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Stayin' Alive: Transnational Sanctuary and Insurgency

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STAYIN’ ALIVE: TRANSNATIONAL SANCTUARY AND INSURGENCY

By

MATTHEW D MURRAY

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Political Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York

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This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Political Science in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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ABSTRACT

Stayin’ Alive: Transnational Sanctuary and Insurgency

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The conventional wisdom of counterinsurgency runs that insurgent groups with bases in neighboring states (transnational sanctuaries) are relatively more difficult to defeat than comparable groups without such bases. Insurgents with transnational sanctuaries benefit from relative protection from attack by counterinsurgents, they may recruit, train, and arm safely in their sanctuaries, transmit propaganda into their target state, and use these sanctuaries as staging points for infiltration or raids into their target state. Counterinsurgents have gone to great lengths to disrupt or destroy insurgent bases in neighboring countries based on the belief that this is necessary to defeating insurgents. However, several groups have lost their sanctuaries but won their wars, while others maintained their sanctuaries throughout their conflicts, yet lost, raising questions about whether the presence of transnational sanctuary is as important as the conventional wisdom assumes. In examining the record of post-1945 insurgencies, this dissertation finds some limited support for the conventional wisdom: overall, insurgents with sanctuary do win at a higher rate than average. However, that advantage largely depends on including several cases against external interveners, who almost always lost, regardless of whether insurgents had sanctuary. Most insurgencies are fought against domestically constituted regimes who lack the option to withdraw, and insurgents generally lose these conflicts far more often, and the presence of transnational sanctuary does not appear to affect the outcome of these conflicts.
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Chapter One
Theoretical Framework, Statement of the Argument, Methods

Cross-border bases, known as transnational sanctuaries, are used by insurgents to train, arm, recruit, and generally strengthen their organization, and are believed to be one form of external support commonly available and beneficial to insurgents. According to the conventional wisdom of counterinsurgency doctrine, these transnational sanctuaries provide insurgents certain benefits, and prudent counterinsurgents must cut off or destroy these sanctuaries if they are to be successful. Yet, insurgencies are decided by a number of factors other than sanctuary, and insurgents with sanctuary have lost while those without sanctuary have won, raising questions about whether and why transnational sanctuary matters.

Does transnational sanctuary aid insurgents, and if so, how? Insurgents with transnational sanctuaries are more likely to defeat counterinsurgents when they are fighting external interveners, either supporting a local ally or maintaining an overseas possession by a foreign power. However, insurgents facing regimes that are not primarily dependent on some external supporter for their long-term survival, that is to say regimes that maintain themselves primarily through some domestic base of support, are not more likely to win than those insurgent groups without transnational sanctuary. External interventions, which include counterinsurgencies, must be kept limited in duration and scope because of prevailing international norms against territorial conquest and aggression. If the belief that transnational sanctuary’s utility to insurgents is correct, then I expect to find evidence that insurgents with sanctuary win more frequently against external interveners than against domestically-constituted incumbents.

1Unless indicated otherwise, the term “sanctuaries” in this dissertation refers to transnational sanctuaries. I will note internal sanctuaries where they are present.
Much has been written about the onset, duration, and periods of peace following civil wars and insurgencies. This dissertation will examine how one type of transnational effect, transnational sanctuary, shapes the outcomes of insurgencies. This study has important policy implications for policymakers tasked with resolving civil conflict, academics who study the laws of armed conflict, and those interested in opposing the unnecessary expansion of war.

Theoretical Framework

There is a large literature on the factors that affect the outcomes of civil wars and insurgency, some of which posit that sanctuary aids insurgents against their targets. Yet, there has not been a comprehensive study that demonstrates the ways that sanctuary aids insurgents. This theoretical framework is divided into three sections. First, I will review the literature about transnational effects that affect insurgency, including external support and sanctuary. Next, I will review the literature about why powerful states tend to lose small wars, such as insurgencies. Finally, I will examine the literature about norms of self-defense.

Internal and transnational sanctuary and insurgency

Sanctuaries may arise in areas within states where governments do not effectively exercise control over significant parts of their territory. Regional conflict dynamics are one transnational effect of civil wars and may facilitate the creation of sanctuaries. A region beset by several conflicts produces new refugee flows and new regional war economies, and reshape zones of effective government control. Neighboring states may be too constrained managing their own internal unrest to check transnational effects emanating from their territory to neighbors. The diffusion of conflict and fighters across weakly defended borders increases the likelihood of spreading regional conflict. Low state capacity increases the likelihood of conflict
because weak states are not able to provide the public goods to prevent conflicts from breaking out and may allow insurgents to establish sanctuaries from which insurgents may attack their targets (Buhaug et al. 2009; Raleigh 2010).

Ungoverned or under-governed territories provide opportunities for insurgents to mobilize and establish bases in peripheral regions (Pugh, Cooper, and Goodhand 2004). Previously peaceful governments may be toppled and replaced with unfriendly regimes with unforeseen consequences for conflict in neighboring states. The Vietminh did not become an effective fighting force until 1950, after the Communists had come to power in neighboring China (Galula 1964). Similarly, the Portuguese exit from Mozambique led to more extensive support and sanctuary for anti-Rhodesian fighters, who were allowed sanctuary in Mozambique, and to transit supplies and fighters to other sanctuary states, such as neighboring Zambia. Conversely, improving ties between neighbors may stem external support for insurgents. Tito disallowed Greek Communists to cross the border into Yugoslavia in 1949-50, which contributed to a successful Greek counterinsurgency after previous attempts to defeat the insurgents failed.

Geography is critical to the establishment of both internal and transnational sanctuaries. Insurgents tend to fare better in geographically large land-locked countries where the population is dispersed rather than concentrated, the economy is primarily agricultural as opposed to industrialized, the weather is temperate, and there are abundant swamps and mountains (Galula 1964). Difficult terrain that is mountainous or heavily forested poses obstacles for conventional militaries that cannot penetrate these areas (Buhaug and Gates 2002). Furthermore, counterinsurgents’ ability to project force declines as they get farther from their home bases as they leave men and material behind to defend their long supply lines. The combination of distance and terrain ruggedness erodes the counterinsurgents’ ability to use force and provides
Insurgents may establish internal sanctuaries at the confluence of provincial boundaries to take advantage of weak coordination among administrative districts. Just as transnational insurgents may seek to escape repression by taking advantage of transnational boundaries, those operating from internal sanctuaries will cross over provincial lines to evade capture (Galula 1964).

The literature on insurgency and sanctuary posits a number of advantages for insurgents with sanctuary. Transnational sanctuary refers to areas contiguous to conflict zones that are used by insurgent groups and separated by international borders (Fall 1967). It can aid insurgent groups in a number of ways: protection from counterinsurgent attacks; recruitment; training; access to arms; infiltration; and opportunities to transmit propaganda to a target population (Fall 1967; Pugh and Cooper 2004; Staniland 2005; Ruys and Verhoeven 2005). These potential benefits are vital to nascent insurgent groups who are vulnerable to government attacks because they have limited manpower and little experience evading government forces. Sanctuary can also serve as rear bases for insurgents in later stages of conflict where they can cache weapons and manpower.

Sanctuary may facilitate the onset of insurgency by lowering the expected costs to insurgents, and may enable insurgents to continue fighting longer. Sanctuary may allow insurgents to build up their arms to the point where they can challenge the conventional military power of their target state (Galula 1964). Staniland (2005) finds that base areas near a border allow insurgents to infiltrate fighters to replace their killed or captured comrades, allowing insurgents to keep constant pressure on government forces without risking their entire force to counterinsurgent attack.
Transnational sanctuary is a frequent correlate of post-1945 insurgencies, although there are considerable disparities in its prevalence. Buhaug, et al.’s (2009) finding that internal conflicts cross borders in one-third of conflicts is one of the more conservative indicators of the prevalence of sanctuary. Salehyan (2007) finds that 55% of rebel groups used transnational sanctuaries. Furstenberg (2010) focuses on cases of African civil wars in the period between the early 1990s and mid-2000s and finds that 60% of the 30 insurgent organizations were transnational.

Many argue that sanctuary significantly increases the likelihood of insurgent victory (Galula 1964; Fall 1967; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Staniland 2005; Bruscino 2006), but the effect varies across studies. Bernard Fall believes that the outcomes of all rebellions after 1945 were determined by the absence or presence of transnational sanctuary (Fall 1967, in Monarch, 2009). Furstenberg’s study of thirty African conflicts found that 47% of insurgents and rebels with sanctuary won, 21% lost, and 31% were ongoing, and none signed a peace agreement or agreed to a regulated ceasefire. By contrast, those insurgents who did not have sanctuary won only 9% of the time and lost 54% of the time. This appears to partly confirm the conventional wisdom that sanctuaries help insurgents achieve victory. However, Furstenberg tempers the potential positive impact of sanctuary for insurgents with another potential explanation: stronger insurgents used sanctuary and the outcomes were more likely a product of the balance of capabilities between insurgents and states. After analyzing 89 insurgencies, Gompert and Gordon (2008) conclude that “(o)btaining sanctuary helps a lot.” They found that 66% of insurgencies had sanctuaries, and the likelihood of insurgents winning a conflict outright increased from a baseline of 28% to 36% when the cases were restricted to just those with sanctuary. The likelihood of government victory declined from 31% to 25% when sanctuary was present.
Insurgents in a transnational sanctuary can avoid “do or die” situations where they have to attack counterinsurgents or else risk becoming irrelevant to their target population (Nagl 2002). Insurgents in internal sanctuary can always lose their base of popular support if the government undertakes measures to undercut insurgent support. If those insurgents cannot block a potentially popular government reform, they may become irrelevant.

Greater fine-grained data are needed to show that transnational sanctuary actually contributes to victory and is not a product of insurgent strength or weakness. With the potential benefits and costs of transnational sanctuaries outlined, it still remains to be seen how transnational sanctuary affects war outcomes. Sanctuary may affect the outcome, but it may also be present in those cases where insurgents were more likely to win anyway. While he believes the data underestimate the importance of transnational sanctuary, Furstenberg (2010) found that only 4.5% of recorded activities took place in another country, indicating that civil war and insurgency remain primarily domestic phenomena.

**External support and outcomes in insurgency**

Winning the support of the population is a priority for most insurgent groups. Insurgents need resources to conduct their struggle against their target states and often seek the support of population centers that can help provision their fighters. Dense forests tend not to be full of natural or lootable resources and are not ideal for growing food to sustain an insurgent army (Rustad, et al. 2008). Insurgents need to station themselves near towns and villages and will not survive long if they are confined to uninhabited regions of a country (Raleigh 2010). The Malayan Communists were dependent on Chinese squatters who had drifted toward the periphery and the jungle. They did not choose the peripheries and jungles because they were remote, but because it was where the sympathetic population was located (Nagl 2002). In the
absence of strong support within their target state, insurgents may find transnational sanctuary an appealing option to provide them with the resources they need to win their struggle.

External support and transnational population linkages are transnational effects that can affect the outcome of civil wars and insurgencies (Gleditsch 2007; Checkel 2010). External support for insurgents can come in the form of moral, political, technical, financial, and military support (Galula 1964). External support can allow insurgents to make up for their initial weakness relative to their target state, perhaps contributing to insurgent victory. Writing during the period that witnessed a spike in wars of national liberation, Galula (1964) believes that moral support is almost always on the side of the insurgents. Military support can come in the form of giving weapons or providing facilities to help them train. States may funnel arms or money to insurgent groups with the goal of weakening a target state, and prefer to support insurgent groups to avoid risks and costs that could degrade their own military strength (Salehyan, Gleditsch, Cunningham 2011). Saleyhan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham (2011) further find that democracies fighting insurgents tend not to face insurgents who receive external support. This finding seems difficult to reconcile with the several cases of democracies combatting insurgencies in other countries, as well as the wars of national liberation that were fought against democracies by insurgents who received a variety of external support.

Not only is transnational sanctuary a form of external support, but insurgents who have sanctuaries are also more likely to be able to access other forms of external support that would be made more difficult to acquire if the insurgents only had internal sanctuaries. Counterinsurgents would have greater ability to deny external support to insurgents who operated solely from internal sanctuary because counterinsurgents have greater control over and may use greater violence in their own territory, which would disrupt the flow of external support to insurgents.
External support, including transnational sanctuary, may prolong a conflict by keeping one side of the conflict in the conflict longer than it would have been without external support, or it may extend the conflict by making it more difficult for the belligerents to reach an agreement. Once a conflict is underway, the presence of a sanctuary may produce private information about insurgent capabilities that leads to bargaining failure because of the information asymmetry between insurgents and states (Salehyan, 2007). Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham (2011) further find that a state receiving external support increases the likelihood that insurgents will receive external support by 2.3 to 2.6 times. This suggests that external support may lead to proxy wars and rival governments may try to stop target states from defeating transnational insurgents whom they support. Cunningham, et al. (2009) find that conflicts against rebels with base areas tend to last longer, although this holds for all types of sanctuary, not just transnational. Apparently, rebel control of any area, even by weak rebels, will allow them to continue to survive in the face of counterinsurgent actions. Given that 38% of civil war conflict outcomes were some kind of long-term low-intensity conflict, it could be assumed that both internal and transnational sanctuary were contributing to these ongoing stalemates (Cunningham, et al. 2009).

External support is not always a boon to insurgent groups. Insurgents prefer more resources to make up for their initial material inferiority, but accepting aid may reduce their autonomy to act (Salehyan, Gleditsch, Cunningham 2011). All things being equal, insurgents should prefer their own domestic support base because they could maximize their resources without constraints on their autonomy. Acquiring heavy weapons can be a long-term liability for insurgents because they decrease the fluidity that insurgents depend on to survive (Galula 1964). They may also prefer domestic support among their target population rather than being viewed as tools of foreign influence if they have external support. External support in the form of sanctuary
introduces a principal-agent relationship between the supporting state and the group using the sanctuary. Insurgents who accept aid and sanctuary may be forced to accept conditions by their benefactors that jeopardize their chances of defeating their target state (Salehyan, Gleditsch, Cunningham 2011). Potential loss of autonomy may lead insurgents to reject external support and sanctuary. If outside support is easy to obtain, there is the possibility that insurgents will take less care to provide for themselves, thereby increasing their dependence on their benefactors (Galula 1964).

External support may be more important to weaker insurgents, who are not strong enough to confront their target states. Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham (2011) find that the strongest rebels do not have external support. Since transnational sanctuary is a type of assistance to insurgents, this finding is at odds with Furstenberg’s (2010) that the strongest insurgents operate from transnational sanctuary. Transnational sanctuary may not aid insurgents if they already have ample weapons and fighters inside their target state (Bairstow 2006).

**Powerful states losing “small wars”**

There is a literature that identifies a tendency among powerful states to lose small wars, such as insurgencies (Mack 1975). This literature potentially undercuts the arguments that sanctuary is decisive in determining the outcome of insurgencies. External interveners may lose for a number of reasons unrelated to sanctuary.

Conventionally armed and trained counterinsurgents often try to use maximum force against insurgents, as they would conventional enemies. Conventional military operations that emphasize firepower and rely on heavily armed personnel, artillery, and armor, tend to receive the bulk of resources, which cannot be spent on effective counterinsurgency policies (Lyall and
Wilson 2009). Relying on training for conventional warfare can deprive a state’s military of past “lessons learned” from irregular warfare. For instance, the U.S. Army’s field guide *Border Security/ Anti-Infiltration Operations* (FM 31-55), which may have proven useful to U.S. forces in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, was left unrevised from the Vietnam War on microfiche at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, far from where it was needed (Bairstow 2006).

The predilection for offensive conventional warfare found in professional armies may lead it to neglect valuable defensive options in counterinsurgency. Neither the French in Algeria, nor Rhodesians or Americans in Iraq spent more than one percent of their military budgets for those conflicts on border interdiction, despite the apparent importance of containing transnational insurgents (Bairstow, 2006). Finally, counterinsurgent militaries and governments may purposely distort history to avoid blame or protect their reputations. Pinning a defeat on insurgents in a transnational sanctuary can allow a government or military to escape blame by claiming international law and state sovereignty tied its hands and prevented it from defeating insurgents that did not observe such rules.

**Norms of state sovereignty and self-defense**

Non-state actors generally have far less to lose by crossing international borders and using violence because they are not bound by international borders whereas states are. International borders are supposed to constrain counterinsurgent attacks because states are expected to refrain from using force against the territory of a state with whom they are not at war. States that violate that accepted norm usually face strong international condemnation and may become the victim of reprisal attacks. Condemnation of counterinsurgent cross-border attacks usually happens even when a counterinsurgent can show that it is responding to an attack, perhaps in “hot pursuit,” or it is responding to a series of attacks over time that come to be
viewed as an ongoing attack against their state. Thus, even states that claim to be exercising their right to self-defense usually have to acknowledge limits on the duration, intensity, and area of attacks outside of their borders. Transnational sanctuary ostensibly protects insurgents because they are not bound to respect state sovereignty whereas their state pursuers face costs for violating the territorial integrity and sovereignty of their neighbors (Deeks 2011; Reinold 2011). Article 2(4) of the UN Charter commits members to refrain from violating the territorial integrity of other states, but insurgent groups are not bound to observe this because they are not members of the United Nations.

While condemnation of cross-border reprisals against insurgents had been routine after 1945, the 9/11 terror attacks against the United States may have helped dampen the criticism of governments responding to attacks emanating from states with whom they are not at war. This may signal an international environment in which international borders are not the constraining institutions that they were for the past half century prior to 2001. Insurgents are potentially less secure in transnational sanctuaries if target states feel less constrained to use force abroad than within their borders. International norms about the legitimate use of force against domestic groups may restrain the use of force within a state’s borders but lead it to use greater violence against groups operating from neighboring territory (Ron 2003). Therefore, the amount of force used against transnational sanctuaries may be greater than against internal sanctuaries. Some evidence from Rhodesia confirms this. The Rhodesian’s most lopsided victories came in neighboring transnational sanctuaries where the insurgents presented relatively fixed targets for conventional Rhodesian forces. This may be especially true when the outside group is attempting to overthrow a recognized government.
Statement of the Argument

Sanctuary’s contribution to insurgent victory has often been taken for granted, and that conventional wisdom ought to be tested. Previous studies of insurgency and sanctuary have failed to explain why insurgents still lose despite having transnational sanctuary and why insurgents without transnational sanctuary still win. To be sure, there are many factors that influence the outcome of insurgencies, but the conventional acceptance that sanctuary leads to insurgent success is quickly imperiled after an analysis of the historical record since 1945.

I argue that transnational sanctuary facilitates insurgent victory against governments and counterinsurgents who are not domestically constituted. These foreign-imposed governments are the result of colonialism, imperialism, and external intervention. This much of my argument is consistent with the conventional wisdom that transnational sanctuary aids insurgents. However, I part with the conventional wisdom and argue that transnational sanctuary does not significantly enhance insurgents’ ability to defeat domestically constituted governments. Insurgents with transnational sanctuary do occasionally defeat domestically constituted regimes, but transnational sanctuary is incidental. My revision of the conventional wisdom significantly reduces the importance of transnational sanctuary as an explanatory factor in insurgent victory because most insurgencies occur against domestically constituted incumbents, which are no more likely to lose when fighting insurgents with sanctuary.

2 While it is usually clear what kind of incumbent is present, there are a few cases where the government appears to be so poorly embedded in society and there are so few supporters that it could flee with its supporters even though it was domestically constituted. White-minority governments, such as Rhodesia through the end of the 1970s, are indicative of this kind of government. In these cases, although they are domestically constituted, the “waiting game” could be used effectively by insurgents to wait for the regime to flee.
Causal Mechanisms

I have proposed four causal mechanisms that explain why sanctuary facilitates insurgents’ victory against some forms of government but not others. The four mechanisms are: (1) The stopping power of international borders; (2) The “waiting game” that insurgents may play against external interveners; (3) The limitation on insurgent power created by an organizational inflection point; and (4) The inability of external interveners to create enduring governments in the countries in which they intervene.

The first mechanism, the stopping power of international borders, does not mean that international borders completely prevent cross-border attacks, but borders do place relative constraints on counterinsurgents, especially the duration of those cross-border attacks. The constraining effect of international borders can be traced to the generally accepted prohibition on aggression, codified in Article 2 (4) of the United Nations Charter and the acceptance of state sovereignty precluding external powers from exercising control over another’s territory without their consent. The extent of the constraining effect of international borders may vary among cases, especially when neighboring states agree to coordinate their actions and/or allow one another’s forces to enter their territory in pursuit of insurgents. The constraining effect may also diminish if insurgents’ sanctuary is located in an ungoverned, or under-governed part of a country where the recognized government does not effectively exercise control over its territory and does not prevent attacks against neighboring states. Despite these exceptions,

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3 Article 2 (4) reads “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”

4 This happens despite the United Nations’ International Law Committee assertion that these states cannot be held responsible for the acts of private actors.
counterinsurgent cross-border attacks directed against insurgents usually face strong international condemnation. External interveners who carry out these cross-border attacks often face additional scrutiny and condemnation because they are already close to violating the anti-imperial and anti-colonial norms established in the United Nations Charter and reconfirmed in subsequent United Nations General Assembly Resolutions (Pangalangan and Aguilera 1983).

Domestically constituted regimes are more easily able to temper condemnation of cross-border attacks if they can credibly claim that they are doing so in self-defense against insurgents who are likely to attack them in the future. Those domestically constituted incumbents can offer self-defense against an armed attack as a competing claim against the aggrieved state’s violated sovereignty; external interveners conducting cross-border attacks against sanctuaries have a more difficult time convincing international opinion that those attacks are self-defense.

The second mechanism, the “waiting game” that insurgents can play against external interveners, is related to the first. The strong norm against territorial conquest (Fazal 2007) means that foreign occupations and counterinsurgencies are expected to be of limited duration. Insurgents know this to be the case and generally prefer to avoid direct confrontations with external interveners who tend to possess the most lethal weaponry and have a substantial supply of it. Once the intervening power withdraws, the costs to the insurgents tend to decrease and insurgents have an incentive to increase attacks against the government left in power. Sanctuary

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5 Article 51 of the United Nations Charter reads “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.”
facilitates the “waiting game” for reasons largely explained in the first causal mechanism: it provides them the relative protection without which they would likely be eliminated if subjected to the full force of the counterinsurgents. International borders blunt the counterinsurgents’ force, enabling insurgents a greater opportunity to survive. The “waiting game” that may be successful in waiting out external interveners will likely be far less useful against domestically constituted governments that have no option to withdraw. Insurgents with sanctuary fighting a domestically constituted government would need to ensure that it maintained a sufficient presence inside its target state or else face irrelevance and defeat. Similarly, insurgents in that position would be more open to the charge of being tools of foreign influence if they operated and received support from abroad; that nationalist argument would likely be in the insurgents’ favor if they were facing an external military intervener.

The third mechanism, the organizational inflection point that limits otherwise successful insurgents, explains why domestically constituted regimes can often keep insurgents from posing an existential military threat. It also explains why the benefits of transnational sanctuary may not lead to insurgent victory. The arming, training, recruiting, and all the other benefits of sanctuary that enhance the fighting potential of insurgents up to a certain point may become a liability. Insurgents who lack heavy weapons and are few in number tend to avoid large, pitched battles with counterinsurgent forces that they will likely lose. As insurgents gain increasingly advanced weapons, including heavy weapons and artillery, they are also more susceptible to conventional

6 While it is usually clear what kind of incumbent is present, there are a few cases where the government appears to be so poorly embedded in society and there are so few supporters that it could flee with its supporters even though it was domestically constituted. White-minority governments, like the one in Rhodesia up through the end of the 1970s, are indicative of this kind of government. In these cases, although they are domestically constituted, the “waiting game” could be used effectively by insurgents to wait for the regime to flee.
military operations carried out by counterinsurgents. This does not necessarily portend disaster, but it may if the insurgents undertake this transformation prematurely. Insurgents are usually able to negate much of the superior military strength of the incumbents because they are difficult to find. Insurgent bands coalescing into a rebel army may be necessary to take and hold territory in the target state, but it also exposes them to what is likely still the state’s superior firepower. This happened to the insurgents in El Salvador who prematurely launched conventional assaults and incurred significant losses from government forces until they dispersed back into smaller bands.

Finally, external interveners have generally proven incapable of building enduring states in the countries in which they intervene.\textsuperscript{7} This is true regardless of whether the insurgents that they faced had sanctuary. In critiquing the conventional wisdom about sanctuary in this dissertation, I put forward a rival explanation for insurgent loss and victory: the nature of their target. My theory predicts that insurgents will usually win when they face external interveners, and sanctuary may help them stay alive long enough to defeat the residual government left in place once the external intervener withdraws. Failure to build lasting structures may be traced back to the cause of the intervention in the first place: namely, the weakness of the client. External interveners often come to the aid of their clients and frequently go on to assume many of the responsibilities of the client governments, including fighting and administration. External interventions to save clients may work in the short term by altering the domestic balance of

\textsuperscript{7} Table 2.1 in Chapter Two gives the results of all insurgencies waged against external interveners. Notable examples of failed efforts by external interveners to build enduring states abroad include the French in Algeria and in conflicts in what was French Indochina, Portuguese attempts to build enduring states in Angola and Mozambique, American efforts to create an enduring Republic of Vietnam, and the Soviet Union’s attempt at cultivating a government in Afghanistan.
forces in favor of the regime facing insurgency, but this is not a long-term solution for stability in the country unless that temporary distortion of forces can be made permanent by either permanently strengthening the imperiled domestic government or permanently weakening the insurgents. Economic aid, armaments, training, and sometimes foreign troops are often enough to keep the imperiled government in power for a time, but that relative security brought about by external intervention insulates the regime from having to have to embed itself in society by incorporating more segments of it. Furthermore, a government that is viewed as having been rescued by a foreign power is not likely to win new domestic supporters in an age in which nationalism remains a prevalent force in politics. If the people generally believe that insurgents will win the “waiting game,” they are less likely to support the incumbent, which is viewed as temporary.\textsuperscript{8}

Methods

The compilation of post-1945 (1945-2016) insurgencies allows a test of whether my refined version of the conventional wisdom, which takes the nature of the counterinsurgent into account, explains the data better than the conventional wisdom. Previous studies of insurgency have generally indicated that insurgents with sanctuary tend to win more frequently than insurgents without it. However, those same studies often fail to differentiate between

\textsuperscript{8} I do not further develop this observation in this dissertation, but I have found, in the course of my research, often-repeated phrases by politicians, military officers, and diplomats that justify external military intervention on the grounds that it provides “breathing space” for an embattled foreign regime. The foreign military intervention is supposed to take over some of the warfighting for the embattled regime, which will then, ideally, concentrate its resources on broadening its domestic political base. I have not found any cases where this actually worked as predicted or described, but that has not, apparently, diminished the appeal of the logic, since it continues to resurface. One possible explanation for why this “breathing space” never materializes is that the military and political resources available to the embattled regime are not fungible.
domestically constituted governments and insurgencies against external interveners. Previous studies’ inclusion of all insurgencies together may hide important trends that would benefit from disaggregation, such as systematically different outcomes because of differences in the nature of the insurgents’ target. My survey of post-1945 insurgencies should help determine whether sanctuary has different effects in different contexts. Table 1.1 below demonstrates how the results will be reported to measure the conventional account’s predictions against my own. This study contains two independent variables, sanctuary and the nature of the target regime, measured against the outcome variable, the success of the insurgency. The first independent variable, sanctuary, is in the left-hand column, while the second, the nature of the target regime, is across the top. The four categories of insurgencies created by the two independent variables explain the divergent predictions of my theory and the conventional wisdom. There will be four possible outcomes for each case in each box (insurgent loss, insurgent victory, mixed, ongoing) that will be reported in Chapter Two.

As Table 1.1 demonstrates, if the conventional wisdom is true, then the cases in Boxes One and Two should be insurgent victories and the cases that fall into Boxes Three and Four should be insurgent defeats. My refined version of the conventional wisdom makes slightly different predictions, although my refined conventional wisdom overlaps with the conventional wisdom in Boxes Two and Four. Boxes One and Three will be the crucial tests for my argument. In Box One, the conventional wisdom predicts that those insurgents with sanctuary will likely defeat their domestically constituted target governments. My argument predicts insurgent defeat in these cases where the insurgents’ target, being domestically constituted, chooses to fight and pay the costs of insurgency and counterinsurgency because there is no option to withdraw if the costs become high. Insurgents may continue to benefit from sanctuary in these cases, but even
substantial material and psychological support from sanctuary will not usually be enough to defeat a regime with sufficient local support. The logic of the conventional wisdom about sanctuary would predict insurgent defeat for those without sanctuary, even when facing an external intervener. Moreover, because many of these external interveners have more lethal weaponry and superior technology to use it, the logic of the conventional wisdom would predict that insurgents without sanctuary fighting against outside powers should lose. My argument predicts that the nature of the target regime is a more powerful explanatory variable than sanctuary. While external military interveners may have superior weapons, technology, and training, among other advantages, they are mitigated by global public opinion, which prefers foreign counterinsurgencies to be brief, and, perhaps, domestic political opinion, which shares the same sentiment.
Table 1.1: Comparing the Conventional and Refined Theories of Transnational Sanctuary and Insurgency

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transnational Sanctuary Present</th>
<th>Domestically Constituted Incumbent</th>
<th>External Intervener as Incumbent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Box 1</td>
<td>Box 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Conventional wisdom predicts insurgent victory.</td>
<td>-Conventional wisdom predicts insurgent victory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Refined explanation predicts insurgent loss.</td>
<td>- Refined explanation predicts insurgent victory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case: FMLN and El Salvador</td>
<td></td>
<td>Case: Vietnam War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transnational Sanctuary Not Present</td>
<td>Box 4</td>
<td>Box 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Conventional wisdom predicts insurgent defeat.</td>
<td>- Conventional Wisdom predicts insurgent defeat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Refined explanation predicts insurgent defeat.</td>
<td>- Refined explanation predicts insurgent victory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case: Shining Path in Peru</td>
<td></td>
<td>Case: Mau Mau in Kenya</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data for the survey of post-1945 insurgencies comes from various Correlates of War databases and UCDP/PRIO databases. My sources for the case studies consist of secondary source materials, including books, newspaper and journal articles, think tank publications, but also primary source documents that have been made public.

Outline of the dissertation

Chapter two will contain the reported results of my collection of post-1945 insurgencies and will contain the information about how I operationalize key terms, such as victory, insurgency, sanctuary, the nature of the target regime, and others. Chapters three through six will
present the four case studies that follow the reporting of post-1945 insurgencies attempt to demonstrate sanctuary’s varying effects in different contexts. I also chose cases from different eras and regions to investigate whether the benefits of sanctuary tend to be consistent across time (after 1945) and location. The benefits the Viet Cong received in the 1960s and 1970s were very similar to FMLN fighters in the 1980s and 1990s. The dependent variable, the outcome of the insurgencies, varied across the cases, though variation on the dependent variable was not the determining factor during the case selection process. I did not choose cases that confirmed my expectation on the dependent variable in each box since I expect the large-n survey to be a more appropriate measure of the two explanations’ strengths. The variations in the dependent variable across the four cases demonstrate three of the four major outcomes in insurgencies: insurgent victory, insurgent loss, and mixed outcome. I will not include a case study of an ongoing insurgency. Chapter seven will be the last chapter in which I assess the relative contribution of my refined conventional wisdom in light of the results reported in chapter two and the four case studies.
Chapter Two: Results and Discussion

Insurgency Since the End of World War Two

Since this dissertation seeks to understand if and how sanctuary benefits those engaged in insurgency, several other forms of political violence have been excluded. Terrorist campaigns, violent protest, one-sided mass killing, coups, civil wars that are largely fought by conventional forces, and interstate war are excluded because those conflicts are not likely to be affected by the presence of sanctuary. Terrorist campaigns are inappropriate to include because terrorist groups are clandestine organizations that do not require holding territory from which to launch attacks against their target state. Terrorists tend to operate in territory controlled by some other group or government and are able to avoid detection and capture because of their clandestine nature. Protest movements may lead to political change, but these movements do not seek to use organized political violence to achieve their aims. One-sided mass killing lacks the necessary dynamic of contestation to be included. Coups are discreet events and are inappropriate to include in this study because they also lack the dynamic of contestation. International borders do not confer protection to belligerents during interstate war, so the limitation on the use of force that sanctuary requires is not in force. Insurgencies possess the requisite dynamic contest where the balance of forces is closer to parity than one-sided violence, but often more asymmetric than interstate conflicts. Insurgents are usually weaker than the target states with whom they are at war, but strong enough to potentially defeat them.

Sanctuary

Sanctuary refers to insurgent bases in territory that is either contiguous to the challengers’ target state or separated by narrow stretches of water. Sanctuaries may be fixed bases or geographical spaces where challengers have camps that they use to train, securely receive arms,
treat their wounded, plan, recuperate, transmit propaganda into their target state, and receive
relative protection from incumbent attacks.

I make no distinction between sanctuary that is allowed to insurgents by another state and
sanctuaries that emerge because neighboring states are unable to prevent insurgents from using
their territory. Some studies of sanctuary note a difference between active sanctuaries that arise
because a neighboring state supports insurgent groups against a rival, and passive sanctuaries,
which arise because a state is too weak to prevent groups from using its territory. The literature
about sanctuary and insurgency usually posits active sanctuaries as more dangerous because of
the greater level of state support. I did not differentiate between these two types of sanctuary
because it was too difficult to consistently differentiate between active and passive sanctuaries.
Labeling sanctuaries as either active or passive pushed me toward ambiguous concepts such as
“political will” and “state capacity,” which I did not believe that I could accurately capture, and
certainly could not measure. These measures, especially state capacity, were going to be
especially difficult to measure in the extrastate conflicts, where at least one major external
intervener was employing some of their state capacity to assist an embattled ally. Several
sanctuaries appear to exist because the hosts chose not to devote resources to prevent them, but it
is unclear whether those hosts ever could have prevented them if they tried.  

From the case studies I conducted for this dissertation and prior to it, I have found limited
support for this conventional wisdom that the nature of a sanctuary affects the likelihood of
insurgent success. Many of the clear-cut cases of active sanctuary, such as Tunisia in France’s

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9 For example, sanctuaries in Ecuador in the conflict with Colombia, FMLN use of Guatemala in
the case of El Salvador, at least Cambodia, if not also Laos, in Vietnam’s case, and the
contemporary concern about Taliban sanctuaries in Pakistan.
conflict in Algeria, and North Vietnam’s support for the Viet Cong, were also cases where external interveners were present, so while these groups received a lot of support, they waged insurgencies that were, historically, very likely to succeed. Active sanctuaries against domestically constituted governments, such as Yemen’s support of Dhofari insurgents against Oman, also gave significant support to insurgents, but those insurgents lost. While the outcome of the war in El Salvador was less one-sided than Dhofar, the FMLN used active sanctuaries in some neighboring states, but was not able to oust El Salvador’s domestically constituted regime.

Outcome

These conflicts are coded according to the outcome for the insurgents. Coding conflict outcome from the perspective of the insurgent is the most precise test of the conventional wisdom that insurgents with sanctuary tend to achieve their aims more often than those that do not have those sanctuaries.

Each conflict is coded as either being an insurgent loss, an insurgent victory, a mixed case, or ongoing. Most insurgent groups articulated goals for their organization and each case was coded against those stated goals. Most insurgents’ primary goal was a change in the political status quo. The kinds of political change most frequently sought included independence leading to statehood, autonomy within an existing state, or greater inclusion within an existing government. Whether those political goals were achieved determined the coding of insurgent success. Generally, I discounted more far-reaching economic and social goals of insurgents because holding them to aspirational goals that would be nearly impossible to reasonably expect any group to achieve would distort the data. Under such high standards, almost every insurgent group would be labeled a failure, even when it is evident that they achieved significant success. Mixed cases are those in which insurgents do not fully realize their primary political goal, but
their actions contribute to comparable changes. For instance, a case would be coded as mixed for a group that sought independence but settled for greater autonomy. Ongoing cases are those in which the challengers have not given up their armed struggle against the incumbent government and the conflict remains active.

**The nature of the incumbent regime**

I argue in this dissertation that sanctuary is likely to contribute to insurgent victory when their target is an external intervener that has the option to withdraw from a foreign territory. Two of the four mechanisms that I use to explain this refined version of the conventional wisdom are linked to the nature of the external intervener. First, insurgents can wait out an external intervention in a neighboring sanctuary. Second, external interveners are usually unable to build a viable state in the territory in which it has intervened. The residual authorities who are present when external interveners leave often lack organic domestic support and falter under renewed pressure from insurgents.

Therefore, I code incumbents as either external interveners or domestically constituted regimes. External interveners are those governments that hold colonial or imperial possessions, or engage in counterinsurgency outside of their recognized borders. External, colonial, or imperial conflicts are relatively easy to identify, as those were the trust and non-self-governing territories of the United Nations.\(^\text{10}\) The other cases of external intervention where the primary counterinsurgents are external interveners are those cases in which the domestic regime would

\(^{10}\) There are some exceptions, such as French possessions in North Africa, which were not included as an UN non-self-governing or trust territory.
likely collapse absent continued intervention.\footnote{There are very few of these cases in this collection of cases. These kinds of cases include the United States’ counterinsurgency in South Vietnam and the Soviet Union’s in Afghanistan. These cases are selected based in part on what happened to these governments once the external intervener ceased its operations.} The Correlates of War project has an extrastate conflict database that provided the core of cases that I coded as external interveners.

My coding of these insurgencies is almost always consistent with the literature. The case histories detailed in the Non-State Actor dataset (Gleditsch, Cunningham, Salehyan 2013) were the first sources I consulted for most of the Table 2.1 categories, as well as the Armed Conflict, Conflict Termination, Peace Agreements, and External Support codebooks by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), as well as the Correlates of War Intrastate and Extrastate datasets and codebooks. Salehyan’s (2011) data on sanctuaries and conflicts helped ensure the accuracy of my coding, as did the Rand Publications, which I cite.

Different databases frequently gave slightly different dates for the same conflict, so I made judgments about what the preponderance of evidence supported. I also tended to combine conflicts between insurgents and governments that started and stopped several times into one conflict dyad. Nevertheless, the broadly reported results in Table 2.1 are very similar to the existing literature (see discussion following Table 2.1), and are also consistent with those authors who have looked at success rates for insurgent groups with and without sanctuary. What is new and different in Table 2.1 is that I take the comparison of groups with and without sanctuary a step further and look at the nature of the counterinsurgents. As Table 2.1 makes clear, that additional step reveals a lot about the conditions under which sanctuary appears to matter. Where insurgents face external interveners, they usually have sanctuary, and they almost always win regardless of whether they have sanctuary. Surprisingly, insurgents with sanctuary win and lose
more often when they have sanctuary because, surprisingly, there are fewer ongoing conflicts among the cases with sanctuary. This finding is at odds with those studies who have found sanctuary more likely to produce mixed outcomes or ongoing conflicts.
Results

Table 2.1: Comparing the Performance of the Conventional Wisdom and the Refined Explanation

All results reported using the following format: number of cases, its equivalent percentage of all cases, its equivalent percentage of cases in that category. For example, the line “Insurgent Loss” in Box 1 reads 12, 15%, 32%, which means there are 12 cases where insurgents lost when they had sanctuary and faced a domestically constituted regime. Those 12 cases were 15% of all cases examined, and that case outcome represented 32% of the cases in Box 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overall (79 cases)</th>
<th>Domestically Constituted Target</th>
<th>External Intervener as Primary Counterinsurgent Force (18 cases=23% of all cases)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Insurgent Loss: 22, 28%</td>
<td>Insurgent Loss: 20, 25%, 33%</td>
<td>Insurgent Loss: 2, 2.5%, 11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurgent Win: 31, 39%</td>
<td>Insurgent Win: 17, 21.5%, 28%</td>
<td>Insurgent Win: 14, 18%, 78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed: 12, 15%</td>
<td>Mixed: 14, 17%, 23%</td>
<td>Mixed: 1, 1%, 5.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ongoing: 14, 17%</td>
<td>Ongoing: 10, 13%, 16%</td>
<td>Ongoing: 1, 1%, 5.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Box 1 (38 cases= 48% of all cases)
- Conventional Wisdom predicts insurgent victory.
- Refined Explanation predicts insurgent loss.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transnational Sanctuary Present (51 cases=65% of all cases)</th>
<th>Box 2 (13 cases= 16% of all cases)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Insurgent Loss: 13, 16%, 26%</td>
<td>Insurgent Loss: 1, 1%, 8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurgent Win: 23, 29%, 46%</td>
<td>Insurgent Win: 11, 14%, 85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed: 10, 13%, 20%</td>
<td>Mixed: 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ongoing: 5, 6%, 10%</td>
<td>Ongoing: 1, 1%, 8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case Study: FMLN in El Salvador</td>
<td>Case Study: Viet Cong and Vietnam War</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Box 4 (23 cases=29% of all cases)
- Conventional Wisdom predicts insurgent loss.
- Refined Explanation predicts insurgent loss.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transnational Sanctuary Not Present: 28 cases=35% of all cases</th>
<th>Box 3 (5 cases=6% of all cases)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Insurgent Loss: 9, 11%, 32%</td>
<td>Insurgent Loss: 1, 1%, 20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurgent Win: 8, 10%, 29%</td>
<td>Insurgent Win: 3, 4%, 60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed: 5, 6%, 18%</td>
<td>Mixed: 1, 1%, 20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ongoing: 6, 8%, 21%</td>
<td>Ongoing: 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case Study: Shining Path in Peru</td>
<td>Case Study: Mau Mau in Kenya</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Box One Cases: Insurgents With Sanctuary Against Domestically Constituted Regime (38 Cases)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Insurgency</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Outcome (Government win, Insurgent win, mixed, ongoing)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iran (MEK)</td>
<td>1960s-</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laos (ULNLF)</td>
<td>1960-1993</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laos/ Pathet Lao government vs Hmong insurgents</td>
<td>1975-early 1990s</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia (Communist insurgents)</td>
<td>1968-1989</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia (CCO)</td>
<td>1962-66</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua (Contras)</td>
<td>1981-1992</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria (Biafra)</td>
<td>1967-70</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman (Dhofar Rebellion)</td>
<td>1965-1975</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia (Chechnya)</td>
<td>1993-2003</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka (Tamils)</td>
<td>1976-2009</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand (Communist Party of Thailand)</td>
<td>1950s-1980s</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco/Western Sahara (POLASARIO)</td>
<td>1975-1989</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan (Taliban)</td>
<td>1994-96</td>
<td>Insurgent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia (EPRDF)</td>
<td>1974-1991</td>
<td>Insurgent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo/Serbia (KLA)</td>
<td>1996-2008</td>
<td>Insurgent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia (NPFL and INPFL)</td>
<td>1989-1996</td>
<td>Insurgent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia (LURD)</td>
<td>1996-2003</td>
<td>Insurgent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua (FSLN)</td>
<td>1977-1979</td>
<td>Insurgent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papua New Guinea (Bougainville)</td>
<td>1989-2001</td>
<td>Insurgent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhodesia (ZANU, ZAPU)</td>
<td>1965-1980</td>
<td>Insurgent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda (RPF)</td>
<td>1989-1994</td>
<td>Insurgent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone (RUF)</td>
<td>1990-97</td>
<td>Insurgent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa (ANC)</td>
<td>1961-1994</td>
<td>Insurgent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan (SPLM)</td>
<td>1983-2010</td>
<td>Insurgent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia (Muslim insurgents)</td>
<td>1992-94</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location / Group</td>
<td>Years</td>
<td>Type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi (CNDD, PALIPEHUTU, FROLINA, CNDD-FDD, and others)</td>
<td>1992-95</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia—various leftist groups (FARC, ELN)</td>
<td>1964-2016</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India (Mizo)</td>
<td>1965-1986</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique (RENAMO)</td>
<td>1977-1992</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan (Baluchistan)</td>
<td>1973-77</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan (UTO)</td>
<td>1992-96</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal (MFDC)</td>
<td>1980-1991</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan (SPLM)</td>
<td>1983-2010</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India (Tripura)</td>
<td>1978-</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia (Aceh)</td>
<td>1975-</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kashmir (JKLF)</td>
<td>1989-</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey (PKK)</td>
<td>1984-</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Box Two Cases: Insurgents with Sanctuary Against External Intervener (13 Cases)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location / Group</th>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Malaya (MNLA)</td>
<td>1948-1960</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan (Anti-Soviets)</td>
<td>1978-89</td>
<td>Insurgent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria (Independence)</td>
<td>1954-1962</td>
<td>Insurgent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angolan Independence (MPLA)</td>
<td>1961-75</td>
<td>Insurgent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia/ Kampuchea (various insurgent groups)</td>
<td>1978-1992</td>
<td>Insurgent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon (anti-French)</td>
<td>1955-1960</td>
<td>Insurgent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free Laos forces v. French</td>
<td>1946-53</td>
<td>Insurgent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>1962-74</td>
<td>Insurgent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indochina (Vietminh)</td>
<td>1946-1955</td>
<td>Insurgent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique (FRELIMO)</td>
<td>1964-1975</td>
<td>Insurgent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia/ South Africa (SWAPO)</td>
<td>1966-1988</td>
<td>Insurgent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam (FLN and Viet Cong against RVN and USA)</td>
<td>1959-1973</td>
<td>Insurgent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan (Taliban against ISAF)</td>
<td>2001-</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Box Three Cases: Insurgents without Sanctuary Against External Intervener (5 Cases)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/Region</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Category</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kenya (Mau Mau)</td>
<td>1948-60</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia/ Timor L’este (Fretelin)</td>
<td>1975-1998</td>
<td>Insurgent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesian war of independence</td>
<td>1945-1949</td>
<td>Insurgent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen (Aden Emergency)</td>
<td>1964-1967</td>
<td>Insurgent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq (various Sunni Insurgent groups)</td>
<td>2003-2011</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Box Four Cases: Insurgents Without Sanctuary Against Domestically Constituted Regime (23 Cases)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/Region</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Category</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Congo (Katanga)</td>
<td>1961-63</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo (South Kasai)</td>
<td>1961-63</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurdish separation from Iran (KDPI)</td>
<td>1946-1990s</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar (Shan)</td>
<td>1961-1996</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar (Various Communist groups)</td>
<td>1948-1988</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru (Shining Path)</td>
<td>1980-1993</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines (Huk)</td>
<td>1946-1954</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka (JVP)</td>
<td>1988-90</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese Civil War</td>
<td>1946-1949</td>
<td>Insurgent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba (26th of July Movement)</td>
<td>1952-1956</td>
<td>Insurgent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia (Eritrean secession)</td>
<td>1961-1993</td>
<td>Insurgent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laos (Pathet Lao insurgents)</td>
<td>1960-1975</td>
<td>Insurgent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal (Maoists)</td>
<td>1996-1999</td>
<td>Insurgent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan (Anya Naya)</td>
<td>1963-1972</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suriname (SLA/ Jungle Commandos)</td>
<td>1986-1988</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala (various leftist groups)</td>
<td>1960-1995</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Period</td>
<td>Status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India (Naxalite)</td>
<td>Late 1960s-present</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines (NPA)</td>
<td>1960s-current</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagorno-Karabakh</td>
<td>1992-94</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar (Karen)</td>
<td>1949-</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India (various Manipur groups)</td>
<td>early 1960s-</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia (Abkhazia)</td>
<td>1992-97</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan (Balochistan)</td>
<td>2004-</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Discussion**

The results from Table 2.1 suggest that my refined version of the conventional wisdom may have greater explanatory power than the conventional wisdom. The conventional wisdom and my refined version of it predict the same outcome for Boxes Two and Four, and both predictions are correct. My argument makes divergent predictions about Boxes One and Three, and my predictions are accurate far more often than the conventional wisdom.

The collection of cases yields some noteworthy observations about the prevalence of sanctuary in insurgency. Sanctuary is a common feature of post-1945 insurgencies, being present in about two-thirds of cases. About 65% of the insurgent groups that have sanctuary are facing domestically constituted regimes, not external interveners. About half of the cases in this study were insurgencies against domestically constituted regimes where insurgents had sanctuary, about one and a half times as common (47%) as the next category of cases, insurgents without sanctuary facing a domestically constituted regime (30%).

Overall, insurgents have better chances of winning than being defeated (insurgents won 39% of the time and lost 28%) when all cases are included, but that masks significant differences between cases where the target is domestically constituted and or an external intervener. Second, insurgent victory is
nearly three times more likely against external interveners than domestically constituted regimes
(insurgents win 78% of conflicts against external interveners and just 28% against domestically
consstituted regimes), regardless of the presence of sanctuary, and insurgents are three times more likely to
lose against domestically constituted regimes than external interveners (insurgents lose 33% of the time
against domestically constituted regimes and just 11% against external interveners), regardless of the
presence of sanctuary. This finding probably understates insurgent success against external interveners
because the victorious external intervener in both cases (the U.K. in Malaya and Kenya) withdrew its
forces shortly after the insurgency was declared over and won. Third, many insurgencies against
domestically constituted regimes tend to have less clear-cut outcomes, but this is not true against external
interveners. Forty percent of insurgencies against domestically constituted regimes had either mixed
outcomes (18%), or they were ongoing (21%). Insurgencies against external interveners had just 5.5% of
each. Taken together, these results strongly support the argument in my refined conventional wisdom that
the nature of the target of insurgency affects the outcome.

The results offer some support to the conventional wisdom that sanctuary aids insurgents, but
they are only slightly more likely to do so. Insurgents with sanctuary are more likely to win than their
targets (insurgents win 46% of the time with sanctuary, compared to 26% for the governments), which is
better than insurgents experienced overall (39% versus governments’ 28%), which includes those groups
without sanctuary. The cases where insurgents did not have sanctuary lent some moderate support to the
conventional wisdom with insurgents losing slightly more frequently than they won (31% and 28%,
respectively). Also consistent with the conventional wisdom, sanctuary nearly doubles the likelihood of
insurgent victory over cases where they do not have sanctuary (insurgents win 28% of cases without
sanctuary and 46% with it). When comparing the cases with sanctuary against those without it when both
types of groups are facing domestically constituted regimes, insurgents win roughly 50% more frequently
with sanctuary (32% versus 21%), but insurgents continue to lose at nearly identical rates regardless of
the presence of sanctuary (32% with sanctuary and 33% without it). Notably, and this was surprising,
insurgencies without sanctuary tend to have less clear-cut outcomes than those with sanctuary (42% of insurgencies without sanctuary are mixed or ongoing compared to 32% of insurgencies with sanctuary). So, if one just looks at the results from the two boxes in the far left column of Table 2.1, they would find strong support for the conventional wisdom and my refined version of it would not appear to offer much.

Disaggregating the data further reveals strong support for my refined version of the conventional wisdom. The nature of the target regime appears to be a much stronger explanatory factor than the presence of sanctuary. External interveners tend to lose against insurgents whether sanctuary is present and the presence of sanctuary seems to have relatively little effect when their targets are external interveners, although the percentage of cases is small (only 23% of all cases). Insurgents with sanctuary defeated external interveners 78% of the time when they had sanctuary and 60% of the time when they did not. These findings are very sensitive to codings and slightly different codings, or the addition or subtraction of a small number of cases could significantly alter these percentages. The overwhelming majority of insurgencies (77%) are against domestically constituted regimes and insurgents are much less likely to win those conflicts than against external interveners, regardless of sanctuary.

Consistent with my refined version of the conventional wisdom and the data discussed so far, sanctuary is correlated with very different outcomes against different kinds of targets. Insurgents with sanctuary fighting domestically constituted regimes lost about four times as frequently (32%) as insurgents with sanctuary fighting against external interveners (8%), and those facing a domestically constituted regime won slightly less than three times as much as those facing external interveners (32% and 85%, respectively). Put another way, insurgents with sanctuary win/loss ratio against external interveners was 10:1, but was approximately 1:1 against domestically constituted regimes.

A nearly identical pattern emerges in cases without sanctuary. Insurgents lost slightly more than 50% as often against domestically constituted regimes (33% versus 20% against external interveners) and won only about a third as frequently against domestically constituted regimes (21% versus 60% against
external interveners). Insurgents without sanctuary had a win/loss ratio of 3:1 against external interveners but a 2:3 ratio against domestically constituted regimes.

The disaggregated results reported in Table 2.1 show that the nature of the target regime is a much stronger predictor of insurgent success than the presence of sanctuary. The results indicate that the win/loss ratios for insurgents change only moderately when the presence of sanctuary is varied, indicating it is not a strong explanatory factor for insurgent success. Against domestically constituted regimes, insurgents with and without sanctuary lose slightly more frequently than they win, but against external interveners insurgents have an 8:1 win/loss, regardless of sanctuary. However, there are very few cases in both categories and insurgents lost just once when sanctuary was present and once when it was not.

In a regression analysis using the data compiled to create Table 2.1, the only statistically significant result was for the interaction term with the presence of sanctuary against an external intervener, further supporting my argument that sanctuary has different advantages in certain contexts.

Overall, the Table 2.1 results are consistent with much of the existing literature. The Table 2.1 results are roughly consistent with Jones’ (2016) finding that insurgents with sanctuary win about 38 percent of the time (Table 2.1 reports insurgents winning 46% of these conflicts) and governments win about 30 percent of the time when facing insurgents with sanctuary (Table 2.1 results reports a lower win rate for governments against insurgents with sanctuary, with counterinsurgents winning just 26% of these conflicts). My results are also consistent with his conclusion that “sanctuary does not necessarily translate into insurgent victory. Not all sanctuaries are equal.” The Table 2.1 results are very similar to Gompert and Gordon’s (2008) finding that sanctuary was present in 66% of their 89 cases (63% of 79 cases in Table 2.1), and my findings about insurgent victory are very similar as well (Gompert and Gordon recorded an insurgent victory rate of about 30%). Overall, I find strong support for Andrew Mack’s (1975) observation long ago that big states tend to lose small wars (insurgencies) even when they are not colonial conflicts. Consistent with Connable and Libicki (2010), governments, not insurgents, generally fare better over a long conflict, although I found that it depends on the nature of the
government under challenge. The evidence from Table 2.1 suggests that Kalyvas and Balcells (2010) are largely right that insurgency and civil war has evolved over the course of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. There were fewer cases of external interveners fighting insurgencies abroad after the Cold War ended than between 1945 and 1991. The dates given for the 83 insurgencies in this study also indicate that more insurgencies after 1991 have mixed or ongoing outcomes, while the Cold War conflicts against external interveners almost always ended with a decisive victory for insurgents.

Other data reported in Chapter Two showed that insurgents tended to win against external interveners regardless of whether they had sanctuary in a neighboring state, lending credence to my argument about the limited benefits of transnational sanctuary. My findings tend to support Lyall and Wilson’s (2009) finding that states identified as occupiers are more likely to lose insurgencies, although I did not test, as they did, whether rates of mechanization of counterinsurgent armed forces explain outcomes of insurgencies. The observations and conclusions in this dissertation also appear consistent with Pape’s (1998) finding that suicide terrorism against democratic external interveners succeeds, although it does not appear that their democratic nature explains their defeat. The democratic nature of the democratic intervener does not appear to be what is important here, but rather that external interveners of all regime types tend to lose, and since 1945, democracies have on several occasions fought insurgencies outside their recognized borders.

The results presented so far lend some support to the refined version of the conventional wisdom that I have put forward in this dissertation. The conventional wisdom and my alternative to it made different predictions about two kinds of cases, representing about 53% of the cases compiled for this study. My alternative correctly predicted far more cases than the conventional wisdom. However, the
results presented here do not confirm my theoretical explanation for why sanctuaries aid insurgents fighting certain types of regimes but not others. My four causal mechanisms—the limitation on counterinsurgent force bought on by international borders, insurgents’ ability to wait out a counterinsurgent, the inability of external interveners to forge enduring governments in the countries in which they intervene, and an organizational inflection point that limits insurgents’ ability to overpower counterinsurgents—have not been confirmed by the data presented so far. Those causal mechanisms will be tested in the four following case studies, each having been selected from one of the four boxes in Table 2.1 to demonstrate how insurgencies fare with and without sanctuary, and against external interveners and domestically constituted regimes. The cases were selected to vary on their outcome, so there is a case of insurgent victory (Vietnam), insurgent loss (Peru and Kenya), and a mixed outcome (El Salvador).

Case Selection

The first two cases detailed in chapters three and four illustrate how insurgencies fare against domestically constituted regimes. In the first case, the Shining Path in Peru, the insurgents do not have sanctuary in a neighboring state, but the FMLN in El Salvador, the second case, does. El Salvador allows three of the four causal mechanisms to be tested, only excluding the one that examines external interveners’ ability to forge an enduring regime in another state.

Chapter three, the Shining Path in Peru is a fascinating insurgency to study, even though it only allows for direct tests of two causal mechanisms, because the group did not use sanctuaries in neighboring states. Although they are rightly coded as having lost, they were perceived by many to be on the cusp of victory until their leader was serendipitously captured, triggering the implosion of the group. The Shining Path in Peru is representative of Box Four conflicts, although the group appeared to be ascendant prior to its rapid downfall. I did one pre-dissertation case study about Nepal’s Maoist insurgency in the 1990s, although the insurgents in Nepal won their conflict while the Shining Path did not. The Peruvian insurgency is interesting
because the group appeared to do quite well without sanctuary, and if not for the government’s luck in apprehending the Shining Path’s leader, Guzman, may have won. But they did not and that is the most typical outcome in these types of cases. In this case and the Mau Mau case, I end the chapter with a counterfactual analysis of whether having sanctuary would have altered the outcome. That analysis provides limited insight into the explanatory power of the causal mechanisms related to the presence of sanctuary.

The final two cases detail how external interveners fare against insurgents with and without sanctuary. The first, the Mau Mau insurgency against the British and others in Kenya, affords the chance to examine all causal mechanisms except for the limitations on counterinsurgents’ actions brought on by sanctuaries and international borders. The final case study, the U.S. counterinsurgency in Vietnam, is the only case where all four causal mechanisms can be and are tested in a single case.

Admittedly, the selection of the Mau Mau rebellion in Kenya is questionable because it is unrepresentative of the small number of cases that exist in that category, and because I already have a case that details insurgent defeat when sanctuary is not present. These problems aside, I felt the two reasons for selecting the case outweighed its unrepresentative nature. First, I wanted to include one of the anomalous cases where an external intervener defeated an insurgency, and this was the only one available in Box Three. In selecting this case, I thought I could learn something about insurgency and sanctuary by studying a case where sanctuary was not present and comparing it to the two cases where it was. I thought a failed insurgency without sanctuary might give the most insight into the benefits of sanctuary by seeing what happens to a group when they do not have it and are especially likely to win, at least according to my argument, because they faced an external intervener. My second reason for selecting the Mau Mau was that
I found far more information available for this conflict than the four others. More information about the insurgency would shed light on the importance of not having sanctuary. Because sanctuary was not present, this chapter, like the case of the Shining Path, will contain a hypothetical counterfactual to assess whether sanctuary could have altered the outcome.

The case of the National Liberation Front/Viet Cong insurgency against the United States and others in South Vietnam has a representative outcome for those types of cases, and the documentation of sanctuary was extensive, so this was a logical case to include. The only previous case study I conducted on these kinds of conflicts was the Soviet experience in Afghanistan, which had the same representative outcome of insurgent victory.

Some may object to the cases selected to study in this dissertation because not all of them are representative of the typical outcomes of those kinds of cases detailed in Table 2.1 in Chapter Two. While it is true that two of these cases are not representative of the most common outcome for the type of conflict they are representing, I chose the cases that I did because there were more serious pitfalls to selecting only the most representative cases. If I only chose the most representative cases, then there would be no cases where the outcomes were anything but a win by one side. Given that about 29% of cases in my collection of post-1945 insurgencies were either mixed outcomes or ongoing insurgencies, I thought that would be a significant omission. Prior to this dissertation, I studied an ongoing insurgency (at the time) when I examined how the FARC used sanctuaries in its conflict with the Colombian government, but I had never completed a case study where the result was mixed. The benefits of selecting the FMLN in El Salvador for my Box One case study seemed to outweigh the costs of selecting a non-representative case. Prior to this dissertation, I completed two representative cases of Box One insurgencies (Rhodesia and Oman), where insurgents lost, so conducting a third study with the
same outcome would likely shed less light than studying a case where sanctuary was present in a
long-running conflict.
Chapter Three

The Shining Path and Peru: No Sanctuary and a Domestically Constituted Regime

Map 3.1 Peru and its departments (Hudson, in McClintock 1998)
The conflict in Peru pitted the government against a Maoist group, *Sendero Luminoso*, or Shining Path, which lacked sanctuary in a neighboring state. The outcome of this conflict corresponds to the conventional wisdom that insurgents require sanctuary to win. However, a closer analysis of the conflict reveals that the Shining Path’s strengths, limited as they were in some respects, likely would not have existed if they relied on sanctuary.

**Background to the conflict**

Although the Shining Path’s armed struggle began in May 1980, the top members of the group began organizing in the 1960s. A military coup in Peru in 1968 began the period of the so-called Military Socialist regime in Peru. The Shining Path’s leader, Abimael Guzman, a college professor, and the upper ranks of the Shining Path, would be dominated by educators. Guzman, a Maoist, found a receptive audience in Ayacucho, where many of the students came from indigenous backgrounds and felt the European descendants in the towns and cities created a government that disadvantaged the indigenous population. There was a sense that rural areas were being left behind as the Peruvian economy increased by 3% annually during the 1960s and 1970s (McClintock, 302).

The Shining Path would eventually declare that it intended to seize power in Peru and institute a new order, although the specific design of the new order remained obscured in revolutionary platitudes. To take control in Peru, the Shining Path’s aim was to seize the control of government by winning the capital, Lima. While the Shining Path broadly set out to follow the three stages of revolutionary warfare—defensive, equilibrium, and offensive—the Shining Path would make use of terrorism to try to persuade supporters of the regime to leave the country (McClintock, 65-66). Clearly drawing from Mao, the Shining Path did not want to assault the
capital directly, but instead sought to cut it off from food and electricity by establishing a presence in the countryside. Over time, the Shining Path would drive away the capitalist supporters of the regime through terrorism, while the army and police would abandon their posts as a result of demoralization brought about by terrorism. And, it almost worked.

**Overview of the conflict**

The Shining Path established its first bases in the relatively poor Peruvian departments of Ayacucho, Apurimac, and Huancavelica in the early 1980s (McClintock, 86). The onset of violence in Peru happened to coincide with the establishment of democracy in 1980. In the early 1980s, the Shining Path was able to expand because the democratic government refrained from using the military against it. Fernando Belaunde Terry, Peru’s president from 1980-1985, thought using the military against the Shining Path would undermine the credibility of the democratically elected government, which would be viewed as maintaining itself through force. The army was eventually called out to deal with the Shining Path once the police demonstrated their complete inability to reverse or even stem the tide of the Shining Path’s advance. The hesitation on the part of the Belaunde government to call out the army to deal with the Shining Path is often cited as a critical error that allowed the Shining Path the time to establish a relatively secure area from which to operate.

The army’s initial response to the Shining Path insurgency in 1983-4 was mass indiscriminate violence, which produced one-half of all the casualties incurred in Ayacucho through 1992 (Starn 1998). Some officers, particularly the lower level officers who were drawn from rural areas, believed that a military solution to the problems in rural areas was likely to fail if there was not a development program accompanying the use of force. The government failed
to bring development to rural areas, arguing that such a program was prohibitively expensive.

Despite the government’s rejection of the proposal by some in the military to engage in greater development in the countryside, there were some ad hoc attempts by the government to address some of the peasants’ complaints. President Garcia, who led Peru from 1985-1990, committed himself to addressing peasant concerns and committed the government to making “investments in public works, implementation in rural zones of emergency employment programs, loans without interest, price supports for peasant products, and a generous policy of legal recognition of communities” (Manrique, 314). Yet, these reforms were often undermined by local officials who objected to land reform.

The military’s brutally indiscriminate campaign continued and facilitated the dispersal of Shining Path cadres north to the Upper Huallaga Valley in the mid-1980s where they began their relationship with Peru’s coca cultivators. By the late 1980s, the Shining Path was establishing a presence in new provinces, including Puno, an area along the border with Bolivia, and in others to the south of the capital, Lima, and near Ayacucho (McClintock, 86).

Two significant developments facilitated the fall of the Shining Path. First, peasants began organizing their own self-defense forces, called rondas, which severely curtailed the Shining Path’s freedom of movement in rural areas and undermined the resource base that fed the insurgency. Second, and more importantly, the government of President Alberto Fujimori (1990-95) began a serious effort to collect intelligence on Shining Path’s leadership, creating special police forces designed to go after the group’s top leadership. That effort led to Guzman’s capture in a safe house in Lima, which in turn led to netting several other Shining Path leaders, significantly reducing the level of threat that the Shining Path posed to the Peruvian state. The movement imploded in the wake of Guzman’s capture. What is interesting about the end of the
conflict is that it happened nearly just as the Shining Path appeared to be on the cusp of winning. The number of car bombs in Lima had reached eight per month by July 1992 and the Shining Path’s plan of defeating the regime without a large-scale military confrontation appeared to be working. The Shining Path hoped that terrorism in Lima would force wealthy Limans to leave the country, withdrawing their money as they left. They believed that this in turn would lead to the collapse of the country’s banking system, bringing even greater hardship, and leave the regime resting on armed forces, which were already plagued by desertion (McClintock, 89).

**The Shining Path’s Internal Sanctuary**

The establishment of internal sanctuaries was absolutely necessary for the Shining Path. The Shining Path’s adherence to Maoism meant that the group tried to win over peasants in the countryside and defeat the government by cutting off the cities from their supplies in the countryside. The Shining Path sought to overturn the existing order where it controlled territory in the countryside. At first, the Shining Path’s presence was often viewed as a reprieve from the “arbitrary rule of the authorities, police, merchants, and teachers,” and its punishment of “adultery, alcoholism, vagrancy, robbery, and cattle rustling” was welcomed (Del Pino, 161).

The government repression in the early period shaped the Shining Path’s relationship with the people they governed in two ways. The people stayed loyal to the Shining Path in the short term because they viewed the Shining Path as the lesser of two evils, and one who would protect them from an abusive state. However, the Shining Path’s increasingly strict governance over the people led the people to view the state as the lesser of the two evils as the conflict wore on, and the Shining Path’s tactic of fleeing in the face of military sweeps undermined an accepted norm that local rulers were supposed to protect the people they governed.
Recruiting and Training

Recruits were drawn from many areas in which the Shining Path had influence, which often included the university. The Shining Path had to contend with the twin problems of recovering from the hammering they took from the military in 1983-4 and the increasing presence of self-defense forces set up by rural communities. The heavy repression of 1983-4, while winning the government no good will, inflicted substantial losses on the Shining Path. The losses that it inflicted on the Shining Path led the group to begin seeking more recruits from the less committed populations. The Shining Path became more dependent on coerced participation as the war wore on, and this contributed to a decline in the quality of Shining Path governance and combat performance as committed cadres were replaced by uncommitted, fearful, resentful peasants.\(^{12}\) Over time, the populations in the Shining Path’s base areas became more important to supply the Shining Path with replacements for fallen fighters.

Male youths were generally the most receptive demographic to the Shining Path’s message, which often put them at odds with older members of their community, who were skeptical of the Shining Path’s program (Del Pino, 161). Many youths were drawn to the destruction that the Shining Path wrought.\(^{13}\) Those who chose to become Shining Path insurgents were well compensated relative to the peasants whose loyalty they were trying to win. The Shining Path was able to pay its fighters salaries ranging from $250-$500 a month by the late 1980s, a figure three to eight times higher than monthly teacher salaries (McClintock, 292). According to a study cited by McClintock, over half (57%) of the fighters reported earning a

\(^{12}\) Del Pino gives several examples of the Shining Path coercing the relatives of those they had killed to fight for them. Children were often sent in the first wave of an attack on a community and mothers often went along to try and protect their children.

\(^{13}\) Degregori (2012) relays a quote from a young militant: “we blew it up just to blow it up, nothing else” (130).
salary, while another thirty-six percent reported receiving “food, housing, or money for expenses” (p.292).

The Shining Path raised children to become soldiers in the areas that they governed. The Shining Path began giving military training to children when they were eight and nine years old and would add them to their ranks around the age of twelve (Del Pino, 174). Del Pino relates that the Shining Path also used to send children in the first wave of any attack, forcing difficult moral decisions on those who were being attacked. Children, though, were not the only ones to be conscripted to fight. The Shining Path expected all able-bodied members of the population it controlled to participate in attacks, even though the general population was never well-armed. Del Pino relates that a typical attack on a target could consist of one hundred people, including mothers who went to protect their children, yet only about five in the group would have guns.\(^\text{14}\)

The Shining Path did this so as to lend credence to its claim to have forged “iron legions” in the countryside that were waiting to strike the cities.

The Shining Path found themselves in a difficult situation by 1984, one that would only worsen as the conflict dragged on. The Shining Path expected to draw on the rural population to replace its losses but increasingly faced resistance. The solution that the Shining Path came to for this problem, and many others, was to use greater violence to cow the population. The effectiveness of increased violence against the population diminished over time as it drove people to towns and cities where they could not aid the Shining Path, or they became desensitized to the violence, or it led them to become more willing to form self-defense committees. Desertions among the Shining Path ranks picked up as the war dragged on and the

\(^{14}\) The Shining Path did often divide the spoils of an attack with those it governed, usually consisting of money, livestock, or other goods (McClintock, 292).
combatants and noncombatants were subjected to serious deprivations of food and medicine. The Shining Path responded to these desertions by publicly killing the relatives of those who deserted as a warning to other would-be deserters of the costs of desertion (Del Pino).

**Arming and Provisioning**

In addition to creating their own state in the countryside, the Shining Path needed to requisition resources from the population in its rural bases. Food was one important provision that the countryside could and did provide. As part of its state-building efforts, the Shining Path collectivized agriculture, which became unpopular once the population over which they governed realized that it meant that food could no longer be produced for sale to urban areas (Degregori, 132). Cutting the cities off from the countryside proved to do more harm than good for the Shining Path and the maintenance of their internal sanctuaries. The ban on producing more than subsistence levels of goods and agricultural produce greatly upset urban-rural linkages that the peasants, as well as those in towns and cities, had come to depend on. The ban on trading with the cities and towns became irrelevant in some Shining Path-held areas as the war went on because the population was not producing what could have been considered subsistence provisions. A survey conducted with members of a Shining Path camp in Sello de Oro revealed that all of them suffered from anemia, “and many were afflicted with tuberculosis, acute bronchitis, and malaria” (Del Pino, 177). Arming came from capturing police posts and from ambushing military units. Additional weapons were purchased through the relationship that the Shining Path developed with narcotraffickers, who were allowed to use at least one airstrip that came under Shining Path’s control (McClintock, 72).
State-Building

Building a new state in the countryside was a fundamental component of the Shining Path’s strategy (Degregori, 128). The Shining Path assumed many of the roles of government: resolving marital disputes, overseeing teachers, punishing criminals, and organizing recreation (Manrique, 204). The peasants were initially receptive to the presence of the Shining Path because many of them felt that the Peruvian government had forgotten them, and they believed that the Shining Path’s promised agricultural campaigns would eradicate hunger.

In 1982, the Shining Path announced its plan to “hammer” the countryside, meaning not only that they would seek to remove all vestiges of the state, but also rid the countryside of all practices that it considered feudal or reactionary (Del Pino, 162). Specifically, this meant proscribing religious beliefs and holidays, and replacing traditional means of governance and individuals with Shining Path governance and individuals. Traditional holidays were replaced by Shining Path holidays, which included a day to remember those members of the group who had been killed in a prison massacre, the onset of hostilities, and Guzman’s birthday (Del Pino 176). The Shining Path’s prohibition on religion created the most tension with Evangelical Peruvians who did not join in Shining Path’s attacks because it violated the Ten Commandments. What further alienated the Shining Path from the people it ruled over was that its members regularly transgressed the organization’s stated rules with impunity, but local peasants were punished for breaking the same rules. The best example of this was the frequency with which guerrillas felt free to take liberties with women, even though it was against the Shining Path’s own rule “do not take liberties with women,” and the Shining Path could punish rape and adultery among the peasants with death (Del Pino 181).
One of the Shining Path’s base zones established in 1983, the San Francisco Guerrilla Zone in the province of Ayacucho, was a good place to set up a base for the Shining Path because the small communities there lacked real links with the cities, the area was economically depressed because of low prices for their agricultural produce, and government devaluations of the currency hurt what little money residents had (Del Pino, 170). The Shining Path set up new political-military hierarchies where it set up bases.15

The Shining Path’s increasingly violent actions towards those viewed as innocents by the local population eroded the Shining Path’s support base. The initial assassinations of unpopular officials or lenders were gradually replaced by less discriminate assassinations of increasingly marginal enemies of the people. Part of the reason for this violence was the generational gap between the young Shining Path militants who challenged the older, traditional community leaders.16 The group began to go beyond simply assassinating government representatives in the countryside and began targeting the families of those representatives, as they did to the family of the president of the Board of Elections in Ayacucho shortly before the 1989 elections.17 The relatives of every individual needlessly killed by the Shining Path came to harbor deep

15 The Shining Path’s Open People’s Committees were part of a local governance structure that the Shining Path introduced in the areas where it had influence. Besides the Committees, there was a “secretary general, secretary of security, secretary of production, secretary of communal affairs, and a secretary of organization” with local party movements, such as the “Poor Peasants Movement, Youth Movement, Feminine Movement, and Pioneer” Children Movement (Del Pino, 176).
16 Degregori argues that the generational challenge was compounded by a Shining Path ideology that viewed violence as “a purifying force that extirpated the old at its roots (136).” [please fix]
17 It appears that the Shining Path’s efforts to intimidate voters into not voting worked better in some areas than others, and worked best in the areas where the Shining Path had the greatest presence. Nationwide, 36% of voters did not vote in the 1989 municipal elections and 22% of the ballots cast were invalid. In the Shining Path’s stronghold of Ayacucho, 85% did not vote and 70% of the ballots were judged to be invalid. (McClintock 79) fixThis indicates that the Shining Path could still strike fear into a large part of the population even if it was finding it difficult to maintain its force (Del Pino, 167).
resentments about the group, and made them more likely to support the local self-defense forces (Starn, 237). Shining Path assassinations of local authorities sometimes led to reprisal assassinations by the peasants as cases in Huaychao and Macambama illustrate. In January 1983, peasants killed seven members of the Shining Path in retaliation for the assassination of three communal authorities (Del Pino, 162). The spiral of violence often accelerated rapidly. Three senderistas (members of local self-defense forces) were assassinated and seven captured in Saccsamarca in February 1983, leading the Shining Path to respond by massacring eighty peasants at Lucanamarca (Del Pino, 163).

The Shining Path’s increased violence in areas it controlled contributed to the population’s disillusionment with the Shining Path’s revolutionary program, even though that same population had often initially welcomed the Shining Path’s presence (Degregori, 142). It is surprising that a group that placed such an emphasis on winning the peasantry proved to govern so poorly, quickly erasing any goodwill they earned by getting rid of corrupt government officials, largely because of a lack of discipline among its members and the group’s infatuation with violence. The increasing violence of the Shining Path led many rural communities to begin forming their own montoneras (self-defense forces) to defend themselves from the Shining Path. These communities felt that the Shining Path’s retreats in the face of large government military action violated “the traditional Andean patron who protects his clients” (Degregori, 141). Del Pino believes that the formation of local resistance to Shining Path rule was the first great challenge to the organization’s success (p.159). Even though the Shining Path was facing

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18 The montoneras were the precursors to the Civil Autodefense Committees (CACs), which were sanctioned by the state.
difficulty in 1989, it still controlled 28% of Peru’s municipalities,\textsuperscript{19} it had the support of 15% of the population, and was inflicting about 1,526 casualties per year while maintaining a force of about 10,000 combatants.\textsuperscript{20}

**Causal Mechanisms**

This case allowed for a direct test of two of the causal mechanisms: waiting for the government to withdraw and whether the Shining Path faced an organizational inflection point. There was no evidence that the Shining Path attempted to wait for the government forces to withdraw, not that they could because they were a domestically constituted regime. There is no strong evidence of an organizational inflection point either. The Shining Path suffered casualties due to government repression, but that repression occurred because the government decided to launch offensives against Shining Path internal sanctuaries. It does not appear that their growing numbers made it easier for government forces to find and attack them. The creation of local rondas were not a result of the Shining Path’s growing power, but by local distrust of the Shining Path, following their mistreatment of local populations.

\textsuperscript{19} McClintock explains that this figure represents the percent of municipalities that were not able to renew their local officials, and this may understate the amount of territory that the Shining Path either controlled or influenced. By December 1991, 47% of Peru’s provinces were declared states of emergency and yet another study suggests that the Shining Path controlled about 40% of Peru’s territory (Gustavo Gorriti and Simon Strong in McClintock, 81).

\textsuperscript{20} The casualty figure cited above may overstate the Shining Path’s military strength, since only 17% of the Shining Path’s victims were members of the police or military (McClintock, 68). McClintock also notes that the public approval of Shining Path was often difficult to discern, but the percentage of Peruvians approving of the Shining Path never got above twenty-five (McClintock, 78).
Counterfactual Analysis

Because this is a case where there was neither an external intervener nor a transnational sanctuary, two of the four mechanisms cannot be investigated in this case. However, in this section I will analyze whether sanctuary could have aided the Shining Path. Specifically, I want to investigate whether transnational sanctuary could have afforded the Shining Path greater relative protection from attack, and, perhaps, altered the outcome. The second missing mechanism, the inability of an external intervener to create an enduring government in the country in which they intervene, will not be part of the counterfactual analysis because the government based in Lima was a domestically constituted regime.

The Shining Path likely would have found substantial protection from Peruvian government attacks by moving to a sanctuary in a neighboring state. Since the military had difficulty locating the Shining Path on its own territory, it is unlikely that they would have done better on foreign territory where knowledge of the population and terrain would have been worse. Peru’s relative military weakness, and in some cases its history of conflict with neighboring states, meant that it was unlikely that Peruvian military forces would have been granted substantial access to neighboring territories, and would likely be very limited if it was allowed access.

While the Shining Path likely would have been more secure from government attack in transnational sanctuary in one or more neighboring states, it seems unlikely that the Shining Path would have fought more effectively if they were primarily operating from transnational sanctuary, as opposed to internal sanctuary. First, there would have been large logistical barriers caused by operating exclusively from transnational sanctuary. The capital, Lima, is just about the
furthest point in the country from any of its international borders. Operating exclusively from transnational sanctuary would have imposed large constraints on the Shining Path’s ability to threaten Lima and many of the other towns and cities along the coast. Fighting primarily from transnational sanctuaries would have forced a different strategy on the Shining Path, who would have had greater difficulty restricting the flow of food to urban areas. As it happened, the Shining Path’s presence in the departments of Ayacucho and Apurimac, as well as to their north in the Huallaga Valley, served as a buffer between Lima and neighboring countries and nearly cut the country in half along a north-south axis of Shining Path-controlled territory. If operating largely from transnational sanctuary, it would have been difficult for the Shining Path to claim that they had a large following in the country, if they could not control any of it. Failing to control territory within Peru could have led to higher morale in both the police and the military, and dampened the sense of the Shining Path’s inevitable victory, which reportedly had seized the capital in 1992. While government forces were making gains in the countryside, thanks in part to the rondas, it has been reported that much of the population, especially in and around Lima, were consumed by a sense of an impending Shining Path victory and the collapse of the government. The population was generally weary of the war, the government appeared unable to stop Shining Path terrorist attacks in and around the capital, the government still could not apprehend Guzman, President Fujimori curtailed liberties in the name of fighting the Shining Path, and many urban poor had been driven deeper into poverty by Fujimori’s economic policies, possibly portending greater economic disaster in the future (Burt, in Stern 1998; Degregori 2012; McClintock 1998).

Internal sanctuary was a requisite of their Maoist strategy of gaining power, and internal sanctuary required some degree of governance by the Shining Path. Governing poorly eventually
cost the Shining Path their internal sanctuary and contributed to their defeat. They did not have the option to wait out the Peruvian government in a transnational sanctuary because the government in Lima had nowhere to go. The strategy had been, and remained until the end, a campaign of demoralization against the Peruvian state. The Shining Path, despite their own propaganda about having “iron legions” in the rural areas, knew well from the mid-1980s-on, that it was very difficult to muster enough fighters just to try and hold onto what they had and remain relevant, much less win a firefight with the Peruvian military for the capital. The Peruvian government, inept as it was at managing its macroeconomic problems and developing its rural areas, showed a great deal of staying power in weathering repeated attacks on the capital and the infrastructure outside of the capital that supported it. Fighting exclusively from transnational sanctuary would have been a strategy for long-term irrelevance, rather than a strategy of winning power. They chose the correct strategy given their ideological orientation and political program, but they executed it poorly, and the odds were still long even if they had managed themselves and the people in their territory better.

The bases were rural as opposed to urban because the rural areas were difficult for Peru’s armed forces to access, and because the populations in the rural areas were viewed as more likely to sympathize with the Shining Path’s aims. The Shining Path’s internal sanctuaries were in Peru’s highlands and in the jungle in the east of the country. The bases areas, including the rural populations who supported the Shining Path, provided the group with relative protection from attack because the peasants did not give them up when the army came. The Shining Path tried to keep peasants around their camps so that the military would have to use greater restraint when attacking these bases lest they kill a large number of civilians. They also used them as forced
labor to dig trenches and fortify bases, increasing the defensive capabilities of the Shining Path (Del Pino).

The Shining Path enjoyed many of the benefits of transnational sanctuary within its internal sanctuary in Peru, and likely would not have gained additional benefits from a transnational sanctuary. It is possible that a sanctuary in a neighboring state would have allowed the Shining Path to obtain some of the same kinds of benefits that it did from internal sanctuary, but there is no reason to expect that it would have caused the Shining Path to perform better, and there is good reason to think that the group probably would have done worse. The Shining Path’s focus on seizing power in Peru would have made it difficult to recruit foreign fighters to fight against the Peruvian state, and they likely would have been limited to organizing Peruvians who left their homes and sought out the Shining Path in their foreign bases. Given that the Shining Path relied heavily on coerced recruitment of Peruvians, especially following the deaths of its most ardent supporters during the course of the insurgency, it is unlikely that they would have been able to coerce and use foreigners to launch attacks inside Peru in the same way they used rural Peruvians.

Arms procurement was not difficult for the Shining Path, who were able to obtain explosives from Peru’s mines and small arms from defeated government forces and narcotraffickers, but it is conceivable that they could also have obtained arms and munitions from groups such as the FARC in neighboring Colombia, a country that shares a considerably long border with Peru.

The Shining Path’s program of gaining control of the countryside in Ayacucho finally elicited a response from the military in 1983. The Shining Path’s response to the government’s
repression was to disperse north to the Huallaga Valley and east toward the jungle (Del Pino). The remoteness of these internal bases allowed the Shining Path ample time and space to flee in the wake of military incursions into their base areas. The populations the Shining Path governed often went with them either out of fear of what the government would do to them, or what the Shining Path would do to them if the group one day returned.21

The abrupt implosion of the Shining Path raises the possibility that they could have continued fighting longer if Guzman had been hiding in a base in a neighboring country, beyond the reach of the special units designated to go after the Shining Path leadership. The conflict almost certainly would have gone on longer if Guzman had not been captured and then brought out on television a number of times to announce that the Shining Path was seeking peace terms. The image of the leader who had been revered as a deity by his followers shattered the group’s morale in equal proportion by which it raised morale for the security forces, government, and the loyal public. But the counterfactual “What if Guzman had not been caught when he was?” obscures the degree to which the Shining Path appears to have already lost the war when Guzman was captured. One of the reasons he was in Lima was because the military and self-defense groups had taken back the countryside where the Shining Path had previously had relatively secure bases. Guzman chose the strategy of moving to “strategic equilibrium” and attacking the cities over the advice of his advisers, who wanted to concentrate on winning back the countryside, because Guzman believed that the Shining Path had established a momentum of expansion that had to be continued.

21 Del Pino relates that the Shining Path would kill anyone who fell behind on their forced marches fearing that they would give up the group’s location if they were captured by the military (pp.186-7).
Conclusion

At first glance, the conventional wisdom about sanctuary appears to be confirmed by the outcome of the case of the Shining Path in Peru. According to this line of thinking, a group with a secure base in a neighboring country will have time to build up and train its forces, infiltrate into the target country and carry out attacks, care for their wounded, obtain arms and provisions, and transmit propaganda into the target country, and all of this presents a considerable foe for any would-be counterinsurgent. Those groups lacking these neighboring bases will not be able to withstand the attacks by the government and will lose. Therefore, the Shining Path lost because it could not withstand the attacks by the government.

The Shining Path’s inability to win in Peru is a puzzling case given the serial ineptness of the government. Here was a government that was perceived as being corrupt, a military of little accomplishment and meagre capabilities, a stagnant economy, and a political system that had already democratized, so it did not have the option of holding out the carrot of greater political participation to frustrated and impoverished peasants. The Shining Path faced a counterinsurgent force that could have been the envy of other insurgent groups, and yet they could not take power. Proponents of the conventional wisdom about sanctuary could say that this case largely confirms transnational sanctuary’s importance: groups lose without it. As I explained above, that is a more difficult proposition to defend when one looks at the history of the conflict. The best explanation for the defeat of the Shining Path, given the serial ineptness of the government, is that the Shining Path was even worse.

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22 McClintock presents data showing that the majority of Peruvians did not perceive their government to be democratic although the elections held between 1980 and 1991 were perceived to be free and fair. Only thirty-eight percent believed Peru to be “a lot” or “a good deal” democratic (p. 295).
The Shining Path’s organization, political program, military strategy, and tactics forced them to eliminate certain options open to other groups. Promising a revolutionary transformation of the country, the Shining Path’s governance at the local level, with all its differences from previous arrangements, and appreciated by the locals for a time, ultimately proved a weakness.

The revised explanation that I put forward in this dissertation is that sanctuary aids those groups who can afford to wait out their targets. Most often that type of situation occurs in reaction to some sort of external military intervention. I argue that those sanctuaries do not substantially alter the outcome of conflicts where the government does not have an option to pack up and leave. Because my explanation does not differ from the conventional wisdom on this case, and the case confirms both explanations, there is no way to assess the relative strength of the two different explanations by just looking at this result. The evidence presented here shows that insurgents can readily obtain the benefits of a sanctuary in an internal sanctuary, thereby undermining the importance of transnational sanctuary. The conventional wisdom rests on the assumption that insurgents seek transnational sanctuary because it is relatively far away from the counterinsurgents, who will not be as effective projecting power over longer distances, and because international borders limit the intensity and duration of cross-border attacks. But groups such as the Shining Path were not chiefly concerned with staying as far away as possible from attack, and they initially established their internal sanctuary in the middle of the country, near the capital. Understanding the course of the conflict makes the conventional account difficult to accept. Some groups, by the very nature of what they set out to accomplish, are not preconfigured to benefit from transnational sanctuary. This is particularly true of those groups who seek to overthrow a government that is domestically constituted, as was the case in Peru.
While the purpose of this chapter was primarily about assessing how groups fare when they do not have transnational sanctuary and are fighting a domestically constituted government that lacks the option to withdraw, it yielded an unanticipated observation. Counterinsurgents do not necessarily need to address the core grievances, or root causes of a conflict, in order to end it. Peruvian peasant grievances about corrupt officials, lack of economic opportunity, and the distribution of land had not been met when the conflict ended. The government rejected a call by some junior officers in the Peruvian military in the mid-1980s to undertake serious development efforts in rural areas because the government could not afford those programs. When development or aid workers went into those areas, they were often attacked or killed by the Shining Path who wanted revolution, not reform.
Map 3.2 Ayacucho, Peru. This is the department where the Shining Path formed (Degregori, in Stern 1998).
Map 3.3 Shining Path Internal Sanctuaries in Northeast Ayacucho: The San Francisco Guerrilla Zone in northeast Ayacucho (del Pino H., in Stern 1998)
Chapter Four


Map 4.1 Colonial Kenya. This map is from Anderson (2005), and also appears in Bennett (2013). The one above shows areas relevant to the Mau Mau and the Emergency in Kenya and the one below shows Mau Mau sanctuaries in the forests. Fort Hall and the Rift Valley are a few of the common points of reference between the two maps.

23 I will use the term Mau Mau, because that is the term that has come to be accepted in Western scholarly discourse about the (largely) Kikuyu fighters during this time. The label “Mau Mau” was a construct of the counterinsurgents, and the so-called Mau Mau referred to themselves as ithaka na wiathi, which Percox relays as either “land and moral responsibility” or “freedom through land” (p.67).
Introduction

Insurgents without transnational sanctuary potentially face destruction if their internal sanctuaries are compromised. This is more likely to happen when insurgents are fighting external interveners, who usually have the most sophisticated military technology available. Insurgents without transnational sanctuary will require formidable internal sanctuary if they are to survive counterinsurgent attacks. However, internal sanctuary also affords insurgents opportunities to display their governing prowess if they can control territory and population, and is a more direct challenge to the authority of the target state they are fighting. The Mau Mau in Kenya lacked sanctuary in a neighboring state, but they had dense forests abutting the population from which their support came. The following chapter examines some of the causes that contributed to the onset of the conflict, the role of internal sanctuary and the British response to it, and then concludes with a counterfactual analysis of how the conflict likely would have differed if the Mau Mau had had sanctuary in a neighboring state.

Economic and political conditions in the lead-up

The British occupation and settlement of Kenya began in the 1890s. European settlers began to quickly displace native Kikuyu (the largest tribal group in Kenya and the group from which virtually all Mau Mau came) from some of the most fertile agricultural lands in what became known as the “White Highlands” (Percox, 50). Following the Second World War, Kenya experienced rapid economic growth in the years leading up to the Mau Mau insurgency. The white settler population benefitted disproportionately from this growth, and continued pushing large numbers of Kikuyu squatters off their land as the mechanization of agriculture reduced the demand for native labor. The displaced Kikuyu who went to find work in urban areas, such as
Nairobi,\textsuperscript{24} fared poorly as the British Provincial Administration continued to maintain its low-wage policy that made it difficult to support a family (Berman, 163). The inequitable distribution of land between Europeans and Kikuyu contributed to the latter’s demands for land reform and a change in development policy (Bruce, 1976: 163).

The struggle over inequitable land distribution facilitated the rise of what became known in the West as “the Mau Mau.”\textsuperscript{25} The Murang’a peasants’ revolt and Mombasa general strike are sometimes viewed as precursors to Mau Mau (Percox, 51). The following year, 1948, was the first year in which the Kenya Government detected the Mau Mau (Percox, 53). Subsequently, the Kenya African Union (KAU), along with the Nairobi trade unions, began a campaign of mass oathing, which was a commitment to significant land reform, in Central Province (where there were large numbers of Kikuyu) in February 1950, which coincided with a general strike in Nairobi of the same year. The oathing was done on a large scale because it was believed to be necessary to generate a sustained group commitment (Berman, 167). In 1950, the British authorities first learned of the Mau Mau’s oathing campaign and set about arresting oath administrators (Percox, 53). The mobilization of the Kikuyu through mass oathing was interpreted by the colonial authorities as the beginning of a campaign to murder the Europeans, and it convinced colonial administrators that the Kikuyu could not be trusted.

The declining trust between the colonial authorities and the KAU leadership made it difficult for colonial authorities to make any peaceful accommodation of African demands, and the lack of compromise was used as an excuse for the more violent tactics that Mau Mau later

\textsuperscript{24}The African population of Nairobi is estimated to have more than doubled from 1948-1952, largely as a result of white settler evictions of Kikuyu tenant farmers (Newsinger, 1981: 161).

\textsuperscript{25} By 1948, land distribution had become so unequal that 1.23 million Kikuyu lived on 2,000 square miles of tribal lands, while about 30,000 white settlers had 12,000 square miles (Newsinger, 160).
employed. The KAU sought greater political representation in colonial government for Africans, but their demands were largely rebuffed.\textsuperscript{26} This disappointment energized the more violent elements within the Kikuyu who subsequently came to reject the formal political process established by the colonial authorities. Some Kikuyu began preparing for violent conflict in 1952. The militants hoped that limited violence would be enough to force authorities in London to intervene over the heads of the colonial administrators and grant the Kikuyu what the local administrators would not not (Berman, 167).

**Onset of the Emergency**

On October 20\textsuperscript{th}, 1952, the British declared an emergency and the Kikuyu leadership, including Jomo Kenyatta and 145 others, were arrested. At this point, the fighters who would become known as Mau Mau were an insignificant military threat to the British, having neither abundant weapons nor military training (Berman, 170). The Mau Mau’s military ineffectiveness was compounded by the preemptive strike against Kikuyu political leadership at the outset of the Emergency.

The British desired to keep down the direct economic and military costs of the Emergency, then, after winning the war, feared the diplomatic cost of hanging on too long.\textsuperscript{27} The British Colonial Secretary, Oliver Lyttelton, was eager that the State of Emergency declared in Kenya be ended as quickly as possible “in order that he could avoid the embarrassment of Opposition questions in Westminster” (Percox, 63). However, Lyttelton was not able to avoid embarrassment from the Opposition who introduced a motion censuring Lyttelton for his

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{26} The KAU sought twelve seats in the Legislative Council, but were given only two.
\item \textsuperscript{27} “[I]ntelligence failures occurred…invariably because the British ran their empire on a shoestring and simply could not afford effective police force” (Popplewell, cited in Percox). The total cost of putting down the Mau Mau rebellion to the British government was 55 million pounds (Newsinger, 182).
\end{itemize}
“handling of African affairs,” something that Percox says was an “unprecedented situation in Parliament’s history” (p.64).

Even though Operation Jock Scott deprived the Mau Mau of their leadership in 1952, the counterinsurgents did little in the following six months to actually stop young Kikuyu from forming armed groups in the forests in the Aberdares and Mount Kenya.\(^{28}\) The initial punitive measures by the British,\(^ {29}\) in addition to other violence in the form of beatings, forced confessions, summary executions, and mass expulsion from settlers’ farms by the European settlers, drove many Kikuyu to support the Mau Mau (Percox, 66). By April 1953, between 70,000 and 100,000 Kikuyu had left the Central Provinces either voluntarily or because they were forcibly evicted by settlers or the colonial authorities. The British increased their harsh response to all Kikuyu throughout 1953 in an attempt to crush the insurgency at the outset and end it quickly. Because the bands of fighters had not yet emerged from the forests, the British failed to grasp how many more Mau Mau they were creating as a result of their repressive policies. British policies were not only creating more Mau Mau, but their policies were also eliminating neutral or loyal Kikuyu as a source of intelligence on actual Mau Mau.

The initial British response in the wake of the Emergency and Operation Jock Scott was to raise penalties for civilians collaborating with the Mau Mau. This often meant the confiscation of cattle, sheep, and goats, and even included collective punishments, such as communal fines, the forcible resettlement of resident laborers to the reserves, and a punitive tax and mandatory

\(^{28}\) There are number of different forces that can be considered counterinsurgents in this conflict. The most significant counterinsurgent forces were the colonial police force (Kenya Police), the British military, European settlers, and Loyalist black Africans, many of whom were also Kikuyu.

\(^{29}\) During this period of early repression, Kenyan authorities screened 58,864 Africans by February 1953, of which 17, 613 were sent to trial, 2,249 were detained, and the rest let go (Percox, 69).
registration for all Kikuyu. The British Governor of Kenya during the Emergency, Evelyn Baring, while insisting that the Mau Mau had no legitimate economic grievances, set out on a program of economic development in Kenya almost from the start of the Emergency. Seven million pounds were spent on “road-building and water projects, the construction of schools, community centers, village halls, hospitals, urban housing, and a new airport for Nairobi,” as well as funds for the construction of an oil refinery and a program of agricultural improvement (Percox, 65).

**The end of the Mau Mau**

The British counterinsurgency succeeded because it combined repression against the Mau Mau and their actual and suspected supporters, and economic development policies designed to maintain the support of loyal Kikuyu (Percox, 48). Governor Baring had an interest in ending the insurgency as quickly as possible because he was eager to get the civilian reconstruction efforts going and wanted them underway within a year of the declaration of the State of Emergency, but believed that the “law and order” problems with the Mau Mau had to be addressed first. Baring believed it was crucial to improve the lives of Kenyans or else the Mau Mau could come back in the future and bring about another Emergency. The British government responded to Baring’s planned economic development proposal with a one-time payment of five million pounds for

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30 The punitive tax that was imposed was not just done to deprive Kikuyus of resources that they could transfer to the Mau Mau or serve as a warning against joining Mau Mau to the Kikuyu fence-sitters, but was done to partially offset the cost of the State of Emergency. More on the British desire to limit the costs of the counterinsurgency below (Percox, 64).

31 While that was Baring’s position, a lot of the early development assistance went to the tribes other than the Kikuyu because the British did not want to set the precedent for other tribes that rebelling would bring about more funding for their areas, so they sent the opposite message, which was that the loyal tribes would receive economic incentives for their loyalty, including loyal Kikuyu, in the form of “a small increase on wages, better living standards for chiefs and headmen,…and the cheap sale of confiscated Kikuyu cattle. (Percox, 83)” [fix]
agricultural reform and rejected the request to expand African education, believing that the
Africans that they had already educated the best were the leaders of the KAU and Mau Mau
(Percox, 66). A second reason why Baring wanted the Emergency over as quickly as possible
was to save the lives of loyalist Kikuyu, who were the Mau Mau’s first targets.\footnote{Percox relates that by the end of 1952 (a little more than two months into the Emergency), 121 loyal Africans were found dead, as well as three European settlers and an Asian woman. Three more European settlers would be killed on January 24th, 1953, prompting 1,500 settlers to march on Government House to demand greater protection (70). The racial hierarchy in Kenya would continue throughout the Emergency with white ‘Europeans’ at the top, Asians a step below, and black Africans at the bottom. The European settlers could safely demonstrate in mass without fear of massive violence from counterinsurgent forces, even though their losses were much lighter than among loyalist Africans. Furthermore, it would take years before the first European settler was hanged for murdering a black African, while thousands of black Africans were hanged for violence against settlers, other black Africans, and counterinsurgent forces.} Baring understood that British commitments were stretched thin and economic, military, and political support from London would be quite modest, so it was necessary to create a sizeable domestic constituency that was anti-Mau Mau. Non-Kikuyu tribes could and did partially fill this role, but the Kikuyu were the largest tribe in Kenya and it was imperative that the whole tribe not rebel against the British.

The two groups that suffered the most casualties during the Emergency were the Mau Mau and the loyalists (Footnote 6 in Branch, 2007). The loyalists were organized into Home Guard units that were essential to providing security for Kikuyu resettled as part of the British project of “villagization” that was supposed to separate the non-Mau Mau Kikuyu population from the Mau Mau to deprive the Mau Mau of supplies and recruits. While the British welcomed fighting the Mau Mau with loyalist Kikuyu because it conserved British resources, the loyalist Home Guards were a troublesome partner for the British. The Home Guards’ lack of discipline contributed to beating captured Mau Mau, abducting and raping women in the new villages, murder, and cattle rustling (Branch, 303). The unpaid Home Guards were subsequently disbanded in 1955 and
replaced with a more professional Tribal Police Force (Branch, 304). Even though the Home Guards were disbanded, the British made sure to buy the loyalty of former Home Guard members and other Loyalists by restricting certain economic, social, and political privileges to those who had not joined Mau Mau. Benefits of loyalty included the ability to obtain licenses to grow coffee, obtain title to newly consolidated landholdings, vote, and run for office in the 1957-58 elections.

**Importance of internal sanctuary**

The first significant military operations by the Mau Mau began on March 26th, 1953, when 300 Mau Mau killed 97 men, women, and children in Kiambu District, and another 80 attacked a police station in Naivasha, killing three, releasing prisoners, and raiding the armory (Percox, 73). The British responded with incursions against the Mau Mau in the forests, and also imposed a one-mile *cordon sanitaire* around the Aberdare Forest to try and deprive the Mau Mau of access to the population, crops, and livestock that they needed to sustain themselves in the forests (Percox, 75-6). However, further action was constrained throughout the first five months of 1953 because most of the available counterinsurgent forces were defending areas from attack and there was nothing left over for offensive operations against Mau Mau internal sanctuaries (Percox, 76).

The British began moving the army into areas adjacent to the internal sanctuaries in the forests following a gradual buildup of forces throughout the first half of 1953.33 Once the

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33 Percox points out that one of the ways that Kenya’s military forces were augmented was by delaying their deployment to another emergency, in Malaya, at the same time. Britain’s competing interests for scarce economic, military, political, and diplomatic resources contributed to their desire to end the Emergency as quickly as possible. Military personnel were also becoming more scarce as the British were in the process of reducing their standing army from 435,000 to 400,000, during the Mau Mau Emergency. General Sir George Erskine became the military commander in Kenya during this period as well (Evelyn Baring remained Governor).
military cleared an area it was turned over to the police to keep Mau Mau influence from returning. The security forces engaged a group of approximately 100 Mau Mau in the forests in early June 1953, and killed over 100 Mau Mau by the end of the month (Percox, 74). The British commander, Erskine, issued a call for mass surrender of the Mau Mau in August 1953, while he waited for the War Office to approve his request for additional troops. It was an ill-timed call because the security forces had yet to seriously threaten the Mau Mau’s existence; not surprisingly, just 66 individuals availed themselves of the offer in its first month (Percox, 80).

Erskine estimated that he was hopeful that military operations could be over by October 1953, which would have meant the Emergency would have been brought to a close within a year (Percox, 77). However, the operations against the Mau Mau in the forests throughout the summer of 1953 demonstrated the difficulty of destroying the Mau Mau in their sanctuaries deep in the forests. The British commander in charge of military operations in Kenya described the futility of finding and engaging the Mau Mau in the forests:

The large gangs do not show themselves because I think they realize they would be cracked on the head if they did so. We are by no means certain what has happened to these gangs. We have pushed into the forest to find them, but we have only found the places where they have been in the past (Quoted in Percox, 78).

The difficulty of finding and rooting out the Mau Mau in their internal sanctuaries, coupled with their continued support in the Kikuyu Reserve, and the Mau Mau’s increased ability to adapt to security forces’ tactics, led Erskine to request more troops towards the end of July 1953. The additional troops arrived by late September 1953, and were deployed around the

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34 The British desire to end the Emergency quickly was used to justify requests for more immediate measures that were believed to be able to end the war more quickly, even if it meant higher costs in the short term.
forests where the Mau Mau were believed to be operating and in the Kikuyu districts (Percox, 79).

The changing center of the insurgency from rural to urban areas in Kenya began in late 1953 and continued into early 1954. The increase in security forces personnel from Britain, as well as the ongoing buildup of local forces, including police, who focused on the sanctuaries in the forests, led to gaps in security in Nairobi that allowed Mau Mau to increase their presence there. Nairobi was used as an alternative internal sanctuary as the rural sanctuaries were increasingly isolated and under pressure from the government. Thousands of Kikuyu fled to Nairobi because they were displaced by the fighting or because they had been forcibly evicted by European settlers, or a combination of the two. Nairobi became a source of “funds, firearms, supplies, and recruits” for the Mau Mau, and law and order continued to break down in Nairobi as armed robbery and political assassinations became more frequent. The Nairobi police appeared to be losing control of a city with 45,000 Kikuyu males and insufficient means to separate the Mau Mau from the non-Mau Mau Kikuyu (Percox, 80).

The limits of internal sanctuary

The security forces possessed insufficient strength to tackle the problems of the Mau Mau in the rural areas and in Nairobi simultaneously, and decided on concluding an operation against Mau Mau supporters in the Kikuyu Reserve before launching Operation Anvil in Nairobi. Operation Anvil began on April 24th, 1954, and proved to be the operation that broke the back of the Mau Mau insurgency. The operation itself was massive; by May 9th, 1954, the British had detained 19,000 adult males, sent 6,000 of their dependents back to the reserves, and arrested
206 key Mau Mau, including Mau Mau intelligence officers, treasurers, lookouts, and gunmen (Percox, 82).

Operation Anvil produced positive developments for counterinsurgents in rural areas in addition to significantly curtailing Mau Mau influence in Nairobi. Mau Mau forces in the forests withered from 15,000 fighters at the end of 1953 to about 2,000 fighters by the end of 1955, and just 500 by September 1956 (Newsinger, 176). Cutting off Nairobi as a source of food meant that the Mau Mau in the forests could provision fewer fighters and the dwindling supply of weapons meant that the Mau Mau were destined for a long term decline in military effectiveness unless they could find alternative sources of arms. It appears that it was the loss of food that had more significant effects on the long term decline of the Mau Mau. Many of the fighters now turned their attention to scrounging for food rather than carrying out operations against loyalist Kikuyu or the security forces. Many Mau Mau turned to forcefully requisitioning food from their native Kikuyu, already dealing with economic hardships from the punitive measures placed on them by the British, and this drained support for the Mau Mau against the only population sympathetic to them (Newsinger, 177).

The British employed both conventional and nonconventional means of fighting the Mau Mau in the forests. The British practice of sending hundreds or thousands of troops into an area to search for Mau Mau rarely produced success commensurate with the cost. The British turned to using irregular forces, or “pseudo-gangs” of loyalists posing as Mau Mau, or captured rebels who had switched to the government’s side, to make contact with the Mau Mau in the forest and then attack them. This tactic led to the killing and capturing of a number of Mau Mau, including one of the Mau Mau’s best leaders, Dedan Kimathi (Newsinger, 177).
Airpower aided the British counterinsurgency effort. British airpower was used against Mau Mau internal sanctuaries in the forests beginning in early 1953 and continued through the end of the Emergency (Percox, 73). Bombers allowed the British to conduct bombing raids against suspected Mau Mau supply depots and guerrilla bands operating deep in the Aberdare forests and the forests around Mount Kenya. In addition to directly bombing the Mau Mau, airpower also allowed the British to drop supplies to small groups of British soldiers who were pursuing the Mau Mau in the forests. These supply drops allowed these groups to operate longer and go farther into the forests (Chappell 2011). Surrendered Mau Mau told their British interrogators that the threat of aerial bombardment kept the guerrillas on the move and some strikes were so terrifying that they led survivors to surrender to the British.³⁵ British airpower was also employed in psychological operations against the Mau Mau in the forests, dropping millions of leaflets urging them to surrender and directly calling on Mau Mau to surrender through sky-broadcasts (Chappell, 505). For the most part, the British avoided killing civilians while employing airpower.³⁶ Pilots were restricted to bombing forested areas prohibited to civilians until late May 1954, at which time they were only allowed to carry out airstrikes outside of the prohibited zone so long as there was a minimal risk of harm to civilians.³⁷ Airpower reinforced many trends underway during the Emergency: it made food and other supplies more

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³⁵ A Mau Mau guerrilla leader, Gitonga Karame, surrendered along with the rest of his unit following an airstrike that killed twenty of their fellow fighters (Chappell, 506).
³⁶ Airpower is potentially counterproductive for counterinsurgents if it is used indiscriminately, and it can provoke a backlash among the target population that they seek to win over. Used discriminately though, airpower can be important for rapidly moving troops, locating insurgents, attacking them, resupplying allied forces, and serving as a symbol of the counterinsurgent’s power. The discriminant use of airpower in Kenya is notable given the heavy handed and often far less discriminant repression that security forces employed against the Kikuyu (Chappell, 504).
³⁷ Chappell explains that the British viewed the change in policy as necessary because the Mau Mau took advantage of the British policy and they operated quite openly in the reserves where British pilots had been prohibited from attacking (pp.502-3).
difficult to obtain, kept the Mau Mau on the move, inflicted casualties, and demoralized the survivors (Chappell, 506).

**Causal Mechanisms**

This was one of the case studies where the insurgents’ target was an external intervener, and one of my four causal mechanisms predicted that insurgents may try to wait out external interveners in neighboring sanctuaries. That mechanism cannot be fully tested in this case because there were no transnational sanctuaries to wait out the British, but it is worth noting that the Mau Mau did not rely on a “waiting game” strategy. The Mau Mau pursued armed engagement against the colonial state and its supporters to bring about the land reform that they sought.

This case provides little support to the causal mechanism that predicts an organizational inflection point, although British airpower, discussed in the last section, increased the costs to the Mau Mau of being detected. Smaller bands of insurgents were easier to hide in Kenya’s forests than larger bands of insurgents, but even the smaller bands could and did fall victim to British patrols in the forests. It is also difficult to assess the possibility of any organizational inflection point because the Mau Mau’s estimated support appeared to have peaked early in the insurgency and then declined over the course of the conflict to the point where the British felt they could declare victory. Therefore, there was no long-term buildup of forces that led to a significant reversal of fortune for the Mau Mau.

This evidence collected in this case strongly supports the causal mechanism that predicts external interveners will fail to create enduring regimes in the country in which they intervene. This case demonstrates how difficult it is for external interveners to hold onto overseas
possessions in the post-1945 era, even when they succeed militarily. The British were able to successfully dismantle the Mau Mau Movement, jailing or killing many of its members, while the British authorities were always concerned that the movement could resurface with greater force. With the insurgency defeated for the time, the British set out to turn over authority to Kenyans quickly, hoping that doing so would avoid a fresh insurgency, and making a deal with more moderate politicians would only be more easily done after having stamped out the first insurgency. The British were unable to retain their colony in Kenya, although the relations between the post-colonial Kenyan government and the United Kingdom are often described positively. For example, Kenya decided to join the Commonwealth, and Kenya protected most of the white Europeans’ property from confiscation after independence.

Counterfactual analysis: Would Transnational Sanctuary have helped the Mau Mau? If so, how?

The Mau Mau case, and all cases that fall into this typology, are missing one of the four mechanisms that I believe explain how sanctuary may be of only limited use to insurgents, and, generally, not decisive in determining a conflict’s outcome. Because the Mau Mau did not use sanctuaries, I cannot examine whether there were limitations on counterinsurgents’ use of force outside Kenya’s borders. The Mau Mau insurgency in Kenya against the British is a good case for examining what happens to insurgents when they do not have access to transnational sanctuary. It appears that the Mau Mau would have significantly benefitted from transnational sanctuary as it would have allowed them time to increase their training and, by extension, their effectiveness as a fighting force, cache supplies and munitions that were relatively immune from attack, survive counterinsurgent attacks, and raise the costs of the counterinsurgency to the British. Given the British desire to limit the economic and diplomatic costs of the
counterinsurgency in Kenya, it is likely that prolonging the conflict by stationing significant numbers of troops in a transnational sanctuary would have pressured the British to quit Kenya earlier than they did.

What would limit a British attack against a neighboring sanctuary? States that attack sanctuaries usually incur some sort of cost for doing so. The costs of attacking sanctuaries and the forms of that cost (diplomatic, economic, military) vary from case to case, but some penalty is almost always paid when the attack happens without the sanctuary host’s consent. British commitments were increasingly under strain as a result of growing global discontent with colonialism and new nationalist demands for independence. The British were particularly concerned that the United States would pressure them to quit Kenya if the conflict dragged on, and the British did not want to open up a rift between themselves and the Americans since they wanted to maintain close relations with the US in the midst of the Cold War. The British had already let India go before the onset of the Mau Mau rebellion, and so it was less important for them to maintain colonies and outposts around the world that facilitated British access to India. Kenya was important to the British because it controls one of the two significant tributaries to the Nile, which was important for controlling Egypt, which was important to the British because the

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38 British concern that American opinion may turn against them was not without merit. British activity in Kenya looked a lot like French action in Algeria. President Kennedy denounced the continued French presence in Algeria and cut a significant amount of American aid to France. The British grew concerned about changing American perceptions of them throughout the 1950s, and were concerned that the Americans might distance themselves from the British. A top leader of KANU, Tom Mboya, visited both Vice President Nixon and Senator Kennedy in 1959 during his trip to the United States and seemed to have had good meetings with both men. American opposition to colonialism came from a number of sources. Under Kennedy, the United States wanted Africa to emerge as a solidly pro-Western block of countries and the United States was concerned that the perception that America was not doing enough to end colonialism would create an opening for the Soviet Union to increase its influence on the continent. See pages 20-24 in Nissimi (2006). The Hola Massacre in 1959 was an attack on inmates at a special detention facility for Mau Mau. Eleven detainees were clubbed to death by guards and another 77 were seriously injured. This is widely viewed in the literature as an event that precipitated the expedited Kenyan independence.
Suez Canal reduced the time it took ships to sail to India. Maintaining control over the headwaters of the Nile mattered less to the British, who experienced a significant decline in influence in Egypt with the rise of Gamel Abdel Nasser and the Suez Crisis of 1956. Not only was the cost of the conflict important, but an economy of force was necessary because British forces were simultaneously carrying out a counterinsurgency in Malaya (1948-1960), which was a competing draw on limited British resources.

The casualty figures reported earlier demonstrate, among other things, that Mau Mau were not a very sophisticated fighting force, and they took tens of casualties for each loyalist they killed and several hundred died for each European combatant killed. They were further deprived of their senior political leadership because of Operation Jock Stock at the outset of the Emergency. A reasonably secure sanctuary outside of British control may have allowed some of the leadership to escape capture. The Mau Mau launched their first attacks less than six months after the Emergency began, which means that the Mau Mau had very little time for formal military training. Sanctuary in a neighboring state would not necessarily have affected the timing of the Mau Mau’s first actions, but it would have provided a reasonably secure base to train recruits. A second constraint on the Mau Mau’s fighting prowess was their vulnerable supply of arms. They did not have their own capacity to produce high quality firearms and usually had to make due with whatever could be smuggled in from Nairobi, or with whatever could be taken from police stations or loyalists they killed. A sanctuary in a neighboring state would have made it easier for the Mau Mau to cache arms, and also could have made it easier to procure arms from sympathizers abroad.

As it happened, the Mau Mau were dependent on flows of recruits from Nairobi and the Kikuyu Reserve to replace their losses. Nairobi was largely eliminated as a source of recruits
following Operation Anvil. Recruits from the reserves became less common over time as the security forces were built up and police activity increased around the reserves. Attracting new recruits became more difficult because the security forces appeared to be gaining the upper hand and prospective recruits did not want to join a losing cause. The difficulty of gaining new recruits was further compounded over time as the Mau Mau increasingly preyed on the Kikuyu population for any supplies that they could find. The Mau Mau would likely have benefitted from both receiving recruits from neighboring countries and being able to train them in neighboring sanctuaries where they would be relatively safe from British interdiction. Many of the problems with obtaining new recruits paralleled the problems with obtaining more food, medicine, and other supplies.

Sanctuary in a neighboring state would have allowed the Mau Mau time to train and collect arms and then gradually infiltrate its fighters into Kenya, while keeping a reserve force safe in their transnational sanctuary. The best the British could have hoped for in this case was to interdict the insurgents as they neared the Kenyan border, but detection would be difficult because the Mau Mau knew to move at night. The British could have elected to improve Kenya's border security with neighboring sanctuary hosts, but walls and fortifications of that sort require substantial resources and manpower, which would be unavailable for protecting the population or attacking the Mau Mau. Whichever tactic the British chose, none would likely have had the psychological consequences that led so many Mau Mau to surrender during the

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39 Armies with far greater technological capacity than the British army in the mid-1950s had great difficulty in interdicting insurgents coming into one country from another. In the Soviet's best year (militarily) in Afghanistan, they were only able to interdict one-third of the fighters and supplies coming into the country, and that was in the 1980s.

40 It should be noted that all of the territory, Ethiopia and Italian Somaliland excepted, surrounding the Protectorate of Kenya was also part of the British Empire, so it is unlikely that the British would have allowed the Mau Mau to have a transnational sanctuary in any of its neighboring colonies.
actual conflict. British bombing and clandestine raids against the Mau Mau would be far fewer than they were because of international condemnation of carrying out attacks on neighboring soil in pursuit of maintaining its colony. This condemnation would not likely have been too great from Kenya’s neighbors at the time because most of the territory surrounding Kenya was part of the British Empire throughout the height of the Emergency, and would likely have not protested incursions of counterinsurgents aligned with the British. If, somehow, the Mau Mau had been able to establish transnational sanctuary in neighboring territory, perhaps in remote regions in neighboring Uganda and Tanzania, which both had small Kikuyu populations under British rule, who may have been sympathetic to Kenya’s Kikuyu, then the relative protection from attack would allow the Mau Mau to survive as an organization and raise the cost of continuing the counterinsurgency and the maintenance of the colony. Given that the British relied far more on direct rule in Uganda than Kenya, it is conceivable that the British may not have been able to prevent all uses of sanctuary in a neighboring state, even if it was one of their colonies.

It is not likely that the British would have been able to disrupt a Mau Mau sanctuary in a neighboring country to the same degree that they did to their actual sanctuaries in the Aberdares and around Mount Kenya. The dense forests shielded the Mau Mau in them from some attacks early on in the Emergency, but this protection relatively declined as the British increased the number of security forces and deployed them to the forests, more aircraft began patrolling and attacking the forests, and new tactics like the “pseudo gangs” encroached on the Mau Mau’s sanctuary. While the internal sanctuaries the Mau Mau used certainly conferred certain advantages to them, they were stuck in the center of the country without an international border to flee across when they were attacked. While counterinsurgents often attack insurgent
sanctuaries in neighboring states, because of the relative protection from attack that international borders confer to sanctuary hosts, they almost never carry out prolonged operations and must be satisfied with the occasional bombing raid or quick incursions over the border. This would likely have limited the use of “pseudo gangs” and small British units that tracked and identified Mau Mau for British aircraft. The British would have been able to impose constraints on recruits and supplies traveling from Kenya to a sanctuary in a neighboring state, but would be limited in their ability to interdict supplies and recruits moving through territories they did not control.

Sanctuary in a neighboring state would almost certainly have increased the duration and costs of the counterinsurgency. The British would likely be constrained in attacking these sanctuaries out of fear of drawing condemnation from the United States, who were eager to end formal colonialism, and whose friendship the British sought to maintain. Attacking sanctuaries in other countries constitutes a use of force that is likely to be interpreted as illegal if the target state is not at war with the sanctuary host and if the target state was not authorized by the Security Council to do so. This may not have been as significant an issue during the period of the Mau Mau Emergency because Uganda was part of the British Empire and Tanzania was a British trust territory under the United Nations. Ethiopia is the only plausible neighbor where the Mau Mau might have established a sanctuary that was outside British control, but it would have been difficult given the dearth of Kikuyu in Ethiopia and its distance from Kikuyu populations in

42 The difficulties associated with establishing a base in a neighboring country, identifying which country or territory would host such a sanctuary, duration of such a hypothetical conflict, or different military challenges to operating in any of the neighboring countries are beyond the scope of this paper. It was unlikely that a sanctuary would have been able to open up on Kenya’s border in 1952, due to the fact that many Kikuyu came from Central Province, but also because independence had not yet come to most of Kenya’s neighbors. Ethiopia and Italian Somaliland would have been the easiest territories on which the Mau Mau could set up bases because the British held the neighboring territories on Kenya’s south and western borders. Bases in those countries could not easily link up with Kikuyu internal sanctuaries, which were in the center and southwest of the country.
Kenya. While domestically constituted regimes might be able to offer a competing value to justify the use of force, such as national defense, the British would only be able to offer up defense of colonialism as its justification for violating a neighboring state’s sovereignty. This would be a tough sell to their American allies and would invite condemnation from the Soviet Union.

The British held national elections where loyalist Africans voted for representatives in Kenya’s Legislative Council in 1957-58, beginning the process that culminated with Kenya’s independence in 1963 and the election of Jomo Kenyatta (first as Prime Minister and later as President). Would transnational sanctuary have changed any of that? It is not clear that it would.

Building on some of the economic development that was undertaken during the Emergency, the British extended voting rights and African representation to loyalists almost as soon as the Emergency ended, thereby sapping any potential residual support for the Mau Mau.43 Additionally, it is not clear that transnational sanctuary would have solved one of the Mau Mau’s chief deficiencies— it largely drew its supporters from the Kikuyu tribe, although some Embu and Meru served in their forces. Going transnational in and of itself would not have helped the Mau

43 Coding the outcome of this conflict was difficult. Throughout this case study the conflict has been presented as a military loss for the insurgents, which it certainly was, but at least some of the group’s aims were at least partially achieved. The Mau Mau were fighting for an equitable redistribution of land, chiefly by appropriating the vast tracks that European settlers had acquired from black African Kenyans over decades of colonialism. There was land reform in independent Kenya, but it was largely land consolidation for the elite, not redistribution to landless and unemployed Kenyans (Harbeson 1971). It is interesting that the Mau Mau Emergency was a much more difficult affair in the British memory than the conflict warranted. [re. this past part of the sentence, what do you mean? this seems very important, but there is no information in the text or footnote to tell us] The British took very few casualties relative to the Mau Mau, but they pressed through reforms during and after the Emergency to stamp out any chance of the Mau Mau returning. The 1959 Hola Massacre could have mobilized the Kikuyu, and other tribes, to make common cause against the British, and this concern likely was one of the factors that figured into the British decision to grant Kenya independence much earlier than it had planned in the past.
Mau appeal to the other tribes and carry out a more coordinated, national struggle against the British.

**Conclusion**

Insurgents without transnational sanctuary potentially face great difficulty in defeating their targets. Insurgents tend to start out with few weapons, little military training, and logistical difficulties at the outset of an insurgency. They often need time and the support of a substantial part of the population. If groups cannot obtain sanctuary in neighboring states, they need to evolve quickly into a fighting force that can seize and hold territory within their respective target states. These internal sanctuaries can afford insurgents the time to develop the necessary military skills, provisions, and recruits to carry out successful attacks against their target state.

The Mau Mau had the odds stacked against them from the outset of the Emergency. Kenya was a country comprised of many tribes, and uniting them would be difficult for a movement that was overwhelmingly Kikuyu. While many other Kenyans may have welcomed the end of British rule, they were not eager to replace it with a Kikuyu-dominated government. The Mau Mau insurgents remained at a distinct military disadvantage relative to the far superior British and all their local allies. The Mau Mau did not operate far from the heavily Kikuyu areas of the country around Central Province. Internal sanctuary in the Aberdare forests served, for a time, as a sufficient guard against the superior firepower of the British. However, the British and loyalist Kenyans were able to eventually isolate these sanctuaries and then gradually deprive the Mau Mau of their forest hideouts.

Transnational sanctuary would have solved some of the most serious problems that the Mau Mau faced. They likely would have avoided physical destruction as states are limited in the
power they can project into other countries. Recruits, provisions, medical care, and rest and relaxation would have been relatively more abundant in a transnational sanctuary, and the war almost certainly would have lasted longer. It is not clear that sanctuary in a neighboring country would have allowed the Mau Mau to forge bonds that transcended tribal identities. It is also not clear that the ultimate outcome would have been different. Waiting for the British to withdraw could have been a viable strategy for the Mau Mau, as the British were foreign colonizers, but that would not necessarily have solved the question of what to do with the Europeans who made Kenya their home and who had taken vast tracks of the best farmland for themselves. It is possible that the Mau Mau may have been able to stay in the fight until the British decided to grant Kenya its independence, but that only would mean that the Mau Mau would have been stronger actors in a new and independent Kenya. There is no reason to believe that transnational sanctuary, if one could have even been constructed, would have enabled the Mau Mau to become so powerful that they could defeat the British-aligned counterinsurgent forces. As it actually happened, the British were quite good at manipulating the franchise so as to ensure that a moderate government, friendly to the British, came to power at independence.
Map 4.2 Mau Mau Internal Sanctuaries in Aberdares, Kenya (Anderson 2005)
Chapter Five

El Salvador and the Farabundo Marti Liberation Front (FMLN): No External Intervention and the Presence of Transnational Sanctuary

Map 5.1 El Salvador (Central Intelligency Agency Factbook 2017)

Introduction

The case of El Salvador is an example of an insurgent group with transnational sanctuary facing a domestically constituted regime. My refined version of the conventional wisdom would predict that it should be difficult for the insurgents to seize power because the regime they are challenging does not have the option to withdraw and must endure the costs of insurgency.
The following case has three parts. The first part is a brief background about the origins and causes of the conflict in El Salvador, and the second section is a brief overview of the insurgency. The third section assesses the relative strengths of the causal mechanisms that can be tested in this case. I conclude that transnational sanctuary provided crucial support to the FMLN, and they benefitted from sanctuary in many of the ways that the conventional wisdom predicts that they would. However, the FMLN failed to achieve its primary objective of seizing power in El Salvador through the use of force, and I show some of the ways that using transnational sanctuary in Nicaragua actually made it more difficult for the FMLN to win.

Overview of the Conflict

The economic and political exclusion of a growing number of Salvadorans contributed to the onset of the crisis in El Salvador. The introduction of coffee in the mid-nineteenth century followed by a series of laws passed between 1879 and 1882 led to the transferring of nearly one-quarter of that country’s cultivatable land that was previously held collectively to private hands (Byrne 18). Economically, many Salvadorans faced severe land shortages due to a growing population and the continued concentration of land in the hands of the country’s elites. The country’s population in the 1960s was just three and a half million, but it was growing by 157,000 per year, and this relative population surge was augmented by the return of 100,000 to 300,000 Salvadorans from Honduras following the 1969 war with Honduras (Byrne, 19-20). The land shortage produced by the expansion of export-led crops such as coffee, cotton, and sugar cane forced many Salvadorans to become seasonal wage laborers or subsistence farmers living on very small plots of land. El Salvador experienced rising wealth and land inequality throughout the 1960s and 1970s that produced calls from the country’s peasants for significant economic
However, the overwhelming majority of Salvadorans lacked any meaningful way to address their economic problems through the political process. The Salvadoran military regime of the 1970s was highly exclusionary and largely served the interests of the military and the agrarian elite. The country’s growing industrial sector was unable to absorb the landless peasants as Salvadoran industry was capital-intensive, and the industrial elites lacked an interest in political reform because they depended on the agricultural elites for the majority of their capital.

Attempts at reform throughout the 1970s failed to make the political or economic system more inclusive. The military manipulated election results throughout the 1970s to ensure that a civilian government friendly to the military came to power. The prevailing political order was challenged by the coup of 1979, which was the proximate cause of the onset of civil war in El Salvador. The junta that was initially installed was led by a relatively moderate, reformist group of military officers. However, it did not last long and they were subsequently ousted by a very conservative coalition of landowners and military officers. This second coup signaled to left wing parties that economic reform, particularly land reform, was impossible to achieve by working within the existing order, and the ensuing massive violence against civilians convinced many Salvadorans that they needed to prepare themselves for war. The ultraconservative junta...

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44 A number of indicators reported by Byrne highlight the increasing impoverishment of El Salvador’s poor in the 1960s and 1970s: the percentage of landless families rose from 19.8% in 1961 to 41.1% in 1971; in 1966 the top 3,000 families held 43% of the land; the bottom 20% of the population experienced a decline in their share of the national wealth from 3.7% in 1970 to 2% in 1980, while the top fifth’s share of national income rose from 50.8% in 1970 to 66% in 1980 (p.20).

unleashed a massive wave of violence against real and suspected members of El Salvador’s left that left an estimated 15,000 dead in 1980 alone (Byrne, 68).

The FMLN was the umbrella name for five different organizations: the PCS, FPL, ERP, RN, and PRTC. Although the five organizations agreed to undertake actions collectively to defeat the government, they maintained their own independent leaderships, financing, recruiting, and provisioning. The FMLN represented the armed resistance to the government and it was affiliated with the FDR, which was the collection of left wing organizations that sought nonviolent change in El Salvador. The relationship between the FMLN and FDR grew more distant as the war progressed, with the FDR occasionally criticizing human rights violations by the FMLN before the FDR effectively disbanded in 1987 to create a new political organization, the Democratic Convergence (McClintock, 53).

The FMLN hoped to repeat the Sandinistas’ success in Nicaragua by toppling the regime in an all-out offensive for the capital, which they launched in January 1981. The FMLN had pinned their hopes for a successful revolution with insurrections in the cities to coincide with the military push. When those insurrections failed to materialize and the “final offensive” of 1981 petered out, the FMLN regrouped between mid-1981 and mid-1982 to consolidate its internal sanctuaries in preparation for the next confrontation with the armed forces (Byrne, 84). The “final offensive” succeeded in carving out the government and insurgent areas of influence that would last until the end of the war. The FMLN’s presence (sometimes measured by the lack of a government presence) encompassed between one-quarter and one-third of the country and was primarily located in rural areas in the north and the east of the country, while the government remained in control of most large population centers and the west of the country (Byrne, 80, 84). The FMLN began constructing alternative governance systems complete with “installations,
workshops, hospitals, schools of instruction” in areas where it had expelled the government’s presence (Harnecker, quoted in Byrne, 83, endnote 29).

While the FMLN tried to consolidate its control in the countryside, the government, on the advice and with the funding of the U.S., began increasing the size of its armed forces to address the military threat posed by the insurgency, and held elections in March 1982 to try to build support for the government to undermine the FMLN’s claim that revolutionary warfare was the best way to bring about change in El Salvador (Byrne, 83). The elections largely achieved the purpose the United States intended, but the armed forces were not able to capitalize on their increased strength because they failed to focus on the small unit tactics that the U.S. advised them to adopt. The El Salvador Armed Forces (ESAF) continued employing large unit operations that played to the FMLN’s strengths, allowing the FMLN to consolidate its presence in the rural areas of the country’s north and east. ESAF’s extensive sweeps were easily avoided by the FMLN, and ESAF eventually fell back on defensive positions around population and economic centers (Byrne 83-84).

Despite the political setback for the FMLN in March 1982 caused by the relatively successful election, they launched what was probably their most successful military phase of the war between mid-1982 and late 1983. The FMLN began capturing small military outposts, then villages and towns before finally laying siege to some of El Salvador’s cities, even capturing the Fourth Brigade Headquarters in 1983. These advances allowed the FMLN to capture weapons, gain military experience, and put larger segments of the population under their control, from which they could later recruit new members and extract resources to further future operations (Byrne, 85-7).
The first phase of the war, characterized by FMLN and ESAF attempts to destroy one another’s arrayed forces and control the capital, gave way to a longer phase of the war in which both sides sought to grind down the other in a war of attrition. This second phase of the conflict was not a fundamental change of means and ends—both sides continued to believe that they could prevail over the other in a drawn-out military contest, as hopes of a quick victory faded. Firefights would continue to take place during this second phase, but the primary focus turned toward winning the population, a key component in a war of attrition.

The FMLN’s successful offensives through 1983 eventually gave way to military and political setbacks beginning in 1984. The March and May elections in 1984 led to the election of President Jose Duarte. The elections constituted a political setback for the FMLN, who tried to prevent the election, and the elections led to more reliable foreign assistance from the U.S. to the government. Furthermore, the elections led West Germany to restore aid because they appeared to have been relatively free and fair (Byrne, 95). At the insistence of the U.S., the government of El Salvador began concentrating on a series of reforms to win over the people through a “hearts and minds” campaign, which included the restoration or extension of services such as healthcare, education, and infrastructure, the subordination of the military to civilian forces, the curbing of human rights abuses, the continuation of elections to condition Salvadorans to resolve disputes at the polls, increased efforts to go after FMLN internal sanctuaries, and the establishment of civil defense units in the countryside (Byrne, 127 and 130-1). As an additional component of the counterinsurgency strategy, the governments of the United States and El Salvador continued to press Nicaragua to close the FMLN’s sanctuaries, although the central aim of the counterinsurgency strategy remained winning the Salvadoran population to the government’s side.
The FMLN’s response to the changing circumstances was to fall back on a classical, prolonged “people’s war” strategy characterized by: the dispersion of their forces across the countryside to force the government to follow suit; more hit-and-run attacks to degrade and demoralize the army and force it to assume a defensive position; and continued economic warfare against El Salvador’s infrastructure to increase the strain on government coffers while increasing the population’s discontent with the government due to poor economic conditions.

The government and FMLN strategies during this period effectively checked one another and neither was successful in achieving what it set out to do. The government was unable to dislodge the FMLN from its internal sanctuaries in the countryside. While the military could usually go into FMLN areas for short periods of time, it was rarely ever able to execute the kind of clear-hold-build strategy that would have won hearts and minds and prevented the return of the FMLN once government forces left. The government’s hope of building civil defense patrols in villages similarly failed to materialize in part because the FMLN made it a priority to prevent their creation, and because the government found it difficult to convince rural Salvadorans to risk their lives for the government. The government’s attempt at winning the people’s hearts and minds through civilian development projects was largely a failure because most of the projects failed to address the land reform issue, which was important to Salvadorans, and because the FMLN’s economic warfare hindered any government attempt to grow the economy. The government was more successful at conditioning its population to accept the outcome of elections than most of its other goals in this period, but that acceptance of elections did not translate to an embrace of President Duarte or his policies.

The FMLN fared little better than the government at achieving its objectives in this period. The FMLN recovered from its decline brought about by the change in government
policies in 1984 and 1985 through forging new ties with the population in its areas of influence, which produced more committed recruits. The FMLN continued bringing in supplies from Nicaragua through Honduras and Guatemala, and it continued its economic warfare against the state, and it successfully prevented the reestablishment of government authority in much of the countryside. It launched another final offensive in 1989, but again did not receive the massive urban insurrection it needed to complement its military offensive, and the stalemate appeared likely to continue.

Access to transnational sanctuary in this period helped the FMLN solidify control over the areas where it already had influence, thus hindering the government’s strategy of denying the insurgents their internal base of support. The arms provided via transnational sanctuary had a significant positive impact for the FMLN. The deployment of mines in the mid-1980s contributed to a marked increase in government military deaths in 1986 and further solidified the FMLN’s hold on its territory as it became more dangerous for government forces to disrupt the FMLN’s presence in the countryside in the El Salvador’s north and east.

Several events transpired in late 1989 that set the conflict in El Salvador on the path to resolution. The most important event was the FMLN’s November offensive that had the goal of capturing the capital and bringing the war to an end. The FMLN was unable to capture the capital, but the balance of forces in El Salvador change favorably for the FMLN as a result of gains made during the offensive. This brought the balance of forces closer to parity, undermined Salvadoran elite beliefs that the military could protect them, and raised questions in the U.S. Congress about the wisdom of continuing to provide assistance to a government that proved incapable of stopping new insurgent gains despite considerable U.S. assistance. The murder of a number of Jesuit priests by the Salvadoran armed forces during the FMLN offensive led the U.S.
Congress to question continued aid to the Salvadoran government and undermined officials’ claims that the Salvadoran military would protect human rights.

Continued external support for both sides in El Salvador was brought into question in 1989 and 1990. Events outside of El Salvador raised new uncertainties for the two belligerent parties in El Salvador and pushed them toward the negotiating table. The Berlin Wall came down the weekend the FMLN launched its offensive, signaling to many the end of the Cold War. The end of the Cold War meant that Central America would not be as an important a region as it has been throughout the 1980s, and the FMLN should have expected less support from the Eastern bloc. Additionally, the Sandinista defeat in the 1990 election in Nicaragua decreased the need for aid to both sides. This certainly hurt the FMLN relatively more than the Salvadoran government because Nicaragua was the important transnational sanctuary and transshipment country for the FMLN. Yet, the defeat of the Sandinistas coupled with the end of the Cold War also meant that Washington had less interest in continuing to assist a military that seemed unable to check the growth of the FMLN.

The approaching parity of forces in El Salvador and uncertainty on both sides about future external support created an opening in which both sides came to view a negotiated settlement as preferable to a military settlement. Although negotiations had taken place prior to the 1989 offensive, both the government and the FMLN had focused on strategies that would allow them to win the war outright. The 1989 offensive and subsequent FMLN offensives throughout 1990 demonstrated to the Salvadoran government and the country’s economic elites that the war was far from over and that the military had either been lying about the prospects for victory or did not understand the nature of the threat the FMLN posed. The FMLN, while generally in a stronger position after the 1989 offensive, realized that it still did not have the
popular support that was necessary, especially in urban areas, to defeat the government quickly. It could prolong the war and raise the costs for the government, but the FMLN did not think it could credibly threaten to defeat the military. The United Nations assisted in brokering a deal between the FMLN and the government of El Salvador that ended the war. The FMLN won some concessions, but it was far short of what the group wanted to do at the outset of the conflict. Twenty percent of the new armed forces were to be comprised of FMLN, many of the government’s special counterinsurgency security forces were to be disbanded, and the effect of the peace deal was to finally include the left in future El Salvadoran elections.

The FMLN’s acquisition of surface to air missiles sometime in the late 1980s or 1990 led to the downing of numerous government military aircraft and reduced the government’s ability to project power into the FMLN’s internal sanctuaries. Nicaragua, who had earlier denied FMLN requests for these surface to air missiles, now provided them to the FMLN when it became clear to the Sandinistas that they would lose the 1990 election.

**Transnational sanctuary**

The FMLN benefitted from extensive transnational sanctuary in neighboring Nicaragua. They were given access to training facilities, arms, and access to the means necessary to spread propaganda. The impetus for Nicaraguan support to the FMLN began with the Sandinistas’

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46 The overarching goal of the FMLN/ FDR as laid out in its Platform of the Revolutionary Democratic Government:

The decisive task of the revolution on which completion of all its tasks and objectives depends is the conquest of power and the installation of a revolutionary democratic government, which as the head of the people will undertake the construction of a new society” (quoted in Byrne, 76).
overthrow of Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua in 1979, and their subsequent declaration of intent to spread “revolutionary internationalism” in Central America. The Sandinistas hosted the FMLN on their territory because they believed it was in their interest to support other leftist movements in Central America that would hopefully produce more leftist governments. The Sandinistas created the Department of International Relations (DRI) and Fifth Directorate of Intelligence, which was “associated with the government’s General Directorate of State Security (DGSE)” to facilitate the expansion of revolutionary activity throughout Central America (Revolution Beyond Our Borders, 464-5). The FMLN were eager to establish sanctuaries in Nicaragua because they believed that it would be difficult for ESAF to attack those rearguard bases in Nicaragua.

The FMLN underwent a qualitative leap in firepower from mid-1980 through the first half of 1981. The insurgents, originally armed with hunting rifles, shotguns, and handguns, ended up with many of the more powerful weapons available as a result of the extensive arming effort on behalf of the Communist countries. Arms provided by Cuba were flown from Costa Rica, by arms traffickers who also sold arms in Honduras and Guatemala, to the FMLN very early in the conflict until Nicaragua was established as the hub for arms transfers in the second half of 1980. Nicaragua became the vital transshipment point for arms from other Communist

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47 Moore relays that the Sandinistas had provided training to the FMLN since the mid-1980s. He identified at least four facilities that were used to train FMLN and writes that several hundred guerrillas could be trained at these four bases. The bases he identifies are “Ostional in the southern province of Rivas, a former National Guard camp in northwestern Nicaragua close to the River Tamarindo, Tamagas outside Managua, and a new camp that opened in 1984 near Santa Julia on the Consiguina Peninsula” (82).

48 A defector claimed that Nicaragua supposedly supplied “2,200 rifles (FAL’s [sic], M-1s, M-2s), two radio transmitters, ammunition, grenades, more than 15 rocket launchers, at least three .50 caliber and one .30 caliber machine guns, 125 boxes of TNT, and ten M-79 grenade launchers” (Revolution Beyond Our Borders).
countries to El Salvador, as well as the transit hub of fighters into and out of El Salvador.\textsuperscript{49} Nicaragua was a very reliable, though not completely reliable sanctuary host. The transshipment of arms from Nicaragua to El Salvador was suspended for about a month beginning in late September 1980 because the Nicaraguan government was concerned that the US would freeze $75 million in aid as a result of the flow of arms from Nicaragua to El Salvador (\textit{Revolution Beyond Our Borders}, 468-69). President Ronald Reagan cut off all U.S. aid to the Sandinistas in 1981 because, he argued, they were fomenting leftist insurgencies throughout Central America.

The Communist countries were eager to get aid to the FMLN in time for the offensive planned for early 1981. The arms shipments resumed via air, land, and sea in October, 1980, and the insurgents quickly found themselves awash in arms and struggled to absorb everything that was being sent their way. Nicaragua outfitted an airfield at Papalonal in Nicaragua to ferry the aid to be delivered to El Salvador in much greater quantities than what could be shipped over land, and put the Commander of the Nicaraguan Air Force in command of the operation to aid the FMLN. In January and February 1981, C-47s from Papalonal reportedly dropped supplies in southeastern El Salvador near routes that were known to be used by the guerrillas to infiltrate into El Salvador (\textit{Revolution Beyond Our Borders}, 470-1). The Nicaraguans also moved weapons and supplies over land routes through Honduras into El Salvador.

Weapons, ammunition, and individuals were moved across the Gulf of Fonseca via naval craft from Nicaraguan ports to El Salvador, or were transferred to FMLN boats or canoes in the Gulf of Fonseca that ferried the supplies to land in El Salvador (\textit{Revolution Beyond Our Borders}, 468-9).

\textsuperscript{49} Vietnam was especially obliging for the Salvadoran insurgents at the outset of the conflict promising them 60 tons of arms, including 1620 M-16 rifles and 1.5 million rounds of ammunition (468-9).
Greater quantities of arms and other supplies were trafficked over water between Nicaraguan and El Salvador than over land through Honduras or Guatemala. Many of the arms would be loaded onto craft in the Nicaraguan department of Chinandega and ferried to the Salvadoran province of Usulutan across the Gulf of Fonseca. From there they could be shipped and transported to any front in El Salvador (Revolution Beyond Our Border, 477). “These routes lead west out of Jiquilisco-Tres Calles, northwest via Tapesquillo Alto, north to El Brazo and northeast to Tierra Blanca-Bolivar. All major guerrilla fronts receive supplies through the Usulutan logistics network” (Footnote 1, Revolution Beyond Our Border, 477). The Salvadoran government reported to the Secretary-General of the United Nations that a ship left Punta Nata, Nicaragua, to go to La Criba, El Salvador, to offload its supply of machine guns and sub-machine guns to a band of 70 FMLN insurgents (Sandinista Aid to FMLN).

While the Nicaraguans scaled back their arms deliveries to the FMLN in late 1981 following the floundering of the “Final Offensive,” they soon resumed shipments in 1982 as part of a ploy to disrupt the elections scheduled for that year. This rearming of the FMLN is notable because it represented another qualitative leap over the previous effort in the run-up to the 1981 offensive. The FMLN gained access to heavier weaponry like 57mm recoilless rifles and M-72 antitank weapons. The arming was successful, but the elections were well attended enough to lead most to the conclusion that the FMLN effort to disrupt the election was a failure (Revolution Beyond Our Borders, 474-5).

The offices of the FMLN Radio Venceremos were in a two-story house in Las Palma, Managua, and its transmitters were at Cerro Cosiguina, also in Nicaragua, and the FMLN’s printing office was in Managua (Sandinista Aid to FMLN). Radio Liberacion began broadcasting in Nicaragua on December 15th, 1980, and Radio Venceremos was established near the
Honduran-El Salvadoran border following *Radio Liberacion*. A secret radio station in Nicaragua announced the beginning of the ill-fated “Final Offensive” against the government on January 10th, 1981. Yet, despite the extensive arming process that had been underway since the summer of 1980, the FMLN were unable to bring down the government in El Salvador as very few of their countrymen joined them during their offensive (*Revolution Beyond Our Borders*, 473).

Nicaragua served as a point of training for FMLN guerrillas, and also an access point to military training in other countries, namely Cuba. The training was comprehensive, including courses in “military tactics, weapons use, communications, and explosives” at Nicaraguan military bases or locations the Nicaraguan government set up for these purposes. The training received at these bases facilitated some of the biggest military victories for the FMLN up through 1983. Specifically, FMLN trainees rehearsed their October 1981 attack on the Puente de Oro Bridge, the Ilopango Air Base in January 1982, and the 4th Brigade Headquarters in December 1983. The trainers constructed a model 4th Brigade Headquarters in Cuba that they used to rehearse the attack (*Revolution Beyond Our Borders*, 476).

A former member of the FMLN who spent considerable time in Nicaragua and Cuba explained the kinds of ways that transnational sanctuary aided the FMLN. This individual did not seek out the FMLN, but was a Salvadoran who had gone to find work in Nicaragua and was promised that he could return to El Salvador if he joined the FMLN. He was sent to a semi-battalion comprised of recruits from Venezuela, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Chile, Argentina, and Nicaragua, which operated near the mountains of Esteli. He was then sent to Cuba for a year to receive instruction on military training and historical materialism before being sent back to Nicaragua where they waited at a large base at Villa Fontana to enter El Salvador. While other guerrillas left for El Salvador, this individual’s turn did not come up because the FMLN
suspended some of its infiltration after the intercepting of some transiting FMLN by Honduras. While in Nicaragua, this individual claims to have helped pack arms destined for El Salvador, including RPG 7s, M50, M30, M16, FAL, and GALILs. Furthermore, he corroborated a Salvadoran naval intelligence officer’s story that these arms used to be shipped via naval craft until one was sunk, after which these arms were moved into El Salvador via light plane. In response to a question about what the Nicaraguans contributed to the war in El Salvador, he said that they helped train FMLN and that some Nicaraguans went to fight in El Salvador (Information on FMLN-GON Collaboration). One former FMLN who later defected to Honduras, Santo Salomone Morales, describes how he and a dozen others went from El Salvador to Nicaragua via naval craft across the Gulf of Fonseca, and they went from Nicaragua to Cuba for training with 900 other Salvadorans (Revolution Beyond Our Borders, Footnote 2).

Many of the leaders of the various factions of the FMLN were allowed to stay in Nicaragua and were able to plan and coordinate actions in El Salvador from their centers in Nicaragua. The Headquarters of the Unified Revolutionary Directorate was in Managua and had the ability to transmit orders to combatants in El Salvador via radio communications. Other command and control elements of the FMLN resided in safe houses in Managua (Sandinista Aid to FMLN).

The FMLN experienced a number of military victories against government forces up through 1983, but were unable to translate military successes into a larger victory because of the massive assistance the U.S. provided to the government’s armed forces, and the doubling in size of the Salvadoran armed forces between 1981 and 1984 (Byrne, 79). While the FMLN successfully established a presence in the countryside and in neighboring Nicaragua, its urban network was eviscerated by right-wing death squads. Those attacks caused the FMLN to move
away from its method of direct confrontation with the military to more hit-and-run attacks, economic sabotage, assassination of political leaders, and efforts to re-establish their presence in urban areas (Byrne, 78). By the end of 1983, the FMLN’s victories led it to concentrate its forces in preparation for larger fights, but this made them more vulnerable to the government’s substantial edge in firepower. The FMLN’s military successes set the stage for its reversal of fortune.

The FMLN continued to benefit from transnational sanctuary, primarily in Nicaragua, in many of the same ways that it had during the first phase, although the extent of aid from Nicaragua was scaled back following the US-led invasion of Grenada in 1983. The Nicaraguans were concerned that appearing to support the FMLN too openly would risk an intervention in Nicaragua similar to the one launched against Grenada, and adopted a lower profile so as to not give the US an excuse to intervene in Nicaragua. The scaling back of Sandinista support was not all that deleterious for the FMLN because it coincided with a shift in strategy away from direct military confrontation with the state toward winning greater support in rural areas and economic sabotage to sap support for the government. The FMLN General Command’s relocation from Managua to the departments of Morazan and Chalatenango in El Salvador following the U.S. invasion of Grenada in 1983 was not all that hard for the FMLN because they had achieved relatively secure zones of control in El Salvador by this time. The decline in the quantity of supplies and weapons from Nicaragua was partially made up for by the continued increase in quality of weapons. Specifically, the FMLN got access to contact- and remote-detoned mines, likely from either the Cubans or Sandinistas, which enhanced the lethality of FMLN attacks (Revolution Beyond Our Border, 477). Despite moving some operations out of Nicaragua, it continued to be the important transnational sanctuary for the FMLN throughout the war. The
U.S., and presumably the Salvadoran government, were aware of some of the other transit routes used to bring in weapons from Nicaragua to El Salvador. In July 1989, the Honduran military intercepted a shipment of 60 Soviet-made AK-47s that were being shipped from Nicaragua to El Salvador, indicating that the land routes from Nicaragua through Honduras were still active (Sandinista Aid to FMLN).

The FMLN continued to benefit from training in Nicaragua and elsewhere during the period 1984 to 1989. FMLN military commanders continued receiving training at the headquarters of the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN) Mercenary Battalion No. 30-11, and the FMLN also received training at the headquarters of the Sandinista People’s Militia. Nicaragua provided two years of political and military training to members of Fuerzas Armadas de la Resistencia Nacional (FARN), one of the parties in the FMLN, who then returned to El Salvador to recruit and indoctrinate Salvadorans, particularly at El Salvador’s National University in the capital San Salvador (Sandinista Aid to FMLN). Documents and the interrogation of a captured FMLN finance officer revealed that the FMLN allocated some of its funds to pay to send recruits to Nicaragua for training. Guerrillas captured by ESAF in 1988 admitted that they received sabotage and guerrilla training in Nicaragua and Cuba intermittently between 1983 and 1987 (Data on Sandinista Support for the FMLN).

US intelligence indicated that 15 FMLN guerrillas received training in the use of surface to air missiles in Managua. Several FMLN guerrillas captured by ESAF in El Salvador in 1988

50 “In late 1987 there were indications of a notable surge in logistics resupply activity collected by the Salvadoran insurgents. Two major routes were used. One consists of an entry point at the mouth of the Rio Lempa or Isla Montecristo northward, el Espino Beach, Usulutan: and El Cuco Beach, San Miguel. The second route begins in the Jucuaran coastal area, extending northward to the war fronts, sometimes paralleling the routes originating from the Rio Lempa area” (Sandinista Aid to FMLN).
told their captors that they had spent time training in Nicaragua or Cuba, and detailed how Cuba went to great lengths to try to conceal the identities of FMLN traveling to Cuba (Sandinista Aid to FMLN).

Surface to air missiles were smuggled into El Salvador from Nicaragua late in the war. Six Nicaraguans were arrested in September, 1991, trying to transit 20 SAMs into El Salvador. The SAMs were part of the FMLN strategy late in the war to secure their liberated zones within El Salvador by denying the government of El Salvador’s air force from striking at rebel-held zones. Following the downing of a number of government aircraft in 1990 and 1991, ESAF responded by dispatching more infantry patrols into rebel-held areas to limit that ability of FMLN to harass flights and flying fewer daytime missions to mitigate the effect of the SAMs (U.S. Department of State 1991). Following a change in leadership in Nicaragua that led to the Sandinistas being ousted following their defeat in the 1990 election, the FMLN began to develop its sanctuary in Mexico, but that move did not have a great effect on the outcome of the war (US Diplomatic Cable 1990). The FMLN still retained access to transnational sanctuaries besides Mexico. According to a U.S. diplomatic cable, an April-1990 raid by Honduran security officials uncovered a safe house that served as a hospital to treat wounded FMLN (More Arms Traffickers Arrested).

Transnational sanctuary provided all of the benefits that the conventional wisdom predicted that it would, but those benefits were not enough to propel the FMLN to victory. There can be little doubt that the quantity and quality of the arms available to the FMLN improved because of Nicaragua’s position as an active sanctuary. The FMLN, though it decreased in absolute size in the years immediately following 1983, continued to be a very potent military threat in El Salvador, inflicting significant casualties on government forces through the end of
the war. This increased lethality made it easier for the FMLN to create zones of influence in El Salvador where government forces would not hazard to venture long in small numbers. Despite the qualitative and quantitative benefits of transnational sanctuary that accrued to the FMLN as a military organization, those benefits did not lead to achieving the FMLN’s stated goal of seizing power through military force.

There is little evidence to suggest that either the propaganda campaign directed from Nicaragua or the relative protection from attack had a significant effect on the outcome of the conflict. Access to radios was rare, and the radio propaganda proved to be insufficient in winning over the population in urban areas throughout the war, and in the countryside during the first phase of the war. The FMLN was only able to build a relatively broad and deep social base in the countryside following its decision to focus on political work and years of cultivating relations with the rural peasantry. The FMLN were certainly well protected in Nicaragua because ESAF did not want to carry out direct attacks in Nicaragua out of fear that it would lead to reprisals and escalation with the armed forces of Nicaragua. Despite this relative security, the FMLN remained relatively secure in their internal sanctuaries in EL Salvador where the majority of their fighters were found.

The FMLN’s access to transnational sanctuary provoked responses that made it more difficult for them to win in the long term. Increased FMLN arming often justified greater U.S. funding to El Salvador, allowing the government to also build up its arms, negating some of the qualitative and quantitative effects of arms from sanctuary. The U.S. got involved in part because it viewed Nicaragua, along with Cuba, as some of the most significant threats in America’s backyard. The FMLN’s sanctuary in Nicaragua nearly assured that the Americans would view the FMLN as a tool of Nicaraguan influence and part of a larger Communist plot to expand their
influence in the Western hemisphere. One of the other pitfalls of U.S. aid from the FMLN’s perspective is that the aid held the fractured regime together longer than it may have otherwise lasted. The United States also began sending arms to Nicaraguans who opposed the Sandinista regime in an attempt to deflect Nicaragua’s attention and energy from El Salvador to Nicaragua. Additionally, the El Salvadoran government had such an enormous advantage in resources that it was going to be very difficult for the FMLN to win a contest decided largely by material factors.\textsuperscript{51}

An unforeseen negative consequence of transnational sanctuary is that desertion rates appeared to be higher in them than in internal sanctuaries. More data are needed, but a combatant for one of the FMLN factions, the ERP, reported that he received training in Nicaragua from 1981 until 1985, and that half of the other ERP members in Nicaragua (75 out of 150) left the group because they perceived they were being treated poorly (Revolution Beyond Our Border, 478, Footnote 2). This appears somewhat higher than the overall decline that the FMLN experienced from its membership high in late 1983 through 1985, when it was estimated that the FMLN was at about two-thirds of its peak members (Revolution Beyond Our Border, 478).

\textsuperscript{51} Byrne relays estimates that the government forces exceeded the capacity of the insurgents by factors ranging from 10:1 to 27:1. Many of the sources used to make that prediction came from some of the top officers in the FMLN during about the midpoint of the conflict or in interviews after it was over, indicating that this was not just a deficit at the outset, when one would expect the guerrillas to be relatively weaker, but something that persisted throughout the conflict. The gap appears even larger if one looks at just the amount of spending. Byrne states that an FPL (part of the FMLN) commander reported to him in 1995 that the largest of the five FMLN parties spent a million dollars a year, which means the high estimate for the entire organization would have to be under five million dollars annually. Total U.S. assistance to El Salvador averaged more than $400 million a year during the 1980s and that would have been supplemented by the Government of El Salvador’s own spending and the contribution from the counter-revolutionary paramilitary units (Byrne, footnote 5, p. 116).
Causal Mechanisms

This case allows for a test of all the causal mechanisms proposed in my argument except the one that examines external interveners’ attempt to construct viable states in other countries. There was strong support for the mechanism that predicted transnational sanctuary would provide relative protection from attack and the one that predicts an organizational inflection point for insurgents. There was little evidence that the FMLN tried to wait out the regime, which is understandable given that the regime was domestically constituted. Massive U.S. assistance to the government was vital to keeping the regime in the fight against the FMLN, but the regime predated such massive external assistance, and so it is still counted as a domestically constituted regime, albeit one under strain during the insurgency.

The FMLN received relative protection from attack by using its sanctuaries in neighboring states. The Salvadoran military did not conduct extensive cross-border attacks to go after the FMLN sanctuaries in neighboring states, but it did try to interdict FMLN forces attempting to enter El Salvador. Interviews with FMLN insurgents revealed no concern on their part that they felt likely to be attacked in their foreign bases. The FMLN leadership often availed themselves of the relative security of sanctuaries, indicating that it was often viewed as safer than being in El Salvador.

This case strongly suggests that insurgents face an organizational inflection point that produces diminished or even negative returns beyond a certain level. The FMLN’s successes in 1982-3 positioned them for their own coming reversal. Successes on the battlefield were changing the FMLN from a dispersed insurgent force to a conventional army as they moved away from small unit tactics to larger units of organization to undertake operations against larger
military targets. By assuming the characteristics of a conventional army, the FMLN made themselves more vulnerable to the conventional armaments of the Salvadoran armed forces. This is a conundrum with which all potential insurgents must wrestle. Insurgent tactics tend to work best when their forces are dispersed. Guerrilla victories against isolated targets that are possible to achieve with dispersed forces often give way to a greater concentration of forces that focus on larger targets that cannot be taken by smaller, dispersed forces. The firepower made possible by conventional armed forces cannot achieve much for government forces if they cannot know where to employ it. Small, dispersed forces make it difficult for government forces to employ that massive firepower, and directing it indiscriminately against the population can produce dangerous internal and external repercussions. Therefore, massive conventional firepower is of limited use against guerrilla tactics, but that firepower becomes more effective as guerrilla armies concentrate. This is particularly true in an era of armed aircraft that require relatively little manpower to deliver a lot of firepower rapidly and accurately over long distances. This tends to be a one-sided advantage as insurgents rarely acquire combat aircraft.

The concentration of forces that is necessary for guerrillas to take well-defended positions saps manpower and resources from other areas of control, in turn making their internal sanctuaries more precarious and likely to be disrupted. A greater concentration of forces in a geographic area makes scavenging more difficult and usually requires more personnel to be taken off the front lines and turned toward provisioning the assembled force (Byrne, 87). And specifically in the case of the FMLN, although this could be true for other groups as well, the focus on turning recruits into effective combatants led to the neglect of cultivating political ties with the people (Byrne, 87). The FMLN’s drive to field larger forces also led them to undertake forced recruitment in some instances which proved to be a liability because forced recruits who
deserted became some of the best sources of intelligence for the Salvadoran government (Byrne, 86). Having access to sophisticated conventional weapons and lots of combatants may be advantages for conventional armies, but these are not the most important factors for insurgents, and access to these weapons may tempt guerrillas to attempt to mimic conventional warfare tactics when they would be better served by guerrilla style attacks.

There was not a lot of support for the mechanism that predicted insurgents would seek to wait out their target state. As previously detailed, the FMLN’s original strategy was to quickly defeat the government early in the conflict with a significant military drive toward the capital that was supposed to be supported by ordinary Salvadorans. Following that defeat, the FMLN sought to reorganize itself to continue the military struggle against the government. Lulls in the intensity of fighting during the conflict generally reflected the FMLN’s desire to prepare for the next assault on government forces, and it does not appear that the FMLN adopted a strategy of strategically waiting for the Salvadoran government to crumble.

**Conclusion**

The proposition that transnational sanctuaries make insurgent groups much more likely to succeed is difficult to defend in light of the case of El Salvador. The primary transnational sanctuary in Nicaragua provided all of the purported benefits of sanctuary to a very capable fighting force who was opposed by a deeply divided regime whose external support was often a congressional vote away from being curtailed or cut off. The conventional account of transnational sanctuary would posit that the presence of a transnational sanctuary should be correlated with FMLN victory, and, the extensive benefits of the sanctuary in Nicaragua should indicate that the FMLN were all the more likely to win. It is tempting to consider that the
decision to scale back the extent of sanctuary in Nicaragua explains the FMLN’s inability to seize power through military force. Yet, that conclusion is not supported by the facts. The FMLN’s period of greatest relative strength vis-à-vis ESAF was at the outset of the conflict, after which it declined in the face of massive US assistance to the Salvadoran government. US assistance to ESAF appeared to outstrip whatever additional qualitative and quantitative gains could be had via transnational sanctuary. It also appears that in the early years of the conflict when aid was being given in very large quantities that the pressure from outside supporters of the FMLN to overthrow the regime early led to an early and costly loss in the FMLN’s first “Final Offensive.”
Chapter Six
The War in Vietnam: Sanctuary and External Intervention

Map 6.1 Infiltration Routes into Vietnam and U.S. Air Bases in Southeast Asia (Whitcomb 1997)

The case study in this chapter about Vietnam demonstrates how sanctuary aids insurgents fighting against an external intervener. This is not a crucial case for testing the predictive power of my refined version of the conventional wisdom; both my refined version and the conventional wisdom predict that the challengers with sanctuary should win. While my refined version of the conventional wisdom does not diverge from the conventional wisdom on how this case should
end, my causal argument differs from that of the conventional wisdom. The conventional wisdom’s explanation focuses on the ways in which sanctuary allows insurgents and rebels to increase their fighting power on the way to defeating incumbent military forces. In Chapter One, I presented four causal mechanisms: the stopping power of international borders and the relative protection from attack for insurgents and rebels in sanctuaries; the “waiting game” that challengers may play out in sanctuaries; an organizational inflection point that limits insurgent and rebel organizations from concentrating too large a conventional military force against incumbent forces with superior firepower; and the inability of external interveners to create lasting governments in the countries in which they intervene. All four mechanisms will be analyzed in this case.

I find that all four of these mechanisms are present in this case as is the conventional wisdom’s prediction that sanctuary enhances the fighting power of insurgents and rebels. However, the conventional wisdom’s explanation of relatively enhancing the fighting power of insurgents does not provide a satisfactory explanation of how the war ended and why the government in South Vietnam eventually fell in April 1975. Rather than turning the National Liberation Front (NLF) forces into a military machine that could run over the combined U.S.-South Vietnamese forces, sanctuary in neighboring states allowed the NLF and North Vietnamese forces to maintain a presence in the south until American ground forces withdrew. The U.S. commitment to negotiating an end to the war beginning in 1968 coupled with the generally perceived poor performance of the South Vietnamese government kept many South Vietnamese citizens from supporting the government in Saigon (the capital of South Vietnam). With little risk of facing a do-or-die situation where the NLF and North Vietnamese would have to commit most of their forces to prevent a mass defection of the South Vietnamese peasantry to
the government’s side, the communist forces opposing the government could choose how intensely they wished to fight because of the relative security of their external sanctuaries. This evidence from this case strongly supports the contention set out in Mechanism Four that insurgencies face upper limits on how large a conventional force they can amass. Insurgencies that attempt to operate like conventional armies run the risk of exposing themselves to the greater firepower of the incumbent forces. On three occasions—1964, 1967-68, 1972—communist forces jettisoned guerrilla tactics and undertook conventional offensives. All three failed to achieve their ultimate goal of toppling the Saigon government, and the attackers suffered staggering casualties each time. The final offensive launched by the north in 1975, and the offensive that succeeded, occurred once the U.S. had decided that it would not massively intervene with air power to save the South Vietnamese armed forces.

The choice to include Vietnam in a dissertation that largely focuses on insurgency, rebellion, and internal war may be considered inappropriate by those who are of the view that the war in Vietnam was largely a conventional interstate war, and the insurgency in the south was an unimportant sideshow to the larger conflict.\textsuperscript{52} To be sure, the war in Vietnam is different than many of the other civil wars and insurgencies included in this dissertation’s list of post-1945 insurgencies and civil wars. The Vietnamese were divided as a result of the end of France’s Indochina War, and North Vietnam was actively aiding the resistance in the south, including

\textsuperscript{52} There are others who argue the opposing position: namely, that the U.S. lost because it did not pay enough attention to unconventional or irregular war and incorrectly tried to adapt conventional strategy and tactics to an unconventional conflict. There are several different ways of viewing the war in Vietnam: an interstate war between North and South Vietnam with significant external intervention on both sides; a communist insurgency against the South Vietnamese government; and an interstate war between the U.S. and North Vietnam are additional ways of looking at the U.S. war in Vietnam beyond the approach here, which analyzes the fight between the U.S. and communist insurgents in South Vietnam.
sending in North Vietnamese troops to fight in the south. That kind and degree of support from transnational sanctuary is rare.\textsuperscript{53} Once the U.S. withdrew, it was not the insurgency that was primarily responsible for toppling the government in South Vietnam, but the conventional forces of the north.\textsuperscript{54} How the war ended cannot be debated, but it is wrong to dismiss the power that the insurgency had, and may have regained, given more time. The insurgency in the south was so potent by 1964 that America felt that it had to significantly increase the numbers of American soldiers in South Vietnam to keep the government from collapsing. Furthermore, the insurgency in the south should be studied because combating it was a significant focus of the external intervener and the regime in power in the south.

This chapter presents a brief overview of the conflict, a description of the sanctuaries in neighboring states and the efforts by the U.S. and South Vietnam to degrade those sanctuaries in neighboring states, and analyses of the four causal mechanisms. Finally, I assess the logic of the conventional explanation about how sanctuary aids insurgent groups against my refined version with the four causal mechanisms to see if the refined version has any greater explanatory power than the conventional wisdom.

\textsuperscript{53} Unlike in just about every other case of transnational sanctuary, in Vietnam, the primary responsibility for building and maintaining the insurgent group’s transnational sanctuary was a state government. The NLF and their military arm, the NLAF, did not view the Ho Chi Minh Trail as existentially important and did not have the resources to construct and maintain such an elaborate logistical system by themselves. [I am not sure I understand this; can you say more?]

\textsuperscript{54} One of the two main sources of opposition to the Saigon government were from South Vietnamese insurgents, who were part of the NLF, or its military arm, the NLAF. These forces are sometimes referred to as the Viet Cong in the literature. The other source came from North Vietnam. Those units and soldiers are referred to as being part of the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) or the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN).
Overview of the Conflict

The causes of the onset of the war in Vietnam stemmed from the previous 1954 Geneva Accords, which dealt with the end of the French Indochina War. The Geneva Accords called for the holding of national democratic elections in Vietnam in 1956, but neither the U.S. nor South Vietnam signed the Accords. The NLF formed in 1960 and began its insurgency against South Vietnam (Dembowski 2009). The NLF won a number of early engagements against the South Vietnamese Armed Forces (ARVN) in some of the areas surrounding Saigon. Those victories coupled with the NLAF’s transition to more conventional operations in the hopes of defeating the armed forces of South Vietnam led the U.S. to significantly increase the number of ground troops it had in South Vietnam and to increase its bombing of communist supply lines through Laos. The U.S. buildup resulted in 184,000 American soldiers in Vietnam by the end of 1965 and 385,000 by the end of 1966 (Brush 1996; Dembowski 2009).

U.S. troops in South Vietnam performed a variety of roles, from training ARVN forces and providing defense for civilian development, to seeking out and fighting insurgents. It was becoming clear to American leaders by 1966 that the bombing campaign was not sufficiently stemming the supply of recruits and provisions south and that more soldiers were needed to effectively combat the growing insurgency. The NLF believed their position to be sufficiently strong by 1967 to launch their “General Offensive, General Uprising,” which was supposed to be the start of the final military operations necessary to defeat the ARVN forces and force the fall of the government in South Vietnam. The culmination of this big push to topple the government in Saigon was the Tet Offensive of 1968; however, it failed in its ultimate objective of toppling the Saigon government and bringing the war to a close. It did, however, greatly impact the dynamics of the conflict. The NLF forces absorbed staggering casualties that forced the organization to
return to guerrilla warfare for an extended period of time, and caused it to rely much more heavily on recruits from the north to replace the losses among southerners. It appears that the Tet Offensive convinced President Johnson not to seek an additional term as U.S. President. He called for a halt to the bombing of North Vietnam and pledged to work to end the war. The U.S. strategy from the time it introduced combat troops in Vietnam in 1965 until 1968 was an attrition strategy (Dembowski 2009); the U.S. sought to kill or capture the communists in the south who would take up arms until there were so few left that it would not seriously endanger the existence of the South Vietnamese regime. Johnson’s successor would attempt a policy named Vietnamization.

U.S. President Richard Nixon claimed to seek “honorable peace” for the United States in Vietnam (the phrase “peace with honor” was not used by Nixon until 1973). Operationalized, honorable peace meant that the U.S. was going to turn over greater responsibility for South Vietnam’s future to the South Vietnamese, particularly when it came to security, bombing the NLAF sanctuaries in neutral Cambodia, and trying to get the Soviet Union and the Chinese to pressure the North Vietnamese to accept a ceasefire that would allow South Vietnam to remain an independent country. The insurgency in the south continued through Nixon’s first term, while the war for the Ho Chi Minh Trail escalated. North Vietnam, perhaps believing that the drawdown in U.S. soldiers in the south made it vulnerable to attack, launched its next “final offensive” against the south while the U.S. was actively and substantially fighting in Vietnam. Nixon responded to the 1972 offensive with a resumption of massive bombing of North Vietnam dubbed Operation Linebacker I and II that led to what is generally perceived as yet another unsuccessful conventional attack on the south (Banner 1993).
Sanctuaries in Neighboring States

Infiltration routes, the routes that were used to transit fighters and supplies to South Vietnam, were closely related to the presence of transnational sanctuaries. North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia were the three states in which communist forces in the south had sanctuaries. The sanctuaries in Laos and Cambodia were, for the most part, adjuncts to the Ho Chi Minh Trail that served many logistical functions—fueling stations, barracks, ammunition storage sites, and stockpiles of food. These bases were also spaces where soldiers could receive medical treatment and training and gain some relative respite from the conflict. Occasionally, the sanctuary sites directly participated in support of offensives into the south, such as the artillery support for the attack on the American base at Khe Sanh. The sanctuaries in neighboring Cambodia and Laos were used by NLAF and PAVN forces to escape pursuit by American and ARVN forces, and because of the bases’ proximity to South Vietnam, allowed the NLAF to quickly regain its influence (Dembowski 2009).
Map 6.2 Insurgent Bases in Laos. This map shows the approximation of insurgent base areas (numbered) in Laos (Vongsavanh 1981).
Map 6.3 The 1970 Operations into Cambodia. The map in the bottom right hand corner below shows the position of a number of base areas in Cambodia around 1970 (Map produced by U.S. Army).

There were four infiltration routes that were available to communist forces at the outset of the conflict: from North Vietnam through the demilitarized zone to the South; the Ho Chi Minh Trail through Laos and Cambodia; infiltration of land forces via the Cambodian port at Sihanoukville; and infiltration along South Vietnam’s coast via the sea. The infiltration routes along the Ho Chi Minh Trail are the most directly related to sanctuary—the roads allowed greater volumes of provisions to be moved south and supplied the bases along the Trail, which in turn provisioned the fighters in the south. The infiltration along Vietnam’s coast is related to the sanctuaries in North Vietnam, from which fighters heading south embarked. Over time the

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55 The demilitarized zone (DMZ) ran roughly along the 17th parallel, on South Vietnam’s side of the border.
communist forces found it very difficult to infiltrate along the coast of South Vietnam, and they lost the port of Sihanoukville with the successful 1970 military coup that brought Lon Nol to power in Cambodia. This section will deal primarily with the Ho Chi Minh Trail since it was the most important infiltration route for insurgent forces, and it survived the entire war.

The North Vietnamese decided to start work on what would become the Ho Chi Minh Trail in 1959 with the creation of a military unit, designated Unit 559, that was responsible for the construction of the Trail. The Trail itself was not actually a single trail, but a network of trails that ran primarily north-south, but also has several routes east to South Vietnam.
By 1975 the Trail totaled over 10,000 miles, comprised of hundreds of roads connecting important areas of supply, such as the North Vietnamese port of Haiphong and roads out of southern China, with fighters in sanctuaries in Laos and Cambodia, as well as those in the field in South Vietnam (Whitcomb 1997). Bad weather, chiefly the monsoons, and rough terrain (high elevations and dense jungle) initially limited the times of the year during which the Trail could be opened. However, the constant improvement of the roads allowed trucks, and later, tanks, to drive on them, and many roads were improved so that they could be used in all types of
weather. The personnel requirements for building and maintaining the Trail were significant logistical challenges themselves. It is estimated that 50,000 Vietnamese were working on the Trail, or sites situated along the Trail, at the height of its construction.

Map 6.5 The Ho Chi Minh Trail after 1970 (Vongsavanh 1981)

The Trail became more important to the insurgents as the war continued. Brush (1996) notes how the composition of the fighters in the south changed as the war changed over time. He
argues that the war in South Vietnam was primarily a guerrilla conflict before 1968. He cites as evidence that five-sixths of the insurgent army in the south were members of the NLAF, not North Vietnamese regular soldiers, and they fought infrequently on the order of about one day a month. These forces needed very little provisioning, on the order of about thirty tons a day, which was too little to be able to prevent (Clodfelter 1989, cited in Brush 1996). By 1972, it is estimated that 90% of the insurgents in the south were in PAVN units. The cause for the changing composition of the southern insurgency was a result of the massive losses suffered by NLF/NLAF in the 1967-1968 “General Offensive, General Uprising” and the 1968 Tet Offensive. The North Vietnamese PAVN units that eventually replaced the decimated NLF/NLAF units had much greater logistical demands, and so the infiltration routes became relatively more important to communist forces from 1968 until the end of the war (Brush 1996).

Because the U.S. was not willing to send ground forces into the north to destroy the sources of soldiers and material that transited south, they focused on disrupting that flow as much as they could. This goal produced two lines of thinking about how best to disrupt the flow of soldiers and material from north to south through neighboring states and sanctuaries: the erection of physical barriers to sever the lines of transit and interdiction efforts, largely using air power, to minimize the numbers of soldiers and amounts of supply reaching the insurgency in the south.

The idea of large physical barriers to separate the north and south was not new. The Nguyen dynasty in the south built two large walls to keep the Trinh armies from the north out of the south as part of a struggle that lasted a century and a half beginning in 1620. The French considered repeating the Nguyen’s barrier concept to try to contain the insurgency in the north, but were defeated at Dien Bien Phu before the idea moved into action (Brush 1996).
American concern about infiltration into South Vietnam by Vietnamese living in the north appears to precede the decision by the North Vietnamese to construct what would become known as the Ho Chi Minh Trail by a year (Brush 1996). Following the Americans’ initial interest in a physical barrier in 1958, two proposals came up in 1961 for preventing the infiltration into the south (Brush 1995; Whitcomb 1997). The first was a proposal from the U.S. military to the Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, to create a cordon sanitaire along the Laos-South Vietnam border. The other proposal was for an international force authorized under the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization to be stationed along the DMZ on the north-south border in Vietnam and across the panhandle in Laos (Brush 1996). Neither of these plans came to fruition. The U.S. military tried again to get decision-makers to seal the border in Laos in 1964 when General William Westmoreland recommended a regional development project that would have happened to cross the infiltration routes through Laos. The idea was that an international force could provide protection, ending the infiltration and allowing the engineers and others to carry out the development work in Laos (Brush 1996). Rather than institute a barrier, the United States opted to begin bombing the Ho Chi Minh Trail in 1964 (Dommen 1972).

Air power was used against the Trail by the U.S. as early as 1961 in Operations Steel Tiger and Tiger Hunt (Whitcomb 1997). The ground forces buildup and the initiation of Operation Rolling Thunder in 1965 failed to stem the flow of fighters south. Because the bombing did not appear to be accomplishing the goal of sufficiently disrupting the flow of soldiers and supplies south, American military leaders urged Secretary of Defense McNamara

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56 A study conducted by the Jason Group in July 1966 concluded that Operation Rolling Thunder had “no measurable effect on Hanoi’s ability to mount and support military operations in the South” (quoted in Brush 1996). The Jason Group (also referred to as the Jason Division, or Jacobs, depending on the source) were a group of American academics who provided advice to
to widen the war by sending ground soldiers into Laos, Cambodia, and North Vietnam to destroy sanctuaries and convince those states to refrain from aiding the southern insurgency (Brush 1996).

McNamara, wary about the prospects for escalation, sought another way to deal with the problem of infiltration into the south. In 1966, a group of academics known as the Jasons advised the construction of a pair of barriers to reduce infiltration. The first barrier, on South Vietnam’s side of the DMZ with the north, would be composed of sensors that would direct aircraft and would also enable soldiers to respond to breaches of the DMZ (Brush 1996). The second barrier also called for sensors and mines to be dropped along the infiltration routes in Laos. The sensors would indicate where air power should be directed and the mines were placed to maim those who used the Trail, and to impede its use by others. The U.S. Military Command, Vietnam (MACV), altered the proposal with a call for erecting considerable physical barriers to movement and attack, such as the use of barbed wire, clearing swathes of land, and sensors to direct artillery. This proposal was, in effect, a call to create a Morice Line in Vietnam. The Morice Line referred to the series of fortifications the French built on Algeria’s border with Tunisia (see Horne 1977). This idea almost certainly came from this Morice Line, given that the proposal for the barrier in Vietnam was identical in many respects (Brush 1996).

However, neither the Jasons’ original proposal nor the MACV alternative were initially implemented because the sensors that were appropriated for the barrier, and were supposed to be in place by November, 1967, were instead diverted to prevent the overrunning of the U.S. Marine base at Khe Sanh that was a part of the North Vietnamese “General Offensive, General
Uprising” from 1967 until 1968 (Brush 1996). Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, replacing McNamara, who resigned at the end of February 1968, announced in March 1969 that the barrier project had been cancelled because “It did not work out as expected” (Quoted in Correll 2004).

American air power gradually turned from attacking North Vietnam to attacking the infiltration routes. U.S. President Johnson initially believed that increased bombing of the north would dissuade them from supporting the insurgency in the south, but he halted the bombing of most of Vietnam on March 31, 1968, and subsequently redirected American air power against the south and against the infiltration routes along the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos (Brush 1996). Whitcomb states that the bombing halt on North Vietnam freed up hundreds of American aircraft for missions against the Trail in Laos.

From 1968 until 1972, the U.S. carried out a very technologically sophisticated air interdiction effort against those using the Ho Chi Minh Trail and the Trail itself. Aircraft and some special operations units placed electronic sensors along the Trail. The sensors were quite advanced. Some detected sound, vibration, chemicals, and smell. Aircraft surveilled the Trail looking for signs of infiltration and relayed signals from ground sensors back to the Infiltration Surveillance Center in Thailand, which then relayed the information to aircraft that were sent to attack the Trail. The U.S. created an aircraft for the task of destroying trucks, which were the primary means of moving supplies as the war went on.57 The Trail was repeatedly mined from the air as well (Banner 1993; Brush 1996).

Despite the technological sophistication of the equipment used in the interdiction effort and the increased focus on countering infiltration from 1968 on, U.S. air power was unable to

57 Supplies were also moved by human beings and sometimes were packed in airtight barrels and floated downstream (Dommen 1972).
destroy enough of the supplies going south to significantly threaten the survival of the insurgency.\textsuperscript{58} The air interdiction effort failed to destroy enough supplies and stop enough men for three reasons: it was mitigated by the countermeasures the NLAF and PAVN took; air power rarely dismantled sanctuary infrastructure; and the insurgency managed to be flexible in its logistical requirements.

Air interdiction efforts could destroy what it could find, but it missed a lot because the communist forces adjusted their methods of infiltration and took countermeasures to fool the sensors. Communist forces operated more at night and less during the day, they used herds of livestock to fool the vibration sensors, and they hung buckets of urine in trees to fool the sensors that detected smell (Brush 1996). They re-used damaged or unusable trucks as decoys so larger convoys could pass or to lure aircraft into an ambush from ground-based antiaircraft. The North Vietnamese engineers tasked with building the Trail used camouflage to hide some parts so well that the Americans never found them during the course of the war (Correll 2004; Whitcomb 1997). The introduction of surface-to-air missiles on the Trail, at least by 1972, if not earlier, reduced the number of aircraft that could safely strike the Trail. The North Vietnamese invested heavily in air defense for the Trail. The antiaircraft defenses were so dense in some parts of Laos along the border with South Vietnam that there was very little air support for the ground forces incursions into Laos (Whitcomb 1997).

The sanctuaries in Cambodia and Laos were not actually physically destroyed until late in the war, when America was publicly committed to leaving Vietnam, and even then, there was

\textsuperscript{58} This is despite a very large increase in the number of Vietnamese trucks thought to have been destroyed on the Trail. Dommen cites a 1971 Senate Foreign Relations Committee investigation that found that the number of trucks thought to be destroyed on the Trail increased from “7,332 in 1968, (to) 9,012 in 1969, and 12,368 in 1970.”
little done to prevent communist forces from rebuilding them. Prior to the Nixon Administration, large numbers of U.S. forces did not frequently cross the border into Laos or Cambodia to destroy sanctuaries. However, a large joint ARVN-U.S. incursion into Cambodia to destroy the sanctuaries there took place between May and June 1970. In Laos the following year, Operation Lam Son 719 was an attack by 15,000 ARVN and American soldiers against sanctuaries near the border with South Vietnam (Starry 1999). But this significant incursion into Laos, late as it was, is largely regarded as a failure. While ARVN and American forces successfully destroyed vast stores of supplies in these neighboring bases, they were not able to significantly impair the logistical effort on the Trail for even a small amount of time (Whitcomb 1997). North Vietnamese forces in Laos and the Laotian communists, the Pathet Lao, met the advance and managed to send the South Vietnamese back after a three-week operation.

Finally, the logistical needs of the insurgency, even with the growing demands from PAVN units, were quite modest and did not require all that much supply to get through. Insurgent units that ran short of soldiers and/or ammunition would revert back to guerrilla warfare until they could be resupplied or brought up to full strength.

To recapitulate, the Ho Chi Minh Trail became more important both for the communist and American-aligned forces from 1968 until the end of the war. The insurgency needed soldiers

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59 Starry’s (1989) record of the amounts of supplies captured during the Cambodian raids gives a sense of how extensively the sanctuaries were developed through 1970:

“By the end of June free world forces in Cambodia had captured or destroyed almost ten thousand tons of materiel and food. In terms of enemy needs this amount was enough rice to feed more than 25,000 troops a full ration for an entire year; individual weapons to equip 55 full-strength battalions; crew-served weapons to equip 33 full battalions; and mortar, rocket, and recoilless rifle ammunition for more than 9,000 average attacks against free world units. In all, 11,362 enemy soldiers were killed and over 2,000 captured.”
from North Vietnam to fight in the south, those soldiers brought with them increased logistical demands, and American aircraft was largely redirected south and west after the 1968 bombing halt on North Vietnam. The Trail would only increase in importance for the insurgency as infiltration by sea became precarious, and the port of Sihanoukville was lost as an infiltration route after 1970.

**Causal Mechanisms**

This is the only case that allows for a direct test of all four causal mechanisms that support my refined conventional wisdom. The causal argument I advance holds up well in the case of Vietnam. All of the causal mechanisms receive strong support in this case, except for the one that predicts that sanctuary confers relative protection from attack, which only receives limited support from this case.

This case provides some limited support for the causal mechanism that predicts insurgents receive relative protection from attack from transnational sanctuaries. Diplomatic concerns restrained American action in all three sanctuary states to a greater degree than the U.S. felt constrained in their actions within South Vietnam. Escalating the conflict in any of the neighboring states, either by increasing the intensity of bombing, including using nuclear weapons, or sending in ground forces, risked weakening the U.S. position in Southeast Asia. The U.S. experience in Korea appears to have strongly influenced its behavior in Vietnam. The U.S. leadership did not want the Chinese to massively intervene in Vietnam with ground forces, as they had in Korea. The United States could not engage in regime change or occupation of North Vietnam to win the war in the South. In Cambodia, too, the U.S. was reluctant to engage in attacks that would have possibly led to the ousting of an officially neutral government and replacing it with a communist one. Political stability in Laos was more precarious than
Cambodia. Despite having a vigorous communist insurgent group, the Pathet Lao in Laos, the government was officially neutral in the conflict in Vietnam because neighboring and outside powers wanted it to be. The Pathet Lao with North Vietnam’s backing was likely strong enough to overthrow the government in Vientiane, but the North Vietnamese did not help their Pathet Lao allies\textsuperscript{60} overthrow the tripartite government in Laos\textsuperscript{61} as long as the U.S. continued to observe the Geneva Accords, in which the parties agreed to keep Laos neutral. Although a party to those Geneva Accords, North Vietnam still used Laotian territory for the Ho Chi Minh Trail, aided by their Pathet Lao allies, who insisted the Trail remain secret (Whitcomb 1997). The U.S. feared that committing a large ground force to Laos in order to cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail would have given the North Vietnamese an excuse to help the Pathet Lao overthrow the government and the entire north of the country would fall. Moreover, many in the U.S. feared that even if they were able to establish an effective barrier in Laos that the Vietnamese would simply infiltrate supplies through Cambodia, defeating the purpose of any invasion of Laos (Banner 1993).

Because the United States was concerned about the countermoves of others arising from any move it made to curtail infiltration and root out the sanctuaries in neighboring states, it pursued measures, such as aerial interdiction, for much of the war that were less than optimal for pursuing their objectives. Erecting a physical barrier across Laos and stationing large numbers of soldiers there would have been preferable from the point of view of ending infiltration into South Vietnam and eliminating sanctuaries in southern Laos and Cambodia, but the U.S. believed that

\textsuperscript{60} Donnen argues that tensions between the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese came under strain in 1970.

\textsuperscript{61} This was the solution arrived at by fourteen states during the Geneva conference on Laos between 1961 and 1962. The government was composed of Royalists, Neutralists, and Communists (Whitcomb 1997).
that would have given an excuse to the Pathet Lao and the North Vietnamese to topple the tripartite government in Laos and replace it with a communist one. That would have been a setback for broader U.S. aims that called for containing the spread of communism. The U.S. frequently used special operations forces to gather intelligence on the Trail, but only very late in the war did the U.S. commit very substantial ground forces into Cambodia to attempt to destroy the sanctuaries there, and that happened after a coup in Cambodia that brought about a more US-friendly regime. The 1971 attacks against sanctuaries in Laos lasted several weeks, but was strongly contested by the North Vietnamese Army in Laos, contributing to the larger failure of the operation. Compared to the extent to which U.S. and ARVN ground forces were used in South Vietnam against NLAF and PAVN forces, those Vietnamese in sanctuaries in neighboring states were relatively more protected than those in South Vietnam where both the U.S. and ARVN forces had a fixed presence.

The mechanism that predicts insurgents may wait out counterinsurgents is only partially confirmed in this case. The Vietnamese who were fighting the South Vietnamese government did not leave South Vietnam to go to Cambodia, Laos, and North Vietnam to wait for the U.S. to withdraw before resuming the war against Saigon. The insurgency, though its strength waxed and waned over time, continued the length of the war. For reasons just explained in the review of the first causal mechanism and for reasons that will be discussed in the third, the Vietnamese communists did not feel that they needed to commit most of their forces to force the U.S. to withdraw. The North Vietnamese were well aware of the antiwar movement in the United States and probably knew that it could not win a conventional fight against a nuclear power, and so continued the insurgency to keep the government in Saigon from winning over the people of South Vietnam, while waiting for the U.S. to withdraw. As long as the government in Saigon
appeared too corrupt and ineffective for many South Vietnamese, insurgency was a way of keeping a military solution open while waiting out the Americans.

Sanctuary also facilitated three general offensives against South Vietnam launched in 1964, 1967-68, and 1972. The relative protection from attack that was described in Mechanism One, coupled with the extensive Trail network in Laos and Cambodia, permitted large numbers of troops, vehicles, supplies, and ammunition to be moved near South Vietnam’s borders prior to attack. Therefore, the relative protection from attack analyzed in Mechanism One should not be understood as solely a defensive boon for insurgents, as the relative protection from attack enabled them to launch significant offensives. However, as will be explained in Mechanism Four, below, those offensives were usually ruinous for the attackers as long as the U.S. was willing to use its considerable firepower to aid the South Vietnamese government.

This evidence in this case generally supports the mechanism that predicts that insurgents face an organizational inflection point. The NLAF and PAVN launched three conventional attacks that failed to achieve their ultimate objectives at the time and cost them dearly. The 1964, 1967-68, and 1972 offensives were conventional assaults supported by guerrilla-style attacks, and all three demonstrate the dangers of premature concentration of military forces against foes with vastly superior firepower. As I explained in the analysis of the second mechanism, sanctuaries in North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia facilitated the three large offensives that occurred during the period of significant U.S. involvement. This appears to be strong support for the conventional explanation of sanctuary, which argues that sanctuaries allow insurgents to
increase their relative military power on the way to militarily defeating the incumbent regime. U.S. air power, which was only partially successful in its air interdiction operation against the Trail and sanctuaries in neighboring states, played a significant role in defeating the 1964 and 1972 offensives. The 1968 Tet Offensive is often explained as a mixed success for the insurgents in South Vietnam. The scale of the offensive further eroded U.S. public support for the war, but the South Vietnamese composition of the insurgency was decimated by the losses from the conflict.

This case strongly supports the mechanism that predicts that external interveners are likely to fail at building viable states in other countries. The U.S. attempted to increase the fighting capability of ARVN and encourage the government in South Vietnam to make reforms that would win over a significant share of the population. It was relatively more successful at strengthening South Vietnam’s military than reforming its government. Dembowski (2009) concluded that the U.S. adviser mission for the military region encompassing Saigon left its ARVN counterpart in a reasonably good condition, although there was still much improvement ARVN would benefit from, but the government failed to enact reforms to dispel widespread perceptions of corruption and ineffectiveness about the Saigon government. The military was slow to enact reforms that would have hastened a more meritocratic officer corps, and the government’s land reform program redistributed very little land and largely confirmed land redistributions carried out by the insurgents.

62 It is unclear if it is even true that sanctuary enhanced the insurgency’s relative military power as the U.S. undertook a significant buildup of personnel in South Vietnam between 1965 and 1968, while simultaneously continuing its adviser mission to enhance the capabilities of ARVN.
In retrospect, it is easy to understand why the Saigon government was not able to embed itself firmly in society, and why it constantly relied on outside support, primarily from the United States, to maintain itself. Ngo Dinh Diem was the first significant autocratic ruler of the Republic of Vietnam. That his overthrow and assassination in November, 1963, was greeted with rejoicing throughout South Vietnam should give some indication of his popularity. However, what followed was a string of successions that provided little continuity for policy over the long term and preoccupied sitting South Vietnamese leaders with the task of fending off rivals for their position rather than building a durable state.

The American commitment to leave Vietnam likely undermined those who considered supporting the regime among the people of South Vietnam. Few were willing to step forward to embrace a regime that had behaved so badly toward its own people, many of whom came to believe that the Saigon government would lose the war. With that possibility very much in the forefront of South Vietnamese minds, the fear of post-war retribution by the communists kept many Vietnamese from embracing the government in the south.

Conclusion

All four mechanisms that I proposed to explain a refined version of the conventional wisdom were expected to be well tested in this case, and the case of Vietnam presented strong support for all four mechanisms. Specifically, insurgents used the relative protection from attack conferred by transnational sanctuary to choose how strongly they wanted to challenge the U.S. and South Vietnamese forces, while the U.S. was unable to create a domestically constituted regime that could endure once the U.S. withdrew. The apparent presence of an organizational inflection point for insurgent groups was strongly supported by the three disastrous conventional offensives launched by the NLAF and PAVN, indicating the limits of the conventional
explanation’s increased relative military power argument. It is unclear if the presence of sanctuary actually increased the relative military power of the insurgents because so many variables affect military power and were constantly in flux, and many are difficult to measure.

None of this means that transnational sanctuary is unimportant. All sides of the conflict in Vietnam recognized the importance of transnational sanctuary for the NLAF and PAVN; they likely would not have been able to defeat the government in South Vietnam without bases and Trail in Laos and Cambodia. The conventional wisdom’s predictions about the kind of benefits that insurgents would receive in those external base areas—training, rest, infiltration, planning—were present. Those bases were important though, not because they created more deadly insurgents, but because it allowed the NLAF and PAVN to remain in the fight until the U.S. withdrew. Following the U.S. withdrawal, the next conventional offensive against the south routed the South Vietnamese armed forces and led to the collapse of the Saigon government.
Chapter Seven: Conclusion

This dissertation asks whether transnational sanctuary helps challengers in civil wars and insurgencies defeat the incumbent regime, and, if so, how? I argue that insurgents with sanctuary are more likely to win against external interveners, but not domestically constituted regimes, because the relative protection from attack conferred by sanctuary allows insurgents to wait for the external intervener to withdraw. Insurgents may materially benefit from sanctuary in a neighboring state, but it rarely allows insurgents to approach or surpass parity with the incumbent, regardless of whether it is an external intervener or a domestically constituted regime. Four causal mechanisms explain this result: the stopping power of international borders; the “waiting game” that insurgents pursue in sanctuaries against external interveners; an organizational inflection point in insurgent organizations; and, the inability of external interveners to create durable domestically constituted regimes where they did not previously exist. Below, I summarize the findings with respect to these four mechanisms from the cases detailed in this dissertation and from cases not included.

This dissertation relies on a bargaining framework of insurgency to explain why transnational sanctuary aids insurgents opposing external interveners most of the time, but also why they do not beat domestically constituted governments more frequently than those groups without sanctuary. Force and the willingness to use it seem to decide the outcome of insurgencies examined in this study. By their very nature, insurgents tend to lack military force relative to the regimes that they challenge. Therefore, they need to either increase their relative military

63 Interestingly, many of the cases of external intervener-led counterinsurgency were those where challengers posed a great threat to the regime in power. The challengers were not necessarily militarily stronger than the incumbent government, but they were relatively stronger than many of their peers, and appeared to present an existential and immediate challenge to their governments. Some of the cases where insurgents’ relative military strength was a cause for
power or they must weaken the resolve of the incumbent regime to continue to resist the demands of the challengers. Most challengers begin at a significant disadvantage when it comes to the ability to project military force and most groups are unable to achieve parity with a state’s military forces. Because the stakes are often higher for domestically constituted regimes than for external interveners (who may lose an election or prestige at home), insurgents are likely to have a relatively easier time wearing down the resolve of external interveners. Because many external interventions occur to stave off the defeat of an ally, ending the external intervention often means a return to a precarious status quo where the incumbent government faces the possibility of a military defeat.

Can external interveners prevent a return to the negative pre-intervention status quo? Not usually. There are two ways this could happen: strengthening the regime so it can resist future attacks, or permanently degrading the armed resistance to the regime. Most external interveners choose to pursue both. Despite considerable efforts by a number of external interveners spanning several decades, almost all have failed to find a way to make the temporary balance of forces brought about by external intervention permanent. External interveners may temporarily redress external intervention, or led to a significant escalation in an ongoing intervention (in the case of colonial or imperial conflicts) to prop up an embattled ally include the U.S. in South Vietnam, the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, and the French in Algeria. The British also faced a number of military challenges that precipitated various degrees of intervention in Malaya, Kenya, and Oman. While it was not a cause of the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan, many worry that the current Afghan government may not be able to defeat the Taliban should the International Security Assistance Force withdraw. Here, the Taliban’s perceived strength is a cause for the continued international intervention by the U.S. and others.

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64 I am referring to the projection of conventional military forces, especially ground forces. While it is true that many insurgent groups seek to avoid government forces as much as possible in the opening phase of a conflict, their ultimate aims often require them to develop conventional military forces that can defeat those of the regime they seek to replace. Controlling the countryside and using guerrilla warfare alone have won few victories, and conventional warfare is often necessary for the challengers to take and keep urban areas.
the balance of forces more favorably for their client, but that favorable balance usually only lasts as long as the external intervener chooses to continue devoting substantial resources to that country.

The evidence presented in Chapter Two demonstrated that: Insurgencies against external interveners are much more successful than against domestically constituted regimes, regardless of the presence of sanctuary, groups with sanctuary fighting against external interveners tend to win more often than those groups without sanctuary fighting external interveners; however, even those groups without sanctuary fighting against external interveners win more frequently than groups fighting domestically constituted regimes, regardless of sanctuary. However, groups with sanctuary fighting domestically constituted regimes do win about 50% more frequently than groups without sanctuary, although both lose about a third of the time. Those results in Box 1 create a bit of a problem for testing my refined explanation because it is one of the two boxes where my refined version predicts different outcomes than the conventional wisdom, but both explanations explain the same percentage of outcomes, making any definitive conclusion difficult. However, Box 4 has an unusually high number of ongoing cases, about a third of all Box 4 cases are ongoing, and 45% of all Box 4 cases fall outside of the Insurgent Win/Insurgent Loss dichotomy, which means a few insurgent victories could significantly raise the relative

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65 This is an interesting finding for a couple of reasons. First, these conflicts often demonstrate greater disparities in military force between the challengers and incumbents than in cases where domestically constituted regimes are left to fight challengers. This indicates that even an overwhelming imbalance of military capabilities in favor of the incumbent may not be enough to achieve victory in civil wars and insurgencies. Second, it is also interesting that many of these groups have what can be described as maximalist aims. These groups almost always sought the replacement of the current regime with a new one. Taken together, this is an unexpected finding given the bargaining model on which I have relied—groups that are vastly inferior in military power relative to the incumbents that they face achieve their maximalist aims more often than insurgents with a more favorable balance of power, often less than maximalist goals, fighting a domestically constituted regime.
insurgent win percentage. These findings largely confirm my refined version of the conventional wisdom about sanctuary and challenger success: groups with sanctuary are more likely to win than those without it when the target regime is an external intervener. Sanctuary is not likely to be decisive for groups opposed to a domestically constituted regime. This begins to address the first question in this dissertation—does sanctuary help insurgents win? But Chapter Two has not addressed the second question—how does sanctuary aid insurgents? I argue that sanctuary does, in fact, confer a number of benefits to insurgents, but it is the relative protection from attack that is most important for insurgent success. Insurgents wait for the external intervener to leave before more fully engaging the regime left in place. The four case studies that followed Chapter Two illustrate how insurgents have fought both external interveners and domestically constituted governments with and without sanctuary.

Before I summarize the causal mechanisms that collectively challenge the conventional wisdom, I have to admit that the conventional wisdom gets a lot correct. Sanctuary provides insurgents with many, if not all, of the benefits articulated in the conventional wisdom: insurgents benefit from the arming, training, recruiting, protection from attack, and provision of medical services. Not only does sanctuary confer those benefits, but the conventional wisdom is also correct in observing that many groups with sanctuary in neighboring states frequently win. The tendency of insurgents with sanctuary to win is most evident in those cases where they oppose an external intervener. The data compiled in Chapter Two also supports the conventional wisdom: insurgents with sanctuary fighting domestically constituted regimes win about 50%

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66 Recoding Abkhazia secession from Georgia and Nagorno Karabakh from Azerbaijan as insurgent victories would reduce the difference in insurgent win percentage with/without sanctuary from 32:21 to 32:29. Box 1 does not have any ongoing conflicts that appear likely to result in insurgent victories as of June 2017.
more frequently than insurgents without sanctuary, although insurgent groups lose at nearly identical rates. But while the conventional wisdom gets a lot of the details about sanctuary correct, the big conclusion—those groups are likely to win because of it—finds little support in this dissertation. Because the conventional wisdom is largely unsupported, its policy implications for counterinsurgents—widening a war to sanctuary states, construction of physical barriers, and coercing sanctuary hosts to get rid of their sanctuaries—may be no more likely to produce victory.

The first and fourth mechanisms have the most support and are generally confirmed in all cases. International borders place relative limits on the duration and, sometimes, intensity of cross-border attacks, and external interveners almost always fail to build enduring regimes abroad. With respect to the stopping power of international borders, the two cases where insurgents had transnational sanctuary demonstrate strong support for this mechanism, as do a number of previous case studies on the same subject, which are not included in this dissertation. There is mixed support for the third causal mechanism, the organizational inflection point for insurgent organizations. Vietnam and El Salvador demonstrated strong support for this mechanism, while Peru and Kenya did not.

Chapter Two reported a strong correlation between external interveners losing and insurgents using transnational sanctuary, which lent support to the conventional wisdom that transnational sanctuary helps insurgents win when they otherwise would not. The qualitative data relevant to mechanism three provides a rival explanation: external interveners lost most of those conflicts because they could not create enduring governments and the presence of transnational sanctuary was a correlation. The Vietnam and Kenya cases demonstrate strong support for this causal mechanism, and evidence from previous research conducted outside of this dissertation
confirm this finding. The U.S. in Vietnam and Soviet Union in Afghanistan both witnessed the fall of regimes they put in place not long after withdrawing. The British were slightly more successful at cultivating a pro-British elite in Kenya, but that was only after they were unable to keep the colony under British control. In Rhodesia, the white settler government, which does not meet the definition of an external intervener despite its historical ties to European colonialism, was so much reduced by the end of its civil war that many of the remaining supporters were able to pack up and leave. That kind of resolution to a civil war or insurgency appears to be rare and proves the rule that domestically constituted governments that have the support of significant sections of the population are difficult to topple through armed struggle. I have to admit that this mechanism is probably less true prior to 1945, and so it may prove to be less true in the future if the norm prohibiting foreign conquest erodes. The world prior to 1945 is replete with cases of successful colonizers and empire-builders who constructed orders that lasted, in some cases, hundreds of years. Since 1945, there has been strong condemnation of conquest and formal empire. The United Nations Security Council would primarily address conquest while the U.N.’s Trusteeship Council was to work in conjunction with the Security Council to oversee independence for those non-self-governing territories who wished to be independent. Whether empire fell out of fashion because of the interests of Great Powers, international institutions, or normative shifts (Fazal 2007) is beyond the scope of this dissertation, but if those are some of the causes for the decline of empire, their reversal may portend empire’s future reemergence.

The second mechanism, the “waiting game,” insurgents may carry out in sanctuaries against external interveners, receives only limited support from the evidence presented in this dissertation. Insurgents use sanctuary for more than just waiting for the external intervener to withdraw. The two cases of insurgency against external interveners only provide limited support
for mechanism two. Several large offensives were launched against American and South Vietnamese forces during America’s Vietnam War; the Vietnamese who opposed the U.S. presence were not merely sitting idle in neighboring North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Yet, they never appeared to feel compelled to risk their entire organizations in a “do-or-die” gamble to overrun American forces before they became irrelevant. The insurgents alternated between periods of waiting, infiltrating, building up their strength, and some cases of very large-scale attacks. While the full case was not presented in this dissertation, the varied uses of sanctuary by the Viet Cong are very similar to the Afghan mujahedeen’s use of sanctuary in Pakistan. In the case of the Mau Mau in Kenya where there was no sanctuary in a conflict against an external intervener, I found no evidence that any significant part of the Mau Mau strategy relied on waiting for the British to withdraw, although such a withdrawal would have made it easier to achieve the land reform they sought. They opted for a strategy of direct armed confrontation with the British, white settlers, and Africans and Asians who supported the government.

It is unclear whether an organizational inflection point exists for all insurgents in all conflicts. From the cases presented in this dissertation and investigated in prior research, insurgent organizations appear to incur significant losses when they concentrate their forces in the face of significant counterinsurgent firepower. If counterinsurgents can strike concentrated formations of insurgents, often through advantages in airpower and artillery, they inflict severe losses on insurgents. El Salvador and Vietnam are the two cases that best demonstrate the potential pitfalls insurgents face when they attempt to concentrate their forces in the face of technologically advanced counterinsurgents, regardless of whether they are external interveners or domestically constituted. In El Salvador, the concentration of forces that was necessary to move from rural to urban areas also exposed them to withering attacks by government forces. In
Vietnam, the insurgents launched several large-scale attacks against the south, and they all resulted in horrendous casualties for the insurgents. Neither the Mau Mau in Kenya nor the Shining Path in Peru attempted massive concentration of forces in preparation for seizing and holding large urban areas, so those cases are less instructive about whether insurgent organizations face an organizational inflection point.

While more research is needed to determine the prevalence of a potential organizational inflection point, the limited support for this causal mechanism undermines the importance of transnational sanctuary because the material benefits conferred by sanctuary may lead to military failure if insurgents concentrate forces prematurely. If the organizational inflection point exists, then having too many soldiers, heavy weapons, and training to fight like a conventional military, which can and are done in sanctuary, only improves insurgents’ chances of winning up until a certain unknown point, after which the group becomes more vulnerable to the superior firepower of counterinsurgent forces.

Generations of counterinsurgency practitioners and theorists have promulgated and reaffirmed the conventional wisdom that sanctuary in neighboring states helps insurgents win when they otherwise would not. But these writers have disproportionately been Western, close to or fully enmeshed in their respective military establishments, and were almost always writing from the perspective of external counterinsurgents who lost their conflicts. In trying to “learn lessons” from past failures in order to avoid them in the future, the frequent presence of sanctuary in these external military interventions was a noticeable correlation. Moreover, because of the numerous benefits sanctuary conferred to insurgents, it was plausible.

Because the conventional wisdom’s chief conclusion finds no support in this dissertation, the policy implications that have traditionally flowed from this assumption are worth examining
and reconsidering. If sanctuaries are generally not vital, then expanding wars into neighboring states is probably unnecessary. The historical record should also engender some caution for those arguing to expand existing conflicts into neighboring states. Many incumbent governments facing insurgency have undertaken great efforts to degrade, eliminate, or cut off sanctuaries from their state. They often experience limited and temporary success in degrading sanctuaries by forcing insurgents to flee from their bases and destroying existing infrastructure. But insurgents return and rebuild once counterinsurgents withdraw, which there is often considerable international pressure to do, although some states can more easily ignore that pressure than others. Efforts to fully eliminate sanctuaries through military force, as far as I can tell, have never worked for counterinsurgents. However, counterinsurgents have experienced success in getting sanctuary hosts to crack down on insurgents using their territory, but sanctuary hosts are often unable or unwilling to do so. Efforts to cut off sanctuaries from their target states, often through the construction of walls, barriers, and landmines, have experienced some success, as the French demonstrated in Algeria, and the Rhodesians were able to do to a degree on their eastern border. Yet, for the varying degrees of success at eliminating, degrading, or cutting off sanctuaries, none of them translated into ultimate success for the counterinsurgents: the Rhodesians fled, the French withdrew, Turkey has not eliminated the PKK, the United States did not eliminate the Viet Cong, etc.

While it was not a causal mechanism, the importance of internal sanctuary warrants a comment. Internal sanctuaries provide many of the same benefits conferred by transnational sanctuary. The Shining Path’s internal sanctuary in Peru was a boon to the organization because it allowed them access to food, which allowed them to provision their considerable forces, it provided a sympathetic population who provided intelligence on government activities, and it
gave the group some strategic depth, allowing them to avoid costly counterinsurgent attacks. The Mau Mau’s internal sanctuaries in the forests demonstrated the pitfalls of not possessing arable land. Eventually cut off from food supplies from Nairobi, the Mau Mau fighters began focusing more of their attention on finding food than fighting the British or their native allies. Yet, the forests provided significant relative protection from attack for the Mau Mau, whom British forces had difficulty locating and engaging deep in Kenya’s forests. Both of these cases also illustrate another point: internal sanctuary, just like external sanctuary, is not a sufficient condition for insurgent victory.

**Future Research**

In this dissertation, I have attempted to more fully demonstrate the circumstances under which transnational sanctuary aids insurgents. The conventional wisdom passed down from generation to generation of counterinsurgency experts was that insurgents with sanctuary are more likely to win than those without it. I proposed a slightly different version of that conventional wisdom, which could explain why sanctuary was nearly perfectly correlated with insurgent victory against external interveners, but not domestically constituted governments: insurgents could wait for external interveners to withdraw in the protection conferred by sanctuaries. Unfortunately for insurgents, but good news for the counterinsurgents who oppose them, “stayin’ alive” does not appear to be the primary concern for the insurgent groups studied here. Force protection is a concern for insurgents, too, but all four of these groups actively sought armed conflict with the governments they opposed; there was little evidence that insurgents facing external interveners sought to wait them out. Usually, they chose a mix of armed confrontation with the external intervener and appeals to the population to unite in the face of an occupying power. But before completely discounting this waiting game argument,
more research could be conducted on those cases in which insurgents had sanctuary and faced external interveners. Not much new research is needed for those, because, in fact, those tend to be the most thoroughly researched conflicts, especially among Western counterinsurgency scholars. Nevertheless, sanctuary tends to be an ancillary focus for most scholars, so gathering the research of what has already been produced would be doable and useful.

Probably the most fruitful direction of future research on this topic would be to carry out comparative case study research on those Box One (insurgents with sanctuary against domestically constituted regimes) cases to determine why sanctuary sometimes facilitates insurgent victory and, perhaps more important, what the limits of sanctuary are. Why does sanctuary not empower more insurgents to defeat domestically constituted regimes, and why do they continue to lose at the same rate as groups without sanctuary? This dissertation, consistent with the literature, suggests domestically constituted regimes provoke less domestic resentment as they are not an occupying force, they are permitted to use armed force to defend themselves, according to contemporary international norms, and domestically constituted regimes can be greatly empowered through foreign aid, giving them significant material advantages over insurgents. Case studies that seek to examine differences between Cold War and post-Cold War cases may be able to confirm whether insurgents have a more difficult time obtaining external support when there is often no superpower ready to provide them with weapons, training, and diplomatic support. Furthermore, domestically constituted regimes seem to have incredible staying power, even when they faced multiple insurgencies lasting decades. Colombia, India, and Myanmar are three of the best examples of this: all have faced a variety of insurgencies over decades, and, at least in the cases of Colombia and India, the governments have delivered some measure of prosperity and democracy to its people while combatting multiple insurgencies.
Both Peru and Kenya provided examples where self-defense forces were an important part of counterinsurgency. I had considered advancing a fifth causal mechanism in this dissertation: external interveners lose because they find it difficult to create local self-defense forces, but I decided that could be subsumed under the causal mechanism about building enduring regimes abroad. However, self-defense forces were not a significant part of most of my narratives presented here, and what evidence is presented here does not strongly confirm my intuition: the British, external interveners in Kenya, successfully cultivated Kikuyu and non-Kikuyu native troops to fight the Mau Mau, while in Peru, a domestically constituted government, many of the ron das were created on the peasants’ initiative, not the government’s. This mechanism does not relate to the presence of sanctuary, but it may explain why insurgents sometimes fail to achieve their goals.

Addressing the core grievances that give rise to insurgency does not appear to be necessary to defeat it, as I made clear in the case of Peru, and to an extent is also true in the other three cases. I summarized the Peruvian government’s serial incompetence in all areas of public policy for more than a decade, yet it still defeated the Shining Path. El Salvador’s government had not won the hearts and minds of its people, many of whom has suffered violence, or knew others who had, at the hands of the government, and land and other reforms did little to address the widening inequality. The British defeated the Mau Mau without giving the land reform the Mau Mau wanted. And in the case of Vietnam, the NLF/ Vietcong insurgency, once comprised largely of Vietnamese from the Republic of Vietnam, was later replaced by NVA soldiers carrying out irregular warfare in the south, as the NLF ranks had been decimated by several large-scale uprisings that inflicted heavy losses on the NLF. More evidence is necessary to prove the
conventional wisdom that addressing core grievances is a necessary prerequisite for ending insurgency.

It is still unclear if insurgents face limitations on the degree to which they can concentrate their forces without making themselves an easy target for the counterinsurgent, who usually possesses superior firepower. The evidence in the Vietnam and El Salvador cases suggested this may happen, but the Kenya and Peru cases did not demonstrate this phenomenon.

One other area of future research that is consistent with the goal of questioning long-held assumptions about what works in insurgency was raised in footnote 8. Politicians, members of the military, and even academics appear to have bought into the analogy that an external intervention “buys time” for an embattled ally to “right their ship” before it goes down. I speculated in footnote 8 that this may be yet another doubtful conventional wisdom because it is not so simple for an embattled ally or client to take security forces who otherwise would be engaged in counterinsurgency and have them become the agronomists, urban planners, or social workers, or whoever else may be necessary to address the complaints that give rise to insurgency. But it would be interesting to see what clients have done in response to massive external interventions to save them.

The evidence presented in this dissertation has produced some sobering conclusions: external-led counterinsurgencies almost always fail. This dissertation has argued that the failure is more attributable to political failings: it is very difficult for external interveners to create durable regimes in other countries in the post-colonial age. However, external interveners have often done much to assist incumbent regimes in their counterinsurgency efforts; the “light footprint” model seems to be the better option for external interveners, but there is not always an effective incumbent government with whom they can partner.
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