Status, Power, and Apologies: How Status and Power Shape the Willingness to Apologize and the Perception of Victims

Louis Lipani

The Graduate Center, City University of New York

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STATUS, POWER, AND APOLOGIES: HOW STATUS AND POWER SHAPE THE WILLINGNESS TO APOLOGIZE AND THE PERCEPTION OF VICTIMS

by

LOUIS LIPANI

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Business in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York

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Louis Lipani

This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Business in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Date

Mary Kern
Chiar of Examining Committee

Date

Karl Lang
Executive Officer

Supervisory Committee:

Donald Vredenburgh
Loren Naidoo

THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK
ABSTRACT

Status, Power, and Apologies: How Status and Power Shape the Willingness to Apologize and the Perception of Victims

by

Louis Lipani

Advisor: Mary Kern

Apologies are interpersonal tools that individuals employ to repair damaged relationships. Management scholars have largely ignored the role that power and status play in the apology process. Across three studies I experimentally manipulate power and status and examine the apology process via a workplace scenario. In Study 1 I propose that power and status have different implications with respect to one’s willingness to apologize. I orthogonally manipulate power and status and examine their effect on people’s willingness to apologize. I find that status, but not power, impacts one’s willingness to apologize. In Study 2 I posit and find that apologies improve victims’ perceptions of power and status-holders’ warmth, with no diminution of their dominance, thereby enhancing their influence. In Study 3 I demonstrate that instrumentality perceptions mediate the relationship between status and willingness to apologize. I discuss theoretical and practical implications for the power, status, and apology domains.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

The phenomenon of a leader apologizing is both understudied by scholars and underutilized in practice. This in spite of the fact that there is a growing body of scholarly work on how and why people apologize, and the associated benefits (e.g. Fehr & Gelfand, 2010; Leunissen, De Cremer, & Folmer, 2012; Tomlinson, Dineen, & Lewicki, 2004). I contribute to this literature by considering how individuals’ status and power, two fundamental bases of social hierarchy, influence their willingness to apologize. There is little consensus in the literature about whether power or status, as defined herein, makes one more or less willing to apologize. I further consider victim perceptions of those with power and status who offer an apology following an offensive act.

Within the power and status literatures there has been a relative lack of focus on the consequences of power and status on interpersonal dynamics (Blader & Chen, 2012). Researchers are just beginning to explore the differences between power and status, with initial evidence suggesting that these factors produce opposite effects (Blader, Shirako, & Chen, 2016). Moreover, within the apology literature the focus has been on the apology itself, and not the relationship between the two parties in conflict (Aquino, Tripp, & Bies, 2006; Ren & Gray, 2009). These represent notable gaps in the apology, power, and status literatures that the present research seeks to fill.

An apology has been defined in the psychology literature as a verbal or written statement that acknowledges responsibility, remorse, and regret for a trust or rule violation (Kim, Ferrin, Cooper, & Dirks, 2004). Apologies are an effective way for leaders, and others with high power and/or high status, to make amends for wrongdoing.
(Kador, 2009). We see examples of leaders apologizing for a variety of acts, from business executives such as Jamie Dimon of JPMorgan Chase and former Target CEO Gregg Steinhafel, to politicians such as New Jersey governor Chris Christie and then presidential candidate Donald Trump (Ross Sorkin, 2014; Haberman, 2016). However, these apologies – to the extent that they are seen as authentic - are made to improve public sentiment with an eye toward one’s customer base or other important stakeholders, for example voters (Kellerman, 2006). Moreover, apologies by public leaders are often delivered on behalf of entire organizations and not the individuals in question.

By contrast, in this dissertation I explore the apology process in an interpersonal context. I consider a hypothetical situation in which an individual with power and status - or lack thereof - has offended another individual. In one set of studies, I test whether the offender is willing to deliver a simple and sincere apology immediately following the offensive act. In another study, I examine victim perceptions of the offender in the aftermath of the apology. I examine these dynamics using vignettes that place individuals in a professional setting. However, my focus is not on an act of task-related incompetence on the part of the offender, but rather on an act of interpersonal aggression. Moreover, the offensive act does not represent an extreme form of hostility, but nevertheless rises to the level at which an apology is in order.

Some additional boundary conditions and assumptions are fundamental to my inquiry. First, I do not take into account the status or power level of the victim, just that of the offender. Second, I do not take into account the nature of the relationship between the two parties before the offensive act. Thus, I assume that the particular aspects of this interaction determine whether the offender is willing to apologize. And third, in my
study of the aftermath of an apology, I assume that an apology is delivered in a simple and sincere manner.

These boundary conditions and assumptions are limitations of my studies. However, considering apologies in this context is necessary as jobs in the modern workplace increasingly revolve around interpersonal interactions (Grant & Parker, 2009). Further, people sometimes act in interpersonally offensive ways, whether intentionally or not (Hershcovis & Barling, 2010). Indeed, instances of interpersonal aggression or incivility, such as rudeness or publicly yelling at an interaction partner, are behaviors that are not uncommon in the workplace (Pearson & Porath, 2009). One reason for this is that individuals’ job demands and stress levels are frequently high. As a result, incidents of abusive or uncivil behavior by supervisors or peers at work occur, and are a significant problem (Andersson & Pearson, 1999; Tepper, 2007). Workplace slights in turn often escalate into interpersonal conflict, which has deleterious consequences for both the individuals in question and organizations as a whole (De Dreu & Weingart, 2003; de Wit, Greer, & Jehn, 2011). Thus, it is essential for scholars and practitioners alike to understand how interpersonal offense can be effectively managed, if not allayed.

Social scientists have consistently found that apologies are an effective way to address conflict and repair damaged relationships (Barling, Turner, Dezan, & Carroll, 2008; Ferrin, Kim, Cooper, & Dirks, 2007). Indeed, for some types of offenses an apology may be the only way to improve the situation between two parties (Tavuchis, 1991). This is largely because apologies play a unique and often vital role in resolving interpersonal conflict (Darby & Schlenker, 1982). More specifically, apologies function
as a tool that individuals can use to manage harmful conflict and mitigate the damage from offensive actions (Fehr & Gelfand, 2010).

Nonetheless, despite the apparent benefits of issuing an apology, leaders and others with high power or status may be reluctant to issue apologies, particularly following a relational transgression (Hetrick, Cushmanery, Fairchild, Hunter, Shapiro, & Shah, 2014; Lazare, 2004; Tucker, Turner, Barling, Reid, & Elving, 2006). There are many potential reasons for this. For one, an apology represents an admission of guilt, and those with high power and/or status may not want to accept blame for an action that is not befitting of their hierarchical position or general social standing. Supervisors in particular may feel as though an apology reveals weakness and undermines their authority (Basford, Offerman, & Behrend, 2014). Indeed, the act of violating social norms has been shown to convey power (Van Kleef, Homan, Finkenauer, Gündemir, & Stamkou, 2011).

Further, those with power and status may feel as though it is more acceptable for them not to apologize. For example, political pundits highlight President Trump’s unwillingness to apologize as a core principle of his leadership style (Krugman, 2017; McGregor, 2017). Moreover, findings suggest that apologies from high status others are indeed more unexpected than those from low status others, one indication of their relative infrequency in practice (Walfisch, Van Dijk, & Kark, 2013).

Nonetheless, given the potential interpersonal benefits of apologizing, it is critical for researchers to determine whether there is something related to the nature of power and/or status that might be hindering those who possess it from apologizing after committing an offensive act. This is particularly important given that power and status
considerations are pervasive in society, and most especially within organizations (Magee & Galinsky, 2008). I have chosen to study power and status as antecedents of willingness to apologize, rather than as moderators, because power and status have been shown to be predictors of social factors such as the of deliverance of organizational justice, and perspective-taking, among other related phenomena (Blader & Chen, 2012; Blader et al., 2016).

Further, given that power and status are often jointly held, it is particularly important for scholars to distinguish whether these constructs have similar or divergent implications for the apology process. To this end, I hypothesize and test whether high and low power, and high and low status, exert opposing influences on one’s willingness to apologize. I utilize a control condition, representing a neutral state of power/status, in order to establish a baseline from which I can determine the incremental effect of high power, low power, high status, and low status on willingness to apologize. That is, if I were to examine just the contrast between high versus low power, or high versus low status - i.e. not include a control condition - I might not able to hone in on whether a specific manipulation was increasing or diminishing willingness to apologize. In addition to studying the effect of status and power on willingness to apologize, I also conduct a mediation analysis to delve into the underlying psychological mechanisms related to apology intentions.

Turning to the aftermath of an apology, the literature is inconclusive as to the effectiveness of apology: that is, an apology does not universally lead to positive outcomes (Conlon & Ross, 1997; Lee, Peterson, & Tiedens, 2004; Struthers, Eaton, Santelli, Uchiyama, & Shirvani, 2008; Zechmeister, Garcia, Romero, & Vas, 2004).
Indeed, a host of factors may impact how an apology is received, including for example how costly the victim sees the apology for the offender (Ohtsubo & Watanabe, 2009). More relevant to the current research, scholars have observed that there is a dearth of research examining the effectiveness of apologies when power is a factor (Walfisch, et al., 2013).

Thus, we are left with many unanswered questions concerning victims’ reactions to apologies from power and status-holders. One of the most fundamental of these is how do victims of an interpersonal offense committed by those with high power or high status react to an apology from the offender? I argue that it is critical to hone in on reactions to apologies from this group of offenders since people tend to be highly cognizant of the behavior of those with high power and/or high status (Fiske, 2010). This increased awareness would apply to both an interpersonal offense, as well as to a subsequent apology, or lack thereof. Further, in organizations the occurrence of injustice, aggression, and abuse from one’s supervisor and/or others with power and status is one of the most vexing and serious issues in the modern workplace (Aquino, Tripp, & Bies, 2006; Sutton, 2007; Tepper, 2007). As such, any intervention that might address interpersonal offenses is of critical importance.

Addressing the reaction to apologies in a broader sense, scholars have examined a number of outcomes, most notably victim trust in, and forgiveness toward, the offender. While these are important outcomes for both victim and offender, it is important to consider outcomes that are of interest to a particular class of offenders - in this case those with high power and high status – so as to establish a motive for apologizing. To this end, of particular concern for those with high power and high status is the degree of
influence that they retain over others after committing an offensive act. I hold that maintaining or enhancing one’s influence might be seen as a motive to apologize. Finding a motive for people to apologize is important given that individuals often find it difficult to apologize (Lazare, 2004), which may be related to a desire to avoid an admission of guilt (Robbennolt, 2003), or to preserve one’s sense of control (Okimoto, Wenzel, & Hedrick, 2013). Indeed, these are particularly important factors for those with high power and/or status.

I propose that an apology after an offensive act – relative to no apology - will enhance high power/status-holders’ level of influence. Further, I argue that this occurs via perceptions of their warmth and dominance. Perceptions of one’s warmth and dominance are fundamental routes to one’s level of influence (Cialdini, 1993). Ultimately, I argue that apologies will impact these perceptions in a positive way, and as a result, apologies might be seen as tools of influence, particularly when used in certain contexts. Support for my argument would imply that for those in possession of high power or high status the act of apologizing holds significant upside, with limited downside, as it relates to one’s degree of influence over others. Concurrently this is also expected to have a positive impact on the psychological well-being of victims, resulting in multiple beneficiaries of this one act.

In sum, in this dissertation I develop and test a model of whether those with high and low power, and high and low status, are willing to apologize following interpersonally offensive acts. I further test two mediating mechanisms related to the apology intentions of those with high/low power and high/low status. Separately, I assess
the interpersonal impact of apologies, focusing on victim reaction toward those with high power and high status.

I disentangle power from status to better isolate the influence of each construct, and to provide greater explanatory power in the form of different causal paths. I draw from a diverse set of literatures including psychology, management, sociology, and communication to develop my hypotheses, and rely on experimental methods to test my hypotheses.

This dissertation is organized in the following way. In Chapters Two, Three, and Four, I provide a review of the relevant theory and findings in the status, power, and apology literatures to develop my hypotheses. In Chapters Five, Six, and Seven, I describe the methods that I used to test these hypotheses, and present my results. And in Chapter Eight, I offer concluding comments and specify potential limitations and future directions for this research.
Chapter 2: Power, Status and the Willingness to Apologize

I draw upon and integrate three large and distinct bodies of literature within social psychology and organizational behavior: the apology literature, the power literature, and the status literature. First I review scholarly work relating to apologies. This includes a general overview of apologies, as well as a summation of the studies linking apologies to the most highly studied outcomes: trust, forgiveness, and reconciliation. Next I describe the relatively limited theoretical and empirical work regarding individuals’ tendencies to apologize. I then provide a summary of relevant findings in the power and status literatures. Finally, I lay out my argument concerning how power and status impact one’s willingness to apologize.

Apology

Overview

The act of apologizing has long drawn the attention of social scientists, many of whom have theorized about the powerful restorative impact of apologies. Goffman’s (1971) notion of an apology involved an admission of responsibility and regret following a harmful act. Further, Goffman (1971) saw apologies as a means to metaphorically split an individual into two parts, one part responsible for a wrongdoing and the other part hoping to be forgiven. In this way an apology enables an actor to convey that an “event should not be considered a fair representation of what [he/she] is really like as a person” (Schlenker, 1980, p.154). The result is that the party committing the offense can be forgiven and the parties can return to a more “normal” course of relations (Ren & Gray, 2009; Schlenker & Darby, 1981).
The sociologist Tavuchis (1991) and the psychiatrist Lazare (2004) build upon this notion by separately arguing that the critical components of an apology are an expression of remorse and an admission of responsibility. Tavuchis (1991) further argues that the power of an apology lies in the fact that even though it cannot logically undo what has been done, that is “precisely what it manages to do” (p. 5). Lazare (2004) echoes this sentiment: “One of the most profound human interactions is the offering and accepting of apologies” (p. 1). A fundamental aspect of apologies is their unique ability to repair broken relationships. For example, psychologists Chapman and Thomas (2008) posit that when a relationship is tarnished by hurt and anger, an apology is always necessary. Within the psychology and management literatures much of the early work on apologies focused on the restorative impact of apologies on victim trust, and that is where I begin my review.

**Apologies and Trust**

Trust violations are interpersonal transgressions that lead to a breach of trust and a reduced level of trustworthiness for the offending party (Kim et al., 2004). Empirical findings support the idea that apologies are effective in repairing trust in fractured relationships. For example, Tomlinson, et al. (2004) explored both the structure and outcomes of apologies. Most fundamentally, they showed that apologizing is superior to not apologizing as it relates to repairing trust in a relationship. They also demonstrated that apologies are more effective when they are: (i) perceived to be sincere; (ii) timely; (iii) expressed in terms of “taking responsibility”; and (iv) within the context of a pre-existing strong relationship. These core elements of an apology are consistent with most
theorizing, particularly sincerity, which is often considered to be a fundamental part of an apology (Smith, 2008).

Building on the notion that apologies are vital interpersonal tools to restore trust, researchers delved more deeply into the contextual factors impacting apology effectiveness. For instance, one key distinction is trust violations involving a competence-based violation versus an integrity-based violation. The difference between these two is that a competence-based violation relates to a work mistake of a technical nature, whereas an integrity-based violation involves a breach that offends one’s ethical principles (Kim et al., 2004). Addressing this difference, Kim et al. (2004) found that apologies effectively repaired trust following competence-based violations, but not following integrity-based violations.

Kim, Dirks, Cooper, and Ferrin (2006) added further complexity to the model by considering the combined effect of the violation type and the attributions made during the apology. More specifically, they varied the language in an apology such that the offender made either an internal or external attribution for the violation. They found that after a competence violation, trust was more successfully repaired when a party apologized with an internal attribution; but after an integrity violation, trust was more successfully repaired when a party apologized with an external attribution. Thus, apology effectiveness can be seen as contextually driven.

A separate but related line of research has considered apologies following intentional versus unintentional transgressions. Findings in this stream reveal that people are more willing to forgive and look favorably upon offenders who apologize after unintentional versus intentional violations (Leunissen, 2014; Struthers, et al., 2008).
Further, Brooks, Dai, and Schweitzer (2014) found that even superfluous apologies – that is, apologies for events that are clearly outside of one’s control - increase trust in the apologizer. This result is consistent with prior research in the sense that a superfluous apology essentially involves an external attribution, and in these instances apologies have been shown to be highly effective in restoring trust. Moreover, this finding is theoretically consistent with the findings concerning competence versus integrity-based violations in one key way: both integrity and intentional transgressions lead to negative dispositional judgments, which are difficult for victims to overlook.

Apologies and Forgiveness/Reconciliation

Apologies yield positive interpersonal outcomes beyond trust. Most notably, apologies inspire forgiveness on the part of recipients towards offending parties (Fehr & Gelfand, 2010; Andiappan & Treviño, 2011; Struthers, et al., 2008; Bachman & Guerrero, 2006; Exline & Baumeister, 2000). This is in line with the premise that an apology is essentially a request for forgiveness (Chapman & Thomas, 2008). Forgiveness is desirable as it represents the internal act of foregoing anger, resentment, and revenge against those who commit offensive actions (Aquino, et al., 2006). Thus it is perhaps not surprising that apologies help to mitigate negative perceptions and aggressive behavior from parties who have been injured (De Cremer & Schouten, 2008; Obhuchi, Kameda, & Agarie, 1989).

Moreover, apologies and forgiveness are seen as important, if not required, precursors to interpersonal reconciliation between parties. Chapman and Thomas (2008) argue that without an apology - and the associated forgiveness - there can be no true reconciliation between two parties in conflict and thus the relationship will inevitably
wither. This is consistent with findings from the trust literature which suggest that when broken, trust is difficult to restore (Kim, Dirks, & Cooper, 2009). Similarly, Tavuchis (1991) acknowledges a natural tension between sorrow and forgiveness that occurs between two parties: only when this tension is resolved via an apology can reconciliation occur. Indeed, the “apology-forgiveness cycle” is theorized to be the fundamental process wherein reconciliation takes place between parties in conflict (Shnabel & Nadler, 2008; Tavuchis, 1991). In support of this thinking, Karremans and Van Lange (2008) found that after forgiving another party, victims were more cooperative toward their offenders and more willing to make personal sacrifices for them.

Willingness to Apologize

Considering the large and growing body of literature on the positive effect of apologies, it is surprising how few studies examine the willingness of the offending party to apologize. Indeed, the vast majority of apology research to date has considered the victim’s perspective, while virtually ignoring the perspective of the offender (e.g., Eaton, Struthers, & Santelli, 2006; Eaton, Struthers, Shomrony, & Santelli, 2007; DeCremer, van Dijk, & Pillutla, 2010). This is particularly noteworthy since it is the offending party that is often expected to initiate the reconciliation process (Leunissen, 2014).

Lazare (2004) noted that in general individuals are reluctant to apologize. Nonetheless, he argued that people may differ in their propensity to apologize. Building on this concept, Howell, Dopko, Turowski, and Buro (2011) surveyed 940 undergraduate students and studied the relationships between a number of psychological variables and a newly developed Proclivity to Apologize Measure (“PAM”). The Proclivity to Apologize construct is defined as an individual difference in the inclination to apologize
after an interpersonal transgression. The PAM correlated positively with seeking forgiveness ($r=.17; \alpha=.96$), self-esteem ($r=.24; \alpha=.87$), neuroticism ($r=.29; \alpha=.66$), agreeableness ($r=.28; \alpha=.60$), compassion and other positive emotions ($r=.39; \alpha=.87$), autonomy ($r=.26; \alpha=.67$), and competence ($r=.22; \alpha=.65$); and correlates negatively with self-monitoring ($r=-.36; \alpha=.62$), narcissism ($r=-.20; \alpha=.84$), and entitlement ($r=-.15; \alpha=.82$). Thus, the PAM is positively correlated with traits such as compassion and autonomy that are indicative of adaptive social functioning, and negatively correlated with traits such as entitlement and narcissism that are less adaptive socially (Howell et al., 2011).

The PAM findings suggest that individuals may vary in their predisposition to apologize. Lazare (2004) considers the factors that motivate people to apologize, noting a number of individual differences that manifest into apology triggers in certain contexts. These include (i) compassion for others; (ii) guilt and/or shame centered on a specific incident; (iii) self-monitoring; and (iv) a desire to maintain relations and social harmony. The latter two factors may be considered more interpersonally strategic in nature, while the first two are internal and are related to the idea that an apology “demonstrates the offenders’ recognition of and concern for the victims’ suffering” (Fehr & Gelfand, 2010, p. 38). It is worth noting that while both Lazare and the PAM view compassion as a factor that is tied to apologizing, they differ in their views of self-monitoring: Lazare asserts that it is positively linked to apologizing, and the PAM finds that it is negatively linked.

Tangney and colleagues (e.g. Tangney, Youman, & Steuwig, 2009) further explore the psyche of the offender, arguing for the primacy of guilt as a trigger of
empathy first and then apologies. Building on the fundamental role of guilt in the
apology process, Leunissen, De Cremer, Folmer, and van Dijke (2013) contrast the
psychological needs of offender and offended, and find that offenders prefer to offer
apologies after unintentional and not intentional transgressions. They argue that this is
because offenders’ guilt and empathy is stronger following unintended misdeeds because
offenders don’t have the opportunity to rationalize their bad behavior beforehand.

Scholars have also assessed the reasons why individuals are reluctant to
apologize, though these generally represent theoretical arguments that have yet to be
tested empirically. Tavuchis (1991) argued that in order to apologize individuals must
overcome a natural disinclination to do so, related to individuals’ fear of rejection.
Indeed, an apology is seen as tantamount to surrendering power to the victim (Leunissen,
2014). This is consistent with the notion that one needs courage to apologize (Lazare,
2004), due in part to the fact that following an apology one runs the risk of losing face or
otherwise making a bad situation worse (Kellogg, 2007).

Lazare (2004) expands upon this rationale by contending that individuals are
averse to apologizing for a myriad of reasons, including: (i) a fear of the reaction of the
other party; (ii) embarrassment and the idea that an apology makes one appear weak; (iii)
a lack of awareness that the other party is offended; and (iv) a lack of efficacy
surrounding the act of apologizing. Chapman and Thomas (2008) weigh in with a slightly
different take, advancing the notion that people refuse to apologize because (i) they don’t
believe it’s worth the effort; (ii) they believe the other party was at fault; and (iii) they
have low self-esteem. Underscoring some of the points above, it is logical to assume that
some offenders may see their behavior as justified and thus not meriting an apology (Leunissen, 2014).

The arguments outlined above represent a window into the psyche of a would-be – and generally reluctant - apologizer. Moreover, at least one article empirically demonstrated that refusing to apologize may be beneficial to one’s psyche, thereby perhaps justifying our reluctance to apologize. Across two studies, Okimoto, et al. (2013) considered whether refusing to apologize is positively associated with a sense of power, value integrity, and self-esteem. In the first study, participants were asked to recall an instance in which they either refused to apologize, offered an apology, or took no apologetic action: the researchers then measured how participants felt about themselves after the situation. In the second study, participants were asked to recall an instance in which they had offended someone; the researchers then manipulated whether participants apologized or not, after which participants were asked how they felt about themselves.

In both studies participants who refused to apologize reported greater power/control and value integrity; in addition, these mediated the relationship between refusal to apologize and greater self-esteem (Okimoto et al., 2013). Refusing to apologize is thus seen as a way to feel more empowered, and an individual’s refusal to apologize might be motivated by basic human needs for autonomy and consistency (Okimoto et al., 2013). It is interesting to consider these findings relative to the previously mentioned PAM study, which in a similar vein suggested that one’s tendency to apologize is positively related to one’s self-esteem and autonomy. One potential implication is that -
consciously or not - those with self-esteem or autonomy concerns may not want to exacerbate these concerns by apologizing.

Notwithstanding theoretical arguments concerning one’s willingness or unwillingness to apologize, there is a notable lack of empirical support for these contentions, with few exceptions. A paper by Exline, Deshea, and Holeman (2007) is one of the few to introduce and test a framework of situational factors predicting apologies, drawing from the justice literature to propose a set of conditions under which individuals are likely to apologize. Building on the arguments of Lazare, among others, Exline and colleagues suggest that there are two broad categories that compel offenders to apologize to victims: (i) these offenders see themselves as clearly responsible for an injustice; and/or (ii) they view their pre-existing relationship with victims as closer or more committed than do those who don’t apologize. Exline et al. showed in a within-subject design that apologies were indeed more likely in situations in which the offender felt genuine remorse, and in which the offender felt closer to the victim. Moreover, in response to open-ended questions concerning apology motives, the two most common responses were a desire to help the other person or the relationship (51% of respondents), and a desire to relieve guilt (39%).

The two broad apology criteria established by Exline and colleagues, which are consistent with earlier theorizing by Lazare and Tavuchis – offenders’ relational concerns and feelings of remorse - serve as the general foundation for my hypotheses concerning apologies, power, and status. More specifically, I argue that the possession of high or low power or status will help drive one’s willingness to apologize.
Power and Status

The theoretical support for making divergent predictions about how those with power or status might behave in certain situations is rooted in social psychology. There have been important conceptual refinements in the power and status literature over the last 20 years, including the notion that power and status are theoretically distinct constructs (e.g. Fiske, 1993; Fragale, Overbeck, & Neale, 2011; Keltner, Gruenfeld, Anderson, 2003). Indeed, scholars are beginning to parse out the differing psychological effects of status and power (Blader & Chen, 2012; Blader et al., 2016; Magee & Galinsky, 2008). I will draw on these perspectives in the conceptualizations of power and status that follow.

Power is defined as control over critical resources and valued outcomes within a set of social relations (Fiske, 1993; Keltner et al., 2003; Magee & Galinsky, 2008). More specifically, power typically entails the control over money, information, or decision-making (Anderson, John, & Keltner, 2012; French & Raven, 1959). By contrast, status is conceptualized as the prestige, respect, admiration, and esteem that a party has in the eyes of others (Anderson & Kilduff, 2009; Fiske, 2010; Fragale, et al., 2011; Magee & Galinksy, 2008). I chose these definitions of power and status because they represent the current consensus within the psychology and management fields, particularly regarding those studies which seek to disentangle the effects of power and status. Importantly, as defined in this literature, hierarchical position or ranking is not a necessary condition of either power or status, though in practice it frequently goes hand in hand with one or both of these factors. Moreover, while I define power in terms of extrinsic resources, it also could also derive from intrinsic, internalized sources (Anderson et al., 2012).
One critical distinction between power and status that is highly relevant to my argument is that status is conferred via the judgments and evaluations of others, while power is considered more a property of the individual actor in a given context, and is thus less reliant on external judgments (Magee & Galinsky, 2008; Blader & Chen, 2012). This fundamental contrast has significant implications for individuals’ motivation and behavior including, I argue, their willingness to apologize.

In the sections below I review extant theory concerning power and status. I organize my review around high and low dichotomies of power and status because I make hypotheses about the willingness to apologize on this basis. The reason why I dichotomize what is a continuous variable by nature is that I consider this a reasonable simplification, taking into account the relatively limited amount of research on the topic. As researchers consider the different effects of power and status, the field has largely structured the inquiry around these two groupings, high and low; this practice is normative in the field (e.g. Blader & Chen, 2012; Blader et al., 2016). I further argue that in practice individuals place interaction partners into these high and low buckets in order to determine how to approach these partners. Moreover, I think that these groupings are even more applicable to my study because I don’t consider a history between the two parties: In this context, I argue that one is even more likely to place oneself or another person into a binary group as a simplifying assumption.

**High Power**

The power-as-control theory (Fiske, 1993), and the approach/inhibition theory of power (Keltner, et al., 2003), provide a theoretical foundation for making predictions concerning how power impacts one’s willingness to apologize. According to these
theories, those with relatively high power experience fewer social/normative constraints and exhibit tendencies of an activated approach system, including more automatic information processing and less inhibited behavior (Fiske, 1993; Keltner, et al., 2003). Further, high power individuals are able to block out peripheral information and focus on task relevant information (Guinote, 2007).

As it relates to the automaticity of social cognition, Keltner et al. (2003) propose that high power individuals “should tend to judge others’ attitudes, interests, and positions less accurately” (p. 273). This is largely because high power individuals engage in more heuristic assessments of others (Keltner et al., 2003). This builds upon basic tenets in power-as-control theory, which suggests that those with power are unmotivated to pay attention to those without power (Fiske, 1993). Relatedly, it has been experimentally shown that high power individuals are poorer judges of others’ emotions than are low power individuals (Anderson & Berdahl, 2002; Galinsky, Magee, Inesi, & Gruenfeld, 2006), and engage in less perspective taking (Blader et al., 2016).

Further, higher-power individuals – after learning of another’s suffering - experience less reciprocal emotion (i.e. distress) and less complementary emotion (i.e. compassion) than lower-power individuals (van Kleef, Oveis, van der Lowe, LuoKogan, Goetz, & Keltner, 2008). Evidence suggests that these social interaction effects may be related to brain function. Indeed, Hogeveen, Inzlicht, and Obhi (2014) found that those primed with high power demonstrated lower levels of motor resonance – a neural mechanism in which one’s brain activity mirrors that of another person - than those with low power. Thus, there could in fact be a neurological underpinning to the tendency of those with high power to neglect the powerless (Hogeveen et al., 2014).
Relative to my argument, the above are factors that could tie into one’s proclivity to apologize or not. For one, the preceding logic can be linked to the baseline premise that in order to apologize one must feel guilty for an offensive act (Exline et al., 2007). Those with high power may not feel as responsible for an offensive act because they are less cognizant of the negative implications for the victim; they are also less likely to be aware of or feel compassion toward the victim (van Kleef et al., 2008). Indeed, Kim et al. (2009) argue that one of the fundamental complications in trust repair is the fact that the offender often does not realize that trust has been violated.

Moreover, power has been shown to foster self-interested behavior and moral hypocrisy, in which individuals place strict moral standards on other people yet engage in less strict behavior themselves (Galinsky et al., 2006; Lammers, Stapel, & Galinsky, 2010). Relatedly, those with high power experience less social pressure with regard to the attitudes that they form (Magee & Galinsky, 2008). The result is that those with high power are more likely to feel justified in their behavior, to consider the other party at fault, and to be emotionally detached, making these individuals less willing to apologize.

Further, the second pillar of apologizing – the existence of a closer, more committed relationship – provides an additional basis for the argument that those with high power are less willing to apologize. This is because power creates social distance and with it the tendency to stereotype and objectify others, and to treat them instrumentally (Fiske, 1993; Gruenfeld, Inesi, Magee, & Galinsky, 2008; Magee & Smith, 2013). For instance, Kipnis (1972) showed that those with greater power create psychological distance between themselves and those with less power, and tend to view these individuals as objects of manipulation. In interpreting these results, he contends
that those with greater power will struggle to maintain ‘close and friendly relations’ with those with lesser power (Kipnis, 1972). Magee and Smith (2013) further theorize that because those with high power are less dependent on the views and actions of those with less power, this reduces their motivation to affiliate with these individuals.

From a relational perspective, those with high power seemingly have more discretion concerning whether to apologize or not because the source of their power is not rooted in their relationship with others. Thus they may feel less inclined to invest emotional energy in apologizing in order to demonstrate their commitment to a relationship. Relatedly, those with high power possess a freedom from social norms, which creates flexibility in terms of how the powerful approach social situations (Blader & Chen, 2012). One example of this phenomenon is the fact that high power is negatively associated with procedural and distributive justice exhibited towards others (Blader & Chen, 2012). This tendency of those with high power to bypass the basic social norm of exhibiting fairness towards others is indicative of how those with high power view social obligations.

A final point concerning the likelihood of one with high power apologizing is the idea that an apology itself entails proclaiming one’s helplessness and putting oneself at the mercy of another party (Tavuchis, 1991). Indeed, Lazare (1995, p. 42) proffers: "What makes an apology work is the exchange of shame and power between the offender and the offended." An apology thus represents a relinquishment of power by one individual to another, placing the other party in a more dominant role (Schneider, 2000; Exline et al., 2007). Within the context of the dyadic relationship, the victim - and recipient of the apology - has temporarily taken control of decision-making. That is, the
recipient of the apology has the power to decide whether or not to accept the apology: this is a level of vulnerability that those with high power might seek to avoid. Indeed, Exline and Baumeister (2001) argue that a fear of apologizing and the associated vulnerability should be especially salient for offenders who desire to maintain dominance within a relationship. Taken as a whole these arguments suggest that those with high power will be less inclined to apologize than those in an experimental control condition.

\textit{Hypothesis 1: Individuals with high power will be less willing to apologize (vs. control).}

\textit{Low Power}

For those with low power the world is a vastly different, and potentially perilous, place due to their lack of control over valued outcomes (Fiske, 2010). One result is that those with low power have a heightened sensitivity to threat and punishment (Keltner et al., 2003). This supports the idea that those with low power will be more willing to apologize, in an attempt to avoid punishment for a negative act. Moreover, one implication of a relative lack of control is that low-power individuals will be more influenced by situational demands (Galinsky, Magee, Gruenfeld, Whitson, & Liljenquist, 2008). In addition, individuals with low power will feel less autonomy due to their relative paucity of resources (Fiske, 1993).

These fundamental aspects of low power, (i) situational predominance, and (ii) lack of autonomy, suggest that those with low power will be more willing to apologize. First, the act of apologizing after committing an interpersonal offense is considered a normative response to resolve a conflict (Tavuchis, 1991). Second, those without a sense of autonomy are expected to apologize more (Tavuchis, 1991).
In addition, I expect that those with low power will be more likely to recognize that an apology is required. For one, those with low power are more likely to engage in perspective taking (Galinsky et al., 2006). In one demonstration of this idea, those primed with low power (vs. high power) were better able to adopt another person’s perspective (Galinsky et al., 2006). This perspective-taking effect can also lead to misjudgments: for example, low-power individuals tend to overestimate negative emotions in their supervisors relative to the emotions that these individuals actually felt (Anderson & Berdahl, 2002). Thus, those with low power are more likely to take the victim’s point of view and recognize that this person requires an apology. Indeed, the low power person is more likely to apologize for even minor issues because he/she might perceive victims to be more upset than they really are.

In addition, those with low power are expected to undergo more complex reasoning in assessing their social relations, and to assume a more strategic posture (Keltner et al., 2003). In this sense, low power-holders should be more committed to preserving their existing relationships because of their relative dependency on other individuals. Supportive of this notion, those with low power must often inhibit their desires in order to avoid negative consequences (Keltner et al., 2003). Taking this factor into account, there is a greater likelihood that those with low power will apologize simply to placate an aggrieved party.

_Hypothesis 2: Individuals with low power will be more willing to apologize (vs. control)._
High Status

With regard to status, status maintenance concerns focus one’s attention outward to social entities (Flynn, Reagans, Amanatullah, & Ames, 2006). This is because status is necessarily conferred by others via social processes (Blau, 1964). Indeed, status by definition cannot be held unless targets willingly choose to grant it (Fragale et al., 2011). Thus status, unlike power, is a property not so much of the individual actor but of observers (Magee & Galinksy, 2008). I argue that because status is derived through our relationships with others, it will affect one’s inclination to apologize, particularly since apologies are delivered in order to influence how others perceive and behave towards us (Lazare, 2004).

There are prior studies that address the relationship between status and apologizing; however either the findings were inconclusive, or the operationalization of status was more closely related to our current conceptualization of power. To wit, Holmes (1990) considered apologies and status but operationalized status as the extent to which one can impose his/her plans on others, which is more akin to power as I’ve defined it. In a sample of apologies, Holmes (1990) found that while offenders of equal status with victims most often delivered apologies (63% of the time), offenders with lower status than victims delivered almost twice as many apologies upward (23.5%) as offenders with higher status delivered downward (13.1%).

Gonzales, Pederson, Manning, and Wetter (1990) also studied the link between status and apologies. The theoretical underpinning for their hypothesizing was Brown and Levinson’s politeness theory (1978), which suggests that those of lower status will tend to be more polite to higher status victims. These authors found that there was no effect of
status on the use of apologies. However there are several important differences between this study and my dissertation. In the Gonzales study, status was operationalized as hierarchical status, which relates to one’s ranking within a social setting. Moreover, this study was focused on the broader concept of accounts, which are verbal explanations of misbehavior that include not only apologies but also concessions, excuses, justifications, and refusals (Gonzales et al., 1990).

Further, in a vignette study involving an instance of a broken promise at work, Takaku (2000) found that status – operationalized as hierarchical rank - did not influence Americans’ views on the appropriateness of an apology versus a justification. This view was in contrast to that of Japanese participants, who felt that an apology was more appropriate than a justification when a lower status individual breaks a promise to a higher status individual, as compared to when a higher status individual breaks a promise.

Returning to my argument, in order to achieve and maintain status one must be pleasing in the eyes of external parties. Social groups convey status to an individual based on attributions that members make about that individual (Hogg, 2001). The individual with high status is perceived not only to possess superior skills and abilities, but also the willingness to use these talents to benefit the group (Fragale et al., 2011). In this way, high status carries with it expectations concerning appropriate behavior, to the extent that those with high status are seen as having responsibility for those around them (Fiske, 1992). Magee and Galinsky (2008, p. 360), in reviewing prior status literature, assert that “status emerges from expectations that individuals have for their own and each other’s performance.”
Consistent with this premise, Blader and Chen (2012) argue that high status individuals will be highly attuned to the impressions that others form of them, and will thus be motivated to behave in a respectable manner. An apology would appear to fall into this category of respectable behavior (Tedeschi & Norman, 1985). Indeed, Tedeschi and Norman (1985) classify an apology as “defensive-tactical” impression management behavior, intended to repair damaged identities. Hogan and Emler (1981) theorize that those with high status must be careful not to give “gratuitous public offense”. I submit that one way to avoid offending is to apologize after a questionable act.

Moreover, one of the ways that individuals who want greater status can attain it is through displays of generosity and selflessness (Anderson & Kilduff, 2009). Additionally, Blader and Chen (2012) found that psychological status was positively associated with exhibiting procedural and distributive justice towards others. These findings all support the idea that those with high status tend to behave in positive ways in order to manage the social judgments that others form of them. Thus, I expect that a high status offender will consider issuing an apology in order to repair the damaged impression that a victim has of him/her.

Perhaps even more relevant to my argument, Blader et al. (2016) theorized and found that high status enhances perspective taking. This directly ties into one’s willingness to apologize in that by considering another person’s perspective, one is more likely to recognize that this party has been offended by one’s actions. This in turn makes one more likely to feel responsible for a negative act, and thus ultimately more willing to apologize (Exline et al., 2007).
The second big theoretical driver of apologies – the existence of a closer, more committed relationship – is also supportive of the idea that high status individuals will be more willing to apologize. Individuals with high status should be generally committed to their existing relationships because these relationships are the source of their status in the first place. Moreover, individuals with high status are more prone to see their existing relationships in a positive light. Indeed, Lount and Pettit (2012) argue that high status triggers an expectation that others will have favorable motives and exhibit positive behaviors towards them. These researchers found that high status led people to initially trust others more, and this was mediated by a belief that others have positive intentions toward them (Lount & Pettit 2012).

Similarly, Pettit and Sivanathan (2012) argue that high status arouses a set of expectations around the social rewards (e.g. displays of respect, approval, appreciation, and praise) that those with high status will receive due to their elevated position. Supportive of this contention, Pettit and Sivanathan (2012) experimentally found that those in high status positions reported hearing applause as louder and seeing facial expressions as more favorable. Moreover, this effect was mediated by expectations of how others would respond: that is those with high status had higher expectations of how the audience would respond (e.g. I expect to hear applause, rated on a seven-point scale) than those with low status.

One takeaway from these two studies is that those with high status are more likely to feel confident in how others will respond to them. As it relates to the apology process, I suggest that high status individuals are more likely to expect that their apology will be accepted, and by extension to worry less that their apology will be rejected. This is
important as the prospect of rejection is a key deterrent for apologizing (Lazare, 2004). Indeed, the instrumental perspective on apologies suggests that individuals are more likely to apologize when they believe that they will be forgiven by the victim (Exline et al., 2007; Leunissen et al., 2012).

A final argument for why those with high status are more likely to apologize is that they are loathe to lose the public standing that they possess, and will expend considerable effort to maintain this standing, including presumably the delivery of an apology. Pettit, Yong, and Spataro (2010), building on classic work on gain/loss frames (e.g. Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) found that individuals attach greater value to status when recalling the risk of status loss than when recalling the potential for status gain. Further, individuals are willing to pay more to avoid a status loss than to achieve a status gain, and put forth greater effort when striving to prevent status loss than when striving to gain status. As previously argued, apologizing often requires considerable psychic pain and effort. Nonetheless, assuming that individuals see apologies as a status-maintenance act, these findings suggest that high status individuals are likely to apologize in order to preserve their privileged social standing.

It is important to note that idiosyncratic credit theory (Hollander, 1958) suggests that those with high status may be less willing to apologize. This theory holds that those with high status can behave in certain unexpected ways once they are established within a group and not lose standing: essentially high status holders accrue social credits that can then be depleted if the person with high status behaves in a peculiar manner (Hollander, 1958). Thus, according to this theory, a high status individual can presumably afford not to apologize after certain actions and instead rely on accumulated social credits.
However, I argue that an apology can be a quick and effective way for the high status holder to replenish the idiosyncratic credit account that was depleted by the original offensive act. As such, I suggest that high status holders might be inclined to take advantage of this opportunity to rebuild the account, particularly if it has been cumulatively diminished by other actions. In this way my hypothesis concerning high status and apologies is not wholly inconsistent with idiosyncratic theory. At the same time, it is likely that high status holders will not be compelled to apologize for all offenses. Perhaps high status individuals will apologize only in those instances in which they believe the apology will materially boost their idiosyncratic credit account.

In sum, for all of these reasons I argue that those with high status will be more inclined to apologize than those in a control condition.

Hypothesis 3: Individuals with high status will be more willing to apologize (vs. control).

Low Status

By contrast, there are both instrumental and relational reasons why those with low status might be less willing to apologize. I make this contention despite the fact that one could also argue that low status individuals may feel some sort of obligation to apologize out of deference, particularly in a context in which they are interacting with high status people. For one, individuals with low status have reason to be skeptical about the quality of their interpersonal ties, as their peers generally view them with less respect and admiration (Blader & Chen, 2012). As a result, they cannot be confident that their apologies will be accepted, an important precondition to apologizing (Leunissen et al., 2012). Indeed, for individuals with low status, accepting responsibility for a negative act
may in fact confirm to others that they are not trustworthy, which may in turn impair their ability to gain status in the future. Thus the implication for those with low status is that the act of apologizing - which even in the best of cases carries social risk - is even riskier for them compared to those with higher status.

Further, for those with low status, relationships tend to be less consensual (Fragale et al., 2011). As a result, low status individuals are likely to feel a lack of relational commitment from their social counterparts. This is because those with low status are aware that they are not as respected or viewed as favorably as others (Anderson, Srivastava, Beer, Spataro, & Chatman, 2006). Principles of reciprocity and social exchange suggest that those who experience a lack of commitment from others will feel less committed in return (Cialdini, 1993). This is a problem as relational commitment is a significant factor in compelling individuals to overcome the natural tendency not to apologize (Leunissen, 2014). As a result, those with low status should be less willing to apologize.

Behavioral confirmation theory (Snyder, Tanke, & Berscheid, 1977) buttresses the prediction that those with low status will be less willing to apologize. This theory holds that people will tend to behave in ways that conform to the views that others have of them (Snyder, et al., 1977). As it relates to my argument, individuals with low status in a particular social context would be expected to behave less admirably within this context by those around them. Low status individuals are more likely to feel that an interpersonal transgression on their part is expected by the group, and as a result might conform to this expectation and behave in such a negative manner. Further, not apologizing may be consistent with the expected behavior of those with lower status,
because a sincere apology is an act of strong moral character and integrity. This in turn should make individuals with low status less willing to apologize.

Hypothesis 4: Individuals with low status will be less willing to apologize (vs. control).

Interaction of High/Low Power and High/Low Status

I have argued that high power and low status, respectively, will tend to make individuals less willing to apologize, while low power and high status, respectively, will tend to make individuals more willing to apologize. But it is important to also consider the interaction of these variables, as there are many roles in society in which individuals possess some combination of these factors. For example, IRS agents are generally considered to have high power but low status, while social workers frequently have high status but low power. Moreover, there is surprisingly little work on the interaction of these two variables, as some researchers have noted (Fast, Halevy, & Galinsky, 2012).

My core premise is that status exerts a greater impact than power in the apology process. The support for this contention rests on the fundamental tenets of image restoration theory (Benoit, 1995), and the notion that the maintenance of one’s image in a social context is paramount. Image restoration theory is concerned with the strategies that both personal and organizational offenders can employ in order to restore their image or reputation after committing an offensive act. The theory rests on two assumptions. The first is that communication is a goal directed activity. Actors will consider salient goals and issue communication in furtherance of these goals, assuming that the cost of this communication is reasonable (Benoit, 1995). Communication is thus seen as an instrumental act.
The second assumption is that a key consideration in communication is to maintain and repair one’s reputation (Benoit, 1995). Reputation has been defined as the set of beliefs, perceptions, and evaluations that a group forms about an individual member (Anderson & Shirako, 2008). In this way the theory builds upon Goffman’s (1967) contention that individuals will strive to preserve their face, particularly if it is threatened. Benoit (1995) further argues that people are concerned with their reputation for two principal reasons. First, one’s reputation is linked to one’s self-image; second, one’s reputation is critical to the degree of influence that one possesses (Benoit, 1995). This is because a positive reputation within one’s community results in greater status in that community (Anderson & Shirako, 2008).

One implication of this theory is that when one’s positive reputation is threatened – as it would be after an offensive act - one will be compelled to take action to restore this reputation. This assumes that the offender is aware that he/she has offended. One of the prescribed actions, according to the theory, is an apology. This is consistent with Lazare’s (2004) argument that offenders often apologize in order to maintain social support. Thus, a high status offender, when facing a situation in which he/she has committed an offensive act, would be primarily concerned with preserving his/her reputation in order to maintain a high status level. Moreover, in this situation one’s level of power should not be of paramount importance since power – as defined herein - will not be impacted by the issuance or non-issuance of the apology.

An additional argument for the dominance of status over power is the idea that status is the more socially fluid construct. This is because status hinges on the views of others, and is thus liable to be modified. By contrast, power - as I have defined it here -
is more fixed and less subject to change. As a result, status concerns would be more prominent in one’s mind given that there is a greater opportunity for status to be altered, even for those with high power who are less reliant on others.

Given these arguments concerning high status, combined with my earlier ones regarding low power, individuals possessing both of these factors should be most inclined to apologize. However, for those who possess both high status and high power, I have argued for opposing inclinations. Nonetheless, one of the implications of high power is the more effective pursuit of goals (Guinote, 2007). Since my argument centers on the idea that a key goal of high status individuals is to maintain their status level, those with high status and high power should be more willing to apologize because it is in keeping with their overarching goal of preserving high status. Thus individuals with both high status and high power should be more willing to apologize.

In sum, with respect to this interaction, I argue that one’s status will be a more impactful factor than one’s power in determining whether one tends to apologize after a transgression. That is to say, under conditions of high status I predict that individuals will be more willing to apologize than those in a control condition, regardless of their level of power. Conversely, under conditions of low status, individuals will be less willing to apologize, again regardless of their level of power.

Hypothesis 5: Individuals with high status will be more willing to apologize (vs. control), regardless of whether they have high power, low power, or control power.

In the case of low status offenders, their status is impaired even before committing the offensive act. As a result, there is less incentive to issue an apology for face restoration reasons. This is because an apology for a single negative act, while
expected to have a positive impact on one’s social standing, presumably cannot transform a low status individual into a high status one. This is in line with my earlier argument about the negative association between low status and apologies.

Thus, I expect those with low status and high power to be the least willing to apologize. For those with low status and low power, an argument can be made on both sides. Indeed, I have hypothesized that low power will increase one’s willingness to apologize because low power individuals are better at perspective taking and are more strategic in their social interactions. Nonetheless, I predict that the possession of low status will override these tendencies as it relates to apologies. To support this premise, I return to my general argument about low status individuals and apologies: because these individuals have less to gain from an apology, and because they can have less confidence that their apology will be accepted, they are less likely to bear the interpersonal costs and risks of issuing one.

*Hypothesis 6: Individuals with low status will be less willing to apologize (vs. control), regardless of whether they have high power, low power, or control power.*
Chapter 3: Apologies and Perceived Dominance and Warmth

Apologies, Power, Status, and Influence

Thus far I have argued that power and status exert varying intrapersonal influence on the apology process. It is also important to consider the interpersonal impact of power and status as it relates to apologies. To reiterate, I define power as control over critical resources and valued outcomes; and I define status as the prestige, respect, admiration, and esteem that one possesses from others (Magee & Galinsky, 2008). Power is thus derived independently from the social judgments of others, while status derives directly from these social judgments.

Despite the substantial differences between power and status that I have enumerated in the previous chapter, there is one fundamental similarity: both power and status are routes to potential influence over others (French & Raven, 1959; Magee & Galinsky, 2008). In other words, people are more likely to follow the directives of an individual who either controls valued resources or who they highly regard (Fragale et al., 2011). Power, status, and influence are thus inexorably linked. Due to this fact, as well as to the general importance of influence in social and organizational settings, I will focus my inquiry on the impact that an apology has on one’s degree of social influence.

The distinction between power and status - and the distinction between these two constructs and influence - is fundamental to my hypothesizing. Power and status have often been thought of in terms of capability to influence; that is, these constructs were defined and measured based on how much influence one possessed. However, Magee and Galinsky (2008) hold that while influence has traditionally been considered a dimension of both power and status, it is in fact a downstream effect of power and status.
Thus influence is a dependent variable in this conceptualization: the possession of power and/or status shapes one’s capacity to influence others. In this way power, status, and influence are conceptually distinct (Magee & Galinsky, 2008).

Social influence is an important concern for humans, going back to our ancestors who utilized influence tactics for reasons of survival and reproduction (Sundie, Cialdini, Griskevicius, & Kenrick, 2012). Indeed, a core social motive for humans is a desire to maximize one’s ability to influence others (Tedeschi & Norman, 1985). It is thus understandable why those with high power or high status would seek to maintain their social influence, particularly after committing an offensive act that might serve to alienate others and chip away at one’s influence. From a research perspective, my objective is to hone in on how apologies impact the influence process with the two groups that typically harbor the most interpersonal influence, those with high power and/or high status.

I approach this study of apologies and the influence process via an examination of the social judgments that others hold of those with high power and high status following an apology. While high power and high status both impact one’s degree of influence, they may elicit different social judgments that in turn impact the influence process (Fragale et al., 2011). I focus on perceptions of one’s warmth and dominance. These social judgments are conceptually distinct from high power and high status, despite the fact that status itself is a form of social judgment. Nonetheless these constructs are linked because the possession of high power and/or high status helps to shape warmth and dominance impressions, as I will explain in the sections that follow. But first I will provide an
overview of the theoretical support for the idea that an apology can ultimately shape one’s level of influence.

*The Elaboration Likelihood Model and Influence*

My argument is centered on the notion that apologies from high status or high power individuals help to shape their interpersonal influence following an offensive act. Further, I argue that this occurs via the social judgments that others make about these individuals after they apologize. It is important to embed my model into a contextual theory of influence. Several theories address the influence process, and one of the most prominent of these is the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM). The ELM is applicable to my argument in that it helps explain how social judgments made by a target about another individual can lead to increased influence for that individual.

The ELM, developed by Petty and Cacioppo (1986) as a comprehensive theory encompassing many prior persuasion theories and frameworks, addresses the cognitive processes that occur within targets of influence. The ELM reflects a dual system approach to judgment, and holds that there are two routes to influence, the central route and the peripheral route (Petty & Brinol, 2012). The central, or elaborated, route is the more cognitively sophisticated of the two, and involves a target’s rational processing of information, arguments, and evidence (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). In order for the target to be changed or persuaded, the target must be both motivated and capable of understanding the information presented.

By contrast, the peripheral - or low route - involves persuasion at a more emotional level. Within the context of the peripheral route, attitudes can be shaped by simple heuristics (Petty & Brinol, 2015). These heuristics involve relatively quick
perceptions on the part of the target. My model concerning the aftermath of an apology is best understood within the context of this peripheral route, although an apology can certainly lead to higher levels of cognitive processing by the target as well.

Importantly for my hypothesizing, the ELM holds that source variables fall under the auspices of peripheral cues. These source factors are aspects of the individual who delivers the message, as perceived by the target (Petty & Brinol, 2015). Two of these source factors are directly related to my model. The first of these is the target’s perception of the source’s authority (Cialdini, 1994; Petty & Brinol, 2015). The implication is that more the source is viewed as powerful or authoritative, the more influence this person will possess. This notion of authority is directly tied to the perception of dominance that I have chosen to study. The second peripheral cue relevant for my argument is whether one is liked by a target: the more one is liked, the more influence he/she will possess (Cialdini, 1994; Petty & Brinol, 2015). Likeability is related to warmth, which is the second social judgment that I study.

Thus, the ELM provides broad theoretical support for my contention that the social judgments that the victim makes about the offending party will result in that party having more influence following an apology. More specifically, warmth and dominance perceptions act as peripheral cues in the influence process. I will now provide a more detailed description of the social judgments dominance and warmth, and present my argument concerning how apologies from high status/high power individuals impact these social judgments.
Social Judgments: Warmth and Dominance

Social judgments are made as individuals engage in social learning, which involves obtaining information about and making assessments of others (Lee & Harris, 2014). Social judgments involve the characteristics that others attribute to a party, and the study and categorization of these trait attributions has a long history in social psychology (Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2006). Fundamentally all individuals, upon encountering others in their environment, must determine the intentions and capabilities of these other parties (Fiske, et al., 2006). This person perception process is often spontaneous, and has been shown to have a neurological basis (Fiske & Taylor, 2013; Lee & Harris, 2014). Further, the impressions that people form about others greatly shape the nature of their interactions with others (Fragale et al., 2011).

Consistent with the ELM, the social judgments that others make about us helps to determine our degree of influence. Two social judgments that directly relate to one’s influence are others’ perceptions of one’s warmth, and their perceptions of one’s dominance (Cialdini, 1993). The warmth dimension refers to the perception of one’s positive intentions towards others, and encapsulates traits including friendliness, helpfulness, sincerity, trustworthiness, and morality (Fiske et al., 2006; Fragale et al., 2011). By contrast dominance is traditionally seen as the perception of one’s tendency to behave in a self-assured manner, and captures traits including ambition, assertiveness, decisiveness, and forcefulness, among others (Abele & Wojciszke, 2014; Anderson & Kilduff, 2009; Fragale et al., 2011). Warmth is considered the primary social judgment because it is the first judgment that people make, and it accounts for the most variance in trait ratings (Fiske et al., 2006; Abele & Wojciszke, 2007). Moreover, the primacy of
warmth can be seen in evolutionary terms as a key to survival is to first determine another party’s intentions before assessing their capabilities.

Warmth is deemed by scholars to be one of the two fundamental dimensions of social judgment, along with competence, though competence and dominance share many qualities (Abele, Cuddy, Judd, & Yzerbyt, 2008; Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2008; Freddi, Tessier, Lacrampe, & Dru, 2013). Nonetheless, while dominance and competence perceptions are closely related, I have chosen to focus my inquiry on dominance rather than competence as I believe it is more relevant to the context that I am studying. That is, dominance, rather than competence, taps more into the emotional aspect of apology process. Moreover, dominance is more traditionally tied to influence, having been linked to leadership as well as to influence in smaller group settings (Lord, De Vader, & Alliger, 1986; Anderson & Kilduff, 2009). In addition, my model builds upon prior, related studies concerning the linkages between power, status, warmth and dominance.

Further, the focus on two dimensions of social judgment harkens back to prior two-fold conceptualizations in the literature including power vs. love, and agency vs. communion (Celik, Lammers, van Beest, Bekker, and Vonk, 2013). Indeed, scholars argue that the existence of two broad classes of social judgment are universally present in the perception of not just others, but also the self and social groups (Abele & Wojciszke, 2014).

Given the critical link between perceptions of warmth and dominance and one’s degree of influence, Fragale et al. (2011) linked high and low power, and high and low status, to these perceptions. The primary goal was to determine whether power and status lead to different social judgments. They argued that both high power and high status
would positively predict a target’s perceived dominance; but that high status would be positively related to perceived warmth while high power would be negatively related to perceived warmth. Fragale et al. found support for their arguments, along with the premise that status acts as a moderator of the negative effect of power on warmth. That is, when status is high, targets are perceived as warm regardless of their level of power.

While the Fragale et al. findings are foundational, they don’t tell us anything about how the relationships between the variables may be impacted by specific types of social interactions including offensive acts and apologies. This is significant as people purposefully engage in certain behaviors in order to appear warmer or more dominant (Holoien & Fiske, 2013). For those with high power or high status, an apology may be an effective way to manage others’ perceptions of their warmth and dominance after an offensive act.

Indeed, I hold that after offending another party, the act of apologizing— as opposed to not apologizing - will lead to increased perceptions of both warmth and dominance for those with high power and for those with high status. My argument regarding dominance is particularly relevant to the apology process as a key reason why people are reluctant to apologize after an offensive act is a fear of appearing weak or inadequate (Lazare, 2004), i.e. appearing less dominant. This is why I am focusing this study on the high power and high status conditions.

My contention is that for those with high power or high status, an apology will not convey weakness, and may in fact convey strength, and thus this longstanding fear is overstated. Supportive of this idea, Tucker et al., (2006) found that leaders who apologized were perceived as more transformational than those who did not apologize.
However, in this study the victim was subjected to a task-related mistake. By contrast, I consider contexts in which the victim perceives an interpersonal exchange as offensive. Thus there are more likely to be emotional implications since negative interactions at work often result in emotional reactions for people (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996).

I will now discuss in greater detail how high power and high status apologies should lead to enhanced perceptions of warmth and dominance.

*High Power/High Status Apologies and Perceived Warmth*

As previously outlined, much of our understanding of the consequences of apologies is rooted in impression management theory. To this end, apologies can improve an offender’s situation in a number of important ways. For example, apologies reduce the blame and anger that victims hold toward offenders, leading victims to punish offenders less severely (Darby & Schlenker, 1982; Ohbuchi, Kameda, & Agarie, 1989; DeCremer et al., 2010). Conversely, in cases in which the offender fails to apologize, there are negative emotional repercussions. Thomas and Millar (2008) found that participants were angrier at a confederate when the confederate had an opportunity to apologize and didn’t than when this person did not have the chance to apologize.

However, as previously mentioned, apologies are not universally effective (e.g. Gold & Weiner, 2000; Skarlicki, Folger, & Gee, 2004). To address this discrepancy in the literature, Hill (2014) conducted a meta-analysis linking apologies with a series of outcomes for offended parties: apologizing was significantly related to forgiveness (k = 79, r = .32), positive attributions of the apologizer (k = 60, r = .24), and positive emotions toward the apologizer (k = 43, r = .33). The latter two correlations provide compelling evidence that, all else being equal, apologies positively alter how victims view offenders.
Apologies are able to accomplish this in part because they function as effective image restoration tools (Benoit, 1995; Benoit & Drew, 1997). Apologies provide information to the victim about the nature of the offender (Tomlinson et al., 2004). That is, apologies signal that transgressions should not be deemed a reflection of the offender’s true identity or intrinsic worth (Goffman, 1967; Ren & Gray, 2009). In this way, an apology is expected to result in a more positive impression of the offender. Therein lies the link between apologies and perceived warmth. Perceptions of warmth are deemed positive, and are typically connected to characteristics such as friendliness, honesty, and good-naturedness (Tiedens & Jimenez, 2003). Moreover, trustworthiness and likeability – both aforementioned outcomes of apologies – have been classified in the warmth dimension (Fiske et al., 2006).

Further, there is some reason to believe that apologies from high power and high status offenders will be particularly impactful, although evidence is mixed. Walfisch et al. (2013) found that apologies from high status others were shown to be more effective than apologies from low status others, with apology effectiveness operationalized as apology acceptance, willingness to forgive, and valuation of the offender. In a separate study, supervisor apologies in the wake of interpersonal offenses were shown to positively impact follower trust in leadership, satisfaction with supervision, LMX quality, affective organizational commitment, and forgiveness (Basford et al., 2013). By contrast, scholars have also shown that apologies from high power offenders are relatively ineffective at increasing forgiveness from low power victims, due to the cynicism with which these apologies are viewed (Zheng, van Dijke, Leunissen, Giurge, De Cremer, 2016).
In sum, though evidence concerning the general effectiveness of apologies from high power and high status offenders is inconclusive, because apologies elicit positive thoughts and feelings from victims, they should enable high power and high status offenders to exude more warmth than if the offender had not apologized after an offensive act. Thus, an apology – relative to no apology - is expected to enhance the feelings of warmth that victims have toward both high power and high status individuals.

*Hypothesis 7: Individuals with high status who apologize after an offensive act are perceived as warmer than individuals with high status who do not apologize.*

*Hypothesis 8: Individuals with high power who apologize after an offensive act are perceived as warmer than individuals with high power who do not apologize.*

**High Power/High Status Apologies and Perceived Dominance**

The perception of one’s dominance is of interest to those with power or status because, like warmth, it can shape the nature of one’s interactions with targets of influence. Indeed, prior research holds that the relationship between perceived dominance and influence is reciprocal in nature (Fragale et al., 2011). Despite this fact, dominance is a construct that frequently carries a negative connotation, and is often linked with aggressive, domineering, and controlling tendencies (Burgoon & Dunbar, 2000; Ridgeway, 1987). However, communication scholars Burgoon, Johnson, and Koch (1998) considered dominance from an interactionist perspective, arguing that perceptions of dominance are a byproduct of not only the focal party’s personality, but also the interaction between two parties. This is relevant to the apology process in that an apology is a transformative interaction between two parties.
Burgoon et al. (1998) further argued that the negative conceptualization of dominance is too narrow and too pejorative; by contrast, they contend that socially competent behaviors lead to perceptions of dominance. To this end Burgoon et al. (1998) factor-analyzed results from two different samples and found that dominance could be characterized as inclusive of components of poise, panache, self-assurance, persuasiveness, and conversational control. Dominant individuals were further deemed to be more relaxed, composed, and expressive, and to initiate and coordinate conversation. In a subsequent study, Burgoon and Dunbar (2000) found that self-reported social skills – as measured by the Social Skills Inventory (Riggio, 1986) - were associated with perceptions of dominance as gauged by interaction partners, observers, and themselves.

Because apologies fall into the category of behaviors that require social competence, I argue that they should lead to greater perceptions of dominance. In particular, apologies demand that one be confident and self-assured, traits that fall under the dominance dimension (Wiggins, 1979). As I have previously argued, apologies are difficult and at once require strength and vulnerability, a balance that requires adroit social skills. Indeed, an apology has been described as an act of courage in which one must first conquer one’s own fear (Tavuchis, 1991; Taft, 2000). I expect recipients of apologies to recognize that apologizers are showing initiative and exhibiting strength in admitting fault, as opposed to shifting blame or denying their wrongdoing.

Apologists must also convince the victim that the apology merits acceptance, which requires persuasiveness. Further, in as much as an apology represents one’s willingness to accept responsibility for a wrongful act, one is demonstrating a willingness
to take the moral high road and shoulder social obligations, another sign of one’s strength. These factors all increase the likelihood that one who apologizes will be viewed as more dominant than one who does not.

**Hypothesis 9:** Individuals with high status who apologize after an offensive act are perceived as more dominant than individuals with high status who do not apologize.

**Hypothesis 10:** Individuals with high power who apologize after an offensive act are perceived as more dominant than individuals with high power who do not apologize.
Chapter 4: Mechanisms Underlying Power, Status, and the Willingness to Apologize

In Chapter Two I explored whether high and low power, and high and low status, impact one’s willingness to apologize. Nonetheless, we still don’t know precisely why this phenomenon occurs. That is, we don’t fully understand the differing psychological processes that power and status exert as they relate to apologies. For example, I have argued that high power and low status individuals, respectively, are more unwilling to apologize, but for different reasons. This contention requires empirical study since the factors underlying why a high power or low status individual might avoid apologizing is an important research question that has yet to be addressed. Moreover, from a practical standpoint, it is important to understand how contextual factors may influence one’s willingness to apologize so as to better address the underlying causes.

Thus, I will focus on the psychological mechanisms that govern why high power and low status individuals are less willing to apologize, and why high status and low power individuals are more willing to apologize. To do this I will introduce the constructs of remorse and instrumentality perceptions as potential mediating variables for power and status, respectively, and the willingness to apologize. In sum, my purpose is to understand more completely the phenomenon of why those with high or low power, or high or low status, are willing to apologize or not.

High Power and Remorse

As I have previously argued, a principle reason why people fail to apologize is that they feel justified in their behavior and hence don’t experience guilt and remorse (Exline et al., 2007). Offenders frequently view their actions as less harmful and more justifiable than do victims, which in turn creates a psychological barrier to repentance and
apologies (Exline & Baumeister, 2001). Baumeister (1996) labeled this difference in perceptions between the offender and victim concerning the nature and seriousness of a transgression the “magnitude gap”. Essentially I contend that the experience of high power, and the psychological distance that this creates vis-a-vis others, results in one being more susceptible to the magnitude gap (Magee & Smith, 2013).

Remorse pertains to the negative feelings that one has relating to the consequences of one’s behavior (Davis & Gold, 2011; Brooks & Reddon, 2003). To reiterate a point that I highlighted in Chapter Two, Exline et al. (2007) predicted and found that apologies were more likely than non-apologies in situations in which the offender felt genuine remorse. Thus remorse can be seen as a precondition to apologies. Moreover, victims view remorse as a critical component in the apology process: perceived remorse reduces the blame and punishment-seeking of victims, and leads to increased levels of empathy and forgiveness (Davis & Gold, 2011; Darby & Schlenker, 1982). In sum, remorse is a fundamental part of the apology process, both for offenders and for victims, and can be seen as an intervening variable between high/low power and intent to apologize.

I contend that remorse is an especially critical factor in the apology process for high power individuals because they are less likely to apologize for social reasons such as politeness or coercion. This is because power reduces the impact of social disapproval (Emerson, 1962). Further, the act of apologizing is a social norm, and power frees individuals from the weight of social norms (Galinsky et al., 2008). The implication is that those with high power will need to feel remorse for their behavior in order to compel them to apologize.
In an interpersonal context such as the one that I am examining, remorse involves the internal recognition that one has behaved badly and created negative ramifications for someone else. One of the key theoretical arguments that I have made is that those with high power may not be aware that they have behaved in an offensive manner towards another person. For one, the possession of power leads one to be more focused on goal pursuit and one’s own self-interest (Guinote, 2007). In this context the psychological state of an aggrieved party may not be pertinent. Indeed, social distance theory suggests that those with high power will show less interest in others’ mental state and will not be as responsive to others’ needs (Magee & Smith, 2013). Supportive of this notion, high power has been linked to a lack of compassion for others (Van Kleef et al., 2008).

The theory of moral hypocrisy is also supportive of the notion that high power individuals will experience less remorse following an offensive act. Moral hypocrisy involves having a double standard concerning one’s view on immoral behavior, and has been linked to the possession of power (Rustichini & Villeval, 2014). Moral hypocrisy provides a theoretical frame for understanding why a high power individual may feel justified in their behavior, even as a victim may feel that he/she deserves an apology.

Across four experiments, Lammers et al. (2010) found that high power individuals, as opposed to low power individuals, judged their own moral improprieties less harshly than the improprieties of other people. The implication is that those with high power will have more psychological freedom to behave badly since the psychological bar for their misbehavior is higher. Building on this finding, I propose that high power individuals will also be less likely to feel remorseful about their behavior, which they may not view as problematic in the first place.
Hypothesis 11: Individuals with high power will experience less remorse than individuals in the control group.

Hypothesis 12: Individuals with high power will be less willing to apologize (vs. control).

Hypothesis 13: Remorse will mediate the relationship between high power and willingness to apologize.

Low Power and Remorse

In contrast to those with high power, those with low power are expected to experience more remorse following an interpersonally offensive act. This contention rests on the notion that those with low power engage in more perspective taking than those with high power (Galinsky et al., 2006). Perspective taking is the process of imagining the thoughts and feelings of another person (Galinsky et al., 2006). This is critical to my argument as perspective taking is related to correctly discerning the interests of others (Eisenberg, Murphy, & Shepard, 1997), which in turn should be tied to remorse.

Remorse involves negative sentiment concerning the consequences of one’s behavior (Exline et al., 2007). In this case I am studying the consequences of one’s offensive behavior towards another person. It is more likely that one will appreciate the negative consequences of one’s interpersonal behavior when one understands the point of view of the victim: this is a consequence of perspective-taking. As a result, the low power individual is more likely to recognize that this victim’s interests have been negatively impacted by his/her actions. For this reason I propose that those with low
power will feel more remorse concerning their offensive behavior.

Moreover, low power individuals will be acutely aware of the negative emotions that others harbor towards them. This was demonstrated in a study by Anderson and Berdahl (2002) which found that those with low power overestimated an interaction partner’s threatening emotions, consisting of anger, contempt, and disgust. I propose that this inclination should be related to heightened feelings of remorse. Indeed, overestimating the victim’s negative emotions could result in low power individuals experiencing even more remorse than the initial offensive behavior would otherwise dictate.

Hypothesis 14: Individuals with low power will experience more remorse than individuals in the control group.

Hypothesis 15: Individuals with low power will be more willing to apologize (vs. control).

Hypothesis 16: Remorse will mediate the relationship between low power and willingness to apologize.

Low Status and Instrumentality Perceptions

The instrumental perspective on apologizing suggests that offenders’ decision about whether to apologize is a function of whether offenders believe that they will be forgiven and thus trusted again (Leunissen et al., 2012). Under this line of reasoning, offenders gauge the odds of whether the victim will accept their apology before delivering one: if offenders believe that their apology will be accepted, they should be more willing to apologize. This was empirically shown in a laboratory study that
involved actual behavior, both in terms of the offensive act and the apology (Leunissen et al., 2012).

The underlying logic behind the instrumental perspective is that would-be apologizers seek positive outcomes and seek to avoid negative outcomes from an apology, and this motivates their apology behavior. This is consistent with the notion that apologizers are strategic in deciding whether or not to issue apologies (Lazare, 2004; Leunissen et al., 2012). The positive outcomes that apologizers seek are forgiveness, along with some form of reconciliation. By contrast, apologizers seek to avoid the rejection associated with an unaccepted apology, which is often accompanied by humiliation and punishment (Exline et al., 2007). Offenders thus gauge whether apologies will lead to outcomes that are in their best interest: when offenders do not believe that they will be forgiven, the apology will not be viewed instrumentally and hence not delivered (Leunissen et al., 2012).

Those with low status, as I have previously argued, should be less confident that they will be forgiven for their misbehavior. This is because they are not in good social standing with their peers, people who in the aggregate have less respect and admiration for them. Victims typically forgive those with whom they want to reconcile and restore a positive relationship (Bottom, Gibson, Daniels, & Murnighan, 2002). However, those with low status recognize that their relationships are not strong. They will thus have lowered expectations concerning their reception from social partners. In short, those with low status have strong reason to believe that the victim will not desire reconciliation and will not accept their apology, since the social link is already weak.

**Hypothesis 17: Individuals with low status will have lower instrumentality**
perceptions about apologies than individuals in the control group.

Hypothesis 18: Individuals with low status will be less willing to apologize (vs. control).

Hypothesis 19: Instrumentality perceptions will mediate the relationship between low status and willingness to apologize.

High Status and Instrumentality Perceptions

High status individuals, by contrast, have strong reason to believe that their apology will be accepted and that the relationship can be restored. This derives from the underlying premise that high status individuals reap social benefits by virtue of the respect and admiration that others have for them (Blau, 1964; Hollander, 1958). Moreover, these benefits often exist in the mind of the high status individual, thus yielding more favorable social perceptions and a set of positive expectations concerning others’ evaluations of the self (Pettit & Sivanathan, 2012).

For example, Lount and Pettit (2012) found that one of the byproducts of high status is the belief that another person will have benevolent intentions; benevolent intentions are the degree to which one wants to do good for another. Pettit and Sivanathan (2012) provide further proof that status cues shape social perceptions: those with high status reported a higher percentage of seeing smiling faces and hearing applause following a public performance versus those with low status.

The factors above drive my contention about the positive link between high status and instrumentality perceptions. High status individuals exist in a world in which they perceive that interaction partners are welcoming and approving of them (Pettit and
Sivanathan, 2012). Indeed, I propose that instrumentality perceptions are a natural extension of the Lount and Pettit (2012) study concerning benevolent intentions. Because high status individuals perceive that others generally want the best for them, they should expect that interaction partners will accept their apologies because of the benefits – trust restoration, forgiveness - that it would provide the high status holder. Thus, I propose that the high status individual is more likely than the individual in the control condition to believe that the victim will be accepting of their apology.

*Hypothesis 20: Individuals with high status will have higher instrumentality perceptions about apologies than individuals in the control group.*

*Hypothesis 21: Individuals with high status will be more willing to apologize (vs. control).*

*Hypothesis 22: Instrumentality perceptions will mediate the relationship between high status and willingness to apologize.*
Chapter 5

Study 1

In order to test the hypotheses concerning one’s willingness to apologize under conditions of high and low power, and high and low status, I employed an experimental methodology.

In this experimental design I utilized a vignette that allowed me to control the nature of the offensive act and the form of the apology, and ultimately to determine causality. In addition, this design allowed me to distinguish the effects of power and status, which often co-vary in naturalized settings. My design further enabled me to clearly differentiate the conditions of high power, low power, control power, high status, low status, and control status.

I examined the apology process in a dyadic context. I did not manipulate the power or status of the victim, just that of the offender. While some power/status studies consider these factors relationally, my goal was to isolate the psychological effect of power and status on the offending party. In this way, I am making an assumption of homogeneity across victims.

I also targeted participants with work experience as I consider them better able to relate to a scenario that involves workplace interactions.

Method

Participants and Design. In this online study, I recruited and compensated participants via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk), an online marketplace created by Amazon.com in which “workers” complete computerized tasks that are posted by “requesters” (Paolacci & Chandler, 2014). Scholars have determined that MTurk worker
samples are reliable (Paolacci & Chandler, 2014). Further, MTurk workers have been found to be internally motivated and demographically diverse, particularly along the dimensions of industry and work experience (Behrend, Sharek, Meade, & Wiebe, 2011; Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011). In the recruitment information, I requested that only individuals with at least six months of prior work experience in the U.S. participate, and I limited the recruitment to the U.S.

Participants were 441 individuals (54% male; 46% female) from the United States with at least six months of prior work experience in the U.S. Participants received $1.20 to complete an approximately 10-minute survey. The mean age was 35.2 ($SD = 11.2$), and the participants reported working 38.8 hours ($SD = 10.0$) per week on average.

Participants were randomly assigned to conditions in a 3 (status: high vs. low vs. control) x 3 (power: high vs. low vs. control) between-participants experimental design. All instructions and questions were constructed and delivered using Qualtrics, the survey software.

**Experimental Conditions.** Power and status were manipulated using primes adapted from Blader and Chen (2012), and Petit and Sivanathan (2012). Participants assigned to the high status/control power and low status/control power condition(s) were instructed to imagine:

You work at a pharmaceutical company and hold a great deal of (relatively little) status within this organization. You have (do not have) the sense that your colleagues really like, respect, and admire you (particularly like, respect, or admire you). Indeed, you possess a great deal of (little) esteem within the
organization. Note that this is separate from the level of power that you possess
in the organization.

In the high power/control status and low power/control status condition(s), participants
were instructed to imagine:

You work at a pharmaceutical company and hold a great deal of (relatively little)
power within this organization. Indeed you are one of the most (least) powerful
individuals in the company. You are personally given control over an unusually
large (relatively meager) amount of resources, compared with your peers in other
departments. Note that this is separate from the amount of respect or admiration
that others in the organization feel toward you.

In the high status/high power, high status/low power, low status/high power, and low
status/low power conditions, respectively, participants were given instructions that
included both the power and status manipulations. The status manipulation was always
presented first, followed by the power manipulation. For example, in the high status/high
power condition, participants were instructed to imagine that:

You work at a pharmaceutical company and hold a great deal of status within this
organization. You have the sense that your colleagues really like, respect, and
admire you. Indeed, you possess a great deal of esteem within the organization.

In addition, you hold a great deal of power within this organization. Indeed, you
are one of the most powerful individuals in the company. You are personally
given control over an unusually large amount of resources, compared with your
peers in other departments.
For the control condition, no such information concerning status or power was provided. Instead, participants were simply told:

You work at a pharmaceutical company.

Procedure. Following the manipulations, participants were presented with a short scenario, adapted from Hetrick et al., (2014), that represents an interpersonal offense from the perspective of an offender. The scenario is as follows:

You are in a work meeting with a group of colleagues in which you are discussing the product pipeline for the company. At one point in the meeting one of your colleagues begins to ask a question that you find irrelevant. You interrupt the colleague and state that the question that the colleague has asked is “stupid” in front of the rest of the group.

After reading these prompts, participants completed the dependent measure, manipulation check, and demographic measures, in that order.

Demographic variables. Participants were asked their gender, age, and hours worked on average per week.

Manipulation Check. Participants were asked two questions to serve as manipulation checks: “How much power do you have at the company?” and “How much status do you have at the company?” Both questions were answered on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (none at all) to 5 (a great deal).

Dependent Variable. Participants were given the following definition of apology: “an explicit verbal or written statement of apologetic intent such as ‘I am sorry’ that you believe is sincere” and asked “How likely are you to apologize to your colleague about
what happened during the meeting?” The question was answered on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (extremely unlikely) to 7 (extremely likely).

**Results and Discussion**

Neither age (r = .06, p = .22), nor hours worked per week (r = -.04, p = .43), correlated with willingness to apologize. A one-way ANOVA showed that gender had a significant effect on willingness to apologize, F(1, 439) = 8.9, p = .003. Women (M = 6.10, SD = 1.35) showed a greater willingness to apologize than did men (M = 5.66, SD = 1.64). As a result, I included gender as a covariate in models testing willingness to apologize.

I tested several assumptions before running tests of the hypotheses. I computed and found Levene’s statistic to be significant, thus I do not have homogeneous variances. However, my group sample sizes are approximately equal; and SPSS uses a regression approach for ANOVA, meaning that ANOVA and multiple regression using dummy variables are mathematically the same, so the problem is less important (Leech, Barrett, & Morgan, 2015). In addition, I compared box plots and confirmed that the dependent variable, willingness to apologize, is normally distributed.

**Manipulation Checks**

A one-way ANOVA showed that the power manipulation had a significant effect on how much power the participants felt they had at the company, F(2, 438) = 322, p < .001. Planned contrasts revealed that participants in the high-power condition (M = 4.42, SD = 0.98) reported a significantly greater sense of power than participants in the control condition (M = 2.84, SD = 0.90), t(296.6) = 14.49, p < .001, d = 1.57, and than participants in the low-power condition (M = 1.90, SD = 0.62), t(251.8) = 26.25, p <
.001, d = 2.52, confirming that the high power manipulation increased sense of power. Planned contrasts also revealed that the low-power condition participants reported a significantly lower sense of power than participants in the control condition, t(269.8) = -10.50, p < .001, d = -.94, confirming that the manipulation of low power reduced sense of power compared to the control condition.

A one-way ANOVA showed that the status manipulation had a significant effect on how much status they felt they had at the company, F(2, 437) = 91, p < .001. Planned contrasts revealed that participants in the high-status condition (M = 4.00, SD = 1.15) reported a significantly greater sense of status than participants in the control condition (M = 3.04, SD = 1.19), t(294.8) = 7.11, p < .001, d = .96 and than participants in the low-status condition (M = 2.23, SD = 0.96), t(273.2) = 14.09, p < .001, d = 1.77, confirming the manipulation of high status. Planned contrasts also revealed that the low-status condition participants reported a significantly lower sense of status than participants in the control condition, t(292) = -6.48, p < .001, d = -.81, confirming that my manipulation of low status reduced sense of status compared to the control condition.

Willingness to Apologize

To analyze the effect of the power and status on participants’ willingness to apologize, I conducted a 3x3 between-participants ANCOVA, with power (high vs. low vs. control) and status (high vs. low vs. control) as the factors, and gender as the covariate; see Table 1 for Estimated marginal means (EMM).

This analysis revealed that gender was a significant covariate F(1, 431) = 9.72, p = .002, \( \eta_p^2 = .02 \). There was a main effect of status, F(2, 431) = 4.04, p = .018, \( \eta_p^2 = .02 \).
There was no main effect of power, $F(2, 431) = .45, p = .641, \eta^2_p = .00$, and there was not a significant power x status interaction, $F(4, 431) = 1.186, p = .316, \eta^2_p = .01$.

High power participants ($EMM = 5.78, SE = 0.12$) were no less likely to apologize than those in the control condition ($EMM = 5.83, SE = 0.12$), $F<1$. Low power ($EMM = 5.95, SE = 0.13$) and control conditions also did not differ, $F<1$. Thus Hypotheses 1 and 2 were not supported.

The high status ($EMM = 6.02, SE = 0.13$) and control conditions ($EMM = 5.98, SE = 0.12$) did not differ, $F<1$, therefore Hypothesis 3 was not supported. Nonetheless, those with high status were more willing to apologize than those with low status ($EMM = 5.56, SE = 0.13$), $t(284) = 2.548, p = .011, \eta^2_p = .02$.

In support of Hypothesis 4, participants experiencing low status ($EMM = 5.56, SE = 0.13$) were less willing to apologize compared to those in the control condition ($EMM = 5.98, SE = 0.12$), $t(298) = -2.447, p = .015, \eta^2_p = .01$.

Hypothesis 5 predicted that individuals with high status will be more willing to apologize (vs. control), regardless of whether they have high power, low power, or control power, and was not supported. Planned comparisons revealed that participants with high status did not differ in willingness to apologize when they also had high power ($EMM = 6.06, SE = 0.21$) as compared to control ($EMM = 5.95, SE = 0.22$), $t(96) = .391, p = .696, \eta^2_p = .00$. Similarly, participants with high status were no more willing to apologize when they had low power ($EMM = 6.04, SE = 0.22$) compared to the control ($EMM = 6.26, SE = 0.20$), $t(101) = -.795, p = .427, \eta^2_p = .00$. Further, there was no difference in high status participants’ willingness to apologize when power was not
manipulated (EMM = 5.96, SE = 0.22) vs. control (EMM = 5.73, SE = 0.21), t(98) = 
.737, p = .461, np² = .00. The results are illustrated in Figure 1.

Hypothesis 6 predicted that individuals with low status will be less willing to 
apologize (vs. control), regardless of whether they have high power, low power, or 
control power, and was partially supported. Planned comparisons revealed that 
participants with low status were less willing to apologize when they also had high power 
(EMM = 5.34, SE = 0.21) as compared to control (EMM = 5.95, SE = 0.22), t(99) = -
2.058, p = .041, np² = .02. Similarly, participants with low status were also less willing 
to apologize when they had low power (EMM = 5.54, SE = 0.25) compared to the control 
(EMM = 6.26, SE = 0.20), t(93) = -2.309, p = .022, np² = .03. However, there was no 
difference in low status participants’ willingness to apologize when power was not 
manipulated (EMM = 5.80, SE = 0.20) vs. control (EMM = 5.73, SE = 0.21), t(104) =
.232, p = .817, np² = .000.

In sum, results from Study 1 provide evidence favoring my argument that status 
exerts a greater impact than power on the apology process. I found a main effect for 
status, but not for power, and in the predicted direction. Low status is related to a 
reduced willingness to apologize as compared to the control condition: this is true 
regardless of whether participants also possess high power or low power. Moreover, high 
status individuals are more willing to apologize than those with low status. I further 
explore the underlying mechanisms relating to these dynamics in Study 3.
Chapter 6

Study 2

In order to test the hypotheses concerning victims’ reactions to apologies from those with high power and high status, I once again used an experimental design that employed a vignette methodology. My research objective was ultimately to gauge the impact of an apology on the influence process, which is why I focused solely on high power and high status.

Method

Participants and Design. As with Study 1, I recruited and compensated participants via MTurk, the online marketplace for completing tasks. In the recruitment information, I requested that only individuals with at least six months of prior work experience in the U.S. participate, and I limited the recruitment to the U.S.

Participants were 196 individuals (54% male; 46% female) from the United States with at least six months of prior work experience in the U.S. Participants received $1.20 to complete an approximately 10-minute survey. The mean age was 35.4 (SD = 11.0), and the participants reported working 36.7 hours (SD = 11.0) per week on average.

Participants were randomly assigned to conditions in a 2 (high status vs. high power) x 2 (apology vs. no apology) between-participants experimental design. All instructions and questions were constructed and delivered using Qualtrics.

Procedure. Participants were presented with a short scenario, adapted from Hetrick et al., (2014), that represents an interpersonal offense. Unlike Study 1, the scenario is from the perspective of the victim and not the offender. The scenario that participants viewed is as follows:
You work at a pharmaceutical company, and you are in a work meeting with a group of colleagues. At one point in the meeting you begin to ask a question about the product pipeline. At that point one of your colleagues interrupts you and states that the question that you have posed is “stupid” in front of the rest of the group.

Power and status were manipulated using primes adapted from Blader and Chen (2012) and Petit and Sivanathan (2012). Participants assigned to the high status condition were instructed to imagine:

The person who interrupted you (“R”) has a great deal of status in your organization and is generally liked, respected, and admired by everyone in the organization.

Participants assigned to the high power condition were instructed to imagine:

R has a great deal of power in your organization and controls an unusually large amount of resources compared with others in the organization.

Participants assigned to the apology condition were then instructed to imagine:

The following day R apologized to you for the interruption and for being rude. R promised you that it would never happen again. You believe that R’s apology was sincere.

For the no apology condition, no such information concerning an apology from R was provided.

**Demographic variables.** Participants were asked their gender, age, and hours worked on average per week.
**Dependent Variables.** After being told about the apology or not, participants were asked about their perceptions of R.

**Perception of Warmth.** Participants were asked to “indicate the extent to which each of the following terms describes the person who interrupted you”, taken from Wiggins (1979) and Fragale et al. (2011): cordial, respectful, cooperative, agreeable, impolite (r), disrespectful (r), uncooperative (r), and quarrelsome (r). The questions were answered on a 9-point scale ranging from 1 (extremely inaccurate description) to 9 (extremely accurate description).

**Perception of Dominance.** Participants were asked to “indicate the extent to which each of the following terms describes the person who interrupted you”, taken from Wiggins (1979) and Fragale et al. (2011): assertive, forceful, self-assured, dominant, submissive (r), unassertive (r), and timid (r). The questions were answered on a 9-point scale ranging from 1 (extremely inaccurate description) to 9 (extremely accurate description).

**Results**

I conducted principal axis factor analysis with varimax rotation to assess the underlying structure for the 15 items used to measure the perceptions of the offender. Two factors were requested based on the fact that the items were designed to index two constructs, warmth and dominance. After rotation, the first factor accounted for 49.1% of the variance and the second factor accounted for 15.4% of the variance. Table 2 displays the items and factor loadings for the rotated factors, with loadings less than .40 omitted to improve clarity. As expected, the first factor appears to index to warmth, while the second factor appears to index to dominance. I computed Cronbach’s alpha to test for
reliability for the two dependent variables, warmth and dominance: the alpha for warmth was .940; the alpha for dominance was .853. Thus, both variables demonstrated good internal consistency (Leech et al., 2015).

Gender (r = -.012, p = .86), age (r = -.112, p = .12), and hours worked per week (r = -.126, p = .08) were not correlated with warmth perceptions. Gender (r = .052, p = .47) and hours worked per week (r = .063, p = .38) were not correlated with dominance perceptions; however, age was correlated with dominance perceptions (r = .239, p = .001). Because the correlation between age and dominance perceptions was significant, and because the correlation between age and warmth perceptions approached significance, I included age as a covariate in models testing warmth and dominance.

I tested several assumptions before running tests of the hypotheses. I tested the assumption of homogeneity of variances by computing the Levene statistic: the test was not significant; thus the homogeneity of variances assumption is not violated. In addition, because the samples for my groups are approximately equal, the Box test can be ignored and Pillai’s trace used for the Multivariate statistic (Leech et al., 2015).

I conducted a two factor MANCOVA to assess whether victims perceive high status vs. high power offenders who apologize versus those who don’t apologize as warmer or more dominant, with age of the victim as a covariate; see Tables 2 and 3 for Estimated marginal means (EMM). MANCOVA works best when the two dependent variables are negatively correlated, as they are in my study (r = -.513, p <.001), (Leech et al., 2015).

This analysis revealed that age was a significant covariate, Pillai’s Trace = .049, F(2, 190) = 4.891, p=.008, multivariate $\eta^2$ = .049. There was a main effect of apology,
Pillai’s Trace = .291, F(2, 190) = 38.930, p<.001, multivariate η² = .291. There was no main effect of context (high power/high status), Pillai’s Trace = .004, F(2, 190) = .366, p=.694, multivariate η² = .004, and there was not a significant apology x context interaction, Pillai’s Trace = .002, F(2, 190) = .186, p=.831, multivariate η² = .002.

Follow up univariate analyses are presented in Table 5. Age was a significant covariate for dominance (p =.002), but not warmth (p=.161). The main effect of an apology versus no apology was significant for warmth (p <.001), but not dominance (p = .062). Victims perceived those who apologized as warmer but no more or less dominant that those who did not apologize. There was no difference between high status and high power for warmth (p = .460) or dominance (p = .454). Thus, Hypotheses 7 and 8 were supported, while Hypotheses 9 and 10 were not supported.
Chapter 7

Studies 3a and 3b

In Study 1 found evidence that there is an effect of status, but not power, on willingness to apologize. It is thus worth exploring the underlying psychology of status and power to add additional insight into why these contextual factors differ relative to one’s willingness to apologize. In order to test the hypotheses concerning the mediating mechanisms underlying power, status, and the willingness to apologize, I once again employed an experimental design involving a vignette methodology.

In Study 3a, I manipulated power and examined whether remorse mediates the relationship between power and the willingness to apologize. In Study 3b, I manipulated status and examined whether instrumentality perceptions mediate the relationship between status and the willingness to apologize.

Study 3a

Method

Participants and Design. As with Studies 1 and 2, I recruited and compensated participants via MTurk, the online marketplace for completing tasks. In the recruitment information, I requested that only individuals with at least six months of prior work experience in the U.S. participate, and I limited the recruitment to the U.S.

Participants were 148 individuals (55% male; 45% female) from the United States with at least six months of prior work experience in the U.S. Participants received $1.20 to complete an approximately 10-minute survey. The mean age was 34.3 \( (SD = 10.4) \), and the participants reported working 38.7 hours \( (SD = 95) \) per week on average.
Participants were randomly assigned to a high power, low power, or control condition. All instructions and questions were constructed and delivered using Qualtrics.

**Experimental Conditions.** Like Study 1, power was manipulated using primes adapted from Blader and Chen (2012) and Petit and Sivanathan (2012). Participants assigned to the high power condition were instructed to imagine:

You work at a pharmaceutical company and hold a great deal of power within this organization. Indeed you are one of the most powerful individuals in the company. You are personally given control over an unusually large amount of resources, compared with your peers in other departments. Note that this is separate from the amount of respect or admiration that others in the organization feel toward you.

Participants assigned to the low power condition were instructed to imagine:

You work at a pharmaceutical company and hold relatively little power within this organization. Indeed you are one of the least powerful individuals in the company. You are personally given control over a relatively meager amount of resources, compared with your peers in other departments. Note that this is separate from the amount of respect or admiration that others in the organization feel toward you.

For the control condition, no such information concerning power was provided to the participants. Instead participants were simply told that they:

Work at a pharmaceutical company.
**Procedure.** Following the manipulations, participants were presented with a short scenario, adapted from Hetrick et al., (2014), that represents an interpersonal offense from the perspective of an offender. The scenario is as follows:

You are in a work meeting with a group of colleagues in which you are discussing the product pipeline for the company. At one point in the meeting one of your colleagues begins to ask a question that you find irrelevant. You interrupt the colleague and state that the question that the colleague has asked is “stupid” in front of the rest of the group.

After reading these prompts, participants completed the dependent measure, manipulation check, and demographic measures, in that order.

**Demographic variables.** Participants were asked their gender, age, and hours worked on average per week.

**Manipulation Check.** Participants were asked one question to serve as a manipulation check: “How much power do you have at the company?” The question was answered on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (none at all) to 5 (a great deal).

**Remorse.** Remorse was measured with three items adapted from Exline et al. (2007); the three items were averaged to assess remorse ($\alpha = .91$) in that study. The items are: “How much regret do you have about what happened during the meeting?”; “How much guilt or remorse do you have about what happened during the meeting?”; and “How committed are you to not behaving in that way again?” The questions were answered on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (very little) to 7 (a great deal).
Dependent Variable. Participants were given the following definition of an apology: “an explicit verbal or written statement of apologetic intent such as ‘I am sorry’ that you believe is sincere” and asked “How likely are you to apologize to your colleague about what happened during the meeting?” The question was answered on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (extremely unlikely) to 7 (extremely likely).

Results and Discussion

I computed Cronbach’s alpha to test for reliability for the variable remorse: the alpha was .918, thus demonstrating good internal consistency (Leech et al., 2015). Remorse was correlated with willingness to apologize ($r = .754$, $p < .001$).

A one-way ANOVA showed that gender did not have a significant effect on remorse, $F(1, 148) = 1.90$, $p = .171$, or on willingness to apologize, $F(1, 148) = 2.5$, $p = .118$. Hours worked per week was not correlated with remorse, ($r = .05$, $p = .557$) or with willingness to apologize, ($r = -.01$, $p = .895$). However, age was correlated with remorse, ($r = .18$, $p = .029$), and with willingness to apologize ($r = .26$, $p = .002$). As a result, I included age as a covariate in models testing remorse and willingness to apologize.

Manipulation Check

A one-way ANOVA showed that the power manipulation had a significant effect on how much power the participants felt they had at the company, $F(2, 147) = 81$, $p < .001$. Planned contrasts revealed that participants in the high-power condition ($M = 4.34$, SD = 1.10) reported a significantly greater sense of power than participants in the control condition ($M = 2.89$, SD = 0.69), $t(81.4) = 7.99$, $p < .001$, $d = 1.45$ and than participants in the low-power condition ($M = 2.04$, SD = .87), $t(91.9) = 11.4$, $p < .001$, $d = 2.30$, confirming that high power increased sense of power. Planned contrasts also revealed
that the low-power condition participants reported a significantly lower sense of power than participants in the control condition, \( t(85.6) = -5.3, p < .001, d = -.85 \), confirming that my manipulation of low power reduced sense of power compared to the control condition.

**Remorse**

A one-way ANCOVA, with power as the factor and age as the covariate, showed that power did not have a significant effect on remorse, \( F(2, 144) = 1.599, p = .206 \).

Hypothesis 11 predicted that individuals with high power will experience less remorse than individuals in the control group, and was not supported. Planned comparisons revealed that there was no difference in remorse between high power participants (EMM = 4.13, SE = .14) and control participants (EMM = 3.90, SE = .14), \( t(102) = 1.15, p = .254, d = .23 \).

Hypothesis 14 predicted that individuals with low power will experience more remorse than individuals in the control group and was not supported. Planned comparisons revealed that there was no difference in remorse between low power participants (EMM = 4.25, SE = .15) and control participants (EMM = 3.90, SE = .14), \( t(98) = 1.752, p = .082, d = .35 \).

Further, there was no difference in remorse between high power participants and low power participants, \( t(93) = - .600, p = .550, d = -.12 \).

**Willingness to Apologize**

A one-way ANCOVA, with power as the factor and age as the covariate, showed that power did not have a significant effect on willingness to apologize, \( F(2, 144) = .052, p = .949 \).
Hypothesis 12 predicted that individuals with high power will be less willing to apologize than those in the control group, and was not supported. Planned comparisons revealed that there was no difference in willingness to apologize between high power participants (EMM = 6.17, SE = .17) and control participants (EMM = 6.20, SE = .16), t(102) = -.134, p = .893, d = -.03.

Hypothesis 15 predicted that individuals with low power will be more willing to apologize than those in the control group, and was not supported. Planned comparisons revealed that there was no difference in willingness to apologize between low power participants (EMM = 6.25, SE = .17) and control participants (EMM = 6.20, SE = .16), t(98) = .196, p = .845, d = .05.

Further, there was no difference in willingness to apologize between high power participants and low power participants, t(93) = -.322, p = .748, d = -.08.

Mediation

I used Hayes and Preacher’s (2014) approach to mediation analysis with a multicategorical independent variable. The model, parameter estimates, and model fit statistics provide the information about how k groups differ from each other; and the approach enables simultaneous hypothesis tests (Hayes & Preacher, 2014). Further, with the bootstrapping approach to mediation, one does not need to find evidence of a direct effect in order to test for and find mediation (MacKinnon, Lockwood, & Williams, 2004).

I dummy (or indicator) coded the groups, following the system outlined by Hayes and Preacher. I coded the control power condition as 1, low power condition as 2, and high power condition as 3, as per Hayes and Preacher recommendation, with the control condition as the reference group. Using these codes and SPSS, which estimates a linear
model, I found estimated model coefficients, I derived group means, and I determined standardized mean differences similar to Cohen’s d.

To test the hypotheses that power influences willingness to apologize through remorse, I used bootstrapping mediation analysis, with age as a covariate, using the SPSS PROCESS macro (Hayes & Preacher, 2014) (bias-corrected, 5,000 resamples). I found no evidence of mediation (Omnibus 95% confidence interval = -.0115 to .0562; see Fig. 4 for the path coefficients for low power and high power). Thus Hypothesis 13 and Hypothesis 16, which predicted that remorse would mediate the relationship between high and low power, respectively, and willingness to apologize, were not supported.

In sum, in Study 3a I found no direct effect of power on willingness to apologize, which is consistent with Study 1 and contrary to my theorizing. Further, I did not find an indirect effect of power on willingness to apologize through the mediating mechanism of remorse.
Study 3b

Method

**Participants and Design.** As with Study 1, Study 2, and Study 3a, I recruited and compensated participants via MTurk, the online marketplace for completing tasks. In the recruitment information, I requested that only individuals with at least six months of prior work experience in the U.S. participate, and I limited the recruitment to the U.S.

Participants were 148 individuals (51% male; 49% female) from the United States with at least six months of prior work experience in the U.S. Participants received $1.20 to complete an approximately 10-minute survey. The mean age was 35.3 ($SD = 10.5$), and the participants reported working 38.2 hours ($SD = 10.5$) per week on average.

Participants were randomly assigned to a high status, low status, or control condition. All instructions and questions were constructed and delivered using Qualtrics.

**Experimental Conditions.** Like Study 1, status was manipulated using primes adapted from Blader and Chen (2012) and Petit and Sivanathan (2012). Participants assigned to the high status condition were instructed to imagine:

You work at a pharmaceutical company and hold a great deal of status within this organization. You have the sense that your colleagues really like, respect, and admire you. Indeed, you possess a great deal of esteem within the organization. Note that this is separate from the level of power that you possess in the organization.

Participants assigned to the low status condition were instructed to imagine:

You work at a pharmaceutical company and hold relatively little status within this organization. You do not have the sense that your particularly like, respect, or
admire you. Indeed, you possess little esteem within the organization. Note that this is separate from the level of power that you possess in the organization.

For the control condition, no such information concerning status was provided to the participants. Instead participants were simply told that they:

Work at a pharmaceutical company.

Procedure. Following the manipulations, participants were presented with a short scenario, adapted from Hetrick et al., (2014), that represents an interpersonal offense from the perspective of an offender. The scenario is as follows:

You are in a work meeting with a group of colleagues in which you are discussing the product pipeline for the company. At one point in the meeting one of your colleagues begins to ask a question that you find irrelevant. You interrupt the colleague and state that the question that the colleague has asked is “stupid” in front of the rest of the group.

After reading these prompts, participants completed the dependent measure, manipulation check, and demographic measures, in that order.

Demographic variables. Participants were asked their gender, age, and hours worked on average per week.

Manipulation Check. Participants were asked one question to serve as a manipulation check: “How much status do you have at the company?” The question was answered on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (none at all) to 5 (a great deal).

Instrumentality Perceptions. Instrumentality perceptions were measured with three items adapted from Leunissen et al. (2012); the three items were averaged to assess instrumentality perceptions (α = .85) in that study. The items are: “To what extent do
you think an apology is important for your colleague?"; “How effective do you think an apology will be to restore your relationship with your colleague?”; and “To what extent do you think an apology will repair the damaged trust between you and your colleague?”. The questions were answered on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much so).

**Dependent Variable.** Participants were given the following definition of an apology: “an explicit verbal or written statement of apologetic intent such as ‘I am sorry’ that you believe is sincere” and asked “How likely are you to apologize to your colleague about what happened during the meeting?” The question was answered on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (extremely unlikely) to 7 (extremely likely).

**Results and Discussion**

I computed Cronbach’s alpha to test for reliability for the variable instrumentality perceptions: the alpha was .530. Neither the validity nor the reliability of the scale were improved by excluding any single item.

Instrumentality perceptions were correlated with willingness to apologize (r = .329, p < .001)

Hours worked per week was not correlated with instrumentality perceptions, (r = .10, p = .221) or with willingness to apologize, (r = -.10, p = .222). Age was not correlated with instrumentality perceptions, (r = -.11, p = .182), or with willingness to apologize (r = .13, p = .107).

A one-way ANOVA showed that gender did not have a significant effect on instrumentality perceptions, F(1, 146) = .163, p = .687. However, gender did have a significant effect on willingness to apologize, F(1, 146) = 10.3, p = .002. Women (M =
6.43, SD = .99) showed a greater willingness to apologize than did men (M = 5.83, SD = 1.27). As a result, I included gender as a covariate in models testing willingness to apologize.

**Manipulation Check**

A one-way ANOVA showed that the status manipulation had a significant effect on how much status the participants felt they had at the company, F(2, 145) = 41.1, p < .001. Planned contrasts revealed that participants in the high-status condition (M = 4.15, SD = 1.03) reported a significantly greater sense of status than participants in the control condition (M = 3.18, SD = .91), t(99.8) = 5.01, p < .001, d = .97 and than participants in the low-status condition (M = 2.37, SD = 1.00), t(95.8) = 8.75, p < .001, d = 1.78, confirming that high status increased sense of status. Planned contrasts also revealed that the low-status condition participants reported a significantly lower sense of status than participants in the control condition, t(90.7) = -4.16, p < .001, d = -.81, confirming that my manipulation of low status reduced sense of status compared to the control condition.

**Instrumentality Perceptions**

A one-way ANOVA showed that status had a significant effect on instrumentality perceptions, F(2, 145) = 5.892, p = .003.

Hypothesis 17 predicted that individuals with low status will have lower instrumentality perceptions about apologies than individuals in the control group, and was supported. Planned comparisons revealed that the difference in instrumentality perceptions between low status participants (M = 2.96, SD = .72) and control participants (M = 3.29, SD = .67) was significant, t(91.5) = -2.251, p = .027, d = -.32.
Hypothesis 20 predicted that individuals with high status will have higher instrumentality perceptions about apologies than individuals in the control group, and was not supported. Planned comparisons revealed that there was no difference in instrumentality perceptions between high status participants (M = 3.46, SD = .77) and control participants (M = 3.29, SD = .67), t(99.7) = .1.211, p = .228, d = .17.

Further, the difference in instrumentality perceptions between high status participants and low status participants was significant, t(96.4) = 3.315, p < .001, d = .50.

**Willingness to Apologize**

A one-way ANCOVA, with status as the factor and gender as the covariate, showed that status had a significant effect on willingness to apologize, F(2,144) = 3.273, p =.041.

Hypothesis 18 predicted that individuals with low status will be less willing to apologize than those in the control group, and was supported. Planned comparisons revealed that the difference in willingness to apologize between low status participants (EMM = 5.77, SE = .17) and control participants (EMM = 6.28, SE = .16) was significant, t(94) = -2.213, p = .028, d =-.51.

Hypothesis 21 predicted that individuals with high status will be more willing to apologize than those in the control group, and was not supported. Planned comparisons revealed that the difference in willingness to apologize between high status participants (EMM = 6.28, SE = .15) and control participants (EMM = 6.28, SE = .16) was not significant, t(101) = .001, p = .999, d = .00.

Further, the difference in willingness to apologize between high status participants and low status participants was significant, t(98) =2.258, p = .03, d = .51.
Mediation

Like Study 3a, I used Hayes and Preacher’s (2014) approach to mediation analysis with a multicategorical independent variable. I indicator coded the control status condition as 1, low status condition as 2, and high status condition as 3, with the control condition as the reference group.

To test the hypotheses that status influences willingness to apologize through instrumentality perceptions, I used bootstrapping mediation analysis, with gender as a covariate, using the SPSS PROCESS macro (Hayes & Preacher, 2014) (bias-corrected, 5,000 resamples). This analysis confirmed mediation (Omnibus 95% confidence interval = .0014 to .0900; see Fig. 5 for the path coefficients for low status and high status); low status indirectly affected willingness to apologize through lower instrumentality perceptions.

Thus Hypothesis 19, which predicted that instrumentality perceptions would mediate the relationship between low status and willingness to apologize, was supported; and Hypothesis 22, which predicted that instrumentality perceptions would mediate relationship between high status and willingness to apologize, was not supported.

In sum, in Study 3b I found a direct effect of status on willingness to apologize, which is consistent with Study 1 and with my theorizing. Further, I found an indirect effect of low status on willingness to apologize through the mediating mechanism of instrumentality perceptions. This finding is also consistent with my theorizing. By contrast, I found no evidence of a mediating mechanism concerning high status and willingness to apologize.
Chapter 8: General Discussion

In this dissertation, I studied how power and status impact the apology process, both as predictors of the willingness to apologize, and as factors shaping victim perceptions of offenders in the aftermath of an apology.

First, in both Study 1 and Study 3b I found that those with low status were less willing to apologize than those with high status and than those in the control condition. However, I did not find a difference based on power on willingness to apologize. These findings add to our understanding of the psychology of both status and power, particularly as it relates to how these factors differ. Indeed, it appears that one’s status, and not one’s power, influences whether one is willing to apologize after committing an interpersonal offense. In addition, I explored two underlying psychological mechanisms that have been shown to play a role in the apology process, remorse and instrumentality perceptions. I determined that for those with low status, instrumentality perceptions influence one’s willingness to apologize.

Further, I explored the impact that interpersonal apologies from high power and high status individuals have on victims’ perceptions of the offender. I focused on high power and high status in particular because these social factors are commonly believed to be apology deterrents, due to the supposed negative ramifications of an apology. In this vein, I proposed and found that there are positive social implications for high power and high status apologizers. More specifically, I found that both high status and high power offenders who apologize – relative to those who don’t – are seen as warmer and no less dominant by victims.
There are several important theoretical and practical implications from these findings. Scholars have primarily focused on the components of an effective apology; by contrast there is relatively little research concerning contextual antecedents of apologies (Exline et al., 2007). This is consistent with the broader notion that research on relationship repair after conflict has often yielded contradictory findings concerning repair strategies, including apologies (Ren & Gray, 2009).

Further, due to the ubiquitous nature of power and status dynamics in social settings, it is important for researchers to include these factors in our understanding of the apology process. Scholars have begun to parse out the separate psychological effects of power and status (Magee & Galinsky, 2008). This dissertation is the first time to my knowledge that power and status – as defined herein – have been empirically contrasted relative to the apology process. My findings shed light on an important difference between power and status relative to the apology process. This represents a contribution to the power, status, and apology literatures.

Blader and Chen (2012) contend that there is a gap in the literature concerning how power and status holders interact with others. These researchers focused on the degree of fairness that power and status holders exhibit towards others. My work on willingness to apologize provides additional insight into how power and status shape interpersonal dynamics. Moreover, since status has been studied less extensively than has power, my findings concerning status and apologies are particularly impactful to the status literature.

One crucial distinction between power and status is that power, as I have defined it, is a property of the actor, while status results from the observations of third parties
Building on these definitions, I argue that the expectations – or lack thereof - of others serves to either stimulate or stifle an apology. This may help to explain why I found an effect for status, and not for power. What’s more, the finding that low status individuals are less willing to apologize is consistent with the idea that the fear of rejection is a big impediment to apologizing (Tavuchis, 1991).

It is important to note that power can also be viewed in a strictly relational sense, which means that an actor may exert his/her power depending on the presence of different counterparties. I did not explore this dynamic in my study, and perhaps this provides an explanation as to why I did not find an effect for power. In addition, those with high power tend to be more effective at goal pursuit, and an apology may be viewed as an effective tool to achieve social goals. This dynamic may have outweighed the impediments to apologizing.

With respect to the outcome of apologies, my research adds to the apology literature by linking apologies to perceptions of warmth and dominance. Much of the research on the aftermath of apologies pertains to relationship repair, focusing on constructs such as trust and forgiveness. By contrast, I demonstrate that apologies do not harm fundamental social perceptions that victims possess about high power and high status offenders. Prior apology studies that did focus on perceptions were concerned with more generalized positive and negative impressions, and thus my findings add complexity to our understanding of the aftermath of apologies. My results can also be seen as in line with prior research that showed that victims look more favorably on apologizers following unintentional transgressions that do not generate doubts about
offender’s integrity. This is because my focus was on one brief, negative interaction that was not overly severe in nature and not necessarily indicative of one’s character.

My research also extends our understanding of the influence process, and represents a novel application of the ELM (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). While power and status have already been linked with perceptions of warmth and dominance (Fragale et al., 2011), we have a limited understanding of how these perceptions change following events like offensive acts and apologies. This research helps to build a more fluid picture of how we perceive those with high power and high status by showing how apologies can shape our perceptions of them.

From a practical standpoint, a deeper understanding of how power and status impact the apology process is applicable to many social contexts, particularly within organizations. Power and status are ubiquitous factors in organizations. Individuals in organizations may transgress or act in offensive ways for a host of reasons, not the least of which is stress induced by excessive job demands, role conflict, work-life balance issues, and other pressures. Moreover, leaders and others in organizations may experience relationship conflict with their colleagues, which has deleterious effects on team performance (de Wit, Greer, & Jehn, 2012). Leader trust-repair strategies such as apologies are thus critical, not only because leaders transgress, but also because leader transgressions are often either unintentional or beyond leaders’ control (Shapiro, Boss, Salas, Tangirala, & Von Glinow, 2011).

In short, there is an important role for interpersonal apologies by leaders and others at various levels of the organizational hierarchy, which is why we must understand the potential impediments to apologies by these individuals. Apologizing is hard to do,
and so it especially important to determine who among us is likely to be most resistant to the act. By demonstrating that low status individuals are less likely to apologize, these individuals can potentially adjust their thinking and behavior. This would seem especially important for low status individuals who are already lacking in social capital within an organization, a deterrent to career success (Seibert, Kraimer, & Liden, 2001). Indeed, low status individuals would seem to be the group that has the most to gain by apologizing, which makes it unfortunate that they would be less willing to do so. To address this, organizations might become more effective in designing targeted interventions such as apology trainings.

Further, results from my study allow us to draw the conclusion that status is a more important factor than power in determining who is willing to apologize. This is important as it allows individuals and organizations to hone in on the presence or absence of status, rather than power, as a key clue in devising apology strategies related to conflict resolution. My results may be seen as an additional negative factor related to low status, but one that can be potentially remedied through training and ultimately behavioral modification.

The other significant practical implication from this study derives from the finding that for those with high power and high status, interpersonal apologies are beneficial acts in terms of retaining influence. It is important to note that this may be in contrast to favorable leadership behavior in a more public context. Indeed, organizational leaders may look at the benefit that public figures, such as politicians, derive from not apologizing and determine that it is also in their best interests not to apologize. However, my research demonstrates that in an interpersonal context there are clear benefits to
apologizing. This is because an apology will not only soothe the victim, but also enhance
the perception of one’s warmth, with no diminishment to the perception of one’s
dominance. This likely results in the offender gaining more interpersonal influence
following the apology, versus no apology. As such, my study shows that high status and
high power offenders have a compelling reason to apologize should the circumstances
dictate, perhaps making this simple act more likely to occur in practice.

Limitations and Future Directions

My conclusions should be considered in light of some limitations. First, the scope
of my studies was quite narrow. I examined a small part of a large and complex
phenomenon, the apology process. My boundary conditions restrict my inquiry such that
I do not account for a host of factors that might affect power- and status-holders’
willingness to apologize in the real world. For example, I do not take into account social
factors such as national culture, or the culture of the theoretical organization in question,
nor do I account for relevant group norms. I also do not account for important
individual-level factors such as cognition, personality, and ethics, among others. In
short, I excluded many factors that should be included in a more expansive and
explanatory apology model.

The constructs that I have selected for this dissertation, as well as the definitions
of these constructs, limit the generalizability of my findings. Scholars have defined
power and status in a variety of ways over time and across disciplines. The differences
between these various definitions and the definitions that I have selected in this
dissertation have important implications for my theoretical model.
For one, my definition of power focuses on control over external resources. My theoretical model would differ if my conceptualization of power incorporated intrinsic, internalized sources. For example, one’s knowledge or expertise gives one power in various contexts, particularly in the workplace (French & Raven, 1959). Conversely, to the extent that one is lacking expertise, one becomes highly dependent on other individuals. Similarly, I do not account for one’s charisma or referent power that can be exerted in various contexts, regardless of external forces (French & Raven, 1959). Like power that is derived externally, internalized power might drive one’s willingness to apologize. Indeed, these internalized power dynamics may supersede the dynamics rooted in external sources, depending on the context. As a result, in this dissertation I may be understating the true role of power in the apology process. The internalized conception of power should thus be included in future work that links power to willingness to apologize.

Regarding status, I have defined this construct in terms of the prestige, respect, admiration, and esteem that others hold for an individual. However, like power, definitions of status have varied over time and across studies (Piazza & Castellucci, 2014). Indeed, some scholars see status as originating from a social ranking, driven in part by intrinsic factors including one’s personality or physical attractiveness, and determined by the consensus of the group (e.g., Anderson, John, Keltner, & Kring, 2001). One’s social ranking may also be driven by one’s place in a formal hierarchy. Regardless of the source, an assessment of one’s social worth would be antecedent to status as I have defined it. That is, prestige and respect would flow from this alternative notion of status. Moreover, there would seem to be aspects of comparative social worth that impact the
willingness to apologize: for example, the saliency and uniformity of the ranking, and the competitiveness of the environment. Thus, one step for future research would be to include an assessment of an offender’s social ranking in the theoretical model linking status and willingness to apologize.

I omit at least two other aspects of status from my studies that have implications for my conclusions. First, I do not account for the specific social group that one places oneself at any given time. One may feel high or low status generally, but this may vary from moment to moment as one moves through various social circles. The fluid nature of status and its impact on the apology process should be explored more fully by scholars. Second, I do not account for the level of respect and admiration that the offender has for the victim. This assessment of the victim’s status by the offender is separate from, but may be impacted by, the status level of the offender. These are critical features of status in the real world that constrain my conclusions about one’s willingness to apologize in a given context.

Beyond my definitions of power and status, two other key features of my studies limit the generalizability of my findings. First, the hypothetical offense that I used in the experiments cannot represent the large range of offenses that occur in the real world. Second, my experiments involve a simple, basic, and sincere apology that does not represent the multiple forms of apologies that offenders can make, or that victims desire.

In addition, my priming manipulations of status and power, and my use of vignettes, represent significant threats to external validity. The primary benefit of using vignettes and primes is to eliminate confounds and to establish causality. However, there is a question as to how my primes of power and status translate to a real-world setting.
The primes create a psychological state of power and status for participants, but the sensation is by definition finite and bounded, and the scenario as a whole is fleeting. The experience of reading a prime simply cannot equate to the real-world experience of possessing power or status. This may explain why my effect sizes are relatively small, which in turn restricts the breadth and depth of my practical implications. That is, with a relatively small effect size, it is hard to gauge just how meaningful power and status are in the overall apology process.

In practice, however, one’s sense of power and status is more deeply ingrained, and thus more impactful. As a result, I would expect the psychological effect of status and power on willingness to apologize to be even stronger in a natural environment, particularly if there are environmental cues that trigger one’s sense of power/status. For example, if one participates in a series of meetings, an activity not uncommon in the workplace, one’s sense of status should be primed. Similarly, if one is in a position to make – or is subject to – budgetary or staffing decisions, power should also be primed. The psychological impact of these, and many other, real-world primes should be far greater than the primes in my experiment. Indeed, a stronger sense of power in reality may influence the apology process in ways that I did not find. This is a research question that should be explored.

My findings might also be impacted by the specific nature of my experimental procedure. First I separated the priming language from the vignette that outlines the offense. This creates a momentary gap in the mind of the participant that might lessen the psychological impact of the prime and the link to willingness to apologize. In addition, I always present the status manipulation first, before the power manipulation;
this might artificially increase the impact of status versus power. However, this only applies to Study 1; in Study 3, I replicate my findings from Study 1, while separately testing power and status.

In a more general sense, notwithstanding results from these lab studies, it is difficult to make predictions about the antecedents and outcomes of apologies given the complexity of human relationships. In a naturalized setting, there is likely to be some type of historical relationship between the two parties, something that my studies do not take into account. The existence of any sort of pre-existing attitudes and feelings held by the respective parties would affect the apology process, both in terms of the antecedents to the apology, and the aftermath of the apology. Nonetheless, for my purposes it was more important to isolate the effects of power and status, and in order to accomplish this goal the best option was an experiment.

Moreover, I conducted the experiments using online workers who were paid small amounts for their participation, and thus there is a question as to how representative this sample is in terms of the wider workplace population. Nonetheless, the pool of available workers on MTurk is large and diverse, and self-reports from MTurk workers indicate that they are motivated by both intrinsic and extrinsic factors (Paolacci & Chandler, 2014). In addition, I am asking participants to engage in psychological processes that are not exclusive to workplace settings.

In terms of future directions, as I previously discussed, researchers should develop a more comprehensive model of the apology process, inclusive of additional definitions of power and status. Scholars should test these hypotheses - both in terms of the willingness to apologize and the reactions to an apology - in more naturalized
settings. This may result in larger effect sizes. Nonetheless, because this is a relatively new area of inquiry, it is important to conduct additional laboratory experiments first before conducting field research. They key challenge in conducting research in the field will be to determine a way to separate the effects of power and status using a non-experimental methodology.

Apology researchers should take into account a range of power and status differences between the offender and the victim. These differences might drive different levels of instrumentality perceptions, a key psychological mechanism in the apology process, as I discovered. Moreover, researchers should seek to uncover mechanisms beyond instrumentality perceptions to help explain the relationship between status and willingness to apologize. For example, researchers might consider remorse as a mediator for status; I considered remorse as a mediator for power, but not for status. As I have argued, high status orients individuals outward toward social entities. Thus, high status individuals are expected to be more cognizant of the negative reactions of victims, and ultimately should experience more remorse for their actions. Conversely, low status individuals should be less concerned with the attitudes and feelings of others, and thus less remorseful. This might help explain the relationship between low status and a reduced willingness to apologize that I found.

In addition, a number of discrete emotions should be tested as mediators. I suspect that emotions such as sadness and fear play a critical role in shaping status- and power-holders’ willingness to apologize. This should be especially true in a real-world context. Perhaps mechanisms other than instrumentality perceptions would be more amenable to targeted interventions by organizations.
Further, there are any number of moderating variables that might amplify the effect of power and status on the apology process, including the personality of both the offender and the victim. In addition, researchers should study actual apology behavior as opposed to the willingness to apologize. With respect to the impact of apologies on influence, researchers might study an actual demonstration of influence rather than perceptions of warmth and dominance, factors that indirectly gauge influence. Researchers should also study the impact of apologies from low power and low status individuals.

Conclusion

Apologies are tools employed to resolve conflict and rectify offenses. The study of apologies has garnered significant interest in both scholarly and popular outlets. Scholars generally agree that apologies - particularly those in an interpersonal context - are an effective means of repairing damaged relationships. Apologies would thus seem to have an important role to play in organizational settings, notably within leader-subordinate dyads. Nonetheless, apologies have yet to be thoroughly examined in this context, which is consistent with the notion that most apology studies consider apologies without a consideration of power or status (Barling et al., 2008). My dissertation addresses this research gap.

Power and status should play a role in the apology process (Tavuchis, 1991). Indeed, scholars have argued that the powerful are hesitant to apologize (Brown & Levinson, 1978; Lazare, 2004). However, empirical support for this contention is inconclusive. Moreover, status has received scant attention relative to one’s willingness
to apologize. What’s more, prior studies have conflated power and status, such that it is unclear precisely how the individual factors influence the apology process.

In this dissertation, I demonstrate that power, as defined herein, does not have a significant effect on one’s willingness to apologize. By contrast, I demonstrate that status does have a significant effect on one’s willingness to apologize. More specifically, I find that low status makes one less willing to apologize. Further, I find that instrumentality perceptions mediate the relationship between status and willingness to apologize. These findings have several important theoretical and practical implications relative to the apology process, as well as to the power and status literatures.

In addition, I find that following an apology from either a high power or high status individual, perceptions of the apologizer’s warmth improves, while perceptions of the apologizer’s dominance are unchanged. These findings demonstrate that apologies from those with high power and high status can play a key role in shaping one’s impressions of these individuals following an interpersonal offense, which in turn has positive implications for the influence process.
Figure 1: Illustration of Willingness to Apologize depending on power or status (Estimated marginal means) – Study 1.
Figure 2: Illustration of perceived warmth of apologizer as a function of apology delivered and power/status of apologizer (Estimated marginal means) – Study 2.
Figure 3: Illustration of perceived dominance of apologizer as a function of apology delivered and power/status of apologizer (Estimated marginal means)– Study 2.
Indicator coding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Control</th>
<th>Low Power</th>
<th>High Power</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D₁</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D₂</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Direct Effect
D₁: \( c'_1 = -0.256, p = .118 \)
D₂: \( c'_2 = -0.228, p = .159 \)

Indirect Effect
D₁: \( b = .302, \text{BCa CI} [0.054, 0.678] \)
D₂: \( b = .196, \text{BCa CI} [0.138, 0.532] \)
Omnibus: \( b = .0068, \text{BCa CI} [-0.011, 0.056] \)

Figure 4: Diagram of the Mediation Model with Coefficients, Indirect Effect, and Bootstrapped CIs – Study 3a.
Indicator coding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Control</th>
<th>Low Status</th>
<th>High Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D₁</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D₂</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Direct Effect

\[ D₁: c'₁ = -0.352, p = 0.1190 \]
\[ D₂: c'₂ = -0.084, p = 0.6956 \]

Indirect Effect

\[ D₁: b = -0.1608, \text{ BCa CI } [-0.3694, -0.0320] \]
\[ D₂: b = 0.0834, \text{ BCa CI } [-0.0409, 0.2666] \]
\[ \text{Omnibus: } b = 0.0313, \text{ BCa CI } [0.0014, 0.0900] \]

**Figure 5:** Diagram of the Mediation Model with Coefficients, Indirect Effect, and Bootstrapped CIs – Study 3b.
Table 1
*Study 1: Estimated Marginal Means, Standard Errors, and n for Willingness to Apologize as a Function of Power and Status*

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Power</th>
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<th>Low Status</th>
<th></th>
<th>Control Status</th>
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<th>Total</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n</td>
<td>EMM</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>EMM</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>EMM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>6.06(^a)</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>5.34(^b)</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>5.95(^a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>6.04</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>5.54(^c)</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>6.26(^d)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>5.96</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>5.80</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>5.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>6.02(^e)</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>5.56(^f)</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>5.98(^e)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Notes:* EMM = Estimated marginal means, adjusted for gender.
\(^a,b\) Estimated marginal means with these different superscripts differ, \(p < .05\).
\(^c,d\) Estimated marginal means with these different superscripts differ, \(p < .05\).
\(^e,f\) Estimated marginal means with these different superscripts differ, \(p < .05\).
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<tr>
<th>Item</th>
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<th>Dominance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Cooperative</td>
<td>0.889</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agreeable</td>
<td>0.878</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cordial</td>
<td>0.868</td>
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<tr>
<td>Respectful</td>
<td>0.856</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Uncooperative</td>
<td>-0.744</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quarrelsome</td>
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<tr>
<td>Disrespectful</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Impolite</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assertive</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dominant</td>
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<tr>
<td>Forceful</td>
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<td>Self-Assured</td>
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<td>Submissive</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unassertive</td>
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<td>-0.526</td>
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<tr>
<td>Timid</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.449</td>
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<tr>
<td>Eigenvalues</td>
<td>7.36</td>
<td>2.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of variance</td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
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*Note:* Loadings < .40 are omitted.
Table 3
Study 2: Estimated Marginal Means, Standard Errors, and n for Warmth as a Function of Apology and Context

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>High Status</th>
<th></th>
<th>High Power</th>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n</td>
<td>EMM</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>EMM</td>
<td>SE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apology</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>4.35a</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>4.25c</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Apology</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>2.60b</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>2.36d</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>3.47</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>3.31</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: EMM = Estimated marginal means, adjusted for age.

\( a, b \) Means with these different superscripts differ, \( p < .05 \).
\( c, d \) Means with these different superscripts differ, \( p < .05 \).
\( e, f \) Means with these different superscripts differ, \( p < .05 \).

Table 4
Study 2: Estimated Marginal Means, Standard Errors, and n for Dominance as a Function of Apology and Context

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>High Status</th>
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<th>Total</th>
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<td>EMM</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>n</td>
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<td>SE</td>
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<tr>
<td>Apology</td>
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<td>7.17</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>46</td>
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<tr>
<td>No Apology</td>
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<td>7.40</td>
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<td>0.18</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>7.28</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>7.42</td>
<td>0.13</td>
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</table>

Note: EMM = Estimated marginal means, adjusted for age.

Table 5
Study 2: Univariate Effects of Apology and Context on Warmth and Dominance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>(df)</th>
<th>MS</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>p</th>
<th>Partial ( \eta^2 )</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominance</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15.47</td>
<td>9.78</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.05</td>
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<tr>
<td>Warmth</td>
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<td>4.58</td>
<td>1.98</td>
<td>0.161</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apology</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominance</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5.56</td>
<td>3.52</td>
<td>0.062</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warmth</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>162.68</td>
<td>70.40</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.27</td>
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<tr>
<td>Context</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominance</td>
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<td>0.89</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.454</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warmth</td>
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<td>1.27</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.460</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apology x Context</td>
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<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.542</td>
<td>0.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dominance</td>
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<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.737</td>
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<tr>
<td>Warmth</td>
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<td>Error</td>
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<td>191</td>
<td>1.58</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dominance</td>
<td>191</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.31</td>
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</table>
Table 6
Study 3a: Estimated Marginal Means, Standard Errors, and n for Remorse as a Function of Power

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Power</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>EMM</th>
<th>SE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>4.13</td>
<td>.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>4.25</td>
<td>.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>3.90</td>
<td>.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>4.08</td>
<td>.14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: EMM = Estimated marginal means, adjusted for age.

Table 7
Study 3a: Estimated Marginal Means, Standard Errors, and n for Willingness to Apologize as a Function of Power

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Power</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>EMM</th>
<th>SE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>6.17</td>
<td>.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>6.25</td>
<td>.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>6.20</td>
<td>.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>6.19</td>
<td>.17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: EMM = Estimated marginal means, adjusted for age.
Table 8
*Study 3b: Means, Standard Deviations, and n for Instrumentality Perceptions as a Function of Status*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>3.46&lt;sub&gt;a&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>0.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>2.96&lt;sub&gt;b&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>0.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>3.29&lt;sub&gt;a&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* Means with different subscripts differ at $p < .05$.

Table 9
*Study 3b: Estimated Marginal Means, Standard Errors, and n for Willingness to Apologize as a Function of Status*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>EMM</th>
<th>SE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>6.28&lt;sub&gt;a&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>5.77&lt;sub&gt;b&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>6.28&lt;sub&gt;a&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>6.11</td>
<td>.16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Notes:* EMM = Estimated marginal means, adjusted for gender. Estimated marginal means with different subscripts differ at $p < .05$. 
Appendix

Study 1 Materials

**High Status Condition**

You work at a pharmaceutical company and hold a great deal of status within this organization. You have the sense that your colleagues really like, respect, and admire you. Indeed, you possess a great deal of esteem within the organization. Note that this is separate from the level of power that you possess in the organization.

**Low Status Condition**

You work at a pharmaceutical company and hold relatively little status within this organization. You have do not have the sense that your colleagues particularly like, respect, and admire you. Indeed, you possess little esteem within the organization. Note that this is separate from the level of power that you possess in the organization.

**High Power Condition**

You work at a pharmaceutical company and hold a great deal of power within this organization. Indeed you are one of the most powerful individuals in the company. You are personally given control over an unusually large amount of resources, compared with your peers in other departments. Note that this is separate from the amount of respect or admiration that others in the organization feel toward you.

**Low Power Condition**

You work at a pharmaceutical company and hold relatively little power within this organization. Indeed you are one of the least powerful individuals in the company. You are personally given control over a relatively meager amount of resources, compared with
your peers in other departments. Note that this is separate from the amount of respect or admiration that others in the organization feel toward you.

**Control Condition**

You work at a pharmaceutical company.

**High Power/High Status Condition**

You work at a pharmaceutical company and hold a great deal of status within this organization. You have the sense that your colleagues really like, respect, and admire you. Indeed, you possess a great deal of esteem within the organization.

In addition, you hold a great deal of power within this organization. Indeed, you are one of the most powerful individuals in the company. You are personally given control over an unusually large amount of resources, compared with your peers in other departments.

**Scenario**

You are in a work meeting with a group of colleagues in which you are discussing the product pipeline for the company. At one point in the meeting one of your colleagues begins to ask a question that you find irrelevant. You interrupt the colleague and state that the question that the colleague has asked is “stupid” in front of the rest of the group.

**Post-Scenario Questions**

How much power do you have at the company?
7-point Likert scale, anchored by 1 = "None at all" and 7 = "A great deal"

How much status do you have at the company?
7-point Likert scale, anchored by 1 = "None at all" and 7 = "A great deal"

How likely are you to apologize to your colleague about what happened during the meeting?
7-point Likert scale, anchored by 1 = "Extremely unlikely" and 7 = "Extremely likely"

The following is the definition of apology: an explicit verbal or written statement of apologetic intent such as ‘I am sorry’ that you believe is sincere.
Study 2 Materials

Scenario
You work at a pharmaceutical company, and you are in a work meeting with a group of colleagues. At one point in the meeting you begin to ask a question about the product pipeline. At that point one of your colleagues interrupts you and states that the question that you have posed is “stupid” in front of the rest of the group.

Status Condition
The person who interrupted you has a great deal of status in your organization and is generally liked, respected, and admired by everyone in the organization.

Power Condition
The person who interrupted you has a great deal of power in your organization and controls an unusually large amount of resources compared with others in the organization.

Apology Condition
The following day the person who interrupted you apologized to you for the interruption and for being rude. This person promised you that it would never happen again. You believe that this person’s apology was sincere.

No apology condition - No information concerning an apology will be provided.
Post-Scenario Questions

Please indicate the extent to which each of the following terms describes the person who interrupted you. Use a 9-point scale to indicate your response, with 1 = Extremely Inaccurate Description and 9 = Extremely Accurate Description.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Rating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. cordial</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. respectful</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. cooperative</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. agreeable</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. impolite</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. disrespectful</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. uncooperative</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. quarrelsome</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. assertive</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. forceful</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. self-assured</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. dominant</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. submissive</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. unassertive</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. timid</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Study 3a Materials

High Power Condition
You work at a pharmaceutical company and hold a great deal of power within this organization. Indeed you are one of the most powerful individuals in the company. You are personally given control over an unusually large amount of resources, compared with your peers in other departments. Note that this is separate from the amount of respect or admiration that others in the organization feel toward you.

Low Power Condition
You work at a pharmaceutical company and hold relatively little power within this organization. Indeed you are one of the least powerful individuals in the company. You are personally given control over a relatively meager amount of resources, compared with your peers in other departments. Note that this is separate from the amount of respect or admiration that others in the organization feel toward you.

Control Condition
You work at a pharmaceutical company.

Scenario
You are in a work meeting with a group of colleagues in which you are discussing the product pipeline for the company. At one point in the meeting one of your colleagues begins to ask a question that you find irrelevant. You interrupt the colleague and state that the question that the colleague has asked is “stupid” in front of the rest of the group.

Post-Scenario Questions
How much power do you have at the company?
7-point Likert scale, anchored by 1 = "None at all" and 7 = "A great deal."
How much regret do you have about what happened during the meeting?
7-point Likert scale, anchored by 1 = "Very little" and 7 = "A great deal."

How much guilt or remorse do you have about what happened during the meeting?
7-point Likert scale, anchored by 1 = "Very little" and 7 = "A great deal."

How committed are you to not behaving in that way again?
7-point Likert scale, anchored by 1 = "Very little" and 7 = "A great deal."

How likely are you to apologize to your colleague about what happened during the meeting?
7-point Likert scale, anchored by 1 = "Extremely unlikely" and 7 = "Extremely likely."

The following is the definition of apology: an explicit verbal or written statement of apologetic intent such as ‘I am sorry’ that you believe is sincere.
Study 3b Materials

High Status Condition

You work at a pharmaceutical company and hold a great deal of status within this organization. You have the sense that your colleagues really like, respect, and admire you. Indeed, you possess a great deal of esteem within the organization. Note that this is separate from the level of power that you possess in the organization.

Low Status Condition

You work at a pharmaceutical company and hold relatively little status within this organization. You have do not have the sense that your colleagues particularly like, respect, and admire you. Indeed, you possess little esteem within the organization. Note that this is separate from the level of power that you possess in the organization.

Control Condition

You work at a pharmaceutical company.

Scenario

You are in a work meeting with a group of colleagues in which you are discussing the product pipeline for the company. At one point in the meeting one of your colleagues begins to ask a question that you find irrelevant. You interrupt the colleague and state that the question that the colleague has asked is “stupid” in front of the rest of the group.

Post-Scenario Questions

How much status do you have at the company?
7-point Likert scale, anchored by 1 = "None at all" and 7 = "A great deal."

To what extent do you think an apology is important for your colleague?
7-point Likert scale, anchored by 1 = "Not at all" and 7 = "Very much so"
How effective do you think an apology will be to restore your relationship with your colleague?
7-point Likert scale, anchored by 1 = "Not at all" and 7 = "Very much so"

To what extent do you think an apology will repair the damaged trust between you and your colleague?
7-point Likert scale, anchored by 1 = "Not at all" and 7 = "Very much so"

How likely are you to apologize to your colleague about what happened during the meeting?
7-point Likert scale, anchored by 1 = "Extremely unlikely" and 7 = "Extremely likely."

The following is the definition of apology: an explicit verbal or written statement of apologetic intent such as ‘I am sorry’ that you believe is sincere.
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