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The Politics of United States Army Doctrine

David C. Rasmussen

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THE POLITICS OF UNITED STATES ARMY DOCTRINE

by

DAVID C. RASMUSSEN

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in political science in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York

2018
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David C. Rasmussen

This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in political science in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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Susan Woodward
Chair of Examining Committee

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THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK
ABSTRACT

The Politics of United States Army Doctrine

by

David C. Rasmussen

Advisor: Susan Woodward

The US Army made four significant shifts in the content of its capstone operations doctrine, Field Manual (FM) 100-5 / FM 3-0, along a spectrum of war since the end of WWII: 1) in 1954 it made a shift from a doctrine focused almost exclusively on mid-intensity conventional warfare to a doctrine that added significant emphasis to high-intensity nuclear warfare; 2) in 1962 it made an even greater shift in the opposite direction toward low-intensity unconventional warfare doctrine; 3) in 1976 it shifted back to an almost exclusive focus on mid-intensity conventional warfare content; 4) and this is where Army doctrine remained for 32 years until 2008, when it made a doctrinal shift back toward low-intensity unconventional warfare – five and seven years into the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan respectively. Did politics have an impact on any of these shifts? Understanding how politics might affect Army doctrine is important considering that the US Army is a doctrine-based military organization. Through this research, I examine whether and how domestic, international, and bureaucratic politics shaped or constrained Army doctrinal choice preceding these four shifts. I found that domestic politics had a minor impact on one shift and a moderate impact on two; that international politics had a moderate impact on one shift and a minor impact on two; and that bureaucratic politics had a significant impact on one shift, a moderate impact on a second, and a minor impact on a third. Overall, politics had more of an impact on the two earlier cases than the latter two, suggesting that as the Army began to rely more on doctrine from 1976 and beyond, that same doctrine may have served to insulate the Army from politics to some degree.
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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION

The US Army [hereafter Army] made four significant shifts in the content of its operations doctrine along a spectrum of war since the end of WWII: 1) in 1954 it made a shift from a doctrine focused almost exclusively on mid-intensity conventional warfare to a doctrine that added significant emphasis to high-intensity nuclear warfare; 2) in 1962 it made an even greater shift in the opposite direction toward low-intensity unconventional warfare doctrine; 3) in 1976 it shifted back to an almost exclusive focus on mid-intensity conventional warfare content, discarding almost all low and high-intensity content; 4) and this is where Army doctrine remained for 32 years until 2008, when it made a doctrinal shift again toward low-intensity unconventional warfare five and seven years into the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan respectively.

What explains these four shifts in doctrinal content along a spectrum of war? The first three were made within a 22-year period – all during the Cold War, but during periods of relative peace. The first occurred after the Korean War, and the second and third shifts occurred three years before and after the Vietnam War respectively. The fourth shift along the spectrum was not made for another 32 years – a full 17 years after the end of the Cold War, and during two simultaneous wars. So how and why did the Army make these relatively sudden and significant doctrinal shifts when it did? Through this research, I examine whether and how domestic, international, and bureaucratic politics may have shaped or constrained Army doctrinal choice preceding these four shifts. I found that domestic politics had a moderate impact on all four shifts; that international politics had a moderate impact on one shift and a minor impact on two; and that bureaucratic politics had a significant impact on one shift, a moderate impact on a second, and a minor impact on a third.
Theoretical Framework and Substantive Focus.

The Importance of Army Doctrine.

The US Army is a doctrine-based organization. Doctrinal concepts inform how it is funded, manned, organized, equipped, trained, and ultimately, how it prepares for and operates during wartime to achieve national objectives (Romjue 1997). Because so much is at stake surrounding Army doctrine – it matters. Doctrine informs how $ billions get spent in annual taxpayer dollars, affects choices about who is drafted or recruited, leads to decisions about which weapons contracts get awarded, and who gets manufacturing jobs.

Doctrine is often cited as a source of both Army successes and of its failures in wartime. Critics of the Army’s performance in Vietnam from 1965-1973 point to faulty doctrine as one reason the US did not accomplish its political objectives there. Wrong doctrine led to wrong organization, wrong equipment, and the wrong training for that conflict (Avant 1993; Krepinevich 1986). In contrast, military leaders and defense scholars often point to the Army’s AirLand battle doctrine of the mid-1980s as a leading cause of US success in the Persian Gulf War (Scales 1993).

Doctrine Literature.

There have been two waves of scholarly literature in American social science focused on military doctrine as a dependent variable and object of study. The first wave occurred from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s. It emerged from a broader discussion among political scientists about whether military doctrine intensifies or mitigates a security dilemma in international politics (Jervis 1978; Waltz 1979); the likelihood of war (Snyder 1984; Van Evera 1984); the extent to which international politics, domestic politics, or organizational behavior affect doctrinal outcomes; and whether civilian political intervention in military affairs is either necessary or sufficient for doctrinal continuity or change (Avant 1993; Kier 1997; Posen 1984; Rosen 1991).
A second wave of literature focused on military doctrine began in the late 1990s and continues today in response to the increased frequency of low-intensity unconventional warfare challenges the US and other nations have faced since the end of the Cold War and after 9/11, particularly the wars in Iraq (2003-2011) and Afghanistan (2001-present). This second debate, unlike the first, does not occur across levels of international, domestic, and organizational analysis. It is mostly confined within an organizational level of analysis, addressing whether and how organizational factors determine conventional versus unconventional doctrinal choices. This overall discussion relies on the assumption that the Army itself has the power to determine its doctrinal focus and that international and domestic political factors are mostly indeterminate.

*The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars*, published by Barry R. Posen in 1984, is the seminal work of the first debate. Posen attempts to assess how and why particular armies choose either offensive, defensive, or deterrent doctrines. He concludes that militaries, if left alone to pursue their own narrow organizational interests, have a tendency to adopt offensive doctrines. On the other hand, he finds that when the balance of international power creates sufficient conditions of national threat or concern, civilian political leaders tend to intervene in military affairs to force the adoption of doctrines better suited to the realities of international politics, such as defensive or deterrent doctrines. As such, he calls this sort of civilian intervention “balancing behavior.” According to Posen, “[i]n times of international calm, when statesmen and soldiers perceive the probability of war as remote, the organizational dynamics…tend to operate. When threats appear greater, or war appears more probable, balancing behavior occurs” (Posen, 59).

Where Posen makes assumptions that civilians intervene when necessary to compel doctrinal change in the military, Stephen Peter Rosen (1991) is skeptical of a civilian ability to do so, and attributes doctrinal change to other causes. In *Winning the Next War: Innovation and the*
Modern Military, Rosen argues from an organizational level of analysis that military innovation, including doctrinal change, is quite difficult for civilians to enforce, even when directed by top civilian political leaders such as a president. Rosen concludes through an examination of twenty-one US and British military innovations in peacetime and war between 1905 and 1967, that change, including doctrinal change, is effective only when senior military officers create favorable promotion pathways during extended peacetime periods in an effort to embed such change within the organization, or when military organizations alter their routine measures of strategic effectiveness during wartime periods. In other words, doctrinal change, even when directed by civilian political leaders such as a president or prime minister, can be thwarted by senior officers or by the routines of military organizations themselves.

Deborah Avant (1993) takes Rosen’s claim a step further, and identifies additional challenges for civilians attempting to direct changes to military doctrine. While analyzing and comparing changes to doctrine from a domestic politics perspective, Avant argues that civilian intervention efforts are more difficult to achieve in countries with divided political institutions, such as the US, than they are for civilians with unitary political institutions, such as the UK. The explanation according to Avant is simple. In countries with divided institutions, the military can play one branch of government off against the other if it chooses to resist civilian intervention. Military organizations in countries without separate political institutions do not have such an option, and therefore civilian intervention is more effective in promoting doctrinal change. Avant cites President Kennedy’s relatively unsuccessful effort to direct the Army to adopt counterinsurgency doctrine on the eve of the Vietnam War in 1962, in contrast to the British government’s successful efforts to direct its army to adopt doctrinal changes during the Boer War 50 years earlier in South Africa.

Avant found that Kennedy’s efforts to intervene were mostly unsuccessful because his
ability to appoint military officers into key positions sympathetic to his wishes was limited in the face of Congressional opposition. Additionally, Avant points out that he was unable to alter the promotion pathways that most officers had been following since WWII. His efforts to promote a low-intensity unconventional warfare doctrine could not compete with the priorities Congress placed on the Army through the budget process – a process that promoted Army programs for fighting a mid-intensity conventional war in Central Europe. According to Avant, Congressional priorities coincided with Army organizational preferences to promote conventional doctrine. This allowed the Army to continue reinforcing promotion pathways in a direction that ran counter to what the president was trying to achieve, and according to Avant, ultimately enabled the Army to resist the adoption of an unconventional doctrine.

Both Rosen and Avant explain how civilian intervention to change military doctrine may be more problematic than Posen initially implied. What neither addresses, however, is Posen’s claim that military organizations, if left to follow their own narrow parochial interests, prefer offensive doctrines over either defensive or deterrent doctrines. This is an assumption that Elizabeth Kier challenges in her book, *Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine Between the Wars*, published in 1997. From both a domestic and organizational level of political-cultural analysis, Kier argues that the interaction between domestic politics and a military’s organizational culture determine whether the military chooses offensive or defensive doctrine. Kier explains how civilians are more concerned with a domestic political balance of power than an international balance, and that the role of the military in society can affect the domestic balance. Additionally, civilian preferences for the military’s role in society are shaped by prevailing political-cultural beliefs. For example, Kier explains how the French Right during the interwar period “worried that a conscript army would not guarantee social stability and the preservation of law and order, while the Left feared that a professional army would do the bidding of the conservative and anti-republican forces
in society” (Kier 1997, 7). This led a majority center and left-wing government coalition to reduce conscription to just one year in an effort to degrade the professionalism of the French Army, and thus minimize its domestic influence. French military officers, when confronted with such short conscription periods, quickly adopted a defensive doctrine. According to Kier, they simply could not imagine maintaining an offensive doctrine with a relatively unprofessional short-term conscript army.

Collectively, these scholars address some of the same variables but from different levels of analyses. They also weight them differently and make different assumptions about them when constructing their explanations. Posen places most weight on aspects of international politics as his independent variable, with civilian intervention as his intervening variable in determining doctrinal choice. Rosen places most weight on aspects of organizational leadership, with the structure of organizational promotions as his intervening variable. Avant weights the structure of domestic institutions and politics as her independent variable, with organizational preferences and interests as her intervening variable. And finally, Kier identifies domestic political culture as her independent variable, with organizational culture intervening to determine doctrinal choice. Posen and Kier attempt to explain offense versus defense and deterrent doctrinal outcomes as dependent variables. Avant attempts to explain conventional versus unconventional warfare doctrine outcomes as hers.

The second wave of literature focused on military doctrine began in the late 1990s and continues today. It largely surrounds a debate about how and why the Army chose to disregard unconventional doctrine after the Vietnam War, and why it then chose to remain focused on conventional doctrine for so long after the Cold War, leaving it relatively unprepared for the wars it faced in Iraq and Afghanistan. I begin with an argument made by John Nagl (1999) because much of this second debate is a reaction to it, and is thus a good place to start. Nagl argues that the
organizational culture of an army determines its doctrine, and that an army’s organizational culture is based on its professional essence. Nagl explains that the US Army’s essence remained defined by conventional warfare during and after Vietnam and the Cold War despite the fact that unconventional warfare increasingly dominated the international system. This mismatch occurred because a conventional focus only requires soldiers to master relatively simple military tasks, and these tasks do not require a culture of learning. Conversely, Nagl argues that unconventional warfare requires a culture of learning because it is more complex in that it merges both military and political tasks. Such a learning culture would then produce a doctrine that correctly reflects and addresses the unconventional challenges of the international system. Nagl points to the Army’s experience in Vietnam as an example of a mismatch between a non-learning culture based on military tasks alone, with a requirement for a learning culture that could have enabled the combination of both military and political tasks in Vietnam. He argues that this absence of a learning culture is the reason why the Army applied a conventional doctrine to what was clearly an unconventional war. Nagl concludes by arguing that the US Army should redefine its essence to promote a culture of learning if its leaders want to adopt a doctrine most suited for a post-Cold War world dominated by unconventional war.

Crane (2002) argues that the Army did learn from its unconventional warfare experiences of Vietnam, but this learning occurred through the lens of a dominant conventional warfare tradition. This tradition taught the Army to ignore its unconventional warfare lessons, and instead to further reinforce conventional doctrine after Vietnam and throughout the post-Cold War period. In other words, Crane argues that the Army learned to avoid unconventional doctrine in order to reinforce the doctrine most consistent with its conventional warfare tradition.

Unlike Nagl and Crane, Petreaus (2006) argues that Army structures and processes, not culture, prevented learning. He explains how narrow-minded senior officers obstructed learning by
requiring junior officers to focus on conventional doctrine only, and by denying them the necessary time and opportunity to reflect on the Army’s unconventional warfare experiences gained in the 1980s-90s. He then explains how the Army’s focus on conventional doctrine encouraged US adversaries to counter with unconventional solutions. He goes on to argue that if junior officers had been given the time and opportunity to learn throughout the 1980s-1990s, they would have realized this and would have somehow influenced doctrinal change soon after the Cold War, and well before the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Unlike Nagl, Crane, and Petreaus, Davidson (2010) argues that the Army had a robust culture, structure, and process for learning. She explains, however, that these were focused almost exclusively on conventional military tasks and doctrine at the tactical and operational levels of war only. The Army traditionally associated unconventional political and economic tasks with a strategic level of war, and this level of war was largely ignored in Army learning and doctrinal processes. It was not until the mid-2000s under General Petreaus’ leadership that the Army finally expanded its learning to include unconventional tasks at the strategic level, opening the door for doctrinal change during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Nielsen (2010) reinforces Davidson’s argument by explaining how the Army built an organizational structure of learning after the Vietnam War to ensure a sustained and successful focus on conventional military tasks. She shows how the creation of a single organization within the Army, Training and Doctrine Command, responsible for synchronizing learning with doctrine, organization, training, equipment, and personnel policies, including promotion pathways, ensured the success and longevity of the Army’s focus on learning conventional military tasks and doctrinal development. Although this helps to explain the continuity of Army conventional doctrine, it still does not provide an explanation for how and why the Army chose to largely ignore unconventional learning and doctrine after the Vietnam War.
Despite some differences, each of these authors identify Army organizational learning, or its absence, as an explanation for the persistence of conventional doctrine. Nagl points to the absence of an organizational culture of learning. Crane shows how organizational culture misdirected learning. Petreaus describes how organizational structures prevented learning. Davidson and Nielsen show how organizational structures and processes actually promoted learning – just learning that further reinforced conventional doctrine.

Unlike the previous four authors, the next two authors focus on strategic culture as the primary source of doctrine. Lock-Pullan (2006) argues that the Army turned to a strict conventional doctrine after the Vietnam War as a means of repairing itself from that difficult war, but more importantly as a means of reorienting itself to a new post-Vietnam American strategic culture. Before and during Vietnam, America’s strategic culture was tied to national mobilization. After Vietnam, America’s strategic culture became tied instead to public and Congressional support for war based on the establishment of clear and militarily achievable political objectives. The new post-Vietnam strategic culture, articulated most clearly through the Weinberger Doctrine, was part of a broader political-cultural shift in America that increased the power of Congress relative to the president. According to Lock-Pullan, the Army responded to this new strategic culture by choosing a conventional doctrine that the public and Congress would most likely support, one that could most likely achieve military objectives, as well as one that its leaders believed could best serve the Army’s post-Vietnam organizational need to repair itself.

Where Lock-Pullan argues that the Army chose the doctrine that would allow it to adapt to a changed American strategic culture after Vietnam, Gray (2006) argues that strategic culture itself constrains Army doctrinal choice. He explains how American strategic culture is deeply rooted in American culture, and shows how this culture has consistently promoted a military mindset and doctrine emphasizing large-scale, mid-intensity regular [conventional] operations. He provided
this explanation as a warning to Army leaders in the midst of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan attempting to make a doctrinal shift toward unconventional warfare. He cautioned that such a doctrinal shift would prove to be difficult if not impossible unless a corresponding shift in American culture occurred. Unfortunately, culture is not something that can be quickly or easily changed.

The next four authors focus both on historical narratives created by the Army or the effectiveness of Army networks to promote these narratives as a source of doctrine. Gentile (2013) argues that defense experts, including current and retired military officers, developed a flawed or misleading historical narrative of the Vietnam War in order to convince President Bush and his advisors that the Iraq War could be rescued if he simply chose a better general and allowed him to properly apply a low-intensity unconventional doctrine and strategy. According to this narrative, Vietnam was not lost because of mistakes made by civilian authorities, or by a lack of public support. The war was lost because the wrong generals were put in charge, and they incorrectly applied a conventional doctrine to an unconventional conflict. This narrative proved to be politically expedient. Gentile argues that it allowed the president to place blame on the military for the poor conduct of the Iraq and Afghan wars thus far, and prompted him to direct the Army to adopt an unconventional doctrine in an attempt to salvage US efforts in those conflicts.

Porch (2013), like Gentile, attributes causal effect to a flawed historical narrative, but for different reasons. He argues that a network of “new school” Army generals asserted a flawed narrative simply to promote their own bureaucratic and career interests. They seized on the opportunity presented by a perceived lack of strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan to discredit their conventional rivals and implement an unconventional doctrine. He contends they were interested in creating a viable mission for a conventionally oriented Army that lacked a significant threat after the Cold War and as a means of reducing civilian control of the Army. Creating a new mission for
the Army would help it secure more resources. Substituting an effective doctrine for a failed policy and strategy would help the Army to reduce civilian control, while increasing the likelihood that civilians would commit the Army to future unconventional conflicts. Porch does not provide an explanation for how this network of new school generals was able to put themselves in a position to make doctrinal choices for the Army, except to say that they discredited their conventional rivals.

Unlike Gentile and Porch, Kaplan (2013) does not point to historical narratives, but he does attribute doctrinal change to the effectiveness of a network. Kaplan argues that General Petraeus organized this “new school” network by fostering military, academic, and political contacts centered on the Social Sciences department at West Point. The effectiveness and power of this network ultimately resulted in a decision by the president to approve use of an unconventional doctrine in Iraq along with a surge of troops to support it. Kaplan describes Petraeus as a maverick who understood, promoted, and effectively practiced the unconventional warfare lessons of Vietnam. He demonstrates how Petraeus deliberately leveraged this network to elevate the importance of unconventional warfare in Army doctrine.

Whereas Gentile and Porch point to flawed historical narratives, they do not explain why these narratives were chosen. Fitzgerald (2013) attempts to fill that gap. He argues that the Army deliberately chose both the lessons it wanted to learn and those it wanted to ignore from its experience in Vietnam. It did this in an attempt to construct an historical narrative that could reinforce the direction it wanted to move its organizational culture in, and that was toward a culture of success. Because Army performance in conventional wars was associated with success, and performance in Vietnam, an unconventional war, was associated with failure, the Army chose to focus its doctrine on the types of wars that could most guarantee its success. This also helped the Army to tie the hands of civilian politicians who might consider committing it to future
unconventional conflicts. If the Army’s doctrine was focused exclusively on conventional conflicts, then policy-makers would be less likely to commit the Army to unconventional conflicts associated with its failure. Fitzgerald argues that this attempt to narrow the options available to policy-makers negatively affected American strategic culture – making both policy makers and the military more reluctant to use force. And ironically, when military force was used, the Army was in turn less successful in dealing with those very same unconventional conflicts it was trying to avoid.

Jensen (2016), like Petraeus, Davidson, and Nielsen, focuses on Army structures, and like Gentile, Porch, Kaplan, and Fitzgerald focuses on networks. Like Rosen from the first wave of doctrinal literature described above, however, Jensen focuses also on the role of senior Army leadership. Jensen argues that when senior Army leaders establish or structure what he calls incubators, i.e., forums free from normal bureaucratic constraints where military officers are free to learn or “visualize new theories,” and then promote and protect these ideas through what he calls advocacy networks or “loose coalitions of defense and civilian officials,” then Army doctrinal innovation becomes possible.

What this body of literature provides are competing explanations for why policy-makers or military leaders might prefer different doctrines – whether offense, defense, or deterrence; conventional or unconventional. What the literature does not adequately address are the mechanisms by which these doctrinal choices are actually made.

Posen, for example, identifies a tendency for civilian leaders to interfere in military affairs to determine doctrine when the international balance of power significantly threatens the state. This provides a powerful explanation for why civilian leaders would become motivated to act as a source of doctrine. What he does not explain, however, are the mechanisms by which civilians actually affect doctrinal choice. For example, how do they overcome the possible opposition of
other civilian leaders, or opposition from the military, in order to compel a doctrinal choice?

Rosen identifies the conditions under which many successful and lasting doctrinal changes occurred. He shows that these mostly happened when championed by senior military leaders who also created sufficient promotion pathways for junior officers to reinforce and realize that change. What he does not explain, however, is how these leaders were able to succeed and overcome the possible opposition of the very same civilian leaders that Posen identifies as seeking doctrinal continuity or change for very different reasons.

Avant attempts to address this gap by claiming that the Army was able to pursue its doctrinal preferences by playing the Congress off against President Kennedy in the period leading up to the Vietnam War. Yet still, Avant does not fully explain how the Army actually did that, except to show that Army preferences during the conduct of the Vietnam War appeared to correspond to a conventional warfare doctrine, and that Congress appeared to promote conventional warfare budgets focused on the defense of Western Europe during that same period. The correspondence of Congressional budgets with Army preferences alone does not provide a mechanism by which the Army successfully used the support of Congress to prevent the president from imposing doctrinal change. In fact, there is sufficient evidence to suggest that President Kennedy was largely successful in his efforts to drive doctrinal change in the Army leading up to Vietnam (a subject I will fully address in Chapter 4). Whether the Army employed that doctrine or not during the conduct of the Vietnam War when Johnson was president is a different issue that should be the focus of a separate analysis.

Kier, like Posen and Rosen, provides an explanation for why particular doctrines may or may not have been preferred, but does not offer evidence to show how that actually happened. She points to the fact that a majority in the French legislature voted to reduce the length of army conscription to just one year as an indication of a wave of anti-militarism in French political
culture. However, it is not political culture that she uses to explain the French Army’s decision to then change from an offensive to a defensive doctrine. She explains that the French Army chose to do this on its own because its leaders were not able to determine or imagine how to support an offensive doctrine with a relatively short-term unprofessional army. For Kier, it was the lack of imagination on the part of French military leaders that became the source of that doctrinal shift. Yet, she does not show how those particular leaders were able to overcome the potential opposition of other military leaders that may have had sufficient imagination, or the opposition of members of the minority in the legislature, or the possible opposition of the French executive branch. In short, she does not explain how a lack of imagination could have had sufficient power to ensure such a profound shift in French doctrine on the eve of WWII.

The second group of scholars offer no more clues about how the Army was actually able to eschew unconventional doctrine after the Vietnam War, and then sustain an almost exclusive focus on conventional doctrine for 34 years. They each offer explanations for why the Army may have done this, but do not offer mechanisms for how this may have actually happened. Nagl explains that an absence of a culture of learning caused the Army to retain conventional doctrine in the face of an international environment dominated by unconventional threats. How then could this explain the Army’s ability to ward off possible civilian intervention to promote an unconventional doctrine? Crane explains that the Army’s traditional conventional culture taught it to ignore the lessons of Vietnam. Again, how exactly could this have prevented the encroachment by others outside the Army from promoting or directing an unconventional doctrine? Petreaus, Davidson, and Nielsen point to Army learning structures and processes, but they do not account for factors outside of the Army either.

Each of these five authors appears to assume that the Army is powerful enough on its own to determine doctrine, unfettered by outside influences or factors, but that assumption fails to
account for the fact that the Army and its doctrine do not exist in a vacuum. The Army and its doctrine are nested within the larger Department of Defense and National Military Strategy, which is part of a larger US Government and National Security Strategy, which is part of the larger United States of America, which exists as part of a larger international system, of which Army doctrine plays an important part in addressing. It also fails to account for the fact that the Army is the largest and most expensive branch of the US Department of Defense (DOD), which is the largest and most expensive department of the US Government. The effects of the Army and the doctrine it adopts are far reaching. There are many interests at stake aside from those of the Army and its members alone. An effective explanation of Army doctrine should be able to account for the competing capabilities that these interests represent.

The last group of authors addressed do look beyond the Army as part of their explanations, but all of them with the exception of Gray still identify the Army itself as the independent variable. Lock-Pullan describes how the Army chose to return to a conventional doctrine that would allow it to respond to a new post-Vietnam strategic culture while repairing itself from that war. Gray, on the other hand, explains how the dominant American strategic culture, uninterrupted by Vietnam, determined Army preferences and hence continuity in conventional doctrine. Gentile explains how members of the Army and a network of its outside supporters purposefully created a flawed historical narrative of the Vietnam War to serve their interests and convince civilian policy-makers including the president to allow them to make a doctrinal shift toward unconventional war. Porch points also to a flawed historical narrative, but one used by supporters of unconventional doctrine within the Army to overcome their conventional rivals and to convince civilian policy-makers to commit the Army to even more unconventional conflicts, guaranteeing future increases in the Army’s share of the defense budget. Kaplan, like Gentile and Porch, point to the effectiveness of an Army network and its supporters in convincing policy makers to allow it to shift toward an
unconventional doctrine. Fitzgerald, also like Gentile and Porch, explains how the Army created and used the historical narrative that best served its interests, arguing that that the Army altered its original narrative of the Vietnam War to fit the lessons it now needed to learn and succeed in Iraq and Afghanistan. The original narrative of Vietnam that it created intentionally ignored those lessons in a deliberate effort to avoid unconventional doctrine, ultimately tying the hands of civilian policy makers from committing the Army to wars of that type. And finally, Jensen argues that senior Army leaders are the engine of change when they establish and protect both forums and networks to develop and promote their new ideas. Again, with the exception of Gray, each of these authors points to the Army, or its supporters, as the independent actor with sufficient power to somehow overcome any and all potential opposition in deciding a doctrine that best serves the Army’s narrow organizational interests. None of them adequately accounts for factors external to the Army to explain doctrinal change.

Is it possible that the Army has the power to consistently make doctrinal choices that only serve its narrow organizational interests regardless of the power of the other services, domestic politicians, or US allies or adversaries to shape those choices in an attempt to realize their interests? Which of these factors, then – the power of the Army to realize its interests, the power of domestic politicians to realize theirs, or the power of allies or adversaries to realize theirs – most influences Army doctrine? That is the primary question I attempt to answer, and how I explain the politics of Army doctrine.

This is an analysis that focuses on power as the explanatory variable, and is therefore a political analysis. Sociological or economic analyses allow us to understand how different interests are initially formed, but they fall short when attempting to explain how those interests are ultimately realized or put into action. For example, a sociological explanation for Army doctrine might explain how the experiences of WWI and WWII instilled a strategic culture of big
conventional wars and a reliance on heavy firepower in Army organizations and leaders. One might come to the conclusion then that an Army doctrine focused on big wars and heavy firepower is a product of such an Army culture. Or, an economic perspective might explain why big-business interests might influence members of Congress to promote a certain class of weapon system and an associated doctrine. Both of these explanations could easily be true, but it is hard if not impossible to prove them without considering how these interests were actually realized through the exercise of power. What sociological and economic perspectives do not offer are the mechanisms to explain how those imbued with such cultural or economic interests gain and maintain enough power both to develop and then approve Army doctrine even over the possible objections and power of others in the Army, or the possible objections and power of the other armed services or Department of Defense civilian leadership, or domestic political coalitions in Congress or the presidency, or allies, or even over the power of adversary threats. Regardless of where these sociological or economic interests or ideas come from, or how they develop, it is ultimately the power to implement those interests or ideas that is the focus of this political analysis.

The Argument: Domestic Politics.

I argue that the outcome of domestic political struggles for control of the military among and between civilian politicians in the separate branches of the US government has a significant effect on the Army and is an important explanation of its doctrinal choices. When legislation or other formal mechanisms are enacted creating or modifying institutions of civilian control, the Army’s agenda and available choices, including its doctrinal agenda and choices, are constrained.

Civilian control of the military is a persistent political characteristic of the United States. Effective civilian control has had more than 240 years to take root and mature. This factor is one reason why the United States’ form of government has endured (Huntington 1957). If any
assumptions can be made about the power of the Army, it is that its civilian masters wield more of it. If it were otherwise, the United States would have likely ceased to exist a long time ago. Because civilians have the power to control the military, they have the power to influence the doctrine it develops. The question then becomes, how do civilians exercise that power to control the US military?

The question of how civilians control the military is a key variable in civil-military relations literature, and several distinctive theories have been developed in the post-WWII period attempting to explain this. Huntington (1957) developed a theory to explain how civilian control is best achieved when civilian and military institutions remain separate. When civilians agree to stay out of military affairs, and the military agree to stay out of politics, civilian control is strengthened. Huntington’s theory depends upon a professional military ethos that embraces the military’s political neutrality as well as subservience to civilian authority – which he explains is more likely when civilians agree to remain outside military affairs.

In contrast to Huntington, Janowitz (1964) developed a convergence theory explaining that the best way for civilians to control the military is to bring civilian and military institutions closer together, rather than further apart. Janowitz argued that the military is more likely to obey its civilian masters when the military more accurately reflects the values of the society that it protects. For Janowitz this means the converging of civilian and military institutions, the sharing of military decisions with political consequences, use of conscription for enlisted personnel, the expansion of civilian sources of officer recruitments – all to ensure a greater cross-section of society within the military ranks – as well as other measures aimed at diminishing differences between civilian and military sectors of society.

Feaver (2003) offers a principal-agent model of civil-military relations that he borrows from microeconomic theory. Feaver describes the relationship of civilians (the principals) to the
military (the agent) as a rational and strategic one. Civilians put mechanisms in place to ensure that the military complies with their instructions, and the military make deliberate decisions based on the information they believe the principal has about them when deciding whether or not to fully comply. He compares this relationship to an employer and an employee. According to Feaver, “[t]he employer (principal) would like to hire a diligent worker (agent), and, once hired, would like to be certain that the employee is doing what he is supposed to be doing (working) and not doing something else (shirking)” (Feaver, 55). The employer knows that the employee may choose to shirk if the employer does not know everything he does. However, the employer cannot afford to observe each employee at all times, so he puts control mechanisms in place to help him know how much working or shirking occurs. Likewise, civilian authorities put control measures in place to ensure that the military is working to achieve its objectives. Feaver identifies both oversight and punishment mechanisms of civilian control including: civilian screening and selection of the officer corps; use of the news media, think tanks, and even inter-service rivalries to spotlight shirking; the use of robust civilian staffs in Congress, as well as audit agencies like the Congressional Budget Office to provide oversight; use of the budget process and budget cuts; the withholding of retirement benefits; use of non-judicial punishment and court martials; verbal rebukes; and even purges of senior officers who may not be working enough toward the achievement of civilian objectives.

Schiff (2009) proposes a concordance, or agreement, theory that blends aspects of Huntington, Janowitz, and Feaver. Schiff argues that civilian control of the military is most effective when societal institutions of the military, political elites, and the citizenry are in agreement over four key indicators, or mechanisms of civilian control: 1) the composition of the officer corps; 2) the political decision-making process as it affects the military; 3) the method of military recruiting; and 4) the style, or doctrine, of the military. If the military, political elites, or
citizenry are not in concordance on these four indicators, then the loss of civilian control over the military, and conversely, military attempts to control civilians, becomes more likely.

Implied but not specified in both Huntington’s and Janowitz’s arguments are formal mechanisms that would be needed to achieve and then maintain either institutional separation or institutional convergence. Efforts to shape the military as a separate professional class, or efforts to bring the military closer to society, would each require formal rules of establishment and enforcement. Either path needs a corresponding means by which to shape the officer corps, to determine and fund appropriate roles and missions for the different military branches, and other mechanisms to ensure compliance with the chosen path. Schiff too lacks specificity when it comes to explaining exactly how mechanisms of civilian control operate. Only Feaver specifies a comprehensive list of measures and explains their operation. What none of these models explain, however, is how the civilians themselves decide such formal mechanisms. In other words, which civilians have the power to choose these mechanisms, and for what purposes? The answer to this question should go a long way to explain how domestic politics affects the Army and its doctrine.

From the Constitution to Title X of the US Code that governs the Army, to periodic defense organization and reorganization acts, to annual appropriations and authorization bills that fund the Army, formal mechanisms and institutions both reflect civilian power and establish civilian control. The purpose and content of these formal institutions are themselves the result of struggles for power among civilians within and among the separate branches of government. The pushing, pulling, and compromising that takes place shape how these mechanisms are drafted, modified, and finally adopted. The outcomes of political struggles then ultimately determine which civilians control the military, how civilians control the military, and by how much.

Although not developed specifically to describe how civilians control the military, Terry Moe (1995, 2005, 2012) offers a domestic politics model of bureaucratic control and structure that
goes a long way in explaining how civilians in the separate branches of the US Government struggle with each other to control the federal bureaucracies. The outcomes of these political struggles are often expressed in the mechanisms of rules, reporting requirements, budgets, statutes, legislation, and executive orders that serve to regulate or structure the organization and performance of government bureaucracies.

According to Moe’s model, the coalitions of politicians that win or prevail in domestic political struggles get to decide which mechanisms of control to impose on the bureaucracy. Of course, these mechanisms are meant to serve the winning politicians’ own interests and policy goals. In this way, the rules that structure the organization and performance of bureaucracies can be traced to the domestic political processes and the strategies pursued by civilian politicians to achieve their own goals. The rules that winning politicians impose can constrain bureaucrats from pursuing policies more to their own liking, and can also disrupt the effective performance of those agencies. That’s not really the issue for Moe, though, because the imposed rules are meant to compel bureaucrats to perform in accordance with the policy preferences of the politicians – nothing more. According to Moe, this is how civilians control the bureaucracy – they win domestic political struggles, then they get to impose rules on the bureaucracy that best serve their political interests.

Since the DOD comprises the largest US federal bureaucracy, and the Army is the largest part of the DOD, Moe’s model can inform the generation of relevant hypotheses tailored to explain and assess how the power of domestic politics can affect the Army and its doctrine. The outcome of struggles among the separate chambers, committees, subcommittees, and individual members of Congress with each other and the president determine the substance and form, or mechanisms, of civilian control of the Army. Winners of these struggles get to impose laws, directives, and procedures to structure how the Army is organized, equipped, and manned, and these in turn
constrain Army doctrinal choice.

The president and Congress struggle over the content and purpose of national security strategy and struggle to control the role that the military plays in achieving it. They struggle to implement strategy in a manner that will most likely achieve their respective political interests. The winners of these struggles get to determine the role that the Army will play. Eisenhower’s New Look, Kennedy’s Flexible Response, and Nixon’s détente, for example, garnered various levels of Congressional support and opposition, and the final outcome of each of these struggles led to specific decisions about how the Army would be organized, equipped, and manned to fulfill its strategic role – constraining Army doctrinal choice.

The president and Congress struggle over the organization of the defense department, and how much control they will each have over it. Organization of the defense department determines the Army’s position within the DOD bureaucratic hierarchy, the authority of its leaders, as well as Army roles and missions relative to the other armed services. This impacts the level of influence the Army has in determining its own organization, equipment, and manning, and in turn, how much choice it has in determining doctrine.

The president and Congress struggle over the source of the Army’s personnel – whether it is primarily composed of drafted conscripts or volunteers. These struggles are politically charged because they have the potential to seriously impact most if not all citizens or their family members in some way, i.e., most if not all members of Congress and their constituents (Cohen 1985). The source of the Army’s personnel affects both its size and doctrinal choices. An Army composed of volunteers is smaller and more expensive and leaves the Army with less money to devote to development and maintenance of its equipment and to the training of its units. This limits what the Army can do, and constrains doctrinal choice. An Army composed of draftees is larger and less expensive. This gives the Army more money to develop and maintain its equipment and to train.
A draft Army allows greater flexibility, imposes fewer constraints, and provides the Army with more doctrinal choice.

The president and Congress struggle over the Army’s budget, including individual line items that can specify numbers and types of Army organizations, equipment, and manning levels. Unlike periodic struggles over national security strategy, defense department organization, and sources of manning, budget struggles occur almost continuously in accordance with an annual cycle. This gives both the president and the Congress ongoing opportunities to fight for control of the Army and to realize their political interests through the continuous authorization and appropriation of taxpayer dollars for specific Army programs. It provides the president and members of Congress a continuous means by which to struggle over strategy, organization, and manning. Struggles previously won in these areas are incrementally affected by the annual budget process, further reinforcing constraints on Army doctrinal choice.

The president and Congress struggle over their respective authorities to use military force. The outcomes of these struggles determine the type and duration of Army operations. Authorizations to use military force for operations that are decisive and relatively short in duration, versus authorizations that are less decisive and longer in duration, inform Army doctrinal choices. If the Army has seen and continues to expect that the outcomes of struggles between the president and Congress are more likely to result in one type and duration of military operation over another, then the Army will narrow its doctrinal choice set to conform to those expectations.

This explanation of civilian struggle for control of the military provides mechanisms by which it is possible to understand the extent to which domestic politics influences Army doctrine. The outcome of civilian political struggles over national security strategy, defense organization, personnel, budgets, and the authority to use military force shape and constrain the doctrinal choices available to the Army. This explanation predicts that changes in Army doctrine can be traced to
the outcome of these civilian struggles. The alternative explanations I offer below approach changes to Army doctrine using international and bureaucratic politics approaches. Use of these explanations at those different levels of political analysis provide a method of comparison by which I can measure the relative explanatory power of the domestic politics approach. Taken together, use of all three models provides a more complete understanding of how politics in its many forms operating at different levels affects Army doctrine.

Alternative Explanation 1: International Politics – Neoliberal Institutionalism.

Instead of viewing Army doctrine as the result of politics among civilian authorities in the different branches of the US Government, an international politics approach considers Army doctrine as the result of politics among the United States and other nations. This first of two international politics approaches, neoliberal institutionalism, explains how and why states struggle with each other to reach agreements and cooperate to advance their respective interests in an anarchic world (Keohane 1984; Martin 1999; Stein 2008). A fundamental interest of every state is the security of its people, resources, and territory. One way that states cooperate with each other to address security concerns is through military alliances according to formal rules (Haftendorn, Keohane, Wallender 1999; Wallender 2000). National decision-makers will consider the existence and alliance rules when developing options for addressing security concerns, including choices about military doctrine.

Alternative Explanation 2: International Politics - Realism

This explanation is based on realist theories of international politics. Morgenthau (1949) argues that politics among nations is determined by the power, especially military power, exercised by each nation-state or group of states. Waltz (1979) refines this theory by arguing that nation-
states will balance military power relative to the power of others either by increasing power (internal balancing) or by combining power in military alliance with other nations (external balancing). Walt (1984) provides further refinement by arguing that nations do not just balance against greater power – they balance against greater power that poses a threat. This approach therefore predicts that changes in Army doctrine can be traced to changes in the international balance of power. The United States will either balance its power internally by increasing Army capabilities and adjusting its doctrine to account for that, it will balance its power externally by creating military alliances and adjusting its Army’s capabilities and doctrine to account for those, or both.

*Alternative Explanation 3: Bureaucratic Politics.*

This explanation views Army doctrine as the result of politics among the Army’s subordinate organizations (intra-service politics), as well as politics among the Army and the other US armed services (inter-service politics). This explanation borrows from leading theories of bureaucratic politics. Halperin (1974) argues that US foreign policy, including defense policy, is largely the result of struggles among competing bureaucratic organizations in the US Government (State, Defense, CIA, etc.). Each government bureau competes for policies that advance its own narrow organizational interests at the exclusion of other bureaus and at the exclusion of what is best for the US Government as a whole. Allison and Zelikow (1999) demonstrate that strategic decisions, citing decisions made during the Cuban missile crisis, are influenced by similar struggles among many of these same bureaucracies. Armacost (1969) focuses on inter-service politics and examines how DOD decisions concerning intermediate-range ballistic missiles and doctrine during the late 1950s were made largely as a result of struggles between the Army and the Air Force for primacy over these weapons systems.
The unit of analysis in this alternative explanation is the Army behaving as a unitary bureaucratic actor struggling with the other armed services within the Department of Defense to develop doctrine that best satisfies its narrow organizational interests, defined in terms of greater resources and bureaucratic autonomy. This explanation considers also the impact of struggles among the eighteen subcomponent Army branches (e.g., between the infantry, armor, aviation, field artillery branches). Each of these individual Army branch bureaucracies competes with each other to determine an Army doctrine that best satisfies its narrow organizational interests, defined again in terms of greater resources and bureaucratic autonomy. This approach predicts that changes in Army doctrine can be traced to the outcome of struggles among individual Army branches or traced to the outcome of struggles between the Army and one or more of the other armed services.

**Research Methodology.**

*Testing Method.*

In order to test the extent to which domestic, international, or bureaucratic politics affect Army doctrine, I will analyze the historical periods preceding the four largest doctrinal shifts made by the Army since WWII – the shifts made in 1954, 1962, 1976, and 2008. I will test for congruence between the predictions made by the domestic, international, and bureaucratic politics explanations outlined above and the outcomes of Army doctrine during these times. Testing the power of an explanation by measuring congruence can be an effective theory testing technique, especially when large shifts in the dependent variable can be identified (George and Bennet 2005; Van Evera 1999). Shifts in Army doctrine preceded by shifts in politics establishes congruence. Large shifts in Army doctrine preceded by large shifts in politics establishes covariance and suggests a high degree of congruence. Large shifts in Army doctrine preceded by small shifts in
politics reduces covariance and suggests a low degree of congruence.

Establishing and measuring congruence alone does not prove that an independent variable affects a change in a dependent variable. In order to prove that a change in one causes a change in the other, it becomes necessary to identify mechanisms by which that change might have occurred. In each of my cases, I look for mechanisms by tracing the sequential processes by which a political outcome may or may not have caused changes to Army doctrine. For example, if an Army doctrinal decision can be sequentially traced back to an outcome of a domestic political struggle, then a causal mechanism for that doctrinal change can be identified. This use of process tracing not only allows me to identify causal mechanisms by which a political outcome may have affected a doctrinal outcome, process tracing tests allow me to measure the explanatory power of the explanation that predicts them (Mahoney 2015).

Process tracing hoop tests and smoking-gun tests are analytic techniques used to determine degrees of certainty and uniqueness, or power, of different explanations (Mahoney 2015; Van Evera 1997). Hoop tests are used to measure degrees of certainty. For example, the realist international politics explanation predicts that changes in the international balance of power will cause changes in Army doctrine. If a mechanism is found tracing changes in the balance of power to changes in Army doctrine, then the international politics explanation passes the test, i.e., it jumps through the hoop that the explanation predicted, and a level of certainty about the explanation’s predictions can be established and measured. Conversely, the explanation can be disproven, or certainty in the explanation’s predictions reduced, when evidence is found that it did not cause a specific change in Army doctrine. For example, the realist international politics explanation would fail a hoop test if there was a major shift in Army doctrine with little to no evidence of a corresponding shift in the international balance of power.

Smoking gun tests can be used to measure degrees of explanatory uniqueness. An
explanation is unique and passes a smoking gun test if evidence, or causal mechanisms, are found that only it predicts. By analogy, if police have a theory that someone in particular committed a gun murder, and evidence is found of that person holding a smoking gun, then the unique theory of that person’s guilt is corroborated and the test is passed (Van Evera 1997, 31-32). The theory fails the test, however, when no evidence is found of that person holding a gun. Lack of evidence does not prove the suspect’s innocence, however. In other words, failure of a smoking gun test neither proves nor disproves the theory. For my purposes, passage of a smoking gun test can prove doctrinal causality predicted by one or several of my political explanations. But failure to pass a smoking gun test neither proves nor disproves them. As an example, the bureaucratic politics explanation would pass a smoking gun test if causal evidence was found tracing an Army doctrinal decision directly to the outcome of a struggle between the Army and the Air Force. On the other hand, failure of the test, or lack of evidence, would not disprove the explanation.

**Dissertation Outline.**

I used this first chapter to introduce my research puzzle and question, establish the theoretical framework of existing debates surrounding military doctrine as a dependent variable, introduced my argument and three alternative explanations, and introduced the methods of explanatory testing I will employ. I use the second chapter (Explaining Army Doctrine) to outline post-WWII Army doctrinal trends and to further develop my argument and three alternative explanations in greater depth. Chapters 3-6 are my case studies: these are the four significant shifts since WWII made in the content of the Army’s capstone operational doctrine publication along a spectrum of war: 1954, 1962, 1976, and 2008. For each case study period I describe the relevant international, domestic, and bureaucratic political factors. This periodization allows me to place the dependent variable (Army doctrinal choice) and the independent variable (politics) within the
same historical context and structures. I then compare the outcomes observed with the predictions made by each explanation within these periods to test for congruence. I further test the validity and power of each explanation in each period case by tracing evidence of doctrinal decisions back to specific instances of political outcomes – whether international, domestic, or bureaucratic. These are my hoop and smoking gun process tracing tests. A seventh chapter (Conclusion) allows me to fully develop my comparison methodology, to summarize each chapter’s findings, and to compare the relative power of each explanation to the others given the findings from each case.
CHAPTER 2 – EXPLAINING ARMY DOCTRINE

Military Doctrine.

This is a study of the effects of politics on the development of official Army doctrine. Army doctrine is a type of military doctrine. Military doctrine is the central idea, collective body of thought, and belief system of a military organization or branch of service (Alger 1985; Jackson 2013; Romjue 1986). It is used to guide the organizing and equipping of military units and to employ them to accomplish military missions (Avant 1993; Farrell and Terriff 2002; Heller and Stofft 1986; Kretchik 2011; Posen 1984; Spiller 1997; Zisk 1993). Doctrine is authoritative. It is published by military headquarters to subordinate commands and branches (Johnston 2000). It is used to train and educate soldiers, leaders, and commanders at all levels about these central ideas, collective bodies of thought, belief systems, organization, equipment, and how to best accomplish military missions (Hoiback 2011).

The US military defines doctrine as the “fundamental principles by which military forces or elements thereof guide actions in support of national objectives” (US Department of Defense 2016, 71). Fundamental principles define the type and nature of war or wars that a military organization prepares for and how it will fight those wars. Fundamental principles about the nature of war and how to fight as well as national objectives are subject to change, and military organizations update doctrine periodically to reflect those changes. British military historian J.F.C Fuller captured this changing nature of military doctrine well when defining it as, “the central idea that at a given time, as affected by strategic circumstances, actuates an Army” (Romjue 1986, 6).

The type and nature of war described in post-WWII US military doctrine varies along a continuum or spectrum of war: from low-intensity unconventional to mid-intensity conventional to high-intensity nuclear warfare (Figure 1) (Dupuy et al. 2003, 65-66). Low-intensity
unconventional warfare is armed conflict involving state-sponsored and non-state military forces organized and trained in an irregular and inconsistent manner equipped with mixed assortments of old and new weapons – mostly of small and minimally destructive capacity (e.g., rifles and machine guns, and other man-portable or light truck-mounted weapons such as rocket propelled grenades and anti-aircraft guns). The intensity of unconventional warfare involving conflict with irregular forces is low when compared to the other levels of warfare along the spectrum (Dupuy et al. 2003, 254; Hasler 2011, 16-17; House 2008, 28; Van Creveld 1991, 18-32).

Mid-intensity conventional warfare is armed conflict involving state-sponsored forces that are organized, trained, and equipped in a regular and consistent manner with the latest warfare conventions and equipped with the most destructive non-nuclear weapons available. The intensity of warfare involving conflict with conventional forces is greater than that of conflict with irregular forces but is less than that involving the use of nuclear weapons (House 2008, 25-28; Van Creveld 1991, 10-18).

High-intensity nuclear warfare is armed conflict involving state-sponsored forces that are organized, trained, and equipped with nuclear weapons. The intensity of conflict involving the use of nuclear weapons is the highest and most destructive level of warfare along the spectrum (Van Creveld 1991, 2-10).

Figure 1 (Spectrum of warfare described in post-WWII US military doctrine)
Army Doctrine.

The Army is the primary land component of the US military. Its mission is to “fight and win the Nation’s wars through prompt and sustained land combat….” (US Army 2012, 1-8; US Department of Defense 2010; US Government 2016). Army doctrine prescribes the central idea and fundamental principles that guide the accomplishment of this mission. Like other US military doctrine, it includes a description of the type and level of war or wars the Army expects to fight at: low-intensity unconventional wars, mid-intensity conventional wars, or high-intensity nuclear wars.

Army doctrine is hierarchical. The Army refers to the doctrine that sits at the top of its hierarchy as capstone doctrine (US Army TRADOC 2012). Since 1942, the Army’s capstone doctrine has been its *Field Manual (FM) 100-5 Operations* (Kretchik 2011, 143). Since the inception of *FM 100-5*, it has “set the foundation for developing…other fundamentals…detailed in subordinate field manuals…. [It] shapes all of Army doctrine, while influencing the Army’s organization, training, materiel, leadership and education…” (US Army Headquarters 2008, v-vii).

It was in 1942 that the War Department first established subordinate major functional Army commands in order to expand Army capabilities to meet the challenges of WWII. This allowed Army Headquarters to delegate responsibility for the preparation of *FM 100-5*, and the training of individuals and units in its implementation, to its newly created Ground Forces Command. Although preparation and training of the manual was delegated, approval authority of *FM 100-5* remained at Army Headquarters and does so to this day. As part of a subsequent Army reorganization, Ground Forces Command was redesignated as the Office of the Chief of Army Field Forces (OCAFF) in 1948. The newly designated OCAFF retained responsibility for preparing and training of *FM 100-5*. OCAFF was in turn redesignated as Continental Command (CONARC) in 1955 in order to command the Army’s numbered continental US (CONUS) regions.
As with OCAFF, the newly designated CONARC retained responsibility for the development and training of *FM 100-5*. Command of the Army’s numbered CONUS regions quickly became CONARC’s primary focus, while development and training of *FM 100-5* lost priority. To address this issue, the Army created its Combat Developments Command (CDC) in 1962 and made development of doctrine its primary mission. That said, the Army left responsibility for training of doctrine with CONARC. This new split between the development of Army doctrine and the training of Army doctrine caused confusion and proved to be problematic. To address this issue the Army disbanded both CDC and CONARC in 1973, and re-united both the functions of developing and training Army doctrine under a single new Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) where both remain today (Romjue 1997, 14-15).

Army capstone doctrine development since 1942 has followed a top-down bottom-up refinement process. Guidance concerning central ideas, fundamental principles, and the type of war or wars the Army expects to fight is provided by Army Headquarters to the command responsible for doctrine development. The doctrine command refines and distributes this top-down guidance to the Army’s other commands and separate functional branches. The doctrine command then collects and reconciles bottom-up input from the commands and branches into a coherent draft of *FM 100-5*, and provides it back up to Army Headquarters for review and approval by the Chief of Staff of the Army. At this point, Army Headquarters, as well as the Chief of Staff himself, may make final changes prior to publication and dissemination of capstone doctrine to the rest of the Army (US Army TRADOC 2012).

Army Headquarters’ development of central ideas, fundamental principles, and its identification of the war or wars it expects the Army to fight are not conceived in isolation. These can be influenced by the White House, Congress, Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, other US armed services, foreign military services, and US allies and adversaries alike. A
considerable amount of attention is paid to these outside sources of influence by Army Headquarters before, during, and after it releases its top-down guidance to subordinate commands and branches for bottom-up doctrinal input and refinement.

The Army capstone doctrine development process is iterative. The Army has published 13 separate editions of *FM 100-5* since the WWII period: 1942, 1944, 1949, 1954, 1962, 1969, 1976, 1982, 1986, 1993, 2001, 2008, and 2012 (US Army Headquarters 1942-2012). Although the content of the doctrine contained in these 13 editions has varied slightly between emphases on offensive versus defensive operations, there have been just four instances of a significant shift of emphasis from one type and level of warfare to another – from unconventional to conventional to nuclear. These shifts occurred in 1954, 1962, 1976, and 2008.

The 1942, 1944, and 1949 editions of *FM 100-5* focused almost exclusively on mid-intensity conventional warfare operations. However, the 1954 edition represented a sharp break from this trend. It decreased its mid-intensity conventional content by 23%, and increased the content of high-intensity nuclear warfare by that same amount. In 1962, the Army’s doctrinal pendulum swung in the opposite direction. The 1962 edition reduced high-intensity nuclear warfare content by 13%, reduced mid-intensity conventional warfare content by 6%, and increased its unconventional low-intensity warfare content by 19%. The next edition in 1969 did not deviate in any significant way from the 1962 edition. The 1976 edition, however, represented more doctrinal change than either the 1954 or 1962 editions. It reduced high-intensity warfare content by 5%, increased mid-intensity conventional warfare content by 24%, and reduced low-intensity unconventional warfare content by 19%. Between 1976 and 2001, the content of *FM 100-5* along the spectrum of war remained relatively stable. There were no perceptible changes in content in the 1982 or 1986 editions. The 1993 edition made an incremental increase in content of low-intensity warfare by 6%. The 2001 edition made another 7% increase to the same. It was not until
2008 that the Army made another significant doctrinal shift along the spectrum of war. The 2008 edition of *FM 100-5* increased low-intensity warfare content from 14% to 46% and reduced its mid-intensity conventional warfare content from 86% to 54%. This represents the single largest shift in the content of Army doctrine along a spectrum of war since 1942. Table 1 summarizes these doctrinal continuities and changes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FM 100-5 Edition</th>
<th>% of low-intensity unconventional warfare content</th>
<th>% of mid-intensity conventional warfare content</th>
<th>% of high-intensity nuclear warfare content</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
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<tr>
<td>1944</td>
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<td><strong>2008</strong></td>
<td><strong>46%</strong></td>
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</tbody>
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Table 1 (Content of FM 100-5 along the spectrum of war from 1942 to 2008)

What explains the four significant shifts in Army doctrinal content along the spectrum of war in 1954, 1962, 1976, and 2008? Individually, these four shifts each represent separate cases of doctrinal development and change. Collectively, these shifts may share something in common. This study explores the possibility that they share the influence of politics in common, especially domestic politics. Why consider politics as a possible source of doctrinal change? Given that the US military is relatively apolitical when compared to the militaries of other nations (Huntington 1959), especially non-democratic nations (Finer 2002), it might be counterintuitive for someone to think that US Army doctrine could be influenced by politics in a significant way. However, even if members of the Army do not openly and actively participate in national politics does not mean that
they do not engage in politics among themselves, nor does it mean that powerful forces operating outside of the Army are not struggling with each other to control or influence the Army and the doctrine it develops.

**Politics and Political Systems.**

Politics are ubiquitous. Politics occur at every level of human interaction among and between individuals or groups of individuals (Dahl 1970, 1). Politics is the power of one person or group of people to influence the behavior of another person or group in ways that they otherwise would not have acted (Dahl 1970, 17; Lasswell 1950, 75). Given a power-based definition of politics such as this, it becomes possible to conceive that individuals or groups both inside and outside of the Army may have the power to influence Army doctrine decision-makers to act in a manner they may not have otherwise acted to shape the content of doctrine in a way it may not have otherwise been shaped. If evidence of such political power can be found, it becomes possible to understand how politics can affect the content of Army doctrine.

A power-based conception of politics is useful and appropriate for the purposes of studying Army doctrine because power and politics are central to the Army in a number of ways. First, the Army itself is a large and complex organization, and powerful forces would be necessary to affect such abrupt and significant doctrinal shifts within it. Second, as the land component of the US military, the Army is the largest service. It requires the largest amounts of personnel and materiel and often suffers the most damage and casualties during wartime. Decisions of how to staff the Army including use of a draft, decisions to fund the Army by raising taxes, and decisions to commit the Army in wartime are all inherently political decisions (Cohen 1985). Third, the Army is often the decisive branch of the US military services. It has decided the outcome of many US wars because it is the land warfare service. Wars are often fought and decided on land – on the
ground. This fundamental principle of warfare is summarized succinctly by military historian T.R. Fehrenbach in his classic account of the Korean War:

...you may fly over a land forever; you may bomb it, atomize it, pulverize it and wipe it clean of life – but if you desire to defend it, protect it and keep it for civilization, you must do this on the ground, the way the Roman Legions did, by putting your young [soldiers] in the mud (Fehrenbach 1994, 1).

It is on land where people live, and it is between people that politics is practiced (Lasswell 1950). Whether America officially declares war or not, its wars have been defined as starting when there are “boots on the ground,” and considered over when there are no more “boots on the ground” (Gilsinan 2015). The Army’s ability to project power on land often make it America’s decisive military force, and as such, a powerful agent for achieving US political objectives.

The content of Army doctrine can be influenced by the outcomes of struggles between different groups interacting within separate political systems. A political system is any persistent combination of individuals or groups attempting to use their power to influence one another (Dahl 1970, 11). For the purposes of this study, I focus on the three political systems that have the most potential to influence Army doctrine decision-makers: 1) domestic; 2) international; and 3) bureaucratic (Figure 2). In order to determine which politics affect Army doctrine the most (international, domestic, or bureaucratic), I further develop these explanations and infer testable hypotheses for each in the remainder of this chapter.
The Argument: Domestic Politics.

This argument considers the effects that civilian political struggles have on Army doctrine. I borrow from Terry Moe’s structural choice theory of political institutions briefly introduced in Chapter 1 to explain how politics occurring within the US domestic political system can influence Army doctrine decision-makers and doctrinal content (Moe 1995; 2005; 2012). An assumption of this theory is that politicians struggle with each other for the ability to decide how to structure and control government bureaucracies as political institutions. Politicians want to structure and control the bureaucracy in a manner that both advances and institutionalizes their political interests.

A key interest of politicians in a competitive democracy such as the US is political survival by winning election or re-election. When politicians win elections, they get the chance to compete with other elected politicians for the authority to enact policies to structure and control the bureaucracy. They fight for policies that will improve their chances for re-election, or election to higher office. When enacting policy, they look to the future and put robust measures in place to institutionalize policies that make it difficult for future opposing politicians to reverse.
Even if policies affecting the structure of bureaucracy become institutionalized, politicians who do not benefit from these policies can be expected to continuously struggle to disrupt or reverse them. Subsequent iterations of domestic political struggles can add conflicting and confounding layers to the bureaucratic policy structures and institutions already in place. These institutionalized structures and conflicting layers act as constraints on the choices available to bureaucrats for accomplishing their assigned missions.

Given Moe’s domestic politics theory, it is reasonable to infer then that policies structuring the Army bureaucracy, like other US Government bureaucracies, also would be the object of struggle among domestic politicians. What are the most likely policies that domestic politicians could struggle over that could add structure to the Army bureaucracy and affect Army doctrinal choice? I contend that outcomes of domestic political struggles over policies related to national security, DOD organization, Army personnel, the Army budget, and the authority to use military force are the most likely policies to affect the Army bureaucratic structure and constrain Army doctrinal choice.

*Domestic Politics and National Security.*

Politicians struggle with each other to implement the national security policies that will most likely enhance their chances of election or re-election, or detract from their opposition’s chances. For example, Eisenhower’s New Look, Kennedy’s Flexible Response, and Nixon’s détente policies were all based on presidential campaign promises, and each garnered various levels of support and opposition among members of Congress who were in turn attempting to fulfill campaign promises or position themselves for future election or positions within the Congressional hierarchy.

National security policies identify threats and how to counter them. These often prescribe
the type and level of war or wars and other challenges the nation must prepare for. Identifying threats and type of wars to prepare for are political decisions that have a significant influence on Army doctrine development. Given the politics that surround national security policy, these may not be based on the most objective assessment of the threat or the nature of wars the nation is most likely to face. Instead, these policies may be based in part on the competing interests of politicians seeking a majority of votes needed to win election or re-election.

Politicians seeking election make national security-related campaign promises in an attempt to appeal to voters. Winning politicians not only attempt to fulfill those promises, they also attempt to institutionalize them by putting measures in place that would make it difficult for their opposition to disrupt or reverse them in the future. This means that the fulfillment or attempt to fulfill campaign promises can determine the content of national security policy, and the content of national security policy significantly influences the content of Army doctrine. I articulate these conclusions inferred from Moe’s theory of structural choice in my first testable hypothesis:

*Domestic politics hypothesis 1 (DP H1): policies designed to fulfill national security-related campaign promises, and national security policies that are influenced by partisan party politics, structure and constrain Army doctrine decision-making.*

In order to test for and measure the validity of this hypothesis, I will look for evidence of whether White House attempts to fulfill presidential campaign promises, or individual members of Congress attempts to do the same, were the source of any Army doctrine decision-making constraints. I will also look for evidence of whether the White House or members of Congress deliberately enacted policies with the intent of either undermining the success or realization of an opposing politician’s campaign promises – thereby adding conflicting or confounding policies on top of existing Army doctrinal constraints.
Domestic Politics and Defense Organization.

Politicians struggle over defense organization and military policies and how much control civilians should have. Some politicians argue that military policy should be left to the generals. Others argue that military policy is too important to be left to the generals (Mallinson 2016). Some politicians fight for policies to increase the control that their respective branch of government has over the military, or they fight to reduce control by the other – whether legislative or executive. Either way, this struggle between branches of government over appropriate levels of control of the military has resulted in changes to the organization and operation of the Department of Defense over time since WWII. Three different defense reorganization acts have been fought over and enacted by politicians since WWII: 1947, 1958, and 1986.

Each of these acts represent an incremental increase in the amount of control that civilian politicians exercise over the military, and each of these acts then caused a corresponding increase in the extent to which the Army and its doctrine are affected by domestic politics. More civilian control causes more political struggle over the structure of the Army bureaucracy, further institutionalizing additional layers of constraint on top of Army doctrinal choice. This leads me to infer my second testable domestic politics hypothesis.

Domestic Politics Hypothesis 2 (DP H2): increased civilian control of the DoD organization and military policy amplifies the influence that domestic politics has on Army doctrine decision-making.

In order to test for and measure the validity of these hypothesis, I will look for evidence of whether increased civilian control of the Department of Defense corresponded to increases in domestic political struggles over defense policy, and whether the outcomes of these struggles added additional constraints on Army doctrinal choice.
Domestic Politics and Army Personnel.

The White House and Congress struggle over the source of the Army’s personnel – whether it is primarily composed of drafted conscripts or volunteers. These struggles are politically charged because they have the potential to seriously impact most if not all citizens or their family members in some way, i.e., most if not all politicians and their constituents (Cohen 1985). Politicians make campaign promises and struggle with each other to enact policies that either can expand, reduce, or eliminate draft or voluntary military service (Bailey 2009). The Army is the most personnel-intensive of the four Armed Services, and the outcome of struggles over the source of its personnel has a significant impact on Army doctrine. An Army composed of volunteers is smaller and more expensive, leaving the Army with less money to develop and maintain its equipment and train its units. This limits what the Army can do and constrains doctrinal choice.

An Army composed of draftees can afford more personnel and can be larger. Draftees are less expensive than volunteers. By definition, volunteers choose to serve, draftees do not. Volunteers must be offered more money and benefits than draftees as an incentive to join and continue to serve in the Army.

The size of the Army affects the type and amounts of equipment and firepower it needs to accomplish its assigned missions, and these affect doctrinal choice. A smaller volunteer Army with fewer personnel relies more heavily on firepower at a higher spectrum of war to accomplish the same mission as a larger Army with more personnel. A volunteer Army needs to shield its soldiers from the effects of enemy firepower as much as possible in order to reduce casualties. Fewer casualties enhance the Army’s ability to attract and retain volunteers. This means that equipment in an all-volunteer Army is heavier for added protection in order to further reduce casualties.

A larger versus a smaller Army, reliance on more or less firepower, tolerance of more or
fewer casualties, and use of heavier equipment for added protection: these are all factors that shape Army doctrine and determine where the Army is able to operate along a spectrum of war. These inferences lead me to my next testable hypothesis:

**Domestic Politics Hypothesis 3 (DP H3): the outcome of domestic political struggles over Army personnel policy shapes the size of the Army, the amount of firepower and protection it requires, and where it can operate along a spectrum of war.**

In order to test for and measure the validity of this hypothesis, I will look for evidence of whether Army doctrinal decisions to either increase or decrease firepower and protection capabilities were directly or indirectly influenced by the number of personnel the Army expected to be able to either draft or voluntarily enlist, or by any expectation that the Army would not be able to sustain enough volunteers if or when casualty rates became high.

**Domestic Politics and the Army Budget**

Politicians struggle over the Army’s budget, including individual line items that can specify numbers and types of Army organizations, equipment, and personnel levels. Unlike periodic struggles over national security strategy, defense department organization, and sources of personnel, budget struggles occur almost continuously in accordance with an annual cycle. This gives politicians ongoing opportunities to fight for control of the Army and to realize their political interests through the continuous authorization and appropriation of taxpayer dollars, or not, for specific Army programs. It provides politicians a continuous means by which to struggle over national security, organization, and personnel. Struggles previously won in those areas are incrementally affected by the annual budget process, further reinforcing constraints on Army doctrinal choice. This leads me to my fourth testable hypothesis:
Domestic Politics Hypothesis 4 (DP H4): outcomes of political struggles over the annual Army budget can constrain or shape Army doctrinal choice.

In order to test for and measure the validity of these hypotheses, I will look for evidence of whether Army doctrinal decisions were influenced either directly or indirectly by the outcomes of annual budgetary struggles.

Domestic Politics and the Authority to Use Military Force.

Politicians struggle with each other over their respective authorities to use military force. The outcomes of these struggles determine the type and duration of Army operations. Political decisions to restrict the type or duration of military operations affect Army doctrine. If Army doctrine decision-makers have seen and continue to expect that the outcomes of struggles among politicians over the use of military force result in a pattern of restriction on the use of ground forces, short duration conventional missions, or the avoidance of long-term unconventional ones, then Army doctrine decision-makers will constrain their choice set to conform to those expectations.

Domestic Politics Hypothesis 5 (DP H5): outcomes of struggles between civilian politicians that result in restrictions on the type and duration of military force will shape expectations about likely Army involvement in future conflicts and constrain Army doctrinal choice sets.

In order to test for and measure the validity of this hypothesis, I will look for evidence of whether Army doctrine decision-makers believed that civilian restrictions on the type and duration of military force could determine the type of conflicts the Army would most likely be committed to in the future, and whether or not this belief either directly or indirectly influenced Army doctrine decision-maker choices.

These eight hypotheses inferred above from Moe’s theory of structural choice provide mechanisms by which it is possible to understand the extent to which domestic politics can
influence Army doctrine. The outcome of civilian political struggles over national security, defense organization, personnel, budgets, and the authority to use military force shape and constrain the doctrinal choices available to the Army.

The alternative explanations I offer below approach changes to Army doctrine using international and bureaucratic politics theories. Use of theories at these different levels of political analyses provide a method of comparison to measure the relative explanatory power of each. Taken together, use of all four explanations provides a more complete understanding of how politics in its many forms collectively affect Army doctrine.

**Alternative Explanation 1: International Politics – Neoliberal Institutionalism.**

This explanation considers the effect that the outcomes of politics among states in an anarchic international system can have on Army doctrine. Neoliberal institutionalist theories of international politics explain why states enter into agreements and cooperate with each other to advance their interests (Keohane 1984; Martin 1999; Stein 2008). A fundamental interest of every state in the international system is the security of its people, resources, and territory. States cooperate with each other according to formal institutionalized rules to achieve and maintain security (Haftendorn, Keohane, Wallender 1999; Wallender 2000). A primary means of achieving security through cooperation is the formation and maintenance of alliances. National decision-makers consider the existence and formal membership requirements of alliances when developing options for meeting international threats. Decision-makers compare the costs and benefits of addressing threats alone or in alliance. Decision-makers choose to abide by alliance rules and work through alliance organizations to address threats when the benefits of doing so outweigh the constraints and costs of acting alone (Cottrell 2016, 2; Duffield 2009, 839; Haftendorn, Keohane, Wallender 1999, 9; Skalnes 1998, 84).
Alliance membership constrains decision-maker choices, including choices about national security strategy and military doctrine. A state’s strategy and military doctrine can either enhance or undermine alliance agreements. States that seek to enhance alliance agreements and cooperation will likely choose strategy and doctrine to complement alliance strategy and doctrine. Alliance strategy and doctrine are developed through negotiation and compromise among alliance members. Even though more powerful members can influence the outcome of alliance negotiations more than less powerful members, agreed-upon strategy and doctrine present all members with some level of constraint (Tuschhoff 1999). National-level decision-makers involved in negotiating or approving a particular alliance rule or organization can be replaced by new decision-makers who may prefer different strategies or doctrine. New decision-makers may attempt to alter previously agreed-upon alliance rules, but they may not be successful (Gruber 2000). They can either choose to abide by existing alliance agreements, or unilaterally implement changes to strategy or doctrine that risk undermining an alliance.

If a newly considered strategy or doctrine has the potential to undermine an alliance agreement, then even new national-level decision-makers may reconsider such changes. In this way, an existing alliance agreed to by a previous government can bind a new government to a particular policy and constrain choice (Skalnes 1998, 44-45). That said, national decision-makers lead sovereign states, and they may calculate that the benefits of a new strategy or doctrine outweigh the potential costs of continued compliance with previous institutionalized alliance agreements, and can knowingly choose to implement a strategic or doctrinal change that undermines an alliance. Either way, one can at least conceive through use of this approach that international politics is affected by the existence of formal institutions such as alliances to the extent that national-level decision-makers may weigh the costs and benefits of complying with such institutions or not.
The United States has maintained a strong record of compliance with international institutions, including military alliances, since WWII (Axelrod 2000; 93-160; Ikenberry 2001, 163-214). US decision-makers are predisposed to follow previously agreed-upon alliance requirements and to compromise with allies (Duffield 2009, 850). In this sense, one can imagine that alliance requirements have significantly constrained American strategic and doctrinal choice, including doctrinal choices made by its Army. The question is: to what extent have international politics as expressed through alliance agreements shaped doctrinal choice? To what extent have shifts in alliance agreements correlate to doctrinal shifts? If there is a strong correlation between the two, what was the cause of alliance shift? Did an ally leverage its power and cause changes that impacted Army doctrine? Or, was it the United States that may have initiated alliance change for some reason? This alternative international politics explanation looks for and measures evidence of such possibilities. These conclusions and these questions lead me to infer this international politics hypothesis to test the explanatory power of this explanation:

*International Politics Hypothesis 1 (IP H1): US policy-makers will require the Army to develop and implement doctrine that supports the establishment or maintenance of US alliance institutions.*

In order to test for and measure the validity of this hypothesis, I will examine the relationship between changes in Army doctrine in 1954, 1962, 1976, and 2008 with changes to either the strategy or supporting doctrine of America’s most significant and enduring alliance since WWII – the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). If and where changes in Army doctrine correspond with changes in NATO strategy or doctrine, I will look for evidence in each of my case studies to determine whether or not these changes were made in response to NATO changes, and whether US government officials with the authority to constrain Army doctrinal choice, such as the White House or Secretary of Defense, compelled the Army to comply with NATO doctrinal change, or whether these doctrinal changes were consistent with pre-existing Army doctrinal
recommendations and preferences.

**Alternative Explanation 2: International Politics – Realism.**

This explanation also considers the effect that the outcomes of political struggles among states in the international system can have on Army doctrine, but with a focus on military power. I borrow from realist balance-of-power theory briefly introduced in Chapter 1 to explain how the balance of military power can influence Army doctrine decision-makers and doctrinal content (Morgenthau 1967; Walt 1987; Waltz 2010).

A key assumption of this approach is that all states struggle to achieve security and survive in an international system that forces each state to rely on itself. States are forced to rely on themselves because the international political system is anarchic in the sense that there is no higher authority above the state to provide for its security and ensure each state’s survival. All states exist under the constant threat that other states may use force at any time to subsume, harm, or destroy them. States are forced by this structural reality of the international system to use whatever power they have at their disposal to secure themselves. They attempt to achieve this security by balancing their power against the power of possible adversaries. They achieve this by either increasing their own power (internal balancing), or by combining their power with other friendly states (external balancing).

Another assumption of this approach is that all states must balance their power whether they choose to or not. The anarchic condition of the international system does not give states any other choice. They either balance power to survive, or eventually cease to exist. All states are subject to these conditions, so are presumed to act in similar and predictable ways. Because states are forced to balance their power whether they choose to or not, the primary variable that a realist seeks to understand to predict behavior is the extent of each state’s power. That is so because
states with more power may be able to balance that power internally against potential adversaries without seeking to balance their power externally in combination with other states.

This explanation considers all available resources as comprising a state’s total power. These include a state’s population, land mass, geography, natural resources, industrial capacity, and economic output or gross national product. The primary manifestation of a state’s power, however, is its military power because the use or threat of the use of force is the final arbiter in the anarchic self-help international political system. A state’s ability to produce military power is only limited by the amount of national resources it is able to command for that purpose.

A state’s military power, or lack of it, is therefore the variable that can best explain state behavior, including doctrinal choice. It is the power of the state balanced against the power of potential adversaries that influences doctrine decision-making processes, and that cause doctrinal content to be positioned at a given point along a spectrum of war. Changes in the military power and capabilities of real or potential adversaries as well as allies will correspond to changes in the military power and capabilities of a state, including its army and its doctrine.

The difference between the neoliberal institutionalist and realist explanations lies in the respective assumptions made about the independent variables employed. The independent variable from a neoliberal approach are the formal rules of cooperation established to achieve and maintain international institutions such as alliances. It is either the benefit of compliance or the potential cost of non-compliance with formal institutionalized rules that most affect doctrinal choice. A realist approach focuses on power, especially military power, as the variable that most affects or constrains doctrinal choice.

I infer the following testable hypothesis based on a realist balance of power approach to international politics:
International Politics Hypothesis 2 (IP H2): changes in the military balance of power and capabilities among real and potential US adversaries, as well as its allies, will correspond to a change in the internal balance of US military power and capabilities, including those of its Army and its doctrine.

In order to test for and measure the validity of these hypothesis, I will examine the relationship between changes in Army doctrine in 1954, 1962, 1976, and 2008 with changes to the military balance of power between the United States and its allies and adversaries during these same periods. If and where changes in Army doctrine correspond with changes in the military balance of power, I will look for evidence in each of my case studies to determine whether or not such changes were actually made in response to a change or changes in that balance of power.

Alternative Explanation 3: Bureaucratic Politics.

This explanation considers the effect that political struggles among the separate US Armed Services (inter-service politics) and among the separate branches within the Army (intra-service politics) have on Army doctrine. I borrow from leading bureaucratic politics theory and empirical works introduced briefly in Chapter 1 that examine military bureaucracy to explain how inter- as well as intra-service politics can affect Army doctrine (Allison and Halperin 1972; Allison and Zelikow 1999; Armacost 1969; Betts 1977; Huntington 1961).

A key assumption of this explanation is that each of the Armed Services and each of the Army’s subordinate functional branches are in competition with each other to achieve and maintain organizational relevance and survival.¹ Each seeks relevance and survival by attempting to increase missions and roles, resources, and autonomy relative to other services and branches. In this sense, the Army is engaged in a zero sum game with the Navy, Air Force, and Marines, and the Army’s internal branches are engaged in similar competition with each other. A gain in mission

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¹ The Army consists of 18 subordinate functional branches: Adjutant General, Air Defense Artillery, Armor, Aviation, Chemical, Cyber, Engineer, Field Artillery, Finance, Infantry, Intelligence, Judge Advocate, Medical, Quartermaster, Signal, Special Forces, and Transportation.
and roles, resources, and autonomy for the Navy, Air Force, or Marines is seen as a loss for the Army and a threat to its relevance and survival. Or, internal to the Army, a gain in mission, roles, resources, or autonomy for the infantry branch can, for example, be seen as a net loss for the armor branch and a threat to its relevance and survival.

Under these conditions, the Army and its separate branches may use doctrine as a means of maintaining or creating missions and roles, securing additional resources, and achieving greater autonomy in an effort to ensure organizational relevance and survival. There is evidence that use of doctrine in this manner increased after WWII. According to Huntington, “[a]fter WWII, inter-service competition contributed to increased service concern with, and output of doctrine…” By corollary he explains that, “[t]he historical output of political theory, it has been suggested, correlates rather well with the presence of political crisis, turmoil, and conflict. So also, when controversies arise [between the services], military doctrine flourishes” (Huntington 1962, 48-49).

The unit of analysis in this explanation is the Army and its subordinate branches behaving as unitary actors struggling with each other to influence the development of a doctrine that best justifies each individual service or branch mission and roles, resources, and autonomy. This explanation predicts that changes in Army doctrine can be traced to the outcome of struggles among the services or among individual Army branches. For example, this explanation would predict that the Army’s increase of high-intensity nuclear warfare doctrinal content in 1954 was a means by which it attempted to secure a piece of the nuclear pie in competition with the Navy or the Air Force, that it would receive resources from the Department of Defense for nuclear weapons, and that it would be able achieve autonomous control of its nuclear capability independent of the Navy or the Air Force. Or, it could have been the result of a struggle between the Army’s artillery branch and its air defense artillery branch for missions and roles, resources, and autonomy related to the employment of surface-to-surface as well as surface-to-air nuclear
weapons. These predictions lead me to my bureaucratic politics hypothesis:

*Bureaucratic politics hypothesis (BP H): changes in Army doctrine correspond to attempts by the Army or its internal branches to protect or increase missions or roles, resources, or autonomy at the expense of, or relative to, the other services or branches.*

In order to test for and measure the validity of this hypothesis, I will examine Army internal doctrine decision-making processes from 1954, 1962, 1976, and 2008 for evidence of whether doctrine was deliberately used by either senior Army leadership, or the leadership of an individual Army branch or several branches, as a tool or justification for increasing missions, resources, or autonomy at the expense of, or in competition with, the other armed services or Army branches. This bureaucratic explanation contrasts sharply with both domestic and international explanations. For example, the domestic politics explanation would predict the increase in high-intensity nuclear warfare doctrine in 1954 as something that might have been imposed on the Army by a winning politician or coalition of politicians attempting to fulfill campaign promises. The international politics explanation would predict it as part of a US effort to synchronize its strategy and doctrine with those of its allies. Assessing the accuracy and explanatory power of these three distinct political explanations matters because how and why the Army protects and defends the United States matters. Therefore, I will attempt to provide such an assessment in the following chapters using my four case studies of post-WWII Army doctrinal shift along the spectrum of war: 1954, 1962, 1976, and 2008.
CHAPTER 3 – 1954 CASE STUDY

The 1954 edition of the Army’s capstone doctrine, Field Manual 100-5, changed significantly in content from the previous three editions published in 1941, 1944, and 1949. The content of these three editions were focused almost exclusively on mid-intensity conventional ground warfare. None of these editions made any mention of high-intensity warfare using nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons were not available in 1941 or 1944, but by the time the 1949 edition had been published, it had been four years since nuclear weapons were first used in war. It was not until 1954, another five years later, and five years after the Soviet Union had successfully tested its first nuclear device in 1949, that Army leaders made a decision to shift content in its capstone doctrine toward nuclear warfare. Given that nuclear weapons technology had been available for nearly a decade by 1954, it is not clear why the Army waited until then to finally incorporate it into its capstone doctrine.

The purpose of this case study is to determine the extent to which politics may have influenced this shift in Army doctrine – a shift that one might have expected to have occurred incrementally or in parallel with the first use and further development of nuclear weapons during the nine years between 1945 and 1954. A consideration of politics at the domestic, international, and bureaucratic levels of analysis can help to solve this puzzle by shedding light on who or what may have had the power to cause this doctrinal shift to occur when it did.

This case study chapter proceeds in three parts. First, I highlight specific changes in doctrinal content from the 1941, 1944, and 1949 editions to the 1954 edition of FM 100-5. Second, I summarize relevant domestic, international, and bureaucratic political factors during this period that may have had an impact on Army doctrine decision-making. Third, I assess the impact of these factors in accordance with the predicted outcomes of the eight political hypotheses developed
in Chapter 2. I analyze each of these political factors for congruence with the doctrinal change itself. Where congruence is detected, I then conduct process-tracing hoop necessary conditions and smoking gun sufficiency tests to assess the certainty with which political factors may or may not have had an effect on doctrinal change.

Through this case study, the extent to which domestic, international, or bureaucratic politics did or did not affect this Army doctrinal shift in 1954 is better understood. I found that that both domestic and bureaucratic politics had some effect on the shift. I was unable to find evidence to determine whether international politics had an impact. An exploration of politics in this case confirms the findings of some previous doctrine studies, while providing insights that other studies or approaches might have missed. Like Barry Posen’s study of interwar French, British, and German militaries in *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars*, I did find that US Army pursuit of its bureaucratic organizational interests explained in part its doctrinal shift in 1954. Unlike Posen, however, I did not find a connection with international politics. I found that domestic politics played a role in setting the conditions that caused senior Army leaders to use doctrine in an effort to preserve its resources, autonomy, and missions. Unlike a conclusion reached by Stephen Peter Rosen in *Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military*, I did not find evidence that senior leaders established favorable conditions such as promotion pathways in an effort to embed this new doctrine within the organization. That said, I focused only on the period leading up to the adoption of the doctrine, and did not explore whether or not senior leaders made later efforts to embed the change. Unlike Deborah Avant in *Political Institutions and Military Change: Lessons from Peripheral Wars*, I did not find that the Army attempted to resist efforts by the administration to impose budget cuts and a doctrinal agenda on the Army by turning to Congress for help, i.e., by playing Congress off against the administration. I did find, however, that the Army actually attempted to resist an
administration agenda informed by domestic politics by embracing and then leveraging the very doctrinal change toward nuclear warfare it had originally tried to avoid. In some respects, my findings in this case are consistent with what Elizabeth Kier found in her case study of the French Army in *Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine Between the Wars*. Where Kier found that the French Army was forced into making a constrained doctrinal choice between offense and defense once the French left came to power and imposed severe limits on conscription, I too found that the US Army was forced into making a constrained doctrinal choice between mid-intensity conventional and high-intensity tactical nuclear warfare once a right-wing American coalition came to power imposing severe budget and personnel constraints on the Army.

**The 1941, 1944, 1949, and 1954 Editions of FM 100-5 (US Army Operations).**

The amount of mid-intensity conventional and low-intensity unconventional warfare content in the 1941, 1944 and 1949 editions of FM 100-5 were the same. Each of these editions devoted 99% of content to mid-intensity conventional warfare, and less than 1% of content to low-intensity unconventional warfare. As mentioned above, none of these editions devoted any content to high-intensity nuclear warfare. The 1954 edition shifted 25% of its content from mid-intensity conventional warfare to high-intensity nuclear warfare. Atomic, nuclear, and radiological weapons or effects, and weapons of mass destruction were discussed on 53 of the manual’s 216 pages. Like the 1941, 1944, and 1949 editions, however, the 1954 edition kept the content of low-intensity unconventional warfare to less than 1% (US Army 1941; 1944; 1949; 1954).

Why did the Army make this doctrinal shift toward nuclear warfare when it did in 1954? One explanation might be that US nuclear technology had advanced to the point where such weapons could finally be used by ground forces. The Army tested its first cannon capable of delivering a small tactical nuclear weapon in May of 1953 (Kretchik 2011, 167). However, since
only a very few of these weapons had become available to Army field forces by 1954, they should not have warranted such a significant shift in Army capstone doctrine at that time. Another explanation might be that the Soviet Union had advanced to the point by 1954 where it could begin to threaten US forces with nuclear weapons, so Army leaders finally felt compelled to address these threats. The Soviet Union had possessed nuclear weapons since 1949, however. These factors alone cannot account for why Army leadership made this doctrinal shift toward nuclear weapons when they did in 1954. An examination of the domestic, international, and bureaucratic political factors with the potential for affecting Army doctrinal choice during this period can provide insight into the timing of this shift where other explanations fall short.

**Domestic Political Factors.**

Domestic political factors with the greatest potential to impact an Army doctrinal shift in 1954 surrounded the presidential campaign of 1952 and the newly elected administration’s attempts to fulfill national-security related campaign promises throughout 1953 and early 1954. Candidate Eisenhower ran on a platform dominated by economic issues (Bacevich 1986, 12; Huntington 1961, 65, 87; Weigley 1977, 400). Eisenhower criticized Truman for taxing and spending too much – especially on defense, and for creating budget deficits that would eventually bankrupt the country – risking economic collapse (Dockrill 1996, 17; Gaddis 1982, 127; Kolodziej 1966, 151-152, 157; Snyder 1962, 485). Eisenhower portrayed the economic threat to the US created by its over-taxation and overspending as equal to or even greater than the military threat posed by the Soviet Union and international communism during this period (Eisenhower 1963, 131, 446, 452). Eisenhower promised that he would not allow the Soviet Union to determine the level of American taxation and spending. He would let Americans set their own limits on taxation and spending, not the enemy (Dockrill 1996, 19; Gaddis 1982, 147; Kolodziej 1966, 197).
Eisenhower promised to provide Americans with the security that they could afford. He would provide, “security with solvency,” by solving what he called the “Great Equation” (Kolodziej 1966, 174, 181). Solving the Great Equation meant finding the right balance among sustainable taxation, government spending, and economy. He promised Americans he could provide them with better security for less cost, and as a result, a better and stronger economy that would sustain the nation’s security for a longer period than an economy under Truman (Kolodziej 1966, 167).

The Truman Administration had been structuring its defense budgets with an eye towards 1954 as a year of maximum danger – the year when the Soviet Union was expected to reach its maximum conventional and nuclear capabilities (Huntington 1961, 68; Snyder 1962, 472; Trauschweizer 2008, 27). This idea came from the administration’s containment policy articulated in National Security Council (NSC) Policy #68 (United States 1950). This document predicted that the Soviet Union’s efforts to expand its military capabilities would peak by 1954, but then decline after. It predicted that the Soviet economy could not sustain military spending at such high rates beyond 1954. Therefore, the United States simply needed to sustain its relatively high levels of defense spending to contain Soviet military expansion until 1954. Because the Soviet economy would not be able to sustain those levels of defense spending indefinitely, its military machine would eventually collapse under its own weight, and the US could then finally reduce its military spending. Therefore, the policy of containment was not viewed as a long-term Cold War strategy.

The Truman Administration argued that steadily increasing defense budgets could be significantly reduced once the policy of containment had forced the Soviet economy into bankruptcy – again, something that the Truman Administration predicted would happen on or about the year 1954. Eisenhower countered that it was impossible to predict when Soviet military efforts would peak and when its economy would be exhausted (Snyder 1962, 401). He argued that the US policy of containment would instead exhaust the US economy. Not only did excessive levels of defense
spending have the potential to harm the economy, Eisenhower argued that excessive defense efforts in their entirety would gradually erode American liberties and way of life. An economy and society increasingly burdened by and geared toward a permanent war-footing could only result in what Eisenhower referred to in his campaign and later administration as a “garrison state.” By “garrison state,” Eisenhower was describing a society where personal freedom, liberty, and economic opportunity were permanently subordinated to the needs of security. A garrison state was something that would eventually destroy the very thing Americans were trying to defend – its liberty and prosperity. In other words, the garrison state that the Truman Administration was unwittingly creating threatened the “American way of life” according to Eisenhower (Dockrill 1996, 30, 63; Friedberg 2000, 127-128, 133; Gaddis 1982, 133-134; Kolodziej 1966, 199).

Eisenhower predicted that the Soviet Union would not back off its defense spending after 1954. The Soviets envisioned an epic struggle between capitalism and communism and were committed to succeed in this struggle for as long as history demanded. In other words, the United States needed a strategy and a defense budget that could be sustained indefinitely – not a strategy requiring excessive spending in the short term that gambled on the possibility of exhausting the Soviets at some arbitrary point of maximum danger. Eisenhower predicted that if the US spent the excessive amounts on defense called for in the Truman budgets planned for in 1953 and 1954, that it was likely the Soviets would simply continue increasing their defense efforts anyways without exhausting their economy. The US would then be forced to continue increasing its defense spending for one year of maximum danger after another, in an endless cycle of increasing defense spending until its own economy collapsed, and, or its way of life eroded by an increasingly militarized garrison state. What Eisenhower offered was a plan to reduce defense spending to a level that the country could afford indefinitely – for the “long haul” (Snyder 1962, 497). Instead of a year of maximum danger with a fixed “D-Day,” Eisenhower instead talked about a floating “D-
Day” that would move along into the future at a level that the US economy could support and that the American way of life would tolerate (Dockrill 1996, 31; Snyder 1962, 401). The strategy of containment followed by the Truman Administration would not bring the Cold War to its conclusion on some notional D-Day in 1954. The Eisenhower campaign argued that the US would have to find a way to sustain the Cold War indefinitely without destroying the very thing it was trying to protect – American liberty and prosperity (Dockrill 1996, 63).

A second key campaign promise made by candidate Eisenhower was to bring the Korean War to a conclusion and to prevent US involvement in any future Korea-type war. The Korean War had stalemated by the time of the 1952 presidential campaign, and had become increasingly unpopular among the American people. Ending the war and bringing American troops home as soon as possible became the number one issue of the campaign (Bacevich 1986, 11; Dockrill 1996, 29; Snyder 1962, 437, 494; Trachtenberg 1991, 14).

The Korean War was a limited war with limited objectives fought under the auspices of the relatively new United Nations. After North Korea invaded South Korea in a surprise attack in June 1950 that almost pushed US and South Korean forces off the Korean peninsula, US forces as part of a larger international United Nations force counterattacked and pushed North Korean forces back across the North-South Korean border by October, and continued their advance through North Korean territory all the way to the Yalu River along the Chinese border. It was at this point that communist Chinese forces entered the war. The Chinese and North Korean armies then pushed the combined US/UN force back to the North-South Korean border by February 1951, and this is where the conflict stalemated until an armistice was signed in July of 1953 (Fehrenbach 1994; US Army 2016).

The Eisenhower campaign criticized the Truman Administration for its mishandling of the war, and promised never to involve the US in another conflict of this kind (Bacevich 1986, 11;
Dockrill 1996, 29; Eisenhower 1963, 454; Kolodziej 1966, 156; Snyder 1962, 437, 494; Trachtenberg 1991, 14; Weigley 1977, 399). So what kind of war was Korea? Eisenhower argued that it was an unnecessary and indecisive ground war that needlessly wasted American lives and treasure. It was unnecessary because it never would have started to begin with if America had taken enough initiative to show strength against Soviet, Chinese, and North Korean communism. It was indecisive because its objectives were limited by self-imposed restrictions the US followed as part of an international UN force it was trying to legitimize and maintain. Wartime objectives became limited to restoring the original border between North and South Korea. Its objectives also were limited to ground warfare on the Korean peninsula. Attacks against communist sources of support and sanctuary inside mainland China or the Soviet Union were off limits to UN forces. The Truman Administration did not want the war to expand beyond the Korean Peninsula. As part of a United Nations peacekeeping action, wartime objectives were focused on restoring only the member-nation’s sovereignty, including borders and territory if violated. Violating borders and territory of another nation in turn, even those of an aggressor, were inconsistent with the UN’s limited goals – goals meant to keep the peace, not expand wars. The Truman Administration also was concerned about involving the US in a wider war with the Soviets and Chinese – a potential World War III that Truman believed would not have been in America’s interest to start or fight. The war was indecisive also because the Truman Administration refused to bring all of America’s capabilities to the fight. Truman would not authorize the use of strategic bombing, including nuclear weapons, during the Korean conflict, even though commanders such as General MacArthur had recommended their use to achieve victory and avoid stalemate (Fehrenbach 1994; US Army 2016).

President-elect Eisenhower did not waste time formulating a strategy to fulfill these campaign promises. He visited the Korean battle front with his transition team in December of
1952 to begin the process of developing a strategy to break the stalemate there. He then met with his secretaries of state, defense, and joint chief chairman nominees on the USS Helena during the voyage home from Korea to begin formulating the administration’s strategies to reduce federal spending, reduce taxes, reduce budget deficits, while still providing a better, stronger defense – in other words, to provide security with solvency. The initial elements of what came to be known as Eisenhower’s “New Look” national defense strategy emerged during this voyage (Kolodziej 1966, 181; Snyder 1962, 391). First, the United States would no longer look to foreign adversary capabilities to determine its level of defense spending. It would not attempt to match its potential adversaries soldier for soldier, cannon for cannon, or tank for tank in order to physically contain threats anywhere in the world (Eisenhower 1963, 453; Snyder 1962, 466). Attempting to match the conventional strength of the Soviet Union, the Peoples’ Republic of China, and emerging nationalist movements around the world would cause the US to spend itself into bankruptcy, and transform it from a democracy to a garrison state. Instead, the US would look to its own internal economic capacity to determine what it could afford to spend on defense. Second, the US would leverage its superior technology, including nuclear weapons and delivery systems, to deter threats before they materialized. It would communicate to its adversaries that the US would meet any aggression at a time of place of its choosing, using the most destructive weapons in its arsenal. To deter adversary advances, it would massively retaliate, if necessary, using nuclear weapons. In this manner, the US could provide for greater security for less cost in soldiers’ lives and national treasure. The US would not find itself bogged down in limited yet costly ground wars in the future. In other words, if the US was not able or willing to match the conventional military strength of its adversaries on the ground, it would use its superior nuclear capabilities to prevent or deter wars such as Korea from occurring in the first place. This initial strategy to reduce defense spending while ensuring security and economic prosperity, a strategy for providing security with solvency,
developed during the USS Helena voyage, continued to shape the Eisenhower Administration’s national security and defense policies for the next eight years (Geelhoed 1979, 100-101).

The Eisenhower Administration moved quickly after inauguration in January 1953 to implement New Look policies. The first action it took focused on breaking the stalemate in Korea by threatening to expand the war by using nuclear weapons against the Chinese mainland if the Chinese resumed hostilities or continued to support North Korean aggression (George and Smoke 1974). The second action it took was a reorganization of the Department of Defense (DoD) by introducing legislation to increase civilian control of the military in order to begin laying the groundwork for significant cuts in defense spending. DoD Reorganization Plan 6, legislation introduced on April 1953, passed in June, gave the chairman of the joint chiefs and the secretary of defense more authority over the separate armed services, and thus increased the president’s authority over the military as a whole (Eisenhower 1963, 447; Geelhoed 1979, 62). The new administration proposed this legislation because it anticipated fierce resistance to its planned cuts from the military services and their Democratic supporters in Congress (Eisenhower 1963, 447-448; Geelhoed 1979, 62-64; Snyder 1962, 518). The administration needed enough control of the military to ensure it support of planned cuts. The next action it took was to replace each member of the joint chiefs who had served under Truman with generals and admirals whom Eisenhower believed would be loyal to him and his New Look cost-cutting agenda (Kolodziej 1966, 183).

The far right wing of the Republican Party, or Republican Old Guard as it was known at the time, led by Senator Taft, had accused Truman during his presidency of politicizing the joint chiefs led by Gen. Omar Bradley. Shortly after Eisenhower took office, Taft demanded that he replace Gen. Bradley and each of the other service chiefs as soon as possible in order to find generals and admirals who would support any amount of defense cuts necessary to realize the Republican Party’s domestic economic agenda – an agenda meant to solve the Great Equation and find the
right balance between security and solvency (Geelhoed 1979, 59; Snyder 1962, 413, 524; Weigley 1977, 401). As chairman of the joint chiefs under President Truman, Gen. Omar Bradley had enough disputes with Senator Taft and other members of his Republican Old Guard coalition that they did not trust him (Kolodziej 1966, 182; Snyder 1962, 410-411). Because one of President Eisenhower’s top political priorities was keeping the Republican Party unified, and because he owed Senator Taft a political debt for endorsing his nomination as the Republican presidential candidate, the president supported Taft’s demands to replace the joint chiefs. President Eisenhower met with Taft in early February 1953 with a list of likely candidates. Taft endorsed the choices, they were announced in late February, and the joint chiefs who had served under President Truman were then each replaced one by one between April and June of 1953 (Dockrill 1996, 18, 22; Snyder 1962, 412).

The first task assigned to the newly appointed Eisenhower joint chiefs in the spring of 1953 was a worldwide review of the status of US military forces, capabilities, and commitments with an eye toward reducing the defense budget. The president gave the chiefs guidance to look for and reduce redundancies both in capabilities and commitments, and then to formulate a Fiscal Year (FY) 1955\(^2\) defense budget that the economy could begin to sustain over the long haul – as opposed to the budgets that the old chiefs under President Truman had put together focused on 1954 as a year of maximum danger (Ridgway 1956, 266-267). The new chiefs were given a defense budget target of $30 billion to work toward for FY 55 (Kolodziej 1966, 169). $30 billion was the amount for defense spending that the newly appointed budget director and secretary of the treasury believed the US economy could afford without experiencing economic crisis (Geelhoed 1979, 101). Given that the Truman Administration budgeted $41 billion for the defense budget for FY

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\(^2\) US Government fiscal years (FYS) straddle calendar years, defined by the 12 months from any given October through the following September. Thus, FY 55 ran from October 1, 1954 to September 30, 1955.
The new chiefs were skeptical they could reduce US military capabilities enough to meet a $30 billion FY 55 budget target while continuing to maintain US military commitments to over 50 allied nations (Ridgway 1956, 268, 318, 327). But given that Stalin had died in March of 1953, and the Korean War armistice was on track to be signed by July, President Eisenhower argued that international tensions had reduced enough that US military commitments, and therefore capabilities, could be significantly reduced as well (Dockrill 1996, 19; Eisenhower 1963, 144; Huntington 1961, 65, 81). The president simply wanted the new chiefs to recommend enough defense cuts to reach $30 billion – the amount that he, his treasury secretary, and his budget director had determined that the US economy could afford, and the amount they had determined was needed now under conditions of reduced international tensions. The new chiefs were not convinced that international tensions were reduced enough to warrant a 27% reduction in the defense budget, however. They came back to the administration in October 1953 with a recommendation for $36 billion – $6 billion over the target they had been given by the administration (Kolodziej 1966, 187-188). To help the joint chiefs reach the correct target, the Eisenhower Administration directed a cut to the Army’s personnel strength by 33% from its current 1.5 million to 1 million soldiers. This would end up being the administration’s primary means by which its pre-determined $30 billion defense target could be met (Huntington 1961, 79; Ridgway 1956, 273).

These directed Army personnel cuts made it even more difficult for the joint chiefs to find a feasible way for the US to continue maintaining its military commitments abroad. In the face of a growing impasse between the administration and the chiefs, the Chairman, Admiral Radford, offered two options: 1) the administration could either reduce its military commitments abroad, or
2) it could allow the Army to begin employing small tactical nuclear weapons on battlefields against military targets to offset its personnel reductions. Adm. Radford argued that the employment of small tactical nuclear weapons would allow the Army to reduce its personnel strength by the 33% required while still meeting its military commitments abroad. The use of nuclear weapons, he argued, would enable the Army to fight and win battles with far fewer soldiers (Huntington 1961, 74; Kolodziej 1966, 186; Snyder 1962, 427, 437; Taylor 1972, 165).

This tactical nuclear weapon recommendation differed from the policy of massive strategic nuclear retaliation already adopted by the Eisenhower Administration. Massive retaliation meant attacking and destroying enemy industrial and population centers with high-yield strategic nuclear weapons delivered by the Air Force. Adm. Radford’s recommendation meant that the Army would now be given the authority to employ low-yield tactical nuclear weapons against enemy military targets in land battles against enemy ground forces. The administration quickly approved this recommendation, and moved forward to submit its $30 billion defense budget to Congress for FY 55 – including its recommendation to reduce Army personnel strength from 1.5 to 1.0 million soldiers (Huntington 1961, 74).

Congress approved the administration’s FY 55 defense budget with only minor Democratic opposition led by Senator John F. Kennedy. Sen. Kennedy, along with Senators Lyndon Johnson, Albert Gore, Sr., and Hubert Humphrey, proposed an amendment to the FY 55 defense budget allocating an additional $350 million to the Army in order to slow the pace of its personnel cuts (Kolodziej 1966, 203). This was also an effort intended to reassure America’s allies, both in Europe and Asia, that the US remained committed to maintaining its defense agreements and would not suddenly and rapidly begin withdrawing significant numbers of ground troops from its forward bases overseas (Kolodziej 1966, 213). This Democratic amendment was quickly defeated by the Republican majority in both houses of Congress (Geelhoed 1979, 109), and the FY 55
budget was passed in August 1954. With this campaign promise to cut the defense budget now
fulfilled, Eisenhower stated that the Republican Party had moved the US out of a wartime economy
into a peacetime economy, and had “exorcised a specter” (Eisenhower 1963, 307).

One key problem with the administration’s new policy to substitute tactical nuclear
weapons for soldiers was that the Army Chief of Staff, General Matthew Ridgway, did not agree
with it. Gen. Ridgway believed that the use of nuclear weapons on any battlefield would increase
the requirement for soldiers, not lessen it (Ridgway 1956, 296). His belief was based on a 1951
Army study conducted with the help of the California Institute of Technology, as well as the initial
results of an ongoing 1953 Army study initiated by Gen. Ridgway himself into the effects of small
tactical nuclear weapons on the battlefield (Gavin 1958, 129-135; Ridgway 1956, 298). Gen.
Ridgway objected to any defense budget or policy that substituted nuclear weapons for soldiers for
other reasons as well. He pointed out that small nuclear weapons suitable for use on a battlefield in
relative proximity to friendly troops had simply not been produced in adequate numbers as of late
1953 to allow for an immediate and significant troop reduction beginning in 1954 (Ridgway 1956,
290). Further, he argued that the use or threat of use of battlefield nuclear weapons would
potentially alienate allies, as it was likely that allied territory and populations, not US territory and
populations, would suffer significant if not permanent damage from any tactical nuclear weapons
use (Dockrill 1996, 62; Ikenberry 2001, 166). Concerning troop reductions, he argued that any
significant and abrupt move in this direction would dampen allied willingness to contribute troops
themselves (Gavin 1958, 152; Kolodziej 1966, 213; Trachtenberg 1991, 166). If the US was
considering a reduction in troops committed to the defense of Europe and Asia, allies such as
Britain, Germany, France, and Japan would likely reduce their commitments as well. Finally,
Ridgway argued that the use or threat of use of small tactical nuclear weapons on the battlefield
could easily and uncontrollably escalate into a massive strategic nuclear exchange (Ridgway 1956,
Gen. Ridgway argued that a policy that avoids, not promotes, the use of nuclear weapons, even small ones on the battlefield, may keep conflicts such as a future limited war like Korea from escalating into a general war between the United States and the Soviet Union involving the use of strategic nuclear weapons capable of destroying dozens of American and Soviet cities and killing or injuring millions of innocent civilians.

The administration brought significant pressure to bear on Gen. Ridgway in an effort to secure his support of the Army budget cuts and troop reductions necessary to reach the administration’s $30 billion FY 55 defense budget goal. The administration not only wanted his support, they demanded that he recommend the cuts himself (Ridgway 1956, 270, 287; Snyder 1962, 522). They wanted him to affirm that a smaller defense budget would equal a stronger economy, that a stronger economy would equal a stronger country, and that a smaller Army could accomplish the same missions as before with fewer soldiers if it simply employed nuclear weapons in future land battles. Gen. Ridgway refused to make these recommendations (Ridgway 1956, 287). He conceded that he was not an economist, and did not know what level of defense spending would or would not be good or bad for the economy (Ridgway 1956, 272). He was a military expert who had studied the issue of tactical nuclear weapons use on the battlefield, and concluded that it would require more, not fewer soldiers. Gen. Ridgway was, therefore, genuinely surprised when President Eisenhower stated in his January 1954 State of the Union address that “[t]he defense program for 1955…is based on a new military program unanimously recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.” In response to this, Gen. Ridgway commented in his memoirs that, “[a]s one member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who most emphatically had not concurred in the 1955 military program as it was presented to the people, I was nonplused by this statement. The fact is the 1955 budget was a “directed verdict.” (Ridgway 1956, 288-289).

In sum, the Eisenhower Administration developed its New Look defense policy to fulfill
three key campaign promises: 1) a promise to reduce federal spending, 2) a promise to end the Korean War, and 3) a promise not to involve the US in costly limited wars like Korea again (Huntington 1961, 65; Kolodziej 1966, 156; Snyder 1962, 389). To fulfill these promises it needed to find a way to leverage America’s nuclear arsenal where President Truman had not (Gaddis 1982, 148). The threat of the use of massive retaliation with strategic nuclear weapons in response to aggression anywhere, including any renewed aggression by China on the Korean Peninsula, was the strategy that the administration chose to end the Korean War and deter other Korea-type wars in the future. The decision to authorize the use of tactical nuclear weapons on the battlefield was the solution that the administration arrived at to justify a 33% cut to the Army’s personnel strength – a personnel cut that the administration felt was necessary to fulfill its campaign promise to significantly reduce the defense budget – even though the Army Chief of Staff did not believe that use of tactical nuclear weapons would require fewer soldiers, and even though adequate quantities of tactical nuclear weapons had not yet been produced and fielded by the time that these Army personnel cuts were directed to begin in 1954 (Ridgway 1956, 290).

**Analysis of Domestic Politics Hypotheses.**

*Domestic politics hypothesis 1 (DP H1): policies designed to fulfill national security-related campaign promises, and national security policies that are influenced by partisan party politics, structure and constrain Army doctrine decision-making.*

This hypothesis has a high level of congruence, and it passes a difficult hoop necessary conditions test. Eisenhower made three national security related campaign promises that appear to be congruent with this hypothesis: the promise to provide security with solvency by reducing the defense budget, the promise to end the war in Korea, and the promise not to commit the US to costly limited ground wars like Korea.

To fulfill his first promise, President Eisenhower cut the defense budget by 27% from FY
54 to FY 55, with 76% of these cuts coming from the Army alone. In an attempt to demonstrate that the US would be able to maintain its security despite these cuts, he relaxed the policies authorizing the use of nuclear weapons, both high-yield strategic nuclear weapons to be employed by the Air Force and low-yield tactical nuclear weapons to be employed by the Army. The administration argued that future wars would be deterred by the threat of massive retaliation using strategic nuclear weapons, and if that deterrence failed, the US would use those nuclear weapons, along with smaller tactical nuclear weapons, to defeat any attacking enemy force. This was part of the administration’s strategy for avoiding costly ground wars in the future, and how it worked to end ongoing hostilities in Korea – by directing threats of massive retaliation against the Chinese if they resumed offensive operations there.

President Eisenhower stated that the primary role of the Army in a nuclear war would be limited to restoring civilian order in destroyed areas, a mission that would require fewer personnel than preparing for costly ground wars. In the event that a ground war did become necessary, the Army would then be authorized to use its small tactical nuclear weapons. The administration maintained that the additional firepower offered by tactical nuclear weapons would allow the Army to defeat any enemy force with fewer soldiers. The combination of changing the Army’s primary role to one of restoring civilian order in the aftermath of massive strategic nuclear weapons retaliation delivered by the Air Force, and then authorizing the Army to use small tactical nuclear weapons if there were any remaining enemy forces to fight, allowed the administration to justify a reduction in Army personnel strength by 33%, and to fulfill its campaign promise to cut the defense budget. The Army then made its significant doctrinal shift to include the use of tactical nuclear weapons. This was the first time the Army had ever addressed nuclear weapons in its capstone doctrine, even though these weapons had first been used by the US in wartime in 1945. Interestingly, the Army did not incorporate any doctrinal content whatsoever concerning the more
important civil defense mission now assigned to it by the president as its primary role.

President Eisenhower’s fulfillment of his campaign promise to reduce the defense budget by placing greater emphasis on both strategic and tactical nuclear weapons established a necessary condition for the Army to make its doctrinal shift to emphasize the use of nuclear weapons in its capstone doctrine in 1954. The president promised to cut the defense budget, and he chose to emphasize nuclear weapons so he could reduce more costly conventional forces. He gave the Army greater latitude to begin using tactical nuclear weapons as part of routine ground operations. The Army then made its doctrinal shift to emphasize nuclear weapons. Without these conditions occurring in the sequence they did, it is unlikely that the Army would have made this shift in 1954. Although these conditions may represent a necessary causal chain, they do not sufficiently explain why the Army made this shift given that Army leaders vigorously opposed substituting personnel with nuclear weapons, and argued that the use of tactical nuclear weapons would require more, not fewer, personnel on any battlefield (Kretchik 2011, 169). It also does not explain why the Army did not incorporate the even more important civil defense mission specifically assigned by the president. Apparently, being assigned a new primary mission itself was not sufficient to cause the Army to make a doctrinal shift.

*Domestic Politics Hypothesis 2 (DP H2): increased civilian control of the DoD organization and military policy amplifies the influence that domestic politics has on Army doctrine decision-making.*

There is a high level of congruence between this hypothesis and the evidence presented here. However, the evidence fails to allow this hypothesis to pass either a hoop necessary conditions test, or a smoking gun sufficiency test. One of the first pieces of legislation introduced by the new administration shortly after inauguration in April 1953 was Reorganization Plan 6 – a plan to increase civilian control of the military by taking power away from individual service
secretaries and chiefs of staff in order to provide more power and authority to both the secretary of
defense and the chairman of the joint chiefs (Dockrill 1996, 25; Eisenhower 1963, 447; Geelhoed
1996, 62-64; Snyder 1962, 518). Instead of attempting to control the military through four separate
service chiefs, the president and secretary of defense could now attempt to control the military
through just one person – the chairman of the joint chiefs. The next step the administration took to
improve civilian control over the military was to replace the chairman and each of the individual
service chiefs that had served under President Truman with generals and admirals who would be
loyal to President Eisenhower and readily comply with his guidance to find a way to provide
adequate security with solvency by recommending the cuts he had pre-determined for the defense
budget (Eisenhower 1963, 455). The new chairman in particular, Adm. Radford, openly agreed
with and advocated ways to cut the defense budget in order to improve the economy (Geelhoed
1979, 66-67). The choice of Adm. Radford as chairman, combined with a reorganization of the
Department of Defense to give the chairman more power over the service chiefs, is congruent with
Adm. Radford’s recommendation to the NSC in October 1953 to find defense budget cuts by
substituting tactical nuclear weapons for Army personnel, a recommendation he was now able to
make to the NSC over the objections of both the Army and Navy service chiefs. After Adm.
Radford made this recommendation, and the NSC approved it, the Army then incorporated tactical
nuclear weapons into its doctrine despite the fact that its senior leaders had vigorously opposed
such a policy. This sequence of events is highly congruent with the predictions of this hypothesis.

This hypothesis fails to pass either a hoop necessary conditions test or a smoking gun
sufficiency test. Although the Department of Defense had been reorganized to give the chairman
more power over the service chiefs, and denied the service chiefs routine access to the National
Security Council (NSC), Army Chief of Staff Ridgway requested and was given permission to
attend an NSC meeting with the president in attendance in October 1953 for the specific purpose of
stating his objections to any policy intended to substitute tactical nuclear weapons for soldiers on the battlefield, and to refute the use of nuclear weapons as a valid justification for cutting Army personnel and the defense budget (Ridgway 1953c). Regardless of the direct access he was afforded and the arguments he was able to make at this October meeting, the NSC ultimately decided to cut Army personnel anyways, and justified doing so because it had given the Army broad authority to use tactical nuclear weapons instead. This shows that despite Reorganization Plan 6, Gen. Ridgway was still able to gain cabinet-level access to the president to state his opposition for substituting Army personnel with tactical nuclear weapons. Additionally, despite Gen. Ridgway’s appointment as one of President Eisenhower’s new service chiefs, he still openly and vigorously disagreed with these decisions to cut the defense budget by substituting nuclear weapons for personnel. Therefore, the evidence does not show either a necessary or a sufficient causal link between greater civilian control and the Army’s doctrinal shift in 1954. It appears that the administration would have chosen to substitute tactical nuclear weapons for personnel, leading to an Army doctrinal shift, regardless of Reorganization Plan 6 or regardless of whether the serving Army Chief of Staff had been selected by President Eisenhower or not.

Therefore, I assess that this hypothesis has an overall low level of certainty. Despite the high level of congruence between the evidence and this hypothesis, there is no evidence of either a necessary or sufficient causal chain between greater civilian control and the Army’s doctrinal shift in 1954.

**Domestic Politics Hypothesis 3 (DP H3): the outcome of domestic political struggles over Army personnel policy shapes the size of the Army, the amount of firepower and protection it requires, and where it can operate along a spectrum of war.**

There is a high level of congruence between this hypothesis and a shift in Army doctrine, and it passes a smoking gun sufficiency test. President Eisenhower moved quickly after assuming
office to cut Army personnel strength. Cuts to the Army represented 76% of the overall defense cuts proposed as part of the president’s New Look policies. Embedded in the FY 55 budget was a reduction in the Army’s active duty strength by 33% from 1.5 to 1.0 million soldiers – a reduction to be achieved over a two year period during 1954 and 1955. This budget submission to Congress was preceded by an NSC decision at the end of October 1953 to give the Army broader authority to use tactical nuclear weapons in order to reduce the number of soldiers it would require. It was just eleven months later, in September of 1954, that that Army then modified its doctrine to incorporate the use of tactical nuclear weapons.

There is sufficient evidence to allow this hypothesis to pass a smoking gun sufficient conditions test. The Army would not have incorporated nuclear weapons use into its doctrine unless the NSC had approved such a policy, and there is sufficient evidence presented here that the NSC approved this policy because it needed a rationale for reducing the Army’s personnel strength. In October 1953, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Adm. Radford, told the NSC that the Army would be able to accomplish its missions and succeed on any battlefield with fewer soldiers only if it were given broader authority to use tactical nuclear weapons. If the administration had not made its decision to reduce the Army’s personnel strength in order to cut the defense budget, the NSC would not have needed to make its decision to give the Army broad authority to use tactical nuclear weapons as part of its routine military operations. It was only after the NSC made this decision that the Army made its doctrinal shift.

I assess that this hypothesis has an overall moderate level of certainty. There is a high level of congruence between the evidence and the hypothesis and sufficient evidence to provide this hypothesis with a moderate level of certainty.
Domestic Politics Hypothesis 4 (DP H4): outcomes of political struggles over the annual Army budget can constrain or shape Army doctrinal choice.

There is a high level of congruence between this hypothesis and a shift in Army doctrine, and it passes a smoking gun sufficiency test. In late 1953 to early 1954, the winning Republican coalition in the White House and Congress cut the Army’s budget 31% over what the previous administration and Congress had approved. Army Chief of Staff Gen. Ridgway officially objected to these cuts. He warned the chairman of the joint chiefs, the secretary of the army, the secretary of defense, and the National Security Council that such deep cuts would not allow the Army to take care of its personnel, maintain its conventional equipment, or meet many of its commitments abroad – military commitments requiring Army forces to assist more than 50 allied countries (Ridgway 1953 a, b, c). The administration responded by telling Gen. Ridgway that the Army no longer required large numbers of soldiers, it did not need to maintain its conventional equipment, and the US could continue to meet all its commitments abroad by deterring or preventing war with nuclear weapons, and in the event of war, the US would win by employing nuclear firepower either strategically with the Air Force or at the tactical battlefield level. Then, the secretary of defense began rejecting Army requests to fund the maintenance and procurement of its conventional equipment, telling Army leadership that it had not requested enough of the “newfangled nuclear items” popular among members of Congress (Taylor 1972, 1972, 171). This may have been good advice for the Army. The winning Republican coalition in the House and Senate were interested in allocating new funds only to support nuclear deterrence and items that would support nuclear warfare (Trauschweizer 2008, 34). The Eisenhower Administration and Republican Old Guard in Congress had convinced a majority of members that nuclear weapons represented the silver bullet needed to maintain security while balancing the budget and preserving America’s economic solvency (nuclear weapons had become a panacea), and only a small Democratic minority
questioned the feasibility of this (Trachtenberg 1991, 151). It was within this context in late 1953 and early 1954 that the Army found itself, a context where the administration and a majority in Congress were willing to approve budget items related only to fighting either a general or limited nuclear war. Within this context, the Army made its doctrinal shift in September 1954 to incorporate the use of tactical nuclear weapons.

This hypothesis passes a smoking gun sufficiency test. There is sufficient evidence to show that the administration’s and Congress’ political support of nuclear-related budget items contributed to the Army making this doctrinal shift. Gen. Maxwell Taylor, the Army Chief of Staff who followed Gen. Ridgway, stated that he directed an additional modification to the 1954 edition of FM 100-5 to further embed nuclear weapons specifically because spending on nuclear weapons had become so appealing to the public as well as to Congress (Taylor 1972, 171). In other words, he admitted using the Army’s capstone doctrine to secure more resources for the Army. The only spending that was politically acceptable during this period was on nuclear-related items, so the Army leadership went ahead and decided to further increase the nuclear-related content of its capstone doctrine.

Like the previous hypothesis, I assess that this hypothesis has an overall moderate level of certainty. There is a high level of congruence between the evidence and the hypothesis, and there is sufficient evidence to show that struggles over the Army budget had an impact on doctrinal decisions in this case.

*Domestic Politics Hypothesis 5 (DP H5): outcomes of struggles between civilian politicians that result in restrictions on the type and duration of military force will shape expectations about likely Army involvement in future conflicts and constrain Army doctrinal choice sets.*

There is a moderate level of congruence between this hypothesis and the nuclear shift in Army doctrine, and it passes a smoking gun sufficiency test. Republicans who came to power after
the general election of 1952 promised to follow a different path than Democrats who had been in power during WWII and the Korean War (Gaddis 1982, 127; Snyder 1962, 485, 492). Republicans promised not to commit America to costly ground wars again. A Republican administration would use nuclear weapons to deter aggressors, and thus avoid future wars. In the unlikely event that deterrence failed, the administration announced that any war, large or small, would still be nuclear. In this manner, they intended to make conventional war impossible for any would-be aggressor to either start or to fight (Huntington 1961, 74). After these promises and policies were made, both during the campaign in 1952 and during the first year of the Eisenhower presidency, the Army then made its shift to incorporate tactical nuclear weapons into its capstone doctrine in 1954. It did not, however, completely discard doctrine that might still have been needed to fight either a large or small conventional war, nor did it adopt doctrine to account for its new civil defense role assigned by the president and NSC as its more important primary mission – a mission to be performed in the aftermath of a US strategic nuclear attack delivered by the Air Force, however unlikely.

This hypothesis passes a smoking gun sufficiency test. There is sufficient evidence that Republican pronouncements and policies that the US would employ nuclear weapons in any future war, large or small, had an impact on Army doctrine decision-makers – causing them to believe that the likelihood and expectation of the use of nuclear weapons had grown so high for any type of future war that it was prudent to finally address their use in the Army’s capstone doctrine. This does not rule out other possibilities for why the Army may have made this shift, but it does create some certainty, although low, that the outcomes of political struggles between Republicans and Democrats over the type of war the Army should prepare to fight in the future had some impact on constraining or structuring Army doctrinal choices. Combined with a moderate amount of congruence, I assess that this hypothesis has some, although a low level of overall certainty for helping to explain the Army’s doctrinal shift in 1954.
International Political Factors.

International political factors with the most potential to affect Army doctrinal change in 1954 were related to US and Western European efforts to rearm Germany as part of an integrated European Defense Community, France’s deteriorating situation in Indochina, the death of Stalin, the end of the Korean War, and US and Soviet nuclear capabilities.

From 1949 to 1954, NATO powers, especially the US, Britain, and France, struggled with each other to find a way to allow Germany to rearm and contribute to the defense of Western Europe. The US and Britain were interested in any solution that would ultimately allow a reduction in their ground troop commitments, while the French were interested in finding any solution that would prevent any future German military resurgence (Dockrill 1996, 91; Eisenhower 1963, 245; Ikenberry 2001, 193). The French opposed allowing Germany to join NATO as an equal partner because this would have afforded Germany the opportunity to create and command German military units, opening the door for a possible resurgence of German military power. As an alternative, the French recommended instead the creation of a European Defense Community (EDC) (Haftendorn 2005; Ismay 2001; US Department of State 2016b). The European Defense Community (EDC) was envisioned as a pan-European army that would have integrated individual German soldiers into units mixed with soldiers from other Western European nations. Mixed EDC units would then augment and serve under NATO command. An EDC treaty was finally reached and signed by all NATO members in May of 1952. Over the next 15 months, all NATO member nation legislatures voted to ratify the EDC treaty except for France (Haftendorn 2005). US efforts to promote French ratification affected US defense policy during this period. In return for promises of French ratification, the US made guarantees that it would maintain its ground troop strength in Western Europe (Eisenhower 1963, 244; Trachtenberg 1991, 166). The French were concerned that a reduction in US troop strength would lead other NATO allies to reduce their
strength as well, eventually leaving France alone on the continent to defend itself against any future German military resurgence (Eisenhower 1963, 245). The French were concerned also with American and British suggestions that an increase in the ability and willingness to use nuclear weapons against the Soviets could allow for a decrease in conventional ground troop strength. The idea that the Americans and British were willing to turn Western Europe into a nuclear battlefield did not sit well with the French, nor the Germans for that matter (Ikenberry 2001, 166). In exchange for EDC ratification, the French requested that the US increase its support to France’s efforts to defeat the Viet Minh and maintain its colonial power in Indochina (Eisenhower 1963, 400; George and Smoke 1974, 249). The US agreed to provide supplies, equipment, and limited air and naval support. However, it was not willing to provide ground troops, nor could it find any utility for using nuclear weapons against the decentralized Viet Minh (George and Smoke 1974, 248). Even if the US had been willing to contribute ground troops, the French were not interested anyways. They did not want the US to become overly involved and potentially interfere with French colonial objectives – objectives the US did not necessarily support – although the US was interested in preventing the loss of Indochina to either Soviet or Chinese influence – especially after the loss of China, and especially after the North Korean invasion of South Korea (George and Smoke 1974, 259). Despite the limited US military aid to the French, and French promises of EDC ratification, the French parliament ultimately voted against the treaty in August of 1954 (Eisenhower 1963, 402). The only remaining viable alternative for the NATO allies at that point was then to allow Germany to join NATO and contribute German units commanded by German officers, something the US and Britain had supported as early as 1949, and something that the French finally yet reluctantly agreed to in October of 1954 (Eisenhower 1963, 408-409).

Germany then agreed to contribute 12 divisions (560,000 soldiers) to the common NATO defense when they were invited to join in October 1954. However, the first German division was
not ready for duty until 1957, and Germany never actually reached its required troop strength of 12 divisions (Haftendorn 2005; Ismay 2001). The US New Look policy to cut defense budgets and troop strength depended in part upon a full German contribution of troops and for other NATO troops to stand up, so that American troops could stand down (Dockrill 1996, 70-71, 82; Gaddis 1982, 153). This did not happen as planned, however, seriously hampering Eisenhower’s plans to reduce troop strength in Europe during his presidency (Trachtenberg 1991, 166).

The death of Joseph Stalin and the end of the Korean War gave Western powers hope that an easing of international tensions might be possible (Huntington 1961, 65, 87). Joseph Stalin, who had ruled the Soviet Union for 28 years, died on March 5, 1953. US and West European leaders anticipated that Stalin’s passing would usher in an era of détente with the Soviets (Eisenhower 1963, 144). This hope reinforced US as well as West European reluctance to continue working toward troop level commitments agreed to by NATO members in Lisbon in 1952 when Stalin was still in power. Allies that originally planned to achieve specific force levels by 1954 continued to delay or stretch out the date when these force levels were projected to be achieved – if at all (Ismay 2001). The British began to argue that NATO conventional force levels were either unachievable or had now become unnecessary (Dockrill 1996, 85; Snyder 1962, 388). Newly elected President Eisenhower and prominent members of the Republican Party in Congress used the death of Stalin to promote the idea among Americans that large numbers of US troops in Europe may no longer be necessary as well (Dockrill 1996, 18). On the other hand, the French continued to argue that the US and UK keep large numbers of troops in Western Europe, not because they had been concerned about an aggressive Soviet Union, but because they wanted to hedge against future German resurgence (Eisenhower 1963, 245). The death of Stalin simply reinforced the idea that Germany, not the Soviet Union, was the real threat to France and the reason that it continued to demand that the US and UK maintain significant numbers of ground troops in
Western Europe (Eisenhower 1963, 400).

Allied hopes that international tensions would ease after the death of Stalin and the end of the Korean War were short-lived. On August 1st, just four days after the Korean armistice was signed, the Soviet Union successfully tested its first hydrogen bomb. This Soviet achievement came just ten months after the US tested its first hydrogen bomb – leading defense experts in the US and allied NATO countries to conclude that the gap in US and Soviet nuclear capabilities was rapidly closing, and that a condition of nuclear parity between the two superpowers would become possible (Knorr 1959, 7). Nuclear parity between the US and the Soviet Union would mean that the US might not be able to deter Soviet conventional military advances around the world with threats of massive nuclear retaliation. If the Soviets gained the capability to respond to a US nuclear strike in kind under conditions of nuclear parity, then US threats of massive retaliation would lose some, if not all, credibility (Knorr 1959, 11). If the US were unable to deter Soviet aggression with nuclear weapons, then the US and its allies might be forced to match the Soviets and its communist allies such as China in conventional capability as well (Ridgway 1956, 325-326; Taylor 1972, 165).

Despite the end of the Korean War, China continued to support nationalist movements in Asia (George and Smoke, 1974, 237). They provided significant material support to the Viet Minh battling the French in Indochina. The US threatened nuclear retaliation against the Chinese if they intervened directly in Indochina, but did not threaten the Chinese with retaliation for continued material support (George and Smoke 1974, 246). Although the Eisenhower Administration considered directly intervening in Indochina with US ground troops to relieve the French, it realized that this would take more troops than had been used to fight the war in Korea – something that would not have been politically acceptable for President Eisenhower given his campaign promises to avoid costly ground wars of this type (Ridgway 1956, 274-278).
Analysis of International Politics Hypotheses.

*International Politics Hypothesis 1 (IP H1): US policy-makers will require the Army to develop and implement doctrine that supports the establishment or maintenance of US alliance institutions.*

There is no congruence between US policy-maker efforts to establish or maintain alliance institutions and the Army’s doctrinal shift to incorporate nuclear weapons in 1954, and there is no evidence to support either a hoop necessary conditions or smoking gun sufficiency test. During the two years that preceded the release of FM 100-5 in September of 1954, the US was engaged in an effort with its Western European allies to establish a European Defense Community as part of NATO. As mentioned earlier, this was an institutional solution to incorporate German soldiers into the alliance effort without the need for German command over German troops. This was a solution offered by the French as an alternative to allowing Germany to join NATO as a full member – something that would require German command. In exchange for its promise to ratify the EDC treaty, the French requested that the US and the UK keep significant numbers of ground troops in Western Europe for at least 20 years. The US worked hard to convince the French that it was committed to maintaining a large troop presence in Europe, while behind the scenes, however, it was preparing to cut its Army personnel strength in Europe while increasing its reliance on nuclear weapons. President Eisenhower told his secretaries of state and defense, as well as the NSC, that the US needed to keep its plans to replace troops in Europe with nuclear weapons quiet until the French ratified the EDC treaty – then the US could announce and begin troop withdrawals (Trachtenberg 1991, 168). The Army chief of staff warned against replacing troops with nuclear weapons. He argued that this would ultimately weaken the NATO alliance. France and West Germany expressed concern over the prospect of turning Europe into a nuclear battlefield. Additionally, there was significant concern among senior Army leaders that the perception of a weakened US ground troop commitment could lead US allies in turn to weaken their commitment
(Knorr 1959, 5; Kolodziej 1966, 213). Therefore, because incorporating nuclear weapons into Army doctrine might have actually undermined or even weakened the NATO alliance, it does not stand to reason that US policymakers would have required the Army to make such a doctrinal shift in some kind of effort to improve or maintain the alliance.

**International Politics Hypothesis 2 (IP H2): changes in the military balance of power and capabilities among real and potential US adversaries, as well as its allies, will correspond to a change in the internal balance of US military power and capabilities, including those of its Army and its doctrine.**

Like the previous hypothesis, there is no congruence between this hypothesis and the shift in Army doctrine in 1954, and there is no hoop or smoking gun evidence to support it. There is, however, smoking gun evidence to disprove it. The Eisenhower Administration made the argument that a general easing of international tensions would follow from the death of Stalin in March 1953, and the end of the Korean War in July of that same year, and that an easing of tensions warranted a reduction in US defense spending consistent with the administration’s New Look policies to maintain security while providing economic solvency. There was no easing of international tensions, however (Dockrill 1996, 26; Gaddis 1982, 141). The Soviets successfully detonated a hydrogen bomb in August 1953, and continued to expand their conventional forces in Europe. By 1953, the Eisenhower Administration estimated that the Soviets had 175 divisions deployed in Eastern Europe, while the US and its NATO allies had only 34 (Eisenhower 1963, 453). In Asia, tensions remained with continued Chinese support to the Viet Minh battling the French for control of Indochina.

The Eisenhower Administration’s New Look policy, however, with its turn to nuclear weapons, was based on an assumption that international tensions were relaxing and the US would maintain a nuclear monopoly, or at least keep a distinct nuclear advantage over any potential
aggressor. In order for US threats of massive retaliation to work and deter conventional attacks, presumably the aggressor would not be able to strike back, or US threats of massive retaliation would then lack credibility. With the Soviet’s successful detonation of a hydrogen bomb within just 10 months of the US’s first successful test, it became apparent that the Soviets were closing the nuclear weapons gap, and nuclear parity between the US and the Soviets was quickly becoming a possibility. Under nuclear parity, it would be possible for both the US and the Soviets to mutually deter each other. At the point of mutual nuclear deterrence, it would become difficult if not impossible for the US to effectively deter Soviet conventional aggression. President Eisenhower’s New Look policies ignored this growing possibility (Friedberg 2000, 71, 133), however, and continued to operate under the assumption of a US nuclear monopoly – moving forward with significant US conventional force cuts – especially cuts to the Army.

The Eisenhower Administration argued that it would be impossible to match the Soviets or Chinese gun for gun, tank for tank, or soldier for soldier, and that nuclear deterrence would be the most efficient means by which either to deter war, or win war if it became necessary (Snyder 1962, 466). President Eisenhower stated that, “whether we added 5 or 20 divisions to Europe, it would not make much of a difference against the Soviet’s 175” (Eisenhower 1963, 453). The administration took this logic a step further. The president said that military policy should be determined with less regard for external events and world affairs, deemphasizing the external, and reversing the traditional basis of military policy-making (Snyder 1962, 474-475). According to Glenn Snyder and other scholars, President Eisenhower’s New Look policy ignored the international balance of power, and instead based its force levels, defense spending, and even military strategy on internal domestic economic goals and requirements (Gaddis 1982, 147; Huntington 1961, 68-69; Kolodziej 1966, 197, 206; Snyder 1962, 497-500; Weigley 1977, 405). President Eisenhower’s statements, along with this scholarly consensus, provides smoking gun
evidence that Eisenhower ignored or downplayed changes in the international balance of power and capabilities among real and potential US adversaries as well as allies when implementing his New Look policies. Based on this evidence, I assess that there is no congruence between the military balance of power and the Army’s doctrinal shift, nor is there any evidence of necessary or sufficient balance of power conditions that could have contributed to this doctrinal shift.

**Bureaucratic Political Factors.**

The Army’s situation as a federal bureaucracy changed rapidly and dramatically during the first two years of the Eisenhower Administration from 1953-1954. Army roles, budget, and personnel strengths were all significantly reduced. Before 1953, the Army often had been the decisive branch of the US armed forces. US victory or defeat in wartime and the achievement of its political objectives often were decided by Army success or failure on the battlefield. As such, the Army traditionally held a higher priority of roles and resources over the other services. As recently as WWII and the Korean War, it was the Army that conducted the majority of combat operations. Naval and air forces provided support to these Army operations. This traditional Army role changed within the first year of the Eisenhower Administration. The new policy of massive nuclear retaliation delivered by air as the primary means for deterring threats, meant that air forces, not ground forces, had now become the decisive US armed force. The policy of massive retaliation had effectively reversed Army and Air Force roles (Snyder 1962, 468). This meant that the US would no longer need to maintain a large and costly Army. The only remaining role for the Army under massive retaliation would be the restoration of a defeated enemy’s civilian order in the aftermath of a US nuclear attack (Bacevich 1986, 27; Gaddis 1982, 166; Kretchik 2011, 167). The preparation and conduct of land combat operations on the scale of WWII or even Korea would no longer be required as a mission the Army would need to perform. In theory, the prevention or
outcome of any future war could now be decided by the Air Force and its delivery of strategic nuclear weapons.

The policy of massive retaliation provided the Eisenhower Administration with a justification for reducing the overall defense budget. In the first two years of the new administration, the overall defense budget was reduced from $41 to $30 billion. Although Air Force and Navy budgets and personnel were reduced, the Army’s share of the cuts was disproportionate. 76% of all defense budget cuts made from 1954-1955 came from the Army (Ridgway 1956, 273). The Army’s overall budget was reduced 31% from $12.8 billion for FY 54 to $8.8 billion for FY 55 (Eisenhower 1963, 452). Cuts to the Air Force were made primarily in troop transport aircraft and close air-to-ground tactical aircraft used to move and directly support Army forces – Army forces that would no longer be needed according to the administration (Ridgway 1956, 313-316). Savings realized by reducing air support to Army ground forces were reinvested into the Air Force budget for long range bombers capable of threatening the delivery of America’s strategic nuclear arsenal (Gavin 1958, 150; Huntington 1961, 83).

The Army did not easily accept its significantly reduced role in the nation’s defense. Almost overnight the Army went from the branch of the armed forces that had led most of America’s war efforts to one that was now told that its most important function was preparing to clean up in the aftermath of an Air Force nuclear attack (Bacevich 1986, 39). From 1953-1954, Army leadership, particularly Army Chief of Staff Ridgway, worked hard behind the scenes through available bureaucratic channels to make the case as to why air power alone, even when delivering nuclear weapons, was not sufficient to deter aggression, or to win a war and achieve any meaningful political objective should deterrence fail (Ridgway 1953a, b, c; Snyder 1962, 487).

In order to reduce defense spending to the levels promised, however, the Eisenhower Administration needed to significantly reduce the Army’s budget and personnel. That is where
most of the savings in defense had to come from if a New Look policy was to be realized (Ridgway 1956, 273). It was within this context that Adm. Radford recommended to the administration that it consider allowing the Army to employ tactical nuclear weapons whenever it could offer a military advantage on the battlefield (Snyder 1962, 437). In this way, the administration would be able to diffuse the Army’s arguments against budget and personnel cuts. By authorizing the Army to use tactical nuclear weapons, it was giving the Army a tool with which it could fight on the modern battlefield, but without the need for maintaining a large and expensive force. If it accepted Radford’s suggestion, the administration would now be able to state that it was reducing the Army’s budget and personnel strength not because it had decided that the Army would now simply be needed as a civil defense clean-up force after a nuclear war, but because it would now be allowing Army commanders to employ tactical nuclear weapons. The advent and authority to use tactical nuclear weapons would now be the reason that the administration would use to justify Army cuts, instead of simply arguing that the Army would be needed only as a civil defense force (Huntington 1961, 74). By changing their justification for Army cuts, the administration believed it could finally gain the Army’s support – something that was politically important for the new administration and the legitimacy of its New Look policies (Snyder 1962, 437).

Adm. Radford’s recommendation adopted by the NSC in October 1953 gave the administration the additional justification it needed to cut the Army’s budget and reduce its personnel strength, and foreclosed any further Army arguments against personnel cuts (Taylor 1972, 165). The problem with the administration’s new justification for Army cuts, however, was that the Army leadership believed that more, not fewer, soldiers and conventional military equipment would be needed to succeed on any battlefield where tactical nuclear weapons would be employed (Snyder 1962, 439). In a sense, the argument that the Army would require fewer soldiers now that it had the authority to use tactical nuclear weapons backfired on the
administration. Providing the Army this new authority actually provided the Army with more, not fewer, reasons for opposing personnel cuts.

**Analysis of the Bureaucratic Politics Hypothesis.**

*Bureaucratic politics hypothesis (BP H): changes in Army doctrine correspond to attempts by the Army or its internal branches to protect or increase missions or roles, resources, or autonomy at the expense of, or relative to, the other services or branches.*

This hypothesis has a high level of congruence with the shift in Army doctrine in 1954, and it passes a hoop test and a smoking gun test. Army roles, resources, and autonomy were under attack by President Eisenhower beginning with his presidential campaign. He stated during the campaign, again during his transition, and again after assuming office that the US could not afford to maintain a large standing army, that costly ground wars of the future would be avoided thanks to his administration’s willingness to threaten the use of nuclear weapons, and that the Army of the future would be needed only to restore civil order in the aftermath of a strategic nuclear attack delivered by the Air Force – a war that Eisenhower believed was highly unlikely in the first place. From FY 54 to FY 55, the administration made decisions to cut the Army’s budget by 31% and its personnel by 33%. Between June and October of 1953, President Eisenhower approved NSC recommendations to use the threat of massive nuclear retaliation delivered by the Air Force to prevent future wars or to win them if deterrence failed. He also approved a policy giving the Army broad discretion to employ tactical nuclear weapons on the battlefield as a means of fighting a ground war, however unlikely, with fewer soldiers. During this period, the Army saw its resources, roles, and autonomy shrink, while the Air Force’s expanded. The Army was being transformed from the branch of service that often decided the outcome of wars to an auxiliary service whose only real purpose would have been clean-up in the aftermath of a war fought and decided by the Air Force. The only new funding that the administration and Congress would approve for the
Army, i.e., the only way the Army could try to limit the reduction of its resources, was to request items for use in battles that would involve tactical nuclear weapons. The timing of administration decisions to significantly and rapidly reduce Army resources, roles, and autonomy, with the exception of items related to fighting limited nuclear battles, is highly congruent with the Army’s doctrinal shift in September 1954.

During this same period, the Army’s armor branch, which had suffered progressive cutbacks since the end of WWII, argued that its forces would be more capable than any of the Army’s other branches to fight and win battles involving tactical nuclear weapons. Its leaders argued in nine separate articles published in the Armor & Cavalry Journal between 1952 and 1954 that armor, including tanks, armored personnel carriers, and self-propelled artillery, were well suited for fighting battles in relative proximity to small nuclear blasts, either friendly or enemy, based on both the protection and the mobility that armored vehicles and forces provided (US Armor Association 1952-1954). The US Army Infantry School, on the other hand, had published only three articles in its quarterly journal during this same period, but simply with the purpose of providing infantrymen information about the effects of nuclear weapons. These articles did not in any way argue that infantry was better suited to operate under atomic warfare conditions than any other branch of the Army (US Army Infantry School 1952-1954).

This hypothesis passes a hoop necessary conditions test. There is evidence that shows that administration decisions to reduce Army conventional roles, resources, and autonomy, while allowing it to realize some growth related only to fighting limited nuclear battles, created a narrow hoop or necessary condition that Army doctrine decision-makers jumped through. If the administration had decided not to allow the Army to employ tactical nuclear weapons, i.e., if it did not see any role for the Army fighting in any type of nuclear or post-nuclear battle, the Army would not have had any reason to incorporate tactical nuclear weapons into its doctrine. In other
words, if the administration had not created conditions requiring the Army to request resources related to fighting in a nuclear environment, or request no resources at all, it is unlikely that Army leaders would have thought it necessary to make a corresponding doctrinal shift.

This hypothesis passes a smoking gun sufficiency test. There is sufficient evidence to show that Army Chief of Staff Ridgway and other senior leaders believed that the use of tactical nuclear weapons on the battlefield would require more, not fewer personnel and equipment. By embracing the use of tactical nuclear weapons and incorporating them into Army doctrine, Gen. Ridgway saw an opportunity to fight to preserve Army personnel strength and conventional equipment – such as the armored and mechanized vehicles best suited for fighting in nuclear battles. Gen. Ridgway stated in his memoirs that he had set out to modify Army doctrine to include tactical nuclear weapons, not as a means to support or justify administration cutbacks, but as a means to fight against them (Ridgway 1956, 296). Gen. Gavin too, stated that the Army should embrace tactical nuclear weapons as a means to preserve its personnel and equipment, not as a way to justify reductions (Gavin 1958, 151). Gen. Maxwell Taylor, the Army Chief of Staff who followed Gen. Ridgway, stated that he directed an additional modification to the 1954 edition of FM 100-5 to further embed nuclear weapons into the doctrine specifically because spending on nuclear weapons had become so appealing to the public as well as to Congress (Taylor 1972, 171). Several scholars came to the same conclusion that the Army made a doctrinal shift in 1954 in an effort to fight for more resources (Kretchik 2011, 169; Snyder 1962, 439; Trachtenberg 1991, 157; Trauschweizer 2008, 2, 6, 46-47). Senior Army leader statements, combined with supporting scholarly conclusions, represent smoking gun evidence that the Army made its doctrinal shift in 1954, at least in part, for the specific purpose of securing more resources relative to the other armed services.
1954 case summary and conclusion.

A summary of my assessment of each political hypothesis is reflected in Table 2 below. I assess with an overall high level of certainty that bureaucratic politics had an effect on the Army’s doctrinal shift in 1954, and assess with an overall moderate level of certainty that domestic politics had an impact. However, I was unable to find evidence to determine with any level of certainty whether international politics had an impact on the Army’s doctrinal shift in this case.

<table>
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<th>Hypothesis</th>
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Table 2 (Case #1 – 1954: Political hypotheses certainty assessments)

I assess there is an overall high level of congruence between the evidence in this case and the bureaucratic politics hypothesis, and there is both necessary and sufficient evidence that together provide this hypothesis with an overall high level of certainty in this case. Senior Army leader statements and supporting scholarly conclusions that the Army used the 1954 doctrine to garner more resources and roles and to protect itself from resource cuts relative to the other services is smoking gun evidence that creates a high level of certainty that bureaucratic politics had an impact in causing the Army to make a doctrinal shift in 1954 that it may not otherwise have made.

I assess that there is an overall moderate level of congruence between the evidence in this case and the domestic politics hypotheses, as well as some necessary and sufficient evidence.
Fulfillment of campaign promises to reduce the defense budget and attempt to avoid costly ground wars by relying more on the threat of nuclear weapons caused the administration to drastically cut Army personnel, but then expand the Army’s authority to employ tactical nuclear weapons as a substitute – prompting the Army to make this doctrinal shift to include nuclear weapons use.

There was no congruence between the evidence presented in this case and the hypothesis that policy-makers would require the Army to use doctrine to support an alliance institution. NSC decisions to substitute Army personnel with tactical nuclear weapons were made without the knowledge or support of key NATO allies, in part, because the president himself feared this would undermine the alliance.

There was no congruence between the evidence presented here and the hypothesis that changes in the military balance of power would cause a corresponding shift in doctrine. Eisenhower’s New Look strategy of replacing conventional forces with nuclear forces assumed the persistence of a US nuclear monopoly. However, as the Soviet nuclear arsenal grew and improved during this period, nuclear parity became a real possibility. Under parity, a Soviet conventional attack became feasible again because massive US nuclear retaliation would not go unanswered by the Soviets, in turn deterring US nuclear threats. Under parity, the US would need to either maintain or increase its conventional posture, not reduce it. The Army doctrinal shift to replace conventional doctrine and capabilities with nuclear doctrine and capabilities does not reflect a balance of power under nuclear parity.

Overall, I assess with a high level of certainty that the Army’s need to protect itself as a bureaucracy helped cause it to make a doctrinal shift that it may not otherwise have made in 1954. I assess with a moderate level of certainty that the outcomes of domestic political struggles also contributed in some way to cause the Army to make this shift that it may not otherwise have made. And finally, I assess that the outcome of politics between nations during this period did not
contribute to cause the Army to make this doctrinal shift.
CHAPTER 4 – 1962 CASE STUDY

The 1962 edition of the Army’s capstone doctrine, Field Manual 100-5, changed significantly in content from the previous edition published in 1954. The content of the 1954 edition was focused almost exclusively on mid-intensity conventional and high-intensity nuclear warfare (US Army 1954). It devoted just 2 of 228 pages to low-intensity unconventional warfare content. The 1962 edition, however, added two additional chapters, or 20% of new doctrinal content, to low-intensity warfare (Birtle 2006, 240; US Army 1962). The doctrinal shift in this direction was so significant that the March 1962 edition of Army magazine “devoted extensive coverage to the noticeable shift from conventional to unconventional warfare in the service’s doctrine” (Kretchik 2011, 185). The purpose of this case study, like the others, is to determine the extent to which politics may have influenced this doctrinal shift. A consideration of politics at the domestic, international, and bureaucratic levels of analysis can shed light on who or what may have had the power to cause this doctrinal shift to occur when it did.

Through this case study, the extent to which domestic, international, or bureaucratic politics did or did not affect this Army doctrinal shift in 1962 is better understood. I assess based on the evidence presented in this case that domestic politics had some impact on this doctrinal shift, that international politics had little to no impact, and I found no indication that bureaucratic politics had any impact on this shift. An exploration of politics in this case confirms the findings of some previous doctrine studies, while providing insights that other studies or approaches might have missed. Unlike Barry Posen’s study of interwar French, British, and German militaries in The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars, I did not find that civilians intervened to impose doctrinal change in response to changes in the balance of power in the international system, but I did find that the president intervened to impose doctrinal
change for domestic political purposes. While Soviet challenges to US interests in the Third World had not changed and were not new, and while there were no large changes in the international balance of power leading up to the 1960 presidential elections that could have driven a shift in Army doctrine, Candidate Kennedy made promises while running for president to improve the US military’s ability to meet Soviet military challenges on the ground with resources and troops short of threatening nuclear war. Once in office, he intervened to fulfill these promises by directing changes to Army doctrine. Unlike a conclusion reached by Stephen Peter Rosen in *Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military*, I did not find evidence that senior civilian or military leaders established favorable conditions such as promotion pathways in an effort to embed this new doctrine within the organization. Like my previous case study, I focused only on the period leading up to the adoption of the doctrine and did not explore whether or not senior leaders made later efforts to embed the change. In contrast to Deborah Avant in *Political Institutions and Military Change: Lessons from Peripheral Wars*, I did not find that the Army attempted to resist the president’s efforts to direct this doctrinal change. I did find, however, that the Army initially was reluctant to make these doctrinal changes until their most senior leaders were ordered to do so by the president.

This case study proceeds in two parts. First, I summarize relevant domestic, international, and bureaucratic political factors during this period that may have had an impact on Army doctrine decision-making. Second, I assess the impact of these factors in accordance with the predicted outcomes of the eight political hypotheses I developed in Chapter 2 (Explaining Army Doctrine). I analyze each for congruence with the doctrinal change itself. Where congruence is detected, I then conduct process-tracing hoop and smoking gun tests to measure the degree to which individual political factors may have affected doctrinal change as predicted by my hypotheses.
Domestic Political Factors.

The domestic political factors with the most potential to impact the content of the 1962 edition of FM 100-5 include the national security debate surrounding the US presidential campaign and election of 1960, the new Kennedy Administration’s efforts to fulfill its national security-related campaign promises in 1961, as well as budget reforms and measures to increase civilian control of the military implemented by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara.

During the 1960 campaign, then Senator John F. Kennedy criticized the Eisenhower Administration’s New Look national security strategy for relying too much on the deterrent effect of massive nuclear retaliation while allowing conventional warfare capabilities to atrophy. President Eisenhower’s strategy relied on nuclear weapons to prevent or deter war. It assumed that a large standing conventional army required to fight a war, a war that would theoretically never happen under nuclear deterrence, was no longer needed. This New Look nuclear deterrence concept justified reductions in the Army’s conventional capabilities, allowing President Eisenhower to sustain relatively low levels of defense spending to support tax cuts and other domestic Republican Party goals (Friedberg 2000, 127, 129).

Senator Kennedy pointed out during his campaign that while the threat of massive retaliation might be both necessary and useful for deterring or avoiding high-intensity general nuclear war, it had proved to be ineffective in deterring threats to US interests at the low- to mid-intensity levels of war (Bacevich 1986, 129; Krepinevich 1986, 27). As Sen. Kennedy stated during a campaign address in 1959, “our nuclear retaliatory power is not enough. It cannot deter Communist aggression, which is too limited to justify atomic war” (Blaufarb 1977, 53; Kennedy 1960, 185; Sorenson 1965, 629). He further argued that the use, or threat of use, of nuclear weapons in response to low-intensity threats was not feasible because any use of nuclear weapons might risk escalation to general war (Nash 2006, 123). According to Sen. Kennedy (1960, 184),
“we have been driving ourselves into a corner where the only choice is all or nothing at all, world devastation or submission…” In the words of Cold War historian Ivo Trauschweizer (2008, 173), “Eisenhower’s focus on economy of means and reliance on nuclear deterrence had left the US defenseless to all but the most dangerous forms of aggression.”

Sen. Kennedy proposed that the US adopt a national security strategy that would not only deter general nuclear war, but one that also would be capable of preventing threats at lower levels of conflict without risking escalation to nuclear war (Friedberg 2000, 71). In addition, he argued that the US should be taking initiatives of its own around the world – not just deterrent measures with the sole purpose of avoiding war. Sen. Kennedy wanted to find a strategy that would once again permit what he called “forward initiatives in policy” (Weigley 1977, 448), and to “reinstate into national security strategy a policy objective beyond war avoidance” (Trauschweizer 2008, 121), as well as “recover the ability to respond to local and limited aggression in order to regain the initiative in the Cold War” (Trauschweizer 2008, 173). Sen. Kennedy found the national security strategy he was looking for described in a 1960 book critical of massive retaliation entitled, *The Uncertain Trumpet*, by President Eisenhower’s former Army Chief of Staff Gen. Maxwell Taylor. Gen. Taylor’s critique of the Eisenhower strategy, and his recommendations for a more “flexible response” to national security challenges, were “seized upon by Democrats such as Kennedy” (Freedman 2000, 19). Sen. Kennedy told Gen. Taylor in April 1960, that “*The Uncertain Trumpet* had greatly influenced [my] thinking on policy and strategy” (Trauschweizer 2008, 121). Gen. Taylor’s proposed strategy would “give multiple choices to…political leaders,” and allow them to “cope with threats of many gradations, extending from subversive insurgency…to limited war – conventional or nuclear – and finally to unlimited nuclear war” (McMaster 1998, 10). According to Gen. Taylor (1960, 6):

The strategic doctrine which I propose to replace massive retaliation is called herein the
Strategy of Flexible Response. This name suggests the need for a capability to meet threats across the entire spectrum of possible challenge, for coping with anything from general atomic war to infiltration and aggressions such as threaten Laos and Berlin in 1959.

The Kennedy campaign adopted Gen. Taylor’s proposed strategy as its strategy. Flexible response called for increasing substantially the Army’s conventional capabilities to address low-to-mid-intensity threats and to sustain and even improve both offensive and defensive tactical and strategic nuclear capabilities. Sen. Kennedy recommended increasing US Strategic Air Command’s nuclear airborne early warning alert capability, accelerating production and development of the Minuteman intercontinental ballistic missile and the Polaris submarine-launched ballistic missile, as well as acquiring more conventional forces to address mid-to-low-intensity threats (Nash 2006, 123). In a speech on the Senate floor in June 1960, Sen. Kennedy argued that the US “must regain the ability to intervene effectively and swiftly in any limited war anywhere in the world [by] augmenting, modernizing, and providing increased mobility and versatility for the conventional forces and weapons of the Army…” (Kennedy 1960).

President Kennedy quickly took action after assuming office to fulfill his campaign promise of implementing a flexible response strategy at all levels along the spectrum of war – from high-to-mid-to low-intensity. He was determined to improve US conventional as well as unconventional warfare capabilities. He requested and received Congressional approval for defense budget supplements in March of 1961 for $1.95 billion to improve strategic nuclear weapons, $237 million in May to improve conventional force capabilities, and yet another $3.247 billion in July for an even greater expansion of conventional as well as unconventional capabilities. These budget supplements included an increase in the size of the Army from 858,000 to 975,000 to support an expansion of conventional Army divisions from 11 to 16, and an increase of Army special forces groups from three to six (Kolodziej 1966, 384-388, 392, 418).

The Kennedy Administration considered low-intensity warfare the least developed and
most vulnerable US capability, and would, therefore, be the level at which the Soviets would most likely to challenge the US and its allies (Freedman 2000, 27; Hilsman 1967, 413; Kolodziej 1966, 332). According to President Kennedy’s Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, “to the extent we deter the Soviet Union from initiating these larger wars we may anticipate even greater efforts on their part in the sub-limited war area” (Norman and Spore 1962, 43). It was in this area that the Soviets had the advantage and would continue taking the initiative where the US could not, unless the US developed a low-intensity warfare capability of its own (Hilsman 1962, 25; Schlesinger 1965, 240).

Because the Army was traditionally focused on mid-intensity conventional warfare (Weigley 1977), and had just spent eight years under President Eisenhower developing its capability for high-intensity nuclear warfare, President Kennedy believed that the Army would need a push or some encouragement to prompt it to fully develop a low-intensity warfare capability. President Kennedy did not waste time pursuing this. According to then US State Department Office of Operations and Research Director Roger Hilsman, one of the first things President Kennedy asked his staff after assuming office was, “what are we doing about guerrilla warfare?” (Hilsman 1967, 413). At his first National Security Council meeting on February 1, 1961, just 12 days after assuming office, President Kennedy directed the Department of Defense to increase its efforts across all the services, especially the Army, in low-intensity counterinsurgency warfare in Latin America and Southeast Asia (Freedman 2000, 288; Taylor 1972, 200; Weigley 1977, 456). He insisted that the Army approach counterinsurgency as a “whole new way of war” that must be developed from the ground up – a way of war in which it lacked experience, doctrine, training, equipment, and organization (Birtle 2006, 225; Gaddis 1982, 217; Hilsman 1967, 415; Krepinevich 1986, 31, 42). The president himself directed that the Army step up its counterinsurgency training and education programs, that counterinsurgency libraries be created at
all Army bases, that field grade Army officers receive counterinsurgency training and rotate through Vietnam or other low-intensity conflict theaters to be eligible for promotion to general officer (Doughty 1979, 26; Krepinevich 1986, 32; Taylor 1972, 202), and that the Army establish an office of special warfare (Norman and Spore 1962, 28). He even sent a letter directly to Army leadership directing they develop new counterinsurgency doctrine (Summers 1982, 73). Finally, he established his own White House Special Group – Counterinsurgency (SG-CI) to monitor the status of these initiatives. It consisted of Gen. Taylor as chairman, the president’s brother Attorney General Robert Kennedy, the deputy assistant secretary of state for political affairs, the deputy secretary of defense, the chairman of the joint chiefs, the CIA director, the US Agency for International Development director, and the US Information Agency director (Birtle 2006, 227; Hilsman 1967, 415; Krepinevich 1986, 30; Kretchik 2011, 185; Taylor 1972, 201; Weigley 1977, 455-457).

The president also sought the full support of Congress to promote and fund his counterinsurgency initiatives, telling legislators in a special address to Congress on March 28, 1961, that the nation needed “a greater ability to deal with guerrilla forces, insurgency, and subversion…” Addressing Congress a second time on the subject on May 25, 1961, he told members that he intended to expand “rapidly and substantially the existing forces for the conduct of…paramilitary operations and sub-limited unconventional wars” (Krepinevich 1986, 30). Kennedy’s efforts throughout 1961 to realize his campaign promises of expanding his flexible response strategy across the full spectrum of war – from high-intensity strategic nuclear war to the far end of low-intensity unconventional war – affected a significant change to Army doctrine in early 1962. According to Army historian Andrew Krepinevich (2011, 39), “as a result of the Kennedy Administration’s push in 1961, the 1962 edition of FM 100-5 contained two chapters relating to counterinsurgency.”
President Kennedy saw the need for civilians to gain greater control over the Department of Defense to realize his flexible response strategic goals and the requirements for achieving them. He saw the need to reshape the military to achieve the flexibility it would require to support his foreign policy initiatives, instead of waiting “for political circumstances to conform to a rigid military structure” (Freedman 2000, 290). Reshaping the military to meet more flexible and diverse foreign policy requirements was not a task that President Kennedy thought could be left to the military (Kolodziej 1966, 342). He and Secretary McNamara, therefore, took steps to enhance civilian control of the Department of Defense (Kolodziej 1966, 326, 420). They replaced all of President Eisenhower’s appointed joint chiefs of staff with their “own men who would be less likely to resist [the] administration’s defense policies” (McMaster 1998, 22), and leveraged the provisions of the 1958 Defense Reorganization Act to a greater extent than the previous administration in order to centralize civilian control under Secretary McNamara (Kolodziej 1966, 423; Poole 2013, 21).

The 1958 Defense Reorganization Act built on its predecessor 1947 and 1949 acts by further consolidating civilian control of the military under the secretary of defense, and Secretary McNamara fully leveraged this power to help realize the administration’s flexible response goals. The 1958 Act gave the secretary more authority and greater control of the four separate service secretaries, and enhanced the status of the chairman of the joint chiefs by giving him a formal fifth, and tiebreaking, vote among the four service chiefs. It enlarged the joint staff as a resource directly available to the secretary of defense, and formalized the existence of the military’s joint unified and specified commands (Kolodziej 1966, 351; Taylor 1960, 106-111). By leveraging the 1958 Act, Secretary McNamara effectively reduced the role of the services to administrative agencies providing trained forces to the joint commands under the direct control of the secretary of defense and the president (Weigley 1977, 449).
With civilian control of the military consolidated, President Kennedy then charged Secretary McNamara with two key requirements relating to the defense budget: 1) to develop force structures to meet a flexible response strategy without adhering to the use of President Eisenhower’s “misguided emphasis” on arbitrary budget ceilings (Gaddis 1982, 204, 225; Poole 2013, 26, 28), and 2) to procure and operate a force to meet the requirements of a flexible response strategy at the lowest possible cost by scrutinizing individual service budgets more closely (Kolodziej 1966, 349). To achieve these requirements, Secretary McNamara moved quickly to develop and implement revolutionary budget reforms within the Department of Defense known as the planning, programming, and budgeting system (DonVito 1969, 1-2; Gaddis 1982, 227; Kolodziej 1966, 343; Poole 2013, 21; Weigley 1977, 448). Where his defense secretary predecessors had developed budgets based on needs articulated by the individual services combined with a pre-determined budget ceiling for each, Secretary McNamara instead organized the defense budget around planned programs based on national security requirements – whether they involved more than one service or not. Under Secretary McNamara, the services were now required to justify budget items based on how they contributed to national security requirements and national defense programs – not on individual service programs. In this way, Secretary McNamara was able to reduce defense spending by avoiding redundant funding requests from multiple services.

Analysis of Domestic Politics Hypotheses.

*Domestic Politics Hypothesis 1 (DP H1): policies designed to fulfill national security-related campaign promises, and national security policies that are influenced by partisan party politics, structure and constrain Army doctrine decision-making.*

This hypothesis has a high level of congruence with the shift in Army doctrine in 1962, and there is evidence that allows it to pass a hoop necessary conditions test and a smoking gun
sufficiency test. Promises made during Senator Kennedy’s presidential campaign in 1960, and policies enacted to fulfill those campaign promises in 1961, were consistent with changes the Army made to its capstone doctrine in early 1962. During his campaign, Sen. Kennedy promised to implement a national security strategy that relied less on nuclear weapons, that would allow the US to address threats below the nuclear threshold without risking escalation to a nuclear conflict, and that would allow the US to begin taking initiatives abroad beyond deterrence or war avoidance. He promised to achieve these goals by implementing a strategy of flexible response – a strategy that would provide the US options to respond to threats at any level of war: from low- to mid- to high-intensity. The president requested, and received Congressional approval for, a $237 million defense budget supplement in May 1961, and another $3.247 billion in July of that same year to increase the number of conventional Army divisions from 11 to 16, and the number of special forces groups from three to six. He increased the size of the Army from 858,000 to 975,000, of which 109,500 would support the increase in conventional divisions, and 7,500 would support the increase of special forces groups. Additionally, President Kennedy issued directives to the Army to increase its low-intensity warfare training and education and to treat it as a primary mission for the entire conventional Army, not just as a contingency mission for the special forces branch. After these efforts on the president’s part to create a flexible strategy that could deal with threats to the US across the full spectrum of warfare, the Army then updated its capstone doctrine to reflect just that. FM 100-5 published on February 19, 1962, retained significant content on tactical nuclear warfare, significant content on mid-intensity conventional warfare, but added for the first time ever, two complete chapters, or 20% of its content, to low-intensity unconventional warfare.

This hypothesis passes a hoop test. There is evidence necessary to showing that the Army did not treat low-intensity unconventional warfare as a mission for the entire Army until after President Kennedy made his intent clear to the Army’s top commanders when he called them to the
Oval Office in late November 1961. Although he did not specifically tell the commanders to change the Army’s capstone doctrine in this meeting, he did tell them that the initiatives they had taken to increase the size of the special forces, and the amount of low-intensity warfare training made available to the officer corps, had not been enough to fully meet his intent. He expected the generals to implement changes that would impact the entire Army. An implied task for the Army after this meeting would, therefore, have been to update the content of its capstone doctrine – the doctrine that affects the entire Army. Passing this hoop test provides this hypothesis with a moderate degree of certainty that President Kennedy’s efforts to fulfill his campaign promises shaped or constrained Army doctrinal choice in 1962.

This hypothesis passes a smoking gun sufficiency test. Sen. Kennedy promised during his campaign to implement a strategy that would allow the US to “intervene effectively and swiftly in any limited war anywhere in the world [by] augmenting, modernizing, and providing increased mobility and versatility for the conventional forces and weapons of the Army” (Kennedy 1960). There is sufficient evidence to show that the President’s attempts to fulfill this promise contributed to causing the Army to treat low-intensity warfare as a service-wide mission and then include it in its capstone doctrine. As Army historian Colonel Harry Summers reported, “President Kennedy himself sent a letter to the Army which indicated a need for new doctrine and tactics” (Summers 1982, 73). These promises and this directive provide smoking gun evidence with a high level of certainty that actions taken to fulfill national-security related campaign promises had an impact on Army doctrine in 1962.

I assess that this hypothesis has an overall high level of certainty in this case given a high level of congruence, combined with a moderate level of certainty provided by evidence of necessary conditions, and a high level of certainty provided by evidence of sufficient conditions.
Domestic Politics Hypothesis 2 (DP H2): increased civilian control of the Department of Defense and military policy amplifies the influence that domestic politics has on Army doctrine decision-making.

This hypothesis has a high level of congruence, but fails to pass either a hoop test or smoking gun test. The Kennedy Administration exercised more control over the military and the Army when compared to the Eisenhower Administration. Secretary McNamara took measures to further consolidate civilian power within the Office of the Secretary of Defense and implemented significant budget reforms by leveraging provisions of the 1958 Department of Defense Reorganization Act. This gave him greater control over individual service secretaries and service budgets. The 1958 act also gave the chairman of the joint chiefs a vote among the four individual service chiefs. With the chairman answering directly to the secretary of defense and the president, combined with President Kennedy’s replacement of the chairman and service chiefs with officers he believed to be loyal supporters, this further enhanced the administration’s civilian control over the military. This increased control corresponds with the flexible response changes implemented by the Kennedy Administration. When the White House issued very specific flexible response strategy directives to the Army, such as a requirement to establish counterinsurgency libraries across the Army, the Army readily complied. When President Kennedy complained in November 1961 that the Army was not going far enough to meet the intent of flexible response, the Army took additional steps in an attempt to satisfy the president, including making significant changes to it capstone doctrine published in February 1962. According to Stephen Peter Rosen (1991, 100), “the attempt to create in the US Army the capability to combat communist insurgencies provides one of the best documented cases of high level civilian intervention.”

Even with this high level of congruence between civilian control and doctrinal shift, however, this hypothesis does not pass either a hoop necessary conditions or smoking gun sufficiency test. Although there is evidence that President Kennedy was directly involved in
specifying Army reforms to meet his campaign promises and promote his flexible response strategy, it is not clear that increased civilian control of the military provided by the 1958 Act, or Secretary McNamara’s use of it to consolidate civilian power in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, had anything to do with the doctrinal shift. Secretary McNamara’s reforms specifically affected the Army’s procurement of equipment and personnel, but not its operational doctrine.

According to Andrew Krepinevich (1986, 35), “the operational approach to counterinsurgency was left to the Army.” This meant that the most significant increases in civilian control, realized in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, probably did not have much of an impact on the Army’s operational doctrine after all. Although the president did intervene directly to promote specific Army doctrinal and operational changes, he may just as easily have done that without any institutional increases to civilian control. Therefore, increased civilian control was likely neither necessary nor sufficient to prompt the Army to make its significant changes to FM 100-5 in 1962, whereas the president’s direct intervention most likely was.

I assess that this hypothesis has an overall low level of certainty. Despite the high level of congruence this hypothesis has with the available evidence, when combined with the lack of evidence of either necessary or sufficient causation, there is some, although a very low, level of certainty.

*Domestic Politics Hypothesis 3 (DP H3): the outcome of domestic political struggles over Army personnel policy shapes the size of the Army, the amount of firepower and protection it requires, and where it can operate along a spectrum of war.*

There is no congruence between the available evidence and this hypothesis, nor does it pass any hoop or smoking gun tests. There were no struggles over personnel policies during this period. The Kennedy Administration’s increase of Army personnel strength from 858,000 to 975,000 was easily achieved without any changes to the nation’s draft or conscription policies (Lee and Parker
1977; Rostker 2006). Of these personnel increases, 109,500 were for the purpose of increasing the number of Army heavy mechanized and armor divisions from three to eight, and 7,500 were for increasing the number of special forces groups from three to six. It is true that increases in mechanized and armor divisions increased the armor protection and firepower for a significant portion of the Army, but there is no evidence to suggest that the administration or the Army chose to increase its mechanized and armor divisions just because it was receiving more personnel. Furthermore, the addition of these five heavy divisions could not have had an impact on the Army’s doctrine in 1962, as the 1962 doctrine reflected a shift in the opposite direction toward low-intensity unconventional warfare ill-suited for heavy mechanized and armored units. Also, the addition of three special forces groups would not have had an impact on changes made to the 1962 edition of FM 100-5 either, as those changes were tailored toward low-intensity unconventional warfare doctrine for use by the entire conventional Army. Low-intensity unconventional warfare doctrine specifically tailored for use by special forces, contained in the Army’s subordinate counterinsurgency manual, already existed prior to the release of the 1962 edition of FM 100-5 (Kretchik 2011).

*Domestic Politics Hypothesis 4 (DP H4): outcomes of political struggles over the annual Army budget can constrain or shape Army doctrinal choice.*

Like the previous hypothesis, there is no congruence between the available evidence and this hypothesis, nor does it pass any hoop or smoking gun tests. There is no evidence of any significant political struggle over the Army budget during this period. Congress overwhelmingly supported each of the Kennedy Administration’s flexible response defense budget supplements. The only evidence of Congressional opposition to President Kennedy’s budget requests came from Representative Vinson who thought that the administration should have asked for more. Also,
there was little to no congruence between the budget supplements and the direction that FM 100-5 moved in. In 1961, the president requested and Congress approved $1.95 billion to improve strategic nuclear weapons, $237 million improvements in conventional force capabilities, and another $3.247 billion in July to expand the number of Army heavy mechanized and armor divisions.

**Domestic Politics Hypothesis 5 (DP H5): outcomes of struggles between civilian politicians that result in restrictions on the type and duration of military force will shape expectations about likely Army involvement in future conflicts, and constrain Army doctrinal choice sets.**

There is a high level of congruence between the available evidence and this hypothesis, and it passes a smoking gun sufficiency test. The Eisenhower Administration’s strategy of massive retaliation meant in part that the Army would not become involved in a land war unless it were allowed to use tactical nuclear weapons. This may explain why Gen. Decker, the incumbent Army Chief of Staff from the Eisenhower Administration, recommended against committing ground troops to Laos in early 1961, unless the president was prepared to allow the Army to employ tactical nuclear weapons. Gen. Decker’s recommendation was consistent with President Eisenhower’s New Look strategy and the Army’s 1954 edition of FM 100-5 focused on mid-intensity conventional to high-intensity nuclear warfare. After the presidential campaign in 1960 – in large part based on criticisms of President Eisenhower’s massive retaliation strategy – the Kennedy Administration implemented a flexible response strategy that would commit the Army at any level of conflict without depending on the use of nuclear weapons. The 1962 edition of FM 100-5, with its two chapters and 20% of its content focused on low-intensity unconventional warfare, is congruent with this change in strategy.

This hypothesis passes a smoking gun test. There is sufficient evidence to show that if President Kennedy had not demanded that the entire Army do more to prepare to fight low-
intensity unconventional war, and if he had not made it clear that they would have to be prepared
do so without relying on nuclear weapons, it is unlikely that the Army would have made such a
sudden doctrinal shift in this direction. The president made remarks throughout his campaign and
after coming into office to reinforce this. For example, during his campaign he stated that, “we
must regain the ability to intervene effectively and swiftly in any limited war anywhere in the
world – augmenting, modernizing and providing increased mobility and versatility for the
conventional forces and weapons of the Army,” and that, “our nuclear retaliatory power is not
enough. It cannot deter Communist aggression which is too limited to justify atomic war”
(Kennedy 1960, 183-184). Later, after assuming office, he stated in a special address to Congress
in March 1961, that we must “strengthen the capacity to meet limited and guerrilla warfare….We
must be ready to deal with any size of force, including small externally supported bands of men”
(Blaufarb 1977, 55). These pronouncements by the president, prescribing and restricting the type
of future wars, and the manner in which they would be fought, signaled his intent to the Army and
constrained its doctrinal choices. In other words, President Kennedy shaped senior Army leader
expectations about the possible direction of future war, and contributed to shaping Army doctrinal
choice in 1962. Therefore, I assess this hypothesis with an overall moderate level of certainty
based on the level of congruence and available evidence.

**International Political Factors.**

The international political factors with the most potential to affect Army doctrinal change in
1962 include how the US responded to a provocative speech made by Soviet Premier Nikita
Khrushchev, South Vietnamese requests for increased US military assistance, NATO member
concerns over President Kennedy’s new flexible response strategy, and a growing crisis in Europe
over the status of Berlin.
On January 6, 1961, during the Eisenhower to Kennedy Administration transition period, Soviet Premier Khrushchev gave what has come to be known as his “wars of national liberation” speech, pledging continued Soviet support for nationalist movements in the Third World (Birtle 2006, 223; Blaufarb 1977, 52; Kolodziej 1966, 327, 332; Krepinevich 1986, 29; Summers 1982, 71; Weigley 1977, 456). In his speech, Premier Khrushchev stated that:

There will be liberation wars as long as imperialism exists, as long as colonialism exists. Wars of this kind are revolutionary wars. Such wars are not only justified, they are inevitable….The peoples win freedom and independence only through struggle, including armed struggle….We recognize such wars. We have helped and shall continue to help people fighting for their freedom (Deitchman 1964, 33).

Soviet support for such movements was not new. The Soviets had been providing support to insurgencies and internal wars prior to 1960 in China, Korea, Southeast Asia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, the Middle East, the Congo, Greece, Hungary, Guatemala, Venezuela, Columbia, and Cuba (Blaufarb 1977, 52-53; Hilsman 1962, 23; Kennedy 1960, 184; Kolodziej 1966, 327, 383; Rostow 1962, 54; Taylor 1972, 200). What was new, was Sen. Kennedy’s promises made during his campaign to improve America’s ability to respond to such threats without relying exclusively on nuclear weapons. Relying on such disproportionate means, according to Army strategist Colonel Harry Summers, “would be like hunting fleas with an elephant gun” (Kretchik 2011, 175). Sen. Kennedy had said during his campaign that he wanted the ability to prevent the Soviets from “nibbling away at the fringe of the free world’s territory or strength” without having to resort to the use, or threat of use, of nuclear weapons (Kennedy 1960, 184). Although Kennedy had already made up his mind early in his campaign to improve America’s counterinsurgency and guerrilla warfare capability, Khrushchev’s speech in early January 1961 more than likely gave the incoming administration an additional impetus to move in this direction (Blaufarb 1977, 52; Freedman 2000, 287).

The first test of President Kennedy’s flexible response strategy was support to South East
Asia Treaty Organization member state South Vietnam. The nationalist insurgency that drove the French from Indochina in 1954 had consolidated in North Vietnam and had been threatening the sovereignty of South Vietnam since its independence from France in 1955. According to historian Russell Weigley (1977, 460), President Kennedy “regarded South Vietnam as something of a test of America’s ability to counter…wars of national liberation,” asking rhetorically, “what was the strategy of flexible response all about, if the US was not to bring military rescue to an anti-communist regime such as Saigon’s?” It also was a test of America’s ability and willingness to stand by its allies and support alliance institutions, whether in Europe or in the Third World (Gaddis 1982, 213; Weigley 1977, 461). Shortly after taking office, President Kennedy approved military aid supporting an increase in South Vietnamese conventional army forces from 150,000 to 170,000 troops, as well as the deployment of 400 US Army special forces soldiers to advise the South Vietnamese Army on the conduct of its counterinsurgency operations (Krepinevich 1986, 58; Taylor 1972, 224). President Kennedy agreed to provide even more military aid after South Vietnamese President Diem requested additional assistance in June 1961. The president approved aid to support another increase of the South Vietnamese Army from 170,000 to 250,000 troops, as well as additional arms, helicopters, small fixed wing airplanes, and 6,000 US Army supply and logistics soldiers (Doughty 1979, 27; Krepinevich 1986, 61; Weigley 1977, 457-458).

The second test of President Kennedy’s flexible response strategy was rebuilding European confidence in America’s commitment to the NATO alliance. Under President Eisenhower, the Europeans had come to rely on the American nuclear guarantee to deter a conventional Soviet attack on Western Europe, so the “new Kennedy approach was not popular among Europeans” (Gaddis 1982, 217). Under the flexible response strategy, the Kennedy Administration increased US conventional forces in Western Europe to provide options for responding to Soviet conventional attacks without resorting to nuclear weapons (Friedberg 2000, 71). Europeans feared
that less reliance on nuclear weapons might actually invite limited Soviet aggression, or if there were an overwhelming conventional or nuclear attack by the Soviets in Western Europe, the US might abandon its allies and be less likely to respond in kind. West German Chancellor Adenauer feared “a growing unwillingness of the US to use strategic nuclear weapons in the defense of Western Europe” (Trauschweizer 2008, 124). According to historian Edward Kolodziej (1966, 409-410), America’s European allies “were concerned about a new emphasis on non-nuclear capabilities and gradual US withdrawal of its nuclear guarantee,” and that “the president might abandon Europe to save the American homeland from atomic destruction.” The Kennedy Administration took significant steps to reassure its European allies of America’s nuclear guarantee and overall defense of NATO to counter this perception. It spent $1.95 billion to improve its stockpile of strategic nuclear weapons, and it deployed two additional heavy Army divisions to Europe for the specific purpose of “bolster[ing] European confidence in the American military commitment” (Kolodziej 1966, 386).

Measures to reassure America’s allies were not only a response to European skepticism surrounding the new flexible response strategy, but also came against a backdrop of increasing NATO-Soviet tensions over the status of Berlin, coming to a head during the June 1961 Kennedy-Khrushchev Vienna summit (Trauschweizer 2008, 127). At the summit, Premier Khrushchev issued a diplomatic letter to President Kennedy outlining a Soviet ultimatum on Berlin. The letter threatened a separate Soviet peace treaty with East Germany, placing the eventual unification of Germany into question, demanded “an end to the occupation regime in West Berlin with all its implications,” and explicitly threatened war if these conditions were not met (Weigley 1977, 460).

The Berlin crisis hastened the Kennedy Administration’s conventional military buildup (Weigley 448), and convinced Secretary McNamara “that additional regular troops were in fact needed…as a way of increasing the number of escalatory steps that could be taken prior to
resorting to nuclear weapons” (Gaddis 1982, 216). This was, indeed, a significant shift from Eisenhower’s New Look strategy that relied on the threat of massive nuclear retaliation to deter a Soviet conventional attack. In a special address to the nation about the Berlin crisis, President Kennedy proposed yet a third increase in defense spending since March (Trachtenberg 1991, 218; Trauschweizer 2008, 127). He requested, and Congress approved, a $3.247 billion increase to continue an expansion of conventional forces so that the US could “fight to maintain its war-won rights in Germany” (Kolodziej 1966, 387). Additionally, the Kennedy Administration deployed another 171 tactical nuclear weapons to Western Europe by December 1961, bringing the total to 285 – a 60% increase over what the Eisenhower Administration had put in place (Gaddis 1982, 216; Trachtenberg 1991, 224; Trauschweizer 2008, 123, 136).

Analysis of International Politics Hypotheses.

*International Politics Hypothesis 1 (IP H1): US policy-makers will require the Army to develop and implement doctrine that supports the establishment or maintenance of US alliance institutions.*

There is no congruence between this hypothesis and alliance politics preceding the 1962 edition of FM 100-5, nor does it pass any hoop or smoking gun tests. The Kennedy Administration responded to NATO concerns about its alliance commitments by improving the US strategic nuclear deterrent, by deploying 171 additional tactical nuclear weapons to Europe, by activating five new heavy armored and mechanized divisions tailored to fight mid- to high-intensity combat, and by accelerating the forward deployment of two of these divisions to Europe. In response to requests from Southeast Asia Treaty Organization ally South Vietnam for more US assistance to fight North Vietnamese-sponsored insurgents, the US provided military aid to help it increase its conventional army from 150,000 to 270,000 soldiers, and deployed a US Army logistics task force, helicopters, and fixed wing reconnaissance aircraft. These mid- to high-intensity warfare measures
taken by the Kennedy Administration to support the maintenance of US alliances in 1961 do not correspond to the doctrinal shift toward low-intensity unconventional warfare in the 1962 version of FM 100-5.

International Politics Hypothesis 2 (IP H2): changes in the military balance of power and capabilities among real and potential US adversaries, as well as its allies, will correspond to a change in the internal balance of US military power and capabilities, including those of its Army and its doctrine.

There is a low level of congruence between this hypothesis and balance of power politics preceding the 1962 edition of FM 100-5, but neither necessary nor sufficient evidence to support it. Two things related to an international balance of power changed between the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations that have some level of congruence with changes to US Army doctrine in 1962. First, the Kennedy Administration downgraded its estimate of Soviet conventional strength from what the Eisenhower Administration had estimated. Under President Eisenhower, the Department of Defense estimated that the Soviet Union had 175 divisions stationed in Eastern Europe capable of attacking a NATO force of 25 divisions. This estimate far outweighed the 3:1 ratio that military planners use to determine an effective conventional balance of military power. The 3:1 ratio means that it takes three times as many attacking forces to overwhelm a defensive force. Since 175 to 25 is a 7:1 ratio, it was a foregone conclusion by the Eisenhower Administration that NATO conventional forces would not have been adequate to defend Europe without resorting to nuclear weapons. The Kennedy Administration significantly reduced its estimate of Soviet strength, however. It determined that Soviet divisions were only 1/3 as combat effective as US/NATO divisions for several reasons. They were understrength, poorly trained, poorly led, and poorly equipped. By reducing its estimate of Soviet conventional combat power by two-thirds, the Kennedy Administration concluded that NATO was facing the equivalent of just 55
Soviet divisions, putting the ratio at 2.2:1 – below that required for the Soviets to effectively attack and defeat 25 NATO divisions. According to Gaddis (1982, 206), “for the first time since 1945, there was a sense of overall military parity with the Soviet Union, possibly even superiority.” Therefore, it was theoretically no longer necessary for the US to rely on the use of nuclear weapons to defeat, or even deter, a Soviet conventional attack in Europe. This logic did not correspond to US actions in 1961, nor to Army doctrinal changes in 1962, however. Instead of reducing US nuclear and conventional capabilities based on a more favorable conventional balance of power assessment, President Kennedy increased those capabilities. He spent $1.95 billion to improve and expand strategic nuclear weapons, deployed 171 additional tactical nuclear weapons to Europe, and spent $3.247 billion to expand the number of Army heavy divisions from three to eight, deploying two of them immediately to Europe. These actions were at odds with changes the Army made to its doctrine in 1962. Instead of increasing the relative amount of doctrinal content devoted to mid-to high-intensity combat to match the administration’s spending, the US Army reduced it.

The second international political event that may have had an impact on the balance of power, or in this example balance of threat, and consequently Army doctrine, was Premier Khrushchev’s “national liberation” speech of January 6, 1961. Certainly, Khrushchev’s speech in which he declares the Soviet Union’s intent to support insurgencies throughout the developing world, combined with the United States’ intent to counter this threat, is highly congruent with the Army’s doctrinal shift toward low-intensity unconventional warfare. That said, Khrushchev’s speech occurred long after the Soviet Union had begun to support such movements, and after Senator then President-elect Kennedy had made a number of speeches of his own promising to counter such threats. It is possible that Khrushchev’s speech gave added impetus to US efforts, but the speech alone could not have had such a dramatic impact on America’s perception of a balance of threat. According to Douglas Blaufarb (1977, 53-54):
[Khrushchev’s]...sweeping language caused him [Kennedy] some alarm. But that language reverberated against a series of events that appeared related: the trouble in Laos, about which President Eisenhower had given his successor a careful briefing; the dawning of awareness that South Vietnam was encountering a serious guerrilla problem; the problem of Cuba, which had become a major US concern through a successful guerrilla-style revolution; the appearance of Communist guerrilla threats in Colombia and Venezuela; and the continuing agonies of France in Algeria.

I assess this hypothesis with some, although an overall low level of certainty given that there is only some congruence with the Kennedy Administration’s lower assessment of Soviet conventional military power in Europe and the Army’s doctrinal shift in 1962, but no congruence with the administration’s subsequent increase in both nuclear and conventional power in Europe. Kruschev’s speech may have been sufficient to give Kennedy an additional sense of urgency for countering the Soviet Union in the Third World, but those challenges predated the Kennedy Administration. An additional sense of urgency in response to the speech may have at least translated into President Kennedy placing more pressure on the Army to update its doctrine to account for these low-intensity warfare threats.

Bureaucratic Political Factors.

The Kennedy Administration presented the Army with different challenges from those presented by the Eisenhower Administration. The Army under Eisenhower’s presidency faced significant personnel and budget cuts, as well as threats to its roles and purposes relative to the other armed services. The Army finally embraced the nuclear warfare doctrine pushed by the Eisenhower Administration, not because of any tactical or strategic imperative to do so, but as a means for competing with the other services over shrinking defense dollars and to compete for sustained relevance. Army budgets and roles increased under President Kennedy, and this “blunted its need to compete with the other services” (Kolodziej 1966, 420). Budgetary affluence under
President Kennedy did not leave the Army completely free to develop the doctrine of its choice, however. It still had to meet the demands of the White House as well as the Department of Defense in their efforts to impose a flexible response strategy, first upon an Army that had been conditioned under President Eisenhower to rely on the use, or threat of use, of nuclear weapons, then upon an Army that was somewhat reluctant to implement a strategy that spanned the full spectrum of war – including low-intensity unconventional war.

Even after President Kennedy assumed office and began asking questions about what the Army would be doing to expand its low-intensity unconventional warfare capabilities, senior Army leaders remained focused on the logic of nuclear weapons. When President Kennedy asked Army Chief of Staff Gen. Decker for a recommendation to deal with an escalating insurgency in Laos in early 1961, Gen. Decker warned President Kennedy that he would not recommend any action there unless Kennedy “was prepared to use nuclear weapons to guarantee victory” (McMaster 1998, 7; Weigley 1977, 452). This same logic was applied six years earlier in 1954 when the US was trying to decide whether to support the French battling the Viet Minh in Southeast Asia. President Eisenhower ultimately chose not to get directly involved in that conflict, except for limited air and naval support, because the Army could not find any way to effectively employ nuclear weapons against the insurgents (George and Smoke 1974, 258). Gen. Decker’s response in early 1961 was not inconsistent with the logic of what historians have come to refer to as the “never again club.” This was a phrase used to describe senior Army leaders conditioned from the lessons of the Korean War, and eight years under the Eisenhower Administration, to believe that the Army should never again involve itself in a land war unless it was allowed to use any and all weapons in the US arsenal, including nuclear weapons, to guarantee victory (Freedman 2000, 290; Weigley 1977, 451). So, it is likely that President Kennedy knew what he was up against when he began pushing the Army bureaucracy to make a shift toward a more flexible strategy and doctrine that could
provide his administration with military options at all levels of conflict. Because President Kennedy anticipated bureaucratic resistance from the Army, he specified the measures he wanted the Army to take to build a low-intensity unconventional warfare capability. He directed an increase in the number of special forces soldiers from 1,500 to 9,000, an increase in the number of special warfare groups from three to six, the establishment of counterinsurgency libraries across the Army, an expansion of the special warfare training program at Fort Bragg, the inclusion of counterinsurgency curricula at all levels of Army education from West Point to the War College, that colonels and brigadier generals serve short tours in theaters such as Vietnam, and that all officers be required to have special warfare training before being considered for promotion to general officer.

In addition to quickly complying with these presidential directives in 1961, the Army actually did implement some of its own initiatives in an effort to try and meet President Kennedy’s intent. Gen. Decker appointed his own special advisor, Brigadier General Rosson, to oversee the implementation of these directives and the Army’s own initiatives (Decker 1962c, 17). “Rosson was…Army Chief of Staff Decker’s eyes and ears on special warfare activities within the service and was to recommend changes in doctrine” (Krepinevich 1986, 31, 43). Gen. Decker also directed the Army staff to develop what he called special action forces or “Cold War Task Forces” (Birtle 2006, 225; Decker 1962c, 15). According to Gen. Decker (1961, 35), “a Cold War Task Force would include service support units, unconventional and special warfare elements, and, if indicated, combat and combat support units tailored to meet a particular [unconventional or special warfare] situation.”

Despite these efforts, President Kennedy sensed that the Army leadership and bureaucracy was not doing enough. He saw the Army’s program at the low end of the spectrum limited to just 9,000 special warfare soldiers, and the Army’s senior officer corps – representing just a small
fraction of the Army. The president maintained that the entire Army should have the ability to
counter unconventional threats and that low-intensity warfare was not just a minor contingency that
special forces soldiers should prepare for. “He [Kennedy] felt that training our soldiers as
guerrillas would equip them to fight guerrillas…” (Decker 1972, 94). In response, Gen. Decker
told the president that any good conventionally trained soldier “could handle guerrillas” (Birtle
did not back down. On November 30, 1961, in an unprecedented action, he summoned all of the
Army’s top commanders to the Oval Office to personally tell them, “I want you guys to get with
it,” that the Army was not doing enough, and that they needed to do much more to meet his intent
(Krepinevich 1986, 31).

Shortly after this Oval Office meeting, the Army did “get with it,” but somewhat
reluctantly. According to Theodore Sorenson (1965, 632), special counsel to the president, the
generals were “sullen at first.” Many of them felt the Army had already gone far enough, but the
president was now pushing it even further (Trauschweizer 2008, 123). Some believed the
president’s efforts were motivated by politics (Birtle 2006, 228). According to special assistant to
the president, Arthur Schlesinger, (1965, 340), “Ridgway, Taylor, and Gavin…looked on the
counterinsurgency business as a faddish distraction from the main responsibility of training for
conventional assault.” Gen. Taylor was quoted as saying himself that, “all this cloud of dust that’s
come out of the White House really isn’t necessary” (Avant 1993, 57). Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Army Gen. Lyman Lemnitzer was reported to have said, “the new administration
was oversold on the importance of guerrilla warfare” (Hilsman 1967, 415). General, then Colonel,
William DePuy said, “we were rather mechanistic about the whole thing,” and that, “the doctrinal
effort was perceived to be a fad originating during the Kennedy Administration” (Krepinevich
1986, 40). In the words of presidential historian David Halberstam (1972, 164), “this was a time
when unconventional warfare was a great fad in Washington.” According to Army historian Colonel Harry Summers (1982, 73), “counterinsurgency became not so much the Army’s doctrine as the Army’s dogma.”

Despite senior leader reservations, the Army did take significant additional steps between late November 1961 and early February 1962 to meet the president’s intent to prepare most if not all of the Army for low-intensity unconventional warfare operations. According to Gen. Decker (1962c, 15), the unconventional Army warfare function “assumed giant proportions almost overnight.” Word quickly went out from Gen. Decker’s office that “every school in the Army would devote a minimum of 20% of its time to counterinsurgency,” and “all infantry units...were to be made proficient in counterinsurgency combat as an additional duty” (Blaufarb 1977, 71, 80). Gen. Decker further directed that “all Army reserve and national guard units...receive specialized counterinsurgency training” (Decker 1962c, 17). In January 1962, the Army published a report “calling on the Army as a whole to accept counterinsurgency as its mission rather than as a contingency limited to the Special Forces” and that “doctrine for the employment of regular forces against insurgent guerrillas has not been adequately addressed” (Krepinevich 1986, 44). One month later, Gen. Decker approved the Army’s new edition of its capstone doctrine FM 100-5 that applied to the entire Army, adding two wholly new chapters, or approximately 20% of its content, exclusively to low-intensity unconventional warfare. According to Andrew Birtle (2006, 276), President Kennedy was finally satisfied with the Army’s efforts.

Analysis of the Bureaucratic Politics Hypothesis.

_Bureaucratic politics hypothesis (BP H): changes in Army doctrine correspond to attempts by the Army or its internal branches to protect or increase missions or roles, resources, or autonomy at the expense of, or relative to, the other services or branches._

There is no congruence between this hypothesis and the 1962 edition of FM 100-5, nor does
it pass any hoop or smoking gun tests. Changes to Army doctrine in early 1962 clearly did not correspond with any attempt by the Army or any of its internal branches to protect or increase its mission, roles, or resources. The Army budget was increasing throughout this period, primarily for conventional forces, and it also was being directed by the administration to increase its missions and roles in the area of low-intensity unconventional warfare. Because the Army was suddenly flush with more resources compared with the lean Eisenhower years, it may have had less reason to compete with the other services; branches within the Army would have had less reason to compete with each other as well. What may have been threatened during this period, however, was the Army’s sense of bureaucratic autonomy for deciding how to apply its increasing resources and how to accomplish its new low-intensity missions and roles. It was receiving specific guidance from the White House and Department of Defense for increasing counterinsurgency training and education, for requiring senior officers to gain counterinsurgency experience, and for expanding the special forces. Writing about this period in Army history, Andrew Birtle (2006, 227) observed that the “Army cherished its autonomy and resented Kennedy’s interference.” Army leaders considered low-intensity unconventional warfare to be a contingency that could be handled by the special forces alone, but President Kennedy did not. He, therefore, urged the Army to treat it as a mission for all Army soldiers and units, and demanded that it train its conventional units in low-intensity warfare. Although the Kennedy Administration increased the special forces groups from three to six, and increased the number of heavy divisions from three to eight, it had not given the Army additional resources for its eight regular Army divisions that would have been affected most by this doctrinal shift. These were the conventional units that would be required to take on new low-intensity missions and roles, yet the administration had not expanded the number of these units. Perhaps it was this disconnect that caused senior Army leaders to resist burdening their eight regular conventional divisions with additional roles and missions. Perhaps that is why Gen. Decker
argued that any conventionally trained soldier could handle guerrillas, while Kennedy argued that conventional soldiers or units could only handle guerrillas if they developed the appropriate doctrine and training to address this “whole new way of war” (Birtle 2006, 225). In the end, the Army complied with President Kennedy’s directives as well as his insistence that low-intensity warfare be adopted as a mission and role for the entire conventional Army, not just the special forces. There is no evidence, however, that the Army was seeking to expand its missions or roles in this area, or that any senior leader thought the Army might garner more resources by doing so. It appears that many senior Army leaders considered this doctrinal shift to be an unnecessary if not unresourced burden that ultimately detracted from its readiness to accomplish its resourced mission of conventional combat (Schlesinger 1965, 340). Army leaders clearly made this shift reluctantly, and thought they were relinquishing some degree of autonomy by doing so. According to Gen. Taylor, low intensity unconventional warfare was “something we have to satisfy. But not much heart went into the work” (Schlesinger 1965, 439).

1962 Case Study Summary and Conclusions. A summary of my assessment of each political hypothesis is reflected in figure 3 below. I assess based on the evidence presented in this case with an overall moderate level of certainty that domestic politics had an impact on this doctrinal shift, with a low level of certainty that international politics played a role, and assess there is no certainty that bureaucratic politics played a role.

President Kennedy took specific action to implement campaign promises to reduce US reliance on nuclear weapons and build capacity for the US military to operate at any level of war – especially low-intensity unconventional war. He directed the Army in writing to update its doctrine and to make low-intensity unconventional warfare a mission responsibility for the entire Army, not just the special forces branch of the Army. The Army, therefore, added this mission to
FM 100-5, the doctrine that applies to the entire Army.

I assess with some, although low, certainty that international politics played a role in causing the Army’s doctrinal shift. Although the Kennedy Administration shifted the US internal balance of power by expanding both its nuclear and conventional warfare capabilities in an effort to bolster the NATO alliance, the doctrinal shift the Army made in 1962 was in the opposite direction – toward low-intensity unconventional warfare. This neither reflected any effort to help maintain the NATO alliance institution, nor did it reflect the shift in the US internal balance of power more toward increased numbers of nuclear and conventional capabilities. It may have reflected the Kennedy Administration’s concern about an increased threat of low-intensity unconventional warfare from the Soviet Union based on Khrushchev’s increased rhetoric concerning support for wars of national liberation. Although the Soviets had already been providing substantial support to many such movements well before 1962, his rhetoric may have added a sense of urgency to the perceived threat, and that may explain with some level of certainty, although low, why President Kennedy may have directed the Army in writing to update its doctrine to assign low-intensity unconventional warfare as a mission for the whole Army.

And finally, I assess that bureaucratic politics did not play a perceivable role in causing the Army to make its doctrinal shift in 1962. The Army was flush with resources after the Kennedy Administration came to power, and there is no evidence that it, or any of its internal branches, attempted to use doctrine to fight for resources, roles, or to preserve bureaucratic autonomy.
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<th>Hypothesis</th>
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Table 3 (Case #2 – 1962: Political hypotheses certainty assessments)
CHAPTER 5 – 1976 CASE STUDY

Introduction.

The 1976 edition of the Army’s capstone doctrine, Field Manual 100-5, shifted significantly in content along a spectrum of war from the previous two editions published in 1962 and 1968. The 1962 and 1968 editions of FM 100-5 each contained two chapters of content devoted to low-intensity unconventional warfare. The 1976 edition deleted both and added a short 9-page chapter on tactical nuclear operations. Low-intensity warfare was mentioned in just two paragraphs throughout the entire 1976 edition, representing about one-half of one page of 200 pages of content. This left the 1976 edition of 100-5 with 190.5 of its 200 pages, or 95% of its content, devoted entirely to mid-intensity conventional warfare. In so doing, it shifted away from doctrine emphasizing dismounted infantry operations suited for low- to mid-intensity warfare to mechanized infantry and armor operations suited for mid- to high-intensity warfare (Gole 2008, 259; Herbert 1988, 64). The development of this doctrine occurred over an 18 month period from early 1975 to when it was published in July of 1976. Training and Doctrine Command developed and circulated a series of drafts to the major Army commands and separate branch schools, and in October, 1975, it held a conference at FT Hood, Texas, for the Army’s senior leaders to begin discussing the various doctrinal concepts face-to-face. In December 1975, a fourth and final draft was circulated back to the major commands and to the Department of Army staff for the first time. After reconciling remaining substantive issues, and then gaining the approval of the Army Chief of Staff over the next six months, Training and Doctrine Command released the new FM 100-5 to the entire Army on July 1, 1976 (Romjue 1984, 5).

Through this case study, the extent to which domestic, international, or bureaucratic politics did or did not affect this Army doctrinal shift in 1976 is examined. A consideration of politics at
the domestic, international, and bureaucratic levels of analysis can shed light on who or what may have had the power to cause this doctrinal shift to occur when it did. I assess based on the evidence presented in this case that trends in domestic politics coincided with changes to Army doctrine, but I could find no evidence of a direct linkage between domestic politics and doctrine in this case. There is evidence that the US Army collaborated with the West German Army in developing the 1976 capstone doctrine, but there is no evidence that any US policy-maker required the Army to do this in an effort to bolster the NATO alliance, although this collaboration may have had a positive effect. There is some evidence that perceived changes to the US-Soviet conventional balance of power prompted Army leaders to refocus its capstone doctrine on mid-intensity conventional warfare in Central Europe, but again, there is no evidence that this was done at the direction of civilian policy-makers. And finally, there is no evidence of rivalry between the Army and another service, or rivalry between different branches of the Army, that may have contributed to this doctrinal shift. There is, however, evidence of cooperation between the Army and the Air Force that had an impact on this doctrine, and a shift within the Army from the infantry branch to the armor branch as the focus for doctrine development leading up to the release of the new FM in 1976.

Unlike Barry Posen’s conclusions from his study of interwar French, British, and German militaries in *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars*, I neither found that civilians intervened to direct Army doctrinal change, nor did I find any evidence that the Army made these changes in some sort of effort to increase resources, autonomy, or missions in this case. In contrast to what Deborah Avant might have predicted based on her conclusions in *Political Institutions and Military Change: Lessons from Peripheral Wars*, I did not find that the Army attempted to play off one branch of government against another to achieve some sort of institutional advantage, nor did I find that the Army established any special promotion
pathways to embed this doctrine during its development as Stephen Peter Rosen’s findings might have predicted.

While John Nagl argued in *Eating Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam* that the US Army’s organizational essence remained defined by conventional warfare during and after Vietnam and that it lacked a culture of learning, he concluded that the Army discarded its unconventional warfare doctrine after Vietnam because it neither fit with its organizational essence, nor did the Army recognize the value of this doctrine because it was incapable of retaining lessons that it might have learned as an organization from its experience in Vietnam. While I did not find evidence to support these claims, I did find that senior Army leader doctrinal decisions were affected in some ways by the domestic political situation, the conventional balance of power, cooperation with a sister service, and a shifting of some doctrinal responsibility from the Army’s infantry branch to its armor branch.

Conrad Crane argued in *Avoiding Vietnam: The U.S. Army's Response to Defeat in Southeast Asia* that the Army did learn from its unconventional warfare experiences of Vietnam, but this learning occurred through the lens of a dominant conventional warfare tradition. This tradition taught the Army to ignore its unconventional warfare lessons and, instead, to further reinforce conventional doctrine after Vietnam. In other words, Crane argued that the Army learned to avoid unconventional doctrine in order to reinforce the doctrine most consistent with its conventional warfare tradition. I did not find evidence to support this claim during my research, but did find that a consideration of politics provided more insight into why the US Army refocused its capstone doctrine on fighting the Soviets in Europe, why it needed a doctrine tailored for a smaller force to successfully defeat a larger force employing weapons systems as effective as its own, why the Army and the Air Force chose to cooperate rather than compete for resources and missions, and why the Army shifted from an infantry to an armor-centric doctrine. While Crane’s
argument can help to narrowly explain why Army traditional organizational preferences might have biased it toward eschewing unconventional doctrine after Vietnam, it does not adequately explain to the same degree the multiple ways in which it developed its capstone doctrine in 1976 that a consideration of politics at various levels of analysis is capable of providing.

This case study proceeds in two parts. First, I summarize relevant domestic, international, and bureaucratic political factors during this period that may have had an impact on Army doctrine decision-making. Second, I assess the impact of these factors in accordance with the predicted outcomes of the eight political hypotheses I developed in Chapter 2 (Explaining Army Doctrine). I analyze each for congruence with the doctrinal change itself. Where congruence is detected, I then conduct process-tracing hoop and smoking gun tests to measure the degree to which individual political factors may have affected doctrinal change as predicted by my hypotheses.

**Domestic Political Factors.**

There are several relevant domestic political factors that occurred between 1968 and 1976 that may have affected Army doctrine. The most relevant are Richard Nixon’s fulfillment of campaign promises to end the draft and the war in Vietnam, and the unravelling of his détente policy after the Watergate scandal under the Ford Administration.

Richard Nixon made campaign promises to end the draft and end US involvement in the war in Vietnam when he ran for president in both 1968 and 1972 (Zelizer 2010, 249). He achieved both by 1973, but not without a political struggle. Early critics of his plan to end the draft charged that it would be more expensive to attract and retain qualified volunteers as opposed to selecting and drafting conscripts (Lee and Parker 1977, 132). Furthermore, it was not clear if the public would support, or if the nation could afford, these extra costs associated with an all-volunteer force while maintaining military commitments abroad (Rostker 2006, 268). President Nixon anticipated
these concerns while campaigning in 1968. He explained how the nation could support the greater cost of an all-volunteer military by 1) reducing the size of the force (Griffith 1997, 281), and 2) by reducing America’s military commitments abroad beginning with Vietnam (Litwak 1984, 4, 193).

In 1969, President Nixon unveiled his plan to empower regional US allies to assume a greater burden for their own, as well as collective, defenses. This policy, first announced by the president during a state visit to Guam in July of that year, came to be known as the Guam or Nixon Doctrine. Between 1969 and 1972, while bolstering the capabilities and responsibilities of South Vietnam to defend itself in accordance with this doctrine, the US simultaneously reduced the number of its soldiers in Vietnam from a peak in 1969 of 543,400 to just 20,000 by the summer of 1972 (Sorley 1999, 346). On August 12, President Nixon reported to the American people in a campaign speech that all combat troops had been withdrawn from Vietnam, and that he would be able to end the draft by the following summer of 1973 (Ambrose 1989, 601). This “slow but steady withdrawal of American forces from South Vietnam, together with the elimination of the military draft, had taken the steam out of domestic anti-war protests” (Gaddis 2005, 154). More than any other factors, these two complementary achievements, ending the draft and pulling US troops out of Vietnam, ensured Nixon’s landslide reelection victory in November 1972 (Ambrose 1989, 655).

Like the elimination of the draft and reduction of US troops in Vietnam, President Nixon’s promises of greater cooperation with the Soviets and Communist Chinese, or détente, further undermined the appeal of the antiwar movement and contributed to Nixon’s election victories in 1968 and 1972 (Friedberg 2000, 194; Sorley 1999, 116; Zelizer 2010, 238). “A vote for Nixon in 1972 was a vote for détente…for a whole new era of world peace” (Ambrose 1989, 661).

President Nixon recognized that domestic support for a confrontational approach with the Soviets and Chinese, held in tact since the Truman years, had broken down as the Vietnam War dragged on. He entered office in 1969 already intending to replace these Cold War rivalries with détente –
a policy of cooperation versus confrontation with America’s chief rivals (Gaddis 2005, 181; Litwak 1984, 1-4, 191-192; Poole 2015, 1). Cooperation with the Soviets and Chinese complemented the president’s goal of reducing direct US military involvement in the defense of regional allies. According to Robert Litwak (1984, 193), “the policy of superpower détente was viewed as a means of creating and ensuring the stable conditions along the periphery which would allow for an orderly devolution of responsibility to incipient regional powers.” Beyond attempting to relieve pressure on US allies such as South Vietnam and appealing to voters interested in promoting peace, détente was also an effort to find a politically acceptable way to continue containing communism (Zelizer 2010, 238). It was an attempt to contain communism through cooperation rather than confrontation. And like the New Look strategy under President Eisenhower, détente under Nixon came to be seen as a cheaper way to accomplish US containment goals (Berkowitz 2006, 76).

Despite President Nixon’s re-election success in 1972, the effects of the growing Watergate scandal began to have a significant impact on his presidency. A majority Democratic Congress started pushing back on the president’s agenda, especially in areas of national security and foreign policy. According to historian John Lewis Gaddis (2005, 179), distrust with President Nixon after the election quickly became “so deep that the US Congress was passing laws – always blunt instruments – to constrain the use of US military…capabilities.” According to President Ford (Ford 1979, 355), “[i]n the wake of the war and Watergate, Congress had passed bill after bill restructuring the President’s power to conduct foreign policy.” By the summer of 1973, Congress cut all funding for US combat operations in Vietnam over the president’s objections (Ambrose 1989, 591, 656-658; Gaddis 2005, 176-177; Schultzzinger 2008, 213). By November of that same year, it passed the War Powers Act over President Nixon’s veto (Brinkley 2007, 88). It then cut defense spending for fiscal years (FY) 1974 and 1975, continuing a trend in steady reductions from a spending peak in 1968. It reduced the defense budget from $78.4 billion in FY 73 to $77.4
billion in FY 74, and then again to $75.1 billion in FY 75 – bringing the defense budget to its lowest point in constant US dollars since the first year of the Kennedy Administration in 1961 (Romjue 1984, 2; SIPRI 1977). The cuts Congress made to the defense budget by FY 75 represented an overall decrease of 24% in seven years from a post-World War II peak of $103 billion in FY 68 (SIPRI 1977). This steady decline in defense spending mirrored declines in Army personnel strength – declining to just 725,000 soldiers in 1975 from a peak of 1,570,000 in 1967, and far below the Army personnel strength of 960,000 that President Kennedy inherited from President Eisenhower in 1961 (Kretchik 2011, 324).

These continuing declines in Army resources, combined with the decline of the power of the president relative to Congress, prompted conservative factions in both major political parties to push back by rallying around hawkish foreign policy issues (Mieczkowski 2005, 308; Zelizer 2010, 241). Conservatives argued that America’s military had become too weak, and the US role in the world had been seriously diminished under détente (Zelizer 2010, 251). They viewed Nixon’s, then Ford’s, cooperative policies with the Soviets and the Chinese as too liberal and attacked them for contributing to America’s decline (Brinkley 2007, 113). They pointed to a series of international crises where cooperation seemed to backfire. They cited Soviet support for Arab countries during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and the loss of South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Angola to nationalist forces supported by the Soviet Union, China, and Cuba as examples (Dobrynin 1995, 365; Isaacson 1992, 608). Furthermore, they emphasized the fact that the Soviets and their satellites had been steadily increasing defense spending throughout the 1960s and early 1970s while the US had been steadily decreasing its spending since 1968.

Conservative Republicans, led by Ronald Reagan, and conservative Democrats, led by Senator Henry Jackson, argued that the American people could and should be convinced to support an increase in defense spending in order to reverse what they viewed as a steady US military
decline relative to the Soviets (Berkowitz 2006, 76). They argued that the US should be able to confront the Soviets from a position of strength instead of attempting to cooperate with it from a position of weakness, as Nixon, then Ford, had been attempting to do but failed (Berkowitz 2006, 77; Brinkley 2007, 82; Kissinger 1999, 92, 112; Poole 2015, 23). Reagan summarized the position of both Republican and Democratic conservatives when he said during a campaign speech that, “peace does not come from weakness or from retreat. It comes from the restoration of American military superiority” (Zelizer 2010, 268).

Liberal Democrats then joined conservatives from both parties to attack détente for failing to challenge the Soviets on their human rights record (Isaacson 1992, 612; Mieczkowski 2005, 282). The two primary issues that liberal Democrats and conservatives from both parties focused on were President Ford’s refusal to meet with Soviet dissident and human rights activist Alexander Solzhenitsyn when he visited the US in early July 1975, and the president’s attendance and signing of accords with the Soviets at the Conference on Security Cooperation in Europe in Helsinki in late July and early August that same summer. In both cases, liberals and conservatives alike accused Ford of appeasing the Soviets, for being soft on communism, and for ignoring human rights abuses (Brinkley 2007, 108; Cannon 1994, 399; 2013, 394; Dobrynin 1995, 348; Gaddis 2005, 205, 189; Kissinger 1999, 649; Reichley 1981, 355).

Senator Jackson accused the White House of failing to extend an invitation to Solzhenitsyn because it did not want to offend the Soviets, saying it was “a sad day when US foreign policy sided with the Soviets and not with freedom of speech” (Kissinger 1999, 651). By attending the Helsinki Conference, and by signing the resulting accords with the Soviets, President Ford was accused of accepting Soviet domination of Eastern Europe (Cannon 2013, 395; Leffler 2007, 252; Litwak 1984, 196). “Liberals and conservatives alike denounced Ford for signing the agreement, charging that the pursuit of détente was hardly worth it if it meant perpetuating injustice by
recognizing Soviet control of Eastern Europe” (Gaddis 2005, 189). Ford was accused of having been “bulldozed by the Soviets into making one-sided concessions such as abandoning Eastern Europe to eternal Soviet domination” (Kissinger 1999, 642). The New York Times even accused President Ford of crossing the line from détente to appeasement (Kissinger 1999, 651).

This pressure on détente coming from all sides of the political spectrum eventually resulted in its unravelling under President Ford. The first signs of this came shortly after the Solzhenitsyn and Helsinki controversies. In the fall of 1975, the president made key changes to his foreign policy and national security staffs in an effort to distance himself from the increasingly unpopular détente policies. In what came to be referred to as the “Halloween Massacre,” Ford replaced Henry Kissinger as national security advisor with Brent Scowcroft. He then replaced James Schlesinger as secretary of defense with Donald Rumsfeld, a Republican hawk, who had been serving as chief of staff. He then replaced Rumsfeld as chief of staff with the deputy chief, Dick Cheney. The president did retain Kissinger as his secretary of state, but his removal from the dual national security advisor function sent a signal to the Republican right and conservative Democrats in Congress that President Ford intended to distance his administration from cooperative détente policies and move toward the right with a more confrontational approach toward the Soviets and Chinese (Brinkley 2007, 129; Dobrynin 1995, 348; Isaacson 1992, 669; Kissinger 1999, 834-844; Reichley 1981, 353; Rumsfeld 2011, 222).

As Republicans entered the 1976 presidential primary campaign season, attacks against détente resumed for political gain by the right-wing of the party led by now candidate Ronald Reagan (Isaacson 1992, 695). His primary goal was to “build American military power, and confront the Soviet Union” (Garthoff 1985, 539). Reagan portrayed détente as American accommodation to an expansionist Soviet Union (Rumsfeld 2011, 227; Zelizer 2010, 270). He charged that both Nixon’s and Ford’s “efforts to foster détente with the Soviets had weakened
American standing in the world” (Schultzinger 2008, 220). While Nixon then Ford had favored negotiation with the Soviets – Reagan favored confrontation (Cannon 2013, 403). He “pummeled Ford for his naiveté and ridiculed him for signing the Helsinki agreement” (Leffler 2007, 253). He cited setbacks in South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Angola as evidence that détente was failing (Dobrynin 1995, 367; Mieczkowski 2005, 288). Reagan used these supposed détente failings to argue that President Ford, as well as Henry Kissinger, must be replaced. He stated on the campaign trail that “there is little doubt in my mind that the Soviet Union will not stop taking advantage of détente until it sees that the American people have elected a new president and appointed a new secretary of state” (Ford 1979, 374).

Reagan’s political attacks on détente were effective. They helped him win early primaries and caused President Ford to reconsider détente altogether as a growing campaign liability (Garthoff 1985, 538, 540; Mieczkowski 2005, 288; Zelizer 2010, 269). According to the president’s campaign advisor Robert Teeter, “détente is a…bad idea with most Republican primary voters” (Zelizer 2010, 261). The term détente had become poisonous (Mieczkowski 2005, 288). President Ford himself even said the campaign “made it necessary to deemphasize détente” (Zelizer 2010, 262). As a result, by March 1976, President Ford completely dropped the use of the term détente for the hard-line phrase “peace through strength” (Gaddis 2005, 189; Garthoff 1985, 548; Leffler 2007, 253; Rumsfeld 2011, 227). He admitted that this shift away from détente was not done for rational foreign policy reasons, but simply to satisfy the domestic political campaign. According to the president, “as the nomination and election approached, partisanship would flourish, making it impossible to discuss complex [foreign policy] issues…in a rational way” (Ford 1979, 353-354). It was, therefore, during the 1976 Republican primary election campaign that “the coffin lid slammed down hard on détente” (Mieczkowski 2005, 288).

It was within this context of growing anti-détente sentiment from both ends of the political
spectrum, from liberal Democrats to conservative Republicans, that the Ford Administration was able to pass the first defense budget increase through Congress since 1968. The defense budget for FY 76 was $77.4 billion, an increase $2.3 billion over the 1975 budget (SIPRI 1978), with the largest portion of the increase going to the Army for development and acquisition of five key land-based weapon systems it argued were necessary if the administration was now serious about discarding détente and reconstituting a US ability to deter and directly confront Soviet conventional military power in Europe.

Analysis of Domestic Political Hypotheses.

*Domestic Politics Hypothesis 1 (DP H1):* policies designed to fulfill national security-related campaign promises, and national security policies that are influenced by partisan party politics, can structure or constrain Army doctrinal choices.

There are several clues present from the domestic political situation in the years between the publication of FM 100-5 in 1968 and FM 100-5 in 1976 that provide this hypothesis with some level of certainty. During the 1968 and 1972 presidential elections, Richard Nixon made and acted upon campaign promises to end the draft, end the Vietnam War, and improve relations with the Soviets and Chinese by promoting cooperation instead of confrontation. By the summer of 1973, he had made progress on all three. President Ford’s subsequent shift away from cooperation with the Soviets and Chinese, caused in part by intense political pressure from the right wing of the Republican Party and conservative Democrats in Congress, combined with the end of the draft and the Vietnam War, to affect Army doctrinal choices made in 1976.

Candidate Nixon promised during his 1968 campaign that he would reduce the overall size of the Army in order to pay for the greater cost associated with attracting and retaining an all-volunteer force. President Nixon was then able to reduce the size of the Army by pulling US troops out of Vietnam – from a peak in Vietnam of 543,400 in early 1969 to less than 20,000 by the
summer of 1972. This corresponded to a reduction in the size of the Army itself from 1.57 million soldiers in 1968 to just 725,000 by 1974 – allowing the Nixon Administration to pay for the more expensive all-volunteer Army while steadily decreasing the defense budget. President Nixon was able to pull US troops out of Vietnam during this period by turning greater responsibility for the defense of South Vietnam over to the Vietnamese. This “Vietminization” was part of the president’s stated goal of lessening US military involvement in regional conflicts by attempting to promote greater responsibility or “burden sharing” among regional US allies. And finally, the improvement of US relations with the Soviets and Chinese under détente was meant to contribute to greater regional cooperation and less conflict, further reducing the need for US military involvement abroad.

Nixon’s campaign promises and then efforts to fulfill them may be sufficient to explain the end of the draft and the end of the war that may have impacted this doctrinal shift, but these are not the only possible explanations for these outcomes. It is possible that both the draft and the war could have ended whether or not the president had made those promises, and whether or not he was even working to achieve them. It is possible that Congress would have voted to end the draft in July of 1972 and voted to cut off all funding for combat operations in Vietnam in January of 1973 regardless of who was president, or what promises they may have made during a campaign. It also is possible that President Nixon would have made efforts to end both the draft and the war whether or not he had promised to do so. Ending the draft and pulling troops out of Vietnam were sufficient reasons for reducing the Army’s strength, but those are not the only reasons that the Army’s strength might have been reduced. The Army’s strength could have been reduced even if the draft had remained in place, and the draft could have remained in place even when the war in Vietnam ended – just like it did when World War II and the Korean War ended.

Although ending the draft and ending the war were sufficient but not necessary conditions
for downsizing the Army, there is some evidence that a smaller Army was one necessary condition for a shift to the 1976 capstone doctrine that was specifically designed to “fight the Soviets outnumbered and win.” If the Army had not been reduced from 1.57 million to 725,000 from 1968 to 1975, it may not have been compelled to develop such a doctrine, even if the fighting in Vietnam had continued.

Although ending the draft and ending the war were sufficient reasons for downsizing the Army, and downsizing the Army was one necessary condition for designing a doctrine based on the principle of “fighting the Soviets outnumbered and winning,” a smaller Army may not have been the only reason for designing such a doctrine. One reason for designing a doctrine solely focused on confronting the Soviet Army were the signs that détente was beginning to unravel as a policy under the Ford Administration. There were international political reasons why détente begin to unravel from 1975-1976, but there were also domestic partisan political pressures exerted on the president to discard it as a policy – which he eventually did in March of 1976, just four months before the Army published its new edition of FM 100-5. The administration’s move away from détente had been building since at least the fall of 1975 and culminated in the spring of 1976 – long enough for Army leaders to perceive while they were finalizing the 1976 FM that an era a relative cooperation with the Soviets was giving way to a renewed era of confrontation – at least validating the need for this new doctrine focused solely on fighting the Soviets.

The domestic pressure on Ford to discard détente came from the right wing of the Republican Party and conservative Democrats in Congress who were eager to politically weaken Ford by finding ways to discredit détente – a policy associated with Richard Nixon. Although sufficient, this may not be the only explanation for the collapse of détente. Détente may have collapsed because the Soviet Union also may have been undermining US efforts at cooperation, making détente difficult to sustain. That said, if détente had not collapsed under President Ford,
the US would not have discarded its cooperative approach to the Soviets, and the Army would not have been either compelled or required to develop a doctrine designed almost exclusively to fight the Soviets in Europe.

Richard Nixon made and kept campaign promises that could at least in part help to explain why the Army may have been downsized from 1.57M to 725k soldiers between 1968 and 1976, and a smaller Army would have been an important reason for causing it to shift toward a doctrine designed specifically for a smaller Army. The anti-détente partisan political and Republican campaign pressures can help to explain President Ford’s shift away from détente toward a more confrontational policy of peace through strength with the Soviets. His shift then toward a more confrontational approach with the Soviets may have been another reason for the Army shift toward a doctrine focused almost exclusively on confronting the Soviets.

The existence of an explanatory pathway from Nixon’s campaign promises to a smaller Army, and from partisan and campaign politics to a deterioration of détente under Ford, and from both the smaller army and the deterioration of détente to the Army’s doctrinal shift in 1976, provides some congruence and therefore at least a low level of certainty to support this hypothesis.

_**Domestic Politics Hypothesis 2 (DP H2): increased civilian control of the DoD organization and military policy amplifies the influence that domestic politics has on Army doctrine decision-making.**_

Unlike the first two cases in this study – the 1954 and the 1962 versions of FM 100-5 – there is no evidence in this case that civilian leaders took any action either to increase or decrease civilian control over the military in the period leading up to the publishing of FM 100-5 in 1976. In the 1954 case, the Eisenhower Administration initiated, and Congress passed, legislation reorganizing the Department of Defense to give the president and secretary of defense greater control of the armed services by enhancing the powers of the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff
while further diminishing the authority of the separate service chiefs. In the 1962 case, Secretary of Defense McNamara implemented reforms that further enhanced civilian control over the military. In the 1976 case, no such actions to affect or reorganize the Department of Defense were taken by civilian leaders. Therefore, I assess that this hypothesis has no level of certainty based on a lack of supporting evidence.

*Domestic Politics Hypothesis 3 (DP H3): the outcome of domestic political struggles over Army personnel policy shapes the size of the Army, the amount of firepower and protection it requires, and where it can operate along a spectrum of war.*

There is a high level of congruence between the outcome of domestic political struggles over personnel policies – ending the draft and reducing the size of the Army – and a doctrinal shift away from low-intensity unconventional warfare to mid-intensity conventional warfare, but no necessary or sufficient evidence linking these causes to this doctrinal shift. As the Nixon Administration phased out the draft while increasing recruitment of volunteers from 1972 to 1973, it simultaneously downsized the Army. The administration explained that it was necessary to downsize the Army in order to pay for more expensive volunteer soldiers while not having to increase its budget for personnel. The ability to avoid budget increases was one argument the administration used to garner support for its plan to implement an all-volunteer force. It also argued that it could safely downsize the Army because combat operations in Vietnam were coming to an end at this same time, because it had been successful in reducing tensions with the Soviets and Chinese as part of détente, and because US allies were assuming a greater share of the burden of providing for their own regional defenses as part of the Guam or Nixon doctrine. When détente unraveled under President Ford from 1975 to 1976, and the likelihood of a military confrontation with the Soviets increased, the size of the Army was not increased accordingly. The Army was developing a doctrine designed to fight the Soviets outnumbered and win, and this was a doctrine
specifically built around the advantages that superior armor protection and firepower provide to an outnumbered force. Greater armor protection and superior firepower are two key factors that would enable the US Army to fight the Soviets outnumbered and win. According to Army historian John L. Romjue (1984, 8) the 1976 edition of FM 100-5 “stressed the substitution of firepower for manpower.”

As mentioned above in my analysis of domestic politics hypothesis 1, a smaller army may have been one necessary condition prompting the Army to make a doctrinal shift in 1976, and the end of the draft may have been sufficient to cause the Army to downsize, but ending the draft is not the only possible explanation for why the Army got smaller. The Army may have downsized anyways as it reduced operations in Vietnam, as allies took on a greater share of the defense burden, and as US relations with the Soviets and Chinese improved, whether the draft had ended or not. So, it is possible that a smaller draft Army may have been equally compelled to develop a doctrine in 1976 that would allow it to fight outnumbered and win, to increase its reliance on armor protection and superior firepower, and make its shift from a low-intensity unconventional doctrine to a mid-intensity conventional one. Therefore, I assess this hypothesis with an overall low level of certainty based on its high level of congruence but absent necessary or sufficient evidence to link these causes to Army leader decisions to modify the capstone doctrine.

*Domestic Politics Hypothesis 4 (DP H4): outcomes of political struggles over the annual Army budget can constrain or shape Army doctrinal choice.*

There is a moderate level of congruence between this hypothesis and the evidence I have found, but no necessary or sufficient evidence directly linking these causes to the doctrinal shift. President Ford replaced James Schlesinger as secretary of defense with more hawkish Donald Rumsfeld in October 1975 after facing political anti-détente pressure from both liberal Democrats as well as conservative Democrats and Republicans over his refusal to meet with Soviet dissident
Solzhenitsyn and his participation and signing of the Helsinki Accords. Secretary Rumsfeld then vigorously lobbied members of Congress to increase defense spending in order to shift from a cooperative détente policy to a more confrontational policy. For FY 76, Congress then passed the first defense spending increase since 1968. The biggest increase went to the Army, and the Army then used it to accelerate development and production of a new generation of tank, armored infantry fighting vehicle, attack and utility helicopters, and an air defense system – all needed, according to the Army, to move toward a doctrine required for a smaller Army to confront and defeat a larger Soviet Army. This congruence suggests that partisan political struggles to undermine détente, then President Ford’s initial moves away from détente and toward a more confrontational policy by appointing Donald Rumsfeld, then Rumsfeld’s subsequent efforts to lobby Congress to increase the defense budget, may have all contributed to the Army’s decision to develop a doctrine built around the heavy armor and the firepower of the new weapon systems it was now budgeted for in order to support a more confrontational US policy toward the Soviets – a policy President Ford was increasingly moving toward to appease, or disarm, his political opponents in both parties in anticipation of the upcoming presidential primary and general elections.

Anti-détente political pressure may have been one reason for the president to replace his secretary of defense with someone more hawkish. The president could have done this to relieve political pressure. But relieving political pressure in an effort to distance himself from détente may not have been the only reason that President Ford replaced Schlesinger with Rumsfeld. Walter Isaacson (1992, 669) argues that the president was looking for any reason to replace Schlesinger, and the anti-détente pressure was merely an excuse. Rumsfeld’s efforts to convince Congress to increase the defense budget may help to explain why they increased it, but again, this may not be the only reason they might have increased it. It is conceivable that Congress could have increased
defense spending anyways, especially given the anti-détente pressures coming from both sides of the aisle. An increase in the Army’s budget may explain how the Army was able to pursue fielding more modern heavy armor and heavy firepower weapons, but it may have found a way to field these weapon systems regardless of whether or not it had received a budget increase. And finally, although the Army developed its new doctrine around the heavy armor and firepower of these weapon systems in order to fight a Soviet Army outnumbered and win, it is possible that it would have developed a slightly different doctrine to accomplish the same thing that nevertheless still made a significant shift away from low-intensity unconventional warfare to mid-intensity conventional warfare. This moderate level of congruence, but lack of either necessary or sufficient evidence tying these potential causes to this doctrinal shift, leads me to assess this hypothesis with an overall low level of certainty.

Domestic Politics Hypothesis 5 (DP H5): outcomes of struggles between civilian politicians that result in restrictions on the type and duration of military force will shape expectations about likely Army involvement in future conflicts and constrain Army doctrinal choice sets.

There is a high level of congruence between this hypothesis and the evidence I have found, but like the other domestic politics hypotheses in this case, there is no evidence directly linking these possible causes to this doctrinal shift. Politicians struggled over placing restrictions on both the duration and the type of military force in the period preceding the 1976 edition of FM 100-5. Congress passed the War Powers Act over President Nixon’s veto in November 1973. This Act requires the president to request and receive Congressional approval for deployments of US military personnel beyond 60 days. This was preceded by Congressional action in July 1973 to cut off war funding and require the president to terminate all combat operations in Vietnam. These struggles between the executive and legislative branches were followed by struggles over military aid. In January 1975, Congress denied a request by President Ford to provide aid to South Vietnam.
in its efforts to continue resisting the North. Then in March 1975, it denied President Ford’s request to provide aid for Angolan forces attempting to resist Soviet and Cuban-backed forces. By denying the President’s requests to support low-intensity unconventional operations in Vietnam and Angola, and by creating a check on the president’s authority to deploy US troops for more than 60 days, Congress began setting limits on both the type and duration of military operations the president could support without legislative approval. The Army then developed and published a doctrine that not only required its forces to fight the Soviets outnumbered and win, but this doctrine was also designed based on the assumption that any future war involving US troops would need to be fought quickly – that its ability to politically sustain any future war beyond its first battle was no longer certain (Romjue 1984, 5-6).

The passage of the War Powers Act over the president’s veto, combined with Congress’ refusal to support ongoing low-intensity allied efforts in Vietnam and Angola, may have been sufficient cause for Army leaders to assume that there remained very little likelihood that civilian politicians would commit the Army to future long-term low-intensity conflicts, and that it, therefore, made sense for the Army to eschew low-intensity warfare doctrine and shift the Army’s focus to mid-intensity conventional warfare – a type of warfare that could be fought quickly and decisively in a first battle – as the doctrine prescribes. Although it is possible that these are sufficient reasons for the Army to design a doctrine aimed to fight and win any future war in its first battle, passage of the War Powers Act and Congressional failure to approve support for ongoing allied low-intensity conflicts do not appear to combine to create any necessary conditions, nor is it likely these are the only explanations. As I will describe under the international politics section, Army leaders had a strong motivation to design a doctrine for fighting and winning the next war in its first battle because the rapid pace and lethality of the modern battlefield now required it, as witnessed in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war pitting US-made Israeli weapons against
Soviet-made Arab weapons.

Although the available evidence of civilian struggles over the type and duration of military force has a high level of congruence with this hypothesis, there is no necessary or sufficient evidence directly linking these possible causes to this doctrinal shift. I, therefore, assess this hypothesis to have an overall low level of certainty.

**International Political Factors.**

The US steadily decreased both its direct and indirect military involvement and support for allies in peripheral regions outside Europe between 1968 and 1976, while simultaneously reinforcing its commitment to the NATO alliance in Europe. It did this while pursuing a policy of cooperation, or détente, with the Soviets in an effort to mitigate or offset reduced US military capabilities. The US shift from confrontation to attempted cooperation with the Soviets also paralleled an overall decrease in US defense spending. At the end of this military drawdown it became apparent that the Army likely lacked enough resources to prepare for anything beyond a defense of Europe (Herbert 1988, 100). At the same time, the Soviets and its Warsaw Pact allies were increasing defense spending. Although overall US and NATO spending still exceeded Soviet and Warsaw Pact spending during this period, US defense experts and politicians estimated that the Soviets would exceed the US by 1978 if those trends continued, eventually enabling it to reach nuclear parity with the US, as well as exceed US conventional capabilities – capabilities that could become paramount under conditions of nuclear parity (Friedberg 2000, 237; Reichley 1981, 348). It was not until 1976 that the US finally made an increase in its defense spending in an attempt to reverse this trend.

US military operations to directly confront Soviet-sponsored clients in peripheral regions culminated in 1968, effectively bringing the Kennedy-Johnson Flexible Response strategy to an
end. Under what came to be known as the Nixon Doctrine, the US steadily reduced direct military involvement in areas outside Europe while shifting a greater burden for defense to regional allies. For example, US troop strength in Vietnam was reduced from a peak of 543,400 in early 1969 to just 20,000 by 1972, and to zero by 1975. During this same period, the South Vietnamese Army assumed an increasing burden for its own defense. By 1975, however, the US began to withdraw even indirect support from regional allies. In January 1975, the US Congress denied President Ford’s request to provide military aid to South Vietnam, and in July 1975, it denied his request to provide military aid to Angolan forces battling Soviet and Cuban-sponsored forces (Berkowitz 2006, 75; Ford 1979, 345, 373; Garthoff 1985, 538; Mieczkowski 2005, 282, 285). It had become clear by 1975 that the US either was unable or unwilling to oppose Soviet advances in areas outside of Europe. According to Walter Isaacson (1992), even “Kissinger had come to the conclusion that the US was not willing to commit itself, especially militarily, to the struggle against Soviet influence in the third world.”

At the same time the US was reducing its efforts to directly confront Soviet influence in peripheral regions, it attempted to increase its efforts at cooperation under the Nixon Administration’s policy of détente. It was hoped that what the US failed to contain through confrontation could be achieved through cooperation instead. In one way, détente could be viewed as similar to Eisenhower’s New Look policy – in that it was a less expensive way, politically as well as monetarily, to attempt to contain Soviet-sponsored communism and nationalist movements (Berkowitz 2006, 76). In this sense, the goal of the US to contain the Soviets had not changed, but the ways and means had. In the end, however, neither cooperation nor containment appeared to improve despite Nixon’s, then Ford’s, efforts at détente. The Soviets remained active on the periphery, had achieved some successes, and created the impression that they harbored even bolder ambitions while taking advantage of US attempts at cooperation (Dobrynin 1995, 342). In the
words of one Soviet official, “the world was going our way” (Andrew and Mitrokhin 2005; Poole 2015, 23). The Soviets had rushed to the aid of Egypt and Syria with arms and ammunition shipments in October 1973 creating a significant existential threat to Israel. They continued to support North Vietnamese aggression against South Vietnam in violation of the 1973 cease-fire agreement. They supported Angolan insurgents in conjunction with the Cubans. They continued to increase their defense spending, and they continued to violate international human rights norms and laws (Berkowitz 2006, 75; Ford 1979, 345, 373; Garthoff 1985, 407, 538; Leffler 2007, 252; Mieczkowski 2005, 282; Poole 2015, 2, 8; Zelizer 2010, 250, 255).

As the US began reducing its military commitments on the periphery, it began increasing assurances to its NATO allies, especially West Germany. While the Army had been focused in large part on unconventional warfare in Vietnam during the 1960s and early 1970s, the West German Army had developed a defensive doctrine of its own to disrupt or defeat a Soviet-led mechanized and armor attack in Europe (Kretchik 2011, 196). When the US Army turned its full attention back toward Europe after Vietnam, it looked to the Germans for help catching up (Herbert 1988, 61, 73-88; Nielsen 2000, 263-266; Romjue 1984, 3). The 1976 version of FM 100-5 that resulted was in complete “consonance with German 100/100 (Command in Battle)” (Sorley 2009, 281). It was also “an accommodation to the Germans” (Gole 2008, 264). Gen. William DePuy, the US Army Training and Doctrine commander responsible for the rewrite of FM 100-5 at the time, said that “the German influence on this manual was significant, had been underestimated, and had not been adequately described by Army historians” (Gole 2008, 263).

As the US Army was busy working with the West Germans to develop a compatible doctrine, Nixon, and then Ford Administration officials were busy convincing Congress to increase the US defense budget in the face of increasing Soviet defense spending and improving Soviet weapons technology (Leffler 2007, 252). Secretary of Defense Schlesinger committed himself to
reversing this trend. He predicted Soviet preponderance by 1978 and made strengthening NATO’s conventional capability his top priority (Poole 2015, 5; Reichley 1981, 348). Although he was unsuccessful, his predecessor, Donald Rumsfeld, along with President Ford, saw success. Secretary Rumsfeld published a critical report in March of 1975 that warned of a “massive shift of power as Soviet weapons technology improved” (Rumsfeld 2011, 224-225; Zelizer 2010, 269). He highlighted a rising Soviet threat in his annual defense posture statement in February of 1976, prompting the CIA to raise its estimates and the Congressional Research Service to begin issuing alarmist reports on the conventional military balance (Garthoff 1985, 545). As of 1976, the conventional military balance was certainly tipped in the favor of the Warsaw Pact over NATO on the Central European front, and was projected to increase. The Warsaw Pact armies maintained 58 active divisions with 564,000 soldiers along this front compared with NATO’s 28 divisions and 414,000 soldiers (Fischer 1976, 8, 11; IISS 1977). President Ford also had become convinced that the US was in military decline relative to the Soviets, and with his help, Secretary Rumsfeld was able in 1976 to convince Congress to make its first defense budget increase since 1968.

Gen. DePuy shared Secretary Rumsfeld’s and President Ford’s view. He said, “the situation in Europe had changed dramatically since we last paid any real attention to it [before Vietnam]. The Soviets were bigger, stronger, and in some cases, had fielded three or four generations of new equipment while we were standing still” (DePuy 1988, 1265; Romjue 1984, 5). The Army’s time in Vietnam represented “a lost decade of weapons advancement” (Herbert 1988, 99; Romjue 1984, 1-2). According to NATO Commander Gen. Alexander Haig in 1975, the Soviets outnumbered the US and NATO forces in Europe “2.3 to 1 in personnel and 3 to 1 in tanks, and Soviet military growth was continuing to increase” (Haig 1976, 14). Based on observations from the performance of both US- and Soviet-made weapons in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, both Gen. DePuy and Gen. Haig had reason to believe that the US had fallen behind the Soviets not just
quantitatively, but qualitatively as well (Herbert 1988, 30, 99; Romjue 1984, 2, 6). The 1973 war turned out to be a microcosm of what a NATO-Warsaw Pact war might look like in Europe (Gole 2008, 240). “Tank ratios [were] similar to what would be expected in Europe” (Sorley 2008, 272). During the conduct of this war, “Arab forces had used Soviet technology to easily destroy American armor” (Kretchik 2011, 196). This led Gen. DePuy to the conclusion that the Army not only needed a doctrine that was compatible with the West Germans, but a doctrine that would allow numerically inferior US and West German troops to quickly defeat numerically superior Soviet and Warsaw Pact armies. Because of the lethality and high attrition seen from the performance of modern weapons used on Arab-Israeli battlefields in 1973, Gen. DePuy understood that any future war fought in Europe would be much different than Vietnam (Herbert 1988, 30, 99). The war would be over quickly, and there would be no time for national mobilization before the war was over and had been decided. Although the US and NATO might not be able to match the Soviets and Warsaw Pact soldier for soldier or tank for tank, they could definitely exceed them in quality if the US committed itself to achieving this. A new doctrine was therefore required for a new generation of American weapons and equipment – a doctrine that also complemented German doctrine, compensated for numerical inferiority, and the lack of time available for national mobilization before any future war would have already been fought and decided.

Analysis of International Politics Hypotheses.

*International Politics Hypothesis 1 (IP H1): US policy-makers will require the Army to develop and implement doctrine that supports the establishment or maintenance of US alliance institutions.*

There is a low level of congruence between the evidence presented above and this hypothesis, but there is no evidence directly linking these possible causes to this shift in doctrine. The US Army collaborated with the West German Army in developing its 1976 capstone doctrine,
and the doctrine the US Army then published mirrored the West German doctrine in many ways, reflecting the fundamentals of highly mobile mechanized infantry and armor defensive warfare that the Germans had refined during the 1960s and early 1970s. The US Army collaborated with the Germans to develop this doctrine after it had been directed to withdraw from Vietnam, after it had been told that US allies in areas outside of Europe would take on a greater burden for their own defense – relieving the US Army of much of that burden, and after it had then been directed to focus its main efforts on the defense of Western Europe, specifically in Germany – all in accordance with the Nixon Doctrine. It stands to reason that US Army collaboration with the West German Army to develop a compatible doctrine strengthened the NATO alliance to the extent that the two NATO armies were now working together in a more cooperative and compatible manner. That said, although US political leaders directed the Army to withdraw from peripheral regions and focus on Europe, and perhaps in part to reassure and help to maintain the NATO alliance that had been neglected to some degree during the time that the US was focused on Vietnam, there is no smoking gun evidence sufficient to suggest that any US political leaders specifically directed the Army to collaborate with the Germans to update doctrine as some sort of supporting effort to maintain or strengthen the alliance.

Although refocusing the Army on Europe may have been a sufficient condition for the Army to collaborate with the Germans to update doctrine, this may not have been the only reason that the Army might have done this. The Army might have collaborated with the Germans to update its doctrine regardless of whether US policy makers refocused the Army on Europe or not, or regardless of whether or not US policy makers believed that the US had largely ignored the NATO alliance during the Vietnam years. The Army might have collaborated with the Germans simply because of the lessons observed from the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, and came to the conclusion that the Germans had the best doctrine for addressing US Army shortcomings in
modern mobile mechanized and armored warfare relative to the Soviets, and that it needed to learn from the Germans. The Army could have come to this conclusion all on its own, whether or not US policy makers refocused them on Europe, or whether or not US policy makers thought that more efforts needed to be taken to maintain the NATO alliance after less attention had been paid to it while the Army was focused on Vietnam.

Due to the low level of congruence and sufficiency that the available evidence lends to this hypothesis, I assess that it has some, although a low level of certainty. In other words, there is some reason to believe that alliance politics may have contributed to prompting US policy-makers to suggest to the Army that it collaborate more closely with the Germans while refocusing its operations on Europe. It could also be that by refocusing the Army on Europe, US policy-makers unintentionally prompted the Army to collaborate more closely with the Germans on doctrine development. Either way, there is not enough evidence to prove that US policy-maker concern about the NATO alliance was either necessary or by itself sufficient to cause the Army to collaborate with the Germans and make such a significant shift away from low-intensity unconventional warfare to mid-intensity conventional warfare doctrine in 1976.

*International Politics Hypothesis 2 (IP H2): changes in the military balance of power and capabilities among real and potential US adversaries as well as its allies will correspond to a change in the internal balance of US military power and capabilities, including those of its Army and its doctrine.*

The evidence presented above provides a high level of congruence with this hypothesis, and there is some evidence to suggest that there is a link with this doctrinal shift. US policy-maker decisions to shift the US balance of power by withdrawing from the periphery, by drawing down US military power, and by refocusing remaining US capabilities on Europe under the Nixon Doctrine is congruent with the Army doctrinal shift away from low-intensity unconventional
warfare to mid-intensity conventional warfare in 1976.

There is evidence that US policy-maker decisions to shift the Army’s focus from the periphery to operations in Europe was one necessary reason for causing the Army to make a shift in its doctrine away from low-intensity unconventional warfare conducted in peripheral areas to mid-intensity conventional warfare conducted in Europe. However, shifting the Army’s focus toward Europe alone cannot explain why the Army made a complete shift away from unconventional warfare doctrine in 1976. Simply based on the frequency of Army low-intensity unconventional warfare commitments throughout history, and especially given its recent commitment in Vietnam, the refocusing of the Army on Europe by US policy-makers alone could not have been sufficient to cause Army leaders to believe that low-intensity unconventional warfare outside of Europe would no longer ever be a possibility for the Army, causing it to delete all such doctrine from its capstone manual in 1976. In other words, the Army would not have made a complete doctrinal shift away from low-intensity warfare if US policy-makers had not refocused the Army on Europe, but there must be other reasons that caused the Army to completely delete all such doctrine from its capstone manual. Perhaps the Army concluded what Henry Kissinger had – that “the US was not willing to commit itself, especially militarily, to the struggle against Soviet influence in the third world” (Isaacson 1992). This may have led Army leaders to the conclusion that the likelihood of the US committing it to another low-intensity unconventional war on the periphery was so low that it was not worth addressing in its capstone doctrinal manual any longer.

There is sufficient evidence to show that a shift in the military balance of power with the US drawdown after Vietnam through 1975 contributed to causing Army doctrine decision-makers to conclude that the Army could handle only one primary mission – the defense of Europe – causing them in part to eschew all low-intensity unconventional warfare content. The Army did not
have enough resources to deal with much more than Europe in 1976. This may have constrained Army doctrine decision-makers to focus the Army on just one primary form of warfare, and in 1976, they chose to focus it on mid-intensity conventional warfare.

It also became clear from the results of combat in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War that Soviet-made combat equipment (armor and anti-armor systems, artillery, air defense systems, etc.) was now equal to, or in some cases more effective than, American made combat equipment. This caused Army planners to reassess the relative conventional military power of the US Army versus Soviet and Warsaw Pact armies, and they came to the conclusion that the Soviets had made huge gains during the 1960s and early 1970s while the US focused on low-intensity warfare in Vietnam. They also concluded that if current trends continued, the conventional military balance of power would tip in favor of the Soviets and Warsaw Pact armies. This assessment contributed to Army doctrinal planners deciding to focus the entire weight of FM 100-5’s doctrinal content into an effort to help offset a looming conventional military imbalance – especially under conditions of nuclear parity.

**Bureaucratic Political Factors.**

During the period between the publishing of the 1968 and 1976 editions of FM 100-5, the Army as a bureaucratic organization was subject to and experienced significant changes. It went from a draft Army sent to fight a low-intensity unconventional war in Southeast Asia to an all-volunteer Army that national political leaders focused almost exclusively on defending Western Europe against mid- to high-intensity warfare capable Soviet and Warsaw Pact armies. It went from a peak of 1.57 million active duty soldiers at the height of the Vietnam War in 1968 to just 725,000 by 1975 – a 54% reduction in just seven years. It transformed from an army composed of ten regular dismounted infantry divisions suited for low- to mid-intensity warfare, with seven
mechanized armor divisions suited for mid- to high-intensity contingencies in 1968 (Dupuy 1970), to an army with just eight regular infantry divisions, and nine mechanized armor divisions by 1976 (IISS 1977). Its composition shifted from an army focused on the lower end of the spectrum of warfare to one that national leaders now focused on the mid- to high-intensity end of the spectrum. Throughout its history and until this time, the Army had been a regular dismounted infantry-centric force. Although it gained mechanized infantry and armor formations between WWII and Vietnam, the bulk of the Army’s fighting force had remained dismounted infantry until 1976, and each previous version of its capstone doctrine reflected this. It was not until 1976 that a vastly outnumbered US Army, composed mostly of dismounted infantry formations, was directed to concentrate its main effort on a superior mechanized and armor-equipped enemy force in Europe, that it shifted its composition and its doctrine to focus on mid- to high-intensity warfare.

Not only did the Army change its composition between 1968 and 1976, it also fully transformed itself from a draft service to an all-volunteer service. This was a shift that senior Army leaders initially opposed, but eventually supported (Griffith 1997, 176-177, 204, 246, 282; Lee and Parker 1977, 37; Rostker 2006, 269). The Army was the largest service and the one that depended most on a draft (Rostker 2006, 146). Prior to the end of the draft in 1973, 75% of Army personnel needs were met through the draft (Griffith 1997, 286). The other services were smaller and usually attracted more volunteers than the Army. In every major American war, the Army was the service that sustained the most risk and loss of life. This fact of life (or death) was not lost on potential military conscripts. Throughout US history, potential conscripts readily volunteered for the Navy, and later the Air Force after its inception, simply to avoid being drafted into the Army. The Army also initially opposed an end to the draft because studies showed that an all-volunteer Army would be more expensive than a draft Army, and the Army would therefore either have to divert more of its budget to personnel, or it would simply be forced to accept fewer soldiers to
populate its units (Herbert 1988, 100; Rostker 2006, 268). Given the post-Vietnam cuts the Army was already receiving, senior Army leaders assumed the situation would become even worse once an all-volunteer force went into effect. So many opposed it, and in some cases even tried to subvert implementation (Griffith 1997, 204, 246, 282).

During this same period, the depth and breadth of the battlefield the Army was preparing to focus its main efforts on expanded from one characterized by skirmishes with lightly armed guerrillas and some regular enemy infantry units in and around small jungle villages and tropical highlands with unimproved road networks to a battlefield spanning a large part of densely populated, urban, and industrialized Central and Western Europe. The size of the battlefields the Army was focused on changed from yards and single miles in the jungle and tropical highlands, to one of tens or even hundreds of miles in Europe. It also changed from an enemy equipped with relatively light and antiquated man-portable small arms weapons with limited ranges to an enemy equipped with state-of-the art and highly mobile heavy weaponry and armor with extended ranges and highly destructive capabilities. The extended European battlefield depths and frontages combined with the need to defend against highly mobile and advanced mechanized and armored Soviet and Warsaw Pact armies also meant that the Army could no longer rely exclusively on its internal indirect fire weapon systems to support its ground maneuver. Highly mobile mechanized and armor forces could quickly outstrip the ranges of the Army’s organic artillery and other ground-to-ground weapon systems. This meant that the Army would need longer range support in Europe, and this was a capability that only the Air Force possessed. The Army, therefore, found itself in a position in the mid-1970s of either fighting over limited resources with the Air Force to replicate Air Force weapons systems for itself, or to cooperate with the Air Force to ensure that it was resourced, able, and willing to support highly mobile mechanized and armor operations that the Army was now required to focus on in Europe. Because the Army’s budget had been

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consistently and deeply cut between 1968 and 1975, it would not have been feasible for the Army to replicate Air Force systems, and it, therefore, put its efforts into cooperation with the Air Force instead of attempting to compete against it (Herbert 1988, 61, 68; Nielsen 2003, 261-262).

According to Gen. DePuy, “we didn’t have enough money to duplicate Air Force systems” (Herbert 1988, 69).

With a shift in emphasis from low-intensity unconventional warfare in peripheral areas to mid-intensity conventional warfare in Europe, combined with a need to reorganize the Army from a force built around regular dismounted infantry formations to one that would be built primarily around mechanized infantry and armor formations, the Army Chief of Staff in 1973, Gen. Abrams, put General William DePuy in charge of the Army command responsible for the development of FM 100-5. Just prior to this appointment, the Army completed a reorganization of those commands responsible for training, doctrine, and readiness. It disbanded Continental Army Command that had been responsible for training and readiness, and the Combat Developments Command responsible for doctrine. It reorganized them into Forces Command (FORSCOM) responsible now for readiness, and Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) responsible now for, as its name indicates, training and doctrine (Gole 2008, 238). Gen. Abrams directed this reorganization because responsibility for both training and readiness exceeded the scope of what one command could handle, and a continuing disunity between training and doctrine had persistently caused both efforts to suffer. By relieving CONARC, now FORSCOM, of the responsibility for training – it could concentrate all its efforts on readiness. By uniting both training and doctrine under TRADOC, these mutually dependent efforts could now finally be synchronized under one command capable of handling both (Nielsen 2003, 233-234; Romjue, Canedy, Chapman 1993). With Gen. DePuy as its first commander, TRADOC moved out quickly to develop a doctrine and implement an Army-wide training plan that would support its
transformation from a regular dismounted-infantry force to one that was built around mechanized infantry and armor formations capable of defending Europe against superior Soviet and Warsaw Pact mechanized and armor forces.

This was a period when the Army’s armor branch became ascendant over the Army’s infantry branch for the first time (Herbert 1988, 82, 103). Gen. DePuy assigned the Army’s armor branch and school, now under TRADOC, and its armor commander, Major General Don Starry, as the lead TRADOC organization with primary responsibility for overhauling FM 100-5. For the first time in the history of the development of FM 100-5, the infantry branch and school did not lead, nor even participate in, the writing of the Army’s capstone doctrine (Herbert 1988, 89). This is surprising given that the combination of regular infantry and mechanized infantry divisions together still outnumbered armor divisions in 1976 when the new edition of FM 100-5 was finally published, and one would assume it may have fostered intense competition between the infantry and armor branches. However, this shift in doctrinal emphasis away from the infantry branch to the armor branch actually fostered cooperation, especially over the acquisition of new mechanized infantry personnel carriers and new armor tanks (Herbert 1988, 68, 102). As the new FM 100-5 was focused on both mechanized infantry and armor operations, it became a means for the Army, and both the infantry and armor branches, to justify the acquisition of new items such as these in order to realize its implementation. As Gole (2008, 259) described the new doctrine, “it was both a fighting doctrine and a procurement strategy.” This boon in resources for both infantry and armor branches likely dampened any negative rivalry that might have otherwise affected this doctrinal shift in 1976.

In what has come to be referred to as the Abrams Doctrine, another major organizational change made to the Army bureaucracy during the period leading up to the 1976 publication of FM 100-5 was related to Gen. Abrams’ efforts to transfer a significant portion of service and support
functions out of the active Army into the reserve Army. Abrams made this shift for two reasons. First, given the fact that US and NATO combat units were already greatly outnumbered in Europe, Abrams wanted a way to increase the number of active Army combat divisions – taking them from an historical low of 13 in 1972 to his stated goal of at least 16 by 1977 (Abrams 1975; Sorley 1992, 362). He also wanted as many active duty soldiers as possible to be in combat positions. Second, Abrams thought that by stripping the active Army of its service and support units and soldiers, and by placing them into the reserves, it would become impossible for any future president to commit the Army to war without also calling up those reserves. During the conduct of the Vietnam War, the Army consistently requested, and the Johnson Administration repeatedly denied, a call-up of reserves. Because there was not enough political support for the Vietnam War, President Johnson decided that he could not call up the reserves – that there would be too much political backlash and resistance from the public and from Congress (Herbert 1988, 76). This had become a huge problem for the Army as it did its best to sustain operations in Vietnam without the support of the reserves, and Abrams was determined to find a way not to let that happen again. According to historian Lewis Sorley (1992, 361), Abrams “appeared determined that never again would a president be able to send the Army to war without the reserves maintained for such a contingency.” Gen. John Vessey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs at the time, recounted that Gen. Abrams could be heard on many occasions saying, “They’re not taking us to war again without calling up the reserves!” (Sorley 1992, 364). In effect, by reorganizing the Army in such a way that it could not be committed to war unless the reserves also were called up, Abrams made it much more difficult for any future president to commit the Army without the political support of the American people and Congress (Fitzgerald 2013, 204; Lock-Pullan 2005, 131). According to James Carafano (2005), Abrams was determined “to maintain a clear linkage between the employment of the Army and the engagement of public support for military operations.”
**Analysis of the Bureaucratic Politics Hypothesis.**

*Bureaucratic politics hypothesis (BP H): changes in Army doctrine correspond to attempts by the Army or its internal branches to protect or increase missions or roles, resources, or autonomy at the expense of, or relative to, the other services or branches.*

The Army’s shift from a draft to an all-volunteer force, its shift from an Army built around regular dismounted infantry formations to one built around mechanized infantry and armor, its shift from relatively confined close-quarter battlefields to broader and deeper battlefields requiring more reliance on the Air Force, its reorganization to unite both training and doctrinal functions under one command – TRADOC, combined with its reorganization of service and support functions out of the active army and into the reserves under the Abrams Doctrine, are all highly congruent with the shift in Army doctrine from low-intensity unconventional warfare to mid-intensity conventional warfare in 1976. The evidence also allows this hypothesis to pass a hoop test, giving it an overall moderate level of certainty when combined with the high level of congruence.

Senior Army leaders initially opposed the shift from a draft Army to an all-volunteer Army, asserting that the Army could not afford to attract or retain volunteers, or that it would become so small it would not be able to accomplish its mission, or successfully fight a future war, at least in the initial stages before a draft could be reinstated and national mobilization achieved. There were even accounts that some Army leaders attempted to sabotage the process (Rostker 2006, 269). Senior Army leaders eventually got on board and supported the transition, but they did return to original arguments against it when developing and promoting the new FM 100-5 in 1976. Arguments were made in support of adopting a capstone doctrine designed for highly mobile mechanized infantry and armor operations on a broad-front European battlefield because an all-volunteer Army with fewer soldiers could only successfully defend against superior Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces with such equipment. It appears that Army leaders may have used the
argument that it needed a doctrine built around highly mobile mechanized infantry and armor operations to compensate for the fact that an all-volunteer personnel system had been imposed on it. Although some Army leaders may have attempted to use this argument to justify its new doctrine, and transitioning to an all-volunteer Army may have been sufficient to cause the Army to become smaller, the Army may have become smaller whether the draft had ended or not.

The Army’s shift from a regular infantry-centric to a mechanized infantry and armor-centric force could have created competition between the infantry and armor branches, but there is no evidence that any competition or rivalry affected the content of the doctrine. What can be said, however, is that the Army’s reorganization of both training and doctrine functions under one command, TRADOC, may have given the TRADOC commander an opportunity to monopolize the FM 100-5 process with the support of the armor branch and armor school. Before this reorganization, Combat Development Command (CDC) had responsibility for FM 100-5, but it did not have authority over the different Army branch schools, such as infantry and armor. The CDC commander would, therefore, not have been able to place primary responsibility for developing FM 100-5 with any single Army branch or school. The unification of both training and doctrine under one command, however, made that possible. It could then be said that the development and writing of the 1976 edition of FM 100-5 may not have been monopolized by the armor branch and armor school officers, and it might, therefore, not have shifted so significantly from low-intensity unconventional warfare toward mid-intensity conventional warfare, had this TRADOC reorganization not happened. Although this may have been a sufficient cause for explaining some aspect of this doctrinal shift, it still does not preclude the possibility that this shift could have occurred for other reasons. What is also not clear is the extent to which the reorganization of Army training and doctrine functions under one command can be described as bureaucratic politics. Although it is possible, I have found no evidence to suggest that any one faction in the Army
forced or influenced another faction to reorganize Army training and doctrine functions in this manner simply to gain some potential advantage over the other, or at another branch’s expense. Therefore, I would assess this evidence as allowing this hypothesis to pass just an easy smoking gun sufficiency test, contributing to some, although a low level of additional certainty.

The shift of the Army’s main effort battlefield from Vietnam to Europe during this period caused it to consider either competing with the Air Force to replicate its systems or to cooperate with it for needed support. Army senior leaders chose the latter, and it is then possible that it used its 1976 doctrine to help either compel or convince the Air Force to support Army operations in Europe. The 1976 doctrine specifically describes the Army’s dependence on the Air Force, and the Air Force’s role in supporting the Army on the wide frontages and depths of a European battlefield. The previous two versions of FM 100-5 examined in this study do not mention Army reliance on, or described support from, other services in this same detail as the 1976 edition. It may, therefore, have been sufficient for Army leaders to conclude that it could not compete with the Air Force to secure enough resources to replicate needed Air Force systems, and that it would instead need to cooperate with the Air Force. The Army may have attempted to influence or compel the Air Force to cooperate with and support it by codifying that support in its doctrine, and in that sense, doctrine was used by one service to compel another service to do something it may not have otherwise done. The question is, was the doctrine actually dependent upon Air Force cooperation? In other words, would the absence of Air Force support have caused the Army not to make such a shift from low-intensity unconventional warfare to mid-intensity warfare? Would a lack of Air Force cooperation made such a doctrinal shift untenable? It may have certainly undermined it, and I believe it could be argued that it was a necessary component. Highly mobile mechanized and armor warfare quickly outstrips organic Army artillery ranges, and longer range aerial weapons platforms then become essential to success. Based on this, I assess that this evidence of inter-
service relations, in this case cooperation not rivalry, was one necessary condition for this shift in Army doctrine, and, therefore, allows this hypothesis to pass a hoop test, contributing to a small amount of additional certainty for it.

The shift of service and support soldiers from the active to the reserve Army was an effort by Gen. Abrams to make it difficult for future presidents to commit the Army to war without the reserves, without an adequate level of public and Congressional support that would be needed to activate them in time of war. In other words, he did not want to see the Army committed again to an unpopular war with one hand tied behind its back. Abrams also made this shift in order to increase the number of combat troops in the active Army – what he referred to as improving the “tooth-to-tail” ratio. As discussed earlier, Army leaders had come to the conclusion based on observations made from the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, that weapons system had become so effective and lethal, that future wars would be decided within the first few days or even in the first battle. Under these conditions, it would be necessary to maximize as many combat troops as possible in front-line combat units, ready to fight a short decisive battle that may well decide the outcome of a future war. By the time the nation were to have activated and trained replacement combat troops under a national war mobilization and, or renewed draft, any such future war could have already been over and decided after the first battle.

Abrams’ concentration of service and support troops into the reserves is not reflected in the 1976 doctrine, but the lethality of the modern battlefield and the need to succeed in the first battle is. His reasons for reorganizing the Army to make it more difficult for political leaders to commit the Army to an unpopular war without activating the reserves is perhaps itself the most political motivation I have come across yet in this research. It is a clear example of the leader of the Army bureaucracy, using his power to reorganize that bureaucracy, to potentially compel political leaders to either do something, or not do something that they may not otherwise do. Nevertheless, there is
no mention of the role of the reserves in the 1976 edition of FM 100-5. Without this political motivation on the part of Abrams, however, he may not have directed this reorganization, and the Army may not have achieved the higher tooth-to-tail ratios that it believed it needed for its new doctrine to succeed in winning its first battles while outnumbered. Therefore, although Abrams’ political motivation may have been sufficient to cause the Army to reorganize its active and reserve forces, it was not a necessary reason, or the only reason. The Army may have pursued and accomplished this reorganization simply to improve its tooth-to-tail ratio, with no political motivation in mind.

Conclusion.

I assess, based on the evidence presented in this case study, with some certainty that domestic politics had an impact on the Army’s doctrinal shift in 1976 (see a summary of the levels of certainty assessed for each political hypothesis from this case in table 4 below). The available evidence shows that President Nixon’s efforts to fulfill campaign promises to end the draft, end the war in Vietnam, and reduce US military involvement in areas outside Europe, combined with Congressional limitations placed on the type and duration of wars the president could support, all contributed to a reduction in the size of the Army. This reduction, when combined with the the beginning of the unraveling of détente under President Ford with his move toward a “peace through strength” strategy outlined during the Republican presidential primaries in 1976, combined to affect the Army’s doctrinal shift toward an almost exclusive focus on mid-intensity conventional warfare.

The available evidence provides a low amount of certainty that policy-makers’ refocusing of the Army on Europe to help shore up the NATO alliance after a decade of focus on Vietnam prompted the US Army to look at West German Army doctrine as an example of what might work
best at that time on European battlefields. This US Army collaboration with the West German Army to update doctrine may have inadvertently bolstered the NATO alliance institution, but there is no evidence that US policy-makers specifically directed the Army to mirror German doctrine. I assess with a moderate amount of certainty that a shift in US military power away from peripheral areas to Central Europe, combined with a growing shift in the conventional balance of military power in favor of the Soviets based on the observed performance of their armor, anti-armor, mechanized, and air defense capabilities employed by Arab armies in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, also had an impact on the Army’s doctrinal shift toward a mid-intensity conventional warfare doctrine.

I assess with a moderate level of certainty that bureaucratic politics had an impact on the Army doctrinal shift in 1976. There is some evidence to suggest that the Army used its doctrine in 1976 to set the conditions for cooperation with the Air Force so that the Army could avoid a requirement to replicate Air Force weapons systems. Because the pace of modern mechanized and armored battlefields witnessed during the Arab-Israeli War, and envisioned for any future European battlefield, would quickly outstrip the range of Army land-based weapons, the Army realized it would need longer-range aerial weapons platforms. The Army could either resource these weapons itself – which would have been cost-prohibitive, or it could rely on support from the Air Force. By writing Air Force support and cooperation into its capstone doctrine, the Army was potentially using its doctrine as a tool to encourage the Air Force do something it may not otherwise have done. In addition to this, the Army’s reorganization of both training and doctrinal functions under one command in 1973 (the new US Army Training and Doctrine Command) may have inadvertently allowed the Army’s armor branch to monopolize the writing of the 1976 capstone doctrine – allowing its officers to favor heavy armor and mechanized infantry conventional warfare doctrine over dismounted regular infantry low-intensity, unconventional
warfare doctrine. However, there is no evidence that the motivation for this Army reorganization was related to any deliberate effort by one branch of the Army to gain an advantage over the other.

As a final note in this case, Gen. Abrams’ initiative to place all service and support functions into the reserves, so that civilian politicians would be forced to call upon them to support any future war, may have been an effort by him to reorganize the Army bureaucracy for political purposes – to begin forcing civilian politicians to do something they may not otherwise do – but because there is no mention of this reorganization in the 1976 edition of FM 100-5, there is no observable evidence of a bureaucratic politics cause and doctrinal effect related to this bureaucratic reorganization.

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Table 4 (Case #3 – 1976: Political hypotheses certainty)
CHAPTER 6 – 2008 CASE STUDY

Introduction.

Between 1976 and 2001, the content of FM 100-5 (redesignated FM 3-0 in 2001) remained relatively stable along a spectrum of war. Like the 1976 edition, the 1982 and 1986 editions were both focused exclusively on mid-intensity conventional warfare. The 1993 edition made an incremental increase in content of low-intensity warfare by 6%. The 2001 edition made another 7% increase to the same. It was only after the Army had been in Afghanistan for seven years and Iraq for five that it made a significant shift to increase the amount of low-intensity warfare content. The 2008 edition of FM 3-0 increased low-intensity content from 13% to 46% and correspondingly reduced mid-intensity conventional warfare content from 87% to 54%. This represented the single largest shift in the content of Army capstone doctrine along a spectrum of war since World War II. About this shift, Walter Kretchik (2011, 270), Army historian and former Army doctrine writer, noted, “as the [2008] manual placed more emphasis on stability operations and COIN [counterinsurgency], it was deemed…revolutionary.” The Association of the United States Army (2008) said, “the new field manual’s impact on the force and the application of doctrine is likely to be revolutionary.” Jennifer Taw (2012, 57), a leading defense scholar, also described the new manual as revolutionary in that it “entails offensive, defensive, and stability efforts.” General William Wallace (US Army 2008), the commander of Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) in 2008, stated in the capstone manual’s forward that, “[j]ust as the 1976 edition of FM 100-5 began to take the Army from the rice paddies of Vietnam to the battlefield of Western Europe, this [2008] edition will take us into the 21st century urban battlefields among the people.”

Work on the 2008 edition of FM 3-0 occurred between 2005 and 2007, and it was published
in February 2008. According to then TRADOC Commander Gen. Wallace, “the development of this version of FM 3-0 traces back to 2005 with a series of issue papers…. [T]he issue papers served as a structural foundation for codifying the key concepts of the manual (Wallace 2008, 2). The papers were staffed with over 200 separate Army commands and organizations as well as the Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy doctrine development centers. Over 4,000 comments were collected and synthesized, and a total of three drafts were produced before it was presented to the Department of the Army level for Chief of Staff final review and comments by the summer of 2007. Chief of Staff review occurred through a series of meetings and presentations until December of 2007 when the manual was approved to be released. It was published in February of 2008.

Through this case study, the extent to which domestic, international, or bureaucratic politics did or did not affect this Army doctrinal shift in 2008 is examined. A consideration of politics at the domestic, international, and bureaucratic levels of analysis can shed light on who or what may have had the power to cause this doctrinal shift to occur when it did. Like the previous case, I assess based on the evidence presented here that trends in domestic politics coincided with some of these changes to Army doctrine in 2008. I was unable to find evidence of a direct linkage between these politics and doctrine, however, but did find evidence confirming that they did not – provided by the Chief of Staff of the Army who approved the 2008 FM, General (Retired) George Casey. There is no evidence that the Army was directed by civilian policy-makers to update its doctrine in any effort to maintain or improve a US alliance institution or improve interoperability with its allies. There is evidence that US military operations, especially in Iraq, may have actually weakened or undermined some US alliance relations, but there is no evidence that this had any impact on this doctrinal shift. The development of this doctrine did coincide with an increased international perception of an imbalance of US power in the international system, of US military
dominance, and that the US was increasingly willing and able to act militarily without the full support of some traditional allies. I infer that this may have allowed the US to remain in Iraq longer than it may have otherwise. By having the power to remain in Iraq (and even Afghanistan where it remains today) longer than it might have otherwise, it demonstrated that it was willing and able to fight costly and protracted unconventional ground wars and that that may have informed senior Army leaders that a shift in doctrine to reflect this might have affected the development of FM 3-0 in 2008. But again, like trends in domestic politics in this case, I was unable to find evidence directly linking an international imbalance of US power to senior Army leader doctrine decision-making in this case. There is no evidence that outcomes of politics between US military services or separate branches of the Army may have affected this doctrinal shift, but there is evidence that rivalry between progressive leaders in the Army such as Gen. Petraeus and his followers, who advocated for unconventional warfare doctrine, and traditionalists within the Army, who advocated for conventional doctrine, may have had an impact on this 2008 doctrinal shift. However, given that one of the Army’s leading traditionalists at the time, Gen. George Casey, was Chief of Staff of the Army from 2007-2011 when the new FM 3-0 was published, and he was personally involved in the final stages of the development of this doctrine, the impact of such a rivalry between these two schools of thought within the Army on this doctrinal outcome ultimately appears unlikely.

Perhaps this doctrinal shift is the result of three factors outlined to me by the Army’s Training and Doctrine Commander at the time who directly oversaw the development of this doctrinal shift, General (Retired) William Wallace. While corresponding about this case, Gen. (R) Wallace told me that while he believes politics may “loosely” or indirectly impact doctrine, he prefers to consider doctrine as the product of three overlapping influences not directly impacted by the politics of the time: “1) it is the product of what we believe to be the nature of war over the
time that the doctrine is influential; 2) it is the product of the operational environment over the time
that the doctrine is influential; 3) it is the product of the experience of senior leaders and thought
leaders relative to 1) and 2)” (Wallace 2017).

As a consideration of politics sheds less light on this doctrinal shift than the previous three
cases in this study, other approaches to the study of doctrine focusing on this period briefly
highlighted in Chapter 1 might prove to be more useful. Retired Army Colonel Gian Gentile
(2013), in *Wrong Turn: America’s Deadly Embrace of Counterinsurgency*, argues that defense
experts, including current and retired military officers, developed a flawed or misleading historical
narrative of the Vietnam War in order to convince President Bush and his advisors that the Iraq
War could be rescued if he simply chose a better general and allowed him to properly apply a low-
intensity, unconventional doctrine and strategy. According to this narrative, Vietnam was not lost
because of mistakes made by civilian authorities or by a lack of public support. The war was lost
because the wrong generals were put in charge, and they incorrectly applied a conventional
document to an unconventional conflict. This narrative proved to be politically expedient. Gentile
argues that it allowed the president to place blame on the military for the poor conduct of the Iraq
and Afghan wars thus far, and prompted him to direct the Army to adopt an unconventional
document in an attempt to salvage US efforts in those conflicts. While the president may have
directed the Army to apply an unconventional doctrine in Iraq in 2007, he did not direct the Army
to make a shift to its capstone doctrine FM 3-0 in 2008. Like Gentile, I assumed that the Army’s
application of a counterinsurgency strategy in Iraq in 2007 might have influenced the inclusion of
such tactics into FM 3-0 in 2008, but as I mention below during my case study, Gen. Casey
confirmed to me that the strategy employed during the surge had nothing to do with the updates he
oversaw to FM 3-0.

Douglas Porch (2013), in *Counterinsurgency: Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War*,
like Gentile, attributes causal effect to a flawed historical narrative, but for different reasons. He argues that a network of “new school” Army generals asserted a flawed narrative simply to promote their own bureaucratic and career interests. They seized on the opportunity presented by a perceived lack of strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan to discredit their conventional rivals and implement an unconventional doctrine. The problem with Porch’s conclusion, however, is the fact that Gen. Casey, one of these conventional rivals he speaks of, was the most senior Army officer involved in developing and ultimately approving this doctrinal shift in 2008.

Unlike Gentile and Porch, Fred Kaplan (2013), in *David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of War*, does not point to historical narratives, but does attribute doctrinal change to the effectiveness of a network similar to what Porch attempted to identify. Kaplan convincingly argues that General Petraeus organized this “new school” network by fostering military, academic, and political contacts centered on the Social Sciences department at West Point. The effectiveness and power of this network ultimately resulted in a decision by the president to approve the use of an unconventional doctrine in Iraq along with a surge of troops to support it. Kaplan describes Gen. Petraeus as a maverick who understood, promoted, and effectively practiced the unconventional warfare lessons of Vietnam. He demonstrates how Gen. Petraeus deliberately leveraged this network to elevate the importance of unconventional warfare in Army doctrine. Again, the problem with this analysis when it comes to explaining the doctrinal shift in the 2008 capstone doctrine is the fact that Gen. Casey, someone who was not part of this insurgent network, was the most senior officer presiding over its final development and approval.

Benjamin Jensen (2016), in *Forging the Sword: Doctrinal Change in the US Army*, like Gentile, Porch, and Kaplan, focuses on networks, and like Stephen Peter Rosen (1991) in his *Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military*, focuses also on the role of senior Army leadership. He argues that when senior Army leaders establish or structure what he calls
incubators, i.e., forums free from normal bureaucratic constraints where military officers are free to learn or “visualize new theories,” and then promote and protect these ideas through what he calls advocacy networks or “loose coalitions of defense and civilian officials,” then Army doctrinal innovation becomes possible. I find this explanation to be consistent with what Gen. Wallace described above about the critical role that senior leaders and thought leaders play in the doctrine development process, and somewhat consistent with how Gen. Wallace managed the development of FM 3-0 beginning as early as 2005 “with a series of issue papers…serv[ing] as a structural foundation for codifying the key concepts of the manual” (Wallace 2008, 2). Of the approaches mentioned above, and of my own below, I think that Jensen’s may ultimately provide the best explanation.

Concerning Rosen’s argument (1991) that military innovations, including doctrinal change, is effective only when senior military officers create favorable promotion pathways in an effort to embed such change within the organization, when applied to this case I found, like my other three cases, that the Army did not create a new promotion pathway before or during the process of developing this new capstone doctrine. It did, however, begin establishing such a pathway with its annual brigadier general officer promotion board in November, 2007, just at the time that the development of this new FM 3-0 was concluding. This board was chaired by Gen. Petraeus and included other “progressive” generals such as Gen. Stanley McChrystal and Gen. Peter Chiarelli and promoted for the first time an overwhelming number of Army colonels to brigadier general specifically based on their experience with unconventional warfare, including counterinsurgency operations. Most prominent among these colonels was H.R. McMaster, who had previously been passed over twice for promotion to brigadier general despite his successes as a brigade commander in Tal Afar, Iraq, employing counterinsurgency tactics, techniques, and procedures (Kaplan 2008).

Despite the shortfalls that political variables may have for explaining this shift in Army
doctrine in 2008, the case study below was still worth conducting. It shows that while there may be some congruence between a shift in Army doctrine and domestic, international, and bureaucratic politics, there may not necessarily be a cause and effect relationship to be found. Knowing if there is not a causal relationship can be just as valuable as knowing if there is. It is also worth understanding whether or not, and to what extent, a different approach, such as Jensen’s, might be more fruitful in this case.

Like my previous three cases of doctrinal shift, this study proceeds in two steps. First, I account for relevant political factors that may have had an impact on Army doctrine decision-making. Second, I assess the impact of these factors in accordance with the predicted outcomes of the political hypotheses I inferred in Chapter 2 (Explaining Army Doctrine). I analyze each relevant political factor for congruence with the doctrinal shift that took place in this case, and where congruence is detected, I conduct process-tracing hoop-necessary conditions and smoking gun sufficiency tests to assess the level of certainty with which it might have been possible for a given political factor to have been part of a causal chain leading somehow to the doctrinal shift.

**Domestic Political Factors.**

By the summer of 2006 while work on the new FM 3-0 was underway, the war in Iraq had become one of the most divisive political issues in American history, perhaps as divisive as the Vietnam War, if not more so (Metz 2010, 9). The Bush Presidency, like the war itself, had become extremely unpopular (Rumsfeld 2011, 705). In his prosecution of what had become a bogged-down war, the public lost confidence in the president himself (West 2008, 206). In his own memoir, President Bush admitted that by a margin of 2 to 1, Americans “disapproved of the way I was handling Iraq” (Bush 2010, 367). As the 2006 mid-term elections approached, political pressure mounted to pull out of Iraq, mostly from Congress. Democrats had been skeptical of the
war from the very start, but also recognized that the war had become President Bush’s, as well as Congressional Republicans’, greatest political vulnerability (Metz 2010, 10). Republicans themselves feared that President Bush’s unpopularity would result in huge mid-term election losses (Kaplan 2013a, 204). Senator Mitch McConnell even told the president himself that “your unpopularity is going to cost us control of Congress” (Bush 2010, 355). He was right.

Largely due to the unpopularity of the war in Iraq, as well as the unpopularity of the president, the Republicans lost both chambers of Congress in the 2006 mid-term elections (Kaplan 2013a, 237, 270; 2013b, 82). The party lost 31 seats in the House and six seats in the Senate (Bacevich 2010, 185). This gave Democrats majorities in both houses for the first time in a dozen years. This political defeat for Republicans was widely viewed as a referendum on the Iraq War (Graham 2009, 653) and a repudiation of President Bush’s Iraq policies (West 2008, 201). Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA) was quoted as saying, when the election results were known, “today is really a referendum on President Bush’s handling of the war in Iraq” (Metz 2010, 11). The election outcome proved to be not only a political defeat for the Republican Party, it also marked a significant turning point in the Iraq War itself (Ricks 2009, 74). According to the US commander in Iraq at the time, Army Gen. George Casey, “loss of the mid-terms…reinforced to all of us the deep dissatisfaction with how the war was going” (Casey 2012, 126).

President Bush knew after the election loss that he had a short amount of time between November and January when Democrats would assume control of Congress to attempt to salvage the war. He understood that Congress would act to bring an end to the war as quickly as possible either by cutting funding, ordering a troop withdrawal, or both, unless he managed somehow to make a change that might turn the war around, or at least create the perception that it might (Metz 2010, 9, 18). Soon after the election, Nancy Pelosi clearly stated that her “highest priority, immediately, is to stop the war in Iraq” (Bacevich 2010, 185). According to Donald Rumsfeld
It was not just Democrats in Congress who had come to oppose the war. “Members of both parties…called for a pullout” (Bush 2010, 355). The unpopularity of the president and of the war that almost certainly led to the Republican losses in Congress made it clear that the only political choices the president had left was to concede to defeat or make some sort of significant change in strategy. “The President knew that if he were to avoid a congressionally mandated defeat in Iraq, he needed a political and military game changer” (Rumsfeld 2011, 715). Although he knew he needed a change, he did not know what he needed to change to. But that did not necessarily matter. What was important to President Bush, at least politically, was that a change was made, or at least the appearance of a change. “It was the appearance of difference that the president needed in order to maintain domestic support for the war” (Gentile 2013, 107-108). The president directed everyone in his administration involved in the war effort “to propose anything that could show noticeable change in the situation in Baghdad” (Rumsfeld 2011, 715). It was not as if the political or military situation in Iraq had suddenly changed in November 2006. What had changed was the US domestic political situation. The Republican loss in the 2006 elections precipitated this. According to then National Security Advisor Tom Donnelly, “I think without the ’06 elections, there might not have been a change” in US strategy (Ricks 2009, 74). To military historian Andrew Bacevich (2010, 187), the political connection was obvious: “Bush responded to electoral defeat by ordering a course change.” That a strategic change in Iraq was ordered in response to a change in the domestic US political situation, and not to a change in the military situation in Iraq, appears to be quite clear. At least it was to Gen. Casey, who said immediately after the election (2012, 143), “it was clear that Washington was looking for something different.”

What was the strategy that President Bush felt he needed to change from? It was a strategy focused primarily on withdrawing US forces – surprisingly, the very same goal the Democrats had.
According to President Bush (2010, 356), “[f]or two and a half years, I had supported the strategy of withdrawing our forces as the Iraqis stepped forward…as Iraqis stand up, we will stand down.” This strategy was based on four self-reinforcing assumptions related to the withdrawal of US forces: 1) the presence of US troops provoked the Iraqi people and created insecurity; 2) standing up the Iraqi government and military would allow US troops to withdraw; 3) the withdrawal of US troops would improve Iraqi security; 4) delaying the withdrawal of US forces would delay the standing up of Iraqi forces. According to Gen. Casey (2012, 136), the presence of US troops was preventing the Iraqi government from standing up because “it gave Iraqi leaders more time to avoid hard decisions on reconciliation and ultimately prolonging our time there.” The only problem with this strategy was that it was not working, at least not fast enough to maintain sufficient domestic American political support for continuing the war long enough to achieve a positive outcome. The only choice President Bush had at that point was to make a change in strategy, any change that could help maintain enough domestic political support to allow the war to continue long enough not to result in complete failure or defeat – something that would have been politically unacceptable to both President Bush and the Republican Party.

Once the Bush Administration decided that a change in the Iraq strategy was needed, it then decided what it needed to change to. Clearly, the effort to stand up the Iraqis in order to stand down US forces had not been working fast enough to sustain US domestic political support. With change in the air, conservative Republicans went to work to offer President Bush options that enough of the public and enough of the Congress might support. A strategic consensus began to coalesce within the defense community and around the conservative think tank American Enterprise Institute. It involved providing the Iraqi population with adequate security first. Adequate security would then create the conditions to allow the Iraqi government to stand up politically and militarily. Then, US troops would finally be able to stand down and withdraw. This
The strategic concept would require more US troops up front, however. It was almost certain that any decision to send more US troops to Iraq would be unpopular among US voters, but if it helped to establish the security needed to allow the Iraqi government and military to finally stand up, and then allow the Bush Administration to start withdrawing US troops before the next general election cycle, then it just might just work to save the Republican Party from another electoral defeat. The idea of using additional US troops to secure the Iraqi population before political progress could be made was based on classic counterinsurgency tactics. If you are able to secure or separate the population from insurgent forces, you deny the insurgency the support of that population. You also protect the population from the violence of the fighting between insurgent forces and Iraqi government and US forces. Once a greater level of security is achieved, then Iraqi government political progress could be made.

The concept of surging additional US troops to Iraq in order to secure the population from the insurgency so that political progress could be made, i.e., so that an Iraqi government and military could finally stand up, was the best idea the Bush Administration had seen for attempting to sustain enough domestic political support to continue the war (Woodward 2008, 264). It was considered bold because President Bush saw it as a complete reversal of the previous strategy (Gentile 2013, 29). “The premise of counterinsurgency is that basic security is required before political gains can follow. That was the reverse of our existing policy” (Bush 2010, 365). Bush and the Republicans were desperate for any viable solution to avoid “losing” Iraq and further damaging the Republican Party. Andrew Bacevich (2011, 185) called it a “hastily contrived Republican effort to save the Iraq War.” Frederick Kaplan (2013a, 260; 2013b, 75-76) described it as a “last chance for redemption” and a “last ditch effort to head off disaster.” It was also bold because it was politically risky. According to President Bush (2010, 356), “I was on the verge of making the toughest and most unpopular decision of my presidency: deploying tens of thousands
more troops to Iraq with a new strategy…to protect the Iraqi people.”

Believing that political disaster was imminent for the Republicans if he could not demonstrate some kind of significant change in Iraq, and fully aware of the political risk he was taking, President Bush went ahead and announced on January 10, 2007, just 11 days before a new Democratic-controlled Congress would convene, a new approach in Iraq that “increased the number of US forces, refocus[ing] them on population security” (Metz 2010, 5). What was unusual about this low-intensity unconventional warfare strategic choice, and speaks to why this was most likely a desperate move to avoid domestic political disaster, was just how contrary this decision was to past Republican choices. As Andrew Bacevich (2011, 188) points out, in deciding to shift to a counterinsurgency strategy focused on securing the Iraqi population,

a self-described conservative Republican endorse[d] national security techniques last employed with disastrous results by liberal Democrats during the Kennedy-Johnson era….Given the Republican Party’s professed aversion to anything that even remotely smacks of social engineering, the Bush Administration’s revival of counterinsurgency qualifies as astonishing.

President Bush’s decision in January, 2007, to surge troops to Iraq to secure the Iraqi population, a decision made in response to mid-term Republican election losses, then had a significant political impact on the 2008 presidential election cycle (Woodward 2008, 236). By February, 2008, the month when the Army released its new capstone doctrine manual, and just a little over one year after the president’s surge decision, the 2008 presidential campaign was well under way. At that point, there had already been over 40 Democratic and Republican presidential primary debates and other public forums such as televised town halls (Newport 2009, 302). The top two political issues that dominated the debates during this stage of the presidential election cycle were the Iraq War and the economy, and the top two candidates that emerged for the Democrats and Republicans were Barack Obama and John McCain respectively.

The Iraq War had been dominating US domestic politics as the top issue since March 2004,
and by February, 2008, it competed only with the economy as the top voter concern primarily because of the emerging financial crisis (Newport 2009, 175, 230). In September 2007, eight months after President Bush announced the surge strategy, the new commander in Iraq, Gen. David Petraeus, was able to report to Congress that violence had dropped significantly and the objective of securing the Iraqi population was on its way to being met, setting the conditions to eventually allow the Iraqis to begin making political progress, enabling an Iraqi army to secure the population, and ultimately allowing US troops to be withdrawn. Despite this report of progress, six out of 10 Americans still remained opposed to the Iraq War and continued to favor an immediate troop withdrawal regardless of whether the Iraqis were ready to provide security for their own people or not. That said, the leading Democratic candidate, Barack Obama, the candidate who appealed the most to the anti-war Democratic base, acknowledged that the surge and the use of a counterinsurgency strategy had begun to work (Friedenburg 2009, 78; Heilemann and Halperin 2010, 330; McCrisken 2009, 59; Newport 2009, 220).

The leading Republican candidate, John McCain, used his support of the surge and counterinsurgency strategy as his top campaign credential, and even took some credit for promoting the idea to begin with. On September 7, 2007, while debating his fellow Republican candidates, Senator McCain argued that he had promoted the idea of a surge long before President Bush had even considered it. He then argued strongly in the debate that the surge strategy was working (Heilemann and Halperin 2010, 278; McCrisken 2009, 42, 58). One week later, Senator McCain announced his first nation-wide campaign tour and gave it a name that spoke to his support to continue following the surge strategy in order to achieve some level of success in Iraq, as opposed to withdrawing without giving the strategy more time to work as some of his Republican opponents and all Democratic candidates proposed. He named his campaign the “No Surrender Tour” (Heilemann and Halperin 2010, 298).
The political impact of the surge strategy appears to have been significant. It was announced in January 2007 at a time when support for the Iraq War had reached a breaking point (Friedenburg 2009, 87). At that time, Democrats remained united in their opposition to the war and demanded immediate withdrawal. A growing number of Republicans were beginning to break ranks with the president and openly began speaking out against the war. By early 2008, however, when the Army’s new FM 3-0 was released, the domestic political situation had changed dramatically. By that time, both the leading Democratic presidential candidate, Barack Obama, and the leading Republican candidate, John McCain, publicly acknowledged that the surge counterinsurgency strategy was working to bring security to the Iraqi people, and McCain even continued to take credit for promoting the idea early on.

The surge counterinsurgency strategy and the public perception that it was working to the extent that it was improving security for the Iraqi people, and the political acceptance of the strategy by the leading presidential candidates of both parties during a presidential primary season where Iraq stood as one of the top two issue for voters, changed the trajectory of the war both in Iraq and in the US (Feaver 2011, 88). Where all hope of any successful outcome in Iraq seemed dim in January of 2007, by February of 2008, it had become a political asset for at least the leading Republican candidate to support, and had become even acceptable for the leading Democratic candidate to acknowledge as working. As Donald Rumsfeld (2011, 716) summed it up, “[t]he true genius of the surge was the political effect it had in the US, where the conflict’s true center of gravity had migrated.”

As these domestic political events were occurring simultaneously with the development of the new edition of FM 3-0, I consider below whether and how these politics may have had an impact.
Analysis of Domestic Politics Hypotheses.

Domestic Politics Hypothesis 1 (DP H1): policies designed to fulfill national security-related campaign promises, and national security policies that are influenced by partisan party politics, can structure or constrain Army doctrinal choices.

There is a moderate level of congruence between this hypothesis and the available evidence in this case, but there is smoking gun evidence that these politics did not have an impact on Army doctrine. President Bush decided he needed to make a change in Iraq to a low-intensity unconventional warfare strategy in part because the Republicans lost the Congress to the Democrats in the 2006 mid-term elections. He believed that the incoming Democratic-controlled Congress would move to end the war quickly before any positive outcome could be realized. He needed to make a bold change in strategy in an effort to at least maintain enough domestic political support to continue the war long enough that the effort would not abruptly end with nothing to show for such a tremendous loss of national treasure and lives, both American and Iraqi. In addition to President Bush supporting a change to a low-intensity unconventional warfare strategy in Iraq, John McCain, the leading Republican presidential candidate, openly supported such a strategy during his presidential primary campaign beginning in September 2007. By February of 2008, when the Army released its new version of FM 3-0, even the leading Democratic presidential candidate, Barack Obama, openly acknowledged that he believed the counterinsurgency strategy in Iraq had begun to work.

The evidence that a low-intensity, unconventional warfare strategy was adopted by a sitting president in response to his party’s loss of Congress in mid-term elections, combined with open and even vigorous support of such a strategy from the leading Republican presidential candidate, as well as acknowledgment by the leading Democratic candidate during the presidential primary election season does not show that campaign promises affected Army doctrinal choice in 2008, but it does show that partisan politics may have had some effect. The evidence shows that partisan
politics – Republican losses in the 2006 mid-term elections – played a necessary role in causing the president to change strategies, and that the changes he made continued to play a role well into the 2008 presidential election cycle. Although this was occurring at the same time that the Army was staffing and finalizing FM 3-0, there is no evidence that these politics had any direct effect on this process. In fact, there is smoking gun evidence that shows the opposite. According to then Chief of Staff of the Army Gen. George Casey, “although there is no question that loss of the mid-terms and partisan politics had an impact on the surge decision, the surge had nothing to do with the new doctrine” (Casey 2017). As Gen. Casey considered the content of the new FM 3-0 while attending a series of Training and Doctrine Command briefings between April 2007 and January 2008, as well as his review of a final draft of the manual in January 2008, there is no indication that these domestic politics occurring at the very same time, that appear to be congruent with this doctrinal shift, had an impact. The marginal notes made by Gen. Casey on these briefing slides, as well as the notes and edits he made on the final draft do not reflect these domestic political factors. His notes do indicate that he considered that new manual was moving too far away from conventional warfare considerations. Where the manual overly stressed the importance of working with and among civilian populations to win hearts and minds, Gen. Casey repeatedly inserted notes to indicate the need to keep the manual focused on fighting the enemy and defeating terrorists – while working with and among populations (Casey 2007, 2008). Those comments and concerns do reflect the environment that Army soldiers were operating in at that time, but they do not indicate a concern for the politics of the time.

Where Gen. Casey does not see or show a connection between the domestic politics occurring at the time and the final stages of the development of FM 3-0, General (Retired) William Wallace, then Army Training and Doctrine Commander, does admit that there may be some connection between domestic politics and doctrine. According to Gen. Wallace, “if politics is the
main reason for going to war in the first place, and our doctrine is how we prosecute war, then there is logically a linkage.” That said, he prefers to consider doctrine as the product of these three overlapping influences not directly affected by domestic politics: “1) doctrine is the product of what we believe to be the nature of war over the time that the doctrine is influential; 2) the product of the operational environment over the time that the doctrine is influential; 3) the product of the experience of senior leaders and thought leaders relative to 1) and 2)” (Wallace 2017).

Although there appears to be congruence between the development of the 2008 FM and domestic political events surrounding the Republican loss of the 2006 mid-terms, the president’s subsequent decision to implement a low-intensity, unconventional strategy in Iraq, and the relatively positive attention given to this strategy during the 2007 presidential primaries – the smoking gun evidence provided by Gen. Casey disconfirms any direct linkage between these politics and the development of the 2008 edition of FM 3-0.

*Domestic Politics Hypothesis 2 (DP H2): increased civilian control of the DoD organization and military policy amplifies the influence that domestic politics has on Army decision-making.*

I found no evidence that increased civilian control affected the Army decision to make its shift toward low-intensity unconventional warfare in its 2008 capstone doctrinal publication. I did, however, find evidence of necessary conditions that support the opposite – that decreased civilian control was necessary in affecting Army doctrinal choice. Once Donald Rumsfeld’s tight control over the Joint Chiefs, the service chiefs, and the combatant commanders was lifted when he resigned the day after the Republican mid-term election defeats in November 2006, the White House was then able to search for other options for the war in Iraq for the President to consider (Kaplan 2013b, 82; Metz 2010, 15, 19, 27). The strategy the president ultimately adopted, a surge of troops to implement classic counterinsurgency tactics, techniques, and procedures in Iraq, may
not have even been presented to him unless Donald Rumsfeld had resigned and civilian control over the military was subsequently loosened or decreased. So in this case, decreased civilian control of the military was necessary to allow domestic politics to enter into the strategic equation in 2006, allowing for a bold new strategic choice in 2007, one that ultimately contributed to shaping Army doctrinal choice in 2008.

*Domestic Politics Hypothesis 3 (DP H3): the outcome of domestic political struggles over Army personnel policy shapes the size of the Army, the amount of firepower and protection it requires, and where it can operate along a spectrum of war.*

There is a moderate level of congruence between the available evidence and this hypothesis, but the smoking gun evidence provided by Gen. Casey serves to disconfirm this hypothesis. Army Chief of Staff Gen. Schoomaker told President Bush at a meeting at the Pentagon with the Joint Chiefs of Staff in late December 2006 that he could only support a surge of troops to Iraq if it did not “wreck the service” by stretching its ranks even thinner than they already had been (Metz 2010, 45). In response, the president promised to increase the size of the active Army. By the end of 2007, at the peak of the surge, the Army had expanded from 485,500 active duty soldiers to 538,128, with the bulk of the increase going to support the expansion of conventional infantry units suited for the low-intensity operations called for under the surge counterinsurgency strategy, and subsequently outlined in the February 2008 rewrite of FM 3-0. It is possible that the Army Chief of Staff’s support for a surge contingent upon additional active Army soldiers was sufficient enough to convince the president to proceed with the strategy, but there is no way to determine if it was necessary. The president may have just as easily proceeded with the surge strategy whether the Army Chief of Staff supported it or not. Given that the administration had proceeded with the invasion of Iraq in 2003 with fewer soldiers than then Army Chief of Staff Gen. Erik Shinseki had recommended, it is not inconceivable that President Bush
would not have hesitated to proceed without Gen. Schoomaker’s support in 2007. If the president had proceeded with the surge strategy without additional active duty soldiers, it also is likely that the surge strategy may not have seen as much success as it had, it may have “wrecked” the Army in the process as Gen. Schoomaker predicted, domestic political support may have eroded to an unsustainable point as a result. Although this may have made it less likely that the Army would have still incorporated such a strategy into its February 2008 rewrite of FM 3-0 to the extent that it did, according to Gen. Casey, “the doctrine had nothing to do with the surge” (Casey 2017).

Domestic Politics Hypothesis 4 (DP H4): outcomes of political struggles over the annual Army budget can constrain or shape Army doctrinal choice.

There is a moderate level of congruence between the available evidence and this hypothesis. On February 4, 2007, less than thirty days after announcing a surge of troops to support a bold new counterinsurgency strategy in Iraq, the Bush Administration submitted its FY 08 budget to Congress that included an additional $5.6 billion earmarked specifically to support the surge. By this point, over half of the 30,000 troops that President Bush ordered to Iraq as part of the new strategy had already arrived. This put the new Democratic-controlled Congress in a bind. As a group they did not support the war or the surge, but they were not willing to deny support to US troops on the ground. Congress approved the additional surge funding, but then passed a war-funding bill in early May that mandated a complete troop withdrawal of troops from Iraq later in 2007. Because it passed only by a simple majority, President Bush was able to veto the bill and Congress did not override it (Bush 2010, 382). The Congress was then forced to continue funding the war in order to support the troops that were there. As a result, the Bush Administration was able to sustain the surge through 2008, and was able to improve security for the Iraqi population to the point where some political progress was made, and some US troops were then able to be withdrawn. If Congress had not provided additional funding for the surge of troops, or if they had
been successful in mandating a total troop withdrawal in 2007 over President Bush’s veto, the
counterinsurgency strategy would not have been given a chance to realize the relative success that
it did. The outcome of budget struggles over the surge of troops to Iraq had a positive outcome for
the Bush Administration. It was then able to fully implement its surge counterinsurgency strategy
in Iraq and realize some level of success from it. This sequence of events may have reinforced the
Army’s decision to incorporate that same strategy into its capstone doctrinal manual, but as we
know from both Gen. Casey and Gen. Wallace, there is no evidence of any direct linkage.

*Domestic Politics Hypothesis 5 (DP H5): outcomes of struggles between civilian politicians that
result in restrictions on the type and duration of military force will shape expectations about likely
Army involvement in future conflicts and constrain Army doctrinal choice sets.*

There is low level of congruence between this hypothesis and the available evidence.
Congress did not act to defund the war in Iraq or order all troops to be pulled out in 2007 or 2008
as President Bush feared after Republican losses in the 2006 mid-term elections. If the president
had not made a change to the strategy, however, and if that strategy had not appeared to be
working, it is likely that Congress would have been successful in overcoming a Bush veto to
withdraw troops. The fact that it was a strategy that politicians from both parties acknowledged as
working, and that it had political support to the extent that a Democratic-controlled Congress was
not successful in forcing a premature withdrawal of US troops, signaled to the Army that this was a
strategy that had sufficient bipartisan political support. It also signaled to the Army that a low-
intensity unconventional war that was not short in duration is something that civilian politicians
could ultimately support as an outcome of domestic political struggle. That outcome, political
support for the continuation of a long-duration low-intensity, unconventional war, may have
reinforced a decision that senior Army leaders had already made to adjust the Army’s capstone
manual, but like the other domestic politics hypotheses, there is no evidence of a direct linkage.
**International Political Factors.**

When the Soviet Union ceased to exist in 1991, the international system shifted from a bipolar to a unipolar balance of power. One pole of power, the United States, dominated the international system instead of two powers balancing each other from opposite poles (Lunderstad 2013, 2). Instead of a re-balancing of power throughout the international system after the Soviet Union collapsed as would have been predicted by realist theory, no nation or group of nations emerged to counter the dominant US position of power (Patrick 2013, 17). According to Robert Kagan (2008, 38), the “anticipated global balancing has for the most part not occurred.” Or, as Michael Mandelbaum (2005, xvi) described it, “no David, or group of Davids, has stepped forward to confront the US.” America’s unipolar moment, as Charles Krauthammer (1990) described it, lasted more than a moment. It persisted. Not only did the US unipolar position continue, the US further reinforced its power by adding more allies to its single pole of power. “In Europe, the US initiated and led a process of expansion that increased NATO from sixteen to twenty-six members by 2004” (Walt 2005, 45). It even acquired allies that had once occupied positions at the opposite pole of power. “By 2008, NATO had already incorporated three former Soviet republics and it was considering taking on two more” (Brands 2016, 358). From 1990 on, US power grew exponentially in relation to any other power or group of powers, without any power to effectively balance against it. This situation persisted throughout the 1990s and 2000s to the point where the concept of a balance of power had lost some meaning. The US continued to increase its power even though it was not responding to the power of another state or group of states, and no other state or group of states appeared to be attempting to balance against this unprecedented expansion of one power. The dynamics of balancing behavior observed among nation-states in the international system for centuries appeared to be inoperative. Stephen Walt observed (2005, 31) that, “the US enjoys an asymmetry of power unseen since the emergence of the modern state
system.” As Brooks and Wolforth (2008, 4) hypothesized, “as the concentration of power in a state increases beyond a certain threshold, system constraints on its security policy become generally inoperative.” Because this situation among states had never been observed before, scholars struggled to describe the nature of the international system using concepts that did not rely on balancing behavior or polarity. “Chinese strategists see the world not as multipolar [or unipolar] but as characterized by one superpower, many great powers” (Kagan 2008, 38). Others described the US as a hyperpower, transcending its status as one of two former superpowers (Brands 2016, 356). The French foreign minister, Hubert Vedrine, once famously lamented that “the United States had become a hyperpower, unbalanced by other international actors” (Patrick 2013, 19). Others began thinking and writing in terms even further removed from concepts that suggested balances of power. As Walt (2005, 31) described the situation, “the US position in the current world order is best understood as one of primacy.”

The consequences of an American position of primacy in the international system became apparent after the events of 9/11 when it initiated two wars in response to those attacks. It demonstrated that it was able to act with or without the support of some key allies because ultimately the power of those allies was not necessary. US power was more than sufficient, as well as relatively unchecked, by any other state or group of states. Even though US allies responded with offers of assistance to the US during its invasion of Afghanistan immediately following 9/11, the US did not initially accept formal NATO involvement. When America’s NATO allies took the unprecedented step of invoking Article V of the NATO treaty (the mutual defense clause) in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks, “the US welcomed the gesture but rather brusquely rejected the proffered help” (Walt 2005, 148). When it invaded Iraq just 17 months after it invaded Afghanistan, it acted in open opposition to NATO member-states France, Germany, Luxembourg, and Belgium, as well as the United Nations (Gaddis 2004, 97). Interestingly, it appeared to play
some of its NATO allies off against each other, causing sharp divisions within, and even undermining the integrity of the very alliance it led (Brands 2016, 358; Mandelbaum 2005, 209). Walt (2005, 131) described US behavior at the time toward its own alliance as a “divide and conquer strategy.” According to Michael Mandelbaum (2005, 266-267),

France, Germany, Luxembourg, and Belgium adamantly opposed the use of force and worked to prevent the UN Security Council from authorizing it…[while] the leaders of Britain, Spain, Italy, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Denmark, and Portugal issued a statement supporting the need for strong action in Iraq.

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, America’s unipolar “moment,” the absence of a counter-balancing coalition creating an era of US primacy rendering concepts of power poles almost meaningless, combined with the US response to the attacks of 9/11, demonstrated that the US was not only able, but now also had the impetus, to act alone, almost unilaterally, in international politics if it chose (Brands 2016, 356). Not only did it demonstrate that its power was unconstrained by a balance of power of real or potential rivals, it was not even constrained by whether it had the support of, or even stood in opposition to, some allies. Again, as Brooks and Wolfforth asserted (2008, 4), “systemic constraints in the US’s security policy became generally inoperative.”

The successful US attack on Afghanistan heightened its sense of primacy, even omnipotence – encouraging hardliners in the Bush Administration to act without the support of some allies in Iraq (Zakaria 2011, 247). American foreign policy after 9/11 under the Bush Administration was becoming characterized as less multilateral and more unilateralist (Kagan 2008, 37; Leffler and Legro 2008, 2-3; Walt 2005, 31). Previous administrations, at least since World War II, routinely depended on the support of the very allied and other international institutions it had helped to create such as NATO and the United Nations. The Bush Administration, however, “practically boasted of its disdain for treaties, multilateral organizations,
international public opinion, and anything that suggested a conciliatory approach to world politics” (Zakaria 2011, 246). According to John Lewis Gaddis (2004, 97), “the US exchanged its long-established reputation as the principal stabilizer in the international system for one as its chief destabilizer.”

Analysis of International Politics Hypotheses.

*International Politics Hypothesis 1 (IP H1):* US policy-makers will require the Army to develop and implement doctrine that supports the establishment or maintenance of US alliance institutions.

There is no congruence between the evidence presented above and this hypothesis, and therefore this hypothesis does not pass any hoop necessity nor smoking gun sufficiency tests. US policy makers pursued a war and implemented a strategy in Iraq that was at odds with some of its key NATO allies, and by doing so it may have actually undermined the strength of the NATO alliance. That the US Army may have then made a doctrinal shift to reflect the low intensity, unconventional warfare strategy that US policy-makers directed it to implement in Iraq could not possibly have been part of a causal chain connected with a US effort to implement either a strategy or a doctrine that helped to maintain an alliance institution.

*International Politics Hypothesis 2 (IP H2):* changes in the military balance of power and capabilities among real and potential US adversaries, as well as its allies, will correspond to a change in the internal balance of US military power and capabilities; including those of its Army and its doctrine.

The evidence presented above provides some congruence with this hypothesis. The collapse of the primary US political and military adversary, the Soviet Union, in 1991, changed the international balance of power from a bipolar system to what some scholars described as a unipolar system. Unipolarity persisted, and by the early 2000s, it became clear that no nation or group of nations was effectively balancing against US power. Thinking and speaking of power in terms of
polarity gave way to describing the US position in the international system as one of primacy. This concept was reinforced by unilateral actions the US took after the attacks of 9/11. It invaded Afghanistan first with little help from allies. It then invaded Iraq against the strong opposition from both allies and adversaries alike. As the US became bogged down in Iraq, both allied and adversary opposition to its actions increased. Nevertheless, in the face of growing international opposition, the US remained in Iraq – eventually applying a low intensity unconventional warfare strategy – a strategy that the Army then formalized and incorporated into its capstone doctrine in 2008. It was the US ability, based on its position of primacy in the international system, to both invade and then remain in Iraq in the face of allied and international opposition that may have helped set the conditions for this doctrinal shift. These conditions may have reinforced decisions that senior Army leaders had already made to shift its capstone doctrine toward conflicts such as those the Army was fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan at the time. They may have concluded given America’s position of primacy in the world that it would continue to engage in conflicts such as these if it was in its interest in the future. If the US had not achieved dominant, relatively unchecked, and overwhelming power in the international system, it may not have invaded Iraq against the opposition of allies and the international community alike, nor is it likely that it would have been either able or willing to remain in Iraq long enough to both require and then to apply a counterinsurgency strategy there. Additionally, if any state, or group of states, had the ability to balance against the US in the 1990s or early 2000s, its army may have needed to maintain a doctrine focused primarily on mid- to high-intensity warfare, even if it had invaded Iraq and created, then faced, an insurgency there. In the absence of any opposing great power or powers, the US, and subsequently its army, were free to devote a significant portion of its resources and doctrine toward fighting, or preparing to fight, expanding and persistent low-intensity unconventional warfare conflicts. Therefore, I conclude that a change in the military balance of
power in 1991 that persisted into the 2000s, allowed the US to largely ignore potential mid- to high-intensity warfare threats. This then allowed the US to shift its internal balance of military power toward low-intensity unconventional warfare threats, and this shift was reflected, in part, in changes to the Army’s 2008 FM 3-0.

**Bureaucratic Political Situation.**

As it became clear on the eve of the 2006 mid-term elections that the unpopularity of the Iraq War was hurting the president’s popularity, and the Republican Party was likely to suffer defeat in the polls, top military leaders and civilian defense officials began to consider other strategic options in Iraq. One option that was opposed by the Joint Chiefs and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld was the very idea of a surge and a counterinsurgency strategy to secure the population (Kaplan 2013b, 75; Metz 2010, 19; Ricks 2009, 107). The Army’s top commander in Iraq, Gen. Casey, did not believe the Army was suited for low-intensity unconventional warfare, stating that it was “optimized for intense short-duration operations, not…counterinsurgency,” and was “still too anchored in conventional warfare” (Metz 2010, 12). The Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Peter Schoomaker, worried that increased Army deployments associated with any surge of troops to perform counterinsurgency operations in Iraq would “wreck the service” (Metz 2010, 13, 45). In order to overcome this bureaucratic resistance and offer the president options for a change of strategy in Iraq, most of which included a surge of troops, the National Security Council led by Stephen Hadley began building a consensus outside the Army with conservative think tanks, and within the Army at lower echelons – with officers below the top brass – for such a surge of troops. Hadley needed strategic options for the president that would show the sort of bold change that would resonate politically. The president was looking for a strategy that might help him maintain enough domestic political support to keep the war going long enough to show some positive
outcomes before Congress intervened to prematurely cut off funding for the war or withdraw US troops. Even though senior Army leaders were worried about whether the Army could handle a different strategy, or whether a surge of troops to Iraq might seriously damage an already overstretched Army, Hadley and the NSC were not worried about the Army. They were interested in changing strategy.

Hadley found the ally he was looking for in the Army with then Lieutenant General David Petraeus, and outside the Army with the conservative think tank American Enterprise Institute, supported by retired four-star general and former Army Vice Chief of Staff Jack Keane. LTG Petraeus, commander of the Army’s Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth at the time, was in the process of revising the Army’s counterinsurgency manual, FM 3-24, when the NSC staff began communicating with him. The new manual was released in December 2006 and received a lot of public attention because it outlined tactics, techniques, and procedures that if applied as part of a new strategy in Iraq had the potential to change the direction of the war. The manual advocated using relatively large numbers of soldiers to secure populations often caught between an occupying force or government, and an insurgent force. Gen. Petraeus himself had commanded an Army division in Mosul, Iraq in the early stages of the Iraq War, had attempted to secure the population there with success, and had been advocating such a strategy for the rest of the Army ever since in Iraq, Afghanistan, and anywhere else it might find itself fighting an insurgency in the future. Gen. Petraeus had spent most of his career in dismounted light infantry units, geared more toward the lower end of the spectrum of war than mechanized infantry or armor units that operated at the mid- to high-intensity end of the spectrum. Advocating for the broader Army to take on a larger role in counterinsurgency operations was something that Gen. Petraeus had been pushing hard for, and a cause that he was able to advance throughout the Army from his position as the Combined Arms Center Commander. This is when and how he caught the NSC’s attention. He
also caught the attention of the rest of the Army and critics in the defense establishment. Because Gen. Petraeus was pushing the idea that the entire Army should focus on counterinsurgency, not just the dismounted infantry, he was perceived by some to be using the Iraq conflict opportunistically to advance his own narrow parochial agenda and career at the expense of the rest of the Army. According to military historian Douglas Porch (2013, 34), “miscalculations in Iraq and Afghanistan created the opening for…David Petraeus…to discredit conventional warfare rivals, snag the top echelons of the US Army, and proceed to hijack policy.” Jennifer Taw describes Gen. Petraeus and his followers as progressives and their conventional rivals as traditionalists. According to Taw (2008, 36-37):

Progressives argue that the world has changed and that the US is facing a complex era of persistent conflict, and thus the military will be challenged time and again to undertake the most challenging stability operations for which it must better prepare. Traditionalists argue that the only thing that has changed is perceptions of the international environment and the threats America faces. But the biggest real threats, they argue, the truly existential ones, will need a conventional military prepared for conventional operations.

Nevertheless, Gen. Petraeus was Hadley’s man, and together with the help of the American Enterprise Institute assisted by retired Gen. Jack Keane, and led by Frederick Kagan who had taught with Gen. Petraeus at West Point, the NSC was able to present a strategy to the president for the sort of bold change in Iraq that he was looking for. This recommendation was given without the support of the senior active Army leadership, the Army commander on the ground in Iraq, Gen. Casey, nor the Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Schoomaker. Peter Feaver (2011, 11) described this bureaucratic end run around the military chain of command as a significant breach of civil-military protocol:

the uniformed military resented AEI and Keane’s involvement and viewed it as an unacceptable breach in the civil-military protocol; the president, so the reasoning went, should be receiving military advice only from statutory military advisors, meaning the chairman, the JCS, and the combatant commanders.

Gian Gentile, a retired Army colonel and former West Point history professor, takes it a step
further. Like Douglas Porch, Gentile argued that Gen. Petraeus and others had circumvented the system to their advantage by advancing their own narrow, parochial interests at the expense of others. Gentile (2013, 102, 106) writes that “[Gen.] Casey undeservedly became the fall guy…. [He] faced an internal insurgency of sorts within the highest reaches of the American defense establishment, campaigning to discredit his strategy and remove him from command.” Needless to say, Gen. Petraeus took over that command in Iraq from Gen. Casey in January 2007, and proceeded to implement that bold new surge counterinsurgency strategy to secure the Iraqi population. Then, just one year later, the Army made its most dramatic shift to its capstone doctrine since World War II. It released its new version of FM 3-0 in February 2008, making counterinsurgency tactics, techniques, and procedures applicable to the entire Army. It then proceeded to implement that doctrine in Afghanistan as well with a surge of troops there just one year later under President Obama in 2009.

**Bureaucratic Politics Hypothesis Analysis.**

*Bureaucratic Politics Hypothesis (BP H): changes in Army doctrine correspond to attempts by the Army or its internal branches to protect or increase missions or roles, resources, or autonomy at the expense of, or relative to, the other services or branches.*

The available evidence provides this hypothesis with some congruence. The Bush Administration, specifically the NSC staff, bypassed the formal military bureaucratic chain of command, the chairman of the joint chiefs, the combatant commander in Iraq, and even the Army chief of staff, in order to find support for a plan that would represent a bold strategic change in Iraq. The administration found the support and the plan it was looking for with the general who had just overseen a rewrite of the Army’s counterinsurgency manual, Gen. Petraeus, and from a conservative think tank, the American Enterprise Institute, supported by a retired Army four star general and former vice chief of staff, Gen. Jack Keane. The strategy that Gen. Petraeus and the
American Enterprise Institute recommended as a bold change involved a surge of US troops for the purpose of securing the Iraqi population in accordance with classic counterinsurgency tactics, techniques, and procedures. Consequently, Gen. Petraeus was accused by some of his critics of playing bureaucratic politics by taking advantage of the situation in Iraq to advance his own career and advance a narrow parochial agenda that would appear to have favored the specialty and branch of the Army that he had served in for most of his career – the dismounted regular infantry. That the Army would then one year later make a similar shift in its capstone doctrinal publication, a shift that signaled to the rest of the Army, not just the dismounted infantry, that it too would be required to consider low-intensity unconventional warfare as a mission, was further evidence for the critics of Gen. Petraeus and his progressive supporters within the Army that he had indeed, not only hijacked policy, but now the Army’s capstone doctrine as well. According to Jennifer Taw (2012, 67), these progressives had gained enough influence since 9/11 to effect such a change to FM 3-0:

The doctrinal record shows that it was only after 9/11 – an attack on US soil – and after the two wars in Afghanistan and Iraq had turned into confusing, difficult slogs, that those who had been arguing for the ascendance of stability operations to a primary mission had the political capital to make the unprecedented change.

One problem with this claim, however, is the fact that Gen. Casey, considered at the time to represent the traditionalists, while Gen. Petraeus represented the progressives, was the Chief of Staff of the Army who personally reviewed, edited, and approved the final version of FM 3-0 before it was published in February of 2008. Additionally, whether Gen. Petraeus oversaw the rewriting of the Army’s counterinsurgency manual in 2006 or not, and whether or not he had been selected to oversee the application of those tactics as part of a strategy to bring security to a chaotic and dangerous situation in Iraq from 2007-2008, the NSC still would have searched for and recommended a new strategy to President Bush, still would have found conservative think tanks with ideas, and would have found someone else within the Army ranks to support and command
troops following whatever strategy they had chosen. It follows then that it is also possible that they may not have chosen a classic counterinsurgency strategy, and that whatever strategy they had chosen may not have seen the same measure of success. Therefore, this evidence may have created some unique conditions providing some level of sufficiency to bring about a shift in the Army’s capstone doctrine in 2008, but there is no evidence suggesting that these conditions were necessary in bringing about such a change. Additionally, whether Gen. Petraeus had been attempting to advance his career and some narrow parochial infantry branch agenda or not, does not help to explain why his ideas were identified by the NSC as a possible new strategy. Again, the NSC would have simply identified someone else or some other idea if Gen. Petraeus and his progressive followers had not been at the right place at the right time. Therefore, the only bureaucratic politics that may have influenced this case are the politics that the NSC played in bypassing the military chain-of-command to find a strategy that met the bold change the president was looking for to address his domestic political challenges. That is why the available evidence only provides a low level of certainty for this hypothesis. There is some, although a low level of certainty, that a general with narrow parochial interests who had spent most of his career in the dismounted infantry branch, who had recently updated the Army’s counterinsurgency manual, was then in the right place at the right time to catch the attention of the NSC, to then be selected to apply those counterinsurgency techniques in Iraq with some measure of success – creating conditions sufficient for the Army to then decide to adopt those same techniques into its capstone doctrinal manual.

I assess that this hypothesis has some, although an overall low level of certainty, based on the relatively low level of congruence it has with the available evidence.

Conclusion.

I assess, based on the evidence presented in this case study that politics had little to no
impact on the Army’s doctrinal shift in 2008. Although there is significant congruence to support some hypotheses, I was unable to find either necessary or sufficient evidence to confirm them. I was, however, able to find disconfirming evidence during an interview with Gen. Casey, Chief of Staff of the Army at the time this new FM was published. A summary of the assessed levels of certainty for each political hypothesis is reflected in table 5 below – most show either low certainty or none.

While there is no confirming evidence, there is some congruence between politics and this doctrinal shift. Republican political losses in the 2006 mid-term elections had an impact on President Bush’s decision to make a strategic change in the Iraq War. He chose a surge of troops to support a low-intensity, unconventional counterinsurgency strategy. This strategy saw some success. The Republican presidential front-runner John McCain strongly endorsed this strategy during the presidential primaries, and the Democratic front-runner, Barack Obama, at least acknowledged that the strategy appeared to be working. This endorsement and acknowledgement of the strategy may have provided the additional domestic political support that President Bush needed to veto a Congressional effort, and prevent an override, to cut off war-funding and force the complete withdrawal of US troops in 2007. This allowed President Bush to continue this strategy long enough to realize additional success. If Congress had been successful in forcing the withdrawal of all US troops out of Iraq in 2007, this strategy would not have had a chance to realize success. One might assume that these political factors could have reinforced Army senior leader decisions to make this doctrinal shift, but there is evidence that they did not. According to Gen. Casey, the surge had nothing to do with the development of the doctrine. Additionally, there is no evidence in this case that policy-makers somehow required the Army to make this doctrinal shift in 2008 to improve a US alliance institution. The US invasion of Iraq and its subsequent pursuit of a low-intensity, unconventional strategy there actually caused divisions within the
NATO alliance.

There is evidence that provides some, although a low level, of certainty that bureaucratic politics may have played a role, although indirectly, in choosing the surge counterinsurgency strategy, but strong evidence that the surge did not have anything to do with the doctrinal shift. The NSC was looking for a bold change in late 2006, and Gen. Petraeus had just finished leading an update to the Army’s counterinsurgency manual to outline tactics, techniques, and procedures that he had used as a commander in Mosul, Iraq after the initial invasion of Iraq with some success. The NSC then identified him and the counterinsurgency tactics he advocated as the president’s bold new strategy. Gen. Petraeus’ critics accused him of playing bureaucratic politics to advance narrow parochial interests of the dismounted regular infantry branch at the expense of the other branches of the Army. If that were true, it is possible that Gen. Petraeus’ promotion of narrow parochial interests may have somehow allowed him to come to the attention of the NSC during its search for a bold new strategy. That means there is some possibility that this strategy would not have been chosen nor successfully implemented in Iraq in 2007 if Gen. Petraeus had not been advocating narrow parochial infantry branch interests. But since we now know based on Gen. Casey’s interview that the surge did not have anything to do with senior Army leader doctrinal decisions in 2008, we know that the choice of Gen. Petraeus to lead the surge strategy would not have had anything to do with the doctrinal shift either.
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<th>Hypothesis</th>
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<th>Hoop Test</th>
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Table 5 (Case #4 – 2008: Political hypotheses certainty assessments)
CHAPTER 7 – CONCLUSION

The purpose of this research was to determine if and how domestic, international, or bureaucratic politics might have affected four significant shifts in US Army capstone doctrine along a spectrum of war since World War II. Where existing scholarship on military doctrine largely ignores, or does not adequately address, politics as a causal variable, I thought a deliberate consideration of politics as an important social phenomenon might be useful in attempting to explain these particular doctrinal shifts. I thought it was important and useful to bring politics into the scholarly discussion and debate surrounding military doctrine, and the results of this study confirm that politics had some effect worth exploring. The benefit of a political analysis, as opposed to a sociological or economic analysis, is that a consideration of politics could help shed light on who or what may have had the power to either shape or constrain doctrinal choices. An understanding of who or what may have the power to affect doctrine in the past, and under what conditions, may be useful in helping to predict who or what may have the power to affect Army doctrine in the future.

An understanding of Army capstone doctrine is important because it is the doctrine that is at the top of the Army’s doctrinal hierarchy and the doctrine that applies to the entire Army. When the Army makes a shift to its capstone doctrine, it affects all other Army doctrine and critical Army functions including organization, training, personnel, and equipment. When capstone doctrine describes a mission or operation, it is one that the entire Army is then required to support. Subordinate doctrine describes missions or operations tailored to individual branches or specialties within the Army. While shifts in subordinate doctrine may be important, shifts in the Army’s capstone doctrine are more important because they are all-encompassing, and, therefore, an important object of social scientific study.
The Army made four significant shifts in its capstone doctrine along a spectrum of war since World War II: in 1954, 1962, 1976, and 2008. In 1954, the Army made a shift in the content of this doctrine to emphasize high-intensity nuclear warfare, even though nuclear weapons were first used in wartime only in 1945, even though the Soviets acquired nuclear weapons in 1949 and even though the Army ignored nuclear weapons in its capstone doctrine published that same year – 1949. This 1954 doctrinal shift meant that high-intensity nuclear warfare was suddenly a mission applicable to the entire Army, not just individual Army branches or functions, for the first time. In 1962, the Army made a significant shift in the content of its capstone doctrine along a spectrum of war toward low-intensity unconventional warfare even though it had been dealing with low-intensity unconventional warfare challenges throughout its entire history. This shift meant that low-intensity unconventional warfare was suddenly a mission applicable to the entire Army for the first time. In 1976, the Army made a shift in the content of this capstone doctrine to delete all low-intensity, unconventional, warfare-related doctrine, even though it had just finished fighting a long and difficult low-intensity unconventional war in Vietnam. This shift meant that low-intensity, unconventional warfare was suddenly no longer a mission for the entire Army. And finally, in 2008, the Army made another shift in the content of its capstone doctrine to once again, after 32 years, suddenly making low-intensity, unconventional warfare a mission applicable to the entire Army again. To repeat, Gen. Wallace’s quote from the previous chapter highlights the importance of this last significant Army doctrinal shift along a spectrum of war from the 1976 to the 2008 version of its capstone doctrine. In the words of the general, “[j]ust as the 1976 edition of FM 100-5 began to take the Army from the rice paddies of Vietnam to the battlefield of Western Europe, this [2008] edition will take us into the 21st century urban battlefields among the people.”

This study shows that domestic politics had an impact on the 1954 and 1962 cases, but despite some level of congruence, no confirmable impacts on the 1976 or 2008 cases. In 1954,
President Eisenhower followed through on campaign promises he made to appease and co-opt the right wing of the Republican Party to cut spending on defense given the Republican philosophy that less government spending would improve the economy. This led to Army budget and personnel cuts, and a decision by the administration to authorize the Army to rely on the firepower of tactical nuclear weapons as part of routine military operations to overcome what would become a potential shortage of Army personnel on any future battlefield. The Army then incorporated nuclear weapons into its capstone doctrine. In 1962, President Kennedy took action to fulfill campaign promises to reduce the reliance on nuclear weapons that the Eisenhower Administration had fostered, and instead emphasized the opposite – low-intensity, unconventional warfare. He specifically directed the Army to update its doctrine and make this a mission that applies to the entire Army, not just the special forces branch. The Army complied by updating its capstone doctrine. In 1976, President Nixon followed through on promises to end the draft and Vietnam War in part to co-opt the anti-war movement and increase his likelihood of election in 1968 and reelection in 1972. Following through on these promises in part led to a smaller Army. Although the shift in doctrine in 1976 coincided with a smaller post-draft Army, and was made in part to refocus on an Army requirement to defend Western Europe as part of NATO against numerically superior Warsaw Pact forces, there is no evidence directly linking a smaller post-draft US Army to this doctrinal shift emphasizing a requirement to “fight outnumbered and win” in Central Europe. The beginning of the US unravelling of détente with President Ford’s efforts to appease the right wing of the Republican Party during the 1976 presidential primaries and Republican convention, led him toward a policy of “peace through strength,” with regards to the Soviet threat, and coincided with a shift in the 1976 doctrine placing renewed emphasis on confronting the Soviets in Central Europe, but again, there is no evidence of any direct linkage between these partisan politics and this doctrinal shift.
In 2008, President Bush needed to make a strategic change to maintain domestic support for the war in Iraq after the Republicans suffered losses in the 2006 mid-term elections. He chose a low-intensity, unconventional warfare strategy involving the use of classic counterinsurgency tactics. This strategy saw enough success that the leading Republican presidential candidate in the 2008 primary election cycle endorsed the strategy and the leading Democratic candidate acknowledged that it was working. This positive presidential primary campaign attention helped President Bush to maintain enough domestic political support to continue this low-intensity unconventional warfare strategy in Iraq throughout 2007. Although these domestic politics coincided with the last two years of a three year process to update FM 3-0, there is no evidence directly linking these to the doctrinal shift. There is, however, evidence to the contrary with Gen. Casey’s statement that domestic politics certainly had an impact on the surge strategy decision, but the surge strategy, in his own words, did not have anything to do with his doctrinal decision-making throughout the following year.

This study demonstrates that international politics had no discernable impact on the 1954 case, almost no impact on either the 1962 or 2008 cases, and only a minor impact on the 1976 case. In the 1976 case, the US Army collaborated closely with the German Army in developing its doctrine, but there is no evidence it did this at the direction of any US policy-maker attempting to bolster the NATO alliance. Even though the doctrinal collaboration between the two armies admittedly may have resulted in some strengthening of the alliance, the Army was not specifically directed to do this.

There is evidence that a perceived shift in the conventional balance of power motivated senior Army leaders, in part, to make the 1976 doctrinal shift. Observations of the combat effectiveness of the Israeli Army employing American-made equipment versus Arab armies employing Soviet-made equipment during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, combined with a
conventional Soviet and Warsaw Pact buildup in the late 1960s-early 1970s, convinced senior Army leaders such as Gen. DePuy that a doctrinal shift toward emphasizing mid-intensity conventional warfare was needed. In 1962, Soviet efforts and rhetoric surrounding its actions and intent to increase support to wars of national liberation around the world may have affected US policy-maker views of not only the balance of power, but the balance of threat as well, and may have caused the Kennedy Administration to put more emphasis on requiring the Army to make a doctrinal shift toward low-intensity unconventional warfare, but there is no evidence directly linking the increased Soviet rhetoric with the doctrinal shift. The Soviets had already been supporting wars of national liberation before President Kennedy took office. Soviet rhetoric emphasizing this may have simply provided President Kennedy with an additional sense of urgency to direct the Army to make its doctrinal shift in 1962. In 2008, US primacy and an imbalance of power in the international system may have enabled the US to invade Iraq and remain there long enough to require a low-intensity, unconventional warfare strategy. This coincided with the Army’s doctrinal shift in 2008, but as with with domestic politics, Gen. Casey confirms that the unconventional warfare strategy eventually implemented along with the surge in early 2007 had nothing to do with his doctrinal decisions throughout the following year. In other words, he would have made the doctrinal shift in 2008 whether or not an unconventional warfare strategy had been implemented in Iraq or not. In 1954, there was no evidence that either efforts to maintain a US alliance institution or the balance of power impacted Army doctrine. The growing prospect of Soviet strategic nuclear parity undermined the logic of replacing conventional Army ground forces with Army tactical nuclear forces because strategic nuclear parity conversely increased the likelihood of mid-intensity conventional ground war.

This study demonstrates that bureaucratic politics had an inconsistent impact on these Army doctrinal shifts. The results show that it had a high impact in the 1954 case, no impact on the 1962
case, a moderate impact on the 1976 case, and little to no impact on the 2008 case. In 1954, senior Army leaders including the Chief of Staff made explicit statements that the Army was incorporating the use of tactical nuclear weapons into its capstone doctrine not because it agreed with substituting tactical nuclear weapons for Army personnel, but because it would use that capstone doctrine as a tool to fight for more resources and missions in competition with the other services.

Concerning the 1962 case, there is no evidence in the period leading up to the doctrinal shift that bureaucratic politics played a role. The Army was flush with resources, its missions were expanding, and it was not in competition with any other service for a role in unconventional warfare, nor were its internal branches in competition with each other over resources, roles, or autonomy with regard to unconventional warfare.

In 1976, the Army made a doctrinal shift, in part, because it was required to operate with an even smaller post-draft, post-Vietnam Army against numerically superior Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces in Central Europe. Senior Army leaders and the capstone doctrine itself stated that this doctrinal shift was made in order to emphasize the heavy firepower and protection offered by armored and mechanized equipment and tactics precisely because policy-makers were now requiring an even smaller Army to fight outnumbered and win. Army leaders also made explicit statements that the 1976 doctrine served as a procurement strategy for the more modern armored, mechanized, aerial, and air defense weapon. Army leaders also may have used this doctrine, not to compete with the Air Force for resources, but to encourage its cooperation. Highly fluid armored and mechanized battlefields would quickly outstrip the range of Army land-based weapon systems. The Army needed Air Force support for continuing to fight beyond these ranges, and incorporated Air Force support as an important aspect of its 1976 doctrine. The bureaucratic reorganization of Army training and doctrine functions under one command in 1973 may have inadvertently given
the armor branch an opportunity to monopolize the writing of FM 100-5 in 1976, but there is no
evidence to suggest that this was done as part of some deliberate effort by the armor branch to gain
an advantage over the other branches of the Army. And finally, Gen. Abrams’ effort to reorganize
functions of the active and reserve Army to compel future politicians into activating the reserves in
wartime may have been an example of bureaucratic politics, but this reorganization is not reflected
in the Army’s 1976 capstone doctrine.

In 2008, there is some evidence that Gen. Petraeus may have used his position within the
bureaucracy to update the Army’s counterinsurgency manual and promote it and himself in an
effort to win command in Iraq over others. He was then in a position to implement a low-intensity
unconventional warfare strategy there and eventually influence Army capstone doctrine to promote
the narrow parochial interests of the dismounted infantry branch over the interests of other Army
branches. However, the evidence is circumstantial, and there is no indication that any of these
efforts to eventually change Army capstone doctrine was ever part of Gen. Petraeus’ intentions.

In summary, I assess that domestic politics had an overall moderate impact on doctrine in
1954 and 1962, with no confirmable impacts in 1976 or 2008; that international politics had little to
no impact on doctrine in 1954 and 1962, some impact in 1976, and little to no impact in 2008; and
that bureaucratic politics had an impact in 1954, no impact in 1962, a moderate impact in 1976, and
little to no impact in 2008. One observable trend that may have significance when comparing these
four cases is that domestic politics appears to have had more of an impact before 1976 than after.

While discussing these cases with Colonel Suzanne Nielsen, director of the West Point Social
Sciences Department, she made the observation that the Army placed more importance on doctrine
beginning in 1976 than it had prior to that. Beginning with the 1976 edition of FM 100-5, Army
senior leaders began using capstone doctrine to inform and drive subsequent changes to
organization, training, and equipment – pronouncing to the Army that it would be a doctrine-based
organization from that point forward – something senior Army leaders still emphasize to this day. Before 1976, senior leaders did not emphasize the importance of capstone doctrine to the extent they did later. Senior Army leaders may, therefore, have been more likely to use it prior to 1976 for political expediency, and less likely to insulate it from the politics of the day (Nielsen 2017). This may provide at least a partial explanation for why domestic politics appears to have had more of an impact on the two earlier cases than the latter two.

Studying the impact that politics had on these four shifts in Army capstone doctrine is only one side of a coin. This study focuses only on politics in cases when there was a significant doctrinal shift along a spectrum of war. It would be just as important to focus on politics when there are no shifts. In other words, some understanding of how and when politics does not impact doctrine is just as important as understanding when and how it does. For example, it would be important to understand why there was not a significant doctrinal shift in Army capstone doctrine along a spectrum of war sometime during the 1980s when the Reagan Administration’s defense policies shifted from the Carter Administration’s policies; or why there was no significant doctrinal shift after the collapse of the Soviet Union; or why no significant doctrinal shift until almost seven years after 9/11. A study of negative cases such as these is necessary for a more complete understanding of the relationship between politics and military doctrine, and an acknowledgment that this study is limited to a partial understanding, or just one side of the coin, of the relationship between politics and US Army doctrine since World War II.

And finally, this is a study of the impact of politics on doctrinal shifts along a spectrum of war, from low- to mid- to high-intensity warfare. It is not a study of doctrinal shifts from offensive to defensive to deterrent doctrines. Those doctrinal shifts were the primary focus of the study of scholars from what I described in my first chapter as a first wave of doctrine-related literature (Kier, Posen, Rosen, et. al). My study does not take those shifts into account. For example, the
Army made a significant doctrinal shift from defensive to offensive warfare when it published its 1986 version of its FM 100-5 (AirLand Battle) capstone doctrine. Political shifts from the Carter to the Reagan Administrations may provide some explanatory power for this shift, or shifts in the US-Soviet bipolar balance of power may provide some explanation. However, my intent was to explain shifts along a spectrum of war. From that perspective, there was no shift made to the Army’s capstone doctrine in 1986. The Army’s capstone doctrine remained exclusively focused on mid-intensity conventional warfare in its 1976, 1982, and 1986 versions of FM 100-5. Although a shift from offensive to defensive doctrine is important as debated among the first wave of military doctrine scholars, it is not the only important shift that should be studied. It may be just as important to study shifts along the spectrum of war as it is to study shifts within the spectrum between offense, defense, and deterrence. Of course, these shifts can coincide. A deterrent doctrine can imply the use of nuclear weapons, and therefore a shift from defense to deterrence, for example, could coincide with a shift along the spectrum of war to high-intensity nuclear warfare.

I chose to focus on doctrinal shifts along a spectrum of war in this study for two reasons: 1) I have not seen a study that focuses exclusively on the impact of politics on doctrinal shifts along a spectrum of war; 2) the more substantive doctrinal changes in my opinion, at least for the US Army since WWII, appear to be associated with these shifts, and not shifts from offense to defense. In other words, shifts from offense to defense may not involve as many changes to Army organizations, personnel, training, and equipment as shifts along a spectrum of war. Converting a conventional Army prepared to fight mid-intensity, highly mobile, defensive armored and mechanized warfare to one that would then be expected to fight mid-intensity, highly mobile, offensive armored and mechanized warfare is much less of a change than converting an Army from fighting a nuclear war to one that must now be prepared to fight a guerrilla war. That is not to say that understanding the impact that politics may have on Army offensive and defensive doctrine is
not important. It is. Just like studying the impact of politics on doctrinal change along a spectrum of war is one side of a coin, and the other side of the coin is studying the impact of politics when doctrinal change does not occur along a spectrum of war; studying the impact of politics on offensive or defensive doctrinal change or lack of change would be akin to studying the fine print and engravings on either side of this same doctrinal coin. The entire coin, therefore, demands further study, not just by me, but by any scholar interested in understanding the impact that politics may or may not have at any level of analysis on military doctrine.

Attempting to understand the impact that politics has on Army doctrine by examining these four cases in the manner that I did is just a beginning. Further research into the impact that politics has on Army doctrine at different levels of analysis is necessary. I think it would be possible to gain a better understanding by expanding some of the criteria I established in this project. For example, I defined bureaucratic politics narrowly and searched only for evidence of outcomes of struggles between separate US armed services and separate internal Army branches. This may have caused me to miss the impact of bureaucratic politics happening at different levels of analysis, say perhaps between the Army and the Department of Defense, or between different communities within the Army not defined by its separate branches such as infantry or armor. Further research that expands the scope and potential impact of bureaucratic politics on Army doctrine, even in these four cases, is worthy of additional research. Concerning international politics, expanding the level of analysis to include non-state actors such as terrorist organizations or insurgent groups, and the impact that these may have had on both alliances and balances of power, might provide more evidence, especially for the 2008 case, into how international politics might impact Army doctrine. An expansion of the analysis of domestic politics to include the relationship between Congress and the Army might produce more evidence of the impact of politics on Army doctrine. I limited my inquiry to the outcome of domestic politics between or within the different branches of
government, and the impact that those outcomes might have had on Army doctrine. And finally, based on the observation made by Colonel Nielsen that Army senior leaders placed less emphasis on capstone doctrine prior to 1976 than after—this may explain in part why I found that politics appears to have had more of an impact beginning in 1976, further research is certainly warranted to confirm if there is such a causal relationship present in any of these cases, and additional research would be useful to compare whether or not doctrine-based military organizations are more insulated from politics than those that are not doctrine-based. Such an inquiry could easily lend itself to comparing not only a single service over time such as this one, but also comparing separate services, or to comparing military organizations from different countries. It is obviously useful to understand why military organizations in some countries are more or less insulated from politics than in other countries. The possibility that doctrine, as an independent variable, might be related to the impact that politics, as a dependent variable, may or may not have on a military organization is an exciting possibility worth researching.
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