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AMERICAN CIVIL ASSOCIATIONS AND THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT:
AN APPRAISAL OF ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE’S *DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA* (1835-1840) APPLIED TO FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT’S NEW DEAL AND THE POST-WORLD WAR II WELFARE STATE

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ABSTRACT


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In *Democracy in America*, Alexis de Tocqueville (1805-1859), a French aristocrat, intellectual and commentator on American society during the 1830’s, described the United States as a society marked by a general “equality of condition,” that is, by a lack of noticeable social and economic distinctions among the citizenry.\(^1\) For Tocqueville, this characteristic of democracy encouraged the formation of an informal political bloc he termed “the majority” - a group who would often elect demagogues to political offices, since the latter were best able to give voice to majority opinion.\(^2\) Furthermore, de Tocqueville believed that this group was not only capable of influencing, but also of controlling, the country. To an aristocrat, not so far removed from a pre-revolutionary France governed by Estates, this was shocking. (It had been traditionally assumed in Europe that the quality of individuals was more important than any numerical majority, and that the opinions and beliefs of a small number of aristocrats, the “best” people, counted for more, or at least should, than those of the uneducated masses.) As a member of a family that had been threatened with destruction during the first French Republic, it was also


\(^2\) Ibid., 222.
frightening.³ It is no wonder that Tocqueville labelled this phenomenon the “tyranny of the majority.”⁴ Political sociologist Clause Offe argues that de Tocqueville believed that this tyranny could also eventually lead to a significant growth in the size and power of government at all levels.⁵ In twentieth century America, these leveling tendencies, and the tyranny of the majority, have found expression in the growth of big government. In this regard, de Tocqueville was remarkably prescient.

Offe’s analysis is central to the question that this thesis addresses – which is, is the present state of civil associations, operating outside of government, and thus sometimes in opposition to majority opinion, able to preserve individual dissenting voices from the “group think” that frequently finds expression in the actions of big government, typified by the programs initiated first by Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal and continued in the post-World War II American welfare state?

It now becomes necessary to define terms. A “civil association” is a group of citizens who freely and without coercion organize outside of government control to promote some special end, whether “social” or “political.”⁶ A “voluntary association” is a civil association devoted to achieving some local community goal, while a “political association” is designed to accomplish some political end.⁷ Typical examples of the activities of voluntary associations are religious instruction provided by church groups, community events and street fairs supported by

⁴ Thomas Clark, “‘The American Democrat’ Reads ‘Democracy in America’: Cooper and Tocqueville in the Transatlantic Hall of Mirrors” Amerikastudien / American Studies 52 (2007), 188.
local businesses, and the charitable endeavors promoted by groups like the Knights of Columbus and the United Way. Examples of the activities of political associations are citizens organizing for the provision of vouchers or tuition tax credits for private elementary and high schools, neighborhood associations attempting to ban pornography in their hometowns, and local groups trying to set limits on what they perceive to be the excessive salaries and benefits provided to public officials.⁸

De Tocqueville’s analysis does seem to make one thing clear. The tyranny of the majority, under present circumstances, is contributing to the continued growth of government.⁹ At the same time, it is also true that the growth of government has in turn increasingly been strengthened the tyranny of the majority. This work therefore poses a second question. If civil associations cannot at present control the growth and power of government, are there any methods by which they can be strengthened, and the historical ideal of “limited government” be retrieved?

This work, rooted in historical analysis, argues that American society is heading down a particular path, i.e., toward an omnipotent government and, conversely, toward an impotent set of civil associations. It also suggests that this is in part the product of Americans having become increasingly unable to deal with the uncertainties of modern life, leading to a state that Émile Durkheim has called “anomie.”¹⁰ Many Americans have not opposed the growth of government, because they see this as a particularly effective means of assuaging the personal, psychological, and economic insecurity common during the Great Depression and post-World War II eras. For them the state has become an all-embracing protector in a world that they believe they can

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neither understand nor control. This fearful and passive attitude works against the determination, courage and sense of purpose that animates the citizens of all strong and healthy societies. It therefore poses a great danger to the American republic.

While feelings of insecurity and anomie have long pre-dated the 1930s, responses to these have traditionally involved participation in local associations such as churches and neighborhood organizations, as well as of course family. Today, the role of aiding people in their social and personal angst has been usurped more and more by government agencies. Robert Nisbet has observed that the traditional way of dealing with personal and societal insecurity has been a “quest for community.”11 Yet it is precisely the decline of community that has been one of the most noticeable phenomena of twentieth century American life.12

A key turning point in this change was the catastrophic collapse of the free market economy between 1929 and 1933 that resulted in massive, albeit temporary, unemployment. One of the most important long term effects of this pivotal moment was the growth of large scale government bureaucracies that today not only deal with the problem of unemployment, but have expanded into an increasing number of functions that include health care and education.

In Democracy in America, Alexis de Tocqueville had suggested that joining voluntary associations – one type of civil association – provided a way of both creating and preserving community. However, many contemporary Americans, instead of summoning up the commitment and dedication to work that is required to build and maintain civil associations, have taken the path of least resistance by allowing and supporting the rise of governmental organizations that have rendered formerly effective civil associations both superfluous and impotent.

12 Offe, Weber, Tocqueville and Adorno, 35; Nisbet, The Quest for Community, xvii.
The case of unions, as one kind of “civil association,” is instructive. Greatly strengthened by the 1935 Wagner Act (the National Labor Relations Act), they were once vital in protecting the material and political interests of many American workers.\textsuperscript{13} Despite government protection, they were free standing, independent organizations organized by private citizens to defend against other private organizations such as modern industrial corporations. Today they have increasingly been co-opted by a Democratic Party that by its very nature is associated with government at all levels. In a variation of Max Weber’s famous dictum, that “charisma” that had informed their creation has become “routinized,” unions today benefit Democratic Party politicians more than the average “rank and file” member.\textsuperscript{14} Even more strikingly, the general indifference of unions to those outside their organization, and especially to the welfare of society at large, has become increasingly harmful to the general public. This is particularly true of public-sector unions that have frequently worked in tandem with Democratic politicians to win high pay and very generous pensions at the expense of the taxpayer.\textsuperscript{15}

One key purpose of this thesis is to investigate how effective or not civil associations have been in challenging twentieth-century sentiment in favor of the expansion of government. Conversely, it suggests the ways in which government has weakened the ability of civil associations to provide both meaning and direction for individuals and to protect the political and civil rights of the general population.

At their very best, civil associations temper and weaken the tyranny of the majority - that eternally restless and occasionally dangerous political “lynch mob” - through the creation of internal divisions in society working at cross purposes with each other. The effect of this is not

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\textsuperscript{15} Fred Siegel, \textit{The Revolt Against the Masses: How Liberalism Has Undermined the Middle Class}. (New York: Encounter Books, 2013), 154, 158, 159, 172, 174.
\end{flushleft}
only to reduce feelings of personal “anomie” by bringing individuals into informal association with others, but also to create a large number of interest groups that divide the majority in a variety of ways. In doing so, following the thought of John Calhoun, the possibility of freedom of action in variance with the majority is made more likely for all.16

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"Man is not free unless government is limited."
- Ronald Reagan

“The American Republic will endure until politicians realize they can bribe the people with their own money."
- Alexis de Tocqueville

"Government's first duty is to protect people, not to run their lives."
- Ronald Reagan

**Introduction**

In predicting the growth in government in the United States, Alexis de Tocqueville’s *Democracy in America* makes two important, albeit seemingly contradictory, observations. On the one hand, de Tocqueville claimed that “the Federal government is visibly losing strength.” On the other, he was apprehensive about the presidency of Andrew Jackson (1829-1837), claiming that many Americans feared that men of Jackson’s ilk would give “a degree of influence to the central authority that cannot but be dangerous to provincial liberties.” Combined with this, de Tocqueville made clear that he believed the state governments were even more tyrannical than the Federal government.

The size of American government has grown enormously since the time of Jackson. Lynn Marshall notes that Jackson was the first American president to create an important public sector bureaucracy in the United States. However, while the size of the Federal government *did* grow during the course of the nineteenth century, it should also be realized that it did so in a relatively slow and incremental manner. The change was nonetheless significant. The 1887

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18 Ibid., 430.
19 Ibid., 89, 90.
creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission and the 1890 Sherman Anti-Trust Act are both examples of this. The ICC was an attempt to control railroad rates. Long desired by farmers, state laws controlling the railroads failed when they were found by the Supreme Court to be interference with interstate commerce. The Commission nonetheless remained largely powerless until strengthened by the 1906 Hepburn Act, passed during the Theodore Roosevelt presidency. This not only strengthened the ICC, but also, at least in the minds of some, “throttled [the] international railroad and shipping business.” The Sherman Act, likewise, “was used to break up [the] Northern Securities Company.”21 Although the passage of this legislation demonstrates that the size and growth of the federal government was more significant than it was during the antebellum period, Milton Friedman has observed that government spending, in 1929, was only 3% of total gross domestic product, (barring of course periods of war).22 While the rate of growth was not particularly remarkable during the nineteenth century, the size, number, and influence of governmental organizations did increase remarkably later on, especially during the presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt (1933-1945).23 (There was of course an even more remarkable increase in the amount of government interference and spending during the Second World War when, according to economist Robert Heilbroner and historian Aaron Singer, “the government placed over $100 billion in contracts” in its determination “to mount a gigantic war effort.”)24

A shift in American public opinion contributed greatly to this change. Federal agencies had been rapidly created to cope with the catastrophic collapse of the economy and a twenty-five

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21 Burton Folsom Jr, The Myth of the Robber Barons: A New Look at the Rise of Big Business in America (Herndon VA: Young America’s Foundation, 2010), 125
22 Milton Friedman, Why Government is the Problem (Stanford: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, 1993), 15.
percent unemployment rate. Democratic party leaders knew that this would immensely increase their popularity. This is ironic. In *Democracy in America*, Alexis de Tocqueville was emphatic in arguing that supporting *decentralization* was a way of *gaining* the support of the American majority. While this is a reflection of an antebellum political culture that, among other things, sought to protect the institution of slavery, it was also an indication of the general suspicion of the growth and power of government on the part of the American population at the time.

There was thus a remarkable change in attitude between the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries. This continued not only through the New Deal, but well into the post-World War II era and, indeed, up to the present. In other words, the existence of big government in America has increasingly become taken for granted by the American public.

While the popularity of the New Deal programs is understandable considering the gravity of the economic crisis, the continued support for increased government interference in people’s lives after the war is not. Roosevelt’s programs did not get America out of the Great Depression. Only the Second World War did that. The fundamental disconnect between the policies of the 1930s and the war went long unperceived by the general public. (One must admit that even in the 1930s *some* Americans challenged the massive growth of government. But while there were some dissent, civil associations, they were, generally speaking, ineffective in challenging a public opinion that had become progressively more in favor of political centralization and big

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government.) But more importantly, America entered a period of unprecedented prosperity after the war, in part due to the devastation of all competing industrial economies. It was an advantage that would last for almost thirty years. The nation was therefore particularly prosperous in the 1960s. Yet it was precisely in that decade that government penetration into areas previously outside of its traditional purview became most insistent and relentless.\footnote{Charles Murray, \textit{Losing Ground: American Social Policy – 1950-1980} (New York: Basic Books Inc., 1984), 24.} The most pressing question in the context of this thesis is why. Alexis de Tocqueville provides a clue.

\textbf{On Alexis de Tocqueville’s Analysis of Civil Associations in American Society during the 1830’s}

Before examining de Tocqueville’s ideas about civil associations and the positive ramifications that they had and might continue to have, it is first important to discuss a few of his assertions that are central to his understanding of democracy and American society. In \textit{Democracy in America}, he famously stated that: “the social condition of the Americans is eminently democratic; this was its character at the foundation of the colonies, and it is still more strongly marked at the present day.”\footnote{Alexis de Tocqueville, \textit{Democracy in America, Vol. 1}, trans. Henry Reeve and Francis Bowen, 48.} Regarding political culture during the early 1830’s, he found, more specifically, an “equality of condition,” that is, that real wealth was somewhat evenly distributed, and that the differences in social status between members of the American citizenry were, relatively speaking, less evident than were the social distinctions found in Europe.\footnote{Ibid., 3.} Furthermore, de Tocqueville concludes that there was more freedom in the United States than in European countries, and that Americans were avowedly and enthusiastically...
champions of liberty and “republican self-government”\textsuperscript{32}. Being measured in his judgement, he also noted that “there exists in the human heart a depraved taste for equality, which impels the weak to attempt to lower the powerful to their own level and reduces men to prefer equality in slavery to inequality with freedom.”\textsuperscript{33} De Tocqueville thus not only observed what philosopher Max Scheler has termed \textit{ressentiment}, but also asserted that the average American, in practice, values equality more than freedom.\textsuperscript{34} It was only in theory that liberty was held to be the highest value.

De Tocqueville also noticed that the phenomenon of \textit{ressentiment}, common throughout the American body politic, contributed to the creation of the aforementioned “majority.”\textsuperscript{35} He believed that many Americans, because they were morally weak and easily succumbed to jealousy, often surrendered to the influence of \textit{public opinion} - the political, social and cultural modes-of-thought that were popular among the majority at any particular moment. De Tocqueville not only insisted that public opinion “really exists,” but that it had pernicious consequences, including shaping the outcome of elections and the formation of public policy.\textsuperscript{36} For the author, these sentiments valuing equality over civil liberties led him to say “I know of no country in which there is so little independence of mind and real freedom of discussion as in America.”\textsuperscript{37} According to the author, Europeans actually debated religion and politics in a more open and friendly manner than did Americans.\textsuperscript{38}

\textsuperscript{32} Ibid., 56; Brogan, “Introduction” xvi, xvii; Offe, \textit{Tocqueville, Weber & Adorno}, 11.
\textsuperscript{36} Ibid., 426, 271, 129.
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid., 273.
\textsuperscript{38} Ibid., 273.
De Tocqueville argued that this majority usually consisted of members of the lower classes, who, restrained neither by intellect or education, could “frequently display the tastes and the propensities of a despot.” He asserted that this is so because in America few are resigned to their place in life. As a result, “[the] lower orders are agitated by the chance of success” to move up the economic and social ladder. Because they are invested with more political power than they previously had due to the establishment of universal manhood suffrage during the early nineteenth century, de Tocqueville suggests that they “unquestionably [exercise legislative authority.]” He concluded that “[universal] suffrage, therefore in point of fact does invest the poor with the government of society.” Encouraged to think boldly, “they discover a multitude of wants that they had not before been conscious of, and to satisfy these exigencies recourse must be had to the coffers of the state.” De Tocqueville viewed such expenditures resulting from government spending to be, in a word, “expensive.” It could also be dangerous.

Tocqueville summarized his understanding of the American majority as follows: “What is called the republic in the United States is the tranquil rule of the majority, which after having had time to examine itself and to give proof of its existence, is the common source of all the powers of the state.” He believed that public opinion influenced American political culture and public policy, declaring that “[the] political maxims of the country, therefore, depend on the masses of the people.” Because they have “sovereign power,” De Tocqueville judged that they also had the power to “destroy or modify” political institutions at their pleasure. (As an

39 Ibid., 222, 280.
40 Ibid., 208.
41 Ibid., 222.
42 Ibid., 222.
43 Ibid., 224.
44 Ibid., 233.
45 Ibid., 434.
46 Ibid., 135.
47 Ibid., 180.
aristocrat descended from an ancient Norman family, and the son of parents first buffeted and then menaced by the French Revolution, his disquietude comes through frequently in his text.\textsuperscript{48}

Given that de Tocqueville concluded that the \textit{majority} influenced public policy through its control of the state, it is important to examine de Tocqueville’s rather original conception of the state. For de Tocqueville, it was comprised of two entities, the “government” and the “administration.”\textsuperscript{49} He viewed government as a centralized state-apparatus at the federal level tending to the needs of the whole body politic, while conceiving an “administration” as a public sector entity operating at the state and local level.\textsuperscript{50} Although de Tocqueville was generally supportive of government at the federal level, it is also important to note that he was against the centralization of administration \textit{within the states}.\textsuperscript{51} In other words, he saw a parallel between the tyranny of state governments in the United States and the tyranny of centralized government in his native France.\textsuperscript{52} This is very understandable at a time when states were all powerful, and the vaunted bill of rights of the American Constitution protected the individual only from the federal, but not from state, government.\textsuperscript{53} States from the beginning of the Republic had had the right to establish official religions, decide who could vote, and whether or not slavery would exist within their borders.

De Tocqueville understood that the American majority had the potential to arrogate the privileges of the state, possibly leading to atrociuous actions. For instance, he noted that many

\textsuperscript{50} Ibid., 89.
\textsuperscript{53} This would only change with the passage of the XIV Amendment in 1868.
Americans, “backed by the tyranny of the government,” despoiled the Native Americans of their lands. He therefore advocated the formation of civil associations as a guard against any crime committed by majority-tyranny. He asserted that associations protected and promoted the common good of American communities. He also understood that civil associations should be local, tied to some particular township or county. In this way they could encourage virtue and good local government without aspiring to the overweening power that allowed government to commit great crimes. He might also have understood that local civil associations operating in the smaller arena of a state could have greater effect than in the confines of the entire nation. Just as the Founding Fathers had hoped to preserve liberty by fragmenting political power among the states, so de Tocqueville thought civil associations could work against potential majority tyranny within the states by atomizing that informal bloc that he so feared.

As mentioned above, de Tocqueville made a distinction between two types of civil associations: political and voluntary. In Democracy in America, he first discussed political associations. He explained that this type of organization “is established to promote the public safety, commerce, industry, morality, and religion.” He subsequently elaborated upon their organizational structure, asserting that it “consists simply in the public assent which a number of individuals give to certain doctrines and in the engagement which they contract to promote in a certain manner the spread of these doctrines.” For de Tocqueville, these political associations would sometimes advocate unpopular causes, such as the abolition of slavery. He stated that,

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57 Tocqueville, Democracy in America, trans. Henry Reeve and Francis Bowen, 199.
58 Ibid., 116.
59 Ibid., 116.
60 Ibid., 202; Tocqueville, Democracy in America, trans. Elizabeth Trapnell Rawlings, 116.
61 Ibid., 199.
because these associations “do not represent the majority,” they could therefore make a positive contribution in challenging public opinion and the political power it represented.62

Anti-slavery societies were, in fact, the most important type of political association that existed during de Tocqueville’s time. Inspired by Christian thought, William Lloyd Garrison in 1831 spearheaded a “New Abolitionist” movement that castigated slaveholders as evil.63 By 1831, there were over 130 anti-slavery groups in the United States.64 Examples of anti-slavery societies during the time of de Tocqueville’s writing were the Manumission Society of North Carolina, the Philadelphia Female Anti-Slavery Society, “the Pennsylvania Society for promoting the Abolition of Slavery, the Relief of Free Negroes unlawfully held in bondage, and for improving the conditions of the African Race,” the New England Anti-Slavery Society, the American Colonization Society, the Massachusetts Anti-Slavery Society, the American Anti-Slavery Society, the American and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society, the Liberty Party and the Tennessee Society for Promoting the Manumission of Slaves.65 (It might be noted that most of these societies were not interested in granting citizenship rights to freed slaves. Instead, many were interested in sending freed slaves to colonies such as Liberia in Africa.)66

De Tocqueville then discussed civil associations that are not primarily involved with the political sphere. He calls these voluntary associations. He describes their characteristics in the following way:

62 Ibid., 204.
64 Ibid., 56.
Americans of all ages and stations, all points of view, meet constantly. Not only do they belong to commercial and industrial associations, but there are countless others: religious and moral, serious and futile, some very broad and others very specific, large and small; Americans gather to celebrate holidays, establish seminaries, build inns, erect churches, distribute books, and send missionaries to the far corners of the world; this is how they build hospitals, prisons, and schools.67

Relatedly, he also observed the formation of temperance societies in the United States. Such voluntary associations he believed improved American society by promoting the common good and encouraging ordinary citizens to perform philanthropic acts for their local communities.68

Temperance movements were in fact the most important type of voluntary associations that existed in the United States at the time. People crusaded against the use of alcohol because they believed it led people down the path of self-destruction (including reducing the ability of the body to fight off disease.)69 Institutions that advocated temperance included Methodist groups, the Union Temperate Society, the American Temperance Union, the United States Temperance Union, the Congressional Temperance Society, the Washingtonian Total Abstinence Society, the New Haven Temperance Society of the People of Color, the New York Temperance Society, the Brooklyn (N.Y.) Temperance Association, the Home Temperance Society, the American Temperance Society, the American Moral Reform Society, the New England Colored Temperance Society, the Connecticut State Temperance Society of Colored Persons and the Temperance Society of the People of Color in the City of Pittsburgh.70 (According to historian

68 Ibid., 119.
70 Holland Webb, “Temperance Movements and Prohibition” International Social Science Review 74 (1999), 61, 62; Eugene O. Porter, “An Outline of the Temperance Movement” The Historian 7 (1944), 57, 58; Donald Yacovone,
Eugene O. Porter, most temperance societies between 1826 and 1836 were interested in advocating “abstinence by pledge from ardent spirits” rather than “total abstinence.”\(^{71}\)

Because of their grass roots nature, the voluntary association was one of the healthiest and most admirable examples of American democracy at work, eschewing government direction in favor of local independent initiative. It is part of the argument of this thesis that the decline of this type of activity remains one of the great tragedies of modern political life.

Noting this practical and pragmatic side of American culture, de Tocqueville asserted that industrial associations (another type of voluntary association) were even more important, in the minds of Americans at least, than political ones.\(^{72}\) (Examples of such associations were newspaper companies, labor unions and private-sector corporations.)\(^{73}\) De Tocqueville disagreed, thinking that political associations were ultimately more important than voluntary ones, since it was only the former that helped insure the existence of the latter.\(^{74}\) In fact, de Tocqueville was ardent in advocating the creation of political associations, given his fear that democratic societies would eventually devolve into tyrannical ones. Worrying that democracies could potentially lack a sufficient number of effective associations of this kind, he concluded that “no measure must be taken to increase the rights of democracy,” that is, the tyranny of the majority, without a sufficient number of these.\(^{75}\) In other words, he believed that American politics was in part a conflict between those who wished the general good of society (through locally organized political associations) and those individuals who, being only motivated by self-
interest and the desire for power, strongly supported tyrannical state control. It is important here to distinguish between the aims promoted by the “tyranny of the majority” and what other scholars and moralists refer to as the “common good” or the “good of the community.” Simply put, the former refers to a form of what in today’s parlance might be called “politically correct thought” that seeks to impose its opinions on society, while the latter represents what is right or wrong regardless of whether or not it is popular.

Believing that democracy in America was not threatened by salutary political associations that move it towards the common good, de Tocqueville asserted that their existence was more necessary in democratic societies than under monarchies. For de Tocqueville, monarchies, unlike democracies, consist of a “body of the noble and the wealthy,” which, although representing only a small minority of the population, collectively have enough prestige “[to] check the abuses of [royal] power.”\footnote{Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Vol. 1, trans. Henry Reeve and Francis Bowen, 202. Although de Tocqueville does not specifically address the issue, perhaps it’s also the case that a sense of noblesse oblige sometimes checks the power of nobles and the wealthy.} Just as the French provincial parlements and noble lords checked the political power of kings throughout the history of early modern France, and the English House of Lords right up to his own time, he hoped that political associations in the United States might similarly reduce the power of self-serving majorities that existed in all of the individual American states.\footnote{Durand Echeverria, The Maupeou Revolution: A Study in the History of Libertarianism, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana University State Press, 1985), xiv, 142; Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Vol. 1, trans. Henry Reeve and Francis Bowen, 202, 89, 90.}

To counter the possibility of democratic tyranny, de Tocqueville concluded there had to be a large number of effective political associations (such as anti-slavery societies, suffrage
movements and free soil groups) in order to check, and if need be challenge, the power of both the American majority and the government which was its expression.\textsuperscript{78}

Given that Alexis de Tocqueville thought that notions of “equality of condition” thoroughly informed American culture, he also feared that the United States would eventually enter a period of decline because of the lack of respect afforded to individual genius and creativity. He believed that societal degeneration would occur in two stages. During the first stage, a democratic society like the United States would need “artificial and temporary [substitutes],” that is, political associations, to replace landed and mercantile notables.\textsuperscript{79} As individuals similar to Washington, Jefferson, Madison, Franklin and Adams, who had represented the last remnants of an older, aristocratic political culture inherited from colonial America, had begun by the 1830s to experience a decline in political power and prestige, they had to be replaced by grassroots organizations. The rigors of democratic practice prevented single individuals from any longer filling this absolutely essential function. During the second stage, he predicted that “[the] more equal the conditions of men become and the less strong men individually are, the more easily [members of a particular association] give way to the current of the multitude and the more difficult it is for them to adhere to an opinion which the multitude discard.”\textsuperscript{80} It is this singularly unfortunate circumstance that became overwhelmingly apparent during the 1930s.

\textsuperscript{78} Tocqueville, \textit{Democracy in America}, trans. Elizabeth Trapnell Rawlings, 118.


The Role of American Civil Associations during the New Deal Era (1933-1945) of Expanding Government: A Review of the Scholarly Literature

In his article, “A Historical Essay,” Phillips Bradley concludes that both de Tocqueville’s analysis and prescription had become ever more salient during the 1930’s. Observing the growth of government in America, as well as the emergence of Fascist and Communist movements elsewhere, he judged that de Tocqueville’s championing of political liberties and advocacy of an “equality of opportunity” philosophy would benefit the entire world.\(^81\) More specifically, Bradley documented that a tyrannical American majority - - what he labeled the “fourth power” - - had encouraged this growth of government.\(^82\)

Matthew Josephson provides a very different understanding of the role and functions of civil associations. Instead of positing that they should be maintained to limit a potentially oppressive government, he believes associations such as unions had to exist to control “privileged groups,” such as corporate capitalist elites.\(^83\) At the same time, he supports the political centralization that was part of Roosevelt’s New Deal. This was due to his conviction that the Federal government would be more successful in implementing policies for the common good than local associations which, he noted, had proven ineffective, since they did not have the resources to deal with a crisis as profound as the Depression.\(^84\)

August Nimtz Jr. has also studied the formation of civil associations in the United States during the thirties.\(^85\) Although contemporary Marxists were generally critical of them, Nimtz

\(^{82}\) The first three being of course the legislative, executive and judicial branches. Ibid., 465.
\(^{84}\) Ibid., 8, 9.
points out that American Communists themselves formed organizations in the United States - - often referred to as “cells” - - that were highly instrumental in promoting Stalinism. He claims that there were at least 100,000 members of the American Communist Party who opposed what they saw as Roosevelt’s capitalist policies promoted by the growth of government. Nimtz explains the ineffectiveness of these “Stalinist” associations by a lack of what Marxists call “class-consciousness,” due to the economic, ethnic and racial divisions between various elements of the American working classes.

To the disappointment of the radical Left, no mass revolution overthrew the capitalist system. But despite the Marxist critique, most non-Marxist scholars do not think of Franklin Roosevelt simply as a capitalist. Chilton Williamson, for instance, actually sees him as flirting with socialism. Although Nimtz believed socialism was unpopular during the New Deal era, Williamson believed that it has become popular enough to become one of the chief legacies left by Roosevelt.

Williamson also notes that one of the effects of this was the growth of welfare dependency during the very prosperous post-World War II era. He suggests that increasing dependency resulted more from personal and collective insecurity prevalent in the new American society than it did from the development of what Oscar Lewis has labeled a “culture of poverty” – that is, a culture that promotes the formation of instable families which have a “lack of order,

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86 Ibid., 216, 184.
direction, and organization.”

Due to the increasing acceptance of “soft” socialism (the provision of massive benefits, rather than the classical Marxist socialism of collective ownership of the means of production) and statism (the central role of the government in providing this largesse), Williamson is not surprised that civil associations that sought to challenge the centralization of the Federal government, whether the American Liberty League or the American Enterprise Institute, to name just two, became largely ineffective during the New Deal and afterwards. His work provides a detailed account of the failures of significant popular protest movements, whether Left, Right or Center, against what sociologist Peter L. Berger and theologian Richard J. Neuhaus have called the “megastructures,” that is, the large government bureaucracies and private-sphere organizations that dominate the public sphere.

Chilton Williamson is certainly not the only one claiming that the popularity of “soft” socialism was one of the greatest, and most terrible, of the New Deal legacies. (All this is very far from the views of Henry Steele Commager, who lauded the general acceptance by the public of Roosevelt’s policies, since these bankrolled insolvent private-sector businesses as well as providing public sector programs to the disadvantaged.)

Max Lerner understood that the social forces operating in the 1930s were far more complicated than being simply about providing new and different ways of assisting the unemployed. According to him, Alexis de Tocqueville accurately foresaw the gradual formation of a “Leviathan State” during the Roosevelt administration. He might also have imagined a new constellation of private associations working against it. Certainly, this was also a time, as

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91 Henry Steele Commager, Commager on Tocqueville (Colombia MO: University of Missouri Press, 1993), 32, 59, 69.
Lerner notes, when the “corporate barons” of the private sector “fought welfare laws and collective bargaining with every weapon.” Like Matthew Josephson, Lerner acknowledges the significant amount of influence that big business had through lobbying that worked relentlessly against a tyrannical majority made more terrible by state power, and an oppressive national consensus about the virtues of the New Deal, evidenced by Roosevelt’s resounding victory in the 1936 presidential elections.

An Appraisal and Interpretation of the Role of Civil Associations and Government in the United States during Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Presidency (1933-1945)

Civil associations during the time of Alexis de Tocqueville had been small and local. By the time of the New Deal, many were more substantial in size and less bounded by locality. The rise of the railroad was mainly responsible for this. It had not only created a “transportation revolution,” but also a more integrated “national” economy that tightly linked the agrarian West with the industrial East. They were also the first truly national corporations in that they drew on the resources and capital of the entire country.

Two prominent neo-conservative scholars have also focused their attention on the large and powerful social institutions that dominated public life in the thirties. Berger and Neuhaus have called both modern capitalist corporations and governmental institutions “megastructures.” While the New Deal led to the considerable growth of the Federal government, private sector corporations were also among the most dominant and influential civil

93 Ibid., 63.
95 Berger and Neuhaus, To Empower the People, 2.
associations of the era.\textsuperscript{96} They also remained in almost constant tension with New Deal public sector programs.

The New Deal programs were certainly unprecedented in size. The Works Progress Administration (1935-1943) alone employed 8,500,000 people, while the Civilian Conservation Corps (1933-1942), which employed over 3,000,000, were among the largest.\textsuperscript{97} Others included the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, which fundamentally distorted the free market agricultural economy by paying farmers not to grow food, and Social Security, a federally run old age retirement plan. The National Recovery Administration, which coordinated a supposedly voluntary effort by industrial manufacturers to halt the downward spiral of prices and wages, was in fact yet another example of heavy handed federal interference in the economy.\textsuperscript{98} All of these were implemented with an enormous amount of government coercion. As organizations such as these proliferated and grew, voluntary associations became weaker as members of groups such as the Moose, Elks, Knights of Columbus and League of Women Voters could no longer afford dues due to the economic effects of the Great Depression.\textsuperscript{99}

At the same time, there were many organizations and individuals who were vehemently opposed to Roosevelt’s policies. One of the largest was led by outspoken Father Charles Coughlin, a reform minded priest from Royal Oak, Michigan who attempted to create his own reform movement through a civil association. Inspired by Catholic social doctrines, he was simultaneously both anti-capitalist and anti-Communist. An early supporter of Roosevelt,

\textsuperscript{98} Higgs, \textit{Crisis and Leviathan}, 173, 159, 179, 213.
Coughlin proposed that more silver coins be minted in order to stimulate the American economy, an inflationary policy that had been much favored in farm states since the late nineteenth century. This “radio priest” was soon to have an enormous national following, for the radio, like the railroads, had irrevocably brought the nation more closely together, allowing national movements to gain more prominence over regional ones.

There was much that was unattractive about Coughlin. His early reformism eventually degenerated into a shameless Jew baiting that ceaseless pilloried the people he claimed were responsible for most of the ills of the world. Many of his critics also came to believe that the association he created did not provide clear and convincing proposals for improving American society. It is also quite possible that the size of government would have actually grown more than it did under Roosevelt if they had been implemented. Despite the seeming popularity of his National Union for Social Justice, witnessed by the number of branches that grew up almost spontaneously across the country, his creation of a new Union Party did not long survive. It suffered an ignominious defeat at the hands of the Democrats in the 1936 election. Coughlin’s ultimate failure reminds us de Tocqueville’s observation that minor political parties were often ineffective, being frequently led by those with “extreme dispositions.”

Other radical associations also fared poorly. Huey Long, a Senator from Louisiana, not only proposed the formation of a “Share-Our-Wealth-Society,” but also demanded an “expropriation of wealth and nationalization of the [U.S.] banks.” George Wolfskill claimed that Long was a radical whose “share-the-wealth movement was only a thinly disguised attempt

101 Charles J. Tull, *Father Coughlin and the New Deal*, 206, 73, 72, 73, 114, 139-141, 134, 163.
to capture control of the Democratic Party.” One can safely conclude that political associations that oppose the status quo, by providing noticeably different visions of society, have little chance of success. This point was made most emphatically by de Tocqueville almost one hundred years before, when he observed that “in America the majority raises formidable barriers around the liberty of opinion; within these barriers an author may write what he pleases, but woe to him if he goes beyond them.” (One must also observe that this is sometimes a good thing.)

Clause Offe has noted that trade unions during Roosevelt’s presidency represented another example of popular civil associations, which in addition also had a far longer period of success. Between 1933 and 1935 around 400 “company unions” promoted by private-sector employers were created. According to Joseph Rayback, this type of union was more popular than more confrontational, independent unions. One critic of Roosevelt, John T. Flynn, claimed that many of the more oppositional unions that became popular later on in the New Deal often tended towards corruption. For instance, Flynn asserted that Roosevelt, realizing the political uses of the increasing number of people joining labor unions during his first term, sought, largely with success, to co-opt them by catering to their interests, even at the expense of the rest of the public. (This had been aided by the passage of the 1932 Norris-La Guardia Anti-Injunction Act which outlawed “[yellow-dog] contracts” that had formerly “required employees to agree not to join a union.”)

105 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America Vol. 1, Tr. Henry Reeve and Francis Bowen, 274.
106 Offe, Tocqueville, Weber & Adorno, 35.
108 Ibid., 329.
109 Flynn, The Roosevelt Myth, 84, 82, 83, 84.
110 Folsom, Jr., New Deal or Raw Deal?, 119.
Just as many Americans who were unable to join unions found themselves economically disadvantaged, conservative historian Jonathan Bean claims that small businesses and medium-sized firms were also seriously hurt by the federal government. Influenced by such scholars as Alan T. Peacock, Jack Wiseman, and Robert Higgs, Bean argues that the interventionist policies of the federal government, spurred on by a “crisis rhetoric” that was exaggerated by self-serving politicians and employed by political careerists and lobbyists to manipulate the public, were successful in their designs to expand government at the expense of smaller businesses.\footnote{Jonathan J. Bean, \textit{Beyond the Broker State: Federal Policies Toward Small Business, 1936-1961} (Chapel Hill NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 12, 7, 8, 103.}

According to historian Burton Folsom Jr., “the major tire makers, Goodyear, Goodrich, and Firestone, got together and wrote the NRA tire code.”\footnote{Folsom Jr., \textit{New Deal or Raw Deal?}, 49.} This policy caused tire-prices to rise significantly. Medium-sized firms such as the Pharis Tire and Rubber Company and the Toledo Tire Corporation were negatively affected, being unable to offer lower prices that might have allowed them a larger place in the market.\footnote{Ibid., 49, 50, 52, 49.} In this way, Roosevelt was able to even occasionally co-opt big business through what many considered unfair business practices. It is not surprising that, generally speaking, owners of small businesses were against the policies of Roosevelt’s New Deal.\footnote{Jeffrey A. Charles, \textit{Service Clubs in American Society: Rotary, Kiwanis, and Lions} (Urbana and Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 115.}

It is worth noting that Republican Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio did try to protect small business by advocating the abolition of the capital gains tax.\footnote{Bean, \textit{Beyond the Broker State: 1936-1961}, 102, 95, 96.} Taft and some of his allies sought to protect what he characterized as the hard-working ‘little guy’ from the forces of political and economic centralization.
At the same time, it is important to remember that not a few of the civil associations of the era supported the growth of government rather than attempting to limit it. As Peter Dobkin Hall’s account suggests, many, even before the Great Depression, had been associated with and promoted by the so-called Progressive movement (a movement supportive of the idea that government can be used as a tool against business to solve economic and social problems).\textsuperscript{116}

There had always been a temptation for private associations to seek government assistance, and so, at least to some degree, become co-opted by them. This tendency to seek alliance with government became more pronounced with the Depression, both because of the enormity of the problems faced by associations at a time of unprecedented economic collapse, and because of the increased willingness of central government to penetrate into so many aspects of private life. In short, Washington, it seemed in the early 1930s, was the only place that had both the power and the money to get things done.

Thus, the National Grange received some support from the Federal government. Although the Grange had been suspicious of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 due to the amount of “production control” it gave to the American Farm Bureau Federation (AFDC), a separate farming organization sympathetic with the cause of the New Deal, the former was often supportive of “many New Deal farm policies.”\textsuperscript{117} Commentator Jay Cost claimed that in this way Franklin Roosevelt helped to create a system “that would mean the creation and maintenance of new client groups dependent upon and loyal to the Democratic party.”\textsuperscript{118} (The administration of course also engaged in more traditional kinds of political patronage. Frank


\textsuperscript{118} Jay Cost, Spoiled Rotten: How the Politics of Patronage Corrupted the Once Noble Democratic Party and Now Threatens the American Public (New York: Broadside Books, 2012), 44.
Hague, the mayor of Jersey City, helped ensure votes for Roosevelt after Harry Hopkins gave the city $500,000 for direct relief and $50,000,000 for work-relief, the latter in the form of WPA programs.)

The only notable political civil associations that mounted politically significant assaults on the Roosevelt administration were the American Liberty League and the Republican Party. In fact, some have argued that the Liberty League was a more effective contrarian association than the Republicans. George Wolfskill for instance has claimed “that the Liberty League would take up the role of administration critic which a moribund Republican Party was unable to fill.” This, in part, as historian Lewis L. Gould explains, had to do with the fact that Republicans from the east were more likely to flirt with New Deal theories than Republicans from the West. However, Wolfskill notes that the American Liberty League eventually also became a defunct organization, due to the decision of the du Ponts, the major financial contributors to the League, to dissolve the association in 1940. They did this because of “the passage of the second Hatch Act limiting contributions to political campaigns.” The act was a crucial element in reducing the ability of associations hostile to the administration from influencing political life, while at the same time demonstrating the ability of the government to affect political outcomes in not very subtle ways.

Due to the activism of civil associations influenced by Progressivism, government interventionist policies were not only undertaken by the federal government, but by state governments as well. According to William R. Brock, these also usurped political functions previously performed by counties and municipalities. Brock documents that even before the

119 Folsom, Jr., *New Deal or Raw Deal?*, 154.
Depression, government spending throughout the United States on the state level for hospitals, education, highways and public welfare was increasing. Commenting on the rise of ever more socially liberal civil associations during the 1930’s, Brock asserts that these radical groups “were a minority composed mainly of social workers, public welfare officials, and their academic allies.”

While August Nimtz, Jr. has labelled Roosevelt a “capitalist,” Chilton Williamson called him a “socialist.” One can say that they were both partially correct. The president did not promote a pure capitalism that would have allowed for unbridled open-market competition. Neither did he come close to out-and-out socialism. As evidenced by the collusion between government elites and tire industries leaders mentioned above, he was instead in favor of a “state capitalism” that encouraged cooperation between government and private sector corporate elites in both the financial and business sectors of the economy. Such inappropriately close relations between commerce and government is further illustrated by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation that also allowed “the federal government [to make] special loans to banks and railroads.”

To some degree, this was not unlike what Mussolini had attempted to accomplish in Italy in the 1920’s (a resemblance of which Roosevelt was aware.) This after all was central to the notion of corporatism that was supposed to be Fascism’s unique contribution to modern

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126 Folsom Jr., *New Deal or Raw Deal?*, 251.
industrial society. As economist Robert Higgs observes, it was in any way clear that true laissez-faire capitalism had already begun to decline significantly by the end of World War I.

Most striking, however, was the fact that cooperation and collusion between the private and public sectors was greater after World War II than before. Ballard Campbell reminds us that Roosevelt had actually not been in favor of creating the long term social welfare programs that would become so prominent during the period of Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society programs of the 1960s. For instance, Harry Hopkins of the Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA) claimed that its purpose was “to see that the unemployed get relief, not to develop a great social work organization throughout the United States.” Many members of labor unions also did not seek to take advantage of a government-administered social welfare program. According to Joseph Rayback, members of the AFL “wanted jobs and not a dole.” It is also worth noting that during this time charity primarily remained both private and local. According to Rayback, “[old] people worked as long as possible; when their strength declined, the family assumed the burden of their support. Church institutions, guilds, mechanics’ societies, and state-erected poorhouses also supplemented this system” of family support for the elderly.

Towards the Weakening and Disappearance of Civil Associations in Post-World War II America: Reflections on the Growth of the Welfare State


128 Higgs, *Crisis and Leviathan*, 237.


132 Ibid., 336.
Franklin Roosevelt had helped create a kind of “state capitalism” that, at least as far as Chilton Williamson was concerned, seemed to be a continuation of late-nineteenth century “crony capitalism” that served to protect corporations against some of its economic rivals and political adversaries. Crony capitalism had continued to affect the New Deal era, as Roosevelt had made efforts to bail-out banks and other private sector corporations. (In Bought and Paid For: The Hidden Relationship Between Wall Street and Washington, Charles Gasparino observes that this type of collusion between Wall Street and public-sector elites to maintain their power and position against what some see as the best interests of the public continues in the twenty-first century.)

While crony capitalism was already an important social reality before the post-World War II era (1945-2016), it is also clear that the number of public-sector institutions that were created during the latter half of the twentieth century have dwarfed those established during the first half, indicating a relentless move towards statism. In this period even private sector corporations, qua civil associations, seem to have lost some of influence they had during the early twentieth century.

That governmental institutions both bailed out corporations and employed people on a larger scale during the last decades of the twentieth century is a well-known fact. It is also reflective of the reality that the public sector has become a significant, and indeed occasionally a dominant, part of the American economy as compared to the private sector. While it was private sector corporations that were the megastructures that most affected American society even during the Roosevelt years (despite the programs and agencies created by the New Deal), the

133 Williamson, After Tocqueville, 57.
134 Higgs, Crisis and Leviathan, 158.
megastructures that were most responsible for shaping society after the war were governmental institutions at the federal, state and even local levels.\textsuperscript{137}

Although the growth in government was not as substantial during the New Deal Era as after, it was a legacy of the Roosevelt administration. Historian Burton Folsom Jr. observes that in fact the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and Works Progress Administration were the only agencies that were abolished. He goes on to note that most of the other Roosevelt programs “were continued, expanded, and energized with new federal support.”\textsuperscript{138}

The following list, which demonstrates the growth in government during the post-war era, is remarkable. It includes the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Environment Protection Agency, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, the Congressional Budget Office, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the Employment and Training Administration, the National Endowment for the Arts, the National Endowment for the Humanities, the National Science Foundation, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, the Office of Economic Opportunity, the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs, the Office of Personnel Management, the Small Business Administration, the Department of Education, the institution of food stamp programs (during the Great Society Era), mandates for higher minimum wages, Medicaid, Medicare, Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF), the Administration for Community Living, the Department of Health and Human Services, the Department of Energy, the Urban Renewal Agency and the Department of Veteran Affairs.\textsuperscript{139}

\textsuperscript{137} Higgs, \textit{Crisis and Leviathan}, 159.
\textsuperscript{138} Folsom Jr., \textit{New Deal or Raw Deal?}, 264, 263, 264.
The list also demonstrates the greater growth of government at the federal, rather than the state and local, level.\textsuperscript{140} Berger and Neuhaus have not only chronicled this, but have also argued that it was a product of a liberal political ideology supportive of massive social programs.\textsuperscript{141}

Aware that social activists have increasingly advocated state-control over many areas of American life, Berger and Neuhaus conclude that social liberals believe “[civil associations] supply mere palliatives, perpetuate the notion of charity, and otherwise manipulate people into [an] acceptance of the status quo.”\textsuperscript{142} As such, they are not to be trusted. Consistent with the movement towards government control, the liberal movement has increasingly made incursions into activities previously reserved for the private sector. Berger and Neuhaus conclude that this has occasionally resulted “in outright prohibitions, repressive taxations, and the imposition of licensing and operating standards that have had a punitive effect on non-governmental agencies.”\textsuperscript{143} In other words, government requirements have made it more difficult for non-government organizations to thrive and survive. It is not surprising that Robert Higgs fears that Progressives want to transform the United States, which he already considers an advanced welfare state, into a polity governed by a class of bureaucratic elites.\textsuperscript{144} There is a danger that it will be increasingly difficult to create new and effective civil associations in opposition to big government if Higgs’ fears are correct.

\textsuperscript{140} John J. Flynn, “The Crisis of Federalism: Who is Responsible?” \textit{American Bar Association Journal} 51 (1965), 229.


\textsuperscript{142} Berger and Neuhaus, \textit{To Empower the People}, 35.

\textsuperscript{143} Ibid., 35.

\textsuperscript{144} Higgs, \textit{Crisis and Leviathan}, 248.
Although the number of civil associations has grown since the 1830’s, their effectiveness and societal influence has not. Membership in private-sector unions in the United States has for instance declined from 36% of the private-sector workforce in 1953 to 10% in 1996. (This of course is related to the decline in manufacturing that has been affected by outsourcing and other structural changes in the economy associated with the rise of globalization.)\textsuperscript{145}

Still, the facts indicate that private-sector unions have lost a significant amount of political and economic power at the same time that government expansion has grown significantly. During the 1960s, Great Society programs created during Lyndon B. Johnson’s presidency (1963-1969) have included Medicaid, Food Stamps, the 1965 Housing Act, and the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965. At roughly the same time (1965 to 1975) government spending as a percentage of GNP dramatically increased from 8% to 24%.\textsuperscript{146} Although this had much to do with the Vietnam War, former President Nixon increased government spending for domestic public-sector programs as well by pursuing policies such as “[raising] social security benefits by 20 percent” before the start of his second presidential term.\textsuperscript{147} Additional public-sector programs that helped create the welfare state were Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), the Bureau of Public Assistance and the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants and Children (WIC).\textsuperscript{148} This increased government activity could not but have helped to weaken the positive role of private civic associations that had so animated public life more than a century before. Associations that

\textsuperscript{146} Campbell, \textit{Growth of Government}, 147, 148, 127.
\textsuperscript{147} Folsom Jr., \textit{New Deal or Raw Deal?}, 262.
suffered decline included such diverse organizations as the NAACP, the General Federation of Women’s Clubs and the Grange.149

The legacy of the Great Society “reforms” was the creation of a vastly larger welfare state. Andrew J.F. Morris notes that the amount of tax revenues spent on public-sector welfare was significantly greater than voluntary spending on social welfare for similar charitable purposes.150 In the opinion of Jeffrey Charles, the growth in “government paternalism” has created a spirit of “civic stagnation” among the American populace.151

Government continued to grow in the 1970’s. At the same time unions such as the Machinists, the United Auto Workers and AFSCME supported the Democratic Party which they correctly understood to be the engine driving increased state power. Fred Siegel observes that public sector unions and interest groups, both supportive of state growth, were also on the rise. (Federal employee unions had only first been allowed under the Kennedy administration. By the twenty-first century they were contributing massively to Democratic candidates, who, once in office, rewarded federal workers handsomely at the general public’s expense.)152 Associations such as teachers’ unions, the AFL-CIO and the National Organization for Women (NOW) distinguished themselves by supporting Democratic candidate of Walter Mondale in 1984.153 Many other seemingly non-political nationally important associations, such as the Sierra Club and the National Resources Defense Council, soon learned to depend heavily on grants received both directly and indirectly from the federal government.154 This was a prolonged but fatal

149 Putnam, Bowling Alone, 55.
151 Charles, Service Clubs in American Society, 152.
153 Siegel, Revolt Against the Masses, 154, 158, 159, 172, 174.
154 Bergner, “Liberal Ideological Complex.”
period for many civil associations. Rather than standing as independent actors outside narrowly fought political races, they allowed themselves to become satellites of the Democratic Party. By becoming entirely partisan, they lost much of that independence that de Tocqueville found one of the most important roles of associations in grassroots American politics.

Private businesses were similarly corrupted. It is revealing of the amount of government influence that liberal economist John Kenneth Galbraith considered American businesses in the late twentieth century to represent “arms of the welfare state.” In other words, some civil associations, instead of operating in uneasy relationships with government, actually became auxiliaries of the state. Some prominent, private-sector associations known for espousing social liberal causes, such as the Ford Foundation, were also particularly vulnerable in this regard.

These trends continued into the 1980’s. During the presidency of Ronald Reagan (1981-1989), a politician who portrayed himself as an economic conservative and believer in “trickle-down” economic policy, government spending as a percentage of the GDP actually went up from 40% in 1980 to 42% in 1988. In fact, government spending as a share of GDP reached a zenith of 44% in 1986 before it went back down to 42% in 1988. While much of this expenditure was devoted to increased military spending, the size of the American government, by 1987, had grown between “three to six times as large as it was before World War I” according to economist

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155 Cornuelle, Reclaiming the American Dream, 143.
157 Milton Friedman, Free to Choose (Orlando FL: Harcourt Inc., 1980), ix.
Robert Higgs. One can easily conclude that the growth of American government was clearly more a legacy of late twentieth-century public policy than anything that had come before it.

There are both sociological and historical reasons that account for why government has grown so much. The decline in local community was in part responsible, as government replaced social functions previously performed by local and regional social institutions. Milton Friedman, for instance, has observed that the political power that was once vested in local communities has declined after World War II. In response, Berger and Neuhaus have both advocated the formation of “strong neighborhoods” as an important first step towards rebuilding the informal groups that might partially reverse this phenomenon.

There are examples of civil associations that have been successful in their attempts to create close-knit neighborhoods. Church organizations in Louisiana, such as Christ Church, Bethany Church and the Trinity Episcopal Church, are examples of voluntary associations that have fostered community-cohesion through providing aid to effected by severe flooding. The Salvation Army, a Protestant voluntary association that has a reputation for providing relief to the poor, has local chapters throughout the United States. Loreen Wolfer has argued that the formation of neighborhood watch groups in a small, working-class Pennsylvania town

\[158\] Higgs, Crisis and Leviathan, 33.
\[159\] Berger and Berger, The War over the Family, 17.
\[160\] Friedman, Free to Choose, 5.
\[161\] Berger and Neuhaus, To Empower the People, 8.
established a reputation for both strengthening community-bonds and making the elderly there feel safer and more secure.164

Some associations can also be political while still remaining independent. The National Rifle Association is an organization with chapters throughout the country. It is supported by many who share the fears of commentator Ben Shapiro that the end of second amendment rights could cause communities throughout the country to become more dangerous and crime-ridden.165 The Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), an organization of “African American churches to effect political and social change” at the local and grassroots level, cooperated with Martin Luther King Jr.’s attempts to challenge both state and federal rulings to ensure both civil rights and civil liberties for blacks in the South.166 For a long time it too remained independent of government. Similarly, Cesar Chavez helped create the National Farm Workers’ Association (NFWA) in 1962, to help local Hispanic American farm-tenants bargain for higher wages and better conditions. (It would later become known as the United Farms Workers (UWA).)167

Because the formation of “strong neighborhoods” can help reverse the trend to a bigger central government, this has raised the ire of social liberals.168 As Berger and Neuhaus note, those supportive of centralization are often only too ready to dismiss as backward ethnocentric bigots all who seek to preserve neighborhoods, sometimes defined along ethnic lines, in the name of community solidarity.169 This is particularly ironic, since liberal community activists

168 Berger and Neuhaus, To Empower the People, 8.
169 Ibid., 8.
have been tireless in creating and increasing community awareness and action in defense of local grass roots causes. Although many social liberals are angered about such defenses of (non-minority) neighborhood autonomy, many liberal civil associations such as the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) have added to the controversy by “making it harder to effectively prosecute criminals” in many urban communities, causing great distress in tightly knit neighborhoods.\footnote{Siegel, \textit{Revolt Against the Masses}, 172, 173.} And, generally speaking, many members of the Democratic Party have been supportive of the ACLU.\footnote{Coulter, \textit{Mugged}, 19.}


Centralizing government policies have also affected the state of educational civil associations. Thus, the decline in the number of Catholic elementary and secondary parochial schools can in part be accounted for by the refusal of government to allow the use of vouchers
and tuition tax-credits.\textsuperscript{174} Students attending Catholic schools who wish to attend college are also obliged to take tests that adhere to federally mandated Common Core standards.\textsuperscript{175} A new Common Core college admissions test known as \textit{Parcc} (the Partnership for Assessment of Reading for College and Careers) has been instituted at the federal level. Many parents have complained that the test is not as challenging as older college-admissions exams such as the SAT and ACT. Although some from lower income backgrounds have supported the new test, those critical of it have objected that it lowers standards for education and career-preparation throughout the country.\textsuperscript{176} It is the kind of federal intrusion that local communities, and local organizations, find it almost impossible to fight against.

Most recently, the government has demonstrated a lack of respect for religious sensibilities. Certain institutions, such as the Catholic Church, believe that abortion, abortion inducing drugs and the use of contraception to be immoral. Washington has nonetheless issued a Health and Human Services (HHS) mandate requiring all public health facilities (as well as some Catholic and other conservative Christian institutions) to provide contraception and abortion inducing drugs for their clients.\textsuperscript{177}


Health care is another industry affected by big government. During the New Deal, the Red Cross was an effective private sector civil association.\textsuperscript{178} With the rise of Medicare and Medicaid, however, the government has assumed a larger role in health care. Rosemary Gibson and Janardan Prasad Singh remind us that government subsidization of health care industries has been part of the Medicare program ever since it was first established in 1965.\textsuperscript{179} Health care has now come under even more federal control through the 2010 Affordable Care Act.\textsuperscript{180} Gibson and Sangh assert that as a result “[collusion] between government and the drug companies, device manufacturers, insurers, and hospitals has become even more of a problem.”\textsuperscript{181} And yet, for reasons of self-interest, some civil associations have both supported this bill and continue to advocate for its maintenance. J. James Rohack, former president of the American Medical Association (AMA), was among those who looked favorably on its passage.\textsuperscript{182}

The growth in government has not only affected purely domestic associations but also those with international ties as well. For instance, a prominent private sector civil association service group, the Rotary Club, had often recruited international members through the 1930’s. However, Jeffrey Charles has noted that public sector organizations such as the Peace Corps assumed their service roles only \textit{after} the decline of institutions such as Kiwanis, Lions and Rotary. In fact, Jeffrey Charles attributes the decline of these kinds of associations to the processes of governmental bureaucratization that has accelerated with every decade.\textsuperscript{183}

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There have been of course attempts since 1945 to create “intermediary institutions,” political associations that mediate between the American people and government by reclaiming some of the functions previously performed by local organizations.\textsuperscript{184} If successful, they could both reduce the dependency of the average citizen on government as well as loosen the power of the state over people. Of special note is the Tea Party, a social and political movement initiated in 2009 specifically to protest the bailout of financial institutions.\textsuperscript{185} (This had protected irresponsible and incompetent bankers from receiving penalties for their too generous lending policies, thus removing any market discipline from financial operations.)\textsuperscript{186}

According to Fred Siegel, “the Tea Partiers feared the way that big government, big business, big media, and a self-serving academia had coalesced in a Chicago-style bulwark of crony capitalists.”\textsuperscript{187} For instance, many members of the Tea Party, supportive of the creation of medium-sized and small businesses, were dismayed at how well established and well connected associations such as Goldman Sachs and General Motors were bailed out by the government, whereas medium-sized businesses were denied such assistance, thus hindering the latter’s ability to hire workers or even survive.\textsuperscript{188} According to economic adviser Kimberly Amadeo, the Tea Party also wants to promote the election, or appointment, of individuals who are against the further growth of government.\textsuperscript{189} Most remarkably, this association has remained distinctly independent from both major political parties.

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\textsuperscript{184} Williamson, After Tocqueville, 163. \\
\textsuperscript{185} Ibid., 163. \\
\textsuperscript{186} Ibid., 163. \\
\textsuperscript{187} Siegel, Revolt Against the Masses, 201. \\
\textsuperscript{188} Ibid., 201. \\
\end{flushright}
Williamson also notes, however, that the Tea Party has been mostly unsuccessful.\(^{190}\) Many conservatives have concluded that elected politicians have pursued policies that have primarily benefited themselves and public-sector elites over the interests of most Americans and their communities. For instance, Daniel DiSalvo has concluded that many workers in public sector jobs who are members of public sector unions - teachers, police, and firefighters - have been the beneficiaries of overly generous pensions paid for by the public in states such as California, Florida, Illinois and New York. (In New York City, sanitation workers in a public-sector union are paid up to $144,000 per year.)\(^{191}\) According to Fred Siegel, similar pay scales and pensions are causing many states to “teeter on the edge of bankruptcy.”\(^{192}\)

Progressives and liberals share the conviction that government programs benefit not merely the disenfranchised but all of society. Conservatives however conclude that the further development of the welfare state only reinforces the growth of a sensate society – one that increasingly values instant gratification over hard work – that will become an ever more entrenched in twenty-first century American life.\(^{193}\) Conservatives view this as running parallel with the development of a permanent ruling class of governmental elites who try to co-opt, intimidate, or punish dissident, or simply maverick, civil associations. Thus, for example, the IRS has demonstrated a preference for auditing civil associations that were sympathetic to the cause of the Tea Party over ones that were not.\(^{194}\)

\(^{190}\) Williamson, *After Tocqueville*, 163.  
\(^{192}\) Siegel, *Revolt Against the Masses*, 202.  
There are of course defenders of the growth of government. John Kenneth Galbraith, in his *Age of Uncertainty*, argues that government intervention is necessary to help people cope with an unpredictable and unstable economy. Such political and social thought is not only popular within academia, but also among an increasing percentage of the larger American population, themselves consumed with ever higher material expectations. This of course has political implications. Most pundits in early November 2016 predicted that Democratic Party candidate Hilary Clinton, a strong advocate of the welfare state, was going to defeat Republican Donald Trump. Although she in fact did not do so due to the peculiar workings of the Electoral College, the fact that she won the popular vote is telling.

Conservative academics believe that the development of a sensate society brings with it many dysfunctional side effects quite independent of a decline in the belief in freedom and self-reliance. The prediction by Brigitte and Peter Berger that individuals will increasingly focus more on themselves rather than the welfare of others, even their own families, seems to be increasingly borne out. In part, the rise of narrow self-interest (or “turn toward the subject”) has contributed to the general decline in family values. This has had a catastrophic effect on society. As Don Eberly observes, males from fatherless households are more likely to commit

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crimes than those raised in intact nuclear families.\textsuperscript{200} Children from broken homes are similarly less likely to succeed in school.\textsuperscript{201}

In \textit{The War over the Family}, the Bergers analyze the causes of this decline. They claim that the rise of a “knowledge class,” that is, a coterie of public-sector elites and professionals who both specialize in the production of “academic knowledge,” and view government to be the primary vehicle for human development, is partly responsible.\textsuperscript{202} Conservatives, however, believe in the social and cultural importance of the family, which they see as the foundation of a healthy society.\textsuperscript{203} Robert Putnam goes further, suggesting in \textit{Bowling Alone}, that the weakening in family values and social life has played a major role in the decline in local community. He bemoans the loss of social capital, by which he means the loss of social connections that helps individuals to survive the vicissitudes of life. One sees some evidence of this in the fact that fewer Americans have become “joiners.”\textsuperscript{204} To Putnam, this decline in civic engagement has been one of the signal characteristics post-World War II era. For instance, states like New York and North Carolina, which both had interventionist state governments during the New Deal period, did not have as much “social connectivity” as some other states in the Union during the Post-World War II period.\textsuperscript{205}

To summarize, this thesis argues that voluntary associations have been weakened by the growth of government power and authority, which has increasingly assumed social functions

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{202} Berger and Berger, \textit{War over the Family}, 38, 39.
\bibitem{203} Ibid., 31, 38.
\bibitem{204} Putnam, \textit{Bowling Alone}, 277, 115, 19, 20, 15, 115.
\bibitem{205} Ibid., 115, 300.
\end{thebibliography}
once primarily performed by intermediate institutions and private organizations in the areas of family life, neighborhood organization, and religious education.

De Tocqueville Updated: Reflections on Popular Culture, the Growth of the American Government, and the Legacy of the New Deal

The United States of the twentieth-first century is increasingly being transformed into a nation more accepting of what Robert Bellah et al. have termed a practical and work-centered “utilitarian individualism” (valuing utilitarian/instrumental/contractual concerns over compassion and community-involvement) and a self-centered “expressive individualism” (or, more plainly, hedonism).²⁰⁶ On the other hand, there are still Americans who, without necessarily being religious, advocate altruistic moral and philosophical commitments concerned with the reformation of society and the morality of its numerous communities. In his important “culture wars” thesis, sociologist James Hunter observes the nature of two separate and competing factions with different value-systems and ideologies, and which therefore have different visions of the “good society.” Hunter groups Orthodox Jews, orthodox Catholics, Evangelical Protestants and non-religious conservatives into one category. These believe in traditional morality and stress self-reliance. A second category consists of Progressives and social liberals who support the growth of secularism in all major areas of society. They especially support a larger and all-embracing welfare state that makes few if any moral demands on individuals.²⁰⁷

According to Stephen Prothero, this “culture wars” thesis was probably more appropriate to the late-twentieth century than the twenty-first. He accepts that liberals have won against the various strains of conservatism (that is, neo-conservatives, right-wing libertarians, traditionalists, and all those who advocate the importance of religious values in human conduct).\footnote{Stephen Prothero, \textit{Why Liberals Win Culture Wars (Even When They Lose Elections): The Battles That Define America from Jefferson’s Heresies to Gay Marriage} (New York: HarperOne, 2016), 8, 9, 11, 242, 264.} Still, there are also several kinds of liberalism. Classical and social liberal thought are not the same. Social liberalism supports both religious and ethnic pluralism as well as big government, while classical liberalism, although promoting pluralism, is also supportive of laissez-faire capitalism and limited government. Despite this, some conservatives and traditionalists argue that classical liberalism has contributed to the spirit of contemporary decadence and societal decline as much as social liberalism. Ben Shapiro disagrees. He places the blame squarely on social liberalism, with its support of the welfare state.\footnote{Ben Shapiro, \textit{Porn Generation}, 4, 2, 5, 6, 2; Ben Shapiro, “When Do Values Trump Democracy?” \textit{The Daily Wire}, accessed December 21, 2016, \url{http://www.dailywire.com/news/7627/when-do-values-trump-democracy-ben-shapiro}.}

Other conservative and libertarian scholars assume that social liberalism has laid the groundwork for other dysfunctional societal effects. In “The Culture of Poverty,” anthropologist Oscar Lewis has argued that a “culture of poverty” has fostered a spirit not only of decadence but also of dependence among large numbers of the poor, rather than encouraging civic participation and, most importantly, individual responsibility. According to Lewis, families deeply embedded in this “culture of poverty” often “[live] with an obsessive preoccupation with sex, food, and drink, clothing and adornment, television and the movies.”\footnote{Oscar Lewis, “The Culture of Poverty,” 4.}

Evidence suggests that not only does a culture of poverty exist in the United States, but that it has gotten worse since “The Moynihan Report,” an examination of the problem of
American poverty, first appeared in 1965.\textsuperscript{211} Discussing the problem of illegitimate births, Daniel Moynihan declared that “24 per cent of all nonwhite births in [1963] were illegitimate.”\textsuperscript{212} In 2014, a government report from the Department of Health and Human Services listed the percentage of women in the United States who had out-of-wedlock births: 29.2% for non-Hispanic whites, 70.9% for non-Hispanic blacks, 65.7 for Amerindians, 16.4% for Asians/Pacific Islanders and 52.9% Hispanics. For the whole population of the United States, 40.2% of women had out-of-wedlock births.\textsuperscript{213}

In *Losing Ground*, libertarian Charles Murray makes the case that liberal social programs have exacerbated such social problems by positively encouraging a spirit of dependence on the government.\textsuperscript{214} It has long been obvious that those individuals strongly tied to religious civil associations such as the African Methodist Episcopal church, the Church of God in Christ, the African Methodist Episcopal church, and the National Baptist Convention are less likely to commit crimes and participate in a culture of poverty than those who are not.\textsuperscript{215} Other examples of civil associations that might be expected to counter this growing decadence would include business and fraternal associations like the Kiwanis and Lions Club, religiously-based groups like the Knights of Columbus, the YMCA and the YWCA, and more secular interest-group organizations such as the NAACP.

Some conservative scholars have argued that progressive policies have hurt the very minority populations that they claim they are intending to help. James Riley believes African
Americans in the United States have fewer opportunities to escape inner city poverty due to the social policies and demagoguery of politicians who seek to either expand or maintain the welfare state.216

In the final analysis, conservative thinkers have concluded that both poor whites as well as some minorities have suffered from the growth of government. As such, there are more than a few who would agree with de Tocqueville that social policy must promote an overall “equality of opportunity” with an eye to the well-being of the entire nation.217 Thus Thomas Sowell has argued that programs such as Affirmative Action have helped only those members of minority groups who have already achieved middle-class status. Poor people from disadvantaged backgrounds who have not already had reasonable “work experience,” or developed work discipline, have not benefited.218 Riley’s observation that “the black poverty rate” fell from 87% in 1940 to 47% in 1960s, well before the institution of Affirmative Action programs, is in this regard of some interest.219 (Poverty rates fell at a noticeably lower rate after that, remaining at 31.9% in 1990.)220

Concluding Question: Can the “Mediating Structures” Approach of Peter Berger and Richard Neuhaus Revitalize Civil Associations and Bring Back Limited Government in a Post-Great Society Era in the United States?

218 Riley, Please Stop Helping Us, 142.
219 Ibid., 155.
220 Ibid., 155.
It is clear that some kind of welfare state is necessary. An excessively large one supported by some politicians and their social liberal acolytes, either for their political advantage, or for ideological reasons, is not. Social liberals such as Chris Mooney are quick to conclude that working-class supporters of the Republican Party are “unenlightened,” racist and “reactionary” because they are either religious, resentful of excessive government assistance to the poor, or unsuccessful in worldly accomplishments as defined by liberal elites.\textsuperscript{221} To remedy what they see as a lack of economic and social accomplishments, as well as the political and cultural confusion and incomprehension they consider to be prevalent among large sectors of the American population, social liberals have promoted the example of an “enlightened” professional upper-middle class as role models for the unenlightened. In this way it is hoped that American society will become more secular and “value neutral.”\textsuperscript{222} More specifically, and more explicitly semi-socialist, social liberals see the growth of government as the most effective means in achieving a prosperous economy and a humane and scientifically-guided society.\textsuperscript{223}

Such hopes are in stark contrast to some conservatives who place their hope in an expanding, vital capitalist economy which they believe will eventually profit everyone. It is the assumption of this thesis that an appreciation of the spirit of religion and traditional morality and an appreciation of the spirit of science, advanced technology, and material accomplishments best developed through capitalism are \textit{not} incompatible sentiments. In order for cultural and human capital to have the widest possible effect, more civil associations, whether religious or secular, regional or local, have to be created to check and also balance big government, with its burgeoning welfare state, and also large private corporations.

\textsuperscript{222} William Van Lear, \textit{The Next American Century} (Lanham MD: University Press of America, 2008), 8.
\textsuperscript{223} Ibid., 5; Brigitte Berger and Peter L. Berger, \textit{War over the Family}, 71.
The central argument is that effective civil associations are necessary for a number of reasons. As locally based groups, they can work against the overweening power of both government and nationally based corporations, thus assuring greater individual and local freedom. In this way they can also help ensure that both public and private sectors work for the common welfare of the American citizen. Born out of local initiatives, their very existence strengthens community spirit and a greater sense of neighborliness. This in turn can reduce feelings of anomie. It also can create greater feelings of self-respect that can help reduce crime rates, and encourage a greater sense of individual responsibility.

As previously mentioned, many members of Peter and Brigitte Berger’s knowledge class, advocating socially liberal political ideologies imposed from above, are allergic to most grassroots movements that do not conform to their preconceived notions of what working and lower middle class people are supposed to believe and want.

These social liberals fall into roughly two categories. First, there are those who believe that the ordinary citizen is not sufficiently “educated” and “enlightened” to make their own life choices, and therefore needs government to provide guidance through means of governmental regulations.224 Second, there are others such as Arthur Schlesinger Jr. and John Dewey who hold a Bancroftian worldview, meaning they believe that human nature is fluid, altruistic, and perfectible. More specifically, they place great hope in public sector institutions, especially public schools, which they see as the principle means of “transforming” and educating future generations with a “Progressive” outlook.225

224 Berger and Berger, War over the Family, 38, 39.
This thesis does not disparage either of the two ideologies, but it does hold them to be incomplete and one-sided. The one assumes human beings are, at base, mostly rational. This is Bancroftian. The other, that people are mostly irrational. Together, this represents the assumptions of most “knowledge class” liberals.

This thesis also assumes that these two inadequate views of human nature can be supplemented and balanced against each other. While recognizing that human beings have a static human nature that tends towards selfishness and self-interest, it is also admitted that the limits of human nature can be expanded and supplemented to a degree through the incorporation of traditional values and virtues, centered around family and local community, which can be communicated and transmitted through neighborhood associations.226

The growth of government both derives from, and has contributed to, the decline in community as well as the family. De Tocqueville was correct when he predicted the inevitable growth of government. He observed that “men readily adopt the notion of a great central (governmental) power in ages of equality.”227 With statism and what de Tocqueville called an “equality-of-condition” becoming more of a reality, and indeed increasingly regarded as an imperative by significant sectors of American people, one must conclude that Tocqueville was especially prescient.228 Phillips Bradley, aware of the rise in statist ideologies and the expansion of government throughout the world during the early twentieth century, advocated in response an increase in the number, status and influence of American civil associations in the manner of de Tocqueville.229

228 Commager, Commager on Tocqueville, 32; Tocqueville, Democracy in America Vol. 1, trans. Henry Reeve and Francis Bowen, 3; Commager, Commager on Tocqueville, 32.
There are general explanations as to why some individuals support the growth of government in the United States. One is the vested interests of politicians. De Tocqueville asserted that the size and number of governmental institutions would grow because those who worked for government often brooded “over advantages they [did] not possess.”

Bradley not only condemns the rise in statism but also the associated rise of materialism that has long negatively affected the United States.

To some degree, the spread and popularity of a materialistic culture is a reflection of an increasingly superficial American value system. According to Clause Offe, de Tocqueville suggested that political centralization engendered the formation of conformist attitudes among the American population. De Tocqueville in fact did fear that the American people might lose “the faculties of thinking, feeling, and action for themselves, and thus gradually [fall] below the level of humanity.” He asserted that the defects of the egalitarian culture of the United States are either leading men “into anarchy” or down the “road to servitude.”

It is self-evident that contemporary America has been affected by the growth of the welfare state. Bradley does chronicle one ironic development. While political power has long been in the hands of Americans who have had formal voting rights, governmental bureaucracies have increasingly come to acquire more power in running affairs than have the American people through the processes of representative democracy.

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232 Offe, Tocqueville, Adorno & West, 22.
234 Ibid., 304.
To guard Americans against the deleterious effects of excessive government, Berger and Neuhaus have advocated the formation of “mediating structures.”\textsuperscript{237} These they define as “institutions standing between the individual in his private life and the large institutions of public life,” and include neighborhood groups, churches and the family.\textsuperscript{238} Berger and Neuhaus, however, do not define these merely as a means of reducing government spending and power in the United States. They instead take a more positive stance, suggesting that these structures can help direct governmental institutions into pursuing beneficial public policies - - such as the disbursement of educational vouchers and tax credits - - while also using resources more effectively and efficiently through collaboration with local, non-governmental associations.\textsuperscript{239}

Given the general acceptance of big government, Berger and Neuhaus assume that it would be difficult to convince the public to radically reduce the size of the bureaucracy. They advocate the concept of mediating structures partly because it is more realistic for community groups to \textit{negotiate} with government rather than to make futile demands for radical libertarian reforms. In this regard, Chilton Williamson has opined that populist protest movements across the political spectrum, from the People’s Party of 1892 to the Tea Party today, have generally been unsuccessful in realizing their respective reformist visions.\textsuperscript{240}

Although many contemporary Americans rail against the size of government, many others continue to advocate its growth. One has only to reflect on how many Americans, especially members of the Democratic Party, are deeply involved in a self-interested, quasi-patronage system that ensures them good salaries and pension and health benefits if they support

\textsuperscript{237} Berger and Neuhaus, \textit{To Empower the People}, 2, 7.
\textsuperscript{238} Ibid., 2, 8, 19, 26.
\textsuperscript{239} Ibid., \textit{To Empower the People}, 7, 22, 24.
\textsuperscript{240} Williamson, \textit{After Tocqueville}, 200, 121, 163, 162, 161, 163.
the right candidates.\textsuperscript{241} Many more, of course, are not. Thus, it falls to the latter to navigate the labyrinthine political and economic system in order to find a satisfactory career without the political patronage associated with government sponsorship.

Both Berger and Neuhaus propose practical measures that are intended to not only make people more aware of broader economic and social opportunities, but also to improve society at the same time. In an effort to provide quality education for all, especially for minority populations, they suggest that educational vouchers or tuition tax credits be given to individual families. American citizens would thus have the option of sending their children to privately-owned primary and secondary schools that, in many cases, provide a superior education to that in public schools. To pursue this specific end, Berger and Neuhaus advocate the creation of more private schools of various kinds.\textsuperscript{242}

In a recent book, Charles Murray has argued that a reduction in welfare payments would reduce dependency by forcing the unemployed to find the best available employment. For Murray, even starting at a minimum-wage job creates pride, self-sufficiency and can lead over time to self-improvement. Murray’s vision is “libertarian” and assumes that the creative potential of the individual can be unleashed when freed from dependency on government.\textsuperscript{243} Note should be taken of former House of Representatives member Jack Kemp’s proposal to create “enterprise zones” in inner-cities by providing generous tax breaks for those individuals interested in starting businesses.\textsuperscript{244}

\textsuperscript{241} Cost, Spoiled Rotten, 6, 7, 8.
\textsuperscript{242} Berger and Neuhaus, To Empower the People, 22, 24, 22, 7; Edward Banfield, “Why Government Cannot Solve the Urban Problem” Daedalus 97 (1968), 1233.
Although Alexis de Tocqueville believed that there is hope for America, he nevertheless was afraid a self-absorbed population is naturally prone to ignoring threats to the survival of its civilization.\textsuperscript{245} According to Offe, Max Weber, like de Tocqueville, feared the consequences of the growth of bureaucracy. Suggesting the influence of de Tocqueville on Weber, Offe discusses the latter’s perception that American society, and indeed the entire West, may be trapped in an “iron cage of dependence” that threatens the existence of political rights, political liberties, and free thought.\textsuperscript{246}

As early as 1962, Milton Friedman reminded the American public that a massive amount of political power had accrued to the Federal government.\textsuperscript{247} Yet this growth is not necessarily irreversible. Many individual states and communities have reduced state and local government expenditures during the 2010’s. In other words, many states are trying to keep themselves solvent by only paying for those programs they can afford. Such cuts indicate that there are still local politicians who are responsibly attempting to ensure financial integrity for the future of their communities.\textsuperscript{248}

This suggests that at least some American political leaders are not only showing signs of fiscal responsibility, but are also demanding more personal responsibility. That they are doing so in opposition to the general popular belief in big government (i.e. majority-tyranny) is cause to give individual citizens some hope for the survival of earlier American ideals. In \textit{To Empower the People}, Berger and Neuhaus likewise speculate about the possibility of a “Neo-Jeffersonian”

\textsuperscript{245} Tocqueville, \textit{Democracy in America}. Vol. 1, 237.
\textsuperscript{246} Offe, \textit{Tocqueville, Weber & Adorno}, 29, 55, 56, 2.
\textsuperscript{248} Andrew Perrin, \textit{American Democracy: From Tocqueville to Town Halls to Twitter} (Malden MA: Polity Press, 2014), 39, 40.
movement that can give ordinary people some say in reducing the amount of government spending and regulations in the United States.\textsuperscript{249}

The American public can do its part by creating civil associations that, among other goals, are supportive of the creation and success of small businesses. A shift in American attitudes that could result in a proliferation of local civil associations can encourage public policies that advocate small businesses creation, as an alternative to the current championing of either big government or big business, as the best solution for some economic problems.

Historian Jonathan J. Bean claims that in the late nineteenth century there was more coexistence between small and big business. He also applauds the resiliency of many small businesses in more modern times despite the federal taxation and overregulation that have threatened their continued existence. He happily observed the ability of small businesses in the 1980s to more quickly discern consumer preferences and adapt to them faster than big businesses.\textsuperscript{250}

Reducing both taxation and the amount of governmental regulations imposed on small business may be the means by which unemployment can be significantly reduced. Cutting taxes and regulations can give individuals a chance to either start their own companies which naturally would involve the hiring of the unemployed or underemployed.\textsuperscript{251} Individuals would in this way acquire social skills associated with work as well as “hands-on” business experience.

Additionally, engaging in the hard work and concentration that small business demands would necessarily require Americans to fight against the moral laxity of a sensate society. American citizens would thus be in a better position to create real wealth both for their fellow citizens and for themselves. Conversely, increased employment opportunities provided by a revitalized

\textsuperscript{249}John J. Flynn, “The Crisis of Federalism: Who is Responsible?,” 229; Berger and Neuhaus, \textit{To Empower the People}, 15.

\textsuperscript{250}Bean, \textit{Beyond the Broker State, 1936-1961}, 177, 166, 48, 167, 175.

economy could help citizens avoid becoming dependent on governmental institutions that, unintentionally or not, foster a spirit of helplessness among the general population.

Civil associations are products of the same energetic and enterprising spirit that animates small business. They are the expression of the desire of people to take their lives into their own hands, and commit both time and effort to making their local communities better. Alexis de Tocqueville came out of a French society that in the 1830s was still haunted by the massacres and mob violence that characterized the most terrible European political upheaval of the previous hundred years – the French Revolution. He feared that democracy could, as in France, lead to mass brutality and murder. He feared the ferocity of the mob. This is one of the reasons why the workings of American democracy so fascinated him.\(^{252}\) He saw the organization of civil associations scattered widely among the largely disunited American states as a guarantee against the centrally organized terror that emanated from Paris under the inspiration of Robespierre and the Paris based Committee of Public Safety.\(^{253}\) In fact, he need not have feared that kind of tyranny in America.

Ironically, the greatest threat to the American Republic has not been the unbridled violent passions of revolutionaries, but the development of a sensate, politically slothful nation excessively dependent on government to provide them with the good things of life. It is not ferocity that is the greatest danger to the American Republic, but the passivity of citizens unwilling to commit either the time or energy to creating the civil associations that allow free people to govern their own communities without the interference of outside government authority. De Tocqueville understood the importance of such groups. He also saw how a

\(^{252}\) Brogan, “Introduction,” xii, xi.

preference for equality over liberty and individualism might weaken both civil associations and the Republic. It remains to be seen if some future resurgence of civil associations and the individual initiative that creates them can overcome the political and social decay fostered by big government and the welfare state.
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