how from the age of monarchy through the eighteenth century, people of lower stratum found a “space of tolerance” for certain kinds of thievery and other infractions needed for continued existence. Those “necessary illegalities” changed after the downfall of the feudal system and the emergence of new propertied classes. With the emergence of capitalism came an increase in crime, and what were once considered tolerated practices were afterwards defined as crimes against property (Foucault 1977: 82-85). Thus, serious attempts to thwart secondary adjustments by using force implies that one party is no longer willing to abide by the informal strategies involved in secondary adjustments, suggesting also that new social and economic relationships may be developing in Machu Picchu and more broadly in the tourism economy of Cuzco.

To conclude, by examining practices of everyday life, we see more explicitly that in Machu Picchu certain forms of exclusion are becoming more commonplace. The introduction of a neoliberal economy has changed the relationship between an institutional order and forms of economic adaptation.

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101 For a good discussion on the similarity and complementarity of Michel Foucault and Erving Goffman see Ian Haking 2004
When it comes to economic discipline, those who control greater capital can define significant spaces so as to exclude some people from participating in a segment of the market, regardless of which side of the exchange they are on. In Cuzco, efforts are being made to criminalize the more fuzzy infractions of secondary adjustments. Secondary adjustments are now becoming much more of a gamble at the same time as they become more crucial for survival. Now people risk arrest or property confiscation by authorities. Such disciplinary measures that displace property owners can become a “capital accumulation strategy” (Harvey: 2003: 145). The more pervasive secondary adjustments become, the more those governing institutions turn to documenting ecological violations or damages to a public resource (as in the case of the thirty three campesinos mentioned above). This situation leads to increasing justification by governing agencies for the further dispossession of Sanctuary inhabitants, and the subsequent turning over of that space to larger capital holders. Machu Picchu is an intangible good. Equally intangible are its institutional walls.

As Harvey notes, there are many contingencies involved in the way dispossession can occur, as was the case of Machu Picchu with the occurrence of a natural disaster. When this unpredicted event happened people scrambled to impose meanings that took the shape of conflict over property. For the resident population, we see internal struggles for control of pueblo land. However, the governing authorities also used the threat of natural disaster to dispossess residents of their possession rights by justifying removal of the population ostensibly “for its own welfare” (ibid.).
As a national symbol, Machu Picchu represents Peru to the rest of the world, and it receives a lot of media attention. In order to retain its value as a commodity Machu Picchu must retain this image. Overt violence on the part of the state would undermine its value as a tourist commodity. Consequently, the right use of the media and the control of information play an important role in the battle between authorities and the Machupicheños; forms of communication thus warrant closer examination, a topic to be taken up in the next chapter.

Looking back on the protest meeting, Frente and the leaders of the mobilization were still faced with the challenge of building a wider district consensus. For the time being, the landslides prevented the protestors from proceeding with the demonstration. This had a positive outcome in that the delay gave them time to open formal channels of communication between Frente and the authorities. Finally, the landslides also gave the leaders of Frente, specifically the president, Oscar, more time to gather and disseminate information, as well as to develop a strategy and a detailed plan of action he would call—a platform of struggle (plataforma de lucha).
The Well Informed Peruvian:

Dealing with bureaucracy requires a certain know how—knowledge about government organizations and techniques of interaction. Complicating matters for anyone wishing to confront state bureaucracy is the fact that the mandates governing institutions are not always easily accessible to local people, nor are they always clearly stated. Even when rules are clearly stated, in practice the activation is negotiable leading to experiences of deception and misinformation as part of the interaction with agency personnel. Moreover, state bureaucracy is currently interconnected with international organizations, NGO’s and multinational entities in ways that demand new interaction skills to deal with changing hierarchies.

Interrogating the Laws of Nature:

One rainy Saturday morning in early February, as INRENA rangers gathered outside their station house to start their daily forest patrols in the community of Corihuaryachina Campesinos and some pueblo residents also gathered nearby along the train tracks. The reason for the gathering of Machupicheños differed from that of INRENA. The Machupicheños were meeting to discuss the judicial proceedings against thirty-three campesinos (mentioned in the last chapter) charged by INRENA for allegedly damaging the environment, and if found guilty the penalty could be expulsion from the
Sanctuary. What transpired in the event is based on the efforts of two actors prominent in local political life, Oscar, and Porfirio, who compete to help organize the campesinos, and interpret the laws of the Sanctuary.

“It’s because people don’t have property titles and no rights,” Regina, Oscar’s ally and fellow Frente member, commented – “otherwise these thirty [three] campesinos wouldn’t have these problems.” She expressed her feelings about INRENA’s latest police efforts as retaliation against increasing dissent among residents against their conservation practices. “This is revenge, how ugly” (Esto es venganza, qué feo), she said. We waited for others to arrive. The gathering broke into smaller groups as people turned to their neighbors to chat. It started to rain softly. Porfirio made a comment about the rain saying that he hoped it didn’t continue to pour too hard. “It’s scary, you know, the landslides” (da miedo pues… de los derrumbes). He was referring to the fierce rainstorm that hit Cuzco the previous day. The conversation moved fluidly from dangerous weather to misfortune. The conversation blended into a discussion about the tragic incident of a family that had drowned a few days earlier. A young couple and their small child were killed when they fell into the raging Vilcanota River after the hand drawn cable car (oroya) snapped as they pulled themselves across. “The chain was rusted,” said a man. Porfirio commented that he had heard different stories about this incident. He was touching on the gossip that the deaths were the result of foul play on the part of the INC because of the family’s protracted legal battles to protect their large land holdings from further state intrusions. As more people began to arrive, the conversation re-focused on
the thirty-three campesinos. Oscar got excited pulling out papers from his folder. One of his talents is a well-developed ability to interrogate law and to point to contradictions in the way it is applied. He waved a document in the air saying, “I have the law right here. Where does it say in the law that one has to [even] ask permission to cut grass?” Another man exclaimed, “Campesino communities have rights!”

According to the director of Machu Picchu’s INRENA office, as well as the INC director of archeology, the inhabitants of the sanctuary are not the original inhabitants. For both these directors, “original inhabitants” mean those who have continuously lived in the area and can trace their ancestry to the Incas. Regardless, the problem rests on the interpretation of the law and the ambiguousness of the definitions. Oscar, who saw a potential in using the law as an avenue for defending residents appeared frustrated over the way institutional actors use various concepts. “Now we have to define [who] is original– what is a sanctuary? It’s all so arbitrary.” Oscar expressed the notion that one could hardly lay down any fixed rule around which the authorities were consistent.

The discussions took on a deeper political and economic tone, noting the way the government favors big capital. Oscar placed the blame on ex-President Fujimori’s policy of favoring large outside capital over smaller Peruvian economic interests. Another man agreed and pointed to the state’s inconsistencies, particularly in the way PeruRail and other companies get preferential treatment - “For others it’s about privatization,” he said, “but for us, no.” Just as he spoke,  

102 I do not know exactly what law Oscar is referring to in this situation.
PeruRail’s *Auto-Wagon* train, with its most luxurious cars, zipped by us with American and European tourists pointing their expensive cameras and camcorders at us.

Turning back to the event at Corihuayrachina, Porfirio jabbed at the Programa Machu Picchu (PMP), “What have they done to improve the lives of campesinos, they’re more concerned with plants, animals and stones, what about people?” Oscar asked rhetorically about the institutional vision for Machu Picchu. “Where are the humans? How can you have such anti-human laws? It’s unconstitutional,” he declared. Porfirio re-constructed the history of the sanctuary, placing emphasis on the sequence of events. He said, “First you had the haciendas and those who worked for the hacendados. After the Agrarian Reform, we had the right to the land. It was before the 1981 declaration of the Sanctuary. It’s ours legally – and what about the money we paid the state for the agrarian taxes? The Sanctuary came after. Before the sanctuary there was the agrarian reform and the state charged us.” The group broke into chatter over how they had been swindled by the state after having paid agrarian taxes. Porfirio shouted, “We should reclaim that money!”

Oscar again consulted his legal documents. He pointed to a national law stating local authority has no jurisdiction over changes in the Sanctuary. He brought this to bear on the incompetence of the current municipal administration to defend its autonomy and its lack of awareness of its loss of power in their jurisdiction. “The mayor doesn’t even know how impotent he is,” he said as he
waved the paper in the air. At this, some people in attendance commented on how the state does everything to try to take away their autonomy.

Oscar once more pointed to the contradictions of privatization; others joined in. Oscar spoke about a law that prohibits taking plastic bottles into the Sanctuary, “ley de botellas,” (the law of bottles) as he referred to it.\(^{103}\) According to Oscar, this law had been revoked shortly after it was passed. Oscar’s interpretation was that the law was repealed because of pressure from the Coca Cola Company, a major supplier in the area. Although that specific regulation had not actually been legally modified,\(^{104}\) in practice it is not enforced. Oscar continued, “When it comes to protecting nature, the big companies can do what they want.” Porfirio jumped in saying, “Of course we protect nature, after all we have to live on this land – we want to protect our Sanctuary, it’s that we don’t want it only to be for the big companies.” A young man standing nearby jumped into the conversation and said “Just look at how we have to live and look at how they live,” -pointing to the INRENA station – “they live like millionaires with their concrete houses, electricity and gas stoves. What are we, animals?” Oscar shuffled through his papers, “Now where does it say that you can’t have a gas stove – this is called arbitrariness!” The conversations turned to the 1997 forest fire blamed on the campesinos. From their perspective, this was propaganda fashioned by state authorities in order to attract the attention of Western environmentalists and to gain their sympathy for a plan to eject inhabitants from

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\(^{103}\) Here Oscar is referring to the law 02-2000-UGM-CD which states the regulations for entering the Inca Trail. Disposable bottles are one of the items people are prohibited from bringing into the Sanctuary.

\(^{104}\) I have not found a modification to that regulation. Even in 2003 under a more recent resolution 002-2003-UGM-CD disposable bottles are still listed as prohibited.
The conversations reflect the way the changing economic policies have affected people’s lives in the Sanctuary. Packed into the discussions are many layers of experience with conservation regulations that convince them the state has manipulated the rules to their own self-interest and for the interests of corporate elites. This encounter offers us insight into the way experiences with secondary adjustments made by people on an individual level, can be directed towards collective organizing. Life in the Sanctuary gives rise to “spatial stories,” based on the particular tactics by which people must live (De Certeau 1984: 115-130). Also, contrary to David C. Scott, “weapons of the weak” and collective action are not distinct forms of resistance but rather can flow into each other (1985).

105 Apu is a Quechua term referring to a sacred place.
The discussions also point to the way many campesinos encounter the laws, and bureaucratic procedures of the government as often enforced in an arbitrary way (Poole 2004: 36). While the grievances of the above actors’ points to what may have given shape to organized dissent, finding a path through the global institutional alignments of Machu Picchu can be a perplexing task. Once the path of dialogue with authorities was decided, residents required knowledge about the jurisdictional roles the many agencies have over their lives. What they now needed was an answer to the question, “to whom do we address our complaints?” When confronting authorities, residents needed to know the chain of command linking subordinate and higher offices. They also needed to identify the various roles of the many agencies involved in what many considered a bureaucratic overload.

The Machupicheños showed a great deal of astuteness when confronting and interacting with authorities. Oscar in particular seemed to know where to go and whom to challenge. It cannot be understated that he played a key role as an organizer. He was well suited for the task as President of Frente. As a university-trained tour guide with a collection of books on the history of Machu Picchu, Sanctuary laws, management plans and the principle studies undertaken by PMP, Oscar meticulously combed through documents, scrutinizing rules, laws and regulations for avenues of negotiation. As mentioned above, Oscar had a powerful tool in that he controlled a town radio-station. He was the director of Radio Machu Picchu, one of two stations broadcasting in the pueblo. Although the mountainous terrain limits broadcast to only a short distance beyond the
pueblo area, it proved very useful in organizing rallies, making critical comments and passing out information on the developments of the protest.

Nevertheless, in Machu Picchu institutional change can happen suddenly with little notification. As the most important national symbol and most popular tourist destination in Peru, Machu Picchu receives a great deal of bureaucratic and media attention. The number of bureaucrats connected to the Sanctuary seems to mount endlessly, so that even residents could not understand the hierarchy as a whole; it would be deceptive of me to claim as a North American anthropologist that I understood it entirely. I can only say that from the perspective of many Machupicheños, important outside information often travels slowly, making the knowledge needed to act on one’s behalf incomplete, and subject to manipulation by many vested interests. For example, at one point in early March it was believed that President Toledo was making a presidential visit to the Citadel. The leaders of Frente believed this to be a good opportunity to take their case right to the top of the bureaucratic chain of command. Oscar was hopeful that they would get an opportunity to speak with him so the president could be personally informed of district problems. For Oscar, the top priority was to ask the President to dismiss the PMP from the Sanctuary and ask that conservation laws be changed to permit property ownership titles. At the time, the understanding by many was that the PMP was an NGO, and therefore from their perspective, had no governing legitimacy in their district; this was an error.

Regina suggested they place large banners along the train route or have volunteers hold signs stating their complaints, requesting a meeting with the
President. Increased police presence only seemed to confirm the rumors that Toledo was in fact arriving. However, despite their plan and efforts to acquire demonstration materials, Toledo never showed up. Again, a few days later there was an increased police presence in the pueblo. This time the police were dressed in riot gear. The President of the United States, George W. Bush, was to make an official visit to Peru, and it was rumored he would go to Machu Picchu. Since neither Bush nor Toledo arrived, some people wondered whether the police presence was in fact preparations by law enforcement for the pueblo demonstration and shutdown.

A similar issue had led to just such an event a few months earlier when police under INRENA supervision forcibly removed a squatter settlement from the pueblo. The large police presence in this incident was first thought by some in the pueblo to be preparation for a visit by the Queen of Spain. Despite the world attention that Machu Picchu receives, media access in the pueblo has been limited, resulting in dependence on governing groups for information, making it easier to distort or control interests. From the perspective of the residents, governance is frequently experienced as a “twilight zone of sliding transitions” (Schutz 1970: 113). Different criteria for action are constantly merging, making what to do somewhat uncertain (ibid). More importantly, it makes it very difficult to hold authorities accountable for their decisions. Consequently, there are ever-increasing opportunities for officials to shift blame and conceal responsibility. This is one reason why the Machupicheños sought
for years to get a parabolic antenna installed to increase signal reception of radio and television, underscoring their felt need to expand information resources.

**Accountability:**

*The Face:*

The Ambassador of Finland paid a visit to the pueblo to unveil the design of a new artisan market and tourist center. The visit occurred just a day after the expected visit from Toledo, and with little notification to the townsfolk. What was supposed to be a joyous occasion for everyone turned sour when pueblo activists who had geared-up for a demonstration directed at Toledo simply modified their banners for the Ambassador. What transpired in this encounter between the Ambassador and the residents exemplifies the frustrations many Machupicheños experience in reference to control and authority over their own district. Along with the Ambassador were directors of PMP as well as the director of INRENA. The protestors filed into the Centro Cultural, many with posters and banners, demanding the Ambassador do something about the national law 001-2000 prohibiting the ownership of property titles of land. The assumption that the Ambassador of Finland might have some influence in the governance of Machu Picchu is not far fetched, considering the debt-for-nature exchange where Finland pays a sizable portion of Peru’s national debt in exchange for conservation commitments to the Sanctuary. At least that was Oscar’s perspective when he insisted the Ambassador remove the PMP and stop INRENA’s bullying practices. Although formally lacking voting power, the Finnish
government nevertheless has a strong operational voice in the PMP, of which INRENA is part. Not surprisingly however the Ambassador stated that he makes no decision on these matters, leaving the authority he represented a bit of a mystery. Hence, when Machupicheños such as Paco questioned, as he did at this meeting, what right an NGO has to control the lives of people in their district, the answer typically received by representatives is that they have a contract with the state, and complaints must be directed to state agencies. State agencies tell residents they can do nothing because of the debt-for-nature agreement with the government of Finland. Finally, when residents encountered the Finnish Ambassador, the representative of the Finnish government in Peru, he told the Machupicheños that he makes no decisions on the matter. “The world is now global,” is thus a phrase that residents often make as an expression of bewilderment, as well as an indication of their desire to understand the “whom” “what” and “whys” that condition life’s possibilities. Uncertainty about the focus of bureaucratic responsibility is one of the main reasons why the Machupicheños experience confusion and frustration. Globalization, as it is given experiential shape in Machu Picchu, is about the way accountability is diffused among many actors. If we examine the multi-institutional experiences associated with globalization as new forms of hierarchy negotiation, we can draw a much clearer assessment of the consequences neoliberal policies have in what is an otherwise contradictory set of conservation and economic development efforts.

The Ambassador wished only to discuss the current development project, but the protestors continued their line of interruptions more in the form of a plea
rather than a challenge. The Ambassador listened but remained silent. While people differed in their styles of communication, most present brought to bear their arguments on a shared complex of concerns. Chela’s question “How can we concern ourselves with building an artisan market when we do not have the security of property titles,” aims at the concern Machupicheños have in trusting governing authorities. At the core of the issues is a jurisdictional right residents need to constantly assert over their district. In fact, it is common for Machupicheños to assert the primacy of their district when addressing agencies. This is what Cori did when she stood in front of the audience alongside the Ambassador, and looked directly at who the protestors believed to be the head of PMP sitting in the front row. She politely welcomed the agency representatives, “buenas noches,” but unlike when addressing the Ambassador, her demeanor changed. She said: “I’ve lived here for 40 years, all my life and this is the first time I see the head of PMP. I don’t think he has been here before and certainly has never made an effort to get to know us. I ask only one thing, that PMP get out of here!” (Que se vaya), and ended with the declaration, “This is the voice of the pueblo, which is the voice of god” (Este es la voz del pueblo que es la voz de Dios). Others too, followed in this manner. First, a speaker would state the alleged abuse against their pueblo, and then declare that the PMP leave their district.

The statement that the voice of the pueblo is the voice of god can be taken as a claim to a right of self-determination; the decisions made by Machupicheños are what should count as the final say on a matter. The
emphasis by residents to reinforce the legitimacy of the jurisdiction is understandable. The institutional arrangement threatens their political status. Without the legality of the municipality, residents would lose their civil status. This point recalls the theme of the last chapter where the Sanctuary is compared to a total institution. What we find in the institutionalization of the economy of Machu Picchu is a process in which the dispossession of residents is attempted through laws that produce “civil-death,” or political dispossession (Goffman 1961: 14-17). For the Machupicheños, these problems could not be less problematic since they arose when the media was filled with rhetoric about the possibilities of building real democracy in Peru, and for the people of Machu Picchu, this rhetoric contrasts with their experiences of governance. As long as governing agencies conduct their activities in what they define as a Sanctuary rather than a district, they can bypass the demand for resident participation, fail to inform them of project intentions, and skew conditions to favor those large capital enterprises the townsfolk feel have taken over their economy. Complicating matters of governance is the fact that the PMP is not an NGO per se but rather a representative body for the Finland/Peru debt-for-nature exchange, whose mandate is administered by the state/NGO conglomerate called PROFONANPE. Even more confusing is the fact that the problems with the way projects were managed fell more directly into the hands of the companies subcontracted by PROFONANPE, such as Pacífico, who did the work. This misunderstanding exemplifies the kinds of institutional knowledge people need in order to address their complaints appropriately. While certainly there was no great love for the
PMP in general, the protestor’s actually aimed at criticizing the way PROFONANPE was administering the PMP mandate. However, by directly targeting the PMP they brought into play a much larger institutional dynamic. This demonstrates how much harder it is to single out the institutions and their functions over your life when global relationships are involved.

When the Ambassador and his architect were finally able to discuss the design of the new market with the heads of the artisan associations, it became clear that the new market would accommodate only 130 posts, despite the fact the number of artisans had grown to 215. Was this just a classical “third-world” development project error because no one had bothered to stay in touch with changes in the pueblo? Martha informed the Ambassador in a soft concerned voice that the exclusion of so many artisans would create serious conflicts in the pueblo. His response was that the artisan market was designed only for the original artisan association that held possession rights over a strip of land along side the River Aguas Calientes. The problem, as both the Ambassador and the architect saw it, was that there is a “natural” shortage of space in the canyon where the pueblo is located, a definition of space that could only antagonize the townsfolk. In a trivial sense, it states the obvious, but every pueblo resident knows that the Pueblo Hotel controls as much land as the entire town and that no one regulates their space. This oversight on the part of the Ambassador and the architect exemplifies the difference between the way space is officially represented in Machu Picchu and how it is lived (Lefebvre 1984). This is why some in the pueblo like Cori, Chela and Martha claimed that the Pueblo Hotel
actually held a property title, and that they needed one as well in order to survive in the Sanctuary because of the perception that a title offers a greater degree of security and protection from state authorities. The Ambassador denied that possibility ardently saying, “No one in the Sanctuary has property titles, possession only.”

The Pueblo Hotel (not part of the Orient Express chain) is nonetheless one of the most expensive in Machu Picchu; a room goes for about $200 per night. It is part of Inka Terra, a Peruvian owned company that specializes in ecological tourism with additional hotels in the Amazon. The Machu Picchu Pueblo Hotel opened in 1991; it sits on 25 acres of land that includes an orchid garden and displays of other flora, and fauna such as spectacled bears that are native to the Andes. It is organized like a nature sanctuary within a nature sanctuary. Their brochure advertises, “forest birds and orchids” that “thrive close to the ruins,” and blends a photo of the Machu Picchu Citadel with colonial cottage houses to create the impression that the hotel overlooks the ruins. Like the Sanctuary itself, the Pueblo Hotel is another example of the commercializing of a natural and cultural heritage. Although the hotel landscape appears to be natural, it is also well tended to create a feeling of man and nature combined harmoniously. Whether the Pueblo Hotel holds a property title or not is beyond my knowledge, but their control of, and ability to alter a protected landscape suggests that they treat their possession rights like property ownership.

As mentioned in the last chapter, the townsfolk were particularly upset with the development plan to create a reservoir for potable water and a proper
drainage system. The residents were informed of this undertaking only by posted billboards that claimed the project would take an estimated time of 60 days. In fact, the project started late and went past the estimated completion time. The pueblo was turned inside out with trenches dug in all quarters, and no end in sight. It made the pueblo unattractive, (usually a point of criticism by conservation authorities), and hard for tourists to enter local restaurants, hotels and shops. Most critically, many businesses were left with no running water. However, large capital enterprises such as Sanctuary Lodge and The Pueblo Hotel were unaffected. Finally, fear of disaster once again crept into the discussions, reviving the discourses around property, governance and nature. Chela and others expressed concerns over the intended location of the new market, which would be built along side the river Aguas Calientes where people felt that a flash flood would destroy it. The Ambassador assured them that a retaining wall would be built. But the point was missed. Machupicheños already know what is necessary to protect them from the river; the real problem is whether they could trust the authorities to properly understand their needs, and more importantly whether they were actually are working on their behalf.

Protestors complained that the pipes used for the “Waters Project” were not large enough and, not in accordance to construction codes, were placed too close to the surface. Once, the leaders of Frente had confronted a PMP civil engineer about the problem. The engineer’s explanation, perhaps technically correct, was that since there were no automobiles in the pueblo, except for a section where buses take tourists to the citadel, there was no need to place the
pipes any deeper. Oscar, in a fury, demanded to know what right the engineer had to make that decision on behalf of the Machupicheños. He declared, “What if at a future time we want to bring cars to the pueblo, or get rid of the train altogether and build a road to Machu Picchu, or for that matter just change the location of the bus station.” The engineer became visibly flustered, picked up his belongings and stormed out of the meeting. What the Ambassador, schooled in the graces of diplomacy, was able to do, the engineer was not. More precisely, the different status positions and power between the Ambassador and the engineer sets the context for different styles of interaction between themselves and the local people. The status of the engineer is more like that of the residents, so that face-to-face encounters with him are likely to produce a more direct challenge. Put simply, the Ambassador, as a high-ranking foreigner intimately connected with the affairs of the Peruvian state can deflect responsibility in ways the engineer cannot.

And the Faceless:

One evening on my way home, I met a friend, “Wilbur,” in the pueblo barrio of Las Orquideas. Wilbur worked in one of the local restaurants, but on this night I found him busily slipping leaflets under people’s doors on behalf of Programa Machu Picchu. He handed me one as he somewhat shyly explained that he was paid 20 soles (about $5 US) for the work. In retaliation to the pueblo opposition over the way the PMP were conducting projects, the PMP notified the pueblo that they were immediately halting all pueblo projects, mainly the water project and the building of the artisan market. The directors of the PMP claimed
their decision was due to the hostility from “certain local personalities” as well as for acts of vandalism against their equipment. Despite this accusation of vandalism, they provided no example of an act, or for that matter evidence that the “certain local personalities” were guilty of them. The leaflet ended with “These lamentable measures could be lifted in the next 60 days if the causes that motivated these decisions disappear” (Estas lamentables disposiciones podrían ser levantadas en los próximos 60 días, en tanto desaparezcan las causales que motivaron estas decisiones). The consequences were immediately felt. Abandoning the projects already in progress meant leaving the pueblo in complete disorder with holes and trenches dug in all major locations; it also left many local establishments such as hotels and restaurants without water.

The coercive force of the message is made to work through local social relationships that in effect get the Machupicheños to police themselves. First, the note comes from the PMP, but it is not clear from which particular institution—the Peruvian state government, the Finnish government, PROFONANPE, the municipal government, or all of them? One cannot tell, since all form part of the PMP directory. The same applies for who wrote it and gave the go ahead to distribute the notice. The proliferation of multinational/multilateral organizations brings a proliferation of faceless forms of governance. The senders and receivers of the message occupy the same time and space, but the mode of communication at the top of the hierarchy is faceless. Equally as “anonymous” is the referent of the message, identified only as “certain local personalities.” However, considering that Oscar Valencia and the members of Frente had
publicly denounced the PMP before one hundred pueblo residents, would it really
surprise anyone to learn that the “certain local personalities” refers to them?

Two men listened to a radio in the plaza. The speaker blamed the
Alcalde for not defending the pueblo against the PMP decision.
“How could he allow the pueblo to be left in such chaos,” the
announcer exclaimed, “The Alcalde should denounce the INC,
UGM, INRENA and the Finish government. Rather than agree with
the announcer, the men named Oscar Valencia as the problem.
One man said, “Frente sticks their noses in everything, and it’s
because of them that we’re left without projects.” The other man
responded, “This Oscar Valencia is a big mouth and he’s always
screwing us over. Now he screwed us again.” The first man
adjoined, “Because they [Frente] don’t know what they’re doing,
they’re just annoying us for the hell of it.” (Fieldnotes 5-2-02).

Later, I passed through the plaza where I encountered Juan Carlos standing
outside his restaurant. He was upset about the condition of the pueblo, since his
restaurant was left with no water and in order to stay in business he had to carry
water from a faucet in the market. “Everyday I’m without water,” he complained. I
asked him what he thought about the PMP decision to abandon the pueblo
projects. His reaction was mixed. He criticized the PMP for their actions, but
said that they had reason to do what they did. He blamed Oscar Valencia. “I
heard him say with my own ears that the PMP should withdraw their projects,” he
said about Oscar.

In short, despite the indirectness of the message, the referent was well
understood by the townsfolk. In a small face-to-face town, people can identity
the intended recipients, while the governing authorities can hide their tracks. The
note succeeded in creating discord and in exacerbating already existing
divisions. This was most particularly the case in the rural areas where the PMP
threatened to divert to rural areas remaining funds allotted for the pueblo
projects. Rural community leaders like Victoria were informed by the municipal authorities that they might receive PMP pueblo money for their use. As Victoria said, “Since the pueblo surely doesn’t need this money because they have so much, we can use it here; we need it. The pueblo rejected this money and the projects, but here we can use all sorts of projects with the help of the municipal government, the UGM and INRENA who are now well disposed to collaborate with us in everything. Now they’ll listen to what we have to say. Before it was different, we had to beg, but now no.”

The notice distributed by the PMP contained one key message: blame. The members of Frente were blamed for the PMP decision to abandon the pueblo projects. The note is a directive that something should be done about it by the Machupicheños themselves. Different local interests and levels of inequalities among rural and pueblo residents are thereby manipulated to control and contain dissent. What is interesting about this form of controlling dissent is how residents can be coaxed into policing themselves. In withdrawing their projects, the PMP is in effect willing to punish everyone on account of a few dissenters. By inconveniencing everyone, the PMP gets other residents to put pressure on Frente to conform to project plans.

The use of intermediaries in such communicative acts is often used to set status distance (Beatty and Takahashi 2001: 63). Moreover, using a written medium as a channel of communication is significant in that it provides anonymity for the sender and avoids the “unpleasant situation” of face-to-face interaction (ibid). Taken as a whole, the ambiguous signature, the indirectness of
communication and the use of intermediaries to deliver a message can be seen as a means of creating a new hierarchy of non-local authority without any notion of consensus. New political hierarchies can induce cooperation for their plans by using the preexisting uneven developments in the rural areas and the pueblo, and the uneven possession rights of pueblo artisans and the Pueblo Hotel.

Factoring heavily in this process of inducing cooperation is a form of communicative practice used to establish new hierarchies.

Some anthropologists have been critical of the role and influence of NGO’s in under-developed countries. NGO’s are said to discursively construct development and establish patronage relationships between themselves and the subjects of their services so as to reproduce “first-world” and “third-world” categories (Escobar 1995). Some scholars have criticized Escobar for disregarding the “non-discursive” factors that shape the power relationships between people and institutions like NGO’s and the state (Edelman 1999, Gill 2000). Lesley Gill noted in her study in El Alto, Bolivia that recipients of NGO services, rather than being passively constituted by NGO discourses, are often involved in their own factional struggles for power and wealth, and align themselves with NGO’s for resources. In El Alto, “Factional cleavages come to characterize the struggle for resources. These cleavages are not based on horizontal class alliances but turn on ties of patronage and dependence that people use to forge shifting alliances tinged with partisan politics or imbued with the discourse of NGO’s (2000: 83). Similarly, in Machu Picchu one also finds international organizations drawn into the struggles among different local factions.
such as Frente and the Alcalde. Likewise, not-for-profit sectors as well as for-profit-seeking organizations such as Orient Express develop vested interests in the way local struggles are resolved. PeruRail, for example, allegedly paid their employees to register as pueblo residents in order to vote for the company's favorite candidate. In the case of Machu Picchu, the NGO PROFONANPE was a member of the PMP. The PMP is a multinational organization comprised mainly of Peruvian state institutions and the government of Finland. As noted above, the PROFONANPE functioned mainly as an organ of the PMP. The PMP as a multi-national governing body is also well suited to subvert local unity or antagonize existing divisions, and undermine existing political dissent. It is not that the townsfolk did not welcome projects, but the problem was that they were not allowed to participate in decision-making. It was already difficult for the townsfolk to compete with large investors like Orient Express, so that when construction projects make competition harder, Sanctuary authorities appear to assist large capital interests. We see above how privatization policies can undermine a very important sense of trust and security needed for conservation agencies to work with the resident population.

The neoliberal Peruvian economist Hernando De Soto (1989) noted that bureaucracy plays a detrimental role in the lives of small business interests. According to De Soto’s, state bureaucracy limits opportunities and the only moral route to help the poor is to free the market of such governmental clutter. However, as we have seen in this chapter, the state is hardly the only bureaucracy in a globalizing world intruding into people’s lives. There is also an
international bureaucracy made up of NGO’s, international organizations, as well as other nation-states, which play a role in structuring a local economy and the opportunities of the less wealthy. More problematic is De Soto’s naïve assumption that the state bureaucracy would simply disappear in a neoliberal economy. The promotion of the property laws De Soto argues for provide little or no solution as long as the state is able to avoid issues of ownership rights by defining people as possessors, or by simply expropriating land in the name of the “public good.” In fact, De Soto says nothing about the state power of eminent domain or its variants, and its unequal application. As the case of Machu Picchu shows, under neoliberalism, expropriation and the limitations placed on property rights are consistent with the interests of large capital investors.

As this and the last chapter have shown, bureaucrats play an important role in structuring a neoliberal economy to favor large capital interests, as well as in disciplining opposition. In addition, the bureaucracy not only structures the neoliberal economy, but the implementation of neoliberal policies also re-organizes the bureaucracy. While it is easy to criticize bureaucrats, one should consider how they are also negatively implicated in power relationships that place them in the position of having to recurrently demonstrate competence in their jobs lest they be fired. This means that bureaucrats are pressured to perform their jobs more efficiently, normally a good thing. Unfortunately, neoliberalism has meant the demise of the few social welfare programs that existed in Peru, largely leaving bureaucrats the task of demonstrating efficiency in police functions. There develops a kind of “culture of fear” among bureaucrats
who then pass it along to their subjects in the form of more inflexible interpretations of policies, as well as in threats of more stringent forms of enforcement. In sum, neoliberalism in this global context fosters an institutional hierarchy that results in a greater degree of political dispossession. Policies and programs are locked in the hands of professionals who can treat public office as a private business and can more readily divest themselves of accountability.

**Concluding Remarks:**

This chapter shows the problems of accountability. We began by inquiring into the kinds of knowledge people need in order to navigate through the bureaucracy of the Sanctuary. We saw first how local politics draws on and rebounds off state and international institutions, as two rival actors with political ambitions try to organize campesinos to fight back against charges of environmental damage. More importantly we saw that knowledge of laws and bureaucratic functions are crucial not just to confront the governing authorities of the Sanctuary, but also to know whom to hold accountable for what. Not only must the Machupicheños contend with the procedures of their own state officials and the often arbitrary enforcements of rules, but that complexity is multiplied exponentially when international and multinational entities are added into the mix of institutions. Responsibility is now diffused to a greater extent than when only dealing with the state. Despite the development goals of these institutions, without accountability or participation, the Machupicheños experience those efforts as a loss of control over their lives. Moreover, the Sanctuary designation,
however important it may be to the nation and the world, often conflicts with the sovereignty of the district leading to a real loss of control in local politics and over jurisdictional boundaries for the residents. Nevertheless, for the people of the pueblo, the Sanctuary offers the prestige that sustains their tourism economy. In the poorer rural areas, where tourism is less significant, (although it does provide some economic benefits to the families along the Inca Trail) the Sanctuary designation offers few benefits and a great deal of loss of control. Finally, what this chapter shows is how Sanctuary authorities can manipulate inequalities to coercively stifle dissent in a “divide and conquer” manner. In threatening to divert pueblo funds to rural areas, the authorities keyed in on the antagonisms that exist because of rural and pueblo economic differences. Also, privatization initiatives made coercion doubly effective in this case. By temporarily abandoning the water project, the Sanctuary institutions left the pueblo in complete disarray making local restaurants and hotels inhospitable and more vulnerable to the unaffected large scale Pueblo Hotel and the Hotels of Orient Express. As a sort of economic sanction, the pueblo residents could then be made to put pressure on the dissenters. In short, the message of whom in reality is dependent on who was effectively communicated by Sanctuary authorities. Focusing on channels of communication such as the Internet, radio, or print as exemplary of globalization obscures the dynamic interplay in which the different participants in global hierarchies choose particular modes of communication; in some situations people strategically choose one communicative channel over another as a way of manipulating others. What we see in this communicative
power play is an example of the social dynamics contextualizing later negotiations between the authorities and the Machupicheños.

*The First Meeting with the Authorities:*

The decision to talk with the authorities was not well received by all the Machupicheños. A few felt that talking to the authorities would be taken as a capitulation and that they would be giving the impression that their threats of a shutdown were just bluffs. Furthermore, it was not just the authorities that some pueblo residents worried would perceive the activists as irresolute, but rural residents in the district as well. In fact, some involved in mobilizing rural residents were concerned that the change in plans would be taken as the pueblo vacillating about challenging authorities because of their own interests in the tourist economy. Juan Carlos, who has strong ties to the rural communities, speculated that after convincing some campesinos of Pampaccauha to participate, they would now be disillusioned due to the changes in plans. During the last anniversary festival, these campesinos were the only ones to stage dissent against INRENA. During the civic parade of the festival, participants from Pampaccauha held banners demanding from INRENA liberty and respect for their agricultural way of life, even as they marched with the very authorities they were protesting (see photo 2 p.252). Nevertheless, conceding Frente’s legitimacy as a non-governmental representative for the district, most Machupicheños did not refuse to go along with the idea of dialogue.

On an early sunny morning on the 6th of March 2002, I met with some of the main participants at the pueblo train station where we boarded for Ollantay.
The train was packed with passengers but, Cori, Regina, Paco and Margarita who were looking official in their dapper outfits, managed to get a seat. In the town of Ollantay, we met up with Charo, Héctor, Chela, Oscar, Marina, Raúl and others, but quickly re-scrambled into different groups as we grabbed taxies for the rest of the journey to Urubamba (see photo 3 p. 253). The protestors had a long day of appointments and they would start with the provincial mayor in the city of Urubamba and conclude in the City of Cuzco with the state conservation authorities, as well as with PeruRail. Also planned for that evening was a meeting with the Cuzco tourism association (AATC). In all there were about 20 Machupicheños, some were from Frente, while others were leaders of their craft association, and still others were just concerned residents.

The broad goals of the meetings on both sides were to come to some kind of agreement in order to avoid the pueblo stoppage scheduled for the upcoming Monday. In agreeing to open channels of communication with governing agencies as their means of effecting change, the leaders of Frente postponed shutting down the pueblo to commercial activity. Therefore, hinging on the meeting on the part of the protestors was whether they would construe the encounters as a success.

Our taxis arrived at the Consejo (municipal building) in the central plaza of Urubamba. Young shoeshine boys quickly stepped up to the well-dressed crowd apparently anticipating potential customers; they were not wrong in sensing our desire to put a final polish on our official look. “Dos soles, dos soles,” meaning “two soles” which is approximately .50 Cents U.S.
shouted. Margarita placed her ankle-high fashionable leather boots up on the lad’s stool. Others, including myself, followed. Our appointment was for 9AM but we were a bit early so the group scattered to get some breakfast. The majority went to a small restaurant nearby where they ate caldo (typical soups) of sorts. Since the restaurant was too small to accommodate all of us, Regina and I rushed to the central market where we quickly drank some sweetened hot milk. As we gulped it down I asked her what she hoped to accomplish from all the meetings scheduled for the day. The members of Frente had composed a written agenda, a platform of struggle (*plataforma de lucha*) detailing their complaints and demands for each organization. For her, the purpose of this trip was to confront the authorities and the private companies, such as PeruRail and Sanctuary Lodge, to tell them that they were committing abuses against her pueblo.

The first meeting with the Alcalde of Urubamba appeared to have gone very well. They ostensibly won back the five thousand dollars withheld by the province, and the provincial mayor gave them full verbal support in their criticism of state institutions and Orient Express. Later that day, in Cuzco, we went to the INC office where we held meetings with the INC, INRENA, and PeruRail. The Cuzco director of the INC stressed the importance of dialogue and compromise and made a number of concessions, including funding the pueblo library, giving more employment to the local people, and reducing tourist fees. The meeting with PeruRail was also interpreted as a success. From the protestor’s perspective, the director had agreed not to sell any art crafts or food on the train.
In contrast, the talks with INRENA did not fare so well. The activists saw Machu Picchu’s director of INRENA as not very cooperative on two important issues. The protestors wished to defend the 30 campesinos charged by INRENA with violating ecological laws and who were under the threat of eviction from the Sanctuary. In addition, the activists sought from INRENA a modification to the law that prohibits people who live in the Sanctuary from obtaining property titles. The director refused to make any concessions and claimed it was all out of his control. Nevertheless, there was an overall sense that the meetings were a success and therefore there was good news to bring back to the pueblo. We will see later whether this optimism was justified. Broken promises are certainly not unheard of in Peru. *Florear* is a phrase commonly used in Peru to mean “to flower”, or rather to flatter and placate with words. Despite the hostile demeanor of the director of INRENA, it can be said that he was at least frank about his position.
Chapter Five
LEARNING ONE’S PLACE IN THE WORLD: THE LANGUAGE OF THE GLOBAL MARKET.

“I think the case of Machu Picchu is one of the most important cases...for Peru. I'll repeat it is a thermometer that measures the pulse of tourism in Peru and in the world. Whatever occurs there has an immense and incommensurable repercussion...that would tomorrow be in all the headlines of the world.” Peruvian Vice Minister of Tourism – Cuzco [Fieldnotes 4-5-02].

This chapter describes aspects of the official meetings between pueblo protestors and authorities. I examine the language of neoliberalism through a “dramaturgical” (Goffman 1959), and rhetorical (Burke 1950) analysis in which these social interactions are viewed as performed on a “stage” and for an “audience” with the mutual objective of inducing favorable actions. The interchanges show how people frame issues as such to direct an audience’s attention to a particular version of reality. Erving Goffman argues that

Ordinary social intercourse is itself put together as a scene is put together, by exchange of dramatically inflated actions, counteractions, and terminating replies. Scripts even in the hands of unpracticed players can come to life because life is a dramatically enacted thing. All the world is not, of course, a stage, but the crucial ways in which it isn’t are not easy to specify. (1959: 72)

Burke explored the processes involved in persuasion, and how it functions as a tool for orienting people into an ideological position, or, as he says, “the use of language as a symbolic means of inducing cooperation” (Burke 1950: 43). For Burke persuasion was not sufficient to explain cooperation between differing interests; persuasion refers to the end product of symbolic action and not its process. Burke instead posits the concept of “identification” in addition to
persuasion. An example of identification in its simplest form is a factory owner who stands in front of his employees and says, “I was a worker once, just like you are now,” thereby presupposing joint interests based on like substance (“therefore we are really the same”). Burke’s related concept of “consubstantiality” refers to the bonds people establish through shared experiences or goals. According to Burke, both identification and consubstantiality work together as rhetorical maneuvers that induce human action toward specific directions.

A is not identical with his colleague, B. But insofar as their interests are joined, A is identified with B. Or he may identify himself with B even when their interests are not joined, if he assumes that they are, or is persuaded to believe so…. Two persons may be identified in terms of some principle they share in common, an identification that does not deny their distinctness… To identify A with B is to make A consubstantial with B (ibid: 20-21).

I draw on Burke’s concepts, of “identification” and “consubstantiality,” to understand the symbolic acts involved in promoting neoliberalism. Combining Goffman’s notion of “back and front stage” and Burke’s concepts of identification and consubstantiality provides an empirical window into the micro processes associated with neoliberalism, and the forging or rejection of new social relationships.

The applicability of Goffman’s approach is heightened by the fact that my analysis focuses on interest groups and their cooperative teamwork in the course of which they agree on and “learn a script” (ibid.: 79). Goffman spatially distinguishes teams and audience in terms of “regions:” front stage or “front region” and backstage or “back region” (ibid: 107).

107 See Goffman 1959, chapter 2, “Teams.”
In preparation for meetings and negotiations the groups learn a kind of script, rehearse and use various strategies. Face-to-face interactions create an immediate context for what is to be considered appropriate and inappropriate to a specific situation. (ibid: 18)

Drawing on these terms, I refer to the official stance of the Machupicheños in the presence of authorities as the front region, whereas the back region refers to the private interactions among the protestors in informal settings away from the authorities, often once back in the pueblo. Examples of stage distinction in the case of Machu Picchu can be seen in how Oscar frequently provided instructions to fellow protestors on how to behave in the presence of the authorities. As the leader of Frente, he was often concerned about participants’ contradicting one another during the meetings. The need to tell a coherent story and maintain the proper presentation is illustrated in the meeting with Peru’s Vice Minister of Tourism. Oscar gathered the participants around him and explained in backstage manner:

When we are inside you can’t have personal conversations. This sh sh sh won’t happen. That could go on in Machu Picchu when we’re talking with [one of] our associations, because if the minister is talking while you are chatting with somebody else, this is lack of respect. Second, those who have to go to the bathroom go once before because once we’re in the meeting there is no exiting. There won’t be this constant opening and closing the door. When the meeting is over that’s when we’ll all leave. OK, no one’s missing right, then I’ll say another thing. A recommendation, this is the theme of our talk [lifts the platform agenda in the air]. We don’t say anything outside of the agenda. They have the platform list so if there is anything that needs to be introduced outside this list I will try introducing it at the right moment. All right then, look, the task is not to talk just for

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108 I am not applying Goffman’s approach as a complete system of sociological theory but rather employing him in a piecemeal fashion for specific situations that are likely to require strategic interactions between social actors. See Geertz’s critique of Goffman in Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology, USA: Basic Books, 1983: 24–27.
talking, we can’t contradict each other. If anyone has doubts [on the pueblo position] we can ask for a moment, a break, coordinated like the way we did in the past, agreed. (Cuzco, Fieldnotes: 4-5-02)

Proponents of economic policies, regardless of persuasion, draw on metaphors, narratives, and, more generally, rhetorical strategies, to promote a particular ideology. Therefore another question involved in examining economic process, as social drama, is to consider the way ideological positions are scripted; of particular interest is an examination of the way a script diffuses responsibility. Typically, proponents of neoliberal policies construct economic narratives that portray the free market as a pure state of nature, not to be tampered with by human intervention. The language of neoliberalism can make opposition to it difficult (Green 2003: 17). As Green states, “a linguistic sleight of-hand has seen U.S. politicians and policy makers emphasizing Washington’s support for ‘market democracies.’ Democracy is clearly something no one can oppose, and Washington’s push to spread market forces into every corner of the world economy wins public support on its coat-tails” (ibid: 18). Calling “unfettered capitalism” “free trade” or a “free market” gives it a degree of legitimacy (17). Equally, terms like “enhancing efficiency,” “getting the prices right,” “removing trade barriers,” connote progress (ibid).

The term flow (e.g., capital flows), borrowed from big business to describe the movement of global capital, evokes imagery of nature. The word implies a process without human direction, goals or intent—capital, like water, just flows. Yet to think of capital as flowing is misleading in that it obscures the social activities involved in its movement, portraying the flow as beyond human control
and hence inevitable. This image conveys a Darwinian message that survival depends on adaptation to the vagaries of the “flow,” such as climate change or environmental variability. The term is also prescriptive in that it is a short step to the conclusion that progress, growth, and human welfare depend on, and are the result of survival through competition (Rivero 2001: 79-80).

However, under the extremes of neoliberalism, especially as found in Latin America, the ideal of competition is hardly realized. As PeruRail’s control of transportation in Machu Picchu shows, neoliberal ideals can easily lead to monopoly, not competition. Hence, competition here is an idea that requires cooperation in maintaining it as a belief as something beneficial to the parties involved. And attaining cooperation is tightly bound to levels of trust involved in the relationships. The fine line crossed in moving from friend to foe means reading between the lines to answer the question just whose side is this person on? Face-to-face strategic interactions allow meanings to be communicated not only through language proper, but also as part of “being in sync” with people co-present in an engagement, through gesture, tone of voice, and movement of body (Hall 1989: 71-72). As illustrated in the next section, this is particularly important because nonverbal cues have been shown to play a role in building trust and credibility among social actors that is not well captured through discursive analysis alone (ibid, Goffman 1959, Manning 2000).
Performing “The Globe”:

The pueblo representatives, after a long day of meetings (discussed in chapter 3), concluded their first round of dissent by convening with the Association for the Tourism Agencies of Cuzco (Asociacion de Agencias de Turismo de Cuzco, AATC) for an in-house discussion with leaders and fellow members of the Cuzco tourism industry about their problems and intentions. While they were still in the City of Cuzco, not far from the Plaza de Armas, the Machupicheños, along with a host of tourist professionals, had climbed a flight of stairs to the AATC office and took seats in a conference room. The day had been harried for the Machupicheños; other than the short meal gobbled early in the morning in Urubamba, the members had had no time to eat and were tired and hungry. The Machupicheños had hoped to receive some support for its cause of protest from the AATC, because as tourist professionals of the same region, they worked closely together. However, that was not going to happen. As shown in the last chapter, large scale private corporations like NGO’s and multi-national organizations, can divide different sectors of a local economy by aggravating pre-existing differences.

Mr. “Jorge Nieto”, president of the AATC, presented his view of the pueblo protest in terms of competition and adaptation. Nieto began by stating that he had had a long talk with Ms. Yasmine Martin the director of PeruRail, (also present), and was optimistic over the results of their discussion. Nieto said, “It seems to me we have good news in general” (Me parece que tenemos muy buenas noticias en general). He portrayed Martin as “demonstrating a
tremendous amount of good will” (una tremenda buena voluntad). As a leader in Cuzco’s tourism industry and a supposed pueblo ally, Nieto unexpectedly took a position against the pueblo protest, and conveyed this message in more than words.

When Nieto began talking about the necessities of a tourism economy, he used a tone of voice that underscored each syllable to animate his logic. He said, “in order to protect our tourism, you, I’m not going to make up stories, but those who have traveled … understand that the subject of security—SECURITY is KEY in any tourist operation. Not one tourist goes to a location where he believes he will be unsafe.” Although he did not directly mention the Shining Path and the civil war, he made implicit reference to “the ten years of suffering.” “We suffered ten years of recession in tourism in great part due to bad news, not necessarily where we are [Cuzco] as much as other places, but just look how much we suffered.” Nieto concluded his remark, saying that his message was “a message of security for the international markets.” Oscar took the pause as an opening to speak about the round table discussions of the day, but Nieto cut him short and asserted that the “table” creates distance between people—“La mesa crea distancia.”

In the exchange above, Nieto’s attempt at placing the positions of PeruRail and Frente under different shades of deference is communicated through the sequencing of his speech acts and his interjection. Also, although for Nieto, Oscar’s “platform of struggle” creates distance, he communicated a certain distance of his own towards Oscar. Since the seating arrangement was already
established, Nieto who was standing waiting for more people to enter the room spoke down to Oscar, who was seated. Though Nieto’s conversation was with Oscar, he did not give Oscar his attention. Rather, Nieto stood with his body semi turned away from Oscar, and gazed at the audience averting eye contact with him. In short, Nieto prevented Oscar from spoiling the attitude of his presentation. The “good will” of Yasmine is paired with Nieto’s stress over securing international investments in Peru. By contrast, the comment on “ten years of suffering” and Nieto’s interruption of Oscar’s speech act set a different ambience for the members of Frente. Oscar was not a person easy to interrupt. We recall in the last chapter when Oscar and Porfirio competed to organize campesinos in the district community of Corihuaryachina There, Oscar raised his voice, waved documents and broadly condemned privatization as an emblem of the state privileging of multinational corporations. In the context of “home” Oscar was generally able to influence a definition of the situation among the participants. Oscar and the Frente members were also quite proficient at holding steadily to their positions when interacting with state authorities. The mobilizers in Machu Picchu polarized their conflict in terms of the “the residents and the state.” Nieto and the AATC represented a different kind of power entity, and with a more ambiguous set of interests.

When Oscar did speak, he explained to an audience of tourist professionals from Cuzco what Frente had been calling their “platform of struggle” (la plataforma de Lucha), and although he depicted the earlier meetings of the day in terms of good news and many solutions, the term struggle now
seemed a bit out of place. The association of “struggle” with civil war “suffering” made Frente’s position seem like a violation of the condition that security in a tourist economy is imperative; it put Frente on the defensive. Nieto turned security and safety into a premise he controlled, and could not be violated without the risk of being de-legitimized as a claimant in the Cuzco tourism economy. Interacting within such premises leads us to consider how the situation is framed so as to produce certain outcomes. Who in their right mind could ever be against security and safety? Nieto then launched into another speech:

The lesson now was to teach Frente about the current state of the world:

[Y]ou [the pueblo of Machu Picchu] would be interested in hearing what the tourism agencies think about, how we see our operations in Machu Picchu, but more fundamentally how we see tourism in Peru and how we see what is happening in the world. I’m going to take a few minutes to reflect and I’m going to start with the good news. (Cuzco, Fieldnotes: 3-6-02)

Nieto informed the audience on the results of his talks with Peru’s Vice Minister of Tourism and the achievements made in creating the new ministry of tourism and placing the UGM, the INC and INRENA under a single bureaucratic umbrella. In a statement akin to his comment on Martin’s “good will,” Nieto praised the state’s effort to promote tourism, declaring, “These are good times.”

The good news is that we have begun to be cognizant of our problems … we have started expressing ourselves so now we have begun reaching accords … these are good times; we are making achievements we would have never thought possible in the past. And how are we achieving this? We simply discovered that everyone has the will for change … we started speaking peacefully. (Cuzco, Fieldnotes: 3-6-02)
One may ask, for whom are these good times? Those operating in the urban sector of Cuzco’s tourism industry would not suffer from the Monopoly of Orient Express as would the Pueblo of Machu Picchu. Different interests reflect the broader rural/urban economic divide between the city of Cuzco and the Pueblo of Machu Picchu, and again between the townsfolk and the campesino communities of Machu Picchu. The Cuzco tourist agencies and tour guides would probably stand to lose much more from a pueblo stoppage, at least in the short term.

A large component of Nieto’s talk concerned descriptions of the global situation. The idea of globalization can be spun according to interest. Here we see how the idea of “globalization” is not just descriptive but prescriptive (Bourdieu 2003: 85). Accepting a particular description narrows the possibilities for action and often implies a tacit agreement on which economic policies are plausible. In essence, discourses of the global play a role in sustaining a particular economic and social order. Nieto paused for a moment, looked at the audience, and then continued his sermon with what he now intended to be the bad news:

I want to tell you a little something more.... I had to attend an engagement on tourism in Europe. What did I see in Europe? You know what? There are now no more countries. It’s as if somebody came with a giant eraser [gestures as if erasing something and makes a swooshing sound] and erased the borders, no more [borders]! You pass through Spain, France, Italy, Belgium, Holland and you know, nobody asks where you are going. Nobody asks for your passport. [Nieto pauses and glances at the crowd.] It is free, completely free. In the past we had to change our money for francs, for liras, for florins, for marks. Now we have one currency that is the euro. Every single country in Europe now uses the euro ... and you know what? In this global world everyone has opportunities. The euro currency,
you know where they make it? You’ve read Condorito,\textsuperscript{109} right? The Pueblo of Condorito, which is a tiny Chilean pueblo connected to a mine, won the world international bid to mint the European currency. And you know why? Because this little tiny Chilean pueblo \textit{[raises his voice and emphasizes each syllable] IS COM-PETI-TIVE. [Lowers and softens his voice and repeats] It is competitive. What are we lacking in order to be competitive?} (Cuzco, Fieldnotes: 3-6-02)

Nieto continued his lesson on global economics stressing limitless opportunity and the value of competition. The message was contained in a subtle analogy that the Pueblo of Condorito is to the world as the Pueblo of Machu Picchu is to PeruRail. The moral was that those who are competitive are justly rewarded. Since, according to Nieto, opportunity knocks at every “global” door, the inability to compete is the fault of the residents of Machu Picchu. What is interesting in the above passage is the way a particular kind of geographical knowledge is used as a tool of persuasion. Nieto’s argument is exemplary of an increasingly common way of classifying world heritage and conservation needs according to a site’s value in the tourism industry (Edensor 1998: 184). Machu Picchu is given a market value relative to other places in the world worthy of tourist destinations, like the Great Pyramids of Egypt, Stonehenge, or the Taj Mahal.

The power of Nieto’s geographical rhetoric is in part based on his travel experiences and his authority as a tourist professional. But also, consider the dramaturgical elements involved in the way credibility is built. First, who plays

\textsuperscript{109} He is making reference to a famous comic book character, Condorito (little Condor), published for over fifty years and popularly read by children and adults throughout Latin America. While not necessarily Mr. Nieto’s intention, it is interesting to note that the general narrative of Condorito is about a poor Condor in constant search to improve his social status. (I thank David Catecera Gonzalez for this insight).
the role of “audience” in Nieto’s oration? In an observable sense the targeted
audience is the people present, namely those from Machu Picchu. But there is
also a sense in which Nieto positions himself so as to rhetorically create an
image that the “real” audience here is the “world” and he is providing “backstage”
instructions to the Machupicheños on how to properly act in a front stage region,
namely the global. In and of itself this is not unusual. Goffman noted that
different kinds of “stage” activities are in no way fixed but are rather fluid, even
occurring simultaneously (1959: 247). In effect people often “stage” a backstage
in order to construct more personalized relationships or to create a notion of
alliance (MacCannell 1973: 596). What is important in the Machu Picchu case is
what controlling the “stage” allowed Nieto to do. Nieto was in a position to walk
two sides of a fence, and this allowed him to criticize the pueblo representatives,
all the while maintaining an attitude of agreement with them; such is the power of
identification. The question of trust posed above (*whose side is the person on?*)
cannot so easily be answered. Nieto continued:

And so this is a reflection; the market has changed, and now the
tourist has much more to choose from. He’s not going to come to
Machu Picchu for the greatness of our ancestors. He’s going to
come to Machu Picchu because here we can give him security,
But A-BO-VE ALL, and this is a new law of the market, because
we have _GOOD VALUE!_ Do you know what _good value_ is?
*Good value* is translated as _buen valor_ but do you know what it
means? [It means] neither cheap nor expensive but the right
price, and you know, we don’t set the right price. The market
decides the right price. And so, this right price, this relationship—
service/cost /price—is what we need to put in our heads, not
because we own Machu Picchu and we are at the _puputi_ (center). The world no longer has a _puputi_. The world is out there

110 Italics mean he used the actual words in English and no translation was required.
111 Puputi is a Quechua term for navel. Nieto is making a reference to the way the Incas referred to Cuzco as the navel,
or center, of the world; hence in this context I translate it as “center.”
and everyone can choose, everyone can go where they want and if we give them any difficulties they will go somewhere else. And you know what? Our unique Machu Picchu isn't unique, there are many Machu Picchu in the world, [and] there are other places, other destinations, nature, archaeology…. If we want to develop our country we need to be open to responsible foreign investment. (Cuzco, Fieldnotes: 3-6-02)

Through identification, different interests are joined or pulled apart by blurring the categories that stand in the way. In this case, manipulating cultural boundaries can serve to produce a feeling of sameness or difference. As has been shown, the use of cultural identity in Latin America, as elsewhere is often an effective way of organizing politically, one that can be applied against large-scale foreign investment as well (Hale 1997). By contrast, one way to change minds and facilitate foreign investment might reasonably be to assault the congruity of the terms that frame identity. Juxtaposing words that might otherwise be seen as contradictory could lead to an examination and acceptance of commonly held categories. If reinterpretations of those categories occur, one has broken the frames organizing identity. For example, the terms Andes, Machu Picchu, Cuzco, and the Incas are congruous when used to give order to a local form of identity (e.g. Cuzqueño). However, note how Nieto shifts the boundary of inclusion into an identity by breaching the language normally used to describe it, According to Nieto:

There are two kinds of Cuzqueño, the Cuzqueño by origin, the one who is born here, and the Cuzqueño by destiny, who chooses to live here regardless if they were born in Katmandu. [The audience laughs] Here we have a Cuzqueña by destiny. Yasmine was born in Switzerland but she chose her destiny, and her destiny is to work with us and for us…. [Margarita adds jokingly but amiable way that Yasmine is from Machu Picchu: “She’s Machupicheña.”] (Cuzco, Fieldnotes: 3-6-02)
Nieto continued:

These people are just as much entitled to call themselves Cuzqueño as the most [Nieto pauses for a moment, apparently trying to think up a comparison or refrain from articulating the kind of Cuzqueño he had in mind] like the most Cuzqueño of the Cuzqueños. (Cuzco, Fieldnotes: 3-6-02)

Identification narratives can often be convoluted accounts that are difficult to disentangle at the moment they are performed. For instance, in the above passage, who is asked to identify with whom? According to Nieto, he and the associates of the AATC are consubstantial with those from Machu Picchu because (1) both can claim membership to the identity of Cuzqueño and (2) they share mutual experiences as small business owners in the local tourism industry. This deduction is based largely on the way Nieto uses the subject pronoun “we” (nosotros) to refer to who must learn the concept of “good value,” and who must reject that they are either the “puputi” of the world or the owners of Machu Picchu. Ultimately, as the passage above suggests, Nieto is supporting PeruRail’s investment interests in Cuzco. If including PeruRail under number (1) would not already offend the sensibilities of most Cuzqueños, then number (2) would most likely be received as an untenable insult to the Machupicheños because the financial might of PeruRail lies at the core of their economic despair, not to mention that the company is neither small nor local. But note that Nieto does not actually mention PeruRail by name; rather, that experiential dissonance is deflected by his much more personalized alternative of naming Yasmine, even going so far as to imply that Yasmine has a greater right to operate in Cuzco because she chose it as her destiny, whereas those from Machu Picchu are merely Cuzqueños by birth. At first, Nieto fostered an impression of likeness
between himself and those of Machu Picchu, only to extend this consubstantiality to Yasmine; he then converted “Yasmine” into “these people” (esa gente) so that ipso facto he was able to discreetly slip the uninvited PeruRail into the Cuzqueño consortium.

But did it work? While it is one thing for an anthropologist to interpret the motives of an actor by deconstructing his/her rhetoric, it is a more difficult task to assess its effectiveness on a group of listeners. It is difficult to confidently determine an answer to such a question, but it is worth an evaluation. Firstly, to be sure, people were not affected in a uniform manner; there was variation. Secondly, to minimize the complex nature of the variation we can ask the question from the viewpoint of the speaker: how does a speaker know whether he/she is convincing an audience of a particular position? As has been shown, an audience often supplies the speaker with non-verbal vocalizations and gestures that provide “back-channel cues” to the speaker (Goffman 1981: 12). In this case we have the laughter that followed Nieto’s comment. The laughter did not embarrass Nieto or spoil his demeanor. In a curious way, the amiable spirit of the laughter perhaps told Nieto that he was being taken seriously. Margarita, no less the vice president of Frente, accepted Nieto’s framing of Yasmine, at least humorously, and even went further, granting her the honor of Machupicheña.

Margarita’s interjection leads us to look at the various stances people take when engaged in talk. There are many reasons why speakers make shifts, but often speakers tend to limit their choices to what is appropriate for the situation
(Goffman 1981). Nevertheless, speakers often do try to manipulate the shifts in talk to control or redirect a conversational topic, and hence change the situation along with the appropriate form of talk. The fact that people change their stances repeatedly in a single conversational exchange can make it difficult for an observer to attach discursive themes onto particular actors. For instance, Nieto completed his talk by apparently contradicting what he had been maintaining, namely about the competitive nature of the economy and the just value imposed by the market.

We have to understand that we have to work together, live together and above all conduct ourselves in a responsible manner. In Spain they gave me a very nice document. You know what it was? - *The Code of Tourism Ethics*. It is a document that addresses many things, like being responsible with our planet… They also address the theme of [economic] investment and when we have an investment that by nature we cannot compete with, then we should welcome it but demand social responsibility—and on this topic that I and Yasmine spoke a great deal about, we are in agreement. (Cuzco, Fieldnotes: 3-6-02)

This last is an expression of ambivalence on the part of Mr. Nieto, who is generally regarded in Cuzco as a pensive and fair-minded individual. He realizes a need for social responsibility. It suggests, I would venture to say, a struggle on his part in facing the contradictions of values posed by the realities of the neoliberal economy: *competition* and *social responsibility*. It is nevertheless a contradiction that can find its rationalizations in the belief that a code of tourism ethics can meliorate the brutal consequences of small capital holders competing with multi-national corporations. Nieto shifted back to his earlier frame and concluded with what he referred to as “another thing I learned in Europe.” Here
Nieto characterizes the situation in such a way as to escape refutation of his universal claim in the value of competition.

He said:

[O]ver there they compete with everything ... you know what? We know how to fight, but we don’t yet know how to compete. There is a difference—he who fights destroys. He who competes moves ahead and pulls up those [people] that are behind him. (Cuzco, Fieldnotes: 3-6-02)

In other words if:
X says, “Competition is the ideal good.”
Y declares, “In Peru competition has been destructive.”

Then,
X simply asserts, “It just goes to show you that what we do in Peru is not “true” competition.

What Mr. Nieto does not mention is that most European countries\footnote{Despite Mr. Nieto’s reference to a general Europe and European Union, the references he makes to old currencies suggests he is drawing examples from experiences of Western European economies.} are not in the same world economic position as Peru, nor have Europeans so harshly dissolved the structures of the welfare state. Nevertheless, the meeting continued for a couple of hours, and much was said. Chela spoke in a humble fashion claiming that the Cuzco tourism agencies have a disregard for the pueblo because Machu Picchu is generally the last stop for tourists ending their travel itineraries. Oscar retorted that the code of ethics should apply to everyone, including the tour guides. Members of the tour guide association AGOTUR (Asociación de Guías Turismo) claimed they have a limited authority and it is the tour agencies that need to make the change. The tour agencies blamed the clandestine agencies operating without authorization. Nieto declared that the
protestors would be responsible for decreasing tourism in Peru. A leader of the tour guide association proclaimed that if the pueblo protested they would destroy the image of Machu Picchu. “Machu Picchu is not only ours, it also belongs to the world,” he said. In the end even though the Machupicheños had threatened to hold a stoppage if their requested changes were not made, for the time being they agreed to have it postponed.

However, after Nieto’s long speech there was an interesting shift in language. The word competition was now being used as part of everyone’s rhetoric. Margarita said that competition obliges us to stop the abuses of the tour guides that charge tourists extra. And, competition obliges us to stop the tour agencies from making deals with certain pueblo restaurants, compelling the tourists to eat at their locations. A member of the AATC criticized the pueblo for not protecting its image, arguing that tourists complain about the little kids who constantly follow them to sell their trinkets. Finally, the solution was to improve the image of the pueblo in order to make it more competitive. Nieto succeeded, at least in part, in having the pueblo look for market solutions to their problems rather than protest; to create promotional packages of their own or to organize the pueblo to make it more aesthetically appealing – to sell a better product!

Unlike the state authorities who treat the sanctuary as a homogenous entity, Mr. Nieto and the AATC have the power to more subtly redefine who is to be included in reaping the benefits of the Cuzco tourism economy. They have the power to deliver the goods to an economic segment of the pueblo that largely comprised the members of the mobilization. Here we can see how Frente’s
efforts to organize as a community of district residents fragmented because of their different economic interests compared to the varieties of groups they represented.

What transpired for the members of the artisan associations was the development of a photo-check identification system. The idea was to stop the increasing number of merchants coming to the pueblo to take advantage of the tourist economy. Each artisan would be required to wear or have in their possession a photo ID in order to sell goods to tourists. If one were not already a member of an artisan association they would be excluded and prevented from doing business in the pueblo. The upshot is that those excluded were mostly the *ambulantes* comprised largely of poorer women and children who come from Cuzco, and whose activities were previously tolerated (see photo 8 p. 256). Like merchants in the Cuzco plaza, mentioned in chapter two, these people do not have a fixed market location and so resort to approaching tourists directly in the plaza, along the train tracks or while tourists are dining in a restaurant.

This meeting has given us a glimpse into the way the neoliberal economy orders market space in terms of exclusion or inclusion. And, as discussed in chapter two, the implementation of the photo ID system further exemplifies the territorial struggles carved out of the relationship between economy and governance. But what we also see in the above exchange is how the state attains hegemony by drawing on personalized relationships and informal situational contexts to promote and legitimize its policies. This is seen more
clearly when contrasted to the interactions that took place in the subsequent more formal meetings with the authorities.\textsuperscript{113}

\textit{The Production of Authority:}

An important corollary in the expansion of the tourism economy in Cuzco concerns the development of “the society of the spectacle” (Debord in Campos 2004). Following Debord, Ramiro Campos describes how social space in Cuzco is organized around the production of visual commodities for tourists. He argues that under neoliberalism “landscapes and monuments become commodities for the tourist gaze” (ibid: 2). Campos describes the development of nationalist discourses revolving around Inka identity as attempts to sanctify a landscape in resistance to market liberalization and the commoditization of life, but concludes that they are unable to stop the overwhelming power of the market economy (ibid). While these nationalist discourses are commonly invoked in public demonstrations, as shown above in the meeting with tourism leaders, once situated in strategic interactions, we can see how regionalist sentiments summoned against neoliberalism can be appropriated. Regional identity, “\textit{Incanismo},” in Cuzco has more recently become a form of political expression appropriated by the growing tourism industry (Flores Ochoa 1990, van den Berghe and Flores Ochoa 2000). In formalized strategic interactions, the invocation of regional identities is too transparently understood as identification

\textsuperscript{113} As these meeting lasted between 6-8 hours, space does not permit me to discuss every possible item discussed nor do I wish to burden the reader with all the details. Rather by necessity I discuss the outcome abstractly, restricting examples to what furthers the argument of the thesis.
strategies. This means that while understanding broader discursive themes is important, once the players such as the Machupicheños, authorities and leaders of Orient Express are inserted into concrete social contexts, negotiations also take on the non-discursive quality of each group’s position of power. Pueblo discussions with Mr. Nieto show that his ability to appropriate identity discourses in support of neoliberalism is in part based on his unique position in the Cuzco tourism industry and his relationship with pueblo residents as not clearly insider or outsider, and not only the content of his talk.

In the weeks that followed the first meeting with authorities, subsequent meetings were held in Cuzco as well as in the Pueblo of Machu Picchu. The next two meetings were particularly important in that the limits to dialogue became apparent to the protestors. The second meeting was held in Cuzco in the regional government building and was joined by the Peruvian Vice-Minister of Tourism. He met with the pueblo protestors and Orient Express (Sanctuary Lodge Hotel and PeruRail) in an attempt to resolve the conflict; conservation authorities were also present but the meeting largely centered on the problems the townsfolk had with the Sanctuary Lodge Hotel. The Vice Minister began by formally greeting his audience in Quechua:

“Asuan sonqo manllaiquicuna
Muna qeipi rimaqunampa
Lloq’anqeipi hamuni rimananchispa
Chiamantara asuan allinta lloq’ecuni
Rucatata q’eillata …”

114 Noting the complicated nature of language translation I would like to mention that this quote was first translated from Quechua to Spanish and then to English. I wish to thank Nayruth Yanez for the translation from Quechua to Spanish.
“My dear friends and countrymen, once again I come as a Cusqueño to my beloved land of Cuzco, and I am happy to see you.” [Cuzco, Fieldnotes: 4-5-02].

And he continued in Spanish: 115

“In the first place I don’t believe this is a platform of struggle; personally as the Cusqueño that I am, I reject this term because I believe that the theme we must address, that we must examine, is how to improve our pueblos and improve tourism. What we need is a platform for developing tourism... Here there are not two fronts, there is no border, here we have a concrete objective to develop tourism in Peru in an efficient manner in front of the world” [Cuzco, Fieldnotes: 4-5-02].

Here we have something akin to an “identification” effort, but it was less effective than in the Nieto case since the official character of the meeting clearly defined the situation as a front-stage event. Rhetorically, the Vice Minister, like Nieto earlier, is attempting to instruct his listeners as if they were back stage, preparing a formal performance for an important audience. He explained that “Machu Picchu is the thermometer that measures the health of tourism in Peru. Whatever happens in Machu Picchu is a world event.”

A spectacle or a tourist attraction, like a performance, implies an audience. The question is what role the audience plays when actors are engaged in economic struggles? Imagining the desires of an audience becomes a contest of different interests, a hegemonic field where different actors struggle to define the audience. For the Vice Minister, we see that the concern is Peru’s image as being politically stable in the world economy. Since Machu Picchu represents Peru to the world, for state officials and their external political and

115  Translated into English for the reader.
economic relations, those representations reflect the neoliberal Peru, either for ideological conviction, or as a matter of “keeping up appearances” for the sake of maintaining financial credibility. The Vice Minister spoke of the presidential visit by George Bush, noting the implications for the Peruvian economy: “The tourism companies of the world say that wherever Bush goes is a good place, no one important goes to a place that has problems.” He went on to tell a story of what happened when he heard of the pueblo plans to hold a stoppage. He was with tourism professionals when they heard of the protestors’ plans to hold an indefinite stoppage at Machu Picchu. The Vice Minister assumed the voice of one of the professionals he had overheard: “Excuse me one moment, please cancel the next two weeks of trips to Peru and put them for Bali.” He concluded his story with, “This is the way these people think.”

However, for the activists experiencing corporate intrusions, the notion of an audience is more akin to a witnessing world. As Oscar said in this respect when he threatened a stoppage, “So the world knows that there is a hotel distorting the meaning of the Sanctuary.” He responded to the comments of the Vice Minister by telling the pueblo’s story. He described the events (discussed in chapter 2) that unfolded when the artisans of the pueblo protested the rules that excluded them from commerce near Sanctuary Lodge; the artisans sold their merchandize in the area around the hotel. Oscar described how police in riot gear were deployed after a few days, allegedly at the request of Mr. Filip Boyen the hotel general manager. To the Machupicheños, the presence of the police
damaged the image of Machu Picchu because it revealed to the world the inequities they experience, and made Peru appear like a police state. They also argued that the presence of police jeopardized the image of Machu Picchu as a place of peace and harmony. The Machupicheños invoked a certain meaning of the Sanctuary to display how market interests take precedence over democratic ideals and social responsibility in Peru. The language that the Machupicheños used was overwhelmingly a language of abuse and social responsibility. As Oscar said to the Vice Minister, “business under neoliberalism thinks only of profitability…they don’t consider social responsibility.” Chela and others further connected their grievances to a regionalist discourse arguing that Machu Picchu is a sacred place where no commercial activity should occur, adding that “[people] should enter barefoot.” But the Vice Minister simply dismissed this on the grounds that all participants in the discussion will stay within the law and the legal contracts that are in effect. Indeed he countered Chela’s nationalist appeal with talk about economy and how the decrease of tourism was due to inadequate promotional and marketing strategies.

“We need to work very hard so that many more tourists come and to treat them very well because they are the best advertisers for our country…. Like some woman who goes to Machu Picchu, loves it immediately, buys something big or small and [then] says to her daughter [when she gets back home], ‘you know what, go to this country, it’s marvelous, beautiful, take your husband, boyfriend or whoever,’ rather than say ‘you know what, I went to Peru, they treated me bad, this and that problem...”
He concluded waving his hands emphatically, still speaking from the perspective of an imaginary woman, but really directing criticism at the protest intentions of the mobilizers:

“...it’s a country where you don’t know if they will throw rocks at you, don’t go and tell your friends not to go.”

No doubt that Chela and others value Machu Picchu as a sacred place, but they took note of their increase in sales when the artisans set up outside the citadel next to the hotel Sanctuary Lodge. The original position of the protestors had been to argue the contradiction in the way privatization had been put into effect in the Sanctuary, but they changed the strategy to that of all business activities should take place in the pueblo below, largely as a way of appealing to nationalist sentiment. While Chela may in fact deeply feel the sentiment that no commercial activity should take place by the Citadel, some of the other artisans were hesitant to accept that line of argument, understanding that they could better compete when located by the Citadel, and that bringing large-scale business down to the pueblo would completely undermine local commercial activity. Regardless of whether it made business sense or not, the point is that the protestors were quick to identify the rhetorical maneuver on the part of the Vice Minister, and he theirs, thereby maintaining the official formalities of their front stage presentations.

Indeed, the Sanctuary Lodge understood the strategy and took formality (and social distance) to the extreme. In response to the protestors and to the Vice Minister’s request to continue future talks, the manager of the hotel, Mr.
Boyen (a European and fluent in Spanish), spoke loudly in English to his Peruvian lawyer, presumably to ensure everyone heard him speak a language few understood. The lawyer then parroted his message into Spanish to those present. He said that they had reached the limit of discussion and dialogue with the Machupicheños, and that they could not afford the loss of revenue by closing the shops, condescendingly adding that the items they sell are “at least twenty times more expensive than any items [the pueblo] sells.” He rejected what he considered the harrying tactics of Frente trying to obligate him to close the concession stands. He was referring to the way Frente and the Alcalde attempted to close the shops, citing municipal regulations that the shops lacked a sellers’ permit. Boyen pointed out that Sanctuary Lodge did in fact have a legal contract with the state, and that the subcontracted shops all had the necessary authorizations to operate.

He concluded:

It will be very hard to find a solution on this point because we are not ready to give in, we are not ready to close the shops, and obviously the Frente de Defensa has done a positive protest for the last five or six days, which changed yesterday, because the police has come up there and removed all of them, which has been decided by authorities, and I can assure you that in the future if again they would be disruptive we will take exactly the same action because we are not willing to give in.” [Cuzco, Fieldnotes: 4-5-02].

One cannot help noticing how Mr. Boyen first claimed the decision to remove the artisans was decided by the authorities, but then goes on to insert himself as part of that decision-making process by saying “we will take exactly the same action” in the future. More importantly here, the protestors had not, at least at this formal meeting, argued that the Sanctuary Lodge concession stands
be closed down, only that they be moved to the pueblo and make competition reasonable. Still one can admire the straightforward assessment of the Sanctuary Lodge in making their power position far more transparent than had the state authorities (or PeruRail officials who paid lip service to their willingness to cooperate). The vice minister could offer no solutions other than a promise to continue to talk with residents, skirting around their aversion to dispossess multinational corporate capital in order to make competition fairer; preferring instead to dispossess the artisans of what amounts to the use of public space. In this case, Sanctuary Lodge Hotel does not own the space outside the Citadel where the artisans had in protest set up their goods, but they were able to use the power of the state to ensure the area remained empty of any competition. While benefiting from state intervention, and the use of state resources such as the police, the Sanctuary Lodge gained an economic stronghold. When it came to social responsibility however, they legitimately invoked the logic of market dynamics against having to take action. Great effort is made to force the people of Machu Picchu to accept market logic, and ultimately dispossession, all the while dissuading them from using political means, including the right to protest and to carry out a stoppage. The state appears to be a neutral arbitrator when in fact it is an example of how under neoliberalism one hand of the state is radically divorced from the other (Bourdieu 1998: 2). It provides an illustration of how economic “technocrats” in Peru are resisting hard won political rights guaranteed by the state, in order to abide by the rigid demands of structural reform and foreign debt payments.
Machupicheños often talk about how the conservation and other state authorities do not understand their lived realities. For this reason the members of Frente now invited the authorities to continue meetings in the pueblo where they could point out some of the problems first hand and also give a wider audience of district residents a chance to voice opinions; the authorities obliged.

The next meeting with authorities took place in the pueblo cultural center about two weeks later, and was moderated by representative of CTAR, the Cuzco regional government. It was anticipated that the meeting would be one of finding solutions; the arbitrator in fact uttered “solutions” some twelve times in his opening lines, stressing its cooperative nature. Present were representatives from: CTAR, INC, INRENA, the Ministry of Tourism along with other state technical advisors, the alcalde and the provincial alcalde as well. The auditorium was filled with Machupicheños from both the pueblo as well as the rural areas. Somewhere in the back rows sat the lawyers for Sanctuary Lodge and PeruRail, but not their European bosses.

As discussion began, the arbitrator stressed that if solutions were not reached on particular issues they should be bracketed and discussed at a later time, citing the importance of maintaining the flow of discussion. After many hours of deliberation almost every issue was bracketed. The INC did make overtures to reduce the entrance fee to the Citadel for Peruvian nationals. Also, some discussion revolved around starting legal proceedings against the Beer Company that damaged part of the Inca sundial of the ruins, and about retrieving artifacts from the Bingham expedition believed to be held at Yale University. In
short, away from direct attention of the media, and away from the management of Orient Express, once in the Pueblo of Machu Picchu, nationalist discourses not only came to life but also held a degree of influence over the authorities. While the representatives for Orient Express continued with their line of market and investment logic, they were put on the defensive by in effect being called traitors, “vende patrias” (national sell-outs). The lawyer of Sanctuary Lodge felt a need to defend himself. “We do identify with the pueblo, the majority of us are Peruvians, the only foreigners are those who made the investment,” he said. Interestingly at one point, though certainly at no cost to Orient Express, the lawyer for PeruRail argued counter to the logic of privatization that the state should retake responsibility for subsidizing train operations for the transportation services once provided to the local people of the region.

Finally, there was a parade of residents each voicing their list of the abuses of Orient Express as well as the conservation authorities, in each case placing responsibility on the state to act appropriately as a governing authority. The number of participating residents and their applause fed into a sense of power over the state representatives and the lawyers for Orient Express. It also made it difficult for the authorities to control the dialogue and stifle dissent.

Eber concluded the exchange with a warning to the authorities:

“If I were a director in the government I would be embarrassed to call myself Peruvian because sirs, we are trafficking in the heritage of our ancestors. If you don’t understand cause and effect, well I do and it will be very sad for those that decide the future of Machu Picchu, [not considering its sanctity]. We will look at your faces afterwards sirs, when you will have to say, ‘I WAS THE ONE WHO SOLD MACHU PICCHU,’ … I protest in the name of the Pachamama of Machu Picchu so that you do not traffic Machu Picchu.” [Pueblo of Machu Picchu, Fieldnotes: 4-18-02]
**Concluding Remarks:**

This chapter has sought to examine specific social contexts in which certain discourses about the economy and the role of the state are invoked. There is no ready-made formula for a situational analysis and I do not propose one. I use the concepts of front/back stage, and identification as tools for calling attention to the contextual nature of discourse, and the way context plays a role in a discourse’s motivational potential for action. Foremost, it is important to reemphasize that neoliberal views are currently dominant in terms of state policy. However, the language of neoliberalism, when examined in terms of the situated encounters of the speakers and the institutional context of their interactions, brings into focus different modes of producing authority. It shows also how state representatives are caught in their own double bind. The meeting with the Vice Minister showed that his authority is based on maintaining credibility with foreign investors, and the upshot is that one must adhere to the neoliberal course at the expense of social responsibility. However, authorities start to lose credibility if they appear to be on the side of foreign investors taking over Peru’s cultural goods. Nationalist discourses in opposition to neoliberal programs do find their own authorial spaces, and they do facilitate notions of social responsibility, as in the pueblo context where authorities were far more susceptible to local views, and had to appear to reject the imperialist implications of the neoliberal project, even though the net result is that we find only minor gains for the Machupicheños and a lot of stalling on the part of the authorities.
In light of this last meeting with the Vice Minister, with we also see why the earlier situation with Mr. Nieto represented a pivotal moment when he managed to convince the pueblo representatives to make changes in accordance with free market principles. By constructing neoliberalism as an inevitable outcome of globalization he absolved the state of responsibilities that produce the dilemma faced by state agents. However one must consider that this was not the resident’s first encounter with such language about neoliberalism. In fact, their rejection of it formed the basis of their protest. By understanding the dramaturgical framing of Nieto’s credibility, we can see his success in getting the pueblo representatives to think of themselves in terms of “economic sectors” and “market dynamics,” and thereby momentarily undermining the organizing principle of their protest. Their sense of district identity that they sought to cultivate among other Sanctuary residents and their criticisms of the state policies that had resulted in their dispossession had been made to “disappear.” The representatives were caught in their own double bind; their sense of district identity, however broad, was nevertheless, as discussed in chapter two, based on interests shaped by class differences.

At this point, one might ask what had been gained by the mobilizers’s engagement with the authorities. It is difficult to point to concrete changes, except for the authorities’ promise to continue the talks. For the protestors, the question that arises is what powers the state and corporate representatives actually have to make the changes demanded of them. Presenting a case before authorities that cannot implement the desired changes is useless. The task then,
from the viewpoint of the Machupicheños, is to gather detailed information about the intentions of the authorities. This entails prying into the sincerity of a promise, and most importantly the claims to have the power to effect change. As we see, one of the stalling tactics of the authorities is to inflate their status and capacity in an effort to postpone more dramatic undertakings on the part of the protestors.

However, one can point to a few less tangible but important achievements. The gross inequalities that characterize Latin American social relations mean that people often do not envisage, much less claim, rights (Alvarez et al 1998: 12). The dialogues succeeded in getting the vast majority of the pueblo politically engaged. Also, people sought to reclaim the use of public space as in the artisan’s “commercial” protest outside Sanctuary Lodge. A much wider group of residents began to understand how they are affected by neoliberal policies, and some even began participating in the discussions. The final meeting in the pueblo drew a large supporting crowd. It is interesting to note that this meeting in the pueblo was the last time the talks with the authorities would take place there. The state authorities canceled the future meetings scheduled to take place in the pueblo. The next chapter will consider the ramifications of these cancellations and explore discussions that took place in what might be considered an example of a real rather than a “staged” backstage event.
Chapter Six
HOW THE PUEBLO BOILED OVER.

"The time has come," the walrus said, "to talk of many things; of shoes and ships and sealing wax, of cabbages and kings, And why the sea is boiling hot, And whether pigs have wings."

~Lewis Carrol

In this chapter I juxtapose the official meeting of the last chapter with corresponding discussions made by and for the mobilization members in their informal settings, in response to previous formal encounters with authorities. The goal is to call attention to the decision-making style of the members, and to examine how issues of credibility factor into the way in which they define their situation and convert that situation into a course of action.

It was a sunny Saturday morning in mid-May. We were a couple of hours short of noon but the sun was already intense. I stood in the plaza not knowing exactly what to do. I had prepared to spend the day in a meeting between the Machupicheños and the authorities. I arrived only to find the plaza empty of the participants. The artisans of the Joyitas Association were busy setting up stands for a chiriuchada, or a chiriuchu benefit, to raise funds to legally establish themselves as an artisan association in the public registry. As we recall in the last chapter, the newly implemented photo-check system required artisans to be part of an established association in order to gain the proper ID to do business in the pueblo.

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117 Chiriuchu is a Quechua term referring to eight cold dishes of food. As a Cuzco specialty, it is specifically eaten for the festival of Corpus Christi but of late it has also become a dish for any sort of special occasion.
After a few minutes Héctor and Oscar Medina\textsuperscript{118} approached me from Calle Pachacútec. Héctor seemed agitated; things had changed. As we stood in the plaza with the sun pounding us, Héctor said that CTAR had called the leaders of Frente yesterday to inform them that a delegation would arrive in Cuzco too late to make it in time to catch the train to Machu Picchu. However, they offered to change the location of the meeting, and also offered to make a PeruRail train wagon available to take the leaders to and from Cuzco. Héctor expressed concern about going to Cuzco. He feared that it was a police ploy to arrest them in Cuzco and silence their protest. “This is dangerous” (ésto está peligroso), he said waving his hands to emphasize his concerns. Medina proposed a different reason for the sudden change on the part of the authorities: “[they] did this with the intention of changing the stage.”\textsuperscript{119} He felt that it was a strategy by the authorities to take the activists out of the context of their own pueblo, and away from the “home team” advantage. The result would be that in Cuzco large numbers of pueblo residents would not be able to attend the meeting on such short notice, reducing their participation. But, Héctor feared something worse from the authorities. “Maybe they’ll make us disappear” (de repente nos desaparecen). Héctor was visibly upset at this change of plans. “How could they change the location at the last moment?” he asked. He felt it was intended as an insult. “How is it that they don’t have time for the pueblo that brings [Peru] the most money?” From Héctor’s point of view the only way the

\textsuperscript{118}Note to the reader: So as not to confuse Oscar Medina with Oscar Valencia, the leader of Frente, I will refer to Oscar Medina by his surname only.

\textsuperscript{119}As a point of interest to the reader, this sentence by Medina about “changing the stage” (cambio de escenario) motivated me to consider Goffman’s notions of back/front stage as a form of analysis.
authorities would take them seriously would be to hold a pueblo-wide stoppage, but his question was also a search for the true motives; behind the rhetorical how could they was a why would they.

Héctor was particularly angry over a journalistic slur discrediting their protest. “They are portraying Oscar Valencia as if he were a lunatic,” he said, referring to an article published in the magazine Caretas, a well-reputed Peruvian political magazine, and written by a well-respected columnist.120 Two editions later the ambassador of Finland wrote a letter to the editor applauding the comments of the author. And also in that subsequent issue there was a lengthier article on the politics of Machu Picchu entitled, “Aguas Hirvientes,” or boiling waters, a play on the often-cited name “Aguas Calientes” (hot water springs) for the Pueblo of Machu Picchu, but more a reference to the troubling developments in the pueblo.121 The writer ingratiated himself with the ambassador, thanking him for his extraordinary patience, and of course for the Finnish funds as well.

Héctor was troubled. Again he searched for concealed motives. “How is it possible that they ridicule our pueblo, such a serious and important magazine, how could they print these kinds of commentaries?” He mentioned a photo he had recently seen in Caretas of Ms. Martin, the director of PeruRail, with the vice minister of tourism.122 “The Vice Minister was supposed to be helping the pueblo.” To Héctor, the fact that they were posed together, with their postures and smiles, suggested that the Vice Minister was giving preferential treatment to

PeruRail. After all the negotiations with the authorities, it seemed to Héctor that all they had received were deceptions, and that their efforts were reduced by the media to a handful of malicious words caricaturing them as crazy. Héctor said that those who have power just buy off the press to bring the pueblo into disrepute and discredit their cause.\footnote{While I cannot be certain, Héctor was apparently alluding to the way the Peruvian media were implicated in a bribery plot orchestrated by ex-president Fujimori’s spy chief Vladimiro Montesinos.}

Charo walked hurriedly down Pachacutec Avenue, agenda book in hand. She joined us in the plaza and listened to Héctor finish his grievance. He soon quieted down and turned to Charo to get the latest scoop. Charo said that the pueblo would assemble in the plaza to decide to continue to talk with the authorities or to break with them and begin the stoppage. Charo asserted her personal verdict. “Already [the authorities] have suspended many meetings and we have tolerated enough, so no more!” José too joined the group. But just then, the local train pulled into the station so he and Héctor went off to see if by chance the authorities had arrived on that train rather than the earlier tourist train. After a few minutes they returned with a negative report.

Medina and Charo began analyzing the situation. “You know, all this is like a game,” Medina said. Charo nodded in agreement and added, “Now it’s like we’re playing a game of chess. You have to move the pieces strategically and deceptively, [first] they say yes then they say no, it’s all a game.” Medina wrinkled his forehead. “It seems to me that their strategy is to divide the pueblo, discredit their leader [Oscar Valencia],” he said, still talking about the magazine article. Charo agreed. “Yes, by demoralizing us.” Medina continued, “It’s regrettable that
they have resorted to such low blows as calling [Oscar] a lunatic. What they want is to completely demolish their enemy.” Charo was resolved. “For that reason alone I hope the population is now going to be more determined - we also have to collect funds.” “He who has money always wins,” Medina blurted out, and then chuckled at his own statement. He called on American history to illustrate the role of money in violence and corruption. He asserted that the oil barons of the United States paid off congressmen to vote in their favor and if they didn’t abide they would “mysteriously” have a car accident. His remark seemed to trigger a fear in Charo. She appeared worried that they may have gotten into more trouble than she had anticipated. Charo rarely sounded so hesitant. She feared the power of PeruRail and the Sanctuary Lodge and felt that as foreign companies they would surely be given preferential treatment by her own government. From her perspective, Peru would never place limits on foreign investors because they would fear losing economic credibility in the “eyes of the world.” “With whom did we get mixed up with,” she asked herself. Héctor responded. “They’re bringing us to the point of exhaustion. We should have gone to Cuzco but in our own train.” Héctor spoke about the frustration of being dependent on PeruRail, the same entity they are fighting, to take them to Cuzco. Medina heightened Héctor’s concern saying in a semi-serious way, “Getting us to use their train could be a strategy for [getting rid of us] with a bomb.” He seemed willing to entertain the idea that the Peruvian government would not hesitate to blow up the train with all the pueblo activists! Charo could not resist a stab at morbid humor by pretending to be reading a newspaper headline; she played on
the contents of the recent magazine article by pronouncing: “The lunatics of the pueblo are dead.” Their comments, among other things, also exemplify how the privatization of the transportation system in the sanctuary creates a sense of vulnerability that in turn fuels suspicion among Machupicheños.

It seemed as if the heat of the sun had deepened. We felt so hot that we moved the conversation to the church steps where there was some shade. A man dressed in a black suit passed us with briefcase in hand. He looked like the lawyer for Sanctuary Lodge. “Is that him?” they said. Charo suspected that the Sanctuary Lodge must have their own informants in the pueblo, feeding them information on the activities of the mobilizers. Héctor, playing with a stray puppy, but not distracted, advised the group “We need to have strategies in order to fight these people.” As they spoke, Hipólito arrived. “Buenas días,” he said with his deep hoarse voice. Hipólito, generally a good natured and friendly man, was not “hip” to the suspicious and fearful tenor of the group when he made what was seen as an inappropriate joke about Oscar receiving three thousand dollars from the authorities. Charo reacted forcefully, raising her voice. “We can’t make those kinds of jokes because later people start talking, taking it seriously.” Hipólito, somewhat embarrassed, hushed up. Héctor continued to speak like a general. “We need to be careful because we could make ourselves more vulnerable, its better to just move slowly but surely.”

At that moment señor Martin, a police officer from the local Comisaría, paused to ask why we hadn’t taken the train to Cuzco offered by the authorities.
“No, we want to go by helicopter, we’re already bored with the auto-wagon” snickered Charo sarcastically, although in a friendly manner. The Comisario wanted to know what had happened to the authorities they were supposed to meet. Was there a new date for the meeting? Charo explained that they had had enough and didn’t believe they were going to accept another date for yet another month later. José approved. “From here on in we start the strike!”

Chela, seeing us from the opposite side of the plaza sauntered across to join us; she greeted us in her shy fashion. Curious about our assembly, she asked, “What are you guys up to?” At that point the group momentarily lost cohesion as people chatted in separate conversations. Chela spoke privately with Charo. Medina reflected aloud to himself, but also to whoever was in earshot. “It’s that they’re changing the stage on us, and we have to be careful because at the end of the tunnel everything stops.” Héctor spoke as obliquely as Medina, but a bit more concretely. “It’s that they’re making fun of us.” Then, Oscar Valencia appeared. “Buenas días.” Suddenly the group pulled together once more, but so excited at Oscar’s arrival that everyone spoke at once. As it quieted down, Oscar went straight to the topic of the day. He said, “We can no longer believe in the usefulness of talking to any of them. First, we come to an agreement but later when you hold them up to it, they say they ‘don’t know’ anything about it.” Oscar was referring to the INC agreement to lower the entrance fee into the citadel to half price for Peruvian nationals. Despite their agreement, the INC continued to charge the regular twenty-dollar entrance fee.

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124 The Auto-wagon train service is one of PeruRail’s most expensive tourist trains.
He cursed the bureaucracy! “Sofía,” who had been listening all along from her store entrance, approached to give some advice. “It’s not our fault,” she quipped, “it’s an institutional problem; we have to organize ourselves like they did in Arequipa.” She was referring to the way protestors in Arequipa effectively organized themselves against President Toledo’s privatization efforts, as discussed in chapter one.

Oscar pulled the group tighter around him to explain the situation with the authorities. He said that the authorities called him from outside of Cuzco, asking Frente to meet them there because they were going to arrive too late to catch the train to the pueblo. “They wanted us to go to Cuzco by train.” Héctor interjected “But Don Oscar, this is a strategy; they’re trying to tire us out.” Medina again alleged that authorities had more brutal motives: “Maybe it’s an assassination attempt?” They laughed. Oscar played along. He announced, “Yes, and later they’ll say, ‘the thirty five members of Frente dead,’” like Charo, also pretended to be reading a journalistic caption. They continued laughing, but Héctor wore a somber face, reminding them of the recent history of the civil war violence. “Yes, like what happened to those people in Uchuraccay.” He was talking about the 8 journalists killed in the village of Uchuraccay in Ayacucho in 1983, allegedly by campesinos who thought the arriving journalists were Shining Path terrorists. Héctor, like many in Peru, suspected that the campesinos had been deceived by the Peruvian military, or that the military were actually the ones to carry out the assassinations. Oscar agreed. “You see how they killed those eight journalists. It’s that they were a strong opposition to the government, they were making the
government tap dance (zapatear), that’s why they made them ‘disappear.’”

Héctor blamed the army for the deaths, trying to defend ex President Alan García. Apparently, he mistakenly thought the incident happened under García’s regime, whereas it was under the presidency of Fernando Belaúnde. Nevertheless he drifted into a eulogy for García. “If Alan García had been president we would now have had government support because APRA has a populist agenda.” Sofía snapped at Héctor. “No way, with APRA what would we have done, dear God, I suffered enough as a student under Alan García.” “I’m not an APRISTA, I’m an Alanista,” Héctor said as if it were the appropriate qualification to distance his support for García from the negative aspects of the politician’s political party.

The conversation progressed into a discussion over the history of politics and presidents in Peru. Héctor twisted it around an evolutionary theory. The conversation jumped back and forth from the projects of presidents to the meaning of evolution. Oscar claimed that the best president Peru ever had was Juan Velasco, because of his agrarian reform. “With the politics of the agrarian reform, ‘sir you see your land, it’s going to be for the campesinos,’” he said as if talking to a hacendado. Héctor reflected over the agrarian reform and the bitter resentment that followed from the hacendados. For Héctor the agrarian reform was not as successful as in Oscar’s depiction. Héctor explained that hate and resentment over the agrarian reform is still pervasive in Peru, and that racism

125 Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana or APRA is the political party in which Alan García is affiliated.
126 Many in Peru also argue exactly the opposite, that they support APRA but distance themselves from Alan García. I thank Professor Patricia Mathews Salazar for this insight.
persists. He spelled out the history of Peru through a proverb: “La necesidad tiene cara de hereje, es madre de todos los vicios,” (Necessity has the face of a heretic and is mother to all vice), which captured the way the need for money breeds corruption. Héctor viewed Peruvian politics in terms of evolutionary theory, explaining that every evolutionary stage presents its particular necessities and the need for money is the necessity of the current stage. Oscar added that now there are new challenges in the world. He too linked stages of history into an evolutionary schema. “Before there was imperialism and that was fatal; then capitalism came and destroyed our economy; and now the world is globalized.” Chela said in passing, to add to Oscar’s comment “Globalization is the new political economy in fashion.” For Oscar, the solution to the problems created by globalization was to create a political mix of socialism and capitalism. He reasoned that the two by themselves would at best only address a limited set of needs, and at worst create extremes in power or wealth. Oscar maintained that a balance of some kind would form a better system, if only one is willing to combine the most constructive aspects of each. As he argued in numerous meetings with the authorities, he believed it possible to develop a socially responsible capitalism.

Chela moved closer to where I sat. As she listened attentively to what Oscar was saying, I caught her attention and asked her, as if I had never heard the term, what globalization meant. To her globalization is about a thorny relationship of exchange. As she put it, “If you don’t buy from me, I won’t buy from you.” As we spoke, Héctor, standing to one side, continued philosophizing
about evolution, while Oscar tried to speak over his voice saying, “Every day there are more changes.”

The group was hungry and the chiriuchu was ready to be served. We shuffled to the other end of the plaza where they purchased their meal consisting of hen, cuy (guinea pig), corn omelet, fish eggs, cheese, toasted kernels of white corn, q’ochayuyo (a lake version of seaweed), and sausage. Since the meal did not appeal to me I opted not to eat. The gang passed me pieces from their plates, as they criticized me for being such a gringo; I ate. The group picked at their plates savoring each piece, pulling apart the fish eggs with their hands. As the group occupied themselves with their plates, Medina declared, as he ate his cuy, “We need nourishment, Napoleon lost at Waterloo for lack of food. Not to mention that one can’t philosophize without food.” Oscar, added, “Naturally,” and just continued eating.

With the meal finished, the group reconvened on a bench in the Plaza. It was now noon and the plaza was boiling from the heat of the sun. Margot filled glasses of cola for everyone. As the group continued their discussion about rejecting further talks with the authorities, they were still entertaining the hope that the officials might arrive later that day. The Comisario returned. As the town’s regularly posted police official, the Comisario was treated like a friend. Oscar turned to him. As president of Frente he wanted the officer to witness their statement. “We are present,” he declared, “but the authorities have not fulfilled [their part of] the bargain. The pueblo waited until the arrival of the local train,
fulfilling to the end the democracy\textsuperscript{127} of the dialogue. Therefore, señor Comisario
the pueblo has the free reign to conduct a strike. “

“Yes, yes, I’m recording everything,” answered back the Comisario.

Charo felt that the magazine article that portrayed Oscar and the members
of Frente as lunatics now prevented them from conducting a reasonable dialogue
with the authorities. “How dare they say that we are a pueblo of lunatics?” By
calling the mobilizers “crazy” the magazine helped discredit their stand in the
talks. Charo was furious over this depiction. She spoke with determination,
saying, “For that alone we are going to do our talking [to the authorities] with a
stoppage.” However, Chela was hesitant about committing the entire pueblo to a
stoppage; she said she wanted a wider level of pueblo participation before
making the decision.

“God will protect and helps us,” Héctor said to further justify the strike.
Margot responded with a more secular attitude, “Let’s do it once and for all, what
are we waiting for?”

“No more!” a woman cried referring to the maltreatment from the
authorities.

“How dare they kick us around, after one institution failed us, to hell with
everyone else,” shouted Eber.

Medina tried to calm people from the intensifying emotional stances. “We
cannot be passionate,” he declared, “We have to think clearly.” They paid little
mind as Oscar revved-up the group. “Remember neighbors that it’s acceptable

\textsuperscript{127} I am not sure why Oscar uses the word “democracy.” I do not know exactly what he means by it but my interpretation
is that he means to use it similarly to the metaphor of “spirit” as in “the spirit of the dialogue.”
to break from the talks because the authorities did not fulfill their part.” Still, even at this point the group retained some hope that the authorities would arrive late. “Let’s wait another half hour,” Oscar said. He was worried that he would be seen as the person dictating the decisions rather than trying to communicate the “will” of the pueblo; that leadership role might make him legally culpable should something go badly during the stoppage. He wanted the group to demonstrate its position. He asked, “What do we do, do we hold a stoppage?”

The heat was sweltering. Stifled by the sun, the group moved again, this time to a shady area in front of the Centro Cultural. There, Alfredo Serrano, the president of the workers association, and later Raúl and Emilio joined the group. They gathered in a circle speaking all at once. Most seemed resolved to conduct a strike.

Oscar posed a question to the group. “What do we do if the president of CTAR sends a fax asking to reschedule a meeting for Monday or Tuesday?” A cluster of people spoke at once, “No, it’s already too late.” Oscar echoed the response as a question, “So we’re not accepting anymore meetings?” Héctor raised his voice above the others. “No, we no longer want a meeting!” Chela, Héctor’s wife, was again less willing to speak for the pueblo. In a well-composed voice she gave her advice. “Oscar, I suggest that we hold a meeting with at least a majority of the pueblo. We alone can’t make that decision.” Oscar acknowledged Chela’s concern. He grew more worried about being seen as dictating the course of action to the group. He declared, “That’s the reason why I’m consulting you.” Oscar continued, “What happens if now or later the
president or vice minister calls and says ‘Ladies and gentlemen we can’t come, and we ask you for a new date for next week,’ what do I tell them?” Héctor appeared to be of two minds, first saying that they should wait no longer, and now he quickly announced that under those conditions he would be willing to reschedule a meeting. Oscar seemed to look for more resolve and asked, “So we accept a meeting?” Again, there was an avalanche of voices saying “No, No!” José turned to Héctor. Somewhat agitated José said, “Come on Héctor, it’s the fourth time they cancelled.” Chela tried to find a middle ground. “If they call you tell them ‘I don’t know because in the evening we are going to have a meeting.’” Once more a stampede of voices trampled one on top of the other:

“No, that’s it,”

“No, they’ve ridiculed us,”

“What good is it if they’ve already deceived us two or three times?”

Charo agreed with Chela’s viewpoint. “Señor Oscar if they call you, you tell them that we will hold a meeting tonight and the majority of the pueblo will decide whether to accept or not.” Eber went into a homily in “grandstanding” style, declaring his position to all:

“My position is clear,” he said, “Sadly, I believe that time has shown me to be correct. A long time ago when the pueblo was asked ‘people what should we do?’ I gave my position and this man as well,” he turns to the man beside him to get his approval, “right,” and continues, “I believe nothing could be clearer, I speak for myself because I don’t represent any association, I believe that it has already become a joke of extreme [proportions] and for that reason we need to take a much stronger position!”
Oscar, yelled out, asking the group yet again, “How should we respond, because all things considered they are surely going to call saying ‘we arrived late and we want a new meeting on Monday or Tuesday or whenever,’ should we accept or not, should we say ‘enough, we have withdrawn from the talks’ what should we say. Speak out, what should we tell them?”

Eber was annoyed. He hadn’t finished yet:

“From the moment, Don Oscar, that they failed to arrive, because [talking as if he were face to face with the authorities] don’t come here with the story that there are no airplanes, that’s impossible señor!”

Eber continued speaking strongly, “From the moment that they failed to fulfill their part and then ridiculed our pueblo, what kind of dialogue will we have with them.”

Both José and Oscar cut Eber off at his last word and spoke at once; but José was quicker. “That’s it; the talks are broken, already!” Oscar then rose over José’s voice, “What answer should we categorically give them?” Everyone spoke at once trying to get his or her voice heard. Irma, like Charo raised her voice to say she was in agreement with Chela, “That’s why I say the same as Chelita that in a meeting this evening we let the majority decide.” Eber toned down his strong words and agreed as well. “Naturally, a meeting, we can’t just decide ourselves.” José blocked out the presence of the others and spoke directly to Oscar as if he were conversing privately. He said, “Señor Oscar you tell them you know what, the pueblo has broken away from dialogue and in a meeting this evening the pueblo will decide what they want to do.” Upon hearing José, Chela modified his statement. “You have to tell them that they are the ones
who broke the dialogue, and they are to blame.” Oscar agreed, “Of course, they’re the ones at fault.”

Everyone gave his or her advice:

Eber: “Now, another thing, when we begin the stoppage, whatever is done will be agreed upon. To do a stoppage we have to be very practical.”

Chela: “We also have to tell those from the communities [about the stoppage].”

Charo: “Let’s get a megaphone and go around the pueblo calling everyone to a meeting.”

Oscar: “But you have to go [to them] with a clear plan, one idea is that we break from the talks, that is, we’re no longer going to participate, and that involves a general assembly either tonight or tomorrow to see what the pueblo is going to do about this let down [on the part of] the authorities, all right.”

Raúl: “These are delicate matters, now we have to see if people are going to be available this evening with this event going [referring to the chiriuchada party], I don’t think they’re gonna be able.”

 Sofí a: “Tomorrow [Sunday] afternoon should be fine.”

 A few of the men standing next to Sofí a informed her in a matter-of-fact way, “Señora the majority drinks on Saturday night.” Raúl reiterated in a low sheepish voice, “They drink.” Sofí a seemed puzzled, “But this is important, I don’t believe drinking has priority.” “Señora, not everybody thinks in the same way,” José quipped, implying that this is a guy thing. Oscar, apparently sensing a growing disorder and a moving away from the central theme spoke loudly and quickly:
“[H]ere’s the deal, at this time we have the presidents of each association, here we have Wiñay Wayna, here we have the Joyitas, the artisans, we have Frente, the rock cutters, and even the writers. So what seems to be the problem? Why go the long way around when we are open with how we stand?” He continued as if speaking directly to the authorities, “you don’t come to my house to disrespect me, now you can leave; I don’t want to talk to you.’ In order to say that we’re gonna ask [the whole pueblo for consensus?] Come on let’s be frank about it, lets not vacillate, it’s either ‘yes’ or ‘no’ and if we want to go on strike, then let’s do it. I want you to know that Oscar Valencia has never acted alone. We know that even though the authorities showed us a lack of respect and gave us the run around, we never made decisions about anything nor even asked them to talk, we [Frente] always consulted you, the leaders of the associations, and it’s recorded in the minutes that everything we’ve done is according to you, now this is an opportune moment since all the presidents are present so you decide because I can’t be playing around [stresses his voice]. Let’s call for an assembly at around five o’clock. Now I don’t want to sound or appear as if I’m taking control but if we’re gonna break with the dialogue, then we break it and goodbye, you see, no dialogue. So what’s the problem if we tell the [regional] president that we’re gonna take different measures. I want to hear from you.”

Cori was about to speak, but was cut off by Héctor who drowned her out with his deep voice. “I mean, we gotta analyze the whole situation, what kind of support do we have from the masses right now, I mean, here we only have the leaders, so many times when we go on strike the masses don’t show up. If we analyze the situation we can see that [as of yet] there is no widespread support. You know, the last time we mobilized we noticed that only a few people showed up, and that’s a problem.” Oscar responded to Héctor’s skepticism about how wide the support is in the pueblo with a lengthy oration that summarizes the differences in decision-making styles between the Machupicheños and the state authorities:

No, no look, I believe this thing has to be carefully managed. Respected members of the town, how can you say we didn’t summon the masses in support of the last national stoppage? We had at least 90% of the town with us. That shows that we are in fact mobilizing residents. We can’t say that the masses have
abandoned us. In all the meetings we’ve held, our neighbors were present, but we also have to analyze that it’s not the same to analyze with one hundred people as opposed to twenty. [W]hen we deal with too many people we also have to deal with passionate and emotional points of view – we cannot analyze the problem with too many people. Now let me consult you, we’re the leaders, what should we do? Should we decide to call a general assembly for tonight or tomorrow? Now, it’s for the best not to call a generally assembly [to make the decision ourselves] and only inform the rest of the date for the stoppage, because you know, I’m not gonna let the authorities play around with us. They are not fulfilling their promises! [P]lease, give me your opinions and I want you to be frank!

Despite Oscar’s leadership role, what we see here is that no single leader can define the situation in an authoritarian way. Here the decision is tied to the question of whether the leaders of various pueblo associations are sufficient or rather a broad pueblo consensus is necessary for initiating a stoppage. Oscar and Frente’s predicament is strikingly different from the way (as discussed in chapter four) governing authorities can diffuse accountability. This calls attention to the different risks incurred by the different stakeholders. The hierarchy of state representatives is not saddled with the same consensus building techniques, as are the pueblo organizers. What is for Oscar a situation that needs to be carefully managed, a problem of image building for pueblo support, is in terms of policy making on the part of state representatives something far less democratic. To be sure, decision making on the part of state representatives involves building consensus to some degree, but it is concealed from public view. ¹²⁸ Bureaucrats are assigned their offices and desks to which they routinely report regardless of the plans they execute. They have the advantage of giving off few warning signals before they move to action. To this, protestors can only gather clues

¹²⁸ See photo 5 p. 254 as an example, though not a photo of this actual event.
obtained in public locales such as in noticing an increased police presence in the streets after bureaucratic decisions are made. On the other hand, the members of Frente and their supporters are known publicly and therefore Oscar’s attempt at building a pueblo wide consensus further exposes him to scrutiny by authorities and makes him, and associates, vulnerable to being held legally culpable should serious problems arise during the protest. In short, authorities can preserve the element of surprise in ways that resident organizers cannot.

For Oscar, the public nature of building consensus means potentially being identified as “the leader” and labeled “the agitator” in advance to any action (he was already labeled crazy). Oscar is well aware of his position and predicament. He comments:

I want to make it clear that Oscar Valencia is not giving orders to anyone; neither do I want you to think that my opinion is most important. My opinion is just like anyone of you citizens, there is freedom of speech and I believe that on Wednesday the 22nd of May the pueblo should hold a 48 hour stoppage, because you know, we’ve got lots of problems, we’ve got problems with the INC, problems with PeruRail and the same with Sanctuary Lodge and they are thinking ‘these idiots are scared to go on strike.’ We can back up [our words] and go on strike!

And he continues:

But also I want you to understand, and it makes my blood boil over the way these authorities don’t complete [what they say they will], but I have a problem I feel like I’m between two swords, one in front from the pueblo and the other behind me from the authorities and the law, so I can’t just say outright ‘let’s go on strike,’ I have to protect the masses so I have to figure out when it would be justifiable [to go on strike].

Finally, Oscar concludes with what amounts to as the justification for a stoppage:

Right now I can say there is sufficient reason. On March 11 we could have already conducted a stoppage, but we were asked to dialogue and we agreed to talk but we found no solutions so now
we can go ahead with a stoppage with dignity because we have exhausted all other means. Now I ask you why so much beating around the bushes, or is it really necessary to ask everyone in the pueblo. I give you the floor.”

Emilio, standing quietly listening to everything that was going on, spoke for the first time, in a low soft voice. “Let’s go on strike once and for all, why do we have to tolerate so much? A resounding “yes,” came in near unity from the crowd.

Again, many people in the group spoke at the same time, and it was hard for anyone to hear anyone else. Héctor raised his voice high above the others so as to make them listen. He criticized the lazy way stoppages and strikes were carried out in the past. He complained about how stoppages were only carried out for a couple of hours and then it was business as usual, but before Héctor could finish a myriad of voices burst out, but I could only capture them in fragments:

“…We did the same two years ago when we held a stoppage…”

“…Like on the fifth of February…”

“Señor Oscar, there is…”

“…All day,”

“…Transportation and everything,”

“…The people, damn it, the people have stopped believing in us,”

Sofía stepped forward to speak. “Go ahead señora,” came from Oscar. Sofía spoke in a gentle but concerned voice that expressed an opposing position on the decision to strike. She reminded them of where the power really lies, namely the laws that make it possible to take legal action leading to prosecution
and jail terms against protestors who block the roads. “I believe that maybe we should take a different approach, a little more intelligent.” Before she could finish numerous voices quickly jumped out against her, again to me they took shape in the form of fragments:

Regina: “But how are we supposed to know…”

Eber: “…the same approach we used on the fifth.”

Héctor: “…just like the other residents, that don’t support us because they come here only to rent out shops and make money.”

Someone said: “…We have to get everyone to participate.”

Another: “Of course, but maybe…”

“In our final hour, after all we’ve been through, we’re gonna get scared?”

“…How many laws have [the authorities] themselves broken?”

Sofía got defensive saying, “I’m not defending this government. I’m just letting you know.” They all spoke at her at once, but one woman could be heard above the rest by her pungent and sarcastic voice, saying, “We already know.” Sofía attempted to reply, but she appeared flabbergasted and was not making much sense “…because one talks, and says ‘yes,’ there should, but you know, and later, later they back down…”

Just at that moment Oscar received a call on his cell phone. The ruckus quieted down. “Yes, yes, right now I’m in the plaza,” Oscar hung up. Chela approached him directly. “We have to get the word out to the communities, right? So they can support the stoppage as well.” Oscar perhaps still somewhat distracted from his call, gave her a concurring but unconvincing nod and started
speaking. “So neighbors, what’s it gonna be? If we go on strike we have to form committees and arrange the pickets so we can succeed in getting our message across, because all things considered, they have their own strategies. We need to do this by Wednesday or we won’t have enough time to organize and notify the press.”

The group wanted the Comisario to take a formal statement of their decision; one of them ran to the station to call him back. As they waited for the Comisario, Oscar went over the reasons for conducting the strike with the others. “Look, the INC has agreed to a resolution and we can’t believe that the director has not sent the orders from Cuzco to Machu Picchu, and after fifteen days they continue to charge twenty dollars when they should be charging only ten. We can’t believe that Jasmine does not have the power to order the [sales people] on the train not to sell sweaters and stuff. So then what agreements and resolutions are we talking about? Well, if it’s a fight they want, then let’s give them a fight! They’ll attack Oscar Valencia. They’ll take it all out on Oscar Valencia, I also want you all to think about that, I’m sure that maybe on Wednesday they could take legal action against me, but I’m not going to be afraid of that. I’M NOT AFRAID! But if we want to organize well, we have to talk to the different sectors; we have to tell them that there’s going to be a strike for this and that reason and they should all sign the logbook of acts and minutes. But there is one thing, yesterday they called to say they’re not coming because of problems with the flights; additionally to have a train available for us to go to Cuzco.”
Oscar schooled the others on what should be taken as the official line, “Oscar Valencia summoned the presidents and informed them of their petition, but the associations decided not to go, they said, ‘we’re not going,’ right? I then informed the Inka regional government and I said, ‘Señor, we don’t want to come…you have to come here,’ and that’s it!”

As Oscar finished, Sofía wanted to be heard. Oscar called on her to speak. Sofía was still playing the devil’s advocate, trying to look at the situation from the other side. “One small thing, it’s true that it rained hard in Cuzco yesterday, maybe they do have a good reason, it was raining and they were endangered by bad weather.” Oscar interrupted, “No, today was their flight.” Sofía responded in a manner that apparently expressed doubt, but was too intimidated to pursue it further. “Oh, it was for today.” Her doubt was in a way well founded. If the officials could not travel the day before because of inclement weather, they would be forced to take a flight in the morning, which is what they did, but not in time to catch the morning train to Machu Picchu. According to Oscar, the authorities arrived in Cuzco at 11am. Based on the train schedule, the best they could have done was to arrive on the local night train and stay over for the next day. The authorities opted not to do that. Nevertheless, they did have options, and the main point being that it was upon them to come to the pueblo not the other way around. In more tranquil times the protestors would have accommodated them, but this was “the straw that broke the camel’s back.”

Oscar finally wanted to know if the decision to strike was fine with all of them. Almost everyone agreed, but Sofía expressed some hesitancy, since not
all the leaders of the associations were present. She was reluctant to decide without including wider participation saying, “Now another thing, shouldn’t every group representative ask their constituents to vote?” Raúl addressed her in a frustrated voice. “If we’ve given them one truce, then another truce, the plane didn’t arrive, the rain, enough already, the cry of strike has already been made.” And somebody added, “It’s about time.” Raúl continued, “We’ve been deceived too many times, we now have to go ahead with the pueblo’s decision to strike.”

With Raúl’s statement, the decision to strike once and for all became finalized. To make it official they called the Comisario Señor Martin to take their statement. They decided that the strike/stoppage would be held on the 29th of May.

_The Breakdown:_

One of the most attention-grabbing aspects of the above incident is the way fear and uncertainty is expressed through recollections of the civil war era against Shining Path and other historical events. Conservation problems are not just a question of conflicting heritage meanings nor of the global relationships in which people are embroiled. The participants express a thorough distrust of the state, and conservation efforts are seen as an extension of the motivation for that distrust, and relate their current struggles against the effects of neoliberalism with past state violence.

While Shining Path terrorized many civilians, the government also incorporated similarly brutal tactics, and was responsible for many of the civilian deaths, thus magnifying the atmosphere of fear throughout Peru (Poole and
With state activities couched in secrecy and the population under the constant surveillance of police forces, people endured general roundups of demonstrators and arbitrary detentions. Popular leaders and particularly members of left-wing organizations were arrested, tortured and/or killed (ibid.). As Poole and Renique describe it “[T]housands of people suffered systematic police harassment and arbitrary detention; journalists, lawyers, and relatives of alleged subversives were executed, arrested, or disappeared” (2003: 3).

What we see in Machu Picchu is that decision making on the part of the above protestors is marked by the presence of this history. What these Machupicheños try to come to grips with is the fact that Machu Picchu is of vital importance to the state, and that they in this relationship are disposable. The suspicion that the move to Cuzco was a plot, the remarks about being eliminated or arrested along with the morbid humor about the assassination of the “crazy” members of Frente, all reflects awareness that the government will see their intentions as too transgressive. It suggests that there is a sense among the participants that a “critical distance” between permissible activity and justification for violence has been breached. By initiating a stoppage, they would bring an important moneymaking engine of the government and private interests to a halt, not to mention attract negative media attention. For that reason it was necessary through their conversations and interactions to advance the rationale that it was the authorities that broke the spirit of the talks, not they. The position that the protestors have as residents of the Pueblo of Machu Picchu is reminiscent of
how Poole describes the use of national identification cards in Peru as both a source of “vulnerability” and “guarantee” that one’s identity would not be construed by authorities as an enemy of the state (2004: 36). Analogous to Poole’s analysis of the identity card, the idea of what lies “between threat and guarantee” can be used to describe the position the Machupiccheños have because of the unique geography of the pueblo (ibid: 37). The pueblo is the bottleneck of tourism in Peru that the tourism industry cannot bypass. The protestors could bring tourism to a halt, and so they have the clout to elicit a degree of cooperation on the part of the authorities. However, the use of that power makes for a very fragile circumstance; the Machupicheños believe that not far behind the appearance of cooperation lies the willingness of authorities to use violence to rid themselves of a problematic population.

Finally, in many quarters throughout Peru, one hears the expression “Machu Picchu is the hen that lays the golden egg for Peru.” The state, business interests, intellectuals and labor, have banked their hopes on a kind of “El Dorado.” Strong is the sense that a single resource could do so much for individual interests and the nation. Many Machupicheños are not so different in this regard, but they do live there and that prompts a fair amount of hesitation and criticism from many other Peruvians, “What are they doing there,” or even “what right do they have to be there” are common questions. In fact, outside of Cuzco and the regional area, many Peruvians I have encountered are surprised to learn that people actually live in the Sanctuary, or that it traverses a political
district. The negative press coverage helped to discredit the protestor’s cause by framing them as irrational, and as holding back national progress.

*The Stoppage:*

On the morning of the stoppage about thirty protestors, mostly Frente and their close supporters, gathered at the juncture between the train tracks and the bus road that leads to the citadel. The rows of artisan stands along the road, normally filled with ceramics, t-shirts and other cloth goods, were then bare, appearing as wooden skeletons. The artisans/vendors arrived, carrying plastic bottles, partially filled with pebbles, to use as rattles. Eber beat his drum and sounded the pututu (sea shell horn); they chanted:

¡*El pueblo unido jamás será vencido!*  
(The people united will never be defeated)

The crowd grew quickly to about seventy people as they made their way along the train tracks inspecting whether the restaurants were closed in support of the stoppage. The train platform, usually rammed with chairs, tables and bustling with tourists looking for a meal were vacant. The group settled across from the PeruRail ticket office, and as the crowd continued to grow so did the police presence.

¡*El pueblo está luchando, la mafia está robando!*  
(The people are fighting, the mafia is robbing)

The protestors stayed within the legal requirements by notifying the regional authorities of their stoppage. At the same time PeruRail had pressured the Cuzco Prefect to terminate the stoppage, but the prefect refused their request invoking the residents’ constitutional right to protest. PeruRail appeared to
comply with the stoppage, suspending arrival and departure services. Nevertheless on the day of the protest they had scheduled a 5 pm departure train. Was this an act of provocation? How could the protestors stop the train without blocking the tracks and hence breaking the law? Police in riot gear took up positions behind the train yard fence.

¡El pueblo se defiende, el pueblo no se vende!
(The people are to defend, the people are not for sale)

Oscar spoke over the megaphone to inform the crowd of the national media interest in their protest. He noted the hypocrisy of PeruRail changing the schedule even as they informed media sources of their support and willingness to cooperate with the Machupicheños. Oscar declared that if the state authorities did not contact them with resolutions they would continue the stoppage indefinitely. People shook their rattles, beat their drums, sounded the pututu, and held up banners against privatization, some which read: “La Lucha contra Privatización” and “Basta de privatización que nos está matando de hambre.” The participants commenced a march through the pueblo, with police tagging behind. Raúl took over the megaphone:

¡Esta es, aquí está, la respuesta popular!
(This is it, here it is, the people’s uproar)

They circled the pueblo, pausing momentarily in various locations to speak of abuses. One such pause was above the pueblo near the entrance to the hot springs. Here different people took turns with the megaphone talking of mistreatments by Orient Express and other problems of the pueblo. On the way down and through the central plaza, about 200 people descended like a long snake (see photo 6 p. 255).
Again they passed the PeruRail office. Protestors defiantly swung the signal chord, ringing the bell meant for incoming trains. Now back on the road to the Citadel the group encountered a line of police wearing helmets and riot gear.

The protestors marched forward. The police stayed firm, batons in hand. The protestors continued. The police buttressed their formation. The protestors got closer. The police stared ahead with hard faces. I marched fairly close to the front, but hesitated and backed off fearing arrest. The others were unrelenting, as the two groups were now face to face. I am not certain about what happened next, but the tension was released, either by command or established orders of the day, when the police parted and let the group pass.

Although the protestors were at least a good kilometer away from the Citadel, and in the valley below it, the police were preventing them from going in that direction. Apparently, the police surrendered the path only when it was clear the protestors were not attempting to bring their demonstration to the ruins of Machu Picchu. Nevertheless surrounded by police on all sides, the protestors walked only a few meters more until Oscar stopped them and pointed to the location where Orient Express once planned to build a cable car to carry tourists up to the Citadel, hence bypassing local bus services.

The protestors were determined not to let the 5pm train depart, but Oscar warned them not to block the train or the tracks. They set up their demonstration at the train yard, but only on the sides of the track. Not long after the protestors settled at the train yard the comisario arrived with word that a tourist had fallen
from a path on Mt. Huayna Picchu and needed to be medically evacuated as
soon as possible to the hospital either in Cuzco or Urubamba. Oscar and the
comisario rushed over to the medical station, others myself included, followed
closely behind. There, a young Irish tourist lay strapped to a stretcher to
immobilize her back from further injury. Oscar assured her in competent English
that everything possible would be done to get her to a hospital; he assured her
that there would be no resistance against a departing train. Oscar also
personally assured the police as well as PeruRail that an emergency train wagon
would be met with no resistance on the part of the protestors. Back at the train
yard gate Oscar instructed the crowd of the situation, and they complied, further
clearing the area of banners that might be taken as a blockage. Yet PeruRail
delayed evacuation for over an hour. At one point a French Canadian woman,
the tour coordinator for the injured party’s tour group, approached the protestors
with police from the opposite side of the train yard fence. Looking rather pale in
the face, she appealed to the protestors to please not block the train as her client
was in need of urgent medical assistance. The demonstrators looked at her
somewhat dumbfounded as they had never intended to block the train, and close
to an hour had gone by from the time they assured authorities that the train
would have free passage because of the emergency. Suspicions grew among
the protestors especially when it was discovered that some tourists were
beginning to congregate a quarter of a mile down the tracks. The crowd grew
skeptical believing that PeruRail was trying to take advantage of the situation. As
they became more impatient, Oscar tried to calm them down saying that they
should not allow themselves to be provoked by PeruRail. It appeared to the
crowd that PeruRail was intentionally misinforming the tour coordinator in stating
that the protestors were not permitting the train to pass.\textsuperscript{129}

By chance I encountered the coordinator some two weeks after the
incident, and approached her for her account. Although I had somewhat
expected she would express hostilities at the protestors, this was not the case.
She and her tour group felt that the problem with the delay was caused by
PeruRail’s unwillingness to send out an otherwise empty train because of the
cost. She was infuriated over the fact that Company representatives tried to get
the injured tourist and members of her group to sign an affidavit stating that the
delay was the fault of the protestors even before the medical situation was
stabilized, but nobody signed. Despite the fact that few if anyone had privilege to
all the details as the event occurred, the commander of the riot police\textsuperscript{130} had
already made up his mind about who was to blame. As the injured tourist was
placed onto the train, the commander faced Oscar with arms folded, head turning
and eyes rolling. Oscar assured him that the passage had been absolutely clear
and that PeruRail was at fault for the delay. The commander moved closer to
Oscar, finger pointed at him, and said as he parted company, “You are
responsible,” (Ustedes son responsables).\textsuperscript{131} It was a rare sight to see Oscar

\textsuperscript{129} Video recordings provide evidential documentation of the protestors’ lawful response from the moment Oscar was
informed of the accident, his prompt reaction as well as the residents clearing the train track area so as not to appear to
be blocking the passage of the train.
\textsuperscript{130} Not to be confused with the comisario.
\textsuperscript{131} The statement was largely made in the context of a warning should there be any medical ramifications to the injured
tourist on account of the delay. The issue was evidentially dismissed as it became clear that the tourist’s medical
condition was stabilized.
appear sheepish and worried, but Regina and other women were less intimidated as they declared the commander had no right to speak to them in that tone and manner.

**Concluding Remarks:**

Certainly the state is not a monolithic entity but its agents often act in contradictory ways; one element of the government can uphold the right to protest as another element is involved in repressing it. In placing much more weight on economic freedom, neoliberal principles offers a way for governing officials of handling political dissent. When resources are privatized the state removes itself as arbitrator of those resources, turning political dissent into an attack against the private property of others rather than a dispute with the state’s role in creating inequality. The confrontation between state forces and the residents makes apparent the potential that privatization has to politically dispossess. The people-power the residents have, to create change, is based on their unique situation to stop the flow of tourism, and bring the tourism economy to a standstill. State authorities will tend to negotiate, since any brutal display of force on their part would run the risk of damaging the commercial image of Machu Picchu as a symbol of man in harmony with nature. Indeed, just a few hours into the stoppage the authorities called Oscar on his cell phone, appealing to Frente to reenter negotiations; they rescheduled a meeting for just two days later. However, if the state were to allow Orient Express and their affiliates to build a cable car, they would undercut townsfolk from the process of moving
tourists through Machu Picchu. This would disadvantage the Machupicheños economically, as well as politically because it would remove a crucial bargaining tool, the ability to stop traffic.

Frente met with the authorities in Cuzco just a couple of days after the stoppage. They mustered the support of most of the townsfolk, leaving the pueblo virtually empty as hundreds joined in a spectacular march through the streets of Cuzco and on to the regional office. The problems in Machu Picchu had by then received a great deal of media attention, even prior to the stoppage and so many of the city spectators were familiar with the context of the march. As can be expected, one could hear a diversity of commentaries among the spectators: “The people of Machu Picchu are too tranquil, they don’t know how to protest”; “The people of Machu Picchu are always causing problems with tourism”; and other off-the-cuff variations of “the people are right or wrong.”

Despite the elaborate display of the march, the upshot of the meetings was that the authorities had few decisions and provided the protestors with no resolutions to their problems. Nevertheless, they arranged for the leaders of the protest to move discussions up the administrative hierarchy and set meetings with authorities at the national offices in Lima. Frente would have to pay for their travel expenses. This meant that the mobilizers would have to raise more funds, and more important, once in Lima they would be cut off from the mass support they had either in the pueblo or Cuzco. At this point we turn attention to the net consequence of the production of blame in the process of dispossession under neoliberalism, that is, insecurity.
Living in a State of Insecurity:

This last chapter will examine the outcome of the protests, and focus more on the internal relationships between members of the mobilization and other pueblo residents in the aftermath of protests and meetings with authorities. After the stoppage described in the last chapter, and throughout the month of June 2002, news about anti-privatization riots in the City of Arequipa filtered into the Pueblo of Machu Picchu. The media showed images of protestors hurling rocks at the police. Two people were killed in the clashes and a state of emergency was declared. There was a two-day national stoppage in support of Arequipa and the fight against privatization. In Cuzco, as in Arequipa, a few protestors started a hunger strike in the Plaza de Armas.

However, in Machu Picchu no demonstration was planned. In a pueblo meeting Oscar explained why he had not organized a stoppage in support of the national protest. Oscar, as he had done so often in the past, took on the role of organizer, swaying the other Machupicheños away from participating in the national stoppage against privatization. He told the group that their current struggles against PeruRail and Sanctuary Lodge were local problems, problems that should stay within the confines of the pueblo. In effect, it was the first time since the pueblo protests began that an argument was made to separate their struggle from the wider anti-privatization movements taking place across the country. Oscar’s rationale did have a broader political context beyond the local politics of “place.” His decision was based on his interpretation of the political
figures behind the national stoppage and their motives. Oscar’s position was that
the Toledo government was floundering under the pressure of all the anti-
privatization protests taking place on a national level, and he felt the government
might be on the verge of collapse. It was his opinion that this would benefit ex-
president Alan Garcia and his APRA political party. He believed members of
APRA were manipulating parts of the protest in order to take advantage of the
situation and even possibly to carry out a coup. Oscar favored neither Garcia nor
the possibility of a coup in Peru; he described Garcia as a dictator. Oscar had on
occasion voiced his support for Perú Posible, President Toledo’s political party.
Whether Garcia was plotting a coup is difficult to know, but what is clear is that
Oscar made apparent the influence of his own party politics in his efforts to
challenge privatization in Peru. Despite Toledo’s privatization push, Oscar
apparently chose to support his party rather than one he opposes, despite its
anti-privatization stance. Oscar’s position illustrates one possible rationale
explaining why, as David Harvey contends, local mobilizations “constantly
intermingle” with broader political movements, but despite the need for
organizing on a larger level, often break from them as well (Harvey 2001: 191).

However, the protestors in Machu Picchu were nonetheless busy given
that they were preparing to go to Lima to meet directly with the highest levels of
governing authorities, (as discussed in the last chapter). Since I supported the
pueblo protests, I was asked by the participants to join them in the Lima meeting.
The request that I attend was centered on the concern for appearing more
convincing to the Lima authorities. As Héctor said in a town meeting, “I suggest
Pellegrino go to Lima so that the authorities know that not only campesinos live here, and moreover so they know that there is a North American who will tell his country about the injustices that happen here.” What we see in this comment is how race and class in Peru is vividly part of the production of credibility. It expresses the experiences of many serranos that to be white, North American and from a small rural town is to be either more believable to authorities, or as less dismissible, or both. However, as it turned out, the meeting was postponed, and since the new date conflicted with my own departure schedule I was not able to attend, hence leaving the outcome of the confrontation with the Lima authorities ethnographically suspended. Nevertheless, prior to departure, the protestors’ plan of action faced two immediate problems: first, there was a question as to how many would travel, and second, the cost; both were interconnected. Both of these issues subsequently posed a larger problem of maintaining credibility among the general population of the pueblo.

While Machupicheños struggle to make sense of the power relations that they are confronting, they are also forced to confront their own contradictions. While they oppose large big money corporations, the majority of townsfolk own commercial enterprises ranging from street vendors to mid-level family owned businesses; it is no surprise that they want market opportunities. Many criticize big business on the basis of its size and power, using terms like “monster” to distinguish them from their own participation in the economy; even so, many have their own growth aspirations. The protestors may be against neoliberal privatization policies, but most are not against the market economy, or for that
matter the state. In fact, in meetings with the authorities Oscar had said that they “welcome private investments in Peru.” People differ in just exactly what role capitalism should have in their lives, and take different positions on the idea of a free market economy. Recall that for Oscar, investments are fine as long as capitalism is socially responsible. And as he stated in the last chapter, he calls for an economy that is a sort of social capitalism.

In separate events, Margarita and Chela, as they prepared for the trip to Lima, provide different perspectives on questions about the nature of their protest: when will the struggle have an end? To what degree should one’s individual economic interests be subordinated to such a protracted struggle? What is the ultimate goal of the protest? Where are its limits?

*Credibility:*

In a small gathering at Margarita’s hotel, Frente members and some of the leaders of the pueblo associations discussed their plans for Lima. Margarita overconfidently read aloud her email communications with Mr. Lorenzo Souza, President of Orient Express in Peru. Mr. Souza had asked Margarita for Frente’s travel itinerary to Lima when they were to meet with the authorities. He invited her to have dinner with him upon her arrival in Lima. Margarita declined the invitation on account of a conflict of interests, but she informed him of the date and time of their arrival, and said Frente as a group could meet with him. She asked if he could arrange a meeting with the prominent members of Lima’s

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132 While Mr. Lorenzo Souza is often referred to in Machu Picchu as the President of Orient Express in Peru, it is not entirely clear that that is his position. Mr. Souza is President of Peruval Corp. S.A. a Peruvian company in partnership with Orient Express.
tourism industry with the purpose of promoting the restaurants and hotels of Machu Picchu. The group reacted strongly against her for asking favors from a man with whom they are fighting and against whose company they are protesting. Margarita defended her actions saying that they thought too negatively, demonizing everyone. “But why is everything satanized, everything exaggerated.”

Locally, credibility can be built in different ways. As Margarita's example shows, credibility can also be lost. Moreover, losing credibility by some provides opportune moments for others to build it. Oscar objected to Margarita’s action. After listening to what was being said, he jumped into the conversation. “Look you can’t trust these people, what they’re trying to do is to encroach in any way possible; for them everything is about money, they don’t understand that what we want is that they don’t do business at the entrance of the Sanctuary, and that they come down [from the citadel] and compete with the pueblo.” Oscar gave an account of how the Sanctuary Lodge once offered to provide him with an office for Frente in their hotel. Oscar said he rejected their offer. “I already know the talk, eventually you’ll learn also that, excuse me for the vulgar comment, ‘the mouth eats and the ass pays.’” The others broke out laughing at this remark. The idiomatic expression conveyed the notion that Orient Express was only using Margarita, and the present offer would have later reprisals. In contrast, by emphasizing that he did not take an offer, Oscar’s story can be seen as an attempt to build credibility on his part.
On the other hand, Margarita was put in the position of trying to “save face.” She retorted defensively, “No, no you don’t understand, the only thing I want is to take advantage of his offer and his willingness to speak to us.” The group, however, was concerned about the class realities between the townsfolk and Orient Express. Oscar jumped back, “You can never confide in them because in the first place they are at another economic level, they don’t care about being on good terms with the pueblo, that’s only their strategy and they know from where to penetrate.” Oscar continued, “We’re never going to be at their level, you have to understand that.” “It’s true Marga,” Marina said, ‘the mouth eats and the behind pays,” softening up Oscar’s more vulgar phrasing. “It’s that we are fighting against them and if they do us any favors we are going to be obligated to them. Regina agreed, “Its better not to owe anyone anything!”

Nevertheless, Margarita still resisted. “But I’m only responding [to Sousa’s email] because he has the desire to be on good terms with the pueblo.” Surprised at Margarita’s excuse, Regina pointed out that he was getting information from her. “You have to be careful,” Oscar said to the group, but directed his warning more specifically at Margarita. Margarita continued to defend her position, “But what I want is that he [Mr. Boyen, Director of Sanctuary Lodge] integrate himself into the [hotel and restaurant] association.” The others, jolted by her statement, responded with “are you crazy” and comments to that effect. Margarita stubbornly stood fast to her position. She exclaimed in her defense, “You see everything as evil.” Oscar spoke in a calmer voice, “Look Marga, what you’ll realize is that after he’s integrated into your association, little
by little he’ll get you removed as president and then he’ll be in charge, leaving you with neither space nor vote.” Margarita seemed discouraged, and said, “What are we going to do, fight against them forever? I don’t want to fight for all my life.”

Oscar emphasized the different socio-economic levels between themselves and Orient Express. “The big are big and the small are small.” Oscar recounted the history of the tourist agencies in Cuzco. When the large agencies of Lima and elsewhere entered the tourist associations of Cuzco, they ended up taking over the industry. Marina echoed Oscar, “The big are never going to be part of us little ones, and they are never going to be part of the pueblo.” Margarita still argued against them, “Why such resentment? If we don’t unite we’re never going to achieve anything, for the rest of our lives we’re going to be in one fight after another.” Oscar pondered over the postures of the big companies. “What would demonstrate support from these big companies? If Orient Express and PeruRail were friends [with the pueblo] they would say ‘I want to be respectful and add another train wagon for the porteadores, but no, they say ‘I’ll put in another wagon if I’m exempt from taxes.” Margarita now pushed the group to the edge and tried to defend PeruRail, or perhaps she was just trying to make the others see the issues from a different perspective. “It’s the [Cuzco tourism] agencies that are at fault,” she said. The group went up in arms, “No, no, the one who doesn’t want to cooperate is PeruRail. If Lorenzo Souza was friendly he would have stopped the commercial activity around Sanctuary Lodge,” said Oscar in an irritated voice and continued, “for some time now we
have been struggling and he has not supported us. He still says he wants to join the pueblo, but [just getting] together with the Lima tourism agencies, what kind of cooperation is that? Our main issue here is that they stop selling goods by the Citadel!” In a comment that expressed class relations within the pueblo, Regina warned Margarita by addressing her by her association role rather than a member of Frente. “You don’t ask them for anything, Hotel and Restaurant Association!” Margarita stayed cool and held to her position. “I’m only taking advantage of his offer,” she said. Regina then chastised her for supporting PeruRail and Sanctuary Lodge. She declared, “You’re putting down the pueblo and making them out to be good.” The group remained strongly at odds with Margarita’s attitude. Oscar concluded, “In the end [the directors of PeruRail and Sanctuary Lodge] are employees with tasks to complete, all the decisions are made elsewhere.” The comment illustrates his frustrations dealing with the convoluted nature of corporate decision-making, and the different class positions in the Sanctuary. It was tongue in cheek remark that expressed an allied sentiment for the opponent who, like they, were just cogs in the wheel of the global economy.

In contrast to Margarita, Chela, the president of an artisan association provides a different take on the pueblo struggle and the position about what their goals should be. Later that same day, Chela chastised the members of her artisan association for not getting more involved in the struggles, as well as not helping enough to prepare a position for the Lima meetings. For Chela, the protests involved a much greater willingness to engage in a long-term struggle.
In a loud and angry voice, which was highly unusual for the soft-spoken Chela, she said:

Everything is tourism, for me it’s an embarrassment to say that we only live from tourism….It’s embarrassing to hear the gringos say that ‘this pueblo lives on my money.’ Do you think other pueblos like Arequipa survive only by tourism, I don’t think so! We too [like Arequipa] have to fight; maybe do a hunger strike….Give our children self esteem. When will we stop begging Sanctuary Lodge? Now, this meeting was to hand out the photo IDs and only for that reason you all have come. That’s exactly why are criticized [referring to comments made by people in Cuzco on the tameness of the Machu Picchu protests]. They say that we live right next to the hydroelectric plant and we have not done anything against its privatization….Do you want your children to be like us, struggling for the rest of their lives against companies that have so much money? Already our children don’t want to study; all they want to do is business. There is no spirit of overcoming. No spirit of excellence. For how long are we going to be hanging on to the tourists just waiting for the high season? My companions, let’s search for alternatives!

Chela’s criticism largely fell on deaf ears. Despite her different stance compared to Margarita, she too can be seen to lose a degree of credibility. Just as Margarita subordinated her role in Frente to her interests as president of the Hotel and Restaurant Association, Chela blurred the boundaries between her political principles, and her role as president of the Artisan Association. As we have seen, people’s social positions begin to conflict with protest demands. What, if not promote the sale of artisan products, is the president of the Artisan Association supposed to do? It appeared that the longer protestors continued to fight on behalf of the pueblo, the more they began to lose popular support. Neither can one easily fault the artisans for wanting to take care of business. Many are in financial hardship and need to secure their own livelihoods.

The comparison of these two prominent women of the pueblo is not meant to praise or criticize one over the other; both participated tirelessly in demonstrations, and in courageously challenging the authorities. Margarita and
Chela both looked at the same social horizon but invoked different futures. For Margarita the question was how long could they continue to engage in protests, for Chela, it was long could they hold back. For Margarita the goal of the protest is more akin to opening opportunities to do big business, and metaphorically speaking, to “run with the wolves.” Chela’s, on the other hand, conveys much more of a social vision of change, of searching for alternatives to the status quo. The point is that different people saw their protest as having different ends, and different ends produce different responses from different audiences. The maintenance of credibility by the protest leaders is more complicated than simply winning the approval of residents in the way of “us,” the Machupicheños, versus “them,” the corporate and governmental elite. What we see here is that these two women are faced with the difficulty of building credibility in one context only to lose it in another. As implied by the reaction of Chela’s audience, were other Machupicheños or protest supporters also beginning to lose conviction in the cause, the leadership, or both -- or were people simply tiring out?

The members of Frente as well as the presidents of the various pueblo associations went house to house collecting money from the townsfolk to help pay for the expenses of going to Lima; some gave but many did not. As they sat in Margarita’s hotel lounge, Marina grumbled that people didn’t want to contribute, and this brought forth complaints about the ungratefulness of some Machupicheños. The problem of money and the question of who would go to Lima raised issues that strained the credibility of the protestor’s intentions among other residents. Some of the members of Frente were concerned that if only a
small number of protestors, largely those from Frente, went to Lima, other
Machupicheños might take it as an indication that they were given kickbacks.
The dilemma became evident when Oscar suggested that the limited budget
might suffice if only he and Raúl made the trip. Other members of Frente, like
Marina, strongly spoke against that idea. In order to sustain a proper image,
representatives of the associations had to be present. Marina insisted that the
artisan merchants would hold Oscar under a cloud of suspicion should the results
of the meetings not turn out as expected. “It’s that I know my women,” she said,
now playing her other role as president of one of the artisan associations rather
than as a member of Frente.

In a later meeting with a larger group of association leaders and pueblo
supporters, the question of travel money turned into an inquiry into the credibility
of the Frente members handling the money. People in the group seemed to
have doubts over the motives of Frente and the destiny of their funds. A voice
came from somewhere in the group. It expressed a kind of interrogating
curiosity. A man wanted to know what happened to the money [for hiring a
lawyer] raised in the “pollada” (discussed in the introduction). He asked, “What
did you do with the money from the pollada? Because,” he continued, “bad
rumors are circulating in the pueblo.” He was talking about rumors that the
money raised was misappropriated. Oscar countered the accusations by
saying that the money was used for a study by a lawyer in resolving the problem
of property titles and also for helping those from the community of Ccollpani in
getting theirs. He, as well as campesinos of Ccollpani, saw getting property titles
as an urgent issue, since there were institutional reports about expanding the Sanctuary and incorporating Ccollpani, the only district community now outside the Sanctuary, within its boundaries; that would mean that the property of Ccollpani residents would be subject to expropriation in a similar fashion to rest of the district. Though some contributors might have charged Oscar for not consulting the group on how the money should be spent, Oscar’s response seemed to quell accusations. Evidently the primary concern was on Oscar’s moral not administrative credibility. The point however is that suspicions were starting to be directed inward and the protest energy was starting to fragment. Moreover, a greater sense of fear began to affect the protestors.

_Fear:_

That day Marina recounted a story to the Frente group of what her artisan friends had overheard. Marina and a few other women had been in an artisan meeting. After the discussion the women left by way of the plaza. According to Marina two of her colleagues had spotted the lawyer for Sanctuary Lodge, the lawyer for PeruRail and the Finnish representative for Programa Machu Picchu who was present at the Cuzco meeting. These three men were sitting on benches in the plaza. As the women walked past them they overheard part of the conversation. The women heard one of the men state, “These people like to annoy and now that we’ve decided to go to Lima, over there they’re going to see, we’re going to give them what they like, now they’re going to know who we really are.”
Marina said that when she was told this, she was stunned; this event scared her. She said, “The moment they informed me, I started to get scared. I doubted whether I should travel to Lima. God knows what they will do to us there. That’s why we have to travel in a group, we can’t send Oscar alone.” Regina, upon hearing this, felt they should seek more trustworthy support from kin. Oscar claimed that at least two congressmen were on their side giving them support. Regina was not convinced, and expressed a lack of trust in the political help. For Regina, family support was more reliable. For greater protection, she wanted Machupicheños with family in Lima to notify them so they too can join the arriving party. “Yes, yes we have to call on all our friends,” Marina said. The women spoke about sending Oscar separately by airplane, because if they traveled by bus as a group it might be sabotaged. Additionally, as noted in the last chapter, they also joked nervously about avoiding travel with Oscar, since he was supposedly the main person they would be after. However, Marina was not joking, she was scared, and her tone of voice was serious. “It’s not easy to participate in these fights. We have family. We abandon many things for leading [the protests]. We risk our lives and sometimes our people don’t give us support, no recognition. For example, they don’t want to lend a hand and help us with [raising money].”

Later that evening, Don Teófilo related the trip to Lima to an event that occurred in 1964, when Emiliano Huamantica, the Peruvian Communist party leader, as well as a noted Cuzco labor leader, died, along with fourteen others.

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133 Cuzco Congressman Adolfo Latorre Lopez of the Peru Posible Party & Cuzco Congressman Daniel Estrada Perez of the Union por el Peru Party
when his bus plunged over a mountainside. According to Teófilo, many believed that the government had assassinated him for his politics. Hearing this, Marina was convinced that as many people as possible should go to Lima; at least two representatives per group. She added, in reference to danger and security, “As a strategy, we have to tell them that Oscar is traveling alone by air, and then we all show up [together].” Rosa was being reflective. She spoke in a serious tone of voice, “Now we can’t be putting people’s lives at risk, we have to face reality, we live in a country that offers no guarantees. It’s best if we travel in a group. Let me tell you people that the other day a resident told me that Souza wanted to get a group [from the pueblo] to go to Lima without Oscar. He told me that Souza said “Why are you following Oscar like little lambs?”

And Danger:

Shortly before the trip to Lima, the Alcalde held a meeting in the Municipio to form a committee for Civil Defense in the event of a natural disaster, in accordance with a new law. The new law\textsuperscript{134} designed by the National Civil Defense, entailed evaluating all municipalities for disaster preparedness and required the formation of local defense committees. This meant the formation of brigades headed by committee leaders. Money would then be allocated to help with supplies and training. Therefore, committee members would have a say in how money was distributed and spent.

\textsuperscript{134} Decree Law 19338
The Alcalde planned to organize the committee by institutions. The private sector would be comprised of Sanctuary Lodge, The Pueblo Hotel and Hautuchay Towers, the three large-scale businesses in the district, each with representatives. Also, the public sector, the INC and PMP would each have a representative as well. On the other hand, the Alcalde counted the pueblo residents as a single unit, and they would have only one representative. In contrast to the way the Alcalde formulated the committee, the Machupicheños, namely Frente members and their supporters, wanted the committee to consist of the neighborhood associations (barrios), as this would give them a greater number of representatives. Given short notice about the meeting, the opponents of the Alcalde were caught unprepared as to how to challenge him. However, they managed to postpone the meeting until the following week, claiming that the low attendance was due to the fact that it had not been sufficiently publicized.

Prior to the new meeting, Charo, Marina, Chela and Ruth, four very politically adept women of the pueblo, together with Raúl, planned to ensure that as many Machupicheños as possible would be elected to the civil defense committee. What they did not know at the time was that the Alcalde had already selected the committee members and was already planning to hold a swearing in ceremony. Furthermore, unbeknownst to Chela, she was the single representative selected to represent the pueblo.

The Alcalde began the meeting recounting the history of disasters in the district. "Understand that this is a place of high risk for floods, mudslides and also

135 The Alcalde and the Prefect (Governor) are mandatory members of the committee.
fires. We should all be aware that we live in a zone of utmost risk. And so the [pueblo] needs to be prepared for these disasters, and for that reason we need to form brigades [that respond] before, during and after the disasters.”

The secretary of the meeting called the names of the appointees. Chela was nominated as representative of the pueblo population. She seemed surprised, and was hesitant about what to do. People in the rear whispered for her not to join the other nominees. She seemed momentarily unsure, but finally she joined the others up front.

At this point, the meeting seemed to go as the Alcalde had planned, but Raúl stood up and changed the course. He sat uneasily in his seat, shaking his head in a “no” fashion. Charo, Marina and a few others were momentarily silent, but apparently they were ready to launch an attack. Raúl beat them to it. He raised his hand and got the Alcaldes’s attention and said, “I believe [this meeting] is in the interest of the whole pueblo, but we are under-represented in the formation of this committee.” What was especially upsetting to Raúl was the fact that the private sector made up of Sanctuary Lodge and the Pueblo Hotel were given two representatives, whereas the sector representing the entire district were given only one. “I don’t understand why they should have more representatives than the pueblo … in case of a disaster we are going to be the first harmed.”

The Alcalde spoke calmly but seemed agitated. He claimed the meeting was just for swearing in the committee as designated by law. “[D]on’t misunderstand we’re not favoring elites or [any type] of class, because disasters
don’t make those distinctions, that is why the committees must integrate the public and private institutions as well as the whole population…. I would like to drop the demagogy.” His posture was that they should not politicize this issue, but the members selected for the committee already implied politicization. Walter Moreno, the acting district Prefect, (and also a committee member) spoke in support of Raúl’s demand for nominating more Machupicheños. Walter argued his point by bending the law to favor the residents. According to Walter, an additional representative for the resident sector could be considered for appointment, because the law calls for representatives from the communities and the barrios. This was interpreted to mean one representative for the rural communities and one for the pueblo barrios. The Alcalde appeared hesitant to accept that interpretation, while the audience approved and saw Walter as an ally.

Charo rose from her seat on the opposite side of the room. “We understand that the committee members are going to coordinate [preparation efforts] with the population, but they need to be able to understand the pueblo. We, the townsfolk, endured all these [previous] disasters but the [people] of Sanctuary Lodge are temporary folks. We live here. The [right] person for the committee should be someone who knows the danger zones of the pueblo.” The Alcalde appeared visibly irritated but kept cool and tried to quell the dissent. He responded with a soft tone of voice, “It’s only a commission.” Charo questioned the Alcalde’s weak response and snapped back energetically, “Then what is its function?” The Alcalde still maintained his composure even though his
face wore signs of discontent, and his hands were tightly clasped on the table. He unfolded his hands to pick up the document mandating the function of the committee, and read it aloud in answer to Charo’s question. “The function of the commission is to confront disasters and calamities before, during and after a disaster as well as to supervise Civil Defense programs.” Raúl began mocking the Alcalde, pulling out his invitation to the meeting and waving it above his head. The Alcalde stared at him, still holding the document he was reading, but then let it drop to the table in apparent frustration saying, “I’m not going to get polemical.” Raúl responded loudly. “It’s not polemic, you have to listen and be informed…” he said still holding his invitation in his hand. Walter broke the quarrel between the two and stated on Raúl’s behalf. “I ask for one more representative so that there won’t be discontent.” Marina bolstered the prefect’s comment. “They have elected people that don’t understand our way of life, and the dangers. We have always lived here in the midst of forest fires and floods. We can’t be led by these outsiders; I ask that we include another representative from the pueblo.” Raúl declared, “The townsfolk are concerned over the possibility of disasters, and it is in the interest of the pueblo to have representatives who are from here.” The audience supported Raúl with cheers of “yes, yes,” and a voice in the crowd cried out, “Let’s elect one.” The Alcalde yielded to the group. “Fine, elect one.” Not surprisingly, Marina nominated Raúl to be the additional representative, and the majority raised their hands in favor. Raúl stood up with a boyish smile on his face and joined the rest of the committee nominees.
Once outside the Municipio, Raúl, Charo, Marina, Ruth, Cori gathered to talk about the event. The women from the Joyitas Artisan Association were also present waiting for Ruth to hand out their photo ID’s. Ruth spoke first. “This ‘Karl’ [referring to the representative from Sanctuary Lodge] would be happier if we went through a huayco [mudslide].” She expressed the notion that instead of aiding the pueblo, Karl would prefer to see it destroyed. “So they could bring in more people from Orient Express.” Raúl was dismayed at the Alcalde’s selection of the committee members, favoring not only large capital but also foreigners (Karl is European). The group acknowledged by shaking their heads. Irma added, “In case of a disaster how would this Karl deal with the problems [we have] with Sanctuary Lodge? Sanctuary Lodge would be his priority,” and then said in a bewildered fashion, “so he’s the one that gets elected. Even if he doesn’t agree with it, he would prioritize [the needs of] Sanctuary Lodge. That’s what he would be told to do by his bosses. And why would he care, after all he’s only an employee.” Ruth added, “If there’s a huayco how is he going to help us anyway?” She was referring to the fact that Sanctuary Lodge is positioned up by the Citadel, about five kilometers away from the pueblo. How could he possibly respond adequately in the event of a disaster? Chela turned to Cori, but spoke to the group as well, “Remember when we were in a state of emergency, did Sanctuary Lodge help us with anything?”136 Cori shook her head to say no. “It was just us; we organized the public meals with our own resources.” Irma confirmed, “How can he [the Alcalde] elect these gringos? If a disaster happens

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136 She was referring to a forest fire incident that occurred a few years earlier and forced many pueblo residents to temporarily evacuate the area.
they wouldn’t [even] give us water. They don’t even live [down here] in the pueblo.” Charo made comments on the need to stay organized in these difficult times. “How could we allow to be left out yet again with no pueblo representation? We can’t let them forget us, a pueblo as important as this one. Machu Picchu is the most important district in Peru, we can’t afford to be disorganized; that would be madness.” Walter Moreno concluded, “If this pueblo doesn’t unite, it’ll die because these big companies are taking aim at us and the objective is to remove all of us once and for all.”

The value of ethnographic attention to what may seem to be a confusion of voices and interests is greater insight into older social themes experienced and confronted by Peruvians in new ways. Ethnography allows us to see the complexity and differentiation of the actors involved. It captures the details of whom and how people are implicated by dispossession according to a politics of belonging. The length of time one has lived in the town, whether one has possession status, as well as one’s socioeconomic status factor into who is a Machupicheño.

The protests began with the issue of defending political autonomy, property and the protection of the economy from large capital investments and state control. Throughout the course of the dispute, the Machupicheños questioned the authority of other nations such as Finland to make decisions in their district because of foreign debt agreements with Peru. They dealt with the
encrusted practices of their government that provoke memories of violence and fear, and reproduce a climate of distrust where no one can be sure of a person’s allegiance. Now, after months of struggle, the Machupicheños come full circle back to the issue of neoliberalism when confronted by the deeds of their own local government, in the attempt to hand over disaster planning and relief operations to corporate powers without mobilizing the interests and local knowledge that most residents considered vital for survival.

What we have seen throughout this essay is a case of how neoliberal policies promote a social Darwinian view of competition that usurps the energy and confidence of local people, manipulates existing insecurities, and arouses their suspicion in this challenging context. I have tried to show how the Machupicheños struggle to define their district of Machu Picchu as a place to live, a way of making a livelihood as well as something to conserve. For many, the right to make money in the Sanctuary is based on the presumption that it is their district and they have the right to live there. But in order to accomplish their objectives, the Machupicheños must, in their various ways, adjust to the strict regulations of the Sanctuary by means of tactical maneuvers, while maintaining an image of total compliance. Dispossession is intricately woven into a social production of credibility. As a population, the inhabitants of the Sanctuary constantly risk being discredited by authorities. Machupicheños are blamed for not having the appropriate identity for the Sanctuary, and for destroying the ecology. That is, the State authorities use heritage to erode the civil-status of residents and control land for the benefit of whoever brings in the most money.
Corporate intrusions into the Sanctuary to a large degree define what is good for the Sanctuary. By contrast, because of Machu Picchu’s high public profile, the government takes great notice of residents’ activities because it has a lot invested in maintaining an image of the Sanctuary that reflects the new free market Peru, worthy of direct foreign investment. This entails ensuring that corporate interests are protected above the interests of their own citizenry, in this case the residents of the district. However, I have suggested in this dissertation that for the state, favoring corporate interests over the interests of the vast majority of the population comes with a price. For those who experience the contradiction it is not uncommon to find the accompanying attitude among citizens that the potential for democracy in Peru wanes with the expansion of privatization.

Finally, what we have seen in the case of Machu Picchu is that privatization efforts can further increase the commercialization of life by the very hand that resists it. From the attempt to form a pueblo train company to compete against PeruRail, to the acceptance of a commoditized identity and the implementation of a photo ID system, life in the district is increasingly disciplined, and political participation increasingly governed, by a corporate perspective first initiated by small-scale entrepreneurs, as a response to corporate intrusions. And just as dispossession of the entrepreneurs involves discrediting and blame, they can pass blame along. Under such conditions, it is easy for those in dominant class positions to limit who can participate in the local economy. Each
rung in the hierarchy is a group of people that live by a different shade of
dispossession.

As people began parting from the above meeting, the artisan women from
the Joyitas Association gathered among themselves. They had their new photo
ID’s in hand, laughing at the way their faces came out looking like mug shots.
1. The Pueblo of Machu Picchu viewed from the Mountain of Putucusi.
2. Campesinos from the district Community of Pampacahua, marching in the civil-parade of the 40th anniversary festival of the District of Machu Picchu – their banners protesting INRENA control.
3. In a victorious moment, the Frente group in Urubamba after meeting with provincial authorities. From left to Right: Raul, Hipolito, Hector (behind), Eber, Oscar, Charo (center), (Names of two behind Charo not known), Marina (holding dog leash), Corina (behind), Margarita, (Names of two beside Margarita not known), Paco (holding a black bag)
4. Luis, during the “positive” protest against Sanctuary Lodge Hotel, demonstrating the use of his hand made flutes to a tourist at the Citadel entrance. In the background are Alpaca 101, Ilaria Jewelry, and food courts all sub-contracted by the Hotel, the subject of Pueblo protest.

5. One of the many pueblo meetings held in the plaza. Here people are deciding how much time to give authorities to respond to their petition before holding a stoppage.
6. Protest march during the pueblo stoppage. The front banner denounces privatization and plans to build a cable-car.

7. Hector and Graciela (Chela) playing the role of Inca king and queen in a dance competition for 40th district anniversary.
8. Local street sellers (ambulantes) selling food and snacks to tourists purchasing tickets for the early morning train to the City of Cuzco.

9. A resident fulfilling her cargo duties with offerings of chicha, beer and local foods during the Festival of the Cross.
10. Residents examining the destructive aftermath of a night time landslide on the outskirts of the pueblo.

11. Two young Machupiccheñas resting on the train tracks that runs by their homes.
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