Dictatorship Across Borders: How Brazil Influenced the Chilean *Coup d'état* of 1973

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Abstract

DICTATORSHIP ACROSS BORDERS: HOW BRAZIL INFLUENCED THE CHILEAN COUP D'ÉTAT OF 1973

BY

MILA BURNS

Advisor: Amy Chazkel

Based on the testimony of Brazilian exiles who lived in Chile during the coup d’état of 1973, on documents recently declassified by the Brazilian Truth Commission and the Chilean Ministry of Foreign Relations, and on broad archival research in United States and South American collections, this dissertation investigates the political, economic, and diplomatic relations between Brazil and Chile from Salvador Allende’s candidacy to presidency and the first days of the Chilean military dictatorship. Despite the widely held notion that the United States was the one and only supporter of the Chilean September 11 coup, this thesis shows that Brazilian influence was also instrumental to the overthrow of the democratically elected socialist president and to the solidification of the Augusto Pinochet regime. The Brazilian government sent expertise, torturers, weapons, and medicines, and installed a network to monitor the activities of Brazilian exiles in the country, which would serve as a model for Operation Condor.

The Brazilian Ministry of Planning, Roberto Campos, one of the most influential Brazilian economists, disagreed with the state-based policies that characterized the Brazilian civilian-military regime. Instead of nationalization and price controls, Campos believed in the strength of the free market and private institutions, a perspective similar to
the one implemented by the Chicago Boys in Chile, and which he took to Chile during trips to that country in the early 1970s. The Brazilian Ambassador in Santiago, Antônio Cândido da Câmara Canto, was also an important ally of the Chilean dictatorship. He helped organize the opposition to Allende and provided information about the activities of leftist groups and the government through the Centro de Informações do Exterior do Itamaraty (CIEX), the Brazilian Foreign Office’s Intelligence Center. Investigating the role of diplomats, businessmen, and politicians, as well as the connections between the United States and Brazil which shared the common objective of preventing the socialist government from developing its “Chilean Path to Socialism,” this dissertation aims to open a new avenue of research at the local and transnational levels, pointing to the significance of relations among South American countries in shaping historical trajectories, instead of limiting the Cold War framework to the question of West-East tensions.
Acknowledgements

The story of Brazilian exiles living in Chile at the time of the 1973 coup d'état is central to this dissertation. It was not easy for me to hear first-hand accounts of torture, persecution, and atrocities perpetrated by South American dictators, so I can only imagine how hard it was for them to live (and revive in our conversations) all of these events. Wilson Oliveira, Nielsen Pires, Otto Brockes, Ubiratan Peixoto, Anivaldo Padilha, Clóvis Brigagão, Jovelino Ramos, Lucas Mendes, Marcos Arruda, Rubem Cesar Fernandes, and many others with whom I had informal conversations: I am grateful for your trust. I am also thankful to my dear friend Sandra Moreyra, who generously put me in contact with many of the exiles, but is not here to see the results of her help. We miss you.

The documents declassified by the Brazilian Truth Commission from 2012 to 2014 form the core of this project. When I started my research, many of them were still lying untouched in huge, brown boxes. Paulo Augusto Ramalho helped me navigate them. I am also grateful for the Coordenação-Geral de Documentação Diplomática of the Arquivo Geral do Itamaraty. Mônica and Luiz Marcelo Chaves were my family all the times I went to Brasília for archival research, offering me bed, breakfast, and music. The visits to the Archivo General Histórico de la Cancillería de Chile, guided by Carmen G. Duhart, were also an important part of this work. In Austin, I was fortunate to conduct research at the Benson Latin American Studies and Collections, and at the Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library, where I relied on the expertise of Charlaine McCauley. Lynore and Jonathan Brown made Austin “weirder,” in the best possible way. Jon has
been the best conference buddy I could ask for, from Paris to Arizona. I am looking forward to the next ones. At the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, besides all the help of the archivists, I enjoyed hours of conversation with Ambassador Melvyn Levitsky.

Several fellowships allowed me to visit archives and attend conferences around the world to develop my research. At the Graduate Center at the City University of New York, I received enormous support from an Enhanced Chancellor Fellowship, Early Research Initiative Knickerbocker Award for Archival Research in American Studies, Advanced Research Collaborative Fellowship, The Graduate Center Provost Summer Grant, University Fellowship, Doctoral Student Research Grant, and grants from the Center for Latin American, Caribbean, and Latino Studies. I am especially thankful to the Chair of the History Department, Helena Rosenblatt, who has worked incessantly to give students the opportunity of professional development, and Marilyn Weber, who has been a tireless advocate for all of us.

I am also grateful to the Moody Research Grant - Lyndon B. Johnson Foundation, which allowed me to develop archival research at the Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library, in Austin, and to the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Foundation Grant, which facilitated my visit to the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, in Ann Arbor. The Innovative Cultural Advocacy Fellowship from the Caribbean Cultural Center African Diaspora Institute (CCCADI) meant way more than financial support. It allowed me to have a network of colleagues who inspire me every day. The team of Instituto Lemann has been a constant presence in my academic life since my master’s at Columbia University. I am very proud to be part of this group.
The loneliness of student life at The Graduate Center was much more tolerable due to the good friends I have made. Krystal Farman, Jonathan Hill, Gordon Barnes, and Aidah Gil were a small but loud cohort of Latin Americanists. Glen Olsen, Ky Woltering, Abigail Lapin, Mohammed Ezzeldin, Arman Azimi, Rachel Grace Newman, and Marianne González Le Saux, I am very proud of our friendship. My friends outside academic life were also an important part of this work. Nayla Duarte and Juliana Yonezawa went beyond that, working twice as much to support my career in journalism while I wrote this dissertation. My parents and my sister, who have never really understood this “Ph.D. thing,” but have always provided me the right doses of laughs and escapism: thanks for being there.

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trust, support, and joy. In the long and rocky path of graduate school, knowing that she would be there to guide me and believe in my potential was instrumental to keep me going. And there is so much more to come.

The CLACLS team was a family, a haven, and a diet killer for several years of grad school. I am thankful to Lawrence Cappello, Karen Okigbo, Victoria Stone, Laura Limonic, Sebastian Villamizar-Santamaria, and Rafael Portela. CLACLS has also provided me several opportunities to learn, and financial resources with its traditional summer grants, to visit archives in Brazil and Chile. Teresita Levy has been a model of generosity, dedication, and beauty that changes the lives of everyone around her. It is no exaggeration to say that CLACLS’ director and my professor at the GC, Laird W. Bergad and his beautiful wife, Fatima, are the most generous couple I have met in the United States. Laird knows more about Brazil than the vast majority of Brazilians, and has taught me more about my country than I could ever learn there. Nossa senhora... I have written and rewritten this part so many times... It seems to never be enough. Having you as a mentor changed my understanding of academic life. Thank you so much.

Sandra Paine has carefully read every page of this dissertation, spoiling me, and turning my journalistic writing into something more legible. Celso Castro has been a great friend for more than a decade and I have counted on his professionalism I don’t know how many times. Rosental Calmon Alves became more than a coleguinha helped me during this rough change from the newsroom to the classroom. James Green has been a great mentor since my master’s at Columbia University, sharing all his knowledge of Brazilian dictatorships and inviting me to witness his passion for democracy. Pablo Piccato, Marc Hertzman, Seth Fein, and Tom Trebat continue to be inspiring figures.
This dissertation, and all of my past and future work, is dedicated to the memory of Gilberto Velho, my first mentor, who introduced me to the wonders and pains of academic life. Obrigada, sempre.

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“Dulce Patria, recibe los votos
Con que Chile en tus aras juró
Que o la tumba serás de los libres,
O el asilo contra la opresión.”

National Anthem of Chile
**Introduction**

In 1973, when the Chilean military bombed the Palace of La Moneda and forcefully removed the democratically elected president Salvador Allende, Brazil had been a civilian-military dictatorship for almost a decade. The two countries have been commercial, cultural, and diplomatic partners for centuries and have experienced similar political moments almost simultaneously. The dictatorships that ruled these nations between the 1960s and 1990 are one example. Another, more recent one, is the shift to leftist, and in the Chilean case, socialist governments in the 2000s. The fact is, one can easily identify political trends in the region, but it is difficult to demonstrate to what extent they are due to mutual influence.

When it comes to the most recent dictatorial period, the role of diplomatic relations between South American governments has been overshadowed by the support of one external element: the Unites States. Analogous to researchers on the colonial era, who have tended to look more at the relations between the colonies and the metropole than among the colonies themselves, historians of the military period have investigated the role of the United States in the worsening of domestic problems, culminating in an unsustainable weakening of the Chilean government, rather than focusing on the possibility that a pre-Operation Condor scheme could have influenced the Chilean September 11. The country had been suffering for several months from a broken economy and facing shortages of items as essential as toilet paper and sugar when the
military action took place. But studies of international interferences in the Chilean coup remain preponderantly focused on the CIA’s covert actions. Today, US and Chilean scholars, leaders, and citizens in general have understood the role of the Americans as essential to that event.

This project argues, however, that the interchange of ideas, strategies, and even military supplies between South American nations was also instrumental for the coup d’état of 1973 in Chile. Despite denials for decades, Brazil’s government was a strong supporter of the Chilean military intervention and a source of inspiration for its leaders. The Brazilian dictatorship provided weapons, medicine, expertise, intelligence reports, and even torturers to the enemies of the Allende regime. This dissertation aims to shed light on this neglected area of history by focusing on one central question: to what extent did the relations between the Brazilian and the Chilean governments in the years before the coup d’état influence the events of September 11, 1973? The answers may alter existing interpretations of the scope of both the dictatorship in Brazil and the actors responsible for the outcome of the political process set in motion after September 11 in Chile. By following the rise of the Chilean military government, I also expect to unveil which aspects of this mutual influence—and support—have contributed to the successes and failures of the two regimes.

I have chosen these two countries for two reasons: first, because of their similarities. Both were long-lasting regimes, considered to be among the most “successful” coups d’états in the region, installed ostensibly for protection from communist forces; both followed periods of economic distress and achieved popularity in the years after the government installation because of sound economic policies; both were
violent regimes, applying murder and torture as tools to control the opposition; and decades after the coups, both are still debating the real dimensions of democracy. In 2012, the Chilean education minister, Harald Beyer, introduced a plan to remove the word “dictatorship” from school textbooks when referring to the Augusto Pinochet government. ¹ He suggested “military regime” would be a more general and appropriate term. Then Socialist Party leader, Osvaldo Andrade, summarized the sentiment of the majority of the Chileans in response to that, stating that “It has the ears of a cat, the body of a cat, meows like a cat and some people want to call it a dog.” ² The Sebastian Piñera government backed off. In Brazil, the recent process of impeaching president Dilma Rousseff brought to the surface a large debate on the fragility of democracy. Rousseff is a former guerrilla member and was tortured by agents of the dictatorship. Her removal from office by a corruption-tainted senate was based on a “crime of responsibility” which a federal prosecutor later concluded she did not commit. ³ For the thousands of Brazilians who demonstrated against her removal from office, she had just suffered a coup d’état. Months before the process, João Vicente Goulart, the son of deposed president João Goulart, claimed that Rousseff was going to be a victim of a coup, similar to what had happened to his father in 1964. ⁴

² Ibid.
⁴ “Filho de Jango diz que Brazil está ‘a caminho de um golpe,’” Época Negócios, August 31, 2015, Available online at: http://epocanegocios.globo.com/Informacao/Visao/noticia/2015/08/filho-de-jango-diz-que-brasil-esta-caminho-de-um-golpe.html
The second motive for choosing Chile and Brazil as the objects of this study is that this is a privileged moment to develop such research. One of the main reasons for the oblivion of historians on this topic is that there were previously no documents available to confirm the Brazilian influence in the overthrow of Salvador Allende. However, several sources that can allow us to answer my central question were recently opened to the public. The efforts of The National Security Archive to declassify, in 2009, the conversations between Nixon and Médici were the first step in the confirmation of the Brazilian connection with the coup d'État of September 11, 1973 in Chile. However, most of the documents attesting to the actions the country took to overthrow Salvador Allende remained a secret.

In 2012, the installation of the Brazilian Truth Commission determined that all the documents related to the 1964 coup and the subsequent dictatorship would become public. In one of the first measures of the group, a set of thirty-seven volumes of documents (including diplomatic correspondence) and fifty-two volumes of reserved bulletins became available at the Brazilian National Archives, in Brasília. In addition to several bureaucratic documents reporting day-to-day activities, the files include the correspondence between military authorities from both countries. They attest to the fact that the influence of the Brazilian regime was much broader than once imagined, and they included the dispatch of military equipment and practices of monitoring that weakened leftist movements and the Allende government itself. Among the first reports is a series of documents from the late Estado-Maior das Forças Armadas (EMFA), the General Staff of the Armed Forces from Brazil. There are also volumes of the Serviço Nacional de Informações (SNI), the National Intelligence Service, within which are
located documents confirming what diplomats have refused to admit for decades: that there was an intelligence service from the Ministry of Foreign Relations and that, more than just monitoring Brazilian exiles living in South America, it contributed to the effort of fighting the democratically elected Chilean president.

The Centro de Informações do Exterior do Itamaraty (CIEX), the Brazilian Foreign Office’s Intelligence Center, was founded at first to report on the situation of exiles in Uruguay, where deposed president João Goulart and his family lived in exile.\(^5\) However, especially after the Ato Institucional Número Cinco (AI-5), the Institutional Act Number Five, in 1968, and the election of Salvador Allende, in 1970, Chile became a central focus of the intelligence service. In the recently declassified telegrams of the CIEX now available at the Brazilian National Archives, the climate of tension and animosity towards Allende is clear. Although many of the reports were used as a network for diplomats to get information, especially the ambassador of Brazil in Chile, Antônio Cândido da Câmara Canto, most of them were written by military attachés and agents infiltrated among Brazilian exiles who collected information not only about the activities of the political enemies of the dictatorship, but also about the Allende administration. Contacts with exiles who had close ties with the Chilean government allowed the Brazilian authorities to have a privileged source of information about the socialist command. The CIEX reports mention domestic problems, such as demonstrations, strikes, and economic indicators. However, several documents discuss and foresee a military coup.

Among the South American countries that went through dictatorial regimes between the 1960s and the 1990s, Brazil was the last one to install a Truth Commission to investigate human rights violations that took place during the military period. The Chilean Comisión Nacional de Verdad y Reconciliación (National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation), also known as the “Rettig Commission,” was created in 1990, right after the end of the Augusto Pinochet regime, with the objective of documenting “human rights abuses resulting in death or disappearance during the years of military rule, from September 11, 1973 to March 11, 1990.” Although this was the focus of the commission, the related documents also shed light on Chilean relations with other countries and reveal the Brazilian role and influence during this time.

When I went to the Brazilian National Archives in Brasília for the first time, in 2013, the documents declassified by the Truth Commission were not yet digitized or organized. Nevertheless, the tone of the available pages about Brazil-Chile relations suggested that there was mutual discontent between the two countries. When put in dialogue with the documents available at the General Archives of the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Relations (Ministério das Relações Exteriores), the Itamaraty, such grievances become clearer. The diplomatic correspondence points to the interference of the Brazilian ambassador in Chilean politics. Câmara Canto supplied the Brazilian military with information about the situation in Chile, influenced the decisions of the government toward the neighboring country, and offered the Chilean military several kinds of support. The Brazilian embassy served as a base for meetings between the Chilean military, a source of information about internal affairs of Allende’s staff, and a hub to

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6 The reports of the Commission, also known as Informe Rettig, are available online at http://www.gob.cl/informe-rettig/
control the activities of supporters of the Allende regime through the monitoring of Brazilian exiles.

By dealing with the relations between Chile and Brazil during the military regime, this project contributes to the fields of diplomatic, military, and transnational history. It is also in dialogue other disciplines, including Political Science and International Relations. Studies about military regimes in Latin America are neither scarce nor new. There are plenty of them, focusing on different perspectives. Recently, with the 50th anniversary of the Brazilian coup and the 40th anniversary of the Chilean coup, several books have been published on the subject. The questioning of the recent history of democratic civilian governments in Brazil as well as the debates on the periodization of the dictatorship have influenced the most recent wave of scholarship with a common thread: the connections between the military and civilians. This could be a result of the challenges historians faced when researching the period and of the creation of the Brazilian Truth Commission in 2012. Even the analysis of educational policies during the period focused on the role of civilians inside Brazilian universities. The result of such debate is the agreement on calling the regime a civilian-military dictatorship. I will follow this idea in this project not only because these historians have demonstrated the role of civilians, but especially because one of the main goals of my work is to unveil the role of Brazilian diplomats in the overthrow of Allende. This is also a branch of the civilian actors of the dictatorship. The search for different actors who took part in the solidification of the regime is also

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present in other recent works.\textsuperscript{9} Following a different avenue of inquiry, Brown University historian James N. Green analyzes the influence of North American intellectuals on the downfall of the Brazilian civilian-military regime.\textsuperscript{10}

In Chile, scholars have also continued to investigate new aspects of the military period.\textsuperscript{11} Mary Helen Spooner focuses on post-Pinochet Chile to demystify the supposed economic success of the regime by showing how slow the country’s recovery was after the long dictatorship.\textsuperscript{12} Inside analysis and first-hand accounts of the Allende presidency boomed during the 40\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of the \textit{coup}. Allende’s former minister of mining, Sergio Bitar, wrote a compelling analysis of his years in the government.\textsuperscript{13} The daughter of Chilean politician Edmundo Pérez Zujovic narrates the assassination of her father during the government of the Unidad Popular.\textsuperscript{14}

However, very few books have focused on the relations between Chile and Brazil with other regimes. Tanya Harmer argues that the Chilean \textit{coup} was part of an inter-American Cold War shaped by disputes between Cuba, Chile, the United States, and Brazil. Harmer’s deep archival research offers a new idea of the extent of American support for the Chilean \textit{coup}, but focuses primarily on the role of Cuba.\textsuperscript{15} Perhaps the only works that encompass relations between Brazil and Chile during the dictatorial

\textsuperscript{9} Maud Chirio, \textit{A Política dos Quartéis} (Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 2012).
\textsuperscript{10} James Naylor Green, \textit{We Cannot Remain Silent: Opposition to the Brazilian Military Dictatorship in the United States} (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010).
\textsuperscript{12} Mary Helen Spooner, \textit{The General's Slow Retreat: Chile after Pinochet} (University of California Press, 2011).
\textsuperscript{14} Marisi Pérez Zujovic Yoma, \textit{La gran testigo: el asesinato de mi padre durante la Unidad Popular} (Santiago: Editorial Catalonia, 2013).
\textsuperscript{15} Tanya Harmer, \textit{Allende’s Chile and the Inter-American Cold War} (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 2011).
period are dedicated to the study of exiles. Historian Denise Rollemberg devotes her seminal book to such research. More recently, Teresa Cristina Schneider Marques, another Brazilian historian, leaned into the same subject. There are also many publications whose authors are themselves exiles. They offer, however, a narrow scope, limited to individual life stories and to the political situation in each country. Diplomatic relations between the two countries are not part of such research.

Scholarship on the US relations with South American dictatorships, however, developed much earlier. Jan Knippers Black argues that the United States had “attempted to modify or perpetuate the internal balance of political forces in Brazil” by using strategies such as warning business elites of the risk of Goulart’s government and the need to contain emerging Peasant Leagues movements, in addition to maintaining a close relationship with the Brazilian military. In 1976, Phyllis R. Parker published for the first time US documents about Operation Brother Sam. After her breakthrough findings, scholars such as Moniz Bandeira and Carlos Fico continued investigating the United

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States deployment of four navy oil tankers off the Brazilian coast, in case the Brazilian Army needed the support of America for the coup. Few were the scholars, however, who shed light on diplomatic relations between Brazil and other South American military regimes at the time.

By investigating the diplomatic relations between Brazil and Chile in this period, it becomes clear that the Brazilian regime installed in 1964 feared the rise of Salvador Allende—and of socialism—in a neighboring country. Moreover, the Brazilian cooperation with the Chilean military and right-wing groups who planned the overthrow of the democratically elected president was instrumental for the effectiveness of the coup and the solidification of the dictatorial regime. When the Soviet Union cancelled the dispatch of wheat to Chile, the United States opened a line of credit to allow the country to buy the commodity. Brazil, however, was not far behind. A few days later, its government donated a ship full of corn flour.²³ The Brazilian military also sent medicine given to political prisoners at the National Stadium and men specialized in torture techniques to the main center of murder and violence in the first months of the Chilean dictatorship.²⁴ The country also sent weapons to Chile, with the Brazilian coat of arms carefully erased, which demonstrates the preoccupation with hiding details of the support and, at the same time, the extension of such aid.

On September 11, 1973, the day of the Chilean coup, Câmara Canto sent several telegrams to the Brazilian government celebrating the new government and recommending that Brazil become the first to officially congratulate the new regime.

Counselor Tomas Amenabar Vergada, chief-of-staff of the Ministry of Foreign Relations of Chile, went to the Brazilian consulate to inform the friendly nation of the new governmental organization.\textsuperscript{25} A month after the \textit{coup}, an extensive report from the CIEX, the Brazilian Foreign Office’s Intelligence Center, celebrated the return to “normality” in Chile. It stated that the schools were open, the police continued searching for weapons, nine people were “summarily shot” on September 30, another three were executed in Santiago at the same day, and other six were shot in Iquique.\textsuperscript{26} For the military behind the Brazilian \textit{coup}, this was “normal.”

The support, however, started much earlier than the day of the \textit{coup}. The Brazilian government conspired with US authorities and assured them that Salvador Allende could be removed from office, as Brazilian president João Goulart had been years earlier.\textsuperscript{27} The meetings between Richard Nixon and Brazilian president Emílio Garrastazu Médici, in December 1971, demonstrate that the two leaders worried about Chile and exchanged information about the country. Moreover, the guarantees of action to prevent Allende from delivering the promise of a socialist administration—and to overthrow him if necessary—gave the two leaders the boost to continue their operations to suffocate the Chilean government.

At the time of the visit, Brazil experienced a powerful economic moment and growing international criticism. Médici saw the trip as an opportunity to silence the

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\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{25} Telegram DMP/600(B39)(571), September 13, 1973, Secretaria de Estado das Relações Exteriores, Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty, Brasília.
\textsuperscript{26} Report No 487/73, BRAN, BSB, IE 11.3, p. 28/121, October 5, 1973, CIEX, Arquivo Nacional do Brasil, Brasília.
\textsuperscript{27} Meeting with President Emílio Garrastazu Médici of Brazil on Thursday, December 9, 1971, at 10:00 a.m., in the President’s Office, the White House, December 9, 1971, Memorandum for the President’s File.
\end{flushleft}
opposition and reinforce the country’s strength. At a dinner in the State Dining Room at the White House on the day of his arrival, the Brazilian president heard Nixon say the now famous phrase: “We know that as Brazil goes, so will go the rest of that Latin American Continent,” a presage of the series of military coups that would take place on the continent with the support of the United States and Brazil. “We shall work together for a greater future for your people, for our people, and for all the people of the American family, for which we have a special place in our hearts,” completed the US leader.28

In another meeting the following day, Nixon proposed the creation of a secret line of communication, to which only the two presidents and one designated authority would have access. Nixon named United States National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger and Médici directed Minister of Foreign Relations Mário Gibson Barbosa. That way, the Brazilian president stated, “not even typists had knowledge of them.”29 Nixon then asked about the political situation in Chile and Médici reassured his counterpart that “Allende would be overthrown for very much the same reasons that Goulart had been overthrown in Brazil.”30 The US president asked Médici if he thought that the “Chilean Armed Forces were capable of overthrowing Allende,” referring unhesitatingly to a coup d’état. The Brazilian dictator was straightforward “that he felt that they were, adding that Brazil was exchanging many officers with the Chileans, and made clear that Brazil was working towards this end.” Nixon then reinforced the importance of the partnership between

29 Meeting with President Emílio Garrastazu Médici of Brazil on Thursday, December 9, 1971, at 10:00 a.m., in the President’s Office, the White House, Memorandum for the President’s File. December 9, 1971.
30 Ibid.
Brazil and Chile to achieve their objectives in Chile. “If money were required or other discreet aid, we might be able to make it available. This should be held in the greatest confidence. But we must try and prevent new Allendes and Castros and try where possible to revert these trends,” stated Nixon.\(^{31}\)

Besides the recently declassified archives in Chile, the United States, and Brazil, this project also relies on the testimony of Brazilian exiles who lived in Santiago at the time of the coup. They were the first ones to denounce the seriousness of the Brazilian interference in Chile at the time of the coup. Some of them were arrested in the National Stadium, the main center of torture and murder of the military dictatorship in the country. Many engaged in leftist movements in the new land, dreaming of a nation where socialism would prevail. They were important witnesses of that event, and some also helped shape Chilean politics of the time, connecting to Chilean leftist groups. I interviewed several of them and also relied on conversations that other historians have collected from the group.

There were three main waves of Brazilian political exiles in Chile. The first came right after the 1964 coup d’état and was comprised of professors, politicians, and other professionals who lost their jobs for being considered enemies of the regime. The second came in 1968, after the Ato Institucional Número Cinco (AI-5), the Institutional Act Number Five, when political persecution against enemies of the government reached the highest level. At this point, students and young activists were among the main victims of repression who had to leave the country. Lastly, with the election of Salvador Allende in 1970, there was a new movement of supporters of the socialist regime who entered Chile.

\(^{31}\) Ibid.
with the hope of seeing the development of a nation where their ideals would be the centerpiece of policymaking.\textsuperscript{32}

Otto Brockes, a doctor in Brazil, left Chile to be part of the Allende project of a \textit{vía chilena al socialismo}, a Chilean Path to Socialism, which included the nationalization of copper mining and other large-scale industries, the expansion of a land redistribution program initiated by his predecessor Eduardo Frei, and the increase of investments in the welfare citizen. “Allende was a very evolved person who had clear beliefs, and had a governmental program dedicated to greatly improving the condition of the Chilean people,” recalls Brockes.\textsuperscript{33} The support Allende gave to Brazilian exiles was central in the strengthening of the tension between the two countries. Furthermore, it caused the intensification of the monitoring of the Brazilian exiles who lived a permanent state of distrust and anxiety. For some of them, it broke any possibility of reaction.

As soon as the candidacy of Salvador Allende to the Chilean presidency began to gain strength, Brazil, the United States, and the Chilean military and civilian groups who opposed a potential socialist government shaped an earlier version of Operation Condor. They used political repression and intelligence operations to intimidate the opposition and weaken the connection among Southern Cone countries. The presence of agents of CIEX infiltrated among the Brazilian exiles was essential for the effectiveness of the later installed Operation.

\textsuperscript{33} Interview with Otto Brockes by the author. Video recording. Goiás, 07/15/2014.
The periodization of Operation Condor is still a source of discussion among scholars. John Dinges considers 1973-1980 to be the Condor Years. Edward S. Herman talks about 1976, when “Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay entered into a system for the joint monitoring and assassinating of dissident refugees in member countries.” Greg Grandin mentions the CIA support for the Operation “throughout the 1980s.” However, if we take into consideration J. Patrice McSherry’s explanation of the three levels of the operation, one can notice that a similar project started much earlier, with the connections between Brazil, the United States, and the Chilean military, right after the election of Salvador Allende. The first consisted in the “cooperation among military intelligence services, to coordinate political surveillance of targeted dissidents and exchange of intelligence information.” The second was covert action, and the third, known as “Phase III,” was the murdering of enemies of the dictatorial governments, especially political leaders.

In 1975, most of South America was under the control of dictatorships. Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Brazil had witnessed the consolidation of authoritarian governments. In November, leaders of each of the countries met in Santiago, Chile to debate the rise of left-wing movements. Chile provided most of the initial effort for the plan, from money to “coordination” from Manuel Contreras, the head of Chile’s secret police, Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional (DINA).\(^{38}\)

The American contribution, however, cannot be minimized. Operation Condor took place during the time of the Cold War and was the result of a series of policies of support to South American military dictatorships with an objective that had been stated by the head of the US Southern Command General Robert W. Porter as early as 1968. Operation Condor would be the result of a “long sought U.S. objective—coordination of the struggle against ‘Communism’ and ‘subversion.’”\(^{39}\) The plan focused on the eradication of leftist ideas from the continent and, to meet this end, the assassination of members of opposition movements. The number of deaths during the Operation Condor period is still unknown, especially because most of the actions were of clandestine nature, but the estimates are that South American agents killed at least 60 thousand people as part of this plot.\(^{40}\) The Operation targets were officially guerrillas and other members of armed groups. But in practice, any political objector could fall victim.

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\(^{39}\) Edward S. Herman, op. cit., 70.

\(^{40}\) The most frequent estimate is of “60,000 to 80,000 deaths.” Victor Flores Olea, “Editoriales – Operacion Condor,” *El Universal*, Mexico.
While it has not been proved, many believe that João Goulart was one of them.\textsuperscript{41} He died on December 6, 1976, at his farm in Corrientes, Argentina, of an alleged heart attack. In 2000, the Brazilian House of Representatives created a special commission to investigate Goulart’s death. It did not reach a conclusion, but the official report stated: “It is not possible to affirm peremptorily that Goulart was murdered. But it would be deeply irresponsible from us, after all the interviews and facts here consolidated, to conclude on the normality of the circumstances of João Goulart’s death.”\textsuperscript{42} The Brazilian newspaper \textit{Folha de S. Paulo} published an interview with Mario Neira Barreiro, a former member of the intelligence service of Uruguay.\textsuperscript{43} He declared that Goulart was poisoned and that the order would have come from Sérgio Fleury, head of the Department of Political and Social Order and confirmed by the then president Ernesto Geisel. In 2009, the magazine \textit{CartaCapital} published a story reinforcing the theory of a “B Agent” that had poisoned Goulart.\textsuperscript{44} The same magazine interviewed Goulart’s widow, Maria Teresa. She released documents that proved that the family was being monitored while living in Uruguay.\textsuperscript{45} All these events are still being investigated and this dissertation intends to contribute to questions that underline them.


\textsuperscript{42} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{45} Ibid.
This project is divided into four chapters. The first one looks at the economic relations between the two countries in the years before Allende’s presidential election and how the establishment of a socialist government fundamentally altered this relationship. Although many scholars have argued that the two dictatorships differed dramatically in terms of economic policies, businessmen such as Roberto Campos, who was Brazil’s Minister of Planning, had a US-oriented style of defending neo-liberal economic policies later put into practice by Pinochet’s Chicago Boys.

The second chapter explores the diplomatic and political ties between Brazil and Chile in the years of the Allende presidency. Câmara Canto, the Brazilian Ambassador in Santiago at the time, was the only foreigner to be present at the moment when Augusto Pinochet took power, and was a big supporter of the general. The diplomatic history of the countries in this interim has never been traced, probably because the Brazilian sources were kept secret for so long. However, now it is possible to confirm what US Ambassador Nathaniel Davis called the “Brazil Connection,” a series of actions from the Brazilian government that contributed to the Chilean coup.46

The third chapter narrates the waves of exiles from Brazil to Chile, starting in 1964, continuing in 1968, and culminating with the incident of the infamous group of the Setenta, the seventy political prisoners exchanged for the release of the Swiss Ambassador Giovanni Bucher in 1971. Their experience offers the opportunity to investigate the expansion of a network to monitor political enemies of the Brazilian regime in Chilean territory. The methodology includes oral histories with Brazilian exiles and testimonies collected by the Brazilian Truth Commission.

The fourth chapter focuses on the Chilean coup d’état. One of the recently declassified documents now available at National Archives, dated from 1971, is a detailed report signed by a Brazilian colonel about the upcoming Chilean elections. It mentions how dangerous the election of Salvador Allende could be. Another important file registers the shipping of several weapons from the Brazilian Army to the Pinochet government, on January 17, 1975. The Brazilian blazon was carefully erased from the weapons. This chapter also includes testimonies of exiles who were in the country on September 11, 1973. Some were arrested, tortured, and witnessed the murder of Brazilian citizens by the Chilean military. It also offers an analysis of the two volumes of documents declassified by the Brazilian Truth Commission about the participation of Brazilian soldiers in the torture of prisoners in the National Stadium.

Nearly fifty years after the fall of João Goulart, Brazil is now experiencing broad questioning about its military period. The debate about opening documents relating to those years and the establishment of the Truth Commission has gained new impetus. By shedding light onto a relation still unknown, this project aims to investigate an important part of the understanding of the dictatorship in Brazil and Chile. As the first country to have a successfully installed civilian-military regime, Brazil influenced the subsequent authoritarian governments in South America. Filling the gap in the scholarship of the period and presenting a new perspective, this project may help us think differently about the mutual influence South American countries exerted during the military period. Also, it opens up other hypotheses regarding the influence of other countries, such as Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay as well as other historical periods when relations between such countries were neglected in favor of the imperialist vision that there is
always a “big nation” supporting and influencing a “small country.” I hope that my focus on inter-regional relations will influence the spectrum of modern diplomatic history in South America. By looking at different relations among Latin American countries, we will be able not only to understand these political interactions, but also to reevaluate the US’s role in the establishment of the Chilean and Brazilian dictatorships. The global organization at the time was much different than previous academic works have led us to think.

This work looks at a small part of Brazil’s great influence and support], neglected for years. Waiting almost forty years to see their own history revealed, many accepted a pre-packed version of it. Memory blurred; the role of dictators faded. Understanding the actions of the government not only in the national sphere, but also at the continental level, may provoke the resurrection of what has been forgiven and forgotten. I make no pretense of exhausting the sources for the study of such a historical time or giving the final word on the importance of this mutual influence to the rise and downfall of the dictatorships in Brazil and Chile. However, I believe that this work can be a point of departure for future studies of how South American governments influence each other, in general. My intent is to present a history of a frequently forgotten diplomatic relation that was much larger and consequential than historians have demonstrated so far and call for a wide range of researches on the relations between military governments in South America. It also brings a series of questions regarding diplomatic history that can be fully explored in future works.
On October 24, 1966, the Brazilian president, Humberto de Alencar Castelo Branco, convened his ministers for the 39th meeting of the National Security Council. The agency was one of the three that directly advised the president, along with the Brazilian National Intelligence Service (SNI) and the Major State of the Armed Forces. The National Security Council produced more than three thousand pages of secret documents between 1964 and 1980, including a 39-page document chronicling the minutes of this meeting in 1966, in which it becomes clear that the Brazilian and the Chilean governments feared the rise of Salvador Allende years before his election as president and discussed strategies to prevent it. The ministers of finance, agriculture, war, the navy, the air force, education, labor and social security, energy, and commerce, among others, discussed the future of the country and the most pressing issues of the nation. That morning in the presidential palace in Brasília, however, the center of attention was the Minister of Foreign Relations, Juracy Magalhães. Famous for coining the expression “what is good for the United States is good for Brazil,” he had served as the Brazilian

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47 Translation by the author: Roberto Campos, Speech of inauguration at the Brazilian Academy of Letters. Available online at: http://www.academia.org.br/academicos/roberto-campos/discurso-de-posse
ambassador to the United States a few years earlier.\textsuperscript{49} President Castelo Branco made the first remarks and asked Magalhães to share the conclusions of his visit to Europe and North America, and “particularly to Latin America.”\textsuperscript{50}

Magalhães mentioned briefly his trip to Portugal, Italy, and the Vatican. He then described his meetings at the US State Department, in Washington, where he complained about the need to improve their communications, since Brazil had been “surprised’ by the Bogotá Conference, a meeting among South American nations, where the main proposal was the creation of an economic bloc among Chile, Colombia, Venezuela, Peru, and Ecuador. The Brazilian government had not been invited, and sent a formal note to the press complaining about having been excluded from the gathering. The plan never became a reality. “When I was in Washington, as ambassador, I was frequently called to the State Department to listen to new information on what was going on in Latin America. However, something as important as that—five countries meeting to discuss the potential formation of a bloc—happened without one word to us from the State Department,” he complained. Then Secretary of State Dean Rusk answered that they were as surprised as the Brazilian diplomat, and that his concerns were founded. Rusk promised to exchange information about all the “problems” related to the continent and “unambiguously applauded the Brazilian government.”\textsuperscript{51}

But Magalhães’s main focus in that October meeting was his trip to Chile, Bolivia, Argentina, and Uruguay. He started describing the tour by saying that “the

\textsuperscript{49} “Juracy Magalhães,” Centro de Pesquisa e Documentação da Fundação Getúlio Vargas. Available online at: http://cpdoc.fgv.br/producao/dossies/AEraVargas1/biografias/juraci_magalhaes
\textsuperscript{50} Ata da Trigésima Nona Sessão do Conselho de Segurança Nacional, October 24, 1966, No 85, Conselho de Segurança Nacional, Arquivo Nacional, Brasília, 1-2.
\textsuperscript{51} Ibid., 3.
promotion of Brazil on the continent and, through it, in the world, is one of the main objectives of Brazilian foreign policy,” therefore, the need for a meeting was patent.\textsuperscript{52}

The first invitation came from Chile right after the Brazilian reaction to the non-invitation to the Conference of Bogotá, in an attempt to “back off of its adventure Bogotana” and seek to rebuild its ties with Brazil, as the diplomatic tradition between the two countries demanded.\textsuperscript{53} The trip to the four countries brought very few practical achievements, according to the minister, except for an agreement on transportation and a few joint reports.

However, in Santiago, the conversation with then Minister of Foreign Affairs Gabriel Valdés was much more fruitful. Its tone demonstrates that, as early as 1966, not only the United States but also Brazil was already fearing the strengthening of communism in Chile and was working to ensure that its influence would not expand to the country’s executive power. It was one of a series of actions that attest to the fact that, in the years prior to the election of Salvador Allende, Brazilian diplomats and businessmen offered ideas and intelligence to groups who could act to prevent a victory of the socialist leader, even if a military intervention were the chosen way of doing it. First, the chief diplomat of Eduardo Frei’s government refused to make a statement against the Tricontinental Conference in Havana, but took clear anti-communist stances and promised to act diplomatically to prevent the new Tricontinental in Cairo from happening. “It was really important because the Frei government acts a lot with the local Communist Party, which is very strong, representing around 30% of the Chilean

\textsuperscript{52} Ibid., 4.
\textsuperscript{53} Ibid.
“electorate,” recalled Magalhães.\textsuperscript{54} Then, similar to what Brazilian President Emílio Garrastazu Médici would do some years later when talking to Richard Nixon in 1971, he stated that the Brazilian government was ready to act in case a military \textit{coup} became necessary.

I must say, ‘off record,’ that I had the opportunity to discuss with Minister Valdez the possibility of a victory of the Communist Party in the next elections, still very far away, if the Frei Government cannot meet the aspirations of the Chilean population. So—I was saying that—it would be the case of the existence of the possibility of the hemisphere acting to protect Chile.\textsuperscript{55}

Gabriel Valdés made it clear that the Chilean political leadership was on the same page as the minister. Besides Brazil and the United States, the Chilean current rulers were ready to act if the communist promise became a reality.

He then said—to my surprise—that he is convinced that, if the communist party becomes the majority, the lively forces of the nation would act in Chile, as they had in Brazil and in Argentina. This is a declaration of the highest importance and completely surprising for us, since our impression was that Chile was moving in the direction of accepting an eventual result of the popular vote in favor of communism.\textsuperscript{56}

Juracy Magalhães and Gabriel Valdés continued the conversation talking about the economic integration of Latin America and the role of Brazil in such a process.

The Brazilian Minister of Planning, Roberto Campos, was also present when Magalhães described his conversation with the Chilean Minister of Foreign Relations at the meeting of the National Security Council. He stated that Magalhães’ achievements were fundamental for the Brazilian economic leadership in the region. When explaining

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{54} Ibid., 7.
\item \textsuperscript{55} Ibid.
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why Brazil was in better financial shape than in the first years of the civilian-military
regime and could now negotiate better terms with the World Monetary Fund, he chose to
compare the country with Chile.⁵⁷ Campos stated that the Committee of the Alliance for
Progress had evaluated the two countries, and he had presided over the committee which
analyzed the Chilean case. Criticizing former Brazilian president, João Goulart, he
affirmed that “the most important difference is that Chile has a lower inflation rate—only
38%—and a financial administration in order, since President Alessandri, from the
Conservative Party, was generally considered an austere administrator, which was not the
case in the Brazilian context at the time.” He also claimed that Chile had other
advantages, including the fact that the country received more international support than
Brazil—Chile had received $20 per person while Brazil had received $4 per person. In
other words, “Chile followed a more humanitarian approach, which made it more
dependent on external support” and on the price of copper in the global market. Brazil
had followed a less austere and pro-development approach, raising taxes and using such
income for governmental spending.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 18.
Magalhães’ conversation with Valdés demonstrates that many years before the election of socialist Salvador Allende as president of Chile, Brazil and the Chilean political elites were already worried about his rise and trusted that military action might be the only way of averting it. However, US covert action in the Southern Cone started even before the 1964 coup in Brazil. In 1962, the CIA spent at least $5 million in support of candidates against the João Goulart government in the October 7 general elections.58

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US ambassador Lincoln Gordon used businessmen and institutions such as the Instituto Brasileiro de Ação Democrática, the Brazilian Institute for Democratic Action, as intermediaries to donate the money for the campaigns of governors, senators, and representatives.\textsuperscript{59} CIA operative Philip Agee recalled the day of the elections as a defining moment, since “for most of the year the Rio de Janeiro station and its many bases in consulates throughout the country have been engaged in a multimillion dollar campaign to finance the election of anti-communist candidates in the federal, state and municipal offices being contested.”\textsuperscript{60} Working in Quito at the time, he feared the growth of leftist movements in the biggest nation of the continent. “Hopefully these candidates will become a counter-force to the leftward trend of the Goulart government—increasingly penetrated by the communists and the extreme left in general.”\textsuperscript{61} There were also the so-called “spoiling operations” in Brazil, in which agents infiltrated organizations of students, workers, and politicians to promote the impression that the already problematic economic crisis was worse than it really was, creating a “long period of unrest and deep social disorganization, intensification of class clashes which would destroy the social and political networks of support of the government and facilitate its fall through a military \textit{coup}.”\textsuperscript{62}

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\textsuperscript{61} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{62} Ibid., 85.
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The Brazilian elite, part of the military, and the US government did not welcome João Goulart’s nationalist policies. He had become president after Jânio Quadros’ resignation due to “external forces” after only seven months in office. While the military ministers in the Cabinet tried to prevent then Vice-President Goulart’s inauguration, his brother-in-law and renowned politician Leonel Brizola created a pool of radio stations, the so-called “Cadeia da Legalidade” (chain of legality), calling on the population to take to the streets and assure Goulart’s right to take office. Goulart was only proclaimed president after he agreed on a Constitutional Amendment abolishing the Presidential Executive and creating a parliamentary government, which would be rejected only a year later, in a plebiscite.

A year earlier, John F. Kennedy had spoken in a White House filled with more than two hundred diplomats from Latin America to reinforce the objectives of the newly introduced Alliance for Progress. The US president sustained that Simon Bolívar’s dream of freedom and glory had never, in the long history of the hemisphere, “been nearer to fulfillment and never has it been in greater danger.” A few months later, Kennedy created the Agency for International Development (USAID) and proposed to lend more

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65 João Goulart was in his second term as a vice president. At the time, Brazilians voted in both the president and vice president, separately. In 1956, Goulart was elected vice president while Juscelino Kubitschek was president. In 1960, he was elected again, but the president elect, Jânio Quadros, was a member of a different party.
66 Ibid.
than $20 billion to Latin American countries to fulfill the need for techo, trabajo y tierra, salud y escuela—homes, work and land, health, and schools.

Chile was chosen to be the “showcase” for the Alliance for Progress. There were many reasons for that. The country had a long tradition of democracy, unbroken from 1932 to 1973, it was largely urban and industrialized, and virtually the whole population was literate, a stark contrast with the rest of the continent. However, the Covert Action Staff Report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities also stressed the Chilean people’s tendency to flirt with communism and the need to prevent the emergence of “another Castro” in the continent. On September 4, 1958, Jorge Alessandri was elected president with 31.56% of the votes, only 33,416 more than the candidate who came in second place, Salvador Allende, who was then of the Frente de Acción Popular (FRAP). The United States also feared that the FRAP would win the 1964 election (and, later, the 1970 vote), and this possibility was combated with money. In the years between 1962 and 1969, Chile was presented with over a billion dollars in direct United States loans and grants, the largest amount a country received in the continent proportional to its population. Besides the desire to prevent the spread of communism in the region, there was a strong impulse to protect US industry. Chile was then responsible for 80% of the

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70 Ibid.
global production of copper, and 75% came from three US companies: Braden Copper, Anaconda, and Kennecott. The FRAP agenda included the nationalization of copper.

After such a close election and seeing Allende’s popularity increase, Jorge Alessandri also understood the need to fight the growth of left-wing politics in the country. Instead of fighting them directly, he decided that promoting a less conservative image of his administration, similar to what then Brazilian president, João Goulart, and his foreign policy projected, would be a good plan. Following the suggestion of chancellor Carlos Martinez Sotomayor, he asked Goulart to visit Santiago. The recently nominated Chilean ambassador to Brazil, Marcelo Ruiz Solar, was in charge of the formal invitation. He received straightforward instructions about the reasons for the visit and how to proceed, since Chile “wants to keep and extend the practices of consulting between the two governments” in order to achieve common ground in their decisions.

On April 22, the Brazilian president arrived and was celebrated by a large part of the Chilean media. The newspaper El Siglo claimed that “the presidential candidate of the people, senator Salvador Allende, summoned the population to cheer President João Goulart,” while he was in the country. But the conservative publication El Mercúrio also saluted Jango’s arrival, stressing that the friendship between the two countries was

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72 Ibid., 98.
old and had flourished in the “soul of its peoples.” The Brazilian president’s nickname was largely adopted by the Chilean press, which made it clear that he was the most important leader and ally in the Southern Cone.

However, at the height of the Cold War, the debates that predominated in the Chilean press were about Jango’s adherence to communist ideals or, at least, his impartiality. The João Goulart agenda included the so-called “Brazilian Independent Foreign Policy,” which prescribed the freedom to trade with both sides during the Cold War, strengthening Brazil as a player in the economic world scenario. Established during the Jânio Quadros presidency, in 1961, this diplomatic approach was based on the assumption that “although States acted on the basis of the principle of self-help, they sought not only relative but also absolute gains, thus enabling other States to benefit.”

Also called *globalismo*, the Brazilian Independent Foreign Policy stated that diversification, instead of an exclusive alignment with the United States, would promote economic gains. It also welcomed the policies of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), created in 1948, of uniting Latin American countries, which should be treated differently from the larger economic powers. The Minister of Planning under João Goulart was economist Celso Furtado, who would later

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become one of the creators of dependency theory.\textsuperscript{78} In 1964, he worked on the implementation of UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) and became an internationally renowned economist, including in America, despite his “Marxist tendencies.”\textsuperscript{79} In summary, Goulart’s foreign policy was marked by a replacement of the “East-West disputes” with a “North-South” spin, in which the preoccupation with development and underdevelopment was also part of the commercial agenda.\textsuperscript{80}

In the domestic realm, Goulart’s nationalist policies were not welcomed by the military elites.\textsuperscript{81} Among the main reasons for the antipathy of the upper class towards him was not only his alleged involvement with the Communist Party, but also his social and economic policies that focused on greater state intervention and could be summarized in the plan of “Reformas de Base” (Basic Reforms). It included land expropriation and electoral and tax reforms. In 1962, he founded Eletrobras, a state-owned energy company. These ideas were promptly interpreted as a communist threat by the right-wing sectors of Brazilian society, as well as by the United States.

At the end of Goulart’s visit to Chile, the two presidents wrote a collective document, the \textit{Declaración Conjunta de los Presidentes de Chile y Brasil}, in which they


\textsuperscript{80} “A política externa independente durante o governo João Goulart,” Centro de Pesquisa e Documentação da Fundação Getúlio Vargas. Available online at: http://cpdoc.fgv.br/producao/dossies/Jango/artigos/NaPresidenciaRepublica/A_politica_externa_independente

\textsuperscript{81} Jorge Ferreira and Ângela de Castro Gomes, \textit{Jango: as múltiplas faces} (Rio de Janeiro: Editora da FGV, 2007).
supported the end of nuclear tests, the respect for all democratic regimes and the improvement of economic integration as an essential part of the development of South America. All these topics were much more aligned with Goulart’s Independent Foreign Policy than with Jorge Alessandri’s defense of a more intense partnership with the United States. Ángel Soto, Rogelio Núñez, and Cristián Garay interpret the document as proof of an asymmetric relation between Chile and Brazil at that time. For Goulart, Chile was simply a “useful ally” because, among the countries of the Southern Cone, it was the one that had stronger diplomatic ties with Brazil.

Alessandri’s pragmatism in accepting such measures, however, was the result of his own lack of conviction in regard to international affairs and the feeling that it was the only way of keeping cordial relations with Brazil. Alessandri’s “technocratic” philosophy was even more explicit in his relationship with Cuba. For example, he ignored the status of anti-Castro Cubans asylees who asked for support in the Chilean embassy. But for Raúl Bazán Dávila, Chilean ambassador to Brazil until 1962, it was not Alessandri, but Jango who took the hardest path. He considered Brazil to be too lost and “dazzled” by its own role in the international scenario to be able to find the best way of approaching the United States for financial aid. He claimed that the most effective manner of getting such support was not the “political argument, based on the territorial importance,” as Brazil believed, but the Alliance for Progress, as Chile had learned long ago.

84 Para conseguir ayuda financeira de EE.UU. Brasil seguiría confiando más que en la Alianza para el Progreso en el argumento político que le da su importancia territorial,
The first resolution resulting from the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs was about a “communist offensive in America.”\textsuperscript{85} Except for Cuba, all the countries agreed that “the principles of communism are incompatible with the principles of the inter-American system.”\textsuperscript{86} The conference took place in January 1962 in Punta del Este, with the clear objective of addressing the diverging responses that country members of the Organization of American States (OAS) had adopted toward
Cuba after the overthrow of Fulgencio Batista. However, instead of impacting relations with Fidel Castro’s government, it became a symbol of the political differences between the nations involved.

Besides having approved a total of nine resolutions, the diplomats decided to “suspend immediately trade with Cuba in arms and implements of war of every kind.”

But the expulsion of Cuba from the Inter-American system was not unanimous. Following the tradition of alignment in foreign affairs, both Brazil and Chile abstained from voting and the motion was adopted by a vote of 14 to 1 (Cuba), with six abstentions (the other four were Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Mexico). Remembering that “in the past three years 13 American states have found it necessary to break diplomatic relations with the present Government of Cuba,” the resolution also ruled that the countries’ members of the OAS should study “the feasibility and desirability of extending the suspension of trade to other items, with special attention to items of strategic importance.” Chile and Brazil once again abstained in block, as did Mexico and Ecuador.

The Independent Foreign Policy continued to speak volumes. Brazilian Chancellor San Tiago Dantas stated that “interventionist formulas or punishments will not be supported by the Brazilian government” and added that Brazil always embraced diplomatic action. Raúl Bazán Dávila, Chilean ambassador to Brazil until 1962, stated that such an attitude was “the guarantee of the principles of non-interventionism and self determination at the same time that keeps the scrupulous caution of the Brazilian sovereignty.” But he also claimed that the Brazilian government’s posture in regard to

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87 Actitud que observará Brasil en Punta del Este, Oficio Confidencial No 77/9 enviado por el embajador Marcelo Ruiz Solar al Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, Rio de Janeiro,
Cuba was “nationalist vanity.”\(^8\) For the Chilean ambassador, Brazilian policies were leaving the country isolated, far from the United States, and also from Argentina, which had broken relations with Cuba in February 1962.\(^9\) Nevertheless, Chile followed Brazil’s lead.

Dissatisfaction with Brazil grew strong among representatives of the US government and the Independent Foreign Policy was becoming a source of inquietude in Washington. A year earlier, Brazil had restored diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.\(^9\) In Punta del Este, the two countries took opposite sides while debating strategies to isolate Cuba. With Brazil as the leader of the moderate bloc, influencing Argentina, Mexico, Ecuador, Chile, and Bolivia, the United States had to accept halfway measures.\(^9\) After this disappointment, the country was dismayed once again with João Goulart’s government. The president replied to John F. Kennedy, right after the missile crisis in October, that Brazil had always been against any military intervention in Cuba because “we always recognize in every country, whatever their regime or governmental system, the right of sovereignty deciding for themselves. (…) Although we do not recognize as legitimate the offensive weaponry that the United States claims exists in Cuba, we have never recognized the war as an instrument capable of solving conflicts between

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\(^8\) Previous work.
After that, Brazilian Minister of Foreign Relations Hermes Lima continued seeking peaceful solutions to the international crisis, a posture that generated more discomfort between Goulart and Kennedy. On November 8th, the Premier of the Soviet Union, Nikita Khrushchev, declared he was grateful to Brazil for its efforts in helping to solve the crisis. The stiffness simmering in the United States was shared with the Brazilian elites and military leaders who would, less than two years later, conduct the 1964 coup.

After the fall of Goulart, Brazil and the United States began articulating ways to overthrow the Allende government—even while it did not yet exist. In the 1960s, the two countries were already worried about the growth of communism and left-wing politics in Chile, embodied by the figure of Allende. During the presidency of Eduardo Frei (November 3, 1964 to November 3, 1970), Salvador Allende’s predecessor, the United States carried out covert actions in the South American country that were “continuous and massive,” according to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities. The United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) spent three million dollars trying to influence the outcome of the 1964 presidential elections in Chile. Between 1970, the year Salvador Allende was elected president and the coup d’état of 1973, the government agency spent, covertly, over eight million dollars. From propaganda to direct financial

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94 Ibid.
95 Ibid. The report stresses that the amount was much more significant due to the price of the dollar in the Chilean black market, “where the unofficial exchange rate into Chilean escudos often reached five times the official rate.”
support to political parties, including Eduardo Frei Montalva’s Christian Democratic Party, CIA resources fomented the military coup. Although scholars have widely investigated and discussed the nature and extension of the US support for both the Chilean and the Brazilian coups d’état, they have not looked into the Brazilian role in the fall of Salvador Allende. Their contribution, however, is essential to the understanding of the dynamics of this regional Cold War and can be an important guide to the reading of the recently declassified documents that attest to Brazilian interference.

The North American Model

As early as 1970, when Brazil had been a dictatorship for six years and Chile was still under Salvador Allende’s socialist presidency, Ambassador Willard L. Beaulac, who served in US diplomatic institutions in five Latin American countries, released a book about the US’s multibillion-dollar aid program to the continent. A supporter of such initiatives, Beaulac gives subsequent researchers clues of how US officials saw the importance of keeping the continent under control during the Cold War. The Brazilian government followed a similar strategy with its intelligence agencies, modeled after the CIA.

When it comes to the diplomatic history of Latin America, scholars have followed a similar pattern: most of the works are dedicated to relations among South American countries and the United States. James Cockcroft’s Neighbors in Turmoil: Latin America traces the modern history of the continent through geography, politics, and culture but ends up, as historians usually do when examining this field, dedicating almost the entire

book to the positions of the US government and its citizenry. Peter Kornbluh demonstrates how US actions were fundamental to the overthrow of Allende. According to the historian, the economic crisis and lack of money for investments during the socialist presidency were the result of maneuvers by US officials. As early as 1970 the White House had succeeded in preventing the Inter-American Development Bank from lending money to Chile. The collaboration was maintained during the dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet, even in regard to internal policies. One of the most celebrated examples of how American views and ways of thinking informed even the nationalist agenda of the Chilean regime were the Chicago Boys, a group of prominent Chilean economists trained at the Department of Economics of the University of Chicago under Milton Friedman and Arnold Harberger, who were in charge of the Pinochetista economic strategy. From 1970 to 1973 the United States Central Intelligence Agency kept contact with the Chilean military with the official justification of gathering intelligence. However, according to the Staff Report of the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities on Covert Action in Chile the connection “meant that the United States sustained communication with the group most likely to take power from President Salvador Allende.”

Ruth Leacock investigates North American concerns about the growth of extreme leftism in the largest country of Latin America. She argues that it was first noticed in

1960, when Tad Szulc wrote an article for The New York Times about the involvement of pro-Castro Marxists in the organization of the Peasant Leagues in the Brazilian Northeast.\textsuperscript{100} According to Leacock, John F. Kennedy read the article and saw it as evidence of subversive activity in the hemisphere. The author also demonstrates that American officials in Brazil were frequently organizing meetings to discuss the Cold War and providing anti-communist materials for those gatherings.\textsuperscript{101} E. Bradford Burns also seeks explanations for the rise of leftist movements in Brazil and North American concerns. He finds that the surge in Brazilian nationalism in the 1950s, which veered leftward and criticized foreign economic domination, intensified a policy of attacks on the United States, which was the single largest investor in Brazil at the time.\textsuperscript{102} The anti-Yankee tone, Burns suggests, gained strength from 1951, when Getulio Vargas returned to power, until the civilian-military coup of 1964—a situation that obviously did not please US corporations.

In his book, Cold Warriors and Coups D’état, W. Michael Weis also frames the diplomatic relations that culminated in North American support of the coup in Brazil.\textsuperscript{103} Weis states that although US policymakers decided to give Brazilian President João Goulart a “reasonable benefit of the doubt,” his intent to support unions was seen as proof that he was “unprincipled and demagogic.” Jan Knippers Black states that North American scholars “ignored what so many Latin American scholars took for granted (but

\textsuperscript{100} Ruth Leacock, Requiem for Revolution—The United States and Brazil, 1961-1969 (Ohio: The Kent State University Press, 1990), 14.

\textsuperscript{101} The Cartilha para o Progresso [Primer for Progress], published in the major Brazilian newspapers, is an example of this strategy. Ibid., 72-73.


failed to document): US complicity” with the 1964 coup.\textsuperscript{104} It was a very similar strategy to the one adopted by the Brazilian government toward the Allende administration. Black argues that the United States had “attempted to modify or perpetuate the internal balance of political forces in Brazil” by using strategies such as warning business elites of the risk of Goulart’s government, containing the Peasant League’s movements, and keeping a close relationship with the Brazilian military. This was achieved, according to the author, through the manipulation of the media and a process of “penetration” of Brazilian elites.\textsuperscript{105}

In 1976, Phyllis R. Parker was already investigating such complicity. Parker collected and published information about Operation Brother Sam for the first time, in \textit{Separate but Equal? U.S. Policy toward Brazil, 1959-1964}.\textsuperscript{106} After that, scholars such as Moniz Bandeira\textsuperscript{107} and Carlos Fico\textsuperscript{108} wrote extensively about the episode, in which the United States posted four US Navy oil tankers on the Brazilian coast, in case the Brazilian Army needed the support of the United States for the \textit{coup}. Fico adds that although the Operation itself is frequently called Contingency Plan 2-61, these two actions were in fact different. Plan 2-61 was a larger project that encompassed the

\textsuperscript{105} Ibid., 95-110.
Operation and was planned in advance; not on the eve of the coup. It included logistical support and the provision of arms and ammunition.\textsuperscript{109}

The role of Brazilian and North American diplomats in the coup of 1964 has also been the focus of scholarly investigation. The US ambassador at the time of the overthrow of João Goulart, Lincoln Gordon, is the central figure of a work by Thomas E. Skidmore.\textsuperscript{110} More recently, Matias Spektor dedicated an entire book to the relations between National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger and the Brazilian civilian-military regime. He claims that Brazil tried to establish itself as a strong global player by building a relationship of equality with the northern country that avoided competition and passivity.\textsuperscript{111}

In the case of scholars analyzing Chilean diplomatic history, the same pattern is observed. In Patricia Verdugo’s work focusing on the day of the coup d’état that culminated in Salvador Allende’s death and Augusto Pinochet’s rise to power, she offers a rich perspective on the factors that led to this outcome—among them, the economic crisis and US support.\textsuperscript{112} La Historia Oculta del Régimen Militar: Chile 1973-1988 and Por la Razón o la Fuerza, Chile bajo Pinochet engages in an extensive explanation of Pinochet’s permanence in the Chilean presidency for almost two decades, analyzing the role of North American intellectuals in the development of economic policies. Both mention the US government support of the coup, but neither raises the possibility of one

\textsuperscript{109} Ibid., 87-8.
\textsuperscript{111} Matias Spektor, Kissinger e o Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 2009).
of the neighbor countries having influenced it.\textsuperscript{113} Journalist Mónica González, awarded the 2010 World Prize from UNESCO-Guillermo Cano of Press Freedom, began to raise the possibility of cooperation between Brazil and Chile during the period. She worked closely with the Brazilian Truth Commission to collect data on that, but has not yet published the results of the investigation.\textsuperscript{114} Emílio Ariel Crenzel also mentions the Brazilian influence on other South American regimes as a possibility but does not dedicate his work to this question.\textsuperscript{115} As demonstrated, historiography on the North American support of the Brazilian and Chilean dictatorships is extensive. Few scholars, however, have shed light on diplomatic relations between Brazil and other South American authoritarian regimes at the time.

\textbf{Diplomats and Spies}

The US government, nevertheless, was not alone in its preoccupation with the emergence of socialism in Chile. Brazilian diplomats and military attachés were also monitoring the lives of exiles in the country and in other nations of the Southern Cone. The presence of hundreds of political enemies of the dictatorship living in exile in Chile disturbed the military. The Centro de Informações do Exterior do Itamaraty (CIEX), the Brazilian Foreign Office’s Intelligence Center was created in 1966 mainly to keep track

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\textsuperscript{114} Mónica González, \textit{Chile: La conjura. Los mil y un día del golpe} (Santiago: Ediciones B, 2000).

\end{footnotesize}
of this group.\textsuperscript{116} A report from July 1967 alerts the Serviço Nacional de Informações (SNI), National Intelligence Service of Brazil, of the creation of two “National Committees” of the Organization of Latin American Solidarity (OLAS) in Chile and Argentina.\textsuperscript{117} The organization founded in Cuba in 1967 shared the ideals of anti-imperialism of the Cuban Revolution and was a common enemy of the United States and Brazil. And so was the founder of the Chilean OLAS committee: Salvador Allende. The CIEX report charges the Frente de Acción Popular (FRAP), a congregation of the Chilean Communist and Socialist Parties, with coordinating actions to spread communism in Latin America.\textsuperscript{118} Allende was then president of the Senate and despite the reprimand of President Eduardo Frei and of leaders of other countries, such as the head of the Christian Democrat Party from Venezuela, Edécio La Riva, and the Peruvian government, went ahead with establishing the board.

During the Eduardo Frei presidency, the Brazilian government kept cordial relations with Chilean authorities. In April 1970, the Chilean administration decided to support the Brazilian candidacy for the United Nations Security Council.\textsuperscript{119} The Brazilian ambassador spent most of his report writing about the repercussions of Chilean domestic policies. The two countries also maintained an intensive schedule of cultural events, such

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\textsuperscript{117} Organização Latino-Americana de Solidariedade. Comitês Nacionais, July 24, 1967, no 415, BR AN, BSB, IE 027, p. 64/72, Arquivo Nacional do Brasil, Brasília.
\textsuperscript{118} Ibid., 65/72.
\end{flushright}
as cinema and arts festivals.\textsuperscript{120} In May 1970 he wrote about Frei’s message to congress analyzing his presidency.\textsuperscript{121} Câmara Canto merely reports on the speech, avoiding any kind of judgment or opinion, very different from what he would do a few months later, during the Allende presidency. His tone only changed when writing about the repercussions of the news about the Brazilian dictatorship in the Chilean press. On June 16, 1970, he stated that the Brazilian government had been the victim of a “terrible diatribe” in a segment at TV 7, “a company in which the State, through several state organizations, is the main shareholder of the kidnapping of the German ambassador in Rio de Janeiro.\textsuperscript{122} He complains that the political commentator Luiz Hernandez Parker even claimed that the Chilean population should be in solidarity with demonstrations “against the torture of political prisoners in Brazil with the objective of creating a broad global movement.”\textsuperscript{123}

Worried about the future of such relations, Câmara Canto closely followed the candidacy of Salvador Allende. He sent the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Relations detailed reports about every demonstration, speech, or event of the \textit{Unidad Popular}.\textsuperscript{124} And he was not the only one. The entire country followed the series of protests that took place in Santiago during the presidential campaign. While promoting Allende, workers,
students, and supporters of the Unidad Popular demanded that President Eduardo Frei delivered his promises of land reform, wage increases, and copper nationalization. The Brazilian dictatorship became a target of the Left. Canto kept the Brazilian authorities posted on the situation in Santiago, especially when Brazilians were directly harmed. While the capital was still under the menace of a huge demonstration, a group of Brazilian students who had arrived in Santiago for an exchange program suffered threats from “leftist students” and were required to leave the University of Chile campus. Canto considered the episode an indication of the “amplification and depth achieved in this country of the campaign of international defamation organized by the media against the Brazilian government.”

A Common Enemy

Fascination is the best word to describe what Luiz José Torres Marques felt in his trip to Santiago. It was not due to the breezy weather in the Chilean capital in May or the effervescence of the streets in that “pivot of change” in 1970. The Brazilian colonel described with excitement a meeting behind closed doors in the Brazilian Embassy. Months before the election in which the majority of the citizens would choose Salvador Allende as president, members of the Brazilian government already discussed this possibility and predicted the 1973 coup d’état. Torres Marques went to the embassy to introduce himself and was surprised by the invitation from the military attaché to join

125 Intercâmbio Cultural Brasil-Chile. Incidentes com estudantes brasileiros, June 27, 1970, telegram number 9125. DCInt/DBP/542.6(32) and 542.64(32)14. Secretaria de Estado das Relações Exteriores, Arquivo Central do Itamaraty, Brasília.
staff members and secretaries of the embassy to discuss the Chilean domestic political situation. He wrote a three-page letter to Estado Maior das Forças Armadas (EMFA), the Major State of the Armed Forces’ Vice-Chief detailing the meeting led by the Brazilian ambassador at Santiago. The document only became public in August 2012, as a result of the work of the Brazilian Truth Commission which had been implemented three months earlier to investigate human rights violations in Brazil from September 18, 1946 to October 5, 1988, a period when the country was under different dictatorial regimes.

The Brazilian colonel stated that the situation in Chile was dramatic and listed several reasons why the Brazilian government should worry: the Communist Party was legal; most of the population and the military were against dictatorships; the military police, known as carabineros, were more powerful than the army and “totally unpredictable;” the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (the Revolutionary Left Movement, MIR) was gaining strength; and the Chilean population favored elections, whatever the outcome would be, an idea which is also “ingrained in the military sector.”

Misspelling Radomiro Tomic’s name, Torres Marques described the Brazilian diplomat’s predictions for the upcoming presidential elections: since the “51 votes from the Christian Democratic Party are heterogeneous;” the “27 right-wing votes will go to Alessandri and the 54 votes from the Popular Unity to Allende;” and that it was probable that “Atomic will hold the third position.” After affirming that both “Allende and Atomic are communists,” Câmara Canto recommended Alessandri, “an austere men and worthy

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from all points of view, the favorite among the upper class,” as the best choice for “those who don’t want to see communism in the country.”\textsuperscript{127}

Torres Marques’ narrative demonstrates that, more than a clear vision of the trends of the Chilean congress, the Brazilian government’s most important representative had a strategy of reaction for each possible outcome. The first was that, in case Alessandri won the majority of the votes, Chile would remain a democratic government. The second situation was Alessandri winning a plurality. In such scenario, the Congress would have to choose a candidate. Then, the diplomat suggested two hypotheses: “Alpha: the congress countersignatures Alessandri ... Beta: the congress countersignatures Allende.” In the “beta” case, the probable consequence would be a “military move against Allende,” according to Câmara Canto’s predictions. There was also a third hypothesis: Allende winning a plurality. In this case, the Brazilian ambassador expected military reactions if Allende were nominated president, and a “subversive reaction” in case Alessandri were nominated.

The investigation of the political, economic, and geographical aspects of neighboring countries was a usual practice for the now defunct Estado Maior das Forças Armadas (EMFA), the Major State of the Armed Forces.\textsuperscript{128} Activities such as “mapping of the national territory and, in particular, the Border Areas” and the strategic analysis of countries such as Chile, Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Argentina and Peru were made and remade constantly.\textsuperscript{129} But, despite not sharing a border, the level of preoccupation the Brazilian government had with Chile in the years when the menace of a socialist

\textsuperscript{127} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{128} Aviso no 05/ FA-2 204, July 20, 1973, EMFA, ANB, Brasília.
\textsuperscript{129} Aviso no 008/ FA-10 238, September 5, 1973, EMFA, ANB, Brasília.
government emerged in the region is far more substantial than what scholars have acknowledged so far and came from all the national intelligence services, including the diplomatic. The Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Relation has denied for several decades the existence of the Brazilian Foreign Office’s Intelligence Center (CIEX), a central part of the interference in South American countries.

One of the central reasons for the obliviousness of academics to this topic was the lack of sources from the period. Like Torres Marques’ report, most of the documents of Brazilian intelligence services about Chile had been classified until May 2012, when the Comissão Nacional da Verdade (CNV), the Brazilian Truth Commission, was established. By the end of its operations, in December 2014, the CNV sent then President Dilma Rousseff a report of more than four thousand pages with twenty-nine recommendations for the government to prevent future human rights violations.130 It also concluded that there were 434 deaths and disappearances from 1964 to 1970 and identified 377 agents of repressive state policies. Millions of documents, including diplomatic correspondence, reserved bulletins, testimonies of victims and torturers, pictures, videos, and books became available at the Brazilian National Archives, in Brasília. Members of the CNV also spent time in Chile, where they collected documents and conducted interviews about relations between the two countries. Besides several bureaucratic documents reporting day-by-day activities, the files include the correspondence between military authorities from Chile and Brazil that scholars and the general public could not yet access at that point.

130 The full report is available online at: www.cnv.gov.br
Another reason for the lack of scholarly work investigating the connections between the two countries is that, when it comes to the dictatorial period, the role of diplomatic relations between South American governments has been overshadowed by the support of the United States. In addition to US influence, the historiography of this time has tended to seek only the role of countries at the center of the Cold War narrative, such as the Soviet Union and Cuba, and their relationship to the military regimes of South America. The interpretative legacy of dependency theory, that there is always a great nation to determine the direction of “small” countries, categorizes the interregional approach as secondary. The links between Chile and Brazil, however, allow us not only to understand this policy change, but also to reevaluate the role of the United States in the dictatorships of Chile and Brazil. The actions of the northern giant were not the only reason for the overthrow of Allende. They were part of a much broader articulation that included a local Cold War dynamic that figured Brazil sometimes as an independent player and at other times as an important US partner against the spread of communism.

**Politics is My Business**

Besides the Brazilian military government, civilians in the biggest country of the Southern Cone were also worried about the potential spread of communism in the area. Between 1972 and 1973, weapons and ammunitions were sent to Valparaíso, in Chile, from the Port of Santos, in the Brazilian state of São Paulo. The ordnance was hidden in boxes of agricultural products imported by then Chilean senator Pedro Ibañez Ojeda and had as its final destination the Chilean paramilitary group *Frente Nacionalista Patria y
The Bolivian dictator Hugo Banzer Suárez was also part of the export of weaponry to the Chilean extreme-right, allowing American and Brazilian businessmen to smuggle arms into bases in the Bolivian territory. According to Elio Gaspari, besides the “political affinities” there was a *quid pro quo*: “the general wanted to sell oil to Brazil and, since 1938, Brazil wanted to control the reserves of natural gas of Bolivia.”

Another central branch of the Brazilian influence was the Instituto de Pesquisas e Estudos Sociais (IPES), the Institute for Social Research and Studies. The entity was created in 1962, when a large part of the Brazilian elite and business sector was discontent with the administration of President João Goulart. High inflation, the perception that the government lacked sound economic policies, and the preoccupation with the spreading of communism in Brazil inspired businessmen to create the institute to develop strategies to oppose the president. At first, it was based in Rio de Janeiro and had the participation of groups from São Paulo. But in a few months, the IPES had collaborators from several states. The main focus of the institute was to connect right-wing movements to resist and oppose the “growth of Soviet communism in the Western hemisphere.” For that, they collected information on thousands of “suspicious people”

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133 Christiane Jalles de Paula, “O Instituto de Pesquisa e Estudos Sociais – IPES.” Available online at: http://cpdoc.fgv.br/producao/dossies/Jango/artigos/NaPresidenciaRepublica/O_Instituto_de_Pesquisa_e_Estudos_Sociais

134 Fundo Instituto de Pesquisas e Estudos Sociais—IPES (QL), Coordenação Geral de Processamento e Preservação do Acervo Coordenação de Documentos Audiovisuais e Cartográficos Equipe de Documentos Iconográficos, Arquivo Nacional, Brasília.
around Brazil. The executive secretary of IPES was Golbery Couto e Silva, the General of the Brazilian Army who headed the Brazilian National Intelligence Service from 1964 to 1967.

The project developed by the institute to remove Jango from power was very similar to the CIA “spoiling operations.” It spread publications and rumors of connections between the president and the Communist Party, and of data that suggested that the economic crisis was more severe than it was in reality. The IPES promoted classes and conferences, published books, reports, and newspapers articles, and even released a series of fourteen movies of “democratic doctrination.”\textsuperscript{135} It also gave money to institutions that opposed Jango’s policies, such as the “Círculos Operários carioca e paulista, a Confederação Brasileira de Trabalhadores Cristãos, a Campanha da Mulher pela Democracia (Camde) do Rio, a União Cívica Feminina de São Paulo, o Instituto Universitário do Livro, e o Movimento Universitário de Desfavelamento,” as well as the Associação de Diplomados da Escola Superior de Guerra.\textsuperscript{136} Besides helping the coup of 1964 with propaganda, some members of the institute acted in “more direct ways,” an effort that the civilian-military regime celebrated when a presidential decree stated that the IPES was a group of “public utility.”\textsuperscript{137}

\textsuperscript{136} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{137} “Fundo Instituto de Pesquisas e Estudos Sociais—IPES (QL), Coordenação Geral de Processamento e Preservação do Acervo Coordenação de Documentos Audiovisuais e
In January 1974, less than a year after the overthrow of Allende, the journalist Marlise Simons affirmed that

The *coup* that brought Brazil’s armed forces to power in March, 1964, appears to have been used as a model for the Chilean military *coup*. The private sector played a crucial role in the preparation of both interventions, and the Brazilian businessmen who plotted the overthrow of President Joao Goulart in 1964 were the same people who advised the Chilean Right on how to deal with Marxist President Allende.¹³⁸

Simons interviewed members of the institute who confirmed that they had an important role not only in the Brazilian *coup*, but also in the Chilean one.¹³⁹ Glycon de Paiva, who was vice-president of the IPES from its embryonic phase in 1961 to 1967, is one of them. The mining engineer accumulated a series of prominent positions in Brazilian politics, including being president of the Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico (BNDE), currently known as Banco Nacional do Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social (BNDES), National Bank of Economic and Social Development from 1955-56. Paiva was one of the founders of the IPES, which had the objective of “defending personal and corporate freedom, threatened by the dormant socialization plan of the João Goulart government,” by “improving the civic and democratic conscience of the people.”¹⁴⁰ Paiva confirmed to Simons that, as “a leading figure in a private anti-Communist think tank” in Rio de Janeiro, he advised Chilean businessmen on “how to ‘prepare the ground’ for the

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¹³⁹ Ibid.
¹⁴⁰ Glycon de Paiva Teixeira Verbete biográfico. Available online at: http://www.fgv.br/cpdoc/acervo/dicionarios/verbete-biografico/glycon-de-paiva-teixeira
military overthrow of President Salvador Allende.”\textsuperscript{141} He states that after Allende’s inauguration, Chilean businessmen looked for his advice and he explained that “the recipe exists, and you can bake the cake any time. We saw how it worked in Brazil, and now again in Chile.”\textsuperscript{142} His recipe was the same that the CIA had used in the “spoiling operations” and that the IPES had applied to Jango: creating a sensation of severe economic crisis among the population, connecting the president to the “cruelties” of communism, and organizing institutions to protest against the government. Paiva confirms that such interventions require a great deal of money, but states that it was all well spent. “The money businessmen spent against the Left is not just an investment; it is an insurance policy,” he concluded. Paiva even claims that the infamous Chilean women’s movement responsible for the “marches of the empty pots,” which influenced the fall of Allende, was inspired by what Brazil had done much earlier, the Campaign of Women for Democracy, an invention of the IPES.

Simons also asserts that Chileans who fled the country to Brazil right after Salvador Allende’s elections in 1970 found good jobs in multinational corporations and developed ideas from their friendship with some of the “architects of the 1964 Brazilian coup.” Inspired by the IPES, they founded the Centro para el Estudio de la Opinión Pública (CEOP), Center for Public Opinion Studies. The Christian Democratic Party also had its version, a similar institution, called the Corporation for Social, Economic and Cultural Studies (CODESEC). Besides the propaganda against the socialist government,

\textsuperscript{142} Ibid.
these groups also organized classes and seminars in self-defense and guerrilla strategies.\textsuperscript{143}

\textbf{My Business is Politics}

The period between 1969 and 1974, while Antonio Delfim Netto was the Brazilian Minister of Finance, is considered one of the fastest periods of economic growth in the country’s history. The “Economic Miracle” assured Delfim Netto a long and stable political career that included five consecutive terms as representative of the state of São Paulo.\textsuperscript{144} The positive economic figures of this period are attributed to the redistribution of federal taxes which were concentrated in the hands of the central government for a greater investment in infrastructure. As a complement to these administrative changes, the bank Caixa Econômica Federal and the Casa da Moeda (Brazilian Mint) became public companies. The Interministerial Price Council (CIP) began regulating prices in all sectors of the Brazilian economy. The protectionist economic policies that defined the Brazilian civilian-military regime continued strong.

Henceforth, after Delfim Netto’s departure from the Ministry of Finance, Brazilian dictatorial economic policy followed the same steps, increasingly distancing itself from the style of the Chilean government. After the 1973 	extit{coup d’état}, the Pinochet government trusted this area to the so-called Chicago Boys, who drew on the teachings of Milton Friedman and Arnold Harberger from the Department of Economics at the

\textsuperscript{143} Ibid.
University of Chicago, from whence most of them had graduated. The central point of their economic policy was to encourage the free operation of the private sector, which would become its most important element; prices would be regulated on their own, as a consequence of competition between corporations; government expenditures would be reduced so that control of inflation could finally be possible. Milton Friedman, sounding like a proud professor, used the nickname in his memoirs to say that in 1975, “when inflation was still raging and a global recession triggered a depression in Chile, General Pinochet addressed the ‘Chicago Boys’... and appointed several of them to positions of power in the government.”

Friedman's point of view is criticized by economists such as Paul Krugman, who states that Chile had a huge economic crisis in the early 70s, which was, yes, partly due to Allende and the accompanying turmoil. Then the country experienced a recovery driven in large part by massive capital inflows, which mostly consisted of making up the lost ground. Then there was a huge crisis again in the early 1980s—part of the broader Latin debt crisis, but Chile was hit much worse than other major players. It wasn’t until the late 1980s, by which time the hard-line free-market policies had been considerably softened, that Chile finally moved definitively ahead of where it had been in the early 70s.

Gary S. Becker attributes the unpopularity of the Chicago Boys to economists in South America who favored the planning and control of the economy by a central federal government, policies antagonistic to those proposed by the Pinochet team. They advocated “widespread deregulation, privatizations, and other free market policies for

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tightly controlled economies.”

Fig. 4. Meeting between the Minister of Planning, Roberto Campos, and then Brazilian president, Castelo Branco. September 10, 1964. Agência O Globo.

The differences between Chilean and Brazilian economic policies have contributed to the lack of interest of academics in the influence of the Brazilian dictatorship in the establishment of Chile’s economic policies. However, despite the commonsensical view that the two countries could not have chosen more different approaches, the documents declassified by the Brazilian Truth Commission, along with oral histories and diplomatic correspondence, reveal that another Brazilian had introduced to the Chilean right-wing sector ideas similar to those later established by the Chicago Boys. Influenced by his business partner, Jorge Flores, Roberto de Oliveira Campos supported the coup d’état in 1964 in Brazil and became a powerful adviser.

during the entire period of the dictatorship. Criticizing João Goulart, Campos classified his administration as a “bitter experience of the radicalization of political attitudes that were leading us to administrative inertia, galloping inflation, economic backwardness and the loss of substance of democratic institutions.”

Roberto Campos was Brazilian ambassador to the United States in 1961, when John F. Kennedy had just started his presidential mandate under the assumption that Latin America was among the most dangerous areas in the world for the spreading of communism. It was the time of the Alliance for Progress and the apex of the Cold War. A champion of the promotion of entrepreneurship and of the free market, Campos was so in tune with US economic policy that he was nicknamed Bob Fields, the English translation of his name.

During the government of Castelo Branco, Campos was named Minister of Planning and commanded economic policies with the Minister of Finance, Octavio Gouvea de Bulhões. Campos’ style was the opposite of his successor, Delfim Netto. When accepting the post of Minister of Planning on April 19, 1964, he warned then President Castelo Branco that the risks necessary to contain a “country disorganized by inflation” could affect his popularity. He claimed that it would be necessary to put “order in the house” before leading the country to further economic acceleration, and that “the results are slow; often the principle of the fight against inflation results in higher inflation, the need to set prices out of phase, especially in the public sector. It is necessary to cut budgets, limiting credit and it should not be ruled out that there could be a period

of recession.” Twenty days after the Brazilian *coup d'etat*, Castelo Branco gave him the green light and answered, aware of the powers of a dictatorship, “perhaps you underestimate me. I have no electoral concern.”

In fact, recalling his invitation from Castelo Branco to the Ministry of Planning, Campos attributes it to his affinity with the United States. Campos had had contact with Castelo Branco for the first time in March 1951, in Washington, during the Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of America, where the central theme was the Korean War. His hypothesis was that when Castelo Branco became president he had agreed to appoint Campos to the prestigious role because of the analysis of the situation the diplomat used to present at meetings of the Brazilian delegation. “In my speeches, I sought critically to evaluate the areas of coincidence and conflict between the interests of Brazil and the United States.”

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151 Ibid., 560.
Right after the civilian-military coup of 1964, during the presidency of Castelo Branco, official relations between Brazil and the Northern giant became stronger. The United States made a large loan to the new government and the country received $2 billion from 1964 to 1970, ranking third behind Vietnam and India as a recipient of US aid. In response, the Brazilian military president adopted a policy of alignment with the interests of the United States, a style that the following president, Artur da Costa e Silva, also cultivated.

As Minister of Planning and during the years of the Chilean dictatorship, Campos made several trips to Chile, where he met with businessmen and members of the right-wing movements of the country. He is one of the links that allows us today to understand Brazil’s influence on Chilean politics as far greater than had been previously thought and that reinforces, independently, the United States’ support of the Chilean dictatorship. The Brazilian model influenced Chilean politics from the conception of the coup, in line with what had happened in Brazil in 1964, to the political and economic aspects of the Pinochet dictatorship, which was implemented according to the interests of Brazilian businessmen and economists. The visit of Roberto Campos, the “mind behind the Brazilian dictatorship,” to Santiago in 1971, is an example of such influence. In addition, meetings and conversations between the militaries of the two countries, unknown until recently, can finally be understood as fundamental to the public policies of the Chilean dictatorship.

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155 “Ingreso silenciosamente al país teorico de la dictadura brasileña toma contactos con la derecha,” Ultima Hora, November 26, 1971. 3.
The Chilean press also denounced the ties between Brazilian businessmen and the opposition to the Allende government. In November 1971, the newspaper *Ultima Hora* described with concern the trip of the former Brazilian Minister of Planning to Santiago. According to the publication, Campos was “quietly in touch with the right wing of Chile” and was “the right person to establish high-level contacts between Chileans and the Brazilian right.”

In describing the story to the Brazilian government, Ambassador Antônio Cândido da Câmara Canto noted that the article was “obviously distorted,” since Campos’ relations with the North American and military capitalists of South America simply “accentuated” the economic ties between the two countries.

These ties had already begun strengthening much earlier, when Campos was still economic director of the BNDE (National Bank for Economic Development). Campos recalls a visit to Santiago in January 1953, “to request ECLAC’s technical assistance for Brazil’s planning, explicitly stating Raúl Prebisch’s desire to have Celso Furtado as ECLAC’s group leader.” Campos criticizes the “Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean methodology,” claiming not to believe in the government’s ability to “rationally coordinate the market” and strongly criticizing the economic policy of the Allende government:

> The methodology of ECLAC has never been successfully applied in Latin America. Chilean experiments (under Salvador Allende) and Peruvians (under General Velasco Alvarado), closer to the ECLAC model, were resounding failures. The whole plan was illusory without socialist authoritarianism. And socialist authoritarianism has shown, over the years, to be a combination of political tyranny and economic inefficiency.

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156 Ibid.
The wave of nationalizations driven by the Brazilian civilian-military dictatorship, which would become one of the characteristics of this period and one of the most important reasons for scholars today to consider the Brazilian and Chilean models to be opposites, was strongly rejected by Campos. He famously disdained what he called the three great “isms:” communism, fascism, and “the most enduring of all, nationalism.” From the oil and nuclear industries to the telecommunications sector, during the dictatorial period various activities previously undertaken by the private sector were absorbed by the state sector, almost always in a monopolistic fashion. The former Minister of Planning associated such policies to Brejnebian socialism.

The devaluation of private companies was associated with Allende’s supposed economic failure. In 1964, however, before referring to what he called the death of nationalism, Campos went on to say that “a certain type of nationalism, in a particular historical context, can contribute to the process of detonating development.” He added, classifying this type of nationalism as “appropriate nationalism (often practiced by me), which tries to compel foreign investors to nationalize faster, or to leave in the territory in which they operate a greater proportion of the fruits of the investment.” Campos

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161 In his memoirs, Campos asserts that “in the early 1970s statism was still the dominant ideology in Latin America. Brejnebian socialism continued to grow, and only the intelligence agencies of some countries perceived the great operational failures of Marxism-Leninism, which had the promise of rapid industrialization with social justice. False but seductive to the Third World.” Campos, 1994, 910.
concludes his critique of the three great “isms” with a prognosis for the late twentieth century: “In the first quarter of this century, we have avenged the socialist utopia. In the second there was the birth, passion and death of Nazi-fascism. In the third, capitalism and communism would fight in the Cold War. In the last quarter of the century, the old “isms” will increasingly give way to liberalism.” Campos also celebrated the Chicago Boys when he remembered, with relief, the years after Allende’s death. He feared his passing would result in the crystallization of a “myth.” He predicted that alive, Allende “would only be a case of lack of objectivity and the lack of rudimentary economic truths. Dead, he could become a symbol of the restless pursuit of a ‘third way.’ Fortunately, the Chilean military developed reasonable economic efficiency and, helped by the international situation adverse to socialism, put an end to the myth.”

Chapter Two

Setting the Terrain

“Era la alegre hora del asalto y el beso.
La hora del estupor que ardía como un faro.
Ansiedad de piloto, furia de buzo ciego,
turbia embriaguez de amor, todo en ti fue naufragio!”

Pablo Neruda, La Canción Desesperada, 1924.

During the late 1960s, a large part of the Western Hemisphere experienced a time of discovery and contestation: miniskirts, swinging London, “black is beautiful,” “flower power.” Meanwhile, the Brazilian population witnessed the solidification of an imposed civilian-military regime and a dictatorship that would last for over two decades. Several movements of resistance were born and suffocated. While many might remember 1968 as the year of demonstrations, riots, sex, drugs, and rock and roll, if you ask a Brazilian what first comes to mind when thinking of that year, he or she will probably mention the Ato Institucional Número 5, Institutional Act Number Five (AI-5). Martin Luther King, Jr.’s assassination, the Prague Spring, and the Black Power movement would be probably relegated to second place.

The Brazilian dictatorial government and the United States, however, had more in common than appearances could tell. Then presidents Richard Nixon and Emílio

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165 Translation by the author: “It was the happy hour of assault and the kiss./ The hour of the spell that blazed like a lighthouse./ Pilot’s anxiety, fury of blind/ turbulent drunkenness of love, everything in you was a shipwreck.”

Garrastazu Médici both understood they commanded powerful nations, and were responsible for putting an end to the spread of communism in Latin America. Therefore, it is not surprising that both worked independently and together to weaken the Left in Chile and overthrow the government of Salvador Allende. Two thousand miles away from Brasília, in Santiago de Chile, the climate was very different. Supporters of Salvador Allende started organizing the campaign for the 1970 elections while then President Eduardo Frei, who defeated Allende in 1964, promoted a series of measures to tackle poverty.\textsuperscript{167} For the first time in decades, agrarian reform, socioeconomic equality, and housing programs became part of the agenda. The Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo (Minvu), the Ministry of Housing and Urbanism, created in 1965, during Frei’s government, is still considered a turning point of Chile’s housing policies. Migration from rural areas and the increase in population were pushing factors of the demand for new places to live and subsequent investments in the cities. Furthermore, the severe rain season of 1965 made it necessary to create options for the homeless. During this time, the government created the \textit{Operación Sitio}, first as a temporary measure, and later, as one of the biggest housing projects of the country’s history.\textsuperscript{168} Chilean citizens could apply to get loans and buy small pieces of land with access to water and electricity.

More and more people, however, began to see Frei’s so-called process of “Chileanization” as too timid. Many decided that it was time to take action and protested


the slowness of the construction of houses by invading areas of Santiago and other urban centers. In March 1967, the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionária (Revolutionary Left Movement) supported the taking of Herminda de la Victoria, which started off a series of over four hundred land invasions during the Frei administration. Moreover, land reform aroused the quest for more rights among peasants, while sectors of the middle class demanded the nationalization of the copper industry. Allende proposed the radicalization of Frei’s boldest measures with the implementation of a socialist government. “La Vía Chilena al Socialismo,” or “the Chilean Path to Socialism,” included deep changes in Chilean economic structure, such as the nationalization of industries and of the country’s most important resource, copper. It also rejected foreign and national monopolies. Allende’s Unidad Popular (UP) vowed to break up large land properties and promote a wider agrarian reform.

When the day of the elections arrived, it was impossible to predict who would win. In March 1970, the United States decided not to officially assist any candidate, but rather to secretly “wage ‘spoiling’ operations against the Popular Unity coalition which supported the Marxist candidate, Salvador Allende.” The CIA spent from $800,000 to $1 million on a campaign against Allende, whose victory “was equated with violence and repression.” On September 4, Allende won 36.29% of the votes. Second place went to

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170 Stallings, 1979, 126. The original program of the Unidad Popular can be found online at http://www.abacq.net/imaginera/frame5.htm.
172 Ibid. This amount refers to the amount spent before Allende’s elections. In a top secret hearing at the American congress, CIA director William E. Colby testified that the
Jorge Alessandri, from the National Party, who received 35.76 %, and in third place was
Christian Democratic Party’s Radomiro Tomic, with 27.95 % of the votes. Allende
won a plurality, not a majority, and the Chilean Constitution determined that in these
cases, the Senate should choose one of the two first candidates to rule the country. But
the decision of Congress in favor of the socialist leader was not only based on numbers.
On October 25, the death of General René Schneider, commander-in-chief of the army
and ferocious opponent of any armed intervention to block Allende’s constitutional
election, turned public opinion in favor of Allende. The military also despised the
violence of the assassination, which was the result of a plot orchestrated by the CIA to
prevent opposition to a coup.

Influenced by the emotional mood that filled the country, Congress named
Salvador Allende president after he signed the Estatuto de Garantías Constitucionales, a
statute the Christian Democrats had proposed in which Allende promised to preserve the
democratic regime. On November 3, Allende was inaugurated president of Chile. More
than a simple victory, his confirmation was a reaction to US intervention. The socialist
agency had spent over $8 million on covert actions during the Allende administration.

See Seymour M. Hersh, “C.I.A. Chief Tells House Of $8-Million Campaign Against
173 See Georgetown University Political Database of the Americas, which can be found
online at http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Elecdata/Chile/pres_totals.html. There are,
however, slightly different numbers from other sources.
174 “Texto refundido de la Ley General de Elecciones de Chile.” Law number 12.891
established in Santiago, on July 10, 1958. Available at the Biblioteca del Congreso
Nacional de Chile (BCN) and online at http://www.leychile.cl/Navegar?idNorma=253140.
175 Patricio Garcia, El Caso Schneider (Santiago: Editora Nacional Quimantú, 1972), and
Florencia Varas, Conversaciones con Viaux (Santiago: Impresiones EIRE, 1972).
176 Boorstein, 1977, 67.
177 Willard L. Beaulac, A Diplomat Looks at Aid to Latin America (Carbondale: Southern
administration was now a reality that enjoyed the support of the population and the tolerance of the military. Nevertheless, the US government’s fear of a new Cuba was greater than ever.178

Médici and Nixon

Fig. 6. Presidents Emílio Médici and Richard Nixon in a press conference at the White House - Photograph by Byron E Shumaker courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration

Brazil posed a different problem to North American foreign policies. The country remained aligned with Richard Nixon’s policies; however, after the passage of Institutional Act Number Five (AI-5), the world—and especially public opinion in the United States—was no longer blind to the violence perpetrated by the Brazilian government. It was a turning point that brought questioning among members of the US government and criticism from the public. A few days after AI-5’s approval, Jack Kubisch, a Brazil specialist from the Department of State, wrote a memo in which he recognized that human rights in Brazil “have already suffered to some extent and remain under serious threat.” Despite the acknowledgement, relations among the United States, Brazil, and Chile remained cordial. In 1972, the Secretary of Treasury of the United States, John Connally, traveled to South America. The summary of his visit to Brazil, sent to President Nixon, states that Connally:

had a long and particularly warm meeting with President Médici who recalled with pleasure his conversations with you last December. Médici reaffirmed Brazil’s policies with respect to Cuba, indicated his enthusiastic support for your initiatives in the international arena, and promised Brazil’s support for the U.S. efforts to restructure the international monetary and trading system.

The conversations Emílio Garrastazu Médici “recalled with pleasure” took place on the occasion of the Brazilian president’s visit to America. Uncharismatic and authoritarian, Médici is considered by many to be the most repressive of the Brazilian

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179 Developments in Brazil: Significance of Institutional Act No. 5, telegram number 292127, December 25, 1968. Available online at: https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:336519/
180 South American Portion of Secretary Connally’s Trip, Memorandum 5001, June 23, 1972, Department of State E.O. 12958.
military leaders. His reputation of being an assertive and arrogant man preceded and followed him on his public appearances. Instead of hoping for the blessing of the president of the world superpower, he considered himself the ruler of a powerful nation of his own.  

The trip offered the conservative media a thread of positive stories to tell, not only in Brazil, but also elsewhere in the Southern Cone. The Chilean magazine *Qué Pasa* published a cover story about Médici’s trip to America. Entitled “Brazil will speak in Washington as a world power,” the story applauded Brazilian economic success and ignored any mention of torture or censorship.  

It was a considerable change from the previous months, when several newspaper articles denouncing abuses of human rights stained the image of the Brazilian government abroad. The negative press began simultaneously to the start of a new strategy of Brazilian leftist groups to denounce the dictatorship and gain strength: the kidnapping of international authorities in exchange for political prisoners.

First, in 1969, the groups Ação Libertadora Nacional (ALN) and Movimento Revolucionário 8 de Outubro (MR-8) abducted the U.S. Ambassador Charles Elbrick. Then, in March 1970, the Vanguarda Popular Revolucionária (VPR) kidnapped the general consul of Japan in São Paulo, Nobuo Ozuchi. On June 18, 1970, the VPR and the Frente de Libertação Nacional (FLN) pulled the German Ambassador Ehrenfried von

181 A brief biography of Emílio Garrastazu Médici can be found online at http://www.biblioteca.presidencia.gov.br/ex-presidentes/emilio-medici/biografia-periodo-presidencial.


Holleben from his car. He was freed five days later, in exchange for forty political prisoners. The Brazilian government reacted violently, with more imprisonment and punishment. While the local media was under censorship and accused the rebels of being terrorists, Chilean leftist networks reacted aggressively, calling for demonstrations against Emílio Médici. The climate of criticism would not end soon.

When Médici traveled to America, he decided to focus on numbers. Brazil was heading for an active international policy. The country’s economy had achieved impressive growth—11.1% a year from 1968 to 1973. The population was moving from rural to urban areas, and the middle class increased considerably. Exports and imports rose from 4.1% and 2.7% per year, respectively, from 1964 to 1967, and to 24.6% and 27.5% per year from 1968 and 1973. It was in this climate that Richard Nixon invited Brazilian president Emílio Garrastazu Médici to visit the United States in December 1971. They agreed on a three-day tour, from the 7th to the 9th. The strong economic momentum led Médici to decide that it was time to pursue Nixon’s endorsement. The open support of the US president would impress his military colleagues, the press, and Brazilian public opinion. Historian Matias Spektor offers an insightful interpretation of Médici’s posture, arguing that “it is also possible that, for him, the trip was a way to legitimize the dictatorship in a period when a network of political

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186 Telegram number 19187, DFE/DPR/660.7(32), June 18, 1971, Secretaria de Estado das Relações Exteriores, Arquivo Central do Itamaraty, Brasília.
188 Ibid., 224.
exiles was beginning to make noise with accusations regarding torture and terrorism from the regime he was commanding.” 189

As James N. Green demonstrates in his work about American civil society’s reaction to the violation of human rights in Brazil and its influence on the weakening of the dictatorship, demonstrations and publications questioning the Brazilian regime were now widespread. 190 During Médici’s stay in Washington D.C. it was no different. A group of Brazilian exiles and American intellectuals carried a large poster, readable from the White House, which stated: “Stop U.S. Dollar Complicity with Brazilian Torture.” 191 While visiting the Organization of American States (OAS), Emílio Médici was once again challenged when a protester, who had entered the meeting pretending to be a journalist, stood up and screamed in Portuguese: “Long live free Brazil—stop the tortures!” 192

Just a few months before Médici’s visit, The Washington Post published a one-page article about Marcos Arruda, who lived in the United States, in forced exile. 193 It detailed Arruda’s arrest, torture, and exile, and explained that it was “based largely on one man’s account of his arrest, nine-month imprisonment and torture at the hands of the Brazilian military government. The Brazilian embassy in Washington, asked about the

189 Matias Spektor, Kissinger e o Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 2009), 45.
191 Ibid., 194.
case, declined to comment, saying that it lacked direct information about it.” The article had a wide repercussions.

It started by describing the day of May 11, 1970, when officers arrested Marcos Arruda. They subjected him to torture and interrogations for several months. His mother, Lina Penna Sattamini, was an American naturalized citizen living in the United States since 1958 and working as an interpreter for the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). She received a letter from her mother explaining that after twenty-four days waiting for news, she had finally learned that Marcos had been arrested. “My son had been tortured so badly that he had been taken to a hospital, where they thought he was going to die.” Sattamini traveled to Brazil to finally be reunited with her son. He had been under arrest for almost three months when the family was allowed to see him for the first time. After the encounter, Sattamini wrote a letter to the Minister of Justice of the Médici government:

Respected Minister, my son is an invalid! His left leg is paralyzed, and he can’t move it. His right eyelid is almost shut and the left is half-open. He suffers convulsions of the thorax, swallows only with great difficulty, and pronounces his ‘r’s doubled, as the French do.

Arruda was released in February 1, 1971. His mother traveled to Brazil and, using her influence as a US State Department employee, was able to help him to obtain a visa. Arruda resisted at first. But after three months, when he was still recovering, he found out that a case was being presented against him at the Supreme Military Court accusing him

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194 Ibid.
196 Ibid., 37.
of subversion. “I would be arrested again and would have to wait for the court judgment in prison. At this moment, my family, my comrades, and I decided I had to leave the country. Much against my will, because I was very critical of US policies, we decided it was time to go.”

But Emílio Garrastazu Médici was determined not to bother with stories of Brazilian exiles and other political enemies based in the United States—or, at least, not to demonstrate that he did. On the night of his arrival, Nixon offered him a dinner in the State Dining Room at the White House. It was almost 10:00 p.m. when the American president proposed a toast. He looked at the Brazilian leader, who listened carefully to the translator, and declared:

Working with you as the leader of that country—because we know that as Brazil goes, so will go the rest of that Latin American Continent—the United States and Brazil, friends and allies in the past, and as this dinner tonight reaffirms, strong and close personal and official friends today, we shall work together for a greater future for your people, for our people, and for all the people of the American family, for which we have a special place in our hearts.

The day after, a self-assured Emílio Garrastazu Médici entered Richard Nixon’s office, at the White House. The confidential meeting became public in 2008, when the National Security Archives declassified a memorandum detailing the conversation. With the help of an interpreter, the Brazilian president said his “visit and his welcome had been far

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197 Interview with Marcos Arruda by the author, via Skype. March 8, 2012.
above anything he had expected.” He continued, making it clear they were equals by saying jocularly that the “word had gotten around that he had hit it off well with the President, that they had become friends, and that was why people were asking him to intercede with the President,” to which Nixon replied that he felt they had “established a close and friendly relationship.”

The “true friends” went on talking about Cuba and what a great coincidence it was that neither wanted any kind of relation with the communist island. Then, Nixon suggested they open a secret line of communication, to which diplomats and their respective Ministries of Foreign Relations would not have access. Nixon said he would name United States National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger to be the one responsible for such channel; Médici pointed to Gibson Barbosa, who had been handling a number of matters secretly, on a special file where everything was handwritten, so that “not even typists had knowledge of them.” After talking about the situation in Bolivia and stressing the difficulty they had “in dealing with the Latin Americanists,” Richard Nixon asked what Médici thought of the situation in Chile. Médici then made it clear that “Allende would be overthrown for very much the same reasons that Goulart had been overthrown in Brazil.”

The conversation between Emílio Garrastazu Médici and Richard Nixon on the cold morning of December 9, 1971, shows that the cooperation between Brazil and the United States in the overthrow of Allende was much more direct than scholars have

199 Meeting with President Emílio Garrastazu Médici of Brazil on Thursday, December 9, 1971, at 10:00 a.m., in the President’s Office, the White House, December 9, 1971, Memorandum for the President’s File.
200 Ibid.
201 Ibid.
202 Ibid.
demonstrated. Just a year after Allende’s inauguration, the American president talked openly about a *coup d’état*, asking Médici if he thought that the “Chilean Armed Forces were capable of overthrowing Allende.” The Brazilian dictator replied “that he felt that they were, adding that Brazil was exchanging many officers with the Chileans, and made clear that Brazil was working towards this end.” Nixon then stated it was important that the two countries work together and offered his help. “If money were required or other discreet aid, we might be able to make it available. This should be held in the greatest confidence. But we must try and prevent new Allendes and Castros and try where possible to revert these trends.” Médici told the president he was happy to see their positions were so close.

In 2002, the National Security Archive published a document narrating the meeting between Nixon and British Prime Minister Edward Heath in Bermuda on December 20, 1971, a few days after Médici had been to Washington. Brazil was among the topics of conversation. The two leaders mentioned the important role the country had in South America, and Nixon made it clear that he meant what he had said to Médici. When asked about Cuba, he stated that Fidel Castro was “too radical even for Allende and the Peruvians. Our position is supported by Brazil, which is after all the key to the future.” And he added, “The Brazilians helped rig the Uruguayan election. Chile is

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203 Meeting with President Emílio Garrastazu Médici of Brazil on Thursday, December 9, 1971, at 10:00 A.M., in the President’s Office, the White House, December 9, 1971 Memorandum for the President’s File, The National Security Archive.

204 Ibid.

another case—the left is in trouble. There are forces at work which we are not discouraging.”206

The Brazilian Coup d’état

Fig. 7. Brazilian coup d'état against President João Goulart. March 31, 1964. Neg. 167102, Archives O Globo.

Ease is not a quality one usually associates with a military coup; but in the Brazilian case, that is probably the best way to describe what happened on March 31, 1964. A group of soldiers marched into Rio de Janeiro. President João Goulart did not try to resist. On April 1 he traveled to Brasília, then to Porto Alegre and finally to exile in Uruguay. He would never again return to Brazil, except when his body was buried there in 1976. That same day, the presidency was declared vacant. Just a few days later, the

206 Ibid.
national Congress appointed General Humberto de Alencar Castelo Branco president. He promised to call elections soon, but Brazilians did not see it happen for more than twenty years. Washington immediately recognized the new government, declaring it part of the democratic forces emerging in Latin America, away from the dangers of communism. Right after the coup, when João Goulart was still in Brazil, Lyndon B. Johnson sent a telegram to the president of the Brazilian Congress, Ranieri Mazzilli, who had temporarily assumed the Brazilian Presidency:

Please accept my warmest good wishes on your installation as President of the United States of Brazil. The American people have watched with anxiety the political and economic difficulties through which your great nation has been passing, and have admired the resolute will of the Brazilian community to resolve these difficulties within a framework of constitutional democracy and without civil strife…. I look forward to the continued strengthening of those relations and to our intensified cooperation in the interests of economic progress and social justice for all and of hemispheric and world peace.

On April 9, the Brazilian military Junta signed the first of a series of Institutional Acts, an invention of the regime that did not exist in the Brazilian Constitution. Institutional Act Number One called the coup a “revolution” and determined the suspension of political rights of every citizen considered to oppose the regime. The new government cancelled the mandates of senators, representatives, and governors. The Act also determined that the country would have indirect elections, meaning that only federal congressmen could decide who would be the Brazilian president. The Constitution was suspended for six months. A large part of the population celebrated the “revolution,” including

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208 Telegram 2162 from Rio de Janeiro, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–9 BRAZ April 2 1964; National Archives and Records Administration.
businessmen, the press, members of the Catholic church, and politicians such as the governors of the state of Guanabara (today’s Rio de Janeiro), Carlos Lacerda, and of São Paulo, Ademar de Barros.

The American government also applauded the civilian-military coup. During the Goulart administration it had reduced foreign aid, alleging that the country could become hostile. Right after Castelo Branco took office, however, relations between the two countries grew strong. The United States made a large loan to the new government, which received $2 billion from 1964 to 1970 and ranked third, behind Vietnam and India, as a recipient of US aid. In response, the military president adopted a policy of alignment with the United States. In April of that year, at the request of Washington, Brazil officially gave its support to the US intervention in the Dominican Republic to prevent the country from turning into a “new Cuba.” The commanding officer and most of the twenty-five hundred Latin American troops that were deployed in the OAS operation came from Brazil.

Relations between the two countries got closer and the United States celebrated the fact that “the armed forces brilliantly stopped communism from taking over

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211 The comparison of small Latin American countries to Cuba and geographically larger ones, such as Brazil and China, was frequent in the media and in official documents. See Paulo G. F. Vizentini, *A política externa do Regime Militar brasileiro: multilateralização, desenvolvimento e a construção de uma potência média* (1964 – 1985) (Porto Alegre: Editora UFRGS, 1998), 42.

The climate of friendship was not constant during the two decades of the Brazilian civilian-military regime, but the first years were a stable partnership. The country once seen as a potential “new China” was now an important ally and would become a solid partner in 1970, when a potential “new Cuba” was born in the Southern Cone. The election of socialist Salvador Allende in Chile was a call to attention; and later, to coordinated action.

The Second Branch

The Brazilian government’s support of Allende’s overthrow was not a hidden matter; it went beyond secret meetings and was well known even to the socialist government itself. In 1985, while Chile was still under Augusto Pinochet’s rule and Brazil had elected its first civilian president in over 20 years, Nathaniel Davis published an insider’s account of the years before the Chilean coup. He was the United States’ ambassador in Santiago at the time and coined the expression “Brazil Connection” to explain the Brazilian influence in the process through which Chile came under military dictatorship. The first branch of the operation, Davis argues, was the Brazilian business sector. He evokes a series of oral testimonies, such as that of ambassador

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215 Ibid., 331-333.
216 In 2012, the Brazilian Truth Commission announced that it would investigate the role of Brazilian businessmen in the Chilean *coup d’état*. For more information, see João Paulo Charleaux, “Comissão da Verdade deve investigar participação de brasileiros no golpe do Chile,” *OperaMundi*, May 5, 2012.
Edward M. Korry, who declared that “the actual technical and psychological support came from the military government of Brazil.”217 Davis also mentions Marlise Simon’s *Washington Post* story, full of interviews with right-wing Brazilian businessmen who admitted to have helped the coup in Chile. One of them declared that “the private sector played a crucial role in the preparation of both interventions, and the Brazilian businessmen who plotted the overthrow of the left-leaning administration of President João Goulart in 1964 were the same people who advised the Chilean Right on how to deal with Marxist President Allende.”218

The second branch of the Brazilian support of the coup, according to Davis, was the Brazilian ambassador. The former American diplomat narrates a meeting in which Antônio Cândido da Câmara Canto’s role was explicit.

At lunch with me in late March 1973 he made a series of leading suggestions (which I turned aside), trying to draw me into cooperative planning, interembassy coordination, and joint efforts looking toward the Allende government’s demise. Later I noticed that the reminiscences of leading coup planners like General Arellano reflected a special tie of consideration for the Brazilian Ambassador, manifested even in the frenetic days before 11 September. All in all there is no real doubt in my mind that allegations of a Brazilian connection are true.219

In an interview with a Brazilian newspaper at the time of the book release, Davis offered that he did not remember the names of Brazilian businessmen involved in the conspiracy,

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219 Davis, 332.
except for Câmara Canto, who “was very subtle.” In another story, Brazilian diplomats denied Davis’ allegations. One of them, who refused to be identified, mentioned that “the Brazilian government opened a line of credit of $20 million for the Chilean government, so that they could buy buses.” The lines of credit to which the Brazilian diplomat referred were also confirmed by the recently declassified documents from the Brazilian government. Actually, the Estado Maior das Forças Armadas and Foreign Affairs Ministry reports show that those credit sources were offered for the purchase of items as varied as automobiles and meat. The Brazilian government, moreover, boosted lines of credit at the end of the Allende government. The strategy allowed the country to continue exporting to the Chilean government, one of the most important consumers of Brazilian goods, and at the same time turned Chile into a debtor. Whenever a company cancelled one of the exports to Chile due to financial reasons, the Brazilian embassy intervened, demanding the Central Bank of Brazil to investigate what had gone wrong.

The country never stopped presenting its products at the Santiago International Fair.

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221 “Diplomatas refutam livro de Davis,” Jornal do Brasil, November 6, 1985, 15. The line of credit for buses is registered in the documents of the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Relations, such as a Telegram DPR/DPB/DALALC/845.15(32)(254), February 04, 1972, Secretaria de Estado das Relações Exteriores, Arquivo Geral do Itamaraty, Brasília.
(FISA) during the entire Unidad Popular administration. The Chilean president himself
visited the Brazilian booth at the FISA, in which entrepreneurs proudly showed new
technological developments.\textsuperscript{226} These events were so important to the Brazilian economy
that in 1972, when Allende decided to cancel the United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development due to disagreements with the Chilean National Society of Agriculture,
the Brazilian government suggested the construction of its own exhibit site 300 feet from
the UNCTAD headquarters.\textsuperscript{227}

Brazil worried as much about the deterioration of the Chilean economy as it did
about the expansion of communism. In a telegram to the Brazilian government, Câmara
Canto stated that the only way to guarantee “democratic and free elections in Chile, on
March 4, is the army.”\textsuperscript{228} After the result of the March 1973 parliamentary elections,
from which the Unidad Popular emerged victorious, Câmara Canto raised the hypothesis
of fraud. On May 14, 1973, he wrote to the Brazilian government warning of the
possibility of a civil war. He repeated the alert on June 11, referring also to a possible
coup d’état.\textsuperscript{229} A month before the overthrow of Allende, he wrote that the situation in the
country was calamitous. “There is no fuel, no buses, no trucks to transport all kinds of

\textsuperscript{226} Telegram number 065983, DFE/DPr/DBP/(190), November 16, 1971, Secretaria de
Estado das Relações Exteriores, Arquivo Central do Itamaraty, Brasília.
\textsuperscript{227} Telegram number 003543, DFE/DBP/DPC/(243), January 14, 1972, Secretaria de
Estado das Relações Exteriores, Arquivo Central do Itamaraty, Brasília.
\textsuperscript{228} Telegram number 011923, DBP/600(B39)602.2(B39)(385), February 2, 1973,
Secretaria de Estado das Relações Exteriores, Arquivo Central do Itamaraty, Brasília.
\textsuperscript{229} Telegram DAM-I/600(B39)611.5(B39)(455), June 11, 1973, Secretaria de Estado das
Relações Exteriores, Arquivo Central do Itamaraty, Brasília.
commodities, no conversation between the government and the opposition, in summary, no cabinet.”

While some Brazilians still deny Câmara Canto’s influence in the 1973 coup, Chilean military authorities soon recognized its importance and paid homage to the diplomatic support they received. Near the small church, Capilla Sagrada Familia de Nazareth, located in the commune Pedro Aguirre Cerda in the metropolitan area of Santiago, rests a tribute to the Brazilian diplomat. In 1977, a bucolic little street in the area was named after Antônio Cândido da Câmara Canto. It was the year of his death. In his motherland, similar tributes took place. But it is hard for current inhabitants of the Chilean street to understand why a Brazilian diplomat deserved such distinction. An ambassador to Chile from 1968 to 1975, Câmara Canto was no regular officer. A ferocious anti-communist, he dedicated three years of his mandate to weakening the presidency of Salvador Allende, and two others to supporting his close friend, Augusto Pinochet.

Tall, robust, and with a strong Southern accent, Câmara Canto was a man full of convictions. In April 1969, he coordinated the Comissão de Investigação Sumária (Commission of Summary Investigation), a McCarthyist-style group designated by the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Relations to expel communists from its body of workers. It would become the biggest purge in Brazilian diplomatic history, resulting in the annulment of 44 mandates. Of them, however, only four were for political reasons. Câmara Canto decided to use the opportunity to get rid of bohemians and homosexuals. “Aguentas una verdad? (can you handle the truth?),” he would ask the defendants in

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230 Telegram DAM-I/600(B39)(518), August 04, 1973, Secretaria de Estado das Relações Exteriores, Arquivo Central do Itamaraty, Brasília.
Spanish. 231 One of the dismissed employees, who had no connections with the communist party whatsoever, asked why he had lost his job. The answer, the Brazilian paper Jornal do Brasil did not dare to write fully: “You were fired because you are (unpublishable word, designating homosexual).” 232 Also among the victims of the Commission was the nonconformist poet, musician, and diplomat Vinícius de Moraes, author of the song “The Girl From Ipanema.” Rumor has it that when he heard they would fire homosexuals and bohemians, he rushed to announce, “I’m an alcoholic!” 233

Among Câmara Canto’s closest friends in Santiago were Sergio Arellano Starck, who led the “Caravan of Death,” a helicopter-borne killing squad under Augusto Pinochet, which resulted in the murder of “at least 75” civilians. 234 Starck was one of the most prominent supporters of the Chilean coup, and so were other intimate friends of Câmara Canto, such as Gustavo Leigh (a general who represented the air force in the 1973 Chilean coup d’état), José Toribio Merino (one of the four members of the military junta from 1973 to 1990), and Herman Brady (Minister of Defense during the Pinochet regime). 235

232 Ibid. In the original, “Fostes punido porque eres (impublicável, designando homossexual).”
According to the ambassador, opposing the Allende government caused him a lot of harm. He described his life in Chile as miserable. Luiz José Torres Marques, who detailed the plans the Brazilian ambassador had in the case of Allende’s electoral victory right before the 1970 elections, was shocked about the diplomat’s routine. “The ambassador and his family live cloistered in their house, inside the embassy, and, in case they have to leave because of work obligations, the embassy secretaries and Brazilian military attachés give them some coverage, working as if they were police officers.”236 The reason for such fear was the “frequent menaces he suffers from national subversive elements and from Brazilians, refugees in Chile since the March 1964 revolution.”237 Marques finished his report urging the Brazilian government to reinforce security in the embassy, asserting that the mood in the country was mounting against Brazilian representatives. “I was advised to wear civilian clothes for my own safety.”238

In the early months of Allende’s government, the relationship between Chile and Brazil was one of carrots in public and sticks backstage. Cordiality was an important element, observed in events such as the XI São Paulo Biennial, in 1971, when the Chilean government sent an artwork by the collective group of geometric painters Movimiento Forma y Espacio to the exhibition.239 The Brazilian participation in the annual Santiago International Fair (FISA), where countries could show their technological innovations,

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237 Ibid.
238 Ibid.
was also regular since the early 1960s, when the Sociedad Nacional de Agricultura
(National Society of Agriculture) created the event, and the Brazilian government sent its
latest technologies in the hopes of boosting exports. In 1971, Allende did not go to the
opening of the FISA, although the Chilean government sponsored the event, because the
president of the National Society of Agriculture complained about agrarian reform and
other policies of the Allende government during his introductory speech.

Furthermore, the country presented severe demands in opposition to Chile’s role
in the international political and economic scenario. In January 21, 1971, Murillo Vasco
do Valle Silva, chief of the Estado Maior das Forças Armadas (EMFA), the General Staff
of the Armed Forces, sent a letter to President Emílio Garrastazu Médici recommending
the removal of Chile from the Junta Interamericana de Defensa (JID), the Inter-American
Defense Board, founded in 1942 to offer military support to OAS’s member states.
Comparing the situation to what had occurred in 1961, when the United States demanded
the withdrawal of the Cuban delegation from the institution, Valle Silva argued that “the
socialist program in development by president Salvador Allende, in Chile, although not
openly declaring accordance to Marxist-Leninist principles, tends to create disharmony
and distrust in agencies where measures of protection from communist ideological
infiltration in the American continent are debated.”240 The presence of Chile, therefore,
would be a menace to these protections.

At home, impatience grew strong against Allende’s policies. The Secretary
General of the far-left political movement Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria
(MIR), Miguel Enriquez, complained that Allende did not deliver on his campaign

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240 EM no 01 FA-2-25, January 21, 1971, Estado Maior das Forças Armadas, Arquivo
Nacional do Brasil, Brasília.
promises and suggested that the population invade farms and industries, taking forcefully what “belonged to them” instead of waiting for the government’s restitution. But if there was one pivotal moment of Allende’s instability in 1971, it was when Fidel Castro decided to do what the Cuban Communist Party called “a symbolic encounter of two historical processes.” The journalist and diplomat José Rodríguez Elizondo defined it differently, stating that Castro sabotaged the Unidad Popular administration. “First, there are no syllogisms for complex situations. Second, the illuminated ones always try to drag along their friends, even if it is for death, and third, the illuminated ones cannot have friends, only followers.”

Guess Who's Coming to Dinner?

Fig. 8. Chileans wait for Fidel Castro’s speech. Photo by Armando Cardoso, Colección-Biblioteca Nacional de Chile

It was a warm evening, warmer than the usual summer evenings in Santiago. The smooth breeze of the Chilean capital was replaced with a heat wave, a harbinger of the upcoming weeks. It was hard to tell, however, if it was the result of unpredictable weather phenomena or of the movement of more than one million people squeezing together on the sidewalks of the Chilean capital to see Fidel Castro. The Cuban leader epitomized the international fears and domestic fragilities of the time. On the occasion of the first anniversary of the Allende government, the president announced to a crowd gathered for the celebrations at the Estadio Nacional that Castro would arrive in a few days. Although the Chilean administration invited him for a 10-day visit, *El Comandante* never confirmed how long he intended to stay.
The Brazilian government kept track of every new piece of information about the meeting between the two leaders. The preoccupation with relations between Chile and Cuba had started much earlier. On the day of Allende’s inauguration, Antônio Cândido da Câmara Canto wrote a few lines about Allende’s opinion on the participation of Chile in the Organization of American States (OAS) and dedicated more than half of his telegram to Cuba. The ambassador informed the Brazilian government about Allende’s intentions to establish closer relations with the Caribbean country, quoting the new president, who declared it to be “a right that belongs to Chile, and which the country will develop with dignity, according to a sovereign nation. He added he would do it unilaterally, without requesting OAS’ authorization,” warned the diplomat. Câmara Canto also contended that a group of thirty representatives of the Cuban government would attend the inauguration ceremony, in what “will be the first contact between the country and the new Chilean president.”

Apprehension grew as rumors about the upcoming trip began to spread. On November 1, 1971, a report from the Brazilian Foreign Office’s Intelligence Center (CIEX) stated that there was no certain date for Fidel’s arrival. On November 9, finally aware that Castro would arrive a day later, at 5pm, Câmara Canto mentioned the declarations of the Chilean Minister of Foreign Relations, Anibal Palma, who complained about an infamous campaign from minority groups to create chaos amid Castro’s visit.

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244 Telegram number 21612, AIG/DBP/601.4(32)47, October 30, 1970, Secretaria de Estado das Relações Exteriores, Arquivo Central do Itamaraty, Brasília.
245 Ibid.
246 No 469, BR AN, BSB, IE 07.3, p. 16/86, November 1, 1971, CIEX, Arquivo Nacional do Brasil, Brasília.
247 Telegram number 064043, DBP/DAC/430(24h)(32)169, November 9, 1971, Secretaria de Estado das Relações Exteriores, Arquivo Central do Itamaraty, Brasília.
The Cubans, Palma stated, were like brothers who, just like the Chileans, had implemented their own “path to liberation and national dignity.” Câmara Canto described details of the supposedly 10-day visit, in which Fidel would be accompanied by the ministers of Mining and Education, “both members of the Cuban Communist Party Central Committee; two members of the political committee of the Communist Party, and the Cuban ambassador in Santiago.”

Castro arrived on November 10, 1971, in Antofagasta. Two days later, Canto described the landing of a “gigantic Ilyushin, from the Soviet enterprise ‘Aeroflot,’ under protection of the strictest security scheme ever seen in Chile.” During the following days, the Brazilian ambassador thoroughly narrated every step of the Cuban leader. On November 12, he communicated the arrival of the former presidential candidate and Secretary of the French Socialist Party, François Mitterrand, and the mayor of Marseille, Gaston Deferre, for a one-week visit to “examine the current Chilean political experience.”

On November 14, Câmara Canto detailed Castro’s four-hour-long speech at the university, in Antofagasta, and compared the Cuban leader to a Mexican comic film actor. “In some moments, I got the impression of hearing ‘Cantiflas.’ In any case, to the present mass of people, obsessed and clearly leftist, the speech of the “Caribbean Hyena,” so-called by La Prensa and Tribuna, “was a truly revolutionary lesson,” stated the ambassador.

248 Ibid.
249 Telegram number 064860, DBP/DAC/430(24h)(32)174, November 11, 1971, Secretaria de Estado das Relações Exteriores, Arquivo Central do Itamaraty, Brasília.
250 Telegram number 065394, DBP/DEOc/920(85)(32)178, November 12, 1971, Secretaria de Estado das Relações Exteriores, Arquivo Central do Itamaraty, Brasília.
251 Telegram number 065769, DBP/DAC/920(24h)(32)179, November 14, 1971, Secretaria de Estado das Relações Exteriores, Arquivo Central do Itamaraty, Brasília.
At the end of the first week of the visit, Câmara Canto drafted an extensive report on the political consequences of the encounter between the two leaders. “For Allende, Fidel’s visit is, up to this moment, at least, a great success. That’s because the commander of the Sierra Maestra is acting in Chilean territory more like a politician from the Unidad Popular than as a foreigner chief-of-state.”\textsuperscript{252} Câmara Canto seemed impressed with the fact that Castro was able to “eclipse” the figure of Che Guevara, who used to be pointed to as the “spiritual guide of all the leftist Latin American movements.”\textsuperscript{253} This charismatic presence was a “contribution from the Prime Minister to Allende, since it is known that the MIR has been impatient, its Secretary General at loggerheads with the UP, and its guerrillas promoting violent actions in the south of the country. Any mention of Guevara’s name during Fidel’s visit would intensify the demonstrations in favor of the armed path and, up until this moment, Allende points to the Chilean path.”\textsuperscript{254}

This accurate observation, seen at first as Castro’s contribution to Allende, would turn into what some scholars consider to be the beginning of the collapse of “The Chilean Path to Socialism.”\textsuperscript{255} As historian Alberto Aggio suggests, there were two steps to this process. At first, Castro’s magnetic figure overshadowed the Chilean president.\textsuperscript{256} Embodying the communism sought by the far-left movements in Chile, he stole all the

\textsuperscript{252} Telegram number 066067, DBP/DAC/430(52)(32)186, November 16, 1971, Secretaria de Estado das Relações Exteriores, Arquivo Central do Itamaraty, Brasília.  
\textsuperscript{253} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{254} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{256} Alberto Aggio, “Uma Insólita Visita: Fidel Castro no Chile de Allende,” História (São Paulo, v.22, n. 2, 2003), 151-166.
attention away from Allende at a moment when the government celebrated the positive results of the municipal elections and popular approval. Next to one of the most charismatic young leaders of the time, Allende looked like “the uncle of the hero.” Later on, when Fidel decided to stay in the country for much longer than one could predict, he began to look like an inconvenient guest, his charming looks fading away, the odor of novelty turning into a boring image, a guest who had forgotten to bring good manners along with his luggage. On November 19, Câmara Canto observed that Fidel was no longer on the front page of the Chilean newspapers, and that the crisis of the universities was the main topic, “even in leftist publications.” He also highlighted that Castro, when answering a member of the Socialist Youth in Concepción, stated that “there is no revolution happening in Chile, but a revolutionary process.”

![Image of Salvador Allende, Fidel Castro, and general secretary of the Communist Party of Chile, Luis Corvalán. Photo by Carlos Altamirano. Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional, Chile.](image)

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258 Visita de Fidel Castro ao Chile, telegram number 067211, DBP/DAC/DCInt/AIG430(24h)(32), November 19, 1971, Secretaria de Estado das Relações Exteriores, Arquivo Central do Itamaraty, Brasília.
Castro stayed for 23 days, visiting more than a dozen cities, including Santiago, Antofagasta, Santa Cruz, and Puerto Montt. He went to factories, houses, the Chiquicamata copper mine, the carbon mine in Lota, and several university campuses. At the Universidad de Concepción, thousands of supporters came to listen to one of his famously long speeches. But Castro did not focus only on the perils of imperialism and international conjunctures. He also mentioned Chilean domestic issues and created embarrassments with neighboring countries. Castro severely criticized the Uruguayan government, forcing the Chilean administration to declare it did not share the opinion of the Cuban Prime Minister.  

While Salvador Allende tried to profit from the result of the municipal elections to control the demands of the radical leftists and the opposition, Castro talked openly about a more radical Marxist approach, since “to unite and wage the struggle, it is not necessary to get everyone to agree on everything.”  

While Allende tried to use a conciliatory tone and convince workers to avoid strikes, Castro declared that workers could not behave as if, after nationalization, they owned the factories. “Saltpeter belongs to all Chileans, the textile industry belongs to all Chileans, copper belongs to all Chileans, and all the natural resources of the nation belong to the entire nation, because this is what determines the will and the duty of the workers of all the Chilean people.”  

While Allende’s advisors tried to find solutions for an unprecedented crisis at the University of Santiago, Castro concluded that “when a revolutionary process...
is begun, when a revolutionary crisis is produced, the struggles and battles become tremendously acute.”

Lubna Z. Qureshi suggests that the Salvador Allende administration was a victim of its moderation. In the midst of the Cold War, the socialist government was an enemy of the United States and Brazil, but at the same time it was not radical enough to gain the same financial and military support that Cuba and the Soviet Union offered to other socialist countries. Qureshi argues that Chile was “too fragile to support any movement of national liberation” and on the day of the coup, fewer than 150 Cuban agents were in Chile, while Castro dispatched 36 thousand troops to Angola in 1975.

Tanya Harmer claims that the Chilean coup was not the result of Washington-Moscow tensions, but of the dispute among Cuba, Chile, the United States, and Brazil. In South America, she states, the Cold War was not a bipolar, but a multidimensional conflict, in which Cuba and other countries from the continent played a decisive role. Harmer also highlights the level of attention the Brazilian press paid to Chile in the aftermath of Allende’s elections. Knowing of the ties between the censored media and the civilian-military government, Harmer suggests that the climate of concern could reflect the same feeling in the high-echelons of the administration. “Of course, it is quite possible that the CIA planted these alarmist reports. But it would also be a historical error to attribute all ideologically driven hostility toward Allende’s Chile to Washington.

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262 Cuba-Chile, Encuentro simbólico entre dos procesos históricos, 265.
264 Tanya Harmer, Allende's Chile and the Inter-American Cold War (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2011).
Certainly, the Chileans noticed a new and ominous attitude toward their country growing within Brazil itself,” writes Harmer.265

Castro was still in Chile when the opposition to Allende mounted the March of the Empty Pots, a large demonstration in which thousands of upper-class women marched to the Palacio de la Moneda beating pots in protest of Castro’s visit with the government.266 The movement in favor of a plebiscite to decide whether Allende should remain in power gained strength. In a vast collection of oral histories, Steve Stern demonstrates the divisions among Chileans who witnessed this period. Liberals and conservatives, elites and the middle-class, workers and the unemployed had very different opinions on the plebiscite, which demonstrates the fragility of the Unidad Popular administration. Although his conversations were recorded years after the end of the Pinochet government, a surprising amount of his interviewees were still supportive of the marches that anticipated the dictatorship.267

Allende had no option other than to react boldly. “A fascist germ is mobilizing certain sectors of our youth, especially in the universities,” he said during a farewell event to Fidel Castro on December 2, 1971. As if he had a premonition of what Emílio Garrastazu Médici would say a few days later, while talking to Richard Nixon at the White House, Salvador Allende compared himself to the deposed Brazilian president, João Goulart. “The events are similar to those experienced in Brazil during the Goulart

265 Ibid., 94-95.
266 For a rich source of images and testimonials of this day, see Patrício Guzmán, “The Battle of Chile.” DVD. Directed by Patrício Guzmán (New York: Icarus Films, 2009).
government.”\textsuperscript{268} And he continued, once again presaging what was soon to come: “I am not a martyr... I will leave La Moneda only when I have fulfilled the task entrusted to me by the people. Only by riddling me with bullets can they stop me from fulfilling the people’s program.”\textsuperscript{269}

\textbf{The Chilean Coup d'état}

![Image of La Moneda Palace](image)

\textit{Fig. 10. The main entrance of La Moneda Palace, September 11, 1973. Archives El Universal}

The bombing of the La Moneda Palace and the overthrow of Salvador Allende comprised the final phase of a plan that had been gestating for a long time. The Brazilian Foreign Office’s Intelligence Center, the CIEX, followed carefully the tense moments that preceded the \textit{coup}. Some of the information present in these reports came by way of


\textsuperscript{269} Ibid., 157.
ambassador Câmara Canto. Others brought crucial details about the domestic situation in Chile from moles who had infiltrated the groups of Brazilian exiles living in Santiago. Through the CIEX, the Brazilian government was able to predict several of these stages and act to assure the Chilean allies that they had strong support in the region.

As early as March 4, 1973, Brazilian exile Cândido da Costa Aragão met President Allende and talked about the preoccupation he and his comrades had with a possible coup against the Unidad Popular government. The Chilean president replied with irony, “There is no problem because in this country gorillas are castrated when they are born.” In May 04, 1973, another report from the CIEX stated that “a Chilean military movement with the objective of overthrowing the Allende government should take place between May 13 and 19, 1973. The Navy and the Air Force are ready to act. However, there is still no agreement with the army for the formation of a central military command for the rebellion of the Chilean F.F.A.A.”

Less than two months later, on June 29, a failed coup attempt took place. Lieutenant Colonel Roberto Souper led the Tanquetazo after learning that the conspiracy to overthrow Allende had been discovered and he would be relieved of his command. Souper crossed the streets of Santiago until arriving at La Moneda with eighty soldiers, six tanks, and ten other armored vehicles. They circled the presidential palace and the Ministry of Defense and opened fire. Then commander-in-chief of the army, General Carlos Prats, responded to the attempted coup and suffocated the rebellion in less than three hours. On June 20th, a little more than a week before the Tanquetazo, a report from

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the CIEX stated that the Chilean Communist Party was divided in regard to what should be the reaction to a potential *coup d’état* organized by “Generals Urbina, Pinochet, Brady, and Pickering, among others,” to keep Allende in the presidency and “nominating technicians and military people to the government.” Despite the failure, the *Tanquetazo* was a prelude of the successful *coup* of September 11. And despite errors in their predictions, the Brazilian authorities would later know that “trustworthy and well situated sources consider it to be possible for them to finally see an outcome in the next days, which could culminate in the fall of the Allende government.”

The Chilean administration, however, was not blind to Brazilian influence. In a series of articles, the Brazilian journalist Roberto Simon revealed that it actually received information about plans of the Brazilian authorities to overthrow the Unidad Popular president. One instance of that was when a Chilean journalist connected to Jorge Alessandri told the Chilean diplomats based in Brazil that a Brazilian general had offered to help him “organize in Chile a movement of armed resistance” in the form of urban guerrillas to fight against the “red danger.” A month later, the Chilean embassy received more information about the Brazilian insurgency plan against Allende. A Brazilian military with “leftist political ideas” told a secretary at the Chilean embassy that there was a room in the Ministry of the Army, in Rio de Janeiro, where the potential Brazilian guerrillas were organizing. It had a scale model of the Andes mountain range.

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and several maps to study military tactics. The idea was to form an anti-communist guerrilla group and train in the area. The military team would be ready to attack in case an intervention were to become necessary to put an end to the socialist government. The Brazilian Army would be responsible for the instructions, helping to teach combat and survival techniques, and sending “several secret agents who entered Chile disguised as tourists.” Chilean soldiers would be in the field, fighting as guerrilla men and women.\(^{276}\)

The Chilean diplomats were also informed that the Brazilian Army had been seeking Chilean volunteers to help “undertake a war adventure” in Chile. According to Simon, members of Fiducia, a right-wing Chilean publication, who were based in Brazil, were responsible for making connections with the Brazilian military. The group of young students at the Pontificia Universidade Catolica de Santiago who founded Fiducia in 1962 would later create the Sociedad Chilena de Defensa de la Tradición, Familia y Propiedad (TFP).\(^{277}\) In the beginning, the group opposed agrarian reform and other progressive ideas of the Eduardo Frei government. Later, it broadened its objectives to “promote a real crusade against forms of communism and collectivism—among which were included the Christian Democrats and a significant number of members of the Catholic clergy—in order to protect property and certain values that they considered to be linked to the most essential of Chilean and Christian traditions.”\(^{278}\)

Allende also worried about the possible interferences of the Brazilian government in the Southern Cone. A report from the CIEX about the meeting between Allende and

\(^{276}\) Ibid.
Alejandro Lanusse, on October 17 and 18, 1971, in Antofagasta, states that the Chilean president asked the Argentinean about the political situation in Uruguay and the risk of a Brazilian armed intervention in the country in case of a victory of General Liber Seregni. Lanusse, in a “short and dry” answer, stated that Argentina would not allow such a thing.\(^{279}\)

The Brazilian Foreign Office’s Intelligence Center also reported on the political climate in Chile. When former president Eduardo Frei, after ten months in silence, criticized the government of the Unidad Popular for the first time since leaving the presidency, the CIEX’ spies wrote to Brazilian authorities. “According to Frei, the Chilean Communist Party (PCCh) is conducting a campaign to destroy the opposition and, consequently, democracy in Chile. He stated that at this point in the country’s history, in which the PC imposes its laws and applies a tactic that it has used in all the countries submitted to its tyranny, it is interesting for them to hurt the prestige of any person who is an obstacle to the implementation of its fatal dictatorship.”\(^{280}\) The report also contended that the supporters of the government started a violent wave to spread lies and hate against right-wing parties creating a climate of restlessness in an attempt to justify an upcoming economic crisis. “The blame would be put on the ‘seditious, conspirers, and saboteurs of the ‘center-right.’”\(^{281}\)

Although the documents pointing to the Brazilian interference in the Chilean coup only started to be declassified in 2012, at the time, the Chilean government was well

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\(^{281}\) Ibid.
aware of the efforts of the dictatorship to destabilize it. The United States also counted on the expansion of the role of the Brazilian government in destabilizing the Chilean domestic scenario. A CIA estimate of 1972 suggested that the country would have a substantial responsibility in the area, “seeking to fill whatever vacuum the US leaves behind. It is unlikely that Brazil will intervene openly in its neighbors’ internal affairs, but the regime will not be above using the threat of intervention or tools of diplomacy and covert action to oppose leftist regimes, or keep friendly governments in office, or to help place them there in countries such as Bolivia and Uruguay. While some countries may seek Brazil’s protection, others may work together to withstand pressures from the emerging giant.”

In Chile, both things were happening simultaneously. While the socialist government understood the danger of the Brazilian influence on its domestic affairs, enemies of the Allende administration looked at the country as a source of protection and inspiration. That was the case on August 2, 1973, at the air base “El Bosque,” in Santiago, where some of highest profile members of the Chilean military met to debate strategic matters. Political tension was disseminated in the country. Both right-wing groups with their empty pans and extreme left organizations, tired of waiting for the communist promise to be delivered, marched against Salvador Allende. Supporters of the Unidad Popular administration also demonstrated in favor of the democratically elected Chilean president. Food shortages and high inflation contributed to the climate of insecurity. But what admirals, generals, and commanders of the Allende Armed Forces discussed was how “the measures adopted by the Brazilian military during the revolution

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of March 31, 1964, could be useful in Chile.\textsuperscript{283} Brazilian government representatives spread the information to its intelligence services in a report that remained secret for almost forty years after the Chilean \textit{coup d'état}.\textsuperscript{284}

Among the high-echelon military personnel present at the meeting was General Cesar Ruiz, who had been commander-in-chief of the Chilean Air Force since 1970. A week after the meeting, Ruiz was nominated Allende’s Ministry of Public Works and Transportation, but nine days later he resigned for not being able to control the strike of truck drivers. Allende told him he should, then, resign as commander-in-chief of the Chilean Air Force as well, which Ruiz did. In 1973, the dictatorial government nominated him dean of the Universidad de Chile, where he remained until being appointed Chilean Ambassador in Japan, in 1975. Ernesto Jobet, commandant of the First Naval Zone, was also present, replacing José Toribio Merino, who would represent navy branch for virtually the entire period of the military Junta, until 1990. Also attending the meeting were Commander Ernesto Huber Von Appen, director of the Naval Aviation, and “several other” officials of the Chilean Air Force and Navy.

Ruiz stated that Chile was “on the razor’s edge” and the spirit of rebellion had permeated all the armed forces of the country. In the case of a military insurgency, he assured his peers that all of the garrisons in Chile were only “expecting the watchword to act,” and the Santiago garrison was committed to the rebellion, except for the Infantry School, which was very close to adhering to the revolt. The group also praised the interview of General Alfredo Canales on July 31, in which he talked about the creation of


\textsuperscript{284} Ibid.
a new party, the Junta Unificadora Nacionalista (JUN), with the objective of “promoting a great national development to overthrow Marxism and give Chileans peace, order, and sense of authority.” The interview was considered an ultimatum to the Allende government and a call for action to the Chilean Armed Forces. The Brazilian informant stated that such praise seemed to “confirm the impression which has been collected in Chile that this action can serve to achieve the objectives, until now developed underhand, of motivating the military to intervene against the Marxist government of Salvador Allende.”

After being briefed about the meeting, later in that same month of August, admiral José Toribio Merino decided to act to make sure the political conjuncture in South America would not spoil the plans of a coup to overthrow Allende. He needed to confirm that the Peruvian dictator, Juan Velasco Alvarado, would not take advantage of the possible fragility of the Chilean military to advance over the territory of Tarapacá. Seeking for guarantees that the international scenario was ready for a new government in the country, Merino turned to Brazil. The admiral was a close friend of Brazilian ambassador Antônio Cândido da Câmara Canto and would later become Commander-in-Chief of the Chilean Navy (from September 11, 1973 to the end of the Pinochet government, in 1990), and president of the Government Junta of Chile from 1974 to 1990.

Weeks before the coup, Merino asked former Naval officer, Roberto Kelly, in whom he deeply trusted, to go to Brazil and meet with members of the government. In Brasilia, not yet sure what the reason for his trip really was, Kelly was subjected to

285 Ibid.
286 Ibid.
intensive questioning. Hours later, he received a phone call from a mysterious person ordering him to go back to Chile immediately, and stating: “do not worry, Peru will not go.” That way, Merino assured the others that external forces would not hurt the coup. It was the green light the men who plotted the military intervention needed to go ahead with their plan.

Four days before the coup, on September 7, the Brazilian embassy in Santiago received a select group to celebrate Brazilian Independence Day. It was a yearly tradition, but in 1973 it served as base for a meeting to set the last details about the overthrow of Salvador Allende. Members of the navy, the air force, the army, and the Carabineros, the Chilean national police force, were used to joining the celebration, but this time Antônio Cândido da Câmara Canto reserved a special room for them, where the actions that would take place in the next few days could be privately discussed. The military junta formed right after the coup had four members, one of each military representation. Câmara Canto was nicknamed the “fifth member,” given the importance he had in the process. On September 8, Câmara Canto wrote a telegram informing the Brazilian authorities of the event, which “around 800 people attended.” The Brazilian ambassador highlighted the attendance of some of the most prominent supporters of the coup, including “several members of the army, air force and carabineiros” and the president of the Chilean Supreme Court, minister Enrique Urrutia, who would later be

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289 Comemoração do Sete de Setembro, 641.7, September 08, 1973, Secretaria de Estado das Relações Exteriores, Arquivo Central do Itamaraty, Brasília.
responsible for giving Augusto Pinochet his presidential sash.\textsuperscript{290} But there were also some prominent figures of the Allende government projecting a public image of tolerance between the regimes and their diplomacies. One of them was the minister of Defense and deputy minister of Foreign Relations, Orlando Letelier, who ended up being the first member of the Allende government to be arrested by the new regime, and went into exile in the United States, where he was killed by the Chilean secret police in 1976. Also present was the president of the Chilean Central Bank, Hugo Fazio, who had been a director of the Chilean Communist Party and lived in exile in the Soviet Union for most of the Pinochet regime. The façade of tolerance, an essential trace of diplomacy, was fundamental in the days that preceded the bombing of La Moneda. It not only allowed the Brazilian government to deny for decades its participation in the events of September 11, but it also gave the Chilean military a harbor. From Câmara Canto and the CIEX agents, they could expect support in the form of ideas, financial resources, and information on the internal affairs of the Allende government, extracted from Brazilian exiles.

\textsuperscript{290} Ibid.
Chapter Three

Leaving and Being Left

“For Otto Brockes, death was part of the routine. He worked at one of the biggest hospitals in Rio de Janeiro, where many of the patients arrived in serious conditions, when it was too late even for a good doctor to save their lives. “I was frightened. I wanted to do something, but could not. It was as if we were ‘using’ the human being in his final stages as an experiment, to learn from them without guidance. It shook me deeply because I did not practice medicine for profit. I dreamed of being a volunteer in Africa.” It was 1969, the height of the dictatorship in Brazil. He started to study Marxism and concluded that socialism was the only possible path to equality and that guerrilla fighting was the only path to socialism.

Brockes became a member of the Partido Comunista Brasileiro Revolucionário (PCBR), the Brazilian Revolutionary Communist Party, a group that disagreed with the Communist Party, criticizing the Soviet Union, but supporting Cuba. When he heard the news of Salvador Allende’s election in Chile, he decided it was time to go. He did not

291 Translation by the author: May God never allow me to die / before I return home / Without seeing the goodness / That I cannot find here / Without seeing the palm trees / Where the thrush sings.”
feel his commitment was with the Brazilian nation, but with the ideals of social equality that only a person as “evolved” as Allende could deliver. As soon as he arrived to Santiago, he started to work in public hospitals, as a volunteer. He then met a Chilean who worked at the Ministry of Health and convinced him to formally work. So he joined the Health Program for Schools. “I examined more than 15 thousand kids. After I was done with work, I went to poor neighborhoods and worked for free, to help the government.” He assisted the emergency teams when there were floods and worked day and night when the 1971 earthquake claimed 85 lives and injured more than 450 people. Allende had been in office for only seven months then.292

Brockes was one of the approximately 1,200 Brazilian exiles who had left the country in the years since 1964 to go to Chile.293 For them, the coup d’état of September 11, 1973 was the repetition of their worst nightmare. In Santiago, the political enemies of the Brazilian rulers had never been able to really consider themselves to be free to expose their ideas and exercise the rights of a citizen. From the language barrier to the lack of work and the monitoring of the repressive Brazilian government, their daily habits were filled with boundaries. Searching for a life away from the authoritarian, right-wing

293 Amnesty International, *Chile: an Amnesty International report* (London: Amnesty International Publications, 1974), 64. The Amnesty International report written a year after the coup reinforces several times that there is a “problem of statistics” under the Chilean dictatorship. The numbers are not precise and international organizations’ estimates differ greatly from the Chilean government’s official numbers. However, the report states that “many thousands of Latin American refugees had been granted asylum in Chile during the government of the Unidad Popular. Although the exact number is unknown, and was almost certainly unknown even to the Allende government, the figure is estimated as being between 13,000 and 15,000. The French newspaper *Le Monde* on 24 September 1973 estimated that there were “4,000 Bolivians, 3,000 Uruguayans, 2,000 Argentinians, 1,200 Brazilians, and a small number from other Latin American countries. Other newspaper sources gave far higher figures.”
civilian-military dictatorship installed in Brazil in 1964 required the finding of new identities, new spaces.

The first challenge in discussing the exile experience is the definition of “exile” itself. Scholars of migrations and migrants face the difficult task of conceptualizing what the movement of a person to a different country is. Several issues have to be taken into consideration. The reasons for the change, the objectives, the degree to which it is forced or voluntary, the possibilities of choosing the place of destiny and the duration of stay, are all questions that imply different wordings. The definition matters, however, because it is not a simple question of semantics, but it affects the very identity of these people. In the case of this particular group, the way one defines them can bring political and emotional charges that may affect the way we interpret their role in the shaping of Latin American politics. In the specific case of Brazilian exiles in Chile, this apparently harmless word choice can be charged with suggestions of being part of a legal and diplomatic negotiation, which did not happen and was not the case.

So, could this forced movement be classified as a migration? Can the Brazilian exiles be part of a diaspora? Or should this exodus be framed as a different concept? Instead of focusing on one specific definition, this analysis of the Brazilian exiles borrows pieces of several concepts, shaping a new framework. I define an “exile” as a migrant who seeks protection internationally due to disagreement with the political establishment in his country of origin. I have chosen the term because, unlike the refugee or the asylee, most of the Brazilian political exiles in Chile had no legal support. If in Brazil the dictatorial government recognized them as political opponents to the regime, this role was also part of their identity in Chile. Their friends, their enemies, immigration
officers, and basically anyone they had to deal with in their daily lives classified them as a group who questioned and resisted their country’s authorities. Even during the socialist government of Salvador Allende, many of them did not enjoy permanent resident status or have a work visa. In this forced migration, most of the exiles continued to voice their opposition to the right-wing regime, thus creating networks of resistance in other countries. However, in the reports by the Brazilian government about this group, they are referred to as “asilados,” asylees. The use of the word “exile” would have implied the recognition that the Brazilian government had expelled them. Furthermore, the Brazilians’ official use of the word “asylee” suggests, intentionally but inaccurately, that they enjoyed legal protection and support from the Chilean government, which was not necessarily the case. According to a report from Amnesty International, the Allende government had no official data on foreigners who entered the country from 1970 onward; “Some political refugees had no more than a stamp which permitted them to enter Chile.” In many cases, exiles chose not to apply for refugee status, fearing that this would impair their mobility to other countries, including as part of their activities in movements of resistance to the dictatorship.

In their daily lives, exiles faced several dilemmas regarding nationality and identity. On the one hand, they were not forced to lose their Brazilian citizenship; on the other hand, they were not allowed to enter Brazil. They moved to a neighboring nation but could not communicate in their native language. Inhabiting a new national space, they had to create a transnational sphere, one that was not part of a process of a voluntary international exchange, but rather of a forced, trans-border interaction. To answer

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questions as simple as “what is your name” or “where were you born,” they had to think carefully. Could they identify themselves as Brazilian exiles? As revolutionaries or enemies of the status quo administration? The response depended on who was asking. To discuss the specificities of identity and nationhood for the Brazilian exiles in Chile, different definitions of nationalism, diaspora, and transnationalism can offer a range of useful frameworks for interpretation of this particular experience, but none of them alone is enough to address their experience. Instead, interpreting the multiple applications of these complex concepts can help us navigate the particularities of the experience of a group of people forced to leave their homeland, for political reasons, for a neighboring socialist country where, after September 11 1973, they were trapped in an “exile inside the exile.”

The definition of “diaspora” has been applied to several different movements of resettlement, such as the Middle Passage, Jewish scattered colonies outside Palestine and to other parts of the globe, colonialism, and contemporary migrations. Instead of focusing on one specific definition, the analysis of the Brazilian exiles in Chile can benefit from the work of different scholars. Borrowing pieces of their perspectives is a useful strategy towards a deeper understanding of the Brazilian exile experience. “Diaspora” is commonly defined as a migration and posterior settlement of people in a place away from an ancestral homeland, in which the individual keeps alive ties with their birthplace, wherever he or she is.

Although deeply related to race and slavery, Paul Gilroy’s investigation of diaspora and nationalism offers some insights to the lives of Brazilian exiles in Chile. In *The Black Atlantic*, Gilroy argues that black identity is the result of a transnational
experience of terror, common in black communities across the Atlantic nations. In the case of the black diaspora, however, identity is not merely related to race, geography, or nation. It is connected to a transnational movement, a process of exchange that surpasses such ideas. Gilroy emphasizes that the black subject relates to the African experience, but also to European modernity. Appropriating W. E. B. Dubois’ concept of “double consciousness,” he includes the memory of violence and the tension between these two understandings as an essential element of “black nationalism.”

As the memory of slavery is intrinsic to the black populations studied by Gilroy, the lively memory of torture and violence is also essential to this group of Brazilian exiles and shapes this forced transnational space. Fernando Gabeira was one of the Quarenta, a group of forty political prisoners released in 1970 as part of the negotiation to free the kidnapped German Ambassador Ehrenfried von Holleben. Gabeira had been arrested for his participation in the kidnapping of American ambassador Charles Elbrick a year earlier, in 1969. For him, the Brazilian diplomatic mission in Santiago was a clear demonstration of a transnational aberration defined more by violence and ideology than by citizenship and nationhood. “Tales about how the Brazilian Embassy refused to help Brazilians in need of aid due to the coup in Chile are well known,” he writes. In fact, while many embassies became fortresses to protect Chileans and foreign refugees, the Brazilian Embassy closed its doors. The intervention of Swedish Ambassador Harald Edelstam saved hundreds of lives and this resulted in his being expelled from Chile in

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296 Fernando Gabeira, *O que é isso companheiro?* (São Paulo: Companhia de Bolso, 1979), 11.
December 1973. Gabeira wrote a memoir of his life as an exile, *O que é Isso, Companheiro?*, which would later become a movie. He states that the memory of an idealized home was potentiated by shock at the way the embassies, the official representations of the Brazilian government abroad, operated. It was also marked by his subsequent experiences of defeat.

We thought of resistance, but ended up being involved in the general confusion created to find solutions to escape the police. The same thing happened with many people in Chile. You say you will resist, you leave to resist, but what you end up doing is running away. I remember I wrote a letter from the Embassy of Argentina [where Gabeira and other Brazilian exiles had asked for protection after the Chilean coup] to a friend in Rio de Janeiro, telling him I was alive. I said: friend, I just lost my second revolution, and I am on my way to break the record of that García Márquez’ character who lost twelve or thirteen, I think. I saw too many people dying, entire groups hiding in factories and resisting until the last man fell. But the general movement was one of running away.

In this sense, Brazilian exiles in Chile inhabited a version of Gilroy’s definition of a transnational public sphere, a forcibly forged space. It begins with the rupture of the homeland, which becomes the representation of terror, torture, and fear. A return home, then, becomes an impossibility. However, the pain of the defeat and the incongruence of the authoritarian state in contrast with the ideals of democracy are not left behind once they move to the socialist nation. The fear (and the reality) of having spies and police officers of their home country following them was accompanied by the discomfort of being an outsider in the new land, where one is neither a citizen nor a legal alien.

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299 Gabeira, 1979, 13.
Therefore, the body of duties and rights that constitutes nationhood does not apply to the former or to the new space.

At the same time, diaspora communities are constituted by a sense of solidarity and the maintenance of community ties. The collective memory of the Brazilian exiles contains questions of nationalism, transnationalism, and identity, resulting in what Gilroy calls the construction of alternate public spheres. They kept networks of solidarity and common identification outside the national space. Although it was a forced migration, the transfer of Brazilians to Chile cannot be considered an antinationalist movement. On the contrary, it is a movement embodied by national aspirations. In this sense, the arrival in Santiago in a period when the project of socialist nation building was taking effect inspired among these exiles a shared belief in the possibility of building a model nation during the diaspora experience. Such hope was interrupted by the Chilean coup d’état, in 1973. As politicians, professors, and student leaders in Brazil and later, in Chile, the exiles shaped their own political beliefs but also the intellectual and political structures of the countries in which they lived. Among the Brazilian exiles in Chile were politicians such as the former Brazilian president Fernando Henrique Cardoso, former São Paulo governor and presidential candidate José Serra, and the Quarenta Fernando Gabeira, who has served as a representative in the federal legislature for the state of Rio de Janeiro for decades.

Exile to Chile was not the result of economic inequality or the seeking of a better life; it was a forced displacement. In this sense, it becomes necessary to move away from the temptation of associating it with immigration. When defining cosmopolitanism and transnationalism in his discussion of the future of the nation-state, Jürgen Habermas was...
dealing with a global order in which democratic states predominated.\textsuperscript{300} To a considerable extent, respect for individualism, freedom of speech, and human rights are inherent in cosmopolitanism. Habermas would later revise his definition, noticing that transnational movements could happen between nondemocratic institutions. Considering that displacement is a central characteristic of diaspora communities, it is possible to conclude that exiles develop a sense of self that is not the result of the state, but of its absence and its impossibility. Just as the concept of “double consciousness” acknowledges the psychological struggle of reconciling Africa, the homeland, with the place of birth or education, exiles struggle to reconcile the oppressive motherland with a new place. In the case of Brazilian exiles in Chile, this sentiment is complicated by the fact that, after some years, the new place also became oppressive and, inspired and supported by what the Brazilian dictatorship had been imposing for almost a decade, also resorted to torture and violence to impose notions of nation and citizenship.

In \textit{Imagined Communities}, Benedict Anderson also defines the idea of nation as an object of transnational exchange.\textsuperscript{301} According to Anderson, the formation of communities is not the result of state imposition, but of a socially constructed process of identity perception. What happens, then, when a dictatorship determines that a citizen born and raised in a country can no longer belong in the national space? When referring to the succession of dictatorships in Thailand, Anderson claims that violence is an instrumental part of the national character in moments of authoritarian leadership. He


explains, “These murders, sometimes accompanied by torture, were typically administrative in character, carried out by the formal instrumentalities of the state, very often in secret.” As manifestations of state power, torture and expulsion become part of the national space for the exile.

**Between Coups**

Nielsen Pires was raised in a very religious family. A couple of years before the coup in Chile, he was talking to a priest near a Catholic school in São Paulo when two men arrived, as if out of nowhere, and punched them several times. Pires asked them to stop what seemed like an inexplicable attack. But they responded loud and clear: he should leave Brazil immediately or the next time they met, they would kill him. It was 1971, only a few years after the imposition of Institutional Act Number Five. Torture, murder, and imprisonment were part of a policy intensified after the AI-5. The decree was approved on December 13, 1968, giving President Artur da Costa e Silva the authority to order the National Congress and the State Legislative Assemblies into forced recess. Under the pretext of “national security,” the government was authorized to appoint federal officers (interventores) to run states and municipalities. Music, movies, theater, and television were censored, and so was the press. Political meetings were

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considered illegal and *habeas corpus* was suspended for crimes of political motivation. Official data attests that this was the most violent period of the Brazilian dictatorship, with more than 400 deaths.

Pires was part of the so-called second generation of Brazilian exiles, who left the country in the years after 1968. This group was comprised of young activists whose actions were, in many cases, informed by the movements of resistance that emerged after the 1964 *coup d’état*, such as demonstrations, strikes, and the *movimento estudantil* (student’s movement). Therefore, at the time they left the country, many of them had no established career and had to start one in a new nation, without the connections they had in their homeland. Pires was a member of the Catholic Academic Youth (JUC). He contacted friends at the church who facilitated his move to Chile. He arrived in Santiago in 1972 with documents, a passport, and a $120 student fellowship, enough to pay for a bedroom and a daily “empanada y caña,” a small beef pie with a glass of wine for a few weeks.

During the period from 1964 to 1979, when the Amnesty Law was approved pardoning civilians and military personnel for all the crimes committed during the dictatorship, several Brazilian intellectuals, teachers, artists, workers, and people whom the regime considered to be menaces were forced to leave the country. In many cases, this movements was classified as “voluntary exile,” a term that becomes almost ironic, considering that the alternative was, in many cases, torture, imprisonment, and death, for

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304 Denise Rollemberg uses the term “generation” due to the amount of different experiences and events that characterized the groups who were forced to leave the country prior to the Institutional Act Number Five or between the Act and the process of “opening,” the “abertura,” in 1979. Denise Rollemberg, *Exílio: Entre Raízes e Radares* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Record, 1999), 49-50.
those who opposed the civilian-military regime and were struggling to survive it. Nevertheless, many exiles referred to such “forced migration” as an expression of autonomy. The book *Memórias das Mulheres do Exílio* was published in 1980 as part of the project *Memórias do Exílio*, which had already printed other collections of testimonies of Brazilian exiles. In this one, women who had to leave Brazil during the dictatorial period narrated their experiences. In the introductory remarks, the authors state that “leaving the country—except in cases of banishment—is always, in a sense, an expression of will, although this choice could have been limited to absurd levels, the extreme example being the option between death / life, in parallel to stay / leave.”

Albertina de Oliveira Costa, Maria Teresa Porciúncula de Moraes, Norma Marzola, and Valentina de Rocha Lima also highlight the importance of the category “voluntary exile,” which is preceded by “imprisonment, persecution, punishment, psychological pressure, reduction of mechanisms of professional, political, and even family expression.”

Some of the Brazilians who went to live in Chile, however, were political prisoners released by the government in exchange for diplomats kidnapped by left-wing guerrilla groups. For them, there was no choice or voluntarism in deciding when to expatriate from Brazil and where to go. “I was not taken. I was dumped,” recalls Wilson Barbosa. He was one of the Setenta, the seventy political prisoners exchanged for the Swiss ambassador Giovanni Enrico Bucher, who had been kidnapped by the Vanguarda Popular Revolucionária (VPR), a group of armed resistance to the Brazilian military

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306 Ibid.
dictatorship. “We had no idea where we were headed to. They sent us to Chile, but it could have been any other place. I left the airplane in shoes with no soles. Police officers had cut them in prison. I had no belt, just a piece of twine tying my pants. No documents, nothing,” he recalls more than forty years later.\textsuperscript{308}

![Image of political prisoners](image)

Fig. 11. Some of the Setenta, group of political prisoners exchanged for the Swiss ambassador Giovanni Enrico Bucher. Image of the documentary Setenta. Globo Filmes

“We are certainly going to Algeria,” Bruno Dauster, another Setenta, reckoned. He considered: “It must be three to five degrees Celsius there at this point, so we will dress for the winter. It was forty degrees Celsius in Rio de Janeiro, in January 1970, and we were wearing wool socks, wool pants, sweaters, ready to go to the airport. But we were not going to the airport at that point.”\textsuperscript{309} “They put us in police cars that had been

\textsuperscript{308} Ibid.

under the sun since 8 am. Can you imagine how it was? They opened them and put us inside. There were some small holes we put our noses at to breathe through. The hot air burned our noses. When we arrived at Galeão [the international airport in Rio de Janeiro], the cars stopped and they did not let us go,” recalls Marco Maranhão.310 “It felt like a sardine can under the sun for so long. Some comrades were feeling sick. I handled that experience relatively well, but year after year, after leaving prison, I started to notice I had developed claustrophobia. So I have this sequel which strangely appeared later on, but it was something that grew on me and today I suffer from very severe claustrophobia,” states another Setenta, Jaime Cardoso.311

The group of political exiles finally boarded a plane to Chile on January 13th, 1971. They arrived the day after, early in the morning. To their surprise, there was a very different treatment at the Santiago International Airport. The Chilean population received the Setenta accompanied by a great deal of celebration. Hundreds of young men and women chanted songs about love, justice, and democracy upon their arrival. Authorities, police officers, and civilians called them heroes. “We left Brazil treated like terrorists; those men trampling us; the media calling us terrorists and all. When we arrived in Chile, still at the airplane stairs, there were two men from the socialist government. They called us comrades. We shook hands. “Compañero, sea bienvenido,” they said, and hugged us. That treatment alone had already softened my heart. After two hugs I was crying,” Marco Maranhão remembers.312

310 Ibid.
311 Ibid.
312 Ibid.
A few days later, President Salvador Allende invited the *Setenta* for lunch in Valparaíso and asked if they needed any help.\(^{313}\) “I remember that one of our friends, Mara [Curtiss Alvarenga], asked him to bring her children who had to stay in Brazil. Some others requested jobs. But since prison we knew what was going on in Chile, and we knew it was not a socialist country. Chile was a capitalist country with a precarious socialist government. I would never ask Allende for any help, and certainly 90% of the Brazilian exiles who were at the luncheon did not ask for any help. It was not our government and he had no obligations to us whatsoever,” recalls Wilson Barbosa.\(^{314}\)

The CIEX

Their government, however, did not simply leave them alone. The Brazilian diplomats carefully followed the steps of the *Setenta* and other Brazilian exiles in Chile.

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In fact, before and during the Allende presidency, Brazilian spies worked freely in the monitoring of Brazilian exiles living in the country. A division of the Ministry of Foreign Relations (Itamaraty), the Brazilian Foreign Office’s Intelligence Center (CIEX) was created in 1966 with the objective of monitoring closely the lives of Brazilian exiles in other countries of the Southern Cone and their connections with international leftist groups. The CIEX was an arm of the Serviço Nacional de Informações (SNI), the Brazilian National Intelligence Service, and although many diplomats have claimed that the employees of Itamaraty remained neutral during the military regime, its existence is proof of the deep involvement of the diplomats in the actions of the government.

Furthermore, the freedom that CIEX agents enjoyed in Chile during Allende’s presidency demonstrates that there was a connection between the Chilean Armed Forces and the Brazilian diplomats in repressing left-wing groups.

Manoel Pio Corrêa created the CIEX in 1966 and the Intelligence Center operated until the end of the military government, in 1985. Corrêa was named the Brazilian ambassador in Uruguay right after the coup d’état and it was in Montevideo, Uruguay, that he had the idea of creating an intelligence service inside the Itamaraty. Working side-by-side with the military attaché Colonel Câmara Senna, he focused his tenure on

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combating any plans of resistance from former President João Goulart and his brother-in-law, politician Leonel Brizola, who were exiled in Uruguay. The diplomat created a network of support that included professionals from different areas, such as politicians, judges, lawyers, military personnel, businessmen, and even farmers. They were trained in Brazil, but their expertise was improving after several trips to Uruguay, and the country ended up being the pilot project for the solidification of the monitoring activities of the CIEX. 319

Pio Corrêa had military experience. He graduated from the Escola Superior de Guerra, in Rio de Janeiro, an institute of the Brazilian Ministry of Defense dedicated to academic research. His interest in secret investigations had appeared much earlier than the creation of the CIEX. In 1959, when he replaced ambassador Odette de Carvalho e Souza as chief of the Political Department of Itamaraty, she handed him an archive with documents and notes about foreigners and Brazilian citizens suspected of being connected to “subversive activities” in the 1940s and 1950s. “A precious gift,” according to Pio Corrêa, who worked hard to expand the archive. “When I left the department in the end of the Kubitschek government, suspicious of what would be the following government (with reasons for that, as we later saw), I left the archive, considerably expanded, with a friend I could trust, who made the connection between the Itamaraty and the Service of Intelligence and Counterintelligence.” 320 His anticommunist ideas were well received by President Humberto de Alencar Castelo Branco. “I used to conspire against the government, and the victory of the March 31 1964 revolution

represented the coronation of my dearest hopes,” he stated in his autobiography.\textsuperscript{321} After the “prize” of becoming the ambassador in Uruguay, he was promoted again and, as soon as he became Secretary-General of Itamaraty, Pio Corrêa founded the Brazilian Foreign Office’s Intelligence Center.

Inspired by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the British Secret Intelligence Service, commonly known as MI6 (Military Intelligence, Section 6), it received the official name of Assessoria de Documentação Política Exterior (Adoc), Foreign Policy Documentation Advisory. From its creation to 1975, it was housed inside the Annex I of the Palácio do Itamaraty, on the fourth floor in room 410.\textsuperscript{322} Even today, many diplomats continue to deny its existence. But the recently released documents of the Brazilian Truth Commission, now in the CIEX collection at the Arquivo Nacional, in Brasília, leave no doubt. The center did what the infamous Operation Condor would start doing in the mid-1970s, with the support of the United States and the active participation of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay: secretly monitor and repress political enemies of the government overseas. Actually, the effectiveness of the CIEX may explain why the Brazilian participation in the clandestine political campaign was not as active as that of other countries. The CIEX agents followed a “Plan of External Search” with the support of military attachés and of the National Intelligence Service (SNI). Most of the reports were sent to the SNI, as well as to military intelligence services of the army, air force, and navy, such as Centro de Informações do Exército (CIE), Centro de Informações da Aeronáutica (CISA), Centro de Informações da Marinha

\textsuperscript{321} Ibid., 814.
(CENIMAR), and the Secretaries of the Estado Maior das Forças Armadas, the General Staff of the Armed Forces.323

Documents attesting to the existence of the CIEX only emerged after the discovery of the so-called “Archives of Terror,” in Paraguay, which was a collection of cases of murder, torture, and disappearances during Operation Condor.324 But among exiles, the perception of being monitored was present and many of them denounced it at the time. Several other governmental agencies, such as the Intelligence Center of the Air Force (CENIMAR) and the Major State of the Armed Forces (EMFA) joined the monitoring.325 “The streets were packed with military personnel disguised as exiles.

Geraldo Vandré [a famous Brazilian composer exiled in Chile in 1968, during the dictatorship] was always with three “friends” who, just by looking at them, you could tell were from the military. Their bodies, their scruff... Only Vandré, who was very naive, did not notice,” recalls Wilson Barbosa.326 He estimates that there were “between ten to twenty of them” in Santiago. “They were the reason we carried guns. But they never approached me. Only once, one of them asked me what cigarette brands were available when I was in line, waiting to buy smokes.”327

Nielsen Pires had a much closer brush with them. He remembers being robbed by a man he is certain was one of the disguised Brazilian officers. “I was walking the streets

323 Ibid.
325 “Consbras Montevideu para Secretaria Estado, Atividades Subversivas na Argentina, Chile, Paraguai, Bolivia e Uruguaí,” April 7, 1976, EMFA, Arquivo Nacional do Brasil, Brasília.s
of Santiago at 7:30 a.m. when this very athletic type takes the papers I was carrying. He
did not ask for money or anything. All he took were documents! And he was strong,
wearng tennis shoes. He did not look at all like a thief. But all I had were discussions on
Karl Mannheim’s *Ideology and Utopia*. Nothing to do with the political documents they
probably expected me to carry.”

The reports sent by spies in Chile focused on daily events in the lives of Brazilian
exiles and not on analysis of political strategies or diplomacy. Former Communist Party
President Amarílio Vasconcelos was one of their favorite victims. His meetings with
Salvador Allende and other members of the Chilean government were narrated in detailed
reports. In one of them, the topic are the requests Vasconcelos and other two exiles,
Cândido da Costa Aragão and Oswaldo (whose last name is unknown), made to president
Salvador Allende, including the concession of a visa to Miguel Arraes, former governor
of Pernambuco, who had been jailed and exiled. In another document, the subject
matter is the appointment of Vasconcelos and Aragão to jobs at state-owned companies
mediated by “Chilean communist Gustavo Diaz, ex-husband of socialist Representative
Carmen Lazo.” The obsession with personal lives over politics appears in one report,
which quotes a supposed statement from Vasconcelos about Allende’s use of sexual
stimulants. “If President Aguirre Cerda died due to red wine, President Allende will die

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329 Chile. Reunião de refugiados brasileiros com o Presidente Allende, BR AN BSB IE
06.6, number 176, 6/80. June 01, 1971, CIEX, Arquivo Nacional do Brasil, Brasília.
Vasconcelos. Governo da ‘UP.’ BR AN BSB IE 06.6, number 212, 78/80. June 28, 1971,
CIEX, Arquivo Nacional do Brasil, Brasília.
due to women.” The central question is: how did the CIEX spies know in such detail the conversations between exiles and government members? Several exiles suspected that moles had infiltrated among them or inside the presidential La Moneda Palace, and this seems to be the only explanation.

The moles also relayed information about the domestic climate in Chile. In May 1972, a report resulting from the contacts between Brazilian “asylees” and Chilean leftists stated that Allende would do a “self-coup” and proclaim Chile a Socialist Republic in the first half of May. “According to other rumors,” it continues, “Allende will only close the national congress and, following constitutional measures, will not call elections in the short term.” Another report from the same day brings an analysis of the support (or lack thereof) for Allende in the Chilean Armed Forces. The Chilean Gustavo Vidal, a member of the Press Committee of the Communist Party, told the exiles that among tenants and colonels, 85% were against the Unidad Popular government. In the Navy, 75% were against Allende. The Air Force would be the only branch still supportive of the UP government, with only 30% against it. A few months later, another report about rumors among Brazilian exiles stated that a coup against Salvador Allende was nigh. The sources were affiliates of the Movimiento de Acción Popular Unitaria (MAPU), the Chilean Communist Party (PCCh), the Radical Party, and a housekeeper of Genaro Arriagada, a member of the Central Commission of the PDC (Democratic

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331 Report No 217, BR AN, BSB, IE 08.5, 16/97, May 13, 1972, CIEX, Arquivo Nacional do Brasil, Brasília.
Christian Party) who had heard her boss talking about a coup to put Eduardo Frei in power.

After gaining access to part of the CIEX archives, in 2007, the Brazilian newspaper Correio Braziliense published a series of stories about the activities of the secret service of Itamaraty. One listed the names of the most prominent diplomats who were employees at the center.334 Among them was Agildo Sellos de Moura, who worked in Santiago from 1967 to 1971, when he became the advisor of the CIEX. A year later he was nominated chief of the Division of Intelligence Security (DSI). According to the testimony of diplomats to the newspaper, those who worked at CIEX were perceived as the lowest class of professionals, and were nicknamed “garbage men.” However, like Sellos de Moura, after working as spies, they rapidly advanced in the diplomatic arena, receiving promotions.

A secret document from the CIEX mentions the March 31 1970 edition of the leftist Chilean newspaper Ultima Hora, which described an upcoming visit to Chile by the Brazilian police deputy Sérgio Fleury, chief of the (DOPS), the Department for Political and Social Order.335 Fleury was the most renowned torturer of the Brazilian dictatorship and, according to the newspaper, his objective in Santiago was to “make contacts with the General Direction of Investigations to prove the existence of a link between Brazilian guerrilla members with the Uruguayan Tupamaros, and also with Chilean leftist groups to then ‘justify’ agreements of repressive action under CIA

335 Relatório Final Comissão Nacional da Verdade, 464. The full report is available online at: cnv.gov.br
control.” His presence in Chile, however, worried the diplomats. Another report from the CIEX questions the success of Fleury’s visit, pointing out that the fact that the “communist media” knew about it demonstrated the “total lack of security” his visit entailed.

For the exiles living in Chile, the interference of the Brazilian government in their lives created a nation inside a nation. They describe this territory as a transnational and independent one, which did not belong to Chile or to Brazil, but was informed by ideologies, violence, and the absence of any legal framework. The idea of nation became strongly linked to ideals such as socialism and anticommunism rather than geographical borders. It was clear that dictatorships supported each other and exiles would not be considered citizens by any state of exception. It was also evident that, with the constant monitoring, no matter where they were, they would never be completely detached from the Brazilian rulers.

One result of this transnational monitoring was the death of one of the Setenta, Edmur Péricles Camargo, known as Gauchão. On June 15 1971, the attaché of the Brazilian Army in Buenos Aires was notified that the “terrorist” would stop in Buenos Aires on his attempt to go from Chile to Montevideo traveling in a LAN/ Chile airplane. Due to the torture session he had endured in Brazil, he was seeking medical treatment with doctor Rodrigues Barrios. However, recently declassified documents from the Brazilian Truth Commission reveal that upon arrival to Ezeiza Airport in Buenos Aires, the Argentinean police arrested Camargo. Less than a week later, the CIEX wrote a report to other intelligence agencies stating that Brazilian exiles in Chile had been worried about

336 Ibid., 465.
Camargo’s disappearance.\textsuperscript{337} The Truth Commission concluded that this case was an example of how the activity of the Brazilian Foreign Office’s Intelligence Center at this time was a precursor to the activities of other intelligence services during the years of the Operation Condor. Camargo was “arbitrarily arrested by the Argentinean organs of repression, during a flight stopover in Buenos Aires at dawn the next day, and put in an Brazilian Air Force airplane which brought him to Brazil, where he disappeared while in the hands of public agents of the Brazilian military dictatorship.”\textsuperscript{338} The report signed by the Brazilian Truth Commission states that the CIEX operations in this case are proof of how the “military dictatorial state completely subverts the function of its relevant diplomatic services, transforming them into the long arm of the law over their own nationals, to imprison and eliminate them.”


\textsuperscript{338} Ibid.
Transnational Forms of Survival

Some of the exiles who could not work legally in Chile had to rely on the so-called *caixinha*, or “little box,” which consisted of a monthly stipend given to those in need. The money was saved with the help of several institutions and individuals and could also be used for emergency situations. Wilson Barbosa relied on that for six months, the maximum time an exile was allowed to use the help. According to Barbosa, the *caixinha* was created by the Frente Brasileira de Informações (the Brazilian Intelligence Front), formed by a group of exiles in the United States and American activists. The money also came from the World Council of Churches and from members of the Ação Popular, a Brazilian resistance group. “It had no party colors. It was for anyone who needed help,” remembers Barbosa.

He had arrived in Chile being treated by part of the population as a celebrity as one of the Setenta. “But once the freshness was over, in a few months, I had no job, no documents, nothing. I was living in a slum in Macul [a neighborhood in Greater Santiago] and I remember I would go to Santiago’s Central Market and ask the vendors to spare me some food. As a history professor, I could not work without a diploma. And the Brazilian Consulate would never help me get my documents.”

The impossibility of relying on Brazilian official channels affected all of them. As seen in the last chapter, the Brazilian ambassador during the entire presidency of

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Salvador Allende, in the early 1970s, Antônio Cândido da Cândido Canto, was one of the most important supporters of the Chilean coup. Before the elections, he had been sending several daily messages to the Brazilian government about the political trends of the country and Salvador Allende’s moves. He went as far as predicting a military coup in case of Allende’s election in 1970. Most of the exiles kept a distance from the Brazilian Embassy. It was seen as the “enemies’ house.”

The only time Ubiratan Peixoto decided to go to the Embassy was due to extreme necessity and some ingenuity. “I had written my father and asked him to send me my academic documents. I had finally been accepted at the University of Chile and would be able to study and get a fellowship. Since I had arrived, I had no regular job. So he sent it, but I had to pick them up at the Consulate, where they needed to be stamped.” When he arrived, staff members of the consulate made him wait for hours, setting up what he called “a sort of torture chamber.” When he was finally invited in, a “tall man with a gold buttoned jacket” asked why Peixoto wanted to study in such a “shitty” place if Brazil had the best universities in the world. “I kept thinking he could just kill me and nobody would find me. So I quickly said I was there because my father had a lot of money, grabbed the documents, and left.” Peixoto also depended on the caixinha when he arrived. He had many friends living in Santiago, and relied on what he calls “Chilean solidarity.” “My friends recommended me to go take a course of lathe mechanics at INACAP [Centro de Formación Técnica de la Universidad Tecnológica de Chile], a professionalizing institute

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343 Ibid.
that gave us 100 escudos just to be there.” But after the course, with no job, he relied on the caixinha.

Nielsen Pires says that fortunately he had never used the money and did not know how it worked when he was questioned at the Estadio Nacional. However, after leaving the place for a so-called “refuge” (a house under the protection of the United Nations and many consulates, such as Switzerland, Italy, France, and Sweden), he met the person who took care of the caixinha. “It stayed inside a restaurant in a wealthy neighborhood. So nobody would figure out what was going on. Some say there was a cell of the Brazilian communist party there. The fact is that during the ‘refuge’ the person who served the food was Camacho, the manager of the restaurant. It was all connected.”

The location of the caixinha and the origin of the money were the most frequently asked question by Brazilian torturers in the National Stadium according to the Brazilian exiles who were imprisoned there.

Journalist Armênio Guedes was behind the organization of this support. There was a “committee of solidarity for those who arrived. We organized a restaurant where people could eat; refugees paid less to eat and, at the same time, it was a regular restaurant that sold food for restaurants inside factories. We had a lot of activities.” He also recalls that the Frente Brasileira de Informações, ironically dubbed the “FBI,” coordinated radio shows, publications in newspapers, and other activities to denounce the abuses of the Brazilian regime.

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Transnational relations, therefore, defined the lives of the exiles even in their new home. These interactions were part of the institutions with which they dealt. German economic historian and sociologist André Gunder Frank, who left Brazil a month before the *coup* with his Chilean wife, Marta Fuentes, and their Brazilian son, Paulo, related his experiences in a series of autobiographical essays. Gunder Frank summarized the sequence of forced exiles: “The month before, and after our son Paulo was born there, Marta and I had already left Brazil again for Chile; later, for Mexico where Miguel was born, then to Montreal, and in 1968, back again to Chile.”

Historian Claudia Wasserman researched the relations between Gunder Frank and three Brazilian exiles during the years in Santiago. Among them were Ruy Mauro Marini, Vânia Bambirra, and Theotônio dos Santos, professors at the Universidade de Brasília (UNB), who were also forced to leave Brazil after the *coup*.

Wasserman sustains that, before 1964, several left-wing intellectuals believed that capitalism could coexist with a more democratic society. After the *coup*, however, Caio Prado Jr. began to argue for “the impossibility of a “bourgeois revolution” and the incapability of the national bourgeoisie to go further with social reforms.” She states that this debate was deepened in Chile. Salvador Allende’s “Chilean Path to Socialism” included the negotiation of social changes with members of the Chilean elite. On the domestic political spectrum, however, impatience grew strong against this position. The Secretary General of the Chilean leftist Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR),

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Miguel Enriquez, complained that Allende was not doing what he had promised, and suggested that the population invade farms and industries, taking forcefully what “belonged to them” instead of waiting for the government restitution.\footnote{Telegram number 062195, BBP/600(32), November 03, 1971, Secretaria de Estado das Relações Exteriores, Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty, Brasília.}

The historian Alberto Aggio claims that such a difference shaped the Brazilian exiles’ visions of democracy, now much more in tune with the MIR position. The exiles in Chile “reflected the division that existed in the heart of Latin American left-wing movements regarding what was going on in Chile.”\footnote{Alberto Aggio, “A Esquerda Brasileira vai ao Chile,” in: \textit{História Viva}, Number 42, 2007, 3.} This process of isolation inside a “foreign” space can produce what Rami Nashashibi calls “a reconfiguration of urban space, informed by a range of transnational circuits,” which provides another lens through which the multiscalar work of the global is made visible in even the most peripheral and hyper-isolated spaces.”\footnote{Rami Nashashibi, “Ghetto cosmopolitanism. Making theory at the margins,” In: Saskia Sassen (ed.) \textit{Deciphering the Global: Its Spaces, Scalings and Subjects} (London: Routledge, 2007), 261.}

For them, this dimension forged by multiple scales is not only due to the diversity of possible geographical boundaries, but also to the various shapes ideologies could take.

\textbf{Letters from the Other Side}

During the period of exile, while Brazil was still under a military dictatorship, censorship prevented intellectuals from writing broadly about their experiences. However, after the \textit{abertura}, the process that culminated in the end of censorship and,
eventually, of the dictatorial rule, the subjects of exile, themselves, responded to this “opening” by producing what would become a foundational part of the historiography on the Brazilian dictatorship. The first wave of works on the subject was published during the civilian-military regime and these were mostly first-hand accounts written by exiles. These publications, which included both works of scholarship and testimonial literature, informed the research of subsequent scholars of the subject, who relied on the memories and perspectives of the exiles on their treatment of the experience abroad. This set of writings was not only influential during the period of censorship, but it continued to be the central source for other works, as well as to shape the main questions, which remained connected to the exile experience, detached from Brazilian politics. Biographies and testimonies accounted for the majority of the published works on the topic from the late 1970s and over the next two decades. Although they do not offer an analysis of the political and social impact of exile in Brazil, they shaped the historiography on the subject for a long time.

In 1976, the sociologists Pedro Celso Uchôa Cavalcanti, Jovelino Ramos, Paulo Freire, Abdias do Nascimento and Nelson Werneck Sodré published one of the most influential books of the period. The title of the work, *Memórias do Exílio, Brasil 1964 - 19??*, ended in a question mark, showing that, for the exiles, the date they would be able to go back to Brazil was still undefined.\(^{351}\) It was the first published collection of comprehensive narratives on the experience of exile during the Brazilian dictatorship. The idea emerged from a group of exiles in Poland who noticed that the transnational experience of some Poles contributed to the understanding of their nation. The authors

justified the urgency of the project stating that “in conditions marked by historical rupture, such as the ones that provoke exile, the collective memory has to be made because it demands a conscious effort of recuperation for the national culture.”

Although the authors seem aware of their influence in the reshaping of Brazilian identity and national policies, they do not address it in the book; it would be too soon to really delineate this role. *Memórias do Exílio, Brasil 1964 - 19??* was published two years later in Brazil, a few months before the approval of the Law of Amnesty. It offers interviews, manuscripts, and a long narrative on the torture and death of Frei Tito. The editors sent invitations to exiles in several countries to give interviews in the book, along with a letter that asked: “How does this international experience among Brazilians affect your world vision? How does this experience modify the exiles’ vision of Brazil? What will be the impact of the exile on Brazilian culture? These questions need to be answered because Brazilian exiles are not outside, but inside the history of contemporary Brazil.”

Taking into consideration the binomial individual-community, the lives of Brazilian exiles in Chile were permeated by the construction of a particular space of empowerment in response to the fact that these displaced individuals were not allowed to share the same rights and experiences in which Brazilian citizens and Chilean citizens were included. In this sense, the community surged as a negation of the difference in the distancing that builds this social process. Erik Swyngedouw considers that “contrary to

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352 Ibid., 9.
353 Frei Tito was a Brazilian Dominican friar and the director of the Association of Youth Catholic Students. He was arrested and tortured several times by the civilian-military regime, and died in 1974. He became a symbol of resistance to the dictatorship, and of the support of a sector of the church of democracy. Leneide Duarte-plon and Clarisse Meireles, *Um Homem Torturado - Nos Passos de Frei Tito de Alencar* (Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 2014).
state-based arrangements, which are hierarchical and top-down command-and-control forms of setting rules and exercising power,” systems formed by transnational experiences “are presumably based on horizontal networks and interactive relations between independent but interdependent actors that share a high degree of trust, despite internal conflict and oppositional agendas, within inclusive participatory institutional or organizational associations. These are systems of negotiation and covenant that operate beyond the state, albeit not independently from the state.”

“In Chile, it became a class clash. In Brazil, there was no such thing. Only the elites had class consciousness,” sentenced Wilson Barbosa. “At the same time, we knew that the triumph of Allende’s Chile would be the debilitation of the Brazilian dictatorship. So we were internationalists. We were one,” remembers Wilson Barbosa. The idea of nationalism, then, becomes problematic. If the diaspora subject is transnational per se, the modern concept of nation-state has to be reconsidered. James Clifford suggests that the limitation affects not only the scholar of the black diaspora, but of any kind of transnational movement. His articulation of anti-Zionist Judaism’s diaspora in relation to Gilroy’s *Black Atlantic* results in a deconstruction of nationalism that can be useful in the case of the Brazilian exiles’ transnational experience. The communitarian character of such group, creating and recreating an alternative transnational public sphere, is marked by a multiplicity of references. “At the same time, diaspora cultures work to maintain community, selectively preserving and recovering

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357 Ibid.
traditions, “customizing” and “versioning” then in novel, hybrid, and often antagonistic situations.\footnote{James Clifford, Routes: Travel and Translation in the Late Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997), 263.} In the case of the Brazilian exiles, Brazilian citizenship is the first common thread to the formation of such community. It is not, however, a hermetically sealed community. It mingles with ideologies and projects of a democratic national space, in which nationality is no longer preponderant. The process of displacement does not paralyze the displaced, but makes him create a particular community, a particular nationalism, in which ideas of social equality and democracy are more important than place of birth.

There are no geographical borderlands between Brazil and Chile. Moving from one country to another, therefore, is by all means a diaspora. In his insightful definition of diaspora, James Clifford claims that it usually “presuppose(s) longer distances and a separation more like exile: a constitutive taboo on return, or its postponement to a remote future. Diasporas also connect multiple communities of a dispersed population.” Clifford relies on William Safran’s defining model of diasporas, which includes the maintenance of a “memory, vision or myth” about the original homeland as well as the hope of an eventual return.

Although the return to the homeland was not a sure thing, hopes of coming back are immortalized in songs, books, and memories of the exile. The song “Sabiá,” written by Tom Jobim and Chico Buarque, became a hymn of Brazilian exiles all over the world. A narrator acknowledged the hopes of returning to this homeland, saying: “I will be back/ I know I will be back / It will not be in vain / That I did all these plans / Of fooling myself / As I did this foolishness / Of finding myself / As I built roads / To lose myself /
As I did everything and nothing / To forget you.” The lyrics summarize the author’s several attempts to build a new home and to forget his ties with his native Brazil, an endeavor precluded by his idealization of the homeland and the faraway—yet kept alive for years—possibility of returning to this idealized place.

In 1979, with the passage of the Amnesty Law, most of the Brazilian exiles returned home.\(^{359}\) The transnational experiences they brought back were essential for the subsequent fight for democratization. The fight for civil rights, demonstrations at universities and, more broadly, ethnic, racial, and social relations in the democratic nations where they had lived, including in early 1970s Chile, planted a seed that would blossom into action in the upcoming years, until the first democratic election, in 1985. The movement for universal suffrage and direct elections, Diretas Já, is an example. As privileged witnesses of the period, able to track the events from both Chilean and Brazilian perspectives, they influenced the two countries’ political scenarios and were influenced by them. The echoes of these events can be felt even today, with Museums of Memory, Truth Commissions, and other initiatives. Both Chile and Brazil are still trying to confront properly their histories and the fight for plain democracy is still in the making.

With the end of the dictatorship, in 1985, there came a wave of new studies of this forced transnational experience. Denise Rollemberg, one of the leading scholars on the subject in Brazil, followed the same framework of the previous works, questioning

\(^{359}\) Amnesty Law is the popular name for Law Number 6.683, signed by then president João Batista Figueiredo in August 28, 1979. The legislation absolved civilians and military personnel of any political crimes committed in the context of the dictatorship, from September 2, 1961 and August 16, 1979.
identity among exiles and the nature of this experience. She argues that this first group of narratives is fundamental to reach an understanding of the period, as the perspective of the exiles themselves offers the possibility for analyzing the quotidian side of such experience, which “involved doubt, certainty, distress, emptiness, fear, insanity, death, difficulty with documents, work, study, reconstruction of pathways—in short, a redefinition of identity imposed by day-to-day life.” Rollemberg dedicates a large part of her research to the daily life of Brazilian exiles. Since the 1980s, she has been collecting interviews with exiles and their families. Books and articles written by exiles are also central to her research. Her work on the lives and connections of groups of exiles in places such as Chile and Mexico attests that they found an environment rich with the exchange of ideas with exiles from other countries in which authoritarian regimes were installed. She argues that although the exile was an experience of punishment, intolerance, and nullification of the national experience, it offered “the opportunity of a rebirth and transformation.” Rollemberg contends that, for intellectuals, exile did not mean isolation, but the construction of a new set of connections, the “radars.” However, she does not enter the question of the influence of

361 Rollemberg argues that the memory of the *abertura*, the period that led to the end of the military regime, shows the behavior of Brazilian society during the dictatorship. “The memory of the *abertura*, according to which the society was the big actor who generated the transformation of a dictatorship into a democratic regime, transcends the period of 1974-1985.” See Denise Rollemberg, “As Trincheiras da Memória. A Associação Brasileira de Imprensa e a Ditadura (1964-1974),” In: Denise Rollemberg and Samantha Viz Quadrat (org.), *A Construção Social dos Regimes Autoritários: Legitimidade, Consenso e Consentimento no Século XX* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilização Brasileira, 2010), 103.
theses “radars” in the shaping of national politics or national identity. She is more interested in understanding the nature of exile and how it affected those who went through it.

It is interesting to notice that Rollemberg opens one of her most acclaimed articles with an anecdote about the exile Maria Augusta Carneiro Ribeiro’s experience with Muslim women in an Algerian bathhouse. The interview was conducted in 1996, so it is hard to know if it was influenced by Joan Scott’s questioning of gender as a category, but it seems probable. Following a trend in the general historiography, in the 1980s and 1990s, works discussing gender flourished.

The same group of intellectuals who had published Memórias do Exílio in 1976, reunited with a group of female exiles to write a book on their perspectives. Memórias das Mulheres do Exílio was an attempt at narrating women’s collective memories of the exile, clearly informed by the historiographical trend of gender studies. Women, like all the other groups that have not been recognized by the historiography, do not have their history registered. That’s what generates the sequence of testimonies of the present on the present, the life stories, the oral tradition, an effort of reconstitution. On the book’s cover, the words “das mulheres” (of women) appear forcefully in the title. It is not by chance. For them, the fact that there were no women in the first publication of the series demonstrates that they were not included even among this already peripheral group.

366 Ibid., 17.
Whenever discussions of race or gender were brought to the table, they were set aside by the larger and more urgent preoccupation with the end of the dictatorship. Only when a democratic voting system was guaranteed, did such debates gain strength.

Fig. 13. Cover of *Memórias das Mulheres do Exílio*, Editora Paz e Terra

Ana Vazquez’s work also focuses on female exiles’ perceptions of identity. In a series of articles published in 1982, she looked at narratives of Brazilian exiles in France.¹⁶⁷ Four years later, Angela Neves-Xavier de Brito broadened the question by looking at identity among exiles in several countries.¹⁶⁸ Brito called attention to a huge gap in the historiography of the Brazilian dictatorship: “the story of this exile has not yet been written. Although few books are beginning to appear on this period, they are more about the nature of personal accounts and memoirs, and like most of the history of our

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era, they are written by men.” To explain how the experience of exile shaped these women’s identity, Brito shows the importance of feminist organizations in the context of the exile community and in the context of the different countries to which they fled. Brito is determined to move away from the first-person narrative, arguing that there is a gap in historiography when it comes to the political and social impact of exiles in Brazil. However, the author also uses as main sources the interviews of Memórias das Mulheres do Exílio and ends up adding little to this debate. Similarly to Rollembert, Brito separates the waves of exiles in two: the 1964 group, who moved right after the coup d’état, mainly to other Latin American countries; and the 1968 group, who looked for destinations in Europe and Africa. The first group faced a return to the previous status they had before they had engaged in political activism. According to the author, this was due to the structure of Latin American leftist political organizations, which held women in an inferior position with no possibility of incorporating a new feminine identity. In Europe, on the other hand, the process of a building a new consciousness on the part of Brazilian women began to emerge. “The process of reflection on the conditions of oppression of women could only be done in exile and especially in societies whose social conditions favored its appearance. It never could have been done in societies such as Brazil or Chile, imbued in patriarchal values.”

In the 2000s, a new shift in the historiography of exile began. Once again, the turn followed a trend in the general historiography of Latin America that shed light onto the role of the diaspora and of transnational studies. The study of exile emerged as a central topic; not a marginal part of broader studies of immigration or dictatorial regimes.

369 Ibid., 58.
370 Ibid., 67.
Questions of identity became secondary, giving place to questions of power, nationalism, and displacement.

In 2007, a volume of *Latin American Perspectives*, edited by James N. Green, Luis Roniger, and Pablo Yankelevich, brought the subject to the fore. The broad collection of articles would later become one of the most comprehensive books on the subject.\(^{371}\) These essays bring various perspectives together on the experience of exile. Notably, they favor transnational analysis over national histories, finally offering an interpretation of the political and social impact of exile experiences in Brazil. The authors consider the problem of conceptualizing exile as the result of a still present challenge to the exclusionary nation-states of the region. They add that “the study of exile highlights an ongoing tension between the principle of national membership and the principle of citizenship. Once pushed into exile, people may lose the entitlements attached to citizenship but at the same time may become even more attached than before to what is perceived as the ‘national soul.’”\(^{372}\) The belatedness of such a publication is the demonstration of the gap in studies on the topic.

A few years before this publication, the Brazilian historian José Murilo de Carvalho had already raised the question of citizenship before, during, and after the military regime.\(^{373}\) The topic dominates scholarship after the dictatorial period, a consequence of the challenges of constructing a democratic state after two decades. In his brief history of citizenship in Brazil, which begins in 1822 with the independence,

\(^{372}\) Ibid., 4.
\(^{373}\) José Murilo de Carvalho, *Cidadania no Brasil, o Longo Caminho* (Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 2001).
Carvalho looks at the Law of Amnesty of 1979 as an ambiguous process of redefinition of citizenship because it was “broad, general and unrestricted,” meaning that it included at the same time the exiles and perpetrators of torture, murder, and other crimes committed during the regime. “In any case, it gave political rights back to those who had lost them and helped to renew the political fight.”

One of the most prolific historians of the Brazilian dictatorship, Carlos Fico dedicated several books to the history of the 1964 coup d’État and its consequences. The influence of the United States is at the core of his research. In 2013, however, Fico, Maria Paula Araújo, and Monica Grin published a work that followed the trend of studying transitional justice, driven by the creation of the Brazilian Truth Commission in 2012. The collection of essays included a new interpretation of the exile experience. The authors did not question how this period shaped the lives of those who were expelled from Brazil, but how it redefined the way the country addresses questions of the legacy of political violence. Their presence, the authors claim, is central to the country’s reconciliation with democracy.

Green, Fico, and Carvalho are not alone in addressing this new set of questions. In the 2000s and 2010s, the popularity of transnational history created a new framework for research on the experience of exile. Rodrigo Patto Sá Motta mentions the topic when

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374 Ibid., 176.
looking at Brazilian universities under the military regime.\textsuperscript{377} The process of expelling professors who were seen as menaces to the regime, known as \textit{expurgo}, is central to his narrative and to the understanding of how the policies installed during the regime of exception shaped ideas of nationhood in the transition to democracy.

This more recent trend in the historiography of the Brazilian exiles, which starts in the late 2000s and shifts from their quest for identity to their role in the shaping of nationhood reveals the fruitfulness of the topic, one that will probably occupy a much more central role in the future historiography of the Brazilian dictatorship. The long list of publications stimulated by the fiftieth anniversary of the Brazilian \textit{coup d'état} and the small number of books dedicated to the theme of the exile among them, however, points to the still timid approach to the topic. The introduction of a broader methodology that equips us to inquire not into the exiles’ experience, but rather into their impact in the framing of nationhood and democracy in Brazil, furthermore, has the potential of placing the topic at the center of the debate. And it does not seem that this move will take another fifty years.

\textsuperscript{377} Rodrigo Patto Sá Motta, \textit{As Universidades e o Regime Militar} (Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 2014).
Chapter Four

The Coup

“Soldado, no me dispires, soldado.
Yo sé que tu mano tiembla
soldado, no me dispires.
¿Quién te puso las medallas?
¿Cuántas vidas te han costado?
Dime si es justo soldado
con tanta sangre ¿Quién gana?
Si tan injusto es matar,
¿por qué matar a tu hermano?”
Victor Jara, Canción del Soldado.

After a long day visiting patients, Otto Brockes spent the night of September 10, 1973, organizing groups of resistance to a possible coup d’état in Chile. They discussed how to defend themselves and where to go in case the imminent military insurgency took place. He remembers a communist woman stating: it will happen tomorrow. The doctor returned home, in the far neighborhood of Macul, hoping she was wrong. He had not eaten anything but could not find food in the refrigerator. He went to bed hungry. The day after, Brockes woke up and noticed there was no public transportation in the area. He jumped in a truck and then walked to downtown Santiago where a friend said they were supposed to meet their comrades in a factory. There, a member of the Socialist Party stated that there would be no resistance. Allende was dead and the Communist Party had given up fighting.

The leaders of the group divided up the men and women present into safe houses and Brockes was sent to the house of a communist leader. When he arrived, still hungry, the wife of the leader complained about the fact that they already had very little to eat.

and her husband had brought guests. The older son lectured his mother on the sacrifices the revolution required. Brockes felt embarrassed. He decided it was better to take a chance and go back home. Starving and tired, he arrived late and started reading a document that a Trotskyist friend had given him. He fell asleep. “Nationality?” screamed the Chilean soldier, in Spanish, waking him up immediately. “Brazilian,” Brockes answered. “Can I see your documents?” And when the doctor turned to find his ID card, he felt the blow to his back. The acute pain mixed with a feeling of despair and disgust. “They did not have the guts to attack me looking at my face, but when I turned they hit me and put me on my knees. They beat me from that moment on, until that night, nonstop. They broke my ribs, my head got huge, swollen. And I was inside my home. Butchered. I fainted once, twice, and they continued beating me, while I was completely covered in blood.”

The soldiers asked about his connections to the enemies of the newly imposed government. Where were they? Where were the weapons? In a flash, Brockes thought of his mother, his years fighting the dictatorship in Brazil, his friends who had died at the hands of the regime, the lives he had saved working as a doctor. “This is the wrong approach,” he concluded. “I am making them kill me. I can pretend without telling them anything.” So, he denied being a guerrilla fighter and told the soldiers he was a doctor who had arrived in Chile as a tourist, hoping that they might see the stamp in his passport from a month earlier, when he had been to Brazil. “Cállate, perro” (shut up, dog), one of them answered. But another officer, after some time, saw his documents and commented

379 Ibid.
380 Ibid.
381 Ibid.
“but it does say doctor here...” They started to calm down. But suddenly one of them found a room where one of Brockes’ comrades kept fake documents, pictures, all the equipment he used to falsify passports. Ironically, that saved his life. “They thought I was a big boss, some high-profile person and they concluded it would look good if they took me to the Ministry of Defense and bragged about having arrested me. They hit me a lot, but did not kill me. I fainted again and when I woke up I was already being dragged in the street. My feet had no more nails; I was practically naked at this point. They threw me into a bus of the carabineiros, and sat on my head, laughing.”382

Brazilian exiles such as Brockes suffered in the hands of the soldiers as thousands of Chileans did, but their previous experience with another dictatorship allowed them to organize ways of surviving it. At the National Stadium and at international embassies, they were central in structuring movements of resistance. They were also key witnesses of the influence of the Brazilian civilian-military regime in the coup, since they were the few ones who could identify Brazilian officers and understand their orders. Brockes was one of the many exiles in Santiago on the day of the coup d’état. Instead of the Ministry of Defense, the police officers took him to a station of the carabineiros where he was interrogated and tortured again. “At that point, I hadn’t eaten anything for two days. They offered me water. I pretended, but of course I did not drink,” he said, explaining that he feared poisoning. The soldiers took him to another police department at General Mackenna, where political prisoners were sent. There, he was put in a cell with several Chileans. At some point, a very courteous police officer said he was sorry for all that rudeness, which was “not in tune with the politeness of the Chilean people” and

382 Ibid.
introduced him to a Brazilian woman. “She had been raped several times. ‘You are both in terrible conditions,’ the officer said. Please, talk to her and maybe you can cheer her up a little bit,” recalls Brockes. 383 “I recognized her immediately, but she did not recognize me because my face was disfigured. I had examined her with a child a week before. I said, ‘it’s me’ and she hugged me and started to cry. Well, I have never seen this comrade again. I don’t remember her name and I never saw her again.” 384

The imposed government arrested an estimated 40,000 Chileans. Furthermore, the Amnesty International report on the coup highlights the “atmosphere of extreme xenophobia” which dominated the country after September 11. 385 The institution translated one of the leaflets distributed at the time. It said that ‘The actions carried out by the armed forces and police only pursue the good of Chile and Chileans, and therefore they have the support of civilians. No compassion will be had for the foreign extremists who have come to kill Chileans. Citizen: remain alert to discover them and denounce them to the nearest military authority.’” 386

According to the report, “many thousands” of refugees and visitors were imprisoned or expelled. 387 It is hard to determine precisely the number of Brazilians exiled in Chile at the time of the coup. Citing the newspaper Le Monde, the Amnesty International report estimates that there were around 1,200 Brazilians. 388 The Brazilian Truth Commission states that the number is still unknown, and acknowledges that some

383 Ibid.
384 Ibid.
386 Ibid., 64.
387 Ibid.
388 Ibid.
people talk about “hundreds, others thousands, who had moved to Chile during the three years of the Unidad Popular government to escape repression in Brazil—some with the intent of staying there; others on their way to other countries—or to witness or participate in the innovative political experience that Chile was undergoing at that time.”

Nielsen Pires was one of them. On September 15, the Saturday after the coup, he tried to silence his intuition for a few hours and followed the weekly tradition. He woke up, drank a glass of milk, ate a small piece of bread, got dressed, walked a few blocks and boarded the first bus to Barrio Alto, in Santiago. His girlfriend, Sara, lived in the wealthy neighborhood of the Chilean capital. On that cloudy afternoon, they did not imagine that they would eventually marry and remain together for the rest of their days. Had the young couple believed in omens, they would probably have given up then. At the end of the habitual weekend luncheon, Sara drove Nielsen back to his apartment. There, he gathered the three hundred dollars he had been saving for the past two years, his old transistor radio, and ten of his favorite LP records. He told her to go back home and stop by his apartment again the next day. If he were not there, she would know he had been killed or arrested. Running away was not an option. Not again.

On the day of the coup d’état Nielsen Pires was a few blocks from the Palacio de La Moneda. He had seen a similar scenario a decade before, in Brazil. However, this time he had decided that he was not going to hide. So when officers entered his apartment on Sunday, at 3 am, a few hours after his lunch with Sara’s family, he knew what to expect. “They pushed me with the barrel of a machine gun. I woke up when they screamed,

‘Where are the guns? Where is the money?’” The soldiers and many other men who looked like civilians, according to Pires, broke through the door, entered the house and started beating him. “It was a long sequence of punches. One cannot even know the degree of anger. They looked all over the apartment and concluded that there was nothing. No radio, no money. There was nothing, it was clear. But my Panamanian friend who shared the apartment with me was full of books on Marxist economics.” The father of his girlfriend, who would later become his father-in-law, had invited him to stay in their house in an upper-class neighborhood stating that, because most of the residents supported the coup he would be safe there. “I refused precisely because I had nothing and I was legal in the country. I trusted all would be fine.” Later, in that same day, he was taken to the National Stadium. “It was like being in a war movie. At the Estadio Nacional the climate was one of horror.”391

Nancy Mangabeira Unger also felt as if she were in a Hollywood movie. “I thought, it feels like one of those scenarios,” she recalled forty years later.392 She was hiding from the police in the house of a comrade, inside a closet in the room of a newborn. The baby was sleeping in the crib when the officers arrived for the usual inspection. They were searching houses and companies, trying to find enemies of the government. “The order was clear: to kill,” she remembers. The policemen entered, looked over everything, but did not search inside the closet.

Ubiratan Peixoto compared the coup d’état in Chile to the loss of a second mother. He had decided to leave for Chile as soon as he realized that he would be killed if

391 Ibid.
he stayed in Brazil. Differently from the *Setenta* and other exiles, who went to the country as a consequence of the Brazilian state’s choice, he had been following Salvador Allende since 1958, more than a decade before he was elected president of Chile. As soon as he arrived to Santiago, he engaged with leftist Chilean groups. “I was still a member of the Brazilian Communist Party and took care of connecting it with the Chilean Communist Party and other movements,” he recalls. Peixoto considered himself to be a guerrilla man who belonged just like any other Chilean citizen. “So that defeat hurt me really bad.”

Fernando Gabeira felt a similar anguish. The Brazilian guerrilla group Revolutionary Movement October 8th, or MR-8, of which he had been a member, was the strongest memory in his mind on that strange September day. He was, once again, witnessing failure. Along with the death of Salvador Allende, the “Chilean Path to Socialism” and any hope of taking part in a leftist revolution also died. “It was the beginning of an exile inside the exile; this time, longer and even more painful because we knew that military dictatorships were circling the wagons in the entire continent. In the best case scenario, we would suffer a lot.” After the coup, he moved to Sweden where he worked as a journalist, train conductor, and even wrote a script for the Swedish television about the death of Salvador Allende.

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393 Interview with Ubiratan Peixoto by the author. Video recording. Brasília, 07/14/2014.
394 Ibid.
395 Fernando Gabeira, *O que é isso companheiro?* (São Paulo: Companhia de Bolso, 1979), 11.
396 A short description of Gabeira’s political career is available online at http://gabeira.com.br/biografia/
Wilson Barbosa survived despite his uncomfortably close proximity to the enemy. The day of the coup, the daughter of a professor invited him and his wife, who was a student at the Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales de Chile (FLACSO), to her father’s birthday.\footnote{Interview with Wilson Barbosa by the author. Video recording. São Paulo, 07/11/2014.} Despite the tension, they decided they would have some drinks and celebrate at their house, she had said. After a few minutes at the party, Barbosa noticed a large truck and three smaller ones parking at the sidewalk. Several armed men dressed in black entered the celebration. A captain of the army, who was a nephew of the professor, inquired: “what are these subversive elements doing in your house?” The birthday celebrant ordered, “not with these ones. These ones are mine. They are students.” Barbosa recalls the discomfort. “We had to shake hands with the captain. So, you eat those birthday sweets with difficulty, you drink that little champagne with a dry mouth, then you go back home and caress your 38 revolver, which is the only thing that remains.
If someone invades, I’ll shoot. A defeat is a defeat, comrade. The problem is that it was one defeat after another, you see? This is hard to swallow. It happens, once, twice, three, four, five times, organizations being defeated, you being arrested, massacred, you go into exile, you are humiliated by these guys... it comes to a point when you either become the state or you go take care of your own life.”398

In the first days of the Chilean dictatorship, the military killed two Brazilians: Luiz Carlos de Almeida and Nelson de Souza Kohl. Almeida had graduated in Physics at the Universidade de São Paulo (USP) and engaged in meetings against the Brazilian dictatorship even before he joined the Partido Operário Comunista (POP), the Communist Workers Party. After finding out that the police had ordered his arrest, Almeida decided it would be safer to join other friends in exile, and moved to Chile. On September 14, carabineiros invaded the house where he lived with his namesake, Luiz Carlos de Almeida Vieira, who had just arrived from Brazil. They arrested the two Brazilians.

Carmen Fischer was then married to Vieira and her testimony of 1993 was part of a judicial process in the Court of Appeals of Santiago to investigate the circumstances of Almeida’s death.399 She said that the officers who invaded the apartment, where she also lived, took their books and their political archive, including documents about their political engagements in Brazil. The two men were taken to a police station and, later, to the Estadio Nacional. Vieira told the Commission of External Representation for the Disappearance of the Brazilian Federal House of Representatives that after being tortured, they were put into a police car with a Uruguayan man, and taken to the banks of

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398Ibid.
399The criminal process nº 368/2012 was opened in December 12, 2012. Some of its documents, including Carmen Fischer’s Testimony, can be found online at: http://www.cnv.gov.br/todos-volume-1/645-documentos-citados-volume-i-4.html
the Mapocho River. The officers shot the Uruguayan and Almeida, who was then 25 years old, as soon as they tried to enter the river. Vieira was also shot three times and was the last of them to be washed away by the water currents. A group of Chileans from a church found him near the shore and saved him. Vieira and his then wife, Carmen Fischer, went into exile in Sweden, where Vieira still lives.

Fig. 15. The prisoners were everywhere inside the National Stadium. Photo: Sebastián Rodeiro / La Nacion

Kohl was also a member of the Communist Workers Party and also attended Universidade de São Paulo, where he studied communications. In Santiago, he taught private English classes and worked as a translator. According to his wife, Elaine Maria Beraldo Laune, they never engaged in political activities while in Chile. She recalls that on September 15, 1973, a large group of police officers entered their house, searched

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every room, even breaking the bathtub in search of weapons. She saw through the
window when Kohl was taken to a military car. It was the last time they looked at each
other. Laune also stated that, after conducting their own investigation, his family was able
to find a death certificate from October 19, 1973, signed by Doctor Alfredo Vargas,
director of the Santiago Forensics, who also signed Salvador Allende’s and several other
death certificates in the days following the coup d’état. Kohl’s death happened on
September 16, and the “causa mortis” were wounds due to bullet perforations in the
thorax and abdomen. More recently, the Brazilian Truth Commission also unveiled a
certificate stating that Kohl’s body had been cremated on January 4, 1974, at the
Cemetery of Recoleta.⁴⁰²

According to some friends, Maria Auxiliadora Lara Barcelos was also a victim of
the dictatorships in Brazil and Chile.⁴⁰³ In Brazil, she was a member of the extreme-left
Vanguarda Armada Revolucionária Palmares (VAR-Palmares).⁴⁰⁴ On November 1969,
the Brazilian military police arrested her. Around fifteen soldiers beat her while saying
they wanted to deform her face.⁴⁰⁵ During the interrogation, they played very loud
percussive music, and danced while beating her. She was then tortured with electrical
shocks while lying naked on the wet floor. In 1971, she went into exile in Chile, one of

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⁴⁰² Cópia do Ofício nº 175, de 29 de dezembro de 2011, do Cemitério Geral Recoleta, que
certifica que Nelson de Souza Kohl teria sido cremado naquele cemitério em 4 de janeiro
de 1974. Comissão Nacional da Verdade. Available online at:
⁴⁰³ Cavi Borges, Emilia Silveira, Sandra Moreyra, and Jom Tob Azulay. Setenta. DVD.
⁴⁰⁴ Maria Auxiliadora Lara Barcelos, Memórias da Ditadura.
http://memoriasdaditadura.org.br/biografias-da-resistencia/maria-auxiliadora-lara-
barcelos/
⁴⁰⁵ Haskell Wexler, Brazil: A Report on Torture. YouTube. Directed by Hannah Eaves,
the seventy political prisoners exchanged for the Swiss Ambassador kidnapped in Brazil. There, she went back to medical school, but following the 1973 coup she again had to move. After a period at the Mexican Embassy, she went to Belgium and West Germany, where she had the support of Amnesty International. She went back to school. However, after a few months, her immigration status was again questioned. The renewal of her passport was denied pending the official acceptance of her process of asylum. Her boyfriend at the time states that she was psychologically fragile due to all these problems and that she had never recovered from the torture she suffered in Brazil.\textsuperscript{406} Maria Auxiliadora Barcelos committed suicide by throwing herself in front of a train at the Charlottenburg subway station, in Berlin. She was 31 years old.

**From the Window of the Embassy**

Around 9 a.m. of September 11, 1973, soldiers hurled the first bombs at the La Moneda Palace, where Salvador Allende strived to keep the promise of resisting until death. At noon, Hawker Hunters fighter planes bombed the presidential palace. The smoke covered Santiago. For the Brazilian exiles, there was no doubt that what they feared the most was taking place: a repetition of what they had witnessed almost a decade earlier, in Brazil. For the representatives of the military government, however, it was the achievement of a long awaited investment. At the Brazilian Embassy in Santiago, the news of Salvador Allende’s death was celebrated. Some of the employees stood up. “It was a terrifying moment,” recalled José Viegas, who was second secretary at the time at

the Embassy and in 2003 would become the minister of defense. There were several foggy actions in that embassy, but the main ones took place through the National Information Service (SNI), which operated a parallel channel inside the mission, and by the ambassador himself,” stated Viegas in an interview.

On September 11, a long and urgent telegram arrived at the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Relations, in Brasília, in which ambassador Antônio Cândido da Câmara Canto complained about the lines to buy bread in the upper class neighborhoods of Santiago. The violent reactions of consumers resulted in “conflicts with the stores’ owners and, many times, in clashes with the police,” he writes. In an appealing narrative, he cites an editorial of the newspaper *La Tercera*:

> the lack of bread makes everyday life bitter and harder. It sums up to the long and narrow land of lines that Chile has become. (...) Nothing can be more humiliating to a people then suffering from hunger, in any of its forms. This is what is beginning to happen in Chile. There is no doubt that the population could have endured better the process we are living in if it hadn’t started to attack something sacred: the right to exist and eat. What is going on does not create fervor, but hopelessness; it does not produce revolution, but desperation.

Later that same day, he wrote about the strike of transportation workers. On September 12, Câmara Canto described the establishment of the military junta, Allende’s suicide, and the curfew established to “protect the population from suicide extremist

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408 Ibid.


410 Ibid.

groups which are not yet unarmed.” He then went on to write a series of telegrams, updating the situation according to what he saw on television or read in the newspapers. He ironically celebrated the fire in the office of “extreme-leftist” newspaper *Puro Chile* “by a group of *carabineiros*.” “I am watching from a box seat, since the mentioned paper, which has insulted the Brazilian government for so long, is based in front of our embassy.”

Communications with the Brazilian government were impaired right after the *coup*. A message stating that the staff and the ambassador were safe was sent through the US Embassy, which informed, via radio, the Department of State, which then sent the dispatch to the Brazilian Embassy in Washington. However, as soon as the connection was reestablished, Câmara Canto used it to continue supporting businessmen and politicians who opposed the Allende regime. On September 14, when communications were still problematic in the country, the diplomat did a personal favor for Jorge Fontaine, then president of the Sociedad de Fomento Fabril (SOFOFA), the Society for Industrial Development. He asked staff at the Ministry of Foreign Relations, in Brasília, to send a telegram to Fontaine’s daughter who lived in the United States attesting that the entire family was “happy and very well.” In the message, the Brazilian ambassador

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412 Constituição de junta militar de governo. 601.3 (B39). September 12, 1973, Secretaria de Estado das Relações Exteriores, Arquivo Central do Itamaraty, Brasília.
413 Incendio do “Puro Chile.” 600(B39). September 13, 1973, Secretaria de Estado das Relações Exteriores, Arquivo Central do Itamaraty, Brasília.
414 Ibid.
justified the urgency of the favor, stating that Fontaine was “my personal friend, besides being anti-communist.”

A day later, Câmara Canto asked the Ministry to inform the families of a few Brazilians living in Santiago that they were safe and well. They were students, friends, and staff members of the embassy. No exile was mentioned. Differently from what most of the embassies did at the time of the military action, the ambassador ignored the presence of this numerous group of Brazilian citizens, leaving them helpless. Journalist Dorrit Harazim, who arrived in Chile 48 hours prior to the coup to participate of an international seminar of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), called the ambassador a few hours after the bombing of La Moneda asking him that in case the magazine for which she worked, Veja, called, he was to inform them that she was safe. “Câmara Canto heard everything, proclaimed he would send Veja a message, asked me what the scene looked like (at La Moneda) from the perspective of the guests at Hotel Carrera, and hung up in a jovial tone, saying ‘We won, it’s all in order.’”

Most of the documents about the days following the coup available at the Central Archives of the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Relations, the Itamaraty, are almost fully illegible. But expressions such as “wipe communism out” can still be read. Although almost all the letters faded due to time, constant manipulation, or human action, another telegram, from September 13, gives an idea of the influence of Câmara Canto in its first

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416 Pedido de retransmissão de telegrama, Telegram number 106282, 341.75. September 14, 1973, Secretaria de Estado das Relações Exteriores, Arquivo Central do Itamaraty, Brasília.

417 Moniz Bandeira, 2008, 575.

418 Revolta militar. 600 (B39). September 12, 1973, Secretaria de Estado das Relações Exteriores, Arquivo Central do Itamaraty, Brasília.
and only readable phrase: “I received from the Commander-in-chief of the Air Force and member of the military junta (...)” Later on that same day, in a more readable document from 11:15 am, Câmara Canto transcribes a letter from the Chilean Minister of Foreign Relations, Ismael Huerta, informing the Brazilian government of the structure of the military junta which, according to him, “exercises absolute control over the national territory” and desires to keep with the Brazilian government “the best relation of friendship.”

In another telegram that shows that the ambassador had access to privileged information, he communicates to the Division of Southern America in the Ministry of Foreign Relations that “at this very moment I was informed that, possibly this afternoon, ambassador (Mario García) Inchaustegui and his collaborators will board back to Cuba.” A day later, he continues, “the chief of staff of the Minister of Foreign Relations confirmed that the Cuban ambassador, his staff, and a group of undesirable Cubans, have left the country yesterday in an airplane of the ‘Cubana de Aviacion.’ (...) Out of respect for Sweden, which is in charge of the Cuban interests in this country, the embassy was not yet searched. It’s a matter of days.”

The Swedish Embassy became a shelter for hundreds of refugees. Ambassador Harald Edelstam was nicknamed Raoul Wallemberg of the 1970s after helping the Cuban delegation, dozens of Uruguayan and Bolivians, and over one thousand Chileans escape

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419 Novo governo chileno. 600(B39). September 13, 1973, Secretaria de Estado das Relações Exteriores, Arquivo Central do Itamaraty, Brasília.
the Pinochet government. His actions, however, went beyond simply giving shelter to the enemies of the new government. He influenced other European leaders to do the same and be flexible about their interpretations of the Treaty of Caracas, which determines the rules for asylum and safe conduct passes for victims of political upheaval. On December 1973, he was declared *persona non grata* and expelled from Chile.

Brazilian exile Nielsen Pires is still grateful to Edelstam’s intervention. He went to a refuge inside a cloister for Belgian nuns organized by the Swedish embassy with the support of the French, Swiss, and Italian embassies. Pires describes the place as an interminable sequence of mattresses. They covered the floor of every room, the eatery, and even halls. The nuns were still there, living in a specific and now reduced area, while foreigners occupied the vast majority of the other rooms. “There was a big room that was probably the eatery where we slept on the floor with thin mattresses and blankets, one beside the other. Do you remember Jim Jones, that cult leader who, I think, went to Venezuela and made everyone commit suicide? So, it was something similar, everyone lying in the floor, sleeping together. But it was way better than in the Estadio Nacional. In the stadium, there were machine guns in front of you, held by kids who were 17, 18 years old, who could shoot if they got scared.”

Solange Bastos had a similar impression. She stated that in comparison to the treatment she received in prison in Brazil, the Chileans looked like amateurs. The soldiers had just arrived from smaller

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cities to work in the stadium. In the first days after the coup, some seemed to be as scared as the prisoners.  

Most of the foreigners who survived prison in the National Stadium were transferred to United Nations camps or embassies in Chile. A delegation from Amnesty International visited the stadium on November 7, 1973 and confirmed that there were only twenty foreigners still imprisoned there at this point. However, there were groups detained in other parts of the country. The embassies of Argentina, México, Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, Panamá, and of many European countries continued to give shelter to several exiles and Chileans.

Meanwhile, the Brazilian embassy closed its doors to political enemies of the Chilean regime, including Brazilian citizens. Despite the decision, Câmara Canto followed the actions of other ambassadors. On September 14, he wrote to the Ministry of Foreign Relations about the shelter that the Mexican Embassy had offered to sixty people, including the widow and grandsons of Salvador Allende. Maria Auxiliadora Barcelos, Wilson Barbosa, and other Brazilian exiles took the same route as the Allendes. Barbosa recalls that a plane from the Mexican government took them to Mexico City, but upon their arrival, an agent told him and his wife that they needed to find another country in which to live. Mexican president Luis Echeverría “was a CIA agent who declared he had a commitment with Allende, so he would give asylum to his family and guarantee transit to those whom Allende had accepted in Chile. But the Mexican police and

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425 Exilados na embaixada do Mexico. Telegram 904. 924.31 (00) (B14). September 14, 1973, Secretaria de Estado das Relações Exteriores, Arquivo Central do Itamaraty, Brasília.
government made it clear we would not stay there.” He spent a month in Mexico. “I was simply social garbage. That was when I formed an understanding of the nature of Latin America. This category so many talk about. I understood what the problem was.” Barbosa and his wife, Solange, boarded a plane to Sweden. While they waited, a Mexican police officer who conducted them to the airplane kept telling Barbosa what a coward he was for flying to Europe instead of going back to Brazil and fighting against the dictatorship. “The humiliation of an exile has no limit—the things you have to hear and how much you have to be degraded to remain alive.”

A Brazilian-American citizen experienced the lack of support from two sides. In July 1970, in Brazil, Nancy Mangabeira Unger was sleeping in her house when around twenty soldiers invaded the place, shooting. She was shot in the lungs, liver, ribs, and hand, losing her right thumb. Her mother contacted the US Embassy, sent letters to then Senator Edward Kennedy, and asked Brazilian politicians for help. But Nancy was arrested and was only released as one of the seventy prisoners exchanged by the Swiss ambassador to Brazil. After the coup, she did not find help in either the Brazilian or the US embassy in Santiago.

Several of the foreigners residing in Santiago at the moment of the coup started looking for political asylum in embassies just a few hours after the first bombs. For the

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427 Ibid.
428 Ibid.
enemies of the new regime, Chileans or foreigners, getting a safe conduct and leaving the country was the best hope for survival. However, although the Chilean government had signed the American Convention of Human Rights in 1969, which states that “every person has the right to seek and be granted asylum in a foreign territory, in accordance with the legislation of the state and international conventions, in the event that he is being pursued for political offenses of related crimes,” the junta refused safe conduct for approximately 500 politicians, claiming that they had committed common crimes or participated in the Plan Z, which was a supposed scheme from the Allende administration to impose a Marxist government. This was what the junta professed was the main reason why the coup was an emergency.\textsuperscript{431} Many ambassadors, including the Mexican, were able to negotiate safe conducts in return for resuming commercial and diplomatic ties with Chile.

After the coup, Maria do Carmo Brito tried to contact friends and decided to fight against the military. She found out, however, not only that she could not help, but that in fact she had become a burden. On the day of the military intervention, Chilean radio stations announced that all foreigners should present themselves to the authorities, so any Chilean citizen connected to her would be taking an extra risk. More than a week after the coup, she decided to ask for asylum, but at this point the embassies of Mexico and Argentina were packed. She finally found shelter at the Embassy of Panamá, located in a small apartment in a four-story building.\textsuperscript{432}

\textsuperscript{431} Amnesty International, 67-68.
Many Brazilians went to the same location, where there were also several Uruguayans and Chileans. The place consisted of a living room, three small bedrooms, two bathrooms, a kitchen, and an external area visible from all of the apartments. Every day, more and more people arrived. Brito estimates that over 200 people were sharing that same space. Her son became ill, with diarrhea and vomiting. The solution was to take him, naked and dirty, and place him in one of the neighbor’s care. The ambassador’s office became an improvised infirmary. The ambassador did not like the changes. “As the days passed, he started making more and more aggressive speeches, menacing to remove the Panamanian flag and leave the entire group with no diplomatic protection.”

The exiles slept, ate, smoked, and went to the restrooms in shifts.

When the situation became unsustainable, one of the Brazilian exiles suggested transferring the embassy to his house, which was much more spacious than the apartment. Theotônio dos Santos and his wife, Vânia Bambirra, had been in Chile since 1965 with their two kids. They lived at an old house that suddenly had a Panamanian flag in front of it. According to Brito, “271 people left the apartment and 273 arrived at the new address. Don’t ask me how. I have no idea. But that is what happened.” At night, Brazilians and Uruguayans got together to play the guitar, sing, and tell jokes. In the background, they could hear the bombs. According to Brito, in these homely moments she felt all the weight of cultural differences and of having seen a similar scenario before. For the Chileans, it sounded like disrespect, as if the others did not care for their tragedy.

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433 Ibid., 594.
434 Ibid.
“For us, it was another defeat. Starting all over again. Horrible. But the songs were like an exorcism. It helped. Cultural diversities.”

While so many embassies helped, the Brazilian diplomatic base refused to look after its own citizens and concerned itself with supporting the new dictatorship. If the US government decided to maintain a public facade of non-involvement with the Chilean coup d’état and only recognized the military government on September 24th, Brazil was the first country to officially support the new regime. It was a fast but thorough negotiation. First, the Chilean authorities demonstrated the need for the endorsement. A day after the coup, Augusto Pinochet sent a car to pick up the military attaché Walter Mesquita de Siqueira, and told him he would appreciate if Brazil became the first country to officially support his government. Ambassador Câmara Canto reinforced this feeling in a series of telegrams. The first one, from September 12, stated that it was Brazil’s “maximum interest,” and the second of the same day, suggested that it would be “very well perceived by the military junta and by the people.” Finally, the Minister of Foreign Relations, Mário Gibson Barbosa, said the Brazilian government was willing to give the junta a green light as long as it followed some “minimal formalities.” Such requirements were that the Chilean authorities made a public statement affirming that they controlled the entire territory, listing the names of members of the cabinet, even if they were temporary employees, and guaranteeing they would respect international commitments. That night, in a televised pronouncement, these demands were fulfilled.

435 Ibid., 597.
436 Moniz Bandeira, 552.
437 Ibid.
438 Ibid., 595.
On the morning of September 13, Raúl Rettig, the Chilean ambassador to Brazil under Salvador Allende, quit. At night, when the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Relations was already closed to its general staff and visitors, a group of Chilean diplomats went to Itamaraty to talk about the friendship between the two countries. From São Paulo, president Emílio Garrastazu Médici called to order that Brazil become the first country to officially support the junta, and to send “twenty tons of medicine” to Santiago.

**Estadio Nacional**

“The problem of statistics,” as Amnesty International calls it, is also present when it comes to the number of Brazilian victims of the Chilean coup d’état. First, there is the challenge of identifying all of the exiles who were arrested in several different police stations, barracks, or in places such as houses and stadiums which were turned into prisons and centers for torture in the days and months following September 11. Second, the lists of prisoners were incomplete, full of typos and other errors, and there is also the fact that some of the prisoners refused to be identified. The Committee Carlos de Ré for Truth and Justice of Rio Grande do Sul (CCR) has compiled one of the most recent lists, which was sent to the Estadio Nacional Memoria Nacional and the Museo de la Memoria y los Derechos Humanos de Chile. It comprises 123 names of Brazilians who were arrested and six who were killed by the Pinochet regime. The CCR does not consider it to be a final version of the list, and states that the document is always evolving, updated by

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440 Ibid.
former exiles who include names of friends who are not on the official lists. The
International Committee of the Red Cross estimates that in the early days of the
dictatorial regime in Chile more than 7,000 people were arrested in the National Stadium.
From 200 to 300 were foreigners.\textsuperscript{441} According to the former chief of the Dirección de
Inteligencia Nacional (DINA), the National Intelligence Directorate, Manuel Contreras,
88 Brazilians, 73 men and 15 women were arrested at the stadium, the main center of
murder and torture in the first year of the coup.\textsuperscript{442} It was there that the Brazilian Wânio
José de Mattos died. For other victims of the Chilean dictatorship, his death is the result
of the actions—and neglect—of the Chilean and the Brazilian governments.

Born in Piratuba, in Santa Catarina, Wânio was a police officer and a member of
the Vanguarda Popular Revolucionária (VPR). He was arrested in Brazil on April 24,
1970, and expelled from the military police. A year later, he was sent to Chile, one of the
Setenta. After his banishment, his wife, Maria das Dores, and his daughter, Roberta,
followed him. In the little girl’s birth certificate, her father had been registered as
“unknown,” a clever decision of her mother that allowed them to travel without being
questioned by the regime. Wânio taught at the Law School of the University of Santiago
and led a relatively normal life until the coup. The Truth Commission of the State of São
Paulo reported how this violent break affected the entire family. Wânio, Maria das Dores,
and Roberta, who was a child at the time, were taken to the National Stadium. Later, the

\textsuperscript{441} CHILE – Comisión Nacional de Verdad y Reconciliación - Comisión Rettig. v. I,
Tomo I. Santiago de Chile: Andros/Corporación Nacional de Reparación y
Reconciliación, reedición dic. 1996, 115. Available online at
http://www.dhnet.org.br/verdade/mundo/chile/nunca_mas_chile_a_1vol1_t1.pdf
\textsuperscript{442} CHILE – Comisión Nacional sobre prisión política y tortura – Informe de la Comisión
Nacional sobre Prisión Política y Tortura - Informe Valech, cap. VI – Recintos de
Detención, 524.
girl was separated from her parents. “They took me from my mother, and it marked our lives,” Roberta recalled in an interview to a Brazilian newspaper decades after the episode. “I cried out of hunger. There was no food,” she said. After some days, the Red Cross managed to transfer Roberta and Maria das Dores to the French Embassy. They were exiled in Paris until the approval of the Amnesty Law, in 1979, still with no news of Wânio’s fate.

Otto Brockes witnessed the days before Wânio’s death. “He was desperate in the stadium. He wanted to run away to them, kept saying he had to leave or he would die there,” said Brockes of him, referring to him being away from his wife and fearing his daughter needed him.\footnote{Interview with Otto Brockes by the author. Video recording. Goiás, 07/15/2014.} “We discussed the problem and tried strategies to make him calm down. But he had that thing in mind. And it was impossible to run away from the stadium. There were armed guards, then walls, then other armed guards, then a bunch of machine guns. It was just impossible to run away. But Wânio wouldn’t let these ideas rest.” As a doctor, Brockes worried a great deal about the conditions in the stadium. Most of the political prisoners had intestinal problems because they did not have enough to eat. “We would spend twenty days without defecating because we did not eat, there was no volume. We told the guards to bring us some oranges peels we could eat and make the intestines work,” recalls Brockes. But the request was never answered.

Wânio José de Mattos had terrible constipation. As the days passed, his situation worsened. “I examined him and concluded he had a serious case of acute abdomen, which required surgery,” explains Brockes.\footnote{Ibid.} “I wrote a report and took it to the doctors who were in the stadium—some Chilean military doctors. I approached them and they
ordered me to put my hands behind my head. When we got there, the guard told us to walk in front and he pointed the gun at us. It was terrible to go there at night.” 445 Once they arrived at the improvised doctor’s office, the military doctor told Brockes that inside the stadium he was not a professional of medicine, but a prisoner. He sent him and Mattos back. Mattos’ health condition became more fragile as the hours passed. “I was then able to talk to a Chilean minister who had been arrested. I don’t remember how, but I remember he found a way of sending Wânio to see the doctors again. I took him there, but the problem was already too grave. From the day I diagnosed him to the day they sent him back, three days had passed. It was terrible, a horrible suffering. Wânio stood there and I came back.” 446 After a few days, Brockes heard that an official report stated that they, the doctors, tried to perform surgery on him, but Mattos did not survive the operation. “This was Wânio’s story.” 447

The Mattos family tried to find out what had happened to him after the coup. They spent years with no information about the circumstances of his death. In 1992, after the end of the Pinochet regime and with the creation of the Rettig Commission to investigate torture, disappearances, and murder during the dictatorial period, the Chilean government finally confirmed his death, caused by “peritonitis” inside the Estadio Nacional. The Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Relations, however, had had the information much earlier. On December 31, 1973, they received a report about Wânio’s death, stating that he had died on October 16 of that same year. Attached to the document was Wânio’s death certificate, which the diplomats decided to continue keeping secret: “The notice, n°

445 Ibid.
446 Ibid.
447 Ibid.
583/DIS/COMZAE-4, from the Ministry of the Air Force, from November 21, 1973, states that the CISA stated that, according to information from several different sources, the following Brazilians were killed in Chile, during the Revolution of 09/11/1973, that took place in that country.\textsuperscript{448} The list includes Wânio’s name. Another document from the Ministry of the Air Force acknowledges they had received an anonymous letter on March 22, 1974, communicating the death of the “Brazilian patriot victim of fascism in Chile.”\textsuperscript{449} The letter states that Wânio José de Mattos had been arrested with his wife and their two-year-old daughter, later abandoned in the street where the family had been imprisoned, and found by a neighbor. It signs off with “the people do not forget their heroes.”\textsuperscript{450}

Mattos was the only Brazilian known to have died inside the National Stadium. However, there were other fatal victims of the Chilean regime. Jane Vanini, who had been a member of the Ação Libertadora Nacional (ALN) and the Movimento de Libertação Popular (MOLIPO) while in Brazil, joined the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionario (MIR) after arriving in Chile, in 1971. After the coup she left Santiago and was in hiding in Concepción where, on December 06, 1974, she was murdered. Her boyfriend at the time of her death was the prominent Chilean journalist, Pepe Carrasco, who would later become another victim of the Augusto Pinochet regime. The Chilean government acknowledged its responsibility for Vanini’s death in 1993, as part of the Chilean Truth Commission. However, her family has not yet been able to bury her body.

\textsuperscript{448} Wânio José de Mattos, Comissão da Verdade do estado de São Paulo. Available online at: http://comissaodaverdade.al.sp.gov.br/mortos-desaparecidos/wanio-jose-de-mattos
\textsuperscript{449} Patriota Brasileiro Vítima do Fascismo no Chile, Vaz 3. 110, 4/4, Arquivo Nacional, Brasília.
\textsuperscript{450} Ibid.
The family of Túlio Roberto Cardoso Quintiliano faces the same situation. The Chilean government also confirmed his death in 1993, but never explained how he was killed and did not send his body to be buried in Brazil. Quintiliano was an engineer and while exiled in Chile, attended the meetings of a group called *Ponto de Partida*, Departure Point, where exiles and other politically engaged people discussed the Brazilian dictatorship and the future of Latin America. According to the Chilean Truth Commission, Túlio Quintiliano and his partner were arrested on September 12, 1973 and taken to the Escuela Militar, the Military School, where they were interrogated. She was freed on the same day. Quintiliano has been considered a missing person ever since. His family opened a judicial inquiry to find out details of the circumstances of his death. The report states that after military school, he was sent to the Regimiento Tacna. The commander in charge of this center of detention sent a statement to the President of the Court of Appeals informing that he had not ordered the transferring of Quintiliano to any other unit under his command. “The work of the diplomatic representatives of his country in Chile also did not focus on finding information about his fate,” states the report which concludes that the Commission “is absolutely sure of the responsibility of the agents of the state, which kept him arrested, producing therefore a violation of his human rights especially because it was confirmed that the victim had been imprisoned, and not freed as suggested at some point.”

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452 Ibid.
453 Ibid.
The Experts

The Brazilian exile Luiz Carlos Guimarães was first imprisoned at the Estadio de Chile, smaller than the Estadio Nacional and, according to Amnesty International, a worse version of it.\(^{454}\) He recalls that the soldiers made the prisoners watch torture sessions, and used to shoot detainees randomly.\(^{455}\) In the five days he was at the stadium, the only thing he ingested were a few sips of water. No food was served. Some of those who fainted were killed for having committed such a “crime.” After five days, he was transferred to the National Stadium. He and some other two hundred prisoners were locked in an area close to the bleachers, but isolated by a big iron fence. He had entered Chile with a fake passport and a fake name, so at the first opportunity, he removed his real documents from the case where he also had his asthma medicine and threw it in a toilet full of feces.

A day later, instead of two hundred, there were almost four hundred people in that same space. Every new prisoner went through the same process upon arrival. In the stadium’s velodrome, they had to face the wall and put their hands on it, while the soldiers beat them with their weapons. “Where are the guns? What is your terrorist organization?” they asked. Guimarães watched the groups go to the velodrome and come back, reduced to almost half of their components. “Where are the others? We asked

\(^{454}\) Amnesty International, 19.

ourselves. But we didn’t dare say a word because we knew the answer would soon come silent, hard, and painful.\textsuperscript{456}

Guimarães confirms the participation of at least five Brazilian officers of the Departamento de Operações Internas (DOI), the Department of Internal Operations, in the torture of prisoners at the National Stadium. The DOI was the main agency for political repression in the Brazilian dictatorship. “They interrogated and tortured the Brazilians who were arrested there. The chief of the team, Captain Mike, an official of the Brazilian navy, gave instructions in person to the Chilean officers on the already famous torture method of \textit{pau-de-arara}.” In this system, the prisoner hangs from his knees on a horizontal pole with his hands tied to his feet. In most of the cases, the man or woman would be naked and submitted to electroshocks. The Amnesty International report was clear about the ramifications of such practices, stating that torture was by and large common practice during the interrogation of political prisoners, and that confessions extracted by torture were accepted as evidence by the Chilean military tribunals. “Torture has been carried out by, among others, members of those intelligence services which are responsible only to the junta for their actions.”\textsuperscript{457} What they did not know at the time was that torture inside the stadium was also carried out—and taught—by Brazilian officers.

Captain Mike, a Brazilian navy official, recognized Guimarães in the line to be interrogated. He had ordered the torture of the now exile a few months earlier, when he was a political prisoner in Brazil. “This time you won’t escape me, he told me when he

\textsuperscript{456} Ibid., 571.
\textsuperscript{457} Amnesty International, 7.
approached the line.” At that point, the new installed Chilean government refused embassies’ requests for permission to enter the National Stadium. The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) was also unable to reach foreign citizens, and some of its members were threatened. For Guimarães, those were the hardest days. He considers that he only started feeling safe when he told his story to the UNHCR, the Red Cross, and the World Council of Churches. He then became one of the many political prisoners in Chile exiled in Sweden.

Osni Geraldo Gomes had a similar destiny. He still lives in Sweden and still feels the consequences of his time as a prisoner at the National Stadium. In an emotional video sent to the Brazilian Truth Commission in 2014, he narrated those moments. “My name is Osni Geraldo Gomes. I was questioned and tortured by Brazilian police officers in Santiago of Chile, at the National Stadium, in 1973,” begins his testimony. According to his sister, it was the first time he was able to talk about the events of forty years earlier. Gomes said he had not been tortured at the stadium until the arrival, in October, of the Brazilian officials. They divided the Brazilians into small groups, he recalls, and put them in the interrogation rooms, facing the walls for hours. The Chilean soldiers were responsible for the interrogation, but they followed the Brazilians’ lead, detailed on small pieces of paper, which the officers handed out to their counterparts. He was in the same group as Guimarães, who had been arrested as Pedro Paulo de Souza, the name on his fake documents.

460 Video testimony of Osni Geraldo Gomes to the Brazilian Truth Commission on April 14, 2014. Available online at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-OM1eh3rb1U
Osni Gomes had been arrested under the name of Edson Campos. He immediately recognized the officers as Brazilians because they were physically different from the Chileans. “One was tall, light, almost blond, the other was a mulatto and the third one with a physical appearance sort of common but, both physically and by the way he dressed, he didn’t look like any regular Chilean citizen. And mulattos were practically nonexistent there at this time, especially among police officers and military.”\textsuperscript{461} The three Brazilian officers put him on a \textit{pau-de-arara}—a Brazilian invention, until that time unknown by the Chilean military—then submitted him to electric shocks all over his body, including his penis and anus. They used a machine that increases the strength of the shock as the torture progressed “until the point when it becomes impossible to speak. Anything is impossible for the prisoners. In the beginning, they ask: do you want to talk? Do you want to answer? But then it becomes impossible to react. And they stop in the moment when the shock is unbearable. They checked my throat regularly, I imagine, to see how I was physically.”\textsuperscript{462} Meanwhile, the Brazilian officers left the protocol aside and asked him directly, in Portuguese, about his ties to Brazil. A group of Chilean military personnel witnessed the torture section. Gomes remembers hearing one of them say to the others: “You see, these guys are professionals. Pay attention to them.” Gomes entered the room after breakfast and only left at night. “I spent the night isolated with Guimarães and he told me he knew the blond man, who had been the person who tortured him in Rio de Janeiro.”\textsuperscript{463}

\textsuperscript{461} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{462} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{463} Ibid.
Otto Brockes says that in the four months he spent at the National Stadium, he was not physically tortured anymore. However, upon his arrival, the situation was at the height of its tension. There was no food or water, and the prisoners heard shootings all day long. “After several days there, other Brazilians started to arrive. There was a commission inside the stadium, so we talked to a major of the army or something like that, if he knew that there were Brazilian police officers among the torturers. He said, ‘No. But I will check.’ They day after, he had a bullet in his head. They said he committed suicide.”

Brockes was interrogated several times, always by Chilean soldiers. The Brazilians stayed nearby, giving instructions to their peers. “They went there to show how to do it because the Chileans did not know the techniques. The Brazilian soldiers changed the way the interrogations were conducted, gave it another context.”

Brockes remembers having seen at least three Brazilian officers, always dressed as civilians. They avoided speaking loud or in Portuguese. Most of the time, they whispered instructions to their Chilean counterparts, as if they were worried about hiding the fact that they were Brazilians. Even during the torture sessions, they were basically giving instructions and avoiding direct action.

Brockes remembers that when he met Gomes, he had the impression that the young man would be freed very soon. He told the doctor his true name, fearing something wrong might happen, but Brockes felt he had no business there, despite having entered Chile with a fake name. But when the Brazilian officers arrived, everything changed. “The Brazilian police immediately said ‘no.’ He had left Brazil with the

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465 Ibid.
466 Ibid.
document of a deceased young man. They soon noticed this discrepancy and took him to be tortured. He was tortured, put in the pau-de-arara, electroshocked... Inside the National Stadium, by the Brazilian police."\footnote{Ibid.} He describes Gomes as a very good and sweet person transfigured by the beatings. “When he left the lockup he couldn’t hold up his neck. He suffered from fecal incontinence. His penis was all sore because they introduced a metal band and applied shocks. He left the pau-de-arara almost dead. Little by little, he recovered, but I don’t know if he was ever able to live a normal life again. He was terribly shaken up after that.”\footnote{Ibid.}

Nielsen Pires also witnessed torture sessions perpetrated by three Brazilian men. On his second day at the stadium, the Chilean military and his Brazilian tutors divided the group of prisoners into three smaller groups. Pires was in the first one. Inside a room with four desks, he understood the interrogation was about to begin. “At each desk there was one officer seated wearing military clothes. Right beside him there was a man wearing civilian clothes. We knew this would be the one to torture us. One of the exiles there with me was barbarically tortured. I saw him later and he had burns all over his body.”\footnote{Interview with Nielsen Pires by the author. Video recording. São Paulo, 07/11/2014.} According to the exiles, the Brazilian police officers wore civilian clothes and carried files full of documents and pictures. The Chilean officers called all of the Brazilian prisoners to the center of the field. “We were roughly fifty men and ten women. The group approached and we noticed they were Brazilian officers. They looked at the files
and checked on us. They were very organized. They knew very well who we were. And this was in my very first day at the stadium,” recalls Nielsen Pires.\(^{470}\)

The Brazilian government did nothing about the prisoners. The Ministry of Foreign Relations ignored the calls for help or deportation. There was only one instance of a request of safe conduct on behalf of three prisoners inside the stadium: that of Antônio Paulo Ferraz, Solange Bastos da Silva, and Ricardo de Azevedo. Ferraz was the son of a powerful Brazilian businessman, Paulo Ferraz, the owner of the oldest private shipyard of the country, Estaleiro Mauá. Solange Bastos da Silva arrived in Santiago only five months before the coup. She said that the vice-consul “pretended to worry about the Brazilian citizens, roughly eighty, who were rotting for more than a month, arrested. We came to know later that he went to the stadium after the insistence of the military attaché, who had received the request from the Centro de Informações da Marinha (CENIMAR), the Center of Intelligence of the Navy, which requested the son of a renowned ship owner, who had been arrested with us.”\(^{471}\) The three Brazilians who received the safe-conducts had one thing in common: their parents had flown to Santiago and were in the Brazilian embassy, pressuring the authorities for news of their sons and daughter.\(^{472}\)

The presence of Otto Brockes’ family also helped him to escape the National Stadium—that, and his ingenuity. His sister and niece were in Santiago and managed to contact diplomats and other leaders. Meanwhile, he inserted documents about the torture and general treatment of prisoners in the stadium inside a sausage and sent it with a German prisoner who was leaving the place. The Red Cross was informed of it and

\(^{470}\) Ibid.


\(^{472}\) Ibid.
started working on his removal, worried that if the Chilean officers found out, he would be killed.

Being a foreign prisoner inside the stadium had several peculiarities. First, they were all prisoners of the government of a nation different from their own. Second, if there was any possibility of finding a space where the combination of socialism and democracy could be fulfilled, it had been killed with Salvador Allende. Finally, even inside that transnational authoritarian space, nationality mattered. So the confusion about identities and belonging continued. In the first days, the foreign prisoners slept in shifts. While some lay down and slept, others would stand. However, having to coordinate dozens, sometimes hundreds, of people in each cell was impossible. Keeping track of who had slept and who had not was challenging, so Otto Brockes suggested they divided themselves in groups according to nationalities. “There were people from all over the world, so we organized it like that. Brazilians, Argentinians, Uruguayans, they would all go together. It worked very well and we managed to sleep well in that period.”

The support of the Brazilian government inside this space was not limited to police officers and torture techniques. The country sent a plane full of products to help the maintenance of the improvised prison that the National Stadium had become. “For breakfast, we had a mug of milk donated by the Americans. And after torture, if we needed any medicine, they gave us samples distributed by the Brazilian Navy. We could read in the packing ‘Donated by the Brazilian Navy,’” remembers Nielsen Pires. “After living in Chile, we got to know those weapons, and even the orange neckband used by Chilean soldiers came from Brazil. The two Hercules airplanes that arrived on September

10 brought not only Brazilian torturers to the Estadio Nacional, but many supplements. We all knew that the United States was the father of all the supporters of the Chilean coup. But they would not get their hands dirty and that is why Brazil and Argentina were important. “To do the dirty work,” says Wilson Barbosa.475

Journalist Pascale Bonnefoy Miralles suggests that the “generous” support of the Brazilian government started early enough for them to map where the most wanted political prisoners were. “It was not a coincidence that, in the first days of the Pinochet coup, more than a hundred Brazilians who were refugees in Chile under the protection of the United Nations were arrested and taken to the National Stadium.”476 The monitoring of exiles by its intelligence agencies during the Allende government made it easy for the Brazilian authorities to quickly find its enemies. The information had already been there for years. All they needed was to get the okay from the Chilean authorities.

476 Pascale Bonnefoy Miralles, Terrorismo de Estadio: prisioneros de guerra en un campo de deportes (Santiago: CESOC, 2005), 119.
Conclusion

Less than a month after the *coup d’état* in Chile, when Gabriel García Márquez was still celebrating the popularity gained with the award of the Neustadt International Prize for Literature, the Colombian writer accused Brazil of being dangerous to all South American countries and charged the country with orchestrating the overthrow of Salvador Allende, in Chile, Juan José Torres, in Bolivia, and the dissolution of congress by Juan María Bordaberry, in Uruguay. García Márquez warned that Argentina would be the next victim of the Brazilian dictatorship, united with other imperialist forces. Although other prominent figures and international institutions echoed the accusations right after the Chilean *coup d’état*, scholars did not investigate the Brazilian influence on the overthrow of Allende. The lack of sources, only now declassified, may be the best explanation for the oblivion.

The recently declassified documents presented by the Brazilian Truth Commission between 2012 and 2015 show that García Márquez was right. The Brazilian influence went beyond its frontiers, arriving at other countries of the Southern Cone. The now public telegrams and reports of the Centro de Informações do Exterior do Itamaraty (CIEX), the Brazilian Foreign Office’s Intelligence Center, and of the Embassies of Brazil in Santiago, and of Chile in Brasília attest to the fact that the proximity between the Brazilian government and the Chilean right-wing groups, military, and the United States government was much broader than scholars have demonstrated so far. It also

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underlines that the Brazilian dictatorship was a civilian-military one, in which diplomats played a central role.

The Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Relations operated inside Chile with intelligence agents infiltrated among exiles. Brazilian ambassador Antônio Cândido Câmara Canto was a close friend of most of the military Chileans who became leaders during the dictatorship. The Brazilian regime not only inspired the Chileans, but also fomented its existence with a constant interchange of information, strategies, ideas, military supplies, and even personnel. Despite denouncements of exiles and scholars, the Brazilian government denied for years its participation in the Chilean _coup_ and the Pinochet regime. However, what the US ambassador in Santiago at the time of the coup called the “Brazil Connection” can no longer be debated after the recent declassification of the documents of the Brazilian Truth Commission, the National Security Archives, and the Ministry of Foreign Relations of Chile.\(^{478}\) Brazil provided weapons, medicine, expertise, intelligence reports, and even torturers to the enemies of the Salvador Allende regime.

Four years after the Chilean _coup_, Brazilian officers announced to their superiors the end of the resistance of the leftist groups in Chile. Now, they stated, the armed forces needed to implement the training of its personnel to resist the “anti-subversive upcoming struggle. Such orientation would require an enormous effort, since the Chilean military needed an entirely new system of intelligence and specific training to confront urban

\(^{478}\) Nathaniel Davis, _The Last Two Years of Salvador Allende_ (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985).
guerrillas.” They continued, acknowledging the presence of the “Chicago Boys” in the government, a group “proposing conservative economic guidelines.” After the coup, Brazilian agents also kept track of Chilean exiles and their supposed attempts to remove Augusto Pinochet.

The consequences of this international support lasted far beyond the 1973 coup. The interactions of the United States and Brazil to create an unsustainable situation in Chile and destabilize the leftist movements of the country were a of pre-Operation Condor interaction which set the terrain for the official one. Even before the election of Salvador Allende as president of Chile, Brazil, the United States, part of the Chilean military, and right-wing groups began to shape a structure that the South American dictatorships of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay would establish later, during the “Condor Years.” They used political repression, propaganda, and intelligence operations to intimidate the opposition and weaken the connections among leftist organizations all over the Southern Cone.

As the Pinochet government gained strength and the Brazilian exiles ran away to other countries, the activities of the CIEX became less and less necessary. The monitoring of Brazilian exiles moved on to other countries and practically disappeared from Chile. But the years of being constantly watched caused group psychological traumas that still last. In 2014, one of my interviewees refused to talk to me for weeks.

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482 J. Patrice McSherry, Predatory States: Operation Condor and Covert War in Latin America (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2005), 4-5.
He finally agreed under the condition that my husband accompanied me. At first, I did not understand the prerequisite, but I followed it nevertheless. After almost an hour talking to me, he finally seemed a little more comfortable and told me that the fact that I was a student at a The Graduate Center at the City University of New York, a US institution, bothered him. He confidently declared: “Now that I know you are not a CIA agent, we can start the interview.”

For someone unfamiliar with the history of the diplomatic and military monitoring of this group, it may seem like an overreaction, but the long-lasting paranoia was described by several exiles. Otto Brockes began to tell me the story of Osni Geraldo Gomes without mentioning his name. When I asked who he was talking about, he said he did not remember the name of the person. Only when I directly asked if he was talking about Osni did he confirm, and began to tell the full story. The same impulse and habit of protecting his peers that he felt in the 1970s, he demonstrated again. Osni Gomes states that the torture Brazilian agents perpetrated against him at the National Stadium are still part of his life. “My capacity for physical and psychological adaptation was profoundly affected. And I have been dealing for more than forty years with periods of psychical and emotional instability. This situation prevented me from having stable professional development and stained my entire life. Only today, after all this time, has it been possible for me to rethink my story with enough balance to withhold my indignation, anger, and hate without being completely overtaken by these feelings.”

Differently from most of the exiles, who tried to start new lives in other countries, Otto Brockes did not settle down after the Chilean coup. First he moved to Germany,

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483 Video testimony of Osni Geraldo Gomes to the Brazilian Truth Commission on April 14, 2014. Available online at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-OM1eh3rb1U
with the intention of spending a few months while planning his clandestine return to Brazil. However, when he read the news about the Carnation Revolution in April 1974, he traveled to Portugal to join the movement against the Estado Novo. He then enlisted to finally fulfill his dream to work as a volunteer doctor in Africa. He went to Angola, where he helped the pro-independence forces. “I worked non-stop. I was alone in charge of an entire hospital in the northern area. My ears were swollen by the repetition of the movement of putting in and removing the stethoscope.” He worked from early in the morning until late at night, treating all kinds of diseases, from tuberculosis to leprosy.

When the Cuban army arrived to support Angola’s independence, he joined them as a doctor and providing logistic support. “I had nothing to do with the coup, or anything. At that point I was just a doctor, trying to help.” Brockes was only able to return to Brazil after the Law of Amnesty of 1979, which exempted political enemies of the government as well its supporters from any crimes committed during the dictatorship.

The same happened to almost all of the other exiles. Their transnational experience was essential for the subsequent fight for democratization in Brazil. Many of them brought ideas of equality that flourished in the late 1960s and early 1970s in the countries they had to call home after being expelled from Brazil. In France, England, Italy, Sweden, and other countries, they joined movements in defense of human rights. In Brazil, they organized and conducted several demonstrations against the dictatorship and in defense of civil rights, including the movement “Diretas Já,” which demanded universal suffrage. Many of the exiles became renowned politicians, such as former president Fernando Henrique Cardoso, former presidential candidate José Serra, and

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485 Ibid.
federal representative Fernando Gabeira. Others, like Chico Buarque, Caetano Veloso, and Gilberto Gil, became symbols of the democratization.

Sometimes investigating South America’s history feels like reading a book for the second time. Many things appear to be mere repetitions; others seem like brand new passages. One can easily identify political trends in the region, but is difficult to demonstrate to what extent they are due to mutual influence. In the case of the dictatorships from the 1960s to the 1990s, the “coincidence” of having all the countries experiencing similar regimes meant a broad and long, regional collaboration to fight against their common enemies. The cooperation was not only martial, but also relied on diplomats and civilians who opposed communism, subversion, or anything else they considered to be political enemies of South American dictatorships. This dissertation narrates only a small part a large connection of influence and support between Brazil and Chile. However, a careful look at the documents points to an interaction yet broader that has been kept away from popular knowledge for decades. A greater understanding of the scope of the actions of the Brazilian regime, beyond the national sphere, can reopen the discussion of civilian and military responsibilities during the dictatorship and offer the possibility of an investigation of a local network of intimidation and torture.
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