Meaning Through Things

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MEANING THROUGH THINGS

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A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in the Department of Philosophy in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy,
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“Meaning Through Things”

by

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ABSTRACT

MEANING THROUGH THINGS

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Interpretation is the process by which we find meaning in the things in the world around us: clouds on the horizon, bones, street signs, hairbrushes, uniforms, paintings, letters, and utterances. But where does that meaning come from and on what basis are we justified in saying a particular meaning is the right meaning? Drawing from debates in the philosophy of language, I argue that a complete theory of meaning and interpretation must be grounded in intentions. My argument employs research in the philosophy of language, aesthetics, linguistics, and cognitive science to develop a general framework of interpretation. This framework is then broadly applied to objects of interpretation across a range of fields: legal theory, history, art history, theology, literature, and archaeology.
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1.0 Introduction

In 1980s the Sistine Chapel was cleaned with a chemical that stripped the ceiling of dark grime in the form of dirt and dust, as well as areas of darkness that could be seen as shadows on some of the figures in the paintings. In 1994 a number of prominent archaeologists debated whether or not the aesthetic enjoyment of artifacts was antithetical to the aims of archaeology as science. In the summer of 2015 the Affordable Care Act was brought before the Supreme Court because it includes the words that the health exchanges must be run by “the state”. Each of these events raises questions about what our roles are as interpreters – interpreters of art tasked with restoring the Sistine Ceiling, interpreters of archaeological artifacts tasked with the demands of science, and interpreters of law tasked with ruling on how it is to be applied. In deciding what to do in each of these cases, the art historians, archaeologists, and lawyers must rely on some explicit or implicit theory of interpretation to guide their decisions.

The need for theories of interpretation begins in real world puzzles such as those above: the process of developing and evaluating these theories is a philosophical project. This dissertation takes a broad view of interpretation to come to the conclusion that acts of meaning and interpretation are essentially the same regardless of the method used to convey meaning to the interpreter. I will argue that discovering meaning should be understood as a process of working out the different types of scientific processes and intentions that led to the creation of the object in question.

A number of the same questions arise with respect to interpretation across a wide swath of disciplines: What is the relationship of some work to the intentions of its creator? To what extent can we say meaning is tied to words and symbols themselves?
How are we to know what someone’s intentions were? Art historians, archaeologists, lawyers, theologians, historians, and ordinary hearers and readers all face these questions. That some theory of interpretation is the right one can never be proven by any data set. For, a theory of interpretation tells some theorist how they ought to treat that data set in the first place. However, theories of interpretation can be tested for applicability, consistency, and evaluated for the degree to which they help answer the questions theorists laid out at the start.

A sound theoretical foothold on the relationship between meaning, interpretation, and some utterance can be found in philosophy of language, where for over 100 years philosophers have concerned themselves with the relationship between some sentence, such as, ‘The king of France is bald’, and the meaning of this sentence. In this project I draw on theories from philosophy of language and use this to defend a general framework of interpretation that is grounded in the various sorts of intentions that speakers and creators have when they make certain utterances and objects. In this way I tie meaning to intention, and claim that the ultimate goal of interpretation – to recover meaning – is to work out with what intentions something was created or uttered.

There are a number of moves that need to be defended along the way. First, it must be defended that the right way to approach meaning in philosophy of language is by way of the speaker’s intentions. Further, it needs to be demonstrated that we can move from a theory that is rooted specifically in language to a broader application to frescoes, statutes, and artifacts.
Why are we to think that the right way to approach meaning in philosophy of language has any relation to the speaker’s intentions? Perhaps it might be argued that interpretation of language requires only knowledge of the meanings of the words used in the utterance. Such a position reveals itself to be problematic once we take stock of the number of ways our ordinary, quotidian utterances diverge from the meanings of the words themselves. Consider the following utterances:

1) ‘I’m not here right now’
2) ‘Coffee would keep me awake’
3) ‘John told Paul that Ringo lost his drumsticks’
4) ‘John told Paul that Ringo lost his tie’

These cases require more than the meanings of the words themselves to work out what some speaker could have meant by uttering them on some occasion. Even if this is accepted, a position rooted in intentions seems to open itself up to a number of vulnerabilities to counterexamples and objections. In the dissertation, I defend theories of intention-based meaning from the following objections: that they 1) lead to the result that anything can mean anything, 2) lead us to conclude that the audience must always be right, 3) are untenable in cases with multiple audiences, 4) are unnecessary because context determines meaning, 5) are unintelligible when there are multiple authors, and 6) overstate the degree to which speakers and hearers cooperate. I argue that each of these objections can be resolved with an adequately nuanced view of the relationship between intentions, meaning, and interpretation. This is the first time these objections have been articulated and addressed in a comprehensive way.
Once the general idea of that meaning ought to be tied to intentions has been defended, we can take the position that what some work means is what its creator intended it to mean, and can begin to speak of ‘authorial intentions’, ‘the artist’s intentions’, and ‘the creator’s intentions’. This is an important step but again there is more work to be done. For, an author, artist, or creator can have many different types of intentions with respect to some piece, and can even have some intentions that are the product of other intentions being satisfied. Thus, I present an interpretive framework according to different types of intentions that some agent may have with respect to some aspect of some object. They are: 1) non-intentional, 2) remnant-intentional, 3) use-intentional, 4) signaling-intentional, and 5) meaning-intentional. Each of these five intentional groups maps on to a corresponding interpretive strategy: 1) physico-chemical, 2) byproduct, 3) anthropological, 4) code, and 5) Gricean.

I will begin by presenting the background of the debate surrounding intention and interpretation in Chapter 1. In Chapter 2 I will consider the intentionalists and anti-intentionalist positions and will transition us to the broadly intentionalist picture of meaning that will follow in Chapter 3. After the positive framework is presented in Chapter 3 I will consider a number of objections to intentionalism in Chapter 4. I will then apply the proposed method of interpretation to a wide swath of concrete cases from a number of disciplines in Chapter 5. In Chapter 6 I consider in detail how my proposal can shed light on debates in archaeology. Then I will turn to consider in detail the more psychological, cognitive-science-based questions surrounding interpretation: in Chapter 7 questions of consciousness and intentions and in Chapter 8 the role of affective states in the creation and evaluation of meaning.
The need for the framework I present here arises from the fact that there are a number of phenomena that cannot be explained by previous theories as they are advocated in isolation. I have sought to rectify this in the framework presented here. By taking this broad view of interpretation with respect to many objects across disciplines, we can abstract the framework necessary to provide a comprehensive theory of interpretation that can be justifiably applied within a narrow domain.

Throughout my argument here I will consider a broad view of interpretation with respect to many objects across disciplines, arguing that although there may be differences in the details of the application, at its core, the same capacity undergirds interpretation across domains. This is based on the fact that interpretation is at heart a process of one agent working out what another agent had in mind. It is by looking at data across domains that the sorts of patterns will emerge to allow us to see most clearly what is going on even in the narrowest cases. Indeed, it is striking that, as I will detail as a starting point, essentially the same interpretive debates have arisen across a number of different fields throughout history – this should alert us to the fact that there are likely commonalities in the issues that are being dealt with. Thus, to reach my conclusions, I will begin by discussing interpretation as a general phenomenon before concluding by discussing interpretation with respect to specific domains. By making the framework overt I aim to streamline this process and provide the tools to clean up the debate – and to also provide the structure for intentionalism to be systematically tested.

It surely seems audacious to present a theory that draws on such a range of philosophical topics and purports to apply to such a broad range of subjects, from art history to law to archaeology. I hope by the end of this dissertation to convince the
reader that it is not so strange to approach these all as a unit. On the contrary I hope it will become clear that it is strange in some ways that we have come to see these various types of interpretation as being so distinct. Most all of the subjects I address in this dissertation pertain to the result of humans creating something with particular intentions in mind, some of which are communicative intentions. Although these messages are conveyed through different media surely much is the same: the process whereby the creator develops an intention to communicate a certain message, the process the creator goes through choosing the particular mode of communication of that message, the process the creator goes through to tailor their mode of communication of the audience, keeping in mind their interpretive capacities and tendencies, and after the message has been sent the process the audience goes through to recover the communicative intention by way of the mode of communication. When the same issues and worries are arising across disciplines as I argue here, surely there is room for work to be done faster by opening doors to other disciplines and pursuing these questions together.

What does the framework I present here mean to the restorers of the Sistine Ceiling, the interpreters of the Affordable Care Act, and the archaeologists debating whether or not they ought to revel in the feelings of wonder they have when faced with some artifact? With my proposal, each of these puzzles can be characterized in terms of specific categories of intentions, and the corresponding methods of interpretation can be applied. For instance, as I will detail later, in restoring the Sistine Ceiling, the question is whether some dark patch is a product of natural forces of dirt, dust, and smoke rising to the ceiling or a product of an artist’s intention to depict shadow. If we take it that the meaning of some work is constituted by the artist’s intentions, as I argue
here, then we can understand the task of restoration or preservation as one of keeping a work as close in line with these intentions as possible. By studying the methods of fresco painting and looking at Michelangelo’s oeuvre we can conclude that many of the dark spots that were removed in the 1980s were a result of his intentions and thus should not have been removed. A similar treatment grounded in consideration of the interpretive groups is provided in the Chapters 5 & 6 for numerous concrete cases from legal interpretation and archaeology, as well as literature, history, theology, and music. Before we can return to these concrete examples we must first get a firm foothold in the relevant theory.
Chapter 1
A Brief History of Interpretation

1.1 The Debate on Intention and Interpretation

The aim of this chapter is to review the history of interpretation in broad strokes leading up to and briefly through the 20th Century. We will see that perennial questions of interpretation have arisen across different areas of interpretation and across time. In later chapters I will consider in more detail exactly what I mean by interpretation and how it plays into an explanation of meaning. Interpretation is the process by which we seek to find meaning in the things in the world around us. Much interpretation is a process of getting to know other minds. What did the painter of an ibex on a case wall intend to convey? What does a crying baby want? What was I trying to remind myself to do when I placed this post-it note on the door last night? The limits of our interpretive abilities mirror the limits of our abilities to know the minds of others.

1.2 Histories of Interpretation

The first step in developing a theory of interpretation is to situate this project with respect to previous debates on interpretation. Historically much has been said about how this process does and should work. Consideration of these historical interpretive debates will help us home in on what facts a theory of interpretation ought to account for, what obstacles stand in its way, and which recurring lines of debate crop up across different interpretive contexts.
1.2.1 Histories of Interpretation: Ontogenetic

In giving a history of interpretation, there are a number of possible starting places, some perhaps more natural than others. One could start by considering the advent of language (Dubreuil & Henshilwood 2013: 148; Planer Forthcoming), or by considering how prehistoric manmade objects were interpreted, through consideration of man’s first tools and artifacts, including handaxes, beads, cupules, and cave paintings (Hiscock 2014; Stiner 2014; Godfrey-Smith 2014; Pettitt et al. 2014; Prinz 2014). We could consider, for instance, what the first handaxes were taken to symbolize to those who saw them at the time of their creation (Hiscock 2014). Were they seen as signals of the skill of the maker, as argued by archaeologist Peter Hiscock (Hiscock 2014)? We could also consider what the first Paleolithic beads were taken to communicate (Stiner 2014). Were they “loosely akin to bits in a digital coding system”, as argued by archaeologist Mary Stiner? (Stiner 2014: 62)

In a sense, this would be a story about how we as homo sapiens developed the ability to interpret the physical outputs of those around us, and how we developed our abilities to symbolically represent things in the world with the knowledge of the interpretive abilities of others. This would be an ontogenetic history. However, as I will discuss in detail in Chapter 6, we can not rely on such discussions as a basis for philosophical theorizing about interpretation because archaeologists in these fields themselves rely on theories that they import from philosophy and linguistics, with varying degrees of success. If philosophers hastily draw on theories from other disciplines that themselves draw on philosophical theories as evidence there is a risk of circularity.
1.2.2 Histories of Interpretation: Phylogenetic

Another approach to detailing a history of interpretation would be to consider the role of interpretation in each of our individual lives. We are all, as adult communicators, the product of a process we went through as infants and young children of having our actions be interpreted and interpreting the behavior of those around us as we learn to communicate, grappling with and negotiating past the interpretations and misinterpretations of our audience all the while. We have been doing this since the day we were born, and first cried—long before we ever could conceive of ourselves as doing so.

This process of learning to interpret and be interpreted means that infants and parents alike can grow frustrated as the limits of their communicative abilities become clear (Goodwyn, Acredolo & Brown 2000: 83). A crying baby can want attention, to be held, to be fed, to have its diaper changed, to have a blanket added, to have a blanket removed, and any other of a nearly countless number of possibilities. Crying is a very crude indicator of what action the baby wants performed. As children begin to learn to speak they continue in a process of what has been called a “negotiation of meaning” (Golinkoff 1993; Tomasello 1999: 178) Michael Tomasello summarizes the process in the following way,

...the child says something unintelligible, the adult guesses at its meaning, and the infant either accepts or rejects this interpretation...These kinds of discourse – which occur frequently for virtually all young children learning a natural language – put children in the situation in which they formulate an utterance with some more or less coherent hypothesis of the informational needs of the listener, and then that hypothesis is demonstrated to be either accurate or faulty. (Tomasello 1999: 178)
This process of learning how to interpret and be interpreted is something we have been doing since infancy. Consideration of these individual processes would be a phylogenetic history of interpretation. I will return to discuss such literature in detail in Chapter 5 because it reveals important facts about our abilities to understand the minds of others.

1.2.3 Histories of Interpretation Throughout Time

The ontogenetic or phylogenetic histories would take quite a liberal approach to the subject of “history of interpretation”, which might be best understood in terms of the development of interpretive practices within particular cultures. A more straightforward history of interpretation would discuss the history of practices of interpretation as there is a written record of our interpreting texts and objects across cultures and that is what I will present a rough sketch of now. This is by no means an exhaustive history but serves to introduce us briefly to debates that are again and again carved out along the same lines.

What we will see in this chapter is that throughout the history of interpretation, a number of the same lines of inquiry have emerged. The ancient Greeks were concerned with the role fiction and myth should play in the shaping of citizens, and saw this as dependent in part upon where the messages in poetry came from. Plato in particular argued that because poets could not explain their work they were not reliable sources of knowledge themselves, but mere conduits for the intentions of the muses. Theologians of various religious creeds in the Abrahamic tradition looked to the intentions behind some work to explain its meaning. They explained texts in terms of
God inspiring the writing while at the same time also feeling a pull toward explaining the text in terms of the intentions of the individual writers—which could help explain inconsistencies in the text. This contrasted with the Indian tradition where the words of the text themselves were thought to have their full meaning on their own, and an author or guiding intention was not sought. These basic questions persist today across a wide range of interpretive contexts. We still have debates about the interpretation of Homer and religious texts, and the issues that were raised hundreds and sometimes thousands of years ago are still hotly contested. It is for this reason that the history of these debates can be illuminating.

1.2.4 Histories of Interpretation: Ancient

Ancient Greece is perhaps the first culture that has an extensive history of literature and discussion of that literature. It can thus perhaps be said to be the first evidence we have of a theory of textual interpretation\(^1\). In Ancient Greece, around approximately 300 BC, there was heated discussion about how art and literature should be interpreted, especially with respect to the work of Homer. In Ancient Greece Homer was seen as “the Educator of the Greeks” for his outsize role in shaping attitudes of the day (Carroll Forthcoming 16; Murray 1997; Long 2001). “The Greeks treated Homer and Hesiod the way that Jewish culture treated the Bible and the way that Christian culture later treated the New Testament. They read portions of it aloud and commented upon it” (Carroll Forthcoming 17; see also Murray 1997; Long 2001). How one interpreted

\(^{1}\) There were earlier texts, such as the Egyptian Book of the Dead, but it is not clear that there was an explicit theory of interpretation of such texts.
Homer had consequences for how one should live one’s life (Republic 606e1-5; Murray 1997: 24; Long 2001).

Plato expresses strong views on the interpretation of Homer. He sees poetry—including the works of Homer—as a woefully inadequate source of knowledge (Carroll Forthcoming 16). That is, he argues that although a poet may be able to write well about a sea voyage, if he were on such a voyage he would not actually know how to work on the ship (Republic 597e-601c). As evidence for the ignorance of poets with respect to subjects they might write well about Plato argues that the meaning of the poem is not something the poet himself can explain in a satisfactory way (Apology 22c-b; Republic 597e-601c; Murray 1997: 10-12). In the Apology Plato writes, in the voice of Socrates,

So I would take up those poems of theirs which it seemed to me they had worked on the most, and I would ask them thoroughly what they meant, so that I might also learn something from them at the same time. I am ashamed to tell you the truth, men; nevertheless, it must be said. Almost everyone present, so to speak, would have spoken better than the poets did about the poetry that they themselves had made. So again, concerning the poets, I soon recognized that they did not make what they make by wisdom, but by some sort of nature and while inspired, like the diviners and those who deliver oracles. For they too say many noble things, but they know nothing of what they speak. (Apology 22b-c, trans. 1979)

We see here that Plato writes that although poets can say noble things, their noble meaning cannot be attributed to or explained in terms of the poets themselves. This is taken to be evidence that poets are not really knowledgeable about the subjects they discuss—that they “have no grasp of the truth” (Republic 600e). Plato sees the explanation of the profundity of poetry in terms of something like an oracle, with the poet himself divinely inspired—a mere conduit for some greater being. For Plato, whatever we can attribute the meaning of some poem to lies outside the poet himself.
1.2.5 History of Interpretation: Theological

The notion of divine inspiration, which was prevalent in Ancient Greece, has its most natural home in theories of religious interpretation, where there is a centuries-long tradition subsequent to the time of Plato's writings focused on interpreting texts. Here we see a pull between attributing the meaning of certain texts to the author himself or to some other source that the author acts as a conduit for.

The need for solid grounding for the meaning of such religious works lies in the authority such texts are given in how religious practitioners should live their lives. This is a natural outgrowth of the same interpretive questions that arose with respect to Homer in Ancient Athens, for, "it is clear that the Homeric poems did have a canonical status akin to that of the Bible in later ages" (Murray 1997: 19). We see extensive discussion of meaning in all of the world's major religions, the locus of debates on interpretation for nearly two millennia.

1.2.6 History of Interpretation: Hindu Tradition

Consideration of interpretation in the Hindu tradition takes us back to at least 200 BC. The six major schools of Indian philosophical thought—Sankhya, Yoga, Nyaya, Vaisesika, Mimamsa, and Vedanta—accept the four Vedas as authoritative (Roy 1992: 293). However, a theory of interpretation is needed for these texts because "some of the Vedic principles are found to be contradictory" (Roy 1992: 293). It is thought that these contradictions "cease to appear" with a proper interpretation (Roy 1992: 293). The most influential theory of Vedic interpretation, which is also thought to apply to both literary and non-literary texts—including law—is that of the Mimamsa tradition,
from around 200 BC (Chari 1978: 329). Within this tradition it is thought that "a linguistic text is a self-sufficient structure capable of delivering its own meaning" and that thus "any reference to author or reader is extraneous" (Chari 1978: 330). The meaning of the Vedas is thought to be found in the words themselves. Perhaps one contributing factor to the appeal of this line of thought is the fact that the Vedas are not thought to have a known author, either human or divine (Chari 1978: 330).

### 1.2.7 History of Interpretation: Jewish Tradition

In contrast, the texts of religions in the Abrahamic tradition are thought to be at least partly divinely inspired in one way or another (Berger 1998; Grant 1984; Ansary 2009). Additionally, these religions share the feature that certain interpreters are given more authority than others (Berger 1998: viii). In Judaism, the Rabbinic interpreters of the first five centuries AD, often referred to as Hazal, have been given special authority, in their writings collected as the system of Jewish law, or Halakhah, which includes most prominently the Babylonian Talmud, along with other texts (Berger 1998: viii). Study of the Talmud continues to this day and reverence to the writings of the Rabbinic interpreters from the first centuries AD is often referred to as "Rabbinic authority" (Berger 1998: viii-ix).

Traditionally, interpretation of the Talmud and the Jewish Bible or Torah is quite literal in the reading of the text (Grant 1984; Berger 1998). It is believed that the entirety of written law was dictated directly to Moses at Mount Sinai (Berger 1998: 18-20). Biblical scholar Robert Grant writes "...there is a saying in the tractate Sanhedrin of the Babylonian Talmud...'He who says, 'The Torah is not from God,' or even if he says 'the whole Torah is from God with the exception of this or that verse which not God but
Moses spoke from his own mouth’—that soul shall be rooted up.’ Jewish exegetes believed that every word of scripture had been spoken by God. There could be no question of its inspiration or authenticity” (Grant 1984: 8).

At the same time, even with a quite literal reading of the text, one’s questions about exactly what it means are not resolved. For example, Leviticus 23:42 states “You shall dwell in booths [sukkot] for seven days” (Berger 1998: 18). This leaves open a number of questions, such as: What constitutes a booth? What are the required dimensions? Can it be made of any material? Must everyone do this? Are there any exceptions? Not even for children or the elderly? (Berger 1998: 18). It is here that the rulings of the Rabbinic Sages are needed, and thus many theories of interpretation of the Torah are reflected in their writings, including analogical reasoning, exegetical arguments, logical reasoning, transmitted traditions, and accepted practice (Berger 1998: 18). Without them the Torah itself lacks the required degree of specificity in its commandments.

1.2.8 History of Interpretation: Christian Tradition

In the Christian tradition, the Jewish Torah is considered to be the Christian Old Testament, with accounts of the life of Christ and other texts composing the New Testament. Included in the New Testament are certain sections that can be seen as arguments for a certain interpretation of the Old Testament, especially in arguing that there is a prophesy of Christ’s arrival to be found in these texts. For example, Jesus himself is reported in the book of John to have said “If you believed Moses, you would believe me; for he wrote concerning me” (Grant 1984: 18). This has lead Robert Grant to note that “the interpretation of the Bible in Christianity begins with Jesus” who often
advocates for a looser connection between the recorded word and how we are to interpret it, and certain of Jesus’s interpretations were even considered “blasphemy” by his contemporaries (Grant 1984: 8-11).

Paul the Apostle, who founded the Christian Church, also advocated for certain interpretations of Old Testament passages, and this is documented in his letters canonized in the New Testament (Grant 1984). In a letter to the Galatians he writes, “The promises were spoken to Abraham and to his seed. It does not say, and to seeds, as in the case of many, but, as in the case of one. And to thy seed—who is Christ” (Grant 1984: 21). In this passage Paul advocates for reading certain passages about Abraham’s ‘seed’ in a metaphorical way as being about Christ. We can see figures such as Jesus and Paul as offering arguments about interpretation and meaning of specific passages of texts—in this case arguments about textual interpretation in the New Testament itself. In a sense Jesus and Paul are acting as textual interpreters. I will return to discuss these debates again in Chapter 5.

1.2.9 History of Interpretation: Muslim Tradition

The period from around 600 AD through 1100 AD saw a flurry of development of theories of interpretation in the Muslim world (Ansary 2009: 91-132). Muslim doctrine consists not just of the text of the Qur’an itself but also a collection of hadiths, or sayings attributed to the Prophet Mohammed, which were added to over time (Ansary 2009: 96). This means that Muslim scholars face the added complication of needing interpretations both of the Qur’an and the hadiths.
When some question went beyond what was contained in the Qur’an or the hadiths, the task of interpretation fell to the ulama, scholars who were experts on the Qur’an and the hadiths (Ansary 2009: 98). The method used was qiyas, or analogical reasoning, based in part on reading the works of ancient philosophers, including Plato and Aristotle (Ansary 2009: 96-100). Historian Tamim Ansary writes “…for each unprecedented contemporary situation, scholars had to find an analogous one in classical sources and derive a judgment parallel to the one already made. And if ambiguities arose about the way to apply qiyas, the matter was settled by ijma, the consensus of the community” (Ansary 2009: 97). If even this failed, then the scholars were to find an answer based on their own logical reasoning (Ansary 2009: 97). We see the tradition of theories of interpretation was being carried out in the Muslim world in a sophisticated and systematic way—and in a way that drew directly on the work of canonical ancient philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle.

In these debates across different religions around the world we see certain similar lines of enquiry beginning to emerge: questions about whether meaning should be restricted to the words themselves taken to the letter, questions about how we can resolve ambiguity in texts, and questions about if we can recognize meanings that go beyond the words themselves. We also see debates about whether texts come from the writer or from a mysterious or supernatural force. These are all questions I will return to and advance positions on throughout the following chapters.

1.3 Puzzles of Interpretation

These questions about interpretation are not mere abstractions that begin and end in the philosopher’s chair. How one answers these sorts of questions has
consequences for how one lives one’s life. This happened in interpretations of Homer or religious texts. Interpretation can have straightforward and wide-reaching consequences for other contemporary cases as well.

The questions we saw raised in the religious texts above also arise in legal texts. Imagine you are a judge tasked with determining the meaning of the words ‘by the state’ in the Affordable Care Act. You read that in Section 1311 of the Affordable Care Act, the insurance health exchange is defined as a “governmental agency or nonprofit entity that is established by a state” (Kliff 2012). You hear an argument that this language demonstrates the “congressional intent” (119) that the Affordable Care Act issue reimbursements only for insurance bought on the state exchanges – a claim that if true would lead to the collapse of the Affordable Care Act. You also hear an argument that “The clear intention of the health-care law is to provide consumers with tax credits to purchase quality, affordable health coverage through either a state or a federally-facilitated exchange” (Kliff 2012). How should you rule? Is the meaning of a law fully expressed by the words themselves or must we defer to the intentions of the lawmakers? How are we to learn of those intentions? What criteria should you use to go about making this decision?

Questions of interpretation even arise in art restoration. Imagine that you are tasked with cleaning a marble statue of a young Italian bride who died in childbirth. It is 500 years old and is covered in dust from spending that time in a dank tomb, which it was made for. What should be your approach to cleaning it? You consider this question as you gaze at the statue. As you look at it, you realize that the dust gives it a sort of charm. It makes it clear that the statue is many hundreds of years old. You step away
and look at the statue from a distance. As you move back, you realize that not only does the dust give it a sort of charm, but the dust actually enhances the sculpture as a work of art. This is because the dust has settled in the cracks of the piece, making them more definite. It has gathered around the eyelids and in the contours of the face of the woman, making them more defined and easier to see. It has gathered in the folds of her dress, bringing the fabric more dimension than it would have if it were totally clean. Then you think, “Perhaps the sculptor knew the dust would gather this way, and intended that the statue would appear to me like this with the dust marking the passage of time since her death”. What should you do? How should you clean it? To get to the heart of the matter: what criteria should you use to go about making this decision? Should you do whatever results in a statue that looks the best to you? Should you try to do whatever the artist intended? Should you do nothing and leave it as it is now? Although this topic on the face of it appears quite different I will argue that is has much in common with the religious and legal cases.

The answers to such questions require a theory of interpretation. An ideal theory of interpretation is one that is grounded in clear theoretical and empirical footing, general enough to have broad flexibility but specific enough that it can be brought to bear on individual real-world cases. In Chapter 5 I will return to a marble statue like this one, and detail what happened to the statue when the Italian Directorate for Fine Arts decided it should be cleaned. I will discuss in Chapter 5 the interpretation of the wording of the Affordable Care Act, which went before the Supreme Court. I will also discuss a number of other cases including the restoration of the Sistine Chapel ceiling, metaphor in Homer, a rap song that contains lyrics that may or may not be a true
threat, a footstool from the tomb of King Tutankhamen, and many other examples.

Each of the cases I will discuss presents a certain type of interpretive puzzle.

By the time we arrive at these puzzles I will have presented a framework that I will have argued can help us resolve them. But before we can return to discuss specific cases, I will turn now for the next four chapters to present the necessary theoretical and empirical arguments and details to allow us to return to the world of things on secure footing.
Chapter 2
Intentionalism & Interpretation

2.1 The Place for Intentionalism

In this chapter I will argue for the intentionalist view of meaning against what I view as its two most robust alternatives: the audience model and the code model. I will argue against the audience model and the code model of interpretation. I will then present and begin to argue for an intentionalist view of meaning grounded in the work of H. P. Grice. This provides the foundation of the positive proposal for the interpretive framework that I present that I present in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4 I will defend the intentionalist view from a number of objections. I will apply the positive interpretive framework to real-world cases in Chapters 5 & 6.

2.2 The Audience Model

The vestiges of early theories of interpretation have perhaps been the most persistent with respect to theories of literature interpretation, where see that many of the issues that arose in the earlier debates about interpretation of Homer and religious texts emerge again here. In this chapter I argue against the audience model and the code model. These names are my own and meant to capture the spirit of what I see as the two most robust alternatives to the Gricean model. The audience model is roughly the idea that the audience is the final arbiter of what something means. On the audience model we might come to the conclusion that when we encounter a novel “what the reader does...renders the author’s intention relevant” and determine that “the most interesting question has ceased to be the author’s intentions” (Pappas 1989: 325). These are both anti-intentionalist stances: they support the view that “reference to
artistic intentions and the biography of the artist are never relevant to the interpretation of the meaning of artworks” (Carroll 2001b: 190). The theories I discuss here have their nuances but I categorize them under these headings to capture some truth about what unites them together and to highlight the fact that in interpretation we are basically left with three options for what is the bearer of meaning: the audience, the speaker, or the content itself.

2.2.1 The Audience Model: Gadamer

Hans Gadamer presented a attack on intentionalist theory of interpretation in his 1960 publication Truth and Method, which was sustained in later works and by his followers (Puolakka 2009; Hirsch 1965; Gadamer 1960/1988). The line of reasoning taken by Hans Gadamer is that we are essentially faced with two options: either 1) the text means what the author intended it to mean, or 2) the text means what the audience interprets it to mean. Gadamer’s view is grounded in the historicism of Heidegger. He argues the meaning of some text cannot lie in the recreation of an author’s meaning because this overlooks the fact that each interpretation of a text is constrained by the interpreter’s own historicity (Hirsch 1965). That is, on Gadamer’s view, the history and tradition of the time of the interpreter inexorably shape the interpreter’s perspective. Thus, as interpreters, we can only understand the meaning of a work in relation to our own situation – we cannot “escape our own understanding”. This objection is often called “the hermeneutic circle”. The upshot is that because interpreters are always rooted in some time or other, they can never properly interpret objects from another time.
Literary Theorist E. D. Hirsch (1965) has responded to Gadamer’s criticism by stating that Gadamer’s view conflates the meaning of a work with the significance of a work. On Hirsch’s view, and the view I will advocate here, the meaning of a work is constituted by the author’s intentions and the significance of a work is constituted by the ways the work may speak to the interpreter’s own life. According to Hirsch, Gadamer mistakenly supposes that textual meaning can somehow exist independently of some author or interpreter (Hirsch 1965). Hirsch sees Gadamer’s view as destructive in its implications. To view the text as Gadamer does – as an autonomous piece of language the interpretation of which is an infinite process – is to commit oneself to the position that the text does not have a determinate meaning. Gadamer attempts to avoid this conclusion by conceiving of a text’s meaning as changing in time. However, such a position overstates the amount of homogeneity one finds at a time, or even within some tradition at a time. Without a stable norm to appeal to, we arrive at the undesirable conclusion that a text means nothing in particular.

2.2.3 The Audience Model: Barthes

In the work of prolific author and Critic Roland Barthes, who lived and worked in France during the mid-20th Century, we see at one point in time him holding a view that looks more like the audience model and at other times Barthes holding a view that looks more like the code model. I will discuss his work in reverse chronological order to lead us from the audience model to the code model.

In his well-known 1977 article “Death of the Author”, Roland Barthes described the state of interpretation as he saw it at the time,

The author still reigns in histories of literature, biographies of writers, interviews, magazines, as in the very consciousness of men of letters anxious to unite their person and their work through diaries and memoirs. The image of literature to be
found in ordinary culture is tyrannically centered on the author, his person, his life, his tastes, his passions, while criticism still consists for the most part in saying that Baudelaire’s work is the failure of Baudelaire the man, Van Gogh his madness, Tchaikovsky’s his vice. The explanation of a work is always sought in the man or woman who produced it (143).

For Barthes, centering a work on the author, as was done in the prevailing tradition of biographical criticism, is a “tyranny” – an imposition on the reader that requires fixing interpretation to only one meaning (148). Barthes argues instead for the “birth of the reader”, which allows for the “multiplicity” of interpretations the reader brings to bear on a work (148).

Barthes arrived at his “Death of the Author, Birth of the Reader” position after first advocating a position focused on the text itself. In his earlier work Barthes drew directly on semiotic theories, the “science of signs” which I will explain in detail later in the chapter (Barthes 1990; Allen 2003; Barthes 2005; Svendsen 2006).

In the 1950s and 1960s Barthes embarked on a project in which he attempted to provide a theory of meaning in dress in the semiotic tradition. Barthes’s project was one of identifying ‘links’ between signifiers, or things that carry meaning ("a woman’s suit, a pleat, a clip brooch, gilt buttons, etc.") and signifieds, the meaning conveyed ("romantic, nonchalant, cocktail party, countryside, skiing, feminine youth, etc.") (Barthes 2005: 42). Toward this end, he engaged in a sort of field research survey of fashion magazines, Elle and Jardin des Modes from June 1958 to June 1959, identifying correlations or associations between aspects of clothing and words in the corresponding description of the ensemble.

Among other things, Barthes had difficulty with developing an account of the signs that was narrow enough to capture the range of meanings that some ensemble in
a context could convey, but broad enough that general meanings emerged. Barthes acknowledged these problems, writing, “Unfortunately, the fashion magazine very often gives me links where the signifier is purely graphic (this nonchalant ladies’ suit, this elegant dress, the casual two-piece); I then do not have any way – unless intuitively – to decide just what in this suit, in this dress or in the two-piece signifies nonchalance, elegance or casualness” (Barthes 2005: 44). By the time this work was published in the 1960s Barthes considered it a failure (Svendsen 2006). After this work on fashion Barthes shifts from discussing interpretation in terms of signs to his audience-centered view of the 1970s (Allen 2003).

2.3 The Code Model

Although Roland Barthes moved on after he found that code-like meanings failed to capture what we get across with bodily adornment, this was by no means the only—or the last—foray into such attempts to structure meanings in terms of codes. In this section I will detail the major movements from the 20th Century to capture meaning in terms of codes, also called ‘signs’ or ‘symbols’. In this section I will argue against the position that meaning can be fully explained in terms of codes. I will conclude that a code-based model of meaning on its own can never capture all we want a theory of meaning to capture, regardless of how it is reincarnated. This will then lead us into the final part of the chapter on intentionalism.

2.3.1 The Code Model: Beardsley

Working roughly contemporaneously with Gadamer and Barthes and on the same sorts of issues was Monroe Beardsley, who argued in favor of code-like meaning
and against an intentionalist position (Wimsatt & Beardsley 1946; Beardsley 1992; Wreen 2014). Beardsley argues that “the belief that a text means what its author meant is not sensible” (1992: 25) and “the design or intention of the author is neither available nor desirable as a standard for judging the success of a work of literary art” (Wimsatt & Beardsley 1946: 468). Beardsley takes the position that “literary works are self-sufficient entities” (1992: 24) and rejects an intentionalist picture for what he sees as its three fatal flaws: 1) certain ‘unintended’ aspects of a work can be interpreted, 2) the meaning of a text can change after its author has died, and 3) a text can have meanings that its author is not aware of (1992: 25-26).

To argue for the first point Beardsley gives examples that he sees as illustrating the fact that some texts “have been formed without the agency of an author” but that “nevertheless have a meaning and can be interpreted” (1992: 25). He provides instances of a number of slips of the tongue such as,

1) ‘Jensen argued like a man filled with righteous indigestion’ (1992: 26)

and a poem “composed” by a computer:

2) ‘While life reached evilly through empty faces
While space flowed slowly o’ver idle bodies
And stars flowed evilly on vast men
No passion smiled’ (1992: 26).

Beardsley takes these examples to demonstrate that “There are textual meanings without authorial meanings. Therefore textual meaning is not identical to authorial meaning” (1992: 26).
With respect to the ‘righteous indigestion’ example we can identify, as savvy interpreters, that what this speaker likely intended to say was ‘Jensen argued like a man filled with righteous indignation’, or, if the circumstances were right, that the speaker was making a joke that played on the appearance of a verbal slip. There is no doubt that word meanings and what speakers get across by using those words can vastly differ. Consider something as simple as saying ‘She’s a good philosopher’. When uttered in a specific context I convey which woman is a good philosopher. The meaning I manage to get across outstrips the words I used. There clearly is a difference between the words that are spoken and what is gotten across with those words on some occasion of utterance. This fact itself does not point to the primacy of the speaker or the audience in bridging that gap.

Now, there may have been a reason that Beardsley chose an example that may have been a “Freudian slip of the tongue” to illustrate his point: he may believe that in such instances we have special reason to look to the words themselves and not the speaker’s conscious intentions to work out what they meant. Beardsley does not, however, go into such detail with this example but there is something special about such “Freudian slips” that is worth exploring and that I will discuss in detail in the final chapter.

With respect to the poem that was ‘composed’ by a computer it seems fair to say that the words of this poem are vaguely evocative, although certainly it is not a masterpiece. What seems most relevant to this poem is in what sense it was ‘composed’ by a computer. As far as I know my computer has never written a poem. Something special happened to get this composition. Unfortunately Beardsley does not provide
details on the poem but surely someone had to create a program that would create poems and that would hold certain things fixed. Some effort must have been made so that there was syntactic coherence, and the input of words must have been generated from some source, perhaps other poems. In short, I would say that this poem was created by the computer programmer who wrote the code and selected the input, not by the computer itself. It is human intention that leads to the somewhat evocative nature of these words.

From here Beardsley moves on to illustrate his second point point that “the meaning of a text can change after its author has died” by giving an example from a 1744 poem by Mark Akenside,

3) ‘Yet, by immense benignity inclin’d
To spread about him that primeval joy
Which fill’ d himself, he rais’d his plastic arm’ (1992: 26)

Beardsley points out that because today the meaning of ‘plastic arm’ is quite different from what it was in 1744—when it would have meant ‘malleable arm’—it then “follows that textual meanings are not the same thing as authorial meanings” (1992: 26). However, although if I said ‘plastic arm’ today I’d likely be referring to something like a dismembered Barbie doll, this does not change what the poem means. The meaning of the poem remains fixed. Does Beardsley really mean to say that this poem now refers to some sort of child’s toy? This seems to be an absurd conclusion.

Finally, in arguing for his third point, that “a text can have meanings that its author is not aware of” (1992: 26), Beardsley cites a passage from his sparring partner
on this issue, E. D. Hirsch who writes “...it is very possible to mean what one is not conscious of meaning” (Beardsley 1992: 27; Hirsch 1967: 22). Hirsch uses this to support his conclusion that “there are usually components of an author’s intended meaning that he is not conscious of” (Beardsley 1992: 27). This point echoes the example he used in arguing for his first point of the ‘indigestion’ Freudian slip. The idea is that our subconscious somehow reveals itself despite what we consciously intend to get across. I see this not as a reason to push us toward Beardsley’s notion of textual meaning but a special case for authorial meaning that needs to be considered. I will return to discuss these and other similar examples in Chapter 8 in a section on objects of interpretation that seem to reveal the creator’s subconscious states.

Having taken himself to have established a principled difference between textual meaning and authorial meaning, Beardsley concludes that the aim of literary interpretation is usually to uncover textual meaning. Beardsley writes that he sees textual meaning as being what will lead readers to enjoy it the most—which Beardsley sees as being the ultimate aim of interpretation (32-34). In this way he moves from his starting points and arguments for the code model and ultimately ends up with a position that sounds a bit like the audience model. Beardsley does note that there are exceptions to this that will sometimes allow in the authorial meaning of a work, further blending together the three viable positions on meaning—and in the process obscuring what his position is. However, despite this apparent laxity in his theory, Beardsley finally declares in a punchy conclusion that there is “no need for an author to hover about like a nervous cook” (1992: 36). It seems that in the end Beardsley wants the benefits of each theory without bearing the consequence of committing himself.
2.3.1 The Code Model: Saussure

The root of the position that meaning can be fully explained in terms of codes, is in the Saussurean theory of signs. Modern linguistics has its foundations in the development of semiotics, especially in the works of Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure, and his theories first put forward in an 1894 manuscript and later published posthumously in 1916 in his Course in General Linguistics (Allen 2003; Barthes 2006; Chandler 2007: 2). Saussure developed a theory of signs in which signifiers are correlated with signifieds; that is, in which some thing—such as, say, a garment or a word—stands for some concept—such as, say, chastity. These two together constitute a sign. This basic notion has been used ever since as a grounding for theories of linguistic and non-linguistic interpretation. It is precisely this notion that Barthes drew on in his project on meaning in fashion.

For Saussure a crucial aspect of the relationship between signifier and signified is that the signifier bears an arbitrary relation to the concept signified (Chandler 2007: 22). This is seen in almost all words (except onomatopoeias). For instance, in English the word 'chastity' means chastity; this same concept is expressed in Norwegian by 'kyskhet', in Croatian by 'djevičanstvo'. The fact that different languages have different words for the same concept shows that there is nothing special about the sounds of the words themselves and the concepts they stand for. This is what Saussure means by signs being arbitrary.
2.3.2 The Code Model: Peirce

Charles Peirce, an American philosopher, also working around the start of the 20th Century developed his own theory of semiology independently of Saussure (Chandler 2007). The aspect of Peirce’s theory that has been drawn on the most is his distinction between the three ways signs and objects can be tied together: his framework of icons, indexes, and signs (Bauer 2013: 13; Crossland 2014). Some sign can be tied to some object “through similarity (i.e. iconically), through an existent relation (i.e. indexically), and through convention (i.e. symbolically)” (Crossland 2014: 43). For example, a fire may signify the sun iconically because of their relative color and warmth, smoke may signify fire indexically because of the causal link between the two, and a flame may signify the Olympics symbolically because of an established convention (Crossland 2014: 44). One important point of contrast between Peircean and Saussurean semiology is that Peircean signs need not be arbitrary, where Saussurean signs must be arbitrary (Crossland 2014: Bauer 2013). This means that although smoke may signify fire indexically for Peirce, smoke cannot be a signal for fire for Saussure because the connection between is causal, not arbitrary. Peirce’s theory is still used today, perhaps most extensively in archaeology (Wiessner 1983; Conkey 2001; Lewis-Williams 2002; Trigger 2006; Preucel 2010; Rossano 2010; Bauer 2013; Crossland 2014), which I will discuss in detail in Chapter 6.

2.3.4 The Code Model: Linguistic Theory

A later incarnation of the code view of communication was presented by Shannon & Weaver (1949) who advocated for the view that a message is encoded in a
signal, which is transmitted to a receiver who decodes the signal and thereby obtains the message. A code will develop when both senders and receivers are in a situation where they benefit if a signal is sent and appropriately responded to (Lewis 1969, Godfrey-Smith 2014; Godfrey-Smith Forthcoming). Signals acquire meanings after many iterations of this process, whereby some signal becomes systematically associated with some particular state of the world (Lewis 1969, Skyrms 2010: 34). This is presented as a starting point for understanding all communication.

Although it may capture some part of rudimentary animal communication and some very basic parts of human communication, when carried over to explain the whole of human communication the code model becomes problematic. Although a very limited number of human communications may follow something similar to the code model, the flaw is in thinking that these outlier cases provide the core of human communication from which we simply need to add a few embellishments to our theory.

The code model lends itself well to technical analysis and does capture some part of communication but the sorts of utterances and behaviors that cannot be accounted for by the code model abound (Sperber & Wilson 1986). Consider the following examples of quotidian human communication:

(a) ‘It’s raining’ (Perry 1986; Recanati 2007; Neale 2007)
(b) ‘I am here now’ (Perry 1979; Evans 1982)
(c) ‘I am not here right now’ (Kaplan 1989; Sidelle 1991)
(d) ‘The President is here now’
(e) ‘Coffee would keep me awake’ (Sperber & Wilson 1986)
(f) ‘Mr. X’s command of English is excellent, and his attendance at tutorials has been regular’ (Grice 1989)
(g) ‘You’re the cream in my coffee’ (Grice 1989)
(h) ‘If you see something, say something’
(i) ‘John told Paul that Ringo lost his drumsticks’ (Neale forthcoming b)
It is these sorts of utterances and behaviors that a full theory of communication ought to have the machinery to explain. There is simply not enough contained in the “words themselves” of the examples (a)-(m) to capture the full meaning of any of these acts on some particular occasion of use.

For example, expressions (a)-(c) are not truth evaluable as is; that is, in order to evaluate the proposition expressed as true or false, some information not present in the “words themselves” is required. An utterance of (a) on some occasion somehow manages to express the proposition that it is raining in some particular location and not in others (Perry 1986; Recanati 2007; Neale 2007). For if the utterance meant simply that it is raining somewhere, it might never be false (Neale 2007). Expressions (b) and (c) cannot be evaluated as true or false except when considered at some time, in some location, uttered by one person (Perry 1979; Evans 1982). Definite descriptions such as in (d) change their referent as the person who meets the description changes (Russell 1905; Kripke 1980; Devitt & Sterelny 1987; Neale 1990). I will not detail the problems for (e)-(m) here but I hope it can be inferred from the examples the sorts of obstacles they present for the code model. If we take it that our explanations of communication are meant to explain what we in fact do when we communicate, demonstrating that there are a number of utterances that are not explained by this model is adequate to show the model does not meet its stated aim (Sperber & Wilson 1986).
2.5 Details on Codes

It could be argued that the code model describes a different phenomena – a narrow subset of a sort of communication that arises in specific cases. Some candidate cases might be the sexton lighting one lantern if the British are coming by land and two if they are coming by sea (Lewis 1969), a hand raised in class to indicate the desire to ask a question or a teen wearing a particular color to indicate affiliation with a gang.

In all of these cases there is a reason particular to the circumstances which makes a signal more suited to communication than a linguistic utterance: for Revere it is a matter of time and distance, in the classroom it is a matter of ordering utterances to prevent interruptions and for the gang member it is a matter of conveying a message to some specific receivers but not to others. In all of the cases there are a very limited number of messages that can be conveyed within the code: for Revere the possibilities are no attack, land attack, sea attack; for the student the possibilities are question or no question; for the gang member the possibilities are limited—perhaps in his community he has the options to signal that he is a member of the Norteños, a member of the Soreños, or has no gang affiliation.

In considering the sorts of instances in which we use code-like meaning to communicate—the Paul Revere case, wearing gang signs, raising a hand in class—we see that a number of the same sorts of conditions are present and which lead to the success of codes in that environment.

1) First, and perhaps most importantly, there must be a limited, and concrete range of possibilities of the meaning of the sign or signal that both sender and receiver know (to use the Skyrms/Godfrey-Smith terminology). For the
sexton and Revere the options are the British are coming by land, the British are coming by sea, or the British are not currently coming. For raising one’s hand in class the options are that a student does or does not have a question. These are very limited.

2) Second, there must be a clear distinction between sending the signal or not sending the signal. A torch is lit or it isn’t. A student’s hand is raised or it isn’t. In the circumstances where a student is unsure about the question, their hand may be in a position that is somewhere between the two. We see this as failing to follow the conditions of the signal and might ask, “Is that a hand?”.

3) The physical circumstances of the signal must make it the case that a signal is preferable to other forms of communication. In most of the examples I have considered here the signal is a visual signal rather than an auditory one. Visual signals—such as Revere’s lights or gang colors—transmit their message across time to a wide audience. One’s hand is raised in class to avoid verbal interruptions. A simple ‘check’ is said in chess where there is not ordinarily talking to allow the players to concentrate. Until that point the communication is happening with the visually-perceived chess pieces. Having this signal be auditory breaks that spell. The rigidity of what is said helps to ensure both players agree on whether or not the rules were followed.

4) Fourth and finally, it is necessary that each of these signals be correctly isolated from surrounding noise in order for the model to function properly. This isolation mechanism may arise naturally, if, say, for Revere, there is no lighted tower next to the sexton’s and the sexton never uses a lamp in the bell tower at
night for any reason other than to signal to Paul Revere. One reason ‘check’ works in chess is that it is not often that we utter this phrase on its own in conversation. Something like ‘sorry’ or ‘whoops’ would not work. This can, of course, be confused. If we are playing chess in a restaurant and have finished our meal and I utter ‘check’ something beyond this utterance itself makes it the case that I am signaling that I am about to win or that I would like the bill. That is, in such circumstances, in interpreting this behavior, you must make an evaluation about which code I am following at the moment, the chess code or the waiter code. Something as seemingly simple as where I am making eye contact could resolve the matter.

In summary, code-like meanings are feasible when the following conditions hold: 1) a limited range of communicated contents, 2) clear delineation between signals and no signal, 3) amenable physical circumstances, 4) a lack of noise.

This should, I hope, make it clear that much of human communication cannot be explained in terms of the code model. It is not often that the conditions I outlined here obtain. A theory that seeks to explain the full range of human communication should not start with the code model as basic and work up from there with the thought that instances that require appeal to intention are “problem cases”—rather, in seeking to understand human behavior we should instead see the code model as a limited case of communication that sometimes arises in certain circumstances.

At the same time, codes should still be understood in terms of recognizing that someone intends to send a particular coded signal. In cases where there is ambiguity about what I mean by ‘check’ or if it is not clear whether or not I am raising my hand
this is resolved in terms of considering my intentions. The reason conscious human signals have meaning is in virtue of the sender’s intention. As E. D. Hirsch writes in his own discussion of the code model, the ideas that “linguistic signs can somehow speak their own meaning” is “a mystical idea that has never been persuasively defended” (Hirsch 1967: 23). As I hope to have made clear, to say that much human communication cannot be explained in terms of codes is not to commit oneself to the view that there are not isolated and limited instances in which recognition of adherence to a code is sufficient to explain successful communication. What we should do is seek to isolate various types of communication—the type that requires recognition that the speaker is adhering to a code, as I have been discussing here—and the type that requires recognition of the speaker’s particular intentions on that occasion of utterance, which I will discuss in the next chapter. If it appears that they can work in tandem—as seems to be the case if proponents on both sides do not overstep their bounds—we can view them as joint and mutual projects toward the broader aim of understanding fully communication and meaning.
Chapter 3
Interpretive Framework

3.1 An Interpretive Framework

In previous chapters I have argued that a code-based model of meaning will not adequately serve to fully explain the range of communicative practices we engage in. In this chapter I will argue for my positive account.

3.2 Grice: The Intentional Model

It should be clear from the previous chapter that we need something that goes beyond the code model if we are to have a theory that can explain the full range of communicative acts we routinely engage in. What is needed here is an account that explains communication in terms of a hearer recognizing a speaker’s intentions. Adding this more nuanced intention-based component to our understanding of meaning allows us to account for what humans do when they communicate. It allows us to address the types of cases that I have raised as a challenge for the advocate of the code model.

The intentionalist view of meaning is roughly that what some production means is best understood as what its creator intended it to mean (Carroll 2000). This view was most comprehensively put forward in the field of philosophy of language by H. P. Grice. In works such as “Meaning”, “Logic & Conversation”, “Utterer’s Meaning & Intention” (Grice 1989), Grice presents a theory of speaker meaning. Speaker meaning captures how a speaker can write something such as “Mr. X’s command of English is excellent, and his attendance at tutorials has been regular” in a letter of recommendation and thereby mean “Mr. X is no good at philosophy” (Grice 1989: 33). In such instances we
pick up on the speaker’s intentions that the meaning we are to understand goes far beyond the words themselves.

The keystone of Grice’s theory of how this works is his Cooperative Principle. The Cooperative Principle is the notion that conversational partners will make their “conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange” (Grice 1989: 29). Speakers and hearers assume this principle holds in a “quasi-contractual matter” (29). Further, Grice writes that “On the assumption that some such general principle as this is acceptable, one may perhaps distinguish four categories under one or another of which will, in general, yield results in accordance with the Cooperative Principle” (26). The Cooperative Principle is met by interlocutors observing its “attendant” (28) conversational maxims of Quantity, Quality, Relation and Manner – that is, roughly, that each utterance should be the appropriate length, be true, be relevant, and be stylistically appropriate, with various caveats. Hearers interpret according to these maxims; utterers produce utterances with the expectation that hearers will interpret according to these maxims (Grice 1989; Neale 1992; Neale forthcoming b; Johnson 2016).

For Grice, what an utterer means on a given occasion by uttering something, X, is constitutively determined by the utterer’s communicative intentions in uttering X. (Grice 1989; Neale 1992). Grice formulates the exact conditions for meaning in a number of ways but for our purposes it is sufficient to say that Grice’s account should be understood in the following way (which is a slight modification of the account presented by Sperber & Wilson (2015: 118)): 
“In order to mean something by an utterance, the utterer must intend the
addressee,
1) to produce a particular response \( r \)
2) to think (recognize) that the utterer intends (1)
3) to fulfill (1) at least partly on the basis of his fulfillment of (2)”

The intended response may be a mental response, such as coming to believe
something, or an external performative response, such as shutting the door (Austin 1962;
Searle 1969; Bach & Harnish 1979; Bach 1987). Furthermore, the speaker must believe
the hearer is “capable in the circumstances of having certain thoughts and drawing
certain conclusions”, for, “it is in general true that one cannot have intentions to
achieve results which one sees no chance of achieving” (Grice 1989: 98). In other words,
in order to form genuine intentions the speaker is constrained in some way—he cannot
have a genuine intention to do just anything. I will say more about this point when I
consider objections to the Gricean project in the following chapter.

Grice explains communication in contexts of mutual benefit; this is a component
of his Cooperative Principle. He clarifies this point by noting that the sort of mutual
benefit he has in mind is “some common immediate aim, like getting a car mended”.
He does note however that the Cooperative Principle does not entail that speakers and
hearers share all goals (Grice 1989: 29; Johnson 2016). Interlocutors may have different
desires with respect to the ultimate outcome of the conversation (Grice 1989: 29;
Johnson 2016). On Grice’s view two people cooperating to mend a car meet the
conditions required for his Cooperative Principle even if they each intend to drive off
and leave the other even once the car is fixed (Grice 1989: 29). I will also say more
about this in the next chapter.
3.3 Interpretive Groups

If we say that, following the Gricean line, there is a class of meaning that is best understood as what some creator intended we now have the full range of tools we need to explain the variety of our communicative acts. We can acknowledge that there is this communicative category and that there is another communicative category that is best understood in terms of codes.

In talk of meaning and interpretation a range of varied phenomena is often grouped under the category of the “author’s intention” (Iseminger 1992: ix). Such a classification obscures the important differences in the varying sorts of intentions that underlie object production, and the corresponding variance in the proper interpretive process with respect to those objects. With the tools I have now argued for I seek to redress this overly broad picture of intentions by carving up the conceptual space of interpretation into five groups. This account will allow us to explain the full range of interpretive phenomena we encounter across a range of disciplines.

I have up to this point been discussing what I see as the two types of ways communicative meaning is conveyed: on the code model and on the Gricean model. In interpretation I believe there are three other relevant categories that are not communicative. These additional categories are, first, objects and features that result because of some non-communicative intention. For instance, I recently sliced a nectarine and ate it from a bowl. I am alone in my apartment. This act was not done with any communicative intention. If my neighbor is spying at me from across the street he may of course interpret this behavior. He may ask himself ‘why is she eating that
fruit? This may be something as simple as ‘she was hungry and wanted a snack’. If, say, I had recently come home from a dinner party with a neighbor where I turned down even a bite of his meatloaf surprise because I said I simply was feeling too sick to have a bite of anything, he might find more significance in observing my behavior. A snoopy neighbor does not change the fact that I had no intention to communicate with this act. In the process of creating this snack I also made it so that there is now juice and a pit on a cutting board. This was in a sense an intentional act, but the object of my intention was on preparing the rest of the nectarine so I could eat it. The fact that there is now juice and a pit is a byproduct of this other act. A neighbor who spied on this and thought ‘why did she put that pit and juice on the cutting board?’ would not find the answer on the cutting board but in the other room where I happily ate my nectarine. The final category that is important are those results of my action that I have no control over. By this time some microscopic mold spores have likely already landed on the fruit and started to grow. I have no intentions about this happening or not happening and have no control over this process. Thus, we see that in a process of interpretation there are three categories that are relevant beyond the communicative categories I have detailed, the products of: 1) non-intentional actions, 2) intentional byproduct actions, and 3) use-intentional actions.

Having these categories at hand allows us to refine a notion of meaning that goes beyond simple talk of “author’s intentions”’. I argue that aspects of objects of interpretation ought to be grouped into categories distinguished by the type of intention that was involved in their production. These are: 1) non-intentionally produced aspects, 2) intentional byproduct aspects, 3) use-intentionally produced aspects, 4) signaling-intentionally produced aspects, 5) meaning-intentionally produced aspects.
aspects. Examples of things that fall under each category are: 1) smoke, clouds, coughs, volcanic ash, mold spores on a pit 2) fabric remnants, bronze molds, wood chippings, sketches, visible brushstrokes in an Ingres painting, a pit on a cutting board 3) handaxes, walls, hairbrushes, humming, fruit in a bowl 4) road signs, lilies in a medieval painting, gang colors, bee dances, hieroglyphs, 5) letters of recommendation, jokes, metaphor, visible brushstrokes in a Monet painting. One object may have the aspects in any combination, and in any quantity from one to five. Examples illustrating these divisions are in the table on the following page.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mold on a nectarine pit</td>
<td>Nectarine pit</td>
<td>Sliced nectarine</td>
<td>Adam and Eve by Albrecht Dürer</td>
<td>Basket of Fruit by Caravaggio</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Fig. 1** Intentional Aspect Examples, Nectarine
I have explained in the sections above why the first three examples in this chart are in their respective categories. These are the noncommunicative levels. Although in the three examples I gave with the nectarine I was not intending to communicate with anyone, a nectarine could of course be used in a communicative way. I could set one on the kitchen counter to remind me to make a fruit salad to bring to a party. I could throw one at George Bush in protest of the Iraq War. One context where fruit is regularly used in a communicative way is in art. Apples are often seen as a sign of sin or temptation, evoking the story of Adam and Eve. This is the significance of the fruit in Albrecht Dürer’s *Adam and Eve*, which I have used here as an example of Group 4. In interpreting the apples in this painting we need not know anything specific about Durer or what he intended to communicate with this work, beyond recognizing that he is intending to follow this general code that apples represent temptation. There is nothing about this painting that indicates Durer intends to use this symbol in anything other than the conventional way.

In Caravaggio’s *Basket of Fruit* we see the apple used in a different way. We are accustomed to seeing still lifes where the items depicted are in perfect condition—and viewers of this work would be even more so. When we notice that in this work Caravaggio has chosen to depict a rotting apple we recognize that he is in some way flouting the ordinary convention of what the apple symbolizes. To work out what he intends to get across we cannot rely on the ordinary code meaning of apples in art; we must learn something about what his specific intentions were on this occasion. Art historians have proposed that this work is intended to be a commentary on the rottenness of the church.
The table on the following page gives another set of examples of the five groups from different points in time. I will discuss some of these examples in greater detail in later sections. For now I would like to quickly explain what feature it is in each instance that I would like to draw attention to. The first example is from the Sistine Chapel ceiling. We see in the image I provide that there is a dark spot that does not seem to be a part of the work itself. This dark spot occurred with the passage of time is not a part of Michelangelo’s intention. In the detail of Princess de Broglie we see some slightly visible brushstrokes. It was the stated intention of the artist, Jean Ingres, that his work never show the hand of the artist. Indeed, it was difficult to find a place on the work that showed visible brushstrokes. In creating this work Ingres had an intention to depict a woman in a certain way; he did not want the brushstrokes to be visible in this depiction. That they are visible is a byproduct of his other intentional actions. Prehistoric handaxes were created to be used in a number of ways by early hominids. It does not seem that they were used in a communicative way, and thus are members of Group 3. I will however, explore this further in Chapter 6 in discussing how handaxes should be interpreted. In Ecce Ancilla Domini by Dante Rossetti we see a white lily being used as a symbol of the Virgin Mary. The white lily is used in a code-like way as was the apple above. In the final example we see a piece by Claude Monet. In this work the brushstrokes are visible. They are so visible, in fact, that it seems it was part of Monet’s intention that they were visible. This means that the brushstrokes in the work contrast with those in the painting by Ingres. However, that the brushstrokes are visible in the Monet painting does not have a code-like meaning. We must, rather, learn something about the artist himself and the surrounding art movements to understand what he and other impressionists intended to convey by this.
<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Vatican</td>
<td>Source: Public Domain Art</td>
<td>Source: Met Museum Website</td>
<td>Source: Tate Britain</td>
<td>Source: National Gallery Online database</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
I hope that the previous charts have made the groups clearer and will continue to work to make the groups clear in subsequent explanations and examples.

The reason it is important to understand each of these categories in a project of interpretation is because each is best interpreted by application of a particular strategy, as follows.

1) **Group 1 Physico-chemical** - use of scientific methods, tools, data measurement and analysis

2) **Group 2 Remnant** – consideration of which intentionally produced object and through which process waste could have resulted

3) **Group 3 Anthropological** - consideration of anthropological functional roles, use of group psychological attributions of what function rational humans would have had for some object

4) **Group 4 Code** – decoding based on establishing correlations or associations across symbol uses

5) **Group 5 Gricean** - recognition of complex Gricean intentions produced in accordance with the cooperative principles of communication.

I display the correspondence between the category type and proper interpretive process in the table below.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intentional Aspect</th>
<th>Interpretive Strategy</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Non-Intentional</td>
<td>Physico-chemical - use of scientific methods, tools, data measurement and analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Intentional Byproduct</td>
<td>Remnant – consideration of which intentionally produced object and through which process waste could have resulted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Use-Intentionally Produced</td>
<td>Anthropological - consideration of anthropological functional roles, use of group psychological attributions of what function rational humans would have had for some object</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Signaling-Intentional</td>
<td>Code – decoding based on establishing correlations or associations across symbol uses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Meaning-Intentional</td>
<td>Gricean - recognition of complex Gricean intentions produced in accordance with the cooperative principles of communication</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fig. 3 Diagram of Intentional Aspect and Interpretive Strategy

I now turn to provide some very brief detail on each of these groups, which I will expand on considerably by the use of examples in Chapters 5 & 6. It should be noted again that various combinations of these aspects may be found in one object.

**Group 1 – Nonintentional Aspect: Physico-chemical Interpretation Technique**

The aspects that compose Group 1 are those that were not intentionally produced. The interpretive strategy for objects in Group 1 relies on use of scientific tools and data collection to draw conclusions. For instance, certain sorts of natural events, such as volcanic eruptions, create uniform, measurable markers across a wide terrain. These sorts of markers can be used to trace when certain events occurred concurrently. In mineral or bone matter, fluorine and uranium content increase, and nitrogen content
decreases at a measurable rate over time (Roe 1970: 232). The predictable decay of such materials can be used to determine the age of some object.

**Group 2 – Intentional Byproduct; Remnant Interpretation Technique**

Group 2 aspects are those things that were produced by an agent engaged in an intentional act, and may be interpreted, but were not an object the creator meant to make. This includes those things made by man as a mere byproduct of other intentional actions, such as refuse – “the waste-products of manufacture, like, for example, the flakes of flint struck off in the shaping of an axe or an arrowhead” (Roe, 21). This also includes things the creator specifically tried to not make, or to conceal, such as evidence of the hand of the artist in visible brushstrokes in an Ingres painting.

**Group 3 – Use-Intentional Aspect; Anthropological Interpretive Technique**

Group 3 aspects are used or produced intentionally, in the sense that the object they comprise was intended to meet some specific aim by an agent with some level of foresight and planning. Group 3 aspects fall under the domain of archaeologists, who are “concerned with finding, identifying, and explaining the solid and visible traces left behind by prehistoric man” (Roe 1970: 21). Within this strategy “objects of a given class can often be placed in order of age, simply on grounds of their style, technology and refinement, in so far as they form part of a sequence of types evolving in some understandable direction” (Roe 1970: 227). It is with Group 3 aspects that we consider not just the physical properties of some matter, but cultural processes.
Group 4 – Signaling-Intentional Aspect; Code Interpretation Technique

Group 4 aspects are those that evince something beyond tool use alone: symbolic representation, created with the intention that it be interpreted. Group 4 interpretation requires use of a code. Once the intended response to some code is worked out, it may then be straightforwardly applied, and the work of interpreting some Group 4 aspect is nearly finished.

Group 5 – Meaning-Intentional Aspect; Gricean Interpretation Technique

Group 5 aspects are produced with the intention that the interpreter will recognize the author’s intention to communicate and will arrive at their interpretation at least partly on the basis of that recognition. The proper interpretive strategy of Group 5 aspects is that the interpreter aligns her perspective as closely as possible to that of the intended interpreter.

3.4 Notes on Metaphysics and Epistemology of Groups

It is important to note that these categories are not just interpretive categories: they are metaphysical categories that mean some aspect of an object is in some interpretive category in virtue of being in that metaphysical category. These aspects are in a particular metaphysical category because they came into the world through a certain type of causal process. By “came into the world” I mean became the thing that it is, not that the substance it is composed of was created.

To make this point clearer, I will put it in terms of a well known metaphysical story: that of the lump and the clay (Wiggins 1967; Baker 2000; Sider 2002; Paul 2010; Wasserman 2015). Imagine that there is an artist who brings to his studio a lump of clay
that he will mold into a statue. Let’s say he brings the clay home on Sunday and molds it into the statue on Wednesday. We would say then, that the lump of clay existed on Monday and Tuesday but the statue did not. The statue did not come into existence until Wednesday. The statue is composed of the clay but, it is clear that the statue is not identical to the clay because they have different persistence conditions; we could squish the statue thus destroying it but still have the lump of clay (Wiggins 1967; Baker 2000; Sider 2002).

This is analogous to how I propose we understand the categories I present here. Those in Group 1 play the role of the clay in the statue case: it is the material that constitutes the object. In a statue this could be clay or stone; in a painting this could be paint; in an arrow head this could be bone; in a manuscript it could be ink on paper, or pixels on a screen. Group 1 aspects are made up of the matter, regardless of whether we look at the matter as compounds or atoms and so on; there is no difference in the Group whether we consider the matter to be clay or kaolinite or $\text{Al}_2\text{Si}_2\text{O}_5(\text{OH})_4$.

A special feature of things in Group 1 is that their properties have a certain generality that can be extrapolated to all of the matter, so long as it was in sufficiently similar conditions. This is why such matter lends itself to analysis by sample. For instance, if one wishes to know the age of some paint on a wall in a cave, one need not consider every part of the paint. One need simply scrape off a small section of the paint to send it to the lab to be analyzed. Unless there are confounding factors it is reasonable to assume that the rest of the paint was put there at the same point in time. By contrast, if we wish to interpret the symbolic meaning of this painting, we must consider it as a whole. We cannot seek to understand the meaning of one part of the painting and
extrapolate to conclude that applies to the whole in the same way we could do with the paint sample. This is an important distinction between Group 1 and Groups 2, 3, 4, and 5.

In her discussion of the clay statue example Baker (2000) proposes that a lump of clay becomes “a work of art” in virtue of certain relational features it bears to a community (Sider 2002: 47). In reviewing her book Sider writes “When an artistic community treats a lump of clay as a work of art, there comes to exist an object that is essentially a statue” (Sider 2002: 47). Sider writes that Baker’s statue discussion “brings out one of the more implausible features of her ontology”, for “what there is seems to depend on human interest” and thus “she thinks we create the world” (Sider 2002: 47-48). However, when considering the statue qua art object these conclusions that Sider finds implausible seem to me to me to be the only plausible way to understand things like art objects and statues. Art objects and statues are objects of Group 4 and Group 5. They were created by an artist in an artistic community with a certain artistic intention.

3.5 Moment of Christening Intentions

In many of our creative productions there is a crucial moment of deciding that whatever we have created—be it a dissertation, a group of paintings for a solo show, or an email—is ready to be interpreted. The reason it is stressful to say that such works are complete is because we know once we have sent them off into the world people will take them as evidence of our intentions. We must carefully ensure that everything we wanted to convey is included and that there are not things included that we do not want to convey. The moment an artist brings their work to a gallery or an author gives
their work to an editor with their seal of approval to print, they are making a final evaluation and endorsement of the work. When we know creators have taken great care to hone and finalize some work we as interpreters are at greater liberty to take it that each aspect of the work was intended.

When an artist is working on a piece one of the questions they will be continually asking themselves is whether or not it is “done” – that is, whether the work is at a point where they are happy with it and ready for others to evaluate. It is usually only at this point that an artist signs a work, in part a ritualistic act that signals the work is complete.

It is tempting for one to make minor changes to a work after this point, but after it has been signed even the artist must put up with these, and as time passes the artist recognizes that the intention of the creator of the piece become increasingly unlike the artist as viewer. This of course happens to writers, including philosophers, as well. Kaplan nicely summarizes this feeling at the beginning of his “Afterthoughts”. He writes that he views himself as a different author than he was when he wrote “Demonstratives”. As he was later considering the possibility of revising it, Kaplan writes,

“Demonstratives is now being published, after all these years, in the form in which it was written and circulated for all these years…the spirit of the work – the enthusiasm, the confidence, the hesitations – has an integrity that I regard fondly. It reflects its time…For me to revise Demonstratives now would be the intrusion of a third party between the author and his audience. (Kaplan 1989: 565-566)

Kaplan chooses to leave the work as it was first published.

Many works such as paintings and philosophy papers are the result of labored decisions about when some output is complete. Although the timeline from thought to production of verbal outputs is shorter, we still hold people accountable for what they
say, and may admonish them to think before they speak—that is, to think of how the words they are saying will be interpreted. We hold people accountable for the acts they have christened complete.

This is not to say, of course, that certain features some creator did not want to appear in a work never end up there. Noel Carroll (2008) gives such an example: in the 1960 Stanley Kubrick film *Sparticus*, the men in battle are seen to be wearing watches although the film is set in the 1st Century BC. This is the result of an inattentive costume director not making sure the extras removed their watches before the scene starts. Carroll writes, “Since we know that the photographic process is automatic, abiding blindly by the laws of chemistry and optics, we understand that things appear, to the chagrin of filmmakers, in motion picture images that were never meant to be there” (Carroll 2008: 17). Because of our knowledge about the creative medium we as interpreters can hypothesize that this is an oversight and choose to disregard it in interpreting the work. If, in contrast, Kubrick had been a painter rather than a film director, painting, say, a painting of soldiers from the 1st Century BC, we can be sure that if watches were included here would be a result of his intention and thus should not be discounted when interpreting the work. The fact that there are slip ups such as the watches in *Sparticus* is a case of something getting by the final moment of christening intentions. Certainly these happen, but they do not present a “paradox” for the account.
Chapter 4
Objections to Intentionalism

4.1 Introduction

In previous chapters I have argued for a framework of categorizing objects of interpretation according to the intentions with which they were created and argued for a corresponding interpretive strategy based on those categories. In this chapter I will present common criticisms related to aspects of my positive view and argue that it can stand up to them. The objections I will consider are: 1) Anything Can Mean Anything, 2) The Audience is Always Right, 3) The Cooperative Principle is Too Demanding, 4) Context Determines Meaning, 5) Multiple Authors, and 6) Multiple Audiences. I consider these objections because they have been common in the literature and I see them as the most likely to arise in someone encountering my proposal.

4.2.1 Objection 1: Anything Can Mean Anything

The first objection I would like to consider is the claim that if some work means what the author intended it to mean, then anything can mean anything. In literary interpretation, this is an objection Beardsley advances, as described in earlier chapters (1992: 36). Beardsley held the view that “unfortunately the belief that a text means what its author meant is not sensible” (1992: 25). This is not a viewpoint that was restricted to literary theory. Similar objections can be found in the philosophy of language. John Searle, for example, in his classic Speech Acts (1969), objects that Grice’s intentional account does not place enough weight on the conventions that govern meaning.
In *Speech Acts*, Searle advocates Grice’s theory of meaning (Grice 1957) as a useful starting point, but seeks to revise it based on crucial defects he sees in the theory. Searle asserts that in privileging utterer intentions, Grice’s account does not place enough weight on the conventions or rules that play an important role in meaning. Searle provides what he believes to be a counterexample to Grice that captures this and that demonstrates the overlooked “connection between what a speaker means and what the words he utters mean” (Searle 1969: 44).

In Searle’s example, an American soldier is captured by Italian troops. In an effort to get them to come to believe he is a German soldier and release him, the soldier utters the only phrase he knows in German, “Kennst du has Land wo die Zitronen bluhen?” Searle claims that he is “disinclined” to say that “when I utter the German sentence what I mean is ‘I am a German soldier’, or even ‘Ich bin ein deutscher soldat’, because what the words mean and what I remember that they mean is ‘Knowest thou the land where the lemon trees bloom?’” (Searle 1969: 45). This is meant to demonstrate that what some utterer, U, meant by some utterance, X, is more tightly tied to what the words mean, and what the speaker remembers they mean than Grice’s theory allows. Searle then concludes that meaning cannot be merely a matter of intention, that it must be at least partly a function of the words used. And even more strongly, “One might say that on Grice’s account it would seem that any sentence can be uttered with any meaning whatever, given that the circumstances make possible the appropriate intentions. But that has the consequence that the meaning of the sentence then becomes just another circumstance” (45). In light of these problems for Grice that Searle believes he has highlighted, Searle continues to the conclusion that
Grice’s account must be amended so that what a speaker meant but uttering some string of words is not just “randomly related” (45) to the meaning of the words used.

4.2.2 Addressing Searle’s Alleged Counterexample

It seems quite strange that Searle, who spent quite a good deal of time setting up this counterexample could go on to argue that it demonstrates that any sentence could be uttered with any meaning whatsoever (45). If this were the case, Searle could have saved himself a lot of ink by having the example be, “Suppose some utterer, U, says, ‘Knowest thou the land where the lemon trees bloom?’ to some addressee, A, intending to mean, and thereby meaning, ‘I am a German soldier’”. Searle however, did not say this because without the elaborate setup it would not make sense that A could genuinely form the intention to communicate “I am a German soldier” by uttering “Knowest thou the land where the lemon trees bloom?” to just anyone.

The audience in the example had—and it was essential to the example that they had—a very particular epistemic position. They could not have been German, but had to be able to identify when German was spoken, and not notice the likely upward inflection of the question. In addition to the elaborate setup of the case, Searle includes a footnote at the bottom of this page further supporting the claim that what an utterer means by an utterance is constrained by what he can reasonably intend to be interpreted as meaning. Searle writes in that footnote, “If it seems implausible that one could intend to produce the desired effects with such an utterance in these circumstances, a few imaginative additions to the example should make the case more plausible” (44). These “imaginative additions” are that the Italian soldiers: “know there are German soldiers in the area wearing American uniforms, have been
instructed to be on the lookout for these Germans and release them as soon as they identify themselves, and lied to their commander and said they can speak German when they cannot” (Searle 1969: 44). They are included in the chart below, which shows how the American soldiers were able to formulate their communicative intention.

![American soldier holds beliefs about Italian soldiers’ interpretive capacities and tendencies in general:]
- Not fluent in German
- Can recognize German being spoken
- Will release German soldiers

![American soldier holds beliefs about Italian soldiers’ epistemic position in this particular context:]
- Know there are German soldiers in the area wearing American uniforms
- Have been instructed to be on the lookout for these Germans and release them as soon as they identify themselves
- Lied to their commander and said they can speak German when they cannot (Searle 1969: 44)

American soldier expects he will succeed in that Italian soldiers will interpret American soldier’s utterance of “Kennst du has Land wo die Zitronen bluhen?” as meaning “I am a German soldier.”

American soldier forms the genuine intention to communicate “I am a German soldier” to Italian soldiers through the uttering of “Kennst du has Land wo die Zitronen bluhen?”.

American soldier utters “Kennst du has Land wo die Zitronen bluhen?” to Italian soldiers and thereby means “I am a German soldier.”

Fig. 4 Searle American Soldier Intention Formation Chart

We can see from this chart that the formation of intentions U can have in uttering some X is importantly constrained by how the utterer expects the audience to interpret U’s uttering X. It is this fact that means that although the actual words uttered in this case could have been different; U could have uttered instead many other sentences in
German and have meant the same thing, as long as U could form genuine intention that the audience would thereby take him to mean “I am a German soldier”. The only bearing the actual meaning of the words used in X has on what U meant in uttering that X is in how this shapes U’s expectations of how A will interpret that utterance. In this case, because U thought A could not distinguish between most German words, the words of X were relatively unimportant. At the same time, although there could be many German phrases here, for this reason X should not contain any German words that the American soldier might think the Italians could recognize and realize are unrelated to being a German soldier such as if he had uttered, “Doppelganger du has Bauhaus wo die Bratwurst Zeitgeist?”

This is a very special case because the language uttered is not a language the speaker or the hearer know. In cases where X is in A’s language, U will expect the specific meaning of the words uttered to bear more directly on how A will interpret X, and thus will more closely constrain the communicative intentions U can formulate about uttering X.

Although Searle uses the American soldier example to assert that if meaning is based on the speaker’s intention, any utterance could have any meaning whatever, he actually seems to be aware of the fact I highlight: that meaning is constitutively determined by the intentions with which the utterance is uttered, which are themselves causally constrained by the speaker’s expectations and beliefs about his audience. As Grice himself notes in the discussion of this case, “one cannot in general intend that some result should be achieved, if one knows that there is no likelihood that it will be achieved” (Grice 1989: 101). It seems that Searle’s example highlights not the random,
but the particular facts about U’s beliefs about A’s epistemic position that make it the case that U can utter something, X with the genuine intention to elicit some response, R, in A. Searle’s intended counterexample is, then, an illustrative and imaginative example of Grice’s theory in action, rather than a problem for it.

4.2.3 Wild Intentions & Intending Versus Trying/Hoping/Doing

The Gricean account of meaning can get around certain objections that focus on what might be considered “wild intentions”. Before we proceed to the next objection let me provide more details on how I see this playing out. This question about the constraints on the sorts of intentions speakers may have with respect to certain utterances is not new. In a canonical 1968 paper Keith Donnellan presents an example about Humpty Dumpty in which he notes that Humpty cannot utter ‘there’s old glory for you’ and thereby mean ‘there’s a knockdown argument for you’ (Donnellan 1968: 211-213). As Donnellan writes, in making some utterance with some communicative intention,

...what the speaker means is determined by the content of that intention. Whether he can form that intention, however, may depend upon what expectations he has about his audience and their ability to grasp his intention. It does not follow, then, from this analysis that speakers might, out of the blue, mean anything at all by any utterance (Donnellan 1968: 212).

As Donnellan explains, the reason that Humpty could not mean ‘there’s a knockdown argument for you’ by uttering ‘there’s old glory for you’ is because intentions depend on the speaker’s expectations of his audience. If Humpty knows that there is no way his audience will take him to have meant ‘There’s a knockdown argument for you’ by his utterance of ‘there’s old glory for you’ he could not have formed the genuine communicative intention to get across that content with that utterance.
Many philosophers have attempted to get more precise on exactly what mental state is required to formulate an intention (Anscombe 1957; Donnellan 1968; Schiffer 1972; Neale 1992; Neale 2005; Devitt Forthcoming). As Michael Devitt (Forthcoming: 10) maps out, these vary a great deal, perhaps most importantly in whether or not the required mental state is some sort of belief that the speaker will/may/can/is likely to succeed in getting across the content of the intention or if the required mental state is a lack of the belief that the speaker will not/may not/cannot/is likely to not succeed in getting across the content of the intention. In many such discussions talk of the required mental state for an intention moves from the consideration of this question in terms of specific utterances, such as of ‘there’s old glory for you’, to other sorts of behaviors, such as attempting to swim somewhere very far (Devitt Forthcoming). As Devitt highlights, drawing on Dennellan and Schiffer, if someone’s life is at stake—such as if a woman is abandoned on a faraway island—she “might try anything however bleak she thinks the prospects of success” (Devitt Forthcoming: 10). This might seem to provide support for the idea that intentions aren’t really as constrained as Donnellan claims.

This line of reasoning raises many questions. First, an understanding of the relation between communicative intentions and general intentions is desired. How similar is it really between trying to swim to a faraway shore and trying to get across a certain meaning to an audience with an utterance? Is someone ‘trying’ something supposed to be taken as evidence of their intending? How do we distinguish between ‘trying’ something and ‘doing’ something? Does ‘trying’ require an intention? Is someone doing something supposed to be taken as evidence of their intending? If I knock a glass of water off the table does that mean I intended to knock a glass of water off the table?
Certainly figuring out the answer to all these questions would be an enormous task. I think that for our purposes what we need to do is look at what is special about some of the cases considered in the discussion, such as the example of someone trying to swim to a shore when she is stuck on an island. What is it about this example that makes it the case that she might try? The answer of course is something about how dire her situation is and how we evolved to survive.

People in burning buildings often jump out the window. It is unlikely that they believe they will survive. If someone jumping out of a building did so with the intention that they would survive we might call this a ‘wild intention’. When the stakes are high enough we might try any number of last-ditch attempts, no matter how unlikely it is we will succeed. Further, in matters of life and death rational thought may be totally surpassed by instinct.

Thankfully, most utterances aren’t life and death. There is often some balance of benefit to getting a desired meaning across and cost to not getting a desired meaning across. As Sperber and Wilson (1986; 2015) insightfully point out in their work, the fact that a speaker chose to make an utterance is evidence that he or she thought it was worth it. Except under extreme circumstances we always have the option to hold our tongues. That we do not is evidence that we thought the utterance would provide us some benefit or reduce some cost.

The costs and benefits of some utterance succeeding or failing vary with the conversational context. As I will discuss later in the chapter when I consider multiple audiences we may even wish to get a meaning across to one audience and not the other. If I am having a casual conversation with a friend I will likely feel like the cost to
saying the wrong thing is quite low. If I am on the witness stand I will likely be aware the cost to saying the wrong thing is very high. When I am formulating my utterance on the witness stand I will likely have an explicit belief that my saying something will have a certain effect. With a friend I may not consciously think about it. This is all to highlight that it seems our standards for what sort of mental state we require to have a genuine intention vary based on the circumstances of the costs and benefits of succeeding in an intention and failing in an intention. This is why philosophers have proposed accounts of intention along a range of degrees of strength, from the weakest minimum requirement of not having the belief that it is impossible to succeed, to the strongest requirement of having the belief that the speaker will succeed. This seems to be in agreement with the conclusion Devitt comes to in the discussion of this topic, where he writes "...the less a person believe that she will succeed in doing A is she tries, then, other things being equal, the less likely it is that she will intend to do A" (Devitt Forthcoming: 11).

An upshot of this idea is that if someone routinely engages in some activity that is unlikely to succeed we can take this as evidence that he or she likely perceives the cost to be less than the potential—albeit rare—benefit. This is seen in behaviors such as emails stating that a Nigerian Prince would like to transfer you five million dollars or men who try to pick up women with cheesy lines.

4.3 Objection 2: The Audience is Always Right

The next objection I will consider is that if intention is constrained in some way by the interpreter, then the interpreter must always be right. This would in fact be true on the sort of picture that Barthes advances, but it is in no way a consequence of Grice’s
view. Jennifer Saul (2002a, 2002b), for example, makes this objection against Grice and in doing so reveals a misunderstanding of the relation between meaning and interpretation that will be productive to explain and set straight. In Saul’s example, a speaker is exiting a concert hall and comments ‘Kevin plays well’, assuming the acquaintances she has run into were also at the concert and thus will take her to mean, ‘Kevin plays the triangle well’ (Saul 2002a). However, the acquaintances were, in fact, on their way to a meeting about the local water polo team, and they “quite rationally” (2002a: 370) take the speaker to have meant ‘Kevin plays water polo well’ (2002a: 369-370).

Saul argues that if what the speaker meant is related to the audience’s interpretation, “an audience’s misunderstanding of a person’s utterance would prevent them from saying what they meant to say, even if they uttered all the right words” (2002a: 358). Saul concludes that “we don’t require that that what [sic] is said must be a part of the audience’s interpretation” (2002a: 358); in other words, “audience interpretation should not have an impact on what is said” (2002a: 358, fn. 16). Saul takes this to be a point against Grice and those working in the Gricean tradition, especially Deirdre Wilson & Dan Sperber (1981).

The sweeping conclusions Saul draws go too far in separating meaning from interpretation and reveals a misunderstanding of what is meant by intentionalist claims that link meaning to interpretation. Grice’s account does not entail that the way the audience in fact interprets an utterance has any bearing on what the utterer meant. Rather, it is the speaker’s expectations that constrain her communicative intentions and thereby constrain what she could have meant. In Saul’s example, if the utterer did
happen to know the audience was headed to a meeting about the water polo team, rather than coming from the concert, she could not have uttered ‘Kevin plays well’ with the genuine expectation that it would have been taken to mean ‘Kevin plays the triangle well’.

This does not entail that the utterer was wrong about what she meant. Rather, she failed to communicate because her beliefs about the audience were wrong. The utterer can certainly fail to communicate some content, p, or succeed in communicating p, but cannot “succeed in meaning something” (Bach & Harnish 1979: 149) or “fail in meaning something” as this is exhausted by the content of her intentions. With the Gricean model, the utterer’s beliefs about the audience’s epistemic position will not always correspond to the audience’s actual epistemic position. The utterer may, of course, hold false beliefs about the audience; but there will usually be a good deal of overlap between the audience’s epistemic position and the beliefs the utterer has about the audience’s epistemic position. The fewer true beliefs the utterer has about the audience’s interpretive tendencies, the more likely she is to intend to succeed in something that she will in fact fail to do. Although it will certainly affect the success of communication, whether or not the beliefs the utterer holds about the audience are true does not affect what U meant by uttering X.

4.4 Objection 3: The Cooperative Principle is Too Demanding

The next objection I will consider takes us a bit deeper into the details of Grice’s theory. Recall from the previous chapter that Grice’s theory is grounded in his Cooperative Principle, a “quasi-contractual” (Grice 1989: 29) relation between speaker and hearer. I will now consider the objection that the Cooperative Principle is too
demanding or does not capture something we usually engage in when we communicate. To help me voice this objection I will draw on the work of psychologist Steven Pinker (2007a; 2007b; Pinker, Nowak, & Lee 2008; Lee & Pinker 2010) 2.

In a series of articles and a book chapter Pinker presents a game-theoretic framework that is meant to help explain the use of implicature in contexts such as bribing, where the ultimate aims of the speaker and hearer may diverge – that is, in cases when they are not, Pinker argues, abiding by the Cooperative Principle. This is presented as a response to what Pinker sees as Grice’s failure to recognize that speakers and hearers are not always cooperating (Pinker 2007: 392; Pinker, Nowak, & Lee 2008: 833). However, in making his argument Pinker seriously mischaracterizes Grice’s views on cooperation (see also Reboul 2014).

Pinker makes his argument against Grice by considering cases of bribing. He has us consider a scenario of someone attempting to bribe a police officer to get let off without a ticket. He imagines in this scenario that someone gets pulled over for speeding and then asks the police officer, “Can’t we settle this here?” intending to implicate that he would like to bribe the officer. Pinker then asks us to consider what the benefits are for this person to implicate the bribe via “veiled speech” rather than state it directly. This presents a piece of Pinker’s overall argument against Grice, which goes

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2 This objection is found in many forms elsewhere in the literature. Andrei Marmor writes “The standard model in the pragmatics literature focuses on ordinary conversations, in which the parties are presumed to engage in a cooperative exchange of information” (Marmor 2011: 83) but that “the enactment of a law is not a cooperative exchange of information” (Marmor 2011: 96). Peter Godfrey-Smith & Manolo Martínnez write “Many theorists have seen communication as a fundamentally cooperative phenomenon. In an evolutionary context, however, cooperation cannot be taken for granted, because of problems of subversion and free-riding” (Godfrey-Smith & Martínnez 2013: 1).
along the lines of the following reconstructed argument (2007a; 2007b; Pinker, Nowak, & Lee 2008; Lee & Pinker 2010):

1. Veiled speech is inefficient.

2. Because veiled speech is inefficient it is uncooperative.

3. Grice only considers communication that occurs in contexts of pure cooperation, as given by his “Cooperative Principle”.

4. Therefore, veiled speech cannot be accounted for by Grice, and we need Pinker instead.

I will now argue that premise 3 is false\(^3\).

Let me begin by detailing Pinker’s defense of the truth of premise 3. He writes,

Existing theories of indirect speech are based on the premise that human conversation partners work together toward a common goal – the efficient exchange of information, in the influential theory of H. P. Grice…Yet a fundamental insight from evolutionary biology is that most social relationships involve combinations of cooperation and conflict. (Pinker, Nowak, & Lee 2008: 833)

Pinker writes that his police bribe case “is inconsistent with the traditional idea that indirect speech is an implementation of pure cooperation: The driver here is using indirect speech not to help the honest officer attain that goal (viz. to enforce the law) but rather to confound that goal” (Pinker, Nowak, & Lee 2008: 834). Note that in this criticism of Grice Pinker writes that the bribing case is inconsistent with the idea of “pure cooperation” because the driver is not helping the officer to attain his goal of enforcing the law.

\(^3\) For further discussion of this case, including an argument that premise 2 is false, see Johnson 2016.
However, Grice simply does not demand full cooperation as Pinker suggests. On the subject of cooperation Grice writes, “Our talk exchanges do not normally consist of a succession of disconnected remarks, and would not be rational if they did. They are characteristically, to some degree at least, cooperative efforts; and each participant recognizes in them, to some extent, a common purpose or set of purposes, or at least a mutually accepted direction...at each stage, some possible conversational moves would be excluded as conversationally unsuitable” (Grice 1989: 26). In this paragraph Grice uses the following phrases to characterize his view of cooperation: “do not normally”, “characteristically, to some degree at least”, “to some extent”, “or at least”, and “some possible”. This is hardly the language of someone who is demanding full cooperation. I do not think Grice could have made it any more evident that he is hedging here.

In fact, Grice is quite clear on what is required for cooperative transactions. He writes that the following three conditions jointly distinguish cooperative transactions: 1. the interlocutors have some common immediate aim, 2. the contributions of the participants are mutually dependent, and 3. the transaction will continue until it reaches its natural terminus (Grice 1989: 29-30). Note that in the first condition Grice requires only that the participants share a common immediate aim. He goes on to elaborate on this point, writing, “The participants have some common immediate aim, like getting a car mended; their ultimate aims may, of course, be independent and even in conflict – each may want to get the car mended in order to drive off, leaving the other stranded” (Grice 1989: 29; see also 30). Grice clearly notes that his cooperative principle allows that the participants may have divergent ultimate aims, and that these aims may even be in direct conflict, as in the example he provides. To
return to the Pinker example, someone who does not want the officer to enforce the law can still be cooperative with respect to the rules of conversation. We could say such speakers are being "Communicatively Cooperative" although not "Ultimately Cooperative".

Communicative Cooperation requires only that the interlocutors are abiding by the maxims of conversation, not that they wish the conversation to serve the ultimate goals of the other. If one fails to uphold a maxim it is often justified – for example, because of a clash with another maxim. This does not present a counterexample to Grice's Cooperative Principle; it is an instance of it at work. Although I could violate the maxim of quality if I say ‘I lived in Paris' when I in fact lived in the suburbs of Paris, such an utterance is still communicatively cooperative because I violated one maxim in the service of another, namely, I violated the maxim of quality in favor of the maxim of quantity.

However, even if we are having a heated argument in which our aims significantly diverge and I am intentionally saying things to thwart your ultimate goals, I will still not shout in the middle of it “parallelogram!” and thereby say something irrelevant to the conversation. An action like this – that is, a case of not simply not wishing to meet the ultimate aims of an interlocutor but failing to follow the conversational maxims – would be required for the speaker to fail to be Communicatively Cooperative.

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4 This example is from the opening paragraph of O. Henry’s “The Green Door” which asks the reader is to imagine walking down the street after dinner when a woman in diamonds and furs puts into your hand a very hot buttered roll, cuts off your second jacket button, shouts “parallelogram!” and then runs away (Henry 1988: 112).
Ultimate Cooperation is a much stronger requirement than Communicative Cooperation, and plays no part in Grice’s theory of conversation. To suggest Grice demands full cooperation and then fault him for this being too demanding as Pinker does is simply to not understand his work. Pinker’s argument does not present a problem for Grice’s Cooperative Principle and neither do other similar arguments that conflate Ultimate Cooperation with Communicative Cooperation, or otherwise overstate the demands of the Cooperative Principle.

4.5 Objection 4: Context Determines Meaning

I will now discuss the objection to Grice that intentions are not needed because context can do the job. Such an objector would agree with the points I made in earlier chapters arguing that the code model it not adequate as a theory of meaning, but would insist that codes plus the context gets us what we want.

I will consider this objection as posed Andy Egan (2009). Egan’s starting point is one that is quite different from the Gricean one that I present here, and it is a starting place that many other theorists share: the position that the context of an utterance “fixes” or “determines” the meaning of sentences. Thus it is worthwhile to present his view in detail and to highlight the problems it raises as a theory of language.

Egan’s aim is to reevaluate the framework of how a sentence leads to content with context (Egan 2009: 255). David Lewis, in the introduction to one of the canonical papers in this tradition writes, “If a grammar is to do its jobs as part of a systematic restatement of our common knowledge about our practices of linguistic communication, it must assign semantic values that determine which sentences are
true in which contexts” (Lewis 1980: 79). Historically, context has been understood as a set of parameters including the world, time and speaker of the utterance (Lewis 1980; Egan 2009: 255). Egan writes that in such theories too much attention has been paid to the context of the speaker and not enough to the context of the audience.

Egan writes that he will be arguing for the view that, “For some uses of context-sensitive vocabulary, the contribution that they make to the content of sentences in which they occur is sensitive not (merely) to features of the speaker’s predicament, but (also) to features of the predicaments of particular audience members” (256). You will note that although there is a focus here on contexts, this phrasing sounds similar to the argument by Jennifer Saul that I discussed above, in that it advocates for placing emphasis on the hearer rather than the speaker.

With this talk of “context fixing content”, it is clear that Egan takes a very different starting position than the position I have argued for here. Egan takes the position that language is to be treated within a rigid set of mathematical constructs and anything left over is hastily explained as “pragmatics”. This approach leads to many problems.

To argue for his position, Egan presents examples of communications where there are multiple persons in an audience hearing or reading the same message. For one of his examples Egan considers a case where ‘Jesus loves you’ is uttered in a church by Horton, the priest. Egan appeals to our intuitions writing, “The natural way to hear this is...What’s expressed to Daniel is the singular proposition about Daniel, and what’s expressed to Frank is the singular proposition about Frank” (261). To illustrate how this works, Egan introduces his “shotgun assertion” concept. He writes that “what seems
to be happening here is what we might think of as a sort of shotgun assertion, in which different asserted contents are going out to different audience members, rather than a single content going out to all of them. Each audience member gets their own assertion-pellet, loaded with its own proprietary content” (261).

Here Egan presents a metaphor as if it were an explanation. Let us pick it apart and see if we can isolate a concrete proposal. We must ask, in virtue of what is a different content going out to different audience members? Where does the “assertion-pellet” and its “proprietary content” come from? This metaphor makes it sound as though the content comes from the speaker to the audience, but this clearly goes against what Egan has been arguing in the paper, which is for a focus on the role of the audience.

Even as an analogy this is flawed. If we think of assertions going out as if from a shotgun, each target should require its own intention. This is how a shotgun works. Or if it works in a way that shoots “assertion shrapnel” around the room, each content would not reach its desired target, and would reach undesired targets. Instead, if we actually wanted to flesh out Egan’s gun metaphor fully, we would require that the priest go around the room, going person by person, as he would have to if he were a sniper. He would say, ‘Jesus loves Frank’, ‘Jesus loves David’, ‘Jesus loves Andy’, and so on. Each person would be the subject of his name being uttered specifically with the intention to refer to him. Or Horton could make eye contact, one by one, with each person in the room while uttering ‘Jesus loves you’. Each person would be the referent in virtue of the perceptual link between them and the referrer. Surely the audience members would take away something different from this than being in a room where ‘Jesus loves you’ is
uttered to the group. It also would be very different for Horton, who would for each person, have a singular intention to refer.

Egan gets frightfully close to the position I argue he must take here when he writes that the utterer “is aiming to assert similar singular propositions to each of the members of the relevant group” (262). This almost sounds like he is saying the speaker must have such an intention, but he does not follow it through. We are left wondering what it means for a speaker to “aim” an assertion and how this relates to or differs from a speaker having an intention. If aiming is tantamount to intending, certainly there would be a number of requirements on what it means to have an intention that would create problems for Egan’s context-dependent account as he has presented up to this point in the paper.

At the end of his paper Egan acknowledges problems with his view that stem from the issues I have been raising here. He has us consider Sven, who is listening in on Horton’s sermon. In evaluating the truth of Horton’s utterance of ‘Jesus loves you’, Egan writes that “Sven will base his evaluation on whether he thinks Jesus loves the members of the congregation Horton was addressing or not, not based on what he thinks about whether Jesus loves him” (276). So who are “the members of the congregation Horton was addressing”? It seems to me that at the most it ought to include those in the audience. What if Jane is a member of the Church but had to stay home that day? What if Frank brought a Jewish friend to the sermon who is not a member of the church but who is in the audience? What if there is a thief hiding in the back unseen by anyone in the church, including the priest, hoping to steal the gold cross off the wall while no
one is looking? Are these people included in those who must in fact be loved by Jesus in order for Horton to have uttered something true?

Egan writes in response to such problems that,

The thing to say, I think, is that there are some restrictions on who counts as an eligible addressee, and so on who gets to count as a genuine audience member for purposes of resolving context-sensitivity...Since the eavesdroppers clearly weren’t among the intended addressees, they don’t get to count as them. Horton just wasn’t talking to them, and so their context is not eligible to play the relevant semantic-determining role. (279)

By invoking “the intended addressees” Egan essentially sneaks in an intentional, Gricean explanation in at the end to get around the counterexample. He does not acknowledge that the position he ends up with is in stark contrast to what he has advocated throughout the paper. We should not allow him to invoke this position here without noting that it renders everything he has said up to this point in the paper irrelevant. If in the end it is intentions that are responsible for making it the case that some utterance has some referent, then there is no need whatsoever for the context-based framework that Egan argues for in his paper. In short, it is the intentions that matter, not the context.

Let me conclude my discussion of this example by considering its broader implications. Egan’s missteps fall out of the way he sets up the problem—that is, he presents a false dichotomy between his categories of “SPEAKER ONLY” and “AUDIENCE SENSITIVITY”. Egan concludes that “No specification of the properties of the originator of the utterance (whoever or whatever we take the originator of the utterance to be) is going to be of any help. What we need is sensitivity to the context of the reader” (261).
When considering some conversational exchange, there is simply not this tension between the context of the speaker and the context of the hearer. For, as I argued above in discussing the Searle and Saul cases, part of the speaker formulating her utterance is the ways she takes into account the perspective of the speaker. Speakers constantly do this as they formulate utterances. In this way, in saying that the speaker’s intention is what makes it the case that some utterance has some meaning, as I do here, is not to neglect the audience. Rather, the speaker’s beliefs about the audience’s interpretive capacities are accounted for within the speaker’s intention.

4.6 Objection 5: Multiple Authors

It might be objected that although the intentional picture could be advanced for spontaneous utterances that occur in the context of ordinary conversation, surely the same cannot be said for more complex documents created by multiple agents.

This objection can be made with certain types of literature in mind. For instance, some theorists believe that the Iliad was created by one man named ‘Homer’; others believe that this name was given to an amalgam of authors. The argument I present here is not contingent upon the objects under consideration having been created by one author. If the Iliad was created by a number of agents with different intentions, the required approach for interpretation is to treat it as though it was created by one agent.

Insofar as an author decides a book is ready for publication, or the parties who authored a law endorsed it, or voted for it, however begrudgingly, they had some aims that were in common. It is from these sorts of commonalities that we construct an
author for the purposes of interpretation (below). This understanding of interpretation includes those objects that were created by multiple agents.

Intention 1

Intention 2 → Constructed Author → Illiad

Intention 3

Fig. 5 Constructed Author Diagram

The constructed author is grounded in real intentions, just many intentions instead of one—so this account still meets my previously stated requirement that meaning being caused by the sort of thing we could have evidence for—in this case, such as letters between author and publisher or records of deliberations in cases of legislation.

In law, the matter of authorship can become very complicated. There can be contracts that are a product of two parties with wildly diverging ultimate interests, and legislative rulings, which are the result of a multitude of agents (Barak 2011). There is disagreement within legal literature about how to treat such matters. There are some who hold the opinion that “It is illogical to attribute intent to a single author while denying it to a group of authors” (Barak 2011: 135) and those, who, contrastingly, hold the view that “we will do better by eschewing any model that regards legislation as most commonly the intentional product of a single law-making author” (Waldron 1999: 121).

Jeremy Waldron, in particular, takes issue with the idea that we can apply the same principle to novels and poems that were produced by one author, to laws
created by a legislature. He writes, “Though this position [that meaning is tied to author’s intention] may seem uncontroversial with regards to novels and poems, it is confused—and significantly confused—in regard to modern legislation. Legislation, I have assumed, is the product of a multi-member assembly, comprising a large number of persons of quite radically differing aims, interests, and backgrounds” (Waldron 1999: 125). If there is a significant difference between laws and poems and novels as Waldron argues, we should consider to what this difference is due. It is because of some difference in the nature of the artifact itself? Or is it because of the assumption that a law will often be a product of a broader range of authors with more conflicts? It seems that Waldron’s position is the latter, but it is of course not always the case that laws have more authors than novels. We should not think of this, then, as a stark distinction between the types of documents, but a matter of degree that could manifest itself in equally problematic ways regardless of whether we are considering a novel or a piece of legislation.

It seems that in all instances of multiple authors it would be helpful to introduce a distinction between Communicative Intentions and Ultimate Intentions. This distinction parallels the distinction I presented above between Ultimate Cooperation and Communicative Cooperation. We can acknowledge that, of course, writers of Homer, or a contract, or some piece of legislation may have different Ultimate Intentions with respect to the document, they must have overlapping Communicative Intentions within the document itself. Legislation is written along the areas of agreement; legislation is not written along the areas of disagreement. If it were, the resulting document itself would not be coherent, and would not be advocated for by either side. Neither side would vote for a law that contained both the provisions that the drinking age should be
lowered to 18 and that the drinking age should not be lowered to 18. If these conflicts make their way into the document itself, this will be viewed as a problem to be resolved. We can allow for meaning to be a matter of overlapping Communicative Intentions while acknowledging that the Ultimate Intentions of legislators outside of such documents diverge and may even be in conflict.

4.7 Objection 6: Multiple Audiences

I will now consider and respond to the final objection of the chapter. In certain circumstances a speaker may be acting in a way that appears to be uncooperative with a particular audience member (for further discussion see Johnson 2016). For example, one middle school girl may say to another, “I like your skirt…did you make it?” within earshot of a fellow bully. The addressee may realize later she was insulted but the utterance was formulated so that the other bully would recognize it right away, and perhaps could continue the conversation without the target realizing she is being insulted. There is a certain pleasure those in on the joke can take on the lack of understanding in the other. We see here a case of apparent obscurity that arises as a result of the presence of a third party. Does this present a problem for Grice’s Cooperative Principle?

A similar circumstance may arise when the speaker wishes to shield one addressee from conversation she believes to be inappropriate for them. In fact, Grice specifically discussed cases of this type. He writes,

\[\text{Thanks also to Michael Devitt for posing this question in terms of English public schools, where apparently this phenomenon is quite common.}\]
Obviously if the Cooperative Principle is to operate I must intend my partner to understand what I am saying despite the obscurity I impart into my utterance. Suppose that A and B are having a conversation in the presence of a third party, for example, a child, then A might be deliberately obscure, though not too obscure, in the hope that B would understand and the third party not.

(Grice 1989: 37)

For illustration of such a scenario, we can consider a scene from a fiction (King 2008), which Grice seems to have anticipated almost exactly. In this scene, four women—Miranda, Carrie, Charlotte, and Samantha—are meeting for brunch. Charlotte has brought along her young daughter, Lily. Carrie and Lily are coloring at the table.

**Miranda:** How often do you guys have sex?

**Lily:** Sex!

**Charlotte:** Miranda, please! (Points to her daughter, Lily)

**Miranda:** What? She’s 3! She doesn’t know what it means. I’m 41 and I still don’t know what it means.

**Charlotte:** I know, but she is repeating everything.

**Samantha:** If I had known that girl talk was going to be on lockdown I wouldn’t have flown 3,000 miles.

**Charlotte:** No, we can talk. Let’s just not use the word.

**Miranda:** Fine. How often do you guys...

**Carrie:** (looks up from coloring) ...color?

**Charlotte:** Thank you!

**Samantha:** Well, I can’t color enough. I could color all day, every day, if I had my way. I would use every crayon in my box.

**Carrie:** We get it. You love to color. (Turns to Miranda.) Why are you asking? (King 2008)

We see in this example exactly the sort of case Grice mentions as a hypothetical. In this interaction there is intentional and careful obscurity used in the conversation in the form of an adoption of a new word in place of an ordinary word, and we see novel,
metaphorical riffs off the new word by Samantha. The speakers in this utterance are being intentionally obscure in the hopes that the other women at the table will understand their meaning and the child will not.

Note that the substitute phrase Carrie comes up with is one that would not stand out to the child as being something that would be strange for people to discuss. If on the other had, if Carrie had suggested that they discuss “how often they have noodles for arms” even the child would likely pick up on this as being strange and ask what they are talking about. Also, we see, in Samantha’s objection, a reason why the topic is not abandoned altogether for a time when the child is absent.

Of course, there are many techniques a speaker might employ if she has an utterance she wishes only one person to hear. She may meet with some audience alone. She may attempt to make her utterance known to only one audience member by manipulating acoustic means—that is, by whispering. However, whispering is recognized as behavior one engages in when excluding some potential audience member who otherwise would hear, and thus, if done the presence of company who feels entitled to be included, will not be used for reasons of politeness. A speaker could switch to a language one hearer knows and another does not. Although this can, again, be seen as rude and may be objected to by the excluded hearer. Thus, in the presence of audience members who for social reasons feel they should not be ostentatiously excluded from the conversation by means such as whispering, switching language, or asking to speak to someone alone, obscurity remains one of the least socially costly options for excluding some audience.

For Grice, a speaker can be intentionally obscure while still being
Communicatively Cooperative in cases where there are two audiences the speaker has in mind. The speaker uses veiled or obscure wording so that one audience will understand the meaning of the utterance and the other will not. In the case of the child overhearing an adult conversation it is her presence that explains the use of veiled speech. The speaker is cooperating with the adult listeners insofar as the speaker works to ensure they can still understand what she means by the veiled speech.

So, we see that for Grice apparent obscurity can sometimes be explained in terms of a speaker wishing to be understood by one audience in terms of the literal content of their utterance and by the second audience in terms of the implicated content of their utterance. This gap in interpretive understanding is to be explained by differences in background knowledge of the hearers, which was gauged by the speaker. In the “coloring” example, if the speaker incorrectly gauges the background knowledge of her audience she may: 1) produce an utterance that the child understands or/and 2) produce an utterance that the adults do not understand. If she gauges the background knowledge correctly, the utterance will succeed with both audiences as in the coloring example. Such cases do not present a problem for the Cooperative Principle, as Grice explicitly notes.

4.8 Summary of Objections Addressed and Yet To Be Addressed

In this chapter I have defended Grice’s position from a number of theoretically-based objections including: 1) Anything Can Mean Anything, especially as advanced by John Searle, 2) The Audience is Always Right, especially as advanced by Jennifer Saul, 3) The Cooperative Principle is Too Demanding, especially as advanced by Steven Pinker, 4) Context Determines Meaning, especially as advanced by Andy Egan, and 5)
Multiple Authors, especially as advanced by Jeremy Waldron and 6) Multiple Audiences. In the following chapter I will consider the positive application of the theory to a number of concrete examples. In the subsequent two chapters I will address a number of empirical questions that arise out of the Gricean program and a number of remaining objections about consciousness and intentions, the role of emotion in interpretation, and the relation between interpretation and judgment.
Chapter 5  
Application of Framework

5.1 Application Introduction

Now that I have detailed the Gricean, intentional account of meaning and defended it from a number of philosophical objections, I will demonstrate how the resulting philosophical framework—which makes use of the Gricean theory—can be applied to concrete cases. We now turn from the realm of theories and theoretical objections back to the world of things. Recall from Chapter 3 that these are the categories of the proposed interpretive framework:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intentional Aspect</th>
<th>Interpretive Strategy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Non-Intentional</td>
<td>Physico-chemical - use of scientific methods, tools, data measurement and analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Intentional Byproduct</td>
<td>Remnant – consideration of which intentionally produced object and through which process waste could have resulted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Use-Intentionally Produced</td>
<td>Anthropological - consideration of anthropological functional roles, use of group psychological attributions of what function rational humans would have had for some object</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Signaling-Intentional</td>
<td>Code – decoding based on establishing correlations or associations across symbol uses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Meaning-Intentional</td>
<td>Gricean - recognition of complex Gricean intentions produced in accordance with the cooperative principles of communication.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fig. 6 Diagram of Intentional Aspect and Interpretive Strategy
I argue that this framework captures something true about interpretation in general and thus may be applied to all types of interpretation. In applying this general framework to a wide range of disciplines, I do not mean to suggest that there are no important differences between how interpretation ought to be carried out across these fields. Rather, great care will have to be taken when this tool is applied across disciplines. However, aside from these differences in the sorts of objects each discipline primarily deals with – art is usually without words and law is usually only words, e.g. – I believe that our aim in interpreting each of these is to identify the creator’s intention (Carroll 2001b).

Much of what perhaps seems to be differences between fields that could be due to different interpretive strategies is instead differences in abilities of the interpreter to put herself in the proper “interpretive frame of mind” – that is, to align herself as closely as possible with the intended interpreter. Hirsch seems to hold a compatible position when he writes, “A lawyer usually interprets the law better than a literary critic not because he applies special canons of statutory construction but because he possesses a wider range of immediately relevant knowledge” (Hirsch 1967: vii). Below, I will apply this framework to a number of different disciplines including literature, art, law, theology, and history and will suggest other areas for future research. In the next chapter I will discuss in-depth how this framework can be applied to archaeology.

5.2 Non-linguistic Communication

Before I present in detail how this framework can be applied I would like to address a question that may arise from my application of theory from philosophy of language to a broader swath of entities than usual. Philosophy of language is often cast as a project of explaining linguistic phenomena (Montague 1974; Stanley & Szabo
We then need to consider whether or not certain theories from philosophy of language can be carried over to nonlinguistic phenomenon intact, or if these theories are particular to language. Fortunately for this project, the work of Grice, which I draw on here, is not restricted to the realm of the linguistic. Grice holds the view that “the use of language is one form of rational activity and that the principles at work in the interpretation of linguistic behavior are (or are intimately related to) those at work in interpreting intentional nonlinguistic behavior” (Neale 1992: 20). Because of the connection Grice sees between interpretation and speaker meaning we can take this point to extend to the realm of meaning. So, paraphrasing Neale, we can also say that Grice holds the views that the principles at work in the formulation of meaning-intentions with respect to linguistic utterances are (or are intimately related to) those at work in the formation of meaning-intentions with respect to nonlinguistic behavior. This position also has the important benefit of being consistent with prominent theories of language development, as I will detail in the following chapter (Tomasello 1995).

And lastly, it is not evident that a clear line between the linguistic and nonlinguistic could be drawn even if we wanted to draw one. Kaplan’s account of the indexical, for example, relies on the interaction between words like ‘this’ and a gesture on the part of the speaker (Kaplan 1989a). If we broaden this notion to include Kaplan’s expansion of his theory of indexicals (Kaplan 1989b) that accounted for speaker intentions rather than facts about the act of ostention there is still the interplay of the linguistic and the nonlinguistic, for the speaker must make her intentions manifest to the hearer in some way. This often is the result of the hearer tracking the speakers gaze, a clearly nonlinguistic phenomenon (Kaplan 1989, Tomasello 1999, Baron-Cohen 1995). These concerns are present for all indexicals. So, it is not evident how this distinction
between the linguistic and the nonlinguistic could even be drawn. Fortunately, it is not a distinction that we will make use of here. With this clarification we can now move on to consider concrete examples.

5.3 Applying Framework to a Specific Art Example

When analyzing a work of art, interpretation should be done by isolating the various aspects of the piece into these five Groups, and then putting oneself in the proper epistemic position to correctly interpret the various aspects of the piece. The debates surrounding art restoration are essentially debates about whether some feature of the work is a feature of Group 1 or Group 5.

In the 1980s the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel was renovated. Art historians such as James Beck (1993) have claimed that through what restorers have called “cleaning” – a process that when done correctly would remove only Group 1 aspects – was instead removing Group 5 aspects. The Sistine Chapel is a work of buon fresco painting, which involves artists manipulating paint that is actually inside the plaster while it is wet. Once this material hardens, it develops a texture like marble. Buon fresco painting was normally followed by application of further layers a secco by the artist, on top of the marble-like surface (Beck 1993: 65). Artists such as Michelangelo would go back and darken shadows with the a secco layer, giving the work the more heavily shadowed look of chiaroscuro Michelangelo was known for.

The restorers in the Sistine Chapel project took no account of the possibility that some of the darkness on the ceiling may have been due to this a secco layer applied by Michaelangelo, and hoping to remove all of what they considered to be the “dirt” accumulation of five hundred years, chose a cleaning chemical that stripped the
ceiling down to the *buon fresco* layer. In many of the photos provided by Beck, it is clear that darkness that could not be due to random buildup was removed. This means that, as Beck argues, in “cleaning” the works “the artist’s intentions have been seriously distorted” (31). In other words, Group 5 aspects were removed along with Group 1 aspects.

![Pre-restoration Detail of Adam and Eve, Sistine Chapel by Michelangelo The Vatican Source: Public Domain Art](image1)

![Post-restoration Detail of Adam and Eve, Sistine Chapel by Michelangelo The Vatican Source: Public Domain Art](image2)

**Fig. 7** Pre- and Post-Restoration Sistine Chapel Ceiling Detail

This same debate between Group 1 and Group 5 intentions can also arise with sculpture. The *Ilaria del Caretto* in the Cathedral of Lucca was also “cleaned” in 1989, a word that, again, implies the mere removal of Group 1 objects. This sculpture was said in a technical report to the superintendent of Pisa to be covered by a thin layer of dust and fats which had turned black in the depressions of the sculpture (Beck 1993: 24). In this case, the statue was placed in the care of Giovanni Capone, who had no formal training as a restorer, and without the usual study and chemical analysis done by the Italian Directorate of Fine Arts (Simons 1991). Other restorers said the task should take
about a year but Capone completed it in three weeks using his “invention” he described to the New York Times as “a pistol that shoots water and tiny plastic pellets which hit and remove the dirt” (Simons 1991). Beck argues that in the case of this statue, it was the intention of the artist that dust gather this way in the depressions – meaning that to remove it is removing an object of Group 5. Della Quercia, the sculptor of the Illaria del Caretto Beck writes, “knew it would age, and in carving it he almost certainly planned the places where dirt would collect, creating an effect of chiascuro which has now been removed” (Beck 1993: 29). So perhaps even a buildup of dust, if it is intended by the artist, can be more than a mere Group 1 aspect. Any attempt at “cleaning” a piece is in fact an attempt to remove Group 1 buildup. To clean some painting to some degree is to make a judgment about which of the layers on the piece are there because of the artist’s intention.

Further, which Group some object is in can be important to establishing whether or not it is an art object at all. Artist sketches are often displayed alongside works they had presented in a gallery, displayed on their own, or bought by collectors. These certainly are objects of the Group 2 sort, in that they were produced intentionally by the artist with the instrumental aim of creating something else. However, whether they ought to remain mere Group 2 objects, which were not created to be interpreted and thus are not art, or should be elevated to the status of works of art is an open question – one that depends on how one views the importance of various Groups with respect to what constitutes art.
5.5 Applying Framework to a Specific Law Example

Much of the debate surrounding legal interpretation is whether laws are codes, the meaning of which can be read directly from the words themselves, or if interpreting law means finding out what the author’s intentions were when he put those words on the page (Scalia 1997; Dworkin 1997; Neale 2012). This is essentially a question of whether laws are composed of Group 4 aspects or Group 5 aspects.

In the case of apparent clerical errors lawyers may debate whether or not some word is merely a Group 2 object, and can be disregarded (Scalia 1997: 20), as in a recent debate on Obamacare. In Section 1311 of the Affordable Care Act, the insurance health exchange is defined as a “governmental agency or nonprofit entity that is established by a state” (Kliff 2012). These last three words suggest that the markets can only be established by the state, when, in fact, most states use the exchange run by the federal government. Adler & Cannon (2013) argue that this language demonstrates the “congressional intent” (119) that the Affordable Care Act issue reimbursements only for insurance bought on the state exchanges – a claim that if true would lead to the collapse of the Affordable Care Act. Adler & Cannon’s claim is essentially that the wording in Section 1311 is a Group 4 aspect and should be read literally to the letter.

Senate Finance Committee Communications Director Sean Neary took the opposite position, stating, “The clear intention of the health-care law is to provide consumers with tax credits to purchase quality, affordable health coverage through either a state or a federally-facilitated exchange” (Kliff 2012). This stance was reiterated by Law Professor Abigail Moncreiff’s comment on the case, “Even if Adler and Cannon
have the right technical reading, it's unlikely it would hold the IRS to that kind of technical mistake when there’s so much evidence that Congress did not mean for it” (Kliff 2012). Neary and Moncreiff are essentially saying that the intent of the law is contrary to the actual wording in these sections, meaning that this wording is merely a Group 2 technical mistake produced in the process of some other intentional act.

The case above is one where interpreting the law itself requires classifying parts of the law into the interpretive groups. In a number of legal cases judges must also interpret what some person charged with a crime meant by some words they uttered. In a recent Supreme Court case the justices were faced with such a task. The First Amendment protects many forms of speech, including those that are “vehement”, “caustic”, and “unpleasantly sharp” (Tang 2014). The First Amendment does not protect what it deems to be “true threats” (Tang 2014), regardless of the platform that is used to express these threats.

In a recent case that reached the Supreme Court a man posted a number of threats to his Facebook page after his wife left him, including “I’m not gonna rest until your body is a mess, soaked in blood and dying from all the little cuts” (Tang 2014). It was up to the court to decide whether or not such posts constituted threats. Again, the issue at heart was whether the “words themselves” constitute a threat, or if a threat requires a certain intention on the part of the speaker—a debate about whether threats should be considered to be Group 4 or Group 5. Or, as was reported in the New York Times, “The core question for the justices was whether Mr. Elonis’s words alone to convict him, or whether the jury should have been required that he had subjective intent to threaten” (Tang 2014). The accused has said that the posts were “therapeutic"
and “ficticious lyrics” he wrote as an aspiring rap artist (Tang 2014). Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg expressed skepticism about the ability to show that some words were intended to be threatening, asking, “How does one prove what’s in somebody else’s mind? In this case, the standard was ‘Would a reasonable person think that the words would put someone in fear?’ and reasonable people can make that judgment. But how would the government prove whether this threat in the mind of the threatener was genuine?” (Tang 2014; Liptak 2014) Indeed, intent is often a large part of what prosecutors are asked to prove (Dubber 2002; Savage 2017; Phillips 2017). “The question for the justices in Monday’s case, Elonis v. United States, No. 13-983, was whether prosecutors had done enough to prove Mr. Elonis’s intent. Mr. Dreeben, the government lawyer, said the words and their context were enough” (Liptak 2014). We see in this example divided opinions on whether words themselves constitute a threat, or if a threat requires a speaker to have a certain intention in uttering those words.

Keeping these two cases in mind we can distinguish two types of situations in which intent and the meaning of words is an important issue for the courts. The first is in interpreting the laws themselves; the second is in interpreting the words or actions of some person accused of a crime. It is important to keep these two types of legal cases distinct because it seems that one could justifiably think intention plays a different role in one than the other, or that there should be different standards for the spontaneous behaviors of those committed of accusing a crime and professional lawyers who are all trained to a similar standard in the United States. We might think it is reasonable to make high demands on lawyers, judges, and lawmakers who are aware of the specific sort of interpretive process their words and laws will be considered within. However, it is clear that in both of these cases the issues at hand are most clearly understood within
the interpretive Groups I provide here, and the background of meaning and intention bears on both in the same way, although different standards might be applied in the two sorts of legal interpretations.

5.6 Applying Framework to a Specific Literature Example

Metaphor and idiom are paradigmatic cases of the sorts of utterances that cannot be explained by the code model. What is striking about the *Iliad*—arguably the earliest available literary source (Ross 2005)—is the abundance of such devices and the apparent ease with which they are used. In the first few pages of the *Iliad*, Agamemnon is described rising in anger: "His heart was black with rage and his eyes flashed fire as he scowled on Calchas" (Homer 1999: 3). Metaphor and idiom are seemingly violations of Grice’s maxim of Quality – that agents ought not to say that which they believe to be false (Grice 1989: 27). “You are the cream in my coffee” (Grice 1989: 34), “His heart was black with rage” (Homer 1999: 3), and “His eyes flashed with fire” (Homer 1999: 3), involve “categorical falsity” (Grice 1989: 3). The opposite of each statement is true: no one is cream, no one has a black heart, and no one’s eyes flashed fire. “So it cannot be *that* that such a speaker is trying to get across" (Grice 1989: 34). Although based on what he literally said the speaker violated the Cooperative Principle, at the level of what the speaker meant he communicated something true and cooperative. “The most likely supposition is that the speaker is attributing to his audience some features in respect to which the audience resembles (more or less fancifully) the mentioned substance” (Grice 1989: 34). The hearer must recognize the speaker’s intention to communicate that Agamemnon’s eyes fancifully resembled what eyes would look like could they flash fire and come to believe it at
least in part on the basis of that recognition. The use of metaphorical language that is not literally true at the coded level, but that makes sense at the level of what is meant, means that this is a Group 5 aspect. Interpretation of such passages requires an analysis with special attention paid to the intentions of the author.

In interpretation of literary illusions it matters whether or not some author had access to some other work, and therefore could have intended to refer to it, because this is important to identifying the author’s true intention and thus the true meaning of some work (Lowe 2005). This point is the key to debates on whether or not Dostoyevsky’s Crime and Punishment influenced T. S. Eliot’s ‘The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock’ (Lowe 2005). 1945, John Pope, writing in American Literature, proposed that Eliot’s poem was written in 1914 and was heavily influenced by 1914’s first English translation of Crime and Punishment (Lowe 2005). However, it was later revealed by Eliot, who wrote to the journal later that year, that the poem was in fact written in 1910 and 1911, during the year he spent in Paris. So, Eliot could not have been influenced by the 1914 English translation. Despite this a striking number of connections between Eliot’s poem and Dostoyevsky’s novel remain: the city as isolating, an internal monologue of indecision, important moments of that indecision in staircases, a suppressed confession, and allegorical use of the story of Lazarus. (Lowe 2005). Eliot’s letter goes on to solve the mystery: before the time of writing the poem, Eliot had read Crime and Punishment in the French translation – a fact that is important to interpreting his poem because it means that it was possible for Eliot to have formed the genuine intention to allude in certain ways to the Dostoyevsky’s text.
5.7 Applying Framework to a Specific Theological Interpretation Example

Biblical scholars have a long and rich history of interpretation that spans from before there was anything that could properly be called literary theory as I introduced in Ch. 1. Other religious traditions including Hinduism, Islam, and Judaism have rich interpretive traditions. I will discuss Biblical interpretation because in the United States these traditions have the most overlap with other theories of interpretation, such as legal interpretation. It also happens to be the religious text I am personally most familiar with, although much of what I say here could be also said of religious texts in other traditions.

For those of a philosophical bent, a starting assumption that biblical scholars make—that God exists—is a perhaps point of contention. However, without weighing in on that question we can consider the prospects of biblical interpretation within this framework as a conditional. That is, if God does exist, what can we conclude about how the bible should be interpreted? This conditional leads to a number of interesting questions that arise because of the Bible’s special status as the “Word of God”. How could the framework just presented help us interpret the bible?

The first question that arises after posing this conditional and considering biblical interpretation in light of the framework just presented is who the author of the bible is. The first four books of the New Testament are the Gospels according to certain people who recorded them, such as “The Gospel According to Matthew” or “The Gospel According to John”. They are not called “The Gospel According to God”. So is God the author or is Matthew? And if we believe that a text has meaning in virtue of the author’s intentions we can ask, “Whose intentions should we care about: God’s or Matthew’s?”
The bible as “the Word of God” raises some unique problems; its divine origin also allows for unique ways of resolving problems. One theologian writes, “Just as no one can explain exactly how both human and divine natures can be fully present in the one person of Jesus, neither can one explain fully how God so superintended the writing of Scripture so that each word is divinely inspired and yet chosen by a human author” (Plummer 2010: 35). In the case of worries about who exactly is the author of the bible and whose intentions we should try to get at in interpreting the bible, ultimately the only recourse is to declare this to be a case of one of the mysteries of God’s doing that we as man do not need to understand to believe.

Putting aside the question of authorship, the bible is a document that has been preserved through the centuries by scribes who copied each letter by hand. Copying texts by hand led to many errors, as did copying texts in a printing press where letters are laid out individually, in reverse, and pressed onto the sheet. Of course, even with the convenience of a word processor we are not immune to making errors in type (you may have spotted some here). Another relatively new invention that creates problems for translations from ancient texts such as the bible is standardization of dialects and spelling. It is only in today’s connected world that there is the system in place to facilitate or the need for my English and spelling in New York to be standardized with someone’s English and spelling in Los Angeles (McWhorter 2003). And the fact that we all type on programs such as Microsoft word or our iphones, that have standardized spell checkers, helps complete the process. The lineage of religious texts—centuries of scribes copying by hand, setting type backward by hand for a press, and typing on word processors, variations in spelling and dialects—means that the bible is likely the
most typo-laden document in existence. It is also a document that countless people take to be the word of God that ought to be followed to the letter.

These two facts present a problem when considered together. Thus, a whole branch of biblical interpretation is devoted to the identification and elimination of errors in biblical manuscripts—that is to the identification and elimination of Group 2 aspects of the bible. This type of work is called “lower criticism” and is “synonymous with textual criticism and refers to the exercise of collating all known manuscripts of an ancient work to see if there are any differences in wording among the manuscripts the scribal copying produced” and then working to determine which text is closest to the original (Blomberg 2012: 29). “The more independent copies of a given text that we have, the fewer the number of differences, and the closer to the original that the existing manuscripts can be dated, the greater the degree of confidence we have that we have closely approximated the original document” (Blomberg 2012: 29). Concern about errors in the bible is thus understood as errors in transcription of the bible. As the bible is taken to come down from God there is no question that there are no errors in the original.

Looking for errors of transcription in the bible is quite a different process from trying to interpret the symbolic, Group 4 aspects of the bible. To do so, as in all other cases, we must consider the meaning certain symbols in the bible had for the relevant individuals in the narrative. For example, even the most strident of atheists cannot have avoided learning about the star that was said to have been in the sky above the place where Jesus was born. It was this star the wise men are said to have followed to Mary
and Joseph. It makes for evocative imagery that has been used to advantage in countless paintings and lawn ornaments alike.

Many have probably never considered why the wise men followed this star. What was it that made them think that this star in the sky would lead them to the new king of Jerusalem? Here we can appeal to a symbolic, Group 4 fact from the time to make sense of this behavior most of us have probably never considered but that I hope now seems at least slightly puzzling. At the time of the bible, seeing a new ‘heavenly body’ in the sky was thought to be a sign of the impending birth of a new king (Burke-Gaffney 1937; Keener 2009: 99-104; Blomberg 2012: 43). Once we know this symbolic meaning of one of the elements in the story of Christ’s birth, we can better make sense of the behavior of those in the story. This is a Group 4 aspect because we need not consider the particular author’s intention, but need just know this general fact. In light of this general fact we might go on to interpret some other contemporaneous story differently as well, if it makes used of a star as a portent of a new king. This is something we could not do were this a Group 5 aspect. This is an important point of contrast between Group 4 and Group 5 aspects.

5.8 Applying Framework to Specific History Examples

Which group some aspect falls into has important consequences for the historian. A historian may come across archaeological evidence of a green-tinged ivory compass found at an American plantation and need to consult scientific records to determine whether or not the compass had been painted green as a symbol (Group 4), or if it turned that color due to oxidization underground (Group 1) (Kelso & Straube 2008). A historian also might need to distinguish between whether some word in a letter
that was used incorrectly was merely a slip of the pen (Group 2), or a part of what the author said or meant (Group 4/5). A historian needs to distinguish between mere function in a Rococo styled room (Group 3), and symbolic meaning, such as an image of a dolphin in the childhood bedroom of Louis XIV, which indicated that he was the *dauphin*, which in French means both ‘dolphin’ and ‘heir apparent’ (Group 4).

Technically, history starts, and the prehistory of archaeologists ends, with the advent of the written word (Roe 1970: 21). Thus, by definition, historians deal in the sorts of things that were produced with complex intentions of Group 5 as manifest in language. As with all Group 5 interpretations, the historian must recognize that although she is interpreting an object that was created with the intention that it be interpreted, the *historian*, is very different from the intended interpreter. The accurate historian must be able to put herself in the position of the intended audience to arrive at the most valid interpretation of her data. This is exacerbated in archaeological interpretation as I will detail in the following chapter.

**5.9 Specific Application across Domains Conclusion**

In this section, I have applied the framework I introduced in the previous section to interpretation in art, law, theology, and history. I believe this framework could be fruitfully applied in other contexts including interpretation of crime scenes, architecture, film (Carroll 2008; Carroll 2013), clothing (Barthes 2005; Ashwell & Langton 2011), music (Ostertag 2012), maps, and cemeteries. These remain areas of possible exploration for future research. In the following chapter I will discuss in detail how this framework can be applied to archaeological interpretation, and how this framework can shed light on current debates in that field.
Chapter 6  
*Digging Deeper: Seeking Meaning in the Archaeological Record*

6.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter I briefly described how the framework I have advocated for here can be applied to a number of interpretive challenges across a range of domains. In this chapter I will present an in-depth exploration of the potential for the my proposal to advance a debate in archaeology interpretation. This chapter will be grounded in a detailed discussion of the current archaeological interpretation literature. In this chapter I aim to show in an in-depth way the applicability of my positive proposal.

Archaeological interpretation is a wide-sweeping project involving analysis of everything from movements of people across lands as a result of climate change, to hierarchies of power in large groups to analysis of remains of cities to visualization of entire sites otherwise obstructed but which are revealed using advanced scientific tools (Renfrew & Bahn 2012). In certain circumstances we shift from these broader goals, to the more intimate consideration of what the intentions of some individual were on some occasion. We might be drawn in by the refinery of an exquisitely carved biface (Hiscock 2014), struck by the beauty of a set of beads found on a skeleton (Stiner 2014) or hold up our hand in wonder to compare it to a negative hand stencil on a cave wall, wondering why the creator chose to place it there (Pettitt et al. 2014). In such circumstances we cannot help but feel a closeness to the creator of these artifacts that seems to cut across time, as we consider what they intended at the moment they created this artifact.
The process of recognition of intentions of others is an important part of archaeological interpretation of certain objects. The first way this procedure manifests itself is in the classification of certain objects as artifacts—that is, we deem certain objects as having been the product of some human intention (Renfrew & Bahn 2012: 49). Of those things that are artifacts, we can isolate those that were used with some communicative intention to send a message to some other agent. There is a further distinction that must then be made between the sorts of communicative intentions one can have with respect to some artifact—that is, between those communications that can be fully understood within a code-like system, and those that deviate from the code in a way that requires interpreters recognize this deviation and consider the particular creator’s intention. This second form of communicative intention, which picks out what I have called Group 5 meaning has received very little attention in debates on interpretation of archaeological artifacts.

In this chapter, I will begin by discussing how semiotics has historically been used in archaeology as the theoretical grounding for signs, including both Saussurean and Peircean frameworks. I detail the distinction between the code-based and speaker-based types of communicative intentions and will argue that a complete theory of archaeological interpretation will be mindful of and make use of this distinction. I will then present a number of specific cases of archaeological interpretation where I argue we have evidence of this second type of communicative intention in the artifact in question. In doing so I will refine a notion of what features some artifact needs to have to justifiably be classified as evidence of Group 5 meaning. I will conclude by discussing the relation of speaker meaning to questions into decoration and style, humor, the advent of spoken language, and the nature of art.
To make my argument I will present three examples from three different points in time and argue that they have features that are evidence of Group 5 meaning. I come at this project as a philosopher, not an archaeologist, and thus I do not see my role to be to show the full range of archaeological artifacts that would meet the conditions I outline here. Rather, in discussing the philosophical background and presenting these cases, my ultimate aim is to make a theoretical point. If, as I argue, we have evidence of Group 5 meaning in the archaeological record, even in the few artifacts I present here, this shows the benefit of shifting perspective about interpretation of signs and symbols to an intentional perspective. My aim is to bring in ideas from outside the field of archaeology that may be useful but which have not been put on the table explicitly before. What I will do, however, is abstract away from the cases I discuss to what such cases need to have in general so that they can be identified in the future. In this discussion, I also seek to restore the parallel between modern discussions of language interpretation and archaeological interpretation, showing the conclusions that are fall out of the commitments we make in relying on certain theoretical concepts from linguistics and philosophy.

6.2 An Interpretive Framework

The project I undertake here is to argue for the applicability of my interpretive framework to archaeology. The distinctions I present are important to us in our capacity as interpreters of archaeological artifacts because one of our primary goals in such endeavors is to work out what some creator’s intentions were. The interpretive stance we ought to adopt varies based on the type of intention the creator had. We would, for instance, be taking a false step if we thought waste flakes from creating a biface
served a communicative function—or if we similarly assumed that the stone core remains from a practice of creating knives from knapping were tools (Hiscock 2004). For the project of developing a complete theory of interpretation of archaeological artifacts, we must distinguish between the following five types of intentions and corresponding interpretive strategies. Recall that the framework I have presented and defended in earlier chapters is the following.

<table>
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<th>Type of Intention</th>
<th>Example</th>
<th>Interpretive Strategy</th>
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<td>1. Use of scientific instruments and tools such as carbon dating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Byproduct-intentional</td>
<td>2. Stone core remains</td>
<td>2. Consideration of which intentional artifact could have resulted in this object</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Use-intentional</td>
<td>3. Knives</td>
<td>3. Consideration of which role or function the object could have served</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Signaling-intentional</td>
<td>4. Black mourning clothing in the 19th Century</td>
<td>4. Decoding in accordance with meaning determined by established correlations or associations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(results in semantic meaning)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Meaning-intentional</td>
<td>5. Intentionally visible brushstrokes in a Monet</td>
<td>5. Interpretation in accordance with recognition of complex meaning-intentions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(results in speaker meaning)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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Fig. 8 Diagram of Intentional Aspect, Example, and Interpretive Strategy

For any aspect of some object that we wish to interpret, we can categorize it into one or another of these categories.

Recall that aspects are classified in the following way. Those things that we determine have not been created by a human agent with an intention in mind are placed into the first category. Those things that are determined to have been created to serve some specific functional role, are placed into the third category. Those things that have been created with a communicative intention are categorized into the
fourth or fifth categories. Those things that were created as a result of an intentional action but that were not themselves created to serve some function (as required for the third category) or to communicate (as required for the fourth and fifth categories), are understood to fall into the second category of intention. These are byproducts that were produced in the process of an intentional, goal-directed action (such as creating a knife, starting a fire, preparing food, etc.) but the creation of this object or feature itself was not the aim of that intentional action.

The distinctions between these first three categories and a communicative category have for the most part been well-recognized within archaeology (Renfrew & Bahn 2012: 49-54). There has not, however, been attention to the distinction between the fourth and fifth categories, which together are the two types of communicative intentions. It is attention to the important distinction between the fourth and the fifth categories that I advocate here. I have explained this distinction in detail in previous chapters and will briefly revisit it in detail in a later section. First, I will explain how archaeology has historically drawn on theories of linguistic interpretation from philosophy and linguistics. I will argue that this attempt by archaeologists to draw on philosophy and linguistics has been overly focused on signs and symbols and has not been entirely successful.

6.3 Semiology

Archaeology's historical failure to distinguish between different types of communicative intentions may be due to the outsize role semiotics has played as an interpretive strategy. Thus, the project I have outlined in this chapter of distinguishing between these two types of communicative intentions must begin with an introduction
to semiotic theories and their impact on archaeology. Theories of semiology, the
science of signs, fall along two main lines, Saussurean and Peircean. Both have been
employed by archaeologists at different points in the 20th Century. I will begin by
presenting Saussure’s work and its impact on archaeology and will follow this with
Peirce.

6.3.1 Saussurean Semiology & Archaeology

At the start of the 20th Century Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure developed a
theory of signs in which signifiers are correlated with signifieds; that is, in which some
thing—such as, say, a garment or a word—stands for some concept—such as, say,
chastity (Allen 2003: 46; Barthes 2006; Chandler 2007). These two together constitute a
sign. For Saussure a crucial aspect of the relationship between signifier and signified is
that the signifier bears an arbitrary relation to the concept signified (Chandler 2007: 22).
Saussure’s general understanding of the relationship between signifiers and signifieds as
I have presented it here can serve as a good starting point to understand code-like
word meaning.

Different threads of Saussure’s theory of semiology have been used in various
ways by archaeologists as a possible grounding for a theory of archaeological
interpretation. By around the 1960s archaeologists such as Claude Levi-Strauss, Max
Raphael, Annette Laming-Emperaire, and Andre Leroi-Gourhan began applying
semiotic theories to archaeological interpretation in quite a literal way6 (Lewis-Williams

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6 Such use of the theory of semiology in often called “structuralism” in archaeology which Margaret Conkey
describes as “a body of ideas about how human culture and the human mind work” with “explicit origins in
Max Raphael, working in the period following the Second World War, looked at the caves of Lascaux as though virtually everything in them could be seen as a signifier for the signifieds of ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’. Those things that Raphael classified as being signifiers of ‘masculine’ included arrow points, phallic shapes, and depictions of acts of killing or death (Lewis-Williams 2002: 55). Those things that Raphael classified as being signifiers of ‘feminine’ included depictions of “feminine sex”, life-giving, and life (Lewis-Williams 2002: 55).

This line of thinking was pushed to its most literal conclusion by Andre Leroi-Gourhan (Leroi-Gourhan 1968; Lewis-Williams 2002: 60-65) who “dominated archaeology and anthropology in postwar France” (Curtis 2007: 13, 148). Leroi-Gourhan, aimed to create a “systematic synthesis” of all cave art, and drawing on imagery that has long seen caves as symbols of the feminine in literature, saw in the caves of Lascaux themselves a symbol of the feminine, and the act of entering a cave an act of being ensconced within a feminine symbol itself (Leroi-Gourhan 1968: 174; Lewis-Williams 2002: 63; Curtis 2007: 149). He writes “The cave as a whole does seem to have had a female symbolic character, which would explain the care with which narrow passages, oval-shaped areas, clefts, and the smaller cavities are marked in red, even sometimes painted entirely in red” (Leroi-Gourhan 1968: 174). Leroi-Gourhan understood the representations within the cave to be primarily masculine, which provided a balance to their feminine setting in the cave (174). For him “the phallus, the barbed sign, and the throwing weapons were treated as equivalents” (Leroi-Gourhan 1968: 135). Although it might have a certain literary or poetic appeal Leroi-Gourhan’s theory ran

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[linguistics and the study of language] according to which theorists assume imagery encountered “was generated from a set of underlying cultural premises that are structured like language” (Conkey 2001: 274)
into problems when he used it to make predictions and thereby falsified it (Lewis-Williams 2002: 64; Curtis 2007: 161-164; Bahn 2012: 28).

6.3.2 Peircean Semiology in Archaeology

Although interest in the literal application of Saussure’s semiology to whole sites like the caves at Lascaux seems to have died out by the 1970s (Conkey 2001: 284), there has been persistent interest in discussing archaeological interpretation in terms of signs, understood either in the Saussurian terms I have been presenting here, or according to other semioticians, such as Charles Peirce (Wiessner 1983; Conkey 2001; Lewis-Williams 2002; Trigger 2006; Preucel 2010; Rossano 2010; Bauer 2013).

Charles Peirce, an American philosopher, also working around the start of the 20th Century developed his own theory of semiology independently of Saussure (Chandler 2007). The aspect of Peirce’s theory that has been drawn on the most by archaeologists is his distinction between the three ways signs and objects can be tied together: his framework of icons, indexes, and signs (Bauer 2013: 13; Crossland 2014). Some sign can be tied to some object “through similarity (i.e. iconically), through an existent relation (i.e. indexically), and through convention (i.e. symbolically)” (Crossland 2014: 43). For example, as I presented earlier, a fire may signify the sun iconically because of their color and relative warmth, smoke may signify fire indexically because of the causal link between the two, and a flame may signify the Olympics symbolically because of an established convention (Crossland 2014: 44). One important point of contrast between Peircean and Saussurean semiology is that Peircean signs need not be arbitrary, where Saussurean signs must be arbitrary (Crossland 2014: Bauer 2013). This
means that although smoke may signify fire indexically for Peirce, smoke cannot be a signal for fire for Saussure because the connection between is causal, not arbitrary.

Some archaeologists who purport to use Peirce’s theory spend a great deal of time laying it out but the application of the theory to examples is rather thin. Alexander Bauer, for example, writes that a Peircean approach to semiotics “suggests a way to see an object as a kind of agent within semiotic mediation” (Bauer 2013: 12-13). Bauer spends a great deal of time introducing Peirce’s distinctions between icon-index-symbol and his notions of habit and Interpretant. He then follows this with a description of how pottery in the black sea may have constituted a “constellation of practices” that created a Black Sea identity, although there is no evidence of trading activity (Bauer 2013: 19-20). He concludes that “people produce, use, and discard cultural artifacts in ways that reinforce and ‘remind themselves who they are’” (22). He writes that this has shown how a semiotic approach “thus helps us to understand how a Black Sea ‘self’ could emerge at the onset of the Bronze Age” (22). However, the Black Sea glass has not at any point been tied explicitly to the Peircean framework. The threads of Peirce’s theory have been left behind, and it is not clear in what way, if any, they have helped Bauer get to his conclusion.

Some uses of Peircean semiotics are done so loosely that they can at best be thought to be “Peirce-inspired”. Zoe Crossland, for example, presents an account that is ostensibly a Peircean account of ancestral encounters in highland Madagascar, but after laying out Peirce’s theory, proceeds to rename his three categories “affective”, “energetic” and “habitual”, noting that it is a “simplification” and “an idiosyncratic renaming” (Crossland 2014: 73). This move, however, seriously distorts the Peircean
framework, and it is no longer clear whether the examples she provides fit in with Peirce’s original categories, or if they just bear a loose connection to the new categories she presents. If Leroi-Gourhan’s application of semiotics failed because it drew too literally on Saussure’s theory, such applications of Peirce’s theory fail because they are not literal enough. The contours of the theory get lost in the application.

Often archaeologists making use of the concept of signs or symbols draw on the broad strokes of what falls out of semiotics but do not specify which notion of the sign they wish to employ. However, whether or not some specific proposed sign meets the theoretical requirements depends on which notion is being deployed. In articles appearing in a 2014 special issue of Biological Theory on symbols in the archaeological record a number of theorists propose a role for the symbolic in archaeological interpretation. In “Learning in Lithic Landscapes: A Reconsideration of the Hominid ‘Toolmaking’ Niche” archaeologist Peter Hiscock understands the skill that is on display in well-made lithic tools as signifying the skill of the maker (Hiscock 2014). However, it is important to note that because there is a causal, i.e. not arbitrary connection, between the skill of the maker and the resulting quality of the lithic tool, this could only be considered to be a sign on a Peircean account of signs, not on a Saussurean account of signs.

Archaeologist Mary Stiner seems to take a different approach in her exploration of the implications of understanding beads as “instruments of symbolic communication” (Stiner 2014: 51). In this discussion Stiner argues that beads are the sorts of entities that could be used as signs because they are durable, standardized, quantifiable, transferrable, costly, and may be compounded and recombined (Stiner 2014). Unlike
Hiscock, she does not give details on what she thinks beads symbolized. She writes that although beads “seem to have been the minimal particles of information, loosely akin to bits in a digital coding system” there is “little to be gained from trying to reconstruct the actual messages conveyed” (Stiner 2014: 62). Although Stiner does not give details on what she thinks beads symbolized, her characterization of them as “akin to bits in a digital coding system” (62), and her focus on the likelihood that the meanings of beads “were so free to vary” (62) makes it sound as though she is taking their meaning to be more akin to the Saussurean notion of a sign, where there is an arbitrary link between the sign and the signified.

Note that the sort of meaning Hiscock proposes as being signified by the well-made lithic tools is not variable in the same way as Stiner’s beads. In Hiscock’s case there is a causal, non-arbitrary link between the tool itself and what it is taken to symbolize. This means that the “meaning” is easier to “read” as an archaeologist, but it also means that the potential for the object to have read a rich, compoundable, recombinable life as is available to beads—or for that matter words—is not present in this understanding of lithic tools. Whether one takes a Saussurean or a Peircean line on signs will affect the conclusions one may draw about objects that are thought to be signs. Attention to this distinction between the two theories and their history can make this difference more stark. In deploying the notion of signs in archaeology, it is important to either use signs in a consistent way, or identify when it is being used in one or another way.

6.4 Philosophy of Language
At the same time as philosophical theories from the early 20th Century were being applied to archaeological interpretation, philosophers—and in particular philosophers interested in meaning and communication—have moved on from semiotic theories. As presented earlier, a prominent research thread of contemporary philosophy of language is into what is ordinarily called “pragmatics”. Research into linguistic pragmatics is concerned with the ways that the meaning some speaker conveys on some occasion goes beyond the meanings of the words themselves and leads to what I have called earlier Group 5 speaker meaning.

According to the pragmatic tradition\(^7\), Group 5 speaker meaning is to be understood in terms of the intentions of the speaker. My appeal to the broad strokes of the Gricean program allows us to say, then, that we have a meaningful distinction between the conventional or encoded meanings of words themselves and what they are used to express on some occasion. This is what is captured in the distinction between the fourth and fifth categories, as presented earlier:

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<td>2. Byproduct-intentional</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Use-intentional</td>
<td>3. Knives</td>
<td>3. Consideration of which role or function the object could have served</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^7\)I am speaking very generally; there are many pragmatic theories and traditions but their nuances and differences are not relevant for this discussion. They have, however, been detailed in greater detail in earlier chapters.
4. Signaling-intentional (results in semantic meaning)  
4. Black mourning clothing in the 19th Century  
4. Decoding in accordance with meaning determined by established correlations or associations

| 5. Meaning-intentional (results in speaker meaning) | 5. Intentionally visible brushstrokes in a Monet | 5. Interpretation in accordance with recognition of complex meaning-intentions |

Fig. 9 Diagram of Intentional Aspect, Example, and Interpretive Strategy

6.5 Seeking Speaker Meaning in the Archaeological Record

With this distinction between word meaning and speaker meaning at hand, we can now consider the implications for theories of meaning in the archaeological record. If meaning in linguistic cases often goes beyond the encoded or conventional meanings of the words themselves this might be taken to indicate that the same can be said for objects of interpretation from the archaeological record. After all, both words and artifacts are made by the same types of agents with the same intention-recognition and other cognitive capacities. It would be strange indeed if there were a stark distinction between the ways we communicate linguistically and the ways we communicate non-linguistically.

We can ask, then, whether we can find the equivalent of speaker meaning in the archaeological record. In making this move, I shift from using Group 5 ‘speaker meaning’ in a semi-ordinary way to refer to the meaning of utterances to using it as a technical term that marks when some speaker or other agent creates something with a communicative intention that the interpreter recognize that what the creator means
goes beyond the encoded or conventional meanings of the thing or aspect in question. We can pose this in terms of the following question:

**Speaker Meaning in the Archaeological Record Question**

Is there evidence in the archaeological record of meaning that goes beyond the encoded meaning of the aspects or the artifacts themselves, and for which we have evidence that creator had the intention that the interpreters were intended to recognize this meaning?

Thus, we have our task. I will start with our more recent history and will move back in time looking through the archaeological record for artifacts that we can say evince speaker meaning. In this task, what I am interested in is not the particular features of the objects per se but these features insofar as they provide evidence of the relevant intentions required by speaker meaning.

**6.6 King Tutankhamen’s Tomb**

For the first piece of evidence in the archaeological record that can be considered an instance of speaker meaning, let us turn to the tomb of King Tutankhamen. The items in the tomb of King Tutankhamen date from approximately 1300 BC, and were discovered in the 1920s by Howard Carter (Carter 1923/1977; Robins 1997: 9, 158). What is remarkable about the tomb of King Tutankhamen is the sheer number of items that were found in the tomb from which it is possible to construct an overall narrative (Robins 1997). This site also has the advantage of being in the Valley of

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8 This is a looser notion than Grice’s spelling out of meaning intentions which for Grice requires that the recognition of this intention provides at least part of the reason for the hearer to come to believe that p. A number of theorists working in the Gricean tradition advocate for this looser treatment of Grice even in the linguistic cases (Neale 1992, Sperber & Wilson 1986).
the Kings in Egypt and because of the knowledge of the history of Egyptian dynasties can be placed within a well-defined broader historical context (Robins 1997: 9, 158-162). The tomb is full of beautiful furniture including thrones, beds, and stools; there is food encased in packages, statues of the gods, golden chariots, amulets with protective symbols, and the like. Most of the items in this and similar tombs are there because it was thought that they would be helpful to the king in the next world (Robins 1997: 20).

At the same time, in this tomb were found a number of items that deviate from this overall pattern. There are two places in the tomb where lowly characters and enemies of the king are depicted.

In the tomb three staffs with curved handles, made of gilded wood with ivory, ebony, and glass inlay were found (Carter 1923/1977). Carved on the handle of each of these staffs are bound captives, who have distinctive features. They are representing enemies of the king—the Asians who bordered Egypt to the East, the Nubians who bordered Egypt to the South and the Libyans who bordered Egypt to the West. “The figures are easily recognizable as foreigners by their non-Egyptian hairstyles and costume, which also serve to distinguish the different ethnic groups represented” (Robins 1997: 16). On each staff the figures are bound at the feet and at the wrists, their backs arching with the handle of the staff as though they are being hung in the air from their feet and shoulders. When the king held these staffs he would literally be holding—and crushing—the figures in the palm of his hand.

The enemies of the king were also found on another item—the footstool of the king (Carter 1923/1977). This footstool would have accompanied the resplendent golden throne that was also found in the tomb. On the footstool, in gold and blue
faience, are again, his enemies, three Nubians and three figures from the Near East. These figures are bound around their arms and necks. Each is wearing a distinctive garment that would have served to provide viewers at the time with more details on exactly who they were and where they were from. Howard Carter, who led the excavations of Tutankhamen’s tomb, wrote of discovering this item,

> Upon the seat of the throne rested the footstool that originally stood before it, a stool of gilded wood and dark blue faience, with panels on the top and sides on which were represented captives, bound and prone. This was a very common convention in the East – “until I make thine enemies thy footstool,” sings the Psalmist – and we may be sure that on certain occasions convention became actual fact. (Carter 1923/1977: 119)

In this passage Carter ties an idiomatic expression to the object, and characterizes the physical act of putting one’s enemies on one’s footstool as a gesture of power that lives out that idiomatic expression.

These metaphorical gestures of power—putting ones feet on enemies, or crushing one’s enemies on the palm of the hand while walking with a staff—are close enough to acts we might perform today that it makes sense to us why the king 3300 years ago would have symbolized his power this way. We have similarly relevant idiomatic expressions—‘I’ve got you under my thumb’, ‘he’s got him in the palm of his hand’, ‘don’t tread on me’, and so on—and we have similar expressions of power in, say, pulling down an American flag and stomping on it in an act of protest. It is through this shared symbolic framework that even today we can recognize the intention of the creator of these items and can understand what these items mean. We can recognize the way in which the intentions behind these items deviate from those of most of the items found in the tomb.
What is important to note with these artifacts is that there is some standard or conventional role for the items and things depicted in the tomb from which these deviate. When interpreting these items we must recognize the ways they deviate from the overall conventions. The enemies of the king were not in the tomb because it was desired that they accompany the king into the afterlife. To work out why they were there we must consider the particular features of the items they were depicted on and what the intentions were of whoever created these items. To put it in the terms introduced earlier, the tomb of Tutankhamen contains the evidence needed to identify speaker meaning in the archaeological record.

6.7 Dead Metaphors in the Archaeological Record

It might be objected that although we can see a metaphorical reading of the enemies of the king being depicted on the footstool, it may have at the time of the creation of this object been conventionalized. That is, to generalize the objection, what started out as a metaphorical depiction might have been conventionalized by the time of the creation of some particular object. In fact, returning to the footstool case, depiction of the enemies of the king underfoot is also seen in a painting in a tomb from the time of King Amenhotep III, around 20 years before the reign of Tutankhamen (Robins 1997: 9, 136-137). This might be thought of as reason to resist the conclusion I have advocated here: that the footstool in the tomb of King Tutankhamen constitutes evidence of speaker meaning in the archaeological record.

The same process certainly happens with language, where metaphors that have been repeated so often that their meanings seems to be conventionalized are called ‘dead metaphors’ (Lakoff 1987; Pawelec 2006). Some examples of dead metaphors
are phrases such as ‘foot of the mountain’, ‘head of the table’, ‘eye of the storm’, ‘branch of government’, ‘pillars of democracy’ and so on. For some of these dead metaphors, their meaning may be so conventionalized that we no longer recognize they would once have been metaphors.

If the enemies on the footstool of the king parallel dead metaphors does that mean that they no longer count as evidence of speaker meaning in the archaeological record? Let’s say for the point of argument that at the time of the creation of the footstool in the tomb of King of Tutankahen putting the enemies of the king on the footstool in a burial chamber had become conventionalized in a manner akin to the conventionalization that leads to a dead metaphor. Perhaps the first instance of putting enemies on a footstool was 20 years earlier in the tomb of King Amenhotep III. We might say, then, that the footstool in King Tutankhamen’s tomb is not itself an instance of speaker meaning. Even if this is true, it remains the case that this footstool is evidence of speaker meaning in the archaeological record. That is, the presence of a dead metaphor is evidence that there was at some point a “live” metaphor. This means that the live metaphor was used with such regularity that it eventually became conventionalized.

The presence of a dead metaphor is evidence of the proliferation of a metaphor at some prior time. We can distinguish two questions: 1) “Is this artifact an instance of speaker meaning?” from 2) “Is this artifact evidence of speaker meaning?” In the case of the equivalent of dead metaphor the answer to the first question would be ‘no’; the answer to the second question would be ‘yes’. An affirmative to the second question is all that is needed in a project finding evidence of speaker meaning in the
archaeological record, my task here. In short, the possibility that some object’s metaphorical meaning may have become conventionalized does not weaken this artifact’s value as evidence of speaker meaning.

We can push on, then, with this aim to find speaker meaning in the archaeological record. This is a demanding interpretive task because it requires that not only are we able to find meaning by conventions in the past, but that we also have evidence of an intentional deviation from that convention in which we can say there is speaker meaning. However, the presence of the parallel of dead metaphor is not an obstacle to this project, but an instance of its success.

6.8 A Refined Idea of What is Needed as Evidence for Speaker Meaning

With these cases of depictions of enemies of the king in the tomb of Tutankhamen on footstools and staffs we have the examples at hand to develop a more refined view of what a project of seeking speaker meaning in the archaeological record demands. In presenting a case that has the required features for speaker meaning I hope to have homed in on what features some artifact and site must have for us draw similar conclusions elsewhere. To establish speaker meaning in the archaeological record, we need the following:

1) Established conventions of meaning (called “word meaning” or “semantic meaning”), and

2) An apparent deviation from or violation of (1).

This triggers a search for speaker’s meaning that deviates from the word meaning and these two together lead to:

3) Attempt at resolution of the apparent violation based on the assumption that the speaker/creator has expressed something at the level of speaker
meaning.
This framework is built off the Gricean framework of conversational implicatures.

Sometimes, although 1 and 2 are satisfied, a speaker’s meaning in not readily available. In such cases, we will look for evidence that we have not correctly identified or understood the relevant convention.

One challenge of carrying over this linguistic framework to archaeological interpretation is that because of the ambiguity of evidence in the archaeological record, it is very difficult to be in a position where we can be confident that both 1 and 2 obtain. That is, it is very difficult to be in a position where there is enough evidence for the meaning of some artifact or aspect of an artifact that an archaeologist can be confident that they have correctly identified a set convention of meaning for that thing. Without set conventions an intentional deviation from that convention will not emerge. A theorist may think, in the face of artifacts that deviate from the established conventions, that perhaps what they took to be the conventionalized meaning was understood wrong—perhaps that some class of artifacts that they have taken to have one meaning should, in fact, be understood in terms of two groups with two meanings.

This certainly would be a reasonable option. What must not be lost in this debate, however, is that the search for meaning in the archaeological record must allow for the possibility that some creator was intentionally deviating from some established code in a way that the viewers at the time were meant to recognize. There is no doubt we do this today with things like metaphor, and it should remain on the table for non-linguistic archaeological interpretation.
6.9 Broader Applications: Metaphor In the Literature

The account I have provided of what is required for metaphor as an instance of speaker meaning is directly tied to the ways metaphor must 1) deviate from the literal or conventional meanings of the thing that is exploited for the metaphor and 2) be grounded in an intention to thus deviate in a way interpreters will recognize. This is more precise, and I believe more theoretically robust, than some other accounts of metaphor in the archaeological record that are not clear how metaphor relates to signs, or the role of intentions in metaphor, such as in the account of metaphor in archaeology advanced by Christopher Tilley (2000; 2004).

Tilley begins a paper on metaphor in landscapes with a summary and explanation of metaphor in the literature, writing, for example, that “working out a speaker’s attitudes and beliefs may be a key aspect of metaphorical understanding” (Tilley 2000: 9). This seems to be in line with what I have advocated for here. But the examples he uses quickly deviate from this account. He writes, for example, that “Language is, in part, a metaphorical construction of the world, as is material culture” (Tilley 2000: xiv). He goes on to argue that parts of a landscape such as round barrows and dykes are landscape metaphors, writing, “The relationship of other barrows to gullies and places where scarp slopes change direction indicates the symbolic significance of these aspects of the topography too as places of transition, perhaps again of a metaphoric journey from life to death, high to low” (Tilley 2004: 197).

As is pointed out by Joanna Bruck in the comments section of this paper, such an account of metaphor problematically uncouples metaphor from intention. Bruck notes that these structures have “generally been interpreted in militaristic or functional terms”
(201) and asks, “How do we know that a particular barrow was deliberately sited so that it might be visible from one direction but invisible from another, or so that it was just below a ridge rather than on the flat ridge top? Might these relationships have been accidental rather than intentional?” (201) This is important because as Tilley notes in his initial account of metaphor, it is important that metaphor is intended to be metaphor. Thus, in presenting an argument that some site or artifact has a metaphorical meaning we must demonstrate that there is evidence of such an intention, as I have proposed here and have attempted to illustrate in examples.

Additionally, Ronika Power and Yann Tristant, along with others, have proposed that the ceramics used in Egyptian pot burials might have metaphorically represented the womb. As they argue, this link is thought to already be established in Southeast Asia and has been proposed in European, African, and Near Eastern contexts (Power & Tristant 2016: 1478).

Such discussions of metaphor in archaeological interpretation require a clear grasp of the conditions some artifact must satisfy to count as a metaphor, and a clear explanation of how a metaphor is different from a symbol. By looking at the special features of metaphor in language I hope to have abstracted the difference here. I believe that the account I have presented here would have the result that Tilley’s account is not rightly classified as metaphor but that Power and Tristant’s could be, depending on the specifics of the evidence. Additionally, accounts that see metaphor as somehow predating symbols (Coward & Gamble 2010) would be rendered incoherent by my account, which defines speaker meaning, including metaphor, in
terms of the intentional manipulation of symbols that the viewer is intended to pick up on.

6.10 Further Applications: Footed Bowl and Spear Thrower

Are there further artifacts that have not been considered as metaphors by archaeologists that would also be best explained by the proposed framework? I will now present two such artifacts. I choose these cases because they show the broad application potential of this proposal to different types of artifacts and different points in time.

In Predynastic Egypt, from about 4000-3000 BC, prior to the development of hieroglyphs and the pharos of Egypt, we see a transition from the use of flint tools and pottery made roughly from brown clay to more sophisticated production techniques and materials, including bronze (Robins 1997: 8, 30; Hayes 2013). Egyptologist William Hayes writes that what stands out about items found at this time was the “manufacture of fine, thin-walled pottery vessels, chiefly bowls. The exteriors of the better and more characteristic examples are finished with a burnished slip or a curious all-over rippled pattern” (Hayes 2013:14). Many of these finely shaped vessels were also adorned with red pigment (Robins 1997: 30-31; Hayes 2013: 16-17).

It is clear that at this time there were fairly established conventions of what a bowl looked like, conventions that persist today. These conventions, were, of course, shaped by the function bowls serve. There is a reason that bowls do not have holes in the bottom, that they are not sharp, that they usually fit in the human hand, and that they usually do not tip over when set down.
It is within this context that we arrive upon an artifact that deviates from these conventions: a bowl atop a pair of carefully sculpted human feet, with ten intricately carved toes. The bowl is slanted slightly forward, and it looks almost animate—like a character from a Lewis Carroll story—as though it could saunter over and serve you whatever it contains.

We can be sure that a viewer of this artifact would have (1) recognized the normal conventions of what a bowl usually looked like and (2) would have recognized the ways the creator of this bowl deviated from (1), and (3) in virtue of (1) and (2) would have looked for a unique creator’s intention that explains this deviance. In this case it seems clear that the creator has a whimsical, humorous intention (Hayes 2013), which despite a distance of almost 6,000 years from the formation of this intention, still has the same effect on a viewer today.

Moving further back in prehistory can we find evidence still of speaker meaning in Pleistocene hominins from before the development of farming?

Spear throwers are implements used to increase the distance and speed of spears beyond the simpler technique of throwing them by hand (Garrod 1955). Spear throwers include a long shaft, often with a weight at the end, and a hook that is inserted into a groove in the back of the spear (Bandi 1988; Garrod 1955; Leroi-Gourhan 1968). Because of the added length and weight of the spear thrower, when used in the throwing motion the spear can be released at an increased velocity with less strength, and thus can go a greater distance with greater force on impact (Knecht 1997; Rudgley 2000; Whittaker 2010). Spear throwers have been found in many cultures.
including Magdalenian, aboriginal Australian, New Guineans, Native Americans, and Alaskan Inuit (Leroi-Gourhan 1968: 63; British Museum Collection).

Spear throwers that are made of carved reindeer antler are found within narrow temporal and geographical regions, from Magdalenian IV through Magdalenian V temporally and primarily between the Pyrenees and the Dordogne spatially (Leroi-Gourhan 1968: 63). This has lead theorists to the position that most spear throwers were usually made of wood and thus did not survive the passage of time (Garrod 1955: 21; Leroi-Gourhan 1968: 63). Most spear throwers that did survive are unweighted, “of a very simple type, straight sticks, rather narrow, but with a well defined hook” (Garrod 1955: 22-23). These simple spear throwers were found throughout the Magdalenian, including in the cave of Mas d’Azil itself (Garrod 1955: 22).

The item of interest for our discussion is a spear thrower that was found in the cave of Mas-d’Azil in southwestern France (Bandi 1988). This spear thrower is from approximately 12,000 BC and is carved from reindeer antlers. It consists of a long shaft (about 29.5 cm) and at the top, which corresponds with the widest part of the antler, a chemois or ibex is standing as though perched at the peak of a cliff (Bandi 1988; Leroi-Gourhan 1968: 64). We can understand the animal’s legs gathered as though at the peak of the cliff as a result both of the overall desired shape of the spear thrower and as a feature necessitated by the raw material of the antler from which it is carved (Leroi-Gourhan 1968: 64). The animal’s head is turned over her right flank, and she looks back toward her tail, under which there is some object apparently coming out of her rump (Bandi 1988; Leroi-Gourhan 1968: 64). On this mass there is what appears to be a bird, or at least the beak of a bird (Bandi 1988).
This artifact has been described as a humorous one, on the interpretation that the animal is defecating (Garrod 1955; Leroi-Gourhan 1968: 64), and as a sober one, on the interpretation that the animal is giving birth (Bandi 1988). Resolution of whether or not the sculpture is a humorous one or a sober one depends on gathering evidence about what this particular creator could have intended. In the cave of Mas d’Azil, as well as earlier caves, we have remaining evidence of simpler, utilitarian spear throwers as many more were thought to have been made of wood to have not survived (Garrod 1955: 21; Leroi-Gourhan 1968: 63) and from which the intricately carved antler variety would have deviated.

With these examples—depictions of enemies on staffs and footstools, a footed bowl, and a carved spear thrower—I have proposed instances of evidence of Group 5 speaker meaning from early history, recent prehistory, and Pleistocene prehistory before the development of farming. Speaker meaning is a wide-ranging phenomenon that we have instances of from diverse points in history and geography.

6.11 An Abstract Proposal

Another way of looking at the task I have outlined here—to continue seeking evidence of speaker meaning in the archaeological record—could be to take a more indirect approach. The viability of this indirect approach is contingent on one’s beliefs about the evolution of language—which I have not replied on up to this point. If one had the belief that language as we know it today evolved on the back of the evolution of more general intention-recognition and mindreading modules, and if one had the belief that as a result the development of language would occur virtually simultaneously with the development of Group 5 speaker meaning—which is not an
unreasonable position—then one might see the first evidence of language as the first evidence of speaker meaning.

What might count as the first evidence of language is a widely debated issue, but some theorists think that in observing evidence of highly coordinated behavior we have evidence of language—the idea is that such coordination would be impossible without language. It has been proposed that marine shell beads, engraved ocher and eggs, finely made tools (Dubreuil & Henshilwood 2013: 148) evidence of the quarries that must have been needed for lithic tools (Planer 2017), and even in the cultivation of fire (Planer 2017) we have evidence of the advent of language. By taking a more abstract view of the question I have laid out here, we could say that such artifacts—shell beads, handaxes, ash deposits, and so on—may constitute evidence of speaker meaning in the archaeological record.

Of course, I laid out this proposal as a conditional contingent on the truth of both parts of the antecedents—that 1) language as we know it today evolved on the back of the evolution of more general intention-recognition and mindreading modules, and 2) the development of language would occur virtually simultaneously with the development of speaker meaning—which I did not argue for here. I also did not argue that the proposed artifacts really constitute evidence of the advent of language. However, it seems worth highlighting this as at the very least as a possibility that would follow from the satisfaction of plausible requirements.

6.12 Humor

Some of the cases I provided as examples of objects that have speaker meaning were of the sort where the speaker meaning could be seen to be rooted in an intention
to be humorous. The bowl with feet has been read this way, and this is one viable interpretation of the spear thrower that has been proposed in the literature. I understand humorous intentions to be one type of intention that may be realized through speaker meaning. One reason that humorous intentions lend themselves particularly well to discussions of speaker meaning is that humor often succeeds as a result of some degree of novelty. There is often an element of working out an incongruous puzzle or and finding something surprising in humor (Carroll 2014). This means that humor lends itself especially well to intentional flouting of convention. But speaker meaning may be achieved in many other ways; it can also be metaphorical, ironic, clever, discreet, and many other things. I will return to discuss humor in more detail in Chapter 7.

6.12 Decoration & Style

Some of the features of the examples I have presented here as instances of speaker meaning are what might be thought to be classified as types of decoration or style. Thus, it is worth commenting on these categories. Decoration seems to be a type of non-functional detailing on a functional item that is not of the elevated status that it should be recognized as art. Style is the way something is produced, which is usually a result of influences from exposure to a particular group, and often that influence is identifiable. Decoration and style are important to archaeology especially for the role they can play in placing artifacts in chronological order and with respect to certain creative communities.

‘Decoration’ and ‘style’ as categories cut across some of the distinctions I have made in this paper. Decoration and style can be seen both as an intention-based and
as a code-like phenomenon, depending on the circumstances. It seems clear that something can be both intentionally communicative and an element of decoration or style at the same time.

Certain decorative or stylistic features may be due to some creator intending to indicate or refer to group membership or some other meaning, or without this intention—some creator may make a decorative or stylistic choice as a result of having been trained in a certain tradition, following local practices, ignorant of other ways of doing things, or aware of but lacking in the particular required technique for the alternatives (see Wasserman 1983 and Dubreuil & Henshilwood 2013: 157). Thus, to say that some feature of a work is decoration or a part of style is not to classify it one way or another with respect to the categories I have presented here.

6.14 Is it Art?

My argument here has not made any claims about whether or not the objects I discussed ought to be classified as art. Such an argument would require giving the conditions something must satisfy to count as art. This is a question that philosophers have puzzled over for thousands of years (see Adajian 2016 for a review) but I will not weigh in on it here. I will note, however, that there might be interesting connections between the capacity to create and understand speaker meaning and the capacity to create and understand art. Perhaps the two may have similar or overlapping cognitive precursors. It has been proposed by Gregory Currie, for example, that art requires the ability to imagine the mental states of others (Currie 2003). If this ability is thought to be a requirement for speaker meaning, as has been proposed by a number of theorists working on language (Baron-Cohen 1995; Tomasello 2010) there might be
important connections between where we stand on the advent of speaker meaning and what this means for the dawn of art.

6.15 Conclusion

In this chapter I have argued for the importance of clarifying and going beyond semiotic models of sign interpretation in the archaeological record. Doing so leads us to seek Group 5 speaker meaning in the archaeological record. Building off discussions of speaker meaning in linguistic cases, I presented the conditions some artifact must satisfy to count as evidence of speaker meaning in the archaeological record, and discussed a number of concrete cases that met these conditions. Lastly, I suggested ways that this project be situated with respect to inquiry into decoration and style, humor, artifacts as art, and the advent of spoken language.

In presenting this in-depth discussion of the applicability of my interpretive framework to archaeology I hope to have made clear the potential of my proposal to advance an ongoing debate in a field outside philosophy. I believe similar progress could be made with in-depth application of my interpretive framework to all the fields I briefly sketched out in the previous chapter.
Chapter 7
Intentions & the Mind

7.1 Intentions & Communication

I hope at this point to have established a need for and successfully defended an account that ties meaning to intentions in the Gricean model on theoretical grounds. Now that we have a theoretical motivation for adopting the position I advocate for here, the next step is to consider the empirical evidence. The Gricean program has given us a theoretical motivation to seek out the empirical evidence. What I will argue in this chapter is that the theoretical demands of the Gricean program are borne out by the empirical picture. This is an ideal situation for any theory: a theoretical demand backed by empirical evidence.

A starting point for cognitively-based objections to the Gricean program often begins with first pointing incredulously to the cognitive demands of the Gricean program and asking whether it is possible that we really do this. This initial response can develop into more theoretically and empirically-grounded questions about the viability of intentions as a part of any theory. In this chapter I will respond to empirical questions about the use of intentions in a theory of meaning, drawing on research from cognitive science, psychology, and philosophy of mind.

7.2 Objection: Phenomenology of Communication

The first objection I will consider about the psychological plausibility of the demands of the Gricean program relates to the phenomenology of what it feels like when we communicate. I mention it here because it is prevalent in the literature and in
gut reactions or intuitions about what might “seem ludicrous” or “strike us as plainly incredible” when first encountering Grice (Hornsby 2000: 95). There is the accusation that the Gricean account is psychologically implausible because it simply does not feel like we do this much work when we communicate. Intentions are often seen to be highly suspect: too psychologically complex or as mysterious in some way. For example, after briefly presenting the Gricean view of meaning in a 2000 paper, Jennifer Hornsby writes,

I think that this ought to seem ludicrous. Real people regularly get things across with their utterances; but real people do not regularly possess, still less act upon, intentions of this sort. Developmental psychologists find it doubtful whether three-year-old children possess the concept of belief but they do not find it doubtful that three-year-olds can, for instance, tell them things. And notice that an enormous amount would be demanded of hearers, as well as speakers, if such complex intentions really were needed to say things...a person would have to achieve an extraordinary wariness in order to grasp that a speaker with Gricean intentions had said something to her. But surely one doesn’t need to judge the extent of someone’s complex intentions exactly aright in order to converse with her. I think that it should strike us as plainly incredible that it might be as difficult to participate in the ordinary communicative use of language as the orthodox account of saying would have it. (95)

Ought we use such intuitions in evaluating the merit of some theory?

Surely that a theory does not comport with what seems natural before we considered it is not sufficient grounds to dismiss the theory. If we did adopt this position, we would be in the camp of those who insisted that surely it is the sun moves around the earth.

When faced with phenomena that some simple theory cannot fully explain, it might be time to revise the theory, even if it goes against what seems intuitive. I hope to have at this point established the need for a Gricean theory to most fully explain the data at hand, and in particular to have successfully argued in previous chapters
against the idea that the code model or audience model is able to sufficiently explain human communication. The Gricean project has the explanatory power to deal with what are otherwise problem cases. Rather than reject Grice’s view on the grounds that it seems unintuitive, we ought to examine the empirical literature to see if it supports a Gricean position. In the following section I will do just that. I will demonstrate that the empirical data provides support for a Gricean picture that puts the creation and recognition of intentions at the heart of our practices of meaning and communication.

7.3 Empirical Work on Intentions & Communication

To consider the plausibility of Grice’s view from an empirical perspective, I will now consider research into the following areas: children, homo sapiens, teaching and learning, modularity, and cognitive architecture. I will then return to the phenomenology of communication issue posed above informed by a more sophisticated view of the mind. This will allow us to consider the complex relationship between consciousness and intentions informed with empirical research.

7.4 Children

Children are a helpful case for research into intentions and language use because as children incrementally develop the ability to use more and more complex language, we can test what other cognitive capacities develop at the same time, or are cognitive precursors to what sort of language use.

The sound of a crying baby induces a mobilizing sense of distress in those who hear it and the activity of an infant crying can be understood in terms of the resulting
effect this has on the child’s caregivers (Owings & Zeifman 2004). When crying causes a caregiver to engage in soothing activity this causes the infant to associate crying with “rewarding transitions from distress to calm” (Owings & Zeifman 2004: 154). Although it has been shown that certain broad categories do have identifiable cries and that volume does correlate with severity of the problem, crying is of course, a very crude method of communication containing very little information about what led to the cry and how a caregiver may address it (Owings & Zeifman 2004).

Imagine the relief that we all must have felt, then, when, with language, we acquired the ability to communicate in a way that made it easier for our caregivers to interpret our messages. The period between 10 and 24 months is that in which a child moves from communication with referential gestures to the time when language use is abundant (Goodwyn, Acredolo & Brown 2000: 83).

Some who object to the Gricean picture claim that even if adults have complex communicative intentions, surely young children—who are nevertheless able to acquire and use language—do not. Hornsby made such a claim in the section quoted above, writing “Developmental psychologists find it doubtful whether three-year-olds possess the concept of belief but they do not find it doubtful that three-year-olds can, for instance, tell them things” (Hornsby 2000: 85). Unfortunately, Hornsby does not cite a particular study or take the necessary steps to connect the study in a specific way to her argument. However, similar arguments that are tied to specific studies can be found elsewhere in the literature. Marilyn Shatz & Anne Watson O’Reilly (1990), for instance, claim that “children need only believe mothers are instruments magically activated by their signals in order for them to persist in trying to get their mothers to act on their
behalf” (113). Or, in other words, “…no sophisticated theory of mind is necessary to account for the children’s behavior” (113). That is, they argue that children need not have thoughts about the mental states of their mothers in order to communicate effectively with them.

However, empirical work is increasingly proving that the theory that young children are able to acquire language without having thoughts about their mothers’ thoughts is simply not true (Winner 1997; Tomasello 1999; Baron-Cohen 1995; Casler & Kelemen 2005; Wilson 2006). Roberta Golinkoff (1993) writes that Shatz & O’Reilly “have seriously underestimated the communicative capabilities of two-year-olds, and by implication, younger children as well” (200). She continues, writing that they “seem to have relegated two-year-olds’ communicative interactions to the level of language-trained chimpanzees who appear to use sign language only to accomplish ‘overt behavioral goals’” (200).

Contra the claims of Hornsby and Shatz & O’Reilly, there is much research that shows systems that must be in place prior to human language acquisition includes the ability to have thoughts about the thoughts of others. The first communicative acts performed by infants are imperative acts about their immediate needs, such as their need to be fed (Tomasello 1999: 87). At eleven or twelve months of age children begin to be able to gesture to objects in the world, through actions such as pointing, in what might be called the first indicative communicative acts, in that they are about some outside state of the world (Tomasello 1999: 87). This can only occur after the child has learned that others have mental states similar to his or her own, and thus has the concept of sharing attention. Research by Tomasello has shown that language
acquisition begins "directly on the heels of the emergence of joint attentional skills...in a correlated fashion with nonlinguistic social-cognitive and social-interactive skills" (Tomasello 1999: 111).

Infants less than a year of age look at their mothers when they witness a novel event. This is called "social referencing" and is taken to be further evidence that children at this age have thoughts about the thoughts of others. Specifically, it is seen as a sign that the infants recognize that their mothers have minds of their own and may react in some way it would be informative to know about as an evaluation of the event (Golinkoff 1991: 203; Campos & Stenberg 1981). For instance, if the mother appears afraid, the child may learn that the thing in question poses a danger.

Additionally, children from around 9 months to 14 months engage in gaze monitoring (Baron-Cohen 1995: 48). "In this phenomenon, the infant turns in the same direction that another person is looking at and then shows gaze alternation, checking back and forth a few times to make sure (as it appears) that it and the other person are both looking at the same thing, thus establishing shared visual attention on the same object" (Baron-Cohen 1995: 48). Attention to the gaze of the mother is what allows the child to correctly identify the item that led to the emotional response. "Our eyes give them a clue as to our interpretation of events, since our gaze is usually embedded within an emotional facial expression (of interest, pleasure, fear, surprise, disgust, anger, etc.)" (Baron-Cohen 1995: 119). Gaze monitoring is one of the first ways we learn to respond emotionally to the things in the world around us.

Further evidence that young children conceive of others as having minds is seen in studies on perspective. Children around age two will often reorient a picture they
wish to show another so that it is facing up from the viewer’s perspective (Golinkoff 1991: 203; Lempers, Flavell & Flavell 1977). Additionally, Golinkoff writes that further evidence for the claim that infants are engaged in a process of “meeting the mind” of another is that children alter their communication based on who the hearer is, repair failed attempts to convey meaning, share information that is apparently not instrumental, and monitor the reactions of other’s experiences to gain information (1991: 206). Golinkoff notes that of course children must develop these abilities before they can talk about them or overly convey them to researchers, and that we should look for evidence of a theory of mind in behaviors (1991: 206).

7.5 *Homo Sapiens*

An additional methodology for gaining further insight into human communicative capacities is to contrast our communicative abilities with those of non-human animals.

Certain theorists propose the idea that language is something that is in some sense “innate” in all humans. Noam Chomsky proposed his theory of universal grammar, that is, a unified “system of principles that specify what it is to be a human language” (Chomsky 1990: 679). According to Chomsky, “This system of principles is a component of the mind/brain prior to the acquisition of a particular language” (Chomsky 1990: 679). He further writes, “I doubt very much that it makes any sense to speak of a person as learning a language. Rather, a language grows in the mind/brain. Acquiring language is less something that a child does than something that happens to the child, like growing arms rather than wings” (Chomsky 1990: 680). This means, that, in other words,
on Chomsky’s view the essential facts about the development of human language are genetic facts that we all share as a species.

Often comparative studies between humans and other species are done with non-human primates because they are closest to us genetically. What later became modern humans began to become genetically isolated from other primate species such as chimpanzees and bonobos 6 million years ago (Tomasello 1999: 2). In terms of evolutionary time, this is not very long (Tomasello 1999: 216). We share approximately 99% percent of our genetic material with chimpanzees (Tomasello 1999: 2). This means that we are as genetically similar to chimpanzees as lions are to tigers and horses are to zebras (Tomasello 1999: 2; King & Wilson 1975). With respect to this issue, Tomasello writes,

The fact is, there simply has not been enough time for normal processes of biological evolution involving genetic variation and natural selection to have created, one by one, each of the cognitive skills necessary for modern humans to invent and maintain complex tool-use industries and technologies, complex forms of symbolic representation, and complex social organizations and institutions. (Tomasello 1999: 2)

This comparison between Homo sapiens and other primates presents a puzzle. For, we are genetically very close with our primate relatives, but our communicative and other capacities widely differ. There is a question, then, if our exceptional language capacities can be explained in genetic terms or cultural terms. This question has been termed “the sapient paradox” by archaeologist Colin Renfrew (2008).

Psychologist Michael Tomasello dismisses the views of cognitive scientists such as Chomsky 1980 as “philosophical nativism” for ignoring how Darwinian processes actually work (Tomasello 1999:50). Tomasello writes that such theorists explain language development as arising from “some bizarre genetic mutation unrelated to other aspects of human cognition and social life” (Tomasello 1999: 94). Tomasello similarly
dismisses theories that explain human language ability in terms of “innate modules”, such as advanced by John Tooby and Leda Cosmides (1989) and Steven Pinker (1994) on the same grounds. Tomasello writes that the one quarter of a million years that we have to explain the evolution of human language is simply not enough time for such a complex biological mechanism to evolve (Tomasello 1999: 55). Because of the short evolutionary timespan separating us from other primates, a purely genetic explanation does not seem sufficient to explain the gap between our communicative abilities. This is by no means an uncontroversial position (Tooby & Cosmides 1989; Chomsky 1990; Pinker 1994; Lewis-Williams 2002; Renfrew 2008; Wilson & Sperber 2012) but for the sake of moving this discussion along I will assume it for now. I will return to these arguments about biological factors later in the chapter.

7.6 Teaching & Learning

This means, then, if Tomasello is right, that the vast difference between the communicative capacities of *Homo sapiens* and other primates is to be at least partly explained not by genetic differences, but in terms of cultural differences in practices of teaching and learning (Tomasello 1999:4). There may be necessary genetic components separating us from other primates but they are not sufficient to explain the communicative gap between us and other species.

This means that the question about the connection between intention recognition and language can now be raised with an eye toward the communication children do, on the understanding that this will show evidence of the cultural practices that distinguish us from other primates. Our debate has shifted to new ground but it is still one about how tenable the proposed connection between intentions and
language is. We are now looking at the question of intentions and communication from the ontogenetic perspective, considering how human children as individual instances of our species develop language abilities throughout their early lives (Tomasello 1999: 203).

There is a great deal of research on the divergence between how human infants and young non-human primates acquire language (Kummer & Goodall 1985; Call & Tomasello 1996; Tomasello 1999; Schroeder 2010; Goodall 2010). Primate offspring learn to interact with the world via adult primates, who do not engage in teaching of their children (Tomasello 1999). Experimenters who have found some degree of success in teaching sign language to primates have sometimes done so with the expectation that the animal would then pass this language on to its offspring (Schroeder 2010; Hu 2014). However, even in the case of Koko the gorilla, where there was the explicit stated intention that she “teach” sign language to her offspring, this research did not pan out (Hu 2014). In Koko’s case she chose not to mate with her arranged partners and thus had no offspring (Hu 2014). But according to Tomasello’s research the explanation, even if she had produced offspring she could not have taught them language because a non-human primate mother would not recognize that her offspring has their own mind that could be affected by teaching. To be clear, there are well documented cases of offspring learning from their mother by observing her do some activity, such as by getting ants out of a log with a stick, but this sort of learning is still not the result of teaching (Kummer & Goodall 1985; Goodall 2010). Tomasello calls this type of learning by observation “emulation learning” and contrasts it with how we engage with our offspring, which he calls “social teaching” (Tomasello 1999).
Because humans are the only species that engage in social teaching that means knowledge can be accumulated over time, by what Tomasello calls the “Ratchet Effect” (Kummer & Goodall 1985; Tomasello 1999). The Ratchet Effect is the process by which innovations are improved upon by subsequent agents and leads to “cumulative cultural evolution” (Tomasello 1999). The result of cumulative cultural evolution is that “human children’s cognitive development takes place in the context of something resembling the entire cultural history of their social group” (Tomasello 1999: 53). “In this view, complex linguistic constructions are just another type of symbolic artifact that human beings inherit from their forebears” (Tomasello 1999: 135). The upshot of this position is that the key, then, to understanding how our species has developed language capacity can be gleaned from observing how language is acquired in children—specifically in understanding the cultural or social structures are in place for humans that are not in place for other primates.

7.7 Modularity

If we accept Tomasello’s arguments it seems clear that the richness of Homo Sapien language capacity is to be understood at least partly in cultural terms. This does not entail that we should fully abandon enquiry into the possibility of a necessary biological component.

One of the most sophisticated accounts of the necessary biological components for language use is the modularity of mind position. Modularity of mind is the view that “our cognitive architecture resembles a confederation of hundreds or thousands of functionally dedicated computers (often called modules) designed to solve adaptive problems endemic to our hunter-gatherer ancestors” (Tooby & Cosmides 1995: xiv).
Advocates of this view believe that “there are specialized systems for grammar induction, for face recognition, for dead reckoning, for construing objects, and for recognizing emotions from the face” (Tooby & Cosmides 1995: xiv). Modularity of Mind results from a position where the brain is viewed as an organ that has been developed through a process of natural selection, with each mechanism persisting because of an advantage it provided in a particular evolutionary context (Baron-Cohen 1995: 11).

Cosmides et al (1992) use the metaphor of a Swiss Army knife to illustrate how one might think of a modular mind—with each piece specific to some purpose. As I noted earlier, Tomasello rejects the modularity view along with the universal grammar view as a full explanation of our language capacities because he says there has not been enough time for such modules to develop in humans and not also be present in other primates.

One point of entry into debates about the connection between modularity of mind and language capacities is the study of autism. Studies on people with autism can help us identify the necessary biological components of language acquisition. For, despite people with autism having been raised in normal cultural communities, their language capacities do not develop in the ordinary way. This makes it clear that language development has necessary conditions beyond solely the social factors Tomasello identifies.

Psychologist Simon Baron-Cohen and his colleagues were the first to propose that autism results from an impairment in the theory of mind module, the part of the mind that allows us to think about the thoughts of others (Tooby & Cosmides 1995: xviii). To paint a picture of autism Baron-Cohen (61) draws on descriptions from 1943 studies by Leo Kanner, who describes an autistic boy in the following way:
He never looked up at people's faces. When he had any dealings with persons at all, he treated them, or rather parts of them, as if they were objects. He would use a hand to lead him. He would, in playing, butt his head against his mother as at other times he did against a pillow. He allowed his boarding mother's hand to dress him, paying not the slightest attention to her. (61)

Baron-Cohen argues that an impairment in the theory of mind module means that autistic individuals perceive the world without perceiving it as containing mental things such as “thoughts, beliefs, knowledge, desires, and intentions” (Baron-Cohen 1995: 1). As a result of his work, Baron-Cohen has developed a method for detecting autism in children earlier than had been thought to be possible (Tooby & Cosmides 1995: xviii; Baron-Cohen 1995: 139).

If Baron-Cohen is right, autistic individuals provide us with an opportunity to see what our minds would be like without the ability to think about the thoughts of others. Let me briefly provide some details on Baron-Cohen’s theory. He proposes that there are four components to mindreading: the Intentionality Detector, Eye-Direction Detector, Shared-Attention Mechanism, and Theory-of-Mind Mechanism (1995: 31-55).

He notes that there may be other modules involved in mindreading but wants to argue that at least these four are a part (1995: 31-32). The Intentionality Detector is that which allows us to read mental states such as goals and desires in behavior (32-33)—to, for instance, look at someone who is reaching for something, and conclude that they want to open the curtains so they can read their book in the sunlight. The Eye-Direction Detector serves three functions, to help us identify eyes or eye-like shapes, to work out what they are directed at, and to infer on this basis what the organism can see (38-39). The Shared-Attention Mechanism is what allows us to conceive of ourselves and another agent in some relationship with some third, outside object, what Baron-Cohen
calls a “triadic representation” (44). The fourth and final mechanism is the Theory-of-Mind Mechanism (Baron-Cohen 1995: 51; Leslie 1994). The Theory-of-Mind Mechanism is what allows us to infer the full range of mental states about others from their behavior. So far we have accounted for goals and desires (Intentionality Detector) and the perceptual state of seeing (Eye-Direction Detector). With the Theory-of-Mind Mechanism we infer the remaining states, what Baron-Cohen calls the “epistemic mental states” of pretending, thinking, knowing, believing, imagining, dreaming, guessing, and deceiving (Baron-Cohen 1995: 51). The phrase “theory of mind” comes from Premack & Woodriff’s (1978) research on primate research in which they likened our human concept of the minds of others to a theory because mental states cannot be straightforwardly observed in the world (Baron-Cohen 1995: 55).

Baron-Cohen sees these four modules as interconnected, and as developing sequentially throughout infancy (55). The first to develop are the Intentionality Detector and the Eye-Direction Detector, which appear sometime before the child is 9 months old (55). From 9 to 18 months, the child develops the Shared-Attention Mechanism (55). As Baron-Cohen writes (using the acronyms I have spared us from until this point), “SAM [Shared-Attention Mechanism] links EDD [Eye-Direction Detector] with ID [Intentionality Detector] so as to enable eye direction to be read in terms of the basic mental states” (56). In the final phase, from 18-48 months the child develops the Theory-of-Mind Mechanism (56). According to Baron-Cohen, the advent of the Theory-of-Mind Mechanism is marked by the child engaging in pretend play (56). On his theory, “because the theory proposes that ToMM [Theory of Mind Mechanism] is triggered by

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9 Tomasello identifies a similar relation as a cause for differences in teaching and learning (Tomasello 1999: 104).
SAM [Shared-Attention Mechanism]” (Baron-Cohen 1995: 127), in order for the Theory-of-Mind Mechanism to be present, the Shared-Attention Mechanism must first be present.

In contrast with children, Baron-Cohen argues that non-human primates have only the Intentionality Detector and the Eye-Direction Detector, but not the Shared-Attention Mechanism or Theory-of-Mind Mechanism (Baron-Cohen 1995: 124). According to Baron-Cohen, this has the result that non-human primates are able to interpret the behavior of others in terms of their goals and desires but not in terms of more complex mental states.

This means that humans, unlike non-human primates, will engage in behaviors such as drawing the attention of others to events just for the sake of sharing attention. This is observed by Pinker (1994: 340-341), as cited in Baron-Cohen

I cannot help but think of a moment with my two-year-old niece Eva that captures how different are the minds of child and chimp. One night the family was driving on the expressway, and when the adult conversation died down, a tiny voice from the back seat said “Pink.” I followed her gaze, and on the horizon several miles away I could make out a pink neon sign. She was commenting on its color, just for the sake of commenting on its color.

We can imagine that such a behavior by Pinker’s niece Eva was likely the result of having been rewarded for similar behaviors of correctly identifying colors in the past. The adults in the car likely rewarded this behavior again by saying something like, “Yes, Eva, that is Pink! Good girl.” In such interactions we see the fruits of what Tomasello has called social teaching to encourage behaviors resulting from the Shared-Attention Mechanism.
7.8 Takeways & Conclusion

In Tomasello’s work he argues that because of the short evolutionary timespan between when *Homo Sapiens* diverged from other primates we cannot find a complete explanation for our extraordinary communicative capacities solely in biological changes or mutations of the sort proposed by Chomsky (1990) or Pinker (1994) and Tooby & Cosmides (1995). He proposes instead that the gap between our communicative capacities and those of non-human primates ought to be understood—at least in part—as due to differences in how we transmit knowledge to future generations. In this way language is viewed as a cultural artifact that is improved upon and passed on to other generations. If Tomasello is right that cultural forces are a necessary component of our language use this does not entail that there is not also a necessary biological component.

In his research Baron-Cohen has argued that our capacity to think about the thoughts of others is the product of at least four mental modules: Shared-Attention Mechanism, Eye Direction Detector, Intentionality Detector, & Theory of Mind Module. He argues that non-human primates have the Intentionality Detector and Eye Direction Detector but not Shared Attention Module and Theory of Mind Module. Baron-Cohen’s research is grounded in studies of children with autism who are raised in ordinary cultural conditions and thus helps us identify the necessary biological components of language acquisition.

Must we seek an explanation of the gap between our language abilities and those of non-human primates in solely cultural or biological terms? No—and explanations that attempt to draw a sharp distinction between the cultural and the
biological—also understood in terms of the nature/nurture debate—quickly run into problems and may even present a false dichotomy (Prinz 2014: 5). We can instead keep in mind that “nature and nurture conspire together” (Prinz 2014: 5) and view Tomasello and Baron-Cohen’s projects as getting us closer to identifying the necessary precursors to human language development and acquisition10.

What do the empirical studies I have presented here mean for the sort of objections I began this chapter with? To begin this discussion I quoted Jennifer Hornsby, who wrote that the Gricean program ought to “seem ludicrous” because of her unsupported claim that “psychologists find it doubtful whether three-year-old children possess the concept of belief” (Hornsby 2000: 95). Hornsby’s objection is problematic for a number of reasons. First, it draws on our intuitions about what sort of mental processes are and are not plausible. Our minds are capable of much that might antecedently seem overly complex. Imagine the mental equations that much underlie an outfielder’s being able to catch a fly ball, or Serena Williams’s ability to return a serve just out of the

10 In considering the Baron-Cohen proposal we might keep in mind the “Sapient Paradox” point about the sort evolutionary timespan between us and other primates. Does this pose a problem for any sort of biological explanation? One option to get around such objections is to propose that although other primates may have certain cognitive capacities they do not interact with the other capacities in a way that makes them useful in the way they are to us. This means that perhaps in the time we split off from other primates we didn’t develop these capacities, but developed ways for them to interact. This is roughly the position advocated by Steven Mithen in his theory about the development of cognitive architecture (Mithen 1996). Mithen proposes that it is perhaps the fact that our modules have access to each other—and combine to create the sensation we call our stream of consciousness, or as Mithen calls it “generalized intelligence”—that separates us from other primates (Mithen 1996; Lewis-Williams 2002: 108). The metaphor Mithen uses to illustrate this point is of a cathedral. We can imagine our mental modules as chapels of the cathedral, with walls separating them. According to Mithen, the process of developing generalized intelligence is analogous to one of taking down these walls so that one can walk from chapel to chapel with ease (Mithen 1996; Lewis-Williams 2002: 108-109). I won’t go into further details on the plausibility of this theory other than to highlight it here as a possible way around an apparent problem with uniting Tomasello and Baron-Cohen’s theories.
reach of her opponent. Our phenomenological experience of these behaviors belies the complexity of what must be going on in our minds. We should set aside intuitions and rely instead on careful analysis of the rich empirical literature that bears on these questions. Although the studies and researchers I have drawn on here by no means represent an exhaustive sample of the extensive research programs on intentions and the mind I hope to at least have presented a compelling account of the research that points us in the direction of the psychological plausibility of the intentional model.
8.1 Introduction

I will conclude with my final chapter wherein I consider a number of remaining questions and objections dealing with the more ephemeral aspects of interpretation. In particular, I discuss how we are to understand emotional and aesthetic reactions to objects of interpretation, evaluative judgments such as that some work is racist, judgments of an object’s significance, how we should treat artists’ statements about their work, and the possibility of unconscious meaning, all considered in relationship to the positive proposal I have presented in previous chapters. Throughout the chapter I will take as evidence excerpts of what artists and professional interpreters have said about their work and will occasionally report on my own responses as evidence. The features of interpretation I consider in this chapter cannot be straightforwardly pointed to in the world and that is why I will rely on my own reports and those of others. Finally, I will conclude this chapter, and the dissertation as a whole, with a brief summary and by suggesting areas for future research.

8.2 Interpretation & Emotional Response

It is with a particular audience in mind that genuine communicative intentions with respect to some object are developed and it is thus from a similar epistemic position that an interpreter will arrive at the right interpretation. This means that when encountering some work interpreters must do their best to place themselves in the same frame of mind as the intended audience. To correctly interpret the works of Homer, for example, one must approach the works as if one were an ancient Greek. We must work
to get into the proper frame of mind. This is why the historian must spend so much time immersed in the world in which she works, so that – as much as possible – when she views some object she has the ability to respond to it as closely as possible to how the creator expected the intended audience to respond to it. This response should also include appreciation of manner, tone, humor, emotional response, and such. These are, of course, to some extent involuntary responses and they must be conditioned through immersion of the researcher. I have not given these dimensions of interpretation adequate attention up to this point in the dissertation and so address them here. In a way, they present challenging cases for my framework because these are not reactions we can easily conjure up simply by recognizing that the author wishes us to.

This issue of emotional responses in interpretation can arise with respect to whole works, but it also occurs on a smaller scale, with individual words or symbols. One has not fully grasped the meaning of a slur or curse word unless one knows the emotional force and proper instances of use of the word (Potts 2005; Camp 2013). For example, knowing that ‘putain’ in French means ‘whore’ does not help an English speaker to know that it is also used when one does something painful, like slam your finger in a door, or something disastrous, such as dropping the bouillibaise.

There is reason to think that interpretation that requires having the appropriate emotional response will be the hardest task of the interpreter, for, there is evidence that emotional responses are hard to engender in foreign contexts. It has been shown that our emotional responses are weaker when we process something in a foreign language (Keysar et al. 2012), which may be due to the reduction in emotional resonance associated with using a foreign language. A similar weakening of emotional responses
to words spoken in a foreign tongue has been found with respect to the understanding of taboo words, reprimands, expressions of love, and advertising slogans (Keysar et al. 2012).

Learning when it is appropriate to utter which slur in a second language is very difficult, and requires not simply understanding what the word translates to but having the appropriate emotional response to the word. For instance, when living in Paris I noticed I had a different response to the word ‘putain’ after witnessing it being shouted in a frightening interaction in the Metro between a man and the police that included frantically barking police dogs. After this experience the word induced a more visceral response that likely drew on my emotional memory of the event (Damasio 1994; LeDoux 1996; Robinson 2005: 116). I did not have an emotionally heightened response to the word until I had an emotionally tense experience during which it was shouted. Prior to this event, knowing that the word had emotional thrust for native French speakers was not sufficient to induce it in myself.

The same point about emotional resonance and interpretation holds true for symbolic interpretation. If we are decoding, say, an ancient Hindu, Buddhist, and Jain symbol consisting of a plus with lines radiating out at a 90 degree angle we should interpret it as a sign for goodness although today it carries the meanings bestowed upon it much later by the Nazis’ appropriation of the symbol. Our emotional response when encountering the symbol may be the result of encounters with the symbol used with the Nazi meaning, even if we see it in the Buddhist context. To a western viewer, even with knowledge of its history it is shocking to see this symbol in a temple, and conscious effort is not sufficient to stop the emotional response (see image). These
examples of ‘putain’ and the swastika highlight that when encountering words and symbols to some extent emotional responses are outside the control of the interpreter, must be engendered not just by knowledge but by experience, and may be weaker or stronger than is merited in different interpretive contexts.

Swastika Flags in Buddhist Temple  
Kathmandu, Nepal  
Source: Public Domain Art

Fig. 10 Photograph of Swastika Flags in a Buddhist Temple

Emotional responses can, of course, also extend from the unit level of word or symbol to a segment of a work, or the work as a whole. For instance, we might cry with sadness at the end of Leo Tolstoy’s Anna Karenina, laugh aloud at a reading of Tina Fey’s Bossypants, cry with joy at the end of Frederico Fellini’s Nights of Cabiria, or scream at the face that pops up in the diner parking lot scene of David Lynch’s Mulholland Drive—even if we know it is coming and brace for it.
A question relevant to what I have been discussing here is whether or not emotional responses to objects of interpretation are necessary to fully interpret them. If so, this seems to quickly lead to problems. For, as an objector might insist, “If people’s emotional responses are partly going to determine the meaning of a novel, then since different people respond very differently to the same novel, how can we ever come to agreement about what it means?” (Robinson 2005: 106)

In response to such enquiries about emotions and interpretation, Jenefer Robinson writes that the emotional side of interpretation is crucial, for “without appropriate emotional responses, some novels simply cannot be adequately understood” (107). As developed by Noel Carroll & drawn on by Robinson, a narrative can be understood in terms of causal relations (Carroll 2001c; Robinson 2005: 119) and emotions are often vital parts of that causal narrative. Carroll writes, “eliciting the appropriate emotional response from the audience is a condition of our comprehending and following the work” (Carroll 2001c: 216). If we do not feel a sense of fear when we see a monster in a horror film, we will not understand how the monster caused the people in the film to run away.

In further discussing interpretation and emotion in fiction, Jenefer Robinson writes that “if I laugh and cry, shiver, tense, and relax at all the appropriate places, then I can be said to have understood the story” (Robinson 2005: 123). However, this account of the role of emotions in interpretation needs to be made more precise. First, an understanding is still needed of what makes some emotional response the “appropriate” one. And second, it seems that the emotional response must not just be at the
appropriate place, but to some certain degree, and caused by the work in some relevant way.

My understanding of what the appropriate emotional response is at some point in the work is that which was intended by the creator of the work. This means that the appropriate response is something in the hands of the author, not the readers. If we say that the appropriate emotional response is that which was intended by the author, we get around the question above about “how we can ever come to agreement about what it means” (Robinson 2005). Although Robinson does not draw on intentions in presenting her account, such a spelling out of what counts as the “appropriate” emotional response does not seem to be at odds with Robinson’s proposal. I suggest it as a possible clarification. The best authors, musicians, film makers and so on are those who make us feel strong emotions at the right point in the work so that those emotions help propel our understanding of and interest in the narrative of the story.

At the same time, we can recognize that certain emotional responses we have will deviate from what the author could conceivably have intended. Knowing that there is this deviation does not lessen the emotion itself. For instance, when I read Louisa May Alcott’s Little Women around the age of twelve, I had a particular affinity for the character Beth, because I have an older sister named Beth. When I read I no doubt imagined the Little Women Beth being a bit like my Beth, where the novel left space for me to fill it in. Imagine my sadness then, when toward the end of the novel Beth dies. I can recall sitting on the couch and weeping. This surely is an appropriate response to the character in the book dying but the degree to which I experienced it was not proportional to events in the book, and was not due solely to the book itself. It was, of
course, tied to the thought of the possibility of my Beth dying. I could recognize that my response was heightened by my particular circumstances and that the author surely did not intend for her imagined audience to have had a sister named Beth.

This means that Robinson’s account must again be amended so that we can say that the appropriate emotional response must occur not only at the right place in the work, but must be to the right degree, as intended by the author, and due to either 1) the events in the work themselves or 2) events in the world that the work relates to that the author would have intended the reader to know about and relate the work to. Having a sister named Beth does not meet the first or second requirement. However, other works, such as The Little Prince are likely intended to have an emotional connection to incidents outside the work (in this case, to World War II (Adamson 2012)) and thus fall under condition 2. For such works we must recognize such connections in fully interpreting them.

Emotional responses are by their very nature the sort of thing we cannot control as much as we might like. However, as interpreters who wish to get at the meaning that was intended we must do what we can to engender the emotional responses that the intended interpreters would have been expected by the author to have had.

8.3 Interpretation & Aesthetic Response

As with emotional responses, aesthetic responses—such as the feeling that something encountered is beautiful or wondrous—are also to a great degree outside of our control. We might feel in some interpretive contexts that our aesthetic response is too strong or not strong enough. However, willing oneself to strengthen or weaken aesthetic awe is not an effective way to induce the desired effect.
In certain contexts we can recognize that we are encountering some object of interpretation that would have engendered a stronger aesthetic response in the intended interpreters. For instance, the dome at the cathedral in Florence, engineered by Filippo Bruneleschi, was, at the time of construction in the 15th Century the highest and widest vault ever raised—surpassing even the Roman Pantheon—and its construction was considered “the greatest architectural puzzle of the age” (King 2000: 3-9). A common method at the time for building high structures was to use flying buttresses in the Gothic style, such as those at Notre Dame. However, buttresses were not desired in this case because Italian architects “regarded them as ugly and awkward makeshifts” and there was a desire to create architecture with a distinctly Italian, Florentine style (King 2000: 7). There was a question of how the dome could be constructed so that it would not collapse under its own weight, an occurrence not uncommon at the time (King 2000: 8-9).

Without knowing the engineering feats that the architects at the time had to overcome it is difficult to be awed in the same ways that the original viewers would have been. When viewing this structure a modern viewer cannot change the fact that he or she has likely seen larger domes—perhaps in a sports stadium—where the scale is greater. Aesthetic responses seem to be importantly affected by an ability to grasp the novelty of the thing encountered. This is the missing piece in many encounters that would have sparked awe in the original audience. One of the primary projects of making oneself a competent interpreter is training oneself to come to see the object of interpretation as close as possible to how the intended interpreters would have. This often means doing our best to strip away or suspend knowledge we have, given the
differences between our position and the position of the intended interpreters. This is also why knowledge of chronology and history is so important to interpreting artifacts.

At the same time, it is not always the case that powerful aesthetic responses akin to those of the intended audience are difficult to engender in a modern audience—in fact, the opposite has been posed as a potential problem in archaeology. Archaeologists have devoted time to considering whether or not aesthetic responses are at odds with the scientific aims of archaeology (Morphy 1994; Renfrew 1994b; Smith 1994; Taylor 1994).

Archaeologists are often quite moved when discovering certain sites and artifacts. For instance, Howard Carter wrote the following of entering the Sepulchral chamber of Tutankhamen for the first time, “There is a simple grandeur about this monument that made an irresistible appeal to the imagination, and I am not ashamed to confess that it brought a lump to my throat” (Carter 1923/77: 184). David Lewis-Williams writes that,

Modern visitors to Lascaux I are so overwhelmed by the beauty, size and startling preservation of so many of the images thronging the walls that ‘scientific’ appraisal is apt to be silenced. A prominent American archaeologist, who was granted 20 minutes in the cave, told me that the first half of his allotted time was rather wasted because, overcome by the wonder of it all, he viewed the art through a curtain of tears. (Lewis-Williams 2002: 237)

Archaeologist Colin Renfrew writes, “the aesthetic experience...is a reality for many of us, and an underlying motivating force in our enterprise.” (Renfrew 1994b: 264-265). What are we to say of archaeologists feeling moved by artifacts and sites they discover? What is the relation of such experiences to the aims of archaeological interpretation? The worry about aesthetic appreciation might seem especially prescient in archaeology, for, historically, coveting of artifacts based on their aesthetic qualities has
pushed archaeologists toward treasure hunting and plunder rather than systematic science (Taylor 1994; Renfrew 1994b).

One might argue that the usefulness of aesthetics to archaeology falls out of the fact that aesthetics is a form of biologically-mediated perception, which we would share with prehistoric humans (Morphy 1994; Taylor 1994; Prown 1997). Aesthetic responses may be primarily based on shared, and nearly universal sense perceptions (Taylor 1994). It might be argued that “certain conclusions can be drawn on the basis of the shared neuro-physiological apparatus of all human beings” (Prown 1997: 17). For instance, the appeal and dazzling effect of shimmer of jewels, gold, and shells, is something that we might expect to have been nearly constant throughout time, and is certainly something that is present across cultures and times, and found in children and even some animals such as magpies. Shells, for example, have been systematically gathered and used as ornamentation as much as 100,000 years ago (d’Errico et al. 2009; d’Errico & Henshilwood 2011: 53). Archaeologist Mary Stiner has concluded that “preferences in ornament making seem to have been guided by perceptions of rarity and color. Bright colors and vivid markings that catch our eye today were also arresting for prehistoric viewers. Red and luminous white shells were valued across many UP [Upper Paleolithic] instances” (Stiner 2014: 58).

Although perception is a biologically-mediated we can recognize that much of what feeds into aesthetic judgments is cultural and would not have been shared with the intended audience. “It is true that sense perceptions filtered through the brain may also be culturally conditioned” (Prown 1997:17). We want some mechanism by which we can isolate judgments we share with the ancients from judgments we do not.
Archaeologist Colin Renfrew argues that the way to approach aesthetics in archaeology is as a part of the possible non-verbal communicative intentions of the creator. He writes that to understand artifacts, the archaeologist must subsume herself in the work of the ancients just as one must see much of an artist’s oeuvre to understand contemporary art (Renfrew 1994b: 266). He writes,

There is a very strong analogy between the archaeological enterprise—making sense of the material products of human activity—and that of the viewer of contemporary art. I have found—and this is a widely shared experience—that in looking at the work of a modern sculptor or painter, it is necessary to see several works by the same artist before beginning to judge the work, gauge something of the artist’s intentions and see whether they attract my interest or have some effect upon me. Gradually, from a study of the works themselves, one forms a view on these matters. For me personally this experience—struggling with an unfamiliar style and seeking to find some ‘point of entry’ to understand it, or at least to responding actively to it—is closely analogous to the dilemma of the archaeologist among expressive artefacts which one is puzzling to understand…the thrust of our enterprise is…to develop a framework in which their role—then and now—as instruments of non-verbal communication can properly be assessed. (Renfrew 1994b: 267-268)

Renfrew’s proposal for interpreting archaeological artifacts is closely in line with what I propose here. The reason it is necessary to judge a number of works from the same creator or from the same site is that this is the process that helps us get into an interpretive frame of mind that is closer to that of the intended interpreters. When we can see which elements are repeated or changed in a set of works we can get a bit closer to understanding what the artist’s aims. This in turn helps us to best recognize the artist’s intention.

Further, to the point of whether or not appreciation of aesthetic qualities of archaeological artifacts is a problem, Renfrew wisely notes that “to condemn the folly and vandalism of looting, and the art market which sustains it, need not entail the view that all aesthetic sentiments are reprehensible” (Renfrew 1994b: 265). It is clear that we can distinguish between the aesthetic experience itself and what the aesthetic
experience has fueled under unfortunate circumstances. Surely ignoring the beauty of objects that were created to be beautiful is not to fully interpret them.

At the same time, we should be mindful of the potential for aesthetic appreciation to distort which artifacts get the most attention. We might think there is an additional problem here because it ought to be the job of archaeologists to study work because of their significance, not because of their beauty (Smith 1994). R.R.R. Smith has argued that archaeologists consider beauty to their peril, for, many significant works are not beautiful, and many beautiful works are not especially significant (Smith 1994).

8.4 The Changing Significance of Objects of Interpretation

This category of which works are “significant” is an important one, and is not restricted to archaeology. To say that some work is significant is to say that the work has some special importance for some person, situation, or research program, at some moment in time. A work can be significant without having been special to interpreters at the time, and without the creator having intended it to be significant. An object can be more significant to a specific person, situation, or research program, and less significant to another. In other words, significance is something that is relative to the interpreter, and can change with time.

When I examined the reader-centric model of interpretation I noted that some critics have pointed out that we may at times make the judgment that “the most interesting question has ceased to be the author’s intentions” (Pappas 1989: 325). This sentiment is consistent with the view I have advocated for here. The distinction between the meaning of the work and the significance of the work allows us to
simultaneously think there are interesting or perhaps more interesting questions about how interpreters feel when they approach the work than what the author intended. This poses no problem for an account that at the same time takes intentions to be constitutive of meaning. Understanding the significance of a work can surely be an important project as well.

The distinction between the meaning of a work and the significance of a work is spelled out in great detail by E. D. Hirsch—in that discussion, with respect to literature. For Hirsch, meaning is “what the author meant by his use of a particular sign sequence”; significance is a relationship between “the aforementioned meaning and a person, conception, or situation, and so on” (Hirsch 1967: 8). Hirsch points to significance to help us understand why it might sometimes feel as though the meaning of a work has changed. “Clearly what changes for them is not the meaning of the work, but rather their relationship to that meaning” (Hirsch 1967). When interpreters have a change in their evaluative criteria they will evaluate work differently over time. This happens to outside interpreters of the work, and can even happen to the artists themselves.

8.5 Evaluative Judgments

Our encounters with some work can also lead to evaluative judgments. Evaluative judgments are those such as that some joke is funny, some movie is racist, or some song is sexist. Again, as with the emotional and aesthetic quality of some object of interpretation, an artist intending some output to have some evaluative quality is not sufficient for it to have this quality. That is, someone intending a joke to be funny, for

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11 It is this distinction that Hirsch argues Gadamer, in particular, has conflated in his expounding of his theory of the historicity of meaning.
instance, is not sufficient for it to be funny and our recognizing that the creator of the joke had this intention is not sufficient to cause us to find it funny. We often find things funny that were not intended to be funny and often find things not funny when they were intended to be funny. For instance, a recent article in *The New Yorker* explored whether Martha Stewart could be funny when she was intending to be, or only when she was not intending to be (Crouch 2016). Furthermore, someone can, of course, say something or produce some output that is racist or sexist without intending to be racist or sexist.

I do not see evaluative judgments as a problem for the positive proposal presented here. These sorts of judgments about some work follow interpretation within the framework that I have presented here. They are not tied to the artist’s intention or to the intended audience. In making such evaluative judgments we are right to draw on our own reactions and need not seek what the author intended. Of course our notions of what is funny or sexist or racist are always changing, and thus our evaluations of works will change in accordance with this. In this sense evaluative judgments are ever changing, just as some object’s significance is. I see no tension between this and the proposal I advocate here.

Although judgments of the evaluative qualities of works are outside the artists’ hands, they can certainly aim to have their work fall into one or another of these categories. After some work has been the subject of evaluation the artist can reconsider his or her approach. If some artist, say, learns that their work is being interpreted in a racist way—even if they did not intend it as such initially—this can shape the way they formulate their future outputs. Such knowledge of what interpreters
are doing with their work can constrain the sorts of genuine intentions creators can
have toward similar work in the future. Comedian Dave Chappelle, for instance,
learned that some portion of his fan base was interpreting his jokes in a racist way; this
knowledge changed the sorts of genuine intentions he could formulate with respect to
certain types of jokes in the future. He explained it to Oprah Winfrey in 2006:

Winfrey: Okay, you mentioned a moment ago that there were some things you felt
weren’t socially responsible. Like what?

Chappelle: Like there’s this one sketch we did that was about this pixie that would
appear whenever racist things happened—whenever someone make you feel like they
calling you that n-word, but don’t say it—and it was funny. The premise of the sketch
was that every race had this like pixie, this like racial complex, but the pixie was in black
face. Now, black face is a very difficult image but the reason I had chosen black face
at the time was that this was going to be the visual personification of the n-word. It was
a good spirit or intention behind it. But, what I didn’t consider is how many people
watch the show and have…the way people use television is subjective.

Winfrey: I completely understand.

Chappelle: Yeah.

Winfrey: Finish ‘cause I have a story to tell you.

Chappelle: So then when I’m on the set, and we’re finally taping the sketch, somebody
on the set that was white laughed in such a way—I know the difference of people
laughing with me and people laughing at me—and it was the first time I had ever
gotten a laugh that I was uncomfortable with. Not just uncomfortable, but like, ‘Should I
fire this person?’ At the same time I’m just not a naturally assertive person.

Winfrey: What was it about the laugh?

Chappelle: I know all these people are watching TV and there’s a lot of people who will
understand exactly what I’m doing. And there’s another group of people who are just
fans like—the people that like…the kinda people that scream ‘I’m Rick James!’ at my
concerts. They’s along for a different kind of celebrity worship rag. They gonna get into
something...

Winfrey: ...completely different.

Chappelle: ...completely different. I gotta…I don’t want black people to be
disappointed in me for putting that out there.
Winfrey: You don’t wanna be disappointed in yourself.

Chappelle: You know what, Oprah, you’re right.

Winfrey: Yeah, and I had a similar moment years ago. I was sitting up interviewing ku klux klan members and skinheads. And my idea was that I was exposing some of their atrocities and, you know, showing the world who they were. During a commercial break I saw one of them from the stage raise a fist and give just a look to another one of them in the audience and I knew that what I was trying to do was being interpreted by some people the wrong way. And I realized in that moment that I was doing more to empower them than I was to expose them. And since that moment I’ve never done a show like that again because I realized, ‘Oh my god, I am now a part of the problem, and not a part of the solution.’ The exact same thing—that moment occurred when I realized what comes with this kind of power is a responsibility.

Chappelle: It’s a really...It’s a complete moral dilemma.

Winfrey: And it wasn’t about, ‘Oh, what is anybody else going to think of what I’m doing?’ I realized myself, ‘Oh that’s what I’m doing.’

We see in this exchange that both Chappelle and Winfrey had experienced the phenomenon where some work that they had produced was being evaluated in some way that was counter to their intention. This knowledge of the interpretive tendencies of the audience changed the communicative intentions they could formulate with respect to future outputs. As a result both abandoned a certain type of output. Once we learn that our outputs are being interpreted or evaluated in some way this constrains some genuine intentions we can formulate toward similar outputs in the future.

8.6 Objection: Artists Cannot Explain Their Work

I hope it is clear from the previous sections that aesthetic and evaluative judgments deserve special treatment because we cannot induce these responses just by recognizing an author’s intentions. One related topic I have not yet addressed is

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12 The process they describe here mirrors the process I advocated in an earlier chapter in discussion of Searle and the soldiers.
what we are to make of artists’ explanations of their own work. When intention underlies
meaning we have the opportunity in some of these cases to ask the creator what his or
her intention was. This is not a surefire way to work out what some agent's intentions
were, because, of course, this does not rule out the possibility that the agent cannot
remember what he or she intended or, as happens often with artists, intentionally
mislead enquirers about what is meant.

This is not a new problem. In The Republic, The Apology, and other work Plato
points critically to the fact that artists could not sufficiently explain their work. This is cited
also in the canonical 1946 Wimsatt and Beardsley paper “The Intentional Fallacy” that I
discussed at the beginning of the dissertation (Wimsatt & Beardsley 1946). Plato argues
that because the meaning of a poem is not something the poet himself can explain in
a satisfactory way this means that poets are ignorant with respect to their own work
(Apology 22c-b; Republic 597e-601c; Murray 1997: 10-12). Recall from the first chapter
that in the Apology Plato writes,

So I would take up those poems of theirs which it seemed to me they had
worked on the most, and I would ask them thoroughly what they meant, so that I
might also learn something from them at the same time. I am ashamed to tell you
the truth, men; nevertheless, it must be said. Almost everyone present, so to speak,
would have spoken better than the poets did about the poetry that they themselves
had made. So again, concerning the poets, I soon recognized that they did not
make what they make by wisdom, but by some sort of nature and while inspired, like
the diviners and those who deliver oracles. (Apology 22b-c, trans. 1979)

Plato takes the inability of poets to explain their work to his satisfaction as an indication
that its meaning must come from something beyond them. He sees the poet as divinely
inspired—a mere conduit for some greater being or source of inspiration and meaning.
Our desire that artists of many stripes explain their work to our satisfaction—often to their displeasure—did not die with Plato. Bob Dylan, for instance, once participated in the following exchanges at a press conference in San Francisco in 1965,

Reporter 1: I'd like to know about the meaning of the cover photo on your album, *Highway 61 revisited*.

Dylan: What would you like to know about it?

Reporter 1: It seems to have some philosophy in it. I'd like to know what it represents to you—you’re a part of it.

[Dylan smirks]

Dylan: I haven’t really looked at it that much.

Reporter 1: I’ve thought about it a great deal.

Dylan: It was just taken one day when I was sittin’ on the steps, y’know—I don’t really remember too much about it. [Takes out a cigarette]

Reporter 1: I thought the motorcycle was an image in your song writing. You seem to like that.

Dylan: Oh we all like motorcycles to some degree. [Feeling around for lighter]

Reporter 2: Do you think of yourself primarily as a singer or as a poet?

Dylan: Oh, I think of myself more as a song and dance man, y’know.

...

Reporter 3: Do you prefer songs with a subtle or obvious message?

Dylan: With a what???

Reporter 3: A subtle or obvious message?

Dylan: Uh—I don’t really prefer those kinds of songs at all—“message”—you mean like—what songs with a message?

Reporter 3: Well, like ‘Eve of Destruction’ and things like that.

Dylan: Do I prefer that to what?
Reporter 3: *I don’t know, but your songs are supposed to have a subtle message.*

Dylan: *Subtle message??*

Reporter 3: *Well, they’re supposed to.*

Dylan: *Where’d you hear that?*

Reporter 3: *In a movie magazine.*

(Herbst 1981)

The fact that artists may deny that they had some particular intention, or like Dylan act bemused by questions about the meaning of his album photo, motorcycles in his song writing, and his lyrics in general, is not the best evidence for whether or not he had some particular intention with respect to these outputs. It is clear that he views the whole interview as a farce and a waste of time. We should not take his replies as genuine evidence about his intentions toward his work.

What must be remembered in considering such statements is that artists, writers, and others who create works that are the objects of interpretation are constantly put in situations where they are asked to explain their work in simplified terms, often to interviewers who are ignorant about their work, and they are expected to answer repetitive questions in a way that makes their answers sound new. The Dylan interview highlights the strangeness of the idea we have that artists of various media ought to be able to explain their work to the satisfaction of interviewers. As Dylan later says in the same interview, “I’m going to be writing these songs and singing them and recording them and I see no end, right now. That’s what I do—uh—anything else interferes with it. I mean anything else trying to get on top of it making something out of it which it isn’t, it just brings me down, and it’s not, uh—it just makes it seem all very cheap” (Herbst 1981).
We should be taken aback when artists are able to explain their work in words as well as in the artwork, not see this as the expectation for every artist, musician, poet, and so on.

Most importantly, we should not conclude as Plato does that artists do not know what their works mean, or that their meaning lies outside of the artist, simply because artists often do not explain them in words to the satisfaction of the public. Artists who are obscure about their work, or who would rather let the work speak for itself may present added epistemological difficulties in working out what some artist meant, but not a metaphysical problem of whether or not anything was in fact meant by some work. It remains that insofar as the artist had an intention during the process of production that makes it the case that it has a certain meaning. The work itself—not what they say about it—is the best way of getting at that intention.

8.7 Revealing Subconscious States

It might be insisted that although an artist himself is the final arbiter of his intentions, he can never be fully aware of what those intentions are—even at the point of production—because some of them occur at the subconscious level. Let us say, for example, that Bob Dylan, at the age of 5, had a music teacher he adored. Let’s also say that this teacher died abruptly and the last time Dylan saw him he rode away on a motorcycle. Our imaginary Dylan had forgotten about or suppressed this memory by the time he was an adult. If we take this story as true, what could we say about motorcycles in Dylan’s song writing? Can we say that these songs mean something about the teacher although Dylan might not have been consciously aware of it when he wrote the song?
Recall that in Chapter 2 I discussed some sections from Monroe Beardsley and E. D. Hirsch in which the ways that our actions are thought to reveal subconscious states. In that discussion I noted that Hirsch argues for the conclusion that "there are usually components of an author’s intended meaning that he is not conscious of" (Beardsley 1992: 27). E. D. Hirsch, who in many ways takes the opposite position from Beardsley appears to agree with him on this point and writes, "...it is very possible to mean what one is not conscious of meaning" (Beardsley 1992: 27; Hirsch 1967: 22). This point echoes an example Beardsley used in arguing for his point that texts can have meanings without the "agency" of the author, such as in a case of someone uttering "Jensen argued like a man filled with righteous indigestion" instead of ‘righteous indignation’.

The fact that our subconscious mental states are thought to be revealed in a number of ways has not escaped observation by some philosophers of language. However, discussion of how to treat such cases is rather limited. For instance, Anne Bezuidenhout (2001) discussing Joseph Stern (2000) presents the following case,

A young woman Marie, who is in psychotherapy because she is suffering from anorexia nervosa, tells her therapist that her mother has forbidden her to see her boyfriend. Referring to her mother’s injunction, Marie utters:

[1] I won’t swallow that

Here ‘swallow’ is being used metaphorically, and Stern suggests that the content of Marie’s utterance (the proposition she expressed) can be paraphrased as


Given her eating disorder, it seems significant that Marie chose to frame her comment about her mother’s injunction by using the word ‘swallow’ But once we’ve accessed the metaphorical interpretation it seems that we’ve lost the echoes of meaning that might connect what she is saying to her eating disorder and hence to any problems that she might be having with her mother connected to this disorder. (Bezuidenhout 2001: 33-34)
Bezuidenhout’s point is that if we view Marie’s utterance of “I won’t swallow that” as a metaphor which means some literal content we have lost the fact that the metaphor she chose to use appears to tie her eating disorder to her mother. Should we be happy with this result? Or is it better so say that Marie really did mean something about her eating disorder here, although she may not have consciously intended it? Additionally, we have cases such as,

Roy: Are you okay?
Mary: I’m fine, Roy.
Roy: I would have believed you if you hadn’t said ‘Roy’.
(Kecskes 2016; 2014)

It is hard not to agree with Roy that Mary really must not be fine, although she explicitly said she was. And finally we have Freudian slips of the tongue such as, “We need a few laughs to break up the monogamy” (Davidson 2006: 251). What are we to say of such examples? Are we to say the speaker did not mean anything about 1) her mother and her anorexia, 2) her anger, and 3) a desire to break out from a monogamous relationship? Can speakers mean things on the basis of subconscious intentions?

Response to such questions requires us to engage directly with philosophy of mind literature on consciousness. David Rosenthal has considered the question of consciousness of spoken utterances and varying types of mental states in detail. He writes,

Suppose I am angry at you for doing a certain thing. If my anger is conscious, I might explicitly report the anger, by saying ‘I’m angry with you.’ Or I might express my anger nonverbally, say, by some facial expression or body language. And, as with

David Rosenthal’s account of the mind relies on a number of theoretical commitments that it may be problematic to make (Prinz 2012). For now I will set these worries to the side. Further exploration of the idea I quickly propose here would require deeper consideration of the theoretical entailments of the theories of consciousness I draw on. In his 2012 work The Conscious Brain Jesse Prinz also details a number of studies that call the very idea of conscious intentions as responsible for our actions into question (2012: 190-200, 233-237). This is an issue I hope to explore in future work.
cognitive states, when I nonverbally express my anger, the anger may or may not be conscious. (Rosenthal 2005: 315)

Rosenthal writes that in making utterances such as 'I am angry' we report our anger; we do not verbally express it. Reporting one's anger includes explicitly mentioning it. Verbally expressing one's anger on Rosenthal's view occurs when one makes utterances such as "'You shouldn't have done that' or 'What you did was bad (or unacceptable, or uncalled for, and the like).''' (Rosenthal 2005: 316). With such utterances one expresses one's anger without explicitly mentioning it. Rosenthal then goes on to point out that reporting cognitive states requires those beliefs to be conscious, while verbally expressed affective states need not be conscious (Rosenthal 2005: 316). Cognitive states are beliefs such as that it is raining; affective states are such as that the speaker is angry (Rosenthal 2005: 316). I propose that we extend Rosenthal's account and conclude that although things that are meant must be conscious, those that are shown—such as affective states—need not be.

With this distinction between reporting cognitive states on the one hand and expressing affective states on the other hand, we can see that utterances such as “I'm fine, Roy” (Kecskes 2016; 2014) are instances of expressing affective states, not of reporting them. The same can be said of the woman uttering “I won’t swallow that”. We could say that Marie showed that she ties her mother’s being overbearing to her eating disorder, consciously or subconsciously, but not that she meant this by her utterance. Marie would likely be surprised—perhaps even stunned—if her therapist were to point out that she had just uttered a phrase that could be taken as evidence that

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14 I believe this distinction can helpfully map on to Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson’s continuum of showing and meaning (Sperber & Wilson 2015). Fully explaining the details of this proposal would take us too far away from the current thread but I hope to be able to do so in future work.
Marie has made this subconscious connection between her mother and her eating disorder.

What was shown by the uttering of ‘Roy’ may or may not have been conscious. If it was not conscious that Mary convey her displeasure then Mary would have been expressing her subconscious, affective state. It is significant that this utterance arose in a context where there the speaker was asked to report on her internal affective state. She may have for reasons of politeness or privacy have wished to conceal her true affective state, and it may be this dissonance between how she felt and how she wished to be perceived that caused the disconnect between what she explicitly stated and what she showed.

Let me present a final comment on the showing of affective states versus the telling of cognitive states. It is often presumed that communication is costly for both the speaker and the hearer; many explanations for why we engage in communicative acts attempt to account for the cost. This is seen across an array of types of discussions of communication, from Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson’s Relevance Theory (1986) to other work on language that focuses on signaling (Grafen 1990; Skyrms 1996; Godfrey-Smith & Martinez 2013). Sperber and Wilson write,

The key problem for efficient short-term information processing is to achieve an optimal allocation of central processing resources. Resources have to be allocated to the processing of information which it likely to bring about the greatest contribution to the mind’s general cognitive goals at the smallest processing cost...Our claim is that all human beings automatically aim at the most efficient information processing possible. (Sperber & Wilson 1986: 48-49)

Much of the discussion of signaling focuses on communication of information about the state of the world, such as alarm calls. This focus leads to passages such as the following, which focuses on vervet monkey alarm calls:
...the sender derives no personal benefit from communication. She already has noticed the predator. In fact, giving the alarm call may very well expose the sender to more danger than she would otherwise experience. The call may, if noticed, direct the predator’s attention to her. Giving the call may delay slightly her own defensive response to the predator. The receiver has ample motivation to extract information from the signal, but why should the sender take the trouble to put it in? (Skyrms 1996: 94)

A focus on the costliness of communication may be a reasonable starting point in many linguistic cases. For instance, no one would write emails to students if we did not think they would be read.

However, a focus on the costliness of expression is not an appropriate focus for communication of affective states. That is, for the expression of affective states our default does not seem to be not to communicate. On the contrary, the default seems to be to reveal affective states in a multitude of ways. Many bodily changes that reveal affective states are automatic responses, and we may not be conscious that we have undergone such a change (Prinz 2004). We are culturally conditioned to contain our expression of affective states in ways that vary across cultures (Argyle 1975). In a western culture children are trained to act happy when they receive a gift regardless of whether or not they like it. This often fails in younger children.

Expression of affective states is difficult to suppress (Argyle 1975: 111-112). Because of this the explanation for why we produce language that reveals affective states should be understood to be different from language that is costly (such as emails to students). This holds regardless of whether the expression of affective state is something as simple as sighing, saying “Roy” or as involved as an entire conversation in which a friend raves about a recent slight or the results of the election. A full account of our communicative practices will be mindful of this distinction and of what this

15 In other words, to put it in Sperber & Wilson’s terms: the revealing of affective states does not seem to follow the Presumption of Relevance.
distinction means for 1) our theories of meaning and 2) our explanations of why we engage in certain communicative acts.

A takeaway from this discussion that is relevant to the broad project of interpretation that I undertake here is to note that certain forms of expression are more about revealing affective states than others. This is perhaps seen most clearly in painting, especially abstract expressionism. Mark Rothko, for example, is known as an artist whose works express and evoke affective states. It has been said that “No other painter can occasion feelings so intense, so directly” (Schjeldahl 2016). Mark Rothko in 1956 expressed the point in the following way: “The people who weep before my pictures are having the same religious experience I had when I painted them” (Schjeldahl 2016). This is especially present in the work Rothko made at the end of life, before his suicide in 1969 when he abandoned the bright colors of his earlier works (Schjeldahl 2016).

A distinction between work that expresses cognitive states versus reveals affective states could be helpfully made in many interpretive contexts. In particular, attention to this distinction can help us address what seem like problem cases from areas of interpretation that are more typically expressions of the creator’s affective states.

In this chapter I have discussed a number of interpretive issues that I had not previously addressed. These might be thought of as the more ephemeral side of interpretation. I argued that interpretation of emotional and aesthetic aspects of objects of interpretation requires considering the authors intention and the interpretive frame of mind of the intended interpreters. I argued that evaluative judgments of works such as that some piece is sexist and judgments of a work’s significance are not determined with respect to the artist’s intention or the perspective of the intended
interpreters. Finally, I highlighted the difference between expressions of cognitive and affective states in the creation of objects of interpretation and commented on what this distinction means for evaluation of the aspects of works that may not be conscious.
Conclusion & Future Directions

Overall, the structure of interpretation that I have proposed in this dissertation works to group aspects of objects not by field of study, but according to the intentions with which they were produced. I have demonstrated how this division applies to debates that have already started across a variety of fields. This highlights the wide applicability of the Groups I have spelled out here. It is by taking this broad look at interpretation generally that it becomes clear the ontology of interpretation ought not to be divided according to discipline, but ought to be based on the intentions with which objects were created.

The benefit of this from a theoretical perspective is that theories of interpretation can be structured according to these five Groups, and the results of such work on interpretation can have application across a wide range of disciplines. As with any tool, there will need to be discussion of how these strategies can best be applied to each discipline in question. Perhaps some of the answer will lie along traditional boundaries, but first dividing objects across the categories I have discussed here will work to clean up the dialogue, and increase the possibility of successful integration of interpretive theories between disciplines.

Considering interpretation as a broad category also brings into focus what all people bring to the table as creators and interpreters—different types of intentions, emotional and aesthetic responses, evaluative judgments, judgments of significance, and unconscious affective states that may reveal themselves despite our conscious intentions. With further work focusing on a broad ontology of interpretation across these domains progress in interpretation can be made across a range of disciplines.
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