A Realization of Modernity: Case Studies in Connectivity and Time

Mari Gorman
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A REALIZATION OF MODERNITY: CASE STUDIES IN CONNECTIVITY AND TIME

by

MARI GORMAN

A master’s thesis is submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Liberal Studies in satisfaction of the thesis requirement for the degree of Master of Arts, The City University of New York.

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A Realization of Modernity:
Case Studies in Connectivity and Time

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Mari Gorman

This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Liberal Studies in satisfaction of the requirement for the degree of Master of Arts.

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ABSTRACT

A Realization of Modernity: Case Studies in Connectivity and Time

by

Mari Gorman

Advisor: David Halle

My stated goal in applying to The Graduate Center was to explore my previous research in diverse fields of study. This research, the result of a formal investigation of acting, was and still is centrally focused on the subject of relationship itself, relationships being what actors create. In pursuit of a greater understanding of the essential nature of relationship in practical terms, “strokes of existence,” a self-organizing complex system that constitutes universal relationship, was unexpectedly discovered. As such, this system has been shown to offer solutions to many outstanding problems in diverse areas of study. The Liberal Studies program track, Approaches to Modernity, offered an ideal opportunity for me to further explore this work in different contexts because modernity has diverse meanings that span a multidisciplinary spectrum that includes history, philosophy, the arts and sciences, and religion. To reflect this effort, a different topic is addressed in each chapter, focusing on subjects that pertain to relationships in contexts of connectivity and time, for purposes of both contributing to the subject of modernity, and to add to the value of my work.
This thesis is dedicated to
SGI President Daisaku Ikeda,
with my deepest gratitude.
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INTRODUCTION

The word "modern" comes from the Latin “modernus” from modo: now, just now, only.

Originally a Western concept, modernity is now globally considered a measure of the state of a civilization. On the other hand, a view of postmodernism is that modernity is an essentially failed concept, or at least one that has had its day. So, the question inevitably becomes, What is modernity?

Modernity comes in as many versions as there are thinkers or journalists, yet all its definitions point, in one way or another, to the passage of time. The adjective “modern” designates a new regime, an acceleration, a rupture, a revolution in time. When the word, “modern”, “modernization”, or “modernity” appears, we are defining, by contrast, an archaic and stable past. Furthermore, the word is always being thrown into the middle of a fight, in a quarrel where there are winners and losers, Ancients and Moderns.¹

“Ancients and Moderns” refers to a so-called “Quarrel Between the Ancients and Moderns,” a controversy that arose toward the end of the 17th century over which was superior, the scholarship of the new, modern culture, or those of ancient Greece and Rome. This “quarrel” was satirized by Jonathan Swift in 1697 in “The Battle of the Books,” in which he brings books in a

library to life to enact a battle between the Ancients and Moderns. He leaves the decision to the reader. To me, the inference is that they are essentially one and that the battle will kill them.²

Historically, the Moderns gained the upper hand. The developments during the Scientific Revolution in the 16th and 17th centuries bolstered the view of modern culture as superior in constituting change, while the culture of the ancients remained static. As Latour points out, the dichotomy persists, inviting the idea that the realization of modernity lies in the connection of science and the humanities. In the succeeding centuries, with all the meanings it has gained, the concept of modernity can be seen as so compelling that history has refused to let it go, and fortunately it hasn’t, or can’t, because of course history has a place in the present too.

In 1974, I embarked on a formal investigation of acting that led to the discovery of a self-organizing complex system in which, among other things, past, present, and future are aggregated in the present moment, which makes it pertinent to the subject of modernity. With modernity in mind, I have pursued subjects in my coursework with meanings that pertain to connectivity and time, the interconnection of all things being the conclusion of relationship that the system bears out.

The story of this investigation and the self-organizing complex system it revealed are conveyed in my book, Strokes of Existence: The Connection of All Things. The word “strokes,” which is what the system is called, both for short and in its use, is borrowed from painting. In its operation, each stroke both adds to and changes a life, just as each stroke of a brush both adds to and changes a picture.³

CHAPTER ONE

Part I

Global Connectivity

Diversity is the proof of life.4

--Daisaku Ikeda

The British cultural sociologist John Tomlinson offers the term “complex connectivity” for a way of understanding globalization, which he calls an “empirical condition of the modern world,” and “an ever-densening network of interconnections.”5 He cites others who have also conceived of globalization in terms of connectivity, which includes: all the networks and flows6 of “goods, capital, people, knowledge, images, crime, pollutants, drugs, fashions and beliefs, [as well as] social movements and relationships”7 which require the use of all types of transportation and communications systems.8 He explains that “culture matters for globalization in the obvious sense that it is an intrinsic aspect of the whole process of complex connectivity,” but that culture can furthermore be understood as being “constitutive” of complex connectivity.9 “Roots and

8 Tomlinson, Globalization and Culture, 2.
9 Tomlinson, Globalization and Culture, 22-26
routes”¹⁰ are always co-existent in culture, both being subject to transformation in global modernity. How we understand culture as being constitutive of globalization depends our view of its consequences.¹¹ For example, we now experience distance differently, and to illustrate this, Tomlinson compares airplanes to time capsules, because “when we board them we enter a self-contained and independent temporal regime” where our focus is on the familiar routine of in-flight beverages, meals, in-flight movie, etc., that take place in the cabin, and thus “our journey is one through time rather than space.” Passengers rarely even maintain an awareness of the topological changes they are passing over which are markers of distance. Disembarking after such a trip, one experiences what Tomlinson calls “a temporary dislocation” and a “reality of otherness” that challenges one to immediately adjust. The phenomenon of proximity also relates to “the correlation between income and mobility” because those who stay in one place also experience “the ‘dis-placement’ brought to them. One measure of the accomplishment of globalization,” he writes, “is how far the overcoming of physical distance is matched by that of cultural distance.”¹²

Tomlinson asserts that “although the increasing ability to move—physically and representationally—between places is a highly significant mode of connectivity,” it is “ultimately subordinate to—ultimately derivative of—the order of location in time and space we grasp as ‘home’. This means that the most important determinants of people’s experience of globalization is the “dis-placement that global modernity brings to them,”¹³ making global connectivity a local challenge, to be met by individuals. The peace builder, Buddhist

¹¹ Tomlinson, Globalization and Culture, 22-26
¹² Ibid., 4.
¹³ Ibid., 9 (emphasis in the original).
philosopher, educator and author, Daisaku Ikeda, has said, “Inter-civilizational dialogue is currently the focus of attention, but the point of departure or the prototype is human-to-human rapport. The whole thing begins with one person talking with another.”

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Part II

An Encounter

Simon McBurney is an innovative British theatre artist who, for the past 30 years, has created highly original productions with Complicite, the London theatre company he co-founded in 1983. When I saw the ads for The Encounter, conceived, directed and performed by McBurney on Broadway, whose brilliant, highly original work I have seen in the past, I thought I must see this, especially given the long list of critics both in London and New York who awarded it five stars.

The Encounter, inspired by the book, Amazon Beaming by Petru Popescu, is a one-man show based on the National Geographic photographer Loren McIntyre’s real-life encounter with the “uncontacted” Mayoruna tribe of South America. I knew from the show’s promotional material that the aural component was the innovative feature of the show, but I wasn’t prepared for what this would mean until I experienced it.

When you get to your seat, you find a set of headphones draped over it. Audience members are repeatedly warned by a voice over a P.A. system that they must test their earphones before the show begins and to signal an usher if there is a problem, because if the headphones are not working correctly you will not be able to experience the show. With the stereo headphones on,

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14 Ikeda and Tehranian, Global Civilization, 9.
one hears a voice testing one ear and then the other: “You should be hearing the sound in your left ear now….and now in your right ear…”

The stage is fully lit before the show begins. The person who comes out to welcome the audience and ask people to shut off their cellphones continues talking and explaining and also demonstrating the sound equipment on stage, and the sound effects they can produce, and by that time you know it’s McBirney, and then suddenly he is no longer speaking from the stage but inside your head through your headphones, which he retests by going back and forth from one side to the other, through the “2.6 pounds of congealed pate” of your brain. He then does a trick of breathing sexily into your ear, and it really does sound like he is actually doing that. Then he tells us that a voice might come from the seat behind us, and as he says this his voice comes from there.

Continuing to banter while setting up props around the stage, McBirney starts dropping hints about where we’re headed. He finally sits down at a sort of console table and, giving a cue to a sound technician, demonstrates how the artificial lowering of his voice by an octave, combined with a change from a British accent to an American one, enables him to sound like a completely different person—in this case like a strong American male—who, he tells us, is Loren McIntyre. Speaking as McIntyre, the journey begins. This was quite a brilliant beginning.

It wasn’t very long after the show began that I started to feel uncomfortable in a way that gave me no hint that it might have an aesthetic source. What I felt was a kind of disconnect occurring as a result of seeing the character many yards away while at the same time hearing him in my head. When he is finally introduced to the Chief of the tribe, who is quite cordial to him, McIntyre notices that he has numerous growths on his legs, large moles or warts, and from then
on refers to him as “Barnacle.” This came as a shock and reduced McIntyre from a curious National Geographic photographer to a person of no interest at all to me.

Of course we never hear or see anyone else, only McIntyre. We only imagine others from what McIntyre says about them as he moves about the stage, sometimes using cleverly conceived props in front of changing backdrops with geometric designs composed of light, often accompanied by strange jungle kinds of sounds.

It wasn’t too long before I started thinking that the narrative of McIntyre’s experience would have been better served with just a podcast because my imagination would have had free rein. At a certain point during the play one hears a sort of background noise of some scientists discussing things like the relationship between perception and reality, which I wanted to actually hear, but it was somehow obscured. As the play wore on, I began to resent the experience I was having because it seemed to be entirely anti-theatre. Theatre is a live medium, and it is endangered in part because of new, invasive technologies. It is a medium in which life-to-life communication is itself the art form. Wearing headphones, I felt shut out somehow from the theatre itself; I was disconnected from the person I was watching because he sounded like he was inside my head, and thus these two perceptual senses were disconnected. With the headphones I was also completely cut off from others in the audience—even from the person sitting right next to me. When the show was over I actually felt like I hadn’t had a theatre experience at all, and even felt that the production was an insult to the theatre, which is, arguably, all about connectivity.

I didn’t fully appreciate until reading Tomlinson how The Encounter is about globalization and culture. In McBurney’s conception, an encounter with a tribe of the “uncontacted” brings an experience of complex dis-connectivity. Viewed in light of Tomlinson’s aforementioned statement that “the measure of the accomplishment of globalization is how far the overcoming of
physical distance is matched by that of cultural distance,” McBirney’s play is an apt metaphor for how far we have yet to go. As I saw the listings showing the declining numbers of seats sold for *The Encounter* over the next several weeks, it seemed the experience was also disappointing to others; complex dis-connectivity is no fun. Which is a good thing.
CHAPTER TWO

Entanglement Theory in Archaeology

In archaeology and throughout the social sciences there has in recent years been a growing interest in understanding human behavior from a more object, or “thing” centered point of view, a growing interest in the nature and role of “things” in relationships between people and things.¹ This case study is based on the Entanglement Theory of Ian Hodder, in which the connections between humans and things are explained in terms of use and dependence.

Traditionally, subject-object relationships (i.e., “human-thing” relationships), are considered to be produced solely through the agency of the subject, with the object generally considered a passive, subordinate, even dead sort of thing. This unbalanced relational concept has increasingly been seen as seriously lacking by archeologists, whose work is the study of material culture,¹⁵ ¹⁶ and by other social scientists who see it as an underlying cause even of unethical human behavior.¹⁷ ¹⁸ Compelled by the thought that “Different perspectives and discussions of the agency, vibrancy and vitality of mute things have converged on some version of the idea that subject and object, mind and matter, human and thing co-constitute each other,”¹⁹ Hodder

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developed Entanglement Theory. He has written about this theory in *Entangled: An Archaeology of the Relationships between Humans and Things*, and in journal articles. The central argument of the theory is that the understanding of the interrelationships of humans and things is key to understanding human history and culture.

Hodder defines things (or objects) as entities, but states that because of the “connectiveness” of things, questions arise as to what the boundaries between entities are, and what makes a thing a “bounded essence.” Using his computer as an example, he asks if the computer is “just the unplugged processor box or is it also the connections that allow it to work?” His conclusion is that the definition of an entity “depends on its use as a thing.” Thus his computer is not only the processor box but also its wires and screen and so forth—they are all necessary for it to work and thus for him to use as a computer. If he couldn’t use it he would have to get it fixed and in that process the different parts would then be “defined as separate entities depending on use.”

Entanglement Theory approaches human-thing relationships from “the point of view of things,” and these relationships are defined as “entanglements.” In this theory the idea that the human and social come first is dismissed, along with the idea that things are constructed by people and only exist for humans’ use. Leveling the playing field, Hodder also describes humans as things, as “just temporary bundles of matter, energy and information,” and as “flows of blood and nerves and cells temporarily coalesced into an entity that is thoroughly dependent on and connected to air, water, food and so on.”

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20 *Hodder, Archaeological Theory Today*, 1.


22 Ibid., 9.
connection to it as Hodder does to his example of the computer, a human is also a complex “thing” with potentially infinite connections to other things. And like the computer, if something goes wrong in the human, the part that needs to be fixed will be defined as a separate entity. Thus a person’s heart, which is also a thing, would be described separately, with all of its own uses and dependencies. Hodder outlines various types of these connections between things, which are also considered interactions.23

Forms of Connections between Things

Production and Reproduction – Production processes link all the things needed to procure and manufacture things, and the locations and knowledge to do so, e.g., the assembly for making iron includes “furnace, fuel, fire, bellows, ore, tongs, hammer, cooling water, and so on.” The process of reproduction links humans to each other, as it does plants and animals. Reproduction also includes agricultural field preparation, protection of animals, and human birth.24

Exchange – Gifts both given and received create links between things.

Use – Things come into relation with other things as they are used, consumed or applied. This process is explained by the example of a steel hammer head that “needs a wooden handle if it is to be used, and the handle will only stay attached if a metal or wooden wedge is used. Then there are the nails and the wooden planks to be nailed, and the crossbeams to which they are to be nailed and so on”25

 Consumption – The form of use that involves dishes and foods involved in a meal as well as the consumption of social behavior in the form of imitation.

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24 Hodder, Entangled, 43.
25 Ibid.
Discard – Things are associated as they move through their life cycles and become mixed in middens and landfills.\textsuperscript{26}

Dependencies

Hodder defines entanglement as “the sum of four types of relationships between humans and things: Humans depend on things (HT), things depend on other things (TT), things depend on humans (TH), humans depend on humans HH).”\textsuperscript{27} \textsuperscript{28} He also describes two types of dependence. One, which is enabling, “allows people to live, socialize, eat and think.”\textsuperscript{29} The other is ‘entrapping’, as in co-dependent relationships or addictions, or dependencies that can hinder one’s development or increase the difficulties of living.

In explaining “humans depend on things,” Hodder cites food, water, and all the things that people depend on to live, work and enjoy life. He also describes humans as going towards and away from things, to both associate with them and also to disassociate, to ‘be their own thing.’\textsuperscript{30}

In explaining “things depend on other things,” Hodder describes a behavioral chain, which is “a progression of a series of interactions” between things. They are: “Procurement, Manufacture, Use, Maintenance, Repair, Discard.” To explain these, he cites an example in which the procurement of a certain material for the manufacture of something requires a certain kind of tool. (55-56). In turn, the use of the manufactured thing requires quality materials in order to be maintained, tools or materials to repair it during its inevitable process of decay, and a place to discard it. Furthermore, interactions occur within behavioral chains that constitute the

\textsuperscript{26} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{27} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{29} Hodder, "The Entanglements of Humans and Things,” 1.
\textsuperscript{30} Hodder, \textit{Entangled}, 22.
‘performance’ of a thing, which relates to a certain task or objective. For example, a cooking pot must be tempered so that it can be repeatedly subjected to high heat without cracking. With the ability to provide this kind of performance, the pot can contribute to human living.

“Things depend on humans” to procure, manufacture and fix them, as well as make use of, maintain, repair and discard them. He says that if the obvious is added that “humans depend on humans, then entanglement is simply the addition of these four sets of dependences and dependencies.”

\[
HT + TT + TH + HH = \text{Entanglement}
\]

A cell phone is a good example of this formula. Humans depend on cell phones, as everyone knows, for many different reasons (HT). Cell phones require batteries that need to be recharged, making them dependent on a connective wire and a source of electricity (TT). In order to remain in use, cell phones depend on humans to make bill payments to telecom companies (TH). Humans depend on Humans to produce, maintain, distribute and discard cell phones (HH). These complex connections between humans and cell phones are ‘entanglements’.

When a cell phone breaks for some reason or is lost, one who has grown dependent on her cell phone to communicate with family, friends, employers or employees, emergency services and in fact her world, will find herself at a tremendous loss without her cell phone. Many problems can result from the loss of the connections a cell phone provides when one has become dependent on it to manage one’s life. Hodder explains, “As humans increasingly live in a world they have produced, they have to work harder to reproduce that world on which they depend.” People have to purchase cell phones and service plans, which requires them to work or otherwise do something in order to gain the money to both pay for and support them; handle the

\[31\] Ibid., 88
transmission of such payments, keep the cell phone charged and in working order, and protect it. So although a cell phone can extend the capacity of one’s life, it also entraps. A basic argument of Entanglement Theory is that humans and societies are entrapped into the maintenance and sustaining of material worlds, which become more complex over time, and thus things can be said to have agency: “There is an objectness, a stand-in-the-wayness to things that resists, that forms, that entraps and entangles.”

Although, as Hodder says, aspects of his theory regarding relationships between humans and things are in some ways in line with other approaches in the social sciences and humanities, there are, according to Hodder, two aspects of entanglement that have specific, archaeological, dimensions. One is “the physical processes of things”, and the other, “temporalities”.

Regarding physical processes, entanglement focuses on the physical processes of things in themselves. The example Hodder gives is that of a see-through letter box he once noticed at Heathrow airport. It was different from the red and cast iron ones that are common in England, which are designed to keep posted letters safe, private, and dry. The one in the airport was plastic and had a red front but was transparent in the back. Hodder describes this post box as being caught in an entanglement with the Pentagon because the box was introduced after 9/11 when the planes flew into the Twin Towers and the Pentagon. The box was transparent on one side in order to be able to see if there was a bomb in it. Running though this entanglement, he explains, is a climate of fear. It seems that from an archaeological perspective one can take from this that an investigation of the entanglements of a material object can lead to an understanding of its history and culture.

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32 Ibid., 13.
33 Ibid., 97.
34 Ibid., 96.
“Temporalities”, the other component of Entanglement Theory that Hodder states has a specific archaeological dimension, concerns time in various contexts. Time span is one. A firing in the brain is momentary, but a mountain endures over a great length of time. A stone building will last for a longer period of time than a wooden one. Another is linear time. One can ride a bike or drive a car today because in the 4th millennium BC the wheel was invented. Yet another is the ability to keep time. It is possible to determine and mark distances in time, in minutes or centuries for example, because of global systems of time keeping. Hodder also goes into political, economic and religious contexts of time, and suggests, for example, the implications of such things as the build-up of refuse over time, which will create problems for future generations.

Hodder does not believe that things have intentionality, but says that “things have primary agency in that they act in the world as a result of processes of material interaction, transformation and decay. Materials and the forces that flow through them afford humans certain potentials and constraints. In these ways things are actors.”

Many of the examples Hodder conveys of entanglement theory relating to evidence from specific archaeological projects, are from the Neolithic settlement, Catalhöyük, a project which Hodder has led since 1993. It is on the Kony Plain in central Turkey. It has two mounds, one of which contains 18 occupation levels inhabited over a span of 1,400 years. The settlement, which was occupied for about 2,000 years, began approximately 9,400 years ago. The project is revealing information about the development of one of the world’s earliest societies, which

35 Ibid., 5
36 Ibid., 98-100.
37 Ibid., 215-216.
includes the social and economic organization of the settlement, and the transformation from hunting and gathering to agriculture and civilization.”

One example of a discovery at this settlement involves the “Neolithic entanglement with clay.” In the earliest levels, around 7400 cal BC, fired clay objects have been found. Fired clay pottery, however, begins at Level XII, around 7000-6900 cal BC, but evidence suggests that the small, thick vessels were not used over a fire for cooking. Up to Level VII it seems food was cooked by putting heated clay balls into wood or clay baskets with the food. These clay balls go into disuse around Level VII and are replaced around the same time by thin-walled, mineral-tempered clay pots that show evidence of being used in cooking. These mineral-tempered pots also have a greater capacity and, as shown by experiments in behavioral archaeology, have a greater efficiency of heat transfer than organic-tempered pots.

Using ethnographic and experimental data, the difference between cooking in clay pots over a fire and cooking with clay balls was that by cooking over a fire it was possible to do other things because the pot could be left alone on the fire. When the cooking was done with clay balls, the balls had to be moved in and out of the fire in order to be reheated when they cooled. Interestingly, the archaeological evidence indicates that during the Level VII and VI periods, the settlement was at its largest and was packed with houses. It was the custom of the inhabitants of this settlement to bury the deceased beneath their houses, and burial rituals within the houses

39 http://www.ian-hodder.com
40 Hodder, Entangled, 152.

Looking for an archaeological example of human-thing dependence that would indicate the depth of the interconnectedness of people and things that I have discovered in my work, I found one that is significant in \textit{Graecia Capta: The Landscapes of Roman Greece}, by Susan E. Alcock, on ramifications of the Roman conquest on provincial Greece. In it, Alcock explores four different “landscapes” in \textit{Graecia Capta}: rural, civic, provincial, and sacred. The example I found is from “The sacred landscape.”

During the conquest of Greece and in its aftermath, the Romans destroyed or displaced cult objects and sanctuaries that were sacred to the Greeks. Augustus himself took objects from the sanctuary of Athena Alea at Tegea in Arcadia for removal to Rome. Alcott refers to these acts as “symbolic violence.”\footnote{Susan E. Alcock, \textit{Graecia Capta: The Landscapes of Roman Greece} (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1993).} She writes of the innumerable statues removed from Greek cities and sanctuaries as “plunder by Roman troops or by greedy emperors.” Mainly she makes the point that the cult statues and votive—offerings—destroyed or displaced by the Romans were not simply art objects (as we might see them as in a museum today), but were “sacred things [that]
contained and declared the history and identity of individual civic entities as well as the Greeks as a whole.”

Alcott states that the Romans’ consciousness of what they were taking cannot be denied. “Depriving one’s enemy of sacred objects and possessing them yourself served two related purposes: defeating them in perpetuity and adding the power of their gods to your own symbolic arsenal.”

“…the action removed their gods.”

Most dangerously, Alcott states, is that “such acts worked effectively to undermine local loyalties, to shatter established relationships of authority, and, above all, to weaken any pretense of independence. This is an example of how the loss of the things in which a community places their faith (i.e., values most highly and depends on most) for the happiness and security of their community, would leave them rudderless and have a disintegrating effect, which indeed was the outcome of the Roman capture of Greece. This is not simply a general observation of an outcome. The effect of the destruction of what they most valued had to have profoundly impacted their lives, both physically and spiritually. The reason is that human beings are literally composed of their values.

The self-organizing complex system called “strokes,” systematically produces relationships, and in so doing constitutes the inseparability of mind and body and person and environment. In the system, the component of subjectivity is most important because it encompasses one’s values, and therefore one’s attitudes towards everything. This principal, stated by Daisaku Ikeda in a dialogue with Arnold Toynbee, is that “The nature of the thing on which a man places greatest

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46 Ibid., 177.
48 Alcock, Graecia Capta, 179-180.
value characterizes that man’s attitude toward all life.”

Because of the oneness of mind, body, person and environment, this attitude manifests in all one’s relationships, in every aspect of one’s life. An example of this is conveyed in Strokes of Existence: The Connection of All Things: “A person whose motorcycle is at the center of his life, who values his motorcycle above all else, will likely take on the aspects of a motorcycle, attiring himself in such things as a black leather jacket with chrome studs, and mirrored glasses. He will also value a high degree of freedom and like to get around things.”

What people value manifests both physically and spiritually on deep levels, and finds expression in their appearance and behavior. Evidence of this principle can be extraordinarily specific.

Figs. 1, 2, 3.

In the combined images above, the praying woman, as shown by her hat (called a “steeple

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50 Arnold Toynbee and Daisaku Ikeda, Choose Life: A Dialogue, edited by Richard L. Gage. (Oxford University Press: 1976), 367-368. (This dialogue was carried out across 10 days in 1972 and 1973, totaling more than 40 hours.)


52 Fig. 1: detail of Image: The Coronation of Charlemagne (800 AD) © Public Domain https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Charlemagne_coronation.jpgdetail
hat”), as well as by her position, is devoted to the church. The men, with their headwear reflecting subordinate levels of the church building itself, are devoted servants of the church, and are shown performing a ceremony in this relationship, which also indicates the power of the church.

The process through which this oneness of people and things is achieved is a process through which evolution occurs and culture is propagated.\textsuperscript{53} This system, discussed above, empirically realizes “the idea that subject and object, mind and matter, human and thing co-constitute each other.”\textsuperscript{54}

As explained in Hodder’s entanglement theory and further exemplified above, an understanding of the interrelationships of humans and things in terms of dependence does enhance the ability to understand human history and culture.

\textbf{Fig. 2:} Wenceslaus Hollar, © Public Domain via Wikimedia Commons. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Wenceslas_Hollar_-_Salisbury_Cathedral_(State_2).jpg

\textbf{Fig. 3:} detail of Image:Meister des Jouvenel des Ursins.jpg © Public Domain. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Meister_des_Jouvenel_des_Ursins_001_detail_1.jpg#file


\textsuperscript{54} Ibid., 22.
CHAPTER THREE

Makiguchi: Bridging the Narrative Divide

Narrative psychology, a subfield of psychology, is based on the premise that people understand, think about, and explain their lives in storied form.\(^1\) The narrative approach to psychology is inspiring because everyone understands what a story is—even children can tell stories from two and a half to three years old.\(^55\) Despite the simplicity of the concept, however, it is a vast subject, approached from many perspectives.

Notwithstanding the differences between these perspectives, a shared idea in the field of narrative psychology is that we are each living a story of our own making, and by changing our stories we can change our lives. Another is that lived experience can only be described in narrative form.

Jerome Bruner, one of the founders of narrative psychology, wrote in an early paper on the subject that

The mimesis between life so-called and narrative is a two-way affair: that is to say, just as art imitates life in Aristotle's sense, so, in Oscar Wilde's, life imitates art. Narrative imitates life, life imitates narrative. "Life" in this sense is the same kind of construction of the human imagination as "a narrative" is. It is constructed by human beings through active ratiocination, by the same kind of ratiocination through which we construct narratives. When somebody tells you his life…it is always a cognitive achievement rather than a through-the-clear-crystal

recital of something univocally given. In the end, it is a narrative achievement. There is no such thing psychologically as "life itself."\textsuperscript{56}

Based on the evidence of the self-organizing complex system called strokes, already noted in this thesis, in which life manifests itself in the form of relationships, I argue that there is such a thing as “life itself.” By this I mean that both the living of life and the narrative telling of it are both productions of the same intrinsic process.

In an article published nearly forty years before he wrote the above, Bruner, who was also a founder of cognitive psychology, stated that in its understanding of perception, the practice of psychology was still lacking. Quoting L. L. Thurstone, he wrote: ““In these days when we insist so frequently on the interdependence of all aspects of personality, it would be difficult to maintain that any of these functions, such as perception, is isolated from the rest of the dynamical system that constitutes the person.””\textsuperscript{57} Following this quote, Bruner states, “The problem is, indeed, to understand how the process of perception is affected by other concurrent mental functions and how these functions, in their turn, are affected by the operation of perceptual processes.”\textsuperscript{58} It seems that when he wrote this he too believed that a dynamical system such as Thurstone described existed, and only needed to be discovered. In 1986, Bruner turned to narrative psychology as the possible basis of such a system. However, in 2002, a “dynamical system that constitutes the person” in the context of a narrative self was deemed impossible by

Bruner.\textsuperscript{59} The problem he finally concluded was insurmountable is the one he identified at the beginning of his journey with narrative psychology: “There are two modes of cognitive functioning, two modes of thought, each providing distinctive ways of ordering experience, of constructing reality. The two (though complimentary) are irreducible to one another.”\textsuperscript{60}

The two modes of thought Bruner describes are what he termed the “paradigmatic mode, or logico-scientific mode” (he chose to use only the word “paradigmatic”), and the other, the “narrative mode”:

The paradigmatic mode “attempts to fulfill the ideal of a formal, mathematical system of description and explanation. It employs categorization or conceptualization and the operations by which categories are established, instantiated, idealized, and related one to the other to form a system. The imaginative application of the paradigmatic mode leads to good theory, tight analysis, logical proof, sound argument, and empirical discovery guided by reasoned hypothesis. ... The narrative mode leads instead to good stories, gripping drama, believable (though not necessarily "true") historical accounts. It deals in human or human-like intention and action and the vicissitudes and consequences that mark their course.”\textsuperscript{61}

Thus, “the structure of a well-formed logical argument differs radically from that of a well-wrought story.”\textsuperscript{62}

Can the problem of the irreducibility of the “paradigmatic” and “narrative” modes of thought

\textsuperscript{60} Bruner, Jerome, \textit{Actual Minds, Possible Worlds} (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), 11.
\textsuperscript{61} Ibid., 12-13.
\textsuperscript{62} Ibid., 11.
ever be resolved so that they are reducible to each other and thereby enable a fully narrative self? Studying narrative psychology while having knowledge of the theory of value of the Japanese educator and geographer, Tsunesaburo Makiguchi (1871-1944), which gave me the foundation for my work, I realized that the problem had already been solved.

It is not possible to convey anything approaching the breadth of Makiguchi’s theory of value in this space. However, the following is a brief yet concise explanation of it by Daisaku Ikeda, who has built an entire school system, from kindergarten to university, based on Makiguchi’s Pedagogy:

Central to Makiguchi’s Pedagogy was his theory of value. In this schema, he modified the neo-Kantian value system of truth, goodness and beauty dominant in Japan at the time and reordered it as beauty, benefit (also translated as gain or utility) and goodness. He defined beauty as that which brings fulfillment to the aesthetic sensibility of the individual; benefit as that which advances the life of the individual in a holistic manner; goodness as that which contributes to the well-being of the larger human society.

Makiguchi removed “truth” from his list of values, seeing truth as essentially a matter of identification and correspondence; value, in contrast, is a measure of the subjective impact a thing or event has on our lives. While truth identifies an object’s essential qualities or properties, value may be considered the measure of the relevance or impact an object or event bears on the individual.63

Quoting Makiguchi, he concludes:

Value arises from the relationship between the evaluating subject and the object of evaluation. If either changes relative to the other, it is only obvious that the perceived value will change. The differences and shifts in ethical codes throughout history provide but one of the more outstanding proofs of the mutability of value.⁶⁴

Making his claim in regard to the two types of thought—in Bruner’s terminology, “the two modes of thought,” Makiguchi wrote:

Willhelm Wundt attempted to classify the operation of the mind into two elements—a single sense and a single feeling, but I would like to separate them into cognition and evaluation. That these two functions are not of different quality can be observed from the fact that all spiritual phenomena are but manifestations of the unity called life.⁶⁵

And (excerpting parts of it here in support of the present argument pertaining to narrative psychology, and drawing from two other publications in English for brevity), he continues:

There are two types of thinking: One is evaluation without cognition, and the other, cognition without evaluation.⁶⁶

The mental operation by which we know things intellectually is termed cognition. Evaluation, as the word implies, involves placing a value upon things or judging. As mental phenomena, both are but manifestations of the same unified psychology, related but not identical …

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⁶⁶ Ibid., 33.
perception of the thing among things is objective, and evaluation, the perception of the thing in relation to the self, is subjective.67

Makiguchi explains that these two processes of cognition and evaluation are

“in continual interplay, but as a careful consideration of our daily life will show, there are three predominant patterns by which we deal with the phenomena of our living environment: we may make evaluations after having reached a thorough cognition, attempt cognition only after our evaluations, or evaluate things without any definite cognition at all.”68

Though difficult for me to grasp at first, Makiguchi’s explication of subject-object relationships became a crucial part of my work to understand relationships, which are what actors create. My investigation was unusual in that it involved, among other things, the reverse engineering of a character I had recently played for many months, in which I had experienced magnetic interactions between internal physical components that I also experienced as being systematic.69 Importantly, Makiguchi’s explanations enabled me to identify and understand dynamics of relationship that I had experienced. Putting his explanations into practice helped me to understand them. Thus, on first reading Philosophy of Value, the word “force” in the following explanation was particularly encouraging:70

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68 Ibid., 64.
“Cognition means attending to an object, recognizing its quality and mentally receiving it as idea…On the other hand, evaluation is the measurement of relative force between object and subject. Therefore, cognition is objective and evaluation subjective.”

And also this:

The expressions, “This is beautiful” or “This is ugly” mean that the man who has such a feeling has some subjective standard to criticize or evaluate the object and measures the relative force of the object by the quantity of the impression or an agreeable or disagreeable feeling. In this case, the truth or falsehood of the object is not relevant but the quantity of the influence of the object on the subject is the crux of the matter.

Makiguchi’s concept of a “subjective standard” was also important because it explained and confirmed my own intuitive but unusual formulation of a character’s motivation. Through the reverse engineering of the character I played, I realized I had created the character’s desires as if they were already achieved, which is to say in the present tense, making them standards, or criteria, of evaluation. In the self-organizing complex system of strokes, subjectivity is the dynamic motivational component. A subjectivity, or whole subjectivity, is multi-faceted as it can consist of any number of subjectivities, which priorities can change. Subjectivity encompasses what one believes constitutes one’s happiness, and therefore includes one’s beliefs, desires, needs, objectives, intentions, motives, aims, drives, attitudes and points of view, to comprise one’s values and standard of values. We judge things on the basis of our subjectivity, which is

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71 Makiguchi, *Philosophy of Value*, 27.
72 Ibid., 29.
73 Gorman, *Strokes of Existence*, 4-5.
one’s ideal for one’s life in any moment. “What a person’s subjectivities are and what happens in light of them, is essentially the story of a person’s life.”

The fact that as a standard the subjectivity as I embodied and experienced it worked empirically with Makiguchi’s formulation was important because it validated the presence of force. The primary reason for this, and most importantly, is that in Makiguchi’s formulation, the object of cognition is received first. With this, the basic operation of the mind becomes computational. With the two types of thought, one being the perception of an object as a thing among things, and the other an evaluation of the object relative to the self—the objective, scientific mode, and subjective, narrative mode—become reducible, each to the other, permitting a fully narrative self.

Using the primary components of relationship in Makiguchi’s formulation, the following examples are given to show how life itself is narrative, that there is such a thing psychologically as “life itself.”

Again, in Makiguchi’s words, “The perception of the thing among things is objective, and evaluation, the perception of the thing in relation to the self, is subjective.”

The following two examples are of an objective mode of thought (cognition without evaluation):

Objectivity: animals
Subjectivity: I understand animals
Perception: species-specific

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74 Ibid., 15-19
75 Ibid., 18.
76 Bethel, Education for Creative Living, 63.
Objectivity: lion
Subjectivity: I understand animals
Perception: feline

Subjective mode of thought (evaluation without cognition):

Objectivity: lion
Subjectivity: I understand animals
Perception: regal

Objective mode:

Objectivity: the house
Subjectivity: we have a wonderful home
Perception: brick

Subjective mode:

Objectivity: the house
Subjectivity: we have a wonderful home
Perception: comfortable

Repeating one of Makiguchi’s statements:

The expressions, “This is beautiful” or “This is ugly” mean that the man who has such a feeling has some subjective standard to criticize or evaluate the object and measures the
relative force of the object by the quantity of the impression or an agreeable or disagreeable feeling. In this case, the truth or falsehood of the object is not relevant but the quantity of the influence of the object on the subject is the crux of the matter.\textsuperscript{77}

For example:

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{ll}
Objectivity: & the decorations \\
Subjectivity: & The event is a success \\
Perception: & beautiful \\
Response: & relieved \\
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

This is an example of what Makiguchi described as “evaluation without any definite cognition at all”:

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{ll}
Objectivity: & the movie \\
Subjectivity: & Joe loves me \\
Perception: & great \\
Response: & loved \\
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

In the example, the person sees the movie as great because Joe, the person s/he wants love from, sees it as great.

Makiguchi states that “people do tend to confuse cognition and evaluation. Hence we have doctors and lawyers who become unduly concerned with cutting a dapper, well-kept figure

\textsuperscript{77} Ibid., 29.
because clients judge by appearances rather than inquiring into their actual abilities.”

These examples show that it is the content, and not the form of relationship, that creates the division.

With his explication of the two types of thought, Makiguchi discovered how the scientific and narrative modes of thought are reducible to one another, which provides the field of narrative psychology with what Jerome Bruner determined it needed in order to become a full field of psychology. With these “mutually translatable worlds of mind,” Makiguchi also discovered the common ground of science and the humanities. Arguably, therefore, with the notion that it lies in this connection, he realized modernity; the modernity of equality and freedom in the present moment.

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CHAPTER FOUR

Film: Clothed in the Forms of Our Own Consciousness

The depth of the impression of reality that film produces in spectators has made the search for an understanding of the relationship between mental processes and the cinematic process a focus of film studies since the earliest days of film. Studying the history of early cinema, which spans the silent film era, seems in many ways the same as studying the social history of the same period. Is it because film, like theatre in Shakespeare’s words, “holds a mirror up to nature”? Or because early cinema was instrumental in the creation of that social history? I argue, with evidence, that the mental and cinematic process are essentially one and the same, and thus the answer is both.

In his foreword to the 1970 Dover reissue of Hugo Munsterberg’s 1916 book, The Photoplay: A Psychological Study, a book that had been forgotten and all but lost, the film historian and curator of the MoMA film library, Richard Griffith, wrote, “Everybody knows from his own experience that there is a sharp and specific analogy between the film forms which have been worked out since 1900 and the mental mechanism by which consciousness functions on all levels. Everybody knows this—but the knowledge has remained vague, mooney, nebulous.”

Hugo Munsterberg (1863–1916) was a Harvard professor of psychology who today is considered a founder of the field of psychology of film. He drew a connection between the

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mental processes of the spectator and processes of the cinema. José Moure describes Munsterberg’s “most original and important contribution to film theory”:

For the first time since the beginning of film as a medium, a study raised the problem of subjectivity in film and provided the foundations for what can be called in modern terms a spectator theory *(the effectiveness of moving images is based on a psychological phenomenon that requires the mental cooperation of the spectator in order to achieve their full potential).*

Miriam Hansen, in *Babel and Babylon*, claims that the “paradigm shift” between the inception of cinema (1895-1896) and classical Hollywood cinema (c1907), occurred as a result of “the emergence of the film spectator as a concept, a structural term,” and “above all, in the conception of the relations between film and spectator.”

In *Point of View in the Cinema*, the film theorist Edward Branigan conveys a relational framework of film narration. He explains the narration of the text as “a hierarchal series of pairs of (nominal) subjects and objects” and says that “there is thus subjectivity in every narration, including the so-called ‘neutral’ shots of a film. In its widest sense, subjectivity refers to the perceptual context of every utterance within the text.”

He identifies the subjectivities of the text as its author, narrator, characters and reader [spectator]. He also explains that the narrator of

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the text—the omniscient narrator--is actually the only narrator, the character narration being a means the narrator employs for the purpose of storytelling. “Typically, there will be many narrations… and “the reader is also a subject in the scheme of narration/narrative… The reader is defined by the ability to frame all the divisions of the text, thus providing them with an apparent unity.”

In a later chapter he states, “Subjectivity…may be conceived as a specific instance or level of narration where the telling is attributed to a character in the narrative and received by us as if we were in the situation of a character.”

The silent film, “The Mothering Heart,” was directed D.W. Griffith, with Lillian Gish and Walter Miller in a story by Hazel H. Hubbard. It was a cautionary tale in 1913, when most women had few options other than marriage, and men preyed upon them for the housekeeping and other services they could provide for little cost as wives. It tells women that a good woman is a woman with a mothering spirit, but to beware of men who would take advantage of it. Below are selected screenshots from the opening scene of this film, with notations. A major purpose of the examples is to show that the mental processes of the spectator, the characters, and the omniscient narrator (which is the cinematic process), are the same. (So, by the way, is that of the bus driver who takes you to the movie theatre.)

With the screenshots and notations, I show that a film’s story is conveyed in the language of relationships, by all narrators. There are many more components involved in the moment to moment production of relationships; a stroke has 20 components. They all emerge, however, from the same primary components used in the examples in the previous chapter, which are also used here as a shorthand version of a whole stroke.

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84 Ibid., 3.
85 Ibid., 73.
86 Gorman, Strokes of Existence, 13.
The strokes component of catalyst is also included with the primary components in this chapter. The catalyst is what causes a change from one stroke to another. Catalysts have the same function in mental processes as edits do in the cinematic process. In a few of the notations of the narrations, the component of relative object is included, a relative object being something that has a bearing on the present relationship. There are always relative objects in a stroke, but for the purposes of this discussion they aren’t required, and therefore to avoid confusion they are only included where they would be felt to be missing if not noted.

The characters have no names in the film, and so just as people may have identified the characters when it was first shown, the actor’s own names are used.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, subjectivities are multifaceted. To state this another way, subjectivities have facets. In this scene, three facets of Lillian’s whole subjectivity are catalyzed. Each facet is a subjectivity in itself. Thus, in this scene, Lillian has three subjectivities.

I’m a good person
I enjoy life
Everything is normal

As will be shown, different catalysts bring out different of these subjectivities at different points in the scene. However, Lillian’s priority subjectivity is “I’m a good person.” If her subjectivity “I enjoy life” were her priority, meaning more important to her than being a good person, the story would be different, as would she, which would also be the case if “Everything is normal” were her priority subjectivity. This same principle is at work in all the narrations. If
desired, further explanations pertaining to the interoperation of subjectivities in the contexts of priorities and change can be found in *Strokes of Existence*.\(^87\)

The notations of the response component in the omniscient narrator are sometimes missing because the creation of the perception of the person or event is its main purpose. When it is included, it is to further influence the response in the spectator.

I haven’t tried to attend to every moment of the scene with notations of the narratives, but rather to include enough to indicate the function of each of the narrators in the telling or receiving of the story. Also, needless to say, one may see things differently than I have. With film, as Hugo Munsterberg wrote:

The massive outer world has lost its weight, it has been freed from space, time, and causality, and it has been clothed in the forms of our own consciousness. The mind has triumphed over matter and the pictures roll on with the ease of musical tones.\(^88\)

**Table 1:** Screenshots from “The Mothering Heart,” with notations:\(^89\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Spectator:</th>
<th>1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catalyst:</td>
<td>see movie title</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objectivity:</td>
<td>Lillian Gish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subjectivity:</td>
<td>I have a life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perception:</td>
<td>wonderful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Response:</td>
<td>expectant</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Omniscient Narrator:
- **Catalyst:** opening shot of Lillian
- **Objectivity:** Lillian
- **Subjectivity:** Lillian is special
- **Perception:** luminous

### Lillian:
- **Objectivity:** tree leaves
- **Subjectivity:** I enjoy life
- **Perception:** lovely
- **Response:** admiring

### Spectator:
- **Catalyst:** see Lillian
- **Objectivity:** Lillian
- **Subjectivity:** I enjoy life
- **Perception:** lovely
- **Response:** starry-eyed

### Lillian’s mother:
- **Objectivity:** Lillian
- **Subjectivity:** Lillian is happy
- **Perception:** dawdling
- **Response:** prodding

### Lillian:
- **Catalyst:** Mother’s prodding
- **Objectivity:** the afternoon
- **Subjectivity:** I enjoy life
- **Perception:** pleasant
- **Response:** enjoying
Lillian:
Catalyst: see something
Objectivity: something in garden
Subjectivity: Everything is normal
Perception: concerning
Response: alerted

Spectator:
Catalyst: see Lillian’s change
Objectivity: something
Subjectivity: Everything is normal
Perception: concerned
Response: alerted

Omniscient Narrator:
Catalyst: Shot of puppies
Objectivity: puppies
Subjectivity: Puppies are adorable
Perception: mischievous
Response: amused

With intertitles, the omniscient narrator broadcasts what the next part of the story is about.
**Lillian**
Catalyst: recognize that it’s puppies
Objectivity: puppies
Subjectivity: I enjoy life
Perception: mischievous
Response: amused

**Spectator**
Catalyst: see Lillian’s expression
Objectivity: puppies
Subjectivity: I enjoy life
Perception: mischievous
Response: amused

**Omniscient Narrator:**
Catalyst: Shot of puppies
Objectivity: puppies
Subjectivity: Puppies are like babies
Perception: helpless

**Lillian:**
Catalyst: see puppy’s head in can
Objectivity: puppy
Subjectivity: I’m a good person
Perception: helpless
Response: caring

**Spectator**
Catalyst: see Lillian’s change
Objectivity: puppies
Subjectivity: I’m a good person
Perception: helpless
Response: caring
### Spectator

**Catalyst:** see Lillian’s skirt in dirt  
**Objectivity:** skirt  
**Subjectivity:** I’m a good person  
**Perception:** dirty  
**Response:** worried

[The spectator’s change of stroke upon seeing Lillian with her nice skirt in the dirt, is an example of how one’s own subjectivity, though supplanted during the course of watching a film, can still influence an internal personal narrative. In this case, seeing Lillian’s skirt in the dirt could cause her worry if her own subjectivity in life were something like, “I have what I need.” In the stroke here, given that she is in the situation of the character, the information she is internalizing is that being a good person can mean sacrificing something that is needed, worrying her. At the same time, she is internalizing the values of her idol.]

---

### Lillian

**Catalyst:** grasp both puppies  
**Objectivity:** puppies  
**Subjectivity:** I’m a good person  
**Perception:** vulnerable  
**Response:** motherly

---

### Lillian

**Catalyst:** grip can  
**Objectivity:** can removal  
**Subjectivity:** I’m a good person  
**Perception:** tricky  
**Response:** careful  
**Relative obj:** puppies

**Perception:** tricky  
**Response:** careful

---

### Spectator

**Catalyst:** see puppies in Lillian’s arms  
**Objectivity:** puppies  
**Subjectivity:** I’m a good person  
**Perception:** vulnerable  
**Response:** motherly
Lillian
Catalyst: puppy pulls forward
Objectivity: the puppy
Subjectivity: I’m a good person
Perception: anxious
Response: soothing

Spectator
Catalyst: see Lillian’s expression
Objectivity: the puppy
Subjectivity: I’m a good person
Perception: anxious
Response: soothing

Lillian:
Catalyst: see puppy’s nose
Objectivity: Puppy
Subjectivity: I enjoy life
Perception: adorable
Response: happy

Spectator
Catalyst: see Lillian and puppy
Objectivity: the puppy
Subjectivity: I enjoy life
Perception: adorable
Response: happy

Omniscient Narrator
Catalyst: cut to Walter arriving
Objectivity: Walter
Subjectivity: Lillian is happy
Perception: aggressive

Spectator:
Catalyst: see Walter arriving
Objectivity: Walter
Subjectivity: Lillian is happy
Perception: aggressive
Response: curious
Walter:
Catalyst: sight of Lillian
Objectivity: Lillian
Subjectivity: I have what I want
Perception: beautiful
Response: taken aback

Walter:
Catalyst: see Lillian
Objectivity: Lillian
Subjectivity: I have what I want
Perception: motherly
Response: inspired

Spectator:
Catalyst: Walter’s expression
Objectivity: Lillian
Subjectivity: I have what I want
Perception: beautiful
Response: taken

Omniscient Narrator:
Catalyst: cut to Lillian
Objectivity: Lillian
Subjectivity: Lillian is a star
Perception: beautiful
Response: loving

Lillian:
Catalyst: feel puppy against chest
Objectivity: puppy
Subjectivity: I’m a good person
Perception: defenseless
Response: loving

Spectator:
Catalyst: see Lillian
Objectivity: Lillian
Subjectivity: I have a life
Perception: beautiful
Response: loving
Relative obj. Walter
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Omniscient Narrator:</th>
<th>Catalyst: Cut to Walter</th>
<th>Objectivity: Walter</th>
<th>POV: Lillian is happy</th>
<th>Perception: wrong</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Walter:</td>
<td>Catalyst: put on smile</td>
<td>Objectivity: Lillian</td>
<td>Subjectivity: I have what I want</td>
<td>Perception: ideal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Response: presenting (himself)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spectator</td>
<td>Catalyst: see Walter</td>
<td>Objectivity: Walter</td>
<td>Subjectivity: Lillian is happy</td>
<td>Perception: wrong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Response: curious</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>20</th>
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<tr>
<td>Lillian:</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>21</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lillian:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative obj. puppies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spectator:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catalyst: see Lillian and Walter together</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catalyst:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Objectivity:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Subjectivity:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Perception:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Response:</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Lillian</strong></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catalyst:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Walter:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Subjectivity:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Perception:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Response:</td>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Catalyst:</td>
<td>see intertitle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objectivity:</td>
<td>the story</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subjectivity:</td>
<td>Lillian is happy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perception:</td>
<td>disturbing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Response:</td>
<td>anticipating</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>24</th>
<th><strong>Lillian</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catalyst:</td>
<td>W: “Will you marry me?”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objectivity:</td>
<td>his question</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subjectivity:</td>
<td>Everything is normal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perception:</td>
<td>unwanted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Response:</td>
<td>shocked</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Page</td>
<td>Character</td>
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<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Lillian</td>
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<td>Spectator</td>
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<td>26</td>
<td>Lillian</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Spectator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Omniscient narrator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Spectator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lillian</td>
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The spectator can anticipate drama ahead.

Discussing André Bazin, Philip Rosen writes, “Bazin believes in the necessary co-
existence of both “objective and “subjective aspects in the making and receiving/experiencing of films." I believe the above indicates this ubiquitous co-existence.

Christian Metz has written, “One of the most important problems in film theory is that of the impression of reality experienced by the spectator…Films release a mechanism of affective and perceptual participation in the spectator… They spontaneously appeal to his sense of belief—never, of course, entirely, [but] they speak to us with the accents of true evidence, using the argument that "It is so."

When a spectator exits a movie theatre, so taken with a character that she imitates her behavior, her behavior may be just that, an imitation, achieved with the intention to imitate. However, as has been shown, with the structure and process of relationship being the same in both the mental process and the cinematic process, the fusion of a spectator with a film is not superficial. With film, communication occurs on the level of consciousness itself, in the common language of consciousness. With no physical barriers, a film gains access to the mind of a willing spectator and the spectator becomes one with the film. Given that subjectivity is comprised of one’s values, and a spectator’s own subjectivity is essentially supplanted during a film, I argue that the replacement of spectator subjectivity with omniscient narrator subjectivity is a means through which film affects social change.

Several years before the year 1984, which is the title of George Orwell’s famous novel about a dystopian society in that year, the late actor, playwright and columnist Seth Allen said,

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“People think Big Brother’s going to be watching us, but instead it’ll be us watching Big Brother.”
CHAPTER FIVE

A Rationale

It may be helpful to provide credibility to acting as the source of the discovery of the self-organizing complex system discussed in this thesis, since the view that acting has any scientific validity is generally considered laughable. This view of acting goes back to the Greeks, as it derives from Plato’s Socratic dialogue, “Ion.” In this short work, Socrates questions Ion, a rhapsode, a performer of epic poetry, i.e., an actor, about his profession. Ion is depicted as vain and childlike in the dialogue, and through questioning is shown to know nothing about what he does (in the way that musicians and visual artists do), or about anything else. Socrates concludes that the emotions Ion conveys and his ability to inspire strong emotions in the audience are, like the poet, simply a matter of “divine inspiration.” With this, the dialogue has provided classical precedence for a dismissive view of acting.92 Thus, even actors and other theatre people have upheld this view. As Roland Barthes observed, “It is forbidden as a crime of lèse-essence to speak about the theatre scientifically: or rather, any intellectual way of viewing the theatre is discredited as scientism or pedantic language.”93 Yet here is a brief excerpt of what Plato also wrote:

Socrates: The gift which you possess…it is not an art, but, as I was just saying, an inspiration; there is a divinity moving you, like that contained in the stone which

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Euripides calls a magnet, but which is commonly known as the stone of Heraclea. This stone not only attracts iron rings, but also imparts to them a similar power of attracting other rings; and sometimes you may see a number of pieces of iron and rings suspended from one another so as to form quite a long chain: and all of them derive their power of suspension from the original stone.

As I have said, it was the physics of what I experienced as an actor that inspired my investigation of acting. The word “ion,” with the root meaning “to go” is the Greek word that Michael Faraday chose with the classicist William Whewell\textsuperscript{94} as the name for the electrochemical phenomena he discovered, coined because ions move toward the electrode of opposite charge.\textsuperscript{95} Faraday discovered the operating principle of electromagnetic generators, which became the basis of electromagnetic field theory. I am not a professionally trained physicist, yet through the reverse engineering of an acting performance in which I experienced electromagnetic interactions, I inadvertently discovered how consciousness emerges from a hierarchal chain of unified fields. So while dismissing acting as a legitimate art form, Plato inadvertently gave it credibility in the context of physical science. Art will always be a mystery, in every art form.

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\textsuperscript{94} John Tyndall, \emph{Faraday As A Discover}. Gutenberg Ebook. Chapter 6. 
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/1225/1225-h/1225-h.htm 
\textsuperscript{95} Online Etymology Dictionary. 
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Management Plan of Neolithic Site of Çatalhöyük (May 2013).


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