Santana: Middle Class Families in Sao Paulo, Brazil

Elizabeth Riggs Hansen

The Graduate Center, City University of New York
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SANTANA: MIDDLE CLASS FAMILIES
IN SÃO PAULO, BRAZIL

by

Elizabeth R. Hansen

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Anthropology in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York.

1976
This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Anthropology in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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Figure 1. São Paulo, Brazil.
Figure 2. Urban São Paulo.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Middle income people in Latin American countries have scarcely been accorded the attention that tribes, peasants and the urban poor have received from social scientists. Insofar as any attention at all has been paid to these people, Latin American "middle classes" have been either unrealistically glorified or despised by modernization theorists and their critics. Middle income people have remained invisible behind a miasma of theoretical expectations on the behavior of "middle classes."

This may be partly the result of the operational difficulty of practising traditional anthropological methods in urban middle income settings, where there are sturdy walls to keep out intruders, including Ph.D. candidates; it may also result from the definitional difficulties which surround the concepts of "class" and "middle class."

This thesis aims at understanding the structural constraints which have determined the lives of middle income Brazilians in Sao Paulo city, as well as at showing one process of middle class formation.

I have been extraordinarily fortunate in the writing of this thesis for having the advice, criticism and support of Drs. Jane Schneider, Eric Wolf, Daniel Gross, Anthony Leeds and Edward Hansen. These have saved
me from major theoretical faults, much clumsy and imprecise writing and moments of deep despair of ever finishing. Towards the end of writing I received critical advice and support from Delmos Jones and Jaquetta Burnet. My gratitude to all of these is immeasurable. I am also grateful to Leonard Foote, who prepared the maps, genealogies and many of the charts for the thesis.

In Brazil, I often received offers of help, which because of the press of time, I could not follow up. The personnel at EMURB and at the Municipal Archives, for instance, were infallibly gracious and forthright in their interest in my work. Other people offered warmth, hospitality and the different kinds of companionship which make fieldwork a complex and exciting business. Many of these people would prefer to remain anonymous, but my gratitude and affection is no less for not being able to name them individually.

Most of all, however, I am indebted to the individuals and families in Santana, who thought their story was important and who were willing to tell it to me and urge their friends to do so as well. Categorically, this work could not have been done had not one person taken me under her wing and given me the opportunity to get inside people's houses and form a network for myself. All of the people interviewed were extremely gracious and generous about my queries—as well as patient and humorous over my not infrequent gaffes. It is thanks to their
generosity that we may here attempt to demystify the concept of "middle class" and see real people.

It would have been foolish to attempt to disguise Santana under a pseudonym. All names of individuals in the thesis, however, are pseudonyms, and wherever possible, the individuals described are composite distillates of many interviews with many people.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .............................................. 3
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS ........................................... 7

Chapter

I. INTRODUCTION .................................................... 9
II. POLITICAL STAGES IN TWENTIETH CENTURY BRAZIL ............ 59
III. SANTANA: FROM THE TOP OF THE HILL ........................ 132
IV. SANTANA: FROM THE BOTTOM OF THE HILL ..................... 184
V. "NOSSA CLASSE MEDIA SOFRIDA": THE OUTLINES OF A CONSCIOUSNESS OF MIDDLE CLASS ............................... 250
VI. CONCLUSIONS: "MIDDLE CLASSES" AND "MIDDLE SECTORS" ...... 303

Appendix

I. Sub-districts of São Paulo, ranked according to population, area, income, professions and number of students ........... 318
II. Currency Conversion Table ....................................... 322
III. Household composition, material assets and sources thereof of Santana families .............................................. 323
IV. Supplements to Chapter IV ....................................... 329
V. Supplements to Chapter V ........................................ 333

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY .......................................... 349

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LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure

1. São Paulo, Brazil ..................................... i
2. Urban São Paulo ........................................ ii
3. Map of greater São Paulo ............................ 36
4. Center of Santana ..................................... 38
5. Income distribution in São Paulo districts .... 43
6. Nuclei of 17th century São Paulo ................ 45
7. Population of Santana from 1765 to 1825 .... 47
8. Population growth in center city neighborhoods of São Paulo and Nossa Senhora do Ó in the Northern Zone of São Paulo ............... 48
11. The percentages of income strata in selected capitals of Brazil, 1975 .......... 53
12. Family income, education and consumption strata in Brazil, 1975 .......... 54
14. Number of public servants per thousand in the population in selected states between 1920 and 1950 .......... 84
15. National and Paulista political parties .......... 107

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Chapter Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Presidential elections in Brazil</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Employment in the Federal Government</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Santana's Elite, 1900-1930</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Economic decline and loss of family contact in three generations</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Population growth in the Northern Zone of São Paulo, 1934-1950</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Professions of first generation immigrants to Santana, 1900-1930</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Professions of second generation immigrants to Santana, 1900-1970</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Career comparisons between generations of immigrants in Santana, 1900-1950</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Professions of Brazilian rural migrants and second generation foreign immigrants to Santana, 1930-1950</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Bureaucratic absorption in a single family</td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Population growth in the Northern Zone of São Paulo, 1950-1970</td>
<td>213</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The main purpose of this work is to describe the lives and careers of a number of middle class families residing in the neighborhood of Santana, São Paulo city, Brazil. The research was undertaken in order to evaluate the assumption common to many writers that the middle class plays a "vital" or "decisive" role in the political and economic evolution of developing countries.

A background assumption of the study is that changes in a nation's political and class structure reflect the nation's position in a changing world economy. This means that an historical perspective is necessary to account for the variety of economic and political forces which may affect the formation of a middle class— that is, 

1An example of this principle is to be found in Wallerstein's (1972) description of developments in Poland and England during the 15th and 16th centuries. Both had "defeudalized" during the 14th century population decline, and both had relatively similar class structures. England, however, developed multiple economic activities and an industrial base directed by a capitalist class involved in sheep raising, farming and industry. England developed a middle level of "intermediaries" for these activities. Poland, on the other hand, entered the world market as an exporter of wheat and so "refeudalized" its economy and developed the kind of capitalist class associated with latifundia economies. Poland destroyed its intermediaries. It became a neocolonial state, with its surplus drained abroad through...
a group which is discrete from both a lower working class and an upper ruling class—-and its eventual role in the development process. Therefore, the method employed here is the display of family histories and careers against the backdrop of São Paulo and Brazil's political and economic development over the past seventy years. I shall explore periods during which people from middle income sectors could have played the decisive roles attributed them by a number of social scientists, and attempt to gauge their actual influence during these periods.

The results of this study show first, that it is not useful to consider the role of middle classes in developing nations without precise reference to the urban, national and international systems which determine the formation, position and opportunities of specific middle classes. The histories of the families studied suggest that until recently there was no middle class in São Paulo: the various middle income groups which may now be said to compose a middle class in that city were often "created," that is, defined (or redefined) in their social positions by political forces over which they had no control.

the kind of international debt peonage familiar to students of Latin American development (See also Frank, 1969; Cardoso and Falleto, 1970; Ianni, 1970; Wallerstein, 1974).

2See below, pp.25-28 , for the way in which the terms "class," "middle class" and "middle sectors" are being used in this thesis.
Second, because the formation of middle income groups and a middle class reflect shifting political and economic forces, the roles of middle income people in the development process shift as well, and their political and economic influence has had specific limitations over time. Third, the middle class families studied have had less direct influence in the economic and political development of São Paulo than many writers might suppose. The research shows that families like these were never close to top level power, but that periodically different groups among them have been included in different ways at intermediate levels of power. Over the past fifty years, in fact, these families have been progressively marginalized from spheres of power as well as from strategic economic resources.

Before exploring these conclusions further, this chapter will first discuss the literature on middle classes in the development process of Latin America and describe the assumptions about class and middle class which were used in this study. It will close with a brief discussion of the neighborhood and population studied.

The importance of the role of the middle class has been most strongly asserted by authors using modernization models. The concern with modernization grew together with the development of the Cold War and the emergence of the United States as a major economic and political power in search of new markets for its output in the nonindustrial
countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America. In spite of all-inclusive assertions that "modernization is . . . a multifaceted process involving changes in all areas of human thought and activity" (Huntington, cited in Tipps, 1973:200), the causal agent for modernization was seen as "economic take off" (Rostow, 1960). For many writers it was the economy which was seen as the independent variable to which the political and all other systems had to adapt (Apter, 1965:460; Lerner, 1958:401; Rostow, 1962:316; La Palombara and Weiner, 1966:20; Anderson, 1967:iii, 369).

In order to understand the take off process, modernization theorists turned to the European pattern of development for insights into the conditions of change in the nonindustrial countries of the twentieth century.

Part of the pattern included the alleged economic dynamism of European middle classes to which Weber had

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3 Cf. Tipps (1973:200): "The concept tends to be a summarizing one rather than a discriminating one, as every effort is made to specify its meaning in terms which are sufficiently general to avoid excluding any of the possible ramifications of this "multifaceted process." Attempts at definition are aimed more at telling us what modernization is (or might be) rather than what it is not."

4 Cf. Tipps (1973:201): "The influence of . . . received traditions is particularly evident in the case of Modernization theory. Though their terminology may be somewhat novel, the manner in which modernization theorists tend to approach the study of social change in Non Western societies is deeply rooted in the perspective of developmentalism which was already firmly established in the conventional wisdom of Western social science well before the end of the 19th century."
alluded in *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism.* Because it was assumed that the nonindustrial countries would have development patterns similar to European patterns, the "role of the middle class" became, as Stepan (1965:87) has noted, an "independent variable associated with modernization."  

5Cf. Weber (1965:65): "We shall see that at the beginning of modern times, it was by no means the capitalistic entrepreneurs of the commercial aristocracy who were either the sole or the predominant bearers of the attitude we have called here the spirit of capitalism. It was much more the rising strata of the lower industrial middle classes. Even in the 19th century its classical representatives were not the elegant gentlemen from Liverpool and Hamburg with their commercial fortunes handed down for generations, but the self made parvenus of Manchester and Westphalia who often rose from very modest circumstances. As early as the 16th century the situation was similar. The industries which arose at that time were mostly created by parvenus."

6The assumption was by no means universal, even among economists. See Gerschenkron, (1970) and Fishlow (1970).

7A strong tendency to idealize the role of the middle class in Western development was already present in American sociology. See for example Corbin (1922:88): "Alone among the classes, the middle class has consistently been praised; it has been conscious of its might and assertive of its right. Aristotle observed that the chief power of the state may most wisely be entrusted to it. As leader of a newly risen middle class Pericles crowned the great age of Hellenic history, building the Parthenon. In Rome the middle class gave the blood that conquered the ancient world, the brain that laid the foundation of all law. When the lamp of antiquity flickered out in the Dark Ages, it was the middle class that led mankind forward to the new day. It was the middle class protestant who brought the conscience of the world to bear upon the life of the spirit. When England set its constitution above the King, when the American colonies established the people as the origin of all justice, when France built up the foremost European republic, it was always the middle class in whom the move-
The emergence of Latin American middle classes was expected to increase economic dynamism and stimulate political development, very much as the emergence of the European middle classes was thought to have done. Thus, the American sociologist, John Johnson, held that one of the most profound developments in Latin America was the emergence of urban middle sectors as an aggressive political force. Urban middle groups are vitally, if not decisively important in an area where one still commonly hears and reads that "there is no middle class to speak of" (1958: 2, vii; see also Ratinoff, 1967: 61).

According to the American sociologist, Seymour Lipset, the growing middle class in these countries, like its 19th century counterpart supports a democratic society by attempting to reduce the influence of the anticapitalist traditionalists and the arbitrary power of the military (1960: 138).

However, a few social scientists who undertook research among middle income sectors in Latin America were baffled at the social picture presented in these countries. Thus, Lowry Nelson (1950: 47), writing on Cuban 

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ment began and ended. The institutions of civil liberty are the creation not of the proletariat, nor yet of the capitalists, but of those who are neither rich nor poor. . . . the middle class is distinguished above all others for its political independence, its caution, its solid practical intelligence, its steady industry, its high moral average. . . ." (See also Corey, 1935: 13).

---

middle income sectors expressed the sense that society had not yet "set or jelled" in the expected way. Other writers with similar experiences in Latin America concluded that in these countries the middle class had not yet taken up their "real role of mediator in the phenomenon of the class struggle" (Carvajal, 1950:38. See also Dupouy, 1950). Latin American countries were simply not developing economically or politically according to the presumed model.

Explanations for this failure were sought first in local culture and then in the area of psychological predisposition. Among those who concluded that Latin American resistance to modernization was cultural in origin (Gillin, 1965; Rosen 1962, 1964; Greenfield, 1969; Greenfield and Barros, 1965), Frank Bonilla found Latin American culture "disappointing" --as measured by the number of Nobel Prize winners and canonized saints (sic. Bonilla, 1967:240,239). Other writers did not go so far in their disapproval; Lipset wrote

The relative failure of Latin American countries to develop on a scale comparable to those of North America has been seen in some part as a consequence of variations in the value systems dominating these two areas (1967:4).

Yet other writers pushed the chain of causality further away from economics and introduced an element of circularity in the argument by focusing on people's psyches. Drawing on McClelland's research (1953; cf. also Hagen, 1962), some writers postulated that certain ideological or
psychological prerequisites must exist among critical groups before economic growth can take place (eg. Lipset, 1967:3-4). These groups appear in the literature variously under the names of "the middle class," a "new middle class" or "new elites," who are expected to generate the economic growth necessary for modernization. Yet it is frequently left vague or ambiguous whether such groups should be or are in fact a nascent industrial bourgeoisie, or whether they represent the "increasing numbers of middle level functionaries" (Barber, 1968:295; Hoselitz, 1965; Weinberg, 1969: 4) necessary for modern industrial society.

Consequently, there arose a concern with educational systems--or as Bonilla (1967:236) tellingly puts it, with "non-coercive cultural control"--which would create or instill the values consonant with modern economic development (e.g. Coleman, 1965). Such systems should pro-

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9 See the exchange between Halperin (1969, 1970) and Perlmutter (1967, 1970) for a similar discussion on the role of the middle class in the Middle East.

10 Leeds (1971) and in a personal communication has pointed out that the concern with culture traits as intrinsic to the psyches of given populations, rather than as variables depending on specific structural constraints, is peculiarly American. The concern for "education" and "values," however, among modernization theorists appears to have been an alibi for the real concern which was with power. Modernization theory has recently received scathing criticisms on the empirical, conceptual and ideological levels, some of which are mentioned in the text (Bendix, 1967; Weinberg, 1969; Bodenheimer, 1970; Frank, 1972; Tipps, 1973; Walton, 1972). Empirically some descriptions of the modernization process have been found to be overly
vide the skills for advancement based on "achievement" rather than the "traditional" advancement based on "ascription." They would thus prepare the way for the formation of pluralist groups, or a "civic culture," in the words of Almond and Verba (1963), and for the formation of "new elites" (cf. Nadel, 1956), in contraposition to the "traditional oligarchies" of Latin American countries to direct the process of modernization (Apter, 1965:447). Latin American universities were scrutinized and reforms suggested which would foster "modern" values (Lipset, 1967:42). As Solari wrote,

> as academic education is universalized, it is somehow linked with the democratization of society and even

simple or misleading (Tipps, 1973). As a whole, these writings are plagued by ethnocentricity, a unilineal scheme of evolution and disregard for historical context. It should be pointed out, however, that modernization models are more than mistaken theories developed to explain social change. During the period of North American expansionism in the 1950's and 1960's, modernization writers often played the role of "counselor to the king" (see Halberstam, 1969:192-200). In this context, the theory and its promulgation abroad can be seen as a self serving ideology, justifying North American expansionism and blinding foreign as well as native social observers to the realities of power and capitalist development. See for example, Shils (1965:503), on the importance of "modern humanistic scholarship:" "The existence of cultural movements inherited from the past, either by physical survival or by traditional transmission, requires interpretation. To interpret them in a modern way, highly qualified persons, well learned in the techniques of modern humanistic scholarship, which are of universal validity regardless of the parochiality of the subject matter, must be available. The inherited culture is not rich enough in itself either to serve as the cultural complement of a modern society, or to engender the self respect demanded by modernity."
in Latin America it is accompanied by greater pluralism and a wider division of power (1967:48, emphasis added).

But again, when the claims were checked through research they were proven dubious at best. The new elites did not fulfill these expectations (Bonilla, 1967; Ribeiro, 1967; Soares, 1967; Gouveia, 1967); they appeared too bound to tradition to accept their "historical mission."

In the light of the search for a "new" middle class or elite to direct the transition from tradition to modernity, the modernization literature on immigrants is especially interesting. European, largely Southern European, immigration to Argentina, Brazil and Chile in particular, was especially heavy at the turn of the nineteenth century. These immigrants are frequently described as "cultural deviants" because of their lack of traditional Latin American outlooks (Lipset, 1967:23-24; Willems, 1975:192) and as unconscious and unwilling bearers of modernization (Germani, 1950:15-17; 1970:309; Bresser Pereira, 1962; Lipset, 1967).

While immigrants were relatively successful in Latin America, Willems has recently attributed to them a "revolutionary" role in the economic and social development of these countries, which is similar to expectations for modernization imputed to a middle class. Indeed, drawing on Dean's (1969) study of the industrialization of São Paulo, Willems emphasizes the role of upwardly
mobile middle class immigrants in the industrial growth of that city.\footnote{11} According to him, the overall role of immigrants has not been restricted to the implantation and development of an industrial technology. /The immigrant trajectory/ implies a good deal of upward social mobility. Through the institutional channels of business and industry, people of the most variegated cultural origins moved to social classes higher than they had occupied when they first settled in Latin America. And by doing so they revolutionized the very class structure of which they had become integral parts. They not only changed the culture or lifestyle of the traditional classes, social mobility itself became a highly pervasive structural element. This of course happened only in the few countries such as Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil and to a lesser extent, Chile and Venezuela, which attracted large numbers of immigrants (1975:197, emphasis in the original).

The relative success of some immigrants in Latin America notwithstanding, we cannot accept a middle class--immigrant or otherwise--as prime mover in Latin American development because we are never told what a middle class might be, might have been or might arise from. While the

\footnote{11}{It should be pointed out, however, that while Dean writes that the "immigrants who came to engage in trade and industry were by origin petit bourgeois or middle class," several paragraphs later he writes that the majority of the immigrants to São Paulo "had little chance to rise out of the lower class: at best they might reach the level of the retail trade or crafts shop. Those immigrants who acquired fortunes and came to equal the coffee planters in social position were of quite different origins...many arrived with capital in some form...and as a rule the immigrant bourgeois came to São Paulo with resources that placed them far ahead of their fellows [and apparently not just in the middle] and practically determined a prefabricated class structure" (Dean,1969:50-51).}
basic assumptions of modernization theory have been severely criticised by a number of writers (Bendix, 1967; Weinberg, 1969; Bodenheimer, 1971; Frank, 1972; Tipps, 1973; Walton, 1972), the concept of a politically effective middle class continues as a kind of ideological amoeba with claims and counterclaims being made for or against its role in particular historical events.

Thus, a number of critics of modernization theory have attacked its unilineal evolutionary bias and its use of the "traditional"-"modern" dichotomy, as though, in Gouldner's words, the past were "a convenient contrast with the present rather than...a preparation for it" (1970:120). For many critics of modernization theory, the kind of economic development any Latin American country may undergo is a function of its past political and economic dependence on the already developed capitalist countries: that is, the so-called underdeveloped countries are already modern. Their poverty has been generated by their dependency relations with the wealthier countries. For dependency theorists, it is the power relations of capitalism which are the independent variables; the individual economies and class structures of the nonindustrial countries are seen as a reflection of them (Baran, 1960; Stavenhagen, 1968; Frank, 1969, 1972; Stein and Stein, 1970, Wallerstein, 1974; Leeds, 1973). In a succinct reply to modernization theorists' position on the Latin
American middle class, Stavenhagen pointed out that while the term ostensibly refers to a statistical aggregate, it is most often used as a euphemism for the ruling class or bourgeoisie (1968:24-5). When it does not refer to ruling groups, it refers to groups which are dependent on the ruling class (Stavenhagen, 1968:25; Adams, 1967; Horowitz, 1967; Pike, 1968; Petras, 1965; Stepan, 1965). While many critics of the modernization position on the middle class do not deny the existence of middle income groups which belong neither to the ruling class nor to the propertyless working class, they do not see them acting even remotely like their 19th century counterparts in Europe. Thus R. N. Adams writes that

while it is possible to distinguish a growing middle income sector, the older and basic dual structure of prestige and value systems has not changed as much as has been supposed. Rather, the apparently new middle group is only an extension of the traditional upper class, both in terms of economic position and basic values. It is possible to understand many aspects of contemporary Latin America if one sees individuals operating in terms of one of these two major sectors (the upper or the lower); while it is quite impossible to do so by insisting on the emergence of a new middle class (1967:16. See also Leeds, 1964, 1965, 1973).

However, modernization critics have made counter-claims and often seem to share the assumption about the existence and effectiveness of Latin American middle classes. Thus Pike (1968) argues that in Chile a middle class might have contributed not to economic growth as modernization writers expect, but to economic stagnation. Moreover,
the middle class Pike describes for Chile is left as unspecific in its composition as is the modernization version of a middle class. One is unsure as to whether it consists of an industrial bourgeoisie intermarried with a landed aristocracy--distinctions within a ruling class¹²-- or whether it consists of downwardly mobile but socially aspiring poor relatives.

The theme of downward mobility (as opposed to the upward mobility implied by modernization theorists) in the creation of a middle class appears in the literature on Brazil in the writings of Marques de Saes (1973) and Jaguaribe (1973). Marques de Saes, for example, argues that many of Brazil's middle income sectors represent economic "fallouts" from bust periods of that country's economic cycles.

The end of each economic cycle condemned the aristocratic stratum which had risen to economic ascendance to decadence and impoverishment. However, the social status and the political prestige which they had conquered during these periods did not permit other dominant sectors to regard the danger of their proletarianization with indifference. Thus arose a welfaristic state, ready to absorb all decadent groups in its bureaucratic corps and armed forces (1973:23).¹³

As a result of such bureaucratic employment in a

¹²Angel Palerm's discussion of a Mexican middle class in the 18th century also uses the term middle class to refer to what appears to be a bourgeoisie (Palerm,1952).

¹³All translations from Brazilian materials are the writer's.
sinecure or "Cartorial" state, Jaguaribe (1966) argues that the Brazilian middle class had significant influence during critical periods of Brazil's development. The relationship of the middle class with the military bureaucracy was raised recently by José Nun, who concludes (1968) that far from being an inherently democratic force, the middle class in Brazil joined with the military in 1964 to prevent "premature democratization." His argument is based on the assumption that since military officers tend to be of middle class origins, the military tend to represent middle class interests. However, a recent analysis of the Brazilian military (Stepan, 1971:47) clearly suggests that soldiers protect not their origins but their achievements, and that far from acting as representatives of any group, the military acts primarily to defend itself as an institution.

However, despite all the claims with regard to the role of the middle class in the development process of

14"The term is derived from the old colonial notary publics whose functions and status have remained almost unchanged to the present day, and who have a legal and sociological importance which goes far beyond that of their Anglo Saxon counterparts" (Jaguaribe, 1966:168).

15See also Wagley (1964:315): When "faced with a national crisis or the threat of rapid change, the Latin American middle class ultimately acquiesces; it remains passive before a military regime that guarantees stability or it actively supports a political party or a coalition of parties aimed at the status quo." See also Horowitz (1967:157-158).
various Latin American countries, we are told very little about any actual middle class in any of them. The confusion as to what a middle class did or might do arises out of the confusion as to whom a middle class might consist of and how its "middleness" is defined against classes above or below it. The definitional difficulty thus created has been ignored by most writers through a global extension of the term to include a variety of groups which might compose a middle class (cf. Johnson, 1958:3; Ratinoff, 1967:90; Stavenhagen, 1968:23-24; Stepan, 1965:87). As Leeds has pointed out, evasive terms ("middle sectors, middle statuses, middle levels, middle elements, middle groups, middle segments, middle components, middle masses") which refer to no structurally or functionally delineated unit have proliferated (1973:49).

One purpose of this study is to continue the criticism of modernization theory's expectations for a middle class role in Latin American development by bringing to bear ethnographic data from middle income families in São Paulo, Brazil. Another is to suggest some ways in which the

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16 See Johnson (1958:ix): "The terms "middle sectors," "middle groups," "middle components," "middle elements," used interchangeably were settled upon to convey the idea of middleness without paralleling any fixed criteria of middleness employed in areas outside Latin America . . . their membership ranges upward from the poorly paid white collar employee in government with a limited education and often a lack of helpful family connections, to the wealthy proprietors of commercial and industrial enterprises on the one hand and to the educated professio-
concept of "middle class" can usefully contribute to our understanding of the developmental process.

It seems to me that in order to speak of a middle class in Brazil, Latin America, or elsewhere, one must reconcile an historical and political view of class with a functional view of classes and descriptive strata. With E. P. Thompson, I see class as an historical phenomenon, which in fact happens (and can be shown to have happened) in human relationships. The relationship must always be embodied in real people and in a real context . . . . class happens when some men, as a result of common experiences (inherited or shared), feel and articulate the identity of their interests as between themselves and as against other men whose interests are different (and usually opposed to) theirs. The class experience is largely determined by the productive relations into which men are born—or enter involuntarily (Thompson, 1964:9).

We call the experience of class "class consciousness," but it is always embedded in a particular cultural matrix:

If the experience appears as determined, class consciousness does not. Consciousness of class arises in the same way in different times and places, but never in just the same way (Thompson, 1964:10, emphasis in the original).

However, while the class experience is a relationship which waxes and wanes among men, I agree with Leeds (1973:53-5) that in the capitalist world functionally and structurally defined classes have emerged over time, and that these have developed differently in different places. Thus, in the industrial community, one can discern the

---

...nal men, teachers and high level government bureaucrats, usually from old established families on the other."
evolutionary emergence of bounded aggregates of people divided off from and standing over against each other by virtue of organization, position occupancy and network interaction, as well as by cultural mechanisms. The bounded aggregates appear in their broadest and most simply understood forms to be a "proletariat,"... a structurally defined and segregated "middle class" and an "elite" (Leeds, 1973:53).

In the industrial nations, Leeds argues, the functions of the middle class are what one might call "lubricatory:" the making effective of transactions involving the strategic resources of society, the implementation of the exchanges of resources, including money: collection of information, transmission of knowledge, the processing of information for ultimate users.... the function of these activities is the linkage of the positions and organizations structuring the proletarians and elites in such a way that the necessarily interdependent societal functions of these two aggregates can be made to operate more or less predictably (1973:53).

In the industrial North Atlantic community, scales measuring the distribution of income, power and prestige tend to concentrate medium levels of the measures with the middle class, low ones with the proletarians, and high ones with the elites (Leeds, 1973:53; see also Leeds, 1967:347).

However, Leeds argues that such a three layered structure of classes did not evolve in the countries which developed in dependency relations to the industrial nations.

Turning to Latin America in general, I see no sets of functions separately attached to structurally differentiated corporate social bodies of the kind discussed above. That is, as in all state societies, the functions exist, but they are not systematically carried out separately from other functions ... carried out by the elites in European societies and they are not carried out by a systematically segre-
He argues that in Brazil and other dependent countries only two classes developed, proletarians and elites, or "masses" and "classes" (1973:57; 1965:384). This is not to say that there are no middle sectors on a descriptive scale measuring the distribution of wealth, power and prestige in Brazil. These exist by definition, since they are imposed methodologically, and indeed, Willems has shown that in São Paulo state, at least, there has always been since the 1820's a social stratum which cannot by any stretch of the imagination be confused with the upper class of wealthy landowners or with the lower class of slaves, laborers, paupers, mendicants and vagrants (1970:46).

It would seem, however, that Willems is here using the words 'class" and 'status" co-terminously, in a usage which we will avoid. Leeds has shown that many of these middle income strata or sectors are functionally and structurally integrated into the elite, through a series of networks, linkages and patron client relationships; and he has noted that the individuals,

17 It may be pointed out that Leeds (1964, 1965 and 1973) departs fairly radically from Leeds (1957). In the earlier work on cocoa plantations in Bahia, he describes two classes defined by their differential relation to crucial resources, and a third "which is independent of these resources" (1957:276). The people in the third class "occupy a position essentially independent of the productive structure, and could logically, even if inconveniently
qua individuals who compose the oligarchies are not necessarily in the least at comparable income, prestige or power levels: these common stratification criteria are social-structurally irrelevant here (1965:384).

In Brazil, increasing status within the elite is associated with larger networks and with a denser distribution of functions rather than with the delegation of functions as in the North Atlantic community (1973:56). Personalist networks extending through middle and upper income strata are a fundamentally important resource for the upper echelons of the elite, for information, political payoffs and political control.

Thus, in the context of this discussion, I shall only use the term "middle sectors" as a descriptive term, referring to middle income strata with no assumptions as to their class relations. The object of the research was to discover whether a class relation existed, or, in Thompson's words, whether class was "happening" to middle income sectors, many of which are assumed by Leeds to form part of the "classes," or the elite. For, with the partial exception of primate urban centers such as São Paulo,
Leeds sees no convincing evidence anywhere [in Latin America] of a bounded, segregated middle class exclusively exercising a set of societal functions, and ... no evidence that such construction of boundaries is increasing or even taking place (1973:57-58).

This thesis, however, does present such evidence. The research embodied in it suggests that a middle class is indeed being segregated from classes above and below it, and that this is occurring in response to changes in Brazil's position in the world economy. That is, the bulk of the thesis demonstrates that middle income sectors which in the past were discrete, have come to resemble each other structurally, as well as to share similar experiences and ways of feeling about these experiences. However, this middle class is very different from that hoped for by modernization theorists. The groups which compose it have had very little initiative in Brazil's development. Its values are not like those attributed to European middle classes of the 19th century. The emerging consciousness of class which the research suggests is radically different from an upper ruling class consciousness or a proletarian one, because while it arises out of the shared experience of exclusion from opportunities for enrichment or political influence of one, it does not have the material resources of the other to defend.

Moreover, this middle class consciousness of class is necessarily inchoate because the cultural idiom in which
it is expressed is controlled by a very dominant and secure ruling class, and because mechanisms and institutions which were previously available for the political expression of their individual interests, have now been removed. I shall argue that this kind of consciousness of class contributes indirectly to Brazil's present phase of economic development and to many of the "fascist" overtones which characterise it.

These conclusions derive both from the kinds of questions I began my field work with and from the quality of the neighborhood in which I worked. In order to ascertain whether modernization theories about a middle class were correct, I wanted to know:

1. If there is a middle class in São Paulo, how did it develop? How can it be differentiated from groups "above" or "below" it? How could one account for the variety of groups within it, to which all writers paid lip service, while still referring to a single "middle class" which could affect the development process?

2. If immigrants were more modern (oriented towards industrial capitalism) than the native population, why was this so? How much would this affect upward mobility? In other words, how valid was a Horatio Alger vision of the middle class?

3. If the downwardly mobile "poor relative" model of middle class formation were correct, could it be shown
that such people were more conservative and that they
therefore preferred traditional bureaucratic employment
to the risks of business enterprise? More broadly,
how much weight should be given to "origins" in
explaining subsequent behavior?

São Paulo city, Brazil, was chosen to research
modernization expectations on the middle class role
in developing nations because its size, industrialization
and political history would ensure the presence of every
variety of middle sector discussed in the literature: immi-
grants, downwardly mobile poor relatives, businessmen and
bureaucrats. São Paulo is the most rapidly growing indus-
trial city in the world, the industrial center of Brazil
and the largest industrial center in Latin America. Accor-
ding to the 1970 census, the greater São Paulo area had a
population of over eight million, of whom between thirty-
seven and sixty-four per cent are classified as "classe
média" (middle class) by the weekly Veja magazine (Veja,
1975(380):59). Brazil and São Paulo have undergone an
extraordinarily high rate of growth since 1968, which
seems to have expanded the city's middle income sectors.
Again, according to Veja,

Of a total of almost 30 million Brazilian workers
counted in the 1970 census, about 8.2 million, that
is twenty eight per cent of the total, belonged to
the so-called "middle sectors." For the first time
in Brazilian history, this mass inhabiting the towns
and the countryside has surpassed the number of pro-
etarians, which at the time was counted as 8 million

If São Paulo was ideal in terms of its sociological parameters for the kinds of questions I was asking, it was, however, problematic from the standpoint of anthropological fieldwork. Working in a city made it much more difficult to fit into the lives of the people I wanted to study than if I had worked in, say, a peasant community. Thus many more families came to be known through interviews than by participant observation. Many more of the anthropological dimensions, specifically those concerned with revealing the quality of life of informants, had to come from key informants, especially women, than I had anticipated.

In addition, it was at first difficult to find a population as opposed to isolated families, that was willing to be studied. In the field I used the term "middle class" (classe média) as a status term which could be claimed or ascribed to others, as a way to discover the principles used in differentiating persons (cf. Silverman, 1966). I hoped in this way that I would be able to discover the various stylistic, social and political ways in which informants themselves used the term "classe média" and whether it referred to any structurally differentiated category of people. I also used the term descriptively, that is, referring to people who were neither very rich nor very poor. This was done on the assumption that I would be more likely to find a middle class situation
among the middle income sectors of São Paulo, an assumption which was somewhat qualified by the results of this research since the income levels of the families interviewed were in general above the middle income strata of São Paulo.18

During the early period of research in São Paulo, I discovered that the term "classe média" had become a heavily publicised notion related to levels of consumption allegedly made possible by Brazil's phenomenal economic growth since 1968. It is also a highly politicized concept: by Government sponsorship it appears on television shows as a category of people earning a given sum of money per month, in the press as the people responsible for left or right thinking governments; and most clearly in Government sponsored civics courses at the University level, where according to students that I spoke to, the classe média appears as those people who maintain a politically stable and growing economy.

18 However, the "not too rich, not too poor" specification was useful to sidestep gross misdirections in the search for a middle class, such as suggestions that I interview domestic servants who had bought sewing machines or refrigerators on the installment plan, or self styled "middle class" resident North American businessmen with significant real estate and industrial holdings and international financial connections.

19 I was repeatedly referred to the novel, Eramos Seis by M. L. Dupré for a portrait of middle class life. Published in 1942, the book describes the life of a nuclear family between 1915 and 1942. At the opening of the story, the husband is a salaried employee in commerce. He is paying a mortgage on a house in a central city neighborhood.
At that time, a number of people were willing to discuss the ideological implications of the term "classe média" and a few were even willing to claim that status within the context of the discussion. Understandably, very few, however, were willing to submit to a North American stranger's inquiries into their antecedents, household economies and social networks. I was told repeatedly that the classe média was very closed (fechada) with social contacts limited to their families, work places and clubs (família, trabalho, e clubes), and that it would be most unlikely that I would find the close contact situation I was hoping for.

The people who were ultimately studied lived in Santana, one of the forty eight subdistricts in the district of São Paulo. Santana is located north of Sé, the center of São Paulo city, across the Tietê River on the lowlands by the river and on the foothills rising to the Serra da Cantareira mountains beyond. In 1970 its population was 200,490 people, and it was the fourth most popu-

While the wife earns extra money by making sweets for festivities at the homes of wealthier relatives and the children do not have university educations, but rather "normal" or "commercial" courses beyond high school, this is not a working class family, but rather a family belonging to middle income sectors. Nonetheless, they refer to themselves as "pobres" (poor). They are so in relation to their wealthier relatives, and the links with these are described as tenuous indeed. This suggests that the term "classe média" as applied to middle income sectors has a relatively short historical depth among Brazilians.
lated subdistrict of São Paulo (IBGE, 1970:90; see Figure 3 and Appendix I).

Until the 1930's Santana's character was that of a predominantly rural appendage to the metropolis of São Paulo across the river. Today the rural character of Santana has disappeared. There are a few unpaved roads left in the cre-\-ices between the hills which are settled by pocket favelas (shantytowns or squatter\-ments). Much of the area is cut into by major traffic arteries which lead away from the city. The previously rural countryside is now occupied by two story residences and small commercial and industrial establishments. The swamps along the river have been filled and periodic flooding by the river is largely controlled. The military airstrip along the river borders on an air force residential compound as well as on the Parque Anhembí, the largest convention and industrial exposition center in Latin America. In addition, the center of Santana houses the northern terminus for the new São Paulo subway system which was finished in 1974.

The center of the subdistrict, "Aquele miço\-lo do bairro" (literally, the "brain" of the neighborhood), is heavily commercial and extraordinarily busy with motor and pedestrian traffic during the day. It is located on the blocks around the north-south axis of the area, Avenida Voluntarios da Patria, where it crosses the east-
Figure 3. Map of Greater São Paulo.

KEY

1-48 Subdistricts numbered according to Population column in Appendix I.
Municipality of São Paulo
District of São Paulo
Santana
City Center


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west axes, Rua Dr. Cesar and Rua Alfredo Pujol (See Figure 4). Commercial establishments along the main streets include carpentry shops, bakeries, household appliance stores, meat and fish stores, bars, clothing and shoe stores, professional offices, two local newspaper offices, several office supply stores, record shops, musical instrument shops, a guitar factory, beauty parlors, pharmacies, branch banks and an umbanda shop.  

On the side streets commerce is limited to a few supermarkets, pharmacies, bars and occasional small textile stores and "armarinhos" (literally, "little closets," small stores selling sewing supplies, paper goods and toys.). Residential building plots are generally long and narrow; the houses are most often two story stucco buildings with small tiled or concrete front gardens sporting a few formal flower beds. Most have no garages and tin carports are frequent additions to the front gardens. Larger plots may have a garage with servants' quarters above it and a concrete backyard (quintal) between the main building and the garage. This often serves as the household's laundry area.

The monotony of the rectangular two story buildings is relieved by a few more elaborate houses, modeled after the "palacetes" (literally, "little palaces") built by

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Umbanda is a syncretic Afro-Brazilian religious cult (Brown, 1974).
coffee barons in more central neighborhoods of the city early in the century. These may have porches, spiral columns and even minarets, albeit generally on a smaller scale than the mansions they were built to emulate. The largest of these on the top of the Santana hill is a red brick construction in the style of a Swiss chalet crossed with a medieval castle, which now houses a private maternity hospital and a children's library. Most of these older and more distinctive buildings, however,were shabby with disrepair and blended with the simpler two story houses. Occasionally private houses had small signs announcing lessons in music, French and English. Others also doubled as small knitting factories and retail outlets. Most, however, were single family dwellings exclusively.

The interior of the houses and apartments I visited are not characterised by any single style. Except for the older more elaborate houses, public and private rooms are rarely larger than twelve by sixteen feet. The living and dining areas were frequently located in the same room. Furnishings could vary between stark modern leatherette, modern

21Large residential mansions dating from the 1920's often have been converted to business purposes. In the former upper class sections of town (Higienópolis, Avenida Paulista, Consolação and Campos Elíseos, for example) such mansions often house banking, real estate and publicity concerns. In Santana, one housed a hospital, another a language institute. Slowly and inexorably, however, such buildings are being replaced by skyscrapers.
synthetic plush, and, among a very few older informants, dark and heavy Victorian. Decorations in all public rooms might include crochet doilies, plants and flowers, bric-a-brac and paintings of landscapes, religious scenes or animals. According to informants, the presence of a few silver items among older families indicates twenty-five years of marriage. Among younger families, new and shiny silver ashtrays, canapé picks, candy trays and animal figurines create a decorative effect which is taken to indicate upward mobility.

There is a great deal of morning activity on the residential streets. By six thirty in the morning long lines form to wait for the busses which take people to work in the city. Later on, women chat with each other at their garden gates while waiting for the fruit and vegetable vendor, on their ways to and from shopping on the commercial streets. Children play under the ubiquitous tin carports, or, in the quieter areas, right on the streets. Twice a week women may be on the streets as early as six thirty in the morning with their shopping carts to go to the open air markets (feira). These activities peak at mid morning, when the women disappear to prepare lunch--often with the assistance of their maids--for which husbands with cars return home. Then children follow to have lunch and to get ready for afternoon sessions of school. The afternoons are quieter. Men return to work, women rest
or go to the city for shopping, or to charity or religious organizations. By nightfall the houses are shuttered, the Volkswagens are in the carports and the silence is only broken by the drama of television soap operas.

While this impressionistic description might characterise a number of São Paulo's subdistricts, Santana was a logical and interesting area in which to work. Most of the families studied had lived in Santana for between twenty and seventy years: thus, many of the individual careers reflect and are related to the development of the subdistrict as well as of the city. The distinct groupings and interrelations over time among the constituent families which the research revealed might not have been as visible in older or redeveloped areas. These are dominated by high rise rental buildings characterised by the rapid turnover of anonymous nuclear families who have no longstanding ties to each other.

Although Santana's image on the southern side of the Tietê River is that of a distant, inaccessible place with a poor population, and it is surrounded by neighbor-

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22 For example, Vila Mariana, Pinheiros, sections of Lapa.

23 Velho (1973) describes the isolation and anomie of apartment dwellers on Rio de Janeiro's Copacabana beach.

24 This was the case not only for the inhabitants of the wealthier sections of the city, such as Jardim America, Jardim Paulista and Cerqueira Cesar.
hoods poorer than itself (See Figure 5 and Appendix I),
Santana informants themselves consider the neighborhood
typically middle class (típicamente classe média). Indeed,
a survey of the city using 1968 census material
revealed that Santana was far from a poor neighborhood
(Hochtief, Montreal, Deconsult, 1970). It ranked just below
the midpoint of the forty-eight subdistricts of the city
when ranked by income and number of automobiles (twenty-
seventh and twenty-sixth respectively. See Appendix I).
Except for the large number of students and bureaucrats in
the area, Santana was in 1968, more or less "middle" among
all the subdistricts of the city (See Appendix I and Figure
5).

While Santana is thus statistically in the "middle"
of a range of subdistricts, its development was relatively
late. Santana's history is similar to that of many of the
older subdistricts of the city. The original settlement of
São Paulo by the Jesuits in the sixteenth century included
not only the "paramilitary village" of Sé (Wilhelm, 1965:11),
but numerous other sparse hamlets around Jesuit missions or

(See Figure 5), but also for some of the government
personnel dealing with the construction of the subway termi-
nal in Santana and the modernization of the area surrounding
the terminal. Santana probably has this image because it
is surrounded by poorer neighborhoods, because few of São
Paulo's rich ever go there and because to get there from the
center of town one must undergo traffic jams of legendary
proportions caused by road and subway construction.
Figure 5. Income distribution in São Paulo sub-districts.


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chacaras (small farms) which were all linked to the central parish of Sé (See Figure 6 ). The hamlets were linked by trade routes used by the Bandeirantes in the seventeenth century, who in search for anything at all to sell, roamed west for Indian slaves and north for gold. São Paulo's economy provided barely enough for its own subsistence. It was no major export center itself, but engaged in commerce with the country's principal centers of production, export and import: east to the port of Rio de Janeiro, south to the port of Santos, north to the mining region, south and west to the leather, mule and cattle complex, and later with western sugar producing regions of Sao Paulo province.

Until the nineteenth century then, São Paulo was a minor trading center composed of dispersed settlements over a large territorial expanse (See Figure 6 ). Its urbanization consisted not of centrifugal expansion from the administrative center of Sé, but rather of territorial

25"The phenomenon of the town's multinucleated population had its origins in a few Indian villages, founded initially by the Jesuits and grouped around chapels built by [Portuguese] landowners. Embryonic agglomerations and new neighborhoods or parishes, even new towns ... formed around many of these missions or chapels" (Marcilio, 1968:62, 68-69).

26 See Morse (1965) on these quasi bandit explorers.

27 Neighboring towns reserved part of their production for consumption in the capital. These included Atibaia, Bragança, Nazaré, Jundiaí and Parnaíba (Marcilio, 1968:46).
Figure 6. Nuclei of 17th century São Paulo.

shrinkage towards the center, through a process of filling in the empty spaces between existing nuclei. At the periphery many nuclei became independent towns (Marcilio, 1968: 16). Within the area which now comprises São Paulo city, many subdistricts were relatively independent rural communities, which were linked by the city's growth during the late nineteenth century and the twentieth century. Typically, this occurred when local landowners developed parts of their lands creating new nuclei, such as Arouche, Campos Elíseos, Consolação, Sta. Efigenia, Braz and Bom Retiro, which are all subdistricts of São Paulo today (Wilhelm, 1965:13; Marcilio, 1968:16; Mendes Torres, 1969; 1970; Dertonio, 1971; Masarolo, 1971; Jorge, 1970).

Thus, Santana's growth resulted from both Jesuit settlement in the seventeenth century and local landowner real estate development during this century. The Fazenda Sant'Anna was originally a Jesuit estate established by a land grant from the Portuguese government in 1673 as well as by various subsequent private donations. After the expulsion of the Jesuits in the eighteenth century the land reverted back to the crown. The site of the Fazenda Sant'Anna became a seminary and a trade school for impoverished

28Outside developers also played a role. For example, the British based City Company bought huge tracts of land on the southern side of the city in the early part of the century for future development. These are now the wealthy subdistricts of Jardim América and Jardim Paulista.
youths and in 1893 a barracks for the army. The population of the area appears to have been small and relatively constant (See Figure 7), consisting of landowners, slaves, tradesmen, weavers, vagrants and beggars (Mendes Torres, 1970:24-33). The local economy was based on agriculture and pasturage.

Figure 7. Population of Santana from 1765 to 1825.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Hearths</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1765</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1778</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>1139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1780</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>886</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1786</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>1059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1795</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>1029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1818</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1823</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>889</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1825</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>970</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


At the turn of the present century, Santana's population was included in the census of the parish of Sta. Efigenia in the center of the city, and Santana did not even appear on the city maps (Mendes Torres, 1970:70, 81), although one of the principal exits from the city to the trade routes to the north passed through the area. Santana's relatively slow growth at the end of the nineteenth century may be inferred from the figures for the neighboring district of Nossa Senhora do Ó (See Figure 8). During the twentieth century Santana's development was marked by tremendous population growth, real estate development and
Figure 8. Population growth in center city neighborhoods of São Paulo and Nossa Senhora do Ó in the Northern Zone.

Subdistricts  1872  1886  1890  1893  
Seé           9213   12821  16395  29518  
Sta. Efigenia  4459   11909  14025  42715*  
Consolação    3357    8269  13337  21311  
Braz          2308    5998  16807  32387  
Penha         1883    2283  2209   1128   
N. Sra. do Ó   2023    2750  2161   2350   
São Paulo     23243   44030  64934  192409  


*includes Santana.

Shrinkage of the district's territory. 29

The rapidity and shallow historical depth of Santana's development made it possible to discover among the families studied three different trajectories towards the formation of a contemporary middle class in São Paulo. Two of these trajectories have been discussed above and in the literature on middle classes in Brazil: the "upwardly mobile immigrant" trajectory and the "cartorial" trajectory, or the absorption of downwardly mobile rural elites into expanding bureaucracies. A third trajectory, which

29 Santana's dimensions had extended from the Tietê River north to the Municipality of Mairiporã, west to the subdistrict of Nossa Senhora do Ó and east to the Municipality of Guarulhos at the turn of the century (Mendes Torres, 1970:96). During the course of this century Tucuruví (1925), Parí (1934), Vila Maria (1938), Casa Verde (1938), Limão (1965), Vila Guilherme (1965) and Vila Nova
to my knowledge has not been previously described, consists of the history of a "local elite" in Santana—-one of São Paulo's nucleated hamlets—-during this century's urbanization process.

Families representative of all three trajectories were present in Santana by 1930 and the relationships between all three over time are clarified when placed against the historical backdrop of the four political epochs of São Paulo and Brazil's history during this century. These are the First Republic (1889-1930), the Vargas years (1930-1945), the Second Republic (1946-1964) and the post 1964 military dictatorship. Each epoch created opportunities for different groups among the families studied. Besides revealing the careers of Santana's local elite, this method also demonstrated interrelationships between bureaucrats and immigrants which have not been previously discernible because the two categories are usually treated separately. The use of an historical perspective suggests the dialectic by which, over time, middle income sectors were included or excluded from São Paulo's "classes" and the latter's mechanisms of domination. Finally, it shows the way in which groups of entirely disparate origins have come to form at present

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Cachoeirinha (1965) were split off to form new subdistricts. Santana's area is presently of 2,106.7 km² (Mendes Torres, 1970:95-100).

30See Chapter Three for a description of this group and my usage of the term "elite."
a single, more or less homogeneous group.

The Santana families interviewed were friends and friends of friends: except at the outer reaches of the network, many know each other, or know of each other. While differences of origins and wealth existed between these families, the sample may be biased, then, towards shared attitudes and values. These families are clearly not a representative sample of all possible middle class families in São Paulo. I am assuming at the outset, however, that the family careers described here are paradigmatic of the formation of a middle class in São Paulo: that is, the social forces which shaped the lives of my informants affected the lives of other middle income families in similar ways.

A total of ninety householders was formally interviewed. Interviews with the first twenty of them consisted of three parts and in many cases were spread out over several weeks, even months. First, a genealogy was collected for both sides of the family where possible, going back as far as informants were able to remember. This memory span rarely exceeded more than three generations. These genealogies yielded data on ethnic origins, regional and international migrations and employment for between forty and three hundred individuals per family, with a greater emphasis, of course, on the career of the particular informant.
Second, information was collected on household composition, income, property and source thereof, educational level and consumption patterns. Third, informants were asked a number of open ended questions on Brazilian economic and political development, on their visions of São Paulo's social structure and on their own positions and those of their friends and relatives in that structure. Towards the end of the research period I carried out seventy additional short form interviews in order to get strictly comparable data and expand the corpus. In addition, close personal contact was maintained with several families who included me in family and neighborhood activities, involving relatives and friends, many of whom had been or were later also interviewed.

While the average per capita income in Santana was NCr. 514.24 per month (at 1973 exchange rates of NCr. 6.22 to $1.00, this was equivalent to $82.35 per month, or an annual income of $988.20), the ninety families interviewed were considerably better off than the average for the neighborhood, or indeed, most of the city, in terms of their consumption patterns and incomes. According to the Plano Urbanistico Basico (PUB, 1968:144, 148), households like these were part of the 1.7 per cent of the population of Santana with family incomes of over NCr. 1,500.00 per month ($241.15 per month, or $2,893.89 per annum. See Figure 9). They were well within the top 10.6 per cent of
Figure 9. Monthly family income distribution in Santana, 1968 prices.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income Strata in NCr.</th>
<th>Percentage of Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A and B: over 1,500.00</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C: 501.00 - 1,500.00</td>
<td>37.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1: 201.00 - 500.00</td>
<td>45.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D2: 0 - 200.00</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCE:** PUB (1968:148).

Listed family incomes above NCr. 1,500.00 in São Paulo city (See Figure 10), and most family incomes were well above NCr. 4,000.00 a month ($643.08 per month or $7,716.96 per annum). Besides these relatively high incomes, most

Figure 10. Monthly family income distribution in São Paulo, 1968 prices

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income Strata in NCr.</th>
<th>Percentage of Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A and B: over 1,500.00</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C: 501.00 - 1,500.00</td>
<td>36.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1: 201.00 - 500.00</td>
<td>41.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D2: 0 - 200.00</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCES:** PUB (1968:144), Pessoa de Barros (1974:19).

(87.8 percent) of the families interviewed owned their own automobiles (.97 per cent automobiles per family), all owned at least one television set (1.73 per cent televisions per family), radios, stoves, refrigerators, washing machines, vacuum cleaners and various other durable consumer goods. As a group, the families interviewed provided employment for
forty-four live-in servants and sixty-three day workers, as cooks, chauffeurs and laundresses. More than half (53.9 per cent) have their salaries or pensions supplemented by rents from properties they own and just under half (46 per cent) of the families have additional properties besides those rented out, ranging from weekend or vacation houses to plots of land on which they wish to build or which they wish to sell at a profit at a later time (See Figures 11, 12, 13 and Appendix III).

Figure 11. The percentages of income strata in selected capitals of Brazil (1975).30

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Recife</th>
<th>Salvador</th>
<th>Rio de Janeiro</th>
<th>São Paulo</th>
<th>Curitiba</th>
<th>Porto Alegre</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B2</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note the discrepancy between the proportion of the D stratum in Figure 11 in São Paulo (11 per cent) and in Figure 10 (53.2 per cent). The 1975 figures suggest a vast improvement in the earning power of 1968's D stratum. In view of studies which have shown increasingly inequitable income distribution (Fishlow, 1972; Langoni, 1973), this improvement is surely illusory, resulting from changing the cut off points of the strata. There is considerable overlap between the strata C1 and C2 in the 1975 chart and the D stratum in the 1968 chart. For example,
Figure 12. Family income, education and consumption strata in Brazil, 1975.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strata</th>
<th>% Monthly Income in NCr</th>
<th>Educational Level</th>
<th>Purchasing Power Indices</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A1</td>
<td>3 12,000</td>
<td>95% U.A. 85% U.G.</td>
<td>90%: TV, ref, wax, aut, mix, dom, wash, vac 50%: TVc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A2</td>
<td>9 5,600</td>
<td>80% U.A. 50% U.G.</td>
<td>90%: TV, ref, wax, aut 75%: mix, dom 50%: wash, vac 25%: TVc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B1</td>
<td>9 3,600</td>
<td>50% U.A. 20% U.G.</td>
<td>90%: TV, ref, wax 50%: mix, dom, wash 75%: aut 15%: TVc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B2</td>
<td>28 2,200</td>
<td>30% U.A. majority H.S.</td>
<td>90%: TV, ref 75%: wax 50%: aut 5%: TVc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C1</td>
<td>16 1,400</td>
<td>majority H.S.</td>
<td>90%: TV, ref 50%: wax 1%: TVc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>21 1,000</td>
<td>40% inc. H.S. majority inc. Primary</td>
<td>90%: TV 75%: ref</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1</td>
<td>7 700</td>
<td>60% inc. H.S. 40% inc. Primary</td>
<td>50%: TV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D2</td>
<td>7 400</td>
<td>100% inc. Primary or illiterate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


NOTES: U.A. - University Attendance
U.G. - University Graduates
TV - television
wax - electric waxer
mix - electric mixer
dom - domestic servant
wash - washing machine
ref - refrigerator
aut - automobile
TVc - dolar:TV
vac - vacuum cleaner

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Figure 13. Monthly family incomes and consumption indices of Santana families interviewed 1972-1973.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income brackets in thousands of NCr.</th>
<th>1.5-2</th>
<th>2-4</th>
<th>4-6</th>
<th>6-8</th>
<th>8-10</th>
<th>10-12</th>
<th>12-14</th>
<th>14-16</th>
<th>16-18</th>
<th>18+</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. of families with incomes between</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. families owning own house or apt.*</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of automobiles*</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of TVs*</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of live-in-maids*</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of day maids*</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. families with rented property</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. families with unrented property*</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Within each income bracket column.
For most of the families interviewed this relative wealth was derived from salaried positions in commerce, the liberal professions or the various city or state bureaucracies. A few individuals had independent businesses, some times in addition to their regular jobs. Most married women did not work outside their homes. Of all the women over thirty in all of the households studied, thirty-eight or 34.86 percent, had or had had careers. Most of the single women in the sample had worked as teachers, social workers or secretaries, but many were now retired on pensions. Almost needless to say, all members of the families interviewed were literate; all children attended school, generally private school, and all parents expected their children to continue on

C2 in the 1975 chart earns approximately $154.00 a month (1,000 ÷ 6.885 = 145.24), whereas the D stratum in the 1968 chart earns about $130.00 a month (500 ÷ 3.83=130.54). This equivalence is further reinforced when real wages are computed, since not only has the cruzeiro devalued, but so has the dollar (by approximately twenty per cent from 1972 on). Using the 1968 dollar as base we could argue that the $145.00 a month earned by C2 in 1975 is equivalent to 112.00 in 1968 dollars.

Miller (1976), who has studied middle class family organization in Belo Horizonte, writes that "many middle class women have careers which take them outside the home, and often their income is what really allows the household to maintain a middle class life style" (1976:64). In her sample, twenty per cent of married women worked outside their homes (1976:70).

Except for one eighty-four year old individual.
to university. The incidence of university attendance among interviewees declined as their ages increased.

Figure 13 shows that there are significant differences of family income among the families interviewed, and that as a whole the families range upwards through the B2 to A1 strata in Figure 12. However, the range of the Santana families' relative wealth and the foregoing figures should only be taken as a rough indication of their economic rank on a graded scale for São Paulo and the nation. This information says nothing about the emergence of a middle class separate from classes above or below it. In order to demonstrate this emergence, the dissertation relies primarily on the in-depth interviews which reveal the quality of the families' historical trajectories and the quality of the emerging consciousness of middle-class.

In order to discuss the questions raised in this chapter, the rest of the dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter II discusses the distinct political and economic phases which have characterised Brazilian history during this century and attempts to assess middle class influence on Brazilian development. It argues that a middle class could not have played the role attributed to it by modernization theorists for a number of reasons. It also suggests the ways in which middle income sectors were generated by various political and economic forces,
and that the transition from a two to a three class system is a progressive but recent phenomenon. The next two chapters discuss the three trajectories identified in Santana, towards the formation of a single middle class. Chapter V describes those feelings and attitudes among informants which I am here calling "consciousness of class.” Drawing on recent analyses of the television industry in Brazil, it shows how such a consciousness is manipulated by the government so as to propagate an entirely false vision of society. The final chapter elaborates on the conclusions presented earlier and suggests areas for future research.
CHAPTER II

POLITICAL PHASES OF BRAZIL'S DEVELOPMENT AND MIDDLE CLASS FORMATION

It is customary to discuss the history of Brazil in terms of the distinct political phases which have characterized it. Modernization writers tend to emphasize the role of a middle class in effecting the transitions from phase to phase during this century, as well as in the industrialization which has marked recent Brazilian history. This chapter will present an overview of the political phases of Brazil's growth during this century and then discuss the effects of each on the formation of middle income groups. In each phase (First Republic, 1889-1930; the Vargas years, 1930-1945; Second Republic, 1 1945-1964; and military dictatorship, 1964 to the present), Brazil's position in the world economy changed; the political phases reflected these changes, as did adjustments in the class structure. The world system perspective adopted and recent historical research demonstrate that middle sectors were not

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1I am following the more general usage in ascribing the term "Second Republic" to the years between 1945 and 1964. Technically, the Vargas years between 1934 and 1937 are the Second Republic (Carone, 1973).
as important for the transitions between epochs, nor for the industrialization process, as writers favoring modernization theory suppose.

In addition, the chapter argues that in spite of oscillations, the overall trend in Brazilian history during this century has been towards progressive centralization of the Brazilian government and polity. This political trend, as well as various economic forces, significantly expanded urban middle income sectors, as each phase brought an expansion of administrative functions and a growth of middle level positions of influence, thus preparing the ground for a transition from a two to a three class system. However, in spite of the growth of such middle income sectors, the material suggests the hypothesis that the transition from a two to a three class system, with an increasingly large middle class being shunted away from power and manipulated to serve the ends of centralization, is a recent, if progressive phenomenon, and culminates in the definition of a middle class as a politically powerless but consuming group.

Although Brazil's recent history is one of the most successful industrial import substitution efforts in the third world (Bergesman, 1972:71), during most of this century, its history has been linked to that of coffee on the world commodity market. Thus, the First Republic (1889-1930) spanned the years when Brazil's economy was neocolo-
nial, dominated by the export of coffee. Industry, which by 1920 was strongest in São Paulo, was closely linked to the prevailing coffee interests. Electoral politics were controlled by agricultural economic interests and national power was dispersed among the key states of the federation. In spite of chronic overproduction, falling prices, increasing urban unrest and political factionalism, the coffee interests, largely drawn from São Paulo state, were preeminent in government until the 1929 crash, which precipitated the 1930 military coup that brought Getulio Vargas to power.

The Vargas years are commonly pointed to as the critical period in which the government undertook an explicit policy of industrialization. However, the early years of the Vargas regime were marked by an effort at political centralization which aimed to maintain Brazil's position as an exporter of primary products and as an importer of manufactured goods. After a series of financial crises a dictatorship was declared and the growing state apparatus was mobilized to foment internal industrial development in a highly favorable international context. During the fifteen Vargas years there were no direct presidential elections. The dictatorship, declared in 1937, further concentrated political power in the presidency. The urban political movements which had developed during the previous years were encouraged and manipulated, only to be
finally outlawed under the dictatorship.

In 1945, Vargas was deposed by the military which had brought him to power. While coffee remained the most important source of foreign exchange, Brazil's economy was increasingly penetrated by North American industrial interests, which contributed to the import substitution process. Politically, Brazil returned to a direct electoral system, this time with an expanded electorate which was manipulated and controlled by clientelism and demagogery. In spite of the increase in state and municipal autonomy and the electoral opening, further centralization of power occurred through increased government intervention in development planning.

Political centralization reached dramatic new levels after 1964, when a military coup overturned the previous populist regime. Through the process of what Cardoso (1973) has called "associated dependent development," much of the economy has become dominated by multinational corporations. Politically, the regime maintains a facade of electoral democracy at the legislative levels, but the realities are those of an authoritarian regime (Linz, 1962, 1973), if not an outright dictatorship. The effects of these centralizing processes on the development of a middle class will be examined in more detail in the rest of this chapter.
The First Republic (1889-1930)

Of all the political phases in Brazil during this century, the First Republic is the one most linked to the fortunes of coffee, which was grown primarily in the states of São Paulo and Minas Gerais. Although from the turn of the century on the coffee economy was in a chronic crisis of overproduction, São Paulo and to a lesser extent, Minas, dominated national politics and the government artificially supported the price of coffee. The 1929 crash and the drastic decline in coffee prices provided the context for a military coup which was organized by other previously excluded regional interests in the country, and which removed São Paulo from its position of dominance.

Because of blight in Asian coffee fields, in the 1890's Brazil became the world's leading coffee producer for an expanding market in North America and Europe. (Dean, 1969:4; Carone, 1972:29). In the early nineteenth century coffee began its spread in the Vale do Paraíba in the state of Rio de Janeiro and moved west and north to São

2In 1906, when the government began to buy coffee surpluses, Brazil produced 20,000,000 bags of coffee. World consumption in that year was only 12,000,000 bags (Margolis, 1970:25). Because of artificial incentives, coffee production continued to increase during the first three decades of the century, although exports remained stable. In 1929, the year of the crisis, 28,941,000 bags were produced and only 14,281,000 were exported, at a price which was almost forty percent below that of the previous year (Furtado, 1965:197-8).
Paulo and Minas Gerais, where planting conditions were best (Stein, 1957: Dean, 1969:3-4; Nicholls and Paiva, 1970:21ff; Margolis, 1970:25 ff). São Paulo city funneled coffee production from the interior of the state to the port of Santos, and as a result of the financial and industrial infrastructure which developed with the coffee economy, the city grew dramatically (Morse, 1972:227, 159, 164-5)\(^3\)

During the First Republic, São Paulo's population increased as a result of a massive displacement of labor from Europe to Brazil.\(^4\) In the decade which saw the abolition of slavery, 1880-1890, more than 1,500,000 immigrants arrived in Brazil to work on São Paulo's coffee plantations. Most of the immigrants were desperately poor, but the conditions they found on the plantations were grim enough to force many to return—or escape—to the

\(^3\)Prior to the coffee boom, São Paulo had undergone a minor sugar cane boom (1765-1851). However, the sugar was of poor quality and commanded a low price on the world market. While the expansion of sugar areas north and west of the capital (Itu, Campinas, Sorocaba, Piracicaba, Mogi-Guacú, and Jundiaí) prepared the "economic infrastructure that later permitted the rapid expansion of coffee fields . . . many observers attributed the substitution of cane with coffee by the growers to the unsatisfactory conditions of the roads, which offered little security for the transportation of a highly perishable product under adverse conditions" (Petrone, 1968:224-5).

\(^4\)Cf. Hall (1971:3): "The disastrous competition of cheap American grain in Italian markets, when added to the long standing malaise of Italian agriculture and other factors, created a ready supply of desperate potential emigrants."
city for employment.\(^5\) The effect in the city and countryside alike had been anticipated by the coffee planters: a general lowering of wages because of the oversupply of labor provided by the immigrants.\(^6\) Although by 1942 only twelve percent of the city's working class was foreign born, in 1900, ninety-two percent of the industrial workers in São Paulo were foreign born, and eighty-one percent were Italian. By 1920, well after the end of the heavy immigration period, fifty-two percent of the city's working class was foreign (see Hall, nd:2; Rodrigues, 1968; Simão, 1966).

Industry, as Dean (1969:13) has shown, grew in direct relation to the coffee economy. The coffee economy created a money market and foreign immigration had provided both laborers and consumers for industrial production.

\(^5\) They were chosen, because they were poor, by Brazilian immigration services. One way passages to Brazil were paid for whole families of agricultural workers. "The subsidy was limited to families in order to reduce the incidence of reemigration. . . . Immigrants willing to come to Brazil tended to be those without any resources at all, and it was thus very difficult for them to raise the relatively high price of a return passage for a whole family if they became dissatisfied with conditions in São Paulo" (Hall, 1971:2).

\(^6\) Cf. Hall (1971:3): "They were brought to Brazil for one purpose alone: to provide the coffee planters with cheap labor. As one São Paulo deputy phrased it shortly after abolition, 'We need laborers . . . in order to increase the competition among them and in that way salaries will be lowered by means of the law of supply and demand.'"
From rather simple beginnings in the import sector, by 1920, São Paulo had become Brazil's most important industrial center as well as agricultural export center.

The dominance of São Paulo and coffee interests was reflected in the political contours of the First Republic. The Política dos Governadores (governors' or states' politics), as the politics of the First Republic became known, involved the domination of national politics by state governors. According to Assis Barbosa (1968), the Política dos Governadores arose from Brazil's precarious international financial situation and internal political situation: the early years of the Republic were marked by regional civil wars and partisan violence. While Brazil dominated the coffee market, the expansion of coffee plantations required capital investments which the government found abroad. These loans were repaid by the Federal government and not by the states—namely São Paulo—for whom they were made. Thus, when the price of coffee fell between 1894 and 1900, the states retained their revenues, but the government's foreign debt mounted. The debt became increasingly unwieldy because the internal price of coffee had been protected from external price fluctuations by the devaluation of the cruzeiro. That is, as the cruzeiro became worth less, coffee exporters got more of them per unit of foreign exchange earned by their
exports. Conversely, however, the government required more cruzeiros per unit of foreign exchange necessary to pay the national debt. The devaluation of the cruzeiro reached extreme limits by 1898, and this policy could no longer be used to protect the profits of coffee exporters (Furtado, 1965:195). Subsequently these profits were protected by a valorization program, initiated by the **Acordo de Taubaté** in 1906, by which the government bought coffee from the planters and only sold it when the international price was more favorable (Fausto, 1971:228-9; Carone, 1972: 33-35, 38; Furtado, 1965:195). In 1898, however, the then President Campos Salles (1898-1902) was unable to get congressional support for various stabilizing financial measures (including the Funding Loan of 1898) without granting the states complete autonomy in dealing with their internal political affairs (See also Carone, 1971: 174-7; 1972: 114-6, 302-4).

Not only did the states keep their revenues, they were also allowed to form state militias, comparable in every respect to national armies. Consonant with the

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7Furtado (1958:195) writes that the planters were "socializing their losses" with this exchange policy, because as the cruzeiro became worth less, prices for all consumer goods became higher.

8Fernandes (1973) documents the growing militarism of all Brazilian states following the declaration of the Republic. Violence organized by regional oligarchies was not new in Brazil. What was new was its professional orga-
federalism of the time, the administration of government was highly decentralized and dominated by the states' oligarchies. Graham writes that:

As a consequence of the weakness of the central government a highly diffuse network of state administrative systems emerged and took priority over an only partially effective federal administration. These regional administrative systems were entirely at the service of the rural patriarchs who controlled the patronage power (1968:21-22).

In addition, the Federalist Constitution of 1891 introduced direct presidential elections and replaced a property requirement for suffrage with a literacy requirement. Direct presidential elections guaranteed a shift of political power from the numerous and poor northern states—which would have profited from a system of state electors—to the richer, more developed and more populous states of the south, which were fewer in number (Torres, 1965:80-84; Carone, 1972:285-7). Increasingly, the presidency came to alternate between the two richest states, São Paulo and Minas, to the relative exclusion of other states.  

For a more complex picture of the balance of power between the states during the First Republic, see Love (1971), Della Cava (1970), Carone (1971, 1972), Fausto (1972). The alternation between São Paulo and Minas' control of the presidency was known as the Café com Leite policy, coffee and milk, after the dairy interests of Minas and the coffee interests of both.

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At the local level, within each state, the system was implemented by coronelismo or local bossism, as well as by patronage and clientelism. In return for local favors, rural bosses or coroneis guaranteed the election of the state governors and legislators. These would not seat opposition candidates in the legislature and the governors of the states decided among themselves on the next president, whose election in turn was guaranteed by the state political machines. Needless to say, the system involved a good deal of electoral fraud and local level violence (Nunes Leal, 1948; Santos, 1961; Cruz, 1959; Nogueira, 1961; Torres, 1965; Queiroz, 1967; Pang, 1969, 1973; Della Cava, 1970; Nason, 1973). Torres (1965:103-5) tells of a town in Minas Gerais which only discovered that elections had been held in it by reading about the candidate's landslide victory in that town in a Rio newspaper.

10 The military titles of coroneis (literally, colonels), derived from participation in pre-republican state militias and less often, in the Paraguayan War.

11 Cf. Carone (1972:302-7) and Marques de Saes (1973:39). Because of regional conflicts and fraud in elections, each successful candidate had to be approved by a commission of Verificação de Poderes (a confirmation committee). This was a committee which reviewed the voting records of each election, verified whether or not they had been fraudulent and proclaimed the winning candidates. As part of the development of the Política dos Governadores, the control of this committee was given to the states, who systematically excluded all opposition candidates. The "premise was, except when proved to the contrary, in favor of the candidate who claimed to have been elected by the dominant party in each respective state" (Carone, 1972:306).
some months later. However, regardless of fraud and violence, the system guaranteed that the new suffrage requirements of the constitution would have no unsettling "democratic" consequences; it perpetuated regional oligarchies, and perpetuated itself by systematically excluding all opposition.

This was, of course, obvious in the case of the working class. While the foreign colony in São Paulo was extremely difficult to organize politically (Hall, nd: 3), strikes did occur both in the city and countryside. 12 Political opposition from this sector was countered by the availability of scab labor and the effectiveness of the repression by São Paulo's state militia, the Força Pública de São Paulo. 13 Working class or peasant rebellions in other states were also physically repressed (Della Cava, 1970, 1968; Facó, 1963). As President Washington Luis was to say

12 According to Hall (nd:3), strikes in the countryside were more like peasant jaqueries than organized political movements.

13 São Paulo's Força Pública had already played a decisive role in ascertaining São Paulo's prominence in the first years of the Republic (cf. Hahner, 1967, 1969). It was reorganized in 1901, and trained by a French military mission in 1906 in preparation to oppose a federal inter­vention, which never occurred because the Federal government finally accepted a plan to subsidize the price of coffee. The principal duties of the Força Pública de São Paulo were to guarantee the autonomy of the state against other states and the Federal government, to maintain order in the cities during elections and to control strikes and keep rural labor from migrating to the cities during slack periods (Fernandes, 1973:194; Hall, nd:10).
towards the close of the First Republic, "The Social Question" (i.e., the growing number of strikes and incidents of urban disorder), "is a matter for the police."

Repression of dissent was also clear in the case of the most vocal opposition to the *Política dos Governadores*, São Paulo's *Partido Democrático* (PD). The PD was founded in 1926-27, after a dispute over appointments to the Coffee Institute (Carone, 1971:235). It was apparently a splinter group separated from the dominant *Partido Republicano Pau-lista* (PRP) oligarchy. It did not question São Paulo's dominance within the system, or the country's linkages with foreign and dominant economies, because its constituents formed part of an elite which depended on them. It was distinguished primarily by its anti-industrialism and

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14 I am not aware of a history of São Paulo's PD and its consistently liberal, that is, dependent, tendencies over time. In the 1930's it became the UDB (*União Democrática Brasileira*) and during the populist years it became the UDN (*União Democrática Nacional*).

15 The PD espoused Manchesterian liberalism, which it hoped would protect the Brazilian consumer from the high prices associated with tariff protection. "We must be aware that Brazil still upholds a basic law, derived from liberal inspiration, which does not permit privileges of any sort, especially those which mortally assault the principle of free competition. Neither we, nor anyone of good sense, would wish industry to disappear entirely from Brazil. We think, however, that the [proposed tariff] - which we believe is wise - will probably assist those industrialists who have not prepared themselves for the struggle, those whom the English would call 'unfit.' In this way . . . the project would impede natural selection which would be disastrous for the cause of progress" (cited in Fausto, 1972:35). Fausto suggests a more immediate reason for the PD's antagonism towards the industrialists: many industrial entre-
its demands for reform of the existing system which so effectively excluded its constituents. Because electoral machines and results were so firmly controlled by the PRP in São Paulo and by the regional oligarchies in other states, electoral politics perpetuated those in power and excluded all other contenders. 16

The relative stability of the Politica dos Governadores and its systematic exclusion of opposition calls into question the modernization position on what ultimately brought down the First Republic. According to a number of writers, middle class dissatisfaction 17 during the First

preneurs and coffee exporters were of foreign origins and the "opposition characterised itself by an attitude of xenophobia... to contrast with the cosmopolitan openings of the 'old oligarchy'" which dominated the Republican party (Fausto, 1972:36). Fausto provides an example of their rhetoric: "Foreign cads, putrid drippings of overseas townlets, assassins, bought by the money of those who have betrayed their nationality, foreign mud and pus, come to sully the lands of our fathers" (Fausto, 1972:36). This is a kind of nationalism, but subject to the dependency relations of Manchesterian liberalism.

16 According to Parahyba's (1970) measurements of the growth of literacy, urbanization and the electoral rolls during the First Republic, more people could and did vote than before. But, until 1930, access to the ballot was limited to a minuscule proportion of the population. No more than 5.7 percent of the population ever voted in a national election (Love, 1970:9). In addition, while there was an absolute increase in the numbers of the electorate, its size relative to the regional populations decreased everywhere, except in São Paulo, Espírito Santo and Rio Grande do Sul (Parahyba, 1970:96).

17 Responsibility for the political instability of the First Republic was attributed to middle classes as early as 1933 when Sta. Rosa (1963:32-54) identified their
Republic was a "basic underlying cause" of the military coup which brought Getulio Vargas to power (Poppino, 1968: 256; cf. Jaguaribe, 1966:59; Alexander, 1956:234; Johnson, 1958:162; Wirth, 1964:165; Carone, 1965:11-12, 46; Furtado, 1967:585). These writers tend to identify as "middle class" visible, more or less organized groups with some claim to political resources. Fausto (1972) examines the alleged role of the middle class in the 1930 coup, and reduces it to two sides of the same coin: a "middle class" is either identified with the vanguard of the bourgeoisie, in ineluctable opposition to agrarian ("traditional") interests, or a "middle class" acted through the Tenentes (rebellious army officers) in its own nationalist and reformist interest but failed to create more than a "limited" revolution. He concludes that both views are wrong.

Drawing on Warren Dean's study of the industrialization of São Paulo, Fausto (1972:46) points out that there was no opposition between planters and industrial entrepreneurs because industry grew out of the coffee trade. São Paulo's industrialists formed part of the PRP which repre-
sented both agrarian and industrial interests. After the 1930 coup they remained cool to the new government and in 1932 industrialists actively participated in São Paulo's revolt against it.

The Tenentes, on the other hand, were a group of young army officers responsible for revolts in 1922 in Rio, in 1924 in São Paulo and Amazonas, and in 1928 in São Paulo. Although they did participate in the coalition which overthrew the president in 1930, they cannot be identified with the interests of middle income sectors. In discussing the Tenentes, Fausto points out their absolute isolation from and suspicion of the civilian population (1972:58-9)—of any class—and the lack of organizational ties between them and the opposition parties such as the São Paulo PD (1972:61-65; cf. also Carone, 1975). Urban middle income sectors in Brazil cannot, then, be identified with specific groups like the oligarchical industrialists or the rebel Tenentes.

What was actually in the middle, between the working class and the ruling class was a far more amorphous and undefined population, which was itself a precipitate of the boom and bust way in which coffee was planted. The development of such middle income sectors has frequently been described, most recently by Marques de Saes (1973). The complexity of the processes involved in the creation of such sectors is suggested in Lucilla Hermann's study of Guaratinguetá, a city in the Vale do Paraíba.
itself the cradle of the coffee boom. Hermann shows clearly how the decline of one group and the splitting of estates through inheritance made possible the appearance of smaller parcels of land on the market. While estates could be reconsolidated by marriage or purchase in more prosperous areas, in Guaratinguetá, which was in economic decline, the appearance of smaller parcels of land on the market led to the economic ascension of other groups to middle levels of economic stratification (Hermann, 1953:84-89; 1943:37-40; 1950. See also Nicholls and Paiva, 1970). Thus, through complex mechanisms a local boom and bust cycle created several avenues to middle levels of economic stratification.

The coffee economy brought several waves of downwardly mobile migrants to São Paulo. Under prevailing methods of cultivation, the fertility of coffee trees declined radically after thirty years, by which time the soil was exhausted and the land subject to extensive erosion, and fit only for grazing cattle (Stein, 1957). As Dean (1969:42; cf. also Margolis, 1970:330) has pointed out, coffee planters

18During its three hundred year history the area underwent economic cycles based on subsistence agriculture, sugar cane and coffee production for export. Finally it entered a period of decline in which for decades the only jobs available were in bureaucratic and administrative positions (Hermann, 1943; Nicholls and Paiva, 1970).
were obliged to reinvest in new lands and move on to new plantations. Some did so and were able to remain on the crest of the coffee economy; others emigrated to the city with their families, while their economic and social fortunes were still high enough to assure them of university education for their children and careers in the liberal professions and politics. Although such families were no longer oligarchs themselves, they participated in the oligarchy and its institutions. Although they were economically downwardly mobile, they formed, in Leeds' terminology, a part of the "classes" (1965).

Others, however, stayed on longer and saw their estates dwindle in productivity and undergo division by inheritance. Eventually they, too, came to the city, because cattle grazing required a far smaller labor force: the end of coffee plantation depopulated the land, leaving behind grass, cattle and the ghost towns described by Monteiro Lobato (1959) for the Vale do Paraíba (See also Nicholls and Paiva, 1970; Margolis, 1970). For migrants who had undergone serious economic decline before coming to the city, there was no hope at all of acquiring university educations, since at the time there were no free state universities. Nonetheless, these migrants were not at all like the impoverished rural migrants who were to swarm to the cities after World War II. Although they were poor, they still owned land, and although they had no higher
education, they were literate. In 1920, when no more than one quarter of the Brazilian population was literate (Havighurst and Moreira, 1965:86; Smith, 1963:662), this distinguished them from the bulk of the population, but it implied only the degree of wealth and power which was lost through the decline of their plantations. In spite of their literacy, then, many of the migrants who came to the city after their agricultural fortunes were depleted are perhaps best considered as forming a part of the "masses" (cf. Leeds, 1965) for the First Republic provided no means of political expression for people like these.

Urban unrest existed throughout the First Republic and increased in the 1920's. These were years of brutal rises in the cost of living (Carone, 1972:185-6; Fausto, 1972:94) and employment must have been difficult to find in São Paulo's glutted labor market. However, although the Tenente movement provided a focus for the expression of dissatisfaction, one cannot, in Fausto's words, infer from popular sympathy for the Tenentes, the existence of close ties between the movement and the so-called middle sectors. The diffuse support

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19 In São Paulo, "in 1924 there were . . . popular manifestations against the high cost of living: the movement began when the bakeries closed their doors, demanding an increase in the price of bread. Popular pressure . . . led the government to require stocks of flour in the bakeries and to install new butcher shops and fish markets, to reduce the taxes on wheat, milk, potatoes, flour, beans, etc.; and to cheapen transportation costs on certain foodstuffs" (Carone, 1972:190).
accorded to the Tenentes derived above all from its apparent identification with civilian dissidence... it was perceived as the armed sector of civil dissidence (1972:62-3, emphasis added).

Thus, while the Tenente rebels were received by popular acclaim during the 1924 revolt in São Paulo, four days later not even the legislature or the newspapers knew what the revolt was about (Fausto, 1972:58-59). Further, when the rebels appealed to the city’s population for volunteers to help repel a bombing attack by Federal forces, the effort failed, in spite of the acclaim accorded them earlier by street crowds. It is fairly clear then, that middle income sectors had little recourse during the First Republic: the electoral politics of the Política dos Governadores effectively disenfranchised them, and there was no means or mechanism through which they could express their dissatisfaction effectively, much less topple the regime.

The forces which destroyed the First Republic were rooted in the 1929 financial crash and in its own economic and political structure. 1929 was the year of greatest overproduction of coffee and following the crash, the value of exports decreased by almost forty percent below its 1929 price (Furtado, 1965:197; Dean, 1969:181; Levine, 1971:12, Fausto, 1971:242). As we have seen, the Política dos Governadores had established the center of power in the major coffee states of São Paulo and Minas, excluding other states. In 1930, the unwritten rule of presidential
alternation between these two states was broken with the election of yet another Paulista president to succeed the Paulista Washington Luis. This, and the inability of the president to extend credits to the coffee planters after the 1929 crash, provided the circumstances which led to the coalition which toppled the regime. The political leaders of Minas Gerais united with other excluded regional oligarchies, disgruntled coffee planters and all other groups opposed to the regime, including São Paulo's Partido Democrtico. These groups formed the Liberal Alliance, which put an end to the First Republic (Fausto, 1972:102; Queiroz, 1967:52-53; Dean, 1969:182). Their success depended on the support of the military: the Tenente rebels, many of whom were in exile and could only return to political careers with a successful revolution, and the Army officer corps, which only intervened when the revolution promised to be successful, although it had participated in the conspiracy. (Fausto, 1972:103; Marques de Saes, 1973:92).  

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20 It is interesting that the electoral fraud which presumably led to Vargas' electoral loss in 1929 did not activate the coup: rather it was activated by the assassination of his running mate after the election returns were accepted (Tiller, 1965). Against the backdrop of a world depression, this act is best understood as an expression of coronelismo, which had been typified by such acts of violence. Fausto (1972:97) writes that the internal contradictions of the polity of the First Republic would have brought it to an end without the 1929 crisis: he sees a readjustment of elites occurring during the Vargas years. While that is certainly the case, it remains a moot point whether it could have occurred without the 1929 crash, which
The 1930 revolution was not, then, the result of dissatisfaction among urban middle income sectors, but rather the result of the internal oppositions of the *Política dos Governadores* at a particular national and international economic conjuncture. The 1929 crash made it impossible to support the price of coffee: the Paulistas themselves had no stake in a regime which failed them to this degree. It was this context which united regional oligarchies and previously excluded groups such as the PD and the *Tenentes* into an alliance against the regime, and which brought Getulio Vargas to power.

**The Vargas years (1930-1945)**

The dominance of São Paulo in the politics of the First Republic had reflected Brazil's dependence on coffee exports. The 1930 coup represented a realignment between the states' oligarchies and the government in the face of the financial crisis incurred by the 1929 crash. Not only did the price of coffee fall, but the foreign capital which had been essential to protect the internal price during previous fluctuations disappeared (Fausto, 1971:242). Indeed, Britain, to which Brazil was deeply in debt, regarded Brazil as a "conquered country" because of its fiscal dependence on coffee sales (Hilton, 1975:50).

provided the opportunity for all the regional elites to unite against São Paulo's dominance.
Basically two strategies were available: to diversify agricultural exports or to increase Brazil's industrial capacity. One scholar of the Vargas years, Hilton (1975), argues that industrialization was an immediate goal. Dean (1969) has shown, however, that an explicit policy of industrialization did not develop until all the possibilities of the agricultural export economy were played out. Moreover, Hilton's own data suggest that regardless of Vargas' personal intentions, Brazil could not have industrialized in the absence of a highly favorable world context. This context began to emerge in the late 1930's and especially during the Second World War. It is useful, therefore, to conceptualize the Vargas years in terms of two phases, separated by the declaration of a dictatorship in 1937.

In order to deal with the financial crisis and to maintain itself in power, the Provisional government's first actions in 1930 were directed towards an immediate centralization of economic and political power. Many of these actions anticipated the imposition of the Estado Novo dictatorship seven years later. The expansion of government power redefined relations between the state and society, as well as between classes, by the creation of a political structure based on a strong presidency, state corporations and corporativist syndicates and welfare institutions. By the close of the Vargas years in 1945, virtually the entire urban sector (with the conspi-
The process of centralization began eleven days after the new government took office, with the fusion of legislative and executive functions of government and the institution of a new hierarchy of authority between the central government and the states. Lowenstein comments that the result was as "spick and span a specimen of a streamlined dictatorship as any produced before" (1942:19), and it swiftly redefined the position of states' oligarchies towards the central government. Electoral machines and Governors' politics were obsolete. State politics were now controlled by a presidentially appointed interventor, responsible only to the president. The central government could no longer be captured to express a particular interest above all others, as it had been by the coffee oligarchy during the First Republic.

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21 "The chief of government was to decide exclusively on the appointment and dismissal of public officials. All representative and deliberative assemblies (federal, state and municipalities) were dissolved. Constitutions, federal as well as state, remained in force, subject to modifications to be decreed by the government. Otherwise the administration of justice was to function as before. The chief of government may appoint for each state a federal delegate (interventor). The interventor acts for his state as does the president for the whole union. He exercises jointly all legislative and executive powers. He is the executive authority of the union within the state; he may be recalled by the federal government. On the lower level of the municipalities, the mayors are appointed and
Between 1930 and 1935 many of the states lost control of their agricultural production and natural resources to national institutes. In spite of government interventions in favor of agriculture, crises persisted in the coffee, sugar and cocoa economies. A National Institute of Cocoa was created in 1931 and the Institute of Sugar and Alcohol in 1933. While credits were restored to the coffee planters, planters in both Minas and São Paulo were constantly forced to appeal to the central government for assistance, and finally between 1934 and 1935, both relinquished their production to the control of the National Department of Coffee (Garone, 1973:125-155). In 1934, the Mining and Water Codes were promulgated, placing these resources as well under the control of the government. In the same year the Federal Council of Foreign Trade was formed.

It is generally accepted that the size of middle income sectors increased as a result of the growth of Vargas' centralizing institutes and bureaucracies (Jaguari-ibe, 1965:169). Chaffee (1970) shows that the growth of middle sectors in Brazil is associated with the increase in

dischmissed by the interventor" (Lowenstein, 1942:18).

22E.g., The Decree against usury (7/4/1933) and the Decree reducing agricultural debts (1/2/1933) (Garone, 1973:119-123).
the budget for administration during the Vargas years and Vieira da Cunha (1963:116) has documented the increase in public employment between 1920 and 1940 (See Figure 14).

Figure 14. Number of public servants per 1000 in the population in selected states between 1920 and 1940.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1920</th>
<th>1940</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>São Paulo</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rio de Janeiro</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal District</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minas Gerais</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rio Grande do Sul</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
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As Federal bureaucracies and Federal control replaced the loose network of state bureaucracies which had characterized the First Republic (Lowenstein, 1942:100-103; Dalland, 1968:334; Graham, 1968:25; Dean, 1969:230; Siegle, 1966:46-7), the new bureaucrats became dependents of the central government and instruments of the government's domination. Much government employment was limited to the Brazilian born (Johnson, 1958:166), and it is

23"It should not be forgotten that there would be a historic tendency for the administrative budget and the size of the middle class to correlate, independent of any direct relationship . . . [but] the fact remains that the extreme correlation is beyond any simple explanation of the historic growth of two relatively independent factors. A correlation of .99 indicates that in reality the same phenomenon is being measured by two indices. There may be no cause and effect relationship, but if not it would be expected that a third factor is strongly related to both factors" (Chaffee, 1970:122-3).
highly probable that it extended to the literate "masses" which we have seen were created by the downswings of coffee plantation during the First Republic, and who had been virtually disenfranchised by the Política dos Governadores. These previously excluded groups now participated in the mechanisms of domination which increasingly reduced the states to the "status of territorial subdivisions under full central control" (Lowenstein, 1942:51; Hilton, 1975:23).

Of all the regions of Brazil, São Paulo was most affected by the centralizing measures of the Vargas years. For example, in addition to losing control over their agricultural production, the elite of São Paulo city also lost control over industrial labor. Whereas prior to 1930, industrial labor unrest had been a matter for the attention of the police or individual industrialists (Fausto, 1972:108; Dean, 1969:151-167), labor was now controlled by the government. The new labor regulations aimed not only at disorganizing and controlling the working class (Fausto, 1972:107), but also challenged the "excessive individualism" of São Paulo's industrialists. So as to make labor depen-

24Rural labor unrest had often expressed itself through banditry and messianic movements and had frequently been of political utility to state political machines, especially in the Northeast of Brazil. In 1938 such movements were destroyed swiftly and expeditiously by Federal troops (Della Cava, 1970; Faco, 1963).

25Vargas wrote that "the excessive individualism of the past century needed to be limited and corrected, predo-minantly in the interests of the whole society. In this
dent on the state, in 1930 a Ministry of Labor, Industry and Commerce was formed, separate from the Ministry of Agriculture, which had previously handled urban working class affairs. A number of unions were outlawed: those surviving were brought under government control. The right to strike was abolished and a loyalty oath was imposed.

Finally, the working class was split by nationalistic appeals to its ethnic origins—ostensibly to protect the native Brazilian worker's standard of living against immigrant labor—but in fact to discriminate against Italian workers who were felt to be responsible for anarchist ideas and labor unrest (Fausto, 1972:108-109; Dean, 1969:188; Levine, 1971:25, 33). The process of the incorpora-

attitude there is no hostility to capital. Quite to the contrary, capital must be attracted, supported and guaranteed by the public powers. But the best way to support and guarantee it, is precisely to transform the proletariat into an organic force of cooperation with the state, and not to leave it abandoned by the law and the state, and at the mercy of the destructive actions of perturbing elements which are destitute of feelings for the fatherland and the family" (cited in Fausto, 1971:253).

Elected union officials had to be recognized by the Ministry of Labor before they could take office, and a syndical tax of one day's salary was imposed on all workers, whether they were union members or not (Simão, 1966: Rodrigues, 1968:348; Dean, 1969:187-91; Erikson, 1970:52-55; 1972:142-44).

These measures included imposing a limit on the number of foreign third class passengers who could enter the country and the passage of the "Two Thirds" Labor Law in 1930, which required industries to show that at least two thirds of their employees were Brazilian born. In fact, the Italian colony in São Paulo was not particularly
tion of labor was continuous from 1930 to 1937. A structural change occurred in the position of labor: it became a petitioner to the central government, whereas previously it had been at the mercy of São Paulo's industrial oligarchy.

Furthermore, although Vargas had restored credits to the coffee planters, Paulistas were enraged at increased taxes and the imposition of exchange controls. These measures were necessary to pay off foreign debts that "were largely incurred by Paulista presidents" under the *Politica dos Governadores* (Dean, 1969:192). After two years, São Paulo reacted to Vargas' political and financial measures with the Constitutionalist Revolt. The Paulistas had expected Vargas to convene a Constitutional Assembly and had assumed that a new constitution and a return to electoral politics would restore them to their previous political as well as economic autonomy. The focus of their outrage was the *Tenente* military interventor which

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revolutionary and was extremely difficult to organize (see Hall, nd., and Carone, 1972 for organized working class movements). Nonetheless, the divisive political rhetoric flowed. The new Minister of Labor said that one "of the most deplorable aspects of the injustices committed against the Brazilian laborer, and of his exploitation, is that of the foreign workers who come to our country, pushed out by the poverty of their own countries, and take jobs away from Brazilians, because so many employers consider nationals to be inferior workers. Not content with this, the foreigner delivers himself to subversive propaganda, which is frankly despicable in the light of national dignity" (cited in Fausto, 1972:109).
Vargas had imposed on them. The opposition Partido Democratico, which had supported the coup against Washington Luis and the First Republic, formed a united front coalition with the Partido Republicano Paulista, and between them they incited a general political euphoria in favor of São Paulo's rights and the Constitutionalist cause. Except for the working classes (Carone, 1965:120-21), the city's population was mobilized in support of what was essentially a hopeless cause, which would benefit only the oligarchy.

In May of 1932 street riots led to several deaths. In June the Constitutionalist Revolt broke out in São Paulo against the Federal government. It was led by a dissident army general and the São Paulo oligarchy, and fought by the São Paulo Força Publica, aided by countless volunteers. Although the population was enthusiastic, and São Paulo geared itself to produce for civil war (Morse, 1972:326-8), there was simply not enough war materiel and the aid expected from sympathetic states never materialized. São Paulo lost the initial advantage of the surprise attack, found itself unprepared to continue the fight against the Federal government on various fronts, and surrendered in three months (Silva, 1932).

The defeat represented the end of all hopes of a return to the status quo ante for São Paulo: but it also began the period of accommodation between the state's
oligarchies and the central government. The expansion of the central government into areas which had previously been under the control of individual states, or under private control, ultimately benefited the oligarchies economically, in that their markets were assured and protected where possible. While São Paulo continued being the major industrial and coffee producing region in the nation, its revolt guaranteed that its own interests would not be ignored (Fausto, 1971:249). It is significant that in 1935, when other states were embroiled in turbulent electoral battles over centralization versus federalism, São Paulo was "conspicuously removed" from the struggle (Levine, 1971:54). For the time being, São Paulo had tacitly accepted the situation whereby it was asked to supply significantly less than its proportional share of national political leadership in terms of its economic power (Levine, 1971:55).

The political and economic centralization of the Vargas years was more or less continuous from 1930 to 1937. During the Constituent Assembly of 1933 the Paulista delegates attempted to preserve at least the appearance of states' rights, but before the final vote on the new constitution was taken, all the centralizing measures of the Provisional Government (1930-1934) were approved and

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removed from judicial review (Palmer, 1950:86; Lowenstein, 1942:22; Levine, 1970:10). In the Estado Novo constitution of 1937, Federal hold on the states was tightened even further. According to Lowenstein, although the appearances are carefully preserved, the states are reduced to the status of territorial subdivisions under full central control; particularly in fiscal matters, their rights are severely curtailed (1942:51).

This kind of centralization appeared necessary if Brazil were to cope with its internal regional tensions and the economic warfare of the 1930's. In 1934 two main contestants for Brazil's raw materials and Brazil's market had defined themselves: Germany and the United States. Germany needed raw materials, but it could only pay for them with "compensation marks," that is, money which could only be used to buy an equal value of manufactured goods from Germany (Hilton, 1975:40; Carone, 1970:116). The United States wanted to export its industrial production to Brazilian markets. Germany offered Brazil decreased dependence on a single crop, coffee, through its own growing need for Brazil's sugar, rubber, cotton and other primary products. The United States, primarily interested in lowered tariffs for its exports and in Brazil's coffee, offered foreign exchange. Hilton's (1975) study of Bra-

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29 Vargas noted in 1930 that "diplomacy is increasingly orienting itself in the direction of economic problems." In 1935 a Minister of the Foreign Trade Council observed that "Brazil found itself in a period of economic
zilian maneuvers between the opposing interests of the two powers, describes its efforts to avoid having to make a commitment to either country which would exclude the other (see also Wirth, 1970:17-51). Until the war, Germany bested the United States in its competition for the Brazilian market (Hilton, 1975:227), but until 1937, Brazil remained peculiarly dependent upon the United States and coffee because these were its principal suppliers of foreign exchange.

Clearly, the centralization which occurred prior to the dictatorship represented in part an effort to "play out the alternatives of the export economy" (Dean, 1969:205). Brazil was attempting to regain a trade position based on diversified agricultural exports and not to redirect the economy towards industrialization. That war in a time of peace" (Hilton, 1975:8-10).

30 See Dean (1969:180-206) for the measures affecting industry taken by the Vargas government between 1930 and 1937. While in the long run Paulista industry did not suffer, the increased financial and social interventions of the government were "not designed to accelerate the process of industrialization" (Dean, 1969:205), but rather to maintain social order. For examples of the "lip-service" given to the need for industrialization and the ignored opportunities, see Dean (1969:183-4, 203). Dean's book is an effort to qualify and refine the dependency or "external shock" theory of Brazilian development (see Furtado, 1963; Baer, 1965, Frank, 1967, 1969) and show the relations between external factors and the men who must adapt to them (Dean, 1969:15, 86-87).
effort only occurred after the 1937 declaration of the Estado Novo. The effort to play out the alternatives of the export economy failed because of the basic dependence on coffee and the United States for foreign exchange, and the failure is expressed in the financial and political crisis which precipitated the Estado Novo.

In 1937 Brazil could not pay its debts. The economic liberalism of the predictatorial years and the need for free foreign exchange (i.e., not "compensation marks") in exchange for coffee had resulted in concessions to United States manufacturing interests and an "orgy of imports" in 1936 (Dean, 1969:208). The price of coffee fell, and because of deflationary policies introduced in the United States the same year, the flow of foreign exchange ceased (Dean, 1969:209). At the same time, and reflecting the liberal economic policy, São Paulo appeared to be attempting to regain a position of prominence in the nation through electoral means, by forming coalitions with key states in preparation for the 1938 presidential elections. According to Dean, the government could not have survived the crisis within the democratic framework, and only by "dramatizing the political crisis could the government be made to appear less culpable, and the necessary emergency powers be arrogated without a loss of confidence" (1969:208-9).
Although the issue of federalism versus centralism continued to be central to Brazilian politics, the crisis which the government dramatized was only tangentially related to regional aspirations. Between 1933 and 1937 a good deal of visible political turmoil had been generated by two urban movements, the National Liberation Alliance (ALN) and the Integralists. Both the left wing ALN and the Fascist Integralist movement arose in the early 1930's among middle income sectors of Brazil's urban centers (Levine, 1970:63, 69, 73, 74, 90). Leadership for both movements was recruited from among university educated groups (Levine, 1970:64, 67, 87-89). Between them, they may have included from 170,000 to 300,000 active participants in the whole country, concentrated in the capital cities (Levine, 1970:79, 95). The university education of their leaders indicates links to high levels of social stratification—to the "classes" rather than the "masses" (cf. Leeds, 1965). Furthermore, although neither movement had high operating expenses, both were financed by regional opposition politicians and industrialists (Levine, 1970: 75, 95-96). Nonetheless, and in spite of the high political visibility and frequent clashes between the ALN and the Integralists, neither group was able to mobilize the kind of support which the São Paulo oligarchy had generated during the 1932 Constitutional Revolt. The three separate ALN revolts in Natal, Recife and Rio de Janeiro.
in 1935 failed absolutely to mobilize popular support and were speedily suppressed (Levine, 1970:104).

If both movements were financed by regional opposition to the central government, both were also vulnerable to manipulation by the central government. In the context of the 1938 elections, both were used to create a climate which would require and justify a coup. The Integralists, in particular, were encouraged in an ongoing anti-communist crusade which began after the 1935 abortive ALN rebellions. These had resulted in the imposition of a state of siege and massive imprisonments of communists and suspected left wing sympathizers. When Vargas requested a continuation of the state of siege, which had ended in 1937, the Senate refused him. Its spokesman, who significantly was from São Paulo, affirmed that the country was peaceful and that a state of siege during an election year might imply coercion (Carone, 1975:130). Vargas reacted by freeing the left wing ALN prisoners of 1935. In order to further increase the climate of tension, the government created an incident based on a false document which purported to be a "plan" for a communist coup (Carone, 1975:130). In this context, the Integralists were encouraged in their anti-communism and were sought out by Vargas' representatives to support a future coup. The Integralists fully expected to be officially recognized and to participate in the new dictatorial government (Carone, 1975:134-5). Instead,
after the coup, the party was ignored, humiliated and finally abolished together with all other political parties. (Levine, 1970:160-1). In this way the two political groups which emerged from middle income sectors with regional political backing were manipulated to forestall a threat against centralization.

In this way also, by dramatizing a political crisis, Brazil cut itself off from fiscal dependence on the United States and coffee. Payment on the national debt was suspended ten days after the declaration of the Estado Novo. The new dictatorship also recognized that the country would have to begin to substitute domestic industrial production for imported industrial production (Dean, 1969:209). The value of imports decreased and new exchange controls favored the import of raw materials for domestic production at the expense of manufactured imports. The government developed new sources of public financing, and encouraged the development of enterprises which would increase Brazil's self sufficiency (Dean, 1969:209-215; Wirth, 1970:101-110).

However, the opportunity for the heavy, state sponsored industrialization effort represented by the Volta Redonda steel mill only became available with the British wartime blockade on German trade. Only then could Brazil successfully gamble on North American fears of German influence in the hemisphere and obtain the necessary funds.
to build the steel mill. Thus, although the war caused shortages and dislocations, it also provided the context for the "heroic" stage of Brazil's import substitution (Cohn, 1971:303), because the shortages protected Brazil's industries from foreign competition and stimulated exports to consumer markets in Latin America which were cut off from their regular suppliers (Dean, 1969:223).

The war also altered Brazil's relations with the United States. Although Brazil still owed unpaid debts to the United States, Washington launched a massive public relations effort in Brazil and Latin America as part of its effort to maintain hemispheric unity against the Axis. By the end of the war, the Rockefeller Office, as the office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs became known, estimated that it controlled seventy-five percent of the news of the world reaching Latin America. Latin American and especially Brazilian public opinion leaders and business executives were included in this network of influence.

A Rio newspaper observed that what the United States had failed to do with its commercial and good neighbor policy over years, the British blockade did in a matter of months (Hilton, 1975:212). In spite of political disagreements, trade with Germany increased after the declaration of the Estado Novo (Hilton, 1975:174-8). The United States did not retaliate first, because it hoped to regain its export trade to Brazil, and later because it wished to maintain the facade of hemispheric unity against German political expansionism (Hilton, 1975:226-7). It was only willing to underwrite the development of the steel mill after the declaration of the war (Hilton, 1975:219; Dean, 1969:219).
which constituted a "propaganda effort virtually unprece-
dented in the annals of American history" (Epstein, 1975: 50-52).32

Most important, however, to Brazil's industrializa-
tion at the time, was the support now given by the United States as part of its own war effort. In addition to the finance for the Volta Redonda steel mill, this support included the building of bases and infrastructure in the Northeast, the exporting of machinery, and, with the Cook

32"To gain control over the media of Latin America, Rockefeller engineered a ruling from the U.S. Treasury Department which exempted from taxation the cost of advertise-
ments placed by American corporations that were co-
operating with the Rockefeller office. This tax exempt advertising eventually constituted more than forty percent of all newspaper and radio revenues in Latin America. By selectively directing this advertising towards newspapers and radio stations that accepted guidance from his office --and simultaneously denying it to media which he deemed uncooperative or pro-Nazi--he skillfully managed to gain economic leverage over the major sources of news in Latin America. Moreover, as the newsprint shortage became criti-
cal in South America, his office made sure that the indispensable newsprint licenses were allocated only to 'friendly' newspapers . . . George Gallup, who later became famous as a political pollster, and a group of prominent social scientists quietly conducted systematic surveys of public opinion in Brazil. In a clear adumbration of the post war CIA, the Rockefeller Office arranged for a 're-
search division' to employ clandestine observers from the Export Bureau of the American Association of Advertising Agencies in Latin America. . . . [These] 'observers' sup-
plied the Rockefeller Office with data concerning ownership, editorial policy, personal opinions of the owners and edi-
tors of the newspapers and 'propaganda analysis.' Dossiers could thus be systematically organized about the opinions and operations of the major organs of public opinion in Latin America. . . . To assure comprehension of the 'issues' being advanced in Latin America, the office sent 13,000 carefully selected 'opinion leaders' a weekly newsletter

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Mission in 1942, a public commitment to the development of Brazil's industrial system. "Never had the world bestowed so much prestige upon Brazilian efforts to industrialize" (Dean, 1969:223).³³

If changes in the world market and adjustments between regional elites in Brazil dominated the Vargas years, propositions such as Helio Jaguaribe's on the importance of a middle class during these years are clearly wrong. Jaguaribe has argued that a middle class was directly responsible for setting up the Estado Novo, and he associates the industrialization of the Vargas years with a middle class initiative. In his view, the middle class seized control of government in 1930, and in exchange for political acquiescence to oligarchical groups, expanded government employment opportunities for itself, through the creation of superfluous jobs in a "Cartorial State" (Jaguaribe, 1969:169). For Jaguaribe, the

which was to help 'clarify' the news. The coordinator also arranged trips to the United States for the most influential editors in Latin America and later scholarships for their children" (Epstein, 1975:50-52).

³³"The United States, urgently in need of an expanded list of Brazilian raw materials, had in return guaranteed the delivery of manufactured goods to Brazil. Shipping space was strictly rationed, however; it followed that it would be filled most efficiently, not with manufactures, but with machinery so that the Brazilians might produce the goods themselves. Throughout the war, the Bank of Brazil and the Office of Economic Warfare cooperated to this end" (Dean, 1969:222).
Vargas revolution of 1930... represented the political counterpart of import substitution: the country, no longer able to import the consumer goods it needed started to produce them at home (1969:169).

However, the middle class was compelled by considerations of realpolitik to jettison its political principles with the anti-democratic coup of 1937 and the setting up of the Estado Novo (1969:170).

Jaguaribe's argument depends on the assumption of the existence of a middle class, on the misplaced identification of middle class interests with the forces which made the 1930 coup and on a disregard of the regional readjustments between Brazilian elites and the government in the context of a world economic system. Furthermore, the employment of middle income sectors in bureaucracies does not mean that they control them. Far from being created simply to provide for middle sector employment, the bureaucracies were the means of dominating and centralizing the nation's political and economic resources in the face of crisis.

While we have seen that political groups among middle income sectors acted and were manipulated so as to create a climate of unrest which justified the imposition of the Estado Novo, they do not appear to have been a separate class, but were rather linked to various regional elites. Neither the ALN nor the Integralists nor the new bureaucrats in any way "caused" the Estado Novo, nor can they be associated, as Jaguaribe would have it, with the subsequent policy of industrialization which the government adopted. That was
the result of particular world circumstances, which changed at the end of the war.

**Electoral Populism (1945-1964)**

In 1945 Vargas was deposed by the military and elections were reintroduced to Brazil. Brazil's method of development during the next fifteen years was based on state investment and planning and foreign investment. This, intertwined with populist politics, had inherent consequences which led to a highly favorable context for a military coup in 1964.

By the war's end, Brazil was firmly under the political and economic hegemony of the United States. The United States emerged from the war at the height of its economic powers, and no longer had any interest in Brazil's independent industrial development. Brazil's "heroic" import substitution, which had been supported by the U.S. war effort, a captive market and lack of foreign competition, was coming to an end. The United States began to favor the interests of its own entrepreneurs against the nationalism and protectionism of the Brazilian government which had developed during the war years. For example,

---

34 As early as 1941, American entrepreneurs had begun to examine the advantages of partnership and capital association with Brazilian businessmen: "Foreign investors are verifying that the combination of their capital with that of national investors in the country which is being invested in, yields a certain degree of security in view of
North American entrepreneurs who wished to protect their trading and commercial positions in Brazil found their government more willing to assist their economic expansion than had been the case in the pre-war years, when it had frequently permitted debts to American exporters to remain unpaid (Hilton, 1975:227).

It is highly probable that the change in United States interests provided the context for deposing Vargas and reintroducing elections in Brazil. In other words, the reappearance of electoral politics in the post-war period was not merely a "return to democracy" in the flush of the Allied victory, as suggested by a number of writers (Pinsky, 1971:348; Odalia, 1971:358; Skidmore, 1967:79), but an incident in the realignment of hemispheric economic powers. In Brazil, such realignment required primarily the elimination or mitigation of Vargas' statist and nationalist policies (Ianni, 1971:79).

In accordance with United States interests in

excessive economic nationalism" (Feurlein and Hannan, 1941, cited in Ianni, 1971:137-8).

35 According to Gordon and Grommers, "the major single motive for undertaking manufacturing activities abroad was the desire to secure or maintain a footing in a generally attractive market where government policies leave no means of accomplishing this objective other than by direct investment" (1962:147-8).
Brazil, the American ambassador, Adolph Berle Jr., hailed Brazil's return to a free press and anticipated return to "constitutional democracy" at a luncheon given by the opposition UDN (União Democrática Brasileira) party.\(^{36}\)

Moreover, as we have seen above, the North American war effort had resulted in a considerable degree of influence over editorial opinion in Brazil. Stepan's (1971:99-101) analysis of editorial opinion reveals that in 1945 the legitimacy of the Vargas regime was being severely questioned. In addition, the military officers who made the coup against Vargas had developed close relations with American military officers as a result of joint service overseas (Stepan, 1971:128). After the coup, a spokesman for the UDN, which had supported it, recommended that the new government should

> appeal to the foreign capital necessary for the undertaking of national reconstruction and above all for the development of our unexplored reserves, allowing equal treatment and freedom for the remittance of profits (cited in Ianni, 1971:81) \(^{37}\)

---

\(^{36}\)Vargas had struggled with internal opposition since 1930, especially from São Paulo's free trade, anti-industrialist PD, which by the end of the Estado Novo had become the UDN. The UDN appears to have provided the core of civilian conspirators which finally brought down the Goulart regime in 1964. See also footnote 14, p. 71.

\(^{37}\)By 1946 the United States State Department was able to report that "as far as foreigners are concerned, the present Brazilian constitution has abandoned the nationalist perspective (which emerged in the 1934 constitution and had been strengthened in that of 1937), and has restored a regime of equality among foreigners and nationals" (cited in Ianni, 1971:82).
The return of electoral politics and the penetration of the Brazilian economy by foreign interests did not mean that industrialization stopped or that the Government abandoned its attempts to control the economy: both efforts continued, although as Ianni (1971) has shown, the administrations elected in 1945, 1950, 1955 and 1960 alternated in their openness to foreign capital. Coffee and agricultural exports continued to be the most important sources of foreign exchange, but by the 1950's, industry was Brazil's most dynamic economic sector, limited only by the small size of the Brazilian consumer market. After the first flush of post-war imports, which destroyed Brazil's foreign credits, import restrictions were set up

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38 Schmitter (1973:184) coins the term "democradura" for "the adaptation of a basically authoritarian polity to the minimal exigencies of a formal democracy." See also Leff (1968:109, 116-7, 125).

39 Thus the Dutra (1946-1950), Kubitschek (1955-1960) and post 1964 governments' philosophies were "liberal" and inter-dependent. The Vargas (1950-1953), Quadros/Goulart (1960-1964) governments attempted more autonomous nationalistic development schemes.

40 Morely and Smith's (1973) experiments suggest that the smallness of the Brazilian market--because of inequitable income distribution--need not have limited economic growth. Leff (1968:82-84) argues that by discriminating against exports, the protection of internal prices lowered growth and industrial development rates. His argument is especially interesting in the light of the export policy adopted in Brazil in the 1970's.

41 See Baer (1964:45-48) and Furtado (1963:230-40). Dean believes the credits were squandered because the industrialists fell out of favor with the Dutra regime, reflec-
favoring capital rather than consumer goods imports. A general developmental policy emerged, based on the one hand on state planning and investment and on the other on the attraction of foreign entrepreneurs to build capital goods industries and consumer durables (Baer, 1965; Ianni, 1971: 146; Cohn, 1971:308-9).

Many of the centralist policies of the Vargas years were abandoned after 1945. The 1946 Constitution gave states and municipalities far greater autonomy than had been theirs between 1930 and 1945 (Richardson, 1969). However, this was not a return to the Federalism of the First Republic. The political system which coincided with the new general developmental policy depended on three interrelated phenomena: a strong president, bureaucratic expansion and electoral populism.

In 1945 there were no organized political parties except on the left (Singer, 1965:68; Skidmore, 1967:54). After a significant electoral victory in 1945, the Communist party was again outlawed in 1947 (Skidmore, 1967:65-76), and politics were dominated largely by the PSD (Par-

ting its liberal bias. Cohn (1971:305-6) disagrees with all three and argues that the credits were useless anyway because they were not transferable to pay the existing debt to the United States. "They could not be used in a more dynamic manner to solve the internal and external disequilibria in the Brazilian economy (the British debt was used mostly to acquire railroads controlled by that country in Brazil, in a completely unproductive transaction)" (1971:306).
tido Social Democratico), the PTB (Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro) and the UDN (Uniao Democratica Nacional). The PSD was artificially created by the Vargas government before it was deposed in 1945, and was drawn from the remnants of old rural machines and new industrialists. The PTB was a government created, syndicalist labor party, and the UDN was formed out of the old Sao Paulo Partido Democratico and the Uniao Democratica Brasileira of the Vargas years. The UDN united all anti-Vargas forces under its consistently liberal banner. There were other parties, as well, but none, including the political machine of Adhemar de Barros (PSP--Partido Social Progressista), splintered off from the old Partido Republicano Paulista, could attain national expression without forming coalitions with one of the major three parties. Even these did not reach national prominence. Nonetheless, they monopolized the electoral and parliamentary aspects of politics (See Figure 15).

An electoral reform in 1934 had extended the suffrage to women and expanded the electorate. Nonetheless, the right to vote was still limited to the literate. Less than twenty percent of the population voted in the presidential elections of these years (See Figure 16). As Brazilian electoral democracy developed, politicians were elected on the basis of what material and ideological inducements they could offer their supporters. At the lower levels of society the inducements could include free food, medical
Figure 15. National and Paulista political parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Republic and early Vargas years (1898-1937)</th>
<th>Partido Republicano Paulista (1898-1937)</th>
<th>Partido Democratico (Paulista) (1926-1932)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

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Figure 16. Presidential elections in Brazil

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of Election</th>
<th>President</th>
<th>No. voters (millions)</th>
<th>% Pop.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3/1/94</td>
<td>Prudente de Morais</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/1/98</td>
<td>Manuel F. Campos Salles</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/1/02</td>
<td>F. Rodrigues Alves</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/1/06</td>
<td>Afonso Pena</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/1/10</td>
<td>Hermes da Fonseca</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/1/14</td>
<td>Venceslau Braz</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/1/18</td>
<td>F. Rodrigues Alves</td>
<td>.4</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/13/18</td>
<td>Epitacio Pessoa</td>
<td>.4</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/1/22</td>
<td>Artur Bernardes</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/1/26</td>
<td>Washington Luis Pereira de Souza</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/1/30</td>
<td>Julio Prestes</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/2/45</td>
<td>Eurico Gaspar Dutra</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/3/50</td>
<td>Getulio Vargas</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>15.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/3/55</td>
<td>Juscelino Kubitschek</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>15.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/3/60</td>
<td>Janio Quadros</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>18.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


assistance, jobs, football tickets and local improvements in public utilities. None of the parties organized formal mechanisms with which to develop a mass base, but developed rather— and only in a few areas— a series of informal patronal ties to their constituencies (Leeds and Leeds, 1975:205). Predominantly the electorate received lots of populist demagoguery and was maintained in a dependent position vis-a-vis the politician. Thus, for example, the favelas (shantytowns or squatments) of Brazil’s major cities were used by politicians as "currais eleitorais" (electoral corrals). The residents of each curral eleitoral received favors from local ward heelers or politicians.
in exchange for their votes.  

While elected politicians could and often did create a climate of political unrest, they did not usually pose serious threats to the autonomy of the executive. As numerous writers on electoral politics have pointed out (A. Leeds, 1964, 1965; E. Leeds, 1972; Leeds and Leeds, 1975; Galjart, 1964, 1965; Moraes, 1970; Medina, 1964), the populist politicians of the era expanded their electorates by appealing to new groups, such as the peasants of the Northeast, or the urban poor. However, since the dialectic of populism was based on a limited and dependent electorate, accompanied by fear of losing control to the masses (Weffort, 1965:170; Ianni, 1970:198), a more secure electoral base for a given politician often meant the separation and splintering off of that base from another group, thus preventing the development of class politics.  


during endemic electoral campaigns, peasants might demand a change of the political regime as a condition for participation in the electoral process. As a result of these demands by peasants, the executive often found itself in a difficult position, faced with the prospect of not being re-elected. This dilemma of the executive provided the opportunity for the development of new social movements and political parties that would challenge the traditional political system.

\[\text{Galjart (1964, 1965) describes the cultural substratum of a patronage system through the analysis of peasant pilgrimages in the Northeast. He shows that among peasants, vertical ties predominate to the almost absolute exclusion of horizontal ties. See also Galjart (1964, 1965).}\]

\[E. \text{ Leeds (1972:53-56) describes the recognized utility of electoral corrals in Rio de Janeiro's favelas. An administrator attempting to remove a favela from the electoral patronage system by offering various improvements and avenues to self help without requiring votes in exchange was summarily dismissed in 1962. "This attempt to grant political independence to favelas was of course, most threatening to legislators who depended on favelas for electoral support" (1972:56).}\]
politicians who did not develop patronal ties among the poor, politicians of the left, who did, appeared especially threatening because they had large lower class followings. However, all of the populist styles current in Brazil at that time—getulismo, adhemarismo, janismo, nacionalismo, and most regional rural mobilization efforts—operated to blunt class distinctions.

At the middle and upper reaches of society, patron-client relations connected the administrative and electoral systems. Singer has written that each electoral position has a certain political weight which depends on the number of jobs the incumbent can distribute, on the size of the budget he controls, on the electoral income that the position can command through increased or improved public services. The ministries and [state] secretariats of roads and public works are, for instance, considered to be positions of great political weight. This follows from a number of facts: 1) these positions permit the control of the railroads, which are considered to yield a high electoral income because of their large number of employees, 2) the construction of roads and public works (bridges, buildings, etc.) also controlled by these positions permit the management of enormous budgets, from which it is almost always possible to derive a considerable income in

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44 For discussions of the weakness of the left in Brazil during this period, see Harding (1964), Arriaga (1964), Weffort (1965), Ianni (1965), Cohn (1965), Poerner, 1968:197-200), Erikson (1970:277-80), de Kadt (1970), Myhr, (1972). All labor, student and nationalist movements of any account were controlled by the government, whereas political parties of the left were disunited and had no independent popular bases.

collusion with furnishers of materials and sub-contractors (1965:81-82).

Elected politicians were in general far too busy satisfying their clients and maintaining their own power bases from above and below to formulate policy. Congress was placed in "the weak tactical position of reacting [to the president's] initiatives, administrative decrees and faits accomplis (Leff, 1968:125).

The developmental policy adopted in Brazil during these years led to a kind of "entrepreneurial plebicitary regime, with the president himself in the role of the Great Entrepreneur . . . " (Cohn, 1971:310). In order to implement the ideology of developmentalism which emerged during these years, the presidents were able to establish new "parallel bureaucracies" (Dalland, 1972:41-42), when the existing ones were politically recalcitrant, or controlled by opposition interests.47 The bureaucratic reforms of the Vargas years were to some extent abandoned so as to permit a greater number of appointed positions (Graham, 1968:140-42; Siegel, 1966).

46See Bonilla (1963), Debrun (1964), Weffort (1965:192); Ianni (1971:183-85), Leff (1968:139-45), on the development and functions of nationalist ideologies at this time.

47Motta (1972:217) writes that "bureaucracy became the institution that would revive the mechanism of electoral clans" through panelinhas. Bureaucratic inertia as well as political opposition within given bureaucracies led to the creation of autonomous and parallel agencies.
Public employment soared, especially in the early 1960's (See Figure 17), expanding the bureaucratic middle income sectors, and with it the myriad series of informal cliques that Leeds (1965) describes as "panelinhas" (little saucepans). These informal and primary groups, formed for mutual benefit, operated at every level of Brazilian bureaucracies and electoral politics. Horizontally, panelinha members took care of each other's needs; but each panelinha was also inserted in vertical "tactical corps of supporters" called an "isrejinha" (a little church) which allowed the benefits of patronage to flow up and down the social scale (Leeds, 1965:392).

Several contradictory consequences followed from this political organization. In spite of the political opening and the re-emergence of regional power groups, the executive was strengthened. Although the 1950's and early 1960's had a politically unstable appearance, the process which Weffort was to call "the consecration of the State"

48 Characteristically, a panelinha will consist of "a customs official, an insurance man, a lawyer or two, businessmen, an accountant, a municipal, state or federal deputy and a banker with his bank" (Leeds, 1965:393). At the lower or middle ends of the social scale, the professions need not be so exalted.

49 The 1950's and early 1960's were filled with explosive rhetoric on developmental, regional, constitutional and partisan questions (see Skidmore, 1967; Debrun, 1964; Hirschman, 1961; Ianni, 1971b, for examples). There were serious strikes (1953), a presidential suicide (Vargas, 1954), a presidential resignation (Quadros, 1961), and
Figure 17. Employment in the Federal Government.

and the strengthening of the president was not impeded. The president's powers of appointment, bureaucratic creation and the clientelism which characterized electoral politics served in general to insulate him from serious political pressures (Leff, 1964:126).

Clientelism, rather than electoral politics, was the potential weakness in the system. As Scott has pointed out in the language of political science, clientelism and the attendant graft and corruption serve as "post legislative mechanisms for interest aggregation" (1969:326). This means that those functionaries who did not have direct access to situations in which policies were decided and made into law, could in myriad and secret ways affect the implementation of these laws in their own interests. The result was a drain on government resources and perhaps also on government policy. However, Erikson's analysis of the Labor Ministry in the early 1960's (1970:140ff) shows that clientelism could also be used programatically. This constitutional crises in which on one occasion an elected president, and on another a vice president (Kubitschek in 1955; Goulart in 1961) were almost prevented from taking office.

Leff goes so far as to suggest that the clientelism and corruption in Brazilian bureaucracies during the populist era acted as a kind of information tax on foreign interests and businesses, and thus unwittingly and indirectly may have supported nationalist independent economic development.
occurred under Labor Minister Almino Affonso, whose strategic use of patronage in the Labor Ministry and Social Security Institutes began to impinge on national policy making and to undermine the centralized, ultimately presidential, control of labor. That Almino's efforts were perceived as a threat to presidential strength, regardless of the political ideology, is attested by his prompt replacement as minister.

Nonetheless, while there was little threat to presidential strength from within the political system, the Goulart regime was toppled by a military coup in 1964. On the surface, the coup was the result of presidential interference in military affairs and military discipline (Stepan, 1970). His interference united civilian plotters with military plotters against him, and the military plotters with uncommitted or pro-Goulart officers within the army.

The underlying reasons for the coup, and for the existence of plotters, however, were more complex. By the 1960's growth had ceased, and the economy was plagued by inflation. In an expanding economy it is possible that electoral populism and patronage might have been able to meet the claims and expectations raised. In a contracting economy, populism created aspirations and tensions which it could not resolve. These tensions themselves generated a fear of loss of control to the masses, a fear expressed in
the civilian plot against the regime. Indeed, José Nun has argued that the combination of decreased economic growth with increased working class organization and strength (Nun, 1967:91) led the military to act, in the interests of a middle class to overturn the populist regime to prevent "premature democratization" (1968:147).

Like other arguments which hypothesize a middle class initiative in Brazilian development, this argument depends on a number of fundamental misreadings of the Brazilian situation. First of all, as we have seen, populism did not lead to increased working class organization and strength. The tenuous hold that labor leaders had over rank and file workers, especially during the 1964 coup, attests to populism's ultimate weakness in this respect (Erikson, 1970:280-84).

Second, although middle income sectors had increased dramatically as a consequence of bureaucratic expansion associated with populism, especially in its later years, there is no evidence that these sectors as yet constituted a middle class. Expectations that such a class might form were characteristic of this period. However, as Leeds (1965) has shown, the expansion of middle income sectors reflected an expansion in the clientelistic networks of the "classes" rather than the emergence of a structurally discrete group. This is perfectly apparent in the mobilization techniques used by the civilian plotters of the coup to include middle income groups in demonstra-
tions against the regime. Siekman (1964) and Blume (1967) have shown that the civilian organizers of the plot against Goulart were a small group of industrialists and businessmen (newspaper owners, editors, bank owners and managers, lawyers, etc.) in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. Many were affiliated with the liberal UDN and with North American interests in Brazil. Recruitment to the study organization which they formed (IPES -- Instituto de Pesquisas e Estudos Sociais) was conducted in a "personal" way (Blume, 1967:47). IPES drew on material from a North American foundation (Siekman, 1964:148) and launched a massive anti-communist and anti-Goulart campaign. The support which they generated among middle income groups, for example, in the March for the Family and Democracy in São Paulo, was mobilized by personal telephone calls on the part of industrialists' wives, as well as by television and newspaper announcements (Foland, 1967; Blume, 1967).

Finally, it is interesting that Nun's position on middle class power, like that of most modernization theorists, coincides with a neglect of foreign economic and political interests in the Brazilian situation. His analysis of the economic crisis suggests that Brazil was developing in a vacuum. According to Nun, the import substitution process "exhausted itself" without the country "having found a pattern of self sustained development" (1967:91). In fact, however, the economic crisis was inherent in Brazil's relationship to the world economy--specifically
with North American expansionism. It is true that inflation, which at first had played a significant role in generating the funds for Brazil's industrialization (Baer, 1965:103-105; Ianni, 1971:190; Wogart, 1972:167),\(^{51}\) was reducing the buying power of lower income groups, increasing the cost of production and thus deflating profits (Ianni, 1971:192). Monetary stabilization was politically impossible to impose and the economy had reached an impasse. Fishlow has shown (1973), however, that inflation was the result of the monopolistic way in which the industrial sector was structured (1973:76) and of the Government tendency to raise prices for public services. In addition, he argues, the economic impasse grew out of cycles inherent in the foreign dominated process of import substitution. This process is,

\[
\text{virtually by definition . . . bunched . . . Import substitution introduces new lines of}
\]

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\(^{51}\)In Brazil the redistributive effects of inflation acted as a technique of forced savings (Ianni, 1971: 171); working class salaries were held below price raises, with the effect of inflating profits and savings. "Workers did not necessarily suffer in their living standards, but the increase of the living standard was slower than the increase of the real national product. . . . The declining share of the wage sector contributed to the large retained earnings which were used by the private sector in its investment program, while the higher investment proportion of the government in comparison to its savings proportion suggests that through the inflationary process, the government managed to transfer savings from the private to the public sector. It is clear that the redistributive factor of Brazilian inflation was able to work itself out because the wage earning sector was not strong enough to insure
domestic production . . . such activities therefore experience initial rates of growth higher than those possible over the longer term. Accompanying inflation and balance of payments problems mask the problem until too late . . . In Brazil, the import substitution investment boom of the late 1950's was soon followed by deceleration of product growth in the early 1960's and a diminished incentive to invest . . . because much of it was foreign financed, the ultimate balance of payments crisis was intensified (1973:104-105).

National entrepreneurs became clients to the government, not only because of the size of government enterprises, but also because import substitution in conjunction with foreign investment led to a substitution of entrepreneurs as well (Cohn, 1971:314; Dean, 1969:237; Ianni, 1971:177). As foreign companies came to control important sectors of production (automobiles, electricity and cigarettes were between eighty and ninety percent foreign; pharmaceuticals and machinery companies were seventy percent foreign (Cohn, 1971:314)), Brazilian entrepreneurs were increasingly reduced to the status of secondary partners to foreign capitalists and petitioners to the central government.

Nonetheless, it is interesting that before the 1964 coup, it was the foreign companies, despite all their advantages which were hit the hardest.

The foreign firms often assumed that on the basis of their size, and especially their administrative and technical know how, they would be able to domi-
nate the local market . . . the foreign firms had special disadvantages of their own. Their larger size and expatriate managerial and technical staffs contributed to higher overhead costs. Because they employed a "cost plus" pricing policy which attempted to recover overhead costs in the markup, this often placed them at a competitive disadvantage. Furthermore, because of the foreign firms' reluctance (stemming from fears about the exchange rate and political conditions) to increase their capital commitments in Brazil, they usually did not bring with them sufficient working capital to provide substantial suppliers credits to local clients. Hence, they were sometimes at a competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis domestic firms . . . Because of these factors, when field investigation of the [capital goods] sector was undertaken in 1964, the foreign rather than the domestic firms were bearing a disproportionate share of its excess capacity and low profit margins (Leff, 1968a:36-37).

This may help to explain the extremely favorable environment provided by the United States for the 1964 coup. More or less discreet efforts to co-opt leadership elites had continued during the populist years as a continuation of the pro-American propaganda campaign begun so successfully during the World War II years. While American businessmen were too afraid to participate directly in the civilian plot to overthrow the government (Blume, 1967: 222), the American embassy supported the civilian plotters' [52]See Poerner (1968:28, 253) on the State Department's efforts to dominate the Brazilian Student Union (UNE) in the early 1950's, and on the creation of AUI (Associação Universitária Interamericana), a Brazilian and American business as well as State Department financed foundation whose objective was to introduce future political leaders to "good capitalism, as it is exercised in the United States."
propaganda efforts. A year before the coup, the United States began to withhold financial support from the Goulart government and to actively seek out the president's political opponents to sabotage federal programs; these measures and its support of political opponents of the government exacerbated the political and financial crisis (Stepan, 1971:124-25; Skidmore, 1967:322-23; Roett, 1968:322). Military aid was even offered to the conspirators, but it was refused. Because it was refused, American officials could state unequivocally that the revolution was "one hundred percent purely Brazilian" (Skidmore, 1967:325-26). Given the extent of North American interests and the internal political structure of Brazil, however, it is inappropriate to credit Brazilian middle income sectors with the initiative for the coup.

Military Dictatorship (1964 to the present)

The pattern of Brazilian development during the populist years was based on a strong executive, government investment and the attraction of foreign capital. These features continue as cornerstones of development policy after 1964 but on a scale not approached by previous regimes. In spite of the closeness of ties between the new

53 Specifically with the publication of UNF, Instrumento de Subversão, by Sonia Seganfredo (Blume, 1967:215).
Brazilian military government and the United States, the course of Brazilian development after 1964 was not that of a nation forcibly reincorporated into the hegemony of United States imperialism. The pattern that emerged, most markedly after 1964, was that of a radically new kind of economic development, spearheaded by a rapidly evolving partnership between the Brazilian government and transnational corporations. Increasingly, the country has become the site of manufacturing based on sophisticated technology, buttressed by the highest forms of finance.

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55 The nature of the political and economic changes which occurred in Brazil from 1964 on were not immediately apparent. Some writers felt that Brazil had come even further into the American "imperialist" domain in a regime of "colonial fascism" (Ianni, 1971a:211; Jaguaribe, 1964:182; Frank, 1964, 1964a, 1965), or one of restoration of the corporativism of the Estado Novo (Schmitter, 1973; Erikson, 1972; Skidmore, 1973:31-32). Others, as Cardoso (1973), Morely and Smith (1973) and Fishlow (1973:101) have noted, were concerned about the limits political conservatism would place on economic growth. If the argument put forth earlier is correct, the Estado Novo and the centralization which preceded it developed to protect Brazilian interests from the impersonal rationality of the world market, whereas the new Brazilian state exists to integrate Brazil into the world market in a different way, which entails high rates of growth.

56 Technological sophistications appear in the forms of the capability of manufacturing in situ jet planes, which were hitherto imported. Testimony to the financial sophistication involved is the development of large investment banks which began to appear as of 1966 (As Grandes Companias, . . . 1973:75-82, et passim).
importantly, these massive infusions of capital and technology have been coupled with a major effort to provide a new economic infrastructure which would articulate the new economic order. Should this effort be successful, Brazil would stand alone in Latin America as a country capable of becoming a sub-imperial power in her own right for Latin America and with imperial aspirations of her own in the rest of the underdeveloped market.

It is the argument of this thesis that only in this context can we see the beginning of middle class formation: that is, the formation of a group structurally separated from the "classes" and performing distinct functions. Two functions are especially important. The first is to enforce in various ways the developmental and political policies of the central government. The second is to support the development of Brazil's industries by providing an insatiable market for consumer goods. Both of these functions grow out of the changing circumstances which followed the 1964 coup.

In order to understand these changes and the Brazilian "economic miracle," Cardoso (1973) has formulated the model of "associated dependent development." In this model he emphasises that the process of associated development cannot be understood as a function of purely national initiatives: indeed, the nation state is reduced to the role of a single administrative unit within an internatio-
nal division of labor, increasingly controlled by trans-
national corporations (cf. also Wallerstein, 1974; Barnet
and Muller, 1974). As the price for hosting technological
and financial transfers, the nation state must attempt
to guarantee internal stability while committing itself to
infrastructural development.  

In this course of development, a premium has been 
put on speed by the government, probably prodded on by 
transnationals, whose investments are under considerable 
pressure elsewhere in the world from national governments 
and whose commitments to areas that do not suit their 
needs are notoriously fluid (Barnet and Muller, 1974:55-56, 
81-83, 189-210). No effort has been spared by the govern­
ment to make Brazil safe for transnationals, from which 
the successive governments believe that all the blessings 
of economic development will flow.

In its headlong rush towards development, the 
government has faced two major obstacles: 1) opposition 
from major Brazilian industrialists, expressed primarily 
in the arena of national politics, and 2) the problems 
of massing sufficient capital to underwrite infrastructu-

57 Infrastructural development under state owned 
corporations is the nature of the Brazilian government's 
commitment. But here also the transnationals are preemi­
nent, as the government itself is not capable of produc­
ing railroad engines, but General Electric is; nor is it 
capable of producing telecommunications equipment, but 
RCA is, to cite a few examples.
ral costs, which are staggering. Symptomatic of the increasing opposition is the repression for which the government has become notorious since 1968. The capital accumulation problem has led to the overhaul of the Brazilian credit and taxation systems, accomplished primarily under the aegis of Minister of the Economy, A. Delfim Netto (1968-1974) (Fishlow, 1973). Let us consider each in turn.

Under populism, Brazilian industrialists participated in the national government, albeit as clients. Immediately after the 1964 coup, in which many of them took part, it became clear that the new government was to leave the door wide open to the penetration of foreign capital and the rational workings of the market. In effect, the priorities of the government were to the establishment of a functioning free market system, perhaps even more than to the struggle against inflation... In the long run these goals were viewed as mutually compatible, indeed as indispensably linked; in the short run, they might conflict, to the consistent disadvantage of stabilization (Fishlow, 1973:80).

Brazilian industrialists without transnational linkages needed some form of economic protection in order not to be gobbled up by the transnationals. The effect of the government's free market policies were not long in bearing bitter fruit as these industrialists began to be forced into bankruptcy, or were bought out by transnationals. (Ianni, 1971:262-65). Increasingly imperiled by the exe-
utive branch's free market policies, Brazilian business-
men sought to fight back through the legislative branch of
government, in which they were still powerful. Public
debate was focused on the issue of denationalization
(desnacionalização) of the Brazilian economy (Moreira Alves,
1972:163-78; Ianni, 1971:262, footnote 37). For four years
(1964-1968) a feverish struggle ensued between the legisla-
tive and executive branches of government. In late 1968
the executive branch made its definitive move: through
a series of repressive actions it removed Brazilian indus-
trialists cum politicians from power. 58

A series of Institutional acts, notably Institution-
al Act 5 (AI-5) in 1968, removed politics to the near
exclusive domain of the president and his military advisors.
The political rights of many prominent politicians had
been abolished in 1964 and 1965. The old parties had been
abolished in 1965 and were replaced with two government
parties, ARENA (Aliança Renovadora Nacional), and a loyal
opposition, MDB (Movimento Democrático Brasileiro). Indi-
rect elections for the president and state governors were
instituted at that time. While the formalities of indirect
elections are maintained, state governors were removed at
the president's will. In 1968, however, federal, state
and municipal legislatures were recessed, and when recon-

58 For the "igniting spark" of the 1968 military
shift, see Schneider (1970) and Moreira Alves (1973).
vened, stripped of most of their power. Habeas corpus was suspended; official violence reached new proportions, with the aid of United States anti-insurgency training courses. While the poor had always been brutalized by the police, arbitrary physical abuse and torture was practised against members of the middle and upper income strata for the first time, in an effort to stamp out the wave of political terrorism which arose in response to the repression. Rigid censorship of the press and academic community was instituted, and the climate of fear and political apathy which developed was shrouded by nationalist public relations symbols created or inflated by the government. In addition, courses in political indoctrination are required at all educational levels. 59

The increasing control of political opposition permitted the implementation of fiscal policies supportive of capital accumulation. Although many had been developed before 1964, they had been at that time politically impossible to pursue. These included policies to increase federal revenues and create a rational capital market

59 See Schmitter (1970), Truskier (1970), American Committee (1970), Moreira Alves (1972, 1973), Rosenbaum and Tyler (1972), Bishops (1973). The celebration of the 150th anniversary of Brazil's independence included the repatriation of Emperor Pedro II's bones from Portugal; these were sent on a funeral cortège around the country. Other nationalist symbols include the building of the Trans-Amazonic highway and heavily publicized disputes with the United States over the price of soluble coffee.
undistorted by inflation. Rationalizing the capital market created funds for government investment in infrastructure (e.g. minerals, electric power, communications, transportation. See Quem e Quem, 1972:75). Improved tax collection (Hinnichs and Mahar, 1972) and nominally redistributive (but actually instruments of forced savings and capital concentration) federal institutions (BNH, FGTS, PIS, PIN\textsuperscript{60}) have vastly expanded federal revenues. Monetary correction and "crawling peg" devaluations have reduced financial uncertainty by preventing currency speculations and the devaluation of financial balances through inflation (Rosenbaum and Tyler, 1972:17-18).\textsuperscript{61} Because of

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\textsuperscript{60} The BNH (National Housing Bank) was founded in 1964 with an initial capital of one million cruzeiros. To these funds were added those of the FGTS (Guarantee Fund for Time of Service) formed in 1966 and based on an eight percent payroll tax levied on employers. The FGTS is a pension fund to which employees or their heirs only have access on limited occasions: marriage, house building, death or retirement (Hughes, 1972:128; Otero, n.d..109). PIS (Program for Social Integration) is another pension plan paid for by employers to which workers also have limited access (Fishlow, 1973:11). PIN (National Integration Program) is an effort to resettle the Northeastern poor along the Trans-Amazonic highway. All of these plans are forced savings mechanisms which finance Government development programs.

\textsuperscript{61} D. Kleinman's letter to the New York Times (Business and Finance, Sunday, April 28, 1974) emphasises the creation or saving of capital rather than the halting of inflation as the prime motive among the economists—including himself—who developed the monetary correction scheme.
government incentives, export revenues have increased and continued foreign investments have reduced Brazil's shortage of foreign exchange. Although the national debt almost doubled between 1964 and 1971 (Cardoso, 1973:150), international financial agencies have "found Brazil to be an exemplary debtor, and have maintained high levels of lending" (Skidmore, 1973:24).

This style of economic development entails grave social costs. A number of writers have pointed out the increasingly regressive pattern of income distribution and the fact that the development of the industrial sector is not expected to significantly increase employment (Fishlow, 1972, 1973; Cardoso, 1973; Langoni, 1973; Hughes, 1972:134). Even among the employed, the purchasing power of real wages has been reduced, although the effects of this may have been mitigated for some by increased credit facilities. Nonetheless, an increasing number of women and younger people have felt the need to supplement family incomes by joining the labor market, in spite of the low salaries they receive (Langoni, 1973:15, 58, 83, 97). The labor structure was reorganized under tighter central control and the unions which had developed during the previous decade outside the official structure were abolished. Syndicate leaders were replaced by men amenable to the new government's wishes and political orthodoxy is required of all office holders in the labor structure.
In a very real sense, Brazil's growth depends on a poor and politically docile population.

It is within this scheme that middle income sectors have been called upon to perform new functions. These sectors resemble their counterparts under populism. Indeed, the trend towards increased bureaucratic employment characteristic of that period continued after 1964, if at a somewhat slower rate (See Figure 17). Under populism, however, bureaucratic employment among middle sectors represented an extension of the "classes" and their clientelistic panelinhas. Since 1964 many of these networks have been broken through bureaucratic reform. Bureaucracies have been systematically moralized and rationalized: they have been purged of corrupt, clientelistic and other undesirable elements. "Influence," except at the highest levels, has sharply decreased. Whereas corruption and patronage had previously served as "post legislative mechanisms for interest aggregation," the bureaucrats are now expected to lubricate the system for "associated dependent development." To quote Delfim Netto, Minister of the Economy, and central architect of the Brazilian miracle,

As far as the direct action of the government is concerned, nothing is more important than 1) the development of a truly efficient bureaucracy which is conscious of and responsible for its actions, 2) the introduction of modern management methods in government enterprises, including the creation of a stable cadre of administrative and technical
It is absolutely imperative to modernize public administration so as to inculcate in the bureaucracy the values which are compatible with the society we wish to build. Without modernization, it will never be possible to maintain the continuity of objectives, because it is clear that on the level that really counts who administers the country is the bureaucrat: he is the one who decides who does and who does not pay taxes. In the case of indirect action, nothing seems more important to me than to free the entrepreneur from sibylline regulations, from contradictory economic policies and from the power of the unprepared bureaucrat" (emphasis added, cited in Ianì, 1971:248-50).

In addition to their function as lubricators and enforcers of government policy, middle income sectors have been called upon to support the internal market through the consumption of luxury consumer durables which the present economic scheme emphasises (Cardoso, 1973:149). In this process, the concept of classe média (middle class) has become widely diffused through the media and is associated with life style (clothing, appliances, automobiles, all made in Brazil) and is increasingly identified with poder consumidor, the power to consume. Being middle class is a matter not of political participation, but of political neutrality and economic consumption.

Such a middle class is a far cry from that which appears so frequently as a prime mover in modernization theory. This chapter has shown that Brazil's political and economic development has responded to changes in its relations with other actors in the world economic system, and not to initiatives from middle income sectors. Further-
more, it has argued that until very recently, there has been no middle class, but only middle income sectors, which have been variously drawn into the privileged arena of ruling elites. This was true despite the expansion of middle income sectors as a result of overall government centralization and economic growth, which created more middle income positions. Finally, recent Brazilian history suggests that conditions now favor the development of a middle class: we have hypothesized on the basis of the historical evidence that a class formation process has begun. The following chapters present fieldwork data in support of this hypothesis. They show how families of three distinct social origins (local elites, immigrants and bureaucrats) have been affected by shifting phases of Brazilian development in this century, and how despite their dissimilar origins and varied careers, they increasingly form part of a homogeneous class of consumers, even to the point of expressing a shared rudimentary consciousness of their position.
CHAPTER III

SANTANA, FROM THE TOP OF THE HILL, 1900-1930

The next two chapters will describe in detail the three groups which field research suggested constitute significant middle income sectors of Santana. It will be shown that the three groups--an old local elite, a foreign born commercial sector and bureaucrats of rural origins--were distinct. They had different social origins, pursued different careers, emerged as politically visible actors in different historical periods, and on the whole recognized their separateness from each other. Nevertheless, the three groups underwent, albeit in different time periods, a parallel process of progressive exclusion from political power with attendant economic implications. Chapter V will show that these processes are leading to what appears to be a shared consciousness of class based on a sense of exclusion. In Chapter IV I will concentrate on the second two groups--immigrants and bureaucrats.

The present chapter deals with Santana's old elite, which coalesced during the First Republic and was already in decline by the 1930's. The greater time depth in their family histories allows for a more complete analysis of the implications of political marginalization, and suggests a model for the understanding of the careers of the
bureaucrats and immigrants. By the 1920's, Santana's elite families had become intermediaries and brokers in the larger political system of São Paulo. They stood on the lower fringes of the ruling class of the city as a whole. Their economic fortunes were intricately related to the growth of São Paulo city between 1900 and 1930. Political developments following 1930 sheared most of them off from the city's ruling groups, and left only the most fortunate with sufficient capital to be able to maintain themselves for a generation or two. Most of Santana's elite families lived through a brief period of local glory and then fell back anonymously into Santana's and the city's growing middle income sectors.

In 1934 Santana was the most heavily populated district north of the Tietê River, with 43,588 inhabitants.¹ At the turn of the century, however, the area appeared to have been hardly touched by the economic forces which had transformed the city of São Paulo into a metropolis. The city council barely concerned itself with the lands to the north of the city on either side of the Tietê River; its attentions were limited to the requirement that landowners keep a portion of their land in public service for open pasturage and road maintenance (Mendes Torres, 1970:43). In 1880 public transportation did not extend beyond the

¹The area was already reduced by subdivision. See above, Chapter I, p. 48.
bridge which crossed the Tietê River: the urban and rural zones were divided by the hog pens which were established that year on the northern and western outskirts of town, including in Santana (Mendes Torres, 1970:52). The main building of the old Jesuit Fazenda Sant'Anna had been decrepit and run down since 1863 when it had housed indigent minors: ten years later it was more run down, housing equally indigent smallpox victims. Such development as had come to Santana appeared limited to the establishment of São Paulo's first regatta clubs on either side of the river (1905) and the building of the Colegio Santana, an expensive girl's boarding school perched high on the hill overlooking the Tietê valley and the city beyond. The area appeared unpopulated and abandoned to the rich who lived in the center of the city. A wealthy coffee baroness recalls the São Paulo of her youth:

We would take long carriage outings through the suburbs. We went to Braz, to Gloria and principally to the Ponte Grande (Big Bridge to Santana) on dusty roads, crossing uncultivated lands and sighting here and there a poor hovel or a caipira (hillbilly) passing by with his little donkey loaded with the sparse products of his garden, which he was going to try to sell in the city" (cited in Mendes Torres, 1970:58).

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For many years the massive structure of the Colegio Santana and the adjoining chapel built by local landowners were the only reference points in municipal documents dealing with opening new roads or boundary disputes in the area. Santana was beyond the city limits for many of the city's inhabitants.
The baroness's impressions notwithstanding, Mendes Torres's history of Santana (1970) provides some indications that Santana's economy and population had in fact begun to grow before the turn of the century. Santana's population had risen from 970 in 1825 to 7,000 in 1900 (Mendes Torres, 1970:11; Masarolo, 1971:85).\(^3\) Some of this growth in population is attributable to foreign immigration. In 1877 the Provincial Government established in Santana a colonial nucleus for Italian immigrants. By 1888 there were 136 persons in the colony (94 Italians and 39 Brazilians) who planted corn, beans, potatoes and vineyards. While foreign immigrants did not flood Santana as they did other central neighborhoods of the city, their contribution was not inconsiderable and continued well on into the new century. An 1893 analysis of the statistics of birth in Santana revealed that for 107 births, only 48 were to Brazilian parents. By 1927 more than half of the student population in Santana was of foreign extraction (Mendes Torres, 1970:66-67, 76, 110).

\(^3\)Indeed, according to a local petition, the smallpox hospital was moved out of Santana in 1878 because of the "inhabitants of the (Italian) colony of Santana, the large number of carters and mule train drivers that come to the capital from different parts of the state, the large numbers of immigrants residing in the neighborhood of Luz (across the river from Santana) and the large numbers of carters and inhabitants in Luz and Santana," who presumably might catch and spread the disease (cited in Mendes Torres, 1970:60).
Santana's population growth was not only due to foreign immigration, however. We may infer additional growth in the population from the city records which reveal that, beginning in the 1860's, land disputes and requests to the city council for land increased in the Northern Zone of the city. In 1869 lands which had been abandoned and which had been in the public domain for over forty years began to be enclosed and sold privately (Mendes Torres, 1970:50). In order to prevent private individuals from planting rapidly growing trees and thus being able to claim the land as private property, the city council ordered the area ploughed under (Mendes Torres, 1970:50). Disputes continued during the rest of the century, with complaints to the city council about the difficulty of maintaining boundary lines: markers were constantly stolen, leaving the lands unenclosed, and thus in the public domain. In 1881 a commission set up to study the land claims concluded that

in reality the public has been in possession for a long time, but even when proven that a piece of land is of private ownership, it would be convenient to expropriate it for the public's utility (cited in Mendes Torres, 1970:56).

The meadow near the Ponte Grande over the Tietê was declared in the public domain, but the decision was overturned the same year by the Provincial Government, thus opening the way to increased settlement and real estate development in Santana.
In 1889 on the eve of the declaration of the Republic, Santana was declared a separate district of the peace; by 1900 Santana was allotted 3.2 percent of the budget for city improvements (Masarolo, 1971:85). Transportation to and from the district had improved. In 1865 the Ponte Grande over the Tietê had been repaired, and in 1893 the Cantareira Railroad through Santana was inaugurated. It was built to improve contact between the growing city and the waterworks and reservoirs which fed the city's water supply from the Cantareira mountains north of Santana. But, by the beginning of the century it was being used by passengers, as well as to transport agricultural produce to the city's municipal markets (Mendes Torres, 1970:112). In addition, Santana was serviced by horse drawn trolleys which provided sufficiently bad service to incite two riots in 1906. The animals were unhitched and the trolleys were set on fire and sent rolling down the hill. The service was replaced in 1908 by an electric trolley service (Mendes Torres, 1970:90).

A commercial center was forming in Santana although the main street there

looked more like a road than a street, still travelled by mule trains and ox carts, with low wattle and daub houses, immense yards surrounded by bamboo or vine fences, and with little illumination (Mendes Torres, 1970:90).

In between the fenced yards along the main street were
hardware stores, grocery stores (*sécos e molhados*), and saddle and leather goods shops and blacksmith and carpentry shops. By 1913 Santana had its first movie house. In 1911 the center of Santana had 651 buildings. By 1918 the number had more than doubled to 1707 and the main streets had been paved (Mendes Torres, 1970:93,102). The area was fully electrified in 1922 along with the city's more distant neighborhoods such as Jardim America and Ypiranga. In the early part of the century, Santana had sixteen public schools and by 1927, the student population alone was at least 10,812 (Mendes Torres, 1970:84,111).

Mendes Torres is of little assistance in explaining the reasons for Santana's development during the first three decades of the century, beyond stating the obvious fact that the area's growth was a spin-off of the growth of the city. Santana was affected, just as other neighborhoods in São Paulo were, by the city's growth. The family histories which I collected in Santana suggest some of the specific ways a growing metropolis affected the economy and social stratification of one of its outlying neighborhoods.

The lands north of the Tietê River, including Santana, were never coffee lands; they supported a mixed economy based on agriculture and pasturage. Landowners raised cattle, grew sugar, beans, corn, manioc and fruit. According to elderly informants in Santana, the larger...
establishments at the turn of the century, included lumber yards, carpentry shops and brick and charcoal factories. In addition to this, the area's most important economic activity, dating back as far as the eighteenth century consisted of the fattening and sale of mule and horse trains which came from Bragança and Atibaia to the north. It was because of this trade that landowners had been required to maintain the roads in good conditions and allocate part of their lands for open grazing (Mendes Torres, 1970:43).

According to informants who had been part of the elite which emerged in Santana over the first two decades of the century, the city's growth affected their family fortunes in a number of interrelated ways. For large local landowners and animal dealers, who formed the core of the elite, animal sales increased as did trade in general. In addition, the area acquired urban real estate value which further stimulated commercial interests and construction.

As the city grew, an increasing number of horses and mules were sold to its expanding public services, which used them for transportation, sanitary and security services, at that time all based on animal traction. The most important buyer of animals was the growing São Paulo
State Militia (Força Pública de São Paulo) which established its headquarters on the city side of the Tietê River on the road to Santana in 1901. The market for such sales increased again in 1906 when the Força Pública began its expansion under French military advisors. To meet this growing demand, local landowners, now with enclosed fields, either bought whole mule and horse trains for resale or rented out pasture land. At least two local landowners introduced dairy cattle, selling the milk locally and across the river to the city. Other landowners and entrepreneurs established grocery stores and supply houses for the animal trade. Landowners who did this, often in conjunction with other activities, moved their families from their fazendas (large farms, rural establishments) and built houses in Santana on the slopes of the hill.

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4 In 1909 an Army post for the 10th Pursuit Company was established in the old Jesuit fazenda house. It had housed transient military contingents since 1893. In 1916 the main house, slave quarters and other outbuildings were torn down and a new fort was built. This institution's need for animals must have contributed to the growth of the grazing and animal sales economy, although it was not mentioned by any informants as a purchaser of their families' animals.

5 See Chapter II, p. 70.

6 The home of one of these landowners, who was also a druggist in the center of the city, was frequented by law students who would spend "whole nights" having contests over who could drink most freshly drawn milk at a single try (Mendes Torres, 1970:83-84).
We may estimate the importance of Santana's growing commercial center from the traffic which passed on its main street. Although in 1926 the use of Santana's local side streets by vehicles (either motorized or animal drawn) was among the lowest of the neighborhoods around city exits, Santana's main road, leading north to Atibaia, Bragança and southern Minas Gerais carried almost as much traffic as the roads leading to the port of Santos or to Rio de Janeiro, albeit predominantly animal drawn (Mendes Torres, 1970:108-10).

In addition to the commerce which supplied the animal trade, another activity which contributed to the new elite's consolidation of wealth was local retail commerce. Santana's elite families supplied their own needs from the more prestigious stores in the center of the city:


The storekeepers sold to the people down below, to the hillbillies from Juquerí, Atibaia, Bragança. They bought in town for resale here. We would do our shopping in town. The others would buy from the travelling salesmen . . . São Paulo at that time was so small that we would buy in town, at Caltabiano, Casa Machado [stores which informants said were prestigious and expensive] . . . yes, we would telephone the store, and they would send a
boy with the merchandise and we would select it at home. 7

Besides selling animals, dairy farming and commercial retailing, many local landowners developed their lands, or sold them to real estate developers. The disputes with the municipality over the private as against public ownership of land, which were characteristic of the late nineteenth century, continued until 1918, when public and private domains were clearly demarcated north of the Tietê, leaving most of the flatlands by the river and on the slopes of the hill in private hands. 8 A modest real estate boom ensued as houses were built, sold or rented to Santana's growing population (Mendes Torres, 1970:107-108).

As far as one can tell from the names of early Santana landowners mentioned by Mendes Torres, many may have been relative newcomers to the area. Elderly informants are vague about how their ascendants acquired land other than by inheritance. In view of the undefined status of much of the land at the beginning of the century, it is possible that unscrupulous means may have been

7Unless otherwise noted, all of the following quotations were translated by the writer from interview protocols.

8The land on which the airfield was subsequently built remained in the public domain as a cavalry ground for the Força Pública. The State penitentiary property was purchased from a private owner. See Chapter I, p.38.
Some of the landowners were of foreign, generally northern European, origins, although by the turn of the century, and certainly by the 1920's, they were considered "locals." Only the nicknames such as "Chico Francês" or "Pedro Alemão" (French Chico, German Peter) betrayed their non-Brazilian heritage.

Depois, esses estrangeiros acaipiraram se. O francês, ou o alemão já não era língua caseira. Os filhos e os netos todos casaram e ficaram aqui, e faziam parte das famílias.

Besides, these foreigners became Brazilianized /literally, became hillbillies/. French or German was no longer spoken in the home. The sons and grandchildren all married and stayed here, and were part of the families.

The group also included foreigners of more recent arrival, also northern European, who were of relatively high socio-economic status. They were bank managers in the center of the city, liberal professionals, or ran commercial enterprises. Some of them acquired Santana land by purchase or through marriage into landed families.

Most of the liberal professionals, however, were Brazilians, not Europeans. These came with their families from areas in the interior such as the western part of the

For example, while informants are understandably vague on this point, there does seem to have been a cause célèbre in the early part of the century involving the double murder of two sisters, both major land heiresses. They were killed by their husbands, one of whom had migrated to the area, while the other was a landowner in his own right and an important animal trader. The murders were in the idiom of crimes passionels but observers were quick
Vale do Paraiba or the north of the state which were in agricultural decline. These families were typical of the middle income type discussed by Marques de Saes (1973): migrants from areas in decline, but highly educated and politically well connected. Families such as these bought land in Santana, and provided valuable political contacts to the local elite's political "pool."

It is possible to describe the outlines of a "division of labor" among Santana's elite families: as we shall see below, the local landowners and entrepreneurs clearly controlled the most important economic resources, land and trade, as well as the grass roots mechanisms of electoral politics. However, the liberal professionals of Brazilian agrarian origins seem to have provided additional intermediary links to the larger political system beyond Santana. Heads of these families were not ward heelers or political bosses, but they ran the local party organizations, both for the Partido Republicano Paulista (PRP) and the Partido Democratico (PD). For instance, the individual who owned the civil registry—an important political plum—had spent much of his early career acquiring ever larger, more important registries in the northern part of São Paulo state, presumably by participa-

...to note the real estate sales and developments effected by the animal trader. The other husband went to jail.
ting in rural electoral machines, before he came to São Paulo in the early 1920's. In São Paulo he acquired a labor accident registry in the center of the city, and later a civil registry in Santana. He lived and practiced medicine in Santana, where he was for many years the head of the local branch of the PRP.

In my sample, it was generally individuals like these who came to Santana from areas in the interior, who were cited by their descendants as having had personal contacts with prominent political figures of the First Republic, although, as we shall see, local individuals had them as well. Informants indicated that such connections, ranging from various degrees of cousinhood and godparenthood, existed, and formed part of the social and political capital upon which they could draw. Moreover, it appears that the wives of such individuals contributed significantly to setting the "tone" of local life. According to informants, they were far more prominent than other local women in organizing the religious charities and festivities for which many informants remember Santana of the First Republic.

Yet, regardless of this rudimentary internal

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10State governors and national presidents who were mentioned were Rodrigues Alves, Heitor Teixeira Penteado, Washington Luis and Julio Prestes. Mayors and deputies mentioned were Pires do Rio, Franco da Rocha, Francisco Morato, Alcantara Machado.
division, the Santana elite appears to have been united and highly self conscious of its local position. For these families, the population consisted of "as famílias" (the families)--themselves--and "a italiana lá de baixo" (literally "the Italians down below," referring to those of the colony and others who lived on the meadowlands by the river)--people who were socially as well as geographically at the bottom of the Santana hill.

In part, the consciousness and solidarity of the elite was cultural and derived from a sense of what it meant to be of "good family."


Santana was a good neighborhood. In those days there was no Jardim Europa or Jardim Paulista/expensive neighborhoods in contemporary Sao Paulo/. Santana had one of the best schools in the city. The Colegio Santana's students were girls from good families from the interior, and those of means in the neighborhood. My sister went there. It was a neighborhood of middle families, well off families. The poor were further down /the hill/. The families weren't of the elite of the attorneys and supreme court judges of the city, but they were of good family. In Santana we were rich girls. You should have seen the number of little black girls there were as maids.

Good families participated in religious and charitable efforts, such as the organization of bazaars.
and the maintenance of the chapel of the Colegio Santana at the top of the hill. We may surmise that the periodic festivities which often extended over several days contributed to a sense of familism and class:

We led a peaceful and simple social life: the amusements of my era were church bazaars and balls in the houses of families we knew. There was a recreational club, but my father would not permit us [girls] to go there . . . The church was where the neighborhood feeling converged most. Dona Albertina helped the priests, organized the brotherhoods and sisterhoods and the bazaars. She got the girls together to decorate the booths, they dressed up as Bahianas . . . there was a bandstand with music, booths full of [women dressed in] Marie Antoinette [costumes], it was beautiful. We would watch from the window of the registry office, the men in their white suits with canes of ebony . . . They were well attended, they weren't bazaars for the little people. Very few blacks attended; it was refined and young women could go alone. Even

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11 Religious lay organizations.

12 Regional Brazilian costume for women from Bahia.
the soldiers who went were of good family—they had money to spend. That's the way they got the money to finish the church.  

In addition to religious functions, purely social occasions set the elite families apart from others and bolstered their sense of class:

As festas: as festas de São João, com trezentas pessoas que vinham da cidade toda. O Chico Francês fez promessa, e fez por sete anos. Caro? Limão, boi, empregados, ça já tinha. Abobora, batata, já tem. Hoje é caro por causa do uisque. Faziam balões de forma de elefante, piões... eram em casas grandes, com toalha de crochê amarrado com fita. Festas lindas, com fogo de artifícios, bala de estalo que puxava e saia sorte, doces tradicionais: levava uma semana pra fazer cisne de bala, rosinha de papel pros convidados levar.

The parties: the St. John parties with three hundred people who came from all over the city. Chico Francês made a vow and had a party every year for seven years. Expensive? Lemons, sides of beef and servants you already had. Squash and potatoes you had. Today it's expensive because of the whiskey. They made balloons in the shape of

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13Finished in 1925.

14Traditional festivity in June.

15According to Gross's (1971) study of religious vows and pilgrimages in the Northeast, a vow or a promessa "is a kind of private contract between a man and a saint whom he regards as particularly powerful." The object of the promessa is not to get something, "but rather to repay the saint for a prayer answered" (1973:142-3). The vow may involve a pilgrimage, a physical offering at the saint's shrine, money offerings, acts of penance and even musical offerings. In this case we do not know what moved Chico Francês to make his promessa, but he vowed to celebrate St. John's feast day with a party every year for seven years.

16Paper balloons, levitated by hot air.
elephants, tops . . . the parties were in big houses with crochet tablecloths, twined with ribbons. Beautiful parties, with fire works, party favors that exploded and told your fortunes, traditional sweets: it took a week to make candy swans and paper roses for the guests to take home.

Many informants compared Santana at that time to a small town in the interior, where everyone knew everyone else, and where owning land and a store entitled one to leisure. A younger informant attempted to capture the relationship between leisurely appearance and prestige:

Todos tinham fazenda e loja. Agora as lojas estão com mercadoria antiquíssima, que ninguém compra. Chegavam lá de terno branco, com bengala, abriam as vinte mil portas e sentavam pra ler o jornal . . . ia e fechava pro almoço, fechando as portas outra vez. Daí voltavam, abria outra vez, ficavam aí, lendo jornal, batendo papo no terraço, tudo muito quieto, muito distinto.

They all had fazendas and stores. Now the stores would have extremely old merchandise which no one buys. They arrived there in their white suits, with their canes, opened the twenty thousand doors, and sat down to read the papers . . . they went and then they closed for lunch, closing all the doors up again. Then they would come back, open up again and stay there, reading the paper, chatting, on the terrace. It was all very quiet and very distinguished.

The nostalgia and affectionate surrealism of such reconstructions significantly omit any reference to the mechanisms of power by which the Santana elite developed and maintained its local prominence as intermediaries in the larger political system. Clearly enough, members of this group did not simply plan parties and read the newspapers in a social and political vacuum. These were merely the visible symbols of their less visible
economic and political control of the neighborhood and of their links to higher political structures. Historical, genealogical and interview data suggest what some of these mechanisms were.

We have seen above in Chapter II that an important feature of political life during the First Republic was coronelismo, or local bossism. The literature on coronelismo in Brazil is extensive (cf. Nunes Leal, 1948; Santos, 1961; Cruz, 1959; Nogueira, 1961; Torres, 1965; Queiroz, 1967; Pang, 1969, 1973; Della Cava, 1970; Nason, 1973), and describes large patronage and kinship networks as well as a good deal of electoral fraud and local level violence especially in the rural interior. Coronelismo was the mechanism which guaranteed the Política dos Governadores through local elites who acted as intermediaries in the larger system. Local elites and local coronéis perpetuated regional and state elites by systematically excluding all opposition to the dominant political party of the area through fraud and violence.

Santana was no exception in this scheme. Through the use of kinship and patronage, the Santana elite not only controlled the neighborhood and regularly returned

17 The best analysis of the intricate connections maintained by local coronéis and their clients with national and regional power structures is to be found in Della Cava (1968, 1970).
electoral majorities to the dominant Partido Republicano Paulista, but it controlled as well the most important economic resources of the area. Through consanguinity and marriage, the families were able to consolidate their control over land and local commerce. Of the thirteen families in my sample which descended from the elite in question, for example, eight were already established in Santana by 1900. Of these eight, five shared a common ancestor and in addition were bound by numerous affinal ties. Figure 18 is adapted from genealogies of these five families, some members of which married later arrivals. By indicating family involvement in landownership, commerce, politics and the liberal professions, it illustrates the extent to which kinship and marriage facilitated the concentration of resources and political power.

Thus, for example, during the 1920's, Santana's politics were controlled by a coronel from Juquerí, the municipality to the north of Santana. His daughter was linked affinally to an important landowning family in Santana by her husband's brother's marriage. The local

18 Informants were vague about who controlled Santana before the coronel from Juquerí. It was possibly a coronel (who was a captain) from Guarulhos, to the west. In any event, no central city politician was important in Santana until the advent of Adhemar de Barros after the end of the First Republic.
Figure 18. Santana's Elite, 1900-1930

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political boss who represented the coronel, was one Eugenio Braga, who according to informants, was also a tax assessor and head of the municipal department in charge of São Paulo's rivers and marshes. Braga and his brother married into a prominent landowning family indicated in Figure 18 and thus became landowners in their own right. Braga's ward heeler (cabo eleitoral), Jose Goya, was tax inspector and a Justice of the Peace. His brother was an officer of the Força Publica; his daughter married into a family with heavy commercial as well as real estate interests--which was itself related to Braga's wife's family. Among these families alone, then, various local interests were tied into the affairs and benefits of municipal government, and we have suggested above that Brazilian liberal professionals of rural origins provided additional important links to the higher levels of the Partido Republicano Paulista.

The key to political domination in Santana was, as elsewhere in Brazil, control of the electorate, and a kinship idiom, if not kinship, worked here too. Borrowing Weffort's phrase, the political relationships of coronelismo were only "quasi-political, a single dimension of the general social dependence of the voter" (1965:176), which was both masked and reinforced by the extension of fictive kinship. Compadrío (co-parenthood) bound the elite, but it could also be used, especially
in Santana's rural areas to the north, to control the electorate. Thus, we may presume that the coronel from Juquerí's fame for humility and liberalism with the lower classes was politically useful.

The coronel was very simple, very humble, very liberal. Everyone sat at the table, blacks and whites together. Our house was the refuge of Dr. Washington Luis. One day a peasant compadre was there—one of the millions—and Dr. Washington, who was also a compadre, arrived. And the poor peasant got all embarrassed because he didn't know how to use a fork. The coronel said, "Don't worry, eat with a spoon, because the compadre is real people."

But the coronel did not depend solely on his own clientele forged in this way through paternalism and god-parenthood; his political boss and ward heeler in Santana regularly returned majorities to the PRP. Precisely how Braga and Goya controlled the votes is not known. There were no reports of the electoral fraud and violence which typifies coronelismo and the First Republic. But then, we need not assume the grossest characteristics by which coronelismo operated. In view of the contacts with municipal govern-

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19 Leeds (personal communication) argues that the more common usage is "rico e pobre" (rich and poor) rather than "branco e preto" (black and white.).
ment controlled by the political boss and the ward
heeler, and the informal social and political capital of
other elite families in Santana, there is no reason to
suppose that extra legal rather than illegal methods
might not have been used to recruit the electorate. Thus,
a close relative of the ward heeler's spoke of him as
follows:

Ele ganhava eleição por fazer favores pros
outros. Por isso morreu pobre, não guardou nada
para ele. Nas enchentes retirava as famílias lá de
baixo das águas; quando andava de bonde, pagava pra
todos, e depois, em '46 pagava as fotografias pros
pobres. Goya quando pediu o favor, ia lá com a
pessoa mesmo pro "sim" ou "não" na hora. Dizia que
carta era muito fácil esquecer.
Tudo mundo ia perguntar na casa dele, e naquele
tempo a gente era leal, e o politico era honesto.
Ele foi Juiz de Paz por dez anos. Ele era bom . . .
nas eleições levava sacola de lanche pra dar pro
pessoal lá na fila.

He won elections by doing favors for people.
That's why he died poor, he didn't keep anything for
himself. In the floods he would rescue the families
down below from the water; when he rode the trolley
car he would pay for everybody, and later, in '46,
he paid for the photographs for the poor. Goya, when
he asked someone for a favor [for someone else], he
went there with the person for a "yes" or "no" on the
spot. He said letters were too easy to forget.
Everyone went to ask [who they should vote for]
at his house, and in those days people were loyal, and
the politician was honest. He was Justice of the Peace
for ten years. He was good . . . during elections, he
would take bags of food to give to the people standing
there in line.

But, in another context, the same informant added:

Naquela época, até os mortos votavam.

In those days, even the dead voted.

The importance of Santana to the dominant PRP in the
1920's is suggested by its extraordinary population growth. As I noted earlier, its population had grown from 7,000 in 1900 to 43,588 in 1934, an increase of over five hundred percent in thirty years. The large number of students alone in the mid 1920's suggest that a goodly number of the population was literate and eligible for legitimate recruitment into electoral politics by the local political machine.

Although Santana was a semi-rural suburb, controlled by a rural coronel to the north, it also formed part of the urban vote. It will be recalled that in the 1920's, São Paulo's PRP was faced with the vocal opposition of the newly formed Democratic Party (Partido Democrático--PD). This was especially so because of the publicity surrounding elections, which would have been absent in small towns of the interior. As the urban electorate grew more critical, political competition against the PD led to electoral recruitment among the city's foreign working class population by the PRP. According to Fausto,

The PRP ... attempted to include [non naturalized] foreigners in its domain, frequently making use of their "votes" to falsify elections; the PD tried to appear as the legitimate heir to the best Paulista traditions. The manifesto announcing Julio Prestes's candidacy [for the PRP presidential nomination of 1930], for example, was published in Arabic and other foreign languages, causing great scandal among the democrats, who did not spare Julio Prestes for becoming a great man, "even in Turkish" (1972:36).

In accordance with this PRP tactic, Santana's elite participated in specifically urban ways of mobili-
zing votes. In the 1920's the head of the Santana PRP (who had the labor accidents registry in the center of the city) travelled to the legislature in Rio de Janeiro to fight for working class legislation to protect factory workers from the "extra-judicial arrangements of industrialists in Rio and São Paulo" (A Gazeta [São Paulo], 1950, 1/5: 12). Even the women of the Santana elite participated in church activities which aimed at educating and mobilizing the working class of the city. One informant, who seemed aware of the political and paternalist nature of such organizations, described her activities:


I used to work in the Sisterhood of the Angels, putting on little plays for the girls with Dona Albertina. Later I worked in the Catholic Workers Youth movement, with working class girls, preaching for the rights of the workers. I would organize meetings, give classes in religion, sewing classes, classes in moral development to the young women. I had little parties at Easter and Christmas. It was all church business, but there were people who later became political. At JOC I was doing protection, charity, I was being good to the workers.

In the context of heated electoral contests, the value of an urban neighborhood machine which regularly and quietly returned large majorities to the dominant party appears unquestionable. Santana (and probably other neigh-
borhoods in São Paulo) appears to have developed an urban variant of First Republic coronelismo which was important to the São Paulo Republican Party and which linked its local elite to the power structure of the city and state. No other hypothesis seems to account for the rapidity of the Santana elite's political decline after 1930, when such machines were no longer necessary to the oligarchy.

In the 1920's however, the Santana elite did not foresee the possibility of a political shakeup which could affect their position. They were supremely confident and secure in their superior position in the neighborhood. The electoral arena was probably the only one in which, on occasion, the distinction between as familias and a italianáda lá de baixo or a caipiráda was permitted to lapse.

However, the closeness of the families at the top of the hill and the dominance of the PRP in Santana is not meant to imply that there were no political disputes, or that there was no representation of the opposition PD in Santana. Disputes existed, but the families were not split by the reformism and dissent being voiced in the city's main newspapers. The factions in the municipal government of São Paulo had been compared to "two little carts which transported the money out of the treasury . . . with terrible emulations over which would carry away the most money" (Morse, 1972:316)
Thus, in Santana, splits occurred over the distribution of spoils, but always within a context of familism and class. For example, one dispute which was brought to my attention was over the control of judgeships within the PRP.

My brother-in-law organized a party, part of the PRP, but in opposition to Braga's voters, in the elections for Justice of the Peace of Santana. They were elected by the residents of the neighborhood. Braga controlled the workers, the merchants and the people down below. The teachers were all on the side of the brother-in-law, but they only formed an opposition in the election which was for three judgeships and three replacements. They only got one judge and two replacements.

Similarly, the Partido Democratico was represented in Santana, and indeed, it was organized in much the same way as the local PRP, except for the absence of a coronel, whose counterpart was to be found in the upper ranks of the PD organization in the city. Thus, the head of the party organization was a Brazilian liberal professional, a dentist and a pharmacist, who had come to Santana from the interior of the state in 1923. When the PD was formed in 1927, he became the head of the party organization, but the PD's political boss was a local man, just as the PRP's political boss was. The PD political boss was an important figure in commerce and
real estate, whose family had been in Santana since before 1900. This individual frequently argued over political matters with the boss of the PRP--who was his brother-in-law. According to informants, if arguments became too heated, one of the two would present the other with a suckling pig to restore amicable relations. I heard of no political disputes in Santana at that time which split the elite, or which did not occur within such a shared sense of familism and class.

A sense of "being above" political dispute permeates the accounts of the 1924 Tenente revolt in São Paulo. In 1924 the dissident General Isidoro Dias marched from the Santana military barracks to the Força Pública headquarters in the city. Much of the city cheered the rebels on, providing the kind of diffuse support which made the Tenentes appear much more powerful than they actually were. The Santana families did not participate in this

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20 "When they entered São Paulo during the 1924 revolt, the revolutionaries were received with cheers; during the course of the fight, the soldiers in the open trenches on the streets... received cheers from the neighboring residences. A Legalist lieutenant... spoke of his men's resentment before the hostility manifested by the people of São Paulo. Young ladies from Caçapava, Mogi das Cruzes, São José dos Campos, Taubaté, came... to meet the trains bringing government troops and would incite the soldiers to join the rebels. 'The humble and ignorant vegetable saleswoman of the neighborhood would close her complaints on business with the picturesque invective, "It doesn't matter, Isidoro is coming!" This was also the psychology and language of the laborer, the unemployed cook and it may be supposed, even of the beggar, who was
euphoria; most simply ran away during moments of political turbulence:


In '24 Santana was surrounded and the Ponte Grande was a trench /a battle ground/. The families ran away. I came in a baker's carriage to see my fiancée. I managed to pass because I knew many of the officers of the Força Pública and the Army. We escaped to the fazenda of the Bishop in Trêmembé.21

The Santana elite's sense of being above political dispute and in local control is nowhere more apparent than in the May 24, 1930 issue of the local newspaper, Sant'Anna-Jornal. The dominance of the PRP appears to have been unquestioned and not even worthy of note. The first page announced a local PRP meeting. The second page was given to poems, notes on hygiene, an article on the evils of gossip, gambling and usury, and another on social events. In the lower right hand corner of the second page was a column, "Noticiário," whose third item down announced the Prestes victory over Vargas in the national presidential election.

also affected by the crisis." (Fausto, 1972:62).

21 Speaking of the 1930 coup, another informant said, "Tivemos bastante medo em '30. Pulamos o muro pro vizinho e fumos pro sítio do Braga. Eles até que vieram nos buscar" (We were very frightened in 1930. We jumped over the wall to the neighbor's and went to Braga's sítio. They even came to get us).
Under the current regime it was a foregone conclusion, not worthy of any more note than the announcements of regional festivities, public park plantings and unsolved crimes.

The 1930 coup, however, took the leading families by surprise. Unlike other occasions, when they had returned from running away and found their control of the neighborhood intact once order was restored, this time the São Paulo oligarchy was undergoing a redefinition of its political position within the Vargas regime. Elections, upon which the power of local families so heavily depended, were repeatedly postponed, and the Santana families participated in the growing Constitutionalist fervor which developed in São Paulo over the next two years.

When the Constitutionalist Revolt broke out in 1932, Santana's leading families joined in the general euphoria. As many explained, "Precisávamos nos libertar

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Morse (1972:326-28) provides a description of this state: "Men, women and children, including doctors, technicians and professionals rushed in crowds to the headquarters of the movement asking to be sent to the front, or to offer their services... units of volunteers were formed to fight by the side of the Força Publica. 50,000 were finally sent to the front... Money contributions were abundant. The Gold Campaign received offers of gold objects to a value of more than 3,000 contos from the interior, and more than 6,000 from the capital. A public subscription to help the families of the soldiers collected 1,000 contos in three days. The women who organized the Egg Campaign received millions of dozens of eggs for the trenches and the hospitals. A group of Syrian women began another campaign to obtain waterproof raincoats. Indus-
das ataduras da ditadura" (We had to liberate ourselves from the bonds of dictatorship). The men old enough to enlist did so. Young men who stayed behind were mocked on the streets. Many of those too old to enlist organized civilian battalions to maintain public order in the city, while the Força Pública were fighting the Federal troops. The wives and daughters of the families at the top of the hill joined São Paulo's "quatrocentão" women in organizing the Gold Campaign, sewing bees, mess hall and troop morale festivities. They became "godmothers" for the battalions leaving from Santana's barracks, which had been taken over by Constitutionalist forces, and formed welcoming committees for the returning soldiers.

Nunca mais vai haver uma coisa parecida, tão linda. Trabalhamos na penitenciária fazendo colchões, trabalhamos no salão do conservatório da Liga das Senhoras Católicas com as moças de alta sociedade que famlá. Era honra escolher feijão e fazer comida. Trabalhamos em grupos caseiros, costurando ou cosinhando. Todos foram. Era tudo mundo a trabalhar juntos ... esperando noticias.

trial, commercial and wholesale associations joined the movement. Foreign residents, who were accused of absenteeism in 1924, also joined the movement. The policing of the cities was left in charge of civilians; in spite of this there was no vandalism and crimes of violence decreased ... The troops received chocolates, canned goods, wine and toothpaste in great quantities, but in spite of the valorous industrial effort, not enough war materiel."

23 The term "quatrocentão" originated at this time. It refers to families who have lived in São Paulo for four hundred years, and in a more general way to São Paulo's "upper crust."
There will never again be anything like that, so wonderful. We worked at the penitentiary making mattresses, we worked in the music room of the League of Catholic Ladies, with the women of high society who went there. It was an honor to pick over beans or to cook. We worked in groups at home, sewing or cooking. Everyone participated. It was everyone working together . . . waiting for the news.

And, when it was all over, they returned home, as shocked and bitter as the rest of the population, crying "betrayal."

People accused the Força Publica of betrayal because it surrendered, even though it was in a militarily untenable position (Silva, 1932:415-20). The real problem lay with São Paulo's political leaders, who had through rhetoric and through the media, manipulated the public and aroused entirely unreal expectations (Silva, 1932: 127-29). For Santana's families the betrayal ultimately destroyed them as a group. Whereas the city's elite, composed of coffee planters and industrialists, were able to adjust and accommodate to the new order, the Santana families were ultimately destroyed as a local politically influential group because they lost their most important resource, the electoral control of the neighborhood.

We have seen that Santana's elite had been intermediaries in the city's larger political structure, and I have suggested that their importance arose not from the material resources they controlled, but from the number of urban votes they could contribute to the
PRP. As long as they were important electoral intermediaries, they controlled the neighborhood, maintained their cohesiveness and maintained their links to more important politicians. In the absence of elections, under Vargas, their connections with the city's oligarchy decreased, and the politics they represented became obsolete.

The process of their marginalization, however, was not immediate and absolute, except in the case of the coronel. In 1932 the Santana political machine was attacked, a task which was relatively easy to accomplish in the absence of elections. The machine was run by two individuals, the coronel from Juquerí and the cabo eleitoral. Under the new regime, legal proceedings were instituted on a number of charges against the coronel and the ward heeler's office was set on fire by persons unknown. In the words of their children,

Quando perdemos a revolução de '32, abriam processo contra meu pai, dizendo que era aproveitador, que a fazenda era de política—sem ver os documentos. Foi um processo por calúnia e infâmia, e ele ganhou. Aquele que acusou foi condenado a despesas e quarenta dias de prisão, e o pai teve a satisfação de ganhar num regime de oposição. Provou que era herança materna, que os filhos não eram empregados públicos, e, se fosse prático, nossa situação seria outra, e daí, foi homenageado publicamente pelo povo de Santana.

When we lost the revolution of '32, they brought a suit against my father, saying that he had taken advantage, that his fazenda derived from politics—without looking at the documents. It was a suit of calumny and infamy and we won. The man who accused him was con-
demned to pay the expenses and to spend forty days in jail, and father had the satisfaction of winning under an opposition regime. He proved that [the land] was a maternal inheritance, that his children were not public employees—if he'd been practical our situation would be different—and then he received public homage from the people of Santana.

Getulio entrou, e puseram fogo na repartição dele na Ponte Grande. Daí vieram fazer vistoria na repartição dele, e ele foi citado como modelo.

Getulio came in, and they set his office by the Ponte Grande on fire. Then they came to inspect his section, and it was cited as a model.

While both were eventually found innocent of any wrong doing, their political careers and the careers and social prominence of the local elite associated with them began to decline. When the coronel died on his fazenda he was a forgotten figure. The cabo's decline took a bit longer.

After São Paulo's defeat in the Constitutionalist Revolt, what was left of the Santana political machine was taken over by Adhemar de Barros, a young city-side politician of the PRP, in a process that suggests the shifting nature of the coalitions between actors in the larger political system and the individuals who act as intermediaries on the local level. Adhemar de Barros is best known as a São Paulo politician of the populist era. However, as a young congressman in 1933, he had wished to organize a working class wing of the PRP (Cabral, 1962:29), and it is during this time, according to informants, that he first made contact in Santana. When the 1934 Consti-
tution reintroduced elections, he took Goya on as his cabo eleitoral. Clearly then, upward connections could still be made during the Vargas years by a good ward heeler, but they depended on the stability of the electoral process, which was again abolished by the declaration of the Estado Novo in 1937. When elections were reintroduced after the Second World War, Adhemar de Barros formed in São Paulo what was probably the most powerful electoral machine in the country (Skidmore, 1967:67-68), but Goya was passed over. According to one of his descendants,


In '46 Goya wanted to continue in politics in the same way. The voter would ask which candidate he should vote for, he never imposed one. He had no personal interest. He met Adhemar at party headquarters. Adhemar was a doctor and wanted to care for his daughter because he was a ward heeler. Adhemar was introduced in Santana by Goya in '33 or '34. They even used his garage to count the ballots. Then, after the election of '46, Adhemar didn't need him anymore, and he dismissed his ward heelers. It wasn't Goya who abandoned him at all.

Goya's betrayal by the supreme politician of a later era provides a symbol of the political decline undergone by the whole Santana elite as a result of the passing of the First Republic. Ultimately many of the families also lost wealth, although their economic decline was

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It is tempting to ask about the relationship between political marginalization and economic decline. The analysis is complicated, however, because Santana's economy was also changing. In particular, dairy farming became unprofitable in the early 1920's when the city required that milk be pasteurised, thus raising the cost of production. The sale of animals to the city services collapsed with the advent of the automobile, and the growing real estate value of the land undercut what was left of the grazing economy. Animal traders who did not have a land base on which to graze their mules and horses were increasingly at a disadvantage. An informant speaks of her husband's career:


It was hard. The bottom fell out of the animal business. The municipality of São Paulo used the animals for water, garbage and the Força Pública. Automobiles replaced them. It was a difficult moment. The girls were growing up, they were in school, and every trip lost money. We had to sell them fast because we had no pasture and later it became hard to sell them. We didn't have pasture here. Earlier we had rented the land, but it got sold for real estate development. It was a very bad phase.

There were three general avenues followed by Santana's elite families after the 1930's. Urban real
estate development increased in importance, as did careers in the professions and salaried employment. Each possibility, moreover, could involve outmigration from Santana and brutal downward economic mobility.

Real estate had provided a source of profits as early as 1915. If an entrepreneur was not already a local landowner, commerce had provided a financial springboard to amass real estate holdings, during the 1920's. The careers of a number of individuals were similar to that of this informant's father, who was a leading member of the Santana elite.

Meu pai foi um dos primeiros a construir aqui em Santana. Ele chamava de "galinheiro pros pobre" aquelas casinhas lá em baixo. Ele que era o antigo BNH. A rua até que tá com o nome dele. Ele tinha loja de sêcos e molhados, depois herdou os terrenos, e viveu fazendo as casinhas. Ele era um bonachão... quando tava velho sentava lá no terraço com o bolso cheio de balas que dava pras crianças que chamavam ele de vovô. Tava sempre com charuto. Até o pão que ele dava tinha cheiro de charuto. E, as mulheres vinham pagar o aluguel, e as crianças recebiam balas. E, muito dessas casas ainda são nossas, viu.

My father was one of the first to build here in Santana. He called those little houses down below "chicken coops for the poor." He was the old BNH. The street even has his name. He had a dry goods store, and then he inherited the land and spent the rest of his life making the little houses. He was a sweetheart. When he was old he would sit out on the terrace with his pockets full of candies which he would give to the children, who called him grandfather. He always had a cigar. Even the bread he gave smelled of cigars. Yes, the women would come and pay the rents, and the children received candies. Many of those houses are still
Alternatively, real estate holdings which had been split by inheritance could be reconsolidated by marriage, or purchase from disadvantaged relatives. Thus, Gilberto, a prominent merchant and animal trader married a land heiress, and, as her relatives died, bought their shares back from their widows or children. However, with the decline of the animal trade, the commerce which serviced it became an increasingly rare source of base capital. It became a rare occupation after 1930. Very few male descendants of commercial families continued on in commerce or continued to amass capital. Many began to live off unearned income from their lands, and generated little or no earned income of their own.

- Esse foi dolce far niente . . . um capitalista.
- Vivia de renda, tinha uma porção de casas.
- Tinha um armazem, mais vivia de renda, era proprietário.
- Naõ fazia nada, vivia de renda, mais naquele tempo não precisava tanto dinheiro.
- Era proprietário, dolce far niente. Ia gastando e vendendo.
- Eram simples, todos proprietários eram simples, mais tinham fama de rico . . . bruta fama de rico.

- That one was dolce far niente . . . a capitalist.
- He lived on income, he had a bunch of houses.
- He had a store, but lived on income. He was a proprietor.
- He did nothing, he lived on income, but in those days one didn't need so much money.
- He was a proprietor, dolce far niente, he would spend and sell.
- He was simple, all proprietors were simple, but they had the reputation for being rich . . . damned reputation for being rich.
Real estate development was not, however, a lasting source of income for Santana's elite families. Paradoxically, it was only a successful way of maintaining wealth as long as it wasn't sold. Bolaffi has shown that low municipal land taxes together with municipal investments and improvements sent urban land values soaring (1975: 82). Thus, while many la downers developed their land and built rental houses, profits from this source were dampened by a rent control law introduced in 1930 (Bolaffi, 1975:79) and the highest profits were ultimately for those who kept their lands intact. Some of Santana's elite families were able to keep their land and maintain themselves secure in their sense of familism and class, but many others were brutally downwardly mobile. A number of individuals took lowly positions in the bureaucracies, became doorkeepers or janitors in the public schools or street salesmen. Thus, an informant speaks of her sibling's children:

Nã0 tenho muito contato com esses ... sabe, os pais morreram, os filhos foram criados na casa de um

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In 1949, an informant's father, who had been part of the old elite, gave an interview on the progress of the neighborhood to O Jornal das Notícias. At that time, two twin houses on a main street in Santana rented for Cr.300.00 and Cr.2,500.00, respectively. The difference reflects the landlord's inability to raise the rent except for a new tenant. According to the same interview, a large house on Av. Voluntarios da Patria, Santana's main street, cost Cr. 100,000.00 in 1925. In 1949 just one square meter
parente. Estudaram pouco e começaram a trabalhar. Tiveram algum terreninho pra ajudar, casas de herança que deu pra comprar outras casas se quiserem. 'As mulheres casaram só mais ou menos, cê vê, são trabalhadores, mais nada de riqueza não.' São remediados. Outros ficaram pobres, pobres, pintador de parede, porteiros de grupo. A renda acabou, e renda tem de fazer renda. Vendiam e comiam. Cê vê como é o Destino.

I don't have much contact with those . . . you know, their parents died, the children were raised in a relative's house. They studied little and began to work. They had a little land to help, houses they inherited which they could have sold to buy others if they wanted. The women only married more or less well; you understand, they are hard working, but there is no wealth there. They get by. Others became poor, poor, wall painters, doormen for public schools. Their income finished, and income has to generate income. They sold to eat. You see how Destiny is.

Of those who sold land, many sold unwisely or too rapidly. Some did not realize the value of their lands until too late. Thus another informant speaks of her family's fortunes:

Meu avô tinha uns 900 hectares no alto de Santana, Tucuruví e Mandaqui. Não ligou muito com os terrenos porque também tinha fazenda grande com fábrica de tijolo, carpintaria, gado e plantio. Dividiu a fazenda entre os oito filhos, mais porque não cuidou, muito ficou grilado. Daí, lá pro fim da vida, vendeu um terreno prum português, à parcela. O português vendeu pruma compania de loteamento, fez fortuna e foi embora sem fazer o resto do pagamento. Fizeram loteamento, com casas operárias, e dá dó, coitados. Agora tão querendo as escrituras, e não pode, por que a terra é nossa. Ele não pagou, né. Legalmente a terra é nossa, mais a gente tem de pagar os melhoramentos, o que é claro não podemos fazer. Imagine pagar todas essas casinhas. Então os advogados

of frontage cost that much, excluding the cost of the building (O Jornal das Noticias, 1949, 12/14:5)

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falaram pros operários pagar a divida do português, só que muitos não querem, com razão. E o dinheiro que resta, vai tudo pros advogados, né.

My grandfather had 900 hectares in the heights of Santana, Tucuruvi and Mandaqui. He didn't worry too much about that land because he also had a large fazenda with a brick factory and a carpentry shop, cattle and agriculture. He divided the fazenda and the land among the eight children, but because he hadn't taken care of the land, much was lost to squatters. Then, towards the end of his life, he sold some land to a Portuguese on time. The Portuguese sold to a real estate development company, made a fortune, and went away without making the rest of the payments. The land was developed with working class houses, and it's a shame, poor things. Now they want title to the land, and it can't be, because the land is ours. He didn't pay, right. Legally the land is ours, but we would have to pay for the improvements, and its clear we can't do that. Imagine paying for all those little houses. So then the lawyers asked the workers /who lived in them/ to pay the Portuguese's debt, but many of them, quite rightly don't want to. And the money that's left, it all goes to the lawyers.

Many sold land to underwrite a life style, to pay for their children's educations or dowries: others faced competition from larger or unscrupulous developers. All in all, a lot of land was dissipated and was not a basis for maintaining wealth. Only a few families still had land after two generations. For most, their situations were like these informants's:

Nossa chacara agora tem dezesseis casas. O pai loteou tudo, mais gastou dinheiro, tava muito hipotecado, e o Banco ficou com tudo.

Our land now has sixteen houses on it. My father developed it all, but he spent money, it was heavily mortgaged, and the Bank got it all.

Nossa família herdou bastante, inclusive aquele prédio na Avenida São João . . . aquele nos bebemos.
andar por andar. A geração não soube manter. Alguns vão equilibrando, mas não é mais aquela fortuna.

Our family inherited a lot, including that building on Avenida São João [important city-side avenue, lined with skyscrapers]... That one we drank, floor by floor. The generation didn't know how to maintain its wealth. A few of us have managed to balance [our budgets], but its no longer that fortune.

Increased education and careers in the professions was not a panacea either. Among the more successful elite families there was a clear movement away from the relatively independent positions of control over land, commerce and real estate to a dependence on salaries. Thus, among the children of Santana's elite, commerce was replaced by the liberal profesaões: doctors, lawyers, dentists, accountants and school teachers. Similarly, the women married liberal professionals. To the extent that one can judge from the genealogies of the more successful elite families, the trend towards liberal professionalism continues among their children and grand-children, although increasingly as dependents on salaries from large firms, and where it exists at all, on a vastly reduced land base to generate unearned income. There does seem to have been enough among a few families to provide a cushion for at least two generations, if it was carefully managed. Thus, within the family which drank its inheritance "floor by floor," a more successful member finishes her tale of loss of family fortunes with the following caveat:

É preciso muito equilíbrio, muito controle, se não, não dá mesmo. Eu, ó, eu seguro as arreias.
One needs much equilibrium, very much control, otherwise it is not possible. I, I really hold on to the reins.

For some of the older liberal professionals, such control seems to have been necessary, because they did not earn that much. Although we may speculate over what might have been the case had these families been able to maintain their political capital, many of Santana's professionals appear to have had a limited clientele. A prominent but elderly dentist explaining his present difficulties suggests the social and political isolation possible for even a relatively successful descendant of Santana's elite:


In my day, I had everything, doctors, lawyers, economists (as patients). I knew all the classes. Many were political. But now, in this neighborhood—with an office in this neighborhood—you really don't make money. This neighborhood is getting bad for everything. Full of old, conservative and stingy people. Now Santana has become a neighborhood of transients. The old ones don't pay, and the younger ones come from other neighborhoods and already have their dentists. And the popular neighborhoods have millions of third rate dentists.

Among the families who did not become poor, especially those of the Brazilian liberal professionals who had less invested in the neighborhood, the area
became increasingly defined as a changing neighborhood, a place to leave, a place for poor soldiers and immigrant working classes. Many such families left the area. They sold their houses and moved away to other parts of the city, and their descendants explain the move as a consequence of the neighborhood's turn for the worse.

Father was a doctor and a dentist, he had two pharmacies, two cars and a huge house. Really rich he wasn't, but with nine children all studying and graduating [in the professions] and the girls taking piano lessons, he was well off. We left that place because Santana was considered a working class neighborhood, with the police, who were poor. Soldiers of the police were not considered to be part of society. We had relatives in other neighborhoods, in Sta. Cecilia, in Perdizes. When I was a girl, there were lots of Italians and Turks in Santana. They sold charcoal, innards, women sold vegetables from donkeys with baskets on either side of them. The Turks were funny—they bit the money. They were considered lower class, but they rose higher than the middle class. They made a mountain of money.

In a few cases, Santana women married into immigrant commercial families and moved away. While these marriages appear to have been financially sound, since the resulting families at present live in the wealthier
neighborhoods of São Paulo, and are said to be socially, politically and economically well connected, they were against the racist ethic of elite Santana in the 1920's and 1930's. As one informant told me,

Na minha época casávamos com médico, advogado ... Quando Eugenia casou com um Italiano, estranhamos. Ele não era boçal, mas já dava pra estranhar. Diziam que o que vale é o dinheiro, mais que choca, choca muito, viu.

In my day we married doctors and lawyers ... When Eugenia married an Italian, we thought it strange. He wasn't gross, but it was strange. They said it was the money that counts, but it was shocking.

It is unclear, however, what the circumstances were for most of the outmigration, since contacts were subsequently broken. Many became extremely poor, in low status jobs. The overall picture is one of decline and disintegration.

The themes of decline and disintegration are suggested in Figure 19, which expands the genealogy given in Figure 18. It was drawn from four informants, two in the second generation and two in the third. While these informants could not give the collateral line, descended from the cousins of the first generation ("Adults by 1900"), and became increasingly vague about family members whose careers began between 1950 and 1972, the genealogy nonetheless reveals the range of trajectories possible for the descendants of one of the major landowners of Santana. Downward economic mobility was possible for
Figure 19. Economic decline and loss of family contact in three generations.
members of such families even as the elite was forming:
thus, in the first generation, two out of ten individuals
and their nuclear families were impoverished because of
unwise land sales between 1910 and 1920, and their descen-
dants lost contact with the rest of the families.

In the second generation, more than half were
lost to the family. Among forty-two cousins (excluding
affinals) twenty-two individuals became poor and family
contact was broken. Four did not become poor, but infor-
mants were not sure where they lived. Those who were
successful in the second generation and formed the core
of the Santana elite, did so, as we have seen, on the
basis of commerce and real estate. Many, however, were
already living on income. Just under half (thirty out
of sixty-three individuals) became poor in the third
generation. Seven did not become poor, but contact was
broken. Again, over half of the generation's members
were lost to the group (thirty seven out of sixty-three).
Because so many of the descendants of the poor second
generation members are lost to genealogical reckoning in
the third generation, this is almost certainly an under
estimation.

The families who lost their land base in the first
or second generations do not seem to have been able to re-
coup their losses; by the third generation, many are in
lowly employment: policemen, bus drivers, wall painters,
and one of the women had become a domestic servant. In
Figure 19, for example, only one male descendant of one of the impoverished branches was able to improve his economic position. His father had been a municipal bureaucrat of low to middle level ("Ganhava pouco, e não tinha juízo"—He earned little and had no sense), and his siblings continued in lowly bureaucratic or salaried positions. He on the other hand, began his career as a laborer in a sweets factory:

Trabalhava como operário numa fábrica de doces, fazendo goiabada. Começou por baixo mexendo tacho de doce. Esse se fez. Tem pequena indústria, não sei de que. Não é nada de riqueza, mas tá bem.

He worked as a laborer in a sweets factory, making guava paste. He started at the bottom, stirring the pots of syrup. This one made himself. He now has a small industry, I don't know what of. He's not rich, but he's all right.

The difficulty in making a successful economic career without private resources was recognized by some informants, who felt that

É preciso nacer de classe media: É difficil a pessoa ganhar dinheiro sem uma ajuda por traz.

One must be born middle class: it is difficult for a person to make money without some financial backing.

The genealogy in Figure 19 suggests that in order for some descendants to keep their wealth, others must systematically loose it. In this respect, the cross-cousin marriage between members of the second generation is suggestive of the process. The woman and her siblings were landed. She married a cousin with extensive commer-
cial interests, who subsequently acquired land from her siblings, who together with their descendants became poor. The issue from the cross cousin marriage, however, maintained a degree of wealth through the third and fourth generations.

In addition to economic decline undergone by many of the descendants of Santana's elite, there is dispersal and the end of social cohesion. Marriages within the group decrease and the social activities which had identified and united the Santana elite in the 1920's ceased. People who left the neighborhood were largely forgotten. Indeed, photograph albums filled exclusively with graduation pictures are revealing in this instance. They attest to the status importance of higher education in the liberal professions in the 1930's and 1940's. It is ironic and symbolic, however, that the photos in the albums I saw were simply annotated with the profession and the date of graduation, and not the individuals' names. When these had moved out of Santana, they were forgotten and their families lost track of. They are now anonymously part of Sao Paulo's middle sectors, dispersed through the city. I was able to interview a few such individuals, and while they remember their lives in Santana clearly, they have formed other social circles and have only sporadic contacts with families remaining in Santana, if any. In general,
neither those who stayed nor those who left attempted to maintain contact.

Thus, over time, the Santana elite, which had been closely knit in its control of the political and economic resources of the area during the First Republic, has gradually disintegrated. People blamed themselves when they referred to "the generation's inability to maintain its wealth," or to various relatives' "lack of sense," or inability to "marry well," but the forces which had led to social cohesion in the 1920's disappeared in the following decades. Socially the group has disbanded. The sense of familism and class which united them as against other people during the First Republic--the sense that the world was defined as consisting of "as famílias" and "os pobres lá de baixo"--exists only in the memories of informants. Politically, these families and their descendants lost positions of local prominence and political status and never regained them. Economically, many have become brutally poor and others control no resources beyond their ability to work and bring in a salary. Among the families interviewed the salaries have not generated capital. They are spent in a controlled way on consumer goods.

Santana's elite only formed a group with shared access to political power and property for a short period of time: the polity of the First Republic included Santana's
elite in its mechanisms of domination and permitted and encouraged its development as a group. Although we have revealed no direct relationship between their marginalization from political power and their subsequent economic decline and dispersal, it is interesting that a similar sequence, albeit on a lesser scale, appears to characterize the careers of the immigrants and bureaucrats who will be discussed in the next chapter.
CHAPTER IV

SANTANA, FROM THE BOTTOM OF THE HILL, 1930-1972

Unlike the families at the top of the hill, the families with which I am concerned in this chapter never formed a single identifiable group. This chapter deals with people whom the elite at the top of the hill had dismissed as a italíánada lá de baixo, os pobres lá de baixo (the Italians at the bottom, the poor down below). In fact, during the 1920's and 1930's, these people did live at the bottom of the hill, but they were generally not working class people. They belonged to what we have broadly defined as middle income sectors. One group, the immigrants, included families with modest truck farms before the 1930's and with moderately successful commercial and real estate enterprises after. The other group, the bureaucrats, were not as well off initially. Most came from impoverished landowning families who migrated from declining rural areas of the interior. Once in the city, however, these families benefited from the fact that they were literate (See Chapter II, pp. 76-77). Only a small percentage of the Brazilian population fell into this category. They were absorbed by the expanding bureaucracies of the Vargas and populist years and
achieved middle level incomes despite their initial poverty.

During the Vargas years and especially under populism, the immigrants and bureaucrats formed friendships and interlocking networks (sometimes lasting for two generations) which enhanced the political and economic status of both groups. The key to most of these relationships appears to have been the accessibility of government resources which increased dramatically from 1930 to 1964, and which are now in a process of sharp contraction. Following the military coup of 1964 and especially since 1968, both groups have lost influence with government. In other words, they have undergone a process of marginalization which parallels that described for the old elite of Santana in the previous chapter. This chapter assesses the current situation of bureaucrats and immigrants in the light of this parallel.

Santana changed in the 1930's. From a distant underdeveloped area, where the rich of the state might send their daughters to boarding school, and the rich of the city might drive out for a day's recreation in the countryside, it became over the course of three decades a commercial entrepot between São Paulo and the interior. By mid century it would lose most of its rural aspect, and in the next twenty-five years it
would lose all the visible reminders of its distinctive past. The "tone" of the neighborhood changed most dramatically after 1930, however. The quality of the neighborhood's leisure was no longer dominated by the good ladies from the top of the hill. It is said that Santana became known not for the church bazaars, or the cabaret on the top of the hill which had been popular with the local elite in the 1920's, but for the quality of its Italian restaurants, movies, circuses, football and boxing clubs. In the 1930's, the Tatú Club, which had been a center for Republican Party politicians in the previous decade, became a soccer club frequented by the sons of foreign immigrants and rural Brazilian migrants.

Changes in the quality of the neighborhood's retail commerce were more important. According to informants, commerce soared in the 1930's and was increasingly dominated by foreign immigrants or their descen-

1 Some of the roads remained unpaved, but by 1950 truck farming had virtually disappeared. The neighborhood was increasingly connected to the center of town as flood control measures on the Tietê improved and a new bridge was built over it in 1942. In 1948, the last of the elite chácaras (estates) was sold, and the land developed into residential villas. The main house became a private maternity hospital and a smaller outbuilding became a children's library. In 1964 the Cantareira train was removed to make way for a new avenue in Santana which would extend the city's north-south artery into the neighborhood. By 1974 the massive structure of the Colegio Santana would be destroyed to make way for residential highrises.
dants. By the time immigration was cut off in 1930, small industry in the form of textile, furniture, soft drink, printing, glue, food processing and carpentry establishments were interspersed among the older supply houses and dry goods stores of the main streets of Santana.

The development of Santana's local economy was clearly stimulated by the increase in São Paulo's population. After 1930, when foreign immigration decreased sharply because of changed immigration policies (See Chapter II, p. 85, fn. 27), such growth was primarily due to internal migrations by rural Brazilians who came to the city from regions in agricultural decline. Between 1934 and 1939 the city's population increased by over 300,000 people at an average of over 50,000 individuals a year (Cavalcanti, 1972). Santana's population had increased most dramatically in the first three decades of the century, so that by 1934, it was already the most populous district in the Northern Zone of the city. After 1934, its growth rate was outstripped by

We have seen the local elite comment on Santana's change from a neighborhood of "good families" to a neighborhood inhabited by the poor and working class. In the 1940's social scientists studying São Paulo's growth defined it as a working class satellite to the city (See Hermann, 1944:36; Araújo, 1941:71).
the working class neighborhoods which surrounded it (See Figure 20). Nonetheless, its population continued to grow at a respectable rate.

Figure 20. Population growth of the Northern Zone of São Paulo, 1934-1950.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subdistricts</th>
<th>1934</th>
<th>1940</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Santana</td>
<td>43,588</td>
<td>55,081</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>90,198</td>
<td>63.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tucuruví</td>
<td>24,632</td>
<td>33,761</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>88,720</td>
<td>162.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casa Verde</td>
<td>13,542</td>
<td>22,120</td>
<td>64.4</td>
<td>58,571</td>
<td>164.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. Maria</td>
<td>5,722</td>
<td>15,281</td>
<td>167.0</td>
<td>54,373</td>
<td>255.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Sra. do O</td>
<td>7,866</td>
<td>13,436</td>
<td>70.8</td>
<td>51,012</td>
<td>279.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: Mendes Torres (1970:111)

In addition to the general population growth of the whole area, many of Santana's immigrant families were able to develop commercial interests in the area because of changes in the structure of the commerce which had been controlled by the elite. We have seen that the elite's commerce developed primarily to serve the animal trade. The retail commerce which they controlled was linked to the animal trade in that much of their merchandise was sold in the interior, along the animal trade routes. Local retail commerce had always been shared with travelling salesmen, mascates, who where most frequently of immigrant origins. 3 With

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3See the informant cited above, Chapter III, p. 40: "The storekeepers sold to the people down below, to the hillbillies from Juquarí, Atibáia, Bragança ... The others would buy from the travelling salesmen."
the decline of the animal trade, we have seen that the occupations of the old elite changed from commerce to the liberal professions and real estate development thus providing an opening for the expansion of immigrant commercial concerns.

It was thus on the basis of rural migration from the interior and the decline of commerce linked to the animal trade that Santana's immigrant families were able to develop a local, relatively strong and far more varied commercial center along the main streets of the neighborhood than had been the case when the elite families from the top of the hill controlled commerce. Real estate developments proliferated and the area became studded with stylistically undefined two story houses (sobrados) and villas (houses on a private road with a turn around at the end). Many individuals, besides members of the elite, were able to participate in the real estate boom of the epoch and a few of the truck farms belonging to immigrants were subdivided for housing plots and villas, which if unoccupied at first, were soon rapidly filled.

Immigrants had been in Santana since the turn of the century, with the establishment of the Italian colony. Santana's immigrants do not seem to have been representative of the bulk of São Paulo's foreign population: most
of the city-side immigrants were impoverished Italian peasants who were brought to Brazil to work in the coffee plantations or to man the factories in the city at the turn of the century. In 1934 twenty percent of Santana's population was foreign born, although many more must have been of foreign extraction. Only 3.5 percent were Italian born; 8.09 percent were Portuguese born. Santana and the neighboring districts of Casa Verde and Tucuruví had over twenty percent of the Portuguese population in São Paulo, and in general, immigrants from Portugal were not working class, but landowning truck-farmers (Araújo, 1941:73-83). These factors suggest that foreign immigration to Santana may have been of a generally higher economic level than that to the rest of the city. While the immigrant families interviewed in Santana were far from bourgeois, they were not of working class origins either. We do not know how representative these families were of Santana's foreign population, but it is certain that they had more resources--land, capital, training--to take advantage of the commercial opportunities offered by São Paulo's growth than the mass of foreign factory workers, or indeed, as we shall see later on, than the Brazilian rural migrants who came to São Paulo at that time. Some of the foreign families arriving in Santana were able to afford several return trips with their families to visit Italy or
Portugal, and all but one immigrant interviewed (or discussed with their descendants) were literate on arrival. By the 1930's many owned land or their own commercial enterprises and were actively participating in Santana's growth. In general, this applies equally to the foreign born immigrants who arrived in Santana before 1930 and to the second generation immigrants (Brazilian born of foreign extraction) arriving in Santana after 1930 (See Figures 21, 22, 23).

The careers of families arriving in Santana before 1930 do not in any way support Willems's (1975:197) hypothesis of dramatic social mobility among immigrants. They support, rather, Dean's suggestion (1969:50-51), discussed in Chapter I, that foreign immigration reduplicated the structure of the immigrants' countries of origin. We may surmise, then, that the Santana immigrants discussed here were not alone, and that in addition to the laboring masses and the few entrepreneurs, individuals and families of middle economic status also arrived in Sao Paulo. Thus, while the elite at the top of the hill had referred to the population at the bottom of the hill as os pobres or a italianada la de baixo, many of these were neither poor nor Italian, but Portuguese, Syrians or Germans of middle income.

Moreover, while many informants of foreign descent felt that the careers of their kinsmen constituted modest tales of independent achievement in the
Figure 21. Professions of First Generation Immigrants to Santana, 1900-1930

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupations</th>
<th>Before 1900</th>
<th>1900-1920</th>
<th>1920-1930</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Salaries</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factory worker</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artisan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trolley car</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Car driver</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Medium</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial</td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managers in textile factories</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Independents</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truckfarms</td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Transportation</strong> (animal based)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Import company</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restaurant</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 grocery stores</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bar</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Commerce</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Import company</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restaurant</td>
<td>(1)</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Bar</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Industry</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carpentry shop</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shops</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bakery</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Furniture</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factory typography</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td>(11)</td>
<td>(17)</td>
<td>(8)</td>
<td>(36)</td>
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Figure 22. Professions of Second Generation Immigrants to Santa Ana, 1900-1970

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Salaries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>soldier</td>
<td>5 factory workers</td>
<td>gas station attendant</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 factory workers</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>construction worker</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>driver</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>2 tombstone sculptors</td>
<td>2 bookkeepers</td>
<td>TV public city man</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>accountant</td>
<td>6 salesmen</td>
<td>industrial manager</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>head carpenter</td>
<td>industrial manager</td>
<td>4 accountants</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(9)</td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>(19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truckfarms</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>3 animal based</td>
<td>taxi fleet</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce</td>
<td>real estate</td>
<td></td>
<td>gas station owner</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 stores</td>
<td>barber</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>tailor</td>
<td>salesman</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(10)</td>
<td>(10)</td>
<td>(11)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>2 carpentry shops</td>
<td>2 carpentry shops</td>
<td>5 workers in family</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>wire factory</td>
<td>owned carpentry</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>valve factory</td>
<td>shops</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>textile factory</td>
<td>automobile repair</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>bakery</td>
<td>shop</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>lamination factory</td>
<td>(15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>(15)</td>
<td>(65)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>(19)</td>
<td>(31)</td>
<td>(15)</td>
<td>(65)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
new world, there is an interesting shift between the first and second generations as regards careers that suggests a measure of downward mobility, or at least a loss of control over land and capital. Among first generation immigrants arriving in Santana before 1930, 19.44 percent earned salaries and 80.55 percent owned their own businesses: truck farms, transportation companies, commercial or industrial ventures. The proportion of independent businessmen declined radically among the second generation to 52.63 percent among those beginning careers between 1900 and 1930 and to 54.83 percent among those beginning careers after 1930 (See Figure 23).

Figure 23. Career comparisons between generations of immigrants in Santana, 1900-1950.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>First Generation 1900-1930</th>
<th>Second Generation 1900-1930</th>
<th>Second Generation 1930-1950</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salaries</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>19.44</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13.89</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5.55</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>80.55</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truckfarms</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>30.55</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11.11</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13.89</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>25.00</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition, there are suggestive differences in the distribution of careers among the second generation beginning careers between 1900 and 1930 and that beginning careers after 1930. While the proportion of
salaries to independent enterprises remains more or less constant, the proportion of low salaries decreases among the second generation beginning careers after 1930. Among the independents, there is a dramatic increase in industrial and commercial enterprises in the second generation beginning careers after 1930. 4

These data generally confirm informants' reports of Santana's commercial growth after 1930, but they suggest a number of other things as well. First of all, while the first generation immigrants had enough capital to be relatively independent as truck farmers or owners of animal based transport companies, they may have lost land and capital because of difficulties with the language and lack of understanding of Brazilian laws. In some cases, the land appears to have been sold too rapidly and at low prices to real estate speculators. However, we do well to recall that during the early part of the century the status of private property was in the process of being defined in Santana. According to informants' memories and impressions, the Italian colonists, for example, sometimes lost land because they

4 Chi square tests were performed on all of these comparisons; the only one which yielded unequivocal results was that between the first and second generations. However, because of the smallness and non randomness of the sample, the results should be considered as suggestive rather than definitive.
did not speak fluent Portuguese and did not understand the tax laws. Other immigrants or unscrupulous city officials quietly paid the taxes and got access to title. In other instances, official surveys which could have proved immigrant's boundary claims mysteriously disappeared from municipal files (See Appendix IV-A). Such difficulties do not find expression in informants' descriptions of their first generation ancestors' professions as "landown­ ing truck farmer," but they are reflected in the increase of salaried positions in the second generation. Thus, the difficulties which we would expect the first generation to face affected the careers of the second generation.

Moreover, the fact that among the second generation success—that is, higher salaries or increased commercial opportunities—seems to be related to whether a career began before or after 1930 suggests two things. First, the less successful second generation careers may have been affected not only by a general "shakeout" among the first generation families, but also by the

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5Citations from informants which are too bulky to be included here are found in Appendix IV.

6A chi square test on the significance of increased high salaries after 1930 was only at .30. However, the test on the significance of increased commerce after 1930 was greater than .10, suggesting that the variation may not be due to chance. However, as stated above in Fn. 4, in view of the size and non-randomness of the sample, these results are only suggestive and should be regarded with caution.
general labor glut of São Paulo's market during the First Republic, which was specifically created by immigration policies favoring the coffee oligarchy (See Chapter II, pp. 64-65). Second, the more successful second generation careers in commerce beginning after 1930 suggest that improved commercial opportunities resulted not only from the vacuum left by the elite families as their descendants abandoned commerce, but also from the population growth which characterised the whole Northern Zone of the city. To a degree, immigration itself created markets for immigrant concerns. But by the 1930's, the height of the immigration period was over. We may then surmise that the improved commercial opportunities in Santana arose from a particular kind of population growth which could support the increasing variety of Santana's commerce: namely the newly arrived bureaucrats.

The bureaucrats, who arrived in the late 1920's and 1930's were able to pay for the goods and services offered by Santana's commerce, but not for the more expensive commodities handled by the commerce in the center of São Paulo. If the foregoing hypothesis is correct, the result of the Vargas years was not only to stabilize the downwardly mobile rural elites who came to Santana as bureaucrats, but to contribute as
well, through their creation, to the stability and prosperity of Santana's commerce and the immigrants who controlled it.

Most of the bureaucratic families who came to Santana in the late 1920's and 1930's were from reasonably wealthy, landed backgrounds in their fathers' or grandfathers' generations, but had witnessed the precipitous decline of family fortunes. They had seen the value of their production decline and the size of their landholdings decrease through inheritance to the point where a large nuclear family would have difficulty supporting itself. In spite of this downward mobility in the economic sphere, these families were relatively privileged. They were literate, and in their towns in the interior, they or their relatives had had the political and social status of landowners, coronéis or cabos eleitorais. Such individuals were used to prestige and to political influence at least on a local level even though, as one informant put it, "Os poderosos foram de tempo passado. Nós quase que não vimos esse poder" (The powerful ones were of bygone days. We hardly saw that power).

Once in the city though, their literacy entitled them to little in the 1930's, and their sense of social status was incommensurate with the realities of their new situation, as there was no one to validate it:
Viemos pra São Paulo porque meu irmão, que tava na Força mandou vir. Estava difícil lá no sítio. Fomos pro lado de Vila Formosa onde era tudo rua de terra, casinhas . . . não sei, estranhamos. No interior éramos família de certa classe. Aqui era carroceiro . . . era diferente. Mamãe arrazada. Eu não tinha com quem conversar, saía quarenta e cinco minutos à pé pra cidade pra passear. Eu queria trabalhar. Tinha trabalhado na fazenda da minha irmã, mas não gostava. Aqui queria trabalhar na fábrica, e marquei com a noiva do meu irmão pra me arrumar um emprego. De noite, quando falei pro meu irmão, ele não deixou, explicou, me mostrou a diferença de trabalhar em fábrica, que na nossa situação não podia, que era melhor trabalhar numa loja. No dia seguinte falei pra moça que meu irmão tinha falado que a nossa posição não permitia que eu fosse trabalhar em fábrica. Iiiiihi! Deu um borô! Eu só fiquei inteligente depois de velha. Fiquei envergonhada, brigou comigo, brigou com ela, me mandaram de volta pra fazenda da minha irmã, onde me davam todo trabalho pesado . . .

We came to São Paulo because my brother, who was in the Força Publica sent for us. It was difficult on the sítio [subsistence farm]. We went to Vila Formosa [working class neighborhood of São Paulo] where everything was dirt roads, little houses . . . I don't know, it was different. In the interior we were a family of a certain position. Here there were cart drivers . . . it was different. Mother was exhausted. I didn't have anyone to talk to, I would walk forty-five minutes to go look at the city. I wanted to work. I had worked at my sister's fazenda but I didn't like it. Here I wanted to work in a factory, and I arranged with my brother's girl friend that she should find me a job. At night when I told my brother, he wouldn't let me, he explained and showed me the difference between working in a factory, that in our position I couldn't, that it was better to work in a store. The next day I told the girl that my brother had said that our position would not permit me to work in a factory. Iiiiihi! There was trouble! I only got smart after I got old! I was embarrassed, they fought with me, with her, he sent me back to my sister's fazenda, where they gave
The decline of familistic support for many of these families is an added indication of their initial downward mobility. If there were wealthier branches of their families in the city, they were often less than helpful. A few families did have such relatives in São Paulo when they migrated, but most informants laughed at the suggestion that such relatives might have helped. Only one of my informants ever asked for help and was disappointed.

Fui no Instituto Fontoura por indicação de um parente que estava melhor de vida, e trabalhava lá. Eu era auxiliar de químico, mais aí também não tinha futuro. E, o começo não foi muito fácil, não. Aquele parente poderia ter ajudado bem mais. Pensei que ia trabalhar no escritório, mais não, fui para o setor dos operários, puxando carrinho, engarrafando o produto. Fiquei muito chocado com o trabalho braçal. Ademais, tava com um furúnculo enorme debaixo do braço, e sofri aquelas dores. Foi tudo a mesma coisa. Naquele tempo, São Paulo era pequeno, e não oferecia as oportunidades de hoje. E, os parentes ajudavam, mas aqueles que podiam não ajudavam tanto não.

I went to the Instituto Fontoura [a drug factory] through the advice of a relative who was better off, and worked there. I was a chemist's assistant, but there wasn't much future there either. Yes, in the beginning it wasn't very easy. That relative could have helped a lot more. I thought I was going to work in an office, but no, I was sent to the workers' sections, to push carts and bottle the product. I was very shocked with physical labor. Moreover,

\(^7\)See Appendix IV-B.
I had an enormous abscess under my arm, and was in tremendous pain. It was always the same thing. In those days São Paulo was small and didn't offer the opportunities of today. Sure, relatives helped, but those who could didn't help that much.

Unrealistic expectations of this sort underscore the vulnerability of such families. For the untrained in a difficult job market, the opportunities provided by the growth and stability of the bureaucracy during the Vargas years stopped a process of vertiginous downward social mobility.8 Literate Brazilians, eligible for government employ, were provided with secure employment, a modest but sure source of income, retirement benefits, and access to government loans. Most importantly, they were reintegrated into a new scheme of government. For Santana families of such backgrounds, the last was of special importance, for it was on the basis of their new government connections that they were able to establish new grounds for prestige and influence in Santana.

Of the twenty Brazilians in my sample, who came to Santana from about 1928 to 1950, all but three joined bureaucracies. In contrast, none of the eleven second generation foreign immigrants who arrived after 1930 did, although

8There is a parallel here between the careers of the second generation immigrants beginning their careers during the First Republic. We have hypothesized that these, too, were affected by the labor glut caused by First Republic immigration policies.
one was connected to the Força Publica as a tailor (See Figure 24). A few of the bureaucrats had lived briefly in other areas of the city before moving to Santana. They came to Santana because housing was cheap and it was close to the center of the city, where many held jobs in the State Office of the Treasury, the Department of Public Health, the Ministry of Education, the Department of Water and Sewage, and in the Força Publica (See Figures 24 and 25).

The Força Publica provided almost half of the bureaucratic employment among Brazilian migrants interviewed. A degree of mobility through the ranks had been possible in the Força Publica since 1915. In 1924 mobility was limited to the literate: earlier basic education courses had made mobility through the ranks possible even for illiterate volunteers, but in 1924, these were abolished and officer training programs which only accepted literate individuals were instituted (Fernandez, 1972:233). The age of grandeur of the Força Publica had terminated in 1932: with the defeat of the Constitutionalist Revolt, it fell under Federal control. Yet, despite the personal humiliation of being associated with a defeated institution, careers were made

---

9 An informant who participated in the 1932 revolt as an officer in the Força Publica explained:

"O que houve mesmo em '32, o que se nota, é a ambici-
Figure 24. Professions of Brazilian Rural Migrants and Second Generation Foreign Immigrants to Santana, 1930-1950.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupations</th>
<th>Brazilians</th>
<th>Foreign Immigrants</th>
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</tr>
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<td>Forca Publica</td>
<td>8 Water &amp;</td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>4 Sewage</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>5 Dept. of Health</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Treasury bookeeper</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>driver</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-Bureaucrats</strong></td>
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<td>furniture factory independent income</td>
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<td>garage owner</td>
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</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>supermarket</td>
<td>owner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>electrician</td>
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</tr>
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<td>(2)</td>
<td>(8)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>Salaries</td>
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<td>tailor</td>
<td>(4)</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>store manager</td>
<td>accountant</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>(20)</td>
<td>(11)</td>
<td>(31)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 25. Bureaucratic absorption in a single family.
there. In the 1930's it became possible to get university training through this institution, which otherwise would not have been available to the volunteers. In fact, volunteers to the Força Publica had a far lower level of preparation than did individuals who joined the public health services, the teaching bureaucracy or various ministries in desk jobs. Perhaps it is because the requirements were lower than in other bureaucracies that familialistic networks in the Força Publica appeared much stronger than in other bureaucracies. (See Figure 25).

While relatively few individuals interviewed did so, those who were able to take advantage of the university training offered by the Força Publica could, after retirement, start private businesses as civil engineers, veterinarians and doctors.

Bureaucratic employment provided stability and new opportunities to families which were in tight straits. This was recognized by many women of rural

"What happened in '32, what one notes is the unmeasured ambition of the politicians who wanted to recuperate the positions lost with the revolution of '30. They encouraged the people against the Força. Called us traitors, judases, got off trolleys. They called the girls at school daughters and sisters of traitors."
migrant background who married bureaucrats:

In my day we married public servants, who can't make fortunes no matter how hard they try. Working for the state yields less money but more security.

Of all the bureaucrats interviewed, those who joined the Força Publica were most explicit in their recognition of the possibilities for upward mobility inherent in the new structure of opportunities offered them. The following citation is from a volunteer's graduation speech:

Há dezessete anos batia eu as portas deste Batalhão, onde hoje vos reunis para, por meu intermédio, homenagear a tradicional hospitalidade desta terra de São Paulo... Quando rememoro o passado, e comparo o pouco que sou ao nada que era, sinto um orgulho infinito e creio nos destinos gloriosos do Brasil... Uma terra onde o pobre, com o esforço próprio pode estudar e progredir, tendo apenas como limite o limite de suas próprias forças, não pode deixar de ser forte.

A história de minha vida e a história anônima de muitos. É de uma infância pobre, de uma adolescência perigosa sujeita a tentação do vício, através de uma camaradagem nociva... Aos oito anos perdia o meu pai. Aos nove já me encontrava vendendo o suor do meu rosto pelo pão de cada dia... com o espírito aventureiro cheguei eu a Capital Federal. No Rio conheci de tudo. Conviví com a escória de sua sociedade, e realmente sofri... dias de miséria e de desânimo.

Há momento da vida de cada um de nós que representam séculos de intenso viver. Esses momentos eu vivi então. Era Julho de 1924. Rebentara a revolução. Sem objetivos fixos alistei-me a um batalhão de voluntários que não chegou a vir a São
Faulo. Sozinho, sem recursos, descrente dos que, como serralheiro com a minha falta de sorte poderia adquirir; bastante orgulhoso e independente para pedi-lo, decidi alistar-me na Força Pública de São Paulo.

Bendita a hora feliz de minha inspiração.

Aqui encontrei, na disciplina e no trabalho, a orientação segura que minha inexperiência exigia.

Aqui, no exemplo dos meus chefes, completei minha formação moral.

Aqui estudei. Casei-me. Tive filhos, que em Deus espero, terão melhores dias que os meus.

Aqui consegui chegar a capitão e obter o título de médico.

Seventeen years ago, I was knocking at the doors of this battalion, where today we are united to celebrate, through me, the traditional hospitality of this land of São Paulo . . . When I recall the past, and compare the little I am to the nothing that I was, I feel infinite pride and belief in the glorious destinies of Brazil . . . A land in which a poor man, can through his own efforts study and progress, having as a limit only the limits of his own strength cannot be other than strong.

The story of my life is the anonymous history of many. It is the tale of an impoverished childhood and a dangerous adolescence subject to temptations to vice through unwholesome acquaintances . . . When I was eight, I lost my father. By the time I was nine, I was selling the sweat of my brow for my daily bread . . . with an adventurous spirit I arrived in the Federal Capital. In Rio I knew everything. I lived with the dregs of its society and I truly suffered . . . days of misery and depression.

There are moments in the lives of each of us which represent centuries of intense living. Those moments I lived then. It was July 1924 and the revolution broke out. Without any fixed objectives I enlisted in a battalion of volunteers that never reached São Paulo. Alone and without resources; with a lack of faith in the resources that a metal-
worker with my lack of luck could acquire; too proud and independent to beg for them, I decided to enlist in the Força Pública of São Paulo.

Blessed the happy hour of my inspiration.

Here I found, in discipline and work, the secure path which my inexperience required.

Here, with the example of my superiors, I completed my moral development.

Here I studied. I married. I had children, who God willing will have better days than mine.

Here I have managed to become a captain and to obtain the title of doctor.¹⁰

It is clear from these and other statements by the Brazilian rural migrants interviewed that they felt that they were starting their lives at the bottom, saved from absolute proletarianization only by the security of the jobs in the bureaucracies which became available at that time. They came to Santana because the neighborhood was relatively cheap and they were poor. None of these families was able to buy land, or a house when they moved to Santana. Although they now all own their own dwellings, when they moved to Santana they rented the "chicken coops for the poor" being built by the families at the top of the hill, or more usually, houses built by immigrants or their descendants.

The beginning of a symbiotic relationship

¹⁰See Appendix IV-C.
developed between many bureaucratic and non-bureaucratic families: at first it was a relation between ethnic groups. Foreigners, especially Italians, were discriminated against by the Law of Two Thirds (See Chapter II, p. 85-6) and the limitation of bureaucratic employment to the Brazilian born. Social prejudice was expressed by foreigners and Brazilians alike. Older Brazilian informants comment on "unfortunate" marriages between Italians or Syrians and Brazilians, but in fact such marriages appear to have been rare during the 1930's. According to a 1941 survey of the population of São Paulo, foreigners generally married each other because the Brazilians they were exposed to were most often of either a lower or a far higher economic status (Araújo, 1941:72). Because of this legal and social discrimination immigrants in Santana could only gain access to government resources through bureaucratic personnel who acted as intermediaries for them. They became slightly more integrated into the existing political scheme than might otherwise have been the case, in the absence of even nominal participation in electoral politics. ¹¹ However, as the Brazilian born replace the foreign born

¹¹Among the families interviewed only two informants admitted to having relatives who joined or participated in the Integralist or Communist movements of the 1930's.
of whatever extraction, the families became defined by their direct or indirect access to government.

The relationship was recognized. The bureaucrats provided a market for land, commerce and industry which were in immigrant hands, and in return for the relatively cheap rents given them, gave access to jeito. Jeito (literally, "manner," a way to fix or arrange things) is the ubiquitous Brazilian word meaning the ability to get by, to manage, generally by the successful manipulation of one's personal connections. It has to do with the creation of clientelistic networks and is usually applied when there is the expectation of mutual aid. Through their friendships with the bureaucrats, the non-bureaucrats got access to informal channels of information and assistance. The "municipal benevolence," which da Silva Mendes (1958:222) holds responsible for the mushrooming of housing developments in Santana during these years, probably had its roots in many such relationships. Besides the acquisition of building permits, informants mentioned tax exemptions, housing loans from the Caixa Econômica (State Savings Bank), special consideration for their children's application to State schools, legal advice, a few bureaucratic positions for the Brazilian born and even the use of the rare telephones in São Paulo, which even now are only
available at exorbitant prices or to people with connections.

Friendships between the bureaucrats and non-bureaucrats were hardly ever formalized during the Vargas years. Among the families studied only one marriage occurred between a bureaucrat—a Força Pública officer—and a landed woman of Italian descent. While this marriage expressed a union of material and social capital and can be considered as expressive of the bureaucrat-immigrant relationship discussed here, I do not know how frequent such marriages may have been in Santana in the 1930's. Most of the bureaucrats interviewed who came to Santana in the late 1920's and early 1930's were already married and starting families. Among the Força Pública officers interviewed who married foreign women, the women were most often working class women whom they had met in the center city industrial neighborhoods surrounding the Força Pública headquarters.

During these early years in Santana, the immigrants appear to have gotten the better part of the deal: they had capital and the bureaucrats did not. The bureaucrats provided them with opportunities to utilize their capital assets. The bureaucrats, however, gained prestige, which would later be formalized through godparenthood, marriages—in the next generation—and occa-
sionally in joint business ventures. For example, one young \textit{Força Pública} officer, after having graduated from engineering school, formed his first business partnership with his old immigrant landlord. According to the landlord's daughter,


We have known Colonel Thomas for a long time. He was our neighbor when he came to Santana. He rented father's house. Father was a fine carpenter, he worked in constructions, he did all the wood work for the church of São Bento. He was an excellent builder, although he had no formal training. He was a self taught architect. He got along well with the Colonel, who \textit{had a degree but had no experience}. So they became partners and they worked together. They built a lot of houses when my father developed his land. When my father retired, it was the Colonel who built my house. We continue very friendly.

Naturally the opportunities were greater for the bureaucrats who had been able to acquire sufficient training in their bureaucracies to be able to set up independent enterprises. The friendship and patronage extended to the immigrants could then lead to economic gain through the acquisition of commercial clients. Thus, the Cel. Thomas, mentioned above, received a few prestigious city side contracts, through connections.
made in the Força Publica, but the bulk of his business was in Santana among immigrant and other non-bureaucra-
tic families. While Cel. Thomas's career was exception-
ally successful, eventually all of the bureaucrats benefi-
ciated from the friendships formed with immigrants and
their families during the Vargas years.

The relationship begun between bureaucratic
families and non-bureaucratic families became completely
symbiotic during the populist years following the reintro-
duction of elections, because then immigrant friends and
business clients became the bureaucrats' political clients.

The 1950's were prosperous years. Santana's
commerce continued to be fuelled by population growth in
the neighborhood and the area (See Figure 26). The

Figure 26. Population growth in the Northern

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subdistricts</th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>1970</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Santana</td>
<td>90,193</td>
<td>120,284</td>
<td>33.35</td>
<td>200,490</td>
<td>66.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tucuruvi</td>
<td>88,720</td>
<td>175,653</td>
<td>97.93</td>
<td>255,515</td>
<td>45.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casa Verde</td>
<td>58,571</td>
<td>79,226</td>
<td>35.26</td>
<td>99,405</td>
<td>25.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. Maria</td>
<td>54,373</td>
<td>94,118</td>
<td>73.09</td>
<td>116,916</td>
<td>24.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Sra. do O</td>
<td>51,012</td>
<td>62,439</td>
<td>22.40</td>
<td>141,363</td>
<td>127.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limão</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>51,837</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>70,232</td>
<td>35.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. Guilherme</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>41,202</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>74,450</td>
<td>80.69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| V. Nova Cara-
choelrinha   | --   | 24,172| --  | 30,924|27.93|

*These subdistricts were created in 1965.

SOURCE: Mendes Torres (1970:111,171); IBGE
bureaucracies continued to absorb Brazilian migrants from rural areas at an even greater rate (See Figure 17), and migrants of foreign descent arriving in Santana during the 1940's and 1950's were able to set up independent commercial enterprises. Commerce and real estate continued to be the main investments. Various voluntary associations were formed in the neighborhood during these years. Branches of the Rotary and Lions Clubs and the São Paulo Commercial Association opened in Santana as did a local store owners' association. Members in all of these associations included prominent commercial figures, as well as the new local politicians, many of whom were bureaucrats who had migrated to Santana during the Vargas years.

In addition to Santana's continued growth, the expansion of bureaucracies and the reintroduction of elections under populism promoted the careers of bureaucratic and non-bureaucratic individuals alike. It gave people of both groups advantages which had been absent during the Vargas years. Electoral politics meant that every man and woman could be a small scale politician and join a political machine. The implication of this new situation for immigrants is expressed by the son of an independent salesman of foreign descent, who said:

Uma vez meu pai ajudou um vereador por duas coisas: ele queria financiamento pra uma casa e não tinha ligações políticas. Sem ligações era difícil conseguir financiamento. A segunda coisa
Once my father helped a councilman for two things. He wanted financing for a house and he didn't have the political connections. Without such connections it was difficult to get financing. The second thing was to get a parking space in the municipal parking lot. That he got. The financing he didn't get, because the councilman wasn't important enough and couldn't do it. So he went to speak to Cel. João from ___ who was connected with the governor's group. My grandfather had helped his brother in some business...

While I have little specific information on such relationships among men, it is clear that populism provided opportunities for mutual career advancement for bureaucrats and non-bureaucrats alike. Thus, when a popular commercial figure's religious affiliation was being discussed, informants laughed and said,

Ah, esse aí que é político, faz umbanda, espiritismo, vai pra missa todo domingo, é tudo projeção, e ça vê que deu bem, né?

Ah, that one is really a politician. He does umbanda, spiritism, goes to church every Sunday. It's all projection, and you see how it's worked out, don't you?

While they would not provide details on the connections it is clear that for this non-bureaucratic individual as well as for others, there were linkages to be found through Rotary, Lions and commercial associations, in party political associations or in the bureaucracies.
themselves. There was always a jeito, a person could always help, and in the process, help himself.

The populist years were particularly significant for the bureaucrats. As in the First Republic, electoral politics provided special opportunities for those in a position to manage votes. Most of Santana's elected politicians after 1945 were of bureaucratic backgrounds. Many more bureaucrats ran for political office. They were not elected, but they acted as sieves for patronage. Although the bureaucrats never reached the power and position of the old top of the hill elite, the reintroduction of elections greatly enhanced their political and economic fortunes.

According to a number of local politicians, Santana's re-entry into electoral politics was enthusiastic and at first violent. A shooting occurred at a political meeting outside the Santana church and there was a riot in the neighboring district of Tucuruvi. I was unable to get more detailed information on these incidents other than that they were connected with the Communist electoral victory which occurred in Santana and elsewhere, in spite of the lack of local Communist Party leadership in Santana.\(^{12}\) After this initial outburst, however, and

\(^{12}\)According to a local politician: "Eu não sei se acabou o fenômeno do Communismo. Agora ninguém se
the subsequent prohibition of the Communist party, Santana politics were controlled largely by the right wing parties which developed after the second World War (See Chapter II, pp.104§).

Santana politics were largely defined by the complementary trends of Adhemarismo and Janismo (Beiguelman, 1971:325) which dominated the politics of São Paulo during the populist years. Adhemar de Barros, a doctor, began his political career in the 1933 elections for the Constituent Assembly as a PRP delegate (Skidmore, 1967:67-8; Cabral, 1962:29; Bloem, 1955:44). During the Vargas years, when Federal control over the states was maintained by a presidentially appointed interventor, Adhemar was one of the interventors for São Paulo. In 1946 he ran for Governor of the state and was elected. It is said that his party machine, the Partido Social Progressista (PSP) was the most corrupt of all the allegedly venal post war parties. \(^{13}\) Adhemar's own motto was "rouba mas faz" (He steals but gets the job done).

\[\text{manifesta por razões compreensivas} \] (I don't know if the phenomenon of communism is finished. Now no one manifests himself for understandable reasons).

\(^{13}\) The husband of one of the Santana informants kept his accounts. There were two ledgers, one private and one public. Both were burned after Adhemar's death in 1969.
Adhemar's political strength seems to have come from Paulista industrialists and old PRP elements. In Santana he took over Goya's PRP electoral machine and a few of the old elite families at the top of the hill joined his electoral camp. His electoral strength derived from what Weffort has described as the "politics of love" (1965:179), a generous paternalism which promised everyone a share of São Paulo's extraordinary post war economic growth. According to Weffort's analysis of the 1962 elections in São Paulo state, his main electoral supporters in the state were among economically marginal landowners or independent businessmen who looked towards the state for protection, assistance and generosity. They did not expect specific policies, but "a power which cared for the little man" (1965:180).

From this follows the importance attributed by the adhemaristas to distributive activities. The image of a leader, easily accessible to his followers suggests a behavioural style for the administrative bureaucracy which vitiates the impersonality of the laws. Finally, the typical adhemarista whether "progressive" or "conservative" imagines a protective, helpful State to which one can appeal in cases of difficulty, without the technical obstacles of a rational and impersonal administration. It is this structure which permits the small landowner, the "lumpen" and marginal salaried man the certainty that he will survive, even if defeated in the violent competition stimulated by capitalist development, and above all the certainty that he may keep his aspiration of access to higher positions (1965:180).
Adhemar's main opposition was from Janismo. Janio Quadros was a primary school teacher who began his political career unaffiliated with any of the main Paulista political parties. Janio provided the only significant opposition to Adhemar's "politics of love," by promising justice, austerity and an end to corruption. His was the rhetoric of "a revolução do tostão contra o milhão" (the revolution of the penny against the million), of the end of políticasem (politicking--and corruption) and of non political administration (Ferreira, 1964:261-3). His political strength derived purely from his electoral appeal, which eventually led São Paulo's major parties to back him in the elections for state governor in 1955. In 1960 he became president of the republic. Whereas Adhemar's electorate was largely among the petty bourgeois of the interior or in industrial neighborhoods whose populations were composed of impoverished recent migrants from the Northeast or other areas of Brazil (Weffort, 1965:181-2; Ferreira, 1964:239-40), Janio's appeal was basically to the urban electorate (Bloem:1955:70). According to Weffort, Janio's appeal was to segments of the urban working class and to middle income sectors who had no political connections, who expected no favors and who were increasingly dependent on their salaries for survival. Weffort argues that the
Janistas are more stable [than the adhemaristas] in the sense that as a working class, or proletarianized middle class... they have not much to lose with capitalist development... they do not turn to the state cherishing hopes of personal protection but with hopes for justice, for what matters for them is no longer the expectation of favors, but their own ability to work... they expect justice and unconditional application of the law from the state (1965:182-3).

Both Janio and Adhemar were supported in Santana. Many of Santana's elected officials to municipal, state and federal legislatures were of adhemarista backgrounds, but Janio derived much of his personal electoral strength from the Northern Zone of São Paulo, including Santana (Bloem, 1955:70). We shall see, however, that the distinction which Weffort makes between adhemaristas and janistas does not really apply to the families interviewed in Santana.

We have seen in Chapter II that populism interrelated the electoral and administrative systems at the higher socio-economic levels. Bureaucracies and pane-linhas within them became the institutions through which electoral clans were revived (Mota, 1972:217), and the rivalries of electoral politics were expressed by promotions or appointments within given bureaucracies. Among the bureaucrats interviewed in Santana, the Secretariats of Health, Education and Finance and the Força Pública were the loci for the rivalries of electoral politics. They could deal with favorable place-
ments and appointments for teachers, doctors and dentists as well as with legal and financial advice. Patronage possibilities were particularly important in the Força Pública because of the opportunities for diverting matériel. It was allegedly a bastion of Adhemarismo because of an improved automatic promotion law passed by Adhemar in the early populist years. According to a number of informants, advancement could depend on the ability to mobilize votes outside the bureaucracy and political standing within it. The ability to mobilize votes for a given faction depended on willingness to bring the benefits of government to friends who did not have them. Attempts, for instance, to check the redistribution of construction materials and automobile parts to private ends, were at least on one occasion penalized by delayed promotions.

In the political climate of 1972-73 it was unreasonable to expect informants to describe past achievements in the area of patronage and corruption. Understandably, discussions of politics and patronage were

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14Teachers in the public system are assigned schools throughout the state. To receive a desired teaching location, usually in the capital, teachers are required to pass periodic examinations. It was commonly felt that people with connections got the placements they wanted.
usually concluded with statements of this sort:

Eu não gostava, não gosto de política. Só faço por obrigação. A política é falsa, eu tenho impressão, acho que todo político antes da Revolução, se não fizesse favores aos eleitores, não seria eleito. Não há mais aquela glória do político, de se valorizar a si próprio. Esse negócio do jeitinho melhorou noventa porcento. Ainda existe. Eu não tenho me servido e nunca gostei. Se me servia antes, era pra não passar de bobo.

I didn't like and I don't like politics. I do it because it is a duty. Politics are false, I have the impression, I believe that if the politicians before the Revolution didn't do favors for the voters, they wouldn't have been elected. There is no longer that glory of the politician, that high self esteem. This business of the jeitinho [diminutive for jeito] has improved ninety percent. It still exists. I haven't used it and never liked it. If I used it before, it was so that I wouldn't appear as a fool.

Many families helped others get jobs, presumably through patronage and jeito: few were as explicit as this woman, who was committed to the Adhemar network because her husband, after several years of only being able to find work as an accountant in the interior, got a job in a São Paulo city bureaucracy through Adhemar's political machine:

Nos procuramos sempre votar por pessoas honestas, nunca por interesse, dentro daqueles conhecidos que podem fazer alguma coisa.

We always try to vote for honest people, never for self interest, among those people we know who can do something.

Generally, however, I received gossip about tax evasion, political appointments, promotion delays,
disappearance of government materiel, which became more specific as it became more distant from the social milieu of Santana, usually up the social scale, or as it moved into the realm of legal or semi-legal favors or jeito.

As was the case during the First Republic, there was no evidence of gross corruption among Santana informants or Santana politicians, but again, as with the First Republic, we need not assume, or look for the grossest characteristics by which coronelismo or electoral populism were known. Small scale favors and jeito were implicitly and explicitly accepted as the currency of electoral politics. This was made clear by one informant, who said that she, rather than her husband, should have been the politician because, while his reputation for scrupulous honesty yielded him a great deal of prestige and respect, it did not yield the necessary vote when he ran for electoral office. According to this same woman, who had a large network of friends and clients,

Raro a semana que acontece que não dou algum conselho. Essa semana até que foi banal. Em geral eles perguntam pra mim, por que tenho idade e já sei muito, e tenho uma grande rede de amigos. Tou sempre pedindo pra alguém ou dando . . .

It is rare that there is a week when I don't give someone advice. This week was actually banal. Generally they ask me because I am old and now I know things and I have a large network of friends. I am always asking [for information] for someone or giving information.
On a later occasion, she talked about people's voting behavior: some people asked her every year who they should vote for, or if they hadn't seen her, voted blank (votaram em branco). One man, whose vote she was soliciting, told her that he had the highest respect for her candidate, but that the opposition candidate had taken his child to the First Aid Station (Pronto Socorro). "O que se pode dizer à uma resposta dessas?" (What can you say to that?) she concluded.

This instance suggests yet another parallel with Santana politics during the First Republic. Electoral politics provided the opportunity for women to move outside their domestic interests, to assist their husbands by dispensing favors. Some women who sewed for charity regularly delivered their handiwork to poor families prior to elections to check on their voting intentions. Other wives of bureaucrats prided themselves on their abilities to collect votes in return for favors: the use of a telephone, assistance in job placements, the acquisition of documents (birth, marriage certificates, records of educational careers), free medical care or legal advice are just a few examples of the kinds of favors they could bestow among friends and acquaintances. It is highly probable that charitable and religious organizations provided other areas for informal political activity, just as had been the case earlier among the elite families.
In addition to the small scale favoritism and vote mongering described above, the effects of populism on bureaucrats went even further. Inflation, which is generally held to be contrary to middle income interests, ironically favored the bureaucrats, because it was easy for them to borrow money. While bureaucrats had only modest salaries, they also had access to loans from their institutions or from the State Savings Bank (Caixa Econômica). This was especially so among the officers of the Força Pública, who had a mutual loan association, the Caixa Beneficente. Taking advantage of inflation and an anti usury law passed during the Vargas years which forbade interests higher than twelve percent, they borrowed money to build or buy houses. Indeed, buying or borrowing on time in the inflationary years, before the institution of monetary correction following the 1964 coup, were prosperous enterprises because the value of what was eventually repaid, or paid, even with interest became so much less than the original value (Simonsen, 1969:133).

Such loans were important to many of the bureaucratic families interviewed. Whereas they rented houses when they first came to Sartana, during the populist period they began to acquire their own properties. Owning one's own house, or having a casa propria, is an extremely important criterion for social status and mobility:
Gabriel Bolaffi describes an unpublished study on Brazilian political attitudes and aspirations, which revealed that owning one's own house was the main aspiration among urban Brazilians (1975:75).

Subjectively, the acquisition of a home becomes the main evidence of success and the conquest of a higher social position. Objectively, the casa própria not only improves access to credit lines, but liberates the family budget from the inexorable monthly obligation to pay rent (1975:75).

According to Otero and Amaral (nd:34-5), between 1938 and 1964, when the National Housing Bank (BNH) was formed, housing loans were available to the public (in addition to those loans we have discussed above, available to bureaucrats or those with political connections) only through the Previdência Social, or Social Security system. Because of inflation, this institution was unwilling to make long term credit generally available, and during those years only 120,000 housing units were constructed with such loans in all of urban Brazil (Otero and Amaral, nd:40-47). We may judge, then, of the importance of the loans the bureaucrats received through the Força Pública's Caixa Beneficiente, or through the Caixa Econômica, simply by virtue of their employment.

15 By Lloyd A. Free, undertaken in 1960. According to Bolaffi, the results of studies in countries considered to be politically unstable, including Brazil, were not published.
Of the twenty families arriving in Santana between 1930 and 1950 in my sample, ten of the seventeen bureaucrats among them acquired houses through state loans, one was provided with an apartment on which only a maintenance fee, equivalent to a very low rent, was required, and only four did not get houses through public financing. Two informants did not know how their parents (long deceased) acquired the houses they were now living in. Of the fourteen families interviewed who arrived in Santana between 1950 and 1970 from rural areas, eight worked in government offices, and of these, six acquired their houses through government loans.

It is possible that some individuals attempted to transform state loans into productive capital. Although I do not know how common a procedure this may have been, I was told of a middle level bureaucrat who attempted to do so. Money was borrowed, allegedly to build houses for elderly female relatives, but in fact the man was attempting to set up a small plastics factory. He would not have been discovered had not competition from larger firms led him to bankruptcy and to the discovery that all of the elderly relatives for whom he claimed to be building were long dead. Regardless of the possibility of turning such loans to other uses, they were clearly an important economic resource for

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the bureaucratic families. If they were not large enough to generate investment capital, over time significant proportions of the bureaucrats' salaries were diverted from rent payments to other concerns. In addition, we have seen above that the ability to get government loans for non-bureaucratic families was also a political resource which could generate electoral assistance.

All in all, then, the relations of populism provided a margin of comfort, prestige and savings which otherwise would not have been available to bureaucratic families, and through them to their clients and friends outside the bureaucracies. These observations have some bearing on Weffort's description of populism among middle income sectors in São Paulo, which we discussed briefly above. Especially with regard to the adhemarista political machine in São Paulo, he argues that the relationships between the politician and the people were not "quasi-economic."

It is important to note that for the majority this relationship is an expectation rather than a concrete probability [of assistance]. Even if we attribute exceptional efficiency to the adhemarista machine, or to the state's welfaristic abilities we cannot conceive of more than a minority receiving direct assistance (1965:181). The Santana research suggests that the bureaucracies and the bureaucrats who staffed them provided a more
important means of redistributing wealth and resources than Weffort supposes. Unlike the middle income sectors he describes, as recruited primarily by the charismatic styles of the two political leaders of São Paulo (petty bourgeois adhemaristas from the interior in need of protection, or proletarianized middle income janistas in São Paulo city demanding austerity and justice), the Santana bureaucrats seem to have had specific resources to use in the populist game. Thus, whether the Santana bureaucrats were adhemarista or janista (and they seem to have been both on occasion) they all used the same general techniques in recruiting voters and acting as sieves for patronage through favors.

These conclusions are consistent with Leeds's (1972) and Leeds and Leeds's (1972, 1976) studies of populism in favelas in Rio de Janeiro. Personalist ties and clientelism were central to the populist organization which did not permit the development of mass party bases, and they extended up from proletarian favelas through bureaucracies to national political figures. These ties were based on an exchange of material goods for votes, and both in favelas and among the middle income families interviewed in Santana, the quality of life was materially improved. The limits to such distributive activities should not be looked for, as does Weffort, in the inability of any political machine or
state welfare institution to deliver goods and assistance, but in the political system itself which required continued dependence on the politician. As Leeds and Leeds have written about *favelas* and the Brazilian political system,

> A built in limit exists as to what the Brazilian politician can offer in terms of urban services for a *favela*—for he must be careful not to give too much... If the conditions he is ostensibly trying to improve are in fact improved "too much" he will have lost his raison d'être in the *favela* and consequently, will have lost a significant portion of his power base. Thus, the politician's interest must be fundamentally one of perpetuating the system in which he operates (1972:211).

> From this perspective, the effects of political activity such as Santana's on the larger political system appears to have been negligible. During these years none of Santana's politicians or bureaucrats were close to the levels of policy formulation, nor were local politicians of the brand which polarized the population. In fact, favors seem to have knit groups of higher and lower economic status into a web of mutual interest. However, we have discussed in Chapter II the potential draining effect of *clientelism* on the government's ability to implement established policy. While the drain was clearly small scale and indirect among the Santana families, if such relations existed among middle level bureaucrats in all the bureaucracies in the city, state and nation, the scale would

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have been of an entirely different order.

In listening to some informants reminisce about their careers during the populist years, one has the impression of a great bustling activity, an euphoric juggling of many balls at once, upon which depended one's self esteem and social status. Upward social mobility, or at least a comfortable stability was in the populist context felt to be a strong probability. For middle income families like those interviewed in Santana the blurring of class lines which characterised populism in Brazil seems to have provided an ideology of independent individual mobility (for all that it was in fact dependent on the redistribution of state resources), which could seemingly be measured by their expansion of social contacts and political activity. Much of this has changed in the years following 1964.

The events following the 1964 coup put an end to much of Santana's political activity. While all informants claimed to be relieved and grateful for the military intervention, there is some evidence that families like these are being separated from the sources of influence and capital accumulation which were present during the populist years.

It may be noted that while all informants were preoccupied and frightened by the chaotic appearance of politics in the early 1960's, none of the families inter-
viewed participated in the anti-Goulart mobilization efforts in São Paulo which were described in Chapter IX. While all were aware of the mobilization efforts, none was enthusiastic or felt that the coup reflected a "middle class movement" or an effort to benefit a middle class.

I did not participate in '64. Nor did my friends. Politics, like that in the streets, I don't like. I was never attracted to such things. One of Rosario's daughters took part, and I thought it was a bit wrong. She shouldn't have, it was none of her business.

The revolution was not a middle class revolution. It preserved the rich class. The middle class didn't have so much to lose. Who would have lost would have been the rich. The most important factor was the Brazilian Military. Possibly there was a little American feather in there, but I don't know.

I don't rightly know if it was a middle class or an upper class revolt. It wasn't a revolt on the part of the poor. That march that started everything, the organizers were of the upper class. The middle class, you know, let them do it. I didn't go because I don't like that kind of thing. I knew about it through television, radio—everybody knew. We also thought there would be fighting. The police didn't interfere. Generally, the police would be very violent. I don't want to know about politics.

While most of the families seem to have been disconnected from civilian efforts to oust Goulart, they are largely ardent supporters of the military government. Nonetheless, there is evidence that the benefits of the new government are at best mixed for families like the Santana families. Santana is an eminently staid neighborhood, and few of the families have had any direct experience with the repression to which the working class and student groups were subject. While the repression has affected the tone of political conversation, the families were more seriously affected by the centralization measures of the new government which took the form of the moralization of middle levels of the bureaucracies.

Shortly after the coup, a number of moralization campaigns and investigations into corruption

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16 According to an informant's letter in 1975, many of the Santana families interviewed voted ARENA—pro Government—in the 1974 elections, which were notable for the resounding victory by the opposition MDB in the country.
occurred. While these were reminiscent of the moralist, 
janista rhetoric of the previous decade, they were con-
ducted by the military. These "quasi-judicial proceed-
ings" (Schneider, 1971:61) had the effect in Santana of
breaking up panelinhas. As far as I know, only one
individual was "cassado" (lost his political rights) for
alleged corruption. However, bureaucrats who had pre-
viously helped each other and their clients now feel
that to maintain their own positions they must often
refuse favors. In some cases they have gone out of their
way to prejudice relatives and former clients in order
that they may themselves remain above suspicion.

Thus, a highly placed individual in the office
of the state treasury demoted or transferred to small
towns in the interior a number of individuals for whom
he had originally found jobs, or assisted in promotions.
In another case, a woman, whose husband formed part of
an important Santana panelinha requested a favorable
transfer for one of her relatives from a man whom her
husband had helped, and received a form letter citing
legislative articles and items as reasons for which her
request could not be met. She was outraged:

Imagine, citar artigos e items pra mim! Éu, que
conheço ele há tanto tempo! Éu não tava pedindo
alguma coisa desonesti, só pra ele ver se era
possível fazer alguma coisa. E ele ja me conhece
bastante pra poder dizer simplesmente, e' ou não
é possível. Artigos e items, hah! Quero ver

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Imagine citing articles and items to me. I, who have known him for so long. I wasn't asking for anything dishonest, just for him to see if it was or wasn't possible for him to do something. And he knows me well enough to be able to tell me simply whether it is or isn't possible. Articles and items indeed! I want to know what article and item says that his wife can use the official car and driver to go buy shoes on Voluntarios! I just want to know that!

Yet another family with a few building plots in Santana was shocked that a cousin in the mayor's office had not warned them of an impending zoning law which would devalue their holdings unless they got building permits approved before the passage of the law. The ability to cement friendships with favors and government information has sharply decreased. Influence and prestige of course still exist, but among fewer people than appears to have been the case before the military reforms.

Among the bureaucrats in my sample, the majority from the Força Pública and other bureaucracies are retired now, and spend their days at home. Only a minority was able to set up independent businesses during the populist years. A yet smaller minority was able to continue in political life, generally in appointed positions and often at fairly high levels. While these few individuals could, from their positions,
continue to provide a few appointments for qualified friends or clients, their apparent success in weathering the political changes since 1964 has meant relatively little in terms of an increase in their personal power or influence within their bureaucracies. Although they are at higher levels than they were before, power seems to have moved yet higher. They are valued as administrators simply, and as such can be replaced by other administrators. One relatively successful bureaucrat in Santana was aware of this, and told me that he always kept his papers prepared for an immediate withdrawal when the time should come. Another, who had been appointed as the head of an important state run enterprise, found that there were limits even to his administrative rights in the purchase of equipment. When he refused to sign a contract with a large foreign firm, because he considered it exploitative, he appealed to the minister who had appointed him for support. Instead, the minister signed the contract.

Although there were strict limits to the power and influence of even the most successful bureaucrats, those few who remain continue to be men of prestige in the neighborhood, and they are appealed to for assistance when the random violence of the São Paulo police infringes on the Santana community. For example, when a man who had been drinking with relatives at a local
bar was accused by another of parking his car illegally, within minutes he found that the whole block was surrounded by military police cars. The accuser had been a plainclothes policeman and he had the whole party taken to jail. An observer immediately called an influential bureaucrat, who arrived at the jail within the half hour with a judge and two district attorneys to "observe" the proceedings. While all were released an hour later, my informant felt that the fact that the plainclothesman had been drunk, and wrong about the parking violation had had much to do with it, and that a disproportionate amount of prestige or jeito (four influential bureaucrats) had been necessary to settle what should have been the most inconsequential of legal inconveniences.

In addition to the general lowering of levels of influence, the fact of official violence and its randomness has also affected the ease with which people speak of politics. Among some, a surface indifference masked fears of dangers that even they might face from police randomness.

It's forbidden to talk. What you see in the papers is what you are permitted to discuss. It's fear, isn't it? It's all tied up, isn't it? You can't discuss matters which the Government doesn't like. We can't even elect a Government! We can speak only about councilmen. Nobody knows anymore which are the forbidden topics, so nobody speaks at all. The DOPS [Department of Public Order], they squeeze you to find out what you know. If you know just a little bit more, you are a subversive, so then it's best not to know anything. When I realized that, I didn't want to know about politics anymore.

Although some of the families I came to know well were aware of the more terrifying aspects of police repression, of rumours of people who had disappeared and been tortured, others maintained an attitude of blind indifference:

Habeas corpus? O que que eu quero saber disso? Eu não preciso, não fiz nada de errado! Quando precisar, ai me preocupo.

Habeas Corpus? What do I care about that? I don't need it, I haven't done anything wrong! When I need it, then I'll worry.

Yet others would not, or could not believe reports of official violence and repression. The following is condensed from my field notes.

I brought up the subject of the student who was run over by a truck while attempting to escape arrest with Sr. Lorenzo. As far as I had been able to make out, a week or two earlier a notorious police torturer had been assassinated by an allegedly terrorist group on Copacabana beach. Massive arrests occurred throughout the country. In São Paulo they included a student in the Geology Department at the University of São Paulo (USP) who was arrested on bank robbery charges. On the day on which the robbery allegedly occurred, the student was said to be, depending on accounts, either in the hospital or on a field trip. These considera-
tions, however, did not affect the police, who took him into custody. According to the official version, the student attempted to escape and was run over accidentally by a truck. However, when he was declared dead, the police refused to return the body to the parents for burial. It was commonly suspected that the body would show signs of more than being run over. On the day of the Mass of the Seventh Day, the USP campus was crawling with police. At the mass, which took place in the center of the city, the archbishop made a reference in his sermon to the Romans who had returned the body of Christ to his parents for burial. At the close of the ceremony, the congregation stood up and sang a song which had been banned for political reasons for several years. According to a reliable source, many who were in the church that day were arrested the following day, although they were released, apparently unharmed at the end of the week.

I told Sr. Lorenco that I had heard that the accident with the truck had been staged and that the student was already dead when he was run over. I asked him if he thought this was possible, and also why he thought the police would not return the body to the parents. He ignored the second question and made light of the first by saying that it was very hard to know what to believe unless one saw with one's own eyes. He, however, found it hard to believe that the police should have lugged a dead body, placed it in the middle of a heavily trafficked avenue, and then given the go ahead to a truck to run it over, all this without anyone noticing. He closed the discussion by observing mildly that this kind of conversation probably could not occur in a non democratic country like Russia.

Where every man and woman had been able to be a small scale politician, people now turn away from politics and anything verging on the explicitly manipulatory:

Os politicos, essa gente, só come. Não precisamos de representantes que não fazem nada. Houve uma época que política era quase distração. Essas mesas redondas na televisão, que se insultavam, mais aquelas fofocas, brigas, tudo isso, graças

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a Deus, já acabou. Hoje há respeito, calma. Foi otimo a atitude do Governo fechar o parlamento e diminuir o poder dessa camarilha. Atingiu a classe politica, a classe privilegiada que estava no poder. Esse pessoal ganhava rios e rios de dinheiro. O povo trabalhava dez horas por pouco e viaiam toda aquela gente trabalhar pouco e ganhando muito—não pode. Essa politicagem era pra cegar. Os ricos eram assegurados. A classe media e o pobre não viaiam nada.

The politicians, those people, all they do is eat. We don't need representatives who don't do anything. There was a time when politics became almost an entertainment. Those round table discussions on television, where they would insult each other, that gossip, those fights, all that, thank God, is over now. Today there is respect, calm. The Government's attitude in closing parliament and reducing the power of that gang was excellent. It hit the political class, the privileged class which was in power. Those people made rivers and rivers of money. The people worked for ten hours a day and saw all those people working little and making much—-it can't be. All of that politicking was blinding. The rich were safe. The middle class and the poor couldn't get a thing.

Just as political marginalization preceded economic decline among the elite families at the top of the hill, the enforced and self enforced political paralysis attendant upon fear and decreased opportunities for influence within government may have an effect on the economies of many Santana families. As we have seen in Chapter II, the present regime has rationalized the economy and the bureaucracies; according to many informants this rationalization has brought certain apparent benefits. Older informants can see that their children are materially better off than they themselves were when they started their careers: educational facilities have

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proliferated and continue to expand. Most informants send their children to private schools anyway. Financing for homes is no longer a matter available to the few with connections: in principle all of their children may have a *casa propria*, apartments or vacation homes, for that matter, with financing from the National Housing Bank (BNH). The proliferation of consumer credit card organizations in theory permits the younger generation of Santana families to have almost anything, from trips around the world, to automobiles, apartments, speed boats, electric gadgets such as ham radios and sophisticated stereo equipment and color televisions—all on long term credit.

However, while the decrease of redistribution through corruption and influence in the bureaucracies assures the government of greater control and better cost accounting, it removes a margin of maneuverability for the Santana families. Bribery, tax evasion, interest evasion, currency speculation, featherbedding and the whole intangible area of favors, all of these undercut financial predictability for the government. But for the Santana families they had provided a margin which probably could be calculated in financial terms: for example, if legal advice is not available from a friend, lawyers cost money; if one cannot use connec-
tions to get a child into a free and good state school, a private one must be paid for; if materials at a given bureaucracy are now carefully controlled, one must pay for one's own construction materials; if a friendly official will not grant a building permit, one must spend more on meeting building code requirements and so forth.

There are no longer any special advantages in working in government and bureaucrats are no longer at the apex of a system of privilege and redistribution to non-bureaucrats. According to one informant, bureaucrats are salaried people just like anyone else. Everyone pays taxes, everyone pays into pension or other programs which contribute to the concentration of resources for the creation of capital markets controlled by far larger interests than those of the Santana families. And, while the families interviewed who have their own commercial enterprises consider themselves to be in stable and even prosperous condition, a casual walk on Santana's main commercial streets reveals an increasing number of branches of large city-side stores, where local commerce had predominated.

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17 In the past fifteen years the number of non-accredited private universities has increased to the point that many degrees are invalid. The proposed automatic accreditation of such schools will devalue the diplomas of previously established institutions. Education is no longer a matter just for the "classes." See Veia (1975(380):74).
Furthermore, the extension of consumer credit may turn out to be a mixed blessing. It may be said that in strict cost accounting terms the combination of populism and inflation gave the older generation of Santana bureaucrats and non-bureaucrats the opportunity to "get something for nothing." Inflation and low interest rates did not favor those who were selling on time, but it did favor those who were buying on time, because as we have seen, the value of what was repaid decreased over time. The combination of inflation, low interest rates and the kinds of information and favors that were structurally available to bureaucrats and their clients under populism permitted many individuals to acquire property and to attempt to generate productive capital. From this perspective, it is clear that in the long run, not only will the younger generation pay for what they get in a way that the parents never did, but also, because of higher interest rates and monetary correction it is highly unlikely that they will be able to generate a capital base which will free them from dependence on their salaries. Not incidentally, they will contribute with their monthly payments to the creation of capital markets which will increasingly exclude them.

All of this suggests a picture in which the
resources of middle income families like the Santana families may be skimmed off to their financial disadvantage. In spite of explicit statements to the contrary, there is among many Santana informants a sense of unease, a sense of loss of prestige, of position and opportunity. While this sense of unease will be examined in more detail in the following chapter, two informants' observations are appropriate here. The first, an informant's description of her father's funeral rites suggests the discrepancy between a public servant's expectations and the new reality. The father had been a Colonel from the Força Pública, who in his retirement had become a self-taught intellectual and author of many books. Even in retirement he continued to think of himself as primarily a military man, and frequently recalled his wound, sustained in the face during the 1932 São Paulo revolt. Both he and his family expected that when he died he would be buried with military honors as a kind of capstone to his illustrious career:

Ele sempre quis honras militares, e falava que tinha direito. Dizia que se nós negávamos, ele ia sentar no caixão e dar um grito de raiva. Daí, no entêrrro, eu fiz tudo pra ter esses quatro soldados e toda honra. Mas o chefe lá do quartel dizia que ele não tinha direito, que era aposentado, essas histórias lá. Na missa do sétimo dia, caiu uma árvore e abriu o sepultamento dele. Minha irmã ficou com tanta raiva que quando abriram o caixão e ela viu que a ferida tinha aberto e tava vazando lá no rosto dêle, ela falou, "Pai, o Senhor não
precisava dos quatro soldados e as honras militares. O Senhor tem em vez dos soldados quatro filhos ao lado do seu caixão, e em vez da bandeira brasileira, tem o céu azul que está em cima de todos nós." Ilhiih, e aí tínhamos medo que vinha o DOFS! "E em vez das honras militares o Senhor tem os seus livros que rolarão pelo mundo." Foi emocionante. E a Força Publica só mandou dois soldadinhos. Um professor, muito ilustre que também falou na missa, se virou pra esses soldados e disse que agradecia a presença dêles, mas que honras militares na missa não eram necessárias, e não fazia falta, porque só iria impressionar os presentes, e como a filha, minha irmã, tinha dito, o Coronel tinha os livros que impressionariam o mundo.

Mas daí, na missa de trinta dias, ele teve honras. Acho que ficaram com vergonha. Eu tenho todos os recortes de jornais, as homenagens feitas pelo Governador, pelos Institutos. E a Força Publica viu que tinha feito uma gafe. Abriram a Casa Anchieta, lá no Patio do Colégio. Que eu saiba nunca fizeram isso antes pra rezá missa de trinta dias. De um lado tinha a bandeira brasileira, do outro lado a bandeira de São Paulo. E o cônego, com quem eu tinha falado antes que papai morreu, quando ele tava no hospital, ele fez um discurso lindo, lindo, lindo, que pra ser militar, tinha que estar no sangue, que a gente ou nasce militar ou não, né. Ele sentou pra soldadinho, e chegou aos mais altos cargos, se educou, se ensinou, francês, alemão, tanto que quando veio a Missão Francesa, ele foi intérprete. Não sei, falou muito bem. E minha mãe notou um dos soldados lá, um jovem, reto olhando pra frente, mas com as lágrimas caindo no rosto.

He always wanted military honors when he died, and he told us he had a right to them. He said that if we denied them to him, he would sit up in his coffin and shriek with rage. Then for the funeral, I did everything to get those four soldiers and all the honors. But the head of the barracks said that he didn't have the right, that he was retired, that kind of story. On the mass of the seventh day a tree fell down on his grave and opened it up. My sister became so enraged when they opened the coffin and she saw that his wound /from the 1932 revolt/ had opened and was draining there on his face, that she
cried, "Father, you didn't need those four soldiers and military honors. You have instead of the four soldiers, four children by your coffin, and instead of the Brazilian flag, there is the blue sky which is above all of us." Then we were afraid that the DOPS would come! "And instead of military honors, you have your books which will roll around the world." It was impressive. The Force Publica only sent two little soldiers, and a famous professor who also spoke at the mass, turned to these soldiers and said that he was grateful for their presence, but that it wasn't necessary, because military honors would only impress those present, and as the daughter had said, my sister, the Colonel had his books which would impress the world.

But then, on the mass of the thirtieth day, he got honors. I think they were ashamed. I have all the newspaper clippings, the eulogies made by the Governor, the Institutes. The Force Publica saw that it had made a gaffe. They opened the Casa Anchieta in the old College Square— as far as I know, they have never done that before for a mass of the thirtieth day—and on one side there was the Brazilian flag and on the other the flag of São Paulo. And the priest, whom I had spoken to before father died, when he was in the hospital, made a beautiful speech, that to be a soldier it had to be in one's blood, that a person is either born to be a soldier or not. He volunteered as a private and reached the highest positions, he educated himself, taught himself French, German, so much so that when the French Mission was here, he was an interpreter. I don't know, he spoke very well. And my mother noted one of the soldiers there, a young man, standing straight and looking straight ahead, but with tears streaming down his face.

The second informant had hesitant but explicit reservations about the progress of her sons' careers. While she and her bureaucrat husband had worried and saved to be able to put them through school, and while all four sons were securely employed in large firms as salaried liberal professionals, she feared that none
of them would be able to repeat her husband's success in becoming financially independent. While she recognized that his success was not the norm, she felt that circumstances had changed so much that even he might not have been able to make it were he starting all over again today. According to her, it was not only the steady drain of the debt load on their houses and other consumer goods which limited their capital accumulation, but that the opportunities for and information for independent investment were narrowing. The example cited was the new zoning law, discussed above, which, by requiring larger frontages for high rise buildings, not only devalued small plots, but made it expensive for the owner to continue paying taxes on land which yielded nothing, until an adjacent piece came on the market. Larger city-side construction firms, she pointed out, could wait and then would comfortably buy out the whole block.

Possibly the importance of the consumer economy which so clearly characterised São Paulo in 1972-1973 is that it blinds people to such losses. However, it should be pointed out that what families like the Santana families lost—bureaucrats and non-bureaucrats alike—they never had in a formal sense, nor indeed as a group. They had privileges and not rights. Although the privileges were part of a struc-
ture, they were easy to remove: groups of people were not attacked, but rather the privileges were redefined as individual aberrations and abuses, to be attacked and corrected. Informally and discretely, however, a section of the "classes" have lost a significant measure of control over their lives.

In summary, the experience of immigrants and bureaucrats since 1964 and especially since 1968 resembles in many ways those of the old elite on the top of the hill after 1930. In all three cases, they were abruptly sheared off from sources of political influence. In the case of the old elite at the top of the hill, this experience of marginalization appears to have resulted in a certain degree of economic downward mobility. This was clear both in the statements by informants and in their genealogies. For immigrants and bureaucrats, the marginalization experience has been too recent to be able to do more than suggest what the economic consequences might be. It is clear that the economic policies of Brazil's new government affect all of the families interviewed regardless of origin or occupation. Many informants expressed a sanguine optimism about their futures. However, all informants, including these betrayed a kind of tension about their social positions which undercut optimistic assertions. This unease, focused in particular on their relations with other
groups above and below them on the social scale, forms, I believe, a rudimentary consciousness of class, which is the topic of the next chapter.
CHAPTER V

"NOSSA CLASSE MÉDIA SOFRIDA:" THE OUTLINES OF
A CONSCIOUSNESS OF MIDDLE CLASS

This study has described the social and political
careers of a number of Santana families of disparate
origins. Their careers have been informed and to a great
degree determined by the political and economic changes
which Brazil and São Paulo have undergone in the past
seventy years. The families of the old elite, the fami­
lies of immigrants and the families of bureaucrats expe­
rienced the political epochs of the First Republic, the
Vargas years and the populist epoch in different ways
at different times. The present period of military dic­
tatorship finds them in approximately similar socio-econo­
mic-political positions, generally excluded from spheres
of power or influence.

Nonetheless, within the limits imposed by history,
these families also made their own lives, made their
own choices in order to achieve or maintain their patri­
mônio and nível de cultura (inheritable wealth and level
of culture). In the process they have developed a set
of ideas to explain and justify their successes and
failures and to place themselves in São Paulo's class
structure. In spite of their different careers, these ideas are generally shared. This chapter has two purposes. It argues first, that these ideas are the fundamentals of a consciousness of middle class, and second, it attempts to document this inductively by drawing on the statements of interviewees about their class positions. These statements will be related to the structural dimensions I have discussed in the preceding chapters. I will focus specifically on the implications of the shift in hierarchical organization entailed by the change from populism to military dictatorship. How this shift affects the meaning of social mobility as measured by increased consumption is also examined. I shall attempt to relate contradictory feelings about social mobility and achievement and the condition of being classe média to the world in which informants lived, and to judge the possible effects that a consciousness fueled by these feelings might have on the larger Brazilian political system.

I shall conclude that although the Santana families are involved in a wider world of consumption than they were before, they are socially, politically and ideologically cut off from other groups in society, and often from each other in a way that was not characteristic of the populist years. It would appear that the existence of a set of ideas such as that held by Santana families may be essential to the continuity of regimes.
such as the present Brazilian military regime, because it is atomizing, blind to the structure of society and therefore unable to affect it. While it does not cause it, such a mentality permits the political repression necessary for associated-dependent development. There is in addition, important evidence that the military dictatorship is aware of this and is actively interested in propagating a "middle class mentality" as a non-coercive method of domination.

The informants who gave me the information upon which much of this chapter is based were often older women, over fifty years of age. While some of these women had worked as teachers, or in offices as secretaries or typists before marrying, for most their work was limited to their homes after marriage: raising their children, running their households and caring for their husbands when they were home from work. It may be surmised that the personal experience most of these women had of the political and economic changes which affected their families' careers was filtered through their husbands' reports and through their own positions as financial managers of the household. To a great extent the mentality which I shall discuss is one which I saw especially among women, although the few men who participated in such conversations seemed to understand
and share it.

Possibly the major key of the Santana informants' mentality is the emphasis on social mobility and achievement through struggle and work. The dominant characteristics necessary for achievement are "luta," "controle" and "equilíbrio." The three terms, literally translated as "struggle," "control" and "equilibrium" or balanced judgement recur constantly. They carry a host of implications which shade into each other: perseverance, thrift, self sacrifice, shrewdness and a strong dose of moral superiority which occasionally borders on the sanctimonious.

One needs perseverance and will power, tolerance, with a certain reserve; altruism, goodness, dignity, honor . . . or character in general.

*Luta, controle and equilíbrio are not simply moral prescriptions. They embody memories of economies and privations among older women whose children are now grown up, and vital concerns for younger women in the midst of their childrearing cycles.

Minha vida tem melhorado, mais a primeira etapa termina agora porque os filhos terminam e vão ganhar bem, e nós vamos melhorar sem aquela despesa. Minha vida agora não depende de dinheiro. Trabalhar, tem de trabalhar sempre, mas com os filhos se formando . . . e Alfredo muito providente. . . e se precisar, eu posso vender as minhas coisas. Mais tá chegando o tempo que os filhos não vão dar mais despesa, aí e' que vamos melhorar. Nunca vou ser rica, e já fui pobre naquela faze do Mappin, aí eu fazia meus traba-
Lhinos e tive aceitação. Mais que foi uma luta, que precisou grande controle, foi, viu. O começo não foi fácil.

My life has improved, but the first stage finishes now because the boys are going to graduate and make good money and we will improve without these expenses. My life now doesn't depend on money. Work, we'll always have to work, but with the boys graduating... and Alfred very provident... and if necessary I can sell my things [this lady did sewing work for charity and for gifts]. But the time is coming when the children won't be expenses, and then we will improve. I will never be rich, and I have been poor, in those Mappin days [her husband had a poorly paying job in a department store], and then I did my piece work, and people bought it. But it was a struggle, that required a great deal of control. The beginning wasn't easy (See Appendix 5A)

Luta, controle and equilíbrio are important in coping emotionally as well as in financial management:

A gente precisa aprender a ouvir, a calar, a ser cega. Falar no momento certo, mesmo que esteja no ponto de estourar. Só na hora que está equilibrada e que pode falar.

We must learn to listen and be quiet and be blind. To speak at the right moment, even if one is at the point of bursting. One must only speak when one is balanced.

Controle and equilíbrio define the limits of a balanced emotional life, in which emotional excesses are not permitted. While the ideal of emotional control is not always met, it provides a scale of judgement and explanation: it is felt that excessive anger, happiness or...

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1Appendix 5 includes additional citations from informants which are too long to be included in the text.
interest can lead to illness or death (See Appendix 5-B). Thus, when otherwise healthy individuals became sick, a discussion of the clinical symptoms (heart attack, stroke, intestinal disturbances) was often followed by an analysis of the person's emotional life. The patient was too involved in her children's lives, or too angry at a business contretemps, and the loss of equilíbrio resulted in the illness.

The theme of the middle way through the somewhat dour prescriptions of luta, controle and equilíbrio appear to provide a substratum of a middle income ideology of mobility and achievement. Life is no bowl of cherries, nor indeed should it be. Success in the achievement or maintenance of a middle income position depends on individual struggle and effort which is buttressed by internalized norms of control, careful thought, anticipation of disaster and lack of excess.

The success itself is measured by material acquisitions and the sense that one's children have a different--higher--socio-economic springboard for their careers than one did oneself. These two criteria were unanimously held by all the families interviewed. Even among the descendants of the elite families from the top of the hill, achievement was associated with the successful management of the dwindling remnants of their inheritances,
through *luta, controle* and *equilíbrio*, in order to educate their children and maintain a "certain position," while witnessing the drastic decline of other less prudent or less fortunate relatives. Most of the families interviewed who were in the midst of the childraising cycle sent their children to private schools and all had every expectation that they would continue on to university. All informants claimed to be materially better off than their parents, and emphasized their enhanced powers of consumption.

Hoje sou Coronel. Minhas crianças terão melhores chances na vida do que eu. Eu posso pagar os estudos.

Today I am a Colonel. My children will have better chances in life than I. I can pay for their studies.

Eu me considero realizado. Tenho casa e carro.
Meus filhos estudaram, casaram e tem casa e carro. Estou realizado.

I consider myself fulfilled. I have a house and a car. My children have studied, married and they have a house and a car. I am fulfilled.

Eramos de uma classe média pobre; a classe média é a mais difícil de viver. Não somos ricos agora, mas comparado com meu pai, que era funcionário, posso me julgar milionária. O que pude presenciar na minha casa no tempo de menina. Chorei quando tive de parar os estudos. Agora não, as meninas estão todas se formando, advogada, médica. Eu não podia ter um sapato novo, aquilo que eu queria. Hoje não. Vira-se, mexe-se, mais tem o sapato.

We were of a poor middle class: the middle class is the hardest in which to live. We are not rich now, but compared to my father who was a public servant, I can consider myself a millionaire. What I was able to witness in my house as a child. I cried when I had to stop going to school. That's not the
case now, the girls are all graduating as a lawyer, as a doctor. I couldn't have new shoes, things that I wanted. Not today. We may wriggle and squirm but we get the shoes. (See Appendix 5-C).

Frequently discussions of personal achievements were intertwined with an intense celebration of the Brazilian economic "miracle" of the early 1970's. The same criteria, education and material acquisitions of the casa própria (one's own house), automobiles and other consumer goods were seen as the measure of personal as well as national progress and both were celebrated in the same breath.

A classe média hoje vive bem, tem casa, carro, saem de fim de semana. A maioria com apartamento de fora, todos os filhos estudando... já não é fácil distinguir entre a classe média e a alta...

Tudo mundo tem melhorado bastante. Tem mais facilidade de arrumar um emprego melhor, sem muito sacrifício. É rara a família que não tem um universitário, mesmo os pobres, que estuda de noite. O Brasil vai pra frente com essa nova geração. E já começou aí, viu. Em todos os setores o Brasil tá indo bem, não é só esportes. Agora já conhecem, não pensam que é Argentina.

The middle class today lives well, has a house, a car, goes out on weekends. Most have a vacation apartment, all have their children in school... it is not easy any more to distinguish between the upper and the middle classes. Everyone has improved tremendously. It is easier to get a good job, without too much sacrifice. It is rare to find a family which doesn't have a university student, even among the poor, who study at night. Brazil is moving ahead with this new generation, and it has already started. Brazil is doing well in all sectors, not just sports. Now people know about Brazil and don't confuse it with Argentina (See Appendix 5-D).

However, coexisting with this generalized optimism is a deep sense that they are threatened and on the verge
of annihilation.

Agora a classe média tá um sanduíche, exprimida entre os pobres e os ricos. Vamos desaparecer. A média é que trabalha, e é uma luta. Do jeito que vamos, tá sendo engulida. Uns vão pra baixo, menos vão pra cima . . . o controle é pra não ser engulida por a inferior. É preciso poupança. Nos temos uma posição que exige uma aparência, boa comida, boa roupá. Agora o dinheiro que entra está sempre diminuindo, e sem controle não tem jeito.

The middle class is now a sandwich, squeezed between the poor and the rich. We are going to disappear. The middle class is the one that works hard, and it is a struggle. The way things are going it is being swallowed up. Some go down, fewer go up. The control is necessary to avoid being swallowed by the lower class. We have to save. We have a position which requires a certain appearance, we need good food, good clothes. Now the money which is coming in is constantly diminishing, and without control, there is no way.

Temos pouca segurança: tudo muda muito depressa e radicalmente. Não vê as desapropriaçõeis, o progresso . . . não sou contra o progresso de maneira nenhuma, mas um pouquinho mais devagar. O cidadão tem de ter alguma segurança. A gente nunca sabe quando pode espancar com a testa no chão.

We have little security: everything changes too quickly and too radically. You see the expropriations, progress . . . I am not against progress in any way, but a bit slower. A citizen needs to have some security. We never know when we may smash our heads on the floor. (See Appendix 5-E).

The tone of these statements is similar to the dourness of the luta, controle, equilíbrio themes which informants developed over the course of their careers. When juxtaposed to the optimistic themes of progress and achievement, there are, however, added notes of bitterness and betrayal. If life shouldn't be a bowl of cherries, neither should it consist entirely of pits
and stems.

Since all informants consider themselves better off than their parents, relatively stable, and have been able to educate their children and acquire more consumer goods than their parents, these complaints do not appear to have a primarily economic referent. Rather, they seem to reflect negative evaluations of changes in the political sphere, and changes in class relations. It is as if the criteria for social mobility included not only economic factors but political ones as well. Thus, the physical markers of social mobility and class differentiation are "loaded" with symbolic meanings which imply political relations besides or beyond the specificity of the material wealth involved in houses, automobiles, consumer goods and college educations. That is, for example, while material wealth and education for children are symbols of mobility and progress, the symbolic meanings attached to material wealth and education have varied with the political relations maintained by these families over time.

One such major change occurred in the change from populism to the present military dictatorship. In the populist period, money meant power and education reflected wealth and power, or at least the opportunity for access to power through face to face relations with powerful people. Money and education seem to have reflected the manipulatory relations implicit in populism. The
implications of material wealth and education have changed under the military dictatorship. The change elucidates the common foreboding among informants that they, those in the middle, are "sandwiched" and about to be swallowed whole. What these feelings may reflect is their increasing isolation from other groups in society.

They are threatened by the extension of consumer goods to the poor, by the decrease in the manipulatory opportunities both up and down the social scale. Their concern with relations of dominance was apparent in some spiritist\(^2\) sessions I was able to attend as well as in the relationship many women attempted to maintain with their domestic servants and people who were the objects of their charitable efforts. There is some evidence that within their networks they no longer feel comfortable with people who are wealthier. They feel that among wealthier relatives, it is these who have ceased to extend aquela amizade, that friendship, to them. The result of their increasing isolation and the resentment and humiliation which appears to be entailed, has led to an entirely false view of the social structure of São Paulo and to an embracing of the government as their protector from rich and poor alike.

\(^2\)Spiritism in a growing religion in Brazil. See Warren (1968) and Camargo (1961).
Let us take each theme in turn.

The pressure on the "sandwich" from below is apparent in a strain of ill will among some informants commenting on the progress and the spread of consumerism among the poor.

Agora as empregadas têm tudo: geladeira, rádio . . . e nós quanto tempo levamos pra ter. Cê vê os pobres aqui na capital, tudo tem televisão.

Now maids have everything, iceboxes, radios . . . and you should have seen how long it took us to get those things. You see the poor here in the capital, they all have television.


We can see progress by the number of new constructions. It is a sign of growth and progress. Everyone has a car, everyone goes to school. There is no longer any difference between the housewife and the domestic, who has good clothes and wigs. In my day they would never buy those clothes. There was too great a class distinction.

In sum, not only is their status threatened by the extension of the material things which set them off from the lower classes, to the lower classes, but the things themselves no longer imply the class differences they formerly did.

Among families like the Santana families, populist relations were based on personalist, face to face relations, implying the extended use of kinship and friendship in creating networks of patronage up and
down the social scale. Paradoxically, although people were aware of class differences in these extended networks, the populist idiom denied class distinctions between individuals. This is what Weffort means when he writes that "populism always directs itself to the people," and in this act "dissolves class distinctions" (1965:194).

Two contradictory aspects appear to have been basic to populism among families like the Santana families: an elaborate sense of manners using an idiom of friendship and an underlying contempt for those being manipulated. The contempt involved in populist relations has received little previous attention. We shall see it further on, directed at families like the Santana families. It is apparent in the following statement by a man who ran for electoral office during the populist years:

Naquele tempo quem tinha mais dinheiro ganhava.  
Tinha de fazer cédulas, cartazes . . . Fui derro-

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3 This personalist aspect of populism is extremely clear in studies of favelas, and seems to have continued in favelas after 1964. See especially Leeds (1972), for a description of the personalist way in which a female favela leader shames a politician into visiting her favela, prepares a celebration in honor of his birthday and writes a song for him, hailing him as the "ideal friend . . . our pride and passion" (Leeds, 1972:31-2). Although the idiom is one of friendship, the structure is that of patron clientage (See above, Chapter II, Pp. 104-107).

4 This aspect of populism was pointed out to me by
tado bonito. Descobri que tinha quinhentos e cin-
quenta e seis amigos--um voto foi meu--e que não
devia confiar em ninguém a não ser aqueles. Foi
uma dór de cabeça, a cachaça, fui a terreiro de
umbanda, tomei pinga no copo babado, pizza com
óleo diesel, com sujeito bandido, negrada . . .
e sempre aqueles pedidos, estandarte pras Filhas
de Maria de Itanhaem, camisas de futebol . . .
pagava pinga, comia lixo, até cinco ovos fritos,
e odeio ovos . . . Tiravam fotografias de mim . . .
dancei com uma negrona num clube de pretos . . .
não gosto de pretos.

In those days whoever had most money would win. The
candidate had to pay for the ballots, the posters
. . . I was soundly defeated. I discovered that I
had five hundred and fifty-six friends--one vote was
mine--and that I shouldn't trust anyone but those.
It was a headache, the cane liquor, I went to umbanda
ceremonies, I drank liquor from drooly cups, ate
pizza with diesel oil with bandit types, blacks . . .
and those constant demands, demands for standards
for the daughters of Mary of Itanhaem, football shirts,
. . . I paid for drinks, drank drinks, ate garbage,
even five fried eggs and I hate eggs. They took
pictures of me . . . I danced with an enormous black
woman in a black people's club . . . I don't like
blacks.

Presumably politicians did not consciously show
their contempt for their constituents, but we should
note that these observations cast a new light on the
ethic of luta, controle and equilíbrio, which becomes
from this perspective, an instrument to develop an
elaborate sense of manners, a tool to forge the bonds of
populist friendship. In this respect, the anxiety of a

Sergio Miceli in 1973, when he suggested during the
course of a discussion that the best clients are those
who confuse the "idiom of friendship" with "friendship"
itself.
woman who had just seen a domestic servant publicly reprimanded at a religious meeting is suggestive:

O certo é não falar na hora. Eu nunca teria coragem de chamar atenção. Eu não tenho, não tenho coragem de falar. Dentro de mim posso estar preta que nem carvão, mas ninguém vê. É muito difícil pra mim dizer "não." Posso ver uma coisa errada e podia chegar e dizer "Cê acha que tá certo ..." mais assim, aberto, "Vocé deixou a casa suja," "Você pegou aquela comida ..." de jeito algum. Não se faz.

The correct thing is not to say a thing right away. I would never dare to correct someone. I haven't, I haven't the courage to speak. Inside myself I can be as black as coal, but on one sees. It is very hard for me to say "No." I can see something wrong, and maybe I could come and say "Do you think that's right ..." but that way, openly, "You left the house dirty," "You took the food," in no way, it is not done.

These citations suggest that those who could not, or would not maintain controle and equilíbrio could not play the populist game.

As for the betrayals involved in the withdrawal of the language of friendship which appears to have followed the imposition of a dictatorship, very few individuals were willing to suggest that in the past they had been more intimately involved with figures of higher social and political status than themselves, and that they were now cut off. Fewer still were willing to elaborate upon this theme. One man spoke of a boyhood friend who was now an editor of an important weekly magazine and who had on various occasions assis-
ted him with job placements or legal advice. The conflict between friendship and the self-interested idiom of friendship became apparent during an exchange with his daughter, when I asked the man how often he saw his friend and what kinds of things they did together.

He: Não vejo ele mais não. Falamos pelo telefone de vez em quando, se eu precisar. 
She: É um contato comercial... não é amizade. 
He: Cê não sabe nada. Somos muito amigos, mas ele ficou rico, e eu pobre.

He: I don't see him anymore. We speak on the telephone every now and then, whenever I need him. 
She: It is a commercial contact... It is not real friendship.
He: You don't know what you are talking about, we are very good friends, but he became rich and I poor.

In spite of the rarity of such examples, statements about rich and poor relatives suggest a shift away from the extended use of kinship to form networks up and down the social scale. Many families had wealthier relatives who did not live in Santana, but in central city neighborhoods like Higienopolis, in new and modern apartment buildings. There were rare occasions for contact, and these appear to have been strained and uncomfortable situations, which rarely took place in informants' own houses.

Estivemos na casa do Fabio que tem fazenda, estudou... os amigos dele so conversaram entre eles, não nos procuraram pra fazer aquela amizade, aquele bate-papo. A conversa vai sobre o que cada um faz. Eu não posso acompanhar conversa sobre yacht, casa no Guarujá, as cabeças de gado na fazenda... me
We were at Fabio's house, who has a farm, has been to university . . . his friends only spoke among themselves, they didn't seek us out to extend that friendship, that comfortable conversation. The talk is about what each person does. I can't join in conversations about yachts, houses in Guaruja [an expensive seaside resort], the heads of cattle on the farm . . . they made me feel insignificant. (See Appendix 5-F).

On the few occasions I was able to witness parties which included many family members, some of whom were wealthier, informants allowed that they were surprised they had come at all, and pointed out the way in which the wealthier relatives segregated themselves and did not participate in the general merrymaking.

I was able to gather a few intimations of isolation from the world of power and wealth beyond Santana, which seem significant. As far as one can ascertain, the kinds of people who live in Santana are not readily recognized either by government agencies directly related to the modernization of the area, or by wealthier groups of people living in the elegant Southern Zone of the city. Thus for example, an agency concerned with modernization and construction around the northern terminal of the subway station in Santana was in almost complete ignorance of the neighborhood. These did not contact local and regional politicians in an effort to explain their plans, and while they felt this was a great gaffe, they were profoundly surprised at the
turmoil which followed the announcement of the proposed project in the newspapers; they described with some sarcasm the arguments which were presented by local inhabitants against the project in the Municipal Legislature. They contrasted the troubles they had in Santana with the absence of any problems in Jabaquara, the neighborhood at the southern end of the subway line, where far larger tracts of land were expropriated than in Santana. The inhabitants of Jabaquara, much poorer than those of Santana, did nothing until they were "instigated" by a Santana lawyer. Agency officials said:

Nós não estávamos acostumados a lidar com "bairro." Tinhamos mais experiência com população desintegrada, sem essa coerência, essa organização.

We were not used to dealing with "neighborhoods." We had much more experience with disintegrating populations, without this coherence, this organization.

In addition, in spite of the extensive coverage which Santana's opposition to the project received in the
daily newspapers in the first half of 1973, an officer of an important real estate finance company with government contracts (with the BNH, the National Housing Bank) for public housing in the Northern Zone, was under the impression that the whole of the Northern Zone, including Santana, consisted of favelas and mud roads without any public transportation at all (Cf. Figure 5, p. 43)

Ignorance of people like the Santana families, often tinged with contempt, characterised the views of residents from the wealthier Southern Zone of the city. No systematic work was done among these people and only the briefest of descriptive sketches is appropriate here. These were people of varied origins, including foreigners and Brazilian "quatrocentão" families often intermarried with members of other Brazilian regional elites or the descendants of foreign immigrants. All were vastly wealthier than the Santana families and associated with large, often international financial, industrial or real estate concerns. While there were differences in economic status among them, in general their life styles were characterised by the symbols of wealth and power: extensive property, extensive domestic

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staffs, occasionally including armed guards, travel abroad, conspicuous consumption of imported luxury products (antiques, silver, clothes, liquor, etc.) and the presence of important political figures in their immediate entourages, as relatives, business associates or friends. Many had participated in the organization of the March of the Family for Democracy in São Paulo which preceded the 1964 military coup, and while one might hear criticisms of the government among them, they were the criticisms of an extremely loyal opposition. As a group they fully supported all government efforts to suppress terrorism, to achieve order and to develop the country.

Among people like these the investigator's own concern with middle class formation was treated as a joke. I would be assured on the one hand that there was no middle class in São Paulo, except perhaps among domestic servants who sewed on the side, or who had saved enough money to be able to buy televisions or refrigerators on the installment plan, and on the other hand that a middle class was necessary for the orderly and progressive development of the country, and that perhaps they might be considered middle class themselves, since they knew people wealthier than themselves. When pushed however, some allowed with considerable discomfort that poor relatives might be "classe média mesmo"
(really middle class). According to these accounts, what made poorer relatives classe média mesmo was their social invisibility, except on familial occasions, when they could not be excluded:

E' não tem dinheiro, trabalha, e essa luta, não aparece por aí, a não ser em casamento ou missa do sétimo dia . . . usa essa roupa velha, esquisita.

Well, they have no money, they work, it's that struggle. They are hardly seen except at weddings or at masses of the seventh day, and then in old and strange clothes.

Since a number of such relatives were described as middle level bureaucrats, the following comment, made in another context, by a Zona Sul (Southern Zone) individual is suggestive:

O funcionário publico é o cara mais nojento no Brasil. Sempre tem de agradá pra conseguir alguma coisa.

The public servant is the most repulsive type in Brazil. You always have to bribe them in order to get something done.

Alternatively, persistent questioning on the existence of a middle class in São Paulo would elicit catalogues of codes of consumption, related to styles of dress, styles of luxury or intellectual consumption and even styles of setting the table. The underlying theme of such catalogues was the social invisibility of many middle income people. Examples made it clear that there were people in São Paulo who were physically visible--one saw them at beaches and certain business clubs, and in the bureaucracies, but they remained social-
ly invisible. If these impressionistic and unsystematic observations are any indication of the distance between people like the Santana families and government or groups of higher social, economic and political status these families are isolated indeed.

In a process which may parallel the loss of contact with poor relatives which we saw among the elite families in Chapter III, many of the Santana families appear to be losing contact with their poorer as well as their wealthier relatives. The existence of poor relatives is often denied in terms of the question "Do you know any poor people?" Occasionally contact has been broken already. At other times it is in the process of being broken. Thus, when one man was asked if he knew any poor people, he replied that he did not. His son interrupted and said "Mas Pai, tem gente pobre na família," and the father replied, "E mais a gente não vê muito." (But father, there are poor people in the family. Yes, but we hardly see them). During subsequent interviews with this family, poor relatives came to visit, and were sent to the kitchen. Other comments on poor relatives included:

Eu tenho parentes pobres: não são esforçados, nem pra ter uma posição. Não tem ambição. Não, querem lutar. São da família da minha mãe, um é operário que deve ganhar uns trezentos cruzeiros, e outro deve ganhar uns duzentos cruzeiros. Temos sempre que ajudar quando aparecem. Tinham terras, caminhões e venderam tudo, não controlaram nada,
I have poor relatives: they make no effort, not even to keep a job. They have no ambition. They don't want to struggle. They are from my mother's side of the family: one is a factory worker who must earn three hundred cruzeiros [a month] and the other must earn two hundred cruzeiros [a month]. We always have to help them when they show up here. They had land, trucks, they sold everything. They didn't control a thing, not even their children. They have eight children. It's that they have no will, they don't economise. I don't know [who cares].

My mother has contact with poor people. I don't know if in the interior it might be easier. There relatives help each other, visit each other, care for the families and the maids. But I, I don't have any direct contact. I don't leave the house. My husband has a very poor uncle, and when he shows up we help him. But that's rather sparse, it is not direct contact, right?

In addition to increased isolation from rich and poor relatives, it is possible that the decline of opportunities for doing "favors" for one another has led to the re-emergence of invidious distinctions among themselves, which may previously have been disguised by the populist idiom of friendship. If the hypothesis that the bureaucrats acted as intermediaries for foreign immigrants and non-bureaucrats is correct, the language of ethnic distinction used by Brazilian families may
express the contempt of manipulation as well as envy at the success of families of foreign descent.

You see, you meet people at the watering resorts, people who were nothing, charcoal makers, salesmen at feiras [open air markets], now rich. I feel very badly when I meet them. It's not a matter of pride... these Italians don't even speak properly. But nobody notices my distaste. It would make me unlikeable if I... No, we speak, and at times the little Italian women are quite pleasant (See Appendix 5-G).

Ethnic distinctions are not new: we have seen that they existed in Santana as soon as large numbers of immigrants arrived in the area. However, while they were probably stronger in the past when such distinctions also reflected differences in political status and prestige, to the extent that populism brought mutual advantages to both parties, it is possible that the idiom of friendship may have kept feelings of discomfort, guilt, envy and contempt in control. The inability to do things together—in the populist way—has the potential of isolating people from each other, as well as from classes above and below them.

Although this is never explicit, isolation is implied by their statements about rich and poor relatives, as well as by their vision of São Paulo's
social structure and their place in it. The social
world of São Paulo was divided for most Santana informants
into ricos, pobres and classe media (rich, poor and middle
class). We have seen the contradictions and tensions
involved in being classe media and have suggested that
these arise from the shrinking areas of influence for
these families which resulted from the shift from popu­
limism to dictatorship. Accordingly, the categories of
rich and poor have become abstractions, because with the
shrinkage of populist networks, they no longer see rich
or poor people.

Both rich and poor alike are seen as contemp­
tible and to be avoided, although for different reasons.
Money in large quantities is seen as an agent of corrup­
tion or complication which can threaten the unity and
sanctity of the family.

Se eu tiver tudo, um casarão, joias maravilhosas,
uma porção de carros . . . o que que eu posso dar?
O que que uma pessoa assim pode dar? Não pode dar
nada, não pode dar de si, o que é o importante. Ser
egoista é humano e somos todos egoístas, mais com
todas essas coisas é difícil não ser egoísta e
dar de si. Eu agora, veja só, eu não tenho nada.
Só tenho a mim mesma, e só posso dar de mim mesma, mesmo
que seja só um sorriso.

If I had everything, a mansion, marvelous jewels, a
bunch of cars, what can I give? What can a person
like that give? Nothing, one can't give of oneself,
which is the important thing. It is human to be
selfish, and we are all selfish, but with all of those
things it is difficult not to be selfish and to give
of oneself. Me, for example, I have nothing. I have
only myself and I can only give of myself, even if
it is just a smile.

Money creates problems, see. We could win the Sports Lottery ... I would be forced to have another position. A more elegant neighborhood would be necessary. My way of behaving wouldn't change, but I would have to buy things. I wouldn't like to change my life style. I would suffer interference from the family: they would expect me to give them something. Of course I would help, but it would create an uncomfortable situation (See Appendix 5-H).

The Santana vision of the rich is consonant with the perception of money involving potential dangers. While envy and a sense of personal indignity characterises some of the perceptions of the rich, the rich are repeatedly described as thoughtless, frivolous, ungenerous, idle and immoral. They are repeatedly described as people who do not need to think (Não precisam pensar). For example,

Minha imagem dos ricos: tem um patrimônio grande. Não posso imaginar quanto e. Por exemplo, quer comprar a fazenda, vai um milhão a vista, sem pensar. Um industrial, um homem de negócios, tá sempre viajando pro Rio Grande do Sul, pro Peru. Se afasta da casa dele, que é uma mansão que não tem vizinho pra conversar. A casa e grande, com toda uma equipe de mordomo, criadagem, cozinheira, passadeira, jardineiro ... A esposa não fica em casa, sai pra reunião, viagem pro exterior, o mundo todo. Nem sempre o marido viaja com a mulher. E uma vida meio futil. Os filhos ... não são como a classe média com as mamadeiras. Elas não vão perder tempo cuidando dos filhos, tem babá. Então surgiu o problema do...
playboy, dinheiro fácil, não tiveram educação, se
ajuntaram e formaram quase uma classe. Não conhecemos
os pais. Acham quadrados, velhos, não há diálogo.
Vivem a vida deles. O James Dean era o símbolo do
playboy. Os pais não se prendem às coisas. As
mulheres vão fazer compras no Dener, Clodovil, fazem
questão de comprar o mais caro. Quer comprar jóias,
o joalheiro vem pra casa delas. Mas via de regra vão
pra França. É provincialismo comprar aqui.

My image of the rich: they have a large capital base.
I cannot imagine how large. For example, you want
to buy a farm? Down goes one million cash, without
thinking. An industrialist, a businessman, is always
travelling to Rio Grande do Sul, to Peru... He
is away from his house, which is a mansion, with no
neighbors to speak to. The house is enormous, with
a staff of butler, a bunch of maids, a cook, an
ironing woman and gardener. The wife doesn't stay
home. She has a social life to develop. Most of the
time she is out of her house at meetings, trips abroad,
throughout the whole world. And the husband doesn't
always travel with his wife. It is sort of a futile
life. The children: they are not like the middle
class with their baby bottles. They don't waste
time caring for their children, they have nursemaids.
And so the problems of playboys arose, from easy
money, they had no upbringing, got together, almost
formed a separate class. They don't know their
parents, find them square and old, there is no dia-
logue. They live their lives. James Dean was the
symbol of the playboy. The parents do not become
involved with [important] things. The women go
shopping at Dener, Clodovil [two expensive dress de-
signers] and insist on buying the most expensive.
You want to buy jewels? The jeweler comes to their
houses. But as a rule, they go to France, it is
provincial to buy here (See Appendix 5-1).

Santana informants' vision of the poor is
also filled with contempt because the ethic of luta,
controle and equilibrio is felt to be absent from their
lives.

No Brasil só morre de fome o vagabundo que não
quer trabalhar.

In Brazil only good-for-nothings who don't want to
work die of hunger.
The poor: I hardly know how to classify them, because they are hardly human.

But there is also the additional disdain felt for people who can be manipulated and anxiety because the opportunities for manipulation appear to be decreasing. The manipulatory aspect of many of these women's relations with poor people are apparent in the charity work they undertake. Some felt that perhaps the poor were poor because they hadn't had a chance to be anything but poor ("não tiveram chance"). Their charity work was precisely to give them a "chance." But, although this was rarely explicit, there were strings attached. The individuals they helped had to acquire their values of luta, controle and equilíbrio as well as maintain a properly deferential attitude, or help would cease. Thus a woman describing her charity work said,

Eu fazia serviço social na Sociedade de Teosofia. Davamos assistência a umas vinte ou trinta famílias por ano. Arranjava trabalho pro chefe, davamos presentes pra crianças no Natal, davamos roupa, tudo isso. Daí, largava os que não progrediam, os que não faziam nada, deixava. Não podia tirar o lugar de outro que teria fibra e controle, e que queria lutar.

I used to do social work at the Theosophic Society. We would help twenty or thirty families a year. We got jobs for the head of household, and gave presents to the children at Christmas, clothes, all of that. Then we would drop the ones who didn't progress, the ones who did nothing. We couldn't let them take the place of another who might have fiber and control and who wanted to struggle.
I was once present at a food distribution to poor women in the Santana parish house. The following is an abridge­ment of my notes at the time:

At two o'clock I arrived with a number of women who were volunteering their services to the social assistance program of the parish. The women put on pink and blue cotton smocks over their street clothes and began unlocking the cabinets in which the provisions to be distributed were kept (rice, beans, sugar, spaghetti, cooking oil, detergent and bleach). They had brought cakes and a thick sweet chocolate drink for themselves and spread these out on a table in the back of the room.

In another room the poorer women arrived and sat on benches against the wall in silence. They looked wary. Snuffly children leaned against them. One of the volunteers went into that room to register on file cards any new applicants for aid. In exchange for the food the women were required to learn to sew and embroider. First the raw cotton flour and sugar sacking were given them to take home, where they were to be washed until they were white and the letters were bleached out. The following week they would take a number of these white bags home to cut and hem them into dishtowels. Once hemmed, the volunteers who were dispensing the charity would trace a design on the fabric and teach the women how to embroider the design, usually one of fruits and vegetables. Alternatively, if a woman already knew how to embroider, she would be taught needlepoint, rag rug making or crochet. All of this handiwork was sold at periodic church bazaars and the money earned would pay for some of the cost of the food distributed.

The main point was that no food would be given to any woman who did not work. This was made clear in my presence when an older woman complained that the mistake she had made in her embroidery didn't show very much and that she didn't want to pick out the whole pattern and start all over again. She only did this at all, she said, so as to get the food. The volunteer social worker said nothing and continued showing her how to pick out the pattern. Emboldened by the silence, perhaps, the older woman declared that she wouldn't do it. Quietly and with a small smile
the social worker said "E se eu rasgasse a sua ficha, a Senhora não teria de vir mais, nem pra pegar os mantimentos" (Yes, and if I tore up your card you wouldn't have to come here anymore, not even to collect your supplies). The pattern was picked out and started over again.

It is difficult to see how some of these charitable activities would affect the life chances of the individuals many women were trying to help. Two aspects of the organization of charitable works suggest that such activities play a fundamentally different role today than they did during the populist years. First of all, informants said that all such organizations are under much tighter government control than they used to be. While many parish organizations in Santana were rife with internal factions and disputes, these disputes could not spill outside the organization in a scramble for populist type followings, because the control over bookkeeping and materials seems to be much greater. It is no longer possible to sell or distribute materials (food, textiles) clandestinely or privately in order to extend personal networks among the poor.


Our parish became privileged (among those of the Northern Zone of the city). We are all of the same social and educational level. There were dishonest people, parish leaders who hardly knew how to read. There was lots of politicking and lots of things disappeared. So then this control was introduced . . .
Second, items which were made by the poor women in the Santana social assistance group described above were sold very cheaply at periodic bazaars where they were bought by middle income women like my informants. Because the money which was earned at church bazaars paid for much of the food which was distributed to the poor, the poor women who made the merchandise might be considered literally as working for subsistence—food. This and the decreasing opportunities and incentives to extend personal networks among the poor suggest that at present, charity work acts as a way of putting cheap merchandise on the market for the consumption of middle income women like my informants.

Thus, in spite of their charity, many charity volunteers did not see much poverty and in fact chose to avoid situations which put them in contact with the poor and clearly unfortunate. In the example cited above, the food was distributed from the parish house: no one took it to the houses of the women who needed it. In other cases, women donated money or goods to organizations which would distribute it among the poor. In yet other cases women who had actively participated in charity efforts in the past had simply given it up.

Contato com gente pobre? Não tenho muito não. Eu dava aula de artesanato lá na paróquia, fiz curso de voluntária da parte social, mais agora ja não vou mais. Sabe, eu não quero saber. Não gosto de fazer visitação domiciliar. Sou uma pessoa muito sensível,
e ve toda essa miséria, pobreza, não posso fazer nada, prefiro não ver, não saber. Cé não vai modificar o mundo, não é mesmo? Também sou muito sensível pra ver doenças, visitas de hospital.

Contact with poor people? I haven't much. I used to teach sewing at the parish house and I took a social work course to be a volunteer, but I don't go anymore. You know, I don't want to know. I don't like to visit their houses. I am a very sensitive person and to see all that misery, that poverty, I can't do anything about it, so I prefer not to see, not to know. You are not going to change the world, isn't that so? I am also too sensitive for illnesses, visits to hospitals.

Contato direto? Não, eu faço costura, levo pra Liga, e eles que dispõe.

Direct contact? No, I sew, take it to the League and they dispose of it.

Fazemos caridade pelo nosso centro Espírita. O nosso centro manda pra outro centro, e eles que distribuem.

We do charity through our spiritist center. Our center sends it to another center, and they distribute it.

Once an interview was interrupted by a woman who came in to collect the plastic bags in which milk is sold in São Paulo. She explained that it was for a hospital in Uberaba, Minas, for people suffering from Fogo Selvagem, or Penfigo Folhaceo (literally, "Wild Fire;" shingles). The patient gets watery boils which stick to the sheets, so plastic sheets are made out of the milk bags. The interviewee had been collecting them from the neighbors for some time, and as a result had several large cartons full. The visitor said she was taking them to the hospital herself, and the interviewee was astounded:

Eu não teria coragem, que horror meu Deus, ir ver toda essa carne crua, ah, não tenho coragem, não: prefiro ajudar, mas não saber.
I wouldn't have the courage, how awful, my God to go look at all that raw meat, oh, no, I don't have the courage. I would rather help, but not know about it.

The number of women who used to participate in charitable activities and no longer do so, and the fact that increasingly charitable organizations are being bureaucratised under government scrutiny suggests even in this sphere the opportunities for influence are decreasing. Among these women, in the absence of the populist payoff, the incentive to deal with poverty, which seems to make many women uncomfortable, has obviously decreased. The only constant and daily contact that most of these women had with people significantly poorer than themselves was with their own domestic servants.

Certainly the difficulty of training and keeping maids is a constant theme in many conversations. However, I suspect that the nature of the constant contact gives a domestic servant an ambivalent status that is no longer simply "poor." Servants are part of the household, almost "part of the family," and they are "honestly" employed (there is a great preoccupation to protect maids from prostitution). If the servant lives in she brings with her a minimum of the misery associated with "poor" surroundings: if she does not live in she is rarely seen in her own surroundings and these need not be considered. Furthermore, a good deal
of effort is spent attempting to eradicate the evidence of poverty and to instill in domestic servants values consonant with those of the housewife. Besides their domestic duties, many of the Santana women claim to have taught their maids how to bathe, use deodorant, brush their teeth and go to the dentist, and to have given them incentives to "better themselves." Such incentives ranged from free time at night to go to night school, small and more rarely large gifts, such as loans (which are never repaid) to build small houses on the outskirts of the city, or the use of an unrented house. One woman offered to send her servant's children to boarding school. However, these gestures are made in the context of some tension: there is the explicit expectation that the servant will follow her employer's plan for her life. Not unnaturally, the expectation is frequently not met. Thus, one young woman was fired because she married against her mistresses' wishes. Another was unwilling to be separated from her children, no matter how much more money she would have earned as a live-in maid. And, of course, servants often leave to find better paying positions in other houses, leaving the housewife embittered for having been so "generous" and with a sense of increasing lack of control over her own domestic servants. The following are a few comments made by Santana informants:

O pior é quando é casada, falta muito. A criança tá doente, e aí cê fica se preocupando com as crianças dos outros. Cê faz, traz, eu tinha de fazer comida pras crianças dos outros.

The worst is when they are married, they miss work a lot. The children get sick, then you end up
worrying about other people's children. She brings them to my house and I had to make, to carry, I had to make food for other people's children.

Domestic servants, because of their ambiguous status—"poor" yet "part of the family" (Jelin, 1974)—seem to provide one of the last areas of manipulation for many women, regardless of the "alibis" of concern for their future welfare (See Appendix 5-J). Obviously the control over domestic servants is not absolute because other jobs for them are available. Furthermore, to the extent that they and other representatives of the poor approach the consumption patterns of nossa classe média (our middle class), through schooling, credit facilities, not to mention gifts from the housewife, they become a threat to the housewife's vision of social stratification. It is as though in the view of their employers, domestic servants can best rise above their stations (symbolically) by scrupulously maintaining them (materially), through the liens of dependence and deference to the housewife.

The increasing isolation experienced by many individuals seem to have generated feelings of anger, resentment and guilt which were only openly expressed in the spiritist sessions I was able to attend. The three sessions which I witnessed were Kardecist, or Espiritismo Mesa Branca (White Table Spiritism), which is not to be confused with Umbanda, which combines Kardecism with Afro-Brazilian cults (Brown, 1974; Camargo, 1961).
Spiritism is a rapidly growing and developing religion in Brazil (Warren, 1968; Camargo, 1961) and indeed Brazil has one of the world's largest spiritist populations. Imported from France at the turn of the century, through the writings of a medium, Alain Kardec, it spread significantly among the educated classes in Brazil following the 1940's.

To my certain knowledge only six of the Santana families interviewed were spiritists although many more may have been spiritists as well as Roman Catholics. Many had attended spiritist and umbanda sessions out of curiosity, but professed themselves uninvolved. Some of the women interviewed in Santana had been attracted to spiritism, but had subsequently abandoned it, apparently because it violated the ethic of luta, controle and equilíbrio.

Eu tinha medionidade, e no começo achava tudo isso lindo. Mais deixei, não gosto daquele escândalo, aquela gritaria, sem controle nenhum.

I had the capacity to receive spirits, and in the beginning I thought it was marvelous. But I left it, I don't like that scandal, all that shouting, with no control whatsoever.

Acho o espiritismo muito ruim. A pessoa fica biruta, a esposa do Pedro ficou meia ... desmoronou ... Pra seguir o espiritismo como se deve, tem de ser, pessoa muito controlada, evoluída, equilibrada, né, e é raro ter tamanho controle.

I think spiritism is very bad. A person goes nuts. Peter's wife got sort of . . . she came apart . . . To practise spiritism properly, a person has to be very controlled, developed, balanced, and it is rare to have that much control.

Others who were familiar with spiritism through relatives
or friends were similarly repelled: the apparent abandon­ment of self and self control appears to be almost phy­sically upsetting to many women. While all were aware of the large volume of charity works performed by spiritist associations (Warren, 1968:402), and approved of that aspect of spiritism, they found the loss of self and equilibrio during the sessions themselves repugnant.

The sessions which I was able to attend took place in the mid afternoon in a large garage in a private house which had been converted into a formal meeting place. The room was dimmed, and in back there was a table covered by a white cloth around which the leaders, a man and a woman, and the mediums would sit. On the wall behind the table hung portraits of the Virgin Mary. Gounod's Ave Maria was playing softly from a victrola behind the table. In front of the table were rows of benches and chairs for spectators and new converts called assistentes (assistants). The meetings were extremely controlled and patterned until the point when the mediums were possessed. Then the room became extremely noisy with much unintelligible speech as various

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6. There were smaller groups who held their sessions in their living rooms at night. I did not attend any evening ceremonies. After I left Brazil one of these smaller groups expanded and the householder converted his garage into a spiritist center.
spirits made their presence known (See Appendix 5-K).

Many spiritists emphasize the beauty ("é uma beleza, é tão lindo") of spiritist sessions, especially sessions in which the air is allegedly filled with flowers. I was not able to attend any such sessions, and admittedly the three sessions I was able to attend are few to base judgements on. Nonetheless, what was interesting was the abandon the women fell prey to and the excesses of the spirits' demands and exaltations. The spirits I was able to hear, because they spoke the loudest, were the spirits of clearly lower class and brutal men, almost caricatures of the vagabundos the women spoke of when describing the poor. It may be pointed out that the opportunity for the emotional purge undergone by both mediums and assistentes is rarely available during most of these women's daily lives because of the ethic of luta, controle and equilíbrio. However, in addition to providing almost disproportionate confirmations of the women's visions of the poor, the spirits many women were receptive to were peculiarly concerned with power. Indeed, one spirit was especially troublesome: he had possessed an elderly woman and kept shouting, "Eu não peço, eu mando, eu sou Deus" (I don't ask, I command, I am God)\(^7\)

\(^7\)I attended one umbanda session in a favela which contrasted interestingly with these sessions. Physically the ceremony was much less structured than those
This vulnerability, together with the anxieties, resentments, guilts and envies implied in their visions of the rich and poor suggest the reasons for the development of a shared view of society which is increasingly turned in upon itself and willfully blind to the rest of society (cf., "Eu não quero saber," I don't want to know). The Santana families of all three origins appear to have developed an extraordinarily inaccurate perception of São Paulo's social structure, which often contradicts their vision of the middle class as squeezed and about to be swallowed whole. It was not an uncommon belief among the same people who held the "sandwich theory" of the middle class that São Paulo was largely populated by people like themselves, because of national progress.

A maioria de São Paulo é de classe média... é metade média, um quarto rica e um quarto pobre. Agora vem muita gente do norte, essa população

in Santana. The arrival of the spirits, however, was much more controlled and structured. The room was smaller with an altar in the corner covered with Afro Indian and Roman Catholic saints. Women stood on one side of the room and men on the other, but the distinction vanished when spirits took control of the mediums or cavaleiros (literally, "horses") when both wandered or danced around the room. The session began with songs. No victrola and no rhythm instruments. Then an orderly progression of spirits possessed the oldest mediums or cavaleiros: "preto velho" and "boiardero" (old black man, cowboy) who were consulted by the participants on matters of health, money and emotional difficulties. The cavaleiros possessed by unruly spirits grunted, flayed their arms and occasionally fell on the floor, but they did not interfere with the orderly arrival of spirits expected on that evening.
que eles fala flutuante ... cê vê aquele pessoal chegando do norte, ai, que lástima, meu Deus ... e esses imigrantes que dão a impressão de pobreza. Mas deixando de lado essa parte, a maioria é média. Tem a média e a média um pouco mais rica ... mas cê repara na favela como tem televisão. Não pode ser tão pobre assim.

Most of São Paulo is middle class. It is half middle class, one quarter rich and one quarter poor. Now many people come from the north, that population which they call floating ... you see those people arriving from the north, oh, the pity of it, my Lord, ... and it is these immigrants who give the impression of poverty. But leaving that part aside, most of São Paulo is middle class. There is the middle class, and the middle class which is a bit richer ... but you notice in the favelas, how many television antennas there are. They can't be all that poor (See Appendix 5-L).

It is clear, however, that São Paulo is not populated largely by people like the Santana families (See Chapter I, Figure 10, p. 52) and we have heard contradictory statements from Santana informants which suggest that although they know it, they choose not to see it and to limit their perceptions to the celebration of their own achievement through luta, controle and equilíbrio. I have suggested that this follows from changes in their structural position and from the resentment

8 It was suggested to me by a young doctor that in Brazil's largest cities it was relatively easy to forget about poverty. He had friends in Salvador, Bahia, who forced themselves to go to the mud flats where the poor build their houses and watch the children fight with vultures (urubius) and dogs over garbage and stray crabs for food. He said, "Se a gente não fizer isso, devagar começa pensar que ta tudo ótimo, que o progresso tá progressindo" (If people don't do that, slowly they begin to think that everything is wonderful, that progress is progressing).
attendant upon their increasing isolation from groups of higher socio-political status and their loss of influence through populist networks. Moreover, to the extent that they are indeed isolated from other strata in society and that families of disparate origins and careers share the set of ideas described here, I have argued that the Santana families are undergoing a process of middle class formation. They are no longer a part of the "classes."

Their present achievements have resulted from their own efforts in the populist context. In the present context they seem to feel that the maintenance of their achievements depends on government protection, which ensures stability and "protects" them from developing their own bases of influence as well as from political manipulation by politicians and from exploitation by the rich. It is interesting that it is only in connection with government protection that the rich are seen as predatory, as raising prices, as evading taxes, and as other than lazy, futile, frivolous or immoral. In 1972-1973 all informants felt themselves economically stable: things would change for the better if they won the Sports Lottery.

9See Miceli (1972:222), who suggests that the concept of upward social mobility as one subject to chance rather than individual effort is one typical of television programs aiming specifically at the poor, unemployed or marginally employed Brazilian viewer.
or for worse, if the government collapsed. Their personal futures appeared intertwined with the Brazilian economic "miracle" of the time, for which the government was seen as exclusively responsible:


Who was responsible? The Brazilian government. This hard hand we have over us. With total liberty these things lag. The Brazilian is very indolent.

Quem foi responsável? Os benditos militares que deviam ter feito isso há tempo. Foi difícil pro povo, mas o povo sabia que tinha que ser assim, se não, não era possível a restauração da nossa economia. Graças a esse governo que foi muito criticado, o Castelo Branco foi o melhor, forte, não tinha medo, não queria popularidade. Viu unicamente o bem da nação, e viu que o povo ia fazer sacrifício. E é verdade, agora tá tudo mundo com casa e carro, com os filhos estudando.

Who was responsible? the blessed military who should have done this a long time ago. It was difficult for the people, but the people knew it had to be this way, otherwise it would have been impossible to restore our economy. Thanks to this government which has been harshly criticized. Castelo Branco was the best, strong, unafraid, he didn't want popularity. He aimed solely at the the good of the nation, and he understood that the people would make sacrifices. And you see, now everybody has a house and a car and their children in school.

Two recent studies of television programs (Miceli, 1972; Pessoa de Barros, 1974) have shown that the government is actively interested in propagating a middle class world view which coincides in many respects with the one described here. The basic themes in soap operas (Pessoa de Barros, 1974) and in a talk show aimed at a
middle class audience (Miceli, 1972) were nuclear familism and social mobility. On the talk show, neighbors, who we have seen in Santana had provided a source of clients, are defined as people from whom one expects no more than momentary entertainment:

De uma vizinha não se exige mais que um bom papo, uma boa fofoca, uma gargalhada.

From a neighbor you don't expect more than a good chat, a piece of gossip and a laugh (Debe Camargo, cited in Miceli, 1972:51)

The entire social arena of the talk show was defined as a family living room which exhibits celebrities (popular musicians, fashion designers, actors and actresses, scientists, religious figures and occasionally politicians) as the household "bibelots" (Miceli, 1972:60). The show encouraged consumption by displaying the latest fashions in clothing, furniture and other household items. Poor people did not appear on this show. To the extent that an upper class was alluded to, it was characterized by excessive consumption rather than political power. After exhibiting the talents which made them famous, the celebrities were regularly reduced to their familial roles and relations. The hostess's questions revealed that for all their fame, the celebrities were just like the spec-

10 With the exception of domestic servants, who may be referred to as the housewife's "secretariat" or "assistants."
tator "who faces the same problems, suffers, loves, has children, a home, a husband, goes to the supermarket, uses blankets, tidies drawers and feels cold" (1972:79, emphasis in the original). Never is any conflict presented between the demands of the family and the demands of society or the career.

By turning the exception into the rule, the fable of social mobility opposes a state of privation and lovelessness to one of success and happiness. In general, the people who illustrate the fable are celebrities, who are presented as having been able to surmount any obstacles or difficulties interfering with their ascension. At the end of the trajectory the celebrity remains unaltered. He continues to be the same good soul, modest and pure. The celebrity keeps the good qualities from either pole of his career; this permits him to remain immune to "relevant" modifications as he travels the route of social ascension. In other words, the fable wishes to create a belief in the existence of a salvationist project which is at everyone's reach. Everyone should aspire to become the protagonist of this "positive" and "optimist" story, in which men and the world appear to be improving daily (1972:97-100, emphasis in the original).

In the soap operas studied by Pessoa de Barros (1974) there were always two core elements, a love story which must terminate in marriage and the creation of a new nuclear family, and a social drama, which may or may not be superimposed on the love story, involving upward social mobility. Differences in social stratification and social inequalities are presented only to be minimized. Inequalities can always be resolved by love, by social mobility or by familism. Thus, the poor differ from the rich only in the absence of superfluous luxuries:
They resemble each other in the fundamentals: cleanliness, plenty to eat, a loving and concerned mother, and harmonious relations between members of the family (Pessoa de Barros, 1974:59).

When class conflict arises, it is the result not of inequities in the social structure, but of the conflict between equally rich "good" and "bad" sides of an extended family: the class conflicts are resolved by the resolution of the family conflicts—namely the expulsion or death of the "bad" elements (1974:69).

The explicitly political sphere is entirely absent from both types of programs. This is apparent in their treatment of the nation and the law, as well as in their treatment of social stratification. In the talk show, the progress of the nation and state is intimately and explicitly linked to the "'love,' loyalty and labor of every native . . . regardless of other considerations, we are all the same in the national and domestic arena" (Miceli, 1972:123). Far from representing an institution of power or domination, the nation state is conceived of as "protective, 'enveloping' and 'cuddly' [sic.]—as a shield against the anxieties and aspirations of the collectivity" (Miceli, 1972:123).

In the soap operas analyzed, Pessoa de Barros noted a progressive identification of the moral and judicial worlds over time: whereas in the earliest soap opera analyzed, moral infallibility was an attribute of
the people (o povo) and the state and its representatives were represented as fallible and distant from the action on the screen, by the last soap opera analyzed the moral and judicial worlds were united. The hero's mistakes--or crimes--can only be absolved in court and his forgiveness there is what guarantees his moral integration into society (1974:96). Pessoa de Barros notes that

To the extent that political themes and political institutions do not exist in soap operas, the fusion between legal and moral authority carries a strong ideological charge, since it is presented as natural and self evident (1974:96).

In addition to propagating a world view which is blind to inequalities, isolated in its familism, and which ignores political power, this set of ideas also provides a code to limit the input of new information. This is clear in Miceli's analysis of the panel discussions on various topics in the talk show. While the code borrows the outward signs of academic discourse (concern for "definitions," "debate," "objectivity" and "scientific method") to justify the assertions and opinions voiced during the discussions, the subjects of debate are forced into a restricted affective treatment: this is apparent, not only in the choice of topics (macumba, candomble, gossip and eroticism, for example), but in the way the "academic techniques" (appeals to anecdotal and circumstantial historical fact, or to "scientific investigation") are used or ignored in the face of new information. For
example, in a debate over spiritism, two panelists quibbled over its scientific status:

- Em que sentido o espiritismo é ciência?
- Nesse preciso sentido, investigação em laboratório dos fenômenos supranormais para poder descobrir as leis desses fenômenos.
- Que laboratório?
- Nos laboratórios, naturalmente os laboratórios devem ser de pesquisa científica—ou o senhor não conhece isso?

- In what sense is spiritism science?
- In this precise sense, investigation in laboratories of supernatural phenomena to discover the laws governing these phenomena.
- What laboratories?
- In laboratories, naturally the laboratories have to be those of scientific research—or don't you know that? (cited in Miceli, 1972:109).

On another occasion, a female deep sea diver was attempting to describe recent underwater research and was repeatedly interrupted by the hostess with requests to describe her sensations, whether she didn't miss her husband, and whether she didn't get lonely way down there underneath the ocean (Miceli, 1972:112).

The emphasis on optimism, mobility, consumption and national progress touches on all the themes elaborated by Santana informants, with the exception of envy, guilt, anger and despair. These appear in soap operas only to provide plot tension. However, these demons must always be exorcised before the final epithalamion, and they are thus exorcised for the viewer as well, but as Pessoa de Barros notes, such conflicts must be resolved ritually and perpetually—by watching the next soap

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Both writers present evidence of increasing government control over television programming in an effort to propagate this middle class world view as opposed to a populist ideology or one which aims specifically at the poor. Increasing government censorship, the abolition of live broadcasting and the fact that soap opera writers must hire lawyers in order to keep abreast of government cultural manipulation (Miceli, 1972:159-88; Pessoa de Barros, 1974:41-46) support their contention that television is not only an agent of secondary socialization, but that behind the overt concern for culture, education and wholesome recreation, the real concern of the

Miceli's insights on programming for the poor are extremely revealing. These are aimed at the largest audiences presumably in order to attract the largest profits for the program sponsors. These are generally auditorium programs with two basic characteristics. First is a surrealist disproportion in style which is apparent both in what is exhibited and in the way it is exhibited. The programs act as a showcase of the material goods of the advanced sector of the Brazilian economy and the disproportion lies in what is exhibited and the consumption power of the impoverished audience. In one of the more popular programs aimed at the poor, the material wealth is exhibited by an equally surreal male personage who might wear a mini-skirt, Louis XVI boots, a ruff around his neck and a pirate hat, who is generally surrounded by voluptuous and largely naked female flesh. Second, through the surrealism, the social scale is inverted. Such programs exhibit the extreme types of exclusion, misery and exploitation by the promotion of contests of misery, contests of the grotesque, whereby the most miserable contestant (the woman who has had most children, the woman who can peel
powers that be is to substitute one world view for another which conceals the facts and mechanisms of domination more effectively (Miceli, 1974:250-1).

Populist imagery had entailed a clear class hierarchy with fairly precise perceptions of the upper and lower reaches of society. The connection between wealth and the potential for power or manipulation was clearly present. Among middle income people like the Santana families, populism was based on face to face relations between friends or relatives: the idiom which informed clientelism and patronage was one of friendship. While it denied class or status differences or inequalities between friends or relatives (this of course was the myth in populist rhetoric), it extended the social hierarchy to its full ranges and created at least a context for various kinds of political mobilization. The politician may have felt contempt for his electorate, but he spoke to it as a friend and leader. The wealthy relative may have

cocnuts with her teeth, or who can eat pins and little stones, the man with no hands who writes with his mouth, etc.) becomes the most enviable. While the surrealist treatment of these programs dedramatizes the extremes of exploitation and poverty associated with associated-dependent development, the contrasts and disproportions are there and central to the programs. They are not so at all in the "middle class culture" of soap operas and other programs which are gradually replacing this style of program (Miceli, 1972:218-24; Pessoa de Barros, 1974:139).
felt contemptuous of public servants, but he spoke to them as friends or relatives, as did upper level bureaucrats to lower level bureaucrats or bureaucrats to their clients. The "man in the middle," no matter how déclassé or unworthy or manipulated he may have felt himself to be, drew on his inner resources, his own controle and equilíbrio in order to contornar (by-pass, smooth over, avoid) these difficulties, in order to maintain the idiom of friendship, because it was in turn the basis from which he could exert his own manipulatory efforts--it was the basis of his luta, and it depended on a constant readiness to make connections up and down the social scale.

The present a-political social hierarchy glosses over the existence of the rich and the very poor and conceals power behind the slogans of "progress" and "protection." It blows up the middle range of society and emphasizes "Todo mundo tem" (Everybody has ... education, autos, etc.) so that the poles of the social scale tend to become invisible. Connections are no longer made and, implicitly, they should not be sought out. The statements which have been quoted here reflect the Santana families' increasing marginalization from sources of power or influence which, informants seem to imply, will ultimately threaten a loss of wealth, their main criterion for mobility and achievement. No one says the redefinition from a populist hierarchy to the present one is troublesome, but the data suggest
the tensions involved in increasing isolation and helplessness and the resulting development of a consciousness of class which is inward turning and willfully blind to society, and which is exacerbated by government manipulation of the media.

Finally, families like these no longer seem to be part of the "classes" in the two class model proposed by Leeds (1965), but rather seem to be forming a consumer and lubricatory--middle--class with cultural as well as structural boundaries between them and other classes. Historical changes over time have not only brought three types of families of disparate origins to similar socio-economic positions; they have also made these three groups, who in the past had recognized their separateness from each other, and their different social and political positions, come to share a set of ideas which places them in São Paulo's social structure and which defines them as apart from either the "masses" or the "classes" of that city. While the rudiments of a similar set of ideas may have been present among any of these middle income groups previously, especially following periods of exclusion from the "classes" (as for instance among the old Santana elite), what suggests that such ideas might today be considered as a developing consciousness of class is that they are shared by previously disparate groups as a result of shared changes in political relationships, or
class standing.

Moreover, whereas some groups at different times have been included in and used by the ruling circles of the "classes," only aspects of their consciousness of class are useful to the present regime.¹² When some of these ideas are elaborated and propagated by government controlled media they become instruments of domination because by presenting a false vision of society they make it difficult for anyone of any class to attempt to change it.

¹² The culture and class consciousness of the poor have been frequently manipulated by groups in power (see, for example, Gross, 1971). There is an interesting contrast between a Peronist type of manipulation and the present Brazilian development of a consciousness of classe média.
CHAPTER VI

MIDDLE SECTORS AND A MIDDLE CLASS

I have shown in this work how over the course of seventy years the descendants of families of three entirely different origins at the beginning of the century have been brought to similar social, economic and political positions. I have argued that among families like these, a middle class may now be said to be developing, as they are increasingly segregated both by their own consciousness and by historical factors beyond their control from classes above and below them. By way of conclusions, this chapter will summarize what has gone before and make general observations for future research among middle income sectors.

The material resources of ninety families residing in Santana, São Paulo, Brazil were described in Chapter I. In terms of their standards of living, families like these are extremely well off compared to the rest of the city of São Paulo, although they are far from bourgeois. Most owned their own homes, were steadily employed and either planned to send their children to university or had already done so. Besides their homes, their property included rental houses, vacation houses,
automobiles, televisions and other expensive consumer durables. Families like these belonged to the top 10.6 percent of listed recipients of incomes in São Paulo.

Socially and politically, they were increasingly isolated from classes above and below them. Most informants believed that São Paulo was populated largely by people like themselves, whereas the income distribution figures for the city show clearly that this is not the case. Very few among them have any contact at all with the truly rich and powerful in São Paulo city, and although Santana is surrounded by neighborhoods poorer than itself, very few of these families have any contact with the poor beyond that supplied by their servants. There is hatred and contempt for rich and poor alike, who, for different reasons, are seen as lazy and thieving. While many have both poor and wealthy relatives, contacts with these are sparse and strained.

While they presently have little political power or influence beyond the power of their ballots cast in elections, this was not always the case. By juxtaposing the careers of the Santana families against the political epochs Brazil has undergone since the beginning of this century, it was shown that each of these epochs, discussed in Chapter II, created different political and economic opportunities for different families among them. Thus, during the First Republic, when Brazil was a neo-
colonial country exporting primary products, local land­

owning families became a local elite as a result of the
growth of Sao Paulo city and of the Paulista coffee poli­

tics which dominated Brazilian national politics. When
these politics ended in 1930, the Santana elite was
sheared off from ruling groups in Sao Paulo city and state:

The Vargas years stabilized the positions of
middle income sectors, others became downward poor.

state apparatus.

In this respect, Vargas's bureaucracies

tegrated into the new political system and contributed
to the state's increasing control over other groups of the
treasury system of downward economic mobility which had been
over local power they had in their areas of origin. With their move to the city, rural migrants had lost what-

interacted rural migrants and created immunities in Santana.
The Vargas years stabilized the positions of
middle income sectors, others became downward poor.

capital base: some of their descendants joined numerous
their economic positions diminished as they sold off their
that controlled Brazil into national politics. When
these politics ended in 1930, the Santana elite was
the growth of Sao Paulo city and of the Paulista coffee poli-

305
grants or their descendants. These had been present in Santana since the previous century but had simply provided ballot fodder for the local elite during the First Republic. During the Vargas years they laid the foundations for populist access to government influence through their friendships with the bureaucrats.

The Santana bureaucrats acted as intermediaries for the non-bureaucrats during the war years and after. However, during the populist years, their efforts in this respect also served to promote their own careers and to increase their own prestige. With electoral populism clientelistic networks expanded up and down the social scale, and while none of these public servants ever reached positions of direct influence on policy, I suggested that their indirect influence, in conjunction with that of all other bureaucrats in São Paulo and throughout the nation, may have been considerable.

With the advent of transnational domination of the economy under a military dictatorship, clientelism, corruption and informal influence has sharply decreased among the Santana families. Their loss of influence and their increasing social isolation from groups above and below them has led to a sense of malaise, tension and fear and frequently an overt disinterest in politics. All appeared to support the military government as protector against the demands of the poor and exploitation.
by the rich, but government itself was entirely out of their control or influence. The loss of the material benefits of populism, especially in conjunction with inflation, may have adverse consequences on their economic status. This may have been partly compensated for by the extension of consumer credit lines, which allow many families like these to have almost anything that can be purchased, but which also exchanges political influence as a measure of status for lifestyle and poder consumidor (the power to consume) as a measure of status.

All three groups have undergone a process of redefinition as the nation readjusted itself to a new phase of capitalist development. Whereas in the past, there were differences between the three groups as regards access to political and economic resources, they are now all defined as consumers. Although the Santana families participate in defining themselves this way, they are defined as consumers largely by the large corporations and market research companies, on whose sales much of Brazil's economic growth depends. This is why there is such an emphasis in the Brazilian media, whose time and space is bought by such companies, on concepts such as Classe A, B, C, etc., which define groups with specific abilities to consume. The government participates in this definition because it encourages this kind of economic development and because it wishes to depoliticize.
middle income groups which had previously been part of the "classes." Wealthier Brazilians participate in the redefinition of previous relatives and clients because they no longer need them. Many of them have become classe média themselves, distinguished only by their superior poder consumidor, rather than their superior proximity to power or influence.

Among the elite at the top of the hill, political decline preceded economic decline. While it is too soon to say definitely what will happen to the descendants of immigrants and bureaucrats, the possibility of economic decline is recognized by some. As a result, all three groups share an emerging sense of consciousness of middle class as distinct from classes above and below them. Unlike other class consciousnesses, an important aspect of this consciousness is the inaccuracy of its vision of society. Indeed, some informants simply didn't want to know. Chapter V explored the logic behind this willful blindness and suggested ways in which the government's control of the media manipulates it to its own advantage.

There are two salient characteristics of the Santana family histories. Families like these have played an increasingly passive role in Brazil's political process. Among the three groups discussed, the old elite at the top of the hill controlled the most political resources: because of their electoral control of Santana
they formed a distinct group which controlled Santana directly in the interests of the dominant Partido Republicano Paulista during the First Republic and they were linked by kinship and fictive kinship to São Paulo's oligarchy. With the reintroduction of elections during the populist period, the bureaucrats greatly enhanced their situations, but theirs was an an order of influence which was considerably smaller than that of the old elite. They did not form a distinct group. Instead they formed networks and panelinhas which were extensions of the networks and panelinhas of more powerful groups. Non-bureaucrats participated in the populist game, but they did not control the kinds of resources that were potentially available to bureaucrats.

We have seen that the political relations each of these groups has maintained with groups above and below them have changed over time. Periodically, one or another of them have been included in the ruling "classes" while others remained among, or returned to the "masses" of working class or middle income people. At present, and we need not belabor the point, most of the families are increasingly disconnected from sources of power or influence in São Paulo.

Economically, families like these have not held the initiative in Brazil's development, and over time their resources have decreased. Among the three groups, the old elite at the top of the hill again con-
trolled more than the immigrants or bureaucrats, but all three have in the past had access if not to strategic resources—coffee, industry, finance—to resources which permitted them to generate money, at least for a time, no matter how they spent it (urban real estate, commerce, loans at negative interest rates). Regardless of decline, none of the three groups ever stood at the polar extremes of income distribution during the periods we have considered. They were never at the apex of economic power. They were simply there, pushed and shoved by economic forces over which they had no control: the initiatives in Brazil's economic development were taken by more powerful groups in response to changes in the world and national economies. The economic functions of families like the Santana families were limited to those Leeds has called "lubricatory:"

The making effective of transactions involving the strategic resources of society; the implementation and exchanges of resources including money; collection of information, transmission of knowledge; the processing of information for ultimate users (1973: 53).

When applied to families like these, expectations that a middle class might take the initiative in the development process towards modernization are clearly inappropriate and misleading and should be decently laid to rest.

The data suggests that the lack of political influence or economic initiative translates in a complex
way into economic vulnerability—or potential vulnerability. The potential fluidity of inclusion or exclusion into the "classes" and the implications thereof are suggested by the fact that while most informants regarded their personal histories as success stories, what most informants seem to fear above all is downward mobility, even while they are at the height of their economic and political powers. "Nã©o quero que minha filha carregue lata d'agua na cabeça" (I don't want my daughter to carry cans of water on her head), a patriarch from the top of the hill is alleged to have said, thus recognizing a possibility that his descendants might live in a favela without running water. And indeed, the research among elite families and bureaucratic families suggests that there might be a relation between political marginalization and economic decline.

The dialectic of inclusion and exclusion of middle income families into the "classes" may lead us to reconsider the meaning and implication of social mobility for families like the Santana families when their careers are placed in historical context. Over the long run, careers which informants consider modest success stories have the quality of survival rather than social mobility. Among the Santana families interviewed there was only one frequently cited local myth of an ascent from rags to riches: most tales of mobility reflect not only

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1 One immigrant (whom I was not able to interview)
different stages in informants' life cycles but political and economic developments in Brazil. Hutchinson (1960:10) has already noted that upward economic mobility in Brazil resulted from structural changes in the Brazilian economy which created more highly paying positions. Indeed, this is supported by the early histories of bureaucratic and immigrant families, although it does not account for the high rate of downward economic mobility among the relatives of the elite families interviewed. The quality of survival may arise from the fact that in order to remain in a "middle income" standard of living during the transitions which have periodically redefined groups among them from the sources of power or influence, Santana's families have had to consume more, have more education, more of various status criteria than did their fathers (See Hutchinson, 1960:204; Iutaka, 1962, 1963).

These observations raise more general ones on the nature and functions of middle income sectors and the development of a middle class in Brazil. The dialectic of inclusion and exclusion of middle income was allegedly able to transform an animal based transportation company at the turn of the century into a worldwide moving and storage enterprise fifty years later.

Hutchinson contrasts "structural mobility" to that in which individuals circulate to positions in the population "in accord with their individual capacities" (1960:10). It is highly doubtful that this degree of mobility can exist by definition in a capitalist society (See Leeds, 1973:52).
groups which we have seen in the Santana histories suggests that the "class/mass" dichotomy may have been more fluid over time than we previously supposed, and that middle income sectors have acted as political as well as economic "reserves" or "lubricators." If this is true, then we can perhaps speak of the manipulation of middle income groups like the Integralists or like the populist bureaucrats for the political ends of more powerful interests. It is possible that over time, the exclusion or incorporation of middle income sectors into ruling groups may operate like Wallerstein's formula for semi peripheral countries in world economic systems. These systems, he argues, must have three layered structures:

The existence of the third (middle) category means precisely that the upper stratum is not faced with the unified opposition of all the others because the middle stratum is both exploited and exploiter. It follows that the specific economic role is not all that important, and has thus changed through the various historical stages of the modern world system (1974:405).3

If these ideas and the analysis of the Santana histories are correct, it is possible that middle class

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3 See also Simmel (1964:59-61) on the social "magic" of the number three: "The appearance of the third party indicates transition, conciliation and the abandonment of absolute contrast." He believes that the third party introduces "objectivity" which serves towards reconciliation. With regard to a three layered income structure in capitalist societies, we would maintain that in general the third party prevents objectification.
formation is a far longer and less defined process than we have thought and that there should be no "illusion of finality" (Bury, 1920:351) when the process does begin. The Santana histories show that before a middle class can emerge, there must be middle income sectors. Often as not, in the Santana case, political considerations created the economic circumstances for the expansion of middle income sectors. That is, the expansion of state services, state control for political reasons entirely unrelated to the lives of people like those in Santana generated a need for increased goods and services. If the analysis of immigrant employment in the first four decades of the century presented in Chapter IV is correct, this

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This may be so in dependent countries; see Soares (1969) on "premature bureaucratization" in dependent countries. In England, for instance, the economy had generated middle income sectors who participated in the formation of the English working class consciousness and political intransigence. The formation of a middle class, however, was no less political than in Brazil. E. P. Thompson describes the concern of the ruling class to "associate the middle with the higher orders of society in the love and support of the institutions and government of the country" (1964:817). Accordingly, before the passage of the great Reform Bill which extended the suffrage in 1832, the government undertook a massive survey to discover the "numbers and respectability of £10 householders in Leeds." The results stated "unanimously that the £10 qualification did not admit to the exercise of the elective franchise a single person who might not safely and wisely be enfranchised: that they were surprised to find how few would be allowed to vote." "We foresaw," wrote a commentator on the Reform Bill, "that its effect would be to detach from the working classes a large portion of the middle ranks, who were then more inclined to act with the people than with the aristocracy which excluded them." Thompson comments that what

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process is particularly clear in the development of Santana's immigrant commercial center. This, as we have seen (Chapter IV, pp.190-6) may have been indirectly affected by Vargas's centralization policies: the growth of bureaucracies and the large number of bureaucrats migrating to Santana in the 1930's provided a stable and growing market for immigrant commercial concerns.

If the process of class formation is as fluid and vacillating as we suggest, how do we know that a middle class is emerging in São Paulo? One approach is to examine the development of class consciousness as we did in Chapter V. There it was pointed out that informants harbored latent feelings of resentment and fear towards those above and below them in the social order and that those feelings, even if they obscured the realities of social structure, contributed to a sense of boundaries between them and others.

However, because of the oscillating situation of middle income sectors in general, we can assume that a set of ideas similar to these will always be present among some marginalized groups at any point in time. Literature the researcher had done was to "offer a definition of class of almost arithmetical exactitude. In 1832 the line was drawn in social consciousness by the franchise qualification with the crudity of an indelible pencil" (1964: 817-21).
from other times and places is rich with pertinent examples in which marginalization and ideologies of resentment are closely related. Recent studies of witchcraft accusations are a case in point.  

What is special about the Santana histories is that they show how middle income sectors of diverse origins and experience have come to share ideas such that the ideas themselves transcend the particularistic experiences of any given sector and apply in a general way to middle groups as a whole. Their shared ideas reflect differences in their structural positions: that is previously distinct groups have been assigned new functions, namely the underwriting of Brazilian development by consumption and by the lubrication of the administrative system for rational growth of transnational production. This suggests that a middle class which is distinct from "classes" or "masses" or middle income sectors within them, only  

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5 It might be interesting in this connection, to re-examine the periodic outbursts of witchcraft in Europe during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. MacFarlane's (1970) study of witchcraft in Essex, England, is especially revealing of the way in which the incidence of witchcraft accusations arose as a function of the redefinition of the local class structure in response to national economic development. It was not the poor who were a problem. "They could be whipped and sent on their way, or hired as laborers. It was the slightly less affluent neighbors or kin who demanded only a little help, who became an increasing source of anxiety" (1975:203) -- and who were regularly burned as witches. See also Bendarsky (1970) on the Salem witch craze, which also followed a period of redefinition of political and economic status.
begins to emerge when the nation's political and economic resources are vastly increased and vastly concentrated.\textsuperscript{6} It would be interesting to inquire whether a middle class might not also be in the process of definition in other dependent countries which have become staging areas for manufacturing by transnational corporations.

As we have said earlier, however, there should be no illusion of finality about these developments, because as we have seen in Chapter II, the political considerations which created middle income sectors and defined a middle class in Santana, often arose in response to changes in the nation's position in the world economy. As the latter develops, the process could be reversed.

\textsuperscript{6}See footnote 4 above. Jane Schneider (personal communication) raises the question of the relationship of middle class formation to imperium. Empire needs consumers and ideologues. Modernization theorists are cast in an interesting light from this perspective.
Appendix I: Sub-Districts of São Paulo, ranked according to population, area, income, and autos per 100 people.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Income</th>
<th>No. Autos per 100 people</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Tucuruví</td>
<td>317,219</td>
<td>1. Jardim America</td>
<td>1,308.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. V. Nova Cachoeirinha</td>
<td>313,615</td>
<td>2. Consolação</td>
<td>1,132.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Saúde</td>
<td>220,743</td>
<td>5. Pinheiros</td>
<td>1,040.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Santana</td>
<td>166,049</td>
<td>7. F.Fidizes</td>
<td>913.85</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Ipiranga</td>
<td>165,049</td>
<td>8. F.Fidizes</td>
<td>892.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Ibirapuera</td>
<td>144,606</td>
<td>10. Indianapolis</td>
<td>830.44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
According to population, area, average family income, professions and students

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. Autos per 100 people</th>
<th>Public Servants</th>
<th>Industrial Workers</th>
<th>Service Workers</th>
<th>Primary Students</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Family income, professions and students</th>
<th>Industrial Workers</th>
<th>Service Workers</th>
<th>Primary Students</th>
<th>Total Students</th>
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<td>83,527</td>
<td>40,140</td>
<td>50,888</td>
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<td>2. Concelhão</td>
<td>2. V. Prudente</td>
<td>2. V. Prudente</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>5. Ipiranga</td>
<td>5. Saúde</td>
<td>5. Santana</td>
<td>5. Santana</td>
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<td>15. Ibirapuera</td>
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<td>Service Workers</td>
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<td>17. Perdizes 5,974</td>
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<td>18. Tucuruví 8,986</td>
<td>18. Penha 5,695</td>
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<td>22. Butantã 1,636</td>
<td>22. V. Mariana 4,018</td>
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<td>23. Barra Funda 3,896</td>
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Source: Adapted from nochtief, Montreal, DeConsult (1970:20, 47, 213-25).
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Appendix II. Currency Conversion Table

Cruzeiros to the dollar

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*In 1967 the Cruzeiro was devalued, and the New Cruzeiro introduced.

Appendix III. Household composition, property and incomes of Santana families interviewed, 1972-1973

I. Household composition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Family No.</th>
<th>incomes over total in fam.</th>
<th>Adult</th>
<th>Maid</th>
<th>Maid live-in</th>
<th>Par</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Incomes: NCr. 1,500.00-2,000.00</td>
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<tr>
<th>Family No.</th>
<th>No. with total in fam.</th>
<th>Husb. Wife Minors child.</th>
<th>-Other</th>
<th>Maid Live-in</th>
<th>Maid Day</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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E. Incomes: NCr. 8,000.00-10,000.00

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<th>Maid Live-in</th>
<th>Maid Day</th>
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F. Incomes: NCr. 10,000.00-12,000.00

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G. Incomes: NCr. 12,000.00-14,000.00

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<th>Maid Day</th>
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H. Incomes: NCr. 14,000.00-16,000.00

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<td>Minors</td>
<td>child.</td>
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<td>/</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>/</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Notes
- "No. with income over total" excludes domestic servants, but does include their dependent children.
- "Minors" includes small children, be they grandchildren, adopted, or maids' children, as well as university students who contribute nothing to their support.
- "Day Maid" is a domestic worker employed between one or three days a week.
- Mo = Mother
- DaL = daughter in Law
- A = aunt
- S = sister
- Nc = niece
- Nf = nephew
- Bro = brother
- GdD = god daughter
- M'sc = maid's child
- Gr = grandchildren
- ad = adopted
- / = present
- √ = has an income

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II. Properties and nature of incomes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Family No.</th>
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<th>Stock</th>
<th>Productive</th>
<th>Non-Productive</th>
<th>Dwellings</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Rent</th>
<th>Salaries</th>
<th>Pensions</th>
<th>Rents</th>
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Notes

** The ninetieth family was added for convenience.
- ni = no information
- carp. shop. = carpentry shop.
- inher = inherited.
- hs. = house, houses.
- bot = bought or built.
- CE = Caixa Economica.
- FP = Força Publica's Caixa Beneficiante.
- apt = apartment.
- str = store.

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Appendix IV. Supplements to Chapter IV.

A. My grandfather came in Dom Pedro's time. He


Plantavam milho, uva, feijão, café; faziam cadeiras empalhadas do brejo e iam a pé vender na Praça da Sé. Depois de dezoito anos de Brasil foi lá com os filhos visitar a terra dele.

O vó tinha tanto dinheiro que punha no sol numa peneira pra não mofar. Ele guardava o dinheiro no chapéu. A gente ia a missa descalço por causa da lama, e só calçava na igreja. Ele chegava lá descalço, suado, e tirava o chapéu e o pessoal dava dinheiro pensando que era mendigo.


Graças a Deus não faltou nada. Até que o filho da minha irmã hoje é catedrático na faculdade de medicina. Eu já tou velha. Mas nós, aqui, só temos a casa.

My grandfather came in Dom Pedro's time. He
left the Tyrol because there wasn't enough work. He came to do "America." My grandmother was pregnant with my mother, the only Brazilian. Dom Pedro came to my grandfather's house, would take my mother on his lap, they would make bouquets of flowers... They came with money from there. My grandfather got a plot in the colony and bought other plots, big and square ones here, in Cambuci, in Casa Verde, in many places.

They planted corn, grapes, beans and coffee; they made caned chairs from the marsh grasses, and went on foot to sell them at the Praça da Sé [center of town]. After eighteen years in Brazil, he returned with his children to visit his own land.

My grandfather had so much money he would put it in the sun in a sieve so it wouldn't mildew. He kept his money in his hat. We would go to church barefoot because of the mud, and only put our shoes on in church. He would get there barefoot and sweaty and when he'd take his hat off, people gave him money thinking he was a beggar.

He could have been a millionaire, but everything was lost. He died in the epidemic of 1918. He was strong, but there wasn't any medicine to give him. My grandmother didn't understand Portuguese and she became disoriented alone with the children. She started selling, and much was stolen or lost to squatters. They said it was for lack of paying taxes, but they were all cads.

Mother and the aunts married. My mother married a Portuguese. They had dairy cattle, donkeys, employees, but it was all on my grandmother's land and she was selling and losing it. Justice. They are all cads. We spent a fortune. When my aunt was old she wrote a letter to Getúlio. I had the receipts for the lots [the grandfather had bought] and I went to see the engineer who did the survey. He was a disgrace--I showed him the receipts for the lots and he rolled up the survey and wouldn't let me see it again. He hid the survey maps.

Thank heavens we didn't lack for anything. My sister's son is even a tenured professor at the medical school. But we, here, all we have is the house.
B. A chegada em São Paulo é uma lembrança triste. Sentí os deslocamentos da cidadezinha pra São Paulo, e depois soube que era uma coisa penosa. Nos localizamos em Santana porque era um bairro atrasado, pruma casa pequena e escura e triste, apertados em dois quartos. E isso depois de uma dessas casas grandes do interior. As distrações era de olhar da janela, sentar na porta, e aos poucos entrar em contato com os vizinhos. No interior teríamos mais facilidade pra ter relações com famílias de nossa posição... no interior seríamos a elite da cidade. Em São Paulo ficamos marginalizados da vida social do bairro e da cidade, salvo no que a igreja permitia.

The arrival in São Paulo is a sad memory. I felt the dislocation from a small town to São Paulo, and later I discovered it was a sad thing for the family. We moved to Santana because it was a backward neighborhood, to a small, dark and sad house, squeezed into two rooms. This after one of those big houses of the interior. The distractions were to look out the window, sit on the door step and slowly make contact with the neighbors. In the interior we would have had greater facility in having relations with families of our position. In the interior, we would have been the elite of the town. In São Paulo we were marginalized from the social life of the neighborhood and the city, except for those contacts permitted by the church.

Hospital Militar pro soldado e os familiares, a Cruz Azul, a Caixa Beneficiente, com contribuições mensais para as viúvas e dependentes. O fardamento, a comida, tudo por conta do estado. Na época, era bom caminho pro sucesso. Hoje sou Coronel. Minhas crianças terão melhores chance na vida do que eu. Eu posso pagar os estudos.

I was very spoiled. My parents gave me my studies, I finished highschool, but it was a sacrifice for them. We lived in a rooming house in front of the school in the center of the city. I didn't know what I wanted to be. My choice for the corporation was the last. I wanted to be a dentist, but I couldn't go to school. I went to work at the Banco de Credito Real [a bank], but there was no future there. My job was too simple, and it didn't offer opportunities for a career. It paid badly and I didn't like that kind of work. I did a bunch of things. My uncles influenced me to join the Forca Publica. I didn't think that I would have a chance at other things. I joined from necessity. The beginning wasn't easy. When I joined, it was all in the past, the rage of the people against the Forca Publica. They were held in contempt after '32, but with time, everything was forgotten. In the corporation the doors were open to success. I had a lot of support from the commanding officers and my companions and I returned it. There is a lot of unity in the corporation, our jobs demand it. It is very common for an officer to take another man's job to help him out. Besides, there is the Military Hospital for the soldier and his relatives, the Blue Cross, the Caixa Beneficiente, with monthly contributions for widows and dependents. Uniforms, food, everything paid for by the state. At the time, it was a good road to success. Today I am a Colonel. My children will have better chances in life than I. I can pay for their studies.
Appendix V. Supplements to Chapter V.


The beginning wasn't easy. My brother married and I was left to support mother and Januária [a sister]. I was a typist at an American firm and I earned five hundred cruzeiros. I liked to flirt, go out for ice cream, to dance, but I had to support mother. I already knew Robert, who said, "We are both poor, we have no expenses, nothing. Let's get married." The brothers didn't give us a thing. I didn't have a dowry. Then the children came and he took care of us, Januária, mother and his mother, all with seven hundred cruzeiros [that he earned]. I didn't work anymore. It was a hard and controlled life. A small house near the [Força Publica] headquarters, the roof leaked. It was a very great struggle.

Agora eles estão bem, tem patrimônio, os filhos estão educados, tudo isso. Mas foi uma luta, viu. Me lembro que o Coronel ia à pé pro quartel pra ter dinheiro pra comprar leite para as crianças.

Now, they are well off, they have property for their children to inherit, their children are all educated and all that. But it was a struggle, see. I remember when the Coronel walked to work so as to have money to buy milk for the children.

Cê vê, tô com três crianças, todos na escola, e não dá, não dá mesmo, sem grande controle, mandar pra escola, comprar as roupas, os materiais escolares, não dá mesmo.

You see, I have three children, all in school, and I can't, I really can't, without a great deal of control, manage to send them to school, buy their
clothes, their school equipment, I really can't.

B. The following is drawn from field notes.

We walked down an alley to the seamstress's house and D. Chica pointed out the house of a friend who had been so happy when her daughter graduated from Normal School that she got diabetes and died from it.

"Mas, D. Chica, será que é possivel receber diabetes de alegria?"
"É sim. Ela ficou tão alegre pensando que essa parte da vida dela tava acabando que logo ficou com diabete."
"Eu acharia o contrario, que quando a gente tá triste aí que tem mais chance de ficar doente."
"De jeito algum. Qualquer excesso pode matar, dar doença, tudo aquilo. Olha, minha filha, eu conheço gente que até pode morrer de felicidade. De tristeza, ninguem morre. Quando a pessoa tá meia chumbada, e aí que ela pensa com cuidado o que vai fazer, mas nessa euforia a pessoa não pensa bem no que tá fazendo. Por isso que você vê tanta mocidade morrendo por aí, são felizes, eufóricos, e aí, minha filha, você vê, ne, morre num desastre, num acidente. Por isso mesmo que falei que a felicidade mata. É, meu vizinho que tava morando na casa nove era um rapaz, um orfão, lutou pra ter sucesso. Daí, ele casou com a namorada, que tava namorando desde os treze anos, arrumou a casa bem, ajudou fazer os doces, mandou fazer três ternos no Sr. Jandiro, meu vizinho do outro lado que era alfaiate—ele não queria sair de lua de mel e voltar pra bagunça nenhuma. Daí, ele casou, tava na maior alegria, e logo que desceu do ônibus, pôs o pé do ônibus em Poços de Caldas onde iam passar lua de mel, caiu morto. Até que o médico de lá falou pro irmão que era isso mesmo. Então cê tá vendo, né? O sofrimento cansa, mas o que mata é a felicidade."

"But D. Chica, is it possible to get diabetes from happiness?"
"Yes, she was so happy thinking that that part of her life was over that she soon got diabetes."
"I would have thought the contrary, that one might be more likely to get sick when one was unhappy."
"Absolutely not. Any excess can kill, give diseases, all of that. Look, my dear, I know people who can even die of happiness. No one dies of sadness. When the person is sort of leaden [depressed], that's when he thinks carefully of what to do, but in that euphoria, people don't think carefully about what they are doing.
That's why you see so many young people dying, they are happy, euphoric, and then, my dear, you see, don't you, they die in an accident, a disaster. That's precisely why I said that happiness can kill. Yes, my neighbor who was living in the house number nine was a young man, an orphan, he struggled to be successful, he and his brothers, and he did succeed. Then he married his girl friend whom he had been seeing since he was thirteen years old. He fixed the house up nicely, helped make the sweets for the wedding, had three suits made by Sr. Jandiro, my neighbor on the other side, who was a tailor. He didn't want to go on his honeymoon and return to any mess. So he got married and was in the greatest happiness. But as soon as he got off the bus, put his foot on the ground of Poços de Caldas /a resort/ where they were going to spend their honeymoon, he fell dead. Even the doctor from there told his brother that that's what it was /that he died of happiness/. So you understand, don't you. Suffering is exhausting, but happiness kills.

C.

Aquí estudei, casei-me. Tive filhos, que em Deus espero, terão melhores dias que os meus.

Here I studied, I married. I had children, who, God willing, will have better days than mine.

Quando era rapaz, não podia encostar em carro, nem com um dedo. Agora tudo mundo tem carro.

When I was a boy, I couldn't dream of having a car. Now everyone has a car.

Todos melhoraram de vida, todos nossos amigos, mesmo os filhos de sapateiro, a Julia Turca, os filhos estudaram, estão ótimos.

Everyone has improved their lives, all of our friends, even the children of the shoemaker, Julia Turk's children went to school, they are all very well off.

Hoje nós, a classe média, está estabilizada, tem renda boa pra viver, estudar. A baixa que vive de teimosa, e a alta de fazer o dinheiro rolar.

Today we, the middle class, are stabilized, it has a good income to live on, to study with. It's the lower class that lives off shrewdness, and the upper off income.

Nowadays, to have a house and a car is no luxury. Those who must meet schedules have to have a car. I see the busses pass full to capacity and you can't depend on them. Almost everyone of the middle class has a house, and after that, getting a car is the rule. The BNH /National Housing Bank/ facilitates payments for a house.

Vivendo todos os dias, a gente vê o Metrô, os viadutos, a sujeira, tudo isso é progresso. É um corre corre danado, o trânsito tá imprevisível, dificulta demais, me irrita, me atrapalha, mas o Brasil vai ter um futuro.

On a daily basis, we can see the Metro, the viaducts, the dirt, all this is progress. It is a rat race, traffic is unpredictable, it makes life complicated, it irritates me, but Brazil will have a future.

O futuro do Brasil tá muito bonito. Sou muito brasileira demais. Eu acho que o brasileiro vai ter muito que falar neste mundo. O progresso tá demais.

The future of Brazil is lovely. I am very Brazilian. I think Brazilians will have a lot to say in this world. This progress is too much.

Além dos jornais e das notícias, eu senti o progresso, o crescimento, porque viajei bastante na Polícia Florestal. Não é só na cidade, não. Todo o interior cresceu, as estradas, fazendas novas, estão todos no interior. Em Sorocaba não tinha nada, poucas ruas asfaltadas, terreno baldio, chácaras. Agora tem escola, as ruas iluminadas, prédio grande. O crescimento trouxe um futuro garantido. Não queremos ser potência guerreira. Queremos ajudar os outros países. O Brasil agora ajuda a África, a Bolívia; o Brasil é conhecido agora como nação, e não como terra do samba.

Besides from the newspapers and TV news, I know about progress and growth because I travelled a
lot with the Forestry Police. It is not only in the cities. The whole interior has grown, with highways, new universities, these are all in the interior. In Sorrocoroba there was nothing, a few paved roads, abandoned lots, truck farms. Now there are schools, lighted streets, skyscrapers. Growth has brought us a guaranteed future. We don't want to be a warlike power. We want to help other countries. Brazil now helps Africa, Bolivia; Brazil is now known as a nation and not as the land of the samba.

Tudo mundo tem melhorado, tem casa e carro.
Eu acho que com ambigao a gente vai se melhorar em tudo, emprego, casa, estudo. E so olhar em volta mesmo, olha como Santana ta. Antigamente, Santana nao tinha prédio de apartamento fino. O progresso ta demais.

Everyone has improved, has a house, has a car. I think that with ambition, people will improve in everything, in their jobs, their houses, their studies. You just have to look around you: see what Santana has become. In the old days Santana didn't have fine apartment houses. Progress is too much.

E a classe media que mais sofre. Nao quer descer e nao pode se comparar com os ricos e os seus privilégios. Fica expremida entre o desejo de ser e as dificuldades de conseguir.

The middle class suffers most. It doesn't want to fall /into the lower class/ and it cannot compare itself with the rich and their privileges. It is squeezed between the desire to be and the difficulties of achieving.

A classe média é justamente a classe do sanduiche que sofre mais. O rico tem tudo, o pobre nada.

The middle class is precisely the class of the sandwich which suffers most. The rich have everything, the poor nothing.

E a nossa classe média que sofre demais. Nao quero que mude nada, nao, porque se mudar, so muda pro pior.

It is our middle class which suffers most. I don't want anything to change, because changes are all for the worst.
O rico é uma imundice, e o pobre é sujeira.
A classe média e o repositório disso tudo, e é a classe media que sofre mais.

The rich are filth and the poor are dirt. The middle class is the recipient for all this, and it is the middle class which suffers most.

F.
A semana passada fomos prum jantar muito elegante na casa do irmão do meu sogro. Me senti péssima, insignificante, não podia conversar das viagens que tinha feito, e só tinha o vestido feito pela costureira, sem jóias nenhuma; é uma vida muito futil, viu. Essa gente não faz nada.

Last week we went to a very elegant dinner at my father in law's brother's house. I felt awful, insignificant, I couldn't speak of the trips I had taken, and I only had the dress made by the seamstress, without any jewels; it is a very futile life, see. Those people don't do a thing.

Eu tenho uma prima que é rica. O marido é médico, até que tem projeção. Levam uma vida social bem mais intensa, assim, a clínica rende muito. O casamento da filha foi um espetáculo. Mais eu não vejo muito não. Moram longe, no Jardim Europa, tão sempre fora, e ficam as meninas pequenas com as empregadas. Tem de telefonar pra ver se tão em casa. Tivemos no casamento da filha, mas . . .

I have a cousin who is rich. Her husband, a doctor, is actually quite well known. They lead a much more intense social life, his clinic makes a lot of money. His daughter's wedding was a magnificent spectacle. But I don't see them often. They live far away in Jardim Europa [a neighborhood in São Paulo], they are always out, and only the little girls and the maids are home. You have to phone and see if they will be home. We were at the daughter's wedding, but . . .

Não sei bem como é que ele ficou rico. Meu irmão é muito transeiro, âle fica lá com a turma dele. Levamos com certa reserva. Cê vê, em vinte anos de casamento, a semana passada foi a primeira vez que ele convidou pra jantar. Sei lá, deve ser porque voces são americanos.

I don't know how he made his money. My brother is a wheeler-dealer and he stays with his own friends [in another wealthier neighborhood]. We
take him with a bit of reserve. You see, in the twenty years we've been married, last week was the first time he asked us to dinner. I don't know, it must be because you are Americans.

G. Infelizmente, com o progresso os baixos sobem assim. Nós somos de tradição, uma família de estudiosos. Os tios eram escritores, não ficaram ricos. Não é como a classe baixa que só come banana e pode ficar rico. Filhos de imigrantes não tem de ligar.

Unfortunately with progress, the low ones come up like that. We are of tradition, a family of studious people. The uncles were writers, they weren't rich. It is not like the lower class that only eats bananas and can become rich, the sons of immigrants who don't have to care.

Agora a classe baixa está estudando, cê vê os deputados brigando, porque são filhos de verdureiro, tem cultura, mais não é de berço. Hoje um casamento com médico, advogado, já não é muito, tem tanta gentinha. Podem ter berço muito humilde. E bom de convidar, aí cê vê como ele senta, mastiga, usa garfo, e aí não precisa os pais implicar. A moça vê sozinha.

Now the lower class is studying, you see the deputies fighting because they are the children of green grocers. They have culture, but it's not from the cradle. Today a marriage with a lawyer or a doctor isn't much because there are so many little people around. They could have had very humble origins. It's a good thing to invite them (prospective sons in law) and then you can see how he sits, chews, uses a fork, and then the parents don't have to say a thing. The girl can see for herself.

These distinctions are made even within closely knit families: the following is abridged from my field notes.

On D. Claudia's birthday all of her children and grandchildren came to celebrate it with her at lunchtime. In the evening neighbors and associates from her husband's bureaucracy would drop by to congratulate her and drink port out of the colored wine glasses in the breakfront. Lunch was not such a formal occasion. Each of her daughters in law had brought a dessert, and the table was laden with food: a roast, cus-cus, rice, beans, macaroni, roast potatoes, roast chicken, condiments, fruit and various sweets. There were children everywhere. There was no room to seat
everyone at the table. The men sat around the table, the children took their plates to the coffee tables and the women, after everyone was served, sat in the living room area. After lunch one of the sons in law took a niece on his knee and proposed that she invest some of her allowance in a calf. He explained why it was a good investment. He would buy the calf for X NCr., raise it for her for free on his farm, and then sell it when it was grown for 6X NCr. It was clearly a good deal, and the little girl, about ten years old, was excited. She asked her parents if she could accept it, and they had no objections. Her mother, who had gone to the bank before lunch, passed her some money under the table. The uncle saw and said, "Oh, no, it has to be your money, not your parents' money." He insisted that she should go to her bank and draw on her savings account. The little girl wanted to, but her parents would not let her miss afternoon school. The uncle said he would wait for her at the train station the next morning at eight o'clock, and if she could get the money to him before he returned to his farm, the deal was on.

I knew that this was a large and affectionate family, and that the uncle and the girl's father were good friends. I was curious about the insistence by the uncle on keeping the parents' money out of the deal and on the child using her own money, although it was clearly inconvenient for her to get to the bank before eight in the morning. I asked D. Claudia why he was being so difficult. She leaned over and said softly:

Cê ve, minha filha, êle está fazendo certo, insistindo que negócio cada um faz por si mesmo, que até parente pode aproveitar. Mas é diferente da nossa classe média: nós não temos o espírito comercial. Nós damos muito mais importância aos estudos do que ao espírito comercial. São imigrantes, fizeram fortuna a base do comércio. Nós não. Atingimos o nosso nível de cultura por estudo, e o meu filho faz bem de não deixar ela faltar aula.

You see, my dear, he is doing the right thing, insisting that business one does for one's self, and that even relatives can take advantage. But it is different with our middle class: we don't have the commercial spirit. We give much more importance to studies than to the commercial spirit. They are immigrants, they made their fortune on the basis of commerce. Not us. We have attained our level of
culture through studiousness, and my son is quite right not to let her skip school.

H. O dinheiro até que cria problemas. Teve o caso de uma lavadeira de Goiás, cá entende, não é que lavava roupa, é que era pobre. Ela ganhou na loteria, até que trouxe malefício pra ela. Teve de aprender a fazer sala, usar garfo . . .

Money can even create problems. There was the case of the washerwoman from Goiás, you understand, it's not that she literally washed clothes, it's that she was poor. She won the lottery and it brought ill fortune. She had to learn how to make polite conversation, to use a fork . . .

Ah, se corrompe o dinheiro. Meu cunhado era um canalha, mais a inteligência dele foi corrompida pelo dinheiro. Ele era corretor de câmbio, lidava com o dinheiro dos outros, de grandes banqueiros. Tinha o vício de mulheres. Elas exploravam ele até o último fio do cabelo. Como ele era mulherengo, fazia agiotagem ilícita, parou na cadeia várias vezes, e trocava de mulher como a gente troca de roupa. Vendeu o terreno do filho quando arrumou outra mulher, uma casada, com o marido canalhão que sabia, e pediu dinheiro. Deu um apartamento Luis XV pra mãe dela, um açougue pro irmão, e uma casa pra ela. E pelo filho, vendeu o terreno e deixou o nome sujo. Ele se suicidou. Tava pra ir para a cadeia outra vez, por falsificação, e se matou lá no escritório. Quando chegaram lá, estava jogado como um cão. Usou formicida com soda caustica. Só tinha sangue. Se sofreu, mereceu, e merecia sofrer mais!

Ah, does money corrupt. My brother in law was a scoundrel, his intelligence was corrupted by money. He was an exchange broker, he dealt with other people's money, great bankers. He had the vice of women, and they exploited him to the last hair on his head. Since he was a womanizer, he did illegal speculating, he went to jail several times, and changed women the way we change clothes. He sold his son's land when he got another woman, a married woman, with a rogue for a husband, who knew and asked for money. He gave a Louis XV apartment to her mother, a butcher shop to her brother and a house to her. To his son he left a dirty name, and sold his inheritance. He killed himself. He was going to jail again for forgery and he killed himself at the office. When they arrived, there he was, thrown like a dog. He used formicide and caustic soda. There was blood all over. If he suffered, he deserved it, and he deserved
to suffer more!

Todos os problemas desse casamento vem da bondade do Luis. Ele achou que devia dar dinheiro pra esposa, que ela não devia pedir. Fez um casarão pra ela, deu um livro de cheque, e veja só, nam dorme junto com o marido. Não é de se esperar que um homem desses vá se contentar com as quatro paredes.

All the problems in that marriage come from Luis's goodness. He felt that he should give his wife money, that she shouldn't have to ask. He made her a huge house, gave her a check book, and imagine, she doesn't even sleep with her husband. One can't expect a man like that to be content with the four walls.

Hoje em dia tá desquitando de mais. Aí entra a independencia monetaria da mulher. Elas podem fazer, ter casa; o que que vai prender ao homem? So se tiver o espírito religioso, de abnegação, de mãe. Mas isso e raro. Essa questão de dinheiro é um perigo, viu.

There are too many divorces today. Here the financial independence of women is important. They can have or build their houses; what will keep them with the man? Only if they have a religious spirit, a spirit of abnegation, of motherhood. But that is rare. This matter of money is dangerous, see.

I. Esse Tio foi capitalista: nunca fez nada.

That uncle was a capitalist: he never did anything.

A classe rica se interessa mais no dinheiro do que no sentimento. Vive a vida e não quer saber. Enxergam a vida de maneira diferente. Eu não podia sair . . . são mais esclarecidos.

The rich class is more interested in money than in sentiment. It lives its life and doesn't want to know. They see life in a different way. I wouldn't be able to participate . . . they are more enlightened.

Cê pode entrar em contato com pessoas que são tão ricas, e que não tem nada pra dar, nem um sorriso. Quantas vezes ta numa reunião, eu via que pessoas se pagava com coisas tão insignificantes, com a parte material. Não podem entender o que seja uma vida, o que faz uma família. Não sabem dar o tratamento certo pro marido, vêm marido como uma máquina de dinheiro.
You can come into contact with persons who are so rich and have nothing to give, not even a smile. How many times you might be at a meeting, I would see that people were attached to such insignificant things, with the material part. They cannot understand what a life is, what a family does. They don't know how to treat husbands correctly, they see husbands as money machines.

I consider rich a person who lives only off income, that doesn't have to work and who lives well. While we have to work, we aren't rich. We are comfortable, but the day we stop working we slip backwards. They have a very intense social life. It seems it has diminished a lot. Before, it was always receptions for any reason, even for their lap dog's birthday. A very futile life. But it has diminished with the income tax decree, because the government keeps an eye on people who give that sort of party.

There is a great distinction in the way people from different cultural strata relate to each other. We try to relate to people in our own cultural stratum. If we were millionaires and wanted to penetrate the rich class, we wouldn't have a chance. It's a different conversation, a different way of behaving... If we were to meet? There would be trouble. The upper class would not become involved. We see life with more realism. They are more voluble, tell different jokes, take
liberties with other women's husbands. We give our children more solid upbringings. Theirs go out in little gangs, or stay with the maids. The parents don't care where they go. It's a very intense social life, and they don't have time.


Maids leave and it's difficult. I am afraid of getting a thief, everything. I have to get the hill-billies from the interior, who don't know anything, and then they go away. I have to teach them to brush their teeth, use Modess, deodorant. And the best are very demanding. I can't order them anymore, I have to ask them . . .


A minimum wage [for domestic servants] is not required, paid vacations are at the discretion of the employer. One is not obliged to stipulate working hours. One will be obliged [by the government] to collect a percentage of their salaries for INPS [Social Security], but they have to work [in one place] for twelve consecutive months, and it's hard, because maids generally don't stay [that long]. I heard all this on the radio . . . it's impossible, every house has a different kind of life and there can be no [regulations] with such differences. For the time being they should not receive minimum wages. They are no good, you teach them, help them, and then she leaves to find a better job. And it's a struggle to teach them. And when she knows how to do things nicely, she leaves. What do you want to give them a minimum wage for?
The following is a condensation of notes made on the three spiritist sessions which I attended:

Cel. Paulo and D. Maria had come early to take me to the session. D. Maria had been to the hairdresser. They wanted to meet me, interview me, explain about spiritism, and warn me not to be frightened at any noises I might hear or perturbations (perturbações) I might feel. They explained that their center was part of the São Paulo Federation of Spiritists, which had a day care center, an orphanage, a school for retarded children, all of which were run on contributions by the members as well as by the government. Then Cel. Paulo explained that every person had a spirit which survived the body's death: that happiness was impossible in this world, which was a place for expiation. Spirits were reincarnated into this world until they had progressed and then they moved on to a higher plane. The object of the sessions we were attending was to help the spirits who had left this world, to tell those spirits who might not know it that they were dead and no longer of this world. These spirits, in their ignorance, could harm living people. Healing sessions, dealing specifically with the ills inflicted by spirits on the living occurred on separate occasions.

When we arrived at the center "passes" were being done to the people entering the garage for the meeting. The mediums closed their eyes, felt the vibrations of the person being "passed" and performed a series of wiping gestures around the person's body. This was explained to me as a kind of blessing and cleansing of the spirit. Fifty to sixty people, of which twelve were men, were "passed." When everyone was in the garage, the mediums "passed" each other, came into the garage and sat around the table.

The ceremony opened with a general talk by Cel. Paulo on the amount of misery and unemployment in São Paulo, on the need for tolerance of people of color, including Indians, and on how evil spirits should be considered as children to be led and shown the light of reason. The president and the government were blessed. The talk closed with a warning that any emotional disturbances that the assistentes might feel during the session were not to be confused with mediunidade, or the ability to receive spirits. This ability required a great deal of control and training.

He sat, the record was changed to another religious piece and one of the mediums stood to explain that in addition to the incorporation of spirits, the mediums
were also going to write and draw what a spirit might dictate. She sat, and for a while the room was quiet, except for coughs and shifts of position among the assistentes. The mediums sat with bowed heads.

Slowly the room became noisy with unintelligible speech. On one occasion the noise was increased by rain on the tin roof which also leaked in spots. It was hard to tell which medium had been possessed. The noise grew louder and it was possible to follow only one or two spirits at a time because of it. A young man at the table was possessed by the spirit of a gambler. He rocked back and forth repeating "Eu preciso jogar, eu preciso jogar" (I must gamble, I must gamble). Others were possessed by spirits whose bodies had died in automobile accidents and the directrix would quiet their sobbing by telling them they were dead. Periodically the room was filled with sobbing, both from the mediums and from the assistentes, and with uncontrolled laughter. One spirit was particularly troublesome.

He had possessed D. Maria, whose voice became harsh and guttural. Much of what he said I could not understand. The directrix's explanations that he was dead would not quieten him. He demanded cachaca (cane liquor) and screamed "Eu não peço, eu mando, eu sou Deus" (I don't ask, I command, I am God). After much laughter and unintelligible shouting he said "Eu sou o que sou, um trabalhador" (I am that I am, a worker). The directrix seemed to become very angry and said loudly "Você já falou demais, vai embora" (You have spoken too much, go away). He did so, but only after some grumbling and cackling, and D. Maria was returned to herself.

Slowly the other spirits subsided. The room was silent for a second and then a number of the assistentes began to weep quietly. Cel. Paulo rose and read a list of names of people who had died recently and whose spirits needed help. Then the two mediums who had been writing read their pieces. One had as a theme "ainda se fala nas flores" (flowers are still spoken of), which was repeated between references to unemployment and political strife. After this the mediums who had been drawing exhibited primitive sketches by the spirits who had possessed them. One was a picture of a black slave being beaten and another was of a baby in the womb. The medium who had "drawn" the latter was a
young pregnant woman, and she and others believed she had been possessed by the spirit of her unborn child.

Many of the assistentes were amazed at the drawings and repeated among themselves "Mais eu sei que não são artistas" (but I know they aren't artists - with the implication that only spirits could have made them draw). The assistentes were asked if they had seen anything. A sallow young man in his early twenties said he had seen colors, lights and rain, a holy bath, and flowers over the writing and drawing mediums. It had been very dark, he said, in the areas where the mediums were physically possessed. An older woman mumbled her agreement. When it was clear that no one had more to add, a closing prayer was said, again to Gounod's Ave Maria.

In the car, on the way back, Cel. Paulo and D. Maria were anxious that I had not been frightened and were mildly apologetic at the low order of spirits who had appeared that day. On subsequent occasions, when the spirits were of just as "low" an order, they explained in great detail that these madoes, or bossy spirits, were responsible for the political strife in São Paulo. I asked what they meant and they told me they meant the terrorists and the strikers, although no spirit of a terrorist or a striker had ever appeared at their sessions, and the last great strike in São Paulo occurred in 1968 (Weffort, 1968).

L. A maioria de São Paulo é da classe média. Os pobres de antigamente são agora os médios.

Most of São Paulo is middle class. The poor of the old days are now the middle class.

São Paulo tem mudado bastante, acho que os anseios da classe média são bem diferente. Há vinte anos atrás, a classe média pensava somente em economizar o seu dinheiroinho, numa casinha, o carrinho: agora é viagens, uma vida bem sossegada.

São Paulo has changed a lot. I think the anxieties of the middle class are very different now. Twenty years ago the middle class thought only of economizing a little money, a little house, a little car. Now it's trips, a very relaxed life.

Há vinte anos atrás, São Paulo era cidade morta. Depois de '30, São Paulo cresceu por causa da indústria, o comércio desenvolveu. São Paulo cresceu desordenadamente, e começaram surgir as classes. Naquele tempo,
so havia três classes, alta, média e baixa. Agora a classe média cresceu tremendamente: temos três subdi-
visões da classe média, a média alta, a média média e a média baixa. A média alta tem propriedade, um or-
denado muito alto. Não é rico, mas tem meios pra
aplicar o dinheiro. Um funcionário público alto, por
exemplo, o Cel. João ... élê não é rico, mas ganha
bem, tem varias construções. A classe média ampliou
bastante. Agora a maioria de São Paulo é da classe
média.

Twenty years ago, São Paulo was a dead city. After
'30 it grew because of industry and commerce developed.
São Paulo grew in a disorderly manner, and the classes
began to emerge. At that time there were only three
classes, the high, the middle and the lower. Now the
middle class has grown tremendously. We have three
subdivisions of the middle class, the upper middle, the
middle middle, and the lower middle. The upper middle
class has property, a high salary. Such a person is
not rich, but he has the means to invest money. A
high public servant, for instance, Cel. João [a neigh-
bor]. ... he isn't rich, but he earns well, has various
constructions. The middle class has grown a lot. Now
most of São Paulo is middle class.

São Paulo tem uma elite que é uma minoría. A
class média tá no meio e tá sempre crescendo. Depois
e o proletariado, que graças a êles tem esse progresso,
e os parias que vem de outros lugares, pensam que São
Paulo é uma Nova Colorado e formam essas favelas.
Eu enxergo assim no meu mundo. Pode ser que seja
diferente.

São Paulo has an elite, which is a minority. The
middle class is in the middle and constantly growing.
Then there is the proletariat, thanks to whom there is
this progress, and the pariahs who come from other
places thinking that São Paulo is a New Colorado (Ame-
rica) and form these favelas. In my world this is the
way I see it. It may be different.
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