A Eurafrican Future:
France, Algeria, and the Treaty of Rome
(1951-1975)

by

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Abstract

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Before the Treaty of Rome (1957) established the European Economic  
Community (EEC), French officials made it clear that France’s signature on the Treaty  
was contingent on its partners’ acceptance of Eurafican policy. Because Algeria held a  
unique legal status among France’s overseas holdings, the way in which French officials  
advocated its insertion within EEC regulation merits particular attention. This status  
stood distinct from that of the associated territories and, when applied to the Treaty,  
would theoretically extend to Algeria and its residents the guarantees of free labor  
circulation, development aid, and tariff preferences open to metropolitan citizens through  
EEC membership. Because French officials hoped to preserve trade relations and sought  
to quell crises across the empire, they negotiated EEC regulations in a bid to retain  
control through the continuity of economic and political ties. Eager for France to join the  
EEC, the other states agreed. Thus, a supranational treaty became a tool with which  
France could attempt to maintain control over its empire.

This moment in colonial and European relations demonstrates how citizenship  
rights and multilateral diplomacy were influenced by economic as well as political  
pressures. It reveals that Europe’s current borders are strikingly less expansive than those  
envisioned by France and its partners in the early years of European integration.
In the very beginning lies chaos, but a chaos rich in life; it is the fertile primeval slime, where a being is coming into existence, still monstrous, but endowed with a principle of unity, and strong enough to dispel impossibilities, to acquire the essential organs.

- Ernest Renan, *L’Histoire des origines du christianisme*.¹

It is thought that even states can marry one another, in part as a new kind of industry by which one can effortlessly increase one’s power through familial alliances, and in part as a means to expand one’s land possessions.

- Immanuel Kant, “Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch,” 1795.²


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### Abbreviations

**AN**: French National Archives (Pierrefitte-sur-Seine)  
*Archives Nationales*

**ANMT**: French World of Labor Archives (Roubaix)  
*Archives du Monde du Travail*

**BDIC**: Library of Contemporary International Documentation (Nanterre)  
*Bibliothèque de Documentation Internationale Contemporaine*

**BNF**: French National Library (Paris)  
*Bibliothèque Nationale de France François Mitterand*

**CAEF**: Center of French Economic and Financial Archives (Savigny-le-Temple)  
*Centre des Archives Economiques et Financières*

**CAOM**: French Overseas Archives (Aix-en-Province)  
*Centre des Archives Nationales d’Outre-Mer*

**CDHA**: Center of Historic Documentation on Algeria (Aix-en-Provence)  
*Centre de Documentation Historique sur l’Algérie*

**ECSC**: European Coal and Steel Community (Foundational document: Treaty of Paris, 1951)

**EEC**: European Economic Community (Foundational document: Treaty of Rome, 1957)

**DAEF**: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Economic and Financial Division  
*Direction des affaires économiques et financières du Ministère des affaires étrangères*

**DE-CE**: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Economic and Financial Division (DAEF), Service of Economic Cooperation  
*DAEF, Service de coopération économique*

**DREE**: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Economic and Financial Division (DAEF), Direction of External Economic Relations  
*DAEF, Direction des relations économiques extérieures*

**DOM**: Overseas Departments  
*Départements d’outre-mer*

**FED**: European Development Fund (replaces FEDOM)  
*Fonds européen de développement*
**FEDOM:** European Overseas Development Fund (replaced by FED)
*Fonds européen de développement pour les pays et territoires d’outre-mer*

**FEOGA:** European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund
*Fonds européen d’orientation et de garantie agricole*

**FIDES:** Investment Fund for Economic and Social Development
*Fonds d’investissement pour le développement économique et social*

**HAEU:** Historical Archives of the European Union (Florence)

**MAEF:** French Ministry of Foreign Affairs Diplomatic Archives (la Courneuve)
*Centre des Archives Diplomatiques du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères*

**MMSH:** Mediterranean House for the Science of Man (Aix-en-Provence)
*Maison Méditerranéenne de la Science de l’Homme*

**PTOM:** Overseas Countries and Territories
*Pays et territoires d’outre-mer*

**SGCI:** General Secretary of the Interministerial Committee Responsible for Questions of European Economic Cooperation
*Secrétariat général du comité interministériel pour les questions de coopération économique européenne*

**The Six:** Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, West Germany

**SP:** Archives of Contemporary History of Sciences Po (Paris)
*Archives d’Histoire Contemporaine*

**TOM:** Overseas Territories
*Territoires d’outre-mer*
Introduction

Toward a Eurafrikan Future: Assimilation, Integration, and Postwar Europe

In early January 1963, Brussels was in a state of agitation. On the day of Christmas Eve 1962, Ahmed Ben Bella—formerly an exiled leader of Algeria’s National Liberation Front (FLN) and soon to be the independent nation’s first elected president—had written to the Council of the European Economic Community (EEC). He wanted officials in Brussels to know that his young government hoped to explore “the possible future relations between Algeria and the Community.” He hinted that these relations might be tightly bound, as certain articles of the Treaty of Rome (1957), the EEC’s foundational document, were “applicable in Algeria.”¹ European officials proved divided on how to respond, with France finding itself in a particularly uncomfortable position. The letter came at an especially delicate moment, as Algeria had only gained its independence from France in July 1962, following nearly eight years of war (1954-1962) and over 130 years of colonial domination. Meanwhile, the EEC itself had only just marked its fifth year of existence. Comprising Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and West Germany (the Six), a map of the original members of the EEC at first glance suggests a firmly European endeavor. How could Algeria possibly fit into this landscape?

In fact, as this work will reveal, prior to Algeria’s independence, French officials had doggedly attempted—with success—to include Algeria within the burgeoning EEC. Their insistence for its inclusion was part of their larger push for Eurafrique (Eurafrica), a policy they defined as the incorporation of overseas trade relations within the Treaty of Rome. French officials had done so in an attempt to maintain control of the region even as the war grew more

violent and untenable, hoping that development funding from the Six would allow for material improvements that would quell Algerian unrest. They also hoped to maintain trade relations that had been built over decades of colonial rule. Finally, the inclusion of Algeria in the Treaty of Rome would give France a supranational document affirming that Algeria was indeed a part of France. Thus, when Ben Bella wrote his letter in 1962, it was not strictly speaking written from a far-off, former colonized territory. Rather, it was a missive sent from a land that was explicitly named and included within the European project.

In my analysis of this era, I’ve come to view the signing of the Treaty of Rome as significant because it shows the French pushing the other members of the Six to sign a document explicitly naming Algeria as a part of France and therefore as a part of Europe. In essence, France used European integration not to shed its colonies, but to solidify ties with its most important imperial holding. Without talking about the war, the French attempted to weaponize a supranational treaty in order to justify their continued presence in Algeria. The treaty itself could be a tool to win the war.

How did French officials attempt to convince their European partners that Algeria’s inclusion within integrated institutions was the best choice for Europe in the 1950s and early 1960s? What does this tell us about our assumptions regarding the natural shape—and location—of Europe and of the people who count as European, particularly when we see that even after independence European officials remained (cautiously) open to Algeria’s close ties to the EEC? Ben Bella’s letter and the reactions it garnered call into question received wisdom about the European project and about the process of France’s decolonization of Africa. An analysis of the circumstances that led to and followed this moment challenges the very nature of how we understand integrated Europe and Europe-African relations, even to this day. Acknowledging the
elastic understandings of Europe’s limits in the 1950s and early 1960s unsettles traditional discussions of European integration that too often unquestioningly accept the fixed borders of “continental” Europe.

Rather, French officials charges themselves with the task of asserting that indeed, European regulation should extend to Africa and, most critically, to Algeria. This territory, not unlike Italy’s impoverished Mezzogiorno, needed Europe’s intervention and represented a logical, even natural, extension of Europe itself. I challenge histories of European integration that take the current shape of “Europe” as a given, arguing that not only did empire influence decisions at the time of the EEC’s formation, but also that the precise borders of Europe even after decolonization hardly appeared evident to the administrators of its new institutions.

This dissertation makes an intervention in three fields of academic inquiry, ultimately demonstrating that they must be analyzed in tandem in order to make sense of European integration in the twentieth century. Although some chapters or episodes focus on one more than the other two, overall, I am in dialogue with international historians (including the new Cold War history), scholars of political economy, and historians of France and its empire. My project’s focus on the relationship between empire and European integration challenges international historians to research bilateral and multilateral ties inside and outside of institutions, in order to make sense of policymaking. I contribute to the field of political economy by emphasizing some key themes of global political economy, notably the concurrent threads of “conflict and cooperation.”² I also contend that international historians must incorporate ideas from political economy, and vice versa, in order to reach a more accurate understanding of the choices made by France and its partners in the postwar.

Most histories of the European Union focus on the EEC’s role in facilitating trade and labor ties between the Six. Too often, they ignore that four of the six members still possessed formal colonies or administered UN trust territories at the time of the EEC’s creation. Indeed, the EEC’s history is closely imbricated with evolutions in empire and the postwar emergence of successful decolonizing efforts. The significance of empire to the foundations of the European project is perhaps best illustrated in French attempts to inscribe the crown jewel of its empire, Algeria, into emerging postwar institutions.

In the early postwar years, French officials understood the empire to be a domestic concern, and therefore outside of European integration’s purview. By the mid-1950s, political exigencies brought about by the escalation of the Algerian War changed French attitudes. They now argued that precisely because empire was a part of domestic France, it must enter the EEC as a part of France itself. French officials’ insistence that Algeria was a part of France and thus belonged in the EEC reveals that France’s domestic crisis—the Algerian War—directly influenced France’s formulation of European integration policy. Further, during Treaty of Rome negotiations in the mid to late 1950s, French officials’ confused pronouncements regarding Algeria’s legal status within France reveal the messiness of seemingly firm juridical distinctions

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3 Aside from France, the others were Belgium (Belgian Congo and trusteeship of Rwanda-Urundi); Italy (trusteeship of Somaliland); the Netherlands (Suriname and Guiana). Germany ceased to hold colonies after World War I and Luxembourg was never a formal colonial power. Recent studies that examine the impact of decolonization on metropolitan states include Jordanna Bailkin, The Afterlife of Empire (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012) and Miguel Bandeira Jerónimo and António Costa Pinto (eds.), The Ends of European Colonial Empires (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).


5 Martin Evans includes a brief but incisive discussion of the diplomatic impact of France’s pressure to integrate Algeria in the EEC. Martin Evans, Algeria: France’s Undeclared War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 194-196.
across France’s empire. As Ben Bella’s letter shows, such confusion carried into the early years of Algerian independence.

Without accounting for the place of Africa—with Algeria at the heart of this Euro-African vision—the significance of empire in the formation of a unified Europe goes unacknowledged. We must ask: How did Algeria’s inclusion within the European project complicate the notion of borders and challenge the very underpinnings of the “Europeanness” or “nation-stateness” of the project?6 We must also ask: how did France instrumentalize supranational economic accords to enforce foreign and domestic political claims? In the negotiations for European integration, loud cries for Algeria’s inclusion, as well as deafening silences on the same subject, provide a fuller picture of the intersections between decolonization and European integration. Such an investigation challenges contemporary understandings of ahistorical and “natural” geopolitical borders and suggests that the extension of newly defined European citizenship rights to non-white, non-Christian peoples, and indeed, the extension of Europe to non-white, non-Christian lands, remained a distinct possibility in the early days of European integration.7

My intervention into the history of France and its empire is related to this question of borders and the limits of nation-states and empires. I am particularly interested in challenging the

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firm divide historians too often make between North and sub-Saharan Africa; this prevents us from tracking the links between French policies made to organize or govern one or the other. I also want to emphasize the importance of understanding French “domestic” concerns as being inclusive of empire in the run-up to the Treaty of Rome. This can explain why French decision-makers pushed for a version of Europe that integrated France’s empire, even as popular opinion for such a vision waned. France’s economic interests in the colonies, still important despite economic historians who suggest that their might had already weakened, directly drove political policies on the supranational level.8

Integrations

The nation-state survived World War II, but individual states joined together in federations, a form of integration. The most prominent types of integrations that we witness today—such as the United Nations or the European Union—are not the same bodies that interwar political thinker Eugène Guernier or Senegalese statesman Léopold Sédar Senghor once advocated. However, when we examine how the European Union interacts with independent African states, we see the results of choices made when postwar integration did account for a federated France comprising African holdings. I analyze the impact of concrete decisions made as a result of European attempts to adopt that version of federalism.

European integration, like movements for decolonization, gained urgency after World War II. In the postwar era, men like Jean Monnet, Robert Schuman, Paul-Henri Spaak, and the lesser-known but influential Pierre Uri—the “fathers” of Europe—and legions of administrators,

civil servants, and support staff attended meetings in Paris, Messina, Venice, Strasbourg, Brussels, and elsewhere, attempting to make sense of what the postwar would look like for Europe.\(^9\) Despite major losses of colonial territory (India, 1947) and outbreaks of violence in colonial holdings (including the start of the war in French Indochina and sporadic episodes of violent protest in Algeria), for the most part, there appears in these early negotiations an unshakable confidence that the larger colonial order would remain. Indeed, colonial mentalities did not dissipate when the guns cooled in 1945, demonstrating the sustained influence of interwar imperial thinking. In the interwar, particularly with the League of Nations’ emergence, we see, as Mark Mazower demonstrates, a “vision of global order established through regional state-systems each under the leadership of a hegemon […].”\(^{10}\) While Mazower is referring to Germany’s role in the 1940 Tripartite Pact with Italy and Japan, he also notes, “the British were supporting the doctrine of self-determination because they believed they would benefit more from it than anyone else.”\(^{11}\) Indeed, “imperial self-interest was grafted onto Wilsonian rhetoric.”\(^{12}\) In effect, imperial nation-states in the interwar attempted to harness international law to maintain some form of control or significance in their formal and informal empires, even if that meant operating within an international—even federal—system.\(^{13}\) Such “imperial self-


\(^{11}\) Ibid., 559-60.


\(^{13}\) Wilder critiques historians who present the form of a nation-state as “normal” and France’s empire as “deviant” from such an organization, instead calling the “French imperial nation-state” an “internally contradictory artifact of colonial modernity that was simultaneously [… ] Franco-African and Afro-French, national and transnational.” Gary Wilder, *The French Imperial Nation-State: Negritude and Colonial Humanism between the Two World Wars* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 21-22.
interest” lived beyond the League of Nations and was manifest in the policies pursued by French administrators during negotiations for European integration.

In order to make sense of France’s push to include Algeria within the European project, scholars must engage with a longer history of political economy and of attempts to legislate empire. New theories of global political economy assert the importance of geography and legal institutions to a study of economic decision-making. In approaching the archival material with an eye to these elements, I will assert that “politics and economics are inseparable.” Through my archival analysis, I am in dialogue with scholars who ask how economics impact politics in both war and peace, notably through the work of political scientist Dale C. Copeland and historian Adam Tooze. I will analyze how their theories, mainly focused on the run-up to wars, might be understood in light of an institution – unified Europe – whose hagiographic founding myth is based upon a notion of perpetual peace. I contend that the episodes of pragmatic decision-making and of seemingly well-planned but at times disastrously incorrect predictions of economic futures are evident in postwar Europe. They help to explain when and how France’s partners agreed to call Algeria a part of Europe.

In thinking through the foundations of integrated Europe through the lens of French empire, I will also draw on examinations of the emergence of modern French imperial legal systems in Algeria and Tunisia, and their relation to domestic and international affairs. Jennifer Sessions’ account of the conquest and early rule of Algeria by the French evidences the interplay

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15 Ibid., 12.
17 Kant penned “The Perpetual Peace” in 1795, making a case for how a state of perpetual peace could be implemented and sustained. Kant, *Toward Perpetual Peace*.
18 Throughout this dissertation, I take “pragmatism” to mean approaching diplomatic decision-making with an economic or political bottom line as the top priority, as opposed to ideologically-driven choices. As will be clear, however, “pragmatic” and “ideological” visions of Eurafrica overlapped.
of domestic politics with imperial ambitions and the continuity of imperial ambitions across an era fraught with political changes. I will take these two themes – interplay and continuity – and locate them in the postwar history of European integration. France’s push to include its overseas holdings with the European project is demonstrative of the use of the supranational on the domestic stage, and vice versa, as France used European legislation to affirm its right to Algeria. My project challenges traditional timelines of decolonization as it demonstrates continued ties between France and much of its former empire after formal decolonization, here not solely tied to the development aid that would earn Jacques Foccart the moniker *Monsieur Afrique*, but in a more ambiguous series of negotiations between France, Europe, and the former French empire.

Mary Dewhurst Lewis analyzes how the exigencies of diplomacy in the mid-19th century, namely the safeguarding of the Concert of Europe, challenged French practices of imperial rule, particularly by complicating legal systems in Tunisia. I will ask how in the postwar, a new set of diplomatic imperatives might serve French imperial interests, or risk subverting French claims to empire. By then, advocating empire appeared decidedly less straightforward. The postwar did not witness a simple regurgitation of interwar ideology. Shifts in the language used by European officials when discussing dominance over, and then partnership with, African states, demonstrate that gradual change emerged. The importance of historical contingency rather than the influence of ideology alone is imperative in a study of the realization of integrated international organizations. It helps to illuminate reasons behind the successful or unsuccessful implementation of integrated institutions and points to the specificity of a given historical moment in the popularization of such policies. In their collected volume on European integration, Jytte Klausen and Louise Tilly argue that “state building is an events-driven process,

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and state society relations are in large part shaped by the big events that cast the international order. This raises a methodological issue: if state formation is events-driven, it is also contingent, apt to proceed in spasms.”21 These spasms, and their results, are key to understanding that the forms of institutions seen today (and in the past) resulted not from the execution of precise ideology and planning, but from the perceived need to react to specific moments in time. Thus, one must be careful not to ascribe inevitability to the shape of European integration, or indeed, to the shape of Europe itself. As I will argue throughout this dissertation, such ideas were constantly in flux, and notions of the definition of Europe and its borders could be instrumentalized by a variety of interest groups to make very distinct claims.

Yet European integration and Eurafrika were only two of the integration schemes of the 20th century. Algeria’s potential role within a range of international organizations is particularly noteworthy. Nationalists attended the 1955 Bandung conference, which although not a permanent organization, revealed the ability of colonized people to join together to form a political force. The Algerian cause’s success in the United Nations in 1960 is well known, and historians have made much of the signal that the body had moved to being a force for anti-colonial pressure.22 As this dissertation will demonstrate, French administrators before and even after Algerian independence envisioned Algeria as part of France and part of Europe. But Algeria’s strategic geographic location (African, Mediterranean, Maghrebi) and its ethnic and cultural make-up (Arab, Muslim, Kabyle, etc.) rendered its leaders capable of making claims to any number of international memberships, and, conversely, any number of international organizations could make claims that Algeria should belong.

22 On decolonization efforts and the UN, see Mazower, No Enchanted Palace, 149-189.
Some integration schemes died in the planning stage, while others were actually attempted (often to limited success). While this dissertation focuses on the EEC and its forerunner, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), as their collective long life allows for a fuller analysis of evolutions in Eurafrican thinking, there were many postwar attempts at integration. International organization comes in many guises, and can comprise many actors. Martin Dedman differentiates between interdependence and integration when analyzing the European project; such a distinction can also help clarify international versus transnational or supranational. According to Dedman, interdependence can be understood as states organizing a unit addressing “certain policy areas,” without “interfer[ing] with the policy-making of their member states.” Examples of such organizations, which have little power to impose policy on their members, are the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In contrast, integration “requires the creation of a ‘supranational organisation,’” and policy decisions fall to the body of all of the member states. Unlike interdependent organizations, integrated—supranational—organizations demand that member states “transfer some power (sovereignty) […].” This transfer helps explain the success (meaning, the institutions were actually established) of European economic integration, according to Dedman and Alan Milward, the doyen of integration history. In Milward’s influential Rescue of the European Nation State, he contends that the exclusivity of an integrated group creates a “strong cohesive force” committed to “the ‘club’ rules.” This “new legal system and framework” encourages

23 Dedman, Origins and Development of the EU, 7.
24 Postwar administrators puzzled over a tremendous breadth of supranational schemes. These include the GATT (1947), NATO (1949), the Council of Europe (1949, critically comprising the European Commission of Human Rights), the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC, 1951), the European Defense Community (1952, failed ratification in 1954), European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom, 1957), the Common Agricultural Policy (Stresa Conference, 1958), and the OECD (1960, from origins in the Marshall Plan). The variety of successes and failures attests to the difficulties of mounting integration schemes in postwar but still imperial Europe.
25 Dedman Origins and Development of the EU, 7.
following regulations; the lack of a procedure for exit encourages a greater degree of adherence.  

Yet Milward’s assertions are not without issue. Exclusivity can breed discord, as France’s rejections of Britain’s applications for EEC membership in the 1960s attest. While Milward’s analysis offers a useful theory for how the EEC managed to emerge, it is evident that the institution’s birth and life were complicated by internal and external forces beyond Milward’s focus. As Chapter 4 will demonstrate, agreeing to rules is a different task than implementing rules, particularly in a European system of integration that would allow for individual exemptions, notably from the Eurozone. In addition, the “irreversibility” of the organization is in question, because we see some examples of exit in the history of the EEC, notably with Algeria, the subject of this dissertation, but also in the decision of Greenland to leave the EEC following its independence from Denmark (1985) and in the recent and controversial "Brexit" vote. However, Milward’s thesis remains instructive, as he emphasizes economic and political need, rather than ideological discourse, as the driving force in integration. Milward’s contention of the primacy of necessity challenges the argument made by Walter Lipgens, who emphasizes the influence of European federalist movements before the mid-1950s on the eventual formation of successfully integrated institutions. Histories of European integration and, as we shall see, of Eurafrica strongly side with either pragmatic or ideological explanations for the successes and failures of these initiatives. I contend that pragmatic need about colonial markets drove the decisions made by negotiators working to integrate Europe. However, they were able to harness older, more passionate visions of integration that emphasized the fraternal, if not spiritual, side of the endeavor for unity between France, Europe, and Africa.

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26 Ibid., 7-8.
**Assimilations, Associations, and Confederations in France and (Eur)Africa**

In his classic 1961 work *Assimilation and Association in French Colonial Theory, 1890-1914*, historian Raymond Betts mused that the term “France d’Outre-Mer,” literally “overseas France,” embodied the favored French approach to colonization prior to the late 19th century: assimilation. Looking across the ocean, French officials from the Ancien Régime until the birth of the Third Republic claimed far-flung colonies as constituent parts of France itself. Even overseas, there was simply France. Betts cited a 1900 tome on French colonization that declared:

> Assimilation, by giving the colonies institutions analogous to those of metropolitan France, little by little removes the distances that separate the diverse parts of French territory and finally realizes their intimate union through the application of common legislation.27

This notion of a vast, yet uniform France, in which identical legal regimes would enforce harmony across the empire, remained an ideal; declarations of Algeria’s Frenchness would ring out into the mid-20th century (and indeed, in some circles, even later than that).

Assimilationist policymakers in 19th-century France believed that France’s duty to overseas regions went beyond delivering the light of French “civilization” to foreign lands. Rather, France had a duty to itself. A minister under Charles X, the French king whose conquest of Algeria was followed quickly by the toppling of his own rule, asked, “Aren’t the colonies French? Are they not a part of this large family?,” then answered himself: “The colonies are France.”28 During negotiations for the European project after World War II, this confident understanding of belongingness lingered. Algeria was France; therefore, if France joined a European community, Algeria would be a part of it. Assimilationist policy went out of fashion in imperial policymaking circles by the turn of the last century, due in part to the complexity and

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diversity of France’s growing African and Asian empire, and also to the lessons learned from examining how the Dutch, British, and Americans administered their own colonial holdings.\(^{29}\) Associative colonial practices emerged in their stead, acknowledging differences and local particularities while still asserting French dominance.\(^{30}\) As we will see, it was out of associative ideology that leaders like the Senegalese statesman Senghor or the Ivoirian Félix Houphouët-Boigny could promote ideals of a federal or confederal France.\(^{31}\)

However, Algeria, by the first decades of the Third Republic (1870-1940) a settler colony and a key part of France’s economy, remained assimilated, rather than being reformed into an associative relationship like the ones French officials pursued elsewhere.\(^{32}\) Political theorist Stuart Elden argues that “[t]he idea of a territory as a bounded space under the control of a group of people, usually a state, is [...] historically produced. [...] Territory [...] can therefore be thought of as the extension of the state’s power.”\(^{33}\) Territory as “political technology,” in Elden’s view, involves “[m]easure and control,” not just “land and terrain.”\(^{34}\) In the postwar period, by claiming to their European partners that Algeria was inherently French (assimilation still taking the day), French officials hoped to maintain and even extend their control over the territory.

These same officials would harness an ideology of defining Africa and Europe as united on a single geographic plane, “Eurafrica.”\(^{35}\) Like French claims to Algerian territory, French


\(^{32}\) Lewis argues that French practices of administration in Tunisia were derived from observing Algeria’s administration as a cautionary tale. Lewis, *Divided Rule*, 11-13.

\(^{33}\) Elden, *The Birth of Territory*, 322. Emphasis original.

\(^{34}\) *Ibid.*, 322-323.

officials rolled out visions of Eurafrica to impress upon their European counterparts the necessity of including Algeria and sub-Saharan African holdings within integrated European institutions. This had deep roots. In the interwar, one of the most ubiquitous figures in the European integration movement, the Austrian leader of Pan-Europa, Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, envisioned Europe extending beyond the continent. His organization repackaged decades-old justifications of colonization as a benefit not to an individual state, but to the entirety of Europe, with an economic program that argued that unified Europe could enjoy “the communal exploitation of the Pan-European colonies […].” According to Coudenhove, “Africa could provide Europe with raw materials for its industry, nutrition for its population, land for its overpopulation, labor for its unemployed, and markets for its products.” His readiness to open Africa to all Europeans is illustrative of early visions of Eurafrica. Yet in the wake of World War I, ideals of integrated Europe, let alone shared imperial territory, did not resonate widely in Europe’s capitals.


However, Eurafrican ideology persisted. The League of Nations’ mandates system served to “legitimize” imperial practice by internationalizing colonial interests. Interwar Eurafrican proponents, with their focus on European civilizational superiority and the need for access to raw materials and unfettered markets, embraced rhetoric closely tied to the emergence of fascist ideology. When the term *Eurafrique* emerged in the interwar period, it was part and parcel of the racialized worldview of French and Germans alike in the midst of rising nationalist movements. This period saw the publication of books advocating such sharing of Africa, notably Eugène Guernier’s 1933 *L’Afrique: Champ d’expansion de l’Europe* and Paolo d’Agostini Orsini di Camerota’s 1934 *Eurafrica: L’Africa per l’Europa, l’Europa per l’Africa*. Orsini’s work includes maps depicting three major spheres of world order: An American sphere comprising North and South America, clearly dominated by the United States, a Eurafrican sphere dominated by Europe, if not specifically France, and an Asian sphere, inclusive of Russia, with a less obvious dominant force.

Eurafrican proponents had strong views of geographic ties, often linked with particular readings of history. The writer Louis Bertrand emphasized the roots of a “Latin Africa” in North Africa. This bolstered claims that the Mediterranean was an “internal lake” in a Eurafrican continent, which fit with the fascist ideology of a Mediterranean civilization promoted by Mussolini, among others. Some Vichy collaborators embraced Eurafrica as part of a new world

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41 Hansen and Jonsson, *Eurafrica*.
order and Hitler’s own call for Lebensraum included African territory.\textsuperscript{43} Africa—its land and resources, if not peoples—was inseparable from Europe.

\textbf{Postwar Eurafrica: A New Imperative}

After World War II, the newly installed Fourth Republic renamed France’s empire the French Union in a shift that in part marked distaste for overt expressions of European superiority. Despite its origins, the term Eurafrica remained elemental to European integration discussions, even as the rhetoric surrounding the term came to emphasize partnership between Europe and Africa, rather than domination. Wielded as a political tool, Eurafrica offered European (and, as we will see, African and Algerian) administrators a way to assert any number of political or economic claims in the postwar. These included French claims to the indissoluble bonds across the motherland and “her” empire; long-held European convictions that Africa was the “natural” region for European trade and expansion; a growing emphasis on Europe’s material obligations to Africa; and the notion that Europe, with Africa, could form a third front in the Cold War, standing strong and independent of both the United States and the USSR. Indeed, for African leaders, language emphasizing links between Africa and Europe helped to further claims of unity between the continents, including federal or confederation alternatives to full independence for African states.\textsuperscript{44}

We can approach actors' motivations for promoting Eurafrica with a nod to the "Janus-faced" nature of nationalism, which is at once "a resource to be exploited by political entrepreneurs seeking to maximize their power and influence" and "palpably real to those who


\textsuperscript{44} Cooper’s recent monograph interrogates how African and French leaders alike envisioned future relations. Cooper, \textit{Citizenship between Empire and Nation}. 
participate in it.” The continuity of Eurafrican ideals, asserted in the postwar era by a range of actors in Europe and in the French Union, demonstrates the term's use to galvanize popular European opinion.

For French officials, versions of Eurafrica from the early 1950s onward offered a diplomatic tool to assert France’s control over volatile regions, guarantee financial assistance in an attempt to quiet unrest across the empire, and secure the signatures of other European states affirming the French quality of its overseas holdings. By the time European officials gathered to negotiate the EEC at the Conferences of Messina (1955) and Venice (1956), French officials had singled out Algeria as a key to the process of enveloping Eurafrican ideals within European integration. Such an assertion achieved French goals of maintaining economic control of Algeria and harnessing the development aid funds of its European partners (ostensibly to “modernize” industry in the French Union), all while reasserting its claim to the territory through the signatures on the treaty. At the same time, such ideas reflect a longer history of (imperial) nation-states harnessing international organizations as a method of maintaining prestige or even a measure of hegemony.

Peo Hansen and Stefan Jonsson pay considerable attention to the earliest iterations of Eurafrica. They argue that although Eurafrica was not officially written into a European integration scheme until the second half of the 1950s, the ideological basis for this policy had deep influence and was largely at the root of its eventual success. Their survey of Eurafrican ideology from the interwar era to the 1960s will be drawn on throughout this dissertation.


However, they emphasize the influence the lobbyists and thinkers who espoused Eurafrican ideals rather than considering the economic and political motivations that spurred French officials to push the policy. I contend that the efforts of lobbyists and ideologues only drew action from politicians and civil servants after it became clear that such ideology also offered pragmatic solutions to the crises of the postwar era. Giving equal weight to all demands for Eurafrica reduces the significance of such a policy when it finally was inscribed into supranational treaties.

The imbrication of the nation-state and the empire had political and economic implications. For the French ahead of the Treaty of Rome negotiations, the idea of a West German economy that dwarfed that of France was unacceptable; were France to join the EEC without its overseas holdings, this would become a reality. In Guia Migani’s words, “the association of the overseas lands [pays d’outre-mer] would place France at the epicenter of European construction […]” But this was not just about prestige. Without financial assistance of the other members of the Six, France could not afford planned overseas economic and social development schemes and the overseas still represented a critical trade partner for French imports and exports. Although economic historian Jacques Marseille would argue that the loss of formal colonies allowed (the nation-state) France’s economy to flourish, a theme Daniel Lefeuvre then applied to Algeria, the French insistence that unified Europe cut deals with independent African states well into the 1970s reveals the longer life of the economic interconnections of Europe and Africa. Thus, we again see pragmatism in French decision-making, though in a shape different from what historians have argued in the past.

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48 Ibid., 235-236.
49 Marseille, Empire colonial et capitalisme français; Lefeuvre, Chère Algérie.
Hansen and Jonsson’s analysis of Eurafrica is also problematic for its single-minded critique of the neo-colonialism embedded within the ideology. Certainly, the interwar versions of Eurafrica, so often linked to fascist thinkers, embody the spirit of European colonialism. This was not eradicated after World War II, and in the minds of many proponents of Eurafrica, it indeed remained a policy intended to strengthen Europe’s grip on African markets. However, Eurafrican ideas ranged widely based on who was expressing them and at what moment in time. Thus, African elites figure amongst the proponents of postwar versions of Eurafrica; they viewed European integration exclusive of Africa as a potential threat to African states’ economic privileges vis-à-vis France. Further, they asserted that the link between Europe and Africa was more indissoluble than the bond between the European states themselves.

Frederick Cooper’s thoroughly researched monograph on the elite African leaders who promoted federalism and advocated African citizenship within a French electoral system counterbalances Hansen and Jonsson’s analysis; read together, these two works can offer a fuller understanding of the political actors who embraced sometimes wildly different versions of Eurafrica. While Cooper might have delved further into the political and business interests that fueled some European visions of Eurafrica—hardly notions of brotherhood—he rightly posits that Eurafrica could hold strategic meaning not only for Europeans but also for Africans. Indeed, the French Union (and after 1958, the French Community) can be viewed as a type of international organization, akin in some ways, yet divergent from, the British Commonwealth. Cooper, by his own admission, calls "Africa's connections to Europe after the Treaty of Rome […] beyond the scope" of his analysis. But he emphasizes "the tensions and complementarities between two modes of supranational or suprata territorial thinking at this time, one focused on
making a new Europe, the other on transforming an old empire." The citizenship regimes that are his focus were among the preoccupations of the policy makers who populate this dissertation. I analyze similar tensions and complementarities among thinkers (comprising Algerians as well as sub-Saharan Africans and French administrators), looking at how evolving postwar conditions guided particular versions of European borders.

**Sources: Repositories and Creators**

Understanding France’s postwar Eurafrica policy is key to puzzling out French officials’ strategies in Brussels and beyond. Yet existing studies on Eurafrica largely focus on sub-Saharan Africa, reproducing the organization of French administration and the colonial archives that separate Algeria, the Overseas Departments (DOM) and the Overseas Territories (TOM), all of which were treated under different laws and ministries. In fact, concerns about Algeria were bound up in policy discussions related to overseas departments, sub-Saharan Africa, and even poor European regions like the Italian Mezzogiorno. Archival material reveals that Eurafrican ideas dominated some of the negotiations for the Treaty of Rome, as the French attempted to win from their European partners a commitment to such policies.

Research for this project brought me to numerous archives across France and in Italy. In France, I conducted research in the Archives Nationales (Pierrefitte-sur-Seine), Archives du Monde du Travail (Roubaix), Centre des Archives Economiques et Financières (Savigny-le-
Temple), Centre des Archives Nationales d’Outre-Mer (Aix-en-Provence), and Centre des Archives Diplomatiques du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères (la Courneuve). These archives contain official ministerial documents, handwritten missives exchanged between ministers, and countless anonymously penned memoranda meditating on the complicated legal puzzles that faced France in the postwar era. Further research at the Bibliothèque Nationale de France François Mitterand (Paris) and the university libraries and archives of Université Paris Ouest—Nanterre La Défense (Bibliothèque de Documentation Internationale Contemporaine), Aix-Marseille Université (Bibliothèque de Droit et d’Economie Schuman; Centre d’Acquisition et de Diffusion de l’Information Scientifique et Technique; Maison Méditerranéenne de la Science de l’Homme), and Sciences Po Paris (Archives d’Histoire Contemporaine) added a breadth to my source base, particularly thanks to their stores of publications by the administrators and policy makers who populate the pages of this work. The privately run Centre de Documentation Historique sur l’Algérie (Aix-en-Provence) and Centre de Documentation des Français d’Algérie (Perpignan) and numerous departmental and municipal archives in southern France provided periodicals that gave me a fuller sense of how the public consumed the events and policies on which my dissertation focuses. At the European University Institute in Florence, the Historical Archives of the European Union house an incomparable collection of documentation related to European integration, including records of negotiations for Europe-wide treaties, communications from member state governments, and publications.

Despite the archives’ disparate locations (Paris extramuros being the common denominator for many but not all) and the diverse ministerial affiliations indicated in their names, these collections are in conversation with one another, not least because they provide evidence of correspondence between ministries. In these records, certain figures stand out as key
to the insertion of Eurafrica and Algeria within the European project. These men (indeed, women figure only as silent, unnamed typists in these archives) penned memoranda, wrote one another personal notes (occasionally even employing the familiar *tutoyer*), and mentioned relevant colleagues and rivals.

Among the many men, some were high-ranking ministerial officials and diplomats, some acted as African leaders pre- and post-independence, and some are known as founders of Europe. Among the ministers, we will meet Christian Pineau, Gaston Defferre, and Michel Debré. Diplomats include Maurice Couve de Murville and Jean-Marc Boegner. The loudest African voice in the Eurafrican policy discussions was Senghor, but we will also see reformist work by the Senegalese statesman Lamine Guèye. After Algeria’s independence, leaders of the new state also enter this narrative; Ben Bella, as described above and in Chapter 5, is but one of these men. Foreign and French leaders involved in European integration included Robert Schuman and Walter Halstein. But very often, the authors of the records I analyze remain unnamed, presumably low- and mid-level civil servants compiling data ahead of meetings.

Charles de Gaulle, a towering figure in modern French history, plays only a minor role in this story. When de Gaulle returned to power in 1958, the Fourth Republic toppling under the weight of the Algerian War, his entry had little impact on the Eurafrican policy I discuss. De Gaulle was known for being skeptical of European integration, which risked reducing French autonomy and raised the possibility of Britain (with America) drawing ever closer to Europe. However, I contend that we must see in early Fifth Republic decision-making an embrace of the European project as a means of maintaining control in the empire and relevance in Europe and the world. By not overstating the significance of the shift from the Fourth to the Fifth Republic in the early days of European integration, particularly pertaining to Eurafrica, and by highlighting
the ways in which Brussels considered continued links to Algeria and Africa after formal decolonization, I reevaluate the traditional timeline of the process of decolonization. Thus, in the shift from the French Union to the French Community, as the respective postwar republics called France’s empire, analyzing continuity is key to understanding what decisions French authorities took.

Finally, my archival data is revealing in its silence. In over 20 months in the archives, I can count on one hand the number of times I came across the word “war” in the boxes of documents pertaining to Algeria and the EEC. I take this silence as evidence of – initially – the lack of concern from French officials who understood the war as merely “the events.” Indeed, it demonstrates their conviction that France would win the war, rather than any notion of inevitable decolonization. It also showcases France’s sometimes strict, if confusing, bureaucracy, in which an administrator responsible for one domain would not delve into a subject far from his immediate duty. But most of all, I find that the Algerian War is indeed a spectral, silent presence in these archives. My findings reveal that the French saw the Treaty of Rome as a tool for diplomacy, allowing French officials to continue claiming Algeria as a part of France. While not explicitly talking about the war, these officials nonetheless attempted to enforce l’Algérie française’s survival through supranational diplomacy.

Narrative Structure

As I have already noted, the term “Eurafrica” meant different things depending on who advocated or denounced it, and when. It emerged in ideological and economic calls for European integration. And at times, those calls were made without evoking the term at all. We will witness these fluctuations in the chapters that follow. In the postwar era, French political actors and
business people continued to use the term Eurafría. African leaders in France’s empire also employed the term, imbuing it with yet other meanings. Chapter 1 examines these postwar iterations of “Eurafrica,” as the word was applied to idealistic visions of a federative future between Europe and Africa, but also continued to offer Parisian officials the chance to dominate African markets. Eurafrica was but one of a variety of supranational schemes that gained in popularity after World War II. Pan-Africanism and pan-Arabism also drew supporters (and detractors) in this era and indeed, it was not clear to which, if any of these unions, Algeria might link itself. Thus, Chapter 1 challenges firm understandings of geographic limitations to “pan” movements of unity. Rather, officials and political thinkers displayed flexible notions of belongingness, exclusion, and the limits of “Europe” or “Africa.”

The consequences of drawing lines were evident for some Eurafrican proponents after French officials declined to pursue the inclusion of overseas territories within the European Coal and Steel Community. Chapter 2 analyzes the outrage sparked in some Algerian circles after this exclusion occurred. These ramifications were especially disquieting in light of recent citizenship regime reforms across French Africa, and the increased move toward a new political relationship between Africa and the metropole, manifested by Gaston Defferre’s 1956 loi cadre (framework law). The question of Algeria and the overseas territories’ legal relationship with the metropole appeared far from settled. As legal scholars attempted to make sense of how Algeria’s status might be understood within the constitutions of the Fourth and Fifth Republics, their publications revealed that Algeria was not simply the “intégrante” part of France that metropolitan politicians were fond of claiming.

Yet the concerns of Algerian elected officials and French business leaders did not appear to have an immediate impact on the French administrators engaged in the European project.
changed, however, soon after the launch of the ECSC. By the mid-1950s, French officials came to understand the crises in the colonies as being more serious than they had initially believed. A policy of Eurafrica, now inserted in negotiations for the Treaty of Rome, would be a political and economic tool through which to maintain control overseas. Chapter 3 analyzes the year prior to the treaty’s signature, during which time French officials finally embraced Eurafrican policy in the European project. This shift demonstrates that French officials believed they could solve problems of empire by offering new avenues of partnership—even federation—rather than by entirely ceding their claims to overseas territories.

The Treaty of Rome, the founding document of the EEC, did little to clarify exactly how Algeria and the overseas holdings would relate to integrated Europe. Chapter 4 examines the five eventful years between the Treaty of Rome’s signing and the independence of Algeria, years that saw the intensification of the Algerian War, the fall of the Fourth Republic, and the independence of nearly the whole of sub-Saharan Africa. Even as French officials in other offices were preparing for the independence of Algeria, officials engaged in Brussels continued to assert that the regulations of the EEC could and should extend to Algeria.

Algeria’s independence in 1962 cannot be viewed as a clear break in the history of Eurafrica. Chapter 5 asks how French businessmen and the president of independent Algeria alike attempted to clarify, and perhaps maintain, strong ties between the independent state and the EEC. The willingness of French officials and some other members of the Six to consider these claims serves as evidence that the borders of Europe were still far from fixed, and that it remained possible for European officials to consider a Europe that traversed the Mediterranean. However, as Algerian leaders pursued other partnerships in the years after independence, French
leaders’ enthusiasm for the maintenance of these ties diminished. By the mid-1960s, it appeared that a Eurafrica inclusive of Algeria would not survive.

Despite France’s loss of formal empire by 1962, I contend that the Eurafrican policy administrators fought to include in the Treaty of Rome continued to impact European-African relations. I conclude with a short case study of an uncomfortable reckoning between metropolitan French officials, the local administration of la Réunion, and the diplomatic corps of West Germany. In what at first glance appears to be a simple question of visa renewal in the mid-1960s, we see the broader implications of applying (or not) European regulations to another extrametropolitan department of France. This uncomfortable confrontation between French imperial and European interests—embodied in the fates of unnamed, unemployed overseas citizens and two West German mechanics—is evidence of the impact of France’s weaponizing of the Treaty of Rome in the midst of the Algerian War. Like the example of Algeria itself, discussed throughout the dissertation, this event demonstrates the complicated web of alliances that France struggled to balance in the postwar. This is apparent, as well, as I briefly address how French rhetoric about Algeria and Europe changed, notably in 1965. The episodes presented in the conclusion further demonstrate that even after the era of formal independence across Africa, France still made decisions as an empire, not as a pared-down nation-state.

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Returning to 1963, Ben Bella’s letter instigated a divide amongst officials in Brussels over their response. This dissertation will analyze the factors that opened the door for Ben Bella’s inquiry in the first place. It will then ask how the years of insisting on Algeria’s place within France, translated then into Algeria’s belonging within Europe, would impact the relations of independent states that continued to look toward Europe for financial assistance and trade
partnership into the late 20th century. I argue that European integration provided French officials a tool with which to launch a series of economic and political claims over the whole of France’s empire, with Algeria at the heart of this imperial vision. Claiming that the European Economic Community should be a sort of Eurafrican Economic Community, the French brought their “domestic” concerns about empire into the supranational arena. It is now our task to analyze when and how such ideas impacted the emergence of integrated Europe.
Chapter 1

Unions, Vows, and Exclusions in the Postwar

In 1958, the pro-business, pro-Eurafrican magazine *France Outremer*’s cover shouted:

Eurafrica... marriage of love or of convenience? *An unfinished debate!*  
[L’Eurafrique... mariée d’amour ou de raison? *un débat qui n’est pas clos!*]¹

Indeed, if the debate remained open in 1958, the notion of a wedding between or including both Europe and Africa was far from new. Marriage has long been a staple of diplomacy, from literal marriages of royal families (witness Queen Victoria’s grandchildren going to war in 1914) to figurative images of union (political cartoonists depicted the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact as Stalin and Hitler walking down the aisle).² Vows weighed heavy on the minds of top European statesmen in the years after World War II. In the immediate postwar, European statesmen emphasized the necessity of Franco-German nuptials.³ But marital bliss would be hard to achieve if the six members of this marriage vow could not agree on how Africa—part stepchild, part jilted lover—would figure into the union.

The question of the place of Africa, and specifically Algeria, within integrated Europe is central to this dissertation. However, these tensions are often forgotten in favor of triumphalist narratives that focus on either European integration (with its current structure as the inevitable result) or decolonization (with an Africa fully unfettered from Europe). Such histories forget that

¹ Looming above this sentence was “Algérie,” in large block letters, although that referred to a different article. Centre de documentation sur l’Histoire de l’Algérie (CDHA): *France Outremer*, 339 [1958]. Cover page.
they were a critical part of the arrangement, even if disputes arose about exactly what role Africa would play. In fact, some statesmen understood the wedding bells of the early postwar era to be ringing not for the Six, but for Europe and Africa. This version of Euroafrica—romantic and pragmatic—reveals the degree to which European integration schemes merged with postwar planning for Africa. This, in turn, challenges the narratives that too often divide the histories of decolonization and European integration.

This chapter examines the many forms of “union” imagined by French, European, African, and Arab officials in the postwar era. This includes the various diplomatic nuptials envisioned by France Outremer magazine and many others. It also includes the range of ways a diverse group of administrators and political thinkers employed the term “Euroafrica” in order to further a wide set of goals. I argue that understanding this Euroafrican rhetoric is key to understanding the assumptions and attitudes of the French administrators who would negotiate for European institutions. Although my dissertation’s overarching argument is that pragmatism—or at least a French version of what they believed to be pragmatic—had the ultimate influence on how such policies were pursued, no history of Euroafrica can be complete without addressing its ideological origins. What is more, I emphasize that visions of Algeria factored into such understandings of geography and influence; this furthers my insistence that we consider Algeria with French sub-Saharan Africa when analyzing postwar decisions. Finally, understanding the basic language of Euroafrica, particularly in its interwar guise, will familiarize readers with some

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4 Hansen and Jonsson argue that the ideology of the interwar fed directly into postwar concepts of “Euroafrica.” They write, “In continuity with the ideational climate during the interwar period, […] again, many asserted that it was through colonial cooperation, even integration, rather than going it alone, that the exhausted colonial powers in Western Europe were to […] redeem Europe’s global stamina.” This chapter agrees with their basic premise of European powers looking toward Africa for European strength, particularly evidenced by the international coterie of men who celebrated Euroafrica in the interwar. However, as later chapters will argue, Euroafrican policy remained a firmly French objective, with other European powers convinced (or not convinced) to varying degrees of the strategic importance of appeasing France, rather than the ideological or geopolitical significance for their own state to access the materials promised in a Euroafrican arrangement. Hansen and Jonsson, Euroafrica, 71-72.
of its proponents’ claims (though they were myriad and at times contradictory). As later chapters focus on trade and labor negotiations, the term “Eurafrica” will appear less, although it never entirely disappears. Here, I ask that readers consider the objectives of Eurafrican thinkers, so that they can recognize in later chapters the appearance of similar goals, now bundled into European economic policy. The keyword of this chapter is Eurafrica, but European proponents of Eurafrica held just minor influence over French administrators, who, as will be clear in Chapter 3, embraced a policy of Eurafrica only once it appeared to offer pragmatic benefits for France’s status as an empire. Those administrators, however, often used the language of the lobbyists and thinkers I will discuss in this chapter. They were also operating in an era of flux with regards to understandings of citizenship and belonging as it extended to France’s overseas holdings.\(^5\) Thus, I will address new citizenship regimes in late 1940s France before turning to the many voices calling for Eurafrican, Pan-Arab, or Pan-African unity.

Eurafrica was but one of many visions of postwar unity. By the postwar, goals of a Pan-Arab or Pan-African union also enjoyed renewed popularity.\(^6\) The Cold War’s apparent bipolarity only added to the virulence with which proponents of these union schemes fought for

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\(^6\) Such ideology predates World War II and could include more expansive notions of belonging. Goebel argues that anti-imperialism and the precursors to Third World nationalism were in part rooted in interactions between non-Europeans from all over the world, who found themselves in the same neighborhoods, cafes, and workers’ associations in the interwar. Michael Goebel, *Anti-Imperial Metropolis: Interwar Paris and the Seeds of Third World Nationalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015). The significance of such ideology on the international stage should not be discounted. See, for example, G.N. Uzoigwe, “Pan-Africanism in World Politics: The Geopolitics of the Pan-African Movement, 1900-2000,” in *Pan-Africanism and the Politics of African Citizenship and Identity*, ed. Toyin Falola and Kwame Essien (New York: Routledge, 2014), 215-246. Postwar attempts to organize the world in these “pan” movements mattered; Nasser caused such consternation among European administrators that one joked, “We ought to erect a statue to Nasser. To the federator of Europe.” Louis Armand, EURATOM president, quoted in Hansen and Jonsson, *Eurafrica*, 238.
recognition of their imagined communities. While the chapters that follow will take a chronological approach to analyze the decision-making processes related to Algeria, Eurafrica, and integrated Europe, this chapter seeks to examine some of the diverse claims on belonging, inclusion, and exclusion trumpeted by Europeans and Africans from 1945 until well after the wave of independence eradicated most formal European empires. In order to make sense of the economic-political (for indeed, they cannot be untwined) choices of the 1950s and 1960s, I first will therefore emphasize the ideological and, to some degree, intellectual field in which such ideas emerged. Taking stock of such ideas is imperative to a history of this era; it allows the historian to make sense of the range of possibilities imagined, and to take seriously why such ideas might emerge, among whom, and when.

La Mère Patrie, Citizenship, and the Emergence of Nationalist Conflicts in France’s Empire

Frantz Fanon, in A Dying Colonialism, asked, “Is anything more grotesque and humiliating and obscene than the appellation, ‘French-Moslems’?” In my introduction, I detailed French claims that Algeria was a fundamental part of France, a “fact” cemented by French administrative practices in the departments. While future chapters will demonstrate that

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7 Here I borrow from Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1991). Larry Wolff’s study of the invention of Galicia is instructive here, as well, particularly in conversation with the historians of geography I reference in the introduction. Wolff is interested in “further the problem of how an imagined or invented entity, like Galicia in the eighteenth century, became geopolitically real, meaningful, and historical in the eighteenth century—before receding again into the domain of fantasy in the twentieth century.” The same problem can be puzzled out when the idea of Eurafrica is investigated. Larry Wolff, The Idea of Galicia: History and Fantasy in Habsburg Political Culture (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010), 7.

8 Lewis’ contextualization of “forum shopping” within the much grander narrative of imperial competition, sovereignty claims, and European diplomacy demonstrates how geographic certainties (North Africa; Tunisia; France; Italy; Europe) could be undermined by legal regimes and the citizenship rights they might entail. Lewis, Divided Rule, 40-53.


*l’Algérie française* was in fact a qualified moniker, here I will emphasize the most glaring example of disparity between the Algerian departments and the metropole: citizenship rights. Parsing through who counted as “French,” and how that might limit the reach of regulations and benefits emerging from integrated Europe (such as the free circulation of laborers), would prove awkward and contentious in the postwar years. I therefore begin by examining French attempts to extend (or not) citizenship rights to Algerian and other overseas residents, and how those attempts failed to quiet the nationalist movements whose voices grew louder in the years following World War II.\(^{11}\) This will allow me to contend, in later chapters, that it is only by accounting for empire that historians can understand the gravity and reach of European rights regimes related to social assistance and labor mobility.

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Algeria, after France’s loss in the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871), became a site for affirming power and prestige, securing economic benefits, and harnessing military and naval strongholds.\(^{12}\) This was in part achieved by encouraging European settlement there and also by extending French citizenship to sections of the populace. The Jewish community of Algeria gained French citizenship in 1870 through the Crémieux Decree. The assignment of citizenship status to the Jewish community reveals some of the confusion about who could count as French. Although some of the Jews of Algeria traced their roots to continental Europe, including Sephardic Jews who had fled the Spanish inquisition centuries earlier, others claimed millennia-old roots in Algeria, as deep as those the French administration would label *indigène* or

\(^{11}\) Todd Shepard employs quotation marks around terms such as “Muslim” and “European” to challenge the assignment of such firm categories to groups of people. While acknowledging the much more complex web of identities at play in French Algeria, for the sake of simplicity I will not use quotation marks, but readers should be critical of religious or national labels. Todd Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of France* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), 2-3. See also Weil, *Qu’est-ce qu’un français?*

\(^{12}\) These same uses for the colonies would be invoked implicitly and explicitly as France negotiated for a Eurafriacan policy in European integration nearly a century later.
musulman. The limits of the Crémieux Decree’s application also demonstrate the importance of borders in practices of administration: only those Jews living in the three northern departments gained citizenship. Those in the Sahara (Mozabites) would be excluded until after World War II.

Most inhabitants of the three departments did not, of course, enjoy French citizenship rights. Dwarfing the small Jewish community, Algeria’s population prior to the arrival of the French mainly comprised Arab communities and Berber communities like the Kabyle. Despite linguistic and religious differences between and within these groups, the French tended to lump all of these subjects into the musulman category. “Muslims” faced a narrow and hard-to-achieve path to French citizenship: renouncing Koranic law and embracing only the Republican rule of law. Yet even those who took those steps rarely received citizenship. Those who did not attain it were governed by the punitive indigénat, an 1881 law separating French subjects from French citizens (this followed the 1865 Senatus-Consulate). Meanwhile, in 1889, a law extended French citizenship to children born of foreigners in Algeria, applying to the offspring of settlers from Italy, Spain, and so on. A tangled combination of jus soli and jus sanguinis became part of the political life of its residents. The uniqueness of Algeria’s relationship to France—and the possibilities for citizenship that entailed—did in fact have a sort of corollary in sub-Saharan Africa, where the originaires of the Quatre Communes of Senegal held some French citizenship rights and yet maintained their personal status, meaning private affairs were

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15 The term “Algerian,” until the revolution of the mid-20th century, was applied mainly to the European population of the territory.
still governed by local Islamic laws. This hybrid form of citizenship was not available to Algerian men.

The service of colonial subjects in World War I complicated questions of citizenship for the French government. Henry Simon, France’s Minister of the Colonies, told the Parliament in 1918:

[T]o fight in the first ranks of the French Army is, for our African subjects, to stand forever on the side of civilization […]. […] France, in return, must take care to prove to them her spirit of justice and her recognition.

Simon’s assertion was not universally accepted, as some French senators suggested alternatives such as promoting further association, so that, in the words of one senator, “the indigène [will] evolve not in our civilization, but in his own.” In fact, the end of the Great War saw little appreciable change in the rights enjoyed by residents in France’s empire, however. The 1919 Jonnart Law, meant to ease the naturalization process for Algerians, had the opposite effect. This was in part because its wording blocked polygamists—a shrinking population in Algeria—from applying for naturalization, further codifying Islam’s “incompatibility” with French citizenship. Clearly, different rights regimes continued to reign in France during the interwar.

Matters would only become more complicated during World War II and its aftermath. Algerian Jews saw their citizenship rights disappear when the Vichy government revoked the Crémieux Decree in 1940. Guadeloupe, a vieille colonie and part of France since 1674, where men had

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19 This legal distinction appeared in 1848. Cooper, Citizenship between Empire and Nation, 6.
20 Cited in Fogarty, Race & War in France, 235-236.
21 World War I offered an opportunity to reaffirm and bolster the citizenship of the Quatre Communes originaires; Blaise Diagne, first black African elected to the French Chamber of Deputies, asserted that the originaires, like other French citizens, should be conscripted into military service under the same regulations as metropolitan, not AOF, men. Ibid., 237-241.
22 Ibid., 258-261.
enjoyed universal suffrage since 1871, also experienced the erasure of citizenship in those years.  

Meanwhile, the French army again called upon colonial troops, raising once more questions about military service and the rights it might entail. Even before the war’s end, in a March 7, 1944 ordinance, Charles de Gaulle assured the Français musulmans that they would enjoy equal rights to non-Muslims residing in Algeria. Thus, in theory, they could engage in free circulation to the metropole, although in practice transport to the metropole, let alone securing a job there, remained difficult and rare. Fourteen months later, on May 8, 1945, the same day that celebrations across Europe and Algeria marked Germany’s surrender, violent nationalist protests broke out in Sétif and Guelma. Over the course of nearly a week, Algerian protesters killed over 100 Europeans and injured one hundred more. The French response was brutal, with perhaps 6,000 Algerians killed by the French army. This repression had the opposite of the intended effect, inspiring in young Algerians a sense of nationalist defiance against the French. What’s more, 136,000 demobilized Algerians returned home, finding that, in the words of Martin Evans, “[t]he disjunction between the ideal of anti-Nazi liberation and the reality of French

26 Though many historians argue that the years between Sétif and the outbreak of the war in 1954 were quiet, there are indications that experts felt otherwise. For example, the political scientist (and at the time, graduate student) Manfred Halpern, himself a refugee from Nazi Germany in his youth, emphasized the myriad displays of discontentment, large and small, that emerged even after the May 1945 uprisings were quelled. Manfred Halpern, “The Algerian Uprising of 1945,” *Middle East Journal* 2, 2 (April 1948): 191-202.
Algeria could not have been more startling.”27 Some of these veterans would become founding members of the FLN.

Repression was not the only French tactic, however. In the years after, French official attempted to quell Algerian unrest by offering further reforms to its citizenship regime, particularly through the September 20, 1947 \(\textit{loi portant statut organique de l'Algérie} \) (Chapter 2). But reforms of the late 1940s appeared to be too little too late in the eyes of evolving and growing nationalist movements.28 Promises of full legal equality seemed dubious at best, considering the appalling living conditions of Algerian laborers who made it to the metropole and the continued dominance of men of European origin within local administration. Exclusions from citizenship undermined the by then decades-old French claim that \(l'Algérie française\) was a “\textit{partie intégrante}\” of France.

French administrators’ attempts to assure the Algerian population—“Muslim” and “European” alike—that the departments truly composed a fundamental part of France would be undermined by these same administrators’ decisions regarding the exclusion of the overseas territories from the ECSC (Treaty of Paris, 1951). I will analyze reactions to this exclusion in depth in Chapter 2, but here I will introduce one of the loudest \textit{indigène} critics of that decision. At a 1952 Council of the Republic meeting, Senator Abdennour Tamzali reacted in outrage to the knowledge that the Algerian departments would be excluded from the Coal and Steel Community:

Certainly, while we understand very well that the marriages of convenience between foreign economies, necessitated by political and economic imperatives, can be

27 Evans, \textit{Algeria: France’s Undeclared War}, 94-95.
contracted, we cannot however, resolve ourselves to be subjected to a discriminatory regime giving us the feeling—true or false—of being condemned to an experience of concubinage, [the] new form of economic indigénat from which Algeria can suffer.29

Again, we see the metaphor of marriage introduced, now with Algeria suffering the indignity of being shunted to the side as a concubine as France wedded Europe. Tamzali’s critique extends beyond a notion of loyalties to Algeria and focuses on the economic risks to Algeria if it is not treated as a legal part of France. He would have decades of promises, and de Gaulle’s own assurances of Algeria’s equality, to back his denunciation of the decision. For French proponents of Eurafrica, the marriage was a vow of economic union, and abandoning, divorcing, or being unfaithful to Africa could prove disastrous for the war-weakened economies of France and Europe.

**Eurafrica I: Wedding Bells and Businessmen**

In the Introduction, I discussed how notions of a Eurafrican sphere, dominated typically by French actors, gained popularity in the interwar and indeed even impacted the outlook of some Vichy officials. Somewhat remarkably, the term Eurafrica, though popularized by proclaimed fascists, remained in use following World War II. Emerging from the brutality and shame of the war, French officials saw in Eurafrica a path to preserve France’s overseas strongholds while excising the now outmoded terms “colony” and “empire.” Unlike the interwar iterations of Eurafrica, this one typically envisioned brotherhood or unity—even wedding vows—between European and African populations, generally though not always avoiding the paternalistic language of the 1930s. Most critically, the French proponents of postwar Eurafrica

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29 Archives Nationales d’Outre-Mer (CAOM) 81 F 2136: “L’Algérie ne doit souffrir—ni économiquement, ni socialement—de sa non-intégration dans le pool charbon-acier” a souligné M. le sénateur Tamzali au Conseil de la République” in Dépêche Quotidienne d’Algérie, 3 April 1952.
presented it as a means of rebuilding and then preserving French economic might, devastated by the war.

Some French advocates of Franco-African relations bemoaned the survival of the term. In an academic lecture in the early 1950s, to which we will return in Chapter 2, the French Union conseiller Georges Le Brun Keris complained:

One hears a lot [On parle beaucoup] about Eurafrica. This is Mr. Guernier’s word, thus of French origin. It was created to endorse problematic concepts [conceptions critiquables] but was above all polluted by its usage by the German occupant. I am very surprised to see that the same vocabulary [un pareil vocable] has been taken up again, without any hesitation. We at least could make an effort of imagination and avoid using this word when we speak of any form of close association between Europe and Africa.30

Despite his critique of the term, Keris still argued for the importance of such aims. French emphasis on these ties emerged as the war came to an end, and the ideas, as we have seen, predated 1945. That year, the French business leader Robert Lemaignen (whom we will see in a government post in Chapter 4) published an essay he wrote in 1943, which reflected the wartime mood. He concluded, “[I]f this imperial community can tomorrow be a living reality […] so that our sons – the sons of France of five continents – can forget this present nightmare […] they will march at the fore once again [ils marcheront, une fois de plus, les premiers].”31 Lemaignen’s choice of words reflects the larger shift in tone amongst French administrators following World War II. Even before the guns had cooled, French rhetoric about the colonial connection turned from one of explicit hierarchy to one of a sort of equality in filial love of France (if not in citizenship rights). Lemaignen presented all French subjects and citizens as equal partners in France’s resurrection. Noteworthy, too, are the other essayists in the slim volume: Cambodian

statesman Sisowath Youtévong and Léopold Senghor. Their participation demonstrates the turn toward new conversations about Franco-African or French Union relations, despite the unchanged French goals of maintaining economic control and political influence across the empire.

The language of a union of men also emerged in pro-Eurafrican lobbying groups. For example, the 1953 manifesto of the Movement for Eurafrica declared that it would “topple the barrier that still exists too much between the races, and […] bring together, united freely and in brotherhood, men and women […].” Its goal was nothing short of “Assur[ing] the economic prosperity, the valorization, the respect of civilizations, the cooperation demanded by the solidarity that unites the destiny of all Europeans and all Africans.”32 In its idealism, declaring itself apolitical and calling for a Europe open to Africans and an Africa open to Europeans, this organization decried colonialism and demanded, notably, a federalist future.

This is not to say that the older vestiges of Eurafrican ideology were eliminated. Robert de la Motte Saint Pierre, member of a family of planters with holdings in Madagascar, opined in 1950 that “Africa is the natural prolongation of Europe.” Further still, he claimed that Europe’s need of food and industrial materials “could be entirely filled by African development.”33 Like Guernier or Orsini, these Eurafrican endeavors would continue to be defined primarily as a means of achieving European goals. In particular, de la Motte emphasized the importance of action taken by French Union officials and by private enterprises. These actions would be separate from, but complementary to, European-level projects. As we will see in subsequent chapters, although French officials increasingly promised the other members of the Six that they

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33 CAOM 100 APOM 975: “Le Plan Schuman et le Continent Africain d’après une Note de M. Robert de la Motte Saint Pierre,” August 1951.
would be equal partners within a Eurafrican union, French goals (and French dominance) would take primacy.

Indeed, to what degree was Eurafrica ever really European in the eyes of French officials? Despite the continued focus on French-African relations within Eurafrican rhetoric, some French officials were uneasy with their colleague’s willingness to cede economic or political sovereignty in French-held African territories. Senator Michel Debré, who would serve as the first prime minister of the Fifth Republic, was generally dubious of European integration, and his skepticism was manifest in his dislike for Eurafrican ideology. In 1952, he argued that European integration would reduce France’s role as the key power in Africa. Rather than promoting European unity, the French should consider that they already had a stronger connection to their overseas holdings, while East and West Germans, for example, had a stronger natural bond than the one envisioned for France and West Germany.34 Debré’s concerns were perhaps partly assuaged by the exclusion of overseas territories from the Coal and Steel Community. But we will see Debré again in Chapter 4, still concerned about how European unity threatened France’s privileged role in African affairs.35

*A Third Way?*

While it did not win all French administrators to its side, the postwar guise of Eurafrica, like European integration itself, was recast as French and other European administrators realized that their nations’ status as world powers had quickly diminished as the chill of a bipolar Cold War set in. Bolstering relations with Africa would provide Europe with a “third way,” in which a

35 At the same time, public opinion in West Germany and Italy already leaned anti-colonialist by the early 1950s. CAOM: FR ANOM 61 COL 2314: Le Brun Keris, “Europe des Six et Union Française,” *Monde Nouveau, Paru: Revue Mensuelle Internationale* 63 (1952).
Eurafrican bloc could stand its ground between Soviet and American interests. Such a geopolitical reading of Eurafrica willfully ignored the racialized basis of Europe’s presence in Africa in the first place. This Eurafrica, one of equals (but as the French understood it, with Europeans firmly at the helm), would challenge the new world order. Linked with such federalist visions of the future were new ideas of French citizenship. In 1956, in a speech to young people from Bougie (likely of European origin) touring the metropole, European federalist Albert Gordiani emphasized the new possibilities:

You see how France is captivating [attachante], diverse in its countryside, kind [douce] and welcoming; how much one feels proud and free on one’s soil [sol]. How [France] is respectful of diversity: the citizen of Dakar, whether black or white, feels equally at ease in Paris, Lille, or Bordeaux as in his native Senegal because everywhere in the Metropole, as in the Overseas, reigns the same spirit of liberty and respect.

[…] And once you will have returned home, to your family, in that French province which is Algeria, you will see that France remains worthy of our love, regardless of our race or our religion […].

Gordiani’s certitude, spoken after the loss of Indochina, the launch of the Algerian War, and the independence of Morocco and Tunisia, can be read as highly naïve, coming from the perspective of a European. Alternatively, it can be understood as part of a tempered version of Eurafrica that reflected the new reticence about overtly colonialist assertions. While Gordiani’s speech concerned only the French Union, we see in it the same arguments that would emerge to promote Eurafrican ties. The continuity of the land, rather than the distinct rights regimes that had long divided different peoples, would be emphasized.

Proponents would thus paint Eurafrica as a single continent, massive in scale and population, which would serve as a counterweight to a bipolar Cold War order. In his tellingly titled *L’Eurafrique: Notre dernière chance* (Eurafrica: Our Last Chance), published in 1955,

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Pierre Nord (better known for his spy novels) emphasized Eurafrica as the third force in the Cold War, as opposed to a lonely Western Europe, “crushed between the USSR and the USA […].” Only with Africa could Europe emerge as an equal (atomic) power. Nord envisioned the manufacture of atomic bombs in Africa, thanks to the mineral deposits found there. Nord emphasized a Eurafrica that embraced African participation, noting that in sub-Saharan Africa, where there was one European for every thirty-seven Africans, Eurafrica would “not be made, or [would] not last, without the consent of Africans.” Nord’s view of Africans within the French Union proved quite rosy, and he asserted that the French colonial mission had created a legion of proud French Africans, in comparison with Belgian colonial subjects:

[...W]hereas no Congolese told me “I am Belgian,” I need only set foot in Madagascar, AEF, [or] la Réunion, that the dozens of Noirs with whom I make contact tell me with nearly the ease and directness of a Picard or Breton, without my pushing them, by chance during a conversation, “I am French.” […] This is the proof of France’s exceptional success [réussite] in its colonizing work [œuvre colonisatrice].

Nord’s overt celebration of France’s “civilizing mission” would be at odds with the small group of African proponents of Eurafrica. We see here that a single term stood for a heterogeneous idea.

The strength of this version of Eurafrica lay not only with its potential to combat European weakness in the Cold War, but also in its restructuring of European economic relations, now bolstered by African markets. This drew approval and concerns, notably when the “marriage” of France and Africa appeared to hang in the balance. For French officials, this could carry tremendous risk. Pierre Moussa, a civil servant who later became a major figure in the

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40 BDIC S 58320: Ibid., 103-104.
banking sector, published *Les chances économiques de la Communauté franco-africaine* in 1957 while serving as director of Economic Affairs and the Plan within the Ministry of Overseas France.41 France, Moussa argued, already committed to a marriage with Africa through the *zone franc*, which comprised the whole of the French Union. The risk of “bigamy” loomed if France were it to privilege a hypothetical European common market or *zone* over the *zone franc*. This assertion came as the Mollet government faced a growing budget deficit and the mounting public critiques of the Algerian War.42

Rather than disapprove of European integration, however, Moussa argued that the French must take up a policy of Eurafrica. This would safeguard French interests in Africa, allowing the *zone franc* marriage to thrive without introducing an unseemly bigamist tie. Moussa further emphasized the importance of French vows to Africa during a 1958 radio interview with journalist Jean Balensi. Balensi asked Moussa to comment on the continuing controversy regarding overseas France associating with the EEC, with some critics viewing the association as a “fool’s bargain” in which France handed over “the magnificent dowry of our overseas territories.” In response, Moussa defended the decision by pointing out that future accords would lead the other members of the Six to contribute more to Africa, and therefore get more in return.43 In an 11-page article by Moussa published a year earlier, Moussa repeatedly invoked the specter of bigamy, as well as the other unthinkable choice, “divorce,” if France opted to leave the old common market ties in favor of the new union.44 Europe and Africa, he claimed, were

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43 Sciences Po Fonds Pierre Moussa (PM) 24: Interview à la Radiodiffusion (M. Jean BALENSI), Radiodiffusion-Télévision Française, Service Economique et Social, 27 March 1958, 9:30am.
“old historical comrades since the dawn of time.” This couching of French responsibility (and right of access) to Africa paired old Eurafrican paternalism with the postwar fraternal—even romantic—view of Franco-African relations.

Marriage was not always viewed kindly in Eurafrican talks. In 1950, discussing the possibility of a Franco-German partnership in the earliest stages of European integration, Robert Schuman infamously said, “France can carry as a dowry, not only her equipment, but also the African market.” Communist representatives in the Assembly of the French Union cited this phrase in July of that year as they warned of the consequences for Africa of a *pool franco-allemand* and demanded that France immediately cease negotiations for it. From the earliest postwar murmur s of European integration, advocates within France touted its African connections as an appealing “plus” for its European neighbors; within a decade, it was still not always clear who would be a partner in the marriage, and who might be abandoned for a newer, more promising bride.

France did eventually take its vows with the Six and for a time it appeared that Africa also stood on the altar. During the interwar and in the postwar, French officials insisted upon the long history of Franco-African relations. Even after the independence of France’s African holdings, this vision of marriage did not simply disappear. In 1963, as EEC delegates prepared to sign an accord in Yaoundé with independent African states, French Minister of Foreign Affairs Maurice Couve de Murville emphasized the importance of the accord, claiming:

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Purely national interest would lead us more to maintain with these countries our bilateral relations, which are excellent and will remain so, but we want to do more, which is to say to bring as a dowry to Europe, not these countries themselves, which are independent, but our good relations with them […].

In a somewhat remarkable appropriation of the dowry metaphor, France now had to offer not the African states (which by now had their own independent governments) but the track record of Franco-African relations. Such a claim attempted to skirt the more uncomfortable questions of France’s loyalties to its partners in Europe and now, in independent Africa. It also serves as a reminder of the willingness of some African leaders prior to independence to embrace these “good relations” as a means of promoting a federal future within the French Union.

**Eurafrica II: The Romance of Grands Ensembles**

Leaders within the French Union did not sit back while their wedding (or divorce) was planned on their behalf. For a small cadre of politically involved sub-Saharan Africans, including, most famously, the Senegalese statesman and poet Senghor, a federalist solution to the inequalities of French imperial dominance appeared a better choice than outright independence.

Despite the paternalism still latent in the language employed by the French businessmen and administrators discussed above, then, some African leaders imagined that their states, too, could walk down the aisle. However, a federalist future within the French Union was but one of many visions of unity proposed by political thinkers in the postwar era. In this era of *grands ensembles*, sub-Saharan and Maghrebi peoples heard promises that they belonged in a pan-Africa, with

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49 Guinea’s economic fate after it refused the join the French Community would prove a cautionary tale. For example, upon rejecting entry into the French Community, Guinea’s export of bananas fell from 74,000 metric tons sold on the “national market” in 1958 to 28,000 the following year. By 1960, Guinea’s banana export had “disappeared.” CAEF B 0017739/1: Le Conseil, Communauté Economique Européenne, "Note d'Information sur la 2ème session de la Commission Economique pour l’Afrique (Tanger 26.1/6.2.1960)," 12 February 1960.
North Africans also being wooed by pan-Arabist movements.\textsuperscript{50} Like European integration itself, then, Eurafrica can be considered as one feature in a larger landscape of postwar integration schemes.

African leaders harnessed the idealism and the pragmatism of Eurafrican policies, but recast Africa as an equal partner in the endeavor. In August 1950, one month after Schuman’s unsavory comment, Ousmane Socé Diop, a Senegalese senator serving as a French delegate in the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, argued that the proposed “dowry” alienated Africans at the precise moment that Europeans would need them most. Rather, Europeans should focus on the “construction” of “an economic house, habitable for them [Africans].” To do otherwise would “justify the wisecrack [boutade] expressed in our extreme left press, which says that in the execution of the Schuman Plan, France will bring Africa as a marriage gift to Germany.” Playing on Cold War fears, Diop warned that Africa’s “148 million consumers and producers” had already drawn the attention of America and “maybe tomorrow, the USSR.” Further still, he suggested that if Europe did not understand until it was “too late that its influence in Africa can completely disappear,” Africa risked becoming the next Southeast Asia. This was an unsubtle reference to the ongoing war in French Indochina. Africa should, however, embrace the “creation of this third continent,” furthering the “Western culture” it already embraced in order to “gradually bring African populations to the European level.” Africa must not be the “wedding gift, but the best man [garçon d’honneur] who will have his place at the head table [table du festin].”\textsuperscript{51}


Indeed, if Schuman drew the ire of African leaders, appropriating the image of marriage proved useful for their own claims-making. Senghor critiqued the metaphor but not the marriage, asserting Africa’s real power within Europe, not as a gift, but as an active participant. In 1953, Senghor, also a French delegate in the Council of Europe, made an appeal in Strasbourg. The participation of overseas territories in an integrated Europe was, he argued, the most important moral and political question facing those metropolitan states. Claiming to speak in the name of “the vast majority of the African deputies in the French National Assembly,” he declared:

[W]e are for the European Community and, beyond that, for the Eurafrican Community. We are for Franco-German reconciliation [;] we would like, in this marriage of reason, to be the [members of the wedding entourage] who carry the veil of the bride; we refuse to be the wedding gift or the dishes that pay the price in a domestic spat [la vaisselle qui fait les frais de scènes de ménage], or the dolls to amuse the children of tomorrow. We are neither things nor dolls. We are living men; the ends, not the means.

Of course, men of revolution are always considered crazy. But you know that wisdom often borrows the clothing of madness. We are the fous d’outre-mer. Can you be those of Europe so that together we can construct a new Europe that will not be made of historical memories, but of living realities; a Eurafrique, like genuine Europe, motherland of man[?] A few months later, in an article in Le Monde, Senghor dismissed those who would reject Eurafrica as a German idea. He scoffed, “What does it matter, if it’s correct!” In his reading of Eurafrica, it is “one of those classic ideas that have always animated the vision of great men and great people. For the ancients, the Mediterranean was nothing other than an interior sea, a

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52 Cooper writes, “Senghor saw social rights—not just political ones—flowing from the French Constitution […].” Cooper, Citizenship between Empire and Nation, 189.
53 This is a repurposing of the term “fous de la République,” used to describe Jewish politicians who rose through the meritocratic ranks of the Third Republic without having to convert or hide their identity and who displayed passionate loyalty for the Republic. Fou refers to a court jester and the close relationship between the king and his joker; now, the monarch has been replaced by the Republic. Pierre Birnbaum, Les Fous de la République: Histoire politique des Juifs d’État, de Gambetta à Vichy (Paris: Fayard, 1992).
Senghor’s embrace of a version of Eurafrica (and of federalism) that could place African men on equal footing with their European counterparts is a far cry from the Mittelafrikan dreams of interwar fascists. At the same time, it speaks to the usefulness of the term to encompass a number of different goals and ideals promoted by various politicians and administrators. These goals were pragmatic. Senghor wrote, “Africa and Europe, simultaneously neighbors and different, are complementary. I am passing over without comment [sous silence] ethnological and cultural arguments. Let’s talk about the economy and leave the figures to stick, naked [nus], in our memory.”

Eurafrica certainly did not enjoy universal appeal amongst African leaders, however. In 1957, the Guinean politician Diawadou Barry ironically invoked the language of André Demaison (a French novelist who penned the companion guide for the 1931 Paris Colonial Exposition). Calling Africa “the cake of European reconciliation,” he suggested that the European project marked France’s decline and a new era of European neo-colonialism. There were, however, alternatives to combat European dominance over “Eurafrica.” These included “pan-ism” movements that claimed to embrace all of an African or Arab world. Such ideas were not new to the postwar; both Pan-Africanism and Pan-Arabism predate World War II. However, prominent voices promoting grands ensembles emerged after the war, embracing older ideals of sweeping communities with new calls for liberation from European colonialism.

Contemporaries of the postwar iterations of pan-Africanism warned of the importance of understanding the “capital letter” Pan-Africanism, which between 1919 and 1945 hosted five

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55 This was not a new idea. Mussolini embraced the Mediterranean as Mare Nostrum and emphasized its centrality to a larger order dominated by fascist Europe. Marco Antonsich, “Geopolitica: The ‘Geographical and Imperial Consciousness’ of Fascist Italy,” Geopolitics 14, 2 (2009): 256-277.
Congresses attended by W.E.B. DuBois, and “small letter” pan-Africanism, “a group of movements, many very ephemeral. [...] The complicated history of négritude is a good example of this.”58 These movements were in no way confined to the African continent. Marcus Garvey’s Back to Africa movement, for example, helped to inspire future pan-Africanists, particularly African leaders like Kwame Nkrumah.59 And, as we will see below, the Egyptian leader Gamel Nasser also made claims of leading a pan-African world. The question of who could count as African invited tensions between leaders of independent African states by the late 1960s.

The postwar era thus opened the possibility for a variety of links of solidarity—and foreclosures—of such unity. Senghor’s legacy is one such example. We have already seen his advocacy of a federative future between Africa and France, built on notions of common republican ideals and a deeply intertwined past. For Senghor, “Africa” suggested a fluidity of borders. At the July 1958 Couton Congress, he noted, “When we say ‘Afrique Noire,’ we omit [n’oublions] neither the Antilles nor the Pacific islands, even less so Madagascar, all territories to which we are linked by our situation as colonized peoples, if not by links of blood.”60 North Africa, however, would not be included. This is most clear in the fight that erupted between Senghor and Olusegun Obasanjo at the Second World Black and African Festival of Arts and Culture (FESTAC 77). In the run-up to the Lagos festival, Senghor argued that Algeria should only enjoy an observer status, which anthropologist Andrew Apter interprets as Senghor’s attempt at retribution after radical critiques of Negritude were voiced at Africanist conventions in

late 1960s Algeria. It is also demonstrative of “competing Afrocentric frameworks that clashed over the North African or ‘Arab’ question.”

I contend that Senghor’s insistence that Algeria not fully participate is also indicative of the survival of the French colonial mentality that proclaimed North Africa as amputated from the rest of the African continent. As I argued in my introduction, this nominal organization was often blurred by French policy decisions that appeared to impact both North and sub-Saharan Africa: The inclusion of overseas France in the EEC is a particularly clear example of this overlap. It is clear that the Sahara was not always the impenetrable border zone that French colonists insisted it was. Yet the Algerian delegation at FESTAC 77 did not appear particularly concerned over whether they could fully participate. By then, Algerian leaders saw open before them other transnational connections, particularly the Pan-Arabist movement, to which we will return in Chapter 5.

Algerian leaders were also interested in a Maghrebi organization, albeit unbound from the former French colonizer. Todd Shepard traces some of the potential groups that attracted Algerian leaders as part of his study on the “era of grands ensembles.” Algerian leaders looked toward association with their neighbors, in a Union du Maghreb arabe or a “Tunigérie” linking Tunisia and Algeria. For the FLN, “the idea of a Maghrebine Federation” contrasted sharply with French “pseudo-federalism,” a “retrograde and bastard federalism […].” This critique makes clear that the FLN viewed the French restructuring of empire and the trend toward pushing for a Eurafrica within European integration as threats to Algerian nationalists’ claims.

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63 Shepard, “À l’heure des ‘grands ensembles,’” 133.
64 Ibid., 114.
65 Ibid., 129. Quoting “Études juridiques de droit international (reconnaissance du Gouvernement algérien),” March 1957.
After independence, other forms of international and supranational organization, such as those discussed above, became more appealing and more useful to Algerians seeking a new political organization in the wake of decolonization.

However, we should question the impassability of the Sahara in the eyes of major Pan-Arabist leaders. Even the distinctions between Pan-African and Pan-Arab worlds could be blurred. The political scholar Rouhollah K. Ramazani argued in 1964 that the Egyptian leader Gamel Nasser carried the “well-known ambition to guide the Pan-African movement.”\textsuperscript{66} Nasser’s 1955\textit{Egypt’s Liberation} appeared to bear out this desire, as Nasser declared:

\begin{quote}
I may say without exaggeration that we cannot, under any circumstances, however much we might desire it, remain aloof from the terrible and sanguinary conflict going on there today between five million whites and 200 million Africans. We cannot do so for an important and obvious reason: we are in Africa. […] We will never in any circumstances be able to relinquish our responsibility to support, with all our might, the spread of enlightenment and civilization to the remotest depths of the jungle.\textsuperscript{67}
\end{quote}

Nasser’s African calculus fits within the narrative of American anxiety over containment and the tensions of spheres of influence in the so-called Third World. Nasser’s declaration is also notable for its similarity to European claims on Africa. Where once Africa “needed” Europe, now Africa would turn to Egypt. Egypt, itself an African state, would save the rest of the continent from the darkness of European colonial rule.

To Ramazani, Nasser’s eagerness to exert control—even to expand an Arab Common Market—into Africa could help explain why “Arab literature is replete with all sorts of denunciations of the [European] Common Market,” including the risk of “eventual Israeli association.” The market is “suspect because it seems to rob the Arabs of potential leadership of

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{Médiathèque de la Maison méditerranénne des sciences de l’homme (MMSH) 8-25615: Rouhollah K. Ramazani, \textit{The Middle East and the European Common Market} (Charlottesville: The University of Virginia Press, 1964), 91.}
\end{footnotes}
Pan-Africanism [...]”⁶⁸ In an era of mounting fears about Cold War bipolarity, it should come as no surprise that a scholar in the United States would look at Egyptian motivations with such suspicion. Yet the notion of Egypt poised to lead either a pan-Arab or a pan-African world points to the range of possible political associations to be made in this era and to elastic notions of borders that could expand or contract according to political need.

Conclusion: A March Down the Aisle

This chapter has demonstrated the variety of voices calling for integration schemes, Eurafrican and otherwise, in the postwar era. To a stunning degree, political thinkers claiming to promote “Eurafrica” assigned that term to a range of policy goals and ideological claims. Thus, French business leaders worried about their stakes in African markets employed the same term used by African statesmen like Senghor who asserted a future of federative equality across the whole of the French Union. Taking stock of the mutable definition of Eurafrica and the stakes of the many actors promoting it will allow us to better understand the motivations and tactics of the French officials who, by 1956, embraced “Eurafrica” as a non-negotiable feature of the European project.

When the magazine *France Outremer*, whose screaming headline opened this chapter, organized the 1958 Eurafrican “breakfast debate,” it gathered together French businessmen and administrators who emphasized the economic importance of Eurafrica to speak alongside African proponents who pushed for brotherhood between the French and Africans. Old fights set aside, it appeared that Europe (or at least France) and Africa (or at least French Africa) were ready to tie the Eurafrican knot. It was no mistake that Schuman, chastened by his years earlier “dowry” comment, presided over the event. Guernier, author of *L’Afrique, Champ d’expansion*

de l’Europe, would act as “spokesman” for Europe. Senghor and Mali’s future first president Modibo Keita, would shoulder that role on behalf of Africa. Senghor’s subject? “[W]hat Africa has placed into the marriage dowry [corbeille de marriage].”

In his introductory remarks, Schuman drew smiles from the audience when he made the self-deprecating comment that “for average Frenchmen,” including “parliamentarians and even former ministers, […] aware[ness]” [connaissances] of this subject [Eurafrica] generally dates from 1955.” Such a statement could serve to exonerate Schuman from his earlier ignorance. It also confirms my contention, which I will expand in the chapters to come, that it was only after the escalation of colonial crises in the mid-1950s that such an ideology took hold of the wider political establishment in France. Thus, Schuman’s presence at the 1958 meeting would serve to signal his evolved understanding of Eurafrica as a project of unity between Europe and Africa, such that the marriage did not exclude the latter, but rather embraced it.

Senghor and Keita’s presence would solidify this image, in a way that the “debate” unfolded as a series of like-minded, pro-Eurafrican declarations. Jean-Max Lenormand, the director of France-Outremer, who took up the microphone after Schuman, put this new version of the marriage metaphor to use, now seeing the bride and groom not as the Six, but as the Six joining with African states. In an address that sounded at turns like a Eurafrica stump speech and like mid-19th-century wedding-night advice to a nervous bride, he declared:

Marriage of love…, marriage of convenience…, arbitrary concepts [formules], certainly, but through them we can pursue indefinitely the debate on the respective merits of unions based, […] either on] the immaterial, […] or on practical considerations.

69 Guernier, who earned a law degree in Paris, spent much of his early career in Morocco at the Casablanca Chamber of Commerce and would later teach political economy at a university there and, later, at Sciences Po, Paris. He also served as a counselor of external commerce for France and was president of the technical committee of patents. It was his adoption of the term Eurafrica that Keris had critiqued in the mid-1950s, even as Keris and others embraced his assertion that France and Africa be indissolubly bound. CDHA: France Outremer, No. 339 [1958].
71 CDHA: Ibid., 18.
Those who are convinced that one cannot construct anything without love defend their thesis with enthusiasm.

Partisans of the marriage of convenience are more discrete and seem to experience some effort to assert their point of view, never appearing disinterested.

But the most farsighted, do they not allow that the love will be more durable if it is sustained by a “reason” that will be even more so?

After a long engagement, the spouses Europe and Africa consummate [their marriage].

Those who guided the adolescence of one and the other and who watched with joy and emotion at their meeting now think of their future.72

The road to this marriage night was a difficult one. The possibilities for different forms of unions, and the initial reluctance on the part of French administrators to see Eurafrica as a viable policy, rather than new method of discussing Franco-African relations, were reflected in the exclusion of France’s overseas holdings from the European Coal and Steel Community. In the chapters that follow, we will track the progression of French administrators’ attitudes toward Eurafrica.

The term “Eurafrica” was employed unevenly by advocates of the close integration of Algeria or of the whole of the French Union within the EEC. Its intermittent use by French negotiators in Brussels, as well as the presence of the thinkers I discussed in this chapter in Paris and across Europe, suggests that even when the term was not explicitly used, the ideology remained on the minds of those who sought to implement such policies. However, it was not the ideology alone, but the pragmatic need to implement such policies for diplomatic and (especially) economic reasons that Eurafrican policy appeared to come into fruition. Yet as the following chapter will demonstrate, colonial concerns were not the only issues weighing on the minds of European administrators after World War II. And Eurafrica was far from the only way to approach European integration negotiations. Reactions to Algeria’s exclusion from the ECSC

and publications by French jurists who were unsure of how to understand Algeria’s legal status within the two postwar constitutions of the French Republic demonstrate that French officials were far from certain of how to make sense of the metropole’s relationship to Algeria in the postwar era. It is to these debates, and the practical legal considerations of Eurafrican policy, that we will now turn.
Chapter 2

Integrating Imperial Europe while Excluding Empire (1951-1958)

After decades of Franco-German conflict and warfare, the symbolism of the European Coal and Steel Community was not lost on its original members. When the Six signed the Treaty of Paris in 1951, they understood this gesture as the launch of a new, peaceful stage in European history, in which mistakes like the punitive nature of the Versailles Treaty would not be repeated.\(^1\) Coal and steel were, of course, the raw materials of the wars of recent memory and a source of industrial competition that exacerbated tense relations. Thus, the ECSC would be a first step in European reconciliation and integration.\(^2\) The France that signed the treaty was very much still an empire. Changes to that status would be uneven and at times extraordinarily violent. The Lamine Guèye law, extending French citizenship to overseas residents, was only five years old. France’s exit from Indochina, on the heels of the loss at Dien Bien Phu, would not come until 1954.\(^3\) The reformist *loi cadre* (framework law) of Gaston Defferre, which reformed electoral representation and administrative practices in the overseas territories, would be passed in 1956. And in Algeria, while measures like the *statut organique* (1947) emerged, creating an Algerian assembly and theoretically extending equal citizenship rights across the population, the

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\(^1\) The standard trope of European integration historians emphasizes the institutions’ stabilizing outcome: "The primary impulse for supranational government in Europe has always been the pressing need to stop members of the European family from slaughtering one [an]other.” Mark Gilbert, *European Integration: A Concise History* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2012), 16. Although some historians are now reevaluating the Versailles Treaty and its legacy, I am interested in how officials in the postwar would have understood the perceived mistakes of the early post-World War I era. For an example of a historian challenging the line draw from Versailles to World War II, see Zara Steiner, *The Lights that Failed: European International History 1919-33* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

\(^2\) The Schuman Plan, named for French foreign minister Robert Schuman and largely crafted by Jean Monnet, was recalled by Dean Acheson as “so breath-taking a step towards the unification of Europe that at first I did not grasp it.” Quoted in Gilbert, *European Integration*, 27.

\(^3\) France’s loss of its southeast Asian colony falls outside of the purview of this dissertation. However, it is critical to acknowledge that in leaving Indochina, French administrators now took more seriously the imperative of retaining trade ties and political control over the remainder of France’s empire. Yet France’s war in Indochina also had implications for its European ambitions. Mark Thompson, “Defending the Rhine in Asia: France’s 1951 Reinforcement Debate and French International Ambitions,” *French Historical Studies* 38, 3 (August 2015): 473-499.
French government largely conducted business as usual in the departments south of the Mediterranean. These developments in France’s empire force us to reframe the postwar era and consider how what occurred outside of the continent of Europe could come to influence the choices made about how Europe would formulate its integration schemes, particularly related to labor, agriculture, and aid.

Indeed, Algeria in 1951 remained l’Algérie française, part of a France that stretched “from Dunkirk to Tamanrasset,” as French officials were fond of saying. And yet, the Treaty of Paris would outright exclude extra-metropolitan territory, drawing a clear line between Continental France (inclusive of island Corsica) and the Algerian departments. Such exclusion suggests that despite language that insisted upon the French quality of Algeria, officials already acknowledged that the territory was not equivalent to departments on the Continent. In 1951, French officials were willing to distance metropolitan France from its overseas holdings, namely Algeria, in order to achieve the most pressing goal of the day: European integration. In the name of pragmatism, they approved a version of French borders encompassing decidedly less territory than the amount administrators preferred to depict as the extent of France’s reach.

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4 This declaration arises often. In one case, an administrator declared, “To consecrate the existence of a single Patrie from Dunkirk to Tamanrasset, such is the goal [objet] of the present law.” CAOM 81 F 1169: “Projet remis par Monsieur Vinciguerra, Exposé des Motifs,” n.d. (likely 1959).


6 Such understandings about Algeria’s place within the French legal system might be read in conversation with analyses of Puerto Rico and the United States. See, for example, César J. Ayala and Rafael Bernabe, Puerto Rico in the American Century: A History since 1898 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007).
This chapter opens by discussing the exclusion of overseas France from the Treaty of Paris, including the outrage this sparked in some circles in Algeria. It will then turn to the practical considerations of such an exclusion, and the impact officials thought it might have on Algerian trade. Finally, it will present attempts at legal and economic reform, notably Gaston Defferre’s *loi-cadre* for sub-Saharan Africa and the Constantine Plan for Algeria. These reformist efforts, combined with constitutional debates, demonstrate that French officials were far from certain about how exactly Algeria fit within the constellation of juridical demarcations such as Overseas Department (*Département d’outre-mer*, DOM), Overseas Territory (*Territoire d’outre-mer*, TOM), and metropole. However, neither were these officials willing to cede France’s legal claim to Algeria. Rather, these reforms and constitutional inquiries are evidence of the earnestness with which French officials would make claims to Algeria’s place within the Treaty of Rome (Chapter 3). As the ECSC exclusion demonstrates, legal scholars’ concerns alone were not enough to persuade French officials that such an integration was necessary. However, their assertion that it was legally questionable to excise Algeria from the metropole, coupled with the emerging colonial crises, notably the loss of Indochina (1954), the start of the Algerian War (1954), and the independence of Morocco and Tunisia (1956), would be enough to shift France’s direction by the 1956 Treaty of Rome negotiations. Rather than exclude overseas holdings from the Treaty of Rome, French officials would by 1956 understand European integration as a tool for maintaining control across the French empire. Finally, this present chapter will demonstrate that the constitutions of the Fourth and Fifth Republics both cemented a legal definition of Algeria as a unique part of the French empire, but also stopped short of defining exactly what that uniqueness would entail. Such understandings of Algeria’s place with the French Union and, after 1958, the French Community, suggest that while French officials

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7 Here, Wilder’s discussion of political rationality is instructive. Wilder, *The French Imperial Nation-State*, 44-47.
were far from willing to step away from their interests in Algeria, neither were they wholly convinced that it was, truly, France. And yet, these jurists understood that Algeria remained dissimilar to traditional colonies, raising complex questions of the limits of France’s borders and its responsibilities to Algeria’s residents. These legal sources demonstrate the opaque quality of Algeria’s relationship to the metropole prior to the outbreak of the Algerian War but, just as critically, demonstrate that contemporary commentators understood the early Eurocentric versions of the Europe project as unworkable, given Algeria’s unique status within France. This chapter asks: Why were the colonies excluded from the European Coal and Steel Community and how did this exclusion help push French administrators to act differently when negotiating the Treaty of Rome? How did legal definitions of France and its departments impact the way administrators approached the negotiating table?

In the span of five years, the French government shifted from signing a treaty of European integration that explicitly excluded overseas territories to refusing to sign a treaty of European integration without the guarantee that it would include an association with overseas territories. This change appears both abrupt and gradual. It was abrupt in that France’s Eurafrican 
sine qua non
during Treaty of Rome negotiations in 1956 appeared swiftly, seemingly from Gaston Defferre’s office (Chapter 3). Yet it was gradual, as business and legal concerns were voiced in increasingly loud tones over the course of the mid-1950s. The interim period reveals the ambivalence of French officials as they weighed the pros and cons of joining the French Union with a European union. I argue that while Eurafrican ideas gained more traction following World War II (Chapter 1), the early years of European integration failed to account for the colonies in large part because European statesmen were not yet concerned with the potential loss of empire; they did not see the “inevitability” of decolonization or the pragmatic application of
Eurafrica. Thus, integration without colonies appeared unproblematic, as the empire was relegated to the sphere of domestic interest, in contrast to the supranational gaze of European integration.

France’s “Second Rate Relations”: An ECSC without Empire

The well-trodden version of the ECSC’s birth emphasizes a broken Europe emerging from the wreckage of World War II to form a united (capitalist) body that would encourage stability and recovery. Not only were Eurafrican proponents a part of the push to form an integrated Europe, some of its greatest advocates had the ear of Europe’s architects. The omission from the ECSC of overseas holdings cannot be viewed solely as the result of the absence of coal and steel in Africa. Much of the continental territory of the Six also lacked such natural resources (and indeed, proponents of Eurafrica were eager to tap into the natural resources that Africa did contain). Rather, the French Union—Algeria included—was absent from Coal and Steel provisions because French officials did not yet realize that they would need to wield diplomatic weapons to preserve their colonial holdings in Africa. The French began to assert the place of empire within the EEC only as colonial crises became more pronounced, when administrators began to see the EEC as a way to funnel aid money—appeasement—into their colonies. It was the mundane pragmatism of economic and political need that helped steer the choices made by French officials. In sharp contrast to the soaring Eurafrican rhetoric of the last

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8 This process was gradual. Shepard, *Invention of Decolonization*, 55-81.
9 Here the importance of international institutions to empire comes to the fore. Recent scholarship on both the League of Nations and the United Nations asserts these institutions’ roles in shaping the continuity of the imperial system and to “stabilize that order,” at least to a certain degree. I contend that more than just continuity, the treaties and agreements reached in the shaping of the supranational institutions of Europe gave French administrators a legal basis for continuing to make claims on overseas territory, even as other international institutions, namely the UN, were soon to become major platforms for anti-imperial causes. Susan Pedersen argues that the mandates were “a strategic part of the geopolitical order of the interwar,” hence contributing to the “order” I refer to. Pedersen, *The Guardians*. Mazower contends that while it was not the ultimate outcome, the UN “started out life […] as a means to preserve” colonialism. Mazower, *No Enchanted Palace*, 30-31.
chapter, the policy would only be taken seriously as a political tool when French officials realized just how tenuous Paris’ grasp on Algeria and the rest of the French Union really was.

Yet between the passages of the Treaties of Paris and Rome, legal limitations of a Eurafrican entity were far from clear or fixed. Postwar Eurafrican proponents in Paris and Brussels managed to cultivate amongst French officials the conviction that an integrated Europe might extend beyond the shores of the metropole. For example, France’s response to a questionnaire circulated to the Six, likely in 1950, indicated that French officials were prepared to organize their overseas holdings within the framework of the ECSC. The questionnaire interrogated the potential application of ECSC accords in overseas territories, while reiterating that such concerns were not currently the focus of ECSC discussions. Rather, it asked the Six to name its overseas territories assimilated to the metropolitan customs regime and if the planned coal and steel regime would apply in these territories; it also inquired about pre-existing and potential preferential trade regulations, including for coal and steel. The French responded that the far reaches of the French Union would enjoy no such preferential regime. But in a telling addendum, the French respondents declared:

Corsica, Algeria, and the French Overseas Departments (Guadeloupe, Guiana, Martinique, Réunion) form with the Metropole a single customs territory.

The customs regime that will be instituted in France for coal and steel will thus apply in these territories.

Read with the knowledge that the Treaty of Paris would apply only to metropolitan territory, such a statement demonstrates that French officials did not have a uniform understanding of the

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10 Archives Nationales (AN) 81AJ/144: "Questionnaire Relatif à l’application aux territoires d’outre mer des dispositions adoptées pour la communauté européenne charbon-acier," 1950?
11 AN 81AJ/144: French reply and addendum to reply to "Questionnaire Relatif à l’application aux territoires d’outre mer des dispositions adoptées pour la communauté européenne charbon-acier," n.d. but likely 1950. It is telling that the French response was lengthy and detailed, with notions of a coal and steel regime that could encompass extrametropolitan territory, while the Belgian and Dutch replies were perfunctory and implied no such stipulations.
limits of France’s borders in relation to supranational organization. Yet the Treaty of Paris’ wording cemented a smaller scope for an integrated Europe whose regulations would not extend beyond the European continent. Article 79 explicitly excluded all other territory from the Coal and Steel Community:

The present Treaty is applicable to the European territories of the member States. It is also applicable to those European territories whose foreign relations are assumed by a member State; an exchange of letters between the government of the German Federal Republic and the government of the French Republic concerning the Saar is annexed to the present Treaty.

Each High Contracting Party binds itself to extend to the other member States the preferential measures which it enjoys with respect to coal and steel in the non-European territories subject to its jurisdiction.12

Such exclusion should not surprise readers familiar with claims of Europe’s postwar inward turn, during which states such as France and Germany expanded their welfare systems in answer to the suffering of their war-weary populations.13 Simultaneously, however, this was the moment when Western European officials began to work with, and around, American authorities in the administration of Marshall Plan funds.14 European-bound privileges, it appears, could extend to France’s colonies when France saw fit. France had begun to attempt internationalizing its colonial responsibilities, even if it was yet unclear to administrators exactly how that might be accomplished.15 Thus, ahead of the Treaty of Paris’ signing, Robert Schuman (of “dowry” fame)

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declared that the ECSC “will allow Europe to pursue […] the realization of one of its essential tasks: the development of the African continent.”

Overseas France’s potential for inclusion in or exclusion from the European project raised some concerns. Raphaël Saller, a senator from Guinea, cast himself as a proponent of Eurafrica, but feared that a Coal and Steel Community could put African markets at risk. In a 1950 article in the business-focused journal Marchés coloniaux, Saller emphasized the negative consequences of drawing the international community, and particularly West Germany, into African affairs. To Saller, Schuman’s dowry vision, combined with similar rhetoric on the part of both Konrad Adenauer and the German press about “developing Africa together [mise en valeur en commun],” was another way of saying “France would cede to Germany the African market to gain or maintain other European markets.” Saller emphasized the importance of consulting “Africa or its representatives.” Not only was it “surprising” that “men in France […] sincerely believe[d] one could make African development an international task,” but it was also “even more shocking” that Germans could be part of this task, considering it was “this Germany which left in Africa, precisely, such a bad memory […] in a recent past […].” Thus, including the colonies in a European integration scheme risked for Saller not the friendship of other European states, but the unique claim that France could make on Africa. Saller’s version of Eurafrica therefore challenged European integration, claiming to place African needs—under France’s watchful gaze—ahead of Franco-German reconciliation.


18 CAOM 4101 COL 695: Ibid., 1247.
Political concerns about the ramifications of the French Union’s exclusion did not subside with the ratification of the Treaty of Paris. Indeed, for representatives from France’s overseas holdings, this exclusion proved troubling, even alarming. Article 79’s delineation of territory led to deep consternation in some Algerian circles, which found the exclusion of the Algerian departments especially disquieting. If Algeria could be amputated from France where supranational agreements were concerned, could Algerian politicians promise their constituents that they really were guaranteed equal rights as Frenchmen, theoretically made possible thanks to legislation that went into effect in 1947? And how could Algeria’s special French departmental status, dating from 1848, be understood in light of these potential exclusions? The indigene Abdennour Tamzali, as his “concubinage” accusation in the previous chapter attests, vehemently protested the exclusion of Algerian territory from the Coal and Steel Community. At the 1952 Council of the Republic meeting, he attacked the apparent contradiction between French assertions of l’Algérie française and French omission of this same region in the supranational accord. Tamzali and his Rassemblement des gauches républicaines party (Rally of Republican Lefts) did not carry major political clout in Algeria, let alone in the metropole. However, Tamzali’s dissent speaks to the wide-ranging juridical and social concerns that emerged in the early 1950s. Tamzali decried the lack of security for Algeria’s position within Europe, and therefore France, asserting that it smacked of racism. While French officials emphasized “the juridical and economic credo of the intangibility and indivisibility of our economic union with the metropole,” the Treaty of Paris made the departments of Algeria the “subject of an arbitrary discrimination.” He warned: “Our constituents will not easily understand why their territory is placed outside of the [Coal and Steel] pool, like a poor, second-rate relation!”\(^\text{19}\) The treaty promoted the “concept of Eurafrica that had bad press in the time of the dictators.” It would

\(^{19}\) CAOM 81 F 2136: “Tamzali,” Dépêche Quotidienne d’Algérie, 3 April 1952.
privilege Germany—such a recent foe—over French territories that counted themselves as the
terrain of the Free French. He went on:

We talk about territories of colonization that will become available [disponibles] where
foreign nations – our enemies of yesterday – whose past we are ready to forget – will find
an outlet for their oversized [trop-plein] population. […]

We do not understand why Italy, which offers neither steel nor coal, but only a workforce
competing with our own, is thus integrated while Algeria is not[.]

[…] Our constituents will have difficulty understanding that being associated with the
duties [and] military and strategic tasks implicated by our integration in the Atlantic pact,
we may be disengaged from the hopes and advantages of the communities that are being
built [qui s’édifient]. Here is a moral and political aspect of the problem […].

Tamzali’s criticism emerged between Sétif 1945 and November 1, 1954. As a representative of
Algerian constituents in a French national body, his words suggest a deep concern for the impact
on Algerian morale were the population to feel yet again that French officials did not truly
commit themselves to an Algérie française inclusive of the Muslim majority.

Thus, in one fell swoop, Tamzali condemned allowing former fascist states to share in
France’s colonial regime and attacked the supposed pragmatism of the treaty, rejecting the
argument that Algeria was necessarily excluded due to its lack of relevant natural resources.
Tamzali’s interpretation offered a warning of the very real danger of exclusion. Such a decision
would support arguments that Algeria was indeed not part of la France intégrale. Algeria could
be denied access to new markets while its existing trade would be threatened by Italian
competition. And, though Tamzali did not address it, exclusion added fuel to the Algerian
nationalist fire.

Indeed, as supranational ideals flourished in the postwar years, the exclusion of Algeria
from France appeared to offer confirmation for the new generation of nationalists in Algeria:
they were not a part of a French community and never would be. In his lecture on European

20 CAOM 81 F 2136: Ibid.
unity delivered in the 1951-1952 academic year (briefly mentioned in the previous chapter), French Union Conseiller Georges Le Brun Keris warned that if France proved unable to reconcile these worlds, his “North African friends” (with whom he did “not share, I must say, political opinions”), would tell him, “This is perfect; you, France, adhere to the European Union; us, we’ll adhere to the Arab League.”\textsuperscript{21} France’s challenge, therefore, was to uphold its interests within Africa while embracing its new position in Europe. Eurafrica, wielded correctly, could solve the problem, but if not, it would exacerbate the crisis. In the postwar, adherence to a supranational entity could come down to an ethnic or religious identity—something that Keris saw as a threat to the French Union. Thus, both Tamzali and Keris saw the ECSC exclusion as a direct danger to the French Union, as it risked alienating French voters abroad (indigène and European) and pushing les français musulmans toward nascent nationalist organizations.

Such fears did not quickly subside. When the Overseas Territories Commission of the French National Assembly met in November 1953, Jean-Jacques Juglas worried that European integration would have “repercussions on the unity of the French Union.”\textsuperscript{22} Yet inclusion of the DOM-TOM within supranational European accords also appeared to carry risks. It was unclear to government officials how such accords might undermine France’s legal claims to the French Union. For example, a missive on the European Defense Community (EDC) and European Political Community warned that “eminent professors of public law” believed that the ratification of the EDC treaty would require “a procedure of constitutional revision,” as the Constitution “implied” that in a referendum, overseas electors would also participate, “without

\textsuperscript{21} This is the same speech, highlighted in Chapter 1, in which Le Brun Keris critiqued the unimaginative adoption of “Eurafrica” because of its recent history in fascist ideology. CAOM FR ANOM 61 COL 2318: Keris, “L’Union Européenne,” 1951-1952.

\textsuperscript{22} AN C//15639: Assemblée Nationale, Commission des Territoires d’Outre-Mer, 12 November 1953.
distinction of colleges.”23 In fact, throughout the early discussions of European integration, the specter of unfettered African voting (meaning, proportional voting rights for all residents of the French Union) within Europe loomed as a terrifying possibility to the French administration, well aware of the growing populations in the African territories.24 Far from being France’s dernière chance, Eurafrican policy appeared to threaten the balance of power between European citizens and the millions of African subjects of the French Union.

**Algerian Business Concerns and the ECSC**

Caution and confusion also reigned within the business community as various economic actors with interests in Algeria and the French Union attempted to make sense of how the ECSC and integrated Europe might help or hurt trade within the zone franc. In the early postwar, French economic attitudes about the colonies inherited the interwar conviction that empire offered both prestige and wealth to la mère patrie. Indeed, it was not until notable public figures like the Paris-Match journalist Raymond Cartier began to suggest a new cost-benefit analysis of the colonies in the late 1950s that French public opinion came to view empire as a drain, rather than as a boon, to the metropole’s economic well-being.25 At the time of the ratification of the Treaty of Paris, however, cartierisme had not yet emerged as an argument against France’s ongoing overseas presence. And indeed, although someone like Cartier could draw such a firm distinction between colonial and metropolitan economic interests, it is evident that such a line was far from demarcated for the French administrators concerned with European integration.

Reports in the European Algerian press reveal the variety of ways DOM-TOM exclusion from the ECSC could be understood. For some, it smacked of the “bigamy” against which Moussa would later caution (Chapter 1). For others, it threatened to open colonial marketplaces to other European entities that appeared as relative unknowns in the realm of overseas economic markets. In February 1951, the Dépêche Quotidienne d’Algérie strongly critiqued the threat facing Algeria. Reporter Jacques Hasse attacked Italy’s position vis-à-vis North Africa. Condemning the bilateral agreement as one that sold short Algeria’s ability to earn money from its natural resources, Hasse accused the Schuman Plan of making Algeria “pay the cost” of the pool’s creation. He asked:

What will the French Parliament say, when it realizes that Mr. [René] Pleven and Mr. [Robert] Schuman have ceded a part of France’s riches and a portion of its public power to [Italian statesmen] Mr. [Alcide] de Gasperi and Mr. [Carlo] Sforza?

What will the Minister of Finances say, when he sees that he can no longer freely choose exporting states, notably those with strong currencies [devises appréciées]?

What will North Africa say when it finds that its portion of annual benefits is gravely amputated because the different mining companies will by force be turned toward different customers?  

Hasse’s reading of the North African exclusion highlights the threat the treaty posed to North Africa’s burgeoning industry if it were left out of the envisioned benefits. What was worse, Algeria’s legal status made its export industry even more vulnerable, as it was unable (unlike the protectorates Morocco or Tunisia) to court outside customers such as Great Britain, yet would remain outside of the Treaty of Paris, too. To assuage Algerian concerns, Robert Schuman emphasized that although Algeria was not in the coal-steel pool, a bilateral accord with Italy

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would facilitate supplying the Italian steel industry with North African iron ore. He further emphasized that France would retain exclusive control in the affairs of overseas mining.27

Schuman’s reassurances did not quell the anxieties of officials who envisioned a future in which France remained the most important player in Africa.28 The Treaty of Paris’ signing on April 18 of that year only exacerbated these fears. Detractors included the Gaullist Michel Debré (no advocate of European integration), Olivier Wormser of the Direction des Affaires Economiques et Financières, and members of employers’ organizations (patronat) with ties to DOM-TOM industry. Political administrators like Debré and Wormser feared that European integration would force France to cede autonomy, a charge that was amplified by worries about maintaining exclusive control overseas. Some business leaders with stakes in Algeria or the DOM-TOM expressed wariness at having to share access to France’s overseas resources with the other members of the Six and to open new channels for market competition. But for others, linking the French Union with integrated European institutions appeared the only recourse for the patronat to protect its interests.29

Thus, the ECSC’s area of applicability divided the French business community. A 1953 meeting of the Comité d’Etudes et de Liaison du Patronat de l’Union Française (CELPUF) illustrates the tensions and aspirations of colonial business interests following the ECSC’s firm exclusion of overseas holdings. CELPUF deputy president Paul Bernard critiqued the French Union’s absence from integration, pressed for improvements to the policy, and signaled his skepticism about the European project. If the exclusion of the overseas holdings in the ECSC,

28 Such a view is revealing in light of French feelings toward Britain and its Commonwealth.
29 Catherine Hodeir locates the role of business leaders in the colonies before and after 1945, arguing that regardless of political developments, including the eventual decolonization of Africa, they attempted to ensure that policies “were also good for them.” Catherine Hodeir, “Le grand patronat colonial français face à la décolonisation, 1945-1962: problématiques, sources, conclusions,” Outre-mers 88, 330-331 (2001): 142.
which was slated to remain the norm in the CED and the *pool vert*, were maintained in the “future political structure” of Europe, “the break between France and the rest of the French Union will be complete [*sera consommée*].” For a businessman like Bernard, this could prove fatal, as “[p]roduction and consumption in the metropole will be oriented to prioritize the satisfaction of the common European market and not that of the French Union.” To mitigate the crisis, Bernard called for overseas representation within the supranational Parliament and Executive Council and for assurances that exchange preference and “monetary cohesion” be maintained within the French Union. Anything less would risk the “disaffection” of the “exterior populations” of the French Union.30

Bernard was fairly explicit in his explanation of why previous integration schemes had not included the French Union. The Convention of European Economic Cooperation, signed in Paris in April 1948, focused only on “restoring and maintaining the prosperity of Europe and […] lift[ing] it out of the ruins of the war,” an unsurprising goal for the immediate postwar years. Yet such a rationale could no longer pass muster, as excluding Algeria threatened the indivisibility of the French Union. What was worse, when officials did invoke the French Union, their declarations were “fragmented, equivocal, or contradictory.” Bernard harnessed Debré’s mistrust of integration leaders like Schuman and Overseas Minister Pierre Pflimlin and approvingly echoed Debré:

> [I]t is a question of security[:;] France must be calm [*tranquille*] on the Mediterranean. It is a question of prosperity[:;] France needs the outlets and output [*fournitures*] of North Africa. It is a question of existence[:;] France will be less than Spain if it is reduced to the

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30 He also wryly noted that the issue of integrating overseas holdings was an obstacle for Great Britain’s admission into the “European Union” and that “these difficulties are no less great regarding the French Union.” CAOM 100 APOM 975: Paul Bernard, "L’Union Française et l’Europe, Exposé général," Comité d’Etudes et de Liaison du Patronat de l’Union Française, Conférence plénière des 13 et 14 janvier 1953.
territory of the metropole. It is a question of legitimacy[.] France created North Africa. Without France, there would be no Algeria, no Tunisia, no Morocco.\textsuperscript{31}

For Bernard, then, North Africa should be France’s first priority, with the “creation of Europe” a distant fifth after France attended to its relations with the French Union, Great Britain, and West Germany. Yet these goals were intertwined, and Bernard argued that West German interest in North Africa could increase trade revenue for Algeria and elsewhere. Above all, Bernard emphasized the “\textit{République Française une et indivisible},” insisting that all measures toward integration be made with Africans in mind and that DOM-TOM actors participate in the decision-making process.\textsuperscript{32} Thus Bernard offered not a wholesale rejection of European integration, but rather called for a policy that would incorporate overseas France—and especially Algeria—in order to preserve French business interests and advance the local economy.

For some, Eurafrica itself was the risk, as it would cede French control of crucial trade outlets. The CELPUF secretary, A. Garand, called for the protection of France’s overseas holdings. Anticipating the “bigamy” warnings that would emerge in the coming years, Garand reminded the audience that “the French Union is a reality while Europe is but a potentiality [...].” Joining in the European project risked leading overseas populations to believe that “metropolitan France renounced its role as leader at the heart \textit{[sein]} of the French Union. All notion of the French Republic that flows essentially from the principle of assimilation risks demolition in a single blow.” If France did not assert itself as the sole leader in the French Union, these territories would soon become a “common European good [...].” Garand’s harsh warning against

\textsuperscript{31} This is a familiar colonial claim. For a critique, see Fanon, \textit{A Dying Colonialism}.

\textsuperscript{32} CAOM 100 APOM 975: Bernard, "L’Union Française et l’Europe."
European integration in its current guise demonstrates that Eurafrica was not the only way in which French leaders believed future relations with Africa could go forward.\textsuperscript{33}

Jean Blanchard, the Secretary General of the General Confederation of the \emph{Patronat} of Algeria, warned that the Algerian departments were akin to metropolitan France and Corsica, and that excluding them from further European integration projects risked troublesome ramifications. Algeria’s “young and modest” steel industry would be harmed, as it would neither benefit from the Treaty of Paris’ advantages, nor be protected when the Algeria market was “open equally for all the steel industries of the Community […].” Similar regulations, Blanchard noted, were in the works for the \emph{pool vert} and the EDC. This potential triple exclusion worried Blanchard, who saw no “formal willpower [\emph{volonté}] from government officials [\emph{responsables}] to integrate the three Algerian departments into a European agricultural community.” Rather, in the three projects of integration, “the Parliament and the French Government thought ‘continental European’ and not ‘Europe with its natural African prolongation.’” Were the European Political Community, currently under discussion, to exclude the overseas territories, “the divide [\emph{coupure}] would be consummated between the metropole and the overseas territories of the French Union.”\textsuperscript{34} Yet Blanchard was skeptical of the Six’s collective ability to address Algeria’s twin crises of population growth and unemployment. Indeed, Blanchard warned that West Germany and Italy would be “tempted to encourage their own population to come to Africa” seeking agricultural jobs. Prior to World War II, Hitler had exploited concerns about Germany’s population size as part of his justification for \textit{Lebensraum}.\textsuperscript{35} This fear extended to much of

\textsuperscript{33} BDIC Q pièce 10408 (1): M. A. Garand, “Le Problème Institutionnel,” Comité d’études et de liaison du Patronat de l’Union Française. The CAOM and the BDIC both contain a record of this meeting.

\textsuperscript{34} Note the use of the word consummation, here less sexually charged than in Lenormand’s usage (Chapter 1), but nonetheless a particular choice. BDIC Q pièce 10408 (2): [Jean?] Blanchard, Secrétaire général de la Confédération générale du Patronat de l’Algérie, "L’Algérie," Comité d’études et de liaison du patronat de l’Union Française.

\textsuperscript{35} France’s empire figured into Hitler’s vision of an expansive Reich. Chantal Metzger, \textit{L’Empire colonial français dans la stratégie du Troisième Reich (1936-1945)} (New York: Peter Lang, 2002).
Europe, as Mark Mazower shows, such that “fascist demographers argued that colonization in North and East Africa would help solve the problem, at least in Italy.” Here, Blanchard’s concerns reveal that population worries lingered in the postwar years; the notion that this tension would extend to the colonies only caused further alarm. As for industrial jobs, Blanchard put little stock in convincing European industrial outfits to set up shop in Algeria, as French companies already were hesitant to do so.

Blanchard’s ambivalent discussion of Algeria and a possible European future offered both promise and danger. He concluded with a cautious tone, encouraging “steps” to “avoid the dislocation of the French Union and permit its progressive integration […]” These steps would include forming a confederation prior to a European federation. Yet Blanchard firmly declared, “The future of Algeria, like all the rest of North Africa, is North-South and not East-West.”

European integration appeared at turns to be a solution and a threat to coherence of the French Union.

Indeed, the Treaty of Paris’ wording left open the possibility that trade agreements between the Six might comprise overseas holdings, at the discretion of the metropolitan authority that oversaw the region in question. Thus, although excluded from the ECSC, Algeria (and its export market) could indeed be attached to Europe. Ministry of the Interior officials regarded such a move with skepticism, however, and revealed their protectionist attitudes toward colonial markets. In a 1955 letter to the Secrétaire Général du Comité Interministériel pour les Questions de Coopération Economique Européenne (Interministerial Committee for Questions of European Economic Cooperation, SGCI), a Monsieur Thomas in the Interior Ministry cautioned against the economic repercussions for France and Algeria should Article 79 be invoked for Algeria. In

36 Mazower, No Enchanted Palace, 109-110.
37 BDIC Q pièce 10408 (2): Blanchard, "L’Algérie."
38 BDIC Q pièce 10408 (2): Ibid.
Algeria, the coal and steel provisions could include the production, import, and export of iron ore, solid fuels, scrap metal [ferrailles de récupération], and steel products. Thomas warned that if the SGCI adopted recently discussed proposals that would apply the Article 79 regulations in a “pure and simple” manner in Algeria, France would lose “the just compensation for public and private investments in which it has engaged in Algeria for a long time and which were considerably developed in the course of the past ten years for the modernization of the territory and the betterment of the standard of living of its inhabitants.” Worse, because Algeria was not integrated into the “framework” of the Treaty, it would not receive any benefits in return for the opening of its markets, “aggravat[ing] further the economic disequilibrium of Algeria […].” The SGCI should therefore take caution to “assure our three Algerian departments a palliative [palliatif] that must be defined with care.”

Thomas’ fears, and those of the ministry on whose behalf he wrote, crystallize a number of the problems at hand as French officials attempted to parse the benefits and drawbacks of applying a Eurafrican policy. As Thomas warned, opening overseas territories to the other member states risked reducing France’s ability to benefit from its long-held economic privileges in Africa. An imbalanced application of Eurafrican ideals, in which the Algerian market opened but did not see a return, could further upend the already tenuous financial situation in the restive departments. Yet other officials would come to see Eurafrique as a means of securing funding for just such projects of industrialization and infrastructural improvement. Such development

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39 According to Thomas, these privileges resulted from a variety of laws: the customs union (law of 29 December 1884); the national pavilion maritime monopoly between the metropole and Algeria [monopole du pavillon] (2 April 1889); the nationalization of banks and the organization of credit (laws of 2 December 1945 and 17 May 1946, made applicable in Algeria on 16 January 1947); and “the extension to Algeria of the provisions of the 18 November 1882 decree, modified by the decree of 6 April 1962, laying down the procedure for the awarding of contracts by the state and public authorities and authorizing civil administrations to exclude foreign competitors whether in the form of supplies, services, or work.” CAOM 81 F 2136: Le Ministre de l’Intérieur, Directeur Adjoint du Cabinet Thomas à Monsieur le Président du Conseil, Comité interministériel pour les questions de coopération économique européenne, "Application du deuxième alinéa de l’article 79 du traité instituant la Communauté Européenne du Charbon et de l’Acier," 17 June 1955.
schemes were integral to France’s push for territorial association within the EEC, and will be discussed in the next chapter.

The _patronat_ looked to more than just France’s European partners when addressing Eurafrica, however. The early 1950s saw French politicians and business leaders attempting to make sense of their place within an increasingly bipolar world and an economic environment largely driven by American decision-making. Luc Durand-Réville, a senator for Gabon, warned that Europe had to remember that it would need America’s “economic—if not financial—aid” for a long while and that it would be a mistake to give the United States government the impression “that we wish to encircle the new system’s economy in a ‘bamboo curtain,’ which will prevent all exterior exchange.”

The significance of American aid for postwar rebuilding efforts, but also for the advancement of development projects in the French Union, cannot be overstated. Beyond Marshall Aid, the French looked toward their American allies for support in diplomatic and military efforts. At the same time, this focus on America helps to explain the relative lack of attention to the French Union. Jacques Ferrandi, a French civil servant who spent much of his public career within overseas administration, recalled his early engagement on the Committee of Overseas Territories within the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OECE), which attests to the relative lack of interest in Africa at this time:

> [The Committee] met rarely and discussed absolutely theoretical questions without regard for reality. The only reality that mattered at the time was the application of the Marshall Plan. […] The portion of the Marshall Plan in Africa was itself rather modest, and by consequence, so was my activity.

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This French focus on its American partners would shift within the decade, as nationalist movements made progress across the French Union.

We can locate by the mid-1950s a larger interest amongst French administrators for tackling head-on the question of Algeria and Africa within European institutions. In March 1955, the SGCI attempted to map their approach to the International Bureau of Labor’s [Bureau International du Travail] European convention on migrant workers, scheduled for the following month. Despite bilateral accords on social security that France secured with Italy and Belgium, French administrators worried that enforcing the convention’s applicability to Algeria would appear counter to the regulations of the ECSC, according to which “Algeria is expressly excluded from the territorial field of application.” This issue mattered, as nearly 5,000 Algerians were employed in Belgian mines. Thus, understanding how such a convention (and by proxy, the ECSC itself) could apply in Algeria would dictate how a European social security regime might benefit indigène families whose breadwinners migrated to Europe as laborers. However, the French concluded that it was better to avert any direct conflict, arguing that the European Convention on Social Security was “not a direct prolongation of the Treaty of the ECSC. […] The notion of ‘territories’ that was adopted for the application of the Social Security Convention does not necessarily have the same meaning [signification] as the notion of ‘territory’ taken for the functioning of the ECSC.” Without challenging the territorial limitations of the ECSC, French administrators could make the highly pragmatic claim that Algerian workers in Europe should be covered by this convention and, indeed, the French delegation

would not ratify the convention without such a guarantee.\textsuperscript{43} Pierre Alby of the SGCI worried that as the issue was being discussed in Brussels, Algerians were not “distinguished” from metropolitans, but “only the metropolitan part of the French Republic” was under discussion, with Algeria treated as a “\textit{territoire tiers}.”\textsuperscript{44}

Labor migration would continue to pose particularly challenging questions in the postwar era. This included uncertainty about what rights Algerians would be afforded, and even what protections France’s overseas nationals (\textit{resortissants}) might need, if workers from the British Commonwealth were granted access to the same labor market. In 1954, French officials met to discuss how Algeria and the DOM might fit within Council of Europe labor circulation regulations. The Council of Europe, whose seat is in Strasbourg, was founded by the 1949 Treaty of London and initially comprised ten states.\textsuperscript{45} Although the Council of Europe largely falls outside of the scope of this dissertation, its discussions on labor circulation questions are instructive, as the same concerns would emerge again during debates on how to apply the Treaty of Rome in overseas territories (Chapter 4). French officials attempted to make sense of how the proposed Convention of the Reciprocal Treatment of Nationals [\textit{Convention sur le Traitement Réciproque des Nationaux}] could be applied in Algeria and the DOM. Eugène Simoneau, of the Direction des Services de l’Algérie et des Départements d’Outre-Mer, suggested that the regulation exclude “\textit{les citoyens français musulmans d’Algérie},” as they “are not subject to the laws of our Civil Code but enjoy \textit{jouissent} the personal civil status of the Muslim law [\textit{droit musulman}].” The extension of the Council circulation law should thus be restricted to “a

\textsuperscript{43} CAOM FR ANOM 81 F 1133: \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{45} They were: Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. By 1954, Greece, Turkey, Iceland, and Germany also signed accords to join the Council.
definition invoking only French citizenship” in the case of people in Algeria. However, he noted, the convention would apply to all French citizens in the metropole, “regardless of their origin or their status.” These juridical distinctions, by which an Algerian-born “Muslim” would be extended more privileges if he found himself in the metropole, reflect the complex web (or inchoate nature) of Fourth Republic rights. However, administrators wary of the potential labor circulation critiqued not the risk of selective, race- or religion-based application, but rather how an open movement could be “disastrous for the interests of Algerian workers,” who would suffer from the movement of foreigners in the metropole. At the same time, the membership of the Council included the United Kingdom, leading to the risk of Commonwealth workers moving not only to metropolitan France, but also to the overseas territories. In particular, the specter of Mauritian laborers “of Pakistani origin but with British nationality” inundating the workforce of la Réunion disconcerted French administrators. Notable, then, were the voices of French administrators for overseas departments decrying the extension of the Council regulations to the DOM, for fear that the results would be more harmful than beneficial. While this caution was reminiscent of some CELPUF speeches, overall the French Overseas Ministry and other interested officials increasingly viewed Algeria and the DOM-TOM as non-negotiable pieces of the integration puzzle. By the time French officials would approach the negotiating table for the Treaty of Rome, Eurafrikan arguments for incorporating overseas holdings into the EEC would have a familiar ring.

Legal Reform, French Jurists and the Puzzle of Borders

Mounting concerns about the threat to French business and political interests overseas, exacerbated by the evolution of nationalist movements, independences, and wars in Indochina, Morocco, and Tunisia, as well as Algeria and sub-Saharan Africa, caused these administrators to reorient their policies. Thus, policy makers in France may not have been committed to the *ideals* behind Senghor’s visions of a federalist future. But they pursued policies that might lead to the realization of such a goal because it fit within their own pragmatic approach to dealing with nationalist crises in the colonies and the question of dominance within emerging European institutions.

Here, I will describe briefly some of the reforms that French officials implemented in the mid-late 1950s. These reforms had the effect of shifting overseas residents’ relation to the metropole, notably by broadening local representation (*statut organique portant sur l’Algérie, loi-cadre Defferre*), extending citizenship overseas (*statut organique, loi Guèye*), and implementing new forms of economic assistance (*Constantine Plan*). These changes all suggest attempts at appeasing overseas populations and their local leaders. However, they are also domestic attempts by French administrators to maintain control of—rather than introduce independence in—overseas holdings.

In Algeria, the presence of nearly one million French citizens and of entrenched French business interests help to explain why French officials rebuffed Algerian claims to independence, even as the war intensified and grew unpopular in the metropole. French officials continued to resist ceding control, particularly because the empire increasingly came to appear as one of the only tools through which France would remain economically dominant and politically relevant in Europe and the world. But just as critically, French legal scholars observed that Algeria held a
unique juridical status in the constitutions of the Fourth and Fifth Republics. Although these jurists could not reach firm conclusions about exactly how Algeria might be understood within the constellation of French overseas designations such as DOM and TOM, it is clear that they viewed Algeria as a part of France, just as officials since the mid-19th century had insisted through rhetoric and administrative practice. Publications by these jurists demonstrate that by the time of the Treaty of Rome’s negotiations, the French legal community saw pragmatic, even constitutionally mandated, reasons why Algeria could and should continue to be included within the legally defined space of metropolitan France.

Constitutional changes served as a backdrop for wider legal reforms. The May 7, 1946 loi Guèye, named for Senegalese statesman Lamine Guèye, sounded the death knell of the legal category “indigène” even before the passage of the Fourth Republic’s constitution. The law read:

[A]ll ressortissants of overseas territories (including Algeria) have the quality of citizen in the same respect as French nationals of the metropole or the overseas territories. Specific laws will establish the conditions under which they will exercise their rights as citizens.

While the law was applauded in African and metropolitan circles alike, the second sentence introduced disputes within the French National Assembly and beyond. In particular, it was not clear how election reforms would be implemented across the French Union.

I contend that the incertitude and ambivalence witnessed in response to the law’s implementation is very much in step with the French decision to exclude overseas territories from the ECSC. The empire remained a domestic concern, and one that appeared manageable.

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51 Cooper, Citizenship between Empire and Nation, 125.
52 Cooper, Ibid., 88.
53 Cooper, Ibid., 90-105.
through sporadic reform efforts. Early in the postwar, despite expressions of nationalism and acknowledgments that reform must come, major decisions cementing the fate of France and Africa appeared unnecessary, or secondary, to other goals of the Fourth Republic. In the first months of the Fourth Republic, French officials also attempted to implement reform in Algeria. Here, too, seemingly well-meaning (or highly cynical) changes did not stand up to scrutiny from the very people Paris administrators hoped to woo, and yet those administrators did not immediately grasp the gravity of the situation. The September 20, 1947 *loi portant statut organique de l'Algérie* was, in the words of a French civil services administrator in Algeria, evidence that France was “doing nothing but following the path [*conformer à la ligne suivie*] of the evolution of our public institutions since our arrival on this African land.”

The new *statut organique* could be interpreted as a step towards a federal French Union. Roland Drago, a jurist at the Faculté de Droit de Paris, wrote in 1949:

> As Professor Scelle declared: “In our judgment, between decentralization and federalism there are just differences of degree, and no essential opposition. Decentralization, like federalism, implies a decision-making authority or discretionary jurisdiction on the part of the decentralized authorities, meaning a guaranteed legal autonomy. This implies a discrimination between local and communal affairs.” The coordinated administrative autonomy Algeria possesses due to the existence and powers of its assembly is a step toward a federalist solution. […] Algeria thus possesses the necessary competences to integrate into a federal regime.

Drago’s ruminations on a federalist future for Algeria and, by extension, France, were very much on the minds of French administrators in Paris and the overseas territories (particularly West Africa) alike. However, the reform did little to appease Algerian nationalists, although the coordinated attacks of All Saints Day 1954 were as-yet unplanned.

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55 Georges Scelle, a jurist, French delegate to the League of Nations, and member of the International Law Commission; Roger Drago was citing Scelle’s “Le Fédéralisme et l’Union française,” *Revue Politique et Parlementaire* (1948).
As French officials grappled with how the French Union could fit within France’s newly forged European bonds, Gaston Defferre’s *loi-cadre* shifted the ground upon which colonial policy stood. Signed on June 23, 1956, the *loi-cadre* (“framework law”) extended a significant amount of autonomy to local leaders throughout France’s overseas territories. Defferre’s law instituted universal suffrage and introduced a single electoral college in France’s African holdings. It also granted local assemblies stronger legislative power and allowed them to form government councils, although such rights in many cases came *après-la-lettre*, as a system of “double power” had already been in place for several years across many of the territories.57

The *loi-cadre* emerged only two years after the loss of Indochina and the start of the Algerian War, and within weeks of the independences of Morocco and Tunisia. While the *loi-cadre* did lay the groundwork for more autonomy in the French Union, it is not in itself evidence that French administrators in the mid-1950s believed that nearly the entirety of French Africa would gain independence within five years.58 Here, I challenge previous interpretations that take as a given the eventual decolonization of France’s African holdings and see earlier legal regimes as a stepping stone to full—independent—autonomy.59 Rather, the *loi-cadre* represented a French attempt to maintain interdependence between increasingly autonomous—but not independent—African states and the metropole.60 By extending to much of Africa seemingly

59 Migani argues that tying the TOM to the Six would allow France a “pacific decolonization.” Migani, “L’Association des TOM au Marché Commun,” 251-252. However, the jurists’ debates and exchanges between administrators suggest that at the time, decision makers did not see these reforms as a stepping stone toward actual formal independence.
60 Andrew W. M. Smith argues that the *loi cadre* was implemented to reform, not to end, empire. Further, he emphasizes the importance of the private sector on the reforms. He writes, “By focusing on development, colonials administrators could work with private finance […] to create infrastructure and stimulate production whilst minimizing the risk to the colonial state. The *loi cadre* was designed to strengthen the foundations of French control of French West Africa not only in terms of political stability, but also by ensuring that the core economic principles that had always governed colonial profit margins held true – monopoly of market, product and route to market.” Smith’s analysis of the *loi cadre* as evidence of the interplay of political and economic goals is critical, and I
unprecedented autonomy, it offered France a chance to avoid the outbreak of more wars like the one currently raging in Algeria. Thus, the *loi-cadre* should be understood as an evolution in the governance of the French Union, but not as a firm signal that French administrators accepted that outright independence was “inevitable.”

The *loi-cadre* reformed administration in the Overseas Territories, Gaston Defferre’s ministry’s purview, but we must consider how it fits within the history of citizenship and territorial reforms extending to Algeria (and how the war in Algeria influenced Defferre’s actions). Two years later, in 1958, officials introduced the Constantine Plan, a development and industrialization package for Algeria. De Gaulle announced that “all of Algeria must have her share in what modern civilization can and must bring to men.”61 The Constantine Plan would do just that. Its creators, too, had reform, not independence, in mind. Among the modernizing practices that Fifth Republic officials claimed the Plan would usher in were new housing initiatives, agricultural reform, industrial growth, and job creation. These changes were unsuccessful and, at times, destructive. But as Muriam Haleh Davis argues, as late at 1958, “[c]olonial development in Algeria […] helped institute a geographic imaginary that would merge Algeria and France in a common framework known as EurAfrica.”62 We have seen this imaginary at work already; European integration policy would offer yet one more opportunity for French administrators, now preoccupied with Algerian pacification, to assert this framework.

I emphasize the domestic (i.e. French Union or Community-wide) reforms of this era as evidence that French officials in the 1950s viewed legal reform and economic aid as tools to

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maintain the French empire, not as first steps in dismantling it. Thus, French officials’ insistence that the DOM-TOM be included in the Treaty of Rome, the subject of the next chapter, mirrors the domestic legislative and ministerial choices of the era. The attempts at reforming and cementing these relations accelerated as French officials sought to cope with mounting anti-imperial pressure. When French administrators risked angering or alienating the other members of the Six, they were operating under the assumption that although the relationship between France and its overseas holdings might shift, it certainly was not meant to end.

The *loi-cadre*, read as a legislative attempt to preserve the bonds of the French Union, is further evidence of French officials’ expansive vision of France’s territorial reach. The very language of the constitutions of the Fourth and Fifth Republics allowed French administrators to assert this shape of France, or at least, a France that extended across the Mediterranean. In fact, jurists were unsure of exactly how to make sense of the legal status within the new constitutions. Jurists who tackled Algeria’s place within the constitutions of the Fourth and Fifth Republics interrogated whether Algerian departments could be considered part of the metropole only in so far as trade and administration were concerned. This seemingly obvious omission of interrogations of metropolitan citizenship rights within the Algerian departments would leave France in an uncomfortable position during Treaty of Rome negotiations. In the French legal community, it appeared that Algerian territory could and should be considered as a part of France. However, the benefits of membership in an integrated Europe, including labor migration, should not be extended below the Mediterranean.

Thus, not for the first or last time, Algeria would be governed by a different set of rules than the “rest” of France. This ill-defined and yet persistent relationship between Algeria and the metropole would render the notion of further European integration *without* Algeria disquieting to
French jurists; as such, we see that Eurafrican policy within the EEC was not only thinkable, but legally imperative, in the eyes of some figures in the French administration. Just as tracking actual attempts at legal reform in the postwar era demonstrates French administrators’ interest in maintaining ties with African territories, jurists’ discussions of the legal framework of France itself offer proof that France without Africa at this time remained unthinkable for most French decision-makers. French law professors in Algeria took a keen interest in the three departments’ status within French law. This, they believed, would clarify Algeria’s place within the French Union (and, eventually, within integrated Europe).

Some, like Paul-Emile Viard, a professor at the Faculté de Droit d’Alger, argued at the outset of the Fourth Republic that the emergent French Union must be understood as a large yet bonded territory:

And when we say France, here, we no longer dream [songeons] of the Metropole.

We want to speak of France in its entirety, of France purely and simply, which includes not only the metropolitan and Algerian departments, but all of the territories of diverse classifications that are scattered across the world and that are linked [rattachent] to [France].

Yet as the issues with implementing the Lamine Guèye law attest, understanding France “purely and simply” was not so simple at all. These jurists understood the passage of the Fourth Republic’s constitution as a moment when definitions of French territory risked being called into question. Indeed, the very language of the constitution added ambiguity to the situation.

Jacques Lambert, another legal scholar at the law faculty in Algiers, asked how Algeria’s status fit within the framework of the Fourth Republic’s constitution. Writing in 1952, Lambert attempted to pin down Algeria’s exact status by analyzing the Constitution of the Fourth Republic, as well as the 1947 *statut organique* law. He asked: “What place does Algeria occupy

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in the French Republic? Is it [in] metropolitan France itself? That, one could say, is a physical absurdity. Algeria is therefore overseas. But is it ‘overseas departments’ or ‘overseas territory?’” Lambert quickly dismissed the idea of Algeria as a TOM, and citing Minister of Overseas France Marius Moutet,64 declared it a DOM. “But,” he noted, “doubt remains [reste permis].”65 In particular, Algeria’s differences from the DOM meant it should be understood as a separate entity. For example, the Algerian Assembly was separate from the French Union Assembly.66 Article 73 of the Constitution, which dubbed the “anciennes colonies” DOM, excluded Algeria.67 Yet Lambert argued “it was never believed that laws voted by the National Assembly would be applied automatically to Algeria.”68 This unclear legal position had actual consequences for Algeria, because juridical status could determine access to rights and specific development aid schemes.

Lambert’s inconclusive attempt to parse out Algeria’s status demonstrates that Algeria was already considered as something separate from the French “hexagon,” even before the start of the Algerian War. The ambiguous language of the constitution made codifying Algeria’s relationship to the metropole imperative and demonstrates that far from a short-lived dream of certain elite African leaders, Eurafrican interpretations of France’s relationship with its imperial holdings remained a fundamental part of postwar legal debates following World War II. It would be impossible to abandon such claims in the face of increased colonial unrest and intensifying European integration negotiations. Eurafrica would serve as a tool for France to quell nationalist

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64 26 January 1946-19 November 1947; he was also the Popular Front Minister of Colonies, 4 June 1936-8 April 1938.
66 Ibid., 106-107.
67 Ibid., 63.
68 Ibid., 62.
fervor, even if administrators were unsure of exactly how those far-flung territories actually related to France and, by extension, Europe.

The emergence of the Fifth Republic—and the return of Charles de Gaulle to power—in 1958 had little impact on the Eurafrican approach of French administrators in Brussels, as we will see in Chapter 4. Moreover, the rebranding of the empire from the French Union to the French Community under the Fifth Republic’s constitution did not answer the questions that challenged Algeria’s status under French law. The exact relations of the DOM or TOM to Paris remained hazy, particularly as African and French elite alike continued to explore alternatives to independence, such as autonomous, federalist forms of governance. P.F. Gonidec, a professor at the law faculty in Rennes who had briefly worked at the law faculty of Dakar in the early 1950s, argued in 1959 that the DOM were “in the Common Market and not associated with the Common Market [...].” 69 Further, an interwar decision by the Court of Cassation (Appeals Court) had “qualified the Algerian departments ‘transmediterranean’ to make clear that they were simply the prolongation of French territory beyond [au-delà] the sea. [...].” 70 Gonidec’s insistence that the DOM were in the Common Market, a refrain that will reappear in the chapters to follow, demonstrates the use for French officials of claiming the inherent Frenchness (juridically, if not culturally) of a given overseas holding. What’s more, hist work demonstrates a longer history of legal debate regarding Algeria’s exact status. Gonidec’s emphasis on assimilation and association places him in a long line of French colonial discussions over which policy better served metropolitan economic interests. 71

70 Ibid., 599, referencing the 27 February 1934 case Castaniè v. Vve Hutarto.
71 Betts, Assimilation and Association.
These legal scholars, interested in the minutiae of customs regulation, certainly do not pepper their publications with the stirring prose found in pro-Eurafrican journals. Yet in these works, we can locate the attempts at cordonning space and flirting with ideas about the fluidity of borders that had already arisen in the ideologies of Eurafrica’s proponents and detractors. The jurists reveal the pragmatic use of examining the reaches of borders. They also draw attention to the variety of ways in which domestic, bilateral, and multilateral regulations might be implemented. In 1951, French policymakers did not yet fear the “bigamy” or “divorce” discussed in Chapter 1. Yet it is clear from the jurists’ publications that these legal and economic obligations would risk challenging—if not outright undermining—the Europe-centric vision of European integration once forwarded by France and its partners.

Conclusion

Proponents of Eurafrica soon looked ahead to the next stages of European integration. When the ECSC emerged in 1952, European leaders had no doubt that it was but the first step in the supranational organization of the Six. The absence of the French Union from this first pivotal step would serve as a lesson for the next stage of negotiations. Indeed, in the negotiations for the Treaty of Rome, French administrators read their positions backwards into the ECSC debates earlier in the decade. In one 1957 meeting of the Assembly of the French Union, Georges Monnet, a conseiller, evoked a May 1950 Agricultural Commission statement on the OECE, which emphasized that “such an organization cannot be viable unless the adhering countries know to group themselves around [savent grouper autour] those peoples of whom they have assumed guardianship.” He also referenced a 1952 debate in the Assembly of the French Union about the Strasbourg Plan, in which “the overseas territories were considered like a field of
expansion \[\textit{champ d'expansion}\] with a brutality, in a spirit so purely economic that it raised the protests of the interested populations and of our Assembly.”\(^{72}\)

By the mid-1950s, French officials began to assert the place of empire within European institutions, a policy shift that would intensify once the French Régie Autonome des Pétroles discovered oil in the Algerian Sahara in 1956. As colonial crises became more pronounced, these administrators saw a way to funnel aid money into their colonies and to persuade their European partners to agree in writing to the French character of their overseas holdings. Thus, at the same moment Algerian nationalists began to gain international support for their cause, the French were shaping supranational accords explicitly to name and include the totality of the French Union and, most importantly, Algeria.\(^{73}\) This chapter has argued that it was not clear to French jurists or officials during early European integration debates exactly where France or Europe ended, nor was it evident if extending European regulations to overseas territories would do more harm than good. Tradeoffs looked different in the eye of the beholder, as French officials began to weigh ceding sovereignty against gaining European aid funding for the overseas holdings. By 1956, however, this attitude quickly shifted. That year, Defferre’s \textit{loi-cadre} emerged and French officials began to consider their demands ahead of negotiations for the Treaty of Rome. In these negotiations Eurafrican policy would become, in effect, one more tool for attempting to maintain control of increasingly uncontrollable circumstances. What’s more, it would offer France an avenue to cement itself as the most powerful economy in Europe. As Georges Monnet warned, exclusion of the French Union from the EEC would be a dangerous choice:

\(^{72}\) CAOM FR ANOM 61 COL 2316: Analytic Summary, Assembly of the French Union, 24 January 1957.
If all that we form is a union between metropoles, the center of gravity of this union will be on the Rhine. But if we turn towards Africa, the center of gravity will move towards the Mediterranean.\textsuperscript{74}

United in their demands in Brussels, French officials’ internal discussions, and their tardy arrival at the decision to even pursue a Eurafrican policy within the EEC, suggest a more ambivalent attitude on Eurafrican goals and the potential for citizenship rights to undermine European control in Africa. It is to the decision to pursue such policies, inchoate as they were, that we now turn.

\textsuperscript{74} CAOM FR ANOM 61 COL 2316: Analytic Summary, Assembly of the French Union, 24 January 1957.
No Europe without Eurafrica: France’s Line in the Sand (1956-1957)

Just one month before his eponymous loi-cadre introduced major administrative changes to the French Union’s governance and during the preparatory work for the Conference of Venice, Minister of Overseas France Gaston Defferre impressed upon his colleagues in the foreign affairs office that France’s overseas territories must be included in the Common Market. As such, “the European Common Market […] will thus become the Eurafrican Common Market.” Further, the TOM should enjoy special clauses included in the Common Market’s legislation, owing to their “underdeveloped state.” To make his case, Defferre invoked the current economic relations between metropolitan France and the TOM, which he claimed were “precisely founded on the notion of a Common Market […],” comprising the two principal elements envisioned for the future European Common Market: a free exchange zone allowing for the movement of merchandise, services, capital, and labor, and a customs exemption [franchise douanière] allowing for “a system of reciprocal preference.” In a claim that might sound prescient of today’s Eurozone, he suggested that the metropole-TOM Common Market might be seen as “more comprehensive” than the European project’s, as the former was a single currency zone.2

As we have seen in the preceding chapter, French officials appeared unconcerned about linking overseas French holdings to emerging European institutions in the

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2 MAEF 20QO/792: Ibid.
immediate postwar era. However, attitudes shifted quickly as the situation in Indochina and much of North Africa dramatically changed. This chapter interrogates why French administrative practice became firmly Eurafrican in scope, as opposed to the waffling and disagreement of the mid-1950s. By the time France and its allies came to the negotiating table in advance of the Treaty of Rome, French officials, jurists, and journalists had already devoted countless pages and engaged in numerous debates, all in an attempt to calculate arguments for why France’s overseas holdings must be included in the nascent European Economic Community. Notably, after the release of the April 1956 Spaak report and during the Conference of Venice the following month, they contended that their demand was not only logical but also seemingly non-negotiable. Thus, in the year prior to the March 25, 1957 signing of the Treaty of Rome, French officials from the Overseas and Foreign Ministries brought their Eurafrican stance to meetings with their domestic and European colleagues, even as internal conflict continued to simmer.

As I have indicated in prior chapters, the hagiographical version of European integration focuses on the promise of peace it appeared to guarantee, through the binding of war industries, and, increasingly, national economies. I want to ask why, given this peaceful task, French officials risked the ire of their partners, in order to preserve

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3 This dissertation focuses on choices made by administrators in the Fourth and Fifth Republics and largely emphasizes the continuity in their pursuit of Eurafrican policy in the European arena. However, the political changes (and parties) of the Fourth Republic are a key part of the wider history of French imperial policy and postwar decolonization. See, for example, Anthony Clayton, The Wars of French Decolonization (London: Routledge, 2013 edition), 8-11.

4 The Spaak Report recommended both the customs union of the Six and the creation of Euratom. The French were wary of some of the recommendations, particularly relating to agricultural regulations, as the creation of the customs union would impact France’s ties with its empire. Gilbert, European Integration, 47-48.

5 Writing in 1963, Jean Monnet himself emphasized these tropes: “The need was political as well as economic. The Europeans had to overcome the mistrust born of centuries of feuds and wars. The governments and peoples of Europe still thought in the old terms of victors and vanquished. Yet, if a basis for peace in the world was to be established, these notions had to be eliminated. Here again, one had to go beyond the nation and the conception of national interest as an end in itself.” Jean Monnet, “A Ferment of Change,” Journal of Common Market Studies 1, 3 (March 1963): 205.
relations that, as economic historians have demonstrated, did not have the outcome of prosperity that officials would have liked to imagine. For this, I will consider Dale Copeland’s analysis of economic interdependence and war. Copeland contends that in order to understand why a state might risk going to war, scholars must account for that state’s “expectations about the future economic environment.” I contend that we can take his analysis of when wars occur and apply it to the peaceful diplomatic sphere of postwar European integration. Copeland argues that expectations can lead state actors to make decisions that are driven by “selfish realpolitik calculations.” Such calculations in the long 19th century led to outcomes of war or of negotiated peace. In the realm of international institutions in the postwar, we must instead ask how such calculations threatened to undermine the stated goals of these new institutions, even if the threat of war between members was never floated as the alternative.

I contend that the push for Eurafrica prior to the Treaty of Rome’s signing gained traction within French ministerial circles precisely because by 1956, the situations across the French Union—including but not limited to the escalation of the war in Algeria—led French administrators to view the Treaty as a tool for securing international support for the imperial nation-state. Further, such a tool would also allow France to find partners in the funding of projects meant to ease the economic and social conditions seen as the cause of some of these colonial conflicts. At the same time, I emphasize the tensions

6 Jacques Marseille’s seminal work on the economic balance sheet of the colonies strongly emphasizes that on the whole, decolonization was a net gain for French industry. The loss of colonial markets would make France more competitive by pushing industrialists to modernize, such that as early as the Jeanneney report (1964), it appeared that decolonization was not “regrettable pour la France.” Marseille, Empire colonial et capitalisme français, 86-87. However, France’s continued effort to link its European economic planning with even now-former colonial holdings demonstrates that industrial modernization did not fully sway all French administrators to the belief that stepping away from the overseas markets would be good for France’s economy.
7 Copeland, Economic Interdependence and War, 2.
8 Ibid., 327.
within the French administration itself, as some ministries, notably Foreign Affairs, proved suspicious that a strong push for Eurafrica could risk alienating the European allies France had labored to secure over the course of the previous decade. Thus, Eurafrican policy took precedence over France’s new European endeavors only when the colonial situation appeared untenable without supranational involvement.

This chapter will examine the ten months of pressure France exerted on its neighbors in its effort to have the overseas holdings accepted as part of the EEC. It will first analyze Gaston Defferre and Christian Pineau’s adoption of a firmly Eurafrican approach to the Treaty of Rome. Next it will examine how France attempted to bolster support among the other members of the Six, often through the use of economic arguments. Finally, it highlights the concerns and cynicism that remained, now being voiced by members of the French Union Assembly. A concluding section demonstrates the unique risks to France’s Algerian interests as the Treaty of Rome’s signature loomed.

These arguments often left Algeria unnamed and, thus, scholars today must locate meaning in the declarations and silences of French administrators. Indeed, when these administrators consistently invoked a “French ensemble” joining the EEC, their audiences would have to understand Algeria as part of this collective, even as the administrators often emphasized the regulations’ applicability to the TOM. As the jurists’ conflicts make clear, Algeria could hardly be entirely excluded from the conversation. Defferre’s plea for the inclusion of the TOM should be read in part as

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9 On the challenges of forging those friendships, particularly in light of the question of German rearmament, see Alistair Cole, Franco-German Relations (London: Routledge, 2014), 4-9.
implicitly inclusive of the Algerian departments. And his brief mention of the situation of Algerian laborers will make clear that debates about the inclusion of the TOM or of Algeria were not self-contained, as both French administrators and their European partners understood the intertwined nature of stipulations that could apply to one zone or another.

Gaston Defferre’s Eurafrica and the Poorest Region in “Europe”

The socialist politician Gaston Defferre, longtime mayor of Marseille, served as Guy Mollet’s Minister of Overseas France from February 1, 1956 until May 21, 1957, the length of Mollet’s government. In a May 1956 letter insisting upon Eurafrican policy within European integration, Defferre argued that the exclusion of the TOM from the European Common Market risked grave outcomes. Such exclusion could therefore not be “seriously envisioned by France, which cannot sacrifice its African vocation for its European vocation.” The TOM risked being considered as foreign countries in relation to the Common Market, and by extension, in relation to the metropole. This would lead to a rapid “rupture of economic ties with the Metropole, and then to political secession.” Two years after the loss of Indochina and the start of the Algerian War, and mere weeks after the declarations of Morocco and Tunisia’s independence, this was no empty threat. Neither did Defferre advocate that France maintain two separate common markets. Such

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11 Under Defferre’s tenure, the French TOM were: Western French Africa (AOF - Senegal, Sudan, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Mauritania, Niger, Upper Volta), Equatorial French Africa (AEF - Moyen-Congo, Ubangi-Shari, Chad, and Gabon), Saint-Pierre and Miquelon, the Comoros, Madagascar, French Somaliland, New Caledonia, French Establishments in Oceania (today’s French Polynesia), the French Southern and Antarctic lands, the Republic of Togo, and Cameroon (under French trusteeship). The remaining territories to be comprised by the treaty were the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi; Somalia under Italian trusteeship; and Dutch New Guinea.

a scenario could wreak havoc, with France “deprived of protection from competition at the heart of the Common Market” while shouldered with the economic responsibilities of the TOM on its own.\(^\text{13}\)

Only one solution remained, according to Defferre: France must insist that it enter into the European Common Market only on the condition that the TOM would closely integrate, as well. Their inclusion would require special clauses, as the TOM would be exposed to benefits but also disadvantages in their association with the Common Market. Defferre proposed a European-wide equivalent of the Fonds d’investissement pour le développement économique et social (FIDES), a French organism aimed at funding development projects in the French Union. He also argued for protection for TOM industries, a delay in demanding that African territories contribute equally to social funds, and certain protections for agricultural production.\(^\text{14}\) Defferre also emphasized the importance of special clauses related to labor circulation. The Common Market negotiations had stressed the principle of free movement, which Defferre saw as a threat to the TOM. Given the overpopulation and underemployment of a European state such as Italy, which Defferre explicitly named, he suggested that an opening of free movement risked a major influx of European populations into the TOM:

For reasons which are less economic than human, it is necessary to guard against an excessive flux that could bring about unfavorable psychological reactions, that impair the evolution of indigenous [autochtones] social structures, and that lead to clashes between Africans and Europeans, clashes we have only too many examples of in North Africa. It is therefore not possible to implement [laisser poser] without precautions the principle of the free circulation of men between Europe and Africa. I believe moreover that it is likely that for analogous reasons our European partners will themselves raise this question, moved by their desire

\(^{13}\) MAEF 20QO/792: Ibid.

\(^{14}\) MAEF 20QO/792: Ibid.
Defferre’s focus here on Algeria is unusual, as most of Defferre’s communications focused on the TOM, which were technically the only overseas holdings under his purview. However, his comments foreshadow the ambiguity that would appear in the months and years ahead; by focusing specifically on the risk of Algerian laborers migrating to Europe, Defferre acknowledged that the unique juridical regime of Algeria, contentious as it might be, would open the door to more privileges within the EEC than would extend to other parts of the French Union. Defferre’s emphasis on protecting African territories from European labor competition at once blamed petits blancs for colonial woes and suggested that even a staunch Euraficanist hoped to maintain French supremacy within the overseas holdings.16

Defferre acknowledged that admitting the TOM into the Common Market would call into question France’s sovereignty in the overseas territories because it would invite an increase of the economic influence of its European partners. In a theme that would recur, he thus suggested that to maintain any control, France also had to cede control. At the same moment that France was engaged in a war to maintain its political hold on Algeria, it was negotiating documents that would relinquish a considerable amount of decision-making to Brussels. However, Defferre insisted upon the importance of consulting with local authorities in the TOM before going forward with the project. And he posited that through frank discussions with France’s European counterparts, his proposal would be accepted.

15 MAEF 20QO/792: Ibid.
Defferre’s office was far from the only one to grapple with the question of Eurafrica within the EEC. One week after Defferre’s letter, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs drafted a note on France’s participation in the Common Market, “considering its overseas responsibilities.” There was disagreement over what changes France would have to make to its trade regulations with the overseas territories in order to stave off competition from the other members of the Six, with the Commissariat Général of the Plan arguing that preferential trade outlets would suffice as a counterbalance. The Secretary of State for Industry and the Ministry of Overseas France disagreed. Meanwhile, the note’s unnamed author surmised, it would be politically difficult to maintain the two economic spaces of the Franc Zone and the European Common Market without making France’s partners—TOM and European—suspect that France attempted to establish an “overly preferential” regime with the other, to France’s exclusive benefit.\footnote{MAEF 20QO/719: Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Direction Générale des Affaires Économiques et Financières, Service de Coopération Économique, “Participation de la France au Marché Commun compte tenu de ses responsabilités d’Outre-Mer,” 24 May 1956.} This echoes Moussa’s bigamy warnings (Chapter 1).

French Foreign Affairs officials recognized that France’s push for European-wide aid benefiting the territories demanded a serious trade-off. On the one hand, the assistance contributed by the other members of the Six would allow for a more rapid economic development that was “politically necessary” overseas. On the other, “a substantial contribution by the other European countries to the efforts of the Metropole, in particular to investment efforts, will inevitably lead to a sharing of political responsibilities with our partners.” In other words, French officials had to contend with
the possibility that in joining the Common Market, it was ceding sovereignty not just on
the Continent, but also in its colonies.  

Such a concern reveals the variety of goals—sometimes conflicting—pursued by
different French ministerial offices. Defferre’s strong push for the TOM’s total
integration into the EEC could be attributed to his ministry’s tendency “to show itself to
be more attached to the maintenance of existing political and administrative forms than to
economic positions to which this Department often attributes a lesser interest.”
Conversely, the Secretary of State for Moroccan and Tunisian Affairs expressed
reservations because of the “consequences for the future of our relations with the former
protectorates […].” The Foreign Affairs ministry worried that a close link between a
unified Europe and the French Union would prove unpopular at home, leading to hostility
toward the whole of the EEC plan, and weakening French Union bonds. Rather than
abandoning such goals, the ministry advised caution:

This is why, should the government deem it necessary to extend the Common
Market to the overseas countries and territories, it would be desirable that this
position be taken publicly only at the end of the first stage. The provisional
maintenance of the customs barriers between the European states during the first
four years will technically permit a temporary avoidance of the fusion of these
two economic spaces.

A French policy of mandating lag time, rather than spurring change, thus emerged even
before the Treaty of Rome’s solemnization. A French preference for delay will be a
recurring theme in the chapters to follow.

18 MAEF 20QO/719: Ibid. Here I again think of Lewis, whose analysis of Tunisia and the Bardo Treaty
emphasizes the diplomatic pitfalls of “cosovereignty” but also demonstrates how the French believed they
had “transformed the Tunisian question into a domestic French question.” Lewis, quoting Antoine Colonna,
Divided Rule, 171. This interplay of the international (cosovereignty) and the domestic (empire as a
domestic legal sphere) is apparent in France’s approach to EEC negotiations.
19 MAEF 20QO/719: Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, “Participation de la France.”
20 MAEF 20QO/719: Ibid.
If French officials felt confident that they could persuade their neighbors to accept their demands, the question remained of exactly what policy to pursue. During a May 1956 meeting in Venice, France’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Christian Pineau declared to his European counterparts that France could not participate in a common market in which the overseas territories were excluded. The ministers agreed on a French proposal launching a study conducted by “interested national bodies [instances nationales intéressées].” Such a decision might seem remarkable, given the obvious bias that would emerge from a study spearheaded by those states that stood to gain the most. Indeed, the functionary writing up the meeting summary noted that “our partners are never the claimants [demandeurs] on this subject.” This management of the issue by the most interested party should therefore suggest that the other members of the Six recognized the potential French intransigence on the subject of the TOM and wished to turn the page without committing their own time or effort.21

While much of this chapter focuses on documents that ostensibly concern the TOM, reflecting the official separations of colonial administration across French ministries, Algeria was far from forgotten during early Treaty of Rome negotiations. Algeria’s unusual status as an impoverished region of Europe, a colony par excellence, or some other sort of undeterminable entity figured heavily in conceptions of the EEC’s extension to France’s far-flung holdings. One economic affairs administrator within the Foreign Affairs ministry speculated that if France requested for Algeria the implementation of the measures meant to target underdeveloped states, “it would be hard to imagine that the European partners could validly justify a refusal of admission to

Algeria” and would have to “recognize easily that Algeria would be an underdeveloped region in the European Community.” Indeed, the Treaty of Rome would have to ensure that Algeria not be “hurt” [lésé] by France’s integration in the EEC. The goal for Algeria must be “the accession to a standard of living ‘à la Francaise.’” Thus, “a new notion” should be included in the Treaty, “for example of ‘economically delayed [attardée] region’ accompanied by measures of aid and exception that push even further than for the underdeveloped regions of Europe.” This was a thinly veiled reference to Italy’s Mezzogiorno, the impoverished southern region that would draw comparisons to Algeria in the months ahead (Chapter 4).22

The Foreign Affairs administrator declared that the inclusion of Algeria and the formulation of policy that would improve its economy were at the heart of Eurafrica. His high hopes for Algeria’s economic prospects within the EEC attest to the usefulness of European integration in the minds of administrators concerned with colonial crises. The EEC’s money and support would allow for France to maintain control in Algeria. This vision of Eurafrica proved distinctly economic, attesting to the imbrication of trade goals and political ideals. However, the administrator sold the Eurafrican idea as a net gain for all members of the Six. Indeed, for those states interested in “the construction of a Eurafrica […] Algeria must necessarily compose the most important African element.” The participation of all Six EEC states in the investment funds open to Algeria would enhance economic and social development, and their assistance would be rewarded by the improved commercial prospects they would find in Algeria. The administrator

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envisioned a 6.5 percent improvement in the standard of living in Algeria from 1956 to 1966 thanks to a 9 percent net revenue increase. Yet these prospects had limits. While creating 70,000 new posts in Algeria per year, foreign (read: European) workers would have strictly limited access to the Algerian labor market.\footnote{MAEF 20QO/726: \textit{Ibid.}, Emphasis original.} This letter is yet another iteration of the jurists’ debates. Here, an administrator could simultaneously claim Algeria’s place within the EEC and make clear that only certain stipulations ought to cross the Mediterranean. Algeria would enjoy the exact same privileges as the metropole, with major caveats. Thus, Treaty of Rome negotiations did not help clarify exactly what juridical status Algeria would enjoy in either France or in Europe as a whole.

**New Allies and Old Colonies: Selling Eurafrica to the Six**

If Algeria \textit{was} France, France needed to prove to the Six why it should remain the case, and its strong economic ties appeared its best bargaining chip in both domestic and supranational debates. France had major stakes in maintaining, if not improving, Algeria’s economic status. Algeria was metropolitan France’s largest buyer, dispensing 199.7 million francs in 1955 (4.9 million USD, 2015), and its third largest supplier, after the United States and West Germany, at 118.8 million francs (4.7 million USD, 2015). Eighty-one percent of imports to Algeria originated in the metropole (and in return, 71 percent of its exports went to the metropole), 89 percent of imports if the entire Franc Zone were taken into account (which in turn received 80 percent of Algerian exports).\footnote{MAEF 20QO/726: Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Direction Générale des Affaires Économiques et Financières, Service de Coopération Économique, Marché commun, “Les échanges commerciaux de l’Algérie,” 22 August 1956.}
As French officials attempted to make sense of exactly how they could claim the place of Algeria and the TOM in a European common market, they expressed a belief in Belgium’s natural allegiance to this same cause. The Belgian Colonial Ministry called a meeting with representatives of France’s Overseas Ministry on July 18, 1956. Although the meeting was not meant to “prejudice” how either government would proceed during upcoming talks between the Six, the two parties signaled their agreement that the Common Market must extend to the overseas territories “in conditions that take into account not only the interest of the Metropoles, but also the individual conditions in these territories and the needs for their development.” They disagreed, however, on the method. French administrators expressed hope for special dispensations for the TOM’s benefit within the framework of the European Common Market. The Belgians, on the other hand, favored “two concurrent customs unions, one European, one African, linked by the reciprocal granting of preferential regimes.” In light of this difference of opinion, the French administrators recounting the meeting surmised that although the Belgians and French were “often close” [souvent voisins] in their arguments for protecting the TOM and encouraging Eurafrican exchanges, the “political considerations” that instigated these policies were “notably more divergent” and made agreement more difficult to attain.25

But the French had more to worry about than just the Belgians. France’s partners were “distinctly reticent” regarding the Franco-Belgian propositions and they made clear that they did not intend to take “any direct or indirect political responsibility in the overseas territories.” Such reservations reflected national interests. The West Germans observed that tropical products from the overseas territories cost more. Further, the West

German government declared itself unable to “force German importers to change suppliers.” They argued that an investment fund should focus only on non-profit, social investments and declined to name a figure for any possible annual investment. The Italian delegation, having secured assurances that they would only contribute a “modest sum” to the investment fund, worried about the competition from agricultural products exported by both Italy and some overseas territories. The Dutch deemed the advantages of such a policy disproportionately lower than the sacrifices it would entail and declared they would dispute the “soundness” [bien-fondé] of the Franco-Belgian proposition. Instead, the Dutch suggested that the member states only decide for the moment whether even to open a negotiation about the territories after the establishment of the Treaty. As we will see in the coming chapters, West German officials came to privilege their relations with France and hence follow France’s lead to a degree, while Belgian would gradually turn toward the Dutch (embracing a Benelux bloc) and Italy remained fearful of the economic stakes of integrating Algeria into Europe. These sides were not always as clear ahead of the Treaty of Rome’s signing.

In the two months that followed the unveiling of the Franco-Belgian proposal and the withering criticism it received, the French sought to emphasize the political justifications of the project. Their partners proved more receptive to such arguments and the French pushed ahead with discussions couching assistance to the territories within a larger framework of aid for underdeveloped countries. The French noted that they would

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26 Notably, southern Italy’s climate resembled that of North Africa. I will discuss such comparisons and their political use in the next chapter. Olive oil was one of Italy’s main concerns, as it also dominated some French colonial export markets. See, for example, Léon Laitman, "Le Marché et la production de l’huile d’olive en Tunisie," *Annales de Géographie* 62, 332 (July-August 1953): 271-286.

be unable to shoulder indefinitely on their own the burden of current aid levels. French administrators took a Cold War tack: “If Europe became disinterested in [the territories], would it be possible to keep these countries in the Western orbit for much longer?” 28 Such an appeal fed into the larger lore surrounding the very purpose of unifying Europe, which would not just stave off Soviet dominance—a particular concern for the West Germans—but also maintain European prestige on the international stage. Perhaps perceiving the importance of keeping what friends they had, the French were generous in their analysis of their partners’ initial hesitance and ready to make concessions. The other members’ “ignorance of the African problems and the fear of engaging in an enterprise whose scope they struggled to perceive” were to blame for their earlier attitude, rather than any “hostility to the principle of the association of the overseas territories.” To mitigate the issue, the French would approach the Treaty with a policy that appeared quite similar to the Dutch suggestion. The “fundamental principles of the association” would be fixed in the treaty, but only carried out progressively thanks to successive conventions annexed to the treaty and subject to time limits. 29

How should this French acquiescence be understood? Their eagerness to appease their neighbors by delaying the Treaty in the TOM and even Algeria could be seen as a diplomatic shift in tone on the part of the French. But did they ever expect to extend EEC benefits to the TOM in the same time frame as in the metropole? The answer is unclear. However, it becomes evident that the French administrators in these negotiations were aware of the balancing act they had to perform, which included earning the support of the Six but also maintaining the trust of African leaders who increasingly understood their

28 MAEF 20QO/719: Ibid.
29 MAEF 20QO/719: Ibid.
territories’ options as either federation or full independence. Treaty application, with severe limitations, might prove palatable enough to hold the confidence of these Africans for a spell.

By the summer of 1956, the French were able to sketch out how the TOM would relate to the Six in the Treaty. This would include the progressive suppression of customs tariffs related to products imported from the territories, and vice versa. A common external tariff would be established to protect agricultural products from the territories. Over three four-year stages, this tariff would be implemented on such goods as bananas (20 percent), coffee (16 percent), cacao (9 percent), citrus (8 to 20 percent), and oilseeds (at an as-yet-undetermined percentage). Exact aid amounts were sketched out. The common investment fund for the territories would come to 581.25 million US dollars for five years. France and Germany would each contribute 200 million, Belgium and the Netherlands each 70 million, Italy 40 million, and Luxembourg 1.25 million. The investments would be divided between the territories, with 511.25 million going to French territories, 30 million to Belgian, 35 million to Dutch, and 5 million to Italian. Thus, France would secure for its own territories 311.25 million dollars in investment from its partners over five years, an average of 62.25 million per year. The stickier subjects of public health, social security, public security and order, and free circulation of labor would only be addressed by later conventions that would require the unanimity of the Six. Thus, for the time being, France avoided the most trying of debates by deferring difficult decisions and emphasizing that Algeria would not fall under these same regulations.30

30 MAEF 20QO/719: Ibid.
But by then, France’s policy drew suspicion even from its closest ally. “Certain Belgian milieux,” according to the press, did not want the Belgian Congo associated with the Common Market, as Belgium’s contribution to the whole of the territories would be greater than what the Belgian Congo received (the Belgian delegation at the Conference of Brussels in February had not voiced such a matter). Yet despite Belgian grumbles, German concerns, concessions for the Dutch, and the beginning of what would become an unending wave of Italian nervousness, the French viewed the guarantee of aid assistance and gradual tariff harmonization to be a victory for their own colonial policy. The Treaty “instituting the Common Market sets the basis upon which European-African solidarity will develop; the political significance of the principles it implements cannot be emphasized [soulignée] enough.” Such an attitude demonstrates the complex layers of loyalty between Africa and Europe and the diverse goals of the French as they participated in European negotiations.31

French administrators continued internal conversations about what exactly Eurafrique policy might entail and how great a risk France would be taking were it not to pursue such a policy. A late September 1956 Foreign Affairs communication cautioned that including the TOM in the Common Market would cause the French economy to lose important trade channels. Combined with the recent independence of Indochina, the restitution of the Saar to Germany, and the independence of Morocco and Tunisia, “this loss […] could be unbearable for the economy of our country.” To mitigate the risks, France would have to consolidate the Franc Zone, which would require improving the current tariff regulations in the AOF and Madagascar. France would also have to understand that asking its partners to participate in investments and infrastructural

31 MAEF 20QO/719: “Ibid.
improvement would mean accepting a system of co-management [cogestion] in the territories.  

When French and Belgian officials met on September 29, pragmatism somewhat marked the discussion, but the French administrators did not touch on the most dire concerns expressed within the Foreign Ministry. The conclusions drawn during this meeting were intended to solidify a single Franco-Belgian policy ahead of the upcoming October meetings and a meeting in which Spaak was expected to submit figures on aid investment to the Six. Among those in attendance at the meeting in Brussels were Defferre, Savary, Marjolin, and Bousquet for the French, Spaak (the meeting’s host), Buisseret (Minister of Colonies), Scheyven (Secretary General for Foreign Affairs), Rothschild (Chief of Staff for Spaak), and Baron Snoy (Secretary General for Economic Affairs) representing the Belgians. The meeting’s conclusions hardly deviated from early Franco-Belgian declarations, as representatives from both sides agreed that the Six progressively receive the type of advantages enjoyed by TOM-metropole relations. The attendees agreed that the overseas investment fund would be distinct from the European investment fund and would be managed under the jurisdiction of authorities of the overseas states. The meeting led to a call for a common African market, with few

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33 It was clear to Raymond Bousquet, the French Ambassador to Belgium, that the French and Belgians would have to brace themselves for criticism from the Dutch, Italians, Germans, and Luxembourgeois regarding their required commitment to the investment fund. Before such a position was fully revealed, he encouraged an examination of the current state of TOM-metropole relations, notably regarding exports and imports between French and Belgium TOM and the Six. This would make it possible to gauge openness for “a more intimate collaboration” in the TOM on the part of the other European economies. MAEF 20QO/719: Bousquet to Christian Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs, “Le Marché Commun et les territoires d’Outre-Mer,” 8 October 1956; Bousquet to Pineau, “Le Marché Commun et Territoires d’Outre-Mer,” 30 October 1956.
specifics given, and speculated that were the “special problem” of Morocco and Tunisia resolved, “a great political hope” could emerge.\footnote{MAEF 20QO/719: Bousquet to Pineau, “Le Marché Commun et les territoires d’Outre-Mer,” 30 September 1956.}

However, skepticism and hostility toward Eurafrica remained strong within integration circles, and French administrators still found themselves stuck between their “African vocation,” as Defferre and others put it, and their interest in expanding the European project. When the delegation heads met in an intergovernmental conference in Brussels on November 22, the Netherlands, with Italy and Luxembourg following suit, expressed distaste about “launching [themselves] into an adventure.” The Dutch representative questioned the call for public investments rather than “the liberty” of private ones and suggested that the TOM policy would generate “disequilibrium.” The German delegation took a softer tone, calling the problem “complex.” The French and Belgian representatives appeared to make their case strongly enough that they left the meeting having isolated the Dutch delegation and convinced the rest to accept the “political opportunity of an association with the overseas territories […] and the necessity of an investment fund of public origin.”\footnote{MAEF 20QO/719: Laloy, Foreign Affairs telegram to Direction of General Politics – Europe, “Direction des organisations européennes,” 24 November 1956.} Dutch reticence to TOM incorporation extended well past the signing of the Treaty of Rome, as will be discussed in Chapter 5. That the Dutch, still embroiled in overseas economic and political affairs in New Guinea, the Dutch Antilles, and Surinam, would reject aid for the TOM demonstrates that Eurafrica as a solution to colonial questions did not appeal to all Europeans, nor was it the only possible path toward the resolution of imperial affairs.

\footnote{MAEF 20QO/719: Laloy, Foreign Affairs telegram to Direction of General Politics – Europe, “Direction des organisations européennes,” 24 November 1956.}
Impressing upon their partners the importance of Eurafrica, the French and Belgians attempted to normalize it by relying on recent history. The motivation for the policy “could be compared to that which inspired the Marshall Plan [...].”\(^{36}\) They also studiously avoided including Algeria in the discussions of the TOM, even as we have seen that ministerial communications within France acknowledged that the question was very much related. Such avoidance can be seen as a method of skirting the hairy issue of Algerian independence, about which France could not be sure to count on its neighbors’ support, and also as further evidence of the unclear legal status of Algeria not only within Europe, but within France itself. Despite the high-minded supranational idealism evident in speeches by European statesmen and echoed in some news outlets across the member states, it is clear from concerns voiced by France’s ambassadors in other member states that domestic opinion held sway over these seemingly internationalist decisions. This is particularly evident in the case of Germany, where local hesitations risked hindering international statecraft. And yet, West German officials continued to follow French overseas policy demands, even if it was clear that there was disagreement in their ranks.\(^{37}\)

West German officials’ willingness to follow France’s lead flew in the face of German public opinion opposed to the Algerian War. This suggests that these officials believed that European integration was significant enough a goal to risk alienating the


\(^{37}\) This matches the assertion by theorists of global political economy who contend that in the drive to balance powers, “[p]ublic opinion would also be excluded because it might be necessary to ally with a state that had recently been an enemy. The general public might not support sudden shifts in diplomacy so their views would have to be ignored.” While this contention is written with regards to 19th-century attempts at European diplomacy and peacekeeping, it is evident from the disdain of the German newspapers and the ultimate decisions made by Adenauer and others that practical concerns for partnership with France would override domestic criticisms. O’Brien and Williams, *Global Political Economy*, 103.
voting public. In early 1957, Maurice Couve de Murville, then serving as French ambassador to West Germany, wrote to Christian Pineau to inform him of recent opinions emerging from Bonn. His letter detailed two recent articles in German dailies, both concerning the question of the Franco-Belgian proposal to incorporate African territories into the European Common Market. In “Should We Return to Africa,” Die Welt’s correspondent Schröder opined that the Franco-Belgian proposition could slow or prevent the finalizing of the treaties for the Common Market and Euratom. To make the matter more problematic in Murville’s eyes, Schröder pointed to the reasons why Germany should not accept such a project, particularly noting that Germany had not held colonies since 1918, a fact which had become beneficial for the state. Schröder contended that the economic contribution demanded of Germany would be greater than any benefits it could reap. Schröder went further, writing that West Germany’s Minister of Economics, Ludwig Erhard, “exploded like a rocket” when he learned of France’s plan. This economic argument was similar to that of France’s own economic critic of the colonies, Raymond Cartier. It also echoes what Pierre Moussa labeled “le complexe hollandais,” alluding to the prevailing sentiment amongst Dutch politicians and citizens that losing colonial territories had been an economically favorable development. Further still, Schröder also played to his readership’s emotions, casting the German people as “victim […] to Soviet colonialism,” and warning that Africans would view Germany as “participat[ing] in dying colonialism.”

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38 This is in some ways an interesting corollary to the French officials who risked alienating their European partners in the name of protecting French imperial interests.
Murville preferred the second article he detailed. Its author, Schwelien, who Murville noted had traveled to Africa numerous times, used the pages of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung to congratulate the Six for having adopted, following “the events in the Middle East” (i.e. the Suez crisis), a more realistic and positive attitude regarding the problems facing European integration. The Eurafrican goal now appeared less utopian and more feasible, thanks in part to the French realization that such an economic enterprise would need the “consent and even the free association of the African peoples.” 41 Although the Schröder critique forced Murville to acknowledge the formidable challenge France faced as it tried to convince Erhard of Eurafrica’s benefits, Murville echoed the more idealistic goals of EEC-TOM association and suggested that his West German compatriots were ready to be its champions:

Many among them are sufficiently attached to European ideas and have enough taste for major firms and global outlooks to understand that this is but a vast development plan in Africa that would provide for their country, for Europe, and for the equilibrium of the world. 42

Murville’s appraisal of the situation demonstrates that economic practicality helped to encourage West German acceptance of Eurafrica. Germans, Murville noted, “are not indifferent” to “the mining prospects on the African continent.” Thus France might have to worry less about heartstrings than purse strings in order to make a convincing case to Bonn. French officials could likely count on pro-European Germans, including Bundestag president Eugen Gerstenmaier and, critically, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer himself, to balance out – or drown out – Erhard’s concerns. 43 Thus, as the Treaty of Rome’s signature drew near, French officials felt increasingly sure that they could make

41 MAEF 20QO/720: Ibid.
42 MAEF 20QO/720: Ibid.
43 MAEF 20QO/720: Ibid.
Eurafrican demands on their European partners, even as those demands were issued in a distinctly more pragmatic language than the sweeping rhetoric discussed in Chapter 1. At the same time, the pragmatic—if not opportunistic—outlook drew suspicion within France itself. It is to these concerns that we now turn.

**Internal Reluctance**

In the run-up to the Treaty of Rome, skepticism and caution regarding Eurafrican policy continued to reign in some administrative circles in France. An unusually candid note by an unnamed administrator within the Foreign Ministry’s Service of Economic Cooperation, penned in September 1956, demonstrates the concerns of that ministry as Eurafrica threatened to supersede other international policy goals. The note serves as a reminder of the unknowns facing the administrators attempting to forge France’s future relations with Africa and Europe. For example, the missive would not address the integration of the Algerian departments because of the “uncertainties that remain regarding the substance [contenu] of the future status of Algeria.” And within those areas that could be discussed, the administrator surmised that the United Nations would be unlikely to authorize *zone franc* trusteeship territories to enter into a European community. Little would it matter, however, as those territories were unlikely to have any such desire:

> [T]he overseas territories for which the Defferre law foresees the accession to autonomy cannot [envision], either for political reasons [(]this would be to put the brakes on the movement towards self-determination[)] or for economic reasons [(]the gap in living standards and productivity between the overseas territories and Europe is such that an integration, even coupled with all sorts of provisions [réserves], seems difficult to imagine[)] […] anything other than a simple association, without practical reach, to the common market.
Any integration of the territories into the Common Market would therefore be either impossible due to the refusal by the territories themselves or else “destined to remain a pure formality”[purement formelle].”⁴⁴ Thus we see skepticism of the Eurafican project coming from one of the ministries charged with furthering its goals.

The very men who represented the French Union’s constituents also expressed feelings of uncertainty about the future of France’s plan for a European-African connection. When the Assembly of the French Union met in late January 1957, it was with serious awareness of the political climate in Paris and Brussels. The European Common Market dominated the opening session of the three-day meeting, stemming from Georges Monnet’s proposition to demand that the government not sign the Treaty of Rome if the inclusion of the DOM-TOM was not expressly planned. Mr. Reyt and the group Republican Center of Peasant and Social Action [Centre Républicain d’Action Paysanne et Social] presented an alternative proposal calling for the French government to safeguard [sauvegarder] its existing economic and political ties with the zone franc countries before joining France to the European Common Market.⁴⁵

Members of the assembly attempted to make sense of what European unification would mean for France. Georges Monnet, president and reporter for the opinion of the Agricultural Commission, recounted a dire comment from “a high functionary” in the Ministry of Overseas France who, according to Monnet, said: “I share your concerns regarding France’s current responsibilities in the programs of development of the territories. But in fifteen years, when Europe will be done [sera faite], France will be no

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more.” To this, the assembly member Jean Guiter exclaimed, “This language is abominable.” Monnet continued, “It is nonetheless a certitude that, if we have a European government, a European parliament, France as a sovereign and independent nation will cease to exist.” Guiter again interjected: “France will survive us.”

Yet Monnet had a passionate directive for his compatriots. France was not just a geographic space, but something more, like a spiritual entity, a beam [rayonnement] across the world, a sort of torch that marks our country as the incarnation of the ideas of liberté, égalité and fraternité universelle.

France now had to bring these lessons to Europe. In making this claim, Monnet invoked Albert Sarraut’s declaration that France had become a “prisoner of its conquest,” as the domination of African territory was more expensive than profitable. Monnet’s solution to the issue was to ensure that France’s overseas holdings be included in Europe as the key to France’s continued relevance and predominance in Europe. Like other French administrators of the era, Monnet did not appear to notice the incongruity of his claim. Was Africa sucking France dry or was it the last vestige of power that would preserve France’s place as a world leader? Monnet and his rapturous audience did not seem concerned with parsing out the contradiction. Indeed, Monnet sought to galvanize the support of the assembly to secure France’s promise of incorporating the overseas holdings, even as he suggested that without the overseas holdings, France would be

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46 MAEF 20QO/627: Ibid., 9, 10. This language is striking in light of Brexit and the popular fears about what the ceding of sovereignty has done to Britain (and, in the eyes of far-right parties, other nations, as well). The wave of academic inquiries into Brexit ideology has begun. See, for example, Michael Freed, “After the Brexit Referendum: Revisiting Populism as an Ideology,” Journal of Political Ideologies 22, 1 (2017): 1-11, published online 8 December 2016. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13569317.2016.1260813.


nothing. In his speech, Monnet offered the dire image of a Europe centered around the Rhine, cited at the end of the last chapter. The only solution was France joining with the entirety of its overseas possessions:

[I]t is the final necessity that the overseas territories enter [Europe] with [France], showing, by their very presence, that we are there with the willingness to open in Europe this perspective to be not only a Union – a close Union, despite everything, walking close together in the face of the two blocs – but an ensemble entirely open toward a continent that needs it.49

Monnet’s passionate address reveals a litany of concerns and claims being made just prior to the signing of the Treaty of Rome. France had to receive guarantees from its partners regarding the association of its overseas holdings. The overseas holdings sought sincerity in the Six’s pledge. All of Europe needed the strength of the holdings, an unveiled reference to the Cold War blocs. France needed the overseas holdings to maintain its own prestige.

Senator Charles-Cros further considered the place of the French Union, in both a European and a Eurafrican union. Charles-Cros declared that “the French Union must live; it must not be smothered in the Eurafrican corset.” Yet he did not entirely challenge such a future, as “we believe that our destiny will also be the destiny of Africa.” Thus, the imperative for France, with the pressure and support of the Assembly of the French Union, was to maintain France’s position of power within the emerging systems. As always, the question seemed in part: what Eurafrique, and for whom? The Gaullist Marcel Léger promised that “Eurafrica will be humane, it will be with Africa and for Africa or it will not be.” Otherwise, Africa would be “delivered to interior disorder […].

49 MAEF 20QO/627: Ibid., 10.
What a temptation for the Asian masses!" Again, the imperatives were mixed. Africa could not survive without Europe; Africa risked falling to Communism, which (unspoken) would bring Europe to its knees.

Not all were sold on the idea of Eurafrica, or the motivations of the Six, let alone of France. The Corsican Communist Arthur Giovoni was scathing in his assessment of the policy, which he viewed as a method “to check [juguler] the people of black Africa before Algeria has won its independence, the example of which risks being contagious. This consideration explains the haste taken to conclude the treaty.” Giovoni declared that it was not for “the French government to decide for them.” He drew vocal support from the extreme left in the assembly when he declared that the question was not whether colonialism existed “in this or that country, but to determine if the organization of the Common Market is an enterprise of philanthropy or of colonial pillage.” He drew ire for suggesting that parliamentarians and their compatriots, particularly Armand, the former SNCF director, were acting in France’s self-interest. Giovoni’s concluding statement was no less incendiary:

The policy of the Common Market that they propose to us both as a panacea and as a lesser evil is in reality a policy of capitulation and abandon. We oppose it with a policy of friendship and reciprocal interest, a true policy conforming to the greatness of France, in the interests of the people and of peace. Giovoni’s critique, but also the concerns of Monnet and Cros-Charles that Eurafrica be approached with care, reveal that the increasingly uniform front France presented to its

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50 MAEF 20QO/627: Ibid. Léger was part of a group of politicians from Le Havre with strong ties to colonial administration. Claude Malon, Le Havre colonial de 1880 à 1960 (Mont-Saint-Aignan: Publications des Universités de Rouen et du Havre, 2006), 403, 577.
53 MAEF 20QO/627: Ibid., 23.
partners masked entrenched domestic fears about just what such a policy (bigamy, divorce) would do to the French-African relationship.

**Conclusion: Algeria and the Treaty of Rome**

The question of Algeria only exacerbated these tensions. As French officials grew confident that the Treaty of Rome would entail some version of Eurafrique, they worried about what sort of place Algeria would have in such an association. Algeria’s relation to the Common Market confounded French and European officials precisely because Algeria’s relation to France was so inchoate, ongoing war aside. In negotiations for the Treaty of Rome, France expressly renounced the right to ask for Fonds européen de développement (FED) benefits for Algeria, and by extension, for the DOM, even as those funds would apply to the TOM. Such a policy emphasized Algeria’s status as something different from a colony. Further still, no clause in the Treaty would protect Algeria’s burgeoning industry through quotas or customs duties, even as the TOM were able to raise their tariffs against Common Market states. The disadvantages Algeria risked experiencing through its association with the Common Market bear out Defferre’s concerns about not making special dispensations for overseas territories. They also hint at the status afforded Algeria, which appeared to be treated much more like a part of the EEC than like an associated or third-party state, even if such treatment would be highly detrimental. This mixed-up status was all the more confused by the regulations relating to the Sahara because the Common Organization of the Sahara Regions (OCRS) comprised
sections of Algeria, which was integrated into the Common Market, and of Chad, Niger, and Sudan, TOM that were associated with the Common Market.\textsuperscript{54}

On February 20, one month ahead of the Treaty of Rome's signature, the heads of state of the six ECSC members agreed to treaty terms including Algeria and the overseas departments. These measures related to the customs union, rules of competition, and the free movement of services and institutions. Questions of social harmonization programs, agricultural questions, and circulation of workers would be scheduled for clarification within two years. In the meantime, Algeria and the DOM could benefit from the overseas territories investment fund and, with the unanimous authorization of the Council of Governors, loans or guarantees from the European Bank. The question of the origin of aid to Algeria would reappear in tense interactions between France and Germany in 1959-60, a subject which will be discussed in the next chapter. French officials fretted that in the interim, the only agricultural stipulation that seemed to apply to Algeria and the DOM related to minimum pricing. The lack of a special regime for Algeria could result in “major difficulties.” Indeed, although Algeria’s economic situation meant it had a great need for an extension of agricultural commercial outlets, the Treaty currently prevented such growth. This was compounded by fears of the impact of a common external tariff on Algeria’s citrus trade. Such a tariff would be roughly a third lower than the duty in France at the time and represented a major potential blow to Algeria’s agricultural sector.\textsuperscript{55} Labor migration also garnered considerable worry. Bowing to its European partners, France allowed for a “relaxing” of rules that would have allowed for the


progressive liberalization of the movement of Algerian workers. Thus “deprived of necessary outlets,” the Algerians would turn even more to the French labor market – still open to them – at a moment when the metropole would become saturated with workers from the other members of the Six.\textsuperscript{56}

Regardless of these concerns, the treaty moved forward with France’s consent. On March 25, 1957, representatives of the Six signed the Treaty of Rome: Adenauer (Federal Republic of Germany), Joseph Bech (Luxembourg), Joseph Luns (Netherlands), Pineau (France), Antonio Segni (Italy), and Paul Henri Spaak (Belgium). The Six agreed to stipulations that would explicitly name the French Union, along with other colonial holdings. Article 227 delineated where the Treaty of Rome would be applicable. Section 1 named the Six, while Section 2 declared that “general and particular provisions,” including some agricultural regulations, the liberalization of services, and the movement of goods, would apply “to Algeria and the French overseas departments” once “this Treaty enters into force.” Section 3 guaranteed “special arrangements for association” that would apply to overseas countries and territories. This would include French, Belgian, Italian, and Dutch holdings. A fourth section addressed the Saar.\textsuperscript{57} Despite the intensity with which France insisted upon the inclusion of Algeria within the Treaty of Rome, the decision makers nevertheless conceded to the other five states a delayed application, not entirely planned out, of the conditions linking Algeria to the EEC. If these administrators, notably in the Ministry of Overseas France, had insisted that the French Union be integrated into the EEC, citing legal and economic links, they also

\textsuperscript{56} MAEF 20QO/720: \textit{Ibid.}

allowed, notably in concessions from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, certain exceptions to appease their European partners.

The question of Algeria reveals internal and external strife as French and European officials tried to understand exactly where the limits of the EEC were located, and in whose interest those limits were created and maintained. Although the March 25 signing made official the creation of the European Economic Community, which would go into effect on January 1, 1958, this day held little import for France’s Algerian territory, juridically a part of the mother country, yet excluded from immediate application of the treaty’s provisions. Indeed, although special provisions for Algeria and France’s African holdings were a prerequisite for France even agreeing to sign the treaty, such provisions were not meant to take effect until a later date, vaguely alluded to as two years from the entire treaty taking effect, meaning 1960. In fact, there was enough vagary in the language to push off any decision-making until, perhaps fortuitously for those European administrators involved, Algeria’s independence resolved the question in a markedly different way – by excising the North African territory from France’s notion of the reach of its own borders. Thus, in considering March 25, 1957, and its place in the history of France, Algeria, and European integration, one must look at the signature moment not as a full stop, but as a jumping off point for further tense negotiations. The next two chapters will examine the post-Treaty negotiations for how the EEC would relate to and exist in Algeria, the DOM, and the TOM.
After the Signatures: Algeria’s “Hybrid” Relation to the EEC, and the Challenge from France’s Partners (1958-1962)

The period between the Treaty of Rome’s ratification and the independence of Algeria reveals intransigence on the part of French officials, who continued to push for EEC regulations to extend to Algeria even as their European partners intensified critiques of such policies and French public opinion turned against the war effort. This chapter contends that French officials planned for an evolution in trade relations with Algeria that they believed would be realized. In so doing, they laid the groundwork for how future commercial and development aid treaties would be implemented across the former French Community, particularly the DOM. Further, the French used the supranational mechanism of the European Economic Community to solidify, if not extend, control over much of their former and current colonial holdings, even as formal recognition of independence occurred throughout sub-Saharan Africa and as the fall of the Fourth Republic laid bare the tumultuous impact of the Algerian War on the larger French political landscape.

This chapter contributes to the field of international history by offering an example of how that history changes when empire is taken seriously as a unit of analysis in European integration. Policies formulated by French administrators are evidence of the impossibility for those officials of separating France’s imperial goals from its European aspirations. Discussing the world order following World War I, Adam Tooze argues that historians can “locate a dramatic shift in the calculus of power, not external to, but within the government machinery itself, in the interaction between military force, economics and diplomacy.” Tooze contends that in the interwar, French officials attempted to create
new associations with the United States and Great Britain in order to distance itself from previous alliances with Tsarist Russia. New alliances could offer France security in a markedly different diplomatic environment. Meanwhile, Germany (and Japan) witnessed the “nexus between domestic and foreign policy […]”1 While Tooze is primarily interested in how the “old world” formed relations with ascendant America, I am interested in his larger themes of the diplomatic and economic turmoil caused by war, and how world powers attempted to reassert their place in an upended global hierarchy. French officials’ choices after the signing of the Treaty of Rome attest to the messiness of the postwar, when once again the French attempted to forge new relationships while maintaining a privileged position in world affairs.

Nineteen sixty would be a momentous year for Algeria and the DOM, or so the Treaty of Rome would suggest. A litany of EEC regulations, delayed for two years after the official launch of the Treaty, were to be extended to overseas French departments that year. Yet 1960 is more noteworthy as the year nearly all of France’s sub-Saharan African holdings became independent, and indeed, the Treaty of Rome’s benefits continued to elude the far-flung reaches of France. This chapter examines the period between when the Treaty of Rome went into effect, on January 1, 1958, and when Charles de Gaulle proclaimed Algeria an independent state on July 3, 1962, following an overwhelming referendum. In this short interim, the Fourth Republic came to an end and de Gaulle returned to power (1958); French administrators launched the Constantine Plan (1958); African states, as mentioned above, gained independence (1960); and negotiators mapped

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1 Tooze, The Deluge, 23-25.
out the Evian Accords (1961, signed 1962). Although these historical moments inspire long monographs for their significance and their influence, the period is also remarkable because it marks the first and last time a European institution’s borders officially stretched to encompass Algeria. This stunning understanding of territorial reach and economic unity must be taken seriously, and examined not as an unrealizable vision, but as a possibility that had concrete ramifications for European relations and the future of European-African relations into the decades to follow.

The first section of this chapter examines the European discussions surrounding the Treaty of Rome’s “official start.” As noted already, January 1, 1958 did not mark the actual implementation of the Treaty’s policies in any real sense, but rather marked the point at which the Six would start to make sense of how to put the Treaty into action. The second and third sections of this chapter thus turn to what happened as the mandated two-year delay on Article 227, Section 2 came to an end. The French delegation in Brussels faced two separate yet linked problems by late 1959, early 1960. On the one hand, as the second section will discuss, the Commission tackled how the Treaty of Rome would apply in Algeria, following the delay period. Italian officials perceived the possibility of a broad application policy in Algeria as a major threat to their labor force and export potential. On the other hand, the third section examines how as French tactics in Algeria shifted, officials in Paris began to reimagine how European aid schemes could be

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2 Muriam Haleh Davis’ analysis of the social sciences and the Constantine Plan offers evidence of American thought in French social planning and of the interplay between the economy, notions of rationalization, and the last days of formal French colonialism in Algeria. Muriam Haleh Davis, “‘The Transformation of Man’ in French Algeria: Economic Planning and the Postwar Social Sciences, 1958-62,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 52, 1 (Jan. 2017): 73-94.

funneled to the embattled territory. Such a change in policy directly contradicted earlier plans espoused by the French delegation and embraced by the other members of the EEC, particularly West Germany. Thus, by the time of Algerian independence, the subject of the next chapter, French officials had once again frustrated and risked alienating their European partners in order to pursue policies they deemed desirable for restoring peace in Algeria and maintaining economic control elsewhere in the French Community.4

Read together, the episodes of the years in which Algeria was part of both France and the European Economic Community reveal the difficulty of implementing French notions of territory and trade zones, but also demonstrate the groundwork laid for Europe’s future development aid and labor migration structures.

**Creeping Toward Implementation**

The Treaty of Rome’s March signature marked only a first stage of its official adoption. In the months that followed, each of the signatories ratified the Treaty. It would officially go into effect on January 1, 1958, although the first stage of implementation would begin a year after that. As Chapter 3 made clear, France’s push to include its overseas holdings within the Treaty proved successful. Yet internally, debates continued about exactly what that might mean for the French Union. Major skepticism and even outright hostility to the Treaty lingered in Paris, as officials charged with administering extrametropolitan French holdings attempted to make sense of how EEC regulations

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4 Here I am interested in the dynamics of motivation and power. Discussing Japan and Germany in the interwar, Tooze writes, “though the military class and economic groups such as agrarians might have little to lose in abandoning internationalism, other influential groups, notably big business, were slower to relinquish the promises of the 1920s.” Tooze, *The Deluge*, 503. Tooze’s analysis hinges on the imbrication of international trade in the interwar. By the late 1950s, French business leaders embraced ideals of internationalism in trade, but viewed treaty negotiations as a space for carving out regulations that could best serve national interests.
might help or hurt the constituents and business interests under their jurisdiction. Thus, one must see the Treaty’s signature not as a full stop, but as a jumping off point for further tense negotiations with—at times—ambiguous goals. This push risked alienating some of France’s partners, as French officials attempted to balance their role within a supranational European institution with their belief that France must remain the major interlocutor between Europe and the African world.

After the Treaty of Rome’s signing, French officials continued to emphasize that Algeria both was and was not entitled to equal treatment under Treaty stipulations. In April 1957, a working group devised to examine Algeria’s potential inclusion within a European free trade zone emphasized that the departments should be integrated on the same basis as Metropolitan France and argued that the Treaty of Rome already applied to Algeria. However, it noted, “this group of departments presented all the characteristics of an underdeveloped and overpopulated country.” This underdevelopment had already been used to justify the delay in solving questions of free labor circulation that would dog French administrators in the years to come. Indeed, the group warned that the delay in resolving Algeria’s exact status within the EEC had “left hanging a question of capital interest that merits being the subject of a thorough examination.” This would be one element of the working group’s analysis, which also addressed questions of commercial interests, economic growth, and expanded industrialization based on investments. The group also elaborated on the extent of Franco-Algerian trade and argued that the risk of competition from Italian agricultural goods, and eventually those of Greece, Portugal, Turkey, and perhaps even Spain, would have to be mitigated through strong regulation.5

5 The group, headed by Simoneau, comprised: Gutmann, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Direction of Economic and Financial Affairs; de la Genière, Ministry of Economics and Finances, Direction of External
French concern about the threat of competition to Algeria is noteworthy because of how strongly Italian statesmen would condemn the region’s potential to undermine Italian economic stability, as will be discussed in this chapter’s next section.

In July 1957, in the midst of French ratification discussions and only days after the Bundestag had ratified the Treaty, the Council of the Republic’s Commission on Overseas France presented a statement voicing concern about the scope of the Treaty’s application. The senator who presented the statement, Léon Motais de Narbonne, was a representative of les français d’Indochine and would soon serve as senator of les français établis hors de France. Invoking the Biblical story of Esau, the Commission argued that France should not sell “its birthright for a dish of lentils [droit d’aînesse contre le plat de lentilles].” The amount of investment in the Overseas Countries and Territories (PTOM) that France now expected from its neighbors was paltry in comparison to the aid already given by France and the benefits that the other members would reap, developments that alarmed these representatives and their constituents. Citing Article 227, the statement declared that Algeria and the four DOM would “follow the fate [le sort] of the Metropole through the immediate application of key provisions,” while for “evident economic and political reasons,” the associated territories would not. The Commission asserted that the reasons that would prevent such an application in the associated territories “are equally valid for Guadeloupe, Guyana, Martinique, and la Réunion, but here the fiction of juridical assimilation to the Metropole has won.” The Commission expressed dismay
regarding the uneven representation of France within the EEC once overseas residents were factored in, which meant that France’s representation was equal to that of Germany or Italy, despite an overseas population of 50 million. It also worried that the Treaty could allow for “abandoning the Africans” after five years. Despite these seemingly urgent concerns, the Commission deemed favorable the ratification of the Treaty.⁶

The Commission of Overseas France’s worries highlight an ambivalent understanding among French administrators, who perceived the EEC to be a tool for maintaining relevance in Africa and in global affairs, but eyed it warily as opening France to competition from Europe in Africa and beyond. This is evidenced in what appears on the surface to be a petty complaint inserted between the economic concerns voiced in the 1957 statement. The Commission was disturbed that “no one talks about, no one was scandalized” that the Treaty did not recognize French “as the European language and that […] it is placed on equal footing with German Italian, and Dutch.” The Commission argued that such a “shortcoming” would allow for “controversies” of interpretation. Further,

It is finally contrary to the well-understood interest of Europe, which, through the recognition of the universality of our language, could act as a counterbalance to the relentless effort [lutte] which leads the Anglo-American bloc […] to the success of their [language], these great realists knowing full well that wealth exchanges tend to align with spiritual exchanges and that the conquest of markets is facilitated by the conquest of minds.⁷

This moment of apparent vanity, concerning the preeminence of French as the language of Europe and the language of diplomacy, reveals larger French concerns about remaining relevant in the postwar era; this very same concern led French officials to

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⁷ CAOM 81 F 2128: Ibid.
pursue doggedly Eurafrican policies from the mid-1950s onward. Even the acceptance of Eurafrican policy within the Treaty of Rome thus appeared unsatisfactory as a guarantee of protections for the French Union and of a promise that France would maintain its privileged place at the head of such an organization (and as the most important economy of the EEC). Such concerns embody more than the upheaval of colonial practice in the postwar era. They also reflect the malaise of the waning months of the Fourth Republic. Charles de Gaulle’s return to power, precipitated by a coup attempt in Algeria in May 1958 and resulting in the emergence of the Fifth Republic, whose constitution was ratified on October 4, 1958, drew momentary confidence, yet on the whole, little changed in terms of French approaches to the maintenance of Eurafrican policy within the Treaty.  

The absence of major change in Eurafrican policy from the Fourth Republic through the early Fifth Republic speaks to the importance of business interests in France’s African holdings. Decisions taken in Brussels over implementing the Treaty of Rome in Algeria and elsewhere drew concern and critiques from industrial and agricultural interests in Algeria. Indeed, the presence of French business interests—as well as citizens—in Algeria can go a long way toward explaining the long life of the pressure to maintain Eurafrican regulations and connections between Algeria and Brussels. These continuities were pursued even as international and domestic pressure increasingly agitated for ceding Algeria. Agricultural interests found a mouthpiece in the

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8 Frédéric Turpin argues that “the cascade of independence of black African states in 1960 does not mark a profound rupture in the relations between France and these countries. On the contrary, the policy of cooperation [...] is perfectly inscribed in the logic and past practices, except that these [African] governments enjoy[ed] international sovereignty.” Turpin, “L’Association Europe-Afrique: Une ‘Bonne Affaire’ pour la France dans ses Relations avec l’Afrique (1957-1975)?,” in *L’Europe Unie et l’Afrique*, 346. My findings confirm those of Turpin but I again emphasize that historians must address how such practices were implemented in both North and sub-Saharan Africa. The case of Algeria in the Treaty of Rome is evidence of just that sort of continuity, between the French republics of the postwar and the newly sovereign states emerging across the continent of Africa.
Algerian Union of the General Confederation of Agriculture, which voiced opposition to risky delays in applying the Treaty of Rome to Algeria and expressed hope that France’s representatives within EEC institutions could research a solution “favorable to the interests of Algerian agriculture.” France’s interest and concern regarding a free trade zone extended beyond the halls of government. Private businesses also had a stake in how such policies might be implemented in the DOM-TOM. For example, the Syndical Union of Sugar and Rum Producers of la Réunion wrote to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Maurice Faure, in agreement with a position taken by the Algerian Patronat (association of managers), encouraging the government to avoid a “rupture of economic unity” which could arise from a free trade zone that did not include the DOM. Instead, it advocated for “the integration of the overseas departments at the heart of the free trade zone” and “insisted in a most pressing fashion” that the French government push this point during the upcoming debates on the zone. This, however, was a secondary wish to their larger desire: that France continue the Treaty of Rome and renounce the free trade zone project, “whose drawbacks are obvious for the overseas [departments].”

This concern continued unabated as the Six remained in talks relating to a larger free trade zone. In a lengthy report detailing the problematic consequences of such a plan,

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10 Copeland argues that European states go to war when “they believe they are facing actors who are not committed to open trade and commerce in the future.” Copeland, Economic Interdependence and War, 435. Here again his argument on economic interdependence and war can be applied to the institutions meant to uphold a Kantian perpetual peace. War was no longer on the table, but rather the future of integrated European institutions, when French business leaders encouraged regulatory policy that could undermine peaceful relations with the other members of the Six. If Jacques Marseille’s analysis of the colonial economy suggests that such policies were not actually in France’s best interest, Copeland’s assertion of “expectations” can help to explain why the French doggedly pursued such ideas.

released in December 1958, the Algerian *Patronat* invoked a declaration made by the National Council of the French *Patronat* in October of that year. Both organizations advocated rejecting the free trade zone project in its current form. The Algerian document quoted from the parent organization’s statement:

> It is time, too, for those who are attached both to the construction of Europe and to the development of harmonious relations between the Six and their partners, to denounce the intrinsic flaw [*vice interne*] of this negotiation of a free trade zone, and to demand the urgency of opening the real negotiation: that which, conforming to the spirit of the Treaty of Rome, must be engaged with by the Community with each of its European and extra-European partners, and firstly, of course, with those in Europe who traditionally maintain the most important relations with the countries of the Community.

> French industry, for its part, never thought that the institution of the Common Market should lead to the weakening of commercial relations with Great Britain, Sweden, Austria, Scandinavia, and the other states, in or outside of Europe.

> That is why it demands, as it has since the start of the debate that, once the fantasy of the free trade zone is dismissed, the real problems will be approached in a concrete fashion between the Community and each of its partners with the firm willingness to adopt, in the mutual interest of the parties, the proper measures to guarantee the development of exchanges.\(^\text{12}\)

Protections would mitigate risks of Algeria being subsumed by unfair trade practices, including the risk, for example, of Japanese cotton being exported to an EEC state, where it would be “lightly processed” and then sold with the certificate “*Provenance CEE*.”\(^\text{13}\)

Such fears of competition were exacerbated as Belgian, Dutch, and Italian representatives in Brussels all made clear that they would oppose attempts to extend the EEC social security regime to Algerian laborers.\(^\text{14}\)

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\(^{14}\) MAF 20QO/712: Mille telegram to Donnedieu de Vabres, Cabinet – Secrétaire d’Etat et Direction Economique, 12 April 1958.
For some French officials, addressing the specific needs of Algeria within EEC regulation could help to clarify what the departments might expect from the creation of European institutions. Yet to others, specifically naming Algeria as a separate beneficiary of the EEC complicated French claims of Algérie française and risked allowing the territory to be excised from the metropole in terms of trade partnerships. One administrator offered a particularly novel solution to the chaos. Eric de Carbonnel, Permanent Representative of France before the European Communities in Brussels, suggested that “[t]he problem of the domain of the application of this regulation as it concerns Algeria can be treated by preterition.” Preterition is the rhetorical device of omission, or of feigning omission. Carbonnel thus implied that by not addressing Algeria outright—or by insisting that there was no reason for Algeria to be discussed explicitly—the French could tacitly create a legal environment in which its partners accepted the by now less-than-tenable claim on the territory’s Frenchness. France could continue its decades-old colonial practice in Algeria by claiming that metropolitan law still applied in the warring region. This appealed to Carbonnel and others, as it side-stepped the looming questions of applying the Treaty of Rome to Algeria by suggesting that no additional talks would be necessary, as it was merely a part of France.

Carbonnel’s idea was not heeded and as we shall see shortly, he himself was involved in discussions of the implementation in Algeria of Article 227. Yet other officials appeared to share his concern about how to understand Algeria in an official

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15 Daniel Lefeuvre, himself a student of Jacques Marseille, took up Marseille’s inquiry into the calculus of the colonies and applied it specifically to Algeria. He concluded that French authorities clung to Algeria for as long as it remained a “strategic interest.” These state interests in Algeria, in some ways separate from pure economic interests that might have led France to cede Algerian autonomy earlier, can help to explain the attention paid by French officials to how Algeria would be understood within the wording of the Treaty of Rome. Lefeuvre, Chère Algérie, 483-484.

context. In late May 1958, Jacques Pélissier, the Director of Agriculture and Forests in Algeria, complained to the Minister of Agriculture in Paris. The working group charged with a study of the problems of integrating French agricultural policy within the European Common Market had inadvertently stumbled because of the litany of juridical definitions. Pélissier lamented:

In certain already completed reports, Algeria is considered an overseas territory, which causes confusion, as the overseas territories are associated with the Common Market, while Algeria is integrated into it (Article 227 of the Treaty of Rome). Algeria is even sometimes treated [assimilée] as a foreign country, meaning a third-party state, in [relation] to the Common Market.17

Pélissier argued that uniform terminology would “definitively clarify[y] a situation that will be susceptible to creating unfortunate confusion.”18 Even within French ministries, it proved increasingly difficult to establish how Algeria’s legal relation to France—and, by extension, to Europe—might be understood.

Indeed, internally and in the halls of Brussels, French administrators avoided labelling Algeria as a TOM or DOM, even as it was clear that they did not view it as a North African Alpes-Martimes, either. For the French, the stakes were multiple, and ambiguity was perhaps as useful as it was perplexing.19 The official French claims that Algeria comprised three departments like any other, though undermined by the denial of full citizenship rights to the vast majority of the departments’ residents, would offer administrators a legal claim in Brussels claiming all European regulations for Algeria.

18 CAOM 81 F 2255: Ibid.
19 Farid Azfar asserts the usefulness of confusion, and its importance as a subject of historical study. He argues that “as confusion allowed for creative license in matters of punishment, it could equally prevent or facilitate execution.” The openings and possibilities generated by a lack of coherent legal policy in early 18th-century England would be apparent in the otherwise quite different legal landscape of postwar European integration negotiations. “Genealogy of an Execution: The Sodomite, the Bishop, and the Anomaly of 1726,” The Journal of British Studies 51, 3 (July 2012): 577.
This was not without its pitfalls. Were French officials to acknowledge that Algeria was indeed not the same as a metropolitan department, they would promote a reading of its juridical status that subverted the very reasoning for France’s deep embroilment in Algeria’s war for independence. Were they to insist fully on Algeria’s Frenchness, domestic policies would need to shift to incorporate the millions of new citizens.20

Attention to the Treaty of Rome’s operation within Algeria only increased in the months that followed. By early 1959, administrators like Jacques Donnedieu de Vabres, Secretary General of the Interministerial Committee, and Salah Bouakour, Delegate General of the Government in Algeria, Adjunct Secretary General for Economic Affairs, met to discuss what provisions of the Treaty, including but not limited to Article 227 Section 2, would be extended to Algeria. Vabres declared it “easy to see, there are many questions, some of them quite difficult,” and he urged that the issue be dealt with quickly.21 Gilles Warnier de Wailly of the Secrétariat Général of Algeria, to whom Vabres communicated a lengthy memo about the clauses that might apply in Algeria, replied with a hint of disdain, or at least frustration, suggesting that he had already signaled the issues now being flagged by Vabres. De Wailly wrote, “The implementation of the Treaty of Rome in fact still poses, for Algeria, a series of very poorly managed problems, in my opinion.” Pointing out that he had told René Brouillet of the Foreign Affairs Ministry in October that the question must be quickly examined, he wrote that little was done, “even in Algeria […] as far as I know.” Further, noting that Bouakour

20 For evolving notions of citizenship and subjecthood, see Héloïse Finch-Boyer, “‘The Idea of the Nation Was Superior to Race’: Transforming Racial Contours and Social Attitudes and Decolonizing the French Empire from La Réunion, 1946–1973,” French Historical Studies 36, 1 (Winter 2013): 109-140.
21 AN 20000293/4 (déroitation): Jacques Donnedieu de Vabres to Gilles Warnier de Wailly, Secrétariat Général de l’Algérie, Mission d’Etudes, ”Note sur les dispositions du Traité de Rome relatives à l’Algérie,” 10 February 1959. A copy was also sent to Paul Delouvrier.
had charged a colleague with studying the issue, he expressed doubt that the “fonctionnaire” would be up to the task. That being said, de Wailly did have a plan of action. At the behest of Henry Ingrand, Secretary General for Algerian Affairs, de Wailly had reorganized the study mission before the Secretary General for Algerian Affairs, and “I proposed to him a program of work where the application of the Treaty of Rome in Algeria is high on the agenda [figure en bonne place].” This study unit, “naturally in close relation with the General Delegation in Algiers, with you, and the various interested services in Paris,” would have three major tasks:

- to predict the conditions of application of certain provisions of the Treaty
- to negotiate the very application of certain points of the Treaty
- in all likelihood to renegotiate certain provisions that are not satisfactory.

He concluded his letter by pointedly noting that “it is difficult to imagine that the Algerian market will be open to European products, but that the European labor market is not open to Algerian workers.”

Bouakour put the confusion and exclusion in dire terms. He penned a letter to the office of Algerian Affairs within the Prime Ministry, writing that he had previously highlighted the “very serious dangers [inconvénients très graves]” of the omission of Algerian production from the “propositions concerning the development and implementation of the common agricultural policy, established to conform with Article 43 of the treaty instituting the European Economic Community.” Bouakour warned of the problematic effects on “key sectors,” notably cereals, fruits, and vegetables, because the resources and needs of France were only assessed using figures of metropolitan production. “This could lead to a belief that the French market is a long-term, massive

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22 CAOM 81 F 188: De Wailly to Jacques Donnedieu de Vabres, 12 February 1959.
importer of durum wheat, as well as of other categories of fruits and vegetables […], not at all taking into account Algerian production, notably in regards to citrus fruit.” This risked “distort[ing] the common agricultural policy and the external commerce policy of the European Economic Community.” What’s more, Bouakour argued, this exclusionary tactic was “against the spirit that reigned during the preparatory work of the Treaty of Rome, and especially the principles laid out during the Conference of Stresa, which resulted in regrouping in a single and very great French market the supply of the Metropole and Algeria.” To remedy this, Bouakour advocated presenting documentation incorporating both Metropolitan and Algerian production and that all documents be sent to the services of the General Delegation for Algeria to allow them to give input if necessary.23

At its worst, then, preparing for Brussels regulations to extend to Algeria jeopardized French goals for these extrametropolitan departments. Conversely, other French officials continued to argue that Algeria’s integration with the EEC served to prove the very Frenchness of the region. For these men, the relationship between Algeria, France, and the European Economic Community could confirm Algeria’s French quality. In 1959, the Director of Domestic and Foreign Commerce for the Adjunct Secretary General for Algerian Economic Affairs, a Mr. Marzocchi, wrote an article affirming the still-strong link between France and Algeria. Marzocchi summarized some of the elements of the EEC that were already applicable in Algeria. He expressed his hope that the expected increase in exchanges between Algeria and the Six would help Algeria’s economic development. Despite Algeria’s underdevelopment in comparison to the Six,

Marzocchi declared, “In any event, it is important not to commit the error of considering Algeria as a far-off overseas territory, merely associated with the EEC.” Marzocchi launched into a geographic explanation to argue that Algeria must be of interest to the EEC:

By its proximity (the distance is not further between Luxembourg and Algeria than between Naples and Amsterdam), by the size of its population and its potential riches, by the complementary nature of some of its productions and needs in relation to industrial regions, finally, by the size [ampleur] of its commercial exchanges […], Algeria must be considered the little sibling of these young regions of the Community […] that the member states have engaged in helping to develop economically and socially.24

This discussion of geography is revealing, following in a long French tradition of defining the Mediterranean as an internal lake in a Euro-African bloc.25 In such a vision, Algeria serves as a portal to Africa, a great expanse that was the natural extension of France and of Europe. This insistence, so close to the moment of Algerian independence, suggests a willfully blind optimism or a deeply confused atmosphere among those French administrators planning for France’s future with both Algeria and Europe.

What was certain is that even with the independence of nearly the entirety of the French Community in 1960, Eurafriican policy would take on a new urgency for France. That policy would now extend to France’s former empire as well as to l’Algérie française. The use of Eurafrica after the loss of formal empire is evident in declarations by Prime Minister Michel Debré that emphasized the importance of maintaining French supremacy in the economic and political affairs of Africa, rather than ceding all power to Europe. Debré identified new French initiatives as Africa began the process of decolonization, noting that the procedure for revising the Treaty of Rome to account for

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25 See the notion of this bloc in the French and European imaginary, discussed in Chapter 1.
this shift would be time-consuming and best delayed until all of the African states concerned had acquired their independence. More pressing to Debré was that France make clear in this moment of independence that it was still the principal power interested in, and working with, these states. Debré told Minister of Foreign Affairs Maurice Couve de Murville that France should take the initiative to organize a conference regarding the preservation of ties between the EEC and Africa (“all overseas states should be represented, not only the independent states”), ensuring that this conference take place in Paris, and not Brussels. Indeed, it was important that the association between European and African states “not depend administratively on the Commission of Brussels.” As such, France’s objective should be to establish an independent secretariat, located not in Brussels but in Paris.26

Debré expressed these and other ideas to European Commission President Walter Hallstein in July 1960. In a meeting that lasted over an hour, he emphasized that France was the leader [chef de file] regarding questions about the African states:

It is not a question of wanting an exclusive territory [chasse gardée], nor of wanting to have our policy considered faultless. We accept the opened door and we accept critiques, but confidentially [secrètes]. Regarding Africa, there must not be two capitals – Brussels must not compete with Paris. There should not be outbidding; there must not even be feeling that Brussels may be a recourse against Paris.27

Debré also told Hallstein that “if there is a European sentiment, Europe must participate in the effort that is happening in Algeria.” He indicated that former attitudes of the French government (presumably not to involve the rest of the Six) had been justified, but were no longer. Considering Debré’s heavy-handed declarations, his recounting of

26 Sciences Po Fonds Couve de Murville (CM) 7: Michel Debré to Maurice Couve de Murville, 10 May 1960.
27 Sciences Po CM 7: Michel Debré to Maurice Couve de Murville, 23 July 1960.
Hallstein’s responses indicates an agreeable attitude on Hallstein’s part. Hallstein agreed with Debré that the question of a Common Agricultural Policy was a “decisive test.” He concurred that Germany should have “less ambiguity” regarding Algeria and that the Community should “avoid competition,” presumably regarding a question of Brussels versus Paris. In all, Debré declared the meeting “very cordial.” Hallstein’s conciliatory tone in 1960 masks growing dissent from France’s European partners as negotiations for implementing Article 227 began.

The Dutch came to view France’s attachment to Algeria and to its former empire as a weak point through which it could attack France, whose blocking of United Kingdom entry into the EEC angered Dutch administrators. The Dutch government contended that independence had rendered moot the association established by the Treaty of Rome between African and European states and would only accept that these countries could continue to receive aid from the Development Fund until the expiration of the application convention. Georges Gorse, Carbonnel’s replacement as France’s Permanent Representative in Brussels, worried that a negative message from the Netherlands and the EEC as a whole would imbue a sense of ill will toward Europe in newly independent African states. Ultimately, Dutch obstructionism did little to diminish France’s greater power of persuasion within the EEC. However, concerns from the Italian and German

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28 Sciences Po CM 7: Ibid.
29 Great Britain’s Commonwealth connection was cited (guilelessly) by French administrators as a reason why the British could not join the EEC. British requests to join were formally vetoed in 1963 and 1967, and it finally joined the EEC in 1973. The conclusion will touch on this briefly, but for more, see Garret Joseph Martin, General de Gaulle’s Cold War: Challenging American Hegemony, 1963-1968 (New York: Berghahn, 2013), 17-24.
30 MAEF 20QO/723: Gorse telegram to Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, 12 July 1960.
31 Later, Dutch administrators used France’s increasingly sore spot of colonial management as a way of expressing their frustration at de Gaulle’s veto over the entry of Great Britain into the EEC. MAEF 21QO/1462: Telegram signed Crouy, in The Hague, to Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, 20 June 1963.
delegations in Brussels put pressure on French officials throughout the first stage of Treaty of Rome application. It is to those tensions that this chapter now turns.

**A Maghrebi Mezzogiorno?**

Although the Treaty of Rome explicitly named Algeria and France’s DOM in Article 227, Section 2, those stipulations, as well as the ones impacting the PTOM (Section 3), had a built-in delay period of two years prior to implementation. Thus, major issues of how the Treaty of Rome might look when applied in Algeria only arose in late 1959, with tensions rising in the months that followed. An internal memorandum circulated in late 1959 prepared French officials for the demands they could make regarding the application in Algeria of certain parts of the Treaty of Rome. The French asserted that Algeria was “covered by the Treaty of Rome,” yet allowed that “the Algerian departments, even more than certain other regions of the European Economic Community, are in a state of underdevelopment that necessitates various adaptations justified by the concern to facilitate economic and social development.” However, Algeria was “totally integrated in the French customs territory [territoire douanier français],” and “was part of the European Common Market since the Treaty of Rome came into force.” In preparing for negotiations in Brussels, French administrators focused on the realms of agriculture, labor migration, and the European Social Fund. The latter two would become major sticking points in Franco-Italian relations in the early 1960s, which will be discussed shortly. The memorandum speculated that no specific discrimination regarding Algerian workers circulating in the member states would be implemented, “aside from the reservations based on public order or public security and
health.” The French would pursue a policy of quotas by profession to regulate the arrival in Algeria of member state workers. The French went further in speculating how the Treaty’s social policy might be applied in Algeria. The memorandum declared that “The objectives of the social policy defined by the Treaty correspond precisely to those with which the Government has tasked itself in Algeria.” It was here that the French made the demand that would so concern the Italians in Brussels:

Concerning the European Social Fund, it would be contrary to the stipulations of the Treaty if some kind of discrimination is exercised against workers from the Algerian departments, provided that they be employed in a European territory of the Common Market or in Algeria itself.

The memorandum pressed further on the question of the European Investment Bank, which it deemed applicable “fully and entirely” in Algeria.32

Following input from the French and their partners, the Commission submitted a proposal to the Council regarding possible application strategies. Rather than offer dates, the proposal instead suggested what policy proposals the Council should decide upon prior to implementing specific parts of the Treaty of Rome. For example, Article 40, Section 4, concerning the establishment of “one or more agricultural guidance and guarantee fund[s],” could be addressed once the Commission proposals “for working out and implementing the common agricultural policy […]” were settled, as laid out in Article 43, Section 2. The Commission suggested similar delays for decisions that should be made only once the Council settled other key areas of the Treaty, including the free circulation of labor33, the right of establishment34, liberalized movement of capital35, and

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33 Articles 48-50.
the implementation of a “common commercial policy”.

The same recommendations also addressed portions of the Treaty of Rome related to “working conditions and an improved standard of living for workers,” and the establishment of the European Social Fund.

Administrators in the Foreign Affairs Ministry’s Economic and Financial Division, Service for Economic Cooperation worried that the proposition used the phrasing “once [dès que] the Council has decided upon” to explain how these stipulations would be implemented. For instance, the application conditions of Articles 48 to 50 would be decided upon “once [the Council] has decided upon the propositions submitted by the Commission in accordance with [en vertu de] Article 49 of the Treaty.” Rather than “once,” these administrators hoped the language might be changed to “at the moment [the Council] has ruled.”

This seemingly minor change in language, might, it appears, have allowed the French to insist upon simultaneous implementation in metropolitan France and in Algeria of any relevant Treaty stipulation, thus speeding up the timeline of EEC application in the latter. The urgency officials felt appeared to contradict the mood in Paris, as metropolitan France viewed the Algerian War with increased skepticism and French authorities attempted to find a solution for the ongoing

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34 Articles 52-58.
35 Articles 67-73.
36 Articles 110-116.
37 Articles 117-122.
crisis. As mentioned earlier, 1960 also marked the independence of the AOF and AEF, leading colonial officials to take stock of how to maintain influence across the African continent.

Thus, pushing for swift implementation in Algeria and the DOM of the economic side of EEC (labor movement, excise duties, and more) appeared urgent, as did a resolution for the “social” inequalities laid bare by the anti-colonial critique of the French Community. It also allowed the French to clarify what EEC membership could entail for its extra-metropolitan territory. Applying Treaty of Rome stipulations could address concerns across the French Community and, officials hoped, draw the Algerian economy into the fold of the EEC as an impoverished region of Europe. In mid-July 1959, experts from the Six would for the first time discuss a draft for regulating the Treaty’s Article 49, regarding the free movement of laborers. In advance of that discussion, the Foreign Affairs Ministry analyzed a draft document, whose final version would need to be approved by a simple majority of the EEC Council of Ministers. Of particular note were the issues related to Algeria and Algerian workers. “These problems are essentially political” and arose because free circulation with regards to Algeria had to be subject to a special unanimous decision by the Council of Ministers, pursuant to Article 227. Thus, the draft already circulated had to be understood differently if it would or would not apply to Algeria. In particular, French officials were wary that the draft wording appeared to exclude French nationals born in Algeria from participating in EEC labor migration.

Despite internal French concerns, in Brussels, the application of the Treaty of Rome drew particular ire from Italy, with labor migration as a major sticking point. Chapter 1 addressed the history of thinking through a Mediterranean world in a number of fashions, including depicting the Mediterranean as a lake in a Euro-African continent. This phenomenon emerged in Treaty of Rome discussions, as well. Italy, for French officials, with its impoverished southern regions and prosperous, relatively industrial north, was not unlike France, with its prosperous metropole and the undeveloped Algerian expanse. Indeed, when French officials pushed for Algeria’s inclusion within the EEC, the Mezzogiorno offered a useful line of argumentation: if underdeveloped Italy could be a part of the Common Market, why not the poorest region of France?\(^4^2\) Even prior to the Treaty of Rome’s signing, officials attempted to cast it in this light, declaring that Algeria was not a territory or far-off colonial land, but “the most underdeveloped” region of the European community. The Agricultural Study Commission declared it to be “not a ‘poor country,’ but an insufficiently developed province.”\(^4^3\) Once discussions were underway for the Treaty’s implementation, such attempts at normalizing Algeria as another underdeveloped part of Europe continued. Jean Poudéroux, the director of the Maison de l’Agriculture Algérienne, wrote in 1959 in the journal *Communautés et Continents*:


Why have we planned in the execution of the Common Market a transitional period if there was not one for the interior, unequal regions of the continent [des pays du continent]? And how can one not be struck by the economic opposition between Southern Italy and industrial Northern Italy, all the more with the economic situation of France or Germany? Will the harmonization between legislations and conditions of production, even the harmonization of standards of living, social legislations, be more difficult between the Algerian departments benefiting from the huge, but economically sound [valable], effort that France is ready to pursue, and the European economy, [pursuing] the harmonization of living standards between the peasant of Sicily or the Mezzogiorno and the cereal grower [céréaliculteur] of Northern France?

Thus, Pouderoux argued, it was wrong to oppose “this prolongation of France in Africa” entering the EEC, considering that underdevelopment existed even on the European continent. Rather, he concluded, the EEC would find in Algeria “a territory of economic expansion indispensable to the pursuit of its internal expansion.” Further still, France’s pursuit of the Constantine Plan was, in Pouderoux’s eyes, an important corollary to French expectations for European aid, rather than a competing policy.44

For the French, the Mezzogiorno’s economic plight offered a method of normalizing the presence of an impoverished, seemingly unruly region within the EEC. For Italian officials, the very fact that Algeria could be linked to the Mezzogiorno threatened Italian trade and labor migration opportunities and access to development aid.45 This came to the fore when the Six gathered in Brussels in March 1960 to assess the proposition for application described above. All members except Italy agreed to the proposals, with the Italian delegation signaling its concern over the “regulations relative

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45 Italians, of course, were an important guest worker population, notably in West Germany. Rita Chin argues that policies regarding guest workers cannot be treated as “tangential.” Rather, she claims that “these migrants occupied a central place in the most important and enduring question of the postwar period: How would West German national identity be reconstituted after the Third Reich?” The furor over the rights of movement not just for Italians to Germany but for Algerians to continental Europe forces us to expand this question. We can ask not only how the presence of European migrants might help to form postwar European identities, but how the possibility of non-European migrant groups claiming European rights might further rewrite identity in the postwar. Rita Chin, The Guest Worker Question in Postwar Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 7.
to the social fund and the free circulation of laborers,” which it did not want set in place until “before the end of the 2nd stage [étape]” of the Treaty’s implementation, scheduled for December 31, 1965. In private meetings between Italian and French officials in Brussels, the Italian Permanent Representative to the European Communities, Giovanni Falchi, indicated that his government had some room for negotiation, but “remained opposed to the application of the social fund in Algeria within two years.” Falchi pointed out that “Articles 124 to 127 of the Treaty were conceived to help Italy in its fight against unemployment and are thus an important element in the political equilibrium of the Common Market.” The “extension of the funds to Algeria” would “reduce the expected advantages” for the Italians. Gorse, Falchi’s counterpart, sympathized with the Italian position, noting that Falchi’s characterization of the fund’s role in negotiations for the Treaty was correct. For the sake of “certain appeasement to the Italians,” Gorse suggested that indeed, the French delegation could negotiate a two-year delay, with certain technical components of the fund not accessible to Algeria during the first stage of Treaty implementation. Despite this delay, we should understand France’s insistence on the eventual application as part and parcel with the colonial practices that France had used to govern Algeria since the previous century. Inclusion in the Treaty, even with stipulations or delays, still supported France’s claim to Algerian soil. This, despite a brutal war now entering its sixth year.


The Italians were not alone in challenging a French vision of Article 227’s application. François Morin of the SGCI sent a memo and accompanying documentation in mid-1960 signaling that West Germany questioned France’s assertion that Algeria be considered part of the favored social security zone. Morin found the Germans’ juridical basis for this argument “nonexistent,” and he noted that it was “necessary for the French delegation to reaffirm clearly its position.”48 In the German line of argumentation, only those dispositions named in Article 227 Section 2 were applicable in Algeria. Any other application of a disposition would have to be unanimously approved by the Council.49 Considering that the debate over whether the Treaty might apply within Algeria was in full swing, such an assertion would have disturbed French officials in Paris and Brussels.

The negotiations led to Italy offering France two options. Either they could see the “extension to Algeria of the whole of the Treaty’s social dispositions at the end of 1963,” or they could “accept simultaneous application of these dispositions in the metropole and in Algeria, except for the Social Fund which will only apply in Algeria in four years [from now].” Cognizant that not accepting one of the Italian offers would jeopardize Italian opinion of France in Brussels and cause a delay in the application currently in the works of other Treaty stipulations, the SGCI, with the Représentant du Secrétariat Général pour les Affaires Algériennes weighing in, deemed neither of the two proposals acceptable.50 The SGCI, however, instructed Gorse to tell the Italians that the

second solution would be acceptable were the delay period reduced from four to two years and deemed the French “concession” “the most reasonable.”

But when French Permanent Representative Jean Mille and the Italian diplomat Attilio Cattani met, Cattani delivered little promise of further Italian negotiation. Cattani reiterated the importance of the Social Fund to the Italian decision to ratify the Treaty of Rome in the first place. Gorse opined that if Italy maintained its position, French authorities would have to decide “if it is preferable to leave tentatively without solution the problems posed by the application of Article 227 or if it is appropriate [s’il convient] to accept the most recent propositions made by the Italian side.”

For the French, embracing a stalemate appeared to hold as much appeal as making concessions, and this was their tactic in the ensuing months.

In January 1961, Gorse warned that the issue of extending labor circulation regulation to Algeria “posed the larger problem of the relations to establish between Algeria and Europe.” In a letter to the Direction of Economic Affairs within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he noted that the Italian side remained as intransigent as when he reported on the Mille-Cattani meeting of the previous year. Falchi had reiterated the Italian position to Gorse, raising new concerns for the French representative to Brussels. “[I]n a personal capacity,” Falchi emphasized that he had not ruled out the possibility of extending the Social Fund to Algeria at the end of 1963. However, he went on, Italy’s Minister of Labor was “preoccupied by the extension to Algeria and to Algerians of the dispositions concerning the free circulation of laborers. The evolution of events ma[de]
him fearful [of] the arrival in Europe of numerous Muslim elements who can compete with the Italian workforce in Northern Italy.” Although the Italian Foreign Minister had not forgotten the compromise offer from the previous year, which would have encompassed extending to Algeria the labor migration stipulations of the Treaty, it appeared nonetheless that it was not a given that it would be possible “to soothe [apaiser] all of the fears emerging in other administrations.” Falchi suggested that the French “not push too much [n ’insistons pas trop] in the coming weeks.” As Gorse explained:

[Italy] fears, in fact, that too much haste on our part will only awaken in the other [European] delegations concerns that will harden [raider] the whole of the positions and even compromise the slim advantages that the Italian government expects from the execution of the Treaty in this area. Mr. Falchi hinted that in an exchange for some discretion on our part, his government might consider the possibility of supporting us, one or two months after the adoption of the regulation, such that that the principal stipulations of this be immediately extended to Algeria. Certain detailed clauses must however be reviewed, for example those concerning the definition of family.

Gorse reported that a French colleague had “expressed surprise and worry” over “this calling into question of that which until present seemed settled.” Further, he told the Italians that French delegations had “never made a mystery of their intention” to push for the free circulation of labor regulations to be extended to Algeria. Gorse warned that he feared an “impasse” if France maintained its current position, noting that “it is, in fact, clear” that no additional concessions would come from the Italians. As a possible solution, he suggested that problems be treated “one by one” to “obtain for each the best possible solution,” or alternatively, to place the “whole of the problem” of Article 227 back onto the agenda for the next meeting of the Council of Ministers. Gorse cautiously favored the latter idea.\(^53\)

The French continued to view the Italian opposition as “paralyzing” to the application of EEC social policy in Algeria. Nevertheless, “considering it is impossible to overcome [vaincre] this opposition, the Minister of Foreign Affairs has asked us to accept the Italian counterproposals that will slow the application of the Treaty of Rome in this area.” There was more than a hint of resignation in this observation:

The free circulation of laborers “within the limits of available employment” is an important theoretical guarantee [garantie théorique importante] for the immigration to Europe of Algerian laborers. In practice, in the measure where the essential outlet remains metropolitan France, this guarantee will not bring any new good to Algeria [n’apportera rien de bien nouveau]. In contrast, it would allow, at least in theory, the introduction of unqualified Italian laborers into the Algerian labor market.

Therefore, it would be ideal to not put off making a decision regarding Algeria’s place within the Common Market. The extension of social regulations to Algeria should be settled “at the same time as that of the Member States for their European territory […].”

Christian Delaballe, Secretary of State charged with Algerian Affairs, noted that if France took “an intransigent position” it would only “obstruct the problem” and “prevent us from obtaining” results. Thus, he backed accepting the first Italian proposition, pushing for the extension of the social policy provisions to Algeria by the end of 1963. He reasoned that the possible benefits that would arise from swift access to the Social Fund would have “an appreciable interest for the betterment of the technical level of the Algerian labor force.”

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Sources of Aid as Sources of Dispute

For over a year beginning in mid-1959, France risked exacerbating tensions with West Germany, in many ways its most important ally among the Six, in order to secure greater amounts of aid for Algeria. In early June, officials in the Prime Minister’s office reached out to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, expressing hope that Algeria could be included among the beneficiaries of the EEC Development Fund. This had alarming repercussions, because France had explicitly declared, as recorded in Article 16 of the Convention of Application, that “it is the intention of the [French] government not to request the intervention of the development fund outlined in Article 1 of the Convention except for the overseas countries and territories under the purview of the Minister of Overseas France.” Such a demarcation would effectively exclude Algeria and the DOM, yet it appeared possible to one French official within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that France might rescind this declaration. The drawbacks, however, could prove considerable, and did indeed arise throughout the ensuing debate. These would include the risk to funding earmarked for sub-Saharan Africa and Madagascar and the possibility that Algeria would not obtain funds from the European Investment Bank. However, “these considerations can only be appreciated by taking into account the political benefit that the French government can expect to draw from the support that the European Economic Community will give [France] in the Algerian departments.”

Nonetheless, Orphuls of the Foreign Affairs Ministry predicted to Carbonnel that this change in particular risked relations with West Germany, for whom France’s guarantee of only

\[\text{MAEF 20QO/726: Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Direction des Affaires Économiques et Financières, note for Olivier Wormser and Valery, 4 June 1959.}\]
seeking these funds for the PTOM was an important component in agreeing to the Eurafrican policies of the Treaty of Rome in the first place.\footnote{MAEF 20QO/726: Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, outgoing telegram to Ambassade de France, Bonn 30 June 1959.}

Orphuls’ prediction was borne out. François Seydoux of the French embassy in Bonn recalled that during the Bundestag ratification debates over the Treaty of Rome, in June 1957, the Socialist opposition had approved of France’s prior restrictions to the fund’s use. A reversal would bolster SPD critiques that the government was “indirectly financ[ing] the Algerian War […].”\footnote{MAEF 20QO/726: François Seydoux, Bonn, telegram to Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, 3 July 1959. This telegram is one of the only instances I found in the archives that overtly acknowledged the existence of a war in Algeria.} In an interview with Der Spiegel in August, Ferhat Abbas launched just such a claim against the Bonn government, leading Western German officials, according to a Deutsche Presse-Agentur report, to complain about France’s divergence to Algeria of some of the EEC development money destined for the TOM. West Germany contributed $200 million to this fund.\footnote{MAEF 20QO/726: Leduc, Bonn, telegram to Delahaye, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, 18 August 1959.} Despite the objections of the Germans, by October the Delegate General in Algeria informed the SGCI that roughly a fifth of the Development Fund (62 billion francs, a quarter of the credits “returning to France”) could be funneled to Algerian projects.\footnote{MAEF 20QO/726: Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Direction des Affaires Economiques et Financières, Service de Coopération Economique, note for the Minister, ”Extension à l’Algérie des opérations du Fonds de Développement de la CEE,” 3 October 1959.} That month, financial experts met at the Ministry of Economics and Finances to discuss the Common Market. Because of the discovery of more oil in Algeria (they judiciously alluded to its being found in the “Franc Zone”) since the signing of the Treaty of Rome, they agreed that the question of oil products would be called into question during tariff negotiations. The restriction of funds to Algeria was therefore “no longer justified” and these experts declared their intention to
file the first series of projects, amounting to 8 billion francs, aimed at expenditures for hospitals, schools, and other projects of a “social character.” They explained this change in part by noting that the Social Fund, from which Algeria was initially meant to benefit, was not yet in operation in 1959, owing to its rules having never been submitted by the Commission to the Council for final approval.61

West German officials in the Foreign Office, working under future Bundestag President Karl Carstens, declared that they would not consider the “unilateral revocation of the French declaration of March 24, 1957 […].” They defended the disavowal of any revocation by pointing out that the French declaration on not applying the funds to Algeria did not mention a delay or the possibility of reversal, and had “become an integral part of the application accords.” Further, the guarantee was “a preliminary condition for the approval of the Treaty by the federal parliament.”62 Yet the French could argue that indeed, in 1957, then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Maurice Faure had called the French declaration “revocable,” saying that the “problem is not only juridical.” Indeed, the policy of the West German foreign affairs office was “to avoid all debate or parliamentary question about Algeria.” Thus, the French push for EEC development funds to Algeria placed “the federal government in a very delicate position.”63 The French, though cognizant of placing West German officials in this situation, did not back down. An administrator in the Foreign Affairs Ministry’s Economics and Finances Division, Service of Economic Cooperation (DE-CE), declared

61 CAEF B 0062126 (formerly B 25343): Ministère de l’Economie et Affaires Financières, Direction des Finances Extérieures, Compte-rendu de la Réunion des Conseillers Financiers [Conseillers Financiers], 9 October 1959.
63 MAEF 20Q/QO/726: Ibid.
that the “juridical position of the federal government is in reality weak.” Rather, it was clear from Article 16 of the Treaty of Rome, regarding the application, that “the unilateral declaration […] was of a revocable nature […].” Yet convincing the Germans would not just be a juridical endeavor. There were “considerations of a political sort, changes in information on the Algerian problem [les données du problème algérien] that must lead them to adopt a new attitude.”

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs approached West German objections with a measure of disdain. In response to an aide-mémoire from the German government, the ministry dismantled German declarations that it would not consider the French revocation regarding Algeria and the European Development Fund. Not only was Germany wrong to claim that the unilateral declaration was not revocable, but it was “inexact to pretend that this declaration was ‘adopted’ and had become ‘an integral part of the Treaty.’” If the Bundestag worried that during its ratification debates it had assured authorities of the French declaration not to extend the funds to Algeria, that was not France’s problem, but rather of an “internal order […].” Citing Faure’s speech, as well as vague wording in a declaration by the National Assembly member Paul Alduy that same month, the French thus rejected out of hand any West German claim to the unacceptable nature of France’s about-face regarding the funds’ beneficiaries. The French were unafraid to invoke the Constantine Plan, and suggest that their reversal on the funding question was integral to

its success. An unsigned memo likely penned by Michel Debré proclaimed that “the problem of aid to Algeria takes a scandalous appearance [aspect].”

Yet West German industrial interests could prove beneficial to France’s goals in Algeria. Kattenstroth, the Director of Mines, Energy, and the ECSC within West Germany’s Ministry of the Economy, hinted that Economics Minister Erhard might visit the Sahara to survey gas and petrol production. This could “have a profound influence on the German economy regarding cooperation with France in the domains of research and exploitation of Saharan petrol,” but was delicate for West Germany. Erhard himself planned to visit Cairo in 1960, and “wanted, of course, to maintain and develop commercial relations between the Federal Republic and the Arab countries.” Indeed, West German economic interests in Algeria were in no short supply. Investments and manufacturing outfits included petrochemicals (Hoecht) and shoe factories (Salamander, Dillman).

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67 AN 2 DE 69 (Fonds Debré; in the midst of recataloguing at time of consultation, June 2015): “Note sur la Politique Européenne,” 30 June 1960. Later in this memo, he wrote “I believe it necessary to recall to what degree this policy of supranationality is at once unrealistic and dangerous. […] France drowned in European Communities can no longer be at the head of the [French] Community. The union of France and Algeria is in itself compromised.”
68 For a fuller account of West German attitude toward Algeria, see Mathilde Von Bulow, West Germany, Cold War Europe and the Algerian War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016).
70 MAEF 20QO/726: Seydoux, Bonn, to Couve de Murville, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, “Visite de M. Coup de Fréjac le 18 Décembre 1959, Entretien avec MM. Leduc, Rivain, Biclet, Schricke, Féquant et Morizet,” p.j. to 24 December 1959. Hansen and Jonsson argue that all members of the Six stood to gain from Eurafriican policy and strongly emphasize the enthusiasm of a variety of non-French leaders, notably Spaak and Adenauer. While I contend that French goals took precedence, the presence of West German firms highlights the economic possibilities for France’s partners were open trade established between the EEC and France’s empire. Hansen and Jonsson, “Imperial Origins of European Integration and the Case of Eurafrica: A Reply to Gary Marks’ ‘Europe and Its Empires,’” Journal of Common Market Studies 50, 6 (Nov. 2012), 1029.
Jacques Coup de Fréjac, then Chef du département des relations publiques de la Caisse d’équipement pour le développement de l’Algérie, proposed to French foreign affairs administrators a push for wooing German and Austrian business leaders, all while maintaining close contact with the ministry. Unlike French administrators within the government, French business leaders were less opaque regarding the upheaval in Algeria. Despite his encouraging plan to increase German interests in Algeria, Coup de Fréjac also suggested that the French state grant a “political guarantee” for metropolitan enterprises that agreed to install themselves in Algeria. This guarantee would cover two risks:

- Of secession, leading to, for example, the nationalization of the enterprise in Algeria and the loss of invested capital.
- Of an evolution of the situation that compromises the possibilities of trade outlets that existed at the moment when the enterprise in Algeria was created.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs emphasized that “for reasons easy to understand, no publicity shall be done on this subject” and that its possible extension to foreign investments had not yet been examined.71

However, perhaps because of the deeply tenuous situation, French officials concerned themselves more with aid contributions than with private investment, foreign or domestic. As French Foreign Affairs administrators continued to negotiate with West Germany, potential solutions arose regarding the European Development Fund question, but their ramifications appeared to overshadow their advantages. In January 1960, the German foreign affairs official Hilger van Scherpenberg offered to Carbonnel that France reduce its contributions to the European Development Fund by the amount it hoped to see allotted to Algeria, in a compromise that would “permit the end of an episode [un

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dossier], bothersome for its political implications, and whose existence weighed on Franco-German relations.” Despite its freeing French money to move toward Algerian development projects, the solution appeared problematic to the French. Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials cited no fewer than five issues, leading them to conclude that the German proposition “definitively presented more drawbacks than advantages.”

First, because the contribution amounts by the Six to the Development Fund were fixed within the Convention of Application, any revision might open the door to major modifications, and even put at risk the fund itself. Second, France would no longer be equal to West Germany in terms of contributions to the fund. With West Germany as the stronger contributor, “its prestige among the associated African states, currently lowered by its policy regarding coffee imports, would find itself raised to a good level.” Third, African states associated with the EEC would view it as “a unilateral decision on our part [...].” Fourth, reducing French contributions would effectively contradict French claims of the importance of a “community effort” to aid underdeveloped countries, and particularly the PTOM. Fifth, the German solution might further alienate France’s partners, rather than encourage solidarity “with our action in Algeria.” Jacques Donnedieu de Vabres of the SGCI opposed van Scherpenberg’s proposition, suggesting instead that the Prime Minister ask the Minister of Finances to set aside the “necessary credits” for projects planned for Algeria in 1960.

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72 However, we will see a similar calculation in the conclusion, explicitly made by French officials.  
74 MAEF 20QO/726: Ibid.  
The question of European aid to Algeria dogged French-West German relations, and bled into personal disputes between leaders of the two countries. On June 7, 1960, Bonn announced that it would recall to the Austwärtiges Amt Helmut Allardt, second-in-command at the Direction of Overseas Countries and Territories in the EEC (DG VIII). Allardt had reportedly clashed with the French director of the commission, Robert Lemaignen, over future relations between the EEC and independent African states. Allardt, a longtime civil servant, had previously served as German ambassador in Jakarta, as head of the West Germany’s Foreign Affairs Ministry’s Near, Middle, and Far-East Department, and as head of service for commercial policy in the same ministry. The French-published *Marchés Tropicaux et Méditerranéens* applauded his service and his ambition, but noted he “kn[ew] more the Asian mentality than the African mentality” and that he and his African contacts did not enjoy mutual goodwill.

Lemaignen’s chief of staff Jacques Ferrandi’s memories of Allardt confirm the magazine’s depiction of an ambitious functionary who was decidedly not a team player. Ferrandi described his role within Lemaignen’s office as that of a right-hand man, and said that in all instances, Lemaignen passed ideas by him and expected Ferrandi to speak for him. In the entire DG VIII, only Allardt did not treat Ferrandi in this way, going so far as to reject a note of agreement that Ferrandi had signed on Lemaignen’s behalf. Ferrandi recollected a haughty German and faulted Allardt’s personality for his dismissal.

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79 Palayret and Legendre, interview with Jacques Ferrandi, HAEU Web site.
The last straw came when Lemaignen was away from Brussels, and Ferrandi opened a letter from Allardt addressed to Lemaignen, responding to a recent speech the latter had given regarding Europe and development aid. According to Ferrandi, the letter read, in part:

I absolutely disagree with this idea. [...] Obviously, one can see that given your origins, your background, the business world, etc., and given that I myself, I am of a *corps noble*, I am from Foreign Affairs, from diplomacy, that there are profound differences between us…

Ferrandi said he had the letter translated into French and sent to Lemaignen, who was “naturally distraught.” This led directly to Lemaignen demanding Allardt’s resignation.80

However, West German press coverage of the Allardt Affair was withering, as they faulted personal and political causes of his dismissal, and portrayed it as an example of both French and German managerial missteps in Brussels. Allardt “felt too beholden to Lemaignen,” who demanded that Allardt pass all speeches and some correspondence by him. Thus, although Allardt “was totally ready to follow the instructions of the Commission,” he could not abide its “becoming the executive organ of a single member of the Commission.” Allardt clashed with Lemaignen, the former of whom held “a more flexible attitude” toward African states. This included Allardt suggesting direct contact between the EEC and African states, while Lemaignen emphasized that the former colonizer (in these instances, France) would continue to serve as interlocutor.81 One newspaper reported that “Mr. Allardt recently declared in private that we are making fools of ourselves regarding the current evolution in Africa, in seeking to apply the letter

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81 AN AG/5(F)/2558 Fonds Foccart: Translation of dépêche de l’Agence DPA en Provenance de Bruxelles, transmis par le bureau de presse et d’information de Bonn pour information au Cabinet du Président Hallstein, "Motifs de la Démission d’Allardt de la Commission de la CEE," 8 June 1960.
of the EEC Treaty.”

Die Welt attributed the falling out to a speech Allardt delivered in Milan in March 1960, in which he argued that it was “dangerous” to distinguish between African states that were or were not associated with the EEC, and that it was important to avoid improving EEC relations with associated states to the “detriment of countries that are not associated or that do not want to be associated.” This comment “seems to have thus triggered a personal controversy with the French commissioner, Mr. Lemaginen.” This was, according to Die Welt, the first time that a German in a position of leadership had left his post in the EEC, and it warned that the affair “takes on even more significance still because of its purely political importance for the Euroafrican question.”

Marchés Tropicaux et Méditerranéens deemed this same speech to have “undeniably exceeded his jurisdiction.”

Business-focused German publications were particularly disgusted. The Industriekurier contended that the exclusion of states like Guinea, which “denounced the still existing association” with the EEC, should not be excluded from the EEC development fund. Any such exclusion “would be a contradiction with the basis of the political idea that pushed for the fund’s creation.” Industriekurier deemed it “unfortunate” that France continued to hold control of the $581 million in aid, “the large part of which still remains in the fund’s coffers.” The newspaper intoned: “From the political and moral perspective, it is irrelevant whether these countries and territories now have a different status and a new name. Mr. Lemaignen should here walk in step with

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82 AN AG/5(F)/2558 Fonds Foccart: Translated excerpt of “Brouille à la Commission de la CEE au Sujet d’Anciens Territoires Coloniaux ; L’Allemand s’en va – le Français reste’Je voudrais voir vos lettres,’” Westfälische Rundschau, 9 June 1960.
aller de pair avec] the times, even if he does not wish to walk in step with Ambassador Allardt.” 85 The Volkswirt alluded to German contributions to the Fonds de développement pour les PTOM (FEDOM). According to Volkswirt, Germany and the other members of the Six agreed to supporting the FEDOM “on the condition that all members of the European Economic Community would be treated on equal footing in the associated African territories, regarding the execution of development projects authorized by the Fund.” This had been negotiated, as the French insisted on reserving for French firms the “technical control” of these projects. To extend an olive branch, the French then suggested that the projects could go to foreign firms, “on the condition that they partner with French firms.” This proposal also being rejected, the French government refused, “for an entire year, to sign the financial conventions already passed between the Commission and the overseas countries. This is the reason why, of the $581 million dollars the Fund may dispose of by the end of 1962, only a few million have been used so far.” The Volkswirt critique of the FEDOM carried with it a Cold War threat: in its current form, the FEDOM “more resembles a welfare fund [caisse de bienfaisance] than an investment fund; the requests for aid cover a multitude of small projects without connections between them and without a plan for the whole. If it wants to combat effectively Soviet competition, the European Economic Community cannot restrict itself in the long run to the role of health agency [organisme sanitaire].” Volkswirt and other

85 AN AG/5(F)/2558 Fonds Foccart: Translated excerpt of “La toile de fond de l’affaire Allardt,” Industriekurier, 11 June 1960.
newspapers also brought up the variety of associations pursued by the governments of Togo, Cameroon, and Guinea, all recently independent, and the EEC.\textsuperscript{86}

For Germans, this affair not only inspired frustration with France, it led to introspection regarding West German involvement in Europe. The \textit{Neue Rhein Zeitung} ran an analysis under the headline, “At the EEC in Brussels, We Remain Amongst Ourselves.”\textsuperscript{87} It heartily critiqued Hallstein for “very simply refusing to back \textit{suivre} Allardt […].” The article asserted that meetings between government officials in Bonn had concluded that:

The Federal Republic cannot complain about its involvement [in Brussels], because the president of the EEC, Hallstein, is German. But he is, in reality, European.\textsuperscript{88} This attitude is entirely comprehensible, but leads to a certain short-sightedness [\textit{étroitesse de vues}]: because the French members of the EEC remain French above all.

In addition, in Brussels, the French most often outrank the Germans—Hallstein aside. Bonn sends to Europe functionaries or even politicians who have become superfluous […]. In contrast, France often sends to Brussels, as in the case of Lemaignen, the opposite of Allardt \textit{[le vis-à-vis d’Allardt]}—influential industrialists. These men are ready to put up with a shortfall for the length of their activity.

Such critiques are striking, as they demonstrate early strategy in the EEC regarding whose interests might be upheld in Brussels. It echoes a question that can be located in


\textsuperscript{87} For more on this newspaper and other West German journalistic accounts of the Algerian War, see Von Bulow, \textit{West Germany, Cold War Europe and the Algerian War}, 122-123.

\textsuperscript{88} The current discord in Brussels over Donald Tusk’s reelection bears a somewhat striking resemblance to this critique, albeit with key differences. In this 1960 commentary, West Germany was at a disadvantage for sending “Europeans” to Brussels, rather than statesmen with avowedly national (and hopefully economic) interests. In March 2017, 27 of the EU’s 28 governments voted for Donald Tusk to serve another term as European council president. Tusk himself is Polish and the only country to vote against his second term was Poland. The highly unusual instance of every state other than his own supporting him is evidence of recent anti-European trends, particularly in the Polish Law and Justice Party (PiS). But there is a vestige of the West German critique of the apparent short-sightedness of entrusting “Europe” to “the Europeans.” Jennifer Rankin, “Poland Reacts with Fury to Re-Election of Donald Tusk,” \textit{The Guardian}, 9 March 2017, accessed 15 March 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/09/donald-tusk-re-elected-as-european-council-president-despite-polish-opposition?CMP=share_btn_link.
negotiations for the Treaty of Rome: was the EEC meant to offer a supranational system for cooperation and shared influence, or was it a new forum in which individual states could attempt to bolster domestic initiatives?  

Allardt’s replacement, Heinrich Hendus, transferred from his post as West German Consul General in Algiers, was reported to have “excellent relations” with French authorities in Algiers and news of his appointment was met with overt pleasure by French foreign affairs officials.  

Indeed, days before the announcement, Hallstein himself had informed Mille, through Emile Noël, that Bonn was considering Hendus for the post. In Ferrandi’s recollection, “They say that a thin pope is always replaced by a fat pope, a difficult man by a charming man.” According to Ferrandi, Hendus, was just such a man, charming, and “francophile, francophone, literally seduced by France.” Thus, French officials in Brussels, whether responding to an extreme clash of personalities or worried about imperiled relations with Africa, managed to encourage the ousting of a senior German official in favor of one more inclined to agree with their political and economic goals in Algeria.

Despite domestic pressure in Germany to take a firmer line against France, particularly in light of the Algerian War, we see in the summer of 1960 a concerted effort by French and German officials in Brussels to maintain strong links and avoid tense disagreement. Indeed, by August, the FEDOM debates appeared to quiet down. The German government informed Paris that it would lift its opposition to financing Algerian


91 MAEF 20QO/726: Gorse telegram to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 3 June 1960.

92 Palayret and Legendre, interview with Jacques Ferrandi, HAEU Web site.
projects using the European Development Fund. In advance of the official announcement, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs prepared a letter to send to Brussels, detailing for the European Commission what sorts of projects would benefit. These would include “soil restoration,” the improvement of 55,000 hectares in “sheep country,” the purchase of 186 tractors for agricultural insurance companies, and the construction of some 60,000 rural dwellings across Algeria. The letter also noted that “accounting for the urgency […] of some of these operations,” the French government had already taken up the costs of other projects, including building two of six proposed agricultural schools. In contrast, it was no longer going to request funding for the construction of nine hospitals, although it did still intend on pursuing financing for a 400-bed hospital in Guelma.

Yet the French feared that this openness to funding Algeria could negatively impact relations with sub-Saharan Africa, revealing that Eurafrica had the possibility to divide, even as the French hoped it would unite, the francophone world. In Brussels, Mille suggested that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs prepare at the very least an unofficial position in order to react to issues that could arise. For example, Development Fund money funneled toward Algeria would necessarily reduce the amount that other French Community states could claim. Lemaignen suggested that France should “show these states the reasons we have revisited our declaration of intention of 1957 in order to mitigate their reactions.” The question also might arise of the timing of aid to Algeria and the DOM, and whether these departments could claim funds for the entirety of the five

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years of the application of the convention. Thus, accord with Germany did not alleviate Eurafrican concerns, but only moved the site of contention from Brussels to the French Community.

Conclusion

By pushing against their Italian and German allies, French officials shunted aside diplomatic niceties in favor of bolstering their relations with Algeria. In pursuit of a policy that accommodated Algeria’s position within the EEC—dubbed “a bit hybrid” by the agricultural official Pouderoux—French officials made clear their goal to maintain French predominance in Algerian affairs. To an almost shocking degree, thanks in no small part to the lack of foresight regarding the eventual exodus of the vast majority of French citizens from Algeria to France in 1962, these administrators continued to insist that Algeria enjoy a privileged status with the Treaty of Rome, even as the Evian Accord negotiations were underway. In the end, it was not Dutch pressure, Italian complaints, or German worries that would halt the implementation of the Treaty in the Algerian territories. Rather, when Algeria was declared independent on July 3, 1962, the future of France’s Algerian-focused Eurafrican policy was radically changed. The next chapter will ask how statesmen in independent Algeria came to view claims of Eurafrica as useful to bolstering their young economy. It will also examine reasons why France and, to a lesser degree, its partners appeared open to maintaining strong ties with independent Algeria into the mid-1960s.

95 MAEF 20QO/726: Mille, telegram to Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, 23 August 1960.
Chapter 5

A Seventh European State? *Non.* (1962-1964)

The Algerian situation – France’s bloody and expensive domestic crisis – entered its eighth year before the guns began to quiet. Following the Evian Accords, France faced questions domestically and internationally about its future relations with Algeria. The results of the July 1, 1962 vote for Algerian independence, with pro-independence ballots cast by 91.23 percent of registered voters, were made known on July 3.¹ Once Algeria gained its independence, defining Algeria’s status vis-à-vis France and Europe became an imperative. The outcome of the independence referendum did not surprise most French administrators nor much of the metropolitan public, but it did contribute to the already surging numbers of Algerian residents of European descent, known colloquially as the *pieds noirs*, arriving in major French cities like Marseille and Paris. All told, nearly 1 million *pieds noirs* fled to France during and immediately after the Algerian War, with over half of that population arriving in the summer months between May and August 1962 alone.² The presence of European settlers in Algeria—along with wider French business interests in the departments—helps to explain the stubborn diplomatic measures French administrators took in order to integrate Algeria within the EEC. This chapter thus asks: when and how did administrators begin to rethink Algeria’s status within the emerging European project following independence and the flight of Algeria’s European citizenry? And once it became clear that the relationship would be redefined, how did European and Algerian leaders understand how future interactions might look?

African-led calls for Eurafrica, such as Senghor’s discourse (Chapter 1), suggest the multiple uses that French Union leaders – both European and African – saw in such a policy, however different their interpretation of that policy might be. During the first decade of such discussions, non-European Algerian voices were largely absent, with notable exceptions like Tamzali (Chapter 2). That would change in 1962. While the FLN and other Algerian independence groups did not advocate for Eurafrica or Algeria’s inclusion in the EEC during the war, in its immediate aftermath, Algeria’s leaders saw potential benefits to maintaining or even expanding relations with Europe. The bulk of this chapter interrogates this new moment in European integration diplomacy, when it appeared clear to French and European leaders that something had changed with Algeria’s independence, but not clear exactly how that change would manifest itself in Brussels and beyond. Before analyzing the negotiations with and surrounding Algeria, this chapter first examines how the EEC struggled to understand how an independent Algeria fit into its constellation of international relationships (ranging from member states to third-party states) and how French administrators attempted to make sense of what future Franco-Algerian relations might even look like. I contend that the fraught debates and declarations about independent Algeria threatened to upend notions of the very Europeanness of the EEC, as the specter of Algeria loomed as a hypothetical seventh member state of the Community.

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3 Jeffrey James Byrne analyzes this era from the Algerian perspective. Notably, he emphasizes the importance of the period between the signing of the Evian accords (March 1962) and the formation of the first Algerian government (September 1962). He argues that this moment “constituted a consequential historical point in its own right.” The ambiguity that interests Byrne in this months-long period also dominated the comparatively lengthy, but still quite brief period in which it appeared that Algeria might in some capacity indeed remain part of the EEC. Byrne, *Mecca of Revolution: Algeria, Decolonization, and the Third World Order* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 129-139.
Detaching Algeria Swiftly? Challenges from Brussels

If French officials had been slow to admit publicly that France would not win the Algerian War, it appears its European partners leapt upon the new reality as soon as Algeria gained independence. Only a month afterwards, in early August, Belgian officials began to inquire about how to treat the import of Algerian produce (namely, “extra quality” grapes), while the Dutch asked similar questions about exporting eggs to the newly independent state. Jean-Marc Boegner, Permanent Representative of France before the European Communities in Brussels, surmised that the “accession to independence of this country must not, it seems to me, have the effect of depriving it of the benefits of intercommunity preference.” In Boegner’s line of thinking, which received agreement from Christian Delaballe and the DE-CE within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Algerian grapes should continue to enjoy preferential entry rights into the EEC member states.

If concerns about eggs and grapes appear narrow in scope, the elicited responses foreshadowed the much longer discussions that would soon take place in Paris and Brussels over Algeria’s position within the European Economic Community. Boegner received instructions that he could, “if need be, […] underline that it would be premature and hardly opportune to change anything in the current situation.” Because the Foreign Ministry had not yet settled upon its position on “the current and future system of relations between the new state and the EEC, […] it would be wise [il conviendrait] to avoid engaging this subject in one manner or another.”

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answer, it appeared, would quickly become the party line in France. Thus, when Boegner addressed the question of egg exports with Dutch officials, he emphasized maintaining the status quo. Saying that “it seemed to me wise” to continue treating Algeria under Article 227, Paragraph 2 of the Treaty, he noted that the Commission itself, “in an informal manner, had let the member states who were asking about the subject know that in its opinion it was juridically possible not to consider Algeria a third party state.”

Boegner’s instruction to the Dutch went, in effect, to the heart of the debates that would intensify in the weeks, months, and even years to come. When France and its partners signed the Treaty of Rome, Algeria, they agreed, was indeed a part of France, however inchoate its exact status within the Republic might be. Now that an independent Algeria emerged, the future of its relations with the Six appeared far from clear. Indeed, Algeria’s name, thanks to the pressure from France discussed in Chapter 3, appeared in the Treaty of Rome. The question thus became: How would an independent state located on the continent of Africa be connected to the European Economic Community, and what legal and economic rights might this entail?

Such a question came not only from France’s partners, concerned with how France’s drawn-out decolonization of Algeria might impact their trade regimes, but also from within French ranks. Francis Vals, a Socialist deputy from the Aude, proved an especially inquisitive politician. In late August 1962, he submitted a written question to the Council of the EEC, asking whether the Treaty of Rome would continue to apply to independent Algeria and how the Treaty might allow for future relations to be established between Algeria and the EEC. Vals explicitly laid out his line of thinking, wondering if

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Algeria’s status as a French territory until July 1 of that year “impl[ied] for Algeria the maintenance of certain rights and advantages resulting from the Treaty.” Although Vals phrased these ideas as queries, one can see the insistence in his words. Going further still, he asked the Commission if it believed it desirable to secure relations with Algerian leaders through an accord, and brought up the idea of broadening the “economic association convention” already existing between the EEC and the independent Franc Zone states.\(^8\) The SGCI deemed it impossible to provide a comprehensive reply to these queries.\(^9\)

Nineteen sixty-two proved in some respects a watershed year for inter-North African and North African-European relations. Moroccan and Tunisian authorities, claiming solidarity with Algerian freedom fighters, refrained from entering into trade negotiations with the European Economic Community during the war; they now could approach the institution, which offered a potentially lucrative outlet for their products. At the same time, France and Europe began to group francophone North African states—under the heading of the Maghreb—as a unit, even as it became clear that wartime solidarity did not necessarily mean peacetime unity between Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia.

The DE-CE put out a lengthy missive on the topic in October 1962, a copy of which received heavy edits by two hands, likely Olivier Wormser and Yves Delahaye. Before circulating it, Wormser sought to speak with Delahaye and asked him to refrain from sharing its contents. Like Boegner’s communications from Brussels, this note made

\(^8\) AN 20000293/4 (Sous dérogation): Conseils de la Communauté Européenne, Secrétaire Général, Note d’Information, “Question écrite n° 82,” 31 August 1962.

clear that Algeria’s accession to independence changed the landscape of Algerian-French-EEC relations. However, it took a more pragmatic, if unsure, view of the future. In considering this future relation, “the French government will have an important and delicate role to play, because it must at the same time participate in the development of the European position and coordinate its attitude with that of the Algerian government.”

France, it seemed, could direct and determine the path of future bilateral and multilateral relations.

In this reading of potential future relations, some older ideas remained at the center. The case of Algeria differed from that of the “three other North African states” (Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya – not Egypt) because of the claims it could make to the EEC that the other states could not. This dovetailed with the pre-Treaty of Rome claims by France that Algeria’s quality as a territory differed significantly from that of its closest neighbors. However, there were limits to these claims, as it was “obviously absurd” to suggest that Algeria might become the “seventh member of the European Community.” Beyond this, there were few certainties.

Understanding these accords carried practical applications for the French and their partners. In asking its neighbors to continue to treat Algerian products like French products, the French had secured a “provisional solution,” evidenced in the handling of Belgium’s grape import query. But major questions remained, including over the presence of Algerian laborers in Europe. As Common Market regulations entered into...

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11 MAEF 21QO/1462: Ibid., 2, 4, 8.
12 MAEF 21QO/1462: Ibid., 11.
13 Their presence had only grown during the war, and would continue to surge after 1962. MacMaster, Colonial Migrants and Racism, 189-190.
the second phase of their larger rollout, French officials sought to understand if the regulations would maintain the rights of Algerians in France, as defined by the Evian Accords. A glaring question mark (presumably scrawled by Wormser) in the margins of the edited note likely led the second reader, Delahaye, to cross out part of the text:

This [draft of the new Common Market rollout], if adopted, will maintain the privileged regime of Algerian workers in France. However, it will not assure Algeria the possibility of benefiting from the free movement of its workers in the territories of our partners, as the Treaty of Rome could have led it to hope.14

This edit speaks to the larger question that loomed since 1956, if not 1951: did French officials actually ever think this had been a possibility? Should Algerian officials – and citizens – have believed that the Treaty of Rome would offer this right of movement? Why did French officials assert Algeria’s Frenchness, if it would always be qualified by a denial of certain rights that would extend to the rest of French territory?

In attempting to resolve the various issues of trade and migration covered in the draft, the author offered by way of solution two possibilities. In the first case, the status quo of relations between France and the Maghreb, and the carrying out of policy planned for in the Evian Accords, would continue. One potential drawback of this would be explaining how France could call for exceptions to the Common Market rules on behalf of North African states while refusing Great Britain’s Commonwealth similar treatment during negotiations with the British.15 Another solution involved the “multilateralization” of trade regimes, in which France helped to “spread progressively” the same status that it enjoyed with the North African states. This could allow for the movement of Algerian workers to the rest of Europe. However, competitive third party states risked labeling

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such a policy neo-colonialist. And members of the Six, particularly Italy, might object over fears about trade protections. Yet the author hopefully concluded that cooperation between Algeria and France was a first step in cooperation between the Maghreb and Europe, which would lead to “a mutual willingness to resolve common problems […]”16 This lack of resolution, like the time delays discussed in the previous chapter, demonstrates the utility for French officials of avoiding firm, but potentially alienating, stances before their options were well-examined, if not exhausted.

Ever inquisitive, by late November Francis Vals had more concerns for the EEC about how independent Algeria’s trade could go forward. Focusing on Algeria’s wine exportation, Vals wondered if the Treaty of Rome would continue to apply to Algeria on the condition that Algeria not renounce its place within it.17 Would “the advantage of the customs union granted by the Evian Accords benefit the whole of the member states of the Community?” Reversing the query, Vals speculated that if Algeria had (in the eyes of the EEC) become a third-party state \textit{[pays tiers]}, the duty-free entry of its agricultural products into France would have to be “reconciled with the adoption of a common foreign tariff […]” In yet a third possibility, Vals wondered if the Algerian state could negotiate a “bilateral agreement” with the EEC.18 EEC officials declared themselves unable to offer a “substantive” reply.19

These questions of economic cooperation and coordination loomed increasingly large for France as Algeria settled into its independence. After nearly a decade of

18 HAEU BAC-007/1971_0005: Secretary General, Councils of the European Communities, “Question écrite n° 124,” 1 December 1962.
attempting to convince its European partners that France did indeed extend across the Mediterranean and into the northern reaches of the Sahara, French officials now weighed the chances for a variety of forms of cooperation, from bilateral ties between France and Algeria to supranational ties between Europe and North Africa. French diplomats now confronted new combinations of loyalties, as they attempted to factor in the fledgling Algerian government’s affinity toward pan-Arab or at least North African solidarity. They were also burdened with an unenviable task: beginning to uncouple the Algerian and French economies.

The French in Paris and Brussels found themselves in a delicate position, as they attempted to negotiate with Algerian administrators and to manage the needs of the newly arrived pied noir population. French authorities in the Foreign Affairs ministry judged that Algerian authorities, though well aware of new protocols meant to formally separate the French and Algerian treasuries,

would consider the implementation of this measure under the current circumstances as a disparaging act and would not miss passing the unfortunate consequences to the continuation of the French presence in Algeria (end of transfers toward France).

Conversely, clarifying the economic situation could harm the position of French administrators “in this electoral period,” as it might prove “inopportune,”

to get out of this ambiguity and make known the considerable amount of the advances that will undoubtedly never be reimbursed, but it will be time to make known to the public the affair during the vote by the next Parliament on the law of the regulation of the 1962 budget exercise.20

This left French administrators stuck between a newly independent state with which their own economy was deeply imbricated, and a small but vocal electorate already outraged by their loss of home.

In bilateral talks held in late December 1962, the French participants came to believe that “the Algerians’ position was not stalled, but likely leaned more to an association, despite the advice certainly given them by Egyptian experts who recently arrived in Algiers.” The Algerians were, however, probably waiting for the meeting of Maghrebi foreign ministers before taking a stronger stance. The French struggled to balance economic and political exigency with their loyalties to Franco-Algerian trade and to the pieds noirs. The Algerian administration – only a few months after the end of a war predicated on nationalist propaganda that drew sharp divisions between Algeria and France – now faced the uncomfortable task of choosing between practical accords with France and ostensibly ideologically harmonious ones with the North African world. French negotiators viewed their own choices as fraught and identified an attempt to “prolong the current status quo for a while” as their best solution.21

Yet the Secretary of State for Algerian Affairs and the DE-CE warned that the problems could not be avoided for long, signaling that tariff reduction between the Six planned for July 1 “could present Algeria [with] a choice.” The ministers in the French delegation were thus tasked to consider, as they prepared to continue bilateral negotiations with Algeria, if the French “must accept” (a handwritten cross out of the text changed this from “try to avoid”) Algeria fixing higher tariffs for the other members of the Six. If Algeria did raise its tariffs, France stood to benefit from a stronger preferential

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regime than the other members of the Six; this risked “a bias for a free trade regime” between France and Algeria, to the exclusion of France’s European partners.22

Thus, we see within the first months of Algeria’s independence, French and European officials attempting to clarify how the new political and trade landscape might look. At the same time, French officials continued to embrace the useful tactic of “delay” in this arena as they attempted to forge new relations with Algiers without alienating the newly arrived pied noir community. France’s partners did not appear entirely sure of how to proceed, and, as we will see shortly, encouraged France to settle its bilateral agreements with Algeria before bringing those relations back to the Brussels negotiating table. As French officials re-examined the Franco-EEC-Algerian relationship, they found they were not alone in their investigation; from late 1962, independent Algerian leaders entered the fray, to the consternation of France and the other members of the Six. It is to these sometimes uncomfortable exchanges that we now turn.

Letters from Algiers: Ben Bella Writes to Brussels

The situation only became murkier when Ahmed Ben Bella wrote to Brussels, in a letter that appears completely expected in terms of the discourse already occurring in Europe and entirely startling, judging from the incoherent half-replies the note would garner. On December 24, 1962, Ben Bella wrote to the president of the EEC Council, in a letter that would quickly be sent to the Brussels offices of each of the Six, as well as to their capitals and to dozens of officials in a variety of French ministries.23 It read:

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22 MAEF 21QO/1462: Ibid.
23 AN 20000293/4 (Sous dérogation): F. de Schacht telex to SGCI (copy), 4 January 1963. Sent to: Ortoli and Labussière the Prime Minister’s office, Rolland-Billecart in the Secretary of State for Algerian Affairs, Pierre-Brossolette in the DAIF, as well as Pierre Esteva in External Finances and Clappier of the DREE in
The Treaty establishing the European Economic Community stated in its Article 227 the conditions of the Treaty’s application concerning Algeria.

In addition, the convention of application relative to the association to the Community of Overseas Countries and Territories [Pays et Territoires d’Outre-mer] stated, in Article 16, that the regulations foreseen in Articles 1 through 8 inclusive are applicable in Algeria.

I have the honor of bringing to your attention that my government has the intention to inquire through negotiations with the organisms of the Community what will be the possible future relations between Algeria and the Community.

While awaiting the conclusion of these negotiations, my government wishes to see the maintenance for Algeria of the benefit of the regulations that are currently established.

Please accept, Mister President, the expression of my very high regards.

The President of the Council,

Ben Bella

Did Ben Bella and his compatriots know the turmoil into which they were sending the whole of Brussels? In addition to the letter, Algeria’s Foreign Minister, Mohamed Khemisti, sent Ali Lakhdari to represent Algeria in Brussels, telling Brussels that the diplomat hoped “to discuss problems [of] common interest with you.” Lakhdari’s presence seemed to elicit considerably less consternation than the letter, a response to which became the subject of elaborate and inconclusive discussions in the halls of the EEC.

The debate on how to respond to independent Algeria brought up wider concerns among the EEC members, just as the debate on whether to incorporate French Algeria revealed fissures only a few years earlier. The subject of the Algerian government’s “communication” arose when delegations from the Six met in January 1963. The Belgian delegation “hope[d] that the examination of the problem will not be broached until the Committee is able to prepare, in a deeper manner, its decisions on this point.” The Dutch

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the same ministry, Gardellini in the Ministry of Industry, Beaurepaire in the Services of External Affairs, Woimant in the Ministry of Agriculture, Wallon in the Direction of Studies and General Affairs, Chazelle in the Ministry of Labor, and Moureau in Coopération.


delegation “believe[d] it important as of now, notably with the existence of the letter from Mr. Ben Bella, that the Community define as soon as possible its position vis-à-vis Algeria, keeping in mind that until now the Community has applied the regime that was established before the country became independent.” Further, the Dutch argued the importance of “better understand[ing] the exact position of the Algerian government, at the moment when the Council will be called on to discuss the definitive system to apply in Algeria.” This, they believed, should be elucidated ahead of the January 24 Council session. The West German delegation proved less pugnacious, declaring that Article 227 and the similar Article 16 of the Convention of Application Relative to the Association of the PTOM to the Community should remain in place until the future relationship between Algeria and the EEC was defined. The application of these regulations, however, would not go on for an unlimited amount of time. The Italian tone was also fairly conciliatory, arguing that the Algerian query should be considered after a reasoned debate in the Council.26

As they were presenting their first reactions to Ben Bella’s query, the Germans had also raised what turned out to be a very sticky subject: how to reply.

Moreover, the German government believes that it is important to carefully examine – notably within the heart of this Committee – the question of knowing how to best inform the Algerian government of the willingness of the Community to provisionally look over pursuing the application of these regulations in Algeria.27

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The Commission representative picked up on this concern when he spoke. “[D]ue to the political and psychological importance of [Ben Bella’s] question,” it was imperative that Brussels not delay a reply. He suggested that a response written

in rather warm terms [en termes assez chaleureux], but not prejudicing the content, inspired by the type of letters addressed to African states after their accession to independence, can be submitted to the Council as of its January 24, 1963 session, on the understanding that the fundamental problems will be brought up during the session of February 11-12, 1963.28

The Dutch proposed that the reply be limited to “a confirmation of delivery [accusé de réception] like those addressed to states that have submitted requests for association, each minister remaining free, moreover, to make, if necessary, some general declaration on the subject.” This attitude was indicative of the Netherlands’ post-independence attitude toward France’s continued ties to former colonies. Increasingly, the Dutch delegation would see EEC-Algerian relations as a venue through which to critique Gaullist policy, evidence of which will be elaborated on later in this chapter.29

The French delegation declared itself in agreement with the Commission, but emphasized the uniqueness of Algeria – hardly different from its pre-1962 claims – noting that its relationship with the EEC was distinct from those of third-party states. Thus, the French expressed hope that the Council’s reply to Ben Bella would accede to the Algerian request to enter talks and would allow for overtures of a study “in accordance with the Algerian government, on which basis and which modalities must be established the future relations between Algeria and the Community.”30 The discussion concluded with the delegations agreeing to create alternative proposals of how to word

the confirmation of delivery.\textsuperscript{31} Schaus, the acting president of the EEC Council, sent an acknowledgment of receipt to Algiers on January 24.\textsuperscript{32} The reply, he said, “uses the terms of acknowledgments of receipt usually addressed in response to requests for an opening of negotiations.”\textsuperscript{33} Ben Bella would have learned little from such a reply, other than the reliability of diplomatic telegram services. The issue was not laid to rest. If the Council had managed to send a single reply to Ben Bella, it was only because it had not yet tackled the actual substance of the Algerian question.

This was compounded by the fact that the question of Algerian-EEC relations was discussed a few days before the suspension of negotiations with Great Britain, which the French felt limited their ability to insist upon a more “attractive” [engageante] reply from their partners. Yet the French were simultaneously engaged in bilateral talks with Algeria, meant to implement the Evian Accords. In these talks, the Algerians brought up imposing quotas on imports—including from France—as a method of protecting its industry, but also of establishing a preferential tariff that could apply to France and potentially to other states that would guarantee Algeria the same commercial advantages as France.\textsuperscript{34}

Despite the French officials’ pessimism, in early February EEC Secretary General Emile Noël wrote to Secretary General of the Council of Ministers Christian Calmes, summarizing the late January Commission talks as positive, because

\textsuperscript{31} HAEU CM2/1963-885: \textit{Ibid.}
the initiative of the Algerian government, even if its future significance cannot be exactly understood [appréciée] nonetheless constitutes the first significant opening of the part of a geographic zone with which the Community seems to have a real political as well as economic interest, in forming or in reinforcing through organized relations.35

A few days later, Calmes wrote to the delegation heads of the Six in Brussels with a copy of a working paper by the Commission and a letter from Noël. The working paper examined aid commitments made by the EEC to the PTOM associated with the Franc Zone. Were the EEC to satisfy some of Algeria’s requests, it suggested, it might be required to reallocate some financing from other FED projects (as FEDOM was by then known).36

The Commission deemed it possible to continue using FED credits to fund investment in Algeria, as long as Algeria did not “in law or action” [en droit ou en fait] adopt an attitude that the “EEC would consider incompatible with the spirit or letter of the Treaty […].” The paper called Algeria’s independence a “juridical novation [sic],”37 which allowed for the end of the applicability of Article 227 and the Convention of Application to the territory. However, because Algeria had taken the necessary practical measures to permit the execution of the financing conventions finalized before its accession to independence,” this excision need not occur. The Commission, it seemed, was willing to consider the development funding unchanged in light of Algeria’s major shift in legal status.38

The question of aid seemed to rely on the general agreement of the Six. However, much of the discussion of customs duties was predicated on Franco-Algerian relations.

Prior to its independence, Algeria was part of the French customs zone [territoire douanier français] and, as such, did not impose customs duties on French imports. In addition, French Algeria had begun to reduce tariffs with relation to the other members of the Six after the signing of the Treaty of Rome. This was meant to continue after its independence, although France reserved the right to introduce customs duties if Algeria began to enforce “a less favorable regime” than the one France enjoyed prior to Algerian independence. The Commission noted that Algeria had thus far maintained the increasingly favorable regime of customs duties applied to the other members of the Six. Because the question of the right of establishment had not yet been settled in Algeria, it remained a question to take up “ab initio.” 39

The working paper quoted from Ben Bella’s December 24 letter. It noted that the two tasks at hand were, first, using talks to learn of the possible future relations between Algeria and the EEC, and second, seeing about maintaining the current status Algeria was enjoying related to Article 227 of the Treaty. Indeed, the former could not be done if the latter were not “tacitly or explicitly” secured. A “negative or insufficiently positive attitude” toward Algeria might tip the hand toward “certain political tendencies,” putting at risk future relations with Europe. Thus, the Community could find it “politically favorable” for its own interests, and for the interests of its future relations with Algeria, to ask Algeria to demonstrate its goodwill more explicitly. Algeria could do this by guaranteeing the status quo of exchanges and the right to establishment, and through a formal recognition of the Treaty of Rome, Convention of Application, and FED regulations. Finally, they called for a declaration of intention for the two parties, which

would foresee the negotiations within 12 or 18 months that would lead to a global, definitive agreement.40

In the annex to the working paper, the Commission acknowledged the uneven application of export regime charges between Algeria and the Six. The German delegation noted that Algerian agricultural imports were subject to the same withholding tax [prélèvement] as imports from the other members of the Six. In contrast, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands applied to it the same withholding tax as imports from third-party states. The Italian delegation reported the same policy as Benelux, but said its administration could reimburse Algerian exporters the difference between this tax and those of member states. The same individual policies were reflected in exports from the member states to Algeria. The question thus lingered: should Algeria be treated like a member of the EEC or like a third-party state?41

While much of the discussion centered on imports and exports, the right to establish and continue business within Algeria also concerned the Six. These discussions revealed private, commercial interests, but also highlight the unique relationship already existing between France and Algeria, which both appeared in some ways to hope to maintain. In early March 1963, the Algerian authorities signaled to the French that they would protect local Renault factories (the only car manufacturer in Algeria), and suggested they were favorable to talks that could lead to Peugeot assembly in Algeria, as well.42 These overtures were twinned with a text signed by the Algerian Minister of Commerce that would allow for a fixing of quotas on the import of automobiles. A

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40 HAEU CM2/1963-885: Ibid.
41 HAEU CM2/1963-885: Ibid.
42 MAEF 21QO/1462: Telegram received at Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Direction of External Economic Relations; copy also sent to Minister of Industry, signed Gorse, from Algiers, 2 March 1963.
Renault-Peugeot accord would “consolidate the position of the CARAL [Construction des Automobiles Renault en Algérie], permitting it to offer a range of vehicles sufficient for covering nearly all the needs of the country.”  

It would also dissuade foreign competition, three brands of which were “trying to establish themselves in Algeria: Volvo, Volkswagen, and especially Mercedes.” Thus, clarifying EEC-Algeria relations appeared in the interests of the other members of the Six, who saw the risk in extending to now independent Algeria the same modes of assistance they once promised French Algeria, with potentially even fewer returns.

The French were not entirely sure of how their European partners would define independent Algeria’s status, nor were their partners in agreement. If they had held back previously, France’s European partners now voiced their concerns. For example, in April, the Italian delegation wondered if Algeria would modify its tariffs by labeling the Six (except for France) third-party states. In a late May 1963 meeting of the Committee of Permanent Representatives, the delegates discussed the regime that would apply to commercial exchanges between Algeria and the EEC after July 1 of that year. The West German delegation announced it had decided to continue treating Algeria like the EEC member states regarding commercial exchanges and to extend to Algeria the next intercommunity tariff reduction. The French noted hopefully that this pronouncement could carry “a certain weight as the discussion continues.” This contrasted to the Dutch, who made known that the government had hesitations “about the indefinite prolongation

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43 MAEF 21QO/1462: Ibid.
44 MAEF 21QO/1462: Ibid.
of a favorable regime benefitting Algeria.”

In mid-June, only two weeks before the delegations were meant to establish a set of regulations with Algeria, the Dutch Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Hans van Houten declared that Algeria’s independence had transformed it “ipso facto” into a third-party state, although the Dutch understood the arguments for maintaining “a particular regime in favor” of Algeria.

Voices for the status quo did ring out, as well. The Belgian Jean Rey, speaking in the name of the Commission, observed that the current relation was “transitory,” but that the Algerian government should not be “rushed” to take a position on the subject. Rey suggested that the July 1 intercommunity tariff reduction apply to Algeria and that the Community “reflect at its leisure on the other problems that do not require immediate implementation.” Henri Rochereau, a French member of the European Commission tasked with development policy, added that he hoped the committee of permanent representatives would consider, in its examination of the Algerian problem, the use of the balance of the first FED for financing new projects.

This June 1963 discussion revealed the continuity of some fault lines in the Algeria-EEC debate, but also suggested new allies for France. The Italians chimed in with their support of Van Houten. Although the Belgian and Luxembourger delegations did not speak, observers took this to mean their solidarity with Van Houten, part of wider Benelux accord. The Germans did not comment further. Yet the German openness to Algeria’s inclusion in these trade regimes suggests that West Germans saw value in

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46 MAEF 21QO/1462: Telegram received at Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, signed Boegner, from the French delegation, Brussels, 29 May 1963.
47 MAEF 21QO/1462: Telegram received at Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, signed Boegner, from the French delegation, Brussels, 18 June 1963.
48 MAEF 21QO/1462: Ibid.
49 MAEF 21QO/1462: Ibid.
maintaining close ties with the territory. German motivations could be viewed as economically interested, as the EEC-Algerian ties would allow for German goods to flow into Algeria with a reduced customs duty. They also could appear politically motivated. For example, West Germany had an interest in ensuring that Algeria remain in the sphere of the capitalist world, which rejection from the EEC might threaten. In addition, Adenauer and de Gaulle recently demonstrated their strengthened alliance as the former stood with the latter opposing British entry in the EEC.⁵⁰ This closer Franco-German alliance could sway German positions within these EEC talks, just as France’s rejection of Great Britain appeared to have alienated other members of the Six.

As France’s partners hardened their stances, France appeared to soften its own. Recapping the June meeting, Boegner found Rey’s suggestion “reasonable” and wondered if it was wise “to break spears [rompre des lances] to get all of our partners to continue to accord Algeria the intra-community regime.” With West Germany favorable to Algeria, despite Dutch pressure, it did “not seem that there is danger in the delay […].” Indeed, even if Italy and all of Benelux did not extend the regime to Algeria, the result for Algerian exports would be “practically negligible.” What was more, Boegner said he was unaware of the Algerian government having ever asked the French to intervene with the other members of the Six on its behalf. This might be a startling argument coming from a state that had spent a significant portion of the past decade arguing supposedly on Algeria’s behalf before these very same countries, but Boegner appeared earnest in suggesting that France should not take up any policy position that the independent Algerian state had not explicitly requested. Boegner surmised that considering the varied opinions of France’s partners, and the low likelihood of the decision’s actual impact on

Algeria, it would be wise for France not to play the role of “demandeur,” leaving its partners to work out the problem on July 1. Wormser agreed with Boegner’s assessment, only asking that Boegner be “less reserved” regarding Rochereau’s FED query. The French would thus appear to have “an attitude of abstention,” although it was important to avoid having the other members interpret this “as a mark of indifference.”

This approach to Algerian policy was a far cry from France’s earlier interventions, discussed in Chapter 3. If Defferre’s forceful 1956 advocacy of Eurafrique took precedence over the Foreign Affairs office’s fears of steamrolling its Western European allies, and in 1961, the French snippily defended the theoretical right of Algerian men to enter European states as freely circulating laborers, by mid-1963, French policy had shifted, and fast. Boegner presented the contentious issue of Algerian-EEC relations as something that was divisive, yet could and should be solved without France’s vocal input. The question demanded a resolution, but Boegner and his superiors deemed it less critical than the risk of alienating the other members of the Six.

The question of EEC-Algerian relations became a tool for France’s partners to attack broader French policy. An article in the Dutch daily de Volkskrant suggested that Dutch intransigence on the Algerian question during the June meeting derived from frustrations about France’s attitude toward Great Britain during EEC accession negotiations. De Houten’s pronouncement was not “a menacing gesture but rather sending a clear and precise warning addressed to France.” Such a warning would serve to remind the French that “they needed [the Benelux ministers’] cooperation in order for

51 MAEF 21QO/1462: Telegram received at Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, signed Boegner, from the French delegation, Brussels, 18 June 1963.
independent Algeria to continue to profit from the advantages accorded it by the Common Market.” The article’s author drew attention to how Van Houten “prudently and diplomatically” raised the contentious Algerian question. “Certain observers” believed he broached the subject to exert pressure on France, whose “tenacious opposition” to relations between Great Britain and the EEC sparked “the crisis that currently spans the EEC.” Van Houten’s timing—just before a meeting between de Gaulle and Adenauer scheduled for early July and also the next ministerial meeting of the EEC—was purposeful, meant to inspire de Gaulle to take up “a more amenable [souple] attitude toward Great Britain […].” The contention over Algeria was thus meant to serve “as a wake-up call [avertissement salutaire].”

French officials upholding their uncomfortable, if vague, stance regarding EEC-Algerian relations did not receive help from the Algerian delegation in Brussels, who were not forthcoming with their government’s position. On July 1, the same day that the EEC decided to apply a 10 percent tariff reduction to Algeria, as foreseen in the Treaty of Rome, an Algerian delegation gave the European Commission a letter from Algerian Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdelaziz Bouteflika announcing changes to Algeria’s customs tariff. The delegation, led by Kemal Abdallah-Khodja, the Adjunct Director General of the Plan, suggested an autumn meeting to discuss necessary modifications. The functionaries emphasized that their government was in the midst of investigating “a solution to the entirety of the problem of relations with the Common Market.” In the meantime, the Algerian government hoped “to continue to benefit from the Treaty of

55 MAEF 21QO/1462: Ibid.
Rome regime.” They also defended restrictions to their new customs tariff, which appeared to label the Six, with the exception of France, as third-party states. Such restrictions should not be viewed as discriminatory, but rather as “simply resulting from necessities of an administrative nature.”

Jacques Degas, a colonel within the National Defense’s Intelligence Operation Center, believed Ben Bella’s communication with Brussels and Lakhdari’s presence there had done little to clarify Algeria’s position or to help France hone its own stance. Yet it gave some hope that a solution could be achieved. Europeans might interpret Lakhdari’s arrival as a signal of Algeria’s ongoing connection to the EEC. The process of considering Ben Bella’s query “was interpreted as a recognition of a Common Market-Algerian tariff union,” according to Degas. What is more, the designation of an Algerian permanent representative “accentuated this impression,” as until that point, such a title was “reserved for representatives of the member states.” The military intelligence service understood the import Algeria placed on the negotiations, which stood to benefit the fledgling state:

Almost at the same time [in late Winter/early Spring], the Algerian permanent representative implied in private that the current situation perfectly suited his country, which did not intend [n’entendait pas] to accelerate negotiations with the Six. Furthermore, it was out of the question that his country would open itself to a global Maghreb-EEC negotiation that would have the effect of making it lose its privileged position relative to its Maghrebi neighbors.

Algeria, while signaling its desire to solidify relations with the EEC, did not want to risk these relations by pushing too hard. This was made manifest in Ben Bella’s July 1 letter

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58 MAEF 21QO/1462: Ibid.
to the EEC, in which he made clear that Algeria would continue a preferential tariff with France and, to a lesser degree, the other members of the Six, all while proposing talks regarding the future relations between the Six and Algeria. These Algerian decisions led Degas to conclude “it [was] therefore apparent that Algeria has not yet chosen its path [sa voie].” But faced with opposition, particularly from Italy, it appeared that by the end of 1963, Algeria might prefer a “more versatile [souple] solution” – a free exchange zone – which the Commission of the EEC proposed to advise.\(^{59}\)

Although Degas gathered that the Algerians hoped to protect their privileged place within the EEC, information from Rabat suggested otherwise. Less than two weeks after Degas’ note, France’s ambassador to Morocco, Pierre de Leusse, sent a telegram to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He reported that the envoy Algeria would send to Brussels in the fall would be decided by Algiers, with the agreement of the Tunisian government, “which itself would be disposed to taking part in the contacts envisioned with the organism in Brussels.”\(^{60}\) Algerian officials, it seemed, were preparing to abandon their privileges as France’s favored territory in the past. But they had not yet admitted it to the French or the EEC. Such a move by Algeria suggests that the new government hoped to draw out the benefits of French-Algerian relations for as long as it could, even while forging new South-South relations.\(^{61}\) At the same time, it could indicate reluctance on the part of Algerian officials, who might have been concerned

\(^{59}\) MAEF 21QO/1462: Ibid.

\(^{60}\) MAEF 21QO/1462: Pierre de Leusse telegram to the Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, 14 September 1963.

\(^{61}\) Byrne demonstrates that independent Algeria presented itself as a “third way,” in some ways reminiscent of the Eurafrique bloc ideology popular amongst French leaders during earlier European integration negotiations. His analysis, taking a “Maghribi vantage to examine decolonization and the phenomenon of Third World internationalism on a larger scale,” is an important intervention into international history. By engaging with South-South relations (with Algeria often at the heart of actual events, or at least of idealized visions of a potential actions), Byrne demonstrates that Algeria remained central to international imaginaries, even once it became an independent state. Byrne, Mecca of Revolution, 3-4.
about the pragmatism of diving head-first into a Maghrebi agreement when the lucrative potential of trade relations with Europe was still a possibility.

By early September, Brussels attempted to glean from Algeria how its government envisioned a new tariff implementation, but the Algerian ambassador in Brussels, Boualem Bessaïh, only suggested that it would be desirable to discuss this “before the end of the year.”62 By early October, whatever patience or goodwill France’s partners once displayed was running dry. A Dutch statement backed by the Italian delegation declared that relations between the EEC and the Algerian embassy had still not allowed any precise understanding of the intentions of the latter’s government. Thus, as the EEC prepared for the upcoming talks with Algeria, it was imperative to emphasize that “the current state of things cannot be indefinitely prolonged.”63 But the ordinance passed by the Algerian government on October 28 cemented this prolongation, with its fifth article only stipulating that while waiting for “the definition” of tariff relations between the EEC and Algeria, merchandise from the Community, except for France, would be subject to a unique tariff (different from that of France and non-EEC states, and closely following the “column” [colonne] organization of tariffs within the Treaty of Rome Article 227 regulation).64 Hence, nearly a year after the Ben Bella telegram, the relations between Algeria and the EEC remained murky.

A letter sent by Algerian Foreign Affairs Minister Abdelaziz Bouteflika nearly one year after Ben Bella’s initial communication with the EEC bore a strong resemblance

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63 MAEF 21QO/1462: Boegner telegram to the Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, 4 October 1963.
to the 1962 missive. In his December 18, 1963 letter to the Permanent Representatives, he made known that the Algerian government hoped to enter into talks with the EEC, on a date chosen by Brussels.65 Like Ben Bella’s letter, it garnered an uninformative, tardy reply, this one penned on January 28 by the Belgian Henri (Hendrik) Fayat, acting president of the Council of the EEC. Fayat noted the “great interest” with which the Council had received the letter, telling Bouteflika that the Council had invited the Commission to “engage with your government in the proposed conversations.”66 However, the atmosphere in Brussels was not identical to what it had been one year prior. Notably, Algerian functionaries were present in larger numbers. Thus, in late December, a Mr. Hamdani, an advisor in Algeria’s Brussels embassy, had opened “very general” conversations asserting that “all of the hypotheses” should be examined, including those in which all of Algeria’s particular links with the Common Market be renounced. By the start of 1964, another delegation prepared to go to Brussels, signaling the Algerian government’s readiness to open conversations with the Community.67

Algerian officials met with functionaries from the EEC Commission in late February. The former’s delegation was led by Bessaih and included Khodja, by then director of the Cabinet of the Ministry of the Economy. The Algerians emphasized the “preliminary character” of the talks and would not commit to any decision, as they did not have instructions that would allow them to take a position on the different problems that arose. Rather, the talks were “in some way a ‘pre-exploratory’ stage.” The Algerians

did, however, ask the Commission about a plan of financial assistance related to commercial exchanges, and wanted to know the precise intentions of Europe before taking up an exact position. “They also gave the impression of hoping to buy time and continue for as long as possible the current transitional regime,” a French foreign affairs administrator remarked. The Algerians did not seem hostile to the free exchange zone solution that the Commission suggested, as long as the word “‘association’ was not expressly mentioned.” They also claimed to be favorable to coordinating the position of the three Maghrebi states in relation to the EEC. The talks concluded with the Algerian delegation planning to return in a month with its instructions, which, the EEC Commission surmised, would allow Europe to complete reports on exploratory talks with all three Maghrebi states by late April. Despite internal inaction or frustration, the EEC put forth a rosy vision of EEC-Algerian talks in February 1964. The author of a press release wrote that the conversations took place “in an excellent climate of mutual understanding.”

Stalling, foot-dragging, delays, rain checks. For two entities consistently asserting their desire to communicate, coordinate, and conclude accords, Algeria and the EEC spent an inordinate amount of time (and telegrams) avoiding concrete decisions. Why? All negotiating bodies (Algeria, France, the EEC, and its member states) had motivations for prolonging the confused relationship. For Algeria, close relations with the whole of the EEC meant the continued promise of favorable customs and tariff regimes and avoided jeopardizing the unique trade benefits derived from Algeria’s favored status in

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68 MAEF 21QO/1462: Note from Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Direction des Affaires Economiques et Financières, Service de Coopération Economique, “Conversations exploratoires CEE/Algérie,” 29 February 1964. Delahaye’s name written on top (Most likely he was the recipient).
French legislation and, now, in Treaty of Rome regulations. For France, maintaining Algeria’s ties to the EEC delayed the difficult choice between Algeria (and perhaps, by proxy, the DOM-PTOM) and the EEC, all while ensuring that it would not shoulder economic assistance for Algeria on its own. For the EEC, there were more mixed motivations. Some members, like the Netherlands, were frustrated that Algeria – an independent state – would continue to enjoy the benefits of and hold sway over the EEC. But West Germany, perhaps reflecting its own Cold War concerns, stood with France, in a move that would seem to guarantee to safeguard Algeria’s loyalty to the capitalist West.

Brussels increasingly put pressure on France to clarify its own relations with Algeria, before the EEC could take a decisive step. By March 1964, the Commission had repeatedly asked Boegner for information about the most recent state of affairs in Franco-Algerian exchange accords. Boegner asked his colleagues in Paris to provide him with information that he could pass to the Commission, noting that “it seems to me preferable” that the Commission learn of the situation from France, rather than from the Algerian delegation. If the French allowed the Algerians to provide the information, they would give their partners “a pretext to be suspicious.” Boegner cautioned that if the French spoke to the Commission, it would be for the Ministry to first decide if they needed to secure the Algerian authorities’ agreement.70

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs passed this duty to the Secretary of State Charged with Algerian Affairs, who in turn tasked the French embassy in Algiers to inform the Algerians that they were preparing to send to the EEC Commission the text of the last

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decisions on Franco-Algerian economic relations. But it appears that the information was not passed immediately, or that the Algerians asked for clarification. A month later, Delahaye asked the French embassy in Algiers to inform the Algerian authorities that it would share with Brussels the meeting minutes signed in Paris on November 30, 1963, and the protocol on wine signed in Paris on January 18, 1964. Gorse communicated that the Algerians, who themselves had not yet replied to Brussels, approved of the transmission of the documents.

The situation’s complicated nature only became more confused as Algerian officials continued to explore their country’s place in the global economic and political landscape, and as France forged ahead with its own post-colonial diplomacy. Questions about potential bilateral and multilateral accords with Israel on the part of France or the European Economic Community exemplify the exacerbation of this confusion and the conflicting loyalties with which Algerian officials contended. Boegner expressed increased frustration with the Algerians, whose inaction and vagueness on the subject of EEC-Algerian relations were beginning to appear obstructionist. Indeed, in May 1964, as “new exploratory conversations” took place in Brussels (a full 17 months after Ben Bella’s overtures for such talks), the Algerians expressed their desire to conclude an accord with the EEC, but declared themselves unable to do so until Franco-Algerian relations were firmly defined.

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71 MAEF 21QO/1462: B. Layer, Office of Secretary of State Under the Prime Minister Charged with Algerian Affairs telegram to French Embassy in Algiers, 14 March 1964.
73 MAEF 21QO/1462: Gorse at French embassy in Algiers telegram to Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, DREE, 29 April 1964.
The Algerians packaged this delay as a sign of their respect for France, “insisting on the importance [le prix] its government attached to accords with France and its concern not to do anything in Brussels that could upset our country.”\(^75\) Algeria’s plan was thus first to turn to France to make sense of how Franco-Algerian relations could be included and maintained within a system of cooperation established between Algeria and the EEC. Boegner did not appear swept away by this apparent show of goodwill. He speculated on the Algerian delegation’s plans:

Everything happens as if the Algerians used the vague perspectives of an accord with the Community to obtain, in fact, a maintaining of the status quo of commercial exchanges. They even go so far as to demand the benefit of certain elements of the Treaty of Rome that are no longer applicable to Algeria. This is how their delegation focused on the revival [reprise] of the Community’s financial aid and on the necessity of finding an arrangement allowing the use [utilisation] of Algerian labor in the countries of the Community.\(^76\)

The Community, for its part, also declared its need to discuss the matter as an ensemble with France and the member states. Ben Bella’s seemingly straightforward question from late December 1962 had by now taken on much more meaning, it seems, even as the issue remained far from settled.\(^77\)

Algerian officials impressed upon Gorse’s colleagues in Algiers the “difficult situation” [embarrass] in which Algeria found itself as it attempted to determine its position vis-à-vis the European Economic Community. Gorse noted protests regarding an April 28 accord between the EEC and Israel, which could be troubling to Algerian authorities, after a conference of heads of state in Cairo made clear the problems that could arise for “Arab states” that maintained relations with countries developing ties with Israel. He suggested that this conflict arose not because of the content of the accords but

\(^75\) MAEF 21QO/1462: Ibid.
\(^76\) MAEF 21QO/1462: Ibid.
\(^77\) MAEF 21QO/1462: Ibid.
simply because they existed. For Algeria, “which intends to be at the forefront [à l’avant-garde] of the fights led by the Arab world,” it was challenging to find “a compromise between its economic interests and its anti-Israeli outbursts [démonstrations].”

This ambivalence bred inaction. Thus, when Layachi Yaker, Algeria’s Director of Economic Affairs within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was sent to Brussels in early spring 1964, it was without precise instructions, his mission limited to a “simple contact” with the European authorities. Perhaps in part because of this, although the preexisting ambiguities in the spectrum of EEC-Maghreb-French-Algerian relations should not be forgotten, attempts for a common action of the three Maghrebi states regarding the EEC “seemed to pass to the second level,” which would be “an individual approach” that maintained contacts. Gorse surmised that the question of Arab-Israeli relations most likely arose when the heads of state, including the Soviet Khrushchev, met on May 14 for ceremonies in Aswan during which the Nile was diverted as part of the massive dam project. Gorse went further, claiming, “the advice of Mr. Khrushchev will undoubtedly determine the attitude of Colonel Nasser and of President Ben Bella.” Such an assertion gives little agency to Nasser and Ben Bella, both of whom would come to personify the non-aligned movement. Thus, the Algerian representatives would approach EEC negotiations hoping to present any outcome as a victory for “the Arab world over

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78 MAEF 21QO/1462: Gorse telegram to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 19 May 1964.
79 MAEF 21QO/1462: Ibid.
80 MAEF 21QO/1462: Ibid.
81 MAEF 21QO/1462: Ibid.
Zionism,” part of an increasingly anti-Zionist tone Gorse noticed in official
documentation and newspapers that had been, “until now, indifferent.”

Axel Herbst, Director General of External Relations for the Commission, met
with an Algerian delegation led by Ambassador Bessaïh and including the Algerian
Director of Economic Services of Foreign Affairs, on May 13-15. In the meeting, the
Algerian delegation denied responsibility for the precarious state of relations between
Algeria and the EEC, although it did not name a culprit. It also asserted that its “desire to
maintain the status quo must not be interpreted as looking for an opportune moment to
break with the EEC.” Rather, it intended to conclude a global, preferential accord with
the Community. This accord would not be resolved in common with Morocco and
Tunisia, a contention that fit the Algerian delegation’s claim of the “particular problems
that called for particular solutions” between the EEC and Algeria. Only later, they said,
would they examine to what degree there could be coordination with the other Maghrebi
states with regard to European cooperation. This claim of Algeria’s special status is
noteworthy in contrast to the new tones of Maghrebi neighborly cooperation emerging at
this moment. Also noteworthy was the French reluctance to take the lead in pressuring its
European partners. An EEC administrator reported to Hendus that in the midst of one
May 1964 meeting between Bessaih and the EEC Commision, “the French representative
maintained a… diplomatic silence [a gardé un silence... diplomatique].”

82 MAEF 21QO/1462: Ibid.
83 HAEU CM2/1964-1347 and also MAEF 21QO/1462: EEC Council, “Aide-Mémoire du Secrétariat,
Compte rendu de l’exposé fait par la Commission devant le Comité des Représentants Permanents le 21
mai 1964 sur les résultats de la deuxième série de conversations exploratoires avec le Gouvernement algérien,” 22 May 1964.
84 HAEU BAC-007/1971_0002: H. Sigrist, Secrétaire Exécutif adjoint, EEC Commission, to Hendus and
In their talks with the Commission, Algerian representatives raised diverse policies, notably the statute covering Algerian workers in the Community (comprising professional training in both Algeria and Europe), guarantees of technical assistance, and the continuation of financial aid (including the necessity of completing projects that had begun under the former development fund). The Commission noted that maintaining preference for Algerian exports would be limited by GATT regulation and by other associations the EEC had formed, such that “the granting of any preference poses the problem of reciprocity.” Before Algeria’s independence, its workers, “being considered like French nationals [étant considérés comme ressortissants français],” enjoyed advantages like social security and family allowances; “the accession to independence had modified this situation, thus posing problems.” The only solution appeared to be attacking the problem using “the same bilateral route” as taken with “certain African states.”85

The Commission’s assessment of Algerian workers’ rights may at first glance seem logical – these men were members of a third-party, or at best, associated state, and thus member states should concern themselves with their rights within a given border. But their reading of the trajectory of the workers’ rights is far more layered. According to the Commission, Article 227 of the Treaty of Rome did not intended to address Algerians working in the member states. However, before 1962, these workers were considered to be French nationals, meaning that, if the letter of the law were truly followed, the Treaty of Rome would indeed apply to an Algerian just as it would a Parisian or, for that matter, a Luxembourger citizen. What, then, did it mean that with independence, Algerian men

were effectively stripped of rights? Alternatively, what did it mean that for a period of five years, these men theoretically had possessed these rights, and yet were prevented from exercising them by both France and the other members of the Six?

The Commission brushed off other Algerian requests. The demands for technical assistance and workers’ training were “desiderata” of the Algerian authorities and such problems would only be decided upon after the Six discussed them. These two requests come closest to being demands for aid that could easily be construed as responsibilities of the EEC to its member states. The EEC response to questions of financial aid to Algeria had more comfortable precedents for considering the issues. The Commission “remained very reserved” on the question, noting that the examples of Greece and Turkey highlighted the problems arising from the competence [compétence] of the member states. What was more, since the Yaoundé Convention’s signature, it was “no longer possible for the Algerian government to present new projects to the FEDOM […]” The Algerian reaction to this was a “rather intense shock [un étonnement assez vif], seeming at certain moments even to speak about acquired rights in this domain.”

As in all talks we have examined until this point, the May 1964 meetings did not settle the question of EEC-Algerian relations, either. The Commission tasked the Algerians with giving them the necessary precisions on their intentions. In turn, the Algerians declared themselves “unable to give a response until the problem – primordial for [Algeria] – of its relations with France had been resolved.” Only then could it approach the question of how the Franco-Algerian regime could be reconciled with a possible community regime, at which point it would be possible to take up a more precise position. The Commission agreed that it was forced for the moment to take no action

86 HAEU CM2/1964-1347 and also MAEF 21QO/1462: Ibid.
except to establish a calendar of future contacts, but also admitted there existed “a problem of the overlapping [imbrication] or harmonization” of the Franco-Algerian regime with any accord established between Algeria and the EEC. The Algerians, without committing to a set time, indicated that the end of June or early July would likely suit them, with the assumption that by then, they would have had conversations with the French government.87

Soon after these meetings Yaker, Algeria’s head of the Economic division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, indicated that his colleague Boumaza was counting on speaking with Minister of Finances and Economic Affairs Valéry Giscard d’Estaing. A French embassy administrator in Algiers noted that Yaker himself expressed hope that the talks would “contribute to allowing Algeria to establish relations with the EEC that resembled the ones from which certain associated states (he cited as examples the 19 African countries) benefited.” Yaker also reiterated the demands for assistance – naming the European Development Bank – and the questions of technical cooperation and the labor force, which he hoped could be resolved through bilateral accords that could “be fulfilled by contractual relations with the Community.” Yaker’s demands demonstrate that Algeria’s new government believed it possible – and beneficial – to demand the advantages of EEC association without abandoning privileged relations with France. One French embassy official opined that Yaker’s demands were “somewhat naive statements,” revealing that by the mid-1960s, French officials saw less use in pushing their partners to see Algeria as European. Indeed, such a claim from Algeria could now

87 HAEU CM2/1964-1347 and also MAEF 21QO/1462: Ibid.
be viewed as fanciful or absurd by French officials eager to redraw their own borders, now exclusive of Algeria, within Europe.88

Indeed, by early June 1964, it was clear to French officials that maintaining the status quo no longer held the benefits they once thought. Yet choosing an exit strategy was fraught. François Morin of the SGCI highlighted the issue in a letter sent to administrators in the offices of the Secretary of State Charged with Algerian Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (including Wormser in the DREE), and the Ministry of Labor. Morin had previously addressed the challenge of maintaining in Algeria the regulations of the EEC on social security for migrant workers. The Minister of Labor had proposed to Morin writing a letter to the Commission in which “we would have made it known that the best solution to these difficulties to us appeared to be the suppression of the mention of Algeria in the aforementioned regulations.” Morin noted that he “had had, for [his] part, some hesitation to thus take the initiative to break from the status quo that we ourselves had demanded.”89 Yet in a letter, the Secretary of State charged with Algerian Affairs declared, “the maintenance of the status quo will present more inconveniences than advantages.” This could include reinforcing the position of the Algerian government in its ongoing bilateral negotiations with France.90

The solution offered by France’s functionaries responsible for Algerian relations was, in part, to inform the Commission that it must directly ask the Algerian government for answers, which “the French government, since the independence of Algeria, is no

88 MAEF 21QO/1462: Telegram from French Embassy in Algiers signed Louis Dauge sent to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to be communicated to Finances (Cabinet, DREE, FINEX [external finances?]), 30 May 1964. The parenthetical is original.
90 MAEF 21QO/1462: Service des Affaires Générales, Affaires Sociales, within the Secretary of State before the Prime Minister, charged with Algerian Affairs to SGCI, “Application à l’Algérie des règlements n° 3 et 4 sur la securité sociale des travailleurs migrants,” 28 May 1964.
We are a long way from the assertions of the 1950s, or even of a year prior. What, by June 1964, had made France change its mind? Had its mind changed, or were different parts of its policy just coming to the fore? Independent Algeria’s negotiating methods with Europe reflected its own domestic and international concerns. France might need to decide between the French Union and Europe, or between Algeria and its domestic pressures, but Algeria now saw opening before it a choice between the *grands ensembles* offered by closer ties to a so-called Muslim or pan-Arab world, and the economic and political benefits that Europe might offer. Despite its pursuit of relations with the EEC, Algeria increasingly turned to its near neighbors in the Maghreb. In early July, the Algerian Minister of Foreign Affairs met in Algiers with the ambassadors of Tunisia and Morocco, and around the same time, Algeria’s Finance Minister met with a Tunisian delegation and then with the Moroccan diplomat Kacem Zhiri. Georges Gorse suggested to his colleagues at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that these meetings and the increasingly fraternal relations between the three states signaled that talks between the Maghrebi heads of state were “probable and opportune” in the eyes of “the people.”

Although Sahnoun, Director of Political Affairs in the Algerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, made clear that the path to strengthened relations between the Maghrebi states was not without obstacles – he instructed Algerian officials to attempt to avoid media attacks on the other two – he did offer some more tangible building blocks toward unity. Algeria “reaffirm[ed] its refusal to give aid to the subversive activities of opponents of the Tunis and Rabat regimes” —although the right of asylum would not be

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92 MAEF 21QO/1462: Gorse telegram to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 7 July 1964.
undercut—and Sahnoun brought up the problems of economic cooperation at the “Maghrebi level [l’écchelle magrebine],” notably regarding industrialization.93 The most notable site of cooperation, it seemed, was in seeking a common approach to relations with the EEC:

The Algerian government has realized the fragility of its current position. Knowing that the privileged status quo through which its commercial exchanges with France would quickly cease to be compatible with the commercial relations it hoped to develop with the Common Market, it wishes both to better understand the current state of negotiations between its neighbors and the EEC and to contemplate [envisage] with them, in a long-term perspective, a common objective.94

Despite Algeria’s claims of uniqueness, which echoed France’s colonial-era policy and mirrored the status quo that Europe seemed partial to maintaining, Algeria’s leaders, it seemed, were ready to define the state as part of a new whole, located decidedly south of the Mediterranean.

**Conclusion**

In under a decade, leaders claiming to speak for Algeria had presented it in turns as undeniably French; worthy of approaching the EEC on its own; and as a partner in a burgeoning North African ensemble. Such shifts are evidenced in the planning for a variety of futures, none of which were realized. Algerian men would never enjoy the labor privileges in Luxembourg that their metropolitan counterparts could expect; the development aid promised under Article 227 would never fully materialize; and the Maghreb did not yield the united political body its champions had imagined. Yet the frenzy Ben Bella stirred by sending his letter to Brussels speaks to the possibilities of the

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moment of decolonization, when it was not entirely clear why Algeria could not be a part of Europe and, indeed, whether such an association might be useful to the whole of the EEC. Even as Algerian domestic and international goals led its leaders to drift farther from Brussels and into the pull of Cairo and the Maghreb, the conversations sparked by Ben Bella, and by France’s earlier pushes for Eurafrica, did have an appreciable impact on the associated territories and overseas departments that remained within France’s sphere of influence. This impact will be addressed in the conclusion of this work, particularly with regards to France’s approach to the DOM in the wake of Algerian independence.
Conclusion

Eurafrica, but Where? (1965-1975)

The Algerian war will soon be entering its sixth year. No one among us in November 1954, no one in the world, suspected that after sixty months of fighting, French colonialism would still not have released its clutch and heeded the voice of the Algerian people.

With these words, Frantz Fanon opened his 1959 *L'An Cinq de la Révolution Algérienne*. As his book went to press, many officials in France were only just coming to terms with the possible loss of French Algeria. Then, as in 1848, many members of the French administration remained convinced that Algeria composed a fundamental part of France. I have interrogated how and why French officials attempted to maintain control in Algeria, even as the war grew costly and unpopular. They weaponized an emerging diplomatic tool—European integration—as a means of holding fast to the crown jewel of France's empire. This approach to imperialism, with claims of a Eurafrican society linking the continents of Europe and Africa through trade, aid, and even the movement of people, upends traditional histories of the postwar era that discuss European integration and decolonization as wholly distinct processes. Rather, imperial goals helped to shape integration schemes.

As I write the final lines of my dissertation, in March 2017, news headlines hint at codas, though developments are so recent that it is difficult to take stock. The British Prime Minister Theresa May has announced that Britain will begin the process of formal exit from the European Union within the month. The Netherlands has opened a diplomatic row with Turkey, ostensibly to stave off far-right political critiques, but highlighting the divide between migrant laborers without European citizenship rights and the EU populations who move freely. The latter come

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1 Fanon, *A Dying Colonialism*, 23.
from Turkey, the same country that not even sixty years ago was slated, along with Greece and ahead of Britain, to be the next member of the EEC. The human tragedy of the migrant crisis has revealed the limitations of a so-called borderless Europe, challenging the porous nature of those borders in quite a different way than France’s policy positions in the postwar era.

I will conclude by demonstrating that a consideration of the triangle of France, Europe, and Algeria forces historians to recalibrate how they typically analyze Franco-African relations after 1960. The standard historiography of this period highlights two features. First, that France maintained economic ties with Algeria, demonstrating a French attempt at “goodwill” that would be appreciated across the Third World—inclusive of Latin America and Asia. Second, that de Gaulle and, on the ground, Jacques Foccart pursued extended development aid to the Third World in order to bolster France’s position in the Cold War. I will challenge this first claim by demonstrating, in a way that carries over from the previous chapter, the degree to which French officials looked to wipe their hands clean of Algeria in certain “cooperative” domains by the mid-1960s. And I will argue that the second claim can only be understood if the EEC is brought into story, with an eye toward France’s particular legacy with its former colonies and a look at how Britain’s Commonwealth changed the conversation.

The historian Yves Montarsolo argues that the Six answered the question “Europe until where?” by recognizing Africa only as “a ‘market,’ a ‘periphery.’” However, this dissertation has argued that the limits of Europe were malleable. The case of Algeria reveals the other

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3 For an overview of the standard description of post-colonial Gaullist policy toward Africa and the developing world, see Martin, General de Gaulle’s Cold War, 74-94.
4 Montarsolo, L’Eurafrique, 261.
possible shapes that Europe could have taken. Episodes of administrative wheeling and dealing, at turns dominated by political one-upmanship or handwringing, challenge the assertion that the European project only comprised nation-states or that the federalist visions promoted in the postwar did not have a durable legacy.

Discussed side by side, ideas for European integration and Eurafrica demonstrate the range of futures planned for, and the variety of understandings of who should unite with whom, particularly in the postwar era. Such organizations offered administrators and planners a variety of ways to understand and delineate economic cooperation between European states or between a unified European body and the African colonies of particular member states (mainly, but not exclusively, France). They could serve to bolster feelings of nationalism or community, or to enact economic or diplomatic policies. I have argued that the French administration saw Eurafrican policy, inscribed in integrated Europe’s founding documents, as a method of maintaining control of the empire even while ceding some authority in both Africa and Europe. Officials in the postwar did not uniformly view such types of decisions with approval. In the 1950s, disputes over the establishment of an African regional office of the World Health Organization (excluding North and East Africa) revealed French officials’ reluctance to share decision-making authority. Jessica Pearson argues that this challenged “the legitimacy of their colonies in Africa.”

Yet the founding of the EEC is not an anomalous attempt to harness imperial power through international or supranational channels. Mark Mazower, analyzing the division of Ottoman territories between Britain and France after World War I, demonstrates the “internationalist reinforcement of empire,” in which, guided by British colonial interests,

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European and American statesmen operated under the assumption of the “durability of empire.” These assumptions did not die in the Second World War, and the goal of maintaining imperial order carried over into the foundation of the United Nations. While the UN gradually became a key site for asserting anti-colonial claims, this longer imperial history is critical. I have argued that well into the postwar era, even as African statesmen were invited (and elected) to the halls of France’s National Assembly and other government positions, the French continued to take the durability of their Eurafrica as a given. Rather than assuming the inevitability of any one sort of future organization between individual nation-states, we must analyze the range of shapes a nation-state might take in light of domestic and international imperatives.

Even after the formal independence of France’s African holdings—including Algeria—in the early 1960s, French and European officials continued to operate under the assumption that a particular Eurafrican zone, predicated on trade and aid, did still exist. This is clearest in the Yaoundé and Lomé accords and can even be located in recent French decisions to intervene in Africa, such as Operation Serval in Mali (2013-2014). However, trade and military links are not simple recreations of late-19th century colonial practice. They reflect evolutions in old relationships, tied up in decades of claims to European responsibility to Africa, today altered by decades of independence and the varieties of alternative diplomatic and trade ties now open to both European and African states. Indeed, France after the loss of Africa was by no means a simple hexagon. And the limits of European regulation remained far from clear.

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7 Guiliano Garavini characterizes the first Yaoundé Convention (1963) as part of a “new grand idea that would bring [France] a global role equal to de Gaulle's ambition.” As this dissertation has shown, such ideas were anything but new; Yaoundé must be seen as a continuation of the policies of EEC-African relations that French administrators had advocated for the previous decade. Garavini, *After Empires: European Integration, Decolonization, & the Challenge from the Global South, 1957-1986* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 48. Benedikt Erforth, “Mental Maps and Foreign Policy Decision-Making: Eurafrique and the French Military Intervention in Mali,” *European Review of International Studies* (Forthcoming).
The “Rest” of “France”

On July 3, 1962, the day de Gaulle recognized Algerian independence, he sat down with Adenauer in Paris to discuss European integration. Marking the news of the day, Adenauer said Algeria’s new status “frees France […] to devote itself more easily to its great tasks in Europe and the world.” What did the map of this “free” France look like? Algeria’s independence did not spell the end of France’s overseas presence. Guyana, Martinique, Guadeloupe, and la Réunion maintained their status as DOM.

As the previous chapter noted, by 1964, French officials appeared decidedly less interested in privileging ties with Algeria above those of the EEC. However, the policies they had pushed for over the past decade would have lasting effects. In January 1965, an administrator in the SGCI wrote that “French tactics” after the Treaty of Rome’s signing had created “dangerous precedents,” namely that the question of applying Treaty regulations to the DOM was to be approached piecemeal. This was due to “the impossibility of cutting off [trancher] the problems unique to Algeria, which in the Treaty of Rome was completely assimilated to the Overseas Departments. Discretion was necessary.” The administrator argued that with Algeria “settled,” the question of applying the Treaty to the remaining DOM could be tackled. The SGCI administrator worried that the uneven application of Treaty of Rome regulation overseas, due in no small part to the fraught nature of incorporating Algeria within that regulatory sphere, would now negatively impact the DOM’s trade prospects. He warned that there “is no obvious reason in the eyes of our partners” to address only parts of the Treaty “because it suits French financial interests […].” However, he argued that the other members of

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the Six might still find “political and intelligible reasons […] to want to totally assimilate […]
the European territory of the Community and the far-off departments of the French Republic.”

However, this administrator’s tactic for encouraging such cooperation was a marked departure
from the French diplomatic pressure recounted in previous chapters. Rather than forcefully call
for such assimilation during EEC meetings, he reasoned that:

[...] to deal with this problem, the common agricultural policy negotiating room does not
seem like the most appropriate place. It is a much broader problem and seems to require
more discretion. Discussion in the heart of Brussels [l’enceinte bruxelloise], under the
inevitable surveillance of journalists, can have disadvantages when it comes to questions
centered on the assimilation of certain French [citizens] from across the seas to French of
the European continent.\textsuperscript{10}

His solution was action taken by the French toward the other member states, but seemingly on an
individual, or bilateral, level. This could avoid unpleasant discussions about France’s “many
current financial demands,” which was important as by June, he expected that the EEC would be
pushing for sugar regulation while “presenting several very heavy” demands on European
expenditure.\textsuperscript{11} This shift from multilateral pressure to bilateral negotiations suggests that by the
mid-1960s, the French were ready to adopt new approaches for the European project, or even to
sidestep Europe-wide decision-making in favor of older bilateral diplomatic discussions.

Being “freed” from Algeria appeared to have an impact not just on how the French would
pursue European policy, but how they understood the tasks ahead of them. Internally, French
administrators began to blame Algeria for the issues facing incorporating the DOM into the EEC.
The same day that the administrator discussed above warned against discussing the DOM in
Brussels, another argued that Treaty of Rome regulations had not been extended to the DOM in
the past because of the “problems that the total application of certain provisions in Algeria would
have posed for our partners […], notably those related to free labor circulation.” Optimistically,
he declared that “[t]hese problems having disappeared, the case of the DOM will undoubtedly be easier to sort out.” The administrator repeatedly referred to the DOM as an “integral part of the French Republic.” This insistence, still to be validated through international accord, just as Algeria was only years earlier, was an unspoken benefit of extending the Treaty of Rome to the Caribbean and the Indian Ocean. The benefits he acknowledged for France were the opening of the movement of labor, the Social Fund, and European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (Fonds européen d’orientation et de garantie agricole, FEOGA), particularly for sugar to the DOM. The advantages for France’s partners appeared decidedly less advantageous: the extension would allow for the “harmonization of social systems,” meaning salary parity for men and women. The other advantage for France’s partners would be France’s “renunciation of the benefit of the FED.” In other words, while France gained economic assistance through FEOGA, the Social Fund, and the political and economic benefits of labor circulation that affirmed the DOM’s status as “French,” France’s partners would enjoy the benefit of France no longer claiming FED funding for the DOM.12

As in the era of l’Algérie française, labor circulation remained puzzling. Here, the administrator hinted at a sort of preterition (Chapter 4). He noted that under Articles 48 and 49 of the Treaty of Rome, free movement of labor clauses did not apply to the DOM. However, he mused:

We can however ask ourselves if theoretically, the free movement of labor implemented by Regulation 38 does not apply to DOM nationals, since according to our domestic law, they are nationals of the French Republic.

In this case, the application of these texts to the DOM would concern only movement in the direction of the other EEC states to the DOM.\textsuperscript{13}

In effect, this administrator went from acknowledging that the Treaty did not apply fully in the DOM, a suggestion that the DOM were not just like any other part of France, to suggesting that because DOM residents were technically French citizens, the French could gloss over their current exclusion from free labor circulation and immediately launch into a policy allowing EEC member state laborers to migrate to the DOM. What was more, the administrator emphasized that by 1967, the right of establishment, meaning the right of Europeans to settle permanently in another member state, should also be extended to DOM nationals, just as establishment in the DOM should be extended to citizens from the other members of the Six. Through this agreement of reciprocity, he argued, “[o]ur partners, it appears, have accepted the thesis that the DOM were France,” negating the necessity of a special text.\textsuperscript{14} It thus appears that the DOM replaced Algeria as the unnamed French overseas beneficiary of European aid. However, that was not the attitude shared by all administrators in overseas France.

In early March 1965, the office of Louis Jacquinot, Minister of State for DOM-TOM, circulated a note urging the French administration to include the DOM within the FEOGA. Jacquinot’s office was particularly concerned about DOM sugar manufacture, calling the integration of the DOM into FEOGA “the fundamental [essentiel] problem at the present time.” The problem appeared as delicate as it was important. On the one hand, it would require FEOGA to cover “the losses incurred on the export of surplus sugar, whereas in the present system, this loss is met by the producers with the partial support of the state budget.” Unsaid by the ministry, this risked further alienating France’s partners as agricultural policy was being negotiated. And yet, were the DOM not included in FEOGA, any financial policy that set the DOM apart “would

\textsuperscript{13} AN 19950190/7 and CAEF B-0067657/1: \textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{14} AN 19950190/7 and CAEF B-0067657/1: \textit{Ibid.}
create a distinction” between DOM and continental French sugar, “with all the risks which such a discrimination could bring for the future of the sale of DOM sugar on the market of the Community or even of the metropole.” This, the ministry warned, would “represent a very marked regression” for how DOM sugar was currently treated on the French market.15

The ministry’s administrator showed a keen awareness of the hesitance of some of France’s partners, noting that the DOM’s sugar production could cause a surplus and lead to “heavy financial burdens for the Community.” However, the French should stand their ground, in a complex dance of economic and political pragmatism:

Yet, on the political level, it cannot be discussed that the Overseas Departments are an integral part of the French Republic and therefore an integral part of the European Economic Community.

Consequently, from an economic perspective, it is also unquestionable that if French sugar production is liable to pose problems of surplus and financial costs to the European Economic Community, under no circumstances can the responsibility be solely ascribed to the Overseas Departments, but must be considered as a problem that will be solved on the national level.

Lastly, if we consider the problem from the perspective of financial burden, we find that, in the case of a financial regime particular to the Overseas Departments, the charge would entirely fall to the French budget, while in the case of the total integration in FEOGA, this charge would have a community character. Without a doubt, our partners will invoke the case of the Overseas Departments in order to demand an additional contribution from France to FEOGA, but in principle, it does not seem that this contribution can be higher than what the French budget alone would assure for a regime specific to the Overseas Departments. In any case, for the case of equal financial expenditure, the political problem would not be posed.16

The minister acknowledged that he was discussing major spending; at the moment of his writing, the DOM’s export expenses tallied 20 million francs for the marketing year. Thus, the solution of enforcing the DOM’s place within EEC regulation would serve French political interests, if make no appreciable difference in their economic expenditures. This would avoid a list of unsavory

15 AN 19950190/7: Ministère d’Etat, Départements et Territoires d’Outre-Mer, "Note concernant la situation de la production sucrière des départements d’Outre-Mer à l’égard de la Communauté Economique Européenne," 5 March 1965.
16 AN 19950190/7: Ibid.
possibilities, including placing DOM sugar in a “hybrid situation” and “creating an extremely unfortunate and serious [fâcheuse et lourde] discrimination between various parts of the French Republic.”

This language of hybridity and discrimination is a direct echo of criticisms leveled within France coming from the outright exclusion from (Tamzali, Chapter 2) and uneven application of (Pouderoux, Chapter 4) European regulations in Algeria. Jacquinot had served as France’s Overseas Minister for three governments during the Fourth Republic, with his last term ending in June 1954. Perhaps his experience watching the efforts of his successors, particularly Gaston Defferre, to include the DOM-TOM in the EEC impacted the emphasis he placed on ensuring that such uncomfortable and confusing situations would be avoided in the future. This lesson-learning seemed to come with a hint of optimism. In that same period, French ministers also claimed that determining how the remaining DOM might relate to the EEC had become easier without the Algerian question, rather than the Algerian question steering the choices made in the previous decade, as Chapters 3, 4, and 5 demonstrated. The acceptance of new geopolitical realities came only after a few years of Algeria’s independence. For example, a missive from the Ministry of Agriculture indicated that in mid-March 1965, the time had arrived to alleviate issues pertaining to the Treaty of Rome’s application in the DOM. This was thanks to the “now settled” Algerian “affair, which had for a long time disturbed the work, because the fate of the DOM was linked to that of Algeria in Article 227 of the Treaty […].”

The contention that the DOM’s French character could not be questioned is evidence of how strongly French administrators came to view the loss of Algeria as inevitable and necessary, albeit in a timeframe that extended into the early period of Algerian independence. It also

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17 AN 19950190/7: Ibid.
suggests the continuity of a geographic logic of “Europe” that extended well beyond the continent; Algeria was now naturally “out,” yet the Frenchness of the DOM could not be disputed. The French transformation from advocate of continued Algeria-EEC ties to relatively silent witness to the end of those discussions is indicative of the other political and economic motivations alive in the French camp as it explored other possible trade and political ties by the mid-1960s. Yet it is clear that the French still thought close relations with Algeria were possible, if increasingly frustrating. As one Foreign Affairs Ministry administrator complained, while Morocco and Tunisia had formally pursued negotiations from June 1965, Algerian authorities still had not set a timeline for talks. Rather, “during exploratory conversations, [they] gave the impression of being in no rush, and on the contrary, [being] very ‘greedy’ [gourmands].” The Algerians appeared big-headed in this administrator’s eyes:

Indeed, they claimed to be able to obtain, from that moment, satisfactory prospects not only from the point of view of the trade regime, but also regarding financial assistance and labor.19

Yet 1965 would prove difficult for France’s relationship with all three Maghrebi states. Reflecting on the evolution of Algerian-EEC relations two years later, in 1967, one French administrator linked the challenges of Maghrebi-EEC diplomacy to the July 1965 empty chair crisis, which stemmed from French fears about the EEC’s control over the budget, particularly in light of the common agricultural policy.20 He did not mention Boumediene’s coup and the ousting of Ben Bella, nor a Franco-Algerian partnership for exploiting Algerian oil established that very month.

20 Gilbert, European Integration, 79-83.
Just as the Algerian question forced the French to ask their partners to understand a much more sweeping geography of Europe, so too did the remaining DOM’s relations to the EEC invite introspection and diplomatic squabbles. The remaining overseas holdings posed a peculiar set of questions for EEC officials. Take la Réunion, a tiny island east of Madagascar. As a department of France, it might seem that la Réunion, like Corsica—another island department—would represent an extension of the European Economic Community into the waters of the Indian Ocean. In practice, it was not so simple.

In 1962, Maurice de la Giroday & Compagnie, located in the departmental capital of la Réunion, Saint Denis, hired the German Mr. Erb as a “representative” of Volkswagen and Mercedes. Soon after, Erb was joined by his countryman, a Mr. Horsting, who was posted to Saint-Pierre. Both had moved with their wives. 21 By late June 1965, it came to the attention of the West German Embassy in Paris that the Prefecture of la Réunion denied the men’s requests for visa renewal, effectively meaning they would be required to leave the island by August of that year. 22 The West German embassy’s initial inquiry into the denial, at the behest of the company and of the men, who were worried by the “peu motivée” decision, asked for the French Minister of Foreign Affairs to intervene and encourage the prefect to change the decision. 23 The Giroday company had appealed to the German embassy, calling Erb and Horsting, both “‘spécialistes diplômés’ classés dans ‘les cadres supérieurs,’” “indispensable” and

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21 AN 20040335/4: Préfecture de la Réunion, Cabinet to M. le Ministre d’Etat chargé des Départements et Territoires d’Outre-Mer, Cabinet & Secrétariat Général, “Expulsion de la Réunion de deux ressortissants Allemands,” 10 August 1965.
22 AN 20040335/4: Ministry of Foreign Affairs Direction of Administrative Conventions and Consular Affairs to Ministre d’Etat chargé des Départements et Territoires d’Outre-Mer, “Expulsion de la Réunion de deux ressortissants allemands,” signed Heuman (Chef du Service des Conventions administratives et des unions), plus two attached documents, 8 July 1965.
“irreplaceable” in their role instructing local (“indigène”) mechanics working for Giroday. Such qualifications, the embassy insisted, were “nonexistent” [introuvable] in la Réunion as well as in France, yet the prefecture of la Réunion would not prolong their residency permits (nor those of their wives) because of the current state of la Réunion’s labor market.

The response of la Réunion’s officials, and Paris’ decision to back them, reveals the limits of application of European law in the furthest corners of “France.” Here, free circulation of labor would confront the economic realities of extrametropolitan territory. La Réunion’s sub-prefect defended the decision, emphasizing the “very particular situation of this department,” including the high birth rate and the “endemic” underemployment of the local workforce. Because of this, he explained, the administration had pursued with “a certain severity” limits to the introduction of metropolitan and foreign workers into jobs that could be taken up by the Réunionnais themselves. Further still, the Réunionnais official was incredulous of Erb’s and Horsting’s invaluable nature. Giroday had received the right to hire Erb under the condition that his stay be limited to the terms of his work contract. The sub-prefect opined that it seemed “hard to believe” that after three years, Erb had not managed to train a single Réunionnais mechanic who would be capable of replacing him.

The situation in la Réunion in some ways echoed the recent worries France had expressed over French Algeria’s—and then independent Algeria’s—relationship with Europe (Chapter 5). Over the coming months, the exchange became triangular, with West German officials appealing

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to the French in Paris, who in turn attempted to appease both la Réunion, which was cautious to not anger the metropole, and West Germany, a key ally. Hugues Vinel, chief of staff for the Ministre d’État responsible for overseas affairs voiced concerns to the French Ministry of Work. While he saw the necessity of “quell[ing] immigration in an already overpopulated department, I do not wish to adopt such a measure with regards to nationals of an EEC partner without having serious juridical reasons motivating it […]” Further, he worried that it could spark retaliatory measures against French nationals working or hoping to work in West Germany. Vinel’s concern about the implications for EEC movement is instructive. His query and the triangular arguments surrounding the German mechanics are very much a product of the same debates that surrounded Italian protectionism and French fears about a European settler saturation in the larger African labor market.

By December, however, Paris had come down firmly on the side of la Réunion. Early that month, the Director General for Work and Employment told Vinel’s office that he “entirely share[d] the point of view” of the Prefect of la Réunion, which was justified given the employment situation on the island. Unemployed Réunionnais should be given priority or at least (and this was added in with a pen), foreign firms must “engage in the local training of technicians.” Going further, he reminded the Overseas officials in Paris that Regulation 38/65 relative to the free movement of laborers within the EEC did not apply to the DOM or TOM. Erb and Horsting would have to leave la Réunion.26

How should this decision be understood? On the one hand, it suggests the dominance of domestic concerns in France, including the importance of appeasing a departmental cohort

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before turning to EEC partners. One the other hand, it reinforces the contradictions in France’s understandings of its own borders and, by extension, those of Europe. Like Algeria before it, la Réunion was France, but only sometimes. EEC labor regulations were subsumed by local protocol, at the risk of angering a major supranational partner and neighbor.

In the Réunion mechanics discussion, as with earlier debates about Algeria, an image of Eurafrica emerges that is, if we are using judicious terms, ambivalent. Or perhaps we are better served discussing Eurafricas. Indeed, confusion and conflict were in some ways hallmarks of the policy. We have seen examples of this throughout this work. A note circulated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the late summer of 1956 emphasized that during a meeting of members of the Six in May of that year, the ministry made clear that France would not participate in a common market that excluded the overseas territories. But the very next sentence in the document limited the inclusion, pointing out that

[T]he difference in the economic structure between the six European states and the overseas territories and states makes a pure and simple inclusion of the latter in the Common Market on equal footing as the metropole impossible. This total inclusion cannot be imagined until a more advanced stage of development in the overseas territories and states.27

Inclusion, with an asterisk, would enervate French Union leaders like Senghor and later confuse French and European administrators. What is more, it risked overseas holdings’ already ambiguous juridical statuses at the very moment that French officials most needed to impress upon their public and the wider world the inherent Frenchness of those territories.

Historians must analyze the decisions and motivations behind trade and economic policies because they reveal so much more about the contexts in which such choices and deals were made. French officials successfully convinced their European partners to sign a version of

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the Treaty of Rome that incorporated France’s overseas holdings – including a clause that explicitly named Algeria – and allowed for the gradual extension of EEC trade regulations into those territories. This had real results, including lowering some trade barriers and drawing European-wide funds into industrial development across French Africa. It also raised uncomfortable questions about who could count as European. And critically, for French officials, it offered a supranational tool through which to reassert the French quality of Algeria. De Gaulle’s veto of Great Britain’s entry into the EEC has already been chronicled by his many biographers, historians of European integration, and international historians.28 For the purposes of my study, the French conviction that Britain could not be a faithful member of a European partnership because of its Commonwealth responsibilities is noteworthy because, of course, France spent over a decade insisting that its own empire would join with France as it entered that very partnership. As Dutch frustration in Chapters 4 and 5 showed, France’s partners increasingly viewed such an attitude with disdain and sought both to enlarge Europe to include Britain and to pressure France to make fewer claims for its colonial holdings. But this European dance, in fact, drew the attention of the very holdings that were often drawn into question.

An Exit?

By the mid-1970s, Algeria no longer maintained the unique status upon which France had once insisted. The EEC Council increasingly attempted to implement a “global Mediterranean approach” for the three Maghrebi states. The Algerian authorities expressed interest defining such a relationship, presumably in part to clarify their trade position, which differed depending

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28 Alex May argues that by the time Britain was accepted into the enlarging EEC, the Commonwealth was less of an issue for it. In this version, then, it was Britain’s diminishing emphasis on its own vestiges of empire, rather than French changes of heart, that shifted the conversation. Alex May, “The Commonwealth and Britain’s Turn to Europe, 1945-73,” The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs 102, 1 (2013): 29-39.
on which member of the Six was concerned.\textsuperscript{29} Yet the Algerians could no longer count on the support of France, which had been so strong when Algeria was still a juridical part of France. Indeed, by the mid-1970s, the French were outright hostile to Algeria’s requests for maintaining a close relationship. In November 1977, a majority of the French senators declared themselves unable to ratify newly concluded accords between the EEC and Mediterranean states. They cited the presence of “a certain number of our compatriots” held as hostages in Algeria.\textsuperscript{30} Presumably, these senators were thinking of six French citizens taken hostage in Mauritania seven months earlier, and whom Polisario Front guerilla fighters pushing for the independence of the Western Sahara would release in December.\textsuperscript{31}

In June 1972, Algeria’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, addressed the Belgian Royal Institution of International Relations’ Interuniversity Center of Independent Research. Perhaps fittingly for a speech in Brussels, his topic was “Algeria and Europe: Perspectives on Cooperation.” Bouteflika, who would become president of Algeria in 1999 and who remains so at the time of this writing, offered “some reflections” on the issue of current relations between Algeria and the EEC. According to Bouteflika, “the heart \[\textit{nœud}\] of the problem” was that despite a decade of Algerian independence, “certain” Western European administrators, taken by “nostalgic dreams […]”, have not lost the hope to perpetuate a degree of domination through new methods.”\textsuperscript{32} He insisted that Algeria “did not differentiate itself from the other countries of the Third World,” yet emphasized its unique geographic position and its

\textsuperscript{29} AN 20000293/4: Communautés Européennes, le Conseil, Note: “Projet de schéma pour un exposé des motifs concernant les Accords de coopération entre la Communauté, d’une part, et chacun des pays du Maghreb, d’autre part,” 7 January 1977 (emphasis original).


\textsuperscript{31} This was two years after Carlos the Jackal landed in Algiers with his OPEC hostages. Jonathan Kandell, “French Hostages Say Algerians Held Them,” \textit{The New York Times}, 28 December 1977.

particular history of decolonization. Indeed, arguing that the Algerian War left traces of trauma and destruction, as had the decades of colonial rule before it, Bouteflika argued that:

Instead, thanks to their realism, the Algerian people made the deliberate choice to overcome natural feelings that could have been theirs and showed that they were ready to engage with the path of a real cooperation.

Bouteflika would go on to tell his audience that Algeria “was integrated, despite itself [malgré elle] in the Treaty of Rome, before describing some of the transformations of Algerian-EEC relations, from relative integration in the early 1960s to the labeling of Algeria as a “third party state” by some EEC members only a few short years later.

Bouteflika’s recounting of history should remind us of the key moments highlighted in this work. By mid-1962, Algeria was independent. Throughout the nearly eight-year war, members of the FLN and other nationalist organizations did not address Eurafrika or future ties with France. The war was fought with the goal of severing such ties and ending over a century of l’Algérie française. Yet late in 1962, the government of a now independent Algeria did make overtures to the EEC, pointing out in a letter to Brussels that the territory was explicitly named in the Treaty of Rome. Within three years, talks on this question fizzled, but we should take seriously that for these three years, it seemed possible that an independent, majority Muslim state located on the continent of Africa seemed poised to enjoy the benefits of EEC membership. A treaty ostensibly about trade had the potential to extend a certain type of European identity beyond the borders of Europe. The denial of its application in Algeria, then, perhaps foreclosed the possibility of such an identity surviving, but only in the late 1960s.

34 CAOM BIB AOM 20730/1972: Ibid., 203.
When we examine European integration through the lens of Eurafrican integration, not an integration limited to the European continent, we see before us a fuller version of the postwar possibilities for relations between Europe and Africa. This version undermines the heroic postwar story and reasserts empire into contemporary understandings of the foundation of Europe and the European project. The history of European integration is an imperial history. Only by recognizing the importance of Algeria to France in these negotiations can we begin to challenge the claims that resonate today of irreconcilable cultures or definitive geographic boundaries.

Although France’s insistence that Algeria was part of France and therefore should be included in the European project gradually quieted, we must further investigate how North Africa and especially Algeria were bound up in France’s larger Eurafrican project. This was a French-driven project, and takes us far from the contemporary rhetoric about pure divisions of worlds or cultures. The agricultural official Pouderoux insisted that Algeria was the natural site of Europe’s “internal expansion” because he viewed Algeria as inherently French, and therefore a part of Europe. The long, deadly struggle fought by Algeria’s nationalists naturally reminds us that such a conviction was held by the French government and, until late in the war, by the French public, too, but not by many Algerians themselves. But to me, reading Pouderoux’s conviction, at once a statement of geographic expansion and an assertion of the possibility that Europe could exist outside of “European” territory, is proof that Europe has never only meant one thing.

Such ambiguous notions of political borders and geographical limitations (or openings) upend claims made today of strict lines between “civilizations” and should give us pause as we attempt to make sense of contemporary interrogations of Europe’s borders and citizenship.
regimes. Imperial policy, often promoted by the French government, influenced how European institutions would approach trade and labor migration. If we believe that six nation-states joined together to form these supranational organizations, we are wrong. By adjusting the unit of analysis from nation-state to empire, a new, more accurate understanding of trade and labor policy, and of the very shape of “Europe,” emerges. In economic, political, and geographic terms, Europe was never only on the continent.

Such an investigation helps situate this policy in its historical moment, including Western concerns about the spread of Communism and the coming wave of trade negotiations embodied by the Yaoundé and Lomé Conventions. A consideration of Algeria also helps point to the primacy of French domestic concerns, privileged over the rhetoric of supranational cooperation and European partnership during the moment of European integration. Indeed, when we consider the French reasoning behind Eurafrica, which included maintaining a firm grip on trade and markets and reaffirming the metropole’s role as the leader of an empire, we see a policy that is strikingly inward looking. For France, Algeria was a logical extension of the metropole, and therefore, a part of Europe. That is, until it wasn’t. The confused attempts at implementing a Eurafrican vision attest to this moment of conflict between France’s domestic exigencies, as it faced insurgency in Algeria, and its outward-looking goals as it gazed towards its European, or perhaps Eurafrican, future.
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